Chapter 1
Orientalism and Occidentalism: Some Theoretical Issues in Cross-Cultural Representation

In bringing nation, news and otherness together, this study draws on Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983), which has provided an important point of contact between studies of media constructions of collective identities and notions of nationhood. In this seminal work on the cultural origins of nationalism, Anderson argues that the nation is an imagined community. It is *imagined* because citizens of a nation may never get to know each other personally, but nevertheless assume a national identity through sharing a common image of themselves. The nation is a *community* because, in spite of the socio-economic differences between the members, people within it share a sense of common destiny which distinguishes them from other peoples.

According to Anderson, the rise of print capitalism enabled and sustained such processes of national imagining because this made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in ways that were profoundly different from previous generations. The print media instils in disparate individuals the confidence that whatever they are doing (and reading) is shared anonymously by the rest of the population. Anderson cites the novel and newspaper as two archetypal examples of print media that created a sense of simultaneity which, according to Anderson, is 'transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar' (Anderson, 1983: 30).

Anderson argues that this sense of simultaneity comes from two sources: the calendrical coincidence made possible with the newspapers' homogenising of time, and the 'simultaneous consumption' of newspapers-as-fiction:

> What more vivid figure for the secular, historically-clocked, imagined community can be envisioned? At the same time, the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his [sic] own paper being consumed by his [sic] subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually
reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life (Anderson, 1983: 39).

Anderson's emphasis on the importance of print media in the creation of new languages of power and his rich attention to communicative practices is particularly relevant to the examination of the media construction of collective identities. It allows us to consider the close relationship between mass communication and identity. Such a close relationship manifests itself in three ways. Firstly, there are collective practices which media report regularly, thereby reinforcing a sense of community; secondly, there are ways of reporting certain collective ceremonies and rituals which are themselves important in fostering a sense of identity; thirdly, the practice of reading (and watching) news may itself be a collective ceremony in modern life. These three dimensions to mass communication enable the community to be imagined in a certain way and in a certain style that distinguishes it from other communities.

Anderson's notion of the nation as an imagined community has been central to analyses of the construction of national identity. Drawing on Anderson's work, Hall (1992: 293-295), for instance, identifies five discursive strategies with which the nation can be narrated and imagined. They are, firstly, stories of the nation which provide a set of national images, symbols and rituals which represent the historical events which give meaning to the nation. These stories, told and retold in the media, popular culture and national histories, perpetuate a sense of national belonging. A second aspect is the emphasis on the origins and continuity of the nation. This gives the impression that the nation, rather than being a historical invention, is natural and unquestionable. The third strategy is what Hall calls 'the invention of tradition', which includes a set of ritual or symbolic practices that acquire a mythological dimension. The fourth strategy is the idea of an original 'people' and their national character. The last strategy is to evoke the primordial notion of the purity of a people.

Hamilton (1990) also draws on Anderson's notion of imagined community but takes it a step further and proposes the concept of 'the national imaginary'. By this term, she means the ways in which contemporary social orders produce not merely images of themselves but images of themselves against others (1990: 16). Drawing on the Lacanian schema, Hamilton defines the imaginary as a space which is typified by a child's relationship to a
mirror, whereby the child sees itself in a mirror, while thinking it sees someone else. Hamilton argues that an image of the self implies at once an image of another, against which the self can be distinguished. However, distinguishing ourselves from others does not lead to the neat identification of who 'we' are as different from 'them'. Hamilton is careful in pointing out that what characterises the process of constructing 'ourselves' against others is reflexivity -- where the identification of the self and the Other is confused: 'Imaginary relations at the social, collective level can thus be seen as ourselves looking at ourselves while we think we are seeing others' (Hamilton, 1990: 16-17). Furthermore, she suggests that the use of Other is necessary in any self-definition because it is precisely the split-off part of the self, the unrecognised part, which is seen in the Other.

Hamilton's concept of the national imaginary is useful in articulating the intention of this work: to look at the means of constructing an Other, against which the national self is imagined. In other words, it examines the construction of the nation, but it is the national Other, not the nation per se, that is the focus of analysis. Given this, Orientalism (1978) is a natural point of entrance, since this seminal work has opened up a way through which to consider the construction of otherness, and, by implication, the relations between the self and Other. It is also useful to look at the Japanese (Nihonjinron) and Chinese occidentalist discourses -- examples of counter-discourses to orientalism. Furthermore, a discussion of both orientalism and its counter-discourses points to the dynamic and complex nature of othering.

Orientalism

Although it is now over a decade since the first appearance of Edward Said's Orientalism (1978), the book has remained one of the most influential texts in contemporary discussions of Western discourses on non-Western cultures. Much of Said's approach is influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, which is concerned with the politics of discourse. Said extends Foucault's (1978, 1979) analysis of discursive oppositions such as sane/mad, healthy/sick, legal/criminal to include ways in which a cultural order is defined by constructing an 'exotic' Other. Said uses Foucault's theoretical approach to consider the historical construction within Western discourses of a geographical domain -- the 'East' -- through a set of institutionalised
practices which he calls 'orientalism'. This entails looking not at how these discourses represent the Orient as an object given in advance of knowledge, but at how they actively mark it out or produce it as an object of knowledge.

Said's project consists mainly of tracing the ways in which the concept of the 'Orient' is located within academic and imaginative Western discourse, and argues that the production of this discourse is responsible for the systematic discipline by which European culture produces and manages the 'Orient':

In short, from its earliest modern history to the present, orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-and-fast distinctions as "East" and "West": to channel thought into a West or an East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the centre of orientalist theory, practice, and values found in the West, the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as having the status of scientific truth (Said, 1978: 45-46).

Orientalism, for Said, not only carves out the Orient as an object to be known and controlled, but also creates a position for the Westerner as the subject who knows and controls. This, Said argues, determines that the position of the Westerner is inscribed as fixed, substantial and authoritative, while that of the Orient is inscribed as insubstantial, transient and inscrutable. Because the Westerner assumes such a position, it becomes a point around which statements, actions and propositions can be organised according to principles of consistency. In Said's (1978: 2-3) description, orientalism becomes a "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the 'Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'... [I]n short, orientalism [is] a Western style for dominating, reconstructuring, and having authority over the Orient".

According to Said, what is involved in orientalism is not simply a set of Western views about the East, but a systematic deployment of a discourse which establishes a structural dichotomy between centres and peripheries, between knower and known, the independent and the dependent. It is directly homologous with other discourses that developed in the West in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many of which analysed by Foucault -- discourses, for example, of madness, illness, sexual
deviance, femininity and criminality. In each case, there is a marking out in discourse of an object to be known, the construction of an opposition between the knower and the known, the active and the passive, the rational and the irrational.

It is also clear from Said's analysis that these dichotomies do not exist as exclusive and fixed categories, but in complex meaning systems which overlap and reinforce each other. In many of these discourses the object of knowledge of one discourse may become the metaphor for another. For example, the delinquent is described as 'mad', the mad is described as 'childish', or the sexual deviant as 'ill'. An example provided by Said is the persistent feminisation of the Orient by a 'masculine' West. The Orient, according to Said, is described as 'supine' and 'feminine', inviting 'penetration', 'insemination' and colonisation by the West (1978: 219). Through the use of such phallocentric metaphors, the feminine, the oriental and various possible 'others' are conflated. They become nothing more than a standing reserve of useful potential to be produced in such a way as to form what Couze Venn (1992) refers to as the 'deep-seated discursive alliance of logocentrism, phallocentrism and ethnocentrism' which, according to Venn, constitutes the core of Western thought. Such a discursive alliance in turn serves to enhance the position and the prestige of the active speaker.

Although Orientalism ostensibly focuses on the Middle East, Said's critique of orientalism has provided a useful framework for the analysis of Western representations of non-Western societies. However, it has also generated considerable discussion, evaluation and criticism for its problematic aspects, one of which is his tendency to adhere too closely to the logic of binarism for understanding the representation of cultural and racial difference. As the following discussion of the 'oriental' counter-discourses will show, both orientalism and occidentalism are uneven formations deployed nonequivalently across different cultural and historical sites. Terms such as the Orient and the Occident are multivalent and plural, and the Orient signifies different meanings over time and space. Equally, the positioning of the self/Other is shifting, negotiable and contextual. Each 'self' has a multiplicity of Others which define different aspects of the self; consequently, each 'self' is also multiple, with different oppositions with different Others implying different, even contradictory selves.
This is where Said deviates from Foucault. Foucault (1979) emphasises the absolute complicity of power and knowledge and goes so far as to identify both within the single conjunction 'power-knowledge'. Said, on the other hand, appears to posit the Orient as an object referent existing independently of Western discourses about it. Unlike Foucault who engages with power in its diffuse and delocalised form, Said holds a notion of power that is highly centralised, unidirectional and irreversible, thereby failing to consider the problem posed for the West by the change of power relations between the West and the Orient. It also prevents him from recognising the power of the oriental cultures in their deployments of the Other.

While drawing on Foucault's notion of discourse, Said also seems to deviate from Foucault in the way in which discourse can be analysed. While Said appears to be concerned with identifying the dichotomised and essentialist structure in orientalist discourse, Foucault, on the other hands, is concerned with the 'conditions of existence' (Foucault, 1991: 59) of such discourse. In addition, while much of Said's project consists in relating the orientalist discourse to the thought and mind that engender it, Foucault stresses the need to examine the 'practical field' in which the discourse is deployed. Furthermore, Foucault, much more than Said, recognises the extent to which power is not simply oppressive, but is also enabling (Foucault, 1978).

**Occidentalism**

For these reasons, Said's analysis, though fruitful, is perceived as a relatively simple model of the West's domination of the East. This model of orientalism does not allow for the othering in which oriental nations might participate, both of the Occident and of oriental Others. An important and prominent example of how the Orient deploys otherness for purpose of constructing national self is the position of Japan and the discourse of *Nihonjinron*. Certainly, Japan, like other Asian countries, has been orientalised by the West in history. Two years after the appearance of Said's *Orientalism*, Richard Minear (1980) conducted an analysis of the Western tradition of Japanese studies over the last hundred years. Minear's analysis of the interactions between the West and Japan in the past few centuries enables him to claim that the historical relation between the West and Japan was very different from that which obtained between the West and Said's
Orient. Minear points out that, as the remotest segment of the 'Far East', Japan was unknown to the West until Marco Polo's time, and although Japan succumbed to Western force in the nineteenth century and briefly in the middle of the twentieth century, it did not become a colony. In spite of this, his examination of Western historical scholarship on Japan finds that it still follows a colonial orientalist tradition. Minear finds that Japan has been orientalised historically, in the sense that it has been constructed as an exotic civilisation in ways characteristic of orientalist discourses. Minear's study is an effective footnote to Said's critique of orientalism, especially since the latter does not specifically look at the position of Japan.

This was to change after World War II. Japan became a more problematic figure in constructions of the East/West opposition. Since it has become a non-oriental, modern and Western orient, Japan seems to contradict the Western ways of imagining the 'world', which are based on the dichotomy between the 'modern' West and the 'pre-modern' non-West — a dichotomy which in turn has played a role in setting up concepts of 'the Western world' itself. If it was the West that created modernity, it was modernity that created the imaginary space and identity described as 'Western' (Morley and Robins, 1992: 141). Such an imaginary space, which contains two distinct areas, the modern West and the pre-modern non-West, provides a discursive scheme according to which other cultures and societies are represented.

Modernity in the discursive scheme is perceived to possess a technological, futurological and universal dimension. The modernisation project was cumulative, future-orientated, based upon the logic of technological progression and progress' (Morley and Robins, 1992: 141). It is also defined as the antithesis of tradition as a means of conceptualising space and time. It is 'defined as the experience of living with rapid, extensive and continuous change' (Hall, 1992: 278).

Defining modernity in this way, however, begs the question of Japanese modernity. Japan has not only acquired modernity, it is also claiming its franchise on the future, yet Japanese society and culture seem to be profoundly 'different' and 'pre-modern'. To make the pairing of modern West and pre-modern non-West sustainable, particularly in the exceptional
case of modern Japan, requires a means of explaining away any peculiarities that may threaten the dichotomy.

One explanation is provided in Nihonjinron, or literally, the Japanese discourse on being Japanese. Nihonjinron explains Japan's successful modernisation project by emphasising Japan's racial, cultural and psychological differences from the West, and argues that Japanese success is not a result of emulating the West, and that its success cannot be emulated by the West. In a comprehensive discussion on Nihonjinron, Befu (1993: 120) points to the close relationship between Nihonjinron and internationalisation. As Japan increasingly accepts foreigners and foreign cultures into Japan and encourages Japanese economic investments and travel overseas, Japanese become increasingly aware of the need to define themselves and their culture. According to Befu, Nihonjinron fulfils this need.

This Japanese discourse of Japan's uniqueness articulates a Japanese ethnocentrism, and has at times served the nationalistic purposes of right-wing politicians and intellectuals in Japan. Since the 1980s, Nihonjinron has become a national ideology, officially endorsed by Prime Minister Nakasone, an internationalist as well as a staunch nationalist (Befu, 1993: 125). Befu traces the historical development of Nihonjinron and points out that Japan's changing definition of its national identity should be understood in the context of its relationship with the external world. For instance, in the late feudal times of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a branch of scholarship call kokugaku (national learning) arose in reaction to the received Confucianism which was the official political philosophy of the feudal government. Kokugaku scholars attempted to demonstrate the superiority of Japanese culture over Chinese culture, and their nationalistic discourse on Japanese cultural identity, according to Befu, manifested some of the characteristics of the modern Nihonjinron (Befu, 1993: 122).

It is clear that the early form of Nihonjinron in the first half of the nineteenth century used China as its point of reference in the reinventing of Japan's national identity. However, after that period, the West gradually replaced China as Japan's Other, with Japan's admiration and envy of the West gradually giving way to disrespect. Creighton's (1996) study of the representations of the Gaijin (foreigners) in Japan's advertising campaign
reveals a great deal of ambivalence towards foreigners, especially those from the West. The West, according to Creighton, is seen as a bearer of innovation and style, but at the same time it is also seen as a moral threat.

Modern Nihonjinron, with its emphasis on the difference between Japan and the West, relies on the West as its Other. To many Japanese subscribing to this discourse, the Americans are selfish, materialistic and individualistic, and Australians are lazy, dirty and hedonistic. In this sense, there is a complicity between orientalism and Nihonjinron -- or self-orientalism. Iwabuchi (1994: 53), for instance, argues that Nihonjinron shares with orientalist discourse of the West its view of non-Western countries, and also suppresses the voices of minority groups in Japan, such as Koreans, Ainu (indigenous inhabitants in Japan), and burakumin (Japanese Untouchables), women and the working class. In addition, like Western orientalism, Nihonjinron also needs to exoticise its Other for self-definition. Furthermore, by ways of 'orientalising a homogeneous self' (Creighton, 1996: 152), Nihonjinron presents an image of Japan that feeds back into the Western perception of the Orient on the one hand, and accepts the Western attribution of differences between Japan and the West on the other.

In the context of discussing the mutual perceptions of the US and Japan, Robertson (1990) points out that Nihonjinron centres upon claims of the selfish individualism, materialism, decadence and arrogance of Westerners, particularly Americans. In addition, Robertson argues that, from an historical perspective, Japanese identity would be inconceivable without making reference to its Other. Furthermore, by tracing the change of Japan's Other, he shows how relative terms like the 'East' and 'West' are:

Japanese identity largely rests on a form of occidentalism, since in functional terms China was the original 'Occident' for Japan and the concern with the west since the sixteenth century has been constituted by a generalisation of 'China' so as to encompass the Western world, particularly since the 1850s (Robertson, 1990: 193).

Similar to the Japanese Nihonjinron but less systematically scrutinised is the Chinese discourse of the Other. Like the Japanese, the Chinese have appropriated Western orientalist constructions of China and produced a discourse marked by a combination of Western constructions of China with
Chinese constructions of the West. Xiaomei Chen (1995) calls it a 'Chinese occidentalist discourse'.

According to Chen, this discourse may be regarded as consisting of two related yet separate discursive practices. The first practice is an 'official occidentalism' -- the Chinese government's use of the essentialisation of the West as a means of supporting a nationalism that effects the internal suppression of its own people. In this process, Chen argues, the Western Other is construed by a Chinese imagination in order to discipline and dominate the Chinese self at home. This variety of official occidentalism found its best expression in Mao's theory of the three worlds and superpowers (USA and USSR) in the 1960s and 1970s, the government's nationwide 'anti-bourgeois' campaigns in the 1980s, and official discourse against the Western attempts to bring about 'peaceful transformation' in the 1990s. The official occidentalism, similar to Nihonjinron, is marked with an ambivalence to the West: the West is useful to Chinese authorities because of its science and technology; it is also useful for its status as a moral Other in the government's oppression of marginal or dissenting discourses within China.

The second is an 'anti-official occidentalism' which uses the Western Other, in its cultural and ideological absence, to criticise the oppressive presence of official ideology. According to Chen, the adoption of an occidentalist discourse is a strategic move by dissenting intellectuals. This discourse also essentialises the West, albeit in a positive light. By suggesting that the West is politically and culturally superior to China, some Chinese intellectuals, who are themselves accused of being too 'Westernised', can defend their opposition to established 'truths' and institutions. In other words, for both official and anti-official occidentalism, the West is a useful Other, although it is essentialised in different ways and for different political purposes.

Chen points out that Western orientalism and Chinese occidentalism share many ideological techniques and strategies, and both seek to construe its Other by asserting a distorted image of its own uniqueness. However, Chen argues that occidentalism has served an ideological function quite different from that of Western orientalism: orientalism is a strategy of Western world domination, whereas Chinese occidentalism is primarily a discourse that is
evoked by various and competing groups within Chinese society for a variety of different ends, largely within domestic Chinese politics.

There is ample evidence to show that in some Chinese representations the orientalist framework is strategically deployed in the process of redefining national identity. The perceived reason for the international success of Zhang Yimou's films, including *Raising the Red Lantern, Ju Dou, Red Sorghum*, and *Yellow Earth* is, as Wang (1994) argues, the 'self-orientalising' of Chinese culture, which caters to Western audiences's expectations, thereby enabling the Chinese film-making industry to become competitive internationally. Many of these films are set in pre-modern China and, by highlighting the backwardness and certain peculiarities of Chinese society, represent an exotic China that seems timeless and unchanging.

In another instance, Tian Zhuangzhuang, another fifth-generation film-maker, also resorts to an orientalist framework in his early films about ethnic minorities. Gladney (1995) shows how these films have a more general oriental bias which exoticises the minority for the sake of the majority. Tian's film *Horse Thief*, made in 1986, while ostensibly about the minority peoples of Tibet, actually addresses issues of alienation, corruption and spirituality that pertain to the Chinese Han majority, the implied audience of the film. Gladney hence concludes that it was on the Tibetan frontier, through his depiction of a stigmatised minority, that Tian was at that time able to address key issues troubling Chinese society. Gladney argues that the path-breaking fifth-generation filmmakers have used the representation of ethnic minorities in China to provide a critical vision of the Chinese nation as a whole.

Chinese discourses of the Other are also found in some writers' reactions to criticism of orientalism in post-colonial studies in the West. Some observers argue that an anti-orientalist mentality has the potential to allow nationalism to suppress the modernisation project in China. According to Zhang Rongyi (1994), the anti-orientalist need is not as urgent for China as the need to modernise, and this latter goal should remain unchanged.

Wang Yichuan (1994) agrees with Zhang, but seems to take one step further in his reaction to the critique of orientalism in the West:
I believe that the major premise on which we introduce the critique of orientalism to China is that China continues to open up to the world. Only when China has completely integrated itself with the world can it begin to consider deconstructing the Western power. Unless this happens, the critique of orientalism would be more reactionary than progressive to China (Wang, 1994:149).

It is clear that Chinese occidentalist discourse also has complicity with Japanese *Nihonjinron*. After all, both Chinese and Japanese discourses rely on the West as the Other; both construct the self as culturally and racially unique; and both are deployed for nationalist agenda. Just as China was once Japan’s Occident, Japan has become part of China’s Occident or, in Iriye’s (1990) view, China’s intermediary to the Occident. Given this, it is not strange that Chinese reactions to *Nihonjinron* discourse articulate a Chinese ambivalence towards the West. Some Chinese writers have noted the overtones of Japanese militarism in the right-wing use of *Nihonjinron*. They see it as part of Japan’s ambition to resume its role as an economic leader in the 'Great East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', they also seem to welcome the implication behind the Japan’s growing tendency to say 'No' in its political and economic interactions with the West. They have noted that Japan used to consider itself a Western nation, but in recent years has clearly wanted to 're-Asianise' itself. Some writers consider this shift as a reaffirmation of the Confucian cultural tradition. Guo’s (1994) writing seems to embody this contradiction:

*Japan That Can Say No*, by Morita Akio and Ishihara Shintaro, published in 1989, attacks the US’ racially prejudiced trade and economic policy, and urges Japan to discard its 'small nation mentality' acquired after World War II. This is an indication of Japan’s growing awareness of its Eastern cultural identity, and its strategic move to 'leave Europe and return to Asia' (*tuo ou fan ya*).

However, most Asian countries were once the victims of Japan’s ‘Greater Sphere of Co-prosperity’. Although they welcome Japanese investment and technology transfer and wish to maintain equal trade relations with Japan, they do not want to become a market for out-of-date Japanese goods. In other words, the co-operations between Asian countries should be compared to wild geese flying in a single straight
line, not in the 'V' shape, with Japan leading, as the Japanese want it (Guo, 1994:15).

The contradiction in Guo's reaction to Japan's self-analysis is indicative of China's ongoing dilemma in its attempts to resist Westernisation and yet achieve modernisation. The anti-Western discourse of Nihonjinron has inspired some Chinese writers whose national pride and paranoia about Western cultural influences may lead them to think that China, too, can say 'No' to the West. In the context of discussing the economic and trade relationship between the US and Japan, Xu (1994) observes that the fact that Japan is increasingly saying 'No' to America shows that the power relation between the West and Japan is changing. 'Japan is no longer the little brother. Equality, rather than dependency, becomes the basis of Japan-West relations' (Xu, 1994: 10).

Othering

The discussion of orientalism and its counter-discourses so far suggests a few important things about othering that Said fails to address. Certainly, the West has so far occupied the space of the knower, but what is often overlooked is the fact that this knower may also be the object of essentialist discourse. Conversely, the discussion of Chinese responses to Japan's economic power suggests that the less powerful does not necessarily accept the position of powerlessness. China's response to the critique of orientalism in the West shows that the known is not just passive. On the contrary, both the Chinese and Japanese examples show that non-Western nations may also engage in the strategic deployment of 'orientalist' images in order to essentialise, firstly, the West, secondly, themselves, and thirdly, other oriental nations. Xiaomei Chen (1995) summarises it succinctly:

Orientalism and occidentalism must be seen as signifying practices having no permanent or essential content. Given their socioeconomic and political status in relationship to the West, Third World countries have rightly decried their Western Other in occidentalist discourse. But Third World countries have an equal right to employ discourses of occidentalism for contrary purposes, to use, "misuse", re-present, distort, and restore the Western Other, exploiting it as a counter-
structure against the monolithic order of things at home (Chen, 1995: 48).

Furthermore, the process of othering is engaged in by all, not just Western powers. Said sees orientalism as purely a Western invention, and therefore implies that only the West is engaged in the procedures of dichotomising and essentialising. The Chinese example shows that the strategy of we-they dichotomy is equally useful to anti-imperialist and national liberation movements of non-Western nations. James Clifford (1988) is right to point out that Said's failure to consider the non-Western anti-imperialistic and nationalistic discourses constitutes a major blind spot in Said's critique:

The key theoretical issues raised in orientalism concern the status of all forms of thought and representation for dealing with the alien. Can one ultimately escape procedures of dichotomising, restructuring, and textualising in the making of interpretative statements about foreign cultures and traditions? If so, how? Said frankly admits that alternatives to orientalism aren't his subject. He merely attacks the discourse from a variety of positions, and as a result his own standpoint is not sharply defined or logically grounded (Clifford, 1988: 261).

In addition, othering is not just about external nations, races and geopolitical entities, but includes the othering of internal groups within a society. This Other applies to all sorts of categories -- the obvious racial and ethnic Others in a given society, women as the Other in the masculine national imaginary, and striking workers as the Other in corporate capitalism, who pose a threat to the national unity. This is important to bear in mind since the investigation of nation-building must pay attention to increasing internationalisation on the one hand and new forms of cleavages and internal differentiations on the other.

The evidence of internal othering also confirms the idea that the symbolic coherence of the nation is always a problem: if you are excluding those included in the geopolitical entity of the nation-state, then this can counter the political purpose of the nation to maintain cohesion. In addition, it reinforces the idea that the nation is a constantly shifting and negotiated category, and the construction of national imaginary often has to rely on the
contextual and situation-specific understanding of what constitutes the national self and Other. Furthermore, as much as it constitutes a problem, we also need to see how this internal othering is socially and politically useful, helping to reproduce a unity within the nation, or allowing the marginalised discourses to challenge the hegemony of ruling ideology.

Finally, rather than a dichotomised relationship between the subject and the object, the self and the Other, as Said suggests, one must acknowledge the fact that in historical terms the two interpenetrate. Bhabha (1983) argues that the construction of otherness is permeated by ambivalence because the colonial stereotype functions in a manner analogous to that of the psychoanalytic fetish. According to Bhabha, the fetishistic nature of colonial discourse determines that the construction of otherness takes the form of 'multiple and contradictory belief', and is based on the tension between the 'recognition of difference and the disavowal of it'. 'The conflict of pleasure/displeasure, mastery/defence, knowledge/disavowal, absence/presence has a fundamental significance for colonial discourse' (Bhabha, 1983: 27).

Bhabha (1990) also argues that at the centre of orientalism there is not a single homogenising perspective but a polarity. Western representations of the Orient contain a profound ambivalence towards that otherness which is the object of both desire and fear. According to Bhabha, Said's argument demonstrates this sense of ambivalence but fails to address it theoretically, hence falling back on his notion of 'experience' and 'sceptical, critical consciousness'.

The ambivalence which Bhabha identifies in Western orientalism also describes the non-Western discourses of the Other, as the Chinese and Japanese views of each other and the West shows. Given this, it becomes apparent that the analysis of representation of the Other lies not so much in proving that the othering occurs, but in uncovering the ambiguity, ambivalence and indeterminacy that mark the othering process.

To some critics, the problems with Orientalism discussed so far come from the fact that Said's critical position features a mixture of a Western liberal humanism and a futile struggle to transcend it. Therefore although he rejects occidentalism as the alternative to orientalism, he appears to be
unable to avoid an occidentalist perspective. Clifford's criticism of Said's critical position is appropriate:

Sometimes his analysis flirts with a critique of representation as such; but the most constant position from which it attacks orientalism is a familiar set of values associated with the Western anthropological human sciences -- existential standards of "human encounter" and vague recommendations of "personal, authentic, sympathetic, humanistic knowledge" (Clifford, 1988: 261).

However, it would be unfair to suggest that Said is not aware of the intellectual dilemma of the critic. More than once, Said argues in Covering Islam (1981) that true knowledge of another culture is possible and desirable only if two conditions are met. Firstly, the critic must feel that he or she is in uncoercive contact with the culture and the people being studied; secondly, the critic must be aware that all knowledge is interpretative and interpretation is a social activity. But Said seems to believe that the problem of the critical position can be resolved with a combination of 'experience' and a 'sceptical critical consciousness' (Said, 1978: 327).

Yet these notions are considered to be problematic by his critics. Young, for instance, is not convinced that a recipe consisting of experience, critical consciousness and a belief in the possibility of achieving human understanding is enough to prevent the critic from falling into the trap of self-referentiality:

Said's difficulty is that his ethical and theoretical values are all so deeply involved in the history of the culture that he criticises, that they undermine his claims for the possibility of the individual being in a position to choose, in an uncomplicated process of separation, to be both inside and outside his or her own culture (Young, 1990: 132).

The problem of positionality becomes all the more real when critics like myself have lived the moment of crossing the borderline, in the literal and intellectual sense, and when their projects consist of deconstructing various discourses of the Other, from both the 'occidental' and 'oriental' perspectives. For this reason, I find Bhabha's notion of ambivalence particularly helpful. The contradictions -- both inside the Western structures
of knowledge, within which I now operate, and inside myself as a migrant in the literal and intellectual sense -- need not become an obstacle; instead, they can be exploited. I believe that to exploit the notion of alterity and ambivalence for productive critical purpose, as Bhabha suggests, means three things. First, as a critic it is of paramount importance to identify, wherever and whenever possible, the moments of 'discomfiture' and places of 'dislocation' in the cross-cultural representations.

Secondly, it is important for a critic like myself to constantly articulate the feelings of displacement and alienation whenever they occur in the process of criticism. Born and brought up in China and speaking Mandarin until I turned 25, I found myself having to think in English in order to participate in the Media Studies and Cultural Studies discourses after I came to Australia. I realised that neither my mother tongue nor the daily English I had learned from textbooks in China prepared me for this challenge. As a result of learning a considerably new cultural vocabulary in order to survive as an academic here, I have unlearned many of my Chinese ways of understanding and expressing ideas. This put me in a sometimes frustrating, sometimes enriching, dilemma of not being able to speak as a 'native' Chinese, nor as an Australian. During my research tour to Beijing at the end of 1994 -- the first time I returned to China after five years -- I realised with extreme poignancy that my position would perhaps be forever betwixt and between: I had not only lost some of my Chinese cultural vocabulary, I also caught myself looking at China with Western anthropological eyes. In other words, I found myself caught between different axes -- a specific Chineseness and a specific Australianness, an everyday and an academic discourse. Indeed, as Ang (1993) observes, the diasporic imagination is steeped in continuous ambivalence, and the ambivalence and indeterminacy highlight the fundamental precariousness of diasporic identity construction.

Thirdly, but not least importantly, a critic's self-reflexivity entails the recognition of desire -- the investigator's subjectivities. The need to acknowledge desire is of particular relevance to critics born and bred in non-Western countries yet operating in the Western intellectual ambience, for they may constantly experience difficulties arising from their own conflicting language and analytical positions. On the one hand, analysts need to be able to refuse simple identification with any pre-given social-cultural categories; but on the other hand, he/she need to pay enough
attention to local positioning, especially while reading the utterances from marginal or peripheral discourses.
Chapter 2

Nation, Other and the Construction of Japan: A Juxtaposition of Australian and Chinese Narratives

The discussion of orientalism and occidentalism suggests that the representation of the Other has more to do with the self than a 'real' Other, and that it responds to certain cultural, professional, political and economic requirements of the epoch. Chinese and Australian representations of Japan are not only determined by their respective historical, political and economic relationships with Japan but, more importantly, by the use that can be made of 'Japan' in internal othering processes in China and Australia. Given these, a study of the representation of the Other must start with an examination of what constitutes the 'nation' in a given space and at a specific time. Such an examination is likely to be more revealing when we juxtapose the narratives of the nation in two culturally and historically different countries, as Hamilton (1990) rightly observes:

[I]f images which construct various National Imaginaries are in commodified circulation both internally and externally, we are still obliged to ask whether all of these images possess the same status and empirical validity. While we can perhaps accept that 'evidence' can be found in 'real' products such as books, poetry, newspapers, stories, and immobile visuals (like paintings and sculpture), as well as new mass forms such as radio, television and film, we must ask whether the images produced and reproduced in these media are the same for all 'nations' (Hamilton, 1990: 17).

This chapter will discuss the contents of national imaginaries in Australian and Chinese narratives by considering some contemporary texts which are concerned with the discourses of nationalism and otherness. The review provided here is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of the issue of nationhood and otherness. The selection has three aims: first, to look at the fluidity and malleability of the nation, and the deployment of discursive strategies in the reproduction of national identity both in the Chinese and Australian discourses; secondly, to consider the process of othering which invariably occurs in these constructions of national identity; and thirdly, to consider the effect of these processes on the constructions of Japan as the particular Other in Chinese and Australian contexts.
The juxtaposition of Australian and Chinese narratives shows that there are some remarkable differences in the Australian and Chinese discourses of national identity. China is a big country with a long history, whereas Australia is a country with a small population and 'short' history. This determines that Chinese discourses of national identity have a more available repository of established images, symbols, myths and rituals than Australian ones.

However, the discussion also points to the fluidity and malleability of nation and its need to reproduce itself in both Australian and Chinese narratives. It suggests the dynamic process by which the reinvention of the national self implicates the reinvention of the national Other. It demonstrates that this process is characterised by heterogeneity, ambivalence, and contradiction, and that the imagining of the self and Other is mutually reflexive, sometimes ambiguous, and always complex.

Nationalism, Modernity and Otherness -- A Chinese Example

In a series of investigations, Duara (1988, 1992, 1993) studies constructions of Chinese nationhood as rhetoric. Challenging the universal relevance of Anderson's view of the importance of print capitalism in enabling the imagining of a common destiny, Duara argues that in the Chinese case it is imperative to study the complex relationships between the written and spoken word and the myths and folk memories which embody a people's relation to the land. It is the agrarian, family-centred nature of Chinese society which produces the master metaphor of the Chinese nation as the family. The emphasis on the collective consciousness and identity is reinforced, he argues, through linguistic mechanisms. The absence of exact Chinese equivalents for English terms such as 'privacy' or 'identity' attests to the denial of individual categories. The Chinese word for country, guo jia (country family), encapsulates the close relation between the notion of country and family.

As elsewhere, human aspects are crucial to the formation of the Chinese nation. Nations are often compared to the body of individuals, hence expressions such as the 'giant standing upright in the East'. The relationship between individuals and the nation is often depicted as the relationship
between a parent and a child, hence words like 'motherland' (Zu Guo). The relations between nations are often compared to the relations between individuals and take on an affective dimension.

Duara endorses Anderson's argument that nationalism goes through constant imaginings, and it is through this process that the relationship between the self and Other is constantly defined and redefined. In the Chinese case, this changing process involves what Duara calls the softening and the hardening of the boundary: 'Boundaries between communities exist along a spectrum between hard and soft poles and are always in flux' (Duara, 1993: 21). When a master narrative is used to define and mobilise a community, it usually does so by privileging certain elements such as language, religion or historical experience as the constitutive principle of the community. The hardening of the boundaries that occurs in such a context serves to constantly redefine who is 'us' and who is 'them'.

The reconstruction of Chineseness also resorts to evoking the established images, symbols, and myth about the origin and history of the nation. For instance, the Chinese authorities in the late 1970s and early 1980s were still paranoid about the cultural influence from Taiwan and Hong Kong; however, they were quick to exploit the nationalist sentiments expressed by Taiwan singer Hou Dejian in his song 'Descendants of the Dragon':

In the ancient East there is a dragon
its name is called China.
in the ancient East there is a river,
its name is called Yangtze.

For many years and many generations
we have been the descendants of the dragon.
Yellow skin, black eyes and black hair,
we are all descendants of the dragon.

Equally popular in the early 1980s in China was the Hong Kong popular singer Zhang Minmin, whose 'My Chinese Heart' won the hearts of the Chinese population as well as the official praise of mainland Chinese authorities:
This blood flowing through my heart
echoes the sound of the great China
no matter where I am
my heart is always Chinese.

The Yellow River, the Yellow Mountain,
the Yangtse River, the Great Wall,
no matter where I go,
they are always held dear to me.

Hou and Zhang's songs also deploy the important strategy of redefining 'Chineseness' according to the notion of the 'descendant of the Yellow Emperor' (yan huang zi sun). Within this formula, Chineseness is a matter of biological descent. According to this notion, a Confucian scholar or socialist cadre, a Hunanese peasant or Hong Kong entrepreneur, will always be Chinese by virtue of blood. Such a formula has already gained considerable political currency in China, where the modernisation project needs to exploit the human and economic resources in the Chinese diaspora. Indeed, as Dikotter (1994) points out, myths of origins, ideologies of blood, conceptions of racial hierarchy and narratives of biological descent have formed a central part of the cultural construction of identity in China. In fact, Dikotter argues, in an era of economic globalisation and political depolarisation, racial identities and racial discrimination have increased in East Asia.

Duara's theory of the soft and hard boundaries helps to explain the changes and continuities in Chinese narratives of its Other. For instance, the primordial sentiment of China as the Middle Kingdom (zhong quo) justifies China's description of any people other than the Han population, which constitutes 94 percent of the Chinese population, as barbarians. Sun Longji (1992) argues that the Chinese tend to see the world as a circle, with themselves occupying the centre. Such a notion has enabled it to deal with the rest of the world largely in hierarchical terms, defining the peoples furthest away from the centre as the least worthy of respect. Hence, although terms such as gui (devils) and fei (bandits) -- used to refer to non-Han ethnic minorities -- have disappeared from official discourses, the fact that they are still in use in colloquial Chinese attests to the endurance of such a chauvinistic mentality (1992: 341). Until recently, and with only a few
exceptions, Westerners appear in the film representations either as backdrops to enhance the poshness or the decadence of places where the snobbish and sleazy Chinese would like to congregate.

Such a traditional Sino-centric perception of the Chinese identity and the world order constitutes the mythos about China's national identity prevalent in 1949-1979, from the establishment of the People's Republic to the end of Mao's era. China was depicted as a great nation which had created a splendid ancient culture and was once in the forefront of world civilisation. It was only because of the evil behaviours of the 'feudal' class and the ideology of Confucianism that China remained stagnant at a certain point in its development. In modern times, the invasion of the foreign imperialists left China further impoverished and on the verge of destruction. It was the proletariat and its party that saved China from this predicament and led it towards a bright future.

This sino-centric view of China was also the cultural basis for the 'official occidentalism' which found its best expression in Mao's theory of the 'Three Worlds'. According to Mao, China was the leader of the 'Third World' countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggle against the 'oppression', 'exploitation', and possible invasions of imperialists headed by the United States. Such a geopolitical configuration allowed Mao to build a nationalism that effected the internal suppression of dissenting discourses inside China. In other words, an external Other -- the American imperialists -- became useful in Mao's oppression of those who constituted 'bourgeois' or 'anti-revolutionary' forces in China.

However, with the normalisation of the relation between China and USA in 1972 and the rapid industrialisation of other East Asian nations in that decade, a different image of the outside world began to infiltrate the minds of the Chinese people. The adoption of the open-door policy and economic reform towards the end of the 1970s resulted in a remarkably altered perception of China's place in the world. China was backward, its living standards low, and its science and technology undeveloped. The collapse of the old perception led to a search for a new cultural identity in the 1980s. This sense of crisis was embodied in the statement of Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese premier, who said that if China failed to seize the opportunity to modernise itself through the new industrial revolution, its right to be a
nation on the earth would be terminated (He, 1995).

The perception of China as an underdeveloped, backward country is prevalent among intellectuals, officials and urban residents in the 1980s and 1990s. Conversely, the West is perceived by the Chinese consumers as permanently affluent and advanced. Jian Wang's (1996) analysis of the foreign advertisements in the Chinese press of the 1980s and 1990s finds that one of the expedient advertising strategies used to gratify Chinese consumers' desire for Western modernity is the use of Caucasian models in the advertisements. Wang observes that, for similar reasons, Western advertisements exoticise people of colour, the Caucasian models in Chinese advertisements are equally commodified as the Chinese people's exotic Other. The difference, however, is that the Third World Other is more likely to be impoverished but romanticised, while the Western Other is clearly associated with modernity, high-living standards and style.

He (1995) argues that this perception of the self as inferior to the West marked the collapse of the mythology of the strength of socialism and created the need for a new version of national history. For example, *Heshang* (River Elegy), a television series made by intellectual dissidents in the 1980s, was read as a 'self-conscious cultural critique', characterised by a kind of 'auto-orientalism' (Anagnost, 1993: 65). Cultural critiques such as *Heshang* demonstrate an awareness that the inherited culture of the Chinese nation did not provide the necessary adaptive leverage to enable China to achieve progress and modernity; they also demonstrate an ambivalence towards, even a disavowal of, China's cultural legacy.

From the perspective of Chinese authorities, China's problem was not so much an identity crisis as an 'authority crisis'. Pye (1993) argues that the urgency of the question of Chinese nationalism can be explained by the erosion of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thoughts as the basis of state legitimacy in China: 'The expectation is that nationalism will have to fill the void created by the crisis of confidence and by the collapse of the myth of socialism as magic' (Pye, 1993: 107).

However, Pye also argues that in spite of the greatness of Chinese culture, China is in fact a civilisation pretending to be a nation-state. Nationalism, Pye argues, involves only those sentiments and attitudes basic to
orientations toward the nation-state, but the Chinese nation is a relatively recent one that made the transition from empire to nation only around the beginning of the twentieth century. Because of this, Pye argues, efforts to achieve modernisation have left China with a relatively inchoate and incoherent form of nationalism. Both historically and in contemporary times, the tension between the desire to modernise by adopting Western science and technology, and the desire to maintain essential Chinese values has been consistent and institutionalised (Pye, 1993).

Such a tension explains the contradiction in Deng's post-Mao economic policy, which aims to experiment with Western economy without introducing Western social and ideological systems. In other words, while the Dengist reformers used the positive images of Western science and technology as a political weapon against the Maoist conservatives who resisted economic reforms, they were also quick to denounce the intellectuals and students who demanded political reforms and Western style democracy. The image of the West, as embodied in the Statue of Liberty erected by hunger-striking students in Tiananmen in 1989, was denounced and rejected. Once again, the content of the 'West' proved to be malleable.

Equally malleable is the content of the national self. In comparison with the middle-kingdom mentality, the neo-Confucian view of a cultural China suggests a China that is superior, but not racially exclusive. In other words, through education and imitation, barbarians can acquire Chinese culture and become part of the community and hence distinguish themselves from others who do not share similar values. The culturalist notion of China has at times been useful to the dominant ideologies in Chinese history, and some writers observe that the economic ascent of many Confucian states, such as Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and, most importantly, Japan, is increasingly empowering Confucianism as a nationalist discourse. In the same way as the traditional Chinese mother may secure her position by giving birth to a high-achieving son, China may find the prosperity of its past vassal states to be celebratory of its cultural strength. The looming vision of the 'Greater China', which describes the activities in, and interactions between mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese becomes potentially more powerful with the possible diminishing power of communism as the state ideology in China, and China's further integration with the global economy in the twenty-first
century.

The process of softening and hardening boundaries is often facilitated by metaphor. For the Chinese, the master metaphor of the nation as family relies on the metonym of the body of woman to represent the purity of the nation. Such rhetorical structures, however, are open to inflections and improvisation. Duara (1993:16) identifies, for instance, the trope of the nation as the raped woman in anti-imperialist discourse. Words such as rou lin (ravage, trample), which frequently appear in historical and literary texts to describe the action of the Eight Western Alliances in China at the beginning of the century, as well as the action of the Japanese in China during World War II, have an explicitly sexual connotation.

The openness of language also enables the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to exploit what Pye describes as the 'contentless and incoherent' nature of Chinese nationalism. In its socialist ideology, the discourse of maternity is evoked to promote an official version of patriotism. As maternity is associated with the 'natural' and unquestionable, the mother as a figure of identification is appropriated to elicit an unconditional allegiance to the Party. A cliched, yet highly illustrative Chinese song, for instance, starts with 'I sing a folk song to the Party and I compare the Party to my mother'. This Party-nation-mother equation is evoked in the official rhetoric of the nation as a mother welcoming the return of her expatriates with open arms. Contemporary writer Bai Hua's Unrequited Love (1980) challenges official rhetoric with his protagonist returning to the motherland only to be suspected and condemned for his Western lifestyle overseas. Out of desperation, the hero of the novel cries out: 'I love my motherland, but does she love me?' The fact that the novel was quickly denounced and officially banned adequately shows the tyranny of 'mother'.

This Party-nation-mother rhetoric is taken up in the discourse of modernisation and economic reform, which has operated as a hegemonically powerful element in the Party's legitimacy, particularly in the post-Tiananmen era. Goodman and Segal (1995) suggest that the CCP's legitimacy was under serious threat and nothing but economic growth and reform could restore its fortunes. In this sense, the discourse of modernisation becomes strategically important for the Party to gain acceptance by the population. By emphasising the necessity of raising the
living standards of the Chinese people, the discourse of modernisation suffuses everyday life and pervades the personal histories and the hopes for the future of the ordinary people, thus deflecting direct criticism of the system itself.

The discourse of modernisation in China necessarily involves a reinvention of nationalist rhetoric in the media. An article by Sun Xupei, the editor-in-chief of *Journalism Research Materials*, an academic journal from the Institute of Journalism, China Academy of Social Sciences, embodies such rhetoric. Entitled 'The function and the operation of the Chinese news media in the ten years of the new era', the article is a mixture of Sinocentrism, Confucian culturalism, and socialist state ideology.

During the ten years of Cultural Revolution, the nationalist discourse was replaced by the discourse of class struggle. In the new era of reform, however, we have realised that patriotism has a long tradition and is deeply rooted in the popular consciousness and social psyche. For this reason, we have made the concept of patriotism an effective ideological tenet. We have made patriotism a basic strategy in the practice of news reporting, since it is acceptable to a broad spectrum of communities, The slogan 'Descendants of the Yellow River, unite and rejuvenate China' has gained acceptance by both Party members and Christians (Sun, 1992: 3).

Such a conscious deployment of nationalist discourse in the media is a natural strategic reaction to the shifting of the boundary which separates 'us' and 'them'. The institutionalised tension between modernisation and nationalism in China, as Pye points out, determines that this strategy will continue to be deployed in the future. This certainty is encapsulated in the article by Sun Dasheng, from the Information Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of Propaganda:

With the deepening of the economic reform, various voices from overseas come in through different channels. An important means of enemy forces is to resort to the strategy of 'peaceful transformation' for subversion and agitation. For this reason, it becomes all the more important to ensure that the media is on the right track in directing public opinion (Sun, 1992: 4).
The ongoing modernisation project ensures that such conflict and contestation will continue, particularly in the attempt to exploit nationalism as an important tenet of state ideology. If nationalism has sought two things, independence and national unity, it is largely in the service of the latter that the Chinese media resorts to the nationalist discourse. Such a complex and dynamic scenario determines that the media will continue to be an important discursive site where a certain kind of knowledge is propagated and contested as a means to constantly define and redefine the boundary between 'us' and 'them'.

However, as Hall points out, the discourse of national identity is always ambiguously placed between past and future. 'It straddles the temptation to return to former glories and the desire to go forward ever deeper into modernity' (Hall, 1992: 283). This temptation and desire may explain why Japan is privileged in the official nationalist discourse as a possible model for modernisation. Japan is considered as living proof of the past glory of Chinese civilisation, the glory to which China wishes to return. More importantly, it is regarded as an intermediary between China and the West -- a solution for China's future progress and modernity without introducing Western cultural and ideological values. However, although Japan may be an answer to China's modernisation project, it is also problematic for nationalist discourses since, historically, Japan, more than any Western nation, subjected China to national humiliation, suffering and loss, and wartime images of the Japanese have become an integral part of the Chinese collective memory. That is why looking at how Japan is constructed in the Chinese narratives provides important clues to how China sees itself as a nation.

In Chinese official representations of Sino-Japanese relations, particularly in the late 1970s and 1980s, the cultural affinity, historical experience, religious interaction and geographical proximity between China and Japan were ritualistically highlighted. Central to these representations is the strategic use of orientalist images of Japan and China to emphasise the sameness between the two nations. The historical othering of Japan as invader, rapist, bestial animal is played down. In this sense, what has occurred is both the softening and hardening of boundaries. While differences between China and Japan are de-emphasised or erased in an attempt to accept Japan as culturally one
of 'us', differences between the Confucian states and the West are emphasised.

The fluid nature of the boundary which separates the self from Other in the Chinese context ensures that the narrative structures which contribute to the softening or the hardening of boundaries, are subject to constant strategic appropriations. Central to these strategic appropriations is the process Befu (1993: 4) refers to as the 'selective remembering and partial forgetting' of the nation's historical and cultural legacy. The discourse of modernity, with Japan as a role model, has to address the ambivalence and volatility which characterise the dominant sentiments about Japan among the Chinese.

For instance, during the Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945, to be nationalistic meant to be anti-Japanese, whereas today, to be patriotic means to accept the Party's policy and the post-1978 discourse on Japan. The words used in the past to describe Japan, such as wokou (Japanese pirate invaders) during the Sino-Japanese War at the turn of the century, and riben guizi (Japanese devils) which came into use during World War II, suggest a nation under external threat. Superimposed on this historically generated phraseology, which has yet to lose its currency, are the contemporary official incantations about Japan as a cultural cousin. In this discourse, Japan's interaction with China 'flows from the remote past' (yuan yuan liu chang) and Japan is depicted as a close neighbour 'separated only by a strip of water' (yi yi dai shui). These representations point to a state ideology which is more outward- and forward-looking, yet still paranoid about the Western threat to Chinese values. The complicity between these contemporary representations of Japan and Japanese Nihonjinron is clear, for they both depict Japan as a Confucian state which has succeeded in absorbing technology while maintaining its cultural essence.

The Chinese audience's identification with the heroine in the Japanese NHK TV series Oshin exemplifies the softening of the self/Other boundary. The 297-episode story of the wartime struggle of Oshin, an ordinary, hard-working, kind-hearted Japanese woman, was screened on Chinese television in prime time for several consecutive months in 1985. In spite of the fact that Oshin was represented as sympathetic to the Japanese soldiers, the Chinese audience were deeply touched by Oshin's stories. They read the story of Oshin's life as a celebration of Confucian values, and saw her as
having admirable qualities that led to the economic ascendancy of Japan.

However, the relatively sanitised, sometimes exoticised images of Japan in Chinese official representations began to be seriously challenged in the 1990s, when the rapidly emerging commercial press increasingly provided alternative national images. Another interleaving discourse of Japan emerged, consisting of revived images of Japan as a rapist, a war criminal of bestial cruelty, and more recently formed images of the Japanese as cold economic animals and unrepentant militarists.

This is not to suggest, however, that the official representations of Japan remain static and monolithic. On the contrary, they, as Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 will suggest, have effectively and actively deployed various forms of Japanese otherness to accord with the priorities of the political agenda of the time. This is most clearly demonstrated in the People's Daily's commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the victory of the anti-Japanese War whereby, among threats of Taiwan's separatist movement, a collective memory of Japan as an historical enemy was mobilised to produce a sense of national pride and humiliation in order to unite the mainland Chinese, Taiwanese and the people of Hong Kong.

**Self, Other and National Imaginary -- An Australian Example**

If, as Said argues, orientalism became, from the eighteenth century onwards, a sort of 'common currency' for the powers, there is little doubt that this conceptual framework has deeply affected the way in which Australia's geopolitical position has been defined. As an English-speaking outpost of European civilisation in the Pacific, Australia has had the institutional structures and discourses to speak authoritatively both about and on behalf of the Orient.

Since what Said calls orientalism has played a significant role in shaping Australian attitudes and perceptions of Asia, Said's analysis has exerted a significant influence on recent Australian scholarly thinking about national identity and Australia's relation to Asia. However, as important and productive as it is, his original formulation offers no enabling framework to explain the Orient's resistance to its circulation or the deployment of counter-discourse, as Said himself acknowledges in his later work (1993).
Nor is it adequate to address the interpenetration of national images between Australia and its Other. Most importantly, it does not account for the contradictions and ambiguity which characterise the deployment of images, rituals, and myths of origins in the narratives of Australian identity.

For instance, as Turner (1994) observes, in spite of the popular conceptions of Australians as nationalistic, there are few formal occasions on which Australians ritually express their patriotism. The few occasions that do exist, including Anzac Day, Australia Day, and centenary celebrations, are fraught with ambiguity. Even the celebration of Christmas has a forced quality, due to its awkwardness geographically and seasonally. This sense of ambiguity consequently manifests itself in discourses of national identity:

... European Australians have been uncertain about, and slow to develop, 'indigenous' national rituals. Where we have developed such rituals, they tend to be marked -- perhaps even made possible -- by their contradictory nature. It is as if the existence of some ambiguity is a precondition so that the ritual may be observed without undue embarrassment (Turner, 1994: 68).

Popular myths about the origin of Australia as a nation are also ridden with ambiguity. For instance, Paula Hamilton (1993) notes that the most powerful myth in the Australian historical landscape is that this is a new country with a short history. The history consists of settlers' stories, told to each other by several generations of English and European migrants. However, according to Hamilton, such narratives of migrant experience as a dominant part of discourse of Australian identity tend to erase or attenuate the memories of invasion and decimation of Aboriginal peoples.

Although European Australians have fewer ritual occasions and no ready repository of legends and myths about the birth and origin of the nation, they have to some extent appropriated Aboriginal history in the nation-building project. Mercer's (1992) criticism of the celebration of the Australia's Bicentenary in 1988 notes the use of the image of the ancient land and immemorial time in attempts to 'graft' indigenous cultures tactically onto the more precise and historically recorded time scale of nation-building.

The orientalist framework in Said's formulation is also inadequate in
considering the logic behind Australia's narrow self-representation to foreigners. Turner (1994), for example, notes the deployment of 'self-othering' strategies in Australian narratives of national identity, particularly those used in the tourism industry. 'Rather than challenging or complicating foreign understandings of Australian cultural identities, the unlikely national project of tourism is recycling them' (Turner, 1994: 117). Such images, replayed through the media, eventually recirculate back home and further shape Australians' vision of Australianness. Consequently, Turner argues, Australia commits itself to a national image which inhibits the movement towards a pluralistic definition of the nation.

In his study of Australian nationalism, White (1981) argues that a national identity is an invention, an intellectual construct. Because of this, the issue at stake when we look at constructions of nationhood is not simply whether certain constructions are truer than others, but what their functions are, whose creations they are, and whose interests they serve. To do this, White directs our attention to the forces that are important in the making of national identity. He analyses three kinds of influence: first, a whole array of modern ideas about science, nature, race, society and nationality; second, the role of the intelligentsia, including writers, artists, journalists, historians and critics; and lastly, groups in society that wield economic power.

Writing almost a decade after White's *Inventing Australia*, Hamilton (1990) argues for the importance of looking at the processes by which narrative devices create and maintain a reservoir of public images regarding the Land, the Aboriginals or the Asians that have largely constituted Australia's national Other. Just as the land is feminised in Chinese discourse, a similar metaphor -- the land as the body of a woman -- can also be found in Australian representations of national identity, albeit with varied metonymic affiliations. While the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial discourse in China evokes the purity of the body of woman, the early nationalist discourse in Australia portrays the land as infertile and hostile. Such discourse reveals man as the speaking subject confronting the land as the alien Other and attempting to define himself through his attempts to understand and conquer the land. Kay Schaffer (1987) points out that because man, as the agent of history, confronted raw nature as the vast and empty Other, the land has been made to take on the attributes of the object of masculine desire. This desire, argues Schaffer, became a generative force in
the narratives of pioneering and settlement. However, when the land proved to be hostile, deceitful and unproductive rather than nurturing, it was compared to a *femme fatale* and acquired a dimension of danger.

Schaffer also traces change and continuity in representations of landscape over time and finds that in the colonial period of Australia's history the dominant group whose interests would help define the image of Australian landscape was British. Hence, representations of the land as the object of desire often pose the Empire as culture -- the male master against the land as nature -- the feminine mistress. This was to change by the late nineteenth century, when the colony took on a cultural and political identity as a new society. The land as an object of desire and fear had a new master: in Schaffer's words, 'the matey, egalitarian native son of the democratic nationalist tradition' of Australia. However, although the old British authority was supplanted by a new Australian order, the idea of the land as a desired object answerable to a male need remained constant (Schaffer, 1987: 57).

Turner (1993) also identifies an ambivalence in Australian fictions about the land: a sense of isolation, madness and death is counterpoised to a sense of spirituality. His study of nationalism in films argues that they represent the land as tough, dangerous but beautiful, and that they validate a nationalist myth of accommodation and acceptance. Such a myth admits the impossibility of conquering the land and therefore recommends a manner of survival by living in partnership with it. The 'man' in films such as the *Man from the Snowy River*, Turner argues, is not the toughest one, but the tough but flexible one who can accept and live with the priorities of the land. The land, in this sense, appears in a transmuted form as a woman, on whom the Australian (man) strategically works his will.

Another perspective on Australian identity can be gained by tracing the shift of Australia's geopolitical allegiances over the last century and examining how the boundaries between a national 'us' and 'them' are negotiated and redefined. Colonial Australians considered themselves the loyal subjects of the British Empire and regarded Britain as 'home'. By the late nineteenth century, however, Australia was developing a political and cultural identity distinct from that of Britain. The 1890s saw a version of Australian nationalism which was anti-British and anti-authority and which embraced
mateship and egalitarianism (White, 1981; Alomes, 1988).

Acutely conscious of its Anglo-Saxon origins, fearful of Asia yet painfully aware of the decline of British imperial power, Australia by the 1950s was looking to the US for geopolitical associations. White writes of Australians being eager to follow in the footsteps of America in the process of building a new, modern and democratic nation (1981: 62). Journalist John Pilger (1989: 75) remembers his teenage days when he and his friends hoped that Australia could become 'the Fifty-First State' and that Australians would become 'honorary Americans' so that Australians could shed their country's dullness and insignificance.

Australia's shift in its geopolitical allegiances over the first half of the twentieth century is a shift in self-perception from that of an outpost of an old society to that of a new society. The shift of geopolitical allegiance from Britain to the United States was part of a defining of a sense of Australianness, at least by defining a difference and a separation from Englishness. More recently, white Australians have been forced to rethink their sense of nation and identity in relation to the Aboriginal peoples of Australia. Central to the understanding of Australian representations of Aboriginal people is what Hodge and Mishra (1990) call the discursive regime of Aboriginalism. This discourse of Aboriginalism functions in a similar manner to orientalism, although Said's orientalism ostensibly leaves out internal othering processes such as this. One of the underlying assumptions of this discourse is, as Said points out, the claim that the Other cannot represent itself, it must be represented by others. Within the discursive regime of Aboriginalism, the Aboriginal peoples' own voices are either suppressed or appropriated to validate the foundation myth and legitimate their dispossession of the land. Hodge and Mishra's close readings of early settlers' writings on Aboriginal people reveal an eroticising process, by which Aboriginal people were portrayed as objects of desire (Hodge and Mishra, 1990: 33).

Moore and Muecke's (1984) study of the representation of Aboriginality on the Australian screen identifies two dominant discourses of Aboriginalism. One is what they describe as the assimilationist formation, which portrays Aboriginal people as 'nature', foil or background. They are represented as non-adult, non-human, and genetically responsible for their own poor
situation. The other discourse is more enlightened in its multiculturalist formulation, replacing the notion of 'race' with that of 'culture'. However, Moore and Muecke argue that a certain 'positivisation' of Aboriginal culture occurs in this discourse. This positive process of recognition allows acceptance of Aboriginal art, dance and language, but screens out what are seen as 'undesirable social habits' associated with Aboriginal realities.

Writing ten years later, Muecke sees the issue more in terms of intervention than representations:

Aboriginal otherness is becoming increasingly central to debates about cultural identity in a country redefining its nationality with the Mabo-republicanism agenda. In fact this centralisation may imply a merging of that familiar opposition self/other (Muecke, 1994: 249).

Such a shift, argues Muecke, is inevitable as Australian identity is increasingly marked with 'in-betweenness' and 'becoming'. The 'merging of that familiar opposition self/other', which Muecke encapsulates in his work, also applies to Asians and Asia in Australian narratives, although they seem to be less developed. Bronoiwski's account of Australian landscape painters' attitudes to the Orient reveals much about Australia's gendered view of itself and the Orient. Arthur Streeton, she notes, for instance, warned Tom Roberts that the Orient was 'enervating, feminine, passive, a seductive place where masculinity might go limp' and therefore the Orient was to be resisted and dominated (Bronoiwski, 1992: 5).

Australians were not the first nor the only ones to perceive the East-West difference in gender terms. It had been a theme of European orientalism for centuries. Helen Tiffin's (1984) study of the representations of Asia in contemporary Australian fiction reveals an exotising and eroticising process. Such textual deconstruction also shows that popular media texts' representations of Asia, such as in the ABC TV drama Embassy, involve a combination of fear and desire expressed through the exotic, the erotic and a lingering colonialism (Mitchell, 1993).

Hamilton (1990) details the content of this combination of fear and desire in her study of representations of Asians and Aborigines in the construction of the Australian national imaginary, and reveals a process by which
Australians have searched for certain forms of otherness to incorporate into the national self. According to Hamilton, Australia's post-war attitude towards Asia assumed a number of contradictory and ambiguous forms. On one hand, Asians are to be feared, with the memories of the bombing of Darwin in 1942, and the POW experiences, coupled with the dread of invasion by the Asian hordes; on the other hand, Hamilton argues, Asia has a 'seduction effect' on Australians, both for those seeking a new kind of transcendental experience which materialist society at home could not offer, and for those succumbing to the lure of feminine, docile and childlike Asian woman.

According to Bronioiwski, throughout the 1960s and 1970s at least fifty Australian novels set in Asia and the Pacific region were written as a result of more contact with Asia, growing trade and migration, more media exposure, the end of the Vietnam War, and British withdrawal from Suez. These Australian writers, observes Bronioiwski, shared a sense that Asia was their new world where Australians could stop cringing or snarling at the West (1992: 176).

Australian constructions of Japan deserve specific and separate scrutiny in the Australian discourse of national identity. Within the Australian national imaginary, Japan occupies a unique position because of its post-war success with modernisation and its growing trade and economic interaction with Australia. With the increasing presence of Japanese business and tourism in Australia, Japan has become a point of reference, from which Australians reflect upon their identity and Australianness. It also articulates Australia's ambivalence towards modernity: on the one hand, Australians want to achieve the high-tech, economic power of Japan; on the other hand, they are anxious about the undesirable consequences of modernity as indicated in negative stories, including Japanese youth suicides, lack of leisure time and housing shortages.

The war memories of Japan are also significant because they serve to legitimate a more recent anxiety about the threat of Japanese corporations. According to Morley and Robins (1992) some Japan-bashers fall back on the image and rhetoric of wartime Japan in their attempts to understand Japan's economic strategy. The use of Pearl Harbour as a point of reference evokes the image of oriental conformity, stealth and ruthless dedication, thus
suggesting that Japan wins but it does not play by the rules (Morley and Robins, 1992: 151).

*Australia and the Asian Game* (1994) by Michael Byrnes, can be read as an example of this kind of narrative. Byrnes is one of Australia’s longest-serving correspondents in Asia and has written extensively on Japan for the *Australian Financial Review*. In his book, he details Australian business and trade interactions with Japan. His account is based on the assumption that Australia gets a raw deal in its trade with Asia because it does not understand Asian ways of thinking. Byrnes says that Australia still does not understand Japan after forty years of dealing with it. He compares the cultural differences to an alligator swamp that Australians need to traverse in order to reach the Asian treasure trove. According to Byrnes, the Japanese use the psychological game of control to their economic advantage in their dealings with Australians, and Australians very often lose the game because they do not know when the game starts or, in some cases, do not realise there is a game at all.

If, as Hamilton (1990) argues, fear and desire characterise the Australian national imaginary of its Other, then the fear of Japan derives not so much from the worry of ‘going limp’ when confronted with the supine femininity of the Orient, but from the anxiety of having one’s masculinity challenged. Australia’s dependence on trade with Japan clearly indicates that Japan has not only acquired Western modernity and is claiming its franchise, but also that it threatens to transcend Western modernity in the future. Such fear and anxiety constitute a form of ‘techno-orientalism’ (Morley and Robins, 1992: 151), a trope of orientalism that has particular application in contemporary representations of Japan. The neo-nationalist sentiments identified in the debates surrounding the MFP are specific manifestations of this (Sugimoto and Mouer: 1990).

Japan’s economic power and its multi-faceted interactions with Australia mean that Australians are increasingly aware of Japan’s othering of Australians. Mouer observes that, as a dominant international actor, and economic victor, Japan is now in a position to impose its judgement on Australia’s self-understanding. Since, according to Mouer, assessments of the differences and similarities between Australians and Japanese are made increasingly on Japanese terms, the national priorities and national identity
of Australians will be very much affected by the images the Japanese have of Australia. A telling example is that Japanese views of Australian workers as lazy and strike-prone have begun to change Australians' perceptions of how they work, and of Australian industrial relations (Mouer, 1990: 52-3).

Another implication of Japan's economic success and Australia's dependent relationship with Japan is the weakening of the Australian position as a Western power. Byrnes' (1994) account of a range of Australia-Japanese coal, iron and steel mill negotiations strongly points to the ineffectiveness of the Australian emphasis on individualism, egalitarianism and rationality. Australians are outsmarted by their Asian counterparts in various business deals because winning, according to Byrnes, lies in the use of psychology rather than law. Byrnes suggests that Japan's ability to elide Australia's logical approach renders the latter's Western tools 'sterile'. Here, Byrnes still maintains the familiar association of Japan, its inscrutability and irrationality; however, the power relation implicated in this traditional association is fundamentally reversed. Power is no longer necessarily associated with rationality and logic; on the contrary, it may be associated with a refusal to engage on these terms.

Furthermore, the growing Japanese economic power and its interactions with the West result in a desire to incorporate certain forms of Japanese-ness into the national self. This is evidenced in a trend of 'learning from Japan' which was prevalent in early 1980s in countries like the US, UK and Australia. These 'soul-searching', self-othering narratives from the West nevertheless spring from the Japanese perception of Westerners as being lazy, idle, and having no sense of national goals or collective identity. Ironically, these were the very perceptions that the West once entertained of their oriental Others.

* * *

It seems, from the juxtaposition of Australian and Chinese narratives of national imaginaries, that Turner's description of the difference between the 'old nations' and the 'new nations' is most appropriate to the Chinese and Australian situations. Of course, all nations are 'constructed' -- indeed, all forms of collective
identity are culturally produced. The old nations, however, have more
densely mythologised histories from which explanations or
legitimations can more implicitly emerge. The newer nations have to
undertake the process of nation formation explicitly, visibly,
defensively, and are always being caught in the act -- embarrassed in the

The difference between old nations and the new also manifests itself in the
varying degree of reflexivity with which discursive strategies are deployed.
Chinese narratives tend to resort to national images, myths and stories and
treat them as given and unproblematic in their own right, with confidence
that they produce a more or less homogenous meaning. Their Australian
counterparts, on the other hand, seem to recognise the vulnerability and the
instability of certain national images and symbols and consequently tend to
accept contradiction as a prerequisite for the construction of meaning:

New ways of thinking about the nation would necessarily involve the
acceptance of a degree of inherent contradictoriness: for instance, the
need to acknowledge cultural differences at home while presenting a
more cohesive political identity in our relations with other nation-

The application of one set of categories to 'domestic' nationalism and
another to external nationalism is a strategy deployed by both Chinese and
Australian discourses of national identity. However, while Australian
discourses at home have to accept cultural differences as an inherent part of
Australianness, cultural pluralism is less tolerable in Chinese domestic
nationalism. In fact, while loyalty to the Party is expected of all Chinese
living in China, the category of race, cultural affinity and historical
experience, rather than political allegiance, is applied to the Chinese
overseas. Australian discourses of national identity are faced with different
issues. The need to widen the inclusiveness of Australianness exists within
the nation-state, rather than coming from outside. Hence the process of
nation-building in China is one by which the us/them distinction is
constantly re-defined with a recourse to categories such as 'race', 'cultural
affinity', and 'historical experience'. Such categories enable the softening
and the hardening of cultural boundaries to occur, thereby redefining
Chineseness. The issue in nation-building in Australia, on the other hand,
is how to de-emphasise categories such as 'race', 'language' and 'historical experience' and build a discourse based on cultural hybridity at home while still presenting a common Australianness to its national Other.

Placed in the context of representing Japan, the difference of nation-building strategies translate themselves into a number of advantages and disadvantages in handling the tension between war memories and economic realities. Both Australian and Chinese narratives need to build a future-motivated discourse of a special partnership with Japan, and both need to deal with the legacy of the past by means of 'selective remembering and partial forgetting' (Befu, 1993: 5). While the emphasis on 'historical experience' and 'cultural commonality' in Chinese nation-building works towards constructing a discourse of embracing Japan, such strategic expedience is absent in Australian narratives. Conversely, the de-emphasising of 'race' as a nationalistic category in Australian nation-building and an institutionalised policy of cultural pluralism within Australia may be more conducive to accepting the racial difference of Japan.

More importantly, it is possible to form an impression at this point that there may be an important difference in the ways Japan is othered in the Australian and the Chinese imaginaries. This impression will be tested by way of a more detailed and thorough analysis in the second-half of this thesis; suffice it to say here that there seems to be an increasingly assertive and active deployment of the otherness of Japan in Chinese discourses. By contrast, Australian discourses of Japan, though entrenched in the 'occidental cosmology', are increasingly self-reflexive and self-objectifying. To put it more crudely, due to the shift of the complex and intricate power relations, China at the end of the 20th century may be in a stronger position to 'other' Japan than its Australian counterpart.
Chapter 3
News as Narrative

The discussion of various kinds of internal and external othering and their close relationships to the national imaginary suggests that the complexity of othering cannot be grasped without studying the structures and processes by which othering takes place. Given this, it is important to look at the role of media, since, as Hamilton (1990) points out:

What has come to distinguish a 'national self' from 'national others' -- in a process which, in an older form, was described as stereotyping or even racism -- emerges not from the realm of everyday concrete experience but in the circulation of collectively held images through multiple circuits of exchange typified by the print medium earlier and mass media today (Hamilton, 1990: 16).

Emphasising the complicity of media and national imaginaries brings us back to Anderson's work on nation-building. Apart from arguing that nations are imagined communities and newspapers enable such imagining to take place, Anderson also points out that communities are to be distinguished not by their falsity or genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined (Anderson, 1983:15). This observation points to the importance of studying 'nation' by way of looking at narrative forms and strategies. Drawing on this argument, Mercer identifies four dominant and contiguous categories through which the nation could be regularly imagined: namely, the peopled nation, the topographical nation, the historical nation, and the contested nation.

The newspaper form, assimilating some prior techniques of correspondence, literary commentary and early forms of advertising, provides some of the mental equipment and techniques by means of which these new coordinates could be navigated on a systematic and regular basis. As such it is a crucial device and cultural technology through which a certain sense of the national community may be inscribed. A nation can be increasingly 'imagined' which is peopled, traversed, delimited by roads and frontiers, narratable in terms of politics, business, military affairs, commodities circulation and exchange, and not in the least, petty pleasures, diversions and amusements (Mercer, 1992: 39).
An important argument put forward by Mercer is that newspapers, though 'thin' and 'insubstantial' as a commodity, are rich and substantial as cultural history. Newspapers, the 'diaries of the nation', perform the task of registering, forming and tabulating the texture of daily life in ephemeral ways, which nevertheless have enormous significance in cultural histories of nationhood. This has important implications for the textual analysis of newspaper content. Rather than regarding the content of newspapers either as ephemeral, textually insubstantial and therefore undeserving of cultural analysis or as unquestionable evidence of historical facts, Mercer argues that newspapers should be studied as a form of 'cultural technology' which enables people to imagine their collective identity in a style which distinguishes them from their Other.

For this reason, Mercer stresses the need for media criticism to look, not at the correctness of representations, but at the style, figures of speech, and the narrative devices in the representations of the Other. Said also supports this argument in his more recent work *Culture and Imperialism* (1993). Endorsing Bhabha's (1990: 292) proposal to 'consider cultural construction of nationhood as a form of social and textual affiliation', Said argues that 'nations are themselves narrations': 'The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism' (1993: xiii).

If nation should be studied as narration, and if newspapers provide devices for the nation and its Other to be narrated and imagined, then an inquiry into the news construction of national identity and otherness must start with a deconstruction of the narrative forms and strategies in news. Analysis of news, or analysis of the nation in the news, within these parameters is based on an array of assumptions regarding the nature, function and the effect of news, which may be in contrast to journalists' view of their work. It also requires an array of analytical tactics and strategies, which allow us to uncover the deployment of narrative devices in news. The discussion here of news as narrative is not a comprehensive review of narrative, nor of all the studies of news that use narrative theory. Instead, it has three specific purposes: first, to explain why narrative analysis is appropriate for this comparative study; secondly, to explicate the concepts and frameworks which are central to the narrative analysis in this work; and thirdly, to describe a means of applying narrative analysis to the study of media, identity and otherness.
Comparative study and narrative analysis

Discussing the structural qualities of news, Bird and Dardenne (1988) point out:

We tend to assume that news media in different cultures have different aims and emphases, but we are not very clear on what these might be. It will also be valuable to examine how and why the narrative genre of news has changed over time as culture changes (1988: 76).

Bird and Dardenne’s observation points to the importance of comparing news media from different cultures. Entman’s (1991) study of news frames also points to the value of comparative media studies, albeit from a different angle:

Comparing media narratives of events that could have been reported similarly helps to reveal the critical textual choices that framed the story but otherwise remain submerged in an undifferentiated text. Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably, because many of the framing devices can appear as "natural", unremarkable choices of words or images. Comparison reveals that such choices are not inevitable or unproblematic but rather are central to the way the news frame helps establish the literally "common sense" (ie. widespread) interpretations of events (Entman, 1991: 6).

Although cross-cultural studies of news form a branch of cross-cultural communication studies in general, this field has received far less attention than other areas, such as organisational communication, media policy and technology, and development communication. A survey of Gazette, an international journal devoted to mass communication studies, attests to this. Cross-cultural studies of news that do exist can be divided into two types. The first type is usually identified with the area of international communication, where researchers of one country examine news media of another country. International communication studies are implicitly comparative, although researchers do not usually analyse the media of another country in relation to their own.

As far back as 1983, Edelstein lamented that cross-cultural studies of news tend to produce data that do little more than reinforce existing assumptions: for
instance, Chinese media is less 'objective' than North American media (Edelstein, 1983). This kind of cross-cultural research tends to create the 'subject-object' dynamic, objectifying the 'other country' studied and its media. The danger of this kind of comparative research is that it not only constructs an Other from a Western speaking position, but also fixes that Other in a timeless, unchanging position.

The present study falls into a second type of cross-cultural study of news. This approach studies the news coverage of the same issues or topics by the media of two or more countries. As such juxtaposition usually requires the intimate knowledge of at least two media cultures and sometimes bi-lingual skills, it remains a fairly underdeveloped approach to the study of media. To the extent that this approach has been explored, researchers seem to favour intra-cultural comparisons -- comparing the coverage of disparate yet similar events or issues by the media of the same country (eg. Entman, 1991; Rachlan, 1988). The few existing studies which do take this particular cross-cultural approach (eg. Atwood, 1987; Kirat, 1989) fail to illustrate the symbiotic relationship between modes of story-telling and the cultures which produce them. Cross-cultural studies of media coverage of China, for example, (including some of those undertaken by Chinese scholars operating within the Western scholarly community) usually conform to the tradition of judging the Chinese media system against the criteria of a Western, democratic model (eg. Cheng, 1990; Shen, 1990).

Studies of cross-cultural news often adopt a naive assumption that the truth of the representation of one culture by another can be assessed by making reference to the former's 'reality'. This assumption may explain why many studies of cross-cultural news are concerned to uncover bias and distortion, and are optimistic about the possibility of ultimate objectivity and truth (eg. Terrell, 1989). In other cases, studies are consistently preoccupied with a dichotomy of positive and negative, or favourable and unfavourable image-building (eg. Mousa, 1987; Schutz-Brooks, 1987, and Goodman, 1990).

If comparative studies in the West more often than not lead to the objectification of the country being compared, it is because the assumptions, rules and frameworks are usually set by the West. In other words, the paradigm which is applied in many comparative studies is deeply rooted in an orientalist way of thinking. For instance, although the creation of the practices of
'objective' news is historically and culturally specific, its standards are evoked as having universal relevance. Hence, news from non-Western countries often fails to pass the 'objectivity' test because it is either 'unprofessional' or 'propagandist'.

The assumptions of 'objective' news come from what Carey (1989: 20) refers to as 'the transmission view of communication'. The central idea of such a view, according to Carey, is that communication is the transmission of signals or messages over distance. In this light, news is regarded 'as enlightening or obscuring reality, as changing or hardening attitudes, as breeding credibility or doubt'. The study of news from this perspective is usually premised on a set of dichotomies -- dichotomies between fact and fiction, information and entertainment. Within this set of dichotomies, questions of the effect of the news on the audience and of the functions of the media in society are raised and asked.

The transmission view of communication has largely relied on a conceptual distinction between objective journalism and propaganda. Under the transmission view of communication, propaganda is understood to be an aberration, a betrayal of objective news values. Studies of news based on this distinction tend to assume the structures of news stories are universally applicable, even though so-called objective reporting was born in a specific American context.

The standards of objective reporting have been challenged from outside America. Anura Goonasekera's (1992) study of the criteria of news selection in Asian countries, for example, finds that among Asian countries such as Malaysia, India, China and Korea, considerable differences exist regarding the importance and function of news. The Chinese, he argues, stress the importance of national identity in news selection. The Indians tend to prioritise the political interest of the government. The Malaysians tend to value racial, religious and cultural harmony more than anything else. The Koreans, Goonasekera implies, seem to be less concerned with political priorities than with the professional ethics of news-making. From a different angle, Donsbach and Klett's (1993) study comparing the definitions of the notion of objectivity among US, UK, Italian and German practitioners of journalism, argues that objectivity is subjective. Journalists in these four countries, they claim, differ not only in their understanding and interpretation
of the term but also in the importance they attribute to the professional value of objectivity. Hence, the ethnocentrism of the notion of objectivity becomes clear: it not only projects American notions of objectivity onto others, but also ignores the cultural and institutional means by which other peoples make claims to truth. Hackett's (1984) critique suggests that objectivity and bias ought not to be the evaluative standards against which news content is judged. On the contrary, news research should treat bias and objectivity as rhetorical devices and practical norms, and make them the object of investigation.

While the notion of objectivity has been problematised in Western media criticism, if not among media practitioners (Tuchman, 1978; Gitlin, 1981; Hackett, 1984), the assumptions associated with it are still largely at work in Western scholarship when it comes to studies of non-Western media. One obviously problematic aspect in these studies is their failure to examine the history of political language in different cultures. In the case of Chinese media, this problem can be addressed by drawing on existing studies of Chinese political culture. As early as the 1950s, after the Chinese Communist Party seized power, Li's (1958) study of Chinese Communist terminology found that among Chinese Communist publications, there were revivals of traditional expressions with new meanings attached to or forced upon them, and there were newly created terms to represent unprecedented situations or to replace older phrases for purposes of mass mobilisation (Li, 1958: i). Li's study suggests that media language in Communist China should be studied as in the context of the historical process of evolution of the Chinese language. It is hard to grasp the full meaning of present forms and strategies of political discourse without reference to the tradition of the Chinese language, just as it is difficult to understand Chinese Communism without reference to traditional Chinese society.

A study of media language as a form of political culture should also pay attention to the relationship between language and its more general cultural and social conditions. This requires researchers to move away from the news-as-information concept employed in most content analyses in media studies, and instead to consider news as myth and ritual. Michael Schoenhals's (1992) study of political language in China finds that Chinese political discourse is restricted not so much with respect to content as with respect to form. He argues that because the regulation of the formal aspects of discourse is a powerful means of control, it is more important for students of Chinese
political culture to study how formulations both prescribe and proscribe new concepts and ideas than simply to compile a list of taboo topics in Chinese political discourse (Schoenhal, 1992: 20-21).

Pye's (1978) seminal work on the communications and political culture of China also points to the importance of symbolic language used in the political context. According to Pye, the mass media in China are adept at using Aesopian language, historical allegory and code words to make their points. Pye argues that people tend to believe the power of those who can speak in riddles and decipher cryptic remarks (Pye, 1978: 228). Pye suggests that the Chinese media has been largely studied within a conceptual framework quite inappropriate to its historical and contemporary role. The unique relationship between the media and political process in China defies the conventions of the 'free', adversarial or professional press of the West. It also defies the image of the 'controlled press', of manipulation and submission. For a better understanding of Chinese media, an investigation into the close relationships between journalism and history, rhetoric, and collective memory is in order.

Another problematic aspect in the studies of Chinese media propaganda by Western scholars is that the unique context in which news and propaganda is consumed is seldom taken into consideration. Many newspapers, especially the Party papers, are subscribed to by work units instead of individuals, and they are consumed in a compulsory and collective context. A routine practice in most Chinese workplaces is reading and discussing certain issues in the papers during Friday afternoon ideological study sessions. People read newspapers -- at least the Party paper -- with a view to find out, not what is going on, but what the government wants them to know.

Stated in another way, the Chinese use media to shape opinions and values, but they also seem to assume that much of their audience knows more than is being revealed by the media. Nathan (1985: 175), in a rare survey of Chinese readers' responses to propaganda, writes of the remarkable ability of Chinese readers to read the news critically and construct their own realities accordingly. His survey finds that one third of the readers were what he calls 'decipherers': people who treat news in the official press as useful but not as truth. They see the media as official sources of information, which sometimes enables them to reach conclusions opposite to what the press accounts intended. Nathan's
findings show that the study of Chinese media should not assume that the
readership is a passive, monolithic entity.

While the notion of objectivity assumes the worthlessness of propaganda,
Chinese writers such as Li (1987) argue that propaganda is an indispensable part
of Chinese media. He makes a distinction between news values and
propaganda values. Propaganda value, according to Li, is the 'function and
ability of a fact or issue to elaborate, explain and disseminate certain points of
view of the propagator'. In other words, the effectiveness of propaganda lies in
its ability to instil facts and materials (si shi he cai liao) with propaganda value.
Li's elaboration of the relationship between facts and persuasion points to the
irrelevance of certain categories of analysis such as 'bias' and 'distortion',
which are commonly invoked in Western analyses of Chinese media within
the propaganda framework.

To criticise the Chinese media simply because it is propaganda is to imply that
there is a way of saying things without moralising. A more productive way to
study such media would be to redefine the questions and issues and focus not
on bias and distortion, which presuppose an opposing truth, but on news-
making as a cultural practice. In this sense, Chinese news is not dissimilar to its
Western counterpart: they are both produced under the restraints of literary
forms, narrative structures and linguistic strategies, and they both bear a close
relationship to the cultures that produce them.

Analysing news in the context of these constraints leads us to what Carey calls
'the ritual view of communication' (Carey, 1989: 21). From the perspective of
the ritual view of communication, the dichotomies between fact and fiction,
truth and propaganda, information and entertainment need to be undone.
Comparing the 'straight' journalistic practice of the quality papers with that of
the tabloid press, Bird (1990: 386) finds that although tabloids emphasise
entertainment and quality newspapers emphasise information, broadsheet
papers and tabloids are located along the same storytelling continuum. Bird's
argument is as applicable to what is referred to as the propaganda of the non-
democratic media systems as it is to the so-called truth-seeking of the media in
the West since, as Bird points out, journalism of whatever kind is story-telling
that owes as much to established codes and conventions as to a relationship
with the world 'out there'.
Such a view of news also suggests that news, regardless of where it comes from, is narrative, and therefore should be read as narrative. Schudson (1982) argues this point most succinctly:

The power of the media lies not only in its power to declare things to be true, but in its power to provide the forms in which the declarations appear. News in a newspaper or on television has a relationship to the 'real world', not only in content but in form; that is, in the way the world is incorporated into unquestioned and unnoticed conventions of narration, and then transfigured, no longer a subject for discussion but a premise of any conversation at all (Schudson, 1982: 98).

In other words, if stories are presented in certain formats and with certain procedures, it is because these formats and procedures are value-laden and are believed to be most effective in capturing the interest and concerns of the reading public. Bird and Dardenne (1988: 67) observe that if six crime reporters come out of a court trial with practically the same story, the story is not the vindication of objective reporting but the triumph of formulaic narrative construction. The six crime reporters may be writing about reality, but their 'story' emerges as much from the stories that have gone before as from the facts of the case in court.

As a way of working around the impasse of the 'subject-object' scenario, the notion of juxtaposition is more appropriate than that of comparison. In other words, the aim of this comparison is not to pit one media system against another and judge the practices of one against the benchmark of another. Rather, it is to demonstrate, via juxtaposition, that journalism is deeply embedded in the culture that produces it. Its faults and its triumphs are characteristics of the culture as a whole. The forms of story-telling it has adopted are those prized and cultivated throughout much of our literature.

What is narrative analysis?

Having said that reading news as narrative may enable us to undo the dichotomy between propaganda and objective news by underscoring the rhetorical and structural devices used in news of any culture, a definition of narrative is in order. According to Kozloff (1992), narrative theory has its roots in the Soviet Union of the late 1920s, especially in the works of the Russian
Formalists and Vladimir Propp; it since then has been fed by studies by a diverse, international group of linguists, semiologists, anthropologists, folklorists, literary critics and film and television theorists. In recent years, a considerable volume of literature in media studies has examined the narrative qualities of news, although no systematic use of the concepts and methods developed within linguistic and literary narratology has been used (Pietila, 1992).

That news is story seems self-evident: editors urge their reporters to go and 'get the story'; journalists congratulate each other for having written a 'good story'; and readers feel they have got their money's worth if the papers they buy contain a 'good story'. Studying the structure of current affairs news in the American media, Collins and Clark (1992) point out:

The news tells a story. A story involves relationships between the text -- the story being told, the teller -- narrator, and the audience whose recreation of the story gives it meaning (Collins and Clark, 1992: 26).

Hughes (1968), in her seminal study of the human interest story, points out that news, though perishable, has the timeless interest of literature. In other words, although news is fresh every day, its plots are old, its themes repetitious, and its character types limited. This is because news topics that make stories are just the topics that have made good stories in the past and have become 'perennial stories'(Hughes, 1968: 184). According to Hughes, perennial stories include, for instance, stories about changes of fortune, separation and reunion, animal stories, lost child stories and adventure stories. In this sense, the details in news about character and plot change almost daily, but the framework into which they fit -- the symbolic story-telling modes -- is more enduring.

Newspapers not only like to carry stories of perennial themes, they tend to tell these stories in an unchanging narrative form. Darnton's (1975) account of his experience as a news writer shows that news writing is heavily influenced by stereotypes and by preconceptions of what 'the story' should be. Without pre-established categories of what constitutes 'news' it is, Darnton argues, impossible for journalists to sort out experience:
To turn a squeal sheet into an article requires training in perception and in the manipulation of standardised images, cliches, "angles", "slants" and scenarios, which will call for a conventional response in the minds of editors and readers. A clever writer imposes an old form on new matter in a way that creates some tension -- will the subject fit the predicate? -- and then resolves it by falling back on the familiar (Darnton, 1975: 189).

As story, news has structural features such as plot, theme and character development as well as choice of voice and mood. In the case of news in the West, for instance, conventional form dictates a posture of detachment, of objectivity and balance. News writers are supposed to balance the pros and cons, liberals and conservatives, heroes and villains. However, scrutiny of textual structures reveals the countering control wielded through choices of structural elements. Although journalists prefer to think that news is determined by the news values that are intrinsic in events, it is clear that news values are 'culturally specific story-telling codes' (Bird and Dardenne, 1988:73).

Both news and story are forms of symbolic literature, but although character, setting, plot and time are necessary ingredients for both news and story, these are not to be read too literally. Like an archetypical story which could start with 'a long time ago, in a place far away, there was a beautiful girl and a handsome lad', the modern news often starts with Who, When, Where, and What in the lead, with Why and How to follow in the rest of the news. However, as in stories, the who-what-when-where of particular events tend to be quickly forgotten, and what news does bring up are the larger, more important questions.

For instance news, like story, is usually about people, what they say and do. However, names of individual people may appear in the news from time to time, but the significance of these names is not the persons per se, but the social aggregate these names stand for, such as families on welfare, victims of crime or jobless migrants. More importantly, names in news function to personify politics, and in the minds of journalists, people become surrogates for institutions. Hence, we have politics reduced to a clash of personalities, pitting Paul Keating against John Howard, Mahatier against Keating.

Similarly, like story, news requires setting or location. Indeed, the convention of starting news with a dateline in news writing is intended to establish the
authority of the news report. To give a story a setting is to make the event more 'real'. Readers are invited to 'experience' the event rather than to be merely informed about it. As a consequence, stories tend to be more touching than straight news reports. Journalists tend to evoke this sense of real life in features rather than in 'hard' news. However, although the canons of objectivity determine that the use of setting is relatively rare in political reporting, spatial dimensions are constantly evoked for symbolic purposes. Hallin (1987), for instance, argues that journalists not only tell us where a particular event took place, they also communicate to us images of our neighbourhoods and cities, of the nation and the world around it.

To explicate this point, Hallin (1987: 111-2) lists a number of reasons why journalists refer to geographical locations. According to Hallin, journalists use place as authority, such as the use of White House to represent the US government; they use place as actional information, such as when the community newspaper tells us where the Neighbourhood Watch meeting is to be held; they use place as social connection, e. g. the national newspaper creates a sense of national 'where' for a national readership; they use place as setting, which is a basic narrative element in feature stories; and finally, they use place as subject, in other words, places appear in the news when they become objects of political controversy. When this happens, most places are not covered on their own terms, from the perspectives of the people living in those places, but from the point of view of participants in the political controversy. Hallin points out that when places are used as subject, we need to ask how they are represented and what images of them emerge from the totality of news coverage; to which I would like to add, why certain places are represented while others are not.

Also, as story, news narrates events not only in their spatial contexts, but also in their temporal contexts. Stated in another way, events proceed chronologically, but when the teller gives an account of what happens, he/she is not bound to follow the chronological order. The teller is likely to present the events in any order that he or she finds most effective.

Furthermore news, like story, not only reorders the sequence of story events, it also alters their duration. For instance, the 'inverted pyramid' style requires the reporter to state the number of casualties in an earthquake before giving an
account of the earthquake; and the television reporter may use repetition or slow motion to prolong the actual event of the earthquake.

The order of the story development can be established in two ways. Studying the television narrative, Lewis (1991: 126-7) shows how discrete stories can be linked, either by a 'sequential code', or by a 'hermeneutic code'. While the sequential code operates upon the chronology, the passage of time, the hermeneutic code operates on the basis of three-stage components of narratives: enigma at the beginning, suspension in the middle, and resolution in the end. 'Scenes are not discrete, they are linked by ideas, themes or characters, by things that grow in our consciousness' (Lewis, 1991: 126).

Since part of the story-teller's skill is to control and direct the narrative development, the sequential code and the hermeneutic code may enable us to examine those critical moments in the process of advancing a story. The examination of what lies behind temporal choices reveals the process of manipulation. Gitlin (1981: 263) quotes Cindy Sammuels, the Assistant Manager of the New York Bureau of CBS news: 'If you have a story, and it gets bigger, then something else happens that moves it forward, you say it moved forward and it got bigger, you don't say it got bigger and it moved forward'.

Studying journalists' notions of time, Schudson (1987) points out that although journalists fetishise 'timeliness', this notion operates not by Greenwich mean time but by a cultural clock, a subtle and unspoken understanding among journalists about what is timely and what events are 'new'. According to Schudson, temporal distortions happen in several ways. One, he argues, is by the juxtaposition of different temporal dimensions, such as historical time, political time as well as biographical time. For instance, what the Japanese Prime Minister is saying and doing about the war which the Japanese participated half a century ago is likely to become news, not just because the Japanese Prime Minister's speech or action is new or recent, but also because that it may contain politically opportune possibilities in dealing with Japan for countries like China and Australia. Stories like these would not become stories unless some degree of historical depth can be assumed. Journalists are like story-tellers in that they not only operate according to their geopolitical map, but also according to their cultural clock.
Another kind of temporal distortion happens when journalists use what Schudson (1987: 96) calls 'semiotic tense', the tense used to narrate events or issues which have no clear beginning and ending. The significance of these events and issues may be unclear but their contested meaning may bear on some future event. News stories about foreign policy debates are typical examples of the news using semiotic tense. These stories do not report events but provide government officials a place to signal and negotiate the meaning and direction of certain policies. For this reason, Schudson argues that this kind of reporting illustrates most effectively the way in which the media are instruments of governing.

Still another kind of temporal distortion manifests itself in what Schudson (1987: 97) refers to as the 'rhythmic quality of news'. The best news stories are those with rhythmic qualities -- stories that are timely, that have anticipatable end points (such as an election), and that have outcomes that figure in simple, binary oppositions (again, like an election). The rhythmic quality is most obvious in stories about cultural festivals and anniversaries, which provide opportunities to exercise some kind of self-conscious sense of history. Both the Australian and Chinese newspapers' reminiscences of the anniversary of the victory against Japan in World War II attest to the appeal of the rhythmic quality of news, although such media events also rely on the symbolic potency which comes from a juxtaposition of different temporal dimensions.

Temporal distortions are necessary for story-telling purposes in that they allow strategic containment and appropriation. For instance, some stories such as issue-related stories have a weak chronological narrative structure. Therefore, in order to 'sell' the story, the story-teller may need to move the narrative forward by affiliating it with stories which have a dramatic narrative structure; other stories may already have a chronological structure, but the story-teller may still find it necessary to introduce some dramatic narrative elements in order to facilitate a transition from suspension to resolution.

However, if narration is, as Scholes (1981: 205) puts it, 'the symbolic presentation of a sequence of events connected by subject matter and related by time', then the story is only one part of the narration. Kozloff (1992: 69), in her discussion of television narrative, observes that every narrative has two parts: the story -- 'what happens to whom' -- and the discourse -- 'how the story is told'. Pietila (1992) observes in his study of the discursive composition of news,
that story means a sequence of actions and events, while discourse means the
discursive presentation or narration of events (Pietila, 1992: 40). In other
words, while story consists of actions and events, discourse consists of themes
and moral lessons which become intelligible through story-telling. In this
sense, how the story is told determines the particular theme and moral of the
story. Given this, we can turn journalists' favourite questions back on them
and say: while 'news as story' reveals to us journalists' assumptions of What
happens to Whom, 'news as discourse' discloses journalists' assumptions of
Why and How things happen.

Pietila identifies three common moments in the story-telling process, by which
events and actions of news are linked by the theme. One is when the narrator
provides a condensed view of the matters covered in the news, in the form of
summarising statements in the headlines and leads. Another moment is when
the narrator provides background facts which place the pieces of information
in their relevant contexts to render them intelligible. The third moment is
when the narrator identifies which one of the actors appearing in the news is
responsible for the piece of information concerned.

However, it should also be noted that although the story-telling aspect of news
is clearly important, much of the news that we read and encounter on daily
basis can hardly be called a 'story'. For instance, so-called 'hard news' presented
in inverted pyramid style, is designed to save time for both news reporters and
readers, and seems to contain nothing but facts. The inverted pyramid style,
with the lead summarising five W's and one H, chronicles rather than
narrates events and actions. Bird and Dardenne (1988) observe that news does a
great deal of chronicling, recording newsworthy events in a routine fashion.
These accounts are not 'stories' designed to engage the mind and often lack
narrative elements basic to story-telling, such as character, setting, and plot
development. Rather, they are chronicles that provide a record that something
noteworthy has happened.

However, this is not to say that the chronicle is a more reliable reflection of
reality than is the story. Indeed, Bird and Dardenne suggest a distinction
between 'story-formed news', which presents cause-and-effect relationships in
a logical progression, and 'chronicle-formed news', which utilises the inverted
pyramid form with lead and frequent attribution. They suggest that chronicle
news is narrative but nevertheless lacks comprehensible narrativity.
Narratives, such as political speeches or budget reports, may not be stories in themselves, but they are what Bennett and Edelman (1985: 165) call the 'seedbeds of stories', which may evoke a set of overlapping scenarios featuring settings, characters, and actions that are not included in the text. The cues in the text may set off similar resonances in people who share characteristics such as class, gender, ideology and ethnicity, thereby creating a sense of belonging for individual readers. In this sense, chronicles and stories are indispensable components of the 'cultural technology' of imagining the nation.

Furthermore, as a form of narrative, the chronicle tells and assures us that the world is still going on and that things we value still matter. Justice is done and the evil, deviant and unlawful are punished. Since, as Bird and Dardenne argue, judgements of what deserves to be chronicled change over time, tracing the changes in news chronicles can reveal a lot about the culture and its dominant values. In this sense, chronicles are not stories in a simple, conventional sense, but they are still 'vital, myth-repairing narratives (Bird and Dardenne, 1988: 74).

This is not to say that individual news stories are like individual myths. Rather, news as a communication process acts like myths. News is mythological because it, as Barthes (1972) argues, naturalises and depoliticises beliefs and ideas which are products of specific social-historical relations and turns them into 'natural attitudes'. In this sense, both news and myth function as a validation of culture. The narrative forms and strategies in news-writing, though bearing a close relationship to specific social and historical realities, are seen as natural, taken-for-granted, common sense ways of knowing the world. This mythological function of news is most clear in what is usually referred to as the 'bad news', including news of crimes, strikes, terrorism, and violence. In most cases, bad news of these types appears in the form of news briefs, and is bereft of basic narrative elements. However, the morally cohesive function of 'bad news' points to the way in which news reports, as a major form of constructing and transmitting social knowledge, are fundamentally ideological. It is in this process of constructing the moral normality and expelling the dangerous, the different, and comical — the Other — that the work of myth is revealed, for these narratives do not have to be explicitly identified as such to be recognised for what they are. This quality of being already known is necessary if news of such events is to have the mythological effect, as Knight and Dean's (1982) analysis of myth and the structure of news finds:
Myth is seen as a "second-order" signification whose method for establishing meaning is suggestive and evocative rather than declarative, and whose function is the "deformation" of first-order meaning. Myth works by invading straight talk, impoverishing it as pure denotation and preparing it for injection with mythical concepts and meaning (Knight and Dean, 1982: 146).

This points to the important fact that news not only has a structural and temporal dimension, it also has a linguistic dimension. Both the story-teller and reporter use language as their medium in their definition and understanding of the unknown, the unlawful and the uncanny. And it is through language that meaning is constructed by the story-teller and listener/reader. Given this, the importance of studying the language of news, including some basic narrative devices which are made possible with language, cannot be over-emphasised.

One important aim in the study of news language is to identify the specific relationship between the journalist, the news and the reader. Does the journalist attempt to hold the middle ground as the professional, non-partisan mediator, or does he or she identify with the actor(s)? Does she or he become an actor in the story? How does the journalist address the listener/reader? Hartley (1982) points to the significance of looking at a journalist's mode of address:

it is a problem the media cannot escape. They must develop a practical 'mode of address' which expresses not only the content of the events they relate but also their orientation towards the viewer or reader, since this orientation is an unavoidable constituent element of all language (Hartley, 1982: 88).

Studying the construction of meaning through news language also entails looking at the rhetorical devices commonly used in news language. Metaphor, for instance, communicates the unknown by transposing it into terms of the known. For instance, as discussed earlier, nationhood is an elusive concept, but it can be made graspable by likening it to fatherland or motherland. For another example, although the Orient is something unknown and unfamiliar to the West, it can be understood, and indeed
misunderstood, by its association with things that are known and familiar. Hence, in orientalist discourse, the 'inscrutable and mysterious' Orient takes on the qualities of a woman, a child, an irrational person.

The power of metaphor is enduring. Edie (1976) observes that once we have culturally organised our experiences in a distinctive manner and chosen our metaphors, we tend to think within the cultural-linguistic bounds that we have unwittingly set up for ourselves. News, in this sense, relies on the power of metaphor. In spite of journalists' claims that news merely mirrors reality, not create it, news nevertheless sizes up situations, names their elements and defines them in a way that contains an attitude towards them. Journalists, as story-tellers, not only provide reassuring familiarity, but also explain new situations by rendering the unfamiliar familiar. To do so, journalists often resort to fitting new situations into old metaphors. In other words, they are given the power to place people and events into the existing categories of hero and villain, good and bad, and to 'invest their stories with the authority of mythological truth' (Bird and Dardenne, 1988: 80).

While metaphor works by stating that one thing is another because one thing is like another, metonymy works by using a part or element of something to stand for the whole. 'Metaphor constitutes the world in a name and as a whole, but metonymy divides the world into parts and shows the entailed relations among them' (Mellard, 1993: 103). News is metonymic because a reported event or issue is interpreted for the whole of the reality. However, it is important to realise the choice of metonymy and the omission of others is determined by the larger metaphorical context, as one may give a significantly different, sometimes contradictory, picture of the same whole. To say that Japan is China's cultural cousin is as true as to say that Japan is China's historical foe, but the privileging of one aspect and de-emphasising of another is determined by the specific purpose of the symbolic action. Therefore, the dynamic relationship between metaphor and metonymy keeps the language open to endless selection and appropriation.

While metaphor and metonymy are common rhetorical devices in storytelling to endow events and actions with meaning, irony, as a rhetorical device, highlights the limitations of metaphors and metonyms. It functions to underscore the contradictions and oppositions in the totalities of metaphorical and metonymic representation. The use of irony indicates an increase in the
story-teller's awareness of the power of language. Such a device, according to Glasser and Ettema (1993) is one of many conventions of narration characteristic of modern news, and it is also one of the most powerful rhetorical devices journalists can use to vivify the boundaries of morality without appearing to be moralistic:

By reporting the facts accurately but ironically, journalists can abide by the norms of neutrality and steer readers away from what the facts 'obviously' mean. That is, irony works for the journalists not as it violates or contravenes the conventions of objective reporting but as it quietly -- perhaps even deceptively -- uses these conventions for dramatic effect (Glasser and Ettema, 1993: 323).

In other words, an ironic news story points to the possibility of polysemeic and ambiguous interpretations of the news text. By engaging the reader with an invitation to join in a game of language, the ironic news writer often uses metaphors and metonyms, but only to foreground them as metaphors and metonyms. In this way, irony works not by imposing an interpretation on a text but by establishing the conditions for multiple -- typically contradictory -- interpretations.

How to do narrative analysis?

If news tells a story, and like story, news has a structural, temporal and linguistic dimension, we may proceed to read news within these parameters in order to understand why newspapers, as Mercer (1992) argues, provide a mythological sense of identity, community and belonging through a daily narration of who we are, where and when we are, what we ought to think, remember, and belong to. Readers unknown to each other share habits of reading, and through such a daily practice are united by news headlines such as 'the nation remembers', 'the nation rejoices', and 'the nation celebrates'. In the reading of these stories about the founding of the nation, and in the commemoration of the anniversaries and festivals which celebrate the nation, and in the cherishing of the 'common sense' of what is good for the nation, rituals are maintained, national myths and legends are validated or repaired, and a sense of historical continuity is ensured. Daily news, ephemeral as it is, contains in its narration crucially important clues to the politics of nation-building.
To understand the power of newspapers as cultural technologies in the construction of national imaginary, we need to deconstruct news narrative conventions by questioning the 'unquestioned' and highlighting the 'unnoticed'. Day in and day out, journalists go about their 'business', asking questions concerning Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How, and containing them in hard news, features, or editorials. Yet they may be either too busy, or unwilling, to reflect upon the implication of these practices. They tend to think that they are going about reporting and mirroring the world, and that there is not much point in pausing and reflecting upon either the social, political and institutional constraints under which they work, or the narrative forms and conventions with which they write news.

For this reason, Manoff and Schudson believe that news is more important and journalists less important than is popularly recognised. This suggests that the value of media criticism lies not so much in trying to change the working habits and conventions of journalists, but in alerting readers to the limitations and constraints underlying news-writing. Reading, therefore, becomes a challenging, but necessary intellectual exercise, as Manoff and Schudson (1987: 8) point out:

In a world where the news media provide so much of our information about what lies beyond our immediate ken, and at the same time offer unspoken guidelines about how to read that information, how to absorb it, how to take it into our lives, it is important to know how to read not only the news, but journalists and journalism itself (Manoff and Schudson, 1987: 8).

In other words, news analysis should inform us at several levels. From such an analysis, we expect to get not just the journalist's account of what happens during the day. More importantly, we expect to acquire knowledge about the social, economic and political constraints under which journalists work, as well as the literary and narrative structures of news-writing that itself acts as a constraint on what journalists produce. Ultimately, we expect to learn about how these constraints influence the news account we are given to read. Again, Manoff and Schudson (1987) suggest:
The reporter who asks 'who' is supposed to develop a sense of what 'whos' in the world are legitimate sources for and subjects of news. If you ask 'when', you necessarily incorporate a particular version of history, however foreshortened; if you ask 'where', you call up an already inscribed political geography, no matter how unconscious it may be. No 'why' or 'how' gets asked without some assumption about what counts in the press as an explanation. In short, the apparently simple commandment questions of journalism presuppose a platform for inquiry, a framework for interpreting answers, a set of rules about who to ask what about what (Manoff and Schudson, 1987: 5).

These platforms, frameworks and rules will be examined in later chapters. I want to ask journalists the questions they themselves ask the world daily, and what journalists mean by these questions. It may be a truism to say that these frameworks, platforms and rules are cultural rather than natural; to prove it, however, is no easy task. For example, why are presidents and prime ministers the most important actors in news about the nation? Why do reporters always quote their sources and provide attribution to interpretations, even though they are certain of the reliability of these quotes and interpretations? What is the logic behind the juxtaposition of editorials and cartoons? Answering these questions entails closely examining the variety of narrative techniques used by journalists and finding out how these techniques argue for particular readings of events, characterisations and attribution of motives. Although journalists are supposed to write news according to the objective canon that emphasises facts, they know they are expected to go and get the 'story', and that they can tell only one story, and they have only one right way to tell it. In this sense, news is part of age-old cultural practices, and as stories, news contains rhetorical and structural devices which are not natural but cultural.

Deconstructing news narrative also entails de-mythologising news, particularly the 'bad news' about the unlawful, the deviant, and the different. We need to scrutinise how news accounts structure their content to the views of certain dominant groups and serve to inscribe in the social consciousness the fundamental lineaments of order and normality. We need to show how news performs its instrumental role of governing by publicising the crimes of the 'bad' yet denying them a voice, fostering social cohesion through moral solidarity, and promoting an explicit sense of national community.
Furthermore, deconstructing news narrative requires considering the folkloric nature of news. When Darnton (1975: 193) describes news as a commodity manufactured in the newsroom and as a ‘way of seeing the world that somehow reached The New York Times from Mother Goose’, he is indeed implying the perennial nature of certain news stories and their thematic affinity with the folklore of that given culture. Consequently, any understanding of how news constructs and maintains national identity starts with deconstructing the standardised ‘images, cliches, angles, and scenarios’ which will call forth conventional responses in the minds of the editors and readers of a given culture.

In addition, an important part of the project of deconstructing news narratives consists in studying their structure. If journalists define events and situations in their stories in terms of what, who, when, where, why, and how, then critical news-reading should turn these questions back on journalists and consider the ideological effect of this interpretative framework. This is because, as Hall (1984) observes, ideology is not a kind of conscious commitment to a particular philosophy, but a set of practical understandings and frameworks which people use unconsciously to make sense of the world. Ideology, according to Hall, functions most effectively when we are least aware of the frameworks we use to tell ourselves a certain story about the world. In this sense, the interpretative frameworks within which journalists ask questions about the world are profoundly ideological, because they enable us to make sense of what is going on around us, why things happen in certain ways, and what we should do; they strengthen common understandings in a heterogeneous society by telling us when and where and who we are in the world — largely in a most plausible, natural, and taken-for-granted manner. Since myth, according to Barthes (1972), is a way of knowing about the world whose view is uncritical, rather than a body of knowledge that is untrue, news is deeply mythological. The ideology effect of news depends on news as a form of talk whose operations remain concealed in its work.

The structure of news narratives bears a close relationship to the 'oppositional thinking' that characterises popular imagination in the West. According to Hartley (1982), news proceeds on the basic us/them opposition where 'us' includes the culture, nation, public, viewer, family, newsreader, news institution, and the 'them' includes striker, foreign dictator, foreign power, the weather, fate, bureaucracy, etc. Such narrative structuring, based on binary
opposition, Hartley argues, is one of the ways in which stereotyping is achieved.

However, in order to retrieve the intelligibility and historical continuity of nation-building in such an ephemeral form, we need to study news not only as structures, but more importantly, as dynamic, performative processes -- processes by which stories are created, appropriated and transformed, not as individual stories but, more importantly, in a chain of stories. Studying news as a dynamic process entails considering news-making as an ongoing activity. If, as Carey (1989: 23) argues, 'communication is a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired and transformed', the importance of studying the processes by which stories are created, reshaped and appropriated cannot be over-emphasised.

However, such processes usually take more than one story to make sense, and therefore individual news stories should not be studied in isolation. For this reason, Carey (1987: 151) argues that journalism must be examined as a 'corpus', which includes not only the multiple treatments of an event within the newspaper, including breaking news, follow-ups, news analysis, interpretation and background, critical commentary, editorials, but also other forms of journalism that surround, correct, and complete the daily newspaper. Only when the separate stories are reintegrated into a coherent framework can the reader identify the elements of drama and nuances of character.

With this stratagem in the reader's mind, various segments of media narratives are no longer considered as innocently disparate and separate, but as juxtaposed and arranged to work either to emphasise a political meaning of the dominant narrative, or to undercut, mock or subvert a political meaning of the dominant narrative (Caputi, 1991: 34). These narrative segments may appear in different media (newspaper vs television), in different genres (editorial vs news report), in different forms (a written text vs pictorial text), and in different times (a recent story vs a story in the past or in the future). These segments, or what Mercer (1985: 56) refers to as the 'interleaving discourses', 'abbreviated tidbits', or 'bestiary of human monsters' are strong coordinates of a dominant narrative. These segments may not appear in a coherent and systematic way but, as Hartley observes, they may 'break their individual boundaries and collectively signify particular themes, issues and meanings' in the world. Complementarity, juxtaposition and orchestration become useful analytical
concepts in the narrative analysis of news because they enable readers to select clues from different stories to "construct a 'photofit' picture" of reality (Hartley, 1982: 118).

Carey (1987: 151) also compares journalism to a 'curriculum'. The first course of the curriculum, according to Carey, is the breaking of the stories of the daily press, with a bare identification of actors and events. This is followed by intermediate and advanced work of fine-grained descriptions and interpretations, the weekly summaries and commentaries, and book-length expositions. By comparing journalism to a curriculum, Carey draws attention to the problem of what unit of analysis an examination of journalism should engage. A news story on a given day can become a unit for analysis, but its meaning is sometimes incomplete unless the reader establishes the precise order of the story development by reading a given news story in conjunction with follow-up news stories the next day, or even with a set of stories over a period of days and weeks.

Finally, if narrative involves the story-teller, the story and the audience, it is language that brings these three parts together. If narrative is a place where sequence and language intersect to form a discursive code, then the language of news is worth scrutiny, because news, as Bird and Dardennes (1988) say, is a 'particular kind of mythological narrative with its own symbolic codes'. Studying news as language, therefore, helps us uncover the relationship between the narrator and his or her story, and the 'reality' constructed by that story. This entails looking at the 'reality effect' produced by news -- how language is used in a way to create the illusion that it can faithfully reflect and mirror the world out there. If the 'reality' of news, as Hall (1982) points out, is but an 'effect' and can be understood not as 'naturalistic' but as 'naturalised', the significance of news criticism lies in uncovering the processes by which that 'effect' is achieved.

For the purpose of this work, studying news language means, first of all, finding out the relationship between the story-teller and the story: is the story-teller also a character in the story he or she tells, or is he or she outside the story-world? We need to assess the degree of distance, in terms of space and time, between the story events and the time and place of the story-teller's narrating. News is conventionally presented as if the events came first, reports of them second, and the interpretation third, while in reality, news is a
discursive composition of bits and pieces of information which are organised and arranged into definite relationships with one another by means of the narrator's linking discourse.

In addition, we need to find out how the story-teller relates to the audience: if he or she attempts to speak as one of them, or if the story-teller attempts to adopt the voice of God. More importantly, we need to consider the discursive forms and strategies which enable the story-teller to speak to the intended audience, thereby implicating, inviting identification from, and seeking alignment with them.

Furthermore, we need to identify the symbolic codes -- be it metaphor or metonymy -- that the story-teller deploys in giving the story meaning, and find out how these codes are employed in ways that make them appear given and natural. We also need to study how metaphors keep language open to change and bring in new meanings that may alter or contest the symbolism that surrounds these metaphors.

Finally, we need to assess the degree of self-consciousness that the story-teller exhibits: how much is he or she aware of the narrative form being used, and to what extent does the story-teller uses the rhetorical device of irony as a way of alerting readers to a 'conflict or tension between what is professionally mandated and what is morally and intellectually problematic' (Glasser and Ettema, 1993: 333). We must find out how irony enables journalists to report the 'facts' accurately and impartially while at the same time letting it be known -- albeit quietly -- that the facts do not 'speak for themselves'.

* * *

News is narrative, and should be read as narrative. This chapter identifies a range of concepts and assumptions necessary for reading news in this way, and suggests a range of analytical tactics and strategies that help us uncover the processes by which the nation is made narratable and imaginable. They constitute the main approach appropriate to the analysis of news construction of Japan in the Australian and Chinese press in the second part of this thesis.

The methodology of analysis proposed here assumes that the meaning of news cannot be understood unless we consider both the social, economic and
organisational structures under which journalists work, and the narrative structures and conventions that journalists work with. While the focus of the thesis is on the latter, it is assumed that an analysis of the narrative forms and strategies is not fully intelligible unless one is aware of the social background of news-production and news-consumption. Before making a detailed analysis of news constructions of Japan, the next chapter juxtaposes the Chinese and Australian contexts in which news is produced and understood.
Chapter 4
The Social Context of News Production in Australia and China

Hall et al (1978: 54) point out three aspects of the social production of news: the bureaucratic organisation of the media which produces news in specific types or categories, the structure of news values which orders the selection and ranking of particular stories within these categories, and the moment of construction of the news itself. This thesis is concerned with narrative constructions of 'Japan'; however, to understand why particular narratives dominate in news constructions of identity, otherness and difference, we need to move beyond a discursive analysis of the media and also consider the professional mandate of journalism as well as the media's relationship to the state and the law, and to its readers, competitors and proprietors.

This chapter is a synoptic discussion of these factors. It is intended to sketch a context in which we consider the moment of the construction of the news itself and a range of issues in the Australian and Chinese media, including the history and development of the press, changes and continuities in news values and news-gathering practices, press ownership and structure, the media's relation to government, business and foreign policy, as well as the role of the media in the nationalist ideology. However, the purpose of such a discussion is not so much to provide a 'balanced' description of the media of the two countries as to highlight the issues and emphases which are specific to each country's media system, and which are likely to impact on each country's media constructions of Japan. For the purpose of this work, the focus will be on print media -- the press -- covering newspapers, journals and magazines.

This juxtaposition shows that changes in the 1980s and 1990s have resulted in a great degree of diversification, fragmentation and pluralisation in the Chinese press, while the Australian press have gone through a different, if not opposite process. It also shows that the notion of journalistic professionalism means different things in Australia and China, and that the two media systems have different notions of what constitutes news values. However, despite these differences in Australian and Chinese media, the study suggests that the relationship between the media and nationalist ideology in both Chinese and Australian contexts is a close and complex one.
News Production in Australia

Changes in the Australian press

Commenting on the Australian media in the 1980s, Turner (1994) states:

During that decade we saw business ascend to a position of cultural authority despite the excess of the larrikin capitalists, the concentration and decline of the national news media, and the installation of the economy as the central category in the political conceptualisation of the nation. Since the 1980s, Australians have become used to hearing the nation talked about as if it were a brand name, rather than a social community whose interests politics should protect (Turner, 1994: 156).

Ten years before Turner made this observation, Windschuttle (1984) had already painted a grim picture of concentration in the Australian media. The commercial media in Australia, according to Windschuttle, had the most highly concentrated pattern of ownership in the West. Four large corporations, namely John Fairfax Ltd, News Corporation Ltd, Herald and Weekly Times, and Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd controlled practically all of the Australian press. Three of the big four owned every capital-city daily and every major newspaper: John Fairfax owned the Sydney Morning Herald, the Melbourne Age and the Australian Financial Review; News Corporation owned the Australian, the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mirror; and Herald and Weekly Times owned the Melbourne Herald, West Australian and the Courier-Mail in Queensland.

Such heavy concentration had enjoyed almost twenty years of stability and continuity until 1986-1987, when the 'shake-up' introduced new players to the Australian media game, and changed the situation for the worse. One major purchase was Murdoch's takeover of the Herald and Weekly Times, a purchase which he claimed to be the biggest newspaper takeover in the English speaking world. Through these moves, Murdoch added six metropolitan daily newspapers to his holdings, plus provincial and suburban newspapers and magazines. Before the takeover, the Melbourne Herald and its associates controlled 48 per cent of the circulation of Australian
metropolitan dailies; Murdoch had 28 per cent and Fairfax 24 percent. After the takeover, Murdoch held nearly 59 per cent, Fairfax 24 per cent, and three minor players -- Holmes a Court, Northern Star Holdings, and United Media Ltd -- shared the remaining 17 per cent (Bowman, 1988: 34). In other words, Murdoch now controlled nine of the seventeen capital-city dailies, and in terms of total circulation, by May 1988, he controlled 61.6 per cent (Bowman, 1988: 38 and 244).

Another change resulted from the sale of Fairfax to the Tourang consortium headed by Canadian entrepreneur Conrad Black. As a result of these takeovers, there are now only eight metropolitan daily newspapers in the state capitals. Five of these are owned by Murdoch who, in 1985, became a citizen of the United States after having lived there for many years. As Henningham (1990: 66) argues, 'the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the worst period of newspaper closures ever experienced in Australia -- and probably in any other Western industrialised country'.

Cunningham (1994) argues that, due to a concentration of media ownership in Australia, diversity through a variety of outlets is becoming difficult. On the other hand, Cunningham also points out that it is increasingly possible to look for 'internal pluralism', or 'diversity within a media outlet', which has been made possible with the growth of opinion columns and greater use of free-lancers and non-journalists as feature writers. Turner (1994) shares Cunningham's view of Australian media regarding diversity and notes that many alternative and quality media outlets went to the wall, unable to operate in a field dominated by three players. Commenting on the view that the mainstream press lacks interest in independent opinions, Turner argues that, as a result, representations of important national issues are marked with a 'discursive unanimity'. Turner therefore concludes that the concentration of the media in Australia is a structural impediment to free expression of opinion, to investigation and analysis (Turner, 1994: 147). However, having said this, Turner also acknowledges the fact that, despite the general decline in journalism's authority and the lowering of journalistic standards, 'credible' journalism exists, albeit largely within the work of individual journalists.

Henningham's (1996) content analysis of Australia's metropolitan newspapers reinforces these impressions. Today's Australian newspapers,
he states, are more alike than different, and are 'indistinguishable from one
another on basis of content priorities'. According to Henningham, the
oligopolisation of Australian newspaper ownership and the related
shrinkage of newspaper titles has resulted in a tendency for newspapers to
seek a broad popular readership, using similar formulae of news value.
Henningham also notes that Australian journalism has changed through
the emergence of manifestly opinionated writing and the abandonment of
objectivity as a goal.

Changes in the 1980s added another characteristic to the Australian press. It
not only has very heavy concentration of ownership, it is also
predominantly foreign owned; almost 90 percent of the metropolitan and
national daily press is under the control of Rupert Murdoch and Conrad
Black.

Australia has two national newspapers, the Australian and the Financial
Review. The Australian, which will be the subject of a detailed scrutiny later
in this work, was started in 1964 by Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd as a bold
suggest that the Australian is known for its 'identification with free market
economic policies' and that its primary readers are members of the
technocratic and business elites. The paper has established a reputation for
its consistent concern with government foreign policies. It is described by its
current editor-in-chief Paul Kelly as having an aspiration to 'run an
aggressive newspaper based on the principles of accuracy, disclosure and
fairness' (Kelly, 1994: 86).

A major economic factor which affects the quality of news, especially
international news, is the need to run the news organisation as a cost-
effective business in terms of collecting news. Such a profit-driven policy
results in a concentration of news sources and reduction in the necessary
journalist labour. According to Tiffen (1993), the most important
independent means of securing information is the assignment of reporters
to specialised 'rounds'. Such reporters are expected to generate a regular
flow of news from the allocated rounds. However, as this is a fairly
expensive practice, especially in covering unpredictable and infrequent
occurrences, newspapers usually rely on 'generalist reporters', who in turn
rely on limited and routinised sources, mostly from a few international
agencies such as Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, via the Australian Associated Press (AAP).

It is ironic that, in spite of Australia’s separate and independent agenda with Japan in economic and political terms today, as well as its desire to forge links with Asia, financial constraints determine that most of the news of that area still comes from a secondary source. A study (Murray, 1994) of news of Japan in the Australian media during World War II finds that in the 1930s, Australian newspapers relied heavily on British-based cable services and so Australian news had a European focus. The Australian Broadcasting Commission’s (ABC) coverage of the Japanese War relied heavily on the BBC, which concentrated overwhelmingly on the European war. The study finds that because the ABC’s coverage of Japan was limited, Australian service personnel went to war largely unprepared for their task.

Fortunately, however, due to the growing importance of Japan as a trading partner, Japan has been considered important enough by the ABC and major Australian newspapers to assign their own correspondents in that country. This ensures that important news, particularly that concerning Australia-Japan relationships, is reported from Australian perspectives. Furthermore, these papers run features and commentaries written by Australians who are either living and working in Japan, or who are Japan specialists.

*News Values and Values in News*

Although proprietors and advertisers may influence a decision to run certain news items, most news items are gathered and written by journalists, who make routine decisions about the newsworthiness of events. Gitlin (1981: 258) identifies three stages in this decision-making process: an editor decides that a certain situation should be investigated as the possible source of news; a reporter decides what is worthy of note in that situation; and editors decide how to treat and place the resulting story.

Studies of the factors and process of news structuring and news selection (Galtung and Ruge, 1981; Galtung and Vincent, 1992) seek to identify some common factors which render certain events more likely to be defined as news than others. They believe that in the transition from events to news, events are more likely to become news if they concern 'elite' countries and
'elite' people, can be seen in personal terms, and have negative consequences. They also find that events are more likely to become news if they are familiar and culturally similar to one's own nation, thereby revealing a tendency towards ethnocentrism.

Galtung and Vincent (1992) believe a combination of these factors explains certain aspects of the way in which Japan is reported in the Western media. According to them, the economic development of Japan went largely unreported for a very long time, because it was a process, not an event; it happened in a peripheral country (at the time); it was not negative and therefore did not fit crisis-oriented news values and Japan was culturally unfamiliar to the West. Galtung and Vincent point out that Japanese industrial achievement went undiscovered until the sudden realisation that Japanese economic power had become a threat. This realisation, according to Galtung and Vincent, had two consequences. On the one hand, Japan began to be noticed and reported, but with overtones that its success was part of a devious plot, a conspiracy by 'Japan Inc'. On the other hand, Japan was seen as a capitalist country, part of the West, there was no understanding that Japan might have perfectly valid agenda and strategies that were quite different from the West's.

News values, although hard to define, function to transform difficult decisions in the news-gathering and news-selecting process into routine choices and provide directions and constraints regarding the formats (such as straight, 'hard' news, 'soft' features, editorials, etc.) and procedures (such as the conventions of interviewing, sourcing, quoting, and observing the narrative structures of presentation). These directions and constraints enable individual journalists to write news stories that do not necessarily represent their own value judgment. Tiffen believes that most journalists prefer to think that there is a kind of force afforded by news values, independent of them and over which they have no control, which constrain and guide their work (Tiffen, 1989).

Certain events are more likely to be defined as news, not necessarily because they are intrinsically important but because they fit easily into the process of news-gathering. This is amply illustrated in Tiffen's study (1989) of the Australian media in the context of inter-party and intra-party politics during the 1970s and 1980s. According to Tiffen, election campaigns are newsworthy
because they provide winners and losers, clear beginnings and endings, and momentum and drama. Both inter-party and intra-party politics make good news because

the emphasis on leaders as a central ingredient in political news resonates at several levels: its convenience for news-gathering; its importance and centrality in reporters' direct experience of politics; audience interest in the human qualities and personal dramas of leaders; editors and reporters' views of how politics works (Tiffen, 1989: 176).

The convenience of news-gathering and the audience interest in human qualities also determine that issues are not usually considered to be news unless they emerge via events. As Tiffen explains, coverage of issues depends on how their 'abstract principles, amorphous conflicts or continuing conditions become crystallised into newsworthy events' (Tiffen, 1989: 178). If, as Tiffen suggests, issues usually become public not as autonomous topics for debate but embedded in, and secondary to, the reporting of conflicts and power plays, then to study the process by which issues are transformed into politically potent symbols and used to advance a news story becomes significant.

Some writers have commented on how the notion of 'objectivity' has become such a celebrated and desirable goal that it has become ritualistic (eg. Tuchman, 1978). To many journalists, a news story has no ultimate value unless it is 'objective'. Indeed, the notion of 'objectivity' has always been the bedrock on which journalists have based their professional credibility and journalistic authority. However, if this is the case, how are the aforementioned socially conditioned, implicit ideological positions represented in news? Studies have found that it is exactly this professional goal of objectivity that enables the ideological process to occur. Hall et al (1978) provide a good example of how such a process can be uncovered in their seminal study of the British press coverage of crime. Central to their analysis is the notion of primary definers and secondary definers of social events. Hall et al argue that because journalists are careful about making the distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion', they adopt the practice of ensuring that media statements are grounded in 'objective' and 'authoritative' statements from accredited sources. These accredited sources include MPs
for political topics, employers and trade union leaders for industrial issues, and experts if the topic is about a specialised area of knowledge. In this way, these spokespeople become the primary definers of topics. As the media has a role in reproducing the definitions of those 'accredited sources', journalists become the secondary definers of social events (Hall et al, 1978: 58).

Hall et al argue that once the primary definition establishes the initial interpretation of a particular topic in the form of news stories, features and editorials follow to provide further information about the topics within the parameters set in the primary news stories. While features provide explanations of events in terms of motive, cause, consequence, and significance, editorials pass judgment and suggest solutions to the events in question. In this way, features and editorials are, according to Hall et al, 'two different ways of effecting an ideological closure' (Hall et al, 1978: 88).

Although the concept of primary definition is thoughtful and important in explaining the nature of media discourse on social issues, it is inadequate in assessing the role of editorial writers and freelance feature writers who may take different lines in the same newspaper. Some writers (Curran, 1990; Schlesinger, 1990) criticise the concept as being structuralist and deterministic. They observe that the concept of primary definition tends to overstate the degree of coherence and consistency of the dominant culture. It also tends to exaggerate the congruence between primary definers. Schlesinger argues that an examination of news sources should not only look at what they say to the media, but also analyse the strategies and tactics of sources in relation to the media.

Given that the structure of news values is an important variable in determining news content, it is important to study that structure as a dynamic and enabling force rather than as a totally restraining devices. Tiffen (1989) points out that there is no elaborated universal formula of news values; they are shared and understood but not articulated or codified, nor necessarily consistent or adhered to. For these reasons, news values are better understood as responses to the various cross-pressures in news production. However, Tiffen argues that this ambiguity and imprecision is not disabling. Instead, it makes possible a constant negotiation and
definition, thus giving flexibility and more freedom to individual journalists.

*Foreign policy, media and nation*

News is produced at the intersection of the organisational structures of news-making and the internal structure of news values. If so, how this intersection affects the news about the nation and news about foreign nations deserves scrutiny, as does the relationship between media and government. More importantly, it is necessary to examine how this relationship manifests itself in the news.

Gans' (1979) investigation of the American press offers one point of departure for conceptualising the relationship between news and nation. Writing about news in the American context, Gans argues that news, be it domestic or foreign, treats the nation as a unit. Most common news about the nation is stories of national ceremonials, which resort to a consensual view of the nation as a cohesive entity: 'Because the symbolic complexes are components of the nation and reflect on the nation as a unit, threats to them become newsworthy' (Gans, 1979: 20). Such a logic enables journalists to write about wars, scandals and disasters by focusing directly on their consequences for the United States as a whole. Kennedy's assassination, for instance, was represented as putting the whole 'nation' in mourning, while the Watergate scandal was seen to have plunged the 'nation' into cynicism. In terms of foreign news reporting, Gans finds that foreign events were more likely to be considered newsworthy if they involved American activities in a foreign country, or if they were foreign activities that affected American policy.

One direct consequence of treating the nation as a unit in news structuring and selection is that the most frequent actors in the news are inevitably individuals who play a role in national activities. This explains the frequent appearance in the news of presidents, presidential candidates, and leading federal officials and state and local officials. By contrast, unknown individuals are unlikely to become news unless they are victims, or violators of the laws and social mores. Furthermore, the activities that are more frequently represented in the news are 'national activities' which,
apart from national ceremonies, consist mainly of government, business, law and religion -- symbolic complexes which constitute the nation.

These observations are largely applicable to the Australian context. Given that nation is a principal organising unit, despite wide differences in race, sex, class, age and religion, the media participate in a discourse of nationalism which sees the nation as a unified entity. This strategy of 'making it national' functions by glossing over the differences between these divisions in the name of 'national interest':

The discourses conventionally used to represent the nation come to 'mean' the nation almost irrespective of their context of use. Established discourses of the 'national' can be wheeled into place on a wide range of social terrain and put to work for a wide variety of political or ideological interests -- even competing or contradictory interests -- at any one time (Turner, 1994: 10-11).

The notion of the 'national interest' has, since Federation, been actively mobilised and contested in the context of the Australian media. One obvious reason for concern about what is good for the national interest is the heavy media concentration and foreign ownership. Bowman (1988), for instance, expresses profound doubts about American citizen Rupert Murdoch and his papers' stands in the national interest of Australia:

When Australia and the US argue over trade, for example, Murdoch's Australian editors know that for commercial and political reasons their only possible course is to back Australia. But in matters such as American bases in Australia, American defence and foreign policies, American labour policies, American investment, American society in general, Murdoch's papers to a remarkable extent present Australia's interests as similar to America's practices (Bowman, 1988:20).

This is not to say, however, that the media and journalists are simple conduits for the views of the powerful. There are differences at times about the definition of 'nation' as in the 'national interest'. The *Sydney Morning Herald* has clashed with the Department of Foreign Affairs over its reporting of Indonesia, and the ABC clashed with former Prime Minister Hawke over its coverage of the Gulf War. In other words, media
organisations can and do at times interpret the interests of the nation in different ways to those in political power, albeit still within ideological parameters. There are, of course, some core issues which are usually beyond questioning eg, the use of violence, the system of parliamentary democracy and, until recently, multiculturalism.

An area where nationalist discourses are employed consistently for political purposes is in the news coverage of foreign affairs. The nation, in this context, becomes a key area of contestation as politicians, editors, diplomats and journalists vie for the authority to speak in the national interest. Media practitioners would like to think of themselves as part of the fourth estate, independent of other seats of power and responsible only to impartial truth, serving the public by being the vigilant ‘watchdog’ of the government. However, the economics of news-making point to the difficulty of such a vision and, as Tiffen (1978) suggests, it is interdependence, rather than independence, that best describes the actual relationship between the state and the media.

From the perspective of foreign policy personnel, the relationship between the media and foreign policy is a symbiotic one. Susan Boyd, Official Spokesperson for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, argues that

[the activities of the Australian media outside Australia are thus a matter of interest to those responsible for the management of Australia’s international relations. The challenge is to uphold the basic commitment to freedom of speech and of the press, while working to minimise the potentially negative impact on bilateral relations with countries which have different cultural norms and traditions. This is frequently the case in those countries in Australia’s inner policy focus, its neighbours in the Asia and Pacific region (Boyd, 1991: 149).

An example of the vital relationship between Foreign Affairs and the media, albeit in a negative way, is the furore which followed the publication in the 1980s of David Jenkins’ articles in the Sydney Morning Herald making allegations against members of the Suharto family. The articles resulted in the reporter being expelled from Indonesia and Foreign Affairs,
which disapproved of the Herald’s articles, did nothing to bail the newspaper out. Consequently, the paper lost its representation in Jakarta.

In spite of this, Foreign Affairs maintain that it is their job to uphold the basic commitment to freedom of speech and of the press, while working to minimise the potentially negative impact on bilateral relations with countries which have different cultural norms and traditions. An example of this is the involvement of the Australian Embassy in 1991 in resolving the dispute between the Thai authorities and the Australian, which had published a story by its Bangkok correspondent Alan Boyd. Thai authorities had claimed that the article was not historically factual. Under threat of the ban of the paper from Thailand and the expulsion of the correspondent, the Australian was forced to acknowledge the story was misleading and to state that it was willing to publish a corrective story. The matter was finally resolved with the Australian Embassy in Bangkok functioning as a channel of communication between the paper and Thai authorities (Boyd, 1991).

It is clear that the rhetoric of the 'free press' is a strategically important one for both Foreign Affairs and the media. From the perspective of the media, a declared distance from the government is critical to maintaining the credibility of the news organisation; and from the perspective of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the notion of 'freedom of speech' in the press is important in promoting and legitimising its foreign policy decisions. For both Foreign Affairs and the media, the rhetoric of 'national interest' is crucially important for it not only enables them to speak separately as the custodians of an Australian identity, it also justifies that interdependence and complicity.

**News Production in China**

In contrast to the Australian situation, Chinese news media have quite a different history, structure and professional standards, and therefore pose quite different issues to those studying the Australian news. A fundamental problem with studies of Chinese mass media in Western scholarship is that many do not recognise that the Chinese media have undergone tremendous changes since the late 1970s. To understand the Chinese press, it is important to trace these changes, and more importantly, explore their implications in relation to broader social changes in China.
Changes in the Chinese Press

According to Franz Schurmann's monumental work *Ideology and Organisation in Communist China* (1968), which details the structure of the Chinese press in the 1950s and 1960s, the press system in the People's Republic of China (PRC) was integrated with the formal bureaucracy of the Communist Party and the government. The press were organised in a hierarchical pattern parallel to the Communist Party. At the top of this hierarchy is the national press, which represented the authority of the Central Committee of the Party. The newspaper the *People's Daily*, the journal *Red Flag* (now called *Seek Truth*), and the news agency Xinhua comprised the commanding voice of the government, with all other news outlets being subordinated to these three. This national press structure was replicated at provincial and municipal levels, and all were under the strict control of the Propaganda Department of the local Communist Party. Accordingly, the substance of the press in China was determined by the Communist Party's projects of national integration, mobilisation and social transformation.

Sun Xuepe (1994: 356), Director of the Institute of Journalism at the China Academy of Social Sciences, highlights another important aspect of the structure of Party press -- the co-existence of publicly circulated papers (*gong kai bao kan*) and internally circulated papers (*nei bu bao kan*). Both at national and provincial levels, news organisations have publications which are circulated only within organisations. Xinhua News Agency, for instance, has the most internal publications, catering to the cadre readers at high-ranking, middle-ranking and grass-root levels. These internal publications play a crucially important role as they provide top-level decision-makers with information on the basis of which they can make decisions. They also provide the decision-makers with feedback on how their policies are being implemented at grass-root levels.

In other words, the dominant mode of communication in the Party press is a two-way process. The internal press is supposed to report to the Party leadership the people's concerns and their aspirations, as well as the performance of lower-level cadres. Indeed, according to Zhao (1995), journalists writing for internal publications are instructed by the Party to
cover areas such as sensitive problems in the implementation of Party policies, especially deviations and mistakes that are important for the leadership to know about, the political thinking of all types of people, and their opinions on important domestic and international events. Clearly, the purpose of such 'bottom-up' reporting is not to inform people but to gather intelligence for the leadership.

The publicly circulated press, as Zhao argues, are instruments of 'top-down' communication which serve to propagate the Party's policies and directives, to persuade people about the correctness of policies, and to tell them the good results of particular policies. In such cases, the press do not play any significant role in reporting policy-making, especially debates within the Party on important issues.

Such rigid Party press structure came under threat in the late 1970s, when the mass media in China began to undergo drastic transformation, along with the vigorous, if tortuous, growth of the country's economy. Economic reforms and an open-door policy introduced market logic into China's Party-controlled news media and led to the emergence of a commercial sector within the system. These developments have produced the current intermingling of Party logic and market logic in the news media. A place where such intermingling is most telling is the internal press, which became an economically competitive paper because of, rather than in spite of, the 'inside' nature of its content. The most widely read internal publication of this kind is Reference News (Cancao Xiaoxi), which has a circulation of approximately seven to eight million, and is probably the most widely read newspaper in China (Hood, 1994: 40). In other words, internal publications such as Reference News are not commercial papers, but the very notion of 'inside', 'real' news attached to them makes them highly commercialised.

Writing in the mid-1980s, Ming (1987) points out that the economic reforms which started in 1978 had brought 'three breakthroughs'. The first breakthrough was in the total scale of the mass media system, as seen in the increase of ownerships of TV sets and radios by individuals, as well as the dramatic increase in the number of newspapers, journals and magazines. The second breakthrough, according to Ming, was the transformation from a structure that consists only of Party press to one that contains both Party
press and commercial press. This breakthrough manifested itself in a number of important shifts: from politics-oriented newspapers to trade-oriented ones; from papers that target a general audience to those that target specific audiences; and from nationally and provincially based to regionally and locally based papers. This, according to Ming, led to the third breakthrough: a major change in the function of the mass media, especially the news media. Before and during the Cultural Revolution, the media was dominated by Mao’s view of the media in class society as an instrument of class struggle. With the diversification and expansion of various media and the rapid transformation in the media structure, this view no longer prevailed. On one hand, the media could now function to inform, educate and entertain. On the other hand, different media could give priority to specific functions, depending on their targeted audience. Also, advertising, for the first time in the history of Party press, became a significant feature of the media.

The three breakthroughs bred euphoria among Chinese journalists and scholars in the 1980s. They predicted the arrival of the fourth breakthrough: the creation of a comprehensive vision for the Chinese media which would affirm the diversity of forms, of purposes and of audiences being shaped at that time. This prediction was accompanied by a series of enthusiastic discussions and debates on many issues, such as the loosening of the Party’s rigid control of the press, press freedom, press legislation and the professionalisation of journalism. However, these hopeful discussions were brought to an end by the suppression of the Shanghai-based, technocrat-run journal World Economic Herald in May, 1989, which precipitated the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989. Soon after the political unrest, the General Secretary of the CCP, Jiang Zemin, reiterated the prescribed relationship between the press and the Party, asserting that journalism in China was primarily and ultimately the organ of the Party (Hsiao, 1990).

However, these statements could not stop the process of change in Chinese media. After a few years' hiatus after the students' democracy movement at Tiananmen, and following Deng Xiaoping’s tour to southern China and the 14th Congress of the CCP, a new newspaper boom started in 1992. The changes which occurred before 1989 were pushed to a more comprehensive scale. The most significant change in the Chinese media since 1992 has been the unstoppable trend towards commercialisation. The media in China
since the Communist revolution in 1949 had been government-financed and state-controlled. The shift from planned economy to market economy, however, is rapidly changing this scenario. Although state control remains fundamentally intact, government subsidy has been increasingly replaced by financial self-sufficiency for most TV stations and newspapers.

This market-orientation has various and important implications. With the exception of only a few Party papers, such as the People’s Daily, and news organisations such as Xinhua, more and more Chinese newspapers find themselves operating like business organisations, attending to issues of supply, demand and profit. Yu's (1994) survey of press changes since 1989 finds that the growing decline and loss of government subsidies has resulted in more and more newspapers that are either jointly run by Chinese and overseas press organisations, or financially sponsored by both overseas and Chinese companies. Also, the tendency to go commercial is driving journalists to reconceptualise the news as a commodity, resulting in a more pluralised and diversified information structure as they pursue more readers.

More importantly, the commercial sector of the Chinese media represents a form of journalism that is different from traditional Party press reporting. The relationship between the Party press and the commercial sector is complex. Unlike traditional Party organs, which depend on government subsidy and operate as government bureaucracies rather than business enterprises, commercial papers are financed through commercial revenue and managed as business enterprises. They have to depend on advertising and/or sponsorship for their survival. For this reason, they operate according to a market logic similar to that of commercial news media in the West.

However, unlike Western commercial news media, which are first and foremost commercial enterprises, news media institutions in China, whether they are completely or partially dependent on commercial revenue, all have institutional affiliations with the Party, the government or quasi-official institutions. Some of them may need to be economically self-sustaining, but they cannot pursue profit as their primary objective. In terms of content, while the commercial press needs to respond to the interests and tastes of readers, they will still first and foremost cater to the propaganda
needs of the Party. Failing to do so could result in having their publications banned.

Zhao (1995) argues that, although the commercial press threatens to challenge the monopolistic control of the news media, its oppositional potentials have largely been contained by tight political control. The relationship between the Party press and the commercial press is one of mutual containment, accommodation and occasional contradiction. Increasingly, this hybrid system of economic freedom and political control has become the defining feature of Chinese news media in the 1990s (Zhao, 1995: 166).

Two recent phenomena in Chinese newspapers have further changed the look of the Chinese press. One is the increased number of pages of newspapers. For decades, most national and provincial dailies in China had four pages. The first few years of the current decade saw a widespread increase in the number of pages of many newspapers such as the Shanghai-based Wenhui Daily and Beijing-based Guangming Daily, both of which expanded from four to eight pages. What appears in the additional pages is mostly economic news and features stories, including social news (often a euphemism for crime news), sports news, lifestyle and, most visibly, advertisements. Some papers, like Guangzhou Daily, also include a page targeted at overseas Chinese.

Another phenomenon is the sudden appearance of weekend editions. Many newspapers have either Saturday or Sunday supplements, or print separate weekend papers, like the Beijing Weekend of the China Daily. Most of the weekend publications are devoted to entertainment; some of them have become highly popular reading. These papers are mostly sold by street vendors and feature topics similar to those in Western tabloid journalism, including sports cars, girls in bathing suits, pop stars, and military espionage stories.

These two phenomena are significant for at least three reasons. Firstly, the traditional categories appropriate for studying Party media are becoming increasingly inadequate in the era of market economy. Advertising in China has never been studied as a form of propaganda, although it obviously is. Formerly, the Party press was solely concerned with effective persuasion and
indoctrination and with national integration and social mobilisation; however, the issues it faces in a diverse media environment are more complex. Confronted with the increasing need for financial self-reliance, the Party press has to juggle between its role as the Party's mouthpiece and as a commodity, between authority and accessibility, between indoctrination and readability. Given this, it is important to examine the new forms and strategies which the Party press adopts to meet with the changing situation.

Secondly, with newspapers becoming increasingly reliant on self-generated revenue and more preoccupied with entertainment, a structural opposition to the 'serious' official press has emerged. Although the commercial newspapers would not openly challenge the leadership of the Party, their appearance will provide discursive sites for ideological contestation in the area of popular culture. The entertainment content was a response to market forces, and their ideological function should not be overlooked. This change adds an important dimension to the study of the media in Communist China.

Thirdly, the increasing dependence of news organisations on foreign sponsorship and growing interactions between Chinese journalists on the mainland and in Taiwan and Hong Kong will call into question the role of the media in constructing Chinese identity. With the increasing coverage of overseas Chinese in the press, as well as growing attention to the interests and needs of overseas readership, the media, more than ever before, become important in reshaping the 'national imaginary' of who the Chinese are. The 'Middle Kingdom' mentality, which regards China, particularly mainland China, as the centre of the world, is proving increasingly unproductive in economic and political terms. Given the dynamics of the relationship between centre and periphery, it becomes significant for students of Chinese media to study the role of the media in the politics of Chineseness.

News or views -- A Chinese understanding of newsworthiness

The two most influential press organisations in China are Xinhua News Agency (New China Agency) and the Party newspaper the People's Daily. Being the long-standing principal government organ for gathering and disseminating news at home and abroad, Xinhua is directly supervised by
the CCP and its Propaganda Department. The National Division of Xinhua consists of Domestic and External Departments. The Domestic Department gathers and disseminates news within China through a network of branches in the principal cities and towns, providing a major source of information for provincial newspapers. The External Department is responsible for disseminating abroad news about developments in China (Porter, 1992: 2-3). As the two most influential press organisations in China, Xinhua and the People’s Daily have a symbiotic relationship. On the one hand, Xinhua is one of the major sources of news, particularly international news, for the People’s Daily; on the other, Xinhua tends to rely on the People’s Daily to provide both facts and the interpretation of events (Porter, 1992: 9).

Apart from publishing many papers which contain news and features on both domestic and international affairs, Xinhua’s important role in decision-making can be seen from its internal publications. These are journals and papers which are ‘classified’, some limited to ‘office use only’, such as Reference Materials (Cankao ziliao), while others are limited to certain cadre levels inside China, such as the Reference News (Cankao xiaoxi). Although the Reference News is classified as an ‘internal publication’, consisting of articles and news reports from foreign news agencies and presses, it is subscribed to by most cadres, including rural grassroots officials. The Reference News is therefore not only one of the main sources of information shaping Chinese public opinion on world affairs, but is also an antidote to the official versions of world affairs provided in the publicly circulated press.

The People’s Daily is another institution that plays an important role in the shaping of public opinion, but it functions in a somewhat different way to the Xinhua News Agency. The editorial staff who are members of the International Affairs section of the paper read most of Xinhua’s Reference Materials every day before deciding which international news items the paper will carry (Barnett, 1985). According to Barnett, the main function of the People’s Daily is to articulate and interpret government policies in an authoritative way once decisions have been made, rather than to gather and disseminate information on international affairs, as Xinhua does. Regular editorials (she lun) are the most authoritative policy statements, unsigned ‘commentator’ (ping lun yuan) and signed commentaries (shuming pinglun) are almost equally authoritative.
An important feature of the *People’s Daily*, as in many Chinese newspapers, is its variety of commentaries. Studying the editorial formulation in the *People’s Daily*, Wu Guoguang (1994) observes that Chinese newspapers do not have editorial pages as does the West. Editorials and commentaries are published on different pages according to editors’ perceptions of their relevance and importance. An editorial on the front page is the most important, while commentaries, signed or unsigned, may appear on other pages. According to Wu, Chinese journalists generally do not differentiate between editorials and other types of commentary, as they necessarily present the opinions of the newspaper and the top leadership. They are usually produced directly on command from the top Party leaders, and they are often revised and censored by the Party leaders themselves (Wu, 1994: 196).

Another important feature of Chinese newspapers, particularly the Party press, is the process of formulating editorials and commentaries. Wu observes that although the Party Centre initiates commands for commentary subjects in the *People’s Daily*, these commands are treated in different ways by the press. The first is what Wu describes as the ‘pouring’ method. The ‘water’ refers to the ideas or completed instructions formulated by the central leaders and Propaganda Department at the top; the cup is the brains of journalistic commentators. The second method is what Wu refers to as the ‘bird-cage’ method. The ‘cage’ is a leader’s general idea rather than a specific instruction. Commentators can write commentaries within the parameters of this general idea, like a bird flying in the cage. The third method, which Wu refers to as the ‘kite flying method’, has become common during the 1980s. The commentators choose a topic by themselves, and can express their personal views as long as they are within the boundary of the Party ideology. The commentators are like a kite flying in the sky with just a string in the hands of the Party (Wu, 1994: 203). The increasingly common use of the ‘bird-cage’ and the ‘kite flying’ methods in the 1980s represents Chinese journalists’ desire to ‘water down’ (dan hua) the propagandist flavour of Chinese media so that the content may become more ‘palatable’.

Perhaps the most prominent feature of the Party newspapers is the journalists’ understanding of what constitutes journalistic professionalism.
As discussed earlier, the most important criterion of professionalism in the West is 'objective' reporting. To comply with requirements of 'objective' rules, journalists make careful distinctions between 'fact' and 'opinion', and follow the necessary process by which subsequent features and editorials develop views out of the facts provided in primary news. Chinese journalists, however, operate under the constraints of a Party agenda rather than the constraints of objectivity. News may contain more opinions than facts, and editorials may come before news. This is because propaganda needs facts, but the purpose of using fact is not to force readers to accept the facts per se, instead it is to make them accept the points of view which the facts are used to prove. For purposes of propaganda, any fact that may help advance a good point of view can be used, whether they are historical facts or current facts, unknown facts or familiar facts (Li, 1987: 56).

What is significant about this quote is that it suggests that 'propaganda' is not a 'dirty' word in Chinese politics and does not have the same connotation as in the West. Rather, it can be considered as a form of professionalism that serves the Party on the one hand and the reader on the other. A professional journalist is therefore a good 'propagandist'. Zhao (1995) defines the professionalism of Chinese journalists as

the journalists' efforts to contextualise, to relate a news event to the broader political situation, to take into consideration the Party's propaganda needs, its current concerns and objective. The construction of a news story is a process of abstraction, of elevation, of injection of political meaning into news personalities or, more bluntly, of developing an example to fit the propaganda needs of the Party (Zhao, 1995: 60).

Such a notion of professionalism is embodied in two types of news-writing practice. One is the tradition of positive reporting; the other is discovery of role models. Just as the journalist hero in the West wants to be a 'muckraker' or 'watchdog' exposing government wrongdoing, the ideal type of Chinese journalist is one who discovers a role model.
The position of the reader

In the Chinese context, journalists' understanding of how their readers relate to news comes from their knowledge of Chinese political culture. The tradition of positive reporting, for instance, comes from the notion of unity and consensus; readers expect news, as a public form of communication, to be free from conflict and contestation. This expectation of consensus is also rooted in what Pye (1992: 198) describes as a 'deep craving for order to the extent of creating a profound fear of luan' (chaos). This craving for order and fear of chaos became more pronounced in the process of economic reform and modernisation, which gave rise to the CCP's sense of crisis of authority. On one hand, economic reform and modernisation were initiatives of the government to give legitimacy to the Party under threat, but on the other hand it was seen by the government from the very beginning as a Western challenge to Chinese authorities.

Party journalists know that although they are only allowed to give readers the final confirmation of the authorities' judgment of a given issue or situation, their readers are acutely aware of the conflict and disharmony behind consensus. A survey conducted in 1988 by the People's University in Beijing asked 1,800 journalists whether they thought Chinese newspaper readers believed the domestic press. According to the survey, only 1.1% of the journalists replied in the affirmative. This wide-spread cynicism was reinforced during the demonstrations in April and May of 1989 when marching journalists carried a banner reading, 'Don't believe us -- we tell lies' (Hood, 1994: 41).

From the perspective of the Party journalist, professionalism lies in being able to service the conflicting desires of the reader. The Chinese reader, like his/her Western counterpart, expects assurance from news that his/her government is in control, his/her country is stable. Thus the reader seeks guidance and leadership from journalists and wants to be protected from certain kinds of potentially disturbing information. The reader also knows that this very leadership and protection is a double-edged sword which can be used to promote government control and tyranny. Therefore the reader wants to be able to read between the lines for hints that the journalist is not in fact promoting the government line and is on the reader's side. A cynical
reader therefore learns to distrust official news texts and is inclined to construct opposite readings.

*Nationalism, foreign policy, and the Chinese media*

The rapid development of mass communication in post-1978 China occurred hand in hand with the development of postal communication and telecommunications -- what Alan Liu (1991) describes as 'transactional communications'. While the increasing volume of transactional communication increases social and economic exchange and personal freedom in general, the proliferating number of new associations -- based on group interests, trades and professions -- indicate an increasingly diverse, pluralistic, and partly segregated society. Studying the relationship between social change and communication systems in China, Liu suggests that the advent of freer communication since 1980 is dissolving the forms of nationhood created by CCP propaganda, and transactional communications and associations are providing new building blocks for a genuine and substantive nationalism in China.

Thoughtful as his analysis of changing social structures may be, Liu's optimism about the collapse of the official nationalism is built on a false premise. The nationalism created by CCP propaganda is not 'artificial'; rather, as Goodman and Segal (1995) argue, it is pre-modern. It is more of a vague cultural nationalism than one which is allied to a specific state or government. However, it is exactly this 'primitive' nationalism that appeals to a society like China, which is still largely pre-modern. Additionally, even though the CCP is aware that the definition of 'Chineseness' may lie outside its control, as Goodman and Segal point out, the Party does not necessarily want to give up its role as the 'guardian' of this Chineseness. Ultimately, it is important to remember that, despite the CCP's resorting to economic reforms which lead China into further interdependence with the outside world, it does not necessarily want to forsake its nationalist ideology. Therefore, a more realistic scenario than the one projected by Liu regarding the future of nationalism in China may not be the replacement of one kind of nationalism by another, but an ongoing contestation of different perceptions of nationhood.
The co-existence of economic freedom and the communist political regime, of pluralised press structures and centralised nationalist ideology, makes the relationship between the press and foreign policy more complex. It becomes important to examine the assumptions behind the way the Chinese press presents the world in general to its readers, as well as the way in which it reports China's foreign relations, particularly problematic ones such as China's relations with Japan. The ongoing tendency towards a more plural, diverse and regional press demands a more sophisticated framework within which to understand the relationship between the press and foreign policy. Chang et al (1993), for example, suggest that a realistic assessment of the press' relationship to foreign policy must differentiate two concepts: foreign news, which describes events in a foreign country, and foreign policy news, which reports a country's foreign policy toward another nation. In foreign news, Chang et al observe, views expressed by the newspapers are independent of the nation's policy, whereas in foreign policy news, the views are directly related to the nation's interests abroad: 'The former constitutes the world landscape as seen by China without it being part of the picture, whereas the latter clearly concerns China's position in the world in relation to others' (Chang et al, 1993: 177).

Differentiating between these two forms of news enables Chang et al to account for the different ways in which the world is represented in the national press as distinct from the regional and local press. Their study finds that the coverage of the outside world in the regional press does not necessarily adhere to the foreign policy stance sketched by central news authorities, such as the Xinhua News Agency and the People's Daily. This argument has important implications for any study of Chinese press coverage of foreign countries: the 'world' represented in foreign news is less likely to be affected by Chinese foreign policy than that represented in foreign policy news.

While some representations of Japan, for example, may fall under the category of foreign news and contain images of Japan that are consistent with collective memories and nationalist sentimentality, stories of Sino-Japanese relationships are mostly categorised as foreign policy news and are governed more by the Chinese government's interest-driven policy towards Japan than a desire to understand Japan. This differentiation enables us to contrast the enduring images and perceptions of foreign countries with the
changing attitudes towards these countries revealed in foreign policy news. It also provides an entrance into the analysis of the press’ relationship with both state ideology and dominant public sentiment.

However, Chang et al’s argument seems to be based on the assumption that, in spite of the decentralisation of the press, foreign policy news remains the uncontested domain of central news organisations. This argument fails to consider the issues brought about by increasing economic regionalism in China. Goodman (1994: 3), for instance, points out that the abandonment of the 'self-reliance' and the adoption of the 'open door' policy may enable the coastal and border regions to develop economic links with other countries. According to him, this regional economic growth has the potential to lead to political disintegration, though it is not a necessary consequence. The implication of this trend is that in the future, the official expressions of China's position in certain foreign policy issues may face challenge from the regional press, which may put the regional interests before the national interest. For instance, due to its historical links and geographic proximity to Japan, Dalian, a port city in Liaoning Province, Northeast China, has become a hub of Japanese economic activity since the economic reform. It is therefore reasonable to hypothesise that Dalian, whose prosperity and economic future depends on good relations with Japan, may dissent from the central government should the Centre decide to pursue an anti-Japan policy.

This is not to say, however, that the ideology of Chinese central authorities’ foreign policy is unchanging. Looking at the domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy, Bachman (1989) summarises the overall ideological elements of the official views adopted by the CCP leadership. They include: Chinese nationalism; China's moral leadership in the world; the necessity of rule by the CCP; the need for rapid economic development and modernity; the need for China to integrate with the outside world; and a socialist morality (Bachman, 1989: 36). Clearly, the key dilemma for the Chinese leadership is how to benefit from the dynamism of capitalism without having to take on what they see as its excessive negative characteristics.

Also studying Chinese behavioural patterns in international relations from the perspectives of its political culture, Pye (1985) argues that the dominant ideology in Chinese politics in the 1980s was pragmatism. According to Pye,
pragmatism assumes that once the logic of the situation has changed, new policies should be adopted, leaving no room for emotional ties of loyalty and ideological consistency. This pragmatic tendency enables Chinese leaders to make extreme shifts in foreign policy, which prove to be not only baffling to foreigners, but also emotionally unacceptable to the Chinese population.

Given that the dominant position in Chinese foreign policy is one of pragmatism, and that nationalism is likely to continue to be a basic ideological tenet in China's domestic and international politics, it is necessary to examine the processes by which the official press' foreign policy news provides possibilities for pragmatic uses of nationalism. Additionally, as the Chinese press becomes more diverse and more attentive to the specific needs and interests of targeted audiences, nationalist views in the foreign news of the commercial press pose a serious challenge to state ideology. Therefore, under the rubric of nationalist ideology, the mapping of nationhood becomes a contested process and the definition of Chineseness an ongoing political issue.

* * *

Examination reveals that the Australian press is commercially run, has a high concentration of ownership and suffers from a lack of diversity while the Chinese press is state-controlled but has a newly emerging commercial sector within the Party press system. Given this, the choice of sites of analysis in this work should reflect this difference. The decision to concentrate only on the Australian, therefore, is made with the assumption that, to look for diversity and pluralism in the Australian press, we need to focus on pluralism in a single news outlet. We also need to scrutinise the performance of individual editors and journalists, who may resort to specific strategies to reclaim journalistic credibility. Similarly, in the Chinese case, the decision to scrutinise the Party paper People's Daily and selected commercial papers is made with the assumption that a complete picture of the Chinese press is not obtainable unless one looks at the contradictions, ambiguities and contestation that exist within the system.

The discussion also points to the difference in journalists' perception of professionalism. The job of an Australian journalist is to give the
appearance of objectivity while knowing that it is impossible to fully achieve. To negotiate this paradox, the journalist resorts to irony. The job of the Chinese Party journalist is to provide official truths as a way of servicing the conflicting desire of the sometimes idealistic, sometimes cynical Chinese reader. Moreover, with the press' relationship to the Party slowly changing from that of 'tongue and throat' to that of the 'kite flying in the sky' or the 'bird in the cage', the challenge to the Party journalist lies in reducing the reader's cynicism and convincing him/her that they do not have to assume the worst of Party journalism, and that truths exist more in negotiation than in polarity.

This points to the importance of examining how the system claims professional authority in the process of news-making, rather than judging either kind of professionalism. It also points to the importance of what Mercer (1986: 184) refers to as the 'occasions of reading':

It's much more fruitful to understand 'texts' in this way, as occasions located in historical time and space, determined by conditions of circulation, distribution and legibility than to treat them as either expressive of a totality or as the simulacrum of a structure.

Furthermore, in both Australian and Chinese presses, there is a fusion of foreign affairs news and domestic political news. Given this, an analysis of news constructions of identity, difference and otherness in the Australian and Chinese press needs to go beyond news of Japan in the area of foreign affairs, and to scrutinise as well the representations of Japan in the reporting of domestic politics. These are issues that will be taken up in the detailed news analysis from this point.
Chapter 5
From Metaphor to Irony: Issues and Solutions in the Australian's Stories of Japan

It was more food for thought than diplomatic incident, but Japanese immigration officials moved swiftly into damage control yesterday after it was revealed that two Australian chefs were refused visas on the grounds that "there is no such thing as Australian cuisine".

Japan relented yesterday and granted visas to the two 29-year-old Queenslanders, but the incident had already sparked a lively debate among top Australian chefs over whether there was such a thing as genuine Australian cuisine.

In a novel appeal against the rejection of their visas, former Gold Coast chefs Mr Damian Turner and Mr Brett Doidge late last week dished water buffalo salad, crocodile pie, Moreton Bay bug, Tasmanian prawns and other Aussie delicacies to the immigration officials in Nagoya who had turned them down.

Award-winning Sydney chef Mr Tetsuya Wakuda, whose restaurant menu includes what he calls Australian cuisine, said yesterday he was "angry, very, very upset" about the incident and planned to complain to the Japanese ambassador in Canberra.

"Of course there is such a thing as Australian cuisine," he said. "What right do these officials have to say there isn't?" (Meade, 1994: 5).

Unlike many stories of Japan that appear in the economics, finance, trade, investment and technology sections of the Australian, this story seems to be free from figures, jargon and abstractions, and contains only the essential facts necessary for a news story: Mr Turner and Mr Doidge from Queensland (Who) were rejected, and later granted visas (What) to go to Japan (Where). Such an incident happened because initially the Japanese immigration officials thought there was no such thing as an Australian cuisine (Why) but it was resolved because the Australian chefs convinced the Japanese immigration officials that an Australian cuisine did indeed exist (How). The story seems to have a good dramatic narrative structure, with an element of
conflict (rejection of visa applications), suspense (to prove to the Japanese the existence of an Australian cuisine), and a happy ending (the Japanese immigration officials changed their minds and the two Queenslanders had got their visa applications approved).

This story, however, also illustrates some of the issues, anxieties and ambiguities central to the construction of national identity in Australia. To begin with, the debate about Australian cuisine (or the lack of it) is not exclusively concerned with food. Rather, the obsession with and anxiety about 'whether there is such a thing as an Australian cuisine' can be read as an anxiety about whether there is such a thing as Australian identity. In this way, the 'eclecticism', the 'hybridity' and the 'incorporation of Asian ingredients' -- words that are used in a subsequent discussion (Ripe, 1994: 15) in the paper's lifestyle section about Australian cuisine -- become interchangeable in defining the 'Australian identity'.

What is operating in these stories is a kind of orientalism that functions not so much to exoticise Japan as to exoticise the self. It is an ambiguous, ambivalent and indeterminate process. These stories seem to orientalise the self, partly through incorporating Asianness into Australian culture, and partly through flaunting the authenticity of Australianness. In other words, Australians are seen to be engaged in an 'auto-orientalism', just like their Asian counterparts. Furthermore, contrary to Xiaomei Chen's argument that Western orientalism is mainly about domination of the Orient, these stories suggest that the 'West' can also deploy orientalism for the purpose of resisting and negotiating domination by the Orient.

One of the most tangible and effective ways of demonstrating the cultural pluralism of Australia has been the strategic presentation of 'ethnic' food. However, using food to symbolise national identity can blind us to the fact that changing one's cultural values may not, after all, be as easy as changing one's culinary preferences. While many people in Australia would gladly try sushi or sashimi, few would consider Japan as one of 'us'. In fact, Australia-Japan relations are marked with tensions arising from continuous past/present, memory/policy, and sentiment/reason conflicts. In this sense, using food to stand for identity may be effective at a metonymic level, but it also points to the inadequacy of such a device. News, which routinely invokes one part or aspect of Australian life to stand for the whole nation,
cannot fully convey the ambivalence, ambiguity and indeterminacy which mark the ways nation is imagined.

The 'Who' factor in the story is also riddled with ambiguity. Surely, Mr Damian Turner and Mr Brett Doidge, the Queensland chefs, are the actors, for without their initial action of applying for a visa, there would be no story. However, their names do not appear until the third paragraph. This suggests that the two names are mentioned not because they each possess intrinsic significance, but because the convention of news-writing demands the specificity of fact. These names are metonyms for Australia, and their conflict with Japanese Immigration becomes a metaphor for Australia-Japan relations and the problems of mutual perception. The real 'actors' in the story are 'Australia' and 'Japan'.

The incident shows the media has the ability to 'embarrass' foreign affairs bureaucrats -- the Japanese Immigration officials in this incident -- and to employ public opinion to change the decision-making process. It also shows the role of the media in transforming individuals' experience into a national affair. Individual points of view, once articulated through the media, acquire a collective, even national dimension. Conversely, nationalist discourse inevitably has to invoke the personalised narratives of individual experience, and its ideological currency can be sustained only when it is capable of expressing itself in the stories of individuals, and within specific tropes, such as writings on food, travel and sports.

The main characters in the story are those who have the capacity to develop the plot. In this case, it is the anonymous Japanese Immigration officials who demonstrate this capacity. While the Japanese Immigration officials are in a position to 'refuse', 'reject' and then 'relent' and 'grant visas', the Australian applicants, by contrast, can do no more than be 'told bluntly' and then seek to 'appeal', and finally have their applications 'approved'. The active voice used to describe the Japanese behaviour, and the passive voice used to describe the Australian action in this diplomatic incident are emblematic of an Australian submissiveness to Japan.

Japanese Immigration's rejection of the two Australian men's applications ironically compares with Australian Immigration's rejection of Japanese war brides' applications to join their Australian husbands after World War
II. Juxtaposing the two disparate events points to the remarkable change in power relations between Australia and Japan. Australia's official position regarding Japan has shifted considerably in order to cope with the new economic realities in Australia-Japan relations. However, traditional ways of understanding Japan, which positions the West as an active, masculine and dominant subject, may still persist, although they seem to contradict contemporary realities.

In the past Japan has been constituted as an Other in the process of defining Australian identity. However, this Other is refusing Australia an identity. In this particular case, as the rest of the story reveals, the most authoritative definer of Australian cuisine, ironically, is the Japanese-born, Sydney-based Wakuda; and in his menu, Japanese seaweed and sansho sauce are appropriated as Australian cuisine.

The Japanese city of Nagoya, is named as the place where the original visa applications were rejected. Again, the mention of the city has more to do with the journalistic requirement of specificity than with the significance of the place, as Nagoya for an Australian reader probably would not be distinguishable from Kobe or Hokkaido. What is of significance here is the geopolitical position of Japan rather than the geographical location of Nagoya. Japan, the name of a place, appears in the story more as an actor than as a location. As a key player in the global geopolitical power game, Japan, as the actor rather than a location, initiates the change in the Australia-Japan relationship, be it in the area of trade, finance or tourism.

The cuisine story is a useful introduction to my analysis here because, firstly, it embodies the ambivalence, ambiguity and indeterminacy that marks Japan's position in the Australian national imaginary. It points to the need to study how the nation is represented by the Other, and how the Other's representation of 'us' shapes 'our' sense of the national self. The analysis also reveals the limitations of metaphor and metonymy in news narrative and point to the need to explore alternative rhetorical devices. If news can no longer effectively describe and represent contemporary Japanese realities with a set of traditional orientalist metaphors and metonymies, then it seems difficult, if not impossible, for it to forsake these metaphors and metonymies and invent more effective devices. Thirdly, the analysis of the story shows an array of reading strategies useful for my examination of how
journalists address these issues and problems under the constraints of journalistic conventions.

However, to fully understand the complexity of Australian news constructions of Japan, a more detailed and systematic analysis of a range of individual writers and their stories in the *Australian* is required. The analysis will be structured to highlight three on-going issues in Australian news narratives of Japan. The first is the tension between views of Japan that are rooted in war experience, on the one hand, and that attend to the contemporary economic reality on the other; the second is the tension between an orientalist framework of understanding Japan and an actual discourse of Japan that challenges that framework; the third is the tension between the professional mandate of representing Japan 'objectively' and the desire to tell stories of Japan by way of representing the ambivalence, ambiguity and indeterminacy that mark the story-telling of Japan.

**Historical Legacy vs Economic Realities -- A Conflict Between Memory and Contemporary Policy**

If Australians have subscribed generally to Western views of Japan and the Japanese, their unique relationship with Japan in trade, technological and political contexts determines that there is also a great deal of specificity in Australian attitudes to Japan. Australians now like to think that Australia has a 'special relationship' with Japan, given that Japan is Australia's largest trading partner, its largest export market (26.4 per cent) and one of the few countries which has maintained a trade surplus with Japan (Jain and Weeks, 1993: 13).

However, Rix (1988) points out that such notions of a special relationship may sometimes be more Australia's wishful thinking than reality. This is because in Australian-Japanese trade relations, Australia is one of Japan's numerous 'suitors' and is usually 'unable to resolve the tensions' and 'compete' for Japan's agricultural markets and and therefore has to 'adjust' to the development and change in Japan's trade policy: 'Australia is a quiet and unassuming partner, an agenda-taker in the relationship' (Rix, 1988: 171). The reason for Australia's 'timidity' and 'vulnerability' in relation to Japan stems from the fact that Japan is the largest buyer of Australia's major exports, such as coal, iron ore, wool, and minerals. In addition, Japan's
tough import restrictions impose constraints on Australia's ability to increase its sales of agricultural products to Japan. Japan's bilateral trade deals with other countries, such as USA and China, pose a threat to less powerful partners, such as Australia. Although Japan has assured Australia that it will not settle trade deals with a third country at Australia's expense, it is equally adamant in its demand for stability of supply and competitive price (Rix, 1988: 163).

A 'constructive partnership' is a catchy phrase used to describe Australia-Japan relations at a governmental level. This rhetoric, according to Jain and Weeks, has a practical purpose: it conveys an image of Japan that best suits the government's Japan policy. However, the inequalities in the Australian-Japanese trade relationship may lead other sectors of the Australian community to consider that relationship as a partnership that is more 'destructive' than 'constructive:

This scenario -- the Australian government's eagerness to build on a burgeoning constructive partnership tempered by a sometimes hostile and angry community -- raises the questions: is the sense of maturity in the relationship which exists at the government/household level going to be 'hijacked' by emotive elements within the community? (Jain and Weeks, 1993: 14)

The 'emotive elements' consist not only of trade friction and imbalance, but more importantly of bitter war memories from the Pacific War. This is further complicated by Japan's growing direct investment in Australia, and the increasing number of Japanese tourists. These lead to what Jain and Weeks call the 'politicisation' of Australia-Japan relations. In contrast to the official rhetoric of high ideals and a constructive partnership, the analogy which has gained currency in Australia's popular imagery is the prospect of another Japanese invasion' of Australia.

In short, there is a tension between a policy-driven discourse of the Australia-Japan relation and a more hostile, emotionally loaded popular discourse. This tension manifests itself in the Australian newspapers' reminiscences about World War II and reports of activities commemorating the 50th anniversary of V-J Day. The Australian, like other newspapers and electronic media in the country, gave lavish coverage to these events. These
included personal memories of the war, mostly by Australian soldiers who were prisoners of war of the Japanese; news reports about the Japanese government's indecision in giving a war apology; and coverage of commemorative events in Australia. This anniversarial event, like Anzac Day and Bicentennial celebrations, gave rise to a forum where the media could orchestrate the collective imagining of the nation, but it also created an occasion for disturbing war memories and hostile attitudes to Japan to resurface. A close reading of these stories reveals an ambivalent strategy, which allows the official and popular discourses to co-exist, albeit in a compartmentalised manner that is made possible through a careful use of different narrative forms.

One type of collective remembering takes place in the form of the paper's editorial and hard news -- the most 'authoritative' narrative forms in newspaper journalism. The Australian's editorial for the anniversary is entitled 'V-J Day: a new nation celebrates', and it remembers the end of the War dispassionately, and speaks of 'Australia' and 'us' as if what constitutes them were given and self-evident:

Internationally, Australia began to speak with its own accent and to seek its own destiny. Examples were our support for Indonesian independence, the drafting of the 1951 peace treaty ending the formal occupation of Japan, the security agreement with Japan. By the mid-1950s Japan was our second biggest market for exports. Japan's attitude to its wartime past -- even today ambiguous at best and mostly lacking in remorse -- has not affected the strength of bilateral ties (Editorial, the Weekend Australian, August 12-13, 1995: 22).

In contrast to the dispassionate and impersonal voice of the editorial, personal memories of war appeal to the emotions of readers and have the power to stir up latent, hostile feelings against the Japanese. In these writings, Japan's war past is not to be forgotten and forgiven, but to be remembered and vindicated. For instance, John Laffin, a member of 231 Battalion and historian of the unit, offers the Australian readers a way of savouring the past that is quite different from the paper's editorial. Detailing the ceremony of Japanese surrender following V-J Day in 1945, the author writes that 'Australia exacted a memorable revenge against the enemy' when Australian Lieutenant Colonel Murray Robinson ordered Japanese
general Uno to place his sword at his feet. According to Laffin, Robinson was flouting military tradition and the Japanese general, shocked and affronted by the command, choked back his tears and for a moment appeared to be about to commit harakiri. The climate of the intense showdown in Laffin's account is prolonged to maximise its effect: the Japanese were humiliated and submissive while the Australians were assertive and victorious. Laffin's description of the ceremony is almost lyrical:

Colonel Robinson with WO Page at his side took position while military police escorted forward the Japanese general and his party. The Japanese flag was lowered and left to lie in a crumpled heap while the Australian flag was raised to its masthead and fluttered in a sudden breeze (Laffin, 1995: 7).

Laffin's nationalism has a nostalgic touch: 'even now, when reminiscing at reunions, they speak of the surrender ceremony at the Bandjermasin when their forthright CO forced a Japanese general to bow'. Indeed, such nostalgia has become more pertinent in recent decades, when Japan has been increasingly able to say 'No' to its Western opponents. The paper's inclusion of such almost sadistic memories may well be strategic. It registers the resentment of, and even hatred for, the former enemy, yet contains this in a personal and emotional form of writing, thus dissociating it from the editorial stance of the paper.

A similar strategy is clearly at work in the paper's reaction to the Japanese refusal to apologise for the war past. 'Hard' news is usually limited to reporting conflicts within the Japanese government and do not mention the Australian government's position on this issue. In some cases, examples of other countries -- such as Asian and Pacific governments -- demanding Japanese apologies are duly yet dispassionately reported. Given that the Australian government is determined not to let this issue 'affect the strength of bilateral ties', as the aforementioned editorial says, the absence of an explicit official position is clearly understandable.

However, this does not mean that the apology issue had not caught the imagination of the Australian population. In fact, public attitudes regarding whether Japan should say 'sorry' ranged from the forgiving, forward-looking view to a downright demand for a Japanese apology. Indeed, such a
spectrum of views is registered in the press, but mostly in a personalised
fashion, typified by letters-to-the-editor, a special form of journalistic writing
often reserved for opinions considered unfit for mainstream discourses. A
Mr Bruce Sivanlingam, for instance, writes to the Australian regarding the
apology issue and argues that countries that suffered during the Japanese
War should not ask for Japan's apology, nor for war reparations. This is not,
the author argues, because they should forgive the Japanese. On the
contrary, saying 'sorry' and paying reparations, according to the author,
would only result in the war past being forgotten:

By forcing Japan to make an apology we could be sowing the seeds of a
future conflict. With no understanding of the need to say sorry,
Japanese may conclude that their nation is being unjustly dealt with.
Wringing reparations at this juncture would also be a mistake. It would
absolve Japan, one of the wealthiest nations on earth, in an almost
painless way. The Japanese would then have a very valid case for
telling us that now everything is square (Sivanlingam, 1995: 10).

Laffin's popular history and Sivalingam's letter to the editor have at least
one thing in common: they both express a desire to see that Japan is still in
some kind of pain and a determination to get even with the Japanese. A
juxtaposition of the official and popular discourse of Japan as expressed in
the paper reveals not only a difference of attitudes, but more importantly, a
difference in the form which contained these attitudes. In other words, in
the process of negotiating the tension between official discourse and public
sentiments, a strategic containment of competing narratives could prove to
be more effective than total omission.

The most ambivalent moments in the paper's commemorations are the
accounts of the experiences of a few 'war brides', Japanese women who
married Australian soldiers during the war. After the war, these women
were not allowed to join their husbands and settle in Australia, and it was
not until 1952 that the Australian government allowed the first 'war bride'
to join her husband. From the narrative point of view, these experiences
make good stories, as they contain perennial themes of separation and
reunion, change of fate and fortune, and a happy ending. Also from the
point of view of the official policy of Japan, these stories could be read as
triumph over prejudice, peace over war, as indeed the headlines of these stories suggest.

However, these stories are significant because they contain two morals which, though not necessarily intended for the reader, can nevertheless be inferred from reading between the lines. First, these stories imply that the official policy towards Japan has not always been favourable. Embedded in these stories about the 'war brides' is the message that what made these Australian ex-servicemen and their Japanese wives' lives after the war more miserable than necessary was not so much the prejudice of Australians as 'rigid and unsympathetic' (Nelson, 1995: 8) Australian politicians and bureaucrats. Australia's then Minister for Immigration Arthur Calwell is quoted as reflecting the view of many Australians about Japanese war brides: 'Japanese women should not be allowed to pollute our shores' (Rintoul, 1995: 4).

Moreover, Australian ex-servicemen have often been constructed as the most racist and prejudiced sector of the Australian community, and the media have tended to seek views from some members of the RSL whenever an anti-Asian remark is needed. However, stories of the support and understanding which the Australian ex-servicemen gave to their colleagues who married Japanese women imply that ex-servicemen's reactions to Asia came out of specific experiences and their hatred is by no means unremitting and indiscriminate. In contrast to Arthur Calwell's remark, Gordon Parker, an ex-prisoner-of-war who married a Japanese woman, was assured by his POW mates that it was OK to marry Japanese women because 'they didn't belt us or starve us, or shoot us. It wasn't the women' (Rintoul, 1995: 4).

A curious legacy of the war experience with Japan is the tendency to see post-war Japanese business as hostile, dangerous and in need of conquering. Some stories of Australian business involvements in Japan combine nationalist images of Australian settlers with militaristic jargon evoking war-time Japan. As discussed in Chapter 2, in Australian representations of national identity, the land is often compared to a femme fatale because of its hostility, deceitfulness and unproductivity. These representations reveal a process of man confronting the land as the alien Other, and attempting to define himself through his attempts to understand and conquer the bush. This narrative framework remains intact in certain popular discourses about
Australia's relationship to Japan: Japan, rather than the bush, becomes the Other, and like the bush, it seduces those with an adventurous spirit, but is inevitably treacherous.

Given this, it is not hard to understand why success stories about Australian businessmen who have 'made it' in Japan are threaded through with militaristic, if not phallocentric descriptions. 'Ansett Breaks Car Rental Barriers' is a story about Australian businessman Bob Ansett succeeding in Japan's car rental business. According to the story, it took four years for Ansett's company, Budget Rent-a-Car, to 'break into' Japan; within twelve months, he 'targets' 2000 rental cars, having 'cracked the Japanese barrier' in a tough market. According to the reporter, the Budget breakthrough proves that Australians can make the big time in Japan: 'Impossible in such a tightly-held, foreigner-wary country? Not for Bob Ansett' (Australian, May 25, 1985: 18).

In narratives like this, Japan is depicted as tough, hostile and unfathomable, just like the bush. Australian businessmen, on the other hand, become the national heroes of the modern age; they seem to embody both the settlers' survival skills and the ex-servicemen's courage. The hero is always the one who learns 'the bush skills' in order to conquer Japan: skills to cope with poor living conditions, high costs, and above all, crossing the language barrier and communicating with the inscrutable natives. 'I lived in a cockroach-infested room, about nine square meters, for a year, paying 13,000 yen a month, an incredible rent by today's standards', says Roger March, the hero in another success story 'Helping Australians Do Business in Tokyo'. The story not only employs similar militaristic term such as 'breaking into the Tokyo business circle', but also further extends the metaphor of Japan as an exotic Other:

Arriving in Kobe in 1978, he immersed himself in the local scene for three years. He disdained the life of the foreign settlement at this historic, picturesque port and got down to the task of absorbing the language and culture by living as a local. So native did he become in the acclimatisation process that he felt he had to restore his roots. He arrived back in Sydney to take a job with the trading house Marubeni Australia Ltd (Goodall, May 30, 1988: 12).
Afterwards, March is quoted as saying, 'I felt I was part of Australia again.' According to Alan Goodall, the reporter of the story, March did go back to Australia for a year only to return to Japan, this time to Tokyo, to make a bigger impact. Here, Kobe, and through Kobe, Japan, is constructed as 'native', 'foreign' and 'picturesque', but at the same time, as threatening to sap masculine energy. Describing how March became interested in Japan, Goodall says that March was already 'fascinated' with Japan many years ago, stayed 'hooked', and finally 'took the plunge'. Through the use of such metaphorical images, the Oriental and various possible 'others' are confused as all are placed under the sign of availability. Japan, as a consequence, goes through a process of feminisation: on the one hand, Japan, like the bush, is a 'hostile' and 'competitive environment'; on the other hand, it is 'picturesque'. Like the bushmen who need to get away from their women from time to time to regain their male solidarity with their mates, a year back in Australia is considered necessary for the Australian hero to re-establish his cultural identity. In the process of transplanting the narrative of bush hero onto businessmen, masculine identity and national identity become interchangeable, and through this an association between Australianness and manliness is made. Furthermore, the tension between a policy-driven discourse of Japan and a war-time memory of it seems temporarily but effectively managed.

The Orient Strikes Back

As discussed in Chapter 1, orientalist discourses very often rely on a discursive alliance between ethnocentrism and phallocentrism. Indeed, as some of the Australian's Japan stories in the 1980s reveal, Said's (1978: 220) vivid description of nineteenth century French administrators and merchants who 'poured out their exuberant activity on the fairly supine, feminine Orient' is still applicable today. However, these success stories constitute only a small proportion of the stories of Australians in Japan throughout the 1980s. This is because Japan, after all, is not so easy to conquer. The unequal economic power relation between Australia and Japan determines that in the narratives of Australian men wanting to conquer Japan, more Australians return frustrated rather than triumphant. It is therefore clear that a narrative of Japan that is rooted in past experience no longer adequately describes the contemporary realities in Australia-Japan relations. In a changed situation where Japan is no longer 'supine' and
'feminine' and where Australia's performance as Japan's business partner is by no means 'exuberant', the orientalist dichotomy between the self/subject/masculine and Other/object/feminine appears ever more problematic. As the following stories show, what often happens in the Australian narratives of Japan is not so much the collapse of such a dichotomy as the reversal of the implications of the traditional frameworks. Consequently, constructing meanings of these stories becomes an increasingly ambiguous process.

As Australia's trade relation with Japan may to a considerable degree depend on the Australian Prime Minister's performance in Japan, one frequent actor in the Australian narratives of Japan is this man. In February 1984, Australia's former Prime Minister Bob Hawke made a five-day visit to Japan with the intention of convincing the Japanese that it should treat Australia seriously. For several years Japan had been reported to be 'suspicious and distrustful of Australia's reliability' as a stable supplier of raw materials because of Australia's poor record in industrial relations and its economic 'lethargy'. As a result of this, Japan threatened to 'diversify' its sources of imports. The main agenda of the visit was to seek Japan's assurance of commitment to the economic partnership, compete for its continuing fidelity as a buyer of raw materials, and convince it of Australia's economic vigour. Hawke was portrayed as eager, pleasing and deferential. 'No one thinks of Bob Hawke as an artist, but in Tokyo yesterday he did a very good job of painting a portrait of Australia as a reborn country emerging from a dark period of inertia' (Ellercamp, 1984: 7).

The Orient is designated as 'backward, degenerate, uncivilised and retarded' (Said, 1978: 207), and is known for its 'habits of inaccuracy' and 'aberrant mentality' (Said, 1978: 205). Australia has considered itself a Western country, although recently its Westernness has been problematised. In Ellercamp's story, however, Australia is represented as having taken on these Oriental attributes: it is lethargic, unreliable and recovering from 'inertia' and a mixture of 'regression, pessimism and despondency'. Furthermore, Hawke's message to Japan that Australia was 'primed and ready to go' evokes the metaphor of a machine or tool, which is passive and waiting to be used. Although Hawke is said to have done a good job in portraying a rosy picture of Australia, Ellercamp's narrative does not give the impression that his eagerness was enthusiastically reciprocated, as his
Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Nakasone, was ominously silent. As a result, the reader may have been left with an impression that Hawke might as well have been talking to a brick wall.

The sense of frustration -- speaking but not being heard -- is reinforced by an accompanying photo of Hawke and Nakasone standing together (see Appendix 1). Bob Hawke, on the left side of photo, is smiling ingratiatingly and looking straight into the eyes of Nakasone, seeking signs of commitment and assurance, while Nakasone, on the right, though smiling, is looking sideways, with his eyes riveted on something distant and unknown to the reader. Although his fingers are pointing at something which, from the look of his eyes, might be of great interest to him, Hawke's eyes are adamantly focused on those of Nakasone. If the written text gives the impression of Hawke talking but not being heard, the photo reinforces this impression by presenting Hawke as seeing but not being seen. Here the orientalist stereotype seems to remain intact: the West is the substantial speaking subject, the gazer, the knower; whereas the Orient is voiceless, unreliable and inscrutable. However, the orientalist discourse is reversed: Hawke's gaze is disempowered by the reality of existing economic relations. In other words, the trope of the gaze is maintained, but it is in reality irrelevant. The strength of Japan comes from its refusal to return the gaze of the West, thereby frustrating any attempt at fixity and commitment. The refusal to engage is also identifiable in other parts of the Australian press. Gibson's (1994) investigation of the *Australian Financial Review*’s deployment of orientalist frameworks reveals a similar process. ‘[T]he familiar association of Japan with inconsistency and instability is maintained, while on the other hand, the implications of this association are fundamentally altered’ (Gibson, 1994: 99).

One important consequence of this phallocentric tradition is the sexualisation of the Japan-West relation. According to a British *Economist* article which appears in the *Australian*, for example, Nakasone was to go through an 'orgy' of deregulation as part of his administrative reform. Such an orgy would help Japan to avoid the scenario of the mid-1980s, when 'Japan was gang-raped out of this trade-surplus-led growth by four Western Finance Ministers in New York's Plaza Hotel in September 1985' (Weekend *Australian*, May 3-4, 1986: 27).
Paul Kelly, the *Australian*’s current editor-in-chief, then the National Political Commentator, also resorts to the use of sexual metaphors when talking about the trade relationship between Australia and Japan. Reviewing the status of Australia’s trade with Japan, Kelly says that ‘our market penetration is slipping’; and, proposing new strategies of doing business with Japan, Kelly again suggests: ‘Companies do not need to invent new products to penetrate Japan’s market; they have only to sell existing products which have become competitive due to the yen appreciation’ (Kelly, December 1, 1987: 15). While, according to Kelly, the Australian ‘penetration’ was slipping, Japan was becoming increasingly potent, as he has described in another story about Japan a month earlier: ‘As a success, Japan lived off the world economy; as a superpower, it determines the world economy. Japan became strong by export market penetration’ (Kelly, November 28-9, 1987: 19).

Although it is true that phallocentric expressions like ‘penetration’ may have lost their denotative meaning and do not necessarily indicate an exclusively masculine position, it is equally true that the choice of these expressions is far from innocent. Furthermore, as Hartley and Montgomery (1985: 239) point out, certain images and expressions tend to dominate, partly through their relatively frequent lexical or semantic occurrences.

The difficulties of Australia-Japan economic and trade relations result in the Australian discourse not being able to step outside the narrative framework of considering the Japanese market as ‘impenetrable’ and a ‘hard nut to crack’. Many stories articulate an anxiety which came from a feeling of impotence. There are numerous stories about the Australian business sector being either too shy to take the Japan challenge, or simply not being able to ‘get up’ even when the temptation is there. According to an economic report (Goodall, November 2, 1987: 1), Austrade was offering help to Australian companies pushing to break into the Japanese market. However, half the companies which Austrade approached did not even bother to reply to the offer. The main reason for what is implied as the wimpy behaviour of Australian companies, according to Goodall, was the fear of the language barrier and a lack of tough business instincts. He quotes a Tokyo trade ambassador’s comment on Australian business, ‘Australian manufacturers look great swimming in an indoor heated pool, but throw them in the ocean and they sink’.
Venn argues that in the Western discourse of the Other, phallocentrism and ethnocentrism often go together. This 'discursive alliance' -- embodied in Australian discourse on Japan -- fosters a reaction to Japan similar to that of an impotent man: a mixture of self-loathing and resentment towards his seducer. This reaction, seen in racial terms, oscillates between outright racial arrogance to abject hopelessness. 'Nation on the Brink of Boom and Bust' (Australian, November 20, 1986: 17) invokes the voice of an Australian economist comparing Australia with Asia and the Pacific region as not having the 'urgency which is manifesting itself in most other parts of the region'. Unless Australia can catch up with the 'energy and dynamism' of the region, Australia will become the 'poor white trash of Asia'. The warning echoes an observation made by Greg Sheridan, the Australian's foreign news editor, who says that unless Australia gets its act together, it will become the 'sick man of Asia' (Sheridan, November 24, 1986: 7). Here lies the problematic aspect of a specific kind of Australian self-perception. The weakness of such a self-perception lies not only in seeing Australia as being male and white, but also in its inability to see itself as anything outside these frameworks. Despite the shift in economic power relations, this self-perception continues to position Australia and its Other in the traditional orientalist paradigm. It is this self-Other positioning that becomes the liability and weakness of Australia in the context of new economic realities. Furthermore, Japan's refusal to operate within this paradigm, as encapsulated in Nakasone's refusal to return Hawke's gaze, renders Australia doubly vulnerable.

The anxiety over cultural identity, as signified in the sexual metaphors in representing the Australia-Japan relationship, sometimes results in a discursive strategy of sexualising Australia-Japan relations but avoiding the designation of specific gender roles. In the 'constructive partnership' discourse which is much advocated by the government since the 1980s, the bilateral relationship between Australia and Japan has been described as 'a marriage made in heaven' (Australian, May 28, 1982: 27), and to have gone through one 'honeymoon' after another (Gibson, 1994: 95). Trade and economics narratives become easily sexualised but remain gender-unspecific -- Australia is always paranoid about Japan's infidelity and its habit of engaging in trade deals with a third country at the cost of Australian exports, and Japan was constantly required to give assurance of commitment and
loyalty to its Australian partner. Given that Japan is the biggest importer in 
the world and is constantly threatening to 'diversify' its sources of supply, 
the relationship is unequal: Japan can afford to practice trade polygamy; 
Australia, due to the small size of its economy, is limited to monogamy.

However, some strategic changes seem to be under way in the narratives of 
Australia-Japan economic relations. By the end of the 1980s and in the early 
1990s, Australians seem to have come to better terms with its unequal power 
relationship with Japan. While narratives still fall back on a masculine 
construction, there is a tendency to soften up the masculine edges and 
sometimes attempt to appropriate the femininity of the Oriental Other. As 
suggested at the beginning of this chapter, self-eroticisation as a discursive 
strategy can be quite effective in constructing an Australian identity that is 
marketable to Japan. To a considerable extent, this strategy frees the 
narratives of Japan in Australian constructions from rigid, out-of-date, and 
thus unproductive orientalist discourses, and creates new space for 
experimenting with alternative narratives.

Such changes are most identifiable in the narratives of Australia-Japan 
relations in the context of tourism. Trade, investment and tourism are the 
three major areas of Australia-Japan economic relations, and Japan is the 
biggest source of overseas visitors to Australia. Here we see the gender-
metaphoric specificity of different kinds of economic relations. The old raw-
materials trade, on which the Australian-Japan relation has been 
traditionally based, is very much about blokes discussing blokey things -- the 
grade of iron ore, the quality of coal, prices etc. Tourism is completely 
different, especially if, as in the case of Australia, it is driven by demand 
from young Japanese women. Whereas raw-materials negotiations are all 
about 'being strong', 'driving a hard bargain' etc., tourism is all about being 
attentive, alluring and 'nice'. It is one of what Hartley (1992) calls the 
'smiling professions' which, as he also argues, have always been strongly 
feminised.

*The Australian* (La Planche, 1990: 26) estimates that by the year 2000, 
Japanese and other Asian tourists will account for about half of the foreign 
visitors to Australia. Consequently, Australia must firstly compete with 
Japan's other favourite destinations, such as Hawaii and New Zealand; 
secondly, it must come up with new and different tourist attraction to lure
visitors to return; and thirdly, it must become linguistically and culturally more 'Japan-literate'.

This is not an easy task for many Australians. The increasing presence of Japanese tourists, especially in Queensland, brings back memories of the Pacific War experience. This produces rhetoric of another 'Japanese invasion'. Given this, the media has the role not only of registering the concern and resentment of individuals in the community but, more importantly, of providing a discursive space for the business sector which is interested in enticing a steady flow of Japanese visitors. La Planche's story is entitled 'Asian Invasion a Pleasing Prospect: Down Under seen as spacious, friendly and safe -- with adventure at reasonable price'. While the story falls into the category of a normal report on the state of Japanese tourism in Australia, it is nevertheless interesting in its use of the term 'Asian invasion' in the headline. The intention seems clear: by appropriating the terminology of the war discourse, the speaker invariably deprives the word 'invasion' of its meaning and renders it empty and powerless. Additionally, the use of the passive voice in 'Down Under seen as spacious, friendly and safe' is unusual in a newspaper headline, as traditionally in English-language journalism, headline writers opt for the active voice and present tense.

Besides the headline, another strategic manoeuvre in the above story is the placement of four related photos that were originally a cluster of images used for Qantas advertisements to Japanese tourists (see Appendix 2). The images are arranged as two pairs, both following a chronological narrative order. In the first pair of images, a Japanese 'adventurous young lady' is panning for gold, alone, smiling happily, dressed in casual, androgynous clothes; in the second image she is changed into a 'sophisticated lady', wearing a slinky dress, dancing in the nightclub with a Caucasian man. In the second pair, in the morning, she is 'making friends with a native', taking a stroll along the beach with an Aboriginal man, both of them admiring the beauty of a seal in front of them; in the afternoon, she is shown to be sipping a glass of wine, her eyes ogling the Caucasian man who is her wine-tasting companion.

This group of images, which originally appeared in Japanese women's magazines, project a picture of Australia as an irresistible escape for single
Japanese women, where their fantasy for independence, freedom and romance could come true. In these images, the Australians, both Caucasian and Aboriginal, are the objects of the Japanese woman's desire. Here the orientalist discourse is reversed: Australia, rather than the Orient, is exotic, enticing, and submissive, thereby subverting the Western dichotomy between culture and nature, man and women, subject and object. Increasingly, the Australian man -- or Australia as a man -- becomes the object of desire and engages in a reversed process of exoticisation and eroticisation.

What is semiotically interesting about this cluster of images is not their creation but the implication of the Australian's decision to run them alongside the written text. Reading from the written text on the left hand side to the pictorial text on the right, we experience a transformation from tourism as an abstract notion sustained by numbers and statistics to its embodiment in the representation of the body of a young female Japanese. The juxtaposition of the images from the Qantas advertisement with the written text relies on the reader's knowledge of omission -- the omission of some intertextual information which is necessary for rendering the two seemingly disparate texts coherent and intelligible. One source of such information is already existing stories about Japanese tourists in Australia. These stories, such as 'Australia Tempts Young Japanese Women' (Roberts, 1986: 12), provide an explanation for the Australian tourist industry targeting young, single Japanese women rather than men. According to these stories, single women from 18 to 30 have the time, the inclination and the money to travel, and as land prices in Tokyo and other cities rise rapidly, young people are postponing marriage for two or three years. This enables the Australian tourism sector to say 'get the girls, the boys will follow'.

However, informed reading of the image of the young Japanese body depends on additional knowledge derived from discussions and representations of the 'yellow cabs phenomenon' in novels, films, documentaries and popular magazines in the early 1990s (Kelsky, 1996). Japan is a patriarchal society where a woman's role, once she is married, is defined by her husband; because of this, women's magazines in Japan, like those in the West, exploit readers' yearning for independence and romance by offering them fantasy, play, escape; in reality, travel, especially to the exotic parts of the West, such as Hawaii and Australia, has become extremely
popular with young Japanese women, because it provides them with possibilities forbidden in Japan, including sexual encounters with Caucasian men. In this sense, the issues of power, gender and race, brought about in discussions of the phenomenon of 'yellow cabs' -- young Japanese woman seeking sexual experience with white men at holiday resorts -- becomes relevant.

The presence of the young female Japanese body in these tourism stories also, by the power of narrative to coordinate relevant 'abbreviated tidbits', brings to mind the image of the Japanese 'war brides' who, almost half a century ago, were treated as alien, morally degrading and likely to pollute 'our' shores. Unlike the young Japanese women tourists in Australia in the 1980s who are constructed as both the subject (and object) of desire and seduction, the 'war brides' were in their time the object of derision and fear. Linking the two historically disparate images of Japanese women points to the fact that issues of power, race and gender are not only historically specific, but also interwoven.

The juxtaposition of the written text and a pictorial text also relies on the reader's tacit understanding of the generic codes and conventions of narration. While readers are encouraged to take the written text more or less literally, they are given ample hints that the pictorial representation may be taken less seriously. To play along with a particular kind of Japanese fantasy by taking on their images of 'us' is strategically important, but readers more than likely know that these images do not necessarily bear any resemblance to reality. Also, it is important to realise that, by using the Japanese imagery of Australia, Australia engages itself in a process of ironic self-objectification. The placement of Japanese images of Australia in the Australian media does not necessarily mean that the Australian producers and consumers of their images accept the validity of these images, but it certainly expresses Australia's willingness to participate ironically in the making of them.

What is ironic, however, is the fact that although the nation's self-images in Japanese terms are produced for Japanese tourists' consumption, such images, once replayed through the media, tend to come back to become part of the national self-imaginary (Turner, 1994). In this sense, the power of Japan lies not only in its tendency to essentialise Australia, but more importantly, it lies in its growing capacity to shape the Australians' vision of Australianness.
Objectivity vs Self-Reflexivity

What is evident in the above examples is an important shift in the Australian Japan narratives from the objectification of Japan as the Other to self-objectification; and from a reliance on metonymy to a reliance on irony as a discursive device. This process can be better demonstrated in a comparison of two news stories in the *Australian* from the late 1980s. One is the *Australian*’s interview with Japanese Foreign Minister, Tadashi Kuranari (Loudon, 1987: 19). The other is a story about the Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita’s visit to Australia (Ecleston, 1988: 19). As diplomatic visits and exchanges are an important aspect of international relations, stories covering these activities are numerous and worth close examination. From the perspective of news values, both stories rank high on the scale of newsworthiness, as they both base their narrative on the nation as a unit and thus satisfy the criterion of impact.

During Loudon’s interview with Kuranari, the reporter is almost invisible and voiceless, allowing himself to become the mouthpiece of Kuranari, who talks about his love of peace as a Nagasaki man, his vision of Japan’s future in the Asian and Pacific region, his encouragement of Japan-Australia relations, and his diagnosis of Australia’s financial reality. Kuranari, and through him, Japan, appears logical, responsible, and trustworthy; throughout, he insists tirelessly, he is a man of peace, a man from Nagasaki who is more committed than anyone to ensuring a peaceful future for the world and for the region’. Kuranari’s presence as an interviewee is constructed to take on both a physical and a figurative dimension:

"It is rare encounter, this meeting with one of Japan’s top policy-makers, because like Mr Nakasone, he is usually not accessible to newsmen. Now, however, he is in full flow and the setting for our meeting is appropriate: we are in a room at one of Fiji’s plushest beach resorts, and the Pacific for as far as the eye can see appears as an endless, tranquil expanse of emerald-coloured glass (Loudon, 1987: 19)."

The specific mention of the Fijian hotel facing the Pacific Ocean as the setting for the narrative, is both factual and metonymic. In this particular context, Fiji as a place is given a geopolitical relevance. Loudon situates the
Australia-Japan interview in an Asian-Pacific rim context. Also, Loudon's repetitive mention of Kuranari as a 'man from Nagasaki' evokes an historical time -- the end of World War II. Consequently, the author uses the power of the narrative to suggest that the story mirrors reality and that the disparate details share a relevance which the narrative has restored to them.

The lengthy profile, which takes up almost an entire page, is accompanied by a much shorter text, which can be read as part of Kuranari's profile, albeit under a different headline and in a separate column. Entitled 'Pulling Rabbits from a Hat', the short story describes Kuranari's talents and performance as an accomplished magician, as well as a master exponent of aikido:

When he attended last year's session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, he gave a luncheon for African countries where juju is treated with considerable respect.

When the conversation got bogged down on issues of nuclear non-proliferation and the like, Mr Kuranari pulled a rabbit or two out of his hat, extracted a few bouquets of flowers out of tiny cubes, and sent the African ministers wide-eyed and wondering about this new form of diplomacy by the little man from Tokyo (Loudon, 1987: 19).

Here we see the shifting of Loudon's gaze from that of the trusting, admiring, upward look of the first story, to the detached, though amused, but ultimately condescending look in the second one. While Loudon unreservedly gives Kuranari the entire discursive space in the long story, the Japanese Foreign Minister in the second story is a voiceless mime. Additionally, while the presence of Kuranari in the first story is both substantial and commanding, the body in the second story is a caricature. The sub-text of Loudon's second story is quite unambiguous: Kuranari, and through him, Japan, are not only cute and humorous, but also inscrutable, mysterious, and irrational, and if they win, they may do so through tricks. Kuranari, a Japanese government official standing for Japan, is a metonymy, whereas, the magician, who is perceived to be evocative of Japan, is a metaphor for the country.
Between the two stories, we see a shift in the teller’s position. In the first account, the story-teller allows himself to be used as a conduit for Kuranari’s narrative. In the second, he reassumes the position of a speaking subject and proceeds to invoke the stereotypical Western representation of Japoneseness, although it should also be pointed out that this stereotypical construction of Japan is not necessarily entirely attributable to Loudon, for Kuranari did pull the rabbit and did seem to participate in his own construction. Also, the first story appeals to rational thought whereas the second story appeals to emotion. The second can be read, on the one hand, as a reassuring antidote to the first one -- reassuring those used to an orientalist discourse (after all, Japan does not behave like ‘us’, and therefore does not deserve to be treated seriously). It can also be read as an act of controlled narrative violence in relation to the first one. Such a reading appreciates the need and effort of the writer to construct an enlightened narrative of Japan, but at the same time acknowledges the existence of residual feelings about Japan and accommodates them, albeit within a limited discursive space.

It is possible, however, to read Loudon’s texts in a third and more productive way. Each of the two texts, standing in their own right, seems to give the impression that there is only one story about Kuranari and there is only one way to tell it. However, the juxtaposition of the two contradictory texts serves to discredit this impression and points to the possibility of a polysemic and ambiguous interpretation of these texts. In this sense, although Loudon resorts to metonymy as a rhetorical device, his intention is ironic, for he invites his reader to engage in a language game, where the reader is encouraged to question and contradict the obvious and commonsense meaning of ‘Japoneseness’.

A text to consider for comparative purposes is the ‘the Inscrutable Mr Takeshita’ by the Australian’s foreign affairs writer Roy Eccleston (Eccleston, 1988: 19). It is a lengthy account of the personal diplomacy (or, to be more exact, the lack of it) between Australia’s then Prime Minister Bob Hawke, and the Japanese Prime Minister, Noboru Takeshita, who was touring Australia. Eccleston starts by sympathising with Hawke because Takeshita, unlike US Secretary of State, George Shultz, was not really into golf. The reporter laments that ‘mateship, that peculiar barometer by which Australians seem to measure relationships, is missing’. Additionally, the reporter notes that there was no great fanfare for Takeshita’s arrival, not the
'community interest that would be attached to a visit by President Reagan',
not the 'curiosity brought out by a royal tour'. As for Mr Takeshita, the
reporter says that in many ways, he was the personification of Australia's
view of the Japanese: 'diminutive, polite to the point of obfuscation, easily
underestimated, and difficult to appreciate fully'.

According to Eccleston, Hawke's frustration also came from the fact that
Takeshita was different from Nakasone, with whom Hawke was alleged to
have a matey relationship. Eccleston's comparison of Takeshita with
Nakasone reminds readers of the Australian's 1984 stories about Hawke's
visit to Japan. Paul Ellercamp, at that time, struck a euphoric note in his
report headlined 'You're fair dinkum', Yasu tells heroic Bob' (Ellercamp,
February 4-5, 1984: 2). The story is full of hyperbole about the vital new
personal relationship between 'Bob and Yasu'. Just as President Reagan and
Mr Nakasone had established a 'Ron and Yasu' relationship, it now seemed
that a 'Bob and Yasu' mateship was about to be created. Ellercamp
breathlessly relates, in tabloid style, trivial incidents illustrating 'Yasu's
admiration for Bob'. Interestingly, the story is the only time in the 1980s that
the Australian represented a close personal relationship between Japanese
and Australian Prime Ministers. Although Eccleston does not specifically
refer to the Nakasone story, he nevertheless relies on the power of
narratives to contain traces of each other. By saying that Takeshita is 'more
nondescript than Nakasone', the author expects his readers to fill the
narrative gap by bringing some extratextual information into the reading.

In Eccleston's account, the Oriental attributes and orientalist structures seem
intact -- Japan is marked by its difference from 'us'. Eccleston continues: 'The
Japanese also speak another language, have a different tradition, and tried to
invade Australia just over 40 years ago'. By saying so, the author seems to be
setting himself up as a target for criticism. However, what is obvious, and
thus easy to overlook, is the fact the author is telling the 'truth' -- truth in
the mimetic, as opposed to metaphoric, sense: the Japanese do speak another
language; they do have a different tradition; and they did try to invade
Australia 40 years ago. In this mimetic spirit, Eccleston continues to tell the
truth: 'Yet Japan is Australia's major trading partner, with trade of $17
billion in 1986-7. Japan takes 26 percent of our exports and supplies 21
percent of imports'. And having said this, the author seems compelled to
tell the 'ultimate' truth that could be unkind:
Perhaps the biggest hurdle for Australians is equating Japan's powerful position with the fact it has no fighting force, no arsenal of nuclear weapons. The sound and fury is absent. The power itself, like the friendship, is more hidden or diffuse than the obvious US style (Eccleston, 1988: 19).

Here, the familiar association of Japan with indeterminacy and insubstantiality is maintained, but the implications of this association are fundamentally changed. Eccleston equates power with fluidity and silence, thereby throwing the epistemology of orientalism on its head. Standard dichotomies between the insubstantial and the substantial, the silence and the voice, invisibility and presence are constructed as preventing Australians from fully recognising the economic power of Japan. Strength, as Eccleston suggests, lies not in a high public profile, as Reagan or the royal family have, but in the silence and invisibility of Takeshita, who 'speaks softly', but 'carries a big stick', and 'represents power in a way with which many Australians cannot quite come to grips'.

It is clear by now that Eccleston recognises the inadequacy of existing narratives, but nevertheless seems to consider 'objective' journalism the saving grace. In other words, although he recognises that existing narratives no longer describe economic realities, he nevertheless attempts to reinvolve the 'credibility' of the mimetic, 'objective' reporting, which operates on the assumption that facts speak for themselves.

It is in this specific sense that Manoff (1987) makes the remark that all journalistic stories are ironic:

In no case... does reading the news... confirm the impression that narrative seeks to convey: that there is but one story to tell and one right way to tell it. Journalistic narrative depends on its effect on this impression, and all stories are in this measure ironic. The real irony, however, is that this impression, the most basic one both writers and readers share about the news, is wrong (Manoff, 1987: 229).

While the desire to define and rationalise the Other via metaphor and metonymy constitutes all discourses of identity, it also constitutes the
problem of such tradition. The difference between Loudon and Eccleston lies in the different approaches to this problem. Loudon seems to pretend that Japanese power can be comprehended through metaphors, but then goes on to ironically discredit this belief by underscoring the contradiction of such metaphors (the metaphors of Japan as logician and magician). Eccleston, on the other hand, although recognising and experiencing the ironic situation regarding Australian narratives of Japan, resigns himself to the wishful thinking that, after all, facts are self-evident and do speak louder.

From the perspective of narrative status, Eccleston's story seems to take on a privileged position, as his minimalist way of appearing to simply tell the truth by letting the facts speak for themselves creates a particularly literary effect in a body of writing where the conscious use of literary devices is usually discouraged. On the other hand, Loudon offers readers a choice of interpretations, and is in this sense, more 'reader-friendly'. For this reason, Loudon appears to be running less risk of alienating readers than Eccleston, whose definitive description of Japan leaves readers with only one choice -- that of either accepting or rejecting his 'facts'.

It is apparent by now that the fundamental difference between Loudon and Eccleston is the difference between a self-reflexive approach to language and an 'objective' approach to it. While the former alerts the reader to the duality of language and encourages him/her to see the contradiction between what the text says and what the text means, the latter gives the impression that language reflects the totality of reality. To further demonstrate this difference, we can now turn to a comparison of two individual writers. One of them is Greg Sheridan, the Australian's foreign news editor. The other is Gregory Clark, an Australian-born, Japanese-married specialist in Australia-Japan relations. Juxtaposing Clark's stories of Japan with those of Sheridan's reveals that, as story-tellers, they have different relationships to the stories they tell. Although they seem to warrant comparable 'credibility', their understandings of Japan, and their individual strategies of representing Japan could not be further apart.

Sheridan affirms his faith in 'objective' language; Clark ironically disavows it. They deserve close examination for they embody the processes by which an individual writer's interest in, power relation with, and cultural distance from Japan structure their stories.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, increasing economic and political interaction between Australia and Japan made the coverage of Japan in the Australian press all the more strategically important for Australia. Talking about the need for Australia to become 'mature' in the international arena, a new discourse emphasising the need for Japan-literacy arose in Australian narratives about Japan. This kind of discourse builds on the assumption that Australians need to grow out of their racial and cultural stereotypes and historical war memories of Japan and the Japanese if they want to engage in a constructive partnership. This theme of maturity runs through the *Australian*'s writings about Japan and the Australia-Japan relation throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Greg Sheridan, the paper's staff writer and foreign news editor since the late 1980s, has consistently expressed this view about Japan, as have writers like Paul Kelly and Des Keegan.

Like many other authors of 'enmeshment' narratives, Greg Sheridan seems to think that the need to understand Japan, and Asia in general, is necessitated by an Australian economic crisis. His article (Sheridan, November 24, 1986: 7) warns that unless Australia plugs into Asia, it will be in great danger of 'becoming the sick man of Asia'. To avoid such a scenario, argues Sheridan, Australians need to discard their ignorance and arrogance regarding Asia.

Japan is the paradigmatic Asian success story. Utterly devastated by World War II, it is a few islands with no resources other than 120 million people. It is also now the most powerful economy in the world.

Like most East Asian societies, it has an ultimately Chinese-patterned culture which provides patterns of authority and harmony in social organisation which have been lost to societies like Australia (Sheridan, November 24, 1986: 7).

An underlying assumption in Sheridan's narratives is that Australians need to discard myths and stereotypes about the Japanese, and start looking more closely at the Japanese 'reality'. However, Sheridan seldom mentions the fact that such a mature understanding is necessarily premised on a realistic and honest assessment of Australians' feelings of resentment and hostility towards Japan. In his study of public opinions of Japan in Australia, Rix (1991) traces changes in Australian attitudes to Japan, arguing that the
experience of some Australians in the hands of the Japanese during the Second World War reinforces in the minds of many others the sense of threat that Australians have about Japan. Given this, Rix argues public feelings remain a powerful and inhibitory factor in Australian-Japan relations and therefore should be taken into consideration in debates on the growing Japanese presence in Australia.

Such unconscious, collective memories of Japan are hardly given discursive space in Sheridan’s narratives of Japan. These pro-managerial, pro-technocratic narratives of Japanese corporate life appear ‘enlightened’ because they seem anti-racist and anti-orientalist. ‘Exploding myths about Japan’ (Sheridan, February 13-14, 1988: 26), exemplifies the use of such a narrative: ‘our view of Japan is so one-dimensional, and yet Japan is so complex’, he says. He mentions five myths about Japan held by Australians: the Japanese have a lower standard of living despite their high income; they do not have leisure; they do not know how to enjoy themselves; there is something shonky about Japanese democracy; and Japanese industrial success has created an extremely ugly urban environment. Having erected these targets, the writer respectively shoots them down, labelling them as either ‘wrong’ or ‘untrue’. He suggests that the reality in Japan is just the opposite to these myths. These observations seem to imply that if myths about other cultures result from our desire to generalise, then making counter-generalisations may explode these myths.

Another problem with the kind of cultural representation Sheridan undertakes is that it makes the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy absolute. The narrative of looking beyond pride and prejudice seems to be based on a humble recognition that in the past Australia has been blinded by a Eurocentric vision and has lived in ignorance, but now it is coming to know. However, it also seems to assume that what is to be known -- ‘our Asian neighbours’ is transparent, determinate and above all, waiting to be rediscovered. Therefore, although Sheridan repeatedly advises his readers to enter the ‘new age of reasoning’ (Sheridan, September 24, 1990: 25), his own epistemology seems to be firmly anchored in a set of binary oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, subject and object, knower and known. This position is also clear in his use of the metaphor ‘Australia stands in great danger of becoming the sick man of Asia’: only Asia is to be associated with and deserving of things such as sickness, weakness and backwardness.
Apart from its regular Japan correspondents and staff writers such as foreign affairs editor Sheridan, the *Australian* carries a regular supply of narratives about Japan from its freelance writers and columnists. These by-line writers play an important role in shaping Australia’s image and opinion of Japan. They are presented as specialists whose experience in and with Japan places them in a unique position to acquire an informed understanding of Japan, their stories constitute an integral part of the paper’s narratives of Japan. These stories are examples of what Cunningham (1994: 120) calls ‘internal pluralism’ within an organisation. Such internal pluralism, or ‘diversity within a media outlet’, has been made possible with the growth of opinion columns and greater use of freelancers and non-journalists as feature writers.

One such writer is Gregory Clark, who was responsible for the founding of the *Australian*’s Tokyo bureau. A diplomat turned academic, Australian-born, Japanese-married, and fluent in Japanese, Clark is Professor of International Relations specialising in Australia-Asia relations, in particular Australia-Japan relations, at Sophia University in Tokyo.

One clear difference between Sheridan and Clark is their distance, both physical and cultural, from their object of construction. While Sheridan’s narrative seems to be constructed in the same manner as an anthropologist returning from his fieldwork trips and reporting on his definitive findings, Gregory Clark seems to be more interested in the process of creating ethnography. Writing on a fragile land and property market in Japan, Clark writes, ‘Chiyoda Ward, the small section of central Tokyo where I happen to be sitting typing this article, would be enough to buy up all of Canada. It could buy up all Australia, twice over.’ (Clark, December 15, 1989: 14). Not only is Clark specific about the time and place in which he creates his narrative, he seems to have no qualms about sharing with his readers moments of indeterminacy in knowing Japan:

Japan never ceases to surprise. Just as we were beginning to think it would remain bogged down forever in its theories of racial exclusivity, it about-turns and starts to let just about anyone into the country (Clark, December 15, 1989: 9).
The self-questioning tendency of a reflexive ethnographer encapsulated in Clark's narrative of Japan seems not only to celebrate moments of indeterminacy, it also seems to indulge in ambiguity. Clark at times does not seem to be able to decide if his perceptions, both of Japan and Australia, are Australian or Japanese. This cross-cultural ambiguity, however, can be productive, as Clark shows in his article on the Japanese attitudes to work 'All work and no play makes Japan healthy, wealthy -- and dominant' (Clark, August 16, 1989: 11). The author says he saw an advertisement for office equipment in an Australian magazine that showed an entire office block with lights ablaze except for one floor in complete darkness. The advertisement read: 'It is 5:01 pm. Which office is doing its job right?' To which the author responds:

Coming from Japan, I was puzzled but I knew from the start that the floor with no lights on was clearly doing something wrong. Reading on, I learned this was the efficient office: it had installed the right equipment and everyone could go home on time (Clark, August 16, 1989: 11).

Sheridan, on the other hand, represents his relationship with Japan as that of a realist. Throughout his narrative, the author is absent, as is any information regarding his personal experience with Japan, and the specific moment of constructing his narrative of it. Like a conventional reporter, Sheridan could be saying to his imaginary readers: I represent Japan with facts. All I have done is to collect facts and present them to you. Do not bother to know how I collected these facts. By comparison, Clark the narrator seems to display the self-consciousness of the New Journalist in relation to his readers: I do not know how to represent Japan except by telling you stories of my own experience -- stories of my experience with Japan and stories of me creating stories about Japan.

Reflexivity entails acknowledging the narrator's personal interest and position in the power relationship with the object of narration -- Japan. In this sense, the difference between Sheridan and Clark in the choice of textual form (news reports vs personal feature) and in the authors' relationships to their stories (formal, third-person vs informal, personal 'I') can be meaningfully accounted for. While Clark was initially involved in the setting up of the Tokyo bureau of the Australian, his liaison with Japan
apparently has become more academic. In addition, his long-serving professional position in Japan and involvement in various facets of Japanese society have given him a position from which he can speak to the Japanese as an Australian, and vice versa. This leaves the author with no choice but to engage in the politics of betweenness — declaring his subjectivities and ambivalence and making them part of his Japan narrative. Thus, in comparing Japanese attitudes to foreigners with Australian attitudes to foreigners, the author argues that Australia should learn from Japan's immigration policy and take on a gradualist approach. However the author hastens to add: 'This is not to suggest a return to White Australia. Apart from anything else, as the father of two half-Japanese sons, I have a vested interest in a racially tolerant Australia' (Clark, March 1, 1989: 9).

In another story (Clark, March 8, 1989: 13) which provides a close-up picture of the corruption and bureaucracy of Japanese organisations, Clark’s confession that he is an insider does not seem to discredit his account. After declaring that he is biased because he is a member of NTT’s (Japan’s all-powerful telecommunication company) management discussion committee, and that he knows Shinto — then the president of NTT — and meets with him often, the author goes on to say:

Don't ask me why I was a member. In the past, such committees were exclusively male and establishment Japanese. But the winds of change have decreed that advisory committees today should include at least one woman and one foreigner (Clark, 1989: 13).

Confessions of personal interest such as this abound in Clark's narrative of Japan, and seem to suggest that, at one level, Clark's narrative could bear a close resemblance to the realities of Japan, because the narrator is an informed 'insider'. On the other hand, his readers are invited to suspend their credulity, because, after all, he has a specific interest and motivation. This practice of inviting the identification of the audience with his narratives but at the same time discouraging them from accepting them as the whole the truth about Japan operates at the level of irony: it assumes the impossibility of representing the whole truth of Japan from any single perspective and consequently conveys an anxiety and ambivalence that are common to the Australian construction of national identity.
Sheridan's position, both geographically and epistemologically, is less ambiguous than Clark's. The former's long-standing association with the 'quality' press in Australia, particularly since he became the foreign affairs editor of the *Australian*, seems to enable him to understand probably better than anyone else the importance of appearing to be speaking for the Australian community. In this sense, the difference between Clark's narratives and Sheridan's narratives of Japan is the difference between the former's personal interest and declaration of it, and the latter's group interests and his reluctance to acknowledge them.

* * *

The stories analysed in this chapter point to some of the ongoing issues in the imagining of an Australia-Japan relationship in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as some of the textual strategies that are deployed to address these issues. They suggest that what is going on in the cross-cultural representations is more complicated than mutual stereotyping. In the Australian narratives of Japan, an Australian national imaginary is increasingly shaped by what Japan thinks of it, or by what Australian journalists project on to Japan to represent what Japan thinks of 'us'. Imaginary relations are marked with tensions which manifest themselves in a discourse of ambivalence, ambiguity and indeterminacy. As a discursive space where such tensions are constantly negotiated, the *Australian* has become a site where contestation exists, albeit not so much in terms of images of Japan as in terms of the narrative forms and strategies, with which 'Japan' and 'Japaneseness' are constructed.

The stories analysed here seem to reveal a tension between the fact that Australia is a 'Western' nation participating in and subscribing to an orientalist, and more recently, a techno-orientalist discourse of Japan, and the fact that Australia's desire to control and dominate its relations with this Oriental society is greatly curtailed by its trade and economic realities. These stories show that a traditional orientalist framework is still very much in use. Whiteness and masculinity are still the operational signs of Australianness; however, these signs no longer conjure up images of strength and power. In fact these stories suggest that it is this inability to step out of these traditional frameworks that renders Australia doubly vulnerable in its dealings with Asian and Pacific nations.
These stories also seem to suggest that use of orientalism in the West is not exclusively for the purpose of domination of the Orient. In the context of a changed power balance between the West and Japan, the West seems to participate itself in a self-exoticisation in its attempt to engage and negotiate with its more powerful Oriental partner.

A prominent strategy deployed by some writers like Loudon and Clark to come to terms with this impasse is the rhetorical shift from metaphor and metonymy to irony. Rather than relying on metaphors and metonymies to represent the 'real' Japan, these writers seem to foreground the use of metaphor and metonymy. This strategy allows them to adopt an ambiguous position towards them. On the one hand, they seem to evoke traditional frameworks of understanding Japan but, on the other hand, they are constantly inviting readers to undermine their validity. This rhetorical shift may also be a sign of loss of faith in the credibility of objectivity and a growing hope in the power of reflexivity.

More importantly, the change of discursive strategies as identified should be considered as an ongoing dynamic process rather than a fait accompli. In addition, signs of discursive tensions which occur as a result of strategic shifts may exist not only between the writings of different writers, but also within the writings of one individual writer, or even within a single text. And it is the purpose of recognising and understanding these signs which makes critical reading of news stories a significant and worthwhile exercise.
Chapter 6
The Uses of the Other: Japan and Story-Telling in the *Australian's* Domestic News

As discussed earlier, orientalism and self-orientalism allow Australia to negotiate with its powerful oriental partner -- Japan. However, these strategies have another important use: they allow various social, political and economic groups in Australia to mobilise some aspects of the image of the Other in order to mark out a distinctive Australianness, thereby marginalising other groups inside Australian society. This is often a process by which domestic politics and international relations are fused not so much to other the foreign nation and issue in question as to bring to light the otherness of the national self.

As a way of closely scrutinising this process, this chapter will examine two clusters of narratives in the *Australian*. The first one centres around the January 1985 NSW train drivers' strikes; the second one centres around the March 1990 Peacock-Hawke federal election. In the former instance, stories of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Australia are merged with the strike stories to form the 'Nakasone vs strikers narrative'; in the latter instance, the debate around the building of a Japanese-funded Multifunction Polis is knitted into the election stories, resulting in the 'Peacock vs MFP narrative'.

The analysis will demonstrate, by way of detailing the processes by which events become stories in the Nakasone vs strikers narrative and Peacock vs MFP narrative, how journalists rely on the power of narrative to bring disparate events and happenings together in their constructions of Japan. It also will suggest, through the analysis of 'how', why these constructions appear logical and natural. It will show that in both narratives, Japan is used as a catalyst for an internal othering, whereby some members of Australian community are marginalised for their 'un-Australianness'. In the first instance, Japan is evoked as a way of managing a crisis in industrial relations, whereby the real issue is the conflict between different social groups. In the second instance, Japan is used to frame the MFP debate as a race issue, thereby eliding the real issue of the economic disparity that is inherent in the MFP project. In both cases, a scenario of the nation being embarrassed under the Japanese gaze plays into the hand of those dominant social groups and political groups which claim to act in the national interest.
A false dichotomy between Australia and Japan is established in both narratives in order to cover up some social divisions in Australian society. Having recourse to existing forms and conventions in news-writing, journalists rely on the power of narrative to assign the role of a hero and villain, and the power of narrative to announce the beginning, the middle, and the end of a story. The scrutiny of some moments in the developments of these two clusters of narratives points to a complex process by which issues and events are selected, framed and defined in the form of news and further develop in the forms of features and editorials. Such a process is both formal and ideological, and it is this process that enables narratives to bring disparate issues and events together, thus facilitating and achieving a particular kind of ideological closure justified by a claim to be in the interest of the nation.

In reporting an event or an issue, journalists provide answers to routine questions such as Who, What, When, and Where as if these answers were natural and given. However, as the analysis in the previous chapter shows, these questions hide within their simplicity a complex interpretative framework which is profoundly cultural rather than natural. In this chapter, I want to show that journalists not only give the impression that their stories simply objectively reflect 'reality', they also give the impression that events tell themselves. In other words, journalists give the impression that they, as journalists, are merely the conduit for story-telling, and that they have no input in the selecting, ordering, and organising of events. Manoff's (1987: 217) definition of journalism sums it up most aptly: 'journalism can been as an activity that judges events while it reports them by juxtaposing, amalgamating, or separating facts, events, and opinions in order to find out in them their story'.

Nakasone vs Strikers -- Who Is the Villain?

Stories of industrial disputes are perennial in the Australian media. MacLennan's (1993) Marxist analysis of the Australian press coverage of the 1992 Burnie Mill dispute, for instance, finds that the press, especially the *Australian*, refuses to deal with the dispute in class terms, and instead, reports the class conflict within a collective catastrophe framework. This framework, argues MacLennan, is based on a right-wing notion of the collectivity of the 'nation' and on the assumption that striking workers are the sources of social deviance. Windschuttle's (1984) analysis of Australian media finds that Australian newspapers' coverage of strikes is consistently framed within an
anti-union agenda. According to this agenda, Windschuttle observes, unions are always ruining the nation's economy, strikes are a crime against the community, and management is always absolved from responsibility.

Although there was relatively little reporting of industrial disputes affecting trade relations with Japan in the 1980s, the theme of industrial disputes undercutting the bargaining position of Australia's primary exporters remained a constant element in the *Australian*’s narrative of Australia-Japan relations. As early as 1982, in a Japan trade supplement of the *Australian*, both Goodall (*Australian*, May 28, 1982) and Perkins (*Australian*, May 28, 1982) referred to Japanese opinions that industrial unrest was a source of real insecurity in the trading relationship.

The paper's preoccupation with strikes as a major negative factor in the Australia-Japanese relationship peaked in January 1985, at the time of Mr Nakasone's Australian visit. This crisis produced a cluster of narratives. To understand how and why Nakasone stories and the strike stories merge into one narrative, and why this narrative merge is ideological, it is necessary to realise that the narrative involves two disparate events: that of Nakasone's visit to Australia, which started on January 15 and finished on January 18, and that of the Hunter Valley train drivers' strikes over a pay dispute which had started a few months before the Nakasone arrived and ended after Nakasone left Australia.

Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Australia was part of his Pacific tour. As is usual with diplomatic visits, Nakasone’s impending visit started to generate what journalists call the 'arrival story' in the press even before he arrived. Such stories, as part of standard journalistic lore, brief readers with background facts about the visitor, inform readers of the visitor's planned activities upon arrival, and predict the consequence and significance of the visit. On January 10, five days before Nakasone's arrival, the *Australian* ran a feature story 'Hawke will find Nakasone tough nut to crack' (Goodall, January 10, 1985: 4). Two days later, another feature, 'Nakasone brings hope for Australia’s recovery' (Goodall, January 12-13, 1985: 4), appeared in the paper. Both features provided background information, which served to prepare readers for the imminent arrival of Nakasone. The information included Nakasone's politics in Japan, his recent dealings with his US counterparts, and his expectations from Australia as a trade partner. The two features mentioned nothing about the
ongoing strikes and concentrated on the implications to the Australian economy of Nakasone's visit.

By then the NSW Hunter Valley train drivers' strikes had been going on for a few months. The *Australian*’s coverage of the extended strikes was sporadic and low-key, and consistent with the anti-union stance described by Windschuttle. However, on January 14, an unattributed news story appeared headlined 'Strike worry as Nakasone visit nears' (*Australian*, January 14, 1985: 2). For the first time, it linked the strikes with Nakasone’s visit: 'the threat of an extended stoppage by train drivers in NSW Hunter Valley creates an embarrassing backdrop to the arrival of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Nakasone, in Australia tomorrow'. Here it is important to note that the train drivers' activities and Nakasone's activities are constructed to have some logical connection, not because they overlap in temporal or spatial terms, but because it is perceived to be so by a person whose authority the journalist has decided to invoke. The story quotes extensively from Mr Tom McVeigh, the spokesman for the Federal Opposition, who argues that future relations with Japan would hinge on Hawke’s ability to convince Japan of Australia’s reliability as a raw material supplier. It is clear that the primary definition of the situation, therefore, comes from an established authority, not the reporter, although it is the reporter who chooses to quote the authorities.

It is also important to note the moment in the story when train drivers' strikes -- usually considered to be perennial events, natural and unavoidable, like the Australian bushfire -- suddenly become 'embarrassing'. One usually gets embarrassed in front of another person, especially when this person is in a powerful position to judge, criticise, and ridicule. In this case, it is clearly Japan which is constructed to take on that role as a powerful outsider.

On the following day, the *Australian* ran its editorial 'No power without responsibility', denouncing the ongoing strikes. Building on the facts provided in the earlier news stories, the editorial seeks to pass judgement on the situation. The transformation of narrative elements from news stories to editorial entails a process by which particular issues are taken out of context and rendered into an abstraction. The editorial omits the conflict of interests between train drivers and the management and the actual experiences of striking members. Rather, it adopts a consensual view of Australian society: 'We all know Australia is
slipping, but we do not, as a nation, seem to care. This is the biggest flaw in our national character' (Editorial, *Australian*, January 15, 1985: 6).

An interesting thing about the editorial is its invocation of the kind of nationalism often associated with early Australian literature. Beginning with two lines from Banjo Patterson's poem 'Clancy of the Overflow' -- 'and he sees the vision splendid of the sunlit plains extended, and at night the wondrous glory of the everlasting stars' -- the editorial goes on to say that our ancestors worked hard and long to 'tame a land that was alien to their European backgrounds'; they 'dug and gouged under the thin crust of soil, discovered our mineral wealth, and created a vibrant nation'. However, according to the editorial, 'our vision splendid has bogged down in a morass of sloth'.

If it is the land that is 'alien' to the early pioneers and needs taming, now it is the strikers within the Australian community who should be tamed, because they are the ones who threaten to ruin the 'vibrant nation' and mar the 'vision splendid'. Strikers, in the construction of the editorial, are black sheep and represent a part of Australianness that is undesirable and feared. Here we see a process by which national unity is produced through the identification of an internal Other -- some members of the Australian community whose un-Australianess poses a threat to the health of the nation. In this sense, internal othering is useful because it helps to marginalise antagonistic elements within a society and reproduce a unity within the nation based on sameness of political purposes and social values.

Meanwhile, the paper continued to cover the development of the strikes. One story, 'Talks fail to avert State-wide rail strike' (North, 1985: 3), reported that the Hunter Valley strike by train drivers was likely to spread throughout NSW within 48 hours. While the story appeared at an inconspicuous corner of page three, the context in which it appeared is interesting: the leading stories and news photos of the same page were devoted to the raging bushfires that were threatening three States in Australia. One of the bushfire features, which was adjacent to North's strike story, was headlined 'Nothing is safe . . . it's out of control' (Howard, 1985: 3). Here we see another narrative assimilation -- the assimilation of the bushfire story into the strike stories. At this moment, the juxtaposition may seem coincidental; however, as I will demonstrate later, it may well be a deliberate attempt to establish thematic affinity between the two disparate events.
On January 17, the *Australian* again ran a group of front-page Nakasone vs strikers stories. The message of these stories is clear: Australia-Japan trade is being threatened by militant unionism. The lead story carries the headline 'Japan warns unions on trade' (Goodall, January 17, 1985: 1), quoting Nakasone as warning Australia to 'ensure stable supplies or we'll go elsewhere'. Next to Goodall's story is a news report, 'Train strike certain as vital talks collapse' (North and Molloy, 1985: 1). The story reinforces the feeling of embarrassment and desperation on the part of the Hawke government. These two news stories are accompanied by two photos: a photo of the two national leaders smiling, set alongside a photo of two 'typical Aussie' train drivers sitting in a pub with several empty glasses before them, looking fiercely antagonistic. Under these two photos is the caption, 'Nakasone warns Hawke ... as Jack and Fred vow to fight on' (see Appendix 3). Here, we see an example of how people are used in news stories: while Nakasone and Hawke personify politics, Jack and Fred, as ordinary individuals, are constructed as representing their social aggregate.

In contrast to the tension and hostility on the front page, the story and the news photo on page two attempt a touch of human interest and amicability. Framed in typical 'arrival story' fashion, the story 'A little yoga before serious talks begin' (Goodall, January 17, 1985: 2) focuses on a breakfast shared by a pregnant Mrs Susan Pieters, Bob Hawke's daughter, and Mrs Michiko Futagawa, Nakasone's daughter. Describing their talk as a 'mix of babies and yoga', Goodall explains: 'It was that kind of Australia-Japan summit, the kind that starts with the family and builds on that strong human foundation'. Alongside the written text is a huge picture of the smiling daughters of the two Prime Ministers. Here, we see not only the personalisation of politics, but also the use of femininity in the political agenda.

However, this arrival story's attempt at light-heartedness is severely undermined by a strike story (*Australian*, January 17, 1985: 2) next to the breakfast story. 'Minister's intervention fails to halt train drivers' strike' portrays the bitterness and disillusionment of the train drivers. Although the story itself does not link the strikes with Nakasone's impending talk, the juxtaposition of the two stories on the same page creates a tension too obvious to miss, thus subtly reinforcing the narrative connection of the two events established in the front page coverage on the same day.
Also on that day, the paper ran an editorial 'A blunt warning from Mr Nakasone' (Australian, January 17, 1985: 8), which said that Australians must remember that they had no special trade relationship with Japan. This was an interpretation which cut across the paper's (and the Australian government's) standard narrative that there was mutually beneficial trading interdependence between Japan and Australia. By 1985, it seemed that the nature of the 'special relationship' was open to question. The tone of the editorial was angry, frustrated and accusing. The industrial disputes in this country were described as 'crippling disputes' and 'senseless squabbling'.

We cannot ignore Mr Nakasone's blunt warnings. We cannot afford for the sake of the future of this country to lose the Japanese market. As we said in these columns earlier this week, we can longer permit the use of power without responsibility. If the striking members of the rail unions put an inter-union squabble before the common good of the country they should be sacked and someone willing to work for Australia found to drive the trains (emphasis added)(Editorial, Australian, January 17, 1985: 8).

The professional ideology of journalistic objectivity requires news writers to report facts and suspend their judgement. Editorials, on the other hand, make judgements based on the facts provided in the news. As the editorial links the 'we' of the paper with 'we' of the nation, it is not difficult to tell from both this editorial and the previous one who the national villains are in the scenario. In this sense, the link between editorials and the 'natural interest' they claim to represent is established mythically, for it is through their routine identification with the state's apparatus of law enforcement and order maintenance that editorials establish their legitimacy and expertise. In other words, as Turner (1994: 155) points out, the authority of the editorial has to be constructed rhetorically, rather than through the mobilisation of the expertise or knowledge it has brought to bear on particular topics.

Furthermore, this editorial, like other editorials in the entire Nakasone vs strikers narrative, takes on the power of myth — not only in terms of form, but also in terms of content. All the reader needs to be told at this point is that strikes will result in Australia losing the Japanese market: he or she would have been exposed enough to the news media to know that anything that results in losing the Japanese market would indeed be bad news. The causal relationship
between losing the Japanese market and the strikes is by now 'naturalised' and firmly enveloped in a well-established, news-derived mythology.

However, this editorial goes a step further than the previous one by suggesting that the villain in the scenario of the industrial disputes come from both within and without. While the previous editorial uses a standard narrative in Australian journalism folklore, portraying strikers as the black sheep of the Australian community, this editorial evokes the power of Nakasone but nevertheless constructs him as a racial Other. Beside the editorial denouncing the striking members of the rail unions is a Mitchell cartoon that shows Hawke and Nakasone -- the latter with a camera around his neck invoking one of the stereotypes of Japanese tourists -- in a waterhole surrounded by flames explicitly labelled STRIKES (see appendix 4). Mr Nakasone's comment on the scene is 'Ah, so -- the famous Australian bushfire' (January 17, 1985: 8). Here, Mitchell's cartoon confirms the thematic link between the bushfire story and strike stories, suggesting that strikes can be equally rampant, destructive, and unpredictable. In these constructions, strikers are clearly objectified. However, the juxtaposition of the editorial and Mitchell's cartoon seems to suggest that something else is going on: the strikers are objectified by the 'we' of the nation in the editorial. They are also objectified by Nakasone in the cartoon at the same time. Nakasone, in so doing, is caricatured by Mitchell.

Thealarmist approach adopted in the Nakasone vs strikes narratives continued on the front page of January 18: 'National strike: rail unions defy Nakasone' (North, 1985: 1). On the one hand, Nakasone seems to be on the side of law and order. His presence is legitimate, as are the demands he makes on his Australian suppliers. Moreover, his presence highlights the strike stories and lends weight to an attempt to foster a moral cohesion against these strikers. Also, in this headline pitting Nakasone against the strikers, the government and management are removed from the equation. Nakasone becomes someone with whom 'we' identify, not the Other, while the real Other, the strikers, is internal.

On the other hand, Nakasone is denied a voice, caricatured, and even implicated in the strike stories as having some kind of complicity with the strikers and inflicting embarrassment onto the nation. According to North, Nakasone issued a warning that unless the NSW strikes held up coal supplies to Japanese steel mills, Japan would look to USA, Canada, and China for supplies. North also quoted the Premier of Queensland Sir Joh Bjelke-Peterson as saying
that industrial unrest around Australia had given a very damaging picture of
the nation to the Japanese leader and his large media entourage. The story, as
the headline suggests, enhances the ambiguous narrative status of Nakasone
and demonstrates how this ambiguity plays into the hands of those who want
to see 'law and order' restored. North's story is a good example of othering as a
relational and contextual process.

It is interesting to note that in this set of stories, Nakasone once more
destabilises the Western gaze, as he does in the Hawke-Nakasone news photo
discussed in the previous chapter. The image of the exotica-seeking, snap-
happy Japanese tourist in Mitchell's cartoon embodies a complicated and
ambiguous process, whereby Nakasone is constructed as both the 'gazer' and
'gazed upon'. Again, the trope of the gaze is maintained; however, the
implication of that gaze is reversed: the strength of Japan is seen to lie not only
in its refusal to engage with the Western gaze, as in the Hawke-Nakasone
photo, but also in its capacity to return the gaze, thereby rendering the
Australian gaze powerless.

Mr Nakasone left Australia on January 18 while the strikes were still going on.
However, his departure did not extract the Japanese elements from the strike
stories. Mitchell's regular cartoon (Australian, January 19-20, 1985) 'Bustards of
the Bush' shows 'Mr Sakamune' and 'Bob-san' attending a 'Barbie' which
becomes a bushfire. Another Mitchell cartoon (Australian, January 17, 1985)
seems to be reminding the readers that, however disappointing the striking
workers' behaviour, what really causes Australians embarrassment is the
Japanese gaze. In this sense, Mitchell's strokes emits a strong sense of
resentment seething under the sarcastic gaze of the camera-strung Japanese
tourist -- Mr Nakasone seeking exotica. Such resentment of, and antagonism
towards Japan is clearly absent from the editorial, which adopts a gingerly
deferential stance to Japan.

In both cases analysed here, the cartoons reinforce the message in the editorial
texts by visually demonising them as destructive and unruly. Like Australian
bushfires, strikes are a phantom both feared and anticipated. These cartoons
have a complicity with editorials in that they use an Australian accent in an
attempt to build a nationalist consensus. While the editorials seek to align
readers by including them as members of 'our nation', as 'we' the Australians,
the cartoons seek identification from readers through the use of lower-class
style and accent, which is a major signifier of solidarity and identity for all Australians. In the second cartoon, for instance, Bob Hawke’s conversation with ‘Mr Sakamune’ is distinctively Australian: ‘Welcome to the land of whacko coal, Mr Sakamune.’ ‘We thought you’d like to see a bit of the real Australia... so we laid on a few strikes and a barbie for ya’, and ‘Hope you enjoyed ya visit, Mr Sakamune’, to which the Japanese guest answers, with a distinctly foreign accent, ‘You bet – I’m told in between negotiating coal contracts the Canadians rike a good joke’.

A superficial reading may suggest that these cartoon narratives subvert the editorial message by suggesting that the Japanese, rather than striking drivers, are the real enemies of the nation, and by doing so, these cartoons cater to the ‘lower classes’ in Australian society, not the elite readership of the *Australian*. However, this suggestion can conceal an equally important message: a distinctive Australian accent is also a marker of difference for middle-class, achieving readers of the *Australian*. By speaking an Australian English, Australians mark themselves out as being different from the Japanese, who are represented as not being able to speak English properly. They also mark themselves out as being different from the British and the North Americans. Therefore, Mr Hawke’s Australian accent may serve two purposes: first, it may dissociate him from the clearly non-English-speaking people as represented by Mr Sakamune, and secondly, it may dissociate him from the British, thus enabling him to speak for all Australians regardless of class.

Reading texts in this way allows us to see readers of the *Australian* as positioned as being capable of engaging in the practice of reading between the lines. Both the producers and readers of the paper in this case recognise that it is strategically necessary to give discursive space to dissenting voices. However, they also assume the importance of containing the dissenting voices within the dominant narratives. The fact that Mitchell’s cartoons are hand-drawn, informal in tone and personal in touch is a constant reminder that its opposition to the official position is ritualistic and exists to maintain the appearance of objectivity and balance. In other words, Mitchell’s cartoon texts are part of the ‘licensed dissent’.

Japan continued to be an interpretive framework for understanding the significance of strikes even after Nakasone’s departure. This is clear from the *Australian*’s former Tokyo correspondent Goodall’s review of Nakasone’s visit to
Australia. In a spirit of self-mockery, Goodall (January 19-20, 1985: 2) self-deprecatingly summarises the Japanese impressions of Australians via a question from a member of the Japanese media entourage: 'You all seem so friendly, but why are you pulling against each other?' Again, the evocation of the gaze of an external Other becomes useful in stressing the need of national unity.

January 21 saw a major development in the stories of strikes. On the front page, the lead story is titled 'State and federal governments get tough with strikers' (Molloy and Bagwell, 1985: 1). According to the story, the NSW Government State Rail Authority has decided to resume mass sacking of up to 700 striking train drivers in the Hunter Valley. The SRA will also recruit train operators from inside and outside the railway's workforce to drive trains. Next to the story is a feature profiling a '$10,000-a-week truckie who's laughing all the way to the mine'. The story, together with a photo of a smiling man behind his truck, centres around truck driver Graham Hodge, one of the 200 truck drivers who were keeping the coal industry in Newcastle alive during one of NSW's worst rail strikes.

Mr Hodge, a 29-year-old with two young children from the Newcastle suburb of Cardiff, believes the State's train drivers are "cutting their own throats and the throats of many other Australians by their actions."

"The strike has been good for us as there hasn't been much work around but I'd say we are the only ones who are benefiting," he said.

"The Government has got to get tougher with the drivers and get rid of the lot of them if they won't work." (Toohey, 1995: 1)

Given the consistent anti-union stance of the Australian, it is hardly surprising that the only story written about the personal experience of individuals in the entire narrative is that of a non-striker. The Hodge story is strategically important. Mr Hodge is described as one of the ordinary people who have a young family to raise in one of Australia's suburbs and who love to earn their living by working hard. This human interest angle positions Hodge as one of 'us', inviting readers to identify with him. It also works to dissolve class identification with strikers. To further encourage readers' identification with Hodge, the story depicts him as putting the national interest before his own
interest and wanting strikes to stop despite the benefits he was getting from the
strikes. About his selflessness, story-teller Toohey writes, 'Truckie Mr Graham
Hodge does not class himself as a national hero but that tag may well be
appropriate'.

Why is the tag of national hero appropriate to Mr Hodge? Toohey does not tell
his readers. He relies on the suggestive and evocative power of myth to do the
work. We see the text enlisting the reader in the process of assuming the
'obvious': the strikers are trying to ruin the future of this nation; Mr Hodge, by
doing the opposite of what the strikers are doing, is doing his bit to save the
nation, even at the expense of his own loss; and anybody who puts the interest
of the nation before his or her interest is a national hero. Since readers are
active, thinking beings, they do not have to be told the obvious; myth steps in to
relieve the story-teller, as indeed the reader as well, of the burden of an
exhausting causal account. The Hodge-hero equation closes other narrative
possibilities, giving the impression that this is the only way to tell the story
about Hodge.

The Nakasone vs strikers narrative concluded with an editorial signalling the
end of the strike episode by announcing: 'The Hunter Valley railway union
fiasco is rapidly coming to a head' (Australian, January 21, 1985: 10). As a way of
summarising the consequence and significance of the strikes, the editorial says
that the Hunter Valley train drivers has 'seriously embarrassed the nation
before the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr Nakasone', and their 'petty selfishness'
has caused the loss of tens of millions of dollars in export. For this reason, says
the editorial, the NSW Government's action to replace the striking train drivers
is to be applauded:

The train drivers have shown an unwillingness to participate in the
economy of our country and they must be replaced.

We must ask ourselves whether we are resigned to watching our nation's
status slide to that of the Third World or we have the will to claw back our
lost trading opportunities and rebuild our reputation (Editorial, Australian,
January 21, 1995: 10).

The notion of embarrassing the nation, which initially links the paper's stories
of Nakasone with those of strikes, is re-introduced. The nation is again
personified as having emotions and actions, and as being somebody ‘we’ can identify with. Apart from strategically linking the ‘we’ of the paper with the ‘we’ of the nation, the editorial also seems to be appealing to the readers’ fear, the fear of seeing ‘our’ nation going down the drain, of letting that undesirable aspect of our national character take over and ultimately becoming the Other that ‘we’ hate to be.

It should be clear by now that in the Australian’s strike stories, the striking train drivers are the ‘baddies’ opposing law and order, which have the support of individual citizens like the ‘national hero’ Graham Hodge. Given that the strikes already contain the conflict which is structurally necessary for story-telling, the question arises as to why the stories of Nakasone’s visit are incorporated into the narrative. To answer this question, we need to realise that news not only reports what has happened, but also explains why certain things happen. In the Nakasone vs strikers case, Nakasone’s visit is woven into the narrative fabric because it helps ‘explain’ the consequences and the significance of the strikes as well as legitimise actions taken against the strikers. In other words, Nakasone’s presence enables a mythical explanation to replace the real one.

In his analysis of journalistic practices in the US, Carey (1987) identifies certain conventions journalists follow in their attempts to provide explanations. He argues that the press explains events by ‘elucidating motives, demonstrating causes, predicting consequences, or divining significance’ (Carey, 1987: 172). Such an order of explanation, however, could not be followed in the Australian’s coverage of the train drivers’ strikes: To elaborate the striking drivers’ motives would be inappropriate, for the paper’s intention is to de-legitimise any claims to industrial action by promoting the idea that members of Australian society have roughly the same interests and an equal share of power. It would also be inappropriate to dwell on the cause of the strikes, since the paper holds a consensual view of society, which implies that what unites members of a society is more important than what divides them as interest groups and classes.

The economic future of Australia is seen to depend very much on its relationship with Japan, and the strikers are seen to seriously threaten this relationship. What is good for the nation is good for everybody. Similarly, what is bad for the nation is bad for everybody. It was in this context that the stories of the Japanese became useful. Throughout the 1980s, trade relations and business interactions between Australian and Japan had become crucially
important to the Australian economy. By the beginning of the 1990s, Japan was Australia's largest trading partner. Japan was Australia's largest export market (26.4 percent of Australia's export), and also its second largest source of imports (20.3 per cent of Australia's import). Australia was one of the few countries which maintained a trade surplus with Japan (Jain and Weeks, 1993: 13).

However, the nature of Australia and Japan's bilateral interdependence was also becoming increasingly problematic. Although Australia maintained a fairly comfortable trade surplus of exports to imports in the relationship, several new developments took place. First, the US/Japan trading relationship became increasingly controversial and troublesome, as the US budget deficit and Japanese exports to the US both mounted. This was a major issue which caused Australians to become concerned that insistent US pressure on Japan to open its domestic markets to more imports would possibly be to the disadvantage of Australian producers, notably the beef industry. Second, though new Australian energy exports to Japan were under way, notably liquid natural gas from the North West Shelf, the Japanese were taking an increasingly hard line in negotiating Australian coal and steel import contracts, and looking to other sources of supply. This put pressure on the Australian government to perform more efficiently and reliably as an exporter, exacerbating the already strike-prone industrial relations record in Australia. Third, though Japanese direct investment increased substantially, it did so mainly in property developments and tourist resorts, not in the manufacturing industry. This rekindled public suspicion and hostility, particularly among sectors of the Australian community like the RSL, who had experience of Japan during the Pacific War (Lewis and Sun, 1993).

It is in the context of this problematic yet crucially important relationship between Australia and Japan that the Australian explains the action of strikers, both in terms of its consequence -- the strikes have seriously embarrassed the nation in front of the Japanese -- and in terms of its significance -- tough measures against strikers are necessary in order to win Japan's respect and trust. Therefore, Nakasone, however ambiguous his narrative status is in these strike stories, becomes an enabling factor for these kinds of explanations to become possible, for his presence legitimates the amplification of the notion of national embarrassment and the sense of damage done to the nation, both of which are vitally important to the restoration of law and order. While news functions to provide facts selected according to government officials' definition of events
and issues, features and editorials enable narrative elements in primary news stories to be developed, thereby facilitating an ideological closure. The professional ideology of news writing enables polarisation between national heroes and unpatriotic Australians to occur through various stages of storytelling, hereby othering the latter.

The othering process, therefore, can also occur within a culture, where unequal social and economic relations exist. Furthermore, a racial Other is often strategically evoked to cover up the othering processes which occur within a given culture and society. This is a complicated process. The discourse of national unity seems to entail some kind of internal othering, and this process has to evoke an external Other. Nevertheless, in an attempt to mobilise some aspects of the image of this external Other to mark out a distinctive Australianness, that Other is further essentialised and stereotyped. This point will be further discussed in the following analysis of the Peacock and MFP narrative.

**Peacock vs MFP: Who Is the Victim?**

In 1987, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) proposed to the Australian government that a new kind of a city be built in Australia, with extensive Japanese involvement. The proposed city was called the 'Multifunction Polis' (MFP), featuring high-tech, high-leisure facilities. Responses to the Japanese proposal were mixed. The Australian Federal Government responded with various degrees of enthusiasm, with Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce, Senator Button, being an enthusiastic defender of the concept.

Studying the Australian response to the MFP proposal, Australia's Japan specialist Gavan McCormack (1991) points out that the debate on the project's suitability adopted a technocratic and manipulative approach to public opinion.

The concept of the proposal was vague; its development was surrounded by secrecy and lack of information, combined with public relations manipulation of what information there was; the media for long periods showed no interest at all, then sensationalised the idea; bureaucrats, consultants and think tank members got carried away by their fantasies, so that a plethora of strange ideas flew and circulated (McCormack, 1991: 53).
Prior to the March 1990 federal election, discussions of the MFP in the *Australian* were sporadic, low-key, and dispassionate. Peter Ward’s feature story ‘Japan plans our brave new Utopia’ on April 17, 1989 exemplifies this. Although there may be a ring of sarcasm in the headline, the story proper is a serious attempt to understand the issue. Basing his story on the interview with Gavan McCormack, Ward quotes McCormack as saying that the MFP has a ‘vision of a 21st century unalienated community transcending contradictions of race and class and full of joy and creativity, as a worthy, understandable aspiration’. But, according to McCormack, the creativity ‘equals a wider choice of consumption goods and services and expanded opportunities for corporate profits’. Ward’s attempt at a balanced and non-opinionated perspective conveys caution and dispassion, compared with other major papers in the country.

However, such a cautious and dispassionate stance seemed to go out of the window when the discussion surrounding the MFP suddenly became the focus of a policy debate between the Labor and Liberal Parties during the 1990 federal election campaign in March, 1990. For a week leading up to the election, the *Australian*’s response to the MFP debate was anything but low-key and dispassionate. A close reading of the paper’s coverage of the issue during the week uncovers a very interesting process by which the MFP proposal is injected into stories of the general election. Why would such a nebulous concept, which is yet to become a blueprint for future development, stir up such high-flown rhetoric and become the staple fodder for policy debate during the election campaign?

According to Morris-Suzuki (1991), the answer lies in the fact that the MFP brings together two issues with touch peculiarly sensitive nerves in Australian society. The first is ‘technology’, and the second is ‘Japan’. Both of these, Morris-Suzuki points out, are surrounded by a ‘dense fog of myth’ (1991: 124). Central to the first issue is the view that technology is ‘a disembodied, mysterious and superhuman force which is about to descend onto our society and, in some unexplained way, redeem the Australian economy’ (Morris-Suzuki, 1991: 124).

Such a view also considers Japan as the exemplar of modernity, made possible by the power of technology. Greg Sheridan’s articles on Japanese modernity analysed in the previous chapter represent such a view. The first half of the 1980s saw the Australian business and management sector going through a
soul-searching phase, mostly in an attempt to look for ways to improve efficiency and increase productivity based on overseas experiences. A recurring message in many writings is that, in order to ‘learn from Japan’ in the areas of management, industrial relations, and high-tech development, it is necessary to reconsider ‘our’ own cultural and social values, which may be inhibiting changes. The following article from the *Australian*, ‘Why Japan catches world with industrial pants down’ (Courtnay, 1986: 16), is typical of such discourse:

There is no proof that the Japanese are naturally smarter than we are, yet they seem to outsmart us every time.

What if Australia were left behind because we had become clogged with systems that did not ideally suit a small antipodean country placed more than less in Asia?

What if the cherished principle of individualism has deteriorated into a system where the lowest level in the community became the mean average (Courtnay, 1986: 16)?

Such self-conscious, if not self-effacing, discourse expresses an admiration for Japanese modernity and is embraced by many top-level decision makers in Australia. However, while ‘Japan’ is used to represent modernisation and high-technology as goals to which Australia should aspire, it also is used to represent the problematic aspects of modernisation and ‘high-tech’ society. An article (*Australian*, May 23, 1986: 18) in a supplement edition on Japan in 1986, for instance, offers a not-so-bright glimpse of work prospects for the Japanese women employees who are threatened by automation. The article mentions that the replacement of office ladies (OLs) with ‘techno ladies’ (TLs) further exacerbates the situation of employment inequality for women:

The Nakasone Government had to pull up its men’s socks in a last-minute rush to join the advanced world in outlawing job discrimination. For all their competence plus the new legal status, Japanese working women have a long way to go to challenge their ‘equal’ male colleagues (*Australian*, May 23, 1986: 18).

Another article in the same edition, entitled ‘cracks appearing in worker monolith’ (*Australian*, May 23, 1986: 17), examines the implication of Japanese
automation progress for Japanese workers and company employees. According to the story, the fear of failure to keep up with the workforce is only one of the threats nagging at Japan's neatly regulated, productive workforce. All ages are feeling the effects of automation. The story also challenges the myth of the Japanese management style:

The certainty of career-long employment in a steadily rising climb to the top is being shown to be hollow. The Nakasone Government is casting round for answers to replace the old worker adjustment formulas because Japan's future, as well as that of the individual, is at stake (Australian, May 23, 1986: 17).

It is clear that 'Japan' and 'technology' -- what Morris-Suzuki identifies as the two issues central to the MFP debate -- articulate an Australian ambivalence regarding modernity. Australia is seen to constantly shift between a desire to be as high-tech and economically powerful as Japan, and an anxiety about the consequences of unbridled modernism.

The myth surrounding 'Japan', the second issue in the MFP debate, Morris-Suzuki suggests, operates by way of linking Japan's current economic power with its wartime aggression. In fact, alluding to images of the wartime Japan has become a common discursive strategy to express resentment towards Japanese investment and the growing presence of Japanese tourism in Australia. The following poem 'All Aboard for Changi' by Australian poet Bruce Dawe (1990: 8) encapsulates dominant Australian public sentiments towards Japan:

The official Sayonara starts next week
- until then we might as well lie back
and let it happen, pick up a bit
of the lingo (Domo arigato could prove
useful), learn to shuffle
into squads at sunrise, man the pick
and shovel, try to acquire a taste
for rats and rotten rice, practice being
excruciatingly polite on all occasions Cop
this young Harry thank you kindly sir
there is nothing like a swift kick in the crutch
to make one feel at home, though personally
I prefer
the government policy of perpetual
crouching, after all it's only
a cringe or two from where we are right now
and not to worry there'll be things to see
in the Greater Australia Co-Prosperity
Sphere
that'll knock you silly (e.g. , the coastal strip
a cut-price Ginza for snap-happy flights
of Henshu honeymooners, a Sushi
Bar-and-Grill
on every block and brand-new railway
bridges much sturdier than that one across the Kwai)
- I mean it stands to reason, lower forms
of life giving way to higher, and the rising sun
that shone on digger hats can't hold a candle to
the incandescent omnipotence of the yen...

The poem, published in the Australian four months after the Peacock-Hawke
election, articulates the deeply-felt perceptions and emotions of the Australia
community. Its temporal juxtaposition of the war invasions of Japan in the early
1940s and the Japanese presence in Australia today, and its temporalisation of
places (the river Kwai, Changi) vividly evoke a suspicion and hostility towards
Japan. Such a myth, though widely shared and proving to be enduring, seems
to have increasingly less political currency in the 1980s and early 1990s, when
the discourse of enmeshing with Asia is taking an ever stronger hold.

It is in the context of these conflicting myths about 'technology' and 'Japan' that
the concept of the MFP is introduced to Australia. A close reading of the paper's
coverage of the issue during the week of the federal election reveals how the
MFP is injected into the stories of the election. The process effectively
demonstrates the role of the press as instrument of governing. It also contains
important moments when myth steps in to inscribe certain views of the
dominant social group onto the consciousness of the reader. Above all, it
illustrates how the myth of Japan plays into the hands of the dominant political
power.
The first story which introduces the MFP debate into the 1990 Australian election is 'Peacock to axe Japanese city of future' by its then national affairs editor Paul Kelly (March 17-18, 1990: 1). The news peg of the story is that the leader of the Opposition, Mr Peacock, has pledged that a Coalition government would abandon the proposal for a joint Australian-Japanese city of the future.

Although Kelly conforms to the professional ideology of news-writing by quoting both sides of the argument, he does not bother to appear objective. Even a cursory reading of the story shows that he is not merely reporting Peacock's decision. Kelly responds to Peacock's announcement by ascribing a motive for Peacock's decision. According to Kelly, Peacock's stand follows strong criticism of the MFP from the RSL, the National Party and certain sectors of the community which are concerned about overseas tourism and foreign investment. By further straining community opinion, Kelly argues, the Coalition announcement 'injects a political wild card into the election'.

Journalists' preoccupation with seeking out the motives behind what individuals are saying and doing is, according to Carey, emblematic of Western culture, which assumes that the world is filled with individuals driven by desires and greed. However, Kelly's interpretation goes further than ascribing a motive for Peacock's decision. It also predicts its consequences and significance:

But Mr Peacock's move has the potential to provoke a strong business and community backlash, as well as sour Australia's relations with Japan, our main trading partner.

Given Japan's concern about Australian public opinion, it is likely to prejudice severely the "new city" concept, as well as raise further doubts about the sustainability of the expanding Australia-Japan relationship.

Therefore, Kelly concludes: 'it will be a cruel commentary on the nation if this election is responsible for killing the idea' (Kelly, March 17-18, 1990: 1).

Why will it be a cruel commentary on the nation if this election is responsible for killing the idea (of MFP), and indeed, how does the Coalition's decision to scrap the MFP proposal inject a 'political wild card into the election'? Rather than elaborating on these assertions, Kelly seems to rely on myth to fill the narrative gaps. The knowledge he seems to assume the reader to have is multi-
faceted. The reader should be acquainted with the strategies and techniques of persuasion conventionally used in the election campaign, and realise that the MFP debate is symbolic. Kelly also seems to assume that readers believe that Peacock is exploiting the logic of anti-Japanese sentiments. Furthermore, he seems to assume that the reader is conscious of the virulent yet politically unsound nature of images depicting Japan as a military and economic invader. By avoiding straight talk and inviting the reader to participate in the construction of meaning, Kelly seems to prepare his narrative for injection with mythical concepts and meaning, thereby implicating his reader in the process.

Although conflicts between the party in power and its Opposition are normally institutionalised in media coverage, the Opposition, as represented by Peacock in this particular election, is depicted as having something in common with the strikers discussed earlier: they both threaten to damage the Australia-Japan relationship and embarrass the nation. In both cases, the sense of the powerful Japan gazing at 'us' is evoked. The difference between the strike stories and the Peacock stories, however, is that Nakasone in the strike stories is depicted as physically present, gazing at the strikers with his own eyes, whereas in the MFP stories, Japan is invisible yet still exerting the power of its gaze. Both strikers and Peacock are constructed as an embarrassment in the eyes of Japan.

The following day, the front page story, 'Libs divisive on Japanese: PM' (Austin et al, 1990; 1) provided more facts within the interpretive parameters set by Kelly in the previous day's story. This time, the explanation of Peacock's decision to abandon the MFP came from Bob Hawke, the Prime Minister, who said that Peacock had opportunistically and dangerously misrepresented the MFP to the Australian community by suggesting that it was a proposal for a Japanese enclave. Hawke also pointed out that Peacock's decision had been repudiated by members of his own party, including the Liberal Premier of NSW Mr Greiner, and the shadow Treasurer of the Opposition, Mr Howard, who had expressed support for the proposal only a couple of days earlier.

If Kelly wrote his first Peacock story within the constraints of objective news writing, the comment he wrote two days later calling Peacock a 'danger in the Lodge' (Kelly, March 19, 1990: 1) was blatantly pro-Labor. In the first story, Kelly describes Peacock's decision to scrap the MFP project as a 'political wild card'. In the commentary, Kelly interpretes Peacock's position in racial terms, asserting that it is a 'distortion for scare-mongering'. Based on this
interpretation, Kelly implies that since Peacock is a 'desperate man' trying to exploit anti-Japanese sentiments for domestic political considerations, he is not fit to be the Prime Minister of Australia.

It should be pointed out, however, that the connection between Peacock's anti-MFP stance and his racist attitude towards Japan is not substantiated. Kelly relies on the power of association to establish the validity of his interpretation. By mixing criticism of Japanese dominance in Australia with the idea of racist slurs, Kelly seems to be inviting the reader to equate the racist sentiments expressed by Bruce Dawe with Peacock's position. In this sense, Kelly is ascribing a motive that Peacock may or may not have and reframing the story in a racist narrative, as opposed to an economic narrative; and in a 'Japanese invasion' narrative, as opposed to a 'Japanese investment' narrative.

Kelly's narrative strategy is not uncommon in the Australian narratives of Japan. Commenting on the partnership relation between Australia and Japan, Sugimoto (1991) points out:

Pro-Japanese sentiments have tended to be associated with cultural sophistication and non-racist orientations. Too easily have those who oppose Japan's economic dominance in Australia been dismissed as 'anti-Japanese racists' because the 'anti' in being against Japan's economic dominance is misinterpreted as being against the Japanese people. If debate on the Japanisation of Australia is to be meaningful the notion of racism must be separate from other evaluative criteria (Sugimoto, 1991: 176).

Kelly's explanation of Peacock's motive operates on several temporal planes. While Peacock's announced intention to scrap the Japanese proposal is reported as a current news event, Kelly's mention of anti-Japanese sentiments taps into fears of a Japanese 'invasion' that prevailed in Australia throughout the 1980s. In addition, it brings back the memories of Australians' experience with the Japanese during the World War II. Furthermore, by implicitly linking Peacock's recent action with an historical event, Kelly is able to make a prediction about the future: Peacock would be a danger in the Lodge. The juxtaposition of the four temporal dimensions implicate the reader in a shared assumption of time, memory and meaning.
Kelly's explanation of Peacock's motive also operates in several spatial contexts. The first context is political: the headline 'Peacock a "danger" in the Lodge' links the MFP debate to the election outcome. The second context is geopolitical: Kelly claims that the real issue in the MFP debate is the ability of Australia to strike an effective and integrated relationship with Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. The third spatial context -- the actual site of the 'future city', the multi-function polis -- is conspicuously absent: throughout the Peacock vs the MFP narrative, Adelaide, where the 'future city' was to be built, was never even mentioned. This suggests that the MFP is but a symbolic event which, though a non-story in its own right, embodies a range of narrative possibilities available for appropriation by both Peacock and Hawke. It also embodies a set of narrative dichotomies: between Japan and Australia, past and future, the actual and the symbolic. From the perspective of narrative organisation, the story of the MFP debate is a story about 'issues', which do not offer conflict or dramatic plot development, as crime or sports events do. However, an issue, as opposed to event, does not have a clearly defined narrative structure and therefore forces the reporter to invent or 'fabricate' within the narrative gaps. In this sense, although the MFP is a weakly structured 'issue story', it nevertheless provides occasion for a more fully realised narrative of the election.

As discussed earlier, the questions When and Where in news are never simple. The questions hide within their apparent common sense a whole framework of interpretation within which even the best and most 'objective' reporters operate. The MFP issue, for instance, becomes timely because it is a politically opportune occasion for the election candidates; and in this case, Japan, the place in which the idea of the MFP is born, becomes a new subject rather than a place.

As the national affairs editor of the *Australian*, Paul Kelly's view can hardly be considered purely personal. The strongest indication of the paper's pro-Labor stance comes from the editorial of the same day, 'Peacock sends Japan a powerful message'. The editorial accuses Peacock of using the MFP as a 'bogeyman':

At this stage of its [MFP's] development, acceptance or rejection of the idea is primarily symbolic. But the symbolism is powerful, for it is concerned with notions of the future of the nation and our involvement with -- or isolation from -- Asia (Editorial, *Australian*, March 19, 1990: 10).
The editorial reinforces Kelly's interpretation of Peacock's decision to abandon the MFP. Regarding the motive behind Peacock's decision, the editorial says:

His [Peacock's] appeal is to the fearful gut instincts of racism, to that minority of voters who yearn for the bygone days when Australian was white, when we were -- thought we were -- protected by the mothering arms of Empire, when we had -- or thought we had -- no need to embrace Asian economies, cultures and peoples. His appeal is to people......who view Japanese investment -- 'buying Australia' -- as a prime symbol of all they find difficult about our modern nation' (Editorial, Australian, March 19, 1990: 10).

Though the editorial elaborates on Peacock's intention, it does not mention the fact that its own discourse of 'embracing' Asia is also motivated by economic concerns rather than by a genuine fondness for its peoples and cultures. Asia, particularly Japan, is considered worth 'embracing' because it is believed that Australia's economy can be 'redeemed' by such a liaison.

The Opposition's rejection of the idea, at this early stage, will send the opposite signals -- that Australia's alternative government wants to keep Asia, particularly Japan, at a distance, that it finds the domestic adjustment flowing from closer links too hard to handle. This could, as Mr Keating has pointed out, damage our trading position at a time when the Japanese are opening up their markets (Editorial, Australian, March 19, 1990: 10).

The unquestioned, yet questionable motive for 'embracing' Asia is further evidenced in the conclusive paragraph of the editorial. Expressing the desire to embrace Asia, the editorial nevertheless makes it clear that a distinction between 'us' and 'others' is necessary. In doing so, the editorial may cut both ways: it absolves itself and those it represents from the label of racism, but it maintains a national imaginary based on an us/them dichotomy. Japan, therefore, should be embraced, but with caution and calculation:

The city of the future deserves further study and proper consideration when those studies are completed. We are not so poor that others can take us for granted -- and they would be wrong to think they can. Equally, however, we are not so rich that we can afford to sneer at what others have to offer (Editorial, Australian, March 19, 1990: 10).
Here we witness the triumph of a new form of nationalism over the old one. The latter stems from the past, proves to be enduring and powerful, yet is officially dismissed as old-fashioned at best and racist at worst; the former is officially sanctioned and executed, and buttressed on a forward-looking discourse of internationalisation. Nevertheless, both forms of nationalism rely on the clear delineation of the national self and Other, even if the selves and Others are different. By now, the Australian's identification with the official discourse of internationalisation is clear. Its perpetuation of certain myths at the expense of others reveals its role as the instrument of governing.

Interestingly, although both Kelly's stories and the Australian's editorial appeal to the Australians' fears of being embarrassed by the Japanese, it seems that the Japanese could not care less. After Peacock announced his decision to scrap the Japanese project, the Japanese reaction was scanty. The Australian ran a feature story, 'Japanese have their say -- and they can't agree either' (Shand and Lowe, 1990: 1). Intending to provide background and explanation to the MFP debate, the writers cited several Japanese academics, business and government officials in Australia to portray a picture of indeterminacy -- the Japanese could not decide if the project was good for Australia.

This lack of Japanese positionality is further highlighted by Clark's analysis 'Cutting off your nose to spite a polis' (March 23, 1990: 17). Clark's story depicts a total lack of interest in Japan in the MFP debate that is going on in Australia and thus implies that the whole fuss about the MFP says more about the undesirable side of Australia's national self than about Japan: 'Meanwhile, back in Japan! Bemused smiles and head-scratching. and now thanks to Mr Peacock, further confirmation of Australian rattiness'.

Japan's absence and nonchalance in the debate should never be considered as symptomatic of its oriental insubstantiality and indeterminacy -- an association often made by orientalists. On the contrary, it suggests the phantom-like enigma of Japanese power -- its capacity to incite strong emotions despite its absence. The MFP debate becomes the focus of the Hawke-Peacock contest because it is full of possibilities for political manoeuvre. Peacock is fighting an uphill battle, because he has put forward a policy that easily conjures up the much-criticised perception of Japan as an economic invader. He thereby renders himself vulnerable to the label of racist.
In a subsequent story 'Gloves off in bitter fight over MFP' (Milne et al, 1990: 1&6), Peacock is reported to respond angrily to the racially-based interpretation of his motive behind the decision to abandon MFP. He argues that the election is being sidetracked and hijacked on to racist slurs when the real issue is the economy. According to the story, Peacock mounts his counter-attack on Prime Minister Hawke, describing Hawke as 'desperate and rattled', and Hawke's attack of his motive 'a grubby little exercise'. This is one of the few occasions during the election campaign on which Peacock is given an opportunity to tell his story rather than to have his story reframed into the racist narrative.

However, as the battle intensified, the paper provided discursive space for Hawke to strike a final, lethal blow. On March 22, two days before the election, Hawke said Peacock's sudden announcement to abandon the MFP project was clearly driven by domestic considerations. According to the Australian's news story 'Peacock's full-on insult' (Austin, March 22, 1990: 1), Prime Minister Bob Hawke has made an 'aggressive' address to the National Press Club in Canberra, saying that Peacock has insulted the Japanese by rejecting the MFP out of hand, and by doing so, proves that Peacock is not fit to be the Prime Minister of Australia. Not surprisingly, the story allows Hawke to have the last word about the issue: 'If ever an issue and its handling showed that he was not fit to be prime minister of this country, this has been it'.

Any project would impact on different social groups in a nation in a different way. The symbolism of the MFP issue is apparent from the fact that all the stories examined so far fail to mention the issues of social inequality and economic disparity. In the case of the MFP, Sugimoto (1990: 130) argues that while construction, finance, entertainment and leisure industries would be likely to benefit from such a high-tech city, the working class, women, non-Japanese ethnic minorities, the rural population, and environmental interests may possibly suffer in both the long and the short term.

Nor do any of these stories provide information about what such a high-tech project meant for these social groups in Japan. Sugimoto (1990) points out the MFP debate lacks democratic participatory process, of which the press is supposedly a part. It is also dominated by technocratic language and vocabulary. Consequently, according to Sugimoto, the debate has failed to supply knowledge about Japanese society, which would enable the public to
make informed decisions. Framed in a 'constructive-partnership' discourse, which the government has consistently promoted, the Peacock vs MFP narrative relies on the 'enlightened' rhetoric of burying historical memories and overcoming anti-Japanese sentiments. However, in order to do so, the writers dismiss these memories and prejudices without elaborating on why they are such a powerful factor in the Australia-Japan relationship. Alternatively, they are quick to employ an anti-racist rhetoric to close off the debate. Mostly endorsing the positive responses to the MFP proposal, these writers concentrate on the battle between Hawke and Peacock and fail to include the voices of opposition from certain sectors of the community, in particular, the hostile feelings associated with war memories of Japan. Instead, they seek consensus across social divisions by promoting the view that decisions about the appropriateness of any trade-off must be made at the national level and reflect national priorities. In this sense, the Australian's Peacock vs MFP narrative reveals a great degree of complicity between government, the business sector, and the press.

A retrospective look at the MFP debate comes from Clark, whose ridicule of the media's performance is scathing: 'the media began to debate pros and cons, as if MFP was about to begin tomorrow' (Clark, March 23, 1990: 17). Clark's article represents a moment of inconsistency in the Peacock vs MFP narrative, for it points to the absurdity of reading the MFP debate and the Hawke-Peacock election as having some intrinsic link. This is also an ironic moment, when the newspaper seems to be saying to its readers: it is not that we did not find it absurd in the first place, it is just that we are not allowed to say it until the event is over. In other words, the paper is engaged in a process by which newswriters report the 'truth' first and then remind readers that truth is but a relative concept.

Such a news writing convention, however, is by no means innocent or neutral, and, as shown in the case of the news coverage of the election and the MFP debate, very often plays into the hands of those who have more situation-defining power. For instance, at an early stage of the election campaign, Peacock reacted to Hawke's accusation of racism, claiming that the election was being 'sidetracked' and 'hijacked' onto racist slur, and that Hawke's attack was a 'grubby little exercise'. The Australian reported Peacock's claims, but presented them as moral defensiveness, and thereby did not treat them seriously. By comparison, Hawke's labelling of Peacock as a racist was immediately taken up
in Kelly's report and comments, and was subsequently validated in the editorial. Had there been more 'deconstructive' moments such as that provided by Clark in the news coverage in the early stages of the election campaign, there would have been a more well-rounded account of the strategies and techniques employed by politicians on both sides.

As discussed earlier, elections have a dramatic narrative structure: the conflict between the goodie and the baddie, and a rhythmic quality: a clear sense of beginning, middle and end. However, it is clear that this is not enough. Both the politicians and the media need some issue or controversy to push the plot forward. Here the question arises as to why the MFP becomes the centre of debate, and the why the media, in spite of its awareness of the symbolic nature of the issue, becomes the accomplice in the racist framing of Peacock's position.

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Australian consistently advocates the discourse of integrating with Asia, or what some writers refer to as the 'enmeshment discourse' (Frost, 1994). Such an 'enlightened' discourse, as Frost argues, is born out of the Australian economic crisis, and has become a strong rationale in shaping government policy. The Australian's foreign affairs editor Greg Sheridan's regular articles on Australia-Asia relations, analysed in the previous chapter, have consistently represented this position. According to Frost, both policy-makers and economists who subscribe to 'the economic enmeshment orthodoxy' are quick to accuse their opponents of racism in political and economic debates (Frost, 1994: 27).

Such orthodoxy, as encapsulated in Sheridan's and other journalists' writings, entails the suspension of criticism of Asian countries for fear of offending 'our Asian neighbours'. It also, however, blinds us to the cultural, religious and social specificities of these countries. Furthermore, such orthodoxy tends to privilege the narratives of enmeshment within an 'Australian economic crisis' framework, yet it seems to marginalise or even ignore other kinds of enmeshment forged through, for example, personal contacts, tourism, and non-government activities in the areas of environment, human rights and union linkages. Additionally, narratives of economic enforcements have tended to feature the activities of techno-professional, predominantly male elites, but leave out the activities of women, workers, racial minorities, and the urban and rural poor (Frost, 1994).
Under the rubric of the enmeshment discourse the Australian's reporting of Japanese affairs has mainly been based on the theme of Australia and Japan having a special 'interdependent' partnership. However, although the theme of the special relationship is the main motif running through the Australian's coverage of Japan in the 1980s, it is always pervaded with tension and contradiction. One important tendency in the Australia-Japan relationship in the 1980s and early 1990s is its increasing politicisation. Australian policies dealing with Japan, which once mainly concerned trade, ceased to be purely economic-oriented. Increasingly, economic issues become catalysts for different sectors of Australian society to argue for a particular direction in domestic economic and political policies. Especially in the second half of the 1980s, issues such as direct Japanese investment in Australia, the large increase in Japanese tourism to Australia, and the proposal to build a MFP all contributed to this process of politicisation. In contrast to the optimism of government rhetoric and policies over these issues, some sectors of the Australian community began to express concern over the nature and extent of such development and at times were alarmed about the prospect of a so-called 'Japanese invasion' of Australia.

In the context of these political and economic specificities, it becomes clear why the debate of the MFP would catch the imagination of the voters. A debate over the issue, however tenuous and inconclusive, would help both politicians and the media to simplify and polarise the election process. In fact it is exactly the nebulous and tenuous nature of the issue that enables the process of simplification and polarisation to occur effectively.

* * *

It is apparent by now that my references to these narratives as 'Nakasone vs strikers' narrative and 'Peacock vs MFP' narrative are intended to highlight the false dichotomy between 'Australia' and 'Japan', which both narratives set out to create. What seems to be the real issue to both narratives analysed is the strategy of internal othering. In the Nakasone vs strike narrative, crises in industrial relations are brought under control by evoking a sense of crisis in foreign policy. Nakasone, who embodies Japan, serves to fuse the industrial dispute stories with stories of foreign policy. He therefore serves as a catalyst by which the strikers are scapegoated as the enemy of the nation. In the Peacock vs MFP narrative, we see a process of party politics masquerading as race politics. Japan is a subject matter, and what we see is the appropriation of competing
images of Japan, which enables one political party to attack its opponent in the name of the nation. In both cases, a false dichotomy is set up between Australia and its racial Other. The gaze of Japan is strategically used as a way of managing the social inequalities and economic disparities within Australian society.

Nakasone’s week-long visit to Australia occurred when national strikes were spreading as rampantly as its bushfires. The *Australian* enthusiastically promoted a scenario in which Australia was seriously embarrassed in front of its cultural Other, and this embarrassment at the national level justified the punishment of a few black sheep in the nation. The narrative, therefore, is buttressed by a narrow Australian nationalism. In the Peacock vs MFP narrative, on the other hand, Japan is also Australia’s cultural Other, and is used as a mirror to reflect the Australian ‘rattiness’, as embodied in Peacock’s MFP policy. However, the discourse is buttressed with a nationalism which nevertheless speaks the rhetoric of internationalism. Such a rhetoric privileges competition and efficiency — the verbiage of economic rationalism to which both Labor and the Coalition subscribe. Such verbiage enabled Labor to hold together tensions between being ‘pro-business’ but also ‘enlightened’ and ‘progressive’. Peacock lost the MFP debate and the election because he was quickly and conveniently labelled by his opponents as racist and anti-Japanese. In other words, he proved himself less of a master of the discourse of internationalism.

In both narratives, Japan is construed as having multiple, and sometimes contradictory dimensions, and it is the availability of this multiplicity that makes it an effective point of reference against which a particular kind of Australianness is defined. In the Nakasone vs strikers narrative, the myth of Japan as a hard-working nation steps in to define the ‘sloth’ of Australian workers, as does the myth of a collective-oriented Japan to highlight the ‘selfish’ individualism of Australian employees. In the MFP vs Peacock narrative, the power of Japan’s high technology is evoked to reflect upon the technological backwardness of Australia, as is the myth of Japan’s consensus-oriented style of governing to define Australia’s pettiness in party politics. However, the question of who stands to benefit from the MFP project and what it means for various social groups in Australia is elided.
Furthermore, in both narratives, a self-deprecating, what-Japan-does-so-must-we discourse operates on the level of myth. In other words, each particular aspect of 'Japan' is alluded to, hinted at and implied, rather than described, defined and spelt out. 'Japan' consists of narrative sketches, entailing an interpretative process by which the reader is supposed to bring in his/her knowledge of what Japanese-ness is. Such a process enables an array of the Australian 'selves' to be defined, but at a price: 'Japan' is further essentialised and certain constructs of it are made to seem like unquestionable truths.

This suggests that the power of journalists lies in successfully convincing readers that stories, if told under the constraints of journalistic conventions, assume a life of their own and tell themselves. Studying the processes by which the Nakasone vs strikers narrative and the Peacock vs MFP narrative evolve enables us to understand the means by which journalists rely on the power of narrative in their daily decisions of selecting, ordering and organising news events. Through this activity, disparate events and issues are constructed as having a logical or cause-and-effect relationship. Bennett (1988) is right to say of journalism: 'News is not biased in spite of, but precisely because of, the professional standards intended to prevent bias' (1988: 117). It is the power of news narrative that makes the strategy of internal othering operationable.

As mentioned before, Xiaomei Chen (1995) argues that Western orientalism and Chinese occidentalism serve different ideological functions: while orientalism in the West is a strategy of world domination, occidentalism in China is a deployed largely in domestic politics. The analysis of the Australian's narratives of Japan seems to contradict Chen's view. The Australian's deployment of orientalism (and self-orientalism) shows that orientalism, particularly that of the 20th and 21st century, serves similar purposes to Chinese occidentalism: It not only enables the West to negotiate its changed power relation with the Orient, as indicated in the previous chapter, but also allows dominant social groups within a Western society to engage in internal political and economic oppressions.
Chapter 7
Enemy Or Friend: Change and Continuity in the People’s Daily’s Narratives of Japan

Like Australian media, Chinese media also participate in the constant redefinition of the nation and negotiation of self/Other position. However, due to political, cultural and professional differences, Australian and Chinese journalists may face different issues and problems in the construction of a national imaginary. As well, they may deploy different narrative forms and strategies to address their respective issues and problems.

According to Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, China’s Japan policy adheres to three cardinal principles: to remember the past; to look to the future; and to nurture a permanent friendly relationship (Jiang, 1992: 1). The three principles are not designed to contradict each other, although they may sound contradictory, but to provide a package of choices for political expedience. The role of the Party press is to effectively co-ordinate with the government whenever politically opportune occasions arise. Given this, the effectiveness of media strategies therefore lies in delicate handling of the multi-faceted and multi-layered images of Japan and in skills in recycling the pre-existing stock narratives.

More importantly, the contradiction embodied in 'Japan' is useful for the state-organised remembering, whereby a selective memory of the past is mobilised to serve the current political ends of the nation-state. In the Chinese case, 'Japan' is often evoked as the Other in anti-imperialistic discourses. However, in the same way that nationalist discourses need an imperialistic Other, the government's discourse of modernisation also needs an Other as an alliance and as a role model. Paradoxically, it is also 'Japan' that fulfils this role.

This chapter, in the course of analysing the news reports about the Sino-Japanese relationship in the Chinese People’s Daily in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, will examine the process by which the Party press co-ordinates with the state-organised 'partial forgetting' and 'selective remembering' of Sino-Japanese relations. In doing so, it will seek to identify the issues around nation-building in the Chinese Party press. More
importantly, it will examine change and continuity in the deployment of narrative forms and strategies by the Party press in its attempt to address these issues.

As discussed earlier, in the study of the Chinese media, it is important to consider the distinction between foreign news and foreign affairs news. While the views expressed in the former may be independent of the nation's foreign affairs policies, the views in the latter are more likely to follow the Party line. Since the People's Daily pays more attention to the Chinese government's policy regarding Japan than to Japan per se, this chapter will focus on the representations of Sino-Japanese relations rather than the representations of Japan itself. In an era of domestic economic reforms and an 'open door' policy, when China is becoming increasingly enmeshed in global interdependency, the successes and failures of foreign policies have important implications for domestic politics. The official media, as the 'throat and tongue' of the government and the Party, become particularly important in collaborating with the latter's attempt to 'make the past serve the present, and make the foreign serve the Chinese', as Mao Zedong put it. In this context, Chinese media representations of the Sino-Japanese relationship provide an interesting space wherein history is constantly rewritten, and the boundary between 'us' and 'them' is constantly redrawn.

Sino-Japanese news in the People's Daily is predominantly concerned with cultural exchange and diplomatic events, and very little is about science, technology, business and finance. Although admittedly Japan's importance to China comes mainly from its economic and technological power, the image of Japan as an example of modernity and progress does not seem to have an overriding status in the People's Daily's representations of Japan. For this reason, this chapter will focus on two clusters of stories. The first one consists of cultural exchange stories -- the monk stories and the lost girl stories -- which symbolise Sino-Japanese friendship. The second consists of diplomatic relations stories, like the textbook controversy and the Yasukuni controversy, which reflect tensions in Sino-Japanese relations. In both, the People's Daily uses a strategy of cultural diplomacy in playing up two themes alternately in its treatment of Japan through the 1980s and 1990s; namely cultural affinity and war guilt.
In order for a detailed analysis of these stories to make sense, it is necessary to make two preliminary detours: firstly, a detour into the background of China's official policy of and public perception of Japan and the Japanese; secondly, a smaller detour into the background of the audience which the Chinese official press addresses.

**Sino-Japanese Relations and Chinese Perceptions**

The Chinese public's perception of Japan is characterised by a profound ambivalence. This ambivalence is not matched in China's perception of any other country in the world. Sino-Japanese interaction, be it religious, military, cultural or trade, dates back to the Tang Dynasty (618-907). Because of its status as a powerful nation as well as a Confucian culture, Japan remains a reminder of the power and glory of the once imperial China. This unique relationship has subsequently bred a feeling of affinity with Japan. By the same token, no other country in the world has subjected China to the same degree of trauma and humiliation as has Japan over the last century. The 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War and the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese War have left permanent scars in the hearts of the Chinese. To them, the Japanese are capable of sub-human cruelties.

These contrasting perceptions of Japan have the attributes more of Siamese twins than Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Irreconcilable as they are, they manage to co-exist, though never quite comfortably, in the minds and memories of the public. In fact, Segal (1992: 185) comments that Sino-Japanese relations are distinctive partly because of the 'very uneasiness of the way in which past and present coexist'. While regular interactions on interpersonal levels affirm friendship and cultural affinities, the bitter legacies of the past still continue to generate resentment, as was evident from sporadic angry outbursts of Chinese public condemnation of Japanese military revival and economic invasion.

In comparison with the public's perception of Japan, the Chinese government's perception is less volatile and flexible, partly because of the growing economic relationships between China and Japan through the 1970s and 1980s. In 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka visited China, marking the normalisation of diplomatic relationship between Japan and China. China's Premier Zhou Enlai signed an agreement with the Japanese
government, absolving Japan of any responsibility for what happened in the war and from any obligation to pay war reparations to China. In 1978, the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed, as was the China-Japan Cultural Agreement in 1978. Apart from officially endorsing educational and cultural exchanges between the two countries, the Treaty specified that China and Japan would co-operate on a series of projects, including exploring and drilling for petroleum and natural gas in Chinese coastal areas. In 1979, the Japanese government promised China a loan of 50 billion yen, the first of many cheap loans Japan was to give China over the next decade. These activities generated a 'China fever' in Japanese business circles. By the early 1980s, China had purchased numerous plants from Japan and there were many Japanese companies operating in Chinese cities; by 1986 Japan accounted for one-fourth of China's foreign trade (Whiting, 1989: 93). However, these developments were punctuated by recurring setbacks, resulting in a 'seesaw pattern' of bilateral relations, and China's trade deficit rose to five billion dollars by 1986. During the 1980s, criticism of this imbalance was common within China, as was criticism of the low level of technology transfer and the small size of Japanese investment in China compared with that of the USA and Germany.

Some non-Chinese perspectives are also helpful in understanding the Chinese government's policy towards Japan. Ogura (1979: 529-553), who had been personally involved in some of the major Sino-Japanese negotiations, noted the skilful Chinese practice of putting the Japanese on the defensive by pointing out past faults and errors. More than ten years later, Ijiri (1990: 640) argued that the Japanese had an inferiority complex due to their cultural debt to China and the sense of guilt stemming from their past invasions of China. The Chinese, for their part, were well aware of these Japanese attitudes and often attempted to gain the advantage by using calculated tactics of 'cultural diplomacy'. This argument is endorsed by some Western scholars (Klintworth, 1989: 74; Buruma, 1994: 123), who point out that China often resorts to pricking Japan's conscience in order to extract promises from the Japanese government to increase aid and soft loans to China.

The Chinese government's policy towards Japan is not dissimilar to its policies toward other countries. Since the end of 1970s, China's foreign policy has been governed by pragmatism. That is, the government fully appreciated the significance of Japanese economic power for China's
modernisation and economic development. In order to secure cheap loans from the Japanese government, the Chinese government, until a few years ago, effectively prevented Chinese survivors from making a fuss about their war experience or claiming compensation. On the other hand, the Chinese government has been keen to exploit Japan's feelings of shame and guilt for Japanese atrocities during the war. This can be seen in the Chinese government's tendency to turn the actions of Japan's right-wing nationalists into politically opportune occasions. By protesting to the Japanese government over a range of issues, such as textbook revision, the Chinese government managed to embarrass the Japanese and assume the moral high ground with a viewing to extracting more generous loans and more favourable trade conditions.

Journalists and Their Readers

The People's Daily is mostly concerned with its domestic readership but, because of its centrality in representing Party viewpoints, its influence in shaping foreign attitudes also needs to be taken into account. Schurmann (1968: 61) argued that the paper's readership was essentially domestic, and this view was endorsed in a 1983 Beijing readership study. However in 1984, in analysing the paper's reporting of US President Nixon's visit to China, Wang (1984: 144) argued that the People's Daily could act as the Party's spokesman to the international community, whereas interpersonal and small group communication was a more important means of persuasion for domestic purposes. Wang's argument here is supported by Lee's (1990: 254) analysis of the People's Daily's coverage of Taiwan, which argued that, although the paper was writing essentially for a domestic audience, it was also an instrument for advancing the PRC's foreign policy goals.

Any analysis of the paper's narrative strategies in treating Sino-Japanese news should recognise that Japanese economic relations with China are important enough to have domestic political significance, but also that any possible conflicts between Japan and China can be sufficiently newsworthy to deserve international interest. The Party's news about the Sino-Japanese relationship can be aimed alternately at Chinese and Japanese readers, or other countries in the international community, depending on the specificities of the issue or the event in question. As I have mentioned before, apart from being a direct source of information about the CCP's
policies to international China observers, articles in the People's Daily very often become the primary source of news for Xinhua, China's national news agency, which regularly supplies news about China to the international news agencies. In addition, in considering both Chinese and Japanese readers, it is important to realise that they are not monolithic entities. People's Daily's domestic readership, for instance, consists of a wide social spectrum, ranging from cadres and policy-makers at provincial, local and regional levels, and intellectuals, to less educated readers, such as workers, peasants and soldiers (Chen and Mi, 1989). In the case of Japanese readers, the news and views of the People's Daily may be targeted towards the Japanese government, but it may also be of interest to both right-wing nationalists and left-wing teachers, activists, scholars, and business people.

Coming back to news analysis, this chapter will first look at the special friendship narratives — the monk stories and the lost girl stories. Then it will consider the historical foe narratives of disputes over Japanese screening of textbooks, and the controversy surrounding the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Finally, it will analyse stories of Japan in the People's Daily in August 1995 commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of the Japanese war, in order to consider change and continuity in the narrative forms and strategies in the People's Daily's coverage of Japan.

The Special Friendship Narratives

May, 1979 was an eventful month in the development of Sino-Japanese relations. In the cultural arena, cultural exchanges increased tremendously, and were marked by an increase of visits between Chinese and Japanese in the areas of media, education, religion, science and technology. On the diplomatic level, Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng visited Japan on May 27, and signed the Science and Technology Co-operation Agreement between the Chinese and Japanese governments. Also in May, the Japanese government signed the first contract with the Chinese government finalising its 1979 loan of 56 billion yen to China, the first of many huge loans to be given to China. In the same month, it was announced that details of Japan's 1980 loan to China were to be discussed later in the year. Furthermore, Japan announced its decision to donate money for the
building of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Hospital in Beijing (Lewis and Sun, 1993).

The highlight of these activities was a Japanese exhibition to tour China, which featured the life of a Chinese monk Master Jian Zhen, who went to Japan some 1,200 years ago to promote Buddhism. During the fifty days of the tour, from April 9 to May 29, 1980, the People’s Daily ran thirty-three articles in the form of news reports by staff correspondents, historical features, personal memoirs, commentaries from officials -- including Deng Xiaoping -- and a front page editorial.

Most of these stories were in the form of popular history. Some were dramatisations of the actual circumstances under which Master Jian Zhen survived the sea journey and landed in Japan. Others were features, either profiling Master Jian Zhen’s personality, or detailing his experience in Japan. Most of these stories were written from a human interest angle. The People’s Daily’s Japan correspondent described Jian Zhen’s achievement in Japan as ‘tying the knot’ (jie liang yuan) between China and Japan (Sun and Xu, 1980:4). Another writer (Bu, 1980: 7) referred to the tour of Jian Zhen’s stature as ‘visiting family relatives’ (tan qin). Still another story (Wu, 1980: 7) used the story of Jian Zhen to demonstrate the ‘blood-kinship sentiment’ (xue yuan qin yi) between China and Japan. Here we see the difference in the ways the Australian and the People’s Daily represent an ‘enmeshing’ with Japan. The Australian-Japanese partnership is described mostly by using sexual metaphors -- as a ‘marriage made in heaven’ or a ‘honeymoon’, thereby implying intimacy on the one hand but the possibility of separation on the other. Although the People’s Daily sometimes refers to the Sino-Japanese friendship in matrimonial terms, the frequent use of familial metaphors emphasising blood connection seems to evoke a more natural affinity. It also seems to be in accord with the tradition of telling moral tales that the Chinese audience can easily relate to.

It is a common practice for Party newspapers like the People’s Daily to launch a week-long, sometimes even month-long, campaign about some issues and events. However, it is not always easy to tell immediately and exactly why these campaigns are launched. The political significance of the exhibition tour was explained in the editorial, but not until after almost a month’s continuous appearance of historical stories in the paper. The
editorial summarised the significance of the exhibition tour in a flowery, almost hyperbolic manner:

The friendship between the Chinese and Japanese people flows back along the long river of history (li shi de chang he). The exhibition about Master Jian Zhen adds new treasures to the palace of Sino-Japanese friendship. Our Premier Hua Quofeng has already accepted an invitation to visit Japan when the azaleas bloomed in May. We believe that these growing interactions between our two countries will continue to deepen our mutual understanding and trust, and build a more solid friendship and co-operation (Editorial, PD, May 4, 1980: 1).

Although these stories evoked the past, none of them mentioned Japanese war atrocities. This suggests that the purpose of these stories was to soften the self/Other boundary in the Chinese perception of Japan. They demonstrate what Befu (1993: 5) calls a process of 'selective remembering and partial forgetting' of the nation's historical and cultural legacy. Nation is therefore seen to be created out of a kaleidoscope of conflicting historical facts.

Premier Hua visited Japan on May 27. To mark the event, the People's Daily on the same day ran a front-page editorial which contained many of the ritualistic incantations typical of official discourse of Sino-Japanese friendship. China and Japan were described as being across a 'narrow strip of water' (yi yi dai shui), Sino-Japanese relationship was compared to a river that 'originated from a remote source and flows afar' (yuan yuan liu chang), and the friendship between the two countries was compared to a 'magnificent bridge standing proudly in the east of Asia' (Editorial, PD, May 27, 1980: 1).

If these expressions and metaphors had any substantial meaning, they served to signal the direction of the Chinese government's foreign policy toward Japan. While editorials have the function of signalling future events, an equally common practice in Chinese newspapers, especially Party papers, is to state certain concepts and policies in the editorial, and then to illustrate and reinforce these concepts and policies in subsequent news stories and features. This practice is evidenced in another series of 'special friend' stories. On May 29, 1980, the People’s Daily ran a half-page feature article by a
war veteran entitled 'Where are you, Japanese girl?', accompanied by two photos. Told with a personal, almost sentimental touch, the story explained that the small girl in the photos was a five-year-old Japanese orphan. Her father, a Japanese army engineer, had died during World War II in China. The girl, however, was rescued by Chinese soldiers and handed over to General Nie Rongzhen. General Nie took care of the girl and later on returned her to the Japanese army. The author of the story said, 'I imagine a day when I suddenly find out where you are so that I can send the two photos back and tell this unusual story to you and the friendly Japanese people' (Yao, May 29, 1980: 7).

From the perspective of journalistic requirement for precision regarding Who, What, Where, and When, this story is a non-event, because it does not answer these questions. Its temporality is ambiguous: is it about the war many years ago or is it about the whereabouts of the girl now? Its spatiality is also obscure: is the girl in China or in Japan? And what is the story about? Is it about our historical enemy or is it about our Japanese friend? In spite of these narrative indeterminacies, the story has an effective structure. Its headline presents readers with a riddle, and the text contains rich narrative possibilities for future development, and it combines the 'who did it' suspension with a heart-warming touch of the 'lost child' stories often read in the Western popular press.

On June 11, a follow-up story, 'The Japanese young girl has been found', written by an anonymous staff reporter, appeared with a photo of a forty-three year old Japanese woman looking at her own childhood photo (PD, June 11, 1980: 7). The report claimed that the girl survived the war and was taken back to Japan by her grandfather and uncle. On hearing of the death of the parents, the grandfather and uncle had come to China for the girl. The 'young girl' was now called Mihoko, she was a mother of three, and ran a hardware shop with her husband in a small town in Japan.

To the reader, the story seemed to have completed its narrative process and reached a 'happy ending'. However, the story did not stop there. Instead, it went through a process of metaphorisation. The day after the woman had been found, the People’s Daily ran another article by Yao, entitled 'Bless you, Mihoko':

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Mihoko, the little orphan girl who survived the gunfire of the war, is in fact living quite close to us. Look at a map, and you will see that, Kyushu, where she now lives, is only 400 miles northeast of Shanghai. China and Japan are close neighbours across a narrow strip of water, and like close neighbours, one family's matter soon becomes the other family's matter (Yao, June 12, 1980: 7).

Not only are China and Japan personified, their spatial locations also acquire a historical and geopolitical dimension. Mihoko, the heroine of the story, becomes symbolic of Sino-Japanese intimacy. The writer of the article went still further:

Since the story of the Japanese girl was published everybody in China was concerned about her whereabouts. Upon Premier Hua Guofeng's visit to Japan the story of the girl has finally had a happy ending. The story has again added to the glamour of Sino-Japanese friendship (Yao, PD, June 12, 1980: 7).

It is not until here and now that the question of Why the lost girl story appeared can be answered. The link between Premier Hua's visit to Japan and the lost girl story brings readers back to the realisation that, after all, the story about the Japanese girl should be read as a story which was 'discovered' by journalists to collaborate with the government in signalling its policy regarding Japan. However, the story did not end there and instead started to take on an official tone. On June 13, the paper carried the correspondence between the Japanese woman and her Chinese 'saviours' (PD, June 13, 1980: 4). On July 12 the China Friendship Association officially invited the Japanese girl to visit China. Then on July 20, the paper reported her journey to China (PD, July 20, 1980: 4), and on November 18 a letter from the woman expressed her gratitude and best wishes for friendship between the two countries (PD, November 18, 1980: 8).

These lost girl stories were written from a human interest angle in which personal vicissitudes seemed to be determined by fate and luck. Therefore they make good 'perennial stories' (Hughes, 1968). A detailed reading of the paper's editorials through the 1980s on Sino-Japanese cooperation shows that the Chinese authorities enthusiastically promoted an amiable feeling between the Chinese and Japanese. Usually they were stories about
individuals who had made some personal contribution to Sino-Japanese friendship. In a way, this demonstrates a similarity between Chinese news and Australian news in that, in both cases, news is about people, what they say and what they do; and human interest stories are political news personified. In other words, to the journalists of both systems, the writing of news stories means the 'peopling of the press' (Sigal, 1987: 13). However, while Australian news uses individuals either to reduce politics to a clash of personalities -- as between Hawke and Peacock -- or to use individuals to stand for one particular social group -- as in the story of truck driver Graeme Hodge in the Nakasone vs train strikers narrative -- Chinese news uses individuals to promote consensus. Hence, although the People's Daily's coverage of Sino-Japanese relations is full of human interest stories, the individuals in these stories are represented as uttering similar ritualised incantations, such as: China and Japan are 'neighbours across the strip of water' (yì yì dài shuǐ); and that the two countries have had 'two thousand years of friendly interaction'.

Many other stories featured throughout the 1980s emphasise cultural exchange: for instance, articles on the game of go, sports of particular interest to both the Japanese and Chinese, such as judo, kung-fu, calligraphy (singled out because it is considered to be appreciated exclusively by Chinese and Japanese), cultural exchange activities, such as Japanese translations of Chinese classics and Chinese movies set in Japan or with Japanese actors. In these stories, both Japan and China are seen to reinforce each other's exoticism. Furthermore, it seems that while orientalism can be deployed by one culture to 'other' another culture, it can also be used to emphasise the cultural affinity between two cultures.

These stories also demonstrate an important difference between Chinese and Australian news reporting. While news is mostly about the doings and the sayings of individuals, Australian news tends to assume that individuals, be they politicians or striking workers, are the authors of their own action. They say what they say and do what they do because they have certain motives and purposes in mind. However, it would be misleading to set the action of individuals in these Chinese stories within the frame of individual motives, because in Chinese journalism, individuals personify larger, collective forces. Readers are not told about the intentions and motives of the individuals who participate in these China-Japan cultural exchange
activities, for the intention is understood as a collective one. Readers, therefore, could interpret these activities as newsworthy because they were an effective way of symbolising the trend of Sino-Japanese relations at that particular time. In other words, what made the lost girl stories newsworthy is not the motives behind the individuals involved in the stories, but the symbolism of these stories in the context of the important events that were going on between China and Japan around that time.

Placing these stories in their contexts reveals what is left unstated in the texts. None of these stories touched upon the bitter memories of war experience, but instead they played up friendly sentiments. This indicates the capacity of the text to trigger as well as to suppress the memory of history. The lost girl was found because a symbol of Sino-Japanese friendship needed to be created. Once she was found, the stories around her not only functioned to symbolise personal friendship, but also to signify the PRC’s policy of cultivating a more friendly attitude toward the Japanese. In this sense, the ‘author’ of these stories is the PRC, not the individual writers, although the stories may carry their by-lines.

As argued earlier, popular attitudes in China towards Japan were clearly ambivalent at this time. Whiting’s (1989) study found that the image of Japan in the Chinese media before 1978 was predominantly negative, with Japanese soldiers represented as killers and war criminals. From the perspective of the PRC government, which was hungry for investment and technology from Japan, this hostile popular attitude toward Japan was incompatible with government ambitions to acquire Japan as an economic partner. In order to secure economic partnership with Japan and incur the least internal resistance, symbols of friendship needed to be created. The lost girl and the monk stories ‘discovered’ signs of amity between China and Japan. They were important to the softening of a self/Other boundary, which was perceived to be useful by the government. The intention of such softening was the suppression of Chinese people’s memories of the Japanese war crimes. Although the presence of Japan was invoked in these stories, the political end these stories served was clearly internal. The Other -- Japan -- became part of the self, whereas the self contained otherness which needed to be suppressed.
Both the monk and the lost girl stories demonstrate some important aspects of Chinese journalism that are fundamentally different from notions of news operating in Australia. News is often selected on the basis of its relevance to the central task of the Party and the government, and is reported from these agendas. The news media's role in propagating policies means that news is not about breaking events, but about discovering individuals and things which help propagate policies. Furthermore, the choice of individuals and stories to propagate policies also demonstrates the tradition of positive news reporting in Party journalism. Rather than focusing on the 'bad news' of disasters and conflicts, Chinese Party journalism concentrates on 'good news': achievements, successes, and individuals whose behaviour qualifies them as role models.

It is true that the People's Daily consistently promotes cultural activities between China and Japan. The lengthy sequence of stories around particular events like the monk and the lost girl appeared mostly in the early 1980s, the first few years in the recovery of the Sino-Japanese relationship and the initial stage of Japanese economic involvement with China. All these stories came from internal official sources, which were either the People's Daily itself or the official New China News Agency. Stories with a similar theme appeared annually from 1981 to 1984, mostly in the form of news brief. However none appeared from 1985 to 1990. This could indicate that during the first couple of years from the start of economic reform, the People's Daily strategically invented stories symbolising Sino-Japanese friendship. These stories may have the agenda of reducing popular anti-Japanese sentiment in the domestic audience while at the same time appealing to a sense of cultural and moral debt in Japanese readers.

This account of strategic representations of Japan by the Party press seem to support Pye's (1985) arguments about the pragmatism that governed Chinese foreign policy throughout the 1980s. According to Pye, in Chinese politics opposite emotions can endure without diminishing the intensity of feelings or the blending of sentiments. This vivid sense of the here and now enables policy-makers to exploit the logic of the present situation and facilitates a tolerance for contradictions, an ability to compartmentalise opposite feelings. The extreme shifts in Chinese foreign policy, which seem unaffected by sentimentality, represent fine calculations about national interests and a
keen understanding of the current play of power in world politics. The Party press in this context is an extension of government policy-making.

'Special Friends' Revisited: The Emperor's 1992 Visit

Another milestone in the development of the Sino-Japanese relationship occurred in 1992. It marked the twentieth anniversary of the normalisation of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations and, more importantly, October of that year saw the Japanese Emperor's visit to China, an event which was bound to revive Chinese popular ambivalence toward Japan. It was apparently the Chinese government's hope that this visit would symbolise Sino-Japanese friendship on a higher plane, and consolidate the economic relationship. At the same time, it knew that this event could easily rekindle wartime hostility and resentment.

Many of the stories which subsequently appeared in October were both thematically and structurally derivative of the lost girl and the monk narratives. One month before the visit, the People's Daily ran a front-page editorial which again resorted to familiar, ritualistic incantations about the uniqueness of Sino-Japanese cultural relations (PD, September 29, 1992: 1). It was clear that a media campaign to promote friendly relations between China and Japan was being launched.

On September 25, the People's Daily ran a lengthy article by well-known scholar Zhao Puchuo, 'Neighbours across the strip of water -- reflections and prospects of Sino-Japanese Buddhist exchange' (Zhao, 1992: 7). Not only was this title itself a ritualistic incantation, but the article itself was a synthesised version of the monk stories which the paper had run more than a decade before. The article again emphasised the fact that, despite the war, Sino-Japanese relations went back 1,100 years and thus friendship should outweigh hostility from the war. Here the softening of the self/Other boundary is effected by way of privileging a remote historical Sino-Japanese interaction over a more recent-encounter.

According to Zhao, Masters like Jian Zhen were not only the ambassadors of Buddhist exchange, they rendered outstanding service to cultural relations between the two countries. Zhao also said that traditional Japanese cultural activities, such as flower arranging and the tea ceremony, originated from
earliest Buddhist exchange between China and Japan. By suggesting that these quintessentially Japanese practices came from China, the author was not only exoticising the other culture, but also the self. Like stories of go and calligraphy appearing regularly in the People's Daily's coverage of Sino-Japanese news, this story deployed orientalism not for the purpose of exclusion, but for the purpose of inclusion.

The stories which appeared in October 1992 shared a narrative form and theme with the monk and the lost girl stories of the early 1980s. This suggests that news framings are largely determined by journalists' awareness of existing narrative conventions. These stories conform to formulae which are shared by large numbers of the reading public who accept and preserve these narrative conventions. In this sense, the journalists are readers of the previous text before they can be creators of new texts, and their use of the past can range from the most obvious use of familiar quotations, to the most subtle use of folklore. Although most stories which appeared in the People's Daily during September and October 1992 seemed to be merely commemorative celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the Sino-Japanese normalisation, they had a more immediate purpose: to generate among Chinese readers a feeling of friendship with Japan, which was necessary to ensure the success of the imminent Japanese royal visit. In this way, these recent stories can be read as adding to the earlier chain of stories.

For instance, on September 20 the People's Daily devoted almost the whole of page five to a long article entitled 'Unforgettable episode in the Sino-Japanese friendship -- the story of how China helped Japanese return to Japan in the 1950s' (Hang and Gong, 1992: 5). According to this story, as many as 34,000 Japanese were in China as a result of the War. The article detailed how the Chinese government took special care to ensure that they were happily accommodated. The article also cited many moving stories of individuals, including one Japanese girl who stayed in China and later married a Chinese engineer. She is quoted as saying that, although she is Japanese, she is proud to be the wife of a Chinese engineer, the mother of four Chinese children, and a public servant in the new China. She said that she would do her utmost for her second motherland and that she hoped to take up Chinese nationality.
Although the Japanese woman remained in China instead of returning to Japan, the fact that she was a war orphan thematically evoked the lost girl narrative of the early 1980s. However, it would be simplistic to read the story as a mere repetition of the lost girl narrative, which was intended to generate friendship and gratitude. Rather, this story exploited the undefined, fluid notion of Chineseness. This impression is reinforced by a quote from a Japanese official saying that China and Japan desire (re wang) friendship and commitment to an extent that they are close enough to contemplate 'getting married'.

The fluid positioning of 'us' and 'them' is further evidenced in the example of another Japanese woman in the same article. Married to a Chinese technician and the mother of two daughters and a son, the Japanese woman, though happily married, misses her loved ones in Japan. She decides to return to Japan on her own. However, she returns to her husband and children after the first leg of her journey because she cannot bear the pain of separation. The woman since then lives in tears (yi lei xi mian) because her mother in Japan misses her badly and writes to urge her to go back to Japan. The Chinese husband, seeing his wife becoming increasingly haggard, finally tearfully agrees to let her go back to Japan with their son and daughter. The Japanese woman, with gratitude to her husband and profound attachment to the other daughter, leaves China and embarks on her return trip, again with tears in her eyes.

The Historical Foe Narrative

On June 30, 1982, the People's Daily ran a brief news report entitled 'Japanese Ministry of Education Distorts History and Beautifies Aggression in the Screening of Textbooks'. The article was intended as a straight news report, and contained excerpts of commentaries from the Japanese media:

It is reported that the officials of the Japanese Ministry of Education, in the screening of textbooks, have not only watered down the critical accounts of the Japanese invasion of China, but also revised the textbook in the direction of legitimising their past behaviour. For instance, the original version of the Nanking Massacre reads: 'Upon occupying Nanking, the Japanese army slaughtered 200 000 Chinese and committed rape, looting and arson.' However in the revised version
words like 'rape', 'slaughter' have disappeared. It reads: 'The incident was triggered by the strong resistance of the Chinese army. The Japanese army suffered heavy losses, and out of rage, they killed many Chinese' (PD, June 30, 1982: 6).

The report, appearing with other international news in one of the inside pages, reads like a typical 'hard news' story, offering nothing but facts. The angry reaction to the Japanese Ministry of Education's whitewash of history was contained within quotes from the Japanese media, and no Chinese views were included.

Three weeks later, still in the international page, the paper carried a short commentary (duan ping) on this issue. It said:

The Japanese militarists' invasion brought about profound traumas to peoples not only of China and Southeast Asia, but also to the Japanese people. 'Memories of the past are the lessons for the future'. Unless Japan learns the lesson from the past, it cannot hope to build friendship with China and Southeast Asia'(Commentary, PD, July 20, 1982: 6).

The Chinese epigram 'memories of the past are the lessons for the future' (qian shi bu wang, hou shi zhi shi) was frequently used in the paper's subsequent criticisms of the Japanese government's attempts to gloss over the past. Here it is interesting to note that, while the ritualistic expressions used in the 'friendship stories', such as 'neighbours across a narrow strip of water', and 'river of friendship that flows from far away' relied on spatial metaphors, the 'historical enemy stories' evoked the temporality of Japan. In both the 'special friend' and 'historical enemy' narratives, Japoneseness seemed to be capable of being constantly re-defined and re-configured, and is constructed as having what Turner (1994) refers to as the 'modular' quality,

The short commentary appeared to address a specific audience, thereby aligning itself with certain kinds of readers against others. Given that China and Southeast Asia suffered most during the Japanese war, it seemed possible that the commentary was seeking identification from these countries on the matter. Here, the geo-political scenario of the Sino-Japanese relationship depicted in the 'friendship stories' is reversed. Inviting
Southeast Asia to participate in the act of remembering pits Japan against China and Southeast Asia.

Ten days after the short commentary, the paper carried a news report (PD, July 30, 1982: 6), listing some commentators' and writers' criticisms of the Japanese Ministry of Education published in leading Japanese newspapers, including the Asahi Shimbun. Next to this report was another report (PD, July 30, 1982: 6) reporting angry reactions from Southeast Asia by quoting newspapers from Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore. Both reports had a detached, neutral tone, offering no comments and judgements.

Admittedly, nations are always newsworthy topics. Just as news can use persons to symbolise nations, it can also anthropomorphise international relations. In these reports, the frequent mention of the names of Southeast Asian countries was not intended to denote their geographical locations but to present these places as actors in the political drama, rather than as narrative settings for the drama. In other words, these countries answered the journalistic question of Who rather than Where. These reports could be taken as the People's Daily's continuous efforts to recruit political and moral allies.

Along with these two reports was another short commentary. It is clear from the wording of its heading that the commentary was addressed to the Japanese Ministry of Education. Using an epigram 'harsh words may not agree with your ears but are good for your deeds' (zhong yan ni er li yu xing), the commentary sounded like a warning:

It is important to point out that we criticise the Japanese Ministry of Education for the screening of textbooks, not because we are afraid of Japanese militarists. To be frank, the Japanese militarists are no match for the Chinese people. During the 1930s and 1940s, the Japanese invaders lasted only eight years from the time when they waged the war to the time when they were miserably beaten. Today, if they dare to repeat the past, they will be faced with an even more devastating outcome (Commentary, PD, July 30, 1982: 6).

The first indication that the Sino-Japanese relationship was under threat because of the 'textbook controversy' did not appear until August 2, when
the paper carried a leading news report 'Spokesman for Chinese Minister of Education Warns Japanese Minister of Education not to Visit China'. This short but significant article suggested that unless the controversy of the textbook issue was resolved, the scheduled visit of Japanese Minister of Education to China would be inappropriate.

Coverage of the textbook issue took the form of largely elliptical narrative accounts until August 15, the 30th anniversary of the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II. On that day, the People's Daily ran a lengthy front page editorial entitled 'Memories of the past are the lessons for the future' (Editorial, PD, August 15, 1982: 1). The editorial included a brief account of Japanese aggression against Asia since the beginning of the century and mentioned the Nanking Massacre, the Philippines Massacre and the Singapore Massacre. The tone of the editorial was that of controlled indignation. It claimed that the purpose of mentioning the Japanese invasions in China, Korea and Southeast Asia was not to 'get even' (suan jiu zhang). However, it said that although bygones can remain bygones, they should not be forgotten, let alone distorted. The editorial pointed out that Japan had invaded China, Korea, Southeast Asia and Pacific regions and these peoples' memories were still 'profoundly traumatic' (chuang ju tong shen).

After the appearance of the editorial towards the end of August, the coverage of the controversy began to be personalised. On August 29, the front page reported the meeting between the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ambassador to China and complained that the steps taken by Japan to correct the 'textbook mistake' were 'far from satisfactory' (PD, August 29, 1982: 1). On September 5, the paper quoted Premier Zhao Ziyang reminding a delegation of Japanese filmmakers that 'the past should not be forgotten' (PD, September 5, 1982: 1) and on September 10, the front page quoted Wu Xueqian saying the government was satisfied and 'appreciative' of the Japanese Prime Minister's decision to correct their mistakes in the textbook screening (PD, September 10, 1982: 1). This article signified the end of the controversy by quoting Wu as saying that although the specific steps taken to correct the mistake still needed clarification and were far from satisfactory, Japan had gone a step further in its efforts to correct the mistake. By September 26, criticisms of Japan had disappeared completely, and a report of
Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki's visit to China signalled the beginning of another chapter in the Sino-Japanese relationship.

From the narrative point of view, most of these news reports can hardly be described as stories because, taken individually, they do not contain a basic narrative structure, characters or plot development. Instead, they are more like what Bird and Dardenne (1988) call 'chronicles', the day's record of what is noteworthy and important. However, this does not mean that chronicles simply record reality. In fact, a close reading of these reports reveals strategic moments of selecting and ordering, and of implicating and aligning certain readers in constructing a Japan that is China's historical Other. In this sense, these reports, like stories, offer ongoing definitions of who 'we' are, and who 'our' enemies are, and are therefore no more a reflection of reality than a story is.

On the other hand, also from the narrative point of view, these reports can be read as stories. Although these individual stories do not have a clear eruption of conflict, a plot development and the resolution of conflict, this process can be discerned retrospectively and contextually. In the case of the People's Daily's coverage of the textbook issue, such retrospective patterning needs to take into account the whole length of time, from June 30, 1982, when the first story about the Japanese government's decision to revise textbooks appeared, to the account of Suzuki's official visit at the end of September, which marked the resolution of the controversy. In this way, the mythological narrative structure containing a stability-conflict-stability pattern, is maintained. These reports, when taken together, are 'myth-repairing narratives'.

As reporters are seldom in a position to witness events firsthand, they have to rely on the accounts of others. News is therefore what someone says has happened. For this reason, an operative convention in 'objective reporting' is to provide sources of the story and attribute the story -- especially any interpretations of what the story means -- to sources. Given that news is what sources say, it is important to look at Who is the source the reporter chooses to quote and acknowledge. A detailed tracing of the sources and attribution of the 'textbook issue' stories finds that editorials and commentaries were clearly intended for the Japanese government, with a view to aligning with other Southeast Asian countries. While it is obvious
that the views expressed in these editorials and commentaries were those of the paper, it is clear that the paper tried to dissociate itself from the views expressed in news reports. Among the news reports of the controversy that mostly appeared in the international page of the paper, more external sources were used than internal ones. In July, a total of twenty-seven stories appeared, including fifteen which bore attribution from foreign countries, including other Asian countries and Japan itself. In August, of 105 stories in the paper, '52% either came from foreign sources or attributions. The ratio between internal and external sources in this case was in a sharp contrast to the 'lost girl' series, which came from exclusively domestic sources.

However, although these stories seemed to conform to the convention of 'objective' reporting by providing sources and attribution and using the third-person impersonal tone, they did not seem to conform to the convention of balance, namely the practice of including both the 'for' and the 'against' perspectives. For instance, although the Japanese government was supposed to have provoked these angry reactions, none of the reports quoted any Japanese spokespeople either directly or indirectly. Also, in the tradition of 'objective' reporting, 'hard news' is usually about breaking stories. Issues and policies become the stuff of 'hard news' only when they are contained in a news event that has a clear beginning and end. The People's Daily's reports, however, did not seem to be constrained by this convention. In other words, these reports seemed to imitate 'objective' reporting only as method, not in content.

The detached tone of these reports is a contrast to the overt sentimentalism that characterised the human interest stories and soft features in the 'special friend' narratives. This contrast is important in judging the kind of audience the paper was addressing. The implication is that, in times of crisis when conflicts arise to threaten the stability of Sino-Japanese relations, the paper tends to be used as a forum in which the views of different foreign nations on Japanese influence could be selectively interpreted. The intention was to influence the behaviour of the Japanese government. Considering that many Asian countries have similarly chequered historical relations with Japan, it seems that appealing to the international community was a means of forcing the Japanese to make amends by granting economic concessions to China.
The *People's Daily*’s treatment of the textbook issue is also an example of how the stories of Japan reveal less about what is going on in Japan than what is going on in the domestic political arena. Buruma (1995) points out that although Japan had revised textbooks some years before, the story of textbook screening in 1982 was a pseudo-event whipped up by the Japanese newspapers. However, the controversy came at a good time for the Chinese government. According to Buruma, Deng Xiaoping was being criticised by the army and rivals in the Party for being soft on the United States and Taiwan, and a Japanese trade delegation had visited Taipei just before the Japanese Prime Minister’s planned visit to Beijing. In this context, the textbook issue gave Deng a good chance to flex his muscles by embarrassing the Japanese.

Another indication that the *People’s Daily*’s coverage of the textbook issue reveals more about the Chinese government’s intention than about the actual situation was the paper’s omission of some important facts about the controversy. It did not, for instance, mention the history of long struggle in Japan between the right-wing nationalists and their leftist opponents in the teaching profession. Nor did it reveal the actual change in the textbook, protesting only against its wording. Among all the important deletions in the textbook, as Buruma (1995: 194) points out, are references to the Japanese medical team Unit 731, which carried fatal medical experiments on thousands of prisoners in Manchuria; references to the harsh treatment of ‘comfort women’ by the Japanese Imperial Army; and detailed accounts of the mass killings during the Nanking Massacre.

Two years after the ‘textbook controversy’, the Sino-Japanese relationship seemed to have stabilised, as indicated by Nakasone’s visit to China and the invitation of 3 000 Japanese youngsters to visit China. However, a growing trade imbalance began to exert pressure on this seemingly stable relationship. From 1982 to 1985, China’s trade deficit with Japan rose from one and a quarter billion dollars to five billion dollars (Lewis and Sun, 1993). A front page story in the *People’s Daily* in September 10 quoted the Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang alerting the Japanese Minister of Commerce to the alarming trade imbalance (*PD*, September 10, 1985: 1). On September 22, another front page story quoted Deng Xiaoping as saying that Japan should not only be concerned about Japanese products entering China, but also
about Chinese products entering Japan and the world market (PD, September 22, 1985: 1).

Yet while the Chinese government leaders were stressing to their Japanese counterparts the need to redress the trade imbalance, anti-Japanese sentiment was growing among the public, particularly among university students. The second half of 1985 saw numerous anti-Japanese student demonstrations, which could be explained as being partly due to anger at the worsening trade imbalance, and partly to domestic economic difficulties as seen in price increases and lower living standards. For students, Japan became a convenient outlet for their anger about both Japanese business aggression and the performance of their own leaders, whom they could not openly criticise (Liao, 1990: 254).

One event which triggered these demonstrations was the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (a war memorial commemorating fallen soldiers) on August 15, 1985. Four days before the visit, the People's Daily carried a news report quoting the Japanese paper Asahi Shimbun as saying that Nakasone would officially visit the Shrine in memory of the Japanese surrender (PD, August 11, 1985: 6). The report said that this decision had provoked strong reactions in Japan and was attacked by the Opposition Party of Japan. It did not include any Chinese views on the matter. On August 15, the People's Daily quoted a Chinese foreign affairs spokesman saying that Nakasone would seriously 'hurt the feelings of many peoples of the world' (sun hai shi jie ge guo ren min de gan qing) if he visited the Shrine (PD, August 15, 1985: 4). On August 16, the day after Nakasone's visit to the Shrine, the paper reported the visit without commentary, apart from a brief mention of the criticisms which came from inside Japan (PD, August 16, 1985: 6). On September 20, the paper carried another brief report quoting a Chinese foreign affairs spokesman as saying that Nakasone's visit to the Shrine had 'seriously hurt the feelings of Chinese people' (PD, September 20, 1985: 4). For three months after his visit to the Shrine, the People's Daily followed the development of the issue consistently but in a low-key, detached manner.

There seemed to be a narrative tension in these reports. While Chinese government officials were frequently quoted as saying that Nakasone had hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, these reports did not seem to give
any discursive space for Chinese individuals to express their feelings regarding the matter. Throughout the period discussed here, there was not a single report about individual Chinese or Japanese reactions to the matter. This does not mean, however, the Chinese news is not interested in people. On the contrary, the monk stories and the lost girl stories show that individuals, even historical ones, may be discovered if they serve a symbolic purpose. The absence of individuals and the exclusion of their points of view in these reports suggest that the paper was speaking 'on behalf of' the Chinese people, rather than for and to them. The 'Chinese people' is an absent party invoked by the Chinese government in order to effectively negotiate with its Japanese counterpart.

What also seemed to be noteworthy about these reports from the perspective of narrative analysis is an incongruence between the subject matter and the form that contains it. If the Yasukuni Shrine issue was an emotional matter, as the Chinese officials repeatedly claimed, these feelings were not expressed. Instead, they were rendered into abstractions. Again, this is not to say that the Chinese news is bereft of forms that can express feelings and emotions, as the monk stories and the lost girl stories clearly point to the People's Daily's effective use of the soft feature, popular history, and personal profile. The denial of these forms in the coverage of an emotionally charged matter like Nakasone's visit to the Shrine suggests that rather than seeking to provoke the feelings of Chinese people, the People's Daily's coverage of the 'Yasukuni Shrine issue', like its coverage of the 'textbook issue', was intended either to put pressure on the Japanese government, or to seek identification from the international community, including part of the Japanese community.

Something needs to be said about what these tactics and strategies may mean to Chinese readers. As mentioned earlier, the People's Daily's domestic readership consists of well educated policy makers, cadres and intelligentsia as well as workers, peasants and other less educated social groups. Unlike the 'special friend' narrative, these historical foe narratives are mostly narrative sketches, requiring the reader's knowledge of context to fill in the meanings. In these reports, much background information regarding these controversies was left unstated because they were taken to be understood in the given context. Because reporters assumed they knew the audience and assumed it possessed particular information, they could cast these reports as
narrative sketches. Since these reports mostly appeared in the international news section and were contained in a form of 'objective' journalism unfamiliar to the less educated Chinese readers, it is possible that only the better educated, informed readers could be expected to find these sketches intelligible and read them as an indication of the government's strategic handling of matters related to Japan.

The controversy ended on November 7, when the People's Daily carried a news item reporting a Japanese cabinet notice announcing that Nakasone's visit was part of a routine schedule and was not intended to rehabilitate the reputation of war criminals. It also said that the Japanese government had noted Chinese criticisms on the issue and had given assurances that the Japanese government had no intention of making official the visit to the Shrine (PD, November 7, 1985: 6).

Both the 'Yasukuni Shrine issue' and the 'textbook issue' were variations on, and continuations of, the old theme of Japanese military revival. Both controversies were represented as having hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and other peoples. In the coverage of both incidents, the paper positioned itself more as a spokesperson in an international forum than a reporter for a domestic audience. The Chinese government, dissatisfied with the trade deficit and wanting more Japanese investment, may have found it useful to use the tactics of 'making a feint in the east and attacking in the west' (sheng dong ji xi). Nakasone's visit provided the PRC government with a handy opportunity to wage another moral war against Japan. The real purpose, however, was perhaps not so much to demonstrate ideological consistency as to put pressure on Japan in order to extract more investment and soft loans.

This latter purpose was implied by Deng Xiaoping, who said in an interview with the Chairman of the Japanese Clean Government Party:

Frankly speaking, Japan is indebted to China more than any other nation in the world. At the time of diplomatic normalisation, we did not raise any demand for war reparations. From our Asian perspective, we are thinking of principle and I think Japan should make a much greater contribution in order to assist China's modernisation (Ijiri, 1990: 642).
What happens in the historical foe narrative seems to be more complicated than the 'us' (China) vs 'them' (Japan) opposition. The Other in these stories seems to include not only Japan but the 'Chinese people' as well, since the 'feelings of Chinese people' were evoked, not represented, by the government in order to put pressure on Japan. While the Chinese government may use Japan for the suppression of internal dissenting voices, as shown in the friendship narrative, it may also seek to appropriate internal voices in its negotiation with its external Other -- a strategy which Xiaomei Chen (1995) does not fully acknowledge.

It seems reasonable to conclude that both the textbook issue and the Yasukuni issue were orchestrated using the theme of guilt to pressurise Japan to do something about the trade imbalance. In other words, the Chinese government, renowned for its pragmatic policy of 'using the past to serve the present, using the foreign to serve China' (gu wei jin yong, yang wei zhong yong), raked up war memories to involve the international community as a means of pressuring Japan. This observation points to a factor that is particularly, though not exclusively, true of Chinese media: in the same way that Chinese news tends not to dwell on motives of individuals, questions as to why certain stories are written in a certain way can only be answered by analysing them extratextually.

The Yasukuni stories, like the textbook stories, juxtapose several temporal contexts. First, the time of Japanese invasion from 1930 to 1945; second, the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, when China officially announced its decision not to seek war reparation from Japan for reasons of long-standing friendship; third, Japanese right-wing nationalists' recent activities; and fourth, the Chinese government's determination to protest again at every future politically opportune occasion.

In this sense, both the textbook stories and the Yasukuni Shrine stories seem to point to a similarity in Australian and Chinese news writing in terms of 'timeliness'. For the Nakasone vs strikers narrative in the Australian case and the historical foe narrative in the Chinese case, 'timeliness' operates not by the clock but by a cultural calendar – a subtle and unspoken understanding among journalists about what is timely and what events are genuinely newsworthy. This cultural clock enables journalists to turn hard-
news events into mythical story-telling, it also enables readers to construct the intended meaning through shared assumptions about specific historical events and issues.

Change and Continuity: the People’s Daily in 1995

August 15, 1995 was the 50th anniversary of the Japanese surrender. The People’s Daily launched a month-long campaign to mark the occasion. The coverage included lengthy articles and speeches from important leaders, stories about American pilots and international personalities (such as Canadian doctor Norman Bethune) who helped the Chinese during the War, and reports of commemorative activities which were happening in China.

A close reading of these commemorative stories suggests that the strategy of cultural diplomacy, which was identified in the news coverage of Japan in the People’s Daily in the 1980s and early 1990s, was still in use. The special friend scenario was re-enacted, stressing the emotional ties between China and Japan. ‘Mr Yu Qiang and Japanese orphans’ (Xing, 1995: 8) is a feature story which thematically regurgitated the lost girl narrative, and was apparently written for the occasion. Yu Qiang, a public servant in the regional foreign affairs bureau of Anhui province, had come into contact with a few Japanese individuals who were either orphaned or deserted during the War and were adopted by Chinese families. According to the article, Yu went out of his way to help these orphans trace their Japanese connections. Also moved by these Japanese orphans’ stories, Yu resolved to write about their experience. Based on these experiences, Yu wrote two novels, which were translated into Japanese and became extremely popular with both Chinese and Japanese readers. According to the People’s Daily story, Yu’s writings helped the individuals connect with their relatives in Japan. Throughout the story, there was no mention of why Yu did what he had done. Instead, the story was framed in terms of some larger significance.

Yu Qiang is a warm-hearted person. With a heart that is true and sincere, he helped many Japanese orphans’ dreams of reunion come true. He has therefore won their respect and heartfelt gratitude of the Japanese people (Xing, 1995: 8).
Again, it is clear that in Chinese news, individuals' actions may not be considered newsworthy unless it reflects some kind of collective significance.

As discussed earlier, while the 'special friend' narrative was generated to reduce the Chinese readers' hostile sentiments towards Japan by appealing to 'human feelings' (renqing wei), the 'historical foe' narrative consisted mainly of news reports about the current Japanese government's rhetoric regarding Japanese war crimes. For this reason, these reports usually appeared in the form of news briefs or reports on the speech of government spokespersons. This was also true of the People's Daily's coverage of the issue of a Japanese apology for war crimes during the 50th anniversary of V-J day. These reports on the 'apology issues' (eg PD, August 16, 1995: 1) were not intended to incite anti-Japanese feelings among Chinese readers. Rather, they functioned to indicate to Chinese policy-makers the Party's policy on certain issues, as well as to communicate the Chinese government's point of view to the international community, including Japan itself.

While the 'spokesman story' followed the People's Daily's long-standing strategy of speaking to the intended reader, another story (Li, 1995: 8), in the form of a letter to the editor, seemed more ambiguous regarding both the purpose and the intended audience. Li Wei, the author of the letter, is the director of Beijing Songtang Hospital. Li had a 70-year-old patient, Yang, whose mental and physical health had been permanently ruined by Japanese during the War. According to Li, Yang was arrested by Japanese soldiers in 1944. After suffering various inhuman tortures, Yang was shipped to Japan as a coal miner. In Japan, he was often beaten up by the foreman, and was several times injured in casualty-prone mine sites. Due to his hellish experience, Yang developed a phobia about anything Japanese, including the sight of the Japanese flag and the sound of the Japanese language. Li lamented at the end of his letter, 'Yang has little time to live. He has so far not heard any Japanese person apologise to him, nor has he received a cent of compensation for his labour in Japan. I hope that before he dies, something like this will happen' (Li, 1995: 8).

This story is worth considering, for it contains traces of narrative inconsistency: it centres around the life of a Chinese victim and appeals to readers' hatred and sense of humiliation rather than friendliness and
generosity. Furthermore, it raises two topics which the *People's Daily* has shielded away from since the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations. One is the experience of Chinese civilians who were forced into slave labour in Japan, mostly as miners for the Kajima Company. The other is the right of Chinese survivors from the Hanaoka mine to seek compensation from Japanese corporations. In 1989, families of the Chinese survivors launched a claim against the company for a public apology and a compensation of 5 million yen each to 1000 victims (McCormack, 1996: 252).

Another story which seems to run against the *People's Daily's* narrative ambit is a news report (*PD*, August 31, 1995: 8) about recent findings by both Chinese and Japanese scholars concerning the criminal activities of Japanese military medical teams in China and Southeast Asian countries. The report, written in an 'objective' manner, was inconspicuously tucked away at the lower left hand corner of an inside page, and was sourced as an excerpt from a commercial journal called *Service and Trade Journal*. Although the commercially-oriented papers in China had run more revealing and emotionally stirring accounts regarding this matter, its appearance in the *People’s Daily* was recent and unusual.

Among the commemorative accounts of August 1995, the most obvious violation of the *People’s Daily's* long-standing forms and strategies in covering the Japanese war was its special edition at the beginning of the month (*PD*, August 4, 1995: 9). Under a bold, banner headline ‘Commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Chinese victory in the Japanese War’, the leading story was entitled 'Nanking Massacre: cruelest act in human history. Three months' slaughter, 300,000 people killed'. Next to the story were half a dozen news photos showing graphic details of heaps of dead bodies and the Japanese burying the Chinese alive.

Why did the *People’s Daily* risk stirring anti-Japanese feelings among Chinese readers by running such a letter to the editor, raising the issue of Japanese medical crimes against civilian Chinese, and providing accounts of the Nanking Massacre? To understand the logic of what seems to be an aberration from the *People’s Daily's* normal practice, it is necessary to consider these stories in conjunction with other Japan stories during the paper's campaign to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Japan's surrender, the specific narrative modes which contained these stories, the
specific political circumstances under which these stories appeared and, finally, the impact the emerging alternative media outlets exerted on the Party press in the 1990s.

One important article to consider is 'Comrade Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Japan War Veterans' 50th Anniversary Symposium' (Jiang, 1995: 1). Appearing as Jiang's full-length, unabridged speech, the front-page article highlighted three points. First, the War against Japan could not have been won without the leadership of the CCP; second, the alliance between the CCP and KMT (Chinese Nationalists, most of whom went to Taiwan after the CCP took over in 1949) was the vitally important factor in the winning of the War, and the alliance would not have been formed without the initiatives of the CCP; third, China was the most important player in the War against Japan. The lesson to learn from the War is that China needed to be united and powerful, for backwardness \textit{(luo hou)} and separation \textit{(fen lie)} would lead to abuse and humiliation.

Jiang Zemin's speech and the subsequent speech from the Minister of National Security, Liu Huaqing (Liu, 1995: 1), were preaching a strategic nationalism, whose main ingredients were the CCP's leadership and the unity of the Greater Cultural China, including mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Chinese diaspora overseas. To understand the logic of this discourse, one needs only to consider the political climate facing the CCP in 1995. Modernisation has created for the Chinese people a long-standing sense of dissatisfaction with their leaders (Pye, 1992). The Party's sense of a crisis of authority has sharpened since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, when the image of the Chinese government suffered damage both at home and in the international community. Several subsequent attempts to repair the damage, including Beijing's bidding for the 2000 Olympic Games, proved unsuccessful.

This sense of a crisis of authority deepened because of some external factors. The relationship between China and USA, for example, became at times tenuous over a range of issues, including human rights and freedom of religion. The anti-communist, separatist sentiment in Taiwan, advocating the 'two Chinas', and 'one China, one Taiwan', became more pronounced when Li Tenghui, Taiwan's former President, was allowed to visit USA, further straining Sino-US relations.

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It is under these political circumstances that the rich narrative resources afforded by the 50th anniversary of the end of the War against Japan were exploited. In using the war victory to symbolise the power and triumph of Chinese national cohesiveness, Japan -- constructed as the Other in the story -- was used to remind readers of the danger of national disunity. Therefore, although the Taiwanese separatist movement had nothing to do with Japan, they were constructed as having some intrinsic connection, as in a news report which quoted Liu Huaqing, the Minister of National Security:

The great spirit of patriotism generated during the War against Japan has become one of our most precious historical legacies. Today, patriotism means always defending the unity of our country. Our people need and want national unity. Separation hurts the feelings of the entire nation (PD, August 31, 1995: 1).

Furthermore, stories about the War against Japan became most effective in strategically invoking the hatred for the Other and a sense of humiliation of the self. 'Eye-witness accounts of Japanese crimes in China soon to be released' is a story of this kind. After a detailed description of each of the four volumes in this forthcoming series, the news went on to describe the photos in the publication:

The scars on the bodies of the survivors, the sites where bombs exploded, the remaining chemical weapons, and deserted human bones scattered in the wilderness -- all of them are precious historical evidence of the aggressors' crimes and most powerful and effective teaching materials in the promotion of patriotism (PD, August 22, 1995: 7).

Pye (1992) argues in his study of Chinese politics that Chinese culture places a lot of stress upon the positive energy of the emotion of hate and shame. According to Pye, the strength of humiliation has a two-edged quality: it provokes the Chinese to anger; and it embarrasses and hurts those who cause the humiliation. This story and many other Japan stories which appeared in the same week seemed to evoke that positive energy of emotion by speaking to mainland and overseas Chinese (particularly Taiwanese).
It is in the context of this intention that we can understand the political significance of the narrative modes which contain these stories. As a genre of journalism, letters to the editor have the dual capacity to indicate the paper's sentiment, but nevertheless absolves the paper from assuming responsibility for the views expressed. Similarly, the story about the Japanese medical crime was attributed to an obscure commercially oriented paper. In the case of the account of the Nanking Massacre, in spite of its potential to incite strong emotions, the story, both the photos and unsourced chronicle, was contained in the 'objective' history. The collage was put together without the paper's editorial intervention, thereby giving the impression that history can represent itself. In all three cases, what seems to be happening is a strategic change in the paper's signifying practice. Running these accounts in the Party's paper is a clear indication that the government may consider it inappropriate to officially say certain things about Japan, but nevertheless acknowledges that feelings of hatred for the Japanese and a sense of humiliation may be legitimate.

What also needs to be taken into account is the impact since 1992 of the newly emerging but fast-growing alternative media outlets in China. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but suffice it to say here that the Party press, especially the People's Daily, needs not only to take heed of what is being printed in these outlets, but also needs to reconsider its own narrative forms and strategies as a result of it. The People's Daily can no longer ignore the existence of competing narratives including the Japanese medical crimes, details of the Nanking Massacre, and issues of seeking war compensation, although it still seems to avoid the issue of 'comfort women'. Under the new circumstances, its challenge becomes not so much the suppression of certain narratives as the strategic containment of them.

The People's Daily's commemorative stories of Japan are similar to those in the Australian. Both resort to a strategic containment of competing narratives rather than a total omission of them. However, when considered in the context of the conventions of each paper, this also constitutes the major difference between the People's Daily and the Australian. While the People's Daily's commemorative stories of the 50th anniversary represent a dramatic change in its reporting practices, the Australian's stories seem to be consistent with its narrative strategies in representing Japan in the last decade or so. This is perhaps because the Australian and Chinese discourses
of national identity were faced with different issues. In the 1990s, the process of nation-building in China became one by which the us/them distinction was constantly redefined to widen the notion of Chineseness. The issue in nation-building in Australia, on the other hand, was how to de-emphasise categories such as 'race', 'language' and 'historical experience' and build a discourse based on cultural hybridity at home while still presenting a common Australianness to its national Other.

In addition, the commemorations of the 50th anniversary of V-J day took place at a time when Australia and China were at different historical crossroads. In the Chinese case, the leadership was confronted with a dilemma between the modernisation project and a primitive notion of nationalism -- a nationalism consisting of anti-Western xenophobia, sinocentrism and an obsession with territorial sovereignty. The dilemma was exacerbated by threats of Taiwanese separatism. In the Australian case, the commemorations happened at a time when the country was already imbued with the rhetoric, if not the belief, that its future lay first and foremost in the Asian and Pacific regions. The 50th anniversary of V-J Day was another opportunity to grapple with the ongoing tension between the perceived need for Asianisation and the legacy of history.

* * *

A contextual analysis of the two conflicting narratives of Japan in the \textit{People's Daily} so far reveals a dynamic picture of change and continuity, of tension and negotiation. It also reveals several dimensions of Party journalism which have usually gone unexplored. First, a ritualised reporting of human interest stories which is usually identified with 'Western' popular journalism; second, the use of not only symbolic words but, more importantly symbolic narrative forms to position the reader in a specific way in relationship to the writer (the reader's recognition of that symbolism becomes the consolation prize for the cynical journalist who has to adhere to the Party line); and lastly, stories refer frequently to history, and their meaning only becomes apparent when one reads a chain of these stories.

This chapter suggests that two main narrative strategies -- the 'special friend' and the 'historical foe' scenarios -- are employed for different but
complementary purposes. Though it would be simplistic to think that the paper is aiming exclusively at one specific community, stories signifying friendship are meant to contribute to the lessening of hostility towards Japan and seem to have been intended for a domestic audience. This is indicated by both internally generated sources and the narrative forms of these stories. Most are written in the form of 'soft' features, folk tales and popular literature with a human interest angle to accord with Chinese readers' narrative expectations. In these stories, 'Japan' seem to be represented more as 'self' than as 'Other' whereas those Chinese who oppose the government's pro-Japanese policy implicitly become the internal Other.

On the other hand, conflictual events, such as the textbook and the Yasukuni Shrine issues, signify Japanese historical indebtedness to China, and seem to have been aimed more at the international community to win foreign moral support and to pressure the Japanese government. Here the paper projects itself as an international forum by using more news with external attribution and sources. News of this kind is usually written in a straight, brief hard news form, creating an impression of balance and objectivity. Such a style serves the government's intention of evoking the popular sentiments of Chinese people but nevertheless denying them a speaking position.

Comparing the treatment of news events in the Australian and Chinese media allows us to see some similarity in the ways the Australian and the Chinese press cover news about Japan. In both cases, we see a fusion of foreign policy news and domestic political news. In the case of the Australian, 'Japan' is invoked to pit the striking workers against the nation, as in the Nakasone vs strike narrative, and Liberal against Labor, as in the Peacock vs MFP narrative. Similarly in the case of the People's Daily, 'Japan' provides the Chinese government politically opportune occasions to combat threats of national disunity and political instability. Furthermore, in their negotiations with their Japanese counterparts, both Australian and Chinese government officials are constructed to have the right and capacity to speak for the entire population, hence silencing or appropriating dissenting voices within the nation.

The analysis of the People's Daily's narratives of Japan also reveals a complex and dynamic process by which the self/Other position is constantly
shifted in the official imagining of Sino-Japanese relations. These narratives are a combination of an 'official occidentalism' -- the use of Japan as the imperialistic Other -- and a Chinese self-orientalism -- the emphasis on China's and Japan's cultural uniqueness. They embody a process by which othering strategies are actively deployed as means of both exclusion and inclusion, for purposes of both internal suppression and external negotiation.
Chapter 8
From the Party Line to the Bottom Line: Stories of Japan in the Chinese Commercial Press

On October 14, 1994, the 23rd Asian Games were held in Hiroshima. For the Chinese audience used to turning on their television sets and finding out about China’s growing number of gold medals, it was an unusual day. The women’s table tennis singles final match between the Chinese player, Deng Yaping, and the Japanese player, He Zhili, finished, with Deng miserably beaten by her Japanese rival.

This was not just another competition, in which there was bound to be losers and winners. He Zhili, the Japanese player, had been, until a few years before a top Chinese player. She subsequently married a Japanese, became a Japanese national, took her husband’s name, and now represented Japan. During the match, she appeared to be vindictive and was shown to utter ‘yoshi!’ each time she scored, which is Japanese for ‘good’ but which has particular connotations. Many Chinese films about Japanese War represented the Japanese soldiers as often saying ‘yoshi’ when they were engaged in sadistic activities in China. After the match, when the Japanese flag was raised and the Japanese anthem played, He Zhili was proud and triumphant. She made an emotional speech to the Japanese reporters, saying that she had never felt so good about becoming a champion when she was representing China. She also said that she loved her new motherland because she was treated very well there.

To the Chinese audience, this was apparently too much. He Zhili’s victory became a huge media incident. It also became the focus of conversations among families at dinner tables, among colleagues at workplaces and friends on the bus. Emotions ran high, opinions polarised, and the media, the print media in particular, both broadsheet and tabloid, local and regional, wasted no time in trying to capture the Chinese imagination — with no less enthusiasm than the Australian media’s treatment of Cathy Freeman’s ‘flag incident’. A Chinese national who had chosen to acquire permanent residency in Australia, I happened to be in China at the time and found myself participating in these debates, though with an ethnographic interest and a greater degree of ambivalence than my family and friends.

What was really intriguing was the process by which the media transformed a sport hero into a villain. He Zhili’s victory, and the media coverage and
reactions to it, provide a good example of how the media captured the popular sentiment regarding Japan and the Chinese national imaginary in terms of who are 'us' and who are the 'Other'. Most discussions of the incident were couched in a 'motherland' discourse, in which He Zhili was represented as a traitor. The article from the *Ram Evening Post* from Guangzhou Province (Su, October 16, 1994: 3) was simply entitled 'Her motherland brought her up, but she forgot her motherland'. In the same paper from the previous day, an article from the *Guangzhou Evening Post* entitled 'A Disgusting Confession' was even more scathing:

He Zhili, have you really forgotten you are still Chinese, though you have taken up Japanese nationality? Have you really forgotten that it is your Chinese coaches who transformed you from a slip of a girl into a world champion? Do you really think that the shrewd Japanese would have paid any attention to you if you were nobody (Zhou, 1994: 7)?

An article in the *China Youth Daily* entitled 'After all, you have Chinese blood' (Bi, 1994: 7) admitted it was true and acceptable that some women players from mainland China were now representing Taipei and Hong Kong and were competing against their former colleagues, for, it continued, the people they represented were still the 'children of the Yellow Emperor' (*yan huang zi sun*). However, it was 'emotionally upsetting' (*gai qin shang guo bu qu*), to see He Zhili beat the Chinese and salute the national flag and anthem of foreigners, particularly the Japanese.

These stories reveal a kind of nationalism which draws on myths of origins and ideologies of blood. However, they also seem to reveal the inadequacy of this kind of nationalism. The discourse of motherland, based on the mother and children metaphor, appeals to the affective aspects of human relationships which are typical of 'pre-modern' societies. Such discourse, however, becomes inadequate in an increasingly modernised society such as China whose interdependence with the rest of the world seems inevitable.

These stories also appeal to a popular perception of Japanese-ness which has its origin in the techno-orientalist 'Japan-bashing'. The Japanese are 'shrewd' because they do not play by the rules. Here, Japan is a not just a nation of 'copy-cats', it is a nation that thrives on stealth. It becomes powerful because it
successfully steals others' ideas, technology and, as implied in the He Zhili stories, even people.

These stories recall the People's Daily's use of familial metaphors in its representations of Sino-Japanese friendship. While biological affinity is also emphasised in the He Zhili stories, the mention of the 'descendants of the Yellow Emperor' excluded the Japanese and cast them as China's Other. He Zhili, by becoming a Japanese, was constructed as having acquired otherness and she, like the Japanese government in the People's Daily's 'historical foe' narrative, also 'had hurt the feelings of Chinese people'.

Reading the He Zhili incident in the Chinese media calls to mind the Australian's visa incident and cuisine stories discussed in Chapter 6. Both incidents strongly suggest the symbiotic and complex relationship between nationalist ideology and popular culture. In both instances, the media had the ability to transform individual citizens' actions into national issues; individual points of view acquired a national dimension once they were articulated through the media; what we usually consider to be lightweight, life-style type of journalism, such as cuisine stories in the Australian's case and sports stories in the Chinese media, have a remarkable capacity to inject nationalist ideology into mundane, everyday occurrences. In both Australian and Chinese cases, journalism was indeed what Mercer (1992) calls the 'diary of the nation'.

The difference in the way the two media incidents were handled is more significant. If, as explained in Chapter 5, the Australian's cuisine stories could be read as representative of Australia's anxiety about its national identity, then the He Zhili incident is an indication of the Chinese government's fear of the decline of patriotism. Furthermore, while the cuisine stories were continuously covered in the Australian, the country's national quality paper, the He Zhili incident was only sparingly reported in the People's Daily, the Australian's counterpart in China. On the day when He Zhili beat her Chinese rival Deng, the People's Daily ran only two short paragraphs, explaining that Deng's loss was due to her low morale and ineffective strategies. Apart from this, the paper had nothing to say about He Zhili's pro-Japanese performance. The passages quoted come exclusively from the non-Party press -- an increasingly commercialised sector of the Chinese media.
So, how do we account for the conspicuous absence of the *People’s Daily*, the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda organ, in this nationwide discussion on Chineseness? The answer to this question is three-fold. Firstly, reporting He Zhili’s ‘unpatriotic’ behaviour would be against Party journalism’s tradition of positive reporting; the anti-individualist tradition in Party journalism would have made He Zhili a negative example rather than a model for collective emulation. Secondly, the consensus-oriented tradition of Party journalism would have been unable to accommodate the volatility of public sentiment. Thirdly, since He Zhili became a Japanese champion, saying anything unflattering about her could appear inconsistent with China’s foreign policy towards Japan. Given these constraints, the *People’s Daily’s* representations of the Sino-Japanese relationship employ a kind of official rhetoric towards Japan that is one-dimensional. The rigid and limited narrative forms in the Party press prevent any expression of opinion different from the official line, as is evidenced in its silence in this incident. It is for this reason that it becomes important to study the ideological role of the non-Party sector of the Chinese media.

Although the popular commercial press provides alternative, and sometimes competing, narratives to the *People’s Daily*, the relationship between the Party press and commercial press is more complicated than simple opposition. The media’s coverage of the He Zhili incident reveals a dynamic relationship between the two sectors of the Chinese media that is full of contradiction and contestation, as well as appropriation and accommodation. As discussed earlier, the governing principle of China’s foreign policies is pragmatism, which requires not offending Japan unless considered strategically necessary; but nationalism is an important ideological tenet in domestic politics, and the CCP has always wanted to remain the guardian of Chineseness. In this case, the commercial press, in providing narratives which seem to conflict with Party discourse, was saying things that the Party press wanted to say but was unable to say under the constraints of foreign policy concerns and the tradition of Party journalism. This licensing of critical opinions can be seen in the following passage from the *Shenzhen Gazette*, a local publication:

In a global sense, whether you marry a Chinese or a foreigner, you still marry an earthling. Whether you represent China or Japan, as long as you contribute to the advancement of world sports, you are doing valuable work. However, it is quite petty-minded of He Zhili to bear grudges against and rubbish her country, in which she was born and bred, and in
which she built her fame. After all, as the proverb goes: no son should find his mother ugly and no dog should find its home shabby... How can we expect people to bring order to this world if they do not clean their own rooms? How can we talk about globalism in the true sense if we stick up our noses at the mere mention of patriotism (Chen, 1994: 7)?

The previous chapter identified the narrative forms in the People’s Daily’s representation of Sino-Japanese relations and considered its strategies. It has argued for a more productive way of studying propaganda than a traditional model which relies on analyses of bias and distortion. Analyses of the dominant narratives of Japan in the Party paper reveals a ‘state-organised remembering’ -- a process by which a particular memory of the past is mobilised to serve the current political purpose of the nation-state. It also reveals a process by which individual memory is articulated and incorporated into the realm of ‘official memory’. This is a process of simplification and selection which is determined by China’s official foreign policy regarding Japan and justified by the claim that it is in the national interest. The analysis also shows that the selective and simplified representation of Sino-Japanese relations in the People’s Daily drew on a bifurcated view of Japan: Japan as China’s cultural cousin, and Japan as war criminal.

The discussions of He Zhili in the non-Party press point to the potentiality of the ‘periphery’ or ‘marginal’ discourses to undermine the centrality of the Party ideology. These discourses may deploy a counter-memory of the Other and contradictory definitions of Chineseness. The self/Other positioning in these discourses is determined not by the Party’s foreign policies or the state nationalist ideology, but by the local social and political interest being served. This is a complex process because peripheral discourses can be liberating since they tend to challenge the dominance of the ruling ideology. However, these discourses may also deploy orientalist or self-orientalist strategies in order to other the even more marginal social groups.

This chapter will investigate this process by examining some competing narratives of Japan in the non-Party press -- narratives which may contradict and conflict with official narratives. Furthermore, it will explore how the mobilisation of specific aspects of ‘Japan’ allows various kinds of internal othering to occur within the existing social structure of power in China. In doing so, it will further explore how remembering the past provides a central
mechanism in the process of exclusion and inclusion which is necessary for any
definition of nation.

As discussed in earlier chapters, the Chinese media in the era of economic
reforms have become increasingly multi-faceted and fragmented. We therefore
need to consider the variety and instability of the narrative forms through
which complex social relationships are shaped, expressed and lived. What, for
instance, is the relationship between the increasingly diversified non-Party press
and the Party press? Are they political bedfellows, or junior-senior partners, or
ideological opponents? This chapter will show, through an analysis of stories of
Japan in these media outlets, that the relationship is more dynamic and complex
than any single one of these speculations may suggest. It is exactly this
dynamism which defines Chinese media today, and it defies traditional
approaches to the communist media prescribed in the Western liberal model vs
the propaganda model. Instead, it demands a particularistic approach. There is
an important difference in the way Australian and Chinese media operate.
While the Australian media tend to hide a lack of ideological pluralism under a
veneer of multiple media outlets, the newly emerging media outlets in China
are offering a greater degree of diversity than is usually acknowledged by both
Western media scholars and Chinese authorities. The example of the He Zhili
incident and the press' representations of it indicate that, to obtain a well-
rounded picture of Chinese perceptions of Japan, it is important to go beyond
the Party press and consider an array of outlets and positions which contest the
official discourse of Japan. The identification of these alternative positions in
this chapter is not inclusive. Rather than providing an exhaustive typology of
'differences', the goal here is to provide a few alternative points of reference,
against which the narratives of the People's Daily can be read less reductively.
Three different forms of Chinese media will be analysed to show the way each
demonstrates a unique relationship to the Party press: the technocratic press; the
internal press, and the literary feature supplements of the popular press.

Management Journals -- Traces of Appropriation

Management journals constitute a distinct aspect of the Chinese print media.
They emerged not only because of the need for information for modernisation
purposes, but more importantly because of the technocratic movement of the
1980s, when technocrats needed channels to legitimise their claims to power. In
this sense, the management journals, though part of the mass media, exist for an
elitist readership and represent the views of one important interest group in Chinese society. By rearticulating and appropriating dominant ideological elements, these journals contribute to the gradual process of fragmentation and pluralisation of Chinese society.

China's post-Mao economic reforms were launched in 1978. Starting in the countryside and then in rural township enterprises, the nationwide reforms affected the state sector, especially large and medium-sized enterprises, from the mid 1980s. A wide range of reform measures were experimented with involving many aspects of enterprise management. Some of these measures held important political implications for Party-management relations in Chinese industries. Reform proposals varied in terms of the extent of Party power within different types of enterprises (Chamberlain, 1987: 637). At one end of the continuum was the conservative measure of ensuring a 'factory director under Party leadership'. At the other end was the more radical 'manager-rules' alternative, which excluded the Party from the power structure within the enterprise.

In the 1980s, Party newspapers in China published stories supporting managers against bureaucratic abuses. However, with the erosion of the 'factory director' system and the growing economic confusion which set the scene for the Tiananmen clash, the mainstream papers became disillusioned and more submissive to the Party line. Nevertheless, new managing elites in the state enterprises had become an emerging interest group in the incipient Chinese civil culture. This group began to use the media to voice their interests, thus giving rise to a demand for management journals which would cater to the needs of enterprise managers, economists, high-level intellectuals, writers and journalists. One of the most prestigious management journals, the Modern Enterprise Herald for instance, indicated that its targeted readership consisted of economists, enterprise leaders, and people who had the power to influence policy decisions (1989, no. 9: 21): a group of economic reformers who are, in Chan's (1993) terms, 'the technocratic-managerial social engineers'.

A large number of journals aimed at increasing the efficiency of production by communicating new ideas about enterprise management have appeared since the mid-1980s. Though accurate figures are difficult to obtain, a 1989 PRC Yearbook article on Chinese periodicals and magazines, written one year after the introduction of new regulations for the registration of periodicals, reported
there were some 6 200 titles covering the natural sciences, technology, the social sciences, and art and literature (PRC Yearbook, 1989: 360). It seems certain that a considerable number of these could be classified as management journals concerned with economic reform. The most prestigious ones are published monthly or bi-monthly and include journals such as Management World [1986- ], run by the Economic, Technological and Social Development Centre of the State Council, and the Modern Enterprise Herald [1985- ].

From 1987 to 1990 the Modern Enterprise Herald published seventy-six articles on economic issues and management in foreign countries, of which twenty-eight, almost 36 per cent, were about Japan. There were twenty articles about the USA (about 26 per cent), 11 articles about European countries (14 per cent), nine articles about the 'four Asian dragons' (12 per cent). Similar figures were evident in Research on Economics and Management from 1985 to 1990. In this journal, there were twenty-seven articles about foreign countries -- eight about Japan, six about the USSR, five about Europe, four about the USA, five about the four 'Asian Dragons', and one about Brazil.

These figures, combined with a qualitative reading of the articles, yield some indications of where the attention of managers was being directed. First, both the scale of the coverage and its orientation reveal an admiration for Japanese managerial style and a widespread agreement that Japanese practices, due to cultural similarities, were compatible with the Chinese situation. It was suggested that the emulation of Japanese management practices would entail less radical changes in social values than the adoption of the practices of Western countries such as the USA. Second, while some attention to the USSR and Poland indicated Chinese awareness of economic reforms in other Communist states, little attention was given to other so called 'Western' countries like Britain or France.

The privileging of the practices of Japanese management is a consequence of an ideological shift that occurred in the late 1970s in the thinking of the Chinese leadership. In February 1979, an article in the People's Daily, conveyed a sense of urgency:

Japan realised industrial and agricultural modernisation in less than twenty years... the [Japanese] realised that technological modernisation went hand in hand in with management modernisation. We must pay
special attention to this experience. We must systematically study the advanced managerial style of capitalist countries and make it serve our purpose of realising the four modernisations (Sun and Chen, PD, February 6, 1979: 3).

This article marked an ideological breakthrough because it argued that China should learn from capitalist management. The citing of Japan in this context also proved to be indicative of the desire to balance a nationalist state ideology with the need to learn from foreign experience. Japan was a more likely candidate for emulation than the West, as Japan was less threatening to Chinese national pride as a role-model (Bachman, 1989: 38). Japan was a foreign and capitalist country, but at the same time, like Taiwan, it was a Confucian country with a neo-authoritarian tradition which, compared with Western nations, is more accommodating of state functions (Chevrier, 1990: 131).

In this sense, the discourse of the 'Japanese miracle', 'a phoenix rising out of ashes', which was prevalent both in China and abroad, became useful for the Chinese government. Hungry for Western technology yet cautious about its social implications, China considered Japan, a nation which has achieved great economic power while maintaining relatively authoritarian state structure, a perfect solution to China's dilemma regarding modernisation. As the Japanese, like the Chinese, consider values of citizenship, equality, fraternity and enlightenment to be 'Western' values (McCormack, 1993), the Chinese ruling elites seemed to consider learning from Japan as a short cut to modernity, which would enable them to bypass Western values without missing the benefits of technology.

The Party's exhortation to 'learn from Japan' conveyed in the People's Daily as well as other contexts offered management elites, frustrated in their battle for power, an important option in their prusuit of status. The political climate for them to do so became all the more favourable when the Chinese government declared its intention in the mid-1980s to shift its stress from the acquisition of equipment and whole plants from overseas to that of 'intangible' forms of technology, including advanced management, new skills and scientific rules of operation and technological know-how (Simon, 1989: 618).

Considering the widespread belief that Japan and China are 'cultural cousins' and the fact that Japanese economic power has enabled it to become a vitally
important trading partner with China, the authority of a Japanese perspective was conveniently invoked in management journals wherever it helped to advance a technocratic agenda. Political expediency is clearest in an article from the *Modern Enterprise Herald* (*MEH*), entitled, 'A Strenuous Road to the Growth of Chinese Managers'. The article stated at the beginning: 'A few years ago, a Japanese economist claimed that there are no real managers in China. This Japanese economist's judgment, based on the current situation of Chinese enterprises, is well-grounded'. The article lamented that managers in China had little political, legal and economic autonomy and that managers lacked a working legal framework and were vulnerable to ideological hostility and local pressures. The article thus argued for the institutionalisation of management as an independent power and for legal protection of independent managers (Liu, 1989: 8). Interestingly, this self-analysis relied on evoking the authority of a Japanese point of view and, in this sense, was not dissimilar to some Australian self-representations in reacting to the gaze of the 'mighty Japan'. In both the Chinese and the Australian case, the way Japan saw 'us' became increasingly important to 'our' own thinking of who 'we' were and what 'we' ought to be.

In contrast to the popular newspapers' representations of Japan, in which Japan is mostly demonised as the Other, the distinction in the 'us' vs 'them' dichotomy is constructed in the journals as occurring between managers and employees. Another article from the *Modern Enterprise Herald*, for instance, introduces the idea of 'room where one can give vent to one's anger', claiming that at the entrance to many Japanese factories there was often a rubber man modelled on the managers themselves. Whenever employees were angry at them they could vent their anger by beating the model. Japanese managers thought that angry feelings should be expressed rather than suppressed (Dong, 1987: 25).

In another instance, an article from the same journal (Yuan, 1989: 43) criticised the 'aristocratic' (*gui zu*) behaviour of Chinese employees, arguing that 'in some enterprises, workshops become something like tea houses, where employees play cards, chat and gossip'; the 'iron rice bowl' system had weakened the sense of competitiveness and bred laziness and aristocratic behaviour. In these stories, employees, in both the Japanese and Chinese contexts, are objectified and framed in a way that encourages alienation rather than identification, aligning the reader with the managers. These two stories are similar to the Australian's representations of striking workers in the Nakasone vs strikers narrative in that both Australian and Chinese workers are denounced for their laziness and
pitted against management, which represents the interest of the nation. In both the Australian and Chinese cases, a mythic narrative of hero vs villain, good vs bad is invoked. Japan is used as a catalyst in order to vilify the 'real enemy' from within. However, there is also an important difference. While the Australian’s stories denounce the otherness of workers by subjecting it to the gaze of Australia's racial Other, Japan, in these Chinese stories the Japanese perspective is constructed as something to be identified with.

Articles about Japanese management style in these journals suggest that a Japanese model is relevant to China. This is because, first, the Japanese management style is scientific; second, China needs scientific management and Japan is easier to emulate because of its Confucianist cultural traditions, and therefore China will achieve modernisation by riding the 'bullet train' of Japan. Such an argument relies on a definition of Chineseness that is based on the rhetoric of a 'greater Cultural China', which contends that the periphery (Taiwan and Hong Kong) will set the economic and cultural agenda for the centre (the PRC), thereby undermining the political effectiveness of the centre. In this context, the examples of Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Japan become models of neo-authoritarianism or the co-existence of political dictatorship and economic reform (Lee, 1994: 15).

Many of these stories about Japanese management explain Japan's modernity in terms of science, rationality and knowledge:

In post-industrial societies, knowledge has replaced capital and become the important resource of society. This new concept of knowledge substituting capital has been widely accepted by the top Japanese leadership. From central government to private companies, from cities to countryside, almost in every community there is a strong emphasis on the pursuit of knowledge (Wu, 1988: 22).

They also seem to emphasise the Asianness of Japanese modernity:

Effective management is one of the key factors which enabled Japan to become a strong economic rival of the USA. This unique management is characterised with a life-time employment system, a hierarchy based on seniority, participatory decision-making and a clearly-stated ambit and goal of the enterprise. The Japanese culture is derivative of Chinese
culture, however, the Japanese have succeeded in distilling the healthy aspect of the Confucian culture while the Chinese tend to be held back by it (Feng, 1987: 42).

The emphasis on the Asianness of Japanese modernity has a double impact. On the one hand, it points to the relevance of Japanese example in preference to Western models; on the other hand, it is used as a way of self-objectification in these soul-searching reflections on Chinese management. However, a closer reading of the texts in management journals points to the absence of two things. First, there is no systematic attempt to spell out what Japanese management consists of, except for the occasional mention of its permanent employment system, hierarchy based on seniority, and participatory decision-making process. Second, there is hardly any textual evidence to show that there is a real consensus as to the definition of the concept of 'scientific management'. In fact, phrases like 'scientific management' and 'democratic management' are freely and sometimes interchangeably used although, as many China scholars have observed, the two concepts are in many ways incompatible. These features of the management journals' reporting of Japanese management practices suggest that 'Japan' is being deployed in very specific ways in these texts. The stories have something in common with the Australian's representations of Japan by pro-technocratic writers such as Sheridan. In both cases, a particular aspect of Japanese modernity seems to be extracted, highlighted and represented as the whole truth about Japan. As well, in both cases Japan's modernity is used to reflect on the part of 'us' which is represented as the object of derision.

In addition, in explaining Japan's success in terms of its uniqueness, stories in Chinese management journals endorse the ideology of Nihonjinron by reinforcing the view that the Japanese identity is homogenous and coherent. Furthermore, they resonate with the occidentalist argument in Nihonjinron by emphasising China's cultural similarities with Japan and its incompatibility with 'Western' modernisation models.

A typical story to consider here for purpose of contrast is a report from the Chinese Worker, a journal run by the Chinese Worker's Union. This article summarises the impressions of the Chinese Workers Union Delegates' first visit to Japan. It briefly acknowledges the seniority system, the permanent employment system and the position of the trade union as the three basic tenets that characterise the unique Japanese management style. However, the article
goes on to explain in detail how these features can benefit or disadvantage the workers. It argues that the age-experience criteria, on which each employee’s salary is determined, has the advantage of keeping the workers’ loyal to the company; however, it discriminates somewhat against women workers. Also, in terms of the permanent employment system, the article points out that Japanese managers do not resort to sacking workers to improve efficiency and increase profits, and are rewarded by their workers’ loyalty. However, the article points out that women tended to benefit less from the permanent employment system because of their pregnancy and child-rearing responsibilities. Contrary to most pro-managerial articles in the management journals, this article from the Chinese Worker ended by saying:

Why is it that Japan has become the most powerful economy in the world, yet Japanese workers still have to work long hours and most still can not afford a house? The Japanese seem to become richer, but the quality of life has hardly improved (Li, 1993: 48).

This story is important because, told from the workers’ perspective, particularly that of women workers, it de-mythologises the monolithic and coherent vision of labour relations in Japan and reveals a picture of inequality between workers and managers, men and women. In addition, by identifying with the workers and women in Japan, the story seems to refuse to perceive Japan on racial terms and points to the class conflict across cultures as well as the processes of othering of one social group by another within each society.

Articles about Japanese management in these journals sought to neutralise two types of conflicting images. The first is the image of Japan as an atrocious war criminal. This neutralisation was usually achieved by appealing to readers’ rationality, as in Wu’s article mentioned earlier:

In history, the Japanese imperialists have hurt the feeling of the Chinese in a most traumatic way. However, it is time we used our rationality and started perceiving Japanese history in its entirety. To do this, we must not only look at the history of the Japanese invasion of China and other Asian countries, but also study the invaluable lessons and experiences in the history of Japanese modernisation (Wu, 1988: 20).
The second image to be neutralised is that Japanese management is capitalist and thus exploitative. This was an important task for management journals because managers, as mentioned before, were caught between the Party on the one hand, and the workers on the other. An editorial note (An, 1987: 64) from *Economic Management* pointed out that, because of managers' predicament, the policy of the journal was to give voice to the aspirations and opinions of managers, while at the same time maintaining the delicate balance between Party leadership and managers' autonomy. Confronted with readily available labels such as 'bourgeois individualists', managers constantly needed to reiterate the importance of their role in the name of science, as an article from *Economic and Management Research* says:

The success of some Chinese enterprises learning from Japanese managerial style proves that notions such as 'exploitation', 'oppression' associated with capitalist management came from a lazy and irresponsible attitude to work. Of course, this is not to advocate abandoning the desirable socialist ways of interpersonal relationship. Rather, it is to point out that the strict supervision system and rewarding and penalty system are an intrinsic requirement of modernisation and therefore should be unapologetically promoted (Lu, 1986: 28).

What seems to have been excluded from the management journals' discourse about Japan is a realistic assessment of the differences in cultural values and social infrastructures between China and Japan, which may hinder the Japanese panacea from working in China. Additionally, the bitter memories of Japanese atrocities during World War II, consistently represented in the popular newspapers, which may discourage the Chinese from emotional identification with any Japanese practice, were hardly considered.

Having looked at the complicity between the Party press and the management press in their promotion of the Japanese style of management, it is important to point out their differences. If overt criticism of employees is tolerable in the politically oppressive climate of China, criticising the Party for being undeserving of the authority it enjoys requires more tactful strategies. Feng's article from the *Modern Enterprise Herald* expressed admiration for the Japanese emphasis on expertise but went further to criticise Chinese management practices:
The Japanese sense of hierarchy based on age and experience has nothing to do with authoritarianism. The Chinese also pay attention to hierarchy based on position and experience, but this respect for hierarchy is accompanied by blind faith in authority, a contempt for knowledge and worship of power (Feng, 1987: 43).

Articles like this contain no blatant criticisms of the Party and are characterised by an absence of information, requiring the reader to establish their thematic coherence by drawing on their knowledge of the Party-manager relationship. As has been mentioned earlier, the targeted readership of most management journals consists of 'technocratic-managerial social engineers'. Given that by the mid-1980s, the autonomy of Chinese managers had been largely eroded by the Party hardliners, most of whom were old, poorly educated but tenacious in hanging on to their power, it is reasonable to suggest that stories about Japanese management such as this position the reader as being against the ideological hardliners from the Party by playing with the connotative meaning of texts. As production of such narratives about the managers' role presupposed audience knowledge not only of omission, but of the interpretative status of narrative, they require the reader's sophisticated understanding of the operation of symbolic codes.

Reference News -- An Antidote

The Chinese press is structured hierarchically, in that there is not only a clear distinction between the Party press and the commercial press, but more uniquely, a deliberate division between the restricted press and openly circulated press. The rationale for maintaining a division is that certain readers, mainly state leaders and policy-makers, need to be better informed about current affairs, both domestic and international, than the rest of the population. The 'internal' press is further classified because it is based on varying degrees of accessibility. The internal press is comprised mostly of news reports from the Western media. These are selected and abridged, but usually not edited or commented upon. Reference News, appropriately named, is one of the internal dailies that enjoys a huge circulation. Started in 1957 as an 'insiders' publication, the paper provides a compendium of foreign wire and press reports in translation and is not subjected to official censorship. It has enjoyed an ever increasing circulation. Since 1985 the Reference News has become available to
ordinary citizens inside China and is by now the most available internal paper in China.

In 1986, a nationwide survey (Chen and Mi, 1989) of the readership of print media in China found a considerable overlap between the readers of the People's Daily and the Reference News. According to the survey, the readership of the People's Daily was mostly official enterprises and public service personnel: middle-aged, well-educated people usually exposed to more than one form of the media. The survey found that almost all the paper's readers also read other papers, with as many as 46% regularly reading the Reference News. These findings encourage speculation that most readers of the People's Daily knew how to read the paper in a symbolic way. This is reinforced by the fact that as many as 89% of its readers, when asked the primary purpose of reading the paper, replied that they wanted to 'be acquainted with the Party's and government's policies and directives' (Chen and Mi, 1989: 315). It is reasonable to speculate that the Reference News plays an important role in enabling readers to make informed judgements about what they read in the People's Daily. My own memories of my academic parents regularly subscribing to the Reference News also seems to attest to its importance.

In this context, the 'antidote' effect of the Reference News' representations of Sino-Japanese relations works in several ways: first, by providing assessments of specific moments in the Sino-Japanese relationship that may contradict the official rhetoric; second, by providing background explanations and insider's information which enables readers to read official news of Sino-Japanese relations as political strategies rather than truth; and third, by providing perspectives and information about Japan that challenge the 'common sense' knowledge of Japan.

As said earlier, 1992 was an eventful year for the Sino-Japanese relationship. In April the CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin visited Japan. September 29, 1992 was the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué and the normalisation of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Then, one month after the anniversary of normalisation, the Japanese emperor visited China. To co-ordinate these important activities, the People's Daily's rhetoric about Sino-Japanese relations was euphoric, encapsulated in one article comparing the Sino-Japanese relationship to that of a loving couple desiring to get married (Han and Gong, 1992: 5). By contrast, the rhetoric of the Reference News (RN) was
consistently more sober. Commenting on the implications of Secretary Jiang's visit to Japan, the Reference News story warned that the Sino-Japanese relationship will face a future 'punctuated with sparks of tension and uneasiness' (RN, April 8, 1992: 1).

In another article commemorating the 20th anniversary of the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations, the author, a former Japanese ambassador to China, was more explicit about the problematic aspects of the Sino-Japanese relationship. He said that some perceptions of the Sino-Japanese relations are 'illusory' (cuo jue). Geographical proximity and historical interactions may explain why the Japanese are familiar with the Romance of the Three Kingdoms (one of the Chinese classics) and poetry from the Tang Dynasty, but the Japanese do not necessarily understand the various kinds of difficulties China has been experiencing. On the other hand, there is a tendency on the Chinese part to be more concerned with Japan's economic and technological power than with its culture. Additionally, according to the Japanese author, the Chinese tend to overreact to the activities of a small handful of extreme nationalists in Japan (RN, September 29, 1992: 2). Considering, as Whiting (1989) argues, that these illusions are partly the creation of one-dimensional official media representations, the former Japanese ambassador's comment could be read not only as a corrective to the Party's media representations, but also as a subtle criticism of China's media strategies to enhance the government's pragmatic policy on Japan.

The Reference News also functions as an 'antidote' through its inclusion of narratives which, for ideological and practical reasons, never appear in the People's Daily. A good example is a 20-episode narrative in March 1993, detailing the experiences of the Japanese, Korean and Chinese 'comfort women' during the Japanese Aggression -- an area of collective memory of Japan which both the Japanese press and China's Party press prefer not to touch, albeit for different reasons (RN, March 11-30, 1992: 4). Apart from the sensitive nature of the topic, which explains its unsuitability for the People's Daily, the story and the timing of its appearance in the Reference News is worth considering. Starting from mid-1992, the year which saw a succession of events commemorating the 20th anniversary of Sino-Japanese friendship, the comfort women's stories served as a glaring reminder of a less than respectable aspect of Japaneseness.
What is also interesting about the appearance of these 'comfort women' stories in the Reference News is that these stories illustrate the degree of commercialisation of content in Chinese media: these stories were sponsored by the Great Wall-Peter Desktop Publishing Company and each episode of the story was accompanied by a stamp-like square into which were packed the company name, logo, product, thus integrating the company identification with the story (see Appendix 5). These stories exemplify a special and blatant form of commercial sponsorship that has become widespread in Chinese media. In other words, unlike conventional commercial sponsorship of Western newspapers, which may influence the overall content of the paper, direct sponsorship of specific features, columns or news stories determines their content of some Chinese newspapers.

Another recurring issue in the politics of remembering Japan's past behaviour is the question of what really happened during the Nanking Massacre. The Reference News ran an article about a witness of the Massacre, who, upon hearing of the Japanese film-makers' attempt to gloss over the traumatic event, demanded that the Japanese apologise (RN, December 17, 1993: 3). According to Shang, a 60-year-old witness now living in Taiwan, on December 13, 1937, the day of the Massacre, several Japanese soldiers forced their way into his house, found his father and uncle, and bayoneted his father before they dragged him out of the house. Several minutes later, Shang heard piercing screams, rushed out of the house and saw the corpse of his father, beheaded. Shang also recalled seeing hundreds of dead bodies scattered around the city of Nanking.

Japanese attempts to revise their textbooks, including the contested truth of the Nanking Massacre, is one of the dominant narratives of the People's Daily. As discussed in the previous chapter, the paper's narratives of the historical enemy are mainly intended to keep the Japanese in a morally defensive position so as to better manipulate the current Sino-Japanese relationship to the political and economic advantage of China. However, a consideration of the narrative strategies reveals some differences between the People's Daily and the References News' reactions. First, while the People's Daily's reaction centres around the conflict of terminologies used to remember the event (massacre vs tragedy, invasion vs military advance), the Reference News provides an eye-witness account of the details of the Massacre, thereby taking a more emotionally provocative line. Second, while the People's Daily provides an official history in the form of editorial and commentaries, the Reference News stories centre around
individuals, whose personal recollections of the past are articulated and incorporated into the collective remembering.

The 'antidote' function of the Reference News in relation to the Party press is most clearly demonstrated in its coverage of Japanese politics. From 1994, on one hand, a succession of Japanese Prime Ministers were openly repentant about Japan's past; on the other, a series of outbursts from the Japanese cabinet attempted to rehabilitate Japanese aggressions during World War II. The People's Daily's representation of this situation was almost non-existent except for a small article which appeared in a question-and-answer style (Shao, 1994: 6). By contrast, the Reference News' reactions were much more outraged. Within a week, the paper ran two articles (Huang, November 4, 1994: 3; November 10, 1994: 3), taken from the Singaporean United Morning Herald. The articles gave a scathing account of the Japanese mentality, their dishonest attitude to history, emerging militarism and their sense of racial superiority. Compared with the rhetoric of the Reference News, the People's Daily article was understated and barely scratched the surface of the issue.

By presenting its article in a question-and-answer mode, and with the author's by-line instead of the usual commentaries and editorials, the People's Daily managed to de-officialise its rhetoric and disengage itself from the political views expressed in the article. To understand the politics of these strategies, it is worth remembering the Party's three cardinal principles regarding Sino-Japanese relationship: to remember the past, look to the future, and to nurture a permanent friendly relationship. It is possible to speculate from the People's Daily's method of reporting this matter that the Party considered it more important to 'look to the future' than to 'remember the past'.

The Reference News' narratives of Japan can be read as complementary to those of the People's Daily. An article in the Reference News, September 27, 1992, entitled 'Chinese People's Perceptions of the Emperor' by a Japanese journalist from Japan Economic News, predicted the Chinese reaction to the forthcoming visit by the Emperor. According to the article, the Chinese would be reasonable enough to differentiate Japanese militarism from the Emperor, and the Emperor's visit therefore would not upset the Chinese as much as some might fear. However, given what happened in the past, it would be unrealistic to expect more than one billion Chinese to feel enthusiastic about the Emperor's visit (RN, September 27, 1992: 2).
Apprehension about the Emperor's visit was articulated by both Japan and China. While the Japanese government may have been anxious about the possibility of China demanding the Emperor's apologies and reparation for the war, the Chinese government was cautious about the possibility of anti-Japanese expressions and activities, as happened in the student demonstrations in 1985. In terms of the Party's media strategies, this anxiety resulted in a recovery and recirculation of the narratives of Sino-Japanese friendship in the People's Daily in 1992, both before and during the Japanese emperor's visit. The paper's creation of many pseudo-events, which seemed to have no news value from a journalistic perspective, nevertheless became politically relevant. They were intended to warm up Sino-Japanese relationship before the Emperor's visit. In this sense, the Reference News article cited above may have functioned for some readers of the Party press as a decoding mechanism for the reading of the sub-texts in the People's Daily.

The management journals share with the Party press some rhetorical strategies towards Japan due to their overlapping interests in the Chinese modernisation project. As suggested, both the Party hardliners and technocratic elites see Japan as an intermediary to Western modernity. For this reason, the discourse of Japan in these narratives invokes the accepted perceptions of Japan as an economic miracle. Its cultural homogeneity and national unity is claimed to provide a cohesive force in Japanese enterprises and ensures the success of the nation in its drive to surpass the West. The Reference News, on the other hand, is not only useful for those engaged in decoding the messages of the Party press, it also provides narratives that seem to de-mythologise the 'knowledge' of Japan being produced in contexts like the management journals.

A typical example is a seven-part article 'Five Symptoms of Japanese Disease' by a Japanese writer (RN, May 26-June 1, 1994: 3). Focusing on contemporary Japanese society, the article lists resentment against work, groupism, lack of originality, loss of public morality, and mistreatment of women and the old, as five social diseases of Japanese society: 'These diseases are devouring Japan at a fast speed. They are not the diseases of any "developed society", they are distinctively Japanese.' The article drew attention to the existence of marginalised groups in Japan, such as women, retired pensioners, foreigners, and Japanese nationals returned from living overseas.
Written by a Japanese and appearing in an internal publication, this article nevertheless echoed the points of view from the Chinese Worker discussed earlier. Both seemed to demystify the concept of Japanese enterprises as successful micro-societies in which employees identify with their companies and managers look after their employees as families. The three distinctive qualities of Japanese enterprises, namely permanent employment, promotion by seniority, and trade unions, which were favourably represented in the management journals, were here considered as problematic, breeding xenophobia, conformism and corruption. These stories not only challenge the views of Japanese management style promoted in the management journals, they also repudiate Japan’s self-exoticism, which represents Japan as being free from social inequalities and economic disparities.

The Popular Press -- A Site of Contestation

Restricted papers such as the Reference News resemble the management press in that both seem to cater to the better-educated segments of Chinese society. For this reason, a further distinction needs to be made between the readership of internal publications such as the Reference News and that of the commercially oriented press, which consists of tabloid papers, evening papers, and literary supplements of local broadsheets. Although both cater to domestic readership, the readers of the internal press tend to come from an 'information-rich' background and thus are more intent on, and capable of, taking up newspaper-reading as an intellectual and political exercise. The popular press, on the other hand, is more commercially based, entertainment-oriented and prepared to give readers a 'good read'. It is also reasonable to speculate that the readership of the popular press is more eclectic, but generally less inclined to treat their reading activity as anything other than entertainment.

The concern of the commercially oriented press with entertainment seems to explain their general lack of narratives about Japanese economy and management. However, even when such narratives do appear from time to time, they tend to adopt a voice that seems more accessible to readers of the popular press. One article that appeared in the News Digest (September 9, 1993) tells the story of the 'unique company rules' in a Japanese cosmetic factory. According to the article, each day before and after work, employees are required to take off their shoes and walk two laps along a 75-metre long pebble path. The article explains that this strange practice is intended to help employees relax.
and adjust their acupuncture points, as walking barefoot on the pebbles can
generate stimulation to the muscles and various internal organs. Such anecdotal
accounts of Japanese enterprises also appear in management journals, as in the
previous example of the 'rubber managers', but the assumed position of the
reader in the popular press is quite different. The 'them' in this particular
narrative is our 'boss' (lao ban) against the 'us' the employees:

After a long, hard-working day, workers need some kind of relaxation.
Naturally, they would appreciate the thoughtfulness of their bosses for
making such a rule. Our bosses also seem to have many rules and
regulations, but they are usually intended to maximise workload and
penalise workers (Shen, 1993: 3)

Here we see an example of how the self/Other relation is both contextual and
relational. In the same way that a racial Other can be brought in by management
to vilify their employees, as in the example of the strikers in the Australian and
the workers in Chinese management journals, this racial Other can also be
evoked by the employees as a way of criticising their own management. In this
story, Japan ceases to be the Other; instead it becomes something the Chinese
workers want to identify with although, by doing so, the story intentionally or
unintentionally also reinforces a romantic vision of Japanese management.

A thematic reading of the representations of Japan and the Japanese in the
popular press reveals a keen interest in horror stories relating to the Japanese
invasion of China during World War II. Some of these narratives would be	aboo in the Party press. Most prominent is an obsession with finding out the
exact number of deaths -- how many people were killed by the Japanese, for
instance, in the Nanking Massacre, during the entire duration of the Japanese
invasion of China, and during the Japanese invasion of Asia and Pacific regions
throughout World War II. Related to this narrative is the narrative of the
Japanese as morally depraved and capable of inhuman cruelties. Such narratives
usually appear in a particular genre which seems to dominate the popular press'
representations of Japan, and can be best translated as 'inside stories', or 'stories
behind the curtain' (nei mu). These stories are mostly couched in the historical
period of 'Japanese Aggression', but usually start with a peg such as 'new
discovery' and 'surprising findings', giving a sense of immediacy and scoop
justifying its newsworthiness.
One recurring theme involves stories of 'Japanese bacteriological warfare' against the Chinese, based on historical information which is little publicised (in China) and seldom admitted (in Japan). During the eight-year Japanese invasion of China, there simultaneously was a more despicable and hidden warfare going on against the Chinese -- Japanese bacteriologists' medical experiments on the Chinese civilians on a massive scale. An article in the Worker's Daily (September 24, 1993: 3) entitled 'Former Army Doctor Confesses Killing Chinese' records memories of a 76-year-old Japanese doctor who, ridden with guilt in his declining years, decided to confess the crimes he and his colleagues committed against the innocent Chinese during World War II. The Doctor's recollections were, according to the lead of the story, 'blood-curdling' (mao gu song ran). This effect is duly achieved in the course of the story, which is filled with graphical and clinically detailed descriptions of Japanese experiments on human bodies.

A similar story appeared in a weekend supplement to the Guangzhou Evening Post (Zhao, 1994: 2). Entitled 'Crimes Behind the Black Curtain', the story provided a 'shocking' (jin ren de) account of Japanese medical atrocities against war refugees from Guangzhou (then Canton) and Hong Kong. Presented as an account of research findings by a Chinese historian, the story included interviews with many survivors of the Japanese cruelties, whose recollections are evocative and vivid. A number of photos of the actual sites where medical atrocities were committed also appeared with the article. Growing up in an ordinary Chinese family with stories of my young grandfather dying at the age of twenty-nine while fighting the Japanese, I find these stories powerful and disturbing, and I can hardly imagine any ordinary Chinese, including young ones, reading about these personal memories without feeling shocked.

These reports also seem to point to some important issues. Firstly, the stories of Japanese war crimes should be read in the context of the bigger changes that are taking place in the Chinese media. The push towards a market economy determines that popular newspapers have to produce saleable commodities -- news stories that are new, different and unavailable from the Party press and quality press. Crime news, which until the 1980s, was taboo for the Chinese media, has become a popular genre that offers some entertainment as well as the pleasure of reading, for an investment of some fifty cents. Stories of Japanese atrocities are part of this emerging genre which, with its elaboration and sensationalisation of crime details, create and satisfy the spectatorial desire of the reader in the same way that violence and horror films provide fear and
repulsion to a pleasure-seeking audience. The image of the Japanese as monsters, capable of extreme violence and horror, becomes marketable to the ordinary Chinese, whose first or second-hand memories of war experiences with Japan and knowledge (and sometimes resentment) of Japan's current economic presence in China ensure their receptivity to this genre of crime story.

Secondly, an obvious, though easily forgettable point about these Japanese crimes is that they were committed half a century ago, but it was not until recent years that it became possible to report them in Chinese popular newspapers. Additionally, in spite of the fifty-year time lapse, the sense of horror and repulsion generated in these texts has a current resonance and serves to affirm existing beliefs and perceptions. This points to the importance of studying the relationship between history and the shaping of collective memories, and of studying representations not only as structures, which contain a plurality of discourses, but also as processes by which events or issues from the past are transformed into potent contemporary symbols.

Another recurring narrative in popular press representations of Japan concerns stories of separation and reunions. These narratives are couched in the memories of Japanese cruelties, but they are intended more to elicit compassion for the individuals involved than hatred for the Japanese. One such story is from *Youth References*, entitled 'Modern Lady Meng Jiang -- the Story of A Chinese Woman Seeking Her Husband in Japan' (*Youth References*, December 10, 1993: 3). Lady Meng Jiang is a legendary figure in Chinese folklore who, in order to find the remaining bones of her husband killed in the construction of the Great Wall, keeps digging the wall till her fingers start to bleed. The article tells a story of a 72-year-old Chinese woman who, convinced that her husband was killed by Japanese medical staff for experimental purposes fifty years ago, was finally allowed to go to Japan to identify the bones of her husband.

What these human interest stories seem to share, in spite of differences in details, is an emphasis on a strong human bond against the historical background of Japanese inhuman behaviour. A page-long story in the *Guangzhou Evening Post* (Wang et al, 1993: 2) details the twists and turns in the life of a Korean 'comfort woman' who spent the last sixty years in China. Forced to become a 'comfort woman' of the Japanese army, the young Korean girl remained in China after World War II. Li Shaolin, a kind-hearted Chinese man, took pity on the Korean woman and started to look after her, taking on the role
of her adopted son. Li suffered untold sufferings during the Cultural Revolution for looking after a foreign prostitute, and he sacrificed everything, including the prospect of finding a wife, in order to stick with her. The normalisation of Sino-Korean relations in 1992 brought hope for Li, who had intended to help his adopted mother return to her homeland.

It seems that Li Tianying [the Korean woman -- my note] will not have to wait too long before she can receive the war compensation and return to her homeland. From that day, Koreans will not forget the story of Li Shaolin, an ordinary Chinese peasant (Wang et al, 1993: 2).

If these stories, in one way or another remind readers of the People’s Daily’s ‘lost girl’ stories discussed in the previous chapter, it is because they all centre on topics of separation and reunion, and are what Helen Hughes refers to as ‘perennial stories’, which touch people’s hearts for the hardships these ordinary people endure and the happy or unhappy endings that are destined for them. However, these human interest stories in the popular press differ from the ‘lost girl’ stories in that while the ‘lost girl’ stories were written to promote the friendly aspects of Sino-Japanese feelings by de-emphasising Japanese crimes, these human interest stories, in the case of both the Chinese man and the Korean woman, make no attempt to gloss over Japanese behaviour during World War II. This difference also explains why the ‘lost girl’ stories contain clear traces of government initiatives and participation whereas those in the popular press do not.

At a conceptual level, these human interest stories differ from friendship stories in that while they all appeal to the folkloric aspect of storytelling, popular press’ representations seem to have a clearer mythological narrative structure -- the opposition between the good and bad, the innocent and evil. In the instance of the Korean ‘comfort woman’, readers can easily identify with the Korean woman and her adopted Chinese son against the Japanese, while in the People’s Daily’s ‘lost girl’ stories, the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is deliberately blurred. Additionally, rather than resorting to official verbiage, these popular press stories seem to delve deeper into the collective memories of folk heroes. In the story of the Chinese woman looking for her husband’s bones, a remote yet familiar legendary figure Meng Jiang was invoked for identification.
The story of the relationship between the Korean comfort woman and her adopted Chinese son resonates with another story of separation and reunion. In this instance the relationship spoken about is between a Japanese soldier and a Chinese young man. One day in 1945, the year of the Japanese surrender, Sun Bangjun, a poor young peasant in Henan Province, north of China, met a Japanese soldier outside his village. Sun found that war injuries had rendered the Japanese soldier mute and retarded. Sun took pity on this Japanese soldier and took him home. For fifty years, in spite of poverty, Sun took good care of the Japanese soldier at the cost of being accused of being a traitor, a spy and a lackey of the Japanese. As early as 1970, Sun had made numerous attempts to find the Japanese soldier's family. His efforts finally paid off in 1993, when news of the soldier was finally circulated in Japan and the soldier's brother came to China to take his sibling back to Japan.

An interesting fact about this story is its perceived newsworthiness. In December, 1993, the Guangzhou Evening Post, a nationally circulated popular paper based in southern China, devoted almost half a page of its overseas edition to the story (Liu, 1993: 2). October 1994 saw a restructured version of the same story by different authors, in the Xinmin Evening Post, another nationally circulated daily, based in Shanghai (Kang et al, 1994: 13). Considering the two texts of the same story together points to the perennial appeal of some of the dominant human interest stories, the commodification and repackaging of memories through the popular media, and the social formation of memory as an ongoing, dynamic process. Additionally, reading the two stories comparatively and in conjunction with other 'separation and reunion stories' reveals different processes by which the national identity is constructed.

Comparing the two different versions of the same story reveals that the Guangzhou Evening Post version emphasised the Chinese peasant's selfless deeds and lamented the lack of appreciation by the Japanese: 'It seems regrettable that the moving story was hardly publicised in Japan, except for a small unofficial newspaper'. By comparison, the Xinmin Evening Post story, published almost a year later, included appreciative reactions from the Japanese, including Japan's decision to sponsor Sun's son's study in Japan, and subsequent joint-venture projects between Sun's hometown and the Japanese soldier's hometown in Japan. A Japanese official was quoted as saying that Sun's humanism is a good textbook for Sino-Japanese friendship. The subtleties and alternative details of
narratives within the popular press suggest a difference in the degree of resistance to official history in the making of popular memory.

Reading the stories in conjunction with other reunion stories seems to reveal a concerted resentment in the popular press against the government's rhetoric of Japan as our 'cultural cousin'. If the story of the Chinese woman seeking the remains of her husband is probably read more or less literally, then the Korean comfort woman's experience is also metaphorical of the trauma China experienced at the hands of Japan, for the Chinese nationalist discourse tends to invoke the image of the contaminated body of a woman in its anti-imperialist narratives. And it is for this reason that Chinese readers would have no difficulty identifying with the Korean woman, in spite of the fact that it was not until a few years ago that China and South Korea normalised their diplomatic relationship. By comparison, the story of the Japanese soldier in both versions is structured in such a way that readers identify with the Chinese benefactor rather than the Japanese soldier, despite the Japanese soldier's personal misfortune. Therefore, although the stories can be described as human interest stories, they are not what I have referred to as 'friendship stories', for they are told in a 'forgive but not forget' spirit rather than a desire to promote friendly sentiment towards the Japanese.

The popular newspapers' representations of Japan in both crime (inhuman) stories and reunion (human) stories seem to be a relatively recent phenomenon. This was made possible by the rapid increase in popular newspapers as a result of further economic reforms. This seems to suggest that the study of Chinese media needs to go beyond the terrain of the Party press. Popular newspapers, as a disposable commodity, not only offer pleasure and escape, but also offer sites for competing narratives. Within these popular cultural forms, power is constituted not through persuasion by an editorial or commentary which are identifiable in the People's Daily, but through what Colin Mercer (1985: 56) describes as 'a montage of elements' or 'the interleaving discourse'. In the case of the popular representation of Japan, the titbits of rapist and sadist, a collage of a forlorn wife and orphaned daughters are co-ordinated to provide a discourse of Japan that runs against the ideological grains of the Party press. The power of this discourse does not lie in the accuracy of narrative details and time sequences, but in the feelings evoked of those exposed to such experiences or their familiar recounting, which in turn become the basis for enduring attitudes.
Each of the segments of the Chinese media -- internal press, popular newspapers and elitist management journals -- provides narratives of Japan that seem to contradict and subvert the Party rhetoric of Japan, yet at the same time there is also a considerable degree of thematic overlap. Targeted towards a specific community, each of them employs different definitions of Japaneseness. The processes of 'othering' in these narratives are complex, situational and relational. These representations are neither expressive of the totality of Japan nor reflective of the structure of Chinese perceptions of the Japanese. To be sure, these narratives provide important alternative perspectives from which 'Japan' may be understood, however they also mobilise or de-emphasise particular aspects of the ambivalent impressions of Japan. The images of Japan, either as a unique example of industrial success, or as a sadistic war criminal, are rarefied. 'Japan' has become less a body of knowledge that is untrue, and more a body of knowledge whose construction is unquestioned.

The analysis of Japan stories in this chapter reveals two ways in which Japan has been 'orientalised'. The first portrays Japan as culturally homogenous and coherent and explains Japan's economic success in these terms. Such a construction feeds on Japan's self-representation. Here we see a similarity in the Australian 's and the Chinese management journals' constructions of Japanese modernity. Japan is used as a catalyst to manage the social divisions and economic disparities inside each society. The orientalising of Japan allows for a kind of internal othering: according to the Australian, unless it acquires the high-tech and economic power of Japan, Australia may become the 'sick man of Asia'; similarly, Chinese management journals depict a scenario whereby China will be doomed to backwardness unless Chinese enterprises adopt Japanese management style. In both cases, arguments are made to influence the direction of political and economic policies, which ultimately privilege certain social groups over others.

Both the Australian and Chinese narratives point to the relational and contextual nature of the meaning of 'Japan'. Like the ambiguous positioning of Nakasone in the strikes stories, the use of 'Japan' in the Chinese narratives can be equally contradictory and promiscuous. For instance, what 'Japanese management' means to Chinese managers is different from what it means to Chinese workers. Furthermore, even within workers' discourse, 'Japanese
management' can be different things on different occasions. Sometimes workers' narratives may identify with Japanese employees and see Japanese management as exploitative; at other times it may identify with the Japanese employers and employees so as to attack Chinese managers. The self/Other boundary is seen to be constantly shifting.

The second way of orientalising Japan operates by evoking historical memories of wartime Japan. The power of this kind of orientalism comes from its ability to produce marketable cultural products, such as sex, as in the stories of comfort women; violence, as in the stories of the Nanking Massacre; and crime, as in the stories of bacteriological experiments. In these stories, historical accuracy may be compromised for the sake of sensationalism, and a specific historical image of 'Japan' is sometimes constructed to stand for the entirety of Japanese

Like the images of Japan produced in the Party press, the depiction of Japan in the non-Party press is also determined by the political and economic interests of those who produce it rather than by the realities of Japan. Although these narratives contribute to discursive pluralism in the media, they are by no means to be read as oppositional truths, or the antithesis of the propaganda of the Party press. Before the emergence of the non-Party press, the Chinese reader, armed with what Friedman (1994: 134) calls the 'popular oppositional presuppositions', sought 'truthful' information mainly through the reinterpretation of propaganda. This 'popular cynicism' frustrated the attempt of the regime to act in a completely hegemonic manner. I would argue that just as there was a danger of regarding Party propaganda as hegemonic, there is now a danger of considering the non-Party press as truly democratic. In other words, while a dose of popular cynicism may have proved healthy in a more or less monolithic media environment, the consequences of the emergence of alternative media outlets in China should not be idealised or romanticised. As this chapter has shown, the images of Japan in the People's Daily and those in other sector of the press are not simply oppositional; in addition, as with the constructions of Japanese in the People's Daily, the management journals and popular papers also rely on the impression that there is only one story to tell about Japan and there is only one way to tell it. Hence, rather than cynicism about propaganda or an idealistic faith in the oppositional truth, a sensitivity to the moment and locale of tensions and ambiguities is more likely to bring us closer to 'truth'.
Conclusion

In the Introduction to *Orientalism* (1978), Said points out that orientalism can be discussed and analysed as meaning several things. As a discourse, orientalism can be understood as consisting of an array of images and perceptions of the Orient as well as the techniques and strategies that create and maintain these images and perceptions; as a methodology, orientalism is a 'style of thought' based upon an epistemological and ontological distinction between the Orient and the Occident; as a corporate institution, orientalism deals with the Orient by teaching about it, researching about it and writing about it.

The primary intention of this work has been to study how news discourse constructs the self and Other by deploying various orientalist and occidentalist images and strategies. However, it soon becomes clear that such an aim is impossible to attain without also considering orientalism as a style of thought. Previous chapters represent an attempt to understand the dynamic and complex process by which news narratives construct national identity through othering. They also represent an attempt to deconstruct an orientalist news paradigm that is inhibiting to the study of news, nation and narration.

I

Said's *Orientalism* has been described as 'ground-breaking, but theoretically problematic' (Schirato, 1996: 10). While it is clear that a full understanding of the othering process is impossible to achieve without problematising the very framework of Said's critique, it is also hard to imagine what post-colonial studies of Western representations of the 'Orient' would be like without *Orientalism*. This work therefore is indebted to *Orientalism* not only for the intellectual brilliance it has to offer, but also for the critical opportunities which the problematic aspects of his work create.

The analysis in the previous chapters suggests that orientalist images, strategies and frameworks are deployed at different historical and cultural sites, by both the 'Orient' and the 'Occident', for a variety of purposes, and that the meanings of both the 'Orient' and the 'Occident' are multivalent, depending on the specificities of power relation and the context in which
that power relation is negotiated. It is a process that is far more complex and
dynamic than that offered in Said's formulation.

A number of points arise in the analysis of othering processes in Australian
and Chinese news. Firstly, construction of national identity invariably
entails some kind of othering. The analysis here portrays a scenario whereby
various kinds of othering are actively engaged in, not only by the 'West' but
also by the Orient. Earlier chapters suggest, via a juxtaposition of Chinese
and Australian news constructions of Japan, that the 'we-they' dichotomy,
which is an important strategy in the textualising and essentialising of the
Other, occurs both in the West's representations of the Orient, and in the
Orient's representations of the West. They also demonstrate that what are
referred to as the Oriental countries, such as Japan and China, not only
engage in their projects of othering, but also appropriate the use of
orientalist frameworks for modernisation and nationalistic purposes.
Furthermore, it seems that China has been engaged, at various political
moments and locales, in more active, assertive and dynamic processes of
othering Japan in its nation-building than has Australia. It is economically
less dependent on Japan than is Australia, and politically less inhibited by
the fear of appearing racist and stereotypical. This poses a serious challenge
to Said's critique of orientalism, which is based on the
male/Western/subject vs female/Oriental/object dichotomy.

Secondly, the analysis portrays a picture whereby othering is engaged in not
only for power negotiation with the external Other, but also for the purpose
of marginalising the internal Other. The analysis of the Chinese and
Australian representations of Japan shows that Japan as the external Other is
often evoked as a catalyst to cover up internal social divisions, economic
disparities, and political and ideological ramifications. Furthermore, the so-
called national cultures are themselves segmented along lines of class,
gender and other markers of social identity and stratification. Although their
representations are legitimated in the name of the national interest, it is
often the interests of local cultural or political elites that are served.

While studies of media and identity need to consider the hierarchy of
cultural legitimation that itself reinforces other structures of social power
within the national boundaries, it is equally important to cross the national
and cultural boundaries and consider the complicity between specific social
groups across cultures, which may share similar political, economic and social interests and aspirations. This holds an important implication for the study of the relationship between media and cultural identity in the context of increasingly globalised politics and economy: while the media imperialism thesis poses national and local cultures against external, commercial influences, it very often neglects to address the question of in whose name national and local cultures are being defended against globalisation, as well as the question of whose practical, unconscious frameworks are used too define the social reality for the whole community. Analysis of the representations Japan's modernity in the Australian and in Chinese technocratic discourse shows that they both have to contain the conflicting interests of other markers of social identity, such as workers and women. It is also likely that the techno-professionals in China and Australia, together with their counterparts in Japan, stand to benefit from so-called special Australian-Japanese and Chinese-Japanese 'constructive' relations.

In other words, while it is significant to study comparatively how media of individual cultures and nations construct national identity, it is also critically important to place such comparison both in the context of the ever-more-diverse and ever-more-complex spectrum of cultural differences inside nations themselves, and in the context of the emergence of certain social groups across national borders as a consequence of globalisation.

Thirdly, the analysis points to the ambiguity, ambivalence and indeterminacy that mark the othering process. It shows that the self/Other positioning is fluid and relational. The last four chapters show that what 'Japan' is to Australia and China in various social locales and times are open to constant re-definition. Japan, for instance, is at times, China's cultural cousin, and at other times China's historical foe. Furthermore, 'Japanese management' can elicit either identification or repudiation, depending on whose political frameworks are being used and what practical ends are being served. The Australian-Japanese trade relationship is often constructed as a 'marriage made in heaven', yet stories about trade and finance in the Australian usually evoke metaphors which have militant rather than matrimonial implications. Also, what 'Japan' stands for depends on what kind of Australianness is being produced. Since the nation is a constantly shifting and negotiated category, the meaning of what constitutes the Other is necessarily contextual and situation-specific.
The definition of the Other invariably implicates the definition of the self. It is in re-shaping and re-defining 'our' Other that our own national imaginary is constantly re-configurated. If Chinese official memories of Japan before economic reform evoked the orientalist images of the bestial cruelties of Japaneseness, then the state-organised memory of Japan in the 1980s and 1990s has been geared towards 'positive' exoticisation. Such a shift indicates not so much the change of the Japanese character as the Chinese government's reinvention of its national identity. Contemporary official discourse of Japan in the Chinese press points to a nationalist ideology which is more open-minded and outward-looking than Mao's ideology, more assertive of the Asian and Confucian cultural identity, eager to modernise itself, yet still xenophobic about the threat of the West.

Lastly, the analysis implies that orientalism and occidentalism as othering strategies can be both oppressive and enabling. In the Chinese technocratic discourse of Japan, for instance, what may be considered by the West itself as a globally imperialistic and therefore 'politically incorrect' discourse of orientalism may equally be used by the various groups of intelligentsia against the centrality of the Party rule. In other words, what the Western post-colonialists regard as an oppressive discourse may be an empowering, if not democratizing, one for an internally marginal group in a non-Western society. Conversely, in the case of the MFP debate in Australia, a widespread abdication of positions of Western authority and a language of 'enmeshing with Asia' in the news media have produced an 'enlightened' anti-orientalist orthodoxy which played into the hands of the Labor in its suppression of dissenting voices. It is therefore an example of when the critique of orientalism does not function to promote social and cultural diversity but on the contrary tends to inhibit it. The perceived need to adopt an 'enlightened' discourse of Asia and the mandate of 'objective' reporting result in the creation of a latent and subtle form of orientalism. Orientalist images of Japan largely operate on the level of myth. In the Chinese news, however, a combination of residual anti-imperialistic sentiments and consumers' growing appetite for sensationalism breed an 'oriental orientalism' that is more blatant than its 'Western' counterpart.

While it is an operating assumption that othering is deployed for external and internal domination, it is also clear that it can be a politically and
socially useful strategy for those dominated, for it allows the less powerful social groups in a particular culture to challenge the status quo of a ruling ideology. Conversely, arguing unconditionally against orientalism can be politically dangerous since it may inadvertently suppress locally marginal or peripheral discourses. Therefore, Xiaomei Chen is right to say that, as critics, we must always be attentive to the local positioning of discourse as well as to the 'political and ideological ramifications of utterances, especially our own' (Chen, 1995: 167).

II

Comparative news studies in the West have very often applied Western assumptions, rules and frameworks to the study of non-Western media. The casting of non-Western media as either propagandistic or unprofessional is not only based on a distinction between the self and the Other, but it also renders the Other unchanging. This is an orientalist framework because it projects Western notions of objectivity onto the Other, thereby ignoring the cultural and institutional means by which other peoples make claims to truth.

Reading Japan in the Australian and the People's Daily points to some fundamental differences in their journalists' relation to the story, the news source, and to the reader. In the case of the Australian, a story is a sequence of events that is gathered 'impartially' and reported 'objectively', usually following the narrative order of news, features and editorials. The journalist is only liable to the professional mandates of news-reporting, although these mandates are ideological constructs themselves. In the case of the People's Daily, a story is often a series of narratives 'told' by the government or the Party, albeit often in the form of traditional storytelling and via the conduit of individual news reporters. The journalist's responsibility therefore lies in being the 'throat' and the 'tongue' of the authorities, and to fulfil that responsibility, the journalist is free to invent stories as well as the narrative forms that contain these stories. In other words, the difference between the Australian's news and the People's Daily's news is the difference between an adherence to the professional ideology of news-reporting and an adherence to the Party and the government line.
There is also a difference in the way news in the *Australian* and the *People’s Daily* fulfils the desire or expectations of the reader. In the case of the *Australian*, narrative devices and strategies are deployed to invite, encourage and seek identification, and to satisfy the desire to belong. In the case of the *People’s Daily*, a rapport between the reader and the journalist regarding the symbolism of news events and story forms is crucially important in the construction of meaning. Writers assume readers’ knowledge of the symbolic status of narratives, and the fulfilment of the reader’s expectation in the Party journalism entails trumpeting the Party line while signalling to the reader the need for alternative or oppositional reading, thereby sabotaging the purpose of the official ‘story’. In other words, in the Australian case there is a tendency to associate professional credibility with objective reporting, and consequently irony develops as a strategy to work around the constraints of the professional ideology of objectivity. In the Chinese case, journalists’ professional credibility seems to be defined by their loyalty to the Party. Consequently, cynicism develops both as a form of resistance and as a survival strategy to cope with the political constraints of having to be the ‘mouthpiece’ of the Party.

Given that journalistic practices differ across cultures, it is important to adopt an analytical framework of news studies that is capable of addressing the specificities of each culture. Because the Australian news media prescribes objectivity as the canon of journalistic professionalism, the value of critical studies of news lies in its desire and ability to de-naturalise the practice of balanced reporting and call the credibility of objective reporting into question. However, because Chinese Party propaganda relies on the unapologetic fabrication and invention of news stories, it would miss the point to focus on bias and distortion. A more appropriate way of studying the process of political communication in China is to examine the tactics and strategies operating in the propaganda media -- the process by which political realities are ordered, organised and selected.

These differences in Australian and Chinese news-reporting point to the need to deconstruct an orientalist news paradigm. Such a paradigm tends to perceive non-Western media as non-professional or propagandist, hence implying a sense of ‘ours’ as objective and professional. This analysis opts for a critical framework that is specific to the cultural, social and economic conditions of the society in which the newspapers operate. Such an approach allows us to study the relationship between structures and processes by
which events and issues, and the narrative forms that contain them, become culturally and politically potent symbols.

Each of the Chinese media outlets analysed represents Japan in a moralistic and straight-faced manner, giving the impression that theirs is the complete story about Japan and that there is only one way of telling it. However, it is also clear that Chinese readers have the capacity to recognise the symbolic nature of these structures and forms of storytelling. In other words, it is one thing to say that most of the news in China is propaganda, it is another to say that the targets of this propaganda are relatively immune to it, thereby rendering the purpose of propaganda almost self-defeating.

In the case of the *Australian*, however, the perceived inadequacy of existing stock narratives regarding representations of Japan, and the limitations imposed by the formula of objective reporting, result in journalists writing in sometimes reflexive, sometimes ironic modes and foregrounding the metaphoric nature of certain narrative forms and structures. However, it is probably not often that the reader asks the questions of the news that news customarily asks of reality. In other words, journalists in the Chinese case rely on the cynicism of the reader to salvage the denied truth, while journalists in the Australian case offer their readers a plate of irony mixed with metaphor for the more 'discerning' ones to savour.

This difference between the ways in which Chinese and Australian readers relate to narrative forms points to the danger of using assumptions (for instance, the notion of objectivity) and analytical tools of one culture (such as the propaganda model) to read the narrative of another culture -- a pitfall into which many cross-cultural comparative studies in Western scholarship tend to fall. Propaganda, a notion often scrutinised in the analysis of non-Western, particularly communist media, can be regarded as persuasive communication. Like news in the Western media, 'propaganda' in non-Western societies also has narrative forms and strategies, and has functions similar to the myths and folktales of any given culture. Considering the storytelling aspect of propaganda points to the importance of regarding the persuasive political communication in China as part of its popular culture. The regular appearance in the *People’s Daily* of human interest stories and news reports appealing to readers' emotions rather than rationality show that propaganda can be made savoury for popular taste.
The analysis of both Australian and Chinese media practices calls into question the standard Western perceptions of how Western and communist journalism operate. In the Chinese case, the diversification and pluralisation of the media have made it increasingly possible for unresolved emotional issues between China and Japan to be addressed; the commercially oriented press are capable of registering the dominant sentiments of the public about Japan. In other words, the contradictory scenario of political control and economic freedom in China has made it possible for different perceptions of Japan, past and present, official and non-official, to co-exist. By contrast, the Australian's close editorial identification with the government, and the policy-makers' orthodoxy of 'embracing Asia' determine that a technoprofessional discourse of Japan is privileged over others. Though a commercial paper, the Australian seldom contradicts or challenges the government's position regarding Japan. This difference seems to challenge the notion of dichotomy of control (of communist media) and freedom (of Western commercial media).

However, if contestations in the representations of Japan in the various segments of Chinese media show that the model of monolithic control is no longer a reality in the Chinese media, it also suggests the danger of shifting to the other end of the spectrum and speculating on the possibility of press freedom being brought about by commercialisation. The newly emerging non-official sector has provided important sources of alternative views, but most of them do not deal with 'hard news', nor are they concerned with news of foreign affairs and international news. Furthermore, it is one thing to say that the crime stories legitimate and affirm the readers' need for popular culture and entertainment, it is another to say that the commodification of news has a markedly democratising effect on society in general. This is because the commercial press, or to be more exact, the commercialised press, far from being freed from the iron grip of the Party, is influenced by the invisible hand of the market. Also, as the analysis of management press suggests, its relationship to the Party press is, more often than not, one that can be described as accommodation, containment, and subtle contestation rather than outright opposition. After all, an apparent inconsistency among different beliefs and interpretations of social reality may represent a more subtle form of ideological work which renders the ideology more invisible and powerful, precisely because of its apparent pluralism and diversity.
The search for an alternative, if not a corrective, to the orientalist methodology of reading news points to the value of narrative analysis, since its goal, as Bennett and Edelman (1985) eloquently put it, is not the 'verification of some kind of story or the achievement of an ideal speech situation', but the attainment of 'an understanding of the strains that make alternative narrative inevitable and a recognition of the diversity of human frustrations, aspiration, satisfaction, and imaginative construction'.

A narrative approach to news is intended to dissolve the impasse in comparative media studies created by the us/them, West/non-West distinction by allowing us to assess the performance of media from the local perspective. For instance, we can say that despite the People's Daily's declared role as the propaganda mouthpiece of the Party and the government, the paper has developed a greater degree of dynamism in the 1990s regarding its construction of Japan than the previous decade. This is because the paper took into account the competing narratives of Japan in the fast emerging commercial media and adjusted its narrative strategies accordingly. In terms of narrative analysis, dynamism, rather than being the antithesis of propaganda, became in this case a strategy in political communication to make 'propaganda' more effective.

Studying news as narrative entails not only considering the convention of narration, by which journalists select and organise news stories, but also calling into question the seemingly natural frameworks of interpretations which journalists routinely deploy to make sense of daily happenings. The convention of writing news according to the formula of answering questions regarding Who, What, When, Where, Why and How embodies a 'cosmology' (Galtung and Vincent, 1992), a set of practical frameworks and assumptions about the world in which we live. As Galtung and Vincent rightly point out, news is a major carrier of that cosmology because it reflects what is compatible with a given culture's notion of space, time and knowledge of the world. News is constituted and consumed in such unconscious and taken-for-granted ways that it is easy to forget that it is deeply ideological.

Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How constitute the formula of news-writing, but they also constitute an enabling matrix under which the nation
and its Other is imagined. The nation can be imagined if it can be narrated and is temporal (when), locatable (where), personified (who), defined and described (what), and explained (how and why). News routinely and uncritically constructed in this manner provides readers with a daily dosage of an assurance, a sense of anchorage. New events and issues relating to the nation and its Other are formulaically narrated within this interpretative framework, replaying the scenarios of the past and thereby dissolving any sense of ambiguity, uncertainty, and contradiction attached to these new events and issues.

Reading news within these parameters opens an important entrance to the critical understanding of how news constructs the national self and the Other. It reveals a process of 'storying' the nation and its Other that is often reductionist, simplifying and sometimes caricaturing. For instance, answers to question of Who seem simple and natural enough in journalistic terms, but the 'Who' that makes news are usually the people who are given to represent the nation, or the people who are constructed as a threat and embarrassment to the nation. While people who represent the nation, such as Prime Ministers and government spokespeople become the source of news and interpret what has happened, those who are seen to be a threat or embarrassment to the nation are denied a voice and are invariably denounced for the otherness they display. Both the striking train drivers in the Australian and the Chinese-cum-Japanese tennis player He Zhili are the kind of people who make news because they are considered as an embarrassment to the nation. It is true that ordinary individuals, like Hodge the truck driver in the Australian's strike stories and the Chinese peasant who adopted the Korean 'comfort woman' as his mother, also become newsworthy because their 'ordinariness' is constructed as emblematic of the nation, but the voice of these individuals is invariably appropriated to lend significance to the larger project of nation-building.

Stories about the Other inevitably evoke a sense of Where. This is because in the process of 'storying' the Other, there is a constant remapping of the world 'we' live in, so that we know where we are, who are our neighbours, our allies and our enemies. When journalists mention places, they may be doing something more than just giving us a bare fact about the location of an event. Rather, places tell more about our understanding of cartography, global geopolitics and a specific perception of international community. The
mention of Nagasaki, in Loudon's interview with Kuranari, evokes as much a sense of history as geography. In spite of the gulf created by the War between the Chinese and the Japanese, Japan in the official representations is a 'neighbour' who lives across 'a strip of water'. In some cases a place is often referred to as an actor, and in other cases, a place is mentioned not so much to indicate the location as to evoke an historical implication.

In other words, the construction of national imaginary by and in the media is possible only when journalists also have in their minds a strong sense of When -- a cultural calender, consisting of the anniversaries and festivals that the nation celebrates, periodisation of historical events that the media reminds the nation of, and more importantly, a political memory control which decides what should be remembered and forgotten. Equipped with this cultural technology, journalists are able to assess the timeliness of the events and relevance of the issues concerned. Chinese official media's reminiscences of the 50th anniversary of V-J day amidst the CCP's authority crisis and a growing tension between mainland China and Taiwan attest to the power of media to manipulate the temporalities of specific issues and events. The fusion of the strikes stories with the stories of Nakasone's visit in the Australian also prove that timeliness is in the eye of the journalists and those who claim to represent the nation.

Furthermore, the media is able to participate in the making of the national imaginary because of its capacity to tell stories, and to tell them in a way that easily captures the imagination of ordinary people. In this sense, stories about food (eg the visa incident), about sports (eg. the stories of He Zhili the ping pong player), about separation and reunion, about children lost and found, about adventure into foreign and the unknown places (eg. 'success stories' in the business section of the Australian), about good and evil, innocence and guilt (eg the Japanese medical teams' experiments on Chinese civilians) are imbued with a significance that is larger than the individuals in these stories. It is through the reinstatement of these narrative structures and forms that nation is built, the distinction between the national self and Other re-defined. Indeed, a nation is not a nation unless it is narratable. Narratives of the nation, whether in the form of news or entertainment, truth or propaganda, straight or sensational journalism, are all located along the same storytelling continuum. The difference is in the manner of presentation, not in subject matter.
Newspapers are powerful cultural technologies because they possess the techniques and tools to make the nation and its Other narratable. Apart from the routine practice of defining the situation within the standard parameters of Who, What, When and Where, the largely unnoticed conventions of explaining How things happen and Why they happen are also important means of narrating the nation in accordance with the views of those in power. The process of providing explanations, explicating consequences and predicating significance is often an unquestioned one and, through such a process, issues and events are given a narrative closure. For example, the train drivers' strikes, according to the *Australian*, must be stopped, for they threaten the economy of the nation and embarrass the nation before Japan; Peacock was not fit to become the Prime Minister because his politically motivated decision to scrap the MFP would jeopardise Australia-Japan relations. How things happen is explained in terms of motives, significance and consequence, from the perspective of those who have the situation-defining power, and in the name of the nation.

Narrative analysis offers a method of interpretation that is appropriate to the particular situation of each media system. In the Chinese case, there is, on one hand, a tendency for the media to increasingly diversify, fragment and pluralise, and on the other hand, a convention that each and every media outlet should provide a consensual view. Given this, a study of contestation in the construction of national imaginary in the Chinese context entails a reconstructive process -- the process of treating stories from various media outlets as relational and interdependent parts of a narrative, a process similar to that of putting together bits and pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, thereby constructing the whole picture of the 'contested nation'.

By contrast, in the Australian media there is, on the one hand, the tendency towards media concentration and the shrinking of media diversity, and on the other hand, a self-conscious defiance by individual journalists against the canon of objectivity and a movement towards personal, opinionated writing. Many of the texts analysed in the previous chapters are 'parodic and sceptical', 'immediate and personal', and 'full of contradictions' (Dalgren, 1992: 19). Hence, to appreciate the parodic and contradictory nature of these works, we need to do the opposite of what is required in the analysis of Chinese media. Stated in another way, it is necessary to engage in a
deconstructive process, treating each of these stories as a mosaic of narratives, thereby revealing the layering and juxtaposition of, sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting, narratives.

Narrative analysis allows us to study not only the similarities and differences of story-telling across nations, communities and social groups, but also the change and continuity in different historical periods. For instance, the news constructions of Japan analysed in the previous chapters span a period of only fifteen years, but many dramatic changes have taken place in the structure and practices of the media industry during the period. In the Chinese case, the Party press of the 1990s can no longer confidently expect that other segments of social institutions will do its bidding with any degree of enthusiasm. As mouthpieces of the Party and the government, Party newspapers have lost their credibility and coercive power. Conversely, the Party press may also be strengthened by weakening its claim to represent all people and communities and capitalising on the ideological work performed by emerging alternative media outlets. Consequent to these changes, the strategies the Party press deploys are those of containment, contestation and negotiation rather than coercion and control.

In the Australian case, the restructuring of the newspaper industry in the 1980s has also brought about changes in the ways in which news is gathered and produced. With fewer newspapers and fewer owners, there has been a decrease in diversity in newspaper content. On the other hand, journalists have developed a growing scepticism towards the objectivity goal and an awareness of interpretative frameworks underlying their writing. Hence, in comparative work, just as it is risky to use one country’s media as a benchmark when judging that of another country, it is equally risky to judge the journalism of one historical moment against the professional standards of another historical time.

IV

The particular kind of reading constructed here takes the form of deconstructing an array of orientalist and occidentalist images, techniques and strategies in the news discourse. Such a deconstruction precipitates a deconstruction of an orientalist paradigm in news analysis. Having claimed these, the limitation of my problematics in this project must also be
acknowledged: while it seems possible to critique orientalism both as a
discourse and a methodology, it seems less possible to step outside the
influence of orientalist institutions. After all, I write in English — the
language of the 'Other'; I conduct my research within the parameters of
'Western' academic convention; and, above all, the intellectual output from
the research is answerable to the 'Western' institution which sponsors my
research project.

On the other hand, the presence of many de-constructionist projects
undertaken by 'Others' like myself seems to suggest that what Said refers to
as the Western orientalist 'corporate institution' is not as secure or
hegemonic as it was two decades ago. My own experience of research seems
to suggest that my 'otherness' can be disempowering as well as empowering:
this 'otherness' allows me to distance myself from contemporary official
Chinese points of view; from some Chinese intellectuals, including those
who unconditionally embrace Western theories and those who equally
unconditionally repudiate them; and from some Western scholars who
make a career out of speaking for the Other. At the same time, my
relationship with each of them also allows me to draw on their perspectives
and points of view, appropriate their analytical frameworks, and exploit
what their theories have to offer.

More importantly, my own experience of reading these media texts in
Australian and Chinese news discourses is a process of ceaseless traversing
of the self/Other borderline. The constant shift of my reading position
between identification and distanciation confirms the arguments I have
made about othering: the self/Other positioning is fluid, contextual and
situation-specific. Analysts' own social-cultural formation is not only prone
to transformation, but also marked with ambivalence and indeterminacy.
Given this, the analyst needs to be able to not only relate his or her own
situation as an Other, refusing simple identification with any predetermined
social-cultural categories, but also to acquire an insider's perspective, thereby
rescuing the subtlety and nuance surrounding local positioning.
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Reading the Other: Narrative Constructions of Japan in the Australian and Chinese Press

Wanning Sun

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD in Media and Cultural Studies to the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Western Sydney, Nepean

August 1996
PLEASE NOTE

The greatest amount of care has been taken while scanning this thesis,

and the best possible result has been obtained.
Acknowledgments

The following thesis began under the supervision of Lesley Johnson. I would like to thank her not only for her support in initially taking on this project, but also for her help in the early stages of theoretical and methodological gestation. I also want to thank her for her advice, which she continued to give me in my research.

Greg Noble undertook the second half of the supervision. Greg spent a lot of time reading many drafts. He was instrumental in helping me sharpen the theoretical focus and in improving the overall structure of the thesis.

I am grateful to Lesley and Greg for their patience, understanding and sensitivity. I am perhaps more conscious than anyone else of how patience-wearing and time-consuming it is to supervise a student who is writing in a language that is not her own.

I am grateful to have received a Nepean Postgraduate Research Award for the last three-and-a-half years to undertake this project. I thank Gareth Jones and Cath Stevenson for their support.

A few people kindly spent time reading my chapters and giving me ideas, comments and suggestions. David S. G. Goodman read the entire thesis and gave me useful feedback. Judith Snodgrass and Neville Peterson read chapters from the thesis and offered useful advice. I am also indebted to Mark Gibson both for his inspiring work and for the encouraging comments he gave me. Thanks also to Justine Lloyd both for her moral support and technical (word-processing) advice.

I also appreciate the help of Glen Lewis. Our collaboration prior to my doctoral research inspired me to further my research, albeit in a somewhat different direction.

Also, my thanks to Norbert Ruebsaat, who read my chapters and spent many hours listening to my ideas and discussing them with me.

Finally, thanks to my parents Sun Reihua and Wu Zhonghua for their love and support. As avid but careful news readers, they not only sent me much useful material from the Chinese press for this project but, more importantly, taught me from an early age the importance of reading between the lines.

Almost all the texts from Chinese press are translated by myself, and I am responsible for any error or inaccuracy in the translation.
Certificate of Authorship of Thesis

Except as specially indicated in quotations and bibliographies, I certify that I am the sole author of the thesis. I also certify that the thesis has not been submitted for another degree.

Signature of author:________________________

Date:________________________

March 13, 1997
Abstract

This study is concerned with the way in which discourses of the Other are deployed in the media's narrative constructions of national imaginary. Operating on the assumption that news provides techniques and devices which enable the nation and its Other to be narrated and imagined, the analysis focuses on the structures and processes by which 'Japan' is constructed in the news stories in some Australian and Chinese printed media. The analysis finds that othering is a dynamic and complex process engaged in by both the 'East' and the 'West', for purposes of both cultural domination and cultural negotiation, and to serve both external and domestic political ends. The study shows that what seems to be an essential distinction between the 'Orient', or the 'East', and the 'Occident', or the 'West', in the discourses of the Other is constantly shifting, fluid and context-specific. The investigation points to the need of forsaking a framework of understanding media and identity which is based on a truth vs propaganda, or information vs entertainment dichotomy, and adopting an approach that takes into account the particularities of the cultural practices of each media system.
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Appendices
Introduction

This study seeks to understand how news narratives contribute to nation-building through the construction of otherness. Operating on the assumption that the nation is a symbolic as well as a geopolitical entity and images of the national self imply images of the national Other, this thesis focuses on the structures and processes by which news narrates the Other. Central to this investigation is the notion that newspapers provide devices and tools which enable the nation to be narrated.

Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) has been a key contribution to scholarly work on national identity and postcolonialism, generating many imitators and new research on the construction of Others in nationalist and Western discourse. Said's work is a consideration of how the West has conceptualised its near East as part of a more general analysis of the way in which the representation of oriental Others has been used by European nations both to articulate the relation to the Others and to fortify a sense of national and Western identity. His central concern is to examine orientalism as a Western style for the colonial domination of the Orient. Said also shows, however, that the 'Orient' or the 'East' as an entity can be a reference point for the 'Occident' or the 'West': that the two are in a mutually defining relation.

Said's argument has sparked off much debate as to the strengths and limitations of his approach. This study has no intention of joining the ongoing debate on *Orientalism*. However, Said's analysis of the representation of the Other is a useful departure point in exploring the diverse modes of othering involved in nation-building in the late twentieth century. Through an exploration of the issue of 'othering', this thesis will demonstrate that what occurs in the process of othering is more complex and dynamic than Said's notion of orientalism -- Western stereotyping of the Orient -- and occidentalism -- oriental stereotyping of the West. It will show that both orientalism and occidentalism are strategies deployed across different cultural, social and historical sites. The meanings of the 'Orient' and the 'Occident' are multivalent, relational and situation-specific.

The study adopts a cross-cultural perspective and takes the form of a comparison between Chinese and Australian media in order to examine the change and continuity of narrative forms and strategies of news representation of Japan. Specifically, this thesis explores the construction in
both the Chinese and Australian press of discourses of 'Japan' and 'Japaneseness' in ways that serve the formation of a particular national imaginary.

A cross-cultural comparison is important because it allows us to explore the common ground and differences between discourses of national identity in the use of the Other. Australia has considered itself a 'Western' nation and its representations of Japan are influenced by what Galtung and Vincent (1992: 13) call the 'occidental cosmology', whose notion of space, time, and knowledge of the world is centred around the West as the speaking position. By contrast, China is an 'oriental' country aspiring to acquire modernity, yet cautious of Western social values. Comparing a Western and an oriental nation's representation of the same object -- Japan -- allows us to examine the othering process from both ends, thus avoiding an ethnocentric approach to the study of cross-cultural representation.

However, a cross-cultural comparison is not merely to show that all cultures engage in and act upon their constructions of the Other, but to reveal the discourse of the Other in its plurality so as to gain a better sense of the localised projects of othering. Australia, although 'Western', is also itself an ex-colony of a European power and with a subsequent history of relative dependence. In terms of contemporary geopolitical realities, its Western position is undergoing challenge. Also, in its relations with Japan, Australia has assumed the role of a junior partner. Conversely, China, although 'oriental', is taking the world by surprise with its aggressive economic development and has generated speculations in the West about China becoming the superpower of the 21st century. It has also taken an assertive role in its relations to Japan and regards Japan as a means through which to acquire Western technology without introducing its cultural values. The problematic status of Australia's 'Western' position and China's 'oriental' position determine that a complex and dynamic array of representational forms and strategies are at work in each culture's construction of their Other. Hence, a cross-cultural perspective allows us to explore the dynamic and mutually constitutive relationship between power and knowledge, since it requires attention to the particularities in each of the relationships. Furthermore, using China and Australia for comparative analysis allows us to see how 'the oriental Others' other, thereby revealing nation-building and its relation to power in a much more complex way than Said allows.
'Japan' is an interesting Other to study for this work, because it seems to challenge the conventional distinctions between the East and the West, the centre and the periphery, the pre-modern and modern. Hence, it presents a multiplicity of perspectives to explore the complex issue of 'othering'. Japan's phenomenal rise as an economic power in the world, and Australia and China's specific and complex power relations to it, ensure a considerable degree of tension and dynamism in each country's representations. China and Australia have chequered historical relationships with Japan, and both now have strong economic relationships with that country. In Australian as well as Chinese representations, there exists a tension between an historical notion of Japan as a periphery country and the contemporary reality of its technological and economic power; and a tension between the official discourse of Japan and an historical memory of it as a legacy of World War II. As contemporary Japan assumes an increasingly important place in the reshaping of Australia's and China's respective national imaginaries, constructions of different, often conflicting, narratives of Japan become useful to various forms of nationalism.

As Anderson (1983) shows, the media has historically played a key role in the formation of the 'imagined community' of the nation. An important assumption of this study is that news is narrative, and that journalists, like other humans, are story-tellers. They acquire a stock of standardised story structures that can be used to organise factual information. Consciously or unconsciously, news writers seek to create narratives which appeal and conform to the narrative expectations of both editors and readers. Since journalists make sense of the world by telling stories, we can better understand journalism and the world it constructs by examining our methods of narrative construction.

The focus on news as narrative provides the basis for an investigation of the relationship between journalists and the stories they produce -- how and why news stories appear to write themselves. Journalists avail themselves of narrative techniques, devices and conventions to construct various levels of meanings. Narrative analysis entails examining the social, economic and political constraints under which journalists work. More importantly, it entails examining the literary and narrative structures of news-writing that themselves act as constraints on what journalists produce. On a daily basis,
journalists construct their stories by asking questions concerning Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How, containing them in hard news, features, or editorials, but they may be too busy to reflect upon the implication of these practices. 'What is revealing in a social world created by narrative is the inherent link among its elements. The who, what, where, why, how and when provide acts and events within a narrative frame' (Galtung and Vincent, 1992: 47). The task of media criticism, therefore, is to ask journalists the questions they ask the world in order to uncover their frameworks of interpreting the world we live in, and furthermore, to examine how these questions are an important part of story-telling devices which enable news to construct a particular kind of national imaginary.

An important aim of the thesis is to argue that the objectivity vs propaganda dichotomy in the Western framework is at best unproductive and at worst counterproductive in uncovering the relationship between the media and broader cultural practices. The notion of objective reporting, although it has been on the receiving end of some critical scrutiny and demystification, warrants more vigorous interrogation, particularly regarding news concerned with the construction of the Other. Furthermore, the notion of propaganda should become the object of research rather than evaluative standards, particularly in the context of studying non-Western news.

If national identity is defined in relation to national Others, a natural place to start the investigation of othering is the theories of orientalism. Chapter 1 is a critical discussion of orientalism and its counter-discourses. It shows that the nation is constituted centrally by othering -- processes which are far more complex and dynamic than suggested by Said (1978). The self/Other relation in national imaginaries is fluid and context-specific. Both orientalism and occidentalism are deployed across different cultural sites and historical moments and the contents of the notions of 'Orient' and the 'Occident' have no permanent meaning.

Chapter 2 looks at specific narratives in Australian and Chinese nation-building. It draws on literature on nationalism as well as narratives which come from various forms of popular culture, including literary and filmic representations. The juxtaposition of Australian and Chinese narrative constructions of the national self and Other suggests that in reinventing national identities, images and symbols of the self and the Other are
constantly subject to re-interpretation. However, the juxtaposition also points to the self-consciousness with which the nation is imagined in Australia, which has a small population and a short history of settlement, and the lack of such self-consciousness in the Chinese context.

However, the imagining of the nation and its Other cannot be understood unless we also consider the relationship between the media and collective identity, since nation should be studied as narration, and the news media -- more than any other form of communication -- help make the nation and its Other narratable. Chapter 3 discusses concepts and frameworks and outlines the main form of analysis which will be taken in the reading of the news construction of Japan in the Australian and Chinese press. It argues that news, be it fact or propaganda, information or entertainment, often uses the conventions of narrative and deploys story-telling strategies and conventions. Hence the discussion suggests that narrative analysis is a corrective to an orientalist paradigm of news research in comparative studies.

Apart from the conventions of story-telling, news is also produced under social, economic and organisational constraints. Chapter 4 provides a juxtaposition of the Chinese and Australian social contexts in which the news of Japan is produced and understood. Through an analysis of media ownership, press structure and press relationships to business, government and nation-state, the chapter reveals a process of diversification, fragmentation and pluralisation in the Chinese context, and a very different, if not opposite, process in Australia. Such a difference points to the problematic aspect of the model of control and submission which is usually applied to studies of Chinese media, and suggests the need to study the relationship between the Party press and unofficial, popular media forms.

Having provided the theoretical, methodological, historical and social contexts, the rest of the thesis proceeds to engage in the actual analysis of news representations. In the case of Australian news, representations of Japan can be analysed in two different contexts. Chapter 5 discusses the first context: it looks at the ways in which news negotiates the dynamics of power relations between Australia and Japan, drawing most of its texts from the Australian's coverage of Japan in various areas, such as business, tourism, and foreign affairs. The analysis of these texts points to the ambivalence,
ambiguity and indeterminacy that characterise Japan's position in the Australian national imaginary. It also reveals a process by which Australian journalists engage in the self-exoticisation as well as the exoticisation of Japan. Chapter 6 deals with the second context: it focuses on how Japan functions as an enabling factor for internal political issues to be made narratable, drawing mostly from the Australian's coverage of domestic events and issues. This chapter uncovers the strategy of setting up a false dichotomy between 'Australia' and 'Japan' in order to cover up processes of domestic social and political conflicts, whereby the othering is more internal than external.

There is also a methodological difference. Chapter 5 is concerned with news as individual stories, with a focus on identifying different types of Japan stories and various rhetorical devices which journalists employ in these stories in order to convey their relationship to their stories. Chapter 6, however, is more concerned with news as story-telling, with an emphasis on the performative processes by which stories break, develop and end, thereby revealing strategies of selection, ordering and organisation.

In looking at the Chinese media, it is important to make a distinction between foreign news and foreign affairs news. While all the news outlets may be interested in reporting foreign news, it is the responsibility of the official media to collaborate with the government's foreign policies. Although the People's Daily does from time to time run stories of Japan, its image of Japan is largely refracted through the paper's representations of Sino-Japanese relations. By way of analysing the news reports about the Sino-Japanese relations in the Chinese People's Daily throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, Chapter 7 examines the change and continuity of the role of the Party and the state in controlling ideas and language in nation-building. It shows that the paper uses two main narrative strategies -- the special friend and the historical foe - to negotiate the tensions in Sino-Japanese relations. These strategies are deployed in a process by which a particular memory of 'Japan' is mobilised to serve the current political purposes of the nation-state.

Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to remain the guardian of Chinese national identity, its role has come under threat with the increasing pluralisation and commercialisation of the Chinese press.
Chapter 8 continues to examine Chinese press constructions of Japan, but focuses on the non-Party press. The chapter looks at three distinct media outlets: the restricted papers, the management journals, and the popular papers, each of them demonstrating a unique relationship to the Party press. The reading of the non-Party press finds that the meaning of 'Japan' is multivalent and determined by the political and ideological positioning of utterances. These locally marginal discourses may challenge the self/Other positioning in the Party discourse. However, such a reading also suggests that the relationship between the non-Party press and the Party press is more complex than either a scenario of opposition, or that of effective control of the former by the latter.

Chapters 7 and 8 also contain observations on the similarities and differences in the ways in which news in the Australian and Chinese press is produced, as well as the ways in which the knowledge of Japan is constructed.

My interest in this inquiry derives directly from my own cross-cultural position. A Chinese national, I grew up in an academic family environment in China, majored in English literature for my first degree, and subsequently worked as a reporter in the only English language national daily in China (China Daily). I then taught Western journalism in China. Experience of these two physical and intellectual environments leads me to believe that I am more between two places than from one of them. While I looked to the West with eagerness and curiosity when I was living in China, after living for the past 7 years’ in a Western society, I have grown more tolerant of what I used to think of as the undesirable aspects of Chinese culture. I see this change in myself as a possible result of the daily, sometimes unconscious, exercise of 'looking at things from somebody else's perspective' in which I constantly find myself engaged.

This information about myself will hopefully explain why I choose to juxtapose China and Australia in order to study the news construction of identity, difference and otherness. Apart from the practical factor of having convenient access to empirical data and the people who produce it, there is also an epistemological advantage. The meanings of media texts (or of any text) are most productively studied by those who can think with concepts which are close to those operating in the studied text (Christians and Carey,
1981). Being more in touch with the Chinese and Australian cultural
nuances than with those of any other cultures, I consider the study of the
print media of these two societies as the best focus for my comparative study.

I also believe the starting point of any cross-cultural inquiry requires the
researcher to problematise his or her epistemological position. Recognising
the inevitable partiality of comparative criticism does not necessarily
invalidate the findings of cross-cultural research. What is important is to
declare the researcher’s own subjectivity, and to acknowledge at every
possible point the complex relationships between the researcher and the
society studied.

My investigation into Australian and Chinese media representations of
Japan has a modest objective: I attempt no more than to ‘construct a
particular reading of the text’. The text is a sequence of symbols that contain
interpretations. Our task, like that of a literary critic, is to interpret the
interpretations’ (Carey, 1989: 60). In other words, as both an ordinary reader
and an informed critical reader, I have made it my task to study the
narrative forms and strategies employed by the media of two different
cultures to each construct their national imaginary through telling their
own stories about their common object of narration: Japan.

This study has no claim to comprehensiveness. It makes no attempt to
describe the actual readership beyond relating the specific issues and topics in
the paper. Nor does it aim to assess the full effect of Australian and Chinese
papers on their readers. Furthermore, it makes no attempt to undertake a
comprehensive investigation of the historical development of the
Australian and Chinese representations of Japan. What it does attempt to do
is to contextualise the specific moments when issues of difference, identity
and otherness occur, to identify the ways in which these issues are
negotiated, and consider the processes by which the papers provide a
discursive space to enable such negotiations to take place. I am interested in
the notion of readership in two ways: first, in the sense of journalists' perceptions of what readers need and want; secondly, in the sense of how readers’ positions are being produced in the media texts. Given this, the inquiry is not concerned with the materiality of the reader. The evidence I use here is for analysis of the media, not of the reader.
The period in which the analysis is set is the 1980s and early 1990s, a time of dramatic social change for both Australia and China. These were the years when Australia began to embrace multiculturalist policy and move 'towards Asia'. For Australia, especially Australian business, it became increasingly clear in the 1980s and early 1990s that Australia's economic destiny was closely tied to that of the Asian region. In China, the post-1978 economic reforms and 'open door' policy, which aimed to integrate China's economy with that of the world, have gathered momentum in these years and rapidly changed Chinese perceptions of the outside world. Setting the analysis in an era of change allows us to examine the negotiation of the conflict between historical and cultural beliefs on the one hand and contemporary economic and political realities on the other.

This also explains why this study, although situated in the 1980s and early 1990s, does not aim to provide a complete overview of Chinese and Australian media representations of Japan in these decades. It seeks to locate some specific sites and moments whereby the conflicts between historical attitudes and contemporary realities were being negotiated. The 'Japan' in this investigation refers to an array of constructs, a body of knowledge, not the reality of Japan 'out there'. However, it is also useful to acknowledge at the outset that in the process of discussing this body of knowledge called 'Japan', this thesis has inevitably and paradoxically succumbed, on many occasions, to the linguistic conventions of speaking of nations such as Japan, Australia and China as if they were a monolithic entity.

Since 'Japan' in this study refers to an array of constructs, the approach taken here is a close reading of a limited number of texts. It is hoped that the readings will themselves explain why a more extensive, 'verifiable' survey has not been undertaken. Such a survey would assume the importance of 'balance' that comes from a randomly chosen series of texts; it would also assume the validity of more quantifiable data. Yet it is precisely this assumption that I wish to problematise. An implication of the approach of close textual reading is that the possibility of an 'objective' overview becomes highly questionable, because it often fails to interpret data in its specific context of production and consumption.

The texts analysed in this study come mainly from print journalism. The practical reason for this decision is relative availability of news texts, as
compared to that of TV and film texts. However, that is not the only reason. Since the dramatic growth in Chinese media in the 1980s and early 1990s has been mainly in the print area, it is logical to make them the main sources of textual evidence. There is also a methodological consideration: one of the purposes of this work is to demonstrate that newspapers, though flimsy and textually 'thin', are, as Mercer (1992) argues, rich in cultural history.

I have had to limit the material analysed to a manageable selection of stories. The Australian and the People's Daily are the principal sources of textual evidence. This is largely because of their claims to represent the nation and their claims to be serious papers, although in each case, while they are papers with responsibilities to their respective nations, their capacity and willingness to serve the national interest is questionable. In the case of the Australian, the paper is owned by Rupert Murdoch, the media tycoon who dominates much of the Australian media and who is now an American citizen. In the case of the People's Daily, the paper claims to serve the people but functions as the mouthpiece of the political regime of the People's Republic of China.

Writing on the present and the future of the study of international communication, Mowlana (1994) observes that international communication has in the past viewed power politics, nation-states and political economy as central to the dynamics of the global system but has overlooked culture as an important social conception. What the field of international communication needs in the 21st century, Mowlana argues, is a 'truly comparative global approach' which seeks to 'extend beyond the bounds of culture and language' (Mowlana, 1994: 28). This work takes Mowlana's dictum seriously and seeks to study power politics, nation and culture as mutually constitutive. By seeking to understand how news narratives construct national self and Other and, by implication, their relationship, it aims to find out how cultural negotiation, rather than simply cultural domination, operates. It is hoped that the study of the conditions of the existence of various discourses of the Other and the practical contexts in which these discourses are deployed will be a small but concrete step towards a 'truly comparative global approach'.