THE SHAMAN ARCHETYPE:
A CONTEMPORARY JUNGIAN EXAMINATION

University of Western Sydney
Bringing knowledge to life

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BSc (Hons)

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father,

Frederick Albert Merchant

without whose commitment to the value of education and knowledge,

it would never have been completed.
Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

John Frederick Merchant
The author wishes to thank his principal supervisor, Dr Brendon Stewart for his stimulating input and encouragement throughout the entirety of this project. Without his systematic questioning and curiosity, the author's own ideas would never have developed. I am indebted to the high quality of the supervision I received.

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<td>BPD</td>
<td>Borderline Personality Disorder</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Dynamic Systems Theory</td>
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<td>DevST</td>
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Abstract

Since Jung's first allusions to it, the "shaman archetype" has occupied a place of considerable importance in Jungian discourse. The trajectory of this thesis began with Guggenbuhl-Craig's (1999) view that a "shaman archetype" must be present in Jungian analysts for them to be good at their craft. To explicate the nature and characteristics of this archetype, this thesis examined both aspects of the phrase "shaman archetype".

It was not difficult to demonstrate that shamanism represents an archetype in the classical Jungian sense. This was an important starting point because most Jungians simply assume shamanism represents an archetype and begin their discourse from that perspective. However, this demonstration necessitated examining Jung's classical view of archetypes and certain critiques emerged. It became difficult to support Jung's assertions that archetypes are innate and operate spontaneously with "autochthonous revival". Contemporary critiques of this classical view of the archetype became important in furthering an understanding of the nature of archetypes generally, which could be applied to the "shaman archetype" in particular. Specifically, it was concluded that an emergent/developmental model of archetype was supported most by current research findings. This led to a working model of archetype which enabled further exploration of the "shaman archetype" question.

Apart from this model being supported by Developmental Systems theory in contemporary developmental biology, it highlighted a number of important theoretical conclusions for it collapses the conceptual division between the collective and personal unconscious, as well as the nature/nurture debate in archetype theory and the idea that archetypes contain a "sacred heritage".

The second part of this thesis applied this emergent/developmental model of the archetype to Siberian shamanism by seeing if there was evidence that its central characteristic of the "pre-initiatory illness" could be explained developmentally.
Ethnographic material about the Sakha (Yakut) tribe from the Siberian locus classicus of shamanism was examined and it supported the hypothesis that the shaman archetype was a developmentally produced mind/brain structure arising out of early trauma and ruptures within the early mother-infant bond. Donald Winnicott's theoretical conceptions were then used to describe the particular psychology of the Siberian shaman which emerged. It was concluded that this psychology is, in his term, a "borderline type of case", having arisen from dysfunction at the core of personality development but in an environment of "no other chaos" so that the outer layers of personality development are functional. It is this psychological construction that explains, on the one hand, evidence of psychopathology amongst Siberian shamans, whilst on the other hand, a capacity to work coherently within their own cultures.

It was concluded that Jungian analysts need the same kind of personality structure to be able to work with and use the somatic countertransference as a psychotherapeutic tool. A comparison and contrast of these ideas with contemporary Jungian uses of shamanism was then undertaken so that the implications for the training and selection of Jungian analysts could be deduced.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 1998 I had opportunity to attend the Fourteenth International Congress for Analytical Psychology, a triennial conference run by the International Association of Analytical Psychology. It is a feature of these conferences to have symposia devoted to training issues and being a Jungian analyst trainee myself at the time, I was particularly looking forward to one published theme - "What makes a good analyst?" Given Jung's rather limited (although not necessarily unimportant) references to shamanism (there being twenty seven paragraph references and four footnotes in his writings - see Appendix A), it was Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) who caught me somewhat by surprise when he alluded to a "shaman archetype" as one which is likely to be present in a good analyst. As a consequence, my interest in this concept of the "shaman archetype" was stimulated, shamanism previously having been of no special interest to me although I was aware that it occupied a place of conceptual importance for many Jungians. I had never heard it presented as so central to analytic work.

Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) began by saying that, "To be a good Jungian analyst, I have concluded, is a talent with which, if you are lucky, you are born." (p.408) As a consequence, he sees training to be about refining that talent which he later described as an "inner drive". In his view, the talent arises from the activation of certain archetypes of which three dominate with analysts and which would need to be present for an analyst to be regarded as "good". These are the "healer archetype" (which he sees as essential although some reject it); the "shaman archetype" and the "alchemist archetype" (exhibited in the ability to symbolise).

Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) defined shamans as those who can leave their bodies and make contact with "demons, with gods, with other dimensions of human existence" (p. 409) which could be broadly conceived as the transpersonal realm. He went on to draw a parallel between this and analysis by saying that "We analysts show the
patients these other dimensions. For instance we put them in touch with the unconscious" (p. 409) and this is especially seen through work with dreams, which, in his view, is specifically based on the shaman archetype. Guggenbuhl-Craig concluded that "the selection of future analysts is more important than the precise compulsory organisation of the training. We must receive with open arms the ones who have talent and refuse the ones who have no talent." (p.411).

Given the overall significance suggested by Guggenbuhl-Craig's (1999) comments and the connection to being a "good analyst", the issues struck me as highly significant not the least because they posited an archetypal underpinning to being a Jungian analyst. This thesis, then, is an exploration and attempted explication of the "shaman archetype" to see what implications it has for the training and selection of analysts and for ongoing analytic work.

It became apparent that I would need to examine both sides of the phrase, "shaman archetype", that is, shamanism as an ethnographic phenomenon and archetype as a theoretical construct. Consequently, the following questions arose. Firstly, in relation to the ethnographic record, what actually is shamanism and is there any evidence that a "shaman archetype" exists? Secondly, what does Jung say about shamanism? To what extent did he consider shamanism to be an archetype and do any of his formulations about it relate to contemporary psychotherapeutic work? Thirdly, if such an archetype can be demonstrated to exist, what are the implications for the selection, training and work of Jungian analysts? Lastly, can any of these questions be informed by contemporary post-Jungian discourse on shamanism including current perspectives on archetype theory?

These questions highlighted certain procedural considerations like the need for precision about the concept and definition of shamanism as well as the importance in deducing from the existing ethnographic literature, the actual nature of this mode of being/healing, given the fact that hardly any real shamans are left and that significant anthropologists (like Siikala, 1987a) are critical of popularist sentiment in some of the literature. Nonetheless, it was possible to arrive at a working definition of shamanism by which to further the investigations of this thesis. Additionally, by using the criteria of classical Jungian theory, it was not difficult to show that a shaman archetype exists
in the way that Jung would conceive. To achieve this, however, Jung's method for proving the existence of archetypes had to be reviewed and this entailed an examination of classical archetype theory. This analysis revealed a point of major criticism of Jung's theory to do with the "autochthonous revival" of archetypes and the fact that they could not be said to arise spontaneously without reference to a person's subjective experience. This conclusion took on some significance later in the thesis when contemporary approaches to archetype theory were reviewed and it was discovered that the most plausible model emerging in current discourse also took a position against archetypes as innate, pre-formed and operating with "autochthonous revival".

In relation to the Jungian literature on the "shaman archetype", a preliminary overview revealed a number of uses to which the concept was put. Jung seemed to see it in two main ways - as an archaic archetype important in earlier human pre-history but which has emerged in recent times to compensate for the West's over development of rationalistic consciousness; and secondly, as reflective of the individuation process and especially of the place of suffering entailed therein. Whilst the views of post-Jungians on this archetype span a broad range from its connection with the countertransference (Stein, 1984) to its deliberate evocation in therapeutic work (Sandner & Wong, 1997; Smith, 1997), all writers seem to hold a classical view of it, namely, that it is one archetype of the collective unconscious which will be in existence prior to any experience an individual may have of the world. Given the presence of shamanic practices within Native American culture, a significant position within the USA has emerged which not only sees the shaman archetype as part of humankind's "sacred heritage" but as one which would be in our best interests to access. This perspective reflects a fundamental belief within the classical Jungian position that archetypes of the collective unconscious are unaffected by personal experience and if activated, can be potential wellsprings of healing and meaning.

As far as general archetype theory goes, there has been over recent years a lively debate in the Jungian literature which has called such a classical view into question. Some see archetypes as no more than cultural constructs (Pietikainen, 1998a) or principles of organisation from within a dynamic systems perspective (McDowell, 2001) or as primitive conceptual structures like image schemas (Knox, 2003, 2004) or
as emergent self-organisation properties from the activity of the mind/brain (Saunders & Skar, 2001). Stevens (1998) does make the important assertion that a biological base to archetypes places the theory on a firm epistemological footing and he has published subsequently on this theme (Stevens, 2002). Nevertheless, he has not really taken into account the recent developments within molecular genetics proposed by the Developmental Systems theorists (see Oyama, Griffiths and Gray, 2001). It is important to consider these biologists because their arguments against the idea of a "genetic blueprint" are directly applicable to the theory of archetype and call for a re-appraisal of the classical position. The Developmental Systems theorists are calling for a re-evaluation of both the role of environmental factors in phenotypic expression and of the importance of instinct theory. This is noteworthy because Stevens' biological position on archetypes relies heavily on instinct theory to demonstrate the existence of inborn components that drive behaviour. Whilst the Developmental Systems theorists have vastly enlarged our understanding of the interactionist perspective between genetic background and environmental influence they have also criticised the "genetic blueprint" position as being pre-formationist and it is this criticism which can just as easily be applied to the concept of the archetype *an sich*. The parallel argument would be to say that archetypes do not pre-form any behaviour but that certain environmental conditions need to be present for specific archetypes to be expressed and further, that there is a subtle interplay going on between the archetypal underpinning and the environmental conditions which constellate the archetype's expression. Such an argument requires a modification of Jung's assertion that archetypes can operate autonomously. Research findings within developmental neuroscience enable our understanding to go even further because it suggests that mind/brain structures can be produced by intense affective experience during the earliest stages of human development. One of the most contemporary models of archetype being argued today is that proposed by Jean Knox (2003, 2004). This model combines emergentism and a developmental perspective and relies heavily on the findings of developmental neuroscience that a biological perspective is retained. This thesis concluded that Knox's emergent/developmental model was the most plausible of all current approaches to archetype and it became critical in furthering the investigations in terms of the shaman archetype.
Whilst I believe further work needs to be done in applying Developmental Systems Theory and the emergent/developmental model to archetype theory, the implications from such a perspective are noteworthy. If archetypes as psychic structures are produced through developmental experience involving intense affectivity, it will be virtually impossible to separate activation of an archetype from particular environmental experiences of similar affectivity later in life. This means it will be impossible to continue seeing archetypes as determining or pre-forming behaviour. Rather, archetypes will only be called into activation by the presence of particular environmental experiences. It followed that a further explication of the shaman archetype would be better served by exploring those environmental aspects which have activated its expression. For reasons explained in the thesis, I restricted my attention to the Siberian material on shamanism and this revealed the common cross-cultural feature of the pre-initiatory illness of the shaman-initiate, this being recognised by his/her culture-mates as evidence of a calling to the shamanic vocation. This pre-initiatory illness usually emerges early in life at childhood or adolescence and Jungians have tended to see this phenomenon in terms of the sufferings entailed in the individuation process. Psychoanalytically oriented ethnographers have been keener to view the material more reductively. By examining the pre-initiatory illness in detail, Ducey (1976) developed the most thorough psychodynamic and intrapsychic theory of Siberian shamanism. Overall, he concluded that the Siberian shaman is caught in the earliest stage of personality development, the paranoid-schizoid position (after Klein, 1946) so that depressive and hysterical manifestations of the shaman's behaviour are mere elaborations on that underlying theme. He proposed a standard aetiology for this situation, severe emotional trauma in early childhood either through actual death of parents or other causes of substantial oral frustration. However, Ducey fell short of being able to designate a contemporary diagnostic category for this kind of psychology and he provided little evidence of the crucial early infant trauma on which his hypothesis depended.

Nonetheless, Ducey's (1976) assertions were understood to be critical because he was proposing early infant affective experience as causal in Siberian shamanism. Evidence for his hypothesis was needed through a thorough examination of the Siberian ethnographic records. When this was undertaken on material regarded by
anthropologists as being sound research, there was evidence of a connection between early infant trauma and the shamanic calling. What eventually emerged in this thesis was a particular model of the Siberian shaman's psychology in terms of a "borderline type of case", a concept proposed by Winnicott (1968) but one not widely discussed when Ducey wrote.

Winnicott (1956, 1968) held the view that if early infant trauma occurred prior to the establishment of unit status (i.e. in the first six months of life before a sense of being a separate individual in one's own right) and in an environment where there is "no other chaos" then a particular kind of (psychotic) borderline condition is produced - a functional/dysfunction. This is because the central (nuclear) aspect of the personality structure built up from the early relationship with the mother is dysfunctional but surrounding this are outer (orbital) layers of personality formation which are quite functional. This model was seen to have substantial validity when applied to Siberian shamanism because it explained why shamans are able to move in and out of controlled psychotic/visionary states, displaying their fundamental capacity of mastery, this being a skill to which their training aims. It became apparent that if shamanism represented an archetype comprising part of a contemporary analyst's personality then such a model could explain their somatic countertransferenceal experiences as well. This is because similar early mother-infant experiences have led to the development of the same "shaman archetype" in analysts which gets constellated in the therapeutic encounter when the analyst's own pockets of early infant damage become activated by, and resonate with, that of their patients. In this way, the shaman archetype as a psychic structure can actually provide an explanation for Jung's influence/infection model of psychotherapeutic work.

The implications of the above for the training and selection of Jungian analysts were significant. It could very easily be the case that persons choose psychotherapy as a career because a shaman archetype has been activated in them through experiences of trauma in the early mother-infant bond. If this be the case, then a central place needs to be made not only for one's own therapy as critical in clinical trainings but that such therapy needs to have a reductive/developmental emphasis. Similarly, initial selection would need to include the detection of particular early infant experiences which have led to the shaman archetype as a psychic construction.
Finally, the thesis led to further research questions, the main questions being - does the model of the psychology of the Siberian shaman as proposed, apply to other shamanisms? Secondly, do Jungian analysts generally have the psychological construction as suggested by the findings of this thesis? And lastly, do current exponents of shamanism have a similar psychological construction?

The first phase of the thesis, however, was to determine exactly what shamanism was and this is the subject of the next Chapter.
CHAPTER 2

WHAT IS SHAMANISM?

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Since this study is about evaluating the Jungian position on shamanism and determining if we are dealing with an archetype so that phenomenological characteristics useful in relation to modern analytical psychology and psychotherapy can be determined, a thorough understanding of shamanism is required. Such an understanding is made even more imperative given the difficulties highlighted in the literature concerning this field of study. Siikala (1978) speaks about reconstructions from secondary sources as a problem with the anthropological material and Noll (1990) highlights a Western tendency to romanticise shamanism so that the anthropological accounts become interpreted as "ideal metaphoric abstraction[s] of what many Westerners believe the experiences of shamans ought to be" (p.213). Ränk (1967) sees a "mistake with the existent major comparative research consist[ing] mainly in the attempt of scholars to seek a short cut straight to the meaning and origin of shamanism" (p.21). Therefore, he believes many have lost their way. More recently, Grim (1983) cautions against a tendency to "cultish emotionalism". These statements need noting as we proceed to examine shamanism as a field of study and aspects of them will take on further significance later in the thesis.

2.2 THE WORK OF ANNA-LEENA SIIKALA AND MIRCEA ELIADE

Anna-Leena Siikala from the University of Helsinki is probably one of the most significant contemporary anthropologists investigating Siberian and Inner Asian shamanism not only through her own publications (Siikala, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1987a.
1987b, 1989) but also through her work in collaboration with the eminent Hungarian scholar of Siberian shamanism, Mihály Hoppál (Siikala & Hoppál, 1998).

In her chapter on "The interpretation of Siberian and Central Asian shamanism", Siikala (1989) devotes a section to the research of Mircea Eliade and the important place which he occupies. Her opinion is that Eliade "represents the main stream of studies in shamanism" (p.22) for whilst he dealt with many of the classic issues, he is noteworthy because of the method he used. Despite the fact that there is diversity at every level across the Siberian and Inner Asian groups as also noted by Diószegi (1968c), it has been through the comparative approach Eliade used that he has been able to set the phenomenon in a broader transhistorical context by balancing the interpretation of cultural-specific facts whilst crystallising transcultural elements. In so doing, he has combined these two levels of interpretation whilst avoiding any tendency toward homogenisation. The overall debt we owe to Eliade is that through his work, much on shamanism has become general knowledge and Siikala believes the fundamental contribution of his research has been the opening up of "new vistas on the understanding of basic religious experiences common to all mankind" (pp.24-25).

Eliade's (1964) classic text, *Shamanism: Archaic techniques of ecstasy*, was originally published in French in 1951 and then enlarged and translated into English in 1964. Whilst written from a history of religions perspective, the book is regarded as one of the most comprehensive treatments of shamanism as it reviewed the vast majority of extant ethnographic literature on the subject until that time. Its importance lies not only in its comprehensive overview of the definitive characteristics of the shamanic phenomenon but because it deals with much material from a time before contemporary cultural incursions. This is important because as Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) says, "there are hardly any real shamans left" (p.409).

Later in 1987, Eliade edited Macmillan's *Encyclopedia of religion* where he provided an introductory overview to the entries on shamanism. It is a succinct summary of the views he proposed in 1964 to which he has added some further bibliographic entries and it is a useful place with which to begin an answer to the question, "what is shamanism?" My aim is to provide a working understanding so as to glean those
areas from the ethnographic research which are relevant to this thesis. This will inevitably involve some treatment of the main problems in the study of shamanism.

2.2.1 Eliade's (1987) summary of shamanism

Eliade (1987) begins by stating that "Shamanism in the strict sense is pre-eminently a religious phenomenon of Siberia and Inner Asia" (p.202) but goes on to note that similarities occur in other parts of the world. As a phenomenon, Eliade sees shamanism as centred on the mastery of the technique of ecstasy and that shamans are particular amongst other magicians and ecstatics for their speciality of the trance state - their soul is believed to leave their body and to ascend to the sky or descend to the underworld. Critically, this occurs without shamans being possessed by their helping spirits but rather through their control of them.

Recruitment of shamans occurs in one of three ways. It is either an hereditary vocation or the result of a spontaneous "call/election" by the spirits or by a neophyte's choice to become a shaman (although these shamans are considered to be less powerful). Despite the method of recruitment, a shaman is not recognised by his socio-cultural group until after two types of teaching - ecstatic (through dreams and trance states) and traditional or "didactic" (through the learning of techniques, the names and functions of the spirits, the mythology and genealogy of the clan, and often a secret language). This twofold instruction given by both the spirits and older master shamans is seen as an initiation. Sometimes there are public initiation ceremonies but this is not always the case.

The recognition of election to the shamanic vocation is similar amongst most groups as Eliade says,

Among many Siberian and Inner Asian tribes, the youth who is called to be a shaman attracts attention by his strange behavior; for example, he seeks solitude, becomes absent-minded, loves to roam in the woods or unfrequented places, has visions, and sings in his sleep (Eliade, 1987, p.202).
In 1964, Eliade coined the phrase, "pre-initiatory illness", to describe such characteristics. In some groups these symptoms of pre-initiatory illness indicating election can be of a deranging nature and quite serious. Even hereditary shamans undergo similar changes in behaviour due to their election by shaman ancestors. It is believed that during these states, a shamanic initiation is proceeding. Additionally, there are times when people can become shamans following accidents or highly unusual events of a bizarre or life-threatening nature, though such instances are less common.

Eliade (1987) goes on to note that the symptoms of the pre-initiatory illness have led some scholars to conclude that shamans suffer from a mental disorder. He is of the opinion that shamans have generally healed themselves so that their "initiation is equivalent to a cure" (p.203) and that the pre-initiatory illness is part of a mystical initiation which follows a traditional pattern. In Siberian and Inner Asian shamanism the sequence is as follows - in an imaginal state, the shaman is "killed" by the spirits, then dismembered (generally to the state of a skeleton), put back together again which is followed by an ascent to the world tree where instruction is received in the art of healing and how to orient oneself in the spirit realm, given its inherent dangers etc. The shaman emerges from this ordeal with a strong constitution, powerful intelligence and enhanced energy. A number of examples can be found in his *Shamanism: Archaic techniques of ecstasy* (Eliade, 1964).

Overall, Eliade (1987) sees shamans as functioning by way of mystical trance for four purposes - to take offerings to deities and spirits on behalf of the community; to seek a lost soul which has either wandered off from its body or been stolen by a spirit; to guide the soul of a dead person to its new location or to gain knowledge from the spirit realm (as in divination). Shamans often act as guardians of their tribe's rich oral traditions but their principal socio-cultural function is that of healing. Amongst most groups, sickness is seen as the result of a loss of soul, so a diagnostic séance can be the first phase of the healing process to determine if the soul has just wandered off or has been stolen. All séances involve trance and can be quite structured. They feature drumming, singing, calling on the spirits, a describing of the shaman's soul journey (which can be either celestial ascent or descent) and directives received from the spirits. The séance ends when the shaman collapses motionless. A
shaman's capacity for soul journey means they can act in the manner of a spirit and this is emphasised in various fakir-like tricks, which are undertaken. These often have to do with fire.

This overview would accord with standard views expressed throughout the literature, Harvey (2003), Stutley (2003) and Vitebsky (1995) being representative of contemporary examples. However, Siikala (1978) in her *The rite technique of the Siberian shaman*, notes that although "the describing and explaining of the phenomenal complex going under the name of shamanism has been one of the central themes of research into ethnology, comparative religion and anthropology, ethnomedicine and folklore, no consistent answer has been found to the question 'What is shamanism?'" (p.12). Rånk (1967) is of similar opinion and this raises the definitional debate concerning shamanism which occurs in the literature.

**2.3 THE DEFINITIONAL DEBATE**

Despite the work of Eliade (1964, 1987) there has been over the decades, substantial divergence of opinion amongst scholars as to what can accurately define shamanism and this still occurs today. Geertz (1977) believes things like "shamanism", "animism", "totemism" to be examples of "desiccated" and "insipid" categories "by means of which ethnographers of religion devitalize their data" (p.39) whilst Spencer (1968), in his review of Edsman's (1967) *Studies in shamanism*, called the whole concept of shamanism into question. Following more contemporary trends in anthropology to deconstruct general theories of cultural evolution and history, Taussig (1989) goes so far as to say that "shamanism is . . . a made-up, modern, Western category, an artful reification of disparate practises [sic], snatches of folklore and overarching folklorizations, residues of long-established myths intermingled with the politics of academic departments, curricula, conferences, journal articles, [and] funding agencies" (p.59). Despite these opinions, the research literature on shamanism is vast and it has not been uncommon for scholars to address the etymology of the word "shaman" in an attempt to bring some clarity to the issue of definition.
2.3.1 Etymology

All scholars attest to the fact that "shaman" is a Siberian word from the Evenk (Tungus) group, having come into English through Russian sources. The other Siberian tribes use different words for similar functionaries (see Eliade, 1964). Czaplicka (1914) says the word functions as both a noun, meaning "one who is excited, moved, raised" and as a verb, meaning, "to know in an ecstatic manner". These meanings give some understanding to the phenomenon which goes by the name. It is generally accepted that the most comprehensive etymological account is that of Laufer (1917) who tells us that Seventeenth Century Dutch diplomats, after a visit to the Evenks (Tungus), made one of the first uses of the word. By 1875, it had become included in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. However, speculation amongst scholars as to the actual origin of the word is substantial. For those who trace an historical development of shamanism from Chinese and Indian Buddhism into Siberia, there is a suggestion that this word, šaman, could have been incorporated from the Chinese (sha men) via the Pali word samaṇa (which means an ascetic and religious person). Laufer and other scholars (like Németh, 1913-1914, as cited in Siikala, 1978) refute this. By tracing linguistic changes, Laufer formed the view that shamanism developed in Central Asia and was not Indic-Buddhist. This conformed to similar ideas put forward by early etymologists like Banzaroff (1891) (as cited in Czaplicka, 1914). Shirokogoroff (1935), after his extensive fieldwork among the Evenk (Tungus), concluded that while shamanism was indigenous to them, it was a "shamanism stimulated by Buddhism". This was a position he had begun to develop in 1924 (Mironov and Shirokogoroff, 1924) and it seems an acknowledged position today (Siikala, 1987b). Nonetheless, the Indic-Buddhist view can still make its way into contemporary introductions on shamanism as seen in Peters (1989).

This divergence of opinion around the etymology of the word does make it difficult to be definite about the cultural-historical origins of shamanism. As an Evenk (Tungus) word, the phenomenon is located in a particular cultural and geographical area but of significance, it shares common elements with other Siberian groups who use a different word. As Siikala notes,
for although the magico-religious rite complexes and their associated concept systems in Siberia and Central Asia are not completely uniform in their phenomenology, due to natural reasons of culture, geography, history and social economy, these phenomenal complexes do still contain a considerable number of common elements of a fundamental nature (Siikala, 1978, p.14).

As such, Siikala (1978) is prepared to accept the Evenk (Tungus) word "shaman" as a *terminus technicus* whilst noting that etymology has not really thrown any specific light on the inherent nature of the shamanic complex. I see no reason to deviate from her conclusion. Nonetheless, the broad issue to do with the cultural-historical origins of shamanism has occupied a number of scholars in relation to the definitional debate.

2.3.2 The cultural-historical origins of shamanism

As already noted, Shirokogoroff (1935) believes of the Evenk (Tungus) that theirs is a "shamanism stimulated by Buddhism". Eliade (1964) concurs with this view of southern influence noting that "the ancient Near East, influenced all the cultures of Central Asia and Siberia" (p.500). However, he goes further to state,

[shamanism] in its structure and as a whole cannot be considered a creation of these southern contributions [for] the ideology and the characteristic techniques of shamanism are attested in archaic cultures, where it would be difficult to admit the presence of paleo-Oriental influences. It is enough to remember, on the one hand, that Central Asian shamanism is part and parcel of the prehistoric culture of the Siberian hunters, and, on the other, that shamanic ideologies and techniques are documented among the primitive peoples of Australia, the Malay Archipelago, South America, North America, and other regions (Eliade. 1964. pp.502-503).

Eliade (1964) is highlighting two important points here. Firstly, that much of shamanism can be considered a universal phenomenon. Indeed, later scholars like Peters and Price-Williams (1980) include Africa in their treatment of shamanism which Eliade does not. Secondly, there is suggestion that shamanism is part of the palaeolithic hunting cultures of ancient Eurasia.

Such a palaeolithic connection is also the opinion of Findeisen (1957b) (as cited in Siikala, 1978), supported by the growing number of researchers who interpret certain
palaeolithic cave paintings as representing shamans. Such interpretations have been occurring in the literature from the 1950's onward, Makkay (1953) being one of the first to interpret the horned figure in the Les Trois Frères cave at Ariège, France, as a shaman. Kirchner (1952) (as cited in Eliade, 1964), Lommel (1967), Haydu (1970) and Campbell (1976) all interpret prehistoric art shamanically, a view which has gained considerable credence from the contemporary research of Lewis-Williams in both Africa and Europe (Lewis-Williams & Dowson, 1988, 1989; Lewis-Williams, 1991; Clottes & Lewis-Williams, 1998; Clottes & Lewis-Williams, 2001) as well as that of Clottes (Clottes, 2003a; Clottes & Courtin, 1996) and co-workers (Le Guillou, 2003; Robert-Lamblin, 2003). The African and European parallels (Glob, 1969) alongside similarities in the Sahara (Lajoux, 1977) and Siberia (Okladnikov, 1966) support the view of a universal palaeolithic origin to shamanism.

Overall, Siikala concludes,

The wide distribution of the phenomenon of shamanism and the endemicity of certain of its basic ideas . . . in Arctic and sub-Arctic cultures do, however, support the view that the roots of shamanism lie in the Palaeolithic hunting cultures (Siikala, 1987b, p.2).

A palaeolithic trajectory for shamanism may not be that much of an unexpected situation for Hultkrantz notes,

Considering the ubiquity of shamans wherever (or nearly so) there are hunting cultures, and their decreasing importance in more advanced societies, it is safe to say that shamans are a product of the basically individualistic, predominantly bilateral hunting societies. Since this type of society apparently was represented in the oldest known cultures of prehistoric man there is a strong probability for the high age of the office of the shaman (Hultkrantz, 1973, p.35).

Similarly, Vadja (as cited by Siikala, 1978) is of the view that,

Siberian shamanism came into being as the fusion of concepts and religious techniques assimilated from various directions. The tracing of the roots of shamanism among such differing sources as the hunter culture of the Palaeolithic era, the high cultures of the ancient Oriental and southern Asians or agrarian cultures is for this very reason, he claims, not remarkable (Vadja, 1959, p.23).
It has not been uncommon for scholars to use the palaeolithic material as evidence at hand to indicate shamanism is a primordial religious phenomenon which underpins all religious experience. Shamanism's connection to religion has thus been used definitionally.

2.3.3 Religion

On the issue of religion, La Barre (1970) believed, "Essential shamanism is thus at once the oldest and newest of religions, because it is the de facto source of all religion" (p.352). That shamanism is a universal primitive religious expression is held by Mikhailowski (1892) (as cited in Czaplicka, 1914), Lowie (1948) and Radin (1914, 1937). Hultkrantz (1973), along with Eliade (1964) saw shamanism not as a religion in itself but as an autonomous complex which operates as a segment in different religions - "a religious configuration within . . . religion" (p.36). This is a similar position to that held by those of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition (Bogoras, 1904; Jochelson, 1908). They tended to see shamanism as an archaic religious experience operating something like a North-Asian cult and whilst undergoing its own cultural modifications, was kept in various tribes alongside later religious developments.

It is worth noting at this stage the indebtedness of shamanic studies to the Jesup North Pacific Expedition (hereafter, JNPE) because of the extensive fieldwork it undertook in Siberia. This material will prove crucial to the thesis which emerges in this study.

Franz Boas initiated the JNPE over 1900-1902 after preliminary work along the Canadian and NW coast of the USA. It traversed the Pacific coast of Alaska across to Siberia and made contact with various tribal groups, the principal investigators being Bogoras and Jochelson. Before involvement in the expedition, they had both spent previous time in Siberia as political prisoners. From 1889-1898, Bogoras had been in exile in the Kolyma region of NE Siberia among the Chukchi (Chukchee) tribe and he returned there with the JNPE. Through extensive fieldwork and observation, he was able to describe the séance, role and initiation of Chukchi (Chukchee) shamans.
Jochelson made similar fieldwork observations amongst the Sakha (Yakut), Yukaghir and Koryak groups. Both Bogoras and Jochelson were of the firm belief that shamanism originated in North Asia and that parallels with North America were due to earlier migrations. They not only formed a view about the religious aspect to shamanism but they believed it to be expressive of a particular kind of psychopathology.

In contrast to the JNPE, others see shamanism as a religion in its own right. Czaplicka (1914), Findeisen (1957a) (as cited in Hultkrantz, 1973), Klementz (1910) and Stadling (1912) (as cited in Hultkrantz, 1973) all do this whilst Harva (1933) (as cited in Siikala, 1978) saw it as the old ethnic religion of the Siberian peoples. Even modern scholars like Diószegi (1968a) and Basilov (1984) see shamanism as a religion. As Hultkrantz (1988) puts it, "the shaman lives intermittently . . . in the world of trance, which is the supernatural world. . . . Since the supernatural world is the world of religion, shamanism plays a religious role" (p.39).

It is beyond the scope or intent of this thesis to deal in depth with the religious aspects of shamanism but rather to note at this stage with Siikala (1978) that "Most researchers . . . agree that although the practice of shamanism does demand special mental and nervous properties it is nevertheless first and foremost a phenomenon in the realm of religion and magic" (p.12). Of more relevance, however, is her observation that "the ideological basis [i.e. the belief systems] of shamanism throughout North Asia and Siberia contains similar basic structures and forms of tradition" (p.17) (italics mine). She would include in these the cornerstone beliefs about the helping-spirit system, the possibility of the mutual union of human and spirit and animistic beliefs about multiple souls and the spirit realm. Two things flow from these observations by Siikala. The indication of "similar basic structures" within the ideological systems of different groups does suggest something archetypal as one possible explanation. Secondly, the concept of dual and/or multiple souls, which Hultkrantz (1973) and Jochelson (1926) also specify, is important to this study for it allows us to understand the way illness is seen in these cultures as a loss of soul and to understand the shaman's capacity for soul journey during trance - they utilise their own multiple souls.
Overall, however, from the perspective of religion, we see a significant number of scholars viewing shamanism as representative of something archaic and primordial as with those who study the palaeolithic material. Further, a similarity of patterns in belief systems can be noted across Siberian groups. When it comes to the history of religion, we have already noted that Eliade's (1964) book is a most comprehensive account. On the question of definition, Eliade seems to emphasise one phenomenological feature - ecstasy. In his "Foreword" he states that "shamanism is . . . one of the archaic techniques of ecstasy – at once mysticism, magic and 'religion' in the broadest sense of the term" (p.xix) and then goes on to offer this definition - "A first definition of this complex phenomenon, and perhaps the least hazardous, will be: shamanism = technique of ecstasy" (p.4). Not all scholars have taken this view and this raises the issue of the place of ecstasy, trance and possession in the definition of shamanism.

2.3.4. Ecstasy, trance and spirit possession

Ränk (1967) believes that most Western scholars would accept "ecstasy" as the defining characteristic separating shamans from witch-doctors, native healers and fortune-tellers, seeing Eliade (1964) as being the most influential scholar with this view. He points out, however, that the early Russian ethnographers saw ecstasy and the engagement with spirits as a later cultural development. Hence, Zelenin (1944) (as cited in Ränk, 1967) linked shamanism with primitive aetiology and the art of healing within animism and saw in it "a transitory stage of development which from time to time has been known all over the world" (p. 20). Ränk goes on to note that opinions substantially diverge when the form of ecstasy and the original meaning of the term "shamanism" are raised. Similarly, Siikala (1978) sees ecstatic trance is one way of delineating shamanism. She says, "the technique of communication . . . in ecstasy . . . is, despite variation, common to all manifestations of shamanism" (p.17). She is also aware that it is not uncommon for scholars to emphasise one phenomenological feature of shamanism over others as Eliade (1964) does in specifying ecstasy and magical flight as definitional features of shamanism. The result for Eliade is that he rejects the notion of spirit possession whereas Findcisen (1957b) (as cited in Siikala, 1978) emphasises possession over ecstasy. Since then, these alternatives have led to a major divide amongst scholars.
During the 1960's, with a growing societal interest in consciousness and psychedelics, researchers began to focus on the Altered State of Consciousness into which shamans entered during their trances (Harner, 1973, 1980; Wright, 1989). Harner (1980) eventually coined the term "Shamanic State of Consciousness" (hereafter, SSC) as a way of describing the particular characteristics of this state. This approach led to what Noll (1985) has described as a "renaissance" of interest in shamanism beginning in the 1980's. This was unlike the earlier ethnography because of the type of psychological perspective it focused upon in relation to the characteristics of the SSC. As Noll (1989) concludes, the "proponents of this school are largely devoted to examining and classifying the subjective phenomenology of the shaman's inner, private experiences without reduction to mechanistic causal principles. Self-reports of ecstatic experience by shamans are generally the focus of these investigators" (p.49).

In parallel with this research focus, Peters (1978, 1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1987) did further fieldwork of a more experiential kind amongst the Tamang of Nepal and this substantially extended our understanding of the phenomenology of shamanism beyond that known to the early ethnographers. (The Tamang are a minority Nepalese ethnic group).

Eventually this research area fomented a debate as to whether it was "embodiment" or "flight" which is aboriginal to shamanism. Peters (1989) defined embodiment as "a controlled and voluntary trance condition [as] distinct from the term possession which definitionally may imply that the trancer is a victim of the spirits" (p.118). "Flight" was understood to mean the soul journey that shamans undertake in their trance states. Peters goes on to suggest that both embodiment and flight are culturally primordial and he emphasises the fact that both involve controlled visualisations, which are lucid and non-amnesiac. By extending his definition of a shaman to an ecstatic who employs soul journey and/or embodiment techniques, Peters was able to include in his schema "controlled ceremonial embodiment" (which may be contiguous with "possession") and controlled visualisation/imaging (usually interpreted as "spirits" and/or "soul journeys"). The critical feature is that both are controlled, lucid (meaning a dual conscious awareness of being "embodied" and "disembodied" at the same time) and non-amnesic.
Two central features of shamanism have emerged from these psychologically oriented investigations. Firstly there has not only been acknowledgement of the particular kinds of visualising and imaging which shamans seem to experience in their trance states but that these can occur without them losing touch with events in the on-going Ordinary State of Consciousness. As a consequence, Noll (1989) has been critical of a certain neuro-biological reductionism that some (like Oubre, 1986) have implied in relation to the SSC. Secondly, Noll (1985, 1990) has been further able to stress, as with Eliade (1964), that a central feature of shamanism is control over trance and its subsequent use in ceremonial situations.

Hence, despite the on-going debate as to whether it is "embodiment" or "flight" which is aboriginal to shamanism and the extent to which both are believed to be culturally primordial as Peters (1989) suggests, they do both involve controlled visualisations which are lucid and non-amnesiac. Peters also notes that overall, the ethnographic literature seems to privilege "controlled possession" as the central feature and concludes that "memory and mastery of visionary trance seem to be crucial definitional elements" (p.121).

In comparing shamanic practices and techniques with other spiritual traditions, Peters (1989) concluded that shamanism is humankind's "first spiritual discipline . . . the root from which other spiritual disciplines have issued" (p.115). As evidence of this, Peters notes that shamans' descriptions of their transpersonal states of mind, despite the cultural relativity of the explanations for such experiences, are similar to those from other mystical and meditative traditions in that they share "deep underlying experiential features" which he attributes to an "endogenous transformation process" underlying all the traditions. This process is seen to have an identifiable structure not the least of which is the experience of a psychic death and rebirth, so central to shamanism but common also to many other diverse forms of mysticism. Peters (1989) concludes, "there is a demonstrably similar underlying psycho-transformational process which is precipitated by traditional spiritual practices that utilise ASC [Altered States of Consciousness]" (p.116). A further feature of the "endogenous transformation process" which Peters again identifies as common across traditions is the wedding of such transpersonal and transformative experiences to a
career and vocation of compassionate action oriented toward others, this being a primary goal of most major spiritual traditions.

In order further to explicate this aspect of the shamanic phenomenon, Peters (1989) uses Campbell's (1968) conception of an initiation structure composed of "departure", "initiation" (or transition) and "return" elements (as adapted from van Gennep, 1908/1960). He sees the initiatory phase as characterised by "liminality", a concept he derives from Turner (1967) who describes it as a "betwixt and between" state. Turner (1969) maintains that "liminality" has the important effect of engendering *communitas*, a care for others and an orientation toward communal well-being.

Peters (1989) also notes that in shamanic initiations, a luminous figure is often encountered similar to reports of other experiences like drug induced states (Grof, 1976), those of near-death and UFO abduction (Ring, 1988) which interestingly Ring calls "archetypes of the cosmic shaman". Overall Peters concludes that "[these experiences] are psychologically prototypical, paradigmatic, and archetypal" (p.127) and from his analysis, certain characteristics of shamanism emerge. Firstly, it follows a *rite de passage* structure of departure, initiation and return. Secondly, it exhibits a liminality resulting in *communitas* and thirdly, it entails an encounter with the transpersonal which is always through visualisation often experienced by way of interaction with a luminous figure.

In this material, Peters (1989) introduced a distinctive and notable shift in the perspective on shamanism for he conceptualised it in some way as underlying other transpersonal traditions rather than seeing it just as a widespread and contiguous phenomenon amongst many magico-religious systems. Not only with Peters work but also with the overall research focus on the psychological states of shamans as in the SSC research, a universalising perspective is introduced, the SSC being seen as representing transcultural human capacities. Consequently, in this approach there has been a movement away from focussing on specific socio-cultural contexts in relation to shamanism. Specifically, Peters' view that shamanism is an example of a universal and transcultural capacity of humankind, adds to the evidence of an archetypal configuration and this question will be addressed in detail in Chapter Five.
For the purposes of this study, if shamanism represents a primordial spiritual manifestation as Peter's (1989) concludes then the phenomenal characteristics of shamanism become crucial because they are likely to represent rudimentary expressions of a particular archetypal pattern.

In returning to the "ecstasy" versus "possession" debate, Siikala (1978) attempts to resolve it by seeing both of them simply as "functional alternatives describing the communication between the shaman and the other world" (p.13). She sees the tendency to emphasise one feature over another is driven by the theory the scholars are developing. However, it was Hultkrantz (1967) who extended Eliade's (1964) definitional emphasis on "ecstasy" and defined a shaman as "a practitioner who, with the help of spirits, cures the sick or reveals hidden things etc. while being in an ecstasy. During the trance he may leave his own body, or he may simply summon the spirits to him and ask them to help him" (pp.32-33). This extended definition allowed Hultkrantz to consider much North American material and in his 1973 paper, he specifically addressed the question of definition. Aware of the confusion in the literature surrounding the issue, he believed one common agreement to be that shamanism "refers to religio-magic techniques and the operator of these techniques, the shaman" (p.25). From this point on, he noted that agreement amongst scholars ceased.

To overcome such ongoing disagreements, certain writers have been led to take what they consider a phenomenological approach in the way Wach (1958) describes. For him, the researcher is "concerned to let manifestations of the religious experience speak for themselves rather than to force them into any preconceived scheme" (p.24) and one of the main commentators from such a phenomenological approach to shamanism is Kraus (1972).

2.3.5 The transcultural phenomenological approach

Kraus (1972) begins by noting that despite the vast literature on shamanism, there is substantial divergence of opinion as to the concept of the shaman and a precise definition remains elusive. He sees a diverse range of loosely related phenomena included in the study of shamanism with these widespread across many different
world cultures. He states that "one of the problems that has made the definition of shamanism such an elusive matter is that its basic content is of a very primitive, highly personal, primary process nature. In this sense it is part and parcel of the human condition and may correctly be termed ahistorical" (p.31). This is an extremely interesting comment when viewed from an archetypal perspective for things that are "part and parcel of the human condition" are ipso facto archetypal and again, this issue will be addressed in detail in Chapter Five.

To develop a working model of shamanism, Kraus (1972) examined three autobiographical accounts of shamans from different parts of the world and deduced common characteristics, which he used to establish what he described as a "skeletal" definition of shamanism. He then applied this definition cross-culturally. This is essentially a phenomenological approach to definition and it is not uncommon in the literature for such cross-cultural phenomenological approaches to be used as a way of getting around the definitional difficulties. There seems substantial agreement amongst scholars as to what shamanism is, if the issue is approached phenomenologically.

Five main characteristics emerged for Kraus (1972). Firstly, the shaman is a chosen person. Secondly, shamans are involved with powerful spirit familiars whose aim is tutelary and helping. Thirdly, the shaman's initiation is characterised by a period of psychological crisis in which the shaman-to-be withdraws, subsequently experiencing both psychic torment and tutelage. Fourthly, the shaman's knowledge is attained through this process and (often) the instruction of master shamans; and lastly, the end result of these experiences leads shamans into a communal focus around aspects of healing for their socio-cultural group. These features are not at all dissimilar to those we have already seen Eliade (1964, 1987) deduce.

By applying his "skeletal" definition of shamanism transculturally, Kraus (1972) places himself within that tradition which understands shamanism to be a universal phenomenon. Whilst other comparative and phenomenological studies of shamanism (e.g. Eliade, 1964; Peters & Price-Williams, 1980, 1983) also tend to regard it this way, we have already seen from Eliade (1964, 1987) that it is more preserved amongst the Siberian and Inner Asian groups, despite occurring in many world
cultures, even prehistoric ones (see also Eliade, 1950). The vast majority of scholars accord with this view, Hoppál calling the region of Siberia and Inner Asia the *locus classicus* of shamanism (Siikala & Hoppál, 1998). This is no doubt due to the fact that these societies have remained over an historically long period of time (until quite recently), loosely structured, technologically simple, homogeneous and animistic hunter/gatherer societies which seem to be the kind of society within which shamanism flourishes (Saliba, 1998). Furthermore, the geographic isolation of these groups would have contributed to the continuity of this kind of culture. Specifically in the Arctic regions, as Eliade notes, the religious life of the community tends to be centred on shamanism, which is not necessarily the case in other places in the world. Because of its centrality in the discourse on shamanism, the *locus classicus* requires particular attention.

### 2.4 Siberia as a Locus Classicus

In relation to the *locus classicus*, Hultkrantz in 1973 restated his previous conviction from 1967 that there are two types of shamanism - a general type common across many cultures which exhibits substantial variation and is expressed in a form of "low intensity" which he contrasts with Arctic shamanism (the Arctic including the Inuit peoples, parts of the NW coast of USA and areas west of the Bering Strait) which is more concentrated in its geographic distribution and intensity, and which overall displays a greater degree of uniformity within its geographic boundaries. In this conception, Arctic shamanism is seen as a cultural modification arising out of general shamanism which has been its foundation, a common circumpolar historical tradition having in all probability contributed to this development. This is a critical assertion in relation to this study for if this is so, then we are getting a particularly concentrated and intense version of shamanism in the Arctic regions which, whilst dependent to some extent on these particular cultural groups for its characteristics, nonetheless may be encapsulating in this bounded and concentrated locality, a distilled form of shamanism which is preserving in a very focused way the essential characteristics of this magico-religious phenomenon. In other words, it is not inappropriate at this stage
to speculate that the characteristics of the shamanism in these Arctic regions may be
closer to the essential centre and core of the "shaman archetype" we are considering.

Hultkrantz's (1967, 1973) designation of two forms of shamanism does have support
from many other scholars and Kraus (1972) concludes "[the distinction] is a valuable
one because it systematizes the general impression that shamanism, although
widespread, is considered by many to be found in its most highly developed form in
the circumpolar area, whose historical tradition has contributed to its growth" (pp.20-
21). Fortuitously for the purposes of this study, the kinds of society in which
shamanism has been noted to flourish have been preserved in the Arctic regions until
relatively recently enabling us to observe a shamanism which has been lost in many
other cultures. Additionally, there is an extensive ethnographic literature on Siberian
shamanism much of which has been obtained through direct fieldwork and available
to this writer in both English and French (Bogoras, 1904; Castagné, 1930; Chichlo,
1981; Jochelson, 1908, 1926, 1933; Lopatin, 1940-1941, 1946-1949; Lot-Falcik,
1953, 1970; Mikhailowski, 1894; Montefiore, 1894-1895; Murphy, 1964; Pallas,
1788a&b; Shirokogoroff, 1923, 1929, 1935; Sieroszewski, 1902; Siikala, 1978, 1980,
1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1989; Sumner, 1901). Most of these accounts go back into the
second half of the Nineteenth Century and the beginning of the Twentieth Century.
reflecting a time before the onslaught of Sovietisation and later Western influences.
Compared to many other places in the world, this material can be considered more
pristine.

An important conclusion to be drawn from Hultkrantz's (1967, 1973) assertion that
there are two forms of shamanism is that it highlights the role of cultural
modification. On this latter point, I believe he rightly concludes that an "unalterable
shamanism cannot . . . exist" (Hultkrantz, 1973, p.27) because of cultural changes and
modifications in space and time. Even North-Eurasian shamanism, which has been so
popular amongst scholars, Räek (1967) notes is not a unified phenomenon, for
substantial local differences are evident around the shaman's authority, behaviour
patterns, paraphernalia and personality construction. Siikala (1978) is of similar
opinion and it needs to be noted at this stage that she understands cultural
modification to have occurred with Siberian shamanism despite her observation of its
"similar basic structures" previously noted in Section 2.3.3 above. This will become
an important point when the archetypal underpinning to shamanism is examined in Chapter Five.

Additionally, Hultkrantz's (1967, 1973) two forms of shamanism explains why we are able to recognise shamanism's different manifestations worldwide as belonging to essentially the same class of things and why when countering Spencer's (1968) criticism that such a thing as shamanism is ill-defined and does not exist, Hultkrantz (1973) can assert that shamanism is recognised amongst scholars as a social institution. It may be ill-defined or conceptually flawed to some extent, but this does not invalidate the fact that something of substance is being studied. It should be further stated at this stage that the recognition of some similar human experience whilst at the same time noting its different cultural modifications is exactly what one would expect if an archetype were operative. Again, this point will be taken up in detail in Chapter Five.

On the issue of the two forms of shamanism, Siikala does make the following important observation,

The broader the application of the term shamanism and the more varied the systems of rites concerned, the more blurred the conceptual content becomes. I therefore consider it useful to use the term *shamanism* for the real, 'classical' shamanism of Central Asia, Northern Siberia and other arctic regions, in which the similarities of rite technique and belief system amount to more than a few basic features. Shamanic features, elements and ideas are, on the other hand, found in different parts of the world (Siikala, 1978, p.14) (emphasis mine).

Siikala (1978) is making here the valuable point that there is a "classical" shamanism across the Central Asian, Northern Siberian and Arctic groups and that substantial similarities exist amongst them.

For similar reasons this study will concentrate on this "classical" shamanism for the "similarities" to which Siikala alludes are likely to indicate archetypal patterns. A further advantage in this approach is that it restricts consideration to an amount of material, which on the one hand, can be handled and on the other, is made up of sound ethnographic study as indicated previously. Furthermore, it has not been uncommon for these early fieldworkers like Bogoras (1904), Jochelson (1908, 1926,
1933) and Shirokogoroff (1935) to assert that shamanism originated in Siberia and that Native Americans migrated from Siberia bringing it with them. This tends to place Siberia more centrally. One cannot ignore it.

A further important aspect of the restriction of attention to the *locus classicus* is that the extensive North American material can be precluded from consideration. Both the North American material and current neo-shamanism (see Peters', 2002a and 2002b web sites as examples, <www.tibetanshaman.com> and <www.shamangear.com>) are theses topics in their own right. There are, however, more important reasons for this exclusion. Eliade (1964) has already indicated there is an issue to do with those shamans who choose the profession for themselves - they are considered less powerful. This calls into question the usefulness of much North American material for the purposes of this study for both the Ghost Dance rituals and the Vision Quest are phenomena which have been consciously reconstructed by Native Americans and in which participants choose their involvement (La Barre, 1970). Since this present study is interested in explicating the unconscious (as in archetypal) side of the shamanic phenomenon, i.e. the side which is more psychically pristine, it seems more judicious to concentrate on those cultures where shamanism is experienced as a spontaneous "calling" especially where this may go against the neophyte's rational will. There is abundant evidence of just this sort of experience in the Siberian material.

There is one final proviso in this approach which will become important later in the thesis. By concentrating on original sources wherever possible, only using secondary sources where absolutely necessary and those commentators from an academic rather than popularist background, this study is already restricted to that material which is available in either English or French. It may be necessary, therefore, to access other material in a corroborating way when material from the *locus classicus* is limited. This has not been an uncommon approach in the literature (see Ducey, 1976).
2.5 THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF SHAMANISM

In concentrating attention on the *locus classicus*, certain specific features of Siberian shamanism emerge. A general account of the Siberian shaman's duties can be found in Shimkin's (1939) overview of the Ket. He uses Anuchin's (1914) (as cited in Shimkin, 1939) study of fifteen "full" shamans to indicate they tell stories, cure, prophesy, make birth easier, specify hunting regions and find game, direct the ordeals to settle disputes and shamanise for amusement. By comparing this material with other groups, Siikala (1978) concluded that a shaman's general function is to handle crises that threaten the normal life of the tribe. The one common feature of these crises is that they are seen to be caused by spirits, demons or supernatural beings. Shamans handle these crises in a particular way through immediate contact with their spirit helpers in the supernatural realm. This is attained by way of an ASC (ecstatic trance) wherein mastery is critical, for shamans must, whilst gaining information, get the spirits to do what they want. This is an important feature for at least two reasons. Firstly, as seen before, the commonness of ecstatic trance means that it can be one way of defining shamanism (Eliade, 1964). Secondly, it implies something quite specific to shamanism compared to other manipulators of the transpersonal. It is an activity of direct experiential encounter with the cause of the problem, this being a dissimilar activity to priests who only need to enact a ritual without direct personal involvement.

The other common features of Siberian shamanism which Siikala (1978) notes are the shaman's journey; sickness being explained by the flight of the soul from the body; particular beliefs about the structure of the cosmos; a helping spirit system and the idea of a mutual union of human persons and spirit. However, she emphasises four main aspects - the community within which shamans operate; their emphasis on the supranormal world; the shaman as medium of communication between this and the supranormal world and the ecstatic nature of the communication. Overall, these features tend to align with those concluded by Hultkrantz (1973) who said, "We may now define the shaman as a social functionary who, with the help of guardian spirits,
attains ecstasy in order to create a rapport with the supernatural world on behalf of his group members" (p.34). These features also accord with Kraus' (1972) "skeletal" definition of shamanism, Eliade's work and they are not contradicted by the conclusions of the 1980's fieldworkers like Peters (1981a, 1981b, 1987, 1989) or Peters and Price-Williams (1980, 1983).

There is, however, one aspect of shamanism which Siikala (1978) seems to underemphasise but which Eliade (1964, 1987) and Kraus (1972) note - the psychological crisis which causes the shaman-to-be to withdraw and in which psychic torment is experienced. Apart from the trance states into which shamans enter as part of their healing cures, the involuntary nature of this pre-initiatory illness with its hallucinations, visions and torment alongside bizarre and deranged behaviour has led to the view that Siberian shamans are psychopathological. This issue of psychopathology has a direct connection to views about the Siberian shaman's underlying psychology and requires further exploration.

2.6 SHAMANISM AS PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

The early accounts of Siberian shamanism in English by Czaplicka (1914), Bogoras (1904) and Jochelson (1908, 1926) tended to regard the pre-initiatory illness as a specific form of neurosis, called "Arctic Hysteria". Ohlmarks (1939) (as cited in Eliade, 1964) believed this to be caused by the extremities of the Arctic environment in terms of temperature, the long nights, the desert solitude and a lack of vitamins. Devereux (1961) similarly believed shamans to suffer from a neurosis.

However, as Siikala (1978) succinctly points out - "How can the visions of the North-American Indians, for example, which to a great extent parallel the initiatory visions of the Siberian shaman, be explained by this view stressing arctic hysteria?" (p.27). It should be noted, though, that this observation may only call into question Ohlmarks' (1939) (as cited in Eliade, 1964) explanation and not necessarily the possibility that such groups so widely separated could experience a similar psychological state because its cause arises out of experiences common to the human condition.
Another early account specified epilepsy as the problem (Loeb, 1929), whilst later researchers have tended to see the condition of shamans as something truly psychotic (Silverman, 1967; Kraus, 1972) and pathological (Kroeber, 1940). Ackerknecht (1943) saw the shaman as more like a recovered psychotic but believed that using Western psychiatric labels could be based in socio-cultural bias.

The fact that the pre-initiatory illness can only be cured by shamanising and that shamans eventually are able to control their trance states has caused others to see them either as superior in some way (Eliade, 1964) or as madmen who have cured themselves (Shirokogoroff, 1935). Eliade used the term "supernormal" because of the apparent capacity shamans have to transcend their psychological and emotional difficulties. Basilov (1984) on the other hand, understood the connection between mastery of trance and mental illness when he said, "As soon as the shaman lost control over his visions, he would become a neuropath. But having lost control over himself, he would no longer be a shaman" (p.29).

The SSC research emerging from the renaissance of study on shamanism in the 1980's had such an influence on the psychopathology question that Atkinson (1992) eventually concluded that "the argument that shamanism is not a function of mental illness appears to have prevailed" (p.309). Nonetheless, the literature reveals quite polarised opinions as to the mental state of shamans and these generally reflect the areas of academic interest of the researchers. Psychological tests used in the Native American context have proved similarly divergent (Ackerknecht, 1971; Murphy, 1964; Opler, 1936).

There does seem to be general agreement, however, that shamans experience a degree of mental disturbance with which they have done something personally transformative and culturally relevant. Shirokogoroff (1935), Radin (1937) and Devereux (1956, 1961) all hold this view. As Shirokogoroff (1935) says, the shaman is "the madman who has healed himself". It cannot be overlooked that whilst the shaman's own cultural group may speculate as to their power, they often see their own shamans as deviant in certain ways. As Bogoras (1904) says, the shaman has been described as a "very nervous, highly excitable person, often almost on the verge
of insanity" (p.426). However, to dismiss shamans as "just pathological" as Kroeber (1940) seems to do, does not do justice either to their apparent personal transformation or their cultural services.

In relation to the question, "what is shamanism?", the psychopathology issue is highly significant for as Ränk (1967) indicates, once a psychopathology can be determined, the whole definitional debate around shamanism reduces as the difficulties become collapsed and a psychological universalism is introduced which has the capacity to simplify.

For the purposes of this study, it is not so much that shamans can successfully enter and leave trance states which is of significance but rather the connection between the shamans' pre-initiatory illness and their later healing functions. This will require further explication later in the thesis.

The psychopathology view of shamanism is generally not held today by anthropologists, as Znamenski (2003), when summarising Basilov's paper on "Chto takoe shamanstvo [What is shamanism?]", says, "The old debate about whether shamans were normal or sick people, . . . does not make sense and should be excluded from scholarly discussions" (p.280). Znamenski believes Basilov takes this position because the "psychopathology" stance overlooks the shaman's social role from within a particular socio-cultural context.

Hutton makes a similar point when he says,

Bogoras indeed extended his opinion of Chukchi shamans into the assertion that shamanism in general was a form of mental illness, a theory which enjoyed some popularity among scholars in the early twentieth century but was abandoned by the 1950s as patently untenable. What seems harder to refute is Sieroszewski's perception that shamans were somehow different in kind from the rest of their society. It was repeated long afterwards by Vilmos Diószegi, after his work among former practitioners in various ethnic communities of southern Siberia. He stated that they all had some distinctive trait, being introverts, invalids, psychopaths or misanthropes. Such first-hand research must be treated with respect, but how it accords with Shirokogoroff's characterization of shamans as spanning the spectrum of social types, and how much it reflects the experiences of Diószegi's interviewees under Stalinism, now seems impossible to say (Hutton, 2001, p.77).
An overview of the literature indicates that the issue of psychopathology has not really been abandoned since the 1950's for it still appears as a point of discussion with those researchers who approach shamanism from a psychological orientation (Noll, 1983; Peters, 1982, 1989; Peters & Price-Williams, 1980) including recent commentary (Krippner, 2002). Indeed, Peters (1996) could note parallels between the features of transitional crises and Borderline Personality Disorder like fasting, ASC's, body mutilation, use of psychoactive drugs, body fragmentation, dismemberment and mutilation, all features seen in shamanic rites of passage. Quite recently, deMause (2002) was still describing shamans as "schizoids".

This issue as to the actual nature of the shaman's psychology will become a central issue later in this thesis. It is important to note at this stage that there are quite varied and polarised views amongst scholars not only to do with a definition of shamanism but on the issue of the shaman's psychopathology.

Overall, a review of the literature on shamanism leads to a workable understanding of it and its main features which are relevant to this study.

2.7 SUMMARY

Shamanism is a more complicated area of study than it initially appears for much more is going on in it than rudimentary spirit possession. The palaeolithic material indicates it is representing something archaic in terms of both religion and society whilst most scholars (even those like Siikala who exclusively study Siberian shamanism) consider that something universal is indicated. However, the concentrated form of shamanism in the locus classicalus and the sound ethnography that has been undertaken on these Siberian groups means that phenomenal features are quite clear and this will prove useful if it can be indicated that an archetype is in existence. Siikala's Encyclopedia of Religion entry is as follows and this is a useful summary,
Shamanism is a fundamental and striking feature of Siberian and Inner Asian cultures. The religions of these regions have therefore been described as shamanistic. Shamanism itself is not, however, a religion, but rather a complex of different rites and beliefs surrounding the activities of the shaman connected with very different religious systems. Shamanism is founded on a special technique for achieving ecstasy by means of which the shaman enters an altered state of consciousness, and on the idea that the shaman is accompanied by helping spirits who assist him in this state. While in a state of trance, the shaman is regarded as capable of direct communication with representatives of the otherworld, either by journeying to the supranormal world or by calling the spirits to the séance. He is thus able to help his fellow men in crises believed to be caused by the spirits and to act as a concrete mediator between this world and the otherworld in accompanying a soul to the otherworld, or fetching it from the domain of the spirits. The shaman acts as a healer and as a patron of hunting and fertility, but also a diviner, the guardian of livelihoods, and so on (Siikala, 1987a, p.208).

The features which need emphasising for this study are the fact that the shaman is a healer and that this seems connected to their own self-cure. Further, shamans have direct involvement with the cause of a problem which has been precipitated by a crisis and this demands "a certain nervous and psychic susceptibility in those chosen as . . . representatives" (Siikala, 1978, p.17). These susceptibilities result from the "calling" and pre-initiatory illness so that a two-fold initiation follows - an ecstatic one (which includes dismemberment imagery and psychic derangement) and a didactic one which can involve a master-shaman as teacher. Overall, the mastery of trance and spirits is critical for shamans to be able to perform their healing cures through séance.

Given this working knowledge of the phenomenon of shamanism, we must now turn to Jung and see how he used shamanism in relation to his analytical psychology.
CHAPTER 3

JUNG'S VIEWS ON SHAMANISM

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Bearing in mind that it is not part of Jung's purpose to give a full treatment to the phenomenon of shamanism (the only source he quotes is Eliade, 1951) he does make reference to it in twenty seven paragraphs and four footnotes of his writings (see Appendix A) and this is generally for the purpose of illustrating aspects to do with his emerging analytical psychology, especially in relation to the individuation process.

In his earliest references, Jung (1918/1991) alludes to shamanism as an example of spiritualism which had become reactivated in a compensatory way in the Western collective psyche following the French Revolution and Enlightenment and which he saw within contemporary society as expressed through Christian Science (Jung, 1930/1991; 1931/1991c). Jung (1945/1993) later saw shamanism as reflecting another aspect of spiritualism, the deliberate induction through "trance" of demonic possession states and as elsewhere, he conceptualised this as psychological complexes taking temporary control over the total personality (Jung, 1948/1991a).

However, it is with Jung's later writings on the concept of individuation in "The Philosophical Tree" (Jung, 1954/1981b) and "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass" (Jung, 1954/1991b) that shamanism was addressed more extensively.
3.2 JUNG'S CONCEPT OF "INDIVIDUATION"

Individuation is a central concept in Jung's analytical psychology and it was an area of interest which occupied him for much of his professional career. Most of his writings on alchemy are devoted to explicating the process in one form or another. In two places in the Collected Works, he gives succinct definitions of the term,

Individuation means becoming an "in-dividual", and, in so far as "individuality" embraces our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one's own self. We could therefore translate individuation as "coming to selfhood" or "self-realization" (Jung, 1928/1990, p.173).

And later,

I use the term "individuation" to denote the process by which a person becomes a psychological "in-dividual", that is, a separate, indivisible unity or whole" (Jung, 1939/1990, p.275).

By the 1950's, it is clear Jung conceived of individuation not only as a "natural phenomenon" but also an "inescapable goal . . . not invented by man, but [by] Nature herself [producing] its archetypal image" (Jung, 1957/1993, p.727). The implication here is that individuation is a natural process to do with the unfolding of an original wholeness. In "On the psychology of the unconscious" this issue becomes more explicit when he says of individuation,

[it is a] purely natural process, which may in some cases pursue its course without the knowledge or assistance of the individual, and [which] can sometimes forcibly accomplish itself in the face of opposition. The meaning and purpose of the process is the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; the production and unfolding of the original, potential wholeness (Jung, 1917/1990, p.110).

Overall, Jung's view is that psychologically, the individual is initially an undifferentiated wholeness incorporated in the Self archetype (much like a seed) and that the striving for realisation of the Self is archetypal and therefore inborn.
It is easy to conclude from Jung's statements that individuation is a universal phenomenon for all humankind. Whilst this is somewhat Jung's position, he seems of the view that individuation will become intensified in those individuals where, for some reason or another, tensions exist between their conscious and unconscious positions. However, one thing is clear, it is generally conceived to be a process undertaken in the second half of life. As he says, "[t]he integration of the self is a fundamental problem which arises in the second half of life" (Jung, 1946/1993, p.265). This is because Jung saw the first half of life as more concerned with fulfilling biological roles including sexual maturity and raising a family; adapting to social and economic demands including occupation and career; separating from dominant parental influences and developing a favourable adaptation of ego-consciousness to all of the former (see "The stages of life", Jung, 1931/1991b). Nonetheless, "individuation is an expression, of that biological process - simple or complicated as the case may be - by which every living thing becomes what it was destined to become from the beginning" (Jung, 1952/1991b, p.307).

3.3 SHAMANISM'S CONNECTION TO THE INDIVIDUATION PROCESS

3.3.1 Individuation in "The Philosophical Tree" (Jung, 1954/1981b)

In "The Philosophical Tree" (Jung, 1954/1981b), Jung's aim is to show that the tree image which appears in modern persons has an archetypal foundation and represents the individuation process. Jung argues that it is precisely because of an archetypal foundation that such similar images like the tree can appear in shamanism, alchemy and in modern persons who know nothing of either shamanism or alchemy. Since one third of Jung's statements about shamanism come from "The Philosophical Tree", it is important to consider. He says of the tree symbol,
The inverted tree plays a great role among the East Siberian shamans. Kagarow has published a photograph of one such tree, named Nakassä, from a specimen in the Leningrad Museum. The roots signify hairs, and on the trunk, near the roots, a face has been carved, showing that the tree represents a man. Presumably this is the shaman himself, or his greater personality. The shaman climbs the magic tree in order to find his true self in the upper world. Eliade says in his excellent study of shamanism: "The Eskimo shaman feels the need for these ecstatic journeys because it is above all during trance that he becomes truly himself; the mystical experience is necessary to him as a constituent of his true personality." The ecstasy is often accompanied by a state in which the shaman is "possessed" by his familiars or guardian spirits. By means of this possession he acquires his "mystical organs," which in some sort constitute his true and complete spiritual personality. This confirms the psychological inference that may be drawn from shamanistic symbolism, namely that it is a projection of the individuation process. This inference, as we have seen, is true also of alchemy, and in modern fantasies of the tree as it is evident that the authors of such pictures were trying to portray an inner process of development independent of their consciousness and will (Jung, 1954/1981b, pp.340-341) (italics mine).

Elsewhere in "The Philosophical Tree" (Jung, 1954/1981b), Jung highlights other aspects of this individuation process as reflected in anima imagery. For instance, the shaman's experience of the "heavenly bride" is offered as anthropological evidence of the anima archetype being projected and the "climbing of the magical tree is the heavenly journey of the shaman, during which he encounters his heavenly spouse... the shamanistic anima" (p.303). Jung concludes that his "material is... fully in accord with the widespread, primitive shamanistic conceptions of the tree and the heavenly bride, who is a typical anima projection" (p.340). Jung always sees a connection between the contra-sexual archetypes (anima/animus) and individuation because it is through these archetypes that the deeper layers of the unconscious are accessed. At the centre of the unconscious is the Self archetype with its impetus for realisation (i.e. individuation). Overall, the critical point Jung is making is that shamanism is a reflection of the individuation process and this is still his position as late as 1957 when, in speaking about the symbolism of Christmas tree imagery, he provides a succinct summary of his view in "Jung and the Christmas tree".
The Christmas tree is the world-tree. But, as the alchemical symbolism clearly shows, it is also a transformation symbol, a symbol of the process of self-realisation. According to certain alchemical sources, the adept climbs the tree – a very ancient shamanistic motif. The shaman, in an ecstasy, climbs the magical tree in order to reach the upper world where he will find his true self. But climbing the magical tree, which is at the same time a tree of knowledge, he gains possession of his spiritual personality. To the eye of the psychologist, the shamanistic and alchemical symbolism is a projected representation of the process of individuation. That it rests on an archetypal foundation is evidenced by the fact that patients who have not the slightest knowledge of mythology and folklore spontaneously produce the most amazing parallels to the historical tree-symbolism. Experience has taught me that the authors of these pictures were trying to express a process of inner development independent of their conscious volition (Jung, 1957, p.333) (italics mine).

In returning to "The Philosophical Tree", it can be seen that Jung (1954/1981b) introduces further important thoughts to do with archetype theory. Of significance is his idea that the expression of an archetype can undergo cultural modification and development without losing its basic patterns/features because each archetype has an unalterable core. As he says,

Like all archetypal symbols, the symbol of the tree has undergone a development of meaning in the course of the centuries. It is far removed from the meaning of the shamanistic tree, even though certain basic features prove to be unalterable. The psychoid form underlying any archetypal image retains its character at all stages of development, though empirically it is capable of endless variations. The outward form of the tree may change in the course of time, but the richness and vitality of a symbol are expressed more in its change of meaning (Jung, 1954/1981b, p.272). (italics mine).

Jung is making use here of his concept of the "psychoid unconscious" which he explains elsewhere in "On the nature of the psyche" (Jung, 1954/1991a). By "psychoid", he meant that the unconscious was not purely psychic but also had properties of the organic world. An analogy may be the wave and particle theories of light as two different ways of describing one overall phenomenon. As structural components of the collective unconscious, archetypes were then understood to have a psychoid core which underpinned both biological instinct and psychic image. Hence, any archetypal expression as image arises from the psychoid core of the archetype. The psychoid core ought not then to be confused with archetypal images or
archetypal contents. These belong to the knowable realm of consciousness and occur as analogous motifs in myths, fairytales, dreams, delusions and hallucinations. The idea was that the psychoid core of an archetype is an unknowable (i.e. completely inaccessible to consciousness) factor in the collective unconscious which underlies these motifs and arranges them into typical images and groupings.

The concept of the psychoid was an important theoretical development because it allowed Jung to speak about the physical side of archetypes and their connection to biological instinct whilst at the same time maintaining their psychic aspect and thus their connection to aspects of spirit and imagery. Jung could hold this polarised view of archetypes because he saw them as located on a continuum much like the light spectrum, with biological instinct occupying one pole and archetypal image the opposite pole. As he says, "The dynamism of instinct is lodged as it were in the infra-red part of the spectrum, whereas the instinctual image lies in the ultra-violet part" (Jung, 1954/1991a, p.211). This concept of the psychoid enabled Jung to develop a theoretical perspective to the unconscious which vastly enlarged the "nothing-but-ism" of Freud's approach. The anti-reductive significance of this idea is not often appreciated.

Whilst Jung's (1954/1981b) purpose in the above passage from "The Philosophical Tree" is to elaborate alchemical connections with the individuation process, three important points emerge about archetype theory which should be noted for this study. Firstly, there is an unalterable psychoid core to any archetype which will pre-form that archetype's expression.

Secondly, the expression of an archetype can undergo cultural development, change and transformation. The shamanistic tree symbol is an example of this. It is an earlier cultural expression of the underlying archetype and the reason it has parallels with later tree symbolism (as in alchemy) is because of the psychoid form of the archetype under consideration underlies all that archetype's manifestation in image. If this is the case, it is not unreasonable to conclude that shamanism will represent something from an earlier stage in the cultural development of the expression of the individuation archetype and as such will be closer to the archetype's psychoid core. Consequently, a study of shamanism's phenomenology can elucidate that core and
help us determine the archetypal components in any contemporary expression of the archetype.

Thirdly, the existence of an archetype can be evidenced from the universality of its symbolic and imagic representations not only across cultures but also in individuals who know nothing about such traditions. This will become an important consideration in Chapter Five when the question "does a shaman archetype exist?" is addressed.

3.3.2 Individuation in "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass" (Jung, 1954/1991b)

In "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass", Jung uses shamanic examples to illustrate other aspects of the individuation process. Because he sees individuation as requiring a clash between the position of ego consciousness and the demands of the Self archetype, Jung believes this will necessitate transformative sufferings and he used the tortures associated with shamanic initiation as evidence. As he says,

The fact that the transformative process takes the form of a "punishment"... may be due to a kind of rationalisation or a need to offer some explanation of its cruelty. Such a need only arises at a higher level of consciousness with developed feeling, which then seeks an adequate reason for the revolting and incomprehensible cruelty of the procedure. (A modern parallel would be the experience of dismemberment in shamanistic initiations). . . . It is not difficult to see that dismemberment originally served the purpose of reconstituting the neophyte as a new and more effective human being. Initiation even has the aspect of a healing. [Note: Eliade, Shamanism, esp. chs. II and VII] In the light of these facts, moral interpretation in terms of punishment seems beside the mark and arouses the suspicion that dismemberment has still not been properly understood. . . . [for the] . . . torture inflicted on him is not a punishment but the indispensable means of leading him towards his destiny. . . . For this reason, the moralistic view of suffering as punishment seems to me not only inadequate but misleading. It is obviously a primitive attempt to give a psychological explanation of an age-old archetypal idea that had never before been the object of reflection. Such ideas and rituals, far from ever having been invented, simply happened and were acted long before they were thought. . . . The aspect of torture, then, is correlated with a detached and observing consciousness, that has not yet understood the real meaning of dismemberment. What is performed concretely on the sacrificial animal, and what the shaman believes to be actually happening to himself, appears on a higher level, . . . as a psychic process in which a product of the unconscious, . . . is cut up and transformed. . . .
For this purpose the body must be taken apart and dissolved into its constituents . . . This psychological process is admittedly painful and for many people a positive torture. But, as always, every step forward along the path of individuation is achieved only at the cost of suffering (Jung, 1954/1991b, pp.271-272) (underlining mine).

Here Jung (1954/1991b) is seeing initiatory tortures not as a punishment for guilt but rather reflecting the necessary process associated with the path of individuation and as such they are "the indispensable means of leading him [the initiate/neophyte] towards his destiny" (p.271), all of which is expressive of and related to "an age-old archetypal idea" (p.272) - which in this context, Jung understands to be individuation.

Later in this work, Jung (1954/1991b) adds a further aspect when in a note he states that shamanism's "widespread phenomenology anticipates the alchemist's individuation symbolism on an archaic level" (p.294n) (italics mine) and further that the "numinous experience of the individuation process is, on an archaic level, the prerogative of shamans and medicine men" (p.294) (italics mine). These statements coincide with his view expressed in "The Philosophical Tree" (Jung, 1954/1981b) that shamanism represents something from an earlier stage in the cultural development of the individuation archetype and which may be closer to its psychoid core, hence "archaic". Previously in 1953 in a private letter to Pastor Willi Bremi, Jung had used the word "primitive" to express the same idea,

All mythological ascents and descents derive from primitive psychic phenomena, i.e. from the trance states of sorcerers as found in the universal dissemination of shamanism (Jung, 1953, p.143) (italics mine).

In the following year in a letter to G.A. van den Bergh von Eysinga, Jung makes the same point although here he uses the term "primordial" but the concept is identical.
As animals have no need to be taught their instinctive activities, so man also possesses *primordial psychic patterns*, and repeats them spontaneously, independently of any teaching. Inasmuch as man is conscious and capable of introspection, it is quite possible that he can perceive his instinctual patterns in the form of archetypal representations. As a matter of fact, these possess the expected degrees of universality (*cf. the remarkable identity of shamanistic structures*). It is also possible to observe their spontaneous reproduction in individuals entirely ignorant of traditions of this sort. Such facts prove the autonomy of the archetypes (Jung, 1954, p.152) (italics mine).

Overall, it would appear Jung sees shamanism as representing an early "archaic" and "primitive" stage of expression of the individuation archetype but two additional points can be noted. Firstly, the way "universality" is used by Jung to evidence the existence of archetypes; and secondly, the way he conceives archetypes as operating autonomously, which explains their spontaneous emergence. These points will become important when the whole question as to the specific existence of a "shaman archetype" is explored in Chapter Five.

In returning to "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass", Jung (1954/1991b) infers from two chapters in Eliade (1951) another point of significance to this study, namely that shamanic "initiation even has the aspect of a healing" (p.271) because, after dismemberment, the neophyte is reconstituted as a more effective human being. He develops this point no further but from a previous statement we can see that he connects dismemberment with rebirth symbolism. There he says,

> The sacrificial priest submits voluntarily to the torture by which he is transformed. But he is also the sacrificer who is sacrificed, since he is pierced through with the sword and ritually dismembered. *[Note: The dismemberment motif belongs in the wider context of rebirth symbolism. Consequently it plays an important part in the initiation experiences of shamans and medicine men, who are dismembered and then put together again. For details, see Eliade, *Shamanism*, ch. II.]* (Jung, 1954/1991b, p.227) (underlining mine).

There is something crucial in Jung's allusion to the dismemberment/reconstitution cycle in shamanic initiation as indicating an aspect of healing. This will be examined in some detail in the critique following for it is certainly the case that "dismemberment is a practically universal motif of primitive shamanistic psychology (Jung, 1954/1981a, p.70n) and this needs explaining."
3.4 LATER THOUGHTS ON SHAMANISM AND ARCHETYPAL DEVELOPMENT

Shortly before his death in 1961, in "Symbols and the Interpretation of Dreams", Jung (1961/1993) addresses the issue of the difference between "natural" and "cultural" symbols. In it, we again see shamanism being equated with the expression of archaic archetypal root motifs which can undergo transformations and modifications in the course of human cultural development,

When the medical psychologist takes an interest in symbols, he is primarily concerned with "natural symbols" as distinct from "cultural" symbols. The former are derived from the unconscious contents of the psyche, and they therefore represent an enormous number of variations on the basic archetypal motifs. In many cases, they can be traced back to their archaic roots, i.e. to ideas and images that we meet in the most ancient records and in primitive societies. In this respect, I should like to call the reader's attention to such books as Mircea Eliade's study of shamanism, where a great many illuminating examples may be found.

"Cultural" symbols, on the other hand, are those that have expressed "eternal truths" or are still in use in many religions. They have gone through many transformations and even a process of more or less conscious elaboration, and in this way have become the représentations collectives of civilized societies (Jung, 1961/1993, p.253) (underlining mine).

3.5 SUMMARY

The main way Jung understands shamanism is to see it as reflective of the individuation process. The presence of anima imagery and the tree symbol in shamanism are understood to indicate a self-realisation emerging from expression of the Self archetype and initiatory tortures reflect the transformative sufferings entailed in this process. Individuation for Jung was archetypally driven as evidenced by the fact that the tree and anima images were experienced transculturally as well in people who knew nothing about shamanism or alchemy. Additionally, he saw shamanic imagery as representing an earlier socio-cultural stage in the expression of the individuation archetype, hence "archaic" and "primordial" as having arisen from the
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archaic roots (psychoid core) of the basic archetypal motif to do with individuation. These are Jung's main points in relation to shamanism but he also alludes to the dismemberment/reconstitution cycle in shamanic initiation as indication of a healing aspect, seeing this in the context of rebirth symbolism. This is, however, addressed in only two sentences and is not something which Jung emphasises.

3.6 DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE

From the overview of the ethnographic material on shamanism undertaken in the previous Chapter, it would appear it has more to do with a healing enterprise than Jung seems to emphasise. Whilst he does note what he calls an "aspect of a healing", I believe he has overlooked its significance because of his interest in the individuation process. The Siberian cultures under consideration are much more collective in their orientation, the presence of a shaman for the purposes of communal healer being of such significance that Shirokogoroff (1935) reports the Evenk (Tungus) even actively recruiting them if an interregnum occurs. In such collective societies, personal self-realisation as in the individuation process, is likely to be of less significance than Jung deduces.

When Jung does allude to the role of shamans as healers it is again underemphasised because he connects the idea to the transformative sufferings entailed in the individuation process. It may be much more the case that the "age-old archetypal idea" Jung mentions has more to do with aspect(s) of the "wounded healer" archetype than with individuation (see Groesbeck, 1975). These points certainly would accord both with Guggenbuhl-Craig's (1999) assertion that only some are born with a "shaman archetype" rather than it being a universal human impetus like individuation, and with the general phenomenon in shamanism of the pre-initiatory illness requiring healing before the neophyte is allowed to shamanise for the benefit of others.
Two particular reasons would cause us to re-assess Jung's view that shamanism is a projection of any general individuation process. Firstly, even in shamanic cultures, not all want to become shamans and some recoil from any hint that they may be so called, although in the accounts, this seems more to do with the demand by the spirits that adepts undergo some kind of "transformation" (Bogoras, 1904). Bogoras means by this the demand for the male adepts to live and dress as women and some have preferred death to the following of this call. However, if this demand were related to the adept's individuation journey, it would only reflect an unconscious desire already inherent within the individual so why such an extreme aversion given the culture's acceptance of this way of life for shamans? Why such struggles if the path has to do with a natural process of individuation to which all persons bend?

Secondly, the early onset of the shamanic call runs counter to Jung's general theory on individuation. In his model, whilst no set rule can be adduced for the process, we did note earlier how individuation intensified in the second half of life. This is because the individual must concentrate on certain things in the first half of life to the exclusion of other psychic imperatives. However, as all commentators show, the "shamanic call" most generally occurs in childhood/adolescence and this is difficult to explain with Jung's general model of individuation. Of course, the fact that "the call" occurs in childhood/adolescence itself begs further explanation and this will be examined later in terms of the particular psychology of shamans which it suggests.

I am not convinced that shamanism has to do with individuation per se but rather the particular (archetypal) way that certain individuals respond to their life situation and its attempted healing. It seems Jung is overlooking this and using aspects of shamanism to provide evidence for his assertions about individuation. It is highly likely that the dismemberment/reintegration cycle seen in shamanic initiations is expressing the realisation that something is wrong in the original construction of the person and that action needs to be taken to take things apart, correct them and put the person back together. This is a desire for healing and I believe shamanism is more about psychic healing than about an individuation process. After all, the main societal role of shamans is that of healer.
It is more probably the case that in the dismemberment/reintegration cycle, a damaged psyche is recognising its need for reconstitution lest it remain in an initially dismembered, traumatised and suffering state. Jung (1954/1991b) partly recognises this when he says, "It is not difficult to see that dismemberment originally served the purpose of reconstituting the neophyte as a new and more effective human being" (p.271). However, it may be too romantic to go on to say, "The torture inflicted on him is the indispensable means of leading him towards his destiny" (p. 271). There may be nothing to do with destiny here as any sense of it could be arising from a deep interior awareness that what is going on is centrally important to the individual.

Conceptually, individuation has to do with growth and realisation so that the tree is an understandable symbol of it. However, such concepts are different to that of healing, for healing implies sickness. Even the concept of rebirth which Jung sees as encompassing dismemberment has a healing tone to it, for in it there is a quest to go back to origins and start again. Whilst initiation may entail suffering because of the loss of one thing combined with the unknown of the knew, Jung may be overlooking the attempted healing aspect of the dismemberment/reintegration cycle. This is not an uncommon theme in shamanic cultures as Jung himself notes from chapters Two and Seven in Eliade (1951). The ancients in our own culture have similarly expressed it where the cure of illness was often connected with images of dismemberment and reintegration. The following quote from Aelius Aristides, written in response to his experiences at the ancient incubation healing shrines of the god, Asclepius, attests to this.

He [Asclepius] also revealed . . . very wonderful things in the person of Neritus, one of my foster fathers. For I believe that he dreamed that the God [Asclepius], together with Telesphorus, said to him, in regard to me, that it was necessary to remove my bones and put in tendons, for the existing ones had failed. Then he was in great fear and anguish, when he heard these things about me, but the God said, in consolation and instruction, that it was not necessary to knock the bones out directly and cut out the existing tendons, but that there needed to be, as it were, a certain change of those existing. Thus there was need of a great and strange correction (Aelius Aristides, 171/1981, p.310).

It seems more the case that shamanism is reflective of the wounded/healer archetype. In fairness, Jung approaches this idea in "On the psychology of the trickster figure"
but it is an underdeveloped theme for it is only in this one context that he draws this connection -

the shamanistic techniques in themselves often cause the medicine-man a good deal of discomfort, if not actual pain. At all events, the 'making of a medicine-man' involves, in many parts of the world, so much agony of body and soul that permanent psychic injuries may result. His 'approximation to the saviour' is an obvious consequence of this, in confirmation of the mythological truth that the wounded is the agent of healing, and that the sufferer takes away suffering (Jung, 1954/1990d, p.256).

Keener to incorporate shamanic examples as evidences of individuation, Jung fails to appreciate the extent of shamanism's connection with the wounded/healer concept. It needs to be said that this view does not negate the case that for certain individuals their individuation process may go down a shamanic path. My point is that there will be reasons for this, which will not apply to all persons so that shamanism cannot be used as a general example of an overall individuation process.

On the other hand, we do know that Jung in "Answer to Job" understood individuation to have two aspects, one that he called a "natural" process and one that is consciously realised. As he says,

[The natural] process, as a rule, runs its course unconsciously as it has from time immemorial, [meaning] no more than that the acorn becomes an oak, the calf a cow, and the child an adult. But if the individuation process is made conscious, consciousness must confront the unconscious and a balance between the opposites must be found. . . . The difference between the "natural" individuation process, which runs its course unconsciously, and the one which is consciously realized, is tremendous (Jung, 1954/1991c, pp.467-468).

There are certain reasons why the individuation process becomes consciously realised but Jung generally understood it to occur where tensions exist between a person's conscious and unconscious positions and this means that such conscious realisation will only happen to certain individuals. This could be the case with shamans and is related to the question - why do some individuals in shamanic cultures become shamans and others do not? I believe the original pre-initiatory illness gives us a clue
for it suggests that shamans have a particular kind of psychology, so that as above, shamanism has less to do with individuation than with an attempted healing. The remarkable thing about shamanism is that much of the tension is resolved and the process is turned into a vocation. This could either be a derivative phenomenon or the result of the presence of a pre-existing archetype which is called out (constellated) by certain psychological experiences or that of a developmentally produced psychic structure which for some reason takes on its own psychic life. I am of the opinion that certain life experiences constellate this particular archetypal configuration of the shaman and it is this theme which is developed in Chapter Eight.

3.7 IMPLICATIONS

A number of implications emerge from the foregoing discussion. Firstly, if shamanism is close to the psychoid core of an archetype (be it "individuation" or "wounded healer") and contains early "archaic" archetypal motifs that have undergone cultural development, change and transformation, what is being suggested is that the psychoid core underlying shamanism can express itself through different cultures but in ways that each culture would modify and transform. Such a view actually militates against the unthinking imitation and "cultural colonisation" of shamanic practices and ideas by other cultures because so doing assumes that the archetype's expressive development in one culture can be automatically translated to another. This is a point which will emerge as important when certain contemporary post-Jungian views and practices, derived from shamanism, are examined in Chapter Ten. The critical question becomes, how and in what form has the psychoid core of this archetype expressed itself in our cultural context and are we in any way able to track its socio-cultural modification? Only after answering this question would comparisons with other cultures become viable but this is still a thing far removed from any imitation.

From the point of view of general archetypal theory, the idea that basic archetypal motifs arise from the psychoid core of an archetype which then undergo cultural development, change and transformation means that archetypes themselves do not
"develop" or "evolve" but rather their socio-cultural expressions in terms of image and symbol can modify. This would suggest that the psychoid core of an archetype is a fixed thing in the psychic constitution of individuals and it would not be unreasonable to assume its expression in modern persons. That is, if such a thing as a shamanic archaic archetypal configuration can be demonstrated to actually exist, then from a theoretical perspective it would reside within the collective unconscious in our own day and age and Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) would be correct to conclude that contemporary Western "healers" like analysts, have had this archetype constellated within them since they undertake healing roles (and these may be different to practices) within their socio-cultural group in the same way as shamans do. The "shaman archetype" then takes on substantial significance since it becomes understood to be far more than a metaphor. The phenomenology of shamanism could then be used not only to add to our understanding of the underlying psychoid core of the archetype but also the dynamics of analytic work thereby enhancing analytic practice and technique and potentially, the selection and training of analysts.

Additionally, if shamanism represents something close to the psychoid core of an archetypal configuration then this opens up transcendental and transpersonal aspects for consideration and the implications are vastly enlarged. This argument rests on Jung's theoretical connection between synchronistic phenomena and the psychoid core of the archetypes which he had begun writing about in 1951 (Jung, 1951/1991, 1952/1991a).

### 3.7.1 Synchronicity

Synchronicity is the term Jung coined to explain those experiences people have of meaningfully coinciding events which do not appear to be causally related. He describes synchronicity as an "acausal connecting principle" which relied for its operation on two things - the psychoid nature of archetypes and the acausality and space-time relativity which he believed to prevail in the unconscious. As he says in "On the nature of the psyche",

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Since psyche and matter are contained in one and the same world, and moreover are in continuous contact with one another and ultimately rest on irrepresentable, transcendental factors, it is not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and the same thing. The synchronicity phenomena point, it seems to me, in this direction, for they show that the nonpsychic can behave like the psychic, and vice versa, without there being any causal connection between them (Jung, 1954/1991a, p.215).

Jung was of the view that it is due to the psychic condition of affectivity that space and time become relative and that the kind of numinous affectivity seen in synchronous events indicates the activation of an archetype. The process occurs in this way - a constellated archetype is accompanied by numinous affectivity. This affectivity lowers the focus and level of consciousness whilst the energy in the unconscious is heightened. Unconscious contents flow into consciousness more readily. Included here will be items of "absolute knowledge" i.e. a knowledge which transcends the space-time limitations of consciousness. In "Synchronicity: an acausal connecting principle" Jung uses Swedenborg's visionary experience of a fire in Stockholm. This vision occurred for Swedenborg at the precise time that an actual fire was occurring in the city but he was many kilometres away in Göteborg. Jung sees this experience as evidence of a kind of "absolute knowledge" residing in the unconscious. He says,

We must assume that there was a lowering of the threshold of consciousness which gave him [Swedenborg] access to "absolute knowledge". The fire in Stockholm was, in a sense, burning in him too. For the unconscious psyche space and time seem to be relative; that is to say, knowledge finds itself in a space-time continuum in which space is no longer space, nor time time. If, therefore, the unconscious should develop or maintain a potential in the direction of consciousness, it is then possible for parallel events to be perceived or known" (Jung, 1952/1991a, p.481).

If a recognition in meaning occurs between this "absolute knowledge" and a co-occurring physical event, the result will be a synchronicity. As Jung says in "On synchronicity",

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Synchronistic phenomena prove the simultaneous occurrence of meaningful equivalences in heterogeneous, causally unrelated processes; in other words, they prove that a content perceived by an observer can, at the same time, be represented by an outside event, without any causal connection. From this follows either that the psyche cannot be localized in space, or that space is relative to the psyche. The same applies to the temporal determination of the psyche and the psychic relativity of time (Jung, 1951/1991, p.531).

The unexpected parallelism of psychic and physical events is a manifestation of the archetype's psychoid (psychophysical) nature. In the archetype's constellation, the psychoid aspect has become split, appearing here as a psychic image and there as an external event (which can even be a physical object). Jung believes this is possible because of the "transgressivity" of the psychoid archetype.

Synchronicity . . . rests on the psychoid factors I call archetypes. . . . Although associated with causal processes, or "carried" by them, they continually go beyond their frame of reference, an infringement of which I would give the name "transgressivity", because the archetypes are not found exclusively in the psychic sphere, but can occur just as much in circumstances that are not psychic (equivalence of an outward physical process with a psychic one) (Jung, 1952/1991a, p.515).

In this way, phenomena in which inner perception such as forebodings, visions, dreams etc. show a meaningful simultaneity with outward experiences, regardless of whether they are experienced in the present, past or future (e.g. telepathy) are all manifestations of the "border zone" in which the conscious and unconscious realms touch or overlap as occurs when the threshold of consciousness is lowered and unconscious contents penetrate spontaneously into the area of consciousness. Thus, they can be experienced and noted simultaneously since the acausality and space-time relativity prevailing in the unconscious simultaneously enter and act upon the field of consciousness. What we do consciously in these experiences is link events which are not of a causal nature and we can be inclined to think of the archetype as the synchronistic phenomena's transcendental cause. Jung, however, saw the archetype as more like the "arranger" of synchronistic phenomena. The archetype is the foundational condition from which synchronistic phenomena can emerge, it is not their cause. As Jung (1951/1976) says in relating the paranormal phenomenon of miracles to the aspatial/atemporal and hence acausal aspect of archetypal
constellation, "this remarkable effect points to the 'psychoid' and essentially transcendental nature of the archetype as an 'arranger' of psychic forms inside and outside the psyche" (p.22).

An example of such a synchronistic phenomenon would be the famous bookcase incident when Jung was furiously angry with Freud but had difficulty expressing it. Jung relates this incident in *Memories, dreams and reflections* (Jung, 1963/1990). It occurred in 1909, two years after the two men had first met. The evening of the incident had begun quite emotionally, for Freud had adopted Jung as his eldest son, successor and crown prince in relation to the growing psychoanalytic movement. Later, at Jung's instigation they talked about paranormal phenomena which had always been of special interest to Jung. Freud was quite dismissive and this infuriated Jung. Jung describes his response, "It was as if my diaphragm were made of iron and were becoming red-hot - a glowing vault" (p.178). At this precise moment, a loud report emanated from Freud's bookcase alarming both men. Jung continues.

I said to Freud, "There, that is an example of a so-called catalytic exteriorisation phenomenon."
"Oh come", he exclaimed. "That is sheer bosh."
"It is not", I replied. "You are mistaken, Herr Professor. And to prove my point I now predict that in a moment there will be another loud report!" Sure enough, no sooner had I said the words than the same detonation went off in the bookcase (Jung, 1963/1990, p.179).

Jung's later theory of synchronicity can offer an explanation to such a paranormal occurrence. The emotional connection between the two men, which had been established over the previous two years, was profound and this context gives us some understanding as to the affective (and hence archetypal) atmosphere constellated. In responding to this incident in subsequent correspondence, Freud said,

It is strange that on the very same evening when I formally adopted you as an eldest son and anointed you - *in partibus infidelium* - as my successor and crown prince, you should have divested me of my paternal dignity, which divesting seems to have given you as much pleasure as I, on the contrary, derived from the investiture of your person (Freud, 1909, p.218).
Freud was apparently well aware of other more aggressive feelings emanating from Jung. Jung for his part did not find his friendship with Freud an easy one as can be ascertained from his letter of 28th October, 1907. Freud had in his previous two letters before this date, chided Jung for not writing and Jung offers an explanation in terms of his "self-preservation complex",

[it] often prevents me from writing. Actually - and I confess this to you with a struggle - I have a boundless admiration for you both as a man and a researcher, and I bear you no conscious grudge. . . . my veneration for you has something of the character of a "religious" crush. Though it does not really bother me, I still feel it is disgusting and ridiculous because of its undeniable erotic undertone. This abominable feeling comes from the fact that as a boy I was the victim of a sexual assault by a man I once worshipped. Even in Vienna the remarks of the ladies ("enfin seuls", etc.) sickened me, although the reason for it was not clear to me at the time.

This feeling, which I still have not quite got rid of, hampers me considerably. Another manifestation of it is that I find psychological insight makes relations with colleagues who have a strong transference to me downright disgusting. I therefore fear your confidence. I also fear the same reaction from you when I speak of my intimate affairs. Consequently, I skirt round such things as much as possible, for, to my feeling at any rate, every intimate relationship turns out after a while to be sentimental and banal or exhibitionistic, as with my chief, whose confidences are offensive.

I think I owe you this explanation. I would rather have not have said it. With kindest regards, (Jung, 1907, p.95).

It is not too far fetched to see a complicated Oedipal rivalry being enacted. We know from his own admissions in Memories, dreams and reflections (Jung, 1963/1990) that Jung had a difficult relationship with his own father and so the idealisation of Freud expressed in the above letter is not that unexpected. However, Oedipal idealisations of this kind will mask unconscious rivalries and hostilities as evidenced in Jung's "red-hot" diaphragm in the bookcase incident. From a Jungian perspective, when strong emotion is activated it indicates constellation of a corresponding archetype - presumably here to do with Oedipal rivalry and individuation (in this case, becoming oneself over the dead body of one's father). It is the connection between the psychoid aspect of the archetype and synchronicities, which Jung uses to explain such paranormal occurrences as in the loud report from the bookcase. With the effects of the archetype entering consciousness, its psychoid nature splits so that there is on the one hand, a psychic experience of disagreement and repressed rage and on the other
hand, a physical event - the loud report from the bookcase. One has not caused the other, they are running in a meaningful parallel but acausally, like two aspects of the one thing.

3.8 CONCLUSIONS

To return from this necessary peroration to shamanism. If shamanism represents something close to the psychoid core of an archetypal configuration, its study could provide phenomenological data enabling an explication of the way in which synchronistic and thus paranormal mechanisms actually operate. Indeed, because of the "primitive" nature of the cultures within which shamanism appears, the phenomenology of shamanism is likely to be the closest thing we have to the archetype's psychoid core. It could also be the case that shamanism represents the closest thing we have to any archetype's psychoid core. This closeness to the psychoid core would also explain why shamanism itself is experienced as a paranormal phenomenon. Shamanism would then be open to explication as Jung has done with other paranormal phenomena (Jung, 1902/1993, 1948/1991a).

Nevertheless, such implications and uses are predicated on demonstrating that such an archetypal configuration as a "shaman archetype" actually exists but before this necessary task can be undertaken, a general overview of Jung's theory of archetype is required. This will be the subject of the following Chapter.
CHAPTER 4

AN OVERVIEW OF JUNG'S THEORY OF ARCHETYPE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

To determine whether shamanism actually represents an archaic archetypal configuration, Jung's main points to do with archetypal theory need to be examined.

To begin with, it has been noted by commentators the care which needs to be taken in focussing on isolated passages where Jung discusses aspects of archetypal theory because, as Hobson (1971) puts it, "his methods of thought and exposition vary greatly with the context" (p.66). It would appear Jung saw his emerging views on archetypes as provisional and more like a work in progress. Nonetheless, succinct summaries can be found in Samuels, Shorter and Plaut (1993), Samuels (1985) and other introductory texts like Fordham (1968) and Hall and Nordby (1973).

Jung's ideas about archetypes seem to have emerged in three stages but it is generally agreed that he gives an extensive treatment of the theory in "The structure of the psyche" (Jung, 1931/1991a) and "On the nature of the psyche" (Jung, 1954/1991a) with specific examples being elaborated in The archetypes and the collective unconscious (Jung, 1959/1990). What follows is an overview of Jung's main points to do with archetypal theory so that those features relevant to the question of a shaman archetype can be deduced.

A central conception, and one unique to Jung's analytical psychology is that of the "collective unconscious" for it is this part of the unconscious which he conceives as containing the "totality of all archetypes" (Jung, 1931/1991a, p.157).
4.2 THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

In extending his conception of the unconscious from that which had been gained through his initial collaboration with Freud, Jung in his early career began to see that a "rationally explicable unconscious" is only a top layer, the material of which has been made unconscious artificially (through repression). He goes on to call this the "personal unconscious", beneath which, he says is an,

absolute unconscious which has nothing to do with our personal experience. This absolute unconscious would then be a psychic activity which goes on independently of the conscious mind and is not dependent even on the upper layers of the unconscious, untouched - and perhaps untouched - by personal experience. It would be a kind of supra-individual psychic activity, a collective unconscious, as I have called it, as distinct from a superficial, relative, or personal unconscious (Jung, 1931/1991a, p.148) (underlining mine).

Nine years later Jung is saying in "The psychology of the child archetype",

Modern psychology treats the products of unconscious fantasy-activity as self-portraits of what is going on in the unconscious, or as statements of the unconscious psyche about itself. They fall into two categories. First, fantasies (including dreams) of a personal character, which go back unquestionably to personal experiences, things forgotten or repressed, and can thus be completely explained by individual anamnesis. Second, fantasies (including dreams) of an impersonal character, which cannot be reduced to experiences in the individual's past, and thus cannot be explained as something individually acquired. These fantasy-images undoubtedly have their closest analogues in mythological types. We must therefore assume that they correspond to certain collective (and not personal) structural elements of the human psyche in general, and, like the morphological elements of the human body, are inherited. Although tradition and transmission by migration certainly play a part, there are, as we have said, very many cases that cannot be accounted for in this way and drive us to the hypothesis of "autochthonous revival". These cases are so numerous that we are obliged to assume the existence of a collective psychic substratum. I have called this the collective unconscious (Jung, 1940/1990, p.155) (underlining mine).

The main conceptions Jung has of the collective unconscious to be noted at this stage are that it is a level of the psyche which is separate from personal experience and that it can operate with "autochthonous revival" despite tradition and transmission by
migration having a place. In relation to this "autochthonous revival" issue, it is not unreasonable to assume that Jung gained it from his own personal experience of archetypal imagery. We know from his own admission that the split with Freud in 1912 affected him deeply. He describes his experience in *Memories, dreams and reflections* (Jung, 1963/1990) as a "disorientation" and a "confrontation with the unconscious", from which particular personifications emerged like the Philemon character. Other commentators have described Jung's experience more in terms of a psychotic episode (Winnicott, 1964; Atwood & Stolorow, 1977). Of this experience Jung says,

Philemon and other figures of my fantasies brought home to me the crucial insight that there are things in the psyche which I do not produce, but which *produce themselves* and have their own life. Philemon represented a force which was not myself... He confronted me in an objective manner, and I understood that there is something in me which can say things that I do not know and do not intend, things which may even be directed against me" (Jung, 1963/1990, pp.207-208) (italics mine).

Later, in speaking of unconscious contents he says,

It is not too difficult to personify them, as they always possess a certain degree of autonomy, a separate identity of their own. Their autonomy is a most uncomfortable thing to reconcile oneself to, and yet the very fact that the unconscious presents itself in that way gives us the best means of handling it (Jung, 1963/1990, p.211) (italics mine).

Whilst *Memories, dreams and reflections* (Jung, 1963/1990) is not included in the Collected Works as part of Jung's scientific writing, there is nonetheless something important about the inherent tension in these passages which is likely to give clues as to the subjective underpinning to his academic writing on the theory of archetypes. On the one hand, archetypal imagery is described as "presenting itself" in a particular way, which may be nothing more than a statement about how it is phenomenally experienced. However, archetypal images are also described as possessing a "certain degree of autonomy" such that they can "produce themselves". Given Jung's (1929/1993a) assertion that "every psychology - my own included - has the character of a subjective confession" (p.336), it is not unreasonable to conclude that his
personal experience has had an influence on the "autonomy/autochthonous revival" aspect of his theory of archetype. What is important to note is that this issue of the "autonomy" of the archetypes not only has a subjective underpinning as outlined above but as a concept, it will remain as an underlying, developing and central theme in Jung's conception of the collective unconscious and of the archetypes which make it up. It is necessary then to turn our attention to his specific ideas on archetypes and see what aspects are relevant to this study.

4.2.1 The concept of the "archetype"

As early as 1912 in *Symbols of transformation*, Jung (1912/1986) spoke of "primordial images" to explain the universality of certain patterns of behaviour and motif evident across human experience in comparative mythology, comparative religion and even the dreams of modern persons. By 1917 he was referring to "dominants' of the collective unconscious" and "nodal points" which attract energy and influence a person's functioning (Jung, 1917/1990) but he first introduced the term "archetype" in 1919 (Jung, 1919/1991). It was a word he re-interpreted from earlier usages in the *Corpus Hermeticum* (Scott, 1985), Dionysius the Areopagite (Rolt, 1920) and Irenaeus (Keble, 1872). As a concept it has attained such cultural coinage that it was eventually included in the Fontana *Dictionary of modern thought* in 1977 (Bullock & Trombley, 2000).

Jung initially used this term "archetype" in relation to what he called "motifs" which appeared in experience as images but this was eventually extended to cover all psychic manifestations which were universal and typical in nature. Eventually in "On the nature of the psyche", Jung was drawing a distinction between the archetype *an sich* (as such) which is irrepresentable and the archetypal images which are psychically experienced. He says,

The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the unconscious should not be confused with the archetype as such. They are varied structures which all point back to one essentially "irrepresentable" basic form. . . . The archetype as such is a psychoid factor that belongs, as it were, to the invisible, ultra-violet end of the psychic spectrum. It does not appear, in itself, to be capable of reaching consciousness . . . [but] . . . when represented to the mind, is already conscious and therefore differs to an indeterminable extent from that
which caused the representation. . . . We must . . constantly bear in mind that what we mean by "archetype" is itself irrepresentable, but has effects which make visualizations of it possible, namely, the archetypal images and ideas (Jung, 1954/1991a, pp.213-214).

In Chapter Three we have already come across Jung's concept of the psychoid core of archetypes. It is the psychoid core which constitutes the "irrepresentable' basic forms" of archetypes as distinct from the images and ideas produced in consciousness.

Overall, archetypes are understood to be biologically built-in structural components of the psyche (Jung, 1940/1991) so that "archetypal ideas are part of the indestructible foundations of the human mind" (Jung, 1948/1991b, p.130). It is in this section from "A psychological approach to the dogma of the Trinity" that Jung goes on to say,

However long they [the archetypes] are forgotten and buried, always they return, sometimes in the strangest guise, with a personal twist to them or intellectually distorted, . . ., but continually reproducing themselves in new forms representing the timeless truths that are innate in man's nature. [Note: The special emphasis I lay on archetypal predispositions does not mean that mythologems are of exclusively psychic origin. *I am not overlooking the social conditions that are just as necessary for their production* (Jung, 1948/1991b, p.130) (italics mine).

In this short section, we can note with the phrase "continually reproducing themselves" that the concept of the "autonomy" of archetypes is again introduced. But also to be noted is the place Jung allows for "social conditions" in relation to the mythological aspect of archetypal expression.

Six years later in a private letter to G.A. van den Bergh von Eysinga, Jung makes it quite clear that he is thinking of the archetypes' "reproduction of themselves" as occurring spontaneously and that this characteristic evidences their autonomous nature. He says,
As animals have no need to be taught their instinctive activities, so man also possesses *primordial psychic patterns*, and repeats them *spontaneously, independently of any teaching*. Inasmuch as man is conscious and capable of introspection, it is quite possible that he can perceive his instinctual patterns in the form of archetypal representations. As a matter of fact, these possess the expected degrees of universality (cf. the remarkable identity of shamanistic structures. *It is also possible to observe their spontaneous reproduction in individuals entirely ignorant of traditions of this sort. Such facts prove the autonomy of the archetypes* (Jung, 1954, p.152) (italics mine).

Overall it can be concluded that although the concept of archetypal "autonomy" is an early one for Jung to hold, it had become quite central in his later view on archetypes. It is this aspect which remains a centrally distinctive feature of Jung's archetype theory.

It is because of the capacity to "continually reproduce themselves" that Jung sees archetypes as manifesting themselves in some form or another across space and time. This on-going reproduction of themselves in new forms is precisely because archetypes are already part of the human psychic constitution. As such, any similarities around cross-cultural expression will not just be seen as the product of a random coincidence of similar social conditions but rather as the out-working of the archetypal predisposition to experience the world in a certain way for "archetypes are typical modes of apprehension, and whenever we meet with uniform and regularly recurring modes of apprehension we are dealing with an archetype, no matter whether its mythical character is recognised or not" (Jung, 1919/1991, pp.137-138).

Returning to the above quote from "A psychological approach to the dogma of the Trinity" (Jung, 1948/1991b), we can see Jung in his note referring to the idea of social context, an idea we have already encountered in Chapter Three. He stresses the "just as necessary" place social context occupies in the mythological expression of anything archetypal. Presumably, socio-cultural conditions can activate, arrange and modify archetypal predispositions so that they become expressed in the terms of a particular culture resulting in what he elsewhere refers to as "variations on a ground theme" (Jung, 1954/1991a, p.213). In "A psychological approach to the dogma of the Trinity", this is elaborated a few pages later.
[the] archetype an sich, . . . is an "irrepresentable" factor, a "disposition" which starts functioning at a given moment in the development of the human mind and arranges the material of consciousness into definite patterns. [Note: . . . Archetypes are, by definition, factors and motifs that arrange the psychic elements into certain images, characterised as archetypal, but in such a way that they can be recognised only from the effects they produce. They exist preconsciously, and presumably they form the structural dominants of the psyche in general. They may be compared to the invisible presence of the crystal lattice in a saturated solution. As a priori conditioning factors they represent a special, psychological instance of the biological "pattern of behaviour", which gives all living organisms their specific qualities. Just as the manifestation of this biological ground plan may change in the course of development, so also can those of the archetype] (Jung, 1948/1991b, pp.148-149) (underlining mine).

Given this perspective, it stands to reason that an archetype's expression will always be an intersection phenomenon between the inbuilt archetypal core and the socio-cultural context. As a consequence, we should see cultural differences in relation to any archetype's expression but the differences should not be so great that any sense of the underlying commonality is lost.

There is one criticism of this "social context" viewpoint which should be noted. Such an interpretation of similarities and differences surrounding a perceived cross-cultural archetypal expression does enable Jung to have things both ways. Once an archetypal position is granted then any cross-cultural similarity can be interpreted as something archetypal and any cross-cultural difference can be interpreted as social modification of the archetypal predisposition. However, to solve this problem we would have to articulate the development and modification of the shaman archetypal pattern across space and time and this is impossible. We are only in the position to investigate it as recorded in reliable documents to do with actual fieldwork and to see from these whether our questions can be sufficiently answered or not. Jung's theory does enable shamanism to be seen as representing in its final form an intersection phenomenon between a pre-existing archetype and the cultural history of any group investigated. On the one hand, this is not without explanatory significance and on the other, it is not unexpected if the archetype an sich has an "irrepresentable" aspect to it and operates in the way Jung conceives. I would want to make another point, however. Not only will the cultural expression of shamanism be an intersection phenomenon
between a pre-existing archetype and the cultural history of any one group but within individuals there is likely to be a similar intersection between an archetypal pre-disposition and certain subjective and developmental experiences of those who experience a shamanic "call”.

Now there are a number of points which emerge from this overview which will become relevant in answering the question, "does a shaman archetype exist?". Firstly, Jung’s assertion that archetypes are "irrepresentable dispositions" which can only be known by their effects means that there will be something known and elusive about them at the same time. Secondly, activated archetypes arrange the material of consciousness into recognisable patterns of imagery; and thirdly, that the manifestation of an archetype can change in the course of socio-cultural development. These points will become important in the later analysis.

However, at this point it needs to be noted that this overview of Jung's position has highlighted certain tensions in his conceptions. Can it really be evidenced that archetypes operate spontaneously and autonomously as if divorced from a context? After all, Jung's own experience of the Philemon figure and the apparent autonomy of the collective unconscious occurred within the context of his split with Freud. If such a figure had appeared without that context there may be more justification for Jung's position. What I am suggesting is that an archetype's expression is not only an intersection phenomenon between an inbuilt archetypal core and a socio-cultural context but that such an intersection is likely to be evident between an archetypal core and an individual person's subjective life experience. This issue will be taken up in detail later but to further the question "does a shaman archetype exist?" we will turn to the method Jung uses to evidence archetypes so as to provide a model on which to answer our question.
4.3 JUNG'S METHOD FOR PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF ARCHETYPES

It is in "The concept of the collective unconscious" that Jung outlines his method for proving the existence of archetypes. He begins by looking for sources of unconscious content and turns his initial attention to dreams.

We must now turn to the question of how the existence of archetypes can be proved. . . . The main source . . . is dreams, which have the advantage of being involuntary, spontaneous products of the unconscious psyche and are therefore pure products of nature not falsified by any conscious purpose . . . [W]e must look for motifs which could not possibly be known to the dreamer and yet behave functionally in his dream in such a manner as to coincide with the functioning of the archetype known from historical sources (Jung, 1936/1990, pp.48-49).

Jung's emphasis here is on the archetypal, objective and non-personal, regarding dreams as being "involuntary" and "spontaneous" products of the unconscious psyche, "unfalsified" by conscious activity and as such, producing motifs unknown to the dreamer and yet which function in the dreamscape in the same way as the corresponding archetype has been seen to operate historically. He goes on to state that similar motifs can appear through active imagination, paranoid delusions, trance states and the dreams of early childhood. However, similarity between images occurring in dreams and mythology are not sufficient evidence for the presence of an archetype, there must be a correspondence of functional meaning within a similar context (i.e. serving the same psychic purpose). He goes on to say.

In order to draw a valid parallel [between a motif and a similar one from mythology], it is necessary to know the functional meaning of the individual symbol, and then to find out whether the apparently parallel mythological symbol has a similar context and therefore the same functional meaning (Jung, 1936/1990, p.50).

As an illustration of this technique, Jung summarises the "solar phallus" case example gained from his days at the Burghölzli Mental Hospital in Zurich. This case is dealt with in detail later in Section 4.4.3.
In "The concept of the collective unconscious", Jung (1936/1990) concludes, "first of all, certain symbols have to be isolated clearly enough to be recognizable as typical phenomena, not just matters of chance" (p.53) and this can be achieved through examining dream series and the content of active imagination. The method requires discovery of typical figures and typical situations which not only regularly manifest themselves with a corresponding meaning but display development and variation. The motifs (Jung uses this term to cover both "figures" and "situations") which emerge from this analysis must then be shown to occur in other times and places to rule out chance coincidence. As he says,

We must therefore show that the idea . . . exists independently . . . and that it occurs at other times and places (Jung, 1936/1990, p.52).

In this way, comparative mythology and ethnology are used to substantiate the conclusions. An extended example of this approach would be his analysis of Wolfgang Pauli's dream series in "Individual dream symbolism in relation to alchemy" (Jung, 1944/1992), again dealt with in Section 4.4.3 below.

Alternative explanations as in forms of transmission through language, education, cryptomnesia and culture must be ruled out so that spontaneous transmission (i.e. "autochthonous revival of mythological motifs") can be established beyond doubt. This is the critical issue to do with the autonomy of archetypes, as he says,

It is not sufficient to point out the often obviously archetypal nature of unconscious products, for these can just as well be derived from acquisitions through language and education. Cryptomnesia should also be ruled out, which it is almost impossible to do in certain cases. In spite of all these difficulties, there remains enough individual instances showing the autochthonous revival of mythological motifs to put the matter beyond any reasonable doubt (Jung, 1936/1990, p.44).

Jung recognises that he is not the first to promote the idea of psychic a priori's, it being a tradition which goes right back to Plato but he does say that if he has "any share in these discoveries, it consists in . . . having shown that archetypes are not
disseminated only by tradition, language, and migration, but that they can \textit{reappear spontaneously, at any time, at any place, and without any outside influence.}" (Jung, 1954/1990c, p.79) (italics mine). Jung believed this to be his own particular and unique contribution and as we have seen, it is central to his conception of archetypal theory. However, as Hobson (1971) points out, despite spontaneity and autonomy of archetypes being central ideas for Jung, these are his most difficult assertions to substantiate.

In summary, the active presence of an archetype in an individual can be detected when motifs unknown to the person spontaneously appear and cluster around typical phenomena which can be seen elsewhere to occur across other times and places and which display a correspondence of functional meaning in a situation where no other explanations other than "autochthonous revival" are possible.

\textbf{4.3.1 Comment}

Jung's assertion that dreams are involuntary, spontaneous products of the unconscious psyche not falsified by any conscious purpose is a debatable position to adopt but it is one which Jung has emphasised elsewhere in "A study in the process of individuation".

There are products of active imagination, and also of dreams, which reproduce the same patterns and arrangements with a spontaneity that cannot be influenced (Jung, 1950/1990, p.332).

On this point, Hobson (1971) says that "in suggesting that dreams arise with a spontaneity that cannot be influenced... he [Jung] seems to underestimate the extent of secondary elaboration, which certainly occurs in reported dreams and is probably an important factor in active imagination" (pp.73-74).

It would have to be agreed that secondary elaboration is a feature relevant in dream reporting, whilst the imagery arising in meditative states like active imagination is highly questionable and susceptible to inductive effects (i.e. the unconscious influence on a client by the therapist) as the contemporary debate surrounding
"repressed memories" and their "accessing" would attest (Sandler & Fonagy, 1997). Importantly for my line of argument, I do not believe that the occurrence of dreams can be excised from their subjective context. Many of Jung's own examples can be adduced to illustrate the point. For instance, his example of the woman patient who dreamed of him as a "corn god" deity (Jung, 1939/1993) occurs within the context of an intense erotic transference and any reasonable commentator would have to conclude that the dream has not occurred "spontaneously" (i.e. without a context). Whilst the dream could be explained as a form of primary process thinking finding the only suitable imagery at hand with which to express its purpose, what still needs explaining is why and how it is that this particular imagery has emerged. So despite a questioning of its "spontaneity", I am not necessarily suggesting that some imaginal aspect of the collective unconscious has not been activated.

It would appear that Jung, whilst believing archetypal experiences could be connected to things like education, language and migration, had a personal preference for conceiving them as operating autonomously without any reference to personal experience or environment, a view no doubt influenced by his own "confrontation with the unconscious". Two related and crucial questions are begged by this position - what is the relationship between the collective unconscious and our own personal experience and does the collective unconscious actually operate spontaneously and autonomously? These will be important questions to address in further explicating the phenomenon of the shaman archetype.

Before going further with the application of Jung's method for the proof of archetypes to the shamanism question, a fuller examination of these questions in relation to the idea of the "autonomous" archetype is required. I will endeavour to show that it is this aspect of Jung's theory and hence its place in the application of his method of proof for the existence of archetypes which is questionable, not because archetypes do not exist but because they do not operate spontaneously and autonomously in the way he conceives.
4.4 THE "AUTONOMOUS ARCHETYPE" QUESTION

In "The Structure of the Psyche", Jung (1931/1991a) uses two case examples to illustrate archetypal autonomy - that of an army officer and the other of the "Solar-Phallus" man, an example which he had described previously (Jung, 1912/1986) and which he does so again at a later date (Jung, 1936/1990). We shall first turn our attention to the army officer material.

4.4.1 The case of the army officer

The army officer had presented to Jung with three hysterical (conversion disorder) symptoms - heart pains, a choking sensation in the throat and a piercing pain in the left heel. Nothing was wrong with him organically, the symptoms were psychogenic. Dreams revealed that just prior to the onset of his symptoms he had suffered a relationship breakdown when his girlfriend jilted him and became engaged to another man. During psychotherapy with Jung, the man's real but unconscious affects were able to be expressed, the symptoms of the heart pains (having analogously represented his "broken heart") and the lump in the throat (having analogously represented his "swallowed tears") disappeared. But the pain in the heel remained. The man then had a dream about being bitten in the heel by a snake and becoming instantly paralysed. This dream image does give some clue as to why the man feels pain in his heel but as Jung points out, the unconscious is striking in its use of a mythological motif reminiscent of the Genesis story where Jahweh speaking to the Garden of Eden serpent says, "I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel" (Genesis 3:15).

Because the dream image did not accord with any obvious rational explanation. Jung (1931/1991a) concluded that it "probably derives from some deeper layer [of the unconscious] that cannot be fathomed rationally" (p.146). However, Jung also tells us that in discussing the dream with the man, other relevant factors emerged -
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He had been the darling of a somewhat hysterical mother. She had pitied him, admired him, pampered him so much that he never got along properly at school because he was too girlish. Later he suddenly swung over to the masculine side and went into the army, where he was able to hide his inner weakness by a display of "toughness". Thus, in a sense, his mother too had lamed him (Jung, 1931/1991a, p.146).

Jung (1931/1991a) goes no further and yet this information would appear critical in giving an interpretation to the dream imagery, a point which I will take up below.

To continue with Jung's (1931/1991a) explication. He acknowledges that the man had probably heard the Genesis story at some stage in his life despite his knowledge of the Bible being at a "lamentable minimum" and that the snake image is now being remembered from the deep unconscious and used at this suitable opportunity. Given the situation between the officer and his mother, the line "I will put enmity between you and the woman" is likely to have had significant psychic resonance with his own personal dynamic. However, Jung concludes that this "part of the unconscious evidently likes to express itself mythologically, because this way of expression is in keeping with its nature" (p.147) such that,

[the] dream of the snake reveals a fragment of psychic activity that has nothing whatever to do with the dreamer as a modern individual. It functions at a deeper level, so to speak, and only the results of this activity rise up into the upper layer where the repressed affects lie, as foreign to them as a dream is to waking consciousness (Jung, 1931/1991a, pp.147-148) (italics mine).

Jung (1931/1991a) goes on to say that the heel symptom is therefore raising all the man's life disappointments to the "level of a mythological event" (p. 149) and that this corresponds to a kind of "magic by analogy" known in both ancient and primitive cultures, such that he can identify or participate in the pain of all humanity. "The healing effect of this needs no proof" (p.150), Jung concludes.

However, to purport that the collective unconscious operates in this way is not really necessary. There are alternate ways of seeing how someone's personal life experience and the collective unconscious operate together which are more plausible. An
explanation can come from a combination of Freud's concept of the "return of the repressed" with that of the "here-and-now" being a re-run of unresolved issues from the "there-and-then" in a person's life. Jung seems to overlook that the paralysing snake image is probably the most apt way for the officer to express the paralysing effect on him of his own hysterical mother and may be understood as no more than this. Jung does note that such an "as if" motif accords with the metaphorical way of thinking encountered in primitive cultures. Something similar is probably going on here with the officer. The image is related to early (and thus more primitive) levels of psychic functioning corresponding to the man's early experiences with his mother. Thus the mythic imagery is pointing to the "earliness" of the experience for him since early infant experience coincides with a time when the psyche and the affects it experiences, are "primitive". In fact, mythological motifs may be the best way for the unconscious to articulate deep and early trauma (as if it is coming from another world) rather than these motifs saying anything about an hypothesised part of the unconscious expressing itself mythically "in keeping with its nature", as Jung (1931/1991a) asserts.

My main point is that the officer's imagery cannot be seen to be arising spontaneously and autonomously. It is more plausible to understand it as a way of expressing something "psychically pramaeval" having to do with his early problems with an hysterical and paralysing mother from which we know he is in later life endeavouring to effect a compensatory solution. The overall linkages and interpretation would run something like this - the officer has a deep inner sense of having been turned by the mother into a "mother's boy" to such an extent that it equates to a paralysis. His masculine erotic potential has been truncated through this identificatory/narcissistic adhesion to his mother as opposed to a truly psychosexual viability being enhanced through the relationship with her, she being in his experience, a real "heel". The deeper mother material is a forerunner to his later relationship as these dynamics would understandably get played out through projection onto the girlfriend (who apparently had the good sense to get out) where his infant's (initially) broken heart and the compensatory manoeuvres around it, get concretised in the adult exchange. So the dream reveals that the officer sees his mother as a Satan/serpent whose effects have had a paralysing effect on his masculinity. Hence it is not necessarily the case that the "content . . . probably derives
from some deeper layer that cannot be fathomed rationally" (p. 146), as Jung (1931/1991a) puts it. Lack of clear rationally understood connections is not sufficient reason for us either to give up on the task or to resort to "autochthonous" explanations. The imagery is perfectly understandable in light of the material about his mother relationship and therefore has everything to do with the dreamer as a modern individual. Indeed, the fact that the dream re-works the mythic image points to this, for the Genesis story tells of a bruising not a paralysing sting, and there must be some very personal reason why this is changed by the officer's unconscious to produce the paralysis image. There must be some psychic resonance between this and his own personal dynamic.

So it would appear that the unconscious is using a metaphorical mythic image because it is endeavouring to express deep early problems from a time when the psyche operated in such primary process images. Thus it may not be that an "immemorial pattern" of the human mind "which we have not acquired but have inherited from the dim ages of the past" (Jung, 1931/1991a, pp.149-150) has been stirred but rather that the unconscious has latched onto this image as the most appropriate way to express the problem of the deep unconscious and unresolved affects it contains from actual early life experience.

Jung's (1931/1991a) final conclusion is to suggest that the imagery having emerged in a depersonalised way points to a universalising solution - a pan-human pain to do with "the sorrow of the world" (p. 150). My argument is that it is still very personal but is expressed in mythic proportions which coincide with the level of (unconsciously) felt psychic pain.

What I want to go on to argue is that there is always a connection/interaction between mythic/archetypal imagery and personal experience so that postulating autonomous archetypes is just as reductive as arguing that there is nothing more to consider than personal developmental history alone. The state of affairs is more akin to a pole with archetypes at one end and subjective experience at the other. Emphasising the (Jungian) archetypal pole is just as reductive as the emphasising the (Freudian) developmental one. Both poles must be held. Such a position does not preclude the possibility that an early primitive level of affective experience activates archetypal
energy. My point is that whilst archetypes can conceptually exist, they do not operate autonomously in a way disconnected from subjective and developmental experience. Experience is the result of an interaction between archetypal predispositions to experience the world in a certain way and subjective life experience.

The question which this analysis begs is, how do archetypes become activated in the first place, autonomously or in response to life experience and what is the mechanism? To answer this we must look at what Jung says about the constellation of archetypes.

### 4.4.2 The "constellation" of archetypes

In classical theory, it is generally agreed that archetypes are activated when a breakdown has occurred between the unconscious and conscious psychic positions so that a compensatory psychic balance can be (re)established. As Jung (1953/1993) says, "an archetype becomes active . . . when a certain lack in the conscious sphere calls for a compensation on the part of the unconscious" (p.677). An example would be his patient who experienced a synchronicity to do with a scarab beetle when in the consulting room. Jung outlines this case in both "On synchronicity" (Jung, 1951/1991) and "Synchronicity: An acausal connecting principle" (Jung, 1952/1991a). He describes the female patient as displaying an exceptional rationalism which she used as a defensive manoeuvre so that the psychotherapy had become stagnated in an impasse. She then had a dream of being given a gold scarab. At the precise moment of telling Jung this dream, he hears a tapping at the window, opens it to find a scarabaeid beetle trying to enter the room. On catching the beetle, Jung presents it to the woman saying, "here is your scarab". This synchronous event had such a profound effect on the patient that the therapy progressed markedly from that point on. Of this case Jung (1952/1991a) says, "It is this kind of situation that constellates the archetype with the greatest regularity" (p.440). In other words, the impasse in the therapy had activated a compensatory archetypal constellation to do with (psychic) rebirth for Jung knew that the scarab beetle was an ancient symbol of rebirth. The mechanism for such a synchronicity we have outlined before in Chapter Three - the unexpected parallelism of the psychic and physical event is a manifestation of the (rebirth) archetype's psychoid (psychophysical) nature. In the
archetype's constellation, the psychoid aspect has become split, appearing, on the one hand, as a psychic image (the dream of the scarab beetle) and on the other as an external event (the scarabaeid beetle trying to enter the consulting room).

Notwithstanding this explanation by Jung (1952/1991a), what I want to highlight is the way the archetype gets constellated in the first place given the emphasis which Jung gives to "autonomy/autochthonous revival" in his theory of archetype. I will go on to argue that there is insufficient evidence to support the view that archetypes operate autonomously. Rather, there is evidence that they become activated in response to intense emotionality which has come about through a person's subjective life experience.

In his early career, Jung certainly believed that archetypal content can be activated by distressing life experience as the following quote from 1912 indicates.

The changes that may befall a man are not infinitely variable; they are variations of certain typical occurrences which are limited in number. When therefore a distressing situation arises, the corresponding archetype will be constellated in the unconscious. Since this archetype is numinous, i.e. possesses a specific energy, it will attract to itself the contents of consciousness - conscious ideas that render it perceptible and hence capable of conscious realisation. Its passing over into consciousness is felt as an illumination, a revelation, or a "saving idea" (Jung 1912/1986, p.294) (italics mine).

In a similar way, we can safely assume that for the scarab beetle patient, the therapeutic impasse would have been an emotionally distressing occurrence and further, that this situation would have unfolded with Jung before the appearance of the archetypal image of the beetle in her dream. The point is that the personal context is important to note in the sequence of events and that emotionality is suggested as being operative in the archetype's constellation.

It is interesting to note given Jung's early statement from 1912 above and his later emphases on archetypal autonomy, that when elaborating his theory of synchronicity in the 1950's he seems to move toward his earlier position. In "Synchronicity: An acausal connecting principle", Jung (1952/1991a) devotes some attention to Rhine's
classic experiments on extrasensory perception and psychokinesis undertaken at Duke University's Paranormal Psychology Laboratory. In terms of my argument, what seems noteworthy is that despite Rhine being able to demonstrate both extrasensory perception and psychokinesis beyond chance occurrence and whilst these were seen to operate over vast distances which precluded fabrication, there was a decline effect over time, i.e. the best results were obtained at the beginning of the experiments. Jung suggests this is because of an initial emotional engagement and expectation on the part of the subjects. Jung's description of the poor results in the experiments from the English medium (Mrs Eileen Garrett) attests to this, "as she herself admits, she was unable to summon up any feeling for the 'soulless' test-cards" (p.434). Emotional engagement seems crucial in the whole process even if Jung's overall explanation relies on his theory of synchronicity about a constellated archetype which separates into a physical occurrence and a psychological one. On summarising Rhine's experiments a few pages later, he says,

[Rhine] would never have got the results he did if he had carried out his experiments with a single subject . . . He needed a constant renewal of interest, an emotion with its characteristic abaissement mental, which tips the scales in favour of the unconscious. . . . The mantric procedures owe their effectiveness to this same connection with emotionality: by touching an unconscious aptitude they stimulate interest, curiosity, expectation, hope, and fear, and consequently evoke a corresponding preponderance of the unconscious. The effective (numinous) agents in the unconscious are the archetypes. By far the greatest number of spontaneous synchronistic phenomena that I have had occasion to observe and analyse can easily be shown to have a direct connection with an archetype. This, in itself, is an irrepresentable, psychoid factor of the collective unconscious (Jung, 1952/1991a, pp.480-481) (underlining mine).

However in a previous paragraph on Rhine it would appear that Jung sees affectivity as having some connection to the instincts for he says,

it must be remembered that with Rhine the first series of experiments generally produced the best results, which then quickly fell off. But when it was possible to arouse a new interest in the essentially rather boring experiment, the results improved again. It follows from this that the emotional factor plays an important role. Affectivity, however, rests to a large extent on the instincts, whose formal aspect is the archetype (Jung, 1952/1991a, p.440) (italics mine).
By definition, instincts are understood to be unlearned and to operate somewhat autonomously so that it is not clear the extent to which the affectivity is conceived as being the prime operative cause in the constellation of the archetype responsible for the synchronicity. I believe the appeal to instinct somewhat confuses the issue.

What I am arguing is that archetypal constellation will always depend on heightened emotionality even if the archetype once constellated contains its own numinous affectivity and something bi-directional is implied. I am suggesting, on the one hand, that it is not compensation alone which leads to archetypal activation with its numinous and affective characteristics, whilst on the other, I am emphasising Jung's point that emotionality can activate archetypes because of its ability to lower the threshold of consciousness. It is in this latter way I believe that archetypes get constellated. But by emphasising autonomy, the necessary role of emotionality can become overlooked in the classical theory. Of significance, however, is the implication which flows from this "necessary role of emotionality", for emotionality arises in people from out of their personal life experience and this means that archetypes are always constellated through personal experience with the operative cause being emotionality. They do not occur autonomously.

Following on from this critique, crucial questions for this study emerge once the existence of the shaman archetype can be demonstrated - what are the particular subjective life experiences that elicit an affectivity leading to the constellation of the shaman archetype? Further, an understanding of the connection/interaction between particular life experiences and the shaman archetype will not only explain why this archetype gets constellated in some individuals and not others but will provide information potentially useful in the selection and training of analysts given that Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) is correct in his assertion that all analysts have had the shaman archetype constellated in them. What I will be arguing is that certain types of early infant trauma activate the shaman archetype which then becomes part of the individual’s psychic constitution. If there is no other chaos in the individual’s developmental environment which would thrust them into psychosis, they do not become overwhelmed by this psychic constitution but can use it in healing enterprises.
In returning to the case of the army officer, Jung (1931/1991a) makes a final point which bears directly on the nexus between the personal and archetypal that I am suggesting. He posits that the officer's history of disappointments were "raised by this symptom [the pains in the left heel] to the level of a mythological event, as though this would in some way help the patient" (p.149). One could conclude that a prognostic trajectory has been activated in the dream for the storyline does somewhat identify the dreamer with the Genesis story and hence a hero/saviour figure, for in Christian theology, "the seed of the woman" is Christ and an identificatory battle of cosmic proportions is adumbrated. In other words, the personal trauma of this man could be seen to have activated something archetypal. As we have seen before in Section 4.4.2 above, Jung (1912/1986) was of the opinion that the passing over of an archetype into consciousness could be felt as a "saving idea" and it is not unreasonable to conclude that the officer's imagery is running along a similar track. The general question which this then begs is - can one get to the nub of the personal problem and in particular, a therapeutic solution, through the personal material alone? The answer to this question will indicate the place and value of an archetypal perspective and for the purpose of this thesis, the place and value of knowing the workings of the shaman archetype.

A case from Whitmont and Perera (1991) neatly illustrates this issue. In Dreams: A portal to the source (Whitmont & Perera, 1991) they describe the case of a highly successful businessman who suffered from a bipolar disorder. He would oscillate between intermittent spells of depression with feelings of alienation and emptiness and manic periods of excited fury and destructive hostility. He had the following two dreams on the same night:

Dream 1: My business partner long ago left his wife and children, so now he has to declare bankruptcy.

Dream 2: The family cat has gone on a wild rampage, biting and clawing at whatever got in her way. I feel that this was because I had failed to pay attention to the animal. As I try to restrain the cat, she grows bigger and bigger to lion size and shape. I fear there might now be a threat to life and limb unless I can propitiate her by giving back her rattle (Whitmont & Perera, 1991, p.87).
Chapter 4 An overview of Jung's theory of archetype

Whitmont and Perera (1991) make the point that the imagery in the first dream is quite understandable from an everyday point of view but that the second dream is more "magical", archetypal and mythopoetic.

An interpretation of the first dream in terms of the dreamer's personal story is quite easy. He is currently emotionally bankrupt because of his disconnection from "wife" (i.e. feminine affectivity) and "children" (i.e. fruitful future development). But this is descriptive and does not tell us the core dynamic or cause of this situation needful for appropriate therapeutic leverage.

Whitmont and Perera (1991) were reminded by the second more archetypal dream of the Bast/Sekhmet myth from ancient Egypt. Bast was a cat goddess associated with joy, dance, music and playfulness who used to use a rattle called a "sistrum" in her ceremonies. Sekhmet on the other hand was a lion goddess associated with the scorching and destructive power of the sun. In the myth, Sekhmet became furious at the hubris of the Egyptian priests and reacted with a bloodthirsty rampage which threatened all humankind. This was only halted when Ra intervened by giving her an intoxicating drink.

Whitmont and Perera's (1991) interpretation of the mythological motifs in terms of the dreamer's present situation runs something like this - the dreamer has ignored his "cat nature" (i.e. playfulness, closeness to others and enjoyment), instinctual energies which when disregarded become vengefully destructive. Whilst this is the current problem being highlighted by the unconscious, the Bast/Sekhmet myth to which the images relate gives us a clue as to the core problem to be addressed - hubris. Given the dreamer's associations to the business partner in the first dream, it is not hard to see the attitudes reflected in these associations as being the location of the problem. The man's actual business partner was seen to be a person overwhelmingly bent upon success in business and finance and on gaining prestige and power at the expense of personal feeling and emotional closeness to others, i.e. treating himself and others with an insolent pride which wrote out feeling connections. The point is that this area of specific therapeutic application (the man's current hubris in relation to his feelings) only came into focus when the archetypal material reflected in the mythological story suggested by the second dream could be combined with the dreamer's personal
associations. In other words, the archetypal material allows access to the nub of the personal problem which it would be more difficult to gain through the personal material alone.

This case example is important because it illustrates the value in combining an archetypal perspective with that of personal experience. In relation to the shaman archetype, whilst an understanding of its activated presence needs to be grounded in subjective life experience, an understanding of the dynamics of the archetype can point to certain trajectories which are positively prognostic and which no doubt relate to the archetype's connection to healing functions. Thus, whilst certain life experiences can constellate the archetype, once activated it will bring to the individual its own content. In the case of the shaman archetype, I believe this will be aspects to do with the wounded/healer.

Returning again to the case of the army officer, Jung (1931/1991a) does consider the possibility that the dream image of the paralysing snake may be no more than a "concretized figure of speech" (p.148) and concludes that his thesis really needs as proof "a case where the mythological symbolism is neither a common figure of speech nor an instance of cryptomnesia" (p.148) to show that the "absolute unconscious" has nothing to do with personal experience. It is here he returns to the "Solar-phallus" case which he has previously concluded has been central to his thinking in relation to archetype theory. He says,

This observation is not an isolated case: it was manifestly not a question of inherited ideas, but of an inborn disposition to produce parallel images, or rather of identical psychic structures common to all men, which I later called the archetypes of the collective unconscious. They correspond to the concept of the 'pattern of behaviour' in biology (Jung, 1912/1986, p.158).

It is this case example which we must now examine in terms of the an archetype's autonomy and constellation.
4.4.3 The solar phallus case

The following account from "The structure of the psyche" is Jung's most succinct statement of the case.

The case is that of a man in his thirties who was suffering from a paranoid form of schizophrenia. He became ill in his early twenties. He had always presented a strange mixture of intelligence, wrong-headedness, and fantastic ideas. He was an ordinary clerk, employed in a consulate. Evidently as a compensation for his very modest existence he was seized with megalomania and believed himself to be the Saviour. He suffered from frequent hallucinations and was at times very much disturbed. In his quiet periods he was allowed to go unattended in the corridor. One day I came across him there, blinking through the window up at the sun, and moving his head from side to side in a curious manner. He took me by the arm and said he wanted to show me something. He said I must look at the sun with eyes half shut, and then I could see the sun's phallus. If I moved my head from side to side the sun-phallus would move too, and that was the origin of the wind.

I made this observation about 1906, in the course of the year 1910, when I was engrossed in mythological studies, a book of Dieterich's came into my hands. It was part of the so-called Paris magic papyrus and was thought by Dieterich to be a liturgy of the Mithraic cult. It consisted of a series of instructions, invocations, and visions. One of these visions is described in the following words: 'And likewise the so-called tube, the origin of the ministering wind. For you will see hanging down from the disc of the sun something that looks like a tube. And towards the regions westward it is as though there were an infinite east wind. But if the other wind should prevail towards the regions of the east, you will in like manner see the vision veering in that direction.' The Greek word for 'tube', αὐλός, means wind-instrument, and the combination αὐλός παχυς in Homer means 'a thick jet of blood'. So evidently a stream of wind is blowing through the tube out of the sun.

The vision of my patient in 1906, and the Greek text first edited in 1910, should be sufficiently far apart to rule out the possibility of cryptomnesia on his side and of thought-transference on mine. The obvious parallelism of the two visions cannot be disputed, though one might object that the similarity is purely fortuitous. In that case we should expect the vision to have no connections with analogous ideas, nor any inner meaning. But this expectation is not fulfilled, for in certain medieval paintings this tube is actually depicted as a sort of hose-pipe reaching down from heaven under the robe of Mary. In it the Holy Ghost flies down in the form of a dove to impregnate the Virgin. As we know form the miracle of Pentecost, the Holy Ghost was originally conceived as a mighty rushing wind, the πνεύμα, "the wind that bloweth where it listeth". In a Latin text we read: "Animo descensus per orbem solis tribuitur" (They say that the spirit descends through the disc of the sun). This conception is common to the whole of late classical and medieval philosophy (Jung, 1931/1991a, pp.150-151).
In "Symbols of Transformation", Jung (1912/1986) says of this patient that he "was a small business employee with no more than a secondary school education. He grew up in Zurich, and by no stretch of imagination can I conceive how he could have got hold of the idea of the solar phallus" (p.157). This case is too central to Jung's view of the autochthonous nature of archetypes for him to be so sure, especially given later indications that Dieterich's publication had a first edition in 1903 prior to Jung's contact with this schizophrenic patient in 1906. This fact is noted by the editors of the Collected Works (Jung, 1931/1991a:150n, 1936/1990:51n) but since the patient had been committed prior to 1903, any concerns were considered inconsequential. Nonetheless, Jung (1931/1991a) discounts both the possibility of this schizophrenic with a "mixture of intelligence" having esoteric interests (as many schizophrenic people do) and the possibility of him being sufficiently self-educated to have either come across the material or some cultural variation of it. After all, there is a suggestion of the theme in mediaeval paintings which Jung notes saying that this "conception is common to the whole of late classical and medieval philosophy" (p.151) (i.e. the spirit descending through the disc of the sun) and elsewhere, that "[t]he association of sun and wind frequently occurs in ancient symbolism." (Jung, 1936/1990, p.52). Jung (1936/1990) knows that there are no paintings like this in the man's home town of Zurich and that the patient had not travelled. The man did, however, work in a consulate through which many travellers would have passed. I do not believe that the possibility of actual contact with the material or of cultural transmission can be entirely ruled out for Jung to hang so much of this theory of the autonomous nature of the collective unconscious on this case. As Rivers (1923) says on this issue of the cultural transmission with respect to archetypes, "the possibility cannot be excluded that the common tradition reaches the individual in infancy, childhood and youth through the intermediation of parents, nurses, schoolfellows, the overhearing of chance conversations, and many other sources" (p.178).

Apart from too many questions being raised by the solar-phallus case for it to be used as an only proof for the existence of archetypes, Jung is, of course, aware that the issue of proof is actually more complicated than the single presentation of this case would suggest. As he says,
If we had only such cases, the task of investigation would be relatively easy, but in reality the proof is much more complicated. First of all, certain symbols have to be isolated clearly enough to be recognizable as typical phenomena, not just matters of chance. This is done by examining a series of dreams, say a few hundred, for typical figures, and by observing their development in the series... In this way it is possible to establish certain continuities or modulations of one and the same figure... \[\text{and}\]... one can discover interesting facts about the variations undergone by a single type. Not only the type itself but its variants too can be substantiated by evidence from comparative mythology and ethnology." (Jung, 1936/1990, p.53).

It is this method which Jung uses in "Individual dream symbolism in relation to alchemy" (Jung, 1944/1992) by tracking an extensive dream series of Wolfgang Pauli. However, whilst Jung was not working directly with Pauli, he having been sent by Jung to analyse with a colleague, Pauli may be far too familiar with Jung's theories and concepts for the dream material to be considered sufficiently uninfluenced. He was in personal communication with Jung and later co-authored *The interpretation of nature and the psyche* with him (Jung & Pauli, 1955). This same line of argument could be applied to other examples Jung uses to evidence archetypal content as in the woman patient used in "A study in the process of individuation" (Jung, 1950/1990) who had been a student of psychology for nine years (and thus not naïve) before working directly with Jung. Jung tracks her emerging artwork to illustrate the individuation process and by Picture Two (out of Twenty Four), he confidently announces that the "personal relationship to me seems to have ceased: the picture shows an impersonal natural process" (p.294). This view so flies in the face of evidence from clinical practice to do with transference phenomena as to be highly suspect. One gets the impression that all too often, Jung is interested in removing any personal context or not focussing on it or minimising its influence so as to emphasise the objective nature of the psyche.

**4.4.4 Other case examples**

As noted earlier, personal context needs to be taken into account when dealing with content from the unconscious. In fact, Jung's own diagnostic work as a physician reveals some interesting cases where he is able to put the personal psychosomatic context of patients together with their dream imagery, the cases of muscular atrophy
(Jung, 1934/1993) and epilepsy (Jung, 1935/1993) being the most classic. The point is that a patient's psycho-physical condition can influence dreams which can contain archetypal motifs. In these cases it is the subjective life situation of the dreamers which enables Jung to interpret their dreams and provide medical diagnosis.

With the muscular atrophy case, a seventeen year old girl was being treated by physicians who were unsure if her condition was due to hysteria (conversion disorder) or progressive muscular atrophy. Jung (1934/1993) asked for dreams and she recounted two separate nightmares, one where her mother was found hanging in the family home and a second where a frightened horse ran through the house and leapt from the fourth floor to its death. Jung interpreted the mother image as "the unconscious life is destroying itself" and the archetypal horse image as "the animal life is destroying itself". From these dreams Jung deduced that the young girl's condition was of a grave organic disease (and not hysteria) with a fatal outcome and this prognosis was soon confirmed.

In relation to the epilepsy case, Davie (1935) was treating a patient where again it was unclear if the man's faintings were psychologically induced or organic. Davie presented one of the man's dreams to Jung where the final image was of a drained pond revealing two extinct animals, one of which was a minute mastodon. Because of Jung's knowledge of comparative anatomy, he understood the mastodon image and the draining of the pond to indicate an organic disturbance caused by a blockage to the circulation of cerebrospinal fluid. Jung concluded the epilepsy was organic and not psychogenic and again this proved to be the case.

Whilst a sceptic might say that in each of these cases Jung had a one-in-two chance of predicting correctly, nonetheless as given, they illustrate my point that there is no such thing as an archetype operating in a "no context" way. It would seem that Jung's conception of archetypal autonomy, spontaneity and "autochthonous revival" needs to be re-examined. Even if an archetypal predisposition exists it cannot operate in an autonomously independent way divorced from its situational context. Indeed, this would very much be the case if "functional meaning" as Jung purports, can be demonstrated.
Given Jung's case examples of the army officer and the solar-phallus man which we have examined, I am not of the opinion that he has sufficiently proven the point that archetypes arise autonomously, spontaneously and with "autochthonous revival". Rather, archetypes are imbedded in an environmental context and whilst they can pre-dispose individuals to experience the world in a certain way, they become activated not out of their own autonomy but through intense emotionality. It is not that Jung has no view that archetypes can be activated in this way but my position is that they will only get activated in this way. The essential interactive nature of the psyche with its environment needs to be re-asserted for as Samuels (1994) so succinctly states, "archetypally structured predispositions would come to nothing without a sufficiently precise environmental correspondence, or fit" (p.35).

My point is not that this critique invalidates Jung's overall theory of archetype. It is rather to state that on all occasions, dream imagery and other types of unconscious content which are not arising from conscious choice, always occur in a context and in response to something. This will be the case even when images apparently unknown to the dreamer occur and when archetypal content is activated. As we have already noted, Jung in 1912 certainly believed that archetypal content can be activated by distressing life experience but as time went on, he seems to have emphasised the archetypal side of the exchange to the detriment of the subjective side. I believe both the position of personal material in archetypal constellation as well as the nature of the personal/archetypal nexus need to be brought into clearer focus.

A number of implications follow from this critique. Firstly, Jung's classical view of the collective unconscious being unaffected by personal history means that it can be approached as if a well-spring of pristine psychic content that is both healing and guiding. This position has been taken by certain Jungians in relation to shamanism (Groesbeck, 1989; Moore & Gillette, 1993; Ryan, 2002; Sandner & Wong, 1997; Smith, 1997) but if my argument that the "no autonomy" of archetypes is the state of affairs, then such an approach will require substantial revision. Hence an overview and critique of these commentators will follow in Chapter Ten.
Secondly, if pre-existent archetypes in the collective unconscious are only activated by intense emotionality arising from an individual's personal subjective experiences so that a nexus is established between the archetype and the personal material which has activated it, then not only will the phenomenology of the subjective material be important in explicating the "ground theme" or "core" of any one archetype but it ought to be possible to delineate the particular emotionally intense life experiences associated with the constellation of a nominated archetype (as opposed to any other archetype). For the purposes of this study, once the existence of a shaman archetype can be demonstrated then the particular emotionally intense life experiences causal in its constellation can be studied. However, this hinges on demonstrating that a shaman archetype actually exists and it is to this question that the next Chapter turns.
CHAPTER 5

THE "SHAMAN ARCHETYPE" QUESTION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

As indicated in Chapter Three, the question as to whether shamanism represents an archaic archetypal configuration which will undergo cultural modification as conceived by Jung, or whether it is just a convenient metaphor by which to articulate certain phenomena and experiences, has implications beyond the mere semantic. Additionally, if shamanism represents something of the psychoid core of an archetypal configuration then this opens up transcendental aspects for consideration and the implications are vastly enlarged for shamanism could provide phenomenological data enabling an explication of the way in which such mechanisms operate.

In terms of post-Jungian discourse this question of a "shaman archetype" is of some significance because most Jungian commentators on shamanism simply assume it represents an archetype and its phenomenology is then viewed from that starting point. Groesbeck (1989), Moore & Gillette (1993), Ryan (2002), Sandner & Wong (1997) and Smith (1997) would be the most representative examples and a critique of their positions will follow in Chapter Ten.

However, given the overview of Jung's theory of archetypes and method for proving their existence as previously discussed in Chapter Four, it is now necessary to see if shamanism conforms to deductions from it so that the question as to the existence of a shaman archetype can be answered.
5.2 APPLYING JUNG’S METHOD

5.2.1 Preliminary comments

When previously summarising Jung's method for proving the existence of archetypes, it was concluded in Section 4.3 that "the active presence of an archetype in an individual can be detected when motifs unknown to the person spontaneously appear and cluster around typical phenomena which can be seen elsewhere to occur across other times and places and which display a correspondence of functional meaning in a situation where no other explanations other than 'autochthonous revival' are possible."

Initially some preliminary remarks to do with "unknown motifs" and "spontaneity" are needed for we will be looking at shamanism as a socio-cultural phenomenon rather than its occurrence in specific individuals and certain difficulties arise immediately. Within shamanism, it could not be said that the motifs which appear are unknown to the individuals for as seen in Chapter Three, it is the particular occurrence of certain motifs which provides evidence of the "call" to be a shaman. It is these motifs amongst other phenomena which are recognised by both the individual and their socio-cultural group as indicative of the shamanic vocation. However, in Jung's view, just because motifs are known to an individual through their culture does not in itself preclude the operation of an archetype. As he says in "The concept of the collective unconscious",

It is not sufficient to point out the often obviously archetypal nature of unconscious products, for these can just as well be derived from acquisitions through language and education (Jung, 1936/1990, p.44).

And elsewhere in "A psychological approach to the dogma of the Trinity",

The special emphasis I lay on archetypal predispositions does not mean that mythologems are of exclusively psychic origin. I am not overlooking the social conditions that are just as necessary for their production (Jung (1948/1991b, p.130n)).
Presumably, archetypal content can be activated through cultural means so that a difficulty would only arise if unknown material was being used alone to deduce the existence of an archetype. What is of more significance is the occurrence of equivalent motifs across space and time where cultural transmission can be ruled out and this issue will be discussed in detail below in Section 5.2.2.1.

Furthermore, and notwithstanding the critique undertaken in the previous chapter to do with the "autonomy" issue in Jung's theory, similar difficulties arise in relation to the issue of the "spontaneity" and "autochthonous revival" of archetypes when shamanism is considered as a socio-cultural phenomenon. From the perspective of individuals, Hobson (1971) has already noted that it is an immense task to fulfil all of Jung's criteria for demonstrating the existence of archetypes and suggests it is probably impossible actually to substantiate the one of "autochthonous revival". We have seen in Chapter Three that the spontaneous "election" of individuals to become shamans does occur but the influence of language, education and culture on them could not possibly be ruled out. Indeed, how could one rule out cultural transmission once mythological stories are incorporated into a culture? However, from the socio-cultural perspective, there are examples from the ethnographic literature in relation to shamanism where similar motifs appear and cultural transmission can be ruled out of consideration. In relation to initiation phenomena in shamanism, Eliade (1964) discusses the parallels between Siberian initiation and those within Australia and states that such "a parallelism between two groups of mystical techniques belonging to archaic peoples so far removed in space is not without bearing on the place to be accorded to shamanism in the general history of religions" (p.51). This would also accord with an archetypal explanation. He goes on to say that "this likeness between Australia and Siberia markedly confirms the authenticity and antiquity of shamanic initiation rites" and as such, would indicate a particular component of the shaman archetype coinciding with the initiation archetype as studied by Henderson (1967). Campbell (1976) has been able to draw similar conclusions when comparing shamanic practices in Tierra del Fuego with those of Alaska. Although these locations are from the same New World continent, cultural transmission, whilst highly unlikely, cannot be entirely ruled out and so Campbell's deductions must be
treated tentatively. Nonetheless, they are corroborative rather than contradictory and this is noteworthy.

Generally, in relation to shamanism as a socio-cultural phenomenon, the issue of "autochthonous revival" becomes somewhat relativised because the motifs and imagery to do with the phenomenon are already present in the cultures making it impossible to deduce any occurrence of something purely autochthonous.

There is another aspect to do with this "spontaneity" question in relation to shamanism which is worthy of comment and that has to do with the spontaneous nature of the pre-initiatory illness amongst certain individuals from within those cultures being studied. Whilst the concepts, motifs, imagery and ideologies to do with shamanism are present within these cultures, why is it that certain individuals undergo this "spontaneous calling" and others do not? This is a crucial question for this thesis. If my view of archetypal activation is correct then not only does Jung's theory require modification from a general perspective but specifically in relation to shamanism, the communalities around the emotionality derived from certain developmental experiences of those who become shamans will enable us to explain why this occurs for them and not others.

To further progress the question as to the existence of a shaman archetype, a triangulation approach will be adopted. Firstly, deductions derived from Jung's theory will be related specifically to shamanism. These will then be compared to those of another researcher of archetypes within the classical Jungian tradition, Erich Neumann. Lastly, deductions from ethnographers who are not approaching shamanism from a Jungian perspective will be examined.

5.2.2 Using Jung's criteria

If shamanism represents an archetypal configuration as conceived by Jung then a number of deductions follow. Being in the nature of things by way of the collective unconscious, then any archetype will be seen to express itself across space and time.
Chapter 5 The "shaman archetype" question

5.2.2.1 Shamanism across space and time

If shamanism is the result of an archetypal constellation which is itself archaic as Jung conceives, then we should be able to find evidence of its expression within prehistoric cultures as well as across diverse and different cultures historically. This is precisely what we do find. From the historical perspective, we have already noted in Chapter Two that there has been speculation for some time concerning palaeolithic cave art and shamanism, Frobenius (1933) (as cited in Campbell, 1976) making such deductions from his North African research prior to the discovery of the Lascaux caves in 1940. Historically, much comment has focussed on these famous French caves as by Campbell (1976), Drury (1996), Eliade (1964), Halifax (1982), Haydu (1970), Kirchner (1952) (as cited in Eliade, 1964), La Barre (1972), Leroi-Gourhan (1977), Lommel (1967), Makkay (1953), Smith (1992) being only a representative sample. But as Clottes and Lewis-Williams (1998) point out, the actual French scholars of the cave art have tended to be sceptical of any interpretation (like the shamanic one) and have traditionally stuck to facts and a structural rather than interpretative approach.

One main speculation of those scholars studying the French palaeolithic cave art has been how to interpret Leroi-Gourhan's (1967) "wounded men" figures found in a number of the caves. These seem to depict humans wounded by spear-like projectiles but Smith (1992) interpreted them shamanically, believing the lines to indicate forces emanating from their bodies. From the discovery of a similar figure in the Cosquer cave, Clottes and Courtin (1996) concluded that the speculation could be ended. For them it was clear that a killed man was depicted for "the large sign that overlies him could not in any way be a symbol of forces emanating from within the body: the sign is outside the body and crosses it from one side to the other" (p.160). Clottes and Courtin did not, however, completely discount shamanic possibilities for they were aware of other human depictions apparently dressed as animals or birds like the "sorcerer" in the Dordogne Gabillou cave. They also noted that most of the other human figures depicted in the caves are drawn completely lacking in detail, despite the artists' capacity to render animal figures with life, beauty and precise characterisation. They did wonder then if these figures represented "extraordinary
beings, shamans or spirits in human form who could be depicted only in a somewhat indirect way" (p.161).

What has been emerging over recent years is a body of contemporary evidence from other parts of the world which is causing the French cave art to be re-interpreted. Most notable is the extensive work of Lewis-Williams on the caves of the southern African San. He concluded that the painted caves were expressing something shamanic and he then began to look at European cave art in the same way (Lewis-Williams, 1991; Lewis-Williams & Dowson, 1988, 1989).

Clottes subsequently became interested in Lewis-Williams' research and his commentary on the European material. A professional collaboration emerged (Clottes & Lewis-Williams, 1998). They say in their Introduction that "We have undertaken [this project on European caves] because our initial studies have convinced us that shamanism - both the concept of the universe and the practices it engenders in so many regions of the world - responds better than any other to certain particulars of the art of the deep caves" (p.9).

Their thesis is based on two premises. Firstly, the view that there is a universal human propensity for the nervous system to enter altered states of consciousness; and secondly, the ubiquity of shamanism among hunter-gatherer communities. Given these, it is not difficult for them to find evidence of figures from Palaeolithic cave art that represent the stages of trance. Also by taking into account the caves' topography, geographical structure and context, including the positioning of the figures, Clottes and Lewis-Williams (1998) concluded that the caves were sites of ritual. By combining neuropsychology and ethnology in this way, they believe they have demonstrated that a "shamanic interpretation goes far beyond mere conjecture" (p. 79).

Most recently, Clottes (2003a, 2003b) with a number of co-workers returned to re-investigate the paintings at the Chauvet cave in France and a number of shamanic interpretations followed which are covered in Clottes' (2003a) book, Return to Chauvet cave. Excavating the birthplace of art: The first full report. In this publication, Le Guillou (2003) believes that the way the so-called "sorcerer" figure is
drawn "is characteristic of prehistoric depictions of humans such as the 'Horned God' that dominates the Sanctuary in the cave of Les Trois-Frères in Ariège" (p.170n). This figure has often been interpreted in a shamanic way, Campbell (1976) being one of many who do so.

Further evidence follows from the prevalence of bear depictions at Chauvet (up to fifteen recorded in the cave complex so far), which Robert-Lamblin (2003) believes could be interpreted in the same way as bear mythology in Arctic cultures where the bear has a mythical role analogous to that of the shaman. Chichlo (1981) has already seen a link between bear mythology and shamanism in the Neolithic rock art of the Siberian Sakha (Yakut). Robert-Lamblin used his study of Inuit culture, including their shamanic tradition, to interpret what may be the significance and meaning of the cave complex in terms of a site of ritual in a similar way to Clottes and Lewis-Williams (1998) above. He concluded,

Although we cannot assert that Chauvet Cave was the scene of real 'shamanic practices', as we have not so far found any traces of rituals that could have accompanied the production of the depictions, we nevertheless think that it may have been a sanctuary, inside which those who lived essentially from hunting came to celebrate a site that was particularly rich in game or to communicate with the animal kingdom and perhaps the supernatural world (Robert-Lamblin, 2003, p.207).

In his Conclusion to the re-examination of Chauvet cave, Clottes (2003c) reiterates the view he presented earlier (Clottes & Lewis-Williams, 1998, 2001) that the "dangerous animal" depictions in the cave are related to mythology within the framework of shamanic practices and beliefs. It is not without significance for this study that he and these other reputable researchers are coming to such conclusions. There would appear to be a growing body of irrefutable evidence to support the view that shamanism was practised by our palaeolithic ancestors. And this is corroborated by other examples of shamanic activity in the art of prehistory which can be found elsewhere. Kent Reilly's (1996) research in Mexico on Olmec art (1500-300 BC) at the Oxtotitlan cave near Chilpancingo in the Guerrero region and at La Venta, have been interpreted as depicting shamanic activities like cosmic flight. Further
similarities can be found in the Sahara (Lajoux, 1977), Siberia (Okladnikov, 1966) and Scandinavia (Glob, 1969).

In relation to shamanism's distribution across space, we have already seen that it can be found in cultures as diverse as Indonesia, North America, India, Central and North Asia, Australia, ancient China and Persia (Eliade, 1964), Peters and Price-Williams (1980) even including Africa which Eliade does not. The view that shamanism is a universal phenomenon is also supported by those like Siikala (1978) who restrict their attention to the Siberian *locus classicus*.

Most of the major researchers on shamanism agree that it has been part of the human experience for a long period of time and that it has been reproduced in the vast majority of world's cultures as would be expected if it had an archetypal underpinning in the way Jung conceives. As Stein (1987) says, "One basis for claiming archetypicality for any human activity is its ubiquity" (p.58).

5.2.2.2 *Shamanism as "irrepresentable disposition"*

If archetypes are "irrepresentable dispositions" which can only be known by their effects as Jung (1948/1991b) says, then there will be something both elusive and known about them at the same time. If shamanism is the result then of an archetypal expression, such a concept would be seen within the conscious articulation or attempts at conscious articulation amongst people but with a difficulty surrounding precise definition, which is exactly what we do see with shamanism, for the vast literature on shamanism indicates an agreed sense of something similar being investigated by scholars, despite their difficulties in formulating a precise definition. This is exactly the kind of situation which archetype theory would predict. Furthermore, as Kraus (1972) notes on the issue of definition, "one of the problems that has made the definition of shamanism such an elusive matter is that its basic content is of a very primitive, highly personal, primary process nature. In this sense it is part and parcel of the human condition and may correctly be termed ahistorical" (p.31). In terms of classical archetypal theory, things which are part and parcel of the human condition are *ipso facto*, archetypal (Whitmont, 1991).
5.2.2.3 Shamanism as a cluster of typical phenomena with functional meaning

If the function of archetypes is to arrange psychic material into certain patterns with functional meaning and if shamanism is the result of an archetypal constellation, then a particular pattern to do with this phenomenological expression ought to be able to be deduced from the ethnographic studies and this is what we do find both in Eliade's (1964) comparative morphology (see his Chapter Eight in particular) and with later scholars (Grim, 1983; Ryan, 2002; Siikala, 1978; Smith, 1997) including those who have undertaken their own fieldwork like Peters (1989) and Peters and Price-Williams (1980). From Chapter Two we can see that shamanism has a definitional core and that it expresses itself with functional meaning (e.g. healing séances) in those cultures where it occurs.

5.2.2.4 Shamanism and imagery

A fourth deduction from Jung's theory of archetype is that there will be a connection between an archetype and imagery. The arrangement of psychic material into a pattern which becomes recognisable to consciousness as a particular archetype occurs as a certain set of images. As Jung (1926/1991) says, "A psychic entity can be a conscious content, that is, it can be represented, only if it has the quality of an image and is thus representable" (p.322). This is not to say that the concept of the archetype is equivalent to an actual concrete image, rather the archetype orders and directs psychic material into visible images. It is behind the images as a latent invisibility but can become known to consciousness through the set of images it produces. Consequently, within archetypal theory, the presence of a pattern of certain images will indicate the presence of a constellated archetype and conversely, if an archetype is being constellated, strong imagery organised into perceivable patterns will be seen. The presence of both strong and definable imagery within shamanism (Noll, 1985) and around particular themes (as in Eliade's, 1964, Chapter Eight; Groesbeck, 1989; Siikala, 1978) is further evidence that the phenomenon is archetypally driven.

The implications of these points for later research needs to be noted, for once an archetypal perspective is granted in relation to the shamanic phenomenon, the images it produces (what Neumann, 1955, calls an archetype's "symbol canon") can be used
to gain an inductive grasp as to the essential structural elements of the constituent archetype under consideration. At this point, however, Neumann's classical understanding of archetypes and their expression will be examined to see if this also adds evidence to the existence of a "shaman archetype".

5.3 THE NEUMANN MODEL

Neumann (1955) has probably undertaken the most extensive analysis of any archetype from a classical perspective when investigating that of the "Great Mother" and his work is regarded as a classic study of the expression of this particular archetype. He begins by summarising Jung's general approach to archetypes from which he specifies four essential components. This is followed by an outline of the way he sees archetypes as emerging both into consciousness and into cultures. He then deduces a method for the explication of the "Great Mother" archetype but it is a method which could be applied to any other archetype.

5.3.1 An archetype's four components

The four components which Neumann (1955) saw related to any archetype were the emotional/dynamic component; the symbolic component; the material component and the structural component.

The emotional/dynamic component is seen when a person experiences an energetic affect in their psyche which takes hold of their entire personality. Neumann calls this "biopsychical seizure" and asserts that such an experience is due to the effect of an archetype - "the archetype is . . a dynamism" as Jung (1954/1991a) says.

The symbolic component of an archetype is seen when it manifests itself in specific psychic images to such an extent that the particular range of images can be used to deduce the characteristic elements of the archetype.
The material component is seen when "the sense content . . . is apprehended by consciousness" (Neumann, 1955, p.4).

The structural component is seen in "the complex network of psychic organisation, which includes dynamism, symbolism, and sense content, and whose center and intangible unifier is the archetype itself" (Neumann, 1955, p.4). In other words, the structural component is seen in the overall psychic organisation which emerges as both a product of and deduction from the dynamism, symbolism and sense content components and which includes them. What finally emerges as a structural entity understandable to consciousness as a particular and nameable archetype has actually been constellated by the central pre-dispositional energetic core of the pre-existing archetype itself. In fact, from Neumann's position it could be argued that the archetypal core operates proto-epistemologically in the sense that it pre-arranges knowledge.

At this stage, the question of the "shaman archetype" is supported when shamanism is aligned with Neumann's grid. In shamanism, the "biopsychical seizure" of the emotional/dynamic component would be seen in the pre-initiatory illness experience common to all shamanic callings as well as in the shaman's subsequent trance states. The symbolic component is evidenced by the specific universal characteristics of shamanism which can be articulated (Elia de, 1964; Noll, 1985, 1989, 1990; Peters & Price-Williams, 1980; Siikala, 1978). The material component would relate to the fact that there is a wide body of literature on shamanism despite difficulties in its definition and this indicates a certain conclusion by scholars (an "apprehension by consciousness") that there is a common phenomenon which can be articulated. Lastly, the structural component would relate to the quintessential elements and characteristics emerging from the foregoing analyses.

5.3.2 An archetype's emergence

In relation to how an archetype emerges, Neumann (1955) begins by asserting the nexus which Jung saw between archetypes and instincts. In "Instinct and the unconscious", Jung (1919/1991) says, "the archetype . . . might suitably be described as the instinct's perception of itself, or as the self-portrait of the instinct . . . [Thus]
unconscious apprehension through the archetype determines the form and direction of instinct" (pp.136-137).

The unconscious initially throws up images so that instinct will manifest itself in consciousness in this way. The archetypes order this initial imaginal material in consciousness into symbolic images so that any one archetype develops its particular symbol canon. This is not a smooth process for Neumann (1955) is keen to stress the interfused nature of the archetypes in the collective unconscious such that it is not unexpected if separate archetypal differentiations in consciousness are difficult to achieve. It is only with later differentiations, subtlety and distance that consciousness can separate the images into groups of symbols, delineating individual archetypes, which become recognisable as such. As consciousness seeks to understand these symbols, then views, orientations and concepts emerge but Neumann believed these began to operate in consciousness independently of their origin. As a consequence,

although all these many forms are ultimately 'variations on a ground theme',
their diversity is so great, the contradictory elements united in them so multifarious, that in addition to speaking of the 'eternal presence' of the archetype, we must also speak of its symbolic polyvalence (Neumann, 1955, p.9).

Given what Neumann (1955) has outlined so far, it would not be unexpected that a certain definitional confusion could occur with any archetype. If on the one hand, the nature of the archetypes in the collective unconscious is "interfused" as he says, then differentiation into a tightly understood archetypal manifestation would be difficult to achieve. On the other hand, once consciousness begins independently to interact with the symbolic material emergent in it, a diversity would begin to appear (the "symbolic polyvalence") so that again a condensed and uniformly clear archetypal expression would be difficult to achieve. The definitional difficulties we saw with shamanism as outlined in Chapter Two not only become perfectly understandable from this perspective but such a situation adds further indication that an archetype is operative.
To continue with Neumann's (1955) analysis. He goes on to state that the symbolic images differentiating in consciousness eventually form sacral images and these get infused with particular "mythological motifs" which reflect the essential nature/dynamic of the archetype constellated. Here Neumann is developing the connection Jung saw between archetypes and mythological motifs. We have already come across this connection in Chapter Three and as Jung says in "Introduction to the religious and psychological problems of alchemy",

Myth is the primordial language natural to these psychic processes. . . Such processes deal with the primordial images, and these are best and most succinctly reproduced by figurative speech (Jung, 1952/1992a, p.25).

Thus archetypes, as "eternally present" contents of the collective unconscious, express themselves as mythological motifs across different cultures. For Neumann (1955), this leads directly to a method for the explication of an archetype for it is "only through 'amplification' – the method of comparative morphological psychology, which interprets analogous material from the most varied spheres of religious history, archaeology, prehistoric studies, ethnology, and so on – can we reach an understanding of the archetypes and the individual symbols" (p.13). This is because the "mythological motifs" through which archetypes manifest themselves appear among all peoples at all times in identical or analogous manner.

Neumann (1954) has made a similar point in The origins and history of consciousness where he posited that early humans perceive the world "mythologically" i.e. by archetypal images that are projected upon it. The corresponding symbols which communicate this unconscious material cluster around mythological motifs and these then configure the mythologies of all peoples. For Neumann, this mythic approach is important in explaining common trends/themes amongst myths from different parts of the world. Conversely, however, the presence of similar themes across cultures gives evidence of common underlying mythological motifs and it is these which indicate, from a classical Jungian perspective, that archetypal components are at work.
It is in this way that the cross-cultural analyses of shamanism undertaken by scholars like Eliade (1964, 1987), Kraus (1972), Peters and Price-Williams (1980) do give evidence for an underlying archetypal component to shamanism precisely because such cross-cultural comparisons of substantial similarities can actually be achieved. Indeed, as Neumann (1955) says, "Because certain constant relations are demonstrable in the depth psychology of mankind, . . . the structural analysis of a particular archetype is not impossible" (p.11). Moreover, the fact that shamanism is so steeped in mythology and that shamans generally are the custodians of their group's mythology (as if they are closer to it and its power) is further evidence that shamanism is an archetypal manifestation.

There seems sufficient indication that shamanism conforms to an archetypal configuration as outlined by Neumann (1954, 1955). Specifically in relation to the argument of this thesis, something more needs to be said about the "biopsychical seizure" aspect.

In line with Jung, Neumann (1955) believed that one way "biopsychical seizure" can occur is spontaneously, the experience being so like that of a total "other" that it can be difficult to establish any relational connections between the personal psychology of the person having the experience and the eruptive content. In spontaneous eruption, Neumann granted that the archetypal manifestation depended to some extent on the specific situation of the individual but believed collective aspects like the race, people and group to which the individual belonged and also the historical epoch were more critically involved. As a consequence, Neumann believed the more a spontaneous expression of an archetype occurs in a context where the constellation of the unconscious is more collective (as in early humankind) the more the specific situation of the individual concerned can be dispensed with when determining the archetypal structure. If my view of archetypal constellation which is beginning to emerge in this thesis is correct, then this position taken by Neumann will require review.

Having considered the views of Jung and Neumann (1954, 1955) who adhere to a classical view of archetypes as their main theoretical position, it is necessary to turn to the ethnographers themselves, especially those scholars who are not approaching
shamanism from an archetypal or Jungian perspective, to see if they perceive anything archetypal in their study of shamanism.

5.4 VIEWS OF THE ETHNOGRAPHERS

5.4.1 Mircea Eliade

Having provided the most extensive study of the phenomenon of shamanism, it is not without significance that Eliade (1964) himself concludes that, as a religious experience, it is archetypally based.

In discussing comparative religion (which is the discipline through which Eliade, 1964, approaches shamanism), Eliade's view is that "the very dialectic of the sacred tends indefinitely to repeat a series of archetypes, so that a hierophany realized at a certain 'historical moment' is structurally equivalent to a hierophany a thousand years earlier or later" (p.xvii). Whilst it is this repeating which allows the history of the phenomenon to be written, the mere fact that such a repeating can be observed to organise itself into definable patterns is actual evidence of an archetypal process. An example would be Eliade's explication of the Altaic shaman's ritual of climbing the birch tree. In this section, Eliade is positioning his research by arguing that the (religious) history of a phenomenon cannot reveal all about the phenomenon. In Altaic cosmology, the birch tree symbolises the World Tree and "the steps up it represent the various heavens through which the shaman must pass on his ecstatic journey to the highest heaven" (p.xiv). Eliade believes there is strong evidence to assert that this type of cosmological view is Oriental in origin and would be one example (amongst a number of others) of the religious ideas of the ancient Near East penetrating far into Central and North Asia and influencing the shamanisms there. But as he points out, there is no reason to believe that these Oriental ideas created the cosmology and rituals of the Altaics because similar ideologies and rituals around themes of ascent and descent appear all over the world and in places where Oriental influence has not occurred (see Grimal, 1965; O'Connor, 1993). Eliade goes on to say,
More probably, the Oriental ideas merely modified the ritual formula and cosmological implications of the celestial ascent; the latter appears to be a primordial phenomenon, that is, it belongs to man as such, not to man as an historical being: witness the dreams, hallucinations, and images of ascent found everywhere in the world, apart from any historical or other "conditions". All these dreams, myths, and nostalgias with a central theme of ascent or flight cannot be exhausted by a psychological explanation; there is always a kernel that remains refractory to explanation, and this indefinable, irreducible element perhaps reveals the real situation of man in the cosmos, a situation that, we shall never tire of repeating, is not solely "historical" (Eliade, 1964, p.xiv).

Such primordial phenomena which belong to humankind as such are, from a Jungian perspective, archetypal. Indeed, the myths they spawn last the test of time because being archetypally based, they have universal significance.

Overall, Eliade's (1950, 1964, 1987) research on shamanism reveals a phenomenon with a cross-cultural distribution of something deemed to be essentially similar but with noted cultural differences which is exactly what we would expect from an archetypal configuration as conceived by Jung. Since the archetypes are not viewed as static forms which pre-determine all behaviour and experience but rather as organising principles into which specific individual experience can be poured (so that they act more like moulds), the particular culture into which individuals are born will have an influence on the way an archetypal configuration expresses itself. The result will then be an observable similarity of pattern around an archetype's expression across cultures but with specific cultural modification being observable at the same time. Thus Räkä's (1967) and Siikala's (1978) observation that even North-Eurasian shamanism, which has been so popular amongst scholars, is not a unified phenomenon because substantial local differences are evident around the shaman's authority, behaviour patterns, paraphernalia and personality construction, is not an unexpected outcome if a shaman archetype was in operation.

The overviews of a range of scholars have been able to demonstrate the underlying characteristics of shamanism which appear cross-culturally and it seems justifiable to assume that these are reflective of an underlying archaic archetypal pattern. This
conclusion is further supported through Eliade's (1964) methodology. Working as he did as an historian of religion, his method is comparative.

The historian of religion does not reach a comprehension of a phenomenon until after he has compared it with thousands of similar or dissimilar phenomena, until he has situated it among them; and these thousands of phenomena are separated not only in time but also in space (Eliade, 1964, p.xv).

Applying this methodology to shamanism, Eliade has been able to draw together the cross-cultural characteristics of the phenomenon and describe the various ways an underlying shamanic pattern manifests itself within different cultures. Whilst he interprets this material within a history of religions framework, an archetypalist could just as easily use it to describe the phenomenological characteristics of the archetypal pattern once it is granted that such an archetype exists (as argued above).

Whilst Eliade's (1964) position is actually quite archetypal, it is interesting to note that "Jung" appears nowhere in his references. Given the cultural coinage which Jung's concept has gained, Eliade's use of the word "archetype" may not be that unexpected. However, an archetypal perspective actually has the capacity to explain the phenomena he enunciates. Nonetheless, Eliade is a significant researcher on shamanism and his material does provide evidence of an archetypal configuration for shamanism. The views of other ethnographers need to be examined.

5.4.2 Other ethnographers

In addition to Eliade (1964), other ethnographers have noticed the similar worldwide characteristics of the shaman phenomenon within those cultures in which it appears, Kraus (1972) and Peters and Price-Williams (1980) being notable examples (see Sections 2.3.4 & 2.3.5, pp.18-24 above). The implications this has concerning the underlying psychic structures of humankind, has not been lost on other scholars for as Ducey (1976) states, "the patterns intrinsic to the shamanistic experience . . are encountered repeatedly the world over" (p.174). Similarly Campbell (1976) concluded that "Psychology lurks beneath and within the entire historical composition, as an individual controller" (p.264). It is difficult to doubt that the
phenomenon represents something of general human experience and is thus archetypal.

Larry Peters is an important ethnographer to consider because of the extensive fieldwork among the Tamang (a Nepalese ethnic group) which underpins his conclusions (Peters, 1978, 1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1997). When he compared shamanic practices and techniques with other spiritual traditions, Peters (1989) concluded that shamanism is humankind’s "first spiritual discipline . . . the root from which other spiritual disciplines have issued" (p.115). As evidence for this, Peters noted that shamans' descriptions of their transpersonal states of mind, despite the cultural relativity of the explanations for such experiences, are similar to those from other mystical and meditative traditions in that they share "deep underlying experiential features" which he attributed to an "endogenous transformation process" which underlies all the separate traditions. He concludes that the process is "psychologically prototypical, paradigmatic, and archetypal" (p.127) with an identifiable structure not the least of which is the experience of a psychic death and rebirth, so central to shamanism but common also to many other diverse forms of mysticism. Overall, "there is a demonstrably similar underlying psycho-transformational process which is precipitated by traditional spiritual practices that utilize ASC" (p.116).

There are further features of this "endogenous transformation process" which Peters (1989) again identifies as common across traditions. Firstly, the wedding of such transpersonal and transformative experiences to a career and vocation of compassionate action oriented toward others, this being a primary goal of most major spiritual traditions. Secondly, in shamanic initiations, a luminous figure is often encountered similar not only to Jung's account of the Philemon experience but also to reports of other experiences like drug induced states (Grof, 1976), those of near-death and UFO abduction (Ring, 1989) - which Ring interestingly calls "archetypes of the cosmic shaman".

In this material, Peters (1989) is introducing a distinctive and notable shift in the 1980's renaissance of study on shamanism for he conceptualises it in some way as underlying other transcendental traditions rather than just seeing it as a widespread
and contiguous phenomenon amongst many magico-religious systems. This line of argument is important because not only does it give further evidence of an underlying archetypal pattern but it aligns with Jung's conception of shamanism as "archaic" in relation to the archetypal pattern. Indeed, the broad common features which Peters notes would be expected if an archaic archetype was operative, as would the transcendental aspects of the experiences if shamanism represents something of a psychoid archetypal core in the way we have seen Jung envisage.

So whilst extending the phenomenological understanding of shamanism beyond that which is provided by the early ethnographers, such material of a cross-cultural nature which Peters (1989) provides, does give further confirmation to Jung's conception of shamanism as being an archaic archetypal configuration which has developed into different forms as civilisation has emerged.

The opinions of other researchers corroborates this archetypal perspective. Larsen (1976), when in commenting on the death and rebirth experiences of shamans, concluded that "the individual enters a mythological archetypal realm" (p. 65) so that these experiences were understood to be prototypes of all later mysteries. He sees such experiences operating as a "doorway to the transpersonal" and this would coincide with the psychoid aspect of the archetype. However, as with Peters (1989), the archetypal aspect has not been developed by Larsen because it is not the main focus of his theoretical interests.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS

It is precisely because shamanism contains something archetypal that we are able to recognise its different manifestations worldwide (both in space and time) as belonging to essentially the same class of things and why Hultkrantz (1973), when countering Spencer's (1968) criticism that such a thing as shamanism is ill-defined and does not exist, can assert that shamanism is recognised amongst scholars as a social institution. It may be ill defined or conceptually flawed to some extent, but this does not invalidate the fact that something of substance is being studied. As
previously noted, this recognition of some similar human experience at the same time as discerning different cultural manifestations is exactly what one would expect if an archetypal configuration as conceived by Jung were operative. Additionally, shamanism has been seen to align with the other aspects of Jung's archetype theory.

The other approaches from the triangulation method adopted to answer the question about the existence of a shaman archetype have added support to the view that it does so exist and this seems a satisfactory conclusion with which to proceed further into this study.

What is of importance here is that once such an archetypal position is adopted, then any correlations between shamanic characteristics and the experience of analysts, as Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) suggests, is something more than coincidental. The Jungian position would give a theoretical interpretation to these correlations and this enables the material to be organised beyond the phenomenological observations alone.

A number of pathways now emerge from this answer to the question of the existence of a shaman archetype. Firstly, a consideration of the way that the concept has been used by later Jungians. Secondly, given the critique of Jung's classic theory of archetype in Chapter Four, we need a theoretical model by which to articulate its constellation as well as an understanding of the personal life dynamics which would particularly activate this archetype in any one individual. The aim would be to apply this material to the future selection and training of analysts.

It is these issues which will be explored in the following Chapters. We shall begin by looking for an appropriate theoretical model drawn from contemporary Jungian approaches to archetype theory by which to further these investigations.
CHAPTER 6

CONTEMPORARY ARCHETYPE THEORY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Given the critique of Jung’s classical theory of archetype which emerged in Chapter Four, it is necessary to examine the approaches of contemporary Jungians to archetype theory, the aim being to deduce an appropriate model by which to further explication of the shaman archetype.

Samuels (1985) gives a comprehensive overview of both Jung’s theory of archetype and the major critiques of it up until that time. Since then, contemporary debates have focussed on two main areas - apparent contradictions in the theory (von Raffey, 2000a, 2000b) and a questioning of the a priori and innate status of archetypes. Substantial comment has emerged in this second area since Pietikainen’s (1998a) paper on "Archetypes as symbolic forms". The debate has polarised on the one hand, toward those who argue for a biological base (and hence the innate aspect) to archetypes, against the counter view which argues against innatism but which uses aspects of Dynamic Systems Theory (hereafter, DST), self-organisation and emergentism in its articulation.

6.2 Von RAFFEY (2003a) AND THE ISSUE OF CONTRADICTION

Von Raffey’s (2000a) position is less germane to this thesis so limited comment will follow. She asserts that Jung virtually accords archetypes conscious intention as they are purported to lead and guide people, yet she says he describes them as being amoral. Such concepts seem incompatible to von Raffey. Taking the anima archetype as example, she sees it as one of the biggest contradictions because, on the one hand,
it is supposed to represent Eros and create relationships, but on the other hand, being an archetype, it is collective, and hence impersonal in nature such that it could only represent impersonal relations.

These assertions have been vigorously engaged by other commentators (Astor, 2000; Beebe, 2000; Kast, 2000), Kast making the important point that von Raffey's (2000a) criticisms are justified if a theoretical position on archetypes is taken whereby they are not understood as archetypes of relationship and if it is overlooked that archetypal images are brought to consciousness through people's complexes.

It would appear that another essential point is missed in this commentary. Confusion will occur with Jung's concept of the archetype if the psyche's mode of function is overlooked. For Jung, the psyche always operates by projecting its own contents and this is a position of substantial importance because it enlarges the concept of "projection" beyond being a mechanism of ego defence only. As Jung (1940/1991) says, "our ordinary life... swarms with them [i.e. projections]" (p.83).

Within this perspective, if archetypes are understood to predispose the individual to experience the world in a certain way, then in the course of normal development they will project their content onto actual human others. In this way, far from promoting an impersonal engagement with the environment, archetypes actually are the psychic underpinning to, and base of, personal engagement. The anima archetype will actually get relationships going in the first place but the process is through an interaction between this archetype already present and its content which is rounded out through being projected onto an external object. The critical misunderstanding is either to see archetypes as operating autonomously as this leads to their reification and the justified criticisms of this position (Atwood & Stolorow, 1977) or to conclude like von Raffey (2000a) that the whole concept is unhelpful and should be discarded. The essential interactive nature of the psyche with its environment needs to be stressed. After all, there is never a situation of "no context", as Samuels (1994) puts it. It is this aspect which will be important in further understanding the shaman archetype, a point to be taken up in the next Chapter.
6.3 PIETIKAINEN (1998a) AND ARCHETYPES AS SYMBOLIC FORMS

Pietikainen (1998a) evaluates Jung's theory of archetypes in the context of Cassirer's (1955) (as cited in Pietikainen) philosophy of symbolic forms and argues that archetypes are culturally determined functionary forms which organise and structure aspects of human cultural activity. He discusses two implications which flow on from this perspective. Firstly, the significant contribution a discourse on archetypes can make to hermeneutical and cultural studies; and secondly, "archetype" as a concept can be removed from anything to do with genetics and biology. He goes so far as to say, "genetics - or, strictly speaking, any branch of science based on biological premises - has so far not given any evidential support for the much-discussed thesis of the inheritance of archetypal structures" (p.342).

Pietikainen's (1998a) paper generated substantial comment in the Journal of Analytical Psychology (Hogenson, 1998; Mogenson, 1999; Pietikainen, 1998b; Solomon, 1998; Stevens, 1998) but it was Stevens who seemed most challenged by Pietikainen's (1998a) cultural view. Stevens says, "the biological implications of archetypal theory are enormous in their ramifications and help to place the whole Jungian edifice on firm epistemological foundations" (p.351). Stevens' position is important to review because of the place accorded the biological/genetic perspective in relation to that other aspect of archetype theory which has been debated since Pietikainen's paper, namely, the extent to which archetypes can be understood to be innate and a priori psychic structures.

6.4 THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ARCHETYPES

It is certainly clear that Jung held to a biological perspective in relation to the theory of archetypes. He says following his first presentation of the Solar-phallus case in The symbols of transformation,
This observation is not an isolated case: it was manifestly not a question of inherited ideas, but of an inborn disposition to produce parallel images, or rather of identical psychic structures common to all men, which I later called the archetypes of the collective unconscious. *They correspond to the concept of the "pattern of behaviour" in biology* (Jung, 1912/1986, p.158). (italics mine).

And elsewhere he states,

The collective unconscious contains the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution, born anew in the brain structure of every individual (Jung, 1931/1991a, p.158).

Not only can numerous other quotes be found in Jung's writings (Stevens, 2002, giving a comprehensive overview) but it should also be stressed at this point, that Jung's concept of the psychoid as previously indicated in Chapters Three and Four, itself accords with a materialist theory of mind. Overall, Stevens (1982) concludes, "Jung asserted that all the essential psychic characteristics that distinguish us as human beings are determined by genetics and are with us from birth. These typically human attributes Jung called archetypes" (p.16).

In his first publication arguing for a biological base to archetypal theory, Stevens (1982) says he was initially introduced to the idea by Champenowne who asserted that Jung was more biological than Freud. "Archetypes, she declared, are biological entities . . . Like all biological entities they have a natural history: they are subject to the laws of evolution. In other words, archetypes evolved through natural selection" (p.17). Stevens has continued to develop this line of argument in his later work (Stevens & Price, 1996; Stevens, 2002).

As already noted in his reply to Pietikainen (1998a), Stevens (1998) argues that those who are prepared to entertain the idea of archetypes only as "culturally determined functionary forms" are overlooking the very epistemological base on which Jung's theory of archetype can be maintained, which according to Stevens can only come from archetypes having a biological, and hence inherited base. He believes Pietikainen to be overlooking the mounting weight of evidence from other fields of
discourse which point to inherited innate capacities of mind and he cites evidence from Cosmides and Tooby (1989) in the field of evolutionary psychology; Mithen (1996) from evolutionary archaeology; Sperber (1996) from the field of cognitive science and Stevens and Price (1996) from the field of evolutionary psychiatry. Stevens view is that not only do the innate capacities of mind to which he refers arise from a biological base, the biological base itself has arisen out of selection pressures during the course of human evolution. Thus, archetypal predispositions are not only understood to have an adaptive function but these dispositions are inherited in the genome.

It does need to be added that Stevens (1998) is at pains to point out that his perspective in no way denies that "cultural influences affect the forms that symbols and our responses to them may take, but these influences work on the archetypal imperatives which all human beings are born with" (p.351). However, in addressing Pietikainen's (1998a) point that symbols represent nothing archetypal but are only culturally relative, he asks, what then generated culture and how is it that human cultures have so many characteristics in common? Stevens concludes,

Our archetypal propensities, "modules", or "evolved psychological mechanisms" determine the kind of cultures we form, and these in turn influence the reproductive strategies adopted by individuals living in them (Stevens, 1998, p.347).

Few other Jungians seem to hold a similar biological position, although Niesser (2004) did present a paper at the XVI Congress of the International Association for Analytical Psychology on "Neuroscience and Jung's model of the psyche: a close fit". Niesser runs a comparison between the findings of neuroscience and a range of Jung's concepts, concluding that "we may now be in a position to actually locate brain structures which contain the collective unconscious" (p.1). He further proposed that the functioning of these subcortical brain structures coincides with the "basic emotional systems" posited by the contemporary neuroscientist, Jaak Panksepp. Panksepp (1998) lists these as - seeking, rage, fear, panic, lust, care, play - and he believes they predispose behaviour in particular directions. Panksepp goes so far as to say,
Our brains resemble old museums that contain many of the archetypal markings of our evolutionary past... Our brains are full of ancestral memories and processes that guide our actions and dreams but rarely emerge unadulterated by cortico-cultural influences during our everyday activities (Panksepp, 1998, p.75).

This is of significance because other neuroscientists assert that the brain displays a kind of innate knowledge. Damasio says on this,

The brain does not begin its day as a tabula rasa. The brain is imbued by the sort of life with knowledge regarding how the organism should be managed, namely how the life process should be run and how a variety of events in the external environment should be handled . . . . In brief, the brain brings along innate knowledge and automated know how (Damasio, 2003. p. 205).

Such a position is not in disagreement either with Panksepp (1998) or others who write in the field (LeDoux, 1998, 2002; Watt, 2000).

However, Hogenson (1998) points out that Stevens has been relatively alone in addressing the importance of the biological underpinning to archetypal theory and he hits the mark when he realises that the debate between Pietikainen (1998a) and Stevens (1998) is not an incidental or minor epistemological issue. He notes that Pietikainen represents a tradition where the argument about the relationship between innate structure and cultural representation is expressed in logical terms whereas for Stevens it relies on empirical research for justification (which presumably is also logical). Hogenson is also aware that the argument for the innateness of archetypes can no longer occur in a context which does not take into account biological research. It is "rather . . . the extent to which it [biology] plays a role and the precise nature of the role played" (p.363) which is critical. Nonetheless, Hogenson mounts a substantial critique of Stevens' particular biological view and this is important to examine because, as noted above, Jung's conception of archetypes is not only very biological, it is directly connected to the argument for the innate and a priori status of archetypes. The extent to which a biological perspective in archetype theory can be maintained needs determining.
6.5 HOGENSON'S (1998) ARGUMENTS AGAINST STEVENS' BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

6.5.1 Darwinian fundamentalism

Hogenson (1998) highlights a number of problems with Stevens' (1982, 1998) genetic and evolutionary approach. Firstly, he coins the phrase "pan-adaptationist reductionism" which like Mithen (1996) and Gould (1997a, 1997b) is a critique against Darwinian fundamentalism, something which Gould and Lewontin (1979) call the "Panglossian Paradigm". Essentially these different articulations are opposing the same simplistic view of evolution, namely, if something exists it must be because it has adaptive and hence survival value. Mithen, Gould and Lewontin make the point that things can exist for a whole range of other reasons. In endeavouring to make his point for the importance of a biological base to archetypal theory, Stevens would seem to err in the direction of "Darwinian fundamentalism".

This critique certainly needs to be taken into account for if biologically based archetypes can be shown to exist then only a number of alternatives follow. Firstly, they could confer survival value (even if only in posse) and the issue is resolved apart from the precise explication of the related psychic phenomena. This is essentially Stevens' (1982, 1998, 2002) position. Secondly, they could be meaningless structures and their presence is more akin to some kind of "psychic chatter" in the way that certain biologists consider "pseudogenes" and dispersed repetitive elements of DNA as dispensable genomic noise (trash) (Brosius & Gould, 1992). Thirdly, these archetypes could be vestigial, i.e. they once had survival value and served an adaptive purpose for humankind but that this is now no longer the case. The last possibility is that archetypes are akin to spandrels in architecture, i.e. they are structural entities that have arisen as by-products of other decisions in design which have later become co-opted for another purpose. This last alternative is an intricate issue in biology and will be dealt with in Section 6.5.5 below.

The first three alternatives above can only be decided by examining an archetype's expression in terms of its functional significance for persons. If an archetype confers
adaptive value then it is neither vestigial nor meaningless. As Jung says on this theme in "On the psychology of the trickster figure" (although expressed in relation to myth),

Now if the myth were nothing but an historical remnant, one would have to ask why it has not long since vanished into the great rubbish-heap of the past, and why it continues to make its influence felt on the highest levels of civilization (Jung, 1954/1990d, p. 262).

It has not been uncommon for significant Jungian clinicians to note that archetypes have adaptive value (Satinover, 1985; Stein, 1987). If an archetype can be shown to exist and to confer survival and adaptive value (i.e. functional meaning) then the issue is resolved.

6.5.2 The view that archetypes cannot develop

Hogenson (1998) alludes to certain post-Jungian assertions that archetypes are not capable of development and hence that the emphasis on the evolution of archetypes as suggested by Stevens (1982) is not possible. As Samuels says,

Fordham [1981] claims that it is conceptually wrong to assert that an archetype is capable of development and proposes instead the idea that it is consciousness which is necessary for the development in the first place (Samuels, 1994, p.74).

This view that archetypes, if biological entities, cannot develop, is only plausible given a non-interactionist and autonomous view of archetype as if they are fixed and autochthonous structures. The arguments already proposed in Chapter Four would call this view into question. Further, given an interactionist perspective, any archetypal expression will be both called forth from a particular developmental experience within a specific cultural context and will have an effect upon that cultural context. This in biology is akin to the Baldwin Effect and Hogenson (2001) has enunciated this in relation to Jung's view of archetype. The model to be presented in the next Chapter relies heavily on an emergent/developmental perspective to archetype and will argue
that what actually "develops" are emergent structures which result from a
developmental "interaction between genes, brain and environment" (Knox, 2004, p.1).

6.5.3 The silence of discourse

Hogenson (1998) highlights the overall absence of Jungian terminology within
evolutionary psychology and poses the questions - why import such a language if
evolutionary psychology can get along without it and why is it that this discipline can
describe its findings without any reference to Jungian concepts?

It is not that surprising to find different levels of investigation using a different
language to describe phenomena. This happens all the time in the physical sciences
without comment. Chemistry can quite adequately empiricise and articulate using its
own terms without recourse to the terms of sub-atomic Physics because its language
has been found to be appropriate at this higher level of organisation. Yet this occurs
without Chemistry having to deny that in all its investigations, sub-atomic particles
are present and active. To make the point, we could recast one of Hogenson's (1998)
questions thus, "why is it that Chemistry can describe its findings without any
reference to Physics?". Sociologists could mount a similar line of argument against
the reduction of their concepts to those of social psychology.

Hogenson's (1998) question is really a cloaked form of reductionism apart from being
an argument from silence. The problem with reductionism is not only that it amounts
to a "nothing but" argument (as Jung, 1914/1993, puts it in relation to Freudian
theory) but if taken to its logical conclusion, we arrive at an infinite regress from
which no discourse becomes possible (i.e. psychology is nothing but physiology,
which is nothing but biochemistry, which is nothing but chemistry etc.). The
alternative position is that every level of discourse can have its own validity so long
as it is logically consistent and empirically verifiable.

It is not without significance, however, that a bridge of discourse is currently being
developed between neurobiologists and psychoanalytic psychology. Freudian and
attachment theory are being re-assessed in the light of the on-going discoveries from
human infant neurobiology and Schore (1997, 2001a) has proposed that the time is
now right for a rapprochement between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. He believes that the recent advances in the interdisciplinary study of emotion were showing that the central role played by regulatory structures and functions represented the contact point between psychoanalytic theory and biology which Freud predicted in his metapsychology. In particular, Schore sees the "psychic structure" as described by psychoanalytic metapsychology as equivalent to the psychobiological mechanisms by which the right hemisphere processes social and emotional information at levels beneath conscious awareness and by the way the orbital prefrontal areas regulate affect, motivation and bodily states.

Whilst further implications from this research will be explored in Chapter Seven it is important to note at this stage that there is a discussion going on between these two different discourses (neurobiology and depth psychology) such that the parallels and overlaps are being teased out. Since the relevant researchers are involved with early infant states and Freudian theory privileges this discourse in addition to the more pervasive cultural impact of psychoanalysis, it is not necessarily surprising that Jung's theory of archetype has received less attention from infant neurobiology. But this does not necessarily mean that it could not be done.

6.5.4 Biological reductionism

It has not been an uncommon argument against the sociobiology that Stevens (1982, 1998) represents to say that the richness and complexity of human culture cannot be reduced to biological imperatives (Hogenson, 1998).

Whilst this is an anti-reductionist argument, its effect is to polarise the debate between biological determinants on the one hand and cultural richness on the other. However, an interactionist and emergent/developmental perspective as will be argued in the next Chapter, is capable of resolving this problem. Besides, no argument can proceed if conclusions are avoided because of unpleasant outcomes - this may simply be the true state of affairs.
6.5.5 The issue of spandrels

Hogenson (1998) proposes another view that archetypes may be better understood as "spandrels", a term he gained from Gould and Lewontin (1979). "Spandrel" is an architectural term which refers to spaces which become left over as an effect of a building's structural design but which were not directly intended by the architect. These can be co-opted for other purposes after their appearance in the final building. Gould and Lewontin borrowed this architectural term to describe morphological structures within biology which have arisen as by-products of "another decision in design, and not as adaptations for direct utility in themselves" (Gould, 1997b, p.10750). They are biological "spaces left over" which can be used later for adaptive value whilst not having arisen in the first place for any such purpose. These authors are concerned that evolutionary explanations need to take into account such structures because "[t]he failure to separate reasons for historical origin from realities of current utility underlies many fallacies in evolutionary thought about adaptation." (Gould, 1997b, p.10754). Hogenson discusses this issue in relation to archetype theory, positing that archetypes, whilst existing as psychic structures, could actually be the leftover results of other evolutionary processes which have been incorporated into an alternate purpose.

Gould and Lewontin (1979) are concerned about what they call "just so stories", which too easily confuse the causes of historical origin from current adaptive utility. The "just so story" runs along these lines. If a structure exists it must have arisen in the first place as an adaptation which confers survival value on the organism. Hence, any existing structure is seen as an adaptation conferring survival value on the organism. This view is akin to the "Darwinian fundamentalism" discussed above in Section 6.5.1 above. However, Gould and Lewontin do not believe that all structures necessarily confer survival value, at least initially. They use the example of *Margarites vorticiferus*, a boreal Pacific trochid gastropod, to which Gould (1997b) returns in his latest article on the topic, adding other examples like the masculinised genitalia in female hyenas and the shoulder hump of the giant Irish deer. *Margarites vorticiferus* by comparison, however, is a far neater example and with regard to it, Gould says,
all snails that grow by coiling a tube around an axis must generate a cylindrical space along the axis. This space is called an umbilicus. It may be narrow and entirely filled with calcite . . ., but it is more often, and especially in land snails, left open. A few species use the open umbilicus as a brooding chamber to protect the eggs.

We may therefore ask: Is the umbilical brooding chamber a co-opted spandrel - a space that arose as a nonadaptive, geometric byproduct of winding a tube around an axis? Or did snails initially evolve their spiral coiling as part of an actively selected design centred upon the direct advantages of protecting eggs in a cigar-shaped central space? (Gould, 1997b, p.10753) (italics mine).

Gould (1997b) realises it is impossible to answer these questions directly because we cannot observe the actual historical evolutionary sequence. However, by tabulating the comparative anatomy into a cladogram, evolutionists are able to infer an historical sequence from the distribution. In relation to *Margarites vorticiferus* he states,

The cladogram of gastropods includes thousands of species, all with umbilical spaces (often filled as a solid columella and therefore unavailable for brooding) but only a very few with umbilical brooding. Moreover, the umbilical brooders occupy only a few tips on distinct and late-arising twigs of the cladogram, not a central position near the root of the tree. We must therefore conclude - both from geometric logic (ineluctable production of the umbilicus, given coiling of the shell) and from the distribution of umbilical brooding on the cladogram - that the umbilical space arose as a spandrel and then became coopted for later utility in a few lines of brooders (Gould, 1997b, p.10753) (italics mine).

The difficulty I see with Gould's (1997b) line of argument is an implicit slide toward purposivism. There is no pre-existing plan or design in relation to evolution. Genetic variation arises spontaneously through the process of mutation and it is this which provides the major source of variation on which evolution by natural selection depends, the knowledge of which has filled the great gap in the plausibility of Darwin's theory.

Genetic mutations are occurring all the time and many do not become (and may never become) apparent, residing in the background of an organism's genome. It is only when environmental conditions change and the pre-existing mutation/s confer some survival value on the organism that one is likely to see them expressed. This may take
many generations but it needs to be stressed that the environment has in no way purposely caused the mutation/s in the first place, they are already present. In other words, the use of the term "adaptation" is only possible after the event of some pre-existing mutated variation which confers adaptive value on an organism to the point where their survival is advantaged and the new genetic material passes into the species' genome. Views of purpose, design or progress in this process are philosophical positions which have nothing to do with Darwin's theory.

It is only by sheer chance that any variation (even structural) which has arisen through spontaneously occurring mutations will confer any survival value upon an individual to the point of reproduction so that the new variation will pass to the next generation. In this way, the value of any variation (even structural) which has arisen through spontaneously occurring mutations is determined by its capacity to provide adaptive survival value i.e. its functional utility. The term "adaptation" always needs to be understood in this "after the event" way.

Presumably with snails, a long series of accumulated mutations (and hence a genetically determined process) has led to the presence of shells and this structure conferred survival value on those snails in which the structure appeared. But so does the presence of the umbilicus confer survival value for certain species. This is only another version of the functional utility of pre-existing variation whether the umbilicus is an artefact of construction or not. It can still be viewed as the end result of a genetically determined process, which for some species is conferring survival value.

It would appear that the state of affairs is as follows - spontaneously arising variation (shell construction) confers survival value. Spontaneously arising variation (umbilicus as by-product of shell construction) confers survival value (for some). I am not sure in this context whether one can talk meaningfully of "explicit adaptations" as Gould (1997b) does, as if some were more real adaptations than others. There are just adaptations no matter how they have arisen. Whether a structure is an artefact of construction or not is irrelevant if the test of an adaptation is its functional utility. Because an aspect of structure is not immediately "useful" is not relevant because there is much background genetic variation in an organism's genome which is not
currently "useful" as well. It takes a particular environment for the pre-existing variation to express itself and to be found to be "useful". Why can it not be the same with pre-existing aspects of structure?

Given the complex evolutionary pathway that would have had to have occurred historically, one could make the point that the current shells have been "coopted" at a later date anyhow, for they could not have arisen in their entirety in one evolutionary leap and conferred their adaptive value. There would have had to be a series of accumulating mutations initially producing structures which may have had nothing to do with shell protection at all but which have taken on the protective function at a later date. This is actually Darwin's (1873) principle of functional shift used to counter Mivart's famous argument that evolution is impossible because there would have had to have been stages of "useless" structures before complex and elaborate useful structures appeared - examples often attested are those of wings and the eye. Darwin reports Mivart as asserting that such complex structures like these could not have arisen all at once and would require a long evolution in morphology to reach the final structure as we know it. Darwin argued for functional shift i.e. "an organ originally constructed for one purpose . . . may be converted into one for a widely different purpose." (Darwin, p.138).

Furthermore, Darwin's argument to do with "functional shift" implies sequential spandrelisation in that structures which appear for one purpose (e.g. the initial "not eye" or "not wing" structures which eventually evolved into the eye or the wing) he considers to have been taken over for another purpose at a later date. This is another way of saying they are "coopted" (to use Gould's, 1997b, term) and if this is the case then the distinction between "explicit adaptation" and "spandrel" collapses and we are left with considerations of functional utility only.

In view of the fact that the emergence of the variation on which the whole evolutionary process depends has been random in the first place, it seems to me of little significance whether functional utility for the organism is conferred now or later in the sequence of events. The only test which enables one to name something as an adaptation is its functional utility.
It is not a case of "co-opting" as Gould (1997b) puts it but rather another part of the genetically determined morphology providing functional utility in another environment. The fact that this may be occurring later in evolutionary time is irrelevant since much mutationally produced variation remains unexpressed in an organism's genome in the first place. Timing cannot be accorded too great an importance because functional utility is all a matter of chance, whether now or later.

In his conclusion on the spandrel issue, Hogenson (1998) says that "[m]any traits of the psyche may be characteristics of the complex system itself, and not adaptations to environmental demands" (p.369) and such could be the case with archetypes. However, organisms do not adapt to environmental demands when it comes to their morphology. All we can say is that mutation confers certain characteristics on organisms which enhance their survival value. We can only speak of "adaptive value" after the event. Some of this sort of thinking is because of an implicit purposive baggage which comes from the use of the term "adaptation" which often confers a Lamarckian belief that the environment adapts the organism to it by changing or developing it.

Hogenson (1998) goes on to say that such "non-adaptationist traits may nevertheless prove useful at some later date, and under evolutionary conditions far different from those that prompted the structural development of which they are a derivative artefact" (p.369). There is an implicit Lamarckianism here for there is no such thing as conditions which prompt the evolution of structure. Environmental conditions will only give survival advantage or not to structures which are already present and which have spontaneously arisen from random mutation.

I believe it to be unfortunate that Gould (1997b) has chosen to use as an analogy (and Hogenson, 1998, has followed), the spandrels of San Marco in Venice. Architectural examples are replete with design/designer imagery, and by the very nature of the exercise, purposive. Unless one argues for some kind of theistic/designer evolution, one cannot speak of "primary intent" in evolutionary biology as Gould does. Similarly, Gould's use of the term "explicit adaptations" which whilst understandable in the light of his argument about spandrels, is problematic. There are no such things as "explicit adaptations". There is only variation which has arisen and which has been
found to have functional utility. One could just as easily argue that Gould's "explicit adaptation" is actually a co-opted by-product, for it has originally arisen spontaneously with no purposive connection to anything and it is only after this event that survival value is found to have been conferred on the organism to such an extent that it survives and passes the accumulated mutated genes into the species' gene pool. Even the use of the term "coopted" is misleading as it implies intention. It is rather that something in the evolved structure is found at a later time in a particular environment to confer survival value which it initially did not.

Finally, what Gould (1997b) overlooks in his use of *Margarites vorticiferus* as his example is that Lindberg and Dobberteen (1981) report that the umbilicus in female specimens is significantly larger than in male specimens, suggesting a selection pressure towards those females who can grow larger umbilicoi and presumably, for reasons of functional utility (unless females are just larger anyway). If the structure is conveying functional utility through having undergone evolutionary change, can it really be regarded as a "co-opted by-product"?

This section has been a lengthy foray into the biological position on archetypes for I believe it important to establish that a biological perspective on archetypes is not necessarily discredited by those like Pietikainen (1998a) who want to stress a cultural perspective only. This is without necessarily arguing for Stevens' (1982, 1998, 2002) overall position but the archetype model which will be argued in the next Chapter does rely on a biological underpinning. Hogenson and Stevens (Stevens, Hogenson & Ramos, 2003) have continued a debate over recent years on these issues and this requires further comment.

**6.6 THE ONGOING HOGENSON/STEVENS DEBATE**

Hogenson and Stevens continued the debate on these issues at the XV Congress of the International Association for Analytical Psychology (Stevens, Hogenson & Ramos, 2003). At that time, Hogenson reiterated his earlier view from 2001 that "the archetype itself and the archetypal image are emergent properties of a complex
dynamic system" (Hogenson, 2001, p.376) (italics mine). Thus he criticises Stevens for separating structure and content for a "dynamic systems view of the psyche sees both structure and content as emergent properties of an interactive dynamic system . . . . the genetic code at best determines baseline morphology" (p.375). In this perspective, structure is seen to exist as much in the environment as it does in the genome or the brain.

Stevens (Stevens, Hogenson & Ramos, 2003) on the other hand, saw the difference between himself and Hogenson as semantic and akin to the distinction between the archetype an sich and its manifestations in conscious awareness. Maloney (2003a) in reply to Hogenson (2001) makes a similar point. Stevens goes on to describe the archetype as "innate neuropsychic potential" which equates to the archetype an sich and which is innate and phylogenetically determined. On the other hand, he sees Hogenson's archetype of "emergent properties" as describing the actualised manifestations and not the underlying archetype an sich. Stevens believes there is abundant evidence from neuroscience that the archetypes an sich can be located in the limbic system of the old mammalian brain and in the basal ganglia of the reptilian brain. And as Stevens notes, these neuropsychic structural components are genetically determined.

On a later occasion, Hogenson (2004b) expanded on the way his view of archetypes as emergent properties could be understood to operate by using concepts of self-organising criticality, fractals and power laws. Here archetypes were seen to be one of a number of variant elements within a whole self-organising symbolic system which runs from an association to a complex, to the archetype, to synchronistic events and the emergence of the Self (archetype). Each of these becomes evident as the system transitions through a series of self-organized critical moments that result in phase transitions within the symbolic system as a whole. Hogenson points out that this position is similar to that of Saunders and Skar (2001) who saw archetypes as emergent phenomena preceded by a personal psychological complex.

Saunders and Skar (2001) had highlighted self-organization as a process typical of large complex systems and they noted it to be generally accepted as operating within the brain and important in its functioning. In their conception, complexes occur first
and archetypes as we experience them are an emergent property of the activity of self-organisation to do with these complexes in the mind/brain. Archetypes then are appropriately defined at the level at which they emerge but cannot in any way be considered as a priori entities. Whilst Saunders and Skar assert that their position is in line with the original development of Jung's ideas in that he derived the concept of the archetype from his earlier discovery of the feeling-toned complex, it is Hogenson (2004a) who has pointed out that this is a radical reversal of classical archetype theory which most commentators have failed to appreciate. The classical position is that archetypes exist before complexes rather than being emergent properties from the formation of them.

The application of DST emergentism to archetype theory leads both Hogenson (2004b) and Saunders and Skar (2001) to the view that archetypes are later levels of emergence preceded by complexes. Hence, as Hogenson says, both he and Saunders and Skar "make the claim that the archetype does not exist, in the sense of being a discrete ontologically definable entity with a place in the genome or the cognitive arrangement of modules or schemas in the brain" (p.13).

Earlier in 1998, Hogenson had pointed out that an emergentism perspective is in full accord with current findings from other investigators working within a connectionist paradigm (this is a field of investigation which works in computer modelling of neural networks). As example, Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith and Plunkett (1996) have been able to demonstrate in relation to language acquisition that complexity can emerge from the learning experiences of simple innate start points. This evidence runs counter to Chomsky's (1965) "deep structure" view of language, a view that Jungians like Stevens (1982, 2002) often use to evidence psychic innatism. As Hogenson puts it -

The connectionist model, which posits the evolution of more loosely coupled tendencies to which experience adds rich representational content, may thus capture more of Jung's distinction between the archetype as such and the archetypal image or representation, which he conceives of as quite variable (Hogenson, 1998, p.368).
It is amazing that these commentators can have such opposed views when commenting on similar neuroscience research - Pietikainen (1998a), Hogenson (Stevens, Hogenson & Ramos, 2003), Jones (2003) and Saunders and Skar (2001) asserting that support for an innatist position has not been forthcoming in the behavioural and brain sciences whilst Stevens (1990, 1998, 2002), Tresan (1996), Maloney (2003a) and Niesser (2004) assert the opposite. This disparity requires explanation but the model which eventually emerges from this discussion in the next chapter has the capacity to draw the research together. At this point, however, it is important to note that Hogenson (2004a, 2004b) and Saunders and Skar are not the only commentators who take an "emergent property" view of archetypes. This perspective is also being used by Knox (2001, 2003, 2004), McDowell (2001) and Tresan (1996). It seems to be unfolding as the prevailing paradigm.

6.7 THE EMERGENTISM APPROACH TO ARCHETYPES

6.7.1 Tresan (1996)

The "emergent property" approach to archetypes seems to have begun with Tresan (1996) who proposed that Jungian metapsychology can be re-evaluated in terms of emergentism, supervenience and complexity theory from the fields of the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind. He further believes that any school of depth psychology (including analytical psychology) will probably not survive as a mainstream treatment modality if its theory and practice are found to be at variance with the findings of modern neuroscience. Tresan uses examples from the areas of learning, memory and symbolising, to illustrate how clinical observations familiar to experienced depth psychotherapists not only agree with Jungian theory but are compatible with neuroscientific findings. Tresan's conclusions are important not only because he links Jungian theory to neuroscience but because he introduces the concept of emergence in relation to the archetype.
6.7.2 McDowell (2001)

McDowell (2001) as a later commentator is important because his argument utilises both DST and emergentism but from which he finally takes an innatist position, something unusual amongst those who adhere to emergentism.

His view is that the psyche is a "dynamic system which functions adaptively" and the question which he then raises is, whence comes the organisation? McDowell (2001) believes himself in agreement with Jung when he states that the organisation comes from the archetypes, although McDowell conceives of them in his own particular way as mathematically based "principles of organisation".

In developing his argument, McDowell (2001) examines the assertion of certain object-relations theorists that we inherit "preconceptions" or "simple orienting structures" but he finds inconclusive evidence that such things can be detected in the pre-cortical regions of the brain. He goes on to argue that even if this were shown to be the case, a newborn could only inherit a few such simple orienting structures and this could not account for the number of archetypes experienced clinically.

He notes that a person's genes are too few to code as a blueprint of final structure, going on to say, "My body's structure is emergent, that is, my body self-organises with minimal guidance from the genes" (McDowell, 2001, p.640). He concludes that the psyche (personality) is also a self-organising dynamic system and finds corroboration from certain psychoanalytic writers who have also equated the personality with a self-organising dynamic system. However, he notes that this begs the question, how can the entirety of human complexity arise from so few genes (only 32,000 in the human genome)? It is here that McDowell's particular view of the source of the archetype en sich suggests an answer.

McDowell (2001) concludes that archetypes are equivalent to mathematical principles inherent in the nature of things and as such, are not inherited entities. Rather, they are equated with a "pre-existing mathematical abstraction" (p.646) so that "any archetype-as-such can be described as a mathematical principle" (p.647). He goes on to state that, "I do not mean to suggest that an archetype-as-such is biologically based, or that
it is based in the body. An archetype-as-such is mathematically based. Biology is one medium in which it may be expressed, the personality is another". It is in this way that he understands archetypes as a priori "principles of organisation" in contrast to Saunders and Skar (2001) whom he criticises for not seeing archetypes as a priori but only as emergent properties of a dynamic system.

By combining DST, emergentism and innatism, there is much of value in what McDowell (2001) proposes. However, one problem with this view of archetypes is that they become reduced to pre-existing possibilities which can only be known after the event. Any number of "principles of organisation" can be adduced after the event to explain human psychic and behavioural material, e.g. McDowell's clinical vignette concerning Jack who had a dream involving three gorillas and which McDowell goes on to interpret in terms of "principles of organisation" to do with "authority" and "relatedness". Other commentators could just as easily have described the clinical material differently, Jung (1952/1992b) by contrast describing Wolfgang Pauli's dream of a gibbon (number sixteen in the series) as referring to "subhuman" aspects of the psyche and the "bestial instinctive foundations of human existence".

McDowell (2001) may be in danger of adding any number of "principles of organisation" to explain clinical imagery, experience and psychopathology somewhat like the early instinct theorists who specified many instincts to account for the complexity of human behaviour (e.g. James, 1890, cites over twenty), leading to a catalogue of "principles of organisation". What is needed is a determination as to the precise number of "principles of organisation" plus the relevant environmental conditions so that outcomes can be predicted and clinical technique refined.

I believe it more justifiable to view our experience of archetypes as biologically based emergent phenomena between the "principles of organisation" and particular environmental conditions, whilst it is probably extremely difficult to separate these out because the whole probably becomes greater than the sum of the parts.

It needs to be noted that a biological underpinning to archetypes is not necessarily discounted by the fact that a newborn could only inherit a few "simple orienting structures" and that these could not account for the number of archetypes experienced.
clinically as McDowell (2001) argues. Such a situation would not be an issue if there were only one or a few archetypes which manifest in different ways, an opinion which Jung canvassed in "Instinct and the unconscious".

Just as it may be asked whether man possesses many instincts or only a few, so we must also raise the still unbroached question of whether he possesses many or few primordial forms, or archetypes, of psychic reaction (Jung, 1919/1991, p.135).

Furthermore, it could be the case that the archetypes we experience are emergent phenomena which begin with these "simple orienting structures" but which undergo a complex interaction between this level and that of the developing cortex so that the archetypal phenomena as we experience them, emerge. Embryological research does indicate that simple biological start-points can develop into complex behaviour patterns, so much so that they can even appear to be innate, when in fact they are better understood to be developmental (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith & Plunkett, 1996; Gottlieb, 2001). Much of this was known over fifty years ago (Lehrman, 1953). In the same way, there may be simple biologically based "archetypal" start-points from which a range of psychic phenomena emerge as a result of neural/psychic development as the organism interacts with its environment. We will discover in the next section that Knox (2003, 2004) does seem successfully to add a developmental perspective into emergentism. Nonetheless, I believe McDowell (2001) is making a useful point by highlighting a perspective which emphasises a priori pre-biological principles of organisation which are understood to be in the nature of things for underlying pre-biological patterns have been noted across other sciences. The "New Physics" will talk of the way matter seems to have an inbuilt tendency to spontaneously organise itself into more complex forms (Davies, 1990; Davies & Gribbin, 1992). Such tendencies would have flow-on effects into biological systems as would the pre-biological fact that organisms are autocatalytic chemically dissipative systems (Weber and Depew, 2001) ("Dissipative structures" is a term taken from Prigogine, 1980, and means the way open systems take in matter and energy and then dissipate it to the environment in degraded form). These are by their nature, self-organising developmental systems, i.e. there is a chemical foundation (like a principle of organisation) to the fact that organisms are self-organising
developmental systems. However, McDowell's statement that "An archetype-as-such is mathematically based. Biology is one medium in which it may be expressed, the personality is another" (p.647, underlining mine), overlooks the fact that these pre-biological underpinnings (his mathematical ones as well as chemical and physical ones) will be expressed through biological systems and not to conclude so, leads to an overemphasis on the importance of the mathematical principle at the expense of the biological outcome. I would want to argue that as these pre-biological principles of organisation express themselves in living things, the biological underpinning to the archetype an sich is formed.

There is a final criticism of McDowell's (2001) approach, which whilst not directly connected to my line of argument, is important to state because it is an error often encountered in Jungian discourse. He posits that an archetypal viewpoint is important because reductive interpretations can deny people their creativity, injuring their sense of self and miss the healing potential which the archetype's image represents. This is a relativistic argument in that correctness of archetypal theory is being determined by its clinical efficacy. The problem is that clinical efficacy can occur for any number of reasons none of which may have anything to do with archetypal theory. Correctness of theory cannot necessarily be determined by positive clinical outcomes (nor incorrect theory by negative outcomes, for that matter).

Before exploring further the developmental aspect to archetypal emergence, Maloney's (2003a, 2003b) contributions need consideration, for he is another commentator who takes an innatist position. He and Hogenson (2003a) have been carrying on a debate in the Journal of Analytical Psychology about this issue on which Jones (2003) has commented and Hogenson (2003b) replied.

6.7.3 Maloney (2003a)

Maloney's (2003a) innatism is evident in his wanting to emphasise that which the organism has and which it brings to its encounter with the environment. On emergence he says, "A cycle of emergence as applied to psychology or culture requires both a consideration of innate design components and an environmental
context" (p.102). Maloney stresses the importance of the under-pinning to complex systems and concludes,

The mind is richly structured at birth. The structure resides both in the astounding complexity of the brain, and the regularities of the environment. This structure shapes experience in specifically human ways. We need not fall pray [sich] to discredited ideas like genetic determinism, nor single genes for language as a whole, in order to appreciate this fact. There are neither genetic effects without environments, nor are there environmental effects without genes. There is only a complex interplay that creates an emergent regularity, the features of which have yet to be fully described. . . . [However] archetypes do have a genetic component, and do reside in part, in the brain (Maloney, 2003a, pp.105-106).

This interactionist perspective which Maloney (2003a) posits is a sound position to take but two points are of note. He positions the rich structure of the mind "at birth" rather than seeing it as developing later and he further states that archetypes have a "genetic component". It remains to be seen the extent to which these assertions are verifiable and it is these issues which bring us to consider Knox's (2003, 2004) model. She combines emergentism with a developmental perspective and in this way centrally places environmental input into archetypal constellation.

6.7.4 Knox (2003, 2004)

Knox (2003, 2004) takes a stand against psychic innateness, especially any attempt to designate archetypal imagery as genetically-specified or to see archetypes as operating like pre-formed innate pieces of imagery and fantasy waiting to be called forth by the correct environmental stimulus. She offers instead a "developmental model in which mental contents emerge from the interaction of genes, brain and environment" (Knox, 2004, p.1). She goes on to state her central theme thus, self-organization of the human brain and the recognition that genes do not encode complex mental imagery and processes, but instead act as initial catalysts for developmental processes out of which early psychic structures reliably emerge . . . [Archetypes are] emergent structures resulting from a developmental interaction between genes and environment that is unique for each person. Archetypes are not 'hard-wired' collections of universal imagery waiting to be released by the right environmental trigger (Knox, 2004, p.4) (italics mine).
In this way Knox (2004) does not deny the existence of archetypes or their key role in psychic functioning or them as a source of symbolic imagery, although she is understanding their formation and operation in a particular way.

Knox (2003, 2004) emphasises a developmental perspective similar to that occurring in contemporary biology as Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith and Plunkett say,

some innate predispositions . . . channel the infant's attention to certain aspects of the environment over others . . . [but] as little more than attention grabbers so that the organism ensures itself of massive experience of certain inputs prior to subsequent learning. . . . at the cortical level, representations are not pre-specified; at the psychological level representations emerge from the complex interactions of brain and environment and brain systems among themselves" (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith & Plunkett, 1996, p.108).

This follows a similar approach to that outlined by Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray (2001) within evolutionary biology and genetics and on which more will be said later in Chapter Seven.

Knox (2004) advocates for the self-organising emergent properties of the human mind and she refers to Schore (1994) as providing evidence of an interaction between early life experience and brain development, that is, the intense emotional experiences in early life directly influence brain development. To this Fonagy (2002) (as cited in Knox) adds an important perspective - "psychological experience has the capacity to filter and modulate environmental effects upon neural structures that in their turn will have the power to determine a subsequent psychological response" (p.7). This would indicate that once neural structures are developed then interactive and iterative effects come into play between brain and mind. This aspect of her model which will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.

Knox (2004) understands this process of development to be founded upon certain automatic subcortical innate biological processes which can pre-determine behavioural responses and which work effectively in the species-typical environment.
She sees these processes underpinning instinct as we have come to know it - for example, Lorenz's (1952) imprinting being an example she uses to illustrate on the one hand, the pre-determined tendency to imprint (geese chicks normally follow their mother when she is the first thing they see after hatching) whilst on the other hand, the environmental susceptibility of the response pattern (the geese chicks follow Lorenz and not Mother Goose if he is the first thing they see after hatching).

From this, Knox (2004) considers the place of perceptual analysis as an early developmental process for infants i.e. the active comparing between stimuli leading to the emergence of an early structure called the "image schema". She believes these constitute the basis of later concept formation for "The image schema is a mental gestalt, developing out of bodily experience and forming the basis for abstract meanings" (p.9). Knox likens these "image schemas" to archetypes - they do not contain symbolic content in themselves but provide the scaffolding on which imagery and metaphorical elaborations can be constructed and in so doing she retains the distinction between the archetype an sich and archetypal imagery. Thus, archetypes are understood to be "reliably repeated early developmental achievements" (p.9).

Knox (2004) then combines this idea of the image schema as core gestalt with that of implicit models which organise the infant's early experience into patterns of expectation in a similar way that Fonagy (1999) and Johnson-Laird (1989) conceive. Overall then,

The archetype, as image schema, provides an initial scaffolding for this process, but the content is provided by real experience . . . Repeated patterns of experience are stored in the form of internal working models in implicit memory. This kind of memory is not accessible to consciousness, but acts outside awareness, structuring our perception of the world by interpreting it in light of the generalized gestalt patterns of implicit knowledge (Knox, 2004, p.10).

As Knox (2004) states in conclusion, her overall theme is to argue that mind and meaning do not exist in any a priori way but that they emerge out of developmental processes which includes the early experience of interpersonal relationships. She posits image schemas as the earliest psychic contents to develop. These are
understood to be experienced in non-verbal and embodied ways, rather than as pre-existing fully-fledged symbolic meanings waiting to be activated.

6.8 CONCLUSION

What I particularly want to emphasise is the place of biological underpinning in Knox's (2003, 2004) model of the archetype for in combining this with the developmental/emergent characteristics she stresses, her model not only becomes a powerful tool by which to understand and incorporate all the research findings up until this point in time but it provides the most useful model by which to further explicate the shaman archetype. Its consideration and implications are the subject of the next Chapter.
CHAPTER 7

A WORKING MODEL OF ARCHETYPE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

We have already seen in Chapter Three that Jung's classical theory of archetype poses some significant problems. This chapter is focussed on developing out of the foregoing overview of contemporary archetypal theory, a working model of the archetype by which to finally explicate shamanism. It is Knox's (2003, 2004) model which seems most useful for this purpose.

Whilst concentrating on "image schemas" and arguing for an emergent/developmental view of archetypes, Knox (2004) does state that "the body provides the substrate, the anatomical structures and physiological mechanisms that underpin and provide the foundation for symbolic thought" (p.3). Furthermore, she notes that the process of development is founded upon certain automatic subcortical innate biological processes which pre-determine behavioural responses and which work effectively in the species-typical environment. She sees these processes as explaining instinct as we observe it. For Jung, biological instinct is intimately linked to archetype theory. As Fordham puts it,

On numerous occasions Jung has related the concept of archetypes to that of instincts. His latest view is that if instincts be taken as innate patterns of behaviour then the archetypal images show a comparable pattern. In this he affirms his earlier idea that the archetypal images are the representatives in consciousness of the instincts themselves (Fordham, 1957, p.11).

However, these biological aspects do not seem the main focus of Knox's (2003, 2004) interest probably because she is more concerned, like most other writers who apply DST
to archetype theory, to take a position opposed to anything genetically innate. As she says, "this model refutes any possibility of innate (genetically-specified) archetypal imagery" (Knox, 2004, p.6).

But in relation to biology and archetype theory, we have already seen Hogenson (Stevens, Hogenson & Ramos, 2003) assert that "The crucial question in a discussion of biology and psyche is not whether the two domains are linked, but how they are linked" (p.368). In 1998, Hogenson was saying

developments in linguistics, cognitive psychology, philosophy, and computer science, among other fields, as well as in biology and neurophysiology were all moving in the direction of arguing that some sort of innate structures of the human brain do account for the most characteristic aspects of human cognition (Hogenson, 1998, p.362).

This statement is interesting because Hogenson (1998) seems disinclined through his emphasis on emergence, to give archetypes any locality. As he says later, "the archetypes do not exist in some particular place, be it the genome or some transcendent realm of Platonic ideas" (Hogenson, 2001, p.607). Nonetheless, it needs to be kept in mind that Hogenson's (1998) criticisms of Stevens' strong biological perspective can be countered as was seen in Chapter Six. That analysis showed it not to be unreasonable to conclude that biology has a significant part to play in the scheme of archetypal experience.

Knox's (2003, 2004) position does contain a biological focus for the model she proposes sees development itself as leading to mind/brain structures which underpin archetypal experience. As she says when commenting on Schore's research - "the intense relationships of early life directly influence the development of key parts of the brain" (Knox, 2004, p.6). She goes further to suggest with Fonagy (2002) (as cited in Knox, 2004) that once such structures are in place, they can modulate subsequent psychological responses. I believe that the "early psychic structures" which she posits as underlying "image schemas" can be understood to be bio-structural and in this way her model of archetypes as emergent phenomena allows for them a corresponding neural location even
if only as interconnections of neural clusters. Schore's on-going research does seem to imply that environmental experience and development lead to neural clusters of synaptic organisation in particular brain locations which coincide with aspects of psychoanalytic theory. It is perfectly reasonable to conclude that the same may be the case with archetype theory. Schore's research requires some explication because of its bearing on the bio-structural aspect of Knox's emergent/developmental model of the archetype.

7.2 SCHORE'S RESEARCH

In his *Affect regulation and the origin of the self: The neurobiology of emotional development* published in 1994, Schore drew upon current findings in infant research and neurobiology to propose that an infant's affective interactions with the early human social environment directly and indelibly influence the postnatal maturation of brain structures that regulate all future socioemotional functioning. Over the ensuing years, he has continued to accrue evidence that this is the case (Schore, 1998, 2000a, 2001b, 2001c, 2005).

On turning his attention to Bowlby's Attachment theory, Schore (2000a) concluded that a biological control system in the brain regulates affectively driven instinctive behaviour and he identified this biological control system with the orbitofrontal system and its cortical and subcortical connections. He labelled this the "senior executive of the emotional brain" which he understood to act as a regulatory system which is centrally involved in inhibitory control. It is expanded in the right hemisphere and is dominant in human infancy. In Chapter Six, we have already seen Schore (1997, 2001a) propose that the time is now right for a rapprochement between psychoanalysis and neuroscience because studies in the interdisciplinary study of emotion were showing that the central role played by regulatory structures and functions represented the contact point between psychoanalytic theory and biology which Freud predicted in his metapsychology. Thus, Schore sees the "psychic structure" described by psychoanalytic metapsychology as
equivalent to the psychobiological mechanisms by which the right hemisphere processes social and emotional information at levels beneath conscious awareness and by the way the orbital prefrontal areas regulate affect, motivation and bodily states.

Specifically in relation to Knox (2003, 2004), Schore's (1994) overall position that postnatal emotional experience has a direct impact on the structural development of the brain which then takes on a regulatory function is of particular significance for it sits comfortably with the model she proposes. Furthermore, Schore (2000b) has gone on to propose a DST approach to emotional processes in a similar way to Knox. Other researchers in developmental biology corroborate Schore's findings.

7.3 DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY

Gottlieb is a developmental biologist who as early as 1970 proposed what he called a "bidirectional structure-function hypothesis". By this, he suggested there was more at work than just a linear causal connection between structure and function. He proposed that over the lifespan of an organism, feedback also occurs in the other direction between function and structure to the extent that structure only fully realises itself through function. Since then, "bidirectionality" has been substantially researched (see the review in Black and Greenough, 1998) and Gottlieb (2001) provides an overall summary. He says of his own research involving human foetuses,

each sensory system begins to function while still undergoing maturation (i.e. while cell division, migration, growth, and differentiation are still going on), so each system could contribute to its own normal prenatal (as well as postnatal) development. Thus, normally occurring spontaneous and evoked function (experience broadly defined) could play a role in the rate at which a sensory system becomes completely mature as well as contributing to the overall competence of the system by, for example, influencing the number of neurons, as well as the size of neurons and their axonal and dendritic fields, . . . The positive influence of functional activity on the nervous system is not restricted to the prenatal period but continues into adulthood (Gottlieb, 2001, p.44).
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The critical point from both Schore and these findings in developmental biology is that the end product of development leads to actual neural bio-structure as a result of the dynamic interaction which goes on bidirectionally between structure and function (experience in the environment). In addition, this occurs from the earliest stages of development, even prenatally.


The implication of the foregoing is that despite the emphasis on cultural perspectives in relation to archetype theory like that of Pietikainen (1998a), biology is far from being discounted in the way he argues. Biology has its place but in a particular way that is understood to be quite different from that proposed by Stevens (2002). I believe it allows for the conclusion that there is a bio-structural underpinning to archetypal imagery but not as some kind of genomic blueprint which gets "read out" in an automatic way. Rather, it is the result of developmental processes in species-typical environments such that early life experiences forge a "hard wired" template of particular neural clusters which underpin the emergent archetypal patterns within individuals. In this way, archetypes are still seen to be structural components of the psyche but they are not genetic or completely present at birth. Rather it is through developmental experience that they become bio-structured.

Overall then, the bio-structural aspect of Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental model of archetype is able to combine an understanding of innate biological start points with developmental experience leading to mind/brain structures which initially operate implicitly and which underpin the emergence of complex human archetypal imaging. If this is the case then eventually the neural clusters coinciding with "archetypal experiences" could be located in particular brain localities. There are important points
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here. Firstly, the fact that emotionally intense early life experience before the emergence of consciousness can actually lead to the development of key parts of the brain means that a biological underpinning to archetypes gets built-in in a structural way. Emergent archetypal imagery and experience are then connected to and derived from these developmentally produced structures. Secondly, there is a significant shift in seeing the presence of these bio-structures not as pre-determined innate entities in any preformationist sense but as having emerged from developmental experiences. Thirdly, because the particular clusters depend on development, the environment in which the development occurs (normally, species-typical environments) becomes central in understanding the emergence of particular archetypal imagery. Presumably, different sorts of environmental input can lead to different sorts of archetypal imagery.

We are now in a position to offer a final working definition of archetype for the purposes of this thesis which comes out of the bio-structural aspect of Knox's model (2003, 2004). Archetypes are developmentally produced bio-structural templates which initially operate implicitly but which underpin the emergence of complex imagery. They are initially produced by, and later activated through, intense affectivity. This means that archetypes are not present in the psyche in any preformationist sense nor do they express themselves autochthonously.

In this definition, the bio-structural template aspect would align with Jung's idea of the archetype an sich. The emergent imagery aspect would align with the archetype's manifest expression which we experience.

By emphasising the bio-structural component in Knox's (2003, 2004) model, it becomes a very powerful tool by which to understand archetypal imagery and a consideration of its implications is discussed below. However, before doing so, it is important to note the difficulties facing this kind of research. Principally, it is just not easy to observe all the causal and contributing factors at emergent levels of function. This is a problem encountered in Chaos theory and is usually articulated in terms of the "butterfly effect". Similarly, in fluid dynamics, we do not have the capacity to analyse each of the causal
connections at the micro level required to give a linear explanation of events. One is compelled to look at things from a higher level of organisation and see what patterns emerge given the start points which are indiscernible. We have already noted Maloney (2003a) making this point with archetypes, that is that there is some kind of unknowable innate underpinning which can only be known/seen by its effects at a higher level of organisation. I believe the bio-structural aspect of Knox's model alongside her use of the "image schema" concept allows for a similar interpretation and of significance, such a position does coincide with Jung's distinction between the archetype an sich and its manifest expression.


7.5.1 Implication 1 - The model has substantial explanatory power

Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental model is more than a compromise position for it can take into account all of the evidence up to this point in time. Her model certainly coincides with the other emergentism positions of Hogenson (1998, 2004b), McDowell (2001), Maloney (2003a), Saunders and Skar (2001), Tresan (1996) and does not need to challenge the cultural perspective of Pietikainen (1998a). Of significance, however, is the fact that if innate biological start points coinciding with developmental experience lead to mind/brain structures which initially operate implicitly and which underpin the emergence of complex human archetypal imagery, then the observations of those like Stevens (2002) and Niesser (2004) who detect a correspondence between archetypes and brain locations is not that unexpected. The main difference is in the explanation as to how such bio-structural components get there in the first place. For Stevens, they arise from the encoded genetic make-up of the individual, whereas for Knox, they are arising out of developmental experience.
Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental model of archetype also enables us to explain instinct as we observe it because these response patterns are understood to arise within species-typical environments from the automatic subcortical innate biological startpoints which she posits. This is important for archetype theory because as stated in the Introduction to this Chapter, Jung from his earliest years was drawing a connection between instinct and archetype. In 1919 he said, "The primordial image [i.e. archetype] might suitably be described as the *instinct's perception of itself*, or as the self-portrait of the instinct" (Jung, 1919/1991, p.136) and in 1931, "the archetypes are simply the forms which the instincts assume" (1931/1991a, p.157). By 1954, Jung had developed his position in detail in "Psychological aspects of the mother archetype" where at one point he states,

The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, nothing but a *facultas praeformandi*, a possibility of representation which is given *a priori*. The representations themselves are not inherited, only the forms, and in that respect they correspond in every way to the instincts, which are also determined in form only (Jung, 1954/1990c, p.79).

Fordham (1957) was the first to indicate that Jung's approach to instinct was in complete accord with the traditional biological instinct theory of Lorenz (1957) and Tinbergen (1951), although Jung (1954/1991a) himself only ever referred to the early instinct theorist, C. Lloyd Morgan. Stevens (1982) extensively developed Fordham's view in his *Archetype: A natural history of the self* which was later re-visited by Stevens and Price (1996) to draw parallels between Jung's (1954/1991a) "patterns of behaviour" and the ethologists' "innate releasing mechanisms" as evidence that archetypes are the biological base behind "genetically transmitted . . . patterns of behaviour" (p.200ff).

Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to critique instinct theory, it is important to note that Knox's (2003, 2004) model does contribute to an explanation of the way instinct can function and this is important given Jung's adherence to it in relation to archetype theory.
Finally, in combining an understanding of innate biological startpoints which underpin the emergence of complex archetypal imagery, Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental model of archetype does enable a way to explicate the psychophysical nature of the psychoid core to the archetypes, making the concept of the "psychoid" much more understandable. The physical side would coincide with the biostructures and the psychological side with the emergent archetypal imagery.

7.5.2 Implication 2 - The model leads to a new perspective on innatism

All of those Jungians who adhere to an emergentism position seem to be against anything genetically specified in relation to archetypes and it is from this position that they argue against innatism (viz that archetypal content is genetically encoded). However, as indicated above, Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental model is based on a biological underpinning to archetypal imagery and it is not unreasonable to conclude that, at the very least, this would be reflected in bio-structural neural clusters of some kind. As Fonagy (2002) (as cited in Knox, 2004) indicates, once such developmental structures are present they then have the capacity to influence psychological life in a similar way to Schore's (2000a) regulatory "senior executive of the emotional brain". Thus, it is also not unreasonable to conclude that archetypes will be experienced as if innate because they have become present through early life experience before the emergence of consciousness. They are present by the time we become aware of their activity but they have not been present from birth.

In other words, the end result of the developmental process which Knox (2003, 2004) specifies would lead to the laying down of a "hard wired" template of response and imagery potentials which when activated would appear to the adult to be spontaneous and not as having arisen from conscious awareness. This is because the underpinning bio-structure has been imbedded when the infant psyche was still unconscious and developing. Similarly, because of the bio-structural underpinning, archetypes will be experienced as if innate. Hence, the whole way that innatism has been conceived of up until now needs revision.
The question now begged is the extent to which these bio-structural templates have the capacity to influence psychological experience autochthonously. We have already seen in Chapter Four that for other reasons, this is a questionable position in relation to archetype theory. The autonomous issue becomes even more questionable when we consider the environmental sensitivity of archetypal development which the bio-structural aspect of Knox's (2003, 2004) model implies.

7.5.3 Implication 3 - The model implies an archetype-environment nexus and is opposed to the view of the "autochthonous revival" of archetypes

Knox (2004) explicitly makes the point that her position is one of interaction. As she says, she "challenges the view that mental contents can be innate and offers instead a developmental model in which mental contents emerge from the interaction of genes, brain and environment" (p.1). As a consequence, archetypes are understood to be "reliably repeated early developmental achievements" (p. 9).

In this way, archetypes are the result of developmental interaction between the human organism and the environment. Without the environment, archetypes would not emerge into being. This implies certain things. Any archetype emerges in the first place because of particular environmental experience and this means that the emergent imagery will be environmentally specific. Species-typical environments would lead to the norm but other environmental input can lead to different and specific archetypal clusters. We are reminded here of Samuel's (1994) assertion that "archetypally structured predispositions would come to nothing without a sufficiently precise environmental correspondence, or fit" (p.35). However, Knox's (2003, 2004) model goes further by showing that the bio-structures leading to the emergence of archetypal imagery develop in the first place as the result of particular environmental experience. The archetypal imagery does not arise from some preformationist potentiality expressing itself once the appropriate environmental fit is supplied. I believe this implies that there will always be a nexus between archetypal imagery and particular environmental experience so that a vector is
established in the opposite direction, akin to Gottlieb's (2001) "bidirectional" hypothesis and as supported by Schore (2000a) and Fonagy's (2002) (as cited in Knox, 2004) observations that once neural structures are in place, they can modulate subsequent psychological responses. Specifically, the environment will not just lead to the original developmental emergence of any one archetype but once some kind of bio-structure has been forged, similar environmental conditions will always be necessary for that archetype's activation. In other words, the emergence of particular archetypal imagery in a person's life will be connected to a similarity in their current affective environment with the original affective environment during the archetype's original developmental emergence. It is the interactive resonance between these two states (the "then" and the "now") which will constellate the emergence of archetypal imagery in the present, for this interaction between the environment and the bio-structure will formulate imagery out of "then" (early experience) and "now" (current affect) so long as there is a correspondence between the two which has been forged through the developmental process. Again as argued in Chapter Four, archetypes are not understood to operate with "autochthonous revival" but always in connection with specific environmental conditions because they have emerged from, and cluster around, particular environmental inputs.

One value of this model is its capacity to explain repetition phenomena encountered in clinical experience. "Transference love" and the "repetition compulsion" would be two examples in point.

In relation to transference love, Freud (1914/2001) notes that "it exhibits not a single new feature arising from the present situation, but is entirely composed of repetitions and copies of earlier reactions" (p.167). It is the very aspect of "repetition" which Freud saw as revealing the infantile aspect (the "then") to the phenomenon. Clinicians see such things all the time - the same dynamic played out in the transference and in every other significant relationship into which persons are (projectively) attracted.

An explanation in terms of Knox's (2003, 2004) model would run something like this. The "then" affects of early developmental experience around the unresolved Oedipal
situation get bio-structurally embedded in the psyche of the individual like a template. The "now" situation of the later analytic encounter has such similar affective resonance with the infantile experience that the bio-structural template becomes activated. Imagery-affects emerge and are projected onto the therapist so that the earlier unresolved infantile dynamic gets played out in the "now" of transference love.

The "repetition compulsion" is a way of describing similar dynamics especially of individuals who continue to series through a sequence of abusive relationships. In recent years, the American Psychiatric Association (1994) has debated whether to add a "Masochistic Personality Disorder" to their Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (hereafter, DSM IV) as a way of articulating this phenomenon which many counsellors find difficult to explain - surely people do not like abuse and learn from their experience? I believe it is rather that something much more powerful than learning from one’s experience is at hand, because we are dealing with an activated template in a similar way as described above. Again, the "then" of early affective developmental experience around abuse has become bio-structurally embedded in the psyche of the individual. Later, in the "now", a person is encountered who sufficiently resonates with the original abuse situation (with all its excitements, potentialities and connectabilities) so that the bio-structural template becomes activated. Imagery-affects emerge and an emotional vector is established which gets projected onto the object. This can be of such energy that individuals may have very little choice over the (unconscious) compulsive quality to the experience.

The fact that we all tend to be attracted to the same sorts of people can be explained in a similar way, that is, as the end result of a resonating template being projected.

The following points from this discussion are noteworthy for archetype theory. Firstly, since there is a bio-structural template which underpins the emergent imagery-affects in these situations, it is not unreasonable to describe the individual as "hard-wired" to experience the world in this way. This explains the compulsive nature of the phenomena. Secondly, the repetition aspect makes the subjective experience of the phenomena appear
as if something innate is operative. In some ways, the situation is innate but not because anything is genetically specified before developmental experience but because the bio-
structure, once there and operative, is experienced as if innate. It is by drawing these two aspects together that we have the classical description of an archetype.

Of further significance for the archetype-environment nexus as implied in Knox's (2003,
2004) emergent/developmental model is the finding of developmental biologists that
development is indeed very environmentally sensitive. This is evidenced through what
they call "noise" effects. In arguing for the less recognised influence of development
within evolutionary biology and against the view that organisms are "lumbering robots'
created by their genes 'body and mind'", Lewontin (2001) refers to Waddington's (1957)
foundational research on "developmental noise" which showed that an organism's
phenotype is not necessarily given even when the genotype and environment are
completely specified. Lewontin concludes,

The two sides of *Drosophila* [the fruit fly often used in genetic experiments] have
the same genotype, and no reasonable definition of environment will allow that the
left and right sides of a pupa developing halfway up the side of a glass milk bottle
in the laboratory are in different environments. Yet, the number of sterno-pleural
bristles and the number of eye facets differ between the two sides of an individual
fly. Small events at the level of thermal noise acting during cell division and
differentiation have large effects on the final developmental outcome (Lewontin,

The flow-on research over later years was able to show that "by selection, an organism
can be made developmentally insensitive or highly sensitive to perturbations of its
genotype, its environment, developmental accidents, or any combination of these"

Whilst it is beyond this thesis to give full treatment to the findings from Developmental
Biology and recognising that the sterno-pleural bristles and eye facets of *Drosophila* are
a far cry from archetypal imagery, nonetheless, the implications of the on-going research
in developmental biology is to suggest that during development, even slight micro
differences in environmental conditions can have observable effects at the phenotypic level. The observable differences between monozygotic twins like fingerprints would be a case in point. However, it stands to reason that such effects would be even more the case for human individuals when in their early life they are imbedded in intense emotional experiences that are likely to be anything but "micro". In Knox's (2003, 2004) model, it is from this level of experience that image schemas leading to archetypal experience develop. Hence, when considering any archetype (like the shaman archetype), the macro and micro environmental conditions related to its emergence will require careful consideration.

7.5.4 Implication 4 - The model further collapses the nature/nurture debate in relation to archetype theory and possibly the division between the Classical and Developmental Schools in analytical psychology

We have seen the nature side of the debate in archetype theory to emphasise a genetic basis to archetypes and this view is primarily represented by Stevens (2002). The nurture view sees archetypes as entirely cultural phenomena without needing any reference to biology or anything innate and is mainly represented by Pietikainen (1998a). Knox's (2003, 2004) model is more interactive and follows the position of most current biologists and psychologists in which genetic pre-dispositions to many psychological phenomena (including intelligence, temperament and some psychopathologies) are always articulated in terms of particular environments which activate, call out or moderate genetic pre-dispositions. At the simplistic level, without such a view, the psychological differences that can be noted between monozygotic twins would be more difficult to explain.

More significantly however, by connecting her model with Schore's (2000a) and Fonagy's (2002) research (as cited in Knox, 2004) and asserting that emotional experience directly influences brain development, Knox (2004) is aligning herself with the whole biological perspective which sees structure as only fully realising itself through function (as seen earlier with Gottlieb, 2001). This is an extremely important
consideration, for as Gottlieb so succinctly points out, if this is the case, then the nature-nurture controversy all but evaporates. In the same way, Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental model of archetype has the potential to collapse the nature-nurture debate in relation to archetype theory.

Furthermore, if kinds of bio-structures get imbedded at the brain level out of developmental experience, then this model has the capacity to collapse the Developmental versus Classical debate in archetype theory.

In *Jung and the post-Jungians*, Samuels (1985) states that within the Jungian world, there was from 1950 to 1975 a London (Developmental) School, which emphasised a clinical perspective, and the Zurich (Classical) School which emphasised a symbolic approach to the psyche. During the 1970's, a third Archetypal School emerged.

Samuels (1985) concluded that the Classical approach endeavoured to work with what is known, remembered and understood about Jung's own methods and emphasised the process of mutual discovery, making unconscious material conscious, progressive release from meaninglessness and compulsion, dialogue between the unconscious and consciousness so that development is seen as a realisation of the Self archetype into consciousness.

The Developmental School aligned itself with psychoanalysis and its emphasis on early infant experience and the transference/countertransference phenomenon within psychotherapeutic work.

Finally, Samuels (1985) saw the Archetypal School as emphasising the operation of the archetypes in the collective unconscious and their impact on imagery. He noted later that this School seemed to be in decline (Samuels, 1997).

According to Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental model, archetypes are present in the mind/brain as developmentally produced structures which can later
influence psychological life when activated by particular environmental conditions. Given this, significant aspects of both the Classical and Archetypal Schools' perspective on archetypes can be preserved with minimal modification.

Firstly, the "other worldly" aspect of archetypal experience is understandable because the emergent imagery arises from deep unconscious layers of the psyche and its experience will be as if spontaneous, innate and not related to conscious knowing.

Secondly, the "structural components of the psyche" aspect of archetypes can be retained because that which underpins archetypal imagery are bio-structural neural templates. What is removed though, is any sense that archetypes are preformed components of the psyche as if their structure is determined by the genetic code as well as the view that they can operate autochthonously without any reference to environmental conditions.

From the Developmental School's perspective, if the bio-structural neural templates which underpin the emergence of complex human archetypal imagery have originally arisen through developmental experience, then this School's emphasis on the importance of environmental experience in the development of the psyche is satisfied.

7.5.5 Implication 5 - The model collapses the "sacred heritage" view of archetypes.

Generally, it is the received position in classical archetype theory to view the archetypal level as a wellspring of health that is available to humanity because as Jung (1931/1991a) says, it is "untouched" by personal experience and therefore tends to remain pristine. Such a view is the foundation of Ryan's (2002), Sandner and Wong's (1997) and Smith's (1997) positions on the shaman archetype and whilst they will be critiqued later, it is important at this stage to note that Knox's (2003, 2004) model has the capacity to collapse this kind of perspective because emergence of the archetypal is a developmental outcome connected to particular environmental experiences and is not the result of anything preformationist. As she says, archetypes are "reliably repeated early developmental achievements" (Knox, 2004, p.9). In other words, because the archetypal
world is built up through developmental experience there is unlikely to be any separate collective unconscious divorced from personal experience into which individuals can tap for their healing. What this raises is a much larger theoretical issue, which is addressed in the following Implication.

7.5.6 Implication 6 - The model collapses the conceptual division between the collective and personal unconscious

There has always been a Jungian discourse around the indivisibility of the collective and personal unconscious both conceptually (because experience makes them hard to separate) and in terms of clinical technique. Jung was aware of this very issue when, in the context of assessing the needs of individuation he stated in "The structure of the unconscious",

This distinction [between the personal unconscious and the collective psyche] is far from easy, because the personal grows out of the collective psyche and is intimately bound up with it. So it is difficult to say exactly what contents are to be called personal and what collective (Jung, 1916/1990, p.279).

Neumann (1955) makes a similar point by stating that the connection between archetypal manifestations and an individual's personal life experience ought to be possible theoretically but which may not be achievable practically. Satinover (1985) and Stein (1987) both conclude from their own clinical work that the distinction between the collective and the personal psyche is difficult to maintain in practice. (They also argue that as much as possible this distinction needs to be achieved clinically lest the patient succumb to ego-inflation). Williams (1963), on the other hand, goes so far as to suggest that the personal and the collective unconscious are actually indivisible.

What Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental model suggests is that these statements by both Jung (1916/1990) and others may be reflecting a true state of affairs and not just practical difficulties. Seeing archetypes as "reliably repeated early
developmental achievements" and not present in any preformationist sense before experience, they have arisen from developmental experience and this means there need be no division between a collective psyche and the personal unconscious. There would only be differential layers of unconsciousness depending on the age of a person when the bio-structural startpoints became imbedded through developmental experience. Jung's statement above ("the personal grows out of the collective psyche") would need reversing to read - "the experience of something apparently collective grows out of the personal".

It does need to be remembered, however, that Knox's (2003, 2004) model is not so reductionist as to argue that archetypes do not exist at all. Rather, they are understood to be bio-structurally present, not in any preformationist sense but as (bio-structural) startpoints from which imagery can emerge if sufficient affect is experienced which resonates/aligns with the original affect when the bio-structure was being developed in the first place from early emotional experience. In other words, it is possible to have archetypes as (developmentally acquired) structural components of the psyche but without the additional concept of the collective unconscious. As a consequence, Knox's model has the capacity to overcome a number of disparities in Jung's statements about archetypes and this is the subject of the next implication.

7.5.7 Implication 7 - The model can explain many of Jung's disjunctive statements to do with archetype theory

When overviewing Jung's classical theory of archetype in Chapter Four, we have already noted certain tensions in it, for Jung stresses the spontaneous and autochthonous revival aspect of archetypes despite other statements, especially his early formulations, which imply archetypes are activated by environmental situations. As he says in 1912,

The changes that may befall a man are not infinitely variable; they are variations of certain typical occurrences which are limited in number. *When therefore a distressing situation arises, the corresponding archetype will be constellated in the unconscious* (Jung 1912/1986, p.294) (italics mine).
This view sees archetypes as activated ("constellated") by particular distressing life experiences/situations and conversely that these experiences/situations activate a corresponding archetype.

Similarly, the emergence of archetypes as a compensatory manoeuvre on the part of the psyche implies something other than autochthonous spontaneity. We saw in Chapter Three how Jung (1918/1991) conceived shamanism itself in this way, it being understood to be an example of spiritualism which had become reactivated in a compensatory way in the Western collective psyche following the French Revolution and Enlightenment.

Other statements indicate that Jung was quite aware of the connection between the psyche and its environmental conditions, as he says in "The structure of the psyche".

We are all agreed that it would be quite impossible to understand the living organism apart from its relation to the environment. There are countless biological facts that can only be explained as reactions to environmental conditions. . . . The same is true of the psyche. Its peculiar organisation must be intimately connected with environmental conditions (Jung, 1931/1991a, p.152) (italics mine).

It is not easy to align such statements with Jung's views on the "autochthonous revival" of archetypes. However, they are in perfect alignment with Knox's (2003, 2004) model for we have already seen in Section 7.5.3 the significant place that environmental experience has in it. It is this environmental perspective which makes understandable the above comments by Jung. The peculiar organisation of the psyche is most definitely connected with environmental conditions if archetypes as reliably repeated early developmental achievements become imbedded as bio-structural underpinning templates through environmental experience in the first place.

In a similar way, Jung's following statement from "On the nature of the psyche" can be understood with Knox's (2003, 2004) model,
[archetypes] essential being is unconscious to us, ... *they are experienced as* spontaneous agencies (Jung, 1954/1991a, p.216) (italics mine).

Such a statement, which reflects phenomenal experience, is perfectly understandable with an emergent/developmental model of archetype. In it, archetypes would be experienced "as if spontaneous" because of the process of their emergence. The biostructural archetypal template underpinning the activation of emergent imagery has originally been laid down developmentally in a state of early infant unconsciousness. When the resonating "now" affect occurs, the template is activated but as it resides in the implicit/unconscious layer of the psyche, it will be experienced as if alien, "spontaneous" and probably "innate" and usually not connected to anything which we can consciously understand. This model then makes understandable Jung's own experience of the Philemon figure which we discussed in Chapter Four (Section 4.2). His subjective experience can be explained by the model without having to resort to the concept of "autochthonous revival". The same would be true for the other case material of the Army Officer and the Solar Phallus man also discussed in Chapter Four.

A second area of disparity in Jung's classical archetype theory has to do with the difficulty he saw in separating personal and collective psychic content as discussed in Section 7.5.6 above. This same issue is reflected in the following from "Concerning the archetypes, with special reference to the anima concept",

The *représentations collectives* [archetypes] have a dominating power, so it is not surprising that they are repressed with the most intense resistance. When repressed, they do not hide behind any trifling thing but behind ideas and figures that have already become problematical for other reasons, and intensify and complicate their dubious nature. For instance, everything that we would like, in infantile fashion, to attribute to our parents or blame them for is blown up to fantastic proportions from this secret source (Jung, 1954/1990b, p.63).

Knox's (2003, 2004) model provides an explanation as to why the interaction between archetypal imagery and personal experience would be noted as occurring this way. The situation will appear like this not because archetypes are preformed in the psyche and
operate autochthonously but because early infant experience from which archetypal imagery is derived, is very affectively intense. In other words, archetypes are not hiding behind other difficulties and intensifying them, rather, the intense affects of early experience are developing the archetypal template(s). This reverses the direction of Jung's (1954/1990b) perspective such that we could say - problematical material arising from personal experience actually activates the archetypes which leads to both imagery and numinos affect.

A third disparity in Jung's archetype theory which commentators have noted has to do with an apparent Lamarckanism in the way he understood archetypes to become structural components of the psyche. [Lamarkianism is the discredited view that acquired characteristics can be inherited].

On this issue, Stevens (1982) notes that Jung's early concept of "primordial images" did suggest Lamarckianism, a charge not that surprising given some of Jung's views as to how archetypes arise. His most explicit statements are made in "The Structure of the Psyche" (Jung, 1931/1991a) and these seem to arise from his belief that "the unconscious . . . is the deposit of all human experience right back to its remotest beginnings" (p.157). As example,

the daily course of the sun and the regular alternation of day and night must have imprinted themselves on the psyche in the form of an image from primordial times. . . . [T]he physical process imprinted itself on the psyche in this fantastic, distorted form and was preserved there, so that the unconscious still reproduces similar images today (Jung, 1931/1991a, p.153).

And at a later point,

The psychological conditions of the environment naturally leave similar mythical traces behind them. Dangerous situations, be they dangers to the body or to the soul, arouse affect-laden fantasies, and, in so far as such situations typically repeat themselves, they give rise to archetypes (Jung, 1931/1991a, p.155).
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So in relation to an everyday phenomenon like the family, he goes on to conclude, "These ordinary everyday facts, which are eternally repeated, create the mightiest archetypes of all" (p.156) (italics mine).

Overall, this would appear to be a Lamarckian explanation as to how archetypes arise - situations of "danger" evoke "affects" which lead to "fantasies", the multiple repetition of which over a long period of time leads to archetypes as structural components of the psyche.

Recently, Hogenson (2001) has considered this claim that Jung used a Lamarckian model of evolution to underwrite his theory of archetypes. He is able to demonstrate that Jung is not only familiar with, but uses the writings of Baldwin and Morgan, both of whom were noted and forceful opponents of neo-Lamarckian theory from within a neo-Darwinian framework and that Jung's statements need to be understood from this perspective. The Baldwin and Morgan model, now known as the "Baldwin Effect", explicitly views psychological factors as central to the evolutionary process and Hogenson makes an argument that Jung's statements can be read this way rather than as representing anything Lamarckian.

Whether Jung was Lamarckian is not an issue of central concern to this thesis except through its connection to archetype theory generally and then to the shaman archetype by implication. But if Knox's (2003, 2004) model is correct, then statements above like - "Dangerous situations . . . arouse affect-laden fantasies, and, in so far as such situations typically repeat themselves, they give rise to archetypes" (Jung, 1931/1991a, p.155) - become quite understandable at least at the level of the infant's psychic development. Knox's explanation would be in accord with this statement whilst avoiding anything Lamarckian. Dangerous situations arouse affect, which gets bio-structurally templated and which forms the basis of image schemas and finally archetypal imagery as an emergent phenomenon. Jung is right then in that dangerous situations, especially if repeated, can give rise to archetypes. However, this does not imply that anything need
get incorporated into the genome, for the process can remain a reliably repeated developmental achievement.

7.5.8 Implication 8 - The model aligns with Developmental Systems Theory from contemporary biology

Given the fact that Knox's (2003, 2004) model presented in this Chapter relies on biological startpoints and bio-structural neural templates as underpinning the emergence of complex archetypal imagery, it is not without significance that the model aligns with a new perspective being articulated in contemporary biology, that of Developmental Systems Theory (hereafter, DevST). It is not within the scope of this thesis to give a full consideration to DevST apart from showing how its main themes support Knox's model.

DevST is an attempt to do biology without the dichotomies of nature/nurture; genes/environment or biology/culture and Oyama, Griffiths and Gray (2001) provide a comprehensive overview of this approach. In particular, it criticises the current trend toward conventional interactionism with its quantitative emphasis on concordance rates (e.g. certain traits being discussed as to the percentage of their genetic and environmental determination) and even the concept of "genetic predisposition". It prefers to approach matters from a developmental perspective that does not rely on a distinction between privileged, essential causes and merely supporting or interfering ones. Oyama, Griffiths and Gray show how much research data has supported this position over the years. It tends to be overlooked, however, because on the one hand, it is not conceptually easy to view things this way and on the other hand, it is easier to frame research questions without addressing such data. Most biologists, once giving lip service to interactionism, carry on as if the implications of DevST research were unimportant. As Weber and Depew conclude,
[Developmental System Theory] advocates begin by arguing that if we take as seriously as we should the fact that organisms develop we must regard them as epigenetically constructed in each generation from a large array of developmental resources, some heritable, some not, rather than as read out or printed out from a causally primary, quasi-preformationist genetic program. (Oyama, 1985). In consequence, genes are regarded by DST as only one of a number of developmental resources. Natural selection is construed as able to act in principle on variations in any or all of these resources. The differential retention of these variants will manifest itself as fitness-enhancing changes in aspects of the life cycle in a particular environment (Weber & Depew, 2001, p.239).

Oyama, Griffiths and Gray (2001) outline the six main themes of DevST. Firstly, there is an emphasis on joint determination by multiple causes. They argue that a wide range of developmental resources goes into producing any trait and that the gene/environment division is only one way to describe what goes on. Phenocopying (i.e. where both mutation as well as environmental change alter an organism in the same way) would be a case in point. An example would be the bithorax mutants in *Drosophila*, for the bithorax phenotype can also be induced by ether. "Genes and ether shocks turn out to be developmentally equivalent in this respect" (p.3). Hence DevST argues for causal parity between genes and other factors of development. However, because such things do not fit neatly into traditional categories, they have been largely overlooked or marginalized in biology. With Knox (2004), we have seen that she too has an emphasis on multiple causes for hers is "a developmental model in which mental contents emerge from the interaction of genes, brain and environment" (p.1).

Secondly, DevST emphasises context sensitivity and contingency such that "the significance of any one cause is contingent upon the state of the rest of the system" (Oyama, Griffiths & Gray, 2001, p.2). Thus, calculated coefficients of heritability can say nothing about the extent to which a trait can be modified by environmental change. Developmental biologists have demonstrated that development is indeed very environmentally sensitive so that context sensitivity can operate at quite micro-levels as we have already seen in Section 7.5.3 with "developmental noise" - phenotype does not necessarily follow even if genotype and environment are completely specified. In a
similar way, the importance of environmental experience in relation to archetypal emergence is also stressed in Knox's (2003, 2004) model.

Oyama, Griffiths and Gray (2001) also point out that once information metaphors are used in relation to DNA so that an outcome is seen as an expression of genetic information that is somehow controlling development, then it acquires a special status - it represents what the organism is "meant to be", its "inner essence". Context sensitivity is then often treated as an interference to a basic pattern. How much of our thinking about archetypes has been cast in similar terms to do with a "special status"?

Thirdly, DevST addresses the issue of extended inheritance, i.e. the fact that organisms inherit much more than their genetic constitution including things like chromosomes, nutrients, ambient temperatures, childcare and other aspects from "epigenetic inheritance" like chromatin marks that regulate gene expression, cytoplasmic chemical gradients, gut and other endosymbionts, a niche and physical environment. Such things do not fall neatly into gene/environment categories. In a similar way, Knox (2004) argues against "genetically-specified archetypal imagery" but sees archetypes emerging as the result of a range of developmental experiences and influences from genes, brain and environment.

Fourthly, DevST understands development in terms of construction so that "[t]he life cycle of an organism is developmentally constructed, not programmed or preformed. It comes into being through interactions between the organism and its surroundings as well as interactions within the organism" (Oyama, Griffiths & Gray, 2001, p.4). Thus, phenotype is the result of non-trivial interactions between genotype and environment during development. As Lewontin (2001) puts it, "All that genes ever do is to specify a norm of reaction over environments" (p.61). DevST's are quite critical of the implicit and at times explicit preformationism within neo-Darwinism i.e. the view that the information for producing an organism is contained in the zygote and becomes "read-out". Knox's (2003, 2004) model is also opposed to a "read-out" approach to archetypes.
but takes a similarly DevST constructivist position for it incorporates bidirectionality between structure and function.

Fifthly, DevST specifies distributed control in that no one factor can be said to completely control developmental outcomes. There are a vast and heterogeneous assembly of interactants which are system-dependent and change over time so that attention needs to be given to ways the developing organism functions as a resource for its own further development. As such, DevST is especially critical of the concept of the "genetic blueprint". Moss (2001) concludes there is ample evidence we are dealing with "self-organizing, causally reciprocal systems of interactants" (p.85). Similarly, Knox's (2003, 2004) emergent/developmental view of archetypes is also opposed to any notion of a "genetic blueprint".

Lastly, DevST understands evolution in terms of construction in that organisms and their environments are seen to be one system and it is this which evolves over time. Outcomes are not imposed but emerge. Whilst the process of evolution is not really the focus of most emergent/developmental approaches to archetype theory (including that of Knox, 2003, 2004), it is noteworthy that Hogenson (2001) has addressed the issue of evolution in relation to Jung, arguing that many of Jung's statements about the transmission of archetypes could be understood in terms of the "Baldwin Effect". In other words, psychological factors being played out in cultural contexts can be central to the overall evolutionary process. This position would accord with the point being proposed by DevST.

Whilst these parallels between DevST and an emergent/developmental model of archetype like that proposed by Knox (2003, 2004) can be noted, the overall significance of DevST for archetype theory has not yet been developed by Jungians. So far, Hogenson (2004a) has only made one passing reference to Oyama's (2000) work because she criticises innatist models in biology. What the above overview of DevST suggests is that a line of mutual and fruitful interchange is possible between the research findings of these biologists, emergent/developmental models of archetype and archetype theory
generally. What DevST indicates, in particular, is that one can retain a biological perspective on archetypes without having to accept innatism or preformationism so long as a developmental focus is maintained.

7.6 CONCLUSIONS

Following the analyses undertaken in this Chapter, we are now in a position to offer a working model of the archetype derived from contemporary theory and current research by which to explicate the shaman archetype. Utilising emergent/developmental models of the archetype, a working definition would be -

Archetypes are developmentally produced bio-structural templates which initially operate implicitly but which underpin the emergence of complex imagery. They are initially produced by, and later activated through, intense affectivity. Hence, they are not present in the psyche in any preformationist sense nor do they express themselves with "autochthonous revival".

The particular aspects from this working model relevant to the shaman archetype are the following. Firstly, like all archetypes, the shaman archetype will initially become psychically imbedded as a bio-structural template of response potentials through particular early intense affectivity during infancy. Presumably, early developmental experiences will be different in those individuals who never experience a shamanic "calling".

Secondly, despite any appearances to the contrary, a shaman archetype once imbedded will not later arise autochthonously but its constellation will depend on the nexus between it and particular affectivity in the "now" which resonates with the affectivity originally experienced in its developmental bio-structural imbedding.
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These aspects raise the following questions to be examined in the next Chapter. What is the initial early developmental affectivity which gets the shaman archetype imbedded as a response potential in the first place and which differs to the affective experience of those individuals who never experience anything shamanic? What is the later affectivity in post-infant/child experience which constellates the shaman archetype in the "now"?

The subject of the next Chapter is to see if there is any evidence in the ethnographic literature which relates to these questions. However, before proceeding, we need to note one final conclusion from the analyses undertaken in this chapter and that is the view that there is no collective unconscious which contains the shaman (or any other) archetype in any preformationist sense. If so, it is no longer a tenable position to view shamanism as representing a wellspring of pristine archetypal content into which individuals can tap for their healing. This will become an important point to take-up later in Chapter Ten when post-Jungian uses of the shaman archetype are examined.
CHAPTER 8

THE DEVELOPMENTAL SIDE TO THE SHAMAN ARCHETYPE

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Given the working model of archetype as outlined in the previous Chapter, the question now to be addressed is this - what are the environmental conditions and developmental experiences which could be of such intense affectivity as to cause a shamanic archetypal pattern to become psychically imbedded as a bio-structural template of response potentials? Since this question is about developmental experience at the infant level, a psychodynamic perspective is suggested. We are fortunate that in the literature, Siberian shamanism has been investigated from such a perspective. The most comprehensive explication of the specific psychodynamic sources of the Siberian shaman's life experience, healing techniques and fantasy life has been undertaken by Charles Ducey in his 1976 paper entitled "The life history and creative psychopathology of the shaman: Ethnopsychoanalytic perspectives."

8.2 DUCEY'S (1976) PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE

Ducey (1976) confined his study to the home of "classical" shamanism i.e. North and Central Asia and only used data from other cultures when it seemed relevant in providing corroborative support to his thesis. We have already seen divergence across Siberian shamanism (Siikala, 1978) but significant scholars like Eliade (1964) and Alekseev (1987) do agree with Ducey that "the characteristics and practices of Siberian shamans vary little" (p.174). Similarly Klementz in an early encyclopaedia entry is able to conclude,
One must not lose sight of the fact that in the various beliefs of the Siberian tribes a very close connexion is noticeable, and, likewise, there can be observed an uninterrupted identity in the foundations of their mythology, and in their rites, even extending as far as the nomenclature - all of which gives one the right to suppose that these beliefs are the result of the joint work of the intellectual activity of the whole north of Asia (Klementz, 1910, p.26).

Hence Ducey's (1976) particular focus on North and Central Asian shamanism is not an unjustified position. He begins by giving an overview of the "is the shaman sane?" question and posits that such a question is likely to be driven by the position of the shaman as the one who "bridges the gap between the known and the unknown" (p. 175). That the shaman occupies some kind of liminal/borderline zone has been noted before (Peters, 1989) and will be returned to later as this may be quite indicative of the Siberian shaman's underlying psychology. Ducey's opinion is that because of this liminal/borderline "bridging" phenomenon in shamanism, investigators have focussed on one side of the duality, emphasising either a psychopathological perspective or alternatively, like Eliade (1964), "supernormality". Nonetheless, Ducey's overall conclusion is that "severe psychopathological conflicts do lie at the root of the shaman's personality, but he has the capacity to employ these conflicts in the service of sublimated cultural activities" (p.176). As such, he sees shamanism as "an attempted cure of a preexisting mental disorder, a defensive activity" (p.177) and that the shaman "employs neurotic and psychotic defenses to confront the anxiety arising from specific infantile and childhood situations and fantasies for a cathartic, curative purpose indispensable to his culture" (p.178) (italics mine). This is despite the fact that "healthy and pathological patterns are too deeply interwoven to be meaningfully separated" (p.177). This final comment relates to the duality issue noted above and will become an important point later when assessing the actual nature of the Siberian shaman's psychology.

Ducey (1976) goes on to develop a psychodynamic, intrapsychic theory of Siberian shamanism from which he concludes that shamans are caught in the earliest stages of emotional and psychological development - the paranoid-schizoid position (after Klein, 1946). He proposes a standard aetiology for this situation, severe emotional trauma in early childhood either through actual death of parents or other causes of substantial oral frustration which have ruptured the "good enough" mother-infant
bond. Given the importance of Ducey's assertions both to the psychopathology question and the relation of this to the developmental side of the archetype's constellation, his position needs examination.

Ducey (1976) initially establishes his model through analysing the symptoms which shaman-initiates display during the phases of their pre-initiatory illness. We have already seen in Chapter Two that Siberian shamans have had a serious and disturbing psychological experience/illness early in life (often at adolescence) and that this pre-initiatory illness is interpreted as a (mostly unsolicited) calling, which is not only experienced as a destiny/fate but is articulated in their cultures as an election by the spirits. A strenuous and difficult initiation follows involving altered states of consciousness, dismemberment imagery and death/rebirth phenomena, which follows a rite de passage structure of departure, initiation and return (van Gennep, 1908/1960).

Within the locus classicus, the pre-initiatory illness moves through three phases and Ducey (1976) follows the account as outlined by Lot-Falck (1970). Despite being an obscure French publication, Lot-Falck's outline is not significantly dissimilar to that of Eliade (1964, 1987).

The first phase is articulated as a "spirit possession" and has been historically described as "Arctic Hysteria" (Czaplicka, 1914). In it, the initiate experiences a series of recurrent "attacks" by particular spirits (the unquiet, wandering dead from deceased lunatics or suicides).

Ducey (1976) interprets "Arctic Hysteria" as a conversion and/or dissociation state evidenced in the ethnographic records by descriptions of uncontrolled spasms, trances, wild dancing, howling, epileptoid seizures, frenzied flight, erotomania, fainting, conversion symptoms, singing and chanting often in unknown languages, with extended sleep and amnesia following such attacks. (Ducey cites Brill, 1913; Czaplicka, 1914; Shirokogoroff, 1935 and Gussow, 1960). Czaplicka (1914) also tells us that Buryat children who become shamans have been noted in their culture to absorb themselves in meditation, to have a fondness for being alone, to have mysterious dreams and sometimes fits leading to unconsciousness. Eliade (1964,
1987) indicates that other characteristics can be nervousness, dreaminess, a tendency to be sickly, withdrawn, and contemplative with hallucinations of torture by ancestral spirits. Ducey points out that all these symptoms are schizoidal in nature.

Ducey (1976) goes on to make the point that these schizoidal symptoms indicate a pathological reaction to early loss which is further evidenced by the other symptoms of withdrawal from social relationships and hallucination. Indeed, the epileptoid seizures, trances, amnesia and other symptoms are dissociative phenomena that represent a periodical re-emergence of disruptive infantile wishes and anxieties. Similarly, the erotomania suggests an early frustration of emotional needs arising from a subjectively undifferentiated mother who both withdraws (leading to intense frustration) and uncontrollably approaches. It is the latter which is experienced as a tantalisation, hence sexualised.

However, Ducey (1976) notes that other symptoms are present in "Arctic Hysteria" which do not make the condition easily identified as conversion disorder (hysteria) using Western psychiatric diagnosis. He notes such symptoms as irregular habits, detachment from others with a need to be alone, cyclic characteristics like sudden mood swings from irritability to affability and from depression to agitation (which is more suggestive of bipolar disorder - see Castagné, 1930), hallucinatory fantasies of torture by spirits (as in the persecutory delusions of paranoid schizophrenia) which seems both universal and indicative of a more profound disturbance. There is also no belle indifférence as in Western conversion disorder (hysteria), the shaman-initiate expressing real distress. It is these symptoms which cause Ducey to reconsider the simple diagnosis of conversion disorder (hysteria). An analysis of the second phase of the pre-initiatory illness adds further to this reconsideration.

The second phase of the pre-initiatory illness is characterised by "soul loss" and is experienced as a chronic and stable melancholic/depressed condition. Apparently the subjective experience has changed from something having "come upon/into" the initiate to a situation where something has been "taken away". Other characteristics noted in the ethnographic reports are apathy, helplessness, tedium vitae, sexual obsession, delusions of persecution, hallucinations, seizures and fugues. In particular, the experience of dismemberment is intensified and a master shaman is called in to
tutor initiates so that their lost soul can be found. This is followed by instruction about the various spirits, how to summon and control them, teachings around techniques, names and functions of the spirits, mythology, genealogies and a shamanic secret language.

The initiate eventually emerges from the second stage into a third which is experienced as a cure. The critical features of this third stage are a resulting mastery of the spirits and the capacity to enter and leave trance states at will, without being possessed.

What Ducey (1976) particularly notes about the second stage is that feelings of worthlessness are reportedly absent and that this is unusual in (neurotic) depression. What are reported are apathy and a sense of emptiness (from soul loss). Through citing Guntrip (1970), Ducey believes this further suggests a schizoid condition. Of note, a subjective sense of emptiness would indicate early deprivations in the infant-mother relationship because something in early experience has not been put-in in the first place. The result in adulthood is a flat, empty and monochromatic version of depression alongside *taedium vitae* and boredom. Clinicians often encounter such cases in the consulting room with individuals who have suffered a deprivation of emotional needs from the earliest stages of infant development.

Overall, Ducey's (1976) extensive analysis of both the "Spirit Possession" and "Soul Loss" phases, lead him to conclude that shamans display underlying schizoid tendencies despite the conversion (hysterical) and depressive symptoms which are more obvious. As he says, "the shaman’s hysterical tendencies seem to be founded upon an underlying but pervasive schizoid predisposition" (p. 187). His position is further corroborated through the well received position that a splitting of the psyche occurs in all conversion disorder (hysteria) and he cites Federn (1940) and Fairbairn (1952) to that effect. What this situation indicates is that severe difficulties have been encountered in the earliest stages of development "when the crucial differentiation of self and other is at issue" (p.185). From a Kleinian perspective, the "depressive position" and its concern with whole objects has not been reached and this is evidenced by the feelings of fragmentation and emptiness that are present rather than the more usual depressive affects. Ducey concludes,
hence only representations of part-objects (bad and good spirits, sexually and aggressively conceived), splitting of the psyche through introjections of and projective identifications with part-object imagoes (abduction of soul and torture by spirits), and consequent confusion of self/object boundaries (one’s own oral-sadistic impulses projected onto spirits, gender identity confusion) appear in the future shaman’s fantasies; in other words, he seems caught in the paranoid-schizoid position (Klein, 1946), and "depressive" and "hysterical" manifestations are mere elaborations on this underlying theme (Ducey, 1976, p.189).

Ducey’s final diagnostic conclusion is that shamans suffer from "hysterical psychosis".

We can see that by concentrating on the first two stages of the shamanic pre-initiatory illness, Ducey (1976) has deduced a layered view to the psychopathology and he proposes a standard aetiology for this situation, severe emotional trauma in early childhood either through actual death of parents or other causes of substantial oral frustration. It is certainly the case that psychoanalytic research has determined that inadequacy of emotional satisfaction at the earliest stages of infant development can result in dissociative splitting, schizoid withdrawal, psychotic denial and attempts to restore reality through psychotic hallucination. Shamans certainly exhibit the adult behavioural characteristics of these dynamics as in their withdrawal from relationships, their experience of hallucination and their dissociative symptoms.

Ducey’s (1976) conclusions are reached through his psychoanalytic interpretation of the symptoms of the pre-initiatory illness and are augmented by his interpretations of shamanic imagery, healing rites and functions. For example, an identification with the mother is evidenced in the female nature of the shaman’s trappings and insignia and in the emphasis on a sex change in their initiation. Similarly, cannibalistic imagery and that of the soul being stolen by female figures is interpreted as indicating oral frustrations with sadistic resolution and/or a sado-masochistic mother-child relationship indicative of deprivations at the earliest (oral) stage of development. Further, the fantasy of the soul being stolen and removed to the upper world is seen by Ducey as a concrete representation of the early splitting of the psyche in response to the subjectively undifferentiated mother.
From a psychoanalytic perspective such interpretations are quite sound but they are, nonetheless, interpretative lines of argument. This is insufficient for the purposes of this thesis because the material could be interpreted in other ways. For instance, Jung (1912/1986) could just as easily argue that cannibalistic female imagery as indicative of the negative side of the Great Mother archetype. Is there any evidence external to Ducey's (1976) interpretations which is available to substantiate his conclusions?

Ducey (1976) himself posits two other lines of evidence. Firstly from material to do with child-rearing practices, and secondly, from what he detects in the Siberian ethnographic records to indicate emotional loss in early childhood for those who become shamans.

### 8.2.1 Ducey (1976) on childrearing practices

In relation to child-rearing practices, Ducey (1976) cites research by Barry, Bacon and Child (1955) who undertook cross-cultural ratings of infant care from 111 cultures. The data they used came from ethnographic publications and the Human Relations Area Files kept at Yale University. Using this data, two separate analysts averaged their ratings on a scale of 1-14 for each culture on fourteen items to do with infant and child care. They found that the Sakha (Yakut) (the Siberian tribe usually considered the most classical representative of classical shamanism) were overall one of the lowest scoring cultures on each of their child-rearing measures. Ducey makes special mention of one particular dimension (Item 9: diffusion of nurturance) which indicates the extent to which infants are cared for exclusively by the mother during the first twelve months. The Sakha (Yakut) received quite a low rating on this dimension (5 out of a possible 14) and Ducey concludes, "This combination of a defective but intense relationship with the mother is precisely the pattern identified by our intrapsychic theory" (p.190).

However, neither Ducey (1976) nor Barry, Bacon and Child (1955) provide any statistical analysis of the data. Since the statistical question Ducey asked was, "are the other culture's mean score on Item 9 (diffusion of nurturance) different from the Sakha (Yakut) score?", a one sample $t$ test is appropriate. When this is done, the Sakha (Yakut) are definitely significantly different to all other cultures ($t_{100} = 11.94$.}
The mean for the other cultures being 7.75. As Ducey realises, this result is particularly telling because it means the infants in Sakha (Yakut) culture are cared for exclusively by the mother. As he says with regard to schizoidal psychopathology, it is the conjunctions around an intense but defective relationship with the mother which is aetiological. This finding does add weight to his hypothesis.

When the other items specified by Barry, Bacon and Child (1955) are also subjected to statistical analysis, an interesting pattern emerges in terms of infant care over their first twelve months of life. As before, the statistical question being asked is, "are the other culture's mean scores on the items different from the Sakha (Yakut) score?" so one sample t tests were performed in which the rating given to the Sakha (Yakut) on each scale was used as the comparison score against the mean. The results are summarised in Table 8.1 following and show that the mean country scores were significantly above the scores given to the Sakha (Yakut).

The results seen in Table 8.1 are quite telling for on all the items the mean scores of all the other cultures are significantly different from the Sakha (Yakut) scores. Of importance, these differences were all in a lower direction meaning that the Sakha (Yakut) do not perform as well on these infant care dimensions compared to all the other cultures.

The final two dimensions on which information was available for the Sakha (Yakut) were Items 13 (anxiety about dependence during the transition period from infant to the status of child) and 14 (childhood indulgence) being an overall rating of the degree of indulgence shown to older children prior to puberty. Again, one sample t tests were performed in which the rating given to the Sakha (Yakut) on each scale was used as the comparison score against the mean. These results are summarised in Table 8.2 following and show that the mean country scores were significantly below the score given to the Sakha (Yakut) for Item 13 but significantly above for Item 14.

The result for Item 13 indicates that the Sakha (Yakut) are displaying significantly more anxiety about transition period dependence than the other cultures overall. The result for Item 14 indicates that the Sakha (Yakut) are less indulging of their children than the other cultures overall.
### TABLE 8.1

**THE TREATMENT OF INFANTS ACROSS THE FIRST TWELVE MONTHS**

[a one sample t test of mean scores against Sakha (Yakut) ratings]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>MEAN other cultures</th>
<th>MEAN Sakha Yakut</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The display of affection toward the infants, i.e. the extent to which the infants were held, fondled, caressed and played with</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.76*</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Protection of the infants from environmental factors</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.79*</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Degree of drive reduction, i.e. how fully are the infant's needs reduced?</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19.32*</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Immediacy of drive reduction, i.e. how quickly are the infant's needs reduced?</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>11.28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18.44*</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Consistency of drive reduction, i.e. how consistently are drives reduced?</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.46*</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Constancy of presence of nurturant agent, i.e. is there a substitute if the mother is not present?</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.60*</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Absence of pain inflicted by the nurturant agent, e.g. cold baths, depilation, rough handling or physical punishment</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.45*</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Overall indulgency during infancy</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10.33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.76*</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Diffusion of nurturance, i.e. the extent to which nurturance of the infant is shared</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.94*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the p<0.05 level
# TABLE 8.2

## THE TREATMENT OF CHILDREN

[a one sample t test of mean scores against Sakha (Yakut) ratings]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>MEAN other cultures</th>
<th>MEAN Sakha (Yakut)</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The degree of anxiety about Dependence developed during the transition period from infantile dependence to status of child</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-14.96*</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Overall childhood indulgence (from ages 5-12)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.41*</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the p<0.05 level
These statistical results from all of the fourteen items do support Ducey's hypothesis. The Sakha (Yakut) do not perform as well as other cultures in relation to their infant and child care, which in all possibility could foment conditions whereby the needs of the infants would not be met in the earliest months of life.

8.2.2 Ducey (1976) on emotional loss in the early childhood of shamans

Ducey (1976) also argues that there is sufficient evidence from the ethnographic literature to show that Siberian shamans have as a group suffered severe emotional loss at a very young age often through the loss of parents from starvation or through some other violent means and it is this which is aetiological in their "hysterical psychosis". It is this evidence which now needs examination.

Ducey makes the following range of assertions in relation to this issue,

Proverbially and in reality, young orphans, universally hated and rejected, are particularly apt candidates to become powerful, fear-inspiring shamans. One common theme permeates the numerous cases in the literature: loss of parents, often by starvation or some other violent means, at a very young age (Ducey, 1976, p.179) (italics mine).

Ducey (1976) adds to this statement later when he says that "a unique occurrence in the shaman's background is the loss of close emotional ties through death" (p.190) and that a "notable feature of the shaman's childhood is the early loss of parents. Every ethnographer remarks on the frequency and possible universality of severe emotional loss in the shaman's background (Bogoras 1907; Czaplicka 1914; Campbell 1959)" (p. 184) (italics mine).

Much of this early loss of parents Ducey (1976) attributes to starvation (due to the harsh, unpredictable Siberian environment) and it is this which produces what he sees as "the commonness of oral frustration of children in these cultures, since mothers cannot nourish themselves and their children adequately" (p.185). He concludes that "depending upon the quality of the actual relationship and the earliness of the loss, the child may still be enmeshed in the process of establishing stable and unified self-

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and object representations that are well differentiated from one another" (p.191) and it is this which he believes leads to psychopathology in Siberian shamans.

Given the importance of these claims to Ducey's thesis, it is necessary to investigate his evidence by examining exactly what those commentators to whom he directly refers have to say, namely Bogoras (1907), Czaplicka (1914) and Campbell (1959). [Bogoras (1907) is the publication to which Ducey refers but the edition available to this author was published in 1904 and will hereafter be referred to as such]. We must note, of course, that none of these writers are endeavouring to assert Ducey's point so it is a case of gleaning relevant comments from the main thrust of their arguments. Nonetheless, this is an important exercise because one criticism of shamanism research is that authors will quote upon the quotes of others to the point that we have an iterative discourse so removed from the original data that conclusions become questionable (Siikala, 1978).

It is in her section on "The Shaman's Vocation" that Czaplicka (1914) addresses these issues and she primarily quotes from Bogoras (1904). The Bogoras material will be discussed below. The only other relevant material not connected to Bogoras occurs in her section on "The Shaman's Preparatory Period". Here she refers to the Gilyak shaman, Koïnìt (taken from Sternberg, 1893) who experienced his shamanic onset at twelve years of age. As a case example, this has to do with the onset of a shamanic "call" at adolescence and is not directly supportive of Ducey's thesis that Siberian shamanism is due to early trauma in the mother-infant bond unless it can be shown that the adolescent onset is a later outworking of a trauma initially experienced in the infant stages of development. Czaplicka provides no evidence that this is the case.

In dealing with Ducey's (1976) reference to Campbell's (1959) The masks of god: Primitive mythology, this author has access to Campbell's (1976) revised edition. In this work, Campbell also gives an example of the shamanic call occurring in youth/adolescence when discussing the Evenk (Tungus) shaman, Semyonov Semyon (taken from Ksenofontov, 1930), who lay sick for a whole year before becoming a shaman at age fifteen. As with the example of Koïnìt above, such cases are not directly supportive of Ducey's thesis. There is only one reference to anything that may suggest a connection with childhood trauma and this comes from a legend. In
discussing shamanic imagery, Campbell refers to the legend of the Sakha (Yakut) shaman, Aadja (again taken from Ksenofontov, 1930) which begins with two brothers whose parents had died when they were very young. Legends are problematic material to use as evidence for Ducey's (1976) thesis because they are constructed stories, each aspect of which is intended to communicate something specific. Jung (1940/1990) notes in his analysis of "The Child Archetype" that the child-hero is usually presented as both special/divine on the one hand and vulnerable/attacked on the other. This is to emphasise a number of important attributes - the divine-child-hero's manifest detachment from its background (the mother), its "vocational specialness" and its capacity to transcend misfortune. Being so symbolically dense, it is not necessarily the case that orphanhood in such legends reflects actual life experience. It may be more about asserting the "vulnerable" side of the special/divine-vulnerable/attacked nexus. Furthermore, as the orphaned "Divine Child" is seen in the mythology of many world groups irrespective of shamanism, such legends should not be over-emphasised in support of Ducey's hypothesis.

Bogoras' (1904) material is not only more extensive on the issue at hand but its importance lies in the fact that it comes from direct fieldwork, which has not been the case with either Czaplicka (1914) or Campbell (1976) who both rely on secondary sources. Bogoras' relevant references occur in his section to do with the "Preparatory Period" of the individual shamanistic inspiration (pp.415-426). He begins by saying that the "shamanistic call begins to manifest itself at an early age, in many cases during the critical period of transition from childhood to youth [and that it] is easy to understand that this critical period of human life, which is always full of unexpected changes and developments, is peculiarly adapted to the first implanting of shamanistic inspiration" (p.415) (italics mine). In other words, the shamanistic call is generally of adolescent onset and this is further evidenced by the fact that the "Chukchee say that young persons destined to receive shamanistic inspiration may be recognized at a very early age, even in their teens, by the gaze" (p.415). Bogoras does provide examples of this very thing, e.g. Kele'wgi who received his call when "a young lad" (p.426) and of Kr'mqal who was called when in his "early youth", being "afflicted with a strange illness, which caused him to sleep in his inner room day after day, almost without interruption" (p.450). Other examples would be those of
Scratching Woman and Ye'tlin (see below). However, it is of note that Bogoras sees these adolescent manifestations as a "first implanting". Presumably nothing in earlier childhood indicates the shamanic call.

The point Bogoras (1904) is making is about adolescent onset alongside other features of the shamanic call like "abrupt" and "obscure". He goes on to note that the shamanic call can also occur for people of more mature age who have called on the spirits when prompted by misfortune. He says, "To people of more mature age the shamanistic call may come during some great misfortune, dangerous and protracted illness, sudden loss of family or property, etc. Then the person, having no other resource, turns to the 'spirits', and claims their assistance" (p.421). He gives as examples, Aiñanwa't, who received his call after a severe illness when more than forty; Niro'on, who was called as an adult when searching for his reindeer herd which had run away in fog; Ka'tek who received his call when of mature age after a life threatening incident when hunting seal and Quikinna'qu who unexpectedly began shamanising late in life.

Bogoras then makes the point that even this type of onset (i.e. calling to the spirits out of misfortune) can even occur with the young. As he says,

> It is also considered perfectly natural that a young boy visited by some great misfortune should try to call to the "spirits". If they deign to come to his assistance, their fellowship with the boy is likely to become very intimate, and he has the chance of being a really great shaman (Bogoras, 1904, p.423).

It needs to be noted that this statement is in the context of a calling on the spirits arising out of misfortune which Bogoras has been discussing in relation to those who are of mature age. He is indicating that even the young can do this and enter into a shamanic relationship with the spirits in this way. This statement is not centrally about the special place of the young in relation to shamanism or of early trauma but the place of misfortune at any age and the subsequent request to the spirits within the context of the shamanic calling. Presumably, the younger the person, the more desperate the call and hence the more intimate the connection between the shaman.
and the spirit. It is in this way that the younger person has the prospect of becoming a more powerful shaman.

Bogoras (1904) provides examples; firstly, that of Scratching Woman whose poor father died when he was very young and following which he and his mother nearly starved. They continued to suffer for many years and with so little food that Scratching Woman remained "sickly and weak". Then he called on the spirits. A va'rgit (i.e. supernatural being) came to him in a dream and said "Cease to be such a weakling! Be a shaman and strong, and you will have plenty of food" (p.424). Secondly, Ye'tlin whose family perished early in his childhood from a contagious disease. He was left alone with his small sister and he called to the spirits who answered him and he became a renowned shaman. Bogoras concludes these examples by saying that "a number of Chukchee tales tell of young orphans, despised and oppressed by all their neighbours, who call to the 'spirits', and with their assistance become strong men and powerful shamans" (p.424) (italics mine). However, given the context, Bogoras is emphasising the connection between misfortune prompting a call to the spirits which, if answered, can lead to a shamanic vocation. He does not seem to be emphasising any special place for those orphaned except to indicate that orphanhood may be their particular misfortune prompting a call to the spirits. It would appear that Ducey's (1976) statement - "Proverbially and in reality, young orphans, universally hated and rejected, are particularly apt candidates to become powerful, fear-inspiring shamans" (p.179) - has been taken from this quote by Bogoras. In relation to Ducey's hypothesis, however, it needs to be noted that these situations of calling on the spirits must be occurring many years after infancy and so they do not directly support the hypothesis about trauma in the earliest stages of infant development being aetiological in Siberian shamanism.

Overall, Bogoras' (1904) argument in this section seems to be asserting that adolescent onset of the shamanic call is the norm, its nature being "abrupt" and "obscure" unless prompted by a call to the spirits in response to misfortune. Such a call can occur at any age but the matter is still one of "election", for the shamanic vocation, even in this circumstance, depends on the spirits' answer. Or to state things another way, we have very little evidence that being orphaned in itself, leads to
becoming a strong and powerful shaman for Bogoras only cites the case of Yeʼilm and a number of legendary tales when mentioning orphanhood. It would appear that the orphanhood in these cases is the misfortune which prompts the call to the spirits. Furthermore, Bogoras provides no evidence that trauma in the earliest stages of infant development is implicated in the aetiology of Chukchi shamanism.

At this stage, it would not appear that the ethnographic literature Ducey (1976) cites is sufficiently conclusive for us to agree that the "notable feature of the shaman's childhood is the early loss of parents" or that there is necessarily "severe emotional loss in the shaman's background". Nor does there appear to be any evidence of early infant trauma corresponding to the paranoid-schizoid level of development in those who become shamans.

8.3 OTHER COMMENTATORS WHO SUPPORT DUCEY'S (1976) HYPOTHESIS

There are other writers, however, whom Ducey (1976) does not cite but who do support his argument. Castagné (1930) on the Kazak Kirgiz says, "Autrefois les baqças [shamans] engageaient parfois de tout jeunes Kazak-Kirghizes, le plus souvent des orphelins, afin de les initier à la profession de baqça" [In the past the baqças occasionally enlisted very young Kazak Kirgiz, most often orphans, in order to initiate them to the profession of baqça] (p.60). However, the operative word is "occasionally" so that the pre-condition can again be understood to be "misfortune", whether through orphanhood or some other problem. Furthermore, Castagné is not referring here to contemporary events but to stories of the past and these may again be falling into the category of "divine child" legends. There is also no indication that the orphan status for the children has occurred in the earliest stages of infant development.

As with Castagné (1930), Novik (1984) notes that it is not uncommon in Siberian legends for the shaman-hero to be an orphan or one who is abandoned (usually by
celestial parents). Again it could be argued that these legends are being stated this way to emphasise "divine child" characteristics and the place of solitude within the shamanic vocation. Novik also relates the Nganasan legend of a future hero shaman being summoned to help an old shaman resurrect his dead daughter when "a very young child (he only just started to walk')" (p. 208ff) and that the trickery of the spirits which the child accomplishes, results in his parents being killed in revenge. Of interest in this legend, the loss of parents results from the child-hero's mastery of the spirits rather than being the pre-condition of the shamanic call.

In his "Shamans and their religious practices", Alekseev (1987) notes that "exclusive to the Yakuts was the belief that each shaman has an iie-kyl (beast-mother), a supernatural being who is sometimes involved in the upbringing of the shamanic kut [i.e. soul], but is considered to be the shaman's magical double" (p.103). The presence of this kind of imagery can be interpreted as a psychological identification with the mother and this would accord with Ducey's (1976) overall hypothesis.

More significantly, Lopatin (1940-1941) gives an interesting firsthand account of a shamanistic performance by the Orochi (Orochee) shaman, Ghindia, which contains material more relevant to this investigation. This performance was enacted to regain the favour of Ghindia's patron spirit and had become necessitated by the drama and scandal involving the death of her husband who was thirty years her senior and whom she disliked. Lopatin gives this account,

she began singing in a low, almost whispering, voice, now and then striking the drum gently . . . 'I am a poor woman. There is nothing in me that would distinguish me from any other woman in our village. I was a poor orphan. I was a deserted girl. My parents died very early. I do not remember my mother. My youth was hard; my childhood was without joy and my girlhood lonely. My relatives reared me . . . I have always worked hard . . . My marriage was unhappy. Oh, I was very, very unhappy. But I must not speak of that at all . . . If I do not touch memory then memory will not touch me. All is gone (Lopatin, 1940-1941, p.353).

Not only is Ghindia relating here her difficult childhood but this is contextualised in terms of her being an orphan from such an early age that she cannot remember her mother. It would appear this was experienced by Ghindia as traumatising. This
account more directly supports Ducey's (1976) hypothesis unless Ghindia's orphanhood is simply understood as her particular experience of misfortune which has prompted her call to the spirits and that no special place is accorded to the fact that the misfortune has occurred in childhood.

Additionally, it is easy to establish from the literature that the psychological disturbance associated with shamanism often appears in childhood/youth and that many groups in their recruitment of shamans will seek out children who display such characteristics of disturbance. As Czaplicka (1914) quoting Agapitoff and Khangaloff (1883) says, "A child chosen to be a shaman is recognized among the Buryat [a Neo-Siberian group like the Sakha (Yakut)] by the following signs: 'He is often absorbed in meditation, likes to be alone, has mysterious dreams, and sometimes has fits during which he is unconscious" (p.185). What is noteworthy is that Czaplicka in summarising Agapitoff and Khangaloff goes on to say,

After a period of trial the soul of the child returns to the body, which for a time resumes its normal life. But on his reaching adolescence, peculiar symptoms show themselves in the person who has undergone these experiences. He becomes moody, is easily excited into a state of ecstasy, leads an irregular life, wandering from ulus to ulus to watch the shamanistic ceremonies (Czaplicka, 1914, p.185).

In other words, early symptoms are evident which re-emerge in adolescence. This could indicate that the relevant psychopathology has its aetiology in childhood and/or infancy but that the experience of puberty draws it into the foreground.

In a similar way, Sandschejew (1927-1928) (as cited in Eliade, 1964) from his work with the Alarsk Buryat notes that those children elected by the spirits will cry in their sleep, become nervous and dreamy. And Mikhailowski (1894) on the Altaians says. "The future kam [shaman] begins to realize his destiny at an early age; he is subject to sickness, and often falls into a frenzy. . . . The tendency is hereditary; a kam often has children predisposed to attacks of illness" (p.90). Mikhailowski also discusses cases where a boy or girl can be subject to fits even in families where there is no shaman. Similarly, Eliade concludes on the Altaians that "While still a child, the future shaman, . . . proves to be sickly, withdrawn, contemplative" (p.20).
Chapter 8 The developmental side to the shaman archetype

We have already noted above, Castagné's (1930) observation of the Kazak Kirgiz shamans who would sometimes enlist orphans for training. He goes on to say, "cependant, pour la réussite du métier, une prédisposition aux maladies nerveuses était indispensable. Les sujets se destinant au baqçylyk étaient caractérisés par des changements subits d'état, par le passage rapide de l'irritation à l'état normal, de la mélancolie à l'agitation [nevertheless, for success in the profession, a predisposition to nervous diseases was indispensable. The subjects intending themselves for the baqçylyk were characterised by unexpected changes in state, by rapid transition from irritation to normality, from melancholy to agitation] (p.60)". It would appear again that the disturbance associated with shamanic election manifests in childhood and it is of note that the baqças thought such a predisposition to nervous disorders would occur amongst orphans, i.e. where there is a possibility of early emotional deprivation.

However, the fact that the emotional disturbances evidencing the shamanic call occur in childhood/adolescence without any apparent concurrent causative trauma can only suggest a possible issue of re-emergence, i.e. the psychopathology is already present from the time of infant development but emerges at a later age (for some reason). In this way, Ducey's (1976) hypothesis is not necessarily discounted but it requires more evidence.

Ducey himself admits that,

the reasons for the defectiveness of the mother-child relationship can be inferred only from vague clues ... The scarcity of food and the unpredictability and harshness of the environment doubtless contribute indirectly to, but do not in themselves account for, its insecurity and frustrations. But the mother's anxiety over these external difficulties may well be transmitted to the infant" (Ducey, 1976, pp.189-190) (italics mine).

In this way, Ducey is allowing for the effects of a disrupted emotional atmosphere on an infant's development apart from particular traumata. In terms of the connection between infant development and psychopathology this is a substantially acknowledged position and Winnicott is the clinician who has most argued this position. He makes the point that the "mental health of the human being is laid down
in infancy by the mother, who provides an environment in which complex but essential processes in the infant's self can become completed" (Winnicott, 1948, p.159). In other words, there are developmental tasks which can only be completed by the infant when in an emotional environment that is "good enough" and this is largely connected to the mother's preoccupation with the care of her infant, one that is a sensitive and active adaptation to the infant's needs. Hence, in "Psychoses and child care", Winnicott can say,

mental ill-health of psychotic quality arises out of delays and distortions, regressions and muddles, in the early stages of growth of the environment-individual set-up [i.e. the mother-infant dyad]. Mental ill-health emerges imperceptibly out of the ordinary difficulties that are inherent in human nature and that give colour to the task of child care (Winnicott, 1952b, pp.227-228).

The situation for the infant can become even further compounded if it has to incorporate the illness patterns of the mother as suggested by Ducey above. As Winnicott (1956) indicates, "the theme of the infant's introjection of the illness patterns of the mother [is a] subject . . . of great importance" (p.305).

Such a perspective is substantiated by later clinicians. For example, Gunderson (2001) makes a similar point when discussing the childhood experiences of those with Borderline Personality Disorder (hereafter, BPD). He states that any childhood trauma experienced by BPD patients to be "emblematic of sustained developmental problems that formed the patient's disturbed personality" rather than the cause per se of their problems. So whilst he can go on to state that 70% of BPD patients have childhood histories of physical or sexual trauma, he concludes,

the social conditions needed for BPD to develop require emotional estrangement from parents. This estrangement gives abusive experiences during childhood an impact that is far more traumatic in warping character development than is the impact of similar events on children who have the opportunity to find support, talk about the events, and react with their families (Gunderson, 2001, pp.44-45).
Clearly as with Winnicott, Gunderson (2001) sees that it is the early experience of developmental problems in infancy which is critical in BPD, even before the impact of later traumata.

This perspective is important in relation to verifying Ducey's (1976) hypothesis for his position is substantially validated if it can be shown that conditions exist amongst the Siberian groups that would facilitate the kind of traumatised or "not good enough" mother-infant environment which his hypothesis infers.

It becomes important then to look at the Siberian cultures to see if their customs and lifestyle are such as could produce conditions whereby the mothers are sufficiently affected so that the needs of the infants are not met at an early stage in their development. We can only glean such material from the ethnographic records and whilst the early ethnographers were not themselves directly concerned with this issue, I believe there are sufficient studies available for us to deduce conclusions which are beyond the tentative.

It is important to emphasise that we are not necessarily looking here for differences between these cultures and our own. Most cultures have quite different and presumably satisfactory ways of organising and doing childbirth and childrearing. However, given Ducey's (1976) assertions as to early disruptions in the mother/infant relationship as aetiological in Siberian shamanism and the psychoanalytic belief in the centrality of the early mother/infant relationship in relation to later psychopathology, we need to see if any such evidence is available from the ethnographic sources. It is not in any way a case of trying to demonstrate adverse effects due to practices which differ from those in the West or to read Western interpretations into the experience of another culture. But we are aware through the research of the post-Freudians that particular emotional patterns of the mother in the early weeks after childbirth can have long-term effects on the psychological well-being of the infant so that it would be legitimate to conclude that this psychoanalytic research on early infant development has made discoveries that are applicable to the general human condition, irrespective of culture. Given Ducey's assertions and the argument of this thesis, it is important to ascertain if the environmental conditions under which mothering occurs in Siberian groups could in any way foment affective
states in the mother (like depression and/or anxiety) which could constitute a "failure of the environment" (Winnicott's term) to such an extent as to be aetiologically implicated in relation to a bio-structural imbedding of a shaman archetype.

8.4 FURTHER EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT DUCEY'S (1976) HYPOTHESIS

8.4.1 The Sakha (Yakut) as a special case study

Of all the Siberian groups, the Sakha (Yakut) by far have been the most extensively studied and ethnographic material resulting from more than one direct observation is available on them. On two occasions, Jochelson undertook direct fieldwork amongst them. Firstly, from 1884-1894 as a member of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society expedition; and secondly, from 1900-1902 as a member of the famous Jesup North Pacific expedition undertaken through the American Museum of Natural History. These resulted in two ethnographic publications (Jochelson, 1926; 1933). Sieroszewski (1896, 1900, 1902) also had opportunity of direct observation when he spent twelve years living with the Sakha (Yakut) as a political exile in Siberia. An abridged overview of his early findings was subsequently translated by Sumner (1901). Mikhailowski (1894) included sections on the Sakha (Yakut) in his publication but like much of the material on Siberian shamanism, it is an overview gleaned from other observers and not the result of direct fieldwork. For this reason I will be concentrating on Jochelson and Sieroszewski (including Sumner's translation) as their accounts are firsthand and I will only use Mikhailowski and other accounts in a corroborative way.

In addition to having such extensive material available on the Sakha (Yakut), we are in an even more fortunate position, for Jochelson (1926) notes that by comparison with the Yukaghir (another Siberian tribe) whom he was studying at the time, Sakha (Yakut) shamanism is very well preserved. Indeed in 1908, Jochelson had gone further, asserting that "among the Yakut, a people with a more developed primitive culture [compared to the Koryak who were another Siberian tribe] . . . [p]rofessional shamans can be found everywhere . . . even at the present time" (p.48n). This
situation adds considerable weight to the conclusions which can be drawn from Jochelson's direct observations of Sakha (Yakut) culture and shamanism.

Furthermore, according to Krader (1954), the Sakha (Yakut) do not have as developed a culture like the Buryats so that their shamanism has not become accommodated to other cultural uses like determining socio-cultural class and rank. Sakha (Yakut) shamanism primarily deals with the spirits in relation to animistic beliefs and is likely, thereby, to be a more primitive expression of the shamanic complex.

By comparison, whilst Bogoras (1904) has undertaken extensive ethnographic work amongst the Chukchi (Chukchee), it would appear by the turn of the century, they practised a "family shamanism" rather than "professional shamanism". Hence Bogoras could observe few genuine trance states. Their performances were of a poor kind and Bogoras could only rely on remembered accounts with little direct observation.

For these reasons, Sakha (Yakut) shamanism is so often regarded, as Ducey (1976) puts it, "the 'most classical' representatives of classical shamanism" (p.190). Given this position, an overview of Sakha (Yakut) culture is called for to see if there is any correlation between the developed shamanism it exhibits and Ducey's hypothesis that emotional ruptures in the mother-infant bond are aetiological in the shamanic complex.

8.4.2 An overview of Sakha (Yakut) culture

8.4.2.1 Harsh environment and life

No one would deny that Siberia is a particularly harsh and difficult environment in which to live and according to Jochelson (1926), the Sakha (Yakut) and the Yukaghir in the Upper-Kolyma region encounter the most severe climate in Siberia. Sumner (1901) states that the hard winters and bad meadows place many Sakha (Yakut) households on the verge of distress, the least accident overthrowing the security of their existence. Since children will become labourers who cost nothing, there are high
birth rates (on average, ten children to one husband). However, this situation is paralleled by high rates of infant mortality (one example Sumner quotes is of a woman who had twenty two births of which eleven died). He goes on to conclude, "Infant mortality amongst them is frightful . . . This is due to the misery in which they live, on account of which they cannot give care to their children, even when they are rich" (p.80). This situation would appear even worse for the girl children. Czaplicka (1914) (citing Sieroszewski, 1900), when commenting on the decline of polygamy amongst the Sakha (Yakut), makes an interesting statement - "Another reason for the decline of the custom [i.e. polygamy] is that girls die in infancy more frequently than boys, as they are not so carefully tended" (p.112).

There would seem to be flow-on effects of this harsh way of life into other mores and attitudes for there appears to be an overt exploitation of the weak by the strong inside the family groups. According to Sumner (1901), younger members of the family can be forced into marriage or put to work under harsh conditions, children can be given away as labourers to outside persons or simply sold and the beating of wives and young children is not that uncommon. In fact, Jochelson (1933) describes the Sakha (Yakut) as warlike and blood vengeance occurred between clans, which was often resolved through ransom or the giving of a girl in marriage.

Similarly, Sumner (1901) states that the old are treated badly and often beaten and intimidated, so that fearing a lonely old age, they make up the greatest number of suicides. This is substantiated by Jochelson -

according to a Yakut tradition, aged parents and also sick and crippled people, unable to work, were doomed to die and were even buried alive after three days of abundant entertainment.

Trostchansky, who lived as a political exile among the Yakut for about twenty years, characterizes them as egotistical utilitarians. He says that aged people are not in favour; they are beaten by their own children and are often forced to leave their dwellings and to beg from house to house. They are not admitted by the rich and the poor people force them to do hard work, like dressing skins . . ., for every bit of food (Jochelson, 1933, p.132-134).

It is not unreasonable to conclude that a conjunction of a number of the factors outlined above could place certain mothers in a position of such stress as to have
flow-on effects into the efficacy of the mother-infant bond in the way Ducey (1976) envisages. It is possible that other customs specifically to do with the status and position of women in Sakha (Yakut) society could further exacerbate these stressors on young mothers.

8.4.2.2 The status and position of women in Sakha (Yakut) society

According to Sumner (1901), the women occupy a remarkably low status in Sakha (Yakut) society - they have no rights to land, property or independent existence. Within the family, the girls are treated as subordinate to the boys (who will one day take over sovereignty of the family). They are considered as "outsiders" because they will eventually marry and become the property of their husbands. As Jochelson (1933) puts it, "[a] girl, say the Yakut, is really a lot of aliens" (p.132). Hence, Sumner (1901) describes them as having a sense of being "worthless" and "rightless" so that they display "servile" and "cringing" behaviours and attitudes. Furthermore, since societal emphasis is on the woman's capacity to breed, polygamy is practised but this is in an environment where multiple wives may not be affordable because the wives have to be housed separately (Jochelson, 1933). Sumner (1901) concludes, "Everything is against the women; the conditions of labour, . . . and the land tenure which recognises the men only as having a share; and traditions and education" (p.95). Their low status is further amplified by the fact that the Sakha (Yakut) employ chastity girdles which are even worn constantly at night (Sieroszewski, 1900, as cited in Czaplicka, 1914) and through the custom of chotumnur whereby brothers do not let their sisters go off in marriage whilst still a virgin (Sumner, 1901). Such customs may not be that unusual in patriarchal/patrilineal societies but what is noteworthy is the position in which the new wives/mothers can be placed and the emotional impact of this on them and their infants.

Furthermore, the wife's labour is exploited and the husband is revered, as Sumner says,

To acquire an extra gain, win food or money, or earn something by outside work is considered more desirable [to the husbands] than to follow heavy daily labour which would maintain the life of the family from day to day" (Sumner, 1901, p.78).
Hence they pursue interests in external affairs, are lazy, attend village assemblies and leave the women to do the hard work. Sumner (1901) goes on, "Inside the house he [the husband] is treated with almost slavish respect and consideration. His presence puts an end to cheerfulness, the excuse for which is that he must maintain respect" (p.78).

In relation to the Sakha (Yakut) marriage system, most marriages are brought about without the participation or consent of the young people. Apparently the girls have little input into the marriage decisions by their fathers and even repugnant suggestions can be forced upon them through threats and beatings (Sumner, 1901). This situation can be exacerbated through their bride-price system, for although payment is made for a bride, there is a reciprocal system of dowry so that the bride is expected to bring gifts when she takes up residence within her husband's sib. Notwithstanding the fact that the bride-price system can help the woman over the emotional threshold of leaving her own blood relatives because she is seen to have and is treated with value, Sumner notes that difficulties can arise if there are price disputes.

She is very coldly received by his relatives if she brings less than was expected. . . . Often there is a complete rupture, . . . In [this] case, they boycott her and she suffers all kinds of petty household persecutions which poison her existence" (Sumner, 1901, p.84).

Moreover, because the wife comes from another sib, she can often be undermined by the maiden sisters of the husband. Sieroszewski (1902) knew cases of suicide by young wives under the persecution of the husband and his relatives.

The emotional impact of these situations could be compounded by the strict rules to do with bride interaction with in-laws, especially the father-in-law and other male relatives (Sumner, 1901). These are called "avoidance customs" and they entail a whole range of rules to do with approach, dressing and verbal address, which could
only exacerbate any tense emotional atmosphere, making everyday interactions difficult and placing a strain on domestic relationships.

Again, it is not unreasonable to conclude that these factors to do with the position and status of women in Sakha (Yakut) society could further exacerbate the stresses under which women endeavoured to do their childrearing. However, it is with childbirth practices that Sakha (Yakut) customs seem most extreme. This is an area of particular interest because of the connection between adult psychopathology and disruptions to the emotional well-being of the infant during the early months of life, which is exactly what Ducey (1976) has proposed in relation to Siberian shamanism.

8.4.2.3 *Sakha (Yakut) childbirth*

"Women, especially when they are pregnant, . . . are considered in some sense unclean" so says Sumner (1901, p.96). So even before the birth of the infant, a sense of personal inclusion by the mothers-to-be would be difficult. If other factors compounded this atmosphere of emotional estrangement then a more problematic situation could emerge for the future mother-infant dyad.

Jochelson makes a most interesting statement in relation to childbirth amongst the Sakha (Yakut),

The view is commonly held that women of primitive and low-cultured peoples have easier child-births than those of civilized and cultured nations; that with the former this process is much the same as any of the other natural and painless organic functions. I had more than one opportunity, while living among the Yakut and the Yakaghir, to convince myself that this view is erroneous. Of course, the women of these tribes are not as delicate as the women of civilized nations; but the absence of proper obstetric methods, and the necessity of being on their feet soon after child-birth, result in chronic suffering, *nervous diseases*, and premature age. Besides, many cases have come to my knowledge where young women have died as a result of an irregular birth, or of the barbarous practices of native midwives. (Jochelson, 1926, p.96) (italics mine).

It is of significance here that Jochelson (1926) is attributing a connection between "nervous diseases" in the mothers and the "barbarous practices" they have had to endure during childbirth.
In particular amongst the Sakha (Yakut), the presence of the actual father at the birth is considered advantageous because he can loosen "what he fastened". That childbirth is attended by much fear for the women is evidenced by the willingness of the mothers to name the father no matter what the circumstances of the conception. Birthing is facilitated by the mother leaning across a bar with pressure being applied to the abdomen by the midwife. If this is to no avail, the shaman is called because the Sakha (Yakut) believe difficult childbirth, premature birth and hard labour to be due to evil spirits having entered the mother.

Jochelson goes on to say -

no consideration is shown to either mother or child; for women possessed of evil spirits are regarded by the Yakut as no less perilous to society than those infected with epidemic germs. This accounts for the entire absence of compassion, and for the cruelty, manifested by the Yakut towards women suffering the pains of labor (Jochelson, 1926, p.102).

Jochelson (1926) then outlines as an example, the case of one woman who died from a ruptured perineum and punctured bladder as the result of a shaman's interventions. He gained the following account of the incident from a Russian observer (a man named Gebler).

The woman was a primipara, and the wife of the clan elder. As soon as the first labor-pains came, - which, according to the subsequent assertion of the unfortunate woman, were premature, - the husband sent for the shaman to hasten the delivery. The shaman arrived, and at once began his performances, and, having invoked his guardian spirits, set himself to the task of exorcism.

A structure made of birch poles [a structure with a bar across which the woman leans while pressure is applied to the abdomen] . . . was built by the husband with the help of the shaman, and the unhappy woman was dragged to it by force. Her cries and resistance were of no avail. With the aid of the shaman's son and her sister-in-law, the woman was dragged to the structure. Her hands and feet were fastened with skin straps to the side-poles of the structure, and her neck bound to the cross-piece. While the assistants held the woman, that she might not tear herself away from it, the shaman began to squeeze the child out, pronouncing incantations at the same time. The woman's cries were disregarded.
At length the shaman declared that he saw a long-tailed evil spirit holding the child. The husband of the poor woman begged the shaman to expel the spirit. Then the shaman armed himself with iron tongs, such as are used by a blacksmith, and pulled the child out piecemeal. Gebler, who was in the hut at the beginning of the performance, and who did not dare to interfere, had to leave the dwelling, not being able to witness the sufferings of the woman.

When he returned in the evening, the victim, already released, lay in a pool of blood on the bare ground, covered with a fur coat, moaning feebly [the ground is permanently frozen in the region of the Yakut]. The Yakut drank their tea quite unconcerned about the sufferer. Gebler intimated to the Yakut how cruel it was to mutilate a woman in child-birth and then to cast her away on the floor. The master of the house replied that his wife was not ill, but that the evil spirit had possessed her. Then Gebler carried the woman from where she lay and put her upon a reindeer-skin, and covered her over with a coat (Jochelson, 1926, p.102-103).

Gebler informed an official and the woman was transported to an infirmary where she died. The shaman was arrested and seemed to die of fright.

Given the fact that Jochelson (1926) indicates such practices and procedures were the norm, it is not stretching the point too far to say that these Sakha (Yakut) cultural practices set-up the kind of traumatising conditions required for difficulties to emerge in the early mother-infant dyad. This material adds weight to Ducey's (1976) hypothesis that ruptures and difficulties in this early phase of development are aetiological in "hysterical psychosis".

8.4.2.4 After childbirth

Information on the subsequent child-rearing practices among the Sakha (Yakut) is also informative. Sumner says,

the Yakut mothers have not much milk. Not a child grows up without using a sucking horn. The mothers suckle the children long. The author saw five-year-old boys who demanded the breast when they saw their little brothers enjoying it. Children are often suckled at night to keep them quiet, but in the daytime they lie cold, damp, and neglected, while their uproar fills the house, the mother being employed in her [demanding] household work. Some mothers employ a means of putting their children to sleep, especially if they are fretful boys, which often causes spermatorrhea (Sumner, 1901, p.80).
The last sentence is a rather academic way of saying the boys are masturbated.

This is a description of an emotional atmosphere where the infants could experience the mother as subjectively undifferentiated in that she both withdraws (leading to intense frustration) and uncontrollably approaches (and this in a specifically sexual way with the boys). Such situations can lead to a confused and confusing early frustration of emotional needs providing the kind of experience for the infants which accords with Ducey's (1976) hypothesis.

There are further factors indicated in the ethnographic records which could compound an already tense emotional atmosphere in the mother-infant dyads. Firstly, Jochelson (1926) says there is some evidence that infanticide was not unknown amongst the Sakha (Yakut) and he recounts a probable case when a child was born to a woman who had sexual relations with his Cossack. Aggressive impulses towards one's infant is probably not that unusual for any mother but the infant is in an entirely different situation if murderous impulses are concretely entertained as an actual solution to a problem.

Secondly, the ownership of children could lead to a mother and her infant being permanently separated in a very rupturing way. Sumner (1901) points out that such situations could come about because a general economic value was placed on children due to their subsequent labour. As a consequence, they were owned by the entire sib group, so if a widow remarried into another sib, the members of her first sib group would take away her son(s). It would appear that such situations could be more common than we may first think, for amongst the locus classicus tribes, marriage was not necessarily too permanent and divorce was common (see Section 8.4.5 below).

It is these factors which again add to the possibility that they could compound and place certain mothers in a position of such stress as to have flow-on effects into the efficacy of the mother-infant bond in the way Ducey (1976) envisages. If there is a preponderance of rupture and difficulty in the mother-infant dyads as seems to be suggested from this overview so far, then we ought to be able to find descriptions of anxiety-ridden behaviours amongst young children.
8.4.2.5 Descriptions of the Sakha (Yakut) children

Sumner (1901) provides an informative description of the behaviour patterns of the Sakha (Yakut) five to ten year olds.

[they] are by no means sprightly or enterprising, and they are excessively obedient. Even when playing they do not make half the noise and movement which our children make. When there are several in a family, you may not notice their presence for a long time. They hide themselves away in the corners . . . busy with something or other . . . - but all of it only half aloud. They are hardly ever so far carried away as to cry aloud or to sing aloud. At a threatening shout of a grown person, they come to silence and scatter. Only when they are alone do they become lively. This happens in summer, in the woods and groves, and in the fields. They are very fond of assembling to play there (Sumner, 1901, pp.80-81).

We have here a description of behaviour which is excessively self-monitored and riddled with anxiety. Such behaviours in children usually arise from early experience of an environment that is untrustworthy, threatening and unprotective. Notwithstanding the occurrence of infanticide impulses which we have already noted, early emotional deprivation and a frustration of needs can be experienced by the infant as an attack. The environment is then seen as potentially punitive. Furthermore, if the mother is excessively emotionally distracted and/or disturbed then she is unable to offer the kind of emotional protection to her infant which the Oedipal stage necessitates. The resulting defensive activity for a child is often one of withdrawal from threat. The point is that Sumner's (1901) description fits perfectly with the latter whilst the underlying cause of the behaviour accords with Ducey's (1976) hypothesis.

Furthermore, if conditions can become so difficult for a number of Sakha (Yakut) mothers that they are pushed into psychopathology with flow-on effects to their children, as continues to be suggested by this overview, then we would expect to see a prevalence of some kind of anxiety disorder in the culture. This is what we do find in terms of the early ethnographers' descriptions of "Arctic hysteria".
8.4.2.6 "Arctic hysteira"

The Sakha (Yakut), according to Jochelson (1926), is one of the Siberian tribes for whom "Arctic Hysteira" is more frequent and more serious. The highest degree of the disease seems to occur amongst those from the Upper-Kolyma region and Jochelson could find a sufferer in each of the families from this region. In addition, one half of the older Sakha (Yakut) women were seen to suffer from the version of the disorder which involves involuntary mimicry symptoms. He also noted that it was among the Sakha (Yakut) women in particular, that some suffered melancholia (depression), that is, they became apathetic and indifferent to everything, ate little and sat in silence.

Jochelson (1926) believed there to be a connection between "Arctic Hysteira" and the psychical effects of the environment, that is, the cold, the dark winters, the light nights in summer and the general monotony of the landscape. The disease also seems linked to certain stressors as it occurred more acutely during times of famine and food shortages. These factors are no doubt implicated but the fact that across the Siberian tribes, "Arctic Hysteira" can be observed most frequently and severely amongst the Sakha (Yakut) women is not that unexpected given the evidence so far as to the quality of their lives in their culture. This finding adds weight to the proposition being forwarded by Ducey (1976) that the emotional atmosphere for the women is distressing enough to foment real psychopathology which will have flow-on effects into their childrearing and the mother-infant dyads. For certain infants, problems could be further compounded beyond their needs not being met because they may end up either absorbing the illness patterns of the mother or reacting in response to those patterns, e.g. the infant of a depressed mother having to keep the mother happy so as to get its needs met. Such a compounding of difficulties could quite plausibly effect the "good enough" mother-infant bond leading to real psychopathology in the infants as Ducey suggests.

8.4.3 Corroborative evidence to do with childbirth from other Siberian groups

Jochelson (1926) notes that similar "barbarous practices" as with Sakha (Yakut) childbirth are seen amongst the Yukaghir and he goes on to relate that the many taboos and rules among the Yukaghir require a host of wearisome exercises which
neither aid the mother’s health nor that of the child. In relation to childbirth in particular, the Yukaghir mother will walk about the room with the onset of labour until she has to be helped by other women. Eventually she sits on her husband’s lap who encircles her body with his arms and squeezes down on her abdomen, aided by two other women and another man to increase the pressure. Sometimes a towel or leather belt is added. "The harmful effects of these obstetric performances upon the patient and the child are obvious. They frequently kill the former, especially when her pelvis is too narrow, or when the child is in a wrong position" says Jochelson (1926, p.101). It may be little wonder that Jochelson also notes that there are many barren women amongst the Yukaghir for this could be a self-protective manoeuvre. their anxiety inhibiting ovulation.

The Yukaghir mother generally lies down for only two or three hours after the birth and walks outside the next day. Similar taboos as apply with menstruation are observed for up to the next forty days. Jochelson (1926) also noted that in the past, infants who had lost their mothers at birth were often killed.

The point of this material is that the mothers from another Siberian *locus classicus* tribe with a developed shamanic tradition could be having similar emotionally disturbing experiences as do the Sakha (Yakut), with flow-on effects into the "good enough" mother-infant bond so that further support is given to Ducey’s (1976) hypothesis.

Unfortunately, no corroborative material in relation to childbirth could be found amongst the Koryak, which was the other major group Jochelson (1908) studied. They were very secretive about their childbirth procedures and neither Jochelson nor his wife could observe any, apart from the fact that the mother is considered unclean for a month after the birth and food taboos are enforced for the following year.

In relation to other *locus classicus* tribes with a developed shamanic tradition, we do have some evidence that aligns with the Sakha (Yakut) material. Bogoras (1904) tells us that the Chukchi (Chukchee) mother is not allowed to express pain or distress or to receive any help during childbirth so that the birth often occurs alone. As he says,
Custom strictly forbids the woman to groan, or to give way to the pain by any audible sign. Nor may help be given by other women. The woman who has been delivered has to attend to her own needs herself, and to those of the new-born infant. . . . The woman who accepts help . . . will be mocked her whole life long (Bogoras, 1904, p.36).

Conceivably, such a situation would add to the mother's stress and could compound with other factors leading to pathological responses. Bogoras (1904) also indicates that if the mother dies, the child is smothered but occasionally such a child is reared. Schrenck (1903) (as cited in Czaplicka, 1914) says that with the Gilyak, birth occurs in a specially constructed hut outside the home despite the season or weather. Winter in Siberia can be exceptionally uncomfortable, the flimsy nature of the huts means the mother and infant would be exposed to the cold and wind. Seeland (1887) (as cited in Czaplicka, 1914) suggests this custom is in response to the fear of death so that the mother and infant remain away from the main home for eight to twelve days. Again, the isolation implied in this custom could place the mothers under such stress as to contribute to the kind of psychopathological reactions Ducey (1976) posits.

8.4.4 Corroborative evidence from a circumpolar group - the Inuit

Whitney (1910) had occasion to witness a few incidents of "problokto" (the Inuit word for "Arctic Hysteria"). Whitney was a hunter and adventurer who spent a year amongst the northernmost tribe of Inuit. He explains "problokto" in the following way,

Problokto is a form of temporary insanity to which the Highland Eskimos are subject, and which comes upon them very suddenly and unexpectedly. They are liable to have these attacks more particularly at the beginning or during the period of darkness (Whitney, 1910, p.67).

One occasion Whitney witnessed is described by him as follows,

At half-past one that night I was awakened from a sound sleep by a woman shouting at the top of her voice - shrill and startling, like one gone mad. I knew at once what it meant - some one had gone problokto. I tumbled into my clothes and rushed out. Far away on the driving ice of the Sound a lone figure was
running and raving. . . . At length I reached her . . . She struggled desperately, and it required the combined strength of the three of us to get her back to the shack, where she was found to be in bad shape - one hand was frozen slightly, and part of one breast. After a half hour of quiet she became rational again, but the attack left her very weak.

In the meantime I went over to her igloo to look after the child. There I found the poor little pickaninnny without a stitch of clothes on, crying her eyes out, while five of the wolf dogs, which had broken into the place, were eating everything they could find (Whitney, 1910, pp.83-84).

We can see here the possible negative effects on the infants exposed to this kind of emotional atmosphere, particularly if it is regularly repeated or runs in parallel with other symptoms of disturbance and/or the frustration of emotional needs.

In addition to this material presented so far, an overview of the ethnographic literature reveals other general features in the locus classicus which could have a detrimental effect on the mothers in these tribes and thus on the "good enough" mother-infant bond.

8.4.5 Other general features in the locus classicus which parallel Sakha (Yakut) society

It would seem that across the locus classicus, women are regarded quite abjectly. The point in outlining the following is to indicate that as with the Sakha (Yakut), there is a possibility of certain negative factors and stressors compounding so as to disturb the "good enough" mother-infant bond, producing psychopathological effects on the infants in the way Ducey (1976) argues.

Amongst a number of groups, women were treated like property not persons. According to Pallas (1788a), the Ostyak (Ket) consider their wives like "necessary domestic animals" and treat them accordingly like "slaves not consorts" (p.305). Similarly, Pallas (1788b) describes the Samoyeds as treating their wives like "slaves . . . scolding and cursing them" (p.9). And Montefiore says of them,
Girls . . . are more or less valuable property, and the impecunious parent frequently sells his children at a very early age, in order that he may realise their value. . . It is not uncommon for a Samoyed to sell his wife to another for the consideration of a few teams of deer, and he sometimes barters her for a lady whose husband may be willing to accept the view that exchange is no robbery (Montefiore, 1894-1895, p.405).

Pallas (1788b) goes further saying that the Samoyed treat their wives as "impure creatures", subjecting them to many taboos and rules, especially when menstruating. Pain in childbirth apparently indicates the wife has had an illicit affair and this often (as one would imagine) produces a confession.

Bogoras gives a number of examples which indicate the inferior place of women amongst the Chukchi (Chukchee). As he says,

The position of women, on the whole, is inferior to that of the men. "Since you are a woman, be silent" . . . - these words are repeated every time that a woman severely reproved dares to say a word back in her own defence" (Bogoras, 1904, pp.546-547).

Bogoras (1904) later gives an account of a woman's protest against the "intolerable ill-treatment" by her father-in-law resulting in her leaving her husband and returning to her family home. He notes that this story is "characteristic of Chukchee family life" and adds, "The wife is often harshly treated by her husband. I have mentioned the case of a husband killing his wife with a blow of a fire-brand. Blows, though less severe, are not infrequently dealt out to women" (p.551).

Furthermore, abduction of women has been practised in the past amongst the Chukchi (Chukchee) which could be followed by the exchange of another woman to replace her or by a blood-revenge incident (Bogoras, 1904). A similar situation holds true for the Gilyak (Schrenck, 1903, as cited in Czaplicka, 1914). Bogoras also reports that amongst the Chukchi (Chukchee), older brothers can carry their sister off from their husbands against their wishes.
In relation to marriage customs, polygamy was practised amongst the Koryak (Jochelson, 1908), the Gilyak (Sternberg, 1893, as cited in Czaplicka, 1914), the Ainu (Batchelor, 1901), the Samoyed (Montefiore, 1894-1895), the Chukchhi (Chukchee) (Bogoras, 1904) and the Ket (Ostyak) (Pallas, 1788a). Polygamy is not that unusual outside of Siberia but in the *locus classicus* it can result in particular stress. As Jochelson (1933) indicates, the custom is that wives be housed separately but the Siberian environment is not economically viable enough for this practice to be affordable. Tensions thereby arise between the wives.

There is evidence of a bride-price system among the Yukaghir (Jochelson, 1926), the Gilyak (Sternberg, 1893, as cited in Czaplicka, 1914), the Ket (Ostyak) (Pallas, 1788a) and the Samoyed (Pallas, 1788b) so that tensions can arise in terms of the reciprocal dowry not being regarded as sufficient as we saw with the Sakha (Yakut) in Section 8.4.2.2.

Bogoras (1904) notes that for the Chukchi (Chukchee), marriage was not necessarily too permanent and wives could be returned easily. In fact, he found one third of the Chukchi (Chukchee) had been divorced. Divorce is also easy amongst the Koryak (Jochelson, 1908), the Kamchadal (Krasheninnikoff, 1818, as cited in Czaplicka, 1914), the Ainu (Batchelor, 1901) and the Samoyed (Montefiore, 1894-1895). As indicated with the Sakha (Yakut) in Section 8.4.2.4, this can lead to mothers being separated from their children because the *sib* groups own the children.

Krasheninnikoff (1818) (as cited in Czaplicka, 1914) informs us that the Kamchadal practise infanticide -

if a child was not desired, there was a widespread custom of causing abortion by shock or by killing the child in the womb. Old women specialists in these matters were found, but they frequently caused the death of the mother. If the undesired infant did not die before birth, the mother strangled it or gave it living, to the dogs to eat (Czaplicka, 1914, p.129).

Apparently, the Kamchadal would also kill one twin out of a pair as well as infants who were born during storms.
Similarly with the Chukchi (Chukchee), Bogoras reports -

New-born babes, indeed, after the death of their mothers, are frequently smothered, and carried out with them to the funeral-places, but this is because of the impossibility of raising them. I have heard, too, of women just delivered, who, when feeling very ill, would smother their children as a sacrifice to the spirits (Bogoras, 1904, p.48).

Later, Bogoras adds the following,

Sarytcheff says that in his time the Chukchee exposed their misshaped infants [Note: Sarytcheff, II, p.109. Steller mentions that the Kamchadal women of his time had many ways of producing abortion, but that, not satisfied with this, they often also smothered their babes, and then gave the corpses to the dogs, or exposed them alive in the middle of the wood (p.349) . . . I know of no such practice in modern times. But in the case of a lying-in woman dying in her labors, the babe is often smothered and exposed, together with the mother, in a common funeral. [D. Crantz says, in his History of Greenland, that, 'with the Greenland Eskimo, a suckling babe which has lost its mother and has no one else to nurse it is soon after buried alive by the desperate father' (I, p. 218). The Eskimo of America, moreover, exposed their new-born babies whenever they pleased] (Bogoras, 1904, pp.513-514).

Bogoras (1904) also tells of a starving Yukaghir family who in 1895 resorted to cannibalism of their children. As indicated in Section 8.4.2.4, an infant is in a potentially traumatising situation if murderous impulses are concretely entertained by the primary caregivers as an actual solution to a problem.

The custom of avoidance was also practised amongst the Altaians (Radloff, 1884 & Shvetzoff, no date, as cited in Czaplicka, 1914), the Buryat (Khangaloff, 1894, as cited in Czaplicka, 1914), the Kalmuk (Jytecki, no date, & Tereshchenko, 1854, as cited in Czaplicka, 1914) and the Ket (Ostryak) (Pallas, 1788a). As with the Sakha (Yakut), this can place strains on domestic relationships if the mothers, for other reasons, are already experiencing an emotional isolation.
Overall, we do not get a positive picture of the position and status of women amongst the main Siberian groups. As with the Sakha (Yakut), there is a possibility in these cultures that negative factors could so compound as to disturb the "good enough" mother-infant bond, producing pathological effects on the infants and leading to the shamanic complex in the way Ducey (1976) argues.

8.5 CONCLUSIONS

Bearing in mind that the observations of the early ethnographers were about other things than Ducey's (1976) hypothesis and the fact that current observation is difficult because of the demise in aboriginal Siberian culture, it has to be noted that the historical material overviewed from the Sakha (Yakut) and other groups, supports or is at least in accord with, Ducey's hypothesis. Nor is there anything in the material that contradicts the hypothesis.

There is evidence of societal practices and customs which could affect the mother's ability to meet the needs of her infant which would have implications for the efficacy of the early mother-infant dyad. Overall, both the physical and emotional atmosphere for the Sakha (Yakut) women could be described as harsh and there is a predominance of "Arctic Hysteria" amongst them, including melancholia (depression). There is some evidence that infanticide was practised. The custom of "avoidance" makes domestic relationships difficult and would work against a sense of inclusion in addition to the effects of the overall low status of the Sakha (Yakut) women in their society. Disputes to do with the bride-price could exacerbate this situation. Again, it needs to be emphasised that none of these customs is necessarily a problem in itself or that a Western criticism of any is implied but rather to see if it is possible for a combination of events to occur whereby the emotional stability of the mother is so disturbed (either in her own early childhood or as an adult at the time of childbirth and immediately following) that emotional mirroring and an attending to her own infant's needs is missing.

What we can see with the Sakha (Yakut) (and to some extent with other groups), is the possibility of emotional isolation and victimisation of the mother together with
distressing childbirth procedures. It is these conditions which in all possibility would produce abnormal affective states from which the mother may either want to protect her child, attack her child or to use the closeness of the child for her own emotional comfort. In the former circumstance there would be a withdrawal of spontaneous affect so that the mother does "therapy" with the child rather than parenting (as Winnicott puts it); and in the latter case, the infant becomes narcissistically used (and thus abused) or attacked by the mother. Of course, such response patterns can all occur at the same time, but from the infant's perspective, this would be within a coherent sib group with its built-in supports (in fact, the children are owned by the sib) so that a situation of "no other chaos" could quite plausibly be experienced around the central disruption to the mother/infant relationship, the recipe (according to Winnicott) for severe psychopathology which, on the one hand, masks itself behind a "false self" presentation but which on the other hand, does not slide into full-blown psychosis.

In other words, it is not unreasonable to conclude with Ducey (1976) that environmental conditions under which mothering occurs in Sakha (Yakut) society and possibly other Siberian groups, are such as to foment affective states in the mother (like depression and/or anxiety) which could constitute a "failure of the environment" to such an extent as to be aetologically implicated in relation to generating a particular kind of psychological development in their infants which is the forerunner to the shamanic complex. I am proposing that it is the intense affectivity of this developmental background which causes a shamanic archetypal pattern to become psychically imbedded as a bio-structural template of response potentials which is later activated in the pre-initiatory illness and which is seen in the resulting imagery. If this is the case then the question begged has to do with diagnosis for Ducey concluded that shamans, as a result of these developmental experiences, suffer from "hysterical psychosis". However, hysterical psychosis is not a current DSM IV diagnostic category. To fully explicate both the uses and abuses of the shaman archetype in post-Jungian discourse, it is necessary to review this diagnosis and to ascertain what it is that is going on in the psychology of shamans and why it is that they can function so coherently in their own socio-cultural contexts. It is to this issue that the next Chapter is addressed.
CHAPTER 9

THE SIBERIAN SHAMAN AS A "BORDERLINE TYPE OF CASE"

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Given the evidence presented in the previous Chapter which accords with the general hypothesis advanced by Ducey (1976), it is not unreasonable to conclude with him that environmental conditions under which mothering occurs in Sakha (Yakut) society (and possibly other Siberian groups) are such as to foment affective states in the mother (like depression and/or anxiety) which could constitute a "failure of the environment" to such an extent as to be aetiologically implicated in relation to generating a particular kind of psychological development in their infants which is the forerunner to the shamanic complex. Given the focus of this hypothesis on the early mother-infant bond, I believe Donald Winnicott to be the most appropriate theoretician by which to further explicate the nexus between dysfunctions in the early mother-infant bond and the developmental/emergence of the shaman archetype.

9.2 DONALD WINNICOTT

Winnicott combines expertise as both paediatrician and psychoanalyst and had many years experience working directly with children as both physician and psychotherapist as well as a psychoanalyst of adults. As such, his is a theoretical perspective grounded in clinical as well infant observation and casework. Given the general thrust of Ducey's (1976) hypothesis, I believe it important to use a theoretical perspective like Winnicott's which is driven by infant observation and clinical experience.
The clearest statements of Winnicott’s ideas are in "Primitive emotional development" (Winnicott, 1945), "Paediatrics and psychiatry" (Winnicott, 1948) and "Psychoses and child care" (Winnicott, 1952b). His is a developmental theory of mental illness such that:

the emotional development of every infant [involves] complicated processes . . . and that lack of forward movement or completeness of these processes predisposes to mental disorder or breakdown; the completion of these processes forms the basis of mental health. . . . The mental health of the human being is laid down in infancy by the mother, who provides an environment in which complex but essential processes in the infant’s self can become completed (Winnicott, 1948, p.159).

Winnicott believes that infants reach a significant stage of development around six months whereby they begin to experience themselves and others as whole persons. Prior to this is the earliest stage of development in which three essential achievements are required. Firstly, an integration out of a primary unintegration. Secondly, personalisation (i.e. a sense that one’s person is in one’s body) and thirdly, realisation (i.e. reality contact) (Winnicott, 1945).

In this earliest stage up to six months of age, the individual is not understood to be a unit but rather an "environment-individual set-up" (Winnicott, 1952b). What occurs after birth is an on-going experience of environmental impingement. If this occurs in the context of a good-enough active adaptation to the infant’s needs then the environment is discovered (as opposed to being reacted to) and the sense of self is not lost. Alternatively, if the impingement is of a faulty adaptation and thus negative, the infant has to react to it and the sense of self is lost, only to be regained in the return to isolation. As time proceeds this cannot be maintained without more and more defensive organisation to try and keep the impingement out and it is this which begins the defensive manoeuvre of splitting.

Gradually over time through "good enough" experiences, the unintegrated bits come together into an integrated but raw state individual where "the individual psyche becomes lodged in the body". The mother’s good care neutralises the sense of persecution from the outside so that integration and personalisation are achieved.
Good care is achieved through attention to the bodily needs of the infant and through it being allowed to have its instinctual experiences. However, incomplete integration will lead to the related pathologies of disintegration, depersonalisation and dissociation and it is these processes which appear regressively in the psychoses. As Winnicott puts it,

Mental ill-health of psychotic quality arises out of delays and distortions, regressions and muddles, in the early stages of growth of the environment-individual set-up. Mental ill-health emerges imperceptibly out of the ordinary difficulties that are inherent in human nature and that give colour to the task of child care" (Winnicott, 1952b, pp.227-228).

Additionally, a failure at this stage leads to a paranoid potential as the infant is exposed to a sense of persecution from the outside environment. In extreme cases the individual opts to live permanently in their own inner world which is not firmly organised and so the external persecution is kept at bay at the expense of achieving unit-status.

The second aspect of the initial phase of development is the readiness for hallucination or illusion as the way of establishing contact between the psyche and the environment. Indeed, from his clinical observations of infants, Winnicott firmly believed that infant behaviour cannot be accounted for except on the assumption that there are infant fantasies (Winnicott, 1941). He sees the infant at this stage as "ready to believe in something that could exist, i.e. there has developed in the infant a readiness to hallucinate an object" (Winnicott, 1948, p.163). Beginning with the infant approaching the breast with this "readiness to hallucinate", it conjures up what is actually available, and over time, realisation occurs through the progressive build-up of experience of the breast as an actual external reality. As such, the beginning of objectivity is achieved, the converse of which is magical thinking and subjectivity. Winnicott (1952b) believes that the adult experience of the arts and religion have their trajectory from this zone of "primary madness" (p.224).

In this early stage, the infant is being introduced to external reality and so problems here will pre-dispose the individual to schizoid and schizophrenic states. In other
words, emotional development in its earliest stages "concerns exactly the same phenomena that appear in the study of adult schizophrenia, and of the schizoid states in general and of the organized defences against confusion and un-integration" (Winnicott, 1952b, p.222). Thus, psychotic illnesses arise from disruptions and emotional chaos at this stage. In such cases of chaos, splitting continues and the end result is a secret inner life on the one hand (which is truly incommunicable) but in which "magic holds sway" (Winnicott, 1948, p.170) counterpoised with a "false self" (Winnicott, 1952b, pp.224-225). This idea of the "false self" is a particular Winnicottian concept and it is understood to build itself around a compliance "with mundane management from outside, convenient because life-giving, but unsatisfactory in the extreme to the infant" (Winnicott, 1948, p.170). As he points out in "Psychoses and child care" (Winnicott, 1952b), the "false self" can be initially satisfactory and may even acquire a pseudo-maturity, however, the psychotic material behind it is latent and will require attention in the end. The compliance can also break down if too isolated from the individual's spontaneity. Indeed, problems with reality contact orientate the individual to extreme experiences so as to feel real. Similarly, if there is too much routine in such a person's life, external reality lacks meaning and the concomitant feelings of unreality will reveal themselves in a craving for the new (Winnicott, 1948).

In so far as normal development is concerned, Winnicott says that -

[the] gap between complete and incomplete adaptation is dealt with by the individual's intellectual processes, by which, gradually, the failures of the environment become allowed for, understood, tolerated, and even predicted. Intellectual understanding converts the not-good-enough environmental adaptation to the good-enough adaptation (Winnicott, 1952b, p.225).

He goes on to state that this situation is fine if there is no other chaos which causes the environment to behave unsteadily, for unpredictability is traumatic.

In summary then, an early phase of personality development requires movement through a zone of "primary madness". If there is a good enough maternally directed adaptation to the environment then infants move through this into reality contact.
Infants participate in this developmental movement by way of their intellectual processes, i.e. the use of their thinking to overcome the failures in the environment. This healthy line of development can be thwarted in two ways either through inadequate maternally directed adaptation in the first place and/or a situation of "other chaos" surrounding the mother-infant dyad. If the former, then splitting begins as a defensive manoeuvre so that a "false self" is presented to the outside world behind which the individual is caught in the zone of "primary madness" so that psychotic material lies in the background. If this situation is occurring in an environment of "no other chaos" then the "false self" can achieve a pseudo-maturity and the individual is able to function fairly well but the psychotic material in the background will require constant management.

There are two concepts of significance emerging from this overview which need highlighting, that of the conditions which lead to development of the "false self" and the possibility of a corresponding and connected situation of "no other chaos". For what is suggested is that the addition of "other chaos" to an inadequate maternally directed adaptation will lead to actual psychosis but that a situation of "no other chaos" alongside inadequate maternally directed adaptation leads to something else.

It is in his paper on "Primary maternal preoccupation" that Winnicott (1956) makes more specific the nexus between inadequate maternally directed adaptation and the situation of "no other chaos".

9.2.1 Primary Maternal Preoccupation

Primary Maternal Preoccupation is a psychological state which Winnicott (1956) believes mothers enter toward the end of the pregnancy and which lasts for a few weeks after the birth of the child. In it the mother experiences a "heightened sensitivity, almost an illness" which could be "compared with a withdrawn state, or a dissociated state, or a fugue, or even with a disturbance at a deeper level such as a schizoid episode in which some aspect of the personality takes over temporarily" (p.302). Winnicott sees this as a necessary phase because the mother in the first weeks must become absolutely preoccupied with their own infant to the exclusion of other interests. In the ordinary course of events, this situation is temporary and the
mother recovers from it and problems only arise if the life of the infant is threatened or it dies or the mother's anxieties make these a feared possibility or the mother is unsupported to such an extent that she is prevented from going into Primary Maternal Preoccupation.

On the effects of insufficient Primary Maternal Preoccupation so that the needs of the infant are being insufficiently met in this earliest stage of experience, Winnicott says, without the initial good-enough environmental provision, [the] self that can afford to die never develops. The feeling of real is absent and if there is not too much chaos the ultimate feeling is of futility. . . . If there is not chaos, there appears a false self that hides the true self . . . that is only playing for time. . . . [W]hen there has been failure at this first phase, the infant is caught up in primitive defence mechanisms (false self etc.) which belong to the threat of annihilation (Winnicott, 1956, p.304-305) (italics mine).

Here we see the nexus between development of a "false self" and the situation of "no other chaos" spelled out more succinctly. The situation of "no other chaos" allows for the development of the "false self" as a defensive manoeuvre but as we have seen earlier, behind the "false self" is the true self which gets caught in the zone of "primary madness" and which incorporates psychotic material into its personality organisation. As Winnicott (1952b) says, "disturbances which can be recognized and labelled as psychotic have their origin in distortions in emotional development arising before the child has clearly become a whole person capable of total relationships with whole persons" (p.220). So unlike neurosis, psychosis develops from failure of the individual's environment to satisfy its needs at a very early stage, before emergence of the complete personality. The individual develops, as a result, a sense of futility, unrealness, and a false self (Winnicott, 1955).

It would appear that psychotic material can become incorporated into an infant's developing personality because of failures in the maternally directed adaptation to the environment but that it is possible for this to occur in an environment of "no other chaos". It is this situation of "no other chaos" which aids the emergence of a "false self" defensive manoeuvre as a way of handling the overall situation. In such a

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situation we could get the kind of case which Winnicott describes in his paper on "The use of an object". He says,

It is in the analysis of the borderline type of case that one has the chance to observe the delicate phenomena that give pointers to an understanding of truly schizophrenic states. By the term 'a borderline case' I mean the kind of case in which the core of the patient's disturbance is psychotic, but the patient has enough psycho-neurotic organization always to be able to present psycho-neurosis or psycho-somatic disorder when the central psychotic anxiety threatens to break through in crude form. In such cases the psychoanalyst may collude for years with the patient's need to be psychoneurotic (as opposed to mad) and to be treated as psychoneurotic. The analysis goes well, and everyone is pleased. The only drawback is that the analysis never ends. It can be terminated, and the patient may even mobilize a psychoneurotic false self for the purpose of finishing and expressing gratitude. But, in fact, the patient knows that there has been no change in the underlying (psychotic) state and that the analyst and the patient have succeeded in colluding to bring about a failure (Winnicott, 1968, p.102) (italics mine).

I propose that such a situation can occur because the individual's earliest development has had two aspects running in parallel - inadequate maternally directed adaptation to the environment during the early phases of the mother-infant dyad but in a situation of "no other chaos" which prevents the psychotic material from spilling out into full blown madness. It is this constitution which makes up the "borderline type of case" where a neurotic false self can be mobilised to counteract the real problem which is of a psychotic nature.

9.3 "NUCLEAR" AND "ORBITAL" PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

In relation to personality development, it may be useful at this juncture to utilise a conception put forward by John Wisdom who speaks of "nuclear" and "orbital" aspects of personality structure (Wisdom, 1961, 1964). Wisdom primarily uses these terms in relation to psychoanalytic introjects and their place in personality development but they are useful for the purposes of this thesis, in the following way. A person's earliest experience in the mother-infant dyad across the first six months of life will lead to development of the nuclear (core) part of the overall personality but
further developmental experience will constitute the orbital or outer layers of personality structure. In such a conception it would be possible for an individual to have a psychotic core (nuclear) part to their personality but within outer (orbital) layers of functioning, if the outer (orbital) layers have developed in an environment of "no other chaos". Winnicott speaks of something similar in his paper on "Anxiety associated with insecurity" when he says -

without a good-enough technique of infant care the new human being has no chance whatever. With a good-enough technique the centre of gravity of being in the environment-individual set-up can afford to lodge in the centre, in the kernel rather than in the shell. The human being now developing an entity from the centre can become localized in the baby's body and so can begin to create an external world at the same time as acquiring a limiting membrane and an inside. [The converse is of] an environment developing falsely into a human being, hiding within itself a potential individual (Winnicott, 1952a, pp.99-100).

A crude nosology of personality "disease" would then appear as in Table 9.1 following. There, the use of the term "dysfunctional" in the nuclear (core) part to the personality is equivalent to "psychotic" as it aligns with Winnicott's zone of "primary madness". It would be akin to Eigen's (1987) idea of the "psychotic core".

In aligning these ideas about severe difficulties in the early mother-infant dyad alongside a "no other chaos" situation which enables certain individuals to organise strong enough ego defences around a "psychotic core", we may be getting a glimpse of what is actually happening within Siberian shamanism given the evidence so far for Ducey's (1976) hypothesis connecting shamanic psychology to early mother/infant difficulties. The suggestion is opened that shamans may be similarly constructed as in the combination of Winnicott's and Wisdom's formulations above, that is they represent a "borderline type of case" where the orbital layers of their personality are functional because they have developed in a situation of "no other chaos" but that this masks psychotic material at the nuclear level of development because of the environmental failures at the time of the "environment-individual set-up". Shamans can, thereby, still experience "primary madness" and it is this which would enable them to access experiences of magic and transpersonal imagery.
TABLE 9.1

A CRUDE NOSOLOGY OF PERSONALITY "DISEASE"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUCLEAR (CORE OF THE PERSONALITY)</th>
<th>ORBITAL (OUTER LAYERS OF THE PERSONALITY)</th>
<th>RESULT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IF FUNCTIONAL</td>
<td>IF DYSFUNCTIONAL</td>
<td>THEN NEUROSIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF DYSFUNCTIONAL</td>
<td>IF DYSFUNCTIONAL</td>
<td>THEN PSYCHOSIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF DYSFUNCTIONAL</td>
<td>IF FUNCTIONAL</td>
<td>THEN PERSONALITY DISORDER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, the situation of "no other chaos" could easily be the case with Siberian shamans as they would be surviving their early infant experiences within intact societies and extended family and sib groups. The "no other chaos" would aid their integration as would the mastery inherent in their initiation and training not to mention the ego-strength developed by what they have already been forced to overcome, manage and control from infancy and which they would be continuing so to do.

Given the conceptions developing here, it is no longer a question of "are shamans mentally ill?" using Western diagnostic categories. Rather it is to assert that all infants go through a stage of "primary madness" and that normality is a developmental achievement from out of this zone where "magic holds sway". In other words, the muddles, distortions and traumas experienced by an infant in the earliest stages of development will position them along a normal/abnormal continuum, the extent of derangement and psychotic quality material will depend on the distortions experienced in the earliest months of life together with the effects of any "other chaos". In relation to any individual's position along this continuum, Winnicott's concept of "no other chaos" being an experiential atmosphere after initial disturbances allows for an explanation as to how individuals who may be quite disturbed can develop sufficient personality organisation to present as normal when in fact their earliest layers of development are anything but normal. I am proposing that Siberian shamans are a variant on these processes - a "borderline type of case" which enables them to be stable enough to function coherently in their socio-cultural group but which also allows them to access psychic material from the zone of "primary madness" which underpins their magico-religious experiences. However, the "borderline type of case" being proposed here is something different from the current psychiatric diagnostic category of BPD and as such, the term and concept of "borderline" needs further explication.
9.4 THE TERM "BORDERLINE"

The word "borderline" was first used by Stern (1938) to describe a type of patient who was appearing in consulting rooms displaying both neurotic and psychotic characteristics but who did not fall easily into either diagnostic category. Clinicians soon came to see these patients as characterised by what Schmideberg (1947) described as a "stable instability". Grinker concluded from his research that -

the borderline is a specific syndrome with a considerable degree of internal consistency and stability and not a regressive state in response to some internal or external conditions of stress. It represents a syndrome characteristic of arrested development of ego functions. Clinicians have recognized that the borderline syndrome is a confusing combination of psychotic, neurotic, and character disturbances with many normal or healthy elements. Although such symptoms are unstable, the syndrome itself as a process is recognizably stable, giving rise to the paradoxical term "stable instability" (Grinker, 1977, p.162).

As diagnostic clarity has emerged over the years, it is this "stable instability" which has remained as a distinguishing feature of the disorder so that Peters is able to conclude,

the borderline patient is different from the psychotic patient because of the capacity for rapid recovery (often to previous levels of functioning) with nominal therapeutic intervention, relatively good reality testing, ability to establish a therapeutic alliance, more adequate object relations and no residual after-effects of cognitive and affective disorganization that mark the chronic psychoses. However, this stable personality organization remains constricted and impoverished, displaying many of the diagnostic indicators mentioned in DSM III (Peters, 1988, pp.11-12).

Eventually a particular clinical category of BPD was formulated but as with the other Personality Disorders, it is a psychiatric classification which only became listed in DSM IV in 1980. Gunderson (2001) notes that there are few publications on BPD up until and including 1975 with only five books being published on the disorder over the period 1968-1974. It is understandable that Ducey (1976) would not have come to
the conclusion that Siberian shamans suffer from BPD because he was writing before it became a diagnostic category.

In overviewing the research on BPD, Gunderson (2001) indicates that it has virtually no genetic basis but rather arises within a family environment of high conflict and unpredictability and where there are high incidences of sexual abuse.

Gunderson (2001) notes that those with BPD display an oscillating maternal attachment pattern around two loci. The first is termed an "anxious/ambivalent" dimension which is characterised by the need to check for caretaker proximity; signalling need for contact by pleading and other calls for attention; and clinging behaviours (see Ainsworth, Blehar & Waters, 1978). The other is a "disorganised/disoriented" pattern which denies dependency needs with an apparent absence of separation anxiety and a reluctance or fear of becoming attached. Gunderson cites research which indicates that such patterns develop in response to primary caregivers who are depressed, disturbed or abusive and it is these qualities which have been found present in the caregivers of many borderline patients. Gunderson indicates that a number of clinicians believe this alternating attachment pattern to be the core psychopathology of BPD. In this way and as seen before in Section 8.3, Gunderson believes that any childhood trauma experienced by those with BPD to be "emblematic of sustained developmental problems that formed the patient's disturbed personality" rather than the cause per se of their problems. So whilst he can go on to state that 70% of BPD patients have childhood histories of physical or sexual trauma, he states,

The social conditions needed for BPD to develop require emotional estrangement from parents. This estrangement gives abusive experiences during childhood an impact that is far more traumatic in warping character development than is the impact of similar events on children who have the opportunity to find support, talk about the events, and react with their families (Gunderson, 2001, pp.44-45).

Gunderson goes on to conclude,
Their family experience often includes marital discord, abandonment, violence, and substance abuse [so that the resulting BPD is] marked by broken identities, primitive defenses, and transient failures in reality testing. . . . So disturbed is the development of many BPD . . . individuals that it seems unnecessary to invoke genetic causality (Gunderson, 2001, p.54).

It can be seen then that borderline aetiology is generally accepted to arise in the pre-Oedipal stage of psychological development and it is this which explains the reliance of those with BPD on the pre-Oedipal defences like splitting and projective identification (Grotstein, 1981) rather than repression which stems from a later Oedipal developmental period.

The DSM IV clinical category of BPD does specify a psychiatric category indicative of gross psychopathology. The "borderline type of case" as suggested by Winnicott (1968) and being proposed here, is indicative of something less "full blown" but rather a variant on a continuum toward BPD. Its roots arise during early child development when the infant is transitioning the zone of "primary madness". Failures in the environment for the infant due to inadequate mothering at this stage predispose the infant to splitting defences so that the nuclear part of their personality remains fixed at this primitive level of development. Hence one aspect of their personality structure will be psychotic in nature. For Siberian shamans, it is this nuclear core which underpins their magico-religious experiences. If the developmental environment contains "no other chaos" then the later orbital levels of personality can develop quite functionally but the psychotic nuclear core remains active. Whether any individual develops a complete BPD or this less severe "borderline type of case" will depend on the extent and severity of damage in the zone of "primary madness" plus the quality of the "no other chaos" experiences. In this way, the "borderline type of case" can be understood to occupy a place along a continuum, the extreme pole of which would be BPD.

The proposal of this thesis is that the "borderline type of case" is the best way to describe the psychology of Siberian shamans. Overall, evidence suggests that they do function coherently in their own sociocultural groups which would indicate they do
Chapter 9 The Siberian shaman as a "borderline type of case"

Not suffer with gross psychopathology like psychiatric BPD. In fact, in many Siberian tribes, individuals with gross psychopathology are recognised as quite separate to those who are shamans. Where the DSM IV psychiatric category becomes important in this study is that it will highlight specific "borderline" characteristics which can be used to make a further determination as to whether the Siberian shaman's psychology fits with the "borderline type of case".

Siberian shamanism now needs to be examined to see if there is evidence that it aligns with the "borderline type of case" as argued here.

9.5 THE SIBERIAN SHAMAN AS A "BORDERLINE TYPE OF CASE"

Evidence to support the assertion that the psychology of Siberian shamans is of the "borderline type of case" will be examined across four areas - implications in the literature; the presence of dismemberment imagery in Siberian shamanism; the presence of self-mutilating behaviours; the shamanic characteristic of "liminality" and the nexus between Siberian shamanism and psychological derangement. Finally, the Siberian Chukchi (Chukchee) tribe will be overviewed to see if it can add any further corroboration.

9.5.1 Suggestions in the literature

There have been suggestions in recent literature on shamanism as to a connection between it and BPD.

Larry Peters (1988) seems to be the first to suggest there may be some connection between shamanism and BPD but this has only been in a very passing way. In his paper, "Borderline personality disorder and the possession syndrome: An ethnopsychoanalytic perspective", Peters investigates the relationships between BPD and Bourguignon's (1976) "negative possession trance". The "negative possession trance" is defined as an undesired and spontaneous altered state of consciousness in which a person's actions are interpreted as being under the influence of an alien spirit.
Peters examines these disorders from the perspective of object relations theory and the core symptoms of BPD are compared to the "possession syndromes" reported in certain cultures. Peters concludes that "negative possession trance" is a cross-cultural variant of BPD.

Whilst Peters (1988) is particularly interested in the "possession syndrome", he does in passing note the parallel between shamans' dreams and hallucinatory experiences and those of borderline patients. He sees cultural processes as accounting for the "creative reconstitution" of the "psychological states which begin as schizophreniform" but which can be made "socially beneficial" through group acceptance and affiliation which militates against isolation; through initiation; through the positive effects of a shared and agreed upon mythology and through the status and role which the neophyte ultimately assumes.

However, these conclusions by Peters (1988) are made without either stating that shamans suffer from BPD or attempting any other analysis of their psychology (which is not the point of his paper, of course). Nonetheless, his allusions do beg the question as to the actual psychology of shamans. This is of importance because Peters' statements are suggestive of an extension to Ducey's (1976) psychoanalytic diagnosis of Siberian shamanic psychology and introduces the possibility of seeing it in terms of BPD.

Eight years later, Peters (1996) in "The contribution of anthropology to transpersonal psychiatry", discussed several cross-cultural and transpersonal principles of healing, particularly psychic healing through shamanic rituals, and presented an example from his previous work amongst the Tamang (Peters, 1978). Peters (1996) paralleled these healing principles with rites of passage and then applied these principles to the successful treatment of a case of Western BPD. In relation to BPD, his overall opinion seems that it is less prevalent in cultural contexts with meaningful rites of passage. This is a point Peters has made before (Peters, 1994). Peters (1996) notes a view in the literature which sees BPD as culture-related and on the increase in the West because Western cultures lack "clear mores and structures for the young" unlike traditional societies. Thus, "rites of passage, like healing rituals, assist people through life crises and have similar transformational structure" (p.209). Whilst Peters would
see a novice becoming a shaman through following such a pattern, the issue of the shaman's psychology in relation to BPD is not directly addressed because he sees their initiatory experiences as "apparent psychopathology". As he says - "Crisis, suspension of convention, altered states of consciousness, transcendent symbols, and community can transmute apparent psychopathology into psychological and spiritual growth" (p.214). It is not clear whether Peters is using the word "apparent" to indicate real psychopathology or to say that it only appears this way when it is not actually the case. He does seem to side with Eliade (1964) that shamans have done something so creative and purposeful with their psychological problems that any psychopathology can ultimately be discounted.

Notwithstanding the fact that Peters (1996) does put forward the positive proposal that Western psychiatry and psychotherapy could learn from the shaman's experience and rite of passage, parallels between the shaman's experience and those with BPD are implied. In this way, Peters' paper does align with the suggestion being developed here that the shaman's psychology maybe of a "borderline type of case".

9.5.2 The presence of dismemberment imagery

In relation to Siberian shamanism, Eliade (1964, 1987) makes the observation that the experience of dismemberment imagery during the shamanic calling/initiation does seem a consistently common theme across a number of Siberian groups. This has been confirmed by later researchers like Hutton (2001) who, although questioning the universal aspect for which Eliade argues, does acknowledge that "A common theme across a swathe of Central Siberia, from the Sagays through the Evenks and Sakha to the Nganasan, was that the novice underwent the terrifying dream-experience of being physically dismembered and then reconstructed" (p.73).

Such descriptions of dismemberment do raise the question, from a psychological perspective, as to underlying psychotic tendencies. Psychiatric researchers have endeavoured to identify typical dreams of various clinical categories like schizophrenia, depression and BPD (see Kramer, 1969; Natterson, 1980; Oremland, 1987; Richardson & Moore, 1963 as examples). However, Friedman (1992) concludes that overall, the results have been disappointing although certain statistical
trends can be noted. One such trend amongst those with severe internal pathology like psychosis or borderline dynamics is dreams that "depict extreme violence, fragmented and mutilated body parts, cannibalism, and so on" (p.19) although Friedman notes that such imagery can occur in the dreams of neurotics and normals. Nonetheless, the trend corroborates Stone's (1979) earlier assertion that dream imagery of dismemberment, death of the dreamer, etc. can indicate extreme psychopathology, often of a borderline nature.

A few illustrative examples from the clinical literature follow. Stone (1979) reports the case of a woman who attempted suicide and was diagnosed with psychotic depression which was preceded by this dream image - "One of my arms was torn off and my heart was exposed" (p.12). Similarly, Boss (1959) reported this dream image - "I fell into a large heap of skulls and my body disintegrated" - which preceded a schizophrenic episode (p.170). One of Friedman's (1992) cases involved a patient who presented with depression and anxiety but this masked more severe underlying pathology which was revealed in this dream image - "A dead woman is hanging on the wall of a shed with hooks and her legs are cut off at the knee" (p.23).

Dismemberment is one aspect of Siberian shamanism which Eliade (1964) particularly uses to illustrate shamanism's universality because it is one thing which occurs in groups so distant from each other that cultural transmission can be ruled out, for example between Siberia, Australian aboriginals and South America. As he says, "this likeness between Australia and Siberia markedly confirms the authenticity and antiquity of shamanic initiation rites" (p.51). Despite Eliade utilising this common phenomenon to construct a universal pattern for shamanism, such a common theme across such distant cultures is noteworthy and does support the thesis being argued here. In other words, it is not surprising that dismemberment would be a universal aspect of the shamanic call/initiation because it reflects a borderline type of psychology which is the one pre-disposed to such a "call".

The most illustrative example of dismemberment imagery among Siberian shamans comes from the case of the Nganasan (Tavgi Samoyed) shaman, Sereptie Djaruoskin as recorded by the Soviet ethnographer, Popov (1968). In describing his calling to the shamanic vocation, Sereptie Djaruoskin says that at one stage in the process (entering
the seventh tent) he "went in, not as a man but as a skeleton; I don't know who gnawed me off, I don't know how it happened" (p.142). Indeed, the inhabitants of the tent "did not look like real human beings but like skeletons which had been dressed". As with similar material from Australian aboriginals such an experience was enacted on initiates so that they could be reconstituted. As Sereptie Djaruoskin says, "When I entered as a skeleton and they forged, it meant they forged me" (p.142). Whilst the tone of these recollections are thereby positive, it is also of interest that during this process he does say, "This is my fate - to lose my mind".

There is a salient difference between the dismemberment imagery of Westerners and that reported for Siberian shamans - there is a positive outcome in the shaman's case. In current clinical work, such positive outcomes would generally be interpreted as indicative of sufficient internal structure to overcome the psychic fragmentation(s) being experienced. This would again align with the "borderline type of case" as being argued in this thesis because the orbital part of the personality which has developed in an environment of "no other chaos" is sufficiently functional to mobilise a degree of transformation of the psychotic nuclear component and/or sufficient defensive structures which aid functionality have been mobilised.

9.5.3 The presence of self-mutilating behaviour

Self-mutilation not only indicates psychopathology but is one of the most noted characteristics in Western BPD (see Section 9.6.5 below).

In relation to Siberian shamanism, Basilov (1984) indicates that stabbing and cutting of themselves is not unknown among shamans and Bogoras (1904) gives a number of examples of self-mutilating behaviour amongst the Chukchi (Chukchee) shamans. The following case of Ak'mlakë is indicative.

Among the Reindeer Chukchee on the Wolverene River I knew a man by the name of Ak'mlakë ('Marrowless'), who gave himself out as a shaman, though the people usually did not pay much attention to his claim. At the times of ceremonials, Ak'mlakë would pretend that a k'elë had entered his body and was bent on destroying his life. He would usually spend a part of his time crawling about in search of a knife. The women of his house, however, well aware of this holy-day custom of his, usually took care to conceal all knives and other sharp
weapons. Once, at a thanksgiving ceremonial at which I was present, he began his usual search, and came to me, among others, explaining with signs his desire for a knife, in order to be able to destroy himself. The 'spirit' who possessed his body could not speak the human language. I really had a knife on my belt: and a Russian cossack who sat next me proposed laughingly that I give it to Aki'mlakê. Hearing this, the women of the house raised a frightened cry. Aki'mlakê, however, who doubtless was stung by the taunt implied in the words of the cossack, suddenly picked up from the ground a long, sharp-pointed chip of wood, and, baring his abdomen, put one end of the stick on his body, and the other against my breast. Then he made a thrust forward with the whole weight of his heavy body. The chip, of course, was snapped in two. One end flew up and hit me on the brow very near to the left eye, leaving an ugly gash. The other end cut a deep scratch entirely across the abdomen of Aki'mlakê. I wonder that it had not been driven in. All this was done so quick that nobody had time to interfere.

Aki'mlakê with much coolness picked up a handful of snow, and, wiping, off the blood from his abdomen, quietly went to another tent. In half an hour, when he was no longer thirsty for blood, I asked him about his actions; but he disclaimed all knowledge, and expressed the utmost wonder when showed the bloody scratch on his abdomen (Bogoras, 1904, pp.442-443).

This account of Aki'mlakê is quite telling because it definitely suggests a connection between shamanic activity and self-mutilating behaviour. Of course, it could be the case that Aki'mlakê is just more psychologically disturbed than other shamans and it is this which has caused the account to be preserved because of the bizarre nature of the material. It is difficult to determine.

Bogoras (1904) later adds that pretence of suicide is often carried out with a rifle or a rope in shamanic performances whilst also noting that "the exploit of stabbing one's self with a knife is one of the most common achievements of the shamanistic art, and it is so generally practised that the spectators are said to ascribe little importance to it" (p.446). It would appear that cutting and stabbing oneself with knives has become part of shamanic performance. Bogoras relates how Chukchi (Chukchee) tales often recounted stabbing as a shamanistic achievement. For instance, in transferring his power to another, a shaman may stab himself and then the recipient and on several occasions, Bogoras says he witnessed shamans trying to stab themselves. Similarly, Scratching Woman showed Bogoras a deep scar which he maintained was produced by stabbing, whilst a young shaman-girl was described in an account of a family feud.
as a "woman able to stab herself" with impunity (p.446). Bogoras goes on to report similar stabbing practices amongst the Yukaghir -

in the village Pyatistennoye I found . . . an old wooden knife covered with dark spots, which were said by the natives to be the shaman's blood, which flowed down when he stabbed himself through the abdomen. Krasheninnikoff describes a Kamchadal shaman, who likewise stabbed himself with a knife while having the fur shirt on, and then drew from under its cover handfuls of blood, which he swallowed. Sarytcheff tells the same of a Yakut shaman, who not only stabbed himself through the abdomen, but even ordered his assistant to drive in the knife with a log up to the handle. After that the shaman came to the hearth, took three burning coals, and swallowed them with much composure and without any visible pain (Bogoras, 1904, p.447).

It could be the case that shamanistic self-cure has enabled self-mutilation to become transformed into a stabbing technique which is then used to indicate shamanistic prowess. Novik (1984) is certainly of the opinion that shamans turn cutting and self-mutilation into a healing isomorphism on behalf of others rather than themselves. The case of Aki'mlakë above, could be illustrating something at the more primitive end of this transformation process. On this theme, Novik quotes Dolgikh (1962) about the Enet shaman, Narzale,

I then began to shamanize and did not kill the reindeer. . . . Instead of the reindeer, I cut my own head with the leash, as one chokes a reindeer. I stabbed myself, as though piercing it in this way. It is the illness that I was stabbing. Had I not stabbed and choked myself, the sick one would not have recovered. Further on in the story it is told how Narzale, after receiving presents, went away, and sometime later . . . [was] . . . killed by a bear. Commenting on his death, the relatives of the cured man came to the following conclusion: 'The bear killed him because he gave up his own soul for the sick man. Did he not choke himself here and give up his soul for the sick man? He said to the kacha [spirit of illness] 'take my soul instead of the sick one'. That is why he died. Why else should a bear come out of its lair in the winter and kill him? (Novik, 1984, p.201).
It could very well be the case that shamans transform self-mutilating impulses into a healing isomorphism as part of their mastery but its presence in the first place does add corroborating evidence to the view that the Siberian shaman's psychology is of a "borderline type of case".

9.5.4 The characteristic of "liminality"

It is not uncommon for commentators to note that Siberian shamans occupy a zone between psychopathology and normality which is exactly what one would expect if they are a "borderline type of case" as argued in this thesis, for we have already seen "stable instability" to be a "borderline" characteristic. Ducey puts it this way -

[the shaman] bridges the gap between the known and the unknown, between the cognitively understood and the affectively apprehended, a gap created by suffering, by intrapsychic or interpersonal conflict. Viewed from another angle, he occupies a position in the two realms simultaneously: he functions within his everyday world precisely by going beyond it into the world of fantasy (the supernatural). Hence each group of investigators has been correct but has focused on one extreme of the duality. . . . In other words, the controversy over the relationship of madness and shamanism may be viewed as a variant of, or at least a parallel to, the controversy over the relationship of madness and creativity (Ducey, 1976, pp.175-176).

Consequently, "Healthy and pathological patterns are too deeply interwoven to be meaningfully separated" (Ducey, 1976, p.177).

However, unlike Ducey (1976) who detected both neurotic and psychotic elements in the Siberian shaman's psychology so that he concluded "hysterical psychosis" as a diagnostic descriptor, it would seem we are now in a position to state that the Siberian shaman is more of a "borderline type of case" as understood by Winnicott. The inherent characteristic of "stable instability" would explain the divergence of opinion on the psychopathology issue (as reflected in the literature generally, and in Ducey's quote above) because a healthy or psychopathological perspective could be emphasised depending on which aspect of the shaman's psychology one concentrated.
9.5.5 The nexus between Siberian shamanism and psychological derangement

It is possible to find in the Siberian anthropological literature, examples of those who either become shamans as a result of suffering significant psychological derangement, or who during the initiation phase suffer such derangement. Bogoras' (1904) material on the Chukchi (Chukchee) is illustrative of this nexus. As he says, "There are cases of young persons who, having suffered for years from lingering illness (usually of a nervous character), at last feel a call to take to shamanistic practice, and by this means overcome the disease" (p.421) (italics mine). And he mentions a number of cases that illustrate this theme. Firstly, Te'lpnā who, "according to her own words, had been violently insane for three years, during which time her household had taken such precautions, that she could do no harm to the people or to herself" (p.428) (italics mine). Similarly the story of K'lmqāi, "who claimed for himself shamanistic powers . . . . He was afflicted with a strange illness, which caused him to sleep in his inner room day after day, almost without interruption" (p.450) (italics mine). It was after this experience that a spirit appeared to him and he became a shaman. And further, the story of Tiluwgi who became a shaman in his "very early youth, after a protracted illness from which he freed himself by the song and the drum" (p.454) (italics mine). Whilst it is not clear if K'lmqāi's and Tiluwgi's illnesses were physical or psychological, the fact that they were cured through shamanising does suggest something psychosomatic.

In another place, Bogoras says -

it is entirely permissible to abandon shamanistic performances at a more mature age. . . . [One shaman] said that he and his 'spirits' became tired of each other. Most of the cases, probably, were simply the result of recovery from the nervous condition which had made the persons in question fit subjects for the inspiration (Bogoras, 1904, p.419) (italics mine).

Furthermore, it would appear that the very act of shamanising seems to keep a kind of derangement at bay. Bogoras (1904) says that "while the shaman is in possession of the inspiration, he must practise, and cannot hide his power. Otherwise it will
manifest itself in the form of bloody sweat or in a fit of violent madness similar to epilepsy" (p.419) (italics mine).

We find similar accounts from the early firsthand ethnography of Jochelson. In his work on the Yukaghir and the Yukaghirized Evenk (Tungus), Jochelson (1926) speaks of the "nervously strained youths who are inclined to become shamans" (p.31). In fact, one Yukaghir word for shaman is irkeye ("the trembling one") which indicates their nervous make-up. Jochelson later describes a performance by the shaman, Athanasy. It was so wild it terrified the Yukaghir for "his performance was like an attack of madness or delirium tremens". Jochelson describes Athanasy as being "psychically unbalanced and abnormal" and "wildly neuropathic" (p.199).

So also with the Koryak, Jochelson says,

Those that become shamans are usually nervous young men subject to hysterical fits, by means of which the spirits express their demand that the young man should consecrate himself to the service of shamanism. I was told that people about to become shamans have fits of wild paroxysm alternating with a condition of complete exhaustion. They will lie motionless for two or three days without partaking of food or drink. Finally they retire to the wilderness, where they spend their time enduring hunger and cold in order to prepare themselves for their calling (Jochelson, 1908, p.47).

In similar fashion in his later fieldwork among the Yukaghir and the Yukaghirized Evenk (Tungus), Jochelson (1926) says that "[t]he future shaman complains, in the song, of the spirits that compel him to start the shaman's career, strangulate him, and threaten death if he does not consent to follow their call" (p.31).

Other accounts indicating the nexus between derangement and Siberian shamanism occur in early Russian sources which have been recently summarised and in part translated by Znamenski (2003). The following is from Anfiov's (1902) account of the séance he witnessed with the Samoyed (Nentsy) shaman, Nigalai. The séance began with Nigalai in conversation with his spirits but then it seemed as though the spirit had departed. Znamenski continues,
The failure of the shaman to attract the attention of his spiritual interlocutor made Niglai "totally crazy". "He ran around from one side to another, beating his drum with a wild anger and shouting something that we could not comprehend". Finally, he "suddenly flung his drum to the ground, dropped by the hearth, and started to howl in an inhuman and piercing voice. In fear we jumped and ran to him. The shaman writhed in convulsions, feverishly tearing away from his chest metal trinkets and cutting his hands with them".

Thinking that Niglai experienced epileptic fits, the Russian observers tried to help the shaman, but the native audience had to evict them literally by force, warning that "now Niglai is going to cut everything with his knife!" After they dragged Anifilov and his friend out of the dwelling, the Samoyeds themselves scattered away in panic, hiding from the "crazy shaman". When the two friends were at a safe distance from the chum, they learned from a native who happened to be around that Niglai indeed ran outside with a knife and cut the throat of a reindeer, then he cut to death a nearby dog that he ran across and tried to stab one of the natives. As it turned out, it was not the first time when the shaman "went mad". The Samoyed who escaped the knife of the shaman later told them, "Last year the same thing happened. If he cannot learn anything [from spirits] during his flight, Niglai goes mad. But if he learns something, he is all right". Both friends surmised that when spirits did not reveal anything to the shaman, Niglai lost control of himself and experienced a fit. . . . He is definitely not a charlatan and "shamanizes" sincerely. Having plunged himself in a "shamanic trance", he genuinely loses his mind. By giving himself up to mysterious spirits, he loses contact with all earthly things. He drives himself to the extreme of madness and cuts with his knife whatever he sees (Znamenski, 2003, pp.49-50) (italics mine).

In a similar fashion, Anokhin (1910) tells of his experience among the Altaians which has again been recently summarised and in part translated by Znamenski,

The Altaians are terrified of the power of spirits. . . . "I believe this feeling of fear was primarily responsible for the spread among the Turkic tribes of a nervous disease called belinchi. People who are sick with this ailment are called belinchi-kizhi, which could be rendered as 'possessed'. Belinchi-kizhi usually experience fits and are prone to hypnosis. They frequently run away to woods and wander there for days. Belinchi-kizhi are easily [sic] to manipulate, and they instinctively imitate the behavior and voices of other people. Anokhin thinks that belinchi is a special form of epilepsy. This and similar "ailments" are considered spirit calls from an internal force called tős that signals to a chosen individual to accept the shamanic vocation. . . . An old shamaness named Uituk, from the Chibit village, complained to Anokhin that after Altaian Burkhanists (native religious reformers) burned her drum and shamanic costume, she could not shamanize. As a result, "satans" (körmös) constantly "pressed" her and forced her to continue her vocation. She added that when she was alone in her yurt, these spirits attacked her and 'chewed' her legs and hands (Znamenski, 2003, pp.51-52) (underlining mine).
From more recent ethnography we find similar accounts indicating the nexus between Siberian shamanism and psychological derangement. The Hungarian ethnographer, Vilmos Diószegi, had undertaken an ethnographic research expedition through Siberia in 1957/1958 and had met the Soyot shaman, Suzukpen. After recording him in shamanic performance, Diószegi (1968a) enquired as to how he acquired his powers. Suzukpen then related this story. He had been hunting with two of his brothers when they came across a crow in their path. The crow did not move so Suzukpen threw some snow at it but to no avail. He continues,

Then I hit its beak with my stick. Kok-kok. The knock resounded loudly. What was all this? What was going to happen to me? Because the night before - before seeing the crow - I had already felt miserably. Next day I went back to where I had seen the crow. Not even a trace of it was to be seen, anywhere! Although the others, that is, my brothers, have seen it too. From then on, from the time I hit the beak of that crow, I became very ill. My mind was deranged. I have been suffering for as long as seven years. Finally, I began to shamanize, because everybody kept saying all along: I must shamanize in order to get well again. Nine years after I became ill, I gave in at last and ordered the drum and the drumstick because I had been urged to take up shamanizing (Diószegi, 1968a, pp.279-280) (italics mine).

Diószegi (1968a) also relates the case of Chirgalang, another Soyot shaman. Chirgalang says of his calling, "I was twenty years old when I fell sick. My heart was ailing. I had been sick for about ten years. Finally I took up shamanizing" (p.288) (italics mine). From this account (as with Ki'miqái and Tålů'wgi above), we cannot be sure if Chirgalang is describing physical or psychological sickness although again, there is a psychosomatic tone to the account because of the cure coming through shamanising.

In summarising his findings to Professor Potapov, who was director of the Leningrad Ethnographic Institute, Diószegi goes on to say,
I had an opportunity to meet several shamans personally, and I could observe them for long periods too. My experience had shown that there were notable individual traits in every single one of them, which were not characteristic of the other members of their ethnic group in general.

The Buryat shaman, Hadi, was an introvert. He was neurotic. He had frequent hallucinations. Chibadayev, the Beltir, was extremely misanthropic. Chibadayakov as also rather like an introvert person, evidently neurotic too. The Sagay, Kizlasov, was of poor physical condition, he suffered from constant headaches. All the time that I was with him, he had cold compresses upon his forehead, daily. Borgoyakhov was psychopathic. His mouth was constantly open, his tongue hung out and it kept jerking like that of a dog. The Karagasy Kukuyev was taciturn and shy. His capacity of concentration was poor and failing. At the time of full moon he suffered from headaches. While I was there he had several nose-bleeds.

The Soyot Ak Nitka was a misanthrope. Suzukpen Saldzhak had neurotic convulsions. His family was affected with hereditary abnormality, the daughter of his sister for instance, about thirty years old, was a harmless idiot.

Those former shamans, whom I have had an opportunity to know personally were, doubtless, mostly nervous, neurotic individuals. These abnormalities must have been evidently inherited within the family or the clan. This could explain the belief of the hereditary order of becoming a shaman. However, this in itself would not be enough to become a shaman: a tendency, a feeling of vocation, must have been another condition. Therefore, those members of a family who were born with a hereditary abnormality, could only become shamans if they possessed this tendency, because only such individuals would "feel" the calling of the spirits, they would "see" the "spirits" coming to them. This must be the reason that the aspirants became shamans only if they were "chosen".

As far as those shamans are concerned who were not descending from a shaman-family: just as in a family with abnormal genes there are healthy members, a member of a healthy family might also be afflicted with neurotic tendencies or abnormal mental traits. Such individuals - although they have no shaman-ancestors - "feel" their vocation, they "see" the spirits, consequently, they become shamans (Diószegi 1968a, pp.314-315) (italics mine).

Diószegi's (1968a) overview in terms of "neurotic", "misanthrope" and "psychopath" is noteworthy because it comes from direct field observation.

A further classic case in the literature is that of the Enet (Entsy/Samoyed) shaman, Savone, related by De Prokofyeva (1951). When a young girl, Savone had gone with friends to collect cloudberry in the forest but had become separated from them. She recounts that a forest spirit fell upon her and she lost consciousness. She was found a few days later (she believed it to be a month) wandering naked in the forest. She recounted that she had lived with the forest spirit in his forest dwelling. Being found
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pregnant, she later gave birth to a stillborn "infant-monster" supposedly fathered by the forest spirit. "After delivery Savone was in torment for a long time, and acted as one demented" (p.125) (italics mine). Shamans from her own group could not heal her so she consulted a renowned Ket shaman who helped her and taught her how to shamanise. However, her nervous condition did not disappear despite her shamanising. She did not want to be a shaman but eventually reconciled with her fate and accepted the hereditary shamanistic calling of her mother (who also was a shaman). Considering the fact that she possessed a complete shaman's costume (which De Prokofyeva tells us could be collected by the ethnographer, Verbov, in 1938) meant that she must have been a "'strong', experienced shaman". Again we see a clear presentation of the correspondence between psychological derangement and the shamanic calling.

Lastly, we have already encountered the case of Sereptie Djaruoskin (see Section 9.5.2 above) in terms of dismemberment imagery but his comment during this process that "This is my fate - to lose my mind" (Popov, 1968, p.142) does align with the argument being advanced here of a nexus between shamanising and psychological derangement.

Given the nexus between shamanism and psychological derangement then it is not surprising that Bogoras (1904) was able to note that the preparation for each shamanistic performance is extremely painful and is "considered almost a peculiar kind of sickness. In conformity to this, most of the shamans show marked nervousness before the commencement of the performance" (p.432). And also that "The [shamanic] performance itself is considered as a recovery from illness. The same shaman who was nervous before the performance regains after it his self-possession, and looks really as if he were braced up by some strong tonic" (p.433).

Overall, there seems sufficient evidence from the literature to indicate a nexus between shamanism and states of psychological derangement. This evidence needs to be taken into account because in all cases it has been gained through direct field observation. However, whilst evidence of psychological derangement would be a necessary condition for arguing that shamans are a "borderline type of case", it is not
in itself sufficient. What we really need are in-depth case studies of individuals but such work is now impossible.

9.5.6 Summary

The areas of evidence examined so far do support the proposal that the way to understand the Siberian shaman’s psychology is to see it as a "borderline type of case" as outlined in this thesis. Parallels have already been drawn in contemporary literature by Peters (1988, 1996) between shamans and those who suffer with BPD which is further evidenced through the presence of dismemberment imagery and self-mutilation behaviours in Siberian shamanism. The observed characteristic of liminality of shamans and the nexus between shamanism and psychological derangement (as would be expected if they are a "borderline type of case") further supports the thesis. As noted above, this latter condition, whilst necessary, is not in itself sufficient evidence. However, the existence of "family shamanism" amongst certain Siberian tribes may benefit the study at this point.

9.6 FAMILY SHAMANISM

Family shamanism is used to describe the situation in some tribes whereby every family has one or more drums of its own which are used by family members for specific family ceremonials. As a type of shamanising, it runs in parallel with "individual shamanism" and there is debate in the literature as to the relationship between them. Bogoras (1904) is of the view that "Family shamanism, being quite simple and primitive, probably antedated the shamanism of individuals having special skill and vocation, and the latter seems to have grown up based on the former" (p.413). This was also the view of Jochelson (1908) through his work on the Koryak. Eliade (1964), on the other hand, takes an opposing position and considers family shamanism among the Chukchi (Chukchee) to be a "plagiaristic aping of the ecstatic technique of the professional shaman" and a "hybrid phenomenon" (p.253). It is not the intent of this thesis to try and settle this dispute but to note that "family shamanism" occupies a place of significant importance in Chukchi (Chukchee).
culture and this may prove useful for the further exploration of the thesis being investigated here that shamans are of a "borderline type of case". Bogoras maintains that "family shamanism" is also encountered amongst the Koryak, the Asiatic Inuit (Eskimo) and probably the Yukaghir and the Kamchadal but that in "modern times the importance of family shamanism is losing ground among all the tribes named, with the exception of the Chukchee" (p.414). This would suggest that the Chukchi (Chukchee) can be used as a special case in relation to "family shamanism" and we are additionally fortunate to have Bogoras' extensive ethnographic study of them.

Bogoras (1904) notes that every adult Chukchi (Chukchee) will occasionally take up the drum and especially in winter. In other words, shamanistic abilities seem to be spread across the whole cultural group such that it could be argued that the psychological factors which lead to shamanism must be pervading the whole culture. Now if that is the case and if shamanism is connected to a "borderline type of case" as being proposed in this thesis, then we should be able to detect elements of "borderline" characteristics in the culture as a whole. Bogoras' detailed ethnography of the Chukchi (Chukchee) culture will now be examined to see if "borderline" characteristics can actually be detected in it. This will be done by taking Bogoras' descriptions both of Chukchi (Chukchee) culture generally and of particular shamans and mapping these across the diagnostic criteria for BPD as outlined in DSM IV.

What is not being suggested here is that Chukchi (Chukchee) culture has BPD. Rather, if shamans are a "borderline type of case" then a culture where family shamanism is practiced (i.e. where many individuals exhibit the shamanic complex and presumably have the shaman's "borderline type of case" psychology) should reflect some "borderline" characteristics. To do this, the DSM IV criteria for BPD will be used as a grid over which Chukchi (Chukchee) culture from Bogoras' (1904) early fieldwork will be laid to see if any parallels emerge. If there are parallels then this would further corroborate the conclusions drawn earlier in this Chapter.
9.7 "BORDERLINE" CHARACTERISTICS IN CHUKCHI (CHUKCHEE) CULTURE

9.7.1 Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) as a diagnostic category

The current DSM IV criteria for BPD are listed in Appendix B.

9.7.2 Criterion 1: A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterised by alternating between extremes of idealisation and devaluation

Without detailed individual case studies it is impossible to detect anything to do with this criterion from Bogoras' (1904) material.

9.7.3 Criterion 2: Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging, e.g. spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating (do not include suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour covered in Criterion 5)

There seem some indications from the Chukchi (Chukchee) that fit with this criterion, particularly in relation to obstinacy. As Bogoras says,

the Chukchee shows a peculiar obstinacy in accomplishing whatever seems of momentary interest to him. In trading, when a Chukchee has set his heart on any trifling object, he is often ready to offer thrice, or even ten times, the price of it. If his offer is not accepted, he will start a brawl rather than desist from his purpose of his own free will (Bogoras, 1904, p.46).

In a way, this is an example of an approach to spending which does indicate a lack of impulse control.

There are two particular individual shamans whom Bogoras (1904) describes that do display characteristics which would align with this criterion. Firstly, ņñeõ'ın, whom Bogoras describes as "a spendthrift, much given to card-playing, and cared little for
his herd and home" (p.422). Secondly, Scabby-shaman, who is described as displaying erotomania by running about naked from tent to tent and raping women.

9.7.4 Criterion 3: Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood, e.g. intense episodic dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety, usually lasting a few hours or only rarely more than a few days

Generally, in describing the Chukchi (Chukchee) shamans, Bogoras (1904) says of them that "Nervous and highly excitable temperaments are most susceptible to the shamanistic call. The shamans among the Chukchee with whom I conversed were as a rule extremely excitable, almost hysterical, and not a few of them were half crazy. Their cunning in the use of deceit in their art closely resembled the cunning of a lunatic" (p.415). And later, he describes one as having "a very unsteady, excitable nature" (p.421), "often almost on the verge of insanity" (p.426).

Furthermore the Chukchi (Chukchee) shamans seem very nervous -

The Chukchee are well aware of the extreme nervousness of their shamans, and express it by the word mǐl'rkilqin ("he is bashful"). By this word they mean to convey the idea that the shaman is highly sensitive even to the slightest change of the psychic atmosphere . . . The shamans possess this nervous sensitiveness in a still higher degree than other people (Bogoras, 1904, pp.416-417).

Two Chukchi (Chukchee) shamans, in particular, seem to fit the anxiety aspect of this criterion. Both Ye'tilm and K'irmqäi had incessant nervous twitches although these seemed permanent and not intermittent.

9.7.5 Criterion 4: Inappropriate, intense anger or lack of control of anger (e.g. frequent displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights)

In his section on the Chukchi's (Chukchee's) "Mental Traits", Bogoras gives an insightful overview of their tendency to angry and violent outbursts.
The Chukchee is easily angered; often a trifle will suffice to transform his merry laughter into the most unreasonable rage. They themselves are not unconscious of this peculiar feature of their mind. "I am a tundra wanderer", one of my Chukchee acquaintances, named Nîro'n, would say to me. "My anger rises suddenly. It comes and goes of its own accord". Some women bear a special name on account of their violent temper. They are called "quarrelling women" (marañausqattê). These are regarded as nuisances even by their housemates. Among the men, some have the very suggestive epithet "hasty" (qivr) prefixed to their names . . . .

The Chukchee, when angry, growls, shows his teeth, and makes a threatening bite on his sleeve or on the handle of his knife, in defiance of his foe. Some of them, when angered, shed tears of rage, and tear their hair like unruly children.

Their language is singularly poor in abusive terms, and quarrels are immediately settled by blows or wrestling. There is no lack of murders, some of them of a barbarous character. Thus, in a camp near Cape Erri, the son and the nephew of the rich reindeer-breeder Yeku'tku, being goaded to the extreme by constant blows and abuse, cut his throat, and that with the knowledge of his wife, the mother of one of the murderers. In the summer of 1896 on the Poplar River, an affluent of the Small Anui, a young man killed his brother in order to get possession of his flock. The murderer, with his accomplice and their victim, arranged a contest of jumping over a barrier, the loser to pay the forfeit of skipping about for a while with his feet and hands bound together. When the elder brother lost, the other two men accordingly tied his feet, and coolly stabbed him with their knives. I heard the details of both deeds from the murderers themselves.

In the tale of "Elendi and his Sons", published in my "Chukchee Materials", Elendi, to avenge the treachery of his slave, kills him in a most cruel manner. With sharp stakes he fastens the slave's hands, feet, the fleshy parts of his sides, and the skin of his scalp, to the ground, and then makes both of his wives urinate and defecate into his mouth (Bogoras, 1904, p.45) (italics mine).

In this account, not only is the tendency of the Chukchi (Chukchee) to anger (even to the point of murder) made clear but a telling characteristic is the childlike features it displays. All this would concord with the thesis being argued here that the Siberian shaman's psychology is of a "borderline type of case" which has its aetiological roots in early childhood.

Later Bogoras (1904) mentions old Cossack reports of similar cases, e.g. of Anadyr Cossack Boris Kusnetsky who was captured by the Chukchi (Chukchee) in 1754 and
witnessed a son stab his father with a knife and a brother stab his brother out of mere spite.

Bogoras (1904) goes on to state that even those with a quiet and good-natured temperament are usually not free from occasional outbursts of anger of quite a severe kind. He relates the story of Aįnianwa't, who when young, had become so vexed by the unruliness of his reindeer herd that he turned to the setting sun and invited the wolves to come and devour the herd. To the Reindeer Chukchi (Chukchee) this was almost a sacrilege since wolves are classed with evil spirits. Despite Aįnianwa't's attempts to avert the disaster, misfortune did overtake the herd.

Bogoras (1904) mentions on two occasions that mutually destructive violence, sometimes resulting in murder, was common such that "Violent quarrels between father and sons may lead even to murder" (p.556). He gives a number of stories illustrating this tendency toward violence. One is the story of two brothers "one of whom, at the time of a tobacco famine, killed the other because he refused to share with him his tobacco-supply" (p.549). He "stabbed him from behind with his spear, ripped open his breast, and took out his lungs, which he found covered with soot. He scraped away a part of this, and used it to fill his pipe (p.59)".

Also common was the brutal treatment of women for "when refused by a woman, they are inclined to violence and rape" (Bogoras, 1904, p.37). He also says,

The wife is often harshly treated by her husband. I have mentioned the case of a husband killing his wife with a blow of a fire-brand. Blows, though less severe, are not infrequently dealt out to women; but it also happens that a wife ill-treats her husband" (Bogoras, 1904, p.551).

Bogoras (1904) also relates one case of a wife shooting her husband - although this was purported as a "voluntary death" requested by the ill husband.
The story of Nuwa't is also illustrative of this criterion.

A man, Čei'pu by name, expelled his eldest son, Nuwa't, who was a very unsatisfactory herdsman, and made his younger son the principal heir . . . The disowned youth wandered from camp to camp, and at last came to a rich reindeer-breeder, Yo'nlì. He married Yo'nlì's daughter, and lived at his house as an adopted son-in-law. The following spring, when moving to the summer pastures, the father-in-law, who was much displeased with his work, wanted to drive him away. The young wife was with child, but among the Chukchee this forms no obstacle to the rupture of a marriage. The quarrel happened while they were travelling. The young man said nothing; but after a while he sat down on his wife's sledge, embraced her from behind, drew his knife, and cut open her abdomen. Then he jumped from the sledge and cut his own throat (Bogoras, 1904, p.555).

Extreme borderline characteristics are being evidenced here.

Specifically in relation to shamans, Bogoras (1904) gives a few examples which align with this DSM IV criterion. Firstly, that of Kele'wgi, "who seeks a quarrel on the slightest provocation" (p.426) and who on one occasion drew his knife on a Cossack who did not want to pay an exorbitant price for reindeer-skins. He also wanted to quarrel with Bogoras over payment for interviews.

Secondly, Scratching Woman, who could not sit long in one place "but every little while he would jump up with violent gestures" (Bogoras, 1904, p.427). He also displayed hysterical symptoms of a pain "somewhere inside his back". He would quarrel with his neighbours and had an "exceedingly bad" temper when under the influence of alcohol so much so that Scratching Woman's wife had to keep knives away from him. As he says,

Drink really makes my temper too bad for anything. Usually my wife watches over me, and puts all knives out of my reach. But when we are apart, I am afraid". With this he showed me a long scar on his shoulder, which he said was the result of a drunken brawl when his wife could not watch over his actions (Bogoras, 1904, p.428).
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Thirdly, Tel'ipitâ, whom we have encountered before in Section 9.5.4 and who "according to her own words, had been violently insane for three years, during which time her household had taken such precautions, that she could do no harm to the people or to herself" (Bogoras, 1904, p.428) (italics mine).

9.7.6 Criterion 5: Recurrent suicidal behaviour, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behaviour (This criterion seems to be the most marked and noted for BPD sufferers)

Bogoras (1904) is of the opinion that the Chukchi (Chukchee) are susceptible to suicide ideation as this seems to arise from "nuthiwi'qin" (which means "soft to die"), for the Chukchi (Chukchee) "generally are highly susceptible to any physical or psychical impressions of a kind to which they are unused" (p.416). It is the sensitivity from nuthiwi'qin which makes them susceptible to psychic influences. Thus, in relating similar cases of nuthiwi'qin among native guides of Lamut and Yukaghir origin who "on losing their way in the uninhabited country, run away from fear and despair, and every trace of them thereafter has been lost", Bogoras concludes that "Suicides are also frequent among the Chukchee" (p.417).

It would appear that this tendency is exacerbated by a lack of impulse control. As Bogoras says,

When thwarted in his purpose, the Chukchee is ready to go to any extreme, even to committing suicide, from uncontrollable rage. I know an instance of a young girl who went out to the herd and hung herself to a tree, out of anger because her mother refused to take her along to the feast in a neighbouring camp.

This motive [suicide] frequently plays a part even in cases of voluntary death among old men, ... Little-Spoon, having been angered by his sons, requested that he be killed. The Chukchee frequently have a lurking inclination towards suicide ... well known even to the Chukchee themselves. "You know our people," I was told on several occasions. "For any reason they want to kill another man or themselves". During the epidemic of influenza on the Wolverine River ... there occurred two cases of suicide. One was that of a husband vexed at the loss of his young wife; the other, that of a mother who had lost her only son, a child of ten. There are cases of something like tedium vitae. In 1895, at the Anui fair, I spoke with a man named Ka'tik, who declared that he did not want to live any longer. He gave as his reason, that fortune was adverse to him,
that all his relatives had died, and that he was afraid that his herd at some time might begin to dwindle away, although at the time of speaking his reindeer were prospering. I did not pay much attention to his words, but the next winter I heard that he really had ordered himself to be strangled.

At the head waters of the river Omolon I met a family four of whose members had taken their own lives within four years without any apparent reason. Their neighbours felt much afraid, and expressed the opinion that the spirits who wanted more prey had treacherously led them on to self-destruction (Bogoras, 1904, pp.46-47) (underlining mine).

In a later section, Bogoras (1904) relates a similar case to that of Ka'tìk above, where a woman who died by strangulation was motivated more by fear of her herd decreasing and who maintained that "life held no pleasures for her" (p.561).

In his section on "Birth and Death", Bogoras (1904) relates a number of other incidents. One of a man who on the second day after his wife's death and because of his grief, took his own life by stabbing himself with a knife. He also notes that some girls prefer to take their own lives than be married against their will. Another incident illustrates the nexus between suicide and the peculiar Chukchi (Chukchee) custom of "voluntary death" which has been alluded to above. Bogoras tells of an old man who had taken a second wife for the sake of getting children but was subsequently abandoned by his first wife. After some time he repined and then requested he be killed which was then done by strangulation with a rope. It would appear that voluntary death can be requested for psychological reasons and is little different to suicide.

Bogoras (1904) devotes a whole section to the custom of "voluntary death" which he states is still "of frequent occurrence among the Chukchee". It tends to be inflicted by a friend or relative, upon the express wish of the person who desires to die and Bogoras was aware of about twenty cases during his time with the Chukchi (Chukchee). They considered it better than death by disease or old age and in their folk stories it is presented as praiseworthy. Usually it is done by stabbing with a knife or spear or by strangulation or shooting by rifle and there are rituals ways that it is enacted. Bogoras says that for the elderly, it is due to the "hard conditions of their life, which make existence almost unendurable for any one unable to take full care of
himself. Accordingly, not only old people, but also those afflicted by some illness, often prefer death to continued suffering" (p.560).

However, Bogoras goes on to say -

[the] most peculiar cause for voluntary death is the wrath, the lack of patience, of the Chukchee . . . Unable to fight against suffering of any kind, physical or mental, the Chukchee prefers to see it destroyed, together with his own life (Bogoras, 1904, p.561) (italics mine).

This suggests there is something occurring here of a more psychological nature.

Indeed, voluntary death can also be requested in response to intrafamilial problems. Bogoras was told -

Among our people, when a father is very angry with his lazy and bad son, he says, "I do not want to see him any more. Let me go away." Then he asks to be killed, and charges the very son who offended him with the execution of his request. "Let him give me the mortal blow, let him suffer from the memory of it" (Bogoras, 1904, p.561).

This is a particularly interesting account psychologically for it reveals the use of voluntary death as a means of emotional revenge and also as a way of acting out a splitting polarisation of internal emotional states. The father here is using death as a way of escaping a painful situation (caused by the son) but through the custom of the son delivering the blow and being left with the irreversible guilt. Such an approach aligns with BPD behaviour for as Grotstein (1981) points out, those with BPD rely on defences like splitting because the disorder has arisen from the pre-Oedipal zone of development.

Bogoras certainly notes that psychological motives in relation to voluntary death can also lead to suicide. As he says,
It must be borne in mind that all these psychical motives lead as often to suicide as to voluntary death. The difference is, that the younger people, especially those not fully grown, when desiring to die, destroy their life with their own hands, while those who are older more frequently ask to be killed. I know of some cases of boys and girls who were not yet twenty, and who killed themselves from spite, shame or sorrow (Bogoras, 1904, pp.561-562).

Particular cases of Chukchi (Chukchee) shamans exhibiting self-mutilating behaviours have already been presented in Section 9.5.3 above. Such cases add further evidence to the argument being advanced under this criterion.

9.7.7 Criterion 6: Identity disturbance; markedly and persistently unstable self-image and/or sense of self. [Note: he or she may feel that he or she does not exist or embodies evil]

This criterion is impossible to satisfy without in-depth case studies of particular individuals from the culture or of shamans and we simply do not have the material needed.

9.7.8 Criterion 7: Chronic feelings of emptiness

Similarly as above, this criterion is impossible to satisfy without in-depth case studies of particular individuals from the culture or of shamans and we simply do not have the material needed.

9.7.9 Criterion 8: Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment (do not include suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour covered in Criterion 5)

Similarly as above, this criterion is impossible to satisfy without in-depth case studies of particular individuals from the culture or of shamans and we simply do not have the material needed.
9.7.10 Criterion 9: Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms [Note: or depersonalisation, derealisation, or hypnagogic illusions]

With the case of Ak'mälakë above, it was noted that he had a complete amnesia in relation to the stabbing attempts and amnesia indicates dissociation.

Dissociation is generally regarded as related to the defensive manoeuvre of splitting which can occur to such an extent that separate personalities emerge. As Grotstein says,

"Split-off" really means that part of one's being has undergone alienation, mystification, and repersonification - in effect has become someone else, an alien presence within ... splitting is an act of imagination which bequeaths to the split-off portions of the personality a life-support system with a will to live, which repersonifies this creation in a way that it may well be thought of as someone else (Grotstein, 1981, pp.11-12).

It is in this way that dissociation would give a psychological explanation to possession trance phenomena exhibited by shamans.

Overall, however, this criterion is impossible to satisfy without in-depth case studies of particular individuals from the culture or of shamans and we simply do not have the material needed.

9.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is understood that the DSM IV criteria for BPD could not be used on their own to support the proposal that the Siberian shaman's psychology is of a "borderline type of case". It is a very questionable exercise to use Western psychiatric diagnostic criteria through which to look at another culture, although in terms of individuals we know that the major clinical disorders do appear consistently across cultures (Murphy, 1976). Indeed, earlier research by Murphy, Wittkower, Fried and Ellenberger (1963)
and Murphy, Wittkower and Chance (1967) where cross-cultural surveys of schizophrenia and depression were undertaken, "core symptomatology" could be detected despite cultural influences. Nonetheless, it is not the intention here for this analysis to stand on its own but rather to state that DSM IV was the only available tool through which to search for "borderline" characteristics amongst the Chukchi (Chukchee) by which to add corroborative evidence to that presented in Section 9.5.

Clearly, certain of the DSM IV criteria like Seven, Eight and Nine have been difficult to use because they presuppose an in-depth knowledge of particular individuals and we simply do not have the information. However, Criterion Four and Criterion Five are the most telling particularly because Criterion Five has been noted as the most marked one for BPD. There are overwhelming indications that the borderline characteristics expressed in Criteria Four and Five are not only shared across Chukchi (Chukchee) culture but that particular shamans can be found who exhibit these characteristics as well. It is this which does add substantial corroborative evidence to that presented in Section 9.5.

I believe it reasonable to conclude that the psychology of Siberian shamans is of a "borderline type of case" as proposed in this thesis. Peters (1988, 1996) has hinted in a similar direction but it is not a position fully developed nor does he write from a Jungian perspective. Before being able to determine the utility of this conclusion for Jungian studies, it will be important to see how other Jungians have used shamanism and approached the whole question of the shaman archetype. It is to this material that the next Chapter is addressed.
CHAPTER 10

THE POST-JUNGIAN USE OF SHAMANISM

10.1 INTRODUCTION

Given the conclusions so far from this study as to the emergent/developmental nature of the shaman archetype and the evidence for its connection to early infant experiences leading to a particular psychology of a "borderline type of case", it will be useful to see how such conclusions align with post-Jungian approaches to shamanism and whether they facilitate a useful critique.

Shamanism occupies a place of some conceptual importance in Jungian discourse for we have already seen in the introduction to this study, Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) refer to the connection between being a "good analyst" and the activation of a shaman archetype.

Following Jung's approach, shamanism is generally regarded as an archetype in the classical sense such that its manifestation is understood to emerge from a pristine level of psychic life untouched by personal experience making it a "sacred heritage" into which modern persons can tap for their healing. Furthermore, an overview of the literature reveals that this idea of a shaman archetype has been used in a variety of ways by post-Jungians including its place in Jungian analyst training; its connection to the clinical use of the countertransference; as a model for the individuation process and as reflecting archetypal patterns in the collective unconscious which can be accessed for healing purposes.
10.2 THE SHAMAN ARCHETYPE AND JUNGIAN ANALYST TRAINING  
(von FRANZ, no date)

Von Franz (no date) (as cited in Kirsch, 1982) sees a "shamanic initiation" as central to the vocation of being an analyst and Kirsch, when considering the place of personal analysis in the training of analysts, summarises her chapter,

Von Franz has discussed the vocation of the analyst in the context of shamanic initiation. In primitive tribes, the shamanic initiate is the one who experiences a breakthrough of the collective unconscious and is able to master the experience, a feat many sick persons cannot achieve. Von Franz emphasizes that such an experience must occur in the analysis of a candidate as part of the training of an effective analyst. It is the perspective of initiation that differentiates the Jungian point of view from that of some Freudians. The latter often see resistance as the product of the parental introjects, now projected onto the analyst and institute. For the Jungian, resistance includes not only those aspects, but also the dimension of shamanic initiation, which evokes the collective unconscious (Kirsch, 1982, p.391).

Whilst Kirsch (1982) uses von Franz’s (no date) point to explicate differences between a Jungian and Freudian perspective on resistance, von Franz is asserting that an experience of the breakthrough of the collective unconscious "must occur in the analysis of a candidate as part of the training of an effective analyst".

In my opinion, von Franz (no date) (as cited in Kirsch, 1982) is raising a fundamental question as to whether entry into analyst training activates something like a shamanic initiation or whether a shamanic complex has previously been activated in those who seek out analyst training. It could be argued that after the event of being accepted into an analyst training programme it may not matter one way or the other; however, the question becomes more than academic because the answer to it would have two important implications. Firstly, in the way selection of candidates is undertaken in the first place for it would seem quite a difficult thing to predict beforehand if a "shamanic initiation" will occur later in any candidate chosen for training. Secondly, there would be implications for the way an analytic training process is undertaken, for it would require things be done to ensure a "shamanic initiation" occurs during the
training. Additionally, if a developmentally produced shaman archetype is already present in those individuals who apply for training then analyst training should be about the mastery and use of the experiences it foments. What is again highlighted is the selection process of analyst trainees, for if the initiatory crisis around unconscious content were only about what happens in the training analysis, as von Franz seems to imply, then this would be too late to use for the purposes of selection for analyst training. Selection would then focus on detecting those applicants in whom a developmentally produced shaman archetype is already activated (even if only in rudimentary potential) and/or detecting those who display capacity to have it activated (from which something else follows).

The findings from this study significantly relate to these issues, for if shamanism and its initiatory experiences are the result of a developmentally produced archetypal pattern arising from early infant experiences, and if a "shamanic initiation" must occur in the training of an effective analyst as von Franz (no date) (as cited in Kirsch, 1982) suggests, then the task of selection is to detect those individuals who have had the kind of early infant experience leading to the emergence of a developmentally produced shaman archetype. In other words, selection for analyst training will be about detecting something already present and this will be in terms of a certain kind of early infant experience. This makes the specification of core criteria for selection an easier task.

On this theme of analyst training, von Franz's (no date) (as cited in Kirsch, 1982) additional point is also worth noting. She says that it is not only the "breakthrough of the collective unconscious" which is critical in producing an "effective analyst" but also the "mastery" of the experience. As Noll (1990) indicates, "mastery" is a centrally important skill within shamanism. This aspect would add to the selectors' task for they would not only have to detect a certain kind of early infant experience in those who apply for Jungian analyst training but they would have to detect the presence of a capacity to master breakthroughs of unconscious content through assimilating it into psychic health. Presumably, given the model of the Siberian shaman's psychology argued in this thesis to do with the nuclear and orbital components of personality development, such "mastery" would align with capacities contained within the orbital layers of personality development which are functional.
10.3 THE "SHAMANIC COUNTERTRANSFERENCE" (STEIN, 1984 and SEDGWICK, 1994)

Before assessing Stein's (1984) and Sedgwick's (1994) comments about a "shamanic countertransference", a succinct overview of the classical Jungian approach to the countertransference is required.

10.3.1 Jung on the countertransference

Countertransference is the term used to describe the subjective responses of the analyst to the analysand. Freud (1910/2001, 1912/2001) tended to regard these as an interference to psychoanalytic technique because they introduced the analyst's personal material into the process which interfered with the "evenly suspended attention" he recommended. Up until 1937, Jung held to similar views, for he says in "The realities of practical psychotherapy",

If . . . he [the analyst] is neurotic, a fateful, unconscious identity with the patient will inevitably supervene - a 'counter-transference' of a positive or negative character. Even if the analyst has no neurosis, but only a rather more extensive area of unconsciousness than usual, this is sufficient to produce a sphere of mutual unconsciousness, i.e. a counter-transference. This phenomenon is one of the chief occupational hazards of psychotherapy. It causes psychic infections in both analyst and patient and brings the therapeutic process to a standstill (Jung, 1937/1993, pp.329-330).

It is for these reasons that early in the psychoanalytic movement, Jung had recommended that analysts undergo their own analysis. As he says in "The theory of psychoanalysis", a series of lectures he gave in 1912,

we must expect from an analyst a very serious and thorough psychoanalytic training of his own personality before we are willing to entrust a patient to him (Jung, 1912/1993, p.200).
And this call for the analyst to be analysed was seconded by Freud (1912/2001) very early in the psychoanalytic movement.

However, by 1946, Jung's position on the countertransference had substantially changed from that which he held in 1937. In "The psychology of the transference" he says,

In any effective psychological treatment the doctor is bound to influence the patient; but this influence can only take place if the patient has a reciprocal influence on the doctor. You can exert no influence if you are not susceptible to influence. It is futile for the doctor to shield himself from the influence of the patient . . . By so doing he only denies himself the use of a highly important organ of information. The patient influences him unconsciously . . . One of the best known symptoms of this kind is the counter-transference evoked by the transference. But the effects are often much more subtle, and their nature can best be conveyed by the old idea of the demon of sickness. According to this, a sufferer can transmit his disease to a healthy person whose powers then subdue the demon (Jung, 1946/1993, pp.71-72).

We can see here that Jung (1946/1993) has also changed his attitude toward psychic infections. He adds to this later when he says, "the unconscious infection brings with it the therapeutic possibility - which should not be underestimated - of the illness being transferred to the doctor" (p.176). In other words, psychic infections are now seen as a potentially positive occurrence rather than bringing the "therapeutic process to a standstill" (Jung, 1937/1993, p.330).

Nonetheless, it would appear that Jung did not see this influence/infection model working therapeutically if the analyst has not undergone their own analysis, for later in the "The psychology of the transference" he reiterates his 1912 call,

we may justifiably expect the doctor at the very least to be acquainted with the effects of the unconscious on his own person, and may therefore demand that anybody who intends to practise psychotherapy should first submit to a training analysis (Jung, 1946/1993, p.177).

In relation to the countertransference, the contemporary understanding of it tends now to see it from Jung's perspective, that is, as an invaluable tool of communication
about the nature of the unconscious situation for the analysand which can then be used constructively in the psychotherapeutic encounter.

10.3.2 Stein (1984)

In response to Machtiger's (1982) call for Jungian analysts to investigate more closely the phenomenon of the countertransference, Stein (1984) introduces three other types of countertransference which differ from the usual "maternal-nurturant" and "eros-sexual" patterns more prevalent in the literature. He specified these as power, shamanic and maieurtic, believing that each of these types of countertransference shows its own distinctive, archetypally based patterning. In relation to the shamanic type of countertransference, Stein believes Jung in "The psychology of the transference" (Jung, 1946/1993) emphasises a "shamanic model of healing" such that "analysts become infected by their analysands' illnesses and then effect a cure by healing themselves and administering the medicine they manufacture in themselves to the analysand via 'influence'" (p.77). This view does align with that of Jung as outlined in Section 4.3.1 above but Stein's conception of it in terms of something shamanic requires attention.

Stein (1984) sees the particular characteristics of the shamanic process as being about psychic healing which operates through psychological identification rather than difference. Through an intensification of empathy the participants in the therapeutic process come to resonate psychologically with each other. Psychic infection is often experienced and the analyst's function is to find a cure for it. In this way, the therapeutic task is to pass this medicina over to the analysand. Stein maintains this process requires "permeable ego boundaries" and an "elastic sense of personal identity" on the part of the analyst.

The model of the shaman archetype as described in this study does provide an explanation for exactly the phenomenon which Stein (1984) describes. As seen above, he maintains there are the two constitutional requirements for an analyst to enter into the "shamanic countertransference" - "permeable ego boundaries" and an "elastic sense of personal identity". From our investigations through Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine we concluded that the shaman archetype was an
emergent/developmental psychic structure which had arisen from early (i.e. preverbal) damage in the mother-infant bond but in an environment of "no other chaos", resulting in a personality structure akin to a "borderline type of case" as understood by Winnicott. As noted in Chapter Nine, the critical aspect of this personality structure is that there is core dysfunction of a psychotic nature within outer layers of functioning. It is exactly this type of personality constitution which does lead to "permeable ego boundaries" and an "elastic sense of personal identity" because psychic damage has occurred at the time when individual identity as separate to the mother/infant "environment-individual set-up" is being established. In other words, a countertransference vector can get established between analyst and analysand because the analyst's own pockets of early infant damage become activated by, and resonate with, that of their analysands. This is an important point because it means that "shamanic" is more than a metaphor for describing this type of countertransference work. What this present study contributes is not only an explanation as to why the countertransference can be experienced this way but also suggests that modern psychotherapists, like Jungian analysts, have had a shamanic archetype emerge within them through their own developmental experience. It quite understandably operates in the way Stein describes.

This shamanic aspect of the countertransference can also explain the following observation by Samuels' when speaking of the countertransference,

Space does not permit me to do more than to suggest that one product of going beyond projective identification has been to highlight the mystical and even shamanistic feature of the experience of being an analyst. I think we do a lot of our work in a low-grade trance! (Samuels, 2000, p.412).

Stein (1984) goes on to highlight certain dangers in working this way with the countertransference. One is the possibility of a folie à deux of mutual (unconscious) identification which excludes conscious engagement with the analysand's relevant psychopathology. The issue of identification can also lead to projections on to the analysand of the analyst's own pathology for the analyst's self-healing. As he says, the "reversal of the therapeutic direction is the great unanalyzed shadow of the shamanic type of countertransference" (p.80). An example of this would be the recent
case in Sydney involving Professor Towndrow, who was a psychiatrist struck off the register for engaging in a sexual relationship with a client. Whether Professor Towndrow was aware of either Jung or Stein on these matters is not known but we have here an example of a long-term psychotherapy where transference and countertransference material was activated. The secretly recorded transcript of a session with the client who laid a complaint against Professor Towndrow was aired on the Australian Broadcasting Commission's "AM" program (Swan, 2004) and it follows:

_Towndrow:_ I wanted to be close to you.
"Beth": By having sex with me?
_Towndrow:_ I'm sorry if I've made a terrible mistake.
"Beth": Why did you want to be close to me? Why? Weren't you close enough already?
_Towndrow:_ I've destroyed you. Is that what's happened? I've destroyed you?
"Beth": I just want...
_Towndrow:_ Are you going to complain?
"Beth": I just want to know what you did.
_Towndrow:_ Are you going to complain?
"Beth": I just want to know why you did it! Don't you understand? I just want to know!
_Towndrow:_ Because I'm sick. It's because I'm sick. And it's because I'm sick... I thought, I thought, I thought it was something... I thought it was something we did together.
"Beth": How could we do it together? I'm your patient. You've got all the power! How could we do anything together?
_Towndrow:_ Aren't you going to be my therapist? (italics mine)
"Beth": No! Don't you see how sick that is? Can't you see that me being your therapist is really bizarre and sick?

Given Stein's (1984) warnings about the "reversal of the therapeutic direction", it is noteworthy that this is exactly what Professor Towndrow proposes. This transcript adds weight to Stein's assertion and again highlights the critical importance of Jung's original call for the analyst to be analysed so that such situations of unconscious identification can be minimised. What needs to be stressed is that the training analysis for analysts be a real psychotherapy and of such duration that the psychic bedrock of the analyst's core personality dysfunction not only be accessed but sufficiently transformed to prevent the kind of acting out noted above.
What seems to be emerging from this review is that Guggenbuhl-Craig's (1999) "talent" to be a good analyst is really about the (built-in or developed) capacity to work positively and therapeutically in this type of countertransferential/infection-influence way which has come through mastery of one's personal psychic components whilst understanding that it is the analyst's own psychic damage from the early mother/infant level of experience which forms the basis of the countertransferential resonances in the first place.

10.3.3 Sedgwick (1994)

In Sedgwick's (1994) examination of countertransference from a Jungian perspective, the shaman metaphor receives only cursory mention probably because he sees Stein's (1984) three designations as "characterising . . . certain analytic styles rather than countertransference-inducing situations per se" (p.137). Sedgwick does go on to re-emphasise Stein's warnings about the dangers of this style of countertransference but, of significance, he takes the shaman metaphor no further. Given his extensive treatment of countertransference from a Jungian perspective and the important contribution of Stein (1984), it is regrettable that the shaman component receives such little attention.

10.4 THE "TRUE JUNGIANS" (GROESBECK, 1989)

Groesbeck (1989) in responding to Henderson's (1963) suggestion that Jung was akin to a shaman, uses Eliade's (1964) definition of shamanism and concludes that a shaman archetype does exist. He then summarises Jung's life as an example of it in operation by paralleling the characteristics of the shamanic pattern with Jung's actual life experiences, using many of Jung's psychological formulations in the process. He sees Jung as having undergone a shamanic illness, as having shamanic initiations and powers, as articulating a shamanic myth of healing and having a shamanic world vision.
It is not because Groesbeck (1989) parallels shamanic experience alongside a biography of Jung's life that his approach is important (similar kinds of things have been done elsewhere - see Ryan, 2002; Smith, 1997) but rather it is his concluding assertions that the only "true Jungians" are of the "shamanic" style. He believes that these sorts of analysts "function as shamans in the therapeutic process dealing directly with the patient's illness in order to produce a transformational healing experience" (p.274), that is, like Stein (1984) he sees them as following Jung's (1946/1993) involvement/influence model of psychotherapeutic work. Groesbeck proposes that this way of working is in parallel with the way shamans work their healing art. Of significance, he speculates that the rigours involved in the shamanic style tend to push practitioners away from it and into adopting one of the other approaches that he elaborates.

I believe it is self-evident that this issue concerning the "true" Jungian position is of particular importance given the diversity around the ways that Jungian analysts work and the debate concerning which approach is the most authentic for Samuels' (1985) initially listed the Classical, Developmental and Archetypal Schools later including a Fundamentalist perspective (Samuels, 1997) and Psychoanalytic School (Samuels, 2000). All this must have an impact on a number of critical areas beyond Jungian identity. Groesbeck (1989) is suggesting that the Jungian psychotherapeutic style is founded upon particular aspects/characteristics of the life/person of the analyst rather than technique and this may need to be emphasised as a most distinctive and critical Jungian contribution to psychotherapeutic practice. Whilst current trends within Samuels' (2000) Psychoanalytic School may be moving away from such an authentic Jungian position, what Groesbeck's analysis suggests is that an understanding of shamanic experience and characteristics would enable practitioners to elaborate further those things which are quintessentially Jungian as opposed to psychoanalytic. Distinct analyst selection and training issues emerge as well as implications for clinical practice to do with capacity for working in Jung's involvement/influence model as centred in the countertransference.
10.5 LATER TREATMENTS OF INDIVIDUATION (DOWNTON, 1989)

Downton (1989) uses shamanism as a structural model by which to understand the individuation process and in particular, its traumatic nature, elaborating on this theme as originally articulated by Jung. Particular attention is paid to the shamanic concept of the "world tree" which is conceptualised in terms of seven stages of transformation and which Downton believes can be used to explicate a sequential (though not necessarily linear) psychic journey toward individuation.

Noll, having a substantial research background in anthropology (Noll, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990), is critical of Downton's (1989) conception of shamanism seeing it as "an all too common ethnocentric romance or ideal metaphoric abstraction of what many Westerners believe the experiences of shamans ought to be" (Noll, 1990, p.213). Based on his own research, Noll (1990) specifically criticises Downton's conception of shamanism as romantic and infused with Western goal-oriented abstractions like "self-actualisation" which bear little relationship to the actual experience or worldview of shamans. Noll believes that shamans' accounts in the literature do not refer to hierarchies of stages but rather to the mastery of a series of techniques not the least of which is the "naked attainment of power" over human persons, nature and the spirit world. It is these techniques which have practical applications, for generally, the shaman's experiences are entered into not for themselves but for the sake of the healing of others within their own socio-cultural community. The overview of Siberian shamanism undertaken in the course of this thesis would accord with this assessment.

Whilst Noll's (1990) concluding emphasis returns to that of individuation suggesting that "the task of the future is to stick close to the actual recorded words of the shamans in the ethnographic literature and to compare their experiences with the phenomenology of the individuation process" (p.216), he has highlighted the way shamanism can be valorised within Western discourse. Hutton (2001) has similarly noted that historically the West has moved away from a negative attitude to shamanism toward something more valorising. Lucas and Barrett (1995) in their paper "Interpreting culture and psychopathology: Primitivist themes in cross-cultural
debate" have substantially explored this theme and it is to that which we will now turn.

10.5.1 The "arcadianism" critique of shamanism (Lucas and Barrett, 1995)

In endeavouring to bring certain clarities to the cross-cultural understanding of mental illness, Lucas and Barrett (1995) explicate a schema they call "psychiatric primitivism" which is a body of ideas, images and vocabularies about cultural others through which the West comes to understand itself. In so doing, they note an ancillary point taken from Clifford (1990) who proposes that primitivism in art and literature enables one to come to know and contain the forbidden, the marked off and the tabooed. This theme may relate to the kind of Western interest in shamanism as proposed by Downton (1989) above.

According to Lucas and Barrett (1995), "psychiatric primitivism" employs two opposing perspectives, the "barbaric" and the "arcadian". They trace these concepts back to Ancient Greece where the barbaric view saw primitive society in terms of degeneration, disruption, pathogenesis, irrationality, ignorance and a lack of civilised control. Conversely, the "arcadian" perspective sees primitive society as pristine, harmonious, therapeutic and where there exists both a harmony between guileless and innocent participants and between them and nature, so that spiritual awareness, insight and inventiveness are all heightened. The latter is similar to Eliade's (1974) idea of the "myth of the eternal return", the characteristics of the "golden age" being primacy, originality, simplicity and pleasure.

Lucas and Barrett (1995) proceed to note the historic ways the West has conceptualised and understood "primitive cultures" around either the degenerate "barbarian" theme or the "arcadian" theme of the noblesse sauvage. In each of these traditions, they see the principal structuring feature to be order/disorder. In the "barbarian" perspective, civilisation is ordered and primitive society is disordered. These positions are reversed in the "arcadian" perspective, for here, civilisation is seen as disordered and primitive society as ordered.
They go on to note that within the polarised perspectives of barbarism/arcadianism there is a "dual characterization" of the primitive as both "exotic stranger" and "primal force" within ourselves at one and the same time. This means that primitivism (in both the "barbarism" form and the "arcadian" form) can be used as a reflexive tool enabling the West to understand itself and through which the "other" is conceptualised either as an exotic or as a threatening presence concealed within the Western self. Lucas and Barrett (1995) argue that Western discourse to do with shamanism is an example of exactly this reflexive tool for in it, shamanism have been conceptualised as either a "severe neurotic or even a psychotic in a state of temporary remission" (Devereux, 1980, p.15), as a "healed madman" (Silverman, 1967) or as a visionary and healing seer (Doore, 1988). More specifically, the native healing function of shamans is seen as one dimension within the "arcadian" perspective for, as they say, from "an Arcadian perspective, the harmonious and ordered society, the natural Primitive, and the creative ritual healer go together" (p.314). It is in this way that Lucas and Barrett are able to propose that the "arcadian" ideal informs the "alternative therapy" movement. As they say, the "Arcadian ideal functions as a source of ideas, images and practices for these therapies, and promises innovation by perpetually appropriating the healing powers of other cultures" (p.315) because they are seen to have "prophylactic potentiality".

It is not difficult to see that Downton's (1989) view of shamanism falls within the arcadian perspective as outlined by Lucas and Barrett (1995). Noll's (1990) criticisms of Downton's approach to shamanism in terms of a "romance", "ideal metaphoric abstraction" and valorisation are not unjustified. Downton is, however, not the only Jungian who approaches shamanism from an "arcadian" perspective.
10.6 SHAMANISM AS A "SACRED HERITAGE" (MOORE & GILLETTE, 1993; RYAN, 2002; SANDNER & WONG, 1997; SMITH, 1997)

As indicated in the introduction to this Chapter, it has not been uncommon for Jungians to regard shamanism as an archetype in the classical sense such that its manifestation is understood to emerge from a pristine level of psychic life untouched by personal experience making it a "sacred heritage" into which modern persons can tap for their healing. This understanding is primarily represented by Ryan (2002), Sandner and Wong (1997) and Smith (1997). Moore and Gillette (1993) are somewhat unusual in that they do not think there is a shaman archetype as such but subsume shamanism under the "magician archetype" which they see as the psychic underpinning to the mature masculine. Not to assume shamanism is an archetype is an unusual approach in post-Jungian discourse particularly if a classically oriented archetypal perspective is assumed. However, it is not difficult to see that the overall approach of Moore and Gillette falls within the "sacred heritage" perspective for they say of the magician,

he understands . . . the primal energies of the psyche which lend our human enterprises substance and meaning. This is the energy that rescues lost souls, those who are bewildered and locked away in the 'death' of a neurosis, a complex, or an obsession. This energy is available to us all, because there is a Magician within every one of us (Moore & Gillette, 1993, p.10).

Similarly, it is not difficult to show that Smith (1997), whilst giving one of the most comprehensive comparisons of Jungian psychology and shamanism from the perspective of spirituality, falls within the "sacred heritage" perspective as the following indicates,

Perhaps the most salient common feature of shamanism and Jungian psychology is that they both offer a way of soulful living that takes its direction from spirit, a transcendent dimension of wisdom and power. For Jungians this transcendent dimension within the psyche [is] referred to as the archetypal Self. . . . Both Jung and shamanism offer considerable possibilities for helping the modern western health care profession understand how to draw upon the sacred for healing purposes (Smith, 1997, p.3).
Ryan (2002), contrasts Jung's psychology and shamanism from an archetypal perspective particularly noting the parallels in structure and function between the two disciplines. By utilising much Native American material, he speaks about the "visionary access to what Jung called the pleroma - the creative source and its archetypes, recognized by him as healing, empowering and illuminative - both explicitly or by implication repeatedly in the world's shamanic traditions" (p.42). Given such an approach, it is not difficult to see that Ryan also takes a "sacred heritage" perspective on shamanism.

All of these approaches differ quite markedly from the understanding of the shaman archetype which has emerged in this study. As indicated in Chapter Seven, if an emergent/developmental model of the archetype is correct then both the "sacred heritage" view of the shaman archetype and the conceptual division between the collective and personal unconscious collapses. The former are foundational assumptions to writers like Moore and Gillette (1993), Ryan (2002), Sandner and Wong (1997) and Smith (1997), but if found questionable then many of their assertions would be called into question and a line of substantial critique is suggested.

Furthermore, I believe the analyses of Lucas and Barrett (1995) offer additional critique of the West's "sacred heritage" approach to shamanism and I shall concentrate on Sandner and Wong's (1997) text, *The sacred heritage: The influence of shamanism on analytical psychology*, as the main example. It is not difficult to see that it, as well as Smith (1997), Ryan (2002) and Moore and Gillette (1990, 1993) all fall within the "arcadian" perspective on shamanism which Lucas and Barrett enunciate.

### 10.6.1 Sander and Wong (1997) as example

Sandner and Wong's (1997) text is replete with examples of an "arcadian" approach to shamanism and Leonard's (1997) introduction is an example of much which follows in this edited collection. Despite admitting that on her trip to Siberia she did not actually meet any real shamans (they all having been killed by the Soviets in all probability she, herself, tells us) we are informed that she "encountered directly the shamanism of the reindeer people of the Arctic" (p.xv). Leonard is of the opinion that
aboriginal cultures contain ancient wisdom from which the West has moved away. As a consequence, she says,

In this volume you will discover many fascinating accounts of the way the practice of Jungian psychotherapy can emerge from the varied and ancient heritage of shamanistic healing to revitalize our sense of wonder, renew our faith as we search for meaning and to help heal the broken relationships and the alienation we suffer when we try to separate ourselves from our ancient heritage or any part of the cosmos (Leonard, 1997, p.xvi).

Notwithstanding the view that much of benefit can be gained by studying shamanism, one can see that this kind of "ancient heritage" perspective aligns with the "arcadianism" as proposed by Lucas and Barrett (1995). But if shamanism is a culturally specific expression of an archaic archetypal configuration which is what Jung seems to suggest, ought Westerners try to imitate the expression of it as seen within other cultures? Furthermore, will not an archaic archetypal configuration express itself differently within our cultural context?

Whilst Sandner (1997) goes on to state that analysts are not shamans as they do not conduct their healing endeavours in an Altered State of Consciousness, he does say that "some therapists have continued exploring shamanism in order to enhance and perhaps even redefine the ways they treat patients" (p.3). Of significant concern for psychotherapeutic practice is Leonard's (1997) assumed links between the "healing rituals of shamanism" and the practice of depth psychology such that therapists are utilising "shamanic practices" like - waking visions; archetypal dreams; imaginal work; body experiences; Altered States of Consciousness and sweat lodges, to name a few and that these practices are being applied to issues of breast cancer, surgery, death, abuse, addictions, anxiety and "cultural loss of soul".

One would desire success for such therapeutic ventures but my concern is that they are not taking into account Jung's position on shamanism as being one expression of an archaic archetypal configuration (albeit to do with individuation) which will modify itself within and through particular cultural contexts. Nor are they addressing the "arcadianism" in their assumptions. I believe there is a danger in incorporating, in an uncritical way (through being driven by the "arcadian" assumptions which invest these other cultures with "prophylactic potentiality" as Lucas and Barrett, 1995, put it) shamanic practices which rightly belong within another tradition thereby completely mis-reading both the phenomenon of shamanism and Jung's position on it. Such an endeavour to appropriate the healing powers of other cultures, as Lucas and Barrett suggest, renders this line of Jungian thought susceptible to popularist sentiment as opposed to a praxis informed through sound research and critical thinking and which overlooks the fact that such healing powers are culturally specific and culturally determined. True shamanic practices are rooted in a cosmological, animistic and mythic belief system to which most analysts would not adhere. It seems a questionable procedure that once some kind of archetypal homology is granted between shamanism and psychotherapeutic healing techniques that such similarity is translated into actual clinical or personal practice, employing trance states for healing which derive from a direct connection in thought and practice with particular beliefs in a transpersonal realm. Not only is this what some of the practitioners in Sandner and Wong (1997) seem prone to do (see Wong, 1997 as example) but they have a tendency thereby, to read into Jung what he may not actually be saying. Sabini's (1997) contribution is a case in point. She quotes the following from Jung's "Symbols and the interpretation of dreams" and informs us he is talking about the "loss of sacred tradition",

Through scientific understanding, our world has become dehumanised. Man feels himself isolated in the cosmos. He is no longer involved in nature and has lost his emotional participation in natural events, which hitherto had symbolic meaning for him. Thunder is no longer the voice of a god, nor is lightening his avenging missile. No river contains a spirit, no tree means a man's life, no snake is the embodiment of wisdom, and no mountain still harbors a great demon. Neither do things speak to him nor can he speak to things, like stones, springs, plants, and animals. He no longer has a bush soul identifying him with a wild animal. His immediate communication with nature is gone forever, and the emotional energy it generated sunk into the unconscious (Jung, 1961/1993, p.255).
I do not believe the thrust of this paragraph by Jung (1961/1993) is about a "sacred tradition" being lost as Sabini (1997) would have it. Jung does not even use the term. Rather it is about the "de-humanizing" effect on modern persons through scientific understanding such that projections from the unconscious can no longer occur on to nature and natural phenomena and the corresponding emotional energy sinks into the unconscious and re-appears in the dreams of modern persons. The "sacred tradition" position may be more a case of reading into Jung what Sabini wants to find, as Noll (1990) has elsewhere suggested.

Overall the "sacred heritage" approach is reminiscent of Jung's perception that the West has a proclivity to imitate Eastern (and other) cultures, a critique to which we will now turn.

10.6.2 Jung as critic

In his writings from 1929 to 1943, Jung identified a certain tendency in the West to imitate Eastern practices and he was critical of this for a number of reasons. It needs to be remembered that Jung's comments were made within a particular historical period where much interest, beginning with certain Nineteenth Century trends, was being expressed in the West around yoga, theosophy, anthroposophy, Buddhism etc. (see Jung, 1936/1991, in particular). Jung critiques this trend, his main assertions being that from the Renaissance onwards, an historic split had occurred in the Western mind around faith/knowledge. Therefore, Westerners will be particularly attracted to any system which unites "religion" and "science" (as yoga at the time seemed to do), notwithstanding the fact that other elements in the West will be attracted to aspects of Eastern philosophies which speak to one side or the other of this bifurcation. As he puts it in "Yoga and the West",

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The West... with its bad habit of wanting to believe on the one hand, and its highly developed scientific and philosophical critique on the other, finds itself in a real dilemma. Either it falls into the trap of faith and swallows concepts like prāna, atman, chakra, samādhi, etc., without giving them a thought, or its scientific critique repudiates them one and all as 'pure mysticism'. The split in the Western mind therefore makes it impossible at the outset for the intentions of yoga to be realized in any adequate way. It becomes either a strictly religious matter, or else a training like Pelmanism, breath-control, eurhythms, etc., and not a trace is to be found of the unity and wholeness of nature which is characteristic of yoga (Jung, 1936/1991, p.533).

There would also seem a corresponding tendency in the West toward a fascination with the new - "new sensations or a titillation of the nerves" Jung says about Chinese yoga in "Richard Wilhelm: in memoriam" (Jung, 1930/1990, p.58). In this memoriam, Jung's position on the issue is stated most succinctly,

Unfortunately, the spiritual beggars of our time are too inclined to accept the alms of the East in bulk and to imitate its ways unthinkingly. This is a danger about which too many warnings cannot be uttered, ... The spirit of Europe is not helped merely by new sensations or a titillation of the nerves. What it has taken China thousands of years to build cannot be acquired by theft. If we want to possess it, we must earn the right to it by working on ourselves. Of what use to us is the wisdom of the Upanishads or the insight of Chinese yoga if we desert our own foundations as though they were errors outlived, and, like homeless pirates, settle with thievish intent on foreign shores? The insights of the East, and in particular the wisdom of the I Ching, have no meaning for us if we close our minds to our own problems, jog along with our conventional prejudices, and veil from ourselves our real human nature with all its dangerous undercurrents and darknesses... We need to have a firmly based, three-dimensional life of our own before we can experience the wisdom of the East as a living thing. Therefore, our prime need is to learn a few European truths about ourselves. Our way begins with European reality and not with yoga exercises which would only delude us about our own reality (Jung, 1930/1990, pp.58-59).

Of course, such an imitation of Eastern practices may be a way the West goes about understanding itself as Lucas and Barrett (1995) suggest, or conversely, is a way of conceptualising a return to an idyllic "golden age" as exemplified in Rousseau's noblesse sauvage. But for Jung we can see that the end result of this "fascination" is an unthinking imitation.
I am of the opinion that in a similar way as Jung sees the West's early interest in yoga, the interest of certain Westerners in shamanic native healers and their "sacred traditions" combines both a pursuit of ancient healing techniques and an involvement with the religious ideas of the non-Western group as if both were part of a "lost science" to be retrieved, all aided and intensified by the West's "bad habit of wanting to believe" (Jung, 1936/1991, p.533) and which can lead to a blind and uncritical swallowing of concepts from the other tradition.

We have already noted that for Jung, such things come about because Western persons are so far separated from their cultural foundations that their mind has split into a faith/knowledge dichotomy, one result to this split being a Rousseauian "return to Nature". As he says in "Yoga and the West",

Through his historical development, the European has become so far removed from his roots that his mind was finally split into faith and knowledge, in the same way that every philosophical exaggeration breaks up into its inherent opposites. He needs to return, not to Nature in the manner of Rousseau, but to his own nature. His task is to find the natural man again (Jung, 1936/1991, p.534).

We can see that Jung would prefer persons to return to their own nature - the nature within them - and this would include their own (psychic) history. He puts it this way in the "Commentary on 'The secret of the golden flower'",

it is sad indeed when the European departs from his own nature and imitates the East or 'affects' it in any way. The possibilities open to him would be so much greater if he would remain true to himself and evolve out of his own nature all that the East has brought forth in the course of the millennia (Jung, 1931/1981, pp.9-10).

Consequently Jung (1936/1991) believed that "In the course of the centuries the West will produce its own yoga" (p.537) but because the West has a different cultural and psychic history and therefore a different "mind", it is impossible to transfer directly and incorporate into the Western psyche that which has taken thousands of years to develop in another culture.
Specifically in relation to shamanism, if it reflects an archaic archetypal configuration as Jung seems to suggest, then it would be part of humankind's collective psychic history and open to Westerners' experience. Similarly, if such an archetypal configuration is the result of emergent/developmental processes then a shamanic bi-structural archetype would be a "reliably repeated early developmental achievement" (Knox, 2004, p.9) and would not only have core common features across cultures if the early infant experiences underpinning its emergence were the same but the emergent archetype would again be available to the experience of those individuals in whom it has developmentally emerged. However, given Jung's criticisms above, more than mere imitation of its appearance in other cultures is required. Rather, it would require a tracking in Western culture of individuals' actual experience of this archetypal component, its specific constellations and modulations in and through Western culture in ways different to its occurrence in animistic cultures.

The critical point for psychotherapeutic practice is that Jung (1931/1981) believes the involvement of the neurotic in such Eastern practices will bring about the very thing to be avoided i.e. a suppression of the unconscious. As he says in "Commentary on 'The secret of the golden flower'",

There could be no greater mistake than for a Westerner to take up the direct practice of Chinese yoga, for that would merely strengthen his will and consciousness against the unconscious and bring about the very effect to be avoided. . . . Nothing would be more wrong than to open this way to neurotics who are ill on account of an excessive predominance of the unconscious (Jung, 1931/1981, p.14).

Here Jung (1931/1981) develops the important issue of avoidance which he sees as being employed by Westerners in their imitations of Eastern practices and philosophies. We have already seen him allude to this theme in "Richard Wilhelm: in memoriam" (Jung, 1930/1990) where he talked about the insights of the East having no meaning for Westerners if we "veil from ourselves our real human nature with all its dangerous undercurrents and darknesses" (p.59). He goes on to say in the "Commentary on 'The secret of the golden flower'",
Western imitation is a tragic misunderstanding of the psychology of the East, every bit as sterile as the modern escapades to New Mexico, the blissful South Sea islands, and central Africa, where "the primitive life" is played at in deadly earnest while Western man secretly evades his menacing duties, his *Hic Rhodus hic salta* (Jung, 1931/1981, p.8).

And later in "The psychology of eastern meditation", Jung says,

I am therefore in principle against the uncritical appropriation of yoga practices by Europeans, because I know only too well that they hope to avoid their own dark corners (Jung, 1943/1991, p.571).

Overall, Jung's critique of yoga suggests that the search for primitivist ideals arises out of an endeavour to heal a psychic split and to overcome and/or avoid shadow material. A similar idea is also suggested by Lucas and Barrett (1995) when they speak of "the threatening presence concealed within oneself". This poses the question as to whether certain Jungian approaches to shamanism of the "sacred heritage" variety is an attempt to "sanitise", "harmonise" and "un-chaos" various threatening aspects of the self by articulating them as aspects of a neglected sacred archetype. The dual Jungian concepts of the "archetype" and the "prospective nature of the psyche" have allowed this idea of the "primitive within" to be seen as a positive thing unlike psychoanalysis, where problems arise through "an upsurge of the primitive within" (Lucas & Barrett, 1995, p.314). As a consequence, the "sacred heritage" approach may then be enabled to privilege one aspect of the shaman discourse within the ethnographic literature and overlook the "dark side" of shamanism to which writers like Devereux (1980) allude - she notes that even members of a shaman's community may regard them as wretched, crazy, cowardly, rapacious and contaminating. Such a privileging of the shaman discourse around the "arcadian" perspective may be a splitting manoeuvre enabling some Jungians to overlook their own shadows in the way Jung posits Westerners are prone to do through their imitation of other cultures' practices. A more fruitful line of enquiry would be to further investigate the reasons why certain Jungians have been drawn to an "arcadian" perspective on shamanism in the first place.
Chapter 10 The post-Jungian use of shamanism

From a psychotherapeutic point of view, this issue of avoidance highlights one reason why therapists should be cautious about directly absorbing or imitating practices from the East. "Shamanic" therapeutic practices as recommended by Leonard (1997) and enacted by others in Sandner and Wong (1997) and Smith (1997) may actually contribute to the avoidance of real gross pathology which is being masked by identification with archetypal imagery, resulting in a strengthening of narcissistic and anti-relational positions which have been attracted to the messianic and grandiose components of the enterprise in the first place. Indeed, such avoidance would be another example of mis-reading shamanism, for in it, confrontation with derangingly disturbing experiences are a critical component of initiation. We have an example of this very thing from Peters' (1989) fieldwork among the Tamang, where he had opportunity to glean from his shaman informant (Bhirendra) the nature of his initiatory experiences. An important aspect of this experience was a period of isolation where the powers of death had to be confronted. Peters says that this "is the point at which all the repressed forces of the unconscious may confront the shaman [so that he] therefore must first confront his dark side" (p.125). In other words, central to the shaman's initiation is a confrontation with shadow material rather than an avoidance of it.

10.7 CONCLUSIONS

By examining the uses to which Jungian discourse has put shamanism, important issues have emerged given the emergent/developmental model of the shaman archetype proposed in this thesis.

Firstly, definite training and selection issues to do with Jungian analysts are implicated for if the shaman archetype is an emergent/developmental psychic structure and its presence is critical for being an effective analyst then its detection at the time of selection of trainees and its activation during the training process are critical. Furthermore, the nature of the training analysis comes into clearer focus for if the presence of an activated shaman archetype is required for effectiveness, and this archetype has arisen from ruptures and difficulties in the early mother-infant
bond, then the training analysis would need to include a significant developmental and reductive focus in addition to anything archetypal and symbolic.

Even in different psychotherapeutic modalities which emphasise technique and re-education over process and the use of the transference/countertransference therapeutic relationship, it could very easily be the case that persons choose psychotherapy as a career because a shaman archetype has been activated in them through experiences of trauma in the early mother-infant bond. If this be the case, then once again, a central place needs to be made not only for one's own therapy as critical in psychotherapy trainings but that such therapy should have a developmental and reductive emphasis.

Secondly, the emergent/developmental model of the shaman archetype substantially adds to our understanding of the way the countertransference works, for if this archetype arises from ruptures and difficulties in the early mother-infant bond, then it is this area of psychic activity which is countertransferentially resonating with that of the patient. In other words, the shaman archetype as a psychic structure can actually provide an explanation for Jung's influence/infection model of psychotherapeutic work. It is not just a metaphor and Groesbeck (1989) will be correct in saying that the true Jungians are of the shaman type. Indeed, a final explanation of the communicative use of the countertransference will probably rest on further explication of the emergent/developmental model of the shaman archetype and this will be a distinct Jungian contribution to clinical understanding.

Thirdly, it would appear that shamanism has less to do with the classical understanding of individuation that has been articulated by some Jungians as a "sacred heritage" present in humankind's collective unconscious. Whilst an emergent/developmental model of any archetype will call into question the conceptual division between the personal and collective unconscious, such views also seem suffused with "arcadianism" and run the risk of avoidance which Jung has highlighted in other responses of Westerners to Eastern practices and philosophies. Indeed, Jung's critique of this Western tendency is noteworthy given the classical approach of Jungians like Moore and Gillette (1993), Ryan (2002), Sandner and Wong (1997) and Smith (1997). If Siberian shamanism is the expression of an
archaic archetypal configuration resulting from an emergent/developmental process, then we should not just imitate it but rather elucidate the similarities and differences between ethnographic shamanism and contemporary psychotherapeutic healing indicating how it is that the archetypal core has evolved and developed in our non-animistic cultural context and from that to see what practical use may be gained, given the dangers and criticisms as discussed above.

It would appear that shamanism is far from being an ethnographic romance, or just a useful model, for if it is an emergent/developmentally produced archaic archetypal configuration it becomes a psychic structure with explanatory and hypothetico-deductive potentialities. These potentialities relate to the characteristics of the type of mastery required for psychotherapeutic work, the selection and training issues for analysts and the countertransferential aspects of Jung’s influence/infection model of psychotherapeutic healing.
CHAPTER 11

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis began with Guggenbuhl-Craig's (1999) assertion that the activation of a shaman archetype was significant in whether a Jungian analyst would be "good" at their craft. To determine the validity of this assertion, the thesis took on a particular trajectory around an examination of the two parts of the phrase, "shaman archetype". Firstly, an investigation of shamanism, its research status and relevant phenomenology including Jung's views about it; and secondly, classical archetype theory to see if there was sufficient evidence that a shaman archetype actually exists. What finally emerged was a contemporary archetypal model that explained the particular psychology of Siberian shamans allowing an explication and critique of the post-Jungian discourse to do with the shaman archetype.

An examination of shamanism revealed quite a disparate and at times polarised discourse amongst scholars with a substantial debate as to what shamanism actually is. Whilst the entire definitional debate was beyond the scope of this thesis it seemed valid to conclude that a sufficient number of reputable scholars agreed there was something significant in the phenomenon of shamanism to warrant scholarly investigation. It was therefore possible to arrive at a working definition of shamanism so as to progress the thesis further whilst recognising that the debate on definitional issues is still not over, Hutton (2001) being a most recent commentator.

When Jung's views on shamanism were examined, it was concluded that they did not really coincide with the actual ethnographic phenomenon of shamanism. He seemed keener to incorporate shamanic examples as evidences of the operation of a universal individuation archetype and as such, failed to appreciate the extent of shamanism's connection with the wounded/healer concept. Given the overall conclusion about the shaman archetype that finally emerged in this thesis, it would appear it has more to do with the way certain individuals respond to their life situation and its attempted healing. It is highly likely that the dismemberment/reintegration cycle seen in

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shamanic initiations is expressing the realisation that something is wrong in the original construction of the person and that action needs to be taken to take things apart, correct them and put the person back together. This is a desire for psychic healing so that in the dismemberment/reintegration cycle, a damaged psyche is recognising its need for reconstitution lest it remain in an initially dismembered, traumatised and suffering state. Because such a process would arise from a deep interior awareness that what is going on is centrally important to the individual, it is understandable that this aspect of shamanism would be experienced as a "biopsychical seizure" with feelings of "destiny" and a "calling".

These conclusions did not negate, however, that for certain individuals their individuation process may go down a shamanic path. My point was that there will be personal and developmental reasons for this, which will not apply to all persons so that shamanism cannot be used as a general example of an overall individuation process. Seeing the shaman archetype in its Siberian expression as a developmentally produced bio-structural component of the psyche having arisen from ruptures in the early mother-infant dyad before the achievement of unit status actually explains why some individuals receive a "shamanic calling" and others do not. The archetype's emergence is dependent on this particular early infant experience which only certain individuals will have.

There were other points from Jung's understanding of shamanism which became important in this study. He saw shamanic imagery as representing an earlier socio-cultural stage in the expression of the individuation archetype, hence "archaic" and "primordial" as having arisen from the archaic roots of the basic archetypal motif to do with individuation. Given the fact that Siberian shamanism seems to occur inside pre-industrial, animistic hunter/gatherer societies, Jung's "archaic/primordial" view does accord with that of ethnographers and those who study comparative religion who see in Siberian shamanism something "early" in terms of cultural development. In this way, we concluded that Siberian shamanism could be understood as closer to the psychoid core of an archetype (whether it is individuation or something else). There were a number of significant implications highlighted by this thesis which flowed on from this view.
From the point of view of general archetypal theory, the idea that basic archetypal motifs arise from the psychoid core of an archetype which then undergo cultural development, change and transformation means that archetypes themselves do not "develop" or "evolve" but rather their socio-cultural expressions in terms of image and symbol can modify. This suggests that shamanism can express itself through different cultures but in ways that each culture would modify and transform. This view militates against the unthinking imitation and "cultural colonisation" of shamanic practices and ideas from one culture into another because so doing assumes that its expressive development in one culture can be automatically translated to another without intra-cultural development. This emerged as a significant critique of certain post-Jungian uses of shamanism which could be extended as a critique of the whole neo-shamanic movement within Western discourse. The critical question for Westerners really is, how and in what form has the psychoid core of the shaman archetype expressed itself in Western cultural context and are we in any way able to track its socio-cultural modification? Given the overall conclusions about the shaman archetype that finally emerged in this thesis, it would not yet be possible to give a comprehensive answer to this question and a line of future research is suggested here. However, given that the Siberian expression of the shaman archetype is understood to be a developmentally produced bio-structural component of the psyche, it is not unreasonable to assume its expression in modern persons and Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) could very well be correct to conclude that contemporary Western "healers" like analysts, have had this archetype constellated within them since they undertake healing roles within their socio-cultural group in the same way as shamans do. It is then not so much that being a good Jungian analyst is "a talent with which, if you are lucky, you are born", as Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999, p.408) says, but rather that being "good" has more to do with an individual's capacity to process and use the early infant traumas associated with the development of the archetypal structure in the first place. Significant implications for Jungian analyst selection and training follow - selection would need to include the detection of particular early infant experience which has led to the shaman archetype as a psychic construction whilst the training analysis would need to have a central developmental and reductive emphasis so that the early infant traumas could be reconstituted as resonance points for use in the countertransference.
Consequently, the shaman archetype took on substantial significance being understood as far more than a metaphor. The phenomenology of shamanism could then be used not only to add to our understanding of the underlying psychoid core of the archetype but also the dynamics of analytic work thereby enhancing analytic practice and technique.

Furthermore, Jung in his later career saw a theoretical connection between the psychoid core of the archetypes and synchronistic phenomena which enabled him to give an explanation to paranormal phenomena. If shamanism represents something close to the psychoid core of an archetypal configuration then this opens up transcendental and transpersonal aspects for consideration and the implications derived from study of the shaman archetype are vastly enlarged. Its study could provide phenomenological data enabling an explication of the way in which synchronistic and thus paranormal mechanisms actually operate.

In endeavouring to answer the question, "does a shaman archetype exist?" it was necessary to review classical archetype theory and this highlighted an area of significant critique to do with Jung's concept of the "autochthonous revival" and spontaneous activation of archetypes. There seemed insufficient evidence to support the view that archetypes operate autonomously but rather that on all occasions, they become activated in response to intense affectivity which has come about through a person's subjective life experience.

My point was not that this critique invalidated Jung's overall theory of archetype. It was rather to state that on all occasions, unconscious imaginal and affective content always occurs in a context and in response to something. This will be the case even when images apparently unknown to a person occur. I believe both the position of personal material in archetypal constellation as well as the nature of the personal/archetypal nexus need to be brought into clearer focus.

The findings from this thesis enabled us to take this point further. It is not just that archetypes are constellated by intense affectivity but given the emergent/developmental model of archetype evidenced in this study, archetypes are understood to be produced in the first place as emergent, developmental structures in
the psyche from out of the intense affective experiences of early infancy. Given this situation it is not surprising that the imagery archetypes activate can appear primitive, archaic and often mythological. This is because such images are related to early (and thus more primitive) levels of psychic functioning at the time of the archetype's construction. Mythic imagery is pointing to the "earliness" of psychic experience since early infant experience coincides with a time when the psyche and the affects it experiences are "primitive". In fact, mythological motifs may be the best way for the unconscious to articulate deep and early trauma (as if it is coming from another world). As such, archetypal imagery cannot be said to be arising spontaneously and autonomously. It is more plausible to understand it as a way of expressing something "psychically primeval".

It was understood that if the early environment/archetype nexus was a correct perspective, then Jung's classical view of the collective unconscious being unaffected by personal history would require substantial revision. Furthermore, if the emergent/developmental model of archetype evidenced in this thesis is correct, then the conceptual division between the collective and personal unconscious collapses. This is because in the model, archetypes as psychic structures are constructed out of early infant affective experience in the first place and are not pre-formed structures. This means there is only one unconscious and this possibility demands serious consideration because I believe the emergent/developmental model of archetype is for other reasons (discussed below), the most plausible model of all.

The important corollary to the above conclusion is that the "sacred heritage" view of archetypes also collapses for there is no separate well-spring of collective pristine psychic content which is healing and guiding. The "sacred heritage" position has been taken up by most Jungians in relation to shamanism so a substantial review of this position also became begged.

When worldwide shamanism was aligned with Jung's method for determining the existence of an archetype it could be demonstrated that shamanism reflected an archetype in the classical sense. Indeed, it is because shamanism is archetypal that we are able to recognise its different manifestations worldwide (both in space and time) as belonging to essentially the same class of things and why scholars can recognise it
as a social institution. It was noted that if shamanism is the result then of an archetypal expression in the classical sense, such a concept would be seen within the conscious articulation or attempts at conscious articulation amongst people but with a difficulty surrounding precise definition, which is exactly what we do see with shamanism, for the vast literature on shamanism indicates an agreed sense of something similar being investigated by scholars, despite their difficulties in formulating a precise definition. Shamanism may be ill defined or conceptually flawed to some extent, but this does not invalidate the fact that something of substance is being studied. The recognition of some similar human experience at the same time as discerning different cultural manifestations is exactly what one would expect if an archetypal configuration as conceived by Jung were operative. For this reason an archetypal perspective on shamanism bears directly on the definitional debate and can contribute to a further understanding of it.

The implications of these points for later research needs to be noted, for once an archetypal perspective is granted in relation to the shamanic phenomenon, the images it produces (its "symbol canon") can be used to gain an inductive grasp as to the essential structural elements of this archetype. Furthermore, any correlations between shamanic characteristics and the experience of contemporary Jungian analysts, as Guggenbuhl-Craig (1999) suggests, is something more than coincidental. An archetypal perspective would give a theoretical interpretation to these correlations and this enables the material to be organised beyond the phenomenological observations alone.

On this point, contemporary emergent/developmental models of the archetype like that proposed by Knox (2003, 2004) were seen to be the soundest way by which to further understand archetypes and the shaman archetype, in particular. This was not just because such models align with the thrust of argument in this thesis but because they seem the most plausible models of all for the following reasons. Firstly, they align with current neuroscience in terms of the bidirection of structure and function. Secondly, these models retain a biological perspective which we had concluded with Stevens (1998) was epistemologically important for archetype theory beyond the face validity that there must be a biological underpinning to archetypal imagery. Significantly, the developmental aspect of this biological perspective means that a
position can be taken on archetypes without adhering to pre-formationism or innatism. Thirdly, these models have significant explanatory power - they can incorporate all other theoretical positions as well as instinct theory and can elucidate Jung's concept of the "psychoid". Fourthly, they can explain why archetypes will appear as if innate and why Jung could conclude, though I believe erroneously, that they operate with "autochthonous revival". Fifthly, they re-assert the environment/archetype nexus but in a bidirectional way, that is, early infant environmental experience leads to the construction of archetypes in the first place and that these psychic structures do not become activated later in life without particular environmental triggers to do with intense affectivity. In relation to the shaman archetype, this would explain why the shamanic calling can be experienced not only in adolescence but also later in life. Sixthly, they have the capacity to draw together the perspectives of the Classical, Archetypal and Developmental Schools in relation to archetype theory. And lastly, they are supported by research evidence which uses Developmental Systems Theory in biology.

The emergent/developmental approach to archetypes proved useful in furthering the investigations of this thesis; what became evident was that Ducey's (1976) hypothesis that early infant trauma underlies the Siberian shamanic phenomenon required serious examination once such an emergent/developmental view of archetype appeared in the Jungian literature. Corroboration for the hypothesis was needed from the ethnographic record and this thesis filled in the gap in the plausibility of the hypothesis. When the Siberian ethnographic records were examined there seemed sufficient evidence to conclude the presence of societal practices and customs which could affect a mother's ability to meet the needs of her infant which would have implications for the efficacy of the early mother-infant dyad. Siberian shamanism was then understood to be the expression of a developmentally produced archetype, the critical experience being trauma in the early mother-infant dyad before the achievement of unit status and in an environment of "no other chaos" so that a particular psychology akin to Winnicott's "borderline type of case" emerges. Specifically, Siberian shamanism reflects a particular kind of psychological structure along the normal-abnormal continuum of "borderline states" so that on the one hand, shamans cannot be described as "mentally ill" which as Hutton (2001) points out is "patently untenable", whilst on the other hand, they have suffered real psychological
derangement as a result of traumas and difficulties arising from their early mother-infant experience but from which they have achieved some healing. It is this experience of "recycled madness" (as Giles Clark, 2004, puts it) which enables shamans to occupy a place of socio-cultural significance in being the communication channels between the known sense world and that of the transpersonal. I would go so far as to suggest that the particular psychology of Siberian shamans as reflected in the ethnographic material underlies all other cultural manifestations of shamanism and a line of future research is suggested here.

The model of the Siberian shamans' psychology as outlined in this thesis does have the capacity to explain the phenomenon of shamanism as we see it. The pre-initiatory illness noted in the ethnographic records becomes understandable as a breakout of deranged psychic material from the psychotic core of the developmentally produced shaman archetype which is already present in the initiate's psyche having arisen from ruptures and traumas experienced in the earliest stages of infancy. Presumably, the emotional changes to do with adolescence and the onset of puberty create affective states of such intensity as to foment activation of this underlying archetypal configuration. The concurrence of dismemberment/reconstitution imagery during the pre-initiatory illness also becomes understandable in terms of psychic content expressing both the realisation that something is wrong in the original construction of the person and that action needs to be taken to take things apart, correct them and put the person back together.

The ethnographic record also indicates that there are times when people can become shamans later in life following accidents or highly unusual events of a bizarre or life-threatening nature. This experience of a later call to the shaman vocation can also be explained by the view of the shaman's psychology presented here, for such experiences coincide with intense affectivity which would re-activate states of early infant vulnerability.

Mastery of the pre-initiatory illness, so essential to shamanic initiation, is also explained by this model of the shaman's psychology. The degree of mastery would depend on the quality of functional development in the orbital part of the personality arising out of good experiences in an ongoing environment of "no other chaos". It
would be from these functioning orbital layers that transformation of the psychotic
nuclear components would be mobilised, for in current clinical work, such positive
outcomes generally are interpreted as indicative of sufficient internal structure
overcoming the psychic fragmentation(s) originally experienced.

Overall, the differential aspects of the nuclear and orbital parts of the shaman's
personality structure can explain both the shaman's experience of derangement in the
pre-initiatory illness (including the presence of dismemberment imagery) as well as
the reason why they can attain eventual mastery, with its all important self-cure.
These differential aspects can also explain the divergent debate in the literature that
has gone on in terms of the psychopathology of shamans. It can be very easy to
emphasise one aspect of the shaman's personality structure over another, seeing them
either as "supernormal" when the effects of the orbital layers are stressed; or
alternatively, pathological if the effects of the nuclear component are stressed. The
model proposed in this thesis maintains that both positions are accurate but that they
must be held together, not separately, a position which Ducey (1976) so aptly
recognised when he said that the "healthy and pathological patterns [in the shaman's
psychology] are too deeply interwoven to be meaningfully separated" (p.177). Little
wonder that researchers can detect characteristics of "betwixt and between" liminality
and a "stable instability" amongst shamans because they would always be mediating
between the functional and dysfunctional zones within themselves.

This model of the shaman's psychology is also able to explain other aspects of
shamanism like transpersonal imagery and experiences. Since the shaman's core
complexes are understood to reside in the developmental zone where "magic holds
sway", it would be through projection that these complexes are experienced
exteriorly as spirits and interiorly as visions. Such an understanding does rely on
accepting Jung's position that projection is the natural way that the psyche functions
and that the experience of spirits is a projection of unconscious complexes. Jung
initially proposed this idea in "On the psychology and pathology of so-called occult
phenomena" (Jung, 1902/1993) and developed it in detail in "The psychological
foundations of belief in spirits" (Jung, 1948/1991a). It has not been uncommon for
contemporary commentators on shamanism like Vitebsky (1995) to take a similar
view.
The centrality of feminine imagery in the shaman's visions and regalia is also explained by this model of the shaman's psychology. Since the dysfunctions in the shaman's personality structure go back to the earliest months of life when the infant is primarily dependent on the mother then the feminine imagery represents a mother identification as an attempted cure.

The model also has the capacity to explain the noted deviance of shamans even within their own tribal groups. This is because their psychological construction is actually different to their socio-cultural others - they are a "borderline type of case" - and this explains the over-representation of suicide and the unusual custom of "voluntary death" in certain Siberian tribes where shamanism predominates.

It has to be noted that that the model of the Siberian shamans' psychology as argued in this thesis does somewhat re-open debate around the question, "is the shaman psychopathological?", although it has not been my direct intention to do so. I do think that the question to do with the psychopathology of shamans has been ill conceived revealing earlier and outmoded views of psychopathology. Simply put, shamans will have a psychology as everyone has a psychology and I prefer to articulate this in terms of the uniqueness of their psychology rather than necessarily arguing for a psychopathology with its over-reliance on Western psychiatric categories. Besides, it is virtually impossible now to get any case study evidence by which to affirmatively answer this question. Nonetheless, the psychopathology view does still appear as a point of discussion with those researchers who approach shamanism from a psychological orientation (Noll, 1983; Peters, 1982, 1989, 1996; Peters & Price-Williams, 1980) and even quite recently (deMause, 2002; Krippner, 2002) despite Hutton (2001) asserting that by the 1950's it had become untenable to view Siberian shamanism as a form on mental illness.

Questions to do with the psychology of shamanism are highly significant, however. We have already noted Ränk's (1967) observation that once a psychopathology can be determined, the whole definitional debate around shamanism reduces as the difficulties become collapsed and a psychological universalism is introduced which has the capacity to simplify. I believe that the findings of this study and the model of
the shaman's psychology that is proposed, do have the capacity to simplify the definitional debate.

Finally, by examining the uses to which Jungian discourse has put shamanism, important issues emerged given the emergent/developmental model of the shaman archetype evidenced in this thesis.

Firstly, definite training and selection issues to do with Jungian analysts are implicated for if the shaman archetype is an emergent/developmental psychic structure and its presence is critical for being an effective analyst then its detection at the time of selection of trainees and its activation during the training process are critical. Furthermore, the nature of the training analysis comes into clearer focus for if the presence of an activated shaman archetype is required for effectiveness, and this archetype has arisen from ruptures and difficulties in the early mother-infant bond, then the training analysis would need to be of a developmental and reductive nature as opposed to something centrally archetypal and symbolic. Moreover, the aspect of shamanic mastery becomes highlighted because it would be important in selection of analyst trainees to detect those individuals whose orbital layers of personality development were sufficiently developed to be able to contain and aid reconstitution of the underlying psychotic material in the core of the personality.

Secondly, the emergent/developmental model of the shaman archetype substantially adds to our understanding of the way the countertransference works, for the shaman archetype as a psychic structure can actually provide an explanation for Jung's influence/infection model of psychotherapeutic work. It is not just a metaphor and Groesbeck (1989) will be correct in saying that the true Jungians are of the shaman type. Indeed, a final explanation of the communicative use of the countertransference will probably rest on further explication of the emergent/developmental model of the shaman archetype and this will be a distinct Jungian contribution to clinical understanding.

Thirdly, shamanism has been articulated by some Jungians as a "sacred heritage" present in humankind's collective unconscious but the emergent/developmental model of archetype calls into question the conceptual division between the personal
and collective unconscious on which such a view is based. This view seems also suffused with "arcadianism" and runs the risk of avoidance which Jung has highlighted in other responses of Westerners to Eastern practices and philosophies.

Given the position of this thesis that Siberian shamanism is the expression of an archaic archetypal configuration resulting from an emergent/developmental process, then it should not just be imitated by Westerners but rather the similarities and differences between ethnographic shamanism and contemporary psychotherapeutic healing need elucidating. In this way it could be shown how it is that the (shaman) archetypal core has developed in non-animistic cultural contexts and from that to see what practical use may be gained from it by Westerners.

It would appear that shamanism is far from being an ethnographic romance, or just a useful model, for if it is an emergent/developmentally produced archaic archetypal configuration it becomes a psychic structure with explanatory and hypothetico-deductive potentialities. These potentialities would seem to relate to the characteristics of the type of mastery required for psychotherapeutic work, the selection and training issues for analysts and the countertransferential aspects of Jung's influence/infection model of psychotherapeutic healing.

There are further suggestions for future research apart from these, for if shamanism represents something close to the psychoid core of an archetypal configuration, its study could provide phenomenological data enabling an explication of the way in which synchronistic and thus paranormal mechanisms actually operate given Jung's theoretical connection between these two things.

The critical and final research questions which are prompted by this study are these. Firstly, does the model of the psychology of the Siberian shaman as outlined in this thesis apply to other shamanisms? Secondly, do Jungian analysts generally have the developmentally produced psychological construction as suggested by the findings of this thesis? And lastly, do current exponents of shamanism have a similar psychological construction? The answer to these questions would go somewhat in addressing Walsh's (1990) observation about shamanism that "[at] the present time, psychological studies are almost non-existent" (p.270). To this issue, I believe this thesis has been a preliminary corrective.
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APPENDIX A

JUNG’S REFERENCES TO SHAMANISM

1) Jung, 1918/1991, p.15
"Meanwhile the table-turning epidemic burst its bounds altogether and proliferated into spiritualism, which is a modern belief in spirits and a rebirth of the shamanistic form of religion practised by our remote forefathers."

2) Jung, 1918/1991, p.16
"Hand in hand with this [the dechristianization of man's view of the world] went the importation of strange Gods. Besides the fetishism and shamanism already mentioned, the prime import was Buddhism, retailed by Schopenhauer. Mystery religions spread apace, including that higher form of shamanism, Christian Science."

3) Jung, 1930/1991, p.514
"America has resuscitated the ghosts of Spiritualism, of which she is the original home, and cures diseases by Christian Science, which has more to do with the shaman's mental healing than with any recognizable kind of science."

4) Jung, 1931/1991c, p.48
"The most important figure in their [Jung's American patients'] religion is the shaman, the medicine-man or conjurer of spirits. The first American discovery in this field - since taken up in Europe - was spiritualism, and the second was Christian Science and other forms of mental healing."

5) Jung, 1945/1993, p.648
"Demonism (synonymous with daemonomania = possession) denotes a peculiar state of mind characterized by the fact that certain psychic contents, the so-called complexes, take over the control of the total personality in place of the ego. At least temporarily, to such a degree that the free will of the ego is suspended. In certain of these states ego-consciousness is present, in others it is eclipsed. Demonism is a primordial psychic phenomenon and frequently occurs under primitive conditions. . . . The phenomenon of demonism is not always spontaneous, but can also be deliberately induced as a 'trance', for instance in shamanism, spiritualism, etc."

"the individuation process develops a symbolism whose nearest affinities are to be found in folklore, in Gnostic, alchemical, and suchlike 'mystical' conceptions, not to mention shamanism."
7) Jung, 1953, pp.143-144
"All mythological ascents and descents derive from primitive psychic phenomena, i.e. from the trance states of sorcerers as found in the universal dissemination of shamanism. The trance is regularly bound up with the recitation of journeys to heaven or hell. Other regular features are the climbing of the tree (world-tree, world-mountain, world-axis), reaching the heavenly abode (village, city), winning the heavenly bride (nuptiae coelestes, hierosgamos), or the descent to the underworld or world of the dead, or to the "Mother of Animals" at the bottom of the sea. All these are genuine psychic phenomena which can still be observed today in modified form. . . . The most recent and perhaps most complete collection of shamanistic phenomenology is M. Eliade's Le Chamanisme, 1951. Here we have an archetypal psychic experience which can crop up spontaneously everywhere. The archetype is part of the psychic substructure and has nothing to do with astronomical or meteorological phenomena."

8) Jung, 1954, p.152
"As animals have no need to be taught their instinctive activities, so man also possesses primordial psychic patterns, and repeats them spontaneously, independently of any teaching. Inasmuch as man is conscious and capable of introspection, it is quite possible that he can perceive his instinctual patterns in the form of archetypal representations. As a matter of fact, these possess the expected degrees of universality (cf. the remarkable identity of shamanistic structures). It is also possible to observe their spontaneous reproduction in individuals entirely ignorant of traditions of this sort. Such facts prove the autonomy of the archetypes."

9) Jung, 1954/1981a, p.70n
"Dismemberment is a practically universal motif of primitive shamanistic psychology. It forms the main experience in the initiation of a shaman."

"In shamanism, much importance is attached to crystals, which play the part of ministering spirits. They come from the crystal throne of the supreme being or from the vault of the sky. They show what is going on in the world and what is happening to the souls of the sick, and they also give man the power to fly."

"In spite of the diversity of the tree symbol, a number of basic features may be established. . . . My case material has not been influenced in any way, for none of the patients had any previous knowledge of alchemy or of shamanism. The pictures were spontaneous products of creative fantasy, and their only conscious purpose was to express what happens when unconscious contents are taken over into consciousness in such a way that it is not overwhelmed by them and the unconscious not subjected to any distortion."
"Like all archetypal symbols, the symbol of the tree has undergone a development of meaning in the course of the centuries. It is far removed from the meaning of the shamanistic tree, even though certain basic features prove to be unalterable. The psychoid form underlying any archetypal image retains its character at all stages of development, though empirically it is capable of endless variations. The outward form of the tree may change in the course of time, but the richness and vitality of a symbol are expressed more in its change of meaning."

13) Jung, 1954/1981b, p.303
"In the Ripley Scrowle the serpent of paradise dwells in the top of the tree in the shape of Melusina... This is combined with a motif that is not the least Biblical but is primitive and shamanistic: a man, presumably the adept, is halfway up the tree and meets Melusina, or Lilith, coming down the tree. The climbing of the magical tree is the heavenly journey of the shaman, during which he encounters his heavenly spouse. In medieval Christianity the shamanistic anima was transformed into Lilith, who according to tradition was the serpent of paradise and Adam's first wife, with whom he begot a horde of demons."

14) Jung, 1954/1981b, p.305
"The motif of the double quaternity, the ogdoad, is associated in shamanism with the world-tree: the cosmic tree with eight branches was planted simultaneously with the creation of the first shaman. The eight branches correspond to the eight great gods."

"A conception prevalent in shamanism is that the ruler of the world lives in the top of the world-tree, and the Christian representation of the Redeemer at the top of his genealogical tree might be taken as a parallel."

"The relation of the tree to mountain is not accidental, but is due to the original and widespread identity between them: both are used by the shaman for the purpose of his heavenly journey. Mountain and tree are symbols of the personality and of the self, as I have shown elsewhere."

"The cross as well as the tree is the medium of conjunction. Hence St Augustine likened the cross to a bridal bed, and in the fairytale the hero finds his bride in the top of a great tree, where also the shaman finds his heavenly spouse, as does the alchemist. . . . On the one hand the anima is the connecting link with the world beyond and the eternal images, while on the other hand her emotionality involves man in the chthonic world and its transitoriness."
"Our material is . . . fully in accord with the widespread, primitive shamanistic conceptions of the tree and the heavenly bride, who is a typical anima projection. She is the ayami (familiar, protective spirit) of the shaman ancestors. Her face is half black, half red. Sometimes she appears in the form of a winged tiger. . . . The tree represents the life of the shaman's heavenly bride, and has a maternal significance. Among the Yakuts a tree with eight branches is the birthplace of the first man. He is suckled by a woman the top half of whose body grows out of the trunk. This motif is also found among my examples."

"The inverted tree plays a great role among the East Siberian shamans. Kagarow has published a photograph of one such tree, named Nakassä, from a specimen in the Leningrad Museum. The roots signify hairs, and on the trunk, near the roots, a face has been carved, showing that the tree represents a man. Presumably this is the shaman himself, or his greater personality. The shaman climbs the magic tree in order to find his true self in the upper world. Eliade says in his excellent study of shamanism: 'The Eskimo shaman feels the need for these ecstatic journeys because it is above all during trance that he becomes truly himself: the mystical experience is necessary to him as a constituent of his true personality.' The ecstasy is often accompanied by a state in which the shaman is 'possessed' by his familiars or guardian spirits. By means of this possession he acquires his 'mystical organs', which in some sort constitute his true and complete spiritual personality. This confirms the psychological inference that may be drawn from shamanistic symbolism, namely that it is a projection of the individuation process. This inference, as we have seen, is true also of alchemy, and in modern fantasies of the tree as it is evident that the authors of such pictures were trying to portray an inner process of development independent of their consciousness and will.

20) Jung, 1954/1990b, p.56
"Anyone, therefore, who does not know the universal distribution and significance of the ayami motif in the psychology of primitives [Note: I am thinking especially of shamanism with its idea of the 'celestial wife' (Eliade, Shamanism, pp. 76-81)], in mythology, in comparative religion, and in the history of literature, can hardly claim to say anything about the concept of the anima."

21) Jung 1954/1990d, p.256
"Since all mythical figures correspond to inner psychic experience and originally sprang from them, it is not surprising to find certain phenomena in the field of parapsychology which remind us of the trickster . . . His universality is co-extensive, so to speak, with that of shamanism, to which the whole phenomenology of spiritualism belongs. There is something of the trickster in the character of the shaman and medicine-man, for he, too, often plays malicious jokes on people, only to fall victim in his turn to the vengeance of those whom he has injured. For this reason, his profession sometimes puts him in peril for his life. Besides that, the shamanistic techniques in themselves often cause the medicine-man a good deal of discomfort, if
not actual pain. At all events, the 'making of a medicine-man' involves, in many parts of the world, so much agony of body and soul that permanent psychic injuries may result. His 'approximation to the saviour' is an obvious consequence of this, in confirmation of the mythological truth that the wounded is the agent of healing, and that the sufferer takes away suffering."

"The sacrificial priest submits voluntarily to the torture by which he is transformed. But he is also the sacrificial who is sacrificed, since he is pierced through with the sword and ritually dismembered. [Note: The dismemberment motif belongs in the wider context of rebirth symbolism. Consequently it plays an important part in the initiation experiences of shamans and medicine men, who are dismembered and then put together again. For details, see Eliade, *Shamanism*, ch. II]."

"The fact that the transformative process takes the form of a 'punishment'... may be due to a kind of rationalisation or a need to offer some explanation of its cruelty. Such a need only arises at a higher level of consciousness with developed feeling, which then seeks an adequate reason for the revolting and incomprehensible cruelty of the procedure. (A modern parallel would be the experience of dismemberment in shamanistic initiations.) The readiest conjecture at this level is that some guilt or sin is being punished. In this way the transformation process acquires a moral function that can scarcely be conceived as underlying the original event. It seems more likely that a higher and later level of consciousness found itself confronted with an experience for which no sensible reasons or explanations had ever been given, but which it tried to make intelligible by weaving into it a moral aetiology. It is not difficult to see that dismemberment originally served the purpose of reconstituting the neophyte as a new and more effective human being. Initiation even has the aspect of a healing. [Note: Eliade, *Shamanism*, esp. chs. II and VII] In the light of these facts, moral interpretation in terms of punishment seems beside the mark and arouses the suspicion that dismemberment has still not been properly understood. A moral interpretation is inadequate because it fails to understand the contradiction at the heart of its explanation, namely that guilt should be avoided if one doesn't want to be punished. But, for the neophyte, it would be a real sin if he shrank from the torture of initiation. The torture inflicted on him is not a punishment but the indispensable means of leading him towards his destiny. Also, these ceremonies often take place at so young an age that a guilt of corresponding proportions is quite out of the question. For this reason, the moralistic view of suffering as punishment seems to me not only inadequate but misleading. It is obviously a primitive attempt to give a psychological explanation of an age-old archetypal idea that had never before been the object of reflection. Such ideas and rituals, far from ever having been invented, simply happened and were acted long before they were thought... The aspect of torture, then, is correlated with a detached and observing consciousness, that has not yet understood the real meaning of dismemberment. What is performed concretely on the sacrificial animal, and what the shaman believes to be actually happening to himself,
appears on a higher level, in the vision of Zosimos, as a psychic process in which a product of the unconscious, an homunculus, is cut up and transformed. By all the rules of dream-interpretation, this is an aspect of the observing subject himself; that is to say, Zosimos sees himself as an homunculus, or rather the unconscious represents him as such, as an incomplete, stunted, dwarfish creature... essentially unconscious and therefore in need of transformation and enlightenment. For this purpose the body must be taken apart and dissolved into its constituents... This psychological process is admittedly painful and for many people a positive torture. But, as always, every step forward along the path of individuation is achieved only at the cost of suffering.

"(Man) cannot conquer the tremendous polarity of his nature on his own resources; he can only do so through the terrifying experience of a psychic process that is independent of him, that works him rather than he it.
If such a process exists at all, then it is something that can be experienced. My own personal experience... not to mention the statements... of all the great religions, [Note: Including shamanism, whose widespread phenomenology anticipates the alchemist's individuation symbolism on an archaic level. For a comprehensive account see Eliade, Shamanism.] all confirm the existence of a compensatory ordering factor which is independent of the ego and whose nature transcends consciousness... The numinous experience of the individuation process is, on an archaic level, the prerogative of shamans and medicine men: later, of the physician, prophet, and priest; and finally, at the civilised stage, of philosophy and religion. The shaman's experience of sickness, torture, death, and regeneration implies, at a higher level, the idea of being made whole through sacrifice, of being changed by transubstantiation and exalted to the pneumatic man - in a word, of apotheosis."

"the archetype of the heavenly marriage plays a great role here. On a primitive level this motif can be found in shamanism. Cf. Eliade, Shamanism, p. 75."

"Cf. the Creator making the first men out of sweat in Eliade (Shamanism, p. 334 n.), who mentions this in connection with the sweat-bath."

27) Jung 1956, p.331
"It should be noted that music is a primitive means of putting people into a state of frenzy; one has only to think of the drumming at the dances of shamans and medicine-men, or of the flute-playing at the Dionysian orgies."
28) Jung, 1957, p.333
"The Christmas tree is the world-tree. But, as the alchemical symbolism clearly shows, it is also a transformation symbol, a symbol of the process of self-realisation. According to certain alchemical sources, the adept climbs the tree – a very ancient shamanistic motif. The shaman, in an ecstasy, climbs the magical tree in order to reach the upper world where he will find his true self. But climbing the magical tree, which is at the same time a tree of knowledge, he gains possession of his spiritual personality. To the eye of the psychologist, the shamanistic and alchemical symbolism is a projected representation of the process of individuation. That it rests on an archetypal foundation is evidenced by the fact that patients who have not the slightest knowledge of mythology and folklore spontaneously produce the most amazing parallels to the historical tree-symbolism. Experience has taught me that the authors of these pictures were trying to express a process of inner development independent of their conscious volition."

29) Jung, 1958, p.338
"One of the greatest hindrances to understanding is the projection of the shaman - the saviour. As soon as you are elevated to such a rank, you are powerless, lost in a sea of mist. When signs of this inflation appear, this is a serious warning, and the inflation must be discouraged as soon as possible. You are just as unable to perform miracles as a shaman as a rule is."

30) Jung, 1960, p.410
"all primitives have a great respect for dreams, not always of course for their own, but when the chief dreams, or the witch doctor - that's something else! Because there, under really primitive conditions, dreams still have a social function. Rasmussen, in his book about the Polar Eskimos, describes the case of a shaman who, guided by dreams, led his tribe [from Greenland] over the frozen sea of Baffin Bay to the extreme north of the continent, because there were no seals that year, and there they found the food they needed. But on the journey half of the tribe began to doubt and turned back, and they all perished, while the people he led stayed alive."

"When the medical psychologist takes an interest in symbols, he is primarily concerned with 'natural symbols' as distinct from 'cultural' symbols. The former are derived from the unconscious contents of the psyche, and they therefore represent an enormous number of variations on the basic archetypal motifs. In many cases, they can be traced back to their archaic roots, i.e. to ideas and images that we meet in the most ancient records and in primitive societies. In this respect, I should like to call the reader's attention to such books as Mircea Eliade's study of shamanism, where a great many illuminating examples may be found.

'Cultural' symbols, on the other hand, are those that have expressed 'eternal truths' or are still in use in many religions. They have gone through many transformations and even a process of more or less conscious elaboration, and in this way have become the représentations collectives of civilised societies."
APPENDIX B

THE CURRENT DSM IV CRITERIA FOR BPD

**Criterion 1:** A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterised by alternating between extremes of idealisation and devaluation.

**Criterion 2:** Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging, e.g. spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating (do not include suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour covered in Criterion 5).

**Criterion 3:** Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood, e.g. intense episodic dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety, usually lasting a few hours or only rarely more than a few days.

**Criterion 4:** Inappropriate, intense anger or lack of control of anger (e.g. frequent displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights).

**Criterion 5:** Recurrent suicidal behaviour, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behaviour. [It is this criterion which seems to be the most marked and noted for BPD sufferers].

**Criterion 6:** Identity disturbance; markedly and persistently unstable self-image and/or sense of self. [Note: he or she may feel that he or she does not exist or embodies evil].

**Criterion 7:** Chronic feelings of emptiness.

**Criterion 8:** Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment (do not include suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour covered in Criterion 5)

**Criterion 9:** Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms [Note: or depersonalisation, derealisation, or hypnagogic illusions].