Ethics of Trust and Resistance:
Participation in Indigenous Research

Ruth Melanie Nicholls

Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
University of Western Sydney

2009
Dedication

I would like to begin by acknowledging the traditional custodians of the places in which I live and work, the Darug and Gundungurra nations. This thesis is dedicated to the community development workers involved in this research.

Mentors, like good friends, are people to be cherished. Dr Graham Henderson continues to inspire me with his humanitarian work for Oxfam and his commitment to helping others showing the greatest level of humility I have ever witnessed. Dr Maggie Brady never ceases to amaze me with her astute observations on politics and personalities. And Jilpia Nappaljarri Jones, the quiet activist, always reminds me to 'keep it real'.

My family and my friends, I cannot thank you enough for being so good to me while I have travelled the ups and downs of this journey.
Acknowledgments

First acknowledgments must be made to my supervisors: A/Prof Moira Carmody, for her steady and calm advice during challenging intellectual and emotional times, and A/Prof Michael Darcy for always reminding me of ‘the bigger picture’ of power and knowledge. Dr Murray Lee and Dr Mary Hawkins were generous with their time and thoughts at the formative stages of this research.

The Social Justice and Social Change Research Centre at the University of Western Sydney generously provided my stipend and funding for travel costs associated with speaking as a research collaboration (community participants and myself) in Melbourne. The National Health and Medical Research Council also provided a conference subsidy for us to attend this event. Other funding that supported work associated with this thesis was provided by the Foundation for Young Australians Indigenous Grants Program; the Australian Institute for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies conference subsidy; and a post-graduate student bursary from The Australian Sociological Association.
Declaration

This is to certify that

i) this thesis comprises only my original work towards the Ph.D.

ii) due acknowledgment has been made in the text toward all other material used

iii) I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution

__________________________________________

Ruth Melanie Nicholls B.A. (Australian Studies) Hons
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECG</td>
<td>Aboriginal Education Consultative Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHMRC</td>
<td>Aboriginal Health and Medical Research Council New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIATSIS</td>
<td>Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Census Data Enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIHR</td>
<td>Canadian Institutes of Health Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRCAH</td>
<td>Cooperative Research Centre for Aboriginal Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHEW</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCS</td>
<td>Department of Community Services, New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>Health Research Council of New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HREC</td>
<td>Human Research Ethics Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRA</td>
<td>Indigenous Research Reform Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAIDOC</td>
<td>National Aboriginal and Islander Day of Observance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHMRC</td>
<td>National Health and Medical Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorry Day</td>
<td>Day in Memory of the Stolen Generations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAFE</td>
<td>Technical and Further Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>WGIP</td>
<td>Working Group of Indigenous Populations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMA</td>
<td>World Medical Association</td>
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Abstract

In negotiating research relationships with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the question of colonisation runs deep. Often, as a gesture to counter the colonising effects of the research gaze, ‘participation’ is hailed as a methodological solution, as a means of healing and transforming power relations. In practice however, the ethical implications of research activities remain complex and contested (Cornwall, 2008, p.276). Much is written about why participatory methods offer remedial qualities of empowerment to counter colonialism in research, but there is little discussion of what happens when participatory research with Indigenous Australians does not operate as a smooth process of reclamation. Often, researchers avoid accounting for resistance to participation because this is viewed as a personal ‘failure’ to accurately represent the interests of a colonised group. The basis of these assumptions comes from a moral compulsion to alter power relations towards social justice: such logic cannot accept that ‘oppressed’ peoples would reject opportunities for empowerment. Yet, international literature (Kothari, 2001) shows that subjectivities comprising participatory research must be carefully considered when constructing research relationships.

Drawing from a case study of my own participatory research experience with an Aboriginal community development organisation in Western Sydney, I consider how a non-Indigenous researcher might approach an understanding of their ethics when attempting to ‘decolonise’ their research. I reflexively investigate my own practice to offer a discussion of the ways in which researchers can understand how they come to determine what is ethical and what is not. My account begins with a description of a case study involving multiple forms of participation over a three-year period, which I explore as a series of ‘invited spaces’ (Cornwall, 2004). Drawing from my case study, I incorporate Foucault’s ethics (2005) by discussing how ethics codes create subjectivities, which not only shape the participants in the research, but also shape the kind of ‘selves’ researchers seek to become through participatory research. I consider the contingencies that have led to the construction of a remedial role for participatory methods in research involving Indigenous Australians by critically analysing the discourses within the National Health and Medical Research Council’s ethics guidelines.
This research offers a multi-layered approach to reflexivity, by attending to transparency, interpersonal relationships, and a collective evaluation of the process with participants (Nicholls, 2009). Collective reflection about (re)presenting research findings to a variety of audiences highlights the importance of examining one’s own motives as crucial to ‘ethical’ practice. Researchers seeking to achieve a form of participation without resistance set themselves an impossible task. Resistance is not to be feared, but is to be expected within the mechanics of power relations amongst subjectivities within ‘communities’. Incorporating resistance into accounts of participatory research enables an ability to acknowledge ‘internal conflicts and contradictions’ (Fawcett & Hearn, 2004, p. 211) without deeming participation a failure.

I argue that participation is a liminal space between trust and resistance, containing tensions and productive possibilities. By attending to one’s ethics (Foucault, 2005), participatory researchers might now understand fluidity, uncertainty, and dynamism within research relationships as a rich source of reflexive work towards countering the colonising gaze.
Preface

Three women sit together on the grass in the shade of a Eucalypt in the grounds of a university campus to the far west of Sydney. Ruby\(^1\) and Barb work for a local Aboriginal community association. Ruby is Darug, a traditional owner, a descendant of the Boorooborang clan whose country surrounds the Hawkesbury River to the north-west of the metropolitan fringe. Barb is from Bundjalung Country to the north, but she has been living locally for quite a few years. I am a non-Indigenous Ph.D. student, who has been volunteering for, and undertaking participatory research with, their community development organisation for two years at the point of our meeting under the tree.

Ruby and Barb are visiting campus because there is an exhibition hosted by the university to provide career and education information to Aboriginal students from the local high schools. A few hundred young people buzz and bustle around the Social Sciences building; where they are welcomed to country by an Elder, traditional dances are performed, and Aboriginal workers from government, corporate, and community sectors have set up information stands. Ruby and Barb comment that when they were at school there were very limited choices in career development compared to what is on offer at this exhibition. After a brief tour around campus, we sit together to eat some lunch in the relative quiet outside, and Ruby and Barb have a smoke. As part of our participatory research together we are preparing a paper for a national human ethics conference, where we will present together as a case study in reflexive conversation. We have spent a lot of time talking about ethics, it’s a regular topic of discussion; but on this day we are recording our conversation to assist in drafting our paper, which will also form the basis of a journal article we intend to publish together.

While we sit together, I reflect. Aware of the time demands of community workers in both their work and family commitments, I am particularly grateful for Ruby and Barb’s time to contribute their ideas to a journal article, and to travel interstate to give a paper to a large audience. I

\(^1\) The participant herself chose this pseudonym, as did several of the other participants.
am aware of the push I am making to represent our work collaboratively, which takes time and energy away from the core concerns of community development. But Ruby and Barb assure me that there are several reasons why they are keen to participate. They tell me I have given time, energy and commitment as a volunteer, and their participation is a sign of appreciation and reciprocity. It’s also an opportunity to be active citizens—to represent themselves and their own perspectives. We sit together, and converse …

Barb: I just think that we’ve just had enough of the rules …
Ruby: I think the rules are European rules and they don’t fit.
Barb: We’ve tried living under those rules and it just doesn’t work. This is our rules, this is the way we’re gonna work, this is the way we’re gonna live, this is the way we’re gonna do it. You know, you need to come and meet us half way. I mean, we’ve already been there and what have you [non-Indigenous people] done?
Ruby: I think it’s more than half way now. They need to come way over half way to meet us, ‘cos the distrust is so prevalent … and that’s what you’ve done in your research is you’ve come more than half way. We’re here, you’ve come right over, We hadn’t even moved over … slowly we’ve started moving to meet you half way. But you’ve had to come right over.
Barb: Have you noticed that? With your work?
Ruth: Umm …
Barb: I didn’t mean to give you the questions!
[laughter]
Ruth: No, no. I think it’s good that you ask me these questions. (26 September 2007)

Barb’s question, ‘Have you noticed that? With your work? stumped me, because it is about resistance. During the research process I had to do a great deal of ‘moving’. In contrast, the participants purposefully held their ground. They resisted my rules of engagement in order to assert their own rules. Only once I had moved ‘right over’ did Ruby and Barb slowly start to meet me half way. These metaphors of movement and rules suggest strategies like a chessboard: Black versus White, of tactics, and protocols. Accounts of movement and strategic positions also suggest that our experience of research encompassed spatial dimensions in which resistance, and building trust
towards participation mediated distance between people. Participation in
research was the ‘middle’ of this space, a liminal threshold between European
rules, and Indigenous self-determination. Participation was a space defined by
tension and difference as much as respectful encounters (Jones with Jenkins,
‘Research’ is a pejorative term for many Indigenous Australians (Humphery, 2001). As Smith (1999, pp.99–103) illustrates, Indigenous peoples around the world have dissenting views about research because of the close association it has with colonisation. It is an activity imbued with qualities of acquisition, removal, control, exploitation, subjugation, and oppression. Research continues to be dominated by coloniser languages (particularly English), coloniser theories, and concepts (Smith, 1999, pp.58–77). Consequently there may be reticence about participation in research, unless the methodology claims to enable community self-determination (Onemda, 2008, p.7).

Participatory approaches are often hailed as a methodological solution to marginalisation, appropriation, and exploitation (Potts & Brown, 2005). I refer to this implicit assumption of social justice as a ‘counter-colonial’ logic. It is a rationale underpinned by a moral goal to transform colonial power relations through participatory practices.

Contrary to the remedial promises of participation, my experience of undertaking participatory research was not a smooth process of intellectual reclamation. It was an experience replete with uncertainties that illuminated a disparity between theory and practice little discussed in Australian literature. By drawing upon on a reflexive case study of practices, discourse, and subjectivities I present a way of understanding the complexity of practicing this approach. This thesis offers a discussion of the moral logic underpinning why researchers might use participatory approaches with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

My evaluation of counter-colonial participatory research involved thinking about how we create truths about others, as well as the goals we might seek to achieve, and the kind of people we seek to be throughout the process (Foucault, 1994c). My argument seeks to clarify the connections

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2 My reading of Foucault’s ethics suggests that morals are discursive and non-discursive rules and conventions to which the self ascribes values of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in order to judge and construct relationships with others. I explain this in further detail on page 78.
researchers make between social justice, research ethics and methods. In clarifying these connections however, it is necessary to draw out the complexities of participatory research in practice and contrast this with theories about decolonisation and participation.

A key conceptual strategy is my use of Cornwall’s account of participation as an ‘invited space’ (Cornwall, 2004, p.76). Originally used by Cornwall to describe spaces of engagement in which citizens have been invited into by government or an NGO for the purpose of ‘participation’. The intention behind the term ‘participate’ is used differently in this argument, to describe how Indigenous people are invited to participate in research in order to counter the distanced and ‘objective’ gaze of non-Indigenous knowledge. I describe my experience of doing participatory research with an Aboriginal community group as a series of invited spaces, in which multiple subjectivities interacted and shaped processes. The concept of an ‘invited space’ has enabled me to consider carefully the boundaries of participation, and the kind of power relations that shape the scale and scope of possibilities. My case study of ‘invited spaces’ delineates the inter-relations of social roles such as Aboriginal community development workers, Aboriginal youth, teachers, parents, youth workers and ‘researcher’. Each of these social roles was shaped by institutional rules, tacit knowledge and power relations that determined a web of power (and resistance) throughout the research process. It is from this position that I develop my argument for viewing participation as a liminal space between trust and resistance. Participatory practice does not operate in concrete, stable and predictable ways—much as power rumbles and grinds, it shimmers and pulses amongst and between all participants in research.

To establish my argument I first want to describe the logic of counter-colonial remediation in relation to ‘participation’ in more detail. Following this I will introduce a problem with this logic, and then I will explain how I sought to address this problem by reflexively exploring the connection between ethics and methods.
Counter-colonial logic: participation & remediation

‘Counter-colonial logic’ posits that if Indigenous peoples control and own the research process and its outcomes, research becomes a process of healing, transformation and reclamation in resistance to the colonising gaze (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p.2). The subjectivities constructed within this logic reflect ideals about social justice in contemporary Australia. I draw some of my ideas about ‘researcher logic’ from Emma Kowal’s (2006a) insightful ethnography of White anti-racist health professionals working with Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. Kowal refers to this scenario as a ‘post-colonial frontier’, and describes the moral rationale of these ‘ambivalent helpers’ (Kowal & Paradies, 2005) as a ‘post-colonial logic’. Importantly, Kowal works to show not only how this logic is constructed, but also how it fails to maintain itself. The crux of Kowal’s thesis is that the logic of remediation (that is, seeking to heal, transform, and empower Aboriginal people in research practices) unfurls when there is resistance to ‘emancipatory’ research methods. Indeed, this experience was a feature of my case study of participatory research. Kowal’s solution to this composition of subjectivities is a metaphor of friendship. As I will show, my focus on participatory praxis yielded quite a different conclusion. I incorporate Kowal’s theorisation of anti-racism into my reflexive approach; and then I consider productive ways of responding to resistance.

I use the term ‘counter-colonial’ rather than ‘post-colonial’ in order to engage with literature by Indigenous writers about decolonisation. Many Indigenous writers argue that there is no ‘post-’ (Smith, 1999, p.98), rather colonisation endures in forms of institutionalised racism and discriminatory practices in everyday life for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. I seek to evoke a process of moving against and challenging colonisation as a social justice imperative in research. Hence, my decision to employ the term ‘counter’ rather than ‘post’ is itself an example of counter-colonial logic in practice. This hints towards the simultaneous project of practising and being critically reflexive about social justice throughout this thesis.

The problem with the assumption that participation is an antidote to colonial harm is the way power is defined. To understand how power is
defined in relation to participation and its potentials for transformation it is important to consider briefly why ‘participation’ is linked to transformation, social justice (Croft & Beresford, 1992) and counter-colonialism. The diversity and ways in which ‘participation’ is used to evoke applied research methods with a focus on process to effect social change will be reflected throughout my argument to come. Rather than create a concrete definition of what I believe ‘participation in research’ is, my argument will highlight the diverse (and sometimes contradictory) contexts and applications of the term as a discourse applied to a multitude of methods.

Participatory research methods are ascribed a range of origins (Johansson & Lindhult, 2008). Some practitioners cite Lewin’s organisational research in the 1940s as the ‘genesis’ of democratic research methods with a focus on action to generate social change (Bargal, 2006; Fine, Torre, Boudin, Bowen, Clark et al, 2004, p.95). Others draw the roots of their work from the radical emancipatory movements of the 1970s, associated with Fals Borda and Freire, focusing on empowerment and emancipation from oppression (Grant, Nelson & Mitchell, 2008). In participatory discourses, no clear distinctions are made between community-based research focusing on political capacity-building through consciousness-raising (Cahill, 2004), participatory democracy (Mohan & Hickey, 2004), pragmatic action applied in either a development context (Chambers, 2005, pp.110–114) or participation in an organisational change context (such as professional development) (Sense, 2006).

The means by which participatory researchers inculcate the heritage of their methodological approach indicates how they view the ‘problems’ they are interested in. Participation may be applied for a variety of reasons, ranging from techniques of sustainable development (cost-sharing, improving literacy, improving health, capacity-building) to a means of stabilising and strengthening political systems or confronting “‘structures of oppression’ within existing forms of economic development, state formation, political rule and social differentiation” (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, pp.6–7). Often, participatory research discourse diffuses into activism and development practices by focusing on praxis and an oppositional stance towards ‘expert’

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3 Participatory research discourse purposefully conflates ‘applied problems’ with ‘research problems’.
knowledge (Chambers, 2005, p.106); the result of which is participatory researchers claiming roles as scholar/activists or mavericks/heretics (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.14). This politicisation of research is one way of seeing how subjectivities begin to form and reinscribe the subjectivities of participants. Although participatory discourse often claims a heritage of radicalism, in contemporary contexts it is now a mainstream institutional practice warmly embraced by agents and institutions of liberal-democratic economic development, such as the World Bank (Cooke, 2004, pp.43–45; Francis, 2001; Jordan, 2003).

The way power is defined has implications for evaluating the moral outcome of ‘participation’ because it determines the way in which social (in)justice goals are formed. This shapes the way researchers form values about what is a morally good or bad process or outcome:

Some distributive theories of justice explicitly seek to take into account issues of justice beyond the distribution of material goods. They extend the distributive paradigm to cover such goods as self-respect, opportunity, power and honor. Serious conceptual confusion results ... [it] obscures issues of domination and oppression which require more process-oriented and relational conceptualisation. (Young, 1990, p.8)

Despite the differences between accounts of where participatory methods first emerged and how they can solve applied problems, there is an underlying epistemological assumption made about power that is common to the imperatives for participation in research (Gallagher, 2008, p.139; Johansson & Lindhult, 2008, p.102). This is to suggest that power and knowledge are distributed unevenly in research and decision-making processes (as either top-down, or homogenising or exclusionary) and should be corrected in order to generate democratic, inclusive, sustainable and socially just alternatives (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.11). An uneven ‘distribution’ of power to determine knowledge creates a moral imperative for epistemological alternatives. There are contradictions, multiple goals, and shifts in the rationality of discourses about participation. Such discourses include remnants and traces of power as a commodity that needs to be redistributed or ‘shared’

4 Like Iris Marion Young, I apply the term ‘social justice’ to consider the social products of institutional conditions (1990, p.36).
Participatory research poses an epistemological challenge to conventional methods of ‘extracting’ data by rejecting the possibility of a neutral stance and highlighting the relational aspects of rapport with participants (Tolman & Brydon-Miller, 2001, p.5). In participatory research there is an explicit connection between values, justification of knowledge and justification of the methods used to obtain such knowledge (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.13).

Participation has a moral appeal because it suggests that not only particular subjectivities of ‘marginalised’, ‘oppressed’ and ‘dismayed’ people will be heard, but that these people will be able to control how they are constructed and represented as a result of manoeuvres orchestrated to ‘equalise power’ (Wakeford & Pimbert, 2004, p.39). This logic suggests that “power is often seen to be something to be reduced, negated or worked around” (Gallagher, 2008, p.140). Participatory research can therefore be understood as an ‘invited space’ (Cornwall, 2004), encompassing characters who fulfil particular roles of transformation and ‘counter-hegemony’ (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.9).

Attempting to measure the reversal of power in order to evaluate the outcomes of participation results in “no positive opposite or counter to participation” (Kothari, 2001, p.178). In effect refusal or resistance by participants suggests either ‘abnormality’ (as the participant requires/ deserves empowerment); or researcher inaccuracy in identifying the locus for transformation (due to inauthentic/ superficial techniques not ‘properly’ grounded in community support). How are researchers to make sense of a participant who changes their endorsement of a project depending on whom they are talking to, or of someone who passively refuses to take part in an empowering activity (Ortner, 1995)? A productive view of power enables researchers to acknowledge the ability of participants to destabilise and sometimes resist participatory processes, while simultaneously continuing to be involved.
Accounts of sustainable and ‘culturally safe’ research outcomes for communities have been achieved with little disruption or challenge to the researcher(s): indeed, why would a researcher offering a ‘solution’ encounter resistance to their work? This logic also suggests that if a researcher encounters any resistance to their projects of remedial inclusion, it must be because the researcher did not adequately engage with stakeholders. Resistance to participation in research means a personal failure on the part of the researcher to redress the power of their gaze. Hence, the result of this counter-colonial logic is a set of emancipatory goals and a sense of neo-colonial shame if these goals are not achieved. The logic implies that the researcher must have been ‘unethical’ if there was resistance to the research.

**Power relations & participatory discourse**

An alternative to the distributive concept of power is to follow Foucault’s vision of power as a ‘productive force’ operating within a web of inter-relations, that is:

> never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation ... individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. (Foucault, 1980, p.98)

A productive vision of power creates possibilities for understanding relations between people as never fixed, but always shifting according to the knowledge we accept as true (and also the knowledge we reject), the institutions we accept and reject, and the knowledge we apply to understanding ourselves. In this way, I make a distinction between ‘power relations’ and privilege: power circulates, but privilege symbolises substantive and material inequality. Power relations may ascribe certain forms of knowledge with discursive privilege through institutions and social practices. Therefore, my inclination is to consider how power and knowledge shape

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5 On pg.77 I refer to language as the discursive production of knowledge, that is, a material and substantive means of expressing power-knowledge as an archive (such as a written set of rules or an institution). By non-discursive, I am referring to social practices towards self and others that circumscribe ‘truths’ in order to produce social effects, particularly power-relations (such as an ‘unwritten rule’ of politeness).
epistemological and moral imperatives for participation to challenge discursive privileges. Participation in research is about reclaiming, reinscribing, decolonising and self-determination.

A productive view of power also enables a researcher to consider how their subjectivity, their view of themselves and the way they relate to participants may alter during participatory processes. For example, Gallagher reflects upon resistance to his ‘regulatory tactics’ for facilitating child-participation: “my attempts to coax the children into doing what I wanted them to do can be seen as efforts to mobilize the strategy of adult domination ...My notes bear this out, recording that I felt like I was becoming a teacher at points” (Gallagher, 2008, p.146). Likewise, my case for recognising resistance in participatory research is not as “a source of despair or celebration. The task of analysis ...is to describe the way in which resistance operates as part of power, not to seek to promote or oppose it” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p.51). Resistance shapes the way a researcher understands their role in the participation process, often creating an ethical aporia (Kowal, 2006a, p.25). Resistance to social justice projects forces the researcher to consider their actions and beliefs carefully.

Focusing on the effects of power demonstrates how typologies of ‘wide’, ‘deep’, ‘narrow’ or ‘superficial’ participation are produced (Cornwall, 2008a, p.271). A critical stance recognises that participation by itself is not inherently good: rather different levels of participation emerge as typologies, ranging from superficial participation such as ‘consultation’ to deeper, transformative modes such as self-determination and self-mobilisation (Cornwall, 2008a, p.270). Researchers then judge their own moral value according to those typologies, and may also judge other researchers critically for being ‘superficial’.

Foucaultian contributions to Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) ‘participation as tyranny’ critique (viz. Henkel & Stirrat, 2001; Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2001) outline how discourses of participation shape the subjectivities of participants. But there is little engagement with the question of how researchers'/practitioners' subjectivities are shaped; either through participatory discourses, or the ways the community subjectivities also shape
them. My research suggests that participation is not only a form of governance of research participants (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001, p. 182), but it is also a form of governance of our ‘selves’ as researchers trying to address a ‘moral’ problem.

Crucially, responding to resistance in my research altered the composition of subjectivities within ‘invited spaces’. After a participatory event did not go ‘to plan’, I maintained contact with participants by volunteering to assist with community development activities that were not associated with my research outcomes. In doing so, my subjectivity shifted from ‘researcher’ to ‘volunteer’, and trust in our collaboration developed. A consequence of this shift in my subjectivity was an invitation to participate in research on the terms of the community members. The end result was not only a reflexive evaluation⁶ of the research experience, but also a participatory evaluation.

My interest in the ways researchers morally frame their work is to observe how values are constructed and deployed. My focus on ethics is not to create a subjective or normative account of what is ethical. Instead, there is possibility for understanding the wider implications of the ways in which we frame, produce and reify knowledge for the purposes of moving towards social justice. We are not only shaping the subjectivities of the participants in our research, but their subjectivities inform how we govern ourselves. The potentials for understanding how our work is ‘ethical’ operate on multiple levels, from micro-practices between people to the broader political discourses that inform, regulate and compel particular processes and approaches to research.

A map of the thesis

My argument offers a contribution to understanding the ethics of participation in a specific context: a case study of participatory research underpinned by a

⁶ Relationality, alterity and positionality are discussed in further detail in Nicholls (2009). These concepts form the basis of the reflexive methodology that incorporates a three-layered interpretive stance. These concepts emerged once I was able to reflect on action undertaken in the field, through the course of encountering resistance and developing trust. This shift enabled me to critique my own values and actions on an ethical basis: in effect the argument of the thesis as a whole is designed to explore this shift from using participation as a lever for social justice into applying relationality, alterity and positionality to consider the ethical veracity of praxis.
moral purpose of decolonisation. Participatory discourses shaped how I related to the participants in the research, how they related to me, what social practices ensued, and the mutability of power relations throughout the process. Participatory discourses shape the subjectivities of participants and researchers. This case study introduces the ways I governed myself according to the remedial qualities of counter-colonial participatory discourse. This thesis comprises nine chapters, which I will now signpost.

Chapter 2, ‘People, Places & Spaces’, provides detail of the invited spaces of the case study. In doing so, it reveals the complexity of establishing trust; the multiple, intersecting power relations between participants (some of whom controlled the terms of participation for others); and the rumbles of resistance throughout the process. This case study provides the background to why I was compelled to investigate the moral dimensions of participatory research in practice. The purpose is to frame participation as spatial, temporal, performative, methodological, material, dynamic and full of uncertainties. The multiple subjectivities and examples of resistance challenged my ideals of what ‘participation’ was in practice, and formed the basis for undertaking a critical evaluation of the process.

Chapter 3, ‘Developing an Ethical Subjectivity’, discusses the theoretical approach I use to understand ethics. I do not use the term ‘ethics’ in a normative way, as a prescription or general theory. Rather, I use the term ‘ethics’ as Michel Foucault did in his later work on the history of sexuality (Foucault, 1983; 1986; 1988a; 1988b; 1988c; 1988d; 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 2005) and governmentality (Foucault, 1991c; 2007). Just as the terms ‘archaeology’ and ‘genealogy’ were employed by Foucault in a specific methodological sense, ‘ethics’ are distinguished from morals. Ethics in this argument describe developing a reflexive subjectivity: delineating the kinds of rules, discourses and relationships we ascribe to govern ourselves. I employ this theoretical approach to create questions about how to analyse the ethics of participation as discourse in practice. Developing an ethical subjectivity involves understanding the rules of formation for discourses associated with (informing and formed by) institutions, beliefs, identities and social practices. I draw from Iris Marion Young’s conception of the self “as the product of an identity it shares with others, of values and wills that are not external and
willed ...but constitutive of the self" (1990, p.228). Employing this theoretical perspective, I develop more detail of counter-colonial logic.

Chapter 4, ‘Regulating Indigenous Research’, represents my attempt to “think through the meaning and consequences of the new devices that have been invented for the government of the self” (Rose, 1999, p.xxvii). In this chapter I provide a historical review of issues that have culminated in a discursive ‘right’ possessed by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to participate in research about their cultures and communities. I begin by discussing how participants in research were originally framed as subjects in bio-medical testing, and how contemporary debates of ethical researcher/participant relationships reflect the original medical codes. I then consider the development of Indigenous subjectivities through international mechanisms such as the United Nations and discourses such as human rights. I show that claims to health as a human right became pivotal in distinguishing ‘difference’ in Australian policy making related to health and health research ethics. The convergence of ethics regulation and recognition of difference is the point where Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ rights to participate in research is legislated through the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC).

Chapter 5, ‘Discursive Ethics’, is a discourse analysis of the NHMRC ethics guidelines for research involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. These ethics guidelines seek to protect the collective interests of Indigenous Australians from research appropriation and harm. No other groups in Australia have their own set of guidelines published by the NHMRC. The regulatory guidelines suggest that the best means for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to protect their intellectual, spiritual and cultural heritage from research harm is to be actively involved in the process of research. My analysis identifies a number of discourses that produce researcher and participant subjectivities. Drawing on these discourses as discursive intersections of power and knowledge, I consider how positions of alterity are established and maintain an ethical imperative for Indigenous participation in research.
Chapter 6, ‘Living the Talk’, returns to the case study in practice. Here I outline the reflexive methodology I developed to consider interpersonal and collective dynamics during the research process (Nicholls, 2009). I suggest that additional political and relational layers of reflexivity are essential to critically evaluate participation by working ‘the spaces between’ through reflection about collaboration. By exploring ‘relationality’ as a methodology, this chapter discusses three layers of reflexivity (self-reflexivity, interpersonal reflexivity and collective reflexivity). This reflexive work entails resisting essentialist positions while also recognising difference within a collective. The result is the ability to see that the Self–Other hyphen both connects and distinguishes between us in processes of collaborative counter-colonial research. Subjectivities are formed by relationality, positionality and alterity; for “the self is indeed a product of social relations in profound and often contradictory ways” (Young, 1990, p.228). Developing an ethical subjectivity is to account for this in evaluating research relationships.

Chapter 7, ‘Everything’s by Word of Mouth’ considers the social practices of gaining and maintaining ‘community consent’ as a part of the process of negotiating counter-colonial research. The title is used as a metaphor to demonstrate how ‘community’ is created discursively and non-discursively through informal and unstable power relations. The reputation of a researcher, and their consequent ability to successfully engage at a community level is reliant on ‘community’ approval through word of mouth rather than a procedural and administrative mandate provided by a university ethics review committee. I begin the chapter by questioning the unproblematic use of the term ‘community’ (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p.17) by unpacking the practical implications of statements such as this:

Mainstream ethics includes social justice, empowerment, fairness, the obligation to do no harm, but for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples ethics requires that protocols should be set by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community. (Shibasaki & Stewart, 2005, p.3)

This chapter shows how ‘being ethical’ equates to following rules and obligations established according to multiple discourses, social and institutional practices, and the effects of power and knowledge within a social field (Foucault, 1980, p.246). I offer various ways of conceptualising how to
work with a ‘community’, including recognising specific Indigenous uses of the
term, and Iris Marion Young’s metaphor of city life (1990, p.237). The process
of understanding research according to those protocols ‘set by the community’
creates complex invited spaces in which it becomes impossible not to meet
with resistance.

Chapter 8, ‘Examine Your Motives’, discusses how participants
construct their own ethical subjectivities as well as those of others (such as
researchers, government officials, non-Indigenous people and other Aboriginal
people). Through this discussion the role of resistance in participation
emerges, for there exists a discursive rule ‘not to speak for others’. It is here I
consider ways of productively engaging with resistance. I also consider the
political context of the research, recognising how fear of unintended
consequences remains a significant challenge in the development of trusting
relationships. Fear of unintended consequences is a substantive element of
how researcher subjectivities are constructed, and how a researcher develops
an ethical subjectivity.

Chapter 9, ‘Trust and Resistance’, concludes my argument. I suggest
that understanding one’s subjectivity as “resultant of the social expectations
targeted upon it, the social duties accorded it, the norms according to which
it is judged” (Rose, 1999, p.222) sheds light on the ethics of social justice that
govern researchers seeking to counter colonialism through participatory
practice. I explain how participatory researchers construct and attach moral
value to their methods by reiterating that it is the composition of
subjectivities in participatory research that gives the approach its moral
authority: the potential for categories of ‘powerless’, ‘oppressed’ and ‘local’
people to be ‘given’ power over those who are ‘outsiders’, ‘privileged’ and
‘powerful’. I restate the dynamism between subjectivities within invited
spaces while constructing knowledge about others and simultaneously being
‘othered’.

My argument shows how social relations between a researcher and
Aboriginal participants can be better understood as a dynamic liminal space
constituted by power relations (Foucault, 1980). Rather than continuing to
argue that reversing the colonising gaze equates to reversing ‘the distribution’
of power (as if it were a commodity), I will show how attending to power relations is a useful means of understanding the complexity of the process:

Participation as praxis is, after all, rarely a seamless process; rather it constitutes a terrain of contestation, in which relations of power between different actors, each with their own ‘projects’, shape and reshape the boundaries of action. (Cornwall, 2008a, p.276)

It is with this recognition of tricky terrain (Smith, 2005) that I now turn to how I came to be sitting under a tree with Ruby and Barb, and I will discuss the details of shifting my subjectivity from researcher to volunteer in the process of having to ‘move over’.
CHAPTER 2    PEOPLES, PLACES & SPACES

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the background details of the case study I use to discuss participation in practice. This will position and re-position myself within a series of ‘invited spaces’ (Cornwall, 2004). My account of fieldwork does not seek to assert a non-Indigenous right to continue placing ‘Others’ under the research microscope: this is not an ethnography of the symbolic or cultural meaning of my actions and those of others (Rose, 2004). Rather, my focus in this chapter is to consider participation as a discourse and social practice, and “relate [it] not to a thought, mind or subject which engendered it, but to the practical field in which it is deployed” (Foucault, 1991b, p.61). Here I will outline the way in which my argument draws from my experience of undertaking participatory research in collaboration with an Aboriginal community-controlled organisation. I will outline the temporal, spatial, institutional and regulatory dimensions of the case study. By using a productive definition of power, I will show how I sought to make the research ethical by altering my subjectivity from ‘researcher’ to ‘volunteer’ to allow for the process and products of the research to be determined by the participants. This change is crucial to understanding how a researcher might have to ‘move over’ and respond to resistance from participants in the many forms it may take.

Participatory research involves working with others, and placing trust in the process of the research being undertaken and completed by a group (a complex combination of subjectivities), as opposed to a single researcher (Hill, 2004). Unlike traditional ethnographies, which are based upon unobtrusive methods, this method demands collective activity over an extended period of time. My research sought to create a series of invited spaces (Cornwall, 2004) in which a group of Aboriginal people could actively participate, not simply agree to be docile subjects of an interview or survey. In order for the action of collaborative design, implementation, evaluation and redesign to be completed, the invited spaces needed to endure. As participants withdrew, new people entered, and the dimensions and contexts of the spaces altered. Spaces overlapped, participants had different reasons for being involved, and relations amongst the participants were as dynamic as
my own negotiations as an outsider seeking to develop trust. The research process was therefore a fluid, unstable and complex experience.

What follows is my attempt to ‘make sense’ of this experience. In seeking to consider reflexively what I have learnt about counter-colonial participation, I acknowledge that predominantly this account is only one voice, and other perspectives might consider it inaccurate. The way I would like this story to be considered is not as a damning singular truth, but as an account of memories and emotions, of bewilderment peppered with my disappointment at my own unmet expectations. But these reflections are also countered with accounts of inclusion, care, and generosity. Eventually, I came to recognise that it is the uncertainties within participatory processes which produce interesting and meaningful data. As I will explain in the next chapter, my theoretical work in this thesis is to understand my own ethics (Foucault, 1994a) in relation to the participants in the research and the knowledge that our collaboration produced.

This chapter introduces the places, spaces and people of the case study. In this capacity, I need to distinguish between concepts of ‘place’ and ‘space’: ‘place’ is a stable, “proper and distinct location” (de Certeau, 1984, p.117) that delineates “relationships of coexistence” (de Certeau, 1984, p.117); while ‘space’ is “a practiced place” (de Certeau, 1984, p.117)—it is about power and knowledge. Both ‘place’ and ‘space’ delimit the field, the case study.

First I will discuss my position at the outset of this research process: this enables an understanding of how I came to do research with an Aboriginal community group in a particular place, and how we then came to collaborate within a series of participatory research spaces. Second I will introduce both ‘place’ (maps, signs signifying borders, names of ‘places’), and ‘space’: historical events that shape people’s understanding of land and others, contestations about reclaiming and naming territory, how words on a sign inscribe social relations within space by recognising or denying Indigenous custodianship. ‘Space’ reflects the vocabulary of colonialism: mapping, drawing lines, creating ‘order’ (Foucault, 1966), for “one of the concepts through which Western ideas about the individual and community, about time
and place, knowledge and research, imperialism and colonialism can be drawn together is the concept of distance” (Smith, 1999, p.53). Metaphors of ‘space’ are therefore relevant to evaluating participatory practices (Cornwall, 2004), particularly in the context of decolonisation.

Following this I will discuss the institutional structures (both from the community and from the university) that shaped the dynamics of participatory research spaces. I consider the bureaucratic and institutional technologies that mediate the terms of participation; those that allow, limit and regulate who can participate and who cannot. The purpose of this narrative is to provide the details of a case study of participation: to show how participation is a volatile social space encompassing multiple power relations and resistance. Finally I will explain how these collaborative spaces operated as a series of events. I will give detail of the methodology, the dynamics of the collaboration, and the outcomes of collaborative activity.

**Constructing research inquiry & negotiating relationships**

The location of this case study unfolded through a series of contingencies: my research interests at the outset (which were framed by issues of social justice); my methodological focus on partnership with Aboriginal people; and a chance meeting. The place in which this case study occurred was ‘organic’ rather than pre-determined—I did not set out to study a specific location. Rather, I intended to do research in partnership with Aboriginal people who were willing to work with me. In this way, the construction of subjectivities was intended (Aboriginal community members would steer the research) in order to achieve my interests in social justice. At the heart of my beliefs was a supposition that participatory research would result in social justice outcomes—to challenge stereotypes in research literature premised upon non-Indigenous knowledge. I ardently believed that if Aboriginal participants controlled the process, the research could counter the colonial gaze.

Therefore, although I had penned a research proposal about a particular topic (Aboriginal women and girls’ resilience to criminalisation), my primary focus was how I would undertake the research. I was particularly inspired by the idea of decolonising the methodology (Smith, 1999). Within the first six weeks of my candidature, I had met Ruby at a community crime—
prevention grant workshop in Western Sydney. Here’s her retrospective account of our first meeting and our subsequent research partnership:

Ruby: [A.] and I went to the crime-prevention workshop for a submission and we met Ruth there. And Ruth was just startin’ out with her Ph.D. and she wanted to do research with Indigenous communities. So we had a chat to Ruth and then she came out to [us], and we said, ‘oh well, we could work with you on that’. And Ruth’s theory, well, how I see Ruth’s theory is, the research is about us telling her what we want, and us telling her how we want to be portrayed in her research, and to the point where we’re even allowed to look over the drafts and take things out if we’re not happy with it. So that’s what we do. And Ruth’ll come in and we’ll discuss some of the things we’ve talked about in interviews and things like that. So that’s how we got the community report. (7 August 2008)

My focus on inclusion, transparency, representation and self-determination in the research process is reflected in Ruby’s description of our partnership. I will provide detail of the process later in this chapter. But I should also explain why I wanted to create a research collaboration that would enable young Aboriginal women to challenge stereotypes about their strengths and resilience. How did it come to pass that I met Ruby and her colleague at a community crime-prevention workshop?

My research background prior to beginning my doctoral studies was the social determinants of Aboriginal health, particularly focusing on harm-minimisation approaches for communities to take action countering alcohol misuse (Brady, Nicholls, Henderson & Byrne, 2006), and research for a historical analysis challenging stereotypes about Indigenous use of alcohol (Brady, 2008). Under the social determinants paradigm, social factors such as racism, history, poverty, gender, employment and education directly affect health status (Wilkinson, 2005). An evidence base of social determinants enables health promotion policies and community development activities to complement primary health-care interventions (I will discuss the status of Indigenous health in Chapter 3, and the social determinants of health in more detail in Chapter 4). One of the social determinants I wanted to consider in my
doct oral work was criminalisation of young Aboriginal women, and ways to
challenge racial and gendered ‘pathologies’ of crime (Carrington, 1990).

At the time I penned my research proposal, Aboriginal people of all
durges and in all jurisdictions were over-represented in the Australian criminal
justice system. This had been well documented since the issue of Aboriginal
deaths in custody came to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s (Carrington, 1991;
Cunneen, 1992; Cunneen & McDonald, 1997; Harding, Broadhurst, Ferrante &
Loh, 1995). Statistics specific to New South Wales illustrated the gravity of the
issue:

In the five years between 1997 and 2001, nearly 7% of the
Indigenous population in NSW received a prison sentence.
Their rate of imprisonment in 2001 was 16 times higher than
that for the population as a whole. The rate of imprisonment
was even higher than this for young Indigenous males. In 2001
more than 1 in 10 Indigenous males received a prison
sentence. The figures for Indigenous women were lower but
still very high—about 1 in 62 Indigenous females in the age
group 20-24 were imprisoned in 2001. (Weatherburn, Lind &
Hua, 2003, p.9)

The findings of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
attributed the high numbers of Aboriginal deaths in custody to the
disproportionately high numbers of Indigenous Australians being incarcerated
(Cowlischaw, 1990, p.103). In response, government policy turned to consider
prevention strategies to incarceration, incorporating not simply changes to
police surveillance and discretion, but also the responsibilities of Aboriginal
people to develop within themselves protective social factors of ‘resilience to
offending’ within a discourse of ‘community crime-prevention’ (a neo-liberal
approach to policing social institutions of family and community that Garland
(1997, p.179) might consider a form of ‘governmentality’).

Predominantly, research about the resilience of Indigenous individuals
and communities drew from socio-medical models to determine
‘developmental pathways’ to potential offending, with a view to developing
‘early interventions’ for Aboriginal youth (Homel, Lincoln & Herd, 1999). Risk
factors for resilience included forced removal from family, ‘welfare
dependence’, institutionalised racism, alcohol use and cultural factors (such
as congregating in open spaces). Protective factors included ‘cultural
resilience’, personal controls and family controls. This research concluded that ethnographic and other qualitative methods were needed to explore cultural, historical and local differences (Homel et al., 1999, p.184). Other studies used structured surveys of Aboriginal students undertaking tertiary studies (certainly not a ‘high risk’ cohort) to understand resistance to crime by asking questions about resistance to drugs and alcohol (Samuelson & Robertson, 2002). Concurrently, a social–ecology model (Zubrick & Robson, 2003) argued for a ‘developmental research agenda’—by analysing ‘distal exposures’ (such as socio-economic inequality, market deregulation and mobility) in comparison to ‘proximal exposures’ (biological dysmaturation, poor-quality parenting, family conflict and violence, drug and alcohol abuse and eroding social capital) (Zubrick & Robson, 2003, p.6). Again, these findings called for empirical qualitative data about cultural perspectives of risk and protective factors (Zubrick & Robson, 2003, p.7).

I was concerned by the underlying assumptions of this literature in light of Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (1999) Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. In criminological literature, Aboriginal families were either “viewed as sites of physical and moral danger” (Haebich, 2000, p.13) or they were given (along with ‘community’ and ‘school’) a responsibility to become a site of intervention for policing children and young people. The rhetoric of community-based early intervention was to ‘break the pathways leading to crime’ (National Crime Prevention, 1999:ix). Research measuring categorisations of ‘protective’ and ‘risk’ behaviours was entrenching subjectivities of ‘problematic’ peoples and their cultures.

I wanted to move my research towards a form of advocacy that would challenge pathologising stereotypes of criminalisation. My research interest was to undertake qualitative research in partnership with an Aboriginal community group to create a case study of young Aboriginal women’s perspectives. My methodological inclination was to employ an appreciative approach in order to avoid pathologising young people, their families and their community, and their culture (Bishop, 2005, p.110). As most criminological research about Aboriginal youth was dominated by a deficits-based vocabulary, I wanted to focus on the strengths of the research participants, using the logic of appreciative research. The rationale of appreciative
research suggests focusing on 'problems' only generates more information about problems; but if inquiry focuses on positives, research results can begin to find answers to problems (Ludema, Cooperrider & Barrett, 2006; Zandee & Cooperrider, 2008). By using "vocabularies of hope" (Grant & Humphries, 2006, p.413), I anticipated some of the negative associations Aboriginal people had about participating in research could be addressed (Brough, Bond & Hunt, 2004; Murphy, Kordyl & Thorne, 2004).

The term ‘appreciative research’ has different meanings across disciplines: Ludema et al. (2006) take the term appreciative to mean focused on strengths. However, criminologists such as Jupp (2006) and Katz (2002) take appreciative to mean that the methodology is informed by hermeneutics and ethnography; that it will study the social world from the perspectives of the research participants. The aim is “to describe, understand and appreciate the social meanings and interpretations which categories of individuals attribute to events, contexts and others’ actions” (Jupp, 2006, p.17). My use of the term was to incorporate both of these meanings: to focus on the perspectives of young Aboriginal people, and defer from focusing on negative stereotypes. Part of this logic was to counter the assumptions implicit within my own gaze by involving community workers in the design and analysis of the research.

Ruby: Ruth and [the community organisation] put in for the submission ... 
And we wanted to portray it in a good perspective, not in a negative one. So we got to design it and pick what we wanted in it and things like that. (7 August 2008)

I met Ruby and her colleague at a community crime-prevention meeting in Western Sydney in October 2005. She represented one of three Aboriginal organisations at the meeting. After I explained my presence at the meeting, she and her colleague invited me to come and visit their office in a place called Richmond, a historic town on the north-west fringe of Sydney. We discussed their grant submission for community crime-prevention funding over a cup of tea. I did not approach this ‘place’ on the basis that I had any evidence to suggest that it was problematic (in terms of criminological indicators such as statistics). Rather, this place became the focus of my
research because Ruby and her colleague allowed me to come in. As I will discuss, this was the first ‘invited space’ (Cornwall, 2004) of our collaboration.

**White picket fences & a river called Deerubbin**

The Boorooberringal People of the Darug Nation are the traditional owners of Richmond. Dotted with colonial sandstone houses, its central feature is a large cricket pitch demarcated by a white picket fence. Known as a ‘Macquarie town’, Richmond was established close to the Hawkesbury River to function as the food bowl of the colony in its nascent stages: its heritage is primarily associated with the formative years of colonial agriculture. But the sparkling river surrounded by lush crops was not always called the Hawkesbury. Darug people also gathered their food from the river and its banks, though they knew it as ‘Deerubbin’. This place, defined by a river, and the complexity of contemporary claims to ownership, provides the context for my case study.

My case study of counter-colonial participation is a ‘situated practice’. As such I seek to acknowledge the productive aspects of power as it converges between and amongst people, institutions and social spaces (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p.17). Moreover, my theoretical commitment to the local site of practices and institutions is drawn from Iris Marion Young’s assertion that “to be useful in evaluating actual institutions and practices …[it] must contain some substantive premises …from the actual social context in which the theorising takes place” (1990, p.4). This stance reflects recent theorising on the importance of grounding theory in the local as a means of ‘decentering’ the research process (Narayan & Harding, 2000):

[T]aking the land seriously has implications for social science knowledge … this applies to theorists as well as to fact-grubbing empirical researchers. I want to suggest a new meaning for the term ‘grounded theory’: linking theory to the ground on which the theorists’ boots are planted … To this way of thinking, the local is the only site of knowledge or the only legitimate site of politics … This suggests an argument against pure general theory, in favour of what we might call dirty theory—that is, theorising that is mixed up with specific situations. The goal of dirty theory is not to subsume, but to clarify; not to classify from the outside, but to illuminate the situation in its concreteness. (Connell, 2007, p.207)
Contestation about names, multiple histories attributed to place, acts of claiming and reclaiming are all examples of the way counter-colonial knowledge and power rumble and grind in the realms of the grounded and local. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999, p.157) writes about the importance of naming and renaming the landscape in the process of decolonisation, drawing from Paulo Freire’s saying ‘name the word, name the world’. Engaging with the local, grounding and embedding the research within a site of historical complexity and subtlety, is to be “sensitive to the effects of prior processes which are themselves shaped by forces that did not originate within that space” (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p.17).

Below are maps illustrating ‘Country’ in the Sydney region. ‘Country’ refers to the land, waters and natural resources within Aboriginal spiritual domains, and operates politically as a ‘nation’ (Dodson, 2009). The maps also show that renaming and reclaiming does not occur without contestation. According to Elder Uncle Greg Sims, maps which ambiguously distinguish between Eora and Darug (see Figure 1) are incorrect: “Eora means of the first people to walk out of the rainbow, they are the rainbow people. The Eora is the Cadigal clan of the Darug nation which is in Sydney Cove; that’s where my great grandmother was born” (Personal Communication, 2 November 2007). From his perspective, Eora is a Darug ‘coastal dialect’ (Hinkson & Harris, 2001, p.xxi). The ‘Eora’ reveal one example of the political complexity of embedding research in connection to land, place and Indigenous knowledges. Decolonising research is not a simple or straightforward process.

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7 Note the way Figure 1 represents Eora and Darug with the same key.
During the onset of colonisation in 1788 there were estimated to be some 250 Indigenous nations, and within each of these groups were clans with distinct dialects reflecting the heterogeneity of cultures (Arthur & Morphy, 2005, p.78). The clans exemplify a local relationship to Country; that is, a political and spiritual relationship to a specific place and a responsibility to care for, and a right to access, the resources within that place. The contemporary system of local governance (the Hawkesbury Local Government Area [LGA]) incorporates Boorooborongal, Kurrajong and Colo clans within its borders. These groups are located the north-west of Sydney, the top left of Figure 2 (as indicated by the arrow). These maps are reminders that there are many social and political systems that ground knowledge to a place, that
linking theory to the local means incorporating temporal and spatial complexities (Cornwall, 2004).

Figure 2  Map of Aboriginal clans of Sydney

A member of the ‘first fleet’, Watkin Tench, realised the multiplicity of dialects in Darug Country upon meeting a Booroobongal man called Yarramundi during one of his expeditions along the Hawkesbury River in 1791. Tench stated, “our natives and the strangers conversed on a par and understood each other perfectly, yet they spoke different dialects of the same language” (Flannery, 1996, p.194). Watkin Tench refers to Yarramundi as ‘Yellowmundee’ (Flannery, 1996, p.193), and the difference in written naming remains evident today. There is a reserve named after Yarramundi at the point where the Hawkesbury River becomes the Nepean River (Figure 3). Nearby, on
the road towards the Blue Mountains, there is a Regional Park called Yellomundee (Figure 4), a space in which caring for Country continues through bush regeneration and community development activities coordinated by the Yellomundee Regional Park Aboriginal Bush Care Group and the community organisation involved in this research.

**Figure 3** Nature reserves in the local area reflect the heritage of Booroobergongal ancestors such as Yarramundi

**Figure 4** Variations in spelling show the complexity and contestation in renaming ‘place’
While Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples identify as a group on the basis of a collective experience of colonisation, their experiences are also specific to place (exemplifying the many different nations, languages, cultures) and specific to history (initial contact between the colonial administration and Aboriginal nations varied). Ownership and control over the land was a high priority of the nascent administration because of the Hawkesbury’s role in developing agriculture. Contact between the Darug and farming settlers was violent as both sides struggled to survive. From as early as 1795 there are colonial accounts of Boorooborangal people being denied access to yams growing in the alluvial soil of their Country; of torture and death as punishment for ‘stealing’ the failing corn crops of the settlers, and of massacre under the auspices of the colonial administration (Murray & White, 1988, pp.117–127). There is evidence of punitive expeditions in the early 1800s killing “not less than 400 blacks in the Hawkesbury Valley” (Brook, 1999, p.14). Darug people fought against the invasion of their land in the face of the devastating impact of introduced disease such as smallpox, which spread rapidly and resulted in high mortality rates (Brook, 1999, p.8; Butlin, 1983).

The colonial administration had an inconsistent policy approach to Aboriginal people, oscillating between states of war and benevolence. Eventually, Governor Macquarie settled upon the idea to institutionalise (civilise, educate, normalise, assimilate) young Aboriginal people at the Native Institution, which was established at Parramatta in 1815 (Hinkson & Harris, 2001, p.157). In 1823 the Native Institution at ‘the Black town’ replaced the Parramatta facility (Brook & Kohen, 1991; Hinkson & Harris, 2001, p.142). Nearby, Yarramundi’s daughter Maria Lock lived to the age of 70 on the land granted by Macquarie to her relatives Colebee and Narragingy (Hinkson & Harris, 2001, p.158). As a Boorooborangal woman, Maria and her family lived on the first land grant made to Aboriginal people by the British administration, until the Aborigines Protection Board rescinded the claim in 1919 (Hinkson & Harris, 2001, p.158).

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8 Darug is also the word for ‘yam’ (Kohen, 2006, p.19), observed by Tench to be a staple of the traditional custodians (Flannery, 1996, p.193).
9 The Battle of Richmond Hill, 1795.
10 Blacktown LGA (originally given this name because it was an official settlement for Aboriginal people) continues to have one of the highest population densities of Aboriginal people in Sydney (ABS, 2007, pp.27-28).
The introduction of the Aborigines Protection Act in 1919 forcibly removed many Darug and Gundungurra families from their Country to centralised reserves at locations such as La Perouse, Katoomba and the South Coast (Johnson, 2006). Boorooborongal people had established camps during the 1840s in-between Windsor and Riverstone, at North Richmond, and a mission was built at Sackville Reach (existing from 1889 until 1946) (Brook, 1999, p.15). The policy approach toward relocating families depended on inter-marriage and fairness in skin colour (Wood, 1998). Some families remained in the area by obfuscating their Aboriginal heritage from the authorities (Tobin, 1999).

Contrary to popular imaginings of Indigenous Australia, New South Wales is home to the greatest proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as a percentage of the total Indigenous population of Australia (ABS, 2007, p.18). Sydney has the greatest percentage of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples living in one ‘Indigenous region’ (9.2 per cent of Australians who identify as Indigenous live in Sydney according to the 2006 census) (ABS, 2007, p.21). In the most recent census 1,162 people in the Hawkesbury identified as Indigenous (ABS, 2007, p.28). While this proportion as a percentage of Sydney’s total population (1.9 per cent) seems low, the proximity of the community to Blacktown, Riverstone, and Mt Drpirit should not be disregarded—suburbs of Blacktown have proportions ranging from 7.5–11 per cent of the total Indigenous population of Sydney (ABS, 2007, p.28). Moreover, Aboriginal community workers assert there are many more people who could identify themselves as Aboriginal, but choose not to.

Pearl: If our community wasn’t married, already out there, then everyone went down to La Perouse and somewhere else, I’m not sure. But some of my family ended up down at La Perouse, and some of my family were married so they stayed in the area. And I read a passage the other day, and it was about the blanket distribution here in Windsor, and fairer Aboriginal people weren’t eligible for them blankets, only the really dark people were eligible. And I’ve

11 Because the Northern Territory has the largest proportion of Indigenous people (as a percentage compared with the non-Indigenous population within its borders) (ABS, 2007, p.18) it represents a cultural frontier between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia (Kowal, 2006a). In fact, only 12.9 per cent of Australian Indigenous peoples live in the Northern Territory (ABS, 2007, p.18).
often said to you about that stuff in the community about being fair skinned and different skin colour, and I think that’s all come from all that. Colonisation has just distorted everything. And a lot of people died as well, from disease, and then we had the massacre up at Richmond Hill fighting for the food, so there’s been a lot of stuff that’s happened here. A lot of stuff. And I know it happens all the time in a lot of different communities, but there’s quite a number of kids that don’t recognise they’re Aboriginal at some of the schools but everyone knows they are. (18 September 2007)

Hence, self-identification is not the only precursor to inclusion within a ‘community’. To add to the complexity, not all Indigenous Australians living in Greater Western Sydney are traditional custodians of Darug Country. They may trace their ancestral lineage from other parts of NSW or interstate, reflecting the mobility patterns of Aboriginal people to urban centres for the purposes of seeking work or education (particularly since citizenship rights commenced in 1967) (Morgan, 2006; Taylor, 2006, p.3). In this case study, participants represent Gundungarra, Kamilaroi, Wrandjuri and Bundjalung nations as well as Darug. As such, connecting research to the local draws out the complexities of social practices and politics, rather than essentialising place and Country.

Aboriginal culture in the Hawkesbury has continued throughout the ongoing years of colonisation, though hidden at times by the threat of assimilation policies and popular misconceptions that skin colour is a primary determinant of cultural identity. Community development programs and cultural events support the identity of the traditional owners as well as Aboriginal people from other nations. An annual family concert is held to celebrate NAIDOC week, with Darug singers and artists on centre stage. Welcome to Country is given in language, and young people are learning language from their Elders. The Aboriginal community organisation involved in this thesis was established to raise the profile of, and provide a voice for, the Aboriginal community in the Hawkesbury. Although neighbouring areas (such as the Blue Mountains) explicitly recognise Aboriginal heritage, the Hawkesbury remains a place defined by its role as ‘the bread basket’ of Australia’s first colonial settlement. On the border between the Hawkesbury Shire and the City of the Blue Mountains, Aboriginal custodianship is signposted (Figure 5).
In contrast, the Hawkesbury sign has a white picket fence, representing White ownership and control over natural resources (Figure 6).

Figure 6  The white picket fence reinscribes colonial claims to the land and waters of the Hawkesbury
This introduction to the place and spaces of the research case study highlights the complexity and contestations inherent producing knowledge grounded as in ‘dirty theory’ (Connell, 2007). From this brief account of the place in which we were located, we see that the social dynamics of relationship to Country (being Darug or not) immediately indicate relations of power within the composition of collaboration. Moreover, the contemporary application of symbols such as the white picket fence serve to reinscribe colonial ownership and control over a place comprising many diverse Indigenous cultures and people. There is no simple group of ‘Aboriginal people’ within this research, but an array of perspectives and experiences that contributed to the dynamism and fluidity of the research process.

**Institutions & regulations**

The next important consideration for this story of participatory research is an account of the institutions and regulations which shaped the process of creating and maintaining ‘invited spaces’. There are several forms of institution to consider here. There are university rules and regulations associated with governance structures, such as ethics review committees, accountability to the National Health and Medical Research Council, higher degree research rules for panel review of proposals, postgraduate student funding and candidature time lines. Publishing, presenting and authoring research are of this institutional context, as is creating a distinction between ‘the field’ (where information is collected), and the institutional spaces where theorising, writing, and research are carried out.

The field also has its own institutions and regulations: community identities such as Elders and Traditional Owners, community governance structures such as management committees, reference and consultation groups, and social roles such as ‘parent’, ‘youth’, ‘worker’, ‘community member’. All of these operate within a nexus of grant monies and project acquittals, interaction with local and regional government agencies, and a busy one-room office space, housing several Aboriginal community workers at a time.

My research required approval from the University of Western Sydney Human Ethics Committee, and had to meet the principles outlined in both The
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (NHMRC, 1999) and Values and Ethics: Guidelines for Ethical Conduct in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research (NHMRC, 2003). Obtaining ethical approval from the University required that I provide evidence of community involvement in the development of the research proposal and of the ways in which community members would be involved in the research. I had begun negotiations with the community organisation in October 2005, and the project manager provided written confirmation of our agreement on 17 May 2006 to support my research proposal and ethics application. The University ethics committee granted me approval in October 2006 [HREC 06/119] to begin the research ‘proper’. Hence, I had been negotiating the terms of community participation in the research with the organisation for a year before I was institutionally cleared to commence research activities.

The issue of when ‘participation’ in participatory research technically begins is not often discussed in critiques of ethical guidelines. But it is a challenge and a grey area of ethical regulation of the research—for while the researcher is in the process of negotiating design and ethics processes they are not institutionally considered to be undertaking research per se. Some participatory action research practitioners have discussed the incommensurability of the procedural account of research practice as envisioned in ethics governance, compared to the reality of community-based practice (Boser, 2006; Grant, Nelson & Mitchell, 2008). However, there is scant detailed discussion about this issue documented in the Australian literature regarding participatory research involving Indigenous peoples, particularly given the NHMRC requirements for evidence of consultation and negotiation in ethics applications. This ethical/legal grey area warrants further consideration as a technical and legal issue. What is relevant to my argument is the creation of a regulatory ‘grey space’ in which a researcher can only claim to be ethical by referring to participatory processes.

A consistent element of negotiations with the community association was that I would acknowledge the organisation and recognise the intellectual contributions of the workers to the development of the project. On these terms it was important to ensure communication and research business was inclusive and transparent. My involvement with organisation was minuted at
community management committee meetings from November 2005 to November 2008. In January 2006 I gained verbal approval from the community management committee to undertake research in partnership after making a short presentation of my research intentions. During this meeting it was established that I would ensure that feedback from our research would be provided to the community through the management committee. Thus my behaviour was also regulated by rules of incorporation for governing a community association.

Every year a new management committee is elected at the Annual General Meeting. Through volunteering, I maintained connections with the committee members, and our activities were regularly reported in Annual Reports (2006, 2007, 2008). Often guidelines suggest researchers broker a written agreement with community representation. I would argue, however, that attention must also be paid to informal contact with community members as a way of maintaining agreements and collective consent for research projects. With every new committee member, I needed to renew negotiations in order to maintain the agreement discursively. Relying on a written agreement may provide a legal basis for continuing research activities, but it will not generate trust. Rather, it might erode the reputation of the researcher and associated project.

In terms of university governance, the University required that I notify their ethics committee chair of any further changes to the research methods (personal communication, 10 October 2006). A researcher is required to report, justify and ask for institutional approval to exercise those changes. The first of these changes I reported was in November 2006 (only a month after receiving initial approval) due to unanticipated changes to community workers involved, and a new collaborative recruiting strategy for involving young people in the project. Once the research had begun in earnest, it was evident that the project needed to be fluid and adaptable to new information and networks. For example the community workers requested that the local youth interagency (principally incorporating youth workers, council and other community agencies), as well as the local ‘technical and further education’ (TAFE) college become involved. Following this, I again modified the research protocol to acquire approval to undertake the evaluation interviews.
(September 2007). The result of this constant need for adjustment, and the requirement for me to ask permission to associate the research with community-determined changes filled me with anxiety. I felt I was walking a fine line between meeting the legal requirements of fieldwork and being ethically responsive to the community-based development of the research design.

I have published a minor account of the contrast between institutional and community expectations of research procedures in the *Journal of Metropolitan Universities and Community Engagement* (Darcy, Nicholls, Roffey & Rogers, 2008). As an example of my concerns, I discuss the perceived formality of signed consent forms from the community perspective. While I was institutionally required to focus on developing an administrative accountability of fieldwork by drafting and negotiating written consent, the participants expressed their discomfort with bureaucratic forms requiring signatures and contractual agreement. The drafting of the consent forms (for both the parents/guardians and the young people) highlighted a time of disconnection, as I had to differentiate my role in the project as a researcher seeking to extract data legally from the process. This eroded the collaborative ‘feel’ of the project and showed how institutional protocols designed to ‘protect’ participants can actually be perceived as threatening. I was required to state that the data would be stored ‘securely’ on campus and ‘destroyed’ five years after the research has been completed. My moral goal of using participation to support and encourage community ownership and control of data diminished with every form I handed out. My institutional ethics requirements reinscribed a colonising gaze.

I did not set out to follow neatly a pattern of participatory action research method. My interpretation of the ethical guidelines (NHMRC, 2003), focused on:

- processes and protocols of consultation
- consent (ongoing, not simply at the outset)
- negotiation (ongoing, not simply at the outset)
- involvement and inclusion
- community Benefit
ownership and publication of materials
exploitation of Indigenous knowledge as a potential ‘harm’.

I soon recognised that my interpretation of *Values and Ethics: Guidelines for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research* (NHMRC, 2003) had resulted in a methodology of community-based participatory research. In seeking to engage with a social justice imperative for research, the ethical weight of participatory outcomes became central. While I was aware of the differing views within the ‘family’ of participatory methodologies (Freirian Action Research, Community-based Participatory Research, Rural-Appraisal, Collaborative Inquiry, and so on) (Reason & Bradbury, 2008, p.7), their methodological similarities were the best connection I could make with the ethics guidelines.

My connection between ethics and methods drew me to focus on an applied issue or problem (a practical problem which may be distinct from the idea of a research problem) determined by the participants at a local level. As a collaboration, we would develop an activity to address the issue, implement the activity, and then evaluate our actions. The evaluation would then determine which future actions might be taken to address the issue further on a grander scale through funding opportunities. On these terms I wanted the project to produce various types of knowledge including experiential, fusing with theoretical to generate social transformation, often referred to as the ‘action turn’ (Chiu, 2006, p.190). I emphasised inclusion throughout all stages of the research in an effort to make the power dynamics of the research process as transparent as possible.

While I felt this approach responded to the values in the guidelines, it was difficult to understand clearly where I stood in the process. I was aware that I was a catalyst for introducing research activities within the community development focus of the organisation; however I needed to work out how I would meet the requirements of a doctoral dissertation—was ‘solving’ problems of structural oppression possible within 3-4 years? I realised that the ethics guidelines and the counter-colonial literature (Smith, 1999) represented a contra discourse to the managerialism of candidature timelines and funding, in addition to systems of ownership/copyright attributed to the material
presented in the thesis. As Zolner highlights: "The way that dissertations are thought of at the university negates some of the fundamental tenets of collaborative, community-based research. If this was a collaborative project, then how could I be the single author of the final dissertation?" (2003, p.105). The moral obligation I had established towards the research topic was placed in opposition to the institutional structures that facilitated my candidature. I was vexed.

Over the course of the project it became clearer that it was not my prerogative to emancipate others and make vast claims about the transformative outcomes of the research. Instead, I needed to alter my view to consider whether "the process of participatory action research can in itself become a space in which dominant discourses are challenged and framed" (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008, p.176). I began to think that the implicit assumption that ‘participation’ equated to ‘ethical’ research (and ‘resistance’ equated to ‘unethical’ research) needed to be challenged. It was through the process of evaluating the experience of research that I came to this position.

Temporal dimensions of fieldwork

The development of a participatory project is not linear; it is messy, emotionally murky at times and requires constant adjustment of expectations. It demands from a collective group an intuitive and intellectual stamina. This section of the case study delineates the morphology of the project over time, and demonstrates not only the flexibility of participants in this dynamic environment, but the parallel endurance required. I have provided this narrative account to give context to the themes considered in the latter section of this thesis, and to the constantly changing relationships amongst and between participants and myself. This account shows that ‘trust’ is a process that needs to be constantly attended to, particularly in the face of resistance.

To frame my narrative account I have summarised significant events throughout the period of my fieldwork highlighting the process of consultation, negotiation, community control and involvement. Over a period of three years, negotiation and renegotiation was ongoing. During this time period, many of the community stakeholders involved in the project changed (some
left, some joined, and some adopted new roles within the invited space of the research). Following the table I provide more detail of the process. I have used ‘spaces’ as a descriptor to cross-reference with the table and assist in clarifying sequences of events. This also shows how complex the research process has been as participatory activities overlap and intermingle.

Table 1  Temporal dimensions of the case study in relation to ‘invited spaces’ of participatory research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>I commence Ph.D. candidature. I have no community contacts in Western Sydney, but have a proposal (and a counter-colonial moral commitment) to undertake work with the ‘local Aboriginal community’.</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>I meet the Aboriginal community organisation project manager and administration worker at a community crime-prevention meeting held in Western Sydney.</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>The Aboriginal community organisation submits a proposal to the Attorney General’s community crime-prevention grant round. I am included as an evaluator of the project.</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005–</td>
<td>Informal meetings at the organisation, developing trust, consulting on ideas to develop for the future while we wait on the outcome of the funding. Meanwhile I have to submit my full proposal for confirmation of Ph.D. candidature and ethics approval. I volunteer for Sorry Day and for the local NAIDOC committee.</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2006</td>
<td>We are not successful in the crime-prevention grant application. The project manager leaves unexpectedly. My initial ethics application receives approval.</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2006</td>
<td>A smaller project is developed, and a grant won to fund activities. A new management committee is elected. New staff join the community organisation and I need to work to develop trust. I resubmit my ethics application according to the new project design.</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>Gatekeepers crucial to youth recruitment in the project indicate their wish to have won the grant money. Difficulty engaging gatekeepers to encourage youth participation. Trust not adequately developed with all members of the team and resistance occurs in respect to distributing and collecting consent forms and encouraging participation through stakeholder liaison. Hip-hop in the Hawkesbury workshops are facilitated by a high-profile Aboriginal hip-hop artist. Youth participation in the workshops is lower than anticipated (contrary to youth consultation during the design phase that indicated this activity would interest youth in participating). The project did not provide transport to the workshops, although the workshops were held at community neighbourhood centres. Torrential rain results in minor flooding on the day of the final workshop—unless participants have parent with a car to drive them they are unable to attend.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2007–August 2007</td>
<td>I volunteer for Sorry Day, and provide administrative assistance to the NAIDOC committee (regular ongoing volunteering approximately 2 days per week). Trust begins to develop, although staff changes continue. As the results of the hip-hop workshops are not as expected I have to change tack in order to meet my Ph.D. requirements. I consider a reflexive evaluation of the process will contribute to decolonisation and ethics literature. Discuss this shift in research focus with community workers at the organisation. There is relief for everyone that my Ph.D. timeline no longer places pressure on the collaboration to achieve outputs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>I am invited to undertake interviews with community workers and committee members about ‘the ethics of research’ from a community perspective. I submit another modification to my ethics application.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>We travel interstate to present collaboratively at a National Ethics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>I volunteer for Annual General Meeting. A new management committee is elected.</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Community workers reignite action research process. I provide training in interview techniques, the workers develop semi-structured interview schedules and record interviews. The research is owned and controlled by the community group. Volunteering for NAIDOC committee and Sorry Day maintains my contact with the group on a regular basis.</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>I transcribe interviews and facilitate workshops in group data analysis. We use group idea building, mind maps and colourful text collages. Youth participants in the project provide artwork for the community report.</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>Draft community report presented to youth focus group for evaluation.</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>Community report, postcard and badge printed and ready for distribution during NAIDOC week.</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2008</td>
<td>Finalise interview excerpts to be used in the thesis. Discuss context of use with participants for construct validity.</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>Provide formal feedback and present a community report of research findings to the community management committee.</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**A first invited space**

I begin my account of the first invited space with my visit to Ruby and her colleague at their office in Richmond to further a grant application to the Attorney General’s Office for a community crime-prevention initiative. The project design was an ambitious three to five year community crime-prevention intervention. It was to involve multiple Aboriginal community organisations (the other associated groups represented ‘Aboriginal families’ and ‘Aboriginal women’ specifically). The goal of the work was to produce
evaluated outcomes of social crime-prevention and community awareness of youth issues. While the community development workers were to undertake a number of preventative social interventions (in the form of youth-centred community development initiatives focusing on self-esteem and self-expression), my role as a researcher would be to evaluate and provide analysis for the outcome assessment of the project. This project was designed quickly (within a matter of a few days) in response to the deadline of that grant round. My role was an auxiliary position to a community development project (as opposed to a project devoted purely to participatory action research).

While we waited for the outcome of the grant we continued to meet informally to develop trust and discuss ideas without a deadline of a formal project (from the community organisation’s perspective). One of the most important pieces of feedback I received was that I was prepared to listen and discuss ideas and negotiate, rather than impose a predetermined research project on the collaboration. This meant that over time, the details of the project, the research questions and the expectations of the project changed, and everyone in the collaboration demonstrated flexibility. As a fledgling researcher this time was full of uncertainty—I had to present a detailed proposal to a university panel to confirm my candidature and I needed to acquire ethics approval to undertake the work involving young people. Knowing that the ethics process could take time, I needed to determine details of methods, including unintended consequences and potential harm. This was a challenging task given the indeterminacy of the project and the need for funding to implement community development activities in addition to gathering information.

The terms of negotiation and consultation in the participatory process altered my initial focus on the perspectives of Aboriginal women’s resilience to criminalisation. The community workers determined that their community development project was not to exclude young men—because they were committed to the idea that men and boys were to be involved in creating solutions to problems. My primary methodological interest was to ensure that my Eurocentric gaze did not colonise the research; I was particularly aware of the criticisms made of non-Indigenous women’s feminisms over-riding the complexity of inequality in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women’s lives.
(Moreton-Robinson, 2000). This shift in my research focus is an example of how my commitment to counter-colonialism meant that I did not treat gender as a fixed platform of difference. Rather, I sought to acknowledge that differences within and between groups in communities (Cornwall, 1999, p.50) exist, which challenge non-Indigenous constructions of gendered subjectivities.

The plans within the first collaborative space fell through after a year of collaborative meetings. The project manager unexpectedly left the organisation, and we did not win the grant. The next few months involved a dramatic overhaul of key staff, and a sense of confusion about whether I should continue to press for research collaboration during a time of intense organisational change. This factor, combined with the reality that we had no funding, created concerns that the time spent developing trust, discussing research ideas, approaches and ethics had been wasted. Despite these doubts the acting project manager was prepared to continue working together. Reflecting about this period, Ruby noted the importance of endurance in building trust:

Ruby: I think what won it for me was when all that stuff went down with [A.], and you didn’t know where the organisation was gonna head but you still stuck in there ... that’s part of that stuff. That’s part of that not leaving because the shit’s hit the fan and just sticking in for the long haul. (26 September 2007)

A second invited space

We began a new iteration. We designed a smaller scale project, with a small budget, short lead in time, and with a view to developing an evidence base for the community organisation to increase grant-winning capacity. This project was to be pilot-research for longer term community crime-prevention activities. With a new team leader, new staff and a budget (in the form of a small community grant we brokered) the project was reconceived by drawing upon elements we had collaboratively developed in the first phase (we knew, 12

12 The project was co-funded by a community grant for not for profit organisations, provided by The Foundation for Young Australians’ Indigenous Small Grants Program (http://www.youngaustralians.org/fund/ ya_fund_indigenous.asp).
for example, that young people in the area were interested in hip-hop [dance, music and art]). Although much humbler in scale and budget, the preparation of this new project was intense—it required extensive stakeholder liaison (through networks of schools, youth workers and families). But after fifteen months of working together we had a budget and a project ready to be implemented. Successfully completing this project would provide an evidence base for future large-scale community grants in the future, as well as demonstrate the organisation's capacity to deliver projects within budget. We designed three main dimensions of data collection: hip-hop raps, interviews and youth participation in evaluation.

This space showed me that although negotiations and consultations are ongoing, the results of such trust-building work are not stable. ‘Community’ as an entity is not static, and neither are community organisations. In the first 18 months of the research relationship the organisation had two different project managers, and six people in administrative or project roles. Sometimes there were difficulties and delays in recruiting staff. All of these people were busy undertaking the core activity of community development work, establishing their own roles within the community. It was difficult to reconcile the reality of doing participatory research with my timelines for doctoral candidature.

Ruby: And I think that might be a critical part of that, maybe the community that you research, they set the timeline, and I think universities need to understand that if you’re going to work in Indigenous communities, the timeline will be a longer, extended period. I don’t think you can put a timeline on it Ruth. You may have to say, look, I’m gonna do research in Indigenous communities; it may take a lot longer than somebody who’d going out, I dunno, to research something else. I don’t think you can timeline it. Because those relationships, you need to build them for a year and a half, two years, ‘cos no one’s gonna trust you. (26 September 2007)

As a researcher I had to revisit constantly the shape of the project to ensure it was aligned with community-defined interests. This was not an easy task in such a rapidly changing and unstable research team environment. I was always aware that I was an outsider, and that I did not know or understand community politics, and the nature of relationships between community
development workers, with their own web of power relations, did not involve me. The need for proving trustworthiness, maintaining consent, and the potential for resistance was always present. Once up and running, the second space was more closely aligned with principles of participatory action research. We designed a small project to develop an understanding of Indigenous youth perspectives of ‘protective’ factors from crime. This meant two things: the inquiry needed to focus on localised perspectives of young people themselves (but could also be potentially replicated for broader general implications), and needed to generate rich qualitative data. We began by drawing mind maps together to decide the shape of the project.

Figure 7 An example of a mind map used to design the hip-hop project

Source: Ruth Nicholls

Our collaborative team decided to use hip-hop as a creative qualitative technique with Aboriginal youth living in the Hawkesbury Local Government Area. We knew that young people at one of the local high schools had performed raps in Darug language at school assemblies to celebrate NAIDOC week. We also knew that hip-hop dance, music and art was popular with local young people. Drawing from international literature, I saw the potential for
using hip-hop as a performative qualitative method (Ladson-Billings & Donnor, 2008, pp.75–76). The hip-hop workshops were to be led by an Aboriginal facilitator. The participants would write lyrics to inform qualitative understanding of young people’s perspectives of resilience. I will discuss the rationale for this creative and unconventional approach shortly. Following the workshops, the community workers were to undertake semi-structured interviews one on one with youth participants augmenting youth perspectives articulated in the raps. Finally, youth participants would evaluate a draft of the community report to confirm whether representation of their ideas was accurate. The report would include young Aboriginal people’s raps, artwork and opinions.

Hip-hop is a global form of youth culture (Mitchell, 2003; Perkins, 1996, p.258) that emerged on the streets of New York in the late 1970s, at that time performed predominantly by African-American artists (Bennett, 2000, p.59). Hip-hop comprises four creative elements: writing (graffiti), dancing (breaking), rhyming (rap) and disk-jockeying (scratching and sampling music from vinyl records). Some argue that hip-hop comprises a fifth element, known as ‘beat boxing’ (Stavrias, 2005, p.45): the creation of a beat using human voice, rather than machine. Daniel Banks describes this as ‘the essence’ of hip-hop: “the experience of creating something from your own body, from your own experience without material or physical resources” (Australian Broadcasting Commission [ABC], 2006). The politics of hip-hop are diffuse. Underground artists continue in a spirit of resistance, but it has also become a part of the popular music scene synonymous with misogyny and violence in the context of American racial politics. However, this is only one aspect of this global, diverse movement. Banks argues for the following definition:

For many people, hip-hop is synonymous with rap music, not knowing that hip-hop is a global, multi-ethnic, grassroots culture committed to social change, social justice and self-expression through certain specific modes of performance. Rap is a part of hip-hop and in addition to the commercial rap music that the record industry promotes, there are many, many deeply thoughtful, political, poetic and socially conscious ... artists using the mode of rap to communicate a progressive counter-hegemonic message ... it’s a process of reclaiming your own history; writing it, performing it and keeping it alive. (ABC, 2006)
Hip-hop symbolises a dual modality: while burgeoning as a global youth movement, its strength lies in its ability to represent the otherwise unheard in a very local context (Iveson, 1997, p.42). Maxwell’s (2003) ethnography of hip-hop in Sydney’s Western suburbs exemplifies the meaningfulness of hip-hop culture to those located outside the racialised and ghettoised climate of North American popular rap music. Maxwell’s fieldwork focused on the meaning of hip-hop to caucasian males living in Sydney during the 1990s, showing local politics are distinct from violent American gang rivalry. Instead, the Australian focus seeks recognition through ‘authenticity’, which rejects affected American accents and valorises the ontologies of those living in (sub)urban Australia (Iveson, 1997, p.43).

Hip-hop has come to have particular currency for culturally diverse and marginalised youth, and has broad appeal in Indigenous Australia (Stavrias, 2005). It has been integrated into various community development and health promotion activities. In these events, teams of hip-hop artists (musicians and dancers) travel to regional and remote locations to run dance and rap competitions that focus on a positive health promotion messages. The potential for self-expression is exemplified by ‘MC Bec’, an Aboriginal hip-hop artist:

I think it’s just there’s no other form of music that you can express yourself the way you can with hip-hop. Because with hip-hop you can just flow and just keep going and express so much; because a song in hip-hop has so much more lyrics than just an R’n’B song, or something just about partying, or shallow stuff like that, ‘cos with hip-hop you can express like really deep stuff, like philosophy and your own beliefs and you can tell a story, and you can just spit it, and just let it out. It’s like The Dreaming, like the Aboriginal belief, you sort of in The Dreaming, in the zone, and that’s like hip-hop for me. I’m like in The Dreaming when I’m rapping or dancing when I’m up there, and there’s nothing else like it. (ABC, 2006)

In the context of research around crime, popular rap music follows a trope of dialogue about criminal behaviour. This generates a creative platform for sharing experiences, contrasting with modes of inquiry that rely on in–

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The facilitator for the Hip-hop in the Hawkesbury workshops was involved in such projects.
depth interviews and potential psychological harm to participants. Hip-hop creates a performative platform for discussing crime, as the content is ‘wrapped’ or ‘packaged’ in genre. This is not without analytical challenges, as “the slipperines of constructs such as genre and discourse, and the difficulty of sometimes keeping them apart” (Fairclough, 1995, p.212) require consideration.

We recruited a Murri14 hip-hop artist from Western Sydney as facilitator of the workshops. ‘Brothablack’ was not only a successful artist, he also had experience working in schools as an Aboriginal liaison officer, and expertise running hip-hop workshops with Aboriginal youth in remote areas, focusing on healthy behaviour and lifestyle choices. At the time of the hip-hop workshops Brothablack had just released his debut album and was regularly aired on Australian MTV and the national youth radio station Triple J. The timing of the workshops was of the essence—Brothablack was about to go on tour overseas. We had the funding and the opportunity to secure an exciting role model and facilitator for the workshops. It was relatively early in the school year and I was anxious to finally collect some data (I was by this stage eighteen months into my candidature).

Recruiting young people to attend the workshops proved difficult. The main challenges were:

- gatekeeping and parental approval of a youth-centred project design
- an inability to recruit formally through schools
- stakeholder jealousy over the grant monies
- lack of transport to workshop venues (particularly in the case of wet weather).

We began by working through the local youth interagency network comprising youth workers from the neighbourhood centres, staff from the local high schools, police youth liaisons, health workers, the council, and other community development areas of specialisation. The youth interagency seemed enthusiastic about the project, and looked to have access to a

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14 His mother’s Country is near Rockhampton, Qld (Carroll, 2001, p.69).
substantial number of young Aboriginal people who they thought would be
interested in participating. The community workers and I visited all of the
youth centres personally to spend time with the youth workers, providing
details of how the project would work and the need for both the young person
and a parent or guardian’s written consent. This highlighted the tensions of
designing projects according to a focus on youth interest and participation as
opposed to focusing design on ‘what parents/guardians will approve of’. It was
only later, in the evaluation process, that it was revealed to me that a
community member and ‘gatekeeper’ to youth involvement felt that hip-hop
was ‘too controversial’ and was not encouraging participation in the
workshops.

One youth worker we met with was Maori. He openly mistrusted research
applied to a community development context, and my involvement with the
community as a non-Indigenous person. He suggested that I was attempting to
deceive youth participants by couching participation in research as a ‘fun’
activity. Although he was associated with an organisation that ran hip-hop
dance classes, and he ran music programs, we did not have any participants
from his neighbourhood area attend our workshops. His perception was
interesting because I was conscious of not using recruitment strategies (such
as posters or community radio announcements) that would suggest the
workshops were only about ‘fun’. My concerns about ensuring participants
understood the workshops were for a research purpose limited the recruitment
strategy to engaging with guardians who had access to young people, who
would pass on information sheets and consent forms (viz. Appendix A), and an
article in the local newspaper (Hawkesbury Gazette, 7 March 2007).

In addition to these gatekeeper challenges, I did not have ethical
approval to recruit young people directly through schools. This was for a
number of reasons: primarily because the project was not exclusively schools–
based (the project was to include young Aboriginal people aged between 12-24
years of age and who would not necessarily be at school). Doctoral research in
schools requires approval from the state Minister for Education, and the
application must demonstrate that the research is of use towards education
outcomes (those relevant to the research needs of the Education Department).
The project could not be categorised as focused on education—it was
principally working in partnership with an Aboriginal community organisation to research issues that would further community development activities and increase opportunities of applying for larger grants in the future.

When I was invited to speak at the local Aboriginal Education Consultative Group (AECG) meeting I felt palpable tension from staff of a school I had visited. All stakeholder liaison I undertook was in the company of workers from the community organisation and the research was consistently framed as a partnership. One (non-Indigenous) teacher in particular explicitly indicated her wish to obtain the grant money we had won for the project. ‘Her’ students\(^\text{15}\) were the group performing raps in language at their school assemblies. There were politics and egos at play. There were only so many polite phone calls I could make to interest schools in distributing flyers about the project. Disappointingly, again key gatekeepers did not support or encourage participation in the project.

We situated the workshops at neighbourhood centres within walking distance to public housing, public transport and schools with a large number of Aboriginal families attending. Despite assertions that hip-hop dancing and music are extremely popular with youth in the area (derived from consultation with youth workers and parents), attendance at the workshops was abysmal. The first two workshops had no participants, and the final workshop (for which we received notification of consent forms in advance) was marred by torrential rain. There was, however a lively group of parents and children of all ages who attended the final workshop. The participants all seemed to enjoy watching Brothablack perform, learning how to beat box and shyly putting together a group rap while sharing pizza. Many of the children in attendance were still in primary school and were the younger siblings of participants or the workers’ children (their parents were also present for duty of care). In the end it was only a group of six (eligible) participants who contributed to this rap.

\(^\text{15}\) Approximately sixty Aboriginal students attending this high school participated in ‘her’ extra-curricular programs.
I came along to write a rap song
I came from Claymore out to Glenorie
To meet Brothabrack to write this deadly story
The Greater West is where I’ve lived all my life
Sticking with my mates to keep them outta strife
I’ve seen a lot of different places that you wouldn’t know
But I decided to kick ‘em now with this funky flow
From the beach to the west
Walkin’ out my back door where the air is fresh
Comin’ down a steep hill, with my mad skills
No spills, all thrills, all the competitors I drill.
Buggin’ on my girl when I’m really bored
Window shopping: empty pockets
This shit I can’t afford
Talkin’ about the truth, we make raps with Ruth
Stating the facts, raps meshed by Brothabrack
Mother Earth’s pain, drought give us some rain
Filling Warragamba to save Sydney’s future
No matter where we go, this place our zone where we roam
The area I call home.

12 March 2007

The meagre turn out of youth (ages 12–24 years) participants had not met my expectations of engaging ‘marginalised’ young people to ‘represent’ in a youth-centred forum (this was to my mind, the ‘success factor’ for the project). After each of the workshops the community workers could see my disappointment in the attendance rates. They assured me that it is always difficult to engage attendance at community events, even without ethical restrictions on recruitment strategies, such as consent forms.

Ruby: The only time I think we were really aware of the difference was when we did the hip-hop. And you were really quite stressed, and I stepped back and all of us were just oh well, we’ll go and get the pizza, there’s not much we can do, and I know it was part, it was important to you to get the research
but you were on a higher intensity than we were. We were like, oh well, yep. Let's have pizza, yeah. We'll have a feed now, try again tomorrow ...

Ruth: I was so stressed out.

Ruby: ... And that I think that’s one of the only times I’ve noticed a difference. But we get stressed, we’re not perfect. (26 September 2007)

My internal logic deemed that the research must have been ‘inauthentic’ participatory research because of low attendance rates at the workshops. The way Kowal describes participatory research initiatives that do not achieve their objectives reflects how I felt after the hip-hop workshops:

Failed interventions are attributed to an inauthentic rendering of whichever ‘success factors’ are deemed most important. Perhaps the Indigenous participants were not adequately engaged and empowered, even if they may have appeared to be; perhaps the program did not really correlate with the community priorities, even if people may have said so at the time; ...perhaps the people involved were not the appropriate people from the community’s perspective, even if some community people said they were. While these diagnoses may well be ‘true’ in some cases, they are applied all the time, no matter what the circumstances. This indicates the criteria for attributing inauthenticity are internal to remedialist logic, rather than reflecting the external reality. In a non-falsifiable loop, the definition of an authentic intervention is one that works, and correspondingly, a failed intervention must have been inauthentic. (2006a, p.158)

In berating myself for having failed to produce an ‘authentic’ participatory success in the workshops I became temporarily blinded to recognising the time, commitment and participation the community workers had demonstrated, particularly as the workshops were held in the evenings, including a Friday and Saturday. Community workers had brought their own children along, and had even organised for an artist to decorate a didgeridoo\(^{16}\) as a gift for Brothablack. In evaluating the workshops I was told:

Ruby: And a big thing: if we don’t turn up, don’t stress, because that’s really something that’s really well noticed in our community. If you stress out ‘cos something’s not getting done when you want it done.

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\(^{16}\) Made and decorated by a Wiradjuri person. Didgeridoos are not instruments traditionally made by Darug peoples.
Barb: That’s what I find. If someone comes in who sees you and something’s happened and then they get stressed out well, you look at them and think, ‘Oh my God, just leave me alone, go away’. (26 September 2007)

I soon realised through evaluation that my administrative framing of research (for the purposes of attaining institutional ethics approval) had excluded rather than nurtured youth participation. The hip-hop project design was targeted at the discrete subjectivities of Aboriginal ‘youth’ aged from 12–24 years old, yet the only workshop that resulted in ‘data’ was one at which younger siblings also came along and joined in the activity. Micah (another community worker) explained to me the importance of siblings, regardless of their age, being able to participate in activities.

Micah: Equality— you know, if one can’t have it, nobody has it. You could be one short, but that doesn’t matter. Nobody has it. Or if one can’t go, they all can’t go. ... Sometimes, I’ve thought it’s a bit harsh, but that’s their system. You know, if one kid couldn’t go on the excursion because he was in trouble, then the other kid couldn’t go. (18 December 2007)

My ethics application and research proposal had determined participation in the hip-hop workshops according to age brackets, an arbitrary marker of youth relevant to my research findings rather than the interests of the participants.

The hip-hop workshops were an experience of the challenges in meeting community expectations while also adhering to institutional requirements (Darcy et al., 2008). But this phase also forced me to consider critically the participatory process of the research itself, rather than focusing on ‘failed’ data collection outcomes. Clues began to emerge about why ‘resistance’ manifested.

Pearl: Adapt. Be able to adapt, because I think that’s what you’d find. Well, that’s what’s happened in our community, now first we had one idea, you and [A.] and that didn’t work. Then we tried the hip-hop. And, well, you know I still believe that worked; it was just that isolation part. Um, maybe [M.] was right about the research stuff, that it did put people off. (18 September 2007)
This final suggestion, that research had ‘put people off’, was a clue to low participation rates. I wanted to explore why people had resisted (refused to participate) in an activity that was designed by community members, facilitated by Aboriginal people, and intended to benefit the community. Despite the intentions of the research design, community workers immediately involved in the project expressed misgivings about my motives, and an overarching suspicion of research as damaging and stealing from the community. I decided I needed to evaluate this point of resistance, because it revealed a gap between theories of ethical methods (such as participation) and practice. Reflecting on the process, I recognised I had constructed ‘compliant research participants’ according to levels of inclusion (surely deep and authentic forms of participation generated more representation and inclusion?). I needed to reconcile those characterisations with the lived dynamics of shifting opinions, whispers and local politics. In doing so, I needed to adjust my view of participation to consider why community members had resisted involvement in the project.

A third invited space

After the poor turn out at the hip-hop workshops the community workers thought that they would probably never see me again—that I would walk away disappointed. But I did not walk away (despite my doubts about my capacity to support ‘real’ participation). I continued to volunteer, helping to organise community events that marked Sorry Day and NAIDOC celebrations.

Pearl: It’s about that, maintaining that relationship, and I know, and I’ve heard it through other workers and you’ll hear it when you talk to them about people coming in and being there for a little while ...
Ruth: And then just disappearing?
Pearl: ... And it happens all the time.
Ruth: Yeah, I remember once you were saying something when you thought that I might go...
Pearl: Yeah, yeah!
Ruth: ... After the hip-hop workshops?
Pearl: I did, yeah. So for you to still stay around after, that was also just another inroad in showing, look I’m not going to give up just because it gets a bit too hard. (18 September 2007)

After the frenetic lead up to the workshops, I saw the need to recognise fatigue on all sides of the partnership. The organisation was undergoing more staff changes, and other community development activities needed to take precedence over the ‘youth crime-prevention’ project. A teenager had left home, a baby grandchild had passed away, and dynamics between community members remained challenging and disorienting to me as an outsider.

I persisted. My approach was to remain in contact, participating in organisational life in a volunteer capacity. I helped out when there was little administrative support for the NAIDOC concert, writing stallholder letters and other associated administrative tasks such as taking minutes at meetings. I was determined to demonstrate commitment to the organisation, to show respect and reciprocity (Maiter, Smich, Jacobson & Wise, 2008). I was heartened to be reminded of the ethical value of reciprocity when my co-inquirers presented me with a beautiful hand-painted bowl filled with fruit and chocolate as a thank you for my volunteering. During this time, a shift occurred. Workers who had viewed me with some suspicion began to warm to me. I was told in particular that actions such as sitting on the floor in the crowded office space ‘won over’ those who had initially mistrusted my intentions.


Barb: I think it’s very much body language. I pick that up straight away.

Ruth: I think of when you’re talking about me sitting on the floor?

Barb: That really opened the door for me, when you walked in and sat on the floor, and I was going ... you know I think that’s when it was the end of it. That was it. That was when I just fully opened up to you. (26 September 2007)

As a consequence of this developing trust, the workers invited me to interview with them, to ‘help’ my dissertation interests and further our
discussions of research ethics (which we spent many hours discussing unrecorded). It emerged that my actions as a humble volunteer altered the community workers’ views of my subjectivity. No longer was I purely an outsider researcher—I was also ‘a helper’.

Pearl: I think what did it for everybody was when you volunteered your time at NAIDOC; one, that you’re so far over-qualified to sit down in front of the computer and do that stuff for us as an organisation, that really won most of the Aboriginal workers over, and the community. Oh, Ruth’s in, Ruth’s organising the ... yeah. And all the time you’ve spent, what’s it been? Two years? It has to have been nearly two years. Yeah, you know you’re always there to put your hand up and to me, that’s what builds relationships. That’s why people are willing to sit down and talk about your research or me and [M.] come out there, ‘cos yeah, part of it’s that we want to do it, but part of it’s to support you ‘cos i.e. you support us as well. Yeah, that’s the Aboriginal community. (18 September 2007)

Jade: The thing that stood out for me with you in the relationship with [the community organisation] is that you actually contributed. It wasn’t just a matter of coming in and asking some questions then leaving. You helped us organise a number of events, which were important to us when we were quite short handed and desperate for people to help so, and I think that’s important in dealing with communities that you... um ... It’s not a matter of owing, but when people contribute and build a relationship with the community. I think that’s probably more important than sort of swanning in with a bunch of questions and sort of asking about your attitudes or what you want, what do you think will fix these issues. So I think the most important thing with researchers, or anybody really, is to build those relationships first and then if you gain the trust of people, then you will probably get a better quality outcome. (30 November 2007)

During this time of volunteering, I refocused my research on ethically evaluating the process of doing research collaboratively. We drafted a journal article together, and travelled to Melbourne to present at the National Research Ethics conference. This was the reason I was sitting with Ruby and Barb under the tree. But it was not the culmination of our research activities
together. After this experience we found ourselves returning to the second of our participatory spaces.

Returning to the second invited space

A year after the hip-hop workshops I had completed a first draft of my dissertation with a new focus on ethics and methodology. There was no longer a stress on gathering data from young people for my Ph.D. research, but there remained a shared sense that we had not finished our collaborative project. Once the organisational changes had settled, the community workers told me they were eager and ready to undertake the next stage of data collection to complete the hip-hop project. As originally planned, they wanted to do training in interviewing and data analysis. They had recruited young people for the interviews and were ready to go. We began the action cycle again, and I offered to volunteer my research skills, providing training in how to design interview questions (the group determined to use a semi-structured interview schedule using the premise of appreciative, strengths-based inquiry). The community workers determined the questions and the frames of analysis, undertook qualitative analysis and revised the draft community report. I provided training in interview techniques, transcribed the interviews, assisted with training in group idea-building (Hurworth, 2007) and data analysis, drafted the community report, facilitated youth evaluation of the report and organised the production of the report and the associated materials (postcards and badges). The research itself, however, was ‘community owned’, and the data (youth perspectives) collected was not for my doctoral interpretation.

The group first needed to (re)determine and reiterate their overarching aim and question. The reason for repeatedly clarifying the overall purpose was because there were new participants who had not been involved in the hip-hop phase, and it had been over a year since we had stated our research aims in our project proposal. The group worked quickly and effectively through two mind-mapping exercises (strategies we used to design the project) and clarified how they wanted to present the issues discussed in the data.

Facilitating the group data analysis phase was emotionally challenging. Another community worker, Biddy, became distressed and began to cry as we read through the interview transcripts together. She was closely related to
one of the participants, and the experience the young person was recounting was upsetting for her. This is an issue which is little discussed in terms of participatory research—because of the embeddedness of the research in a local context, it is impossible (and indeed not desirable) for the co-inquirers to be disconnected from the data and the inquiry. This intimacy of inquirers to research material can be empowering and liberating, but also runs the risk of being traumatic and unsettling. Upon Biddy’s distress, we thought it was time to stop, but she was adamant that we continue on in the data analysis.

Biddy’s discomfort in dealing with the data reminded all of us of the potential harms of research, and the fact we were dealing with embodied ‘real life’ problems (as opposed to theoretical problems) riddled with emotional issues which could not have been planned for in the design of the research. Biddy continued working enthusiastically on the project, but after witnessing Biddy’s discomfort Barb dropped out of the process. Although there are other factors that altered the terms of her participation, she was never again at work on the days I came to visit (most notable on a day we had organised to do an evaluation interview). I felt I had lost her trust; perhaps from her perspective my subjectivity had returned to that of a ‘cold-hearted researcher’.

The next method of data analysis I introduced was not adopted enthusiastically by the group. Partly because it directly followed after the emotional incident previously described, but also because it involved ‘dry’ matrices. Using the technique of ‘idea-building’ (Hurworth, 2007) I was keen to introduce the group to a technique that would record ideas and supplement report writing (a task which community workers told me was always challenging). But the written task was met with questions such as ‘why are we doing this when we can just talk about ideas? And, ‘this is slow and a waste of time!’

Although I was hoping the group might find idea-building a useful tool for future activities, when I returned the following week to complete the next part of the analysis, all the community workers had lost or misplaced their worksheets (a resource pack I had compiled for ‘how to do research’). Below is an example of one of the idea-building sheets used in this activity.
While the group found this exercise painstakingly and unnecessarily complicated (not unlike the experiences of other participatory research practitioners [Cahill, 2007]), this particular activity was crucial for developing a clear idea of ‘themes’ which the group could agree upon (usually there...
would be an array of different opinions expressed in conversation, without a deliberation achieved). Furthermore, this activity provided detailed records of the context of the report, which were useful reference material during the drafting process. Employing a method that requires a sophisticated level of literacy is obviously not applicable to all research situations; however, I had hoped it might be a tool to develop capacity. In the end however, it was most useful to me as documentation of how ideas were determined as a group. The participants did not see the point of the exercise.

The next technique of group analysis was far more successful. I stuck coloured sheets of cardboard on the walls: each with a title (from our mind-mapping exercise we had decided to use three themes for the report, and there was also a miscellaneous sheet). Below are two examples of these sheets with the titles ‘friendship’ and ‘safety’.

Figure 10  Examples of qualitative group data analysis collages

Source: Ruth Nicholls
We each took a copy of the interview transcripts, and highlighted, cut out and glued our favourite quotes to the sheet of cardboard we thought they suited. After this process, we all wrote comments on the coloured sheets explaining why we thought the quote fitted, or responses to the data. This activity was a resounding success, and feedback I received indicated that this process was fun and useful to the group for future research and group activities.

*Pearl*: What I really liked, what really stood out for me was that evaluation that we did. And pulling together what we did in that report. And I’ve never done anything that way before. It really had an impact; I really loved it. And I would like to use that somehow. Because it really worked I thought. (25 July 2008)

The idea-building pages and the coloured sheets with quotes and comments, together with the rap lyrics, formed the basis of the first draft of the community report. The workers gathered youth artwork (or any other form of self-expression) to add to the report, and recruited a group of six young people (all of whom had been interviewed for the community report) to participate in a youth evaluation of the draft report. We met at the local Pizza Hut on a Friday evening, and discussed the findings of the report over ice cream after everyone had had their fill of the ‘all-you-can-eat smorgasbord’. Some examples of evaluation comments are provided in the following table.

**Table 2** Youth evaluation of the ‘Mittigar Gurrume Burruk’ draft report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you agree with the findings of the report?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• <em>I agree completely, there aren’t enough safe places for young people to hang out. As well as enough public transport services.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Yes because I have friends that have that very problem.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Yes because it is true.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think adults will be sympathetic to young people’s point of view?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Some will and some won’t. Many adults are indifferent to the opinions and point of view of the youth simply because they’re not as old.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Yes because that might be what their kids complain to them about.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Hopefully cause their own children are probably in the same predicament. (20 June 2008)

With this positive endorsement from the youth participants, we had achieved outputs of a full colour community report with artwork, poetry, rap, quotes and group analysis. We also produced a postcard and a badge. The community report title, ‘Mittigar Gurrume Burruk’, is a Darug phrase meaning ‘happy to see you friend’ (a Darug Elder gave the organisation permission to use the title). The report, postcard and badge show a strengths-based message from the perspective of young people, highlighting issues of friendship, isolation, the need for transport and safety at night.

Pearl: And I think that it also revalidates everything that’s been said to everybody in the Hawkesbury over and over again. Fix the bloody transport, give these kids something to do; it’s been said that many times, it’s just another report that says that, but in a different way I think. (25 July 2008)

Reflecting on these outcomes, I am reminded of a bus stop I pass on my way to Richmond. It symbolises the findings of the Mittigar Gurrume Burruk youth report: the isolation and frustration of people who rely on public transport in the semi-rural periphery of a large city. Not classified as living in a remote or regional place, young people in the Hawkesbury do not have the same access to recreational activities and public transport options as their counterparts in higher density areas of the metropolis. The rural ideals of the colonial ‘bread basket’ of Sydney are placed under threat by vandalism.

17 I am not accusing young people of vandalising the bus stop. Rather, I consider this example of vandalism as a metaphoric expression of frustration and isolation.
My thesis does not contain any further analysis of the findings within ‘Mittigar Gurrume Burrk’ other than this description of the report’s role in the process of collaboration. In this way, the project differs from other examples of participatory research that integrate academic analysis more overtly into the material produced. Rather, I highlight the issue of method:

In work with marginalised or vulnerable people, one of the most important features of these types of method is their ‘hands-on’ nature, and their ability to enable people to generate information and share knowledge on their own terms, using their own symbols, language or art forms. (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.17)
The organisation’s logo features prominently in the design of the report and postcard, with the colours of the logo used to ‘brand’ the package of awareness-raising products. The front of the postcard is reproduced below:

Figure 12 The ‘Mittigar Gurrume Burruk’ postcard

Pearl: I think what I liked, too, about the research was that when we finally got the report done is [T.] picking up that postcard and saying, “That’s mine. That’s my artwork.” That’s what I feel we’re about. That’s empowerment, and that’s what we envisioned in that report. Empowering young people, not working on the negatives, but working on the positives of who they are and what they are. (25 July 2008)

The report was conceptualised, generated, analysed and evaluated by the community members themselves. On the back of the postcard is a line from the workshop rap song: “No matter where we go, this place: our zone where we roam. The area I call home”; and a quote from a poem: “Being Aboriginal to me means belonging to a group of people with a rich artistic history, diverse culture and unique sense of Family and traditions”.  

Participation?

Although the report was printed and ready for distribution during NAIDOC week 2008, it has not been formally launched in the community. There have been a number of circumstances that have delayed this event. I have learnt to discern when I should step back and allow the participants to determine when and how they seek to further the outcomes and products of the research.

18 Participants’ words were not edited; rather, spelling and grammar remained exactly as the participants had originally presented in their material.
This ‘stepping back’ acknowledges that participants must live with the effects of research in a different way to the researcher. I hope the report will generate awareness and discussion amongst stakeholders about services to support young people accessing public transport and meeting safely at night. I also hope the participants will find the report a useful resource for applying for funding in the future to provide evidence of community development issues, and evidence of their ability to combine initiatives and research. To determine this I have attempted to feedback the findings of my thesis argument to the community, in addition to reporting on the outcomes of the collaboration.

Knowing that communicating the findings of research in an accessible and meaningful way is important, I sought to deliver a final report to the community management committee in November 2008. The committee was provided with a copy of a summary of the research prior to the meeting (reproduced in Appendix B). I had hoped that the meeting would enable informal discussions and feedback. When I turned up to report, only two members of the committee were present, meaning a quorum had not been achieved. Although another community member arrived late, there was no time for me to present given that other matters had to be considered. This raised yet more questions for me about the terms of participation. Although I had sought to always be accountable, and a meeting was arranged well in advance of the day, participation remained ‘uncomprehensive’ (some might say unconvincing). I do not think this is a reflection of the people involved in this research. I now consider my expectations that community committee members would be present at the meeting to be based on a discourse that suggests participation operates as a uniform and unwavering entity, with no competing priorities in the lives of participants. I view this not as an act of ‘resistance,’ but an example of the complexities of people’s lives beyond the terms of ‘research co-inquirer’ or ‘research participant’, or ‘committee member’. People possess many subjectivities, shaped by multiple discourses that prioritise or hinder participation within an array of spatial and temporal factors. Participation over a long period of time (three years in this case) endures only if it incorporates fluctuations, alterations and acceptance of the possibility for ‘non-participation’ at times.
Detailing the process of participation in practice demonstrates how the discursive constructions of subjectivities interplay in participatory spaces. Within this case study, I indicated a shift in my position from trying to facilitate participatory research involving young people to ethically evaluating participation with community development workers. Crucial to the changes in ‘participation’ was the form of my subjectivity from initial engagement, meeting with resistance, mistrust, and gatekeeping to a change in how the community participants perceived my intentions. Their views of me as a researcher changed when I committed time as a volunteer.

Participation as a social space is mediated by boundaries of inclusion and exclusion: being an insider or an outsider. Despite the best of intentions, as a researcher (with my institutional forms, timelines, need for data, task of a thesis to write) I maintained a position of ‘outsider’. When I let go of the need for data as an outcome and focused on the process of working with the community as a volunteer, trust began to develop. My subjectivity, according to the community workers, altered. I became an ‘insider’ of sorts, someone who was willing to get to know people, help out, and be accountable. With this change in my subjectivity, participation began to flourish: the community workers invited me to undertake interviews with them to evaluate our experience (and help me out with my research); and the workers took ownership and control of the Mittigar Gurrume Burruk project outcomes.

My understanding of garnering community consent changed with that of subjectivities within the research process. Later in my argument I will discuss the concept of ‘community’ exploring why the process of the research (protocols of respect, developing trust and recognising resistance) were so important to the community members involved in the research. While the material outcome of our collaboration (the ‘Mittigar Gurrume Burruk’ report) was a milestone, it was the tangible shift in subjectivities that enabled collective evaluation about the effects of participating in research. Later in my argument I will discuss the outcomes for participants and my reflexive approach to writing about community perspectives.

Understanding how subjectivities are constructed (and altered) is a crucial aspect of Foucault’s ethics. In the next chapter I will describe the
theoretical basis of my argument for understanding oneself in relation to 'the space' between trust and resistance.
CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPING AN ETHICAL SUBJECTIVITY

My aim in exploring a case study of participatory research with Indigenous peoples is to consider how the connections made between morals and methods shape the formation of subjectivities in participatory spaces. In the introduction to my argument I proposed that participatory methods for decolonisation are underpinned by a social justice imperative for counter-colonial remedialism: to redistribute power between Indigenous peoples and researchers. Participation is intended to build the capacities of Indigenous participants to legitimate forms of knowledge relevant to their interests. I also suggested that this vision of power as a commodity is problematic, because it does not incorporate adequate explanations for resistance within ‘empowering’ research. My theoretical response was to view power as productive, following Foucault’s definition of an unstable and divergent force.

Values attributed to methods create truth-games about what are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ approaches to research, and how researchers should govern themselves in relation to research participants. On such terms, the rationale for a colleague confessing privately that they feel their research has been not been ‘ethical’ because they merely consulted with Indigenous participants reflects ideas of deep or shallow participatory techniques (Cornwall, 2008a, p.276). This might also explain why a group of postgraduate students hush with reverence while listening to an account of a ‘child-led’ participatory project in Africa. Again, they are attaching values of authenticity to this form of participation (Cornwall, 2008a, p.276), such that a method enabling pre—or semi-literate children to control the data collection, interpretation and analysis was considered to transform power relations, therefore achieving authentic social justice outcomes.

A way of exploring the ethics of participatory spaces is to consider how ‘participation’ as a discourse creates certain ‘types’ of researchers (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.14). By asking how researchers employ participation as a means of ‘being ethical’, I will ask what types of behaviour are valued as ethical and what are not. I will consider what participatory tactics researchers employ to determine the ethical value of their work. I will attend to questions of whose opinions and knowledge are discursively validated and whose are not.
Throughout my argument I will ask how participatory discourse informs the kinds of subjectivities we seek to embody, and the question of how to govern ourselves (Davidson, 1994, p.119).

Whilst previous critiques of participatory methods (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001) have highlighted the ethical dangers of producing certain types of ‘participant’ (by subjectification), I suggest that not enough attention is paid to the ways participants, institutions, methods and techniques produce certain types of ‘researcher’. This has implications for the kind of reflexive work employed to address the outcomes of participatory research projects: particularly the reflexive aspects of monitoring and evaluation that assess the role of the facilitator, and the broader social justice and ethical effects of actions towards change. Consistent with my use of Foucault’s productive definitions of power and resistance, I will employ his approach to understanding ethics.

In this chapter I will detail the theoretical tools I am using to evaluate my case study. Here, I will extend my discussion of productive power to consider how people inform and are simultaneously formed by power-knowledge: I refer to this as a process of ‘developing subjectivity’. My intention in using this theoretical approach is to consider how to develop an ethical subjectivity when researching with, and for, other people. Drawing from the specific situation of this case study, I will consider how a non-Indigenous researcher might approach an understanding of their ethics when undertaking research in the context of decolonisation.

Foucault’s legacy was to create histories of how people are shaped by knowledge and power, by exploring the intersections and interferences amongst science, politics and ethics. In Foucault’s account, people are categorised as having particular social and personal identities according to ‘dividing practices’ that shape and are reinforced by scientifically ascribed classifications (Rabinow, 1984, p.8). (As I will discuss in Chapter 4, an example of a dividing practice is how people are categorised as ‘Indigenous’ or ‘non-Indigenous’.) Systems of knowledge determine the ‘truth’ of how an individual becomes part of a population group (Rabinow, 1984, p.8). These ways of shaping people, ‘making people up’ as Hacking (1986) argues, are exemplified
in statistics: quantifying socially constructed principles, standards or behaviours according to whether they are normal or abnormal (another example of a dividing practice) into a ‘statistical truth’. The dividing practices and classifications inform and reinstate each other in a process of normalisation: “by ‘normalisation,’ Foucault means a system of finely gradated and measurable intervals in which individuals can be distributed around a norm—a norm which both organises and is the result of this controlled distribution” (Rabinow, 1984, p.20). The normalising gaze enables techniques of comparison, differentiation, hierarchies, homogenisation and exclusion (Young, 1990, p.126) to shape social practices.

Categorising, measuring and counting, are techniques used to govern ‘population groups’ (Foucault, 2007, p.42). By creating data about groups (their problems, strengths, likes, needs, fears), the state is able to determine the most effective actions to govern populations (Foucault, 2008, pp.18-20). As I will explain, these ‘truths’ also hold implications for the way we govern ourselves in relation to others.

Closing the gap

The health status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples is an example of a data set that informs, and is informed by, socially constructed dividing practices and scientific knowledge (Ring & O’Brien, 2007). At present there is a 17-year difference in the mortality rates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander men living in the Northern Territory compared to non-Indigenous men in the NT (Pijn, 2008, p.41). This statistic, now commonly known as ‘the gap’, has been extrapolated to account for the difference in mortality rates of all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples across Australia (the current data show that the national disparity between women is 10 years, and the national disparity between men is 11.8 years) (Pijn, 2008, p.41). The gap exemplifies differences in material and social circumstances between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, and subsequently is also used to describe disparities in educational outcomes, wealth, employment, criminalisation, and empowerment. The gap is also crucial to understanding the reason a separate set of ethics guidelines exists for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. I will explain this in further detail in Chapter 4.
The significant disparity in health outcomes comparing Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia reflects both the state’s ability to care for its citizens, and in counter-discourses (such as neo-liberalism), the capacity of citizens to maintain their own health according to the resources available to them. Changes in government bring changes in the approach towards normalising Indigenous health outcomes (Aldrich, 2006): in 2006 the ‘Close the Gap’ campaign commenced, driven by NGOs (led by NGOs with rights-based approaches to development), community-controlled health organisations, and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner. A National Indigenous Health Equality Summit was held in Canberra in March 2008, and the Prime Minister (along with other key political figures) signed a ‘Close the Gap Statement of Intent’. The result of the ‘Close the Gap Statement of Intent’ was governmental accountability; the Rudd Government was now “committed to measuring, monitoring, and reporting on their joint efforts in accordance with a range of supporting sub-targets and benchmarks” (Calma, 2008, p.3). The figure below shows the Prime Minister and the Federal Minister for Health on the front cover of the report about the summit.

Figure 13  Close the Gap: Outcomes from the National Indigenous Health Equality Summit

The ‘Close the Gap’ campaign did not emerge without an evidence base. A complex and value-laden industry of ‘Indigenous policy’ and ‘Indigenous
health’ draws fuel from statistics of Aboriginal people’s health status (Lea, 2008, p.13). The canon of this sector is the importance of ‘evidence based’ research, to collect detailed information about the lives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, driven by an ardent belief that more knowledge will solve or fix a problem (Lea, 2008, pp.127–134; Pholi, Black & Richards, 2009). Kowal astutely notes this in her account of anti-racist health researchers working with Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. She intimates how the intersection between what is non-discursive (existent in material form) is mutually informed by the discursive (the statistics):

Indigenous statistics do not only describe something called Indigenous ill-health, they create it. Even more than that, they create the subjectivity of an ‘Indigenous person’ in the moment they are recognised as unwell by the state … the material reality of ill-health—the chest pain, the infected sores, the displacement from home for dialysis treatment in town, the grief of premature death—are all abstracted and given new form through statistical representation. (Kowal, 2006a, p.154)

Indigenous health statistics demonstrate the way in which non-discursive events (an injury, dialysis, an infection) do not exist in a political vacuum: rather, ill-health is understood in relation to social, political, cultural and gendered contexts (Carson, Dunbar, Chenall & Bailie, 2007). I should point out that in making this assertion I am not judging the veracity of material circumstances: I am not seeking to de-legitimate the reality of different morbidity and mortality rates, or suggest that the painful experience of ill-health is a social construction. Rather, I seek to highlight how we respond to these statistics morally: for “a PAR-inspired understanding of social justice suggests that it is in fact unethical to look in on circumstances of pain and poverty and yet do nothing” (Manzo & Brightbill, 2007, p.35).

Statistics such as ‘the gap’ become a moral issue because they are evidence of difference from the norm. The goal of ‘closing the gap’ is a moral task of normalisation through realignment because a social value of contemporary society is that all citizens have a right to equal health status. Ironically, the status of ‘Indigenous health’ can quickly be attributed to the fact that Australian society has not always considered ‘equal health’ to be a right possessed by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Historical and
contemporary examples of discrimination, violence and racism reinforce the moral impetus to ‘close the gap’.

Researchers have a moral task of improving the accuracy of evidence base, to improve the quality of assessments and assimilative outcomes: Kowal (2006b) refers to this metaphorically as ‘moving toward the mean’. Part of the challenge to determine an accurate evidence base about ‘Indigenous health’ is the need for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to self-identify as part of a collective group in the Census and associated forms of monitoring, to assist in the collection of statistics, enabling the government to “assess Indigenous disadvantage” (Pink, 2008, p.1). The challenge for this ‘science of government’ (Rose, 1999, p.6) is to understand Indigenous resistance to subjectification. I will discuss this further in Chapter 4.

‘The gap’ shows an intersection between power and knowledge. Non-discursive material truths do not exist separately from discursive rules, for ‘the gap’ is malleable: its size depends on the type of statistical model applied to determine the result. ‘The gap’ is currently determined by the Census Data Enhancement (CDE) Indigenous Mortality Quality Study (a direct method, without statistical assumptions); however, the gap was previously (1996–2001) determined using indirect methods (Bhat with and without unexplained growth, and Hill) (Pink, 2008, pp.2-4). Each of these models has different strengths and weaknesses, judged according to what is most ‘valid’, ‘reliable’, ‘representative’ or ‘accurate’. The ABS stresses that it is crucial not to compare the results across different methods to then make assumptions that health status has changed: rather the ABS highlights the difference between the methods, and why they produce different results. These reservations show how technologies of the state are methods employed to deal with information, not inherent truths.

As Foucault suggests, the value ascribed to ‘truths’ is constructed within systems of knowledge (what is valid does not exist in isolation to that which is in-valid). In this light I am not questioning the material truths of pain and injury that constitute ‘the gap’; rather I am interested in the way that we respond socially, politically and morally to facts that change at the whim of a scientific explanatory system. We ground our responses to knowledge in the
belief that statistical facts are 'concrete', 'stable' and 'reliable'. It is crucial to remember that knowledge and power constantly intersect and contradict as often as they reinforce each other.

This short account of a complex issue demonstrates the way in which knowledge, power, social practices and discourse mutually inform, reinforce and interplay. It shows how defining a problem (measuring the health of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and comparing health statistics with people who are categorised as non-Indigenous) creates a body of knowledge that reinforces a moral response to statistical facts. Knowledge responding to 'the gap' reinforces the social, political and ethical dimensions of material responses, such as emphasising participation as a form of remedialism in research. In this process, what knowledge is already discursively established about Indigenous research participants informs our ethical approach to relating with them. The process of research becomes a project of remedialism: for research with Indigenous peoples to be 'ethical', it must be "performative, healing, transformative, decolonising, and participatory" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p.2).

Such an account of 'Indigenous health' might suggest that the people collectively constituted by statistics are 'victims to subjectification', unable to resist the power of the state to garner information and control population groups. But that would only be to understand partially the mechanics of power. By recognising the existence of resistance as an essential component of power (Foucault, 2007, p.389), it is possible to understand some of the broader social questions I seek to ask, such as: how is it that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are the only 'minority group' to have a set of culturally specific ethics guidelines for research? Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' offers some theoretical suggestions:

Citizens have made strategic use of their status as members of identifiable consumer communities to demand collectively access to better, or more appropriate services ... through the deployment of essentialist categories of identity ([eg.] "Indigenous peoples") ... consumer communities have been able to extract concessions from authorities ... to force change in health related policies and practices. (Petersen, 2003, pp.198–199)
With the expression of resistance ever-present in relations of power, it is important to remember that the interplay of power and resistance occurs throughout the discursive and non-discursive social practices that shape what is ethical and what is not. To explain this, I consider how there is more than one way to understand the production of ‘subjectivity’: for we also internally produce our own subjectivities, normalising practices and remedial projects.

**Ethics are discourse**

Many people interpret Foucault’s work as a pessimistic account of ‘subjects’ as products of an all-pervasive sovereign state (Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005, pp. 857–862). However, his penultimate writings on ‘care of the self’ offer a different view; they offer the concept of subjectification as “the way a human being turns him—or herself into a subject” (Rabinow, 1984, p.11). This results in two ways of understanding how people are shaped by knowledge and power: the first is “subject to someone else by control and dependence”, the second is “tied to his own identity by a conscience or self knowledge” (Rabinow, 1984, p.21). I refer to the latter as ‘developing ethical subjectivity’.

Focusing on how people develop an ethical subjectivity demands an exploration of the relations of power and knowledge that “cluster” (Rabinow, 1984, p.12) around researchers and participants, shaping them as subjects within a field of social relations specific to ‘research practices’. Using this approach, I will explore the ‘technologies of the self’ (the intersections of knowledge and power to develop subjectivity) as: “what establishes the relation with oneself and with others, and constitutes human beings as ethical subjects” (Foucault, 1984, p.334). The process of subjectification enables recognition of people as complex, context-specific subjects engaging within historically emergent principles of social order generated by other humans (Falzon, 1998, p.59).

The purpose of this theoretical perspective is to understand how discourses shape research behaviours (such as valued knowledge, valid methods and ethical relationships). Research ethics in practice are not simply a cause and effect of government rules. Rather, ‘ethics’ are constituted by discourses: domains of knowledge and power (with concepts, theories and material technologies) that produce complex experiences and relationships.
with others. People attempt to recognise themselves as 'ethical' within these relationships through 'technologies of the self'. These technologies:

[D]escribe the processes of construction of selfhood through the workings of psychological and other formal knowledge groupings, or sciences. These knowledge groupings are technological in the sense that they are systematic mini or inter-discourses implicated in self-construction. (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p.52)

To consider ‘developing an ethical subjectivity’ Foucault provides three domains that might be interrogated. These are: “How we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge … The field of power in which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others … How we constitute ourselves as moral subjects” (Foucault, 1983, p.237). Resultant from these domains of inquiry are three methodological lenses that can be adopted:

- language as the discursive production of knowledge
- social practices as relations of knowledge and power
- governmentality and subjectivity as practices of the self.

These lenses broadly mirror Foucault’s methodological focus over the 1960s (with his focus on the archive); the 1970s (the shift into genealogy); and the 1980s (his exploration of ethics) (Davidson, 1986; Falzon, 1998, p.101; O’Leary, 2002, p.9; Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005, p.843). Like ‘archaeology’ and ‘genealogy’, Foucault does not use the term ‘ethics’ in a conventionally philosophical way. The methodological importance of ‘ethics’ is the shift in understanding how subjects are produced: they are no longer passive recipients of subjugation, but active in reflexively observing discourses and social practices that shape their perceptions of others and themselves. In this way, “ethics neither displaces genealogy or archaeology nor makes them irrelevant, but it does alter the final methodological implications of both” (Davidson, 1986, p.230).

Foucault was often criticised for not providing an ethical alternative to that which he critiqued (see for example Falzon’s [1998, pp.16–19] discussion of Habermas’ critique of Foucault). But Foucault was not interested in replacing one set of rules with another, nor was he tempted to tell others
what they should do (Foucault in Kritzman, 1988, p.52). Foucault’s ethics is not to ‘lay down the law’, but to analyse it. In this way, my analysis does not seek to provide a prescription for other researchers in the way that they undertake their research relationships. Rather, I am offering a discussion of the ways in which researchers can reflexively understand how they come to determine what is ethical and what is not.

In Foucault’s analytic what people usually refer to as ‘ethics’ are moral codes, while ‘morality’ comprises three domains:

- a moral code
- the behaviour of people under that code
- the way that people “constitute themselves as moral subjects of a code” (O’Leary, 2002, p.11).

This enables Foucault’s analytic to be quite separate from the social and legal institutions that his work sought to expose as generating a series of discursive truth-games (Foucault, 1994b, pp.255–256; O’Leary, 2002, pp.7–9). In his own words he explains:

in general, we have to distinguish, where the history of morals is concerned, acts and moral code. The acts [conduits] are the real behaviour of people in relation to the moral code [prescriptions] imposed on them. I think we have to distinguish between the code that determines which acts are permitted or forbidden and the code that determines the positive or negative value of the different possible behaviours ... another side to the moral prescriptions ... the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport a soi, which I call ethics, and which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions. (Foucault, 1994b, p.263)

The ethics, the relationship with oneself, suggest a form of reflexivity embedded within discourses and social practices that position the self—this is positionality. Ethics is not a confession measured against the qualities of an ideal universal self. Rather, developing ethical subjectivity is about creating domains of concern for oneself: domains of concern about the knowledge and power relations that shape oneself.
These domains of reflexive, positional concern are four-fold. Foucault terms them ethical substance; mode of subjection; self-forming activity; and telos (Foucault, 1994b, pp.263–266). According to Foucault’s analytic, “it’s not always the same part of ourselves, or our behaviour, which is relevant for ethical judgment” (Foucault, 1983, p.238). The ‘ethics’, the reflexive domains of concern, are not to be interpreted as prescriptions for what is moral. Rather, they are a methodological means for reflexive interrogation of social practices (discourse). For example, the ‘ethical substance’ is the part of self that discourse suggests is of moral concern: substance may be mental or physical; it may be a personal virtue or an act (Foucault, 1994b, p.263). The ‘mode of subjection’ is about how discourse shapes ways of relating to rules and obligations (Davidson, 1994, p.118). The ‘self-forming activity’ is how discourse prescribes what kind of “ethical work one performs on oneself in order to be an ethical subject” (Davidson, 1994, p.118). Finally, telos is the ethical goal, “the mode of being at which one aims in behaving ethically” (Davidson, 1994, p.118), as determined by discourse.

My argument suggests that these four domains of ethical subjectivity are useful for evaluating ‘participation’ as a discourse. Participatory researchers strive towards a form of ‘participatory nirvana’ (Cornwall, 2008a, p.271), seeking ‘authentic’ empowerment as an ethical goal (Baistow, 1994). Participation in the context of decolonisation seeks to produce a researcher who acts as a facilitator for emancipation through knowledge (such as Freire’s conscientisation [Manzo & Brightbill, 2007, p.37]), who self-negates in order to reverse the distribution of power of the colonial gaze. The ethics of participation attributes qualities of behaviour and personal accountability that privilege the local, Indigenous and marginalised in order to attain an ethical goal. However, this rationale cannot cope with internal resistance to its goals. Researchers who experience resistance to their ‘facilitation’ cannot fathom that ‘the oppressed’ might resist emancipation. Rather, the counter-colonial participatory researcher believes that they have not accurately and adequately served the interests of ‘the oppressed’, that they have failed to create correct conditions for empowering participation, that failure is their fault because they ‘possess’ power over others. This belief in the reversal, the redistribution, of power—as a commodity—is problematic because it cannot account for resistance.
As my case study shows, there is a dislocation between participatory theory (which does not recognise resistance) and practice (the actual behaviour of people in a social field). By considering how researchers create their ‘ethical subjectivity’, this dislocation can be explained. Social practices are complex intersections of power-knowledge; they are constantly jostling, shifting, reinscribing, resisting. Social practices are embodied, emotional and unstable: power-knowledge relations are not mechanistic or mindless but corporeal (Falzon, 1998, p.44). Foucault’s ethics are about people understanding what surrounds and shapes them: relationships with others, rules and obligations, the things that are said, and those that are unsaid. Simultaneously, moral problems are not conceived at a purely individual level, but within a social context of technologies, authorities, explanations and subjectivities that shape ‘self’ (Rose, 1999). As Cornwall (pers. comm. August 2009) notes, “engagement in participatory research shapes the subjectivity of the research facilitator as well as those whom the research facilitator seeks to engage in the work …this is not recognised enough, and is an important experiential dimension of participatory research”.

Analysing the ethics of participation shows how power relations (as a set of reversible relationships [Foucault, 2005, p.252]) connect and define ‘the researcher’ and ‘the participants’. For, “we continually encounter the other, influence [her], exert power over [her], and at the same time are influenced by [her] in turn” (Falzon, 1998, p.89). By considering power relations, this approach enables recognition of the participants’ choices and decisions within the research process (as well as those of the researcher). This approach enables me to reflect upon the effects of these choices and decisions in my research practices. The participants in the research are not ‘docile bodies’ or ‘research subjects’: the participants are active in their knowledge-power of shaping my subjectivity as much as I am shaping theirs.

The idea that subjects can enter into an “active process of self-formation within discourse” (Rabinow, 1984, p.11) is a departure from readings of Foucault’s subjects as inhuman, mechanistic, docile bodies.

19 Falzon uses a dehumanising grammar referring to the Other as ‘it’, which I have rejected and replaced with a pronoun more appropriate to my case study.
dominated by omnipresent state surveillance. Throughout my argument, I consider the way in which we constitute ourselves according to the moral codes that prescribe behaviour, the activities and practices we undertake in order to be considered ethical by the institutions we operate within, and the social fields and relationships developed within the research process. I use the term ‘social field’ as “a multiplicity of ‘force relations’, of shifting, mobile, open-ended interplays” (Falzon, 1998, p.44). As a method, this view of ethics differs from pre-ontologically ‘encountering’ the other (for example Levinas, 1985): it involves power relations through activities and action, which might also incorporate refusal on the part of others. Ethical encounters are not a one-sided dialogue with an ‘other’ but are multiple, unpredictable and internal. This approach to ethics also enables analysis of how ‘others’ are discursively constructed prior to our relationships with them. Hence, I am able to consider consent to enter participatory spaces, and varying forms of resistance to participation.

**From the ancients to oneself**

Foucault developed his account of ethics from studying ancient Rome and Greece. The literature he drew from included Cicero, Epictetus, Hippocrates, Marcus Aurelius, Plato, Plutarch and Seneca (Foucault, 2005, pp.xxxi-xli). Of the various concepts he used to explore ethics genealogically, *epimeleia heautou* and *cura sui* emerged as the levers for making his case. *Epimeleia heautou* was pivotal because it enabled Foucault to explain ‘ethics’ as multi-faceted: incorporating a general standpoint (comprising relations with others); a certain form of reflexive attention; and a form of praxis (Foucault, 2005, pp.10–11):

... *epimeleia heautou*, which means taking care of one’s self. It does not mean simply being interested in one’s self, nor does it mean having a certain tendency to self-attachment or self-fascination. *Epimeleia heautou* is a very powerful word in Greek which means “working on” or “being concerned with” something. ... That which a doctor does in the course of caring for a patient is *epimeleia heautou*. It is therefore a very powerful word; it describes a sort of work, an activity; it implies attention, knowledge, technique. (Foucault, 1994b, p.269)
A similar concept to epimeleia heautou—gnōthi seauton—formed the moral imperative of the ‘Othering’ process in the European ‘science of man’. Rousseau states in his Discourse on Inequality: “the inscription on the Temple of Delphi [Know Thyself] …contains a precept which is more important and more challenging than all the heavy tomes of moralists” (1755 [1984, p.67]).

Foucault (2005, p.3) juxtaposes epimeleia heautou with the Delphic prescription ‘know yourself’ (gnōthi seauton) to argue that although the phrase ‘know yourself’ is indicative of the subject’s knowledge of their relation to truth, in ancient Greece it did not prescribe a moral imperative, but rather a demand for “prudence” when approaching the oracle (Foucault, 2005, p.4). In Foucault’s analytic, the demand to develop a form of reflexive attention on the self can be understood as ‘self knowing oneself’, so the terms are entwined, despite primacy of ‘know yourself’ in Western philosophy over the relatively obscure epimeleia heautou.

But what is Foucault referring to as ‘self’? Is it a substantive, autonomous individual, with ‘free will’ and agency? In part, suggestions that Foucault reneged on his previous ideas in order to ‘re-introduce the subject’ (Falzon, 1998, p.52) stem from the way language is understood across cultures: particularly the issue of reflexive grammar. The English title ‘The care of the self’ given to volume three of The History of Sexuality, is a technically problematic translation of the Greek, Latin and French terms used by Foucault in his writings about ethics. O’Leary (2002, pp.119–120) explains that the terms Foucault uses epimeleia heautou, cura sui, and souci de soi, are all reflexive pronouns which translate into ‘self-care’. Foucault does not use a definitive article in the way that the well-known English translation does. ‘Care of the self’ is literally souci du soi (de + le = du). In using the non–definitive (souci de soi) Foucault is not dealing with a substantive form called ‘the self’ (le soi) but is referring to ‘self’ as a pronoun meaning ‘oneself’. As English verbs do not grammatically express reflexivity (relying on pronouns for this effect), there is a potential reading of the infinitive ‘to care’ as indicating a fundamental shift in Foucault’s thinking towards a substantive ‘self’ possessing agency and free will.

Souci is a noun derivative of a reflexive verb (se soucier de), which means ‘care’ in the context of worry and concern. Souci de soi is much better
explained as self-consideration as a cause for concern (that which warrants attention) rather than satiating physical needs, help or comfort. In this way, it is not to be confused with feminist ethics of care derivative of Carol Gilligan’s writings on female moral deliberation (Baggini & Fosl, 2007, pp.12–14); nor is it to be confused with what Foucault describes as the Californian ‘cult of the self’ (Foucault, 1994b, p.271). My preference is to use rapport à soi, which means a ‘relationship concerned with oneself’. This preference is sourced from the quote discussed earlier (Foucault, 1994b, p.263) (see page 78 of this thesis).

Deleuze’s (1988, p.100) reading of Foucault’s ethics expresses the reflexivity inherent in the language. He describes the relation to oneself as ‘folding’, which leads to a reflection. Folding occurs in the context of relations with others that repeat difference rather than reproduce the same (Deleuze, 1988, p.98). Similarly, Kendall and Wickham state, “the subject is produced out of the doubling of force upon itself, the attention to self” (1999, p.53). By bending and folding subjective understandings of self and other, metaphors of the practical exercises involved in *epimeleia heautou* emerge. Foucault (2005, p.500) refers more concretely to methods such as the importance of listening, the importance of writing and the importance of meditations. The reflexive process of ‘folding’, of self concerned with itself, differs from what is usually understood as ‘self-understanding’, rather:

Reflection is no longer a matter of reflecting on ourselves in order to discover an essential nature that will ground our forms of thought and action. Rather, it is a turn to history in order to comprehend ourselves, the principles we live by, our ways of acting, in their finitude, their historical emergence and specificity. (Falzon, 1998, p.69)

Given I have discussed reflexivity, it is important not to neglect the idea of positionality, that is, the importance of this form of reflection being attached to ‘a history of the present’: “Human action within discourse is always positional, that is, it always occurs through a subject position inhabiting a space between the two poles of knowledge, the discursive and the non-discursive” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p.53). By locating oneself within the history of the present, the multiple effects of knowledge-power that shape and surround oneself become apparent while attempting to relate with others
'ethically'. Foucault refers to this as 'governing' the self (in contrast to being governed directly by coercive measures of the state). This means self-positioning oneself within discourse, within power relations with others, and in regards to the kind of knowledge others possess of the self.

**Rapport à soi: oneself & others**

My discussion of Foucault’s ethics has so far focused on the idea of subjectivity and oneself. But discussion of Foucault’s ethics must also incorporate consideration of how ‘others’ simultaneously constitute the ‘self’, for “the other is indispensable for the practice of the self to arrive at the self at which it aims” (Foucault, 2005, p.127). This process of relating self with other is synchronistic: the process of subjectification (shaping oneself through power and knowledge) involves measuring, comparing and contrasting oneself with others. That is, to be concerned with oneself there must always be a boundary (self/other) that enables the constitutive elements of the self to develop. This undertaking is pervasive: every person is in the process of constituting their ‘self’ by subjectifying others.

For example, Henkel and Stirrat’s (2001) contribution to the ‘participation as tyranny’ debate (Cooke & Kothari, 2001) suggests that claims of empowerment made by participatory approaches to development are a benevolent attempt to “reshape the personhood of the participants” (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001, p.182). This argument suggests that while participatory practitioners think they are acting as moral agents, they are actually subjectifying participants. Such an accusation suggests that subjectification simply equates to ‘tyrannical’ and oppressive behaviour, which reinscribes roles of obligatory transformation (such as ‘marginalised person’ to ‘empowered person’). I do not disagree with Henkel and Stirrat’s critique; however, I do consider their conclusions neglect to recognise that the process of subjectification is unavoidable. Subjectification of others is not a causative effect of participatory discourse: it is a transversal effect of the knowledge and power that positions our ‘gaze’. Participants gaze upon the researcher during the process too.

The key point here is to consider the difference between the process of subjectification (of others) and the process of developing an ethical
subjectivity. Recognising that all persons possess the ability to ‘gaze’ upon another evokes the relational mechanics of Foucault’s ethics. As such, it is the researcher’s relationship with the participants that shapes the constitution of their self. To develop an ethical subjectivity the researcher begins to ask critical questions about subjectification such as:

- Why do I feel the participants in my research require empowerment through using a participatory research approach?
- How is my health status/ economic status/ level of education/ experience of interpersonal violence/ experience of racism/ the colour of my skin etc. different from the participants in the research?
- How do I know of these differences? Do I compare and contrast myself with others to articulate difference? What measures of normalisation do I call upon to articulate difference?
- Am I an empowered subject? What privileges do I know I have? What privileges do the participants believe I have? How does this affect our relations with each other?
- What actions should I take to recognise difference and privilege in relation to participants?
- What do I know of how others perceive my motives and actions?

These questions reflect worry or concern about the role of the self in relation to others. Therefore, it is not only the self-constitution of our subjectivities through discourse (social practices, discursive rules, institutions) that are of concern to our ethics. It is also the way we constitute knowledge about ourselves in relation to others. The product of this process of comparing and contrasting oneself with others (a dynamic relationship of constituting knowledge) enables decisions about who gives instructions and who follows instructions, who governs and who is governed, who is responsible and who is in need of care. The notion of governing is what bridges rapport à soi into relating ethically with others because “it is the power over oneself that thus regulates one’s power over others” (Foucault, 1994c, p.288).

‘Governmentality’ is a product of the relationship between oneself and others. Foucault defines governmentality in a number of ways, including, for
example, as a regime of sovereign power emergent in Europe during the eighteenth century (Foucault, 2007, p.388). For my argument I use the following definition:

‘Governmentality’ implies the relationship of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of ‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other. (Foucault, 1994c, p.300)

Governmentality is not only about techniques of the state to control citizens; it is also about the ways in which citizens internalise various discourses in the process of governing themselves. Power relations exist everywhere and between everyone; therefore “the analysis of governmentality—that is to say, of power as a set of reversible relationships—must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to self” (Foucault, 2005, p.252). Foucault’s ethics are about shaping oneself to consider oneself as an ethical citizen; they are about governing oneself in order to ethically govern others:

[T]he person who takes care of [her]self properly—that is to say, the person who has in fact analysed what things depend on [her] and what things do not depend on [her]—when [she] has taken care of [herself] so that when something appears in [her] representations [she] knows what [she] should and should not do, [she] will at the same time know how to fulfil [her] duties as part of the human community. (Foucault, 2005, p.197)

By using Foucault’s ethics, I have a lens to see how researchers and their relationships with others are shaped by discourses, definitions of power, and categorisations of humanity (whether female or male, Indigenous or non-Indigenous, young or old). The purpose of my argument is to discuss how deliberations towards social justice are made, how certain types of people (ethical and unethical) are constructed, and how alterity is employed to create remedial forms of participation. By reflexively remembering that “the self is a product of social processes, not their origin” (Young, 1990, p.45) and occurs “within regulated cultural and decision making processes” (Young, 20___).

20 I have altered the gender specificity in this quote to apply it more appropriately to the subjective quality of voice presented in this argument.
1990, p.33), the way people understand themselves in the context of social practices, institutions and regulations, decisions they make, and participatory methods they employ become visible. For “the ways in which participants are constructed by others—and perceive themselves to be constructed—within any given space for participation means that they are never neutrally positioned players” (Cornwall, 2004, p.84). Hence, developing an ethical subjectivity involves asking questions about:

how they see you, how you see them, how they think you might see them, how you want them to see you, what they want and need, what you want and need, what they think you need, what you think they need, how much they adhere to mainstream or colonized ways of thinking, how much you adhere to mainstream or colonized ways of thinking ... how much they trust you [and] how much you need to be in control. (Zolner, 2003, pp.108–109)

My argument now turns to consider some of the ethics discourses that I have identified which are relevant to the way participatory research constructs values of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ processes and outcomes. This establishes the basis of claims of moral authority made by participatory methods to achieve social justice through empowerment.

**Some tenets of participatory ethics**

Applying Foucault’s ethics to participatory discourse reveals three particular examples of ethics: Care Ethics, Communicative Ethics, and Communitarianism. These views of morality are important points of distinction for my argument because they all inform the rationale of ‘participation’. Each of these principles comes from a rich and extensive tradition (Honderich, 1995) that differs in ethical reasoning from the approach adopted in this thesis. In using Foucault’s ethics I am attempting to identify philosophical tenets that underpin the moral basis of participation. And this enables me to identify the kinds of values through which researchers applying participatory methods develop their goals and knowledge about themselves. In doing so, my analysis differs from discussions about principles of bio-ethics (Frank & Jones, 2003).

Care Ethics view determinations of justice by the quality of relationships. Rather than subscribing to a universal rule defining justice, Care Ethics
maintain "that ethical decisions arise through caring in a way that’s different from the way they arise when rules and principles decide things: they hold that care isn’t just another virtue but that instead it’s basic to ethical reflection in itself" (Baggini & Fosl, 2007, p.13). Care Ethics became articulated as a form of female moral deliberation, in contrast to masculine constructions of justice using rational autonomy (also categorised as White and bourgeois [Young, 1990, p.110]). As noted earlier, the focus on relational accountability in participatory research makes Care Ethics relevant to how researchers construct themselves as ethical.

Communicative Ethics are sometimes called ‘discourse ethics’. Here ‘discourse’ is a linguistic term, and describes a dialogic process. Foucault and Habermas had famous disagreements about ethics (Foucault, 1984, p.373) because in Communicative Ethics, Habermas argues for ‘foundational ethics’ over relativism (Falzon, 1998, p.3). In Habermas’ terms, discourse is a universal model for determining ethics in communication with others: reason can be achieved not by individual determination, but through a process of dialogue (Mohan, 1999; Van Der Ret, 2008):

Habermas’ discourse ethics leads those engaged in ethical reflection to criticize and regulate their reflection: Have alternative resolutions and conceptions of this issue been explored? Have participants assessed the way in which the consequences of alternatives will affect every participant, and has everyone potentially affected been able to participate? (Baggini & Fosl, 2007, p.68)

Iris Marion Young writes about the importance of formulating justice through the relational by drawing from Habermas’ Communicative Ethics. But she then challenges its implicit universalism:

Despite the possibilities of a communicative ethics, Habermas himself retains a commitment to the ‘moral point of view’ as that of a ‘generalized other,’ in which the reasoning subject abstracts from her or his own concrete contexts of need, desire, and commitment and regards others from this general standpoint. (Young, 1990, p.118)

Part of the problem for ‘participation’ as a moral goal is the idea that the only alternative to “a unitary metaphysical vision” (Falzon, 1998, p.4) is fragmentation (expressed pejoratively as ethical relativism). Resistance is
viewed as a threat because it fragments goals of social justice. This complex debate between ‘relativism’ and ‘universalism’ is long-standing, and I do not claim to solve these differences. Rather, it is important to consider how we come to judge ‘relativism’ or ‘universalism’ as central moral features of social justice. Using Foucault’s ethics as a methodology enables one to adopt a critical stance, and always remember the social, political and historical contexts that shape the composition of subjectivities in participatory spaces.

Communitarianism is another normative (universalist) moral code (Callahan, 2003) that informs the moral impetus for ‘deep’ and ‘transformative’ participation. In this model of moral deliberation, ‘community’ is ontologically prior to individual identity (Popke, 2003): asserting, “humans have the discursive power to ‘articulate situated moral rules that are grounded in local community and group understanding’” (Christians, 2005, p.151). Communitarian moral deliberation attests a dialogic process (like Communicative Ethics) with a “multi-cultural vision of community that seeks to honour difference” (Christians, 2005, pp.155–158). When applied to the research context in practice with Indigenous research participants:

This model directs scholars to take up moral projects that respect and reclaim indigenous cultural practices. Such work produces spiritual, social, and psychological healing, which in turn leads to multiple forms of transformation at the personal and social levels. (Denzin, 2005, p.953)

The remedial promises of participatory transformation are fundamental to the vision of social justice Communitarian Ethics strives towards. However, Young suggests some reservations: “Communitarianism represents an urge to see persons in unity with one another in a shared whole” (Young, 1990, p.229). Again, resistance to emancipation and transformation cannot be accounted for because Communitarianism represents “an urge to unity, the unity of subjects with one another. The ideal of community expresses a longing for harmony among persons and mutual understanding” (Young, 1990, p.229). The problem with this vision of ethics is it creates a narrative of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’, of external forces of colonisation threatening the good will of a harmonious community (Sewell, 2001). It simplifies ‘community’ and social relations, and creates impermeable borders of inclusion and exclusion according to what is valued as ‘harmonious’ or discordant. The contestations and complexity of
power relations within participatory practices are not accounted for in this model of ethics, and yet ‘community’ is a central concept to the moral claims of ‘participation’. I will discuss this in further detail in Chapter 7, ‘Everything’s by Word of Mouth’.

Moral approaches such as Care Ethics, Communicative Ethics and Communitarianism are reproduced in many of the discourses that prescribe how to relate ethically with Indigenous participants. Each of these moral codes suggests an answer or a truth that can be achieved to decolonise, and each of these approaches suggest “a desire for a better, less fragmented world ...a redemptive fantasy that attempts to overcome history and the ongoing effects of colonisation” (Jones with Jenkins, 2008, p.482). Each of these ethics partially reveal why resistance to participation is so unpalatable. Foucault’s ethics enable critical reflection about why resistance is attributed negative rather than productive qualities, and similarly, how these ethics seek to mitigate the negative effects of power through remedial forms of participation.

In this chapter I have argued for a reflexive and critical approach to understanding ethics. The next part of my argument considers how regulations, institutions and rules for constructing ‘authentic’ participatory research projects have become established, internalised and ethical. I move towards a partial history of the present context of remedial, counter-colonial participation in research.
CHAPTER 4 REGULATING INDIGENOUS RESEARCH

An invited space (Cornwall, 2004, p.76) is a social field constituted and delineated by subjectivities. The previous chapter outlined theoretical tools for considering how researchers develop an ethical subjectivity. I now turn to consider the historical contingencies that shape and inform relationships between subjectivities within counter-colonial participatory spaces. Considering historical contingencies is an attempt to make the connections between decolonisation, counter-colonial research methods and the remedial qualities of participation visible. In this chapter I will show how ‘participation’ in research has come to be a ‘right’ claimed by Indigenous subjectivities. I will also discuss why exercising this right in practice can be fraught and complex: participating in research means engaging with a system of knowledge that always carries the potential to reinscribe colonial power. The historical contexts I provide in this chapter are at the basis of counter-colonial research relationships. These historical contexts form the premise on which researchers understand their obligations to institutions and to the people with whom they undertake research.

Institutions and their rules inform social practices such as research relationships. In order to understand better the kinds of subjectivities that inhabit invited spaces, I will connect the formation of “people and statements” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p.26). This prompts me to ask questions such as:

- How have universities come to judge research relationships according to bio-medical principles of experimental testing?
- How have dividing practices been reclaimed by Indigenous groups in order to argue for distinctive rights to participate in research?
- How does the shift from ‘protection’ from (bio-medical) harm to ‘the right to participate’ shape the subjectivities of researchers in relation to participants?

To address these questions, I first consider the emergence of regulatory ethics codes for research. Following this, I discuss a rights-based construct of
Indigeneity on a global scale. I show how this intersected with a global redefinition of ‘health’ to place emphasis on self-determination and the social determinants of health. As I will discuss, this intersection resulted in a culturally distinctive set of ethics guidelines for any discipline of research involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

**Ethics and research regulation**

Research subjects have not always been protected through ethical regulation. To understand why there are now formal protocols for protecting the rights of human research subjects, it is crucial to consider why governments consider research a worthwhile activity. My departure point is the early twentieth century, when research became an essential component of modernisation. By ascertaining ‘truth’ and ‘facts’, research enables the development of new technologies to ‘improve’ all spheres of life (Cooper & Packard, 1997). In terms of research involving human subjects, bio-medical research continues to be an influential domain for developing technologies to care for and govern populations. The tenets of bio-medical research are specific to Western European cultural concepts of knowledge (Christakis, 1992), often described as ‘logical empiricism’ or ‘positivism’—making truth claims according to a doctrine of ‘verifiability’ (Honderich, 1995, p.508). Medical research has a focus on empirical fact-finding, which legitimates methods for testing hypotheses: “A fundamentally rational and experimental science, Western medicine holds research in very high esteem and bases its power upon it” (Christakis, 1992, p.1079). Bio-medical research is therefore crucial to activities such as maintaining public health, curing disease, and the humanist tradition of ‘mapping the body’. Subjectivities in this paradigm comprise a researcher who seeks to ascertain truth about population groups by aggregating the results of controlled tests on research subjects.

At this point it is important to make a distinction between the role of a doctor caring for a patient and the role of a researcher in relation to a research subject. Although both of these relationships are located in a medical paradigm, different morals underpin them. Prior to World War One, doctor–patient relationships were founded on the basis of trust in the doctor as an expert, and the therapeutic context of the relationship (Hazelgrove, 2002, p.122).
With the onset of World War One, a rapid quest for increased medical knowledge transformed doctor-patient care into a composite of researcher and their human subject. This relationship was underpinned by a utilitarian ethic to strengthen military tactics. Medicine was an important technology of the state, which required testing on humans as ‘experimentation’ in order to improve knowledge about biological warfare. Under this ethic of utilitarianism, conscientious objectors became guinea pigs in hospital trials for vaccines with a high risk of harm (Hazelgrove, 2002, p.115). Medical testing was no longer simply about finding a cure for disease, but involved testing for harmful effects. The Nuremberg Trials (1946–1947) revealed extreme violations of human rights exercised for the purposes of ‘research’. But as an exhibition of post-war punishment, the trials also demonstrated to the general public that authorities in America and England were able to discipline their own research endeavours to effect civic trust in state-sanctioned medical experiments. As Hazelgrove suggests, “the predominantly utilitarian ethic that underpinned British attitudes to knowledge gained through medical atrocities was consistent with government sponsored experimentation practices” (2002, p.114). Nuremberg demonstrated to the public the trustworthiness and ethical veracity of medical research authorities in America and England (Hazelgrove, 2002, p.111). Governments needed to maintain legitimacy for their own research activities through formalised systems of regulatory accountability. The crucial contingency at this point was the introduction of a regulatory code to outline the ‘rights’ of human subjects in research.

Despite the existence of the Nuremberg Code (1948), the 1950s and 1960s revealed continuing unethical practices in English teaching hospitals (Hazelgrove, 2002, pp. 118–120; Israel & Hay, 2006, p.32). One of the first members of the World Medical Association (WMA) and editor of the British Medical Journal during this period was particularly concerned with professional ethics (Hazelgrove, 2002, p.117)—he saw the damage caused to the credibility of bio-medicine and the status of doctor-patient trust by the details of the Nuremberg trials: this had the potential to erode the status of the medical profession and the legitimacy of knowledge produced by it. Consequently, the WMA was the first professional organisation to produce a global code of ethical conduct for its members. The Helsinki Declaration
(1964) extended the ten-point Nuremberg Code, constituted by twelve universal points with a non context-specific application (Israel & Hay, 2006, p.34). As a professional body, the World Medical Association's rules of conduct created a formalised system of knowledge that produced certain 'types' of professional relationships (ethical/unethical), types of research method (ethical/unethical); and types of participants (consenting/non-consenting).

The introduction of a supra-national professional code stimulated a proliferation of regulatory instruments within the laws of nation-states. In the United States, the 'National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bio-medical and Behaviour Research' was established in 1974. Five years later the Commission produced 'The Belmont Report' (1979), which shifted away from a code to the 'broader principles' of respect for persons, beneficence and justice (Israel & Hay, 2006, p.35). This discursive shift was important for the construction of subjectivities: no longer would a code explicitly prescribe which behaviours were admissible or inadmissible. By creating a set of 'principles', a moral, personal, value-laden series of decisions about ethics would need to be made by researchers, and by the committees who judged the research. This shift was an example of a technology of 'governing the soul' (Rose, 1999).

Eventually the institutional regulation of research practices was to extend to all disciplines of research involving human subjects. During the 1970s the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare oversaw the National Institute of Health's 'Office for Protection from Research Risks', and extended the tying of funding (which had existed for bio-medical grants since 1966) into a rule that "all research conducted in institutions receiving DHEW funds be exposed to an IRB [institutional review board] review comparable with that applying to bio-medical work" (Israel & Hay, 2006, p.42). This was the beginning of what is known as 'The Common Rule': the broad application of the Belmont Report principles across all disciplines (and, as I will soon discuss, this continues to resonate in ethical regulation of research in Australia today).

When researchers employ the Common Rule, they draw upon four principles: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice
(Israel & Hay, 2006, p.18). Known as 'principilism', this set of ethics "emerged as a practical and 'objectively transparent' means of dealing with ethical decisions when state intervention emerged" (Israel & Hay, 2006, p.18). In effect, principilism is a technology of normalisation that enables administrative surveillance of research processes (for example, a focus on written informed consent as a form of accountability). Review committees could vet research using foundational interpretations of the Common Rule set out as 'applications'. The most commonly cited are no harm, fully informed consent, no deception and the protection of privacy and confidentiality of participants (Lincon & Guba, 2003, pp.221–222). Just as Foucault distinguished between moral codes and people's actual behaviour, the introduction of the Common Rule did not necessarily make research practices more ethical. Its function was to regulate and govern research practices so that the knowledge produced by the research remained legitimate. Nevertheless, despite a set of administrative ethical principles, the 1970s saw American prisons, public lavatories and social laboratories (Punch, 1998, pp.167–168) become sites of ethical controversy in medical and behavioural research.

The administrative results of ethical regulation and surveillance saw discursive strategies for determining, proving, accounting for, measuring and evaluating ethics (Koro-Ljungberg, Gemignani, Brodeur & Kmiec, 2007): consent forms had to be signed by all participants, information sheets about the research had to be provided, and an evaluation of risks be discussed. The technique of calculating the 'ethical outcomes' of research operates through the correlating the precept of beneficence with the calculation of 'risk' (Haggerty, 2004; Johnson, 2008). Beneficence has been transformed from its origins in deontological philosophy to the now ideologically dominant mode of calculating the probability of events (O'Malley, 1996). Haggerty refers to risk as a "science where statistics about previous events are used to analyze the likelihood of future untoward potentialities" (2004, p.402). Calculated risk is applied as a means for determining 'beneficence' in institutional review. By providing evidence of the probability of events, a positivist research proposal can convince the system that there is little risk of harm, or potential litigation towards the university. The application of ethics regulation resulted in new ways for researchers to measure their ethics, and to engage in strategic tactics for endorsement by ethical review committees. Relationships between
the researcher and their subjects became calculated according to indicators of risk.

The process of writing ‘passable’ research proposals involves constructing scenarios in which the relationship between the researcher and the participant will result in minimal harm (Haggerty, 2004). Designing research to mitigate harm holds methodological implications for the way knowledge is framed, collected and determined. Some critiques of institutional ethics regulation term positivist review of all research as a form of ‘methodological conservatism’. At the core of the problem is “the idea that the researcher-researched relationship ought to be objective and distanced” (Lincoln & Guba, 2003, p.228).

Regulatory ethics guidelines are instruments that shape practical determinants of research relationships by creating discursive boundaries and protocols. Researchers may be required to provide interview schedules or details of how recruitment strategies will maintain anonymity between participants to protect confidentiality and privacy. For researchers undertaking ethnographic research in a ‘naturalistic field setting’, this may create constraints on the development of rapport with participants the relationship with whom should “not be restricted to the moments of entry, exit, and data collection but extended beyond the scope of …academic needs” (Bhattacharya, 2007, p.1100). Bhattacharya points out problems in the presentation of a singular consent form template to multiple participants, which is imbued with “characterization [that] assumes a homogenous understanding of methodology, methods, implementation, and negotiations of multiple un/planned circumstances while conducting research” (2007, p.1108). As Punch concurs:

[T]here are simply no easy answers provided by general codes to these situational ethics in fieldwork …my position is that a professional code of ethics is beneficial as a guideline that alerts researchers to the ethical dimensions of their work, particularly prior to entry. I am not arguing that the field–worker should abandon all ethical considerations once he or she has gotten in, but rather that informed consent is unworkable in some sorts of observational research. (1998, p.171)
Van den Hoonaard (2006, pp. 263–264) extends this analysis to suggest that fieldwork as a methodology is now in decline because of the close, unstructured relationships it builds between researchers and participants. Noting a slump in field-based research reports (in Canada) since the introduction of regulatory codes, Van den Hoonaard suggests there is now a homogenisation of social science and humanities methods, with particular precedence given to interviews as the sole data-gathering technique: “The ‘interview’ has come to occupy a dominant position in contemporary methodology because it approximates an approach that medical researchers are more familiar with that any other social-science method” (2006, p.264).

While theories of the relational are now intrinsic to many social research approaches (such as participatory research), the problem still remains that to pass ethical review researchers must account for ‘measurable’ harms and risks associated with their endeavours (Boser, 2007; Brydon-Miller & Greenwood, 2006; De Tardo Bora, 2004). The political contexts of knowledge production therefore coalesce with the construction of researcher subjectivities, and the subjectivities of research participants: in order to pass regulatory review a certain kind of relationship is discursively formed. The context of participatory research relationships can now be viewed as complex for authorities to regulate, and for researchers to determine what exactly is ethical in their practices.

The Australian system is connected to the genesis of the American system of institutional review. Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) responded with post–Helsinki documentation in 1966, and in 1985 stipulated that all NHMRC-funded work required ethical review. In 1999 the NHMRC stated that all institutions receiving NHMRC funding must apply ethical review to all research involving humans (irrespective of whether the project was health-related or directly funded by the NHMRC) (Israel & Hay, 2006, p.48). The National Health and Medical Research Council’s guidelines have had several iterations, the most recent of which was released in 2007 (titled the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans). Ethics review committees comprise an array of subjectivities that represent professional expertise (pastoralism, the law,
medicine) to review principles of ethical conduct: research merit and integrity, justice, beneficence and respect (NHMRC, 2007, pp. 13–14).

Feminist critiques of the Australian system (Halse & Honey, 2005; Halse & Honey, 2007) highlight the complexity of determining what is ethical within such an administrative, institutional framework. Although several groups are given ‘special consideration’ within the National Statement (NHMRC, 2007), the only group to have a distinguishable set of ethical values are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (NHMRC, 1991; 2003; 2005). To consider how a different set of values produce a different set of subjectivities in relating ‘ethically’ with Indigenous Australians, I now turn to consider how such a regulatory system might define and employ the term ‘Indigeneity’. Indeed, it now follows to consider how it has come to be that Indigenous Australians are the only group to be able to claim a different set of ethical values applied in research.

Indigenous rights, human rights

Development studies (and many other disciplines) tend to divide the world into North/South contexts as a way of delineating the colonisers from the colonised (Schutte, 2000). Given my case study’s ‘Antipodean’ location, such neat dividing practices cannot be unproblematically employed. As such, I will outline a specific context for using the term ‘Indigenous’21 in my argument. When I am referring to ‘Indigenous’ people, I refer to literature from Australia, Aotearoa/New Zealand and Canada. Indigenous peoples from Australia, Aotearoa/New Zealand and Canada remain colonised by a British Head of State, and have similar Anglophonic experiences of colonisation. While the non– Indigenous populations of these states enjoy comparative economic prosperity, high standards of living, health, housing and education (viz. ABS, 2004; Hunter, 1999; 2006), their Indigenous counterparts experience the effects of institutional racism and cultural genocide which manifest in pathologies of high incarceration rates, high unemployment and poor health in comparison to ‘mainstream society’ (Cunningham, Cass & Arnold, 2005; Ring & O’Brien, 2007). Indigenous peoples’ status is often defined by the kinds of

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21 Indigeneity is a contested and complex concept. Rather than provide a pithy definition, I recognise the diversity and contestations permeating political constructions of ‘Indigeneity’.
‘gap’ I discussed in Chapter 3 (see page 71), and the kind of social justice ‘gap’ I employed as the moral rationale for my case study of participatory research (see page 34).

Indigenous peoples comprise many social groups who determine their collective identity from the specificity of the local (such as relationship with Country, distinct forms of culture and language, their specific experience of colonisation). When I use the term ‘Indigenous’, I do not do this to imply homogeneity. I use this term to discuss the dividing practices employed within discourses that shape subjectivities which distinguish between Indigenous and non-Indigenous. I acknowledge many Indigenous peoples prefer not to use ‘Indigenous’ in favour of local and self-determined identifiers.

‘Indigenous rights’ have not emerged from a political void. They are a result of a global collective rights movement of decolonisation emergent through the United Nations (Battiste & Henderson, 2000, pp.1-8; Blaser, Feit & McRae, 2004, p.2; Davis, 2008; Garkawe, Kelly & Fisher, 2001). Over time, Indigenous peoples and their rights have been framed in particular ‘orders of discourse’. For example, Grosfoguel (2007, p.214) draws connections with the way in which Indigenous peoples have been categorised according to non-Indigenous concepts of ‘rights’ drawn from particular historical contexts (see table below).

Table 3  Orders of discourse for Indigenous rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Century</th>
<th>Indigenous peoples</th>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C16th</td>
<td>People without writing</td>
<td>The rights of people</td>
<td>Sepulveda versus de las Casas (School of Salamanca)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C18th</td>
<td>People without history</td>
<td>Natural rights</td>
<td>Enlightenment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20th</td>
<td>People without development</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Grosfoguel, 2007, p.214

Other commentators note the way in which Article 73 of the UN Charter (1943) refers to ‘peoples’ without self-government, emphasising a
shift from a territorial categorisation into a legal one (Battiste & Henderson, 2000, p.62). According to Chapman, “the use of the term ‘peoples’ in international law implies the right to full self-determination, including political independence” (Chapman, 1994, p.219). These various ways of defining Indigenous rights are only one way of considering Indigenous identities; for “‘Indigenous peoples’ have been provisionally defined in three basic ways: legally/analytically (the ‘other’ definition), practically/strategically (the self-definition), and collectively (the global in group definition)” (Niezen, 2003, p.19).

Although the UN has been pivotal in recognising Indigenous peoples as collective groups, there remain problems in the exercise of collective rights within human rights law. According to some commentators human rights are based upon a ‘radical individualism’ drawn from eighteenth century liberal individualism (Chapman, 1994, p.212). This critique is similar to Smith’s comment that “Indigenous groups argue that legal definitions of ethics are framed in ways which contain the Western sense of the individual and of individualised property” (1999, p.118). Christakis’ work on cross-cultural bio-medical ethics also highlights the social character of self-determining identity according to relations with others:

Western societies stress the individualistic nature of a person and put much emphasis on the individual’s rights, autonomy, self-determination, and privacy. But this is at variance with the more relational definitions of a person found in many non-Western societies which stress the embeddedness of the individual within society and define a person by means of his relations to others. (1992, p.1086)

Iris Marion Young (2004) argues that Indigenous self-determination evolves through relationality rather than territoriality (which suggests separateness and independence). Her argument incorporates feminist critiques of autonomy to consider “relations among peoples and their degrees of distinctiveness are more fluid, relational, and dependent on context” (Young, 2004, p.178). Niezen (2003) and Young (2004) demonstrate the complexity of determining identity by connectedness or difference, and their arguments are useful in considering how subjectivities are developed and shaped when people interact with each other. The ways in which people view one another (and themselves) is context dependent, relational and strategic. Claiming
Indigeneity “is part of a shifting continuum or bricolage of identities ranging from the individual actor to the family, clan, tribal group, language group, village, region, province, nation, and, not least of all, international affiliation” (Niezen, 2003, p.12). Hence, throughout this literature I also treat ‘Indigenous rights’ in a similar way to a productive view of power:

Rights are not fruitfully conceived as possessions. Rights are relationships, not things; they are institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another. Rights refer to doing more than having, to social relationships that enable or constrain action. (Young, 1990, p.25)

Given that I have considered ways in which collective identity is defined, it is now useful to consider how ‘Indigenous rights’ were produced. United Nations’ use of the term ‘Indigenous’ first emerged in 1957 within the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 107, ‘Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi–Tribal Populations in Independent Countries’ (Clark, 2008, p.77). This was highly significant use of language given it was “a time when scholars still commonly referred to subjects of their investigations as “ primitives”” (Niezen, 2003, p.4). The UN’s involvement in the political process of decolonisation began in 1960, when self–determination was introduced as a ‘right’ in Article 2 of the UN General Assembly’s Declaration of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Niezen, 2003, p.41; Blaser et al., 2004, p.5). The legal processes of decolonisation in Africa also fostered a “decolonisation of the mind” (Smith, Battiste, Bell & Findlay, 2002, p.177) amongst Indigenous scholars who began to publish anti-colonial critiques of research in the 1970s (Smith, 2005, p.87). For example, Connell’s account of Libertés (1973) by Paulin Hountondji is of a text “centrally concerned with the connections among intellectual integrity, freedom, and popular participation in political change” (2007, p.103).

During the 1960s, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander activists identified with goals of equality articulated by the Civil Rights movement (most commonly associated with Black rights in America) (Brady, 2004, p.16–19). The struggle for equal recognition under the Commonwealth was realised in constitutional reform in 1967—and it was after this that Aboriginal activists turned attention to the notion of autonomy (Clark, 2008). As Brady notes, ‘equality’ had the potential to translate into policies of assimilation. Mirroring
the politics of the United Nations (the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 [Pritchard, 1998, p.184]), ‘self-determination’ became the official policy for the treatment of ‘Aboriginal Affairs’ under the Whitlam Government when it came to power in 1972 (Brady, 2004, p.20). The first article of the Covenant states: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development” (Pritchard, 1998, p.186). In light of this global discourse of rights during the 1970s “there was a growing recognition among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people that as the original population their status implied an entitlement to certain rights” (Brady, 2004, p.22). It was this political climate which saw the development of the Indigenous rights movement.

The UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP)\(^\text{22}\) was established in 1982 (Pritchard, 1998, p.40). The group worked to articulate collective difference and uniqueness, not only in relationship to land and self-determination rights, but also in ways of knowing and understanding the world as expressions of culture that warranted protection under international agencies such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The international context of this diverse yet synergistic articulation of identity was also crucial to changing the policy of colonising nation-states by arguing a contravention of rights for cultural expression and protection. Professor Mick Dodson’s account of being a part of the group provides insight into the synergies of the movement:

My first session at the UN working Group on Indigenous Populations was a moment of tremendous insight and recognition. I was sitting in a room, 12,000 miles away from home, but if I’d closed my eyes I could just about have been in Maningrida or Doomadgee or Flinders Island. The people wore different clothes, spoke in different languages or with different accents, and their homes had different names. But the stories and the sufferings were the same. We were all part of a world community of Indigenous peoples spanning the

\(^{22}\) It has been argued that the use of the word ‘Populations’ instead of ‘Peoples’ in the title reflects the constraints placed upon the group in its rights to claim self-determination (Dodson, 1998, p.62).
Thus, Indigenous resistance has been a struggle characterised by a global collective push for instruments of international law rather than the violence often associated with ethno-nationalist disputes (Blaser et al., 2004, p.16; Niezen, 2003, p.15). The collective work of delegates of the WGIP led to the United Nations declaring 1993 the International Year of the World's Indigenous people, closely followed by the International Decade for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1994–2004), and eventually the Declaration of Indigenous Rights in 2007.

During the ratification of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in September 2007, the United States of America, Australia, Canada and Aotearoa / New Zealand were the only nation-states to vote against the resolution. More recently, a change in federal administration has resulted in ‘formal support’ (though not legally binding) of the Declaration (Human Rights Commission, 2009). This push for recognition of different rights continues to remain a contested journey, as Behrendt explains:

Some non-Indigenous people feel confused about this seemingly contradictory stance – the claim for ‘equal protection’ and the rejection of the ‘same standards’. Such confusion indicates an inability to grasp the notion that what we Indigenous people are asking for are the same rights but that we seek to exercise them differently ... We all hold these rights by virtue of being human even if we have a different cultural construct of what those rights might mean in practice. (2001, p.4)

‘Differentness’ is not understood on the basis of liberalism and the rights of an individual. Rather ‘differentness’ is the right to exercise collective rights within a system of law (human rights) that privileges the role of the autonomous individual under the power of a sovereign state. The articulation of how Indigenous identity might be expressed is complex and contested because Indigenous Australia comprises heterogeneous cultures expressed

23 The resolution was supported by 148 member states of the UN (with 11 abstainers).
through many different languages, relationships to sea and Country, and knowledge systems. This collective comprises difference and heterogeneity, but is held together by a resistance to liberal individualism.

The developments in international law recognising Indigenous peoples’ rights mirror the processes of decolonisation within other institutions such as universities. A struggle to reclaim intellectual sovereignty exists within arenas such as the academy, and this has ramifications for researchers. It is crucial to consider that the responsibility of researchers to adhere to human rights principles in the ethical conduct of research must begin to engage with Indigeneity as a point of difference. I will now briefly consider rights of intellectual self-determination in the context of universities and the business of research.

**Indigenous knowledges & self-determination**

As I discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the academy represents a colonising force. From Indigenous perspectives, research continues to have the potential to entrench eugenic constructions of race. For example, dehumanising research practices (such as cranial measurements and dissection of cadavers) were used to contribute to a eugenic discourse that legitimated invasion. Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s *Decolonizing Methodologies* begins by reminding the reader “research is probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world’s vocabulary” (Smith, 1999, p.1). Research, measurement and statistics are all governmental technologies that many Indigenous groups continue to find threatening. For example, from Canada:

> [E]pidemiological portraits of Aboriginal sickness and misery act as powerful social instruments for the construction of Aboriginal identity. Epidemiological knowledge constructs an understanding of Aboriginal society that reinforces unequal power relationships; in other words, an image of sick, disorganized communities can be used to justify paternalism and dependency. (O’Neil, Reading & Leader, 1998, p.230)

From Indigenous perspectives, research is perceived as problematising and objectifying (Smith, 1999), and resistance to involvement in research has become a logical reaction: “One Indigenous response to this ‘dirtiness’ has been to reject participation in, and the value of, research itself” (Humphery,
2001, p.197). The other response has been self-determined intellectual reclamation, which has come to be known as ‘Indigenism’.

Indigenous standpoint and knowledge systems are often referred to as Indigenist research in Australia (viz. Rigney, 1997; 200124). From this perspective, non-Indigenous involvement in research about Indigenous peoples is problematic and contentious. In this way, similarities can be drawn with essentialist debates in the ongoing development of feminist theory regarding the probity of male involvement in research for and about women (Pease, 2000), and similar debates of researching ‘otherness’ defined by age, (dis)ability, class, and ethnicity (Fawcett & Hearn, 2004).

A standpoint position would generally be that experiences produce knowledge and knowledge divorced from experience is colonizing, appropriating and oppressive. Knowledge is not only about the construction of ‘others’ in society that happen to be beyond the gaze of researchers, but is very much concerned with overcoming dominant constructions of ‘others’ within the research process itself. This highlights the importance of countering ‘othering’ within the research process. (Fawcett & Hearn, 2004, p.209)

Indigenist critique is usually aimed at non-Indigenous misinterpretation because universal application of non-Indigenous theory is disconnected from context and place (in contrast to Indigenous standpoints which are grounded in a relational context with place, kin, and the experience of colonisation). Stand-point theory has many proponents in Indigenous Australian literature, who assert that “non-Indigenous Australia cannot and possibly will not understand the complexities of Indigenous Australia at the same level of empathy as an Indigenous Australian researcher can achieve” (Foley, 2003, p.46). The development of an Indigenist standpoint reflects theorised explanations of what it is to be Indigenous in terms of a subjugated ontology, epistemology and axiology, which highlight “the ways knowledge is produced and legitimated” (Semali & Kincheloe, 1999, p.34). As Grosfoguel suggests:

24 “Indigenism is multi-disciplinary with the essential criteria being the identity and colonising experience of the writer. Similarly, by the term ‘Indigenist’ I mean the body of knowledge by Indigenous scholars in relation to research methodological approaches” (Rigney, 2001, p.1).
“The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks” (2007, p.213).

To make the Indigenist distinction is to extend upon the post-colonial assertion that alternatives to western epistemology exist, by framing research through the specific location of Indigenous knowledges, standpoints and experiences of colonisation (Smith, 1999). This “epistemic decolonial turn” (Grosfoguel, 2007) is explained as a shifting from “those who read subalternity as a post-modern critique (which represents a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism) [to] those who read subalternity as a decolonial critique (which represents a critique of Eurocentrism from subalterned and silenced knowledges)” (Grosfoguel, 2007, p.211). This logic incorporates assertions that “self-determination must incorporate the right to exclusive self-representation” (Hollinsworth, 1995, p.92) and a protest against the idea that colonial practices are of the past (expressed as ‘post’ colonial) (L.T. Smith et al., 2002, p.175; G.H. Smith, 2000, p.215).

‘Indigenism’ does not operate without contention. Other commentators refer to “counter-essentialism” in order to challenge “assertions of a fixed and stable indigenous identity” (Sémaili & Kincheloe 1999, p.22-23). Sémaili and Kincheloe question:

[T]he essentialist assertion that there is a natural category of ‘indigenous persons.’ Indeed, there is great diversity within the label, indigenous people. The indigenous cultural experience is not the same for everybody; indigenous knowledge is not a monolithic epistemological concept. (1999, p.24)

The process of intellectual self-determination by decolonisation is rich with complexities of standpoint and ways of determining the subjectivity of ‘others’; in this discourse non-Indigenous subjectivities symbolise colonising thought. In the process of decolonisation, Indigenous standpoints are to be privileged with the aim of actively reversing the effects of colonisation into ‘reclamation’ through methods such as testimonies, story-telling, celebration of survival, action, revitalisation, restoration, networking, protection and democratisation (Smith, 1999, pp. 142–162).
Polarisation has defined articulation of Indigenous knowledges in the academy. While Indigenist political imperatives remain embedded in a struggle against (neo)colonisation, there is a tendency for this critique to homogenise ‘Western’ knowledges into a monolithic positivist frame of inquiry. The methodological response to this is increased representation of Indigenous standpoints in research (through participation) to counter non-Indigenous Eurocentrism in research:

One research milieu that incorporates the means to address social inequity is found in participatory action research (PAR). The participatory action research approach to community issues is a culturally relevant and empowering method for Indigenous people in Canada and worldwide as it critiques the ongoing impact of colonization, neo-colonialism and the force of marginalisation … Most importantly, this approach serves to deconstruct the Western positivist research paradigm that is, and has always been, antithetical to Indigenous ways of coming to knowledge on many levels; theoretically, cognitively, practically, and spiritually. (Ermine, Sinclair & Jeffery, 2004, p.13)

Here the connection between discourses and their productive effects become visible. Indigenous participation in research is crucial to countering Eurocentrism. Indigenous participation is therefore integral to the project of decolonisation, and to the protection of Indigenous peoples from the harms of epistemic violence.

There are many other oppressed groups who might make similar claims for recognition of difference. But the question now becomes – how have Indigenous Australians been able to combine the protection of human rights with the right to different ethics guidelines? To understand this political manoeuvre I return to the discipline of health research (the genesis of research ethics guidelines) and to the politics of the 1970s.

Health is a human right

In 1978 a new WHO concept of health was declared ‘a human right’. It was to have “a profound influence on the discourse of Aboriginal health activists” (Brady, 2004, p.27), as well as those of Australian politicians and policy makers (Aldrich, Zwi & Short, 2007). The Alma Ata declaration of health fostered a global re-definition of public health based on social and economic
factors, rather than biological determinism. The new public health was defined by ‘wellbeing’ rather than ‘freedom from disease’ and was to be explained through social patterns of disease and ‘causal pathways’ associated with ‘social gradients of health’.

Commentators critiquing the bio–medical disenfranchisement of other disciplines of research under institutional ethics regulations have observed the implications for how ‘research participants’ also came to be redefined.

As strange as it may seem, the bio–medical basis of national research ethics codes is even overwhelming medical research on health. The conventional bio–medical concept of the “human subject,” as found in ethics codes, is out of step with WHO’s own holistic definition of health ... The “human subject” in international and national research–ethics policies is a highly individualistic, autonomous person, in contrast to WHO’s holistic definition of a healthy person. (Van den Hoonard, 2006, p.266)

This illustrates how research participant subjectivity is altered when a foundational definition of a discourse (such as health) is modified. The formation of the research subjects in ethics discourse changed when social and cultural factors became legitimate attributes of health status.

‘Health as a human right’ became a political concept and an instrument for self-determination of Indigenous rights to collective difference (Brady, 2004, p.33; Eckermann et al., 2002, pp.174-190). In the process of claiming collective rights to health and wellbeing, Indigenous activists aligned their self-determined articulation of health with the new WHO definition which highlighted “the need for community participation and local self–determination in health” (Brady, 2004, p.27). Australian Aboriginal definitions of health developed to shape policies by melding cultural, social, and political difference. While no pan-Aboriginal word for ‘health’ existed, there was a political imperative for recognition of Aboriginal health rights distinct from the mainstream, which played a crucial role in the “bureaucratic management of Indigenous health matters” (Brady, 2004, p.126). Phrases were developed to encapsulate difference:

Gatjil [Djerrkura] told us there is no word ‘health’ in Aboriginal languages. He said that health means ‘to promote
and strengthen the life of Aboriginal people as a means of ensuring their survival and growth.\footnote{Gatjil Djerrkura’s definition of health is echoed and repeated in a culturally specific ethical value titled ‘survival and protection’ (NHMRC, 2003). I will discuss this in Chapter 5.} We then found that this sentence can be translated back as a single word into every language that we tested. (Fleming & Devansen, 1985 cited in Brady, 2004, p.39)

Importantly, from the mid-1980s in Australia, health (the dominant discipline of ethical regulation) became equated with notions of ‘survival and growth’ in Indigenous policy making. As a result of this, Indigenous Australians were able to lobby the National Health and Medical Research Council for special ethics guidelines on the basis of their right to good health. Indigenous Australians had a right to ‘survival and growth’ (incorporating social and biological determinants of health), and it was the responsibility of researchers to support this right.

In November 1986 the Menzies Foundation and the NHMRC held a conference in Alice Springs titled ‘Research Priorities in Aboriginal Health’ (NHMRC, 1991, p.4; Menzies School of Health Research, 1987). While the purpose of the meeting was to identify social and bio-medical ‘problems’, the Aboriginal delegates staged a ‘take-over’ to critique the basis of Western research and prioritise ethics from an Indigenous perspective (Humphery, 2002, pp.14–17). The NHMRC provides a polite account of this meeting as follows:

The 1986 National Conference on Research Priorities in Aboriginal Health exhibited all of the hallmarks of a lack of trust and difference-blindness. Yet participants courageously moved the debate forward by recommending the creation of a set of ethical standards for research in Aboriginal health. (NHMRC, 2003, p.4)

From this conference the Medical Research Ethics Committee of the NHMRC became “convinced that the Aboriginal community singled itself out for special consideration” (NHMRC, 1991, p.4) citing in particular, “its
conspicuous level of poor health resulting from social, historical and cultural factors” (NHMRC, 1991, p.4); that past research has “concerned itself primarily with matters of interest to science or to white Australians” (NHMRC, 1991, p.4); and “insensitivity among researchers to the values, needs and customs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities” (NHMRC, 1991, p.4).

In response to the controversy of the Alice Springs meeting, a closed workshop was held the following year in Camden, NSW to create a set of ‘advisory notes’ (Houston, 1988). The result was a document with “a desire to protect Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ cultures and value base, and not surprisingly sought to do so in a prescriptive process” (NHMRC, 2003, p.4). The advisory notes formed the basis of the Interim Guidelines on Ethical Matters in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research (NHMRC, 1991). In their first form, the guidelines were ‘protectionist’, designed to limit harms. This called for a redraft of the guidelines which aimed “to extend the boundaries of ethical assessment to promote ‘inclusiveness’ as a way of ensuring that the previous history of marginalisation of Indigenous interests within the construction of research is redressed” (Dunbar & Scrimgeour, 2005, p.17).

It is also important to remember that during this period the NHMRC extended its regulatory scope to include all disciplines of research (as I discussed earlier). Consequently the guidelines designed for health research involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait peoples now applied to all disciplines involving human participants—education, anthropology, community development, criminology and so on. At this point, connections can begin to be drawn between Indigenism as intellectual self-determination, and the right of communities to be actively involved in shaping research protocols according to the self-determined need of ‘the community’.

Some commentators (Kowal, Anderson & Bailie, 2005) have connected the NHMRC’s attempts to improve Indigenous health status with determinants of health identified by social epidemiology in the ‘Whitehall Studies’, which suggest the relative perception of control you have over your life correlates with your health and wellbeing. Marmot (2004) asserts that a social gradient of
autonomy, social engagement, and relative empowerment determines health status and suggests that the social determinants of health are just as important as primary health care interventions. Similarly, the remedial possibilities of empowerment through participation include the World Health Organization’s ethics guidelines for research with Indigenous peoples. While this document is “not intended as a substitute or replacement for national and international medical research ethics procedures” (WHO, 2009, preface), it reflects a methodological preference for active involvement (Marinetto, 2003) of Indigenous communities through participation. Importantly, this document emphasises the connection between improving Indigenous health and employing participatory approaches to research.

While the ‘right’ to health indicates why institutions such as the NHMRC support a participatory approach, the desire for self-determination and empowerment on the part of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples themselves should not be a neglected part of this story.

**Indigenous participation & remediation**

The Aboriginal health sector was engaged with self-determination politics of community control well before the NHMRC guidelines were published. From as early as 1973, Redfern Aboriginal Medical Service was providing community-controlled primary health care, and Fred Hollows placed major emphasis on the role of Aboriginal workers in his trachoma survey of Aboriginal communities (1975–1977): “the reason we succeeded was we got a good lot of Aborigines working with us” (Jones, Buzzacott, Briscoe, Murray & Murray, 2008):

‘Barefoot medicine’ had great appeal to the early Aboriginal health movement because of its political agenda, which in China was a political, rather than a technical creation [Fifkin 1978], explicitly designed to disestablish the power of the medical professionals and to give the people a role in their own health care. (Brady, 2004, p.36)

The idea that health services could be mobilised into culturally self-determined care disassociated from professional elites was as influential globally as it was in Australia. When China joined the WHO in 1973, Mao’s barefoot doctors made a huge impression because of the scale of health
delivery (Brady, 2004, p.30) and had a profound influence on politicising the WHO’s definition of health (Lee, 1997). This ideological approach encouraged empowerment of para-professional community members in the provision of primary health care, and concomitant derision against outsider professional control of community health services (Brady, 2004, p.36).

A similar destabilisation agenda has much to do with the empowerment ideology of ‘bottom up’ principles of development. In the field of education, for example, Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* was a highly influential document for Indigenous activists such as Linda Tuhiwai Smith (Smith, Battiste, Bell & Findlay, 2002, pp.176–177), Graham Hingangaroa Smith (2000, p.210), and Marie Battiste (2000, p.206), and for anthropologists seeking to integrate praxis within their work (Bauman, 2001, p.208). This challenge to expertise resonates now in the form of privileging local, Indigenous, community knowledge as an exercise of decolonisation, and in the requirement of community sanctioning of research as an ethical requirement (Anderson, 1996; Bishop, 1997; Brown, 2005; Fletcher, 2003; Van Der Woerd, 2006).

Health is the most influential domain in which regulatory change for ethical review has occurred. ‘Health’ as a domain of knowledge, converges with the moral problem of Indigenous health status (as a population group). Within this account, there is no clean cause and effect: rather a multiplicity of events, processes, new institutions and rules (Foucault, 1991b, p.76), and new technologies through which people to understand themselves (Rose, 1999). By deploying subjectivities towards the exercise of Indigenous rights, community activists have effectively challenged government institutions, lobbying for more appropriate research methods involving their communities (Blaser et al., 2004; Petersen, 2003). Historical contingencies have enabled a socially (re)constructed definition of ‘health’ to become the key to the statutory implementation of distinctive regulatory ethics guidelines for Indigenous Australians. By forging a distinct definition of health (an internationally recognised human right), Indigenous Australia gained political leverage for self-determining the provision of health care and activities associated with health care (including health research). The basis of this special consideration was claims for recognition of collective rights to ‘differentness’: defined
positively (in terms of ontology, epistemology, and axiology) and defined negatively (in terms of the experience of colonisation and resultant health status).

All of the historical events recounted in this chapter demonstrate how ‘interdiscursive’ changes can occur simultaneously (Foucault, 1991a, p.68). People are shaped into subject positions according to categorisations such as researcher/participant or Indigenous/non-Indigenous, that produce and re-inscribe material effects and discursive products. The next part of my argument seeks to identify the kinds of subjectivities that are produced in the NHMRC guidelines for research involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. The convergence between discourses and subjectivities inform how participation in research is to be exercised in practice as a remedial ‘right’.

Moreover, the history of institutional regulation reveals why researchers are governed by rules of administrative accountability such as written, informed consent. The difference between institutional and community views of research ethics set the tension inherent to doing research with and for Indigenous participants; both prerogatives shape participatory space through discursive rules and implied social practices of distance or relationality. Roles, characterisations and subjectivities are formed in relation to these rules and this tension.
CHAPTER 5 DISCURSIVE ETHICS

My argument for viewing participation as a remedial space between resistance and trust draws on the idea that 'space' is a social practice constituted by an interplay of subjectivities, discursive rules, knowledge and power. In Chapter 2 I located and introduced my case study as a series of invited spaces. In my account of this case study, I referred to the institutional practices I followed in the development of my research, including the stipulation that I demonstrate the values outlined by the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (NHMRC, 1991) and Values and Ethics: Guidelines for Ethical Conduct in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research (NHMRC, 2003) (see page 34). Although my research was not 'health' research, I was obliged to follow the NHMRC guidelines to meet the institutional governance and funding requirements of the university. As discussed in the previous chapter, all research in Australia involving humans must adhere to the principles outlined by the NHMRC. These guidelines are part of an archive that shaped, informed and produced my conduct in relating to, with, and for others. They are an archive that informed my subjectivity.

In this chapter I will consider the 'productive effects' of the NHMRC ethics guidelines for research involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (NHMRC, 2003). The productive effects of this archive are several discourses, which sometimes reinforce and sometimes contradict one another. These discourses create ideals and attributes for 'types' of persons, which in the process of developing an ethical subjectivity, people recognise and either seek to align with, or reject. In this light, "discourse is not a place into which subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions" (Foucault, 1991a, p.58). Focusing on an archive (a text such as a set of ethics guidelines), enables consideration of the social effects of the rules of engagement ascribed to the field, and the reiteration of discursive knowledge to normalise behaviours and relationships.

Following Foucault's archaeological approach to discourse (Foucault, 1972), I will focus my analysis on the way truth is ascribed to "a corpus of 'statements' whose organisation is regular and systematic" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p.42). Rather than a 'deep' hermeneutic reading, the focus
on rules suggests reading not only for the institutional effects of regulatory instruments (such as protecting human rights), but also the moral and epistemological authority ascribed to statements. My analysis will also look for the ways statements recur and repeat, and the types or categories of people, activities, relationships, knowledges and truths that are propounded or dismissed. The methodological approach to discourse analysis is as follows:

    do not question discourses about their silently intended meanings, but about the fact and conditions of their manifest appearance; not about the contents which they may conceal, but about the transformations they have effected; not about the sense preserved within them like a perpetual origin, but about the field where they co-exist, reside and disappear. (Foucault, 1991a, p.60)

The archive (text) I am analysing does not exist as a regulatory instrument in isolation. As I have already discussed, all Australian university research involving humans is subject to review by the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (NHMRC, 2007). This set of regulatory guidelines contains special provisions for the assessment of research involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and is to be read in conjunction with Values and Ethics: Guidelines for Ethical Conduct in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research (NHMRC, 2003), and Keeping Research on Track: A guide for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples about health research (NHMRC, 2005).

    Within these guidelines, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community values (comprising reciprocity, respect, equality, responsibility, survival and protection, spirit and integrity) are distinguished from 'mainstream' principles of 'research merit and integrity, justice, beneficence, and respect for persons' (NHMRC, 2007). These values are expressed diagrammatically in Values and Ethics: Guidelines for Ethical Conduct in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research (NHMRC, 2003), which I will henceforth refer to as Values and Ethics (NHMRC, 2003).

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27 As my research commenced in 2005 my ethics application was assessed according to the previous version of the document (NHMRC, 1999). However, in this instance I am referring to the way this text is clustered in relation to current regulatory devices.
The diagram, like the text, is intended for researchers. It uses a teleological representation of time, with arrows directed towards a ‘future’. This depicts a linear view of time and space, a modernist project of development directed towards what lies ahead. These arrows, representing ‘development’ towards the future betrays the remedialism inherent to research involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples: progress, change, improvement for the future designed to heal and repair the effects of ill health of the present and the past; the moral imperative for a separate set of guidelines in the first place (see page 109). Problematically, this diagram suggests that research incorporating these values operates as a linear, sequential practice. As my evaluation in later chapters will reveal, this is not the case.

In contrast, Keeping Research on Track: A guide for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples about health research (NHMRC, 2005) presents the values very differently. Designed as a community resource of information about rights within the research process, the community report differs starkly.
This diagram mimics Central and Western Desert iconography—symbolic representations of people, places, country, spirits and resources (Meyers, 2005). This image suggests a ‘traditional’ representation of holistic knowledge, without linear temporal dimensions. My purpose in pointing out the differences between these representations of the values is to highlight the different subjectivities attributed to audiences. These images show a difference between how researchers are to interpret the guidelines, and how Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples might employ them. *Keeping Research on Track: A guide for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples about health research ethics* (NHMRC, 2005), discusses intellectual property, provides basic information about research methods and outlines an ‘eight step research journey’ (building relationships, conceptualisation, development and approval, data collection and management, analysis, report writing, dissemination and ‘learnings’ [NHMRC, 2005, pp.15–27]). *Keeping Research on Track: A guide for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples about health research ethics* (NHMRC, 2005, p.8)

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28 Dots and symbols are a traditional knowledge system used in the desert sand. In the 1970s Aboriginal artists developed innovative techniques using acrylic paints on canvas to produce artwork of worldwide acclaim. While dots are famously associated with a homogenous view of Aboriginal ‘culture’, the technique is specific to desert communities (Berndt, Berndt & Stanton, 1992, p.69).
Track asserts, "Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have a right, and indeed a responsibility, to be involved in all aspects of research undertaken in our communities and organisations" (NHMRC, 2005, p.i). This is a document designed to support and facilitate the right to active community participation in research.

While I have indicated that there are multiple texts related to one another as a corpus of regulatory material published by the NHMRC, the guidelines designed for researchers, Values and Ethics (NHMRC, 2003), are my focus. I suggest that the 'research journey' between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and researchers demands more than human rights protection—rather it is shaped by discourses that suggest the conduct of individuals should consider the remedial quality of relationships. The kinds of qualities I refer to are counter-colonial, healing, inclusive, participatory and deferring to community control (rather than researcher control). These discourses connect, inform and reinscribe a connection between (counter-) colonialism, ethics and methodology.

I suggest that three discourses from this archive inform researcher and participant subjectivities: i) a discourse of apology, ii) a responsibility for action, iii) pragmatic 'differentness'. The order of my discussion of these discourses is arbitrary; although there is not a causal flow between the discourses, they are interconnected and mutually inform the rationale of each other. At the same time, there are internal disruptions and confluences amongst the discourses as they compete for primacy. This evokes confusion within emergent subjectivities about how to juggle the various effects in practice. It makes developing an ethical subjectivity a very complex arena.

**Discourse of apology: a moral domain**

The discourse of apology demands recognition that the context of research involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and communities is not post-colonial: the legacy of invasion and the process of colonisation continue to exist and function as a structural oppression, as defined by the 'new' social movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Young, 1990, pp.39-65). This discourse implores non-Indigenous acknowledgment of the contemporary impact and effects of colonisation, through a concern for social accountability, and a
more subtle and socially contextual understanding of offensive behaviour:
“Unethical behaviour need not always be a glaring act or infraction. It often includes subtle or only sub-consciously intended encroachments on values and principles” (NHMRC, 2003, p.3). Young discusses subconscious oppression as “assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions” (1990, p.41). In this case, the discourse of apology is referring to ‘difference-blindness’: a refusal to recognise Indigenous peoples’ rights to difference (see page 103). The symbolic gesture of ‘saying sorry’ (Rudd, 2008) is inherent to the apology discourse.

The discourse of apology demands researchers recognise how and why Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people might perceive research to be negative, intrusive, threatening—full of potential neo-colonial harms.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples vigorously oppose the assimilation, integration or subjugation of their values and will defend them against perceived or actual encroachment. Researchers must be aware of the history and the continuing potential for research to encroach on these values. (NHMRC, 2003, p.18)

For the discourse of apology to establish itself, it must delineate moral dimensions. The discourse of apology constructs three particular subjectivities: the ‘coloniser/researcher’; the ‘counter-colonial researcher’; and ‘collective Indigenous community’. The collective Indigenous community subjectivity is defined here by negative experiences of colonisation (other discourses within the guidelines draw upon positive aspects of collective identity, as I will soon discuss). The coloniser/researcher is drawn from a binary of domination/oppression, defined in relation to colonised subjectivities. It represents the omnipresence of neo-colonial force in research. The coloniser/researcher is one who makes unsophisticated and prejudiced conclusions:

Crude or unsubstantiated assumptions of the value or vitality of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and societies have led Australian history in many instances to discriminate against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. (NHMRC, 2003, p.14)
Indigenous community subjectivity highlights the moral basis for a special set of guidelines: "The marginalisation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures by the dominant society has created myriad inequalities" (NHMRC, 2003, p. 14). This collective is united in a struggle against colonisation.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples continue to act to protect their cultures and identity from erosion by colonisation and marginalisation. A particular feature of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and these efforts has been the importance of a collective identity. This collective bond reflects and draws strength from the values base of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and cultures. (NHMRC, 2003, p. 18)

Indigenous community subjectivity is determined according to a collective oppositional stance: "The repeated marginalisation in research of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander values has reinforced these barriers over time creating a 'collective memory' that is an obstacle to research today" (NHMRC, 2003, p. 18). Colonisation is an enduring process of oppression, and research represents a colonial technology. The apology discourse asserts that this is a result of Eurocentric research practices generating harmful errors of judgment and discriminatory practices:

Not surprisingly the early observers knew nothing about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and cultures. The substantial errors of judgement that followed have had a significant impact on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples ever since. (NHMRC, 2003, p. 2)

Introductory statements such as this suggest a conflation between a colonising government (the decision makers) and researchers (the early observers). This is an accurate impression of colonial bureaucracy, because many of the first written accounts and observations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples were by government officials or powerful landowners (see, for example, Watkin Tench’s observations, page 28). This conflation exists in the discourse of apology to suggest how contemporary perceptions of research evoke being a subject of the colonial gaze. In a later chapter I will discuss the way in which community participants in research may perceive research to be ‘government consultation’: reflecting both the importance government places on ‘evidence-based policy’ and community indifference to
distinguishing between consultant/contract research and university research. The important point is that sovereign power and surveillance techniques are attributed to the activity of research, irrelevant to whether a researcher holds social justice as an their imperative.

The discourse of apology seeks to transfigure uneven power relations by creating categories of cultural alterity. For example, the metaphor used here of one set of cultural values held by researchers (colonisers), and the other by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples as a collective group:

The discourse of apology seeks to transfigure uneven power relations by creating categories of cultural alterity. For example, the metaphor used here of one set of cultural values held by researchers (colonisers), and the other by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples as a collective group:

The construction of ethical relationships between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples on one hand and the research community on the other must take into account the principles and values of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures. (NHMRC, 2003, p.2)

This represents a moral warning not to reinstate neo-colonial research by ignoring, assimilating or subjugating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander values. Research without reference to the collective values of the guidelines reinscribes colonial practices, it re-enacts *Terra nullius* (Connell, 2007, p.47) by evoking a discursive *Intellectual nullius* (Rigney, 2001, p.10).

Researcher subjectivities continue to be deeply embedded in the experience of colonisation and are required to demonstrate actively a political commitment to counter-colonialism, in the form of a critical imperative to “redress the injustices found in the field site or constructed in the very act of research itself” (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p.305). The explicit connection between colonisation, marginalisation and discrimination are integrated into a moral imperative to improve Indigenous (health) status by referring to established knowledge: “International and domestic studies have increasingly revealed a correlation between social and economic inequality and poor health. Research should seek to advance the elimination of inequalities” (NHMRC, 2003, p.14). Remedialism is inherent to ‘ethical research’, thus:

When making judgements about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Australia and its public institutions must acknowledge the history, and bridge the difference in cultural outlooks to find a fair, respectful, and ethical way forward. (NHMRC, 2003, p.2)
The apology discourse establishes a moral domain constituted by power dyads: researcher/community, coloniser/colonised, power/oppression, institutional racism/community values. Although the definition of oppression is closely aligned with structural oppression (manifest subconsciously within daily practices), there remains a trace of ‘power as a commodity’ in the moral dimensions of the apology discourse. Consider this example of an Indigenist writer discussing anti-colonial strategies:

Academics who are to be true allies to Indigenous Peoples in the protection of our knowledge must be willing to step outside their privileged position and challenge research that conforms to the guidelines outlined by the colonial power structure and root their work in the politics of decolonisation and anticolonialism. (Simpson, 2004, p.381)

Like the moral imperative for ‘participation’ discussed at the outset of this thesis, the apology discourse frames power “much like wealth in a redistributive welfare system” (Gallagher, 2008, p.140). This model implies that if the distribution of power is reversed, an ethical outcome will be achieved. This domain establishes a complex moral problem. If power is to be redistributed, how is the outcome to be measured? Is this defined as the benefit of the research? Do the participants in the research directly receive it? In its application what is the difference between the delivery of benefits for participants in research health, and defining benefits for participants in sociological research?

The apology discourse establishes a rationale, reinforces and supports the production of a counter-colonial researcher. This is a researcher who is prepared to take responsibility for the legacy of the coloniser/researcher by taking remedial action to benefit the community. The document states “clearly, however, much remains to be done to ensure the genuine recognition of the fundamental values and principles of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures within Australian society and its institutions” (NHMRC, 2003, p.2). A necessary step after apology is to take action.
Closing the gap: responsibility for action

The impetus for action is not only to recognise and acknowledge a moral responsibility to counter colonisation, but to do something to rectify the situation. This has implications for ways of understanding ‘benefit’ to the community. The responsibility for action evokes either a ‘technical outcomes’ approach (Miller & Rainow, 1997), or a radical view of empowerment. As I suggested in the introduction, the way in which problems are defined influences the research approach adopted. Throughout my argument I have used the term ‘remedialism’ to describe the moral goals of recognising Indigenous rights to participation in research. The discourse of responsibility for action delineates the healing qualities of the ‘the counter-colonial researcher’.

Counter-colonial subjectivities are those of contemporary researchers who work against ‘difference-blindness’ (NHMRC, 2003, p.3). Due to the legacy of colonial power relations these subjectivities are constructed as owing an obligation to the “spirit and integrity of communities not just to individuals” (NHMRC, 2003, p.19). This demands ‘making an effort’ to demonstrate counter-colonial accountability: “Researchers will need to make a particular effort to deal with the perception of research held by many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities as an exploitative exercise” (NHMRC, 2003, p.18). The counter-colonial researcher therefore owes an obligation to the ‘collective Indigenous community’, and recognises a responsibility to take remedial action in their work.

An example of ‘making an effort’ is a willingness “to modify research in accordance with participating community values and aspirations” (NHMRC, 2003, p.11). Kowal’s (2006a) ethnography of White researchers working with Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory describes this discourse as ‘post-colonial logic’, which seeks to invert colonial power relations by supporting Indigenous self-determination. Of the ethics review process she states:

White anti-racists must show how they changed their plans, bent to Indigenous desires, if they are to demonstrate their “integrity”. In effect they must demonstrate the inverted power relations of post-colonial spaces through the
bureaucratic processes of ethical review. (Kowal, 2006a, p.248)

The ethical value of ‘responsibility’ is used to ascribe features of methodology that allow the counter-colonial researcher to be accountable for their actions. For example, this includes “transparency in the exchange of ideas, and in negotiations about the purpose, methodology, conduct, dissemination of results and potential outcomes’ benefits of research” (NHMRC, 2003, p.17). Such accountability demands “agreed arrangements regarding publication of the research results, including clear provisions relating to joint sign off for publication” (NHMRC, 2003, p.17). Such accountability contrasts with the National Statement emphasis on integrity, which suggests “disseminating and communicating results, whether favourable or unfavourable, in ways that permit scrutiny and contribute to public knowledge and understanding,” (NHMRC, 2003, p.12). Responding to this political call involves making research more inclusive and democratic by fostering Indigenous involvement and control throughout the research process. Participatory methods, fostering “community engagement and participation” (NHMRC, 2003, p.23) is a suggested methodological response.

Another value, ‘reciprocity’, evokes mutual obliged exchange. The application of reciprocity in the text involves “unequal power relationships” and demands “a return (or benefit) to the community that is valued by the community and which contributes to cohesion and survival” (NHMRC, 2003, p.10). In practice, this suggests that research must be undertaken on the basis that it responds to self-determined collectively articulated needs according to a variety of scales: “The proposal links clearly to community, regional, jurisdictional or international Indigenous health priorities and/or responds to existing or emerging needs articulated by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples” (NHMRC, 2003, p.11). Defining such benefits in practice is a complex undertaking, as I will discuss in Chapter 7. But this value also provides clues to the importance I placed on capacity-building in my research experience, in providing training in research techniques.

An implication of the responsibility for action is how to define ‘benefit’. The goal of the counter-colonial researcher is to return a benefit
that supports the collective cultural identity of the participants. One response is a ‘development approach’ to define benefit in terms of ‘capacity-building’:

> Whether the proposed research will enhance the capacity of communities to draw benefit from beyond the project eg. through the development of skills and knowledge or through broader social, economic or political strategies at local, jurisdictional, national, or even international level. (NHMRC, 2003, p.11)

Responsibility for action stipulates that research must have practical, immediate use for the participating community, defined in contrast to a (coloniser) researcher who selfishly reaps all of the rewards.

In addition, the unitary vision for harmony (as discussed previously in my account of Communicative Ethics/ Care Ethics/ Communitarianism [see page 87]), underlies the basis of what is deemed ethical: “Ethical research occurs when harmony between the sets of responsibilities is established, participants are protected, trust is maintained and accountability is clear” (NHMRC, 2003, p.16). An ethical research proposal is one that integrates ‘respect for social cohesion’, with the research design reflecting: “the importance of the personal and collective bond within Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and its critical function in their social lives” (NHMRC, 2003, p.18). Internal resistance is not considered an ethical part of the process.

‘Responsibility’ is not only about return or benefit in the form of capacity-building. It is also about measures of social accountability. The goal of this process is to “move beyond a kind of superficial compliance mentality” (NHMRC, 2003, p.21) underpinned by a logic which asserts that “mistrust had emerged because of superficial engagement between communities and researchers” (NHMRC, 2003, p.10). The response to rectify this situation of mistrust is to reassert “a respectful relationship [that] induces trust and co-operation” (NHMRC, 2003, p.11) precisely because this “is fundamental to a sustainable research relationship” (NHMRC, 2003, p.12). This rationale connects the moral impetus of the research to taking action. To be an ethical researcher a counter-colonial researcher must develop sustainable relationships through ‘deep’ engagement. Spatial qualities are attributed to
Indigenous participation in research, much like Cornwall's (2008a, p.276) discussion of 'deep', 'wide' or 'shallow' participation.

*Values and Ethics* states, "respect is a feature of strong culture, a personal and collective framework, which induces and promotes trust, cooperation, dignity and recognition" (NHMRC, 2003, p.11). 'Respect' therefore is about the quality of relationships, "the trust, openness and engagement of participating communities and individuals is as important as the scientific rigor of the investigation" (NHMRC, 2003, p.12). Indigenous participation also therefore equates to epistemological remedialism. This logic asserts that the quality and integrity of the research findings are at stake.

Such accountability challenges the neo-colonial ethnographic practice of interpreting others (speaking for them), or techniques of 'capturing voice', whereby the participants are passive subjects who provide data for unbiased generalised findings (Carter & Little, 2007, p.1320). Consequences and accountability are framed within the social dimensions of research relationships, rather than regulatory principles of human rights protection:

Researchers need to understand that research has consequences for themselves and others, the importance of which may not be immediately apparent. This should be taken into account through all stages of the research process. (NHMRC, 2003, p.12)

Being a counter-colonial researcher is therefore a demanding political task. They must ensure that they are not subconsciously reinforcing oppression, they must recognise that there is always a potential for them to be viewed as neo-colonial because they are a researcher, they must take action to deliver benefit to the participants in the research, they must carry social responsibilities in developing trusting relationships. Being an 'ethical' researcher is also a partisan endeavour:

Advocates who talk about values and cultural difference are often told they are being too political or are adopting an 'ideologically correct' view. Token gestures worsen this situation by exposing the debate to dismissive labelling. (NHMRC, 2003, p.3)
Thus far, I have suggested that the apology discourse makes a case for alleviating the negative effects of colonisation facilitating ‘deep’ Indigenous participation in research. But this is not the only way collective identities are constructed within the discourse. There is also, importantly, a positive construction of collective community identity, drawing upon ‘difference and differentness’.

**Pragmatism & difference**

I make a distinction between ‘difference’ and ‘differentness’ in order to convey a positive, self-determined articulation of ‘otherness’ in relation to equality. While the discourse of apology makes a case for different treatment on the basis of a collective experience of colonisation, there is another definition of collective identity articulated on the basis of positive attributes of cultural difference, such as epistemology and axiology (as outlined in my discussion of Indigenism, see page 104). This discourse attributes collective identity to common values—values that differ from non-Indigenous ethics. Most crucially, this assertion of positive difference is based upon epistemological validity:

Values underpin what we perceive, believe, value and do. In the research context to ignore the reality of inter-cultural difference is to live with outdated notions of scientific investigation. It is also likely to hamper the conduct of research, and limit the capacity of research to improve human development and wellbeing. Contemporary writing about science recognises this. (NHMRC, 2003, p.3)

The definition of collective identity in positive terms is to assert equality through difference: a right not to be assimilated. ‘Equality’ is usually defined in terms of identical rights, privileges and status, or as the text states, “equality as a value may sometimes be taken to mean sameness” (NHMRC, 2003, p.14). However, the implied meaning in the text is that “equality affirms Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ right to be different” (NHMRC, 2003, p.14). This creates a moral imperative for the researcher to “seek to advance the elimination of inequalities” (NHMRC, 2003, p.14). In practice, this suggests researchers must be non-discriminatory but also recognise ‘differentness’ as part of their remedial endeavours.
While this discourse draws strength from the symbolic assertions of the discourse of apology and the call for remedial action, it also implies that research should recompense community participants. The text suggests that equality be demonstrated by way of “distributive fairness and justice” (NHMRC, 2003, p.14), which reinscribes a concept of power as a commodity, as equity: “The distribution of benefit stands as a fundamental test of equality. If the research process delivers benefit in greater proportion to one partner in the initiative that other partners, the distribution of benefit may be seen as unequal” (NHMRC, 2003, p.15).

The contrasts between positive and negative definitions of ‘collective Indigenous community’ exist in the ethical value of ‘Survival and Protection’. ‘Survival’ “includes maintaining the bonds and relationships between people and between them and their environment” (NHMRC, 2003, p.16). In practice, this means actively supporting collective identity, while ‘protection’ is needed from colonial erosion of collective identity (NHMRC, 2003, p.18):

Barsriers between research and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples have been created for example where some researchers or institutions have ignored or sought to undermine this distinctiveness. (NHMRC, 2003, p.18)

*Values and Ethics* (NHMRC, 2003) therefore seeks to highlight ‘differentness’ as a positive attribute of collective community identity. But the text also seeks to emphasise difference within community identity itself. This results in arbitrary repetition of the term ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’; sometimes this lexicon may be used twice within one sentence, producing awkward prose. The reason ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ is used so frequently is that the term ‘Indigenous’ is considered homogenising:

This document does not use the term Indigenous. While this term has been used recently, most Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples prefer terms that better reflect their cultural identity such as Nyoongar, Koori, Murri, Ngaanyatjarra, Nunga and Palawa. This is about more than just language. It is a reflection of real cultural diversity. The use of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in these guidelines is intended to encapsulate this diversity. (NHMRC, 2003, p.2)
While the goal of the phrase ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ is to encapsulate diversity, there remains a conceptual slipperiness in simultaneously expressing diversity of cultures and the collective identity used to legitimate a separate set of ethics guidelines. Moreover, the reference to regional groups might suggest that the basis of ‘community identity’ may be drawn in purely spatial dimensions from a regional level. As the maps reproduced in the introduction of this thesis demonstrated (see page 28), within Darug Country there are many clans (such as Boorooberongle); and within contemporary urban communities such as Sydney there are Murri people living in the Koori region of Australia. So while this deference for the term ‘Indigenous’ reflects use as a regional self-identifier for individuals and families, the complexity of defining contemporary communities ascribed on the basis of traditional regions can be an inaccurate description of the collective identity of a ‘community’.

In practice, this means that the way a counter-colonial researcher approaches a community must be on terms of difference and differentness: juggling between a right to a collective identity based on differentness, constituted by a multiplicity of differences (not only ascribed by the spatial but by many social categorisations such as gender, age, languages spoken, custodianship of cultural practices). As such the text demands that the discursive knowledge-base of research must ‘reposition’ itself:

These guidelines are based on the importance of trust, recognition and values. The guidelines move away from a sole reliance on the quasi-legal consideration of compliance with rules. They promote a more flexible approach that encourages research to reposition itself to incorporate alternative perspectives. (NHMRC, 2003, p.4)

This idea of repositioning evokes a metaphor of epistemic remedialism. The guidelines demand that researchers engage with Indigenous knowledge systems to ensure ethical integrity of research findings. Epistemology is a moral concern: “Within the research process, failing to understand difference in values and culture may be a reckless act that jeopardises both the ethics and quality of research” (NHMRC, 2003, p.3).

29 For example, co-inquirers informed me that the term ‘Koori’ was inappropriate for our community report because there were Murri people involved in the project.
The basis for recognising differentness is therefore moral—it is a counter-colonial acknowledgment of the diversity of cultures comprising collective community identity. The basis for recognising differentness is also epistemological—researchers must ensure engagement with collective community members in order to ensure that data is not misinterpreted: “Researchers who fail to appreciate or ignore Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ knowledge and wisdom may misinterpret data or meaning, may create mistrust, otherwise limit quality or may overlook a potentially important benefit of research” (NHMRC, 2003, p.15). The combination of difference and differentness creates a pragmatic rationale for ‘community participation’ in research.

Methodological pragmatism suggests that Indigenous participation is a means for successful, culturally appropriate (sensitive and inoffensive) data collection methods (Kowal et al., 2005, pp.468-469). This pragmatic approach argues that involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as active participants attains the best quality data. Methodological pragmatism is always underpinned by an epistemological imperative, for example:

Random sampling procedures violate a fundamental principle of every indigenous group with whom I have worked. It assumes that a statistical or mathematical rationale should determine whom we talk to or with whom we intervene ... Within an indigenous context, however, one looks for proof and generalizable knowledge by selective sampling of those who have the knowledge that fits the question. (Mohatt & Thomas, 2006, p.110)

The methodological implications of engaging with difference and differentness are described in ‘Appendix 2: Suggested Application of the Guidelines’ (NHMRC, 2003, p.23). Here, the research process must be “ethically defensible on the grounds of each of the values” (NHMRC, 2003, p.23). The research process is described as conceptualisation, development and approval, data collection and management, analysis, report writing and dissemination (NHMRC, 2003, p.23). The text defines research as a collective enterprise: “Research involves groupings of people in collaborative exercise” (NHMRC, 2003, p.3), suggesting “it is, therefore, essential that researchers engage with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities collectively, not
just with individuals” (NHMRC, 2003, p.18). Defining research as ‘collaboration’ (Byrne-Armstrong, 2001) has implications for processes and protocols for group decision-making: “The structures and processes for negotiating community engagement and participation will therefore vary” (NHMRC, 2003, p.23).

Processes for group decision-making inform the way collective consent is determined and the kinds of agreements established when commencing the research. The guidelines consider it ‘ethical’ for ownership and control of research to be equally distributed (rather than the sole right of the researcher) and suggest that assessment of proposals provides evidence of “whether appropriate agreements have been negotiated about ownership and rights of access to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ intellectual and cultural property” (NHMRC, 2003, p.13).

An example of such an agreement for assuring transparency in the research process is prioritising knowledge transfer to community stakeholders: “Researchers should not make the publication of research findings a greater priority than feedback of findings to the community in an appropriate and understandable way” (NHMRC, 2003, p.12). Such processes and protocols rely on a clear application of the term ‘community’. I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 7, ‘Everything’s by Word of Mouth’.

Defining research as collaborative and community-based is an explicit turn towards participatory methodology: “Consultation and other strategies that facilitate Aboriginal participation are critical in all phases of this research process” (NHMRC, 2003, p.23). Within the text, a spectrum of participatory research is referred to:

Several different models have been used successfully to build trust and recognition of cultural values and principles while also advancing the objectives of the research enterprise. Some models have placed greater reliance on participatory processes. Some have established innovative institutional arrangements with the ongoing involvement of communities ensuring the integrity in the research enterprise ... other models promote Aboriginal community control over the research process, with Aboriginal people leading and implementing the research activity. (NHMRC, 2003, p.5)
“Community engagement and participation” (NHMRC, 2003, p.23) are therefore key methods for applying the guidelines, and are encouraged over the model of limiting harm by bureaucratic measures. Epistemological pragmatism therefore infers a connection between the authenticity of Indigenous participation in the research and the integrity of the research findings.

Intertextuality

The NHMRC is not the only institution to produce special guidelines for research involving Indigenous peoples. Given I have put forward an argument that a number of discourses coexist within *Values and Ethics* (NHMRC, 2003), it is useful to consider whether other texts exemplify a similar array of discourses, and to ask whether other texts support, challenge, reinforce, or revalidate the complexity of counter-colonial research. The next part of my discussion will consider some of the regulatory guidelines produced by institutions other than the National Health and Medical Research Council. My reason for including this review is to highlight that texts do not operate in isolation: researchers naturally read and interpret additional material about topics relevant to their endeavours. Hence, my intertextual discussion incorporates literature pertaining to ethical research with Indigenous groups from New Zealand and Canada in particular.

There is a wealth of literature outlining Indigenous perspectives of health research ethics. For example, Ermine et al. (2004) highlight areas of divergence (such as interpretation of ethics, academic freedom, collective ownership, consent and benefits), current trends, and the development of a theoretical ‘convergence’. An annotated bibliography by Sinclair, Maxie and Scott (2004) (which functions as an appendix to Ermine et al., 2004) contains approximately 500 references, reflecting the significant amount of material produced in relation to Indigenous research ethics and Indigenous knowledge protection over the last 30 years. Similarly, bibliographies compiled by McAullay, Grew, and Anderson (2002), and Caine, Davis, Jacobs, and Letendre (2004), reveal a corpus of literature that causes researchers to ask many questions about the nature of knowledge and ethics as praxis rather than prescriptively following a code (Borchert, 2004; Letendre & Caine, 2004). Some examples of Indigenist perspectives of research ethics from Canada
include questions about how to define ‘Indigenous research’ (Weber-Pillwax, 2001; 2004; Semali & Kincheloe, 1999); and comparative studies such as ‘A comparison of the principles underlying Inuit Qaujimanituqangit and the Canadian Psychological Association Code of Ethics’ (Whak, 2004) and ‘Ethical Dilemmas in Doing Participatory Research with Alaskan Native Communities’ (Mohatt & Thomas, 2006). There are also several accounts of reflexive practice, such as Baydala, Placsko, Hampton, Bourassa, and McKay-McNabb (2006) and Ruttan (2004), which have many similarities to critiques of institutional barriers when attempting to forge ‘equal partnerships’ in community-based research (Stoecker, 2008).

It is interesting to consider how this literature relates to the statutory guidelines in Australia, Aotearoa/ New Zealand and Canada, for (health) research involving Indigenous communities. Although Australia, Aotearoa/ New Zealand and Canada all face similar issues in the provision of health services to their Indigenous populations (Cunningham, Cass & Arnold, 2005), they have developed distinct approaches to regulatory guidance of research. While political lobbying for Indigenous rights continues at international fora, the Indigenous peoples of Australia, Canada and Aotearoa/ New Zealand have produced an extensive amount of literature articulating a right to participate in research about their people and communities.

In Aotearoa/ New Zealand, Maori academics have articulated boundaries for non–Indigenous research legitimated not only by exercise of the Treaty of Waitangi, but also by systems of pedagogy and research that are culturally specific and self-determined (called Kaupapa Maori). Regulatory mechanisms in Aotearoa/ New Zealand (the Guidelines for Researchers on Health Research Involving Maori [1998]) aim to increase Maori participation in health research, allocate research resources according to Maori health needs and perspectives, and develop culturally appropriate practices in health research (Health Research Council, 1998, p.3). Operating under the Treaty of Waitangi, the Health Research Council of New Zealand (HRC) must recognise Article 2 (the retention of control over Maori resources, including people) and Article 3 (a right to a fair share of society’s benefits). The HRC approach is to use ‘consultation’ as a mode of developing partnerships, focusing the research topic according to maximising potential benefits to Maori participants (HRC,
The guidelines prescribe a consultation checklist that focuses on administrative and bureaucratic concerns, such as “list tasks and timelines. Allocate responsibilities and ensure communication channels are open” (HRC, 1998, p.12). There is little discussion of ethical values within the document, as it states it “should be read in conjunction with the HRC Guidelines on Ethics in Health Research” (HRC, 1998, p.3). This document does not explicitly engage with substantive Maori perspectives of cultural protocols in research; rather it focuses on the obligations of partnership reflected in the treaty.

Canadian First Nation, Inuit and Metis people have published extensively on philosophical responses to ethics, and established explicit regulations (compared to the less prescriptive ‘values’ I have analysed). In Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) has set out Guidelines for Health Research Involving Aboriginal People (2007) for any research receiving their funding. These guidelines are a result of establishing an Aboriginal Ethics Working Group in 2004, which worked closely with the Aboriginal Capacity and Developmental Research Environments (ACADRE) network, a multi-disciplinary link between academic institutions and local partnerships with regional First Nation, Inuit and Metis communities (CIHR, 2007, p.2). The CIHR has 15 articles, which are prescriptive and ‘rights based’, compared to the discourses I identified in Values and Ethics (NHMRC, 2003). Article 3 is the most relevant to my argument, stating, “communities should be given the option of a participatory-research approach” (CIHR, 2007, pp.36–37).

The University of Saskatchewan’s (2006) analysis of the CIHR articles suggests any “research that affects Aboriginal well-being” should apply the guidelines: as a consequence this widens the scope of application to “archival research that may perpetuate negative or inaccurate representations of Aboriginal people” (University of Saskatchewan, 2006, p.4). Such an interpretation infers that application of these different guidelines extends beyond that which involves living human participants to research which may affect people connected to historical documents. Therefore, researchers in the humanities studying archival material about history or literature might also be required to consider the ethical impact of their research. This is not (yet) the case in Australia.
There has been a flurry of intellectual debate and academic activism in Indigenous Australia surrounding the constitution of regulatory codes (Anderson, 1996; Dunbar & Scrimgeour, 2005; Humphery, 2001). Many of these documents highlight the convergence of the global Indigenous rights movements with the local concerns about research as a neo-colonial practice. In Australia, activism has focused on techniques of governance, reflecting the complexity of democratic representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in regulatory systems. The most prominent set of multidisciplinary guidelines (as opposed to health research) involving Australian Indigenous peoples is the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies Guidelines for Ethical Research in Indigenous Studies (AIATSIS, 2000). The introduction of the AIATSIS guidelines positions the underlying principles of the document within the protection of Indigenous rights in the UN framework of international law, “founded on respect for Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to self-determination, and to control and maintain their cultural heritage” (AIATSIS, 2000, p.1). The guidelines consist of 3 main areas of ethical guidance: “consultation, negotiation and mutual understanding”, “respect, recognition and involvement”, and “benefits, outcomes and agreement” (AIATSIS, 2000, pp.5–15). These are detailed through eleven ethical statements (reproduced in the table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4 AIATSIS Guidelines for Ethical Research in Indigenous Studies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Consultation, negotiation and free and informed consent are the foundations for research with or about Indigenous peoples.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The responsibility for consultation and negotiation is ongoing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultation and negotiation should achieve mutual understanding about the proposed research.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indigenous knowledge systems and processes must be respected.</td>
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<tr>
<td>There must be recognition of the diversity and uniqueness of peoples as well as of individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The intellectual and cultural property rights of Indigenous people must be respected and preserved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Indigenous researchers, individuals and communities should be involved in the 
research as collaborators.

The use of, and access to, research results should be agreed.

A researched community should benefit from, and not be disadvantaged by, 
the research project.

The negotiation of outcomes should include results specific to the needs of the 
researched community.

Negotiation should result in a formal agreement for the conduct of a research 
project, based on good faith and free and informed consent.

Source: (AIATSIS, 2000, pp. 5–15)

Another important institution undertaking political reform for research 
practices is the Cooperative Research Centre for Aboriginal Health (CRCAH). 
This organisation incorporates linkages between universities and industry 
partners (front-line community controlled health service providers and 
government agencies) by developing collaborative research agendas generated 
by ‘industry round-tables’ (details are at www.crcah.org.au). The CRCAH 
produced a monograph series about what it terms ‘the Indigenous Research 
Reform Agenda’ (IRRA) (Henry, Dunbar, Arnott, Srimgeour, Matthews and 
Murakami-Gold, et al., 2002a; 2002b; 2002c). The ‘key elements’ of the IRRA 
are reproduced in the table below. This ‘reform agenda’ outlines pragmatic 
mechanisms for Indigenous participation in research.

Table 5 The Indigenous Research Reform Agenda

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Involvement of Aboriginal communities in the design, execution and evaluation of research.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Defining a coordinating role for Aboriginal community controlled organisations associated with the research.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation and negotiations with Indigenous organisations as ongoing throughout the life of a research project.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms for ongoing surveillance of research projects by Indigenous partner organisations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership and control of research findings by participating Aboriginal community controlled organisations.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Processes to determine research priorities and benefit to the Indigenous communities involved.

Transformation of research practices from 'investigator-driven' to an adoption of a needs-based approach to research.

Determination of ethical processes for the conduct of research.

Linkage between research and community development and social change.

The training of Indigenous researchers.

The adoption of effective mechanisms for the dissemination and transfer of research findings.

Source: (Henry et al., 2002a, p.1)

The second paper in the IRRA series is a discussion titled Rethinking Research Methodologies (Henry, et al., 2002c). Here, the connection between an ethical approach to research with Indigenous Australians and three methodological approaches (cross-disciplinary research, collaborative and participatory research methodologies, and the development of reflexive research practice) is referred to superficially, and reinforces the alterity of subjectivities I discussed earlier. A review of CRC AH projects by Dunbar, Arnott, Scrimgeour, Henry and Murakami-Gold (2003, p.40) revealed many difficulties in implementing participatory action research, despite the steady increase in the adoption of the approach by members of the organisation. Researchers sighted challenges such as 'securing the participation of suitably qualified peoples' on reference groups, time pressures resulting from necessary collaboration, and 'difficulties in achieving consensus' in identifying and mobilising 'communities of interest' (Dunbar et al., 2003, p.39-40):

Of all the areas under consideration, it is at the level of implementing collaborative and participatory methodologies that researchers are reporting the most difficulty ... Operationalising these principles within the context of research at the institutional and Indigenous community level is clearly not easy. (Dunbar et al., 2003, p.39)

A subsequent review of the literature (Henry, Dunbar, Arnott, Scrimgeour & Murakami-Gold, 2005) suggested institutional and structural improvements to be made such as the transfer and dissemination of research findings, and capacity-building. The connection between research and tangible social
change in the form of community development discourse of remedial 'capacity-building' is evident throughout the IRRA.

At the regional level, the Aboriginal Health and Medical Research Council (AHMRC) of NSW has a detailed set of regulatory guidelines for research into Aboriginal health, specific to their own ethics review committee (AHMRC, 1999, p.23). The ethical issues which must be addressed in research applications are: Aboriginal community control; communication strategies which work within the context of community control; and models of community inclusion in the framing and undertaking of the research. This document shares many similarities with the OCAP principles (ownership, control, access and permission) found in Canadian literature (Schnarch, 2004). Its regulatory pertinence is positioned in relation to researchers seeking to work with Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services.

A local protocol for the Western Sydney community development sector is titled Respect, Acknowledge, Listen: Practical protocols for working with the Indigenous Community of Western Sydney (Hurley, 2003). Although the protocols "have been researched, consulted, and collaborated with the Indigenous community of Western Sydney" (Hurley, 2003, p.3) there is no methodological detail provided in the document about this process. The document provides some useful principles for working with communities (distinct from researching communities), such as attending and supporting Indigenous events, and the importance of non-tokenistic consultation. Dunbar and Scrimgeour discuss the role of community-based organisations in the brokerage of collective consent, highlighting the fact that "when academic researchers and Indigenous peoples talk about research and ethics, they do not always mean the same thing" (2006, p.183). Their analysis suggests that application of Indigenous-specific principles in practice depends on the quality of communication between researchers and community to develop shared understandings of research ethics agreements.

Indigenous critiques of ethics guidelines in practice highlight a lack of institutional mechanisms to ensure accountability once the university review process has granted ethics 'clearance'. A study investigating "The effectiveness and suitability of ethics assessment processes for research about
Indigenous-Australians’ by the National Indigenous Postgraduate Association Aboriginal Corporation (Tozer, 2006) revealed the inconsistencies in institutional implementation of Indigenous-specific research guidelines. Using a survey of 27 universities and in-depth interviews with postgraduate students and staff from Indigenous centres' programs within the universities (Tozer, 2006, p.5), the report found that:

[E]thics assessment processes operate at a relatively superficial level. The processes do not promote a comprehensive understanding of Indigenous Australian ethical protocols or encourage a deep commitment to ethical issues for research about Indigenous-Australians. (Tozer, 2006, p.107)

The study called for deeper institutional involvement of Indigenous Centres within universities, and Indigenous staff in the assessment of ethics applications. Similarly, Dunbar and Scrimgeour have concluded that:

Researchers are obviously reluctant to openly criticise a system on which they rely for access, and so it is difficult to track the extent of resistance to increased levels of community control over research and its findings. Evidence of resistance, however, is indicated in proposals for research that lack detail about the way significant Indigenous involvement will be achieved and clear statements of Indigenous rights such as recognition of intellectual property, cultural safety, and power of veto over publication. (2006, p.182)

Brown notes the conflict of ethical precepts in which “researchers have found themselves torn between institutional and community agendas” (2005, p.89), while other commentators refer to systemic issues:

University researchers often find themselves in a time, process and funding crunch. These factors can result in an outcome that is experienced by the community as less than promised, reinforcing the perception of exploitation or one-sidedness to benefits. (Ruttan, 2004, p.15)

The Onemda VicHealth Koori Health Unit has applied a community development approach to researching Aboriginal health research ethics (Shibasaki & Stewart, 2005; Stewart & Pyett, 2005). Their first community seminar resulted in a community publication called We Don’t Like Research ...
But in Koori Hands it Could Make a Difference (VicHealth Koori Health, 2000). In arguing for greater community control of research, community workshops identified barriers to and strategies towards increased involvement of Aboriginal (and Torres Strait Islander) peoples in academic research (VicHealth Koori Health, 2000, pp.25–26). Many of the barriers were associated with structural issues of funding, qualifications and the linking of philosophies between research institutions and community service providers. From this meeting, ethics emerged as a topic that warranted further discussion, resulting in an evaluation of six models of community control and review of research to be undertaken with Koori people (Stewart & Pyett, 2005).

Onemda’s (2008) most recent publication, We Can Like Research ... In Koori Hands, reiterates the theme of community control strengthening the capacity for community change. Similarly, some Indigenous commentators within universities have suggested the institutional ethical management of research requires the introduction of a charter or treaty of ethical research (Worby & Rigney, 2002), which might in turn foster Indigenist movements similar to Kaupapa Maori (Smith, 2000).

Emergent subjectivities

A distinction can now be drawn between the roles of the ‘collective community subjectivity’ and the ‘counter-colonial researcher’ in the process of decolonisation. What this demands in practice is an engagement with methodologies that actively involve Indigenous peoples in the determination of research about their cultural heritage and identity. Participation and collaboration are viewed as crucial for protection from neo-colonial research: “Failure to use a collaborative approach often results in published data with scant useful feedback to the communities of concern, as well as intentional or unintentional exploitation of community knowledge” (Mohatt & Thomas, 2006, p.95). Counter-colonial collaboration is to occur on the terms of the Indigenous peoples, and the researcher must work to engage with Indigenous methodologies throughout all stages of the research. If the researcher cannot themselves speak from within the collective community standpoint, they must develop a position which is respectful and privileges collective community knowledge in order to counter colonialism in research. This demand for collaboration and for the shift in ownership and control of representation of
research findings is closely aligned with the moral/epistemological dimensions of participatory research approaches.

Despite a wealth of literature attending to this topic, there is a discursive silence that indicates a lack of critical analysis. Remedial projects of power reversal assert their moral authority, such that most discussions repeat and reiterate the construction of problems and solutions with predictable circularity. Few, if any, of these accounts recognise or pay attention to internal resistance within the process.

This chapter has established a basis for the construction of subjectivities that shaped my research experience. I have put forward a case for understanding the moral dimensions of participatory methodology in terms of the characters (good and bad) that discourses create. But, do these characterisations of subjectivities remain stable in practice? A more detailed consideration of how subjectivities (colonial/researcher, collective community and counter-colonial researcher) shape and inform one another in practice is required. The next part of this thesis will consider three ways of understanding how subjectivities shape, inform, mingle and coexist: relationality, alterity and positionality. In the next chapter, I outline my method for evaluating how participatory space operates in collaboration with the community members involved: this brings a focus on reflexivity within a participatory, relational context. Reflexivity in this form also draws out the dynamism and multiplicity of subjectivities within participatory space.
CHAPTER 6 LIVING THE TALK

I began my discussion about participation as an ‘invited space’ (Cornwall, 2004) by detailing a case study. The story of that process now provides the context for evaluating ethics in collaborative, participatory research. In this chapter I will explain my method for collectively evaluating the experience of research with participants (Nicholls, 2009; forthcoming). As participatory research conceptualises ethics in a very different way to principilism and institutional review, I developed a reflexive method to evaluate the process with the community development workers involved in the hip-hop workshops and the production of the ‘Mittigar Gurrume Burruk’ report.

[Ethical dilemmas encountered in participation are best understood in a process-oriented way. PAR is reliant upon and seeks to facilitate the competence and reflexivity of participating people. This means that the PAR process is flexible, socially responsive and emergent and so the questions between the participants and the researcher progresses. Hence, participants should be allowed and encouraged to engage in the ethical review of their own projects. (Manzo & Brightbill, 2007, pp.38-39)

Collective evaluation changed the dimensions and terms of use of participation in my research. While the active involvement of the community workers had always been a feature of the research process, the participatory focus of the project had been in engaging young people in the workshops and interviews. In this way, there was a ‘double layer’ of participation from my perspective, and for the community workers involved. These layers of participation resulted in a complex array of subjectivities constantly shifting, being reproduced or fractured (Lather, 2007): there was me shaping the participation of community workers and the participation of young people; the workers shaping the terms of my participation and facilitating youth participation; and of course the young people viewed my subjectivity (researcher, stranger) as different from that of the workers. In this chapter I focus on the role of community workers as co-inquirers about research ethics.

This chapter shows a different approach to reflexive understanding of participation in research. I engage with Indigenist literature and explore the concept of ‘relationality’ to recognise interconnection between all the
participants (including myself). As I am not Indigenous, my ability to articulate
the explanatory principles of ‘relationality’ in Indigenist terms is limited by
standpoint. In this capacity I attempt to consider elements of praxis and
protocol through positionality, attention towards fluid subjectivities, and a
fine balance between ‘participatory consciousness’ (Heshusius, 1994) and
recognising difference (McCorkel & Myers, 2003).

This evaluation is gendered work, but it does not privilege feminist
epistemologies. In part, this is because I have attributed the moral
underpinning of my employing participatory methods to decolonisation. But
this admission also reflects the dynamics of the collaboration more accurately.
When I began my research, I was most interested in the gendered experiences
of participants (rather than ‘youth’ per se), and it was my intention to
consider Aboriginal women’s experiences of criminalisation. However, once I
was in the field negotiating the terms of participation, the community
development workers did not want to exclude young men from the research:
identity as a community was to be inclusive of Aboriginal women and men. As
decolonising research confers participants the right to determine the research
according to their interests, it was not my prerogative to challenge this
decision. I moved to recognise that “gender is not the only difference”
(Cornwall, 1998, p.50) to affect the lives of research participants. As Aileen
Moreton-Robinson points out, from an Aboriginal woman’s perspective,
Australian feminist debates neglect to recognise critically ‘Whiteness’ in
discursive academic practices. She argues that the “middle-class white woman
remains centred, but is unmarked, unnamed, and structurally invisible”
(Moreton-Robinson, 2000, p.147). These points of tension within Australian
feminism have existed since colonisation (Paisley, 2000). In this chapter I seek
to respond theoretically to these concerns, much as I sought to in practice.

Most of the community development workers involved in the project
were women—but there were also men involved in the hip-hop workshops. All
of the participants in the ethical evaluation however were women. In this
way, I draw from feminist literature (Reid & Frisby, 2008) to develop my
reflexive understanding of what enabled me to carry out my research as I did.

While I share no fundamental identity with any other person
(as I am a unique ensemble of contradictory and shifting
subjectivities), I am situated by one of the most powerful and pervasive discourses in social life (that of the binary hierarchy of gender) in a shared subject position with others who are identified, or identify themselves as women. This subject position influences my entrée into social interactions and the ways I can speak, listen and be heard. In this sense I am enabled as a woman, to research with other women. (Gibson–Graham, 1994, p.219)

However, the differences between our subject positions remain pivotal. While I may feel connected with the participants on the basis of gender, I am aware that binaries and hierarchies define us by clustering around questions of Indigeneity and non-Indigeneity. The colonising gaze remains the most pervasive discursive frame to our relationships. Pearl, Ruby, Barb, Miah, Biddy and Jade are ‘community’, and I am representative of ‘the university’—a stranger and outsider with forms for people to sign, and my digital recorder sitting on the table between us. On these terms (Indigenous/ non-Indigenous; community/ researcher) I am like a man attempting feminist participatory research. While I felt connections with the participants in the evaluation because of our gender, I knew that my subjectivity was also White (Hurtardo & Stewart, 2004), younger (by at least ten years), tertiary educated, middle-class with Green politics, a vegetarian, a non-smoker, and not ‘local’. These features constructed the participants’ view of me (Mantzoukas, 2004)—and created an impetus for me to have to ‘move over’ and work hard to develop trust. Difference was not always a difficulty (often there were jokes about how much I liked eating salad). But difference was always present.

Feminism has a long and rich history of praxis, and has taught me a great deal theoretically about methodology and reflexivity. However, while I can say the social dynamics of this evaluation are gendered, I cannot describe this work as exclusively feminist. I also consider there is not enough literature which carefully considers ethical subjectivity amongst non-Indigenous and Indigenous collaborations. Usually, non-Indigenous people ascribe the role of counter-colonial researcher and attempt to negate their subjectivity to reverse their power over the Indigenous participants (Kowal, 2006a; Muecke, 2005, p.174). This was how I began my research, but I now view power dynamics and developing an ethical subjectivity as more complex and nuanced.
Ethnography as a principal methodological technique was purposefully refused in order to move against the (neo)colonial position of the ethnographer’s gaze. Participatory Action Research demands the researcher to ‘enter the field’, and in doing so, they function as a participant observer. However, the method does not ask the researcher to explicitly observe ‘others’ for the purpose of collecting primary data. Rather the method involves observation of self and others through action. Methods of recall that supported analyses of interviews (drawing partially from Mauthner and Doucet’s [2003] voice-centred relational method) included the following:

- Diary keeping to record key dates, regularity and duration of meetings, time spans involved in the research process. Particularly because PAR praxis is iterative, there was never a clear project end date to the activity in the field. This enabled me to see that it was the timelines placed upon me as a research candidate with university deadlines that shaped and construed timelines of participation.

- Journal writing for private use (recalling emotions such as disappointment, conflict, wondering about the basis of resistance within the participatory process, ‘dumping’ raw emotions on the page after lengthy and intense experiences in the field). The purpose of journaling for private use was to develop un-inhibited reflexivity about my own role in the field.

- Notes written transparently whilst in the field for the purposes of collaborative activity. These included notes from meetings to determine project plans, phone numbers or email contact details of stakeholders in the participatory project, drafting a budget, and writing grant applications.

- Email correspondence between myself and community co-inquirers noting key dates, invitations to meetings, co-ordinating and following up on participatory activities.

These techniques supported my analysis of the interviews, which commenced when Pearl mentioned to me that members of the management committee and workers at the organisation wanted to know what they could do to reciprocate all of the volunteering I had done for NAIDOC week celebrations. She had suggested to the group that I might be interested in doing some interviews, and so it was by invitation that I applied for a variation
to my ethics protocol for permission to interview workers and community members associated with Mittigar Gurrume Burruk (approval was provided by the Chair of the University of Western Sydney Human Ethics Committee in September 2007).

The participants and I were already in the habit of talking about the experience of research, which was both an advantage and a disadvantage. It was an advantage because everyone had a considered opinion about the topic, and rapport was already well established. The disadvantage was that sometimes people had already articulated what they felt was important to say. As such, the material collected is only a small representation of the many discussions we had about research over the period of my contact in the field (from October 2005 to November 2008). My method is not ethnographic—I was not undertaking participant observation. I did not want people to feel like I was noting down everything they said while I volunteered in the office. The interviews were a transparent method of collecting data: participants could request that the recordings be stopped if they wanted to discuss confidential issues. Interviews were recorded from September 2007 to September 2008. Most interviews took the form of conversations, and were therefore unstructured and were not usually directed by my interrogation (although sometimes I asked questions for clarification of concepts). Sometimes co-inquirers asked me questions, but usually the conversations were evaluative and affirming. Interview lengths varied between vignettes of five minute conversations and in-depth discussions of over an hour.

*Pearl:* And we’re oral people to start with. So our stories, and our opinions and our things that we want to tell you should be counted and should be recorded because that’s how we do things. We’re talking people. (25 July 2008)

The interviews were transcribed and returned to participants to check they approved of the material; they could make any changes they felt necessary. I took the position that relationality was the primary factor for the integrity of the data—as such it was crucial that the participants felt they would not be misrepresented and could retain control over how their voices ‘sounded’ on the page. I do not consider the data collected to be a moment of
truth crystallised without context; the data are co-constructed and contextual, which means that quality comes from the participants' ongoing engagement with representation. As Gaventa and Cornwall suggest, "'truths' become products of a process in which people come together to share experience through a dynamic process of action, reflection, and collective investigation" (2008, p.179).

Interestingly, while we discussed the discomfort of seeing spoken word transcribed, no one requested significant changes be made. Rather, comments affirmed identity: "I didn't realise I sounded so Black!" and "If other Aboriginal people read this they'll recognise that I'm Aboriginal. I don't want to change the way I sound. I'm proud of my identity." With this direction, I transcribed the data to include colloquial pronunciation to accurately reflect accent and conversational intonation. The data have not been grammatically 'cleaned' by me, and the participants were invited to adjust the representations of their voice if they wanted to.

To analyse the written transcripts I drew from Mauthner and Doucet's (2003, p.419) account of using a voice-centred relational method. Here, they describe a reflexive joint construction of knowledge produced through the interaction between the researcher and the participant by integrating emotional and social responses into accounts of the reading process. Although they point out that the voice-centred relational method "still exhibits a leaning towards more interpretive assumptions, with hints of both phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches" (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003, p.423), there is critical work that can be applied to make this process ontologically transparent and epistemologically accountable. As Byrne, Canavan and Millar recount: "we were compelled by the [voice-centred relational] method and participatory structure to acknowledge, consider and capture our respective biases before any attempt at interpretation was made" (2009 p.76).

Similarly, in this Chapter I use reflexivity on a number of levels to explicate my position in the field at the time of undertaking interviews and in listening, transcribing, choosing excerpts and writing about the research process. For example, I acknowledge that despite attempts to address power
effects through the research process, such as returning segments of interviews to be used with approval of the participants, the power to determine which words are included in this thesis and the final context of the placement in the text is made by me.

The final output can only be a reconstructed account of facts, events, observations, and theory as interpreted by the researcher. It is also a process imbued with power relations, for the researcher has the power to select, highlight and contextualise certain elements of the data. (Mehta, 2008, p.237)

This admission cannot artificially ‘fix’ inequality within the research process, but is an attempt to be transparent about power relations (Grbich, 2007, p.99). I am aware of textual moves (exemplified by Lather and Smith’s disruptive double text in Troubling the Angels [Lather, 2007]) that can be deployed to challenge dominant researcher voices. However, presenting a difficult and disruptive text to erode and self-negate my own voice is not my principal objective here. I consider there might be other occasions for representations of material included in this thesis, which post-structurally play with voice and texture in representation. The focus of my task in writing this thesis is encapsulated in this statement of participatory research’s commitment to evaluating practice critically:

Honestly acknowledging this confusion and the uncertainty they faced in trying to respond to these power differentials between the academic researchers and community participants, and among the community participants themselves, offers important insights into key ethical challenges facing these researchers and gives their accounts of their work a credibility and legitimacy that more sanitized accounts often lack. (Brydon-Miller, 2008, p.207)

Given that “epistemology determines and is made visible through method, particularly in the participant-researcher relationship, measures of research quality, and form, voice, and representation in analysis and writing” (Carter & Little, 2007, p.1316), I will now provide detail of three concepts informing the evaluation of the research process: relationality, alterity and positionality.
Some of the participants in the research have already been represented within this thesis. At this point I would like to reintroduce Jade, Pearl, Micah, Ruby, Biddy and Barb’s voices, providing their opinion on the underpinning methodology used for evaluation: the concept of relationality.

Pearl: *That relationship, we talk about, this is one of the major strengths, I think. ‘Cos without that, you have nothing. As far as I’m concerned, if you haven’t got that relationship built in that community, you’re not going to get anything outta anybody.* (18 September 2007)

Micah: *What happens is that we tend to choose people who we can work with, who will sit down and listen to us.* (18 December 2007)

Biddy: *Sometimes it [research] loses the heartfelt part, and that’s what you really want to get across.* (4 September 2008)

Ruby: *Word of mouth and people getting to know about you in the community. And if they wanna put you out there, they’ll put you out there, and if they don’t they won’t.* (26 September 2007)

Barb: *And I think it just takes … that researcher to come, and get to know these people, you know, personally, sit down with them, have a cup of tea, get to know the community, get to know the organisations. Then branch out with them you know, and go to Sorry Day, NAIDOC, you know, associate yourself with what they’re doing and eventually they’ll learn that respect and I think you’ll have more openness.* (26 September 2007)

The concept of relationality is expressed in similar terms by Indigenous peoples from various parts of the world. For example from Canada:

An Indigenous paradigm comes from the fundamental belief that knowledge is relational … My father was saying how a couch or sofa in Cree translated literally means “someplace you sit.” Rather than calling it a sofa, rather than calling it an object, you name it through your relationship to it. You can extend this to say that ideas and concepts, like objects, are
not as important as my relationship to an idea or concept. (Wilson, 2001, p.176–7)

And in Australian Indigenist literature:

In Indigenous cultural domains relationality means that one experiences the self as part of others and that others are part of the self; this is learnt through reciprocity, obligation, shared experiences, coexistence, cooperation and social memory. (Moreton-Robinson, 2000, p.16)

The Indigenist paradigm therefore deems knowledge construction and validity measures according to the relational. Like participatory practice, “this relational portrayal of power relations mirrors Foucault’s view of power residing not in individuals but in the positions they occupy and the ways in which discourses make these positions available to them” (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008, p.177).

I cannot pretend to assume that as a non-Indigenous person I am able to appropriate Indigenous knowledges because standpoint is a requirement of Indigenous relationality (Moreton-Robinson, 2000, p. 18). However, as a non-Indigenous person I can respond thoughtfully to relations amongst participants to consider the ways in which I can identify my own ontological presuppositions. For example, I can find similarities with post-structural feminist research approaches which highlight connectedness (and disconnectedness) with research participants (Gibson-Graham, 1994; McCorkel & Myers, 2003, p. 204) and the “complex, shifting and dynamic” (McCorkel & Myers, 2003, p. 223) shape of such relationships. As Manzo and Brightbill note, “the ethic of care, like participation, considers ethics as relational” (2007, p.36).

‘Indigenist research’, like feminist research, “is a perspective with a set of principles that inform research approaches” (Grbich, 2007, p. 95). This includes empowerment as a desirable outcome from research, on the basis of addressing inequality, manifest in cultural and structural discriminatory practices (such as the need for epistemological realignment in research practices). What differs, however, is that “Indigenous methodologies tend to approach cultural protocols, values and behaviours as an integral part of methodology” (Smith, 1999, p. 15).
Your methodology has to ask different questions: rather than asking about validity or reliability, you are asking how am I fulfilling my role in this relationship? … This becomes my methodology, an Indigenous methodology, by looking at relational accountability or being accountable to all my relations. (Wilson, 2001, p. 177)

Maori researchers have outlined *Kaupapa Maori* to express the cultural expectations of relating to participants ethically and respectfully. The approach articulates a self-determined epistemology, rather than one that is controlled by a cultural outsider with the mission to ‘empower’ research participants (Bishop, 2005, p. 123). Smith’s writings provide detail of culturally specific expectations, which provide cues for non-Indigenous researchers to consider how a community might judge them to be a trustworthy, ‘good’ person (Smith, 1999, p. 119–120). Researchers are expected to develop prevailing relationships with participants (Bishop, 2005, p. 117) on the terms of the local community (Bishop, 2005, p. 129).

Pearl: I’m the same as you, to do that. I have to over-extend myself and do things way beyond what I would normally do in …

Ruth: Your focus?

Pearl: Yep, way beyond to build them partnerships. So there’s really no difference. I think Ruth, if you really think about it and apply it to everything. You can’t just sit there and say ‘this is how I’m going to do something’, because it doesn’t even work when you implement it into community work. (18 September 2007)

Much of the focus of this approach is about relationality and conduct, and distinguishes between the development of rapport with participants and the development of trust (Bishop, 2005, pp. 111–112). The notion of rapport does not always incorporate critical ideas of responsibility to community participants (Oakley, 2003, pp. 245–247). The way in which rapport extends into trust and meaningful engagement is by the researcher proving themselves as willing to move into a liminal, in-between space, decentering themselves by challenging traditional notions of objective control between researchers and research participants. This process is how Heshusius suggests we begin “describing ourselves and our work in ethical (and therefore participatory) terms” (1994, p. 20).
Alterity

Relationality not only highlights the multiple connections between people through accountability—it also highlights disconnection, difference, and a hyphen that separates as much as it connects. Just as power relations always encompass forms of resistance, relationality also defines who is connected and who is not, and the terms of difference.

In discussing ‘Indigeneity’, I want to reiterate that I recognise the complexity and contestations that reflect the many different peoples who identify as ‘Indigenous’ and indeed, the researchers who in turn recognise their alterity in relation to participants (Fawcett & Hearn, 2004). In recognising alterity between the researcher and participants, a demand emerges for a method of countering the situated power/knowledge of the researcher. Researchers must exercise caution in working the hyphen of self—other: the goal of collaborative work should not be to “dissolve/consume/soften/erase” difference (Jones with Jenkins, 2008, p. 475), for “indigenous peoples—as a matter of political, practical and identity survival as indigenous peoples—insist on a profound difference at the Self—Other border. The hyphen is non-negotiable” (Jones with Jenkins, 2008, p. 475). For some Australian Indigenous researchers, the hyphen remains articulated as insider/outside research:

As for practical advice for non-Aboriginal researchers in the Aboriginal arena, well, getting your foot in the door is the major objective and I guess I have painted a reasonably bleak picture ... given that I possibly have a certain attitude about non-Aborigines continuing to put us under the microscope, good luck, you’ll need it, because as I said before, no matter what your intentions are and how you present yourselves, until a more enlightened and less suspicious time appears; as a non-Aboriginal researcher, you’ll always be seen as an outsider mate, an outsider looking in. (Mackenzie, 2007, p.8)

The participants in their evaluation consider alterity according to an inability to empathise with the feeling of being colonised:

Ruby: If you’re going to go and research Indigenous communities you better do some learning first, so you understand what Sorry Day is, what NAIDOC means, what the referendum meant for everybody in community, and then

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maybe once you have, and you’ll never totally understand, but you may have an empathy, then I think you can start. (26 September 2007)

Pearl: Maybe as a researcher, if you were to understand the history of what has happened, to the Aboriginal people in Australia, then maybe you would understand that you couldn’t just walk in there and say, this is what you’re gonna do. If you did do that, and took away that research and used it against them ... know historically how ripped apart Aboriginal people have been from most everything that has affected them in Australia. (18 September 2007)

Jade: I think part of it is that, um, some researchers probably don’t necessarily have the ability to empathise very well with other people, and empathy is an important part of it ... I don’t think it has to be necessarily sympathetic, but I think if you can empathise with some of the things that might have happened to people, that happened in the past, well, that’s important. I haven’t had a lot experience with this sort of research, but I would imagine it’s a fairly important part. Understanding people a little bit, and maybe knowing when to take a step back too, or understanding their reactions—if they’re angry reactions, figuring out why, and whether you need to rethink how you do things. (30 November 2007)

Not being able to understand totally the experience of colonisation delineates a difference. This creates situations whereby a researcher should not assume to be connected to everything that occurs—power relations between participants have an impact on the degree of participation, but these relationships may not involve the researcher directly. This suggests there are times to step back and acknowledge power relations amongst participants in collaboration.

A productive way of recognising difference is for discursive repositioning that “challenges the essentialising dichotomization of the insider/outsider debate” (Bishop, 2005, p. 115). Essentialist definitions on either side of the hyphen “assume a homogeneity that is far from the reality of the diversity and complexity” (Bishop, 2005, p. 111) of what all participants in a collaboration have to offer. This also applies to the differences amongst forms of collaborative arrangements (Jones with Jenkins, 2008, p. 472). Lather
suggests, “the move is, rather to endorse complexity, partial truths, and multiple subjectivities” (2007, p.136). This demands a separation of discursive construction of subjectivity from structural location (Fawcett & Hearn, 2004, p. 211), exemplified for example in the development of a pro-feminist male standpoint (Pease, 2000).

Obviously, such a process is highly complex, but can be attempted using an ethical form of reflexivity that enables the self to identify carefully multiple domains of self (Foucault, 1994a, p.223). These multiple views of self delineate between discursive and material elements of subjectivity. Acknowledging difference amongst participants requires attention to multiple subjectivities produced by the surrounding social context and discourses. For example, while I am interviewing Jade, or Pearl, or Biddy I am an outsider and they are insiders. I could essentialise their subjectivities as ‘Indigenous’ and mine as ‘non-Indigenous’. However, in a different social context Pearl might know more about her family’s history than Jade or Biddy; Pearl might assert that her opinion should be privileged over Biddy or Jade because she is a traditional custodian of the place where they are located; Biddy might have wider community connections than Jade; and Jade might be learning her language and actively caring for Country. Each of them can make claims of power and knowledge over each other by performing certain subjectivities within context.

Jade: I suppose, one of the things I think is probably important in recognising is ... within communities there is just such a range of diversity in people's experience, and that attitudes and perceptions are going to be just as diverse. You know things that upset people will be quite different. What people are open to will be different depending on their experience of growing up. Or even how ... Not everyone grew up with their Aboriginality intact. And some people come to it later in life. So in which case, they may have different attitudes to those people I would consider fortunate enough to know things about their past. (30 November 2007)

Each of these social contexts suggests competing discourses of 'authenticity': proof of lineage, embeddedness in the community, and protecting the natural resources of the land. Incorporating Narayan’s (1998)
argument against cultural and gender essentialism, the insider/outsider frame might recognise that such essentialisms are ‘neat packages’ derivative of the colonial rationale of invasion and imperialism.

What postcolonial feminists need to do is not endorse ‘cultural relativism’ but to resist various forms of cultural essentialism, including relativist versions ... by pointing to the internal plurality, dissention and contestation over values and ongoing changes in practices in virtually all communities. (Narayan, 1998, para 46)

In this way, definitions of subjectivities become more complex and contextual than simple attributions of insider/outsider: instead, there is a focus on difference within categories of ‘insider’ to recognise power relations amongst participants exist simultaneously with power relations between the researcher and collective group. The terms of participation for a participant may depend on their relationships with other participants, more than the terms of their relationship with the researcher. Family connections, roles at work (which categorise and create hierarchies), belief or interest in a project, all influence the terms of participation.

Jade: It is important not to assume ... sometimes when I look at the way, or listen to the way other people talk about Aboriginal people you get a real diversity in their opinions and some are of course of they’re drunks, they've got a bottle of red Nellie in a paper bag, they beat their kids and do all these terrible things to them; and then you have the other people who almost idealise Aboriginal people as the noble savage. You know who might be fresh out of the trees, but they've got all of these amazing traits. And basically I think is as a researcher probably, it's a matter of marrying up the fact that Aboriginal people are just other humans who have all those flaws, and you talk to them and you deal with them in a way that treats them like another human being. ... And whilst not making an assumption that everyone is bad, and does terrible things to their children, also don't make the assumption that everyone is good and they deserve some sort of special treatment. I think that might be valid. A valid point of view. (30 November 2007)

In summary, while epistemological preference can be given to the relational, this must always encompass difference. In practice this suggests that the idea of “us” cannot stand in place of the hyphen; it can only name
an always conditional relationship between’ (Jones with Jenkins, 2008, p. 475). This means “orientation to a relationship—to the hyphen—rather than to the Other, is the most feasible posture for a colonizer collaborator” (Jones with Jenkins, 2008, p. 482). Rather than define relationships according to connections and disconnections, relationships amongst subjectivities can be conceived as liminal spaces. As social contexts, discourses, rules, and institutions constantly inform and produce the shape of subjectivities, power relations (incorporating acquiescence and resistance) become the site for ethical attention. To understand ethical subjectivities, creating a rigid definition of one self and the participants can only result in essentialism. Fluid definitions of self, responsive to social, political, institutional contexts enable attention towards power relations and ethics. This is a process of “being open and susceptible ... learning from difference rather than learning about the Other” (Jones with Jenkins, 2008, p. 480).

**Positionality**

To attend to the liminal suggests a spatial dimension to participation. Cornwall (2004) discusses the importance of incorporating space into analysis of participatory practice by considering the power dynamics of ‘invited spaces’. Consideration can be given not only to the types of knowledge produced within a local, community-based context but also to metaphorical applications of spatial reflexivity. For example, consideration may be given to who speaks within an invited space of participation (such as a community consultation, a meeting, an interview):

*Jade: People walk away, and they get some kind of doctorate or something become doctor somebody because, in fact, unless you deal with the community for a while, all you’re doing is touching the surface. And what you’re probably doing is getting to the people will most likely to give you their opinion. And they may not reflect, they obviously don’t reflect the whole community’s opinion. They are more outspoken, and sometimes those people that are more outspoken, are also the people that are more bitter about things in the past. Not always, but you certainly will get, it’s like dealing in any community, you will get people who sit back and evaluate the person in front of them and wonder if they can trust them. And if they do, they will give them information. (30 November 2007)*
Jade delineates space by showing how a researcher ‘walks away’ from the community back to the academy. In contrast, there exists an alternative space, deeper than the ‘surface’. The ‘surface’ is a space in which only outspoken community members are located. This has implications for the type of information provided. Jade sees an alternative space where a researcher comes before the community to have their trustworthiness appraised (similarly, kanohi kitea, the seen face, is an ethical protocol in Maori communities [Smith, 1999, p.120]). Metaphors about depth and authenticity are evident in everyday talk about research practices.

Viewing participation as a spatial practice evokes ‘postionality’ within a collaboration as “constantly shifting ground on which struggles for control are waged” (Cornwall, 2004, p.81). Even for ‘insiders’ participatory spaces are not stable or fixed: Smith (1999, pp.196–199) points out her identity as a Maori woman shifted from being ‘a community member’ to that of ‘researcher’ when undertaking field work. As an insider, she was able to identify this shift reflexively in relationships, which resulted in her suggesting that while standpoint (being Maori) enables cultural understanding, there remain additional relations of power which need to be addressed in research relationships: “Being a Maori researcher does not mean an absence of bias; it simply means that the potential for different kinds of biases need to be considered reflexively” (L.T. Smith, 2000, p. 236). Similarly, Nagar emphasises the researcher’s need to reconceptualise their place within collaboration as ‘a fissured space of fragile and fluid networks of connections and gaps’ (2003, p. 359). For, “one’s location—the fluid geographical, political, emotional, gendered, raced, classed position—is we think perhaps more important than the distinction between academic and non-academic researcher” (Cahill & Torre, 2007, p.203).

Bishop suggests that there are some similarities between Kaupapa Maori and collaborative participatory methods, but develops more detail about the “discursive positionings within the collective” (2005, p. 121); he goes on to say that “[t]his emphasis on positionings within a group constituted as whanau [family] also addresses concerns about accountability, authority and control” (2005, p. 121). From this standpoint, “while cross-cultural
competency could be argued as a necessary condition for the researcher to engage in participatory research, it is not sufficient in itself to ensure empowerment of the other research participants” (Bishop & Glyn, 1999, p. 178). A spatial critique of participation might then involve differentiation between kinds of knowledge created within social, political, and institutional spaces to distinguish:

the ‘epistemic location’ from the ‘social location’. The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations, does not automatically mean he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location ... not claiming an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is automatically epistemic subaltern knowledge. (Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 213)

Viewing participation as a spatial practice enables recognition of the diversity of standpoints within collective groups: social locations, epistemic locations—a multitude of subjectivities within participatory research.

Given this discussion of relatedness, alterity and positionality, I cannot rely on a ‘first person’ application of reflexivity to situate knowledge (Rose, 1997). Researchers need to engage with reflexive evaluation of collective and negotiated design, data collection and analysis to consider the interpersonal and collective dynamics at play during the research process, and the catalytic effects of participation. Additional political and relational layers of reflexivity are essential for a researcher to evaluate empowerment and participation critically in a counter-colonial context. Incorporating resistance into accounts of participatory research enables an ability to acknowledge “internal conflicts and contradictions” (Fawcett & Hearn, 2004, p. 211) without deeming participation a failure.

**Multi-layered reflexivity**

Reflexive identification of the researcher’s discursive position in collaboration with community requires recognition of at least three layers of reflexivity (Chiu, 2006, p. 191). This differs from literature regarding researchers using reflexivity in peer-based team work (Sltanen, Willis & Scobie, 2007). The layers of reflexivity I consider part of my methods are ‘self-reflexivity’, ‘interpersonal reflexivity’, and ‘collective reflexivity’, drawing particularly
from the model outlined by Chiu (2006), though differing in theoretical analysis (she uses Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, while I will situate each layer within the context of counter-colonialism). A similar structure of ‘first-, second-, third-person inquiry’ is outlined by Reason and Bradbury (2008, p. 6), as a means for distinguishing between voice(s) and practice—however, there is a different intention and emphasis in my application.

The focus here is to identify discursive positions within a collective, and to account for movement, fragility, fluidity and change within collaborative research relationships. By practising the three layers of reflexivity, there is an opportunity to reframe notions of justice, empowerment and participation within research as a paradigm of relationships that nurture self-determination, whereby “the individual person is constituted through his or her communicative and interactive relations with others. The individual person acquires a sense of self from being recognized by others with whom he or she has relationships” (Young, 2004, p. 183).

First person: transparent, self-reflexivity

*Pearl: I always just talk from my personal view, what I believe; I don’t talk for anybody else. (4 September 2008)*

The first layer is self-reflexivity (first person), which asks the researcher to identify what hidden assumptions may underpin their research. For example which disciplinary theories structure the research proposal or funding that have enabled the research to proceed? Feminist researchers refer to this as ‘reflexive transparency’ (Oakley, 2003; Rose, 1997) and although it does not necessarily contribute to a broader agenda of social change evaluation within the research process, it does enable reconceptualised quality assessment (Lather, 2003). The researcher must be aware of the context of power and privilege in the research process, of what ideas were included and what ideas were excluded according to predetermined elements brought by the skills or strengths of the researcher.

First-person reflexivity also demands that the researcher consider the ways in which they write about collaborative research. There has been a noted tendency for researchers to ‘hide’ within collaborative texts (Pain, 2004, p.
658), and there is a danger that this “systematically distorts the power positioning of all who participated in the research” (Chiu, 2006, p. 189). Others have noted the irrelevance that writing to academic audiences holds for community inquirers who are more interested in the practical outcomes of the research activity or in the production of material for use by the community involved (Nagar, 2003). It is therefore pivotal for the collaborative researcher to recognise their identity when presenting material intended for a variety of audiences.

Heshusius (1994) contends that it is possible to become over-concerned with the self, emphasising the distance between self and others as a result of efforts to manage subjectivity. In this way, “the preoccupation with how to account for one’s subjectivity can be seen as a subtle version of empiricist thought, in that it portrays the belief that one knows ‘how to handle things’” (Hersusius, 1994, p. 16). This highlights the need for additional layers of reflexivity; not towards controlling collaboration, but as a gesture of attention and receptivity to the relational, the spaces in-between. Working reflexively in the interpersonal and collective layers reveals what connects those working in collaboration, just as self-reflexivity highlights the hyphen of difference between us, with all of its complexity and tensions (Jones with Jenkins, 2008, p. 473).

Second person: interpersonal reflexivity

Micah: One of the things that we’ve been saying from long time that you can’t work with Aboriginal communities without working with Aboriginal people. (18 December 2007)

The second layer is relational-reflexivity (second person), which calls for an evaluation of interpersonal encounters and the researcher’s ability to collaborate with others. As feminist researchers have noted “Reflexivity has mainly focused on examining the identities of the individual researcher rather than the ways in which those identities intersect with institutional, geopolitical and material aspects of their positionality” (Nagar, 2003, p. 356). Positionality enables the researcher to consider the terms of their inclusion within the collaboration by considering interpersonal encounters along the research journey, and the ability to collaborate (as opposed to lead, control or
delegate). *Kaupapa Maori* demonstrates an intersection between what is deemed ethical behaviour by the community (as opposed to institutional or non-Indigenous determinants of ethical behaviour) and the necessity for the researcher to be self-aware of the process in which they are embedded (Bishop, 2005; Smith, 1999).

Within my research experience, community co-inquirers have communicated the idea of positionality as a fine balance of commitment to relationships and self-checking. Co-inquirers have not demanded that I deny my subjectivity of ‘being’ a researcher, but that I acknowledge such a role and then build relationships of trust in that acknowledgment.

*Jade:* If you haven't experienced it, you don't know what the realities of other people's existence is. The things that we accept as everyday stuff they don't have. So it’s a bit of a learning experience isn't it?

*Ruth:* Yeah definitely.

*Jade:* The differences in affluence and education, and not making judgments about people based on that, you know, so yeah, I can understand where you’re coming from on that. It’s quite a steep learning curve. (30 November 2007)

Recognition of relationships is exemplified in the distinction between traditional modes of interviewing research subjects and developing ‘authentic rapport’ with research participants (Oakley, 2003). Extending this into an agenda of collaborative inquiry demands complex and careful negotiation to include community-determined inquiry (Smith, 1999, p.137).

*Pearl:* This is from my perspective, so I can’t talk for everybody, but I think they need to be at everything. And I even think this could work in a non-Indigenous research ... that your research may need to go for two or three years to build that relationship ‘cos the more relationships that you build, the more quality that you’re going to get outta your research, ‘cos as long as you can be partial I suppose and not have your whole heart and soul in with the people as well.

*Ruth:* Mmm.

*Pearl:* I dunno. I think you would really need to look at that, to step back from it sometimes maybe as a researcher. I think you get more quality from
us, because we’ve built a relationship for nearly two years. (18 September 2007)

Third person: collective reflexivity & catalytic validity

The third layer of reflexivity is where the biggest claims about social change are made in participatory action methodologies. This third layer demands the question of how the collaboration determined the frames of inquiry. It also asks what were the terms of participation, who participated, or did not … and what effects this had on the outcome of social change and practical knowledge for the community participants.

Building upon a reflexive determination of positionality, this layer questions the idea of an all-knowing, all-seeing researcher, and connects with Lather’s (2003, p. 189) discussion of construct validity (was the theory underpinning the research actually relevant to findings; and in this case, ‘practical knowledge’?) and face validity (were the findings analysed by the participants in the research as well as the researcher?). For example, Biddy reflects on using semi-structured interviews with youth participants with whom she had ongoing (trusting) relationships. She notes that she was able to increase the quality of the data by tuning the questions according to her knowledge of the people she was interviewing. She also comments on the quality of the data according to the level of rapport and trust, indicating that if I had been attempting the interview, I would not have been able to achieve the same quality of data:

Biddy: When I was asking the questions, I sorta mixed them around a bit and changed them … and I think it just added … they were comfortable, like if you went and did it they’d be … they didn’t know you. (4 September 2008)

‘Collective-reflexivity’ seeks to articulate not only contextual change of action outcomes from the research (such as the procedural accounts of evaluation and output in the form of ‘lessons learned’), but extends into a domain of “catalytic validity” (Lather, 2003, p. 191). The suggested reflexive process of collaborative ‘sense-making’ is therefore a theoretically consistent tool within participatory methodology. However, this third layer of reflexivity also demands that the researcher understand a shift in their positionality. This
shift entails simultaneously being receptive to alternative domains of power and knowledge, and attempting to maintain space for this throughout the entire research process by ceding researcher control beyond the initial phase of negotiation, and extending participation into data collection, analysis and distribution.

Ruby: I still believe that it all boils down to the individual researcher and the community and I don’t know if you can apply, you would have to make it that you’re—if you were going to make it like a step by step process, you would have to make it so interchangeable, there’d have to be ... so it could be manipulated and interchanged so that it could suit the community. I still think the community should steer it. So maybe you go in there, as a researcher, and just have something in your head, but like you say, the whole thing changes anyway. (26 September 2007)

With this in mind, it is worth considering that gestures of inclusion require decentering. Whether it is possible to apply the three layers of reflexivity equally and at all times is yet to be determined. From my experience, these movements and shifts are best considered as complex, unstable positions. Perhaps then, attention to the three layers of reflexivity is like juggling: requiring concentration, movement, balance and coordination. Juggling is resisting essentialist positions while also recognising difference. This is the ability to see that the hyphen both connects and separates us when we undertake collaborative counter-colonial research.

Moreover, this layer of reflexivity calls for discussion amongst collaborating participants about the effects of taking part in research, to reflect together about whether participating was transformative, affirming, cathartic or empowering. Carter, Jordens, McGrath and Little (2008) have undertaken empirical research into the social processes of research participation. By coding interview data under a rubric of ‘participating in research’, Carter et al. (2008) have identified several domains of participation which shed light on why people choose to participate, and also why people choose to disengage from the research experience. Most ethics review processes assume that research participants are at risk of emotional disturbance through participation, and protocols of protecting the wellbeing of
participants must be set in place (such as highlighting the participant’s right to exit research at any stage, and the availability of counselling services for participants if required). In contrast to this assumption, Carter et al.’s research found that the participant’s desire to exit the research process was based upon undergoing an ontologic and epistemic experience of reconstituting knowledge about themselves through involvement in research. Participants chose to exit the research process once this process of affirmation or catharsis reached saturation point. Similarly, earlier feminist reflexive work notes participants found the interview experience cathartic (England, 1994, p. 85). However, the idea of the relation of the self in constituting knowledge of oneself has great implications for evaluating the ethics of research participation.

Pearl: I feel like that I’ve been empowered now, through your research and through being involved from the beginning and all the way through it, that when somebody else comes in, I can ask them what they’re doing with it, where it’s going and what is going on and feel that I have the right to ask them questions. So I think that’s a really great outcome. (4 September 2008)

Another approach for gleaning the participant’s experience of research stems from the idea that interviews may be epistemic (Brinkmann, 2007). This supposition, inspired by Socratic dialogue, endeavours “to move conversation partners from doxa to episteme (i.e. from a state of being simply opinionated to being capable of questioning and justifying what they believe is the case” (Brinkmann, 2007, p. 1117). Brinkmann argues that “the conversation partners were thus positioned as responsible citizens, accountable to each other ...and the topic would therefore not be the narrative of the individual’s life or his or her experiences but rather people’s epistemic practices of justification” (2007, p. 1128). In this way, participants can ask questions of the researcher, and the researcher can reflect upon what they have developed relationally with the participants to ask epistemic questions. This might hold implications for considering the relational quality of the data:

Jade: People who I think know things are the ones who aren’t aggressive and aren’t easily offended. And you can actually ask a question. (30 November 2007)
This provides clues for establishing ethical relationships which simultaneously seek to divulge a personal commitment and openness from the researcher, while also operating under the rubric of a research relationship in an counter-colonial context. That the process entails finding “a common understanding [which] does not imply fixity or comprehensiveness” (Siltanen et al., 2007, p. 49) enables some integrity in maintaining fluidity in the construction of subjectivities within the collaboration.

Re-presenting collaboratively

One of the ‘troubling-points’ of collaborative and participatory research is the notion of producing collaborative material for an academic audience. During the process of working within invited spaces our collaboration had a number of opportunities to co-present: a seminar at my university (December 2006), a conference interstate (October 2007), and submitting an article to an international journal (September 2007–December 2007). Here, I reflect on each of these re-presentations.

In December 2005 we gave a presentation at an ‘engagement’ seminar hosted by the Social Justice and Social Change Research Centre of the University of Western Sydney. We focused on the ethics of collaborative research, and highlighted ways of understanding the NHMRC guidelines by discussing some of the recommendations of the AIATSIS guidelines and community responses to these points. After the presentation, a member of the audience approached us.

Pearl: Afterwards this guy came out, he was an academic person, like a research person. And he came up to Ruth, and like me and [M.] and [C.] were standing there, and he’s like, ‘how do you get them to interact with you?’ The three of us just looked at each other and thought, you’ve gotta be kidding me—we’re standing there! (4 September 2008)

Pearl: Something that I found interesting was that day that we went to Parramatta with you ... and you’re big on values, and I’m big on values and I don’t know if that has a lot to do with research, but that’s just my concept. When that guy came out and spoke to us, I thought, ‘My God if you were to
come into the community, you wouldn't get jack from us’. He seemed quite arrogant. And I thought, ‘My God, you’ve got no people skills at all’. And maybe that’s a big component that needs to be understood in your research, but you need people skills.

Ruth: Yep, it’s about interpersonal skills

Pearl: It is, and how you relate to people. Because if you don’t have that, how are you going to get anything out of it?

Ruth: Mmm, he didn’t really have any idea of what he was talking about as well.

Pearl: But he was arrogant. He was arrogant, and I thought my goodness, and he kinda gave me the opinion of, oh, you know ... we had just got up there with you as well, which historically happens through research in Indigenous communities but there was no acknowledgment that we got up there with you as well, he was more interested in talking to you about how to get in there, and we were all standing in front of him, and I thought my goodness you arrogant little person. And that’s not how we work in our community ... in the Hawkesbury. We really strive and try to acknowledge everybody. That’s my opinion. (18 September 2007)

This discussion highlights the difference between pragmatic issues of participation (questions of how to engage, gain access to participants) and the moral issue of decolonising research. Counter-colonial research is not a technical application of participatory methods (such as mapping or photo-voice). Counter-colonial research demands engaging with Indigenous knowledge systems such as relationality, recognising and acknowledging the role of all participants within a collective.

We also travelled interstate to give a paper together at the National Health and Medical Research Council’s Human Ethics Conference based upon our group discussions.

Ruby: We’ve done a conference with Ruth down in Melbourne, me and [M.] and Ruth.

Ruth: The National Ethics Conference.

30 I should note that the NHMRC provided partial funding for this by covering the registration costs of community co-inquirers.
Ruby: Yep, about how we got involved in the research and the designing of
the questions and how we get to steer which way we think it should go. And
our opinions are valuable and Ruth listens to that kind of stuff and that's

While there were some reservations about speaking in front of a large
audience, this experience of representing the research experience was
positive and highlighted the way in which we had juxtaposed power relations
in our collaboration.

Ruby: So when we went to Ruth’s conference … not Ruth’s conference, the
ethics conference down in Melbourne, we were all allowed to sit at a table,
and no one had to get up and stand at the podium, so, the microphones were
just in front of us which I think is less intimidating … I think it was because
we were all equal, all sitting at a table, and there was all them academics
sitting up there talking about different things, but we were all just equal.
And there was no power or … Ruth was at the table sitting right next to us. (4
September 2008)

Following this presentation we received feedback from an audience
member. She emailed:

Ruth—I was in the audience at the ethics conference in Melbourne where you
presented this week. I’m just emailing my congratulations on a great
presentation—innovative style and a wonderful feeling about it. It wasn’t just
what you and the other two presenters actually said, it was the living the talk
message that came through—from [J.S.] (just an ordinary audience member).
(19 October 2007)

The audience member’s feedback about ‘living the talk’ highlights the
symbolic importance of participation in the representation of research. It was
not what we said, but the symbolism of our presentation style that struck a
chord of authenticity. Our session did not contain any other papers with
community members speaking about the research experience as ‘ethical
subjects’. Hence, in many institutional spaces representing an account of
participation in a participatory way is just as important as the intellectual substance of the presentation.

Differences in preferred modes of representation were highlighted when we attempted to write a journal article together. Using the transcripts of our discussions and the material we discussed in the seminar and conference, I drafted a composition of our thoughts. This was the first time the participants saw their voices on the page.

Ruby: We did an interview with Ruth for a paper she wanted to present, oh it was to go to a journal thing, and so we did this interview and me and [M.] are talkin’ normal and Ruth transcribed it all. And we’ve looked at this written thing and gone, ‘We don’t speak like that!’ And Ruth’s gone, um, I’ve written it exactly how you’ve spoken it. And we’ve gone, ‘Oh we sound dumb!’ We’ve gotta change that, we need to change it. We sound silly, I’ve got ‘shit’ and I think I had [laughter] but yeah it was horrible, we were readin’ it goin’ awh! … which makes me wonder, because as Koori people we have that thing about being seen as not as educated, so I wonder if that’s why people have that issue when they read it? Like ooh, that sounds a bit dumb here, better change that. You know what I mean because that’s what I found, and I think [M.] even made reference to that. (25 July 2008)

What this experience highlighted was the issue of representation as intertwined with ownership and control of research. Using a medium that the participants did not feel was their strength (writing for an academic audience rather than speaking), displayed the points at which the research process may become less transparent and interpretation and use of data may become exclusive. This reiterates the need for critical reflexivity in any interpretive (hermeneutic) analysis of data. By integrating gestures to reinsert ownership and control in the process, the research material is explicitly co-constructed with the participants.

Biddy: All hell’d have broke loose if she31 said ‘This passage meant this’, but it didn’t.

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31 Not referring to the author, but another researcher.
Pearl: Can you imagine!
Biddy: Ah, no.
Pearl: The people when they go, ‘That’s not what I meant by that!’
Biddy: Yeah, because I can say Joe Blow does this, and you can take it in a different way than you would.
Pearl: And that’s why ...
Biddy: People involved should get to read it.
Pearl: That’s why, that’s what Ruth’s research is about, is us being actively involved in her research. And that’s why, me and [M.] were talking yesterday about how you did that paper and when we seen the way we sounded, we sounded really ...
Biddy: And when I was reading it back I though, geeze, [T.] talks black!
Pearl: I know, I know exactly! That thing where you go ‘Wow, do I really speak like that?’ But being allowed to see yourself and change it. That was a really important part of it. Especially I ‘spose like Biddy said, if when it’s recorded, and you transcribe it and that’s not the general meaning that you have for it.
Biddy: Sometimes it loses the heartfelt part, and that’s what you really want to get across.
Pearl: And I think sometimes, when I’ve looked at the paper that Ruth did, our heartfelt stuff was in it, because most of our words stayed, it wasn’t transcribed into academic language. We would’ve went ...
Ruth: Who is that?!
Pearl: ‘What’s that?!’, you know (4 September 2008)

It is in the reporting of participatory research to academic peers that the greatest ethical dilemmas of this approach become apparent. The uneasy division between the academy and the participants reveals itself in developing and representing ‘voice(s)’. In writing for an academic audience, the division between community and researcher are reinscribed. The balance of juggling between subjectivities is tenuous and fragile. The writing process highlights a paradox of community-based participatory research: there are multiple perspectives and contributions in the research process, multiple ways of representing a collective research experience, and multiple audiences to address. These multiplicities suggest that at times, despite efforts, research
findings may struggle to find the right ‘pitch’. This is an ongoing challenge in connecting ethics with methods.

In this chapter I explored the concept of relationality as methodology drawing from Indigenist epistemology. Acknowledging the limitations of applying Indigenist research principles as a non-Indigenous person, I discussed the limitations of the Self–Other hyphen using post-structural feminist ideas of reflexivity, positionality and fluid subjectivities. Following this, I outlined a multi-layered approach to reflexivity which described the personal, interpersonal and collective implications of research in practice. These theoretical considerations enable a vision of collaboration which is fluid—‘working the hyphen’ to understand connectedness and difference between Self–Other.

The reflexive meditations within these chapters are therefore critical reflections of myself within the process of undertaking a collaborative research project, and comments on the research process provided by community co-inquirers in recorded conversations, for which I obtained written consent. Community co-inquirers were provided with transcripts and we have discussed the data in the context of written analysis.

This chapter provided the basis for explaining the way in which people’s behaviour under moral codes is to be interpreted in this study. The methodology distinguishes itself from ethnographic and hermeneutic techniques to consider ways of engaging with and integrating Indigenous ways of knowing into the research process. By providing both the theoretical impetus and practical implementation of relationality as methodology, the ethical evaluation of the research can now incorporate voices from various layers of reflexivity with a clear understanding of quality and validity of qualitative data used in the discussion.

In the next chapter I will focus on the process of defining, attaining and maintaining community consent. Using a metaphor of trust to consider relationships and reciprocity, I consider the extent to which participation assumes harmony, consensus, and unwavering consent. Using a critical
interpretation of resistance I consider the complexities of working collectively in community-based research.
CHAPTER 7  EVERYTHING’S BY WORD OF MOUTH

Ruby: We’re really good with word of mouth. That’s how we talk, and it only takes us to say one thing to one person and the whole community knows either you’re suss and they’re not going to talk to ya, or this person’s alright, we’ll have a chat to her. (26 September 2007)

In this chapter, I will argue that the way ‘community’ is defined has implications for the scope of participation. This sounds like a fairly straightforward proposition of cause and effect. However, do participants employ the term community in the same way in different contexts? Do researchers employ the term for different purposes? If qualities of ‘community engagement’ in participation have a moral underpinning, what implications might exist for the ethical outcomes of the research? The complexity of defining ‘community’ is a central concept for evaluating the ethics of participation. In this discussion, I will show that ‘word of mouth’ is an example of how the term ‘community’ is employed on a variety of scales to articulate local, national, and international identities. Using ‘word of mouth’, I seek to diffuse the construction of fixed and rigid subjectivities in the research process, including the construction of one’s own position in participatory practice.

I am going to take problematic definitions of ‘community’ as a central concern for evaluating the ethics of participation in practice. To do this, I will explore how the process of gaining and maintaining collective community consent for participatory research involves recognising multiple subjectivities within invited spaces. As I indicated at the outset of my argument, community is employed as a natural and self-evident collection of people with shared interests within a social field. Similarly, Gibson-Graham (1994) found the action research approach relied upon a gendered identity that was supposed to be inherent and coherent, but in practice the context and situation affected and altered social identities.

I am exploring community as “a situated practice, a site of resistance and as a dynamic political field” (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p.17). I will treat community as comprising multiple discourses that hold implications for
consent, and the success or failure of participation as an ethical endeavour. Employing the term ‘community’ has implications for participatory processes and the goals participation seeks to achieve.

In all community approaches process—that is methodology and method—is highly important. In many projects the process is far more important than the outcome. Processes are expected to be respectful, to enable people, to heal and to educate. They are expected to lead one step further towards self-determination. (Smith, 1999, p.128)

The way in which community is defined by the research project determines who is listened to and who is marginalised, the breadth and depth of consultation, the levels of participation, and accordingly the shape and flux of research question(s). In this chapter, community voices represent their perspectives, in an embodied case study of people, time and place. Community-based participatory research is operationally grounded in the local, so this case study discusses local circumstances, while also considering wider social and political implications (Mohan, 2001, p.166).

I’m going to explore gaining and maintaining collective community consent as a process of determining margins of trust and resistance, which shape the boundaries of participation. ‘Word of mouth’ indicates a non-discursive diffusion of knowledge, which ascribes a reputation that will either ‘make’ or ‘break’ the degree of participation. ‘Word of mouth’ has implications for the width, depth and veracity of participation—the kind of claims it can make about engagement and effectiveness. Word of mouth not only indicates consent, it also indicates a potential for refusal, rejection and resistance. In this chapter, I will make an argument for recognising resistance as a natural part of negotiating consent with multiple subjectivities.

Consent is usually defined in terms of an individual, a rational autonomous being deciding whether or not to take part in an activity. ‘Fully informed’ consent is a key mantra emanating from the Nuremberg Code that resonates in contemporary research regulations. However, because counter-colonial research must support participants’ rights to associate as a part of a collective identity, consent needs to be treated as a collective exercise (with fully informed consent of individuals embedded within it) (NHMRC, 2003,
p.19). Consent can be considered a regulatory instrument, a form signed by a fully informed research subject. In a collective view of consent, it is an approval process that must pass through key gatekeepers, authorities and mechanisms that are discursively constructed to represent the interests of the collective.

In some circumstances and some communities, consent is not only a matter of individual agreement, but involves other properly interested parties, such as formally constituted bodies of various kinds, collectivities or community elders. In such cases the researcher needs to obtain the consent of all properly interested parties before beginning the research. (NHMRC, 2003, p.14)

However, consent is also about personal decision-making, and creates measures of community engagement and effects qualities of participation. Viewing consent as a social practice (as compared to institutional), collective consent is about developing a ‘good reputation’, fostering inclusion, and making the activity of participation a democratic process. Community consent demands understanding discursive protocols of knowing who should be approached first, who will be angry or offended if not involved, who has a legal right to be involved, and who has the influence to evoke resistance to participation.

Collective consent equates to ‘community consent’. The NHMRC guidelines state, “a key concept is the notion of community. In these Guidelines community is recognised as a complex notion that can be invoked in relation to cultural groups, geographic groups or communities of interest” (NHMRC, 2003, p.2). In Chapter 5, ‘Discursive Ethics’, I discussed the way ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subjectivities are invoked as characters who either fight against or reiterate neo-colonial research practices. One of the presupposed collective interests of ‘community’ is an oppositional stance against ‘research’ from ‘the outside’. Positive difference and oppositional difference define ‘community’ subjectivity: the positive features are different cultural values and knowledge, which highlight epistemological concerns for the quality of inquiry. Difference as opposition is comprised of collective experiences of colonisation, marginalisation and discrimination. Oppositional difference results in a moral power dyad of coloniser/colonised, which renders researchers ethically responsible to ‘community’. Whether positive or
oppositional, these differences establish dichotomies that produce subjectivities imbued with morally ‘good’ or ‘bad’ qualities (Kothari, 2001, p.140). ‘Community’ is valorised as a local moral agent operating against neo-colonisation (Francis, 2001, p.79).

As I have argued throughout this thesis, the idea of reversing the distribution of power through participation is conceptually problematic. Essentialised ‘good’ and ‘bad’ characters cannot account for resistance or power relations within a community. For a researcher to evaluate the ethics of participation in practice, the concept of ‘community’ must be recognised as complex, dynamic and multifarious. Observing ways in which essentialised characters are invoked and used as tactics to include and exclude is crucial, to understanding how participants shape the researcher’s subjectivity, and in turn, how a researcher will constitute and govern their ‘self’.

A vision of harmony: place, space & culture

Although many discussions about community begin by stating the dangers of assuming homogeneity, community as a concept always relies on connections that bind people together to create a collective identity. Discourse about community searches for connections, a cohesive bond, forms of commonality.

Definitions of community are as diverse as communities themselves and there is no one definition of community which applies in all cases. Communities cannot be assumed to be homogeneous. To make this assumption is to ignore the diversity of groupings within communities. On the other hand, community can be used as a shorthand way to describe groups of people who indeed share a culture, including common linguistic characteristics, common geography, common culture and a common history. (AIATSIS, 1999, p.41)

Often research proposals use cartography and statistics to scope and define community in human geographic or sociological terms. Within critiques of post-industrial society and the urban-rural continuum, a prevailing definition of community is based upon the self-contained location in which people live, where they were born, where their family live, and social, political, and economic structures which bind people collectively (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2005, pp.71–72). More contemporary sociological thought, reflecting a transnational, diasporic and globalised world may define
community according to what people imaginatively construct as home or
nation (Anderson, 2006). Community is also constructed 'virtually', through a
sense of identity in belonging (Abercrombie et al., 2005, p. 72). These
discourses of place, statistics, politics, imagination and belonging are all
useful and interesting (and have been a major concern of sociology since the
discipline's inception). Most interesting is not necessarily the substance of the
various definitions of community, but the way that definitions produce
subjectivities. Community is not substantive and stable, but a complex series
of power relations, ascribing connections and boundaries of inclusion and
exclusion:

classic ethnographic technique presupposes the existence of a
functioning community, a small, tradition-bound social
universe that is to be the object of knowledge ...community is
not a pre-given social entity. Communities have become
political actors who claim their right to define history, to
regulate the body, to enact violence. (Connell, 2007, p.177)

If 'community' as a concept is viewed as a political and dynamic entity
that manifests a social field, then applying theoretical definitions
disconnected from local social practices is not particularly relevant to
participatory epistemology. If theoretical definitions of community fail to
engage with the way in which the participants explain the concept for
themselves, then participatory activities will be limited to the interests of the
researcher alone, rather than the interests of the participants. As such, this
discussion considers how participants define and use the concept of
community as a social practice, and how participation itself operates spatially.

As I discussed in the outset of this thesis, a crucial space to consider in
counter-colonial participatory research is 'Country'. Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples attribute collective identity according to a genealogical
relationship with Country: this genealogy encompasses ancestors who live in a
place as spirits watching over the resources (the land, water, creatures and
people). Country incorporates spiritual, spatial and political dimensions.
Affiliation with Country functions like nationality. Relationship to Country
delineates resource allocation, rights and responsibilities. This relationship has
affective dimensions: I have heard people describe their relationship to
Country as like their love for their grandmother. People may identify with more than one Country, depending on the genealogies of their parents:

For us, country is a word for all the values, places, resources, stories and cultural obligations associated with that area and its features. It describes the entirety of our ancestral domains. All of it is important – we have no wilderness, nor the opposite of wilderness, nor anything in between. Country is country – the whole cosmos ... So when we acknowledge traditional country, as increasingly people do in Australia, it is no empty ritual: it is to acknowledge who we, the Aboriginal people, are and our place in this nation. It is to take special note of a place and the people who belong to it. In doing that, it seems to me, all Australians might have a clearer notion of who they are and where they stand in relation to their history and the land they live in. (Dodson, 2009)

Ruby: It’s a bigger picture. It’s the land, it’s everything, the water, the trees, that is your community. (26 September 2007)

Barb: It all has meaning, it has a place. We have a place, it all has a place, and I think it’s a matter of respecting it. (26 September 2007)

Community is related to, but remains distinct from, nationality. Nation is used in the context of identity, attributed by the ancestral spirits and their descendants who are recognised as the Traditional Custodians of Country. But within the geographic borders of a Nation there often live Indigenous peoples from other Nations (this is especially the case in urban and metropolitan locations). Indigenous people may identify with multiple communities at a time: their nationality/nationalities, their specific locality, their rights as Indigenous Australians, and an affinity with the global Indigenous community. The multiple sites of community are exemplified by Barb explaining to her children their nationality is Bundjalung, despite being born in Darug Country, and being a part of the ‘local community’.

Barb: See, my children are from this community, they were born here, and everything I do is for them. Even though they will always be known as Bundjalung, that’s my tribe ... they were born here ... My children say, but why we’re Darug we wasn’t born there, so I gotta explain to them da da da da, and go back through time and explain to them this is who I am. But at the end of the day I think they’re proud that they’re Bundjalung, they’re proud that.
they’re on Darug Land, you know, they’re proud of everyone else who comes in, or who wants to be part of things, so to me I think, you know, looking at it in that way, it’s my children too.

Ruby: I think that’s a perfect example. They’re proud of who they are, but they’re also proud of where they live. So they acknowledge themselves and they acknowledge the land that they live on. You couldn’t ask for more, and I think that respect, you still have to be respectful no matter whose land you go in. (26 September 2007)

Relationships with Country are not static, nor can these relationships be taken for granted, or assumed to be a quintessential part of how Aboriginal people identify themselves and construct their own subjectivities. Although Ruby and Barb have just provided an ideal account of Indigenous governance, some relationships to Country and affiliations with nationalities have been disrupted by colonisation. When access to the land and resources became controlled and denied, access to practising culture, ceremonies, speaking language and caring for Country were also denied. People were forcibly removed from their Country, which meant their right to their identity was denied. Sadly as a consequence, some families chose not to identify as Aboriginal because of the negative impacts of racism.

Jade: When I was growing up, the explanation for a lot of things was that there was Spanish in the family and that sort of thing. But whilst I understand that there are people who you just look at straight off and you see their Aboriginality and it makes their life harder, it also in some ways it gives them a connection that I can’t have. Some people are lucky enough to know where they come from and also they know the history and some of the stories and the lore, and are secure in their relationship with in their family groups. And so there is an upside and a downside to being obviously Aboriginal. (30 November 2007)

The Stolen Generations, institutionalisation and policies of assimilation forcibly denied continuity of culture (HREOC, 1997). Many people know they are Aboriginal, or know a regional affiliation (such as Koori) or local affiliation (such as Wiradjuri or Darug) because they know where their family members
were born; however, institutions such as missions dislocated many people’s cultural histories.

Jade: I think the thing that is most saddest about it is for those people who actually do know where their Country is and who live in it, there’s lots of people who are displaced and for different reasons either they were put there they’ve moved there with their families and you know, you know, like in Sydney there are so are many different groups. They can’t live in their place, for one reason or another. (30 November 2007)

While people may have an Aboriginal identity, they may not know the cultural practices of relationships to Country, and must choose to actively reclaim and learn language, protocol, and connections. The process of self constituting oneself (Foucault, 1994a) through intersections of power and knowledge at community events, meetings, and becoming involved in community associations.

Jade: I’m very careful about how I deal in the Aboriginal community. Some people I’ve talked to call people like me things like ‘blow ins’, or ‘Johnny come latelys’ there’s another one, um, one I’ve heard which isn’t quite so offensive, is ‘a newborn’, but so in my dealings with the community generally, well I basically say is that I’m learning, I don’t know, I’m open to people teaching me things. The thing that I’m careful of is trying to figure out who really knows things, because some people claim to know things that they don’t know. Yeah, so I’m careful about that stuff. (30 November 2007)

People who do not know cultural practices associated with a relationship to Country can still identify with the ‘community’. Therefore, a researcher must never assume that the cultural basis of collective bonds are experienced by individuals in the same way. Like power, culture is a dynamic process, not a concrete possession.

The concept of community invokes notions of an idealised unity of purpose and action among social groups who are perceived to share a common culture. To some extent, ‘community’ and ‘culture’ are treated as synonymous, rather than as principles operating at different levels of social realities. Indigenous culture is therefore seen to define
Indigenous community. This, of course, is not so. (Peters–Little, 2000, p. 5)

In this light, cultural identity cannot be assumed to result in a shared vision of a local problem determined by a participatory method. A participatory researcher must navigate how a community is experienced from ‘within’ to determine how a community-based project is scoped, managed and implemented. This directs contextual attention towards spatial history: the layers of displacement and forced removal of Aboriginal people from traditional land, contemporary decisions to live in other parts of the country, intra– and inter-family politics within local areas (MacKenzie, 2007), and contestation about representation within the community (Peters-Little, 2000). These factors impact the perceived assumption within the methodology that every member of the group will agree unanimously with the framing of the question (or framing of the ‘problem’), the attributed local understandings of why the problem is a priority, that such a priority will be unanimous and remain stable over time and how best to address it.

Despite the efforts of the guidelines to reflect ‘real’ cultural diversity (NHMRC, 2003, p.2) there are deeper affective and political dynamics that operate within regional language groups, comprising the complexity of local understandings of community. While many research proposals will be framed around a generalisation of Indigenous perspectives, the community-based participatory model renders the research localised, and findings are therefore specific to the community involved. Generalisability of the findings is not simply restricted by the scale of the project or sample size, but also by the heterogeneity of Indigenous cultures and peoples. There is a double bind whereby the complexity of ‘community’ is recognised but the term remains ‘shorthand’ for arbitrarily grouping diverse peoples. This manifests at the level of subjectivities of research participants projected in research proposals, literature reviews and methodology. Externally assigning attributes associated with a ‘problem’ (or a strength) to a collective group results in stereotyping:

Jade: It’s really insulting to assume that all Aboriginal people do the terrible things that some people have done. It’s almost as insulting to assume that they are all noble savages. (30 November 2007)
Emphasising and recognising diversity within a collective group is therefore a crucial part of understanding how community members define themselves and use the term ‘community’. Community is affective, contextual, comprised of multiple subjectivities. Hence, determining a unified definition of a research problem encapsulating community interests is a difficult task for the researcher who has a moral obligation to follow community wishes. The power paradox lies in simple assumptions that power between ‘researcher’ and ‘community’ can be reversed: “It seems naïve to assume that, simply by wishing themselves into a participatory stance, investigators will be able to lead the community in transcending historically and culturally rooted differences” (Francis, 2001, p.79).

Micah: My dilemma in talking then is about the fact that we are not all one people, so that has to be respected as well, and protected that we are different people. I can't speak for everybody. (18 December 2007)

Hence, as other commentators have found in the development context, the orientation to collective action in participatory research neglects social differentiation within communities (Cleaver, 2001, p.44; Guijt & Shah, 1999). An ideal vision of ‘community’ denies social differentiation to place emphasis on mutuality and reciprocity (Young, 1990, p.230). This creates a normative, universalised moral point of view determined between rational citizens in dialogue (Young, 1990, p.118). Whereby differences are to be put aside in the pursuit of a moral good of achieving ‘harmony’, ‘consensus’ and ‘mutual understanding’ (Young, 1990, p.229).

As this case study of perspectives and experiences from within a community confirms, recognising difference is just as important as any unifying force. Incorporating relationship to ‘Country’ into the way people use the term community shows the many discursive rules that construct different rights to represent a ‘place’. To return to the process of determining collective consent for research within a community, I am interested to view the social field as a series of discursive practices that ascribe and deny authority to persons within the collective.
Within Country, the Traditional Custodians (the people whose genealogies are local) have discursive rights to speak and be heard over people from other Nations. This is why a protocol of respect is to acknowledge ‘Country’, which means acknowledging the discursive rights of the ancestors and the Traditional Owners of a place and space. The Elders within a community are Traditional Owners who possess knowledge about Country, and as custodians of language and culture, perform a role of pastoral care (Hurley, 2003, p. 8).

**Ruby:** And I think that what may help is if you have Elders or prominent people in the community that you’ve built a base trust with ... the Elders play a big part, the Elders play a massive part.

**Barb:** They need to play a big part and I think that, for people who, and even within our own community, I feel like it doesn’t matter where you go, I think if you don’t know the Elders, you go and look for the Elders. You find them, you talk to them, you communicate with them, and you know I don’t believe that anyone should just walk inside someone else’s place and say, oh well I’m going to do this. You can’t do that you know. And our Elders are really important, and they’re fading and without them, ‘cos they’ve done so much work, and the next generation’s coming up, and you know, we need them, and they need us, so at the same time, we all need each other.

**Ruby:** And our Elders are, it’s the same as any society, that you need, people say it all the time, that you need to respect your Elders. So that is part of us as well.

**Barb:** You respect your Nan and Pop.

**Ruby:** You respect your Elders, bloodline or no bloodline, you respect your Elders and you know, so I think that’s a major part of our culture. (26 September 2007)

Acquiring consent from Elders does not necessarily assume that an Elder transforms heterogenous views into one, or that the consent of an Elder equates to collective consent. Rather, Elders represent Indigenous forms of governance, and their involvement in negotiation about research acknowledges discursive rules and protocols. Acquiring the consent of a prominent person is not a straightforward task: “For younger students there is a very real constraint on access to knowledge when working with elders. There
are also protocols of respect and practices of reciprocity. The relatively simple task of gaining informed consent can take anything from a moment to months and years” (Smith, 1999, p.136). Such challenges in meeting protocols are heightened when the researcher is non-Indigenous or from a differing nation than the Elder: questions of positionality shape the discursive rules of a relationship.

Ruby: Those prominent people, you build a relationship with them, and then they’ll slowly introduce you to other people, once they know that you’re decent and you’re not gonna rip ’em off. (26 September 2007)

Identity attributed to regional affiliation with traditional Country determines the role of a person within collaboration (as either someone who is not from that place, in contrast to a Traditional Custodian who is ascribed discursive authenticity). In this way positionalities, as ascribed by the relationship to Country and the discursive roles of paying respect to Traditional Owners, are the more subtle cultural values on which collaborative participatory research is being undertaken. Such heterogeneity also makes Indigenous systems of governance complex. Unless unanimous decision-making has been achieved through group decision-making, differences within the group may become fraught. Undertaking collective, community based research practices, the researcher will want to be alert to the dynamics of group decision making, particularly at the outset.

Jade: So if we accept that things have changed and we can't go back and we know we can't, then how do we go forward and does it go forward mean with permission of the local people, whether you can practise your lore and tell your stories on their country and educate your children to that and maybe speak the language. Maybe if we could resurrect some of those languages. That would be really nice to people to feel comfortable enough to say ‘Times have changed—every Aboriginal person has a right to their culture. Even if they don't live in that place any more.’ That would be a nice thing. (30 November 2007)

Another method for garnering community consent is through a ‘community-controlled’ organisation (such as a health service, an Elders'
council, a land council or a community association). Indigenous community-controlled organisations have rules of community management, and are incorporated entities (Rowse, 2005). Community organisations are regulatory institutions, accountable to funding bodies, and usually operate under the rubric of the not-for-profit sector (Barraket, 2008). Positioning research in partnership with an Indigenous community organisation auspices community participation, but cannot guarantee it. In developing relationships of trust I learnt that partnering a research project with a community organisation does not equate to the collective consent and subsequent unanimous participation of the community. I sought to find a community-controlled organisation to partner the research with, as this seemed the most pragmatic way of approaching the issue of permission, negotiation and consultation with the community involved in the research (Dunbar & Scrimgeour, 2006). It may have been possible to source a group of Aboriginal workers from within a ‘mainstream’ organisation (that is an organisation that did not identify as Aboriginal community controlled); however this might have created a different dynamic in the group’s research interests, which ultimately would need to pass non-Indigenous managerial approval processes rather than grass roots community approval processes. My decision to partner with a community-controlled organisation was a political decision in the project design, shaping the subjectivities of participants.

Community-controlled organisations are designed to represent self-determined community interests and needs. Peters-Little argues that the term ‘community’ gained currency in the 1970s as a means of governing with a policy of self-determination: “The term was used to enable the government to distribute funds for welfare programs and the delivery of services to Aboriginal people” (2000, p.10). Peters-Little suggests that community organisations function as ‘gatekeepers’ that privilege some and exclude others, because they were established under a bureaucratic administrative principle, rather than self-determined modes of governance. Similarly, within community organisations, the discursive positions of people within groups and committees impact upon decisions and outcomes. Community events may draw upon essentialist visions of ‘Aboriginal’ cultural capital (such as the didgeridoos and dot painting), using signifiers not necessarily related to local heritage.
Meanwhile, local youth interests in wider global movements of Indigenous representation are dismissed.

Jade: An example of that for us is on the NAIDOC thing. When we talked about, it was that discussion about whether we get the New Zealander [hip-hop] dance group to come and dance, and I was all for it, because NAIDOC is one of those things all about celebrating culture. But there was, remember someone objected, one of the Darug people objected and said ‘no, it’s about being Aboriginal’. And the thing that I find, the contradiction that I find there is, we talked about, we had didgeridoo players there. That’s not, they’re not from here. But we overlooked that little discrepancy, because it’s ‘good’, everyone likes the didgeridoo. But we’re not open enough to accept these other things. So it’s a bit of a conflict. I think in how we think. (30 November 2007)

As a practiced space, community operates through informal networks of communication, through ‘word of mouth’. These networks determine people’s reputation, and hold implications for gaining collective consent. Now I turn to consider expressions of difference within communities, which are often viewed as a ‘fracturing’ (Secomb, 2000) of communitarian values of care and transparent dialogue.

Responding to resistance

It would be facile to suggest that because this case study is located in a peri–urban space, where Indigenous people live in coexistence with ‘the mainstream’, that my conclusions about difference might not be relevant to remote locations. Just as the introduction to this thesis demonstrated the complexity of places and spaces on the city limits (see page 26), other examples of participatory projects in regional and remote settings recount similar challenges (despite misconceptions that more cohesive communities exist in discrete settlements where English is not the principle language spoken and people have highly visible connections to ‘traditional’ culture).

Although these Western Desert people have lived together for over thirty years, they do not comprise a homogenous community. Their social organisation enables, indeed encourages, independence of action, and the so called
‘community’ is composed of small, labile, autonomous collections of people who rarely come together for a shared purpose. (Brady, 1990, pp.19–20)

Brady’s example of a participatory action research project was intended to address serious social problems of substance misuse and interpersonal violence within a community. However, as she explains “The main purpose of employing the methodology, which was to enable community members to utilise our research findings as a basis for an intra-community and community-researcher dialogue, and then to act upon their ‘problems’ was a failure” (Brady, 1990, p.19). Brady’s anthropological analysis cites cultural differences in the way people define problems, a non-agrarian society (compared to Freire’s work with peasants) with no impetus to challenge the distribution of labour, and a methodological assumption that communities are homogenous as the reasons a participatory action approach was unsuccessful. Her analysis of the different ways community members defined the problems the research was addressing, and their non-conformity and resistance to the research concluded that the methodological task of ‘mutual problematising’ was not appropriate to the social dynamics of the community.

Ortner describes manifestations of resistance as ‘ethnographic refusal’. She cites an account of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak taking “the Subaltern Studies school to task for creating a monolithic category of subaltern who is presumed to have a unitary identity and consciousness” (Ortner, 1995, p.183), which results in “compounded powerlessness (female and poor and of minority status) [for which] ‘the refusal of subjectification’ may be the only strategy available to the subject” (Ortner, 1995, p.184). This account of resistance highlights the myths made about communities in participatory discourse (Cleaver, 2001, p.44; Cooke & Kothari, 2001, p.6; Gujt & Shah, 1999), which continue to assume homogeneity. Heterogeneity, and power relations within and amongst a community disrupt the moral rationale for ‘reversing’ the distribution of power between coloniser and colonised.

The internal heterogeneity of communities as social spaces and practices, means resistance (like power) is not restricted to a researcher/participant dyad. Within a ‘community’, participants will resist each other, shaping and affecting power relations amongst everyone involved.
For example, a scenario might ensue where a participant has taken offence to a suggestion made by another participant over an issue unrelated to the participatory project. The offended person still wants to participate in the research, but they do not want to acknowledge the presence of the offensive person: they do not want to speak to, or look at, the other person. Their refusal creates resistance within the participatory process: people are no longer working together; sides are taken over who was wrong or right. The researcher might be able to ’sit on the fence’ and maintain distance from the disagreement—but these social relations affect participatory outcomes.

Another example of ‘internal’ resistance, are factions amongst local families in a community (Mackenzie, 2007; Peters-Little, 2000, p.10). Again, resistance can highlight the importance of recognising the multiple stakeholders needed for acquiring collective community consent:

_Pearl:_ The biggest thing for us in our community is everything’s by word of mouth. It would only take us to go and say, don’t trust that bloke, you won’t get in there. Unless you find some other family that doesn’t trust that family and then you’ll get in through that family. That’s a big part for us as well, we don’t have any main family groups out here, which is different in other communities, that’s why ours is diverse as well. We don’t have any family groups that have a lot of power. (18 September 2007)

Does the ubiquity of resistance create an ethical push to counter it (Hoy, 2005)? Is it possible to alter participatory methods so that resistance will not occur in future? Resistance resides where power glimmers and pulses amongst all institutions, rules and subjectivities. Resistance shapes subjectivities, keeps social spaces and practices dynamic.

One can only appreciate the ways in which resistance can be more than opposition, can be truly creative and transformative, if one appreciates the multiplicity of projects in which social beings are always engaged, and the multiplicity of ways in which those projects feed on as well as collide with one another. (Ortner, 1995, p. 191)

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32 Note this metaphor is spatial.
Resistance is crucial to enabling subjectivities such as ‘subaltern’ to be constantly challenged, reinscribed and self-created. Due to this dynamism, manifestations of resistance can be disorientating and destabilising in social fields:

*Jade:* The right thing can be right that week, but not right the next week. That's the thing it's a nightmare. It's also one of those things that also frightened me off a little. Is this Black politics thing. It's that one minute it's okay, and the next minute it's not. (30 November 2007)

Viewing community as a dynamic space of social practices enables an explanation for fluctuations in consent, dependent on time, place and social context. Of course, such a process will continually evolve, new resistances will emerge, and constant renegotiations will be required.

*Pearl:* I don’t know if I can put a time approval in our community because you can have approval one day and then it only takes for you to do something and then they’ll shy away from you—they won’t come back. You’ve just gotta make sure, if you’re going to be in that community you have to just do everything and not offend people, and I can’t explain how. I would hope that if you had your own value system you would know how not to offend people. (18 September 2007)

Participatory methods need to incorporate resistance into processes for determining collective consent as an inevitable part of democratic participation. Explicitly anticipating resistance means a process is established for listening to the basis of non-consent. The basis of non-consent can then be addressed to ensure deliberation in participatory processes is democratic, representative of the local. Fantuzzo, McWayne and Childs suggest “resistance should not be viewed as a bane or threat to the research process but as a valuable and appropriate manifestation of [the participant’s] commitment to protecting the interests of their particular group” (2006, p.46). Their reflections on resistance enabled a retheorisation of the concept of informed consent in research, which usually focuses on participants who have ‘said yes’. They argue that “what is missing from this standard sequence and essential to forming a genuine connection/partnership with the community of participants
is a process that respects the voices of the no members of the community” (Fantuzzo et al., 2006, p.31).

People who say ‘no’, who do not consent, who refuse, are viewed by participatory discourse as oppositional to harmony and mutual understanding (for these qualities are the basis of an ideal vision of community [Young, 1990, p.229]). Resistance to participation usually results in self-ejection from a participatory process, in ‘non-participation’. By reframing methodology to incorporate the concerns of the people who do not want to consent to the initial design or definition of a problem, concerns about methods and recruitment that might hinder wider community participation can be identified and addressed. Community as a space, a volatile series of social practices intersecting with one another, can address the social products of discourse, such as stigma associated with measurement scales (Fantuzzo et al., 2006, p.34). By proactively recognising the rights of the participants to refuse consent, research can develop trust and re-engage participation. Similarly, Atkinson finds:

[W]hen conducting research within Aboriginal communities there is a need to honour the integrity and fidelity of community in both its dynamic diversity and its interconnected unity. It is important here to understand that within this essence of community there is often great conflict which has meaning in itself. (Atkinson, 2002, p. 20)

Jade: It’s an interesting success story because they are diverse people, they come from different backgrounds different tribal groups, some of them don’t come from that area, they’re from land councils. But they formed a committee, a co-management committee, and whilst they disagree, they have actually managed because they have relationship that they are allowed to disagree without hating one another and walking away. That’s really a good example of people sitting down and getting over their differences and allowing people not to agree and if it’s more to do with one person’s area than the others then the people who don’t have anything to do with it that on the committee will support that group’s point of view. (30 November 2007)
Urban community

One final consideration for the use of the term ‘community’ in participatory research is to consider “appeals to community are usually anti-urban” (Young, 1990, p.236). More often than not, research about Aboriginal ‘communities’ focuses on remote and regional parts of the Australia, where ‘community’ is seen to be discrete and separate from ‘the mainstream’. Yet 31 per cent of people who identify as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander in the census live in major cities (ABS, 2007, p.6). Consider for example, how Micah mediates distance between herself and other members of ‘community’ on the basis of her urban lifestyle:

_Micah: We don't own the earth, and we don't own what comes from it. We share in it and we take care of it. We don't own it, which was a huge dilemma for me in buying a home—you know, we don't own things—that is one of those things where you are constantly struggling, the new society and our cultural ways, which is really hard when we constantly do that. A lot of Aboriginal people struggle with that and have to deal with those dilemmas on a daily basis ... People put us down for it. I've got a cousin who lives in the bush and who wants to be back with nature, and that's great. That's his way. But he looks down on other people who don't. That's not fair, you've got people out in the middle of Australia going ‘Well, you live in a house in Sydney, so you're not really Aboriginal’, you get put on by our own people who go ‘You're not really one of us'. And then you get non-Aboriginal people going 'you're not really Aboriginal because you live in a' [exclamatory pause]. So it's constant, caught where you are straddling both sides. You know you are damned if you do and damned if you don't. (18 December 2007)_

Anti-urbanism pervades discourses about community, such that people living in urban centres may feel ‘put down’ by other members of their collective identity. Similarly, research about urban Indigenous communities is either a policy blind spots or results in “tenacious stereotypes about Aboriginal people in urban areas such as Sydney” (Behrendt, 2006, p.6).

_Little attention ... is paid to the vibrant and functional Aboriginal communities throughout the metropolitan area ... these community-building activities and organisations are hidden by images of out-of-control and violent Aboriginal_
people who are seen as lawless, without a sense of community responsibility. And through these images, Aboriginal people are seen as a danger to the social fabric rather than as making a contribution to it. These images also reinforce the impression that no cohesive Aboriginal community exists in urban areas, so we once again become invisible. (Behrendt, 2006, pp.7–8)

As I discussed earlier, many Aboriginal people in Sydney are not Darug. This means that Sydney’s ‘Indigenous community’ is a space where multiple nationalities coexist in one place, and difference is recognised and accepted. This multiplicity of communities within community means that the term is invoked, employed, and felt according to social contexts. Take, for example, the differences in meaning of ‘community’ implied in Ruby and Barb’s conversation:

Ruby: For me, the community I work in is my home. Anything I consider part of me is my community, and because for me in the Hawkesbury, my family’s lived there for generations and I have too, the whole Hawkesbury is my community. Every single part of it. The grass, the trees, the river, the people, the places, the kids, the school, that is my whole community, that’s how I feel about it.

Barb: I’m the opposite—maybe ‘cos it’s not my community. But I’m really passionate about coming into another community and working, only because I wanna see change and I wanna see change within ourselves and all the other tribes, and, um, I think that’s why I put myself out there I think, not to say oh, well you shouldn’t be here, and if anyone asks us questions I say this is why I’m here. You know, ‘cos at the end of the day, we all are Black, and we all need to work together. If we keep separating ourselves and saying we can’t do this because of this or that, we’re still gonna have this diversity between ourselves and it’s not gonna move forward—it’s just gonna move backward and I think, it’s just gonna get further back so that’s what I think about community. And working in community, why it’s more like to me, it’s gotta bring people together

Ruby: Oh definitely if you think of your community at home.
Barb: You’re still trying to bring people together, but ...
Ruby: But would you still feel that?
Barb: Oh, it’s my home. I’d feel that same way as you would.
Ruby: And I still feel, for me, that whoever moves into the Hawkesbury they’re part of my community so when they come to outreach and they need help, I don’t see who they are, there’s another one of our community mob that need our help. (26 September 2007)

In this peri-urban space, community development workers do not use community in a singular way—multiple discourses of community interchange and interweave throughout conversations; ‘my community’, ‘your community’, and ‘our community’ all co-exist simultaneously. Multiple and simultaneous spaces and social practices exist to constitute community. Young suggests the city (as a metaphor) is an ethical alternative to the unitary ideals implicit in community. She describes “an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference” (Young, 1990, p.227). The city does not represent one singular and static identity; rather, group identities are used strategically, constituted by different discourses depending on the context. Group compatibility within social fields constitute community as much as connections of place and family:

Jade: Well, I suppose in the Aboriginal community up to a point it’s about place but it’s also about relationships, and it’s not just about relationships with family, it’s about individuals within community, and that’s just people who are compatible. (30 November 2007)

Jade’s use of the word ‘compatible’ recognises difference and the ways in which people develop relationships and connections with one another. But does not assume that everyone is the same, or has the same goals rather, difference may ‘fit together’ like a jigsaw piece complements but is not the same as its surrounding pieces. Participatory methods cannot assume harmonious consensus (Mohan, 2001, p. 159). ‘Community’ is constituted by multiple discourses shaped by power, knowledge, compatibility and difference.

Implications for consent

Listening to a person’s rationale for saying ‘no’, and acknowledging non-consent does not result in a participatory proposal that accommodates for a comprehensive and unitary vision. But it does allow for a process that
demonstrates respect for diverse opinions, and rejects a pathologising, essentialist view of participants. Attending to collective consent with sincerity means constantly attending to trust and resistance throughout the participatory process. As Pearl suggests, if engagement with ‘community’ comprises only superficial consultation, the implementation of projects becomes unrealistic.

_Pearl:_ I think when people write programs or projects everyone says about the consultation, but it’s not realistic

_Ruth:_ Because they say we’ll do the consultation at a meeting?

_Pearl:_ Once! Or they say, I’ll do it at the beginning and then we might do it halfway through the project, and then we’ll do it at the end or something like that—that’s not realistic. (25 July 2008)

For community workers such as Ruby and Barb, one of the challenges in implementing their community development programs is a lack of time and funding resources for attending to ‘deeper’, more ‘authentic’ forms of participation. The ‘struggle’ they face is in making sense of resistance within community, in the face of a discourse that suggests they must ‘tap into’ a unified and harmonious entity.

_Barb:_ I think even though you do consult, you still struggle. It doesn’t matter where you are, you’ll still struggle and I think even if you are from Bandjalung territory you still gotta consult your Elders, you still struggle with any decisions you make and what you implement, I think too. It’s always a struggle.

_Ruby:_ It is a struggle.

_Barb:_ And I’ve found it personally a struggle for myself, even though I do consult, I still find it a struggle because even though I understand and I respect that it’s Darug, I also believe too that there’s not just Darug children around here, they got a lot of tribes all in one, and even though I do, I do go and consult, but still I struggle with it because, I just feel that it’s hard. (26 September 2007)

Determining collective community consent for research is therefore not a stable or fixed or singular process, but a difficult and contested terrain:
In the spaces between research methodologies, ethical principles, institutional regulations, and human subjects as individuals and as socially organized actors and communities is tricky ground. The ground is tricky because it is complicated and changeable, and it is tricky because it can play tricks on research and researchers. (Smith, 2005, p. 85)

Governing the self in such tricky terrain is to recognise there is no singular, fixed, stable or grounded consent for participation. Participation is a social field, a liminal space between trust and resistance. Participation is a dynamic intersection of knowledge and power, in which difference and differentness mutually inform and contest identities and rights. This trickiness does not simply apply to outsiders.

Ruby: And look, you know, some people would come across adversity all the time and we’ve spoken about adversity. You may come across barriers too, but I come across barriers within my own community because I’m fair skinned. So. Everybody’s faced with a barrier, I think. (26 September 2007)

Participation in research is also tempered by ‘consultation fatigue’ (Titterton & Smart, 2006, p. 56), whereby communities are often invited to have input, but see few returns of benefit, or little recognition of contributions and ideas. Consequently, “some communities have experienced so many such attempts to ‘participate’ them that they have become tired and cynical” (Cornwall, 2008a, p. 274). Aboriginal communities often complain about being ‘over-researched’ and ‘under-recognised’, whereby participation is experienced as superficial, tokenistic and receptive only to the voices of ‘the usual suspects’ who cannot represent the opinions and experiences of a whole community (Cornwall, 2008b, p. 41).

With this in mind, there are two significant issues that researchers operating in the field as participatory activists must address and communicate transparently with participants. The first is clearly conceptualising the pragmatic boundaries of what research can realistically achieve. From a community participant’s perspective, there is fatigue with research repeating pathologising conclusions (just looking at a small component of a well-researched topic):
Micah: I suppose in research, the first thing that I always think of is to make sure that it has not been over-researched already, and it is not a topic that there's lots of information on, and you're only just looking at a small bit extra or something. When there is so much already researched around that, in a lot of Aboriginal communities. There is, it seems to be something that just keeps ... research research research and no actual activity happening results from a lot of that research or consultation or whatever they call it. (18 December 2007)

Second, there is also a perceived conflation of researchers and government officials (as flagged earlier on page 120). Consultation by government departments is often viewed as research, and researchers often undertake contract work for governments. This entrenches the connection between the state (representing a colonising force) and research (a vehicle of colonisation, a gaze). There is also an expectation that funded programs and activities will result from participating in research or being consulted.

Ruth: Do you think perhaps from the general community perspective people might not know the difference between a government official and a researcher?

Micah: Yeah, probably a lot of general community, who might not necessarily be working in government departments or working in non-government organisations, won't understand the difference. They'll think of it all as government and that if you're doing this research, then why aren't we getting programs then from it. So there would need to be to be education campaigns, or you need some really good Aboriginal people working alongside the researchers, who could really clearly explain that ... who are still there on the ground when the researchers leave, to keep explaining that: ‘No no no, that research was just for that. Now we've got to use this to get the funding, the funding doesn't come with the research’. That is why the links between yourself and [the organisation] are so good. So that when you're gone from collecting your research, [the organisation] is still there to say, ‘No no no—now we've got to use this research to get funding’, rather than doing it all on your own. (18 December 2007)
My motive as a researcher was to avoid superficial consultation, and encourage involvement throughout the research process. ‘Word of mouth’ highlights the problems with definitions of community that conflate culture and place, and the implications that more complex understandings of a community hold for maintaining consent and nurturing participation. Understanding why people may have blocks or barriers to the research process enables a researcher to comprehend better the contexts of power and knowledge, which shape participation as a dynamic space. In highlighting the diversity of experiences and expressions of culture within culturally heterogenous communities, the complexity of determining collective action in research emerges. In this way, resistance to research no longer equates to ‘inauthentic participation’, but actually means the research has included the array and degrees of consent that can be expected from diverse collectives. Manifestations of both trust and resistance are evidence of an ethical research process.

The title of this chapter, ‘Everything’s by Word of Mouth’, shows the non-discursive pulses of power within a social field. While researchers struggle to account for institutional paper-trails of ethical consent, ‘community’ operates according to its own rules and regulations. Participation places the researcher within a web of power relations, in which they may have no direct involvement: family factions, histories, discursive connections with Country, favoured strategies and techniques for governing others which draw from essentialist categories and stereotypes.

Many of the findings in this chapter are not new or extraordinary (Guijt & Shah, 1999). But that is exactly the point. Participatory discourse continues to frame and shape engagement with the field in such a way that researchers recursively return and repeat the same mistakes of homogenisation because of a moral belief in a unitary vision. Rather than viewing this repetition as a problem to be rectified, perhaps this offers an opportunity to consider why this misconception continues to occur in practice. Strong moral compulsions for strengthening community identity and recognising collective rights frame the subjectification of participants in research. The next question to consider is how these might frame the subjectivity of the researcher.
CHAPTER 8 EXAMINE YOUR MOTIVES

Throughout my argument I have been making a case for describing the kind of ethical behaviour, goals, and relationships a researcher strives towards in employing participatory approaches. In this chapter, I attend to values, intentions and consequences of research, for the 'community', for oneself, and others. This includes how the intentions of the researcher might be viewed or interpreted, and the basis of understanding discursive community rules of behaviour. My argument now turns to examine ethically the motives for applying a participatory approach.

Jade: Sometimes it's hard to see the spirit and integrity in lots of things. But it can be there, and it's hidden, and sometimes those things are lost and I suppose in broken communities ... You see ... I don't quite know how to put it ... but sometimes it's a matter of perception and even if you are doing the wrong thing, you can perceive from your point of view that this is the right thing to do and maybe that's from community point of view and also from a researcher point of view, because this is where you need to go. And you may think, for example, on a moral ground, but you have to really examine your motives. (30 November 2007)

Perceptions about what is 'right' and what is 'wrong' constitute the 'technologies of the self': processes of deliberation that construct “selfhood through the workings of psychological and other formal knowledge groupings or sciences” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p.52). How people govern themselves is about personal and 'private' values, attributed to the psyche (Rose, 1999). 'Participation' as a concept creates ideas about how we understand ourselves in relation to others, how we should behave, how we should measure success and failure, and how we should govern our 'souls'. 'Technologies of the self' are not mechanistic, but draw from feelings, values, thoughts and emotions that we create when we establish values about rules of behaviour according to 'ethical substance', 'mode of subjection', 'self-forming activity', and 'telos' (Foucault, 1994b, pp.263-266). This return to considering interiority of thought is not to suggest a phenomenological 'truth', but to consider how we come to judge what is 'true': how institutional rules and discursive protocols are internalised and come to feel 'private' and 'natural'. Jade reiterates a
spatial metaphor of researcher/community ethics, by delineating between professional and private, inside and outside:

**Jade:** Looking at this, I think it is not just about research. It's a bit of a guideline for how you treat people, and not just in a professional capacity, but in a private capacity; and not just in Aboriginal communities, but outside them. (30 November 2007)

This focus on the production of subjectivity reiterates the importance of relationality and positionality within participatory practice (as I discussed in Chapter 6, ‘Living the Talk’). Participatory researchers emphasise an epistemological rejection of distanced observation, and privilege personal accountability towards ’others’ by rejecting institutional rules and regulations in favour of the affective responsibilities of care and friendship.

**Pearl:** I’ve still got a feeling it’s about your values as a person. With research, I really wonder, you know, well if you wouldn’t do that to a friend, well you wouldn’t do that to a community. That kinda stuff. If you have no personal values, how can you be an ethical researcher? That’s my opinion. (18 September 2007)

In this chapter I will discuss how participants develop their own ethical subjectivities, through collective identity and ’working two ways’. I will consider the counter-colonial ethical concern of ownership using spatial metaphors of knowledge moving during the research process: the researcher coming ‘in’ and removing knowledge ‘from’ the community. This highlights the difference between ‘good intentions’ and unintended consequences of participation in research. In many of these examples, participants refer to experiences of research outside of the ‘Mttigar Gurume Burruk’ project: this shows that participation as a social practice is informed by the many social, political and historical factors which shape people’s subjectivities. Evaluating the ethics of an ’invited space’ is also defined by wider political contexts and histories which differentiate ‘community’ from the ‘mainstream’.
Working two ways

In the introduction to this thesis, I opened with a quote from Barb and Ruby discussing their rejection of working the ‘European way’, and how I had to ‘move over’ within an invited space for participation in the research process. This process of moving between different rules and protocols creates boundaries in social fields about how ‘truth’ is ascribed, what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, what is effective or ineffective.

Ruby: For the Hawkesbury and for [the organisation], our governance and our constitution are the European way of doing things and then we’ve got the Koori way of doing things.

Barb: And I think it’s a matter of how we utilise it and how we work it because we can work the European way, but it won’t work for the community; we can work the Koori way, but it won’t work for the European way, so I think it’s a matter of finding a halfway mark. (26 September 2007)

Throughout my argument, I have argued that Indigenous rights are framed around human rights exercised differently, and collective rights encompassing difference. Similarly, participation in research is an Indigenous right to counter colonial harms. In the preceding discussion of ‘community’ I considered the discursive rules for gaining community consent. Ruby juxtaposes these implicit community protocols with university rules and regulations for research ethics.

Ruby: I think we work differently. I don’t know if I can describe to you in words, but we don’t work the same way, do we? We work completely different—like you can be governed by all these laws in your organisation, but our laws, maybe they’re unspoken rules that we do for the community. (26 September 2007)

These different rules operate just as formal institutional rules function in the production of researcher subjectivities: unspoken community rules govern the conduct of community behaviours. Likewise, Pearl expresses this as an internal battle, whereby she feels accountable to rigid systems of governance to ensure her community organisation retains its incorporated
status; but she also feels she must adjust her practices to the multiple and shifting social spaces of community in their different contexts.

*Pearl: You have to work in two different ways, which is what I have to work in. My governance and all that is straight down the line, but when you work with community it’s not straight down the line, so I’m constantly in battlement between that everyday, which I find quite frustrating, ‘cos the community just doesn’t work that way.* (18 September 2007)

Working two ways translates directly into project management concerns, particularly timelines. If engaging with a ‘community’, the researcher cannot expect outcomes to occur on schedule (to assume that because people have consented to participate in the research that the participation will happen on the terms of the researcher rather than the terms of the community). Determining the way in which a community based participatory project will ‘flow’ requires an understanding of the discourses, contexts and social spaces shaping the participant’s use of term ‘community’. This knowledge comes to be developed relationally, through embodied engagement with people.

*Ruby: It would be kind of like myself walking into a physics classroom and teaching physics, and I have no idea about the background of it and trying to tell people or trying to teach people how to learn something and I have no idea what it’s about anyway. And I might have read books, but you’re not actually going to understand until you go out there. You can read as many books as you like, but you need to actually go out there and experience it.*

*Barb: You gotta feel it, you’ve gotta walk in their shoes—and that’s what you’ve done with us, is that you’ve felt it and you’ve walked with us, so you know, you walk side by side with us, wherever we went, you came with us. And I don’t know if you’ve felt it or you’ve met any barriers along the way, personally yourself?* (26 September 2007)

Evidently I did. As the complexities and contradictions of ‘community’ emerge, so do patterns of resistance to timelines and project ‘outcomes’. A counter-colonial researcher needs to view community processes as mutable, dynamic, with ebbs and flows, activity and pauses.
Pearl: It is a constant process ... I've known, and you must know this from working with us, in the Indigenous community, your timeline may go like this [she draws a straight line with an arrow indicating a linear process from left to right].

But our time lines go like this [she draws a wave pattern].

Ruth: Yep.
Pearl: And we may still get to that end where you are.
Ruth: It's a different journey.
Pearl: It is. It's not a straight line for us. You may ring up, and go 'oh god these girls haven't called'—but we'll call in the end. And it's just the way that we are, in the Hawkesbury, that we work.
Ruth: So, a researcher can't just expect to say, 'Bang!' this will happen by this time ...
Pearl: You know that. It won't. I'd be very surprised if it did. So here in our community, like I said, I can't speak for everyone, but here in our community, I'd be very surprised if it did. (18 September 2007)

This wave pattern indicates movement between trust and resistance, as participatory activity ebbs and flows according to the rules established by community protocols. When Ruby and Barb described me as having to move ‘all the way over’, there was, for example, a period of time where I always had to politely re-initiate contact with the community workers, to recreate the invited space of participation according to the community worker’s time and availability. I had to be flexible, bend my linear research plans to meet the shape of developing trust. It was only once I had moved ‘all the way over’ that I began to receive invitations, or a promised phone call. Participation as a social field was dynamic because it would unpredictably open and close, punctuated by trust, and then resistance.
Participatory action research theory can often refer to cycles of action and reflection (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.15), drawing from Lewin’s metaphors of circles, spirals, and flow diagrams (Drummond & Themessl-Huber, 2007, p.432). This model of participation assumes that participation is constant: its form changes (action, reflection, planning) but it always ‘flows’. My experience of participatory research was punctuated with resistance. As I narrated in Chapter 2, there were various phases that overlapped, repeated, and changed as participants departed, arrived or changed roles. Participation was a space between trust and resistance that was never guaranteed and required that constant attention be paid to resistance. Like Pearl’s drawing of the community timeline, participation is a dynamic, liminal threshold, a place of productive tension between trust and resistance.

Resistance was not a feature of the research that I could ‘control’ or mitigate. It was a technical component of participation in practice (just as developing and maintaining trust is). Resistance punctuates participation, and trust enables it to flow. Power and knowledge shape trust and resistance, and subjectivities alter according to the context. The process stops and starts, and moves up and down ‘scales’ of participation such as co-option, compliance, consultation, co-operation and collaboration (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.16). The quality of participation is therefore never fixed, because the fields that define it (such as time and subjectivities) are not stable. Therefore, a transformative participatory project might involve elements of tokenism and manipulation on the basis of material incentives within the process. The moral qualities of participation become less certain and more subtle as power relations are evaluated.

Values & subjectivity

Throughout my argument I have provided examples of the way groups of people are attributed certain qualities, certain subjectivities. For example, I discussed the moral response to statistics about Aboriginal mortality rates; I discussed the positive articulations about difference made by Indigenist researchers, who assert distinct systems of knowledge in the process of reclaiming and reinscribing; and I discussed the oppositional construction of researcher/community subjectivities in regulatory discourses. Here,
participants discuss the way values operate and shape people’s lives from their own views of self-governing. Identity is a social space in which rules and practices of behaviour reinforce the connections between people.

**Micah:** People will say to me, how do you know you’re Aboriginal? And I say it is inside of you, it is there, it’s who you are. It connects you, which is your spirit. And your integrity is what you were taught from your family about respect. And in behaviours and what we were talking about earlier, on, it’s just something you are taught at a very young age—and the hard part is that a lot of our kids aren’t being taught that because of dysfunctional families and because of the Stolen Generations and removals by DOCS... our kids aren’t learning to connect to their spirit, who they are, and they're not learning that respectful behaviour, and those things we were talking about. (18 December 2007)

Micah suggests that identity is not only about ‘looking Aboriginal’ (her skin is fair, her eyes are blue, her hair is blonde) but also about feeling personal values of Aboriginality. Her values are also articulated in opposition to colonial and neo-colonial policies that erode Aboriginal family life. The role of families in fostering self-governing behaviours is central to how Micah views her own and her community’s identities.

**Micah:** In terms of those specific values I suppose a lot of those values are things that we do in our everyday work. But we don’t ever name them, you know, just at looking at them. It was funny, I was having a conversation with [S.] the other week about something that happened between the organisation I work for and [the organisation], and we both said at the same time, you know, those gubs have got no manners. So we don’t necessarily always call them ‘the values’; they are all White terms anyway. But it’s about manners, for us it’s sort of something that’s really, it’s just there. It’s something you’re taught at such a young age. (18 December 2007)

Micah reiterates the way her values are personal, felt and embedded in her identity and cultural upbringing. She also reflects on how her subjectivity

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33 Department of Community Services.
34 Gubba means ‘White person’.
(as shaped by her role in the family) ascribes rules for how she must behave, tasks she must carry out, ways she must govern herself.

Micah: Who you are in your family sets the responsibility that you have. I was the only daughter, you know, I had a lot of responsibilities that weren’t labelled ‘These are your family values’, because you’re the only girl. But they were just told, I had to help with the cooking, and I had to ... you know, I rebelled against it a lot of times! But I had to help, you know the boys didn’t have to do stuff that I had to do. And that was when I look at it, that was that thing about, not just sometimes I’ve labelled it myself as being sexist, but just that it’s about in Aboriginal families boys and girls have different roles. And they don’t cross. (18 December 2007)

Micah’s reflection on being assigned (and resisting) a gendered role in her family as part of her responsibility shows an active decision she has made to privilege her cultural identity over her misgivings about gendered work. The connection between her identity and her ethics enables her to distinguish her subjectivity from that of her non-Indigenous friends. The personal, embedded protocols she learnt as a child enable her to connect with other Aboriginal people, and reinforce a sense of collective difference.

Micah: It was never said that this is your ‘Aboriginal sharing value’. It was just how we were raised, and if people came over and you were having dinner, then you made enough for those people. You never made them sit on the edge and watch you have dinner, which a lot of my White friends and families did—you’d just sit there while they had their dinner. And it wasn’t until I was older and I started talking to lots of Aboriginal people and working more with Aboriginal people from different areas, and you started to connect that, oh, that’s what you do, that’s what we do. But our non-Aboriginal friends don’t do that. (18 December 2007)

Sharing food is not mentioned in institutional ethics guidelines, and yet in the field it is always present at meetings and gatherings: a warm cup of coffee on a winter morning, lunch out the back on a sunny spring day, pizza for the kids at the workshops, Johnnycakes at a picnic on Sorry Day. A value of reciprocity is not a clinical and calculated exchange of return or benefit to the
community (NHMRC, 2003, p.10), but a mutually constituted space through the
gesture of sharing and demonstrating care and generosity towards others.
Reciprocity is not only about exchange, but an acknowledgment of the
historical and the interpersonal context in which the exchange is made.

*Micah*:

Recip-blugh— can’t even say it, that’s like sharing to me, you know, but
we don’t call it that. It’s just our way. You know, so a lot of people would not
be able to identify this [value], but if you talk about stories and their family,
then you can see how it works. (18 December 2007)

**Ownership of knowledge in participatory spaces**

Metaphors of ownership emerge as a constant threat to the counter-colonial
goal of remedial participation. Knowledge articulated through a participatory
process is viewed as locally owned, and a part of people’s cultural identity.
Although the participatory researcher has involved people in research, they
are still viewed as coming ‘in’ to the community as an outsider and stealing
cultural heritage.

*Barb*:

I see White people coming in … it’s a matter of this thing that we were
brought up with, was that they’re taking things away from them or they’re
taking their stories. (26 September 2007)

Spatial metaphors abound: making in-roads with community, facing
barriers, blocks, moving up, in and out. These metaphors of movement and
resistance, distance from, and intimacy with, are mediated by trust developed
over time.

*Barb*:

You work your way from there. It’s different blocks I think with
Aboriginal people, and you work your way up there. And it’s not gonna
happen overnight, and it’s not gonna happen in six months, it’s gonna happen
in years.

*Ruby*:

And you understand that, Ruth. (26 September 2007)

The subjectivity of the ‘coloniser-researcher’ re-emerges. The
coloniser-researcher seeks to gather information quickly, without developing
reciprocal relationships. They then retreat, to achieve their own aims selfishly.

Barb: And I think that’s why, I think why the Aboriginal community is so reluctant with researchers is, they wanna come in, they just want to do it, get it over and done with, and go! And I think that to us, we find that they didn’t have an understanding, they didn’t wanna get to know us, they just wanna write their thing and go away and do what they need to do. (26 September 2007)

Collective identity shapes subjectivity as oppositional: community versus government, community versus research. Research and ‘government’ remain conflated in this oppositional identity. Just as I had to represent institutional rules and regulations for written informed consent to ‘secure’ data on campus, and destroy it after a set period of time (as discussed in Chapter 2), values determine ownership over research findings and material.

Barb: I think it comes down to yourself, you know.
Ruby: Definitely and values as well.
Ruth: What are some of these values?
Ruby: I think, if we talk old school, it’s respect, politeness, offering to help, wanting to share, that thing about ownership and that being taken away all the time. That’s a big thing about research. I think that needs to be clarified, that whatever community does, they own it. I don’t know if I can clarify that if the government takes it away, though, and I don’t know how you could get around that. What else? You know, none of this lying and stuff like that. (26 September 2007)

Spatial and temporal dimensions of trust and resistance are related to the way community as a social practice and space claims ownership over knowledge. ‘Local’ knowledge, ‘traditional’ knowledge, ‘community’ knowledge conflate into intellectual heritage. The spatial metaphor continues as Indigenous knowledge is mapped onto intellectual property ‘owned’ by the collective rather than created by an individual (Janke, 2001). The articulation and reclamation of knowledges (local, traditional, collective, Indigenous) as property is designed to counter colonial claims of ownership of ethnographic
material or rights to bio-diversity patents. Research culture is embedded in the Eurocentric concept of ‘intellectual property’, which assigns ownership of ideas to an individual who ‘creates’ knowledge.

* Micah: Even the plants have been sold. You know plants that belong, I can’t remember how it works now, but in W.A., there are plants that don’t even belong to this country any more that have been purchased … just crazy. Some company that uses it for something overseas has purchased the rights to these plants. How can that be? That goes against all our values. We don’t own the earth, and we don’t own what comes from it. We share in it and we take care of it. (18 December 2007)

In contrast, community subjectivity attributes ‘ownership’ as the rights and responsibilities of custodians. Indigenous protocols constitute a group’s cultural heritage and are distributed amongst a collective by intangible means such as storytelling, dance and painting (Janke, 2001).

* Micah: A value like survival and protection I suppose it’s about our culture for one, and having some connection to that in terms of the survival and protecting that too, because there are some people who … there’s a website going round … and these bloody fellas in America promoting Aboriginal culture in America. They’re not, they’re Yanks, they’re doing didge lessons. So we need to protect. It’s like those places up in Darwin and in Queensland and that have imported didgeridoos painted in China. You know, we need to be able to protect some of that and our government doesn’t do it for us, it doesn’t treasure the art of this, of here, of Aboriginal people in Australia. My dilemma in talking then is about the fact that we are not all one people, so that has to be respected as well, and protected that we are different people. I can’t speak for everybody, but for me, they should be protecting and treasuring. The culture that we have and saying how dare you rip that off. And going after those people to say, no, this belongs to Australian Aboriginal people from wherever you know Yorta Yorta people, Darug people, Bundjalung people—that belongs to them. How dare you rip that off? (18 December 2007)
In counter-colonial terms, Indigenous custodians should be attributed rights and benefits for their intellectual contributions to research (Fundacion Sabiduría Indígena & Kothari, 1997). Questions about the distribution of benefits such as copyright and authorship of research finding become increasingly complex in participatory research (Greenwood, Brydon-Miller & Shafer, 2006). In my experience this equated to a right to self-representation, and information being provided about the applications of research material.

**Pearl:** I am more aware, and because I’ve been given a right to speak through the research with Ruth I now feel that if somebody comes in, I can say ‘Well hold on a second, that’s not how I’ve done it before, what are you going to do with it? I want to see it, blah blah blah’.

**Biddy:** Which is like giving you more rights because ...

**Pearl:** Yeah, equal power. You can record me but I want to see what it says, I want to know what you’re going to use that for, and then what is that person going to use that for.

**Biddy:** Just like copyright isn’t it? (4 September 2008)

Complex questions arise over technical distinctions to be made between research produced in a participatory context (integrating local knowledge to solve a practical problem), and Indigenous (intangible) heritage. My point is not to solve such legal questions but draw attention to the ways participation in research, collection of knowledge and attribution of intellectual property to the researcher or their institution create sites for healing and reclamation in a counter-colonial context.

**Micah:** It’s really heartbreaking, what we’ve lost in Australia, and what hasn’t been valued. That’s heartbreaking, but all we can do today is work towards restoring some of our values, which is hard. There are a lot of people in mainstream society in Australia who don’t want our values restored, who don’t want to know. It threatens them, so that’s another sort of again, just quietly breaking down some of those barriers about that threat and no we’re not going to come and take your backyard, if we get native title. (18 December 2007)
Participation in my research operated in multiple sites. The initial focus on participation to contribute to criminological literature about youth resilience to offending shifted after the hip-hop workshops. As I felt that the institutional ethics requirements for signed consent forms created mistrust, and the resistance exercised by adult gatekeepers limited my ability to engage young people in research, my research changed to focus on the experience of participation for the community development workers. During the course of this shift, I relinquished my shared ownership of the data to enable the community workers to undertake the research without the need for my ethics forms. Once my ethical rules and regulations were removed from the project, the community workers undertook their interviews, data analysis, and production of the report with the view that the Mittigar Gurume Burruk community report was their own, and the distribution of the information in the report was under their own control. My thesis could now consider the implications of this shift for the possibilities of participation.

Pearl: So everything that we’ve done with Ruth we have ownership over and Ruth hasn’t took it away or made it hers, it’s part of ours as well. So that’s what her idea is for this thesis. Is that, yeah?
Ruth: Yeah.
Pearl: Does that sum it up?
Ruth: Pretty much sums it up.
Pearl: In simple layman’s terms?
Ruth: Yeah.
Pearl: With no big words! (7 Aug 2008)

Similarly, access to findings and communication of findings in accessible language is also a prerogative counter to conventional academic practices (Lee, Jaragba, Clough & Conigrave, 2008).

Pearl: I think that’s part of the problem with stuff. And maybe that’s why there’s so much confusion, because when it gets all written up, the data and that, it’s in academic language and then the people that are involved in it look at it and go, ‘What the hell does this mean anyway? I don’t understand what you’re talking about. I don’t know what this means’, you know. So you saying you want to do a consultation and break it down into less academic
language is a fantastic idea to feed back to the community. Because then they’ll understand. And it makes me wonder, I know it’s a lot of work, how does your research or anybody’s research, if it’s that high academic, I wonder if a component could be done where the same thesis is written in simple layman’s terms language and then gets sourced back to the community. (4 September 2008)

Good intentions and unintended consequences

Participation within an ‘invited space’ always has a political context. During the time that we evaluated our experience in Sydney, the Australian Federal Government staged an ‘intervention’ in the Northern Territory\(^{35}\), exercising racially-based policies on the premise of responding to a national emergency of child sexual assault in Aboriginal communities.

Citing the rape of small children, violence against women, closed communities, uncontrolled grog running and X-rated pornography, [the former Minister for Family, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs] unleashed a suite of ‘drastic measures’. Compulsory health screens for signs of abuse in children; leasehold changes and a disbanding of the permit system for Aboriginal townships; privatisation of home ownership; removal of Indigenous tenancy organisations; suspension of the Community Development Employment Program; …and more. (Lea, 2008, pp.ix–x)

The Howard Government specified a report titled Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle: Little Children Are Sacred (Wild & Anderson, 2007), as the evidence on which its military-style response was based. Yet, the Little Children are Sacred report was written using the principles of the ‘Indigenous Research Reform Agenda’ (one of the authors was an Aboriginal woman closely associated with the CRC for Aboriginal Health). The report’s methodology focused on respectfully engaging with communities, and fostering a participatory atmosphere of trust (Wild & Anderson, 2007, pp.50-56). The

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\(^{35}\) The Federal response to child sexual assault in Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory was initiated by a conservative government led by John Howard (1996-2007). Although a change to a more socially progressive administration in 2007 has led to a formal apology to the Stolen Generations (Rudd, 2008) and recognition of the Declaration of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (Human Rights Commission, 2009), ‘the intervention’ prevails at the time of writing this thesis.

\(^{36}\) These Arrente words translate as “In our law children are very sacred because they carry the two spring wells from our country within them” (Wild & Anderson, 2007, p.i).
report’s recommendations, aligned with community development principles of healing and restorative justice, cited the need for “effective and ongoing consultation and engagement” (Wild & Anderson, 2007, p.52), and “community-based and community-owned initiatives” (Wild & Anderson, 2007, p.53). But the ‘good intentions’ of the report’s authors were forgotten as an administration intent on radical neo-liberal reform seized upon the research findings. Much like cases in the past (Carrington, 2002, pp.129–130), concerns about sexual violence in Aboriginal communities legitimated an attack on a ‘problematic culture’, by creating stereotypes about the women, men and children whose lives were depicted on the pages of the report.

Micah: And that frustration … There’s been lots of research, the recommendations come out and you know, it goes right back to the Royal Commission into Deaths in Custody, and the Stolen Generations report, the Bringing Them Home report, none of them, very few of the recommendations ever get implemented. And then you get things like the Northern Territory response implemented which has no basis: there’s been no recommendations from any research to suggest that you start quarantining in money and you start sending in the army. (18 December 2007)

My mention of ‘the intervention’, as it has come to be known, is not to discuss the polemics of a racially discriminate response (Altman & Hinkson, 2007), or the complexity of the social issues the Little Children are Sacred report sought to address (Toohey, 2008). What is relevant to this argument is the political context of the dangers of participating in research, for: “Every space has a history, and elements of its past and those actors within it, can linger. Even as different people enter the space, these elements can pattern these relationships of distrust and familiarity, collusion and contestation” (Cornwall, 2008b, p.45). In our case, the results of a research report were felt thousands of kilometres away. We were all disturbed by the way research with ‘good intentions’ was transformed into the linchpin of a national emergency that called for the reintroduction of racial discrimination in policy-making. We were reminded that the effects of research, the power and knowledge effects, are very real. Although our project about ‘youth crime’ was always framed on a strengths-based approach, the potential for misuse of the research was a great concern for community participants.
Pearl: You can have all the good intentions ... and that actually concerns me that someone can pick pieces out of your research ... and absolutely destroy lives. Now that makes me worry for you as a researcher because that hasn’t helped you guys at all. Not one bit, and I don’t know how a researcher would get back into that community now after that happening.

Ruth: Yeah, I think there’s a lot of damage been done.

Pearl: A lot of damage, a lot of damage. So what can you do, as a researcher to stop that from happening outta your research? (18 September 2007)

I have no guarantees for Pearl and Micah. Even if the development of a research question follows all the ethical considerations of community collaboration, trust, and centres Indigenous knowledge systems into the inquiry, there is still the matter of ‘research consumption’ beyond the collaboration. An additional element of mistrust lies in the way in which external parties may use research publications to legitimate a policy that has not gone through the discursive protocols for acquiring community approval. Such events erode the ethical integrity of researchers who have sought to develop trusting partnerships with community co-inquirers.

Micah: Making sure that built within your research, however you do it, is something that states how this research should be used, and very clearly, what is right and what is wrong. You know like, dos and don’ts. You know that type of thing, so that when it picked up in ten years time and you’re gone from here ... they can clearly see what the intent was and it doesn't have to be interpreted in any way. See, it is that interpretation is where things get lost, if it is not clearly stated. I think that would be the most important thing is to make sure that there is no room for interpretation around. It's clearly stated what is meant to happen.

Ruth: So I guess one of the things would be is to say that this document talks about Indigenous issues. But it's not trying to make some pan-Aboriginal statement, for example?

Micah: It is talking about local issues and the local concerns and local people. (18 December 2007)
It is very difficult to provide a guarantee against unintended consequences or interpretations of research. The reflexive task for the researcher who tries to achieve social justice outcomes through their work (Pain, 2004, p.657) is a parallel duty “to understand and accept responsibility for the consequences of their work” (Hilsen, 2006, p.26). What I learnt from our discussion about good intentions and unintended consequences is the importance of recognising the history of a space, and the individual experiences of participants and their prior beliefs and expectations of research. Pearl shared with me a negative experience of genealogical research about her family, which claims her great-great-grandmother is not Darug but Darkinjung, from Mangrove Mountain. This is a reminder of contestation about places and spaces and how naming impacts contemporary identity and access to resources. Here, the issue of misrepresentation of family highlighted a need for validity checks in the data and ownership over the results to mitigate potential harms.

Ruth: Didn’t you say something about … a researcher who’s said stuff about your family that’s not right?
Pearl: Yes. It’s not right. It’s not right—so there’s a massive division between the family because some gubba’s come in and told them that this is what they’ve found. Now they haven’t seen that at all. They’ve seen no evidence of that.
Ruth: Where do you think they got the information?
Pearl: I believe it comes—they say that Martha walked down from Mangrove Mountain because her children died and she had one child left. And she went back to the Mission. Now she would have only moved back to the Mission because that’s where her family was from, but they haven’t counted that. They’ve just said, she’s come from here, whether she was visiting or her husband who was there or whatever, and gone back to Sackville, so as far as they’re concerned she’s Darkinjung … Now that’s a load of crap. … The whole thing’s is a lie.
Ruth: Why do you think that information’s been put out there that way? Do you think it’s to fit in with some land claims?
Pearl: I think it was about a land claim. About Darkinjung people claiming some land … So I didn’t get involved in it, Ruth … my thing is, for my Nan’s grandmother to speak three languages, she would know who she was. And I’ve
tried to explain that to them and the great thing I found solace in I s'pose is, people from the same line are having issues with the same thing. They're upset because their families have told them who they are.

Ruth: Was that your main knowledge of, or experience of research before we did something together?

Pearl: Yeah, it was.

Ruth: And your TAFE stuff?

Pearl: And my TAFE stuff, yep. And that spoke about qualitative and quantitative, so when you came in and spoke about that stuff I had a little insight into who that meant and different things like that so I was lucky. The other stuff that upset me with the research was, I can’t understand how you can research something and then not check with the people to see if the information is correct. Now I’ve looked in them books, and they’ve got my Nan’s never married. So we don’t exist as far as they’re concerned. So how can you justify doing that when the information is wrong? That’s not right. That pisses me off.

Ruth: And in the end that becomes really political material because people can refer to that.

Pearl: That’s right.

Ruth: And say, this is the way it is because this research says …

Pearl: Yeah, I s'pose in the society we live in that values what is written on paper. But for us it’s not what it’s about. I don’t care what the paper says. I know what I was told. So you know, the society we live in places written literature in a very high place, which is a shame. Especially when it’s wrong or detrimental to people or communities and used against people, it’s horrific, Ruth. It’s like power and war and it’s horrific.

Ruth: Well, knowledge is power.

Pearl: Yeah, they say that. And how people sleep at night I don’t know; they must have no conscience. No conscience. And they’ll pay for it. But yeah, that’s my experience. (25 July 2008)

While acknowledging the wider political contexts of research and the impact this had on participants, there was also an opportunity for us to consider the strengths of the participatory approach.
Pearl: That [Mittigar Gurrume Burruk report] was great, that was really good. It was really good that we could [participate] because we know our community best, to think what information would be best and not be hurtful, as most research, well, not all but, historically has hurt us as a community, so for us to be able to do that was really good ... I've totally enjoyed the whole process. I've got a better insight into things. (25 July 2008)

One of the strengths of the community-based participatory approach is the idea that the participants will know whom to speak to, and how to adjust questions, and interpret data most effectively (because such framing is determined by community members themselves). However, there are also potential harms to participants because of their connection with others. This does not mean that we should abandon the idea of community-based participatory research, but that discussions about ethics (third person, collective reflexivity) should be an integral part of the process of recognising potential harm as much as potential benefits. In my account of the data–analysis process with the community workers (on page 59), I noted that Biddy experienced discomfort because of her connection to an event described in an interview transcript. Although she told me while undertaking the interview she did not experience emotional pain, it was later, during our analysis of the data that her tears began to flow as we read the transcript together. In our collective evaluation, we discussed the incident of Biddy's tears resulting from her personal knowledge of participants:

Biddy: And the hard stuff ... it just helped me through it.
Pearl: I think that's going to be a dilemma anywhere, because if you've got Indigenous researchers, and they go into their own communities, they're gonna face that anyway. I don't know how you'd get around that—I don't know. I don't know how you'd stop them from getting upset though. I think it's inevitable if they're from that community that is gonna happen. The only thing I can think of is if you were a researcher and that happened then you would have to, whatever people auspiced you to ... they'd have to have counselling or something to get past it. It's going to happen. Biddy: The researcher, she would be really heartfelt as well. (4 September 2008)
Participation is a social space from which harm and benefits emerge as much as they ‘come in’ through an external force. The focus of normative ethics principles is generally on the idea of an external force influencing harms and benefits, assuming the participants do not have the potentials to create harms or benefits to one another. Participation as a space between trust and resistance is a need to “explore the methodological economies of responsibility and possibility that engage our will to know through concrete efforts both to produce different knowledge and to produce knowledge differently” (Lather, 2007, p.135). Examining our motives for achieving social justice in research practices should incorporate a reflexive concern for altering power relations and knowledge of others within a social field. No one involved is a neutral subjectivity: every person brings their own motives, values, rules and internal systems of governance into the area of participatory space. Moreover, participation is also a “non-innocent space” (Lather, 2007, p.204). While our intentions and actions are based upon social change for justice, there is always the potential for unpredictable effects. These can reverberate far from the local place in which the research takes place.
CHAPTER 9 TRUST AND RESISTANCE

My case study involved working in a series of invited spaces constituted by power relations, resistance and internal contestations. In my attempts to be ethical, to reverse the colonising gaze, I needed to follow discursive rules and protocols set by ‘the community’. Being ethical equated to following rules and obligations established according to multiple discourses, social and institutional practices, and the effects of power and knowledge within a social field (Foucault, 1980, p.246). Reflecting upon the experience of participatory research in practice, I was also able to see how relationships form and shape notions of the self, of ethical or unethical behaviour.

I have argued for conceptualising participation in research with Indigenous peoples as a space shaped by trust and resistance: a liminal threshold, a dynamic space punctuated by ebb and flow. Participation operates as a “necessary tension between the desire to know and the limits of representation ... where a failed account occasions new kinds of positionings. Such a move is about economies of responsibility within non-innocent space, a with/against location” (Lather, 2001, p.204). Counter-colonial ‘economies of responsibility’ connect ethics and research methods: inclusion and a ‘right’ to participation become a necessary mechanism of power relations between researchers and Indigenous participants. In recognising spaces as ‘non-innocent’ it becomes possible to see the productive possibilities of tension and resistance as much as those of trust.

Viewing participatory ethics in a space bounded and permeated by trust and resistance “we have here a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are the pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one must act” (Foucault, 2007, p.75). My conclusion brings together my discussion of developing ethical subjectivities with my reflections on how I tried to be ethical. These findings lead to my argument for conceptualising participation as a liminal space between trust and resistance.
Developing an ethical subjectivity

The kinds of selves researchers seek to 'be' (ethical, counter-colonial, socially just, action-oriented, communitarian, caring) are a reflection of the logics of the reform they work towards. The language, explanatory principles, techniques and methods applied by researchers shape the form of their ethical subjectivity. Using the lens of Foucault's ethics, I outlined the ethical qualities of participation according to the way rules, morals and knowledge of others regulate and shape behaviour and attitudes.

Within invited spaces of participation, power relations inform the actions and reactions of all people involved, not simply those who did the 'inviting'. Developing an ethical subjectivity entails consideration of how information about 'others' (both those situated within our midst, and those situated within statistical archives) is constructed and reinscribed. Foucault's ethics are a reminder of the danger in essentialising subjectivities, for "the use of categories to distinguish between different segments of 'the community' leads [us] to treat these categories as unproblematic and bounded units" (Cornwall, 2008a, p.277). It is a reminder that those who constitute statistical populations and 'research subjects' simultaneously constructs our own subjectivities, framing 'selves' according to formal systems of knowledge and power relations with others.

Attending to mechanisms of power in participation, and considering how subjectivities develop during the process, enables reflexive assessment of the quality of the research process (as opposed to positivist values of rigour and reliability). Reflexivity demarcates 'economies of responsibility', such as privilege according to race, class or gender in relation to others. With this reflexive knowledge of the constitution of self, ethical action becomes possible:

One cannot govern others, one cannot govern others well, one cannot transform one’s privileges into political action on others, into rational action, if one is not concerned about oneself. Care of the self: the point at which the notion emerges is here, between privilege and political action. (Foucault, 2005, p.36)
The implication in Foucault’s quote that “one cannot govern others well” mirrors critiques that suggest ‘participation’ as a method might actually be a pervasive form of modern governance (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001, p.179). If a participatory researcher remains focused on the ‘reasons’ others need to be transformed and empowered through participation (without understanding their ‘self’), they will not be able to ethically “transform one’s privileges into political action on others” (Foucault, 2005, p.36). Foucault’s ethics are a method for reflexive evaluation of praxis. His ethics enable us to see that participatory research is comprised of subjectivities that fulfil particular roles of transformation and ‘counter-hegemony’ (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.9). It is the composition of subjectivities in participatory research which gives the approach its moral authority: the potential for categories of ‘powerless’, ‘oppressed’ and ‘local’ people to be ‘given’ power over those who are ‘outsiders’, ‘privileged’ and ‘powerful’.

Participation as a discourse creates certain ‘types’ of researchers (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.14). Decolonisation of research involves participatory methods that create a remedial moral response and a remedial researcher. My analysis suggests that counter-colonial researchers attempt to be ethical by the following means:

- They employ participation as a strategy for moral justification of the quality of their work, making implicit and explicit connections between ethics and methods as the rationale for employing methodological approaches that earnestly attempt to be transformative and empowering.

- They value behaviours of researcher accountability over protocols of interpersonal responsibility, respectfully treating knowledge as the heritage for maintaining collective identities.

- They work reflexively to explicitly situate the location of their gaze and seek to mitigate its effects.

- They do not value methods of neo-colonial knowledge acquisition—of ‘stealing’ information away from researched communities, of writing
exclusively for the academy, of re-enacting a colonial gaze over participants, of employing participation superficially, such as token ‘consultation’.

- They value their work according to whether it has supported counter-colonial goals of reversing the colonising research gaze.

- They value and privilege the opinions of subjectivities who identify as ‘Indigenous’.

- They seek to achieve remedial goals of empowerment and anti-oppression by working towards a state of ‘participatory nirvana’ (Cornwall, 2008a, p.271).

- They have difficulty in making sense of internal resistance to an ‘empowering’ participatory process, blaming themselves for being ‘unethical’ when resistance emerges.

**How I tried to be ethical**

I draw my conclusions from my experience of working in a series of invited spaces. Entering such spaces demanded that I recognise my own subjectivity: my role in social practices, and the role of other people in constituting my understanding of being ethical. This research experience enabled me to recognise that research ethics are not only about epistemological differences over how research subjects are defined (as passive subjects or active constituents). I am now able to view the decisions I made about volunteering, committing to a research collaboration during times of uncertainty, and the kinds of outcomes I sought to achieve as inherent to the process of developing an ethical subjectivity. In this process, I have now come to see the rich complexity and the uncertainties of working with a community group as strengths of the research experience. Enduring contestation and resistance was a part of my developing trust in a participatory process. As I discussed with Pearl:

*Ruth: Do you think that’s about trust as well?*

*Pearl: Maybe it is about trust? I hadn’t thought about it before.*
Ruth: Because everything seems to be about the researcher having to get the community to trust them, but I think it’s a bit about the researcher trusting the community as well?

Pearl: Yeah, I think that’s true. ‘Cos that bit about the power dynamic of saying the researcher is in a big position of power, but actually if they reconfigure that power, it can be seen that the community has the power too. And unless you’re willing to see it, you’ll have resistance against your research. And I think too, traditionally for us that we shared everything that we had. We share the power, and we make that an even playing field as well. So you trust us, and we might take a longer time to trust you, but if you can hang in there, you’ll end up getting the trust. (18 September 2007)

It was through reflexive evaluation with community development workers such as Pearl that I began to understand how research participants exercise power to form the subjectivity of the researcher (through the development of trust or a manifestation of resistance). Despite my ‘good intentions’, the research process inevitably met with resistance, just as Cornwall notes:

[T]he most transformational intentions can meet a dead end when ‘intended beneficiaries’ choose not to take a part, or where powerful interest groups or gatekeepers within the community turn well-meaning efforts on the part of the community development workers to their own ends. (Cornwall, 2008a, p.274)

My evaluation addressed resistance to my ingenuous attempts at facilitating participation: the project’s focus on ‘youth strengths’ and ‘youth interests’ challenged the views of some parents who believed hip-hop was ‘too controversial’. Similarly, power relations produced a situation where a teacher became a resistant gatekeeper. Operating as an invited space, the hip-hop workshops demonstrated how various discourses shape our understanding of others and ourselves, how we develop certain moral goals, and shape ourselves to align with these goals. Democratic representation of heterogeneous communities of interest, respectful incorporation of Indigenous protocols (which then discursively privilege and exclude others), and the multiple contexts for collective identity all serve to show the web of power relations in counter-colonial participatory research. From this evaluation I was able to see that gaining collective consent for research is not about attaining a
harmonious vision but listening to resistance amongst subjectivities—reiterating multiplicity rather than a singular vision.

Employing a collective relational approach to reflexively evaluate the research process drew out multiple subjectivities rather than reinforcing alterity. By employing ‘techniques of the self’, and viewing participation as a spatial practice, I was able to consider three layers of reflexivity in collaboration with research participants. We considered strategies for understanding the way people employ the term ‘community’, and also the implications of research as intended or unintended outcomes of research. The challenges in maintaining ‘authentic’ participation as the basis of our research relationship enabled me to see the value of participants determining and exercising participation on their own terms.

Participation is a social practice and field with temporal, performative, methodological and material spatial dimensions containing multiple subjectivities. This case study of participation was an example of an invited participatory space, in which a non-Indigenous subjectivity sought to attend to issues about, with, and for an Indigenous community. This example of participation had multiple layers and multiple sites: the community development office, community meetings and volunteering, the hip-hop workshops, writing the Mittigar Gurrume Burruk report and collective evaluation of the research experience. Mittigar Gurrume Burruk and the hip-hop workshops showed how power relations shift and destabilise the research process. I had to follow institutional rules and practices of obtaining written consent, negotiating with ‘gatekeepers’ to invite participants into spaces of participation. But I also began to see how I had subjectified participants according to discursive and non-discursive practices of research. My moral interest in addressing over-representation of Indigenous youth in the criminal justice system shaped my research approach toward appreciative, strengths-based research that would challenge stereotypes.

I also believed the research would have more epistemological and moral credibility if it were controlled by the ‘community’ participants: subjectivities such as ‘Aboriginal community organisation’, ‘Aboriginal workers’, and ‘Aboriginal youth’ all lent a form of ‘moral authenticity’ to the research. I
had to 'move' into a space of participation delineated by the participants themselves, adopting a 'new' subjectivity in the process. This involved volunteering, not giving up when things were difficult and confusing, and moving 'all the way over' to engage with 'non-European' rules and practices. As a research approach, participation demands the researcher 'participate' in invited spaces too, and face the discursive boundaries of inclusion and exclusion just like the other participants. We must attend to the process of our own subjectification in the field.

Collective evaluation about the research process highlighted issues for consideration in practising counter-colonial research. For example, the way participants define (or imagine) community has practical implications for garnering collective consent and engendering participation. The mutable and diverse ways participants deploy constructs of community create borders of inclusion and exclusion that shape the terms of participation. My experience of developing trust was to become involved in 'community': to volunteer, share, turn up regularly to events and perform 'relationality' as a sign of respect and a willingness to be accountable (Lather, 2007, p.110). Shifting my subjectivity from 'outsider-researcher' to 'insider-volunteer', enabled me to permeate a boundary of resistance into a participatory space of trust.

The political contexts surrounding participation always shape and inform the constitution of trust and resistance. In our reflexive evaluation we considered the difference between good intentions and unintended consequences. While my introduction highlighted the importance of grounding research to a local place, good intentions and unintended consequences remind us of the effects of events thousands of kilometres away. The local context, the ground we stand on, is important—but so are the connections with the larger political questions we seek to address in pursuing social justice and through the symbolism of participation in research.

The ethics of participatory research show fragile and dynamic relationships within a social field; such as turning up, signing consent forms then not turning up, gate keeping, racism, and so on. Trust and resistance both inform ethical dimensions in a tactical social field of participation.
Ways of thinking and acting do not just concern the authorities. They affect each of us, our personal beliefs, wishes and aspirations, in other words our ethics. The new languages for construing, understanding and evaluating ourselves and others have transformed the way we interact. (Rose, 1999, p.3)

Foucault’s ethics show how reflexive concerns of alterity, positionality and relationality enable an attempt to avoid the tyranny of subjectification (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001). Ethical participatory research requires critical reflexive attention about the self in order to know one’s ‘ethical place’ in relation to others.

The care of the self is therefore quite the opposite of an invitation to inaction: it is what encourages us to really act, it is what constitutes us as the true subject of our actions. Rather than isolating us from the world, it is what enables us to situate ourselves within it correctly. (Gros in Foucault, 2005, p.538)

It was through the process of developing an ethical subjectivity that I improved my understanding of my personal interest in social justice and the boundaries that define ethical actions towards such goals. For example, I was able to see the importance of acknowledging my subjectivity (a middle-class White woman) in relation to my discursive position within a collective group. In relating with others, I was able to see a shift from my subjectivity as ‘researcher’ to ‘volunteer’ and ‘helper’. Viewing relationships with others within a series of invited spaces enabled me to consider what separates and connects people. In the dynamic process of participatory research, resistance shapes the form of activity as much as the development of trust. By evaluating the operation of resistance amongst subjectivities within participatory space, I was able to attempt developing an ethical subjectivity.

**Participation as a space between**

Acknowledging resistance is a necessary element of evaluating power relations in participatory research. My use of the term resistance is grounded in the idea that “it should neither be celebrated nor feared. It is a technical component of power” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p.55). Adopting this approach entailed not conceptualising resistance as hegemonic force external to ‘participation’ itself, but as a productive mechanism that delineates the
shape of an invited space. Resistance operates just as “power works through discourses, institutions and practices that are productive of power effects, framing the boundaries of possibilities that govern action” (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2008, p.175).

Reflexively evaluating the machinations of resistance involved thinking about how I created subjects of others as well as myself. In the introduction to this thesis I suggested that participatory research has a moral goal of altering power relations. Participatory spaces are dynamic interrelations of productive power, resistance, and multiple subjectivities, which are measured against normative goals of unity, harmony and congruence. This vision of participation begins to crumble when participants choose to exclude themselves from the process, or when rules, social practices, or institutions elude participatory goals.

Seeing power and resistance as productive has implications for the way social change or transformation is perceived, the way in which knowledge is constructed (if it forces a single community view), and the way that ‘participation’ may be co-opted into a superficial function for tokenistic consultation. This analysis highlights the importance of clearly accounting for, describing and acknowledging power relations and resistance throughout the research process. The results show that “while PAR is a form of power, its effects are not only negative … Rather they are messy, entangled, highly variable and contingent” (Kesby, Kindon & Pain, 2007, p.19).

Accounts of counter-colonial research that provide examples of resistance (such as collaborative decision-making and processes of negotiation) give an assessment of the ethical quality of the research. Without accounts of rigorous debate amongst collaborators, how can we know if a participatory project is not a tyrannical application of methods imposed by an outsider? Recognition of resistance within participatory processes shows a commitment to listening respectfully to different points of view, to participation by consent rather than duress or duty; to collective reflexivity that recognises all the varying effects of research (both intended and unintended). Accounting for resistance enables a researcher to consider tensions reflexively as possibilities within ‘non-innocent’ spaces, for “The other who refuses to give itself over ...
is our best teacher. This is the other of our own reformulated thinking as well as those we other and those who other us' (Lather, 2007, p.160). If the dominant goal of a participatory process remains to produce only ‘one’ vision for change, dilemmas will continue in practice. For example, questions about representation within collaborative endeavours will remain, such as:

- what processes decide which material is included in written accounts of the research (and what material set aside);
- whose voices are included meaningfully in representations about participatory research;
- do all the voices unanimously desire to communicate with the same audience, or are there multiple priorities within collaboration which deserve equal consideration and may possibly contravene one another;
- what are the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion within collaborative and participatory research?

The implication of my argument is that resistance within participatory processes is not a failure, but a necessary part of deliberating democratic participatory outcomes. By taking the opportunity to consider why people resist, and why they say ‘no’, productive possibilities emerge from participatory spaces. Resistance within participatory spaces operates in many forms and on a variety of scales: ranging from non-participation to altercation, simmering or formalised protest. Resistance does not take a monolithic form but is a component of power.

Accounting for resistance within participatory research is a part of understanding the ethics. Without resistance it is not possible to view the jostling of power relations amongst multiple subjectivities, the individuality of people within population groups, the complexity and unpredictability of social life. Rather than worry that it is impossible to determine a perfectly harmonious and congruent vision of unity, Foucault’s ethics enabled me to distinguish between my moral intentions and the freedom inherent in an ‘uncontrollable’ social field. The quality of the research is strengthened, not threatened by recognising diverse subjectivities. After all, why should participatory research strive to find a ‘single truth’ or solution? Why should
participatory processes of change (such as reconciliation) demand a unified vision rather than productive possibilities generated by recognising difference?

A potential criticism of these findings is to suggest that such deliberative processes integrating resistance will make progress towards change unachievable: that ‘real’, unequivocal problems, such as ‘the gaps’ of mortality rates, educational outcomes, and attrition within the criminal justice system need to be addressed. It is obvious that democratic deliberative processes do take longer than quick consultations and baseline surveys synthesised by experts who then decide what the best course of action should be. But my point is that inclusion of resistance in the evaluation of participatory research enables ‘blockages’ to be identified and addressed more effectively in the long run. Political expediency may be one concern, but in addressing moral questions of inequality, marginalisation and the effects of colonisation, a fast and superficial version of participation will not generate or support sustainable and productive relationships. My findings about resistance might be considered ‘symbolic’, but in order to effect real change we must “put an end to the misguided notion that reconciliation comes in two discrete and opposing forms—practical, meaning worthwhile and effective; and symbolic, meaning near enough to worthless” (Dodson, 2009).

This research is grounded in the local, working in real-life situations of complexity, diversity and contestation. It is easy to think that such concepts are ‘fluffy’ and theoretical, but power and resistance are real, and they affect material outcomes and productivity (as my case study showed). By viewing participation metaphorically (as a ‘space’), its symbolism becomes cogent. And, as Mck Dodson reminds us, symbolic acts, such as acknowledging Country, have real implications towards practical outcomes:

Some might think this ritual of respect is purely symbolic—and therefore unrelated to all that needs to be done to improve our health and well being, and bring reconciliation nearer to reality. But it is not unrelated. It is one of the essential tools we need to get these jobs done. A symbol, after all, is only a symbol when it stands for something concrete. Governor Phillip didn’t think planting the British flag in Sydney Cove on January 26 was a gesture without meaning, even when there was so much work to be done. He knew how practical that symbolism was. (Dodson, 2009)
As Dodson reminds us, it is the pertinence of symbolic acts that create possibilities for the future. ‘Participation’ is as I have argued, is an explicit and active connection between ethics and research methods. It represents a social field in which acknowledging diversity in opinions and identities is crucial to developing trust and moving towards social justice goals for a healthy and empowered citizenry. But acknowledging resistance means that researchers must attend to the power of symbolism as meaningful to their practice.

In future it would be valuable to see more studies of participatory research with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that do not fear describing and accounting for resistance as a technical component of the process, integrating the possibilities of tension into methods. It would also be interesting to know more about the processes of resistance experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander researchers ‘working the hyphen’ between their community identity and researcher subjectivity. Wider scale interviews with researchers employing multi-layered reflexivity to their work would also be of value to consider how this critically informs their evaluation and monitoring techniques, and whether decisions made throughout the research process are altered by these techniques of the self. While there is a growing number of researchers seeking to make their personal power relations transparent in participatory practice (Mehta, 2008), decolonisation demands reflexive discussion about the research process itself (with reference to initiation, benefits, representation, legitimacy and accountability) (Bishop & Glynn, 1999). It is crucial to recognise relationality, alterity and positionality.

Echo: ‘have you noticed that? with your work?’

Let’s return to that day when Barb, Ruby, and I sat under the tree in the grounds of the university. Let’s consider the echoes of our voices, and reverberations of our words, and our laughter together.

Barb: I just think that we’ve just had enough of the rules ...
Ruby: I think the rules are European rules and they don’t fit.
Barb: We’ve tried living under those rules and it just doesn’t work. This is our rules, this is the way we’re gonna work, this is the way we’re gonna live, this is the way we’re gonna do it. You know, you need to come and meet us half
way, I mean, we've already been there and what have you [non-Indigenous people] done?
Ruby: I think it’s more than halfway now. They need to come way over halfway to meet us, ‘cos the distrust is so prevalent … and that’s what you’ve done in your research is you’ve come more than halfway. We’re here, you’ve come right over, we hadn’t even moved over … slowly we’ve started moving to meet you halfway. But you’ve had to come right over.
Barb: Have you noticed that? With your work?
Ruth: Umm …
Barb: I didn’t mean to give you the questions!
[laughter]
Ruth: No, no. I think it’s good that you ask me these questions. (26 September 2007)

Undertaking this research has been an ethical journey—one in which I have learnt about the formation of my own subjectivity. I have not been unaffected by such a journey. Often, because of my convictions about the moral rationale for participation, I was scared to critique an approach I so ardently believed in. I was worried my research might be interpreted as cynical, bitter or against participation. That is certainly not my intention. Rather, I have argued that identifying the moral impetus for participatory tactics enables a critical mode of ethical monitoring and evaluation of the process. My research enabled me to view participation as a social space and practice imbued with multiple power relations, framed by trust and resistance.

Ethical regulations create subjectivities of ‘community’ and ‘counter-colonial researcher’; these are positions of alterity that are discursively established and reinscribed. Decolonising research in Australia is ‘fixed’ in a project of remedial reversal. It is informed by the wider political landscape of self-determination, democratic representation and citizenship, all of which are problematic and systematically denied to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. In this political landscape, subjectivities in research, particularly between Indigenous community participants and non-Indigenous researchers, continue to be founded upon a political need for power-reversal and transformation. And this goal will continue to be very difficult to achieve
if non-Indigenous researchers persist in a belief that it is possible to achieve ‘deep’, ‘wide’, ‘full’, ‘authentic’ participation without resistance. Rather, by listening to dissent, researchers can begin to unpack the rigid subjectivities they have constructed about Indigenous participants and can work to create invited spaces which allow for multiple subjectivities, opinions and ‘community representation’. Participation in research is a liminal spatial practice meshed between trust and resistance: it is dynamic and contested with its contexts shaped by discursive rules, institutions and histories.
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Appendix A

Items referred to as Appendix A were located in a pocket on the inside back cover of the examination copy of the thesis. Appendix A consisted of the following:

- Ethics consent forms to participate in hip-hop in the Hawkesbury workshops, March 2007
- Mittigar Gurrume Burruk community report
- Mittigar Gurrume Burruk postcard
- Mittigar Gurrume Burruk badge.
There have been many highlights over the last three years of working in collaboration with [the organisation]. The process of developing the hip-hop Project was a time in which I learnt many lessons, particularly about the differences between what is described in the textbooks as 'best practice' community-based research methods, and the reality of engaging many people at one time. I have learnt about the reality of applying a community-based action project within my limits as a student accountable to the university ethics system. For example, there are many additional rules for PhD students who want to work directly with schools, and this created a barrier for the research. I have also learnt that the university focus on written consent forms created age limits for children and young people to participate in the workshops. During evaluation we considered the project really needed to provide transport for participants rather than rely on parent/guardians. This demonstrates the challenges between being a researcher, and working in a community-development context outside of the university rules.

The Mittigar Gurrume Burruk Report was a really exciting result of our work together, and I hope that some of the ideas I have shared about ways of working with data might be useful for future activities. Another highlight was travelling to Melbourne to speak at the National Research Ethics Conference in October 2007. The audience was so impressed with our presentation, because the [organisation's] workers brought life to the ideas in our presentation, showing the importance of community-control and active participation in making research about Aboriginal communities. I received an email with the following feedback: “I was in the audience at the ethics conference in Melbourne where you presented this week. I’m just emailing my
congratulations on a great presentation—innovative style and a wonderful feeling about it. It wasn't just what you and the other two presenters actually said, it was 'the living the talk' message that came through”. For this I would like to say ‘thank you’ to [the organisation] because it is through the experience of working together that my thesis is able to ‘live the talk’ and provide better insights into the reality of doing research with communities that is 'ethical' on the terms of the community, rather than just university protocols.

What I have learnt along the way

There are 8 key themes that I have learnt from ‘living the talk’ with [the organisation]. These are:

**Values**—researchers place a lot of value on the integrity of the data they collect (the validity and reliability of their study). Our experience shows that working with communities is about personal integrity — understanding your responsibilities and framing research question in relation to the interests of people involved in research. This means placing value in relationships with people and the community. I learnt this through participating in preparations for NAIDOC and helping out on the day.

**Spirit and Integrity**—the importance of family and ancestors, and the relationship to country and community are not integrated into mainstream ethics guidelines. Although there are limitations on the ability for a non–Indigenous person to understand life from an Aboriginal person’s perspective, researchers should consider the impact of colonial systems of labelling people and communities and seek to challenge this in their research. By working closely with [the organisation] over the last 3 years my research attempts to bring community perspectives to research ethics.

**Survival and Protection**—it is very important for researchers to acknowledge the ownership of ideas and community knowledge belongs to the participants in the research. This is challenging for researchers working with mainstream intellectual property laws. The difference in values about copyright remains a
huge problem, and should be taken seriously by researchers. In our research collaboration the findings of the Mittigar Gurrume Bùruŋ report belong to, and will remain with [the organisation].

**Working Two Ways**—researchers need to acknowledge that community dynamics and protocols are very different to systems of governance brought with colonisation. A researcher will have to adhere to a set of university ethics rules (eg. written informed consent papers) but at the same time, they must also make an effort to develop trust by working with the community to understand their interpersonal responsibilities. The research may take longer than expected, and should be accounted for in research design and funding. In our research partnership I learnt the difference between theory and practice when organising the hip-hop project. I found the university ethics rules could hinder youth participation. By changing my role in relation to the project, [the organisation’s] workers were able to own and control the data collection aspect of the project more effectively. This resulted in additional interviews, poems and artwork for the Mittigar Gurrume Bùruŋ report.

**Community**—understandings of community have implications for researchers gaining consent to do their study. The researcher needs to consider that geography is not the only way to define ‘community’. Community is complex—it also needs to be understood as social and cultural. Each participant understands community according to their own personal circumstance (eg. being in country, or coming from another nation), and by being a part of a collective identity that has different values, interests and priorities to the ‘mainstream’. By evaluating the research experience with [the organisation’s] workers, my thesis is able to show a variety of living perspectives, and ensure voices of participants shine through.

**Historical Misrepresentation**—while many researchers understand that communities may hold some mistrust of research, it is important to understand the specific experiences of a community, rather than making broad generalisations. This is part of recognising diversity, and challenging stereotypes by considering the different experiences of colonisation communities have endured. For example, because the Hawkesbury was one of the earliest colonial settlements this has impacted upon mainstream
recognition of the community today. Many researchers tend to focus on remote desert communities rather than recognise urban communities. Our research collaboration shows the vibrant living culture in the Hawkesbury has insights to offer about values and ethics.

Unintended Consequences—the framing of research questions can produce information that may harm a community. By involving communities in discussing research from the start of a project, the researcher can work hard to minimise unintended consequences. An example in our collaboration was a focus on ‘strengths’ and positives in the questions we asked. The Mittigar Gurrume Burruk report discusses issues about public transport and night time activities which are well known local issues—however the report shows a youth perspective and provides clues for positive steps to support young people. Hopefully the report will provide an evidence base for future grant applications and activities.

Interconnection and Harm—the textbooks about participation in research suggest there are many good outcomes from community steering the research process. However, the ethics requirements should also consider whether having an inter-connection between participants might be difficult or challenging at times. Sometimes a person may get upset about an aspect of the research findings because they know whom the research is about. It is important for researchers to consider this weakness of the participation method, and consider ways of caring for others while they participate as a co-researcher. This was an issue I had not considered in my research design, and is an important lesson for the future and for other researchers to consider.

Putting this to good use: what other researchers can learn about being ethical

While I hope this research partnership has been useful to [the organisation], I also hope the research will be useful for other researchers to read before they begin work with communities. The thesis has three main sections:

- theory about ethics
- analysis of the ethics guidelines researchers use
- reflections about ‘living the talk’ with [the organisation].
Without the experience of working with [the organisation] I would not have gained the insights I have learnt about working ethically with communities. I would like to thank you very much for allowing me to work with you.