The Construction of an Anti-Western Islamist Discourse
in Indonesian Magazines

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This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy for
the School of Social Sciences and Psychology
University of Western Sydney, Australia

2014
Dedication

For my beloved husband, Godo Tjahjono, and my lovely boys, Data Avicenna and Excel Arrayyan
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the people who have given me support, both moral and financial, in my studies.

I thank the University of Western Sydney for granting me the UWS International Postgraduate Research Scholarship, and also the School of Social Sciences and Psychology which supported my extension. This scholarship allowed me and my family to survive during my PhD studies.

To my Principal Supervisor, Dr Steven Drakeley, I am sincerely grateful, not only for his supervision, his supporting my scholarship extension, and his kind understanding and encouragement, but also for his broad knowledge of Islam and Indonesia which greatly extended my understanding. I would not have been able to achieve this without his help.

To my other Supervisory Panelists I offer my thanks for their supervision and suggestions: to Associate Professor Hart Cohen and Dr Milissa Deitz from the School of Humanities and Communication Arts, for their critical comments on the area of media and communication as part of this thesis.

I thank Ms Vanessa Goldie-Scott, of the special academic English staff, who helped with my English throughout this thesis. Special thank you also to Rhubarb Editing and Expert Editor who carried the copy editing of this thesis.

I wish to thank Professors and Senior Lecturers from the Religion and Society Research Centre. I offer my thanks to Associate Professor Adam Possamai, who helped and supported my extension, and to Eva Garcia, who helped with my administrative work in so many ways during my candidature.

I am grateful to my friends during the PhD years: to Farjana Mahbuba, a kind and helpful friend, for her help and for sharing some administrative work; to my PhD friends, mbak Atun, mbak Ilka, mas Daus; and to my friends who finished earlier, mas Zen and Irfu, mas Muttakin and mbak Alim, Anne Lawrence and Lisa Worthington. I thank them all for their friendship during my stay in Sydney and for sharing the PhD experience.

Other people whom I would like to mention, who were also kind and supported me in many ways, are long time family friends Martin and Chris O’Hare and Melanie Morrison. I thank them for helping me to understand and adapt to the Australian culture.

I would also like to thank my friends who have helped during my research in Jakarta, mas Asrori (Gatra), mas Rani (Sabili), Fajar Hermawan (Tempo), Pak Mahladi (Suara Hidayatullah) and a long-time classmate Agus Sudibyo (Indonesian Press Council).

I thank friends and colleagues at Paramadina University, Jakarta, who allowed me to take study leave.
I would not have been able to undertake the PhD study and this thesis without the sincere prayers and encouragement of my parents, both of whom are university academics: Professor Akhmad Khusyairi and Dra Rosyidah. Their ongoing support never fails. My brothers have also been great supporters: Anton Alifandi, Ivan Syahbana Khusyairi, and my twin brother, Johny Alfian Khusyairi. I thank also my aunt, Aini Munarip, who supported and took care of me during my years in Sydney.

This long journey could not have been undertaken without the kind and loving understanding of my husband, Godo Tjahjono, who has always supported me. I feel blessed and grateful for his on-going support in pursuing my dream.
Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original, except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

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Juni Alfiah Chusjairi

( March 13, 2014 )
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AJI</td>
<td>Aliansi Jurnalis Independen [Independent Journalist Alliance]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKIN</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara [State Intelligence Coordination Agency]: The name ‘BAKIN’ was further shortened to ‘BIN.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIN</td>
<td>Badan Intelijen Nasional [National Intelligence Body]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat [People’s Representative Council]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKW AJ</td>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Ahli Sunnah Waljama’ah [Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of Prophet]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam [Islamic Defenders Front]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>Golongan Karya [Functionalists group party]: The ruling political vehicle of Suharto regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTI</td>
<td>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: A transnational movement which aims to establish a new caliphate. It was founded in Jordan, in 1953. This is to be the Indonesian chapter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAIN</td>
<td>Institut Agama Islam Negeri [State Institute for Islamic Studies]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia [Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jama’ah Islamiyah [Islamic congregation]: Jihadi Islamist terrorist network. JI’s aim is to create a Pan-Islamic state in South-East Asia. It is linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network. It was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIL</td>
<td>Jaringan Islam Liberal [Liberal Islam Network]: A group of young progressive Muslim intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapolri</td>
<td>Kepala Kepolisian Republik Indonesia [Head of the Indonesian Police]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISDI</td>
<td>Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam [Indonesia Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopkamtib</td>
<td>Command for the Restoration of Security and Order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIPI  Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia [Indonesian Institute of Science]
LIPIA Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab [Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences]: This institute is funded by Saudi Arabia and is located in Jakarta.
MISS SARA  *Menghasut, Inisiasi, Sensasi, Sadisme, Suku, Agama Rasdan Antar Golongan* [Sedition, Insinuation, Sensation, Ethnic, Religious, Racial groups]: A New Order acronym for the things which the Indonesian press are forbidden to use, in order to secure harmony in the Indonesian pluralist society.
MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia [Indonesian Mujahidin Council]: The leader of this group is Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. This Islamist group was established in 2000 and is referred to as a radical/jihadist group.
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia [Indonesian Ulama Council]
NII Negara Islam Indonesia [Islamic State of Indonesia]
NU Nahdlatul Ulama [The Arising of the Ulama] is the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, established in 1926. It consists of traditional *ulama* and their *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school).
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [National Awakening Party]
Polri Polisi Republik Indonesia [Indonesian Police]
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan [United Development Party]: An Islamic party of which the majority of members are Nahdlatul Ulama members. This is the only Islam based party of the New Order period.
PWI Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia [Indonesian Journalist Association]
SIUPP Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers [Press publishing permit]
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian army]
UIN Universitas Islam Negeri [State Islamic University] (previously IAIN)
List of People Mentioned in the Thesis

Abbas, Nasir: Former regional leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah. Currently he is a reborn anti-terrorist, working with the police and promoting anti-terrorism.

Abduh, Umar: Ex-convict. He was one of the people involved in the hijacking of Garuda Indonesia in the 1980s. He is currently well known as a ‘terrorist observer.’

Awwas, Irfan Suryadi: Head of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

Bachtiar, Da’i: Former Chief of Police in Indonesia

Downer, Alexander: Former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Faruq, Omar Al: Kuwaiti citizen, holding a Pakistani passport. He came to Indonesia as a refugee and was married to an Indonesian woman. He was a senior Al Qaeda member. He was arrested in Bogor, West Java, on 5 June 2002 and handed over to the United States three days later.

Hambali (alias RidwanIsamuddin, alias EncepNurjaman): He is an Indonesian citizen, who was captured in Thailand and has been held at Guantanamo Bay since 2002. He was the operations chief of Jama’ah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda’s representative in South-East Asia.

Hussein, DrAzahari: Hussein was a Malaysian citizen, a former lecturer at University Technology Malaysia in Johor and JI expert in bomb making. He held a PhD of Statistics from Reading University, England. Before his death in 2005 he was the most wanted person in Indonesia, because of his masterminding of several bombings. He was finally shot and killed in a raid in East Java.

Imron, Ali: Imron is one of the four men who were the perpetrators of the first Bali bombing

Jones, Sidney: An American researcher in charge of the Indonesian Program of the Brussels based International Crisis Group (ICG). In May 2004, she was not able to renew her work visa and was expelled from Indonesia because her ICG report had upset the Head of BadanInteligensiNasional [National Intelligence Board], General AM Hendropriyono.

Manulang, AC: Former Chief of the State Intelligence Coordinating Board (BAKIN)

Megawati: The fifth Indonesian President. She is also Indonesia’s first female President.
SBY/SusiloBambangYudhoyono: Currently the Indonesian President, elected twice. His first presidency was 2004–2009 and the second is 2009–2014. At the time of the first Bali bombing he was the Coordinator Minister of Politics and Security [MenteriKoordinatorPolitikdanKeamanan].

Soeripto/Suripto: Former General Secretary, Ministry of Forestry and Plantations

Syamsuddin, Din (Prof, Dr): Head of Muhammadiyah, General Secretary of MajelisUlama Indonesia[Indonesian Islamic Council]

Top, Noordin M: Malaysian citizen, who claimed to be Al Qaeda’s representative in South-East Asia. He was also a skilled bomb maker and involved in several bombings in Indonesia. Top was shot dead in a police siege in Temanggung, Central Java, on 8 August 2009.

Umar, Hussein: General Secretary of DDII(DewanDakwah Islamiyah Indonesia)
Abstract

This thesis is a study of the Islamist discourse on terrorism and how western countries are constructed in four Indonesian magazines, *Tempo*, *Gatra*, *Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah*, in relation to the five bombings which took place in Indonesia. I define the first two magazines as the general magazines and the last two as the Islamist magazines.

The bombings coverage analysed is that of the Bali bombings 1 and 2, the JW Marriott 1 bombing, the Australian Embassy bombing and the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing. The first study is of the bomb which killed or injured more than 200 people in Kuta, Bali, an area which attracts large numbers of international tourists; the second is of the bomb which exploded in Jimbaran, Bali, also a tourist area; and the last three studies are of the bombings of icons of ‘the West.’ In addition, the way in which the readers of the magazines responded to the reporting of the five bombings analysed is also examined.

To address the topic, I conducted research in the offices of four magazines in Jakarta. I copied articles from the *Gatra*, *Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah* offices, and *Tempo* provided me with digital copies. I also interviewed two or three journalists/editors from each magazine. Further, I conducted focus group discussions for the readers of the magazines. Ten focus groups were involved during the fieldwork. There were two groups for each magazine and the other two groups involved readers of both the general and Islamist magazines.

The examination of the two general magazines shows that each constructs a different anti-western Islamist discourse in its reports on the terrorism. *Gatra*, in part, presents the Islamist view and construct that western countries are opposed to Islam, and therefore conspiracy theories concerning who was responsible for the bombings are likely to be true. *Tempo*, on the other hand, does not present an anti-western Islamist view in its reports. Mainstream views of terrorism are dominant. The comparison of the Islamist magazines shows a similarity in how the Islamists construct anti-western Islamist discourse in their reports. Both *Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah* view the western countries, mainly the United States, as anti-Islam and as enemies who would try to destroy and undermine Islam.

The readers of the magazines generally perceive terrorism in Indonesia from an Islamist perspective, although they do not agree with acts of violence. The readers of both the general and Islamist magazines perceive the western countries (particularly the United States) as being in opposition to Islam and Muslims. The bombings which occurred in Indonesia are viewed with the suspicion that the western countries were involved.

These findings show, partly, the Islamisation of society in the social and political context in contemporary Indonesia. They show not only that Islamisation exists in society (as exemplified by the readers), but that, to some extent, the media institution also has been Islamised. In the reform era, the Islamist magazines have the space and opportunity to disseminate their Islamist ideas, while the general magazines, though adopting mainstream views, are also partly Islamised by the strengthening of the journalists’ self-identification as Muslims.
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

This thesis is about the construction of an Islamist discourse in Indonesian magazines in the post-New Order, or reform era, the period from the fall of President Suharto in 1998 to the present. For the purpose of this study, the magazine writings related to the five infamous bombings in Indonesia which targeted western people (the Bali bombings) and western icons (the JW Marriott/Ritz Carlton and Australian Embassy bombings) will be studied. The magazines I have chosen to analyse are two Islamist magazines (*Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah*) and two general magazines (*Tempo* and *Gatra*). I use the term ‘Islamism’ here to refer to an ideologised understanding of Islam, one in which a political program held to be truly Islamic is emphasised. That political program tends towards what is generally considered to be a radical or militant political expression of Islam and is invariably anti-Western. Thus the term ‘Islamist press/publication’ in this thesis refers not only to those magazines which target Muslims and uphold the Islamic faith and values, but also to those which promote the Islamist worldview/ideology. The term ‘general press/publication’ or ‘general magazine’ in this thesis refers to those magazines which target Indonesian people of any religious background. This term is preferred rather than the term ‘secular’ press/publication or magazine, given that ‘secular’ in the Indonesian context is a negative term referring to atheism, which is seen as ‘bad.’

This research relates to Indonesian politics post-New Order, and specifically to the rise of Islamism in the new political context, including the emergence of many radical Islamist groups. The democratisation of politics after the fall of the New Order regime, which had lasted from 1966 to 1998, led to much greater press freedom and with it the rise of Islamist press and publications. In relation to these contexts, the thesis will seek to contribute to an understanding of how the Indonesian media construct an Islamist discourse on terrorism. In addition, the research studies how the readers of the magazines perceive the discourse on terrorism. The thesis will analyse the readers’ responses, linked to the magazines they read. This analysis will give an overall understanding of the readers’ response, but also will help us to understand whether such a response is in accordance with the magazine’s frames and construction of Islamist discourse on terrorism.
In the global context, the Indonesian bombings under discussion in this thesis occurred as part of, and against the background of, the historical shift in global politics initiated by the ‘9/11’ bombings in New York in September 2001. For some Muslims, the ‘War on Terror,’ which resulted from the impact of the September 11 bombing, brought changes in the way they perceive the United States or, in general, the United States and its allies, principally Britain and Australia. For others, the ‘War on Terror’ reinforces their negative perceptions of ‘the West.’ Usually, from the Islamist point of view, the ‘War on Terror’ is seen as a conspiracy by the West “to weaken Islam” or to “extend western influence” (Smith, 2005a: 118). In other words, for some Muslims it is also seen as a ‘holy war’ or crusade against Islam—a modern day version of the crusades during the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Accordingly, in a public display of anti-Americanism, many Indonesian Muslim organisations protested on the streets around the United States Embassy in Jakarta against President Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ (Hasan, 2005). Another typical Islamist reaction towards the September 11 tragedy was voiced by the then Vice President of Indonesia, Hamzah Haz, in a Jakarta mosque, when he stated that the tragedy would “cleanse the sins of the United States” (Rabasa, 2003:32).

These reactions can be understood in a context where America’s foreign policy towards countries such as Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq is one of the main international issues that concern the Islamists. In line with an Islamist conspiracy theory perspective, ‘the West’ is accused of having played a part in the bombings which occurred in Indonesia, even though the bombs mostly targeted and attacked properties which symbolise western domination (the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton luxury hotels) and western decadence (bars and restaurants in Bali). This accusation is usually directed at America and its allies because, for Muslims, the world is assumed to be dominated by Americans who disseminate the ‘War on Terror,’ which Islamists tend to see as really a ‘War on Islam.’ According to the conspiracy theory, the bombings in Indonesia were carried out by western agents in order to further justify this ‘War on Terror.’

 Tempo and some scholars have completed research on how Indonesians responded to these bombings in relation to who they believed was behind them. For this thesis, these researches

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1 Hamzah Haz was also the leader of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP [United Development Party]). PPP had been the only Muslim party allowed during the New Order. In the post-New Order era, PPP had moved in a more Islamist direction, in order to compete more effectively in a context where other Muslim parties could now court the Muslim vote.
are significant in order to understand the readers’ responses to terrorism and to the magazines they read, and particularly in understanding whether the magazines reinforce or shape the readers’ opinions or whether, on the contrary, the magazines do not play a part in any way in shaping their readers’ views.

Soon after the first Bali bombing (Bali bomb 1), Tempo (2002) held a poll on how Indonesians responded to such an act of terror. More than half (61.9%) of the 500 respondents in Jakarta did not believe that it was the work of Indonesian Muslims, and only 38% believed it was. More comprehensive and recent research was completed by Sukma, Ma’ruf and Abdullah (2011), focusing on the Bali bombings, the Australian Embassy bombing and the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton bombings. The national survey, which was funded by the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund on counter-terrorism, was conducted through 30 provinces in Indonesia with a majority Muslim population. Several questions were asked in relation to these acts of terrorism in Indonesia. Compared to the research by Tempo, Sukma et al.’s research shows a shift in the people’s views on whether Indonesian Muslims were behind the bombings. According to this research, when asked whether they believed that Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI, the radical Muslim group usually blamed) was behind the bombings, 37.7% of respondents disagreed that it was the work of JI, 35.8% believed it was and 22% stated that they were uncertain. The respondents who disagreed, as Sukma et al. (2011: 32) state, “clearly relate themselves to the previously mentioned ‘conspiracy theories.’”

Furthermore, interestingly, in relation to conspiracy theories and the view towards anti-Americanism, when the respondents were asked whether the bombings were the work of “American agents deployed to destroy Islam’s image” (Sukma, 2011: 32), 33% agreed with the statement, 22.8% disagreed and 34.5% were neutral. These numbers show how the United States, to some extent, is still suspected of involvement in the bombings. In relation to this thesis, this view will be significant in understanding the readers’ responses to the events of terrorism themselves and to the Islamist discourse surrounding them.

As explained earlier, the focus of this thesis is to reveal how the four selected magazines construct Islamist discourse and terrorism. Therefore, a preliminary understanding of the

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2 There is a discrepancy of 5% in this research that was not explained in the paper.
3 There is a discrepancy of 9.77% in this research that also was not explained in the paper.
Indonesian press is required at this point. A more comprehensive explanation of the
Indonesian press landscape is elaborated in Chapter three.

The Indonesian press terrain in the post-New Order era is very different from what it was in
the New Order context. During the New Order era the government tightly controlled the
press. Indeed, a ‘publishing permit’ had to be granted by the Department of Information
before anything could be published. These permits have been abolished in the post-New
Order. This new policy resulted in a dramatic rise not only in the number of publications in
general, but also in the number of magazines, including Islamic publications. During the New
Order, only a small number of Islamic publications existed, while in comparison, Irawanto
(2011) classified 44 Islamic press publications (mostly magazines, but also newspapers and
tabloids) based in Jakarta in the current reform era. This number, he notes, is significant,
given that, in the New Order era in 1994, of the 275 existing Indonesian publications, only 13
were Islam-oriented.

In relation to perceptions towards ‘the West,’ or anti-Americanism, according to Irawanto
(2011) the ‘Islam-oriented political magazines’
4 tend to incite hatred towards ‘the West,’
specifically criticising the United States’ hegemony and policy towards Israel. These
publications, according to Irawanto, included Sabili, Suara Hidayatullah and Media Dakwha.
In addition, western countries and their people were considered to be infidels, and were also
seen as an ‘enemy’ (Ahnaf, 2006).

This rise of Islamist publications can also be seen, in the local political context, to coincide
with a rise of Islamism. Post-New Order Indonesia shifted and transformed to a new
democracy which Abuza (2007:1) sees as having facilitated “the rise of political and radical
Islam in Indonesia.” At the very least, democracy has facilitated the open expression of
Islamist political ideas in the public domain, which previously could only be expressed in
private. In this era, Indonesia has been witnessing a rise of hardline Islamist groups. The
radical militias, Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujahidin, are also examples
of the growing phenomenon of Islamism. In addition, there has been a growth in Islamist
associated violence. According to the Setara Institute, violence, attacks and religious
intolerance have increased 20% to 30% between 2006 and 2012. As an example, Setara notes

4 I will henceforth use the term ‘Islamist magazines’ rather than the term ‘Islam-oriented political magazines’ as
used by Irawanto.
that in 2012 there were 317 violations of human rights in Indonesia (including 264 instances of violence related to religious intolerance) which were perpetrated by both the state and Indonesian society.

Not only have the radical Muslims been emerging, but, generally speaking, Indonesian society has also become more Islamised.\(^5\) Thus, in the post-New Order era, there are more *santri* compared to *abangan*\(^6\) as Ricklefs (2012) has noted. Far more people are practising the Islamic rituals, such as fasting and wearing Islamic dress, and are enrolling in Qur’anic courses.

In connection with the rise of Islamism and Islamist thought and the events of terrorism that occurred in Indonesia, this thesis will analyse two Islamist magazines, *Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah*, also comparing them with the general magazines, *Tempo* and *Gatra*.

### 1.2 Research questions
This study looks at how selected magazines in Indonesia constructed an anti-Western Islamist discourse around the selected bombing events which occurred between 2002 and 2009. It is based on the articles dealing with the following bombings: Bali bombings 1 and 2 (12 October 2002 and 1 October 2005); the Australian Embassy bombing (9 September 2004); the JW Marriott Hotel bombing (5 August 2003); and the JW Marriott/Ritz Carlton Hotel bombing (17 July 2009). These bombings are selected because of their proximity ‘relation’ to western countries or western people. Bali is a well-known international tourist province, and the other three targets, the Australian Embassy, the JW Marriott Hotel and Ritz Carlton Hotel, are well-known western-owned or western-associated icons. Australia is considered to be an ally of the United States and the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels are believed to be owned by American Jews and are considered as symbols of the United States’ global hegemony. Furthermore, the United States government and its policy are believed to be controlled by Jews.

The research will also elaborate on how the readers perceived this ‘constructed reality’ presented in the magazines. Therefore, an understanding of the readers’ responses to the

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\(^5\) I will further explain the Islamisation of Indonesia in Chapter 2.

\(^6\) ‘*Santri*’ refers to Muslims who exhibit pious and orthodox behaviour, whereas ‘*abangan*’ refers to Muslims who blend Islamic with pre-Islamic beliefs and practices.
articles in the magazines is also analysed. Four magazines are selected for this research. The first two are general Indonesian magazines (*Gatra* and *Tempo*) and the Islamist magazines are *Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah*.

*Gatra* and *Tempo* are two examples of mainstream magazines that are very popular in Indonesia. Both are weekly magazines. *Suara Hidayatullah* is a monthly magazine and *Sabili* is the foremost Islamist magazine, which is distributed fortnightly. It is more like *Tempo* or *Gatra*, but with an Islamist point of view.

The research deals with two main aspects: the text and the readers’ responses.

Research questions relating to the texts are:

- How did the Indonesian magazines construct the Islamist discourse and anti-westernism in the articles concerning the five bombings listed above?
- What Islamist discourse is in the magazines in relation to the five bombings selected?

Research questions relating to the analysis of the readers’ responses are:

- How did the readers perceive terrorism and the bombings analysed?
- Who were the perpetrators, according to the readers?
- How did the readers respond to the anti-western discourse?
- How did the readers respond to the articles they read in relation to the bombings analysed and the Islamist discourse in particular?

Based on the research questions, the thesis will have reason to expect:

- Significant differences in how the general magazines and the Islamist magazines constructed, framed and covered the Islamist discourse on terrorism in the articles concerning the five bombings mentioned.
- Significant similarities between the general magazines in constructing, framing and covering the five bombings mentioned.
- Significant similarities between the Islamist magazines in constructing, framing and covering the five bombings mentioned.

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7 A comprehensive profile of each magazine is included at the end of this chapter.
- Significant differences between the general magazines and the Islamist magazines in their readers’ responses to Islamist discourse.
- Significant similarities among the general magazines readers in their responses to Islamist discourse.
- Significant similarities among the Islamists magazines readers in their responses to Islamist discourse.

**1.3 Previous studies on terrorism/bombings**

Some research on the discourse on terrorism and the bombings in Indonesia has been done by Indonesian scholars. In general, the research compares the Islamic/Islamist press with the general press or with the Catholic-background press (Aziz, 2007; Fauzi, 2003; Novianti 2004). Below are summary tables of the previous research. Only one researcher is listed as analysing Sabili (Ahmad, 2010), and Mu’arif (2003) only studied the Islam-oriented press. In addition, none of their research has analysed the readers’ responses. Therefore, this study, especially because it includes the readers’ responses, will be a significant addition to the previous studies.

**Table 1.1 Previous studies on terrorism/bombings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name/Research</th>
<th>Methodological approach</th>
<th>Research result summary</th>
<th>Readers’ responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fauzi, A. C. (2003). <em>Wacana Terorisme dalam Media: Framing Analisis Pemberitaan Harian Kompas dan Republika dalam Peristiwa Peledakan Bom di Bali</em> [Terrorism Discourse in the Media: Framing Analysis on the Coverage of Bombing in Bali in the Daily <em>Kompas</em> and <em>Republika</em>]</td>
<td>Qualitative and quantitative: Using framing and quantitative content analysis in analysing the text</td>
<td>Focuses on only the Bali bomb 1 in the national newspaper daily <em>Kompas</em> and the Islam-oriented daily newspaper <em>Republika</em>. <em>Kompas</em> is seen as taking a humanistic stance. The bomb is not viewed as a religious matter and <em>Republika</em> stresses the involvement of foreign agents and the US as being behind the bombings.</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Muarif, S. (2003). <em>Pemberitaan Media terhadap Terorisme: Analisis Wacana pada Harian Umum Republika</em></td>
<td>Qualitative: Using Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis in order to analyse</td>
<td>Focuses only on one newspaper, the Islam-oriented daily <em>Republika</em> and also on Bali bomb 1. The findings of the research reveal that the</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Page</td>
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<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Findings</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Novianti, D. (2004).</td>
<td>Wacana Media dalam Kasus Bom Bali: Pertarungan Wacana Harian Republika dan Harian Kompas dalam Kasus Bom Bali</td>
<td>Qualitative: Combining Van Dijk and Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis in analysing the text.</td>
<td>Comparing the discourse on Bali bomb 1 in Kompas and in the Islam-oriented daily newspaper Republika. Kompas tends to report from the point of view of the official investigation team (from the government), while Republika tends to oppose the result from the official team’s investigation because it believes pressure is being applied to the team by the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ahmad, P. (2010).</td>
<td>Terror in Indonesia: Terrorism and the Representation of Recent Terrorist Attacks in Three Indonesian News Publications within a Context of Cultural and Social Transition.</td>
<td>Qualitative: Cultural studies framework used to understand the social, political and cultural context of the bombing.</td>
<td>Focusing on three press publications: the Indonesian English daily newspaper, The Jakarta Post; Tempo; and Islam-oriented magazine, Sabili. The bombings understudy are Bali bombing 1 (2002), JW Marriott bombing (2003) and the Australian Embassy bombing. The Jakarta Post mainly focuses on three issues: the government’s policy on issues concerning terrorism and national security, the government’s actions towards terrorism, and the acceptance by Indonesians of the existence of terrorism in Indonesia. There are three main issues which are covered by Sabili: the US as inciting global opinion in targeting Indonesian Muslims as</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘terrorists’; the anti-Terrorism act as an instrument to imprison Islamist activists; and the denial of the existence of Jama’ah Islamiyah. Tempo is considered to be neutral, and practising the objective role of journalism. Three main issues in Tempo are: the humanistic tragedy of the bombings; the investigation process; and the revelation of the terrorist network.


1.4 Methodological approach

The methods used to analyse the text here are both quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative approach used is the traditional content analysis that is a quantification of unit/themes, using a coding sheet. While useful, the weakness of such quantitative content analysis is not only its inability to reveal the latent content, but also its inability to reveal any ‘real’ symbolic meaning of the messages (Krippendorf, 2004). The qualitative measurement is more likely to analyse the embedded latent meaning of the text.

The quantitative approach in this thesis is combined with framing analysis. Therefore, the frames are quantified in order to count the number of themes and issues discussed. This quantification is useful also to count the frequency of themes. The frequency of themes relates to how the media frame certain issues. The media framing analysis in this study is an analysis of words and pictures in the articles and is considered to be the second level of agenda setting (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001). Framing, in text analysis, involves categorising
and/or analysing themes or issues which are salient. It involves not only words but also pictures or images of reality which are perceived as a construction.

McCombs’ (2001) view of agenda setting theory relates to how the media’s agenda can shape or set the public agenda, i.e. how it communicates messages to the public. Framing is “the transmission of object salience” (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001:69). In short, according to McCombs’ definition, “framing is the construction of an agenda with a restricted number of thematically related attributes in order to create a coherent picture of a particular object” (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001:70). In addition, Tankard (2001) distinguishes between agenda setting and framing by viewing the selection of issues covered and how they are presented in the media. How these issues are presented in the media is defined by them as ‘attributes’ (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001).

Framing concerns selecting and stressing the salient issues. Selecting issues refers to the inclusion or exclusion of issues according to the media’s view. Not everything can be covered in the news and so the media select those aspects that will be covered. Stressing the salient issues refers to the writing of the facts, the use of words and pictures and the selection of the image that the media would like to present.

To sum up, agenda setting relates to the ‘agenda’ usually put forward by the media institution, and framing is the product of the agenda, which is the themes or salient issues constructed by the institution.

1.5 Methodology and data gathering

1.5.1 The magazines and articles analysed

As mentioned above, the four magazines to be analysed are: *Gatra, Tempo, Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah*. The five bombings studied are: Bali bombings 1 and 2, the Australian Embassy bombing, and the JW Marriott 1 and JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombings. The articles analysed are those that appeared immediately following the bombings and up until three months after each bombing. All translations of parts of the articles used in the thesis are my own from the original Indonesian.
1.5.2 Profiles of the magazines

**Tempo**

*Tempo* was first published on 6 March 1971, during the early days of the New Order, as a news magazine which, in some respects, resembled an Indonesian version of *Time* magazine. The magazine was published by student activists, Goenawan Mohamad and Fikri Jufri, with financial aid from Ciputra, a well-known Indonesian entrepreneur of Chinese descent. In 1982, *Tempo* was banned for two months due to its coverage inferring unfairness in the general election in Indonesia. Its second and last banning occurred in 1994, following an article on a governmental transaction involving a former German warship\(^8\). This banning lasted for approximately four years. *Tempo* began publishing again in October 1998, in the reform era. A further elaboration on the politics of the *Tempo* banning is presented in Chapter 3.

Currently, there are two versions of *Tempo*, Indonesian and English. This thesis used the Indonesian version of *Tempo*.

**Gatra**

Soon after the banning of *Tempo* in 1994, *Gatra* was published. However, its birth was somewhat controversial. This magazine was intended to replace *Tempo*, whose journalists were divided over whether to accept the ban or republish *Tempo* under another name, but with the financial assistance of one of Suharto’s cronies, Bob Hassan. *Gatra* was published on 19 November 1994. The shareholders of the magazines were Bob Hassan, holding 33.75%, Ciputra with 41.25% and staff with the remaining 25% (Farida, 2004). Among the journalists, there were questions of principle as to whether they should join this newly published magazine, which some felt represented the authoritarian regime. Those who opted to join the magazine were seen as “traitors” by those who believed that the magazine was a “puppet of the regime” (Steele, 2005: xxviii).

The *Gatra* cover is more or less the same as that of *Time* magazine, following *Tempo*. *Gatra* was first established by Hery Komar, Mahtum Mastum, Lukman Setiawan, Harijoko Trisnadi and Budiono Kartohadiprodjo. These five people were the Directors of PT Era Media Informasi, which published the magazine. However, early in the reform era, 23 December 1998, there was an internal conflict in *Gatra* which led to the resignation of 83 journalists who quit and established a new magazine, *Gamma* (Farida, 2004). The first four Directors

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\(^8\) The ship was bought by the then Minister of Research and Technology (BJ Habibie) who became the President of Indonesia in 1998, replacing Suharto when Suharto was forced to step down.
listed above left, leaving only Budiono Kartohadiprodjo. Eventually, some few years later, *Gamma* closed down.

**Sabili**

*Sabili* represents one of the earliest Islamist magazines available on the market. As Muzakki (2009: 213) notes, *Sabili* is a magazine with “strict conservative ideology.” He notes that its “ideology of Islam tends to be blindly opposed to the West and other religions in its worldview,” while, however, categorising *Sabili* as a “conservative but non-militant hardliner” (2009: 213). In other words, it does not promote violent jihad.

*Sabili* is intended to be ‘media for all Muslims,’\(^9\) without differentiating between them, regardless of their political ideology, organisation or groups, thereby uniting the Muslims and covering the all-embracing universality of Islam. Although *Sabili* claims to represent all Muslims, this is questionable, as Farida’s (2004) research on the representation of Islamic ‘liberal thinking’ in *Sabili* shows that the magazine rejects and opposes liberal Islamic thoughts. This liberal kind of thinking is seen as a secularisation of ideas and as threatening the pure Islamic faith.

It is not clear when the first *Sabili* magazine was published. However it is generally accepted that it was in the early 1980s. This period was a difficult one for such an Islam-oriented magazine to appear in because the New Order government did not support Islamist ideas. The first magazine was published with a purple cover and without a date (month or year). The editor’s article in the first edition mentioned that the intention to publish the magazine was motivated by the lack of media representation of the real and comprehensive face of Islam. Unfortunately, the lack of expertise in the area of media management meant that it was both the first and last publication of this magazine at that time.

After two years of silence, *Sabili* was republished in 1988. In its first four years, its intention to publish fortnightly was not achieved. Nevertheless, the distribution increased from 2,000 copies in the early editions to 60,000 in 1993. The magazine published for the fortnight 6–19 January 1993 is known to be the last edition of *Sabili* in the New Order era. The magazine was forced to close down due to a reader’s letter [*surat pembaca*] which had broken the

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\(^9\) This is according to *Sabili*’s profile in *Profil Majalah Islam Sabili* (Unpublished Document of *Sabili*, Jakarta, n.d.).
SARA\textsuperscript{10} taboo, concerning a Muslim woman who, it was claimed, was forced by missionaries to convert to Christianity. The Editor-in-Chief of *Sabili* at that time was called in by the attorney general to be questioned. In the New Order context such a call was effectively an invitation to be arrested and then put to jail. Rather than risk imprisonment, the Editor-in-Chief refused the call and considered it wise for the magazine to close down. *Sabili* therefore closed down until the middle of 1998, early in the reform era.

As mentioned above, the reform era marked a significant change for magazine publishing and the media in general, as the government was more open and a publishing permit (SIUPP (*Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers*)) is still required but much easier to get. In this era, the distribution numbers of copies per issue of *Sabili* grew significantly. In 1998, there were only 25,000 copies per issue (Muzakki, 2009: 212), but, according to Nielsen Media Research, 135,000 copies were sold in 2000 (Muzakki, 2009: 2013; Rijal 2005: 443).

**Suara Hidayatullah**

*Suara Hidayatullah* is associated with an Islamic boarding school, Pesantren Hidayatullah, established by the late Abdullah Said in January 1976, in Balikpapan, South Kalimantan. He was a former adjutant of Kahar Muzakar, the leader of the Darul Islam\textsuperscript{11} rebellion of South Sulawesi in the 1950s (Bruinessen, 2013a).

Abdullah Said came to Kalimantan at the end of 1969 as a fugitive. Said (whose real name was Muhsin Kahar) was wanted by the police because he had organised a group of Muhammadiyah youths to destroy a gambling area in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The attack took place on 28 August 1969. The police arrested ten Islamic activists suspected of being involved in the incident. Muhsin Kahar escaped to Balikpapan and changed his name to Abdullah Said, and then came back to continue his *dakwah* [preaching/Islamic propagation]. In 1971, he tried to establish his *pesantren* and Muslim village but he failed. He then went to Java, trying to find Qur’anic and Islamic teachers. Eventually he succeeded by asking his friends, Hasyim (from Gontor Ponorogo), Usman Palese (from Persis Bangil), Hassan Ibrahim (from Krapyak Yogyakarta) and A Nazir Hassan (Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta) to join his pioneering *pesantren* in Balikpapan. In 1976 the Minister for Religious Affairs, Professor Mukti Ali, officially opened the Pesantren Hidayatullah.

\textsuperscript{10} ‘SARA’ is the abbreviation for *Suku* [ethnic], *Agama* [religion], *Ras* [race] and *Antar golongan* [among groups]. The New Order regime did its utmost to prevent any discussion about these sensitive topics.

\textsuperscript{11} The Darul Islam rebellion is linked to Negara Islam Indonesia [Islamic State of Indonesia] in wishing to build an Islamic State led by Kartosuwiryo, who was the leader and based in West Java.
In the field of media, *Hidayatullah* owns the *Suara Hidayatullah* magazine and *Hidayatullah* website. The magazine was first published in 1988, and in 2000, according to Musyawarah Nasional I Hidayatullah, the magazine was committed to being available to the public (Karni, 2010). It analyses the problems and dynamics of Islamic preaching [*dakwah*] in Indonesia and the world. Its contents include columns with interviews with public figures, recitations, Qur’anic verses and *Hadits* (heroic stories about Islamic missionaries in Indonesia), and it also covers family problems.

According to Muzakki (2009: 10), “*Suara Hidayatullah* developed strict-conservative thinking about Islam (meaning it was much less prone to adopt and reinterpret Islamic doctrines to fit specific problems).” As is the case with *Sabili*, *Suara Hidayatullah* is a news magazine and the leaders of the *pesantren* wanted it to be an Islam-oriented version of *Tempo*\(^\text{12}\). The circulation of this magazine in 2004 was 53,000 copies (Muzakki, 2009).

Irawanto (2011) categorises *Suara Hidayatullah* as a politically-oriented Islamic publication. He also stresses that the magazine is dependent on online sources which are mostly fundamentalist. Therefore it is not surprising that *Suara Hidayatullah* has a stance of strong political resistance towards the United States and its hegemony, and a policy against Israel. In addition, according to Karni (2010), the magazine promotes *ghazwul fikri* [war of ideas], a contestation of the thinking that defends various ideas which are identified as destroying Islamic values.

1.5.3 The selected bombings

**Bali bomb 1 (Bali)**

The first bombing in Bali, known subsequently as Bali bomb 1 [*bom Bali 1*], occurred on 12 October 2002, and is the biggest bombing attack Indonesia has known. It killed 232 people (88 of whom were Australians) and 300 were injured. The explosion took place in a tourist area, Paddy’s Pub and Sari Club, in Legian Street, Bali. These were popular places for westerners to frequent. Furthermore, Paddy’s Pub was exclusively for westerners. Only the waiters, cleaners and other staff were Indonesian.

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12Personal interview with the Head Editor of *Suara Hidayatullah*, 1 February 2011.
**JW Marriott Hotel 1 (Jakarta)**

The second bomb attack examined in this thesis occurred at the JW Marriott Hotel. The 150 kilogram bomb exploded on 5 August 2003. The JW Marriott is located in the area of Mega Kuningan, part of the ‘Golden Triangle’ business district in Jakarta. In this bombing 12 were killed and around 150 injured (Solahudin, 2013). This hotel is considered to be a place for westerners to meet and have lunch, and the bomb exploded during lunch time.

**Australian Embassy bombing (Jakarta)**

The third bombing was an attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. The bomb, which had been placed in a car, exploded 5 metres away from the front of the high security building on 9 September 2004, killing 9 people and injuring more than 100 (Solahudin, 2013). It was the second bombing attack in the Kuningan area, coming only 13 months after the Marriott bombing. The people injured and killed were mostly Indonesians. They were the security staff, people who were queuing for visas, and people who were passing by.

**Bali bomb 2 (Bali)**

The second Bali bombing (known as Bali bomb 2) took place in Jimbaran and Kuta, a popular tourist area in Bali, on 1 October 2005. Three bombs exploded in this area during the dinner hour, killing 23 people and wounding almost 200 (Solahudin, 2013). The victims were mostly Indonesian citizens, as well as 24 Australians, 7 Koreans, 4 Americans, 4 Japanese, and 1 German. The first bomb exploded in Menega Cafe, the second in Nyoman cafe, 20 metres away from Menega cafe restaurant, and the third around Kuta Square, 5 kilometres from Jimbaran, in Raja’s cafe.

**JW Marriott 2 and Ritz Carlton (Jakarta)**

The fifth and final bombing to be analysed was carried out as joint attacks, 12 minutes apart, on the JW Marriott Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel, on the 17 July 2009. As previously mentioned, the JW Marriott is located in the one of the central business districts in Jakarta called Mega Kuningan. Therefore the second Marriott bomb and Ritz Carlton bomb are known together as ‘Bom Mega Kuningan Jakarta 2009.’ In this attack 9 people were killed and 53 injured (Solahudin, 2013)

These two hotels are located close to each other. The first bomb exploded during the regular Friday breakfast meeting run by Castle Asia, in the JW Marriott lounge. Castle Asia is a
consultancy business in Jakarta which specialises in advocacy policy, economy projection and political risk analysis concerning Indonesia. James Castle, the owner, is a skillful lobbyist and at the time of the bombing was presiding over a meeting with foreign and local businessmen, some of whom were killed or injured when the bomb exploded. Twelve minutes afterwards, another bomb exploded in the Airlangga Restaurant in the Ritz Carlton. These bombings caused the cancellation of the arrival of the Manchester United soccer team, which was scheduled to play against the Indonesian team and was booked to stay at the Ritz Carlton. They occurred nine days after the general elections for the President and Vice President in Indonesia.

1.5.4 The readers
Focus group discussions for the readers of the magazines were held to gain an understanding of the overall Islamist discourse on terrorism and the West in relation to the bombings analysed.
Ten small focus group discussions were held in Jakarta, 17–21 February 2011. The groups consisted of both males and females (5–6 people per group), Jakarta residents who were regular readers of the magazines analysed (Gatra, Tempo, Sabili or Hidayatullah). The selection criteria for the readers included the stipulations that they
1. had read the magazine/magazines for a minimum of five years.
2. had an interest in the topic of terrorism.
3. were between 18 and 45 years of age.
All group members were provided with copies of the relevant articles prior to discussions taking place.

1.5.5 The journalists
Further interviews with the magazines’ journalists and editors were conducted to provide supporting and supplementary data, in order to achieve a richer and broader analysis of the content. The data gleaned provide a significant contribution to understanding the magazines’ points of view, plus those of the media as a whole.

The interviewees remain anonymous in order to protect them from any possible repercussions, given that in the interviews they provided their opinions and their ideological stances on terrorism and Islam which to some extent are sensitive. However, in the appendices I have provided the date of the interview and their names abbreviated.
1.6 Structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 is an introduction. It serves as a background to the study and an outline of the thesis. The methodology is explained in brief in this chapter and more thoroughly in Chapter 4. Chapter 2 explores the socio-political context of contemporary Indonesia in the New Order and the post-New Order. It looks at how Indonesia, Islam and terrorism integrate. It also looks at the Islamisation of Indonesian society and the background of Islamist radicalism in Indonesia. Chapter 3 explains the context of the Indonesian press, both in the New Order and the post-New Order. In general, it explores how the state controlled the press in the New Order and how the Islamist press survived in this era. With the liberalisation of the press in the New Order there has been a growth of Islamic and Islamist press. The growth of this press is related to the growth of Islamism and the Islamisation of Indonesian society.

Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in this thesis, including the justifications and limitations of the selected method. Chapter 5 is a content analysis and framing of the general magazines, Gatra and Tempo. Chapter 6 is the content analysis and framing of the Islamist magazines, Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah.

Chapter 7 is a close look of the articles of the general magazines, Gatra and Tempo. Analysis in this chapter focuses on who, according to the magazines, was behind the bombings. One article related to each bombing was selected from each magazine. Chapter 8 is a close look at the articles from the Islamist magazines, Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah. Chapter 9 is the result of the readers’ responses to the magazines. The chapter explores the readers’ responses and the differences between their responses to the secular/general and to the Islamist magazines. Chapter 10 is a Discussion Chapter and Chapter 11 is Conclusion.
Chapter 2

Political Islam, Islamisation and Islamism in Contemporary Indonesia

This chapter begins with an explanation of the social and political context of Indonesia, both in the New Order and post-New Order, or reform era. Although the bombings analysed in this thesis occurred in the post-New Order, in order to understand their overall context, a brief account of the New Order is required.

This chapter will also elaborate on perceptions, attitudes or behaviours of Indonesians in relation to the United States and the West, specifically related to Islamist terrorism directed at westerners. The examination and analysis of anti-Americanism discourse in contemporary Indonesia will further expand on Indonesians’ perceptions regarding this ‘super-power,’ thereby providing an understanding of the responses of the readers of the magazines.

Within this context, the chapter further explains the place and role of Islam and Islamism in relation to the political dynamics in Indonesia and elaborates the Islamisation of Indonesian society. It also explores the origin of terrorism and radical Islam in Indonesia. In relation to this thesis, this explanation and analysis is important, in order to establish the relationship between the Islamist discourse and the text analysis of the media articles, as well as providing some background to the analysis of the readers’ responses.

2.1 Introduction

Although the majority of Indonesians are Muslim, Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Under the 1945 Indonesian Constitution [Undang-Undang Dasar], the ideology of the Indonesian state is Pancasila, which consists of five principles, the first of which is ‘Belief in one God.’ All the world religions which are present in Indonesia (Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism, as well as Islam) can subscribe to this principle. In addition, the Constitution guarantees the right of Indonesians to worship according to their own beliefs.

Another significant point to understand about Islam in Indonesia is that Islam did not penetrate Indonesia through invasion or occupation but through trade and preachers who, to some extent, adapted their practice of Islam to accommodate the traditions and beliefs of the
locals, for whom Hinduism and Buddhism, as well as indigenous beliefs, were previously the dominant religions or religious belief systems. In other words, the approach towards propagating Islam was accommodative to the other cultures and beliefs which already existed.

2.2 Background of Islam and politics in contemporary Indonesia

2.2.1 Islam and politics in the New Order
The structure of the New Order was built with strong control over politics and society. Three important control mechanisms were the formation of what was effectively a state party (Golkar) which incorporated all state bureaucrats, tight control of villages and neighbourhoods and the fact that the Indonesian army played not only a military role but also a socio-political role, which enabled it to control the society.

In January 1973, in order to limit the political role of the parties, President Suharto forced the nine remaining political parties into a restructure so that only three remained. These were the government’s own party, Golongan Karya [Functionalist Groups Party or Golkar] and two others, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia [Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)] and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan [United Development Party (PPP)] (Effendy, 2003). Four Islamic parties were merged into PPP, and five others, which were nationalist oriented or had a Christian identity, were merged into PDI. This forced merger was one of the reasons why many Muslims were displeased with the New Order.

The supporters of Masyumi, the modernist Muslim political party banned by Sukarno, were deeply disappointed, because they had expected the ban to be lifted due to their significant role in removing Sukarno (Drakeley, 2005 : 130). Clearly, Suharto did not intend to share power. Blocked from political involvement, Masyumi’s activists changed their political movement to dakwah through DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation]) which was established in 1967 by former Masyumi leader, Muhammad Natsir (Ricklefs, 2012:160). DDII was assisted by a Saudi based organisation, Rabiṭah al-Ālam al-Islamy [Muslim World League and the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations (IIFSO)]. They received funding to translate and publish religious books, such as those published by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jamiat-al
Islamy (Solahudin, 2011). These books were circulated among, and read by the Islamist activists.

During this early New Order period, Islamic groups, leaders and organisations were strictly monitored and their activities, from activities of religious piety to political activities, were often restricted by the New Order. Any acts perceived to be against the state or the state ideology (Pancasila) were not tolerated, nor was Islamism, nor any attempts to promote an Islamic state. Islamism and any groups which supported the building of an Islamic state were very closely monitored by the Indonesian government. An indication that religious organisations were viewed suspiciously was apparent when in 1983 Suharto introduced a requirement that social organisations acknowledge the Pancasila as their sole ideology (Drakeley, 2005:120).

Political Islam was not favoured by Suharto since it was considered a threat, not only because it could potentially challenge the New Order regime’s political dominance, but because it was feared that political Islam could undermine Pancasila, the state ideology, and renew the push for an Islamic state. Therefore, Islamists who showed interest in building and disseminating an Islamic state agenda were seen as right-wing extremists. One example of this discrimination involved Abu Bakar Ba’asyir13 and Abdullah Sungkar, the founding fathers and owners of the Islamic boarding school in Ngruki Solo (central Java), the Pondok Pesantren Ngruki14. They were arrested in 1978 and held for four years on charges of subversion and of pushing the agenda for an Islamic state. They later fled to Malaysia and returned to Indonesia in the post-New Order era.

Over the years several controversial incidents occurred which generated tension between Suharto’s government and significant sections of the Islamic community. One such episode was the hijacking, in 1981, of Garuda Flight 206 (Indonesia’s national airline). Another was the tragedy of 12 September 1984, which has become known as *Peristiwa Tanjung Priok* (Tanjung Priok Incident). Two Indonesian soldiers entered a local mosque in this Jakarta Port district without removing their shoes and smeared dirt from the gutter on the mosque wall (Effendy, 2003). This was seen as extremely disrespectful. In addition, a local mosque

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13 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is generally considered the leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah, the organisation which is responsible for the bombings in Bali and Jakarta and several others.

14 After the Bali bombing 1 in 2002, this Islamic boarding school was notorious, as it was the breeding ground of Jama’ah Islamiyah members. Some of its alumni were involved in several bombings in Indonesia.
activist was detained by the army. As Effendy (2003) states, these incidents angered the local Muslims, who then carried out further protests and demonstrations. The Indonesian army, ABRI\textsuperscript{15}, killed 63 of the Muslim demonstrators and wounded more than 100, and 171 remained missing (Bresnan, quoted in Effendy, 2003).

These were not the only incidents involving friction between Suharto’s regime and Muslims, although they were among the worst. There then followed the bombing of a bank, BCA\textsuperscript{16}, in 1984 in Jakarta, and of Borobudur temple in central Java in 1985. Since these bombings were seen as protests about the Tanjung Priok Incident, radical Islamists were blamed. Another incident involving the New Order regime was the Lampung tragedy in 1989, which was the massacre of the Warsidi group based in Lampung area of southern Sumatra, who were accused of rejecting the Indonesian ideology, Pancasila, and of promoting an Islamic state.

However, it should be noted that during this period, although the New Order regime was politically hostile towards Islamist aspirations, grass roots Islam was able to play a major part in Islamising Java and Indonesia generally (Ricklefs, 2012). In the global context, the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 was ‘inspiring’ to some Indonesian Muslims. In a local context, Islamisation in education was also taking place. Islamic state schools, from madrasah (elementary Islamic state school) to IAIN (currently UIN, the Indonesian Islamic Institute) were expanding with the help of state funding. The Institute was further developed by Professor Mukti Ali, who was the Minister for Religious Affairs at that time. It had a lowly status before Mukti Ali developed it into a respected institution (Ricklefs, 2012). In the early 1980s, many of its lecturers were sent to western universities to pursue Masters and Doctoral degrees, and from this a large number of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals were ‘born,’ although most of them were modern, moderate or progressive Muslims.

LIPIA (Lembaga Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab [Institute for Islamic Sciences and the Arab Language]), an institute established in 1980 and funded by Saudi Arabia, is another example of Islamisation through education. This institution facilitates the dissemination of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi teachings to counter the widespread teaching of the Shi’ite’s Ayatullah Khomeini, with his Iranian revolution (Ricklefs, 2012). LIPIA, which was

\textsuperscript{15} Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia [Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia]

\textsuperscript{16} The initials of this bank are BCA. Because it is Chinese owned, \textit{pribumi} [indigenous] Indonesians cynically say that it is not the Bank Central Asia, but that it is ‘\textit{Bank Cina Asli},’ meaning a ‘pure Chinese bank.’
formerly Lembaga Pendidikan Bahasa Arab [Arabic Language Institute], was established by Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, which was closely connected to Natsir’s DDII. Their working together not only involved translating and circulating books, as explained above, but also providing guest lecturers to some pesantren, including to the notorious Ngruki (Solahudin, 2011).

Students at this institute were taught the ideas of the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood and Mawdudi, and the top students were sent to Saudi Arabia for further education. As Ricklefs (2012) stated, some fought in the jihad (literally meaning ‘to struggle’) against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and a significant number of people returned in the late 1980s and 1990s, some declaring themselves Salafis (the preferred name of Wahhabi Islamic Puritanism). These Muslims, categorised by Ricklefs (2012) as Revivalists, have a project of dakwah, with an Islamist agenda.

Islamisation also occurred on university campuses. Students studied and modelled themselves on other Islamist movements from the Middle East. This occurred partly because, in the late 1970s, the political students’ movement was effectively outlawed by the New Order regime and new regulations on student political activity were issued\(^\text{17}\). Bruinessen (2013b: 61) states:

> On university campuses and among mosque affiliated youth groups elsewhere, the Muslim Brotherhood literature fell upon willing ears. More overtly political student movements had been successfully repressed in the late 1970s, and strict new regulations prevented most organized student activity on campus, but the government allowed, and perhaps even encouraged, the cultivation of religious piety through study circles (known as halqah or daurah). Most of these were at some time connected with the DDII and modelled themselves to some extent on the Muslim Brotherhood or the Hizbut-Tahrir, the other major transnational Islamist movements.

Furthermore, in the last 10 years of his rule, the 1990s, Suharto identified more closely with ‘Islam.’ His approval of the establishment of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI [Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association]) led by his confidant, BJ Habibie\(^\text{18}\), is an indication of this. ICMI established its own think tank, CIDES (Centre for Information and Development Studies) and its own newspaper Republika. Although some scholars view the establishment of ICMI as a tool for the Suharto regime to gain political support from the Muslim quarters (Liddle, 1996b), it did, however, play a significant role in the rise of

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\(^{17}\) An example of this was the NKK/BKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan), a regulation which urged the students to go ‘back to campus’ and study, rather than be involved in politics.

\(^{18}\) BJ Habibie was later the Vice President, assisting Suharto in the later years of his presidency, but when Suharto was forced to step down in 1998, he became the third President of Indonesia.
Islamisation among the middle classes of Muslims in Indonesia (Hefner, 1993). Other indicators of this shift are that a few cabinet ministers came from ICMI, and also that so-called ‘green army’ members (army personnel who identified as devout Muslims) had risen to hold significant positions in the army.

Suharto ‘greened’ not only his government but also his family. In the 1990s, he and his family performed hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. This, in a sense, ‘completed’ the construction of his ‘new self’ as a Muslim, whereas before he had been seen as a nominal Muslim who was believed to practise Javanese mysticism. To some extent Suharto’s performance of the hajj was also seen as a political move. After the hajj, Suharto adopted the name ‘Muhammad.’ Because, in Islam, Muhammad is the name of the last Prophet, no better name could be chosen as his hajj name. Further justifying his identity as a true ‘Muslim,’ he was then frequently quoted in the media as Haji19 Muhammad Suharto, and after the hajj, he permitted women and girls to wear veils at public schools, which previously had been prohibited (Smith, 2005a).

Suharto’s close identification with Islam also brought political changes in the media. He was routinely seen on television in his new Muslim persona, for example, performing Friday prayers. His eldest daughter, Siti Hardijanti Indra Rukmana, who wore kerudung20, was held up by Indonesians as a positive role model. More mosques were built—I recall that the mosque at Muhammadiyah University, in my hometown (Jember, East Java), received funding from the Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila21—and the Islamisation of economic and financial institutions also occurred during these years. The first Islamic or Syari’ah Bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia, was established in 1991 (Fealy, 2008).

In general, Indonesia had become more Islamised during the 1990s. KISDI, the Indonesian Committee for solidarity with the World of Islam, which was established by Natsir’s DDII, intensified its presence in Jakarta’s streets and “it was the precursor of the various vigilante groups that emerged after the fall of Suharto” (Bruinessen, 2013b: 63).

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19 A person who has performed the pilgrimage is usually entitled to use the title ‘Haji’ (for a male) and ‘Hajjah’ (for a female), which, to some extent, positions them as having a higher religious status.
20 Kerudung is a sort of veil, covering the woman’s head, but the hair in front is usually seen a little bit.
21 This is a social foundation, established in 1982, which is supported by Suharto. This organisation is seen as political because it gives funding for social needs, and support in building mosques, to win the hearts of Indonesian Muslims.
Suharto’s new closeness to Islam and Muslims was not a coincidence. He had started looking for a new ally who could give him political support, because he was not convinced that the army forces, who were the prime support of the New Order regime, were still completely loyal (Ricklefs, 2012). This political situation in the 1990s, as explained by Bruinessen (2013a), had its consequences. It was in these early days of Indonesia’s becoming more open to the Islamist discourse and more oriented to the Middle East, that the seeds of views more critical of the western discourse were planted.

Suharto’s co-optation, around 1990, of many of his former Islamist critics, and the emergence of a faction within the armed forces that patronised Islamist groups, were crucial factors in empowering Islamist discourses that were more strongly oriented towards the Middle East and critical of western influences. This occurred, not coincidentally, at a time when human rights discourse and the strengthening of civil society were becoming core elements of American (and more generally, western) foreign policy. Anti-liberal and anti-western Muslim discourses were welcomed and patronised by the elements in the regime that were, for various reasons, opposed to liberalisation and to western political and cultural domination. In a departure from previous government policy, street demonstrations by radical Muslim groups, especially when protesting issues like Israeli policies in occupied Palestine, were allowed (Bruinessen, 2013a).

To sum up, at the end of the Suharto years, as explained by Ricklefs (2012), there was a growing alliance among the ‘green army,’ other leaders in the regime and the emerging Islamist movements. At the other end of the social spectrum, the grass roots level, Javanese society (and Indonesia in general) was becoming more Islamic, not only in its beliefs but also in its everyday life.

2.2.2 Islam and politics in the post-New Order
Developments in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto in 1998 have greatly changed the image of Indonesian Islam and the then existing perceptions of Indonesian Muslims as tolerant and inclined to compromise. In the heyday of the New Order, the 1970s and 1980s, Indonesian Islam had presented a smiling face—perhaps appropriately so, under an authoritarian ruler who was known as “the smiling general” (Bruinessen, 2013a: 1).
The beginning of the reform era (which spans from 1998 until the present) was marked by the fall of President Suharto, who had ruled the country for 32 years. This era also brought the rebirth of democracy and openness of the government in social, political and economic contexts. As will be explained further in this section, this has provided a very different context for Islam, and for political Islam in particular, one in which radical Islamist groups have emerged and are operating openly and energetically.

It is important to mention a few changes in relation to Islam and politics during the post-New Order period. First, an Islamic political euphoria was seen in the birth of the Islamic parties. According to Azra (2006), the euphoria was a manifestation of the Muslim elite after their suppression and marginalisation by the New Order. This euphoria could be observed when the new Habibie government held a democratic parliamentary election in June 1999, the first since 1955. Of the 48 parties who were seeking election, 20 were Islamic parties (Azra, 2006).

Second, there was the emergence, from 1998, of the so-called radical Islamist militia groups, including Laskar Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujahidin. These groups claim to be committed to defending the Islamic faith in a national context. Laskar Pembela Islam, as part of the military wing of Front Pembela Islam (FPI [Islamic Defenders Front]), was established in Jakarta, on 17 August 1998. According to Hasan (2005), it is a group which consists of thugs, students from Islamic boarding schools, and youth organisations from the mosques. The group’s claim is that it is concerned with morality, therefore its main objectives are razias [raids] on venues such as discotheques, casinos and bars (which usually sell ‘haram’ liquors), as the group considers these sinful. This group attacked the Playboy Indonesia headquarters less than a week after the magazine’s first issue was released on 7 April 2006 (Kitley, 2008; Handajani, 2010). The magazine was accused of defining immorality. Further, as Handajanie (2010) notes, FPI threatened Playboy Indonesia’s models and the family members of its editors. Playboy Indonesia was forced to close in July 2007, while its Editor-in-chief was sent to jail, charged with indecency. This incident is indicative of the increased influence of Islamic perspectives in Indonesian public life and society.

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22 ‘Haram’ means that it is prohibited according to Islamic law—any liquors that contain alcohol are haram.
The second group, Laskar Jihad, is part of Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jama’ah [The Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet]. It was established in Solo, Central Java, on 14 February 1999. Ja’far Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, was an Afghanistan alumni during the Soviet occupation. According to Smith (2005a), although Laskar Jihad gained funds from the Middle East or South East Asia, this group was not connected with Al Qaeda. Laskar Jihad sent 10,000 of its members to fight in the religious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Maluku in 1999.

Laskar Mujahidin is part of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia [Indonesian Holy War Assembly] and is associated with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. It supports the implementation of Shari’ah law and an Islamic state. Laskar Mujahidin also sent its members to the conflict in Maluku. However, these two groups did not work well together and sometimes clashed due to their different aims in taking part in the conflict. According to the ICG report (2005a), Laskar Mujahidin tended to attack churches, Christian leaders and priests, while Laskar Jihad is more concerned with securing and maintaining stability in the region.

A third aspect of the post-New Order context for Islam relates to the governance reforms which introduced much more decentralisation and led to some Islamisation of regional law. Aceh, one of the provinces of Sumatra, is a well-known example of a place where Shari’ah law (Islamic law) has been implemented in post-New Order Indonesia. But many other local governments also have implemented some aspects of Shari’ah law through the local regulations [peraturan daerah]. One example is in Sawahlunto, where a couple must demonstrate their ability to read Qur’an before receiving their marriage license (Bush, 2008). Another example is the restriction on the sale and consumption of liquor in Tasikmalaya, West Java.

### 2.2.3 Islamisation

An increasing number of members of the ummah [Muslim community] are becoming more pious and identifying themselves, first and foremost, as Muslim, rather than Indonesian. Political and social factors at both national and international levels have contributed to this

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23 As argued by Azra (2006), the conflict in Maluku is not merely a Christians versus Muslims conflict. It has its roots in politics and economics and in unequal distribution social economic power among the ethnic groups in the region.
shift. Some scholars explain the situation in this reform era from a political or historical perspective and argue that it is due to societal and political change. According to Bruinessen (2013a) it is Islam in Indonesia which has changed its “face.” The changing face of Indonesian Islam in the post-Suharto period, according to Bruinessen, is characterised by inter-religious conflicts, jihadi movements supporting local conflicts, and even terrorism, which was carried out by radical terrorist groups connected to transnational Islamist movements.

From a long term historical perspective we can see that the Islamisation of Indonesia is a continuous process. As noted above when Islam arrived in Indonesia to a significant extent it adapted itself to local beliefs. But even then some Muslims followed and promoted a more orthodox understanding and practice of Islam. We can understand the Islamisation process in two senses. Over time not only did Islam spread throughout Indonesia in terms of conversion from earlier beliefs, but gradually Islamic practice in Indonesia became more orthodox. To better understand the phenomenon of Indonesian Muslim society and its adherence to Islam, it is important to look to at the work of Clifford Geertz. His famous work, *The Religion of Java* (Geertz, 1960), described the socio-religious life of Muslims in Java based on his research in East Java. His typological identification of three main cultural streams, abangan, santri and priyayi, has long been used to understand Islam in Indonesian society and, furthermore, has been employed to understand the Islamisation of contemporary Indonesia. Geertz’s main idea points to a social system with its culture and syncretic religion in a local Javanese setting, the largest ethnic population in Indonesia. The abangan group refers to the people who practices Islam in a more syncretic way with elements of Hinduism, Buddhism and animism (local beliefs) compared to santri whom are orthodox and tend to comply with formal Islamic rituals and other forms of normative expressions of Islamic piety. While priyayi is associated with a person who has a higher social status rank, something like an aristocrat.

As explained by Ricklefs (2012), who uses these cultural themes, an understanding of the characteristics of these streams, and of the inherent santri–abangan polarisation, is necessary for examining the process of Islamisation in Indonesia.

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24 I am borrowing the term from Bruinessen (2013a: 3).
Using a historical context, Ricklefs explores the increasing rise of religiosity and piety in Javanese society. Although his work focuses on the Islamisation of the Javanese society in Java, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, his study is a reflection of contemporary Indonesia. The dichotomy between abangan and santri, as identified by Geertz in the 1960s, is currently no longer visible. Ricklefs (2012:254) states that “the abangan are possibly a minority now, and in any case politically voiceless and insignificant.” The abangan have largely abandoned their syncretic forms of Islamic belief and have adopted the orthodox santri-style form of orthodox Islam. In other words, there is an increase of more orthodox Islamic religiosity in all aspects of society, whether measured in terms of the increase in the number of people fasting during Ramadan, the number of Qur’anic courses available, or the increasing presence of other aspects of Islamic rituals in daily life. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the process of the Islamisation of Indonesian society speeded up significantly in the decades after Geertz made his observations and this has resulted in major social changes.

Furthermore this socio-religious Islamisation of Indonesia that has significantly transformed Indonesian Muslim society has political dimensions. In a democratic context there is no longer any constraint on Muslims seeking to express their Islam politically, including in a radical direction. Thus in a more democratic Indonesia, radical Muslims are emerging and trying to infiltrate the state’s policy-making, and are generally seeking to make an impact on public policies. Recent events illustrative of this include the refusal of Islamist groups to allow Lady Gaga to perform in a concert for which thousands of young Indonesians had already bought tickets, demonstrations by FPI against the Miss World contest which was held in Bali, and protests against the seminars given by Irshad Manji, 25 who was eventually prevented from speaking.

Looking from a political point of view, Bruinessen (2013a: 3) states: “The post-Suharto years have presented a very different face of Indonesian Islam,” and he explains that there is a “a conservative turn” taking place in mainstream Islam. The members of the two largest Muslim organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, were previously seen as having a balance between liberal and progressive views, and conservative and fundamentalist views. There has now been a shift to the latter. Although this does not mean the total rejection

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25 Irshad Manji is a Canadian who promotes a reformed and liberal interpretation of Islam.
of progressive and liberal views, the members who support such views have lost their power (Bruinessen, 2013a).

This changing ‘face’ has manifested not only in the above Muslim organisations but also in the semi-government organisation, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), which has made several controversial statements. One of these was made in 2005, when their fatwa [authoritative opinion] declared that secularism, pluralism and religious liberalism were incompatible with Islam (Bruinessen, 2013a). This statement, according to Bruinessen, was motivated by the radical Islamist wanting to attack the Jaringan Islam Liberal [Liberal Islam Network]. This shows that the ‘face’ of Indonesian Islam is changing not only within the general society, as characterised previously (inter-religious conflict and radical Islamist groups), but also within MUI and mainstream Muslim organisations (Bruinessen, 2013a). It is appropriate at this point to elaborate further on the nature of Islamism and radicalism in Indonesia.

2.3 Islamism and radicalism in Indonesia

2.3.1 Defining Islamism

Islamism and Islamic fundamentalists are widely referred to by scholars or in the media. The word ‘fundamentalist,’ as explained by Esposito (1994), is a term influenced by American Protestantism and relates to a movement in the twentieth century which stressed the literal meaning of the Bible as fundamental in Christianity. Therefore, according to Esposito, for most Christians the term ‘fundamentalism’ is negative, as it has been used to promote a literal understanding of the Bible which is seen as stagnant, backward and extremist.

In relation to Islamists, the term ‘fundamentalism’ is mostly used cynically, and designed to undermine them (Hakim, 2005). Therefore fundamentalism has a pejorative connotation. According to the liberal view (Naharong, 2009), fundamentalism relates to extremism, fanaticism and traditionalism, and from a western media point of view (particularly in the United States media), it is perceived as representing extremism, fanaticism and even terrorism.

Therefore, most scholars object to the use of ‘fundamentalism’ in the context of Islam. The term ‘Islamism’ is widely used and is academically neutral (Muhtadi, 2009; Sears, 2004). Although there are still objections, this term is nevertheless popular and widely adopted. Olivier Roy (2004: 58), is one of the scholars who defines Islamism.
What I call ‘Islamism’ is the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that claims to re-create a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing sharia, but by establishing first an Islamic state through political action.

Roy (2004:58) further asserts:

Islamists see Islam not as mere religion, but as a political ideology that should reshape all aspects of society (politics, law, economy, social justice, foreign policy, and so on).

A more detailed definition of Islamism was elaborated by ICG (International Crisis Group) in 2005. They elaborate on the term ‘Islamism,’ distinguishing three main issues (ICG, 2005b): political Islamism, missionary activism and the jihadis. Political Islamism is a movement which seeks power through political means (for example through political parties) rather than violent means. Missionary activism is both revivalist and fundamentalist but does not seek political power, nor is it involved in political activism. The missionary activities focus on dakwah to reinforce the faith of Muslims. The jihadis use violence in order to achieve their goals. The jihadis consider themselves as the armies of Islam or of God, defending the dar al Islam and the Islamic umma against infidel enemies. The jihadis are divided into two groups, Jihadi Salafiyya and Qubis. The former group consists of Salafis who have been radicalised, and the latter group is influenced by Sayyid Qutb, and wage jihad locally against their kufr ruler. The rulers are therefore seen as close enemies and the jihadis are attacking the government of their own country because it does not rule according to God’s law. In addition, they wage jihad against what they term a ‘distant enemy,’ such as Israel and ‘the West,’ especially the United States.

One aspect of Islamism is that “Islamists feel that their own cultures are being lost or corrupted by Western influences” (Sears, 2004: 95). In the Islamist view, according to Sears, the world’s politics and economic policies are unfair to Muslims. In addition, the media (such as film) is considered to disseminate permissive values and loose morals (for instance, the use of drugs and alcohol, sex outside of marriage, and materialism in general) which are not in line with Islamic values. Therefore, Islamists try to eliminate and reduce the western influence.

According to the above definition, Islamism can be seen as a movement which is not only political but also ideological. Social and political actions are among the means by which Islamists endeavour to achieve their goals. Violent radical actions can also be tolerated by those who have a radical view. For the moderates, other forms of action can be performed,
for example, preaching, disseminating ideas through the media, and through participation in political parties.

Islamists believe that Islam offers a solution to all problems faced by society and Islam is therefore not only a moral or spiritual belief, but also a religious ideology which must be implemented in all areas of life. Therefore, one of their main goals is to change the ideologies which are implemented by their governments (such as capitalism, nationalism, socialism, and other ‘isms’), because they not only consider them incompatible with Islamic teachings and Islamic values, but also consider those ideologies to be unsuccessful in creating a prosperous and fair society.

One of the characteristics of Islamists is the anti-western attitude that triggers a belief in a conspiracy theory (Naharong, 2009). This can be understood as linking to acts of terrorism. As Naharong (2009: 13) states:

> They believe that all bad foreign influences and unfortunate incidents prevalent in Muslim societies are intentionally created to weaken and destroy Islam and its adherents. According to Islamists, these are carried out either by foreign (CIA and Mossad) or by domestic agents.

### 2.3.2 Background of radical Islam in Indonesia: Jama’ah Islamiyah and Darul Islam

Comprehensive research on terrorism in Indonesia, including on Jama’ah Islamiyah and the contemporary Darul Islam movement, has been carried out by the ICG. Sidney Jones has been extensively referred to by scholars such as Barton (2004) and Fealy and Borgu (2005), who have also researched the Islamist movement in Indonesia. However, the most recent piece of research, which tries to explain the relationship between Darul Islam and Jama’ah Islamiyah, is by Solahudin (2011). His most important discovery is that there is a link between Darul Islam and Jama’ah Islamiyah, in that some members of Jama’ah Islamiyah were previously members of Darul Islam. His book also gives details about the early days of Darul Islam (from 1949) to Jama’ah Islamiyah in the early 2000s.

Darul Islam, or, in Indonesian, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII [Indonesian Islamic State]) began as a group of people led by Kartosuwiryo, who attempted to build an Islamic state, during and after the Indonesian revolution. Kartosuwiryo was a Hizbullah [Islamic militia] organiser during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (Barton, 2004). He was not satisfied with the moderate turn Masyumi took after Indonesian independence, so he established Tentara Islam
Indonesia, and one year later NII (in 1949). This movement clashed with the Indonesian nationalist forces such as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). According to the Indonesian government, Darul Islamis associated with ‘rebellion,’ because it attempts to build an ‘Islamic state’ in an existing ‘Pancasila state’ (Indonesia). Eventually Kartosuwiryo was arrested and sentenced to death by the late President Sukarno (Turmudi and Sihbudi, 2005). After his death on 5 September 1962, there was no formal organisation of the Darul Islam until after the early 1970s, when the New Order government used this group for political reasons (Barton, 2004; Fealy, 2005; ICG, 2005a). General Ali Murtopo, the well-known political operator and right hand man of President Suharto, reunited the Darul Islam members. The intention of the New Order government was obvious prior to the 1977 election. Murtopo’s intention was to raise issues of Islamist extremism so as to weaken the one-and-only Islam oriented party allowed at that time, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan.

Early in 1976, Abdullah Sungkar attempted to form a community [jama‘ah] that would work for the establishment of an Islamic state (Solahudin, 2011). However this failed to materialise. Further, in late 1976, Abdullah Sungkar26 and his friend Abu Bakar Ba’asyir joined Darul Islam (ICG, 2005a; Solahudin, 2011), because it supported the establishment of Islamic law. However, before going into partnership with Darul Islam, Abdullah Sungkar, with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and some other supporters, established, the above mentioned Pesantren Al Mukmin, well known as Pondok Pesantren Ngruki (Turmudi and Sihbudi, 2005).

These two prominent figures of Pesantren Ngruki, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, were captured and sent to jail in 1978 for undermining Pancasila, and for their intention of establishing an Islamic state. In 1982 they were brought to trial and sentenced to nine years jail. In 1985 they were released on a technicality (Jones, 2005), but both fled to Malaysia due to the threat of re-arrest, taking their supporters with them. Their years in Malaysia were a significant turning point. Because of the war in Afghanistan, Abdullah Sungkar made contact with mujahidin leaders in Afghanistan and set up a training academy for Darul Islam cadres on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. According to Solahudin (2011), as many as 200 people were involved in the training between 1985 and 1991. Most were Indonesians but some were Singaporeans and Malaysians. Abdullah Sungkar’s main

26 Later, in 1993, Abdullah Sungkar established Jama’ah Islamiyah.
objective, however, was not to fight against the Soviets, but to give military training to Darul Islam cadres, who also received religious training from international *jihad* figures such as Abdullah Azzam, former mentor of Osama bin Laden (Solahudin, 2011). Azzam had extreme views on *jihad* which would later cause controversy among Muslims around the world. As Solahudin notes, Azzam’s view was that it was acceptable to carry out terrorist acts in the name of *jihad*.

Azzam’s radical views had a great impact on the ideological thinking of the Darul Islam members, who were now inducted into a new school of thought, *salafi jihadism*. This radical position went way beyond Darul Islam, which adhered to the traditionalist thinking of Islam. Moreover, Abdullah Sungkar strongly criticised the Imam of Darul Islam, Ajengan Masduki, because of his religious practice, which was perceived to contain *sufi* beliefs (Solahhudin, 2011). The conflict resulting from these different ways of thinking further divided the members of Darul Islam. As explained by Jones (2005), this was a continuing power struggle, with ideological and doctrinal difference between Sungkar and his rival Ajengan Masduki. Both of these men were committed to using force to establish an Islamic state but Sungkar was more excessive in his use of *salafi jihadist* doctrine and, therefore, established Jama’ah Islamiyah in 1993, adopting *salafi jihadism* and also modelling on the radical Egyptian group al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah, with which Sungkar had made close contact during his years in Afghanistan.

Solahudin (2011) explains that the Darul Islam members in Afghanistan were ordered to choose whether to stay with Darul Islam or join Jama’ah Islamiyah under the leadership of Abdullah Sungkar.

These radicals returned to Indonesian at the end of 1999 and Jama’ah Islamiyah went on to carry out several bombings in Indonesia, from church bombings on Christmas Eve 2000 to bombings targeting western icons and people, such as in the Bali bombings and the bombings of the Australian Embassy and JW Marriot/Ritz Carlton Hotels in Jakarta.
2.4. Terrorism and anti-Americanism

2.4.1 Terrorism and jihad
There are many definitions of terrorism. As pointed out by Matusitz (2013: 3), the US Department of Defense definition of terrorism refers to “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.”

Sears’s (2004) definition of terrorism is, to some extent, similar to the above definition. She defines terrorism as a violent act to achieve certain political goals. However, she adds that terrorism has been used for centuries as a political tool used by the oppressed to fight against their oppressors.

There is no general agreement on the definition on terrorism. However, according to most people’s understanding of the term, terrorism relates to the use of violence, and the reason behind it is political, and may also be religious and ideological. Therefore according to this understanding, the five bombings analysed in this thesis were acts of terrorism, because they were acts of violence with political objectives that happen to be related to religion. In these cases, they were acts of terrorism perpetrated by very radical (or extremist) Muslim groups in Indonesia linked to Jama’ah Islamiyah.

For some Muslims, terrorism relates to the jihad concept. Militant Islamists often interpret the jihad concept to justify their acts of violence and believe that terrorism is an effective weapon to use in the fight against their enemies (Sears, 2004).

The meaning of jihad has also been contested among Islamic scholars. Jihad, as defined by Sayyid Qutub, is an offensive war against the enemy of Islam. However, Rasyid Ridha’s definition of jihad is Islamic dakwah and amar ma’raf nahi munkar, i.e. to do good deeds and reject bad deeds and act without violence (Chirzin, 2006). Jihad, according to Qutub and Abdullah Azzam (i.e. to fight against the enemy of Islam and that the use violence is justified) is the ideological context of terrorism and suicide bombings in the name of Islam, including in Indonesia.
Terrorism and *jihad* in Indonesia are linked to historical circumstances, specifically to the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. As previously explained, many Darul Islam members were sent to Afghanistan, not to fight against the Soviet Union, but to receive military training and to embrace the teachings of *jihad*.

After the defeat of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the foreign fighters did not know what to do upon their return home. Other circumstances soon provided new missions. Iraq invaded Kuwait one year after Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government was concerned at that time that Iraq would also attack Saudi Arabia, so they sought help from the United States, which complied with the request (Solahudin, 2011). At the same time, Bin Laden offered his help to the Saudi government, warning them that any US military effort was really an attempt to control Saudi’s oil and that the US army’s presence would be a violation of Islamic principles, since it was in Islam’s holiest land. However, Bin Laden’s offer was rejected, although he was backed by some Saudi religious scholars who demanded that the US leave and that there should be political reform in Saudi Arabia. Solahudin (2011) explains that many outspoken religious scholars were arrested and sent to jail. Bin Laden then fled to Sudan and established a business there, but due to a bomb attack at Riyadh in November 1995, for which he was blamed, the Sudan government was told by the US to hand him over to the US authorities. This forced bin Laden to flee to Afghanistan in 1996.

On 23 August 1996, in the name of the World Islamic Front, Osama bin Laden declared war against the United States and Saudi Arabia (Solahudin, 2011). Two years later, in February 1998, he refocused on the United States, issuing a *fatwa* that it was “the obligation of every Muslim to kill Americans and their allies in whatever country when possible.” Solahudin (2011: 171) further asserts:

> The declaration represented a further evolution of Salafi Jihadi thinking. It positioned America and its allies as the main enemy against whom war must be waged...Bin Laden’s new declaration not only permitted but mandated the killing of civilians (linked to the US).

To further spread his word globally, Bin Laden then invited the Indonesian Jama’ah Islamiyah leaders (at that time Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir) to Afghanistan to a meeting on 3 August 1998 (Solahudin, 2013). He wanted Jama’ah Islamiyah to shift from local concerns (such as establishing an Islamic state/Islamic law) to an international context targeting the United States.
As Solahudin (2013), explains, after the meeting with Bin Laden, the JI leaders shared their views with both Darul Islam and JI members. The Darul Islam members rejected bin Laden’s *fatwa*, however the JI members were divided. Those who agreed with bin Laden’s *fatwa* carried out the attack on Bali on October 2002 and the further bombings that are analysed in this thesis.

2.4.2 Voices of anti-western sentiments and conspiracy theories

As Mujani states (2005:1), “anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia,” yet it came more clearly into focus following the destruction, by Islamist terrorists, of the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001. This was the work of Al Qaeda, an Islamist organisation, led by Osama bin Laden. The perpetrators deliberately targeted the economic and military centres of the US, which, according to them, were symbols of the superiority of the United States. Following this attack, the discourse of terrorism or terrorists and their link to Islamsurfaced, while at the same time anti-Americanism emerged more clearly in Indonesia when President Bush launched his ‘War on Terror,’ including the US led military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan (which, for many Muslims, constitute a war against Islam).

The Indonesian government at that time, led by President Megawati, reacted promptly following the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. She travelled to the US, voicing condemnation of the attack and offering moral support to Bush’s government. However, the reaction of her Vice President, Hamzah Haz, was embarrassing for Megawati, since he publically announced that September 11 would “cleanse the sins of the United States” (Rabasa, 2003:32). This statement naturally angered the US government when it was delivered to worshippers in the mosques. However, in the Muslim context, Haz’s statement can be explained as meaning that ‘the US needed introspection,’ as Sebastian asserts (2003: 432):

Hamzah Haz qualified his expressions of sympathy with the view that the terrorist violence may help the US ‘atone for its sins.’ He was presumably referring to US policy in the Middle East. His remarks to a Western audience may seem insensitive but no doubt resonated within Muslim circles. For Muslims, the accepted response to a tragedy is to submit oneself (pasrah) to the will of God and in the process to engage in self-examination in an attempt to comprehend the meaning of the tragedy. The Vice President’s statements could be interpreted to mean that though he deplored the attacks, he called on America to practice introspection.
Many Indonesians became increasingly disaffected with the United States following its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq (Anwar, 2008). Because the majority of people in both those countries were Muslims, the US led war against terrorism was seen as a disguised attempt to advance American power and undermine the Islamic world (Smith 2003).

Thus there is a strong impression among Muslims that the US-led war in Afghanistan and the war against terrorism was a war against Islam and Muslims; this impression grew stronger when President George W. Bush gave his military operation in Afghanistan the code name “crusade” and later “infinite justice.” Even though President Bush, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, attempted to make it clear that the war was not against Islam by visiting mosques and Islamic centres and having meetings with Muslim leaders to stress that their military operations in Afghanistan are not against Islam, the perception persists among many Muslims that the west continues to show its hostility towards Islam and Muslims. (Azra, 2006:136)

President Megawati’s refusal to support the US military intervention in Afghanistan is understandable in the Indonesian political context, as Indonesians may have seen her as merely a nominal Muslim from a nationalist party, and she therefore had to be cautious in her stance.

Although probably the majority of Indonesian Muslims did not approve of the Taliban or of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the dominant discourse that developed in the Muslim community in Indonesia (as elsewhere) was that these military interventions were attacks on Muslims (Sebastian, 2003; Sukma, Ma’ruf and Abdullah, 2011). Following the US intervention in Afghanistan, protests and demonstration rallies were held in Indonesia, mainly in Jakarta. Angry crowds from various Islamist groups gathered around the US embassy in Jakarta, rallying and protesting against Bush’s “holy war" (Hasan, 2005: 303). According to Hasan (2005), these demonstrations took place not only in Jakarta, but also in several other cities in Indonesia, with demonstrators burning flags and billboard advertisements for McDonald’s and Kentucky Fried Chicken, which are American icons.

Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which are considered to be moderate, voiced their deepest rejection of the attack on Afghanistan, and Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI [Indonesian Council of Ulama]), a semi-government organisation of ulama, also voiced their objections against the US. MUI’s statement said: “We condemn the attack of the US in Afghanistan as a manifestation of arrogance and the true evil which challenges human rights and justice and truth” (Smith, 2005a:106). Not only did the MUI condemn the attack on Afghanistan, but its Secretary General read a statement

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27 An ulama is a Muslim scholar.
ordering Muslims to prepare for *jihad* (Ichwan, 2013). However, as Ichwan explains, MUI later revised this statement, explaining that *jihad* was not meant in the sense of war, but rather as a struggle for good.

Somberadical Islamist groups, as a protest against the attack on Afghanistan, threatened to ‘sweep Indonesia clean of Americans’ and send *mujahidin* fighters to Afghanistan. This threat was seen by the Head of National Indonesian Intelligence as being against the law and an act of terrorism. It was stated by the Minister for Religious Affairs, Said Agil al Munawwar, that any Indonesian who participated in the *jihad* in Afghanistan would automatically lose his citizenship (Budiman, 2002). In fact, the ‘sweep’ never took place and no-one lost his citizenship.

As explained earlier, the negative sentiment of Indonesians towards the United States is due in part to the solidarity Indonesians Muslims feel towards their brothers and sisters in other Muslim countries.

However, the anti-American attitude does not necessarily condone violent actions or even demonstrations and protests. Mujani’s national survey (2005) shows that only 1.5% of Indonesians have participated in anti-American demonstrations. Therefore, although many Indonesians dislike the United States (mostly because of its foreign policy), most of them do not approve of demonstrations and even fewer approve of violent actions against the US. As Mujani (2005), asserts, although the demonstration outside the United States Embassy in Jakarta involved thousands of people, it was too small to claim that Indonesian society is anti-American. Although many Indonesians dislike the Americans, for the most part they do not actively show their feelings in public, let alone carry out violent actions against them.

So who does take part in anti-Americanism demonstrations and protests? Most likely, the demonstrators are members of radical Islamist groups. These radical groups, according to Anwar (2008), feel pure hatred towards all Americans and symbols of America. Thus, as explained by Imam Samudra (2004:120), one of the perpetrators of the Bali bomb 1, “in the context of the Bali bombing, the main target is clear, the United States and its allies.”

Conspiracy theories in relation to terrorism and bombings in Indonesia are also widespread. Conspiracy theorists believe that the United States is involved in the bombings and also
believe that the US is linked to the Jews, who are considered, according to Islamist discourse, to be a leading force in the US. 

In Indonesia, the evident discourse concerning Jews is a belief that their strong influence is corrupting Islam (Siegel, 2000). It is, therefore, not unusual to hear news referring to Jews as being behind the bombings in Indonesia, rather than blaming Jama’ah Islamiyah. Moreover, it was rumoured among some Indonesians that the September 11 attack was part of a dirty scheme by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, and that 4,000 Jews had left the building before the attack (Budiman, 2002). This conviction is further evidenced by polls that have been carried out in Indonesia and also by the Pew Global Research Center (2011), which found that most of the respondents believed that the bombing was the work of Jews. 

In addition, the Pew Global Research Center (2011), carried out a survey on whether Indonesians believed that the September 11 bombings were the work of Arabs. The results showed that only 20% (of 1000 respondents) believed they were. This number was only a slight rise from the 16% who stated this belief in their 2006 survey, clearly indicating that the vast majority of Indonesians had held to the view that America and the Jews were to blame. 

The picture below was taken during the Indonesian Justice Party rally. The description of the photo is my translation. 

**Figure 2.1 Rally accusing the United States as being behind the Bali bombing**

Description of the photo: A protest by the Justice Party, accusing the United States of being behind the Bali bombing which killed 180 people. The party prayed together, welcoming the fasting month of Ramadan (1423 H), in the Al Azhar Mosque, Jakarta, on Sunday 3

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28 This is currently named the Prosperous Justice Party.
29 This is according to the Islamic calendar.

This Muslim demonstration illustrates the relationship between religion and the anti-American attitudes of many Indonesians. As explained earlier, one of the reasons for the negative sentiment towards the United States is the solidarity Indonesian Muslims feel towards Muslims in other Muslim countries. Mujani’s (2005) research explains the relationship between religion and anti-American sentiment in the context of Indonesia. His research was undertaken in Aceh (a Muslim majority province) and on the island of Nias (which has a Christian/Catholic majority). The findings show that most Muslims in Aceh (61%) dislike the United States, while only 7% of Christians/Protestants in Nias dislike the United States. Considering that both of these areas experienced tsunami tragedies and received aid from the United States, this strongly supports the conclusion that religion is a major factor in determining Indonesian attitudes towards the United States.

This demonstration also illustrates the widespread conspiracy theory contained within the discourse linking Indonesia, Muslims and Jews according to which the Jews seek to destroy Islam and to rule the world (Bruinessen 1993), using the US as their agents. As can be seen in the photo above, the demonstrators brought a banner stating ‘USA & Jews-designed Bali bomb.’

This conspiracy theory in its original form spread along with anti-Semitism from the Western countries to Arabian countries where the anti-Islam dimension was added, propelled by the establishment of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli conflict. This scape-goating of the Jews in Indonesia (where there are almost no Jews) as noted by Bruinessen (1993), comes from the Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. He notes that the hatred to Jews cannot be separated from the Palestine and Israel conflict. The Indonesian Islamic community views the occupation of Israel in Gaza as injustice for Palestines. This can be seen through many demonstrations and protests against Israel by Muslim organizations in Jakarta or other cities elsewhere. Indonesia and Middle East has long had a close relationship. Many Indonesians travel and study in the Middle East. This certainly eases the exchange of ideas from the Middle East to Indonesia. (Bubalo, A., Fealy, G 2005)

Bruinessen (1993) notes that there are also anti Jews expressions which are not linked to the Israel and Palestinian conflict. The target of the anti Jew attacks are actually aspects of the
political situation in Indonesia which Islamist groups do not like, for example the spreading of the Islamic liberal thinking, human rights concepts, which are then linked to the conspiracy theory about the Jews. In other words everything antithetical to Islamist thinking and objectives is held to be part of the Jewish plot, including in this instance the Bali bomb.

2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to provide an explication of Islam and the Islamisation of Indonesian society, leading to a better understanding of Islamism generally, and, in relation to this research, of the discourse which takes place in the magazines analysed and of the readers’ responses to it.

To sum up, the Muslim community in Indonesia has become far more Islamised in recent decades. This can be seen from the everyday lives of Indonesian Muslims, who, more and more, are practising the rituals of Islam, such as fasting during Ramadan and praying five times a day, and are undertaking many Qur’anic courses. Their Muslim identity is not only shown on their KTP (ID card) but is also put into practice in the performance of Islamic rituals and practices, and increasingly in efforts to live their everyday lives in conformity to normative Islamic beliefs. This Islamisation of Indonesian society naturally has political expressions also, including the trend towards Islamist politics.

Highly relevant to the latter is the significant change in the social and political situation in the post-New Order which has brought democratisation and has also brought a new ‘face’ of Islam to Indonesia. There is a rise in religious intolerance and a mushrooming of radical Islamist groups with various agendas, such as establishing an Islamic state or even approving acts of violence. This rise in religious intolerance is further linked to the Islamist discourse referring to Islam in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia. The link between the radical groups, which had existed for a long time, developed significantly in the New Order. LIPIA was established as an educational instrument to disseminate Saudi’s Wahhabism, and there was close contact between members or leaders of Darul Islam and Jama’ah Islamiyah.

To sum up, the manifestation of Islamisation in Indonesia as explained in this chapter brought up the Islamist political religious views within the mainstream discourse. In this case, this view entered into the press which in this research are the Islamist magazines that I will
explore. A further question to be explored in the case of bombings and terrorism in this research is whether an Islamist discourse has also entered the general magazines, bearing in mind that Indonesia has considerably grown more Islamised.

The following chapter discusses the context of the Indonesian press publications, and the place of the general and Islamist press in contemporary Indonesia. The dissemination of the Islamist discourse in the press will also be discussed.
Chapter 3

The Indonesian Press in Context

This chapter gives the context of the Indonesian press in the New Order and in the reform era. There are significant differences between these two periods in terms of the extent of state control. The government in the New Order controlled the press through the Department of Information, which issued publishing permits (SIUPP). However, since the beginning of the reform era, the Department of Information has been eliminated and publishing permits are no longer required. With the reform era came a huge increase in the number of various press publications, including the rise of the so-called ‘Islamic’ press/publications and ‘Islamist’ press/publications. As explained in Chapter 1, the Islamic press/publications referred to in this thesis are print/press publications which are targeting Muslims, but which do not adhere to the Islamist ideology. On the other hand, the Islamist press/publications are print press/publications also targeting Muslims, but with an Islamist ideology.

Generally speaking, in the New Order the Indonesian press was controlled by the state, but it became a freer press in the reform era. These changes were in line with the political context in Indonesia, as explained in Chapter 2. The background information not only shows the positions of the so-called Islamic press and the Islamist press in contemporary Indonesia, but also helps in understanding that the rise of the press ran parallel with social and political changes, both local and global. Both the Islamisation of Indonesia society (as outlined in Chapter 2) and the Muslim globalisation which disseminated the Islamist discourse are significant factors in shaping the Muslim mediascape in Indonesia.

3.1 The press in the New Order

3.1.1 State control

A few studies by western scholars on the Indonesian press have made a large contribution to this field of study, especially in giving us an understanding of the social and political background to how the Indonesian press operates.

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30 The ‘Indonesian press/publication’ throughout this thesis refers to the print press, including newspapers and magazines.
Some examples of scholars who especially studied the Indonesian press during the New Order era are Hill (1994) and Romano (2003), who focused on the Indonesian press system, and Steele (2005), who focused on the publication of Tempo magazine.

During the New Order President Suharto stressed the importance of the press as a ‘partner’ in the developmental process of the nation. The press system, which was considered to be in accordance with Indonesian values, is ‘pers Pancasila’ [Pancasila press]. According to the Press Act of 1966, the obligations of the press were to safeguard, defend, uphold and implement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in all their purity (Flournoy, as cited in Sharp, 2013).

The Indonesian government’s concept of a “free and responsible press” press was different from the concept of such a press in the West (Romano, 2003: 41). In the Indonesian context, the press was expected to operate within a system which could not criticise the government, as it was the responsibility of the press to support the development of the nation. It had no ‘watchdog’ role as it has in western countries.

In practice, the freedom allowed to pers Pancasila is frequently expressed as the freedom not to hurt society (Romano, 2003). Romano also explains the MISS SARA acronym which was introduced during the New Order. The press was forbidden from covering news that could cause instability or conflict in society. Menghasut [incitation], Insinuasi [insinuation], Sensasi [sensation], or Spekulasi [speculation] which could fuel tensions of Suku [ethnic], Agama [religion], Ras [race], Antar Golongan [inter groups rivalry] was strictly forbidden.

The New Order regime held control over the press in various ways, both formally and informally limiting ‘press freedom.’ Editors could be phoned by the Department of Information or by the military army regarding news that displeased them. This “telephone culture,” as McCargo (1999: 31) quotes from Hanazaki (1998) could be a warning for them not to cover a particular news item. Further, McCargo stresses the large number of press bans during this era and the obligation of the press to join the official journalist organisation, Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI), which was controlled by the government. The leaders of PWI were usually active or retired army generals.

31Hill’s (1994) book The Press in New Order Indonesia has also been translated into Indonesian.
Heryanto and Adi (2002: 53) describe the tight control of the press during the Suharto regime:

During the first 25 years of Soeharto’s New Order Regime (roughly 1966–1990) the press was stripped of its political power, tightly controlled and blatantly co-opted. It was depoliticized, except in matters such as providing support for the ruling government and justifying the latter’s use of repression.

The press control in the New Order lay in the Press Act of 1966, which required the press to own a *Surat Ijin Terbit* (SIT [Permit to Publish]) from the Department of Information and a *Surat Ijin Cetak* (SIC [Permit to Print]) from the Military [Kopkambtib]. In 1982, the *Surat Ijin Terbit* was renamed *Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers* (SIUPP [Press Publication Enterprise Permit]) (Steele, 2005).

The government’s control of the press reached its peak on 21 June 1994, when the Department of Information banned three press publications, *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik*. This ban was caused by their coverage critical of the New Order Government’s purchase of 39 ex-East German warships, a transaction supported by the Minister for Research and Technology, BJ Habibie (Harsono, 2000; McCargo, 1999; Steele, 2005). The ships were not only expensive, but the press also covered the disapproval of the Minister for Finance, Mar’ie Muhammad, who opposed their purchase because he considered them over-priced. In the end, it emerged that one of the ships sank during its journey to Indonesia. This whole coverage undoubtedly angered the government.

The press banning led to mass protests and demonstrations in the streets in many cities in Indonesia. At that time, I was a student at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Yogyakarta and I was amongst the protesters. Thousands of students from many universities in Yogyakarta gathered in UGM to protest against the banning. The police came and dispersed the demonstrators with water and gas and also beat them.

The Department of Information offered the magazines the chance to publish again if they agreed to a political compromise—they would have to share their ownership with Suharto’s inner circle. This was later evident when *Editor* was republished under the name ‘*Tiras,*’

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32 *Tempo* and *Editor* are both magazines and *Detik* is a weekly tabloid.
33 *Editor* was first published in 1987.
with the majority shareholder being the Minister for Manpower at that time, Abdul Latief (McCargo, 1999; Sen and Hill, 2000).

*Tempo’s* position was different from that of *Editor*.*Tempo* had a larger staff, was better established and was given permission to publish again as ‘*Gatra,*’ with the majority shareholder being Bob Hasan, who was a Suharto crony. Some of the staff were reluctant to join the new magazine—75% of them agreed to move to *Gatra* while the remaining 45 journalists and some editorial staff and office boys did not agree (Steele, 2005). *Detik* was republished as ‘*Simponi,*’ but there were no publications after its first launch because PWI withdrew its recommendation, claiming the tabloid featured articles which were not in accordance with its permit.

The relationship between Indonesian journalists and the government was deteriorating after the three bannings, a situation which eventually triggered the establishment of the Alliance of Independent Journalists [Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI)]\(^{34}\) who challenged the government-owned journalist organisation, Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI). Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (established 21 June 1994) had extensive support in Jakarta and in major cities in Indonesia such as Bandung, Surabaya and Yogyakarta. To further challenge the government, AJI published an underground bulletin, *Suara Independen* [Voice of Independence] (Harsono, 2000). The circulation of *Suara Independen* without a publishing permit angered the government. Eventually, three AJI\(^{35}\) journalists were sent to jail for propagating hatred of the government and publishing without the required publishing permit (SIUPP). The government’s strong control over the journalists and the press ended in 1998, as soon as Suharto was forced to step down and was replaced by BJ Habibie.

### 3.1.2 The general and the Islamic press in the New Order

#### 3.1.2.1 The general press/publications

Press publication in Indonesia in the New Order grew into a corporate industry that could make money. Sen and Hill (2000:56) state: “The press was being formally reconstructed from an ideological tool for political groups to an industry producing goods for the market.” One characteristic of the press during this era, according to Sen and Hill (2000: 57) was that

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\(^{34}\) Sen and Hill (2000: 53) state that AJI was “a radical alternative to PWI.”

\(^{35}\) According to Sen and Hill (2000), four journalists were jailed.
“there were fewer publications, concentrated in fewer hands but with large readership.” The largest industry was Kelompok Kompas Gramedia [Kompas Gramedia Group], which became a publication ‘empire.’ This group, which was established by a Catholic-Javanese, published Kompas, the prestigious national daily newspaper. Kompas was owned by Jacob Oetama and the late PK Ojong, both well-known Catholics, and its birth was supported by Catholic parties, Catholic Universities and Catholic organisations (Sen and Hill, 2000). However, in the early 1970s, the relationship between Kompas and the Catholics became more distant. The New Order government issued a policy pushing the newspaper to be independent from the political parties (Sudibyo, 2001). In 1997, the final year of the New Order’s regime, in a count of print publications, Kompas Gramedia Group had 9 newspapers, 5 tabloids and 14 magazines. Kompas’ survived the bannings in the New Order due to the care it took in its self-censorship in relation to political issues (Sen and Hill, 2000).

During the New Order, the Kompas Gramedia Group was central in publishing not only newspapers but also various magazines and tabloids, one of which was Monitor, with a distribution of over 700,000. The Chief Editor of this tabloid, Arswendo Atmowiloto, was a Catholic. In its edition of 15 October 1990, Monitor carried out a poll to identify the most popular people in Indonesia. The result of the poll outraged Indonesian Muslims because the Prophet Muhammad was ranked eleventh. Atmowiloto himself was ranked tenth and the Indonesian President at that time (President Suharto) was in first place. There were mass demonstrations, and attacks on the office of Monitor, which was accused of blasphemy and of belittling the Prophet Muhammad (Hefner, 1993). The Minister for Information banned the tabloid and Persatuan Wartawan Indonesiawithdrew Atmowiloto’s membership. Atmowiloto was then prosecuted for undermining Islam and sentenced to five years jail because the judges agreed that comparing the Prophet to ordinary people was an outrageous act of blasphemy.

The second largest press empire, according to Sen and Hill (2000), was the Jawa Pos Group, which was acquisitioned by PT Grafiti Pers, who owned the prestigious weekly magazine, Tempo. Further, as Sen and Hill state, this group, by the late years of Suharto’s regime, had 20 daily newspapers, 5 weekly tabloids and 4 magazines. This group was considered as a success, since it was the only press publication successful in publishing outside Jakarta.

36 The question of the poll was: “Who do you admire most and why?”
Tempo, the weekly publication, was set up in 1966 by three former student activists, Goenawan Mohamad, Fikri Jufri and Christianto Wibisono. Goenawan and his friends were mainly interested in publishing a magazine similar to Time. When it was first published in early 1971, Tempo’s articles were written by top quality writers, poets and intellectuals (Steele, 2005). As a magazine which developed during the New Order, and in consideration of the government’s strong control of the press, Tempo had strategies to avoid being banned. One of the strategies was to maintain close links with people in the government (Steele, 2005). This tactic began in 1982, when Tempo was first banned. However, Tempo’s initial preference for government minister turned out to be unwise. According to Steele (2005), the banning in 1994 had a political tone of its own, although, as already explained, coverage critical of the controversial purchase of the East German ships by Habibie saw Tempo banned due to the complex underlying politics surrounding the purchase. Further, Steele explained that the Department of Information wanted to topple Fikri Jufri, who was in charge of Tempo at this time. He was considered to be close to General Benny Murdani, a Christian Javanese and Chief of ABRI in 1988, and then Minister for Defence and Security. The Indonesian political landscape was starting to change in the 1990s (as explained in Chapter 2), and the Suharto government was strengthening its ties with Muslims. As Steele further cites from the ex-Tempo journalists, Fikri Jufri ought to have been removed by Tempo due to this closeness to Murdani, and the moment for his removal came when Tempo published the story about the controversial purchase (supported by Habibie) of the 39 ex-East German warships, which exposed Tempo to political retribution.

3.1.2.2 The Islamic press/publications
As explained in Chapter 2, Islam was politically marginalised in the New Order until Suharto’s political turnaround in the 1990s. In this context, the Islamic press was also politically marginal and was not a ‘big business.’

37 In 1993, General Murdani was removed from this position. (During this period, President Suharto was known to have problems in his relationship with the General.)
38 Murdani was no longer in agreement with Suharto, and some political observers and analysts noted that the President shifted his political stance towards Indonesian Muslims in order to gain support.
39 One of Steele’s informants in her study explained how Fikri Jufri tended to be biased. General Murdani was always depicted as a good person. On the other hand, Habibie, who was also the Head of the Indonesian Muslims Intellectual Organisation, was depicted as bad. Moreover, Tempo also covered Murdani’s daughters’ wedding, which was regarded as a big event. According to Harmoko, the Minister of Information at that time, Jufri had chosen sides. Harmoko, according to Steele, had also told Tempo to remove Fikri Jufri, but Tempo had refused to do it.
Hill (1994: 124) describes well the position of the Islamic press in the New Order. It is somewhat surprising to many foreign observers that, while more than 80% of the Indonesian population is categorised as Muslim, two of the largest daily newspapers are associated with Christian interests. Overall, there has been a sorry history of unsuccessful attempts to establish and sustain explicitly Muslim papers. Since the banning of Abadi in 1974 and particularly during the mid-1980s, the Islamic media has been marginalised by more professional, secular or Christian interests.

Abadi was the Islamic daily newspaper which was published by Masyumi. As Hill explained, it was banned in 1974, along with 11 other publications. Following the arrival of Japan’s Prime Minister Tanaka on 14 January 1974, there were protests and demonstrations, with Japanese cars being set alight and showrooms of the Astra Company and the Coca Cola Plant attacked (Steele, 2005). Following these demonstrations, 12 publication firms had their licenses withdrawn, among them the Islamic daily newspaper, Abadi, which was considered to be the voice of Masyumi supporting Muslims (Hefner, 1997). This daily newspaper and another Indonesian English daily, The Jakarta Times, were the only two publications that were allowed to republish, albeit under another name and with stipulated changes to the editorial staff. Abadi was obliged to change its name to ‘Pelita’ and The Jakarta Times became the Indonesian Times (Hill, 1994). As Hill further explains, the daily Pelita was well accepted in the market, until the New Order regime suspected that its presence was supporting the PPP, the Muslim opposition party in the 1977 and 1982 general elections. Pelita was immediately banned after the 1982 election and republished four months later, but was abandoned by its Muslim readers due to its moderate reporting and a management which was seen as commercially pragmatic (Hill, 1994). Eventually, in 1985, ten principal Golkar members took control of 60% of the shares of the daily Pelita, recruiting Muslim journalists from Kompas, but even this could not boost its circulation, and it decreased significantly following the sacking of 52 of its 253 journalists and the resignation of 4 key editorial staff who had come from Kompas (Hill, 2004).

The Islamic press in the New Order failed, according to Hill (2004), because of its inability to find a balance between accommodating the interests of its readers while at the same time accommodating the state’s interest. The general media has long been seen as not having the ability to stand up for the Islamic ummah because of its support for the government.
Thus, after the banning of Abadi, the Muslim ummah did not have a media voice to represent them until the early 1990s, following the establishment of ICMI.\textsuperscript{40} Owned by ICMI, Republika was published on 4 January 1993, by Yayasan Abdi Bangsa\textsuperscript{41}, as the national daily newspaper based on the ideology of Islam. It covered a broad spectrum of Islamic perspectives, from the liberal to the literal (Watson, 2005).

\textit{Republika} brought together an impressive clutch of some of the country’s major liberal Islamic intellectuals and journalists, into a venture designed to produce a ‘quality’ paper which was broadly secular in its coverage of events and issues, yet informed ideologically by Islamic values in much the same manner that \textit{Kompas} or \textit{Suara Pembaruan} were by Christianity.\textsuperscript{(Hill, 1994:126)}

SIUPP was easily obtained by Republika because ICMI was led by Suharto’s confidant, and its content was not considered as ‘hardline.’ During this period, SIUPP was not only hard to obtain but also expensive, at a cost, according to Hefner’s (1997) informant, of $140,000.

In the early years of Republika, among the Senior Editors of this daily newspaper were some renowned Muslim intellectuals, including Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, Amien Rais, and Adi Sasono (Anwar, 2012) who were members of ICMI. Currently, Republika is owned by Erick Tohir, one of Indonesia’s businessman. Although not owned by ICMI, Republika is still a representative symbol of the Islamic community (Anwar, 2012).

Karni (2010) divides the Islamic press (as distinct from the Islamist press) in the New Order into two categories, ‘moderat’ [moderate] and ‘berhaluan kanan’\textsuperscript{42} [leaning towards the right]. His standpoint for this categorisation is from a view of the political genre of the magazine, i.e. whether its political stance is moderate or radical. According to him, the two moderate magazines were \textit{Ummat} and \textit{Panji Masyarakat}. Both were Islamic press, had publishing permits and were available to the public (Karni, 2010). \textit{Ummat} was first published in 1995 and \textit{Panji Masyarakat}\textsuperscript{43} in 1997. \textit{Panji Masyarakat} was established by the renowned Islamic scholar, Buya Hamka (Irawanto, 2011), and \textit{Ummat} by Mizan, one of the largest Islamic publishing companies in Indonesia. These moderate magazines\textsuperscript{44} only lasted for four years until they were officially closed. One more highly prestigious magazine journal in the

\textsuperscript{40} ICMI and its birth are explained in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{41} Yayasan Abdi Bangsa is ICMI’s organisation for collecting and managing financial sources for ICMI.
\textsuperscript{42} By this, Karni means leaning towards more ‘radical Islam’ in western terminology.
\textsuperscript{43} According to Karni, \textit{Panjimas} was first published in 1967 but due to the low circulation and low advertising revenue, it was not published after 2002. In 1997, it was published with a ‘new look’ under new management and the Islamic content was reduced and more space was given to social and political issues.
\textsuperscript{44} Muhammad (2005) and Karni (2010) state that these magazines can be categorised as moderate Muslim magazines.
New Order was *Ulumul Qur’an* (Muhammad, 2005). This too, did not last long. The demise of these magazines was due to poor management, which is a serious problem for Islamic magazines, as explained by Muhammad, and, according to Hill (1994), the Islamic press were less professional in their reporting, and problems lay in identifying and defining the potential readership as well as in efficient marketing and distribution.

Magazines which are seen as ‘leaning towards the right’ (Karni, 2010) include *Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah*, and these are the subject of this thesis. An examination of these magazines will be included at the end of this chapter.

### 3.2 The press in the reform era

#### 3.2.1 Liberalisation of the press and the media

After the downfall of Suharto, following 32 years of authoritarian rule, the relationship between the state and the media and the press in Indonesia changed to a more open system, and, generally speaking, the state no longer controls the press as it did in the New Order. The liberalisation of the press began when President Suharto was forced to step down and was replaced by BJ Habibie, his previous Vice President. Habibie appointed Lieutenant General Yunus Yosfiah[^45] as the Minister for Information (Sen and Hill, 2000). Although many journalists were doubtful about Yosfiah’s true intention at that time, SIUPP was eventually removed, which meant that the government’s intervention in the press stopped. As a result, there was a tremendous increase in publications in Indonesia. Another significant reform by Yosfiah was the removal of the Minister for Information’s regulations on press bannings (Permenpen No.01/1984). Once these regulations no longer existed, a spirit of ‘anti-state control’ emerged during the early years of reform, in reaction to Suharto’s tight control of the press (Kristiawan, 2012). Yosfiah involved Indonesian senior journalists and media law specialist Toby Mendel, from Canada, in the creation of the new press regulations.

[^45]: As Sen (2000) and Steele (2005) explain, Yosfiah was notorious for his involvement in the 1975 ‘Balibo 5,’ affair, in which five Australian journalists were killed in East Timor. He was Captain when on duty in Balibo, East Timor. A comprehensive explanation of Yunus Yosfiah and the background of releasing and easing the publishing permit is given by Steele (2012). After finishing his duty at East Timor in 1979, he was appointed to study at the US Army Command and General Staff college at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA. During his stay in the US, he observed the relationship between the government and the press in the democratic system. Yunus wrote a thesis, *The Role of the Mass Media in Developing Countries (India and South Africa)*, which, according to Steele (2012), showed the transformation of his thinking on how the press should be.
The removal of the SIUPP resulted in an enormous growth in media publications, and a tremendous increase in the number of TV and radio stations. Pintak lists totals of 30,000 journalists, more than 1,000 print publications, 150 TV stations and 2,000 radio stations (Pintak and Setiyono, 2011: 186). Not only did the freedom of the press impact on the growth of various publications, but also on the concentration of ownership in the hands of a number of media conglomerates. In other words, as Nugroho et al. (Nugroho, Y., Putri, DA., Laksmi, S.2012:4) asserts, “the growth of the media industry in Indonesia has been driven by capital interest leading to a media oligopoly and the concentration of ownership.” According to Haryanto (2011), of the nine major group companies owning mediabusinesses, half are new to the media business, with no prior experience in media and journalism. Haryanto states that these business owners are keen to use the media to further their own ends, including their economic and political interests. Major groups, such as Kompas (well-known as Kompas-Gramedia Group and prominent for its national daily newspaper, *Kompas*) and Tempo group (prominent for its *Tempo* magazine and East Java based national daily, *Jawa Pos*), which were dominant in the New Order, currently still exist, but there are more competitors in the market, including new-comers and the franchise publications.

Like Haryanto (2012), Lim (2012) provides details of 13 major media companies and also maps the landscape of the media industry in Indonesia—‘the league of thirteen media concentration in Indonesia.’ Unfortunately, only one print publication was included among her 13 big industry media companies, the Islam national daily newspaper, *Republika*, which is currently owned by Erick Tohir, who also owns a Mandarin daily, *Harian Indonesia*. It would appear that Islamic publications are not an attractive investment.

Although the government’s intervention in the workings of the press is different from what it was in the New Order, threats now come from the public. Accusations of defamation and of not in being in accordance with religious moral values can threaten the press. One example of this, as described by Steele (2012), is the case involving *Tempo* and Tomy Winata, a ‘tycoon businessman,’ concerning a fire at Tanah Abang market in 2003. *Tempo* covered the story and related the fire to the interests and involvement of Tomy Winata. Winata sued *Tempo*, and his supporters surrounded the *Tempo* office to protest the reporting. The chief editor of *Tempo*, Bambang Harymurti, was sentenced to one year in jail.

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46 Tohir’s company, Mahaka Media, bought the majority of *Republika* shares in 2000. The newspaper was heading towards bankruptcy (Anwar, 2012).
Another example, in relation to ‘pornography,’ was the publishing of the Indonesian *Playboy*. After it was first published in April 2006, the magazine was attacked by Islamic groups, such as Front Pembela Islam, who disapproved of its publication, and the Chief Editor of *Playboy Indonesia* was sued for undermining public morals (Kitley, 2008). The Chief Editor was named a ‘moral terrorist’ and found guilty of indecency, and sentenced to two years in jail. This case shows that the Islamists in the reform era are making their voices heard.

### 3.2.2 The Islamic press in the reform era

The removal of SIUPP, after the fall of Suharto in 1998, stimulated the creation of many more Islamic publications. Irawanto (2011) lists 44 Islamic press establishments existing in the reform era, and divides the publications into several genres, according to their content. This number is large, compared to the number existing in 1994 (during the New Order), when, of 275 publications, only 13 were Islam-based (Hill, 1994).

Irawanto’s categories for the magazines include: Islamic proselytising, popular culture, mysticism, political Islam, Islamic rituals, Sufism, women, and teenagers (girls). In general, the challenge in the Islamic press, according to Jakfar (2010), is not only the lack of good management and lack of capital, but also the fine balance needed between identifying market demand and not compromising ideology. Undoubtedly, this view concerned the ‘political Islam’ genre, as mentioned by Irawanto (2011). As will be explained below, not many publications of the political Islam genre survived in this reform era, and yet the magazines propounding Islamist ideology have survived.

In the reform era, two of the magazines that were established in the New Order went out of business. *Ummat* stopped publishing in 1999, one year after the reform era began, because of lack of advertising support and low circulation (Karni, 2010). Before it was closed, circulation was only 20,000 copies. *Panjimas* was also closed down in 2001, for the same reasons as *Ummat*, but *Panjimas* was revived and turned into a luxury paper which was published fortnightly from 2003. However, this reprieve did not last long, and *Panjimas* is no longer published.
The outcome for both these ‘moderate’ magazines (as Karni (2010) labels *Panjimas* and *Ummat*) is interesting, when compared to that of *Sabili*\(^{47}\). In the reform era, when the marketing restrictions on the press were lifted, *Sabili*, a magazine which is considered to be ‘hard-line,’ survived. In other words, when there was state intervention in the press (during the New Order) the so-called moderate magazines, such as *Panjimas* and *Ummat*, survived, and the so-called hard-line magazines sank (Karni, 2010). However, when the press was opened up to the market and state intervention was reduced, the moderate magazines lost ground, and the hard-line magazines increased in circulation.

At the other end of the spectrum is *Madina*, a moderate, pluralist magazine, established in 2007 by Mizan, a well-known Islamic publishing company. This magazine did not survive long however, and closed down in October 2009. According to Muhammad (2005), the decline of the moderate Islamic press is caused not only by poor financial management but also by poor editorial management, including choosing news items and packaging them in as interesting a way as possible.

A liberal Islamic magazine, *Syir’ah*, was first published in the reform era, in September 2001. The language used in this magazine tended to be academic rather than journalistic. *Syir’ah* was seen as promoting religious tolerance and multiculturalism from a multiculturalist perspective and as being inclusive of all levels of Islam (Irawanto 2011; Laksmi and Haryanto, 2007). It tended to be more ‘daring’ than *Ummat* and *Panjimas*. Controversial and sensitive themes, such as homosexuality and inter-faith marriages by Muslims, were some of the topics covered. Therefore, to a large extent, *Syir’ah* was seen as a liberal Muslim magazine. It only lasted for six years. According to Laksmi and Haryanto (2007), *Syir’ah* could not survive alone financially and was dependent on the aid of donors, one of which was the Asia Foundation.

There are also magazines for Muslim women, such as *Ummi* and *Aisha*, which focus on professional career women, and *Noor* and *Paras* which focus on women’s fashion. For teenage Muslim girls, there is *Annida*. Islamic mysticism and supernatural belief are also among the popular genres (Irawanto, 2011), catered for by *Hidayah*, *Hikayah*, *Ghoib*, *Al Kisah* and others.

\(^{47}\) Since 1998, *Sabili* has been openly available to the public because the publishing permit was granted.
To sum up, the number of Islamic publications has increased significantly in the reform era. Although a range of genres is available, this thesis will focus on the political Islam genre, described by Irawanto (2011) as usually having an Islamist ideology, and referred to here as the ‘Islamist press.’

3.2.3 The dissemination of Islamist discourse in the press

The designation of the ‘Islamist press’ refers to a press publication which targets Muslims and has an Islamist ideology. This is similar to the ‘political Islam-oriented magazines’ genre as defined by Irawanto (2011).

This research raises also the question of the dissemination of Islamist ideology throughout Indonesia. The media is a powerful instrument in doing this, especially in the Reform Era. As explained in Chapter 2, the rise of democracy, in parallel with the rise of the free press, has meant that there is a new freedom to disseminate ideas, as compared to the situation during the New Order, when the government was authoritarian and the press was controlled.

Islamist discourse and the Islamist press are not new phenomena. The significant difference, now, is that during the New Order, the magazines which contained such discourse were not widely available to the public. Despite its limited circulation, *Media Dakwah*, published by DDII, is one example of the Islamist press of the New Order. During the New Order period it did not have a publishing permit and so its material was only allowed to be circulated among members of the organisation; nevertheless, it was widely available to the public. According to Liddle (1996a), *Media Dakwah* promotes a scripturalist tradition, and Siegel’s (2000) observation on the magazine is that it shows anti-Semitism. Liddle’s (1996a) analysis of *Media Dakwah* shows it to be heavily critical of ‘the West,’ particularly of the United States. Further, he observes that one article states that the Jews are dominating the US and its foreign policy, and that the magazine promotes a conspiracy theory of the Jews’ interest in dominating the world. *Media Dakwah* cites quotations from the Qur’an regarding the behaviour and attitude of the Jews. As Assyaukanie (2009) asserts, the media play a significant role in spreading Middle Eastern thinking, in particular, that of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism and the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. *Media Dakwah* is a prime example of this.
In the reform era, the discourse of MISS SARA prejudice is openly covered in the press, in contrast to press coverage during the New Order, when such issues were more hidden. As research by Sudibyo, Hamad and Qodari (2001) into Republika, Media Dakwah, Kompas and Suara Pembaruan shows, in relation to the Maluku conflict, both Republika and Media Dakwah tended to promote ‘news of hate’ [kabar-kabar kebencian] specifically prejudiced against other religions. This kind of reporting would not have existed in the New Order.

In connection with the anti-western Islamist discourse in the press investigated in this thesis, it is significant to understand, as explained previously, that most Indonesians believe that the United States is the superpower of ‘the West,’ and it is usually associated with the Jews. They not only believe that the Jews are behind America’s foreign policy, including its support of Israel and opposition to Palestine, but also that the American President cannot be free from the Jewish network (Liddle, 1996a).

This belief relates, further, to the tragedy of September 11, 2001, in New York and the Pentagon, and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ launched by President George W. Bush. The discourse in the Islamist magazines referred to this as a ‘holy war’ against Islam, designed to undermine it. The discourse on terrorism and the bombings that occurred in Indonesia, which is the main focus of this research, cannot be separated from these issues. The Islamist press is growing and raising issues of conspiracy theories involving Christians and Jews (Irawanto, 2011). Although these issues are not new, they have become stronger in the discourse on terrorism. Irawanto (2011) includes in this type of ‘Islamist press’ not only Media Dakwah but also Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah, which are the subject of the research.

Politically-oriented Islamic publications, such as Sabili, Suara Hidayatullah and Media Dakwah, are very critical of modern democracy, American hegemony and America’s support (real and alleged) of Israel, since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US. (Irawanto, 2011: 73)

Sabili communicates a “hard anti-western line” (Watson, 2010:56). Muzakki(2009), another observer of Sabili, observes that Sabili’s perspective on the West is that it is synonymous with the United States, which, in turn, is dominated by Jews. According to him, Sabili also refers to the US as identical to Christianity and to Christianity as the enemy of Islam. In the domestic context, Sabili opposes the Chinese (Indonesian Chinese), due to their alleged domination in the Indonesian economy. Further, Muzakki (2009:221) states:

Sabili develops a logic and perspective which blends the West, Unbelievers, Christians, and Jews and later Chinese. That is why the magazine tends to be anti-Western, anti-Unbelievers, anti-Christian, anti-Jewish and anti-Chinese.
In a more specific analysis, Assyaukanie (2009: 50) considers that Sabili disseminates Wahhabism and adopts the political attitudes of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood:

*Sabili* covers Islamic issues with a puritanist tone. It adopts a strict Wahhabism in many of its ideological issues and stands with Ikhwanism in political attitudes.

However, the Islamist discourse was not only presented in the Islamist press. As Barkin (2001) observed, in *Republika*, the one and only Islamic national daily newspaper, in connection with the September 11 tragedy, the coverage was not about finding out who was behind the bombings, but about the role of the Jews, who, *Republika* stated, have always supported the US and who stand behind its glorification.

Similarly, Fealy (2003) and Fauzi (2003) analysed the first Bali bombing. Both scholars observed that *Republika* supported a conspiracy theory of the bombing, which Fealy found surprising, due to *Republika*’s good reputation as an Islamic daily. Specifically, Fealy (2003) observed how the newspaper turned the readers’ attention to events which were not clearly linked to the bombing and to a more prejudiced view.

The following section provides a framework for an analysis of the Indonesian mediascape, which is further used to analyse the text under investigation.

### 3.3 Contemporary Indonesian mediascape and the Islamist discourse: An analytical framework

The previous sections have explained both the general and the Islamist press. This section further explains the factors which affect the landscape of the Indonesian press. It is argued that there are two ways to describe or explain the transformation of the contemporary Indonesian press: internal local factors (including domestic social and political context) and external factors (including Muslim globalisation).

#### 3.3.1 The social and political context

Besides liberalisation, the reform era brought other significant changes for the press. One of these was in the strategy concerning the language used in news reporting. Euphemism was popular during the New Order, and was necessary to avoid repression or even banning by the state. This strategy demanded that readers read ‘between the lines’ (Hanazaki, 1998). During the New Order, there were political implications for offensive reporting, especially if it concerned government policy or criticism of personnel close to the ruling regime. News
reports were not permitted to fuel anger or hatred towards other ethnic groups, religions, or race (as was set out in the restrictions defined by MISS SARA). In other words, the regime wanted to maintain a stable and steady government.

However, in the reform era, the rules of reporting defined in MISS SARA were put aside, and news concerning hatred and prejudice is now evident in the press (Sudibyo, 2001). This is not a good situation, as the euphoria of press freedom has coincided with the rise of religious intolerance (as explained in Chapter 2), which the Islamist press uses as a further tool to support Islamist discourse and disseminate it amongst the public.

The publications purveying Islamist discourse in the New Order were not widely available to the public, but they disseminated it underground to the Muslim activists in the university mosques, Muslim organisations and similar venues. The reform era is significant as a time when the Islamists realised that the press could be used to disseminate Islamist ideas to mainstream Muslims. Spreading the ideas of Islamism was one way of getting mainstream Muslims’ attention in order to widen the Islamist influence, complementary to the spreading of Wahhabism during the New Order, which was mainly done through institutional education, LIPIA and sending students to Saudi Arabia.

The emergence of the Islamist press can also be investigated in terms of its challenging the mainstream press publications in Indonesia, which had been dominant. According to Islamists, the mainstream press portrayed a negative image of Islam, and did not represent the true Islamic (that is, the Islamists’) view. Their view was that the ‘liberal Muslims,’ whom the Islamists bitterly opposed, had been the dominant sources for the mainstream media, especially in the New Order (Rijal, 2005). These ‘liberal Muslims’ included Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and other Muslim intellectuals who supported religious pluralism.

The struggle using words is necessary as part of jihad for the Islamists although for some jihad with weapons is not removed. (Hasyim, 2013: 2)

Magazines such as Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah need to position themselves as part of the Muslim community in Indonesia, therefore these magazines exist specifically in order to represent Salafi-Wahhabi of Islam (Assyaukanie, 2009; Hasyim 2013) and they need space to express their doctrines (Hasyim, 2013). One of their various conduits for dakwah [Islamic propagation] is through press publications.
The purpose of the Islamist press is to represent Islamist ideology and also *dakwah*. The presence of a press with an ideological background is not new in Indonesia. During the Old Order, the Indonesian press mostly represented the ideologies of the political parties at that time. For example, *Harian Rakyat* was linked to PKI [Indonesian Communist Party], *Merdeka* was linked to PNI [Indonesian Nationalist Party], *Duta Masyarakat* was linked to Nadhlatul Ulama, *Abadi* was linked to Masyumi, *Pedoman* was linked to PSI [Indonesian Socialist Party], *Kompas* was linked to the Catholic party, and *Angkatan Bersenjata* and *Berita Yudha* were linked to the Indonesian army (Hanazaki, 1998). In the reform era, there are also some press publications which are owned by leaders of a political party, but the difference between them and the above-mentioned press is that the current publications owned by party leaders do not have a clear ideological platform. The press is only used as a tool for image-making of the party or the leader of the party.

Thus, through democratisation and the liberalisation of the press, the Islamist magazines now have their chance, in the post-New Order era, to disseminate their Islamist ideas in the public domain.

3.3.2 The influence of Muslim globalisation on Indonesia’s mediascape

In this section it is argued that, although the link is complicated, Indonesia’s Islamist press is influenced by Muslim globalisation, which, in this context, refers to that in Middle Eastern countries. This is significant in order to understand the effect of Muslim globalisation on Indonesia in both a social and political context. To explicate this argument, Appadurai’s (1996) framework on globalisation is used and further explained.

Appadurai (1996) adheres to the heterogenisation school in his view concerning globalisation. According to Appadurai, globalisation does not refer to a concept of homogenisation of culture, as it is not linear, but has a local response or adaption. This response then shapes heterogenisation, or local adaption, in other words indigenisation, which results in a variety of responses in the culture. For example, in Indonesia, McDonalds sells chicken with rice and rice porridge because it is perceived as more ‘Indonesian’ food.

A significant concept in Appadurai’s (1996) work, which relates to this thesis, is his view that the process of indigenisation could also involve countries other than the United States or
other western influence, as, for example, occurred with Japanisation in Korea. This pertains to the question of Islamisation in Indonesian society, which is mostly influenced by Middle Eastern countries, believed to be the heartland of Islam (Assyaukanie, 2009). Islam, also, is a globalising force, along with the capitalism of western countries (Bull et al., 2009). In the context of Islamist discourse in Indonesia, Middle Eastern Muslims are the driving force influencing the Indonesian community. Islam in Indonesia would not have spread to the same extent without Muslim globalisation.

In understanding how Muslim globalisation works in Indonesia, Appadurai’s (1996) conceptual framework of ‘scapes’ can be useful. The five ‘scapes’ are: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, ideoscapes and mediascapes. The suffix ‘-scape,’ in this framework, points to the fluidity and irregular shapes of these ‘landscapes,’ because each ‘scape’ can be viewed from any angle, with each group of viewers experiencing it differently. The scapes are also linked to each other and cannot be separated.

Ethnoscapes involve the moving of people, such as migrants, tourists and workers. Technoscapes is the global flow of technology moving around the world. Financescapes are the global flow of money. Ideoscapes is the movement of ideology or ideas, mostly political. The last ‘scape’ is mediascapes, which involves the production, distribution and dissemination of media throughout the world and the images that are created by these media.

Pertinent to this thesis, Bull, Pandich and Woods (2012) explains in detail the ‘five scapes framework,’ as coined by Appadurai (1996) to explain the globalisation process, which Bull calls ‘Muslim globalisation.’ He argues that Islamisation is not a response to globalisation but ratherpart of it. “Islam has long been a globalizing force alongside Western-based capitalism and other forces” (Bull, Pandich and Woods, 2012:32).

Furthermore, Bull criticises Olivier Roy for using too narrow a definition of ‘global Muslim’(a term coined by Roy), as only referring to Muslims in the West or the Muslim diaspora. Bull argues that the movement of people is only one of the five movements of globalisation and illustrates how Indonesian Muslims connect to a broader global Muslim community, mainly in the Middle East. The five ‘scapes’ offered by Appadurai (1996) are interconnected with and influence each other. Following is a summary of Appadurai’s (1996)
concept of the five scapes as used by Bull (Bull, Pandich and Woods, 2009) in the context of Indonesia.

Ethnoscapes: Indonesia represents a unique intersection of ethnoscapes. The movement of people and temporary migration for education is central to Islamic globalisation. Bull gives the example of Indonesians studying at Al Azhar University, Egypt. These students participate in the creation of a global Muslim identity. Upon their return, their perspectives on Islam have been influenced by their experience in Egypt. Another example of transnational movement of people is the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the Cold War. This created a global Muslim network.

Technoscape: This scape relates to contemporary modern technology which, although it comes from western countries, is commonly used in Muslim countries. These modern technologies include CDs, computers and mobile phones. Technoscape is important as an instrument in facilitating the ideas and movement of Muslim globalisation, such as through the use of the internet with all its programs and facilities, social networks and websites.

Financescape: This relates to the world-widespread of multi-national Islamic banking. Additionally, it refers to the distribution of funding from wealthy Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, providing scholarships to Indonesian students to study in the country of the donor.

Ideoscape: The ideoscape involves ideas, beliefs and values. The spread of Islam in Indonesia is categorised as part of the movement of global ideas. Conversion to Islam does not stop the idea of the global movement, and is just the start of the dissemination of ideas. Bull gives an example of how traditional Islamic schools (pesantren) in Indonesia adopt Islamic values as part of the curriculum (part of the strategy for globalising Muslims).

Mediascape: The Muslim mediascape includes films and television programs from other Muslim countries, such as from Indonesia’s neighbour, Malaysia. The famous Upin dan Ipin is one example of a television program for children to introduce them to Islamic values. Additionally, Islamic print press, television preaching and sermons, whether in DVD format
or using some other digital recording technology, have contributed to fuelling sympathy for Muslim brothers who are waging _jihad_.

The scapes described above show the flow of Muslim globalisation—not only the movement of people from one place to another, with the consequent effect on what they believe, but also the distribution of technology and and the movement of finance, and, lastly, how the media have affected all of this. This raises the question of how these ‘scapes’ relate to the Indonesian mediascape in particular.

A discussion of the Indonesian mediascape cannot ignore the social and political context of Indonesia. As explained in the previous chapter, the rise of Islamic radicalism coincided with the liberalisation of the press. Given this context, the press, or media in general, can be used to expand and disseminate Islamist ideology spread by the Muslim globalisation movement.

The dissemination of ideas and thoughts by Islamists is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. As previously explained, it did occur during the New Order, but was forced underground, as were the magazines _Sabili_ and _Media Dakwah_. In the reform era, the liberalisation of the press brought Islamist ideas to the public, including through their dissemination on the internet. Lim’s (2005) research, _Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet_, is an outstanding study. She focused on the Laskar Jihad, which was involved in the Maluku conflict in the late 1990s to early 2000s, and their use of both the internet and print publications to disseminate conspiracy theories concerning the United States and Israel in the Maluku conflict. Using the so-called religious conflict in Maluku, these media are further used to propagate global Islamic radicalism and Islamist identity. The strategy of using the internet and print publications was, to some extent, successful in reaching a wider audience. However, the use of these media was not enough to persuade the readers to wage _jihad_ (Lim, 2005).

Another excellent research study on Islamist discourse is _Salafism and the Internet_ by Iqbal, who argues for the use of the internet by _Salafis_ as a medium to “localize the global media and further spiritualize the use of technology for their socio-religious needs and interest” (2008:1). Iqbal (2008) analyses from the perspective of the incompatibility of religion and modernity, which he sees as an incorrect stance. The technology of modernity, in this case the internet, can be a medium for disseminating religious ideas such as _Salafism_.

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In connection with this thesis, I argue that the Islamist magazines’ message content concerning local acts of terrorism which occurred in Indonesia (in this case the five bombings under analysis) is also part of Muslim globalisation, encouraging local terrorism in order to further disseminate the global Islamist discourse. How does this premise work in relation to the general magazines? To the best of my knowledge there has been no research on the Islamist discourse in Indonesian general magazines. However, it has been argued that, given that Indonesian Muslims have become more Islamised (Ricklefs, 2012), there is a possibility that ‘Islamisation’ is present in the general magazines. Whether or not this Islamisation involves the Islamist discourse is yet to be ascertained. Taking into account studies by Steele (2011) and Pintak and Setiyono (2011) which show that journalists in Indonesia mostly accept Islamic values as their worldview, I argue that the Islamisation process has come into the press, specifically, to journalists. Steele’s (2011) study argues that journalists in Indonesia accept the universal values of journalism but within an Islamic idiom, and the research of Pintak and Setiyono (2011), a survey of 600 journalists in Indonesia, finds that the influence of Islam in the newsroom is, to some extent, increasing but that they reject radical Islam.

Like the majority of their countrymen, the journalists’ sense of identification with Islam has strengthened, blending with the Indonesian nationalism so loudly espoused by the media under Suharto. For the most part, they favour the weaving of Muslim values into the fabric of the society but support the continued separation of mosque and state and reject the violent manifestations of militant Islam, fearing they undermine the stability of the nation. (Pintak and Setiyono, 2011: 204)

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explained the landscape of Indonesian press publications. In relation to this thesis, it has explained the place of the Islamist and general press publications in contemporary Indonesia and described the Islamist discourse available in the press publications. The previous two chapters thus provide the foundation for and the framework of the thesis. However, before presenting the analysis, it is important to describe the methodological approach used in this thesis, which will be explained in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Methodology

This chapter explains the methodology used in the thesis—the approach used to analyse both the text and the readers’ responses to the text, and also the methods used for data collection. The texts to be analysed are selected articles concerning the Bali bombings 1 and 2 (12 October 2002 and 1 October 2005), the JW Marriott bombing in Jakarta (5 August 2003), the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta (9 September 2004), and the JW Marriott/Ritz Carlton bombing 2 in Jakarta (17 July 2009), that appeared in the two Islamist magazines (Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah) and two general mainstream magazines (Tempo and Gatra).

Two methods are used in this thesis to analyse the text: quantitative content analysis and qualitative content analysis (discourse analysis). The quantitative content analysis refers to the positivist paradigm and the discourse analysis to the constructionist paradigm. The positivist paradigm refers to the so-called ‘objective reality’ that the media present, and the constructionist paradigm refers to the construction of ‘reality’ by the media. A brief explanation follows of the philosophical paradigm of news and how this relates to this thesis.

The methodologies are complementary. Critiques of quantitative content analysis as positivist social research ask whether quantitative content analysis (framing) may reveal the underlying factors behind the message (Gunter, 2000). This question can then be answered through qualitative content analysis (discourse analysis). Therefore, combining quantitative content analysis and qualitative content analysis (social semiotics analysis) in this research not only serves as a balance but also allows a more holistic analysis of the texts.

Azis’s (2007) and Fauzi’s (2003) research on the coverage of terrorism in the Indonesian media has been helpful in determining the units of analysis. I also referred to the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the methodology used by Mahony (2010)\textsuperscript{48}, which I feel are relevant here.

\textsuperscript{48} I am indebted to Inez Mahony, who has given me advice and sent me her PhD thesis (2010).
The additional analysis, of readers’ responses, furthers our understanding of their opinions about the articles they have read concerning the five bombings mentioned above. It is important to understand how the readers read these magazines, or, in other words, how the message of the text is understood by the readers.

Other additional methods of data collection included interviews with the journalists and/or editors of each of the magazines analysed. These interviews are not the primary data in the research project, nevertheless they play an important role as material for an analysis supplementary to the quantitative analysis.

4.1 The paradigm approach and the social construction of news

4.1.1 The paradigm approach

Three theoretical paradigms in social science have influenced the theoretical perspective and research methodology concerning the mass media. These are positivist, interpretive and critical social science paradigms (Gunter, 2000).

The positivist paradigm sees the media as ‘a picture of reality,’ i.e. the media are a reflection of society as it is. This claim, that the media are a mirror of reality, is challenged by the interpretive paradigm, that sees the media as constructing reality. According to this (constructionist) paradigm, there is no objective reality portrayed in the media, and reality is socially constructed (Weerakkody, 2009). The media are described not as stating ‘facts’ but as constructing them. Journalists are not ‘reporters,’ reporting the facts, but according to this paradigm, are constructing them. According to the constructionists, there could be different constructions of the same event, and thus what the journalists produce is not a mirror of a society (Tuchman, 1978). In relation to mass communications, the social constructionists assume the audience to be active (Baran, 2012). That is, the audience actively processes and selects information from the media, and only stores the information which meets its cultural needs. News itself defines and shapes reality. In a certain way, news continuously defines and redefines, constructs and reconstructs social phenomena, as stated by Tuchman (1978).

The critical paradigm perspective looks at how the media are influenced by ideology and the power relations within society. The media look at injustice, marginalisation and disempowered people and try to make positive changes in society (Weerakkody, 2009).
4.1.2 The social construction of news

The term ‘social construction of reality’ was first coined by Alfred Schutz (Baran and Davis, 2012; Tuchman, 1978) but was further elaborated by sociologists Berger and Luckman in 1966, when they published The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Their book made no mention of the social construction of reality within mass communications (Baran and Davis, 2012), but media and communication scholars saw that their work would be useful in developing media theories.

The ‘fact’ of an event, according to the social constructionist paradigm, is the result of a ‘construction,’ and therefore depends on how the event is seen and how ‘facts’ are subsequently constructed. The same event can result in different constructions, depending on how it is perceived and understood by the newsmakers. In other words, the media, seen from this perspective, are not a value-free medium—there is no ‘reality’ portrayed in the media but only the media’s ‘construction of reality.’ Burns (2002:110) gives a definition of construction as “the process journalists use in deciding what to omit and what to include from their research material.”

4.2 Quantitative content analysis and framing

As explained above, in analysing the texts, this thesis uses quantitative content analysis combined with framing and (qualitative) social semiotics analysis. This research will employ Weerakkody’s (2009) multi-method research concept. The quantitative and qualitative methods are derived, respectively, from positivist and interpretive paradigms (as explained above) and are suitable for this research because of the kind of data collected from fieldwork. According to Weerakkody (2009), multi-method research uses more than one methodology and data collection method in one study. These tools can be taken from the same paradigm or from different paradigms, or can be a combination of qualitative and quantitative data. In this process qualitative data and quantitative data can supplement each other and the different paradigms used can add a holistic view of the discourse under study.

In this thesis, the first method used to analyse the articles in the magazines is quantitative content analysis.

Quantitative content analysis involves the examination of manifest content—the literal, denotative, generally accepted and shared meanings of a message, such as a word, phrase, speech, advertisement or other media message. Quantitative content analysis
involves ‘counting’ to describe the manifest content and measure the ‘amounts of the categories of variables empirically and systematically. (Weerakkody, 2009:146)

Hansen explains that “the purpose of the method is to identify and count the occurrence of specified characteristics or dimensions of texts” (Hansen et al., 1998: 95).

Using quantitative content analysis (combined with framing analysis), the thesis will examine the extent of the coverage of the bombings in the Islamist magazines—themes, sources, and how western countries are presented—according to ‘countable’ criteria.

‘Framing’ analysis was coined and first developed by Erving Goffman (1974), a sociologist who studied how individuals learn to make sense of their everyday lives (Baran and Davis, 2012; Pan and Kosicki, 1993). Some media and journalism scholars then developed and used the framing approach in their research. Early scholars who used the approach were Gitlin (1980) and Tuchman (1978), who focused on journalism and how news influences how we view the world. Gitlin saw that the ideas of some groups (e.g. Student New Left Movement in the United States) were marginalised and neglected in the news. Tuchman looked at the role of the newsroom and its limitations in covering news of the women’s movement in the US. Her findings showed that there is no such thing as objective news. News is framed in a certain way in order to strengthen and legitimise the general way we view the world.

Increasing numbers of contemporary scholars have used and developed this approach, defining and conceptualising it—among them are Gamson, Entman, Pan and Kosicki, and Edelman (Baran, 2012; Eriyanto, 2001). These scholars, as well as Gitlin, have also given a definition of framing: frames are principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters (Gitlin, 1980).

I have identified the frames through reading the articles, which, in turn, reveals the themes or frames presented in the magazines in which the articles appear.

4.3 Coding manual
The coding manual is used to avoid ambiguity in explaining what should be included in each category for the content analysis research. Weerakkody (2009) notes the importance of the
coding manual in maintaining reliability and validity in the coding process. The categories and units of analysis originate from the magazine articles that I have read.

**Table 4.1 Coding Manual**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Units of Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Themes/Topics</td>
<td>(1) Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) JW Marriott bomb 1 (5 August 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Australian Embassy bomb (9 September 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Bali bomb 2 (1 October 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) JW Marriott 2 /Ritz Carlton bomb (17 July 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source (Fauzi (2003), with some adjustments)</td>
<td>(1) Indonesian Government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Indonesian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Academics/Scholars (Indonesian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Islamic organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Western media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Asian media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7) Government officials (western countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8) Intelligence observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9) Alleged terrorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10) Academics/scholars (other than Indonesian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11) NGO (Indonesian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12) NGO (foreign)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13) Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14) MPR/DPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western countries mentioned (Islamist)</td>
<td>(1) United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Australia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Western countries mentioned (Islamist) | (1) United States |
|                                       | (2) Australia
The selected articles are in relation to the five bombings listed. All were written within three months of the attacks.

(1) Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002)
(2) JW Marriott bombing 1 (5 August 2003)
(3) Australian Embassy bombing (9 September 2004)
(4) Bali bomb 2 (1 October 2005)
(5) JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombings (17 July 2009)

### Themes/Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes/frames relating to western countries</th>
<th>General magazines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Western countries’ reactions to the bombings</td>
<td>(1) Western countries’ reactions to the bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Western countries’ influence on Indonesia for their own interests</td>
<td>(2) Western countries’ influence on Indonesia for their own interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) The western conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam</td>
<td>(3) The western conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings</td>
<td>(4) Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Western countries’ aid in the investigation of the bombings</td>
<td>(5) Western countries’ aid in the investigation of the bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia</td>
<td>(6) Bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Islamist magazines

(1) Western countries as being behind the bombings
(2) The western conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam
(3) The western agenda to hegemonise Indonesia for its own interests
(4) Bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia
(5) Western people are hedonist
(6) The Western aid to Indonesian Military/Police

### 4.3.1 Themes/Topics

The selected articles are in relation to the five bombings listed. All were written within three months of the attacks.
4.3.2 News sources

There is a broad range of news sources and, within this context, in each news event, the aim is to persuade and convince the readers of the ‘reality’ of the situation. Each article usually refers to more than one source of information. Sources are:

1. Indonesian government officials: statements or quotes from officials, such as the President or Vice President, Ministers, or others whose statements represent the Indonesian Government
2. Indonesian Police: statements or quotes from the Indonesian Police
3. Academics/Scholars (Indonesian): statements, quotes and comments from researchers or lecturers in Indonesia
4. Islamic organisations and Islamists: Indonesian Islamic organisations, both mainstream (such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama), and also those newly acknowledged in the reform era (such as Front Pembela Islam, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia); statements, quotes and comments from people affiliated with these organisations, whether they are a member or the Chair of these organisations; the Islam oriented parties (for example, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera); those with affiliations to pesantren
5. Western media: any media organisation source which is considered to be from a western country
6. Asian media: any media organisation source which is considered to be from an Asian country
7. Government officials (western countries): statements, quotes and comments from a person who is considered to be representing the government of a western country
8. Intelligence analyst: a person who is considered as having expertise in the area of Intelligence
9. Alleged terrorist: a person who is suspected of being involved in the bombing/bombings under study
10. Academics/scholars (other than Indonesian): statements, quotes and comments from academics from countries other than Indonesia
11. NGO (Indonesian): statements, quotes or comments from members representing an Indonesian Non Government Organisation
12. NGO (Foreign): statements, quotes or comments from members representing a foreign Non Government Organisation
4.4 Coding and reliability testing

4.4.1 Coding procedure
Coding, in content analysis, is implemented after the coding manual has been completed. This is then used in a pilot study before the actual coding begins (Weerakkody, 2009). Further, as Weerakkody (2009) explains, the reading of the coding can be the work of the researcher himself/herself (intra-coder) or of an inter-coder, another person working on the coding. Weerakkody suggests that using another person (inter-coder) as a coder will make the coding more objective and will be more reliable in achieving the ‘agreement of coding,’ calculated as a minimum of 80%. “No matter how hard researchers tried to ensure the validity and reliability of framing analysis, questions often arise in regard to the objectivity of coding” (Yang, 2008: 83). Therefore to maximise the validity and reliability in this project I chose a second coder.

In this research project, the reliability test involved two coders with 20 sample articles. The first coder was the researcher and the second was a member of the Indonesian Press Council (Head of Division for Public Complaints and Ethics). The latter was selected because he and the researcher had already worked together on a project on Indonesian newspapers (quantitative content analysis), covering the Indonesian General Elections in 2004, and on several other projects. Also, as a former classmate of the researcher, he had had similar experiences, and this made it easier to work within the same ‘frame of reference.’

4.4.2 Testing reliability
Reliability in content analysis is essentially about consistency: consistency between different coders (inter-coder reliability) and consistency in the individual coder’s coding practice over time (intra-coder reliability) (Hansen et al., 1998).
According to Krippendorf (2004: 211), reliability is “stability, reproducibility and accuracy.” Testing the reliability in quantitative content analysis is significant in order to find out whether the coding manual is clearly defined.

If checks on reliability reveal considerable divergence in how the same material is being categorised by different coders, or by the same coder over time, then it is necessary to tighten up the coding guidelines, to make the coding instructions and definitions clearer. (Hansen et al., 1998: 121)

In the reliability test for this study, twenty articles coded by the first coder were then re-coded by the second coder and the results of the inter-reliability tests were all over 80%.

The inter-coder reliability test used in this thesis is the Holsti Formula. According to this formula, reliability is seen in the agreement percentage, which shows how much agreement there is among the coders in evaluating the content. Holsti Formula:

\[
\text{Inter-coder reliability} = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}
\]

M is the total amount of agreement among the coders, N1 is the total amount of coding by the first coder, and N2 is the total amount of coding by the second coder. Reliability is measured as between 0 and 1. A score of 0 (zero) means there is no agreement between the first and second coders. A score of 1 (one) means there is full agreement on the coding practice between the first and second coders—the higher the mark, the higher the reliability. According to the Holsti Formula, the minimum reliability score allowable is 0.7, or 70%. If the agreement among the coders is measured as 0.7 or higher, it is reliable. On the contrary, if it is below 0.7, the coding sheet must be revised, due to the lack of clarity in the coding manual and its operational definition.

4.5 Social semiotics

The social semiotics used in this thesis refer to Halliday’s work and, specifically, to that of Hooker (1993) and Sudibyo (2001) who have adapted the method in their research. Hooker analysed and compared the language of ‘Old Order’ and ‘New Order’ speeches of the former Indonesian presidents, Soekarno and Suharto. Sudibyo analysed the coverage of the ‘Maluku conflict’ (an ethno-religious conflict between Christians and Muslims) in the

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49 The Old Order is the period 1945–1965, which was governed by the late President Soekarno. After Soekarno stepped down, Indonesia was led by President Suharto (1966–1998) for a period which is also known as the New Order. The period since Suharto was forced to step down in 1998 is also known as the reform era.
Indonesian national newspapers, Kompas (Catholic based), Republika (Islam based), Suara Pembaruan (Catholic based) and in Media Dakwah, an Islam based magazine. In addition, Jackson (2005), combining the methods of Halliday and Fairclough, analysed the Indonesian students’ magazines published in the New Order. However, this thesis is particularly concerned with analysing how ‘the West’ is depicted in relation to the five bombings listed.

According to Hooker (1993), adapting from Halliday (1978), the three main elements in text analysis are field of discourse, tenor of discourse and mode of discourse. However, in this research I will focus on the first two, because, specifically, these two relate to a larger social and political context. ‘Field of discourse’ (the context) refers to the event which took place and is the discourse by the media. ‘What happened?’ is the question to be answered in this element. Using this method, Sudibyo (2001) discovered the difference between Media Dakwah (Islamic magazine) and Kompas (national daily newspaper–Catholic based) in their reporting of the Maluku conflict at the turn of the last century. According to Sudibyo, Media Dakwah tended to report it as a Muslim/Christian conflict, with the prominent victims being the Muslims.

In relation to the research undertaken for this thesis, the main questions to be raised in the field of discourse are:

1. How was the bombing perceived by the magazines?
2. Was it a conspiracy by ‘the West’ to undermine Islam?
3. Was it an act by Indonesian Muslims against ‘the West,’ to counterattack western hegemony and western support for the occupation by Israel of the land of the Palestinians?

The second element, ‘tenor of discourse’ (who is taking part), refers to the people who provide the information (in this case, the sources mentioned in the article), and whether they are one-sided in their opinions. According to Sudibyo (2001), the Maluku conflict coverage in Media Dakwah tended to be one-sided, the sources being exclusively Muslim, and Kompas was seen as having more balance, using a number of sources with different viewpoints—not only government officials, but also Muslims. Therefore, in this thesis, the main questions to be answered are:

1. Who and what were the sources for the articles in the magazines?
2. Did the sources for each magazine differ?
4.6 Readers’ responses

The readers’ responses in this thesis do not serve as audience research, because this would require another thesis. Nevertheless, they provide an understanding of how the readers perceived the magazines they read, and whether their understanding of the bombings which occurred in Indonesia, the global war on terror, and ‘the West’ was reinforced by the magazines. Data collection was through focus group discussion and some interviews. The main questions to be answered through the readers’ responses were:

1. Who were the western countries and how did the readers perceive ‘the West’ in relation to the bombings researched in the thesis?
2. How did the readers perceive western countries in response to the magazines they read?
3. Was there an Islamist discourse in the readers’ opinions?

Focus group interviews were held in Jakarta (17–21 February 2011) during three months of fieldwork. The groups were filmed and audio-taped. Prior to the focus group, each person was given one week to read the articles. Selection criteria for the groups required that the readers:

4. Had read the magazine/magazines for a minimum of five years.
5. Had an interest in the topic of terrorism.
6. Were between 18 and 45 years old.

The groups consisted of both males and females (5–6 people per group) in a total of 10 groups. The groups were made up as follows:

- *Tempo*: male group and female group
- *Gatra*: male group and female group
- *Sabili*: male group and female group
- *Suara Hidayatullah*: male group and female group
- Readers who read both types of magazine: male group (either *Tempo* or *Gatra* and either *Sabili* or *Suara Hidayatullah*) and female group (either *Tempo* or *Gatra* and either *Sabili* or *Suara Hidayatullah*)

Bertrand et al. (1992) explained three approaches to analysing data from the focus group interviews, of which I used the following one in this thesis.“One useful approach to
organizing the material is to make an inventory of the points discussed” (Bertrand et al., 1992: 203). The main points of the focus group interviews are therefore listed in the inventories of data and further analysed according to the research questions. This approach, according to Bertrand, is suitable for data which have clear-cut differences among the groups. The groups in this thesis are clearly differentiated, not only by the magazines read but also by gender differences (male–female). Therefore, using Bertrand’s approach, the data patterns of responses can be analysed for each group.

4.7 Additional data collection
In addition to the above mentioned text analysis, I also interviewed journalists and/or editors from each magazine. The interviews took place during fieldwork and all the interviews were held at the journalists’/editors’ offices in Jakarta. The number of people interviewed from each magazine is as follows: Tempo, 3; Gatra, 3; Sabili, 2; and Suara Hidayatullah, 3. The material derived from these interviews does not provide the main data to be analysed, but it is complementary to the main data of the texts.

4.8 Limitations and strengths of the methodology
The strength of the methodology used in this thesis is the combination of quantitative content analysis and qualitative content analysis, as shown in the social semiotics of the positivist and constructionist paradigms. This combined methodology reveals not only the ‘surface’ meaning conveyed by the media, but also the ‘latent’ meaning of the messages. Each type of analysis complements and strengthens the other, enriching the analysis and allowing a more holistic view of the text.

For this thesis, the readers’ responses were also significant in revealing their views on the magazines they read. In media analysis, readers’ responses served an important role in linking the media and the audience, and help us to understand the impact of one on the other. Specifically for this research, they served to clarify whether the magazines reinforced their view of the western countries covered in the magazines. On the other hand, readers’ responses also have some limitations. The responses observed concern articles about the bombings which occurred between 2002 and 2009. Although all of the readers were given the articles to read, there are gaps in the ‘time span’ of the event. The fieldwork took place in 2011, and although the readers had the chance to read the magazines, there would nevertheless be a ‘gap’ in the sense that, by 2011, the view of ‘the West’ that they had held in the period 2002–2009 may have changed.
Chapter 5

Islamist Discourse in the General Magazines

This chapter presents the data analysis of the general magazines *Tempo* and *Gatra*. The quantitative data presented include the number of articles, the sources of the reports, the frames (themes) in the magazines, the number of western countries mentioned, and the words used to identify the perpetrators.

The quantitative approach is used in this chapter in an attempt to generalise the data in a quantitative way. This demands that, all of the articles be read, and the frames carefully identified and quantified. There are frames in *Gatra* that are not available in *Tempo* and vice versa. Additionally, *Tempo* has fewer frames in relation to western countries. Previous content analysis studies of terrorism in Indonesia (Azis, 2007; Fauzi, 2003\(^{50}\)) and Mahony’s (2010)\(^{51}\) research on Indonesian Islam in the Australian and Indonesian press are a valuable contribution to this analysis.

The frames identified in *Tempo* are: western countries’ reactions to the bombings; western influence on Indonesia in the interests of ‘the West’; western countries’ aid in the investigation. The *Gatra* frames are: western countries’ reactions to the bombings; western influence on Indonesia in the interests of ‘the West’; western foreign agents as being behind the bombings; western aid in the investigation of the bombings; and the ‘fact’ that the bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia.

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\(^{50}\) Fauzi’s research was on the discourse on terrorism in the daily *Kompas* and *Republika* concerning the Bali 1 bombing.

\(^{51}\) I am most grateful and indebted to Inez Mahony for sending me her Ph D thesis, *Constructing Indonesian Islam in the Context of the War on Terror: a critical analysis of how the Australian press framed “the other”* (University of Queensland).
5.1 Tempo

Table 5.1 Total number of Tempo articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Bali bomb 1</th>
<th>JW Marriott 1</th>
<th>Bali bomb 2</th>
<th>Australian Embassy</th>
<th>JW Marriott/Ritz Carlton</th>
<th>Total (N=62)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tempo is a high profile weekly magazine, founded in 1971. Among the magazines which are analysed for this thesis, Tempo had the most magazines articles on the bombings. In the reports analysed, the magazine had a combination of long investigation reports and short reports. The long investigation articles were mostly concerned with the investigation into the bombings and in the short reports specific issues were raised in connection with the bombings, such as focusing on the victims in the minutes before the bombings.

5.2 Tempo news sources

Table 5.2 Total Tempo news sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Total N=236</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesian government officials</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Academics/scholars (Indonesian)</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Islamic organisations</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Western media</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Asian media</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Government officials (western countries)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Intelligence observer</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Alleged terrorist</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Academics/scholars (other than Indonesian)</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NGO (Indonesian)</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tempo relied heavily on civilians as news sources (36%). These news sources mainly included the victims of the bombing. Tempo reported in a humanistic way, by focusing on the victims of the bombs and emphasizing their suffering.

The second biggest news source for Tempo was the Indonesian Police (30%). In the bombing reports, Tempo quoted or covered the Indonesian Police’s official statements of the bombings, including the Police investigation. The Chief Editor of the magazine confirmed the Indonesian Police as not only the trusted official source in this case, but also the most reliable source. Tempo admitted that there were conspiracy theory rumours surrounding the bombings spread among the journalists during this period, but rumours without proof are not good evidence, and therefore Tempo would not approve of such theories.

The third largest news source was government officials, who provided less than half (11%) of the amount of news sourced from the Indonesian Police. As has been explained above, the coverage of the bombings mostly involved the investigation and statements by the Indonesian Police, who had the special privilege of, for example, giving press releases and press conferences.

Statements from the alleged ‘terrorists’ only make up 6% of sources and are not from the ‘high profile terrorists’ (for example, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah) but only from people suspected of having been involved in the bombings.

Government officials of western countries (4% of sources) included officials of neighbouring countries at the time of the bombings (for example, John Howard (Australian Prime Minister) and Alexander Downer (Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NGO (foreign)</th>
<th>3%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>MPR/DPR</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Asian government officials</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreign NGOs mostly referred to Sidney Jones from ICG (3.4%), who is an expert on terrorism.

5.3 \textit{Tempo} frames

Only a small number of \textit{Tempo} articles mentioned western countries, and therefore there were few themes or frames relating to them.

\textbf{Table 5.3 \textit{Tempo} frames}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Western countries’ reactions to the bombings</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Western influence on Indonesia in the interests of ‘the West’</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Western countries’ aid in the investigation</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: one frame is counted as one per article

\textbf{Western countries’ reactions to the bombings}

‘The West’s’ reaction is considered by \textit{Tempo} to be excessively harsh. Hard-hitting statements by Kofi Anan, John Howard and George W. Bush, regarding the devastating Bali bombing, were quoted.

According to John Howard: “It is brutal and humiliating. This is absolutely an act of terror” \textit{(Tempo, 21–27 October 2002 edition, paragraph 3)}.

According to Kofi Anan: “This attack is against both national and international moral standard, in which we agree that no such act is justifiable no matter what” \textit{(Tempo, 21–27 October edition, 2002 paragraph 4)}.


The magazine makes it clear that the high profile and influential international leaders were angry at the bombing (in this case the Bali 1 bombing). Further, \textit{Tempo} explains how these
angry reactions turned into actions (pressuring the Indonesian government for the anti-terrorism act).

**Western influence on Indonesia in the interests of ‘the West’**

Australia and the United States were mentioned as pushing for Indonesia to fight terrorism. One way suggested was to offer the Indonesian government military aid, which had been suspended during the Clinton era because Indonesia was accused of violating human rights in East Timor.

According to *Tempo*, western countries, mainly the United States, were also pushing the Indonesian government to implement government anti-terrorism regulations. These were hastily put in place to please the United States. The Indonesian government seemed too weak to challenge the US.

**Western countries’ aid in the investigation**

One of the articles after the first Bali bombing, which elaborated on the presence of foreign agents, was ‘Sherlock Holmes in action’ (21–27 October 2002). The article reported how western countries—the United States (through the FBI), Australia (through the AFP), England and Germany—were aiding the investigation into the bombing. A total of 91 western agents were in Bali. Specifically, Indonesia and Australia were signing an agreement to cooperate in a joint investigation.

**5.4 Gatra**

The total number of *Gatra* articles covering the bombing is 35. Compared to those in *Tempo*, *Gatra* articles were mostly long investigative reports, with few short reports.

**Table 5.4 Total number of *Gatra* articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bali bomb 1</th>
<th>JW Marriott 1</th>
<th>Bali bomb 2</th>
<th>Australian Embassy</th>
<th>JW Marriott 2 /Ritz Carlton</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Gatra</em></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5 *Gatra* news sources

**Table 5.5 Total *Gatra* news source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Total (N=206)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesian government officials</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Academics/scholars (Indonesian)</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Western media</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Asian Media</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Government officials (western countries)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Intelligence observer</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Alleged terrorist</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Academics/scholars (other than Indonesian)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NGO (Indonesian)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NGO (foreign)</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>MPR/DPR</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Asian Government officials</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were a total of 206 sources for the *Gatra* articles. The Indonesian Police was regarded as the source for official statements and, in this case, was the biggest source of information, providing 23%. There was not a heavy reliance on the Indonesian Police, however, because the Islamist sources and civilians each contributed 16%. The dominant information from civilians was quotes or statements from the alleged terrorists’ close relations (including families or neighbours).
The Indonesian Police was referred to as the official source, and as for Tempo, primarily served as the source of information concerning the process of investigation of the bombings by the Indonesian Police.

Interestingly, some of the Islamist sources were also used by Sabili, for example, Irfan Awwas, Hussein Umar and Umar Abduh. In this category, Gatra also quoted or reported statements from Ustad from pesantren\textsuperscript{52}.

On closer examination of the Gatra sources, and according to interviews with its editors and journalists\textsuperscript{53}, Gatra had a ‘special’ network for contact with the Islamists and holding special interviews.

The academics or Indonesian scholars sources, who contributed 9%, are highly reputable scholars, for example, Dr Riza Sihbudi, Dr Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Deliar Noer.

Government officials of western countries (5% of sources) were mainly officials from Australia, for example, John Howard (Prime Minister), Alexander Downer (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and Graham Ashton (Australian Federal Police), who held important positions at the time of the bombing.

Table 5.6 Tempo vs Gatra (similarities and differences) in the use of news sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tempo</th>
<th>Gatra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The position of Indonesian Police</td>
<td>Indonesian Police were considered as the official source.</td>
<td>Indonesian Police were referred to as the official source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The</td>
<td>Civilian sources in Tempo were</td>
<td>Civilians sources in Gatra mostly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{52} The Ustad most quoted are from the pesantren Ngruki Solo and Al-Islam, Lamongan. The first is the pesantren established by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah, and the latter was established by H. Khozin and Ja’far Shodiq, who are brothers of the Bali bombers, Ali Ghufron, Amrozi and Ali Imron.

\textsuperscript{53} During the fieldwork period of January–March 2011, I interviewed the Chief Editor, Deputy Chief Editor and one editorial staff member of Gatra. Both the Deputy Chief Editor and Editorial staff member are responsible for national and international reports on Islam. According to the statements in the interview, Gatra has a special link to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and so can have special interview access.
different in civilian sources | mostly the victims of the bombs. | referred to were the wives/relatives/neighbours of the alleged terrorists.
---|---|---
The Islamists | The Islamists were not widely referred to. | The Islamists were significantly referred to.

5.6 *Gatra* frames

**Table 5.7 *Gatra* frames**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th><em>Gatra</em> frames</th>
<th>Total (N=16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Western countries’ reaction to the bombings</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Western countries’ influence on Indonesia for their own interests</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Western countries’ aid in the investigation of the bombings</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Western countries’ reaction to the bombings**

Frames that can be categorised as ‘the West’s’ reaction to the bombings include statements or other reactions to certain actions. The reaction of western countries was reported more overtly by *Gatra* than it was by *Tempo*. An example of *Gatra*’s open reaction is the article on how the Australian government suspected and investigated some Indonesians in relation to ‘terrorism’ after the Bali bomb 1. For example, one news article, ‘*Serangan Fajar Kawanann Monster*’ [*Dawn Assault by Herds of Monsters*], reported on how Australian Federal Police and Australian Intelligence and Security broke down the door of an Indonesian family who were active in the Qur’anic study club in Perth. The assault, as explained by *Gatra*, was intrusive and violent, involving automatic guns. Taufik Abdat, the house owner, had his hands tied and was pushed to the floor, while the rest of the family were shouting and crying. He was suspected of having a close relationship with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the leader of
Jama’ah Islamiyah. Further, the report described how Abdat was forced to answer 20 questions during the 3 hour investigation. The report was damning of the Australian government, highlighting the violence of the raid and the investigation and claiming that they seem to accuse anyone who had been in contact with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, even if they had only attended his sermons. The article showed how recklessly the Australian government accused Indonesians of being part of the Jama’ah Islamiyah network. Another article in the same edition confirmed Gatra’s point that the Australian government was thoughtlessly raiding the homes of Indonesians. The headline was ‘Australian raids are similar to robbers.’ In this article, Gatra found the support of the Yogyakarta Sultan, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, who discouraged Indonesians from going to Australia. From Yogyakarta, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX’s attitude was courageous. “I think, at the moment, Indonesians must not go to Australia,” he said. According to Sri Sultan, Australians had overstepped the mark. “Australia should have been doing it in a way, and not hurting the Indonesian society” (Gatra, 9 November 2002).

The magazine praised the Sultan for his courage in speaking out, and the report gave the impression that Gatra did not approve of such raids. They were described as violent and as targeting Indonesians without a thorough investigation.

**The western conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam**

According to the investigation by the Indonesian Police, the bombings were the work of Jama’ah Islamiyah. Gatra however, gave an alternative view, claiming that it could be the work of ‘the West,’ as a conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam. In supporting this view, Gatra referred to the Islamist opinions of leaders such as Umar Abduh, Irfan Awwas and Habieb Rizieq. Indonesian intelligence analyst and former Head of BAKIN, Major General ZA Maulani was also mentioned and quoted. These people were also referred to in Sabili.

Up until the time of the last bombing analysed in this thesis (the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing), this discourse was still present and was still questioning the possibility of the involvement of ‘the West,’ with statements in the reports. One example was the sub-headline:

> After the bomb explosion in JW Marriott Hotel at Mega Kuningan, South Jakarta, the police investigate the supposed involvement of AlQaeda and the Noor Din Mohd Top’s

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54 Yogyakarta is one of Indonesia’s special provinces. This province is a Javanese monarchy, ruled by a ‘King,’ who is called ‘Sultan.’
terrorist network. Is it true that the real puppeteer is western intelligence?” (Gatra, 29 July 2009)

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Islamists were the second largest source of information and opinion referred to, therefore it is not surprising that there were questions about the bombings being the work of ‘the West.’

**Western countries’ hegemonic agenda towards Indonesia for their own interests**

When the first Bali bombing occurred, it raised the question of the existence of ‘terrorism’ in Indonesia. It also raised the question of whether the Islamist organisation, Jama’ah Islamiyah, was involved, as was charged by the United States. As explained by *Gatra*, the information that Jama’ah Islamiyah was involved in the bombings was given by Omar Al-Faruq, leader of South East Asia Al-Qaeda, who was captured in Indonesia and is currently jailed in Guantanamo Bay.

In response to Omar Al-Faruq’s information, the magazine reported that the Indonesian President, Megawati, was uneasy about this information, which was perceived as “the American version” (*Gatra*, 2 November 2002). The Indonesian government went on to approve the United States’ assumption of the existence of Jama’ah Islamiyah, expressed in the then Minister for Defence’s assertion that Jama’ah Islamiyah was behind the bombing. *Gatra* shows the Indonesian government as being helpless against the United States. Indonesia had to follow the views of the US. Further, Indonesia had to approve the inclusion of Jama’ah Islamiyah in the list of terrorists organisations.

**Western countries’ aid in the investigation of the bombings**

Western government aid towards the investigation was discussed in relation to Bali bomb 1. According to *Gatra* (November 16, 2002), the aid came from the Australian Federal Police (49 people), the FBI (11 people) and Scotland Yard (21 people). The discourse in this theme concerned whether the investigation team was well received by the Indonesian Police.

One of the forensic team from Polri admits the role of the foreign investigators. However, he feels a bit uncomfortable working together with the Police from those developed countries. “They are somewhat arrogant,” he said to the Gatra reporter, Anton Muhajir. Although they are only superior in terms of their equipment. “For professionalism and discipline, we are equal,” he said. (*Gatra*, 16 November 2002, p.33)
**Bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia**

*Gatra* also pointed out the discourse that the materials used to make the bomb were not available in Indonesia. Although there was only one report on the discourse that the ‘bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia,’ nevertheless it is important to note that this discourse was practically the same as in *Sabili*, specifically, in terms of sources and reports. ZA Maulani, the former Head of Indonesian Intelligence Agency stated that the Bali bomb was made up of ‘micro-nukes, special atomic demolition munition,’ which could only be found in certain countries, such as the United states, England, France, Israel and Russia (*Gatra*, 16 November 2002, p. 33). He further stated: “I am convinced that there is a strong country behind the Bali bombing.” In this report, *Gatra* also used Hermawan Sulistyo’s analysis, which confirmed ZA Maulani’s statement. Although Sulistoyo disagreed that the bomb was a micro-nuke, he stressed that “this bomb is deliberately created by Israelis to make us look stupid.” Thus *Gatra* openly offered the possibility that the bomb could have been the work of western countries and, to endorse this point of view, also endorsed the possibility that the bomb materials were not from Indonesia. Compared to *Tempo*, although there was a discourse on the bombing materials, *Gatra* referred only to the official investigation statement and did not take into consideration the opinions of anyone other than the Police.

**5.7 Gatra’s chronological order of the bombings**

The table below is a list of the *Gatra* frames which were identified in connection with each of the bombings. The frame most mentioned is that western foreign agents were behind the bombings. The magazine consistently made it clear that there was a likelihood that western countries were involved in the bombings. As has already been explained, these statements were usually then supported by the Islamist news sources (which were similar to the news sources used by *Sabili*).
Table 5.8 Gatra’s chronological order of the bombings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Bali bomb 1</th>
<th>JW Marriott 1</th>
<th>Australian Embassy</th>
<th>Bali bomb 2</th>
<th>JW Marriott/Ritz Carlton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Western countries’ reaction to the bombings</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Western countries’ influence on Indonesia for their own interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Western countries’ aid in the investigation of the bombings</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.8 Choice of words in association with the perpetrators

The choice of words used in the general magazines to describe the person behind the bombings was analysed. Although many words were used, four words in particular were used most to refer to the perpetrators of the bombings. The first is ‘*teroris,*’ meaning ‘terrorist.’ This is the harshest of the four words, highlighting the evil of the person. Two others are not as harsh, are in common use and do not label or ‘name’ the bomber: ‘*pelaku pengeboman*’ and ‘*pengebom,*’ meaning the person who carried out the bombing. The fourth word, interestingly, is the English word ‘bomber.’

Table 5.9 Words used in association with the perpetrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Tempo (N=107)</th>
<th>Gatra (N=72)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Teroris</em></td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelaku Pengeboman</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengebom</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared to Gatra, Tempo more often labelled the bomber with the word ‘terrorist’ (Tempo in 55% of instances and Gatra in 38%). ‘Pelaku pengeboman’ was the name used in both magazines in the second highest number of instances (Tempo, 33% and Gatra, 25%). However, the word used with the third highest frequency was different for the two magazines: ‘pengebom’ in Tempo (9%) and ‘bomber’ in Gatra (22%). The term used least by Tempo was ‘bomber’ (3% of instances) and by Gatra was ‘pengebom’ (15%).

Overall, Tempo labelled the perpetrator ‘terrorist’ in 55% of instances and used one of the less harsh terms in the remaining 45%, while Gatra used the label ‘terrorist’ less frequently (in 38% of instances) and the less severe terms more often (62% of instances).

5.9 The journalists: Background and perspective

The general magazines are more open, and their requirements for their journalists relate to competency. Both Tempo and Gatra claim to recruit from various educational backgrounds—university graduates from private or state universities or even the state Islamic State university are welcome. The ability to write is the most important requirement of recruitment. Any religious background is welcomed by both magazines. Nevertheless both magazines agree not to recruit a person who is a party activist. As the Chief Editor of Gatra said: “We are not going to play politics.”

One of the Tempo journalists I interviewed described the diversity of the magazines’ journalists in terms of their religious piety. He explained that journalists ranged from one very pious journalist on the magazine staff, who had a black forehead (an indication of performing many prayers), to a journalist who loved to drink.

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55 Personal interview, 11 February 2011
Although the magazines both accepted journalists from any background, they differed in their views on terrorism. *Tempo* viewed terrorism not as a religious act, but as a criminal one. As explained by its Editor-in-Chief, there must be no emotional involvement in relation to religion: “People have been killed and killing is against the law.”\(^{56}\) This perspective can be seen as a secular view. On the other hand, the Editor-in-Chief of *Gatra* viewed terrorism as a global problem which stems from injustice. From the above views it can be seen why the magazines differed in their representation and construction of terrorism and western countries. These views will be explained below.

5.10 Discussion

**Selecting the news source**

From its choice of sources, it appears that *Gatra* accommodated the views of people from the Islamic organisations, including the Islamists. (As previously mentioned, the Islamist news sources were also available as news sources for the Islamist magazine, *Sabili*\(^{57}\).) For *Gatra*, the sources from the Islamic organisations and the civilian news sources were equal in their contribution to news (16% each,) and their contribution is second only to that of the Police. On the other hand, these Islamic organisations were not significant as news sources for *Tempo*. *Tempo* relied on information from the Indonesian Police and even more on that from the civilian victims. The Indonesian Police were *Gatra’s* most important news source also, but their contribution was not significantly greater than that of the Islamic organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.10 Comparison of <em>Tempo</em> and <em>Gatra</em> news sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tempo</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tempo* claimed to rely on the Police investigations and also on ICG–Sydney Jones reports, but the Vice Editor-in-Chief of *Gatra* explained that he did not want to rely on only official

\(^{56}\)Personal interview, 10 February 2011

\(^{57}\) Analysis of Islamist discourse in the Islamist is presented in Chapter 6.
information from the Indonesian Police. Moreover, he cynically accused Sidney Jones of buying reports from the Police, saying that that was why Jones’s reportswere thorough and complete. The Vice Editor also explained how pleased he was when one of the Ustad [Islamic preacher] praised *Gatra*, saying that it is more ‘Islamic’ than *Tempo* (which is more secular in content). He was pleased because he understands that *Gatra* is not an Islamic or Islamist magazine like *Sabili*, but is a general political magazine.

One of the journalists whom I interviewed explained that it was true that the Vice Editor-in-Chief did not want to rely on the investigation reports by the Indonesian Police and the ICG reports. However, the Vice Editor did allow other journalists to use these reports, even though he did not totally approve the practice. So, he was not rigid and strict. When I asked why he didn’t want to rely on the ‘secular news sources,’ the journalist explained that the Vice Editor had a close link to the Islamists, including Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. If any *Gatra* journalists wanted to interview the Islamists, the Vice-Editor usually shared his Islamist sources. According to Steele (1995), the choice of source is connected with the professional ideology of the journalist. Considering that the Vice Editor, to some extent, rejected the information provided by the Indonesian Police and Sidney Jones’ ICG report, and, furthermore, was pleased that *Gatra* was said to be more Islamic than its rival, *Tempo*, I believe this attitude shaped the way *Gatra* constructed the terrorist bombings and, significantly for this research, was also likely to influence how *Gatra* perceived western countries in connection with the bombings analysed, especially since the Vice Editor was one of the persons in charge of covering the national and international issues which relate to Islam and to political Islam.

**Framing**

**Table 5.11 Frames of Tempo and Gatra**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>The frames</th>
<th>Tempo</th>
<th>Gatra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Western countries’ reaction to the bombings</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Western influence on Indonesia in the interests of ‘the West’</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Western countries’ aid in the investigation of the bombings</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia

It was not easy to identify the frames in the general magazines. I defined the frames by particularly finding the discourse connected with western countries, since the Islamist discourse generally takes an oppositional stance towards them. Especially in relation to terrorism, the Islamists believe in the theory of the conspiracy by ‘the West’ (Naharong, 2009).

Table 5.11 identifies the frames which are presented in both of the magazines. The main frames which can be defined as the Islamist discourse are frame 3 (western foreign agents as being behind the bombings) and frame 5 (bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia). Frame 3 leads to the conspiracy theory blaming western countries as being behind the bombings. Frame 5 also leads to blaming western countries, assuming that the bombs were not from Indonesia. The bomb materials were produced in western countries and western countries have access to them.

Two of these frames were clearly evident in Gatra, although frame 5 was only mentioned once, in connection with the Bali bomb 1. However, it is worth noting that although it was only mentioned once, this was in a special report in which academic experts and the former Head of the Indonesian Intelligence (ZA Maulani) discussed only the question of the sourcing of the bomb materials.

Tempo frames the bombings differently, because, as explained by its Chief Editor, the bombings were seen as a criminal act rather than being linked to a religious act. Tempo therefore focused on the victims of the bombings, and the impact of the bombings on the people and community. The bombing victims were viewed from the humanistic angle (this finding is similar to Ahmad’s (2010)), and Tempo reported them in detail (usually in one or two special reports), from the cause of the bombings to their suffering. Some ended up in hospital, seriously injured or disabled for life. Other victims were left with psychological disorders.

There was no significant Islamist discourse in Tempo. However, there were discourses in relation to western countries. Tempo perceived western countries as, to some extent, having
the power to control the Indonesian government, and therefore Indonesia was seen as being in a subordinate position to them (particularly to the United States). Tempo’s construction was that the United States was the superior while the Indonesian government was the subordinate, and that the Indonesian government was powerless to confront to the United States.

In contrast, Gatra referred to the possibility of the involvement of western countries in terrorism in Indonesia, and this suggestion (or belief) can be seen not only in its reports but also in its sources supporting the theory. It was Gatra who gave an ‘indisputable’ account of the treatment by the Australian government of Indonesian Muslims in Australia who were assumed to be involved with the Jama’ah Islamiyah. The capture of Al Faruq had a big question mark attached to it at Gatra, especially since the Indonesian Police handed him over to the United States. The anti-western Islamist discourse construct in this thesis was therefore suspicious of the involvement of western countries in the bombings, and on the other hand western countries were constructed as being suspicious of Muslims and regarding them as terrorists.

5.11 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the difference between the articles in the general magazines Tempo and Gatra. The news sources, frames and the journalists’ backgrounds and perspectives on terrorism used in both magazines are significantly different. Generally speaking, Tempo is reluctant to view the bombings and terrorism in Indonesia as a product of a conspiracy theory, while Gatra to some extent suspects that it is a conspiracy theory to undermine Islam. Gatra’s articles tend to be Islamist in such a way, relying heavily on Islamist sources while Tempo’s view which tend to be secular, mainly rely on the official reports from the Indonesian Police.

The next chapter is an analysis of the Islamist discourse in the Islamist magazines. Referring to the analysis in the general magazines, it will include the use of sources, frames and also the journalists’ standpoints which helps to understand why the anti-western Islamist discourse is written in such a way.

58 Al Faruq is the coordinator of Al Qaeda operations in South East Asia and was arrested in 2002 in Bogor, West Java, then handed over to the United States and jailed at Guantanamo Bay.
Chapter 6
Islamist Discourse in the Islamist Magazines

This chapter presents the data analysis for the Islamist magazines, Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah. As explained in Chapters 1 and 4, the quantitative content analysis is designed to count the manifest content of the magazines.

Previous content analysis studies on terrorism in Indonesia (Azis, 2007; Fauzi, 2003) and Mahony’s research on Indonesian Islam in the Australian and Indonesian Press (Mahony, 2010a; 2010b) are valuable contributions. These three researchers have already been referred to in identifying the coding manual. However, each research study is unique, therefore different frames, perspectives and issues are still to be identified in the content of the magazines studied in this thesis. This thesis will quantify the number of articles overall, the sources used in the magazines, the countries mentioned, and the frames used in the articles.

6.1 Sabili

Sabili literally means ‘My Way.’ It is a small magazine, half the size of an A4 sheet of paper. The content of Sabili magazine includes: Wawancara [interview], Kolom [column], Profil [profile], Konsultasi agama [religious consultation], Telaah utama [main investigation, which includes opinion], Telaah khusus [special investigation], and Tafakur [Editor’s opinion]. Sabili’s main reports lie in Telaah utama and Telaah khusus. These two reports mainly cover the current national and international issues. Sabili targets students, Muslim activists and young professionals. Islamist groups, such as members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and ex-Masyumimembers, are considered to be readers of this magazine (Rijal, 2005). Readers from urban areas, such as Jakarta and its surroundings, make up 50% of the total number of its readers.

Table 6.1 gives the total number of articles in Sabili concerning each of the five bombings analysed.

---

Fauzi’s research was on the discourse on terrorism in the daily newspapers, Kompas and Republika, concerning the Bali 1 bombing.
Table 6.1 Total number of Sabili articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bali bomb 1</th>
<th>JW Marriott 1</th>
<th>Bali bomb 2</th>
<th>Aust. Embassy</th>
<th>JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton</th>
<th>Total (N=31)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were a total of 24 articles in Sabili\(^{60}\) with at least 4 to 5 pages of reports concerning the bombings. However, during my analysis of the articles concerning the bombings, I found that there were also 7 opinion pieces. These opinion pieces are included because, in this magazine, they are part of Telaah utama, which is the main investigative report. The people who had the privilege of writing an opinion article in Sabili were: ZA Maulani (former Head of Indonesian Intelligence); Din Syamsuddin (Head of Muhammadiyah and former General Secretary of Indonesian Ulama Council)—who wrote 2 opinion pieces; Ismail Yusnanto (Head of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)); Suripto (Intelligence observer); and Irfan Awwas (Head of Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI)).

Also, Sabili made a report of interviews with various people (which are not included in the analysis). Among these people are: Habieb Rizieq (Head of FPI); Fauzan Al-Anshari (Head Department of Data and Information Indonesian Mujahidin Council); Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Jama’ah Islamiyah); and Stanley Harsha (Press Attaché of the United States Embassy in Jakarta). When I asked the Vice Editor-in-Chief why they interviewed staff from the United States Embassy, he stated that it was part of covering both sides in the news. They did not want to be accused of only reporting from ‘one side,’ because they claimed to be reporting a balanced view.

### 6.2 Sabili news sources

Table 6.2 shows the sources used by Sabili, which are divided into 15 categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Total (N=153)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesian government officials</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{60}\) A List of the articles is in the Appendix.
The sources most cited in *Sabili* (29%) were from Islamic organisations, including Islamist organisations. These well-known sources included Habib Rizieq, Irfan Awwas, Ismail Yusnanto, Din Syamsuddin and Fauzan Al Anshari (Indonesian Mujahidin Council).

The Indonesian Police provided the second highest percentage of sources, at 15%. The Police were cited due to their official statements given in the investigations of the bombings. However, these officials’ statements were usually criticised from (or confronted with) the Islamist point of view, because according to the magazines, the Indonesian Police were cynically seen as aiming to please western governments.

Government officials accounted for 8% of sources cited, or approximately half the contribution of the Indonesian Police. The government officials’ comments were not much appreciated in *Sabili*. As with the sources from the Indonesian Police, their comments were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic organisations</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western media</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian media</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials (western countries)</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence observers/analysts</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged terrorist</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics/Scholars (other than Indonesian)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO (Indonesian)/Secular organisation</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR/DPR</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Government officials</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
not relied on. These sources were needed, however, in order to understand the government’s view on the issues, which would then be confronted by the view of the Islamist sources. At 10%, the percentage of sources cited from Government officials from western countries was higher than that for Indonesian Government officials. These included statements from John Howard (Australian Prime Minister), Alexander Downer (Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs), George W. Bush (President of the United States), and Stanley Harsha (Press Attaché, United States Embassy, Jakarta). The first three of these men were quoted mainly due to their statements accusing Jama’ah Islamiyah of being behind the bombings. However, their statements were usually confronted with the contrary Islamist point of view, that Jama’ah Islamiyah was not behind the bombings and that ‘the West’ sought to undermine and stigmatise Islam. Harsha, however, was quoted because of his statement refuting the accusation of many Islamists that the United States was behind the bombings. In addition, in the coverage of the JW Marriott bombing 1, Harsha was given a place (approximately one quarter of a page) for a press statement denying the United States’ involvement in the bombing (Sabili, No.3 TH.XI 28 August 2003, p. 19). This, as already explained by the Vice Editor-in-Chief, is part of Sabili’s policy of covering both sides and presenting a balanced view in its reporting.

The opinions of the intelligence analysts, MPR/DPR and the academics, although each comprising only 5% of sources, nevertheless supported the view that neither Jama’ah Islamiyah nor Indonesian Muslims were behind the bombings. The intelligence analysts’ and academics’ justification of this view was that the materials used in the bombs were not produced in Indonesia, and they made the suggestion that western countries were trying to corner Islam and further their hegemony of Indonesia. The intelligence analysts frequently quoted in Sabili were AC Manullang (Former Chief of Indonesian Intelligence), ZA Maulani and Suprapto. These people were highly respected and presented as the highest experts in bombing related intelligence.

### 6.3 Western countries mentioned in the articles

#### Table 6.3 Western countries mentioned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen in Table 6.3, the United States was mentioned most frequently. There are various possibilities as to why this was so. These magazines take a stance opposing the western countries, and also, the bombings which occurred in Indonesia were perceived as a conspiracy towards Islam, as can be seen (previously in this chapter) from the analysis of the frames of their articles. The US is currently perceived as the leading force and superpower in engendering war in Muslim countries. In particular, the US is seen as having an agenda of destroying Islam and preventing it from moving forward.

Australia received the second highest number of mentions. Australia is Indonesia’s closest ‘western’ neighbour and is seen as the United States’ close ally. The magazine also referred to the US and its allies [Amerika Serikat dan sekutunya] as a generalisation of western countries.

### 6.4 Frames relating to western countries

After reading all the articles, I categorised the frames which relate to western countries and the Islamist discourse into six classifications, as listed below. There are 30 frames and each article can have more than one frame, which I define as a theme/issue.
Table 6.4 Frames relating to the western countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>N=30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Western countries as being behind the bombings.</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The western agenda to establish hegemony over Indonesia for its own interests</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Materials of the bomb were not produced in Indonesia</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Western people are hedonist</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The ‘western aid’ to the Indonesian Military/Police</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There can be more than one theme/issue in each article. One theme/issue is counted as one per article, although it may be stated or quoted several times.

**Western countries as being behind the bombing**

This frame has the second highest number of themes/issues (17%), and is consistent with Fauzi’s (2003) findings on the coverage of the Bali bomb 1 in the Islamic daily newspaper, *Republika*, where the Islamist press tended to adopt the discourse that the bombings were not the work of Muslims. Members of the Islamic organisations supported the theory that ‘the West,’ or foreign agents, were behind the bombings. In addition, in accordance with Fauzi’s (2003) research on *Republika*, high profile people, such as academics and intelligence analysts added weight to these findings. Therefore, it would seem that the support of Islamists alone was not thought to be enough to convince the readers. The scholars and intelligence analysts were seen as a legitimate and justifiable source. Further findings from this research, as well as that of Fauzi (2003), show that these sources were mentioned more than once in each article and their statements were repeated several times.

The bombing could have been engineered by foreigners, especially the United States, in order to justify their attack on Islamic fundamentalists whom they claim are terrorists. (Professor Dr M Budyatna from the University of Indonesia, *Sabili*, No. 8 TH X 31 October 2002, p. 15)

It could be (the work) of US Intelligence, CIA, which uses whatever it takes in the interests of America. (Dr Riza Sihbudi, *Sabili*, No. 8 TH X 31 October 2002, p. 15)
*Sabili* consistently accused ‘Western Intelligence,’ the United States and its CIA, of responsibility for the bombings, and even Australia, in the case of the Australian Embassy bombing, even though the investigation by the police led to Jama’ah Islamiyah as being the perpetrators. The discourse that ‘the West’ was behind the bombings was in all of the related articles in *Sabili*, except those concerning the last bombing analysed, the JW Marriott 2. In the articles concerning the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing, *Sabili* tended to assert that this was the work of the Indonesian Police, ‘using’ the Islamists as the operators in the field.

**Conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam**

The dominant theme (47%) was that the bombings were designed to undermine and stigmatise Islam. *Sabili* was in agreement with its sources, stating that the bombings were designed to ‘corner’ Muslims after the 9/11 tragedy and Bush’s declaration of the ‘War on Terror,’ when he accused Al Qaeda of being behind the Pentagon and World Trade Center attacks. This ‘War on Terror’ further added to Muslims’ suspicions of the motives of ‘the West’ and their reluctance to accept accusations against Muslims on issues of terrorism. Bush’s views were interpreted as unsympathetic towards Muslims, and attacks on Iraq deepened Muslims’ lack of faith in ‘the West.’ A great deal of the western countries’ involvement in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan, also engendered hatred and suspicion. There was a widespread feeling of solidarity towards other Muslims, and this involvement was considered as invasion. This frame was mainly supported by sources who were members of Islamist organisations, Intelligence analysts, and academics or scholars.

Today, with various forms of intellectual engineering, the enemy of Islam is bearing down on Muslims and their faith. With their arrogance they are trying to muzzle Islam from the face of the earth. (*Sabili*, No.7 TH XIII 20 October 2005)

Terrorist stigmatisation, which is attached to the Islam community is rapidly spreading and ‘the West’ plays a major part in making this stigmatisation. (*Sabili*, No.7 TH XIII 20 October 2005)

The political analyst from the University of Indonesia, Ahmad Suhelmi, sees the Australian Embassy bomb as part of ‘the West’s’ international conspiracies to discredit Islam. (*Sabili*, No. 6 TH XII 8 October 2004)

**The western hegemonic agenda towards Indonesia for its own interests**

‘Western hegemony’ (11%) relates to the assumption that the bombings that occurred were the work of ‘the West’ trying to extend its hegemony of Indonesia. In this perspective, the bombings were seen as an attempt to weaken Indonesia and take advantage of this to further
‘the West’s’ agenda to dominate and to control Indonesia. Some of the issues in this theme concerned ‘the West’s’ domination of Indonesia’s natural resources, especially the United States’ desire to take over Indonesia’s Freeport mining. In addition, the anti-terrorism act, which was issued soon after the Bali bomb 1, was alleged to be fulfilling the wishes of the United States. The Indonesian government issued the anti-terrorism act because the US applied political pressure on it to ally with ‘the West’ in the ‘the global war against terror.’

Indonesia has no choice. The one and only way is to respond to ‘the war against terror’ led by the United States. The bombings in Indonesia have placed psychological, economic and political pressure on the Indonesian government. *(Sabili, No. 8 TH X 31 October 2002)*

**Materials of the bomb were not produced in Indonesia**

This theme had the same percentage (11%) as ‘Western hegemony.’ *Sabili* tended to believe that the materials of the bomb were not produced in Indonesia. According to the magazine, the bomb materials came from western countries. This argument was backed up by intelligence analysts and academics who, according to the magazine, were bomb experts.

According to Dr Yazid Bindar, given the type of bomb explosion, no ordinary person can access the materials and make them explode. *(Sabili, No. 5 TH XII October 2004, p. 21)*

In another paragraph, *Sabili* cites a further opinion of Dr Yazid Bindar’s:

However, Bindar continued, a high explosive type bomb, such as TNT, RDX as well as this C4 is hard to find in Indonesia. It is even difficult to find the network to get it. RDX and TNT are hard to find. Moreover, C4 is only owned by superpower countries, such as the United States, England and Israel. It is not possible to find it in Indonesia. *(Sabili, No.5 TH XII October 2004, p.21)*

**Western people are hedonists**

*Sabili* reported an unfavourable view of western people’s lifestyle, which was considered ‘sinful’ by Muslims. They were described as having fun, dancing and drinking. This theme is relevant to the Bali bombings, since Bali is considered to be ‘an island of paradise.’

On Saturday, 12 October, after long day’s work, a New Zealand television cameraman intended to pick up a prostitute in the Sari’s Club. However the plan was unsuccessful because the cafe, which sells liquor to foreign tourists, was full. Feeling frustrated, he then went to his hostel, 500–700 metres away from Sari Club, trying to get over his disappointment at missing out on some fun. Suddenly he heard a big bang from the club he had just left… *(Sabili, No. 8 TH 31 October 2002)*

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61 For Muslims, drinking alcohol is *haram* [forbidden].
6.5 Bombing frames in chronological order

Table 6.5, below, shows the bombings analysed, focusing on the frames which were referred to in the reports on each bombing incident. All of the frames referred to the western conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam. The frames laying the blame on western countries as being behind the bombings occurred in relation to all of the bombings analysed except for the last—the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing in 2009. According to the investigation by the Indonesian Police, undertaken between the Bali bomb 1 and the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing, there was no indication that western agents were behind the bombings, but Sabili was reluctant to admit the involvement of Muslims. The hedonism of western people was also one of the focus frames in relation to the Bali bombings 1 and 2.

To sum up the reporting of the bombings in their chronological order, there was a consistent frame from the Bali bomb 1 to the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bomb that the bombings were a conspiracy to undermined and stigmatise Islam.

Table 6.5 Bombing frames in chronological order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Themes/Issues</th>
<th>Bali bomb 1</th>
<th>JW Marriott 1</th>
<th>Aust. Embassy</th>
<th>Bali bomb 2</th>
<th>JW Marriott/Ritz Carlton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Western countries as being behind the bombings</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The western hegemonic agenda towards Indonesia in the interests of the ‘West’</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Materials of the bomb were not produced in Indonesia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Western people are hedonist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.6 Suara Hidayatullah

Suara Hidayatullah literally means ‘The Voice of Allah’s Guidance.’ It is an A4 magazine and its content include Salam (editorial), Konsultasi keluarga (family consulting), Surat pembaca (readers’ letters), Ibrah (religious advice from the Hidayatullah Chairman), Kajian utama (the main study), Laporan utama (the main report), Serial da’i (da’i serial), Figur (figure), Perjalanan (journey), Bayan (opinion from the Chairman of Hidayatullah leaders’ organisation). This magazine is a pesantren based magazine, as it was previously distributed among pesantren students, before it was publicly distributed and available to the public. The magazine therefore has a specific readership, including its alumni students.

Table 6.6 Total number of Suara Hidayatullah articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suara Hidayatullah</th>
<th>Bali bomb 1</th>
<th>Australian Embassy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the magazines analysed, Suara Hidayatullah had the least number of articles on the bombings. This magazine is distributed monthly and is more a dakwah magazine, although it does cover national and international political issues.

6.7 Suara Hidayatullah news sources

Table 6.7 Total Suara Hidayatullah news sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Total (N=40)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesian government officials</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Academics/scholars (Indonesian)</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Islamic organisations/Islamic parties</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Western media</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Asian media</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source Type</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Government officials (western countries)</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Intelligence analysts</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Alleged terrorists</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Academics/Scholars (other than Indonesian)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NGO (Indonesian)/Secular organisations</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>MPR/DPR</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Asian Government officials</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of sources for Suara Hidayatullah was 40, some of which were also used in Sabili. Most sources cited were civilians. The civilian sources were dominant in their support of Suara Hidayatullah’s view that neither Indonesian Muslims nor Jama’ah Islamiyah were behind the bombings. They included unnamed witnesses from around the area of the bombings. Some civilians were cited anonymously, only describing their profession, for example, as ‘dokter di Kuningan’\(^62\). The civilians were ‘witnesses’ in support of the contention that there was a ‘mastermind’ behind the bombings. Other sources for this magazine who had a similar view were the academics/scholars, Islamists, Intelligence analysts, alleged terrorists, and members of MPR/DPR. They supported the Islamist point of view.

On the other hand, the Indonesian Police and the western government sources were criticised and challenged from the perspective of the magazine’s other sources, or the magazine itself, which allowed the reporters to include their own opinions in their coverage.

From the quantitative assessment of the magazine’s Islamist sources (which were fewer in number than Sabili’s), it seems that Suara Hidayatullah did not rely on their support. However, the findings of the independent investigation by the Indonesian Muslim

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\(^{62}\) ‘Dokter di Kuningan’ literally means ‘surgeon in Kuningan.’ Kuningan is an area of the central business district in Jakarta.
Council was explained comprehensively in the magazine as a challenge to the official findings of the Indonesian Police.

Civilians also supported the magazine’s viewpoint. The intelligence analyst sources for *Suara Hidayatullah* were the same as for *Sabili*—Suripto and ZA Maulani. However, the academics/scholars cited in this magazine were science experts who had a knowledge of bombs.

### 6.8 Western countries mentioned in *Suara Hidayatullah*

Since there were only a small number of articles concerning the bombings, overall only four western countries were mentioned. As in *Sabili*, the United States was considered the leading superpower, which, with the help of its allies was trying to destroy Islam. Those countries which were considered as its allies were also mentioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States and allies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One article is counted as one per article

### 6.9 Frames in *Suara Hidayatullah*

Due to the limited number of reports, there were only a small number of frames evident in this magazine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Themes/Issues</th>
<th>N=9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Western countries as being behind the bombings</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam: 22.3%

3. The western hegemonic agenda towards Indonesia in the interests of the ‘West’: N/A

4. Materials of the bomb were not produced in Indonesia: 33.3%

5. Western people are hedonist: N/A

6. The ‘western’ aid to the Indonesian Military/Police: N/A

Total: 99.9%

Note: There can be more than one theme/issue in each article. One theme/issue is counted as one per article, although it may be stated or quoted several times.

Western countries as being behind the bombings

Of Suara Hidayatullah’s articles, 44.3% supported the view that the bombings were the work of ‘the West’ or of foreign agents, and its reports mostly contained evidence to show that Indonesians, specifically JI, were not responsible. The magazine also covered an independent investigation by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia which quoted the opinions of bomb experts. The independent investigation’s results tended to point to the bombs being the work of western countries, the underlying rationale being that the materials of which the bombs were made could not be found in Indonesia. It also found that, according to an anonymous civilian witness, a member of TNI, not only was ‘the West’ behind the bombings, but more specifically, ‘JI,’ by which was meant ‘Jewish Intelligence.’

So, who is behind the bombing? I agree with Kapolri and BIN that the operation/process mode of the bomb is the same as the Bali and Marriott bombs. The puppeteer is JI. JI is not Jama’ah Islamiyah but Jewish Intelligence. There are many JIs (Jewish Intelligence) hanging around CIA and Mossad. (Suara Hidayatullah, October 2004/Sya’ban 1425)

Conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam

Like Sabili, Suara Hidayatullah believed that the bombings were a conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam (with 22% of articles stating or implying this), and that they could also have been the work of the Jews. Western countries, such as the United States and England were also implicated.

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63 Suara Hidayatullah reported that, in the case of the Bali bombing I, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) carried out an independent investigation as a challenge to the investigation led by the Indonesian Police. According to the MUI investigation, the bombing was not the work of Muslims. The materials of the bomb are not produced in Indonesia.
Materials of the bomb were not produced in Indonesia

The frame that the materials for making the bombs were not produced in Indonesia was also prevalent, appearing in 33% of articles. To justify this frame, the magazine cited academics and scholars who claimed to be bomb experts.

Who can produce (the bomb)? Only western countries such as the United States and England. (Riza Wahono⁶⁴, Suara Hidayatullah, 09/XV/Syawal-Dzulqa’dah 1423)

6.10 Discussion

6.10.1 The journalists: Background and perspective

Both Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah have two main requirements for their journalists. They must be Muslim and they must not smoke. Formal education is not such a concern.

A secular educational background is acceptable as long as it fits in with the Islamic views of the magazines, which directly oppose and are critical of liberal Islam and liberal views. For Sabili, an Islamic activist background is a further bonus. Suara Hidayatullah recruits journalists from its Islamic boarding school alumni and also journalists from various educational backgrounds. However, the former are given priority.

The Editor-in-Chief and Vice Editor-in-Chief of Sabili whom I interviewed both had a secular university education. The Editor-in-Chief of Suara Hidayatullah also came from a secular educational background. Also, they both have a background as Muslim activists, which is considered a bonus and a proof of commitment. Additionally, they have experience in journalism, especially the Vice Editor-in-Chief of Sabili, who is a graduate of a journalism school.

6.10.2 Constructing an anti-western Islamist discourse

Both of the Islamist magazines take an oppositional stance towards western countries. According to the magazines, ‘western country’ means mainly the United States, which is perceived as the superpower. Therefore in their reporting, the Islamist magazines construct the United States as: 1) the leading force of the western countries in creating global terrorism; 2) an enemy of Islam because it is trying to destroy Islam, and because of the perceived US invasion of Muslim countries; and 3) as the perpetrator of the bombings in Indonesia.

⁶⁴ According to this article, Riza Wahono is an expert in physics from the Center for Studies on Strategic and Applied Technology.
Both of these magazines perceive the United States as the main force, but the Israelis (whom Suara Hidayatullah refers to as the ‘Jews’) are cast as another enemy of Islam.

These unfavourable perceptions in relation to western countries stem from what are seen as their injustice and double standards, mainly the United States’ policy towards Israel, and the stigmatisation of Islam as harbouring terrorists. As the Chief Editor of Sabili explained, since the US no longer has an enemy since the fall of the Soviet Union (or the end of the Cold War), it is looking for one. He sees the business of the US, in selling weapons, as only one example of how the grand design of ‘the West’ operates in the context of economics.

Both of the magazines believe that Islam is opposed to violence and the killing of innocent people, and therefore raise questions as to who carried out the bombings. According to the Editor-in-Chief of Sabili, ‘the West’ was behind these acts of terrorism. He theorised that it could be a US approved ploy designed to discredit Muslims. He sees Islam as a highly likely enemy target. ‘The West’ is also believed to fear the considerable growth of Islam, and, hence, to be keen to undermine it. If the Muslims are strong, western countries (mainly the United States) might have to cede power to them.

Additionally, Suara Hidayatullah views western countries as having the wrong impression of Islam. Islam rejects violence. Human rights and policy towards Palestine are obviously the main concern of this magazine. Further, the Vice Chief Editor stresses that it is not Suara Hidayatullah’s policy to be ‘anti-West,’ but only ‘anti’ the views of ‘the West’ towards Islam, which seem to be wrong. Suara Hidayatullah criticises this western wrong thinking towards Islam and exposes it in their media.

Thus, the Islamist magazines’ opinion of the West in relation to terrorism, and of western countries in general, is predominantly unfavourable. Western countries, especially the United States, were portrayed as behind the bombings analysed in this thesis. In addition, the magazines also believed that ‘terrorism’ and ‘the War on Terror’ were launched and engineered by western countries (mainly pointing the finger to the US) after the September 11 tragedy, which, according to the Islamists was a deliberate attack on Muslims. Moreover, the Islamist magazines maintained that the September 11 bombing was the work of the United States, the superpower, and engineered in order to create chaos. Additionally (according to the Editor-in-Chief of Sabili), because the US no longer had a
definitive enemy it could no longer sell weapons, which meant a huge financial loss, so ‘terrorism’ was engineered to create a new market.

If we look at the September 11 case, I believe it is engineered by the United States. Why? Because the US no longer has an enemy, and this is no longer profitable. They could not sell weapons, so finally they create chaos all over the world, including terrorism and war. (Editor-in-Chief, Sabili)  

The ‘War on Terror’ is part of a new colonialism style to find resources and markets, as well as disseminate their ideology. This all began in 2001 when they tried to make, and engineered terrorism in Indonesia and elsewhere. We are certain that terrorism in Indonesia is engineered. (Editor-in-Chief, Sabili)

The aspiration behind the Islamist magazines is to resist and fight against injustice from the world. Furthermore, this injustice is seen as not only political and economic, mainly due to the domination of the US, but also due to the predominance of ‘mainstream’ information in the media. The Chief Editors of both Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah argued that their magazines are not intended to reinforce mainstream perspectives, which they assume are the same as the western point of view regarding terrorism. The mainstream and general opinion frame was that the bombings were the work of Muslims, which was a frame the Islamist magazines were definitely opposed to. From their own point of view, the Islamists magazines serve to provide an alternative view, challenging the dominant view.

The news coverage on terrorism on television, in magazines and newspapers just follows the western opinion and that of its allies. Sabili gives another perspective which advocates the right of Muslims who are oppressed and suppressed. (Vice Editor, Sabili)

Consequently, they mainly denied the facts and investigation findings provided by the Indonesian Police and did not consider them as significant. They did not consider the Police as an official source that had to be referred to, as the Vice Editor of Sabili admitted: “The news that we cover is not only from the perspectives of the Indonesian Police or Densus 88. We don’t want to be the Police’s Public Relations’ officer.” They were sceptical of, and cynical towards, the official sources which represented the Indonesian government, because they considered the government to be virtually powerless and undermined by the US.

The Islamist magazines refer to opinions from their sources. As explained by Irawanto (2011), the Islamist magazines tend to depend on online sources which are cheap. Also, Sabili or Hidayatullah are not big media companies and their financial support is not large compared to that of the general magazines. Their offices are simple and plain compared to those of Tempo and Gatra. Their human resources are low in number—there are no more than

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65 Personal interview 27 January 2011  
66 Personal interview 27 January 2011  
67 Personal interview 7 February 2011
ten journalists and editors. It should be kept in mind that, although the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, this type of magazine has a very specific market.

Sources used in the magazines are obviously sources which support the magazines’ view. As explained by Steele (1995:800): “Sources are needed to add credibility and add as a voice of authority. In practice this means that journalists will report on the ‘facts’ as gathered from sources of recognized authority, but ask other authorities to analyse or interpret these facts.” Concerning the bombing articles analysed in the magazines, this means that the journalists reported on the facts about the bombing but also asked ‘experts’ to analyse and evaluate the investigation process. The ‘experts’ appealed to by these Islamist magazines were mostly Islamists, or any person who supported their view.

As already explained, the Islamist magazines covered an ‘alternative’ view, different from that of the mainstream magazines. The Islamists’ standpoint was that Muslims are suppressed and oppressed by the global domination of the United States. Their view was that terrorism is engineered in an effort to undermine and stigmatise Islam, and that the materials used in making the bombs were believed not to be available in Indonesia.

As shown in the table (table 6.2), the sources most used by Sabili were the Islamists, all of whom supported the view that it was highly unlikely that Muslims were behind the bombings, but that the bombings were an attempt to undermine and stigmatise Muslims. These sources were certainly selected to support this Islamist point of view.

Although all the facts arising from the investigations of the bombings tended to point the finger at Muslims, specifically Jama’ah Islamiyah, it seems that the Islamist magazines still rejected and opposed these official ‘facts.’

The ‘fact’ that, according to the Islamist magazines, the bombings were designed to undermine and stigmatise Islam, was further elaborated in their discourse of the oppression and suppression of the Islamic ummah[community], which is in line with the Islamist view. Although they don’t agree with violence, the magazines argued that terrorism is the result of tyranny by the colonising western Christians using their local puppets.

Terrorists attacked civilians because England, United States and other colonisers slaughtered Muslim civilians. The ‘terrorists’ exploded bombs because Muslim countries
were attacked by missiles and rockets. The terrorists robbed their enemy because their natural resources were taken by the colonisers with the help of the local puppets who are faithful to their master. Too much blood has been spilled by the infidel Westeners. (Vice Chief Editor, Suara Hidayatullah)\(^6\)

The framing of terrorism with Muslims was closely related to the United States’ political affairs public policy and its intervention in Middle Eastern countries, which were perceived as Muslim countries. The Editors-in-Chief of both magazines spoke of hosting annual meetings in their offices with the staff of the United States Embassy in Jakarta, chatting on friendly terms. During one visit, one of Suara Hidayatullah’s editors questioned the United States policy towards Israel and Palestine and, according to him, the US staff could not answer the question satisfactorily. Suara Hidayatullah pointed to the fact that United States policy is overwhelmingly supportive of Israel. These routine visits from the US Embassy still did not change either of the magazines’ stands concerning the United States or other western countries.

6.11 Conclusion: Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah

Sabili is a fortnightly magazine, and therefore publishes more articles than does Suara Hidayatullah, which is a monthly magazine. The number of articles affects the total number of news sources and frames.

Although both magazines can be defined as Islamist, Sabili is a more political magazine than Suara Hidayatullah, which is a pesantren based dakwah magazine, whose readers are mostly alumni and santri. Sabili targets readers who are students, Muslim activists and young professionals.

The sources used in Sabili were mostly Islamist. On the other hand Suara Hidayatullah relied on academics and scholars and also on civilian sources, whom the magazine described in such a way as to make them appear to be high profile people who did not want to be identified. Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah also shared some of the same sources who supported their view that Muslims were not behind the bombings, and included the Intelligence analysts source, MPR/DPR. The magazines also shared some of the same sources from western government officials, for example, John Howard and Alexander Downer.

\(^{6}\) Personal interview 24 February 2011
Three main themes were shared by these magazines in relation to ‘the West:’ the frame that western countries were behind the bombings; the frame of the conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam; and the frame that the bomb materials were not produced in Indonesia.

In short, the Islamist magazines’ construction of ‘western countries’ (mainly perceived as the United States) was unfavourable. They were blamed for masterminding global terrorism and specifically (in relation to this thesis), for engineering the bombings, led by the United States. The analysis of the articles shows that this perspective is in line with the thinking of the journalists who believe that the western countries have a hidden agenda to Islam. The next chapter looks more closely at the reporting in each magazine, using qualitative analysis.
Chapter 7
A Closer Look at the Articles: The General Magazines

This chapter further analyses the articles selected from the general magazines using the qualitative approach, referring to the work of Hooker (1993) and Sudibyo et al. (2001) using Halliday’s (1978) social semiotics (as explained in Chapter 4).

The focus of this chapter is to make a qualitative analysis of these reports, and to construct their meaning. One report was chosen concerning each of the bombings analysed, focusing on the research question of what happened and who took part.

Hooker (1993) referring to Halliday (1978) explains that field of discourse’ is the context, to the event which took place and is the discourse by the media. ‘What happened?’ is the question to be answered in this element. The second element, ‘tenor of discourse’ (who is taking part), refers to the people who provide the information (in this case, the sources mentioned in the article), and whether they are one-sided in their opinions.

I chose this discourse analysis because it relates to the research question (as explained in chapter 4) of ‘who’ perpetrated the bombings according to the reports analysed. The ‘field of discourse’ explores who were the perpetrators of the bombings, as perceived by the magazines. The ‘tenor of discourse’ mostly observes the sources used by the magazines. The choice of sources reveals the position taken by the magazines in order to support their views.

The bombing event articles from each magazine which are to be analysed are set out in Table 7.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tempo</th>
<th>Gatra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW Marriot 1 bombing (5 August 2003)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

69 I am grateful to Professor Virginia Hooker from the Australian National University, who, during the postgraduate conference at Melbourne University, 2011 gave me advice on how to analyse my data. I also thank her very much for sending me an example of her work using Halliday’s social semiotics on this analysis.
Bali bomb 2 (1 October 2005) | ✓ | ✓ |
Australian Embassy bombing (9 September 2004) | ✓ | ✓ |
JW Marriott 2 and Ritz Carlton bombing (17 July 2009) | ✓ | ✓ |

7.1 Tempo

7.1.1 Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002)

Headline: 9/11 for Australia

Sub-headline: Australia and the United States are pushing hard for Indonesia to fight terrorism. One way: George W. Bush’s government is offering military support. (Tempo No. 34/XXX1/21–27 Oktober 2002)

Field of discourse

This article reported the hard-hitting statements given by Kofi Anan, John Howard and George W. Bush. According to Australia and the United States, Indonesia was not serious in its war against terrorism. Further, they demanded that Indonesia fulfill its promise to fight terrorism. In return, the United States offered to resume aid to the Indonesian military to support Indonesia in this fight. This military aid had been stopped after the bloodshed resulting from the East Timor referendum in 1999.

On the other hand, the magazine was careful not to accuse Jama’ah Islamiyah of being behind the bombing and mentioned Howard’s and Bush’s attitudes towards the organisation.

Voicing similar opinions, Bush and Howard, although not directly accusing Jamaah Islamiyah (led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir) of being responsible for the Bali bomb, still referred to his connection with AlQaeda, seen by the United States as the major international terrorist organisation.

Howard said that he will demand that Megawati’s government find and sentence to prison the person behind the bombing in Kuta. “She (Megawati) promised me via telephone that she will act tough” he said. Currently Howard is demanding that she keeps her promise to rid Indonesia of the terrorist groups, irrespective of their ideology or religion. (Tempo No. 34/XXX1/21–27 Oktober 2002)

Tempo related Howard’s statement regarding the war against terrorism (which did not openly accuse Islamists of being behind the Bali bombing) to the treatment of Muslims in Sydney.

Howard may have been able to shift the prejudice against religion when he railed against the terrorists...but the people in Sydney perceived terrorism issues as identical with Islam. Rocks were thrown at the house of Imam Ahmad Shabbir, a teacher in an Islamic school in southwest Sydney. (Tempo No. 34/XXX1/21–27 Oktober 2002)
Tempo also saw the Indonesian government’s response to terrorism as not being prompt enough.

The Indonesian government was warned by the Australian government of the threat of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ustad from Ngruki village in the border of Solo several times. Not long before the Kuta bomb exploded, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, stated that Ba’asyir was the leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah which had a link with Al Qaeda. In Malaysia and Singapore, members of Jama’ah Islamiyah are wanted by the Police.

As for Ba’asyir, he is living peacefully in his pesantren without any interference from the police.

Before the blood-filled incident last week, the United States’ Ambassador for Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce had the chance to warn the Indonesian government that there is a threat of a terrorist attack on United States interests. (Tempo No. 34/XXX1/21–27 Oktober 2002)

Tempo reiterated the fact that Indonesia was the only country in South East Asia which did not pay any attention to American warnings and act against Jama’ah Islamiyah members.

In the South East Asian region, only Indonesia is considered not to have responded to the United States’ global campaign against terrorism. Malaysia and Singapore have captured members of Jama’ah Islamiyah. The Philippine government assigned 1,000 US army staff to implement contra-terrorism training, which finished two months ago. But the Megawati government is seen as allowing Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the accused leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah to live in peace in his pesantren. (Tempo No. 34/XXX1/21–27 Oktober 2002)

The US$50 million military aid for Indonesia was treated with scepticism by Tempo, which reminded its readers how military aid was stopped during the Clinton government era because Indonesia was responsible for the devastation during the referendum in East Timor in 1999.

The current condition has changed since the rise of the Republican, Paul Wolfowitz, former United States Ambassador for Indonesia and currently the deputy Minister of Defence. He is actively campaigning for military aid for Indonesia. The Republican Party is known for building a close relationship with the military leaders in developing countries. This is the result of the Kuta tragedy for the Indonesian military: the aid offer came albeit in the context of war on terrorism. (Tempo No. 34/XXX1/21–27 Oktober 2002)

Tenor of discourse

The sources in this report are Government officials from western countries, for example John Howard, Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) and George W. Bush (US President).
7.1.2 JW Marriott 1 bombing (5 August 2003)

Headline: Guessing who destroyed the Marriott

Sub-headline: The leaders of Jama’ah Islamiyah were assumed to know who was behind the Marriott Hotel bomb. There was a delivery of weapons, explosives and ammunition from Semarang and Bengkulu. So what is the role of Asmar, Abu Farouk and Mustafa the brigade commander? Do they dare to die? (Tempo 24/XXX11/11–17 Agustus 2003)

Field of discourse

This report stemmed from the discovery of a severed head after the bombing of the JW Marriot Hotel. The head was assumed to have belonged to one of the bombers. Further, the article gives details of the victims of the bombing, including those in the Syailendra Restaurant (among whom was the General Manager of Rabobank International Indonesia) and taxi drivers who were waiting for their passengers outside the hotel.

Criticisms from leaders of various western countries appeared in this article, including reports from Australia and the United States. However as well as criticism, these countries did offer Indonesia military and investigative aid. It was mentioned in the article that George W. Bush, then President of the United States, immediately called the Indonesian President, Megawati, to convey his sympathy.

Of the four pages devoted to the bombing, three were dedicated to the investigation process carried out by the Indonesian Police, which pointed to the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah.

Tenor of discourse

Most of the sources used in this article were from the Indonesian Police, since it was mostly a report on their investigation. Some sources were named and others were anonymous, even though they were official Police sources. However, one source was the lawyers representing Jama’ah Islamiyah.

7.1.3 Australian Embassy bombing (9 September 2004)

Headline: The morning of bloodshed in Kuningan

Sub-headline: There is a systematic pattern in the Bali bomb, JW Marriott and Kuningan. Azahari and Noordin M Top were free to roam about in Jakarta. (Tempo No.29/XXXIII/13-19 September 2004)
Field of discourse

This report started from the situation surrounding the Kuningan area where the Australian Embassy is located, minutes before the bomb exploded. *Tempo* described how people were queuing in front of the Embassy to sort out various matters. *Tempo* described in detail how, once the bomb had exploded, people around the Embassy were thrown several metres. Nine police officers who were standing guard in front of the Australian Embassy were badly injured. Heads, arms, and bodies were scattered around the scene.

The MMC hospital, which is close to the Embassy, was in chaos. The doctors and nurses panicked, thinking that the bomb had exploded in the hospital, because windows were broken.

Condemnation and sympathy came from western countries, including the United States, Australia, and from the United Nations.

Ironically, as explained by *Tempo*, the incident occurred when the Chief of the Indonesian Police, General Da’i Bachtiar, was having a meeting with the People’s Representative Council. He had just claimed that Jakarta was safe when the bomb exploded.

*Tempo* seemed eager to point to the weakness of the government at that time in handling issues of security and terrorism. Moreover, the magazine reported on Brigadier General of Police Gorries Mere, who took Ali Imron to an elite location, Senayan Plaza, to drink coffee at Starbucks. According to Mere, he was looking for the Malaysian bomb maker, Dr Azahari.

Finally, *Tempo* covered how the Police investigation led to the search for two Malaysian citizens, Dr Azahari and Noordin M Top. *Tempo* focused on the updated information from the Police which led to both terrorists. No alternative views were given as to who was behind the bombings, and so *Tempo* tended to point to these Malaysians as the perpetrators.

Tenor of discourse

There were several civilian sources for this article, who were the witnesses at the time of the bombing, or were victims who were injured. The Indonesian Police were also used as sources, because the article related to their investigation. Another source was from a western government, Alexander Downer, who according to *Tempo*, received a text message 45 minutes before the bomb exploded, warning that there would be an explosion.
7.1.4 Bali bomb 2 (1 October 2005)

Headline: Azahari is hunted, Azahari is recruiting

Sub-headline: In addition to hunting down the perpetrators of Bali bomb 2, Police are still searching for Azahari and Noordin M Top. They are allegedly carrying explosives and in the meantime, the Police could only arrest their comrades. (Tempo, 10–16 October 2003)

Field of discourse

The article related to the Police investigation tracing Azahari and Noordin M Top. It claimed the Police had been looking for the perpetrators for three years, searching several places across Java, but failing to capture them.

The magazine focused on the difficulties faced by the Police in tracing Azahari and Noordin. Most of their friends had been captured and jailed. Furthermore, the wanted men had been recruiting new people and using new groups to bomb their targets. This new recruitment and formation of groups was also the discourse raised in the ICG report by Sidney Jones (2005a).

Tenor of discourse

The two sources used in this article were the Indonesian Police and Sidney Jones.

7.1.5 Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing (17 July 2009)

Headline: The shadow of Noordin

Sub-headline: The Police source concluded that the bomb explosions at the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton were the acts of Jama’ah Islamiyah. President Yudhoyono opens other possibilities. (Tempo, No.22/XXXVIII/20-26 Juli 2009)

Field of discourse

The first five paragraphs of this article explained that before bombing the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels, the perpetrator spent a few nights at the JW Marriott. Further, the article reported on the possibility of another group’s having targeted President Yudhoyono in the bombings, due to the fact that the explosions took place just days before the Presidential election. This opinion was, however, contested by Indonesian Intelligence, who claimed that Jama’ah Islamiyah was behind the bombing. They cited as evidence the facts that the bomb materials used were the same as in the Bali bombs 1 and 2, a western hotel was the target, and there were suicide bombers. Sidney Jones also agreed that suicide bombing was part of
the strategy of Noordin M Top’s network, and she believed also that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was not the target.

However, *Tempo* also reported another point of view. Abu Rusdan, the former representative of Jama’ah Islamiyah, who was sentenced to three and a half years’ jail, said that there was only a very slight possibility that Jama’ah Islamiyah was involved, due to their minimal access to bombing materials (which were believed to have been taken by the Police) and JI’s use of high explosive bombs rather than the explosives used on the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels. However Rusdan’s opinion was marginal. The main discourse raised was whether or not the bombing was the work of Jama’ah Islamiyah, and whether the target was SBY.

**Tenor of discourse**
The sources used in this article were the Indonesian Police, Sidney Jones, Islamists, and civilians.

**7.1.6 Brief summary of *Tempo***

*Tempo* depended heavily on the investigation report by the Indonesian Police (as was confirmed in an interview with one of the journalists who reports on terrorism issues). Therefore, not surprisingly, *Tempo* tended to support the belief in the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah. The ICG reports, led by Sidney Jones, were a supplementary source. *Tempo* relied on the facts that there was a bomb, and people were killed and, that according to the Police investigation and ICG reports, JI was behind the bombing.

As a consequence of basing their articles on ‘facts,’ therefore, sources used were mainly the Indonesian Police, civilians, ICG, and the Indonesian government. Although there were some Islamist sources, they were not much referred to.

**Table 7.2 Brief Summary of *Tempo***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombing event</th>
<th>Field of discourse</th>
<th>Tenor of discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>• Condemnation from Australia, America and the United Nations of the devastating bombing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Australia and America push/urge Indonesia to investigate who was behind the bombing</td>
<td>• Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Foreign government officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• There is an assumption that JI is behind the bombing

| JW Marriott 1 | • JI is accused of being behind the bombing
| | • Australia is ready to help Indonesia in the investigation |
| | • Civilians/victims of the bombing
| | • Government officials of foreign countries
| | • Indonesian Police

| Australian Embassy | • JI is accused of being behind the bombing |
| | • Indonesian Police
| | • Civilians
| | • Government officials from foreign countries

| Bali bomb 2 | • Azahari and Noordin Top cited as being behind the bombing |
| | • Indonesian Police
| | • NGOs from western countries

| JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton | • According to the Indonesian Police, JI was behind the bombing, but according to SBY, someone was trying to undermine his authority |
| | • Civilian
| | • Indonesian government officials
| | • Indonesian Police
| | • Foreign NGO (ICG)
| | • Islamists

7.2 *Gatra*

7.2.1 *Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002)*

Headline: Al-Faruq’s Confession

Sub-headline: Indonesia is overloaded by bomb terrors after the Bali explosion. Omar Al-Faruq’s\(^{70}\) confession led to the jailing of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Police keeping an eye on Hambali\(^{71}\). Jama’ah Islamiyah is officially declared by George W. Bush as the terrorist organisation. In Mexico, Megawati ‘sowan’\(^{72}\) to George W. Bush. (*Gatra*, 2 November 2002)

**Field of discourse**

The headline of the coverage stressed the subordinate position Indonesia held in relation to the United States. The stressing of the word ‘sowan’ in quotation marks leads to the interpretation of Indonesia’s position as lower than that of the United States. In the previous sentence, the jailing of Ba’asyir and Bush’s official statement on Jama’ah Islamiyah further

\(^{70}\) Omar Al-Faruq is the coordinator of Al Qaeda operations in South East Asia and was arrested in 2002 in Bogor, West Java, and then handed over to the United States and jailed in Guantanamo Bay.

\(^{71}\) Hambali is an Indonesian citizen and member of the Jama’ah Islamiyah. He is allegedly involved in several bombings in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

\(^{72}\) ‘Sowan’ means ‘visit’ in the polite form of the Javanese language which is used to address upper class people or people regarded as of higher status.
stressed the helplessness of the Indonesian government in the context of terrorism, and the
discourse of the existence of terrorism in Indonesia.

The article covered Al Faruq’s confession of Jama’ah Islamiyah’s involvement in various
bombings in Indonesia. His confession led to the capture and jail sentence of Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir for his role as the leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah in Indonesia. But Ba’asyir’s arrest
invited sympathy and comments in his defence, to the effect that charges were directed at him
too early. Moreover, according to Gatra, the Indonesian government officials were keen to
approve what was believed by the United States, without instigating a thorough investigation.
Gatura implied not only that the United States investigation was premature, but that it was too
early for the Indonesian government’s investigation of the Indonesian Islamists as the alleged
bombers to be conclusive.

The numerous bomb threats increasingly confirm that Indonesia is the hotbed of
terrorists, as frequently stated by the United States government officials. Is it true? The
bomb in Bali finally silenced statements of government officials that there are no such
things as terrorists in Indonesia. It further raises the question, is the terrorism really the
work of an Islamist group, as alleged by ‘the West’? “It’s best that we do not recklessly
accuse,” said Riza Sihbudi, the Middle East political observer from the Indonesian
Institute of Science.

However, rather than patiently waiting for the outcome of the investigation, the United
States and Australia instead directly ‘point the finger’ (tunjuk hidung)\(^73\). According to the
country which is said to be ‘mbahnya’ (the home) of human rights, the bombing is the
act of the AlQaeda network, more precisely, Jama’ah Islamiyah. Therefore the radical
group which is based in Malaysia has to be immediately disbanded. (Gatra, 2 November
2002)

Thus Jama’ah Islamiyah was finally officially named as a terrorist organisation. According to
Gatra, this official declaration was to show the international community, particularly the US,
that Indonesia was serious in handling terrorism. According to Gatra, in issuing this
statement the Indonesian government showed its weakness in wanting to please the
international community, especially the United States.

What can we do, when without strong evidence, the government declares Jama’ah
Islamiyah as terrorists. This step is part of the continuing attitude of the government to
start a war against terrorism. Less than a week after bomb explosions in Bali, the
government issued an Enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law\(^75\). These are

\(^73\) ‘Tunjuk hidung’ [pointing the nose] is a term meaning directly pointing the finger at the suspect.
\(^74\) ‘Mbahnya’ is from the word ‘mbah,’ meaning, in the Javanese language, ‘grandfather’ or ‘grandmother.’
These people are considered to be very old. In this context, the United States, which is supposedly the ‘home’ of
human rights (and therefore should understand human rights and should adhere to the principle of the
presumption of innocence) should not feverishly accuse Jama’ah Islamiyah before the investigation has finished.
\(^75\) A Government Regulation in Lieu of Law is an interim law passed in emergency conditions, which must be
eventually ratified by the legislature.
signals that Indonesia has become serious in countering terrorism, an attitude particularly waited for by the United States, following the tragedy of the World Trade Center in 2001. (*Gatra*, 2 November 2002)

As previously mentioned, Ba’asyir’s capture and sentencing to jail resulted in expressions of sympathy from various high profile Indonesians. *Gatra* continued to publish news of the support given to Ba’asyir, and it is apparent that, instead of receiving censure, he received the deepest sympathy. Support came not only from the students of Pondok Al Mukmin, but also from other ulamas. The former head of Indonesian Intelligence, ZA Maulani, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, Salahuddin Wahid, and a number of ulamas visited Ba’asyir while he was still hospitalised at Solo PKU Muhammadiyah hospital.

Ustad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is the victim of arbitrary detention, said the General Secretary of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah, Hussein Umar.

The actions of the Police in arresting Ba’asyir can be categorised as an act of rashness. At least, that is according to Adnan Buyung Nasution. This senior advocate, usually called bang Buyung, who voluntarily joined the team of lawyers for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

The total number of lawyers defending Ba’asyir is 32. “Ba’asyir’s detention, which was only based on the confession of Al-Faruq, is an act of sloppiness. Moreover Al-Faruq’s identity is not clear,” said bang Buyung.

Chairman of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Irfan Awwas said associating Ba’asyir with a series of bomb terrors is without facts.

The government is believing without reserve Al Faruq’s recognition, said Hussein Umar. Frankly speaking I am worried that the government will be moreover run amok and act towards capturing preachers as is experienced by Ustad Ba’asyir. (*Gatra*, 2 November 2002)

**Tenor of discourse**

The sources used in this article were government officials, the Indonesian Police, Indonesian political scientists (for example, Riza Sihbudi), Islamists (for example, Hussein Umar), and others such as Adnan Buyung Nasution, a very well-known advocate in Indonesia.

The government officials and the Indonesian Police were merely official sources, quoting official statements from both the government and the Indonesian Police. But other sources were used to support the argument that the detention of Ba’asyir was not appropriate. In other words, the choice of sources in the magazine tended to support Ba’asyir, and none of the sources, other than the statements from the Indonesian Police or government officials, supported the findings of these institutions. Rather, the magazine questioned whether their findings were accurate.
7.2.2  JW Marriott 1 bombing (5 August 2003)

Headline: Evidence from a dead body from third floor

Sub-headline: The materials of the Marriott hotel bomb are similar to the Bali bomb. A former santri of Ngruki Pesantren is accused of being the suicide bomber. Suspicion towards the Jema’ah Islamiyah is stronger. But, who bought the blue Kijang car which exploded outside the Marriott lobby? (Gatra, 16 August 2003)

Field of discourse

This news coverage was a comprehensive report on the minutes before the JW Marriott 1 bomb tragedy and also on the subsequent investigation by the Indonesian Police. It covered details of the suicide bomb which exploded during lunch time. A blue kijang\(^{76}\) car exploded at the hotel lobby. According to the news report, the Indonesian Police accused Jama’ah Islamiyah of being responsible, because the materials used in this bombing were the same as in Bali bomb 1. A human head found on the third floor of the hotel was alleged to be that of Asmar Latin Sani, a Jama’ah Islamiyah member from Bengkulu, Sumatra.

But in the last paragraph of the article, Gatra concluded with the possibility of foreign agents being implicated in the bombing.

Nevertheless, that the Marriott bomb is the work of Jama’ah Islamiyah is not yet clear. Some people still believe that Jama’ah Islamiyah is only a pretence made by foreign agents to undermine Islam. (Gatra, 16 August 2003)

Tenor of discourse

This report had a total of seven pages, some of which contained pictures. Only a small number of sources was used.

This article mostly referred to Indonesian Police sources, because the article was really a report on the event of the bombing and the following police investigation, in which the Police identified Jama’ah Islamiya has being responsible.

A second source was civilians, in this case, the man who sold the car which exploded in front of the Marriott Hotel, and others, including the alleged bombers.

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\(^{76}\) ‘Kijang’ is a brand of car.
7.2.3 Australian Embassy bombing (9 September 2004)

Field of discourse

Headline: We are in mourning (again)
Sub-headline: The Australian Embassy in Rasuna Said, Jakarta, has been targeted by a bomber. While, 30 minutes before, the Head of Indonesian Police said the Capital city was secure. (Gatra, 18 September 2004)

This special article on the Australian Embassy attack mainly covered events after the bombing. The magazine reported that the explosion was a few metres away from the Australian Embassy fence, and that the windows of surrounding buildings were shattered. Victims were reported as being mainly Indonesians. When the bomb exploded, the Head of the Indonesian Police, General Da’i Bachtiar, was in a meeting of the House of Representatives, where ironically, according to Gatra, he stated that Jakarta was safe and secure. The meeting was hurriedly disbanded when news of the bomb broke. The last page of the article then explained the Indonesian Police officials’ suspicion that Dr Azahari and Noordin M Top’s network were behind the bombing, as the pattern and technique of the explosion were similar to that of the Bali bombing. Further, it quoted the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, as saying that the bomb was the act of the Jama’ah Islamiyah and that he (Downer) had been informed they would strike again. The last paragraph of the article concluded: “It is too early to conclude who is/are behind the bombing.”

Tenor of discourse

The sources for this article were similar to those for the JW Marriott bombing. They were not varied, and just two main sources can be identified in the article—civilians and the Indonesian Police. The first source included the civilians (witnesses) who were close to the bomb at the time of the explosion, who described the minutes before and the chaos following the bombing. The second source was the Indonesian Police, who provided information on the investigation.

7.2.4 Bali bomb 2 (1 October 2005)

Headline: The intention to do jihad in an evil way
Sub-headline: Three bombs exploded in Bali; twenty three victims. It was not clear who were the targets of the bombing. Were tourists in Bali accustomed to bombs. Is this another money-making exercise by ‘the West’? (Gatra, 15 October 2005)
Field of discourse

This article reported on the suffering brought to Indonesian people as a result of the bombing, especially, in this case, those in Bali, who are dependent on the tourist industry. According to the article, 51% of the labourers in Bali work as part of the tourism industry. Therefore, the report sought to convince its readers that Indonesians had no reason to bomb their own country, because the result of the bombings caused suffering to Indonesians themselves. The article further reported, and condemned, John Howard’s accusation that Jama’ah Islamiyah was behind the bombing. However, the Indonesian Chief of Police of Bali Province, I Made Mangku Pastika, did not dare to make such an accusation. In line with his attitude, Hidayat Nur Wahid, the Head of Indonesia’s Consultative Assembly [Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 77] also spoke against relating terrorism to religion. According to Hidayat, relating acts of terrorism with a specific religion is not logical, because it is forbidden in all religions to carry out such acts.

Ja’far Umar Thalib, the former leader of Laskar Jihad, also believed that no Muslim groups would carry out such an act. As he was quoted by Gatra: “If the bomb was the work of a specific Islamist group, these Muslims are being driven by the enemies of Islam and Indonesia.”

Gatra cited another Islamist source, Irfan Awwas, who argued that the Australian governments’ accusation that the Islamist group Jama’ah Islamiyah was behind the bombing was ‘wrongly addressed’ [salah alamat]. Further, according to Awwas, there was Australian involvement in the intelligence network related to the bombing.

To make the report appear neutral, Juanda (an intelligence observer) was cited. Although his comments came from a context of globalisation and imperialist capitalism, nevertheless they were in accord with the other Islamist comments that the bomb was not the work of Indonesians alone, but occurred in the context of the domination of natural resources.

In its final paragraph, the report covered comments from Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who was sentenced to jail for two years and six months for his part in the first Bali bombing: “I don’t

77 Hidayat Nur Wahid is also known as the President of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [National Prosperous Justice Party], an Islam based party.
agree with bombing in ‘safe’

areas, including Bali, because, it will inevitably cause the
death of innocent people.”

Tenor of discourse

The sources for this article were from various backgrounds: tourism analysts, the Indonesian
Police, the People’s Consultative Assembly, Islamists (including statements from Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir) and also civilians.

Despite the variety of their backgrounds, all were of much the same opinion. Each
emphasised how the bombing could only lead to the suffering of ordinary Indonesians as
indirect victims (for example, the tattoo artist who relied on international tourists to make a
living). This being the case, in their opinion, Indonesian Muslims (accused by John Howard
of being the perpetrators of this heinous crime) would not carry out such a deed which could
only lead to their own suffering.

7.2.5  JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing (17 July 2009)

Headline: Investigating the puppeteer of the Mega Kuningan bomb

Sub-headline: After the bomb exploded at the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton Hotels,
in South Jakarta, police investigated the suspected involvement of Al Qaeda and the
terrorist network Noordin M Top. Is it true that the real puppeteer is western
Intelligence? (Gatra, 29 Juli 2009)

Field of discourse

For the first three pages, this comprehensive special report article mostly focused on the
business meeting held by James Castle on the morning of the bombing, and the
chronological events concerning the bombings in both hotels. In the last two pages of the
article, Gatra covered a report on the investigation carried out by the Indonesian Police, who
considered the Islamist group Jama’ah Islamiyah as prime suspects. However, Gatra seems
reluctant to believe that the bombing was the work of the Islamists. To stress this point, the
magazine reported that the results of DNA tests involving the suspected suicide bombers
were negative. Second, the magazine speculated on the bomb which was left in room 1808 in

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78‘Safe areas’ mean states which are not at war.
79This business (breakfast) meeting is held every Friday morning in the Marriott lounge. James Castle is the
Chairman and the founder of Castle Asia (1980). He was the former Chair of US House of Trade in Indonesia.
He is known as a very good lobbyist, for any overseas company who would like to invest in Indonesia.
the JW Marriott Hotel, which added to the theory that the attack was the ‘work of Jama’ah Islamiyah.’\textsuperscript{80} Gatra suggested it could have been planted and, further, the magazine seemed to find support from the Islamists for an alternative view of the bombing.

Umar Abduh reminds everybody not to point too hurriedly to the involvement of Al Qaeda and JI. Umar is convinced that western intelligence is behind all of this bombing.\textit{(Gatra, 29 Juli 2009)}

\textit{Gatra} also quoted AC Manulang:

AC Manulang claimed that the bomb explosion was an attempt by the United States to discredit Islam. By showing the world that there are still lots of radical Islamists, he said... American icons such as the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton were deliberately sacrificed to further make the point.\textit{(Gatra, 29 Juli 2009)}

\textit{Gatra} then added a clear and obvious opinion given in an interview with Umar Abduh, who added that, besides discrediting Islam, the bomb explosion was meant to be a warning for Indonesia to be a ‘good boy.’ These foreign masterminds used and maintained troublesome local apparatus. “So don’t be surprised that terrorism in Indonesia is hard to eradicate.”

In the closing paragraphs of the article, \textit{Gatra} seemed to support the views of the Islamists. Not only did it quote interviews with the pro-Islam faction (as explained in the tenor of discourse) to make it clear that there was also the possibility that foreign agents were behind the bombings, but the magazine also concluded that there were many theories surrounding the cause of the bombings.

\textbf{Tenor of discourse}

Since the article was a long and investigative one, covering the minutes before the bomb explosion and an analysis of the possible perpetrators behind it, the sources are best divided into three groups. The first group comprised the victims and their relatives and the relatives of the suspected suicide bombers. The second group included the Indonesian Police, intelligence analysts, and the third group was the Islamists. From the second group, two of the intelligence analysts, Hendropriyono and Widjayanto, believed that the bombing was the work of the Islamists, inside the network of Noordin M Top. Another intelligence analyst, AC Manulang, was opposed to believing that Islamists were behind the bombing. The third group included just one Islamist source, Umar Abduh.

\textsuperscript{80} The JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bomb exploded inside the hotel. According to the police investigation, the suspected suicide bomber stayed in the hotel for three nights (at $154.00 per night) before the bombing. He checked into room 1808. After the bomb exploded in the JW Marriott lounge and the Ritz Carlton, an unexploded bomb was found in this room. This same sort of bomb was also found in Central Java, Cilacap, at the house of Baridin, a suspected terrorist and part of Noordin Mohammad Top’s network (Al Qaeda/Jama’ah Islamiyah).
### 7.3 Brief summary of *Gatra*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombing event</th>
<th>Field of discourse</th>
<th>Tenor of discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Bali bomb 1   | According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI was behind the bombing, but the magazine opens the possibility that it could be the work of foreign agents | • Government officials  
• Indonesian Police  
• Academics/scholars  
• Islamist |
| JW Marriott 1 bombing | According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI was behind the bombing, but the magazine opens the possibility that it could be the work of foreign agents | • Indonesian Police  
• Civilians |
| Australian Embassy bombing | According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI is behind the bombing, but *Gatra* opens the possibility that other organisations/agents were behind it | • Indonesian Police  
• Civilians |
| Bali bomb 2   | According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI was behind the bombing, but according to the sources and the magazine, it could be the work of western intelligence | • Islamists  
• Academics/Scholars  
• Civilians  
• Indonesian Police  
• Western government officials  
• People’s Consultative Assembly |
| JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing | According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI was behind the bombing, but according to the sources and the magazine, it could be the work of western intelligence | • Islamists  
• Indonesian Police  
• Civilians (victims of the bombing)  
• Intelligence analysts |

_Gatra_ approached the discourse on terrorism in relation to the bombings analysed from two angles: from the thorough investigation by the Police, which stated that Jama’ah Islamiyah was behind the bombings; and through the voice of the Islamists, quoting their statements and asking for their opinions, which were undoubtedly opposed to the findings of the police investigation. The statements by the Islamists mainly accused western governments (i.e. the United States) of masterminding the bombings in an effort to undermine Islam.
On the surface, the report seems to be balanced. However, on a second reading *Gatra* could be seen to be predominantly in support of the Islamists, and whether or not this is so, the Islamists certainly have a conspicuous place in this magazine. Interview articles are not analysed in this thesis. But it is significant to note that, during the analysis, I found three interview articles. Two of them were exclusive interviews with the leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and one was an interview with Ustad Ilyas (not his real name), the person who hid the Malaysian bomb expert, Dr Azahari. The two interview articles with Ba’asyir had the headlines: “Hatred towards the United States is right, carrying out the bombing is wrong” (23 August 2003); and “Where’s the proof?” (26 October 2002), (also showing a picture of John Howard on the bombing site). The interview article (*Gatra*, 19 November 2005) with Ustad Ilyas had the headline: “Obligation to terrorise the United States.”

Various sources were used by *Gatra*. As explained earlier, its two primary sources were the Indonesian Police and the Islamists. Therefore, the Islamists’ role in *Gatra* was significant, not only in their shaping an alternative view from that of the Police, but in the substantial amount of space they were given in the magazine.

In conclusion, in this magazine Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was not labeled as a terrorist. He was portrayed as an *ulama*, despite the so-called ‘facts’ identifying him as the leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah, which was responsible for many bombings in Indonesia.

### 7.3 Conclusion

As explained in Chapter 2, there is an Islamisation process in Indonesian society—generally speaking, the Indonesian Muslim community has been Islamised. The dichotomy between *abangan* and *santri* is decreasing, and *abangan* are no longer dominant in the structure of the Indonesian Muslim community (Ricklefs, 2012).

In the contemporary Indonesian mediascape, the rise of Islamic and Islamist media is in parallel with the Islamisation of Indonesian society. This raises the question of how the general magazines compare to the Islamist magazines in their treatment of issues connected to Islam, for example, terrorism. How do the general magazines’ reports cover such issues?
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) explain that media workers (in this case, the journalists) can influence the content of news. For example, how the journalists perceive and view terrorism relates to what is produced in their reports. This premise is true of *Gatra*. The two most influential people in this magazine, the Chief Editor and the Vice Chief Editor, do not view terrorism in the same way that the mainstream media do. Terrorism is viewed as the result of unjust policy. Islamisation exists not only in society but, as argued by Pintak and Setiyono (2011), also in the internal media institutions, or even in the newsrooms.

However, the secular view espoused by the Chief Editor of *Tempo*, and by the other two journalists I interviewed, represents a liberal perspective for Islamists. All the journalists I interviewed were Muslims, but they hold to the view that their religion should not affect their reporting. To cover sensitive issues such as terrorism fairly, they must release their identity as Muslims so as not to be one-sided. Therefore, *Tempo* relies on the official investigation by the Indonesian Police and Sidney Jones’ ICG report, which it sees as reliable sources.

In the next chapter, using the same approach, I will analyse the Islamist magazines.
Chapter 8

A Closer Look at the Articles: The Islamist Magazines

This chapter will focus on the Islamists magazines, Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah, and analyse their articles covering the bombings within the framework of field of discourse (what happened) and tenor of discourse (who took part), referring to the work of Hooker (1993) and Sudibyo (2001).

Only seven articles were analysed, because not all the articles from Suara Hidayatullah were available. There were no articles from Suara Hidayatullah covering the Bali bomb 2, or the JW Marriott 1 and JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombings. The bombing event articles which are to be analysed from each magazine are set out in Table 8.1 below.

Table 8.1 The bombing event articles to be analysed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sabili</th>
<th>Suara Hidayatullah</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW Marriott 1 bombing (5 August 2003)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali bomb 2 (1 October 2005)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Embassy bombing (9 September 2004)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW Marriott 2 and Ritz Carlton bombing (17 July 2009)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.1 Sabili

8.1.1 Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002)

Headline: Bali bomb—We are being attacked

Sub-headline: One day before the Bali bomb exploded, the United States Embassy issued a travel warning for their citizens especially who are in Bali not to go to cafes, discotheques and other venues. Why? (Sabili, No. 08 TH X 31 October 2002, pp. 12–16)
**Field of discourse**

Headlines in the *Sabili* magazine for articles about the Bali 1 bombing tended to point the finger at the United States as being behind the bombing, due to the US Embassy’s press statement issued one day before the bombing. The headline, *Bom Bali-Kita Diserang* [Bali bomb—We are being attacked] stressing that it was the Indonesians who were being struck by foreigners.

The article looked at the discourse on who was behind the bombing (pointing the finger at the US) and the materials used in the bombing, which were believed not to be available in Indonesia. Although the article also covered the discourse on the existence of terrorism in Indonesia, this represented only a small part of the coverage. To further stress the link between western agents’ involvement and the bomb used in the explosion, *Sabili* included a picture of where the bomb (C4\(^{81}\)) exploded, with the caption: *Bekas C4, Punya siapa?* [traces of C4, who owns it?].

Although admitting that proving US involvement was not easy, in order to convince readers to share this belief the magazine offered evidence as proof:

> Proving the involvement of ‘the West,’ especially United States and the CIA as being behind the bombing in Bali and Manado\(^{82}\) is not as easy as turning one’s hand palm up.
> (p.15)

According to the magazine, three facts concerning the bombing were significant: First, the press release from the United States Embassy in Jakarta warning US citizens to avoid discotheques, cafes or places normally frequented by westerners; second, only a few Americans were victims of the bombing; and third, the docking of several western ships (American and Australian) near Bali, a few days before the bombing. These facts were used by *Sabili* to justify its accusation of the involvement of the United States.

> Twelve hours before the bombs exploded in Bali and Manado, on Saturday at 10.00 am, the United States Embassy in Jakarta issued a press release warning to all American citizens in Indonesia, especially in Bali to avoid certain types of venue. (p. 15)
>
> The docking of several foreign ships, especially from United States and Australia, in the Benoa Sea, Bali, a few days before the bomb explosions in Bali and Manado, aroused suspicion for the Balinese community (people). (p. 15)

Furthermore, according to this article, the United States was a suspect in this matter because of its repressiveness, and intervention in Indonesia.

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\(^{81}\)C4 is believed to be the sort of bomb used in the Bali bombing. It is not only devastating, but it is also believed not to be available in Indonesia (i.e. the materials of which the bomb was made are not from Indonesia).

\(^{82}\)Two bombings occurred on 12 October, one in Bali and the other in Manado, the capital of North Sulawesi. Although there were no casualties, the iron fence of the Philippine Consulate was toppled.
Note that the list of foreign agent involvement is still long, such as foreign agents’ involvement in several government institutions such as Mabes TNI\(^{83}\) and Polri\(^{84}\). Without paying attention to the Indonesian regulations, foreign agents, especially from United States, pressed the institutions to act severely on terrorism. (p. 15)

*Sabili* denied any participation by Indonesia in terrorism of any nature, contrary to the accusations being made by the United States. According to the article, the alleged involvement of Indonesian Islamists was not proven and not possible. Covering the disagreement among the Indonesian Government officials about the existence of ‘terrorism’ in Indonesia, *Sabili* came down on the side of denying Indonesians’ participation in terrorism.

Since the issue of terrorism began, up until now, there has been no proof of an Al Qaeda network in Indonesia. The United States and its allies, Australia and Singapore, have accused several prominent Indonesian Islamist figures, such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Habib Rizieq Shihab of involvement in terrorism, but these accusations have never been proven. (p. 14)

**Tenor of discourse**

Most of the information in this article came from various Indonesian sources, such as Indonesian government officials, Islamic organisations, retired Government officials and Indonesian scholars or University professors; only a few of the article’s sources were foreign. The sources can be divided into those who believed the bombing to be the work of Al Qaeda and those who saw western foreign agents as being behind the bombing. Although few sources discussed the existence of terrorism in Indonesia, the main criterion for their selection by *Sabili* was the fact that they did believe that the Bali bombing was the work of foreign agents.

Sources which can be categorised as representing foreign agents were CNN television (quoting Alexander Downer, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs for Australia, who accused Al-Qaeda of being behind the bombing) and the Press Attaché of the United States Embassy in Jakarta, Stanley Harsha. However, the magazine only dedicated one paragraph to Harsha, allowing him to counter the accusation of Indonesian Muslims who claimed that the CIA and the US were behind the bombings in Bali.

The alleged involvement of the United States and the CIA in the Bali and Manado bombings was promptly denied by the United States Embassy, with Harsha issuing the statement: “The accusation is not true. United States did not know earlier that there was going to be a bomb in Bali and Manado.” (p.16)

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\(^{83}\)Mabes TNI is the abbreviation of Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian Army Headquarters.

\(^{84}\)Polri is the abbreviation of Polisi Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian State Police.
The Indonesian sources selected by Sabili mostly laid the blame for the bombings on the United States and other foreign agents. Only limited space was given to statements or comments about the possible involvement of Al Qaeda, since this was not the position held by the magazine. For example, although Sabili quoted a statement from the Minister of Defence, Matori Abdul Djalil\textsuperscript{85}, that the Al Qaeda network was behind the bombing, in the same paragraph, his statement was countered by Hasyim Muzadi\textsuperscript{86} who said that it was too early to accuse Al Qaeda.

Other Islamist organisations, such as from the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), blamed the United States:

> According to the information from the Head of Indonesian Defenders Front, Habib Rizieq, the press release from the United States Embassy was released after input from the CIA. Only one victim of the Bali bomb is American. In fact, there are significant numbers of American citizens in Bali who frequently go to cafes in Legian Street, Kuta Bali. In addition, the American consulate in Bali received only minor damage, although the bomb also exploded in Renon, a mere 100 metres away from the consulate. (p.15)

To further their argument that the United States masterminded the bombing, Sabili involved sources from the Indonesian Police and Indonesian State Intelligence\textsuperscript{87}. They were quoted as saying that the bomb which caused such devastation would have required materials that could not have been produced or even been made available in Indonesia.

To stress the magazines’ view regarding US involvement, statements from high profile academics were also quoted.

> Looking at the type of bomb and the destruction it caused, many people, especially political observers, hold the view that western agents were behind both bombs in two Indonesian major cities. (p. 15)

Professor Dr M Budyatna from the University of Indonesia made the following statement:

> The bombing could have been engineered by foreigners in order to justify their attack on Islamic fundamentalists whom they claim are terrorists. (p.15)

A supporting statement came from Riza Sihbudi\textsuperscript{88}:

> It could be (the work) of US Intelligence, CIA, which uses whatever it takes in the interests of America. (p.15)

\textsuperscript{85} Matori Abdul Djalil is also known as one of the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia. His statement (as the Minister of Defence), that the Al Qaeda network was behind the bombing is to some extent controversial, regarded as slapping Indonesian Muslims in the face.

\textsuperscript{86} At the time of the bombing Hasyim Muzadi was the Head of Nahdlatul Ulama.

\textsuperscript{87} The sources were: the then Head of Indonesian Police, Da’i Bachtiar; the former Head of Indonesian Police, Rusdihardjo; and the then Head of Indonesian State Intelligence, ZA Maulani.

\textsuperscript{88} Dr Riza Sihbudi is a staff member of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia [Indonesian Institute of Science]. He is an expert on politics in the Middle East.
8.1.2 JW Marriott 1 bombing (5 August 2003)

Headline: Islam cursed, Islam accused (Sabili, No. 3 TH XI 28 August 2003, pp. 16–21)

Field of discourse

One year after the Bali bomb 1, Sabili again accused ‘foreign agents’ (i.e. ‘the West’—alias the US) of being behind this Marriott Hotel bombing.

According to some Intelligence observers, the Marriott bombing is not free from the involvement of foreign agents whose goal is to undermine the Islamic community in Indonesia. Is it true? (p.16)

This sub-headline pointed to the involvement of foreign agents, meaning westerners, that have a specific interest in undermining Islam.

The first two pages of the magazine article reported the government officials’ findings on the group/people behind the bombing. Although the investigation concluded that Jama’ah Islamiyah was the culprit, Sabili did not support this finding, and further, raised the possibility that the United States could be responsible, and also the possibility that the bomb could have been manufactured or planted by other groups seeking power.

Sabili dismissed the accusation by the Minister of Defence, Matori Abdul Djalil, that Jama’ah Islamiyah was behind the bombing, claiming that these accusations were not only without factual proof and data, but could also lead to misinformation that may have a negative impact on Muslims.

The view held by Minister of Defence, Matori Abdul Djalil, regarding JI’s, involvement is causing the government increasing embarrassment. Giving information to journalists, without facts and valid data, he directly accuses JI as being behind the Marriott bomb. (p.18)

Sabili denounced the foreign magazines as making the situation increasingly difficult for Muslims. The magazine usually refers to western countries when it uses the word ‘foreign,’ but in this article it also mentioned Singapore’s The Straits Times. This newspaper was seen to be a bad influence, because it covered the story claiming the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah in the Marriott bombing, even going so far as to claim that it had received confirmation from an informant who was a member of this organisation.

What makes it worse is that foreign media coverage of the Marriott bomb has tended to be inaccurate, thus damaging the Islamic community. (p.18)

The Straits Times consistently refers to JI as being behind the Marriott bomb, yet the information given by this Singapore daily lacks conviction for many people, since it does not meet journalistic standards.(p.18)

Ironically, although The Straits Times’ report is flawed, other forms of media, including the local television and newspapers, have been picking it up. For days, the news has been
making headlines, gradually shaping the Indonesian community’s opinion that JI is indeed behind the Marriott bombing. (p.19)

In line with Singapore’s The Straits Times, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Alexander Downer, also accused Jama’ah Islamiyah of responsibility for the Marriott bombing, which, according to Sabili was an accusation without proof.

The Straits Times’ report was made worse by the unfounded opinion of the origin of the bomb by the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer. Without valid proof, Downer immediately accused JI of being behind it. He also warned of possible further attacks by Islamic militant groups linked to Al Qaeda. (p. 19)

As can be seen in the first two pages of the article and in the quotations above, Sabili opposed the view of the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah. The magazine tended to stress the involvement of foreign agents (United States) in the Marriott bombing or, as in the last two paragraphs of the article, of groups inside Indonesia who have something to gain from the bomb explosion.

The magazine’s belief in United States involvement was also apparent on the last pages. The accompanying picture was one of cars destroyed by the Bali bomb, with the heading:

Bali bomb, engineered by foreign agents.(p. 21)

Rumors of the involvement of the United States in the Marriott bomb were further fuelled with the news that five hours before the bomb exploded, the United States Embassy cancelled all bookings for rooms at Marriott.(p. 20)

In addition to this explosive disclosure, a statement was given by the scholar and Islamic organisation leader, Professor Dr Din Syamsuddin89. He was not only certain of the involvement of the United States, but adamant that Jama’ah Islamiyah did not exist and that it was only the United States setting out to destroy the portrayal of Islam.

Din’s analysis stems from the belief that there is no group or organisation named JI. He said there are certain people from the Islamic ummah (community) who admit to participating in the war in Afghanistan: “But, I am convinced, by books published in the US, that they were formerly trained by the CIA. After that they still maintained the relationship.” He added that the existence of JI could be a global movement or a shape of a new imperialism, which does not want Indonesia to be a stable country, while simultaneously ruining the image of Islam, Indonesian’s majority faith. “What we have to understand is that JI is an American set up,” Din said.(p. 21)

Interestingly, on page 19 of this 6 page report, a quarter of a page is dedicated to Stanley Harsha, the spokesman for the United States Embassy in Jakarta, denying the rumours that the US had known earlier that there would bea bomb in the JW Marriott Hotel. (The rumours were that the United States Embassycancelled bookings for the hotel.)

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89 At the time of the bombing, Din Syamsuddin, a PhD graduate from the University of California, Los Angeles, was Vice Chair of Muhammadiyah (the second largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia) as well as General Secretary of Majelis Ulama Indonesia [Indonesian Ulama Council].
Tenor of discourse

The sources for this article can be divided into government officials (Indonesian and foreign), foreign media, members of Islamic organisations in Indonesia, and retired government officials.

Indonesian government officials included Cabinet Ministers, such as the Coordinator Minister for Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Minister for Defence, Matori Abdul Djalil, and the Indonesian Police. Foreign government officials included the Press Attaché of the United States Embassy in Jakarta, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Alexander Downer. In this case, another foreign source was Singapore’s The Straits Times.

Indonesian government officials were referred to or quoted concerning their statements accusing Jama’ah Islamiyah of being behind the bombing. The official line of the Indonesian State, as given by the police and the Cabinet Ministers, was that Jama’ah Islamiyah had carried out this act.

As explained in the field of discourse, Sabili covered these views, while at the same time attempting to dismantle their arguments by seeking sources to mount counter arguments. Their highly credible sources included Professor Dr Din Syamsuddin and the former Chief of Indonesian Intelligence, AC Manulang. Both men held strongly to their conviction that Indonesian Muslims were not behind the bombings.

8.1.3 Australian Embassy bombing (9 September 2004)

Headline: Bomb for the newly elected President (Sabili, No. 5 TH XII Oktober 2004, pp. 17–21)

Field of discourse

Since the Australian Embassy bomb exploded during the Presidential election in September, it was not surprising that the headline of the article related to the newly elected President. The bomb meant for the Australian Embassy detonated in the street of Rasuna Said, five metres in front of it. Sabili’s coverage of the bombing first focused on the investigation by the

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90 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is currently the President of Indonesia. He has been elected twice, in 2004 and 2009.
91 The Police sources were Chief of the Indonesian Police, General Da’i Bachtiar, and Director of the Narcotics and Drugs Agency, General Gories Merde.
Indonesian Police, who accused two Islamist Malaysian citizens, Dr Azahari and Noordin M Top, of being responsible. The article expressed doubt that they were to blame, drawing attention to the tardiness of the Indonesian Police in investigating and capturing the two men, and stressing the suspicion that ‘others’ were behind or ‘masterminding’ the bombing.

Is it true, Dr Azahari Husen and Noordin M Top the accused, are the puppeteers of a series of bombing cases which occurred in Indonesia? Would there by any chance be another group(s) masterminding the chaos and violence in this country? (p. 18)

Further, the article pointed out that the Indonesian Police had received a text message 45 minutes prior to the bomb blast, a fact which the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, stated at his press conference following the bombing. This raised further questions about who masterminded the bombing.

The article clearly showed that Sabili suspected the involvement of the United States and Australia and quoted chemistry expert, Dr Yazid Bindar, who explained that the bomb materials were not available in Indonesia and were only possessed by the United States, England and Israel.

Given the type of bomb explosion, no ordinary person can access the materials and explode it, according to Dr Yazid Bindar. (p. 20)

However, Mr Bindar continued, a high explosive type bomb, such as TNT, RDX as well as this C4 is hard to find in Indonesia. It is even difficult to find the network to get it. “RDX and TNT are hard to find. Moreover, C4 is only owned by superpower countries, such as the United States, England and Israel. It is not possible to find it in Indonesia.” (p. 21)

Sabili’s discourse, that Jama’ah Islamiyah was not behind the bombing, was further stressed by the magazine’s endeavour to find out who actually was the ‘mastermind’ behind it. Soeripto (Intelligence Officer) categorically stated that the bomb was deliberately used to create chaos in order to make Indonesia appear ‘a failed country,’ in the interests of developed countries such as the United States. In addition, he was adamant that an organised intelligence, backed up by significant financial funding was running a propaganda campaign.

On the second page of the article (p. 18), there was a picture of Alexander Downer with his staff, examining the Australian Embassy after the bombing. The picture was accompanied by the text “Australia terlibat?”[Is Australia involved?].

Tenor of discourse

The sources used for this article were government officials (Chief of Indonesian Police), Islamic organisations, retired government officials (perceived as intelligence observers) and a scientist.
The discourse in the article still claimed the involvement of foreign agents in the bombing and cast doubt on the investigation by the Indonesian Police, and their accusation that Islamists were behind the bombing. In connection with the other bombings, Sabili again quoted members from the Islamic organisations (Leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Irfan Awwas) and pengamat intelijen [intelligence observer] (Soeripto) to support the magazine’s view that the bombings were not the work of Islamists.

To further support its viewpoint in this article, Sabili quoted statements from Dr Yazid Bindar, an expert in chemistry from the well-known Indonesian Institute of Technology, Bandung, East Java.

8.1.4 Bali bomb 2(1 October 2005)

Headline: Police failed, Islamic community is cornered (Sabili, No. 7 TH XIII 20 Oktober 2005, pp. 17–21)

Field of discourse

The first few paragraphs concerning the second Bali bombing focused on the work of Indonesian Intelligence, which was seen as weak and not capable of capturing the perpetrators of not only the Bali 2 bombing but also of the bombing which occurred before. This failure led to Muslims being stigmatised as ‘terrorists’ and ‘the West’ was seen as having played a major part in this stigmatisation.

Terrorist stigmatisation, which is attached to the Islam community is rapidly spreading and ‘the West’ plays a major part in causing this stigmatisation. CNN, the television news, is foremost in defending ‘the West.’ Without proof, this television channel mentions Jama’ah Islamiyah as being behind bombings all over the world, including Indonesia. (p.18)

Sabili connected the discourse of stigmatisation to the mainstream belief and accusation that Jama’ah Islamiyah, a network connected to AlQaeda, was responsible for not only the Bali bombing 2 but also the two previous bombing analysed. Therefore, the report tended to counter statements which accused Jama’ah Islamiyah of involvement, and also connected this accusation to the discourse of undermining Islam.

John Howard, the former Prime Minister of Australia, who was described as “one of the Heads of Government who repeatedly mentioned Jama’ah Islamiyah as being behind world terrorism” (p.19), was also a target of criticism. He was described as “nyeleneh” [an intellectual deviant] because of his accusation that Islamist radicals were behind the bombing. According to Howard, quoted from the Sydney Morning Herald, the Islamist radicals were not in line with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was seen as a moderate Muslim.
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is a threat for the radical Muslim because he is a Muslim moderate. Therefore they want to stop him with the bomb. (p. 19)

Regarding Howard’s opinion, Sabili stated:

Howard’s accusation, of Islamist fundamentalists being behind the Bali bomb 2, is truly wild and dangerous, because the haphazard accusation is merely his assumption, not based on facts and reality of field study. (p. 19)

Further in the article, Sabili covered opinions and comments on the stigmatisation of Muslims.

Today, with various forms of intellectual engineering, the enemy of Islam is bearing down on Muslims and their faith. With their arrogance they are trying to silence Islam from the face of the earth. (p. 21)

According to Sabili, stigmatisation was the work of the United States, and the reason for it was to maintain its hegemony in Indonesia and its strong bases. If Indonesia failed to suppress terrorism, the US could prepare an invasion plan, as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sabili dedicated the conclusion of the report to statements and opinions by NGO activists who not only resisted stigmatisation but also the accusations aimed towards Islam. In addition, the Qur’an (Ali Imran verse 54) was quoted at the end of the article:

And the disbelievers planned, but Allah planned. And Allah is the best of planners. (p.21)

**Tenor of discourse**

The sources for this article were similar to those used in previous articles but with some additional sources used to support the magazine’s view that Jama’ah Islamiyah was not behind the bombings.

The first were official statements from Indonesian government officials—from the Indonesian Police, foreign government officials, foreign media and a foreign terrorism observer (Rohan Gunaratna). These sources all supported the view that JI was behind the bombing. On the contrary, sources from the Islamic organisation, Front Pembela Islam [Islamic Defenders Front], were keen to accuse western countries of being responsible. A new source, not mentioned in other articles, referred to the bombing as analysed from the perspective of Front Perlawanan Penculikan [Kidnapping Defence Front] and Gerakan Nasional Antiterorisme (GNAT) [National Anti-terrorism Movement]). The former group supported the view that the United States has stigmatised Islam and involved Muslims in the

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92 Gerakan Nasional Antiterorisme is a group made up from various religions.
discourse on terrorism, and the latter group, according to one of their declarations, refused to connect the Bali bombing with religion.

8.1.5 JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing (17 July 2009)

Headline: Radicalism is maintained on purpose: After years of lying dormant, the bomb is re-exploded. Is it a result of maintaining radicalism? (Sabili, No. 2 TH XVII 22 Sya’ban 1430, 2009)

Field of discourse

This article tended to point to the Indonesian government as maintaining ‘radicalism’ in Indonesia, as is apparent from the headline. It is worth noting that ‘radicalism’ in this context does not refer to ‘radical Islam’ but to the ‘radicals’ who, according to Sabili’s view, masterminded the bombings.

The early paragraphs of the article reported on the situation in the JW Marriott Hotel’s lounge, where James Castle, Consultant and Lobbyist, and Chairman of Castle Asia, was preparing to start a breakfast meeting with other expatriate directors of multinational companies on the topic of oil and mining in Indonesia. Among these were Timothy Mackay (President Director of Holcim Indonesia), Kevin Moore (President Director of Husky Oil), and Dave Potter (Exploration Director of Freeport Indonesia).

Further, Sabili reported on the suspects of the bombing which occurred in the JW Marriott lounge and, approximately ten minutes later, in the Ritz Carlton lobby. Sabili reported that, according to the Indonesian Government, the bombing was the work of Muslims, and they were assumed to be the intellectual puppeteers behind the bombing. The families of the suicide bomber suspects were being questioned and subjected to DNA tests, in order to identify the bombers. Sabili seemed reluctant to accept that this was a suicide bombing, as the word ‘bomb bunuh diri’ [suicide bomb] was in quotation marks, along with other cynical responses to the work of the police who questioned the families of the suspects. As the article reported, the families not only denied that their sons had any involvement with the bombing, but also the denied that the man who appeared in the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton recorded CCTV footage 93 was the son of any of them.

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93 At the time after the bombing of the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels, most Indonesian television networks broadcasted the camerarecording captured by both hotels. The parents of one of the suspects of the bombing were interviewed and asked whether the man appearing on the screen was their son.
Sabili’s response to the work of the Indonesian Police was suspicion as to who was really behind the bombing. To address this suspicion, the article also reported an interview with Irfan Awwas, Chair of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and Umar Abduh (an Islamist activist). They believed that the Indonesian Police could possibly have set up and taken part in the bombing. In addition, Irfan Awwas supported the theory behind the stigmatisation of Islam. Further, he explained that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was being pressured by western Intelligence to represstwhat they called the ‘Islamist fundamentalists’ who, in the reform era, had become so free. Sabili quoted Awwas:

In my opinion, the statement from the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, comes from pressure by western intelligence. The aim is in order to pressure SBY to be hard on Islamic groups of the coalition. SBY received amessage to pressure what they call the Muslim fundamentalists who are free in this reform era. (p. 27)

In the last paragraphs of the article, Sabili criticised the Indonesian government for not working comprehensively to minimise ‘radicalism’ in Indonesia which could lead to further targeting of Muslims. Sabili argued that only Densus 88\(^{94}\) and Indonesian Intelligence have been given the task of controlling radicalism or terrorism, whereas its cause is so complex that it needs the joint support of other ministerial departments, such as the Department of Education, the Department of Religion and the Department of Labour.

**Tenor of discourse**

The sources used for this article were the Indonesian Police, the parents of the accused perpetrators, an Islamist organisation and an Islamist activist. The Indonesian Police were the source for the result of the investigation relating to the DNA tests, which did not match the ‘parents’ to the suicide bombers. The representative of the Islamist organisation was Irfan Awwas, from Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and the Islamist activist was Umar Abduh.

**8.1.6 Brief summary of Sabili**

According to the text analysed above, Sabili refused to admit that Muslims, or in this case Jama’ah Islamiyah, were behind the bombings. In the first three bombings analysed (Bali bomb 1, JW Marriott 1 and Bali bomb 2), Sabili strongly accused western countries, led by the United States, of being responsible. This statement was strengthened by opinions offered from various sources, mainly from local Islamists, which supported the conspiracy theory that

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\(^{94}\) Detachment 88 is a special Police unit for the eradication of terrorism in Indonesia. Juni this not the first time Densus 88 has been mentioned. Perhaps this note should be moved to there.
the bombings which occurred in Indonesia were designed to undermine Islam. Additionally, bomb experts insisted that the materials of which the bombs were made could not be found in Indonesia.

In its reporting of the last two bombings analysed (Bali bomb 2 and the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton), Sabili tended to be more cautious, not directly accusing western agents (which in this case meant the US or its allies) of responsibility. In the Indonesian political discourse during this time, it was widely accepted that Jama’ah Islamiyah exists, and, according to the investigation of the bombing (and also of the previous bombings), that this Islamist organisation was involved.

In other words, the text analysis of the reports on the Bali bomb 2 and the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing shows that although not directly accusing foreign agents, Sabili also refused to admit that the Islamists were the perpetrators of the bombings. Sabili pointed out the weakness of Indonesian Intelligence and the Indonesian Police and presented the possibility that they themselves were the perpetrators. As quoted from Umar Abduh:

They (the police) are just testing us (Muslims), whether or not we can still be as one or not? Can we reject the accusation that Muslims are the bombers? And the fact is, until today only a small number of Muslim figures reject this accusation. Most of them are following the mainstream of the accusation of Muslim stigmatisation. (Sabili, No.2 TH XVII 22 Syaban, p. 27)

The theory of Muslim stigmatisation was strengthened in the analysis of the last 2 bombings. As an Islamist magazine, it is not surprising that Sabili had a worldview in accordance with that of the Islamists, which supported the conspiracy theory and the belief that ‘the West’ was the enemy. Therefore, any opinion which was contrary to this worldview could be reported, but would then be contested with the Islamist worldview.

A closer scrutiny reveals that the Sabili magazine mostly relied on opinions and online sources (as also stated by Irawanto (2011)), rather than reporting on investigations.

Table 8.2 Brief summary of Sabili

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### 8.2 Suara Hidayatullah

#### 8.2.1 Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002)

Headline: Alternative Investigators from Istiqlal Mosque: Facts Search Team for Bali bomb of Majelis Ulama Indonesia found different facts to the findings of police. What are the findings? (09/XV/Syawal-Dzulqa’dah 1423)
Field of discourse

The headline of this special report of Suara Hidayatullah’s pointed to the facts of Bali bomb 1 according to the investigative team led by Majelis Ulama Indonesia.

This article was dedicated to supporting the fact (as found by Majelis Ulama Indonesia) that Jema’ah Islamiyah was not the mastermind behind the bombing, and pointed to ‘the West’ as attempting to stigmatise Muslims. Generally speaking, those Indonesian Muslims involved in the bombing were only ‘doing the work,’ but behind them was the ‘mastermind.’ Further, the article urged the Indonesian Police or Government officials to look at the facts again and refer to the findings of Majelis Ulama Indonesia as a second opinion.

The first paragraphs of the article explained the role of Tim Pencari Fakta [Fact Finder Team], formed by Majelis Ulama Indonesia in order to gather facts on the Bali bomb 1 case. This team involved experts from various fields of study—not only the Intelligence experts but also physicists, chemists, micro-nuclear analysts and others. Their findings, as reported by Suara Hidayatullah, showed that the bomb was sophisticated and could only be made by an industrially advanced country. It could not have been the work of even the most experienced bomb makers in Afghanistan. Indonesians who fought in Afghanistan were not assemblers, but users. A person who was experienced in Afghanistan still could not assemble such a bomb. The magazine favoured the United States as both the mastermind and maker of the bomb.

To justify their accusation, Suara Hidayatullah quoted Riza Wahono:\n
Who can produce (the bomb)? Only western countries such as the United States and England.(p.39)

To further stress the involvement of ‘the West’ the magazine reported that MUI urged the government officials to direct the investigation to the possibility of the involvement of foreign agents, in this case ‘the West.’ Suara Hidayatullah argued that the involvement of ‘the West’ was directed mainly towards the stigmatisation of Islam.

Further stressing the magazine’s view of foreign (western) involvement, a picture of foreign agents in the bomb explosion area appeared on the second page. The caption under the picture read: “Foreign/western intelligence: the possibility of their involvement.”

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95 According to this article, Riza Wahono is an expert in physics from the Center for Studies on Strategic and Applied Technology.
Tenor of discourse

Three sources were used for this article. All three were regarded as academics and supported Suara Hidayatullah’s opinion of who was behind the bombing. In addition, the magazine stressed and explained the view held by Professor Dr Din Syamsuddin.

Din Syamsuddin, as the magazine explained, is known as the General Secretary of Majelis Ulama Indonesia and also the Head of Muhammadiyah. It was apparent that Suara Hidayatullah held Syamsuddin’s statements and opinions regarding the bomb in high regard, because they were different from the opinions expressed by the mainstream media. His view was in accordance with that of the magazine, namely that Muslims suffered negative stigmatisation because of the bombing.

The second source was Didi Satiyadi, who in the article was described as an expert in engineering physics and explosions, and the third source was Riza A Wahono, a physics expert from the Center for Studies on Strategic and Applied Technology. The last two sources were depicted as experts on explosions and explosive materials, in other words, as bomb experts, and therefore credible. To support their credibility as experts, Suara Hidayatullah referred to them as PhD graduates from a well-known university in Europe.

8.2.2 Australian Embassy bombing (9 September 2004)

Headline: A strong force is behind the Kuningan Bomb
Subheadline: There is a peculiar event before and after the Kuningan bomb. Is there a strong force behind it? (Oktober 2004/Sya’ban 1425)

Field of discourse

The article came to the conclusion that neither Indonesian Muslims, nor a Muslim organisation was behind the bombing. Forces that had the ability to explode such bombs were Israel, America or Australia. The high-ranking Australian government officials, as reported by Suara Hidayatullah, had known that there could be a bomb explosion. This was based on the press conference statement by Alexander Downer, who mentioned that 45 minutes before the bomb occurred, the Indonesian Police had been warned that there would be a bomb in the
Australian Embassy unless they freed Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. To further stress the magazine’s suspicion that foreign agents were behind the bombing and to emphasise this viewpoint, the magazine put forward two anonymous sources. The first was described only as a doctor/surgeon whose office was around Kuningan, and the second as a high ranking army officer.

In the early paragraphs of the article, Suara Hidayatullah described how, before the bombing occurred, the surgeon was warned, by a friend who works at an American NGO, not to go near the Australian Embassy. No explanation was given as to why he could not go there. The second anonymous source was an army intelligence officer who accused the Jews of being behind the bombing.

So, who is behind (the bombing)? “I agree with Kapolri and BIN that the operation/process mode of the bomb is the same as the Bali and Marriott bombs. The puppeteer is JI. JI is not Jema’ah Islamiyah but Jewish Intelligence. There are many JI’s (Jewish Intelligence) hanging around CIA and Mossad,” adds the high ranking officer. (p.45)

The magazine reported that Jema’ah Islamiyah or Al Qaeda were only a vehicle and an instrument for the interests of the radical coalition of Jews-Christians who are worried about the rise of Islam fundamentalists in Indonesia and the world. As the quoted officer noted, the groups behind the bombing had the intention of ruining the image of Islam and spreading the discourse that having a strong desire for Islamic piety is the same as radicalism and terrorism. To back up the magazine’s view, Suara Hidayatullah reported Suripto’s opinion, that there was a ‘mastermind’ behind the bombing and this mastermind was a strong force that could protect the suspect, who was from ‘a force of a foreign network.’ As Suara Hidayatullah explained, the suspects were Jama’ah Islamiyah and Dr Azahari. So even though the bomb was the work of Muslims, the important matter was catching the ‘mastermind.’ These people would not be able to work alone, due to the lack of networks, finance and technical skills in making bombs.

In the last paragraph of the article the magazine reported the assumption of the Indonesian Police, that the bombing at the Australian Embassy was the work of the same

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96 At the time of the Australian Embassy bombing, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was allegedly involved in several bombings in Indonesia. He was also the head of Jama’ah Islamiyah which was suspected of being part of the Al Qaeda network.

97 In this article, Suripto was referred to as “Special staff” for the Head of Indonesian Intelligence and Head (Council Adviser) of Indonesian National Defence and Strategic Study.
organisation/people that carried out both the Bali and the JW Marriott bombings (i.e. Jama’ah Islamiyah).

**Tenor of Discourse**

Two of the sources for this article were anonymous. One was described as a surgeon/doctor who ran a surgery in the area of Kuningan and had a friend who worked at an American NGO, and the other as a high ranking army officer. Even though these sources remained anonymous, they were presented as being high profile and important people. In other words, the magazine wanted its readers to understand that, as their professional backgrounds suggested, they were people whose evidence could be believed.

Another source, Suripto, was described in the magazine as the former expert or Special Staff for the Head of Indonesian State Intelligence and Head (Council Adviser) of the Indonesian National Defence and Strategic Study. The magazine described his position so as to make him appear an expert in national defence and security. However, his former official government position as the General Secretary of Forestry and Plantations was not mentioned, as it was too far removed from his role as a security and defence commentator.

To support its view that the bomb materials were not available in Indonesia, Suara Hidayatullah referred to one other source, Widodo Hardjoprawiro. As a bomb and a ballistics expert, he was a former instructor in the Intelligence Strategic Board for the Indonesian National Army [Badan Intelijen Strategis (Bais) Tentara Nasional Indonesia].

### 8.2.3 Brief summary of Suara Hidayatullah

The articles or reports on the bombings in Suara Hidayatullah were very similar to those in Sabili. According to Suara Hidayatullah, ‘the West’ instigated the bombings in order to stigmatise and undermine Islam. The magazine also challenged the investigation by the Indonesian Police with its report on the investigation by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, which undoubtedly rejected the dominant and mainstream view presented by the Indonesian media, focusing on the fact that the bomb making materials were not available in Indonesia and therefore, in this case, only western foreign agents would have access to them.

*Suara Hidayatullah* also rejected the involvement of Muslims or Jama’ah Islamiyah and pointed to Jewish Intelligence as a possible or probable culprit. Generally speaking, like
Sabili, Suara Hidayatullah maintained that western foreign agents were involved, with the aim of undermining Islam.

Unlike Sabili, which clearly identified its sources, Suara Hidayatullah frequently used anonymous sources, claiming they were highly ranked experts or trustworthy witnesses.

Table 8.3 Brief summary of Suara Hidayatullah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombing event</th>
<th>Field of discourse</th>
<th>Tenor of discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>• The bombing is perceived as an attempt to stigmatise Islam</td>
<td>• Islamists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘The West’ is believed to be behind the bombing</td>
<td>• Academics/Scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW Marriott 1 bombing</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>• ‘The West’ is the mastermind behind the bombing</td>
<td>• Islamists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bombing</td>
<td>• The bomb is the act of JI (which is not Jema’ah Islamiyah, but ‘Jewish Intelligence’)</td>
<td>• Intelligence experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Anonymous civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Foreign government officials</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• TNI intelligence (anonymous)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Academics/Scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali bomb 2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW Marriott 2/Ritz</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlton bombing</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

8.3 Conclusion

It is evident from the above analysis of the texts that the language used in the Indonesian press has changed. As explained by Hanazaki (1998), the Press in the New Order used euphemistic language as a reporting strategy, but this strategy is no longer common, as can be seen in the reporting by both of these magazines. Their language was more straight forward and contained ‘news of hate’ (Sudibyo et al. 2001,). The liberalisation of the press has given the Islamist press the freedom to print articles that would certainly have been in violation of the restrictions of the MISS SARA regulations of the New Order.

According to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), ideology may also influence the reporting by the media. In this context, the Islamist magazines tended to have an Islamist ideology, and
therefore their reporting tended to have a political Islamist stance. Also, part of the reason for the existence of the Islamist press is the propagation of Islam. As its Vice Editor explained in an interview, *Sabili* is keen to present an alternative perspective, advocating the rights of Muslims, which are under pressure and eroded. *Sabili* believes that the mainstream Indonesian press are just following the reports generated by the West and its allies.

*Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah* did not have significant differences in their opinion of who was behind the five bombings analysed. Both magazines argued that the West was responsible. *Sabili* tended to mention the United States as representing the western countries and Australia was mentioned as one of its allies. Additionally, *Suara Hidayatullah*, stated that the Jews were involved and used the acronym ‘JI,’ which most often refers to Jama’ah Islamiyah in connection with terrorism in Indonesia, to refer to ‘Jewish Intelligence.’

The construction of western countries in both the Islamist magazines was that they are the opposition or the enemy. Western countries (especially the United States) were therefore perceived negatively and blamed for the bombings. The Islamists’ attitude of anti-westernism tended to lead to their belief in the ‘conspiracy theory,’ as explained by Naharong (2009). (The results of this research also showed this to be the case.) Moreover, this conspiracy theory proposes that all of the bad influences on and bad things that happen in Muslim society are deliberately created to weaken and destroy Islam. Specifically, CIA and Mossad are implicated as being behind them.

The discourse of ‘the West’ in connection with issues of terrorism, as analysed in the magazines, was constructed as intending to undermine Islam. This construction was influenced by a feeling of being threatened by the *kafir* [infidels], in this case, westerners.

To sum up, both of these magazines were constructing a discourse on who was behind the bombings, because they believed that the discourse in the mainstream media pointed to the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah and its leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The Islamist media took a different perspective (within an Islamist perspective) as an alternative to the mainstream discourse, and, further stressing their ideological frame, the view they offered opposed or resisted the mainstream discourse. As explained by the Vice Editor-in-Chief of
Sabili, their standpoint was established through what they saw as the injustice experienced by most Muslims in the world, including the Palestinians.

This chapter completes the analysis of the magazines. The next chapter explores and analyses the readers’ responses to the magazines they read.

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98 Personal interview 7 February 2011
Chapter 9

The Readers’ Responses

This chapter presents the results of the focus group interviews which took place during fieldwork in Jakarta, 17–21 February 2011. One to one interviews were also conducted. Jakarta was chosen because, as it is the capital city of Indonesia, most media are represented there and, most importantly for this research, the magazines whose articles are analysed are based primarily in Jakarta.

There were ten small focus group discussions (five to six people per group) with both male and female readers of each magazine. The readers were selected according to the following criteria:

1. They were Jakarta residents.
2. They had read the magazine/magazines for a minimum of five years.
3. They had an interest in the topic of terrorism.
4. There would be approximately equal numbers of males and females, aged between 18 and 45 years.

The technique used in selecting the participants is the snow ball sampling. This technique assisted me in getting other potential participants. Additionally, for Sabili, the secretary to the Editor in Chief assisted me in finding the interviewees. He selected the readers who had been subscribing the magazines for 5 years, which I am very grateful.

All participants were provided with copies of the relevant articles prior to discussions taking place. A group of male readers and a group of female readers of each magazine was selected (eight groups), and also a group of male readers and a group of female readers classed as ‘mixed readers’ (two groups), who read at least one general magazine (Tempo or Gatra) and one Islam-oriented magazine (Sabili or Suara Hidayatullah).

In addition, six individual interviews were conducted with readers—four female readers of Sabili, and two ‘mixed readers’ (one female and one male).

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99 Separating female readers and male readers into different focus groups was an attempt to make the readers comfortable in the discussion, and concerns the methodological demand that focus groups be as homogenous as possible.
The main focus of the analysis of readers’ responses is to investigate how the readers viewed western countries. It also explores the readers’ views about the five terrorist bombings with which this thesis is concerned, specifically, about the question of who was behind the bombings.

9.1 The general magazines readers’ profile

The readers of both *Gatra* and *Tempo* were interested in what they called national and political affairs and liked to keep up to date with such issues. These issues could be a theme of discussion with their friends and in the office. These magazines were considered as a highly reliable source of information. As Awad, one of the mature male readers, said: “What I need is information. Keeping up to date with the current national issues is important, not only for job reasons, although keeping up to date does concern my job.” He explained that his job dealt with security and politics, so understanding current issues was a necessity.

These general magazine readers had clearly defined needs within the secular world and used the magazines as their main reference. In addition to reading the magazines, they also watched news on TV and read general newspapers. The women readers even read *Indonesian Cosmopolitan, Femina* and *Kartini*.

Some of these readers went to *pengajian* [religious study groups] in their community.

9.1.1 *Gatra* readers’ profile

In the focus groups there were a total of twelve readers of *Gatra*, six male and six female. One was a student, four were self-employed and one was an employee. Of the male readers, one subscribed to the magazine, one read the magazine because it was available in the office, and the other four bought the magazine. Two of the female readers were students, one was an employee and the other three were self-employed. Five of the female readers subscribed to the magazine and one bought it once a week.

9.1.2 *Tempo* readers’ profile

There were five male *Tempo* readers and six female readers in the groups. Two of the male readers were university students and the other three were employees. The students read *Tempo* because their parents subscribed to the magazine, and of the employees, two

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100 *Femina* and *Kartini* are both local women’s magazines. The first is for the younger readers, in their 20s and early 30s, who are pursuing their careers. The latter is more a ‘stay-at-home mum’s’ magazine.
subscribed to the magazine and one bought it each week. Among the female readers, four were self-employed and two were employees (one was a primary school teacher and the other a secretary). All were married. Three of the female readers subscribed to Tempo, and the other three bought the magazine each week.

**9.2 The Islamist magazines readers’ profile**

*Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah* were of particular interest for their readers, due to the Islamist views they espouse. The readers felt the magazines’ viewpoint was important because it promotes caution, reminding them to be aware of ‘enemies’ outside Islam. Reading Islamist magazines was also important for the whole family, because they offer Islamic solutions for the problems of everyday life, including family life. Having the magazine inside their home also made them feel comfortable. They hoped that their children would be interested in reading it. These were important considerations in order to keep the faith high for the whole family, because the world was perceived as secular. Therefore it was important to have something to hold on to, and Islamist magazines were the answer.

*Sabili* readers understood that the magazine’s focus is political Islam and current national and international politics. The readers needed an alternative view to the mainstream view, in order to understand and answer questions concerning some national issues, especially issues relating to Muslims. They found both *Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah* to be reliable sources of help in addressing these issues.

The general magazines, such as *Tempo* and *Gatra*, were seen as mainstream and of no benefit, because their reports were the same as those on TV. The Islamist magazines were considered to provide an alternative view, alongside what was the dominant view seen on television or through other media. This broader perspective, according to the readers, was not only important in understanding the voice of Islam, but also helped them to avoid being ‘brainwashed’ by mainstream media with their mainstream views. “So as not to get provoked by mainstream magazines, we have to read Sabili, whose views are in accordance with our faith” (female reader of *Sabili*).
9.2.1 Sabili readers’ profile

There were six male readers. One was a student, and four were employees. Four of them subscribed to the magazine and two bought it fortnightly. There were six female Sabili readers. One was a student, one was an employee and the other four were self-employed. Only one subscribed to the magazine and the others bought it fortnightly.

9.2.2 Suara Hidayatullah readers’ profile

There were five male readers of Suara Hidayatullah. Two were students and three were employees. They all bought the magazine once a month. There were six female readers. Two of them were full-time mothers, one was an employee and three were self-employed. One subscribed to the magazine and the others bought it once a month.

9.3 The mixed magazines readers’ profile

The ‘mixed readers’ read both the Islamist and the general magazines in order to have balance in their lives. They felt they needed to read the general magazines to understand the world, and in particular to keep up to date with national issues, but they felt life was too short to live in just a secular world, and needed also to read something which gave a religious perspective. The Islamist magazines fulfilled this need.

The general magazines provided information on the current national and international issues which the readers referred to. A review of contemporary understanding of the current social and political situation was needed because of the limited time they had to read or watch daily news. The Islamist magazines were seen as a ‘reminder’ that there is a ‘world’ after this world. The readers could also compare the issues of the political and social events, and find the ‘voice of Islam’ in the Islamist magazines.

There were five male ‘mixed readers.’ One was self-employed and the other four were employees. One of them subscribed to the magazines and the others bought them or they were available in their office. There were six female readers of both the general and Islam-oriented magazines. Two of them were full-time mothers, one was a student and the other three were employees. Two of the female ‘mixed readers’ subscribed to the magazines and four bought it or it was available in their offices.
Two additional interviews were held separately, one with a female reader and the other with a male reader. The female reader was a government official from the Department of Social Affairs and the male reader was a Commissioner of the Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights.

9.4 Response to and perceptions of western countries

9.4.1 An overview

‘Western’ people, according to the readers in the focus groups, are mostly perceived as those from the western countries with ‘white people’ (the Indonesian word is ‘bule’ [Caucasians]). Historically, the ‘imagined’ West has its origins in the colonial years. The Indonesians’ first encounter with people from western countries was with the Portuguese, then with the English, Spanish and the Dutch East India Company, which later colonised Indonesia for hundreds of years. The ‘imagined’ westerners, for Indonesians, are the Caucasians, ‘the white skinned’ people with blonde hair.

Borrowing Appadurai’s (1996) term ‘imagination,’ regarding the influence of globalisation, the ‘imaginary West’ is the ‘white people,’ mainly seen as the Americans. America is mentioned most not only due to its status as the current superpower, but also because of the dominance of the Hollywood entertainment industry, which extends even to Indonesia—from Hollywood films in the cinema to the franchise of Indonesian Idol on Indonesian television, MTV, magazine franchises and advertising. In addition, the icon of ‘America’ in the multinational food industry and hotels is apparent in Indonesia. McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and the JW Marriott, Hilton, and Ritz Carlton Hotels are not only found in the capital city but are also spreading outside Jakarta.

In the political sense, it is not surprising that America is mentioned most. The US is perceived as the major superpower, which can influence global power relations. For the readers, the US policy towards Muslim majority countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and also Egypt, is also an issue for Indonesia with its large Muslim majority. The attack on Iraq is blamed on America’s economic interest in oil. The Indonesians, to some extent, have a sense of solidarity with their brothers and sisters in other Muslim countries. The unfavourable image of ‘the West’ stems from US government policy, with its apparent
double standards in vaunting its protection of human rights while also protecting its own political interests, leading to the invasion of and intervention in Islamic countries.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Israel and the Jews and Zionists play a significant role in the minds of Indonesian Muslims. The readers perceived the Jews as being among the decision makers in the American government. They were also believed to be the enemy of Islam, feeling hatred towards Muslims and being keen to undermine Islam. The readers’ of Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah stressed the United States’ support of Israel in the building of a coalition, which will further rip apart Islam.

9.4.2 Tempo readers
‘Western countries,’ according to the Tempo readers meant the United States, which is the superpower and has the ability to exert considerable influence.

United States is influencing our everyday lives. (female reader)

According to the Tempo focus group, the American lifestyle has an impact on every aspect of their everyday lives, for example, eating habits. In western society, McDonald’s food and Coca cola are considered to be junk food, but in Indonesia, they are considered prestigious because of their ‘western style.’ Imported television programs are also considered as influential, from franchise programs such as Indonesian Idol, X Factor Indonesia to television movies.

From a political point of view, the readers also recognised that the Indonesian government could not escape from the involvement of the United States. The US is involved in decisions concerning public policies in Indonesia, and the readers considered this intervention excessive. The arrest of the alleged terrorist, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, in relation to the first Bali bombing, was seen as merely fulfilling the wishes of the United States, According to Tempo readers, there was insufficient evidence to warrant his arrest. The readers perceived the US as hostile to Islam and wanting to destroy it through terrorism.

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was captured without enough proof, because the Americans told Indonesians to capture him, therefore he was captured. So, our country is dependent on the US. (male reader)

I view ‘the West’ as resistant to having Islam as a ‘strong’ ideology, so Islam is crushed from the inside with terrorism. (male reader)

Israel was also perceived as ‘the West,’ because of its close relationship with the United States. The Tempo readers saw the Israelis as being behind United States policy, and believed that these two countries want to conquer the world.
We know the American and the Israeli’s history. They want to conquer the world.
(female reader)

However, this perception pertained to the governments, not to the people, of the US and Israel, and was mainly due to the United States’ foreign affairs policy which was seen as unfavourable. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were viewed specifically as an attack on other nations.

9.4.3. Gatra readers

According to Gatra readers, the notion of ‘western countries’ included not just the nations of the United States and Israel (which share a close relationship), but also the people who follow their national religions, in other words, Christians and Jews. In general, ‘western’ society was considered as the ‘white people,’ perceived largely as Christians.

Similarly to the readers of Tempo, Gatra readers felt that the United States is currently the superpower which is conquering the world, not only politically but also culturally. They said that many films came from Hollywood (America) and dominated the distribution of films in Indonesia. Politically, the United States was perceived as greedy, wanting the oil in Iraq.

The United States is greedy. In Texas, they have lots of oil that can be consumed for hundreds of years, but they still want to invade Iraq. They are egoistic. (female reader)

9.4.4 Sabili readers

The Sabili readers perceived the ‘western’ countries as ‘the Americans’ or the United States. Their perception of western society specifically related to their religion, Islam. The readers’ tended to accuse the United States of being hostile to Islam, and of beginning the ‘War on Terror’ as a war against Islam. The US was presumed to be afraid of the rise of Islamism. As Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, the readers believed that the United States aims to control it, so that it does not develop and rise to power.

‘The West’ is afraid of the rise of Muslims, but given a choice they would rather it were to take place (the bombings) in Indonesia...so they could control it. (female reader)

In other words, the bombings in Indonesia were believed to be a deliberate attack on Muslims in general, and Indonesia was chosen because its government would cooperate with the United States.

According to the readers, the United States is the world’s ‘police,’ which wishes to conquer Arabic countries and the Middle East, both politically and economically. The readers proposed that the United States’ interest in Iraq is to acquire oil, and that the US also coveted
the natural resources in Papua. Since the majority of people in Iraq and Indonesia are Muslims, these actions were seen as hostile towards Muslims. US actions concerning ‘weapons of mass destruction’ were also seen as hostile.

Accusing Iraq as having weapons of mass destructions is a hostile act towards Muslims. (male reader)

There is much of Indonesia’s natural resources in Papua, but all are for the Americans. (female reader)

The United States was extensively discussed in relation to George W. Bush, who was seen as taking a hard and hostile line where Muslims were concerned.

‘The West’ always wants to be superior, such as wanting to be the superpower country. Especially in the Bush era, taking a hard line against Islam. (female reader)

However, the Sabili readers had a positive impression of the United States’ current President, Barak Obama. This was not only due to the fact that Obama spent a few years of his childhood in Indonesia with his Indonesian stepfather, but also because he gave the Islamic greeting, ‘Assalaamu’alaikum,’ when he visited Indonesia. Also, from what they knew through other media, more and more Americans are converting to Islam, and this reinforced their positive view.

Good deeds from the United States were seen as positive. For example, the readers appreciated the western aid given to Indonesia following the tsunami tragedy in Aceh in 2004, although were somewhat suspicious of the intention behind it.

9.4.5 Suara Hidayatullah readers

The Suara Hidayatullah readers perceived the ‘western countries’ specifically as the United States. They saw the US as a country which has sophisticated technology, but which, politically, is being driven by Zionists (Jews), who are considered the enemies of Muslims. The Jews were believed to be smart but devious people, and therefore the United States’ sophisticated technology was attributed to them. Because of their hostility to Muslims and their ongoing underlying agenda concerning them, Muslims must be extra careful.

Behind the Americans is the Jews...including every sophisticated technology is from the Jews.(male reader)

Islam was defined as an ‘enemy’ of the United States and a threat to its status as the current superpower. According to a Suara Hidayatullah reader, if Islamic countries were to unite, they could displace America.

If Islam unites, Islamic countries will be the superpower, not America as the superpower. (female reader)
9.4.6 Mixed readers (Tempo/Gatra and Sabili/Suara Hidayatullah)

According to mixed readers, the notion of ‘western countries’ is not only associated with the United States, but also the United Kingdom and Israel. These countries were admired for their modern technology. However, the mixed readers’ perception of ‘western countries’ (mainly the United States) concerned their domination of developing countries, such as Indonesia. Their relationship with these developing countries was seen as being linked to their interest in access to natural resources. The readers questioned the dominant role of the western countries in connection with the mineral and oil resources in Indonesia, which are in Indonesian territory but only partly owned by the Indonesian government.

9.5 Response to the bombings and the perpetrators behind the bombings

9.5.1 An overview

There were no significant differences between the responses of the readers of the general magazines and those of the readers of Islam-oriented magazines to the bombings analysed. In general, the readers doubted that the bombings were totally the work of Indonesians, and thought the Indonesians who were involved in the bombings were only ‘puppets’ of the western countries. They believed the Indonesian Muslims involved were uneducated and stupid, and could have been bullied into carrying out this heinous act. The readers’ pointed to ‘foreign agents,’ perceived as westerners (and mainly from the United States), as the masterminds behind the bombings. These views were dominant for readers of both the general and the Islamist magazines.

Further, in the broader social and political context, the participants believed not only that the bombings analysed in this research were not carried out by the Indonesians, but that they were part of the international scenario of the western countries (mostly perceived as the United States and the Zionists).

Therefore, for most readers, the explanation of the bombings relies on the Islamist discourse of the ‘conspiracy’ theory. They considered the bombings to be part of the western scenario of conspiracy against Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. Western countries were considered to feel threatened and frightened by the rise of Islam.
On the other hand, the readers generally also opposed the use of violence. Islam was considered to be tolerant and a religion of peace, and, therefore, acts of violence were a violation of Islam.

9.5.2 Tempo readers

Tempo readers did not approve of violence, and believed Indonesia should not be a war zone. Jihad, according to the readers, was only legitimate during the Prophet Muhammad’s era. Therefore, bombings in the name of Islam are not acceptable.

According to the readers of Tempo, the bombings were the work of Indonesian Muslims who do not understand the true meaning of Islam. However, they doubted that hardline Indonesian Muslims were totally responsible, because there could have been involvement by an international network. Brainwashing of under-educated Muslims was considered one explanation, involving either the Jews or even Al Qaeda.

Only God knows the truth...But they say Americans are the puppeteers. (male reader)
It is the work of the hardline Muslims. They don’t know the true meaning of Islam. They are being brainwashed. They are being brainwashed by the international network. It must be Israel or Al Qaeda. (male reader)
I think there is a foreign (western) involvement in this matter, and Indonesia is just a puppet. So, they recruit people that are under-educated and who can be brainwashed. (female reader)

Another reader pointed to the involvement of the westerners in providing funding. Also, it was assumed that the Muslims who went to the pesantren, and lived in exclusion, away from other people, would therefore be easily influenced.

Everybody I think is brainwashed, because they are located in a pesantren, in an exclusive Islamic school, nobody else, because they live in a village. But on the contrary, they can go abroad, which means that somebody is funding them, and this may be the westerners. (female reader)

Funding was related to access to weapons and materials for the bombs. Readers believed that a lot money was needed to carry out the bombings. The money must have come from the rich western countries, mostly assumed to be the US, with the help of Israel.

It was believed that the bombings in Indonesia were the work of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the alleged terrorist, but that Ba’asyir was only the man who organised where to explode the bombs. Tempo readers believed that there was a high ranking person behind Ba’asyir, who could be from the CIA (the Americans) which is believed as an act against Islam, or else from the Indonesian government (for example, in order to turn people’s attention to other issues, rather than focusing on the corruption in the government).
9.5.3 *Gatra* readers

The bombings were condemned by *Gatra* readers because, generally speaking, Indonesians are friendly and tolerant people. The slogan ‘Unity in Diversity’ was seen as evidence of Indonesia’s multiculturalism. Despite this multicultural background, Indonesian people were believed to live in harmony. In this context, the bombings which occurred ripped apart the harmony and stability in Indonesia, putting people in their own ‘boxes.’ One of the (male) readers saw that

> even though we know that there is so much corruption in the government...we still live in harmony.

*Gatra* readers believed the bombings to be the work of the Jews, in cooperation with the United States.

> The cooperation between America and Israel is clearly observed, to rip apart Islam. (male reader)

> Somebody designed the terrorism in Indonesia, it’s not only the superpower country but it is a race. It’s the Jews. (female reader)

> Jewish are *jahiliyah*\(^{101}\), they can be friends to western people and to others, as long as it is in their interest. (male reader)

> I think who led the bombing in Indonesia are the Jews. The Jews and the United States are friends together in harmony. (female reader)

The source of funding was one of the reasons that the readers ‘pointed the finger’ at western countries. The Muslims who exploded the bombs were economically poor, and not educated. These people were willing to sacrifice their lives and explode the bombs in order to get money for their families in return. However, as did the *Tempo* readers, *Gatra* readers condemned violence in the name of Islam. They stated that Islam rejects violence and the killing of innocent people.

9.5.4 *Sabili* readers

All of the informants disagreed with the use of violence. Violence was believed not to be in accordance with Islam, and they further stressed that Islam is against the killing of women and children. According to the readers, suicide bombings are only permitted in a warzone, such as in Palestine or Afghanistan. The readers perceived the bombings analysed as masterminded by western or foreign agents. *Sabili* readers were reluctant to admit that they were the work of Muslims. These readers tended to attribute responsibility to non-Muslims,

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\(^{101}\) *Jahiliyah* means ‘ignorance.’ It refers to the uncivilised years in Arabia before Muhammad became a prophet. It can also be translated as ‘barbarism.’ In this context, the Jews are referred to as similar to these people, who only make friends with people who can benefit them.
as Islam is a peace loving religion, opposed to violence. *Sabili* readers believed that the five bombings analysed in this thesis were the work of the United States and Israel and that, generally speaking,

Indonesians are just scapegoats. (male reader)

The Israelis were blamed because of their fear that there will be an Islamic rise from ‘the East.’ They will try to prevent Indonesia from developing, especially with regard to the Islamisation and the economic development which could allow it to usurp their power. The Muslims are used by the people who are hostile to the truth of Islam.

The bombs are creating a destruction...Muslims won’t do that...Bombing and suicide bombings are only permitted in a state of war...and there is no proof of the involvement of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. (male reader)

**9.5.5 Suara Hidayatullah readers**

*Suara Hidayatullah* readers believed that Islam is not to be identified with violence, because Islam does not teach its *ummah* to carry out violent acts. The readers therefore objected to bombings or acts of violence.

*Suara Hidayatullah* readers were mostly in accordance with those of *Sabili*. However, while *Sabili* readers saw the bombings as the work of the United States and the Jews, *Suara Hidayatullah* readers saw them specifically as the work of Zionists, with the help of the US. The Muslims were to be blamed for the bombings so that the Israelis could rise, and, on the other hand to decrease the number and influence of Muslims.

We know the objective...it’s for the rise of the Jews, Israel...and therefore minimise Islam in the world. (female reader)

The bombings were also seen as the American and Zionist plan to direct the world, in order to gain power over Indonesia.

**9.5.6 Mixed readers(*Tempo/Gatra* and *Sabili/Suara Hidayatullah*)**

Like the readers of the other magazines, the ‘mixed readers’ also objected to violence as being against Islam and not to be tolerated. Although they agreed that the bombings themselves were the work of hardline Muslims, they did not believe that the Muslims were working alone, but that the United States was behind the bombings (as part of a larger scenario or agenda of the US and its allies). Nevertheless, they felt that the hardline Muslims’ existence was ‘important,’ as only they could defend Islam.

If the hardline Muslims didn’t exist, who would defend Islam? (male reader)
Bombings and terrorism were perceived to be part of a strategy of pressure exerted by the western countries on Muslim countries. Labelling Muslims as ‘terrorists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ is in the interests of ‘the West.’

9.6 Discussion

A challenging issue for this research was that the readers of the magazines needed to reconstruct, after a time lapse of several years, what they felt and how they had responded to the bombings when they took place between 2002 and 2009.

In her audience-research into the meaning-making experience of the media discourse on terrorism, Aly (2010) stresses that when an attempt is made to recall an event after a gap of several years, it is conceptualised as ‘accumulation of effect.’ In other words, the meaning-making experience will run on continuously as the readers interact with the text media and at this point there could be a shift in their opinions. According to Hall’s (1980) encoding-decoding concept, the interaction between the text and the readers can be further termed ‘preferred/dominant’ reading, ‘negotiated’ reading and ‘oppositional’ reading. Aly (2010) added the terms ‘acceptance,’ ‘negotiation’ and ‘resistance.’

Unlike Aly’s (2010) research, in which she found that there was a shift in how her informants decoded the text over time, Hall’s (1980) research could find no such shift. The shift seen by Aly (2010) could have occurred due to other bombing and terrorism events which were continuously developing and leading to changing opinions. In this thesis, the construction of ‘the West’ and the person or groups or agents behind the bombings is believed to have remained the ‘same,’ and not to have been influenced by additional information accumulated after other bombings occurred. From the devastating Bali bomb 1 (12 October 2002) to the last bomb explosion in the JW Marriott Hotel on 17 July 2009, all were perceived by the readers as the work of the ‘same’ people.

In this thesis, it can be seen that the construction of the western countries and the persons or groups or agents behind the bombings was that western forces, mainly the United States and Israel (i.e. the Jews and Zionists) were to blame. The readers still believed that these ‘foreign agents’ were behind the bombings, even though further investigations indicated the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah. In other words, they believed that the Muslims were doing the ‘dirty work’ as the perpetrators of the bombings, but that, initially, the western agents were the engineers.
The first issue in this research involves the informants’ perception of ‘the West.’ Generally speaking, all perceived ‘the West’ as the current superpower, the United States, followed by Israel. The Jews were considered as having a big influence on US government policy. Christianity was also seen as the religion of westerners.

Furthermore, the United States, as ‘the West,’ was seen to have gained strength after the September 11 tragedy, following George W. Bush’s declaration of the ‘War on Terror.’ His linking terrorism with the bombings which occurred in Indonesia stuck firmly in the minds of the informants. According to most of them, Bush was hostile to Muslims and had used a devious policy to disguise his political and economic interest in oil, as he had done in Iraq.

In relation to the readers’ responses to the five bombings analysed in this thesis, from the first Bali bombing onwards, the readers, generally, believed that foreign agents were behind the bombings. There was no opinion shift from the first Bali bombing to the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton attack in 2009. During these seven years many new events occurred, including the capture of Islamists (for example, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir) and also the attack in Malang which killed Dr Azahari, the bomb specialist, and a Malaysian citizen. Other Islamists were also attacked and killed during this time as the Indonesian government fought against terrorism. Nonetheless, the readers mainly stuck to the belief that the bombings were the work of the westerners.

There was no significant difference between the way the readers of both the general and Islamist magazines perceived the western countries in their reading of the text. Generally, they all made the same assumption—that western countries were behind the bombings. However, the way readers decoded the text could be different, since the four magazines under study varied in their portrayal of western countries and terrorism in Indonesia, and in their interpretations of the role played by ‘the West,’ specifically in relation to the terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

9.6.1 General magazines readers

According to Hall’s (1980) concept in decoding, the Tempo readers clearly employed ‘negotiated’ reading. They believed that the United States, or western foreign agents, were the mastermind behind the bombings, even though, in its reports, Tempo did not accuse the western countries of responsibility. Generally speaking, Tempo held the view that the
bombings were an act of terrorism, while its readers perceived them as an act against Islam and the United States as being behind the bombings.

The readers of the other general magazine, Gatra, employed a ‘negotiated’ reading. Gatra held a mid-way position, blaming the bombing attacks on foreign agents or claiming that they were the work of the Islamist group, Jama’ah Islamiyah. However, its readers mainly believed that they were the work of ‘the West,’ specifically the United States.

9.6.2 Islamist magazines readers

The readers of both the Islamist magazines are considered as having ‘preferred’ or ‘dominant’ readings of the text. The Islamist magazines are seen as blaming western countries (mainly the United States) for the bombing, and so the text is in line with the opinion of their readers.

The Islamist magazines tended to view the bombings analysed in this thesis as part of a conspiracy by ‘the West’ towards Indonesia, as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. ‘The West’ was seen as the United States, because it is the current superpower. After the cold war, the United States no longer had an ‘enemy,’ and needed to invent one. Additionally, terrorism and the bombings in Indonesia were perceived as having been ‘made up’ after September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center.

The discourse and issue of terrorism in Indonesia came after September 11, when they (US) created ‘terrorism’ in some countries including Indonesia. Therefore I believe that terrorism in Indonesia is made up. (male reader)

The problem is then the Indonesian government clearly could not do anything because of pressure from the United States. Everything is made up and Muslims are the victims. (female reader)

9.7 Conclusion

The readers of the magazines ranged from holding a moderate view to a conservative one. The moderate readers were those who read the general magazines. These readers were more concerned with the secular issues, and so chose to read the general magazines rather than Islamist magazines. The readers of the Islamist magazines were more concerned with their faith. Islamist magazines were their choice in order to reinforce their faith and, importantly, to understand issues from an Islamic perspective. All the readers in the focus groups, however, were against violence and rejected violence in the name of religion/Islam.
‘The West’ was mainly perceived as the United States, because it is currently the superpower, as seen in its hegemony of world political and economic power. Its policies, especially those directed towards Muslim countries, were viewed unfavourably by the readers. The bombings in Indonesia were perceived as being closely connected to America and these antagonistic policies. Therefore, the dominant belief of the readers concerned the relationship between ‘powerful’ America (backed by the Jews) and the Muslims. They believed the bombings were not the work of Indonesians only, as they could not have been carried out without the help of a powerful country (i.e. America) which has not only political and economic interests in Indonesia, but also wishes to minimise the rise of Islam. Western countries were thus seen as being in opposition to Islam. The readers suspected that America was backed up by the Israelis (Jews), who oppose the growth of Islam.

In general, the readers’ opinions regarding the person/agents responsible for the bombings, from Bali bomb 1 to the JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing, did not change. They conceded that Indonesian Muslims carried out the bombings, but they could not believe that these men had acted without the help of westerners. The facts concerning the necessary technology, and also the funding required, raised questions, because most of the suicide bombers came from a poor background. Readers also questioned whether the bombers had been ‘brainwashed.’

In a broader social and political context, it is evident that Islamisation in Indonesian society comprises the Islamist view. The readers’ belief in the conspiracy theories shows that this is the case. However, I argue that these views are unconsciously internalised by the readers, meaning that they are not aware that their opinions are being kept in line with the Islamist discourse, since their reason for reading the Islamist magazines is to keep their faith high and find an Islamic perspective through which to understand current social and political issues.

The next chapter is the last chapter of this thesis which is the discussion and conclusion. The chapter synthesizes all of the findings and analysis of chapters one to nine.
Chapter 10

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter is a discussion and conclusion chapter that synthesises and draws connections between Chapters 5 through 9. As explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis, Chapters 5 through 9 consist of the data findings. To quickly summarise the content of the chapters, Chapters 5 and 6 are the quantitative analysis of the findings; the former deals with the general magazines while the latter discusses the Islamist magazines. Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 comprise the qualitative analysis of the general and the Islamist magazines. Finally, the last chapter of the findings is Chapter 9, consisting of the readers’ responses to the magazines.

The findings of the data in Chapters 5 to 8 are discussed and linked to the Islamist discourse and the factors that influence the reporting on each magazine. Additionally, the readers of the magazine from Chapter 9 are further discussed in connection to Islamist discourse.

To sum up the discussion, the analysis of the five bombings in this thesis shows that only Tempo does not refer to the Islamist discourse, but constructs the Western countries as being more superior and having the power to control the Indonesian government. The other general magazine, Gatra, presents to some extent the Islamist discourse in the reports, and in some measure constructs a belief that the Western countries are foes to Islam. Both Islamist magazines perceived the Western countries as an enemy. As I will explain in this chapter, this reporting is shaped by the journalists’ view on terrorism.

The Islamist magazines present a dominantly Islamist discourse, and adopt an oppositional stance towards the Western countries. The Western countries are considered as enemy to Islam because of their perceived effort to destroy and undermine Islam. On the contrary, the readers of the general magazines believe that the Indonesian Muslims who carried out the bombings were only uneducated people who were brainwashed to do such a violent act. Nevertheless, the readers believe that the Western countries, led by the United States, are responsible for the bombings analysed in this thesis.
Finally, using the social and political context of contemporary Indonesia and the Islamisation of Indonesian society, the chapter will explore and argue that the content of the magazines is not only shaped by journalists’ and editors’ views on terrorism but is also a product of larger social and political circumstances.

10.1 Discussion

10.1.1 Framing and the construction of the Islamist discourse in the magazines

Quantitative analysis

In Chapters 1 and 4, I defined framing as selecting and stressing the salient issues. In framing, the important themes and issues are strengthened and reported in a certain way as to create a certain frame of discourse. To identify these frames, I categorised certain issues, which were available in the reporting of terrorism in all four magazines.

As explained in Chapter 2, one characteristic of the Islamist magazine is an anti-Western attitude (Naharong, 2009), where Western influence is considered unfavourable and as bringing negative influences. Therefore in the frames that are analysed in this thesis (Chapters 5 and 6), firstly I categorised the frames that connect to the Western countries. In this thesis, reports that mention the Western countries in each magazine are further grouped into themes/issues. This grouping of theme outcomes is the framing.

Below is a table comparing the way each magazine frames the relationship of the West to the bombings. A total of seven separate ways, in which the magazines frame these issues in relation to the Western countries, are identified in the reporting from all of the magazines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Tempo</th>
<th>Gatra</th>
<th>Sabili</th>
<th>Suara Hidayatullah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Western country/countries reaction to the bombings</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Western country/countries influence to Indonesia for their own interests</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Western foreign agents as being behind the</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The frames which I identify as Islamist discourse in relation to terrorism in this thesis are:

(3) Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings; (5) Bomb materials are not produced in Indonesia; (6) Conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam; and (7) the Western people are hedonist. These frames relate to the concepts of Islamism as explained in Chapter 2. According to the findings of the study, the United States in this framework is mostly referred to as representing the Western countries due to its position as the current superpower.

Prior to an analysis of the Islamist discourse in the magazines, I will discuss the frames in Tempo. Among the four magazines studied, Tempo was the only magazine that did not show an Islamist discourse.

As shown in Table 10.1, the frames in Tempo are Western country/countries reaction to the bombings (43%); Western influence to Indonesia in the interest of ‘the West’ (28.5%); and the Western country/countries aid in the investigation (28.5%). Tempo mainly focuses on how the bombings have affected the relation between Indonesia and the Western countries; therefore, these issues were put forward. ‘The Western countries reaction to the bombings’ includes condemnation by Western countries of the bombings by the then President Bush or the Australian Minister at that time, John Howard. ‘Western influence on Indonesia in the interest of “the West”’ includes the United States’ success in pushing the Indonesian government to regulate anti-terrorism. Finally ‘the Western countries aid in the investigation
or military aid to Indonesia’ includes the United States’ aid to the Indonesian military, which was previously stopped due to the Indonesian military’s violations of human rights and the aid in the investigation bombings. Looking at the frames, the attention given by 

Tempo reports highlights within a national context, taking into account Indonesia as a country and a nation in relation to the Western countries. In this case, Tempo constructs the Western countries as being superior and Indonesia as inferior. Therefore, the Western countries are construed as having the power to push the Indonesian government on anti-terrorism laws. According to Tempo, this occurs mainly in the interest of the West. In summary, the Tempo’s concern is the low bargaining power of Indonesia.

In contrast to Tempo, the other general magazine, Gatra, partly shows Islamist discourse in the reporting. The following frames are presented in Table 10.1: (3) ‘Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings’ (19%), and (5) ‘bomb materials not produced in Indonesia’ (6%). In other words, according to Gatra, Western countries are considered suspiciously involved in the bombings. These frames were shown in almost all of the five bombings analysed. Additionally, to some extent Gatra constructs the Western countries as opposed to Muslims as shown in the frame ‘the Western countries reaction to the bombings’. As it has been explained in chapter 5, besides the Western countries leaders condemning the perpetrators of Bali bomb 1, Gatra also reported on the Australian Federal Police’s reaction towards Indonesian Muslims living in Australia. The AFP was described as attacking the houses of Indonesian Muslims due to the assumption that they were members of Jama’ah Islamiyah. The raid was described as negative and it presented Australia as unfriendly towards Muslims.

Further, the Islamist magazines show a more anti-Western view compared to Gatra, parallel with Islamist belief. This anti-Western attitude triggers the belief of a conspiracy theory in the case of terrorism issues (Naharong, 2009). Additionally, terrorism is constructed as a tool to destroy Islam. Therefore the Islamist magazines view the Western countries as enemies or as unfavourable, due to their capitalist and liberal ideologies, which are not considered compatible with Islam. Neither of the magazines supports violence, as stated by the editors. However, both consider terrorism an effect of injustice and the double-standard policy of Western countries (mainly the United States) towards Muslim countries.
According to the data findings for the magazine *Sabili*, the frame that the bombings are ‘a conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam’ has the highest percentage (47%) as well as pointing fingers to Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings (17%). On the other hand, although *Suara Hidayatullah* focuses less on conspiracy theories (22.3%), nevertheless it also accuses the Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings (44.3%) with the support of proof that the material of the bombs was not made in Indonesia (33.3%).

Additionally, as explained in chapter 6, the *Suara Hidayatullah* adds Jews as very involved in the bombings; in this case, JI stands not for Jama’ah Islamiyah but the ‘Jewish Intelligence’.

Table 10.2 below lists all of the magazines’ frames that exist for each bombing. It accordingly shows whether there is a shift of frames from the first Bali bombing to the last bombings analysed, at the JW Marriott Hotel.

The table shows that *Gatra* consistently shows the option of ‘Western foreign agents as behind the bombings’. This is also similar to the reports in *Sabili* and *Suara Hidayatullah*:\(^{102}\) not only are Western foreign agents seen as being behind the bombings but the bombing is also perceived as an effort to undermine and stigmatise Islam. The frame that the bomb materials are not produced in Indonesia is also significant to *Sabili*, as it is consistent in four of the bombings, except the last bombings analysed (JW Marriott 1/Ritz Carlton). Additionally it is mentioned once in *Gatra* and *Suara Hidayatullah* with regard to the first Bali bombing.

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\(^{102}\) *Suara Hidayatullah* only reports on two bombings, Bali bomb 1 and the Australian Embassy. The magazine is abbreviated as SH in the table.
Table 10.2 Frames in each magazine and bombing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Western country/countries reaction to the bombings</th>
<th>The Western country/countries influence to Indonesia for their interest</th>
<th>Western foreign agents as being behind the bombings</th>
<th>The Western country/countries aid to the investigation of the bombings or military aid to Indonesia</th>
<th>Bomb materials is not produced in Indonesia</th>
<th>Conspiracy to undermine and stigmatise Islam</th>
<th>Western people are hedonist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempo</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabili</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>SH</td>
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<tr>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tempo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gatra</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sabili</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>SH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tempo</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gatra</td>
<td>Sabili</td>
<td>SH</td>
<td>Bali bomb 2</td>
<td>Tempo</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gatra</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabili</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>SH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bali bomb 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>SH</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>JW Marriott 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tempo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gatra</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sabili</td>
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</table>
Qualitative analysis
Following the quantitative analyses in Chapter 5 (Tempo and Gatra) and Chapter 6 (Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah) are Chapters 7 (Tempo and Gatra) and 8 (Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah), which deal with the qualitative analysis. These chapters selected one article from each bombing to be studied. All of the magazines had complete articles for each of the bombings analysed, except Suara Hidayatullah. As previously mentioned, Suara Hidayatullah had articles only on the first Bali bombing and the Australian Embassy bombing.

The purpose of Chapters 7 and 8 is to further study the articles to identify the perpetrators of the bombings, according to the magazines and the sources used. However, in this qualitative analysis, I will further summarise only the result of the perpetrators of the bombings. The following section will discuss the sources.

The result as shown below in Table 10.2 describes that Gatra, Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah are parallel and confirm the result of the framing that accuses ‘the West’ of being behind the bombings. Gatra shows the investigation held by the Police, which revealed the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah, but it also further underlines the possibility of Western involvement. Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah assert that not only were the bombings the work of the ‘the West’ but also an attempt to undermine and stigmatise Islam. This leads to conspiracy theories in terrorism, parallel with the belief of the Islamists.

This section has summarised the findings of four chapters (5, 6, 7 and 8). The next section, referring to these chapters, explores the factors that influence the content of the reports in the magazines.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tempo</th>
<th>Gatra</th>
<th>Sabili</th>
<th>Suara Hidayatullah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Bali bomb 1   | • Condemnation from Australia, America and the United nations towards the devastating bomb  
  • Australia and America push/urge Indonesia to investigate who is behind the bombing  
  • There is an assumption that JI is behind the bombing. | • According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI is behind the bombing but the magazine opens the possibility it could be the work of foreign agents | • US as being behind the bombing            |
|               |                                                                       |                                                                        | • The bombing is perceived as a stigmatization towards Islam                                   |
|               |                                                                       |                                                                        | • “The West” is believed to be behind the bombing                                            |
| JW Marriott   | • JI is accused as being behind the bombing  
  • Australia is ready to help Indonesia in the investigation | • According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI is behind the bombing but the magazine opens the possibility it could be the work of foreign agent | • US as being behind the bombing            |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| Australian    | • JI is accused as being behind the bombing                           | • According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI is behind the bombing, but *Gatra* opens the possibility of other organization/agents. | • US and Australia as being behind the bombing                                               |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        | • “The West” is the mastermind behind the bomb                                                |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        | • The bomb is the act of JI (which is not *Jemaah Islamiyah*, but “Jewish Intelligence”)       |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| Australian    | • Azahari and Noordin Top as being behind the bombing                 | • According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI is behind the bombing but according to the sources and the magazine, it could be the work of Western intelligence | • Muslims being stigmatised as terrorists                                                   |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| Australian    |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   | • According to the Indonesian Police, *JI* was behind the bombing but according to SBY, someone was trying to undermine his authority. | • According to the official statement of the Indonesian Police, JI is behind the bombing but according to the sources and the magazine, it could be the work of Western intelligence | • The involvement of the Indonesian government/Indonesian Police in the bombing.            |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        | • The bomb is to stigmatise Islam                                                           |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| Australian    |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |
| JW Marriott   |                                                                       |                                                                        |                                             |

**Table 10.3 Qualitative analysis table**
10.1.2 Factors influencing Islamist discourse in the magazines

In a larger social and political context, the Islamisation of Indonesian society as explained by Ricklefs (2012) and the changing face of Indonesian Islam as perceived by Bruinessen (2013a) have confirmed that Indonesian Muslims are more Islamised in ritual practice and keener to adopt the Islamist discourse.

In a smaller context, Pintak and Setiyono’s (2011) survey on 600 Indonesian journalists shows that the influence of Islam is increasing in the newsroom. In this context, journalists’ ideological perspective and view towards terrorism may influence the content of the reporting. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) developed a theoretical framework on factors influencing media content. The framework is a ringed model of a hierarchy of influences that shape media content. Among these influences are the journalists’ point of view and the ideological level.

The editors and journalists in the general magazine Tempo (according to the interviews, as explained in Chapter 5), view terrorism as a criminal act regardless of their beliefs and religion, which reflects their secular point of view. This secular view further shapes the overall view on terrorism in the reports. The main reports in Tempo focus on the investigation by the Indonesian Police as well as on the victims of the bombings.

On the other hand, one of the factors that influence Gatra to adopt an Islamist discourse is the journalist view on terrorism. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) explain that journalists can influence the news report, which in this case can further shape the reporting of terrorism. As explained previously in Chapter 5, the editor-in-chief of Gatra views that terrorism is an effect of injustice in the world. The roots of terrorism are seen as the unjust social and political policies. Although the perpetrators of the bombings committed a violent act, the editor-in-chief of Gatra attempts to assert that this is an impact of unjust policy. In this case, the editor-in-chief of Gatra believed that although he perceives terrorism as emanating from an unjust policy, journalism may not report assumptions on conspiracy theories. Facts must be reported as stressed by Gatra. The facts on the investigation led by the Indonesian Police point fingers to the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah. These facts were present in the reporting; however, the magazines’ stance – that terrorism originates from the Western countries’ (mainly perceived as the United States) unjust policy – shapes the reporting.
Both of the Islamist magazines’ standpoints are to challenge the dominant mainstream view on the reports of terrorism as well as supporting the Islamist ideological view. The mainstream view is regarded as not representing the Islamist view. To some extent, the view of terrorism for both of the Islamist magazines is similar to the view from *Gatra*: that terrorism stems from an unjust policy. This policy refers to the actions by Western countries, mainly pointing to the United States policy and ‘invasion’/intervention towards Muslim countries, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. To further stress that the magazine does not want to follow the mainstream view, the vice editor-in-chief of *Sabili* explains that the magazine does not want to be regarded as the ‘spokesman’ for the Indonesian Police, the government’s official source for the investigation on terrorism.

Below is the table of news sources present in the four magazines analysed:

**Table 10.4 News sources (all magazines)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>News sources</th>
<th>Tempo</th>
<th>Gatra</th>
<th>Sabili</th>
<th>Suara Hidayatullah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesian government officials</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Academics/scholars (Indonesian)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Islamic organisations</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Western media</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Asian media</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Government officials (Western countries)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Intelligence observer/analyst</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Alleged terrorist</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Academics/scholars (other than Indonesian)</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NGO (Indonesian)</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NGO (foreign)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>MPR/DPR</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As stated by the editor-in-chief of Tempo, the conspiracy theories’ view is regarded as lazy because it is considered the easiest assumption or accusation to make without thinking or even looking at the facts. Police investigations are perceived as important for Tempo; therefore the Indonesian Police sources are significant in number (30%) and there are only a limited number of sources from the Islamic organisations (4%).

Gatra’s view on terrorism stemming from an unjust policy and not merely relying on the Indonesian Police’s report (as explained in Chapter 5) is further reflected by the choice of sources, as shown in Table 10.3. The Indonesian Police (23%) has the highest percentage of sources. A slightly lower percentage of sources are from the Islamic organisation, which includes Islamists (16%). These Islamist sources not only were used as sources in the Islamist magazine Sabili; specifically, also in Gatra these sources were also used to counter the opinion from the Indonesian Police and from the government officials.

Steele (1995), quoting from Soley (1992), explains that news sources are not neutral, and are selected by the media to interpret news in order to support the media’s views. To summarise, Pintak and Setiyono (2011) state in their study concerning Indonesian journalist that there is an increase of Islam influence in the newsroom. This is perhaps the case in Gatra, parallel to their research that religion is taking its place more than their identity as journalist.

The Islamists are the main source in Sabili. They are included in the category of Islamic organisations’ sources, as the main source (29%), almost twice as large as the source of the Indonesian Police (15%) and the Indonesian government officials are in the second and third highest source. As has been explained in the qualitative analysis of the Islamist magazines in Chapter 8, the Indonesian Police and the Indonesian government officials presented facts and investigations on the bombings. These facts were contested in the context of the Islamist discourse, meaning that the Islamists challenged the facts of the investigation with an anti-Western Islamist discourse. Additionally, the Western government officials are the third
largest news source in Sabili (Table 10.4). As also in the case of the Indonesian Police news source, the Western government officials’ source was contested with the news source from the Islamists.

Suara Hidayatullah, on the other hand, relies on civilians (18%) as news sources. However, in contrast to Tempo, which refers to victims of the bombings as civilians, Suara Hidayatullah refers to the anonymous witnesses on the bombings who believed that the bombings were a conspiracy theory or the work of the Western agents, as explained in Chapters 6 and 8.

The Indonesian Police and the government officials of Western countries are respectively the second- and third-largest sources in Sabili. However, their view is contested by the third-largest news source, which consists of Indonesian academics/scholars and Indonesian Intelligence analysts, and their view that the bombing is a conspiracy theory.

Table 10.4 summarises the three largest news sources used by the magazines. These news sources reflect the framing as previously analysed in this chapter. For example, the Indonesian Police news source in Tempo serves as the official source bringing investigation facts, on which the magazine relies. On the other hand, in Gatra and mainly the Islamist magazines, they bring the investigation facts, but then these ‘facts’ are contested by other sources. Therefore, the choice of new sources, as well as the journalists’ view as previously mentioned in this chapter, serve to shape the magazines’ view on terrorism.

Table 10.5 Three largest news sources used in each magazine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magazine</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tempo</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>Indonesian Government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatra</td>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>Islamic organisations and Civilians</td>
<td>Indonesian Government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabili</td>
<td>Islamic organisations</td>
<td>Indonesian Police</td>
<td>Government officials (Western countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suara Hidayatullah</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>Indonesian Police and Government officials</td>
<td>Academic/Scholars (Indonesian) and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.1.3 Readers’ response

As explained in Chapter 9, the research question to be answered, in connection with the readers’ responses, is who is behind the bombings.

Referring to the findings in Chapter 9 on the readers’ response, among the four magazines analysed, there is no significant difference on how the readers respond to who is behind the bombings.

The readers of all four magazines acknowledge that the bombings are the work of the Indonesian Muslims. However, they believe that behind these Muslims are superpower countries such as the United States, and/or that the bombings were carried out in cooperation with the Jews, who are considered smart but tricky people. Although there is a response that the perpetrator could also be al-Qaeda, it is not the dominant belief. Magazine readers considered the Indonesian Muslims, who had carried out violence in the name of God, to be plain and simple-minded people. The readers believe that these people are poor and uneducated and therefore easily brainwashed to commit such a violent act.

To sum up on the fieldwork data, from the Bali bomb 1 to the last bombing analysed (JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton), there is no shift of opinion on the perpetrators of the bomb. The readers believe that the Indonesian Muslims (Jama’ah Islamiyah) were behind the bombings. It is believed that they are merely the perpetrators, but behind them there is a great ‘engineer’.

10.2 Conclusion

10.2.1 The anti-Western Islamist discourse (magazine articles):

The research questions in this thesis are how the magazines construct the Islamist discourse and anti-westernism in the magazines. As has been shown throughout this thesis, there is no evidence of Islamist discourse in Tempo. However, in Gatra and in the two Islamist magazines (Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah), an anti-western Islamist discourse is apparent, although it is less pervasive in Gatra than in the Islamist magazines. Although Gatra has a
less intense Islamist discourse compared to the Islamist magazines, finding such a discourse in it is significant, taking into account that the magazine is categorised as a general magazine. As explained by Naharong in chapter 2, one of the characteristics of Islamists is the anti-western attitude which further provokes a suspicion in a western conspiratorial thinking. The anti-western Islamist discourse in Gatra, as explained in the previous chapters, lead the readers to the opinion that the mastermind behind the bombings are the West. This is further endorsed through sources used by Gatra, which has a significant number of Islamist sources.

The Islamist discourse which does appear in the general magazine (Gatra) shows that Islamisation has also come into newsrooms (Pintak and Setiyono, 2011). The factor influencing Gatra’s Islamist discourse is its journalists’ views on terrorism. As Shoemaker and Reese (1996) explain, journalists can influence and shape their news reports on terrorism. As has been previously explained, the view of the Chief Editor of Gatra was that terrorism is an effect of injustice in the world. The roots of terrorism were seen as unjust social and political policy. Although the perpetrators of the bombings carried out an act of violence, the Chief Editor tried to portray this as the impact of unjust policies. However, on the other hand, Tempo’s Chief Editor has a different view. Terrorism is perceived as a criminal act, regardless of one’s beliefs and religion, thus reflecting the magazine’s secular point of view.

The two Islamist magazines (Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah) were filled with an anti-western Islamist discourse that linked terrorism to the five bombings analysed. Both magazines were considered as challenging, and opposing, the mainstream view. They were seen as providing an ‘alternative’ to the mainstream magazines, which mainly represented the voice of the Indonesian Police.

The Islamist magazines’ unfavourable construction of ‘western countries’ was shaped by the ideological views and background of their journalists, who were Muslim activists and had a background in Islamist organisations from their university days or from other Islamist organisations in the community. Referring to Shoemaker & Reese (1996), ideological background can also exert an influence on how news is reported.

The construction of ‘western countries’ was that they are enemies of Islam and their intention is to destroy it. ‘Western countries’, in the context of these bombings, means specifically the
United States, with its unjust policies towards Muslim countries and Muslim people (in this case, its policy concerning the Palestinians, and other acts of invasion and intervention in Muslim countries). Suara Hidayatullah also stressed the role of the Jews in trying to destroy Islam, and therefore constructed them as an enemy with a hidden agenda to eradicate Islam.

The purpose of these Islamist magazines is not only for *dakwah* [Islamic propagation] but also to disseminate Islamic thinking from the Middle East, which is perceived as the heartland of Islam. They are the ‘puritanist’ magazines, sympathetic not only to the Wahhabi type of Islam, but also to the cause of Islamic radicalism in general (Assyaukanie, 2009).

To sum up, I conclude that the Islamist discourse has made considerable progress in the print publication. Surprisingly the Islamist discourse has influenced the mainstream media, as shown in the findings of Gatra. This explains the Islamisation of the Indonesian society has influenced many elements, including the print publication. Moreover as shown in the findings of the readers’ response, the Indonesian *ummah* believes particularly in one aspect of the Islamist discourse: the conspiracy theory behind the bombings.

**10.2.2 The readers’ responses:**

The second part of the thesis is the readers’ responses to the magazine articles. The readers believe that terrorism is not in line with the teaching of Islam. In general, the readers are suspicious of the involvement of western countries in the bombings. They agree that Jama’ah Islamiyah are the perpetrators of the bombings but this Islamist organisation did not act alone. Technology and other sophisticated things such as bombs can only be made by western countries.

The western foreign agent (the United States) is considered to be the mastermind behind the bombings. This general opinion has not changed since the first Bali bomb (2002) to the last bombing analysed, JW Marriott 2/Ritz Carlton bombing (2009), where the investigation by the Police led to the involvement of Jama’ah Islamiyah. To conclude, the news they read from the magazines does not affect their view, which is a conspiracy theory.

In a broader context, referring to the current social and political context in Indonesia, both of the findings from the news articles and readers’ responses show that Islamist discourse is present in Indonesian society. As explained in chapter 2, the nature of the Indonesian society
has become more Islamised. The increasing rise of pious public and Islamisation of Indonesian society, is an effect of Muslim globalisation; which is the influence of Middle Eastern countries.

10.3 Recommendation for further research

The framework used in this study can be used in other publications, especially the frame categories. The readers’ responses can also be referred to, to some extent, but to develop a deeper understanding a further ethnographic approach is needed. In connection to the current situation of one of the Islamist magazines (Sabili) studied, for further research, I suggest a further study of the Islamist publications industry and their background in connection to publishing magazines.

At the time when I was writing this conclusion, Sabili had not published for the past three months. In an attempt to find out the reason behind this stoppage, I contacted two people who had previously worked for the magazine and had helped me during fieldwork. The informants were at first reluctant to explain the situation concerning Sabili. However, they told me that, generally speaking, there was a conflict which triggered the cessation of publication. They explained that the Islamist magazines suffered from a lack of professionalism, were ill-managed and finally succumbed to internal conflict. The conflict was about running the business. Although the Islamist magazines have a very limited market, they made good money. Sabili also has a radio station. The stoppage in publication raises the question of whether the Islamist magazines truly exist to disseminate Islamist ideas (as in Islamic propagation) or whether they are in some part also a business. As explained in Chapter 3, the Islamist magazines in the New Order were only distributed underground. During this current reform era, they have attained their ‘moment’ in the free press and the free market, and Islamist discourse is therefore widely spread through them. However, it seems this ‘moment’ is seen as a dual opportunity—to disseminate ideological ideas and also to make a ‘profit’, in terms of ‘selling’ an Islamist discourse in the market.
References


Hasyim, S. (2013).*Kaum Salafi Indonesia dan Ruang Maya*. Bag-1, Retrieved October 20, 2013, from http://www.nu.or.id/a.public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,4-id,47726-lang,id-c,kolom-t,Kaum+Salafi+Indonesia+dan+Ruang+Maya+Bag+1-.phpx


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**Online Resources**


www.indopubs.com/perceptions.rtf

http://cmrc.colorado.edu/cmrc/images/stories/Center/Publications/whitepaperfinalversion.pdf

http://www.islamlib.com/?site=1&aid=766&cat=content&title=wawancara

http://www.setara-institute.org
Appendices
Appendix 1

List of people interviewed

**Sabili**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>07-02-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td>27-01-2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Suara Hidayatullah**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MH</td>
<td>01-02-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>01-02-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DH</td>
<td>24-02-2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tempo**

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>BS</td>
<td>08-02-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>WM</td>
<td>10-02-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>25-02-2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gatra**

<table>
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<th>Initials</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ASK</td>
<td>1-02-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>HM</td>
<td>08-02-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>HL</td>
<td>11-02-2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2

### List of Tempo articles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Bombing event</th>
<th>Article Headline-Subheadline</th>
<th>Edition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>911 untuk Australia : Australia dan Amerika Serikat menekan keras Indonesia agar memerangi terorisme. Salah satu cara : pemerintahan George W. Bush menawarkan bantuan militer</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Aksi Para ‘Sherlock Holmes’</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Hilangnya Surga bagi Para ‘Backpackers’</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Mengapa Gosong dan Terpotong-potong : Semua jenis peledak menimbulkan tiga efek :gelombang kejut, panas dan penghancuran</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Bunga, lilin dan Doa Kami : Has the Clash Civilizations begun in Bali?</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Sekeping Gigi pun Berarti</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Setelah Nirwana Terbakar : Siapa biang bom Bali masih samar. Petugas kerpotan menggali para saksi</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Mereka Berkisah tentang Malam yang Kelam</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Detik-Detik Mencekam di Pinggir Kuta</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Operasi Ngruki Satu di Solo</td>
<td>Bali bomb 1</td>
<td>No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Luka Marriott, Bali dan seterusnya</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>No. 24/XXX11/11-17 Agustus 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Makan siang berdarah di Marriott</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>No. 24/XXX11/11-17 Agustus 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Bagi Eni, Encep tetap si Bageur</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>No.26/XXXII/25-31 August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Balada Tertangguknya si Ikan besar</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>No.26/XXXII/25-31 August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Dokumen Teror dari Kalibanteng</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>No. 24/XXX11/11-17 Agustus 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Antrian Negara Pemeriksa Hambali</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>No.26/XXXII/25-31 August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Mereka Bicara tentang Hambali</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>No.26/XXXII/25-31 August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Hantu Bom dari Johor</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>No.27/XXXII/01-07 September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>JW Marriott 1</td>
<td>Upaya Menjerat Dr Azahari</td>
<td>01-07 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>Tarian Terakhir dari Eva</td>
<td>No. 29/XXXIII/13-19 September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>Cendawan Ledakan dari Lemari Plastik</td>
<td>No. 30/XXXIII/20-26 September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>Doktor Bom dari Bilik-Bilik Gelap</td>
<td>No. 30/XXXIII/20-26 September 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>Kisah ‘Macan’ di Bom Kuningan</td>
<td>No. 30/XXXIII/20-26 September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>Dikejar Bayangan Mengerikan</td>
<td>No. 30/XXXIII/20-26 September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>Terapi Lewat Diskusi</td>
<td>No. 30/XXXIII/20-26 September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Australian Embassy</td>
<td>Satu Jejak Bom Kuningan</td>
<td>No. 31/XXXIII/27 Sep-03 Okober 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Bali bomb 2</td>
<td>Dari Kertas Ajakan Berkencan : Sekali lagi, Bali diguncang bom. Tak sedahsyat tragedy Legian 2002, tapi menunjukkan pola yang berubah. Dengan modus bom bunuh diri, pelaku bisa menyusup langsung ke jantung keramaian-bukan sekadar jalan raya yang diallui mobil pengangkut bom seperti yang sebelumnya terjadi.</td>
<td>No. 33/XXXIV/10-16 Oktober 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Bali bomb 2</td>
<td>Secuil Daging Penentu Identitas : Tim forensic berhasil mengenali sebagian besar korban bom Bali II. Jati diri ketiga pelaku lebih sulit diungkap lewat identifikasi.</td>
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