WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE
PROBLEMATIC ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA IN
THE INVASION OF IRAQ 2003

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Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

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AMIR AL_QARALLEH

2012
DEDICATION

To my late father who taught me how to face difficulties. To my late mother who always supported my dreams to finish my education. To my late brother “ABU FERAS”; I wish that he was still alive to join me in my joy of accomplishing my PHD degree. I miss you all.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

This thesis examines the way in which the mass media, including major newspapers, and television channels, dealt with the issues of weapons of mass destruction and the issue of legality surrounding the US led attack on Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, in the periods immediately before, during, and after the 2003 invasion.

The thesis focuses on the issue of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and how it was portrayed by the mass media as a justifiable reason for the invasion. It concentrates on three phases of the event: the first surrounding efforts by the ‘coalition of the willing’ to obtain a UN resolution for the invasion of Iraq; the second concerning mass media management and the issue of no weapons being found during the invasion; and third the role of the mass media in shaping public opinion during the invasion and thereafter.

The key issue examined here is whether the mass media served, essentially, to promote the agenda of executive government in the U.S and U.K or whether it had an agenda of its own. Hence, with this in mind the study investigates the role of the mass media with reference to weapons of mass destruction.

Administrations in both the U.S and the U. K, along with mainstream mass media in these states presented the Iraq invasion as a legal act. The U.S administration asserted that the invasion was legal relying on the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence, by arguing that Iraq’s WMD’s were an imminent threat to the U.S and its interests in the Middle East region. The British government asserted that U.N resolution 1441 indicated that if Iraq failed to cooperate and comply with U.N WMD’s team, then it would face an international consensus calling for serious consequences. The Blair administration argued that Iraq breached international law and thus demonstrated that an Iraq invasion was justified relying on security claims. The Blair administration argued that Iraq’s WMD’s were capable of targeting
the U.K, and therefore, according to Blair, it was legitimate to act before the Iraqi regime conducted any attacks against England. Evidence in this thesis indicates that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by both the US and the U.K governments was neither legal nor moral.

The mainstream mass media in both countries functioned to present the arguments to invade Iraq to the public relying on Iraq’s WMD’s imminent threat. The thesis shows that mainstream mass media in both countries asserted Iraq’s possession of WMD’s and presented the case to the public in order to shape opinion that would unquestionably support an Iraq invasion and regime change. In chapter 6, the thesis shows how mainstream mass media uncritically followed the administrations pronouncements without questioning the validity and the accuracy of such claims.

In this thesis I argue that the mass media and the governments of the US and UK played a definitive role in legitimising and justifying the war for both the American and the British people. This role was achieved through the extensive usage of rhetoric and closely managed discourse which helped influence public opinion in these countries that the invasion of Iraq was justified. This thesis examines the crucial role played by the mass media in driving its own agenda, as well as acting as a vehicle for government propaganda in their countries, and in other developed countries.

I conclude by arguing for the importance of mass media neutrality as an integral element of a healthy democracy. The thesis shows how consideration of mass media’s treatment of WMD in the Iraq invasion can help to suggest some possible reforms which could contribute to greater media responsibility in times of war.

1.2 AIMS

The thesis examines whether the mass media provided a neutral coverage of relevant facts and competing interpretations, or merely expounded and endorsed the position of the US leadership with a view to shaping public opinion in support of the latter, and whether the unbalanced presentation
significantly influenced public opinion in the US, in such a way as to support and facilitate the invasion.

It explores whether during the invasion, the mass media took a calculatedly passive role, with news coverage mediated through the embedding of journalists. It also examines whether at a later stage, the mass media came out to increasingly shape public opinion in order to withdraw from Iraq and to expose the violations that had been committed against humanity. This shift in the role of the mass media is analysed to determine whether there was bias on the part of the mass media.

The thesis utilises Noam Chomsky’s ‘propaganda model’ of the mass media to analyse and explain the role of the mass media during this period. According to the propaganda model the US administration regulate the mass media in order to shape basic principles and ideologies.

A crucial element of ‘propaganda model’ is a distinction between ‘worthy victims’ and ‘unworthy victims’ of other state authority’s aggression. People mistreated in enemy states are constantly presented by mainstream mass media as ‘worthy victims’ whose suffering calls for immediate intervention. Whereas the victims of potentially greater abuse by other state authorities are considered by mainstream mass media as to be ‘unworthy victims’.

Iraq had become an ‘unworthy victim’ for the US administration because of high public awareness of hazardous situations in Iraq. Two elements are relevant to this shift in US views: (1) following the invasion Iraqi people considered the US the major enemy and (2) the deaths of US soldiers. This led to the reduction in news coverage when dealing with Iraq. The thesis argues that as widespread internet access increasingly shaped public perception of the invasion, the American public became increasingly aware of the tragic situation in Iraq, thereby forcing mainstream mass media to adapt to this situation.

In this context, the examination compares and contrasts Chomsky’s model of events with the influential alternative view of Piers Robinson. In Robinson’s model, the mass media has no influence in shaping either public or
government attitudes toward issues if there are high levels of policy certainty among the US executive. Where the U.S leadership is agreed on the importance of a particular policy, they have no particular interest in media support and they will go ahead with the policy with or without such support.

However, while Chomsky sees a lack of policy certainty on behalf of executive authority generally reflected in corresponding uncertainty in the media, Robinson argues that such executive uncertainty opens up a space for possible media influence of government policy.

For example, the acclaimed CNN effect (whereby sympathetic media coverage of human rights violations in a country would lead to a response supportive of human rights by the US government).

In Chomsky’s model, by contrast, the mass media functions to drive the government’s propaganda and to support governmental decisions by shaping public opinion to gain a mainstream consensus. A successful change in public opinion can then facilitate and allow for concerted action by the political leadership.

The thesis tests whether the available evidence of events surrounding the 2003 invasion supports Chomsky’s "propaganda model", rather than Robinson’s point of view.

Generally speaking available evidence does provide strong support for Chomsky’s position. It is true that under certain circumstances the media, under pressure of public opinion, can become critical of government policy, and call for changes, But, in contrast to Robinson’s claim that executive uncertainty can empower the media to force such changes, it appears that where the US leadership is not convinced of the importance of such intervention, then it will not take such action despite mass media demands.

The thesis examines the US and UK administration discourse that had been extensively used in order to morally and politically justifies the invasion of 2003. The study examines the crucial role the mass media played in mediating the gap between US and UK governments and public opinion in both countries by explaining the language used by both Bush and Blair to legitimise
the invasion. The thesis also investigates how that discourse has changed after the invasion along with the role of the mass media in reshaping public opinion.

The evidence does not support Robinson here. It appears that where the US leadership is not convinced of the importance of such intervention, then it will not take such action despite mass media demands.

1.3 RESOURCES

The thesis relies on primary and secondary sources. With respect to the former, the thesis uses a range of resources e.g. Newspapers; and Television Broadcasting; Public Opinion Polls; United Nations Resolutions concerns Iraq; The British Assessment of Iraq WMDs Programme; US Department of State Conferences: White House Releases, Conferences and Briefings; Congressional Research Service Reports; US Senate Reports; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) Reports; the Project for the New American century (PNAC) letters to Bush Administration regarding Iraq; the speeches and statements of President Bush and Mr. Tony Blair; Amnesty International Reports; Human rights Watch Reports; UN Weapons Inspection Reports; Iraqi Speeches and Statements; Parliament Debates (Hansard); Anti-War & Anti-Americanism Movements Debates.

Secondary sources examined include the relevant literature on the role of the mass media and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

1.4 METHODOLOGY

The thesis explores the Iraq invasion through presenting the motivations that shaped the U.S foreign policy to intervene in the Middle East region. It argues that the U.S administration was, and is motivated by different strategic goals that indicate the necessity to engage in Middle East security and stability. Chapter 2 of the thesis demonstrates that U.S imperialism is shaped to control the world through exercising its power internationally. To achieve this end, it appears that the U.S administration functions to expel any rival power that would obtain control and grip over the Gulf region. The flow of oil is a key strategy for the U.S foreign policy. This explains why the U.S administration
highlighted the Iraq threat which would if not contained harm the U.S government supremacy and crucial grand strategies in the region.

Chapter 3 presents the legal grounds that both administrations in the U.S and the U.K relied on to invade Iraq to accomplish the desired goal of maintaining full control of the region’s oil riches. However, the discussion shows that the Iraq invasion was illegal and thus illegitimate.

The thesis employs a range of different techniques of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) - (applied to primary source in the form of newspapers, magazines and recordings of radio and television broadcasts) to explore the form, content, aims and intentions of mass media presentation and to:

[1] Draw upon a range of alternative sources in order to assess the role of the mass media discourse in illuminating or obscuring relevant facts. These will include UN resolutions, academic analysis, eye witness accounts, etc.

[2] Explore the rhetorical use of language in mass media presentations to actively shape public opinion in pursuit of particular political goals.

[3] Consider the role of mass media discourse in contributing to the legitimation of a particular-neoliberal-social order.

[4] Explore the way in which different groups seek to regulate and direct social developments through use of the mass media, and the active role of the mass media in the construction of social events and processes.

The analysis here applies and builds upon Chomsky’s ideas of mass media coverage of events, shaped by concepts of worthy and unworthy (i.e. out of favour) victims of any state. It also considers the concept of democracy in third world countries depending on the US administration’s interest in the social groups or political developments in the particular nation in question.

Chomsky’s general framework settings are: selection of a topic; how the distribution of information is formulated within the news reports; what factors led to verbal & visual emphasis on a certain topic; the context in which the issues once created are framed; how information is selectively disseminated; and finally, how a specific context is applied as the conclusion of any issue.
The thesis considers the ways in which Chomsky’s analysis is supported and developed by Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) and use of language; Van Dijk’s ideology analysis, and Lakoff’s study of the use of metaphor and fallacies in social discourse, as tools to shape and control public perceptions and judgments. The thesis examines opinion poll data collected by Gallop, Mori, and others to explore the effectiveness of these mass media presentations in shaping public opinion in respect of the war.

Examination of the subject matter in this thesis is by way of historical analysis; comparative study; analytical approaches; and critical discourse analysis.

1.5 JUSTIFICATION

There have been a number of studies of the mainstream US and UK mass media’s treatment of events leading up to and during the third Gulf War. But these focus mainly on coverage of specific issues and time periods, without a clear structural analysis of the changing forces shaping the mass media’s role, and the mass media’s role in changing public perceptions, before, during and after the invasion.

Likewise, there is very little literature researching the role of Arabic mass media during the invasion of Iraq 2003. Nor has there been systematic analysis of the mass media’s failure to consider the Chinese and Russian attitudes and abstention towards the use of force against Iraq, or explanation of the mass media’s turnaround from unconditional support of the invasion to an increasingly critical perspective. All of these issues are considered in the thesis.

The underlying claim to be tested in the thesis is whether the mass media in the US and the UK crucially failed in their role of providing factual information, and a forum for balanced presentation of competing ideas and analyses to sustain informed participation by the general public in these countries. In this context, it is important to understand how and why this might be the case – whether the mass media was in a position to drive government propaganda and agenda- and whether it was able to effectively shape public opinion in support of the war in the US, while public opinion remained strongly opposed elsewhere.
1.6 OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this thesis are: Firstly, examining the theory of ‘manufacturing consent’; Secondly, examining the ‘uncertainty’ theory offered and supported by Piers Robinson claiming and arguing that media has no influence when policy makers are certain of an issue and that the media effect is a ‘myth’; Thirdly, examining whether the mass media when reporting the acclaimed imminent threat by Iraq was biased in presenting the facts; and Fourthly, examining the need for neutrality since the public relies on the mass media to separate facts and that the mass media should not drive its own or government agendas.

Thus, in order to achieve the objectives, the thesis examines the role of the mass media over four periods: First, the relationship between Saddam Hussein and US after 1979. It examines the motivations to support Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran and then examine the changes in US foreign policy that occurred after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, and how the mass media highlighted the issue of Iraq WMDs; Secondly, it examines the important role the mass media played in connecting Iraq with al Qaeda after the attack of 2001 and how the mass media supported the Bush administration in War against Terror to create rationale to invade; Thirdly, it examines the mass media management during the invasion; and Fourthly it examines how the mass media shaped public opinion after the invasion and the demands to withdraw from Iraq and how the mass media exposed the human rights violations of Abu-Graib prison.

1.7 THESIS STRUCTURE

This thesis is divided into the following chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction to the thesis.

The chapter introduces the subject of examination in this thesis, and the structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2: US – Iraq relations ‘Historical background’ and the strategic motivations of the US in the Gulf region.
The Chapter addresses the US strategic interests and motivations in that region. This Chapter examines the historical background of the US – Middle East relations since the first discovery of oil in the region. Accordingly, the Chapter investigates the special relations between the US and key Middle Eastern states, notably, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. More importantly, it examines the long term US support to Israel state. Finally, the Chapter investigates why Iraq fell out of favour for the US administration foreign policy.


The chapter seeks to reveal whether the US-led attack upon Iraq in 2003 was legitimate under the charter of the UN. The chapter explores in depth the US legal claims to justify the invasion of Iraq. Examination of the background of the war is essential to determine whether or not the United Nations Security Council did implicitly authorise the Iraq invasion. It also examines the just war framework in order to evaluate whether the US invasion of Iraq was justified under the terms of just war theory.

The chapter investigates the US rationales to legally justify the invasion. This include reference to alleged: Weapons of Mass Destruction; fighting international terrorism (links between Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein); and the need to overthrow the evil regime in Iraq (humanitarian intervention).

Chapter 4: Chomsky’s manufacturing consent and US foreign policy in contrast with Robinson’s ‘uncertainty’ theory.

The chapter examines Noam Chomsky’s theory of ‘manufacturing consent’, and compares it with Piers Robinson’s ‘uncertainty’ theory. This analysis provides the basis for determining whether the mass media in the US is directed by the administration and elite groups, other than the media controllers themselves or whether such media controllers have their own agendas and are themselves able to drive the US administration policies, in times of policy uncertainty.

The thesis argues against Piers Robinson’s view that the US administration does not rely on mass media to gain public support before or after US humanitarian intervention in any state. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that the US
executive does indeed rely upon mainstream mass media to generate public support for its agenda.

**Chapter 5: Critical Discourse Analysis, henceforth (CDA).**

The chapter introduces and examines the theories of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), notably Noam Chomsky’s ideas of ‘mass media coverage of events’; George Lakoff’s ‘metaphor analysis’; Tuan A. van Dijk and his ‘Ideology analysis’; Norman Fairclough’s ‘advance discourse analysis’; and finally it examines the contributions of some other Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) scholars to explore ways in which particular sorts of linguistic operations and constructions can function to shape public perceptions, values, moods, and judgments.

**Chapter 6: Mass Media and the invasion of Iraq ‘manipulating, framing, and misleading discourses’.

The chapter analyses the discourse efforts in both the U.S and the U.K to legitimise the Iraq invasion in 2003. It also tracks media management during the invasion and media discourse after the mission was accomplished. I demonstrate that media discourse in the last phase shifted from being supportive of the two administrations’ positions to critically exposing major human rights violations. Analyzing the discourse during the three phases (before, during and thereafter the invasion) involves consideration of the language adopted by the two administrations, and the mainstream mass media. The speeches and statements by both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair along with comments from their advisors and colleagues are considered. This includes their efforts to present the Iraq invasion as being urgently needed to protect the international community and the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein's evil actions.

The chapter analyzes mainstream media outlets discourse in the U.S and the U.K, along with selected examples of material from government sources covering the three phases analyzed in this chapter.

This chapter examines the role of the Arabic mass media during the Iraq invasion of 2003. It evaluates whether or not the Iraqi media efforts were successful in informing the Arab world and the international community of Iraq’s willingness to cooperate with the U.N weapons inspections and to diplomatically resolve the tension with the U.S administration. It also evaluates Iraqi media bias during the military operations; it traces the misleading information of the Iraqi minister of information Mohammed Said al Sahaf in informing both the Iraqi public and the Arab world of fake victories against the U.S troops and allies. This chapter also sheds some light on the Arab media contribution before, and during the Iraqi invasion. It examines whether or not Arab media opposed the invasion of Iraq.

Chapter 8: Concluding thoughts and recommendations.

The chapter presents the key findings of the thesis. It also evaluates the issue of mass media neutrality, by reference to the discussion in the chapters above. It argues that the mass media should remain neutral since the public relies on mass media to uncover facts and events. Also, the chapter examines the overall role of the mass media in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, depending on WMDs as a fabrication to justify the interests of US & UK governments in the Gulf region. The chapter introduces proposal for reforming the mass media.
CHAPTER TWO


2.1 INTRODUCTION

In order to obtain a clear view of the US involvement in the crises and conflicts of the Middle Eastern region, this Chapter addresses the US strategic interests and motivations in that region. This Chapter examines the historical background of the US – Middle East relations since the first discovery of oil in the region. Accordingly, the Chapter investigates the special relations between the US and key Middle Eastern states, notably, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. More importantly, it examines the long term US support to the Israel state. Finally, the Chapter investigates why Iraq fell out of favour for the US administration foreign policy.

Almost sixty years ago Ernest Eller (1956) realised the pivotal importance of the Middle East region’s oil resources. For him the Middle East is ‘an area of decision for the United states in the critical years ahead’. Eller (1956) further argues that few Americans noticed this, when he writes:

‘…They neither know how much nor care about the lands east of the Mediterranean. This lack of interest and understanding has spawned grave errors in our foreign policy that promise sorrows and dangers for the future. This is tragic, for the destiny of civilization has been decided there often in the past; and it may be again in our life time. Many reasons will bring this about, but large among them looms oil.’

Eller (1956) points out that humanity lives in an era of oil, where oil means power for peace or war, and it appears that the Communists were eager to rule the World. Eller (1956) suggested more attention by US foreign strategy towards the Middle East region, arguing that ‘without oil we could not fight a war with any
hope of winning- if we could fight at all. Oil is a key to our survival. And the Middle East means oil for there lie most of the world’s resources.’ On another occasion Eller (1956) emphasises the significance of the Middle East oil in helping shape the US destiny in the second half of the 20th century. He concludes that ‘at the moment we in the West have uneasy control of it, without realizing its almost priceless value. Most of us accept this great blessing with a casual carelessness that is frightening.’

Examining Eller’s article in depth, lead to the conclusion that the US scholars and scientists in the 1950s had a comprehensive knowledge of the importance of Middle East region’s oil. To a certain degree they aimed at guiding the US administration towards paying more attention to the Middle East region for two reasons: firstly, to eliminate the Soviet potency in the Gulf and, secondly to take advantage of the region oil riches. As noted from Eller, the US government was highly recommended to involve itself in the Middle East in order to ‘hold together the far-flung fragments of the free World and thereby keep uneasy peace’ (ibid: 14). To do that, Eller believed that the US needed to control the Gulf region oil resources.

Michael B Oren (2007), in his extensive study of the US foreign policy in the Middle East region, states that the US is expansively, deeply and existentially engaged in the Middle East, in its constant quest for a steady source of fuel. Furthermore, Oren (2007) argues that ‘the Middle East impacts the security of the United States and the well-being of all of its citizens.’ Meanwhile, The US remains the World’s largest importer and consumer of petroleum sources with almost 60 percent of its oil imported to satisfy the domestic demands which increased to 70 percent by the year 2010 (Victor D & Victor N, 2003). Consequently, diversification and constancy in the global oil market is a continuous concern for the US government (ibid). This background explains the US motivations to involve itself in the Gulf region conflicts to secure the oil supplies.

The US has been deeply engaged in the Middle East region for many years, particularly since the signing of an oil discovery deal with Saudi Arabia in 1933 (Khalidi, 2005). The US has been the most important, and in general, the dominant power in the Middle East since 1942 when the US forces landed in Iran.
and North Africa (ibid). According to Khalidi (2005) the US increased its power in the Middle East region starting from the mid-nineteenth century as a consequence of its educational, medical and charity endeavours. Therefore, the US was considered as a non-colonial, and even an anti-colonial power. Though, as Khalidi (2005) stresses the US administration became extensively involved in the region’s internal affairs and conflicts.

In 1981 a US Lieutenant Colonel Benedict F. FitzGerald (1981) writes:

‘The Middle East is now the focus for a major portion of US strategic thinking. American concerns for assuring the continued flow of oil to the industrial West and Japan, resolving the Arab–Israel problems, preserving the national independence of area states, and maintaining regional stability indicates the importance and the complexity of US involvement in the region’.

FitzGerald (1981) indicated that the traditional strategic interests for the US in the Middle East have remained somewhat stable. According to FitzGerald (1981) ‘foremost among these interests has been the containment of Soviet influence’, and therefore, avoiding a direct confrontation with the Soviet. A third main US interest in the Middle East is to maintain steady access to oil. FitzGerald (1981) argues that ‘for years the US has held that oil must be available at reasonable prices and relatively free of restrictions, not just for the US but for all nations.’ Another interest of the US has been the assurance of Israel State survival. FitzGerald (1981) indicates that American commitment to Israel survival has been a vital theme of US foreign policy since the birth of the Israel state in 1948. According to FitzGerald (1981) ‘there seems little doubt that the security and well-being of Israel will continue to be primary objectives of US Middle East policy.’

Similarly, Professor H.W. Brands (1994) writes:

‘Americans, despite their pre-1945 lack of interest in the Middle East, soon came to recognize the region’s importance. World War II brought a revolution in American foreign policy, with Pearl Harbor and its aftermath thoroughly discrediting the isolationists who had kept the United States on the sidelines of world affairs during the 1930s. By 1945, most Americans, and nearly all American policy makers, believed that the United States must take an active part in keeping the peace in areas previously beyond the pale of official American concern. The Middle East, where peace chronically needed keeping, was one of those areas.’
Brands (1994) indicates that the concerns of the US foreign policy in the Middle East, were driven by three factors which drew American attention to the region: oil, the Soviet Union, and Israel. During the decades after 1945, oil supplies worried the US policy makers. The US and its allies need for petroleum exceeded Western petroleum production. At the same time, the Middle East was the global prime source of exportable oil; as a result the Middle East was crucial to the security and affluence of the US and Western allies. The Americans worried about the Soviet Union more than they worried about any other opponent. Above all these factors the US foreign policy in the Middle East was shaped to support the state of Israel and its safety. In the same context, modern US policy towards the Middle East has been characterised by three main objectives. These objectives include: securing Middle East endless support for the US and allies during The Cold War, ensuring the unrestricted stream of petroleum at market prices, maintaining the flexibility of Arab states allied with the US, and upholding the security of Israel state (Covarrubias & Lansford, 2007).

However, some scholars argue that oil and threat from other states upon US strategic motivations in the Middle East region, is not crucial in deciding the US involvement in the region. Rather they argue that religion will be the foremost factor in establishing conflicts between nations. In his acclaimed controversial article The end of history, Francis Fukuyama (1989) suggests religious and nationalist ideologies as a substitute to communist ideology. For Fukuyama (1989) the ‘rise of religious fundamentalism in recent years within the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim tradition has been widely noted.’ Fukuyama (1989) was mistaken when he argued that after the struggle and conflict between the nations ‘the state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognize and protects through a system of law man’s universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed’. The proclaimed state is the United States of America which emerged as liberal after the end of the Cold War, and the end of the Soviet Union. In his analysis of the next threat that might face this state, Fukuyama indicates that religion and nationalism will be the imminent threat to ‘liberal’ societies. In his study Fukuyama (1989) failed to define the national interests for these ‘liberal’ societies, notably, the US. Hatred exists among either religious or nationalist
groups against the US which has been motivated by the unpopular policies of the US in the Third World’s internal affairs. For one who explores the US foreign policy it would appear that the US creates its own enemies and not vice-versa. The Afghanistan invasion in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, would indicate that the US was driven by imperial, strategic and economic motivations rather than by a struggle between religions. As such, this thesis deeply investigates the real motivations that led the US to involve in military engagement in the Middle East and to establish international campaign against Iraq.

2. 2 U.S IMPERIALISM

Alex Callinicos (2002) argues that one of the characteristic features of the Marxist theory of imperialism is that it deals with military conflicts and diplomatic efforts between nations as ‘instances of the more general process of competition that drives capitalism on’. For Callinicos (2002) the theory of imperialism in the 19th century increasingly highlighted the fusion of two hitherto relatively independent processes, the first, geopolitical competition among nations and the second, economic rivalries between capitals. On the one hand, the rising industrialisation of war meant that the ‘Great Powers’ without developing their economy in a capitalist economy could no longer preserve their position (ibid). On the other hand, as Callinicos (2002) emphasises ‘the growing concentration and internationalism of capital caused economic rivalries among firms to spill over national borders and become geopolitical contests in which the combatants called on the support of their respective states.’

According to Mann (2011) many factors have helped certain nations and capitalist corporations to increase in strength over the last 200 years. These include the growth of a number of centralised bureaucratic state organizations, with huge military capacities and highly developed infrastructure; and a number of massive corporate structures that seek markets, raw material and cheap labour internationally.

In so far as the main goal of capitalist investment and production is to generate profit; this involves the production and sale of goods of greater value than production cost. Accordingly, the working class and replacement demand for technology and raw material cannot provide sufficient demand for the profitable
sale of total output. Besides, there are limits to the luxury consumption of the wealthy elite. These limits, combined with state authority assistance for big business to keep wages low to increase profitability, would generate and increase the threat of under-consumption, unless such surplus could be absorbed in ongoing expansion of the scope and scale of productive investment (David Harvey, 2010 quoted in ibid:96).

This explains the concentration of capitalist wealth and power in fewer hands; as the system crucially relies on accumulation and reinvestment to expand the scale of production to absorb the increasing surplus produced by accumulation and maintain high profits (ibid).

But such accumulation can only be sustained by an increasing availability of – affordable - productive inputs and demand for productive output. And pursuit of such opportunities leads to an increasing scale of capitalist competition around the world. Powerful corporations call upon powerful governments to support them in gaining access to such cheap resources and overseas markets.

Individual capitalist corporations compete amongst themselves to advance their economic positions. This would indicate that capitalist corporations are subject to ‘intrinsic pressure’ to expand their capital operations and also reduce their costs through increasing the scale of both production and technological innovation (Mann, 2011: 96). This explains capitalists corporations continued desire to search for more resources, more investment opportunities, and more consumers in order to avoid system crises (ibid: 96).

According to Mann (2011) two reasons explain national governments close cooperation and relations with big business corporations. On the one hand, nation states are crucially dependent upon big business to provide employment and tax revenues within their jurisdiction; this would allow financial power of these business owners to obtain control over selection of key government personnel. On the other hand, the state provides and ensures the establishment of necessary infrastructure, a healthy work force, a stable money supply and ‘ongoing access to credit to ensure uninterrupted investment, more powerful state apparatuses have also become increasingly involved in assisting big home based
capital to gain access to raw materials, investment opportunities and markets overseas’ (ibid: 98).

All these factors ‘led to the use of state military power by bigger, wealthier states to protect their home markets and create formal overseas empires or protected spheres of control’ which in turn, ‘has led to imperial conflicts and wars, as nations newly developing sufficient economic and military power to challenge established empires and trade and investment barriers, have set out to build or extend their own empires through force of arms’ (ibid: 99).

Accordingly, Security and economic rivalries are interlaced in complex structures of conflict that advanced into the ‘terrible era’ of inter-imperialism conflict between 1914 and 1945 (Bukharain, 2002).

According to Callinicos (2002) Marx theory of imperialism provides an excellent framework for understanding the current US war policy. Callinicos (2002) illustrates the US and Western attack upon Afghanistan to strengthen Marx ideas. The oil corporations and the Bush administration wanted to build a pipeline through Afghanistan as a means of exporting the oil and gas of Central Asia. The Afghanistan attack was also driven by the US geopolitical motivations to reassert its global supremacy after the attacks of September 11th, 2001.

Callinicos (2002) indicates that during the history of imperialism, Great Powers policies were directly driven by compound mixtures of geopolitical and economic concerns. As an example Callinicos (2002) highlights how the British ruling class during the end of the 19th century began to consider Germany as imminent and major threat to British strategic interests, as a consequence of the Second Reich decision to establish a world class navy. For the British’s naval administration and to the security of British island, this was a threat to British sea power. Callinicos (2002) gives another example of economic motivations illustrating German-Russian conflicts:

‘... Hitler was an intensely ideological ruler, whose long term aim was to secure dominance of the Eurasian land mass for a racially purified – the decision to start the Second World War, to extend it to the Soviet Union, and to attempt to take Stalingrad
were heavily influenced by fears about raw material shortages- and in Hitler’s vision of a colonised Russia as the solution to the economic contradictions of German capitalism.’

In so far as the Marxist theory of imperialism explains and analyses the concepts in which economic competitions and geopolitical motivations become ‘interwoven’ under capitalism, it simply does not subordinate one to the other (ibid).

Economic strategy is only one part of a broad range of political-economic supremacy objectives reaching out from dominant Western, capitalist countries for control (Peet 2007). According to Richard Peet (2007) the era following the post- Second War can be termed ‘Pax Americana’ rather than ‘Pax Britannica’ as a consequence of the US succession to dominance of the globe. Peet (2007) argues that the US has undertook further aggressive attitude towards the world, particularly, since the late 1970s and since the attack of September the 11th, 2001 upon the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, resulting in creating a new sphere of hegemony, the so-called ‘neo-imperialism’. This is a new type of imperialism where the control is the product of physical, political and cultural influences during military interventions merged with control over principles (ibid: pp 184-194).

Peet (2007) differentiates between two ideological systems that lie behind the neo-imperial hegemony; these ideological systems stem from diverse sources, but serve the same targets. On the one hand, there is neo-conservatism which is the more visibly aggressive ideology by which the US confirms its political- military power in order to expand freedom and democracy to a ‘world that must want them’ (ibid). Peet (2007) then emphasises that freedom and democracy to the neo-conservatist means ‘by freedom the neocons mean the market and the profit motive, and by democracy they mean American-style elections in which people are free to vote for any candidate or party they choose, provided that the elections has already been fixed by the need for campaign finance.’ On the other hand, neoliberalism represents the less aggressive dogma. In this ideology, the economics of the third world are rehabilitated to make them accessible for development (ibid). By development, neoliberalism means ‘privatization, deregulation and other policy devices that entail the capturing of the global economy by finance capital’ (ibid).
And yet, the US aggressive behaviour around the globe verifies those economic inspirations. The acclaimed excuses offered by the US government to interrupt the World system and order are obvious according to Khalidi (2004). Between the neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism lies the threat against the developing countries and World stability. So freedom means maximisation of profit revenues, and American style elections to assure that opposed regimes should be overthrown. As development in Third World nations is connected with the global economy in order to control the fate and the well being of those nations. The US nowadays symbolises the highest levels of imperialism, given that it monitors the people suffering around the globe, and then intervenes under purportedly humanitarian claims, when in effect they are driven by strategic economic and security motivations (ibid).

According to Callinicos (2002) the derivations of the unrivalled and extraordinary potency of which the Bush administration’s foreign policy was shaped, is marked by the end of the inter-imperialist competition’s last phase, the Cold War (1945-1990). According to Callinicos (2002) the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the unexpected 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union left the US as the primary and the only leading military power in the World. Those events gave the US capitalists access to areas that had formerly been prohibited to them as a consequence of Cold War partitioning of the world into opponent ‘superpower blocs’. Of particular importance was Central Asia which had been positioned at the border between Chinese and Russian spheres of direct influence, and as such formed a strategic position and important energy reserve bloc in the continent (ibid).

Nevertheless, Callinicos (2002) emphasises that the US faced two possible sources of challenge after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the first, the Western capitalist bloc challenge, notably, Germany and Japan that had been submissive to US political and military leadership during the Cold War. However, both countries developed an emulative economy to US capitalism. Consequently, the US economy failed to face the challenges posed by the German and the Japanese, causing the international economy to enter into a new era of crises at the end of the 1960s. In explaining how Germany and Japan became a major challenge
opposing the US leadership in the new World order subsequent to the Soviet Union collapse in 1991, Callinicos (2002) writes:

‘Liberated from the restraints demanded by unity against the Eastern bloc, Germany and Japan might increasingly assert themselves geopolitically and develop into world powers threatening US hegemony. Though it was a newly reunified Germany that flaunted its independence from Washington (for Example, by engineering the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991-1992 in defiance of the efforts by the administration of the elder Bush to keep the federation together), Japan’s penetration of US markets and its growing investments in the American homeland made it seem the greater threat’.

The second potential rivals according to Callinicos (2002) came from outside of the Western bloc. Russia remained a Great Power despite the social and political disorder that occurred consequent to the 1991 collapse. Russia, at that stage was armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, spread out across Eurasia, consisting of, or bordering on huge energy reserves. China also posed a major threat to the US. The Chinese economy grew rapidly subsequent to 1980s through adopting a communist market which vindicated capitalism and gave them the resources to construct a major military power in the most geopolitically unstable region in the world. According to Callinicos (2002) China is the foremost threat that the US might face ‘indeed, as the Japanese economic challenge receded in the course of the 1990s, China loomed ever larger as the major long term threat facing US capitalism.’

In order to diminish the effectiveness of these potential challenges, the US administration expanded the NATO into Central and Eastern Europe during the 1999 Balkan War (ibid). This expansion according to Rees (1999) was performed to: (1) maintained the position of the US, as the leading power in Western Europe and extended it eastwards; (2) legitimised the penetration of the economically and strategically crucial zone of Central Asia by a US-led NATO now authorised to undertake ‘out of area’ operations; (3) amount to a new strategy of encirclement directed towards Russia, a Russia that US policy-makers had concluded was unlikely somehow to metamorphose into a prosperous liberal democracy and would have to be contained. Accordingly, the Clinton administration practised a pluralistic strategy in order to maintain US supremacy through a ‘continent-wide policy of divide and rule’ (Callinicos, 2002). Despite the claims of the multilateral
approaches of the US policy to promote the expansion of NATO and the EU, Callinicos (2002) asserts the strategic aims of the Clinton administration were to ‘maintain US hegemony in Eurasia’.

In the light of the above discussion the literature suggests that the US strategic policy prior to the Soviet Union collapse in 1991 was characterised by motivations to contain the potential threats that might be caused from China, Japan and Russia. Thus, for the US to maintain its supremacy around the globe as the only super power, the US strengthened the expansion of NATO and the EU for unilateralist aspirations to preserve US control in Eurasia. That was accomplished to endorse the US dominance of the former Soviet Union heritages, and also to prevent any potential threats which might menace US interests in the world.

Ironically, the US motivations to interrupt the world order were driven by imperial enthusiasms, particularly, after it became the only super- power (Boyle , 2004). Therefore, for the US to maintain its supremacy, many humanitarian interventions during 1990s were driven by claims to impose democracy, appears to be a means to justify US imperial foreign policy (Simes , 2003). In his article *American’s imperialism dilemma*, Simes (2003) argues that:

‘President Bill Clinton’s humanitarian and nation-building efforts were a departure from earlier interventions. Defending the Panama Canal or attacking Grenada may have saved innocent lives, but these missions were enacted primarily to serve important American interests or destroy declared enemies. Clinton’s moralistic projects, on the other hand, typically [were] divorced from US interests’.

In the foreword to his book *Destroying World Order* Boyle (2004) asserts that:

‘It has become a truism to state the September 11, 2001 “changed everything” as well as that “nothing will ever be the same again.” In fact, little has changed in the imperialist tendencies of American foreign policy since the founding of the United States of America in 1789. The fledgling United States government opened the 19th Century by stealing the continent of North America from the American Indians, while in the process ethnically cleansing them, and finally deporting the few pitiful survivors by means of death marches... the imperial government of the United States of America opened the 20th Century by stealing a colonial empire from Spain, (Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Philippines), then inflicting a near [genocidal] war against the Filipino people, while at the same time purporting to annex the former Kingdom of Hawaii while subjecting the
Native Hawaiian people (the Kanaka Maoli) to [genocidal] conditions - all in the name of securing America’s “place in the sun.”

Boyle (2004) describes the US aggression upon Iraq and other nations, when he writes:

‘Now, the 21st century witnesses the effort of the imperial government of the United States of America to steal a hydrocarbon empire from the Muslims states and peoples surrounding Central Asia and the Persian Gulf under the pretexts of “fighting a war against international terrorism” (Afghanistan) and “eliminating weapons of mass destruction” (Iraq). For the past 215 years the imperialist foreign policy of the United States of America has been predicated upon racism, aggression, genocide, ethnic cleaning, [and] crimes against humanity, war crimes, and slavery. At the dawn of the third millennium of humankind’s parlous existence, nothing has changed about the imperialist operational dynamics of American foreign policy.’ Emphasis added.

The end of Cold War era led to a brief stage of cooperation between Washington and Moscow, keeping in mind that both powers supported Iraq in its war against Iran in order to contain the Iranian Islamic revolution. In addition, both the US and the Soviet Union also rejected the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990. President George H.W. Bush intensive diplomatic efforts to obtain Soviet Union support for the coalition against Saddam Hussein were a major reason for the Soviet Union’s decision to vote in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorising the use of force against Iraq. Though, the Kuwait liberation attracted the high levels of US-Russian cooperation in the Middle East (Covarrubias & Lansford, 2007).

The 1990s era marked a commonality rather than disagreement between the US and Russia bilateral relationship. Both countries agreed to cooperate on a range of issues, including efforts to resolve the Israel-Arab conflict and contain terrorism. Russia supported the US containment policy upon Iraq in 1993. However, the 1998 Iraq sanctions crises highlighted the US-Russian tensions as Russia opposed the sanctions against Iraq in order to strengthen its influence in the Iraqi regime policies and decisions. Nevertheless, in the wake of September 11, 2001 Russia did not oppose the US-led war on terror, although it resisted the US democratising efforts in the Middle East which was considered as a threat to Russia’s relations with key allies, notably, Syria and Iran (ibid: pp 63-78).
The attack of September 11, 2001 and the war on terror gave the US and the Bush administration the golden chance to continue with its military dominance around the globe. Callinicos (2002) argues that:

‘Their world-historical perspective leads the Bush team to conclude that a window of opportunity has opened in which they can use the US’s present military superiority to improve the long term position of US capitalism. 11 September and the “war on terrorism” have provided the occasion for this effort, but the US is after much bigger game than the elusive Bin Laden and his Al Qaida network’.

In his speech in June, 1, 2002 at West Point President Bush (2002) declared that ‘all nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a price’. It can be argued that this statement highlights that the US would assure its international control and benefit its capitalistic approaches in the Middle East region through claiming pre-emptive defence against terror.

Moreover, the war on terror provided the US with an opportunity to establish a string of military bases in a region that was closed to it during the Cold War, namely, Central Asia. The US also had the chance to return its troops to The Philippines, where US bases were closed in the early 1990s. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America ( NSSUS) in 2002 emphasises this new strategy through indicating that security challenges require the US to establish military stations and bases within and beyond North East Asia and Western Europe ( NSSUS 2002). Moreover, President Bush, in his foreword to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2002, declared the imposing of the American free market capitalism doctrine upon the world:

‘The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom-and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity’ (ibid:1).

To achieve these targets and strategic motivations it would appear obvious that the US should impose liberal market policies in order to guarantee US economic and military dominance globally and to shift the terms in favour of US capitalism. This context should explain the Bush’s administration’s emphasis upon Saddam
Hussein’s regime and his alleged imminent threat to global peace. Moreover, the US strategic motivations in the region led the US to intervene in Iraq on these grounds. According to Callinicos (2002) the main concern for the Bush administration was not, however, to confront US major rivals, but to remove Saddam Hussein compulsorily. This mechanism was set to achieve two main purposes: ‘first, a successful US war against Iraq would serve as a warning to others: if overwhelming US force can remove the recalcitrant ruler of a minor Middle Eastern power, then Washington’s potential peer competitors had better watch their step. Secondly, bringing down Saddam Hussein would play a more specific role in an ambitious programme that at least some on the republican right harbour for reordering the entire Middle East’ (ibid).

Similarly, Professor Michael Klare (2002) of Hampshire College indicates that the aims of the US foreign policy strategy after September 11, 2001 were not only to fight international terrorism but also to drive their long-term energy motivations. In his examination of Vice president Dick Cheney’s national energy plan, Michael Klare (2002) highlights three key points:

- The United States must satisfy an ever-increasing share of its oil demand with imported supplies. (At present, the United States imports about 10 million barrels of oil per day, representing 53 percent of its total consumption; by 2020, daily US imports will total nearly 17 million barrels, or 65 percent of consumption.) Sources of supply like Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Canada would be needed to provide this additional oil.

- The United States cannot depend exclusively on traditional sources of supply like Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Canada to provide this additional oil. It will also have to obtain substantial supplies from new sources, such as the Caspian states, Russia, and Africa.

- The United States cannot rely on market forces alone to gain access to these added supplies, but will also require a significant effort as a part of government officials responsibilities to overcome foreign resistance to the outward reach of American energy companies.
Michael Klare (2002) concludes that:

‘American efforts to obtain increased supplies of foreign oil will require more than trade deals and diplomacy. It will also require the threat of or the use of force to dissuade hostile forces from attempting to obstruct the flow of petroleum to the United States. This, in turn, will require an enhanced US capacity to operate militarily in areas of likely fighting over oil. It is for this reason that Washington is expanding the American military presence in the Gulf area’.

Therefore, the US imperial doctrine has been unleashed after September 11, 2001 in order to accomplish strategic interests in the Middle East. Callinicos (2002) stressed that ‘once again we see how economic and geopolitical considerations are inextricably interwoven in the grand strategy of US imperialism.’

Due to deep developments in the nature of the Middle East’s power balances and inter-state relations, US foreign policy has changed and this has also directly and indirectly affected outcomes in the past half-decade. The attacks of September 11, 2001 marked a primary change in US foreign policy through advancing the neoconservative agenda to the front; endorsing preventive intervention; unilateralism; and focusing upon Islamic terrorism as the major threat to US security. This agenda, motivated the US invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq, and also threatened both Syria and Iran with possible regime change. This was combined with a strong democratising agenda, by claiming that terrorism was produced by repressive nations and that more democratic participatory would help to reduce hatred and anger expressed in terrorist behaviour. In addition, the US polices created indirect outcomes, mainly, ‘the empowerment of Iran, the eruption of Sunni-Shi’i conflict in Iraq, the resurgence of Kurdish ambitions, and the flourishing of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ which generated additional chances and dangers for middle eastern states.¹

According to The Carnegie Endowment paper entitled the Middle East: Evolution of a broken regional Order published in 2008, the direct US armed involvement in the Middle East began in the 1980s, with the US Navy escorting petroleum

containers through the Persian Gulf (Salem, 2008). Through 1990-1991 the US presence escalated to full engagement, with US military leading the war to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The paper (Salem, 2008: 11) further added that:

‘The invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the occupation since then, has had far more dramatic consequences. It eliminated Iraq as a strong state, thus creating a regional power vacuum and completely altering the power balances and containment effects of that state. Second, it created a domestic power vacuum, which instead of flowering into democracy erupted into insecurity and sectarian civil war, consuming Iraqi lives and livelihoods and inexorably drawing in regional states as well. Third, it placed the US military in the heart of the Middle East within the context of a long occupation and aggressive regional –regime change agenda. The reality of that predicament reignited anti-colonial feelings of decades past, now conjoined with “anti-crusaded” rhetoric that has even deeper Islamic and historical resonance’.

Indeed, the Carnegie paper offered a valuable explanation of US involvement in the Middle East region, arguing that the shift of US policy in the wake of September 11, 2001 has changed the stability of the region fundamentally. These developments and involvement explains the US imperialism thrust towards the region. The paper (Salem, 2008: pp11-13) summed up the dangerous outcomes that affected the region after the attacks of September the 11th as follows:

- The attacks marked an event of historic magnitude for the Salafist Jihadism promoted by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, one that has galvanised Jihadism throughout the Islamic world. Although al-Qaeda took a strong blow with the subsequent US overthrow of the Taliban and the occupation of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda –style jihadism had proved its reach and status and would become a growing force. It has survived, though embattled, in Afghanistan and Pakistan; it has grown dramatically in post-invasion Iraq; and it has proved its appeal in operations and attacks throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.

- The toppling of the Taliban and the Saddam Hussein regimes inadvertently removed the main adversaries that kept Iran contained. The empowerment of the Shi’i majority in Iraq made Iran’s windfall profit from US policies in the region all the more dramatic. The strengthening of Iran has been compounded by: a sharp increase in oil prices that brought in extra billions
to the Iranian treasury, by the defeat of the Iranian reformist movement, led by Mohammad Khatemi, and the rise of the hard-line element, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

- The re-emergence of Iran and the events in Iraq have triggered sectarian Sunni-Shi’i tensions. Those tensions have been tearing Iraq apart and fueling brutal ethnic cleansing that has left virtually no part of the country untouched.

- The shift in US policy has also influenced the Israeli aggressive and uncooperative policies. Although the peace process had been effectively suspended with the last – minute failure of the Camp David talks hosted by outgoing President Clinton in 2000. However, the new turn in the US policy under George W. Bush, after September 11th, encouraged Israel to pursue more aggressive policies.

The Carnegie paper (Salem 2008) concludes that ‘after 2001, the United States sought to create not only a new regional order, but a new middle east. This would be a region where US power would be dominant and local states will be US clients, a region where old regimes would be overthrown- violently or through elections – and new elites, friendly to the West, would be emerge.’ Thus, one can argue that the US policies after the Cold-war symbolise high levels of imperialism, where the ideal environment for more tensions in the Middle East region were created in order to satisfy the US ascendancy and protect its existence in the region. Also, it can be argued that the US claims of an imminent threat from Iraq were fabricated in order to invade Iraq and so to obtain more influence in the region. The Carnegie paper (ibid)² divided the US policy during the Post -9/11 period into four phases, each one of them characterised by claims offered by the US administration to legitimise actions in the Middle East region, particularly the Iraq invasion.

²Also See Ardeshir, M., Imperial assault on the Middle East, International Socialism Interview with Alex Callinicos, 2005. Available from: mhtml: file://E: International Socialism Interview with Alex Callinicos “ the Imperial assault on the Middle East”.com
The first phase (claims to fight terrorism) lasted from 2001 – 2003. In this phase the US administration policy concentrated on the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Middle East system was not directly influenced. The second phase (claims of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction), lasted from 2003-2005. In this phase structural change started causing the Middle East system to shatter. This era is defined by the US- led invasion upon Iraq in order to disarm and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime, depending on the purported WMD threat to US national security. Also, this phase is characterized by the US administration applying huge pressure to democratise the region’s regimes. The third phase is that of 2006 (decline in the US mission in Iraq). In this stage the US failure to control the situation in Iraq, raises the question of the legality of the invasion among the US public. Once again the US administration announced its democratising efforts in Iraq and the Middle East. The last phase was from 2007-2008 (restore Iraq stability claims). The tough policy of the Bush administration caused Iran to withdraw its support for radical insurgent groups in Iraq, and forced Syria to close down most of its porous borders with Iraq. As noted above, the US shifted polices in order to obtain full control of Iraq, consequently the Bush administration offered new claims – in each phase - in order to maintain high levels of legitimacy for imperial motivations in the region and to present validations for the US public that intervention in Iraq needed to maintain and protect US interests in the region (ibid).

Unsurprisingly, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2002 (NSSUS 2002) proclaimed those assumptions:

‘The US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our national Interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity’. Emphasis added

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002: 1), further states that ‘this path is not America’s alone. It is open to all.’ One can argue that that the US strategy was clear: the US aimed at creating a world that had to be ‘Americanised’ whether nations agreed or disagreed with this assertion: a world where American free market policies needed to be imposed forcibly, which would
benefit the US national interests. As such the US had the right to politically and economically change the world order. For the US to achieve these strategies, it would (ibid: pp1-2):

- Champion aspirations for human dignity;
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global attacks against US and friends;
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- Prevent enemies from threatening the US and allies with weapons of mass destruction;
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- Develop agendas for cooperative with other main centres of global power; and
- Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and the opportunities of the twenty-first century.

Accordingly, it can be argued that those tools, which had been dictated by the US administration to advance its global strategy starting from 2002, confirm the US future policy to achieve its imperialist aspirations, internationally. Examining those instruments leads to the conclusion: Americanise the world economically and politically. Furthermore, the Iraq invasion and the subsequent developments strengthened the US aims, and that American hegemonic ideas should spread internationally, regardless of international stability and peace. Chapter 6 argues that the US administration fabricated evidence of WMD’s and links with terrorism in order to justify the invasion of Iraq and major US involvement in the region.

2. 3 U.S STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Although Israel obtains a noteworthy level of US support, it would be according to Noam Chomsky (1999) ‘an error to assume that Israel represents the major US
interests in the Middle East. Rather, the major interest lies in the energy reserves of the region, primarily in the Arabian peninsula.’ And thus it became fundamentally a truism of US foreign policy that these energy reserves should remain under US direct control. Noam Chomsky (1999) further asserts that ‘a more recent variant of the same theme is that the flow of petrodollars should be largely funnelled to the US through military purchases, construction projects, bank deposits, investment in Treasury securities, etc. It has been necessary to defend this primary interest against various threats.’ Whereas Petras (2006) argues, contrary to most American progressives who believe that petroleum, and particularly the US interests of ‘Big Oil’, is the main motivation for US strategic interests in the Middle East, that ‘there is no evidence that the major US oil corporations pressured Congress or promoted the war in Iraq or the current confrontation with Iran.’ In his effort to prove his case Petras (2006) indicates that:

- The oil companies did not endorse a war strategy;
- The interests of the oil companies have been beneficial to the state interests of Israel;
- The wars have prejudiced their interests, procedures and concords with prominent Islamic and Arabic regimes in the region; and
- The supremacy of the pro-Israel lobbies surpasses that of oil companies in shaping US – Middle East policy.

These arguments might be partially true; however, it is not the case that the Jewish lobby in the US is the only dominant factor in shaping US foreign policy towards the Middle East. There are a number of factors that drive the US strategy in the region which were mentioned earlier in this Chapter. In his extensive analyses of the US-Israel relations Noam Chomsky (1999) highlights the secret behind the special relation ‘from the late 1950s, however, the US government increasingly came to accept the Israeli thesis that a powerful Israel is a “strategic asset” for the United States, serving as a barrier against indigenous nationalist threats to American interests.’ Hence, it can be argued that the US by providing support to the Israel state should have something in return, mainly, Israel is
'serving to protect US control over the oil-producing regions of the Gulf' (Chomsky 1999: 21). Also, Chomsky (1999) asserts the influence of pro-Israel lobbies in the US is overestimated. Noam Chomsky (1999) writes:

'It is doubtful that the various pro-Israeli lobbies in the US would have had much influence in policy formation, or that the climate of opinion deplored by Peled and other Israeli doves could have been constructed and maintained. Correspondingly, it will very likely erode if Israel comes to be seen as a threat rather than a support to the primary US interest in the Middle East region, which is to maintain control over its energy reserves and the flow of petrodollars'.

2.3.1 THE DESIRE TO CONTROL AND PROTECT OIL SUPPLIES INTERNATIONALLY

The importance of the Middle East region did not emerge suddenly out of the blue. The oil reserves that have been discovered in the Gulf region, shaped the attention of the Super Powers, and therefore there was a race by the Powers to take advantage of the oil resources in the region. The old fashioned thinking that the West have about the desert, camels and the land of nothing but sand, has been changed totally. According to Chomsky & Achcar (2007: 53) if the Middle East did not have the main energy reserves of the world, then policymakers nowadays wouldn’t care much about it. Moreover, it became obvious during the early twentieth century, mainly, when the global economy shifted to oil, that the largest and most easily reachable supply of energy was to be found in the Middle East region.

In the early 1930s, US petroleum’s companies obtained a ‘foothold’ in Saudi Arabia. At that stage Washington recognised instantly that this was imminent prize, and therefore they should keep it for themselves. Not surprisingly, the US aided Saudi Arabia during 1943, because the British had attempted to push the US government to give up its interests in Saudi Arabia. However, after World War II, the relationship between the US and England improved. Therefore, America considered the Britain as a client state. At that stage the US rose to be the world super power along with the Soviets (Chomsky & Achcar, 2007).

Chomsky and Achcar (2007: 54) assert that the US control of the oil reserves in the region at that time was not driven by domestic oil demands for its own consumption. It is worth noting, that North America during 1970s was the main
oil producer in the world. As a result the US was not consuming much Middle East oil, and in fact it still does not predominantly rely on Gulf region oil. Chomsky and Achcar (2007: 54) emphasise the US desire to control the region’s oil, arguing that the US was always concerned about opposing powers, because they could jeopardise US dominance of the world. To consolidate their position the US should obtain power over the oil supplies:

‘Washington has always worried that Europe might become what’s called a Third Force that might go off in an independent direction. And it could: it’s a region roughly comparable to the United States in terms of economy and population, in many ways more advanced. So one way of keeping Europe dependent has been to make sure that it’s reliant on oil, and that United States controls the oil’ (ibid: 54).

As such, the US strategic concerns in the Gulf region have always been focused on the enormous and incomparable oil resources. This strategy explains the US-led upon Iraq, 2003. Chomsky & Achcar (2007: 55) stress that ‘for any person of minimal rationality, it’s obvious that the United States invaded Iraq because it’s right in the midst of the riches oil-producing regions in the world.’

In their investigation of US policy in the Gulf region immediately after 1958 - the year in which the US had overthrown the British in the region - Chomsky and Achcar (2007: 55) indicate that the US foreign policy towards the Gulf region maintained the same system adopted by the British government during their domination in the region. The British system recognised the local states in the Gulf region as independent states in their appearance; however the British governed the states with various constitutional and other arrangements, and therefore England was the actual government. Chomsky and Achcar (2007: pp 55-56) observe that the US added another pattern to the British system, notably, creating a new system of:

‘Peripheral states, these would be the gendarmes – the local cops on the beat, the Nixon administration once called them- with police headquarters in Washington and a branch office in London. They were preferably non-Arab, so Turkey was the main one. Iran, as long as it was under the shah, was a major one... and Israel became part of this peripheral system beginning with the June 1976 Arab-Israeli war.’
In this context, the US maintained its control of the Gulf region oil; from 1958 until 1990 (the year Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait). Thus, it was logical for the US administration to militarily engage in the region to protect its vital interests, resulting in the US decision to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait in 1991. This shift in US foreign policy indicated that any threat to its oil supplies would authorise the US to protect its interests. As such the invasion of Iraq was another piece of the US ‘system of control’ (ibid: 56).

Chomsky and Achcar (2007: 56) highlight the economic and strategic importance of Gulf region’s oil as follows:

‘No one can downplay the significance of the economic interests, which are immense with regard to the oil industry. US oil companies are now more prosperous than ever, by the way, with the new wave of oil price increases. On the other hand, there is also the huge strategic importance of the control of oil, which gives the United States decisive leverage over its partners and potential rivals. Japan is a partner whose allegiance to the United States is guaranteed by, among other factors, US control over its oil sources in the Middle East. But China, a potential threat to US global hegemony, is checked, too, by the same control’.

To make their case clear concerning the US-led attack upon Iraq, Chomsky and Achcar (2007: 56) argue that the ‘centrality of oil for the US policy in the Middle East is not speculation’. Thus, oil is a main aspect behind the crucial significance of the region. The US claims for invading Iraq were supposedly driven by motivations to protect the global economy and its access to oil (the US presents itself as the guardian of US and allies interests against any threats). Hence, the US presented strong claims in order to obtain public consensus supportive to the Iraq invasion in 2003. According to Chomsky and Achcar (2007: 56) oil justification would not convince the public opinion to legitimise the Invasion of Iraq 2003. Accordingly, the US presented Iraq as an imminent threat to international peace to achieve its outstanding oil policies in the region.

In his article *Navigating the Gulf*, Sterner M (1990: 14-39) reveals the true motivations for the US oil policy in the Gulf region. For him, the US involvements in the Gulf region are driven by three factors:

- If the US free itself from dependence of Iraq oil, which produces almost 4 million barrels a day. This should indicate that this quantity will withdraw
from the global oil supply, causing oil shortages around the world, and therefore the oil price will surge internationally. Energy demands in the US are higher than Japan or Western Europe, therefore, increases in petroleum prices internationally will have greater impact upon US economy more than any other industrialised economies.

A comprehensive energy policy would certainly benefit the US in reducing its dependence on imported oil. However, there are many factors which might be considered as obstacles to achieve this energy policy, such as: the environmental costs of allowing larger oil drilling in coastal waters or by switching to coal; the financial costs to industry and the consumer of adapting automobiles to work on substitute fuels and the loss of federal revenues through oil industry tax benefits which support domestic production. At the same time, the US is importing 50 per cent of the petroleum it consumes, or about 8.5 barrels a day. Even with aggressive energy policies, the US will remain dependent on imported oil for a major portion of its energy needs during upcoming centuries.

The Gulf oil is likely to become a more significant element of the world total supply in the future. The key issue here is the oil price, if the price is maintained at a high level for several years, this will encourage the exploration of oil in areas outside the Gulf region and also allow for the development of alternative fuels. Nevertheless, to sustain the prices of oil at high levels is an impossible target which will cause the US to greater dependence on Gulf region oil, with the region’s huge proven reserves and low production costs.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US – naturally - was forced to protect its oil interests in the region. Saddam Hussein generated a crisis which caused 4 million barrels a day, or roughly 6 per cent of the world’s oil supply, to be withdrawn from the market. This has caused the oil prices to increase more than double (Sterner, 1990).

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3 Those figures were back in 1990.
According to Sterner (1990: 16) the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, reduced the US gross national product (GNP) between .5 and 1 per cent and also increased the inflation by almost 1 per cent through 1991. If Saddam Hussein maintained his occupation of Kuwait the consequences for the US economy would have been severe. This explains the US immediate demand for Saddam Hussein to peacefully withdraw from Kuwait, or the US would be obligated to use force in order to liberate Kuwait. The US administration acknowledged that if the Kuwaiti occupation continued, then the US would suffer serious economic consequences. Thereafter, the US realised that the removal of Saddam Hussein was necessary to uphold its oil supplies in the Gulf region. This explains Saddam Hussein’s removal from power which was successfully accomplished in 2003.

After the 1973-74 Arabic boycott on oil supplies to the West as a consequence of the Arabic-Israel 1973 War (Brands 1994),⁴ the West learned their unforgettable lesson in assuring that oil supplies should remain accessible at reasonable prices. Therefore, any threat to this mechanism should be defeated. The Iraq invasion is a clear illustration of maintaining security and stability in the Gulf region, in order to guarantee a smooth flow of the region’s oil. This argument is supported by Sterner (1990: 16) who asserts that:

‘The West’s best assurance that Gulf oil resources will remain available at fair market prices will be if these resources stay under the stewardship of the several governments of the Arabian Peninsula, free of intimidation or pressure from outside powers. These are governments that are pro-Western in outlook, have enormous financial investments in the oil-importing countries, and therefore recognize their interest in the health of Western economies. They are unlikely to adopt a political agenda that overrides these considerations of basic economic self-interest. ... It is worth emphasizing that it is not the US interest to defend certain leaders or forms of government in the Gulf. What the United States is defending is the territorial and political dependence of these states’.

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⁴ For more details refer to Brands, H., Into the Labyrinth : the United States and the Middle East 1945-1993.
To a certain extent, the US policy in the Gulf region is shaped and driven by assumptions to control the region’s oil. Therefore, the US performance in the Middle East, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, offer a clear understanding of a foreign policy motivated by oil strategy rather than securing international peace. Hence, political dependence of the region’s regimes will naturally guarantee the flow of oil at reasonable prices, as well as strengthen the US dominance internationally.

2.3.2 THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND EFFORTS TO CONTAIN UNITED STATES MAJOR RIVALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

Even though oil always shaped US policy towards the Middle East during the decades following the Second World War, the idea of a stable and secure Jewish state in the Holy Land always has been supported by consecutive US administrations (Little 1945: pp 77-155). President Harry Truman recognised Israel as a new state for the Jews in Palestine, just a few minutes after its establishment on 15 May 1948. During the half-century Israel and the US were both involved in a sophisticated “special relationship” (Chomsky 1999), where the US opened its embassy in Tel Aviv in early 1949. In 1950 a mutual relation started between the US and Israel, which was driven by aspirations to contain radical Arab Nationalism. However, starting from 1961 the relationship became even closer, when Israel received both military and diplomatic support. Accordingly, during the Johnson and Nixon presidency (1970s era), Israel was considered as America’s strategic asset. Even though the special relationship between the US and Israel during Presidents Ford and Carter era was characterised as ‘running cold’ (ibid:57), the relationship ‘become a permanent fixture of US foreign policy’ (ibid: 78) during the Clinton presidency.

Noam Chomsky (1999: 9) discusses the special relationship between the US and Israel and argues that this relationship ‘has been a curious one in world affairs and American culture.’ He further expresses that the US economic and military aid to Israel exceeded any other aid offered by the US to other countries.\(^5\) Also, at the

\(^5\) In order to obtain clear understanding of US foreign aid to Israel, refer to Chomsky, N., Fateful triangle: the United States Israel and the Palestinians. USA: South End Press, 1999, 2\(^{nd}\) Edition. p 10. Also, Chomsky for the sake of revealing the US foreign aid to some other countries illustrates the US economic and military aid
ideological level, Israel receives considerable support from the US in its conflict with the Arabs. Noam Chomsky (1999: 13) argues that the special relationship between the US and Israel is not merely shaped because of domestic Jewish political pressures, however, to a certain extent this influence is overestimated. According to him one should consider two major observations: first, the theory of the influence of American Jewish community pressures underestimates the ‘scope of the ‘support for Israel,’ and second, it overestimates the role of political pressure groups in decision-making.’ (ibid: 13)

As far as support for the Israel theme, Noam Chomsky (1999: 16) stresses that among the Jewish community in the US, the unity has always been demanded, and in general achieved. However, this theme has critically weakened the Jewish community attempts to criticise or adjust the unsympathetic and ‘ultimately self–destructive government polices’ (ibid: 16) in Israel. It is seen to be illegitimate for the Jewish community in the US to criticise Israel policies. According to Noam Chomsky (1999:16) the explanation presented by the Jewish community for this principle is:

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6 Since 1967 Israel always has been supported by the US administrations against its conflict with the Palestinians, for more details see previous Book pp 11-13.

7 To a certain extent the “Support for Israel” scope in US is huge; the debate that the American Jews have to support Israel is a live phenomenon in the US. However, the Jewish community always supported the state of Israel polices either by money and ideological support; they supported the survival of their nation- as they claim- . In so far the claims that the Jewish lobby in the US is the only group who support Israel is not entirely true. Also this theory overestimated the role of the Jewish lobby in shaping the US foreign policy as we noted the US foreign policy is driven by economic policies in the region, and the assurance of the Israel state, should main assurance for the US to achieve its interests in the region. We will proceed in this section of the chapter to reveal our claims, and we will obtain a clear view of the accurate motivations for the US to support Israel state.
'The reason generally offered in defense of the doctrine that Israel may not be criticized outside its borders is that only those who face the dangers and problems have a right to express such criticism, not those who observe in safety from afar.'

Thus, as argued by Chomsky (1999:14-17) the scope of ‘support for Israel’ among American Jews is huge in the US; however, it is undervalued by the American Jewish community pressures. Also there are limitations and restrictions upon their freedom to judge and censure the Israel state. Hence, we could not consider them as a strong pressure power upon US foreign policy in the Middle East region.

Similarly, the influence of political pressure groups in decision-making is overestimated by many scholars. Chomsky (1999:17) emphasises that the pluralism of US ideology and politics always has been overvalued:

‘No pressure group will dominate access to public opinion or maintain consistent influence over policy – making unless its aims are close to those of elite elements with real power. These elements are not uniform in interests or (in the case of shared interests) in tactical judgments; and on some issues, such as this one, they have often been divided’.

The US- Israel relationship has always been shaped primarily by the shifting responsibility that Israel occupied in the context of US changing conceptions of its strategic – political interests in the Middle East (Chomsky 1999). Regardless of the extraordinary level of US support for Israel, it does not represent the first priority for the US policy in the Middle East region. Nevertheless, the primary target for the US is to control the oil reserves of the region, mainly, the Arabian Peninsula petroleum resources. According to Chomsky (1999:17) the US ‘was committed to win and keep the prize’. As noted, since World War II it has been practically ‘an axiom of the US foreign policy that these energy reserves should remain under US control.’ (Ibid: 17). This control is also shaped by another connected theme which is ‘the flow of petrodollars should be largely funnelled to the US through military purchases, construction projects, bank deposit investment in the Treasury securities’ (Ibid: 17). And thus, it’s evident that the US should protect and defend this interest against various threats, therefore, Israel is the ideal tool to achieve that.
The USSR threat to the US interests in the Middle East region—since the end of World War II—has been an ongoing concern for the US administrations. Logically, the US must defend its economic advantages in the Gulf region. Thus, the US would not tolerate USSR actions which might jeopardise its oil resources, nor give them the chance to obtain a significant position in the Middle East’s oil manufacture and circulation (Albert & Dellinger, 1983).

In 1947, the US organised its first main post-war counterinsurgency campaign in Greece, in order to destroy the ‘Communist – led peasant’ (Chomsky 1999: 18) and ‘worker – based nationalist movements’ (ibid: 18) ⁸. The major motivation for the counterinsurgency campaign was driven by concerns to control the Middle East’s oil resources. Thus, the US purportedly fabricated the claims to intervene in Greece depending on an imminent threat by the Soviets to US interests in Europe and the Middle East region. This policy was further adopted by the US administration. Accordingly, in 1947 president Truman announced his doctrine which indicated that the US should preserve the right to spread throughout the Middle East region (ibid: 19).

The accomplishment of the military and ideological efforts by the US announced the success of the counterinsurgency campaign. Thereafter, the US had a solid foot in the Middle East region, understanding that the Soviet could not risk any nuclear war with the US, and therefore, any Soviet efforts to gain control of the Middle East region’s oil was doubtful. The second threat to US supremacy in the Middle East region had been created by Europe, mainly, France and England. However in 1956 the US was successful in containing both of these threats, by forcing the British, the French and the Israeli’s out of the Egyptian territory (ibid: 19).

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⁸ Noam Chomsky indicates that the US started its counterinsurgency campaign, by entering Greece after the withdrawal of Nazi’s, and after the British imposed the rule of royalist elements and former Nazi collaborators suppressing the anti-Nazi resistance—in Athens. However, Britain could not handle these situations, and thus given the US the opportunity to take over the task, destroying both the Communist-led peasant and worker-based movements whom they fought the Nazi. The efforts by the US to eliminate the two movements caused 160,000 Greeks to be killed and 80,000 becoming refugees. For insightful information, it is highly recommended to read pp 18-19 of Noam Chomsky’s book Fateful triangle: the United States Israel and the Palestinians, In order to obtain a clear view of the US barbaric policies in Europe after the World War II.
The other threats to US dominance of the region came from Germany, Japan and China, which were discussed earlier in this Chapter. This background explains the special relationship between the US and Israel. The US considered Israel as a ‘Strategic Asset’ (Chomsky 1999: 20, little 1945: 103) which indicated that the Middle East region should be defended from any threat. President Nixon in 1969 declared that Israel support is needed to maintain the US position in the Middle East region (Nixon 1969); this policy became the so-called Nixon doctrine, which has shaped the US-Israel relationship from 1969 until now. Thus, it’s worth examining the aspects of this strategic asset theme in order to reveal the secrets behind the special relationship and the US motivations for its significant and ongoing support to the Israel state.

According to Chomsky (1999:20) the US administration realised that the Middle East region has to be defended from the Arab radical nationalism. He further argues that:

‘A third threat from which the region must be “defended” is the indigenous one: the threat of radical nationalism. It is in the context that the US—Israel “Special relationship” has matured. In the early 1950s, the US—Israel relationship was decidedly uneasy, and it appeared for a time that Washington might cement closer relations with Egyptian President Nasser, who had some CIA support’ Emphasis added.

Israel became worried, as the US-Egyptian relations became closer. Consequently Israel organised terrorist cells within Egypt territories in order to execute attacks upon US installations along with Egyptian public facilities. From Israel’s point of view these attacks would destroy the US—Egyptian close relationship. Israel

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9 The British and the French (with the Israeli help) tried to reassert their influence in the region, by invading Sues in 1956.

10 Nixon news Conference, 27 Jan 1969. Available from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1942. In an answer to the question of whether or not there is any plans to achieve peace in the Middle East, President Nixon replied that ‘I shall simply say at this time that I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States to cool off the situations in the Mideast.’ Thus, it was a clear sign from him to consider Israel state as a strategic asset in the region to support the outgoing US polices and to be a ‘powder keg, very explosive. It need to be defused.’
aimed at convincing the US administration that the assaults were carried out by the Egyptian ultranationalist extremists (ibid: 20).

However, from the late 1950s, the US administration progressively came to accept Israel’s notion that a powerful Israel is a ‘strategic asset’ for the United States. The US administration believed that Israel’s continuity and stability would constitute a barrier against indigenous radical nationalist threats to American interests, which might gain support from the USSR (ibid: 20). This should explain the secrets behind the enormous support Israel gained from successive US administrations from late 1950s until now. Even though the USSR collapsed in 1990 the US administration still consider Israel to be strategic asset in the Middle East region that would maintain the US interests.

In his book, *Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Noam Chomsky (1999) reviewed the procedures that Israel followed in order to strengthen the strategic asset theme:

- Israel’s moves to block Syrian attempts to aid Palestinians being massacred by Jordan in September 1970, at a time when the US was unable to intervene directly against what was perceived as a hazard to US clients in the Arab world. This involvement led to a considerable increase in US aid to Israel;

- The Israeli’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, was considered as a major act to strengthen the US position in the Middle East, and thus highlighted the concept of Israel as a strategic asset; and

- Israel improved its relations with allies in Africa and Latin America, in order to strengthen its position as a strategic asset. Thus, Israel’s services and aids in both Africa and South America have been considerable.  

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12 For more information on these three policies conducted by the Israelis refer to: Chomsky, N., *Fateful triangle: the United States Israel and the Palestinians*. PP 23-27.
So far, the US-Israel relationship is shaped by the concept of considering Israel as a strategic asset for the US in the Middle East region. Noam Chomsky (1999) in his preface to his book indicates that ‘the historically unique US – Israel alliance has been based on the perception that Israel is a strategic asset, fulfilling US goals in the region in tacit alliance with Arab façade in the Gulf’ (ibid: xii). Therefore, has been of central importance for the US to support the Israel state. However, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 marked a new era for the US policies in the Middle East, and thus immediate US response was needed to control the situation in the Middle East. Thus, it can be argued that the role of Israel as a strategic asset has been declining even though the US supported policies to Israel still exist, as the fundamental Islamic groups spread in the region. Noam Chomsky (1999: xii) points out that the US considers the ‘Islamic fundamentalism is an enemy only when it is ‘out of control.’ In this case, it falls into the category of ‘radical nationalism’ or ‘ultranationalism.’ This, should indicate that Israel as a strategic asset still maintains its strength in the US policy in the region. It’s worth noting that the Islamic movements still exist in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen and in most Middle Eastern countries. This existence, from the US point of view represents a major threat to its facilities and interests in the region; therefore, a strong Israel is needed in order to maintain the balance in the region and its oil supplies.

2.4 U.S – MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This section of the Chapter examines and evaluates the relationship between the US and some Arabic countries, namely, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait and Iraq. It also examines the crucial relationship between the US and Israel. This examination, on the one hand, provides a clear understanding of the US motivations to extensively involve itself in the Middle East region disputes and polices. On the other hand, it explains the foremost shift in the US policies toward Saddam Hussein, and why he became out of favour with the US administration.

2.4.1 U.S – SAUDI RELATIONS

After the Second World War the US- Saudi diplomatic relations were established on the foundation of political, military and commercial understandings (Blanchard, 2009: 3). King Abd Al Aziz was recognised by the US as the ruler of
Hejaz and Nejd in 1931. Nevertheless, until 1942 the US did not establish diplomatic representatives in the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. From the early 1930s till 1945, the US- Saudi relations were shaped considerably by the 1933 awarding of an oil exploration allowance to the California Arabian standard Oil Company [CASOC, the forerunner of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco, the forerunner of nowadays Saudi Aramco)] (ibid: 3). In 1938 (CASOC) discovered significant oil reserves in Eastern Saudi Arabia. Consequently the US private and public concerns were shaped to defend and manage petroleum operations during the Second World War period, leading to the establishment of expanded bilateral relations between the US and Saudi Arabia (Davis, 1997). Meanwhile, the US government progressively succeeded in replacing the United Kingdom’s influence in Saudi Arabia, where it became the main supporter for Saudi Arabia, politically and militarily during the 1940s and thereafter (ibid: pp 96-136). The February 14, 1945 meeting between President Franklin Roosevelt and King Abd al Aziz aboard the USS Quincy marked a starting point for the extensive US – Saudi political relationship which expanded thereafter.  

By the mid- 1940s, and during the early stages of the post-war period the US - Saudi Arabia relations were shaped by tangible US efforts to offer both training assistance and military planning to the Saudi regime. This era was marked by the construction of the first US military airfield at Dhahran, which produced the foundation of US- Saudi Arabia bilateral military collaboration (Fuchs, 1974). Also, in this era there was a huge involvement of US contractors, participating in the Kingdom infrastructure development, leading to commercial and economic bilateral relations between US and Saudi Arabia during the post- war era (Blanchard, 2009 : 4).  

Despite the disagreements between the US and Saudi Arabia over the Israel – Arab conflict, both pursued common national security intentions starting from 1950. The contradictory responses to Arab- Israel conflicts in 1948 1967, and 1973 generated circumstances that challenged and tested the mutual relationship  

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between the two governments (Blanchard, 2009: 4). However, according to Blanchard (2009:4) the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon’s administrations perceived the Saudi regime as a major assistant for the US in relation to socialist and nationalist regimes in the region. Also, they considered Saudi Arabia as a barrier against any Communist efforts to spread in the Gulf region or the Middle East.

However, as a consequence to the October 1973 Arab- Israel war, a dormant tension in the US – Saudi relationships rose to the surface causing alteration to the established economic and political solidity between them (Blanchard, 2009: 4). As a response to the US comprehensive support to Israel in its war against the Arab world in 1973, the Saudi government started an oil embargo and oil production cuts in order to force the US to abandon its assistance to Israel. The US accordingly suffered from high levels of cost inflation, and therefore started to search for new oil resources. A report presented to US Congress in 1975 indicated that sustained oil sanctions by Arab countries would disturb America’s fundamental lifestyle and degrade US security; the report also highlighted the need to use force in order to excise the effects of the oil embargo against the US and seize oil fields in Saudi Arabia. However, the relations between the US and Saudi Arabia normalised after the oil embargo ended, where both the US and Saudi Arabia officials worked to re-establish the bilateral relationship on the shared grounds of ‘opposition to communism, renewed military cooperation, and through economic initiatives that promoted the recycling of Saudi petrodollars to the United States via Saudi investment in infrastructure, industrial expansion, and US securities’ (Blanchard, 2009: 4).

The US - Saudi relations were extensively strengthened during Presidents Carter and Regan administrations, as the Saudi regime supported anti-Communist urges around the world in efforts similar or congener to US anti-Communist policies.

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Iran’s revaluation in 1979 and the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviet helped shape intensive US-Saudi relations from 1979-1990, where the foreign policy efforts of both countries agreed upon wide support for anti-Soviet Mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran. The 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Persian War in 1991 placed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a host for US combat troops and military equipment engaged in operations to free Kuwait from Iraqi forces. The continued presence of US military troops in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s was considered as a serious frustration by some Saudi opposition groups, mainly, Al Qaeda Leader Osama Bin Laden, who attacked the US, Saudi Arabia targets (Blanchard, 2009: pp 4-5).

The collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 announced the end of the Cold War era. Accordingly, the shared anti-communist interests that symbolised the security issues between the US and Saudi Arabia since 1940 had been eliminated. However, US foreign policy was strongly shaped to defend the regimes of ally states in the Gulf region by preventing threats of conflict which might interrupt the continued flow of Saudi petroleum to international markets. During 1990-2000 the US – Saudi relations remained strong in areas such as defence cooperation. However, the political ties were challenged by a Saudi anti-US movement which demanded immediate departure of US troops from Saudi Arabia. Also, the Israel – Palestinian fighting resurgence in late 2000, created strong disagreement between the US and Saudi Arabia, as the Saudi government blamed the US administration for its endless aid and support to Israel (Blanchard, 2009: 6).

The September 11, 2001, attacks on US soil marked a new episode for the US-Saudi relations. The US government directly accused the Saudi administration officials of participation or negligence. Also, some US officials argued that the Saudi policy decisions for the last decades directly, or indirectly, supported some religious fanaticism which led to terrorist attacks. The attacks created the most severe challenge to the bilateral relations of US and Saudi Arabia (Blanchard, 2009: 6). According to Blanchard (2009:6):
The direct participation of 15 Saudi nationals in the September 11, 2001, attacks, kindled strong criticism in the United States of Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist groups. The attacks constituted the most serious challenge to US-Saudi relations since the 1973-1974 oil embargo.

The Saudi government denied any knowledge or involvement in the September 11, 2001, attacks, and responded by intensively focusing on confronting and controlling extremist religious groups in the Kingdom after 2003. The Saudi government welcomed and hosted the US and allies troops in 2003, and participated in the coalition to invade Iraq. The counterterrorism polices undertaken by the Saudi government helped to shorten the gap between the US and Saudi Arabia. However, the US administration doubted the Saudi counterterrorism efforts, and thus it can be argued that the bilateral relations still suffer from distrust (Blanchard, 2009: pp 7-13).

Saudi Arabia in 2008 remained the US central partner in the Middle East (ibid: 30). According to US international trade administration, Saudi Arabia imports from US were estimated at $12.5 Billion in 2008 with an increase of almost 2.1 Billion as in 2007 and 4.7 Billion as in 2006. The Saudi imports from the US were mainly weapons, machinery and vehicles. Furthermore, approximately 11.1% of US oil imports and 7.2% of US oil consumption, according to the US Energy information Administration 2007 (cited in Blanchard, 2009: 30) are imported from Saudi Arabia. However, there has been a decline in oil quantities imported from Saudi Arabia, which was formerly the biggest foreign supplier of oil to the US. This explains the US demands to Saudi Arabia to increase its daily oil production in order to lower the global oil prices since 2008. Surprisingly, the Saudi officials rejected the US demands and argued that the decline in the value of the US dollar and the instability of the oil producing regions led to the increase in oil prices by late 2008 (Blanchard, 2009: 30).

As we discussed above, Saudi Arabia represents a major key investment for the US. The huge value of Saudi Arabian imports from the US and the oil interests are the central issues for any US administration targets in Saudi Arabia. Also, the

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Saudi Arabian petrodollar investments in the US form another key issue of the crucial need to maintain the US-Saudi bilateral relations in good shape. This, to a large extent, should explain the US performance in the Gulf region and its wide emphasis upon regional stability from any threat of conflict. This should also clarify the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, on the grounds of protecting biotical interests in the region. The Iraq invasion gave the US the golden opportunity to establish a foothold in the Persian Gulf.

2.4.2 U.S – EGYPT RELATIONS

Egypt, as other Arab states, was subject to outside influences on their domestic affairs. Egyptian history suffered from long periods of foreign intervention. In the 19th century, Egypt under the Ottoman Empire was a semi-autonomous territory. However, as the influence and the strength of Ottoman Empire declined; the British supported the Empire in order to serve as a barrier between it and Czarist Russia.\(^{16}\)

Because of its agricultural productivity, large domestic market, and its strategic position between the Mediterranean and Red Seas, England during that era, considered Egypt –exceptionally- valuable to its Empire. In order to secure its most prized colony, India, England considered Egypt as the vital element in protecting the route to India. As the Ottoman Empire weakened, the Sultans were forced to grant Europeans certain economic advantages and legal protections in Egypt, which negatively stifled the Egyptian economic by flooding it with goods manufactured mainly in Europe. This led local Egyptian merchants to abandon their business (Sharp, 2009: 2).

As Egypt developed its economy, it relied on ‘cash crop’ (ibid: 2) policies, mainly based on exporting cotton, which was faced with constantly changing prices. This left the economy susceptible and dependent on harvests goods. Egypt at this stage could not generate sufficient capital to finance its modernisation, without a diverse and strong economy. This led Egypt to be financially dependent on European assistance. Egyptian leaders borrowed huge amounts from European

banks (Sharp, 2009:3). These circumstances, forced Egypt to sell all its shares in the Suez Canal Company in 1869, in order to make payments on its foreign-owned debt. Unsurprisingly, as Egypt failed to pay all its debts, the French and British had the golden chance to directly engage in Egypt politics until the mid 20th century (Sharp, 2009:3).

However, the 1920s were a time of rising resistance to European rule in the region, with anti-British revolutions breaking out in Egypt. Consequently, as a reaction England declared Egyptian independence in 1922 (Oren, 2007: pp 407-419). According to Sharp (2009:3) political power in Egypt for the next three decades ‘was contested among three main actors: the British, the Egyptian monarchy, and nationalist wafd party, which was the driving force behind the Egyptian independence movement after World War I.’ Although, independence was given to Egypt, thousands of British troops stayed stationed near the Suez Canal and most Egyptian ministries were British officials. Paradoxically, the king of Egypt had the authority to appoint a government and dismiss parliament, but relied ultimately upon British support. During the years 1922-1952, the Wafd party dominated the parliamentary elections. However, by the end of 1952, it lost its popularity to anti-British movement “Free Officers Movement” (Sharp 2009:4).

By 1952 the Free Officers Movement succeeded in forcing the British out of Egypt, disbanding the parliament, and overthrowing the monarchy of King Farouk. This Movement was led by a thirty four-year-old leader, Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser. As a response, the British government showed signs of major concerns, whereas the United States recognised the new regime and started a dialogue with Nasser (Oren 2007:508). According to Oren (2007: 507) ‘Truman’s ability to juggle America’s strategic and ideological interests’ succeeded in penetrating Egypt politically, and thus eliminating the Soviet exploitation in the region.

During Nasser’s era, Egypt was at the centre of superpower rivalry for influence in the Middle East region. Nasser’s establishment of a neo-aligned movement was able for a short time to manage to steer Egypt clear of Soviet or Western Camps (ibid: 4). However, in 1955 Nasser demanded military training and equipment
from the West camp, but he was faced by rejection on the grounds that Nasser was planning to aid Algerian independence against the French. As a result, Nasser shifted to the Soviets and the Czechs to provide him with defence assistance. In 1956, the US and Britain decided to withdraw the offer of economic assistance to Egypt in order to construct the Aswan Dam. Nasser responded by nationalising the Suez Canal Company in efforts to finance the Dam (Yapp 1991, Oren 2007, Hekal 1986). This decision aggravated the French and the British, leading to the October, 1956, French, British, and Israeli invasion of Egypt. The US administration, represented by President Eisenhower convinced the three countries of immediate withdrawal of their forces from Egypt by early 1957. The US involvement in that matter was the Key element in establishing and improving the US- Egyptian relations, and at the main time served the US targets and influence in the region (Yapp, 1991:409).

Nasser’s popularity after the 1956 Suez War climbed, as he became the symbol of Arab nationalism in the post-colonial era. It is worth noting that Nasser’s newborn authority allowed him to develop a powerful Egyptian foreign policy that aimed to demolish pro- Western government in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. At the same time he supported the Palestinian guerrilla actions against Israel, and worked towards creating a mutual Arab state through establishing the United Arab Republic with Syria 1958-1961. This era of powerful Nasser, did not last long. The June, 1967 defeat of Egypt by the Israelis, reduced Nasser’s popularity and destroyed his dreams of spreading the pan-Arab ideology around the region

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18 Despite the Egyptian ownership of the Canal, the British- French Company operated it, and then collected the revenues, after paying small rent to Egypt. Thus, British and France invaded Egypt to occupy the Canal, whereas the Israel goal was to stop the Palestinian guerrillas from using Egypt as a base for operations against Israel.
Meanwhile, after the June, 1967 war, the US-Egyptian relations terminated due to US support and assistance to Israel.

In 1970 and after the death of Nasser, Anwar Sadat the Vice President became the President of Egypt. Sadat at that time was challenged by various elements: first, the defeat of the June 1967 War which weakened Egypt’s reputation. Second, the loss of the Sinai Peninsula consequent to the Israel triumph. Thirdly, approximately 25% of Egypt’s gross domestic product was absorbed in efforts to rebuild military expenditures (Sharp, 2009:5). In these difficult circumstances, President Sadat realised the crucial importance of a military victory against Israel, in order to improve his own legitimacy in Egypt and also advance Egypt’s situation in any future negotiation with Israel. The 1973, October War, succeeded in boosting Sadat’s credibility among Egyptians, enabling him to recover the relations with the West, whereas the Soviet – Egyptian relations declined because President Sadat requested assistance from USSR in order to attack Israel prior to 1973 War, but he was faced by rejections and delays (Mustafa 1987, Sharp 2009:5).

After the October, 1973 War, the US- Egypt diplomatic relations were restored in November of that year, one month later both countries participated in the Geneva peace Conference. In 1974, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger started disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria and Egypt and Israel in 1975. As a result the US recommenced its economic aid to Egypt after eight years of suspension (Sharp, 2009:5).

Unexpectedly, on November 20, 1977, President Sadat made his historical visit to the state of Israel. Sadat was the first Arabic leader to visit Israel. His visit announced the Egyptian recognition of the Jewish state. Sadat aimed at 1) encouraging the Arab- Israel peace process, 2) ending the historical conflict and hatred, and 3) establishing a peace settlement in the region. However, most Arab leaders and the Arab public criticised Sadat’s policy and regarded him as a traitor.

One year later, President Carter invited both the Israeli and the Egyptian leaders to attend talks in Camp David at Maryland, in efforts to recover a peace process in the Middle East. Accordingly, on September 17, 1978, Israel and Egypt along with the US as a witness, signed double agreements. The first, agreed upon an
independent Palestinian entity in the West bank and Gaza Strip, after withdrawal of Israel. The second, agreed on peace accord between Israel and Egypt to be established. President Sadat and Prime Minister of Israel Menachem Begin signed the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This accord was the first agreement between the Israelis and the Arabs. However, as we mentioned earlier the Arab countries considered Sadat as a betrayer; this led the Arab League to declare a decision that would revoke the Egyptian membership of the League. The Arab mainstream agreed at that time that Egypt betrayed the Arab world through establishing peace relations with the Israel state. From this researcher’s point of view, the US efforts to achieve a peace settlement between Israel and Egypt were driven by two factors. First, to stop the Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel, as the Palestinian used the Egyptian soil to attack Israeli targets, and second, to contain any Soviet attempts to gain foothold in Egypt and therefore in the Middle East. To a large extent the US policy was successful in protecting its strategic asset (Israel) from any threat, mainly, from the biggest Arab country- Egypt.

This, should explain the US financial support to both Egypt and Israel after the signing of the 1979 Peace treaty. Thus, there were good strategic reasons for the US dedications to maintain the peace between these countries. According to Sharp (2009:6) the US government provided a total of 7.3 billion to both countries in 1979 along with economic and military grants. Moreover, the Carter administration declared its assurance of presenting economic and military assistance required to assure the safety of Israel.\(^{19}\) Meanwhile, Harold Brown the US Secretary of Defence in 1979, proclaimed the new expanded relationship between Egypt and the US, by supplying Egypt with military equipment with long term financing arrangements.\(^{20}\) Egypt became the second – largest recipient of US assistance and aid after 1979 (Sharp , 2009: 6).

\(^{19}\) Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel, march 26,1979. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/

President Sadat was assassinated in 1981, as the anger amongst the dissidents of the Egypt-Israel peace convention reached its highest levels. The vice President at that time, Hosni Mubarak was immediately assigned to be the President of Egypt. Mubarak’s foreign policy concerning maintaining strong ties with the US remained as it was during Sadat’s presidency. In 1991 Egypt participated in the allied coalition to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. Also, Hosni Mubarak followed Sadat’s path in maintaining the peace treaty with Israel. In an effort to satisfy the US demands for democracy in the region after September 11, 2001, Mubarak was challenged by internal resistance in accelerating political reforms seeking public acceptance of Egyptian aid to US policies in the region. However, Egypt again participated in the invasion of Iraq, in 2003, regardless of public resistance and broader sympathy to the Iraqi people. It’s evident that the US succeeded in keeping Egypt as a strong ally for its policies in the region. The US since 1979 aimed at sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israel peace treaty, realising that Egypt’s moderating policies in the region, served as main supportive to US interests in the region. Mubarak called for impartial and comprehensive peace between the Arabs and Israelis; this was always regarded by the US as a stabilising force in the region.

According to Sharp (2005) the US foreign policy in the Middle East region always intended to continue solid relations with Egypt. For him the primary US interest is to ‘capitalize on Egypt’s historic leadership role in the Arab world’ (ibid: 2), illustrating the Egyptian’s previous role in leading the Arab states in depending on Soviet Union weaponry, nationalising foreign interests, and introducing democratic institutions. The US valued the Egyptian active opposition to terrorism, and therefore, the US welcomed the Egyptian influence in the region which aimed at convincing other Arab nations to cooperate against terrorism. Hence, a strong Egypt would benefit the outstanding US polices in the region. In addition, a second US interest was to uphold the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord. The US-Egypt relations were also shaped in aspects of cooperate defence of regional friends against any opposing aggression or threats. Egypt participated in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, and in 2003 invasion of Iraq. The last US interest was to maintain good relations with Egypt leadership, in order to ‘sustain Egypt’s moderate voice in Arab councils and in some cases to rely upon Egypt to persuade
less moderate Arab states of the wisdom of compromise’ (Sharp 2005: 2). Consequently, President Mubarak ‘serves as a conduit carrying the various peace proposals among the Syrian, Lebanese, US, Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian negotiators and has counseled leaders of Libya, Sudan, and Iraq’ (Sharp 2005: 2).

In his visit to Cairo on June 4, 2009, President Obama called for a new beginning in relationships between the US and the Muslim World, he also argued for the need to recognise the mutual interests of shared peace in the region and, the recognition of Israel (Koutsoukis 2009). President Obama’s visit to Cairo marked the crucial importance of Egypt in the region, understanding that achieving peace would lower the hatred felt among the Arab and Muslims towards the US. Also, his speech declared the new US policy in the region, arguing that the two states (Israel, Palestine) were the only resolution to the conflict and that the US did not accept the legitimacy of Israel’s continued settlements in Palestine (Obama 2009). Broadly speaking, the visit has shown the importance of Egypt in the new US administration policies in the region. Thus, it can be argued that the US foreign policy is shaped to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict, by continuing the US- Egypt strong relations. Realising the role of Egypt in the region was one of the main reasons for President Obama to visit Cairo and to address his speech to the Muslim world. This indicates that Egypt occupies a pivotal consideration in Obama’s administration policy in the Middle East.

2.4.3 U.S – KUWAIT RELATIONS

The Sabah’s family has been the ruling power in Kuwait since the mid-1700s, although there were formal and informal restraints on the family’s power to govern (Terrill 2007). At the formal level, the Kuwaiti foreign policy from 1899 until 1961 was in the hands of the British, as Kuwait was officially under a protectorate relationship which was applied during this era. At the informal level, the Sabah family was challenged by the internal distribution of power within the emirate which was shaped by ‘the rejection of absolutist rule impression’ (Terrill 2007: 5). Kuwait gained its independence from the British in 1961, and formed the first constitution in the same year. The US- Kuwait relations started in October 1951, by establishing a consulate in Kuwait city (Katzman 2005: 1). As a result of the 1961 Kuwait independence from Britain, the US elevated its diplomatic
representation to an embassy level. It is significant that Kuwait was the first Gulf state to establish a relationship with the Soviets in the 1960s. Moreover, during the 1960s and 1970s the US-Kuwait relations were particularly described as cold, given Kuwaiti’s opposition to US policies of favouritism to Israel (Katzman 2005: 6). However, the US-Kuwait political and defence relations warmed significantly ‘at the height of the Iraq-Iran war (1987-1988), when the US established a naval escort and tanker reflagging program to protect Kuwait and international shipping from Iranian naval attacks’ (Katzman 2005: 2).

Kuwait succeeded in convincing the US administration to protect the Kuwaiti oil tankers. Kuwait threatened the US with demanding Soviet support against the Iranian attacks (which would indicate a strong Soviet influence in the Gulf region). Thus, the US was forced to become directly involved in the crises. The justifications offered by the US government to establish ‘Operation Earnest Will Program’ to defend Kuwait and international oil shipping, were: first, to secure Kuwait from Iranian threat, and second to stop any Soviet efforts to obtain foothold and influence in the Gulf region (Shahab 1993: 47-53).

The relations between Kuwait and the US became substantial as a result of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, when both countries feared an overwhelming Iranian victory. The US feared that Iranian victory would mean Soviet influence in the region. Whereas, Kuwaiti worried about Shiitic influence in the Gulf region, and therefore, threaten the local governments and systems. However, Kuwait remained neutral during the conflict, but in later stages the Kuwaiti offered economic, logistical, and diplomatic support for Iraq. By summer 1986, the Iranian responded by attacking Kuwaiti vessels in the Gulf. Consequently, the US assistance to the Kuwait government against Iranian attacks ended the Iranian naval assaults upon Kuwait oil tankers (Terrill 2007: 24-25). The US policy during the Iran-Iraq war was shaped to achieve three elements: (1) the gulf region is crucial to the US economy, therefore, any threat to oil flow or control of the oil supplies by unfriendly regimes, should be defeated; (2) the US interests in the region will be destroyed, if the Iranian are able to spread their influence in the region, thus, Iranian strength should be eliminated; and (3) as a part of US strategy in the Gulf region, Soviet influence in the gulf must be reduced, and therefore, the region should remain under US direct control. These elements
explains the US motivations in the region; this also explain the US response to the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait (Shahab 1993: 54).

The Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was driven by claims that Kuwait originally belonged to Iraq. When the Ottomans ruled most of the Arabian territory, Kuwait at that time, was under the province of Basra city. And since Basra became a part of Iraq, then Kuwait logically should be a part of Iraqi territory (Terrill 2007: 10-11). To that extent, from Saddam Hussein’s point of view, the Iraqi had historical rights in Kuwait, and therefore it should be combined with Iraq. Surprisingly, the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie in her meeting with Saddam Hussein dated the 25th of July, 1990 offered no comments on Iraqi plans to bond Kuwait to Iraqi soils (Glaspie 1990). Four days after the meeting, Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait, on August 2, 1990. To observe a clearer view of the US attitudes toward the Iraqi arrangements to invade Iraq, it’s important to view the meeting Between Saddam Hussein and Glaspie, which indicated the US position of Arab-Arab conflicts, and also highlighted the US green light for Iraq to invade Kuwait. Following are the words of both Saddam Hussein and Glaspie:

**Saddam Hussein:** as you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is no hope, [and] then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.

**US Ambassador Glaspie:** What solutions would be acceptable?

**Saddam Hussein:** If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in our war with Iran- we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq, including Kuwait, then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. What is the United States’ opinion on that?
US Ambassador Glaspie: We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary of State James Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.²¹

To a large extent, the US administration practiced a dual strategy regarding the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict. The US encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait, and at a later stage the US rejected the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The US aimed to obtain reasonable justification to maintain ample influence in the gulf region. The only mechanism to achieve this, was through motivating Iraq to occupy Kuwait, and thus the US would have the authority to intermediate in the region’s system. It is worth noting, that the US-Kuwaiti relations until 1990 were not solid, despite the US assistance during the tankers crises. Also, Kuwait always blamed and opposed the US for its supportive policies to Israel. Moreover, the Kuwaiti cooperative relations had been closer to the Soviet than the US. However, the tensions between the Soviets and Kuwaitis arose during the Iranian assault upon Kuwait oil vessels as we discussed earlier. Broadly speaking, the US strategy in the Gulf region succeeded in creating the ideal environment for more US involvement, through encouraging Iraq to invade Kuwait to observe a solid foothold in the World’s largest oil reserves.

According to Oren (2007: 564) President Bush in 1990 faced a dilemma when he had to decide between two strategic assets. Oren (2007) further argues that Kuwait supplied the US with oil, whereas Iraq contributions to US welfare were no less imperative. Iraq strong relations with the US promoted stability both in the Middle East and the Gulf region. In addition, the US valued Iraq for exercising a crucial constraint on Iran and exerting a moderating influence upon Palestinians (Oren 2007: 564). The spark that started the fire shortly before the invasion was Saddam Hussein’s accusation of Kuwait waging an economic war on Iraq. Saddam Hussein asserted that Kuwait was cheating on its Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil production quota and was thereby flooding the international market with cheap oil. From Saddam Hussein’s point of view this

policy, played a critical role in decreasing the price that Iraq would obtain for its oil. Also, Saddam Hussein accused the Kuwaiti of stealing Iraqi oil, by drilling into Iraqi oil fields along the Kuwaiti borders (Terrill 2007: 26). Consequently, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990; he apparently believed that he would obtain worldwide acceptance to the invasion, particularly, with the US tolerance for the Iraqi action.

However, the US administration blamed Saddam Hussein for the invasion, and considered it illegitimate. President Bush obtained a US Congressional decision to authorise potential military action against Iraq. The war began on January 17, 1991, and Iraqi forces were defeated and driven out of Kuwait (Terrill 2007: 31). This US involvement marked a new era of US- Kuwait bilateral and deep relations.

One should note that Kuwait rests upon approximately 10 percent of the world’s known oil reserves (Terrell 2007: 1), this makes Kuwait a vital target for the US strategic interests in the region. Thus, it can be argued that the US policy toward the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and the response by organising the coalition to free Kuwait was driven by motivations to obtain dominant control of the region’s oil resources. After the operation Kuwait freedom in March, 1991, Kuwait drew closer to the US, by signing a ten-year defense contract on September 19, 1991, which was renewed for another ten years in September, 2001 (Katzman 2005: 2). Further, the pact indicated that the US army would provide joint military exercises and training for Kuwaiti forces. In addition, Kuwait agreed upon an increase in its arms sales from the US. Kuwait agreed also on the US army being stationed in the country territories, without any restrictions (Katzman 2005: 2).

The US was advantaged by the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. The US weaponry industry benefited significantly from arms sales during and after the invasion. It is worth noting, that Kuwait was responsible for paying the costs of operation Desert Storm. In his report presented to US Congress members, Katzman (2005) indicated that Kuwait paid 16.059 billion (this amount was fully paid before the end of 1991) to offset the costs of both Desert shield and Desert Storm. This huge amount paid to the US government highlights the enormous profit the armament factories in the US gained subsequent to the US direct military involvement. Also the direct engagement with the Iraqi forces and the extensive attack upon Iraq,
gave the US army the chance to test its modern war machinery in a natural experiment. It would appear irrefutable, the US consequence to the success of Kuwait’s freedom, was to obtain permanent access to the region’s oil reserves. Also, the US acquired a foothold in the strategic entrance of Shatt al Arab, which would restrain any Iranian threat to US interests in the region.

Kuwait supported the US administration’s decision to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. Kuwait also participated in the coalition to remove the Iraqi regime. In addition, Kuwait closed almost 60 percent of its territory to secure almost 250,000 US- led invasion forces and several thousands of armor and military equipment. Moreover, Kuwait funded almost 266 million dollars to Operation Iraq freedom in 2003. In the post- Saddam Hussein era, Kuwait stationed almost 90,000 US army personnel (Katzman 2005: 2).

The shocking number of US army equipment sales to Kuwait, verify the advantages the US obtained subsequent to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1991. According to information from The Defence Security Cooperation Agency, provided in March, 2004, Kuwait purchased almost 6.3 Billion of military equipment from the US during 1991- 2002. One might argues does Kuwait really need all these equipment, especially after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in 1991. It’s obvious, that the US administration realised the security issues Kuwait suffers, and therefore employed that to obligate Kuwait to increase its military purchase, which benefitted the army equipment industry in the US.

Also, it’s essential to evaluate the US- Kuwait oil relations. Worth noting that the US imports almost 260,000 barrels a day from Kuwait, which form 3% of US oil imports. Importantly, Kuwait’s confirmed crude oil reserves are almost 95 billion barrels, which is 10% of the World’s total proven crude oil reserves. This quantity is enough for 140 years at current production levels (2 million barrels a day). The US aims to convince Kuwait to open its northern oil fields to US foreign petroleum investments. However, the US succeeded on June 8, 2005, in obtaining Kuwaiti acceptance to proceed with the ‘Project Kuwait’. Consequently, several of US energy firms, including Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, and Conoco Phillips, are part of the bidding to accomplish the project (Katzman 2005: 6). This project will increase Kuwait oil production to almost 400,000 barrels a day, which indicates
an increase of 140,000 barrels per day. It can be argued that the US has a strong control of Kuwait’s internal policies, which point to the advantages the US gained subsequent to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

2.4.4 U.S – ISRAEL RELATIONS

In the Swiss city of Basle, in August 1897, the Zionist organisation was created. Theodor Herzl, the Zionist chief, published his book *The Jewish State* in 1898, in which he first introduced his vision of the only solution to the anti-Semitism of European societies. His vision was to create for the Jews their own country, and was motivated by settlers who had already migrated to Palestine on a very small scale. During the beginning of the twentieth century, the Palestine population consisted of 96 per cent Arab Palestinian, and only 4 per cent were Jewish (White 2009:12-13). Realising that the Jewish community was small at that time, the foremost and early priority for the Zionists was to secure more land in order to establish an expanded and secure Jewish community at Palestine. Accordingly, the Jewish National Fund was founded in 1901, in order to provide land for the Jewish to settle in Palestine, henceforth, the (JNF) started to buy land, often from rich Arab Palestinian (ibid: pp 12-23).

Understanding the vital support of an imperial power, the Zionists needed to secure a charter for the Jewish guaranteed by a European power. Thus, Herzl immediately contacted Britain in order to locate a colony for the Jews (ibid: 14). Both parties agreed on Palestine as the land of Israel, which marked a new era for the recognition of Zionism. The birth of Israel was supported by President Weizmann and by the majority of British policy makers due to: (1) helping the birth of a natural ally for the British Empire which competes for more influence in a crucial geopolitical region of the world, would increase British supremacy in the world; and (2) during the mid nineteenth century onward, there were sympathetic emotional and religious support for the creation of Jewish state in Palestine amongst the European Christians (White 2009: 15).

According to White (2009: 15) ‘in the end, the role of the imperial powers proved crucial,’ the British key role in helping establishing the state of Israel, was represented by the Balfour declaration, which was sent by the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to the Zionist banking mogul, Lord Walter Rothschild in
1917. In this promise, the British government announced the establishment of the Israel state in Palestine as a national home for the Jewish people and also, the British pledged to offer their greatest endeavours to assist the achievement of the State of Israel’s objectives (Covarrubias & Lansford 2007: pp 123-124).

After the British decision was to withdraw from Palestine and hand the matter of Jewish and Palestinian’s conflict to the United Nations. To end the conflict the United Nations, in 1947, developed a partition plan to divide Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem under UN administration. However, the Arab states rejected the proposal (Migdalovitz 2009: 7). The state of Israel announced its independence on May 14, 1948, consequently the armies of Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, invaded Israel immediately after the independence declaration. However, the conflict was ended and the Arabian forces withdrew without accomplishing any developments that would serve the Palestinian rights in Palestine. This war marked a new era of power for Israel in the region, supported by the US and UK. In addition, the Israel state expanded its territory through forcing the Palestinians out of their land, and by committing state terrorism against Palestinians (ibid).

On May 14, 1948, the United States became the first country to recognise the state of Israel. We have discussed earlier in this Chapter the relationship between both the US and Israel. We have discussed also, the US official attitudes toward the 1956 tripartite aggression against Egypt, and the immediate US demand for France, Britain and Israel to withdraw from Suez Canal. Israel as a strategic asset for the US interests in the region has been deeply examined earlier in this Chapter. In addition, previously we investigated the crucial role of the US administration in achieving the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979; the Chapter also examined the US assistance to Israel during 1967, and 1973 wars between the Arabs and Israel.

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22 For more insightful information on the suffering of Palestinian people consequent to Israel state creation and the massacres against the Palestinians people please refer to White, B., (2009). Israel Apartheid: A beginners Guide. USA: Pluto Press.
It is noteworthy that the US provided Israel with considerable economic aid, which became significant during the end of 1960, and reached enormous levels in 1973, when it numbered in billions of dollars given annually to The State of Israel (almost 1.8 billion in 1970). This positioned Israel ahead of all US aid recipients. According to Khalidi (2004: 128) during the 1960s the US administration realised that Arab states (surrounding Israel) mainly, Egypt and Syria started to demand weapons from The Soviet Union in the light of their defeats by Israel in 1948, 1956, and 1967. As a response, the US began to offer significant military and economic assistance to The Israel state. For Khalidi (2004) the US Cold War policy highlighted the crucial need for a strong Israel in the region in eliminating further Soviet influence in the Middle East. Khalidi (2004: 128) further asserts:

‘The deepening American involvement in Vietnam in the late 1960s contributed to the imposition of Cold War patterns on the Middle East, as American policy-makers came to see the alignment with the Soviet Union of several Arab states, notably Egypt and Syria through Cold War lenses. Especially after it routed the Arabs in 1967, and as the war in Vietnam turned uglier, a potent Israel came to be attractive to the United States as a proxy stick with which to beat Soviet proxies in the Middle East’.

The US support for Israel from late 1960s onward was according to Khalidi (2004: 129) ‘increasingly both quantitatively and qualitatively different from that it extended to any other country in the Middle East’. The US aid to Israel not only exceeded any other aid offered to other countries, but it offered advanced weapons systems no other ally or client, as well as NATO allies, received, and which most of the time were delivered to the Israeli army at the same time they reached US military forces (ibid).

Following the 1967 war, the US and Israel interests developed into a regional partnership, as the US increasingly considered Israel as an agent for US interests in the region. In addition, the US after the Camp David Talks extended its strategic interests to Israel, by increasing the levels of loans. Most importantly, the US – Israel relationship since 1967, was centered on securing Israel and securing US vital interests in the region. The special relationship between the two systems can be simply described as a dual policy, as Israeli need US adherence to its own interests in the region, whereas US needs Israel to serve as its beacon in the region (Covarrubias & Lansford 2007: pp 123-135).
It is worth noting that Israel during the Iran-Iraq war, supported Iran—although it was officially neutral—in the meantime the US supported Iraq. This, to a large extent did not harm the special relationship between the US and Israel. Also, during the war against Saddam Hussein in 1991, the US ordered Israel not to militarily engage in the conflict, despite the Iraqi attacks on Israel by missiles. The US point of view was that any Israeli engagement would result in a regional conflict spiral. This, marked a new phase in the extensive special relationship between the US and Israel, where Israel maintain a cooperative defence with the US. Accordingly, the US defeat of the Iraqi regime, to a large extent alleviated Israel from one of the main security threats.

Moreover, due to the special relationship between the US and Israel after the Gulf War 1991, the US during the Oslo 20 August 1993 accords (held in Norway on the 20th of August 1993) became the spokesperson for the Israelis in its negotiations with the Palestinians (Khalidi 2004: pp 118-151).23 More importantly, the September, 11th, 2001 attack upon America, highlighted Israel as the only legitimate partner for the US regional stability policies in the Middle East. Consequently, the removal of Saddam Hussein from the US point of view, considered as a grand opportunity for a regional peace. This served Israel’s strategic concerns in the region, by eliminating the strategic threat from Iraq, which left Israel’s eastern borders relatively secure. Also, this removal would also open regional avenues to more aggressive peace proposals between the Arabs and Israel.

To sum up, as we previously discussed, the US is one of the greatest consumers of oil in the world and also one of the most powerful markets in the world economy. Thus, one of the primary interests of the US is to guarantee perennial access to oil at a steady price in the Persian Gulf. Logically, political and military disorder in the Gulf Region not only interrupts the oil price, but the accessibility to petroleum reserves. This was clear during the Arabs oil embargo strategy in the 1970s. Therefore, it is advantageous for the US to maintain a hegemonic position in the

region in order to sustain control over its vital interests. This explains the extensive support Israel receives from the US. The US administration always considered Israel as a primary client in the region. However, many developments weakened Israel as a strategic asset for the US policies in the region, for instance: Israel is no longer seen as a block to any Soviet influences in the region; and Iraq no longer poses a threat to Israel’s national security. Hence, it can be argued that the establishment of the US as a dominant military power in the world following the collapse of former Soviet Union, and the success of the first and second Gulf Wars, weakened the strategic partnership between the US and Israel and thus Israel may hold less importance for US policies in the region.

2.4.5 U.S – IRAQ RELATIONS

In October, 1914, the Anglo-Indian expeditionary force which landed on the al-Faw peninsula, marked a new era in the region’s history. A new state was born, stretching from the waters of the Persian Gulf in the south to the Kurdish mountains in the north (Tripp 2006: 1). The British occupation of the provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul which were ruled by the Ottoman Empire, created the so-called Iraq state. Consequent to the strategic demands of the First World War and the disassembly of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war, the British militarily occupied regions that previously were ruled by Ottoman authority. However, the British were obligated to seriously consider shaping the political reforms of the occupied territories (Tripp 2006:1). According to Tripp (2006) regardless of various doubts concerning achieving this policy- shaping the political systems- among British official circles, the decision was taken to accept the League of Nations mandate24 for the territories, committing the establishment of a state by the British government, which would ultimately be granted independence. Due to this plan, the state of Iraq was founded. Tripp

24 A league of Nations Mandate refers to a legal status for certain territories transferred from control of one country to another following World War I, or the legal instruments that contained the terms for administering the territory on behalf of the League. These were of the nature of a treaty or convention and contained minority rights clauses that provided for the right of petition and adjudication by the international Court. The mandate system was established under article 22 of the Covenant of the League on Nations, entered into on 28 June 1919. For more Information refer to http://www.Mideastweb.org/leaguemand.htm/
(2006: 1) argued that the creation of the state of Iraq was accomplished because of ‘the ambiguous legacy of the old-fashioned imperialism on one hand and the recognition of the principle of self-determination on the other’.

Consequent to the changes in the international politics following the First World War, the mandate system was created to control states that were previously under the Imperial German and Ottoman Empire authority. This gave the old imperial powers a stubborn hold on much of the world. However, the nationalism movement across Europe, Asia and Africa expanded and spread calling for immediate independence. The Iraqi people rejected the mandate system, as they were uncertain about the true nature of the system and at the meantime opposed the British huge involvement in their land. The Iraqi people driven by anger towards imperial rule, started their revolution against the British in 1920, as a result England was forced to establish a limited form of Iraqi self-government. Prince Feisal Ibn al-Hussein of the Hejaz was officially called to be the first constitutional monarch of Iraq, following the 1921 Cairo Conference (Shahab 1993: pp 3-9).

Thereafter, the shared common interests between King Feisal and Great Britain, were harnessed to develop the new state and to make it work. The rejection among the Kurds in the north and the Shia leaders of the south, increased, because they believed that the idea of the state which was firmly controlled by the British and their Hashemite allies, would not serve their goals. At this stage the King was able to overcome this resistance by force, nevertheless, as those resistance movements interrupted and attacked the British forces in large scales, England granted Iraq full independence in October 1932. Iraq was the first of the League of Nations mandates to gain full independence.

However, according to Tripp (2006: 2), British influence did not end with Iraq’s proclamation of independence. The British remained pervasive in Iraqi matters as they:

I. Maintained their military mission to the Iraqi armed forces;

II. Mainly owned most of the Iraq Petroleum Company which had begun to exploit the vast oil reserves of Iraq from the late 1920s;
III. Preserved the two British military bases at Habbaniyah and Shuaiba, and

IV. Worked in Iraq’s ministries as advisers, in large numbers.

In May, 1941, the British invaded Iraq consequent to Rashid Ali al Gailani government policies, which were considered by the British as an obstacle to British war efforts and also the Iraqi officials were seeking an alliance with Axis powers. Thus, the British were able to restore the Regent as they succeeded in installing a government more friendly to Great Britain. The British influence in Iraq continued strongly much as before the 1941 intervention. Therefore, Iraqi politics were conquered by the conservative figures of Nuri al Said, which was comprehensively supported by the British. Nevertheless, the circumstances inside and outside Iraq was changing deeply. At the internal level, the radical new parties started to question the continued British presence in Iraq, and the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy, which led to mobilising a political public that demanded primary system change. In the meantime, Kurdish nationalism became popular and they started to reject the system policies of excluding them from the benefits of the modern state. Kurds and new radical parties both agreed that the oil revenues were mainly used to benefit the government members and those who were politically close to the government. This internal factor fuelled the ‘sense of social injustice and the need for revolutionary change’ (Tripp 2006: 2).

The internal instability in Iraq was also fraught by the regional disturbances of 1950s, as the Arab governments were defeated by Israel in the 1948 war. In Egypt, the Free Army Officers Movement took over the power, and was faced with the 1956 Suez crises. However, the British and the French were incapable of overthrowing President Jamal Abed al Nasser’s regime. Also, the succession of military Coup d’état (strike against the State) in Syria, was able to overthrow the old regime in 1951. In Jordan, an attempt by alliance of nationalist politicians and army officers to overthrow king Hussein of Jordan was hardly avoided in 1957. In these circumstances, it was not surprising that similar nationalist and republican attitudes would influence a younger generation of military officers and politicians in Iraq to achieve fundamental changes in Iraq (Shahab 1993: 19).
The establishment of the US- Iraq relations started in 1954, consequent to Cold War developments. The US foreign policy aimed during the 1950s at restraining the Soviet Union influence in the region and the world. Thus, the US in order to establish strong relations with the countries surrounding the USSR, endorsed Turkey and Cyprus accession to NATO, and encouraged them to cooperate with neighboring countries. This encouragement helped Turkey and Pakistan to confederate on April, 2nd, 1954. To achieve a full containment of further USSR influence attempts toward the south, it was crucial to adjoin Iran, Afghanistan and Arabic countries to the Pact. Thus, the Iraqi admission to the Pakistani – Turkey Pact had never been a complex issue, given that Iraq announced in April, 25th, 1954, its willingness and desire to attain US economic assistance. However, the British government – which was dissatisfied with Iraq’s accession to the Pact – tried to delay Iraq entry to the Pact, understanding that Iraqi accession would indicate the end of British influence in Iraq, and thus give the US the chance for more influence in the region (Reeadh 1986: 102-103).

However, the Iraqi Prime Minister at that time, Nuri al Said who had strong relations with Great Britain and realised the major role Iraq could play in any regional militarily confederacy which would serve the benefits of Great Britain (ibid). During his visit to London, in 1954 al Said presented his suggested plan which consisted of: establishing a new Turkish – Iraqi confederacy, which could be achieved by Britain and Iraqi efforts to convince Turkey to sign the confederacy, and then these three countries, would encourage Pakistan to participate. Al Said also aimed at strengthening the position of Arab countries through Egypt, Jordan, and Syria’s participation in the Pact. Britain as a response welcomed al Said plan, as the Pact would continue the British existence in the region (ibid). Thus, on February, 24th, 1955, the Baghdad Pact was established between Iraq and Turkey for five years (ibid). The Pact emphasised the cooperation between the two countries against any threat to any of them; and to maintain the security and peace in the region and putting into effect the United Nations Resolutions concerning Palestine. The US supported the Pact financially and morally, without official participation, as the US supported the Israel state and defended the existence of Jewish country, which would mean Iraqi withdrawal from the Pact.
From this researcher’s point of view the US refusal to participate in the Pact was motivated by the US rejection of Britain’s previous colonial history.

The tripartite invasion of Suez Canal in 1956 marked the failure of the Baghdad Pact, as the British, French and the Israeli invaded Suez in order to stop Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal (ibid).

It was clear for the Iraqi opponent movements that the government of Nuri al Said held tightly to the alliance with Great Britain and with the US in the developing Cold War between the USSR and the Western Powers. Thus, Nuri al Said believed that by strengthening the alliance with the West he would maintain control of Iraq’s politics. However, his opponents in Iraq and in the Arab World increased, as there was evidence of links between the reactionary regime and western interests (ibid). In 1958, Jordan and Iraq established a union as a response to the establishment of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria. Consequent to the Jordan- Iraq Union, in July, 1958, an Iraqi military coup d’état guided by Brigadier Abdel Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd-al-Salam Arif seized the capital, and killed King Feisal and most of the royal members, and also shot Nuri al Said (ibid).

Importantly, the revolution of 1958 and the foundation of the Iraqi republic marked the end of the close relationship between Iraq and Great Britain. Most important, during 1961 and as Kuwait announced its independence, Iraqi started to claim that Kuwait belongs to its soils. Also, in 1972 Iraq nationalised Iraq Petroleum Company, which was owned by the British government. This marked the end of the special relationship between Iraq and Britain. In 1968, Ahmed Hassan al Baker became the new President of Iraq, with Saddam Hussein, who played a key role in the coup of Baath party to return to power in 1968., as the Vice-President. In 1971 the British withdrew from the Gulf region, consequently, the Baathist government, driven by Arab nationalist harmony, revoked its diplomatic relations with Great Britain as England had supported the Shah of Iran in occupying the small Islands in the Gulf which had been claimed by the newly independent United Arab Emirates. As the Iraqi regime nationalised the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1972, Iraq was advantaged from the massive prices of oil due to 1973/4 Arab oil embargo. This placed the Baathist government in an
ideal position benefiting from these circumstances, and resulting in creating the most powerful Iraqi government ever (Tripp 2006: 3).

Although Hassan al Baker was the official President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein in fact was the powerful mastermind. It can be argued that Saddam Hussein was the actual President of Iraq during al Baker’s Presidency. However, due to illness, al Baker surrendered his authority to his vice President Saddam Hussein in 1979. Saddam Hussein became the President of Iraq, Chair of the Revolutionary Command Council, and the Commander in Chief of the Iraq armed forces.

As we noted previously, the US-Iraqi relations during 1950s- until Saddam Hussein became the President of Iraq was described as typical. The British influence in Iraq continued until 1972, and thus, the US never had the chance to establish solid relations with Iraq. However, the US supported the Baghdad Pact financially and morally, but it never participated in the Pact. Of interest is that the Baath party seized power again in Iraq in 1963, through the help of the Central Intelligence of America (CIA), as the agency provided lists of communist whom the Baath party in a later stage – during the very beginning of Saddam Hussein’s Presidency- ‘were hunted down, tortured, and killed’ (Gareau 2001).

Before we proceed in examining the US-Iraqi background relations, it is important to view the US polices in the region during the 1970s, mainly, the US assistance to Iran. By doing so, we would obtain a clearer understanding of the situations that led to the first gulf conflict (Iraq-Iran war). More importantly, we will shed some light on the role played by the US administration to support vicious states with arms and economic assistance. In doing so, it can argued that the US administration aimed at containing any Soviet attempts to gain influence in the region. It can be argued that during that time supporting evil regimes was legitimate in the US considerations, regardless of state terrorism which described the situations in both Iran and Iraq. In 1951 the Shah of Iran was forced to go into exile, consequent to the rise of Mohammed Mossadegh power who had nationalised the Anglo/ Iranian oil Company. However, in 1953 the Shah organised a coup with US arrangement in which he was able to re-establish his power. Importantly, Washington in 1957 assisted the Shah of Iran to create Sazeman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK) which means national
intelligence and security organization. During 1957-1979, the Iranian citizens who criticized the Shah regime were silenced; press was censored; people were arbitrarily harassed and arrested; prisoners were systematically tortured and some were executed; religious publishing house were closed down; and mosques were infiltrated (Gareau 2001). All these state terrorism acts were executed by SAVAK, and with the US awareness, support and full agreement.

According to Gareau (2001) Iran became a special type of third world countries, due to huge income gained from petroleum sales. Hence, the US terminated all economic and military aid to Iran, which was being used to build up the country. In 1972, the sales of all types of sophisticated weapons technology excluding nuclear weapons to the repressive regime were approved by President Nixon. Moreover, consequent to 1973 oil prices, the Shah was able to satisfy his desire to obtain more weapons from the US, by establishing a defense weapons contracts with the US. As a result the Shah between 1970 and 1978 ordered $20 billion of arms from the US. (ibid).

It is worth noting, that the Shah of Iran dealt with eight American Presidents; all of them supported the Shah, and agreed to increase the arms sales to Iran. However, in 1979, the Shah was forced again into exile by Ayatollah Khomeini who returned back to Iran from exile to head the revolutionary government of Iran, as the country suffered from corruption and repression. It’s clear that the US administrations supported regimes that it considers now as the greatest enemies to democracy and thus the US. This will explain the shift in US polices toward Saddam Hussein from being the US favored friend to the most enemy of the US ever.

Consequent to Khomeini’s preaching on Islamic revolution in Iran and his calls for the need to establish Islamic revolutions in the Muslim countries, Saddam Hussein’s regime realised the imminent threat Iran posed to Iraq. Meanwhile, Iran started to support Iraq’s Kurds and Shiite communities’ insurrectionary activities in attempts to assassinate various Iraqi leaders. This led Saddam Hussein to order Iraqi troops to cross the borders into Iran in September 22, 1980 (Brands

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25 For more details refer to: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/Iran/Savak.

Having the same concerns, the US for the first two years of the conflict remained neutral. However, the US administration in 1982 supported Iraq against the Iranians. This was motivated by anxiety that any spread of the Iranian revolution throughout the Middle East would affect the Western interests. Gareau (2001) in his analysis of the US support to Iraq during the 1980s stresses that ‘Washington’s support was not motivated by the anti-communist policies of the two Republican administrations of the period, but by the fear of the spread of resurgent Islam’. Also, when the Persian Gulf War seemed to go badly for Saddam Hussein in the first two years, Washington shifted its directions to strongly support him. Those developments, explains the State Department decision in 1982 to expunge Iraq from the list of countries aiding terrorism, and to expand the formal recognition of Saddam Hussein’s regime legitimacy in 1984. The 1980s era marked the highest levels of bilateral special relations between Saddam Hussein and the US administrations.

The suspicious bilateral relationship between Saddam Hussein and the US government was advanced through the US assistance to Iraq to develop its chemical, nuclear, and bacteriological war abilities. In his discussion of the US-Iraqi relations after the State Department decision to remove Iraq from the terrorism list; Gareau (2001) argued that the US administration started to aid and supply Iraq with various fatal weapons. Gareau (2001) further indicates that:

‘This was followed by the extension of credit and a flood of exports that included agricultural products and dual-use equipment to be used Iraq in fabricating missiles and enhancing its nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical war capabilities’.

Similarly, a 1991 Commerce Department report to Congress revealed that during 1985-1987 it had proved that there were 241 dual-use items, capable of making nuclear weapons or long-range missiles if diverted from their claimed

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civilian purposes. The approved dual – use objects were mainly (1) precision machine tools to be used on SCUD missiles; (2) special digital computers for use in missile range; (3) computers for chemical weapons; (4) equipment for Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission; (5) bacterial and fungus cultures and (6) high speed oscilloscopes that could be used to pick up the brief signals from nuclear weapons’ tests.

Meanwhile, the US administration supported Saddam Hussein diplomatically in his war against Iran; the US ‘became an active partner in Saddam’s “oil war” with Iran’ (Gareau 2001). ‘The Regan administration became a co-belligerent with Saddam later in the war. In 1987 and 1988, Washington sent additional ships to the Gulf and carried out a number of attacks on Iranian oil platforms and ships’ as indicated by Gareau (2001). The US ships destroyed two Iranian oil platforms and six ships were sunk. Also, the US assisted Saddam Hussein in dealing with the Shiite population, Saddam Hussein’s policies on deporting Shiites from Iraq started by 1979, however, and consequent to the war with Iran, with the US helping Iraq, e almost 300,000 Shiites were forced out of Iraq who then became refugees in Iran. Similarly, Iraq’s Kurds were facing the same treatment, ‘the Kurds living in Iraq were victimized as well, victims of chemical attacks’ (Gareau, 2001). According to Gareau (2001), ‘by this time Iraq had become the greatest possessor and producer of chemical weapons in the third world, both in quantity and quality’. In the meantime, during 1984-1988, Iran claimed that Iraq used chemical weapons against its troops in southern area.

Classified US documents during the 1980’s show that the US was aware of Iraq’s capability to produce chemical weapons. Those documents also highlighted the Iraqi use of these weapons against Iran. However the US administration never questioned Iraq’s illegitimacy of acquiring chemical weapons, rather the US offered support for Iraq, if the case was to be presented to the United Nations. An action Memorandum signed by President Reganon November 21, 1983 (Battle

2003), and released in 1990, highlighted the US policy concerning the Iraqi use of chemical weapons as follows:

‘We have recently received additional information confirming Iraqi use of chemical weapons (CW). We also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability, primary, from Western firms, including possibly a US foreign subsidiary. ... In October Iran accused Iraq of using CW and on November 8 it requested the UNSYG to investigate. Iran also stated it would soon submit a report providing information and evidence on Iraqi CW use, but has not yet done so. We do not know whether or when this issue will develop further at the UN’ (President Regan’s Memorandum 1983 cited in Battle 2003).

As we analyse this Memorandum it is clear that the US knew the Iraqi’s capability of chemical weapons. It is also evident that the US administration was aware of Iraqi use of those weapons. However, the US respond to Iraqi use of chemical weapons can be broadly described as a consensus policy, where the US was acquainted with Iraq’s chemical weapons capacity, but never attempted to request the UN to investigate the case, and never demanded immediate disarmament of Iraq’s chemical warfare. Rather, the US allowed Saddam Hussein regime to use those weapons against Iran and the Kurds. One might ask why the US policy was shaped to support Iraq in its war against Iran and why the US during the 1980s had a special relation with Saddam Hussein’s regime. An answer can be found in a White House document signed by President Ronald Regan, dated 26 November, 1983 (ibid, Boyle 2004: pp 24-52) 28, which outlined the US strategic policy in the region, and thus to eliminate any Iranian threat to the US interests in the region. President Regan (1983 cited in Boyle 2004) emphasised that he had reviewed and approved the terms of references to govern the US political, economic, and military consultations with key allies in the Gulf region, mainly, Iraq. Regan (1983 cited in Boyle 2004) further indicated that regional allies in the Gulf expressed their willingness to cooperate with the US in planning measures

28 Ibid. Also, to obtain more information on US neutrality polices and the factors that shaped the US polices in shifting it’s polices in the region , where the Regan administration supported Iraq in its war against Iran refer to Boyle,F., Destroying World Order:US Imperialism in the Middle East before and after September 11. USA: Clarity Press. 2004. PP 24-52.
necessary to deter or defend against attacks on, or interference with neo-belligerent shipping, or on critical oil productions and transshipment facilities in the Persian Gulf. President Regan (1983) stressed that:

‘It is present United States policy to undertake whatever measures may be necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping. Accordingly, US military forces will attempt to deter and, if that fails, to defeat any hostile efforts to close the Strait to international shipping. Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic’ (ibid).

It is clear that the US feared that any Iranian victory in its war with Iraq would mean more Iranian and Soviets influence in the region, and therefore, the vital US economic interests in the region would be severely harmed. The Strait of Hormuz is the only way for the flow of oil to US markets. Accordingly, the control of the Strait by any power would logically indicate the control of the oil flow. As we discussed previously, the US during the 1987 Oil Tankers Crisis, responded by defending Kuwaiti oil tankers against the Iranian threat to defend its oil flow. To a large extent, the US also feared USSR attempts to obtain foothold in the region, therefore, the US assistance and support for Iraq was driven by motivations to prevent any USSR involvement in the Gulf region. The US direct involvement during Tankers Crisis was perfectly evaluated by Caspar Weinberger (1994 cited in Brands 1994: 193) who argued that ‘if we did not assist in the movement of the oil shipments through the Gulf, the Soviet Union would be more than happy to become the sole guarantor of the security of small Gulf States.’ Due to regional and US support to Iraq, Saddam Hussein was able to contain the Iranian threat. However, both sides suffered from huge losses, but Iran realised that war with Iraq produced massive negative impacts upon Iran. The UN efforts to end the war finally succeeded on July 18, 1988, through convincing Iran to accept the UN ceasefire resolution. The Iraq-Iran war continued for almost eight years, in one of the world’s most futile conflicts of the twentieth century.

The US-Iraqi bilateral relations during the 1980s can be described as a special and solid one. As we noted the US supplied Iraq with all kinds of weapons, also it supported Iraq politically and economically, in order to guarantee Iraq’s position
in its war with Iran. Also, the US oil exports from Iraq increased rapidly during the 1980s, as Iraq agreed to increase its oil production. It seemed that after the Iraq-Iran war ended the special relations between the US and Iraq would continue. However, another scenario started after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The old friend became the greatest US enemy ever.

After two years of the ceasefire agreement between Iraq and Iran, both countries in 1990 signed a permanent peace accord. This marked the end of the conflict between the two regimes in the region. It is worth noting, that both Iran and Iraq realised that the war was costly, financially and morally. Both countries had suffered from the huge war budget; this was an important impediment for the two systems to avoid any further conflicts in the future. Factually, Saddam Hussein was the winner of the war, as he was able to discontinue the Iranian threat to the region. Importantly, most of the Gulf region states aided and supported Iraq in its war against Iran. This assistance was motivated by domestic anxiety that any Iranian victory would mean the end of most of the systems in the region. Therefore, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq financially and politically, also Kuwait proved long term loans to Iraq in order to help Saddam Hussein’s regime to achieve victory against the Iranian threat. Kuwait financially supported Iraq with almost $10 billion, which according to Kuwaiti officials refundable after Iraq recover from the war. However, Saudi Arabia decided to erase the Iraqi debts, whereas Kuwaiti started to demand its debts back from Iraq. This was the spark that started the fire leading Iraq to decide to invade Kuwait.

For almost thirty years, Iraq had claimed that Kuwait territory historically belonged to Basra. Also, Iraq realised that the Kuwait location had always been vital to its dominance in the Gulf region, noting that Kuwait controlled Iraq’s outlet to the Gulf. Also, Kuwaiti demands for its debts from Iraq marked the beginning of the controversy between the two regimes. Iraq’s argument was that Kuwait should not insist on getting its financial support to Iraq back, as Iraq was the main factor in eliminating Iranian expansionist policies in the region, and therefore Kuwait should appreciate the Iraqi efforts to contain the Iranian imminent threat to the region’s systems. Also, one of the reasons that led Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait was the Kuwaiti oil policies; Kuwait and other oil producers had lowered the oil prices. The Iraqi argument was that Iraq had
financially suffered consequent to its war with Iran, and therefore in order to recuperate, oil revenues would help Iraq to rebuild the suffering economy depending on oil revenues. However, from Saddam Hussein’s point of view, the Kuwaiti oil policies deprived Iraq of revenues required to pay for the recent war with Iran. In addition, Iraq alleged that Kuwait was stealing oil from the Rumaila oilfield, which straddled the borders between Iraq and Kuwait. Consequent to these developments, Saddam Hussein had his meeting with the US ambassador in Iraq, April Golspie who stressed that the Iraq- Kuwait conflict was none of US concerns and that this conflict should be solved regionally. This from the Iraqi administration’s point of view was considered as a green light for Saddam Hussein to deal with the problem as he wished. Consequently, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 with an army of 100,000 thousand (Freedman & Karsh 1993).  

Most importantly, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred at a time of great change in world politics. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, announced the birth of the US as the only remaining super power. Thus, from this researcher’s point of view, the US supportive policies to Iraq during the conflict aimed to form a barrier against any USSR attempted influence in the region. Logically, as the USSR collapsed the US administration noticed that Iraqi containment of USSR influence in the region had expired, and therefore, any threat to the region’s stability should be rejected. This should explain the US attitudes towards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Another argument which also explains the US attitudes was that, the US always intended to destroy and overthrow the Iraqi regime, given that Saddam Hussein was considered as a major threat to US interests in the region. The US administration always intended to attain persuasive reason to directly intervene in the regions policies, in order to gain foothold which would largely benefit the US vital interests in the region. Hence, the US created the ideal circumstances for its legitimate intervention policies in the region. It is worth noting, that the US administration designed and planned its attitudes theretofore

the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, by telling Saddam Hussein that he should resolve the conflict with Kuwait in Arab circles and that the US policies considered that conflict out of the US concerns. This was the hoax that Saddam Hussein never analysed.

However, according to Springborg (1991: 28) Saddam Hussein believed that an invasion of Kuwait was possible, given that, like modern invasions, Kuwait invasion would succeed, as other invasions went unhindered by UN Security Council actions, including Indonesia’s 1975 invasion of East Timor and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Therefore, Saddam Hussein expected to be treated clemently. Nevertheless, consequent to any occupation of Kuwait, the US oil interests would be at stake, which was never figured out by Saddam Hussein (ibid). This was Saddam Hussein’s most costly mistake, given that President George W Bush determined that to ‘allow one nation to invade with impunity would encourage others to do the same’ (ibid: 28). Similarly, Brands (1994: 197) indicates that Saddam Hussein believed that the US would do no ‘more than slap his wrist, or at the most impose trade restrictions’. However, the Iraqi expectations were entirely incorrect, according to Brands, in the US point of view; Iraq occupation of Kuwait would have dangerous impacts upon the US interests and the Global economy. Brands (1994:197) further discussed the impact upon the Bush administration, by arguing that:

‘This left the Bush administration in a quandary. The world or that large part of it that consumed oil could live with a merged Iraq-Kuwait. Such a merged entity would be an important player in the international energy market, but as long as Saudi Arabia, the largest exporter of Middle Eastern oil, remained independent. ... An Iraqi seizure of Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, might turn the global oil picture on its head’.

Strangely, the US never warned Saddam Hussein of the consequences of any attempts to invade Kuwait. Rather the US administration acted as if there was nothing going to happen. From this researcher point of view, if the US warned Saddam Hussein or even gave him indicators of the dangerous outcome upon his actions, Saddam Hussein would most likely have acknowledged that, and therefore would not invade Kuwait. Concerning this view, Young & Jesser
(1997:160) observe that ‘there were also questions of why both Britain and the United States consistently ignored intelligence reports that Saddam Hussein planned to invade Kuwait, and misled the world into believing that the next target was Saudi Arabia when this appears to have been untrue’. Thus, it can be argued that the US administration in reality encouraged Iraq to invade Kuwait with their understanding, of the importance of the regime change in Iraq. The US administration realised the great danger Saddam Hussein posed to the US interests in the region. And thus, regime change in Iraq would give the US the golden chance to promote its interest agenda in occupying Iraq. All these factors should explain the shift of US polices toward Saddam Hussein, and also should explains why Saddam Hussein became out of favour with the US administration. Accordingly, the US succeeded in acquiring UN Resolutions 661 and 678, the first to impose comprehensive sanctions on Iraq whilst 678 provided for the use of armed forces to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which was achieved in 1991.

2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that U.S relations with Middle Eastern states have from the start been dominated by successive U.S governments desire to ensure a continued supply of affordable oil. Such cheap oil was seen as a necessary foundation for U.S economic and military power, and successive U.S governments have sought to develop and maintain a permanent military foothold in the region as a basis for keeping the oil flowing. This explains the U.S government’s efforts to support and stabilize those regimes within the region willing to accommodate such U.S requirements. Ruling elites in post Nasser’s Egypt, Kuwait and particularly Saudi Arabia have been willing to assist the U.S in exchange for appropriate financial, political and military assistance.

For more information on the US and UK policies immediately before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait refer to:

The state of Israel has played a central role since its inception in so far as it has confronted and counteracted the developments of Anti-U.S Arab Nationalism.

From the start U.S imperial interests have confronted a succession of competing interests and powers in the region; first, Britain and France, then the Soviet Union and Arab nationalism.

Saddam Hussein was originally recognized and supported as a U.S ally against Soviet and Iranian influence in the region during the 1980s. However, his aggression against Kuwait in 1990, with the threat of his gaining control of greater oil resources, was seen by the US as dangerous and destabilizing.

This explains why Saddam Hussein fell out of favor with the U.S administration, which thereafter sought to contain Saddam in order to maintain its control in the region. After the September 11, 2001 the U.S administration started to highlight Iraq’s WMD’s as a major and imminent threat and demanded regime change which was accomplished in March 2003.
CHAPTER THREE


3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to reveal whether the US-led attack upon Iraq in 2003 was legitimate under the charter of the UN. This chapter explores in depth the US legal claims to justify the invasion of Iraq. Examination of the background of the war is essential to determine whether or not the United Nations Security Council did implicitly authorise the Iraq invasion. It also examines the just war framework in order to evaluate whether the US invasion of Iraq was justified under the terms of just war theory.

The chapter investigates the US rationales to legally justify the invasion. This include reference to alleged: Weapons of Mass Destruction; fighting international terrorism (links between Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein); and the need to overthrow the evil regime in Iraq (humanitarian intervention).

This chapter draws particularly upon the work of Alex Bellamy and Ronli Sifris to clarify the issues surrounding the legality of Iraq invasion in 2003. In particular, their work argues that the resolutions passed at the time of the First Gulf War were not intended to authorise successive use of force against Iraq. Nor, according to Bellamy (2003: 497), did Resolution 1441, passed on November 2002, provide implicit authorisation to use force against Iraq. Bellamy further argues that:

‘Given the substance of the reports of Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, and the subsequent failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the self-defence argument is also untenable. Indeed, to accept either of the legal justifications proposed for the war in Iraq would stretch general legal principles to such an extent as to risk undermining the principles themselves’.

The chapter introduces the views of international jurists regarding the legality of the 2003 Iraq invasion. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 raised significant debate regarding the legitimacy and legality of military actions against Iraq
without overt United Nations endorsement. Two conflicting views predominated; Bellamy (2003:497) indicates that some argued that the US-led invasion of Iraq ‘enjoyed the implied authorisation of the Security Council’. They suggested that the UN Resolution 678, a ‘remnant of the first Gulf War’ (ibid: 497) continued to permit the use of force in order to accomplish Iraqi compliance with the First Gulf War cease-fire agreement. Others argued that the invasion was illegal and thus, ‘illegitimate’ as there was no straightforward UN resolution to authorise the use of force against a sovereign of an independent country. The US administration argued that the invasion was legitimate, because Iraq posed an imminent threat to the US and international peace and security. Therefore, and depending on this claim the US asserted that the Iraq occupation was legal and inescapable and that the invasion fell under a right to pre-emptive self-defence.

3.2 U.N CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE PARADIGM

3.2.1 PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE

After the end of World War II, leading nation states sought to institute a new normative standard for the use of force in the international community. Resulting from this intensive aspiration, the UN charter was founded on April 25, 1945, which clearly prohibits the use of aggressive force among nations. The Charter of the UN emphasises that international peace is the most primary aim of the newly established international organisation, and is to be conserved if at all possible (Svarc, 2007: 174). Examining the main purposes of the United Nations indicates that the aim of establishing the United Nations as stated in Chapter I of article 1, is to achieve a peaceful international environment to:

- Maintain international peace and security;
- Develop friendly relations among nations;
- Achieve cooperation in solving global problems and the promotion of fundamental freedoms; and
Act as a centre for harmonizing these efforts (UN Charter, Chapter I. Article 1).

The Charter then goes on to highlight two fundamental principles of the UN. First, Article 2(3) requests nations to resolve their international disagreement through peaceful means. Second, Article 2(4) set forth the general prohibition of the use of force (Svarc 2007: pp. 174-175).

The charter’s mandate under Article 2(4) is obvious:

‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ (UN Charter. Chapter I Article 2).

Svarc (2007: 175) observes that:

‘Unquestionably, the prohibition of the use or threat of force contained in Article 2(4) forms not only a part of the conventional but also of general customary international law. The International Court of justice has described this provision as a rule of jus cogens, binding upon all States, not only members of the United Nations. The travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter reveal that article 2(4) was intended to operate as an absolute all-inclusive prohibition...’

Thus, States are fundamentally prohibited from using force in international affairs, and from intimidating others with the use of force in all but narrowly defined conditions (Ibid P. 175). Or as Svarc put it ‘the effect of Article 2(4) is that any specific use of force is lawful only if it is based on a legal exception to this prohibition’ (ibid: 175).

The UN Charter explicitly predicted only two exceptional circumstances: 1) collective military enforcement action taken or approved by the UN Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII (and by expansion for regional organisation under Chapter VIII), and 2) the exercise of individual or collective self-defence as sketched in Article 51 of the UN charter (Svarc, 2007: 175). Therefore, to examine the legality of any military action relies on the enforceability of either of one of these exceptions, which we will examine consecutively.
Svarc (2007:176) emphasises that the Charter of the UN ‘does in fact envision the possibility of addressing an emerging threat with military force if necessary’. Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Security Council is responsible for facilitating the pacific settlement of disputes (UN Charter. Chapter VI. Articles 33-38). Therefore, according to Sifris (2003: 524) The Security Council pursuant to Chapter VI ‘may make non-binding recommendations for the resolution of disputes it considers likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.’ Nevertheless, Sifris maintains that ‘it is only when acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that the Security Council can authorise the use of force’ (P 524.) Article 42 which is included in Chapter VII indicates that should the Security Council consider measures not involving the use of militarily armed forces to be insufficient (Sifris 2003:525) . Sifris (2003) argues that it is generally acknowledged that the UN itself may take an action to impede or it may authorise a member state to take such an act.

Pursuant to Chapter VII, the Security Council might authorise military actions not only in reaction to an aggressive act or major breach of the peace, but even in response to threats to the international peace in order to maintain international security and peace (UN Charter. Chapter VII). The Security Council resolutions adopted in relation to Iraq since 1990 were made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this Chapter I will examine all the resolutions related to Iraq until the invasion which occurred in March of 2003, in order to reveal whether or not the US - led attack was taken under the authorisation of the UN Security Council approval.

3.2.2.1 SELF-DEFENCE AND LIMITATIONS

According to Printer (2003: 337) Paragraph 4 of article 2 only prohibits the use of aggressive force; however, it does not prohibits ‘the use of force in its entirety, and recognizes an exception to the general rule by acknowledging the right of self –defence’. Thus, it can be argued that international law on the use of force in self- defence is outlined by, but not limited to, the Charter of the UN. Bellamy (2003: 501) observes that the UN Charter law on the use of force
is attributed in article 2(4), which internationally considered having the status of *jus cogens* in international customary law. Bellamy further indicates that article 2(4) calls upon nations to avoid threat or use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of other nations in the international society. According to him this standard was internationally ‘intended to be generally applicable and broadly interpreted’ (ibid:501). However, as emphasised by Bellamy there are two exceptions to the general prohibition of use of force which are exist in the UN Charter. First, under article 42 – set out in Chapter VII of the *UN Charter* which outlined Security Council measures that are compulsory on all nations- the Security Council is empowered to approve the use of force to defend, protect and restore security and international peace. Article 42 of Chapter VII reads:

‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such actions by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations’ (UN Charter. Chapter VII. Article 42).

Second, Article 51 of the UN Charter provides nations with an ‘inherent right’ to self – defence against any armed attack. Article 51 in this manner, explicitly states that:

‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect that authority and responsibility of the Security council under the present Charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (UN Charter, Article 51).

In his discussion of Article 51 of the UN Charter, Printer (2003) asserts that the fact that the language states that the right to self-defence is ‘inherent’ proposes that the right, which existed as a matter of customary international law before the adoption of the Charter, was integrated into the Charter and continues to subsist independently of the Charter.
While the UN Charter provides nations for the right to ‘self-help’, it gives slight regulation regarding the modalities of self-defence (ibid: 338). Printer notices that the ‘requirement of a condition precedent means that the right may only be exercised in the case of an “armed attack”’ (ibid: 338). Nevertheless, Article 51 of the UN Charter does not present any definition of what ‘armed attack’ may comprise. According to Printer, the failure to present an accurate definition for what should be considered as an ‘armed attack’ has ‘left scholars to debate whether the right to use counter force exists only in cases of an armed attack, or whether it may exist in situations other than armed attack’ (Ibid : 338). Printer observes that the commonly acknowledged standard is that to constitute an armed attack accordant to the UN Charter, the hostility must be by armed force and of adequate magnitude and cruelty. On the same grounds Joyner (2007:23) argues that two critical principles are necessary for self-defence actions to be carried out legitimately. First, the attack must be real and not imagined, thus making the armed response in self-defence really needed. That is, the use of force must be essential to defend oneself against a certain hazard. Joyner in presenting the second self-defence principle, argues that:

‘The armed response in self-defence must be relatively proportional to the aggrieved offence. An attack by one state does not legitimize the use of self-defence by a state through unleashing overwhelming force leading to the total destruction of the aggressor state. The damage inflicted and the costs incurred must be commensurate with the expected good from the decision to restore the violence’ (Joyner 2007).

Furthermore, according to McCormack (1996) to decide whether or not an aggressive use of force crosses the levels and triggers the use of self-defence is a ‘subjective’ choice to be made by the attacked country. However, ‘the determination is ultimately subject to legal scrutiny by the international community in conformity with the preceding standard’ (Printer, 2003: 339). According to Printer if the aggressive use of military force does not reach the stage of an actual armed attack, a state may follow traditional criminal law sanctions, but may not choose to lawfully respond with military conduct.

Similarly, Svarc (2007: 177) emphasises that ‘the language of Article 51 clearly stipulates that self defence is lawful only where there is an armed attack.’

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Svarc further points out that States are not allowed to protect themselves against every use of armed force. Related to the issue of the right to self-defence against armed attack, Article 51 requires the victim state to immediately report its use of force in self – defence to the Security Council, which would take all necessary measures to restore international peace and security (Shah 2008). In his examining of the language of Article 51 and self-defence principle, Shah (2008: 89) stresses that Article 51 indicates that any self-defence measure of the victim state shall not affect the Security Council authority to ‘take any action it may deem necessary either to maintain or restore peace and security.’

Wattad (207: pp 205-219) in his Article Resurrecting Romantics at War, differentiates between three types of Self-Defence. According to him the first is legal action under the UN Charter, whereas, the second and the third can be easily classified as illegal Self- Defence:

A. Reactive Self- Defence: the reactive self – defence approach is obtained from the exact meaning of the term “if an armed attack occurred”. Thus, self – defence to a hostility that has already been done or is in progress. An illustration of this type of self-defence can be found in the classic case of the 1967 Israeli- Egyptian War;

B. Preventive Self-Defence: it is nothing but the romantic extension of the right to self-defence. Therefore, International law scholars agree that this form of self-defence is illegal under the UN Charter; and

C. Anticipatory/ Pre-emptive Self- Defence: This indicates that an anticipatory/ pre-emptive strike is grounded on a prediction of how the feared enemy is likely to perform in the future. Nonetheless, it can be a rational possibility, it is not based on an observable aggression, and thus it can be considered as illegal.

3.3 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND USE OF FORCE

3.3.1 ANTICIPATORY / PRE-EMPTIVE SELF –DEFENCE.

The principle of anticipatory self-defence regards the right of a state, in specific situations, to resort to force in self-defence before the actual armed attack has
started (Duxbury 2002). Or as Lohr (1985: 34) puts it, anticipatory self-defence indicates the use of force by a state to prevent an attacker before an actual attack has commenced, before the military of the enemy has crossed the frontier, and before the enemy bombs fall upon its territory. Anticipatory is a term that ‘refers to the ability to foresee consequences of some future actions and take measures aimed at checking or countering those consequences’ (Hole 2003: 72).

3.3. 1. 1 RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION

According to Shah (2008:89) the argument for the restrictive interpretation of article 51 highlights the qualifying phrase ‘if an armed attack occurs’ and what represent an ‘armed attack’. Those who argue for the restrictive interpretation maintain that the use of force is ‘expressly limited to situations where an armed attack has already commenced or occurred’ (Ibid: 89). Shah (2008) further indicates that rejectionists of anticipatory self-defence doctrine broadly believe that an armed attack means once the armed forces of one state have crossed the borders of another state. Thus, from their point of view, anticipatory self–defence is not lawful depending on the actual wording of the UN Charter, specifically article 51 which highlighted the concept of ‘if an armed attack occurs’, this phrase indicates that to be lawfully invoked to use force, an army attack against another state must first occur (Simma et al. 1994: pp 676).

Shah (2008 : 89) introduces the Restrictive interpretation argument clearly when he writes:

‘They argue that while customary international law, prior to the United Nations Charter, might have allowed self- defence in anticipation of an armed attack in certain circumstances, article 51 limits the scope of that right. Self –defence is now only allowed in response to an “armed attack” against a state and does not include anticipatory self-defence. Any use of force in self-defence shall be reported to the Security Council immediately, which shall take necessary measures...’.

In his review of the Restrictive Interpretation argument, Shah (2008) stresses that their view indicates that the right to use force in self-defence appears as an independent but ‘temporary right’ conditional upon Security Council
measures ‘... until the Security Council comes into play and hinges on the occurrence of an armed attack. Apparently, article 51 exhausts the customary right to self –defence’ (ibid: 89). Thus, the ordinary meaning of ‘if an armed attack occurs’ should prohibit military actions other than preventative persuaders mentioned and listed in the UN Charter (Brownlie 1963: pp 275-279). Sima et al (1994: 676) indicate that most of the key aims of the UN are to preserve the security and the peace of the international society, and to decrease the independent use of force, it is then contended that self-defence as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force, should be rarely required.

Sifris (2003: 537-38) elucidates the proponents point of view concerning the illegality of anticipatory self-defence. Such proponents regularly refer to international reaction to the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear plant under construction in 1981 as an evidence that there is no rule under international customary law supporting the anticipatory self-defence doctrine. Sifris then pursues in presenting the proponents illustration:

‘Israel justified the attack by stating that the reactor would be used to manufacture weapons for the purpose of attacking Israel. The Security Council unanimously passed a resolution strongly condemning ‘the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct....’ (Ibid: pp.537-538).

Article 51 wording requires an actual armed attack using weapons, therefore, declarations or threats to use force from another state are not sufficient to announce or exercise the right of self-defence doctrine (Gross 2001). Sifris (2003) in his analysis of anticipatory self-defence states that:

‘There is clearly some confusion as to what constitutes an ‘armed attack’ for the purpose of art 51 of the UN Charter. It is interesting to note that in many instances where the international community has rejected a claim of anticipatory self-defence, it has done so out of a belief that one of the core requirements of necessity and proportionality was not met, rather than on the basics that an ‘armed attack’ had not occurred’ (Sifris 2003: 539).
3.3.1.2 EXPANDED INTERPRETATION

Conversely, the expanded interpretation school argues that force can be used as a response to an ‘imminent threat’, and thus the use of force is not entirely limited to an actual armed attack to occur in order to justify the self-defence approach. Shah (2008: 90) emphasises that the expanded interpretation school publicists reasoned their view relying on the role of ‘self-defence is a customary right as well as recognised by the Charter’. Shah (2008:90) further indicates that they argue that ‘Customary law lives side by side with conventional law’. According to international customary law, if the threat of an armed attack is ‘imminent’, anticipatory self-defence is acceptable (Shah 2008: 90). Sifris (2003) who supports the expanded interpretation point view argues that anticipatory self-defence is legitimate, seeing that Article 51 was not ‘intended to invalidate prior customary law, which permitted anticipatory self-defence’. Or, as indicating by (Shah 2008: 92) that the Charter ‘codifies the right of anticipatory self-defence available under customary international law’. And thus as stated by (Shah 2008: 92) ‘the intention of Article 51 seems to be to make anticipatory self-defence a statutory right, not to limit it’.

Brown (2003) provides an example of UN measures regarding self-defence doctrine and the legality of state actions in cases of anticipatory self-defence. According to Brown Israel in 1967 responded with force to aggression posed by Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Israel was supported by the majority of the International community which accepted Israel’s right to act depending on anticipatory self-defence doctrine. Israel predictions that there was ‘imminent threat’ were: the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Sinai, the Arab rhetoric calling to end Israel, the closure of the Tiran straits, and the massing of Arab forces along the borders with Israel. Thus, according to the UN, Israel’s response is a relevant example of a lawful exercise of self-defence under Article 51 (Savrc 2007: 180). Most importantly, if the attack is not imminent, an authorisation from the Security Council is needed in order to legitimate the use of force in case of self-defence.

Crucial to the above discussion of the anticipatory self-defence, is what represents an armed attack? According to Baker (1988: pp 25-49) the UN
Charter does not define what ‘armed attack’ is, nor does any debate of the expression emerge in the San Francisco Conference records. However, according to (Shah 2008: pp 92-93) the restrictive school agree that an armed attack is the physical occurrence of the attack when the army forces of one country cross into another state border.

Contrary to the restrictive school point of view, the liberal school considers that an ‘imminent threat’ is integrated in the concept of an armed attack and thus nations are entirely authorised to use force in self-defence in anticipation if the threat is real and imminent (Shah 2008: 93). Shah (2008 : 93) sums up the arguments for the justification of the use of force in self-defence in the case of an imminent threat or anticipatory self-defence ‘the main argument is that article 51 preserves the customary right of self-defence, which recognizes anticipatory self –defence’ and ‘the development in weaponry and its delivery system has buttressed the main argument’.

In his evaluation of imminent threat and anticipatory self-defence notions, Shah (2008: 94) stresses that those arguments appear reasonable, however, according to him ‘imminent threat must meet the standard that the aggression or the threat has to be “real, verifiable, and leave no choice of other means to deflect it. Only then may the use of force in anticipatory self-defence within the strict limits of proportionality be justified’. Regarding possession of hazardous weapons by nations to be considered as a justifiable reason to declare war under the criteria of imminent threat, Shah (2008: pp. 94-95) writes:

‘The mere possession of these dangerous weapons should not in itself be a ground for reaching a conclusion that the attack is imminent. There must be a clear intention and some sort of mobilization for using these weapons that target the state to justify the use of force in anticipation. Resorting to the use of force on unfounded fear of imminent attack could be disastrous’.

Also, related to the discussion of the notion of anticipatory self –defence is the aspect of pre-emptive self defence. It is worth noting that most international law scholars failed to distinguish between the anticipatory and pre-emptive self defence. As they considered anticipatory self –defence as a pre-emptive self –defence. They catalogue the two notions as to have the same meaning and influence in international law. Shah in his extensive comparative study of
self-defence doctrine in both Islamic and international law refers to Chambers
dictionary to obtain a definition for pre-emptive self-defence in order to
distinguish between anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence. According to
(Shah 2008: 102) the Chambers dictionary meaning of anticipate is ‘to predict
something and then act as though it is bound to happen’. Shah (2008: 102)
specifies that the word anticipate indicates ‘that something is certain and
bound to happen, which must be responded to. The degree of certainty is
greater so there is a lesser chance for miscalculations’. On the other hand,
according to Shah (2008) the Chambers dictionary’s gives the meaning of the
word pre-emptive, in the military approach, as ‘effectively destroying the
enemy’s weapons before they can be used’. Shah (2008: 102) notes that this
meaning ‘connotes a military tactic during the war rendering the enemy less
capable of fighting, it does not involve an action against a sovereign nation’s
weaponry installations without being in a state of war’.

Shah (2008: 103-109) observes that there are three trends on the use of force
under pre-emptive doctrine. Shah listed the three arguments as follows:

I. Argument for Pre-emptive self-defence: This includes states such as the
United States, Israel and scholars whom argue for the justification of
pre-emptive use of force under the broader interpretation of article 51.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US in 2002 spelled out its
National Security Strategy in which it indicated that the US would act
against aggression and threats before they occurred or formed. Thus, the
US announced the new claim of the pre-emptive doctrine as a legitimate
act to self-defence against terrorist organisations world-wide. Israel too
favoured the pre-emptive self-defence approach, under the claim that
the proliferation of atomic, chemical weapons and biological weapons
may form a major threat to its safety and security;

II. Argument against pre-emptive self-defence: This includes those who
identify the seriousness of the threat terrorism poses and argue for
practical interpretation of the rules on the use of force. The mainstream
international law scholars oppose the notion of pre-emption when
discussing the use of force in self-defence. As use of force breaches the
fundamental principles of international law. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force, which should only be used in exceptional cases where all peaceful endeavours have been exhausted; and finally

III. Argument considering pre-emptive self-defence as a cautious approach: This includes publicists and states aware of the dangers and abuse involved in the pre-emptive use of force that strongly argue against it. They argue that a cautious view of anticipatory self-defence must be interpreted consistently with the UN Charter’s aim of limiting the use of force in the international society. This also indicates that the requirement of imminence must mean that there is no time to choose a different approach of action. However, as they emphasise, the danger should be imminent in that it can be classified credibly, exclusively, and with high degrees of certainty. Also, the requirement of necessity should exist, meaning that time has run out as peaceful resolutions to avoid force have been exhausted.

Shah (2008: 107) in his conclusion of the discussion on the pre-emptive self-defence favours the argument against the pre-emptive self-defence. He writes:

‘The arguments for pre-emptive self-defence are not persuasive and the notion seems to be too broad and fraught with risks to be accepted as a norm of international law. To use military force for preventing the states from gaining Capabilities that may pose a threat to a target state or international peace and security in the future (…). Is a very loose ground and several situations would require action today. The Arab states may join hands to attack Israel because it is building its nuclear arsenal and is becoming a growing threat to Muslim states in the region…. India may attack Pakistan because Pakistan supports the Kashmir freedom fighting movements and its nuclear capability is India specific. This will breach international peace and security’. Emphasis added.

3.4 THE LEGAL CASE FOR THE IRAQ INVASION 2003

On March 19, 2003, US and allies military forces attacked Iraq. This invasion came weeks after the US had tried to gain international support for a war against Iraq and two days after, the US administration issued an ultimatum ordering Saddam Hussein to leave office (Joyner, 2007: 22). In this context, the US, the UK and Australia each suggested that there was adequate authority in
existing Security Council resolutions to authorise and legitimise the use of force against Iraq (Bellamy, 2003:501). US Secretary of State Colin Powell in November 10, 2002 insisted that ‘the United States believes that because of past material breaches, current material breaches and new material breaches there is more than enough authority for it to act’ (Cited in ibid p501). Similarly, in an article published in The Guardian, Roberts (2002) emphasises that military actions in Iraq can be justified only under the claim that Iraq violated its commitment to disarm. Roberts (2002) further argues that ‘in the case of Iraq, the core rationale for military actions is Iraq’s consistent violation of UN Security Council resolutions particularly as regards disarmament and inspection’. Robert (2002) insists that ‘the strongest case for the legality of military action rests not on any general propositions about preventive defence or any other such ground, but upon Iraq’s violation of UN resolutions’ (ibid). This, according to Bellamy (2003: 502) ‘formed the basis of the case put forward by the Attorneys-general of the UK and Australia’.

The case of the US, UK and Australia to use force against Iraq without further UN resolution rested principally on interpretations of Resolution 678, Resolution 687 and Resolution 1141. Bellamy (2003: 502) indicates that the US, UK and Australia’s starting point was ‘the observation that Resolution 678 authorised the use of force not only to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait but also to restore international peace and security in the area’.

Related to the research is a brief description of the main Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq passed since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

- **Resolution 678 (1990):** authorises member states ‘to use all necessary means’ in order to ensure immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, aiming to restore security and peace in the area (Sifris, 2003:525).

- **Resolution 687(1991):** sets out the terms of the cease-fire agreement following the 1991 Gulf War. Resolution 687 prohibits Iraq from supporting terrorism, developing or acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction, and from obtaining ballistic missiles with warhead activated ranges greater than 150 Kilometers (Ibid :525).

Resolution 1154(1998): provides for severest consequences to deal with Iraqi failure to comply with the UN Special Commission (‘UNSCOM’) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (‘IAEA’) inspections (Ibid: 525).

Resolution 1194 (1998) and Resolution 1205(1998): both condemn Iraq’s decision to suspend and then cease cooperation with UNSCOM (Ibid: 525).


Resolution 1441(2002): in which the Security Council afford Iraq with a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. The Resolution indicates that the Security Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that breaches of its obligation would attract serious consequences. Also, Resolution 1441 decided that Iraq has been and remain in material breach of its obligation under relevant resolutions (Ibid: 525).

3.4.1 DID U.N PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AUTHORISE THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ?

The US premised its invasion of Iraq on the prediction that Iraq was a major threat to international security and peace, particularly the claims of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. This rationale drove the Bush administration in 2003 to obtain a Security Council approval for the use of force against Iraq, however, the US efforts failed (Joyner 2007: 24).

The 15 member UN Security Council never endorsed or authorised the 19 March 2003 military attack by the US and allies on Iraq. However, according to Joyner (2007), the Security Council issued Resolution 1441 in November 8, 2002, which called for new inspections aimed to find and eliminate Iraq’s
supposed weapons of mass destruction. In response, Iraq agreed to welcome the renewed inspections, which were to be carried out by UNMOVIC and IAEA. Joyner (2007) indicates that under the terms of Security Council Resolution 1441, if Iraq obstructed the Commission’s work, the UN inspectors were to report promptly back to the Security Council, ‘which would then convene immediately to consider the situation and decide how the need for full compliance might be obtained’ (ibid: 24). Most importantly, Resolution 1441 indicates that if Iraq failed to comply with UN Inspectors then serious consequences may apply. This was a direct threat to Iraq presented through Resolution 1441.

In its efforts to obtain a second UN resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq, the US supported by UK and Australia aimed to declare Iraq in material breach of its obligation to disarm under Resolution 1441. However, the veto-wielding members including France, Russia, and China, stressed that they would rather give the UN inspectors more time, as they believed that inspectors still need time to determine Iraq’s compliance with the Commission and to make sure that Iraq’s disarmament was accomplished. This forced the US on March 17, 2003, to withdraw its proposal to obtain a further resolution to allow the use of force against Iraq. (ibid: 24).

Nevertheless, Joyner (2007) emphasises that the US administration argued that sufficient legal support existed for military intervention into Iraq. According to him, the US argument relied on Security Council Resolution 1441 and also on two previous Security Council resolutions. Resolution 678 which authorised UN members to use military force in 1991 to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait; and Resolution 687, which outlined the terms for the cease-fire agreement that ended the Gulf War. The US administration on March, 2003, asserted that because Iraq never complied with the terms of the cease-fire agreement, or with the other Security Council resolutions adopted against Iraq during 1991-2003, use of force against Iraq was justified and lawful (Joyner 2007: 25).

UK and Australia Attorney Generals assert that after Kuwait’s liberation, Resolution 687 outlined the conditions that Iraq would have to accept for a
cease–fire agreement to come into effect (Bellamy 2003:502); it insisted that Resolution 687 ordered Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, elimination or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all biological and chemical weapons, including all related subsystems and research facilities, and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 Kilometers (UN Resolution 687, 1991). According to Bellamy (2003), the Attorney–Generals in both UK and Australia asserted that the Iraqi disarmament was only one section of a broader cease–fire package which included the deployment of UN peacekeepers along the Iraq–Kuwait border, also, the return of Kuwait property pillaged during the Iraqi occupation and the payment of reparations to foreign nationals and corporations that had suffered financial loss as a result of the war. Accordingly, as Bellamy indicates, the Attorney Generals argued that Resolution 687 could be considered as laying down criteria for judging whether or not security and peace in the region had been restored. This point of view was supported by the British Attorney–General Lord Goldsmith, who stressed that any material breach of Resolution 687 would automatically renew the authority to use force against Iraq under UN Resolution 687 (Lord Goldsmith 2003).

Bellamy (2003: 502) indicates that all following resolutions concerning the Iraqi disarmament program, mainly, UN Resolution 1154 and Resolution 1158 which passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, identified Iraqi non-compliance with the UN and thus causing a threat to international security and peace. Bellamy notes that Resolution 1441 found Iraq to be in a material breach of UN Resolution 687 and warned of serious consequences if Iraq refused to comply. Bellamy (2003: pp. 502-503) in his discussion of the meaning of “serious consequences” concept highlights that:

‘...Interestingly, although there was significant public debate about the meaning of ‘serious consequences’, neither the British nor Australian Attorneys-General attached great significance to this phrase. Instead, the key point they both emphasised was that Resolution 1441 identified Iraq to be in material breach of its obligations and therefore the authority to use force under Resolution 678 has revived and so continues today...’.
Thus, both the UK and Australian administrations stressed that the invasion of Iraq was legal because it was authorised by the Security Council (Bellamy 2003: 503).

Sifris (2003) in his extensive analysis of whether Resolution 678 and Resolution 1441 authorise the use of force against Iraq indicates that it has been argued that, if there was a material breach of a Security Council resolution, the use of force is legitimate as a response to that breach. Sifris (2003) further points out that the foremost of those who supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq relied on the notion that the authorisation to use force against Iraq contained in Security Council Resolution 678 had not expired. According to Sifris (2003) those who supported the invasion of Iraq also argued that the authorisation to use force contains no time limitation and had not been withdrawn expressly or impliedly by the Security Council and thus the use of force against Iraq was acceptable.

The proponents of the legitimacy of the use of force against Iraq indicate that Resolution 1441 authorised the use of force (Sifris 2003: 527). Resolution 1441 offered Iraq with a last chance to comply with UN resolutions and threatened it with serious consequences (UN Resolution 1441, 2002). Therefore, as they argued the interpretation of Resolution 1441 expressed that the UN Security Council indicated that military force to be a possible consequence if Iraq did not comply (Bartram et al. 2003). Campbell and Moraitis (2003:pp 14-18) assert that Resolution 678 was not limited to ensure the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait but continues to authorise the use of force to achieve full execution of all subsequent resolutions in order to restore international security and peace to the Gulf region. Campbell and Moraitis (2003) suggest that this indicates any future use of force against Iraq if necessary in order to restore the international peace and security. On these grounds the Iraq war was legal as it aimed to maintain the international peace.

However, Sifris (2003) contends that the better view of whether existing resolutions authorised the use of force against Iraq or not, is that the basic UN Charter principles of resolving disputes relies on peaceful resolution and Security Council control over the use of force, and therefore without explicit words to the contrary, authority to use force would expire once an enduring
cease-fire agreement was in place. Therefore, once a cease-fire agreement is in place, the UN Article 2(4) which prohibits the use of force once again applies and thus fundamentally a new Security Council resolution is needed to authorise the use of force for actions to be legal (Ibid: 528). In the case of Iraq, according to Sifris Resolution 678 was ‘a specific response to the invasion of the sovereign state of Kuwait by Iraq’ and to restore the international peace, therefore ‘force was authorised as a necessary measure to deal with this exceptional situation’ (Ibid: 528). But in the Iraq war of 2003 the use of force was obviously not ‘a response to a similar type of situation’ (Ibid: 528).

Furthermore, UN Resolution 686, which outlines the conditions of the provisional cease-fire agreement, clearly indicates that Resolution 678 ‘remains valid as regards the enforcement of certain terms of the provisional cease-fire until Iraq complies with its terms’ (Ibid: 528 and UN Resolutions 686, 678).

Nevertheless, it is submitted that:

‘Resolution 687, which sets out the terms of the permanent cease-fire, contains no such statement. This indicates that whereas the use of force remained authorised whilst the provisional cease-fire was in place, the authorisation expired upon Iraq’s acceptance of the permanent cease-fire’(Sifris 2003: 528).

Also it is stressed that:

‘The word ‘acceptance’ is crucial in this context, as Resolution 687 provides for a cease – fire predicated upon Iraq’s acceptance of the terms of that resolution, not Iraq’s compliance with those terms. Given that Iraq accepted the terms of the cease – fire, it seems that the authorisation contained in resolution 687 expired at that time’ (Ibid : 528).

In this context, it has been clearly mentioned in Resolution 687 that the UN Security Council had the power to decide whether or not further steps were required to ensure Iraqi full compliance with UN Resolutions. Resolution 687 sets out the UN Security Council’s decision as to ‘remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the region’ (UN Resolution 1154 , 1998) . It has been argued that Resolution 687 noticeably maintains that the Security Council is the only conceded body that has the
power to determine what steps are required to ensure Iraq’s full compliance with its obligations in securing security and peace in the region, and not member states (Sifris 2003: 529).

In his analysis of whether Resolution 687 authorise the use of force against Iraq without explicit UN resolution, Sifris (2003) illustrates UN Security Council Resolution 1154 which passed in 1998, to support his argument of the illegality of the use the force against Iraq relying on Resolution 687. Sifris (2003) indicates that despite the clear threat outlined in Resolution 1154 of possible ‘severest consequences’, the UN Security Council ‘rejected US and UK petitions to pass a resolution that would automatically authorise force should Iraq violate the agreement between the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Iraq’s regime’ (p. 529). In other words, this view has been declared by UN Security Council which clearly states that explicit authorisation is needed to justify the use of force (Ibid: 529). The UN Resolution 1154 asserts that UN Security Council also remains ‘actively seized to ensure the implementation of this resolution’ (UN Resolution 1154). Regarding the use of force against Iraq in 1998, the attitudes of permanent members of the security Council were shaped by high rejections levels of the use of force without UN Security Council authorisation, it has been submitted that:

‘At the passing of this resolution, China, France and Russia, three permanent members of the Security Council, stated that the resolution does not authorise the use of force but confirms that it is for the Security Council, and not member states, to determine when a violation occurs and whether it warrants the use of force’ (Sifris 2003: 529).

In his discussion of whether or not Resolution 1441 justifies the use of force against Iraq by member states, Sifris (2003) emphasises that the same arguments presented to confute the legality to use force against Iraq relying on Resolution 687 as a grounds to invade Iraq, can be employed to invalidate the legitimacy of the use of force depending on Resolution 1441. Sifris (2003:529) points out that ‘the same analysis applies to Security Council Resolution 1441. According to him, although Resolution 1441 offers Iraq with a final opportunity to comply, and warns of serious consequences in the events of Iraqi rejection to compliance, Resolution 1441 nevertheless clearly indicates that in passing
the resolution, the use of force was not authorised by the Security council. Sifris (2003: 529) further strengthened his argument when he writes:

‘While Resolution 678 authorise member states to ‘use all necessary means’ to ensure compliance, Resolution 1441 employs no such terminology. In fact, following the adoption of Resolution 1441, China, France and Russia issued a joint statement asserting that the resolution excludes any automaticity in the use of force. The statement clarifies that, should it be reported that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations, ‘it will be then for the council to take position on the basis of the report’.

In the light of the above discussion, it’s clear that there are arguments to support the notion of the use of force against Iraq relying on existing Security Council resolutions which were employed by the US, UK and Australia in order to justify the use of force. However, as discussed in section 3.2.1 of this Chapter, the fundamental principles of the UN Charter are to peacefully resolve international disputes when they occur in order to maintain international peace and security. Also, it’s clear that the Security Council is the only body which obtains full control over any efforts to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security (refer to section 3.2.1.2 of this Chapter). Thus, it can be argued that the better view is that the arguments to justify the invasion and the use of force against Iraq relying on existing UN Security Council Resolutions are ‘legally flawed’ (Sifris 2003: 529). Therefore, it can be demonstrated that the use of force by US and allies to invade Iraq in 2003 was not authorised by existing Security Council resolutions, which lead us to conclude that the invasion was illegal and thus ‘illegitimate’ since it lacks an explicit UN Security Council resolution authorising the use of force. Or as Joyner (2007: 25) put it ‘the fact remains: The Security Council never approved US armed intervention into Iraq’.

3.4.2 WAS THE INVASION OF IRAQ LEGAL PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-DEFENCE?

In his State of the Union address in 29 January 2002, President Bush announced that ‘whatever action is required, whatever action is necessary; I will defend the freedom and security of the American people’ (Bush 2002). On this occasion President Bush declared the obvious right of the US to use force
against Iraq in self-defence. Although, the US administration also referred to the argument that existing UN Security Council resolutions authorised the use of force against Iraq, the burden of the US official legal argument fell on the idea of pre-emptive self–defence (Bellamy 2003: 512). Moreover, the idea that a right of pre-emptive self-defence, according to Bellamy (2003: 512), ‘might be used to legitimise an invasion of Iraq had been floated as early as June 2002’. However, soon after the attacks of the September 11, 2001 the US spelled out its National Security Strategy in September 17, 2002 (Shah 2008: 103). The National Security Strategy of the US (NSSUS) indicates that ‘the war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration’ (NSSUS 2002). Also, the strategy emphasises that ‘as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed’ (ibid).

The United States, through the National Security Strategy, continues to elucidate its position on the relationship between terrorists groups and those who support their actions (Shah 2008: 103). The strategy clearly indicates that the US makes ‘no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour or provide aid to them’ (NSSUS 2002). Most important, the US as emphasised by the Strategy will disrupt and destroy terrorist organisations by (NSSUS 2002: 6):

- “Direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;

- Defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and
Denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.”

The National Security Strategy as indicated by Shah (2006:105) offers an interpretation of the right to self-defense against threats and justification to wage war preemptively. On page 16 of the strategy it has been argued that:

‘For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not to suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against force that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat - most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack’ (NSSUS 2002: 16).

The strategy further requested that nations:

‘Must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction- weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning’ (NSSUS 2002: 15).

Moreover, the strategy offers a justification for the notion of preemptive self – defense which the US would employ to destroy terrorists cells and regimes that support their goals, the strategy on page 15 also reads:

‘Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threat, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first’ (NSSUS 2002:15).

The overall purpose of the preemptive self- defense and subsequent actions as highlighted and justified by the United States National strategy is to ‘eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reason for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just’ (NSSUS 2002: 16).
The US reference to self-defense as a new doctrine of preemptive right to self-defense becomes clear immediately after the adoption of Resolution 1441. In his speech to the UN, the United States’ Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Negroponte insinuated that Resolution 1441 contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect to the use of force against Iraq (Negroponte 2002). Negroponte (2002) further argued that:

‘If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to the Council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA, or a member state, the matter will return to the Council for discussions as required in Paragraph 12. If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq, or to enforce relevant UN resolutions and protect world peace and security’.

Moreover, the right to self-defense which was employed by the US to attack Iraq was embedded in Article 51 of the UN Charter, in the aftermath of the attacks waged against the US on September 11th, 2001; the US had successfully obtained a justification argument for self-defense to justify its intervention in Operation Enduring in Afghanistan (Bellamy 2003: 512). In the Afghanistan intervention, two resolutions were passed by the Security Council that clearly recognised the US’ right to self-defense in response to the 11th September, 2001 attacks (ibid: 512). According to Bellamy (2003: 512):

‘The success of the self-defence argument in the case of Operation Enduring freedom seems to have persuaded the US administration that the provisions in the UN Charter on Self–defence would legitimise the use of force against Iraq and other ‘rogue’ states’.

Iraq became the focus of attention for the US administration once again after the attacks of 11 September, 2001. In his State of the Union address in 2002, President Bush classified Iraq as a part of the ‘axis of evil’ (Bush 2002).

Gradually, the US administration between June and September 2002 shifted its position and instead ‘attempted to award itself an exceptional right of preemptive self-defence that substantially widened the scope for the legitimate use of force contained in art 51 of the UN Charter and customary law’ (Bellamy 2003: 512).
As we discussed earlier in this Chapter, the UN Security Council in 2002 adopted Resolution 1441 in which Iraq was found in a ‘material breach’ of its obligations under a number of previous UN Resolutions. Notwithstanding, as we demonstrated previously in this Chapter that Resolution 1441 never explicitly authorised the use of force against Iraq, however, in order to examine whether or not the invasion falls under the criteria of self-defence, Resolution 1441 would be further considered in order to reveal whether Iraq violated its WMD inspection program. As has been argued previously in this Chapter the Security Council demanded Iraq’s immediate cooperation with the newly established enhanced inspection regime (UNMOVIC) and (IAEA) under Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 stressed that if Iraq refused to fully cooperate with the UN inspection program, then ‘serious consequences’ would have to be adopted. The US asserted that according to Article 51 of the Charter self-defence is legal against any threat depending on the ‘inherent right’ for states to act in situations of armed attack. Thus, to reveal whether the invasion of Iraq was legal under the claims of self-defence and imminent threat that might be posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime, three purported reasons offered by the US and UK will be examined to uncover the legality of the invasion. The first: the imminent threat posed by Iraqi WMDs, and the second: Iraq’s support for terrorism and the possibility of arming terrorists groups with WMDs, and finally humanitarian intervention for protection of human rights issues in Iraq.

3.4.2.1 THE IMMINENT THREAT POSED BY IRAQI WMDs

The US and allies, relying on the doctrine of self-defence as part of the justification to legally use force against Iraq, asserted that Iraq had been proliferating WMD and developing delivery systems for those types of weapons (Sifris 2003: 531). Before the invasion of 2003 the US and UK both made strong claims that intelligence suggested that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed and was secretly developing nuclear weapons and WMD’s (Shah 2008: 124). In his address to the nation, President Bush in 2003 asserted that ‘intelligence gathered by this and other government leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised’( Bush 2003). Similarly, British Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasised that:
‘What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile [programme]’ (Blair cited in Sifris 2003: 531).

‘We know, with absolute certainty, that [Saddam] is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build nuclear weapon’ Vice President Dick Cheney told Tim Russert on NBC program ‘Meet the Press’ in 2002 (cited in Shah 2008: 125). In his remarks to the Security Council in February 2003, Colin Powell the US Secretary of State, stated that Iraq has materially breached numerous UN Security Council resolutions and has continually been non-cooperative with UN inspection regimes of the past and present (Sifris 2003: 531). Former Secretary of State, Powell, also told the Security Council that there was no doubt that Iraq had developed chemical weapons stocks (Shah 2008: 125). Powell in his remarks informed the members of the Security Council that ‘leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post –September 11th world’ (Powell 2003).

Similarly, the United Kingdom, in its efforts to legitimize the Iraq invasion, made a strong claim that Saddam Hussein’s regime was developing and possessed WMDs (Shah 2008: 125). Former Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his forward to the Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government, which was published in September 2002, stressed that:

‘In the light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest. In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council resolutions expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world... I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped... And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them ... The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam’s, is real’ (British Dossier 2002: 271)
In his speech to the House of Commons on 18th March, 2003, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair indicated that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program was growing, detailed and active (Blair 2003). Blair (2003) also emphasised that there was no doubt that Iraq was developing WMD and Nuclear warheads. He further claimed that ‘Iraq continues to deny it has any WMD, though no serious intelligence service anywhere in the world believes them’ (ibid).

Related to the US and the UK claimed evidence of Iraq’s WMDs, are the efforts undertaken by United Nations to uncover whether or not Iraq possessed WMD which might be considered as a major threat to international peace, and therefore would need to be disarmed and disabled. The Security Council under resolution 1441 set up an enhanced inspection regime (IAEA) in which the UN inspectors resumed inspection on 27 November, 2002. In February 14, 2003, Elbaradei (2003 a) the Director General of IAEA reported that ‘we have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq. However … We are not yet in a position to reach a conclusion’. A few days before the invasion of Iraq, El Baradei on March 7, 2003, informed the Security Council that the UN inspection is moving forward, El Baradei (2003 b) further highlighted that:

- There is no indication that Saddam Hussein’s regime has attempted to import uranium since 1990;

- There is no indication of resumed activities in locations that were identified through satellite images as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any signs of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected locations;

- There is no indication that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment program; and

- There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to obtain or import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment.

In his report El Baradei (2003 b) also informed the Security Council that the IAEA has concluded that ‘with the concurrence of outside experts, that these
documents- which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded’ (ibid).

‘The pre-war evidence gathered by the IAEA points toward the same conclusion: there was no evidence of nuclear weapons and WMD until the date of report’ as emphasised by Shah (2008: 131). Shah (2008) further indicates that there was no clear and convincing proof that Iraq had or was developing WMD.

In their efforts to associate Iraq with nuclear weapons, both the US and the UK administrations fabricated evidence to connect Saddam Hussein with Niger in uranium transactions. In his efforts to follow a lead that Saddam Hussein was aiming to purchase uranium from Africa, US Vice President Cheney in 2002 assigned Ambassador Joe Wilson to go to Niger to investigate the claim (Varney 2008). In his report to the CIA, Wilson indicated that the allegations were unfounded and thus there was no evidence linking Saddam Hussein with any attempts to purchase uranium from Niger (Scheer et al. 2003). However, British Prime Minister Blair cited Wilson’s report as a further evidence of Iraq’s hunger for nuclear weapons; Blair claimed that Iraq imported significant amounts of uranium from Niger (Blix 2004). Blair asserted that evidence also indicated that some of Iraqi WMDs could be available within 45 minutes of an order to use them (Blix, 2004:233). In an Interview by Dafna Linzer published in The Washington Post July 30, 2006, Senator Rockefeller (2006) points out that ‘Bush administration passed on forged documents to UN weapons inspectors to support allegations that Iraq had sought uranium from African nation of Niger’. The IAEA director ElBaradei in March 7, 2003, concluded in his report that the documents provided by the US government to present uranium transactions as evidence in efforts to link Iraq with Niger were ‘in fact not authentic’ (ElBaradei 2003 b).

After the invasion of Iraq, it was evident that there no WMD were found. The United States intelligence Committee concluded in July 7, 2004, that ‘the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting [was] inconsistent and, at times contradictory’ (US Senate Committee on Intelligence 2004). Similarly, in the UK it was asserted by
administration officials after the issue of no WMDs were found in Iraq that the intelligence agencies failed to advise the former Prime Minster Blair about forty-five minute deployment time (Shah 2008:131).

According to Shah (2008: 132), the administrations in both the US and the UK started to blame the intelligence agencies for intelligence failures and mistakes. Shah further asserts that intelligence failure seems not to be the case, ‘on the contrary, both the United States and the United Kingdom’s intelligence agencies warned that intelligence is limited and added several caveats and warnings’ (ibid p 132). Regardless of the intelligence warnings, both administrations ignored caveats of limitation in intelligence duties and presented the evidence regarding Iraq’s WMDs as “absolute[ly] certain” and “without doubt” to their nations and the international community (ibid p 132).

In 2005, President Bush while announcing victory in the war on terror and discussing the democratic shift in Iraq confessed that most of the intelligence information turned out to be wrong, and as the President he announced that he was responsible for the decision to invade Iraq (Bush 2005). Also, Former Prime Minster Blair admitted that the UK intelligence information on Iraq’s WMD was mostly incorrect and that he took full responsibility (Blair 2004).

As discussed previously, after the accomplishment of the invasion of Iraq there was demand in both the US and the UK to reassess the prewar intelligence on Saddam’s WMD because no WMD were found. In the US, in June 2003, the United States’ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in trying to uncover the existence of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction requested to rely on relevant Daily Briefs on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction provided by the White House (US Committee on Intelligence 2004). However, the White House rejected the request (Shah 2008: 126). This left the Committee unable to determine whether ‘Intelligence Community judgments were properly disseminated to policy makers in the executive branch’ (US Committee on Intelligence, 2004:3). However, despite the failure to obtain relevant

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32 Former Prime Minister Blair in his forward to the 2002 dossier on Iraq’s WMDs, claimed that Iraq WMD might be deployed within 45 minutes and thus should consider as imminent threat to UK security.
documents and information from the White House, the Committee concerning pre-war intelligence concluded that:

- Most of the key judgments in the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. (US Committee on Intelligence 2004: paragraph 14);

- The Intelligence Community (IC) suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had [an] active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This “group think” dynamic led Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs (US Committee on Intelligence 2004: paragraph 18);

- The Committee found significant shortcomings in almost every aspect of the Intelligence Community’s human intelligence collection efforts against Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction activities, in particular that the Community had no sources collecting evidence against weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after 1998 (US Committee on Intelligence 2004: paragraph 24); and

- The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in several significant instances, abused its unique position in the intelligence community, particularly in terms of information sharing, to the detriment of the intelligence community’s prewar analysis concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs (US Committee on Intelligence 2004: paragraph 27).

In February 2004 President Bush formed the Silberman-Robb Commission which aimed to evaluate the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In its report to the President on March 31, 2005, the Commission stressed that ‘much of what they
[intelligence agencies] did collect was either worthless or misleading [and] ... intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumption about Saddam’s intentions’. The report concluded that most of the Intelligence Community was wrong in its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability (ibid).

According to (Shah 2008: 128) an examination of conclusions of different Committees and Commissions on US intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, leads to three conclusions:

I. ‘The intelligence community either overstated or distorted the pre-war intelligence on Iraq’s WMD. The CIA abused its power by either suppressing or fabricating evidence. The case of the uranium transaction from Niger... is a case in point. The White House seemed to be comfortable (if not complicit) with this role for the CIA, and may be suspected of hiding something because it turned down the request of the Committee on Intelligence to provide it with the President’s Daily Briefs on Iraq’s WMD;

II. The caveats and warnings of the intelligence reports were either ignored or presented as authoritative and absolute; and

III. The intelligence community turned presumption into conviction and remained wedded to the idea that Saddam had the intention to develop WMD.’

Shah (2008: 128) asserts that ‘before the invasion, Iraq had neither WMD nor the capacity to build WMD but only had the intention to do so when possible’. However, according to ELBaradei, the suggestion that Saddam Hussein’s regime used chemical weapons against the Kurds in the past and thus Iraq should have weapons of mass destruction before the invasion in 2003 is not acceptable, because Iraq’s weapons program was ‘neutralised’ in 1998 by the

UN inspectors (ElBaradie cited in Shah: 128). Or as Shah (2008: 128) put it ‘the grand edifice of Iraq’s WMD was raised on the presumption of intention, not on clear and convincing evidence’.

In England, resulting from the public pressure after the killing of UK soldiers in Iraq, the British government in February 2003 constituted an independent commission under Lord Butler’s supervision. The commission’s task was to review the collection, judgment, and use of intelligence leading up to the 2003 attack on Iraq. One of the most shocking conclusions the commission emphasised was that ‘there was limited intelligence suggesting Iraqi attempts to expand its missile programme, to lay the foundations of a revived nuclear programme, and to develop facilities which could be used for chemical and biological programmes’ (Lord Butler 2004: paragraph 19). However, the assessment of the British Government published in 2002 asserted that the intelligence sources and information regarding Iraq WMD capability were unlimited, accurate and undoubted (British Dossier 2002: 271). In his foreword to the assessment dossier, Former Prime Minister Blair assured that ‘what I believe that assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his effort to develop nuclear weapons’ (ibid: 3). Robin Cook Former British Secretary emphasised that ‘I fear we got into a position in which the intelligence was not being used to inform and shape policy, but to shape policy that was already settled’ (Cook cited in Shah 2008: 129). Paragraph 24 of Lord Butler’s report indicates that:

‘During the spring and summer of 2002... further intelligence came in and the tone of JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] judgments became firmer but successive JIC assessments warned that the intelligence remained limited ... In translating material to the dossier [Govt. September 2002 dossier outlining the evidence of Iraq’s WMD], warning in the JIC assessments were lost about the limited intelligence base on which some aspects of these assessments were being made... It was a serious weakness that the JIC’s warnings on the limitations of the intelligence were not made sufficiently clear in the dossier’ (Butler Commission 2004: paragraph 24).

In its conclusion, the report in paragraph 32 points out that:
The [government’s] report that [claims that] Saddam could deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes ... was unclear and the JIC should not have included it in this form... Mobile laboratories have been found in Iraq but do not match the ones in the intelligence reports which were relied on for evidence of Iraq’s production of biological agent’ (cited in Shah, 2008: 129).

Shah (2008) indicates that Butler’s report stresses that the UK intelligence agency informed the government that evidence was limited concerning Iraq’s WMD. The UK in response ignored this important warning, aiming to make a case for war before the UK public. In addition, the UK government ‘dropped all warnings and caveats about the uncertainty of evidence and presented it as beyond doubt, extensive, and authoritative’ (Shah 2008: 129).

3.4.2.2 IRAQ’S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

The Bush administration, in its justifications presented to invade Iraq, asserted that Iraq associated with terrorist cells and groups. The Bush administration’s statements after the September 11th attacks suggested that there was clear evidence for Iraqi connections with Al Qaeda. These statements were presented to the American public to gain support for the invasion. The Bush administration repeatedly claimed as fact that the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks Mohamed Atta had met with Iraqi intelligence officials in Prague in April 2001 (Risen 2002, Fisher 2003). Nevertheless, The Central Intelligence of America (CIA) director, George Tenet, informed the US Congress that there was no relevant information to support the claim that Atta met with Iraqi officials. Also based on reliable intelligence information available to Czech intelligence, Czech President Vaclav Havel indicated that there was no evidence that Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in 2001 (Fisher 2003).

Following the September 11th, 2001 attacks, President Bush declared a ‘war on terror’ doctrine and the US embarked on an aggressive campaign to punish those responsible for the attacks and to prevent the US from further terrorist activities (Karoubi 2004: 195). The ‘war on terrorism’ principally features two elements: (1) the use of force against terrorist groups and (2) independent actions against terrorists by the US government (Murphy 2003: 347). The US waged its first war on terrorism against the Taliban, who according to the U.S administration supported Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden who was responsible
for the attacks upon the US in 2001. Afghanistan become under control, however, bin Laden never been captured. Accordingly, the US war or terror has not been achieved yet (Karoubi 2004: 195). In his State of the Union address, President Bush in January 29\textsuperscript{th}, 2002, described North Korea, Iraq and Iran as the world’s most dangerous regimes and called them the ‘axis of evil’ (Karoubi 2004: 195). This outlined the second target for the US administration in its war against terrorism. In his speech before the General Assembly on 12 September 2002, President Bush declared that the US was certain that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons and that Saddam Hussein aimed to provide such weapons to terrorists groups (Karoubi 2004: 196).

Some members of the US administration made claims of links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, despite the fact that there was no claim of any direct Iraqi involvement in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Gray, 2004: 180). The assertions of ongoing links between Iraq and Al Qaeda were clearly planned to bring any attack against Saddam Hussein’s regime within the scope of the war against terrorism, therefore ‘giving the doctrine of self-defence based on the precedent of Afghanistan a very wide interpretation’ (ibid: 180).

President Bush in October 7, 2002, claimed that Al Qaeda members were trained by the Iraqi Army in bomb making and in deadly gasses and poisons. Bush also alleged that satellite images showed that Iraq was rebuilding Facilities in sites that used to be a part of the Iraqi nuclear program in the past (Bush 2002). President Bush (2002) further highlights that, ‘Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists’. It has been revealed by almost two hundred reporters who visited the sites after the invasion, that there was no sign of a nuclear weapons program (Varney 2008: 150). However, before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US administration argued that the US had a right to pre-emptive self-defence on the grounds that Saddam Hussein’s regime concealed and weapons of mass destruction and that the Iraqi regime was connected to Al Qaeda.

Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, in February 2003 argued that Iraqi WMD can be connected to terrorist organisations that may use them against
innocent people internationally (Powell 2003). Powell (2003) also emphasised that Iraq was harbouring a terrorist cell led by Abu Musab Zarqawi, a suspected associate of Al Qaeda. Powell (2003) added that senior Iraqi and Al Qaeda leaders had met at least nine times since the early 1990s. Karoubi (2004:205) indicates that Powell in his alleged arguments to present evidence of ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda referred to foreign intelligence reports by British Intelligence Services, which turned out to be ‘no more than a thesis written in 1991’.

Although there was no evidence of any Iraqi involvement in the attacks of September 11th, 2001, on the US, the situation in Iraq had become the focus of world attention (The Times 2003). Tony Blair, the UK’s Former Prime Minster, stated that international peace was in serious risk that rogue states, like Iraq, were proliferating and developing weapons of mass destruction, and would supply them to terrorist groups to which they had links, like Al Qaeda (Blair 2003). President Bush on March 6, 2003, expressed the links between the terrorists who attacked the US and rogue states which possessed WMD; Bush said that ‘the attacks of September the 11th, 2001 showed what the enemies of the United States did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction’ (Bush 2003).

Varney (2008: 150) indicates that ‘any attempt by the Bush Administration to implicate Iraq with ties to terrorism, it would seem, is intended to create a fear factor in American public opinion to justify a war against Iraq’. In his discussion of possible links between Iraq and Al Qaeda Varney (2008: 153) stresses that ‘the administration has been shown to have resorted to vague accusations and false and misleading statements’. Or as Gareau (2004: 225) indicates ‘the way the Bush administration has chosen to fight what it calls ‘the war on terrorism’ is immoral, illegal, overly belligerent and in many ways counterproductive’. 
3.4.2.3 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN IRAQ AND TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY

The US administration suggested ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a third rationale to legitimise military action against Iraq. Very soon after the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration asserted that regime change in Iraq was a major target for the US government (Gray 2004: 191). The US government began to implement the 1998 *Iraq liberation Act* signed into law by Former President Bill Clinton, the Act indicates that ‘It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq to promote the emergence of a democratic government or to replace the regime’ (Iraqi Liberation Act 1998 cited in ibid: 191). Thereafter 1998, the US administration supplied Iraqi opposition organisations with massive aid, including military equipment. During the Bush presidency the regime change approach was adopted. A $92 million budget was promised to train Iraqi militia to form a new army after the supposed overthrow of Saddam Hussein regime (ibid: 191). The US government’s evidence to the Security Council as to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime referred to the poor human rights situations in Iraq. ³⁴

The UK government’s view was supportive of the US regime change policy; it has been argued by UK officials that Iraq would be a better place without Saddam Hussein. In November 2002, the UK Foreign Office issued a dossier on *Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses*, in which it listed Saddam Hussein’s human rights violations against Iraqi people. ³⁵

Immediately before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the UK administration increased its emphasis ‘on the desirability of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein for humanitarian reasons, apparently in order to increase the popular support for military actions’ (ibid: 192).

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In his advice to Tony Blair on 7 March, 2003, regarding the legality of an Iraq invasion, the UK Attorney-General’s argued that ‘the use of force to avert overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe has been emerging as a further, and exceptional, basis for the use of force... I know of no reason why it would be [an] basis for actions in present circumstances’ (Lord Goldsmith 2003 quoted in Robertson 2008: 559). However, Tony Blair two days earlier said that ‘... the 300,000 remains in mass graves already found in Iraq might be thought as something of a catastrophe’ (Blair 2003 quoted in ibid: 559). In March 2003, Tony Blair stated that an Iraqi regime change was the only means of accomplishing full disarmament of WMD; Blair further indicated that ‘the removal of the regime of course has to be our ‘objective’ (Blair 2003) . One month before, Blair introduced the moral argument for removing the Iraqi regime; he insisted that regime change is needed because of Saddam Hussein’s human rights violations against his own population (Blair 2003).

According to Robertson (2008: 559) Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq for almost 25 years, in the course of which he assassinated political opponents, disobedient villagers, and ethnic enemies such as unruly Shias and Kurds. Robertson (2008) further asserts that during its war with Iran, Iraq used nerve and mustard gases that caused 150,000 deaths. Also, Robinson indicates that 5,000 Kurds were killed in Halabja through poisoned gas, part of a genocidal Anfal campaign to eliminate the rural Kurdish opposition.

After having given WMD and Iraqi links with terrorists pretexts, the US government presented the 2003 war against Iraq as humanitarian –to liberate the Iraqi people from dictatorship and to establish democracy (Anderson et al. (Ed’s) 2008: 141). It should be noted that international law permits military interventions, even in the absence of the accord of the governments involved, but only ‘by the United Nations and in the case of grave internal events that represent an imminent danger for the populations and a threat to international peace and security’ ( ibid: 142) and thus ‘military interventions outside the UN framework are prohibited ’ ( ibid: 142). Nevertheless, President Bush supported by Tony Blair led the attack against Iraq in March 2003. The aim was to overthrow the Iraqi regime through military actions and replace it with an elected government (Robertson, 2008: 560). ‘But democracy was produced at
an appalling cost: by March 2006, over 2,000 American soldiers had been killed and 20,000 wounded, together with tens of thousands of civilians’ as noted by Robertson (2008:560). It is worth noting that ‘neither the US nor the UK claimed to be acting pursuant to any right of humanitarian intervention’ (ibid: 561).

According to Robertson (2008) the US and the UK administrations in their efforts to clarify the lawfulness of an Iraq invasion, relied on Saddam Hussein’s records of human rights violations. Thus Saddam Hussein was presented as an evil, monster and another Hitler; however, the two administrations never suggested that Saddam Hussein’s genocide record would make regime change lawful by prosecuting and convicting him in the international criminal court (ibid: PP 562-564).

The US intervention of Iraq depending on human rights violations by the former regime might be morally appealing, however, the concept remains controversial among many international lawyers because it ‘fails to live up to UN Charter principles as it creates tension between law and state sovereignty and contains inherent subjectivity regarding the extent of human rights violations’ (Joyner 2007: 25). Although, ‘a newer version of the concept is called “the responsibility to protect” and may well prove more acceptable’ (ibid: 25). However, under the concept of the responsibility to protect, governments are mandated to protect and prevent their own populations from ethnic cleaning, genocide war crimes and crimes against humanity (ibid: 26). If the government fails to do so, the responsibility would transfer to the international community to protect the populations of that government, by intervening with armed forces if necessary (ibid: 26). In this case, ‘the principle of national sovereignty no longer may be used as a political shield to allow governments to destroy the most vulnerable persons in their society’ (ibid: 26).

Joyner (2008) in his analysis of the legality of the 2003 Iraq invasion questioned whether this situation [the principle of national sovereignty no longer may be used as a political shield] pertained to conditions in Iraq in March 2003. Joyner indicates that the answer would be negative. He further emphasises that:

“While it is true that for two decades Saddam Hussein committed horrific acts of human rights abuse and crimes against humanity against segment of his
population, especially Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south, the fact remains that the United States government tried to invoke the legal pretext of either humanitarian intervention or the responsibility to protect as an afterthought to justify the necessity of its invasion of Iraq in 2003’ (ibid: 26).

However, the lack of imminent or ongoing mass slaughter by the Iraqi regime was itself sufficient to ‘disqualify the invasion of Iraq as a humanitarian intervention’ (ibid: 26). In addition, the no-fly zone in Operation Northern Watch, which imposed in 1997 by the United States, protected the Kurds against any possible attacks from the Iraqi regime (ibid: 26). Thus, it can be argued that no pretext for humanitarian considerations was acceptable to legitimate the US-led attack upon Iraq in 2003.

In their presentation of the UK public response to the Straw Dossier that was published in November 2002, MacAskill and Watt (2002) indicate that Saddam Hussein’s record of human rights violations during the 1980s-90s had been well documented through Human Rights watch, however, both the US and the UK governments ignored it, because Saddam Hussein had not been their major target during that era (ibid). In addition, the US and the UK efforts to present human rights violations as a moral case to wage war against Saddam Hussein was considered by the public in both countries as attempts to gain support for the invasion (ibid). MacAskill and Watt (2002) argue that during the 1980s, UK Ministers and officials defended President Saddam Hussein, and that UK companies helped arm the regime until the Kuwait invasion in 1990. Also, they stressed that the UK Administration during Halabja chemical attack blamed the attack on Iran. However, according to MacAskill and Watt (2002), the 2002 dossier *Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses* detailed the attack and declared the Iraqi regime as solely responsible for the chemical attack.

Invading Iraq on the grounds to establish democracy was another issue that earned heated debate. In their book *the Five Biggest Lies Told Us about Iraq*, Scheer et al. (cited in Varney 2008) list Iraq as a ‘Democratic Model’ as one of

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the five lies, which as they claim was endorsed by the Bush administration to prepare the US citizen’s to accept the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime. Scheer et al. (cited in Varney 2008) note that the US government faced the toughest problem of introducing democracy into a country that suffered from apparent division on the basis of religion, nationalist and tribal passions and with no history of political sovereignty (Scheer et al. 2003 cited in Varney 2008: 153). The authors indicate that the US administration in doing so might face the price of paying and continue to pay, for the deaths of innocent Iraqi civilians, terrorism and the possibility of civil war in Iraq, despite the success or the failure of its attempts to democratise Iraq (ibid:153). However, the Bush administration claim to democratise Iraq, was seen as a clever ploy for two reasons: (1) it provided Bush with a moral goal to complement the WMD and terrorism claims to invade Iraq, and (2) it emphasises the plan that Iraq is being liberated rather than occupied (ibid: 153).

However, Bush’s claims of democratising Iraq after regime change in Iraq faced two criticisms. The first: the Iraqi division of nationalist, tribal passions, and religious interests and having had no previous political freedom (Scheer et al. 2003 cited in Varney 2008: 153). President Bush in response reminded the opponents of Japan and Germany’s ethnic and religious divisions, though both countries experienced democracy (ibid: 154). The second is the perceived disagreement between Bush’s claimed aims to democratise Iraq and the demands to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible (ibid: 154). Both of these factors worked contrary to the need of maintaining security and order in Iraq with the likelihood of leading to massive killing and fighting between religious, ethnic and tribal groups in an unstable country. Also, one might ask, what would be the American reaction to the newly democratic Iraqi government in cases of rejection of future economic dominance, influence and values of the US, if that was incongruent with Iraq’s national interests? This might mean rejection of the prominent international organs with which the US government is closely associated, mainly The World Bank, The World Trade Organisation (WTO) and The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (ibid: 154)
3.5 WAS THE INVASION OF IRAQ 2003 JUSTIFIED UNDER JUST WAR THEORY?

3.5.1 APPROACH TO JUST WAR THEORY

Just War theory has a varied and diverse background (Johnson 1995: 147-148). The theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought in the international environment. Just War has a number of commonly recognised elements, which are customarily divided into two basic categorises which deal with the two central fundamental issues concerning the legitimacy of the use of force (Karoubi 2004: 52). The first issue is jus ad bellum [which concerns when we may justly resort to war], whereas the second deals with the issue of jus in bello [concerns how the war may legitimately be fought] (ibid: 52). In evaluating whether or not war is justified, the concern would be jus ad bellum. The justification in this case can be either theoretical: ethically justifying war and forms of warfare, or historical: dealing with the historical body of rules or agreements such as, the Geneva and Hague conventions, applied in various wars cross the ages (ibid: 52).

The present concept of bellum justum was ‘first formulated, refined and formalised by Christian theologians and philosophers, beginning with Saint Augustine in the fifth century’ (ibid: 52). However, the concept of justifiable war first appeared in Roman culture. In the first century BC, a great Roman jurist, orator and philosopher, Cicero wrote about the legality to use force in Europe. Cicero argued that the ideal and peaceful never waged war, excepting conditions where it resorts to war in defending its safety and honour (ibid: 60). To Cicero the war can be just, only if undertaken for revenge and defence. According to Cicero (1928: 211) , wars fought for wrongs done are to be integrated in wars fought in defence of honour. Thus, all wars conducted without aggravation which might threaten the safety and honour of a state, are unjust (Karoubi: 60). Cicero indicates that, in cases where negotiations are unsuccessful to resolve disputation, war should be accepted as a last alternative (ibid: 60). However, three suggested rules were considered by Cicero to be necessary for a just war; there must be a just cause (e.g. to stop an invasion); there must be a formal declaration of the war through the king or the emperor (e.g. to give the enemy a chance to put things right); and war
must be undertaken justly (e.g. attacks should be targeted against soldiers but not civilians). Ibid: 60.

With the growing Christianisation of the Roman Empire, and due to the increasing social and political influence in the Christian Church, Christian theologians between the fourth and fifth centuries started to develop justifications for the use of force, which would over time take shape as Just War theory (ibid:61). St. Augustine was the first major Christian theologian to address the circumstances under which war is legitimate. According to Augustine, war is an acceptable part of the life of nations; however, the rulers of nations have the obligation to maintain peace. In his view this obligation gives rulers right to wage war, the goal is to defend the nation’s peace against serious injury (ibid: 65). St. Augustine rejected vengeance, relentless and the ‘fever of revolt’ based wars, instead he emphasises that the only reason which justified war, was the desire for peace (ibid: 65). In addition, as outlined by Augustine, it was necessary for a war to be undertaken under lawful authority, thus, warfare that waged without lawful authority fails to meet the criteria of justice; the same can be said regarding warfare that is not directed to achieve peace and the common good (ibid: 65).

A second major Christian thinker to give a great impetus to Just War theory is St. Thomas Aquinas who lived during the years 1225-1274. Aquinas based himself upon St. Augustine’s view of war. In his explanation of the theory of the justness of war, Aquinas focused on defining the right to wage war and the crucial importance of the intent which motivates the decision to use force (DeForrest 1997: 4). Attempting to formulate a simple rule which would give guidance to the right to wage war and the importance of the intent issues related to the decision to go to war, Aquinas asserted that a war is justified when three basic, necessary conditions were met (ibid: 4). Firstly, the war was approved by a lawful authority with the power to wage war; secondly, the war was undertaken with just cause; and thirdly, the war was waged with the right intention aiming to achieve some good or to avoid some evil (ibid:4).

The secular sources for just war theory span a considerable length of time (ibid: 4). Just War theory has been developed in the modern era as a result of
work undertaken by jurists and philosophers (Karoubi: 70). This development in the modern era is credited to work of four Spanish School members, Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Pierino Belli (1502-1575), and Balthazar Ayala (1582), an Italian scholar Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), who lived in England as a Protestant, the great Dutch writer Hugo Grorius (1583-1645), and finally Emer de Vattel (1714-1767), in whose work the extent of the development of early modern doctrine of *jus ad bellum* can be seen as mid 18th century (ibid: 70). In this Chapter, the contributions of Dutch Protestant Hugo Grotius will be assessed. In addition, modern decrees on justifiable warfare, such as the commission to the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, and the United Nations Charter which circumscribe the issue of *jus ad bellum*.

Hugo Grotius, born in 1583 was a Dutch Protestant who wrote on the right of nations to use force in self defence in his most important work, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (On the Rights of War and Peace), published in 1625 after he escaped from Holland to France (Karoubi 2004: 73). Grotius is sometimes referred to as the father of the international law (Deforrest 1997: 4). Grotius who lived in the aftermath of the violent Thirty- Years War in Europe, wrote lengthily on the right of nations to use force in case of self-defence, however, Grotius stressed that his primary objective was to prevent war; in the case of the failure to achieve that, minimising the brutality was the proposed intent. Just War theory was largely secularised through Grotius contributions; his ideas made the theory more acceptable for the age of the Enlightenment. For Grotius, a war was just if seven criteria were met, but at the end he accepted six. These are: the danger faced by the nation is actual, immediate and imminent; proportionality of good over evil; chance of success; declaration of war; declaration of war by the right authority; and last resort (Deforrest 1997: 5, Karoubi 2004: 73).

Grotius grounded his agreement with Cicero’s notion of the need for the declaration of war –when it occurred- in the international law; Grotius argued that the rationale of just war theory is to provide protection for the wounded and sick in war, civilians and combatants alike (Deforrest 1997:5). Resulting from this point of view, is the notion that just war theory exists ‘externally of
any recognized legal system, that it is a part of the ‘law of nations’ which is followed by all civilized nations’ (ibid: 5).

After Grotius, just war doctrine underwent relatively few modifications until the nineteenth century (ibid: 5). The United States’ government, during the first century of its existence came to acknowledge the legitimacy of the just war concept. In 1842, Daniel Webster, the US Secretary of State acknowledged the legitimacy of the customary norms employed by Grotius to define the just war doctrine. It is worth noting that this recognition by the US government occurred as a result of attempts to resolve the so-called “Caroline Incident” (ibid: 5).

The Caroline Incident occurred when the British Army attempted to prevent supplies from reaching the Canadian rebellion in 1837. The British in their efforts to restrict the flow of material to the rebels burned the US ship Caroline and killed several US citizens (ibid: 5). The US government rejected the aggression upon its territory, however, the British government in response argued that its actions were justified under the doctrine of self-defence (ibid: 5). In a letter dated July 27, 1842, Daniel Webster, the US Secretary of State advised the British Special Minster Lord Ashburton that it was for the British government to justify the incursion of its forces if the actions were justified as a matter of self-defence, thus, the British government’s actions would be justified if they met the traditional elements of the self-defence concept: (1) necessity of self-defence and; (2) reasonable and not excessive use of force (Delahunty & Yoo 2009). Deforrest (1997: 5) contends that Webste’sr definition of just self-defence ‘mirrors that proposed by Grotius’. Delahunty and Yoo (2009: 8) indicate that Webster’s description ‘identifies the conditions for legitimate “preemptive” self-defence; by contrast, other allegedly defensive uses of force in anticipation of armed attacks would constitute illegitimate “preventive strikes or wars”’.

Just war doctrine during the remainder of the 19th century and early 20th century, underwent modest development. Hague Conventions codified the just war theory, however, few major developments were undertaken in regards to the principles. By the end of the Second World War and resulting from efforts
to maintain peace and security internationally, two documents were issued which resulted in increasing the recognition of just war theory in the international community (DeForrest 1997: 5). The first document was the Charter for the Nuremberg war crimes trial which encapsulated the reigning notion of just war theory as represented by both St. Augustine and Grotius, while the Nuremberg Tribunal ‘established that just war theory, as Grotius understood it, is universally binding customary law’ (ibid: 5).

The second document was the United Nations Charter which contributed to just war doctrine by recognising the inherent right of each nation to self-defence (UN Charter, Articles 2(4) and 51). Article 51 of the UN Charter asserts the right by each sovereign nation to self-defence, this right is undertaken until the Security Council establish actions to restore the peace and security (UN Charter: Art 51). Article 51 affirms two fundamental points that need to be established to outline the rightful use of force in international disputes: the first, the regulation to use force, and the second collective use of force by nations (UN Charter: Art 51). In resolving international disputes, the UN Charter explicitly and effectively outlawed the use of military force as a method to restore international peace (UN Charter: Art 51). However, the UN Charter recognises the inherent right for states to defend themselves from unlawful attack (UN Charter: Art 51).

The defensive right of a nation to engage in military actions has been upheld by the International Court of Justice in its ruling case of Nicaragua vs. United States of America (DeForrest 1997: 6). In that case, Nicaragua brought an action against the US supporting efforts of insurgency forces that aimed to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The International Court of Justice in its ruling held that the right of states to protect itself in self-defence, as customarily understood, was integrated into UN Charter Article 51 (DeForrest 1997: 6). The International Court of Justice stated that, ‘[in] the language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the inherent right (or droit natural) which a State possess in the event of an armed attack, covers both collective and individual self-defence’ (quoted in DeForrest 1997: 6).
At the end of the Second Gulf war in March 1991, with the Iraqi Army withdrawal from Kuwait, various commentaries on just war theory appeared, generating an outline of the current understanding of the theory (cited in Karoubi 2004: 77). For example, James Johnson in his work, ‘The Just War Tradition and the American Military’ put forward comprehensive criteria for just war theory in the last decade of the 20th century (Karoubi 2004:77). Karoubi (2004 :77) emphasises that Johnson ‘indeed, presents a general comparative survey of just war after the Persian Gulf War, which will serve as the basis for sampling just war ideas’. Johnson in his work introduces seven criteria for war to be lawful: just cause; right authority for use of force; right intention; the goal of restoring peace; overall proportionality of good over evil; a reasonable hope of success; and last resort (Karoubi 2004 :77).

From the previous discussion of the roots and the ideas of just war in tradition and in modern times, it can be argued that the Jus ad bellum involves five different conditions: (1) the cause must be just; (2) a right authority must make the decision to wage war; (3) groups going to war must do so with the proper intention; (4) war must be undertaken only as a last option; and (5) the goal of the war must be a likely emergent peace (Chambers 2004). It should be perceived that all conditions must be met; otherwise, the decision to go to war would be considered unjust.

3.5.2 APPLICATION OF JUST WAR THEORY TO US-LED ATTACK UPON IRAQ IN 2003

3.5.2.1 THE CAUSE MUST BE JUST

‘A war is justly undertaken in response to aggression’, Wells (1996) stressed. Thus, use or threat of force by a nation against the political autonomy or territorial integrity of another nation represents aggression (Chambers 2004: 4). Or as Holmes put it:

‘Aggression can be made out only in the absence of a military attack or invasion but in the (probably) absence of any immediate intention to launch such an attack or invasion. The general formula must go something like this: states may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever the failure to do so would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political independence. Under such circumstances it can fairly be said that they have been forced to fight and that they are the victims of aggression’ (quoted in Chambers 2004: 4).

Concerning Iraq invasion of 2003, the question is whether the US-led attack against Iraq acted with the criterion of war must be for a just cause. Or more specifically, was the invasion of Iraq undertaken in response to aggression posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq?

The US administration described the Iraqi regime as a grave and ‘gathering danger’, and insisted that Saddam Hussein persisted in acquiring WMD. The case presented by the US President, George W. Bush, in identifying Iraq’s aggressive behaviour (in order to justify the invasion) was twofold: Firstly, President Bush in his ‘State of the Union’ address, argued that Iraq had developed and concealed weapons of mass destruction that could potentially be used against American or innocent people in the world alike (Chambers 2004: 4, Karoubi 2004: 202). President Bush’s argument to invade Iraq was that the US was potentially the victim of Iraqi aggression with the supposed threat of an imminent attack by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. Thus, to permit Saddam Hussein to stay in power while possessing WMD, as argued by the US administration, would therefore seriously risk US security and international peace alike. The US administration argued that the United States had a right to pre-emptive self-defence against the Iraqi imminent threat.

The second case to justify the war by the US administration was the issue of Iraqi links to terrorist groups, mainly, Al Qaeda. President Bush argued that a war was needed in terms of ensuring that Iraq could not sell its chemical and nuclear weapons to terrorist cells who would potentially attack American cites again (Chambers 2004: 6). However, in regards to the just cause criterion, it can be argued that there was no international act of aggression by Iraq against the US, the UK or any other state which created a right of self-defence under the just war theory or UN Charter Article 51.
According to Article 51, nations maintain the right to self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurred’, or in response to an imminent attack (Karoubi 2004: 207). As we discussed earlier in section (3.2.2.1) of this Chapter concerning Iraq’s imminent threat posed by WMD and Iraq’s links with Al Qaeda it was submitted that: none of the reasons given by Bush and Blair administrations’ for attacking Iraq, including destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and (the issue of no weapons found thereafter the invasion) or regime change, constitute the right to self-defence in the UN Charter. In Addition, ‘none of the evidence presented by the US and the UK of an imminent threat of attack against the West by Iraq and the links between the regime and Al Qaeda could persuade the international community’ (ibid: 207). Therefore, ‘this war failed to meet the first criterion of the just war theory’ (ibid: 207).

3.5.2.2 A RIGHT AUTHORITY MUST MAKE THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR

The decision to wage war according to just war theory must be undertaken only by the competent authority. Thus, it can be argued that if an ‘illegal or non-legal authorities within a nation were to take action, such action would be unjust, for it would violate the basic principles of how a given society is governed’ (Karoubi 2004: 207). The purpose of limiting the action to be undertaken only by a competent authority aimed to limit the use of force in those who would employed it correctly and to minimise the resort to force in modern period (ibid: 207). The criterion is manifest at both the international and national levels. In this section, examination will include discussion of whether the second criterion was taken by the right authority at both the national and international levels to determine the validity of actions against Iraq. The national level includes the US government and the Acting President of the US government. Whereas, the Security Council represent the sole authority to decide whether peaceful resolution for international disputes are exhausted and thus refer to the use of force as a last resort.

In reference to the US government decision to invade Iraq, the ‘legitimate’ and ‘right’ authority can be considered the US government, under the direction of President Bush (Deforrest 1997: 8). The President of the United States, under the American Constitution, has the lawful authority, as a commander-in-chief,
to wage war and to use military force, so long as Congress is informed (US Constitution cited in ibid: 8). In October 2, 2002, the Congress of the United States in a joint resolution alleged that Iraq concealed and developed WMD and sporting terrorist organisations (US Congress Resolution authorising force against Iraq 2002). The joint resolution stressed that Saddam Hussein regime might employ WMD to launch attacks against the US or supply terrorists with such weapons, thus, actions by the US government are justified to self-defend the security of the US (ibid: preamble paragraph 13). The Congress authorised the US President to defend the national security of the US against the continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime (ibid: section 3). It would appear that the US did act within the constraints of a right authority that decided the invasion, in this case, the US Congress gave the President the right to use force against Iraq. Chambers (2004: 8) stresses that ‘the constitutional and legal requirements of this action were met, so the US action was carried out by competent authority’.

At the international level, as we discussed earlier in this Chapter, is it evident that Resolution 1441 does not expressly authorise Member States to use force against Iraq in the event of Iraqi non-compliance. Also, concerning Resolution 678 Member States are authorised to use all necessary means and measures in pursuit of liberating Kuwait. Resolution 1441 indicated that Iraq had not fully complied with Resolution 678 obligations to disarm and thus Iraq remained in material breach of Resolution 678. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a final chance to comply with its disarmament obligations, also, it warned Iraq of serious consequences in cases where it refuses to cooperate. In addition, if Iraq decided not to fully comply with the resolution it would constitute a further material breach. However, paragraph 12 of Resolution 1441 indicates that the Security Council would decide the serious consequences that Iraq might face. It can be argued that the phrase ‘serious consequences’ does not itself authorise force against Iraq but it highlight warnings to the Iraqi regime in cases of failure to cooperate. It has been submitted that:

‘It was not for individual Member States to judge whether a very minor and technical or more serious violation. No doubt, this requirement is inconsistent with Member
States such as the US and the UK taking unilateral action against Iraq’ (Karoubi 2004: 208).

During attempts by both the US and the UK administrations to expressly authorise force against Iraq relying on Resolution 1441, three permanent Security Council members, Russia, China and France, argued that authorising force against Iraq is not needed and therefore demanded not to include the use of force in Resolution 1441, which explains the lack of explicit language to authorise the use of force in the final draft of the resolution. 38 Resolution 1441, instead, at paragraphs 4, 11, 12, that in matter of Iraqi failure to cooperate, it is for the Security Council to consider the need for full Iraqi compliance with all Security Council relevant resolutions (Karoubi 2004:208). Thus, it is clear that under Resolution 1441, the Security Council is the only authority that would decide on any further action to be undertaken against Iraq (ibid: 209).

Accordingly, the lack of Security Council explicit authorisation for use of force against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 means that the intervening States did not meet the requirement of the right authority to authorise force at the international level.

3.5.2.3 GROUPS GOING TO WAR MUST DO IT WITH THE PROPER INTENTION

The motives for the military action must ‘not be to inflict undue suffering on the enemy state; the defending nation must use only that amount of force, which is necessary for it to achieve its just cause’ (ibid: 209). The motives of those who decided to go to war must not involve the desire for revenge or punishment. Rather, ‘the decision to go to war must be essentially protective; the goal of war is to obtain a just and durable peace’ (ibid: 209). Or as Wells (1996: 257) indicates that the only intention to legitimate a just war is ‘the will

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to right the wrong of aggression and to bring about peace’. Also, the motives for the military action must not be to intend harm, domination, cruelty, personal or national self-interests (Tucker cited in Chambers 2004: 8). The US administration in its war against Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 claimed the war to be for the right motives: pre-emptive self-defence aimed to disarm Iraq from WMD that might threaten both the US and international security, also, prevent Iraq from supporting terrorists organisations with WMD. The US argued that Iraq during the last three decades violated human rights; therefore, the US expressed an intention to free the Iraqi people from an evil regime that used gas and chemical weapons against civilians.

The chapter discussed in details article 51 of the UN Charter which recognises the inherent right of self-defence. An armed attack is required to exercise the right of self-defence according to the article. Although scholars over years argue that expanded interpretation of the article is expanded to include both when armed attack actually occurred and when an armed attack is imminent. Both the US and the UK argued for pre-emptive self-defence because of the threat of Iraq’s WMD. It has been evaluated that there was no weapons found after the invasion. The failure by the coalition forces to discover WMD in Iraq created various doubts internationally regarding the intention behind the invasion.

Mass violations of human rights in Iraq were another motivation for the US and the UK to wage war against Iraq. It has been demonstrated in this Chapter that Iraqi human rights violations during 1980s against Iranian and Iraqi alike, were ignored by the US administration. In addition, given the Iraqi divisions over religion, ethnic and tribal issues, made the situations in the country even worse than mass killing and human rights violations committed through the former Iraqi regime. Chambers (2004: 9) indicates that:

‘The US, as one of the few countries standing between ‘a world at peace’ and the ‘world of chaos and constant alarm’ that terrorism produces, would therefore bring about peace by means of crushing this threat, through ridding Iraq of its dictator Saddam Hussein and eliminating Iraq’s supply of weapons of mass destruction’. 
However, according to (Chambers 2004: 9) various authors have posited numerous theories regarding additional US motivations to invade Iraq, none of these theories satisfy the requirements of ‘right intention’. The most commonly purported theory which highlights the US true intention to wage war against Saddam Hussein regime involves a potential US government desire to acquire Iraq’s oil supplies (ibid: 9). ‘the fundamental motive seems to be the geopolitical position that Iraq holds in the Middle East [as one of] the three major oil and natural gas producing states: Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia’ (Civiltà Cattolica cited in Chambers 2004: 9). This view is supported by Gillespie who is one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the theory of the US desire to dominate Iraq’s oil riches (Gillespie 2004). Gillespie (2004) in his study *Invasion of Iraq* emphasises that the decision to invade Iraq was motivated by the oil prices internationally. According to him, the price of crude oil in 2003 was between US$30 and US$40 per barrel, he adds that ‘Iraq has the capacity to export 2.2 million barrels of oil per day... This works out at 66 million American dollars worth of oil per day, a mighty prize for a successful invasion and occupation of Iraq’ (ibid: 279).

However, some scholars disagree with the claims that the US in its war against Iraq was motivated by the intention to control Iraq’s oil riches, rather, they argue that oil companies from France, Russia and China have contracts to develop oil fields in Iraq (Novact cited in Chambers 2004: 10). They insist that Europe depends on Iraq oil more than the US. It has been argued that ‘oil from Iraq ranks higher among European national interests than American... the goal of the United States is energy independence and, in the shorter term, continuing reductions in reliance on Middle Eastern oil’ (cited in Chambers 2004: 10).

Chambers (2004: 10) in response argues that even if oil is not the motive behind the US action in the Middle East region, it can be consider as a ‘purely an added bonus’. It can be argued that the US government in its war against Saddam Hussein regime intended to bring about peace through defeating terrorist organisations, it can also reasonably argued that ‘US government motives were also ‘tinged’ with a desire for national self-interest’ (ibid: 10).
Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that the US action does not meet the requirement of ‘right intention’ criterion. It has been emphasised that:

‘The criterion of right intention in traditional and modern times serves to reinforce the requirement that the State, which seeks to use force justly, be acting in a truly defensive capacity, rather engaging in military adventurism on the pretext of self-defence... it can be said that, in this case, the criterion was violated by the US and the UK. It seems the unilateral use of force in this case, even against a regime so brutal as that in Iraq, did not meet all the common criteria of just war and every claim based on the doctrine is rejected’ (Karoubi 2004: 212).

3.5.2.4 WAR MUST BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY AS A LAST RESORT

To consider a war justly undertaken, all avenues for resolving the disputes between nations must have been exhausted. Therefore, the threatened nation must first follow all necessary paths for righting the wrong of aggression directed by the aggressive nation. The just war doctrine tradition presumes the moral abhorrence of war and insists that peaceful resolution for conflicts is the objective aim, and that war must be avoided if possible.

Related to the issue of ‘refer to war as a last resort’ as a requirement for just war, the question arises of whether the US administration exhausted all peaceful avenues before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It has been examined that the US government did pursue a number of paths to achieve peaceful settlement to the Iraq WMD situations. The US supported the UN weapons inspector in Iraq aiming to disarm the regime from chemical and nuclear machinery, also, the US sought to establish a resolution in the UN that obligated Iraq to fully cooperate with UN inspectors. As a result Resolution 1441 was adopted in which Iraq was given a last chance to comply with UN inspectors otherwise Iraq might face serious consequences.

However, it has been argued that Saddam Hussein regime could have been overthrown by other means instead of waging war and causing massive civilian deaths. In an article published in 2002, Martin (2002: 20) argues that ‘rather than war or sanctions, there’s a better way to get rid of Saddam Hussein: strategic nonviolent action’. This can be achieved through nonviolent action by the Iraqi population including soldiers to withdraw their consent towards the
regime which would lead to a collapse (ibid). Martin (2002) illustrates the collapse of many Eastern European regimes during 1989 without violence. He asserts that:

‘In 1989, most Eastern European regimes were toppled with little or no loss of life. There were no foreign military attacks, no guerrilla struggles, no sabotage. Instead, there were rallies in the streets, initially small but before long massive, causing entrenched communist rulers to lose their nerve and resign without a fight’ (ibid).

Martin indicates that ‘the same methods can be applied against Saddam Hussein. There are opposition groups in Iraq that can tap into widespread anti-Saddam sentiment’ (ibid). According to him if Iraqi people were given the ‘tools and encouragement’ from the international community to revolt against the regime it may have been possible therefore to avoid war in the region (ibid).

Accordingly, although it can be reasoned that the US government did go to lengths to avoid a war with Iraq, ‘it does appear that all avenues were exhausted first —it is possible that through providing the Iraqi people with the motivation and ability to oust Saddam Hussein, war could have been avoided’ (Chambers 2004 : 12). Hence, it can be argued that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not satisfy the “war must be undertaken only as a last resort” criteria outlined in just war theory requirements.

3.5.2.5 THE GOAL OF THE WAR MUST BE A LIKELY EMERGENT PEACE

The just war theory requires that in order for a war to be just, it should be undertaken to likely produce appropriate conditions to maintain permanent peace. Those conditions should cease the problems that created the aggression which threatened the norms of a peaceful environment.

Therefore, under this requirement the issue arises of whether the US war against Iraq was likely to generate conditions of lasting peace through ending the problems caused by Saddam Hussein’s aggressive regime to his own people and the international community alike.
The US administration purported goals to invade Iraq would, as they argued, establish permanent peace in Iraq and the Middle East region. Accordingly, ‘the lessening of a terrorist threat throughout the world, the ousting of Saddam Hussein (a brutal and tyrannical dictator)’ and the ‘dismantling of Iraq’s supply of weapons of mass destruction, could all be seen to result in peace, in terms of saving lives and making the world safer, less hostile place’ (Chambers 2004 : 12). However, it has been argued earlier that there were no known links between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Al Qaeda and therefore Iraq’s alleged weapon support efforts to terrorist’s organization were groundless. Also, it was suggested that Saddam Hussein as a dictator could have been overthrown by revolts and by prosecuting him for crimes against human rights in front of an international criminal court. It is evident that there were no weapons of mass destruction found after the invasion. Hence, all the arguments that have been presented to invade Iraq, it was argued, were invalid and therefore the invasion was illegal.

The US administration anticipated that Iraq, after ending Saddam Hussein’s regime, would be an ideal and peaceful country that governs itself through democratic means. The US ignored the fact that Iraq had been suffering from dangerous religious, ethnic and tribal divisions which had been controlled by the Saddam Hussein regime. ‘Even after the ousting of Saddam, it is possible that Iraq will descend into a nightmare of revenge of killings, anarchy and new tyranny... the immediate outcome of the war will, then, certainly be tragic’ as indicated in Sunday Morning Herald, one month before the invasion of Iraq.39 Similarly, Chambers (2004: 12) in his argument to present the negative possible outcome of the invasion points out that ‘uproar by Iraqi people, enraged by a US-led occupation of their country, could have been anticipated, as could hostility from supporters of Saddam Hussein, both in Iraq and throughout the world’.

It is noticeable that Iraq, after the invasion, suffered from massive massacres that occurred on a daily basis. In 2006, *the Lancet* indicates that due to the war in Iraq, mortality as a result to violent deaths exceeded 650,000 among the Iraqi people (Anderson et al. 2008: 82-89). *The Lancet* shows that Iraqi people would suffer from non-violent deaths, particularly, diseases due to deterioration of health services, availability of drinkable water, cuts in electricity and displacement of populations (Anderson et al. 2008: 83).

Thus, it can be argued that the outcome of a US-led invasion upon Iraq in the long-term would not be likely to solve the problem the Iraqi people suffered during Saddam Hussein period, also, given the instability and high levels of deaths among Iraqi’s, the US alleged goal of resulting in emergent peace in Iraq after the overthrow the brutal regime, is invalid. In addition, the just war theory indicates that for a war to be just the aim should be directed to set the problems that provoked the aggression. Therefore, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not meet the fifth requirement of just war theory as Iraq still until this time suffers from revenge killings, religious domestic conflicts and militia terrorist actions against innocent civilians.

### 3.6 CONCLUSION

The evidence and arguments considered in this chapter fail to provide any support for either the legality or the morality of the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by the coalition of the willing. On the contrary, the facts indicate clear breaches of international law and a significant failure to satisfy the necessary conditions for just war.
CHAPTER FOUR

CHOMSKY’S MANUFACTURING CONSENT AND THE U.S FOREIGN POLICY, IN CONTRAST WITH ROBINSON’S UNCERTAINTY THEORY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines Noam Chomsky’s theory of ‘manufacturing consent’, and compares it with Piers Robinson’s ‘uncertainty’ theory. This analysis provides the basis for determining whether the mass media in the US is directed by the administration and elite groups, other than the media controllers themselves or whether such media controllers have their own agendas and are themselves able to drive the US administration policies, in times of policy uncertainty.

The thesis argues against Piers Robinson’s view that the US administration does not rely on mass media to gain public support before or after US humanitarian intervention in any state. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that the US executive does indeed rely upon mainstream mass media to generate public support for its agenda.

In this context, it is crucial to examine the capacity of political power and to influence mass media presentations so as to ensure public consent to its policies. To this end, this chapter first introduces Chomsky’s ‘manufacturing consent’ theory. It examines how the US administration had become captive to the manufacturing consent scheme, through extensive use of language in order to construct public approval supportive to US actions, such as the invasion of Iraq 2003.

The chapter then moves on to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Piers Robinson’s ‘uncertainty’ theory. This examination and comparison between the two theories evaluates whether mass media in the US is controlled by the administration in order to drive governmental and elite agendas, rather than the view that US administration disregard the vital influence of the mass media in shaping public opinion before or after primary action.
4.2 CLASS AND POWER IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM

Chomsky and Herman’s ‘Propaganda Model’ theory is built around the idea of effective control of the media by ruling elite groups in The US. While they do not specifically identify the membership of such ruling groups, it seems clear that they have in mind something close to what sociologist C Wright Mills calls the ‘power elite’

Miliband (1989) in his book ‘Divided Societies: class struggle in contemporary capitalism’, introduced what he called a ‘class map’ to differentiate between groups in the contemporary societies. A ‘class map’ of advanced capitalist may be drawn in the shape of a pyramid (fig 1).

Figure 1: class map of advanced capitalist societies.


According to Miliband (1989) the space at the apex of the pyramid with the numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 represents what will be called the dominant class. The
broken line which separates 1 and 2 from 3 and 4 is projected to mark an important distinction between a *power elite* and the rest of the dominant class. Miliband (1989) indicated that C. Wright Mills used the term *power elite* in relation to the U.S. Mills saw the power elite as having three distinct components: 1) chief executives and major shareholders of the hundred or so biggest – industrial, commercial, financial and communications corporations within a nation state; 2) the political directorate which consists of individuals in charge of the main ‘command posts’ of the state; and 3) the top people in the military. Miliband (1989) emphasises that the term ‘power elite’ is used to denote the first two of these groups. But in some regions and some time periods – particularly in war and crises situations - the military leadership can play a central role.

Accordingly, the position of those three groups in the society is crucially important as those groups maintain the power which makes the power elite a distinctive element of the dominant class (ibid: 20). Miliband (1989) in explaining this context quoted Mills who indicated that:

‘The members of the power elite are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact they do occupy such pivotal positions ... They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure ... No one ... can be truly powerful unless he has access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these institutional means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance, powerful’ (Mills quoted in Miliband 1989:20).

According to Miliband (1989:20) the state element of the power elite is considered to be a part of *dominant class*, ‘even though its members are not located in the process of production’. Miliband (1989) indicated that the people who wield state power at the uppermost levels of the state systems undoubtedly qualify to be members of the dominant class.

Numbers 3 and 4 on the pyramid denote the part of the dominant class which is not a part of the power elite, but larger than the power elite (ibid: pp 20-21). Number 3 on the pyramid represents the people who control, and who may also own, a large ‘number of medium – sized firms, which constitute a vast scatter of very diverse enterprises, dwarfed by the corporate giants, yet forming a substantial part of total economic activity’ (ibid:21). Whereas, number 4 on the pyramid
consists of a large numbers of professional classes of lawyers, accountants, middle – rank civil servants and military personnel (ibid: 21).

Numbers 5 and 6 on the pyramid refer to two parts of a substantial lower middle class which is to be found in all advanced capitalist societies (ibid:21). Number 5 represents a large number of people who own and run small businesses. Number 6 is consisting of semi- professional, sub-managerial, supervisory element, civil servants and social workers (ibid: 21). Number 7 on the pyramid represents the vast majority in advanced capitalist societies which sometimes includes up to three quarters of the population, these include: industrial workers, clerical, and service workers, etc (ibid: 23). Finally, number 8 on the pyramid represents the ‘underclass’ groups which include unemployed people, disabled, and chronically sick people (ibid: 23).

In his discussion of the effectiveness of the ‘dominant classes’ in Western societies, Miliband (1989) argues that in any class society, a dominant class may be so designated by virtue of the effectiveness and cohesion it possesses in the control of three main sources of domination. This domination includes: 1) control over the main means of economic activities in the given society which involves the ownership of these means, 2) control over the means of state administration and coercion, and 3) control over the means of communication and persuasion (ibid:27). Accordingly, it can be said that the dominant class of any given advance capitalist society, and their power elites, do maintain the necessary effectiveness and cohesion to pursue their desired goals and objectives (ibid: 27).

In section 4.3 of this chapter, Chomsky & Herman (2002) discuss the performance of mass media in advancing the interests and goals of the U.S administration. The dominant class controls political, economic and communications power in the society, therefore, it can be argued that the power of elite groups functions through mass media (which is controlled and owned by elite groups) to filter the news, marginalise dissent, and allow government and dominate corporate giants to advance their interests and objectives.

Miliband (1989) highlights that although the notion of control is considered to be an important factor in class domination; however, it does not intend to devalue the
importance of ownership. According to him, ownership remains of fundamental importance in the life of capitalist societies, and pervades every aspect of it.

Most important is that ‘corporate elite and the state elite stand on a par with each other: both dwell on the same level of the commanding heights of the social order’ (ibid: 30). It has been argued that the state is located in a given economic context which is firmly shaped by the capitalist mood of production; and that what the state decide is crucially affected by ‘the imperative requirements of capital and the power of those who owns and control capital’ (ibid: 31). However, it can be argued that the state remains the protector of the social order in the society which will in return give capital its preponderance (ibid: 31). Accordingly, the state provides such protection ‘as those who control it think fit, and, in many different spheres, with a high degree of independence – even at times with complete independence, through always, of course within a determinate economic, social, political, and cultural context’ (ibid: 32).

To shed some light on the crucial relationship between the state and ‘property’, Miliband (1989) quoted Marx who argued that:

‘We are... faced with two kinds of power, on the one hand the power of property, in other words, of property owners, on the other hand, political power, the power of the state. ‘Power also controls property’ means: property does not control the political power but is harassed by it, for example by arbitrary taxes, by confiscation, by privileges, by the disruptive interference of the bureaucracy in industry and trade and the like. In other words: the bourgeoisie has not yet taken political shape as a class. The power of the state is not yet its own power’ (Marx quoted in Miliband 1989).

Miliband (1989) indicated that the domination of the bourgeois class over the whole of society has never been complete in the countries of advanced capitalism, and also neither has its domination of the state, therefore, this is not the case in capitalist societies. Rather, Miliband (1989) takes account of the independence and power of the state in a partnership notion between state power and corporate power. A partnership between two different, separate forces which are linked to each other by many means, yet each one have its own separate concerns and sphere (ibid:32).
The terms of this partnership relation are not always firmly fixed, and the relations between those two groups, although close, are far from smooth (ibid: 33). There are many disagreements and tension between state power and corporate power. Because each one of them has their own concerns and sphere which would in return create and produce contention between them. Miliband (1989) mentioned many examples where the US administration imposed constraints upon the freedom of corporate power. Between 1965 and 1975, more than twenty-five major pieces of federal regulatory legislation in the area of consume, environmental protection, personal policies and occupational health were imposed by the Federal Government. The US administrations ‘interventionist propensities and its imposition of constraints on business are particularly marked in periods of crisis and unrest’ (ibid: 33).

Miliband (1989) emphasises that the tensions and differences between the state power and corporate power are real and important; however there is underlying cohesion which binds state and the capital. According to Miliband (1989: pp34-37) the cohesion between power elites and dominant classes is based on a number of distinct but related factors:

- **Common interests**: Which include the very basic material set of interests which the members of these classes have in common, in terms of property, privilege, position, and power;

- **Ideological differences**: Which exist among those two groups in regard to capitalism is mostly concerned with the degree of state intervention and regulation which it requires. Also, power elite and corporate elite disputes over certain policy and strategy are considered to be another aspect of ideological differences. However, those disputes does not seriously damage the underlying consensus about the essential goodness and validity of the system itself; and

- **Common patterns**: This indicates that common patterns of life are shared by members of the dominant class, either by virtue of social provenance, or by absorption. This also produces networks of kinship and friendship, club membership and business and political ties.
The discussion of chapter two highlighted the high level of consensus between executive authority and major sections of the business elite in the US concerning the strategic importance of Middle Eastern oil in the years 2003. In particular there was a common commitment to the use of military force for ongoing domination of the region.

4.3 MANUFACTURING CONSENT

In their book ‘Manufacturing Consent: the political economy of the mass media’, Chomsky and Herman (1988) develop what they called a ‘propaganda’ model as a framework for analysing how the mainstream mass media in the US functions to support the US administration goals and interests (Herman 1996). Herman argues that the mass media rely on information sources supplied by the elite and their propaganda companies which consider elite interests (ibid). Chomsky & Herman trace ways in which power and money filter the news fit to print, marginalise dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their point across to the public (Chomsky & Herman 2002). According to Manufacturing Consent, market forces form structures within the mass media system that limit free expression and tend to advance the ideologies of the economic elite groups through the filters which are built into the mass media system. The effect is to endorse ideologies of the economic elite and filter out information that challenges the elite class (Herman 1995).

4.3.1 THE FILTERS

The crucial perception of the propaganda model is that news reaching the public has to pass through five filters. Each one of these filters eliminates information and ideas before being upgraded to the next filter (Nelson 2002). Those filters are: (a) Size of the mass media enterprise, ownership and

40 Chomsky & Herman In the Preface of their book manufacturing Consent , indicated that ‘ the special importance of propaganda in what Walter Lippmann referred to as the “manufacturing consent” has long been recognized by writers on public opinion, propaganda, and the political requirement of social order’. Further, the authors added that ‘Lippmann himself, writing in the early 1920s, claimed that propaganda had already become a regular organ of popular government’. 
orientation of the mass media; (b) advertising; (c) sourcing; (d) flak and finally (f) anticommunism ideology (ibid). Thus, those filters will serve as economic structuring conditions (Chomsky & Herman 2002). This systematic structure explains how the prevailing mainstream mass media are tightly ‘embedded in the market system’ (Nelson 2002). Mainstream mass media are income-seeking enterprises, owned by extremely affluent people financially sponsored by advertisers who are also profit-seeking individuals. The mass media at this stage relies on governmental information sources, which will cause a confident harmony between the mass media and the government and major corporate companies (Herman 1996).

It is of central importance to examine the five filters offered by Chomsky & Herman, which explain how the US administration regulates the mass media in order to achieve high levels of public consensus supportive to US administration decisions. According to Chomsky & Herman the filters explain the performance of the mass media in removing extraneous information (Chomsky & Herman 2002). The operation of the filters occurs so logically, where the dominant elite are convinced that they choose what is newsworthy depending on their professional news values (ibid). The five filters are:

1. The ownership/profit filter (ibid: 2). Mass media are businesses whose main objective is to generate revenue for their owners and investors. Thus, the mainstream mass media is driven by profit interests. This is a natural consequence of the free market. The cost of establishing a newspaper has become so high that a newspaper needs high revenues and excellent management to achieve extensive circulation. This requires investment from wealthy individuals and other profit-seeking corporations. Hence, mass media is controlled by the hands of wealthy individuals and their corporations. This, the first filter is concentrated by a social elite controlling the information system to serve their profit agendas. The owners will hire the top managers in order to advance policies and targets of what sort of news is allowed, and what sort of editing should be applied to the information before it is published.
Mainstream mass media in the U.S is controlled and dominated by powerful trans-national Corporation (e.g. AOL- Time Warner, Vivendi, News Corporation, General Electric, IBM, Microsoft). The role of these corporations in global political economy is twofold: first, they have provided the hardware and software that has enabled changes in the pattern of news production; second, they are the main source for information, news, and knowledge about the world in general (Fairclough 2006: 99). Those corporations are the main source of views and ideas, and the main providers of creditability and legitimacy for the powers that be. According to Fairclough (2006) they contributed to the dissemination of globalist discourse, claims and assumptions, and of the values, attitudes and identities which are cultural conditions for the successful implantation of globalisation, on the basis of an intimate relationship between theses corporations and other sectors of business, the public relations industry, governments in the most powerful states and other agencies (ibid: 99).

2. The advertising filter (ibid: pp 14-18). Advertising is the crucial source of revenue for the majority of mass media sources. The mass media is forced to keep the flow of advertising revenues in order to maximise its profit and improve the product (more marketing, higher quality production and better writers). This is the nature of the market system, where corporations are required to cope with economic conditions to survive. Accordingly, the nature of the information that passes through this filter should not challenge the corporate system. Also, the type of information that passes through this filter should consider the importance of keeping the advertising revenue at its highest levels. Thus, the information will face changes and frames that do not challenge the interest of the major advertisers.

3. The sourcing filter (ibid: pp 18-25). Mass media organisations require a stable flow of information which will be processed into news. Mass media relies on standard, credible sources of information, mainly, information from the government itself (Gressett & Haltom 1985: 50-65), and from corporations. This will enforce those groups’ societal
positions, giving credibility in society. In this situation, it’s more difficult for critical voices to receive mass media’s attention, and therefore the mass media is obligated to justify the government and corporate actions, for instance. Further, this will offer government and elite interests a straightforward path to publicity, where the news is managed by them into a format appropriate to their goals, and to design the conditions and the agendas under which debate takes place over critical issues.

4. The flak filter (Chomsky & Herman 2002: pp 26-28). The flak filter has the effect that once there is a critical issue debated or published by the mass media as a story or a program, the elite group in society instantly replies by threats to impose sanctions against that mass media channel or the newspaper enterprises. This group increasingly will become more effective in their attacks because it consists of large numbers of corporations with massive funds. At this stage, the attacks will be a direct threat to the mass media source, and the advertisers. Accordingly, the mass media management will choose not to support such a program, mainly, programs that challenge the societal standards. This threat will result in news coverage and material which is uncontroversial and will support the views of the dominant groups in society and their corporations. Thus, the news that passes through this filter emphasis the interests of this elite group rather than the public.

5. The anticommunism filter (ibid: pp 29-31). This filter ignores any ideologies that challenge capitalism. This mechanism always has been the primary aspect of the US foreign policy for at least 80 years. The US administration will consider any state as an enemy if their policies disagree with the US fundamental values. And since this filter functions to impose acceptable ideological values to the US administration, it has significant influence on the mass media. Thus, the variety of debates in mainstream mass media is limited to selective issues, which are agreed goals and targets of the US administration. After the collapse of former Soviet Union and the diminution of socialist movements internationally,
this filter may now have less impact. However, Chomsky & Herman (2002: xvii) argue that:

‘This is easily offset by the greater ideological force of the belief in the “miracle” of the market. The triumph of capitalism and the increasing power of those with an interest in privatization and market rule have strengthened the grip of market ideology, at least among the elite, so that regardless of evidence, markets are assumed to be benevolent and even democratic and nonmarket mechanisms are suspect’.

According to Chomsky & Herman (2002: 31) these filters narrow the variety of news and limit the newsworthiness of information depending on constant news campaigns. Broadly speaking, the mainstream mass media in the US has high levels of censorship and control. It’s obvious that the mainstream mass media is forced to function as it does. As a massive influence of market forces, the mainstream mass media in the US are corporations which are profit–seekers, required to satisfy their shareholders, and to improve the quality and reach of their enterprises. The above filters will shape the quality of news, and decide what is newsworthy, to satisfy the societal elite and their corporations, and also satisfy the US administration. Therefore, once the mass media receives raw news, the five filters become important for its survival. One might wonder what kind of news will pass to the public after all these sophisticated processing filters. The answer is: news that will reflect the governmental and societal groups and their goals and policies.

Herman (1996) emphasised that the power of the U.S propaganda system lies in the capability to mobilise an elite consensus, to appear as democratic consent, causing misunderstanding, confusion, and apathy among the general population (who lack comprehensive ideas in regards to an issue) to permit the elite policies to go forward. However, the elite sometimes will allow debate as long as it works as a tactical means to achieve their goals.

More importantly, the five filters will narrow the array of information that passes through each filter. Those constant news campaigns – the filters- will decide what will be important news. Thus, the mass media coverage of events will be based on serviceability to main domestic power interests, which will decide the choice, the volume and the quality of coverage (Chomsky & Herman.
To Bennett (1990) the amplification pertains to how reporters and editors determine the width of the official news ‘gate’ and so what other social debate on an issue will be allowed to pass. Therefore, journalists more commonly ‘index’ the news with legitimate voices according to prominent official views, which will influence the outcome of news (ibid: pp 106-107). Chomsky (2002: 22) in his book *Media Control* makes the same argument when he writes ‘the United states pioneered the public relations industry. Its commitment was to control the public mind’. Further, the mass media by presenting ideas and preventing the range of alternative news can shape public opinion towards issues and events (Klaehn 2002). According to Herman (1996):

‘The model does suggest that the mainstream media, elite institutions, commonly frame news and allow debate only within the parameters of elite interests; and that where the elite is really concerned and unified, and/or where ordinary citizens are not aware of their own stake in an issue or are immobilized by effective propaganda, the media will serve elite interests uncompromisingly’.

### 4.3.2 WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS

As noted, the propaganda model proposed that the mass media in US perform to serve the elite and government views. Moreover, the propaganda model projects that the mass media options pertaining to the special treatment of specific news stories and issues are primarily political targets (Klaehn 2002). To Chomsky & Herman (2002) the propaganda system on the one hand, will constantly present people mistreated in enemy countries as worthy victims. On the other hand, the greater abuse of other country citizens by its government will be unworthy victims. In this context, the propaganda will manage the five filters in order to accomplish the goals of the government and elite groups. Thus, to decide what is newsworthy, the propaganda campaigns will strain the information in order to impose policies or to achieve mainstream consensus to support worthy victims or to ignore them, depending on the political interests of the administration and corporate interests. Herman & Chomsky (1989) employed the concepts of worthy and unworthy victims to
describe this mechanism, where different treatment of events and issues are obviously related to economic and political advantages rather than any actual worth (Herman 1996). Furthermore, the propaganda model predicts that to serve a political ends, the treatments accorded to news stories and events by the elite groups will vary the agenda-setting serving areas of import (Klaehn 2002).

In the propaganda system the quantitative aspect of mass media coverage is the methodological assumptions which explain the news management of worthy and unworthy victims of other states. Chomsky & Herman (2002) highlight how the mass media claim—sometimes—that the victims who are killed at a far distance are treated as unworthy victims by the US mass media and thus disregarded. Whereas, information of the abuses of worthy victims not only pass through the filters; they will become the basis of constant propaganda campaigns (ibid). Therefore, once the government and the corporate community feel that a story is useful, the mass media in this situation will function intensively in order to inform the public to manufacture consent among them supportive to government attitudes (ibid).

In the US, while there is different treatment of the victims of other states by mass media, the public are unaware of the facts and continue to maintain a high moral attitude. This is clear evidence that the propaganda system in the US is tremendously effective in misleading the public and even the mass media (Chomsky & Herman 2002).

In the propaganda model, the stories of worthy and unworthy victims—friendly and enemy states—will differ in quality and quantity. That is, as far as the quality of the treatment in worthy victims and unworthy victims, expectations are:

A. Official sources of the US and its client regimes to be used greatly and critically with friendly government, while refugees and other dissent sources will be used in dealing with enemies;

B. Anticipation of uncritical acceptance of certain grounds in dealing with friendly states, for instance leaders seeking democracy and peace, and
opposing terrorism. Whereas, in treating enemy states those premises will not be applied;

C. Different criteria of evaluation will be employed, so what is considered to be evil and criminal in enemy states will be presented as an incidental fact in friend states;

D. Diminished evil acts in friend states, whereby massive investigations in the search for enemy villainy and the search for those responsible for the abuse in the enemy states (ibid: 23).

The quality of the coverage of worthy victims will be characterised dramatically and significantly., They will be humanised, and the victimisation will be detailed and the context will create reader interest and sympathy. On the contrary, unworthy victims will have little perspective that will stimulate and enrage negligible humanisation, and slight news details. Therefore, this coverage of worthy and unworthy victims will be displayed in the mass media more directly and offensively in heading, word usage, placement, also in the opinion columns it will anticipate sharp restraints on the range of the expression allowed to present opinions (ibid:23).

With this background, and as it is commonly acknowledged that the shaping of news is critical in forming public attitudes to existing problems, it is assumed that the mass media are a significant influence on public opinion (Sorlin 1994). The US administrations can promote public favour or detestation of other countries or people. This can be simply accomplished through the extensive news coverage of other nations’ struggles with their leaders in the case of worthy victims, whereas, less news coverage of abuses in some other states as it is deemed unworthy for the US administration. Consequently, the assessment of interests and goals will mainly determine the US involvement in other nations’ citizens’ misery. Nonetheless, the mass media –in addition to the previous argument- are intent on avoiding anything potentially hazardous to state security, accordingly, the mass media fear state interference, and so
will be very cautious, in effect imposing voluntary systems of censorship (ibid:113).

In their analysis of worthy and unworthy victims, Chomsky & Herman (2002) stress that the sufferers of enemy countries will be ‘found worthy and they will be subject to more intense and indignant coverage than those victimized by United States or its clients, who are implicitly unworthy’. Thus, this explains why and how the mainstream mass media in US functions in order to pass and impose policies that will be supported by public consensus. That is to say, they use massive directed and selected news coverage of events (ibid: pp xix–xxiv). Chomsky & Herman (2002: xxiv) discuss the impact of mass media upon the public sphere by illustrating the Racak killings and liquica massacre. The authors pointed out that:

‘With the co-operation of the media, the Racak killings were effectively used by US officials to ready the public for war, not only by their intensive coverage but also by their taking the official allegations of massacre at face value. In the same time frame, the media’s treatment of the indisputable massacre at Liquica was insufficient in volume or indignation to mobilize the public, in accord with the US policy of leaving the management of events in East Timor to the US ally Indonesia’.

4.3.3 THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS

The propaganda model presumes that third world elections present an excellent checking ingredient for the model. It presumes that in friendly client countries the elections take place to legitimise both their regimes and leaders. Those elections are mostly held under US support and with extensive US supervision and public relations support. While, other elections in disfavoured or enemy states are considered to be illegitimate, therefore, the US administration will reject and criticise the regime and the elections (ibid: 87).

Consequently, as Chomsky & Herman (2002) assume, the mass media are expected to support the US administration’s dual treatment and position of third world elections. It will maintain a policy supportive to the US administration’s agenda and viewpoint. Therefore, the mass media will find elections in favoured countries legitimate, regardless of any circumstances;
whereas, in disfavoured states the elections will be found illegitimate, ludicrous and incomplete (ibid: 88).

Chomsky & Herman (2002: 88) discuss how the propaganda model functions to legitimise or make illegitimate third world elections. They argue that the election-propaganda framework regarding third world elections consists of imposing instructions on mass media behaviour; the fundamental electoral conditions under which the elections are held in either favoured or disfavoured states; US mass media treatment of third world elections.

4.3.3.1 ELECTION-PROPAGANDA FRAMEWORKS

Chomsky & Herman (2002: pp 88-91) state that the US administration in dealing with third world elections has utilised several mechanisms to determine whether to support or oppose elections. They argue that the US government has a set of agenda topics that should be stressed, particularly, the aspects of democracy; public–relations accomplishment and fairness of the elections. In favoured countries the term democracy will be employed heavily in order to portray the elections as a healthy environment for democracy. At this stage the US mass media will give a friendly state a deferential consideration to increase the elections legitimacy. Whereas, elections in disfavoured states - not associated with democracy- the mass media will intentionally ignore this election and will describe it as illegitimate process. It is clear that the US administration employs a double standard policy supported by subjective mass media.

4.3.3.2 FUNDAMENTAL ELECTORAL CONDITIONS

To the US government there is a list of elements that should be considered when dealing with third world elections. This list will decide whether the elections are meaningful or meaningless. Chomsky & Herman (2002: pp 91-140) in their extensive examination of the elections held in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua over a three year period from 1982-85, the authors demonstrate that there is a set of conditions to verify whether the elections are legitimate or illegitimate from the US administration’s point of view. To
them the US administration will consider these elements to support and legitimate third world elections:

A. Free speech and assembly;

B. Freedom of the press;

C. Freedom of organisation of intermediate groups;

D. Freedom of organise parties, field candidates, and campaign for office; and

E. Absence of state terror and a climate of fear.

Chomsky & Herman (2002) regarding the US attitude toward these elections, conclude that electoral conditions in Nicaragua in 1984 were more encouraging and favorable to the US administration than in El Salvador and Guatemala. This indicates that US attitudes vary from one state to another, and thus, it can be argued that the US exercises double standards in supporting other countries elections. Strangely, instead of supporting the Nicaraguan elections, the US administration announced that those elections were illegitimate and therefore opposed the outcome of the new government. By contrast, El Salvador’s internal situations failed to perform the minimum US electoral election elements; however, the US recognised the elections and considered it as legitimate.

4.3.3.3 US MASS MEDIA TREATMENT OF THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS

The US mainstream mass media pursued the US administration’s agenda in third world elections, regardless of examining whether those elections were held under US electoral elections elements or not. Herman highlights that the El Salvador elections in 1982 and 1984 are excellent examples of democratic advance the US administration’s view (ibid: 91). The contrary is true of the elections in Nicaragua which were considered an embarrassment. Salvadorian elections were seen by the US government to be significant even though this election was held with no freedom of press and assembly; no freedom of state terror and without the fundamental conditions for free elections. Surprisingly, in Nicaragua the elections situation met more of the fundamental conditions
given the high levels of press freedom along with freedom of state terror. Regardless of these aspects the US government considered El Salvador elections more meaningful than Nicaragua elections (Herman 1993).

The US mass media followed the administration policy in its dual treatment of the elections in both countries. They provided wide coverage of the Salvadoran elections; the mass media achieved that without revealing the facts surrounding the voting requirement and also the mass media ignored entirely the basic circumstances crucial for free elections. In the Nicaraguan elections, the mainstream US mass media functioned to disregard the US efforts to disturb the process, rather the US mass media directed its efforts continually to issues that would negate the election’s legitimacy (ibid: pp 31-40).

Not surprisingly, the mainstream mass media in the US functions to advance the US government policies and agenda. In third world elections, the role of the mass media is as an administration vehicle to legitimise or illegitimise elections depending on the US understanding and evaluation of favoured and disfavoured clients. The mass media’s failure to investigate whether or not third world countries follow the elements of democracy or disregard them in the election process, can be observed by the previous illustration. It can be argued that the mass media in the US, mainly, serve to support and legitimise US foreign policies rather than to act as a watchdog. Herman (1993: pp 31-40) points out that mass media behaviour and treatment of the El Salvador and Nicaraguan elections can be described as followed:

‘What makes this tabulation so telling is that the media, in following the government agenda, not only failed to look at whether the basic conditions of free elections were present in the favored countries, but they also asked different questions in the two sets of elections. The mainstream media then followed the government in finding that the Salvadoran elections had legitimized the government, which was democratic and “elected”, whereas the Nicaraguan government was found by the media to be illegitimate and “unelected”, despite the technical and substantive superiority of the Nicaraguan election. The gearing of media news-making to the propaganda demands of government policy could hardly have been closer’.
4.4 MAINSTREAM LIBERAL AND ACADEMIC ‘LEFT’ CRITIQUES

The propaganda model has faced numerous critiques since Manufacturing Consent was published. According to Herman (2000: 104) several liberals along with some mass media academic analysts of the left, disliked the propaganda model. They asked rhetorically the source of Chomsky and Herman’s information that was used to censure the mainstream mass media. Herman (2000: 104) argues that:

‘Many of these critics found repugnant a wholesale condemnation of a system they believed to be basically sound, its inequalities of access regrettable but tolerable, its pluralism and competition effectively responding to consumer demands. In the postmodernist mode, global analyses and global solutions are rejected and derided, and individual struggles and small victories are stressed, even by nominally left thinkers. Many critiques displayed a barely – concealed anger, and in most of them the propaganda model was dismissed with a few superficial clichés, without fair presentation or subjecting it to the test.’

Most of the critiques against the propaganda model presented no evidence to determine its invalidity. For those closely monitoring US foreign policy and the mass media - policy relations it is apparent that the US administration utilises the mass media in order to maintain a consensus supportive to its outgoing policies and targets. The tremendous efforts of the US administration prior and during the Iraq invasion present an example of how the mass media functioned to gather public opinion to legitimise the invasion for the US citizens. The propaganda model accurately explained how the mainstream mass media in the US follow the administration path – as noted in the discussion of the aspects of mass media treatment of worthy, unworthy victims of other states; legitimate and illegitimate third world elections- . Hence, it can be argued that the model presents an important and core tool for analysis of mass media - policy relations.

It is necessary to briefly discuss the main criticisms of the Manufacturing Consent theory. In this discussion the dissertation does not aims to defend the propaganda model. Rather it will explain how those critiques lack a fundamental analysis to replace the model or to explain why the mass media in
the US performs in the way it does. In his article entitled *the propaganda model: A Retrospective* Herman (2000: pp 104-18) mentioned and refuted the major criticisms displayed by mainstream liberal and academic ‘left’. The main criticisms are:

1. **Conspiracy theory.** Herman (2000:106) argues that in *Manufacturing Consent* they clearly rejected the conspiracy theory. In the preface of manufacturing consent the authors stress that ‘... *we do not use any kind of “conspiracy” hypothesis to explain mass-media performance. In fact, our treatment is much closer to a “free market” analysis*’ (Chomsky & Herman 2002: x1). As Herman explains mainstream liberal critics still attack the propaganda model and accuse it of being labelled as a conspiracy theory, mainly, because they are ‘lazy’ to read a ‘complex work’ and that any assumptions or ideas that will challenge the state should be considered and assumed to be a ‘conspiracy’. Academic analysts assumed that some of the mass media foundations consist of thousands of independent journalists and companies, therefore, according to them; any finding that they pursue a ‘party line’ so as to serve the state must rest on a supposed conspiracy accusation.

Robert Entman (1990) in one of his articles argues that in manufacturing consent the author’s abolished their arguments and endorsed a conspiracy theory by claiming that the mass media coverage of the 1973 Paris accord on Vietnam was intentionally planned by the devoted mass media to satisfy the goals of the administration. Herman (2000:105) indicated that the argument of manufacturing consent is that the mass media contains several independent units which function under the pressures of the free market, government and forces from the internal organisation, which explains media behaviour and performance in structural terms. In addition, the majority of mass media bias occurs as a sequence of pre-selection of the right journalists, obeying the dictates of shareholders, the organisation, market and political power (Chomsky & Herman 2002: x1).
2. **Failure to contact journalists.** Romano (1989) states that in Manufacturing Consent the authors failed to contact reporters to question them why they function to present bias in mass media materials. He stresses that the authors should have asked for explanations for the reporter’s performance. However, according to Herman (2000:106) reporters mostly are oblivious of deeper sources of mass media bias they might internalise. In addition, journalists -once questioned- might be inclined to rationalise their performance. And finally, requesting information from reporters and criticising their opinions and programs, may deny the legitimacy of systematic analysis of mass media performance.

3. **Failure to take account of mass media objectivity and professionalism.** Hallin (1994) argues that Chomsky & Herman in their *Manufacturing Consent* proposal failed to take account of the maturing of reporter’s professionalism which is crucial in protecting and rehabilitating the public sphere. For Herman (2000:107) professionalism and objectivity rules are ‘fuzzy and flexible concepts, and are not likely to override the claims and demands of deeper power and control relationships’. He further points out that ‘... professionalism has also internalized some of the commercial values that media owners hold most dear, like relying on inexpensive official sources as the credible news source’. On the whole, objectivity and professionalism are labile factors, since the journalists are influenced by the biases of advertisers and owners as explained by the five filters. Therefore, objectivity rules are vague as a result of elite and government influence upon the outcome of news and information.

4. **Failure to explain continued opposition and resistance.** In their review of The Propaganda Model in *The New York Times* in 1988 both Hallin and historian Walter LaFeber pointed to the sustained opposition to Reagan’s Central America policy as discrepant with the propaganda model (Herman 2000: 107). It is acknowledged that the propaganda model is about how the mass media functions, not how efficient they are (ibid: 108). Also as Herman stresses that ‘with regard to Central America the elite was sufficiently divided over tactics to allow space and
considerable debate’ (ibid:108). In short, the propaganda model investigates and examines the mass media’s performance and behaviour as a consequence of government and elite forces. In the introduction to Manufacturing Consent Chomsky & Herman describe their work noting that ‘we are talking about media structure and performance, not the effects of the media on the public….and where the public’s interests diverge sharply from that of the elite, and where they have their own independent source of information, the official line may be widely doubted’ (Chomsky & Herman 2002: xii).

5. The Propaganda Model is too mechanical and functionalist, and ignores the existence of space, contestation, and interaction. According to Herman (2000:108) those criticisms are negative responses of the serious left-of- centre mass media analysts such as Philip Schlesinger, James Curran, Peter Golding, Graham Murdock and John Eldridge, as well as Daniel Hallin. Their critique of the model includes: that the authors of Manufacturing Consent failed to explain the filters weight; did not allow for external influences; did not present methods in which economic factors function to structure both the choice and form of news presentations. To Herman (2000:109) the propaganda model is not all influential despite having a powerful effect. He maintains that ‘the propaganda model does start from the premise that a critical political economy will put front and centre the analysis of the locus of media control and the mechanisms by which the powerful are able to dominate the flow of massages and limit the space of contesting parties’. In addition, the propaganda model deals with sophisticated arrays of issues and events, therefore, it offers a broad framework to analyse mass media – policy relations depending on internal and external factors. Hence, the propaganda model functions to explain mass media performance without ignoring the existence of space, contestation or interaction.
4.5 THE PROPAGANDA MODEL AND THE IRAQ INVASION OF 2003

It is now broadly asserted and acknowledged that the U.S administration used defective and bogus information in order to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003 for the world and the US public. To accomplish that, the administration depended heavily on the extensive efforts of mainstream mass media to legitimise and sell the war to the US public. In this context, the propaganda model proved its effectiveness in explaining the hidden relation between the mainstream mass media and the government. When considering mass media coverage of the events leading up to the invasion and thereafter, Chomsky & Herman propaganda model is significant, particularly, the US treatment of Iraqi civilians as worthy victims of an enemy state (Rampton 2007).

To justify the war in Iraq the Bush administration resorted to propaganda, with the mass media basically presenting the administration arguments to be facts without scrutiny (Kumar 2006). The mainstream mass media, by not effectively inspecting the case for the invasion, supported the mission (ibid: 48). An editorial article on May 26, 2004 in the New York Times stated that there was a quantity of news coverage of the Iraq war which was not as contentious as it should have been, and that on some occasions, information that was ‘controversial’ at that time, and appears doubtful after the invasion was ‘insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged’ (The New York Times 26 05-2004). These words extracted from the leading newspaper in US, illustrate the mainstream mass media’s failure to present facts and information. To a certain extent, this testimony, confirmed how the mass media endorsed the US Government’s position to invade Iraq via public misleading.

According to Herman (2004: pp 176-184) the foremost priority of the U.S official propaganda was to sell the war to the US public. This was achieved through three strategies coordinated with the mass media cooperation in pushing these propaganda themes. Thus, the propaganda mechanisms consist of:

a) **Demonization**: the mainstream mass media shifted the characterization of Saddam Hussein as an ally to characterize
him as a major enemy and evil. The mainstream US mass media never mentioned that an agreement with Saddam Hussein was possible; rather the mass media did not discuss the US-Iraqi agreement for an extended period of time. The 1983 picture that shows Donald Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam Hussein was never shown on US Televisions Channels. In addition, the mainstream mass media applied strategies to support this propaganda, particularly, avoiding WMD’s specialists who would challenge the official party line; evading criticisms and attentions regarding the motivations of the shift of policies and refusing to analyse or discuss the imminent threat issue (ibid: pp 177-178).

b) Allegation: the US propaganda here started to focus closely on Saddam Hussein’s assumed possession of weapons of mass destruction and its imminent hazard to US national safety. The mass media pushed this theme by following the US administration’s propaganda by claiming that Iraq WMD’s might be an actual threat. The mainstream mass media, also presented extensive news coverage of government statements and concerns on Iraq WMD issues (ibid: pp 177-178).

c) Failed diplomacy: the US administration argued prior to the invasion of 2003 that the inspection programs had failed to disarm Iraq’s WMD and that the war was urgent to force the evil Iraqi regime to disarm. Also, the propaganda asserted that diplomatic efforts with Iraq were impossible and that the Iraqi refusal to co-operate with UN inspectors prevented the peaceful resolution. Thus, the US administration was building its case to invade Iraq regardless of UN charters and International law. The mass media started to legitimate the US administration’s aggression toward Iraq as a natural response to a major threat. Further, the mass media did not discuss the effect of international law and UN charters on the use of force against Iraq. It rejected the debate over the legitimacy of
attacking Iraq by claiming that the administration was purely protecting the US national security (ibid: pp 177-178).

In her opinion article entitled *Good reasons for Going around the UN* in *The New York Times*, 18 March 2003, Marie Slaughter (2003) argues that the Bush administration decision to invade Iraq will be ‘legitimate but illegal’. She further stresses that the UN would legitimise the US actions immediately after the invasion. Claiming that the Coalition forces would find indisputable proof that Saddam Hussein’s regime concealed and possessed weapons of mass destruction, or as she argues that ‘even without such evidence, the United States and its allies can justify their intervention if the Iraqi people welcome their coming and if they turn immediately back to the United Nations to help rebuild the country’.

Paradoxically, the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion revealed that Saddam Hussein’s Regime had no weapons of mass destruction. In addition, it was obvious that the Iraqi people disliked the US and ally’s troops and the US existence in their country. Thus, the arguments presented by Slaughter to legitimise and to explain the government line to the US public indicates that the mainstream mass media helped to shape US public attitudes that supported the Iraq invasion.

Definitely, the mainstream mass media shaped the US public opinion toward Iraq’s Invasion as can be observed by the results of the polls. According to *New York Times/ CBS News Poll* (Negaunee & Elder 2003) the Americans responded that they would support military actions against Iraq even without Security Council approval. The Poll showed that 58 percent of the respondents said that UN was doing an ineffective job in handling Iraqi issues. In the meantime, 55 percent agreed that they would support US and allies invasion of Iraq even if it was in defiance of a vote of the Security Council. In their analysis of the findings of *The New York Times/ CBS News Poll*, Negaunee & Elder (2003) concluded ‘by many measures, the Poll found that the nation is behind Mr. Bush on Iraq. And for all the signs of dissent and protest around the nation, it would appear that support for war is on the rise’. Therefore, it can be argued
that the mainstream mass media in the US aimed at misleading the US public in order to form harmony to promote the government lines and propaganda.

The mainstream mass media coverage of Iraq issues before the invasion failed to criticise the Bush administration’s policies. It uncritically relied upon the U.S administration’s propaganda. The propaganda was shaped to overthrow the Iraqi regime and replace it with an alleged democratic government. This propaganda started to function after the release of the U.S National Security Strategy in 2002, and Bush’s declaration of the axis of evil which asserted Iraq’s WMD’s imminent threat against the national security of the U.S. Hence, the mass media adopted the U.S policy in shaping public opinion through presenting uncritical information and claims of Iraq’s threat. It had been argued that if mainstream mass media politically opposed the Bush administration it would face serious commercial consequences (increasing taxes and imposing new regulations) which were unfavorable to the mass media (Williams 2004).

According to Kuypers (2006), President Bush carefully defined the axis of evil through providing examples of previous evil acts of the three nations: Iran, Iraq and North Korea. However, as Kuypers (2006) stresses the mainstream mass media had narrowed the axis down to these nations, even before President Bush’s speech was delivered. DeYoung (2002) in his article in The Washington Post entitled Bush Lays down a Marker for 3 ‘evil’ states argues that the US has a long-term responsibility to protect the world against evil states that support terrorism. DeYoung (2002) further explains the need for the US immediate response to these threats. He further indicates ‘by singling out Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil” whose efforts to acquire and export weapons of mass destruction could no longer be tolerated, President Bush last night appeared to sharply increase both the immediacy and the gravity of the threat they pose’.

Meanwhile, the mainstream mass media not only supported the US administration’s propaganda but enthusiastically embraced information relying on bogus intelligence. As a result, the dissent arguments were buried, ignored or restricted to the margins of the mass media, and therefore, left without the
terms of decency that main mass media outlets can grant in democratic societies (Schell 2004).

In his extensive study of information management strategies during the 2003 Iraq War, Kumar (2006) stresses that the volume of mass media coverage before the invasion on the front pages of the main newspapers and television broadcast simply adopted the Bush administration’s line. He further argues that the key scheme of mass media was omission, particularly, marginalise and silence opposing information and ignore or bury questions about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the mass media intentionally ignored the historical connections between the US government and Iraq. In doing so, mainstream mass media downplayed and omitted facts that would counter the administration’s case for the Iraq invasion.

Kumar (2006) noted that ‘the message to journalists was clear: either censor yourself or face disciplining’. This message came out not only from the elite groups that own most of mainstream mass media outlets in the U.S, but also from the administration, mainly, the White House. Consequently, if a journalist was known to request important and critical information regarding Iraq issues, it was hard for him/her to attend the white House press conference again. Kumar (2006) emphasises that ‘the press conference was so tightly controlled that even compliant White House journalists were irate. Bush called only on reporters he wanted from a pre-determined list (...) Bush had gone too far in exposing the degree of media subservience, and some journalists were annoyed’.

Apparently, the mainstream mass media in the US performed to serve the administration line and propaganda. In the period leading up to Iraq invasion the mass media followed the US government agenda and goals. The mass media uncritically announced the war against terror; it portrayed Iraq weapons of mass destruction to be a major threat to the US and international community. In addition Saddam Hussein was considered a dangerous tyrant who threatened the US national security. All these themes were presented in order to sell the war to US citizens who were unaware of surrounding circumstances and of their administration’s targets and agendas. The
mainstream mass media mobilised its influence to convince the public that self-defence was legitimate regardless of UN approval and despite the facts that Iraq might not possess weapons of mass destruction. All these facts support Chomsky & Herman’s analysis of mass media-policy relations. In Chapter 6 of the dissertation I discuss, examine in depth and give details to support the validity of the propaganda model.

4.6 UNCERTAINTY THEORY

As noted earlier in this Chapter, the mainstream mass media in the US functions to support the government views and propaganda. In doing so, the mass media shape public opinion towards critical issues, serving the elite groups ends and government views. Whereby, the political and economic perspectives of main mass media organizations will lead to a position in which information and news tend to support dominant perceptions (Robinson 2000). In other words, the Manufacturing Consent theory emphasises the capability of governments to influence the production of the reporters and the importance of journalists in shaping their perceptions of events relying on their own political and cultural background.

In contrast with Manufacturing Consent theory, Piers Robinson (2002: 32) offers the policy-media interaction model as an alternative approach to examine the mass media – policy relations. According to Robinson (2001: 523):

‘Debate over the extent to which the mass media serves elite interests or, alternatively, plays a powerful role in shaping political outcomes has been dogged by dichotomous and one-sided claims. Some attribute enormous power to the news media (the so-called CNN effect) while others claim the media “manufactures consent” for elite policy preference.’

Robinson (2001: 531) argues that when leader consensus exists over a critical issue, mass media are unlikely to generate news coverage that confronts that consent. However, as Robinson argues, in cases where there exists dissension among the elite regarding an issue, mass media functions to produce coverage that reflects this debate by typically supporting one side against another.

According to Robinson (2001: 531) when elite disagreement exists, the news media has the opportunity, to play a more significant and vigorous role in
policy deliberation and formulation, as the mass media obtain the possibility in its coverage to actually share in the elite debate. In this context, the mass media can play a pivotal role in causing strategy alteration. Robinson (2001: 531) indicates this when he writes ‘when and if this occurs, by promoting a particular policy line advocated either by elites outside the executive or particular members of the executive itself, news media can play a key role in causing policy change’.

The policy–media interaction model hypothesises that the mass media’s influence on foreign policy takes place when there exists (1) policy uncertainty, and (2) broad and critically framed news media coverage (Robinson 2002). As noted by Robinson (2000), policy uncertainty occurs when the decision-makers have no policy regarding an issue or event, or when the executive is uncertain over the proper course of action to take. Consequently, the mass media will respond through an extensive and critical frame coverage, particularly, front page news coverage and airing Television programs for a number of days, empathising with suffering people and critiquing of government actions. In these circumstances, the policy makers—being uncertain of what to do and without an evidently defined policy line able to respond to critical mass media coverage—will be obligated to respond to mass media driven public pressure or fear of possible pessimistic public response to government inaction.

On the other hand, according to Robinson (2000) once the administration has decided upon a particular cause of action a decision for non-media related reasons, we would expect to observe high levels of policy certainty with the executive drawing upon its substantial resources in order to try and influence the news agenda’. Therefore, the mass media coverage following the executive decisions will be controlled and contained. Also, as argued by Robinson (2002) the executive will go ahead in their decision with or without mass media support, and the mass media has no influence in shaping either public or government attitudes toward issues if there are high levels of policy certainty in the US executive. Whilst news media coverage might critique the administration’s policy (even when the government is operating to sell its actions), this criticism appears when there is no consensus among the elite.
Conversely, with the executive set on a particular policy, even critical news media reporting is unlikely to influence policy-makers’ course of action.

To Robinson (2000), the policy–media interaction model explains the central role played by the mainstream mass media either to shape governmental views to intervene during humanitarian crises, or to accomplish executive policy change in foreign affairs actions. He further demonstrates that most of US administration humanitarian involvements of the 1990s crises are related to policy uncertainty. Robinson (2000) illustrates the US intervention in Somalia during 1992-3 to prove his case. Robinson writes:

‘Restore Hope is widely understood to have been caused, at least in part, by media coverage of suffering people impelling policy makers to do something (...) As such, the case was initially understood as an easy one for the media driven intervention [thesis].

A second case offered by Robinson (2000) to provide evidence for the validity of his media-policy interaction model, is the 1995 US intervention in Bosnia in order to defend the Gorazde safe zone. According to Robinson the instant target of the intervention was to avoid the collapse of the Gorazde safe area. Nonetheless, as Robinson argues, this was actually media related intervention. He further indicated that ‘the case was considered a hard one for the thesis that media coverage causes intervention because the prevailing explanation for US intervention in Bosnia during 1995 was to avert the collapse of the UN mission’.

Robinson (2002) in his book CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention clearly indicates that the implications of the findings of his analysis support the hypothesis that mass media could influence policy in cases of executive uncertainty. Hence, sympathetic critical news media framing of suffering people can cause policy-makers to either intervene or change their policy regarding humanitarian crises. The CNN Effect examines the relationship between media and policy to determine whether the mass media can influence the outcome of policy makers or vice-versa. Robinson (2002) argues that:
The CNN Effect examines the relationship between the state and its media, and considers the role played by news reporting in a series of ‘humanitarian’ interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda. CNN Effect challenges traditional views of media subservience and argues that sympathetic news coverage at key moments in foreign crises can influence the response of western governments.

To support his case, Robinson asserted that most of US government involvements during the 1990s were related to mass media influence. Therefore, the foreign policy is shaped due to empathies highlighted by the mass media’s portrayal of the suffering people around the international community, causing humanitarian intervention. To verify the claims, Robinson offers the Policy-Media Interaction model to examine the executive certainty or uncertainty of course of actions. Accordingly, Robinson in CNN Effect does not investigates the case of ‘who controls the mass media’ rather he examines how the mass media coverage of humanitarian crises was associated and leading to humanitarian interventions as a sequence of executive disagreement or confounded over a certain course of action (1999: pp 301-309). And even if there was a high level of certainty among the policy-makers, the mass media support is not crucial, and therefore the executive will go ahead in the policy regardless of mainstream mass media support or even public support.

Also, Robinson (2002) in his book CNN Effect, illustrates variety of case studies to support the policy-media interaction model, he points out that the study ‘offers substantive conclusions regarding the significance of news media influence on intervention and explains why the news media can come to affect government policy-making’. Robinson (2002) concludes that ‘under conditions of policy uncertainty and critical and empathy-framed media coverage, the news media can be a factor in influencing policy-makers.’ At the same time Robinson concedes that the so-called CNN effect ‘has become an untested and unsubstantiated fact for many in foreign policy and humanitarian circles’. For this reason, Robinson offers the media-policy interaction model to replace the so-called CNN effect theory, to investigate the policy-media relation. However, Robinson fails to examine this relationship, but continues to assert that the mass media plays a crucial role in shaping governmental decisions and
driving the policy – makers to intervene. However, on other occasions Robinson (2002) indicates e.g. that:

‘The central aim of CNN effect research has been to establish the degree of media influence on policy-makers when they are deliberating over whether to intervene during a humanitarian crisis. Unfortunately influence cannot be observed any obvious or straightforward fashion. We cannot see inside the minds of policy-makers and directly observe news media influence at work’ Emphasis added.

It is argued that it’s complicated to monitor the mass media influence depending on uncertainty or certainty levels among the executive elite. It is widely asserted that political discussion over critical issues occurs in a very secretive environment. Therefore, it’s not easy to determine the central reason for either engaging or ignoring certain humanitarian events and issues. Also, we cannot read the executive minds to observe whether their decision was because of media related influence or because of high stages of policy certainty. In addition, the argument highlighted by Robinson that in high levels of certainty the executive will go ahead in their decision regardless of mass media support, is unconvincing. In democratic societies, the government relies heavily on public opinion support and consensus, in order to legitimise actions and decisions. As well, the democratic governments’ seek to convince developing countries of democratic values; therefore, it’s fundamental to obtain public legitimacy.

4. 7 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPAGANDA MODEL AND UNCERTAINTY THEORY

In the propaganda model Chomsky and Herman offer a systematic analysis of the mass media performance in the US. They argue that because of a number of factors, the mass media outcome served the government and the dominant elite in society. The ownership, advertising, sourcing, flack and anticommunist filters determine the quality and the quantity of mass media coverage of events. They indicate that the mass media in the US adopted the economic market system, in order to maintain survival. Consequently, the mass media coverage when dealing with external issues will consider whether other victims of any nation are worthy or unworthy, depending on US targets and goals. In addition, the mass media functions to portray third world elections depending
on US interests in such countries. Therefore, it will mobilise its influence to either legitimise or illegitimise those elections. The core of Chomsky and Herman’s ideas is that the elite and government control mass media outcomes to accomplish extensive levels of public harmony toward US decisions. This mechanism of public deception explains the prominent role the mass media play in a democratic society, regardless of the definite responsibility it carries, protected by fundamental and constitutional values.

In contrast, as we noted, the uncertainty theory supported by Piers Robinson claims that once there is a high level of policy certainty among the US executive elite on an issue, the policy-maker will continue policy goals, regardless of mass media or public support. According to Robinson when policy uncertainty exists amongst US executive elite, empathy coverage of suffering people will shape the US administration decision to invade. He further argues that most of US interventions during 1990s are perfect examples of mass media influence in driving US government actions, forcing it to intervene during humanitarian crises.

To one who investigates the mass media – policy relations in the US, it’s simple to determine that the mass media in the US functions to present the government actions to achieve agreement supportive to governmental choices, at the same time the mass media coverage will increase the public accord to add legitimacy to government decisions. Broadly speaking, Chomsky and Herman present logical reasons for mass media control in the US. The events after 11, September 2001 and thereafter, present valuable evidence of propaganda model thesis, where the mass media in the US sell the war to both US citizens and the international society. The claims of Iraq’s weapons of mass destructions as justifiable reason to invade, depending on the imminent threat to US and the international community, were the major claims made to US public. It is apparent that the mass media followed the government line in its acclaimed war on terror arguments, without a minimum effort to question those claims and arguments.

The uncertainty theory failed to investigate the relationship between the mass media and the policy makers. Rather, Robinson’s study continues to advance
the so-called CNN effect, without a methodical approach to explain the US mass media performance. Robinson’s claims of mass media’s coverage ability to influence government decisions to immediate response, this was argued not to be the case. The Iraq invasion demonstrated the governmental influence over the mass media and not vice-versa. The alleged claims proposed by Robinson are unable to be substantiated. Ironically, he failed to investigate the case of how the US government involvement in other countries’ situations depend on a solid ground of outstanding policies and targets, more than to obey and follow the alleged mass media influence. In addition, in the US administration there is a very qualified cadre to evaluate and gather information, and therefore, high levels of uncertainty are arguably invalid. Therefore, it can be argued that mass media’s capability to influence government attitudes to invade during humanitarian crises is absurd. Noting that the US foreign policy is shaped to either protect its vital interests or expand it, and thus, humanitarian involvement can be an umbrella to cover its actual motivations.

4.8 INEFFECTIVENESS OF UNCERTAINTY THEORY


‘For policy-makers and academics, the 1990s appeared to be an era of media empowerment. The ending of the Cold War anti-communist consensus between journalists and policy-makers and the spread of real-time news reporting technology seemed to disrupt traditional patterns of media deference to foreign policy elites and expand the power of the media. Interventions during humanitarian crises in northern Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992, Bosnia 199, and Kosovo 1999, often preceded and accomplished by emotive media attention to human suffering, confirmed to some the thesis that media was driving foreign policy formulation’.

Robinson (2005) further indicates:

‘CNN, with its global reach, 24-hour news cycle, and foreign affairs agenda, came to encapsulate the idea of a media-driven foreign policy, creating the so-called “CNN
Effect.” In the wake of 9/11 and the Bush administration’s “war on terror,” however, the geopolitical landscape has been dramatically transformed. U.S. foreign policy has come to be dominated by the perceived threat of global terrorism, rogue states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions (WMDs). The impact of both 9/11 and the subsequent shifts in U.S. foreign policy upon the CNN effect thesis (...) developments since 9/11, specifically the “war on terror,” a “humanitarian war” discourse inherited from the 1990s, and strengthened media management by government, have undermined the CNN effect and ushered in a new era of media deference to government reminiscent of the Cold War era.

Thus, Robinson (2005) strengthened the ideas of the Propaganda Model, claiming that the events after 9/11 had proved Chomsky and Herman ideas of mass media management in the US. Consequently, the propaganda model clarifies the decisive relationship between the mass media and the policy circles in the US. As such, the mass media accordingly will function to advance the government and elite group objectives and policies; therefore, the manufacturing consent themes are still valid in determining the mass media performance in the US. In the preparation to invade Iraq, the US administration utilised the mass media influence to shape public attitudes, via extensive rhetoric handling of Iraq alleged weapons of mass destruction and imminent threat. This will be argued and examined in Chapter 6 of the dissertation, to accomplish a comprehensive understanding of mass media role before, during and thereafter the Iraq invasion of 2003.

According to Robinson (2005) the aftermath of 9/11 episode marked a shifting point for the directions of US administration foreign policy as President Bush announced the ‘war on terrorism’ doctrine and US wars Iraq and Afghanistan. He further argues that as a consequence of these developments, the likelihood of the validity of uncertainty theory has been reduced or even demolished. According to Robinson (2005), three developments led to damage the uncertainty theme:

1. **War on terror framework**: the US foreign policy agenda has ignored the humanitarian issues. Rather the administration functioned to defend the US soil from outside threat. In addition, according to Robinson the mass media followed the US lines to justify the administration actions depending on ideological considerations. He added ‘the war on terror
has helped create an ideological bond between journalists and policy-makers akin to that of anti-communism during the Cold War era’.

2. **National interests framework**: in order for the US and UK administration to justify the Iraq invasion, they adopted polices to change Saddam Hussein Regime as he concealed weapons of mass destruction and to save Iraqi people from the torture. However, the US and UK governments utilised those claims to remove Saddam Hussein regime in order to serve their objectives and targets in the region. Concerning this view Robinson writes ‘...post 9/11 has seen the concept of humanitarian intervention used as a policy tool that Western leaders employ in order to justify interventions driven by national interest and not altruistic concern for the humanitarian needs of other people’.

3. **Mass media management framework**: the US and UK administrations accelerated the management of the information system after the 9/11 event. Therefore, the political administration in both countries limited the capability of mass media to achieve its agendas. As the mass media was forced to highlight some issues over others also it was obligated to frame stories that would serve the administration’s views. Iraq provides an excellent example of high levels of mass media management, since it supported the official policy by portraying the administration’s arguments to invade, particularly, the claims of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, the need for regime change and war on terror narrative. According to Robinson, the strategy of mass media supervision helped to shape public opinion to support the invasion. He concludes ‘it appears that, at least during the 2003 Iraq war, these attempts at media management were generally quite successful’.

Robinson (2005) concludes in his article *CNN Effect Revisited* that ‘the danger for US journalism in these circumstances is that, by following and replicating elite debate, it ends up helping manufacturing consent for the Bush administration’s “war on terror”’. Consequently, Piers Robinson’s uncertainty theory has limited appeal, since the mainstream mass media execute the government and elite’s plans and intentions. For this reason, Chomsky and
Herman’s ideas of mass media –policy relations (propaganda model) remain valid in explaining the controvertible relation between mainstream mass media in the US and government and elite groups.

**4.9 CONCLUSION**

This chapter has critically examined two influential theories of the relations between state and mass media in the developed world; on the one hand Chomsky and Herman’s *Manufacturing Consent* theory and on the other Piers Robinson’s ‘Uncertainty Theory’.

In Chomsky and Herman’s theory the mainstream mass media are seen to serve government and elite groups, through the mechanism of the five filters which function to determine the quality and the quantity of news coverage of certain issues and events.

A centrally important example is that involving identification of what are presented as ‘worthy’ victims of enemy states, whose suffering is highlighted by the media. On the other hand, other such victims experiencing similar levels of suffering are neglected in mass media presentations if their persecutors are not deemed to be enemies of the U.S. Chomsky and Herman identified the latter as ‘unworthy victims’.

The ‘Propaganda Model’ has been shown to be particularly appropriate and effective in explaining mass media’s treatment of crucial issues surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In contrast to the propaganda model, Piers Robinson developed what he called the ‘Uncertainty Theory’ to explain relations between mass media and government policy. Robinson argued that major US overseas interventions in the 1990’s could be understood as driven by sympathetic mass media coverage of suffering in the territories in question.

This chapter has shown that the relevant facts provide little support for Robinson’s ideas. And, indeed, Robinson himself has admitted that manufacturing consent explains the US reliance upon the mainstream mass
media to legitimize its actions. He argued that the mass media management during the Iraq Invasion strengthened the manufacturing consent thesis.
CHAPTER FIVE

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Writings in a number of different areas can be seen to support and extend the ‘Propaganda Model’ considered in the previous chapter, showing how mass media presentations can shape public perceptions and attitudes in line with the objectives of ruling elites. In particular Lakoff’s ‘metaphor analysis’; van Dijk and his ‘Ideology analysis’; and Norman Fairclough’s ‘advanced discourse analysis’, along with the contributions of some other Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) scholars explore ways in which particular sorts of linguistic operations and constructions can function to shape public perceptions, values, moods, and judgments.

5.2 THEORIES OF DISCOURSE

The term ‘discourse’ has been defined with various levels of complexity and scope. Johnstone (2002:2) stresses that discourse is the study of language and defines it as ‘actual instances of communication in the medium of language’. Parker defines discourse as ‘an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being’ (cited in Hardy & Phillips 2002: 2), while Brown and Yule define discourse as everyday language in use (cited in Hardman, 2008: 5). I think discourse is more about language in use; however I believe that discourse is the study of language which includes analysing texts and their aims.
In his book *Language and Power*, Norman Fairclough (2001: 18) highlights that discourse is ‘a form of social practice’. This according to Fairclough (2001: 18-19) implies three aspects ‘firstly, that language is a part of society, and not somehow external to it. Secondly, that language is a social process. And thirdly, that language is a socially conditioned process, conditioned that is by other (non-linguistic) parts of society’. Accordingly, discourse involves social conditions of production and interpretation which are related to three levels of social organization, (1) social situation level — the immediate social environment in which discourse occurs—; (2) social institution level which constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse; and (3) the level of the entire society (Fairclough, 2001: 20-21). Hardman (2008: 5) emphasizes that ‘Fairclough’s meaning of “discourse” implies then, that evidence of social trends, such as oppression of minority groups, prevalent in language use is indicative of such oppression (or trends) being present within society’.

Fairclough (1995: 55) stresses that language in use is constitutive of three aspects of society and culture, that is, each text contributes to shaping each of these aspects. Texts are ‘simultaneously constitutive of (1) social identities, (2) social relations and (3) systems of knowledge and beliefs’ (ibid: 55). Moreover, language use is ‘constitutive both in conventional ways which help to reproduce and maintain existing social identities, relations and systems of knowledge and beliefs, and in creative ways which help to transform them’ (ibid: 55). Fairclough acknowledges that language in use and texts, sometimes, are complex and not simple to analyse, as it may involve ‘complicated mixtures of different discourse types’ (ibid: 55).
However, Fairclough offers an ‘order of discourse’ to overcome the obstacle of analysing complicated texts (ibid: 55). Order of discourse concept aims to highlight and separate the relationships between different types in complicated mixture to reveal the language use and thus discourse orders (ibid: 55). Accordingly, it is of a great importance to distinguish between two main sorts of discourse type, that is, what constitutes the orders of discourse, the first: genres, is the use of language which is associated with viewing people (interview genre) and, the second: discourses which include the language used to represent ‘a given social practice from a particular point of view’ (ibid: 56). Therefore, it can be said that ‘discourses appertain broadly to knowledge and knowledge construction’ (ibid: 56). This shows the significant differences in politics in liberal, socialist and Marxist political discourses (ibid: 56). To analyse discourse, two essential focuses are involved (1) communicative events, and (2) the order of discourse. Fairclough (2001: 56) further explain the two focuses:

‘On the one hand, the analyst is concerned with the particular, with specific communicative events, for instance a particular newspaper editorial or television documentary. The concern here is always with both continuity and change — in what ways is this communicative event normative, drawing upon familiar types and formats, and in what ways is it creative, using old resources in new ways? On the other hand, the analyst is concerned with the general, the overall structure of the order of discourse, and the way it is evolving in the context of social and cultural changes’.

Fairclough (2003: 124) sees discourses as:

‘Ways of representing aspects of the world — the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world.... Discourses not only represent the world as it
is (or rather is seen to be), they are also projective, imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions’.

It can be argued that Fairclough’s consideration of discourse indicates that it is a means to represent the globe with a view to changing relations in particular directions. Fairclough (2003:123) admitted that his views of discourse are rooted in Foucault analysis of discourse. For Fairclough (2003:123) the Foucault analysis of discourse is ‘the analysis of the domain of “statements” — that is, of texts, and of utterances as constituent elements of texts. But that does not mean a concern with detailed analysis of texts — the concern is more a matter of discerning the rules that “govern” bodies of texts and utterances’. In his book critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language, Fairclough (1995: 12) revealed that he adapted Foucault’s notion of order of discourse to refer to the ‘ordered set of discursive practices associated with a particular social domain or institution(...) and boundaries and relationships between them’. Mills (1997) in his book Discourse indicates that Fairclough’s vision of discourse adopted Michel Foucault’s but with a complete structure of analysis (cited in Hardman, 2008:6). Foucault (1972) defines discourse as ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (cited in Hardman, 2008:6).

Brown and Yule (1983) view discourse as language in use. While Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) think that discourse is an enlarged text with an internal organisation, coherence or cohesion. Van Dijk (2001) believes that CDA is not a direction, a school, or specialization next to other approaches in
discourse studies. It aims at giving different perspectives on theorising, analysing and application throughout the whole field. Mills (1997) argues that discourse produces utterances, concepts and effects. Discourse, he believes doesn’t exist in itself and can be analysed in isolation.

5.3 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: A NEW CROSS DISCIPLINE

Recently, discourse analysis has been described according to Fairclough (2001: 9) as a new ‘cross discipline’, if compared to many existing disciplines, such as sociology, linguistics, anthropology, and cognitive psychology. However, Van Dijk (1992: 1) sees discourse analysis as a new and old discipline. According to Dijk traces of discourse analysis can be found in the study of language, public speech, and literature more than 2000 years (ibid: 1). Dijk has observed that one of the main historical sources is classical rhetoric which concerns the art of ‘good speaking’ and deals with the ‘precepts for the planning, organization, specific operations, and performance of public speech in political and legal settings’ (ibid: 1). Thus, rhetoric’s fundamental concern, according to Dijk, was ‘persuasive effectiveness’ which indicates that ‘classical rhetoric both anticipates contemporary stylistics and structural analyses of discourse and contains intuitive cognitive and social psychological notions about memory organizations and attitude change in communicative contexts’ (ibid:1). The emergence of comparative and historical linguistics during the nineteenth century and the birth of structural analysis of language by the beginning of the twentieth century lead to the decline in the importance of rhetoric in both academic research and in the curricula schools which resulted in
replacing rhetoric as being a major discipline by (1) historical and comparative linguistics, and (2) structural analysis (ibid: 1).

Because of crucial developments that took place in the social sciences and in several fields of the humanities, discourse analysis emerged during the 1920s and 1930s. One of these developments was instigated by the Russian Revolution. It highlighted the ‘Russian formalism’ that included new ideas in linguistics, poetics, and anthropology (ibid: 2). Van Dijk dated one of the major works back to 1928, the influential book Morphology of the Folktale by Vladimir Propp. In Morphology of the Folktale the structural analysis of discourse first appeared. It involved the inserting of variable contents of different tales through a ‘set of fixed thematic functions’, and this has had an ‘indirect influence in the study of narrative in several disciplines semiotics, poetics, anthropology, and psychology’ (ibid:2).

Due to the French structuralism in the 1960s and the translation of Morphology of the Folktale along with other Russian formalists and Czech structuralists of the 1920s and 1930s, a major development of structural linguistics emerged (ibid:2). This led to a renewal in poetics, anthropology and the social sciences. Van Dijk (1992: 2-4) located the origins of structuralism and the analysis of texts during the 1960s (for example, (1) Bremond (1964) in his book A New Critical Analysis of Propp; (2) Todorov (1964) An Application of Modern Linguistics and Semantics to Literature; Hymes (1964) Language in Culture and Society, and Halliday (1961) Systemic Grammar.)
Besides focusing on structural analysis during the 1960s, there was a notable interest in conversation analysis throughout the 1970s. For Fairclough (2001:9) conversation analysis is ‘one prominent approach within discourse analysis that has been developed by a group of sociologists known as “ethnomethodologists”’. Some of the influential ethnomethodologists analysts can be tracked to the work of Sacks et al 1974; Sinclair and Coulthard 1975, and Brown and Levinson 1978 (Hardman, 2008: 7). Ethnomethodologists, according to Fairclough (2001:9), investigate ‘the production and interpretation of everyday action as skilled accomplishments of social actors, and they are interested in conversation as one particularly pervasive instance of skilled social action’. The strength of Conversation analysis can be found in its employment of actual extended conversation samples, thus, it can be described as being systematically structured, and that ‘there is evidence of the orientation of participants to these structures in the ways in which they design their own conversational turns and react to those of others’ (ibid:9).

Conversations have a systematic structure and are social in nature, this means that social structure are evident, present and produced in everyday action, and ‘are not just a property of abstract societal macrostructures’ (ibid:9). One of the major criticisms against conversation analysis is that it resists connecting the micro structure of the conversation with the macro structure of the environment it exists in — societies and social institutions—as a result ‘it gives rather implausible image of conversation as a skilled social practice existing in a social vacuum, as if talk were generally engaged in just for its own sake’ (ibid: 10).
A major development in analysing language in use occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. The philosophical work by Austin, Searle and Grice concerning speech acts, opposed the traditional sociolinguistics considerations of language variation and social context, rather, they highlighted the importance of ‘verbal utterances not only as sentences, but also as specific forms of social acts’ (Van Dijk 1992: 5). This new element according to (Van Dijk 1992: 5) added a ‘pragmatic orientation to the usual theoretical components of the language’. Van Dijk (1992: 5) further explain pragmatic point of view:

‘Sentences when used in some specific context also should be assigned some additional meaning or function, an illocutionary one, to be defined in terms of speaker intentions, beliefs, or evaluations, or relations between utterances as abstract linguistics objects and utterances taken as a form of social interaction could be explained’.

Resulting from the developments in analysing language and texts as mentioned above, discourse analysis emerged explicitly as an independent systematic approach of research within and across several disciplines. Therefore, discourse analysis is cross disciplinary and inspects the interactional and social element within texts at a level above the sentence (Van Dijk 1992: 4, Hardman, 2008: 7). The study of texts depending on sentence levels (such as conversation analysis, pragmatic analysis) without aiming to reveal their social motivations, are uncritical and asocial (Van Dijk: 2001). This, according to Van Dijk (1997) highlighted the crucial need to analyse discourse with a special focus on the ‘practical, social and cultural, phenomenon’ of discourse. Van Dijk (1997: 3) further stresses that ‘language users actively engage in text and talk not only as speakers,
writers, listeners, or readers but also as members of social categories, groups, professions, organizations, communities, societies or cultures’.

In methods of critical discourse analysis, Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (2001:2) argue that critical discourse analysis not only focuses on texts, spoken or written, as objects of examination, rather, CDA is a discipline that is characterized as being ‘critical’ aiming to ‘investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language in use or discourse’, which requires:

‘A theorisation and description of both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals and groups as a social historical subjects, create meaning in their interaction with texts’ (ibid: 3).

Therefore, it can be argued that most cross-disciplinary efforts throughout the 1960s and 1970s, mainly (conversational, sociolinguists and pragmatists’ analysis) ignored and failed to link texts with the social environment which created them, or as claimed by some pragmatists and traditional sociolinguists where the ‘context variables are somewhat naively correlated with an autonomous system of language’ (ibid:3) which led to ‘posing a simple deterministic relation between texts and social’ (ibid:3).

CDA, therefore, according to Wodak and Meyer (2001) is a discipline that aims to overcome these failures and link texts with the crucial surrounding environment which is responsible in the production of discourse. Wodak and Meyer (2001) indicate that the focus of the linguistics approaches prior to the CDA approach was mainly concerned with the way in which texts were analysed through only description of the language in use without
attempting to evaluate the power relations placed in the text. CDA goes beyond this mechanism through concentrating on social aspects and connecting them to language in use. CDA thus as outlined by Wodak and Meyer (2001:3) is the examination and analysis of language as a social practice. They also define discourse as being ‘structured by dominance, that every discourse is historically produced and interpreted, that is, it is situated in time and space; and that dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups’ (ibid:3).

Related to critical discourse analysis is the work of Michael Halliday, 1978, *The Sociosemantic Nature of Discourse* and *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 1994. It should be noted that Michael Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) as a text analysis method was considered by Norman Fairclough (2003: 5) to be the only valid alternative method to the influential Noam Chomsky’s transformational grammar theory. According to Fairclough (2003: 5) SFL is ‘profoundly concerned with the relationship between language and other elements and aspects of social life, and its approach to the linguistics analysis is always oriented to the social character of texts’. While Chomsky’s transformational grammar theory provided useful sets of terminology, its narrow focus on language being structural and genetically endowed in the human brain, indicates that Chomsky was not interested in the role of language in real use (Fowler, 1991 cited in Hoyer, 2008:12). Concerning SFL, Fairclough (2003: 5) points out that Halliday’s approach is a valuable resource for critical discourse analysis and that major contributions to the study of critical discourse analysis have developed consequent to SFL (Fowler et al. 1979, Hodge and

Even though SFL, developed by Halliday, is crucial and influential in the study of critical discourse analysis, it’s evident that CDA draws upon a wider range of varied field of approaches to analyse texts; such as grammatical and semantic analysis, conversational analysis, corpus analysis, cultural–generic analysis, social semiotics analysis. Also, as Fairclough (2003: 5) highlights that ‘perspectives of critical discourse analysis and SFL do not precisely coincide, because of their different aims’, CDA aims to provide ‘a more thorough analytical model which the ideas of critical linguistics can be placed’ (Hardman, 2008: 21), whereas, SFL aims to provide one single and specific theory to analyse texts relying on connections between texts and social surroundings (Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 12). It has been argued that ‘studies in CDA are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds and oriented towards very different data and methodologies. Researchers in CDA also rely on a variety of grammatical approaches’ (ibid: 12). For this reason alone CDA and SFL do not coincide and thus CDA is discipline that encompasses a manifold of terms ‘ideology’, ‘critical’, ‘power’, ‘discourse’ and so on (ibid:12).

The most important and influential assumptions that enriched CDA, came from critical linguistics (CL) which is a type of discourse analysis that was developed by a group based at the University of East Anglia in the 1970s (Fairclough, 1995:25). Fairclough (1995:25) indicates that CL is based upon ‘systemic’ linguistic theory which views texts as multifunctional, ‘always simultaneously representing the world (ideational function) and enacting
social relations and identifies (interpersonal function)’ and deals with ‘texts as built out of choices from within available systems of options of vocabulary, grammar’. Thus, CL considers discourse as being ideological in terms of lexical processes and linguistic processes and therefore there is a ‘determinate relation between these two kinds of process’ (Trew 1979b in Fairclough 1995:25).

Fiske (1994) sees discourse analysis as a challenge leading us to treat the language we use as having meaning in a particular historical, social, and political condition rather than dealing with it as an abstract thing. The written words or the oral words we use are used to send abroad sense of meaning and this meaning is identified by our immediate social, political, and historical conditions (Ibid). Fowler has the same point of view as Fiske J, that language is not a means that reflect our realities, it has the power to create this reality. It carries the power that reflects the interests of those who speak or write. Words for them are never neutral (Fiske, 1994; Fowler et al. 1979).

Fiske J, shows how minority groups influenced the way the nation made sense of some events through low-tech media of telephones, home video, fax machines, rebel radio, and private conversations to counter the voices that dominated the mainstream (Fiske 1996). Fiske also argues that there is no inherent meaning in images at all. He attempts to break through the myth of 'realistic images' from a slightly different angle. By doing this, Fiske is trying to focus on the real things, and what has been designed to appear real, by the power of the media’s discourse (Ibid).
CL practitioners see that language in use is simultaneously performing three functions “ideational, interpersonal, and textual” (Halliday 1994). According to Fowler (1991: 71), and Fairclough (1995b: 25), the ideational function has to do with the experience of the speakers of the world and its phenomena. Whereas the interpersonal function includes the insertion of the speaker's own attitudes and evaluations about the phenomena in question, and about establishing a relationship between speakers and listeners. Instrumental to these two functions is the textual function. It is through the textual function of language that speakers are able to produce texts that are understood by listeners. It is an enabling function connecting discourse to the co-text in which it occurs (Fairclough 1995).

In more detail, any text consists of words which record the event to be communicated; this involves the presentation of facts and beliefs and how they are communicated in the content. (Fairclough 2000). Discursive practice refers to rules, norms, and mental models of socially acceptable behaviour in specific roles or relationships used to produce, receive, and interpret the message. They are the spoken and unspoken rules and conventions that govern how individuals learn to think, act, and speak in all the social positions they occupy in life (Alvermann et al. 1977)

Gee (1990) believes that discursive practice involves how one can see the world. It signifies specific and recognisable social identities. People learn to ‘be’ home economists, students, daughters, mothers, members of an ethnic group or gender, entrepreneurs, and volunteers. The social context comprises
distinct settings where discourse occurs (marketplace, classroom, playground, church, conferences), each with a set of conventions that determine rights and obligations—what each is allowed and expected to do. The text then is not a group of words only; it discloses how they are used in different social contexts (Huckin 1997).

Fiske S (1991) shares Gee’s point of view on focusing on the social context of the discourse. She addresses how stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are encouraged or discouraged by social relationships, such as cooperation, competition, and power and how analysing people's words may lead to categorizing them based on race gender, age and class. Social relationships supply one form of motivation to learn about an individual’s life and allow people go beyond stereotypes. However, people in power, it appears, are less motivated to go beyond their stereotypes. So Fiske concludes that a variety of relationships affect people forming impressions of others (Fiske S & Xu, 2002).

In the same way Fiske S & Xu (2002) believe that the group’s cultural stereotypes and prejudice also depend on relationships of power and interdependence. The group’s status and the group’s competition affect how the group is viewed, whether they are liked or disliked, and respected or disrespected. Some stereotyped groups are disrespected and viewed as incapable and useless (e.g., elderly people), other groups are stereotyped as sweet and harmless groups and therefore they are liked such as housewives (Fiske S & Xu, 2002). The stereotype may be changeable due to pressure from the society and so any stereotype related to any group might not be the same over the time.
Van Dijk approaches the social context in relation to power and politics. He argues that discourse can be interpreted differently, and according to him people in power can benefit from a potential abuse of power. He believes that the role of the analyst is to set out the struggle between power and social inequality (Van Dijk 1996). Therefore, analysts should be social and political scientists as well as social critics and activists. This may mean that they conduct research in solidarity and cooperation with dominant groups (Van Dijk 1993).

In fact, the main role of an analyst is to analyse the topic that people talk about because it represents their concerns. Those things may be both mental and personal tenets about ethnic events. Van Dijk believes that the power base of a group, or an institution, has its control over public discourse and communication and so, for him, this is an important ‘symbolic’ resource, as in the case of knowledge and information (Van Dijk 1996). On the other hand, most ordinary people have control over their everyday talk. They control their talk with friends, family members, or colleagues, but they don’t have the same control over media usage (Ibid). In many situations ordinary people show passive control over their bosses or teachers, or of the authorities, such as police officers, judges, welfare bureaucrats, or tax inspectors (Haig 2005).

From van Dijk’s point of view, the major premise in talking about others includes positive self-representation and negative other-representation. Van Dijk offers some practical principles and guidelines to critical discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1993). He claims that CDA proposes no school or approach. He does
not consider CDA as a branch of discourse analysis, like conversation analysis or psycho-discourse analysis; for this reason he suggests researchers look at the CDA as interdisciplinary, and take an eclectic approach towards it using the findings of other cultures, countries, and other humanities disciplines (Van Dijk, 1998).

On the basis of his interdisciplinary attitude towards the field Van Dijk labels his methodology as sociocognitive discourse analysis and states that despite his reluctance to labelling, this label shows to what extent studying cognition is significant in CDA, communication, and interaction (Van dijk, 1998). However, this does not mean that CDA should confine its limits to cognitive and social analysis; rather, due to the real world problems, its complexities and people’s needs CDA should have historical, cultural, socio-economical, philosophical, logical, and neurological approaches ( Ibid, 1998).

Haig agrees with Van Dijk’s point of view regarding people and power. Haig believes that people of more powerful social groups and institutions have more or less exclusive access, and control over one or more types of public discourse. He therefore concludes that these people are more powerful (Haig, 2005).

Wodak suggests that it is important to focus not only on the content, but also on the structures of the text or the talk. Members of powerful groups may decide on the possible discourse genres or speech acts of an occasion (Wodak 1984). A teacher or a judge may require a direct answer from a
student or suspect respectively, and not a personal story or an argument (Wodak 1984, 1986).

Wodak and Van Dijk believe that people in power may abuse the power given to them in some situations. For example, when police officers use force to get a confession from a suspect (Linell and Josson, 1991), or when male editors exclude women from writing economic news (Van Zoonen, 1994).

Another crucial point, related to what has been discussed by Wodak and Van Dijk, is who controls the topic and topic change, as when editors decide what news topics should be covered and what shouldn’t (Gans, 1979, Van Dijk, 1988). Professors decide what topics will be dealt with in class, or men control topics and topic change in conversations with women (Fisherman, 1985).

The discussion that deals with power and dominance is assumed to be about the relations between social groups, unless enacted as an individual realization of group power. This means that purely personal power is not taken into consideration (Van Dijk, 2001).

Van Dijk believes that access to various genres, forms or contexts of discourse and communication is also an important power source. Similarly, social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge (Ibid). Depending on the idea of discourse access and control, Haig thinks that these are very general ideas CDA analysts need to discuss. So if discourse is defined in terms of complex communicative events, access and control may be
defined both for the context and for the structures of text and talk themselves (Haig, 2005).

Context for many scholars is defined as the mentally represented structure of those properties of the social situations that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse (Duranti and Goodwin 1992, Van Dijk 1998).

However, Halliday (one of the fathers of CDA) concentrated on language itself, and discovered three meta-functions of language which are continuously interconnected:

- Firstly, the ideational function through which language lends structure to experience (the ideational structure has a dialectical relationship with social structure, both reflecting and influencing it) (Wodak 2001: 8);
- Secondly, the interpersonal function which constitutes relationships between the participants (ibid: 8); and
- Thirdly, the textual function which constitutes coherence and cohesion in text (ibid: 8).

Halliday's view of language as a 'social act' is central to many of CDA's practitioners, mainly the work of Fairclough (1989) Language and Power. According to Fowler et al (1979:185), CL, like sociolinguistics, he asserts that 'there are strong and pervasive connections between linguistic structure and social structure'. However, whereas in sociolinguistics 'the concepts of language ' and 'society' are divided ....so that one is forced to talk of 'links between the two', for the CL 'language is an integral part of the social process' (Fowler et al, 1979:189). Wodak reports that for Halliday and Kress, three concepts figure indispensably in all CDA, the concept of power, the concept of history, and the concept of ideology (Wodak, 2001:3).
Fowler concludes that language is a social act and he believes that it is ideologically driven. This central assumption of CDA and SFL considers that the speakers can make a choice for the vocabulary and the grammar they want to use. This choice might be taken after being fully aware of what to use, that is to say, consciously or it might be taken unconsciously ‘principled and systematic’ (Fowler et al., 1979:188). Therefore, making a choice is based mainly on the ideology. According to Fowler et al. (1979:188), the ‘relation between form and content is not arbitrary or conventional, but .....Form signifies content’.

Wodak and her colleagues are interested in putting research into practice. After the Second World War, she and her colleagues have chosen the historical approach to CDA. She focuses on the development of theoretical approaches in discourse studies. Wodak thinks that there are several types of CDA, and these types are also in constant flux. They also have different histories. CDA is a way of analyzing social phenomena, and analyzing problems. She believes that the historical approach to discourse considers written and spoken language as a form of social behavior (Wodak, 1996).

Like Fairclough, Wodak acknowledges the dialectic relationship between discourse acts and special areas of action (situations, institutional frameworks, and social structures). What makes this approach different is that it attempts to use all the background information in analyzing different layers of a spoken or written text. Wodak distinguishes between discourse and text. She believes that context is important for the analysis. Context is more important than pictures because there is much people don't know when they just look at a picture. She considers discourse as a complex set of synchronic and coherent linguistic acts that emanate in genre and text. Consequently text is seen as the production of these linguistic acts (Wodak, 1996).

Ruth Wodak identifies six different types of discourse, such as field, institutionalized, metaphor, language-specific meanings etc. CDA highlights the substantively linguistic and discursive nature of social relations of power in contemporary societies. This is partly the matter of how power relations are
exercised and negotiated in discourse. It is fruitful to look at both ‘power in discourse,’ ‘power of discourse’ and ‘power over discourse’ in these dynamic terms (Wodak, 1996).

Wodak (2001b: pp. 69-70) has put forward some features for the historical approach to CDA. She believes that this approach is interdisciplinary. Like other critical linguists, Wodak acknowledges the intricacy of the relationship between language and society. As a result she believes that CDA is interdisciplinary in nature. This interdisciplinary nature could be seen both in theory and practice. She combines argumentation theory and rhetoric with Holliday's Functional Linguistics. This approach is problem-oriented rather than emphasizing some special language issues (Ibid).

Methodology and theory are chosen through eclecticism. In this approach the analyst is always on the move between theory and empirical data. Historical context will go under investigation and will be incorporated into the analysis of discourse and texts (Ibid).

Metaphor has been largely neglected in mainstream CDA (Chilton, 2005a). Michael Reddy was the first scholar to challenge the conventional ideas of metaphor and put them in a cognitive perspective. However, Charteris-Black (2004:28) states ‘metaphor is...central to critical discourse analysis since it is concerned with forming a coherent view of reality’.

In Metaphors We Live By, by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson expanded Reddy’s work. They believe that metaphor is a device of the poetic imagination
and the rhetorical flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. They believe that metaphor has been viewed as characteristic of language alone and is a matter of words rather than thoughts or actions. They disagree and argue that metaphor is a matter of thought and action (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

Lakoff and Johnson indicate in *Metaphors We Live By* that the corresponding conceptual metaphor is ‘argument is war’. Their metaphor theory forms the basis of metaphor research into political discourse. The role of metaphors as cognitive mapping of abstract concepts onto the more familiar suggests that metaphors are a valid commodity in political discourse.

In fact, Lakoff is considered to be one of the most important scholars who has highlighted the importance of metaphor in political discourse in the articles related to the latest war in Iraq (e.g. Chilton 2002, Lakoff 2003, Charteris-Black 2005, Ferrari 2007) and earlier, in the late 90’s, related to racist discourse in newspapers (e.g. Santa Ana 1999, El Refaie 2001).

Lakoff remarks that the traditional view defines metaphor as ‘a novel or poetic linguistic expression where one or more words for a concept are used outside of its normal conventional meaning to express a similar content’ (1993: 202).

According to the classic, conventional interpretation, everyday language is simply assumed not to have any metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue against this classical interpretation, they claim that metaphors form a large part of our everyday thinking. Metaphors are not just poetic ‘twists’ of
language, they are an integral part of how we conceptualize difficult and abstract concepts (Ibid).

Basically, Lakoff and Johnson’s studies on metaphor are based on the assumptions made by Michael Reddy and his 1979-article *The Conduit Metaphor*. They aim at focusing on the importance of metaphors as powerful cognitive tools that govern everyday thought processes. The main assumptions Reddy challenged are as follows:

(a) All everyday conventional language is literal, and none is metaphorical (Cited in Hoyer, 2008);
(b) All subject matter can be comprehended literally, without metaphor (Ibid);
(c) Only literal language can be contingently true or false (Ibid);
(d) All definitions given in the lexicon of a language are literal, not metaphorical (Ibid), and
(e) The concepts used in the grammar of language are all literal; none are metaphorical (Ibid).

Where CDA (and Critical Linguistics in particular) have been concerned with ideological and satisfactory structures of discourse, metaphor is just such a structure. Hodge and Kress (1993:156) contend that ideology involves ‘a systematically organized presentation of reality’. Metaphors are ideological then, in so far as they ‘define in significant part of what one takes as reality’ (Chilton and Lakoff 1995:56). According to Chilton (1996:74), metaphors ‘can contribute to a situation where they privilege one understanding of
reality over others’. Metaphors also play an important role with regard to both the interpersonal and ideational function of language described by Halliday (1985).

George Lakoff, in his book *Moral Politics* published sixteen years after *Metaphors We Live By*, commented that it was common to conceptualize a nation through family metaphors, so he describes in detail the worldview of conservatives and liberals in the United States in terms of two models that share the same conceptual metaphor: THE NATION IS A FAMILY. This is an example of a conventional metaphor model. THE NATION IS A CIRCUS, belongs to the other model which is the imaginative or creative metaphor. After the 2003 edition of *Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson argue that there are four fallacies concerning metaphorical thought that have persisted throughout history. From their point of view, these fallacies have hindered the understanding of the nature of metaphorical thought since the times of Aristotle (Cited in Moreno, 2008).

The first fallacy is that metaphor is a matter of words, not concepts. They believe that metaphors are fundamentally conceptual in nature. For them, metaphorical language is secondary (Ibid: 245).

The second fallacy is that metaphors are based on similarity. For them, metaphors are generally based on cross-domain correlations that come from our experiences so differ from one person to another (Ibid: 245).
The third fallacy is that all concepts are literal and that they cannot be metaphorical. Lakoff and Johnson say that ‘even our deepest and most abiding concepts time, events, causation, morality, and mind itself are understood and reasoned about via multiple metaphors’. They cite the examples of time and space and argue that ‘one conceptual domain ‘e.g. time’ is reasoned about, as well as talked about, in terms of the conceptual structure of another domain ‘e.g. space’ (Ibid: 245).

The fourth fallacy is that rational thought is in no way shaped by our brains and bodies. According to Lakoff and Johnson, the system of conceptual metaphors is not arbitrary or simply dependent on experiences. Instead, it is shaped to a large extent ‘by the common nature of our bodies and the shared ways that we all function in the everyday world’ (Ibid: 245).

In their afterword to the new edition of *Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson (2003) insist that:

‘How we think metaphorically matters. It can determine questions of war and peace, economic policy, and legal decisions as well as the mundane choices of everyday life. Is a military attack a “rape”, ‘a threat to our security’ or the ‘defense of a population against terrorism’? ...Is your marriage a partnership, a journey through life together, a haven from the outside world, a means for growth, or a union of two people into a third party?’


People’s visions vary in the way they consider concepts in everyday life. Considerations of marriage, for instance, may involve a ‘journey’ or ‘haven’; the relationship might seem as a ‘means for growth’, or it might not. Some
see a military attack as a ‘rape’, ‘threat’ or a ‘defense’. This is an example offered by Lakoff and Johnson to show how political metaphor functions. Accordingly, there are ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, ‘neighbours’ and ‘outsiders’, ‘attack’ and ‘defense’. Countries might ‘tighten the screws’ or ‘loosen up’ a foreign policy; they might ‘protect’ and ‘seal its borders’, or they might ‘open up their borders’ in some other occasions (Hoyer 2008).

Hoyer (2008) indicated that Lakoff and Johnson, in their new edition of *Metaphor We Live By*, suggested that metaphors are subject to a conceptual mapping from ‘a semantic source domain to a semantic target domain. The source domains are in most cases things that are easily identified to people and something we can easily relate to. These source domains are often a part of our physical world and therefore familiar’ (ibid: 22). In their book, Lakoff and Johnson (2003) presented conceptual metaphors that can be easily reproduced in various ways. The metaphor TIME IS MONEY can be exemplified in different matters:

How do you *spend* your time these days?
I’ve *invested* a lot of time in her.
This gadget will *save* you hours.
You’re *wasting* my time. (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 7-8)

**The TIME IS MONEY** conceptual metaphor is exemplified through the target domain, TIME, via the source domain, MONEY (Hoyer 2008). Hoyer argues that in Western cultures, time is considered to be a valuable commodity, ‘we receive hourly wages, we pay for how long we talk on the phone; we
pay interests on our loans, etc’ (ibid: 22). In *Metaphors We Live By* Lakoff and Johnson (2003) indicated that the **TIME IS MONEY** metaphor leads to two other connected metaphors, namely **TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE** and **TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY**. Hence, when someone indicates that another person is trying to waste his time, he is referring to time as a limited resource. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) further introduce the **ARGUMENT IS WAR** conceptual metaphor which is crucially related to the **TIME IS MONEY** metaphor. In this metaphor the target domain of presenting the argument is understood in terms of the source ‘war’; ‘elements from war - things like attack, defence, retreat etc- are projected on to the abstract domain of intellectual argument’ (Taylor 2002 quoted in Hoyer 2008).

Lakoff and Johnson (2003) illustrate many examples that include the **ARGUMENT IS WAR** metaphor, such as:

I *demolished* his argument.

Your claims are *indefensible*.

His criticisms were right on *target*.

He *attacked* every weak point in my argument.

Hoyer (2008: 23) emphasizes that ‘*the metaphor implies that when agreement is reached the argument ceases to exist, as the concept of an argument, just as wars, must end in victory or defeat*’. This can be applied to both conceptual metaphors of **TIME IS MONEY** and the **ARGUMENT IS WAR**, in both cases metaphor is a classic source that targets domain
Metaphor theory is crucially connected to political discourse; according to Hoyer (2008) metaphors constitute an important element to convince others of an argument, and serve a legitimising purpose. For Hoyer (2008) ‘metaphors are no doubt used both with a legitimising and delegitimising effect, negative other-presentation vs. positive self-presentation’. One of the most important conceptual metaphors that crucially related to foreign policy discourse is the STATE/NATION IS A PERSON. This metaphor entails that nations have ‘friends’, ‘enemies’, ‘neighbours’, whom they are ‘friendly’, ‘trustworthy’, ‘hostile’, ‘aggressive’, ‘rogue’, ‘cooperative’, ‘uncooperative’, ‘stable’ or ‘unstable’ and so on. Accordingly, a ‘rogue’ and ‘unstable’ nation that tends to be ‘aggressive’ and ‘uncooperative’ is more likely to be considered an enemy compared with another nation which is ‘friendly’ and ‘unaggressive’ and ‘cooperative’ (Chilton & Lakoff 1989 quoted in Hoyer 2008).

The STATE/ NATION IS A PERSON conceptual metaphor according to Chilton & Lakoff (1989) is connected to the COMMUNITY METAPHOR. This metaphor indicates that nations are a part of the international community where there are values, norms, regulations, beliefs and responsibilities toward each other. Some nations considered as being ‘outlaws, ‘irresponsible’, and ‘immature’ and who disrespect values and norms are to be contained by the international community via the means of rules and obligations.
The **STATE/NATION IS A PERSON** metaphor involves and generates several physical and spatial metaphors. One important example can be found in the **BODY METAPHOR**, which is connected to health and where any problem which occurs in a certain nation is to be considered as a disease that might affect the health of the international community, and thus nations are requested to ‘stop the spread’, ‘purge the country’ and ‘stop infection that might target other parts of the nation’ (Hoyer 2008). In international relations this metaphor functions in different ways, nations can speak of dealing out ‘blows’, and being ‘shot down’ in diplomatic proceedings (ibid:25).

In their book *Metaphor We live By*, Lakoff and Johnson (2003) introduce a number of rich metaphors which consist of source and target domains. Below is a list of those metaphors and their definitions:

- **MORE IS UP/LESS IS DOWN**: this metaphor is extensively used to indicate a position on a scale; high speed, low rate, high price etc.

- **GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN**: this metaphor indicates high moral values, low expectations, high standards etc.

- **NATION IS A CONTAINER**: where nations can ‘isolate’ and ‘protect itself’ from outsiders, or it would ‘open up’ and come ‘out of the shell’ (El Refaie 2001 quoted in Hoyer 2008).

- **ARGUMENT IS WAR**: nations can ‘attack’ each other’s arguments for values and positions.

- **POLITICS IS BUSINESS** which is crucially related to **POLITICS PURSUED BY OTHER MEANS**: The combinations of these two strategic
metaphors govern reasoning in international relations. Those metaphors are considered to be the definitive foundations for rational actions. More importantly, those two metaphors are central support for the diplomatic processes in the international environment.

- **POLITICS IS A JOURNEY**: which indicates that ‘new’ issues in international community might be a ‘challenge’ for nations, therefore the creation of new policies is crucial to deal with these challenges as the ‘old’ way of thinking is not efficient.

- **PROGRESS IS FORWARD MOVEMENT**: this metaphor indicates that a new policy does not consider moving back once the policy is set. This metaphor is centered on the notion of ‘mapping out’ which is created with considerations of a ‘vision’ of ‘renewal’ that implies risks which demand strength and determination.

- **WAR IS A VIOLENT CRIME**: this metaphor is mainly centered on the notion of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation. Also, this metaphor is understood through a moral frame, hence it differentiates between ‘we’ the rational nations and ‘they’ the evil and irrational nations. An illustration of this metaphor can be seen in: our troops are skilled, they attack ‘key targets’, whereas their army is unskilled and terrified of ‘our’ military progress.

Van Dijk (1993) approaches CDA in a socio-cognitive way. He shows a current particular interest in cognition. He describes a triangle of: discourse, cognition and society. For him discourse is a communication event including conversational interaction, written text, as well as associated gestures, face work, typographical layout, images, and any other semiotic or multimedia dimension of signification (Van Dijk, 1993).
Society includes both the local, microstructures of situated face-to-face interactions, as well as the more global, societal and political structures variously defined in terms of groups, group-relations (such as dominance and inequality), movements, institutions, organisations, social processes, political systems and more abstract properties of societies and cultures (Van Dijk, 2001).

In the sociocognitive approach, Van Dijk has addressed the role of cognition. However, cognitive theories of meaning in discourse have been neglected by mainstream approaches to CDA, including the sociocognitive approach. Indeed, Wodak (2006:179) suggests that cognitive theories have been rejected and excluded from CDA by many scholars out of often unjustified reason. And Chilton (2005a:21) states that Cognitive Linguistics, which is centrally concerned with meaning, has been eschewed by CDA and does not feature in the literature in any serious comprehended way.

Within the socio-cognitive approach to CDA, discourse and social structure are mediated by social cognition. According to Van Dijk (1993:280):

‘It is theoretically essential to understand that there is no other way to relate macrolevel notions such as groups dominance and inequality with microlevel notions as text, talk, meaning and understanding. Indeed, the crucial notion of reproduction, needs to explain how discourse plays a role in the reproduction of dominance, presupposes an account that relates discourse structures to social cognitions, and social cognitions to social structures’.

At the micro level, Cognitive Linguistics provides an apparatus with which metaphor can be addressed in CDA. In attending to metaphor in CDA, Cognitive Linguistics is the perfect tool. Broadly speaking, Cognitive Linguistics, like socio-cognitive CDA, explores the relation between language, cognition, and culture. Furthermore, Cognitive Linguistics provides insights into the pervasiveness and persuasiveness of metaphor (Van Dijk, 1993). This cognition is the lost segment of many critical linguistic studies and critical discourse analysis; therefore he offers the triangle of society, cognition, and discourse. Though Van Dijk puts a great emphasis on cognition, he believes that since the nature of discourse is lingual, CDA needs merely linguistic foundations as well.
as cognitive foundations. Cognition means both personal and social cognition, beliefs, goals, evaluations, emotions, and any other mental or memory structures, representations or processes involved in discourse or interaction (Van Dijk, 1993).

Available for appropriation in CDA, two accounts of metaphor exist within Cognitive Linguistics: conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1981, 1999; Lakoff, 1993) and the more recent conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Whilst conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and conceptual blending theory (BT) share much in common in their treatment of linguistic and conceptual structure, there are some subtle but important distinctions between them. On the similarities and differences between the two theories, Grady et al. (1999: 101) assert:

‘Both approaches treat metaphor as a conceptual rather than a purely linguistic phenomenon; both involve systematic projection of language, imagery and inferential structure between conceptual domains . . . However, there are also important differences between the approaches: CMT posits relationships between pairs of mental representations while [BT] allows for more than two; CMT has defined metaphor as a strictly directional phenomenon, while BT has not’.

In Van Dijk’s triangle, discourse is a communicative event that includes oral interactions, written text, body movements, pictures, and other semiotic signifiers. Cognition here refers to personal and social cognition, beliefs, goals, values, emotions, and other mental structures (Van Dijk 1998 a). Society includes both local micro structures and political, social and universal macro structures which are defined in terms of groups and their relationships such as dominance and inequality (Ibid).

This structural analysis will not suffice because discourse is not simply an isolated textual or dialogic structure; rather, it is a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context, featuring participants (and their properties) as well as production and reception process (Van Dijk 1988 a: 2).
Discourse can be defined in this triangle as in a social and cognitive dimension. In fact, context is of two types, micro and macro. The Macro context refers to the historical, cultural, political, and social structure in which a communicative event occurs, whereas the micro context shows the features of the immediate situation and interaction in which a communicative event occurs (Van Dijk, 1993). Van Dijk defines the micro context based on the concept of cognition and considers it as a form of a mental model of a communicative situation and calls it a context model. Context models are mental representations that control many of the features of text production and comprehension such as genre, choice of topic, and cohesion on one hand, and speech act, style, and imagery on the other. These models exist in people’s long term memory; the part of memory in which people save their knowledge and view about the events they experience. He argues that there is no direct relationship between society and discourse and he explains in his model how discourse indicates the social and personal features in itself, and how in a certain social situation discourse could be different. In other words, devoid of these mental models, it cannot be explained and described how social structures affect discourse, and get affected in turn (Van Dijk, 1993).

For critical discourse analysts choosing words has an important meaning in analysing and understanding any text. As Van Dijk suggests that for discourse about ethnic minorities or ethnic texts, choosing a certain topic can define what the text producers think or discursively display as the most important information or opinions about ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (Van dijk,1998). Here Van Dijk is suggesting an idea of positive self-representation and a negative other-representation. Van Dijk is trying to investigate how ‘us and them’ as social groups are represented. According to Van Dijk, mental representations ‘are often articulated along Us versus Them dimensions, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present themselves or their own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms’ (Van Dijk, 1998:22) . He believes that one who desires to make transparent such an ideological dichotomy in discourse needs to analyse discourse in the following way (Ibid: pp. 61-63):

a) Examining the context of the discourse: historical, political or social background of a conflict and its main participants.
b) Analysing groups, power relations and conflicts involved.
c) Identifying positive and negative opinions about Us versus Them.
d) Making explicit the presupposed and the implied.
e) Examining all formal structure: lexical choice and syntactic structure, in a way that helps to (de)emphasize polarized group opinions.

The attitude of a speaker, the modality of a text, helps to construct the ideology of that text (Simpson 1993: 6) for him modality is split into four modal systems:

- **Deontic** - the modal system of duty, it deals with the degree obligation need to perform a certain action. For example, using ‘may’, ‘should’ and ‘must’, and use of deontic expressions. Deontic modality is a ‘valuable analytical tool’ for examining ‘persuasive language’ (Simpson, 1993:48)

- **Boulomaic** - Expressions of desire, often modal lexical verbs, as ‘hope’, ‘wish’ and ‘regret’. These are likely to be present in types of persuasive language (Ibid).

- **Epistemic** – linked to a speaker /writer`s confidence in what they have said. This system is characterized by modal auxiliaries such as 'could', 'may', 'must', 'might' and 'should', and adverbs such as 'possible', 'arguably', 'maybe' and 'certainly', as well as modal lexical verbs like 'think', or 'suppose'(Ibid).

- **Perception** – this is a type of epistemic modality, where the degree of truth of a proposition is predicted on some reference to human perception (Ibid).

All in all, there are many differences between the scholars in approaching CDA and this is clear from the wide range of approaches which are possible in CDA, and each of them generates its own set of ideas. All scholars deal with CDA from different points of view, though they share many. Every approach pursue one common idea which is representing the dialectical relationship between language, power, ideology, and the influential role that language plays in
emanation of power and legitimizing social inequalities. It is obvious that the
dominant ideology, which is resulted from the excessive use, will be
presupposed and it becomes natural and neutral. As a result of this, critical
discourse analysts are paying a serious effort to clarify and denaturalize the
hidden power relations in societies, ideological processes that exist in linguistic
text. Analysts study people's talk in depth so that they can awaken the
unconscious of those people who contribute to the establishment and
legitimization of ideology through their ignorance. Critical discourse analysis
takes its power from the powerful people who make use of it.

5.4 PRINCIPLES OF CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
The concern of this thesis is to analyse political agendas which underlie
media discourse and in doing so to use the methodological approach of
CDA. It is not easy to delimit the special principles, practices, aims, theories
or methods of CDA. Yet, to specify the principles some detailed technical
discussion should be presented.

One of the principles discussed widely in critical discourse analysis is the
explicit socio-political stance of discourse analysis and a focus on
dominance relation by elite groups and institutions as they are enacted,
legitimated or otherwise reproduced by text and talk.

‘Unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts (should) take an
explicit socio-political stance: they spell out their point of view, perspective,
principles and aims, both within their discipline and within society at large’.

(Van Dijk 1993a: 252)
CDA then should deal primarily with the discourse dimension of power abuse and the injustice and inequality resulting from it (Van Dijk, 1991). Van Dijk argues that CDA requires a worldview to deal with potential power abuse. He believes that there is a hierarchical power struggle and social inequality which needs to be highlighted. Rejection of this hierarchical worldview would obviously devalue CDA.

‘CDA is unabashedly normative: any critique by definition presupposes an applied ethics (...) critical discourse scholars should also be social and political scientists, as well as social critics and activists’ (Van Dijk 1993a: 253).

Van Dijk’s focus on the normative presence in CDA is reinforced by Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258); CDA does not see itself as either dispassionate or as an objective social science, but rather as engaged and committed. But as Fairclough and Wodak are quick to point out, this does not imply that CDA is less scholarly than other approaches to research: the same ‘standards of systematic analysis apply with equal force to CDA as to other approaches’ (Van Dijk, 1997: 259).

Discourse has a role in the production and the re-production by elites groups and institutions (Van Dijk, 1993). One of the crucial elements of this analysis of the relations between power and discourse is the patterns of access to (public) discourse for different social groups. Critical discourse analysts are trying to recognise the structures, strategies or other properties of text talk, verbal interaction or communicative events and how they play a role in these modes of reproduction (Ibid). Of particular interest to researchers is the role of the media in public discourse.
Theoretically it is shown that to have a clear idea about the relationship between power and discourse in an explicit way, there is a need to consider the cognitive interface of models, knowledge, attitudes and ideologies and other social representations of the social mind. This relationship might extend to another relation of the individual with the social, micro- and the macro-levels of the social structure (Ibid).

It is important to study the relation between discourse structures and power structures. For example, if we listened to a directive speech we may consider it as an order which is used to enact power. So from a discourse analytical and socio-political point of view it is believed that this explanation is effective and adequate. It is claimed that the communicative practices play an important role in the process of social and political change depending on the linguistic significance (Ibid).

Writing about CDA produces many elements to be agreed upon by many researchers. Most would agree that there is at least a social element involved in CDA. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) think that the critical approach to discourse analysis takes two distinctive views:

A. Discourse, which is language use in speech and writing, is a form of ‘social practice’. This social practice is dialectical; it is a two way relationship in which the discursive event is ‘shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but also shapes them’.

B. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects: that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for
instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258).

Fairclough, Van Dijk and Wodak believe that language is related to power relations. Van Dijk (1993a: 250) says that CDA is concerned with ‘focusing on the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance’. Ruth Wodak believes that CDA has a political commitment. It deals with socially relevant problems because their political values are made explicit. In addition to this, she believes that CDA is problem-oriented, which means that it deals with actual social issues which need analysis to understand them better in order to change them if needed.

Fairclough thinks that using the word ‘critical’ with discourse analysis is something not easy to identify in our social practices, particularly language uses.

‘The normal opacity of these practices to those involved in them – the invisibility of their ideological assumptions, and of the power relations which underlie the practices – helps sustain these power relations’.

(Fairclough 1996 cited in Toolan 1997: 222)

According to Van Dijk ‘critical’ is what makes CDA different because many scholars have present studies which are ‘uncritical’ if not ‘apolitical’, having ‘aimed to describe the world, and ignored the necessity to change it’ (Van Dijk, 1993b: 131).

Within the framework of CDA there is a wide use of social practice. Social practice, in itself not only represents and signifies other social practices but it
also constitutes other social practices such as the exercise of power, domination prejudice, resistance. These terms are focused on social power and dominance and are inseparable terms from the framework. Social power is linked to access; access to ‘socially valued resources such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge’ (Van Dijk 1993a: 254). Again it is critical discourse analysts who can study these terms, analyse them and try to change them if possible.

Bear in mind that CDA is not something to be agreed upon widely by all scholars. It is even not that easy to differentiate between what is acceptable and what is not in discourse. Van Dijk says:

‘Indeed, we have already suggested that many forms of dominance appear to be ‘jointly produced’ through intricate forms of social interaction, communication and discourse. We hope that critical discourse analysis will be able to contribute to our understanding of such intricacies’.

(Van Dijk 1993a: 255).

Social phenomena are too complex to be dealt with only one field. Therefore, another important principle can be added here. CDA enjoys an interdisciplinary nature. Sociological, psychological, cognitive, political, psychoanalytical, etc., models are applied when necessary. Fairclough and Wodak elaborate:

‘CDA is by its nature interdisciplinary, combining discursive disciplinary perspectives in its own analysis, and being used to complement more standard forms of social and cultural analysis’ (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271)
In short, critical discourse analysis principles form a guide that deals mainly with the discourse dimensions of potential power abuse, dominance and the inequality that result from it. CDA is an explicit political approach to discourse.

5.5 THE MEDIA AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE

There is no doubt about the great role that the media (Radio, in print, TV and the internet) plays in people’s lives. This has inspired many scholars to study the media from different angles, more specifically to study media in relation with political discourse. The term political discourse suggests many possibilities. It could refer to a discourse that is political in itself; or it could refer to a simple discourse type that happens to be analysed politically, but without explicit reference to political content or political context (Schaffner 2004:pp. 117-119). This would mean that all discourse analysis is, at some level, political (Wilson, 2001:p398-399). Early studies of media language focused on observable surface structures.

Van Dijk is one of the most important figures who started to apply his discourse analysis theory to media texts. He focuses mainly on the representation of ethnic groups and minorities in Europe. In his News Analysis, van Dijk (1988a) integrates his general theory of discourse to the discourse of news in the press, and applies his theory to authentic cases of news reports at both the national and international level. His analysis of texts is a thorough analysis not only an analysis at the textual and structural level of media discourse but also for deep explanations at the ‘production’ and ‘reception’ or comprehension level (Boyd-Barrett, 1994).
Van Dijk calls for different levels of descriptions: grammatical, phonological, morphological and the semantic level. In addition to ‘higher level properties’ such as coherence, overall themes and topics of news stories and the whole schematic forms and rhetorical dimensions of texts (Van Dijk, 1988a). Similarly Fowler (1991) focuses on the linguistic tools such as the analysis of transitivity in syntax, lexical structure, modality, and speech acts, to analyse media texts.

Van Dijk claims that the structural analysis is not enough. Discourse is not an isolated textual structure. It is the form of a complex communicative event that includes a social context with its participants as well as production and reception processes (Van Dijk, 1988a, p. 2). It is necessary to know who produces texts and how.

For Fowler (1991:1) the press contains 'ideas' not 'facts' and they act as 'highly constructive mediators' rather than as neutral reporters. He highlights the way which ideologies are served by the language of the press by referring to a 'consensual theory of society'.

It is important to examine how texts are produced. This according to Fairclough (1995) allows for greater understanding of ideologies of the media and its power over discourse. News texts are considered as mediators between events that they represent and the people who receive the media discourse. In such a case, text producers choose how events are reported linguistically, and they choose what to include and what to omit depending on various factors (Fairclough, 1995).
Fairclough (1995) comments that it is appropriate to find varieties of language for certain purposes and situations. Fairclough assumes an ideological nature for the common sense and he thinks that this is the common sense which is ideological in order to be at the disposal of survival of the unequal relations of power and to be a justification for it. Therefore he believes that the media can play a role in representing the world and attributing identities to people. Fairclough (1995). If the media presents a negative stereotype of a person, this may create a negative belief about the whole social group in which the individual belong (Hardman, 2005).

Fairclough (1992) believes that there is frequently a link between primary discourse (the voice of the writer / newspaper) and secondary discourse (organisations, institutions or individuals whose speech is being reported or quoted). This enables the press to manipulate what has been said and allows dominant ideologies to be maintained (Fairclough, 1992). The analysis of ideology as reflected in the media and in textual structures showed how dominant elite ideologies were reproduced in the media and how ideologies could be revealed by examining language features used in texts (Van Dijk, 1988; Fairclough, 1995).

In his book *Discourse and Social Change*, Fairclough suggests an approach that analyzes discourse as a political and ideological practice. He takes a clear political position while analyzing discourses. He believes that there is no one-to-one relationship between ideology and discourse hence between politics and discourse. These differences of ideology between various media outlets are
mostly considered to be a healthy part of a democratic country (Fairclough, 1992).

The media has a great influence on knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations and social identities (Fairclough 1995:2). Access to the media is linked with power. This power over discourse, as suggested by Fairclough and Wodak (1997), is merely a matter of access. In general, the media is under clear professional and constitutional control (Fairclough, 1995).

Fairclough (2006) notes that language is important in politics, he farther indicates that Language can:

‘Misrepresent as well as represent realities, it can weave visions and imaginaries which can be implemented to change realities and in some cases improve human well-being, but it can also rhetorically obfuscate realities, and construe them ideologically to serve unjust power relations’ (Fairclough, 2006: 1).

Analysts need to understand the ‘production processes’ which entail the journalistic and institutional practices of news-making and the economic and social practices (Van Dijk, 1988a). They play important roles in the creation of media discourse and they can be explicitly related to the structures of media discourse. Van Dijk’s other dimension of analysis, ‘reception processes’, involves taking into consideration the comprehension, ‘memorization and reproduction’ of news information. What Van Dijk's analysis of media (1988, 1991, 1993) attempts to demonstrate is the relationships between the three levels of news text production (structure, production and comprehension processes) and their relationship with the wider social context in which they are embedded. To
identify these relationships, Van Dijk's analysis takes place at two levels: microstructure and macrostructure.

At the microstructure level, analysis is focused on the semantic relations between propositions, syntactic, lexical and other rhetorical elements that provide coherence in the text, and other rhetorical elements such as quotations, direct or indirect reporting that give factuality to the news reports. The analysis of macrostructure pertains to the thematic news stories which refer to historical, cultural, political and social structures in which a communicative event occurs (Van Dijk, 1988a).

Accordingly, Van Dijk believes that there are two models, the micro and the macro context models. These models are mental representations that control many of the features of text production and comprehension such as genre, choice of topics and cohesion. These models exist in people's long term memory where people save their knowledge and view the events they experience. So van Dijk concludes that there is no direct relationship between society and discourse and these models explain how discourse indicates the social and personal features in itself, and how in certain social situation discourse could be different (Ibid).

According to Van Dijk (1988a: 248) newspapers headlines ‘define the overall coherence or semantic unity of discourse, and also what information readers memorize best from a news report’. He claims that the headline and the lead paragraph express the most important information of the cognitive model of journalists, that is, how they see and define the news event.
Van Dijk notes that political situations do not simply cause political actors to speak in certain ways, instead ‘there is a need for a cognitive collaboration between situations and talk or text that is a context’ (Van Dijk, 2006: 733). Unless readers have different knowledge and beliefs, they will generally adopt these subjective media definitions of what is important information about an event (Van Dijk, 1988, p.248).

For Van Dijk (1988, pp. 14-16), the news schemata ‘superstructure schema’ is structured according to a specific narrative pattern that consists of the following: summary (headline and the lead paragraph), story (situation consisting of episode and backgrounds), and consequences (final comments and conclusions). These sections of a news story are sequenced in terms of ‘relevance,’ so the general information is contained in the summary, the headline and the lead paragraph.

Van Dijk (1995: 17) essentially sees discourse analysis as ideological analysis, because according to him, ‘ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies’.

His approach for analyzing ideologies has three parts: social analysis, cognitive analysis, and discourse analysis (Van Dijk 1995: 30). The social analysis pertains to examining the ‘overall societal structures,’ (the
context), the discourse analysis is mainly text based (syntax, lexicon, local semantics, topics, and schematic structures, etc.).

In this sense, Van Dijk's approach incorporates the two traditional approaches in media education: interpretive (text based) and social tradition (context based), into one analytical framework for analyzing media discourse.

To sum up, in recent years the role of the mass media has started to grow significantly, so it is important to observe what the real world is witnessing through what has been presented in different newspapers, TVs or the internet. The media nowadays has become the most important source for people to know about their surrounding and the whole world as well. One can wonder about how the media has an effect on people's lives, beliefs, ideologies, identities and many other important aspects in one's life.

5.6 CHOMSKY`S IDEAS ARE SUPPORTED BY CDA ANALYSTS

One of the most important issues in dealing with critical discourse analysis is its attempts to study and analyse texts, whether they are written or spoken, to find out the discursive power, dominance inequality and bias (Van Dijk, 1998). Van Dijk adds that CDA examines how these discursive sources are maintained and reproduced within specific social, political and historical contexts. In addition to this, it is important to study CDA`s contribution to the general raising of consciousness of the social relations which can be done by focusing on the language used in texts (Fairclough, 1989). CDA aims at exploring the relationships between discursive
practices, events and texts in addition to wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes. These help to investigate how such practices, events and texts are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power.

Accordingly, Fairclough (1995b) believes that ‘the economics of an institution is an important determinant of its practices and its texts’ (p. 40). He argues that the commercial mainstream media works ideologically and is in the service of the powerful, the elite, and the state.

Similarly, Chomsky & Herman believe that power and money can play a curtailing role in filtering the news. The five filters they present regulate the mass media in a way that makes the public consensus supportive to US administration decisions. Using these filters helps in shaping the quality of news and selecting what is newsworthy and what should be ignored.

According to Manufacturing Consent, the filters which are built into the mass media system will serve as economic structuring conditions that control mainstream mass media in an ‘embedded’ way. The media has the ability to advance the ideologies of the elite groups. Like other profit making institutions, the media has a product to sell. Their product is the audience of interest to advertisers (Chomsky, 1989; Fairclough, 1995b).

The commercial dominance over the media is highlighted by many scholars such as Chomsky, 1989: 1991; Van Dijk; Fairclough, 1995b, and others.
They argue that the commercial mainstream media works ideologically and is in the service of the powerful, the elite, and the state. In Chomsky’s book *Media control*, the mass media can present some ideas and prevent a range of alternative news in an attempt to shape public opinions towards the events (Chomsky, 2002).

In The *Propaganda Model*, which is advanced by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, it is believed that social and political policies are manufactured in the public mind due to this propaganda. The news is structured through advertising, media ownership and government sources to meet certain demands for certain powerful groups. The same is true for Fairclough (1995b: 44) who argues that media discourses ‘contribute to reproducing social relations of domination and exploitation’.

Wodak agrees with Fairclough that language manifests social processes and interactions (Wodak & Ludwig, 1999). For Wodak and Ludwig (1999) discourse involves power and ideologies. There is no interaction if the power relations, values and norms do not have a relevant role (Wodak & Ludwig 1999). According to them ‘discourse is always connected with other communicative events which are happening at the same time or which have happened before’ (Ibid: 12). They also believe that discourse can be interpreted according to the background knowledge that the readers or the listeners have (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: pp 271-280).

In regard to what has been presented in chapter 4, reflection on the analysts work on CDA, the researcher finds that there are common tenets as
summarized by Fairclough and Wodak between scholars and Chomsky as they address social problems, talk about power relations and discursive. For them discourse constitute: 1) society and culture; 2) discourse does ideological work; 3) discourse is historical; 4) the link between text and society is mediated; 5) discourse analysis is interpreted and explanatory; and 6) discourse is a form of social action.

5.7 CRITIQUES OF CDA

Some fundamental criticisms of CDA made by a number of critics such as Widdowson, Stubbs, Hardman and others are the lack of CDA’s methods of data collection, text analysis, bias and lack of objectivity. In addition to the criticism and the general debate made about CDA, there is a specific discussion between Fairclough (1996) and Widdowson (1995) who is one of the critics that attacked CDA fiercely (Hardman 2008).

Widdowson (1995) and Stubbs (1997) claim that CDA analysts failed to distinguish between the terms 'text' and 'discourse'. For Widdowson the terms are as vague as they are fashionable, ‘discourse is something everybody is talking about but without knowing with any certainty just what it is: in vogue and vague’. Widdowson criticizes the lack of a clear meaning for 'text'. He believes that the discourse is the process of ‘meaning negotiation’, so 'readers of any text use the contextual knowledge to understand the working of a text with the text itself being a product of discourse’ (cited in Hardman 2008). Readers of the same text may identify different discourses within the product (Widdowson 1996). In Stubbs’ view, CDA provides no systematic comparisons between texts and norms in the
language, and ‘language and thought can only be related if one has data and theory pertinent to both: otherwise the theory is circular’ (Stubbs, 1997: 100).

Hardman believes that Widdowson`s point of view is not incompatible with CDA. On the contrary, CDA analysts are aware that this is possible and ‘CDA is not the only way to analyse a text, and its results are not the only possible reading' (Hardman 2008). Fairclough (1992) also points out that discourse functions in the social world with many other alternatives and even compatibles that can be possible.

Widdowson argues that CDA is an ideological interpretation and therefore not an analysis and it rarely allows for existence of other possible interpretations. Fairclough (1996) in reply to this criticism points to the open – end of results required in CDA.

Another criticism related to data collection is Widdowson`s claim which indicated that interpretation made by CDA analysts is biased as there is a lack of objectivity, this is because CDA analysts select the text to be analysed and there is a prior judgment ready to be taken (Widdowson 1995). Toolan (1997) also shares Widdowson in his point of view; CDA needs to be more critical and more demanding of the text linguistics it uses.

But Harman (2008) argues that any analysis is not subjective is surely incorrect, critical discourse analysts are more open to their reasons to conduct their study.
In spite of the number of criticisms made against CDA, the value of it is not affected. Van Dijk, Fairclough, Wodak and the other scholars, who have contributed largely to this field have established respectful frameworks for finding out the relation between language use and social context with a serious fruitful effort to study the role of the elite, the powerful groups, the economy, the media and many other crucial related issues which would help reveal hidden power, beliefs, and values or bias of texts.

5.8 FALLACIES

A central part of discourse is the construction of logical arguments aiming to change the beliefs of the recipients. In all logical argument, the arguer provides what they claim are good reasons advanced to support a particular conclusion. A strong argument is based upon established facts which really do support the conclusions they are said to support. An argument fails either because of unsupported factual claims, or because the evidence is not really relevant to the conclusion it is supposed to support.

The weakness of a logical argument is not always obvious. It turns out that people readily fall victim to certain forms of argument with a misleading appearance of strength. Such fallacies have served to create and support false or unsupported beliefs. In some cases clever orators have deliberately mobilised fallacies to intentionally mislead their audiences. In other cases those presenting the arguments have themselves fallen prey to the fallacies they expound. A number of such common fallacies have been identified by
logicians in ages gone by. More recently, CDA scholars have highlighted the continued centrality of fallacies in contributing to the shaping of public perception by the mass media.

Head and Mann (2009:49) indicated that informal fallacies are ‘those that can be only detected only through analysis of the content of the argument’. ‘Fallacies of relevance substitute psychologically or emotionally appealing connections between premises and conclusions for logically relevant connections, so that the conclusion can seem to follow when really it does not’, according to Head and Mann (2009). Below is a list of various fallacies:

- **APPEALS TO FORCE FALLACY**: it suggest that listeners should accept certain conclusions to avoid some harm that will come to them if they do not. (Hurley 1994 quoted in ibid :49).
- **APPEALS TO PITY FALLACY**: aim to get listeners to accept particular conclusions out of pity for some group or individual (Hurley 1994 quoted in ibid: 49).
- **APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE FALLACY**: plays upon an individual’s need to be loved, esteemed, admired and accepted by suggesting that a particular conclusion should be accepted or believed because it is widely accepted by others (Hurley 1994 quoted in ibid: 49).
- **STRAW MAN FALLACY**: this fallacy is committed when the arguer distorts an opponent’s argument for the purpose of more easily attacking it, refutes the distorted argument, and then concludes that the opponent’s original argument has been refuted. This is a familiar fallacy in political debate (Hurley 1994 quoted in ibid: 50).
- **AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS**: which direct the attention to the (alleged) bad character of a person involved in presenting their own logical argument, and away from the real structure and content of that person’s argument. Accordingly, the arguer themselves is criticised or denigrated, with the aim of getting some third part
to see the limitations of the arguer as limitations of their argument (Head and Mann 2009:50).

Weak induction fallacies include weak analogies and hasty inductive generalisation (ibid: 58). A weak analogy fallacy is committed when the analogy between two things is not strong enough to support the drawn conclusion (Hurley 1994 quoted in Head and Mann 2009). Consider for instance this analogy:

**PREMISE 1:** Entity A has attributes a, b, c, and z.

**PREMISE 2:** Entity B has attributes a, b, c.

**CONCLUSION:** Therefore, entity B probably has attribute z also.

(Hurley 1994 quoted in ibid: 58).

Head and Mann (2009) argue that if there is some ‘causal or systematic relation’ between z and a, b, and c this is not ‘offset’ by strong disanalogy, the argument is strong, but if there is not, then it is weak.

Such fallacies of weak analogy are closely connected to the use of metaphor considered earlier. The metaphor of ‘nation as a person’ for example, can become part of an analogical fallacy where it is argued that because a nation is like a person, therefore it is legitimate to treat a nation like a person.

Related to inductive informal fallacies is hasty generalization. According to Hurley (1994):

‘Inductive generalisation involves the drawing of a conclusion about all members of a group from evidence that pertains to a selected sample. The fallacy [of hast
generalisation] occurs when there is a reasonable likelihood that the sample is not representative of the group. Such a likelihood may arise if the sample is either too small or not randomly selected’ (cited in Head and Mann 2009: 62).

According to Head and Mann (2009) hasty generalizations are very common in society and form the basis for much stereotyping and prejudice. As people have limited experience of other nation’s ethnic and cultural aspects they might be ready to make sweeping general statements about the nature of all members of such nations (ibid: 62). In this case, people might see only the crimes committed by particular members of such nations and conclude that all members of such nation are criminals; often this is due to ‘systematic scapegoating by mass media outlets’ (ibid: 62).

The main two fallacies that represent hasty generalisation are fallacy of false cause and the fallacy of slippery slope: fallacy of false cause ‘occurs whenever the link between premises and conclusion depends upon some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist’ (Hurley 1994 cited in Head and Mann 2009: 63). Whereas, fallacy of slippery slope occurs ‘when the conclusion of an argument rests upon an alleged chain reaction and there is not sufficient reason to think that the chain reaction will actually take place’ (ibid:63).

Argument from authority is considered to be the other side of the ad hominem argument. In this case, the argument is ‘uncritically accepted on the basis of the authority of the arguer, without serious consideration of its real, logical strength’ (ibid: 66). Head and Mann (2009) asserted that the situation in this case is highly complicated by the fact that appropriately qualified authorities generally can be and have to be trusted to present good reasons for
considered pronouncements within their area of special expertise. Head and Mann cited Fogelin and Sinnot-Armstrong who noted that:

‘An authority is a person or institution with a privileged position concerning certain information...[A]n appeal to experts and authorities is essential if we are to make up our minds on subjects outside our own range of competence’ (Fogelin and Sinnot-Armstrong cited in ibid: 67).

However, we must always be careful to ensure that the experts referred to really are experts in the relevant area. We must also remember that experts cannot always be trusted even in the area of their particular expertise. Where we have reason to believe that they might be biased or prejudice or motivated to be less than completely truthful, it is all the more important that we are informed of the sources of the evidence they rely upon and are guided through the steps that have led them to their particular conclusion.

The previous discussion of fallacies is crucially related to Fairclough’s major ideas on fallacies and fallacious arguments. Those fallacious arguments have the appearance of being logical and sound. However, as Fairclough (2006) indicates it can be demonstrated that some arguments when analysed prove to be invalid and illogical.

In his book ‘Language and Globalization’, Fairclough (2006) highlights the centrality and ubiquity of fallacious argument in public discourse. He focuses in particular upon the straw man fallacy, whereby an opponent’s position is distorted for the purpose of more easily attacking it. The distorted argument is refuted and it then concludes that that the opponent’s original argument has been refuted.
Consider for instance this argument:

‘The world must neither resort to protectionist measures in a fruitless attempt to stop globalization nor should we ignore its undeniable risks’ (Eizenstat 1999 cited in Fairclough 2006).

According to Fairclough (2006) Eizenstat’s globalization argument is *dialogical* in the sense that it responds to the assumed argument of an antagonist (along the lines of: ‘the world should resort to protectionist measures to stop globalization, because globalization is dangerous’). Eizenstat implicitly claims that opponents of globalization argue that it can and should be defeated through protectionism. But such measures are futile because they cannot stop globalization – and therefore there is no serious argument for concerted action to end globalization. But the standpoint he implicitly attributes to antagonists (‘the world should resort to protectionist measures to stop globalization’) is not the real standpoint of those who oppose globalization. Through this misrepresentation, Eizenstat tries to avoid confronting real reasons and real tactics for opposing globalization.

### 5.9 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, previous literature show that critical discourse analyses deal mainly with the relationship between discourse and power and is considered a major theoretical framework needed to analyse the relationship between discourse and power. Also, the chapter discusses various positions taken in the academic literature about CDA and its crucial contributions to explore the forms, content, aims and intentions of mass media’s presentations. Thus, it can be demonstrated that CDA provide a method in which power and domination are reproduced by text and talk.
Chapter Six

MASS MEDIA AND THE INVASION OF IRAQ:
‘Manipulating, Framing, and misleading discourses’

‘Any dictator would admire the uniformity and 
*obedience of the U.S. media’
(Herman & Chomsky, 1988).

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the light of the discussion of critical discourse analysis (CDA) theories in chapter 5, this chapter analyses the discourse efforts in both the U.S and the U.K to legitimise the Iraq invasion in 2003. It also tracks media management during the invasion and media discourse after the mission was accomplished. I demonstrate that media discourse in the last phase shifted from being supportive of the two administrations positions to critically exposing major human rights violations. Analyzing the discourse during the three phases (before, during and thereafter the invasion) involves consideration of the language adopted by the two administrations, and the mainstream mass media. The speeches and statements by both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair along with comments from their advisors and colleagues are considered. This includes their efforts to present the Iraq invasion as being urgently needed to protect the international community and the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein's evil actions.

This chapter analyzes mainstream media outlets discourse in the U.S and the U.K, along with selected examples of material from government sources covering the three phases. This contrasts with earlier discussions which tend to focus on only the first and second phases before and during the invasion itself. Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model is the foundation of the approach adopted here. The thesis shows how media coverage of the war functions to manufacture consent supportive to the administration view and actions.
This chapter is also based upon the theoretical claim that discourse is an element of social life which is dialectically interconnected with other elements, and may have constructive and transformative effects on other elements. It makes the claim that discourse has in many ways become a more salient and potent element of social life in the contemporary world, and that more general processes of current social change often seem to be initiated and driven by changes in discourse (Fairclough, 1992a).

This chapter discusses and analyzes the role of the mass media in the U.S. and UK in building up the story; assessing and supporting the two administrations (phase one). This was achieved through rhetorical devices that shaped public opinion to be supportive to the decision to invade Iraq. The chapter provides public opinion poll data to support the claim that this rhetoric played a crucial role in creating public opinion that supported the Iraq invasion.

This analysis involves consideration of various levels, units, dimensions, modes, and social contexts of media discourse. The key focus of the investigation is the creation of the right environment of public opinion to legitimize the invasion of Iraq at both local (the U.S and U.K) and international levels.

In this chapter critical discourse analysis of the discourse of mainstream mass media and the political leadership in both the U.S and the U.K, shows the hidden agenda of both administrations to invade Iraq. It shows also how these administrations presented the war to the public as a legal action, relying on allegations that Iraq’s WMD’s were a major threat to the international peace and security. In doing so, this chapter investigates the role first of the administrations in both countries and second of the mainstream mass media in selling the war to the public which was achieved through extensive use of language highlighting links between Iraq and Osama Bin Laden after the attacks of 11th of September, Iraq possession and concealment of WMD’s, and the urgent need to overthrow the regime due to humanitarian violations. All of these allegations are analyzed to uncover the ways in which the discourse affected the public perception to support the theme of regime change in Iraq.

This chapter brings together all of the earlier considerations of the thesis. Chapter two of the thesis lays the foundation of the research, Noam Chomsky's
ideas are of a great importance in explaining the underlying causes of why did the mainstream mass media functions that way.

It is worth noting that the mainstream mass media discourse thereafter the Iraq invasion shifted from fully supportive to the administrations to critically questioning the allegations presented by the administrations to pursue supportive public opinion before the invasion. This, in addition to media management during the military attacks, allows me to divide the mainstream mass media behavior into three phases as the discourse changed during those phases. Thus, the chapter analyzes both political and media discourse during three phases:

- The Period preceding the invasion on 19th of March 2003 (phase one). This stage emerged with the events of September 11th 2001. In this phase I examine and analyze the discourse of both administrations in the U.S and the U.K and the discourse of mainstream mass media in relation to arguments presented to legitimate the Iraq invasion (a) Iraq links with al Qaeda, (b) Iraq’s WMD’s, and (c) humanitarian allegations.

- The period from the beginning of the invasion until the fall of Baghdad on the 9th of April 2003 (phase two).

- The period from the fall of Baghdad until now.

Before consideration of political and media discourse during those three phases, it is crucial to understand the relationship between the outcome of this discourse and public opinion. In particular it is crucial to consider the evidence of media effects upon public opinion.

Therefore, it is important to examine the validity, accuracy and the way public opinion polls are carried out and conducted. To this extent, the chapter includes a brief consideration of the nature and validity of public opinion polls. This includes consideration of which polls are trustworthy in measuring public opinion concerning important issues and attitudes towards significant contemporary events.
The particular focus is upon measured changes in public opinion following key media interventions before, during and thereafter Iraq invasion; upon determining whether the language employed in political and media discourse helped in shaping the public opinion in both the U.S and the U.K to support regime change in Iraq.

6.2 PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

There is a systematic relationship between media coverage of events and public opinion. Previous literature on the issue of this relation demonstrated that there is a remarkably powerful 'effect of media content on the salience of foreign affairs for the public, even when (admittedly imperfect) measures of real-world events are included in the mode' (Soroka, 2003: 43). This effect is known as agenda-setting which assumes that the media is influential in telling the public about what issues to think about, leading them to give more awareness to the given matter (Besova, 2008).

In his book Public Opinion, Lippmann (1922: 18) defines public opinion as ‘the picture inside the heads of these human beings, the picture of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their public opinions’. According to García (2010:6) Lippmann used the term stereotype to describe the pictures in the head which would 'guide people’s decisions in an increasingly complicated world'. In another words, it can be said that public opinion is the public thinking, views, reactions and attitudes in certain times concerning issues in daily life. This would include political, economic and social views towards everyday matters.

It is of a great importance to mention some of the most reliable and reputable polling organizations in both the U.S and the U.K. The Gallup poll remains the most accurate and reliable polling organization in the U.S (ibid), whereas, ICM and Ipsos MORI are the most notable polling organizations in the U.K.
Related to the consideration of whether or not the public can rely on polls to accurately gauge their opinion in regard to an issue, some elements should be assessed. Two relevant questions must be asked to evaluate whether or not the public should give some weight to the polls results or merely dismiss them. Firstly what is being claimed and secondly how good was the evidence (Battersby, 2009). To answer the first concern, the public should distinguish between what the headlines claim and what the actual poll claims. In assessing the accuracy of the evidence some issues emerge. One of these issues is how the question is worded to avoid question bias, because the phrasing of questions can influence the answers one receives, therefore, it is crucial to know the actual wording of the question that been asked before someone assess the claims of the poll (ibid: 25).

The population of the public opinion poll sample is another crucial factor that needs to be evaluated before assessing the results. It can be argued that ‘the larger the random sample, the more it tends to get percentages to the actual percentage’ (ibid: 29). A random sample is an unbiased sample, which can be defined as a ‘sample in which every member of the population has an equal chance of being selected’ (ibid: 29).

The last issue that needs to be highlighted is the application of appropriate procedures to allow the sample data to be generalized. In doing so, statisticians will calculate the likelihood by revealing whether or not the random sample of a population was close to the actual value of the sample (ibid:29). The statisticians express these calculations in terms of ‘margin of error and confidence level’ (ibid: 29). The margin of error is the ‘range of percentage points around the sample percentage where the true population average is likely’ (ibid: 29). An example of what is meant by margin error would be if the pollster gets a sample result of 48% with a sample of 1,200, then the margin of error is ± 3 percentage points give a confidence level of 95%; that means that the pollster can claim that the true population percentage would be somewhere between 45% and 51%, 19 times out of 20 (ibid: 29). Explaining the ratio (confidence level) 19 out of 20 likelihood would indicate that the true answers are within the margin of error of the sample, also, the confidence
level can be expressed as a percentage: 95% confidence level, which means that ‘the pollster believes that 95 times out of 100, the true population percentage will be within the margin of error of the sample percentage’ (ibid: 29).

We would expect an ongoing interaction between media coverage and public opinion; the media coverage will influence public opinion – because it has been designed to do so, because new information will lead to new ideas and new responses etc; and public opinion can influence media coverage, in so far as newspaper owners want to sell papers.

But the only direct evidence of such interaction is generally the temporal relation between specific news releases and opinion poll information about public attitudes. In other words, there can be evidence of correlation, or concomitant variation, but no direct evidence of causation.

In fact, there are circumstances in which evidence of correlation can also be evidence of causation. Where there is an appropriate temporal relationship— with cause variable closely preceding effect variable, where more (possible) cause is correlated with more effect, where there is an explanatory model consistent with the data, where there is no obvious counter-evidence to the causal claim, then evidence of correlation can be evidence of causation.

In this case we can map out temporal sequences of events; with significant changes in public opinion preceding significant changes of media orientation and vice versa. The various theories of critical discourse analysis and of ideology considered hitherto provide a theoretical foundation for claims of causation. And, in most of the cases considered here, there are no other obvious explanations for the correlations in question.
6.3 PHASE ONE: (11th OF SEPTEMBER, 2001 – 19th MARCH, 2003)

During this phase the objective of both administrations in the U.S and the U.K was set to portray Saddam Hussein as a danger to peace and security in the Middle East, the rest of the world, mainly the U.S, U.K, and Europe. To achieve this objective the media simply accepted and uncritically repeated executive pronouncements. Public statements by executive authority and media coverage are characterised by repeated and extended use of range of key linguistic and rhetorical devices mentioned in details in chapter 5 of the thesis. Particularly, Fairclough’s ideas on fallacies, Lakoff and his metaphor theory, Van Dijk’s social cognitive model, with more important being common fallacies or fallacious arguments which have the appearance of being logically compelling without really being so.

The extensive use of language -prior to the Iraq invasion- by both administrations and mainstream mass media aimed at achieving desired goals. On the one hand it aimed at obtaining international legitimacy to invade Iraq through U.N.S.C resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq and persuade other countries to support and join the coalition of the willing. On the other hand, generate and enhance support among the public in each country with a view to regime change. In doing so, both administrations and the media presented the regime change doctrine relying on three main assumptions or evidences: (a) Iraq’s links with terrorists groups; (b) Iraq’s WMD threat to his own people, neighbors and international community, and (c) humanitarian intervention because of Saddam’s oppression to his own people.

Also, mainstream mass media intentionally functioned to ignore international Anti-war voices that rejected the war and favored peaceful resolutions to the conflict. The examination of the role of mainstream mass media in both the U.S and the U.K conducted by this thesis over a long period of time prior to the Iraq invasion in 2003, revealed an important element in these media outlets presentations. It can be argued that the mainstream mass media mainly in the
U.S and partially in the U.K neglected the peaceful efforts of Russia, Germany and China, to diplomatically resolve the issue of Iraq’s WMD and to allow a second chance for Iraq to co-operate with U.N weapons inspections. Even though three countries vetoed the use of force against Iraq in the U.N.S.C., still the UK and the US gained internal political approval to invade Iraq. An explanation of why the mainstream mass media neglected and ignored the role of diplomatic efforts, would be that mainstream mass media functioned to unquestionably support their administration’s efforts to legitimize the Iraq invasion. To a large extent the mainstream mass media succeeded in shaping public opinion that supported regime change in Iraq. Logically, mainstream mass media should ignore the Anti-war voices because their main argument was supporting the administrations’ agendas.

6.3.1 IRAQ AND THE ATTACKS OF 11TH OF SEPTEMBER : IRAQ LINKS WITH AL QAEDA

The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, marked the start of the U.S administration’s declaration of its war against terror. In this context, Bush himself, and the administration began to link Saddam Hussein with Osama Bin Laden. However, this allegation of the ties between Saddam and Bin Laden was not declared until January, 2002, when President Bush announced the ‘axis of evils’ frame, in which he considered Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as being the countries that conduct evil acts in the international community.

The debate over the U.S. war against Iraq includes discussion of whether or not the regime of Saddam Hussein was operationally allied with Al Qaeda. In building an argument that the United States needed to oust Saddam Hussein from power militarily, the administration asserted that Iraq constituted a gathering threat to the United States because it continued to develop weapons of mass destruction WMD’s and because it supported international terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda. In the administration view, ousting Saddam’s regime would lessen the possibility and the capability of Al Qaeda’s network to conduct a major terrorist attack using resources or WMD’s provided by the Iraqi regime (CRS Report for Congress 2005).
The Bush administration’s efforts linking the Iraqi regime with al Qaeda and therefore to September the 11th attacks proved to be a challenge. However, the efforts to find this connection began almost immediately after the attacks, as Richard Clarke, the former ‘counterterrorism czar’, reveals in his book Against All Enemies. Clarke mentioned an incident where President Bush spoke to some people, including himself, and said to them: ‘I know you have a lot to do and all, but I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way’ (Clarke 2004).

The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, gave the suitable chance for some U.S administration officials to campaign publicly for their vision of world politics. This vision was exemplified in the documents of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), founded in 1997 by many individuals in high positions in the Bush administration. A partial list of PNAC founders includes Vice President Dick Cheney, his chief of staff Lewis Libby, Chief Pentagon adviser Richard Perle, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz (Source Watch).

On September the 20th, 2001, a PNAC Letter on the war on terrorism, argued that the Iraqi regime was linked to the attacks and thus to the al Qaeda network. This, they indicated gavees the US the right to use overwhelming military force to take control of the gulf region. The main allegations they presented consisted of various accusations:

- The Iraqi regime was - in some way- connected to the September the 11th attacks;
- Iraqis possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) which used them in the past;
- Iraqis were willing to use them against the US; and
- Iraqis were providing substantial support to the al Qaeda terrorist group (Project of New American Century 2001).

The same day President Bush received the (PNAC) letter, he addressed both the Joint Session of Congress and the American people. In this address Bush stressed ‘things will never be the same again’ notion in which he indicated that
as the U.S had been attacked on its own soil it would be legal to act against those who attacked the U.S. Bush further stressed that:

‘On September 11th, the enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars- but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war- but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks- but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day – and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack’ (Bush 2002 quoted in Fairclough 2006: pp 144-145).

Fairclough (2006: 145) indicated that Bush is implicitly arguing from cause to effect: because of the nature of the ‘act of war’ (on American soil, in an urban centre, a surprise attack on civilians), there is now ‘a different world’. According to Fairclough (2006) Bush’s argument is fallacious. In explaining the invalidity of Bush’s argument, Fairclough (2006: 145) stressed that the attack was by its very nature a serious act of terrorism and a morally indefensible indiscriminate assault against innocent civilians, however, ‘nothing about the nature or circumstances of the attack make it inherently epoch-making or epoch – changing’. It can be argued that there have been many previous terrorists attacks on American targets, therefore, despite the repeated claims of ‘new threat’ and ‘new dangers’, the attacks of 9/11 could perfectly well be seen as an event in an established process (ibid: 145).

The U.S administration aimed at highlighting only the ‘epoch-changing’ theme of the attacks because ‘it was self-consciously represented in this way by politicians and officials with power, partly through their capacity to shape the global media agenda, to make it so’ (ibid: 145). This was a very crucial legitimizing move in connecting Saddam to al Qaeda: as this new era was simply dealing with different world attitudes and so old assumptions and old truths would no longer apply. These new challenges were considered to be radically different, and this expectation could give decision – makers the latitude to make them radically different. This notion explains the U.S policy towards Iraq, and the urgent need to deal with Iraq’s alleged WMD threats and
the possibility that they might be delivered to the al Qaeda group. The U.S’ main argument to connect Iraq to al Qaeda centered on the discourse of globalism, of the ‘war on terror’ theme, which was indicated by ‘this is a new era, posing new threats, which require new responses’ (Fairclough 2006: 144).

In his state of the union address in 29th of January, 2002, President Bush highlights that ‘our nation is at war; our economy is in recession and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers’ (State of the Union, 2002). He also announced the countries that constitute the axis of evil which included Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. with Iran being the most concernHe highlights:

‘... The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world’ (ibid) (Emphasis added).

President Bush then points out that those regimes are a threat to international peace and security:

‘States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred’ (ibid) (Emphasis added).

One of the major ways in which President Bush imagines the Iraqi threat was an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy. In this bifurcation, ‘us’ represents the ‘west’, which includes the fundamental moral values of liberal democratic rights and freedoms in politics and capitalist free enterprise in the economic sphere. The other side, ‘them’, not only rejects such values as principles of internal organization, but also poses a major military threat to ‘our’ values and ‘our’ way of life. This polarization is a familiar ideological pattern, according to Van Dijk ‘whereby ‘We’ are associated with positive values such as democracy, rationality, and ‘They’ with dictatorship, violence and irrationally’ (Van Dijk quoted in Hoyer, 2008).
In Bush’s address the bifurcation of us vs. them can be identified through lexical choices. President Bush illustrates the notion of *us versus them* (see Dijk chapter 5) where he aimed at highlighting the bad actions of the Iraqi regime (murder, poison gas, terrorists, anthrax) and compares it with the good actions of the civilized nations (democracy, freedom, rationality, progression), mainly the U.S. This attempt aimed at showing that we (Americans) are democratic societies dealing with dictatorial regimes that possess weapons harmful to the international society and that our weapons are for good purposes, whereas their weapons are for bad, evil actions. It can be argued that the desired goal of presenting such ideological comparison was to manufacture fear among the public to support future actions against those ‘uncivilized regimes’.

Implicit in the term ‘axis of evil’ is the ‘state as person’ metaphor, in particular the idea of a ‘healthy’ state, understood by reference to a healthy person. In this scenario, ‘A positive self –representations’ of western countries which share the same values (democracy, freedom) are highlighted, whereas, *they* constitutes the threat to those values which are crucial in a healthy community (see Dijk chapter 5). The implication is that an unhealthy state can infect a healthy one.

In the State of The Union address, the language is directed to the Americans and the international community; therefore, it was constructed to tell them that the Bush’s administration is now dealing with an evil that is harmful to healthy nations. Getting this message through would have a great impact upon their attitudes towards the Iraqi regime. The Iraqi regime that used poison gas against its own people, might and will (as indicated by the address) deploy weapons to terrorists groups which might be used against the U.S and the civilised world.

Bush ‘appeals to force’ in threatening dire consequences for those who do not accept his call for immediate regime change. He ‘appeals to pity’ by reference to the suffering victims of the evil Iraqi regime, with *the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children*. 
Although it was hard to prove (before the Iraq invasion) that Saddam Hussein had used WMD against his own people or neighboring countries, however, Bush asserted -without available facts-that those WMD’s might be used against some other countries in the region and abroad. This indicates a clear inductive ‘hasty generalisation’; just because Saddam Hussein had used such weapons in the past, this was no guarantee that he would use them again.

One day after Bush's State of the Union address, which identified the axis of evil, *the New York Times* published an article by D. Sanger (New York Times, 2002) who repeatedly emphasized that there was a link between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al Qaeda, without any critical assessment of relevant evidence. He also uncritically repeated the claim that Iraq was in possession of WMD's. The article reads ‘*in his first State of the Union address, Mr. Bush seemed to be outlining a rationale for future action, if he deems it necessary, not only ‘against terrorists but against any hostile states developing weapons of mass destruction*. It seems that Sanger never questioned the allegation that Iraq still possessed WMD's and therefore, followed the president's own words and claims, without examining the creditability of such allegations.

It is clear that the rationale to invade Iraq was being set by the *New York Times*, relying on information from the U.S intelligence agencies without investigating the case of the relationship between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda. Sanger in his article once again employed the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy (see Dijk chapter 5) to differentiate between ‘their’ – unqualifiedly - bad properties and ‘our’ – unqualifiedly - good properties. According to Sanger the U.S represents the democratic society with its own images of freedom and democracy, in comparison to their dictatorial regimes that is characterised with political oppression, repression, violence and aggression.

Also, in Sanger’s article the ‘state/ nation is a person’ metaphor is clear. This metaphor involves that nations have ‘enemies’, and ‘friends’, they are ‘cooperative’, or ‘uncooperative’ they can be ‘trustworthy’, ‘aggressive’ or ‘hostile’ (see Dijk chapter 5). Thus, terrorists and hostile states with WMD such as Iraq are considered to be an aggressive enemy to ‘our’ nation (America).
Sanger relied upon information and evidence presented by President Bush to accuse Iraq, Iran and North Korea of developing WMD’s without raising the question of the validity of such claims. In this case, Sanger aimed to support his conclusion of the Bush’s administration rationale to undertake future actions against those three countries. There is probably a fallacy involved here insofar as ‘the argument is supposed to be uncritically accepted on the basis of the authority of the arguer, without serious consideration of its real, logical strength’ (Head and Mann: 66). Sanger accepted the pronouncement of Bush who constituted the authority, and never critically questioned the validity of WMD’s claims. Sanger presented an argument from authority, without critical analysis or assessing the validity of such claims.

In 2001, the USA Today published an article that reads:

‘The CIA had convincing evidence from the mid-1990s that Saddam Hussein’s regime was funneling money through Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria and other terrorist organizations. Stanley Bedlington, a senior analyst in the CIA’s counterterrorism center until his retirement in 1994, said "We were convinced that money from Iraq was going to bin Laden, who was then sending it to places that Iraq wanted it to go’ (USA Today, December, 3rd, 2001) (Emphasis added).

This article asserted that the CIA, which constitutes the heart of the American intelligence system, had convincing evidence that Saddam was linked to Bin Laden’s al Qaeda network. The article also indicated that former CIA senior intelligence analysts were convinced of these links.

To a large extent, the mainstream mass media in the U.S cited the intelligence agencies repeatedly as being reliable and authoritative on this issue. Arguments from authority are not necessarily fallacious. But for such arguments to be valid or strong, they should (a) appeal to genuine and reliable authorities with relevant expertise, and (b) include reference to the actual evidence and argument leading the authorities in question to the relevant conclusion. In the previous article, it could be said that condition (a) is satisfied but (b) not.
The obvious problem in this case is the simplicity of fabrication of the relevant evidence by a pro-war executive, or by the intelligence agencies seeking to provide such an executive with what they want. It is difficult for ordinary people to access other relevant evidence, thus for this very reason, media should have been particularly vigilant and critical, not simply parroting authorities pronouncements.

In his speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, October the 7th, 2002, President Bush laid out the threat he believed Iraq posed:

‘Before 11 September 2001, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents and lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans - this time armed by Saddam Hussein (...) It would take just one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known’ (Bush, 2002) (Emphasis added).

In his speech Bush aimed at informing the public of the Iraqi danger that required an immediate response. This speech seems to have been constructed to try to win public support for military action through spreading fear that they themselves were in danger of falling victim to Iraq’s WMD, rather than through actual consideration of relevant evidence.

According to Bush a changed international political climate (following the attacks of 9/11) required the U.S to response quickly. New actions were considered to be ‘progressive and the way forward’ in contrast with ‘regressive and backwards’ policies before the September the 11th attacks.

The speech was broadcast by all media stations and then published in all newspapers the next day. It can be argued that the way the speech was constructed indicated efforts to link the 9/11 attacks against the U.S to Saddam Hussein who supposedly sponsored and aided terrorists groups.

The discourse of the U.S administration officials did not differ from the discourse and rhetoric used by President Bush in presenting repeated accusations of the Iraqi – al Qaeda links. Both the president and the vice president considered this given rationale as a concrete reason to invade Iraq in
2003, relying on intelligence information that Saddam Hussein somehow was linked to the September the 11th attacks. Although President Bush never mentioned the links between Iraq and al Qaeda explicitly (not until his State of the Union address on the 29th of January, 2002,), however, Vice President Dick Cheney explicitly revealed this link back on December, 9th, 2001.

In his NBC meet the press interview (NBC, 2001), Cheney stressed that according to CIA information, Mohamed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague five months prior to the 9-11th attacks. Vice President Cheney indicates that according to the CIA report it has been ‘pretty well confirmed that he did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack’ (NBC, Meet the Press, 2001).

In this case the absence of real evidence was compensated or masked by repeated use of such words as ‘confirmed’ and ‘compelling’ to try to add credibility to the argument. The aim seems to have been to give the public the impression that there was no possibility of mistake, and thus assuring them of the relationship between Saddam and al Qaeda. This information according to Cheney does not reflect a possibility of such links but rather a certainty, since the CIA was the source of this reliable security information.

Cheney’s arguments were centered on convincing the public of links between Saddam and al Qaeda. Central here is the supposed reliability of the source of the information – the CIA. But there is no critical consideration of the original source of the information or the possibility of fabrication.

It is of central importance to cast some light on the role of the broadcasting corporations in the U.S in selling the invasion of Iraq to the American people and the international community. The U.S announced its ‘War on Terror’ doctrine after the events of 9 – 11, and so did the printed media and broadcasting agencies. In doing so, the administration considered allegations of Iraqi – al Qaeda links to be a logical and moral reason to invade Iraq. Likewise, most broadcasting enterprises followed the official lines of
presenting allegations of such links to the public without questioning the case. Consider for instance this part of an excerpt from *Fox News Sunday* (September, 15, 2002) interview conducted by Tony Snow with Condoleezza Rice whom she was President Bush’s national security advisor:

‘Snow: Dr. Rice, let me talk about a couple of other breaking news stories. There's a report out of London today that the British government is putting together a dossier that tries to establish a link between Al Qaeda and Iraq. Without going into the particulars of that report, the president seems to have been arguing in recent weeks that, in fact, there is a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Is that true?

CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR: Well, there are clearly links between Iraq and terrorism. And there are Al Qaeda personnel that have been spotted in Baghdad. There are some evidence that there have been various meetings concerning Iraqi personnel and Al Qaeda personnel. (...) this is a regime that has hostile intent toward the United States that has all kind of people in Baghdad who are involved in terrorism -- Abu Nidal, who also has had links with Al Qaeda. We are working very hard to put together the full picture. We do think that there are links there; (...) He clearly has links to terrorism.

SNOW: All right. And links to terrorism would include Al Qaeda? I just want to be certain.

RICE: Links to terrorism would include Al Qaeda, yes’ (Fox news, 2002) (Emphasis added) .

In this passage it is important to differentiate between two discourses, the first, the discourse of Fox News, and the second, the discourse of Condoleezza Rice. Both discourses are aimed at highlighting the issue of war on terror through presenting assumed facts about actual links between Saddam and Bin Laden. At the beginning of his interview with Rice, Snow introduced the so-called ‘British government dossier’ which he indicated did establish a ‘link between Al Qaeda and Iraq’. It can be argued that Snow aimed at informing
the public of links between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda. When introducing the dossier Snow aimed at reminding his guest and the public that the President was confident of the relations between Iraq and al Qaeda.

In this interview both Rice and Snow used a range of different rhetorical devices to get their message through. Snow – uncritically - takes for granted that Rice is willing and able to provide a definitive and truthful answer to the question of links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. He ‘begs the question’ of her state of knowledge and reliability.

He constructs Rice as a reliable authority and she attempts to strengthen her position by claiming that the evidence for such links is ‘clear’ – before actually presenting it. And she re-emphasizes such – alleged – clarity at the end.

In her answers and responses to Snow’s questions, Rice was very confident that there were links between Iraq and al Qaeda. She offered examples of Iraq’s hospitable to a terrorist. Also, Rice described Iraq as being a ‘Regime’ in comparison with democratic systems. In doing so, she aimed at highlighting and reminding the audience of the bad actions of regimes which can be described as dictatorial where there is ‘no freedom’, ‘no standard life style’, and ‘unfair prosecutions’, whereas, democratic societies are characterized by ‘freedom’, ‘ideal life standard’, and ‘fair prosecutions’. Van Dijk (1998) translated the ideological implications of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation into an ideological square where the intention is to:

a) Emphasise our good properties/actions  
b) Emphasise their bad properties/actions  
c) Mitigate our bad properties/actions  
d) Mitigate their good properties/actions (van Dijk quoted in Hoyer 2008).

The British government allied with the U.S administration in their ‘war on terror’ and it supported the rationales the U.S fabricated to invade Iraq. One of these rationales was the Iraqi links with Bin Laden. Analysis of public pronouncements by the British Government along with mainstream mass
media in the U.K shows that both the government and the media supported the U.S claims to invade Iraq.

The British Prime Mister Tony Blair, in his New York City speech in September, 2002, around the first anniversary of the September the 11th attacks, emphasizes that:

‘On September 11 last year, with the world still reeling from the shock of events, it came together to demand action. But suppose I had come last year on the same day as this year- September 10. Suppose I had said to you: there is a terrorist network called al-Qaida. It operates out of Afghanistan. It has carried out several attacks and we believe it is planning more. It has been condemned by the UN in strongest terms. Unless it is stopped, the threat will grow. And so I want to take actions to prevent that (....) Your response and probably that of most people would have been very similar to the response of some of you yesterday on Iraq (.....) there would have been few takers for dealing with it and probably none for taking action of any description’ (Tony Blair, 2002 quoted in Hoyer, 2008) (Emphasis added).

Blair aimed at showing his sympathy and pity to the innocent people and their families who suffered from the outcome of the attacks. In doing so, Blair reminded the audience of the events of September the 11th, and aimed at spreading the image of fear once again among them to motivate acceptance of his conclusion of the urgent need to take actions against terrorism.

According to Blair’s argument, attacks upon the U.S demanded a new way of thinking, and therefore appropriate actions should be carried out. Blair’s argument is grounded in a ‘progress is forward movement’ metaphor (see van dijk chapter 5) which indicates that the old way of thinking is no longer valid, and therefore new policies should be carried out to protect ‘our’ way of living. Blair indicated that the Iraqi regime had never been properly ‘contained’ in the past. Therefore another attack might be conducted against the ‘western’ countries in the near future by the Iraqi regime.

In their arguments to link Iraq with the al Qaeda network, most mainstream mass media in the U.K highlighted existing evidence of this relation. Some of these media outlets claimed that Iraq was training Al Qaeda members on its soil to execute terrorist acts against the U.S, the U.K and the neighboring
countries. Consider for instance this report prepared by Gwynne Roberts for *Sunday Times* (2003) titled *Al Qaeda was trained in Iraqi terror camps*. The report reads:

‘EVIDENCE is now emerging of a shadowy military alliance between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden which involves training al Qaeda fighters to use chemical and biological weapons in sabotage operations in Europe and the United States. **US claims of a direct link** between bin Laden and Saddam have **fallen on deaf ears** in Europe. (...) Abu Mohammed, who fled to Turkey three years ago, told me that in 1997 and 1998 **Islamic extremists** were being instructed to use **poison gas** and **biological weapons** in behind-the-lines operations in the Middle East and the West... Mohammed said a year later he attended another training course at Salman Pak and Unit 999 where he encountered al Qaeda fighters. "There was also training in the use of **biological and chemical weapons**... In the training areas there is a field especially for **weapons of mass destruction**. Here, experts hold lectures and conduct biological experiments, theoretical experiments..." Mohammed added: "They **had maps of the USA, Britain, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia**’(Sunday Times, 13-2-2003) **(Emphasis Added).**

The reporter uncritically accepted that U.S claims of ties between Iraq and Bin Laden were true and real. They presented the claims of various ex-members of al Qaeda who allegedly indicated that Iraq was involved in training al Qaeda fighters in the use of chemical and biological weapons as if such claims were true beyond question.

They sought to instil fear in their audience by highlighting the links between Saddam and Bin Laden. Apparently there are numerous camps to train al Qaeda members around Iraq. Those camps train terrorists on how to use chemical and biological weapons, and they even have maps of some U.S and Europeans territories. It is difficult not to conclude that the reporter was attempting to manufacture fear in order to create and shape public attitudes to support the war on terror and regime change in Iraq.

Also, the reporter employed the ideological bifurcation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ in his report. ‘They’ have Islamic extremists who are trying to acquire WMD to destroy ‘our’ way of life; presumably a reasonable and rational way of life. In his report the writer was able to utilize ideological polarisation (see van Dijk,
chapter 5) to differentiate between us ‘civilized nations’ and them ‘uncivilized’. The justification presented by the U.S administrations does not lie within the good/evil frame, but in a moral accountability and a duty to help the suffering citizens of Iraq. 

The Iraqi government in December 2002 issued a 12,000 pages WMD’s dossier and submitted it to the U.N to show Iraq’s full compliance with U.N WMD’s inspections team. In this dossier the Iraqi government denied having any illicit WMD’s, and argued that its WMD’s capabilities were contained and destroyed during inspections.

In its reporting of links between Iraq and al Qaeda, the British *Daily Mail* (2002) asserted that President Bush’s claims of Iraq’s efforts to aid and support terrorists groups were actually strengthened by the publication of this document, insofar as it was obviously not truthful and did not make any sense.

The *Daily Mail* (2002) article entitled ‘Iraq nerve gas for al Qaeda’ reads:

‘*Iraq has supplied Al Qaeda terrorists with VX nerve gas* as recently as last month, reported yesterday. The startling claim, which could make nonsense of Iraq’s 12,000-page dossier listing no weapons of mass destruction, heightened tensions throughout the Middle East. It also reinforced President George Bush’s assertions that Iraq is aiding the terrorist network led by Osama Bin Laden.(...) Analysts believe that an *Islamic extremist group* obtained the gas in Baghdad and a courier took it over the Turkish border. The target is unknown but is presumed to be *American or European*’(The Daily Mail, 13-12-2002) (emphasis added).

Once again we see the dual emphasis upon links with al Qaeda and WMD’s, aiming to promote a climate of fear, with the claims supported only by uncritical arguments from authority. In presenting these claims the writer relied completely upon the assertions of President Bush along with other alleged expert testimony without examining the trustworthiness of such allegations. The writer never doubted the information; rather he asserted and reinforced the validity of such pronouncements.

According to the previous article it is implicit that if the U.K fails to deal with this dangerous threat then the outcome would be great and harmful. In other
words, appeal to force arguments are central with frequent suggestions of dire consequences following from failure to take seriously the pro-war arguments including attack by various weapons of mass destruction.

The overall purpose of this article and the way sentences were constructed aimed at creating fear, and highlighting an existing relation between Saddam and Bin Laden. In addition, there is an important message to deliver, which is the huge ideological differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see Van Dijk, chapter 5).

6. 3.2 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD’S, THE SECOND ALLEGATION)

Both administrations in the U.S and the U.K, highlighted Iraq’s WMD’s as being the rationale to undertake military actions to overthrow the regime ruled by Saddam Hussein. Before the invasion, the main justifications set by the U.S government to declare war against Iraq without U.N explicit resolution were twofold, first, Iraqi possession and acquirement of WMD’s which were considered to be a major threat to the international community and secondly, the Iraqi regime’s failure to comply with U.N series resolutions to disarm (Flack, 2008, Cook, 2008, Hil et al, 2010, also see chapter 5). In this section, the discourse of both administrations along with the mainstream mass media is analyzed to uncover how rhetoric played a crucial role in presenting alleged Iraqi WMD’s.

The concern of this section is to shed some light on the discourse contributions of the U.S and U.K administrations, and the mainstream mass media in both countries before the invasion of Iraq 2003, in presenting the threat of Saddam Hussein’s WMD’s as a legal basis for overthrowing the regime. Chapter three of the thesis developed a comprehensive examination of the WMD allegation, and concluded that there was actually no evidence of any deployment of such weapons to support the legality of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, see chapter 3).

The Bush administration asserted that the Iraq invasion was legal relying on the notion of preemptive self-defense (see chapter 3) which would allow the U.S and allies to attack Iraq by claiming that Iraq’s WMD’s were a major threat
to the international security. This assertion marked the announcement of the new strategic doctrine, the so-called the ‘Bush doctrine’ or the ‘new preemption doctrine’, which had been presented by President Bush seven months prior to the Iraq invasion (Mehrish 2007; Ali 2003).

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September the 12th, 2002, one year after the September the 11th attacks President Bush declared the so called ‘preemption doctrine’ when he asserted that:

‘We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well’ (Bush, 12-9-2002) (Emphasis added).

In his speech, President Bush repeatedly highlighted Iraq’s WMD’s threat to the U.S and the entire world. In doing so the President efforts aimed at acquiring a U.N resolution which would authorize the use of force against Iraq on the grounds that the Iraqi threat would be affecting the entire world not just the U.S.

President Bush in presenting the case to the U.N.G.A. employed substantial rhetoric with a view to building a solid case against Iraq, and therefore, obtaining a U.N explicit resolution to authorize use of force against Iraq relying on self-defense doctrine.

Here, President Bush’s arguments were grounded in a ‘politics is a journey’ metaphor which is crucially related to ‘progress is forward movement’ metaphor. Within those two metaphors the concept of creation of new policies to deal with new challenges are decisive. Thus, Bush argued that if the U.N. failed to authorise the use of force against Iraq, the U.S would act alone in exercising such force. In doing so, Bush indicates that this new challenge require a new policy to deal with it. He employs the ‘politics is a journey’ metaphor in which politicians must adapt to changes to international relations through new policies.

President Bush in his speech before the assembly demonstrated that:
‘Our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions (...) we know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take (...) the conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. [All the] world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?’ (Bush, 12-9-2002) (Emphasis added).

President Bush highlighted the bad actions of ‘them’ through employment of varied lexicalisation, such as ‘outlaw groups and regimes, no law of morality, violent ambitions, pursued weapons of mass murder, Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger’. President Bush described the Iraqi regime as being an outlaw regime that murdered people with WMD’s; this regime was violent with no consideration of morality. Whereas, ‘we’ the democratic societies are lawful, we do not murder people, and ‘we’ consider moral values when dealing with our own people or other nations. To this extent, they ‘are’ bad to us all; therefore, they should be terminated.

Bush presented various arguments to diplomatically convince the international community of the urgent need to authorize the force to disarm Iraq or the U.S will act relying on preemptive self-defense doctrine.

Bush aimed at reminding the members of the U.N.G.A. of Iraq’s WMD’s. In doing so, he apparently intended to target the hearts and minds of the General Assembly members through creating and framing a fear factor to obtain a resolution to use force against Iraq. President Bush presented various arguments before the U.N.G.A. to support his desired goal.

The rhetoric he employed questioned the major role of the UNGA authority and reputation as an international organization in so far as Iraq had disrespected its resolutions in respect to WMD’s inspection missions. President
Bush’s main goal was apparently to convince the U.N.G.A. of Iraq’s WMD’s threat in order to justify and initiate immediate international action. In doing so, he presented various arguments to support his claims (a) the Iraqi regime was an outlaw, (b) Iraq’s WMD’s were a threat (c) the Iraqi regime had dishonored U.N resolutions.

Bush provided various examples of Saddam’s disrespecting the authority of the U.N. resolutions and UN authority. He reminded his listeners of Saddam’s previous crimes against his own people. By doing so; he aimed both at gathering consensus to act in order to protect Iraqi innocent people and suggesting that Saddam’s next step would be to attack other nations.

It is of central importance to shed some light on President Bush’s various speeches in which he asserted that Iraq was a major threat and therefore, an Iraq invasion was legal because Iraq had failed to comply with U.N. resolutions to disarm its WMD capabilities. These are some excerpt of President Bush’s speeches in different occasions:

- ‘Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons’, and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons’ (Bush, Radio address, 5-12-2002, in Ali, 2003) (Emphasis added).

- ‘The Iraqi regime ... possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons... the evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program’ (Bush Speech, Ohio, 7-12-2002, in Ali, 2003) (Emphasis added).

- ‘our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agents’ (Bush State of the Union Address, 28-1-2003, in Ali, 2003) (Emphasis added).

- ‘intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised’ (Bush address to the nation, 17-3-2003, in Ali, 2003) (Emphasis added).
The main theme of President Bush’s speeches and addresses to the nation were centered on selling the Iraq invasion relying on WMD’s allegation. To achieve this end, the fear factor was the main tool to construct consensus among the public to be supportive to a regime change in Iraq. This was accomplished through employing rhetorical devices which were constructed carefully. The above excerpt indicates some illustrations of language construction that aimed at spreading fear among the American public. Also, the use of fallacies is evident in Bush’s Speech. He presented various arguments to convince the American public of Iraq’s WMD’s, referring to ‘evidence’ and ‘intelligence gathered’ in relation to an alleged ‘nuclear weapons program’. But no solid evidence was actually presented.

The discourse of the U.S Vice President echoed that of President Bush in regards to Iraq’s WMD’s allegations. On various occasions the Vice President highlighted the urgent need for regime change in Iraq. The U.S. Vice president asserted that Iraq refused to comply with U.N weapons Inspectors, and that Iraq was acquiring not only WMD’s but nuclear weapons.

In his speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) national convention in Nashville, Tennessee in 2002, Cheney argued that the U.S will never wait for the Saddam Hussein threat to be uncontrollable, and that U.N resolution was needed to achieve a regime change in Iraq (Cheney, 2002). He also highlighted that Saddam Hussein was a ‘sworn enemy of our country’. According to Cheney Saddam Hussein’s threat should be contained but ‘in the face of such a threat, we must [proceed] with care, deliberation, and consultation with our allies’.

Cheney further indicates that:

‘The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago. These are not weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so that Saddam can hold the threat over the head of anyone he chooses, in his own region or beyond (...)Saddam also devised an elaborate program to conceal his active efforts to build chemical and biological weapons (...)In other times the world saw how the United States defeated fierce enemies, then helped rebuild their countries (...)We would act in that same spirit after a regime change in
Iraq. With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again’ (Cheney, 27-8-2002) (Emphasis added).

Vice President Cheney’s discourse reflected President Bush’s presentation of arguments that outlined Iraq’s WMD’s threat. In most of Cheney’s speeches the anticipated goal was shaping public opinion that would support actions against Iraq relying on WMD’s rationale. In the above speech the supporting arguments can be revealed as follows (a) Iraqi regime was enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents (b) these are not weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq, these weapons are offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale which would be used by Saddam who would hold the threat over the head of anyone he chooses. All these premises indicate that Cheney constructed an argument which would help convince the listener of his conclusion. Cheney’s conclusion is centred on one major assertion, that Iraq possess WMD’s and that regime change in Iraq is crucial.

Cheney in his speech employed the fear factor through stressing that Iraq not only possessed WMD’s but continued to pursue its ‘nuclear program’ and that Iraq also very busy ‘enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents’. These types of weaponry are not ‘for the purpose of defending Iraq’ but are ‘offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale’. In this argument Cheney aimed at informing the American public and cautioning them that the threat was real, and therefore, the US government should not wait until it was too late. Cheney in his speech recalled the U.S previous interventions, when the U.S. launched attacks against Vietnam and North Korea. In doing so, he aimed at reminding the U.S. war veterans of their role in defeating evil states.

Vice president Cheney differentiated between Saddam Hussein’s regime’s evil acts and the democratic fundamental values of the U.S. Cheney argued that the Iraqi people would notice the differences between Saddam’s regime and ‘liberated Iraq’ after regime change. He indicated that Iraq would be restored as ‘a great nation once again’ with fundamental democratic values. Although he never mentioned ideological differences explicitly, however, the notion of
‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is evident, they are authoritarian regimes, we are democratic societies.

In their efforts to report the U.S administration allegations in regards to Iraq’s WMD’s in the period leading up to the Iraq invasion, both CNN and Fox News failed to provide countervailing viewpoints and evidence. Instead, they started to draw conclusions based purely on the assertions of executive authority concerning the WMD’s (McLeod, 2009). In his efforts to assess whether the CNN and Fox news presented actual facts and evidence of Iraq’s WMD’s, or merely adopted the administration line in presenting Iraq as an imminent threat, McLeod (2009) analyzed all transcripts for CNN and Fox News programs for the week surrounding Powell’s speech to the United Nation security Council (UNSC) from February the 1st to the 8th, 2003 that contained the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ within ten words of the terms ‘Saddam Hussein’ or ‘Iraq’. The analysis showed that coverage of the period surrounding Colin Powell’s speech to UNSC ‘largely supported the Bush Administration’s take’ on the issue of Iraqi WMD’s’ (ibid: 131).

According to McLeod (2009) the CNN and Fox News coverage of the issue of Iraq’s WMDs, repeatedly relied on reports centered on statements by President Bush and high-level Bush Administration officials. McLeod (2009) illustrates that several stories on Fox News would begin with a video clip of President Bush making a definitive statement on this issue.

Five days after Collin’s Powell speech to the U.N.S.C. senior White House correspondent Jim Angles In Fox News Special Report on February the 5th 2003, repeatedly highlighted Powell’s allegations in regards to Iraq’s WMD’s in a way that lent credibility to him as established solid facts, Angels further asserted that:

“In a multimedia presentation unveiling a range of newly declassified intelligence, Powell delivers a scathing indictment of Iraq’s weapons programs and efforts to conceal them from inspectors. What he called irrefutable and undeniable evidence. For instance, Powell played intercepted conversations between Iraqi military officers in which they talk about getting rid of the evidence before an expected visit from inspectors’ (Fox News, 5-2-2003) (Emphasis added).
Angels introduced Powell’s pronouncements of Iraq’s WMD’s evidence without questioning the validity of these accusations. Angels, through presenting the authority’s assertion, aimed at informing the readers that the declassified intelligence evidence was trustworthy because it was revealed by a genuine and reliable authority, namely Powell the U.S secretary of State. Accordingly, Angels failed to critically assess whether or not the administration fabricated intelligence evidence to legitimise Iraq invasion. Also, Angels sentences were highly constructed (see Fairclough ideas on how sentences are constructed to deliver modes, intentions and implications, chapter 5) to convince the readers of the reliability of Collin Powell’s new intelligence evidence which indicated that Iraq would manage to destroy the evidence before the U.N. visited Iraq. Angels was confident that Iraq’s WMD’s do exist, without any attempt to reveal the accuracy of Powell’s allegation. In other words he affirmed Powell’s WMD’s testimony. Angels presented Powell’s allegation as being an irrefutable fact. In doing so, he presented various premises to support the administration claim along with his own, an illustration of this is evident in using phrases and words, such as ‘unveiling a range of newly declassified intelligence, delivers a scathing indictment of Iraq’s weapons programs, conceal them from inspectors, irrefutable, undeniable evidence, getting rid’.

Similarly, the CNN functioned to highlight Collin Powell’s testimonies in regards to Iraq’s possession and concealment of both WMD’s and nuclear weapons, without raising any doubts related to such allegations. In CNN Connie Chung Tonight program on February the 5th, 2003, David Gergen (who was a senior political analyst for CNN at that time, and has served an advisor to four U.S presidents) was asked by CNN host whether Powell’s speech delivered a ‘smoking gun’ or not. Gergen responded that ‘he sure had everything but the bullet itself. It was conclusive; compelling evidence (...) he demolished the argument that Saddam Hussein is not concealing weapons of mass destruction’ (CNN, 5-2-2003).

Gergen, in his arguments, intended to support the U.S allegations of Iraq’s WMD’s existence. He never doubted, or challenged the U.S administration claims to invade Iraq. Gergen employed strong words to support his point of view, such as ‘conclusive; compelling evidence, demolished’. Although he
never explicitly mentioned regime change in Iraq, however, he implied that the
Iraqi regime was concealing WMD’s and that regime change was needed to
disarm Iraq. Although his argument sounds valid and logical, however, he did
not provide enough evidence to support the claim that Iraq really concealed
WMD’s. Also, a ‘straw man fallacy’ is evident in Gergen’s argument. The straw
man fallacy is ‘committed when the arguer distorts an opponent’s for the
purpose of more easily attacking it, refutes the distorted argument, and then
concludes that the opponent’s original argument has been refuted’ (Head and
Mann, 2009:50). Anti-war voices -prior to the Iraq invasion- in the U.S argued
that Iraq did not conceal or possess WMD’s. Here, Gergen argued that Powell’s
allegations regarding Iraq’s WMD’s were compelling, conclusive and that the
evidence demolished the opponent’s arguments of no WMD’s were to be
found. In this scenario, Gergen attacked the anti-war argument that no WMD’s
in Iraq through refuting it with his own conclusion, which is Iraq concealment
of WMD’s.

The U.S Government officials repeatedly presented explicit claims to show that
not only was Iraq in possession of huge quantities of biological and chemical
weapons, in violation of U.N. resolutions, but that U.S. intelligence agencies
had identified the particular locations indicating where these weapons were
stored, the identities of individuals involved in their production, even the
military orders issued by Saddam Hussein for their use in the future (World
socialist, 2003).

The U.S claims of Iraq’s WMD’s were brought up in almost each statement or
speech of the U.S administration. Those claims aimed at shaping public opinion
supportive to any predicted military action against Iraq in the near future. It is
noteworthy, that almost all mainstream mass media in the U.S highlighted
those allegations without investigating the case. Here are some illustrations of
the WMD’s discourse that have been heavily employed to get the message
through:

- **August 26, 2002**—Vice President Dick Cheney told the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, “There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has
weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies and against us”. (ibid).

Cheney indicates that Iraq WMD’s were real. In doing so, Cheney conveys to the audience that as Americans ‘we care first about our allies and friends’, this is evident from the structure and the dimension of the sentence as he mentioned friends, allies before the U.S. Although his argument of Iraq’s WMD’s capability seems logical, however, he never mentioned reliable evidence to back his assertion. One might consider Saddam’s past chemical attacks upon his own people; however, it does not mean that he would use it against the U.S or other countries. Thus, his argument does not follow. It can be argued therefore that his generalisation is neither logical nor valid.

- **September 18, 2002**—Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the House Armed Services Committee, ‘*We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons. His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard gas.*’ (ibid).

To create the fear factor among the public, Rumsfeld aimed at mentioning different types of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons such as (VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard gas), with the intention that most of the average American people have hardly any background information in regards to the issues. Although he being the authority indicated that Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons, however he never mentions reliable and accurate evidence to support his claims. Thus, his arguments lack creditability as he fails to include reference to the actual evidence that would lead him to the relevant conclusion which indicates that Iraq is in possession of VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard gas.

- **October 7, 2002**—President Bush declared in a nationally televised speech in Cincinnati that Iraq ‘*possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons.*’ (ibid).

In his speech, President Bush warns the U.S citizens of the threat Iraq possess against the U.S. Bush declared that Iraq was not only producing chemical and
biological weapons, but it was seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons. The President aimed at increasing fear among them to support his plans.

Mass media in its efforts to support the U.S administration claims regarding Iraq’s WMD’s employed an important tactic by broadcasting satellite images and data gathered and captured by the US intelligence to confirm the evidences against Iraq. The media was convinced that those images and the photos captured by the U.S. intelligence satellites provided unquestionable facts of aggressive acts of generating WMDs by Iraq. The World Tribune stated in 2002:

‘US satellite photos reportedly show increased activity near the Taji factory in Iraq, which US intelligence suspects may be involved in the production of anthrax. The facility is located 10 miles outside of Baghdad’(World Tribune, 14-8-2002) (Emphasis added).

Figure Photo 1: Digital Globe imagery of Taji Missile Factory as 11 May 2002

The real message that the World Tribune aimed to deliver was that the U.S administration was not fabricating the issue of Iraq’s WMD’s, and evidence was presented to ‘show increased activity’ which indicated that this site was used to develop and produce anthrax. After the Invasion, reports of the allies forces WMD’S research teams indicated that this site had been abandoned at least ten years ago.

The British government allied with the U.S administration in its claims of Iraq’s WMD’s, and also highlighted the urgent need to disarm Saddam Hussein. The
British policy was motivated by security legitimizations as Iraq was considered a major and imminent threat in the region. The sphere of the impacts of September the 11th attacks along with the terrifying threat of Iraq’s WMD’s capability helped in shaping consensus among the British government to act against Iraq before it was too late and that preemptive attack was legitimate to confront this threat.

In his speech to The Trade Union Congress (TUC) on September 10th, 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair confirmed the real threat of Iraq’s WMD’s. Blair further indicated that:

‘We’re not talking about some mild variants of everyday chemicals, but anthrax, sarin and mustard gas - weapons that can cause hurt and agony on a mass scale beyond the comprehension of most decent people’ (Blair, 10-9-2002) (Emphasis added).

To canvas support for military actions against Iraq, Blair focuses upon the fearful and diverse character of the weapons of mass destruction. The world was not dealing only with nuclear weapons but with ‘anthrax, sarin and mustard gas’. Such weapons threaten dire consequences for innocent civilian populations. To protect such populations immediate action was necessary. Inaction would be disastrous (Hoyer, 2008:58).

On the eve of the Iraq invasion, Prime Minister Tony Blair in his Speech before the House of Commons on March, 18th, 2003, indicated that the attack against Iraq was legitimated relying on security foundations. According to Blair Iraq’s WMD’s was a major threat and therefore, Saddam Hussein had to be contained. Blair further argued that:

‘The threat is chaos and there are two begetters of chaos, tyrannical regimes with WMD and extreme terrorist groups who profess a perverted and false view of Islam (...) the purpose of terrorism lies not just in the violent act itself. It is in producing terror. It sets out to inflame, to divide, to produce consequences which they then use to justify further terror (...) three kilograms of VX from a rocket launcher would contaminate a quarter of a square kilometer of a city (...) the real problem is that, underneath, people dispute that Iraq is a threat; dispute the link between terrorism and WMD; dispute the whole basis of our assertion that the two together constitute
a fundamental assault on our way of life(...). My fear, deeply held, based in part on the intelligence that I see, is that these threats come together and deliver catastrophe to our country and world. These tyrannical states do not care for the sanctity of human life. The terrorists delight in destroying it’ (Blair 20-03-03) (Emphasis added).

In his efforts to gain support for the legality of the Iraq invasion, Blair counted on different rhetorical potentials to confirm that the failure to act on the ‘threat’ posed by the Iraqi regime could lead to horrible events. The failure to act now – according to Blair- would have dangerous consequences and therefore we have the right to defend ourselves. Blair obviously aimed at generating consensus among the members of the House of Commons to support Iraq invasion.

Blair in his debate to endorse the right of self –defence, indicated that evil states should be contained. The notion of ‘nation as a person’ metaphor (see Lakoff, chapter 5) plays a central part in Blair’s discourse. As Hoyer says, ‘based in the ‘nation state is a person’ metaphor, the self-defence scenario entails that war is justified on the basis of the threat alone, and is linked to what Lakoff calls a “strict father morality”, where military action is validated by the need to punish and hold the protagonists “evil” accountable’ (Hoyer, 2008).

Also, the ‘nation as a person’ metaphor is closely related to the ‘community’ metaphor. In his speech Blair harps on the danger of the Iraqi threat to the western world’s fundamental values. The community metaphor indicates that nations are parts of an international ‘community’. Nations are expected to respect ‘norms’, ‘values’ and ‘responsibilities’. Outlaw nations do not consider international community responsibilities and values. Hence, irresponsible nations should be contained through the international ‘community’ by means of obligations, rules and even war (lakoff quoted in Hoyer 2008). This explains Blair’s argument of self-defence policy and the need to overthrow Saddam’s regime.

Prime Minister Tony Blair relied solely on British intelligence information which- supposedly - confirmed beyond doubt that Iraq WMD’s programs were advanced and ongoing. In September 24th, 2002, Blair published the so-called
The dossier which was introduced by the Prime Minister highlighted the ‘British Government assessment of Iraq’s WMD’s’ relying on intelligence information gathered in relation to Iraq’s WMD’s capability.

The document when published raised a massive debate internationally, however, to a large extent, the British people and the mass media gave more attention to the content of the dossier, than to the debate. It can be argued that the mass media in Britain and the administration in the U.S along with the media relied on and cited the document as to be definitive evidence that confirmed Iraq’s various WMD’s capability.

In his foreword to the dossier, Prime Minster Blair asserted that the document was based on information gathered by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), he also indicated that the Committee ‘is at the heart of the British intelligence machinery’, and that J.I.C. ‘is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK’s three Intelligence and Security Agencies the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from key government departments’. All of this introductory information aimed at informing the public that the J.I.C. was a reliable and authoritative, Prime Minster Blair at the beginning of his foreword aimed to inform the public of the importance of the J.I.C. in Great Britain as it constituted the heart of the machinery intelligence, and thus it was trustworthy. According to Blair, the J.I.C. For over 60 years ‘has provided regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues’ (British Dossier, 2002).

Blair emphasized that the threat was real and that the intelligence information gathered in regards to Iraq’s WMD’s was certain. Therefore, the use of force was the only path to stop him. Blair further asserted that:

‘What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to
extend the range of his ballistic missile programme (...) I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped. Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital to his strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional domination. And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them' (British Dossier, 2002) (Emphasis added).

The rhetorical use of language by Blair is professionally structured to achieve a twofold outcome. On the one hand it aimed at introducing supporting arguments which would help to strengthen his conclusion of the urgent need to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime 'he has to be stopped'. And on the other, it aimed at manufacturing fear among the public through repeating the threat of Iraq's WMD's 'WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them'. The supporting premises can be seen in 'established beyond doubt, produce chemical and biological weapons, develop nuclear weapons, ballistic missile, use these weapons'. The message was clear: it was either we fight him or consequences would be great and harmful. This confirms that Blair’s policy was set to highlight security motivations that aimed at accomplishing regime change in Iraq.

Most of the mainstream mass media in the U.K adopted the British Government’s security discourse which highlighted Iraq’s WMD’s imminent threat.

Three days before the military operations were launched against Saddam Hussein’s regime, Sunday Times (2003) published an article that asserted the urgent need to overthrow the regime in Iraq because it violated the U.N. efforts to disarm its WMD’s. The article also reads:

‘Saddam is a dangerous tyrant who has invaded Iran and Kuwait and attacked Israel and Saudi Arabia. He has used chemical weapons, not just in the war with Iran but also against his own people. Four million people have fled his regime and tens of thousands more of his opponents are dead or in jail ... As his people have
become impoverished, he has persisted with efforts to acquire weapons material from other countries. He is a danger to us all’ (Sunday Times 16-03-2003 quoted in Hoyer, 2008) (Emphasis added).

In this article, the ideological bifurcation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ notion is implicit (see Lakoff, chapter 5). A clear illustration of this ideological concept can be seen in the article as follows: the leader of Iraq is Saddam Hussein who is ‘a dangerous tyrant’ because he ‘invaded Iran and Kuwait and attacked Israel and Saudi Arabia’ and ‘used chemical weapons, not just in the war with Iran but also against his own people’. Accordingly, there are no similarities between ‘them’ and ‘us’; ‘they’ have “WMD’s” ‘we’ have ‘strategic weapons’, they are ‘regimes’ we are ‘democratic societies’, they attacked ‘their own people and other nations’ we ‘intervene’. Accordingly, Saddam was ‘a danger to us all’.

Also, the article raised the issue of Iraq’s aggression in the past in order to create a fear factor among the British public that helped in shaping their supportive attitudes of pre-emptive attack upon Iraq. The sentence construction of the article, intended to inform the British public of the real threat and its consequences, reinforces the reader’s mind of previous actions of this dangerous regime which invaded Iran and attacked Israel and Saudi Arabia. Bear in mind, that the public were informed numerous times of the Iraqi missile range, which might be able to be used directly against Britain. Here, the argument is clear: we should save and protect the Iraqi innocent civilians who suffered from this evil regime. Also, we should protect ourselves from evil actions that might be carried out by this regime, thus we should act first. A ‘nation is a person’ metaphor is highly constructed in this article. Saddam was an ‘aggressive’, ‘hostile’, ‘dangerous’ and a ‘tyrant’ enemy to the ‘western world’. Thus, Saddam should be contained to force him to respect international ‘norms’, ‘values’ and ‘obligations’.

Although it is very hard to decide whether or not the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was supportive of the British Government’s allegations of the threat Iraq’s WMD’s possess, however, an extensive review conducted by the researcher of this thesis, revealed beyond doubt that the BBC relied heavily
on U.S government sources and the mainstream mass media in the U.S to inform the British public of the developments of Iraq’s WMD’s related issues. To a certain extent, it can be argued that the BBC was neutral in its media presentation and coverage of Iraq’s WMD’s; it also questioned the U.K claims of Iraq’s nuclear weapons capability. However, after the British government published its assessment of Iraq’s WMD’s, the BBC started to inform the British public of Iraq’s WMD’s which might be used to target some areas in the U.K. In doing so, it can be argued that the BBC helped to construct a fear factor in the public mind which might explain the supportive attitudes that started to emerge in both the House of Commons and the public, which resulted in approving the decision to launch a pre-emptive attack against Saddam Hussein’s regime. To shed some light on the contribution of the BBC in informing the public of the real danger of Saddam’s regime, consider this passage of a BBC report ‘Scud: Iraq ballistic missile’ prepared four months prior the Iraq invasion and almost three months after the U.K published its Iraq’s WMD’s assessment:

‘The fear that Iraq may be able to arm its Scuds with chemical or biological warheads has loomed large (...) analysts have warned that Saddam Hussein could order the use of chemical and biological weapons if the US leads a war against Iraq that is going to end his rule (...) according to the UK prime minister’s dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction: "Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the Scud ballistic missile in breach of UN Security Council resolution 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer-range ballistic missiles." The International Institute of Strategic Studies estimates that Iraq might have about a dozen Scuds hidden away’ (BBC, 18-12-2002) (Emphasis added).

The BBC relied heavily upon governmental intelligence information in regards to Iraq’s WMD’s capabilities without questioning the claims. There are two important observations that can be seen in this report. On the one hand the report mentioned and framed the word ‘analysts’ who ‘warned that Saddam Hussein could order the use of chemical and biological weapons if the US leads a war against Iraq’, one might ask who are these analysts?, therefore, it can be argued that the BBC misled the British public, because it indicated that those analysts warned that Saddam could use chemical and biological weapon to
attack targets in the U.K. On the other hand, the report cited the British dossier which indicated that Iraq was ‘developing longer-range ballistic missiles’ and that Iraq ‘might have about a dozen Scuds hidden away’. By linking the first premise ‘analysts confirmation of Iraq chemical and biological weapons capability’ to the second premise ‘developing Scuds with long-range ballistic missiles’, the conclusion suggests immediate action to contain this aggressive tyrant. Thus, public support to invade Iraq must exist because the Iraqi regime would target us all.

Although the BBC never explicitly warned the public of the Iraqi threat, however, mentioning information regarding Iraq’s WMD’s capabilities would generates fear among them and thus advances their support to regime change in Iraq.

6.3.3 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION MOTIVATIONS: THE THIRD ALLEGATION

Although both administrations in the U.S and the U.K along with the mainstream mass media in both countries gave less attention to humanitarian motivations in their efforts to legitimate the Iraq invasion, they did rely on human rights violations and the urgent need to liberate the Iraqi people. However, examination of the building up of the Iraq invasion discourse showed that both countries, two months prior the invasion, presented humanitarian intervention as a crucial rationale to overthrow the dictatorial regime in Iraq.

The examination in this chapter shows that after the mission of the Iraq invasion was accomplished, it became evident that the main justifications presented by both administrations and the media were proven to be invalid. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime the issue of links between Saddam and Bin Laden along with Iraq’s WMD’s arose (links between Saddam and al Qaeda did not exist and Iraq’s WMD’s not found) and the public started to question the legality of the Iraq invasion in the first place. Accordingly, both administrations and the mainstream mass media started to highlight the issue of Iraq’s past experience in human rights violations, and also stressed that the
Invasion of Iraq was necessary to liberate the Iraqi people and to create a democratic Iraq.

It can be argued that the Human rights violation rationale to invade Iraq started to arise months before the Iraqi invasion. An explanation of why both administrations in the U.S and the U.K waited until the invasion became imminent to highlight these issues, would be that the U.S and the U.K were certain that Iraq’s links with al Qaeda were groundless; also, they were confident that the Iraq’s WMD’s claims were insignificant. Thus, they employed a different and a new rationale to present to the public as an excuse to cover up their misleading assertions after the Iraq invasion reveals their false accusations.

Two days before the coalition of the willing operation started, President Bush (2003) in his Address to the Nation gave Saddam Hussein and his sons forty eight hours to leave Iraq. In his address Bush highlighted that the Iraq invasion was meant to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein. He repeatedly indicated that military actions are to save them from Saddam’s evil actions against them; he further indicates that ‘If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you’. Thus, he presented moral reasons to invade Iraq and overthrow the evil regime that killed many innocent Iraqi people. Bush’s address also reads:

‘As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror, and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near (...) the cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities. In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war. Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people deserve and capable of human liberty, and when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation. Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the violent, and
tonight, as we have done before, America and our allies accept that responsibility’ (Bush, 17-3-2003) (Emphasis added).

In his speech President Bush highlighted some key elements of Saddam Hussein’s previous human rights violations and also he urged the Iraqi people to support the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ troops after liberating Iraq. Adopting some CDA devices, analyzing the rhetoric used by President Bush emphasizes that the Iraq invasion was fundamentally grounded by human motivations. Many rhetorical techniques can be seen in Bush’s Address to the Nation. First, Bush introduced many premises to support his conclusion ‘Iraqi people deserve and capable of human liberty, peaceful and self-governing nation’. Such premises are ‘We will tear down the apparatus of terror, build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free, no more poison, no more torture chambers and rape rooms’. Second, the use of the ideological bifurcation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ to emphasise the fundamental values of the U.S, e.g., ‘freedom, democracy’ and contrast it with the ‘evil’ actions attributed to Saddam Hussein’s regime. The differences between ‘us’ the ‘coalition of the willing’ and ‘them’ Saddam Hussein’s regime according to Bush are obvious, we are ‘Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the violent’, whereas, Saddam Hussein and others are ‘murderous dictators’.

Third, the way President Bush’s address was constructed aimed at generating public support in Iraq which would welcome the invasion. To achieve this end Bush employed ‘sympathetic approaches’ that aimed at targeting the hearts and minds of Iraqi people; such approaches can be found in these illustrations ‘no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms’. Also, Bush employed the frame ‘nation is a person’ in his speech. Saddam Hussein’s regime was responsible of all evil acts that occurred inside or outside Iraq, and thus Iraq was an aggressive nation. In this case Saddam was our enemy and we should defeat and contain him. According to Van Dijk (2003) ‘the nation is a person’ metaphor ‘is pervasive, powerful, and part of an elaborate metaphor system’, which emphasizes the differences between ‘friendly nations, hostile nations, rogue states’.
One day after President Bush’s speech in which he gave Saddam Hussein and his sons forty eight hours to leave Iraq, the Los Angeles Times (2003) published an extensive report by Paul Salopek entitled ‘fearing Iraq, Kurds begin mass exodus: chemical attack haunts memories; youth celebrate’. In this report Salopek reflected Bush’s assertions on Iraq’s previous human rights violations; he also indicated that freeing Iraq would bring peace and democracy in Kurdish territories. In doing so, Salopek aimed at reminding the reader of Saddam Hussein’s previous WMD’s attacks upon Kurds, and argued that the U.S invasion of Iraq would be based on humanitarian intervention. He further highlighted the fear among the Kurds in case the U.S and allies launch their attack against Iraq:

‘Fearful of a chemical or biological attack by a cornered Iraqi regime, thousands of frightened Kurds squeezed into cars, buses and taxi to flee their homes for safety of the countryside as Kurdish leaders praised Bush’s decision to abandon diplomatic wrangling at the United Nations. Iraq’s 5 million ethnic Kurds have been the victims of decades of repression by Iraq’s central government, including brutal chemical weapons attacks ordered by Hussein that killed thousands of civilians. After centuries of wars to maintain their independence, the toppling of Hussein would mean the surrender of the closest thing Kurds have ever had to an independent state. Iraq’s Kurdish factions have agreed to rejoin a democratic Iraq after any U.S.-led invasion’ (Los Angeles Times, 18-3-2003) (Emphasis added).

In this report the message is clear, it firstly aimed at emphasizing Saddam Hussein’s evil actions against the Kurds ‘Fearful of a chemical or biological attack by a cornered Iraqi regime’, and secondly it highlighted the urgent need for U.S humanitarian intervention in Iraq. To support his claims of the U.S humanitarian intentions, the reporter presented various premises to deliver his assertion; such premises can be seen in ‘Kurdish leaders praised Bush’s decision to abandon diplomatic wrangling at the United Nations, the victims of decades of repression, including brutal chemical weapons attacks ordered by Hussein that killed thousands of civilians, agreed to rejoin a democratic Iraq after any U.S.-led invasion’. In another words it can be argued that the reporter highlighted the Iraqi human rights violations against Kurdish
people, and that the Iraq invasion was needed to protect innocent people from the rogue state.

In addition, the reporter made use of the ‘politics is business’ metaphor which is crucially related to ‘war is politics persuaded by other means’ metaphor. In both these metaphors diplomatic processes are considered important elements in international reasoning. Here the reporter highlighted that the U.S diplomatic rational efforts have been abandoned by the U.S administration because the U.N.S.C. never approved the attacks upon Iraq to disarm it and protect innocent people. Accordingly, invasion was considered as a last resort for the U.S and allies to protect Iraqi people.

In most of Blair’s speeches and statements the discourse of the need for humanitarian intervention in Iraq was clear. Blair, on different occasions dating back to 1999, when he first announced his humanitarian intervention doctrine, highlighted the urgent need to overthrow the Iraqi regime relying on human rights violations. Although, the main justifications presented by the U.K to invade Iraq were links to al Qaeda and WMD’s issues, however, it became evident to Blair that those two rationales lacked some credibility. Hence, one day before the military operations in Iraq launched, Blair argued before House of Commons the need to overthrow the Iraqi regime on human rights violations bases. He further stressed that:

‘We can look back and say: there's the time; that was the moment; for example, when Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by the Nazis - that’s when we should have acted (...) naturally should Hitler appear again in the same form, we would know what to do. (...) let the future government of Iraq be given the chance to begin the process of uniting the nation's disparate groups, on a democratic basis, respecting human rights (...)today it is impoverished, 60% of its population dependent on food aid. Thousands of children die needlessly every year from lack of food and medicine. Four million people out of a population of just over 20 million are in exile. The brutality of the repression - the death and torture camps, the barbaric prisons for political opponents, the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty are well documented (...)the Iraqi people, whose only true hope of liberation lies in the removal of Saddam’ (Blair, 18-3-2003) (Emphasis added).
Blair in his speech employed different analogical fallacies between Saddam Hussein and Hitler. Misleading metaphors are connected to fallacies of false analogy; if we say for instance X is like Y, Y was treated in such a fashion, so we should treat X in the same way; we have a logical argument (Head and Mann, 2009). But if X is really not like Y in important and relevant respects then it does not necessarily follow, that it should be treated in the same way (ibid). In this scenario, the analogical device of Saddam as Hitler/ Iraq as Hitler’s Germany is fallacious. Blair explicitly compares Saddam’s aggression upon his own people and neighboring countries with those of Hitler and Nazis when ‘Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by the Nazis’. At that stage Germany was massively armed, militarized and well embarked upon a large scale of imperial conquest, quite unlike Iraq’s situation.

Blair also presented various premises to support his claims, e.g., ‘60% of its population dependent on food aid; thousands of children die needlessly every year from lack of food and medicine; Four million people out of a population of just over 20 million are in exile; The brutality of the repression - the death and torture camps; the barbaric prisons for political opponents; the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty are well documented’. In doing so he aimed at giving greater credibility to his claims of the need to achieve ‘liberation’ through ‘the removal of Saddam’. After regime change in Iraq, the new Iraqi government would have the chance to start the ‘process of uniting the nation’s disparate groups, on a democratic basis, respecting human rights’. The previous examination of Blair’s rhetoric shows the extensive use of language to legitimate the invasion of Iraq relying on human rights violations records of the regime. Blair argued that after achieving liberation, the Iraqi people would notice the positive outcomes of the intervention.

Blair’s speech highlighted ideological bifurcations between Saddam Hussein’s regime and western countries. Although Blair never mentioned it explicitly, however, the lexical bifurcation can be seen in Blair’s speech. Blair highlighted the Iraqi regime’s bad actions: (a) they ‘torture’ their own people in camps without fare prosecution; and (b) they have ‘barbaric prisons’ for political opponents. However, our fundamental values are ‘democracy’, ‘freedom of
speech’, ‘fair prosecution’ and ‘respecting human rights’, therefore, ‘they’ are a threat to us all. According to these ideological differences a regime change is a ‘just action’ given that the harmful aggression towards its own people.

In its efforts to present the morality of the Iraq invasion, the BBC highlighted in its reports and programs the human rights violations in Iraq, and also supported Blair’s views of the need to intervene relying on violations committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. The BBC in its ‘Viewpoint’ program (2003) entitled ‘moral march to war’, interviewed Professor Gwyn Prins of the London School of Economics, who contributed comments on Iraq invasion. In the interview Prins (BBC, 2003) asserted that ‘a war to remove Saddam Hussein from power would be a morally just one’. He further argued that ‘the changing of Saddam’s regime is a legal and moral duty - one that should be honoured by anyone who believes in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. In his extensive comments on whether or not the Iraq invasion would be legal if the notion of just cause exists, Prins indicated that Saddam Hussein’s:

‘Barbarous and genocidal behaviour towards his own people - the Iraqi Kurds poison-gassed at Halabja in 1988 and the Marsh Arabs later - gives the jus ad bellum [just cause - the conditions under which the use of military force is justified]. And this duty is properly mandated. It is in the Genocide Convention and in previous United Nation resolutions regarding the suffering Saddam inflicted on his citizens (...) much of the criticism of the use of force in Iraq that was heard from the "old" Labour back benches at Prime Minister’s Questions, is, I think, actually a cover for people who really want to say that much as they may dislike Saddam Hussein, they hate Tony Blair more, or that they really think that the US is the greater threat to their view of the world. Such people give Saddam Hussein all the benefit of the doubt, and none to the democratic restraints upon any US president. Mr Bush cannot act without a formal mandate from Congress; and he has it. The prime minister was right to ignore them’ (BBC, 12-2-2003) (Emphasis added).

In this interview, the BBC relied upon a very reliable and reputed expert to comment on the legality of the use of force in cases of human rights violations. In doing so, the BBC aimed at informing the public that any actions against Iraq were considered to be just. Prins in presenting his argument aimed at supporting his conclusion which indicated that any invasion of Iraq would be legal in international law. Prins offered premises to support his argument of
just cause ‘use of military force is justified’. An illustration of such premises can be seen in ‘Barbarous and genocidal behaviour towards his own people, the suffering Saddam inflicted on his citizens’. Also, the employment of fallacies is evident in Prins statements. Prins relied upon fallacies to highlights the Iraqi regime crimes against civilians, and the urgent need to conduct humanitarian intervention. Prins argued against those who opposed the invasion of Iraq. Prins relied on just cause approach to strengthen his claims ‘use of military force is justified’. In doing so, Prins aimed at attacking the opponent’s arguments of the illegality of the Iraq invasion and refuted their claims through presenting counter arguments which indicated that the Iraq invasion was just. Further, he indicated that their arguments were groundless because they were merely grounded on hatred of both Tony Blair and the U.S dominance in the world, and that explains why they oppose the Iraq invasion.


On 19th of March, 2003, the U.S and allies started their ‘Coalition of the Willing’ operation to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. As we discussed earlier in section three of this chapter, the U.S and the U.K in order to invade Iraq presented mainly three arguments, the first: Iraq’s links with al Qaeda, Iraq’s alleged WMD’s and thirdly Iraq’s human rights violations. Section three of the chapter argued that human rights violations rationale was employed to back the claims of Iraq links with Bin Laden and Iraq’s WMD’s, however,

It has been demonstrated that both the U.S and the U.K presented this rationale to cover up their false accusations of links and WMD’s issues once the operation Iraq freedom starts. The examination of Phase three of the invasion shows that there is no link between Saddam and al Qaeda; it also shows that no WMD’s were found. This section examines media management during the invasion, and how journalists and reporters were censored. It evaluates how the mainstream mass media in the U.S and the U.K covered the invasion, and how the patriotic feelings shaped most of the media’s presentations.
To better understand the U.S Government’s decision to embed reporters and journalists within military units to report on frontline military actions, an examination of the U.S Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Release, Indemnification, and Hold Harmless document, would help to cast some light on how the media was censored and managed. In this agreement between the DoD and reporters, the reporters agreed upon DoD conditions to participate in the embedding with U.S and allies troops (DoD, 2003). The Release, Indemnification, and Hold Harmless Agreement indicated the U.S government acted by and through the DoD, believes that it is mutually:

‘Beneficial to both the Government and news media organizations (“media organizations”) to place selected news media organization employees (“media employees”) with selected military units (“military units”) for the purpose of providing news media coverage before, during, and after military operations. The placement of media employees with military units is referred to in this Agreement as “embedding” or the “embedding process” and will require media employees to live, travel, eat, sleep, and conduct all professional and personal activities with the military unit to which the media employees are embedded.’ (DoD, 2003).

In this agreement media employees agreed on:

- Participating in the embedding process and following directions and orders from DoD personnel;
- Following the DoD regulations; and
- Failure to follow any direction, order, regulation or ground rule may result in the termination of the media employee’s participation in the embedding process (DoD, 2003).

The total number of journalists who agreed to be embedded with the U.S and allies military units were almost 600, nearly 500 of them were American, and 100 from other nationalities. Those 600 embedded reporters, journalists and photographers agreed upon these publication restrictions:

- No information of ongoing engagements will be released unless authorized by an on-scene Commander; previous information in regards to previous engagements and results to be released only if described in general terms and conditions of the DoD agreement;
- Reports that give specific information on friendly forces movements and deployments are strictly prohibited;
- Journalists (including photographers and camera crew) are assigned to a specific unit and obligated to stay at the same unit unless permitted by DoD to leave;
- No private transportation or firearms; and
- Interviews with military personnel must be indicated on the army record (DoD, 2003).

It can be argued that the embedding system to a large extent, limited the freedom of journalists to truly present facts and reliable information to the public. Reading the agreement between the reporters and the DoD indicates that reporters were to be extensively censored. They were prohibited from releasing their reports and coverage of the actual engagements and developments, unless authorized by an on-scene commander who would decide whether or not the reports would be released to the public. Hence, it is obvious that the U.S was determined to eliminate independent reporting of the Iraq invasion and the U.S adopted unprecedented lengths (embedding) to ensure that its propaganda and spin dominated media agendas. On the whole, the U.S Government’s embedding system can be described as the mechanism the administration used in order to censor the media’s perceptions of the Iraq invasion. A solid argument that supports the claim that embedding the journalists with military units may lead to bias in their presentations can be seen in this one argument ‘a reporter knows the troops he or she covers can lead to bias. Embedded journalists are dependent on troops for food, transportation, and physical protection’ (Haigh et al, 2006).

The US Government had learned valuable propaganda lessons from preceding conflicts, including Vietnam, and the Gulf War 1. The U.S Government was convinced that to allow propaganda to function perfectly in times of conflict, media control was a crucial factor in winning wars.
On March 19th, 2003, President Bush announced the military operations against Iraq ‘On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war. These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign’ (Bush, 2003). Here, the metaphor of the ‘ruler is the state’ is reinforced to indicate that dictators such as Saddam are our enemies that we should fight. Also, the ‘politics is war’ metaphor is evident in Bush’s address; the opponent here is Saddam the ‘ruler’ and thus this war is waged to ‘overthrow’ the regime. Therefore, this power struggle indicates that an actual physical action is to be carried out to end this struggle. Related to this metaphor is the ‘progress is forward movement’ metaphor in which military actions play an important role in defeating the enemy (Saddam) and thus we are ‘going forward’ to demolish the ruler. Bush, in his announcement of the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime, emphasized that the Americans and the world are confident of the U.S army’s capability to achieve a fast victory. He further warned the U.S army of possible Iraqi usage of WMD’s and stressed that the U.S and allies aimed at establishing a new Iraq:

‘The enemies you confront will come to know your skill and bravery. The people you liberate will witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this conflict, America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality. Saddam Hussein has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, women and children as shields for his own military; a final atrocity against his people (...) and helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country will require our sustained commitment. We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people’ (Bush 2003b) (Emphasis added).

In most of President Bush’s speeches and statements regarding Iraq, the employment of well-written rhetoric that aimed at demonising the enemy is evident by alluding to the so-called fundamental values differences between the U.S and those of the evil and corrupt actions of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime. In his announcement of the war against Saddam, President Bush indicated various ideological dissimilarities between the U.S and Saddam
regime. According to Bush this regime ‘has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality, has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas’, whereas the U.S army will show ‘the honorable and decent spirit of the American military’. The message is clear; they disrespect ‘conventions of war’, whereas we ‘respect international law’. Another illustration in Bush’s reference that: our army is ‘skilled and brave’; their army is ‘unskilled and coward’, and thus we will liberate Iraq before the regime commits its last massacre against its own people. This ideological bifurcation also reinforces the metaphor of ‘good is up/bad is down’. Accordingly, Saddam’s brutal regime ‘which is characterised as having low moral values’ will go down, whereas our high moral values would be reinforced through victory.

President Bush also employed a sympathetic approach to convince both the Iraqi people and the international community of the basis of the U.S invasion of Iraq relying on Iraq human rights violations. After liberating Iraq, the people would achieve a united, stable and free country. Bush also asserted that the U.S would come to Iraq with great values that would respect citizens, religious faith and Iraq’s great civilization, in doing so he could assure the Iraqi people that there was no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control. In addition, Bush highlights that the U.S troops are honourable with decent spirit who would respect international conventions of war and rules of morality, whereas the Iraqi troops are immoral and disrespectful of rules of war. Since the premise presented by Bush is false it can be argued that Bush’s argument is invalid and unsound, because Bush preferred the actions conducted by U.S troops in comparison to Iraqi forces’ actions.

In this scenario, the mainstream mass media started to function motivated and influenced by President Bush’s discourse in regards to military operations in Iraq, and also under the restrictions of the embedding system. New York Times from day one of the conflict started Nation at War coverage of the combat in Iraq on its front page; it seems as if the war was merely between the U.S and Iraq. One day after the invasion started the New York Times published a report entitled TROOPS; G.I.’s and Marines See Little Iraqi Resistance in it’s a Nation at War front page. The report indicated big damage to Iraqi troops:
Now, not far inside Iraq, the destruction from the new war is already apparent (...) American soldiers gathered the dead, placing the bodies in black bags and leaving them beside the road before moving on. They also collected the dead soldiers’ belongings, one officer said, so that word could be passed to their families (...) there were no immediate reports of any American casualties along the desert frontier, producing a swelling of relief and jubilation at the point of farthest advance early today (...) the First Marine Division moved some 20,000 troops north overnight in a large convoy. As they set up their base today, the marines repeatedly responded to shouts of "gas-gas-gas" by putting on their masks. At one point, they went to a Stage 4 alert, which meant dressing in full chemical weapons uniform -- masks, clothing, boots and gloves -- in considerable haste’ (New York Times 20-03-2003) (Emphasis added).

This report reflects President Bush’s discourse of the morality of the U.S troops. Highlighting those morals indicates employment of the conceptual metaphor of ‘good is up/bad is down’. In his case, the U.S troops are fighting with considerations of high moral values (they are honorable) which respect international conventions and rules of war, whereas, Saddam and his troops are immoral and disrespectful of rules of war. This is seen in the ‘American soldiers gathered the dead, placing the bodies in black bags and leaving them beside the road before moving on. They also collected the dead soldiers’ belongings, one officer said, so that word could be passed to their families’. This ‘good is up/bad is down’ metaphor is crucially connected to ideological bifurcation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy. The U.S troops were advanced in their accomplishments because they are ‘skilled’ and ‘brave’ contrary to Iraqi soldiers. This explains why there were ‘no immediate reports of any American casualties along the desert frontier’. The report highlighted the issue of Iraq’s possible nerve gas and chemical weapons attacks, even though Iraq never used any chemical, biological weapons during military actions, New York Times through highlighting Iraq’s WMD’s aimed at generating more support among the Americans to the U.S administration’s decision to invade Iraq.

To a large extent, it can be demonstrated that the path the New York Times adopted was in favor of the U.S decision to launch attacks upon the Iraqi regime and the military operations in Iraq. This explains the impact of the embedding system upon their creditability and neutrality. An extensive
research conducted on the military operations coverage of *The New York Times* by the researcher of this thesis, shows that the pattern of *The New York Times* coverage never challenged the U.S military attacks against Iraq, during the period after the invasion or even during the invasion itself when it had been shown without doubt that Iraq’s WMD’s were an illusion that had been fabricated through the U.S administration. However the *New York Times* and some other U.S mainstream mass media kept coming back to the issue of Iraq’s WMD’s.

The media made much of the alleged capture of a female US soldier, Private Jessica Lynch. Saving Private Lynch became a major front page story in the U.S mainstream mass media. The *New York Times* repeatedly highlighted the bravery of U.S troops on its front pages in the run up to Lynch’s capture and after saving her, in doing so it aimed at emphasizing patriotic emotions among the U.S public which would generate more support to the U.S decision. Her capture was an ideal chance for *The New York Times* to employ the tactic of the captivity narrative in which reports and news highlighted the story on a national scale. Consider for instance this opinion piece entitled *Saving Private Lynch* published April the 6th, 2003, in *New York Times*:

‘The rescue of Pfc. Jessica Lynch by American Special Forces from an Iraqi hospital near Nasiriya was an impressive feat of planning, bravery and luck (...) god would protect a worthy nation as he saved his innocent daughters (...) not just because our president told us that we would save Iraq and ourselves, but because for more than two centuries our culture has made the liberation of captives into a trope for American righteousness’ ( *New York Times* 06-04-2003) (Emphasis added).

It seems that the *New York Times* in all of its coverage of this phase of the war was adopting Bush’s discourse in regards to highlighting the issue of how brave the U.S soldiers were in comparison with the enemies. In this report, the writer emphasized that the U.S army was ‘brave’ with excellent planning’, whereas the Iraqi army ‘lack both good planning and bravery’. It is an ideological message to the U.S public: *we* are ‘strong’ they are ‘weak’, and thus we will win the war. Another illustration of showing ideological dissimilarities is evident in this ‘god would protect a worthy nation as he saved his innocent daughters’. Here the writer aimed at emphasizing the issue of the goodness of the democratic system and the badness of dictatorial regimes, *‘we’* as a
democratic society are a worthy nation, whereas ‘they’ the nondemocratic societies are unworthy, and also they are criminals, we are innocents. It also indicates ‘false dichotomy’ fallacy; our innocent Christian soldiers are protected by God, whereas, their soldiers are not. We are therefore the good against the evil. Also ‘false dichotomy’ is evident in ‘not just because our president told us that we would save Iraq and ourselves’. This sentence indicates that Bush was considered to be a protective father who cares about his own children. Whereas, Saddam and his regime do not act the same way in regards to Iraqi troops.

Lakoff’s ‘strict father’ model of moral authority, ‘with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set overall family policy’ (Lakoff 1996) is apparent in this report. This is evident in the report’s reference to the president ‘saving’ both ‘Iraq and ourselves’. Bush is the president whom we should admire. He is acting as a father who knows what is good and what is bad for his own children. As a father Bush decided to invade Iraq because Saddam Hussein’s regime is aggressive toward his own people, the U.S and the rest of the world. Therefore, we should support the President’s decision to invade Iraq. Relating to the previous argument, the writer stressed that the U.S for a long period of time saved captive people and showed them the true meaning of morality and justice. Again this is an ‘appeals to the people’ fallacy that indicates that the U.S policies should be respected, honored and admired.

A content analysis study of the front pages of the The New York Times coverage of the Iraq invasion between March the 1st and April the 15th, 2003, conducted by Ahmed (2008), showed that The New York Times relied more on official sources than upon its own embedded journalists. It quoted official sources 320 times (60.7%), Iraqi sources 36 times (6.8%), Staff/Bureau 164 times (31.1%), Wire sources 2 times (.4%) and Others 5 times (1%). Ahmed’s qualitative analysis showed that The New York Times depended upon official sources in its war coverage; Ahmed (2003) asserted that ‘The New York Times coverage was dominated by the government on this issue.’
The study highlighted that *The New York Times* support to the U.S government decision to invade Iraq was ‘enthusiastic, clear, focused and patriotic in nature’. To support this claim, Ahmed (2003) argued that the content media coverage analysis conducted during the given period of time showed without doubt some important findings regarding *The New York Times* coverage: (a) the paper focused on those parts of statements that reflected the U.S. military dominance; (b) It stressed the need to protect the U.S. national interests in the Middle East region, and (c) The New York Times ideology/policy interaction was consistent with the U.S. government to invade Iraq to restore democracy and to establish a stronghold in the Middle East to support U.S. allies in the region (Ahmed 2008).

Furthermore, the study showed that while there were, during this phase, massive and ongoing anti-war protests in various countries, including the UK and Australia, only 25% of *The New York Times* column news stories covered Anti-War protests. ‘The quantitative finding revealed that *The New York Times* published 168 news stories about the war while one story appeared on the front page focused on anti-war protests’. Ahmed (2008) emphasized that:

‘The qualitative analysis revealed that The New York Times marginalized the coverage of the news related to anti-war protests. Further, news stories related to civilian casualties in Iraq were also marginalized. Whereas the news and the sources quoted in the news stories related to the U.S. efforts to convince world community regarding Saddam’s weapon of mass-destruction (WDM), including chemical and biological weapons, Saddam as a brutal military dictator and this war being for the liberation of the Iraqi people not for the U.S. strategic and economic interests in the region etc., were over emphasized. This was a deliberate effort to convince the American public and to provide justification to invade Iraq’ (Ahmed 2008:50).

It can be demonstrated that the findings of this study strengthened and supported the approach the thesis adopted to explain the way in which mainstream mass media in the U.S functions to support the administration’s point of view. It is evident thus that *The New York Times* functioned to marginalize the opposition (Anti-war voices) and also treated the victims of other states as to be unworthy (Iraqi causalities). In chapter two of the thesis I examined Herman and Chomsky’s The Propaganda Model (1988) in which they
maintained that the U.S media regularly asserted their independence from
government and other institutions in the community, but in reality it functions
virtually as an extension of state propaganda (p. 1). Furthermore, the media
tended to “marginalize dissent and allow the government and dominant
private interests to get their messages across to the public” in ways that
promoted elite hegemony and suppressed opposition to the U.S. foreign policy
(quoted in Ahmed 2003).

The model introduces five interactive and symbiotic filters through which
media messages have to pass (Ahmed: 2008). Those five filters are both
structural and ideological in their presentations. Herman and Chomsky
(1988:3) indicated five filters that explain how the media in the U.S functions ,
those filters are: (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and
profit orientation of dominant mass media firms; (2) dependence on
advertising revenue; (3) media reliance on information sources employed,
funded or sanctioned by government and business; (4) flack which indicates
the pressure campaigns typically orchestrated by the government,
corporations, and right wing think tanks seeking to discipline the media for
perceived transgressions; and finally (5) anticommunism as a national religion
and control mechanism.

Once the filters start to operate, the outcome would marginalize the
opposition; this is achieved through understanding of which victims are to be
considered worthy or unworthy. Herman and Chomsky (2000: .xix) compared
media treatment of victims of enemy states and those of United States and
U.S. client states and emphasized that ‘the victims of enemy states will be
found worthy and will be subject to more intense and indignant coverage than
those victimized by the United States or its clients states who are implicitly
unworthy.

The U.S mainstream mass media covered the Iraq invasion in a way that
reflected President Bush’s views of the way the war should be covered. Its
coverage also reflected the embedding system created to censor and limit
media’s neutrality in presenting facts and trustworthy information related to
the invasion. By contrast, Murdoch’s Fox News covered the invasion in a way
that reflected Murdoch’s vision of how the invasion should be covered, as he strongly and unquestionably supported regime change in Iraq.

On 2003, six weeks before the Iraq invasion Rupert Murdoch asserted that ‘we can’t back down now where you hand over the whole Middle East to Saddam ...I think Bush is acting very morally, very correctly...the greatest thing to come of this to the world economy, if you could put it this way, would be US$20 a barrel for oil’ (quoted in McKnight, 2012). It can be argued that Fox News was one of the prominent broadcasting agencies that gave extensive and uncritically supportive coverage of the Iraq war. During the invasion Fox News in its live war coverage displayed an on-screen waving flag animation in the upper left corner with a headline ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ along the bottom.

Murdoch supported the Iraq invasion before it even started; there was extensive daily coverage a year before the war started that aimed at supporting President Bush’s decision. According to McKnight (2012) Fox News ‘had been drumming up support for the war for over a year, later adopting the US government slogan Operation Iraqi Freedom as its own’, McKnight further reveals Murdoch’s ambitions of overthrowing the Iraqi regime:

‘Murdoch’s global news media outlets had been cheerleaders for the war ever since Iraq had surfaced as an opportune target of choice following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. In each of the three countries forming the key military allies for the Iraq invasion, the United States, Britain and Australia, News Corporation outlets were vital to mobilizing public support for their leaders. This was a happy coincidence for George W. Bush, Tony Blair and the Australian conservative Prime Minister John Howard. No coincidence at all was the uniformity of News Corporation’s media outlets support for the war. Murdoch has never reflected publicly on whether he was wrong on Iraq, even though the reasons for the war, faithfully amplified by his news media, collapsed within a few months of the invasion’ (McKnight 2012:189).
Media Monitor (2003) conducted a study to reveal the tone and amount of media coverage of the Iraq invasion from 19th of March, 2003 until 14th of April, 2003. The study compared and examined the coverage of all of these broadcasting outlets (ABC, CBS, NBC, Broadcast Network Average, and Fox). Table (1) below shows the program, the number of stories covering the conflict and air time for each broadcast outlet for the period from 19th March-14th April, 2003.

Table 1: Based on amount of airtime devoted to Iraq War on network evening news shows from March 20 to April 14, 2003. Note: FOX figures based on hour-long newscast. Other figures based on one-half hour programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BROADCAST OUTLET</th>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>HOURS OF AIRTIME DURING THE PERIOD</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOX</td>
<td>SPECIAL REPORT</td>
<td>14 HOURS, 39 MINUTES</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROADCAST NETWORK AVERAGE</td>
<td>VARIOUS PROGRAMS</td>
<td>7 HOURS, 17 MINUTES</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>NIGHTLY NEWS</td>
<td>8 HOURS, 33 MINUTES</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>EVENING NEWS</td>
<td>6 HOURS, 11 MINUTES</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>WORLD NEWS TONIGHT</td>
<td>7 HOURS, 7 MINUTES</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1 shows the amount of air time devoted to the Iraq invasion in Fox News and some other broadcasting outlets; Fox News devoted its special report program to cover almost 328 stories related to the Iraq invasion, and invested 14 hours and 39 minutes of its airtime on issues related to military actions and Iraq invasion development. It can be argued that the amount of airtime and the number of stories, present clear evidence that the Iraq invasion was an important issue for Fox News, it also indicates that Fox News aimed at gathering more support for the Bush administration’s war against the Saddam Hussein regime. This coverage can be considered crucial evidence that strengthens Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model.
During the invasion, most of mainstream mass media in both the U.S and the U.K continued to assert the existence of Iraqi WMD’s; also, the mainstream mass media ignored casualties among allies’ troops and Iraqi civilians, and neglected anti-war voices. In addition, mainstream mass media highlighted the superiority of the U.S and allies troops in battle fields in comparison with the Iraqi army. In his examination of the U.S media role in presenting justifications for the Iraq invasion, Andrew Calabrese (2005) indicates that during the Iraq invasion, mainstream mass media in the U.S unquestionably adopted the President views of the way in which the war should be reported, he further asserted that:

‘By uncritically following Bush to war, the networks tailored their respective brand identities to complement the White House strategy for “brand America.”’ In the process, they predictably avoided presenting any sustained challenges to the Bush administration’s failure to produce credible evidence of WMDs or links between the government of Iraq and al Qaeda. Moreover, the mainstream U.S. media neglected to give American citizens an adequate picture of the scale of the antiwar movement at home or abroad. Whether or not the United States fits a technical description of an imperial power, the mainstream media consistently obscure from the view of the American people the reasons that increasingly much of the rest of the world sees America as a less than benevolent empire.’(ibid).

Although mainstream mass media in its reporting of the war against Iraq hardly mentioned the existence of the links between Saddam and al Qaeda, Iraq’s possible WMD’s were highlighted during the attacks. On March 23rd, Fox News posted a headline on its screen that indicated ‘huge chemical weapons factory found in south Iraq(...) reports: Iraqi surrender at chemical weapons plant (…) Coalition troops holding Iraqi in charge of chemical weapons’( Fox News, 2003 quoted in FAIR).The same day ABC’s News reporter John McWethy reported Iraq’s WMD’s in the same way Fox News did; McWethy indicated that ‘one important new discovery: U.S. officials say, up the road from Nasarijah, in a town called Najaf, they believe that they have captured a chemical weapons plant and perhaps more important, the commanding general of that facility. One U.S. official said he is a potential “gold mine” about the weapons Saddam Hussein says he doesn’t have.’(ABC News, 2003 quoted in FAIR). Tom Brokaw, the NBC News reporter described the capture of the WMD’s plant thusly ‘
Word tonight that U.S. forces may have found what U.N. inspectors spent months searching for, a facility suspected to be a chemical weapons plant, uncovered by ground troops on the way north to Baghdad’ (NBC News, 2003 quoted in FAIR). NBC Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski presented a detailed coverage of the Iraqi WMD’s plant:

“This huge chemical complex (...) was constructed of sand-casted walls, in other words, meant to camouflage its appearance to blend in with the desert. Once inside, the soldiers found huge amounts of chemicals, stored chemicals. They apparently found no chemical weapons themselves, and now military officials here at the Pentagon say they have yet to determine exactly what these chemicals are or how they could have been used in weapons’ (ibid).

After examining these reports it seems that Fox News led media outlets in giving great emphasize on Iraq’s WMD’s capability, ABC’s News considered the capturing of the commander of that facility as a ‘potential “gold mine” about the weapons Saddam Hussein’. In this sentence it’s evident that news media outlets wanted to find any potential possibility of Iraq’s WMD’s; they aimed at satisfying the public accurately with its news information. One day after the news of Iraq’s possible WMD’s facility existence, the Pentagon issued an update regarding chemical weapon plant found; it announced that the site contains no chemical weapons and had been abandoned a while ago. In response the Fox News correspondent In Qatar quietly issued an update to the chemical weapons story ‘chemical weapons facility discovered by coalition forces did not appear to be an active chemical weapons facility’ (Fox News, 2003 quoted in FAIR). It can be argued that Fox News and other media outlets failed to examine whether or not official sources were reliable in presenting facts in regards to Iraq’s chemical plant. It should have questioned and evaluated the issue before informing the public instead of declaring the following day that there were no chemical weapons found.

In regards to the U.K mainstream mass media role during the Iraq invasion 2003, an extensive study conducted by Gunter (2009) entitled The Public and Media Coverage of the War on Iraq indicated that the U.K mainstream mass media provided extensive coverage of the war on Iraq. Reports and pictures
from Iraq were published on the front pages of newspapers for weeks and broadcasts were dominated by news bulletins, many of which produced extended editions. According to Gunter (2009) in the run-up to the war, the news media adopted a variety of stances on whether the war was just or not. However, during the war itself, the tone of coverage shifted to some extent towards a more supportive tone, but this was often restricted to reporting of the actions of the military in Iraq. However, a number of U.K news outlets continued to challenge the justifications of the war. Despite conflict within the reporting on whether or not to support the war, news sources were dominated by coalition spokespersons while the voices of Iraq were seldom heard (Robinson et al. 2005 quoted in Gunter, 2009).

The U.K public’s attention was captured with levels of news consumption increasing by significant margins. Despite the increased range of news services available to the public, many British turned most of all to tried and trusted brands. Therefore, the BBC’s coverage of the war attracted more attention from news viewers than that of any other television station. Despite the overall dominance of the BBC’s position in the U.K in reporting the Iraq war naturally, a significant minority, in the survey conducted of news consumers, felt that it had been favorably disposed towards the UK and US governments and the pro-war lobby (Gunter, 2009). Gunter (2009) further indicates that:

‘What became clear from research with the public was that they wanted to be confronted with the realities of the war, though accepted that some control over television reporting is necessary to safeguard vulnerable younger viewers and to take into account the possibility that the families of the serving armed forces might be watching. There was recognition also that news reporting from the war might need to be controlled to avoid disclosing military secrets to the enemy’.

The study highlighted that although most viewers held positive opinions about the effectiveness of embedding of reporting, the study results showed that ‘such reporting did not stray becoming into excessively dramatic representations of events and that celebrity-status journalists on the front line did not overwhelm the story with their personalities. The story should be about
the war and not about the adventures of embedded journalists on the front line’ (ibid: 59).

Gunter (2009) highlighted the last result of the study which questioned the objectivity and independence of the embedded journalists. He asserted that:

‘A further concern with embedded journalists was whether they could retain their independence and objectivity while working in such close quarters with the military. Shared, life endangering experiences could result in special bonds developing between journalists and armed forces personnel that could undermine the ability of journalists to report objectively on the actions of people who had become close companions. Research among journalists indicated that they were cognizant of the vulnerability of being embedded in the context of their reporting objectivity, and strove to retain the highest principles of journalistic integrity. Nonetheless, once embedded, they were dependent largely on local military sources of information that represented an inherent source bias For most of the public’(ibid: 59).

Another study entitled Reporting Dissent in Wartime : British Press, the Anti-War Movement and the 2003 Iraq war was conducted by Murray et al., (2008) to reveal the tone of Anti-war protest coverage in the U.K print mainstream media. The study examined seven elite British newspaper’s (the Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, the Independent, the Guardian, the Times and the Daily Telegraph) coverage of the Iraq war; the number of the war stories was 4449. The study revealed that despite the relatively high level of public disapproval of the war in the U.K, the study found that anti-war protest activities did not feature very prominently in the news agenda of the U.K press during the invasion period. Murray et al., (2008: 14) indicate that the anti-war activity was given a principal or main emphasis in only 271 stories (or 6.1 percent) of a sample of 4449 stories, protest was covered more often than areas such as humanitarian issues (5.0 percent) and the law and order situation in Iraq (4.8 percent) and Iraq WMD’s ( 4 percent), but less frequently than other key subjects such as casualties (13.3 percent), reconstruction (7.5 percent), diplomacy (11.8 percent) and, most prominently, battle/strategy (43.8 percent). Murray et al., (2008) further conclude that:
‘Not only did press attention decline, it also became increasingly unsympathetic. Critical treatment of two anti-war politicians, Cook and Galloway, who voiced opposition several weeks into the conflict, highlights this shift (…) so, as the war started and elite dissensus gave way to a “support our boys” consensus, the “sphere of legitimate controversy” narrowed, thereby relegating the anti-war (…) interestingly, it was the pro-war press that devoted most attention to the anti-war movement as the war progressed, often to challenge anti-war sentiment. By contrast, anti-war papers distanced themselves from anti-war activity’.

It is evident thus from these figures that the mainstream print mass media in the U.K highlighted and covered the issues of the battle progress in the Iraq invasion extensively, whereas, to a large extent marginalized anti-war voices coverage in the U.K in its presentations and also de-emphasized the major reason for the invasion which was disarm Iraq’s WMD’s and the need to question the Prime Minster WMD’s allegations to invade Iraq.

6.5 PHASE THREE (FROM THE FALL OF BAGHDAD UP UNTIL NOW)

On May the 1st, 2003, President Bush announced that the major operations in Iraq are ended, ‘major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country’ (Bush, 1-5-2003). President Bush further indicated that ‘we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world. Our nation and our coalition are proud of this accomplishment’ (ibid). In his remarks on major operations accomplished in Iraq, President Bush asserted repeatedly that the Iraqi freedom operation aimed at bringing liberation and democracy to the Iraqi people, without producing any evidence of whether the operation had located any WMD’s. Furthermore, President Bush failed to present any evidence of Iraqi links with al Qaeda ‘the liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We’ve removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more’ (ibid).
According to Mahajan (2003) the genuine joy that Iraqi people felt at the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime enabled the U.S administration to start claiming that the Iraq invasion was constructed in the first place to liberate the Iraqi people. Mahajan argues that although thousands of Iraqi soldiers and civilians were killed or injured by the war, the U.S administration had never found it difficult to argue that this was a ‘small price to pay for the fact that the Iraqi will in many ways be far better off with the end of Hussein and the lifting of U.S imposed sanctions’ (ibid: 12). The U.S administration found it easier to forget that Saddam Hussein’s regime had not used WMD’s against allied troops, therefore, the claims portrayed by the administration that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the U.S that had to be pre-empted were absurd (ibid:12). Mahajan (2003) further questioned the U.S false claims of Iraq’s WMD’s:

‘If, after all, Saddam Hussein’s regime was either unable or unwilling to use the dreaded WMD to save his own rule- the ultimate threat- what would be the circumstances in which he would use them? What possible threat to the world’s superpower is posed by a country unable to fly a single plane against an occupying force’ (ibid: 12).

In this section, I examine why the mainstream mass media in both the U.S and the U.K started to highlight the issues of why no WMD’s were found in Iraq and the fact that there were no links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. Surprisingly, the mainstream mass media shifted its role after the Iraq occupation was accomplished. Before the invasion the mainstream mass media were unquestionably supportive of the administration’s views of the need to disarm Saddam Hussein. However, after the invasion the mainstream mass media critically questioned the allegations to invade Iraq and also started to highlight human rights violations committed by U.S troops and allies.

Before the invasion of Iraq the issue of Iraq’s WMD’s was highlighted and demonstrated by both the administrations in the U.S and the U.K along with the mainstream mass media to legitimately authorize the administrations to invade Iraq on the grounds that Iraq became an imminent threat to the U.S, the U.K and to international peace and security. In the run up to invade Iraq there were repeated explicit claims by U.S administration and government
officials, not only that Iraq was in possession of huge quantities of chemical and biological weapons, in violation of UN resolutions, but that U.S intelligence agencies had pinpointed the precise locations where these weapons were stored, the identities of those involved in their production and even the military orders issued by Saddam Hussein for their use in case the U.S and allies invaded Iraq.

It is necessary to explain this tangible shift of the mainstream mass media from wholly supporting the Iraq invasion to critically question the U.S administration allegations and exposed human rights violations. The mainstream mass media to a large extent never questioned the rationales presented by the administration because there were high levels of predictions that the invasion of Iraq would truly uncover Iraq’s hidden WMD’s and also links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. However, after the invasion it became evident that it never had been the case that Saddam Hussein had been in possession of WMD’s. Accordingly, the mainstream mass media retreated from its original position of support so as to not lose its credibility among the public. Opinion polls suggest that in the face of reports of widespread disorder, looting and continued violence, in addition to concerns regarding U.S troop’s casualties in Iraq, the US public increasingly demanded immediate progress in securing Iraq. All these factors explain the shift of mainstream mass media presentations.

A study by Thrall & Patrick, (2007) indicated that President Bush was able to command media attention in supporting the administration views in regards to the Iraq invasion through applying news frames that would not challenge Bush’s determination to achieve regime change in Iraq. President Bush was successful in garnering support before the invasion by relying on the purported threat of Iraqi WMD and its supposed links to terrorism. However, Bush was not nearly so successful once Baghdad fell. It was evident that the pressure on the Bush administration began almost as soon as the U.S. military had toppled Baghdad (ibid). According to Thrall & Patrick (2007) the pressure upon the administration came in three forms: (a) public desire for visible progress toward eventual success in establishing security and order in Iraq after liberation (b) the administration failure to find any WMD’s , and (c) rising public concern over U.S troop’s casualties. Thrall & Patrick stressed that ‘all
three forms of pressure registered themselves in steadily dropping support for the war and for President Bush more generally’ (2007: 104).

After the U.S troops and allies captured the city of Baghdad, the chaos including the looting of the National Museum and widespread violence, led many U.S public to conclude that the administration had failed adequately to plan for the postwar occupation in Iraq (Diamond, 2004; Himes, 2005; Mathews, 2003 quoting in Thrall & Patrick, 2007). In their study Thrall & Patrick (2007) indicate that from May 2003 onward polls suggested that the public felt that the Iraq rebuilding was going less well than it should, that the U.S would likely be in Iraq for many years ahead, and that in the end of the reconstruction of Iraq the costs might well be too high. In October 2003, 76% said that they did not believe the Bush administration had clearly explained how long U.S. military forces would have to remain in Iraq, and 54% said they felt that Bush did not have a clear plan for Iraq (CBS News/New York Times, October 10–11, 2003; Pew, October 21, 2003 quoted in Thrall & Patrick, 2007), public perceptions of progress decreased in the wake of the invasion and despite the capture of Saddam Hussein, 69% of Americans polled in December said that they believed it was somewhat or very likely that the U.S would stay in Iraq for a long time without success (Gallup, December 17–19, 2003 quoted in Thrall & Patrick, 2007).

The U.S administration failure to find any evidence of Iraqi WMD or even the remnants of a WMD program marked a serious challenge of President Bush’s credibility before the U.S public. The Bush administration’s central justification for taking unilateral action against Saddam Hussein was the imminent threat posed by potentially nuclear Iraqi weapons, by making such bold allegation on the basis of what in retrospect was clearly speculative intelligence; President Bush put his credibility and political future at risk. Although the U.S weapons inspection teams searched across Iraq in the weeks and months after the invasion in their efforts to locate any WMD, it became increasingly clear that Bush would not be able to discover any Iraqi WMD to maintain support for the war. According to Thrall & Patrick (2007) the central argument of President Bush to wage war against Iraq was in trouble in less than 45 days after the mission was accomplished. They also indicated that ‘the polls revealed the
political ramifications of this situation for Bush’. The percentage of people who were “certain” that Iraq was trying to develop (or had been trying to develop) weapons of mass destruction dropped from 56% in February just before the war to 37.5% by June and just 27% by January 2004 (Gallup, February 7–9, 2003; June 9–10, 2003; January 29, 2004–February 1, 2004 quoted in Thrall & Patrick, 2007).

The final and most important pressure that President Bush dealt with was the rising number of causalities among U.S troops. As casualties among U.S troop’s mounted over the summer and fall of 2003 reaching the total of 481 killed in action with no end in sight, so did the pressure on the Bush administration to justify these casualties to the U.S public. Polls in the U.S reflected the changing public view of casualties in Iraq; the number of Americans who felt that the number of U.S casualties was “unacceptable” grew from 28% during the invasion to 62% by early January 2004. This rise in concern continued despite the capture of Saddam Hussein in mid-December of 2003 (Thrall & Patrick, 2007).

The debate over the legality of the Iraq invasion was at its lowest levels in the U.S after the issue of no WMD’s being found after the invasion, however, in the U.K the debate regarding the illegality of the Iraq invasion, can be described as extensive and demandable because the U.K public started to highlight the issue of the public being misled by Blair. According to Ali (2003) although the capture of Iraq proved that there were no WMD’s found, however, the British Prime Minster and his Defence Secretary continued to assert WMD’s as a justifiable reason to invade Iraq. This provoked an astonishing response from former head of the joint intelligence Committee and a former National Security Adviser to Blair, Sir Rodric Braithwaite in a letter to the financial Times on July the 10th, 2003 which indicated that:

‘If the current row rumbles on, demands for a judicial inquiry into the government’s handling of intelligence on Iraq will doubtless grow. Meanwhile, there is little point in speculating on what an inquiry might turn up or its likely effects on the prime minister’s fortunes. But the campaign to win around a sceptical public was not conducted primarily on the basis of intelligence dossiers. In the first months of this year we were bombarded with warnings that British cities might at any moment face
a massive terrorists attack. Housewives were officially advised to lay in stocks of food and water. Tanks were sent to Heathrow airport. People were unwilling to go to war to uphold the authority of the United Nations, to overthrow an evil dictator in a distant country, or promote democracy throughout the Middle East. But in this atmosphere of near hysteria, they began to believe that Britain itself was under imminent threat and that we should get our blow in first. And so the prime minister managed — just — to swing parliament behind him’ (quoted in Ali, 2003).

Although Blair and his Foreign and Defence secretaries asserted the existence of Iraq WMD’s, however, according to Ali (2003) no weapons of mass destructions have been found, Ali further argues that ‘if they exist, they were so deeply hidden as to constitute no imminent threat to Britain. Official warnings of terrorist attacks on our cities have died away’ (ibid: 150). Two days after Sir Rodric Braithwaite shocking letter to Financial Times in which he highlighted how Blair employed the fear factor among the British people to construct consensus that would support Iraq invasion (ibid: 151), the New York Times demanded the U.S administration to present a proper inquiry to determine ‘the administration engaged in a deliberate effort to mislead the nation about the Iraqi threat’ (New York Times, 12-7-2003 quoted in Ali, 2003). Ali (2003) highlighted that ‘most of the lies originated in Britain and were dispatched to help Washington maintain the fiction’.

On April 23rd, 2003, David Usborne the Independent reporter, published an article entitled I was undermined based on an interview with Hans Blix, the chief UN Arms Inspector. Usborne argues that Hans Blix was isolated and also was under heavy pressure from the U.S administration to find something, which he never did (Independent, 23-4-2003). In his article Usborne indicated that:

‘Mr Blix...rubbed salt in the wounds. London and Washington had built the case for invading Iraq on “very, very shaky” evidence, he said. He referred to documents alleging that Iraq had imported uranium for nuclear weapons from Niger that he later revealed to have been faked. “I think it’s been one of the disturbing elements that so much of the intelligence on which the capitals built their case seemed to have been shaky”, he said hinting that Britain and the US might have allowed the information to surface to undermine inspections’(ibid).
A month after Hans Blix’s confession of the role played by the U.S to place pressure upon U.N weapons inspector team to legitimate the Iraq invasion on WMD’s allegation, Paul Wolfowitz the former U.S Deputy Secretary of Defense, in an interview with Vanity Fair admitted that ‘for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on: weapons of mass destruction’ (quoted in Ali, 2003). On June 2003, the Guardian published an article by George Wright entitled Wolfowitz: Iraq war was about oil, in this article Wright highlighted that when the US deputy defence secretary whom he was in Singapore at that time, was asked ‘why a nuclear power such as North Korea was being treated differently from Iraq, where hardly any weapons of mass destruction had been found’, Wolfowitz responded ‘let’s look at it simply. The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically, we just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil’. (Guardian, 4-6-2003).

6.6 MAINSTREAM MASS MEDIA’S COVERAGE TONE

In order to have a clearer understanding of mainstream mass media manipulation, framing and misleading during the run-up to the Iraq invasion, it is of a great importance to shed some light on media contribution after the invasion of Iraq ended, as the media shifted its role through questioning the legality of the invasion and demanding gathering evidence of Iraq’s WMD’s. In this scenario, I present some illustrations in regard to media handling the issues of no WMD’s found, links between Iraq and al Qaeda and also emphasizing human rights violations in Iraq. First I introduce the U.S media then the U.K.

6.6.1 U.S MAINSTREAM MASS MEDIA’S COVERAGE TONE

A) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION NOT FOUND
In his responses to the *New York Times* reader’s questions regarding Iraq’s WMD’s, Bill Keller a *Times* columnist and senior writer for the magazine, indicated that ‘*since the war, the hunt for unconventional weapons has barely begun. The U.S. has not found evidence for the kind of major violations Americans used to justify the war*’ (New York Times 9-5-2003).

Nicholas D. Kristof argues in his opinion piece published in the *New York Times* ‘*since weapons of mass destruction haven’t turned up so far in Iraq, there’s been a revisionist suggestion that the American invasion was worthwhile because of humanitarian gains for the liberated Iraqi people. Fair enough*’ (New York Times 13-5-2003).

In his opinion article on July 6th, 2003, Joseph C. Wilson indicated that ‘*did the Bush administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs to justify an invasion of Iraq? Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat*’ (New York Times 09-06-2003).

The *New York Times* published in October 1st, 2003, ‘*no one can yet say where the F.B.I.’s investigation will lead (most leak investigations lead nowhere), or whether it will produce any evidence of wrongdoing. But in this case, the accusation itself does political damage, at a minimum giving new life to last summer’s investigation into whether the White House cherry-picked evidence about Saddam Hussein’s unconventional weapons and buried dissenting views*’ (New York Times 01-10-2003).

Fox News associated press report emphasized that Collin Powell admits the possibility that Iraq had no WMD’s ‘*Secretary of State Colin Powell held out the possibility that prewar Iraq not have possessed weapons of mass destruction.*’ The report further indicated that Powell acknowledged that the U.S administration thought that Saddam Hussein regime have hidden WMD’s, however, Powell stressed that ‘*we had questions that needed to be answered*’ (Fox News 24-01-2004).
David Ignatius, a top Washington Post op-ed columnist, wrote an opinion column entitled *Fooling Ourselves* in which he aggressively attacked the U.S. intelligence commission that was responsible for presenting fake information in regards to Iraq WMD's. Ignatius further indicates that 'to the literature on deception in war we must now add a new chapter -- on self-deception. For that is the ultimate explanation for how the American military went to war in Iraq in March 2003 equipped with gas masks and chemical-biological suits to protect itself against weapons of mass destruction that turned out not to exist. The presidential commission that released its report yesterday was scathing about this intelligence failure. It described an intelligence community that is "headstrong," "too slow" and "a 'Community' in name only." It dissected intelligence reports that were "riddled with errors," "disastrously one-sided" and that relied on information from "sources who were telling lies." The commission's conclusion was simply worded but devastating: "the harm done to American credibility by our all too public intelligence failings in Iraq will take years to undo" (Washington Post 01-04-2005).

**B) NO LINKS BETWEEN SADDAM AND AL QAEDA**

In his exclusive interview on CBS News 60 minutes show, December 5th, 2007, Richard A. Clark, the former President Bush chief anti-terrorism advisor made decisive charge in regards to Iraq links with al Qaeda. Clarke indicated that he had been pressured by President Bush to find links between Saddam and bin laden which would make the two responsible for September 11th attack. "the president dragged me into a room with a couple of other people, shut the door, and said, "I want you to find whether Iraq did this." Now he never said, "Make it up." But the entire conversation left me in absolutely no doubt that George Bush wanted me to come back with a report that said Iraq did this. "I said, Mr. President. We've done this before. We have been looking at this. We looked at it with an open mind. There's no connection”. "He came back at me and said, Iraq! Saddam! Find out if there's a connection”. And in a very intimidating way. I mean that we should come back with that answer. We wrote a report "It was a serious look. We got together all the FBI experts, all the CIA experts. We wrote the report. We sent the report out to CIA and found FBI and said, Will you sign this report? “. They all cleared the report. And we sent it up to the president" (CBS news 05-12-2007).
James Risen published a report in the New York Times that criticized both the U.S administration and the intelligence and demanded solid evidences to back the U.S claims of links between Saddam and bin Laden, the report also reads ‘the Bush administration has not made these statements public, though it frequently highlighted intelligence reports that supported its assertions of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda as it made its case for war against Iraq. Since the war ended, and because the administration has yet to uncover evidence of prohibited weapons in Iraq, the quality of American intelligence has come under scrutiny amid contentions that the administration selectively disclosed only those intelligence reports that supported its case for war(...) conclusive evidence of joint terrorist operations by Iraq and Al Qaeda has been found, several intelligence officials acknowledged, nor have ties been discovered between Baghdad and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on Washington and New York’ (New York Times 09-06-2003).

On his CNN’s Anderson Cooper 360 show, anchor John Roberts indicated that ‘today, a newly-classified report from the Pentagon’s inspector general gives more ammunition to those who believe that the administration either deceived itself, the country, or both, into thinking that al Qaeda had close ties with Saddam Hussein (...) the I.G.’s report says interrogations of Saddam Hussein and two aides, along with captured Iraqi documents, confirm what the intelligence community believed prior to hostilities, that the Iraqi regime was not directly cooperating with al Qaeda’ (CNN 06-04-2007).

After the release of the FBI’s extensive operation to reveal whether or not Saddam was connected to bin Laden, Fox News aired extensive report that questioned the false allegations presented by the U.S administration to link Saddam with Bin Laden, the report further indicates that ‘more than seven years after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, suspicions Saddam might have secretly collaborated with Al Qaeda or other terror groups remains central to the continuing debate over the wisdom of launching the war, which has cost more than 4,400 U.S. lives. The administration of former President George W. Bush based its case for war in part on fears that Iraq might provide nuclear arms to Al Qaeda for use against the U.S. No nuclear weapons — or any sign of an active nuclear program — have been found in postwar Iraq’ (Fox News 23-09-2010).

C) EMPHASIZING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRAQ
In its full coverage of the so-called Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the *Los Angeles Times* published an extensive report entitled *Iraq prison commander ‘embarrassed, ashamed’ : improvements are made, Abu Ghraib is still a grim, primitive place that highlighted human rights violations committed by U.S high ranked soldiers against prisoners.* The report added that *‘the photographs of U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners have been seen worldwide, and for the U.S. military in Iraq, yesterday was another day of apologies, another attempt to stop a scandal from growing, another attempt to salvage dignity after the abuses that have undermined almost every aspect of the occupation of Iraq(...) but the prison complex built by Saddam Hussein remains a dingy, forbidding place of muddied passageways and damaged buildings. Iraqi detainees live outdoors sheltered from the hot sun by tents, and sleep on thin blankets on wooden boards (...) reporters were at first not allowed off the bus that brought them into the prison, but the inmates found a way to get their message across: As the bus stopped, hundreds of detainees lined up along a fence. They were dusty and dirty, dressed in ragged clothes and drenched in sweat. Some held water bottles; others gestured to their mouths as if they were begging for food’* (Los Angeles Times 11-05-2004).

Eugene Robinson, the *Washington Post* op-ed columnist wrote an opinion piece entitled *Torture Whitewash* in which he questioned and criticized U.S human rights violations in Abu Ghraib prison. He further highlighted that *‘it was a year ago when the first snapshots emerged from Abu Ghraib -- the pyramids of naked men; the vicious dogs lunging at naked men; and Lynndie England with her leash, leading a naked man like an animal. The one I can’t get out of my mind is the hooded prisoner with wires attached to his genitals, fearing electrocution but seeming almost resigned to it, arms outstretched and head slightly inclined in a pose suggesting the Passion. It’s something out of Hieronymus Bosch, a fantasy of Hell from the late Middle Ages (...) the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the United States has signed, bans the inflicting of severe “physical or mental” pain to obtain information or a confession. There’s no way that the infliction of physical agony, prolonged sleep and sensory deprivation, confinement in painful positions for hours on end, sexual humiliation, threats with snarling dogs and other documented U.S. abuses fall short of the definition’* (Washington Post 03-05-2005).

In her story aired on *CNN News*, Elizabeth Landau highlighted the harsh treatment of U.S soldiers upon Abu Ghraib detainees; she also indicated that the torture’s psychological impacts are worse than the physical. Landau tells the story of one Abu Ghraib prisoner *‘Amir was a salesman before being arrested and taken to the*
infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003. During his time there, he says, he was forced to lay down in urine and feces, stay naked in his cell for days, and "howl like dogs do" while being pulled by a dog leash. According to his accounts, he was also sodomized with a broomstick and had his genitals stepped on. After his release from Abu Ghraib in November 2004 -- without being charged -- he had a slew of physical and psychological ailments, including symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, according to Dr. Allen Keller, director of the Bellevue/NYU Program for Survivors of Torture (CNN News 22-05-2009).

6.2.2 U.K MAINSTREAM MASS MEDIA’S COVERAGE TONE

A) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION NOT FOUND

- BBC online political correspondent Nick Assinder argued in his report *how bad is Iraq report for Blair?* that the fact that the Iraq survey group was not able to locate Iraq’s WMD’s, does not provoke any gaps in surprise among the British people. He indicated that Blair ‘completed the process of appearing to shift his justification for the war away from WMD to the removal of Saddam Hussein’. In his report Assinder emphasized that Iraq Invasion was illegal, he added ‘What Mr Blair cannot do, however, is suggest regime change was his real motive for the war - that may well have been illegal and, in any case, was not cited at the time. So he has chosen instead to remind people the precise justification was to uphold UN resolutions which Saddam had defied for 12 years. He will also now take much comfort from the suggestion by the inspectors that Saddam was certainly attempting to produce a WMD programme and was potentially even more of a threat than had originally been suggested before the war. None of this, however, will alter the stark fact that claims used by the prime minister to back the war at the time - including the infamous 45 minute from attack suggestion - were wrong’ (BBC News 06-10-2004).

- On its front page the *Sunday Times* (2003) published an extensive report entitled *Blair Knew Iraq had no WMD* that revealed how Blair misled both the British Parliament and the public in his efforts to invade Iraq relying on the WMD’s issue. Robin Cook, the senior minister who resigned shortly before the Iraq invasion ‘[shattered] the case for war put forward by the government that Iraq presented "a real and present danger" to Britain’, according to *Sunday Times* report. In his revelations to the *Sunday Times*, Cook indicated that the prime minister ignored the ‘large number of ministers who’ spoke up against the war and deliberately crafted a suggestive phrasing to mislead the public into thinking there was a link
between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, and he did not want United Nations weapons inspections to be successful’. Cook also revealed that Prime Minister Blair also ‘misled the House of Commons and asked MPs to vote for war on a false prospectus’ (Sunday Times 05-10-2003).

- In June, 2003 the Independent published an in-depth analysis of false intelligence information that caused the British Government and the public to support Blair in his war against Iraq. The report entitled Revealed: How Blair used discredited WMD evidence indicated that ‘Tony Blair’s sensational pre-war claim that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction “could be activated within 45 minutes” was based on information from a single Iraqi defector of dubious reliability, The Independent on Sunday can reveal. British intelligence sources said the defector, recruited by Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, told his story to American officials. It was passed on to London as part of regular information-sharing with Washington, but British intelligence chiefs considered the "45 minutes" claim to be unreliable and uncorroborated by any other evidence. How it came to be included as the most dramatic element in the Government’s "intelligence dossier" last September, making the case for war, is now the subject of a furious row in Whitehall and abroad’ (the Independent 01-06-2003).

B) NO LINKS BETWEEN SADDAM AND AL QAEDA

- Before even the Iraq invasion ended, Tam Dalyell published an article in the Guardian entitled Blair the war criminal, in which he aggressively attacked Blair’s war against Iraq and also doubts any evidence that link Saddam with bin laden. In his article Dalyell argued that ‘since Mr Blair is going ahead with his support for a US attack without unambiguous UN authorization, he should be branded as a war criminal and sent to The Hague’ because he ‘has disdain for both the House of Commons and international law’. Dalyell further highlighted that ‘many in the Labour party believe Blair has misunderstood the pressing danger. It comes not from Iraq, but from terrorism. If there is a link between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein, it is this: Osama bin Laden hates Saddam Hussein. On at least two occasions Bin Laden’s organisation has tried to assassinate Saddam. The effect of this war, however, could well be to bring the pair together. This is a war that will strengthen terrorism’ (The Guardian 27-03-2003).
The Daily Mail published on the 20th of September, 2003 an article entitled *United States of ignorance*, in which the writer accused the U.S and the U.K of misleading the public through presenting fabricated evidences to show crucial links between Saddam and bin Laden. The article also reads ‘many Americans remain profoundly ignorant about the world which their country dominates. Half of them believe that Saddam Hussein was in some way connected to 9/11. This is the consequence of a brilliant campaign of disinformation waged by Bush’s administration, which has succeeded in implicating Saddam. Though he was a profoundly evil man, there is no reason to believe that he has ever had any significant links with Al Qaeda, or any at all with Osama bin Laden’ (Daily Mail 20-09-2003).

C. EMPHASIZING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRAQ

In its efforts to reveal human rights violations against Iraqi civilians after the Iraq invasion, the BBC covered the issue through in-depth investigations that showed the outrageous acts against the Iraqi people. One BBC report indicated that the U.S troops starve Iraqi people; the BBC quoted a senior U.N’s official who has accused ‘US-led coalition troops of depriving Iraqi civilians of food and water in breach of humanitarian law’. The report further asserted that ‘Human rights investigator Jean Ziegler said they had driven people out of insurgent strongholds that were about to be attacked by cutting supplies. Mr Ziegler, a Swiss-born sociologist, said such tactics were in breach of international law’. ‘Mr Ziegler said he understood the "military rationale" when confronting insurgents who do not respect "any law of war". But he insisted that civilians who could not leave besieged cities and towns for whatever reason should not suffer as a result of this strategy’, the report added (BBC 15-10-2005).

The Guardian published a report (2004) that highlighted the shocking behavior of the U.K troops in Iraq. The report indicated that British troops in Iraq abused prisoners and violated the minimal rights of detainees. In their prison cells, prisoners were ‘beaten till faces [were] “like haggises”’ according to the report. The report mention one incident where a U.K solider tortured an Iraqi prisoner ‘British military chiefs were last night confronted with further damaging allegations about the behaviour of their troops, with fresh claims of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners of war. At a secret location in London last night, military police questioned a soldier, known only as "soldier C", who had come forward with the claims. Defence sources said the soldier was a member of the Territorial Army attached to the Queen's Lancashire Regiment, the unit at the centre of investigations into allegations of torture of prisoners. The
regiment, now based in Cyprus, was deployed in southern Iraq last year. The allegations are particularly unwelcome, coming at a time when the Americans are pressing London to deploy more troops to Iraq’ (The Guardian 07-05-2004).

In his *Mirror* article *Blair will get us all blown to blitz* on 18th of March 2004, Brain Reade argued that ‘a year ago we bombed a country which posed us no threat, slaughtered 10,000 of its civilians and brought down its government. And we hailed it a great day for civilisation’ (Mirror 18-03-2004).

6.7 DISCUSSION

The above analysis of both administration and mainstream mass media in the U.S and the U.K, shows that during phase one mainstream mass media simply accepted and uncritically repeated executive pronouncements in regards to invading Iraq relying on allegations included WMD’s, links between Iraq and al Qaeda and the need to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s evil regime. In doing so, the mainstream mass media made extended use of a range of key linguistic and rhetorical devices to sell the war to the U.S public in the period preceding the Iraq invasion.

During the invasion itself, mainstream mass media was managed through military regulations which limited its capability to present neutral information; rather it followed the governmental agenda that aimed at blocking some information from the public. The embedding system restricted the media from being a watchdog that would inform the public of situations in Iraq.

After the invasion of Iraq it became evident that there were no WMD’s or links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. And due to public awareness of the false claims of the U.S administration, the mainstream mass media started to highlight those issues and human rights violations.

Media outlets are corporations that seek profit for their shareholders; this explains why the mainstream mass media started to highlight issues that
challenged the view of the administrations. Media rely on advertising to survive, thus the cycle of its sales to the public must cover the desired goal of more public reading or watching to satisfy the advertisers desire of attracting consumer attention.

In this section I examine public opinion in both the U.S and the U.K to reveal whether or not the presentation of mainstream mass media shaped public opinion in supporting the Iraq invasion in phase one and two. Whereas, examining public opinion after the invasion is crucial to determine whether the change of mainstream mass media presentation resulted in troop’s withdrawal from Iraq. In this scenario, I will present public opinion polls in both the U.S and the U.K during the three phases of the event.

6. 7.1 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE   U.S DURING THE THREE PHASES OF THE IRAQ INVASION

In their extensive study entitled *Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric*, Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner (2005) indicated that the Iraq invasion in 2003 received high levels of U.S public support because the Bush administration effectively framed the conflict as an extension of the war on terror, which was a response to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Although most Americans believed that casualties among U.S troops were expected, they anticipated a long conflict; detrimental to the U.S economy; also war might increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the U.S. In addition, large anti-war protests broke out in, New York, Los Angeles, Berlin, London, Paris, and across the Middle East region. The U.N had not authorized the Iraq invasion; on the contrary France and Russia, threatened to veto any military actions against Iraq. However, before the Iraq invasion, more than 70 percent of Americans supported the war. This consensus was high regardless of whether or not WMD were found in Iraq, whether or not thousands of U.S soldiers died, and whether or not the Iraq war continued for more than a year (Gershoff & Kushner, 2005).
According to Gershoff & Kushner, (2005) although patriotism would generate support for the war, accounts of the rally-around-the-flag effect suggest that while it might increase support during the war, it could not by itself explain why approval was as high as it was. Gershoff & Kushner suggest that the principal reason that 70% of the American public supported the war was that the Bush administration effectively convinced the public that a link generally existed between terrorism and Saddam Hussein and between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda specifically. Thus, through framing the war on Iraq by linking Saddam to al Qaeda, the administration was able to intimate that Iraq was associated with 11th September attacks, this generated levels of support for the Iraq invasion. Although President Bush never explicitly blamed Saddam Hussein or Iraq for the events of 9/11, however, his repeated assertion of links between Iraq and both terrorism and al Qaeda he provided the ideal environment from which such a connection could be made. President Bush in all his speeches never publicly connected Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden. Nevertheless, whether or not Bush explicitly connected Saddam Hussein to bin Laden, the way language and transitions are shaped in his official speeches almost compelled listeners to assume a connection (Gershoff & Kushner, 2005).

Two days after President Bush address to the U.N in which he forcefully urged it to compel Iraq to comply with Security Council directives on WMD’s, Bush also warned that the U.S was prepared to act militarily against Iraq without the United Nations if the leader Saddam Hussein was not made to honor previous commitments to disarm and allow inspectors inside his nation. In September 13-16, 2002 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll with a random sample of 803 national adults were interviewed over the phone. The first question was what the United Nations should do if Iraq fails to meet a new deadline on weapons inspections -- authorize military action or engage in further diplomatic efforts. 61% of the respondents said the United Nations should authorize military action if Iraq fails to meet a U.N.-imposed deadline on weapons inspections while only 35% said the United Nations should continue to engage in further diplomatic efforts with Iraq if it fails to meet a deadline (Gallup 16-09-2002).
The second question was if they favor or disfavor invading Iraq, 57% of the public favored attacking Iraq, whereas 38% opposed Iraq invasion (ibid).

Chart (1) below shows the percentages of the American public who approve military actions in Iraq in contrast with the public who opposed the war, during the period from February 21st of, 2001 to October 6th, 2002. After both of his speeches dating 11th of September, 2001 and 8th of November 2001, in which President Bush highlighted the danger that the U.S must deal with. President Bush indicated that the terrorists groups who attacked the U.S and Iraq were the foremost threat the U.S faced. Although President Bush never explicitly mentioned that Iraq was responsible for the attacks, he indicated that the Iraq threat was real because it was aiding terrorism groups. This marked the real shift from al Qaeda to Saddam as being the one who should be contained. The increase of public support to invade Iraq is evident after those two speeches, as 74% of the U.S public supported the President’s decision to invade Iraq, while only 20% opposed military actions against Iraq (Gallup 08-10-2002).

Also, President Bush in his widely reported State of the Union address January 29th, 2002, in which he announced the so-called Axis of evil that labeled Iraq, Iran and North Korea as being a major threat to the U.S, because these countries were aiding terrorism and seeking WMD’s. And his speech on the one year anniversary of September the 11th attacks, to a large extent, helped to maintain the same public opinion that supported Iraq invasion. Because of the rhetoric used to frame Iraq as a major threat through presenting arguments that created fear among the public of Saddam Hussein who was supposedly linked to bin Laden and acquiring WMD’s. Gallup Public opinion polls indicated that 61% in June, 2002 supported the Iraq invasion, 31% opposed the war. It can be said that although the percentage of the public who supported the war dropped to 53% in August, however, it stayed at the same average up until October of the same year with 53% favoring the Iraq invasion.
A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll (2003) which was conducted five days before the Iraq invasion showed that 64% supported military actions against Iraq. According to the poll, 64% of Americans were in favor of invading Iraq, while 33% opposed the Iraq invasion. The Gallup news services (Gallup, 2003) indicated that the level of support increased when the public surveyed were asked whether they approve or disapprove military actions in Iraq, it stressed also:

‘The level of support on this basic question is up from the most recent reading taken about two weeks ago, March 3-5, when 59% favored an invasion. Support has generally been in the mid-to-high 50% range since last June, with one exception being a 63% reading shortly after Colin Powell’s Feb. 5 address to the United Nations on Iraq. Support is slightly lower, at 58%, when the same question is asked with the added stipulation that the invasion would take place “in the next week or two.” With this question wording, 40% of Americans are opposed to military action’ (Gallup 15-3-2003).
To understand how the American public opinion frequently changed overtime in favor of war against Saddam Hussein (see chart 2), a close examination of Gallup polls in regards Iraq invasion from (January the 17th, 2002 to March the 15th, 2003) indicated that the percentage of the public who supported the war fluctuated between 52% and 64%. Whereas, the percentage of surveyed who opposed the war fluctuated between 31% and 39%. It can be argued to a certain extent that at least one or two factors played a crucial role in shaping public opinion in the U.S. However, the thesis demonstrates that the use of language and extensive rhetoric played a significant role in shaping public opinion in its battle of influencing hearts and minds.

Chart (2) public opinion during 2002-2003

![Chart showing public opinion during 2002-2003](http://www.gallup.com/poll/7990/public-support-iraq-invasion-inches-upward.aspx)

According to (Gershoff & Kushner, 2005) one of the confirmed objectives of the U.S administration was to rid Iraq of WMD. In a speech to the U.N on September 12, 2002, and also in his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush claimed that Saddam Hussein’s refusal to account for and destroy banned weapons compelled the U.S to disarm him. Gershoff & Kushner (2005)
indicated that the WMD rhetoric of President Bush’s speeches in regards to Iraq’s WMD convinced 82% of Americans to support the war according to the polls, whether or not any WMD were found in Iraq, and 64% favoured a removal of Saddam Hussein, regardless of whether U.N. inspectors found evidence of weapons of mass destruction after the invasion.

Gershoff & Kushner (2005) further indicate that President Bush began discussing WMD at the same point he began discussing Iraq: the January 29, 2002, state of the union address. Bush consistently referred to “weapons of mass destruction” (or alternatively “weapons of mass murder”) from January 2002 to May 2003. According to their examination of 22 speeches of President Bush before the Iraq invasion Gershoff & Kushner (2005) emphasized that ‘17 referenced WMD at least once, with a mean of 2.3 mentions per speech. In this same period, however, the average number of references to terrorism was 12.2 per speech. Clearly, then, terror, not WMD, was the primary rhetorical frame’.

In his speech on October 7, 2002, titled ‘outlining the Iraqi threat’, president Bush referred to WMD seven times, the most of any address; though, the same speech referred to terror or terrorism 35 times, five times as often (ibid: 531). Both Iraq and Saddam Hussein were placed in the same sentence as the word terrorism, and Bush stated clearly that relations existed between the Saddam Hussein and terrorism. This same pattern was evident in the other speeches (ibid: 531). ‘Only once, in the March 19, 2003, address that declared the beginning of the war did WMD appear more than discussion of terrorism. The president employed the term WMD once in that speech, never mentioning terrorism’, Gershoff & Kushner (2005) pointed out.

In their study Gershoff & Kushner (2005) revealed that Colin Powell’s speech to the U.N on February 5th, 2003, had an additional outcome on public support. They argued that Powell’s speech provided more alleged evidences than any other official administration speech regarding links between Iraq and al Qaeda. Gershoff & Kushner (2005) indicated that there was a major relationship between Powell’s speech and increased public opinion supporting the Iraq
They demonstrated that hearing Powell’s speech was correlated with increased support for the war. Their study showed that the polls indicated that 10% Americans changed from not supporting to supporting the war in Iraq after hearing the speech, and they credited the speech with changing their views. According to Gershoff & Kushner (2005), 10% of polls respondents in regards to Powell’s speech outcome, thought that ‘the statement best describing their feelings before and after Powell’s speech was: “Before the speech I did not favor U.S. military action against Iraq, but the speech changed my mind and I favor it now.” This gain was again highest among Democrats’.

Gershoff & Kushner (2005) emphasized that the reason for the shift in public opinion in the U.S was clear, they further indicated that:

‘There was a 30-point jump in the number of Americans who felt persuaded of a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda following Powell’s speech to the U.N. Certainly, in the two days following Bush’s state of the union address in 2003, respondents were asked whether or not enough evidence had been provided to show that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda were connected; only 38 percent of respondents said yes. However, when those same respondents were reinterviewed following Powell’s speech to the United Nations, 68 percent agreed. Nearly the entire 30-point gain came from Democrats. Since the state of the union address came just five days before Powell’s speech, it is unlikely that any other event caused the shift. Additional polls corroborated our conclusions. To pick just one additional example, respondents who thought al Qaeda was the most important threat facing the United States were more likely to support the invasion of Iraq than those who thought al Qaeda was America’s second, third, or fourth most important problem. Surprisingly, respondents who considered al Qaeda to be America’s most important threat were more likely to favor invading Iraq than those who thought Iraq was America’s most important threat’ (ibid: 531).

A Gallup poll conducted on behalf of CNN and USA Today on May the 1st, 2003, showed that 74% of the U.S public agreed that the Iraq invasion was justified.
(Gallup 01-05-2003). During that time both the administration and the mainstream mass media continued its assertion that Iraq WMD’s existed and that links between Saddam and al Qaeda were still valid. This explains why most Americans thought that the Iraq invasion was legal. However, at a later stage the public awareness increased in regards to no weapons being found and no links existing. This forced the mainstream mass media to function to critically oppose the administration through presenting arguments that demanded evidence of Iraq’s WMD’s and links between Saddam and al Qaeda. In addition, human rights violations became a crucial element in requesting immediate withdrawal from Iraq. Bear in mind also, that the U.S public became aware of the high number of casualties among U.S troops. All these factors helped in changing public perception of the Iraq war.

Chart (3) shows that during 2004, almost 39% of American’s believed that the U.S made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq, whereas 60% believed it was not a mistake. However, from mid-2005 up until 2010 the percentage of the U.S public opinion who believed it was a mistake increased dramatically. In May 2004, the scandal of Abu Ghraib prison was all over media outlets; this explains why almost 54% believed it was a mistake, in comparison to 41% who supported the war. It is evident that during 2006 onwards the percentage of American public who opposed the war increased to reach 63% during 2008 and fell to 55% during 2010.

On October 30th, 2011, Gallup poll asked the participants in its survey whether they approved or disapproved of President Obama’s decision to withdraw nearly all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year. 75% of the respondents approved the decision, whereas, 21% disapproved (Gallup 30-10-2011).
Chart (3) the percentage of American public who supported the U.S administration in comparison to public who disapproved the U.S war against Iraq, during the period 2004-2010

Do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Mistake</th>
<th>% Not a mistake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx

6.7.2 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.K DURING THE THREE PHASES OF THE IRAQ INVASION

Although the British public opinion before the invasion was critical of the war, it can be said that the majority of the public agreed upon the invasion if it was authorized by U.N.S.C. resolution. During the run-up to the Iraq invasion, the U.K foreign policy objective was set to disarm Iraq’s WMD’s. Also, it aimed at achieving regime change by removing Saddam Hussein regime. Those two objectives must be fulfilled through means of U.N.S.C. Prime Minister Blair considered U.N resolution 1441 the legitimate framework to disarm Iraq. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq the last chance to allow U.N inspection to disarm Iraq’s WMD’s, if not, the British government believed that it was its responsibility to disarm Iraq’s weapons. In addition, the British government asserted that not only U.N weapons inspections should be allowed to search for WMD’s; they should also verify Iraq’s full cooperation and compliance with U.N.S.C. resolution 1441. Britain believed that resolution 1441 was backed by
a permanent and credible threat of force against Iraq, in case it refused to cooperate. Blair asserted numerous times that if Iraq failed to fully cooperate and comply with 1441 resolution obligations, then the use of force was legal. Blair indicated that the text of resolution 1441 was clear; if Iraq did not cooperate then it will face serious consequences (Stucklik, 2005).

According to Stucklik (2005) the British government officials defended Blair’s approach and discourse of solely relying on resolution 1441 to disarm Iraq, through five basic arguments presented to both the British public and the international community. Those arguments are: (a) Iraq possesses and conceals WMD’s; (b) Iraq maintains close relations with terrorists groups, including al Qaeda; (c) Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq contravenes every single value and principle that any politician holds in the U.K.; (d) Iraq deceived the U.N and international community for the past 12 years while failing to comply with 17 U.N. resolutions in regards to disarm its WMD’s; (e) if the U.N. Failed to act effectively and quickly, ‘it would have mimicked the fate of the League of the Nations’ (ibid:19).

In presenting their case to the British public, Blair and the U.K government officials asserted through three sources that Iraq was producing WMD’s. On September 24th, 2002, Blair published the British assessment of Iraq’s WMD’s, or the so-called British dossier in which Iraq was accused of producing and possessing bacteriological and chemical weapons. The dossier also stated that Iraq was seven months away from gaining a nuclear bomb. Those evidences according to Blair came from the heart of the British Intelligence Commission (ibid: 19). The second source that deepens the British conviction was ‘the failure of Iraq to explain satisfactorily where the unaccounted deadly material remained’ (ibid: 19). This material according to the intelligence information consisted of 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, and almost 360 tons of bulk agents essential to produce chemical weapons. The last source of the British government’s information on Iraq’s WMD’s was the defection of Saddam’s son-in-law (ibid: 19).

Blair’s discourse to the British public was therefore constructed to inform them of Iraq’s WMD’s threat to both Britain and the international community. Blair
argued that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a more serious threat than any “rogue” state (ibid: 19). Stucklik (2005) argued that according to the U.K, Iraq had already used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds in 1988. Saddam Hussein also allegedly considered possession of WMD’s as an acceptable means to dominate the Iraqi people. The U.K believed that a complete disarmament would not be achieved unless there was a regime change in Iraq was accomplished to secure the Iraqi people, neighboring countries and the international community.

Stucklik (2005) stressed that if the British government WMD’s arguments presented to legitimate Iraq invasion did not persuade the public in the U.K, the British official had one more argument to shape public opinion. The brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime argument was presented repeatedly. British officials claimed that they were aware of the consequences of the war against Hussein’s brutal regime which might include the sufferings of Iraqi innocent civilians, but according to them if Saddam continued to rule Iraq there would have been more innocent victims. Stucklik (2005) quoted Blair’s speech in February 2003 in which he calculated the impact of Hussein’s rule ‘Iraq is a country that in 1978, the year before he seized power, was richer than Malaysia or Portugal. A country where today, 135 out of every 1,000 Iraqi children die before the age of five-70%of these deaths are from diarrhea and respiratory infections that are easily prevented’.

British official discourse also highlighted that Saddam Hussein was also accused of smuggling oil and using the revenue to advance his WMD’s capabilities. Blair also targeted the brutality of Saddam’s regime with the British Government promised the Iraqi people to free them from the brutal regime, which would be achieved through regime change (ibid: 20). One month before the Iraq invasion, the British government strengthened its arguments to invade Iraq through presenting alleged evidences that tie Saddam Hussein to bin Laden. This led the U.K to propose, in close cooperation with the U.S and Spain, the second resolution by the U.N which would provide an ultimatum chance for Iraq to comply with resolution 1441, or to face disarmament by means of force. However, the U.N.S.C rejected the proposal. Britain decided to support the U.S invasion of Iraq (ibid: 20).
In this context, it can be argued that the mainstream mass media in the U.K functioned to inform the public of the arguments presented by Blair and the government without even questioning the validity of such claims. However, as we noted before, the U.K public opinion differed from the U.S in accepting the Iraq Invasion. In the U.S, most public opinion never requested an explicit U.N resolution to invade Iraq. In contrast, public opinion in the U.K highly approved of the invasion but only with U.N resolution authorizing the use of force. Surprisingly, during the invasion itself, U.K public opinion was shaped to support the war even without U.N resolution.

Stucklik (2005) indicated the evaluation of British public opinion which supported the military engagement in Iraq, was not easy. According to him the Mori polls from September 2002 (the period in which Blair delivered his speech on the anniversary of 11/9 attacks) to January 2003 (Blair’s speech to the Foreign Office Conference), shows that the British people would support the Iraq invasion if approved by U.N.S.C., 71% in September 2002, and 61% in January 2003. Mori poll in early March of 2003 indicated that if Iraq’s WMD’s are to be located, and a U.N.S.C. had mandated the invasion, 84% of men and 67% of women would have supported the deployment of British troops to Iraq (Mori quoted in Stucklik, 2005). The same poll showed that if no WMD’s were to be found and no U.N.S.C. mandate was given to authorize the use of force, 28% of men would be supportive and only 19% of women (ibid: 25).

A Mori poll conducted February of 2003 showed that 56% of men and 57% of women believed that links between Saddam and al Qaeda were existed. 65% of men and 44% of women believed that the Iraq invasion would remove Saddam Hussein (Mori quoted in Stucklik, 2005).

In most of his speeches and debates regarding the necessity to invade Iraq, Blair solely relied upon security motivations that would allow Britain and the allies to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. In his pre-war discourse, Blair considered U.N resolution 1441 as a fundamental ground that would legitimate the Iraq invasion. It can be argued also, that Blair to a large extent assumed that his proposal to the U.N.S.C to issue a second resolution approving the use of force against Iraq, would be easily granted. This should
explain why the British public opinion was shaped to support the Iraq invasion, only if the U.N approved the use of force against Iraq. Although the U.N.S.C. never authorized the use of force against Iraq, however, the British public opinion remained steady during the military operations. In its poll conducted with a random sample of 969 British adults, between the 28th and the 31st of March 2003, Mori found that 47% of the British public approved of the way the Prime Minister was handling situations in Iraq, whereas, 44% disapproved. The same poll showed that a majority of the British public supported the U.K invasion of Iraq, in contrast with 38% who opposed the invasion (Mori, 2003). ICM, in the Daily Mirror asked on April the 1st, 2003: ‘Now that the war is two weeks old, do you think we were right or wrong to start it?’, 48% of the respondents said 'right', and 38% 'wrong', with men nearly two to one saying 'right' (58% to 32%), while a plurality of women, 43% 'wrong' and just 39% 'right' (ICM, 2003).

One explanation of why the same percentages of the British public opinion that supported the invasion only if U.N.S.C. approved the use of force against Iraq, remained steady during the invasion even without a resolution to authorize the force, would be that the rally around the flag notion and patriotic feelings among the British public. The U.K mainstream mass media during the Iraq invasion shaped the public opinion through “supporting our boys” notion. Insofar, it can be argued that during the military operations against Iraq, media presentation generated public opinion that was motivated by patriotism attitudes. Lewis (2004) emphasized that during the Iraq invasion, the coverage of the British mainstream mass media of the war itself played a significant role in persuading the majority to support military actions. He further indicated that ‘questions about the motives, efficacy, and legality of the war - questions that might have created doubt in people’s mind- were suspended’.

In their study Patriotism meets plurality: reporting the 2003 Iraq War in the British press, Goddard et al., (2008) indicated that news agenda during the Iraq war was dominated by the reporting of day-to-day events such as ‘battle’ stories. Furthermore they argued that a ‘patriotic emphasis, involving support for British troops and their families, and for their part in the conflict, was
present in all newspapers, whether or not they favored the policy of war'. In their study they also showed that the media tends to act as a ‘faithful servant’ by reproducing elite perspectives with little negotiation. According to Goddard et al., (2008) British newspapers were not completely objective in their coverage of the war ‘there was a patriotic inflection, and even the most anti-war newspapers included a quantity of coverage that could be coded as “reinforcing” or “pro-war”’. Goddard et al., (2008) suggest that the character of the British news coverage of the Iraq war to a large extent supported the British policy in times of war, with patriotism and party allegiance.

Due to the shift in mainstream mass media presentations regarding the issues surrounding the Iraq invasion, public opinion in the U.K became more critical to Blair’s policies in Iraq. The Public became aware of no WMD’s; no links between Saddam and al Qaeda were to be surface and also human rights violations in Iraq. Those factors produced a massive public debate of whether or not the Iraq invasion was legal. During the period following the invasion the British public’s support declined and demands for the immediate withdrawal from Iraq arose.

The Mori poll on 27th July 2003, showed that 32% approved (see table 2) of Prime Minister Blair, whereas 55% disapproved. In February 21st, 2005 poll the percentage that approved of Blair’s handling of situations in Iraq drooped to 28%. The percentage of the public who approved Blair’s handling of Iraq’s situations declined in the 2007 Mori poll, only 17% approved, whereas 77% disapproved (Mori 2003, 2005 and 2007). A poll of a random sample conducted by YouGov for Telegraph newspaper on the 25th of April 2007, asked the participants if they think the United States and Britain were right or wrong to take military action against Iraq? 60% opposed the invasion, and only 26% supported it (YouGov, 2007a). Another poll conducted by YouGov on behalf of Channel 4 on the 7th of June 2007, showed that 55%opposed and 30% supported when asked if they think that the United States and Britain were right or wrong three/four years ago to take military actions against Iraq? (YouGov, 2007b).
Various polls were conducted to evaluate British public opinion on whether British troops should remain or withdraw from Iraq after the invasion. The polling agencies were Populus, YouGov and Communicate. A Populus/Times poll conducted on the 5\textsuperscript{th} of February 2006, asked the participants if they think that British troops should stay in Iraq for as long as it takes to make sure that Iraq is a stable democracy or do you think that British troops should be withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible even if Iraq is not completely stable? 62\% requested immediate withdrawal from Iraq, whereas 38\% believed troops should stay (Populus 05-02-2006). In the YouGov/Mail on Sunday poll, YouGov asked on October the 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2004, if participants believe Britain should continue to keep troops in Iraq, or should they now be withdrawn? 53\% believed British troops should withdraw, whereas 41\% believed that troops should remain in Iraq (YouGov 23-10-2004). Communicate conducted a poll in behalf of Independent newspaper on October 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2006, asked if participants of its random sample think that British troops should stay in Iraq for as long as it takes to make sure that Iraq is a stable democracy or do you think that British troops should be withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible even if Iraq is not completely stable? 62\% believed British troops should withdraw, 28\% believed it should stay (Communicate 22-10-2006).

\textbf{Table (2) : War with Iraq trends (2003-2007)}

Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is handling the current situation with Iraq?

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVE</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISAPPROVE</td>
<td>55 %</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>77 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON’T KNOW</td>
<td>13 %</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NET APPROVE</td>
<td>-23 %</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>-60 %</td>
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6.8 CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this chapter shows how the mainstream mass media in both the U.S and the U.K functioned to assist the administration in selling the Iraq invasion to the public. In phase one the mainstream mass media portrayed Saddam Hussein as to be the dangerous enemy that aimed at disturbing the international peace and security.

Also, mainstream mass media uncritically followed the administrations allegations of Iraq’s WMD’s and links between Iraq and al Qaeda. In addition it highlighted Iraq’s previous human rights violations as a last resort to enhance public opinion supportive to Iraq invasion. In doing so, the mainstream mass media heavily relied upon rhetorical approaches to create fear among the public by informing them of harmful consequences if there was a failure to act immediately. Public opinion polls evaluated in this chapter showed the influence mainstream mass media had in shaping public opinion that unquestionably supported regime change in Iraq.

During the military operations, the embedding system limited the mainstream freedom in neutrally reporting the invasion. In this scenario, mass media was restricted from informing the public of actual human rights violations committed against innocent Iraqi civilians as a result of military actions. Before journalists published their reports they were required to pass through a military commander who would approve or disapprove the material before publishing it or airing it to the public. It can be therefore demonstrated that mainstream mass media were censored and biased. Mainstream mass media’s presentations- during the invasion- of both the U.S and the U.K reflected the administration’s point of view in covering the event of the Iraq invasion. It can be argued that nationalism and patriotic feelings shaped most of the mainstream mass media presentations during the Iraq invasion.

Surprisingly, after the Iraq invasion mainstream mass media shifted its position from uncritically supportive to both administrations to harshly demanding evidence of Iraq’s WMD’s and links between Saddam and al Qaeda. It also exposed human rights violations in Iraq conducted by U.S troops and allies and
high casualties among U.S and allies troops. These factors explain public
demand of immediate withdrawal from Iraq. Accordingly, the public opinion
that supported the invasion declined forcing both administrations to withdraw
troops from Iraq.

It can be demonstrated that mainstream mass media discourse during the Iraq
issue is described as to be manipulating and misleading discourse that greatly
relied upon rhetoric to frame Iraq as an imminent threat that would harm the
international peace and security.
CHAPTER SEVEN
ARABIC MEDIA AND IRAQ INVASION 2003

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the Arabic mass media role during the Iraq invasion of 2003. It evaluates whether or not the Iraqi media efforts were successful in informing the Arab world and the international community of Iraq’s willingness to cooperate with the U.N weapons inspections and to diplomatically resolve the tension with the U.S administration. It also evaluates the Iraqi media bias during the military operations; it traces the misleading information of the Iraqi minister of information Mohammed Said al Sahaf in informing both the Iraqi public and the Arab world of fake victories against the U.S troops and allies. This chapter also sheds some light on the Arab media’s contribution before, and during the Iraqi invasion. It examines whether or not the Arab media opposed the invasion of Iraq.

In addition, there was no uniformity among the Arabic mass media in its coverage of the Iraqi invasion issue; most of the Arabic media outlets fully rejected the invasion without presenting logical counterarguments to refute the U.S and the U.K allegations to invade Iraq. However, after the capture of Baghdad, the Arabic media started to function differently and to highlight a democratic Iraq after the collapse of Saddam’s regime. Those issues are examined in this chapter.

Also, this chapter discusses Saddam’s propaganda prior to the invasion and during the invasion itself and how the Arabic media believed the Iraqi propaganda asserting a defeat of America and the allies. The Arabic media functioned to highlight Iraq’s victorious battles against the allies; it started to broadcast and publish materials that reflected the Iraqi Minister of Information’s pronouncement of defeating “crusades”. Shockingly, at the time Iraq claimed those victorious actions, the Americans and the allies had full control of Baghdad. This situation created a state of confusion among both Arabic leaders who supported Saddam Hussein, and the Arabic media.
It is important to indicate that most of the Arabic countries rely on financial assistance and aid from the U.S. However, the leaders who opposed the invasion were forced to act this way as they were motivated and shaped by public opinion that unquestionably rejected any military action against Iraq. This explains why some Arabic leaders refused to cooperate with the Coalition of the Willing. However, after the fall of Baghdad, Arabic leaders who opposed the invasion started to talk about a democratic Iraq and the need to reconstruct Iraq’s economic and political systems.

In essence, the role and tendencies of the mass media vary in terms of dealing with different developments and events, particularly in the field of wars and military activities. This disparity is usually due to several reasons: such as the level of capacities available to those media, public opinion or the political attitudes of the governments that such mass media is trying to follow (Al-Aidi 1999: 80). Furthermore, this disparity in the role and attitudes of the media may refer also to their strategies. towards highlighting backgrounds, motives and attitudes stemming from the political, financial, ethnic and religious subordination seeking to direct the public opinion for their benefits and underline the names of some political figures in such cases (Al-Jundi 2005: 56).

The Iraq invasion, or the ‘war to liberate Iraq according to the U.S administration’, can be divided into three phases, where the disparity in dealing with the repercussions of the war by the Arab media was obvious. Phase I, represents the preparation for the Iraq invasion in which the U.S administration accused Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction (Abdul Rahman 2005:115). At this point, public opinion in the Arab world had been divided into several attitudes according to the media coverage of the Iraq issue. One group saw the Iraqi regime as having politically failed to avoid the military confrontation as well as being accepting of the peaceful proposals reported by the pro-America media. Whereas, another group was convinced of the legality of the war and the need to occupy Iraq to overthrow Saddam’s regime in line with the justifications announced by the U.S (Mustafa 2005: pp 279-386). A third group asserted that the intended war was illegal and there was no convincing justification for the occupation of Iraq and assaulting its
sovereignty, this included Iraqi media and other pro-Iraq media (Mustafa 2005: pp 279-386).

In phase II of the war, 20 March to 9 April 2003, the military activities between the coalition and Iraqi forces had started, and caused Arabic public opinion for the first time to be shaped against the war (Lynch 2006: pp2-9). As for the Iraqi official media (during Saddam Hussein’s regime) their role was restricted to broadcasting statements of the Iraqi officials, rhetoric speeches and images that reflected fabricated victories of Iraq, alleged by al-Sahaf, and aired to the whole world through the Ministry of Information of Saddam's regime (Media Magazine website 2006).

During Phase III of the occupation, which lasted from the fall of Baghdad in the 9th of April 2003 until the present time, the Arabic public stance towards the repercussions of the war on Iraq had become multidirectional. Two factors were involved in this: (1) The Arabic mass media's different positions on situations occurring in Iraq and (2) the emergence of the Iraqi Opposition media after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Mustafa 2005: pp 279-306). After the fall of Baghdad and the overthrow of the former regime - which was marked by the pulling down of Saddam Hussein's Statue in Fardus Square on the 9th of April 2003 - the Iraqi opposition became capable of expressing its political positions for the first time.

After airing multiple scenes of Saddam Hussein’s arrest in his hometown Tikrit and some scenes of his trial, the U.S looked as if it was a heroic savior of the oppressed Iraqi people, but this image distorted and faded once the pictures of the torture acts by the U.S. occupation forces against Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison were published. This incident enhanced the Arabic public opinion against the U.S. presence in Iraq. This scandal, along with the American stance and its interference in the elections in Iraq - which were

41 The emergence of new Iraqi media that represented the Iraqi opposition - who they were not present at the time of President Saddam Hussein - changed the way in which Iraqi public opinion shaped towards situations occur in Iraq and also tried to shape Arabic public opinion against crimes committed by the previous regime. Worth noting that during the reign of Baath Party the Iraqi government media was fully controlling the media arena with full absence of any opposition media.
described by the pro-American media as an advanced stage for a new Iraq - contributed strongly to the disparity in the stance of the Arabic media. The anti-occupation Arabic media (this included: Lebanon Broadcasting Cable; Al-Arabia news; Al-Manar TV Channel; Future TV and Jordan TV) described the U.S. presence in the region as a great conspiracy that aimed at eliminating resistance, plundering the wealth of Iraq and destroying its history (Shageer 2003). The media that opposed the U.S. occupation of Iraq began gradually to moderate their attitudes against the U.S existence in Iraq. This moderation of attitudes was shaped once the Iraqi government was formed as being a pro-American government (Iraqi News agency Website). According to Mustafa (2005) the Arabic media was confused in dealing with situations in Iraq due to the Arabic public opinion which rejected the invasion against Iraq, therefore, once the U.S and allies overthrown Saddam’s regime, Arabic media started to ease its opposition against the U.S and started to talk about a new Iraq after Saddam Hussein.

7.2 IRAQI MEDIA AND COVERAGE OF THE INVASION

7.2.1 IRAQI MEDIA IN THE PRE-INVASION PHASE

At the beginning, it is of great importance to present a brief overview of the Iraqi media during the period of Saddam Hussein’s regime. During this period the Iraqi media was classified as being ‘mobilization media’, due to its complete manipulation by the Iraqi government (Rough 2004: 25). The Iraqi media was fully controlled by the Iraqi Ministry of Information which administrated the Iraqi government satellite channel; the Iraqi government radio; Youth Radio; Voice of Baghdad radio; al Baath newspaper; and al thawrah newspaper in addition to other magazines and journals belonging to the Baath Party. These were the most effective Iraqi media in the period prior to the occupation (Saleh 2003), and the most influential tools in shaping Iraqi public opinion at the beginning of the war. Generally, the role played by these media was positive with respect to Iraqi interest from the official viewpoint. Iraqi media focused on the Iraqi readiness and willingness for negotiations, disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, and acceptance of a peaceful settlement by the Iraqi regime. It highlighted Iraq’s compliance with the
resolutions of international legitimacy and UN resolutions and demonstrated the U.S. insistence on war. The Iraqi media was in harmony in its coverage which emphasized Iraq’s national interests as seen by Saddam's regime and in line with his own point of view regardless of the integrity of such vision.

Iraqi print media in the period prior to the occupation - such as al Thawrah and Al-Shabab newspapers- had the same stance and spoke the same language, the language of the Iraqi regime (ibid). These newspapers highlighted the importance of Saddam’s speeches, and praised him. The Iraqi print media adopted nationalistic rhetoric that aimed at strengthening the position of the President and shaping public opinion to underestimate the threat of imminent invasion. Iraqi newspapers negatively reflected on the consequences of the war, which would cause a military disaster, and dismantle the institutions of the country with the break in the lines of transportation and communication (Al Danani 2007: pp 395-432).

The destructive consequences of the war have been attributable to the absolute dictatorship and central decision-making adopted by the Iraqi regime which was promoted by the Iraqi media in the period prior to the war (Saleh 2003). This was the first aspect of failure of the Iraqi media at that time, the second aspect of this failure was exemplified by the Iraqi media’s failure to refute the justifications presented by the U.S administration to invade Iraq. On the contrary, it focused upon Iraq’s ability to defeat any potential aggression and gave the Iraqi people an impression that Saddam's regime was Invincible (Saleh 2003).

Pertaining to the role of the Iraqi government TV channels in the period prior to the war, they lacked effective propaganda to deal with the U.S justifications for waging war against Iraq. Similar to any other media of Iraq in that period, the efforts of TV channels were limited to the restrictions set by the Iraqi regime, which aimed at making the Iraqi citizens get used to the presence of a large number of statues and pictures of the Iraqi President installed on the civil and government institutions that glorified the achievements of the Iraqi regime. This was a criterion of national loyalty. And this also was the fundamental fault committed by the Iraqi media, which led to ignoring the
national values that could unite the Iraqi people. This was exploited by the American media afterwards to influence public opinion in relation to the invasion of Iraq, and used as evidence of the arrogance and tyranny of Saddam's regime and as justification for their need to fight this regime (Al Iraqia Satellite TV Channel 2005).

The Iraqi governmental TV channel during Saddam Hussein’s regime succeeded in linking the existence of security and peace of mind of the citizens to the Iraqi president, and thus it became a pivotal issue in the life of the Iraqi citizens and cast a shadow over political and military life. This issue could be the reason for the absolute centralism of the Iraqi regime, the reason behind the lack of a sense of national responsibility and reliance upon the central decision, especially in crucial situations. Despite the fact that all Iraqi officials were linked to the President, the Iraqi Information Minister Al Sahaf, in his sole media leadership during this period, succeeded in refuting every American allegation to justify the war on Iraq. Al Sahaf denied the existence of WMD’s in Iraq. He also expressed the Iraqi willingness to accept peaceful solutions and showed, at the same time, the substantial capabilities of Iraq in addressing any attack to defeat the enemies if the Americans preferred to resort to the military option. AL Sahaf succeeded in promoting these convictions to those who listened to his speeches and statements.

Iraqi radio stations, such as Iraqi News agency and Voice of Baghdad radio, to a large extent were successful in achieving the objectives of Saddam Hussein. This included broadcasting the speeches of loyalty, praise, confirming the inevitability of victory for Iraq and broadcasting Saddam's vows that Iraq would be another Vietnam for Americans. At the meantime, Iraqi governmental radio stations ignored the voices of the Iraqi people who rejected the choice of war and demanded peaceful solutions -if possible- to overcome the crisis without compromising the security and sovereignty of Iraq (Al Iraqia Satellite TV Channel 2005).

7.2.2 IRAQI MEDIA DURING THE MILITARY ATTACK

Once the military operations began (20 March to 9 April 2003), the majority of the Iraqi media considered that the war on Iraq had started by firing rockets
at a building where they thought that the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his Assistants were holding a meeting. Firing these missiles was a mark of the commencement of war on Iraq. From this moment, Iraqi official media started to broadcast the events of the war and fabricate imaginary victories, where al-Sahaf was seen as the hero of these victories by using daily statements and speeches of updates on the war with the Americans that showed Iraq as being victorious. At that time, the political imbalance began to deteriorate as a result of the blind adherence to the centrality of the Iraqi leadership. This was in spite of the breakdown in communication between the leadership and the institutions of the state, except for the broadcast of the speeches of the President Saddam Hussein during the war and its impact on

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42 He earned the nickname Baghdad Bob for his wild claims and colorful statements, made while Iraq was being invaded and overrun by American and British forces. These are some of the fabricated statements of Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf: Available at: [http://www.allgreatquotes.com/mohammed_saeed_alsahaf.shtml](http://www.allgreatquotes.com/mohammed_saeed_alsahaf.shtml). Such of these statements include:

- **There are no American infidels in Baghdad. Never!**

- **My feelings - as usual - we will slaughter them all.**

- **Our initial assessment is that they will all die.**

- **I blame Al-Jazeera - they are marketing for the Americans!**

- **God will roast their stomachs in hell at the hands of Iraqis.**

- **They're coming to surrender or be burned in their tanks.**

- **No I am not scared, and neither should you be!**

- **Are these the Americans? People remain silent and placate the Americans. By God, they only deserve scorn.**

  *We slaughtered them yesterday and we will continue to slaughter them.*

- **I told you yesterday that the shock has backfired on them. Indeed, they are shocked because of what they have seen. No one received them with roses. They were received with bombs, shoes and bullets. Now, the game has been exposed. Awe will backfire on them. This is the boa snake. We will extend it further and cut it in the appropriate way.*

  *We are not afraid of the Americans. Allah has condemned them. They are stupid.*
Arab and international public opinion. These speeches aimed at assuring both the Iraqi people and the Arabic public that the Iraqi regime still had control over the country, although the truth was completely different on the ground (Mustafa 2005: 301).

The Iraqi TV channel had been a permanent guest in the homes of all Iraqis during the military operation (Tahan 2006: 214). The Iraqi government channel broadcasted fabricated victories achieved by the Iraqi forces. Airing such alleged victories along with reports on the destruction and damage caused by U.S. bombing, put the spectators in a dilemma. It was difficult to differentiate between the true stories and the fabricated ones. Resulting from the Iraqi Minister of Information’s fabricated statements regarding the situations in Iraq, Arab viewers were unable to believe any Arabic media with regard to what was happening during the military operations in Iraq.

Along with the military operations on Iraqi soil, there was a media battle taking place between the two sides, the US media and the Iraqi government media (Al-Rubaie 2006: pp 1-7). This media battle had two main aspects for the Iraqi citizens: the scenes of bombing and destruction and the statements of Al Sahaf that had been successful- to some extent- in refuting the reports of U.S. troop’s achievements in crossing Bagdad. The latter served to achieve the wishes of the Iraqi people of the war outcome which would indicate Iraq’s spectacular victory. Although Al Sahaf was able to shape both the Iraqi and Arabic attitudes regarding the defeat of U.S and the allies, and that the Iraqi victory was imminent, during his daily fabricated statements, U.S troops entered Baghdad and obtained full control of Hussein’s capital. Anderson (2003) indicates that:

‘At the beginning of the campaign, the Americans and British had made all sorts of overblown claims about, for instance, having pacified towns on the way to Baghdad and neutralized Basra which had later been proven to be altogether untrue or vastly exaggerated. By contrast, Mr. al-sahaf’s statements during the first ten days or so of war had given him a measure of credibility, so people came to believe what he was saying. Reality then overtook him. His claims became ever more fantastical, but ordinary Baghdadis did not realize this until they saw the tanks themselves’.
As for the role played by the Iraqi radio stations during the military operations it was similar to the other media institutions in Iraq. The Iraqi radio reports were identical in terms of achieving great victories, especially in the first week of the invasion. This inspired the Iraqi citizens that there was an unbreakable national cohesion (Baghdad Satellite Channel, 2008). A few days later, the facts began to come out and these reports proved to be false (Baghdad Satellite Channel 2009).

Due to the army operations in Iraq, Iraqi newspapers faced difficulties in distribution and volumes as most shopping centers were closed as a result of the curfew enforced by the Iraqi authorities. Also, most Iraqi civilians’ were in shelters for protection against the bombing and thus they never had a chance to read a newspaper (Baghdad Satellite Channel 2009). However, the Iraqi print media still followed the government lines in presenting fabricated stories regarding Iraqi achievements against the US and allies. This explains why the Iraqi citizens were shocked when they saw U.S and allied troops in the streets of Baghdad in opposition to al Sahaaf’s assertion of fast victory.

7.2.3 IRAQI MEDIA DURING POST – INVASION PHASE

Iraqi media post-occupation focused on covering the events since the fall of Baghdad in April, 2003. The most important event that it covered extensively was the fall of the statue of Saddam Hussein at Freedom Square. This event has been exploited by America to prove its sincerity and the legality of the war and depended on footages of Iraqi civilians showing their full acceptance and agreement of actions undertaken by the US and allies. This highlighted the U.S claims of the invasion as being a war to liberate Iraq from the rogue regime and thus demonstrated that the invasion was a legitimate and legal action. During that time, the Iraqi media entered a new era, where Iraq moved from a media atmosphere entirely dominated by the government to one which included sources controlled by a spectrum of players. Meanwhile, as Coalition forces took control of Baghdad and ended the reign of the Baath party in April 2003, the Iraqi former regime media sources were terminated. Therefore, it can be said that the Iraqi media which arose following the occupation was classified as a ‘diverse media’ (Rugh 2004).
In the period that followed the fall of Baghdad, in which all State institutions were completely dysfunctional, the new Iraqi media were confused and fluctuated in covering the events depending on the political attitudes of the parties controlling such media. This was the situation with the Iraqi media until the Americans took control of it. According to (Allen 2006) as a result of the power vacuum left by the removal of the Saddam Hussein’s regime and with the greater freedom allowed by the US and allies, television stations, newspapers and radio stations sprouted up swiftly all over Iraq. Allen (2006) further indicates that based upon the ownership and financing of these media sources, they can be placed into one of three different categories. The first type of media is governmental. Allen (2006) argues that Coalition forces after the occupation of Iraq realised that it was essential to inform the Iraqi people of the new policies and therefore seek their fulfilment with their vision for the new Iraq.

The second type of Iraqi media which emerged was private and party-oriented. Most political parties were forbidden by the Saddam Hussein government; however, after the overthrow of the regime in 2003 new Iraqi parties were formed and created by Iraqi politicians from both inside Iraq and those returning from aboard. They quickly gathered to establish themselves and their own visions for Iraq in the media market (Allen 2006). The third type was private and truly independent media which aimed to present the era of new Iraq. “These media do retain varying degrees of bias in their coverage of events, but they are not tied to the government or a political party in any major way and are, most importantly, profit-driven, as Allen indicated (2006). For the most part, they look at Iraq and the world from a general Iraqi viewpoint aiming to reach the widest audience possible. During this period, and during the Iraqi election in particular, new multi-sectarian media supported by different conflicting parties belonging to the Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish and other religious and political forces in Iraq began to emerge (Allen 2006). The focus of these media was mainly on the story of the hunt for Saddam Hussein and his prosecution subsequently (Allen 2006). Then they moved to covering the fight between the loyalists to the former Baath regime and the various parties of the Iraqi resistance on one hand, and the American forces and their allies on
the other hand. The Iraqi media had covered the first two elections in line with their own viewpoint; this explains why these media lost their credibility at a later stage (al Qaym 2007).

As for the Iraqi print media that emerged in the period after the U.S. occupation of Iraq in particular, the trends of these media are varied according to their affiliations. Herein below are some illustrative examples:

1. **Baghdad Newspaper**: this paper belonged to the National Reconciliation Movement headed by (Iyad Allawi). It was natural for this paper to support the government formed by Iyad Allawi.

2. **Al-Sabah Newspaper**: an official government newspaper funded by the government and controlled by Shiites, so it covered the events in a manner consistent with the political stance of Shiites and their interests.

3. **Al-Ahali Newspaper**: an independent newspaper funded by an Iraqi-American businessman, Royal Cindy, and his was secular.

4. **Al-Ahali Newspaper 2**: this paper was funded by Naseer Chaderchi / the National Democratic Party. He was pro American. (Al-Rashid Encyclopedia 2009).

The Iraqi radio and TV stations post-occupation were totally reformed due to the change of regime, and the same media have adopted new names and roles in line with the requirements of the new stage. The US government hired a contractor, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), to institute major media outlets in Iraq (Rousu 2010). With their technology and expertise, SAIC founded the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). The Ministry of Information has been replaced with the Iraqi Media Network under the power of the Coalition forces that dominates the Iraqi successive governments. The IMN broadcasts three channels: *Iraqiya TV, Iraqiya TV2* and *Iraqiya Sports TV*. *Al-Iraqiya* was set up in 2003 by SAIC with the intention of establishing a 24-hour news channel. From the beginning *Al-Iraqiya* struggled to maintain trust with Iraqis because it too was seen as a propaganda tool and a spokesperson for Coalition forces.
According to (Badrakhan 2006: 472) many Iraqis have scornfully referred to it as ‘America Television’. The purpose of those who have power over the Iraqi Media Network – namely US and allies coalition- was to terminate the fourth power of the State represented by the Ministry of Information under the pretext that Media Network was a Non-Government Organization and so not subject to the powers of the government, but subject to the power of the Constitution.

The Iraqi TV Corporation, along with all its branches, were replaced with the Al-Iraqiah Satellite channel, which had close links to the government of Iraq since 2004. All the employees of the Iraqi TV Corporation were fired. Some of them were re-employed by the Al-Iraqiah Satellite channel under new terms and conditions and have undergone specific rehabilitation courses so as to be able to serve the agendas of the occupation and Iraqi governments. As for the old staff of the Ministry of information, they have been excluded and deprived of their employment rights. On the other hand, new individuals became involved in the Iraqi media after returning to Iraq from aboard - Iraqi opposition -. For the first time, after April 2003, religious political thought promoting discrimination and discord became involved in the Iraqi media due to its harmony with the thoughts of the parties in power. . Also it is worth noting the common goal shared by all of Iraq’s major political parties and players of setting up private news organizations to endorse their ideologies (Rousu 2010). In his article Iraq: a diverse media Rousu (2010) discusses how religious political thoughts to a certain extent shared the same thoughts of Iraqi political parties aiming to impose their religious objectives on the society.

The role of the Iraqi media in covering the events of the occupation of Iraq (2003) can be summarized in the following points:

1. The role of Iraqi media during the invasion was negative due to the absolute subordination and lack of courage to oppose the Iraqi regime. These media were carrying out the wishes of the Iraqi regime, which made them fail to shed light on the fact that the Iraqi regime was rejecting the military option and that it was fully prepared to accept any peaceful solution to prove that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass
destruction and would allow the international inspection teams to work in Iraq. Mustafa (2006: 282) argues that the Iraqi government media failed to present solid evidence of Iraq’s efforts to cooperate with UN weapons inspections to the point where Iraq could show that it no longer possessed WMD’s, also, the Iraqi media failed to demonstrate that the regime was willing to end the tension with peaceful resolutions, rather, the Iraqi media highlighted the regime’s capability to fight the US and allies. This failure was a result of keeping pace with the official policy of the Iraqi regime. Iraqi media found itself in a state of swinging between the acceptance of a peaceful solution and between the defiance in the media discourse to prove its capabilities in addressing any possible attack. This could be excused and acceptable because the tone of challenge in the Iraqi media aimed to prove ability of Iraq to address any attack and considered at that time as an attempt to avoid a military solution insisted upon by the United States.

2. Iraqi media have succeeded in fabricating fake victories contrary to the reality on the ground. Fabrication of fake victories continued until the last moment. Those who followed up the speeches and statements of al Sahaf could not accept defeat as true, even after seeing the fall of Saddam’s statue.

7.3 ARABIC MEDIA AND THE IRAQ INVASION 2003

The performance of Arabic media in covering the war on Iraq (2003) was dissimilar. This performance can be examined during three stages (before, during and after the war). Many governmental Arabic media as well as those funded by some Arab countries have adopted the official stance of their own states where all news coverage, reports, investigations, articles, and media programs have reflected the policy and attitude of these States toward the war and the Iraqi regime as well. Or as Irani (2007) put it ‘the influence of Arab authoritarian regimes is so pervasive that even independent media outlets will tend to reflect the official line’.
Generally, it was obvious that most Arab governmental media was in opposition to any military actions against Iraq (Al-Jarad 2004: pp. 17-19), but it was not against Saddam Hussein in many cases, especially concerning his stance on the occupation of Kuwait. Despite the dissatisfaction with international resolutions, Saddam Hussein was calling the Arab world to unite against the U.S desire to control the region which would be achieved through invading Iraq and deposing his regime. Saddam Hussein stressed that Iraq had complied with the U.N inspections team and acted upon the desire of the international community in terms of disarming Iraq WMD’s. Saddam’s arguments were in favor of avoiding possible U.S. strikes against his country, in addition to his fear for the interests of the Arab nation, and the possibility of exposing the neighboring Arab countries to danger (Mustafa 2006: 282). The Arab media was eagerly following up debates between the members of the WMD Search Team on the one hand and the U.S. officials on the other hand. This situation created a state of anticipation and stillness in the Arab World despite the political success achieved by the Arab media (Aldnani 2007: 211). While there were so many demonstrations in different parts of the world condemning the U.S stance on Iraq the Arab world was in a state of absolute stillness. In that period, the official Arabic media complained of the injustice of U.S polices and also highlighted the injustice of the economic sanctions which had made the Iraqi people suffer for years. The Arabic media not only blamed the West, particularly the U.S, for the negative consequences of the invasion upon the Iraqi people, but also blamed both the Iraqi President and the U.N (Aldnani 2007).

7.3.1 ARABIC MEDIA IN THE PRE-INVASION PHASE

During this stage, the attitudes of the Arabic media in covering the occupation on Iraq were dissimilar. These attitudes followed the political stances adopted by their states on the war against Iraq. For instance, Kuwait and Qatar never opposed a military attack against Iraq and were willing to provide support and assistance to any military action to overthrow the Iraqi regime, whereas most media in the Arabic countries (such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Egypt) were against any attack on Iraq and its sovereignty (Baghdad TV Channel 2009).
Furthermore, during the period leading up to the invasion ‘official, semi-official local media, and media produced abroad adopted the stated official positions of their respective governments’ (Irani 2007: 36). Thus, to a large extent, most editorials and news items mirrored the viewpoints and policies of their Arabic leaders towards the conditions in Iraq. It is worth noting, that the Arabic countries were aware of the anger of the U.S government and American public opinion following the attacks upon American soil in 2001. However, the Arabic countries never attempted to challenge the Arabic public by supporting any U.S military actions against Iraq (Irani 2007: 36).

Irani (2007: 36) further indicates that Arabic media ‘clearly had an unplanned consensus against an American invasion of Iraq’. This consensus according to Irani was formed because of: (1) the massive antiwar demonstrations in several western countries against military choice, and (2) the US actions towards Iraq would take place without explicit authorization of the United Nations Security Council. This explains the attitudes of government controlled media outlets, in countries that have bad relations with the US, such as Syria-in rejecting any intervention in Iraq.

The Arabic official media consensus against the coalition’s attempted military actions toward Iraq was obvious; however, according to Irani support for Saddam Hussein was minimal and the focus of policy makers and Arabic leaders was on blaming him for the awful situations in Iraq. They requested Saddam Hussein to fully cooperate with U.N weapons inspectors’ teams to avoid any U.S military strikes against the Iraqi people. Irani (2007: 36) further argues that:

‘News reports and analyses intensely followed the work of the United Nations investigations team in Iraq, as well as the discussions and disagreements between the Iraqi regime and the White House. At the time that antiwar demonstrations were beginning to occur in several European and American cities, voices in the Arab world calling for support of Iraq were awakening the political silence and ensuring public support for Iraq’.

Before the invasion most of the Arabic media focused on the suffering of the Iraqi people, however, as noted by Irani (2007) the Arabic media ‘failed to influence the public to the extent that it could become an active player on the
political scene’ p. 36. There was a hidden secret behind this planned failure, as the goal of the official and semi-official Arabic media, driven by local governments, was unwillingly aimed to not cause public confusion. This was explained by Irani (2007: 36) who argues that ‘Arabic regimes were willing to mobilize respective public opinions only to such an extent that it would divert people’s attention from the dismal state of the economy and the constant abuses of human rights in their own countries’.

The attitudes of the Arabic media were changeable according to the stages of the conflict. Many of the media that took positions in favor of the war before it started, such as the Kuwaiti and some Saudi Arabian media outlets changed their attitudes toward the occupation after the scandals and crimes committed against the Iraqi people by the occupation forces during and after the war. After several human rights violations committed by the American forces in Iraq, especially the Abu Ghraib prison scandal (where prisoners were savagely tortured and sexually assaulted), the image of the American soldier was no longer as good as it was before the invasion. Many media outlets within the same country started to have different attitudes depending on the extent of their subordination to the political regime. The government’s Arabic media had different roles from the Non-government media. The disparity also depended on the location of these media outlets. The difference in functional roles between Arabic media located abroad and those located within the Arab world was clear (Shaaban 2004). For instance, London-based newspapers such as AL Sharq AL Awsat and AL Sharq and AL Hayat which were established ‘by a number of businesspersons who try to take a liberal position towards local issues, but without crossing the line’ (Irani 2007: 35). It can be said that both AL Sharq AL Awsat and AL Hayat blamed Saddam Hussein for the suffering caused to the Iraqi people and argued that Saddam Hussein should fully cooperate and comply with the international demands to disarm; at the same time the two newspapers rejected any military actions against Iraq and requested peaceful resolution for the conflict (Shaaban 2004).

The role of the Arabic media during the pre-occupation was changeable depending on the nature of those media, the role of the government media being different from the role of the Non-government media and depending on
the stance of their countries. As for the government media in Kuwait and Qatar, for example, they were less severe in their condemnation of the U.S. preparations for the invasion of Iraq and showed strong support for U.S. military action against Iraq. These media used to criticize Saddam Hussein for his position and accused him of playing games with U.N’s WMD inspectors. Certainly, this attitude was derived from the official position of the two countries, which sought Saddam Hussein’s removal from power. As for TV shows on the Arabic satellite channels, they continued to broadcast intensive entertainment programs and regular shows aiming to withdraw attention from concerns regarding the Iraqi issues (Al-Azzawi 2010).

Opposition media, such as newspapers and electronic websites belonging to the various political parties, took different positions from the government and those positions have differed also among themselves. Some of them fully supported the Iraqi President and his regime and blamed the Arabic regimes that abandoned Iraq while some of them just showed support to the Iraqi regime and its position against the American threats. A major Arabic media outlet which expressed full support of Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and considered him to be the legitimate president of Iraq, was the London – based al Quads al Arabi which constantly claimed that Iraq would be a graveyard for the Americans and another Vietnam, if it thought to invade Iraq (Hassanein 2005)

In the meantime, a new issue had emerged the scandal of the Iraqi oil vouchers. It was reported that the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had distributed such vouchers to some Arab journalists, writers and members of the People’s Council to adopt the official Iraqi position, and to incite the Arabian people against their rulers, Arabic regimes and the Western counties and their associates in general. While the government media took unchanged positions, the Opposition changed positions from time to time, sometimes they blamed Saddam Hussein and sometimes they blamed the Arabic regimes, the United States, Israel and even the United Nations. The opposition media followed up the European-American officials' visits to gain international support and give legitimacy to the intended campaign that had been prepared for the attack on Iraq.
The opposing newspapers such as: Al Quads Al Arabi and al Thawrah newspaper in Syria were very skeptical about reports on Iraqi links to al-Qaeda, and accused the U.S. Administration, Arabic intelligence services and the Israeli Mossad of making up these stories and described the whole issue as a conspiracy against the Arabic and Islamic nations. The opposition forces were located in a few Arabian countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia. Although the opposition activities were marginalized and neglected in those countries - except for Lebanon, the opposition had a stronger influence than those in the Arab Gulf states, Morocco and Sudan (Hassanein 2005).

With reference to the Arab media abroad, they had different positions on the issue of the Iraq invasion. Some of them considered the invasion to be necessary, where others saw no reason to attack Iraq and that everything that was happening was the result of renewed colonial ambitions and a new imperialism represented by the U.S. Finally, some parties unreservedly supported the Americans.

As for the media that had a larger margin of freedom such as Al Quads Al Arabi newspaper and Aljazeera, although they were funded by the Government of Qatar, they could be considered as opposition media in view of the fact that their positions stemmed mainly from their own declared policies since inception, which tended to oppose the local and foreign policies of the Arabic regimes. Most of those media supported any military attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, while some others called him a hero for facing the U.S. imperialism, and described him as the only Arab leader who had the courage to fight the U.S and Israel.

As for the government newspapers in the Gulf, which relied mainly on the reports of the international news agencies, they gave an impression as if they took a neutral position however; this coincided with the American intensive military preparations in the region. In some cases, this neutral position turned into harsh criticism against President Saddam Hussein, but they did not go beyond that point to support the military attack on Iraq.

Although the Iraqi regime accused some Arabic satellite channels of conspiring with the Americans, especially the government ones; there were a lot of Arab
satellite channels that fought for the truth and lost reporters in the battle field for this goal. In the war, many Arabic satellite channels made a great effort, proving that they were strong competitors to the Western satellite channels, and demonstrated real neutrality and professionalism and so broke the monopoly of foreign channels in covering the events. For example, the Al Jazeera News Network took a clear policy since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. This channel, a forum for those who opposed U.S. policies gave room for Americans to express their opinion through interviews conducted with various members of the American Administration in that period, and left the audience to judge the attitudes. Aljazeera was the main channel of communication used by extremist organizations to air their statements, including al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. On the other hand, this channel had been hosting American officials to comment on the events freely despite the fact that the channel itself was against any attack on the Iraq, and even though the political stance of the State of Qatar that hosted the channel was contrary to the trends of the channel.

As for the role of the Arabic radio stations in the pre-occupation period, it is well known that the Arabic States Broadcasting System needed a joint Arabic effort to lay the foundations for a developed and modern approach away from the propaganda method that relies on the exaggeration in editing the news to serve the interests of their governments, thus it can be argued that most of Arabic radio stations followed their government’s attitudes in either supporting the invasion or supporting Saddam Hussein (Mari 2006: 162). The role played by the Arabic radio stations is similar to the role of the Arabic print media and the satellite channels. In respect of the Arabic private media, they were more daring in criticizing the U.S. Administration in terms of the war and supported the former Iraqi President in his determination to take action against any American aggression.

**7.3.2 ARABIC MEDIA DURING THE MILITARY ATTACK**

At this stage, most of the efforts of the Arabic media came together in addressing the attack, attempting to influence the international public opinion through broadcasting the repercussions of the brutal war led by the coalition
forces. It showed pictures of innocent victims who had died or were injured through the targeting of civilian sites. The outbreak of the war and the many Iraqi civilian casualties due to the continuous bombing of the inhabited areas unified most of the Arabic media for the first time in years. According to Irani (2007: 37) most of the official Arabic media had forgotten their initial position on the war, which started when the US and allies targeted Iraq with heavy bombing on March the 17th, 2003. Irani indicates that news in Arab media to a large extent was reported in a neutral manner, however, Irani illustrates a leading Egyptian newspaper Al Ihram as being biased. Al Ihram published several photos and articles reminding the public of Saddam Hussein’s crimes against his own people. Irani (2007: 37) further writes that ‘other newspapers opened their pages to the Iraqi opposition, which expressed their support for the arrival of US-led liberation troops to Iraq’.

After one week of army operations in Iraq, the Arabic government media started to shed light on the losses and misery of the Iraqi people (Irani, 2007: 37). This attitude was explained by Irani (2007: 37) as being ‘a message from Arab regimes to their respective people, their objective was to show how much their people would suffer if they ever thought of taking a helping hand from the US against their own rulers’.

Nevertheless, during this period some official Arab media such as Al Ihram, an Egyptian daily newspaper started to highlight the significance of liberating Iraq through posting articles about the liberation. (ibid: 37). The behavior of this official Arabic media can be explained by understanding the hidden agenda of such regimes; two factors were involved in presenting the issue of “New Iraq” according to Irani (2007: 37) the Arab leaders aimed to (1) qualify the outlet of their media as being a strong evidence of freedom of speech, and (2) overcome the dilemma with the US government caused by the Iraq war ‘it was a problem of regimes not wanting to lose face with the US government by openly allowing their official media to criticize American policy while also wanting to show their public what it really meant to face the same fate as Iraq’.
On the other hand, some Arab media, manly in Yemen and Syria, highlighted the Iraqi regime’s imminent victory against the U.S and the allies. The media outlets in both Yemen and Syria employed Saddam Hussein’s statements that appeared shortly after the start of military operations which indicated that the U.S and allies would face ‘fierce resistance’ and ‘Iraq would be an American soldier’s graveyard, another Vietnam’, to assure viewers of the fortitude of the Iraqi army and also to confuse any news of the advance of coalition troops on Iraqi soil (ibid: 37). These media also utilized the appearances of Iraq’s Minister of Information, Mohammed Saied Al Sahaf to achieve affirmation that Iraq would easily defeat the coalition forces (Miller 2004:214). To a large extent, the Arabic official media during the beginning of army operations against Iraq started to ‘cheer the Iraqi resistance’ intensively (Irani 2007: 37), Saddam Hussein also was highly supported in the Arabic media, which started to assert his right to defend Iraq against foreign aggression (ibid: 37). Most of the Arabic media raised the issue of the illegal actions against a sovereign country, and the lack of UN Council’s explicit authorization to invade Iraq. Consequently the US government was described as being an outlaw country because it launched an attack without respecting the international law umbrella, and that it was morally mistaken as it targeted civilian targets in Iraq causing deaths among Iraqi people (Miller 2004:214). Depending on arguments that demonstrated the unlawful actions against Iraq either morally or legally, both Al Quds Al Arabi and Al Jazeera TV channel opposed the military actions against Iraq and offered endless support to the Iraqi regime, but in the meantime never aimed to confront the media outlets in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Irani 2007 : 37).

Arguing that the majority of the Arabic media supported the Iraqi regime does not mean the disappearance of the voices that supported the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian government and private media intensively supported the overthrow of the corrupt regime in Iraq and thus were in favor of the coalition led attack upon Saddam’s government (Al-Jarad 2004).

Unsurprisingly, a few weeks after the invasion, a state of ‘Arab collective unconsciousness and disinterested’ (Irani 2007 : 38) was created causing Arab viewers to be obligated to ‘become passive viewers’ (ibid: 38). This attitude
according to Irani, resulted from two factors (1) the media in the Arab world gradually ‘seemed to be getting back to in business as usual’ (ibid: 38), it started to broadcast entertainment shows, meanwhile, the war in Iraq was given less importance as far as presenting reports and analysis concerning the Iraqi matter, and(2) most Arabian viewers were from the middle class and thus they never had the chance to obtain the correct and trustworthy news as they ‘could not use the research to get the relevant information’ (ibid:38).

It can be argued that the Arabic media during the first week of the invasion was divided into two groups. One opposed the U.S led attack upon Saddam Hussein’s regime and was fully supportive of the Iraqi regime (Yemen, Syria, Sudan, labia, Lebanon), with the media outlets in these countries blaming other Arab countries of being ‘betrayers’ and ‘disgraceful’(ibid: 38). The second, was media that supported the coalition forces against Saddam Hussein’s regime (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates). The media outlets in these countries highlighted the urgent need to overthrow the Iraqi regime and supported government policies in welcoming the US and the allies troops in their countries in cases where bases were needed to target the Iraqi forces (Tahan 2006).

The media outlets in Arab countries that supported Saddam Hussein’s regime were accused by media outlets in Arab countries that supported the regime change policy in Iraq of being biased and lacking objectivity in handling the Iraqi matter. This, as Irani writes, was due to the Iraqi oil-coupons scandal which arose again in the media during the beginning of the army operations against Iraq. Irani (2007: 38) further indicates that:

‘Intelligence leaks showed that certain opposition writers, journalists, and influential opinion makers appeared on lists of people who were benefiting from a financial system established by Saddam Hussein. They were being bribed to support and polish the image of the Iraqi dictator, his regime, and his family and to adopt the official Iraqi opposition’.

7.3.3 ARABIC MEDIA IN THE POST- INVASION PHASE

The Arabic media had different positions with respect to the American occupation of Iraq. This has been examined previously in this chapter, it is clear
that there were two groups of media among the Arab countries, one supported Saddam’s regime, whereas, the second fully agreed upon immediate overthrow of the Iraqi regime. By April 9th, Baghdad was captured and fully controlled by US and coalition forces (Alfahed 2008). This was a major surprise to Arabic viewers but not to the Western countries public who knew that Saddam Hussein’s regime would collapse eventually in front of the U.S and the allies troops, (Lynch 2006) ‘News about the capture of Baghdad, on 9 April, was not a surprise to the public in Europe and the US. It was, however, shocking and disturbing to the Arab viewers’ (ibid: 38). Shockingly, regardless of the fall of Baghdad, one day after the collapse, the Arabic media which had supported the Iraqi regime, continued to broadcast reports on Iraqi victories against the coalition forces through its TV satellite channels, meanwhile, newspapers columns continued supporting the Iraqi regime by arguing that Saddam Hussein’s regime was still in power, and that the fall of Baghdad was a big fabricated U.S rumor. However, due to the Arabic media massive shock at the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, it can be said that the Arabic media was to a large extent ‘perplexed’ (ibid: 38). In expressing the Arab and Iraqi public attitude after the fall of Baghdad, Irani (38-39) points that:

‘Public opinion was profoundly misled by the Iraqi regime’s slick propaganda. The ordinary Arab viewer in a country like Egypt had hoped that conquering Baghdad would not happen and many were sure that the notorious Iraqi Special Republican Guards would teach the US a lesson(...)TV coverage of US soldiers toppling the big statue of Saddam in central Baghdad brought apparent feelings of shock, anger, and disappointment. Some, however, were pleased to see ordinary Iraqi people spontaneously spit and hit the symbol of ruthlessness and brutality. A few Arab newspapers accused the US Army of staging the scene. Arab journalists criticized western media of biased and unfair reporting by showing off a few Iraqis dancing with joy on television while millions of others were suffering and not allowed to complain’.

Arabic media was forced to deal with unpredictable situations that could not be handled, as events were moving rapidly in Iraq (Alfahed 2008). This was due to the unexpected collapse of the Iraqi regime and the failure of the Iraqi forces to resist the coalition forces which entered Baghdad, marking the end of
Saddam’s era (Alfahed 2008). Accordingly, the Arabic media was in a state of uncertainty regarding situations in Iraq. Irani (2007: 39) indicates that ‘everything was moving at high speed, and news of the anarchy was more appealing to the average Arab reader than news about politics. Revenge killings were constant, and looting public property occurred for several days’. This, according to (Irani 2007 : 39) led all Arabic media outlets at that stage to emphasize ‘the state of lawlessness in Iraq’. Most Arab newspaper writers, in their efforts to highlight the urgent need to restore peace in Iraq, insisted on reinstating law and order and handing power to the Iraqi people. They demanded rapid progression to be undertaken by the US and allies (Alfahed,2008). The US ignored the voices that requested immediate restoration for law and order in Iraq, and so attracted some Arabic media to link the disorder in Iraq with the occupation forces (Irani 2007 : 39).

Immediately after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, insurgency emerged in Baghdad and in some Iraqi cities. According to Irani, the common belief about the background of the insurgents was ‘that they were members of the former Iraqi police force, military and governmental figures left jobless following Paul Bremer’s decision to dismantle all Iraqi services, such as the army and police’. However, some argue that the insurgents that appeared after the collapse of the regime were rooted in Iraqi groups that had supported Saddam Hussein and thus they aimed to resist the occupation force hoping that Saddam Hussein would gather strength and force the U.S and allies out of Iraq (Miller 2004). Due to the insurgency efforts against the U.S and allies, the Iraqi resistance was a perfect opportunity for the Arabic media to invest in heavy reports and coverage to satisfy the Arabic public. Irani (2007: 39) offers a perfect explanation of why the Arabic media performed in such a manner:

‘Generally most Arabs were hoping to see Iraq become an American graveyard, not because they liked Saddam or cared for the Iraqi people but rather they hated (or to extent, envied) the US. The insurgency that started to operate with sporadic acts of violence was the public’s last hope of humiliating the invaders’.
Dealing with the insurgency issue in Iraq highlighted the differences between the independent Arabic media and the official media in handling the approval of the insurgents’ acts in Iraq. As for the independent Arabic media it gave extensive moral support to the insurgency in Iraq and ‘praised its deeds against American and coalition forces’ (Irani 2007: 39). Whereas, the official Arabic media ‘took a cautious stand in its news reports’ (ibid: 39). Official Arabic media behavior towards the insurgents was driven by the knowledge of the background of the jihadist Islamists and their resistance principles, thus, the Arabic official media described their resistance acts with considerations that those jihadist were the same groups that had been persecuted and oppressed during Saddam Hussein’s era. However, at a later stage the Arabic official media started to give the insurgents a ‘nationalistic dye and tried to justify their cause as resisting a foreign presence in their country’ (ibid:39). El-Nawawyy in describing the way in which most Arab media treated the acts of the insurgents in Iraq indicates that, ‘when an Iraqi cab driver blew up his taxi, killing four US soldiers at a checkpoint... he was described as a “terrorist” by US networks and a “freedom fighter” by most Arab networks’ (El-Nawawyy, quoted in Lynch 2006: 191).  

Meanwhile, most of the Arabic media, after the collapse of the former Iraqi regime, started to blame the administration of the coalition forces for not providing the minimum conditions of security and order in Iraq (Irani 2007: 39). In response to the anarchic situations in Iraq, the Arabic media started to shed light on the horrific circumstances of the Iraqi people and their living conditions with devastated infrastructure and their ‘lack of legal government services’ (ibid:39). Arabic official media started to heavily attack the US and coalition forces presence in Iraq, meanwhile, independent Arab media started to criticize the US policy in Iraq:

43 For more insightful details on the way in which various Arab media handled the insurgency issue in Iraq after the collapse of the former Iraqi regime refer to: Lynch, M. Voices of the New Arab voices: Iraq, Al-Jazerra, and Middle East politics today. New York: Columbia University Press.2006. pp230-235.
‘Official media in several Arab countries busily posted articles that showed how miserable the situation could be under a foreign occupation. They used every opportunity to emphasize the believe that Iraqis were actually better off under their former ruler than the present chaos. Independent media outlets based outside the Arab world were fiercely attacking US Government policy and defining the situation in Iraq as a major failure’ (ibid: 39).

The Arabic media shifted its attention from the chaos and insurgency in Iraq to the capture of the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. On the 14th of December 2003, the US announced that it had captured Saddam Hussein and broadcast videos and images of Hussein’s arrest. US broadcasting channels along with some other international TV satellite channels aired images with reports that indicated news stories of an ‘old, weak, and tired man getting out of a rat-like hole’ (ibid:39). This was a ‘turning point for much of the Arab-speaking media’ (ibid: 39). Most of Arabic media considered the event as being shameful, not only for Saddam Hussein himself or his own people, but to the entire Muslim world. Arabic media viewers who had previously respected Saddam Hussein as being a national hero shifted their thoughts and hoped that Hussein had killed himself rather than be captured in such a humiliating manner (ibid: 39; Hassanein, 2005). The capture event seemed as if it crushed any ‘hopes of restoring Iraq to where it was before the fall of Saddam’ (ibid: 39).

In covering the capture of the Saddam Hussein event, the Arabic media, in general, viewed the capture in three different narratives: (1) ‘that the Americans had faked the capture story to destroy his image as an idol to many youth; (2) others gave his capture a religious meaning. They portrayed Saddam in the hole as the Prophet Muhammad hiding in a cave to escape the hunt of the infidels; and (3) Saddam Hussein getting out of the hole with the holy Quran in his right hand’ (ibid: 40). Arab viewers to a certain extent believed some of these narratives, however, and due to the reports broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, they started to realize that the thoughts they held about the courage of Saddam Hussein had been erased consequent to the dishonorable capture, Arab viewers started to turn their backs on Saddam Hussein and started to believe the US news regarding the capture.
The Arabic media which supported the U.S attack upon Saddam Hussein’s regime in its coverage of the chase, arrest and then the trial of the former Iraqi president have portrayed America as a hero who freed the suppressed Iraqi people (Hassanein 2005). While the Arabic media which supported the former Iraqi regime showed endless sympathy with the Iraqi president and demonstrated that the trial was unfair and carried out by the enemies of the regime without complete evidence (Hassanein 2005). Meanwhile, most of the Arabic media showed extensive sympathy during the incident of the murder of Uday and Qusay, the two sons of President Saddam; it considered it to be a savage act undertaken by the US administration. (ibid). Nevertheless, the Arabic media treatment of the trial of Saddam Hussein can be described as being divided into several groups, where media outlets failed to follow a clear position about the trial. This according to (Irani:40) was a reason for the Arab’s ‘mixed feelings towards the deposed Iraqi dictator. Saddam was not a national hero and even those who were striving to show him in a positive light could not ignore his hideous deeds’.

After the Iraqi elections that took place on January the 30th, 2005, most of the Arabic media which supported the ‘Iraqi resistance’ by loyalists of Saddam Hussein and his regime shifted their attitudes (Alfahe 2008). The reason behind this shift was related to the Arabic media’s motivation to be seen as sympathizing with the Iraqi people in order to satisfy its own citizens who started to blame the media for being supportive of the insurgency acts in Iraq (ibid). But this media lost its balance and became confused because it was faced with two groups that needed satisfaction: the first the Iraqi people, and the second the loyalists of the former Iraqi regime who conducted the insurgency operations against both the Iraqis and the Americans (Alfahe 2008). Due to the way in which the Arabic media covered the Iraqi elections, the Arab public did not understand the Iraqi elections, also, the Arab people ‘seemed disinterested in the American’s celebration in holding them’ (Irani 2007:40). Irani (2007: 40) described the way in which the Arabic media handled the Iraqi elections by arguing that:
‘Even those that did understand the value of freely choosing government leadership were skeptical about elections held under occupation of a foreign power. The few that believed in American democracy were elated to see the elections occur and succeed despite the challenges. Apart from the Iraqi media, the Arab media gave little focus to public opinion’.

Variation in the Arabic media has continued in covering the events of Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices and other suicide bombings claimed by different groups within Iraq on one hand, and the coverage of the Iraqi elections on the other hand (Alfahed 2008). While most of the Arabic media were attempting to influence the Arab’s public opinion by arousing the feelings of Arabic nationalism and Islamic identity, some of the Arabic media described the violence associated with the Iraqi elections and directed against the Iraqi people as being ‘resistant’ against the invaders, namely, the US and allies (ibid). Whereas, the Arabic media which supported the US and allies praised the election and described it as an advanced step towards democracy and freedom (ibid).

In the light of this situation, the Arabic media that opposed the occupation, found itself in a state of instability and uncertainty. Sometimes they supported the so-called resistance, and sometimes they stopped describing the suicide bombings as martyrdom acts when such acts targeted the Iraqis. These media have used different expressions such as violence, gunmen and groups of resistance to describe the violent acts (ibid).

Regarding the role played by the Arabic print media in Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Jordan in the post-occupation period, they focused on the distinction between legitimate armed resistance against the occupation forces and criminal acts. With reference to the Iraqi elections, the Arabic media had changeable positions. The opposing newspapers and the private newspapers confirmed that the Iraqi election was not legitimate because it was conducted under the control of an occupying authority. Some of the opposing media have attacked the official Arab stance, which fully supported the Iraqi elections and considered this election the best possible solution to the crisis in Iraq. Although funded by the government of Qatar, AlQuds Al-Arabi can be placed among the Arab print media that opposed the occupation, since its position stemmed
mainly from policies adopted since start of the UN weapons inspection in Iraq, and thus it was clear that both AlQuds Al-Arabi and Al-Jazeera would follow the same policy of rejecting any military acts against Iraq (Hassanein 2005). The majority of the Arabic print media rejected any military attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, while some others described him as a hero in facing American imperialism and considered him the only Arab leader who stood up in the face of the United States and Israel (Hassanein 2005).

The Arabic newspapers which opposed the invasion of Iraq, were very skeptical about reports on Iraqi links to al-Qaeda, and accused the U.S. Administration, Arab intelligence services and the Israeli Mossad of allegations and fabrications and described the whole issue as a conspiracy (Irani 2007:38). The opposing Arabic newspapers went further to even highlight the Arabic public sphere which was driven by assumptions that ‘the whole story was an abstract conspiracy aiming to destroy what was left of Arab and Islamic pride’ (ibid:38).

Most of the Arabic TV channels did not have the courage to express their opinions freely, because of government restrictions that forced TV’s stations to follow its lines and agendas. As a result, most Arabic TV channels were limited to expressing their sympathy with the Iraqi people. In some cases, these channels broadcasted the brutal activities of occupation, and some other cases they show the joy and celebrations of some Iraqis for the overthrow of the former regime as if it was the case with the entire Iraqi people. The role of the Arabic TV channels such as Al Jazeera was effective and successful in covering the events. Al Jazeera demonstrated professionalism and seriousness in performing its job and has ended the foreign monopoly in covering the events that occurred in the Gulf War II by relying on CNN. Aljazeera has been keen, throughout the Iraqi crisis until the present time, to deliver the political messages to viewers by providing the audience with latest news shaped by professionalism and credibility; this allowed the channel to effectively compete in the international media arena (Al-Shammari 2007, p. 121). These channels became a major source for the international satellite channels and news agencies (ibid).
As for the role of the Arabic radio stations in the post-war period, the opposition voice was heard from a few radio stations in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia. Although the opposition activities were marginalized and neglected in those countries -except for Lebanon- this opposition had a stronger impact and influence than those in the radio stations in the Arab Gulf states, Morocco and Sudan (Hassanein 2005).

With reference to the Arab radio stations abroad, they had differed on the issue of the Iraq invasion. Some of them believed that invasion was a necessary action, whereas other media asserted that there was no reason to attack Iraq and that Iraq invasion to a large extent was a result of the renewed colonial ambitions and new imperialism represented in the United States (ibid).

In short, the role of the Arabic media in covering the events associated with the occupation of Iraq (2003) during the three mentioned stages (Before, during and after the war) can be summarized in the following points:

1. The role of the Arabic media in the pre-occupation phase had changeable positions depending on the mass media themselves. The private media had a different role than the government media. The newspapers in the Gulf States, for instance, depended on the international news agencies in covering the event during this period. Concerning other Arabic TV channels, they made a tremendous effort in broadcasting the truth of events in Iraq, such as the Aljazeera TV channel, which exceeded the effort made by foreign channels in terms of covering news.

2. The Arabic media, in general, united against the invasion in the first week of the war due to sympathy with the Iraqi people. Afterwards, this media began to differ according to the political stances of the different Arab countries they represented. As for the private media, it was on the side of the Iraqi regime throughout the military attack.

3. The role of the Arabic media in the post-occupation phase has completely varied due to the surprises of the Iraqi invasion. Therefore, the role of the Arabic media varied many times during this period. We
find, for instance, some government media such as media outlets in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia, at the beginning of the war, sympathizing with the Iraqi regime. But, as soon as Baghdad fell, some Arabic media started to support the occupation, but then opposed the occupation, mainly, after the exposition of the scandals committed by the invaders against the Iraqi people. While the government media in the Arab Gulf supported the military attack, some other private media such as the Al Jazeera channel maintained their stance in opposing the occupation.

7.4 JORDANIAN MEDIA’S COVERAGE OF THE IRAQ INVASION 2003

Jordan has adopted a consistent policy towards various Arab, regional and international crises, trying to take a neutral stance toward those crises and taking into account to some extent the aspirations of the Jordanian public opinion which effect the foreign policy of Jordan, and at the same time not to get involved in open hostility with the United States and its allies. The role of the Jordanian media did not change throughout the three stages of the crisis before, during and after the war on Iraq (Dulaimi 2008: 12).

Although this role has differed somewhat in the wording of the news from one stage to another, it has been extremely neutral in the period that preceded the war and then tended to sympathize with the Iraqi side due to the aggressiveness of the military attack against the Iraq people. After the fall of Baghdad and the occupation forces completely controlled the country, the Jordanian media role returned to neutrality once again. It is possible to describe the role of the Jordanian media as a neutral one with a tendency to favour the Iraqi regime. This was noticed with the Jordanian media which highlighted the negative American acts in the three stages of the occupation of Iraq (2003). In doing so, the Jordanian media employed a neutral position through using words and terms that do not harm any of the parties to the war.
7.4.1 THE ROLE OF THE JORDANIAN MEDIA IN THE PRE-INFRINGEMENT PHASE

The Jordanian media has demonstrated a neutral stance during the period that preceded the outbreak of the war. With respect to the semi-governmental media such as Jordan TV, Radio of Jordan and even the printed media, such as Alrai and Ad-Dustour Newspapers, it approached the crisis in a manner that satisfied the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi people, also, the US and allies. Occasionally, the Jordanian government media used to underline the right of Iraq to agree on the inspection procedures, and sometimes go along with the American and the international position, which stated that Iraq needed to commit itself fully and unconditionally by allowing WMD’s search teams to enter Iraq and Iraq’s full compliance with international legitimacy. Jordanian media started to insist during the conduct of the inspections in Iraq that the war was about to outbreak as a result of American insistence and the hardness of the Iraqi position. The Jordanian media satisfied both the Iraqi and the US, by clarifying the justifications for the war and emphasizing the right of Iraq to maintain its sovereignty. This policy was shaped because of the Jordan geographic location between two hot conflicts in the Middle East (Al-Dulaimi 2008:12). Jordan is practically located not only between the two biggest conflicts in the Middle East, but in the whole world, namely Iraq and Palestine. This geographical location forced Jordan to play this role (Al-Mosa 2009:21).

The role of the Jordanian print media in the pre-invasion phase is represented in topics and reports of the semi-government and Non-government newspapers on the events taking place before the outbreak of the war. The main newspapers in Jordan are Al-Rai, and Ad-Dustour (semi-government newspapers) and Al-Ghad and Al-Arab Alyoum (Non-government newspapers). These papers had the same position in terms of opposing the war on Iraq even though the stance of the Non-government newspapers was more pronounced than the government ones.

It is worth noting that King Abdullah the second clearly rejected the invasion of Iraq in 2003, accordingly, the media discourse in Jordan functioned to adopt the anti-war attitude which supported the Iraqi regime. On April 4, 2003, Al-Rai newspaper published in its front page a speech by king Abdullah in which he
asserted that ‘we are in harmony with ourselves and our people who rejected and condemned Iraq's invasion’ (Al-Rai 04-04-2003). These words indicate that the harmony between the official views of the King and the public existed and demonstrates that Jordan rejected military options against Iraq.

The opposition voices of the Iraq invasion were evident in Jordanian media. Ad-Dustour, the second Jordanian newspaper published an editorial that highlighted anti-war voices in the U.S. The article also reads ‘Hollywood, in a crowd of more than a hundred of Hollywood celebrities gathered to protest the U.S. attack on Iraq, Martin Sheen is likely the best known representative doing the role of President of the United States on television advising the chief of staff, saying: "Give Peace a Chance"’ (Ad-Dustour, 12-12-2002).

Ibrahim Al-Absi, one of Ad-Dustour newspaper’s highest ranked columnists in an opening article entitled America will pay the price emphasized that ‘The responsibility of the Arab governments and the opposition in the Arab world, beside the Islamic and nationalism forces at this time is to realize the catastrophic results of the American aggression on Iraq’ (Ad-Dustour, 5-12-2002). It is clear that Al- Absi aimed at warning the U.S administration of any action against Iraq as it would be defeated. He also highlighted the aggression and the outcome of such action upon the Iraqi people who suffered during the sanctions. According to him the U.S aggression is not solely directed against Iraq but it would also harm the Arab states and Islamic countries.

In February 2003, Ibrahim Al-Absi in his opening article in Ad-Dustour newspaper entitled one hundred years of violence highlighted the aggression acts of the U.S proclaimed democracy towards the world. He further indicated that ‘It is no longer acceptable to see that the United States continues to cry for peace, security, democracy, and freedom of the world, while this country has become more of a threat to international peace and security, and the first enemy to the principles of freedom, justice, and democracy’ (Ad-Dustour, 01-02-2003). In this article the writer aimed at attacking the allegations presented by the U.S administration which indicated that the Iraq invasion was necessary to establish democracy and security in Iraq. Al – Absi refuted these claims by
arguing that the U.S was actually the major enemy of freedom, justice and democracy and that the U.S in fact is a threat to international peace and security.

A study conducted by Al-Dulaimi highlighted the severity of the American bad image in Al-Rai and Al-Arab Alyoum newspapers (2008:13). Al-Dulaimi found that both papers Al-Rai (semi-government) and Al-Arab Alyoum (Non-government) were very harsh in underlining the awful behavior of the U.S and allies. On the role of the Jordanian TV channels in the pre-occupation of Iraq (2003), which was represented in the Jordanian television coverage of the events, it was similar to the role played by the newspapers. It was an impartial stance and tended to justify the position of Iraq and show the bad image of the U.S through its commitment to broadcast any news referring to the responsiveness of Iraq with the resolutions of the international legitimacy, underline the American's insistence on choosing a military solution as a response to the announced willingness by Iraqi President, the Iraqi Minister of information’s commitment to address any military attack, and the likelihood that Iraq would be a graveyard for its enemies (Al-Dulaimi 2008)

Jordanian television was keen to highlight the negotiation rounds between Iraq and the UN’s WMD’s team within the news bulletin, which was broadcast at the specified times. Jordanian TV was able to deliver the idea that the occurrence of war on Iraq was inevitable due to the insistence of the United States to provide a justification for war (Al-Dulaimi 2008).

As for the role of the Jordanian radio stations in the pre-occupation, it can be said that it was hard to find a single radio news bulletin that did not highlight the American intention to use the military solution and the US intent to carry out a strike against Iraq. The similarity in the roles of the Jordanian semi-government media, which highlighted the hostile American stance against Iraq in this period, could be caused by directives of the Jordanian leadership represented by His Majesty King Abdullah II, who had pursued a continuation of the policy adopted by the late King Hussein Bin Talal. This policy intended and aimed at supporting and sustaining Iraq during the period of the siege and
opened the Jordanian borders for the Iraqis to break the siege (Al-Dulaimi 2008).

7.4.2 THE ROLE OF THE JORDANIAN MEDIA DURING THE MILITARY ATTACK

Although Jordan was concerned with the war and its consequences as well as had an overwhelming desire to ensure that the outcome would be in favor of Iraq, the role of the Jordanian media was marked by impartiality. The Jordanian media called the war (the war in Iraq) and did not use the term used by the Iraqis (the American brutal aggression) or the American phrase (Liberation War) or even what Al Jazeera called the aggression as being (war on Iraq). Jordanian media preferred to have its own phrase aiming to harmonize with its media policy. The neutrality of the Jordanian media during this period of conflict has been demonstrated through re-broadcasting the events as reported by both parties to the conflict without giving any comments. Thus, Jordanian media succeeded in maintaining neutrality about the war, although there was a tendency hoping for an Iraqi victory. This tendency was difficult for the Arab media to hide in this period (Al-Dulaimi 2008).

As for the semi-government and Non-government print media in Jordan, they were sympathetic with Iraq and opposed the American aggression, where the alleged Iraqi victory that was reported by al-Sahaf was the headlines of all the Jordanian newspapers. Al-Dulaimi (2008: 14) indicates that the severity of the American bad image reached 61% in Alrai Newspaper (semi-government), while bad image reached 81% in Alarab Alyoum (Non-government). These figures indicate that the Jordanian newspapers were able to a large extent to shape the Jordanian public opinion towards the US awful behavior in Iraq through showing the negative acts of the Americans.

The sympathy of the Jordanian newspapers with the Iraqi regime was so evident through the wording of the daily reports on the number of victims and martyrs who fell either from the Iraqi army or civilians. Nonetheless, Jordan media using terms to refer to the American brutal aggression was evident in daily reports and editorials (Al-Dulaimi, 2008). This according Al-Dulaimi was adopted by most of the Jordanian media because of the public opinion which strongly supported both the Iraqi regime and the people of Iraq.
With regard to the role of the Jordanian television channel during the military attack, it showed sympathy with Iraq and a real desire to see Iraq achieving victory. Consequently, the Jordanian TV channel started to refute the news that demonstrated the U.S and allies’ progress or advance in Iraqi soil. Meanwhile, Jordanian citizens watched the official TV channel, in which it broadcasted al-Sahaaf statements who assured them that Iraqi victory was imminent. It is worth noting, that the Jordanian TV channel employed reports from Aljazeera TV channel in particular to assure the Jordanian viewers that the situations in Iraq were in favor of the Iraqi regime.

As for the Jordanian media in post-occupation, it can be said that that Jordanian media employed expressions of sympathy when dealing with Iraqi people’s issues and conditions. It started to highlight the reality of U.S occupation of Iraq and changed the coverage headline from ‘The war in Iraq’ to ‘The war on Iraq’. The Jordanian media’s main concern during this period was the Iraqi internal cohesion, and calling for an immediate end to the daily bombings and assassinations in Iraq, which had become a large part of the lives of the Iraqis who lived in Jordan in this period (Ammon magazine 2010). Jordanian radio and TV stations in the post-occupation effort focused to cover the events in Iraq with transparency and balanced objectivity; this was characterized by moderation and impartial sympathy with the Iraqi people in most cases. The situation in Iraqi was a top priority in all Jordanian news bulletins in this period (Al Dulaimi 2008). In short the role of Jordanian media during the invasion of Iraq can be summarized as follows:

1. The Jordanian press worked hard to make a balance between presenting the negative image of the U.S during the three stages of the war (before, during and after), and not to engage in a challenge with the U.S. The Non-government newspapers were more aggressive in presenting the negative image of the U.S more than the government newspapers.

2. Jordanian press had a considerable concern about the occupation of Iraq and gave it a very high priority in its coverage and the news on Iraq often occupied the main headlines of the first or the last pages to highlight their importance. According to Al Dulaimi (2008) 71.20% of the Iraqi
news coverage occupied the headlines of all pages, which demonstrates the great concern of the Jordanian press with the occupation of Iraq.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 FINDINGS

This thesis has aimed to explain how the US and UK - lead members of the coalition of the willing – were able to manipulate the mass media prior to, during and after the invasion of Iraq to justify their decision to invade Iraq. As against this view, the thesis suggest that the actual reasons for the invasion lay in their desire to control the flow of Gulf region’s oil to western countries at reasonable prices. Contain the influence of rival powers in the region, as well as ensure the position of the State of Israel as a dominant power in the region. The thesis also examined U.S relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. The discussion here has demonstrated that these relations were crucial for the U.S government to advance strategic interests and policy goals in the Middle East region. This explains the U.S objective of maintaining solid and concrete relations with these countries. The U.S aid and assistance to these given countries has also been examined and evaluated to show how and why the U.S administration’s policy was shaped to prevent any rival from obtaining influence in the region.

Both administrations in the U.S and the U.K claimed Iraq’s WMD’s were a major threat to international security and peace. Therefore, both governments asserted the urgent need to achieve regime change in Iraq and to re-establish a peaceful system in Iraq that would respect international law and security. At this stage, both governments shifted their concerns from the Bin Laden threats to demanding that Iraq disarm or face serious consequences. To achieve this end, the two governments started to highlight Iraq’s WMD’s imminent threat.
On this basis, the thesis suggested that both administrations, along with mainstream mass media in the given countries, functioned to justify the Iraq invasion to the public.

Mainstream mass media initially provided enthusiastic and uncritical support for the public pronouncements and justifications provided by the political leadership of the U.S and the U.K in selling the war to the public. Both administrations and mainstream mass media portrayed Iraq’s WMD’s as a legitimate reason to invade. I also proposed that the governments in the U.S and the U.K, along with mainstream mass media, played a definitive role in shaping public opinion to be supportive of the Iraq invasion. This role undertaken to legitimise and justify the invasion through extensive usage of rhetoric and closely managed discourse, to a large extent, helped to persuade public opinion in both countries that the invasion was legal and justified.

It was also suggested that mass media neutrality is an integral element of a healthy democracy; and how consideration of mass media’s treatment of allegations to invade Iraq (this included: WMD’s; links with al Qaeda; and the need to intervene for humanitarian violations) can help to suggest some possible reforms which might contribute to greater media responsibility in war time.

The thesis proposed that mainstream mass media failed to provide neutral coverage of relevant facts and competing interpretations regarding the situations in Iraq before and during the invasion. The thesis demonstrates that the media were biased in their coverage and expounded the means used by the U.S leadership in shaping public opinion in support of their position. The thesis also demonstrates that the U.S and U.K mainstream mass media’s unbalanced
presentation significantly influenced public opinion in these two countries and their allies in such a way as to support and facilitate the invasion.

The thesis suggested that the mass media during the invasion itself took a calculatedly passive role, with news coverage mediated through the embedding system. I have proposed that the embedding system limited the reporters, journalists, and photographer’s freedom to cover the invasion and to present reliable information that would inform the public of human rights violations against civilians and casualties among U.S troops, allies and Iraqi army.

I have suggested that after the invasion of Iraq ended, the mainstream mass media came out increasingly to shape public opinion regarding the issues of no WMD’s being found; no links between Saddam and al Qaeda; and to expose human rights violations conducted against the Iraqi people. It also has been suggested that at this stage, mainstream mass media aggressively highlighted the urgent need to withdraw from Iraq. I have proposed that the American public became aware of no WMD’s being located in Iraq; no evidence of a relationship between Saddam and al Qaeda; and of human rights violations committed by U.S troops and allies against Iraqi civilians and detainees. One of the major human rights violations was the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in which U.S and U.K army personnel tortured and abused Iraqi war prisoners. Those factors led the American government to decide to withdraw fully from Iraq, which was achieved by the end of year 2011.

The thesis suggested that the Iraqi media and most of the Arabic media failed to present counterarguments to the necessity to invade Iraq relying on pre-emptive and security allegations and so to damage the U.S and the U.K’s credibility. The Iraqi media fabricated victorious actions against the U.S and allies. This led most
of the Arabic media to believe the Iraqi assertion and pronouncement of Iraqi imminent victory against the ‘crusades’. However, after the U.S and allies captured Baghdad at the same time as the Ministry of Information was asserting his fabricated stories of victory, the Arabic public sphere was shocked into knowing the truth. This as I proposed led to a state of confusion among the Arab states that had rejected the Iraq invasion. However, after the capture of Iraq, Arabic leaders and media started to assert the urgent need to reconstruct Iraq and create an ideal environment for the Iraqi people to overcome their previous sufferings.

In this current thesis, I aimed at presenting a logical understanding of the U.S administration’s decision to invade Iraq. I argued that the U.S government was strategically motivated to intervene in the Middle East region to protect its interests and supremacy around the globe. I shall now conclude by summarising the main arguments and findings of the thesis.

8.1.1 WHY IRAQ?

In chapter two of the thesis it has been suggested that there was strong U.S motive to be involved in the Middle East region’s conflicts and crises in order to help maintain the U.S strategic interests in the region. Also, the thesis suggested that securing the flow of the Gulf region’s oil had been a priority in the U.S foreign policy. In addition, securing the continuity of the State of Israel as a ‘strategic asset’, served the U.S dominance and supremacy in the region, and strengthened the U.S position during the Cold War and thereafter. I have demonstrated that U.S imperialism is driven by economic strategy (which is one part of political-economic supremacy) that aims to control the world politically and economically. It has been argued that the U.S government since the 1970s
onwards adopted aggressive attitudes towards the world, mainly Arabic and Islamic nations. The attacks of September 11th, 2001, marked a new era in the U.S foreign policy; as this event has led to a new sphere of U.S hegemony that shaped the so-called neo-imperialism doctrine.

Neo-imperialist doctrine implies that control is shaped to include employment of political, cultural, and physical influences during military interventions. There are two ideological systems within this neo-imperialist doctrine. Although they stem from diverse sources, they serve the same targets. On the one hand, there is neo-conservatism which is described to be a more visibly aggressive ideology that aims to confirm the U.S political-military power internationally through expanding freedom and democracy. Freedom to neo-conservatists means more markets and more profit; whereas, democracy means American-style elections in which people are free to vote for any candidate or party. On the other hand, neo-liberalism represents the less aggressive ideology whereby the economies of the Third World are to be modified to make them accessible for development.

The thesis has demonstrated that the U.S aggressive behavior confirms its desire to economically and politically control the world. It has been argued that the ideologies of both neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism pose major threats to developing countries and world stability. According to these ideologies any regime that opposes such ideologies is considered radical and therefore should be either contained or overthrown.

Chapter two showed how the claimed aggressive policies of Iraq’s regime threatened U.S imperialist objectives and interests in the Gulf region. It was demonstrated that the U.S administration supported Iraq during its war with Iran shaped by motivations to contain any USSR involvement in the Gulf region.
However, at a later stage, and during the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the U.S switched its policies against Iraq to maintain its vital oil interests in the Gulf region. This shift in the U.S policy toward Iraq has been argued to show why regime change in Iraq was needed. The thesis demonstrated that the U.S administration, motivated by imperialism and the desire to control the flow of oil at reasonable prices, aimed at creating a permanent foothold in the Gulf region to protect oil supplies and to prevent any rival power from gaining control over the region’s oil riches. In addition, it has been argued that the U.S administration was driven by motivations to control Iraq’s oil to cope with its increased oil demands. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein was considered by the U.S administration to be a major obstacle that disturbed the U.S strategic motivations in the region and thus regime change was needed. This explains why Saddam Hussein fell out of favour with the U.S administration.

8.1.2 FALLACIOUS LEGAL ARGUMENTS TO INVADE

The U.N Charter and just war theory were introduced to evaluate whether or not the invasion of Iraq was legal under the umbrella of international law and with respect to customary law. Chapter three has examined the ways in which armed attacks are to be considered legal and legitimate. The Chapter demonstrated that the U.N Charter prohibits the use of aggressive force. The Charter also indicates that the aim of establishing the U.N was to achieve a peaceful international environment through; maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and solving international tensions through cooperation.

The U.N Charter in Chapter one, Article 2 prohibits member nations to use force against each other. However, the U.N Charter explicitly specifies only two
exceptional cases to use force. First, collective military enforcement action taken or approved by the U.N Security Council, and second the exercise of individual or collective self-defence; as indicated in Article 51 of the U.N Charter. Article 51 provides nations with an ‘inherent right’ to self-defence against any armed attack. The thesis concerning the self-defence notion argued that actual armed attack by a nation against the sovereignty of another nation is the only explanation of Article 51 of the Charter. Thus, it has been argued that the attack must be ‘real’ and relatively proportional to the aggravated act.

In chapter three of the thesis I have proposed that the U.S and the U.K governments argued that there was adequate authority in the Security Council Resolutions to authorise and legitimise the use of force against Iraq. Both countries asserted that Iraq had breached several U.N resolutions concerning disarming its WMD’s; the U.S and the U.K administrations relied on resolutions 687 and 1441 to legitimate their actions against Iraq. The U.S and U.K governments asserted that UNSC resolution 687 not only authorised the use of force against Iraq to eject its forces from Kuwait, but to secure and restore peace in the region. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a final chance to disarm and to comply with international law, or it would face serious consequences.

In regards to the issues of self-defence and U.N resolutions concerning Iraq, I have demonstrated that the basic U.N Charter principles indicate that member states should resolve disputes relying on peaceful resolutions. I have demonstrated that the invasion was illegal under U.N Charter self-defence doctrine. Iraq never performed actual attacks on U.S and U.K soil; Iraq also never threatened both countries with waging war. I also demonstrated that UNSC resolution 1441 never explicitly threatened Iraq of using collective force to
disarm Iraq and force it to comply with U.N resolutions. The resolution however indicated that if Iraq failed to disarm and comply with UNSC resolutions it would face serious consequences. This does not mean the use of force against Iraq, but is considered to be a warning of future consequences. In this case it might be argued that serious consequences might mean imposing more sanctions against Iraq.

I have proposed that the U.S administration presented the invasion as a response to Iraq’s WMD’s imminent threat and that it should act before it was too late. The U.S administration argued that Anticipatory self-defence gives it the right to wage military attacks in cases of ‘imminent threat’ posed by the Iraqi regime. In response, I have demonstrated that to consider the threat imminent and thus considered anticipatory self-defence, material evidence should exist which would indicate and involve intelligence information that asserts preparations of armed forces and readiness by a state to attack another nation. In the case of the Iraq invasion, it has been argued the WMD’s threat was neither real, nor was it imminent. It has been proposed that there was no indication that Iraq had imported uranium since the 1990s; or imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment program; and no indication that Iraq resumed activities in locations inspected before by the U.N inspections team. The thesis also demonstrated that after the invasion of Iraq no WMD’s were to be located and identified by the U.S and allies inspections.

The chapter also proposed that both administrations in the U.S and the U.K asserted the existence of links between Saddam and terrorism groups. Both governments presented this claim to the public to gain more support to invade Iraq. The administration in those given countries relied on the argument that
indicated the possibility of deploying Iraq’s WMD’s to terrorism groups who may use them against targets in both countries. This to a large extent helped in creating the fear factor among the public to support the immediate invasion of Iraq. I have demonstrated that the administrations in the two countries resorted to vague accusations and false and misleading statements that intentionally aimed at linking Saddam to terror. It has been argued that ties between Saddam and Bin Laden never existed; and that both administrations after the invasion of Iraq asserted that the intelligence evidence (intelligence error) mistakenly linked Iraq to Bin Laden. I also have demonstrated that the ‘war on terrorism’ notion was immoral, illegal, and counterproductive as it never showed reliable evidence to prove that such links and ties really existed.

In their efforts to legitimate the Iraq invasion, both administrations in the U.S and the U.K resorted to arguments of humanitarian intervention and the need to establish democracy in Iraq. Both administrations asserted that regime change in Iraq was needed to protect the Iraqi people from an evil regime and to establish democratic government that would respect and secure the Iraqi people. The U.S and the U.K administrations heavily relied on Saddam Hussein’s previous human rights violations against his own people. Both Bush and Blair presented Saddam as to be evil, a monster, and another Hitler. But they never indicated that Saddam Hussein should be prosecuted and convicted through the international criminal court. I have demonstrated that Saddam’s records of human rights violations during the 1980s-90s had been well documented through Human Rights Watch, but had been ignored because Saddam Hussein, at that time, was not an enemy. I have also demonstrated that the arguments presented by both administrations to democratise Iraq were fabricated to add some legitimacy to their actions and to convince their public of good actions. The Iraqi people after
the invasion suffered from civil war, corruption, and instability. This shows the U.S failure to democratise Iraq and also the failure to maintain security and order in Iraq after the invasion.

Related to the arguments presented to add some legitimacy to the Iraq invasion was the contribution of just war theory. Customary international law recognises just war to be another approach to wage wars in case of defending the safety and honour of states. Just war theory was introduced and evaluated to decide which wars are fought for revenge and defence (just wars); and wars fought for wrongs without aggravations from other states are considered unjust. The five applications of a just war have been presented and reflected upon regarding the U.S invasion of Iraq to decide whether or not the invasion was just pursuant to the doctrine of just wars. I have demonstrated that for the war to be just, Five elements must be satisfied: 1) the cause must be just; 2) right authority must make the decision to go to war; 3) groups going to war must do it with a right intention; 4) war must be undertaken only as a last resort; and 5) the goal of the war must be a likely emergent peace.

The thesis argued that the U.S claims of Iraq’s WMD’s and links with terrorism groups as to be an imminent threat gave it the right to self-defence relying on the pre-emptive notion. The thesis in response demonstrated that the U.N Charter prohibited the use of force against other states; it has been argued also that none of the reasons presented by the U.S and the U.K administrations to invade Iraq constitute the right to self-defence. Thus it was argued that the Iraq invasion failed to meet the first criterion of the just war theory.

It has been introduced that the decision to wage war according to just war theory must be undertaken only by the competent authority. The purpose of limiting the
action to be undertaken only by a competent authority aimed to limit the use of
force to those who would employ it correctly, and to minimise the resort to force
in international relations. This authority includes national and international
levels. I have argued that at the national level, the U.S Congress approved the
Iraq invasion, but the U.N.S.C never explicitly authorised the use of force against
Iraq. I have demonstrated that the lack of Security Council explicit authorisation
for the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 means that the
intervening states did not meet the requirement of the right authority to
authorise force at the international level.

The motives for the military actions must be set to not cause undue sufferings on
the enemy states; the defending nation must use only that amount of force
necessary for it to achieve its just cause. Accordingly, the motives of defending
the state must not involve the desire for revenge and punishment; rather the
action must be protective to achieve peace. Also, the intentions must not be to
cause harm, domination, cruelty, and personal or national interests. The U.S
administration claimed that the Iraq invasion was to be for the right motives, this
includes 1) pre-emptive self defence that aimed to disarm Iraq’s WMD’s which
was considered an imminent threat against the U.S and international security and
peace; 2) preventing Iraq from supporting terrorists groups with WMD’s; and 3)
Iraq’s human rights violations against its own people for the last three decades.
The current thesis demonstrated that Article 51 recognises the inherent right of
self -defence only in cases of actual armed attacks. Both administrations in the
U.S and the U.K argued that it was legitimate to argue self-defence to contain
Iraq’s WMD’s threat.
I have demonstrated that there were no WMD’s found after the invasion of Iraq. This was argued as to damage both administrations assertion of Iraq’s WMD’s. It has been argued that human rights violations during the 1980s-90s were acknowledged by the U.S administration, but had never been highlighted as a need to declare war against Iraq. Iraq’s situations after the invasion became worse than before; Iraqi divisions over religion, ethnic, and tribal issues expanded the tensions in Iraq resulting in mass killing, looting, and instability. Thus the thesis demonstrated that the U.S action does not meet the requirement of the ‘right intention’ principle.

Just war theory indicates that for the war to be considered just all avenues for resolving the disputes between nations must have been exhausted. Therefore, the threatened nation must follow all necessary paths to resolve the tension through peaceful means before resorting to the military option. The thesis discussed whether or not the U.S and the U.K administrations exhausted all peaceful avenues before attacking Iraq. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a final chance to disarm or face serious consequences. However, this does not mean that the two administrations exhausted all avenues to disarm Iraq. I have demonstrated that Saddam’s regime could have been overthrown by other means rather than waging war and causing massive civilian massacre. One of these means is nonviolent action by the population withdrawing their consent and support to Sadam (as has occurred in the situations in Egypt and Tunisia). The thesis argued that although it can be reasoned that the U.S government did go to some lengths to avoid a war with Iraq, if the international community had provided the Iraqi people with the motivation and ability to oust Saddam, then war could have been avoided. Accordingly, the U.S invasion of Iraq did not satisfied the fourth principle of just war.
A just war requires that in order for a war to be just, it should be likely undertaken to produce appropriate conditions to maintain permanent peace. The thesis indicated that the U.S administration claimed that it would generate conditions of lasting peace and security through ending Saddam’s aggression against his own people. The U.S administration also argued that after overthrowing the regime, Iraq would establish a democratic government. I have in response demonstrated that the outcome of the Iraq invasion was disastrous for the Iraqi people. Almost 650,000 lost their lives due to violent actions; Iraqi people still suffer from disease related to lack of health care and medication. To date Iraq is considered to be insecure, unstable, and politically, and economically disturbed. It has been argued that the invasion of Iraq did not meet the last requirement of just war theory.

To sum up, it can be argued that all arguments presented by the U.S and the U.K governments to invade Iraq are fallacious. Notably, the UNSC never authorised the use of force against Iraq. The failure to locate Iraq’s WMD’s which was considered the main reason to invade, damaged the legality and credibility of both countries before their own people and the international community. In addition, the failure to prove Iraqi-al Qaeda links raised heated international debate that condemned the U.S government’s decision to invade. None of the U.S and the U.K claims of just war were met; this to a large extent damaged the U.S credibility internationally and now the situation in Iraq is worse than it was during Saddam’s rule.

8.1.3 WHO CONTROLS THE MEDIA IN THE U.S AND HOW IT FUNCTIONS

It has been proposed that the dominant class in the U.S consist of, 1) chief executives who dominate a hundred or so corporations with huge capital and
sales; 2) the political directorate who are in charge of the main command posts of the state; and 3) the top people in the military. It has been proposed that the first and the second groups denote the *power elite*. The current thesis indicated that although sometimes disagreement and tension emerges between the state elite and corporate power because each one has its own concerns and sphere the thesis argued that partnership relations do exist among the two groups. It has also been highlighted that the domination of the elite group in Western countries includes: 1) control over the main means of economic activities which involves the ownership of these means; 2) control over the means of state administration and coercion; and 3) control over the means of communication and persuasion.

In this matter, the current thesis demonstrated that the U.S government is characterised as an imperialist system that aims to control the world through economic and political approaches to achieve its goal, interests, and objectives. Accordingly, the power elite through its dominance over economic means, state power, and communication, functions through partnership relations between the two power elites to advance imperialist objectives and goals. This, as it has been argued explains why the mainstream mass media in the U.S functioned to uncritically support the invasion of Iraq; as it aimed to advance its own agenda along with government agenda. To support this argument, it has been demonstrated that corporate power fears restrictions, and imposed constraints by the Federal Government, which in return would harm the capital and the profit of corporations.

Mainstream mass media in the U.S is controlled and dominated by powerful trans-national corporations (e.g. AOL- Time Warner, Vivendi, News Corporation, General Electric, IBM, Microsoft). It has been argued that the role of these
corporations in the global political economy is twofold: first, they have provided the hardware and software that has enabled changes in the pattern of news production; second, they are the main source for information, news, and knowledge about the world in general (Fairclough 2006: 99). Those corporations are the main source of views and ideas, and the main providers of credibility and legitimacy for the powers that be. It has been argued that they contributed to the dissemination of globalist discourse, claims and assumptions, and of the values, attitudes and identities which are cultural conditions for the successful implantation of globalisation, on the basis of an intimate relationship between these corporations and other sectors of business, the public relations industry, governments in the most powerful states and other agencies (ibid: 99).

The extent to which the policy can shape the mainstream mass media outcome in the US has been examined in the current thesis. Two major theories have been discussed in this respect. Noam Chomsky’s & Edward Herman’s Manufacturing Consent theory and Piers Robinson’s Uncertainty theory have been introduced. In manufacturing consent the mainstream mass media perform to serve government and the elite group. This mechanism is achieved through five filters that determine the quality and the quantity of news coverage of certain issues and events. As such, the mass media functions to serve government lines depending on worthy victims of enemy states, where the mass media attention will be concentrated to highlight those suffering victims. Whereas, victims with the same level of suffering will obtain less attention in mass media presentations, and therefore be considered as ‘unworthy’, because there is no interest in such country. Relating to ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ victims of enemy states, the mass media will also perform to legitimise or make illegitimate third world elections, depending on US electoral standards, all this to satisfy the policies of the
administration. We have shown that the Propaganda model is the ideal model to explain the mainstream mass media behaviour before, during and thereafter the Iraq invasion of 2003. As the mainstream mass media coverage before the invasion of Iraq functioned to repeatedly assert Iraq’s WMD’s imminent threat, Iraq’s links with terrorism groups and Iraq’s human rights violations.

The current thesis showed that in contrast with the propaganda model, Robinson developed the uncertainty theory to explain the relation between the mass media and policy. In his model, Robinson argues that most of 1990s US interventions were mass media related interventions. He argued that empathic coverage of suffering people by the mainstream mass media would force the administration to take actions. In addition, he argued that high levels of policy uncertainty among the US executive elite will lead to huge mass media influence upon the executive causing it to advance policies supportive to mass media intention and coverage. He further argued that in cases of high levels of policy certainty regarding issue the administration will go ahead in policies regardless of mass media support or public consensus.

I have argued that Robinson’s approach was ineffective in explaining the media’s performance during the given issue. In this case it became evident that mainstream mass media were obligated by the administration to act in such a way that would support its arguments that would manufacture consent supportive of government’s decision. The thesis argued that Robinson himself indicated the failure of his approach and demonstrated that manufacturing consent explains why the media functioned to support the executive elite. Robinson also indicated that mainstream mass media attitudes (before the Iraq invasion) added more credibility to the manufacturing consent theme. The
mainstream mass media intentionally failed to question the allegations presented by the administration to invade, rather it functioned to support the claims without investigating the legality of the invasion. Robinson further highlighted mass media management during the Iraq Invasion strengthened the manufacturing consent thesis. This explains why the current thesis adopted Chomsky & Herman’s mass media-policy framework to analyse the mass media’s treatment of the Iraq invasion. This to large extent helped the researcher to obtain a broader understanding of the mass media’s failure to act as a public watchdog.

8.1.4 RHETORICAL USE OF LANGUAGE

The thesis argued that one of the ways in which we can understand social actions, is CDA. In chapter five I discussed various positions taken in the academic literature about Critical Discourse Analysis and its crucial contributions to explore the forms, content, aims and intentions of mass media’s presentations. This discussion aimed at: 1) assessing the role of mass media discourse in illuminating or obscuring relevant facts; 2) exploring the rhetorical use of language in mass media’s presentations to actively shape public opinion in pursuit of particular political and economic goals; 3) considering the role of mass media discourse in contributing to the legitimation of a particular neo-liberal social order; and 4) exploring the way in which different groups seek to regulate and direct social developments through the use of the mass media, and the active role of the mass media in the construction of social events and processes.

The thesis introduced Van Dijk’s ideology analysis. Van Dijk’s contributions are centred on the notion of positive self-representation and negative other-representation. In this context, Dijk introduced what he called ideology square in
which we can analyse discourse relying on ideological bifurcation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. Van Dijk translated the ideological implications of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation into an ideological square where the intention is to: a) emphasise our good properties / actions; b) emphasise their bad properties / actions; c) mitigate our bad properties / actions; and c) mitigate their good properties / actions.

Fairclough’s ideas are centred on the notions of levels of social events, social practice and social structures. Each of these has a semiotic moment which is dialectally related to other moments. Texts constitute the semiotic moment of social events; orders of discourse are the semiotic moment of social practice; and languages of social structure. Fairclough’s ideas of textual analysis contribute to CDA approach. According to him, texts represent the world through advancing social relations and identities. Therefore, texts can serve ideological aspects through employing lexical process and linguistic tools to advance ideas and beliefs. The thesis also demonstrated that Fairclough’s ideas are crucially related to fallacies. I have introduced Fairclough’s ideas of fallacious arguments and how they are constructed to seem valid and logical when in effect they are invalid, illogical and thus fallacious.

George Lakoff approached CDA from a metaphoric perspective. According to him metaphor theory forms the basis of metaphor research into political discourse. The current thesis indicated that the role of metaphors as a cognitive mapping of abstract concepts on to the more familiar suggests that metaphors are a valid commodity in political discourse. Accordingly, the importance of metaphors lies in considering metaphors as a powerful cognitive tool that governs everyday thought processes. The thesis identified different conceptual metaphors (e.g., NATION IS A PERSON; COMMUNITY METAPHOR; and POLITICS IS BUSINESS, etc.,)
used to analyse discourse in everyday life actions, debate and discourse involved in imposing different political and economic views to ordinary people. It has been demonstrated that metaphor theory is crucially related to political discourse; as metaphors constitute an important element to convince others of an argument, and serve a legitimising purpose.

The thesis also showed that Chomsky’s ideas are crucially related to and supported through CDA analyst’s ideas of the importance of rhetoric in imposing certain propagandas and beliefs. I have demonstrated that Fairclough believes that the economics of an institution are an important determinant of its practise and its texts. In addition, commercial mainstream mass media works ideologically and is in the service of the powerful elite and the state. Similarly, Chomsky believes that power and money can play a crucial role in filtering the news to advance and support the powerful elite interests and objectives. Chomsky also indicated that social and political policies are manufactured in the public minds to support certain powerful groups. Fairclough argued that media discourses contribute to producing social relations of domination and exploitation in a given society.

8.1.5 MANIPULATING, FRAMING, AND MISLEADING DISCOURSES

The analysis of the U.S and the U.K administration’s discourse along with the mainstream mass media’s discourse in those given two countries, aimed at showing four important facts. First, the thesis suggested that the discourse of both administrations before the Iraq invasion aimed at legitimising and justifying the invasion to both their public and international community. In order to achieve this objective; both administrations relied on three justifications to invade; first, Iraq WMD’s threat, second, Iraq links with terrorism groups, and
third Iraq’s human rights violations. I have proposed that both administrations achieved that through the creation of both political and moral justifications. The arguments to invade Iraq were built on an idea that both countries have the right to act relying on allegations of Iraq’s WMD’s threat. Thus, they asserted that self-defence doctrine was legitimate to contain the Iraqi threat. Both administrations along with mainstream mass media portrayed Saddam Hussein as a danger to peace and security in the Middle East, rest of the world, mainly the U.S, the U.K, and Europe. The thesis demonstrated that the main themes of the two administrations and mainstream mass media’s discourse of the “war on terror” and Iraq invasion were centred on four themes. The thesis argued that each one of these themes relied on fallacious arguments, narratives, manipulating frames and misleading discourses. The analysis of the two administrations discourse and mainstream mass media before the invasion of Iraq revealed that four themes were employed to manufacture public consent supportive to Iraq invasion: 1) the September 11, 2001 attacks, marked a new era with new threats that require new responses and policies; 2) the U.S, the U.K and the civilized world face exceptional risks and dangers that call for exceptional measures to deal with; 3) those who pose threats and dangers to the civilized world are the forces of “evil”; and 4) America and the allies are the forces of “good” and their actions are morally justified. The discourse of the two administrations highlighted that their actions were morally just; because they aimed at fighting the evil that would harm both Saddam’s own people and the international peaceful community. The moral discourse was rhetorically employed through the creation of the “axis of evil” doctrine that served to highlight that the U.S and allies are the forces of good, whereas, Iraq and other countries are the forces of evil. This discourse helped in constructing a straightforward approach to fight terror and terrorisms.
The second fact was that mainstream mass media in both countries played a crucial role in assisting both administrations to sell the Iraq invasion to the public. I have proposed that mainstream mass media in both countries functioned to aid both administrations in achieving the justification and the legitimisation they needed to invade Iraq. To achieve this end, mainstream mass media uncritically asserted the administrations allegations of the Iraqi imminent threat. Mainstream mass media highlighted Saddam Hussein as to be a major threat to international peace and security; and that Iraq’s WMD’s can easily attack targets in both the U.S and the U.K if delivered to terrorism groups. It also indicated that Saddam Hussein’s links with terrorist groups are real and evident. In addition mainstream mass media highlighted Saddam Hussein’s previous human rights violations as a last resort to enhance public opinion that would support the Iraq invasion. In doing so, mainstream mass media relied heavily upon rhetorical devices to create fear among the public by informing them of harmful consequences if there was a failure to confront and contain the Iraqi imminent threat.

The thesis also argued that mainstream mass media in both countries played a mediating role between the governments in the two countries and the public by largely accepting the administrations discourse and its agendas. In chapter six, I have provided many evidence of mainstream mass media’s endless support to their administrations. For instance, newspapers and broadcasting channels extensively maintain an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation that aimed at emphasising the bad and evil actions of Iraq, whereas, emphasising the good actions of the U.S and the U.K. Also, mainstream mass media functioned to indicate that the new threat posed by Iraq required new policies and actions, particularly invading Iraq to overthrow the evil regime. I have demonstrated that mainstream mass media
helped in asserting the self-defence doctrine and security discourse in both countries. Also, mainstream mass media functioned to present the moral reasons to invade Iraq through arguing the urgent need to overthrow the rogue and evil dictator because he attacked his own people.

I have demonstrated that the evaluation of public opinion polls data prior to the Iraq invasion showed that mainstream mass media in both the U.S and the U.K helped to influence and shape public opinion that unquestionably supported regime change in Iraq.

The third fact was that during the military operations, the embedding system limited the mainstream freedom in neutrally reporting the invasion. In this scenario, mass media was restricted from informing the public of actual human rights violations committed against innocent Iraqi civilians as a result of military actions. Before journalists published their reports they had to pass through a military commander who would approve or disapprove of the material before publishing it or airing it to the public. Therefore it can be demonstrated that mainstream mass media were censored and biased. Mainstream mass media’s presentations- during the invasion- of both the U.S and the U.K reflected the administration’s point of view in covering the event of the Iraq invasion. It can be argued that nationalism and patriotic feelings shaped most mainstream mass media presentations during the Iraq invasion.

The last fact was that after the Iraq invasion ended, mainstream mass media shifted its position from being uncritically supportive to both administrations to harshly demanding evidence of Iraq’s WMD’s and links between Saddam and al Qaeda. It also exposed human rights violations in Iraq conducted by U.S troops and allies and high casualties among the U.S and allies troops. These factors
explain the public demand for immediate withdrawal from Iraq. Accordingly, the public opinion that supported the invasion declined forcing both administrations to withdraw troops from Iraq. It can be demonstrated that mainstream mass media discourse during the Iraq issue can be described as being manipulative and misleading, and as relying on rhetoric to frame Iraq as an imminent threat that would harm international peace and security.

8.1.6 IRAQI AND ARABIC MEDIA FAILURE TO CONFRONT THE ALLEGATIONS TO INVADE IRAQ

I have demonstrated that the Iraqi media failed to confront allegations presented by the U.S and the U.K administrations to legitimise the invasion. The thesis also argued that although the Iraqi media prior the invasion aimed at informing both the international community and the Arab world of Iraq’s readiness and willingness to cooperate with U.N weapons inspections and to diplomatically resolve the tension with the U.S administration the Iraqi media at the same time asserted its readiness to defeat any attack upon Iraq, and indicated that Iraq would be a ‘grave yard’ for Americans and allies. The thesis showed that the fabricated stories of the Minister of information, Saed Al Sahaaf, created a state of confusion among the Arab states that rejected the invasion of Iraq. Al Sahaaf on many occasions asserted Iraqi victories against the U.S and allies, even at the time U.S troops entered Baghdad and had full control of it. This, to a large extent created confusion in the Arabic sphere that started to condemn the bias of the Iraqi Minister of information.

In addition, I have demonstrated that there was no uniformity among the Arabic mass media in its coverage of the Iraqi invasion issue; as most of the Arabic media outlets fully rejected the invasion without presenting logical
counterarguments to refute the U.S and the U.K allegations to invade Iraq. However, after the capture of Baghdad the Arabic media started to function to highlight a democratic Iraq after the collapse of Saddam’s regime.

The thesis argued that the Arabic media believed the Iraqi propaganda assertion of defeating the American and allies. The Arabic media functioned to highlight Iraq’s victorious battles against allies; it started to broadcast and publish materials that reflected the Iraqi Minister of information’s pronouncement of defeating ‘crusades’. Shockingly, at the time Iraq claimed those victorious actions, the American and allies had full control of Baghdad. This situation created a state of confusion among both Arabic leaders who supported Saddam Hussein, and the Arabic media.

It has been indicated that most of the Arabic countries rely on financial assistance and aid from the U.S. However, the leaders who opposed the invasion were forced to act this way as they were motivated and shaped by public opinion that unquestionably rejected any military action against Iraq. This explains why some Arabic leaders refused to cooperate and participate in the Coalition of the Willing. However, after the fall of Baghdad, the Arabic leaders who opposed the invasion started to talk about democratic Iraq and the need to reconstruct Iraq’s economic and political systems.

The Jordanian media role during the Iraq’s invasion issue was evaluated. The thesis argued that the Jordanian press had worked hard to make a balance between presenting the negative image of the U.S during the three stages of the war (before, during and after), and not to engage in a challenge with the U.S. The Non-government newspapers were more aggressive in presenting the negative image of the U.S more than the government newspapers. In addition, it has been
revealed that Jordanian media had a considerable concern about the occupation of Iraq and gave it a very high priority in its coverage and the news on Iraq often occupied the main headlines of the first or the last pages to highlight their importance. According to (Al Dulaimi 2008) 71.20% of the Iraqi news coverage occupied the headlines of all pages, which demonstrates the great concern of the Jordanian press with the occupation of Iraq.

8.2 IRAQ INVASION: FACTUAL INFORMATION

The U.S and allies invasion of Iraq in 2003 achieved its desired objective to overthrow the Iraqi regime and replace it with assumed elected Iraqi democratic government (Robertson 2008: 560). However, democracy was produced at an appalling cost: over 2,000 American soldiers had been killed and 20,000 wounded, by March 2006 (ibid: 560). In addition, tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians were reported to have been killed since the invasion. The expenditure of the invasion was estimated to reach US$2 trillion (ibid: 560). In his book *crimes against humanity*, Robertson (2008) indicated that the Iraqi people had reacted with some joy at the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, however, this joy was followed with an orgy of looting and destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and country capabilities. According to Robertson (2008) Iraq after the invasion suffered from devastating insurgency, initially from Saddam Hussein’s supporters and followers, and some opportunistic al Qaeda operatives, then and increasingly from a minority Sunni population humiliated and provoked by the U.S ‘invaders’, and from some Shi’ite fundamentalist groups.

In 2004, *The Lancet* undertook a survey to compare mortality during the period of 14·6 months before the invasion with the 17·8 months after it. The method of *The Lancet* Survey was as follows: a cluster sample survey was undertaken
throughout Iraq during September, 2004. 33 clusters of 30 households each were interviewed about household composition, births, and deaths since January, 2002. In those households reporting deaths, the date, cause, and circumstances of violent deaths were recorded. The survey assessed the relative risk of death associated with the 2003 invasion and occupation by comparing mortality in the 17.8 months after the invasion with the 14.6-month period preceding it.

The survey found that the risk of death was estimated to be 2.5-fold (95% CI 1.6–4.2) higher after the invasion when compared with the pre-invasion period. Two-thirds of all violent deaths were reported in one cluster in the city of Falluja. The survey (the Lancet 2004) also indicated that if exclude the Falluja data was excluded, the risk of death was 1.5-fold (1.1–2.3) higher after the invasion. It had been estimated by the survey that 98000 more deaths than expected (8000–194000) happened after the invasion outside of Falluja and far more if the outlier Falluja cluster is included. The major causes of death before the invasion were myocardial infarction, cerebrovascular accidents, and other chronic disorders whereas after the invasion violence was the primary cause of death. Violent deaths were widespread, reported in 15 of 33 clusters, and were mainly attributed to coalition forces. Most individuals reportedly killed by coalition forces were women and children. The risk of death from violence in the period after the invasion was 58 times higher (95% CI 8.1–419) than in the period before the war (The Lancet 2004).

Chart 4 shows the number of deaths reported during the survey period, disaggregated as non-violent deaths, violence in Falluja, and violence in all other clusters. The survey indicated that an increase of violent death was noted during the occupation, and violence was geographically widespread, with violent deaths
reported in 15 of 33 clusters (45%). Violence-specific mortality rate went up 58-fold (95% CI 8·1–419) during the period after the invasion (The Lancet 2004).

Chart 4: Number of deaths reported between January, 2002, and September, 2004


In its discussion of the results, the Lancet (2004) indicated that ‘the death toll associated with the invasion and occupation of Iraq is probably about 100000 people, and may be much higher’. Further the survey stressed that ‘it is possible that deaths were not reported, because families might wish to conceal the death or because neonatal deaths might go without mention’. It can be argued therefore that the deaths among Iraqi people might amount to reach numbers higher than indicated in the survey. This shows the price the Iraqi people paid to achieve assumed democracy. To date Iraq still suffers from violence on a daily basis and there is no sign of restore peace, stability and security in Iraq.
In 2006, Human Rights Watch report indicated that:

‘The human rights situation in Iraq deteriorated significantly in 2005, with a continuing rise in the number of armed attacks by insurgent groups, including the deliberate targeting of civilians and violent attacks such as suicide bombings. The level of abductions of Iraqis, in many cases for ransom, has remained high, while those of foreign nationals has decreased – reflecting in part the departure of foreign personnel working with humanitarian agencies, media outlets and others as a result of deteriorating security conditions’ (Human Rights Watch 2006).

The Report further stressed that the counterinsurgency attacks by the U.S. troops along with allies and Iraqi forces aggravated the human rights situation, resulting in the killing of civilians in violation of the laws of armed conflict. There was also continuing concern about the absence of basic precautions by the U.S. military to protect civilians, including at checkpoints. According to the Report, evidence of the torture and other mistreatment of detainees held in the custody of U.S. forces in 2003 and 2004 have continued to emerge in the wake of the Abu Ghraib revelations in April 2004. Some of the evidence is based on accounts by U.S. military personnel, who have described routine and severe beatings of detainees, including subjecting them to forced stress positions, sleep deprivation, extremes of hot and cold, denial of food and water, and the application of chemical substances to detainees’ skin and eyes. The Report highlighted that ‘the accounts show that abuses have resulted from civilian and military failures of leadership and confusion about interrogation standards and the application of the Geneva Conventions. They contradict claims by the Bush administration that detainee abuses by U.S. forces abroad have been infrequent, exceptional and unrelated to policy’ (Human Rights Watch 2006). It concluded that the ‘efforts to boost economic reconstruction and the rebuilding of Iraq’s devastated infrastructure
continue to be hampered by general instability in the country and the level of violence caused by insurgency and counterinsurgency attacks’.

Amnesty international (2011) indicated that during its ‘war on terror’ the Bush administration authorized the torture method known as ‘water-boarding’ (in which the tightly restrained prisoner is subjected to the experience of drowning). The U.S forces used water-boarding and other interrogation methods that constitute torture and other ill-treatment, including holding prisoners for long periods in stress positions or in isolation, and sensory deprivation. Amnesty International (2011) further argued that ‘this cavalier attitude to the ban on torture and other ill-treatment sent out a signal that the US authorities considered such abuses to be acceptable under certain circumstances, encouraging other governments to follow suit’.

In their article entitled ‘the Iraqi refugee disaster’, Sanders & Smith (2008) stressed that ‘the Iraqi refugee outflow since America’s 2003 intervention is far greater than that resulting from the Indochina war, but it has evoked a dramatically less vigorous response’. They further indicate that Since the U.S. invasion, the number of Iraqi refugees worldwide has risen to more than two million. In their explanation of why Iraqi people flee their country, Sanders & Smith (2008) highlighted that the Iraqi refugee crisis implies an acknowledgment that the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government have been unable to provide security within the country. They also argue that ‘compounding the political difficulty in confronting the current crisis is the relative invisibility of the Iraqi refugees’ (ibid: 23).

It can be argued therefore that the outcome of the U.S and allies attack upon Iraq was disastrous. Many Iraqi civilians lost their life due to the consequences of the
invasion itself and the insurgent actions after the invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime. To date Iraqi people suffer from lack of security, stability and peace. This, as it has been argued was the motivation for many Iraqi people to flee Iraq seeking to save their lives and families. Still, the Iraqi economy suffers from the invasion’s consequences; as the Iraqi government is unable to reconstruct the infrastructure due to the financial burden of the invasion itself. Insurgency in Iraq is a daily action as is bombing in local streets and government buildings causing the killing of innocent people in enormous numbers.

**8.3 EXECUTIVE POWER TO DECLARE WARS**

Although Article 1, Section 8, of the United States Constitution gives Congress power to declare war, the President as Commander in Chief actually has substantial power to initiate and carry forward military actions without Congressional authorization. There have been many cases including those of the wars in Korea and Vietnam where presidents have initiated and expanded overseas military action without congressional authorization (Elsea & Grimmett 2011).

The 2003 intervention was justified as authorized by October 2002 Congressional Authorization for the Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution. But this act basically delegated Congress’s power to declare war to the President at a time when the likely course of future events was uncertain (ibid).

The situation is similar in the U.K, Canada, and Australia. While the Queen is officially the head of the state, as a constitutional monarch she acts on the advice of ministers and particularly the Prime Minister in almost all matters (Naturalnews.com 2011). This includes the exercise of her power to declare war, Britain, Canada and Australia’s military involvement in the US-led invasion of Iraq
as well the UK’s refusals to join a treaty banning cluster bombs were among the decisions approved by the Queen’ (ibid).

According to McKeown & Jordan (2010) since 1901, ‘neither the Australian Constitution nor Defence legislation has required the government to gain parliamentary approval for the decision to deploy forces overseas or, in the rare cases that it has occurred, to declare war’. They also asserted that there have been numerous attempts since 1985 by both the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens to remove the exclusive power of the government to commit Australia to war. However, their attempts to remove the government exclusive power to declare war were far from being achieved and accepted. On 25 February 2010, the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee reported on an Australian Greens’ Bill—the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Approval of Overseas Service) Bill 2008 [No. 2]. The Committee in its conclusion indicated that the 2008 Bill could not be considered to be ‘a credible piece of legislation’ and recommended that the Bill not proceed.

Many critics have traced the disastrous consequence of the illegal 2003 invasion back to a failure of effective subordination of executive power to public debate, discussion and control by the legislature. Massive anti-war public demonstrations in the U.K and Australia were as much motivated by public anger about a failure of public discussion, debate and authorization as by recognition of the illegality and immorality of the war itself.

There have been various proposals for reforms in this area calling for more effective subordination of executive power to legislative debate and discussion or even to wider public decision-making through referenda or other means of consultation.
There is a strong case to be made for such ‘upstream’ reform, as necessary to avoid similarly unjust wars in the future. However, I am not looking at this issue here. In line with the thesis focus upon discourse and media power, I am looking rather at (potentially complementary) ‘downstream’ issues of media reform in the interests of greater objectivity, balance and truth and critical analysis

**8.4 PROPOSALS FOR MEDIA REFORM**

The current thesis showed beyond doubt that mainstream mass media in both the U.S and the U.K functioned to advance the propaganda of the two countries to invade Iraq and achieve regime change. Mainstream mass media in the period prior the invasion of Iraq helped in building up the story and rationales that shaped public opinion to support the action. The current thesis showed that mainstream mass media in the U.S and the U.K lacked objectivity in its presentation and it was biased.

The mass media assumes profound significance in configuring and structuring actions in contemporary societies. Thus, the ultimate responsibility for the media is to present facts and events in an impartial manner as people rely on it to separate fact from fiction. Most importantly, the mass media should not drive the agenda of the state or of other vested interests. There is extensive literature on the role of the mass media in democratic societies. Harvey’s (2005) study, entitled *a brief history Of Neoliberalism* argued that the devastating effects of neoliberalism upon the vast majority of people’s freedom are evident. Harvey (2008) argued that neoliberalism is a threat to democracy. It allows concentrated private ownership and control of mass media, without any effective public regulation or control in the interests of critical balanced or truthful reporting. Blake Morant (2004) In his study *Democracy, Choice, and the importance of*
Voice in Contemporary Media stresses that broadcast media’s functionality in a democracy, requires that the industry disseminate news and information that is full, complete and appealing to an increasingly diverse constituency. He further argues for the media’s duty as a ‘fourth estate’ to report fully and neutrally in order to secure the public in a democratic government. In this context, Blaicock & Krotoszynski (2000) in their analysis enhancing the spectrum: media Power, Democracy, and the marketplace of ideas highlighted the threat to democratic values posed by unduly concentrated media ownership. They further assert that a healthy democracy depends upon a myriad voices rather than a government voice. Moreover, Stucke (2009) in his article toward a better competition policy for the media points to noneconomic values, such as localism and diversity that are important to preserving a healthy marketplace of ideas and ideal democracy.

I conclude therefore by arguing for the importance of mass media neutrality as an integral element of a healthy democracy; and providing some proposals for media reform.

According to Dimaggio (2008) achieving successful media reform requires citizen groups to pursue a dynamic, multifaceted campaign aimed at the American public along with political leaders and media institutions. There are a number of proposals for change, some which may be achieved from within the current political system, and some require pressure and action from the outside (ibid: 314). One of these reforms is the so-called “the Fairness Doctrine” which was created to propose better political balancing in the mainstream press. The doctrine also was designed in order to promote diversity of viewpoints in media by requiring media outlets to allow the expression of multiple points of view on important issues (ibid: 314). Although ‘Fairness Doctrine is no end-all solution to
the problem of corporate media bias’ (ibid: 314). However it is an important step of reaffirming media responsibility in satisfying public interests obligations for more balanced debate in the society (ibid: 314).

In order to conquer the problems of uniformity in mainstream mass media, a further diversification of ownership and control of media is needed. McCheseny (2004) in his book, The Problems of the Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the 21st Century, argued that ‘the bias in free societies must be toward diverse and decentralized ownership whenever possible ... we need a strong nonprofit and noncommercial media sector’ (McCheseny 2004 quoted in Dimaggio 2008: 315). Similarly, Ralph Nader (2007) endorsed the creation of a vastly larger public media sector, funded by taxpayer dollars, and not controlled directly by the U.S government (cited in ibid: 315). Nader further indicated that this media sector is run by ‘government –chartered, citizen membership organization’ (cited in ibid: 315). In addition, there are proposal to create “Media Democracy Act” in which political leaders and citizens groups might gather to establish anti-trust program to break up media monopolies. In addition to supporting ‘free broadcasts for political debate across the spectrum; limits on advertising and monitoring for honesty and accuracy... and guarantees for media freedom in the public interests’ (Schechter 2007 cited in Dimaggio 2008:pp. 315 -316).

It has been argued that the major obstacle that faces freedom in the U.S is neoliberalism because it controls the communications by means of power and capital. The policies of neoliberalisation pose a major threat to democracy and freedom which in turn block the public from obtaining accurate and reliable information in regard to important issues. Harvey (2005) points out that the emergence of diverse oppositional cultures that form both within and without
the market system would reject -either explicitly or tacitly- the market ethic and the practices that neoliberalisation imposes upon the public freedom. According to him, this diverse oppositional movement culture is one of the alternative visions to limit the influence of neoliberalism upon mass media’s performance. The other approach is resorting to theoretical and practical enquiries into the existing neoliberalist system and seeking to derive alternatives through critical analysis. It has been argued that neoliberalisation has faced various oppositional movements both within and outside its range. In South Korea and South Africa many labour movements arose during the 1980s; and also in Latin America working – class parties demanded to participate in power.

The main idea to be highlighted (in regard to these movements) ‘is to work through the whole of civil society in a more open and fluid search of alternatives that would look to the specific needs of the different social groups and allow them to improve their lot’ (ibid: 199). Organisationally, those movements tended to ‘avoid avant-gardism and refused to take on the form of a political party. It preferred instead to remain a social movement within the state, attempting to form a political power bloc in which indigenous cultures would be central rather than peripheral’ (ibid: 200).

8.5 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

I want to conclude by asserting that the Iraq invasion of 2003 is a very broad topic and it could be approached in many ways. I have in no sense exhausted the topic. Rather, I have chosen one particular approach which has very selectively brought certain aspects of language as a crucial element into focus. Critical discourse analysis and Chomsky & Herman’s media coverage of events were chosen to be the theoretical approaches to study the mainstream mass media
performance during the Iraq issues. However, some other researches may approach the Iraq invasion in different ways and may adopt different approaches of language study. I have exhausted my thoughts to present a comprehensive study that would explain why both administrations demanded regime change in Iraq; and how they achieved their objectives.

Further studies on the influence of the ‘internet’ and social media in shaping public perceptions, is highly recommended. The events that took place recently in the Middle East region highlighted the crucial influence (for instance Facebook and Twitter groups) the internet had in shaping public opinion in Egypt and Tunisia which demanded a peaceful regime change in both given countries. Due to these efforts, the public in both countries was able to achieve a regime change without any external help. This to a large extent strengthened the emergence of democracy in the Middle East; and also highlighted that in fact regime change does not require external involvement. The public in both countries gathered and announced that they no longer approved of the legitimacy of both regimes and also withdrew their consensus that was supportive to both Mubarak and Zeen Al Abedeen bin Ali. It is now understood that the internet has had a profound effect upon the public and their power in the Middle East region.
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