FEMINIST IDENTITY AND THE
CONCEPTUALISATION OF GENDER ISSUES IN
ISLAM:

MUSLIM GENDER STUDIES ELITES IN
YOGYAKARTA, INDONESIA

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Western Sydney
Centre for the Study of Contemporary Muslim Societies

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family, to my beloved husband Susanto, who is always there for me and to my lovely sons, Ahabullah Fakhri Muhammad, Acedewa Fayruz Zihan and Akhdan Finley Brisbantyo, who have been so patient throughout. I dedicated it also to mother, father and all of my siblings for their encouragement.

Thank you all very much.
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that religion and feminism can work hand-in-hand when dealing with women’s problems. Special thanks to my editor, Dr. Estelle Dryland, Macquarie University, for editing my work. I would like to express my thanks to the DIKTI and Kopertis V staff for providing me with a scholarship that has enabled me to pursue this doctoral degree. My most important thanks go to my beloved husband, Susanto, and to my sons Fakhri, Zihan and Akhdan, for being with me and constantly encouraging me throughout this process.

Finally, I have appreciated the opportunity to undertake this research and explore my religious beliefs. By offering a new religious interpretation based on gender equality, this research will contribute to enhancing social justice in society. This research has also had a great impact on my personal faith. It has strengthened my faith and enabled me to believe more deeply. Thank you very much my God, for all Your blessings and mercy; because of You I was able to accomplish my study on time.
STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICATION

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original, except as acknowledged in the text. All of my sources of information have been acknowledged in the bibliographies. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

Alimatul Qibtiyah

26 March 2012
ABSTRACT

FEMINIST IDENTITY AND THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF GENDER ISSUES IN ISLAM: MUSLIM GENDER STUDIES ELITES IN YOGYAKARTA, INDONESIA

Women activists, both in the West and the East, are reluctant to self-identify as feminists (a) given the various understandings of the term ‘feminist’; and, (b) due to its positive and negative connotations. Among Muslim gender activists, the debate centres not only on ‘feminist identity’ but also on the conceptualisation of gender issues in Islam. Sometimes their understandings are not only different but contrast strongly with one another. One factor that influences the ways in which people understand gender issues in Islam and deal with the associated controversy is the approach they take when reading and interpreting Islamic texts. Some Muslims interpret them textually while others approach them contextually.

Some work has been done on gender activists by others from organisations outside of universities who have expressed their ideas about particular gender issues; but, no comprehensive work has been done on Indonesian gender activists in universities. Therefore, this research is designed to fill the gap between the issues of feminism and Islam that obtain among gender activists and scholars at universities. This research, in effect, discusses two highly controversial notions, i.e., feminist identity and the conceptualisations of contentious gender issues in Islam of Muslim Gender Studies Elites.

The thesis’ major tasks are to investigate ‘feminist’ identity among Muslim gender activists in Indonesia’s university-based Centres for Women's Studies (PSWs/Pusat Studi Wanita) or Centres for Gender Studies (PSGs/Pusat Studi Gender), to explore what the term ‘feminist’ means to university people who identify as feminist and to those who do not and why some reject that identity, and to ascertain their understandings of Western feminism. This research shows that for strategic reasons, some respondents opt not to publicly identify as ‘feminist’. Self-identification as ‘feminist’ carries a higher risk for women than for men. For those Muslim women who identify as ‘feminist’, the most preferred label is ‘Muslim Feminist’, whereas among non-feminists it is ‘Gender Activist’.

The second task is to discuss the variety of understandings of contentious gender issues in Islam. The research reveals the most and least contentious issues among Muslim gender studies elites in PSWs/PSGs. As well, it shows that while almost all of the respondents evinced progressive views regarding gender issues that are not taken to the religious court, they were less progressive vis-a-vis issues related to ritual (ibadah) activity. Respondents’ progressive views and non-progressive views on polygamy and women’s status were relatively equal. The only gender issue towards which male and female respondents’ attitudes showed significant difference was polygamy, which is more problematic for women than for men. Respondents who advocated moderate and progressive views were to some degree close to the feminist positions.

While most respondents argued that their gender equality values were not imported from Western feminism, they admitted that many Western feminist concepts and strategies had influenced and shaped their thought and their strategies for dealing with women and gender issues in Indonesia. They agreed that Western feminists are able to raise awareness of gender issues, strengthen feminist identity, and build up faith in Islam among their Muslim counterparts.
This research employs an admixture of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The respondents were recruited from six PSWs/PSGs in six universities in Yogyakarta: three were religious-based and three were secular. The respondents numbered 165, including 70 males and 95 females, 105 from religious-based universities and 60 from secular universities. All had been involved in PSWs/PSGs and identified as Muslims. In-depth interviews were conducted with 25 respondents across all categories. In order to provide the context in which gender activists and scholars at universities play their roles within gender equality movements in Indonesia, I documented the social and historical background of the gender equality movement in Indonesia, details of the Constitution and the functioning of the Centres.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBHN</td>
<td>Broad Guidelines on State Policy/ Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPSW</td>
<td>Study Group on Women/Kelompok Program Studi Wanita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPPM</td>
<td>Community Service and Research/Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian pada Masyarakat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP3</td>
<td>Centre for the Development of Research and Education/Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pendidikan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONE</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORA</td>
<td>Ministry of Religious Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFSL</td>
<td>The Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>The official ideology of the Indonesian state, means ‘five principles’: monotheism, humanitarianism, unity, democracy and justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>Islamist Prosperous Justice Party /Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPIM</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Islam and Society/Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG</td>
<td>Centres for Gender Studies/PSG/Pusat Studi Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSW</td>
<td>Centres for Women's Studies/Pusat Studi Wanita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3M</td>
<td>Centre of Community Service and Research/Pusat Penelitian dan Pengabdian pada Masyarakat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSKP</td>
<td>Study Centre of Family and Development/Pusat Studi Keluarga dan Pembangunan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state ibuism</td>
<td>Women’s roles as wives and mothers (ibu) promoted nationally by the government</td>
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<td><em>Tri Darma Perguruan Tinggi</em></td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Thesis, Aims, Significance, and Scope

This research shows how the Muslim men and women of six gender study centres in Yogyakarta universities understand feminism, whether or not they self-identify as feminists, and how they conceptualise gender issues in Islam. It is designed to fill a gap in research on Indonesian gender activists. Until now, scholarship on feminism and Islam has not investigated gender activists in Indonesian universities. Thus although the findings on the gender study centres in Yogyakarta that are the subject of this study cannot be generalised beyond those centres, they do reveal the complexion of this one arena of the under-studied field of Indonesian feminism and gender activism among Muslims.

Based upon my survey results, in the following chapters I will present my findings on the distribution of feminist identity among gender activists and scholars; as well, I will present my findings on various people’s understandings of the nine key gender issues that relate to Islam. To provide context to this research, I will describe the Centres of promotion of gender issues (five Pusat Studi Wanita/PSWs [Centres for Women's Studies] and one Pusat Studi Gender/PSG [Centre for Gender Studies]) in Indonesian universities with particular focus on Yogyakarta’s Islamic and public universities.

As regards feminism this research will illuminate the controversial issues surrounding feminist identity that concern gender activists and scholars in

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I use the term ‘public’ university rather than ‘secular’ university in this research because in the Indonesian context, public universities have to follow the national curricula, including religious teaching. Based on public universities’ policies of mission and vision (see Chapter Three), all claim that one of their main goals is to produce devoted alumni. Many Indonesian people interpret the term ‘secular’ in a negative way: with neither includes nor separates religion from their activities; for this reason, I do not use the term ‘secular university’.
Yogyakarta universities. The detailed information presented in this study shows the percentage of people in the PSWs/PSG who either identify or do not identify as ‘feminist’, the most popular term used and questions what ‘feminist’ means for those who identify or do not identify as ‘feminist’. Some people do not overtly identify as ‘feminists’: this work explores their reasons for not declaring themselves. In addition, it explores the questions surrounding the notions that people have of Western feminism and the differences of attitude that obtain between males and females, the public and Islamic university respondents in terms of feminist identity.

A propos of how Indonesian Muslim gender activists and scholars at universities in aforementioned Centres understand key gender issues in Islam, this research will show that there is considerable disagreement amongst them vis-a-vis the following nine selected gender issues: equality of gender roles in the home and workplace; equality of sexual rights; equal power to make decisions in family life; equal rights to inheritance; equal value as witnesses; symbolic equality of women in the creation story; polygamy; equal status of women; and women’s right to lead public mixed-gender prayers (imam sholat). In this section, I will show (1) the issues towards which almost all of the respondents adopted a progressive approach; (2) the issues on which a high percentage adopted a progressive approach but among whom a substantial percentage endorsed a non-progressive position; (3) the gender issues which divided respondents fairly equally between progressive and non-progressive views; and (4) the one issue on which the majority held a moderate position. In each of these sections, and for every issue, I will present the variability of the responses to the short-answer questions followed by material from the in-depth interviews revealing why people took these various positions.
As context, I will present how the history of the gender equality movement in Indonesia and delineate how the PSWs/PSGs play their roles. I will show that the evolution of the women’s movement occurred throughout three periods of Indonesian history: the late colonial period, early independence, and the period since the establishment of the New Order\(^2\) in 1968. I will look at the issues that predominated in each period and the relationships that obtained between males’ and females’ organisations across these time periods. I will discuss not only the sources of support and challenges that the gender equality movement received and faced when the feminist ideas first came to Indonesia, but also how gender activists responded to them. In addition, I will explore the historical and social backgrounds pertinent to why and for what purposes the Centres were established, the nature of their relationships with national and international women organisations, their goals and programs, and the challenges they have faced and continue to face. Furthermore, I will investigate the similarities and differences that distinguish the six selected university Centres at Yogyakarta and those who are working in or associated with these universities.

My research has shown that almost half of the people in PSWs/PSG identify in one way or another as ‘feminists’, a number I found somewhat surprisingly high, until I reasoned that they were predominantly gender activists. The thesis argues that this feminism is problematic everywhere in Indonesia, particularly for some women activists. In terms of people’s understanding of gender issues, this research will show that in the main people engaged with these Centres have progressive attitudes I something predicted; but, what I could not predict was which gender issues they

\(^2\) The New Order (Orde Baru, in Indonesian) is the term that the second Indonesian president, Soeharto, used to characterize his regime as he came to power in 1968. Soeharto used this term to distinguish his rule from that of the previous president, Soekarno (Old Order, or Orde Lama in Indonesian). The term New Order has since become synonymous with the Soeharto years (1968–1998).
were progressive about and which they were conservative about. Although my respondents were gender activists, well educated and worked in academic circles, not all of them had progressive ideas regarding all gender issues. They were less progressive, for example, regarding the issue of women’s right to lead public mixed-gender prayers (imam sholat) because this matter relates to ibadah (ritual activity). They were also less progressive vis-a-vis inheritance and witness issues because these matters may be related to the religious courts. Issues of woman’s creation that largely relate to the creation story are strongly socialised in Indonesian society. My research has also shown that people responded fairly equally when it come to progressive views and non-progressive views on polygamy and women’s status, matters that have sparked controversy throughout history even among women activists themselves.

As far as understanding the nine key gender issues in Islam has concerned, overall people in the PSWs/PSG adopted the progressive approach I predicted. This could be attributed to several reasons: First; historically, the social structure of traditional Indonesian communities is built upon bilateral kinship relations. The women’s position has been relatively elevated; thus, women have enjoyed a relatively high status (Atkinson & Errington, 1990; Goody, 1976), with some of them holding leading public positions: Second; Indonesia has a long history concerning gender and Muslim women issues. Although nowadays the feminist movement acknowledges Western feminist literature, people have only adopted this point of view relatively recently. Third; gender activists who are usually Neo-Modernists, generally evince progressive interpretations and show greater openness to feminism (Saeed, 2005; Safi, 2003).
1.3. Research Context and Argument

Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world (203 million adherents), followed by Pakistan (174 million), India (161 million) and Bangladesh (145 million) (Huda, n.d.). There are several theories about when Islam was introduced to Indonesia. One argues that Islam was introduced to Indonesia in the seventh century by Arab traders who resided in the coastal village of Baros, North Sumatra. According to this theory, the first Muslim kingdom was in Perlak in around the ninth century (Hasymy, 1993). Other theories suggest that Islam came to Indonesia from Gujarat, India, spread along the west coast of Sumatra and then, starting in the thirteenth century, developed to the east in Java. This period saw the establishment of a number of kingdoms with Muslim influence, namely Demak, Pajang, Mataram and Banten. By the end of the fifteenth century, twenty Islamic kingdoms had been established. Although some of these kingdoms had very little power, together they evidence the domination that Islam had already established in Southeast Asia at the time. Today a large majority of people on the islands and peninsular of Southeast Asia are Muslims. The largest concentrations of Muslims are in Java and Sumatra, whose citizens make up almost two thirds of the total population of Indonesia. Around 98% of Muslims in Indonesia are Sunni followers; other sects include Syiah and Ahmadiyah.

Woodward (2001) argues that contemporary Islamic thought in Indonesia can be classified into five variants: (1) indigenised Islam (Geertz called this form of Islam *abangan*), in which adherents formally identify as Muslim but in practice tend to syncretise religion with local cultural systems; (2) the traditional Sunni Islam of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which usually draws adherents from *pesantren* (Islamic boarding houses) and rural areas who accept local culture as long as classical legal,
theological and mystical texts are not contested; (3) the Islamic modernism of Muhammadiyah, which mostly draws adherents from urban areas who reject mysticism in favour of modern education and social agendas; (4) politicised and anti-Western Islamist groups that promote a discourse centred on *jihad* and *shari’a* (Islamic law) and are most commonly found on university campuses and in large urban areas; and (5) neo-modernist Islam, which tries to discover Islamic foundations for modernity that focuses on tolerance, democracy, gender equity and pluralism. Neo-modernists are concerned more with Muslim values and ethics than with law.

The NU and Muhammadiyah are the two largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia, with approximately 40 million and 30 million members respectively (Saeed, 2005). The NU was established in Surabaya in 1926 to strengthen traditional Islam. On the other hand, Muhammadiyah is a reformist socio-religious movement founded in Yogyakarta in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan. It advocates broad-scope *ijtihad* (creative interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith). Although Muhammadiyah associates are often actively involved in shaping the politics in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah is not a political party.

According to Wahid (2008), Indonesian Islam is comprised of diverse streams of thought and activities. Conflict, tension, dialogue, and harmony contribute to this diversity. Nonetheless, Wahid (2008) divides Islamic thought and practices in Indonesia into two orientations: those Muslims who believe that Islam is *izzul Islam wal muslimin* (the winning of Islam and Muslims), and those who believe it is *rahmatan lil’alamin* (mercy for all creatures). Muslims in the first category are orientated towards exclusivism; they are usually made up of members of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia/DDII, Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia/LDII, Front Pembela Islam/FPI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia/MMI, Hizbuz Tahrir
Indonesia/HTI, and Persatuan Islam/Persis, as well as some Muhammadiyah followers. Muslims in the second category tend to be more inclusive; they are usually affiliated with NU, Muhammadiyah, al-Washliyyah, Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah/Perti, al-Khairat, and Nahdlatul Wathan. However, it is important to note that a person’s affiliation and their orientation towards Islam do not always coincide. For example, not all NU affiliates adopt the more inclusive orientation.

Wahid (2008) explains that Muslims who are exclusive tend to understand Islamic texts like the Qur’an and Hadith in a literal manner, rejecting hermeneutic methods. They also tend to oppose multiculturalism, democracy and gender equality, supporting the Indonesian Islamic State and rejecting syncretism. They are usually rigid in their use of Islamic symbols and define Islam as Arab. Conversely, more inclusive Muslims tend to be open to hermeneutic methods and contextual interpretations of the Islamic texts; they support multiculturalism, pluralism, democracy and gender equality. They tend to be critical of the Indonesian Islamic State and give more attention to substantive issues rather than rigidly use Islamic symbols. They do not define Islam as necessarily Arab. Most inclusive groups were established before Indonesia got independence. In contrast, organizations which tend to be exclusive emerged around the 1970s (Qodir, 2009).

In Indonesia, interpretations of Islamic texts can be divided into three types: literal, moderate and progressive/contextual. Literal interpretations often convey conservative ideas that find support among Islamist groups. Progressive/contextual interpretations, on the other hand, are more ‘liberal’ in their orientation; they are most common among neo-modernist Muslims, who argue that the Muslim community can be strengthened by the adoption of Western advances in education, science and politics. Neo-modernism determines the worth of a human being by their
character (Safi, 2003) and combines respect for classical learning with receptivity to modern ideas, including Western influences (Barton, 1995). The literature of progressive Muslims re-examines Islamic traditions and addresses pluralism on both theoretical and practical levels (Esposito, 1998) and stress ethical/moral guidance over law (Saeed, 2005). However, it is important to note here that a person’s organisational affiliations do not necessarily determine their attitudes about the interpretation of religious texts. For example, not all members of NU or the Muhammadiyah organisation are moderate in their orientation.

Since gaining independence, Indonesia has had six presidents over three distinct periods: the Old Order (the early independence to 1968, when former President Soekarno was removed from office); the New Order (1968–1998) of former President Soeharto; and the Reformation Era (after the 1998 resignation of Soeharto). Chapter Two looks more closely at women’s movements in each of these periods. Historically, women’s status in traditional Indonesian communities has been relatively elevated (Atkinson & Errington, 1990; Goody, 1976), with some holding leading public positions. Examples from Java include Queen Sima (seventh century Jepara, Central Java), Tri Buana Tungga Dewi, (Queen of Majapahit, East Java), the reigns in Aceh of four queens totalling fifty-eight years (1641–1699), and Queen Siti Aisyah We Tenriolle (Ternate, 1856). Princess Bundo Kandung also demonstrated her wisdom and intellectual capability in Minangkabau (It, 2005; Parawansa, 2002; Vreede-de Stuers, 1960).

Indonesia’s cultural traditions were endangered by the gender ideology of the New Order’s ‘state ibuism’, which saw women’s roles as ibu (wives and mothers) promoted nationally (Suryakusuma, 2004). The emergence in the 1970s of Islamist groups endorsing conservative and patriarchal versions of shari’a as state law
(Robinson, 2007) has also endangered women’s equality. Both ideologies have promulgated ideas about women’s proper roles as mothers and wives in the domestic and reproductive spheres, and their status as secondary human beings who are required to be supportive of their husbands.

Islamist and Islamic reviver groups usually have their genesis in public universities (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004). Members tend to have limited education in Islamic studies; those who have studied Islamic studies often have graduated from Middle Eastern institutions where scholars tend to interpret Islamic texts like the Qur’an and Hadith literally (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004). In general, Islamists oppose the reform philosophy of pembaharuan (renewal; loosely, reform) neo-modernists, including their more egalitarian ideas about gender equality and greater openness towards feminism. They argue that gender equality and feminism are Western ideologies not suited to the Islamic tradition, claiming that people who follow ideologies other than Islamic tenets transgress Islamic law and are against God (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004). The numbers of such Islamist groups are growing in Muslim communities in Indonesia (Hasan, 2005; Robinson, 2001). One outcome is that Islamist activists are now translating many Middle Eastern books from Arabic into Bahasa Indonesian in order to disseminate Islamist ideas around Indonesia (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004).

A growing number of scholars are showing interest in the activities of the neo-modernist and pembaharuan (renewal; loosely, reform) movements. Some also contribute to the movements by using historical, hermeneutical and contextual approaches to interpret religious texts, stressing ethical/moral guidance over law (Saeed, 2005). Contextualists in Indonesia and in other countries argue that a fresh interpretation of Islamic sources and a reformulation of Islam is urgently needed.
(Esposito, 1998; Saeed, 2005). Their literature has re-examined Islamic traditions in light of pluralism at both the theoretical and practical levels (Esposito, 1998). They also argue that identity, nationality and class are not of paramount importance because the worth of a human being is measured by her or his character. Safi expresses this view when he says that the worth of a person is not ‘the oil under their soil and not their flag’ (Safi, 2003: 3). Contextualists also see the benefits of Western education, science and politics for modernising the Muslim community. Indonesian neo-modernists combine respect for classical learning with receptivity to modern ideas, including Western influences (Barton, 1995). Gender equality is among their principle concerns; they accept that men and women should have equal rights in the economic and socio-political arenas.

In the midst of an emerging democratic society and with the growing influence of Middle Eastern Islam on Indonesia, Indonesian gender activists are proposing new paradigms and concepts pertinent to gender equality in Islam. They criticise the gender ideology currently being promoted by the New Order as well as by Islamist or Salafi revivalist groups. In addition, they argue that Islam could be a source of gender equality if Muslims interpret religious texts properly and contextually. Should they fail in this respect, Muslims’ limited understanding of the Islamic texts could create further gender problems for Indonesia. Gender activists believe that Islam brings mercy for all creatures (QS, 21:107) and “frees human beings from oppression and discrimination due to sex, race, and ethnicity” (QS, 49:13) (Doorn-Harder, 2006, p. 7). They stress that egalitarian interpretations which emphasise justice for all and equality between men and women (QS, 33:35), will improve women’s position in society (Doorn-Harder, 2006, p. 7).
Indonesian gender activists debate both the value of identifying as ‘feminist’ and a range of specific issues relating to gender equality in Islam. Western feminist scholarship is controversial; so is being a self-identified feminist, just as it is in West. In the western context, some young generation ‘third wave’ gender activists are reluctant to identify as feminist, saying “I am not feminist but ... I love equality” (Caro & Fox, 2008; Gromisch, 2009). In the Indonesian context, people reluctance to be labelled ‘feminist’ is engendered by the stigma attached to the feminist label: feminists are linked to either leftist (communist) or liberal tendencies (Suryakusuma, 2004; Wieringa, 2002). In addition, for many Indonesians, being feminists means promoting individualism, selfishness and immoral behaviour such as free sex (Doorn-Harder, 2006). It is also thought to be anti-men and sympathetic to lesbianism (Sadli, 2002). Because of these negative associations, some Indonesian women’s organisations promote the disclaimer that “even though we struggle for women’s rights, we are not feminists” (Suryakusuma, 2004, p. 271).

In order to show the distinctive feature of Indonesians’ understanding of and attitudes towards feminism, I will provide some discussion in the following pages of Western feminist scholarship. Although feminists across borders experience similar problems such as violence, abuse of women’s rights, oppression, and the justification of inequality and oppression by patriarchal cultures, the theoretical frameworks and methodologies used to respond to and alleviate these problems may differ significantly. Because the problems that confront feminism in western countries may differ from those confronted by feminism in Eastern countries, this difference may shape women’s respective thinking about feminism. In addition, feminists who focus on religious issues may differ in nature and ideology from secular feminists. These differences are understandable and acceptable because they are rooted in different
socio-cultural and religious experiences and backgrounds. According to Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2004), since the 1970s, Western feminist theories have changed from focusing upon their own culture to focusing upon cross-cultural work which involves analysing and theorising the experiences of non-western women. Mohanty suggests that “historicizing and locating political agency is a necessary alternative to formulate the “universality” of gendered oppression and struggles” (Mohanty, 2004, p. 107). However, she adds the “universality of gender oppression is problematic” (Mohanty, 2004, p. 107). All feminists across borders are aware of women’s oppression. But, again, there are many differences in the ways in which gender oppression is institutionalised around the world. Bell hooks (1984) criticises the term ‘women’ employed by most Western feminists for its claiming to represent all women.

The different understandings of women and gender issues persist not only between women activists in developed and developing countries but also within the regions themselves. Indonesia, for example, from the time of the National Women Congress in 1928 until the early 1970s, saw on-going debate surrounding polygamy between women activists from secular and Islamic organisations (Martyn, 2004; Vreede-de Stuers, 1960). Current research conducted by Rachel Rinaldo (2008) shows that outside of universities, Muslim women in the Islamist Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) and Fatayat NU have different understandings of some gender issues.

Although some work has been done on Islamic feminism in Indonesia, there is an urgent need for further research. Some work have been done on feminists by organisations outside universities and on their ideas about particular gender issues; but, no comprehensive work has been undertaken on Indonesian Islamic feminists in universities. Research into feminists in NGOs outside of universities has been

Syamsiyatun found that since the 1980s, NA has challenged the state gender ideology of submissive womanhood. It sees itself as opposing the growing influence of secular feminist thought, which group members’ view as denigrating Islamic values. They also see Islamist thought as propagating ideas that restrict women to their reproductive roles. Rachel Rinaldo’s research (2008) reveals that although both the Islamist Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) and *Fatayat NU* activists argue that men and women are valued equally by Allah, they show differences in thought about gender equality in Indonesia. Whereas, *Fatayat* staff see differences between men and women as socially constructed, PKS cadres understand men and women to be naturally different and for this reason women must be subordinate in both family and society. PKS women believe that Islamic teachings prioritise woman’s domestic roles and require women to take the major role in bringing up the children. In contrast, in the *Fatayat* manual and other *Fatayat* material, whereas childbirth and breastfeeding are regarded as *kodrat* (a natural or inborn quality), raising a child and doing housework are seen as socially constructed roles. Therefore, such tasks may be done by both men and women.

Research into how Islamic women’s organisations in Indonesia perceive and address gender issues has also been conducted by the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat/PPIM (Centre for the Study of Islam and Society) (Jamhari & Ropi, 3

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3 NA is a young women’s group within the Muslim voluntary organisation *Muhammadiyah.*

4 *Kodrat* is the power, ability or capacity to do a particular thing; it is aptitude; everything that men and women have that has been determined by God and that humankind cannot change or reject. *Fitrah* is a natural tendency or original characteristic that can be shaped.
Their research showed that the five Islamic women’s organisations they studied have been actively involved in promoting women’s rights and have taken a significant role in promoting equality since they were established. One of their important findings was that Indonesian Muslim women activists, through their organisations, encourage women to be active in the public sphere while at the same time keeping their families harmonious and happy. Creating a family that enjoys God’s blessing, keeps the faith, has love for each others, and is democratic is another goal of these Indonesian Islamic women’s organisations (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003). Furthermore, their research found distinctive emphasis upon Indonesian gender ideals, i.e., equality in public life but complementary relations emphasising different rights and duties for women and men in the domestic sphere (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003).

Clearly more work needs to be done on Indonesian Islamic feminism; as yet, nothing has been done on feminist organisations inside universities. To date, there is a paucity of research into how and why some Indonesian Muslims identify as ‘feminist’. We need to know what types of people identify as ‘feminist’ and what said people mean by ‘feminist’. This research is designed to fill these gaps.

I was helped in this research by my involvement in Aisyiyah for the past eight years. I have also worked in the Centre for Women’s Studies, UIN Sunan Kalijaga, for almost a decade. My contacts developed through that work assisted my pursuit of this research program. When I embarked on this intellectual endeavour, I found that my personal thirst for understanding my daily life experiences as a Muslim woman activist became entwined with my scholarly quest to investigate feminism among Muslim gender studies elites in Yogyakarta. Thus my interest in conducting this research was enhanced by both personal and academic motivations.

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3 Aisyiyah is one of Indonesia’s largest Islamic women’s organizations. Founded on 27 Rajab 1375 (19 May 1917) in Yogyakarta by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, it is part of the Muhammadiyah organisation.
Little has been written about Muslim gender activists in Indonesia, particularly in regards to feminist identity and the conceptualisation of gender issues in Islam among university gender activists. In the following chapters I will document the range of understandings of feminism held by university-based gender activists and show the level of their understanding of gender as sanctioned by Islam. I will also show how people’s gender and university affiliation (whether with public or Islamic universities) affect their viewpoints. This research is important for the following reasons:

1. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world; but, its experience is still disregarded in the Muslim world (Vartan, 2003). Several important books on women and Islam focus only on Middle Eastern women’s experiences (Ahmed, 1992; Fernea, 1998; Mernissi, 1991; Moghissi, 2006).

2. Islam as practiced by its adherents has never been monolithic. It has always been open to dialogue and intertwined with Muslims’ personal experiences and expectations, as well as with local cultures and traditions (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Gilsenan, 1982; Vartan, 2003). In this sense, no single Muslim society can claim to be the only authentic representative of Islamic societies. Indonesian Islamic feminism might employ different ideas, strategies and justifications during its struggle for gender equality from those of Western feminists or Muslims from the heartland of Islam, that is the Middle East, or Muslims in the diaspora.

3. The development of the Muslim women’s movement in Indonesia has been very different from that of other Muslim countries, such as Iran (Afshar,

1.3. Literature Review

The subject of Islam and Muslim societies has attracted increased attention from international scholars of late, particularly after the attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. Research into Muslim thought about democracy, pluralism and human rights is particularly extensive. When conducting research into human rights in Indonesian Muslim communities, many scholars have included the topic of women’s rights and gender equality. Various forms of research into gender equality and gender equality movements are being undertaken in Indonesia. Some focus on gender relations in traditional or local communities, while others focus on gender issues in the modernising Indonesian society. It will be evident, as asserted earlier, that little has been written about feminist Muslims in Indonesia, particularly about feminist identity and the conceptualisation of gender issues in Islam among gender activists at universities.

To understand how gender activists and scholars in Yogyakarta universities conceptualise nine selected gender issues in Islam, I first review research on gender in Indonesian communities, focusing on traditional Javanese culture, which is based upon bilateral kinship relations. Javanese constitute approximately sixty percent of the Indonesian population and historically have been disproportionally influential in the Republic of Indonesia. Following my review on Indonesian gender relations, I will move on to explore the history of the movement for gender equality that emerged as Indonesia began to take shape as a modern society. Having described the social and historical context of the gender studies centres, in Chapter Two I review
the extant literature on Islamic feminism to provide background for my analysis of the perceived compatibility between Islam and feminism in the Yogyakarta gender studies centres. I also review the different types of feminist theory that have been discussed in the West and now also in Indonesia, focusing on the sameness–difference dichotomy in feminist theories. This review will be used to analyse my findings on differences in understandings and evaluations of feminism in Indonesia, and will be particularly pertinent to my discussion of Muslim thinking on gender equality as opposed to gender complementarity.

The reason why I explore these theories is because researching Muslim gender activists in Indonesia cannot be separated from the cultural background of gender and sexuality, the gender equality movement in Indonesia, the contribution of Islamic feminists around the world and the Western feminist debate.

1.3.1. Gender and Sexuality in Traditional Javanese Society

In order to understand my research findings which show a surprisingly generous uptake of feminist ideas and support for gender equality in quite fundamental ways, some insight is required of traditional Javanese society, Java being the most populous island of Indonesia. This is because this research will provide evidence of a surprisingly progressive notion of gender equality entertained by many Indonesian people.

Historically, the social structure of traditional Indonesian communities is based upon bilateral kinship with the women’s position relatively elevated and enjoying high status (Atkinson & Errington, 1990; Goody, 1976). Bilateral means that “in a given society, a child is considered equally related to both its parents and kinship terminology is the same when applied to relatives on both parents’ “sides”....
of the family” (Errington, 1990, p. 3). Javanese children do not have a family name related to one of their parents: they have their own specific name, in this way differing from other cultures, such as Saudi Arabia, for example, that require the family name relate to the father.

Women’s rights and statuses in traditional Javanese communities are better than those of their Muslim counterparts in the Arab and African regions. Javanese women enjoy more freedom to venture into public places than their sisters in Arab countries (Arimbi, 2006; White, 2006) and have more rights than African women (Goody, 1976). In some Arab countries, women are not allowed to go outside of the home to actively participate in production. Most Indonesian women have been free to engage in economic production activities, to go outside of the home, and, in contemporary Indonesia to drive cars. In terms of inheritance, Indonesian women are permitted to inherit land as well as other property from their parents, whereas African women’s inheritance is limited to houses and other items of property (Goody, 1976). And, not only do they inherit wealth, but many Javanese women also “inherit noble titles equally with their brothers, and maintain control over their wealth even after marriage” (Errington, 1990, p. 3).

Although Javanese women have enjoyed relatively more rights than their Arab and African counterparts, not all of them have had equal access to economic production and to participation in the decision-making process in society. Class, ethnicity and region have impacted upon women’s positions and rights. Many female Javanese peasants contribute prominently to income-producing activities in the markets (Alexander, 1987); in addition, they have power to manage harvests and the domestic sphere (Brenner, 1998). For example, in Java peasant women are more independent than priyayi (aristocratic) women. In Laweyan, Solo Central Java,
peasant women in the merchant community play an important role in economic productivity as well as managing their domestic spheres. In contrast, among priyayi, the female’s value is tied much more to their domestic roles and men’s control over their sexuality and fertility (Brenner, 1998). In certain respects, lower class (kampong) women have considerably more authority and real effectiveness within their social environment than those of the middle and upper classes (supra-kampong) (Sullivan, 1994).

A traditional idea about gender in Java is that males and females are complementary. Married couples refer to their partners as “garwo” a shortened from sigaraning nyowo (literally ‘a half of a soul’). This suggests that their partners, either the husband or the wife, complement each other. In contemporary society, a Javanese woman fully participates in discussions with her husband about family planning; sometimes, she even has more economic power than her husband (Brenner, 1998). Many Javanese men give all of their earning to their wives. Even when buying cigarettes or fuel, for example, they need to ask their wives for money. Therefore, the family expenditure is under the wife’s control.

However, Sullivan (1994) criticises the notion that Javanese women enjoy high status simply because they control the household finances. She argues that Javanese women are in a subordinate position: the real power is in the wider society and in formal settings. Women only have power in the informal sector, i.e. “manak, masak, macak” (breeding, cooking, and adorning herself for her husband), which correlates closely to women’s place in “kasur, dapur, sumur” (bed, kitchen, and doing household jobs). Thus, they have little significant power (Arimbi, 2006). Socially, their status tends to tie them to their husbands, who generally enjoy a higher status than their wives. In the main, a Javanese woman’s status is, therefore,
closely linked to her husband’s status. Javanese belief (adat) decrees that a wife will go wherever her husband goes, irrespective of whether it is to hell or heaven, making her a mere follower of her husband’s deeds (in Javanese language, “surgo nunut neraka katut”) (Arimbi, 2006; Munir, 2002). Sullivan (1994) asserts that Javanese men want to see themselves as masters of their households and their women as ‘just’ managers required to respect the authority of the male head of the household.

A propos of sexuality, Javanese view men’s and women’s sexuality positively: both have the right to enjoy sexual pleasure. In the kakawin world, both men and women have the right to enjoy pleasure in a sexual relationship (Creese, 2004). However, the sexual attraction of a woman is based more upon certain types and the size of the parts of her body rather than on her personality or accomplishments (as is the case with men). In the Javanese old book, Serat Panitisstra, for example, woman’s sexual drive and attraction derive from her slender body, full breasts, pretty face, big eyes, pointy nose and light skin (Munir, 2002; Sukri & Sofwan, 2001 ). Skilful use of perfume is also part of a woman’s sexual attraction (Miharja, 1960): thus, her body is inextricably linked to her degree of sexual attraction.

Sexual relationships have been symbolised in a hierarchical way. In the Javanese old book, Serat Centhini, for example, the ideal woman is always there when her husband needs her: she always smiles even if she is upset, and remains loyal to her husband even though he may have as many as forty wives (Hadijaya & Kamajaya, 1978). In the Javanese wedding ceremony, there is a ritual called miji dadi in which the bride washes the groom’s foot after breaking an egg as a symbol of fertility. This ritual symbolises the unequal sexual relationship that obtains between wife and husband (Munir, 2002) The Javanese epistemology of sexual intercourse,
(manuggaling kawula gusti [the union of servant and Lord]) further stresses inequality in the marital sexual relationship because the wife is the servant and the husband is her lord (Beatty, 1999, p. 173).

In terms of conception, traditionally Javanese people regard men and women equally. The creation and development of human beings, according to Riffat Hassan (1999), becomes a fundamental issue because it relates to the existence of women in the world. According to an old Javanese philosophical treatise, the Teaching of Wrahaspati, men and women eat and drink the six tastes then become life and body. A boy is born if there is more male essence than female essence. Conversely, if there is more female essence than male, a girl is born. The male essence forms the bones, blood vessels and marrow and the female essence becomes the flesh, blood and skin. Three essences come from the male and the other three essences come from the female (Creese, 2004).

This Javanese cultural perception of relatively high gender and sexuality equality has contributed to the discourse surrounding the gender equality movement in Indonesia. As already stated, Java is the most populous island in Indonesia; therefore, it is hardly surprising that Javanese thought and philosophy have significantly influenced the Indonesian government and by extension, the gender equality movement. Kinship throughout Indonesia in pre-modern times was mostly bilateral; and, even where not bilateral, the maternal line was strongly emphasised. As well, Indonesia is well known for its range of influential matrilineal communities, in the Minangkabau, for example.
1.3.2. Indonesian Muslim Women’s and Gender Equality Movements

As I will discuss in Chapter Two, there has been more than one hundred years of social activism vis-a-vis gender issues in Indonesia albeit notions of feminism came later in the late 1980s. In this section, I will briefly address the gender equality movement in Indonesia in general and when and how Indonesian gender activists responded to the notion of feminism.

Before talking about the gender equality movement, I will attempt to clarify what I mean by the term ‘gender equality’ in this section. There is no single concept or meaning of gender equality in Indonesia because every period of time, every place or person might evince different viewpoints. The debate usually concerns the interpretation of equality and how this interpretation should be realised in everyday life. For example, over certain periods of time or among certain groups of people, women are seen as nurturers and natural carers. Therefore, taking care of children is their ultimate responsibility. Conversely, men are seen as active, strong human beings; thus, their responsibility is to earn money for their families. But, these forms of gender role perceptions are no longer subscribed to in certain periods of time or by certain groups of people. For them, earning money and taking care of children is the responsibility of both parents. So, what I mean by the gender equality movement is every discussion, activity or effort that relates to the struggle to achieve equality between men and women.

Over different periods of time, the gender equality movement has embraced different priorities, different levels of women’s autonomy and different strategies. The various positions the movement has adopted have been in response to the government’s gender ideology, the *pembaharuan* (renewal; loosely, reform) movement and international relationships among women activists globally. In the
early days, the women’s movement was concerned with gender equality, e.g., the right to education, suffrage, the right to equal pay for equal work, the trafficking of child and women, marriage laws, prostitution and child marriage. In the late colonial era, focus was more upon education, suffrage and marriage laws (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960). The issue of marriage laws, particularly concerning polygamy and women’s right to divorce, has proven the most controversial issue since the birth of the feminist movement (Martyn, 2004).

The government’s gender ideology has influenced the gender equality movement in Indonesia in different ways. The Old Order, in the immediate post-independence period, paid little attention to women’s issues because the government’s focus was more upon nation building. In contrast, in the New Order, the government paid more attention to women’s organisations, using them to support government policy. In the Reformation Era, the government has become actively involved through the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment. Other factors, including the neo-modernist/pembaharuan movement, revivalist movements, as well as international links among women activists globally have also influenced the gender equality movement in Indonesia. The neo-modernist movement, for example, contributed to the ways in which Muslim gender activists reread the religious texts; the revivalist movements, on the other hand have provided new challenges for them. Meanwhile, the international network of women activists has strengthened the progress of the gender equality movement in Indonesia.

Since the 1980s, the country’s patriarchal culture has been considered the root of gender inequality. This was the time when notions of feminism first appeared in Indonesia. After the ratification of NFSL (The Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women) policy in 1985, issues of equality,
development and peace were raised for further discussion in Indonesia. Women’s NGOs, including the *Kalyanamitra, Yayasan Anisa Swasti* and *Yayasan Solidaritas Perempuan* were established. The late 1980s proved a critical time, for this was when feminist theory generated by gender activists from PSWs/PSGs met with women’s NGOs and Women and Development activists (Noerhadi, 1993). The term ‘*gerakan perempuan*’ (women’s movement) was extended by young women activists generally under 40 years old of age (Noerhadi, 1993). Another term that emerged at this time, ‘gender analysis’, was promoted by international donors. Many women’s NGOs initiated gender analysis programs. These programs were funded by international donors such as The Asia Foundation (TAF), the United Nations, USAID, and OXFAM GB (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004).

The common aim of the women’s groups that united in ‘*gerakan perempuan*’ was to challenge and abolish Indonesian’s restrictive patriarchal system. They raised the profile of women’s rights, e.g., reproductive rights, gender equality, violence against women, the gender gap, and equal pay for equal work for men and women (Ro’fah, 2000). In addition, the gender equality movement was concerned with the terms “feminist” and “gender”, the Pornography Bill, the marriage laws, the trafficking of women and children, quotas of women in the political arena, and the practice of polygamy. Women’s issues were articulated as gender issues in the Board State Guideline (GBHN) in 1993, 1998 and 1999 (Indar Khofifah Parawansa, 2002).

The early 1990s saw not only secular feminists but also religious feminists emerge. Abdurrahman Wahid contends that when ratifying the Beijing Convention, Indonesian Muslim gender activists needed first to consider *kearifan lokal* (local wisdom) that is, religious texts in Islam that he termed ‘*pribumisasi gender*’ (localised gender) (cited in Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004). During this time, the
The number of Muslims committed to feminist ideals increased. They not only showed a deep commitment to Islam: they believe that Islam brings mercy for all creatures (QS, 21:107) and “frees human beings from oppression and discrimination due to sex, race, and ethnicity” (QS, 49:13). They were also convinced that egalitarian interpretations which emphasise justice for all and equality between men women (QS, 33:35), would improve women’s condition (Doorn-Harder, 2006, p. 7).

The 1990s heralded an important decade for Indonesia’s Muslim women because during this time, new forums, organisations, and new Islamic books which were more liberating for the country’s women were launched. Books focusing on equality, e.g., *Women in Islam* by Fateema Mernissi, and *Women in the Qur’an* by Amina Wadud were published in the Bahasa Indonesian language in 1994 by Pustaka Bandung. In the same year, *Uulumul Qur’an* (1994a, 1994b), a prestigious Islamic Journal, published a special edition on women’s issues, feminism, Islamic feminism and anti-feminism. Women and gender activists now had the opportunity to read and discuss directly with prominent Islamic feminists from other parts of the Islamic world including Asghar Ali Engineer, Rifat Hasan and Amina Wadud (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003). According to Arimbi (2006), the 1990s witnessed a shift from ‘*state ibuism*’ to feminist discourse, including Islamic feminism.

### 1.3.3. The Islamic Feminist Movement

#### 1.3.3.1. The History and Definition of Islamic Feminism

I now will explore the range of thinking on feminism to which Indonesia has been responding and contributing both in general and in terms of addressing Islam and feminism. I will show the different positions adopted by scholars when discussing whether Islam is compatible with feminism. In order to establish the context, I will
first present the history and definitions of Islamic feminism provided by scholars both in Indonesia and in the Muslim world generally.

The contemporary notion of Islamic feminism emerged in the early 1990s in various locations around the world contemporaneous with the growth of Western literature on women in Islam (Badran, 2005; Mojab, 2001). Iranian feminists such as Afsaneh Najmabadi, Nayerah Tohiti, Zirba mir-Hosseini, Haedah Moghissi and Valentine Moghadam made contributions in terms of starting a new discourse on Islamic feminism which began in February 1994 when Afsaneh Najmabadi delivered a speech at the School of Oriental and African Studies, the University of London in which she described Islamic feminists as a bridge between religious and secular feminism (Moghadam, 2002).

There are various definitions of Islamic feminism. According to Badran (2004), Islamic feminism is the implementation of the true Islamic religious text that promotes equality between men and women in daily life practice. Ziba defines Islamic feminism as “a movement to sever patriarchy from Islamic ideals and to give voice to an ethical and egalitarian vision of Islam [that] can empower Muslim women to make dignified choices” (2006, p. 11). Amina Wadud (2010) articulates Islamic feminism in her article The “F” word: Feminism in Islam as follows:

Islamic feminism is not just about equality in the public space but also in the family, where most gender roles are prescribed and gender inequality is fixed. Islamic feminism takes responsibility for our souls and our bodies, our minds and our contributions at every level. We take inspiration from our own relationships with the sacred and with the community to forge a way that enhances the quality of our lives and the lives of all others (2010, p. 1).

Cook (2001), in her book Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism through Literature, defines ‘Islamic feminism’ as not a coherent identity, but rather a contingent, contextually determined strategic self-positioning…to call oneself … an Islamic feminist is not to describe a fixed identity but to create a new, contingent subject position… who is committed to
questioning Islamic epistemology as an expansion of their faith position and not a rejection of it (pp. 59–61).

In the Indonesian context, Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman (as cited in Doorn-Harder, 2006) posits herself as a feminist who considers *Pancasila* and Islamic belief to be the foundations of her actions. She states that:

I am a feminist according to Indonesia’s state ideology of *Pancasila*. That means that I base my action on my belief as a Muslim… My goal is equality between men and women, because it says in the Qur’an that men and women are each other’s helpers (Doorn-Harder, 2006, p. 37).

One research finding reveals that Indonesian Islamic feminists encourage women not only to be active members in the public sphere but also to keep harmonious and happy families. Imbuing a family with blessing, democracy, and love for each other is among the goals of Indonesian Islamic feminists (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003). Furthermore, this research showcases Indonesian Islamic feminists’ struggle for equality in public life and equipollence in domestic life (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003).

When discussing Islamic feminism, the terms ‘Islamic feminist’ and ‘Muslim feminist’ should be clarified. According to Cooke (2001), the label ‘Islamic feminist’ should be distinguished from ‘Muslim feminist’, because the former suggests a feminist who is taking Islamic tradition into consideration, while the latter may simply refer to a feminist who embraces Islam but does not necessarily concern herself or himself with reconciling the tenets of Islam with her or his feminism. Cooke further describes Islamic feminism as “a particular kind of self positioning that will then inform the speech, the action, the writing, or the way of life adopted by

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*Pancasila*, the official ideology of the Indonesian state, means ‘five principles’: monotheism, humanitarianism, unity, democracy and justice.
someone who is committed to questioning Islamic epistemology as an expansion of their faith position and not a rejection of it” (pp. 59–61).

Now I will discuss how Islamic feminists approach gender issues in Islam.

1.3.3.2. The Debate surrounding the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Feminism’

Muslim feminists debate the terms “Islam” and “feminism” that is whether or not the heritage of Islam is compatible with feminism or whether a person can combine the Islamic belief with feminist conviction at one and the same time. The debate connects with the historical polemic between the Islamic world and the West, which sees some people perceiving that feminism is the West based and that Islam has its own values (Safi, 2003) I will now delineate the various positions adopted by people engaged in the debate:

1. Islam “lies on the line of faith” whereas ‘feminism’ is a secular term; therefore, Islam and feminism are not compatible. Hammed Shahidin (as cited in Moghadam, 2002; Mojab, 2001) contends that ‘Islamic feminism’ is problematical and an oxymoron in the Islamic world. People adopting this position argue that Muslims do not need to import western terms or values into Islamic society, particularly Muslims have their own religious texts that they consider more relevant and culturally appropriate than those of the West.

2. Islam and feminism are harmonious. Contemporary scholars who favour the term ‘Islamic Feminism’, such as Laila Ahmed, Riffat Hassan and Fateema Mernissi, argue that feminism fits well with Islam. According to Moghadam (2002), Islam does not inherently contradict feminism because Islam promotes equality between men and women, albeit in practice this principle has been misused in order to justify the subordination of women. Anouar Majid (1998) argues that Islam and feminism are not necessarily two opposing terms in contestation with
each other. Majid criticises those who limit the term ‘Islamic’ to purely religious belief.

Debate focusing on the compatibility between ‘Islam’ and ‘feminism’ also shapes the formation of self identity among gender activists in Indonesia, e.g., referring to themselves as “feminists”. According to Doorn-Harder (2006), young Indonesians who may have worked with NGOs and been influenced by Western feminists, are more comfortable being called ‘feminists’ than members of the older generation:

Younger women who are active in NGOs call themselves “feminists.” What exactly the term “feminist” means is not always clear. Many Indonesians and women ... [of the] older generation are not comfortable being called feminists- it calls up images of western supremacy, individualism, and selfishness (Doorn-Harder, 2006, pp. 36-37).

Saparinah Sadli, one of the older generation activists, said: “I am reluctant to use [the term] Indonesian feminism because I am not sure that we have developed an Indonesian theory of feminism”(Sadli, 2002). However, she refers to Musdah Mulia, who is younger than Sadli, as an ‘Indonesian Islamic feminist’ (Musdah Mulia, 2005). In the Indonesian context, reluctance to be called a feminist derives from the stigma attached to the feminist label. As I mentioned earlier, feminists manifesting leftist (communist) or liberal tendencies (Suryakusuma, 2004; Wieringa, 2002) are seen as promoting individualism, selfishness and immoral behaviour such as free sex (Doorn-Harder, 2006): they are thought to be anti-men and sympathetic towards lesbianism (Sadli, 2002).

Whatever their identity - feminist or non-feminist - people assume that Muslims who are feminists should consider the religious texts: the Qur’an and Hadiths as resources in their discussions. Since Islam has a fundamental role in Muslim society, its proponents might fail to promote gender equality if feminists fail
to first consider the Islamic paradigm (Roald, 1998), norms and values in their struggle or works. Non-Muslim scholars such as John Esposito and Miriam Cooke maintain that discussion about women and gender in Islam has to be situated within an Islamic paradigm (Cooke, 2001; Esposito & Mogahed, 2007). I now will discuss how Muslim feminists approach gender issues in Islam.

1.3.4. Approaches towards Gender Issues in Islam

Islamic feminists employ historical and hermeneutical approaches to justify their understanding of gender equality. The historical approach establishes a social, intellectual and religious space wherein it is possible to deconstruct interpretations of gender inequality. The hermeneutical approach allows Islamic feminists to discover what they consider to be the true message of Islamic texts by focusing on the context in which the text was written, the grammatical composition of the text, and the world view of the text (Wadud, 1999).

Muslims feminists believe that Islamic texts respect both men and women equally and that they are source of gender equality. They argue that many Muslims understand gender equality in the texts inappropriately, because they have interpreted them exclusively from a male perspective for centuries. Early gender activists in the Middle East such as Tahereh Qurrotul ‘ayne (mid-1800s in Iran), Nazira Zin al-Din (1920s in Lebanon) and Fatima Aliya Hanim (late 1800s in Turkey), criticised the misogynistic interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith, attacked the veil and sex segregation, and struggled with the gender-based restrictions that had been imposed upon women such as the strict separation between the public and private and the sharp distinction made between males and females (Moghadam, 2002). Muslim feminist scholar Asghar Ali Engineer (1992), in his book Rights of Women in Islam,
asserts that the Islamic feminist movement aims to achieve justice between the sexes in the era of the holy Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.). To do this, Islamic feminists employ hermeneutical and historical approaches to reread texts while emphasising notions of equality and justice between men and women in society, seeing them as “complementary and egalitarian rather than hierarchical and unequal” (Afsaruddin, 1999, p. 23).

Prominent gender activists and Islamic scholar Nasaruddin Umar, in his work *Qur’an untuk Perempuan* (the Qur’an for Women), argues that when people read the Qur’anic verses addressing gender issues such as polygamy, inheritance, witnesses, reproductive rights, women’s right to divorce and the public role of women, they will gain the impression that said verses are misogynistic. However, if people scrutinise them more closely, using ‘the analytic methods of semantics, semiotics and hermeneutics, and paying attention to the theory of *asbab nuzul’* (the reason why the verses were revealed) they will see that these gender verses as part of the process of creating justice and that the texts do not discriminate against women (as cited in White, 2006).

Indonesian Muslim gender activists not only read Islamic texts and other works from Muslim feminists around the world but also Western feminist literature. Therefore, it is important to review the main line of feminist thought discussed and read by them. In following section I will discuss Western feminist thought.

1.3.5. Western Feminist Thought

Feminism invites a variety of approaches. Each approach can be understood according to how it perceives women as either the same as or different from men. The debate over this is known as the sameness–difference debate (Bacchi, 1990;
Bulbeck, 1998; MacKinnon, 1987). While proponents of the sameness position emphasise the similarities between men and women, those taking the difference position contend that women are fundamentally different from men (Bulbeck, 1998).

Catherine Stimpson proposes a refinement to the sameness–difference positions with her maximisers–minimisers theory (Snitow, 1989). “Maximisers” are feminists who maximise the significance of sex difference, while “minimisers” are feminists who minimise their significance (Snitow, 1989). For example, Chodorow (1978) and Carol Gilligan (1982) are maximisers when they opine that psycho-social conditions produce women who are emotional, closely emotionally tied to other human beings and have a care and responsibility ethic, whereas men are emotionally distant, do not cultivate close ties to others, and have a justice and equality ethic. Maximisers sometimes also argue that women’s natures are more peaceful than those of men (McGlen & Sarkees, 1993).

McGlen and Sarkees criticise maximiser theories by comparing them to conservative, non-feminist attitudes:

Conservatives, including many religious leaders, might not agree that men are better, but they do accept that there are differences between men and women that ... lead to men being better equipped, or anointed by God, to head the family, work outside the home, run the churches and generally have the prestigious position in government and business (1993, p. 11).

Cynthia Fuchs Epstein (1998) is also critical of maximiser theory. After reviewing research from the fields of biology and the social sciences, she concluded that the empirical foundations of maximiser theory are weak and further contribute to gender inequality.

Liberal feminism is the most conservative form of feminism. Liberal feminists tend to adopt the ‘minimiser’ position to address the unequal treatment of men and women by law. They argue that gender inequality exacerbates women’s
problems and demand equal treatment for men and women since women are potentially as rational as men, and equally able to maximise their self interest (Mohamad, Ng, & Hui, 2006; Tong, 1998).

Liberal feminists address gender inequality by working within the system to change attitudes about women. According to Lorber (2001), the different treatment of men and women takes shape through gender stereotyping and the devaluation of women. When women’s status is seen as lower than that of men, women face discrimination. This discrimination impedes women when they seek to pursue their goals. For example, women may come up against impenetrable career barriers due to cultural and structural boundaries. This glass ceiling can prevent them from reaching top positions (Lorber, 2001). When women opt to work outside the home, they often find they lack support, such as affordable childcare and help from their husbands.

Radical feminism criticises the minimiser theory of liberal feminism, arguing that ‘sameness’ does not account for sexual violence against women. In the 1970s, when difference was seen as the root of women’s oppression, radical feminists (now known as cultural feminists) framed women’s difference in a way that provided “a higher ethical and moral vision” (Sandoval, 1991). In Sexual Politics, Kate Millet (1970) argued that sexual practice is political; it subordinates women and maintains male domination. Millett shows how leftist male intellectuals in the 1960s wrote famous erotica that portrayed women as disgusting objects to be violated. She claims that the misogynist ideas promoted in these works underpinned the emergence of a profitable pornography industry that has developed over recent decades. Basically, radical/cultural feminism sees women as fundamentally different from men; it subscribes to a notion of sisterhood that holds that all women in the world have
experienced oppression (Bulbeck, 1998; Tong, 1998). They see the root of women’s exploitation in patriarchal culture. Patriarchal culture is made possible, they argue, by the unpaid domestic service of women in the home and by the exploitation of women’s bodies through marriage, sexual slavery, pornography, reproduction and rape (Lorber, 2001).

Some radical feminist scholars (for example, Lorber, 2001; Mohamad et al., 2006) argue that women should fight patriarchal culture by creating an alternate culture that enables them to reshape their lives outside of the patriarchal framework. They also encourage discussion on female sexuality and the female body, arguing that centres for women’s studies are critical to advocacy for women and to the lessening of men’s domination. In their view, radical feminism contributes significantly to the struggle against gender equality by theorising patriarchy, recognising the effects of violence and sexual harassment on women, and supporting and advocating for women. However, critics of radical feminism argue that, by focusing on patriarchal culture, it eschews issues of race, class and religion, promotes homosexual relationships and challenges heterosexual relationships (Lorber, 2001).

The Marxist-socialist feminist approach is similar to that of other minimisers in that it holds that men and women are of equal value (Lorber, 2001; Mohamad et al. 2006; Tong, 1998). It argues that women’s oppression stems from material class relations and the economic structure of the capitalist system (Lorber, 2001; Tong, 1998). It observes that exploitation is concentrated among working class women; indeed, women from the capitalist class on occasion benefit from the exploitation of working class women. Capitalism and patriarchy work hand-in-hand to maintain women’s subordination. Domestic labour is profitable for capitalists because (a) it supports bosses and workers and (b) it reproduces attitudes about women over
generations. Wives provide working men with household necessities, enabling men to work more efficiently in their jobs, while the capitalist exploitation of workers is re-enacted in the workers’ attitude towards their wives. Similar to the way in which workers are paid less than they have earned, women perform unpaid work for their families. Women are only admitted to the workplace when there are insufficient numbers of men to constitute a reserve army of labour. In other words, women are sometimes needed as a substitute source of cheap labour (Lorber, 2001).

Marxist-socialist feminist propose structural change to solve the problem of women’s exploitation, including the abolition of capitalism (Bulbeck, 1998). They argue that government should pay women for housework and childcare, and that women should obtain permanent paid work to minimise their dependence on men. They also argue that women should be paid the same as men in accordance with comparable worth programs (Lorber, 2001). While Marxist-socialist feminists have contributed to the improvement of women’s status in society by promoting economic and social welfare as well as comparable worth, it should be noted that welfare eventually creates problems for women because it makes them dependent upon the state. In this scenario, the state replicates the husband, thus women are still under men’s control to an extent.

Standpoint feminism is essentially a mix of radical, lesbian and psychoanalytical feminist theories (Lorber, 2001). This type of feminism tends to adopt the maximiser position, arguing that the basic cause of women’s oppression is the patriarchal production of knowledge. Standpoint feminists criticise mainstream forms of knowledge that ignore women’s perspectives as if women do not exist. They even go so far as to say that “knowledge is not universal because it is shaped by men’s views of the world” (Lorber, 2001, p. 130). Standpoint feminists claim that
women are sensitive to their own problems. Accordingly, the solution to gender inequality is not the promotion of scientific knowledge produced by women. Rather, standpoint feminists argue that feminist perspectives should be incorporated into academic activities (Lorber, 2001). For example, they argue that female sexuality can only be properly understood by women because it is only women who experience it. Women’s voices are essentially different from men’s and must therefore be heard.

Standpoint feminism thus argues that more women must be involved in the production of knowledge and that this knowledge production should be based on the perspectives of women. If women themselves have the power to act on their own issues, this will help to solve women’s problems more generally, and in the academic sphere in particular. Making research on women conducted by women central to the physical and social sciences could prove to be an effective way of dealing with gender inequality problems. Some important contributions have already been made by standpoint feminists. For example, they have contributed to feminist knowledge by questioning science that is considered to be universal and objective (Lorber, 2001).

The main different types of feminism read by Indonesian gender activists include: Liberal, Radical, Marxist-socialist and Stand Point feminism. I will now briefly review the thought surrounding these from different types of feminism and show case the different approaches the sameness-difference debate. Feminists associated with the different schools tend to adopt different positions vis-a-vis the sameness-difference debate. Based on the above discussions, it becomes clear that Liberal and Marxist-Socialist feminism closely resembles the minimiser theory, whereas Radical/Cultural and Stand Point feminism tends to employ the difference or maximiser theory. Having reviewed the cultural background of gender and sexuality
in traditional Javanese society, the gender equality movement in Indonesia, the
debate surrounding the compatibility of Islam and feminism and the Western
feminist debate on sameness-difference theory as the theoretical foundations and
tools underpinning the analyses of my findings, I will now present the methodologies
employed to ascertain the findings.

1.4.Methodologies

This research used a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Three
main techniques were used to collect data: a survey questionnaire; in-depth
interviews and documentation; and, one additional technique: observation.

1.  The survey variously consisted of a short answer questionnaire containing open-ended
     questions, the Thurstone Scale, and multiple choice questionnaires (see
     Appendix 1 for survey instrument). I employed the Thurstone Scale (Method of
     Equal Appearing Intervals), which allowed estimation of the degree of
     favourableness or unfavourableness expressed by each statement (Edwards &
     Kenney, 1946). These techniques were used to compare and contrast the
     responses of people associated with the PSWs/PSG i.e., self-identified feminists,
     with people of who self-identified as non-feminists and how they related to the
     research variables. I conducted surveys of all respondents in the PSWs/PSG. The
     above instruments were used to obtain data related to the six types of variables
     that appear below. For lists of variables, and ways of operationalising said
     variables, please see Appendix 2.

     a. Social background characteristics

     b. Knowledge of feminist scholarship

     c. Strength of negative stereotyping of feminists
d. Identity (self-identified feminists versus self-identified non-feminists)

e. Knowledge of pembaharuan

f. Approaches to Islamic exegesis (literalist, moderate, or contextualist/progressive)

2. In-depth interviews were conducted to ascertain a more detailed assessment of participants’ understanding of feminism and the nine key gender issues in Islam. In terms of feminism, in-depth interviews were conducted to explore what the term ‘feminist’ meant to people who identify as ‘feminist’ and those who do not identify as ‘feminist’, why people opt not to identify as ‘feminists’, and their reasons for rejecting feminism. They were also used to explore the question of people’s notions of Western feminism. As regards people’s understanding of gender issues in general, this technique was used to ascertain their views on gender issues in Islam and to determine how they support their positions. In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted to collect data on PSWs/PSG as institutions: details sought included histories, a brief ethnography of each Centre, their development, and other issues related to the research. I interviewed the founders and key persons of PSWs/PSG and the staff of the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection. Interview responses were elicited using semi-structured, open-ended questions. (For the list of questions, see Appendix 3). They were conducted in Bahasa Indonesian or Javanese and then transcribed in English. When reporting information obtained through interviews, real names were used only when constructing the history of gender studies centres from interviews with key informants involved with those centres or when referring to data gathered from secondary materials on that history or the history of the gender equality movement in Indonesia more broadly. To protect the privacy of
people interviewed about their personal identification as feminist or otherwise and about their views on gender relations in the light of Islamic teachings, pseudonyms were used.

3. The third technique employed involved the study of the Centres’ documents, e.g., the decrees of organisation, policies, program statements, position papers, newsletters, leaflets, meeting decisions, press releases, training manuals, reports on workshops and other documents relevant to the current research. This technique was utilised to investigate the role of the PSWs/PSG in the contemporary, Indonesian Muslim gender equality movement.

4. The fourth technique was observation; this is, observing the Centres’ activities as well as the operation of the physical Centres’ offices and facilities.

After collecting both quantitative and qualitative data I proceeded to analyse them. In the case of quantitative data, I employed the SPSS statistical program and, for qualitative data, I used descriptive analysis. To test the trends of understanding, I employed the subprogram FREQUENCIES: to test the association among variables I used the statistical analysis SPSS for ‘Independent Samples T Test’ analysis. Because the number of samples (males vs females, Islamic vs Public) were not equal, I utilised unequal variance. According to Green & Salkind, (2005) non-parametric data can be tested by using this program which facilitate a statistical test of whether the means of several groups are equal. The variables are tested for statistical significance (Nie, 1975). Any or all differences among respondents based on social attributes, backgrounds and their understanding of feminism and gender-relations in Islam were indentified using this program.

The survey process and the interviewing and collecting of relevant documents pertinent to the PSWs/PSG were undertaken during my 6 month period of field work.
in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. During this time, I visited the selected Centres (PSWs/PSG) as well as the secretariat and library of the Ministry for Women’s Empowerment in Jakarta to collect documents related to the research.

This research is a motivated sample. As previously mentioned, it was conducted in Yogyakarta, a special province located in the central area of Java. I chose Yogyakarta for several reasons: It is known primarily as an educational and cultural city. Of the approximately, 123 PSWs/PSGs across Indonesia, 15 of them are located in Yogyakarta. In 1928, first Indonesia National Women Congress was conducted in Yogyakarta. ‘Aisyiyah, the longest-serve Muslim women’s organisation was established in this city and, until today, its national board is in Yogyakarta. Many women’s NGOs and Muslim Women’s organisations were originally established there: LSPPA, Rifka Anisa, YASANTI, Tjut Nyak Dien, Dian Desa, ‘Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul ‘Aisyiyah. Several prominent Indonesian women activists include Cicik Farha, Sinta Nuriyah and Yuni Chuzaifah, the founders of women organisations or NGOs outside of Yogyakarta graduated from Yogyakarta’s universities.

The respondents are from five PSWs and one PSG in six universities in Yogyakarta. Three were Islamic universities: PSW UIN (State Islamic University) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, PSG UII (University of Islam Indonesia) and PSW UMY (University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta) and from three public universities: PSW UGM (Gadjah Mada University), PSW UNY (State University of Yogyakarta) and PSW UPN “Veteran” (University of National Development “Veteran”). Picture 1 shows the various locations of the selected universities in Yogyakarta.
The characteristics of the respondents were as follow: (a) Gender activists and scholars concerned with gender or/women issues associated with universities; (b) Members of the PSWs/PSG in Yogyakarta (everyone connected with a PSW/PSG is by definition gender activist, including former staff, staff, and associate members/volunteers); (c) Muslim; and (d) Males and females.

As a sampling strategy, first, questionnaires were distributed among all staff and former staff, and associate members/volunteers of PSWs/PSG; second, they were distributed among authors, writers or researchers concerned with gender or women’s issues from selected universities. As a last strategy, I visited women’s organisations in Yogyakarta and active members affiliated with selected universities. Employing this strategy, I engaged with 165 respondents including 70 males and 95 females, 105 from religion based universities and 60 from secular universities (see Graph 1). In case of in the in-depth interviews, I selected 25 participants based on the survey results that included a range of approaches (literalist, moderate, or contextualist/progressive) sexes, university affiliations, feminist identity (self-...
identified feminists and self-identified non-feminists), ages and ethnicity (see Graph 2).

**Graph 1:**
Percentage of Survey Respondents by Sex and Name of University
(N=165, Islamic Uni=105, Public Uni=60, M=70, F=95)

Sources: Thesis author’s compilation

**Graph 2:**
In depth interview respondents (N=25)

Sources: Thesis author’s compilation
1.5. Chapter Summary

This thesis comprises seven chapters. Having delineated the main thesis aims, significance, scope and theoretical frameworks in Chapter 1, in the following chapter (Chapter Two) I explore Indonesian Muslim women’s and gender equality movements, my aim being to provide the social and historical context of feminists’ thought in Indonesia and to show why the PSWs/PSGs were formed. I discuss types of establishments, issues, concerns and strategies, the relationships between male and female organisations, challenges and support to the movements, and the emergence of feminist ideas in Indonesia. In Chapter 3, I provide an ethnographic account of PSWs/PSG, prefaced by details of their historical development with focus on PSWs/PSG in Yogyakarta. The similarities and differences among the six selected Centres and how people in these Centres play their roles in academic life are also explored. This chapter shows that one of the government’s strategies for improving women’s lives in Indonesia is to work together with universities and encourage them to establish PSWs and/or PSGs.

In Chapter Four, I present my research findings on feminist identity and notions of Western feminism held by activists and scholars in the six selected PSWs/PSG. This represents one of the main findings of my field research. In this chapter I examine ‘feminist’ identity question and what ‘feminist’ means for people who identify as feminist and for those who do not, why they reject that identity, and their degree of understanding of Western feminism. This chapter shows that in Indonesia, identifying oneself as a ‘feminist’ remains a controversial issue for people who are concerned with women’s and gender issues. This relates to the various understandings surrounding the term ‘feminist’, and its both positive and negative connotations for Indonesian society. For strategic reasons, some respondents opted to
not publicly identify as ‘feminist’. Such self-identification poses a higher risk for women than for men.

In order to provide a background for Chapter Six, in which I present my findings on people’s conceptualisations of nine key gender issues in Islam, Chapter Five introduces the terms of debate in the wider Muslim world pertinent to these gender issues. The nine gender issues include: equality of gender roles in the home and workplace, equality of sexual rights, equal power to make decisions in family life, equal rights to inheritance, equal value as a witness, the symbolic equality of women in the creation story, polygamy, equal status of women, and women’s right to lead public mixed-gender prayers (imam sholat). Both the feminist and non-feminist positions are reviewed. I not only focus on the views of leading Indonesian Muslim thinkers, but also relate their thought on these issues to those of influential Muslim thinkers elsewhere in the world. I classify their understandings as textualist, moderate and progressive. Chapter six presents my research findings vis-avis PSWs/PSG activists’ understandings of Islamic teachings on gender, reviewing their positions on the aforementioned nine gender issues. This chapter shows that while almost all of the respondents had progressive views regarding gender issues that are not taken to the religious court; they were less progressive regarding the issues that related to ritual (ibadah) activity. This research shows that respondents’ views were fairly equal when it came to progressive and non-progressive views on polygamy and the status of women in general. The majority adopted a moderate position on women’s leadership of prayers/sholat (Imam sholat). In Chapter Seven I draw together the main argument and the findings of this thesis. As well, I outline the research recommendations for future research.
Introduction

In an attempt to provide the context of how Indonesian feminists’ think, and how the PSWs/PSGs were formed and play their roles in the women’s movement in Indonesia, in this chapter I will explore the history of the country’s gender equality movement. This chapter is important to any understanding of the concepts of gender and the power relationships that prevail between men and women in Muslim society that underpin to the shifting and fluctuating perceptions of how good women, good men and good gender relationships have been seen in Indonesia and in the Islamic context throughout Indonesian history. These concepts may not always have been similar in different historical periods and different cultural, political and ideological settings. The Islamic women’s movement is a discursive process, a process of producing meaning about gender, identity, womanhood and collective selves (Wieringa, 2002).

The opposition that Muslim women and gender equality activists express towards the dominant culture and state policy derives from a wide variety of positions that sometimes intersect or may even contradict each other (Bunch, 1990; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1991). This ever-changing concept of certain women’s issues was evident in the discussion on polygamy at the national Indonesian Women’s Congress in 1928. Delegates from Islamic groups such as ‘Aisiyiyah supported polygamy because it is mentioned in the Qur’an and is believed to prevent men from committing zina (adultery) with women other than their wives or with prostitutes. In contrast, other women’s associations e.g., Istri Sedar wanted to abolish it (Departemen Penerangan Indonesia, 1968). The aims of the meeting were to bring
together all women’s organisations throughout Indonesia to discuss gender issues, build formal relationships, and to provide Indonesian women with a single voice with which to address policy makers (Martyn, 2004). But, due to their various religious, cultural and political backgrounds, having one voice to represent all Indonesian women’s opinions was not feasible. So, when talking about Muslim women’s movements and gender equality processes and practices, one should be aware of the historical, cultural, ideological and political contexts.

In order to examine in more detail the differing concepts of gender and women’s issues in Indonesia, this chapter will discuss the evolution of the country’s women’s movements throughout the following three periods in Indonesian history: the late colonial, the early independence, and the recent period since the New Order in 1968. I will look at the issues that predominated during each period and the relationships between Indonesia’s male and female organisations across those time periods.

Looking at the issues, one finds that in the late colonial period, the issues that predominated were child marriage, education, women’s suffrage and marriage law (polygamy). In the early independence period the dominant issues were socio-economic problems and marriage laws. Then, in the more recent New Order (1968-1998) period, and in the Reformation era (post 1998), the predominant women’s and gender issues included the acceptability of the terms “feminist” and “gender”, the pornography bill, a new marriage law, the trafficking of women and children, quotas of women in the political arena, and the practice of polygamy. In the late New Order period (of the 1980s) the first criticisms of patriarchal culture as the root of gender inequality emerged; and, in the Reformation era, feminist discourse started to circulate much more widely.
Overtime changes have occurred in the relationships between males and females’ organisations. From the late colonial up until the early independent period, there were no fully independent religious based women’s organisations. Conversely, many secular women’s organisations were fully independent of men’s organisations. Only in recent times have some fully independent religious based women’s organisations emerged. Throughout the country’s entire history, both religious and secular organisations have had an equal number of adjunct dependent/subsidiary and semi-autonomous women’s groups.

Having discussed the changes in the women’s movement across the twentieth and early twenty-first century in Indonesia, in the last section I will discuss the sources of support and the challenges that the gender equality movement has faced. I will show that the Old Order Indonesian government, that was in power in the immediate post-independence period paid little attention to women’s issues, whereas the New Order government paid considerable attention to women’s organisations. But, it used them to support government policy rather than to improve women’s lives. In the Reformation Era, the government has become actively involved through the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment to help improve women’s circumstances and opportunities. I will also show that the neo-modernist movement among Muslim intellectuals contributed to the ways in which Muslim gender activists re-read the religious texts, whereas the Islamic revivalist movements provided them with new challenges. The international network of women activists has strengthened the progress of the gender equality movement in Indonesia.
2.1. Issues, Concerns, and Strategies of the Women’s Movement

2.1.1. Late Colonial Period

In the late colonial period, the women’s movements’ focus was upon the issues of child marriage, education, women’s suffrage, and marriage laws particularly on polygamy. Although child marriage and polygamy law were central concerns, there was no significant response from the government. Therefore, the struggle by some women’s organisations to propose an appropriate marriage age and to ban polygamy continued up until the 1970s. These issues not only consumed a great deal of energy and time but also sparked significant controversy among women’s organisations in general. In 1941, the government started paying attention to education and political rights by opening schools for girls and implementing women’s suffrage. These successes were achieved because all of Indonesia’s women’s organisations spoke with one voice about females’ right to education and to vote.

2.1.1.1. Child Marriage

According to Boerenbeker, contemporaneous with the emergence of the feminist movement, there were four types of child marriage in Indonesia: “(1) a little girl is married to a minor boy; (2) a little girl is married to an adult male, and cohabitation is postponed; (3) a little girl is married to an adult male, and cohabitation is not postponed; and (4) a young girl who has reached the age of puberty marries a boy who has not” (cited in Vreede-de Stuers, 1960, p. 39). Because of this, there were many instances of “kawin gantung”, which meant that the couple would not have sexual intercourse until the girl started menstruating (Blackburn, 2004, p. 63). At the first National Women’s Congress, the issue of child marriage sparked controversy between the largest Islamic women’s organisation, ‘Aisyiyah and the non-religious
groups. ‘Aisyiyah argued that the Prophet Muhammad married Aisyah when she was aged nine (Blackburn, 2004).

2.1.1.2. Education

The problem of education for women can be traced back to prominent feminist, Kartini, and her first letter to Stella, a Dutch feminist, dated 25 May 1899.

… ‘modern girl’ … [a] proud, independent girl who has all my sympathy, she who … [was] working not only for her own well-being and happiness, but for the greater good of humanity as a whole. My late grandfather was the first Regent of Middle Java… All of his children had a European education … the highest institution … We girls, so far as education goes, fettered by our ancient traditions and conventions, have profited but little … [from] these advantages. It was a great crime against the custom of our land that we should be taught at all, and especially that we should leave the house to go to school, for the custom of our country forbade girls in the strongest manner ever to go outside of the house … When I reached the age of twelve, I was kept at home – I [had to] go into the “box.” I was locked up and cut off from all communication with the outside world…(Kartini & Geertz, 1964, pp. 31–33)

This letter suggests that in the late nineteenth century, in general women were denied access to education. Initially, Kartini was fortunate because her father sent her to school; but, she was forced by patriarchal custom into purdah (seclusion) at the age of twelve. According to Kartini, a girl’s insistence on her right to go to school was the only effective way to achieve true emancipation and to deal with the problem of the oppression of all women. If women were well educated, not only would the women themselves benefit but the entire nation would benefit also because women were the mothers and the first educators at home. As such, they constituted the moral bedrock of society (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960).

During the colonial era, there were virtually no government schools for Indonesian girls prior to 1913. However, in 1904, the first private school for Indonesian women, Keutamaan Istri (Women’s Accomplishment), was founded in
Bandung by Dewi Sartika. After she married, her husband helped her to expand the numbers of women’s schools. By 1912, nine schools had been established representing 50% of Sundanese girls (Suwondo, 1981). By 1917 female students accounted for 4,900 out of total 24,800 (20%) (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960). In 1912, Mr and Mrs C. Th Van Deventer founded the Kartini Foundation in Kartini’s memory. In 1913, nine years after the establishment of Dewi Sartika’s first girls’ school, the Kartini Foundation opened a new school for women, the Kartini School, in Semarang. Subsequently, schools opened in other cities.

2.1.1.3. Women’s Suffrage

Ten years after the establishment of the Badan Konggres Perempuan (the Association of Women’s Congress), the women’s movement added to their agenda the issue of women’s suffrage. The topic of suffrage for women was first raised at the third National Women’s Congress in Bandung in 1938, in reaction to the colonial government policy that denied Indonesian women’s right to vote. In 1938, a Dutch woman, not an Indonesian, was elected to the National Council. The female Indonesian candidate, Maria Ulfah Santoso, a graduate from the Law school at the University of Leiden, was supported not only by the Javanese Women’s Association, but also by other Indonesian regions (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960). In 1918, the colonist initiated the People’s Council. Long before this time, according to adat (custom), both men and women had the right to vote. This cultural belief was to impact on of local council elections. Four female candidates contested the municipal elections and won seats on their local councils. Finally, after long protests and considerable discussion, Indonesian women were accorded the right to vote for on 9 September 1941 (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960). In 1945 the Partai Wanita Rakjat (a community
women’s party) led by was Mrs. Mangunsarkoro was founded, the only political party in the country run entirely by women. In the 1955 general election, sixteen women successfully contested and were elected.

2.1.1.4. Marriage Law and Polygamy

Public protests against polygamy in Indonesia had occurred as early as the first Indonesian Women’s Congress in 1928. In 1927, a statement written by Soepinah Isti Kasiati, which was published in *El Fadjar* asserted that polygamy, while not obligatory, was nonetheless permitted (Blackburn, 2004). As the ‘Aisyiyah Congress in March 1932, delegate Siti Moendjiyah, defending the practice of polygamy, argued that it prevented the husbands from having extra-marital affairs or sex with prostitutes (Doorn-Harder, 2006). This speech provoked protests among secular women’s organisations. In 1952, people joined in street demonstrations against a law giving pensions to all civil servant polygamists’ widows, and protested against President Soekarno’s polygamous marriages (Blackburn, 2004). The campaigns contesting the marriage law had been last from 1940 to the 1970s (Blackburn, 2004).

Mrs. Soewarni Pringgodigdo, a woman activist, researched the argument that lawful polygamy was better than illicit polygamy, expressed her staunch belief that polygamy was an ‘intolerable evil’ for women: “The Indonesian woman has a right to justice and independence, and polygamy is the very denial of justice and independence” (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960, p. 107). A literal interpretation of a Qur’anic decree on polygamy written by a Muslim student, Jusuf Wibisono, was published in response to Soewarni’s finding. Wibisono wrote: “Polygamy is not only necessary in the case of an excess of women; it is also an active means of contending against the social evils rampant in Europe” (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960, p. 107). With
reference to divorce, he wrote: “It is a good thing that women have not the right of divorce, as women in general are guided by their sentiments rather than by their reason” (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960, p. 107). This statement encapsulated the main argument of those who took a stand against feminist ideas in the process contrasting East with West, Muslim with non-Muslim, and Islamic with un-Islamic. In this way, the terms ‘gender’ and ‘feminist’ were associated with Western ideas or un-Islamic values. Due to this misrepresentation, some Indonesian people discouraged the activists of gender and feminist movements in Islamic society.

The second National Women’s Congress, held in 1935 in Djakarta, decided to establish *Komisi Penjelidik Hukum Perkawinan* (Marriage Law Review Commission), under the leadership of Maria Ulfah Santoso. In response to the Congress, the government improved matrimonial legislation by introducing the “Marriage Ordinance Project”, which included the following points: marriages must be registered; monogamy was an absolute condition of marriage; and if a man wanted to practice polygamy, his first wife could demand divorce through the courts legally; and a husband’s adultery could also be grounds for divorce (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960).

All Islamic associations opposed this law on the grounds that it prohibited polygamy and proposed official registration of marriages. At the third National Women’s Congress (1935), the *Komisi Perkawinan*, a commission entrusted with the drafting of an Indonesian marriage regulation without attacking Islam, was established. Maria Ulfah Santoso, the president of the *Komisi Penjelidik Hukum Perkawinan*, presenting the outcome of the discussion in the form of a working paper, provided detailed information about women’s movements in other Muslim countries, e.g., how Turkey had adopted the Swiss Code, which distinguished...
between matrimonial and religious law. This did not mean that Turks rejected their
religion; rather, they considered it a personal matter (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960).
However, Indonesian Muslims rejected any proposal to keep religious belief and
practice separate from the state given that the first of the five basic principles of
Indonesia, (*Pancasila*) was belief in God.

The most controversial article in the Marriage Ordinance Project was Article
13, Chapter 17, the prohibition of polygamy. Maria Ulfah Santoso stressed that the
Qur’an, as the word of God, must meet the needs of all classes of society at all times.
She pointed out that regulations which were applicable in the seventh century when
Islam first appeared needed certain adjustments before being implemented for the
best in the twentieth century. One of the values of the Qur’an is to protect women not
only physically, but also psychologically. Santoso realised that matrimonial
legislation would be difficult to introduce because many Muslims did not seem to
understand the value of the Qur’an sufficiently and because there were many
interpretations of the Qur’an. She questioned the reason for polygamy, i.e, that an
excess of women requires a man to marry more than one out of pity. It was better to
work hard than to be married out of pity (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960). The way Santoso
understood the Qur’an demonstrated the hermeneutic method of asserting the basic
values of the Qur’an, not just the literal translation. In Indonesia, this hermeneutic
method continues to influence most Islamic feminists today. It is interesting to note
that the strategies employed by Islamic feminists are not products of the 1990s: they
were already in use prior to Indonesia’s independence. Although the colonial
government withdrew the Marriage Ordinance, evidence shows that the women’s
movement had already taken an important stance on polygamy as early as the
colonial period.
2.1.2. Early Independence

In the early-to mid-Independence periods, the gender equality movement pursued two principal agendas, one related to socio-economic problems and the other to country’s marriage laws.

2.1.2.1. Socio-Economic Problems

The aftermath of independence revealed that a great deal of the country’s infrastructure had been destroyed during World War II. In 1957, a government survey of workers in Jakarta found that 96 per cent of their expenditure was consumed by basic survival needs: only 70 per cent could afford three meals a day. Indonesia did not have sufficient numbers of doctors, teachers or other professionals. Most Indonesians remained illiterate and schools and hospitals were found only in urban areas (Martyn, 2004).

In response to these socio-economic problems, in the early years of independence, women’s organisations mobilised their activities in support of the national goals. In a speech delivered in early independence, Vice-President Hatta asked women not to make demands on the state but instead to help build the nation (Martyn, 2004). The women’s movement realised that Indonesia was a new state that needed help to develop a stable society and economy. The movement also viewed socio-economic progress as an important national concern, one that promised to promote women’s gender interests. In order to improve women’s lives, their basic needs for food and nutrition, health, education and shelter needed to be met. In their roles as mothers and wives, these basic needs were very important. During this era,
all women’s organisations, whether religious or secular, whether fully independent, semi-independent or dependent, worked hand-in-hand to overcome the socio-economic problems facing the new nation (Martyn, 2004). Some established schools, literacy courses and courses on the rights and responsibilities of women; others set up maternity and child health centres, and assisted the government in the sphere of community development (KOWANI, 1958).

2.1.2.2. Marriage Law

As mentioned earlier, the problem of marriage laws concerning polygamy, a woman’s right to divorce, and the age of marriage constituted the hardest struggle of the women’s movement and occupied its attention for a considerable amount of time. After independence in 1945, the Indonesian government realised that it needed an agency to deal with religious issues, including its marital laws. To this end, on 3 January 1946, the government established Kementrian Agama, the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In response to continuous requests from women’s associations and from the female members of parliament, in 1950 the Indonesian government appointed a commission on marital law (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960). An early draft of a proposed Act was sent to all women’s associations in October 1952 to solicit their opinions on issues such as: the consent of both parties to a marriage; an age limit of fifteen years for girls and eighteen for men; equal divorce rights for husbands and wives; health certificates for both parties before marriage; and, permission to practice polygamy only after the first wife had given her consent and only if the husband could guarantee that he was able to provide for more than one family in accordance with Qur’anic decree (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960). Muslim women’s associations disagreed with the draft Act: they considered it imprecise. The same reaction came
from the country’s Catholic associations, who disagreed with the draft Act because it allowed polygamy and divorce. In 1954 and 1955, two drafts were sent to the Ministry of Religious Affairs; and, in 1956 they were sent to the Cabinet (which took two years to discuss the principal issues). In February 1959, one more the draft Act was rejected by the government and the Muslim parties in parliament. But, the government promised to enact Marriage Bill for the respective religious and neutral groups (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960).

Finally, in 1974, the government issued Marriage Law No 1. In terms of polygamy, the law stated that if a man wanted to be a polygamist under the court, he must first gain permission from his prior wife/wives and must demonstrate his economic capability to support all wives and children equally. He also must seek the religious court’s approval, which could be given in certain circumstances, e.g., if the wife/wives could not bear children, were chronically sick or disabled, or could not fulfil the conjugal obligations of a wife. These conditions were extended to wives who could not have sexual intercourse with their husbands. This law also decreed that polygamy could only be approved if the husband could treat all wives and children justly and equally. But, although the law seemed to protect women from discrimination in terms of polygamy, it still evinced a gender bias and ignored women’s rights given that it only considered polygamy as a possibility for men and considered his problems only in light of wifely failings. The law did not in any was allude to what should happen if the husband became disabled, infertile, could not fulfil his obligations as a husband. According to the law, it seemed that the sanctioning of polygamy rested solely upon women’s faults and inadequacies (Qibtiyah, 2006).
2.1.3. Recent Periods

After the ratification of The Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women (NFSL) policy in 1985, issues of equality, development and peace were raised and subjected to further discussion in Indonesia. Women’s NGOs were established; for example, the Kalyanamitra, Yayasan Anisa Swasti and Yayasan Solidaritas Perempuan, their common aims being to challenge and abolish the patriarchal system. They worked to raise the profile of women’s rights and issues, e.g., reproductive rights, gender equality, violence against women, the gender gap, and equal pay for equal work for men and women (Ro’fah, 2000). Several important concerns of the early twenty-first century pertained to marriage laws and polygamy, the acceptability of the terms “feminist” and “gender”, the pornography bill, and quotas for women in the political arena. Women’s issues were articulated as gender issues in the Board State Guideline (GBHN) in 1993, 1998 and 1999 (Parawansa, 2002). Although Indonesia has a long history of feminist thinking, it was in the 1980s that feminism was broadly strengthened. In the next section, I discuss the strengthening of feminism during this period in more detail.

2.1.3.1. Marriage Law and Polygamy

Although the Marriage Law was passed in 1974, the women’s movement has frequently criticised it and proposed amendments. Some of their recommendations appertain to the relative positions and responsibilities of the husband and wife. The existing Law No 1 1974 states that the husband is head of family and the wife is head of the household. The current proposal says that both the husband and wife are responsible for the family. Another important issue is the consent of children if their
father wants to enter into a polygamous relationship. Until today, this amendment is
still under discussion in Indonesian parliament.

Although the 1974 law states that polygamy can only be approved with the
wife’s (or wives’) consent, in practice it does not mean that the wife has real
autonomy in this respect. In Indonesian culture many women are economically
dependent upon their husbands; so, if they contemplate divorce they risk suffering
economically. In addition, divorce carries negative connotations in Indonesia’s
Islamic society. As a result, the wife consents to her husband taking another wife
because in reality she has no real choice. This law represents a part of the effort of
women’s organisations to improve women’s status. Although the law regarding
polygamy is still gender-biased, it is better than having no law: at least it minimises
the negative impact of practicing polygamy on women and children. However,
although polygamy has never been officially banned in Indonesia, the popularity of
the practice has declined. An obvious example of this was women’s reaction to the
polygamous status of Islamic preacher, Aa Gym. In 2006, after he took a second
wife, his popularity waned significantly. His audience, which comprised mostly
women, subsequently had less respect for him. One further reason for the confused
stance adopted by some women’s organisations regarding polygamy is that they are
still adjuncts of male organisations. This means that in effect their autonomy is
limited.

In Malaysia, in 2009, one literalist group, the Obedience Wife Club (OWC),
affiliated with Conservative Global Ikhwan. In 2011, this club launched a “polygamy
club” and a 115-page book titled *Islamic Sex, Fighting Jews to Return Islamic Sex to
the World*. This group called upon Muslim husbands to have sex with all of their
wives in the same time (France-Presse, 2011). Currently it has approximately 800
members in Malaysia, and branches in Singapore, Indonesia and Jordan (MacKinnon, 2011). The OWC (Obedience Wife Club) was founded in Indonesia by Dr Ing Gina Puspita in June 2011 (Suryakusuma, 2011). According to Nurmila (2009), Muslim feminists and liberals should work together for the prohibition of polygamy in Indonesia because the practice creates injustice.

2.1.3.1. Terminology: Feminist or Gender

In terms of creating identity by using the term ‘feminist’, Indonesian women’s organisations are still not of one voice. While many groups use the term ‘feminist’, many others opt not to use the ‘feminist’ label but choose to promote feminist ideals. In the Indonesian context, people’s reluctance to be called ‘feminist’ stems from the stigma attached to the feminist label. As suggested previously, feminists are perceived of as having links to either leftist (communist) or liberal tendencies (Suryakusuma, 2004; Wieringa, 2002), as promoting individualism, selfishness and immoral behaviour including free sex (Doorn-Harder, 2006). Some see them as anti-men, as women sympathetic to lesbianism (Sadli, 2002). Due to this, some women’s organisations make the disclaimer that “even though we struggle for women’s rights, we are not feminists” (Suryakusuma, 2004, p. 271). According to Doorn-Harder (2006), young Indonesians who have become involved with NGOs, and have been influenced by Western feminists, are more comfortable being called ‘feminists’ than the older generation:

Younger women who are actively in NGOs call themselves “feminists.” What exactly the term “feminist” means is not always clear. Many Indonesian and women ... [of the] older generation are not comfortable being called feminists- it calls up images of western supremacy, individualism, and selfishness (Doorn-Harder, 2006, pp. 36–37).
One of the older generation of activists, Saparinah Sadli stated: “I am reluctant to use Indonesian feminism because I am not sure that we have developed an Indonesian theory of feminism” (Sadli, 2002, pp. 80–91). However, she refers to Musdah Mulia (who is younger than Sadli) as an Indonesian Islamic feminist (Musdah Mulia, 2005).

2.1.3.2. The Pornography Bill

The early years of the twenty-first century have seen pornography become an important issue in the women’s movement. The Anti Pornography Bill introduced in 1999 has sparked considerable controversy, particularly between religious fundamentalist groups on the one hand, and people in the entertainment and business sectors - and some women’s NGOs - on the other. Controversy over the Bill mainly Centred on the definition of sensuality and its representation, as well as on its supposed harmful effects on viewers. The Government along with religious fundamentalist groups argued that many erotic images contravened the national and cultural Indonesian identity. In addition, opponent groups argued that the draft Anti Pornography Bill indicated betrayal against the true Indonesian identity which was plural, hybrid and rich. Indonesian feminists Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Gadis Arivia, for example, stated that the draft Anti Pornography Bill was: “bertentangan dengan prinsip keanekaragaman atau bhinneka tunggal ika” (against the multicultural principle of bhinneka tunggal ika). Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, the motto of Indonesia, literally means Unity in Diversity. Furthermore, according to Tjen (n.d.), they argued that their disagreement with the draft anti-pornography bill was not a betrayal of Indonesian culture. The Anti Pornography Bill, which was originally drafted in 1999, was resurrected in 2006 by a prominent Islamic political party after
*Playboy* magazine announced its intention to publish an Indonesian version (Gelling, 2008).

In December 2004, Indonesian’s President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became uncomfortable, concerned and worried about programs on television that showed the female navel (Tjen, n.d.). In response to his concerns, the Bill has been revised many times. After drawing criticism from NGOs and sectors of Indonesian society, the name of the Bill was changed from the *Pornography and Porno Action Bill* to the *Pornography Bill*. In 2008, during the holy month of Romadhon, the Bill was finally passed by parliament.

### 2.1.3.3. Political Quota

In Indonesia, women have had full rights in the political arena since 1941 (the late colonial period). But, in reality, it is still difficult for women to attain high positions in the political sphere. For example, Megawati Soekarno Putri, the fifth president of Indonesia, encountered a great deal of opposition, particularly from certain religious groups which claimed the leadership by women would damage the country. Thus, the women’s movement has had to keep struggling for equal rights in the political arena. One of their achievements saw female activists successfully pass the law on women’s quotas in parliament. The law (UU No. 10/2008) guaranteed that every party in the 2009 election should have a minimum 30% of quota for women.

Although the law was passed, in practice there is no fine or punishment if the party cannot (or opts not to) fulfil this quota. In fact, the data revealed that few political parties achieved this quota; in at least 12 parties, women failed to reach the minimum 30% share. As a result, in the 2009 election (followed by 44 political parties), women’s representation in the parliament was limited to 28% (Deni, 2008),
although this number can be adjusted by employing the *proporsional terbuka* (open proportional) mechanism for candidates in parliament.

According to Parawansa (Parawansa, 2002), several obstacles inhibit the recruiting of women into the Indonesian legislature. First, the cultural context, which is still heavily patriarchal, dictates that the political arena is for men and women’s involvement is considered inappropriate. Second, the selection process operates against a backdrop in which most of the leaders of political parties are male; in general, women do not receive much support from their male counterparts. Third, the media do not support the notion that women’s representation in parliament is important. Fourth, the links between political parties and women’s organisations/women’s NGOs who fight for women’s representation in parliament continue to be weak. Finally, women’s lack of education and their traditional gender roles within the family combine to inhibit the advancement of women.

2.1.3.4. Feminism strengthened in Indonesia

Although the modern discipline of feminism originated from Western scholarship and has only recently been embraced by Indonesian academia, Indonesian women were aware of gender issues long before Indonesia gained independence in 1945. In fact, there is evidence of feminist movements in the colonial era, first in relation to women’s struggle for their rights concerning education and women’s suffrage in the colonial era, second in relation to the polygamy debate that emerged in the National Women’s Congress of 1928 and continues to this day. In 1932, the female activist, Soewarni Pringgodigdo, argued that polygamy was an “intolerable evil”, the very denial of justice and independence for Indonesian women (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960).
At the Second National Women’s Congress in 1935, Maria Ulfah Santoso, a prominent woman activist of the time, introduced the Marriage Ordinance Project, which stipulated that (1) a marriage must be registered, (2) monogamy is an absolute condition of marriage, and (3) a wife may demand a divorce if her husband practices polygamy. Santoso also urged that certain practical adjustments should be made to the way that the Qur’an, as the word of God, was used to serve the needs of all social classes. She added that one of the values of the Qur’an is its protection for women, not only physically but also psychologically (Vreede-de Stuers, 1960).

Criticisms of patriarchal culture as the root of gender inequality emerged in the 1980s. This period saw the idea of feminism strengthened in Indonesia, as gender and development activists were introduced to feminist theory generated by gender activists from PSWs/PSG (Noerhadi, 1993). One prominent woman activist, Saparinah Sadli stated:

Since 1998, when Indonesia began its transition towards a more democratic society, many women’s groups have been working actively on women’s rights issues within the context of feminism. Consequently the application of feminist ideas has become more visible, although I should add that in Indonesian feminism, women’s rights are still concerned with a relatively small group of women and some men. At the start of the 21st century, feminism remains problematic for many Indonesians, especially those who are not directly concerned with women’s issues or who are not familiar with the development of feminism in the north [America] or Asian countries ... The terms ‘feminism’, ‘feminist’ and even ‘gender’ are still questioned by the majority of Indonesians. Certain assumptions remain common: feminism is a Western or northern concept; it is anti-male, it perceives men to be the source of all gender inequality; it promotes the acceptance of lesbianism and so forth. (Sadli, 2002: 80–91)

One sign of the spread of feminist ideas in Indonesia was the emergence of the term ‘gerakan perempuan’ (women’s movement), which was used by young women activists, especially those who are under forty years of age (Noerhadi, 1993). Another sign was that gender analysis programs promoted by international donors became stronger in the 1990s (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004).
In the early 1990s, religious feminism was also strengthened in Indonesia. Abdurrahman Wahid claims that, prior to their ratifying of the Beijing Convention, Indonesian Muslim gender activists needed to take *kearifan lokal* (local wisdom) into consideration, including notions of *pribumisasi jender* (indigenised gender concepts) (cited in Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004). The number of Muslims committed to the feminist ideas subsequently increased. The Muslim gender activists showed a deep commitment to Islam, believing that egalitarian interpretations of Islam would improve women’s conditions (Doorn-Harder, 2006: 7).

The 1990s proved to be an important decade for Muslim women in Indonesia. It was during this time that new forums, organisations and Islamic books that were more liberating for women were launched. Some books concerned equality, such as *Women in Islam* by Fateema Mernissi and *Women in the Qur’an* by Amina Wadud. They were published in the Indonesian language in 1994 by Pustaka Bandung. In the same year, Ulumul Qur’an (1994a, 1994b), a prestigious Islamic journal, published a special edition on women’s issues, feminism, Islamic feminism and anti-feminism. Women and gender activists now had the opportunity to discuss women’s issues directly with prominent Islamic feminists from other parts of the Islamic world including Asghar Ali Engineer, Rifat Hasan and Amina Wadud (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003). According to Arimbi (2006), feminism in the 1990s shifted from ‘*state ibuism’* to discourses that included Islamic feminism.

One of the unique features of the women’s movement in Indonesia was the relationship between male and female organisations. In the following section I will discuss how this relationship developed from the late colonial until now.
2.2. The Relationship between Men’s and Women’s Organisations

When considering the level of independence of women’s organisations in Indonesia, three types emerge: fully independent; semi-autonomous; and subsidiary/dependent. Women’s organisations are fully independent when they are unrelated to men’s organisations. Women tend to found these organisations in their own interests, not because other actors want them to. In the programs of semi-autonomous organisations, women tend to function according to their own interests, even though they were affiliated with men’s organisations at the time of their establishment. They are not fully controlled by other actors. Subsidiary/dependent organisations are established to support men’s organisations. They do not have the autonomy to decide their own vision and run their own programs.

According to Wieringa (2002), women’s organisations are part of the women’s movement if they strive to support women’s interests. She classifies women’s organisations as either ‘of’ or ‘for’ women:

Organisations of women (independent organisations) are formed through a process of self-mobilization in which women’s emancipation may be one of the aims. But [those] women may also organize themselves for other purposes, such as around class, ethnicity. Organisations for women (dependent organisations) are usually set up by other actors who want to mobilize women for purposes of their own (Wieringa, 2002, p. 39).

In addition to the above classifications, women’s organisations can also be classified on ideological grounds as religious and secular organisations. Doorn-Harder (2006) has divided women’s organisations that emerged during the early twentieth century into two types: religious and secular. A religious organisation is an organisation based upon certain religious beliefs and thoughts, while a secular organisation is one that has a neutral religious affiliation, declaring itself separate from religion. However, this does not mean that members of secular organisations
are not religious; in fact, many of the members of secular organisations practice religious beliefs (Wieringa, 2002).

The first secular women’s organisations in Indonesia were adjuncts of extant men’s organisations. For example, Putri Merdika (Freedom Women) was founded by the secular nationalist organisation Budi Utomo (Prime Philosophy). The first Islamic women’s organisations were also part of men’s organisations. For example, Aisyiyah was the women’s section of Muhammadiyah, while Sarikat Perempuan Islam Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Women) was the women’s section of Sarikat Islam (the Islamic Association).

A perusal of female heroes in Indonesia reveals that they tended to be supported by men; Kartini was supported by her father and grandfather, while Dewi Sartika was supported by her husband. This pattern can be observed in the formation of most nationalist, religious and political organisations from the 1910s to the 1920s (Martyn, 2004). One important consequence of these subsidiary patterns was that women tended to be seen as supporters or assistants rather than leaders. Women’s organisations were focused on Indonesian ethnic, nationalist and religious issues, rather than gender issues. Although this was a characteristic of the early Indonesian women’s movement, it does not mean that women were incapable of solving their own problems. Rather, it suggests that women felt they would be more effective in their struggles if they involved men. Thus Indonesian women have worked closely with men to work through gender issues.

Some Islamic women’s organisations gained a degree of independence over time. For example, Aisyiyah became autonomous in 1966 after becoming semi-dependent in 1951 (Aisyiyah, 1992) and Muslimat NU has been autonomous since 1952 (Muslimat NU, 2012). Autonomy meant that Aisyiyah occupied the same level
as Muhammadiyah and had the right to manage its own programs and budget. Thus it became capable of leadership, not just support or assistance. Other fully independent women’s religious organisations were established post-1990, like Rifka Annisa (Female Friend) and Rahima, however the number has not risen significantly in recent times. Although their memberships are small, they have more members than secular organisations. For example, both Aisyiyah and Muslimat NU have a nationwide membership, with national, provincial, district and subdistrict branches throughout Indonesia.

From the early women’s movement until early in the post-independence period, secular subsidiary women’s organisations tended to be affiliated with nationalist and political organisations, as well as organisations relating to men’s occupations. Since the advent of the New Order, organisations that come under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been dominant, such as Dharma Wanita (the organisation of civil servants’ wives) and PKK (Family Guidance Movement, women’s organisation at grass roots level). Wives’ organisations like Dharma Wanita, Perwari, Bayangkari and IKWA have remained stable over time.

Both religious and secular women’s organisations have faced many challenges as they have tried to reach their goals. In this, they have received support from other movements as well as from governments throughout recent Indonesian history. In the next section, I will discuss the challenges that women’s organisations have experienced while looking at the degree of external support they have received.

2.3. Challenges to and Support for Women’s Movements in Indonesia

The gender equality movement in Indonesia has been influenced by several factors including challenge and support. Challenges were mounted by some government gender ideologues and emergent Islamist groups. Support stemmed from the women
activists, international relationships, the development of the Islamic *pembaharuan* (renewal; loosely, reform) movement and from the government. Changing government gender ideologies sometimes promoted and sometimes limited gender equality depending on the government in power at the time. For example, in the late New Order, the government established a Center for Women’s Studies and in the Reformation era, the government established KOMNAS Perempuan as a tool for improving women’s lives. The *pembaharuan* (or progressive Islamic reform movement) and international relationships among women activists combined to promote ideas of gender equality. In contrast, Islamist groups challenged gender equality ideas. Some of the key concepts of each factor are described in more detail in the following sections.

### 1.3.1. The Intervention of Indonesian Government

The history of the Indonesian government can be divided into three periods: the Old Order, the New Order and the Reformation era. Different periods have seen different levels of government intervention in women’s movements, based on gender ideologies of the respective government. The Old Order, as the early period of independence, did not pay much attention to women’s issues because the government’s focus was more upon nation building. In contrast, during the New Order, the government focused more attention on women’s organisations using them to support government policy. In the Reformation era, the government has been actively involved in women’s issues through the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment.

During the New Order, the government addressed controversial issues surrounding marriage by passing the Islamic Marriage Law 1974. But, at the same time the government assumed control of women’s affairs in a very strict way. Some
programs seemed to focus more on relegating women to the domestic sphere rather than being supportive (Blackburn, 2004; Ro'fah, 2000; K. M. Robinson & Bessell, 2002; Suryakusuma, 2004). Take the Darma Wanita (a civil service wives association), for example, according to which all civil servants’ wives were obligated to become members. Members’ duties included encouraging and supporting their husbands’ careers. In contrast, there was no government program requiring husbands to support their wives’ careers. This policy seemed to reveal a government vision similar to that of the colonial mindset (Parawansa, 2002), i.e., envisioning women as supporters and not as leaders. Suryakusuma (2004), referring to “state ibuisn”, maintains that it is very important to understand the New Order’s state gender ideology which promoted an ikut suami (follow the husband) culture and only provided one alternative model of family or womanhood. Basically it did not represent the majority of women in the rural areas, who accounted for 80% of the country’s peoples. Therefore, according to Suryakusuma, the PKK (Family Welfare Movement, now the Family Welfare Empowerment Movement) and Dharma Wanita (a civil service wives association) programs were part of a government policy:

[It]…fails to recognize many aspects of rural life. It does not acknowledge the large number of female-headed household, the autonomy of women as widows, divorcees and single mothers, but primarily sees women as dependents of men, when in fact the dependency is two way. It does not acknowledge sufficiently that women need jobs, just as much as, and perhaps even more than, men (Suryakusuma, 2004, p. 185).

In the interest of achieving national stability in the 1970s, the New Order government simplified political parties and strengthened mass organisations, including women’s organisations (Istiadah, 1995; Sears, 1996). In 1978, in response to the UN’s declaration of the Decade for Women and to local feminist NGOs, the government established the Mentri Peranan Wanita (Ministry for the Roles of
Women, now the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection). The latter’s mission was to increase women’s capacity to manage their dual roles (peran ganda) in the domestic and public spheres.

Since the Reformation Era, from 1999 up until now, the Ministry for the Roles of Women has been known as the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment (Mentri Pemberdayaan Perempuan). Throughout this period, there have been shifting paradigms and visions. By moving from sole focus on the roles of women to seeking women’s empowerment, it has been easier to achieve gender equality in the home, at work, and in society in general. For example, the term ‘wanita (women)’ a contraction of wani di tata (being ready to be controlled), implies gender bias. The term ‘Perempuan’ (female) is more liberating for women and free of gender bias (Ro'fah, 2000). “Women” was used in the 1978 Broad Guidelines on State Policy (GBHN) and the term “gender” introduced in 1999 (Parawansa, 2002). A major outcome has been the National Plan of Action to Empower Women, (2000 to 2004), which covered the following four key areas: improving women’s quality of life; raising their awareness of justice; protecting women’s human rights; and strengthening women’s institutions (Parawansa, 2002).

The most significant contribution of the government in the Reformation era has been Presidential Instruction No 9/2000 which appertains to gender mainstreaming in national development. Gender mainstreaming is a major strategy to ensure that women and men gain equal access to, and participate equally in, the benefits of development (Surbakti, 2002). This instruction which applies to all ministries, armed forces, police forces, high courts, heads of local governments and heads of all government agencies, aims to mainstream gender in the planning,
formulating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating of all national development programs.

Although the government changed its vision from women’s roles to women’s empowerment, this does not mean that gender equality has been easily achievable. For example, in Indonesia’s urban areas, women stand a better chance of becoming village heads (lurah) than in rural areas because they are appointed by the government (Surbakti, 2002). This problem derives from a plethora of rigid and un negotiated religious teachings that have strongly influenced the people’s mind-sets and ways of life. To overcome this situation, and to ensure the implementation of a gender perspective in all government programs, the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment has been collaborating actively with women’s organisations, religious organisations, NGOs, professional associations (including the centre for women’s studies/PSW), political parties and other institutions nationwide that have shown interest in women’s issues (Parawansa, 2002). PSWs are research centres affiliated with public and private universities. They have helped to expand the methodologies and theoretical foundations of research into women’s activism and women’s movements (WSA Committee, 1995). PSWs act as mediators and facilitators, disseminating resources and advocating for women’s empowerment and child protection in their local areas (Deputi Bidang Pengembangan dan Informasi Kementrian Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 2002).

Although Indonesia has ratified several international conventions and agreements relevant to women such as the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women (under Law No 68/1968) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women/CEDAW (Law No 7/1984), the reality is that most women remain firmly subordinate to men and still lack power to make
decisions regarding their families (Parawansa, 2002). One of the main causes of this unequal power lies in the ways in which people interpret religious texts which are essentially rigid, literal and misogynist.

1.3.2. The Emergence of Islamist Movement

One of the most prominent external influences on gender issues in contemporary Indonesian Islam is the increasing number of Islamist groups in Indonesia, mainly those from the Middle East and Egypt who espouse the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (Fealy, Virginia and Sally, 2006; Rinaldo, 2008). Their literal interpretation of Islamic tenets challenge the freedom and equality already given to Indonesian women (White, 2006). In the 1990s, Islamic revivalist movements like Salafi Dakwah, which was influenced by the Rabithah (the Muslim World League set up by Saudi Arabia)\(^7\) (Schulze, 1990; Hasan, 2008; Qodir, 2008), began to have a presence on university campuses in Indonesia. The Hizbut Tahrir, Darul Arqam and Tarbiyah movements also emerged on campuses, especially at public universities (Hasan, 2008; Qodir, 2008). They called for Indonesians to be more Islamic and promoted Middle Eastern customs such as modest dress codes, the strict segregation of men and women, and the limiting of women’s roles. These revivalist groups rail against feminist ideas. For this reason, they constitute a serious challenge to Islamic Indonesian feminists today.

1.3.3. Support from the Progressive Islamic Pembaharuan Movement

The progressive Muslim movement, which includes the modernist santri and neo-

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\(^7\) The Rabithah was urged by the Saudi Arabian government to take an important role to institutionalise its influence in cultural and religious activities throughout the Muslim world (Schulze, 1990; Hasan, 2008; Qodir, 2009).
modernist *pembaharuan* (reform) activists⁸, has also influenced the gender equality movement in Indonesia. It has focused on questions of what constitutes proper religion for modern people. It is also based on an understanding of how social changes since the mid-1970s have created a religiously committed Muslim middle class who have generated new demands on Indonesia’s religious market. The *pembaharuan* movement has flourished not only in Indonesia, but also in other parts of the Muslim world. When interpreting religious texts, scholars emphasise historical, hermeneutical and contextual approaches, with stress on ethical-moral guidance rather than on law (Saeed, 2005). Contextualists (not only in Indonesia but elsewhere) have produced a growing corpus of literature that re-examines Islamic traditions and addresses pluralism issues at both theoretical and practical levels (Esposito, 1998). Arguing that a fresh interpretation of Islamic sources and a reformulation of Islam is urgently needed (Esposito, 1998; Saeed, 2005), they are committed to the notion that identity, nationality and class are of little importance. The worth of a human being is measured by the person’s character, for Safi suggests the worth of a human being is based on ‘the oil under their soil and not their flag’ (Safi, 2003, p. 3). Contextualists further argue that Muslims need to learn and adopt Western advances in education, science and politics if they are to strengthen and modernise the Muslim community. In Indonesia neo-modernists combine knowledge and respect for classical learning with receptivity to modern ideas, including western influences (Barton, 1995). Gender equality is among the main concerns of this group, who subscribe to feminist ideas such as men and women having equal rights in the economic, social and political arenas.

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⁸ The aim of the *pembaharuan* (reform) movement is to discover an Islamic foundation for modern issues like tolerance, democracy, gender equity and pluralism. Some prominent thinkers in this movement include Ahmad Dahlan, Nurcholis Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Syafii Ma’arif, and Musdah Mulia.
1.3.4. Support from International Women’s Movements

The international relationships that obtain among women activists globally have contributed to the gender equality movement in Indonesia. Several implications have marked these relationships such as the increasing awareness that women in the world have to confront similar problems including domestic violence, women’s legal rights, and oppression and domination by patriarchal cultures. A further implication is advancing the knowledge, skills and strategies required to solve women’s problems (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004). Networks have been built to bring together women activists. For example, many women’s NGOs and the Centre for Women’s Studies in Indonesia have collaborated with institutions including the Ford Foundation, the United Nations, The Asia Foundation, Learning Assistance Program for Islamic Schools - Equality of Learning Outcomes in Islamic Schools (LAPIS-ELOIS), Australian institutions, and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). All of the above are international organisations that operate in many of the worlds’ countries.

International agencies engaged in education and other programs developed a global network of women activists (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003). For example, Indonesia sent delegates to international women's conferences sponsored by the United Nations in different parts of the world: Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995). After sending a representative to the international conference in Nairobi in 1985 at, the government ratified The Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women (NFSL). A new paradigm used to explore Indonesian’s gender problems resulted in a critical thinking vis-a-vis patriarchal culture as the core element of gender inequality (Ro'fah, 2000). Indonesia
also responded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) by ratifying it in 1984.

Study of international networks from the time of Kartini up until today reveals that links have mostly been in the form of education, which has long provided many opportunities for connections between women, both domestically and internationally. In terms of class and cultural backgrounds, however, the past and present show significant differences. In the early days of the women’s movement, women activists came mostly from the priyayi (aristocrat) or middle to upper class social group. The term middle to upper class society refers to people who were saudagar (traders) and tuan tanah (landlords). Nowadays, many women activists from the new middle class (not the saudagar) seek better lives by employing their knowledge and skills. In addition, international networks have become more intensive and effective: some send Muslim female activists to study abroad, in MA or PhD programs, or for research purposes. Many female’s activists have graduated from American, European, Australian or Asian Universities offer researching women’s or gender issues.

**Conclusion**

The above discussion shown that the history of the gender equality movement in Indonesia, has had different priorities, agendas, strategies and different levels of women’s organisations’ autonomy. In the late colonial era, focus was upon child marriage, education, women’s suffrage, and the marriage laws (including polygamy). In the early Independence period, in line with the new Indonesian government’s preoccupation with nation building, the gender equality movement shifted its focus to contributing to building a new state. Thus, concentration was upon socio-
economic problems and marriage laws. In more recent times, since the establishment of the New Order in 1968 followed by the Reformation period in the 1990s the women’s movements’ agendas have focused more on the acceptability of the terms “feminist” and “gender”, the Anti Pornography Bill, marriage laws, the trafficking of women and children, quotas of women in the political arena, and the practice of polygamy. The issue of marriage laws, particularly concerning polygamy and women’s right to divorce has proven the most controversial issue since the birth of the feminist movement. Since the 1980s, Indonesia’s patriarchal culture has been considered the root of gender inequality. This period has seen the notion of feminism strengthened in Indonesia. Feminism has been embraced by a number of Indonesian academics who have become deeply concerned with terms like ‘feminist’ and ‘gender’.

Exploration of the history of women’s organisations in Indonesia reveals that there have been changes in the relationships between males’ and females’ organisations. In the late colonial period until early independence, there were no fully independent women’s organisations in religious-based groups. Conversely, in the secular sphere, there have been many fully independent women’s organisations throughout Indonesian history. Only in recent times have some fully independent women’s organisations evolved in religious groups. Throughout the entire history of feminist activity in Indonesia, both religious and secular organisations could claim an equal number of dependent/subsidiary and semi-autonomous women’s organisations. This is revealing since it shows that both religious and secular organisations still tend to view women as supporters rather than leaders. In addition, it shows that the dominant cultural and political ideologies in Indonesia in the early nineteenth century still saw women as dependent and as the inferior or second sex. However, as the
discussion above shows there is a significant difference between the religious and secular groups in terms of the independence of women’s organisations. The secular groups have had more fully independent women’s organisations than their religious-based counterparts. This indicates that gender segregation is more problematic in the religious sphere than in Indonesian culture in general. However, with the passage of time, many Indonesian women have gained more independence and by involving males in their programs. This does not suggest that women are not equipped to be leaders, but rather that their struggles are more likely to be effective if they are supported by men. Nowadays, Indonesian women worked closely with men when dealing with gender issues.

In its struggle to achieve its goals, the gender equality movement has both faced challenges and received support from other movements and from the government. Activists have attracted support from the Islamic pembaharuan movement and from women activists globally. But, one of their greatest challenges has been the emergence of the Islamist movement in Indonesia. The government’s gender ideology has influenced Indonesia’s gender equality movement in a variety of different ways. The Old Order, i.e., in the immediate post-independence period, did not pay much attention to women’s issues because the government’s focus was more upon nation building. In contrast, in the New Order, the government paid more attention to women’s organisations, albeit using them to support government policy. In the Reformation Era, the government has become actively involved through the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment.
CHAPTER THREE: ETHNOGRAPHIES OF PSWS/PSGS

Introduction

The history of Pusat Studi Wanita (Centres for Women's Studies/PSWs) or Pusat Studi Gender (Centres for Gender Studies/PSGs) cannot be separated from the history of the women’s movement in Indonesia. As Centres at universities, PSWs/PSGs have important roles to bring to women’s issues as part of the latter’s academic agendas. In effect, they are expected to contribute to eliminating gender inequality in Indonesia from an academic perspective. Cooperation between the academic and grassroots levels is required when dealing with gender inequality and women’s problems. It is essential to creating social justice.

This chapter, in which I present my ethnographies of PSWs/PSG in the Indonesian context, considers the Centres’ historical and social backgrounds, why and for what reasons they were established, the nature of their relationships with national and international women’s organisations, their goals and programs, and challenges they face. I will also provide a general overview of the universities with which the Centres are affiliated to enable their understanding in a broader context.

This chapter focuses on five selected PSWs and one selected PSG. Three are affiliates of Islamic universities: PSW UIN (State Islamic University) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, PSG UII (University of Islam Indonesia) and PSW UMY (University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta), and three of public universities: PSW UGM (Gadjah Mada University), PSW UNY (State University of Yogyakarta) and PSW UPN “Veteran” (University of National Development “Veteran”). Before discussing the above Centres, I will first explicate the historical backgrounds of PSWs/PSGs across Indonesia.
3.1. Historical Background PSWs/PSGs across Indonesia

In 1978, in response to the UN’s declaration of the Decade for Women as well as the Indonesian feminists, the Indonesian government established the Ministry for the Roles of Women (Mentri Peranan Wanita), the aim of which was to increase women’s capacity to manage their dual roles in the domestic and public spheres. Prior to 1978, The New Order had ratified several international conventions/agreements concerning women, including the UN Convention for the political rights of women (under Law No 68/1968). In 1984, the Indonesian government ratified the CEDAW (Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Law No 7/1984), endorsing the resolutions reached at the International Conference on Social Development in Copenhagen (1994), the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (1994), and the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. But, although the Indonesian government ratified these laws, women remained firmly subordinate to men, with few having any role in decision making regarding their families.

While the term “women” appeared in the 1978 Broad Guidelines on State Policy (GBHN), the term “gender” was not introduced until 1999 (Robinson & Bessell, 2002, p. 71). However, the summary report the Ministry for the Roles of Women 1988-1993 informed that Gender Analysis Training was included among its programs (Sulasikin, 1993). According the 1993 report (Sulasikin, 1993), the previous government had left two major problems unresolved, namely the increasing women’s roles in the socio-political spheres, and supporting mechanism for the implementation of associated policies. Women’s problems in the early period (1989-1993) included the gap in women’s access to and participation in education at the higher levels, gender stereotyping in the workforce, and the limiting of women’s
power to make decisions at all levels. During this period, the government cooperated with universities across Indonesia, in particular with the Centre for Women’s Studies, to strengthen and support gender equality policies.

During the late 1980s, the government of Indonesia (New Order) established PSWs at prominent universities across the country, as a way of supporting the government policy for women’s empowerment and gender equity (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004; Indonesia, 2004). One of PSWs’ functions was to aid the process of developing methodologies and theoretical foundations for research with women (Asia, 1995). According to Sadli (2010), the main objectives of these Centres were to provide research data on women issues (e.g.,) women’s rights, and on women’s needs relevant to specific provinces. She approved the establishment of PSWs/PSGs for several reasons:

[…] they constitute an awareness raising process for decision makers at ... [all] levels of which majority are men. In particular they help to raise their awareness that women’s issues should be given adequate attention in program development, and that women should be part of the decision making process in developing these programs ... adequate funds should be allocated in the provincial budget to do research into women and ... to develop relevant programs for women. These Centres are therefore also good vehicles to stimulate university-government-community partnership (Sadli, 2010, p. 366).

The majority of the people associated these Centres is recruited voluntarily. They tend to be cultural brokers, are crucial as opinion makers, and provide channels for engaging with both Islamic studies and feminist writings across the West, the Middle East and Asia. Furthermore, they initiate programs for gender-issue mainstreaming and undertake research into gender and sexuality. They act as agents of change by disseminating information, research findings, and new interpretations of women in Islam throughout Indonesian Muslim society, both at the academic and grassroots levels (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003). For example, since 2002, PSW IAIN/UIN
Yogyakarta has become one of Indonesia’s most active Islamic institutions researching Islam and gender (Doorn-Harder, 2006).

Acknowledging the important roles of the PSWs/PSGs, an MoU (Naskah Kerjasama/letter of corporation) supporting the development of PSWs/PSGs was agreed upon by three ministries i.e., the Ministry of Women’s Roles (Mentri Peranan Wanita), the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and the Ministry of National Education (MONE), and signed on 24 November 1998 at Cibogo Bagor. All parties agreed that PSWs/PSGs were research institutions that focused upon creating a gender justice system for women. In addition, they encouraged specific forms of thought and behaviour that would enhance gender sensitivity in all aspects of life. Support for PSWs/PSGs could engender an equitable democratic civil society (Kementrian, 2004).

In the early decades it seems that PSWs acted as tools of the New Order government to maintain traditional gender roles. In 2000, forums, organizations and Islamic publications began to redefine gender roles. Some PSWs in Islamic universities subsequently formulated programs to promote women’s interests, challenging patriarchal culture and creating egalitarian interpretations of gender in Islam. These centres conducted historical and hermeneutical research to critique ‘misogynistic’ interpretations of Islamic texts. They published new egalitarian interpretations and used them in their training of Islamic leaders and judges.

It was also in 2000 that the Indonesian government, led by Abdurrahman Wahid, issued the Presidential Instruction (Inpres No 9/2000) on Gender

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9 Some programs drew on gender stereotypes to give sewing machines and cooking appliances to women and by having cooking competitions for women.

10 The historical approach considers the historical context of Islamic texts, understanding them as shaped by social, cultural and geographical conditions. It follows the principle of fallibility in human knowledge (Abdullah, 2002). The hermeneutic approach focus on three aspects of a text: the context in which it was written, its grammatical composition, and its world view (Wadud, 1999).
Mainstreaming into National Development. This policy has had a significant impact on the development of PSWs, encouraging women’s participation in education and other institutions. For instance, Kull (2009) found that the number of female students enrolling in higher Islamic education increased over several decades; women currently constitute up to fifty percent of total enrolments in some institutions. The number of females in postgraduate, research and teaching roles has also increased across all educational levels. The number of PSWs across Indonesian universities has steadily increased since the time of their establishment: 16 in 1989, 52 in 1993, 101 in 2002, and, 123 in 2003 (Deputi Bidang Pengembangan dan Informasi Kementrian Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 2002; Kementrian Pemberdayaan Perempuan, 2004; Sulaksin, 1993). The increasing number of PSWs across private and public Indonesian universities indicates that support for and interests in gender equality among peoples at the academic level in Indonesia have increased substantially.

However, some PSWs/PSGs have had a rough time. Many have had to contend with limited human resources as some capacity building programs focus on individuals rather than on the system. Capacity building and human recourses programs improve the capabilities and skills of PSW/PSG people. Some PSWs/PSGs have found it difficult to build cadres, or to find people willing to assume leadership roles. According to Erna, a staff member of the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection, people assume that PSW/PSG directors serve as long term leaders; many PSW directors serve a minimum of four years (two, two-year periods or more). PSW/PSG UII has had a director for more than eight years, PSW UIN for

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11 The gender mainstreaming instruction applies to all the ministries, the armed forces, the police force, the high court, heads of local government and heads of all other governmental agencies. It aims to mainstream gender in the planning, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all national development programs (Surbakti, 2002).
more than six years, and PSW UNY and PSW UMY for more than five years. PSW IAIN Makasar has experienced a similar situation. Centres can find it difficult to replace people who are transferred to the capacity building program, ceasing to be active in PSWs/PSGs (Erna, personal interview, 23 January 2010). Centres also must contend with limited budgets, as they rely on funding from universities, local governments and international donors. According to Cislowski and Purwadi (2011), about 75% of centres became inactive when government grants were terminated in 2010.

According to Erna (personal interview, 23 January 2010), PSWs/PSGs were originally created to help resolve gender issues by interacting with local and national government policy makers. However, she thinks that they are still far from meeting expectations. Many stakeholders recruit gender activists from PSWs/PSGs as resource persons, while research conducted by centres fails to provide appropriate recommendations for policy makers. For these reasons, Erna does not think that research centres effectively contribute to policy making (Erna, personal interview, 23 January 2010). Her opinion confirms the findings of a report by Poewandari, which states:

Women’s and Gender Studies (PSW/PSG) and Graduate Program in Gender Studies providing education to produce “gender studies experts” have the potential to fill in the supply side. But, they have yet to perform such roles properly [...]. Nor have they played active roles in their networks in the specific roles of supplying knowledge for policy formulation (Poerwandari, 2011: 67–8).
3.2. Selected PSWs/PSG

3.2.1. Selected PSWs/PSG at Islamic Universities

3.2.1.1. PSW State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta (PSW UIN)

The State Islamic University (UIN/ Universitas Islam Negeri) Sunan Kalijaga, which was previously State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN/Institute Agama Islam Negeri), Sunan Kalijaga, was established in 1951. UIN, one of the oldest Islamic Universities in Indonesia, is under government control. The transformation from IAIN to UIN was based on a decree issued by the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs Minister (MONE and MORA) (23 January 2004) reinforced by the Republic of Indonesia Presidential Decree. This transformation encouraged UIN Sunan Kalijaga to make corrections and initiate development in various fields. For example, UIN initiated two new Faculties: Humaniora and Science and Technology. (Kalijaga, 2011b). Then, in May 2011, UIN announced that the IDB (Islamic Development Bank) would fund new facilities for four new proposed Faculties: Psychology, Economy, Business, and Engineering (Kalijaga, 2011a). In 2009/2010 the number of student applications reached 8,455, almost doubling the previous years, 4,447 applicants. In 2008/2009, there were 1,029 students were granted scholarships (Republika, 2009). Currently, the total number of students is approximately 15,000 (Kalijaga, 2011a).

In terms of gender equality policy, based on Baseline and Institutional Analysis for Gender Mainstreaming in UIN Sunan Kalijaga, the staff recruitment policy is still gender neutral; thus, the same opportunities are extended to both men and women. However, according to Amin Abdullah (2010), who was rector of UIN between 2000 and 2010, university selection policies featured affirmative action for women. Thus selections have been relatively equal as far as gender is concerned. For
example, when IAIN became UIN, two new faculties had female deans, while the
dean in the Ushuluddin (religious studies, and Islamic philosophy department) was
also a woman. As of 2009, UIN Sunan Kalijaga faculties had three female deans. At
the structural level, 20% of leaders in echelon III and approximately 47% in echelon
IV were women (Abdullah, 2010). Currently, one of the vice rectors is a woman
(UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2011c). This growing gender equality awareness among UIN
leaders cannot be separated from the programs of PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga, from
the gender mainstreaming at UIN and gender awareness programs for UIN staff both
at the academic and structural levels (See Appendix 4).

PSW (Pusat Studi Wanita) the Centre for Women’s Studies at UIN Sunan
Kalijaga was founded on 5 December 1995\(^{12}\). The centre emerged from a kelompok
program studi wanita (study group on women, or KPSW) formed in 1990 by four
committed lecturers. It was managed by the Pusat Penelitian dan Pengabdian pada
Masyarakat/P3M (Centre of Community Service and Research) IAIN, which was
changed to UIN in 2004 (PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2009). The founders were

\(^{12}\) based on the Rector decree No. 128, year 1995.
Susilaningsih, Siti Aminah, Fathciyah, and Sugeng Sugiono. Susilaningsih was elected leader of the KPSW (interview, Susilaningsih 23 December 2009).

The establishment of PSW at an Islamic university served to enhance the study of women’s issues from an Islamic perspective at an Islamic higher education institution and represented the university’s contribution to the national program for women’s empowerment. The mission of the PSW UIN which has positioned itself within a moderate and progressive Islamic framework is to foster gender equality in the Muslim community. Their profile states:

PSW at Islamic universities are expected to provide major support for mainstreaming progressive and moderate Islamic teachings ... [it] stimulate[s] and develop[s] academic discourse and scholarship on women’s issues within progressive Islamic framework ... and to work on the promotion of harmonious gender relations in Indonesia (PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2009).

PSW UIN Yogyakarta envisages “Men and women like the teeth of a comb, standing tall side by side in equality” (HR. Ahmad, Abi Dawud and Tarmidzi from Aisyah) (PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2009, p. 4). Its mission is to “enhance mutual efforts to develop and promote gender equality and women’s empowerment based on progressive Islamic thought” (PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2009, p. 4). The Centre has three main objectives:

1. To promote gender equality in higher education through gender mainstreaming in educational institutions, gender inclusive curriculum development, gender awareness trainings and seminars, and gender related-issues in research projects and publications.
2. To provide professional consultancies on gender in Islamic law, gender in education and other social issues.
3. To build strong networks with multiples stakeholders including government and civil organisations and other agencies, which share similar mission of promoting and upholding gender equality and social justice (PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2009, p. 4).

Since its establishment, the Centre passed gone through four phases: consolidation effort (1990-1995), institutional formation (1995-2001), strengthening the institution (2001-2006), and maintaining a good reputation (2006-present)(PSW
UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2009). The first period was when the KPSW was established under P3M: the second was when the Centre became fully independent from P3M. This second period was important inasmuch as it was then that the institution developed in a broader context. The core members are mostly academics people and women’s rights activists. The potential combination of academics and activists among people within the PSW UIN not only broaden the network to include government organisations but the international donors. In the third period, which saw the strengthening the institution, the Centre was marked by the acquisition of suitable facilities, e.g., permanent office and a comprehensive library. In order to maintain a good reputation, the PSW UIN regularly undertakes institutional regeneration by electing a new director and new board members. Former board members usually become associate members and continue working for the Centre (PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2009).

Since its inception, the PSW UIN has collaborated with government and non-government institutions at both the national or international levels. Some government institutions that have collaborated with the PSW UIN include MORA, MONE, The Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and the Ministry of Research and Technology. As well, some local NGOs have worked with the Centres: Lembaga Kajian Islam Sosial/LKiS (Institute for the Study of Islam in Society); Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia/PKBI (Indonesian Planned Parenthood); Aisyiyah (a Muhammadiyah women’s organisation) and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (young Muhammadiyah women’s organisation); and Muslimat NU (women’s divisions affiliated with NU) and Fatayat (young women’s divisions affiliated with NU) among others. Since 1995, the Centre has been collaborating with international donors including CIDA-Canada (1996-2007), The Ford Foundation (1999-2009),

The board Members of the PSW consist of core and associate members: former are chosen directly by the Rector of the university, indicating his support for the Centre. The board members, who sit on the board for two years, act as the Centre’s organisers. The core members consist of the Advisory Board (the rector and the former director) and the executives (the director, the secretary, and members). These positions can be renewed according to the Rector’s decree, based upon the proposal of the Centre’s committee. The associate members consist of who lecturers and researchers complement the core members. The Centre currently has approximately 2,000 associate members, who have either joined in or have been involved in activities organised by the Centre. The contact details of the Centre and the core members of PSW UIN may be seen in Appendix 4.

Since its inception, the Centre has carried out many activities such as workshops, training, seminars, conferences, research and publications (see Tables 16 and 17, Appendix 4). As of 2010, 28 books and 15 journals have been published: 24 in Bahasa Indonesian, 2 books in two languages (Bahasa and English), and 1 book in three languages (Bahasa, English, and Arabic). Only 1 book was written in English.

Examination of the PSW’s UIN programs and publications clearly shows that the Centre not only emphasises strengthening gender mainstreaming inside UIN but also among the Islamic community outside of the university, such as Islamic schools, Islamic judges and Muslim leaders. One of the impacts of the training of Islamic judges is that they implement a gender equality perspective when making decisions in court. For example, one participant from the High Islamic Court NTB reported that after having attended training at the PSW UIN, in one case he granted more
inheritance to women than to men, because the former spent most their time taking care of their parents. This was despite the fact that in *fiqh* maintains that women should get a half portion of that allocated to men (observation, 29 January 2010).

The combined funding from the Indonesian government, MORA, and CIDA-Canada emphasised capacity building inside UIN, whereas programs sponsored by international donors such as The Asia Foundation, The Ford Foundation, Lapis-AusAid Australia, Danida-Denmark mostly targeted groups outside of the university. Only 5 out of 29 programs or approximately 17% (workshops, trainings, conferences, seminars and research) were funded by the Indonesian government without the collaboration of others. These types of findings are likely to influence the nature of the PSW UIN’s programs, which focus on achieving women’s rights and challenging patriarchal culture rather than of maintaining “state ibuism”. For example, one of the programs challenging the notion of state ibuism is a program sponsored by DANIDA-Denmark, i.e., *A Seminar on the Amendment of National Marriage Law for the Protection of Women and Children*.

1.5.1.1.PSW/PSG Islamic University of Indonesia (PSG UII)

Before exploring PSG UII, in order to establish the context wherein the Centre affiliates, I will first provide a general overview of the Islamic University of Indonesia (*Universitas Islam Indonesia*). UII, the oldest Islamic higher education institution in Indonesia, was established in July 1945, 40 days before Indonesia gained independence from its colonisers. The founders were leading figures including Dr. Muhammad Hatta (the first Vice President of Indonesia). During the 1960s and the 1970s, UII, the country’s oldest Islamic private university, had 22 faculties located across Indonesia. But, new government regulation disallowed
universities from having branches. The branches had to become independent universities. Therefore, UII contributed to the establishment of many Islamic universities in Indonesia. UII’s goals are:

Learning in UII (Universitas Islam Indonesia), is conceived [of] as a process of enlightening [when] mind to enable the learners to contribute [to] improving the quality of the environment in the future, or ideally, to be the mercy of the world (rahmatan li al-’alamiin). Guided by this vision, UII, with its long path of historical leadership and valuable resources and experiences, achieves excellence in delivering education (UII, 2008b).

Currently, UII has approximately 20,000 students: each year approximately 3,300 new students are enrolled. Of its 40 academic programs, 26 are undergraduates including five international programs, 9 professional, masters and doctorate programs. The remainder are diploma programs. Some academic programs, especially those espousing Islamic values, enrich the curricula and are considered among the strongest offers to prospective international students. The Faculties of Law and Economics (Management and Economics) for example, offer international programs in which Islamic-related subjects are offered; e.g., Islamic Thought, Islamic Economics, Islamic Law, Indonesian Business Practices and Islamic Business Practices (UII, 2008a).

At UII, several important structural positions were occupied by women during the current period (2010-2014) (Pikiran, 2009). Women accounted for 5 (1 dean 4 vice deans) out of 16 Faculty leaders. One reason why only few women occupy leading position may be because many women lecturers prefer to do domestic tasks rather than teaching or research. This was evident in research conducted by PSG UII Yogyakarta, which revealed that women lecturers at UII would rather do domestic work or attend to household affairs than develop their academic careers. The lecturers responded " working YES "," career NO "(Pikiran, 2009). It is in this kind of environment that PSG UII exists and run its programs.
I will now explore PSG UII, a Centre that evolved from the Pusat Studi Keluarga dan Pembangunan/PSKP (Family and Development Study Centre) in 1986. During this time, other Centres were also established including the Centre for Social Studies, the Centre for Natural Science Studies and the Centre for Environment Studies. In 1997, PSKP’s name was changed to the Centre for Women’s Studies (Pusat Studi Wanita Universitas Islam Indonesia/PSW UII). PSW UII was established in coordination with the Institution of Community Service and Research (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian pada Masyarakat/LPPM)\(^{13}\) and in 2006, PSW UII changed its name to the Centre for Gender Studies (Pusat Studi Gender Universitas Islam Indonesia /PSG UII) recognising that that discourse and thought on gender justice had become more advanced and progressive\(^{14}\) (PSG UII, 2011).

According to Mila Karmila, the director of the PSG period 2006-2010, the name

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\(^{13}\) based on Badan Waqaf UII Decree no 13 year 1997.
\(^{14}\) based Rector Decree No. 615a/SK-Rek/DOSDM/VII/2006 on 17 July 2006
changed from PSW to PSG because the term ‘gender’ was considered more neutral than the term ‘women’. Therefore, by using ‘gender’ instead of ‘women’ she hoped that more people would become involved with the Centre because the PSG included men and the women whereas PSW people tend to think it is only about women. This change impacted on the understanding that ‘gender’ is not confined to women but can apply to men also. Some lecturers started to show interest in to joining the PSG (interview, Mila, 30 December 2009).

PSG UII was envisaged being a place that could improve society’s understanding of democracy and gender justice. Its mission was to disseminate the principles of democracy and gender justice through *Catur Darma* UII and to develop and strengthen both government and society by introducing gender mainstreaming into all aspects of life (PSG UII, 2011). As suggested in Chapter Two, one of the significant contributions made by the Indonesian government post Reformation was the gender equality movement (the President decree No 8 2000), which instructed all government programs to employ gender analysis and become gender sensitive.

The board members of the PSG include the director, secretary, expert staff and volunteers. One of the prominent PSG activists is Trias Setiawati who has been a PSW director for 8 years since its establishment reported that staff members numbered approximately 20 and that more than half of them were male (interview, 25 December 2009). She further observed that most of the current female executives and functionaries at university were the alumni of the PSW from early period. The recruitment process for new staff for the PSG is through internship and volunteering. The PSG does not necessarily require it female staff to be activists: the most important requirement is that they should be interested and willing to become involved. The names of the current board members appear in Appendix 5. Since its
inception, in order to achieve its goals, the PSG UII has carried out many activities, e.g., training, seminars, research, consultation, community services and publications.

The strong foundation of Islamic studies in UII seems not to colour its mission, vision and programs (See Table 18). As regards the Centre’s programs, focus is upon issues of gender, sexuality, child rights, family, and women in development. This suggests that women’s issues are still attached to issues of sexuality, children, the family and national development. One of the strengths of PSG UII is that many of its activities are undertaken in collaboration with mass media (See Table 18, Appendix 5).

3.2.1.3. PSW University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta/UMY (PSW UMY)

In order to provide a picture of PSW UMY, I will first present some brief information about UMY. It was founded in March 1981 by the Muhammadiyah organisation, is one of the two largest religious organisations in Indonesia. As a religious social movement, Muhammadiyah was a modern phenomenon established by KH Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta in 1912. UMY has five missions: 1) to improve people’s dignity to uphold humanity and civilisation values; 2) to play its role as the Centre of development of Muhammadiyah; 3) to support the development of Yogyakarta as an area that appreciates cultural diversity; 4) to professionally carry out education, research and community services; and 5) to produce graduates with high moral values, sound knowledge and high capability in knowledge and technology. Its vision is to be a leading university that develops knowledge and technology based upon Islamic values for people’s benefit. UMY’s main objective is to produce Muslim graduates with high moral values, who competitive, confident,
and who have the ability to develop the knowledge and technology that will benefit to the people, the nation and humanity (UMY, 2009b).

After a long process of development, UMY currently has seven Faculties (22 program studies); the Faculties of Islamic Studies, Economy, Law, Social and Political Sciences, Medicine, Agriculture and Engineering (UMY, 2009c). Its total number of students is approximately 9,000 (Republika, 2009). The executive board of the university consists of 45 people among whom only two are women. The rector, the vice rectors and all of the deans are male (UMY, 2009a). It is within this context, that PSW UMY has been established, developed its Centre and run its programs.

Picture 4a and Picture 4b: UMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Picture 4a</th>
<th>Picture 4b</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UMY Campuses</td>
<td>Dean’s and Vice Dean’s inauguration</td>
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Source: blog.umy.ac.id


Pusat Studi Wanita Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah University (PSW UMY) was established in 1997. Different from the other PSWs at UIN and UII, PSW UMY was not initially under another institution like LP3 (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pendidikan/Centre for the Development of Research and Education). It was independent organisation directly under Muhammadiyah University. However,
since 2010 PSW UMY has been under LP3 UMY. Its new status has made it harder for the Centre harder to progress and run its programs, because everything must first be discussed with the LP3. However, this could also benefit the Centre, because, the Research Department (LP3) allocates the research funding, either from the university or other resource funding to the Centre if the topic relates to PSW interests.

*Muhammadiyah* University is one of Yogyakarta’s Islamic universities; therefore, the visions and missions of PSW UMY are synchronous with Islamic teaching. Focus upon the values of Islam concerning women is a special characteristic of this Centre. Its vision is to enlighten the people by drawing upon developing Islamic perspectives. PSW UMY’s mission is to improve women’s lives by promulgating Islamic teachings (PSW UMY, 2002). The Centre’s goal is to create harmonious relationships between men and women in all aspects of life and in the nation’s state development program. In order to achieve this goal the Centre has three main programs:

1. To explore and develop the women’s roles concepts in the family, society and development from an Islamic perspective.
2. To explore the equal relationship pattern between men and women based upon the Qur’an and the Hadith.
3. To network with other parties who express the same concerns about women and disseminate the research findings among society (PSW UMY, 2002, p. 1).

PSW UMY’s board members include the rector UMY, advisory board members, vice rectors and the leader of LP3M. Like other Centres, its activities include research, seminars, training, and community services. Details of the board members and Centre’s activities can be seen in Appendix 6 and Table 19. Among PSW UMY’s facilities are an office, a meeting room and a library. However, examination of the program details revealed that most were held between 2001 and 2002. When asked the current director said that the Centre does not have a current
data, collecting system, suggesting that the Centre is stagnant in terms of recording its the programs. According to Ane, a current PSW director, from 2006 up until the present, she has been a member of one of the teams working on the “development” (pembangunan) with a gender perspective in DIY at the provincial level; and, since 2010, she has been a gender budgeting expert for the local government (interview, 22 June 2010). It becomes clear, that capacity building in some PSWs/PSGs is dominated by individuals rather than by group advisory members.

3.2.2. Selected PSWs at Secular University

3.2.2.1. PSW Gadjah Mada University/UGM (PSW UGM)

Gadjah Mada University (UGM) the oldest and the largest state university in Indonesia, was founded on 19 December 1949 and currently has 18 Faculties, 69 undergraduate programs, 24 diploma programs and a Graduate School. At the end of 2010, the total number of students was approximately 50,000. Master’s and Doctorate programs (S-2 and S-3) 31%, undergraduate (S-1) accounted for 55%, and Diploma for 14%. Since December 2000, the university has assumed the new status of a state-owned legal entity (UGM, 2011).

Although UGM does not adhere to a certain religion and faith, one of its orientations in education is generating graduates who are capable, religious, and pious. UGM’s vision and missions are as follow:

*Vision:* To be a World Class Research University which is excellent, independent, dignified, inspired by Pancasila (Indonesia’s five-point ideology) and dedicated to the needs and welfare of the nation and the world. *Mission:* General Mission: To promote excellent teaching-learning opportunities and community service through research. Special Mission: To promote excellence in educational activities, research and community service in the interests of the Indonesian society, to participate in Indonesian socio-cultural building, and to thoroughly ensure completion of the transitional period of the university.
management to Universitas Gadjah Mada as a legal entity and university with good governance (UGM, 2009c).

University leadership has traditionally been male dominated; currently, out of 15 important structural positions, only one is held by a woman, who is as a vice rector for education, research and community service (UGM, 2009b). Only 2 out of the 22 board members of trustees are women (UGM, 2009a).

I will now provide a general overview of PSW UGM. It was established in 1991\textsuperscript{15}, and designed to support gender equality and justice among academics from multidisciplinary studies and non-academic levels. PSW UGM “prepares to uphold the equal rights of women and men, have the same recognition, respect, and valuation from the society in development process, [have] equal access to services and well-balanced in social and economic status”(Sumarah, Kyagulanyi, Al-Mamun, & Sispanyadi, 2009, p. 1).

\textsuperscript{15} based on the Rector Decree of UGM, No. UGM/02/UM/01/37 on 1 March 1991.
PSW UGM was established in response to various gender issues and to encourage intellectual recourse. It was hoped that the “results of the study conducted by PSW UGM can be used as information, feedback and recommendations to the local government, Ministry of Women’s Empowerment, and to the public” (Sumarah et al., 2009, p. 5). PSW UGM’s aim is produce policies and strategies that are gender sensitive and responsive. Gender mainstreaming in management function, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation is also part of its agenda.

PSW UGM has three goals: 1) to become a centre for multidisciplinary studies that is excellent, advanced, and effectively involved in activities concerning gender equality and human rights at the local, national and international levels; 2) to implement the *Tri Darma Perguruan Tinggi* (Three Main Responsibilities of Higher Educational Institutions), including education, research and community service; and 3) to minimise and eliminate gender inequality in society at both in formal and non-formal levels. The Centre’s five missions include: 1) increasing gender equality and justice through education and training; 2) improving the research quality of its multidisciplinary studies concerning human rights and gender perspectives; 3) improving community services, especially for marginalised and vulnerable groups; 4) encouraging innovation and social empowerment from a gender perspective; 5) increasing networking with stakeholders both at national and abroad (Sumarah et al., 2009).

In order to achieve its goals, PSW UGM is pursuing the following programs concerning gender both in the academic and grassroot levels:

1) conducting research into problems of women and gender; 2) developing gender-related concepts; 3) providing intellectual support for policy formulation at the national and regional levels; 4) developing and providing feedback for its gender studies-related curriculum; 5) conducting training and development of gender studies in Centres for Women Studies at other universities and various government institutions; 6) conducting consultancy
and advocacy [vis-a-vis]... gender-related issues; and, 7) empowering the community from gender perspective (Sumarah et al., 2009, p. 1).

PSW UGM, functions in cooperation with national and international donor institutions. Among the international institutions that have collaborated with PSW UGM are the Department of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamad, Pakistan, the International Recovery Platform (IRP) and the Post Disaster Livelihood Recovery Status of Women in the Recovery Process of the Central Java Earthquake 2006. National institutions that have had collaborated with PSW UGM include: the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment, Department of Forestry (Indonesi), Department of Tourism (Indonesia), Regional Education Department (Sleman, Bantul, and Gunung Kidul Districts), PSW UMY, PSW Sarjanawiyata Tamansiswa Yogyakarta, STAIN Ternate, STIE Ternate and Regional Governments (DIY). Some examples of PSW UGM’s programs for training, education, research, seminars and publications appear in Table 20, Appendix 7.

Many of PSW UGM’s programs tend to support government programs rather than women’s empowerment and stressing women’s rights. Like other Centres, PSW UGM also concentrates on Gender Mainstreaming as it pertains to women, children and life in general. This perhaps relates to the source of funding which are mostly granted by the central government, the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection and local governments.

3.2.2.2. PSW Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta/Yogyakarta State University (PSW UNY)

YSU/Yogyakarta State University or UNY/Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta (originally catered for the education sector and produced professional teachers) was founded on 21st May 1964. UNY introduced 12 non-educational study programs on
4 August 1999\textsuperscript{16}, and today it has five Faculties: Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Educational Sciences, Languages and Arts, Social Sciences and Economics and Sports Sciences. Based on 2008 end-of-year data, the total Student enrolments were 28,362. Like UGM, although UNY is not a religious institution, one of its goals is to implement education which contains religious values. UNY’s vision and missions are follows:

By 2020 we envision YSU as having a synergic cultural work system which highly appreciates learning, creative responsibility, and the values of equity, peace, modesty, in implementing the Three Main Responsibilities of Higher Educational Institutions ... to produce highly qualified graduates in the global era. The mission of YSU 2006-2010 is to conduct education, research, and community service in the framework of developing knowledgeable individuals; develop educational systems capable of producing autonomous, creative, and innovative graduates; create an academic culture that supports the development of graduates’ conscience and consolidate the organisation and network systems that support the functions and autonomy of the university (UNY, 2009, 1).

In terms of the proportion of women as top leaders at the structural level, currently UNY has only one female leader, the vice rector for Academic Affairs. Based on figures provided at the data on end of December 2009, the number of female lecturers was approximately half that of men: 391 women and 655 men (UNY, 2009).

\textbf{Picture 6a and Picture 6b: UNY}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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\textbf{Picture 6a} & \textbf{Picture 6b} \\
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Front Gate UNY & UNY Campuses \\
\hline
Source: freewebs.com & Source: picable.com \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{16} based on the President of the Republic of Indonesian decree No. 93/1999.
PSW UNY formerly *Kelompok Studi Wanita (KSW/Study Group on Women)*, was initiated and established by Sulasikin Murpratomo from the Ministry for the Roles of Women, when she visited the University in 1990. In her speech, the Minister emphasised the importance of programs concerning women’s improvement, and education of therefore female/male equality (Ghafur, Muqowim, & Muttaqin, 2002). In 1994, KSW’s name was changed to PSW for institutional reasons. But, the main program remained unchanged because since PSW’s inception most had followed the government’s women’s roles programs.

PSW UNY’s vision is one of an institution that supports social change, especially gender equality issues by conducting research and exploring community services. Research activity should be based upon recognition of the need for social change in society and associated need to interconnect education, research and community services. PSW UNY’s three missions are as follows:

1. Develop research into all aspects of women’s lives and their implications from a female perspective.
2. Develop study by discovering and understanding gender issues, with the aim of achieving gender equality and justice for women.
3. Develop study of welfare and child protection problems (Lemlit, 2010).

A propose of education, PSW UNY has two missions: 1) to help UNY alumni by encouraging their commitment to gender equality; 2) to conduct special activities for female students related to women’s needs. In addition: it has community services-related three missions, i.e., disseminating research findings and making research recommendation to stakeholders, conducting gender courses at the academic, government and community levels, and becoming the an advocacy Centre facilitating child welfare and protection (Lemlit, 2010).
According to Nahiyah (interview, 15 January 2010), one of Centre’s founders and a former director PSW UNY initiated the establishing of child care in universities. After its formation, the child care Centre was given to university (Darma Wanita, a civil service wives association). Nahiyah added that PSW UNY had empowered batik craftswomen in Kulonprogo sponsored by AUSAID. Research activities and programs focused on education, e.g., preparing modules of family management, women and education, education for expected students, advocacy for poor women, and the study of women’s roles in politics. Some of these activities were funded by the Department of National Education via the research Centre of university, UNESCO, UNDP, AUSAID and MORA. PSW UNY has also collaborated with PSW UII and PSW UMY (Ghafur et al., 2002).

Since 2010 PSW UNY has been led by a male, a lecturer of Islamic Studies, Marzuki, and a female secretary is Nur Djazifah. The Main activities of PSW UNY are based upon the five national agendas of the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment: 1) women’s equality in all aspects of life; 2) gender equality and justice; 3) recognition of women’s values and achievements; 4) eliminating violence against women; and, 5) empowering women’s organisations to become equal and independent institutions (Lemdlit, 2010). Similar to PSW UMY, PSW UNY does not hold current data pertinent to its programs. This suggests that currently PSW UMY is not as organised as PSW UGM or UIN. However, according to Nahiyah, currently PSW UNY has programs addressing women’s empowerment in the Bantul and Kulonprogo districts (batik craftswomen and Jamu/herbal medicine sellers) (interview, 15 January 2010). Details of the staff and the contact address of PSW UNY appear in Appendix 8.
3.2.2.3. PSW University of National Development “Veteran” Yogyakarta (PSW UPN)

UPN was established on 15 December 1958 by a group of soldier/military veterans. In 1994, its status changed from a state University to a private university under the military administration of Commander General Sudirman. Today, UPN “Veteran” has 6 Master’s programs, 5 Faculties, and offers 17 undergraduate level courses. The total number of enrolled students is approximately 14,000 (UPN "Veteran" Yogyakarta, 2010a). The founding philosophy of university is to promote human resources and to produce devoted alumni in Indonesia through the vehicle of higher education at UPN "Veteran" (UPN "Veteran" Yogyakarta, 2010b). UPN’s main goals are to support national development in higher education, to create skilled human resources that are essentially, professional, faithful and devoted to God, to maintain discipline, and encourage responsibility and devotion to a high sense of concern for public welfare (2010b). In terms of women’s leadership in this military university, only of 12 top university leaders are women: one is as Vice rector for Academic Affairs and the other is Dean of the agriculture Faculty (UPN, 2010). The military environment clearly influences the existence and types of PSW UPN’s programs.
According to Tia (personal interview, 21 January 2010), a female activist in UPN, the PSW UPN experienced initial difficulty in 1995 from a senior university administrator who was reluctant to give his approval to its establishment. He claimed that the establishment of the PSW was not necessary. Despite the lack of his approval, some women activists voluntarily began activities at UPN. Tia said that activities like these were necessary because there are more women than men in Indonesia; women needed activities so that they did not become a burden on the nation’s development. Tia said that the Ministry of Women’s Roles initiated many national development programs for women on behalf of the government at that time, programs that the PSW UPN could contribute to (personal interview, Tia, 21 January 2010). Wuri (personal interview, 20 January 2010) argued that management at UPN is not gender biased as 75% of its executives are women. She explained that, out of five faculties, four of its vice deans are women, and two out of three of its vice rectors are women. Most of these women have been actively involved in PSW UPN at some time. So, clearly at the management level, UPN is not gender biased (interview, Sri Wuryani, 20 January 2010).
For almost seven years, women’s activists at UPN worked on gender issues without formal institution. Finally, in 2002, a new female leader at LPPM (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian pada Masyarakat/Centre of Community Service and Research) inaugurated PSW UPN as a formal centre under her direction. Before the inauguration, several gender activists at UPN, who had contact with UNESCO, commenced collaboration with this international organisation through LPPM (interview, Istiana, 21 January 2010). By now, many universities in Yogyakarta had established PSWs: some of them invited women activists at UPN to participate in their programs. As a consequence, in order to fulfil this need and because many gender activists - both men and women - at UPN had expresses an interest in gender and women’s issues, the UPN also established a PSW (interview, Sari Bahagiarti, 25 January 2010).

The missions of PSW UPN are to carry out research and community service by applying gender-based science and technology, and to conduct and participate in training, workshops and seminars on gender issues (UPN). One of the regular activities undertaken by PSW since 2008 is the Monthly Talk Show ‘Serambi Jender’ (Gender [Studies] Veranda), which screens monthly on Tuesday on Jogja TV at 3 p.m. Gunawan and Virgawati, who are PSW UPN board members, host the program; and, the speakers are not only from UPN but also from outside of universities (interview, Virgawati 20 January 2010). The talk show focuses on gender and technology topics as part of a trend marking PSW UPN. Like other Centres, PSW UPN’s board members consist of advisory boards (rector), a director, assistant director, and a secretary and several persons who are in charge in research, community service, training and conference and network. Details of the current staff and the contact address of PSW UPN ‘Veteran Pembangunan’ Yogyakrta appear in
Appendix 9: some detailed activities appear in Table 21. Sari Bahagiarti opined that hopefully in the future PSW UPN will become fully professional (interview, 25 January 2010).

1.6. Similarities and Differences among six selected PSWs/PSG

Examination of the nature and programs of PSWs/PSG reveals some similarities and differences. The similarities include: First, the Centres focus on gender issues rather than on feminism. All Centres have similar general visions and missions which aim to improve women’s lives, achieve gender equality and raise gender awareness. Thus, programs in general focus on gender issues. Only PSW UIN’s and UII’s programs mention the term ‘feminism’. Examinations of their visions and missions reveal that almost all of them focus not only on women but also on gender issues by concentrating on equality between men and women. This means that their main programs are not exclusively for women but also for men. This why women’s or gender a project at Indonesian universities are not only participated in by women but by men as well. This finding is in line with the women’s movement in Indonesia in general.

Second, all of the Centres have had male staff as core members. One of the unique characteristics of Women’s Studies Centres is the involvement of male activists in every Centre. For example, one of the founders of PSW UIN Sunan Kalijga, was Sugeng Sugiono, a male lecturer. In other PSWs/PSG, every period has seen some male activists included in their core staff. Even today, PSW UNY has male director, Ismail Marzuki. However, some Centres, e.g., PSG UII, according to Trias, the rules require the director of PSG to be a woman (interview, 25 December
Similar to PSW UIN, according to Ruhaini, because the Centre’s named PSW, then the leader should be a woman (interview, 3 May 2010).

Third, all of the Centres are funded by both national and international donors. However, the terms applying to the duration and variety of funding differ. Based on its programs and funding resources, PSW UIN has the longest program financed by international funding (from 1996 onwards). PSW UGM has enjoyed frequent and lengthy national funding. The different sources of funding for programs seem to affect the types and themes of the programs conducted by PSWs/PSG. For example, PSW UIN, which is mostly funded by international donors, tends to carry out programs that challenge and critique the ‘state iBuism’ promoted by government. Conversely, almost all of PSW UGM’s programs support “National Development” as supported the ‘state iBuism’ promulgated by the government.

The different types of university backgrounds also contribute to the different interests of each Centre. Religion-based Centres, i.e., UIN, UII and UMY, include Islamic teachings in their programs and set Islamic institutions as part of their targets. However, not all Islamic university Centres emphasise on Islam and Muslim-related issues. The levels of interest in these issues differ. For example, since its inception, UIN Sunan Kalijaga’s Centre has focused on gender in Islam. Therefore, approximately 90% of its programs relate to gender in Islam and gender equality for Muslims. PSW UIN conducts gender awareness training for Islamic leaders, judges, internal lecturers and the staff of UIN. UII and UMY also have activities related to Islamic teaching and or the Muslim community, albeit the number is not as high as at in UIN. Ane (interview, 22 June 2010), a director of PSW UMY, claimed that PSW UMY’s programs depend upon the donor. Programs offered by public universities, e.g., UGM, UNY and UPN, exclude religion-based programs.
Neither private nor state universities necessarily support the *pembangunan nasional* (national development) programs of the New Order government. For example, despite being a state university, the programs at PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga do not seem to only operate according to the government’s gender ideology. Rather, PSW UIN staff offer new interpretations of religious texts that differ from mainstream understandings of the Muslim community. They even run such programs as the amendment to the Indonesian Marriage Law. On the other hand, PSW UPN is a private university: none of its programs challenge the government’s policy on women and development. This is understandable because UPN “Veteran” was historically established by a group of retired army officers during the New Order period. They channel their support towards the government system, and, it is the government that dictates women’s issues.

Another factor that impacts on the nature of the Centres is support from university leaders. Some Centres have their full support while others have less support. PSW UIN and UGM have good office facilities and a library courtesy of the university. Other Centres, e.g., UPN and UNY, have received fewer facilities from their universities. Take UPN for example; when I visit the Centre, there is no special room or office for PSW. Usually, the allocation of an office depends upon the current leader (personal observation, 21 January 2010).

### 1.7. People in PSWs/PSG

Many PSW/PSG members are prominent in their fields, especially active female members. Many female managers at universities are alumni of PSWs/PSG. Centres are staffed by impressive people. Two vice rectors at UPN and two female deans at UIN were active PSW members at some time. One active PSW UIN member,
Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, received a National Award from the Ministry of Religious Affairs for her achievements in the field of gender studies and Islam in 2010 (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 2010). Several other people from the UPN, UNY, and UMY centres act as women’s representatives in parliament.

**Summary**

One of the government’s strategies employed to improve women’s lives in Indonesian is to work together with universities encouraging them to establish PSWs or PSGs, and giving support to them. From the time of their inception in 1988, the number of PSWs/PSGs has increased significantly from 16 to 123 in 2003. However, there were some similarities among the PSWs/PSG that I studied. They all seemed to use the term ‘gender issues’ rather than ‘feminism’. Their core staff members were invariably male, although some members did not support male leadership. Also, they all received funding from national, local and international donors, albeit with varying frequency.

The different funding resources, types of universities and levels of support from university leaders tend to influence the nature and characteristics of the Centres. Islamic university (UIN, UII, UMY) Centres are different from those of public universities (UGM, UNY, UPN) in terms of focus of interest. Islamic-based university Centres focus more upon gender equality from an Islamic perspective; e.g., studying Islamic marriage laws, creating new egalitarian interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadith, and spreading new egalitarian interpretations among stakeholders in the Islamic community. Centres attached to public universities, on the other hand, tend to focus more upon gender equality in general, such as gender in education, gender and technology, and gender and economy. Whatever their university
backgrounds, whatever their support from university leaders and the amount of
funding they receive seems not to influence the characters of the people engaged
with the Centres. Most PSW/PSG activists are impressive, persistent and inspiring
people; and, many of them become leaders of women.
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON FEMINIST IDENTITY AND NOTIONS OF WESTERN FEMINISM AMONG GENDER ACTIVISTS AND SCHOLARS IN YOGYAKARTA UNIVERSITIES

Introduction

Having discussed the ethnographies of the Centres for Women’s Studies/ The Centre of Gender Studies in Chapter Three, in Chapter Four I will now explore people engaged with these Centres’ understandings of feminism, with particular focus on how they identify themselves and their notions of Western Feminism. This chapter will include some of the main finding of this thesis. As I suggested in Chapter One, among the important issues for both gender activists and feminist scholars is identity. ‘Feminist’, as a term of identity, has proven more controversial than the term ‘feminism’. Most authors of Islamic feminism literature adamantly reject being labelled ‘Islamic feminists’ (Badran, 2008).

This chapter shows the prevalence of controversial ‘feminist’ identity among Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities based on quantitative data. It also reveals various Muslim gender activists and scholars’ understandings of the terms ‘feminist’ ‘western feminists’ and ‘feminism’ based on my qualitative interview data. In the first section, I discuss how feminist identity became associated with sex (male and female); as well, I examine university affiliations, and social background factors including age, ethnicity, education, overseas experience and conceptual factors, i.e., knowledge of feminism, prejudice towards feminism, and approaches towards gender issues in Islam. In the feminist identity section, I present the percentages of people (1) who claim to have or deny having a feminist identity; (2) who have different feminist identities; and, (3) who are male and female with different feminist identities. I also seek to discern the most and least popular preferred labels for these two groups. In the following section, I explore what
'feminist' means for both people who identify as ‘feminist’ and for those who do not. As regards, the latter, I question why they reject this identity.

In the next section, I explore the various understandings of Western feminists’ ideas held by Muslim gender activists and scholars in the Indonesian universities surveyed. I show which Western feminist ideas have been incorporated into Muslim gender activists’ and scholars’ understandings, which have not, and why some members of PSWs and PSG disagree with these notions. I also examine western feminist’s contributions to the feminist movement in Indonesia.

Through this data I will show that self-identification as ‘feminist’ among Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities has been influenced by the ways in which the term ‘feminist’ is understood given that the term has both positive and negative connotations in Indonesian society. Furthermore, I will show that Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities have a range of understandings of Western feminist ideas which can be adapted to the Indonesian context. Some ideas will lend themselves to adaption because they are implicit in Islam. But, they might be presented using different terminology and thus may be incompatible with Islam and the Indonesian context. Most feminists and scholars hold that universal values such as gender equality, gender justice and the recognition of women as equal human beings are grounded in the Islamic tradition (the Quran and Hadith) and in local traditions. In other word, they do not mirror Western feminists’ views. However, some respondents acknowledged that Western feminist concepts and strategies have influenced their views, their thoughts, and their strategies for dealing with gender issues in Indonesia. But, while they may have been influenced, they still consider those ideas compatible with Islam – or actually part of Islam, in fact.
4.1. Research Findings on Feminist Identity

4.1.1. The Association between Sex and Feminist Identity

One of the important issues among Muslim gender activists is that of identity. Although all of the respondents who participated in my study were gender activists or people concerned with women/gender issues, not all of them identified as ‘feminists’. Figure 1 shows that the overall percentage of respondents who self-identified as ‘feminists’ is lower than that of those who self-identified as ‘non-feminists’. However, an analysis based on sex shows that the percentage of male respondents who self-identified as ‘feminists’ is slightly higher (22 per cent) than those who self-identified as ‘non-feminists’ (21 per cent). Conversely, the figure for the female respondents who self-identified as ‘feminists’ is significantly lower (22 per cent) than that of those who self-identified as ‘non-feminists’ (35 per cent). This was an interesting finding because feminism mostly deals with women’s issues. It was predicted that generally more women would identify themselves as ‘feminists’ than men; but, in this research, this was not the case.

Figure 1: Respondents by Sex and Identity

![Graph showing respondents by sex and identity]

Source: Thesis author’ compilation

The reason why more women than men did not identify as ‘feminists’ could be related to the term ‘feminist’, which is usually attached to women.
rather than to men. In popular usage, it implies someone who is against the Islamic notion of women’s *kodrat* (God-given nature), who is a man-hater, who wants to dominate men, and who accepts lesbianism. Therefore, if a woman labels herself ‘feminist’, she exposes herself to being seen to possess the above negative attributes by certain members of society. Of course, such negative associations will not be attached to men. In other words, self-identifying as ‘feminist’ implies a higher risk for women than for men in Indonesian society.

Figure 1 also shows that males and females account for the same proportion of the total of self-identified feminists (22 per cent). These findings reinforce other reports of how both male and female activists have become involved in gender and feminist activism in Indonesia (Nuruzzaman, 2005). My interpretation of this finding reifies the fact that male core members have been involved in all six selected PSWs and PSG since their establishment.

Another way of understanding the findings is to consider the influence of the traditional Indonesian (and especially Javanese) social structure. Traditional Indonesian communities in the main are based upon bilateral descent or strong bilateral ties in the universal descent system. This local kinship pattern may shape contemporary values. My literature review revealed that in traditional Indonesian societies, the position of women has been relatively elevated, with a high status accorded to women (Atkinson & Errington, 1990; Goody, 1976). Women occupy leading positions in a number of societies. Javanese women, for example, enjoy the freedom to venture into public spaces, to function as traders and organisers of family finances. Thus, they have more freedom than their sisters in Arab countries (Arimbi, 2006; White, 2006) and enjoy more rights than women in some African communities (Goody, 1976). In some Arab
countries, for example in Saudi Arabia, women are not allowed to go out of their homes without permission; and, these days, some may not be permitted to drive a car. Most Indonesian women are free to drive and to go everywhere by themselves. In terms of inheritance, Indonesian women have the right to inherit land houses, and other property. In some communities, they will receive equal proportions to their brothers. However, some African women may only inherit houses and other property, not land. The products from the fields are reserved for male offspring only (Goody, 1976). It may be that such traditional Indonesian practises have shaped men’s regard and concern for women’s rights today.

According to an ‘Independent Samples T Test’ analysis, the sex of the respondents does not associate self-identification as ‘feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’. Table 1 clearly shows the significant (2-tailed) scores as: .112 and .114 (p>.000), meaning that there is no significant association between feminist identification and sex.

Table 1:
The Association between Sex of Respondents and Feminist Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SEX</th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male and female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumes</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thesis author’ compilation

The finding that the sex of the respondents does not associate with self-
identification as ‘feminist’ could be perceived as related to the heavily bilateral social structure of traditional Indonesian communities, a structure that helps us to understand this finding. Furthermore, this finding reinforces Jayawardena’s finding that Third World countries, including Indonesia, “have had a history of active and militant feminism, as well as early movements for women’s emancipation, supported by women and men reformers” (Jayawardena, 1982, p. v). But, militancy is not necessarily associated with the relatively egalitarian attitude they exercise.

4.1.2. The Association between Type of University and Feminist Identity

Figure 2 shows that the overall percentage of respondents who self-identified as ‘feminist’ is lower than that of those who self-identified as ‘non-feminists’. However, analysis based on the type of university shows that the percentage of respondents from Islamic universities who self-identified as ‘feminists’ (31 per cent) was almost the same as those who self-identified as ‘non-feminists’ (32 per cent). Conversely, the share of respondents from public universities who self-identified as ‘feminists’ is significantly lower (13 per cent) than the share of those who self-identified as ‘non-feminists’ (24 per cent). This is an interesting finding for it suggests that feminism is likely to stronger in Islamic universities than in public universities.
Using an ‘Independent Samples T Test’ analysis, my research shows that being affiliated with Islamic rather than public universities does not affect people’s self-identification as ‘feminist’ although in terms of percentage (see Figure 2) there are differences. Table 2 below illustrates the significance of the (2-tailed) score as .072 and .069 ($p > .000$). This means that there was no significant association between the number of those who self-identified as ‘feminist’ in Islamic and public universities.

Table 2:
Respondents’ Affiliation with Islamic or Public Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF UNIVERSITY</th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic and Public Universities</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>-1.832</td>
<td>159.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thesis author’s compilation
My research shows that the type of university is not the determining social factor for feminist identity. It needs to be understood that in the Indonesian context, the public and Islamic university environments do not necessarily influence a person’s religiosity. Approximately 71 per cent of female respondents from public universities wore a hijab (head scarf) whereas every female attending in an Islamic University wears a hijab as a symbol of Islamic identity. Most of the respondents had been associated with Islamic women’s organisations such as Aisyiyah, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, or Muslimat17. Many male respondents from public universities had also been involved with Muhammadiyah or Nahdatul Ulama. Therefore, Islamic and public university staff are considerably similar vis-a-vis the ways in which they frame their religious identities.

4.1.3. The Association between Feminist Identity and Level Social Backgrounds

In this section I will demonstrate the association between feminist identity and the social backgrounds of my respondents, e.g., age group, ethnicity, educational background, overseas experience, knowledge of feminism, prejudice towards feminism, and approaches to gender issues in Islam. Table 3 shows the range of respondents’ social backgrounds. The age groups were quite diverse (from 20 to 70 years), and the Table shows that approximately 75% of respondents belonged to the younger age group (less than 45 years of age). The majority of the respondents was from Java (83 per cent), they had educational backgrounds in the social science (80

17 Aisyiyah, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah are adjunct Muslim women’s organisations of Muhammadiyah. Muslimat is a Muslim women’s organisation attached to Nahdatul Ulama (see Chapter Two).
per cent), and had little overseas experience (63 per cent)\(^\text{18}\). The respondents in the main showed low prejudice towards feminism (78 per cent).

### Table 3
Respondents' Social Backgrounds (n=165, M=70, F=95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Backgrounds</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>&lt;45 year of age (young)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;45 years of age (old)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non Javanese</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Backgrounds</td>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non Social Science</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Experience</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of feminism</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice towards feminism</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approaches towards Gender Issues in Islam</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contextual/progressive</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thesis author’ compilation

Table 3 also shows that respondents’ understandings of contentious gender issues were mostly progressive. In the overall score, no respondents employed the literal approach. However, analysis of the detailed data on contentious gender issues (see Chapter Six), reveals a literal understanding among respondents of a certain gender issue. Table 3 shows that male and female respondents shared the same types of social backgrounds.

In order to determine the association between feminist identity and the social backgrounds of the respondents, I analysed the data using statistical analysis (SPSS).

\(^{18}\) The scores for overseas experience (little, medium, and high) were determined by how often they went overseas and what types of visit they made. Respondents who went overseas for studies such as taking a Master’s or PhD degree were considered ‘high’. But, those who only went overseas for hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca were considered ‘little’ because hajj is important for every Muslim and also because usually there is no correlation between performing hajj and this research.
implementing compare means and choosing **independent Samples Test**. Using this analysis, Table 3 shows the significant value (2-tailed) score of some respondents’ social backgrounds; age group, ethnicity, educational backgrounds: and overseas experience are higher than 0.000 \((p>.000)\). This suggests that age group, ethnicity (Javanese/non Javanese), type of educational background (social sciences and non social sciences), and overseas experience do not significantly associate with self-identified feminists.

Table 4
The Association of Feminist Identity and Respondents’ Social Backgrounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Backgrounds</th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>T-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of Difference</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>Equal variance assumed</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variance not assumed</td>
<td>-904</td>
<td>162.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Equal variance assumed</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Backgrounds</td>
<td>Equal variance assumed</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variance not assumed</td>
<td>-1.958</td>
<td>162.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Experience</td>
<td>Equal variance assumed</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>.058</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variance not assumed</td>
<td>Equal variance assumed</td>
<td>Equal variance not assumed</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Knowledge of Feminism</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>3.561</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.520</td>
<td>146.88</td>
<td>.001</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Prejudice Towards Feminism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-3.732</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Approach Towards Gender Issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.361</td>
<td>.549</td>
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<td><strong>Source: Thesis author’s compilation</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, Table 4 shows that the significant value (2-tailed) score for the level of knowledge of feminism, prejudice towards feminism, and approach towards contentious gender issues in Islam were equal to .000 ($p < .000$). This suggests a very significant association between feminist identity and the level of knowledge of feminism, prejudice towards feminism, and approach towards contentious gender issues in Islam. The more knowledge of feminism the respondents evinced, the less prejudice towards feminism they showed. And, the more progressive means they used to understand Islamic texts, the more likely to they were to identify as feminists.

In other words, respondents who identified as ‘feminist’ were predominantly those who had considerable knowledge of feminism. Exercised less prejudice
towards the term ‘feminism’, and adopted a more progressive approach\textsuperscript{19} to gender in Islam. This means that the determining aspect of gender awareness was not the level of education in general, but rather the knowledge of gender issues or feminism gleaned from special interests, training, or workshops. In fact, those in society who have graduated from higher education institutions and may hold the titles of Master or Doctor will continue to judge from a gender-biased perspective if they have never learned about or studied gender and feminism.

4.1.4. The Most and the Least Popular Preferred Labels

During the survey, respondents who identified as ‘feminists’, were asked to reflect upon more specific identity labels. Four choices were offered in order to identify the most and the least popular preferred labels among these respondents. Choices include ‘Islamic Feminist’ (feminis Islam), ‘Muslim Feminist’ (feminist Muslim), both ‘Islamic Feminist’ and ‘Muslim Feminist’ (keduanya feminis Islam dan feminism Muslim) and ‘Others’ (yang lain). Likewise, four choices were offered to respondents who opted not to self-identify as ‘feminist’ to observe their ways of identifying themselves. The four preferred preferences include ‘Gender Activist’ (aktivis gender), ‘Women Activist’ (aktivis perempuan), both ‘Gender Activist’ and ‘Women Activist’ (keduanya aktivis gender dan aktivis perempuan) and ‘Others’ (lainnya).

Figure 3 shows ‘that Muslim Feminist’ to be the most popular self-label (18 per cent) among the self-identified ‘feminist’ group, while the least popular label for this group was the ‘Islamic Feminist’ and ‘Muslim Feminist’ (only 7 per cent). Ten per cent of respondents identified as ‘Islamic Feminists’. In the self-identified ‘non-

\textsuperscript{19} Progressive Muslims have produced a growing body of literature that re-examines Islamic traditions and addresses pluralism and gender issues at both the theoretical and practical levels. They argue that a fresh interpretation of Islamic sources and a reformulation of Islam is urgently needed (Esposito, 1998).
feminist’ group, the survey result shows the ‘Others’ label to be the most popular choice (27 per cent). However, the ‘Other’ label was selected by respondents who held various understandings and the ‘Gender Activist’ option was chosen by 18 per cent of total respondents among those who self-identified as ‘non-feminist’. Therefore, this finding implies that the latter option was actually the most preferred label among people in this group (see Figure 3). Only 1 per cent of respondents chose both ‘Gender Activist and Women’s Activist’.

Figure 3
Identity Labels among Feminists and Non-Feminists

Source: Thesis author’ compilation

During the in-depth interviews, some respondents differentiated between the labels ‘Islamic Feminist’ and ‘Muslim Feminist’. For example, Gizela, who identified as an ‘Islamic feminist’, described an ‘Islamic feminist’ as someone who has the autonomy, power and capability to reinterpret fundamental values about gender equality within Islam. A ‘Muslim feminist’, on the other hand, is one who embraces Islam (called a ‘Muslim’ in Islam), is not necessarily concerned with Islamic teaching about gender, but supports equal rights for women. Gizela explained this as follows:
A Muslim feminist embraces Islam and prints in a personal identity formally and becomes a Muslim without challenges, without having access to learning deeply and even she or he might not be practicing. For me, I would say that I am an ‘Islamic Feminist’ not a ‘Muslim Feminist’ because I teach tafsir Qur’an [Qur’anic exegesis] and Hadith. So, I have access to reading the basic Islamic teaching to build Islamic values. I have the access and capability to reconstruct Islamic teaching based on gender equality ... an Islamic Feminist is a Muslim who challenges, learns and understands Islam. With that capability, she/he does not only have an opportunity but also uses this opportunity to understand Islam, for example, Zainab Al Ghozali. People say that she is a fundamentalist but she is a feminist because she negotiates and empowers herself. A feminist is a person who is aware of the problem of inequality and struggles to empower her/him self and others (Gizela, interview, 5 May 2010).

Muslim feminis KTP (kartu Tanda Penduduk) nya muslim kemudian menjadi muslim, tanpa mempertanyakan, tanpa punya akses mempelajari secara mendalam bahkan mungkin tidak praktising gituan hanya dalam KTP saja yang penting islam tetapi tidak punya akses untuk mendalami apalagi mempraktekkan. saya akan lebih ke islamic bukan muslim, apalagi saya ngajar tafsir jadi saya lebih punya akses untuk membaca dasar-dasar fundamental, untuk membangun norma-norma di dalam islam, jadi saya mempunyai akses dan capabilitas untuk merekonstruksi ajaran-ajaran islam yang menurut saya lebih setara ... Islamic feminis adalah seorang muslim yang dia mempertanyakan tentang islam dan dia juga mempelajari dan dia juga memahami islam dengan kemampuan yang dia punya jadi bukan hanya dia punya akses tapi dia menggunakan akses itu untuk bisa memahami islam itu, seperti zainab alghozali misalnya dia seorang fundamentalis kata orang, tapi dia seorang feminis karena dia menegosissikan, mengempower dirinya sendiri. Seorang feminiskan seorang yang menyadari adanya ketidak adilan dan dia berusaha mengempower dirinya sendiri maupun orang lain (Gizela, interview, 5 May 2010).

Another respondent, Sita, who referred to herself as ‘Muslim Feminist’; defined a ‘Muslim Feminist’ as a person, and the term ‘Islamic feminism’ referred to the discourse. Sita stated that:

‘Islamic’ is an attribute referring to the religion. I said that I am a ‘Muslim Feminist’ because I am a person who embraces Islam which in Islam we call a Muslim ... I think the discourse is ‘Islamic Feminism’ and the person is a ‘Muslim Feminist’ (Sita, interview, 3 June 2010).

Feminist and non-feminist groups had a variety of sub-labels for ‘Other’: As Figure 3 shows, the ‘Other’ label for non-feminist groups was higher (27 per cent) than for feminist groups (9 per cent). The range of sub-labels for non-feminist groups
was also more than for the feminist groups.

Figure 4
Self-Identified Feminist 'Others': Variety of Sub-Labels (n=15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Feminist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>Gender Strugglers (<em>pejuang Gender</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>Sholeha Feminist (<em>Sholihah feminist</em>), liberal Feminist (<em>feminist Liberal</em>), Feminist Plus (<em>feminis plus</em>), Empowering Women (<em>pemberdaya perempuan</em>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thesis author’ compilation

Figure 4 shows that among self-identified feminists, the most popular sub-label was ‘Feminist’. Some respondents argued that they did not need an additional label, such as Islamic Feminist, Muslim feminist or others. Nova, referred herself as a ‘feminist plus’, because according to her, a ‘feminist plus’ means that she not only pays attention on women issues, but also to other marginalised groups such as the disable, children or non-heterosexual groups.

Figure 5
Self-Identified Non-Feminist 'Others': Variety of Sub-Labels (n=44)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Caring about Gender Issues (<em>Peduli or Pemerhati Persoalan Gender</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Research of Women’s Studies (<em>Peneliti Tentang Perempuan</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Good Muslim (<em>Seorang Muslim Yang Baik</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Gender Equality Concept User (<em>Pengguna Konsep Keadilan Gender</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Other names</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thesis author’ compilation

| 27% | Total Identity Label 'Others' of Self-Identified Non-Feminists Among Respondents |

| 9%  | Total Identity Label 'Others' of Self-Identified Feminists Among Respondents |
Figure 5 shows the variety of labels in the ‘Others’ option for ‘non-feminists’. These data help clarify that although the ‘Others’ label was the most popular option; it comprised respondents who held various understandings. This also implied that the ‘Gender Activist’ option, which was chosen by 18 per cent of total respondents among those who self-identified as ‘non-feminist’ (Figure 3), was in fact the most preferred label among people in this group.

4.2. Self-Understanding of Indonesian Gender Activists and Scholars on the Term ‘Feminist’

There were various understandings of the term ‘feminist’ among the respondents. This was evident in the responses to my in-depth interviews with PSW gender researchers and activists. The group of self-identified feminists obviously did not associate a negative understanding with the term ‘feminist’. However, they defined the term in diverse ways. Respondents who did not identify as ‘feminists’ explained that there were two meanings of the term ‘feminist’, one negative and the other positive. I will now compare the range of understandings of the term ‘feminism’ of those who are self-identified as feminist and those who self-identified as non-feminists.

4.2.1. Self-Identified Feminists’ Understandings of the term ‘Feminist’

My interviews showed a positive association of self-identified feminist with feminism. For example, according to Dullah, a self-identified Islamic feminist, “a feminist is someone who is aware of the inequality experienced by women and who has a notion that women are human beings” (Dullah, interview, 8 February 2010). Nova, who referred to herself as ‘feminist plus’, defines a feminist as “someone who has an intention to give rooms for marginalised groups, including for women by
having either direct or indirect benefit activities for women” (Nova, interview, 24 February 2010).

According to some self-identified feminists, the term ‘feminist’ does not simply imply an awareness that women have, the same capabilities, rights and goals that men enjoy and pursue. That awareness should also be followed by action such as empowerment for themselves and others. Empowerment or action can be demonstrated through teaching or publishing his/her academic work and through always being an activist in women’s NGOs. Gizela, who referred to herself as both an ‘Islamic and Muslim Feminist’ stated as follow:

A feminist is someone who is aware of inequality and endeavours to empower her or himself and others ... A feminist is not necessarily an activist or ... goes down to the street. A philosopher who gives an egalitarian interpretation between men and women is also a feminist (Gizela, interview, 5 May 2010).

According to Sita, who self-identified as a Muslim Feminist, ‘feminist’ depends on a person’s mindset: it is not a matter of being a man or woman. Therefore, a man can be a ‘feminist’. Although there is some notion of a woman’s way of knowing, meaning that only women have direct experience of what it means to be a woman, this does not mean that men cannot empathise and help to solve women’s problems (Sita, interview, 3 June 3 2010). A similar approach was expressed by Tria, a self-identified Muslim feminist:

A feminist for me can be a man or a woman who sees inequality in the relationship between men and women and there is an effort to deal with that inequality problem ... For me, I believe that actually men also feel oppression ... for example, the idea that to be a head of family, the husband has to have more income than the wife (Tria, interview, 20 May 2010).

20 Belenky, Clingey, Goldberger & Tarule (1986) promoted a similar notion in the book Women’s Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind, i.e., that women experience life differently from men, and that only women themselves can experience and feel a woman’s life.
4.2.2. **Non-Feminists’ Understandings of ‘Feminist’**

There are three non-feminists’ understandings of ‘feminist’: first, the term implies neutral; second it has positive meaning; and, last, people imbue the term ‘feminist’ with negative connotations. Maman, a self-identified non-feminist, provided the neutral definition. He expressed the view that the different treatment meted out to the sexes is part of the ‘natural order’, of things, and, therefore, is unproblematic:

> I see that the position between men and women is natural, so for me that should be just like that … Treat men and women proportionally without making the ideas [gender relationship] an ideology. This is my understanding [about the gender relationship] that is grounded in my Islamic teaching … I feel that my family and neighbours do not find any problem with this issue (Maman, interview, 5 May 2010).

Second, some non-feminist respondents defined the term ‘feminist’ positively. This was interesting because some who rejected a feminist identity defined the term ‘feminist’ in a positive way. Some positive meanings, for example, were reported by self-identified non-feminists, Dama, Hera, Nisa, Abdulla and Zihan.

> I don’t want to call myself a ‘feminist’, because … in my understanding a ‘feminist’ is someone who really has a deep knowledge on those issues … So someone can be called a ‘feminist’ if she or he really gets involved not only just sympathetic … (Dama, interview, 12 June 2010)

> I only write something … that relates to feminist thought … I want to be a feminist but not yet … A feminist struggles in the NGO or doing real research … because I have conducted research [about women and economics] and I was disappointed about the result, so I was like a failed feminist (Hera, interview, 1 June 2010).

> A feminist is someone concerned with women’s issues and does not have to join a certain NGO, and goes down to the street [for demonstration] enthusiastically. I think a feminist is anybody concerned with women’s issues… it does not matter in the society or at university (Nisa, interview, 17 May 2010).

> The definition of ‘feminist’ in positive manner is that someone who struggles for the equal position between men and women; therefore, there will be an ideal life and an equal gender relationship in the society and in the family (Abdullah, interview, 22 May 2010).
Socially I don’t have to call myself ‘feminist’ because there are many negative associations with that term in society; but, personally I don’t have any problem with feminist identity as far as the meaning is someone who struggles for equality between men and women (Zihan, interview, 19 May 2010).

Dama, Hera and Nisa considered that to be a feminist one needed certain requirements such as having deep concern for and knowledge of women’s issues, actions in the interests of the gender equality struggle, and joining women’s NGOs. Nisa’s view was quite similar to that Gizela, a self-identified feminist, who claimed that feminist is anybody concerned with women’s issues no matter in which society or at a university. Abdullah and Zihan argued that because there are many different beliefs in society about the term ‘feminist’, including negative associations, people tend not to identify as ‘feminist’ as part of their strategic positioning.

Third, some interviewees rejected feminist identification because they viewed and defined the term ‘feminist’ negatively. Some even misunderstood the term. The negative associations they ascribed to the term ‘feminist’ included: a ‘feminist’ is too extreme and radical. “‘Feminism’ is against women’s kodrat (God-given nature), such as demanding that women want to become boxers or football players or that all ‘feminists’ want to dominate men” (Ana, interview, 1 June 2010)“They want men and women to be exactly the same” (Wulan, interview, 17 June 2010).

Several misunderstandings of the term ‘feminist’ expressed by some self-identified non-feminists were, that ‘feminist’ is motherhood (keibuan) or womanhood: ‘feminist’ is something that relates to a woman’s personality and femininity. One male respondent named Muhsinun stated that “a feminist is someone who has women’s attitude, characteristics, and personality” (Muhsinun, interview, 24 February 2010). Another misunderstanding expressed by Joko: “Feminist for me is
someone who has motherhood or womanhood characteristics, because of that I am not a feminist” (interview, 24 May 2010).

In sum, the range of definitions accorded to self-identified feminists included: a feminist could be a man or a woman, someone who is concerned with women’s issues, who holds the notion that women are human beings who have the same capability as men. He/she is aware of gender inequality, but does not necessarily participate in demonstrations or join women’s NGOs. Although some self-identified non-feminists define ‘feminist’ in a positive way, they do not identify as ‘feminists’ for four reasons:

1. To be a ‘feminist’, someone needs advanced knowledge, takes part in certain types of activities such as demonstrations or joining women-related NGOs, and actively advocates and becomes involved in issues dealing with women and gender publicly.

2. In society, there are many understandings of the term ‘feminist’ including negative associations such as being too extreme, too radical, and men-haters for example. Thus, some people reject identifying themselves socially as ‘feminist’, although they personally may not have problem with a ‘feminist’ identity. The rejection of self-identification as a ‘feminist’ is, therefore, a part of strategic positioning in society.

3. While some people believe that the term ‘feminist’ has with negative connotations (see above), the different positions and roles of the sexes are a common phenomenon and for them part of the natural order. Hence for them, different positions and roles do not need to be conceptualised as problematic.

4. There are misunderstandings about the term ‘feminist’: sometimes it is perceived as motherhood or womanhood, something that relates to a woman’s personality
and femininity.

4.3. Indonesian Muslim Gender Activists’ and Scholars’ Understanding of Western Feminist Ideas

There are many types of Western feminists: radical, liberal, Marxist, psychoanalytical, standpoint and postmodern feminist (Lorber, 2001). Although all have the same goal of improving women’s lives, they have different concepts of how to identify the sources of women’s problems. Once having discovered the different root causes, they devise different strategies for responding to women’s issues. To this end, in this research, respondents were asked about Western feminist ideas in general rather than about which particular Western feminist ideology they identified with.

I will suggest that Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities have a range of understandings about Western feminist ideas which can be adapted to the Indonesian context. First, most respondents agreed that notions of universal values such as gender equality, gender justice and the recognition of women as equal human beings are grounded in Islamic tradition (the Qur’an and Hadith) and in local tradition. Second, some ideas are quite new in Indonesian and Islamic culture and can be adapted because they are compatible with Islamic teachings or are actually part of Islam but expressed using different terminology. Third, some ideas might be not compatible with Islam and the Indonesian context.

In the last section, I will discuss the different concepts of family and power that obtain between western feminist ideas and Muslim gender activists and scholars in PSWs/PSG.

4.3.1. Universal justice values are grounded in Islamic and local traditions

Most of the respondents held that universal values such as gender equality, gender
justice and the recognition of women as equal human beings are grounded in both the Islamic traditions (the Qur’an and Hadith) and in local traditions. In their opinion, these values are not imported from Western feminists. For example, Gizela argued that ‘feminists’ have existed in Indonesia since the time of Queens of Aceh in the 16th century; therefore, Western feminism is only for strengthening feminist identity, particularly after experiencing ‘competing identity’ following the development of the Indonesian Islamist movement in the 1970s. Gizela explained as follows:

Actually, since RA Kartini, … even since Ratu Sima … Queens in Aceh in the 16th century … there were many feminists in Indonesia, because those women got involved in wars and social political activities … and then it seems that the appearance of feminism in Indonesia just happened in the 80s … in my opinion if we trace back to the 80s … Ikhwanul Muslimin has become stronger in Indonesia … particularly after Soeharto collapsed there were many Islamic symbols everywhere … also, many friends, activists, in the 80s graduated from the West … and read feminist literature … So, non-Indonesian feminists [including from the West] strengthened the feminist identity … because there is competing identity [from Islamist groups]. So we half have the values of equality since Ratu Sima … (Gizela, interview, 12 June 2010).

4.3.2. Western Feminist Contributions

Some respondents acknowledged that Western feminist concepts and strategies have influenced their views, their thought, and their strategies for dealing with gender issues in Indonesia. They may have been influenced, but still consider any ideas they imbedded compatible with Islam – or actually part of Islam, in different words.

For example, Rama and Darma, both self-identified feminists, argued that Muslims do, in fact, have gender equality values; but many still interpret Islamic writings on gender literally. As a result, egalitarian values do not usually manifest themselves when reading these texts. In other words, Muslims need to adopt a different approach to rereading and reinterpreting gender-related texts in a way relevant to the present. Therefore, some tend to agree with the approaches Western
Western feminists contribute to implementing the Islamic values into real life easier, so it is like a tool to put the existing Islamic values into ground. Honestly, I think we still recite the Qur’an and Hadith by memorising: sometimes we don’t understand the meaning … (Rama, interview, 11 June 2010).

Western feminists influence two things the discourse … and they raise our awareness … what I mean by influencing the smart discourse is not transferring their values into Indonesian, but the feminist discourse makes aware that what they have done in the West is also stated in the Qur’an … and the most important thing is … that nowadays Westerners [succeed] because there is an effort to ‘dismantle’ [reinterpret] the religious texts based on what they need … that is the one that inspires Indonesian Muslims to do the same thing … so the discourse in the West … gets Muslims closer to their faith (iman) (Darma, interview, 9 May 2010).

By implementing the historical and contextual approach that some Indonesian gender activists have learned from Western feminists, some respondents reported that the contributions of Western feminists are strengthening their faith and belief. Indonesian gender activists have employed the contextual approach to explore and understand how these values and beliefs have become more tangible and more empirical. Also their approach encourages them to be more critical and to explore the impact of Islamic doctrine on women.

Other areas in which most Indonesian gender activists and scholars in this research agreed with Western feminist ideas were the issues that almost all women in the world experience at sometimes in their lives: discriminatory and oppressive problems (Wira, interview, 8 May 2010) and the notions of women’s independence, persistence and openness (Rama, interview, 11 June 2010). Furthermore, one respondent mentioned that she had been inspired by the concept of gender or women’s issues not only at the individual level but also at the collective level of Western feminist ideas (Aibar, interview, 3 June 2010). In addition, Western feminists have encouraged Indonesian discourse and understanding of feminism, e.g., the concepts of patriarchal culture, equal work for equal pay, reproductive and sexual
health and rights, women’s rights, and rights of marginal groups. It is important to note that Western feminists introduced new terms such as gender, autonomy, feminism and patriarchy into Indonesian Islamic feminists’ discourse.

In sum, respondents suggested that the influence of Western feminism on Indonesian Muslim gender activists and scholars in universities was most prominent in the following areas:

1. The raising of awareness of gender and women’s issues among Indonesian Muslim gender activists at the individual and collective levels. This awareness included appreciation for the involvement of women in public life, acknowledgment that almost all women in the world experience similar discriminatory and oppressive experiences, and the inspiration of qualities like independence, persistence, and openness.

2. Influencing the discourse and understanding of feminism, such as concepts of patriarchal culture, equal work, equal pay, reproductive and sexual health and rights, women rights, and the rights of Indonesia’s marginal groups. Within the discourse, it is important to note that Western feminists have introduced new terms such as gender, autonomy and feminism into Indonesian Islamic feminists’ lexicon.

3. Encouraging the Indonesian Islamic feminists to be more critical and explore the impact of Islamic doctrine on women.

4. Strengthening the faith of Islam by operationalising Islamic values in real life. Before contact with Western feminism, many Muslims believed in the equality and justice values outlined in the Qur’an and Hadith. Western feminism has enabled Muslims to use feminism as a tool to explore and understand how these values and beliefs become more tangible and more
empirical. Thus, such values are not concepts but experienced and practiced. Indonesian Islamic feminists report feeling closer to God after studying women’s and gender issues from an Islamic perspective. One approach to understanding Islamic values’ current relevance, for example, is by employing both hermeneutic and contextual approaches.

5. Using feminism as tool of analysis vis-a-vis gender and feminism
6. Strengthening feminist identity, particularly after experiencing ‘competing identity’ during the strengthening of the Indonesian Islamist movement in the 1970s

4.3.3. Incompatible Ideas

Indonesian Muslim gender activists and academics reject aspects of Western feminism that they view as incompatible with their own thinking. Most of my respondents who identified themselves as ‘non-feminist’ showed a lack of knowledge of feminist literature and what Western feminists on the whole actually think. Indeed they were not sure whether their statements represented Western feminist concepts or not. These non-feminist respondents tended to reject the following ideas that they associated with Western feminism: the rejection of the family as an institution; the notion that men and women must have the same rights in all aspects of life; women’s leadership in prayer and in the family; the acceptance of lesbianism; and the concept of men as the enemy. Actually, there is no general agreement that these ideas are necessarily feminist. Western feminists also might disagree with them.

According to Abdullah, the radical rejection of the family institution is not compatible with Indonesian culture (personal interview, Abdullah, 22 May 2010). The views of Joko provide another example:
In my understanding so far that Western feminists want [men and women] to be exactly the same...In everyday life we face a real life...sometimes we cannot treat [men and women] exactly the same. So, for me we don’t need to treat men and women exactly the same, as far as [the different treatment] is in the best interests of both men and women (personal interview, Joko, 24 May 2010).

Both self-identified non-feminists and self-identified feminists expressed concern about extending rights to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people and about anti-male attitudes. Respondents tended to assert that it would be difficult to recognise the legal rights of LGBT people in the Indonesian context as, traditionally, marriage would only occur between a man and a woman. Moreover, they did not agree that lesbianism should be promoted through political or ideological movements. As Tono observed:

Homosexuality and lesbianism, for radical feminist are fine but in Islam they do not have room yet in Islamic jurisprudence. However, as human beings they have rights to live that need to be supported, whatever their sexual orientation is. In addition, Islamic teachings value the behaviour not on the attitude, meaning that if it is only on orientation [unobservable] and not in behaviour it is fine. Furthermore, if lesbianism becomes a political and ideological movement it is inappropriate in the Indonesian context (personal interview, Tono, 9 May 2010).

Some self-identified feminist respondents also disagreed with the radical, confrontational approach that they believed is employed by a small number of Western feminists. Darma argued that “Western [feminists] tend to employ a galak dan melawan (conflict approach) to achieve their goals” (personal interview, 9 May 2010). My literature analysis shows, however, that there are some women’s NGOs in Indonesia operating outside of universities, such as Perempuan Mahardika, that opt not to use soft approaches. For example, on March 24 2010 Perempuan Mahardika condemned the banning of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) Congress in Surabaya (Detik.com, 2010; Effendi,
4.3.4. Different Concepts of Family and Power

According to some respondents, the family institution in Indonesia differs from Western families. For example, Sita argued that the Western family supports and complements public life and productive activities in capitalist society (personal interview, 3 June 2010). Sita’s idea is in line with Ross’ (2008) argument that the standard assumption of political economy is that gender equality can only be achieved when women participate in the formal labour market. The consequence of this approach is that the economic and social significance of household labour is ignored, underpaid and disrespected (Gordon, 1982) and activities undertaken in the public sphere are deemed to be more important than those conducted in the private or domestic spheres. Marxist feminists challenge their non-Marxist counterparts on the greatly divergent valuations of these two spheres (Lorber, 2001).

Sita (personal interview, 3 June 2010) argued that the core values of Islam are manifest not within the public sphere but within the family. Therefore, public activities must support the existence of the family as the family is a microcosm of society. A solid family foundation is the basis of ummah (a strong society). The management of reproductive activity within the family unit is the most important aspect in the Islamic concept of community development. The family has the strategic function of strengthening the community by ensuring natural regeneration in the family. Strengthening and empowering the family institution by creating equal rights among family members is one of the main goals of Islamic feminists. The family is a core value and not a commodity as in the capitalist model. This particular notion is similar to that which Amina Wadud (2010) articulates in her article ‘The “F” word: Feminism in Islam’:
Islamic feminism is not just about equality in the public space but also in the family, where most gender roles are prescribed and gender inequality is fixed. Islamic feminism takes [the] responsibility for our souls and our bodies, our minds and our contributions at every level. We take inspiration from our own relationships with the sacred and with the community to forge a way that enhances the quality of our lives and the lives of all others (Wadud, 2010, p. 1).

When Sita described how she negotiates between her feminism and her family, she said, “they both fit, because my feminism is the foundation of my family, and my family is the foundation of my feminism” (personal interview, Sita, 3 June 2010). Sita’s notion of the harmonious relations between family and feminism contradicts the assumption of the defenders of the family in the West who draw on the conservative ‘pro-family’ movement and are explicitly anti-feminist. The ‘pro-family’ movement often locates “feminists among those who criticise and would even destroy the family” (Thorne, 1982, p. 1). In addition, Thorne (1982) argues that feminists do not want to destroy the family institution; rather they challenge “the ideology of the ‘monistic family’, which elevates the contemporary nuclear family with a breadwinner husband and a full-time wife and mother as the natural and legitimate family form” (p.2).

A further issue concerns the concept of power. Power in the West, according to Sita, often relates to hierarchy and is played out mostly in the public domain (personal interview, 3 June 2010). She says that power relationships in the West tend to be top-down because they are based on individualism. Conversely, she says that power in Indonesia has been shaped by the idea of collectiveness, making power sharing in Indonesia quite common. However, I will suggest that her notion is a simplification; in the West, power may be realised collectively, such as in the case of class interests (Olderma & Davis, 1991). An equally important point relating to the realisation of power in everyday life is that Indonesian women often have more
power in terms of managing the financial aspects of their families than their husbands. Therefore, the concept of power in Indonesia resides not only in the public domain but also in the domestic domain. As a consequence, the rigid segregation of public and private spheres is incompatible with Indonesian culture (Brenner, 1998). Many Indonesian women choose to be housewives; according to some respondents, this decision is an expression of free will and is a means for Indonesian women to realise power.

Brenner (1998) argues that among the Laweyan community (Surakarta, Central Java), the domestic sphere is the source of power and prestige, which differs from much academic Western discourse that locates political power in the public sphere. In Laweyan (and traditional Javanese culture generally), husbands are deemed incapable of managing family money; this responsibility is given to wives instead. Often, if the husband handles the money, he will go jajan (visit a prostitute) or gamble it away (Brenner, 1998). Therefore, a good husband in this culture trusts his wife to control his desires by giving her the authority to manage family money.

**Conclusion**

In Indonesia, identifying oneself as a ‘feminist’ remains a controversial issue for those concerned with women’s and gender issues. This hesitation relates to the various understandings of the term ‘feminist’, i.e., the positive and negative connotations it carries within society. Thus, for strategic reasons, some gender activists and scholars do not publicly identify as ‘feminist’, although personally or individually they may identify as ‘feminist’. The negative connotations are mostly attached to women: a feminist goes against women’s kodrat (God-given nature); she wants to dominate men; and, she accepts lesbianism. On the other hand, it is less
problematic for men to identify as ‘feminist’. This is understandable because self-
identification as ‘feminist’ carries a higher risk for women than for men in
Indonesian society. In terms of preferred labels, among self-identified feminists,
‘Muslim Feminist’ proved the most popular, whereas ‘Gender Activist’ was the most
preferred label among non-feminists.

Regarding how Western feminism has been shaped and thought relevant to
the Indonesian context, most respondents argued that universal values such as gender
equality, gender justice and the recognition of women as human beings were based
on their own sources in the Islamic traditions (the Qur’an and Hadith) and local
traditions, not imported from Western feminism. However, some respondents
admitted that many Western feminist concepts and strategies had influenced and
shaped their thought and strategies for dealing with women and gender issues in
Indonesia, such as challenging Indonesia’s patriarchal culture, for example, As well,
some had been encouraged by the contextual approach that suggest that Indonesian
gender activists should be more critical and use gender and feminism as a tool for
analysis of gender power relationships. Many respondents acknowledged that
Western feminists are able to raise awareness of gender issues, strengthen the
feminist identity, and to build up faith in Islam among Indonesian Muslim gender
activists.

However, some Indonesian Muslim gender activists disagreed with certain
Western feminist notions which, they claimed, were not relevant to the Indonesian
context. These included the rejection of the institution of family, the notion that men
and women must have the same rights in all aspects of life, the idea of challenging
and questioning the religious notion of women’s leadership of prayer and of the
family, notions of lesbianism, and the depiction of men as the enemy. The biggest
difference between Indonesian and Western feminists, according to my research findings, is that in Indonesia, the concept of having a family is non-negotiable (and this is borne out in reality), whereas in Western countries, feminists are often single women who neither have nor plan to have a family.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF GENDER AND ISLAM

Introduction

Before discussing the conceptualisation of Islamic teachings of gender among gender activists and researchers in PSWs/PSG, I will first identify the wider understanding of this issue of both feminists and non-feminists in the Muslim world, mostly in Indonesia. There is considerable disagreement among Indonesian Muslims as to what Islam has to say about many gender issues; for example: the ideal Muslim woman; women’s status and roles in the family and society; polygamy; leadership; the ‘half values’ supposedly placed on women compared to men as in the *aqiqah* (ritual performed at the birth of a baby) and inheritance distribution; the creation of woman; and reproductive rights. My research established that people’s ideas about these issues contrast strongly. One of the important factors shaping their views is the way in which Muslims seek to understand canonical Islamic texts (the Qur’an and Hadith). Generally scholars contrast two principle approaches to or methods of understanding these texts: ‘textual’ and ‘contextual’ (Abdullah, 1996; Amal & Panggabean, 2005; Rahman, 1982).

In the following section I explain the nature of these approaches; then, I offer a categorisation of the positions of nine selected gender issues in Islam as background for the details of my survey findings in Chapter Six. The nine selected gender issues are as follow:

1. Equality of gender roles in the home and workplace (Equal Gender Roles)
2. Equality of sexual rights
3. Equal power to make decisions in family life
4. Equal rights to inheritance
5. Equal value as a witness
6. Symbolic equality of women in the creation story
7. Polygamy
8. Equal status of women
9. Women’s right to be imam sholat (leader of public, [mixed-gender] prayers)

5.1. Approaches to Religious Texts

5.1.1. Textual Approach

A textual approach understands religious texts literally: it produces textual normative teachings. According to Amin Abdullah (2002) and Mubarok (2008), textual normative teachings include teachings drawn from the canonical texts (the Qur’an and Hadith), ignoring the later religious scholarship of the classical schools, and understanding literal readings of the canonical texts. Interpreted this way, the meaning of any text or passage is not problematical. Each is accepted as if it has not been shaped by people throughout the course of history. Its meaning is seen as being wholly attributed in the historical time in which it was first received. Textualists claim that key religious teachings have not changed over time and that understanding of them may not be changed even slightly as societies change. From their perspectives, the supposed original meanings remain valid over all periods of time and in all places. This approach to texts yields socially conservative teachings emphasising rigid dogma and enjoining absolute conformity to what are seen as obligatory practices, with no additions and no use of local languages in the rituals.

According to Fazlur Rahman, textualists evince ‘a general failure to understand the underlying unity of the Qur’an’ (Rahman, 1982, p. 2). They fail to recognise the difference between general principles and specific responses to
concrete and particular historical occurrences. In search of a unified understanding of
the Qur’an, Rahman considers the views of Muslims – most particularly from the
earliest time – expressed in the Qur’anic texts themselves. He emphasises the
intellectual endeavour or jihad (technically called *ijtihad*) which means:

The effort to understand the meaning of a relevant text or precedent in the
past, containing a rule, and to alter that rule by extending or restricting or
otherwise modifying it in such a manner that a new situation can be
subsumed under it by a new solution. This definition itself implies that a text
or precedent can be generalized as a principle and that principle can then be
formulated as a new rule (Rahman, 1982, p. 8).

5.1.2. Contextual and Hermeneutical Approaches

Scholars who adopt a contextual approach to understanding Islamic teachings tend to
seek recourse to the canonical texts (the Qur’an and Hadith); but, they broaden the
scope for *ijtihad* (interpretation) said texts by considering the influences of place and
time on the original revelation of the holy words and examples and on the recording
of the texts (Abdullah, 1996; Amal & Panggabean, 2005; Rahman, 1982; Saeed,
2005). Thus, they understand them as shaped by the socio-cultural and geographical
conditions of different times and places. For this reason, contextual approaches are
also called ‘historical’ approaches. Since an historical or contextual approach tends
to take into account the historicity of human understanding, it uses a variety of
disciplinary approaches to help reach an interpretation. These approaches include
historical, philosophical, psychological, sociological and anthropological disciplines,
which are thought to produce better understandings of the meaning of the texts. The
meanings can be tested continually in the reality of life experience. Scholars of the
contemporary approach claim that texts need to be discussed openly and, where
necessary, reinterpreted. This, according to Abdullah, generates a ‘post-dogmatic’
religiosity (Abdullah, 2002; Qibtiyah, 2007).
Amal and Panggabean (2005, p. 121), providing a useful summary, note the four basic components of the contextual approach to the Qur’an: “(a) the literary context of the Qur’an; (b) the historical context of the Qur’an; (c) the chronological context of the Qur’an; (d) the socio-historical context of contemporary societies”.

Significantly for this research, contextual approaches can deconstruct religious dogma that does not support gender equality and reconstruct it as support for gender equality. But, because such dogma has been internalised in the beliefs of Muslims for centuries, it is not easy for liberal groups to challenge gender views long established in a given society or to address the social problems that result from them.

The hermeneutical approach is a method of interpretation that has been customarily used in human sciences but has also been introduced into religious studies, including the Islamic sciences. It involves re-thinking or imaginatively re-experiencing what the author originally felt or thought. In other words, hermeneutics is a method “to transpose a meaning-complex created by someone else into our own understanding of ourselves and our world” (Bleicher, 1980, p. 1). A hermeneutic approach consequently engages in two tasks: “Ascertaining the exact meaning of a word, sentence, and/or texts at the time it was written, and the discovery of the teachings contained in the symbolic forms employed in the texts” (Bleicher, 1980, p. 11).

Wadud, one of the best known feminist exponents of hermeneutics in Qur’anic exegesis, maintain that the hermeneutic approach focuses on three aspects of the text: first, “the context in which the text was written, [second] … the grammatical composition of the text … and, [third] the world-view of the text” (1999, p. 3). Wadud adds that the hermeneutic approach can be applied to women’s issues in the Qur’an by analysing the text in several ways: the context of women’s
issues in the context of discussion of similar topics elsewhere in the Qur’an; in the light of similar language and syntactical structure used elsewhere in the Qur’an; in the light of overriding Qur’anic principles, only evident by reading the whole text; and, within the context of the Qur’anic Weltanschauung or world-view (1999). She also emphasises paying attention to the distinctive features of the Arabic language because the Qur’an and Hadith employ Arabic to present their messages.

Through hermeneutics, Muslim feminists and neo-modernists tend to reread the texts, emphasising the notions of equality and justice in men’s and women’s roles in society, which are “complementary and egalitarian rather than hierarchical and unequal” (Afsaruddin, 1999, p. 23). In the context of modern Islam, when talking about an equality-based interpretation of the Qur’an, this can only be successful when “a complete re-examination of the primary sources of Islamic thought, praxis and worldview is made that intentionally includes female perspectives on these sources and that validates female experiences” (Wadud, 2000, p. 20).

1.2. A Categorisation of Muslim Thought on Gender in Islam

I have built a categorisation of different ideas on gender issues among Indonesian Muslim thinkers, both feminists and non feminists, drawing on two major approaches, i.e., those of Burhanudin and Fathurrahman (2004) and Woodward (2001). Both are built upon the contrast between the textual and contextual approaches to interpret the religious texts. Burhanudin and Fathurrahman (2004) classify Muslim thought on gender into three categories: conservative, moderate and liberal. Their classification is based upon the ways in which Muslims interpret religious texts and their attitudes towards Western feminists. According to Burhanudin and Fathurrahman (2004), the conservative approach interprets religious
texts literally. Conversely, people on the liberal side understand them contextually and apply a hermeneutic approach. Between the two is the moderate thought which interprets the religious texts inconsistently, sometimes - using the textual/literal approach and at other times - or for other issues using the contextual approach.

Although Burhanudin and Fathurahman’s categorisation mainly concerns gender and feminist issues, it classifies based on the modes of interpretation of the religious texts and the attitudes towards Western feminism. The authors do not provide the explanations for all gender issues in Islam and for gender-oriented thinkers. Therefore, it is difficult for me to find a complete understanding of gender in Islam and of the thinkers who fit this categorisation. To overcome this limitation I draw a broader schema for categorisation of Muslim groups proposed by Woodward (2001).

Woodward (2001) argues that the current phenomena of Indonesian Islamic thought can be classified into five variants: (1) indigenised Islam, (using Geertz’s term, abangan) in which a group formally identifies as Muslim but in practice tends to syncretise religion with local cultural systems; (2) the traditional Sunni Islam of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)\(^2\), which highlights the classical legal, theological and mystical texts. Adherents are usually from pesantren (Islamic Boarding houses) and rural areas, and accept a local culture as long as Islamic values are not contested; (3) the Islamic modernism of Muhammadiyah, \(^2\) which concentrates on modern education and social agendas and rejects mysticism. Its adherents are mostly from the

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\(^2\) Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was established in Surabaya in 1926 to strengthen traditional Islam. This organisation is seen as traditionalist due to its being supported by people in the rural areas. Pesantren in this classification refers to NU-affiliated pesantren. It has a membership of approximately 40 million (Saeed, 2005).

\(^2\) Muhammadiyah is an Indonesian Islamic organisation founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in the city of Yogyakarta, as a reformist socio-religious movement, advocating *ijtihad* (creative interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith). It is one of the two largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia with 30 million members (Saeed, 2005). Although Muhammadiyah leaders and members are often actively involved in shaping the politics in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah is not a political party.
urban areas; (4) Islamist groups, which promote a highly politicised and anti-Western interpretation of Islam, and whose discourse is centred on jihad and Shariah law, they are most commonly found on university campuses and in large urban areas; and (5) Neo-modernism, which tries to discover an Islamic foundation for many types of modernity including tolerance, democracy, gender equity and pluralism. Neo-modernists are concerned more with Muslim values and ethics than with law.

Drawing on these two schemas, i.e., Burhanudin and Fathurahman and Woodward, I divide the world of Muslim thought about gender and feminism in Indonesia into three types: literalist, moderate and progressive/contextualist, much like Burhanudin and Fathurahman; but, I relate those categories to the variants of Indonesian Islamic thought identified by Woodward. Thus, my literalist category covers what Burhanudin and Fathurahman refer to as ‘conservative’ ideas and Woodward’s fourth variant, “Islamist groups”. I use the term ‘literalist’ because usually the mainstream thought pertaining to - or interpretation of - the religious texts by Islamists and conservative orientation is literal. My ‘moderate’ category combines Woodward’s ‘indigenous’ Islam, and his ‘NU’ and ‘Muhammadiyah’ variants. I use Burhanudin and Fathurahman’s term ‘moderate’ because it spans the position between the other two. My last category, the ‘progressive/contextualist’, is similar to the ‘liberal’ orientation proposed by Burhanudin and Fathurahman, and to Woodward’s ‘neo-modernist’ category. I use the term ‘progressive/contextualist’ because the neo-modernist orientation usually employs a contextual approach and has a liberal progressive orientation. According to Abdullah Saeed, neo-modernists espouse three dominant ideas:

First, neo-modernists assert that the Qur’an was a text revealed at a certain time and in certain context and circumstances, which it reflected and responded to. This idea de-emphasises the total ‘otherness’ of the Qur’an that the classical tradition stressed so strongly. Second, they argue that the Qur’an
is not exclusively a book of law but an ethical-moral guide, with both particular and universal dimensions. The particular dimension is limited in scope and is essentially a reflection of the context in which the Qur’an was revealed: the cultural, historical and legal aspects directly related to the situation in Arabia at the time. The universal dimensions are related to areas that are not bound by [the] specific context of seventh-century Arabia. The third idea relates to [the] emphasis that classical Muslim scholars placed on certain aspect of the Qur’an, and which neo-modernists argue should be re-thought (Saeed, 2005, p. 9).

Neo-modernists who are committed to the idea that ‘the worth of a human being is measured by the person’s character (Safi, 2003, p. 3), argue that Muslims need to learn and adopt the Western advances in education, science and politics to strengthen and modernise the Muslim community. Neo-modernism combines knowledge and respect for classical learning with receptivity to modern ideas, including Western influences (Barton, 1995). Progressive Muslims have produced a growing body of literature that re-examines Islamic tradition and addresses pluralism issues on both theoretical and practical levels (Esposito, 1998). They argue that a fresh interpretation of Islamic sources and a reformulation of Islam is urgently needed (Esposito, 1998). Based on their philosophies and strategies, it may be suggested that the pembaharuan movement is closely allied to the philosophy and strategies proposed by activists in the gender equality movement in Indonesia.

It is important to note that here organisation affiliations and the orientation of people’s thought do not always coincide. For example, not all people from NU or the Muhammadiyah organisation have moderate orientation. In the following section, I describe my proposed categorisation in more detail.
5.2.1. Literalist

The literalists’ interpretations of gender issues, according to my categorisation of schema, are based upon literal interpretations of passages relating to women’s issues in the canonical religious texts, the Qur’an and Hadith. Because of their literalism, their taking revelation received in ancient times in a patriarchal society at face value, the interpretations are usually misogynistic, positing women’s roles, statuses, and rights as inferior to those of men. Interpretation is based upon the belief that Islam is a perfect religion. In other words, Muslims do not need to reinterpret it in order to understand how the revelations apply in today’s world. In general, literalists are against the Pembaharuan (renewal) philosophy, including its position on gender and feminism. They claim that gender and feminism are Western ideologies not suited to Islamic traditions. Furthermore, they argue that people who follow any ideology outside Islam are transgressing the Islamic law and may be against God (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004).

Adherents to this group do not constitute a homogeneous entity. In Indonesia, they are split organisationally and divided among themselves over several issues. Some essential fundamentalist perceptions on gender issues are similar in that they generally understand religious texts literally. Followers can be from conservative (masyarakat kolot), radical, fundamentalist or revivalist groups such as Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Dakwah Campus institution, LDK), Tarbiyah movements, Hizbut Tahrir and Salafi Dakwah movements (Machmudi, 2008; Mubarok, 2008)

5.2.2. Moderate

This orientation accepts feminist ideas as long as there is no conflict with what they see as basic Islamic values. They argue that not all feminist ideas are from the West.
Islam originally dealt with gender inequality at its foundation; therefore, the feminist spirit is compatible with Islamic values. Similar to the more conservative ideas, the moderate philosophy believes that Islam is the perfect religion. Everything is explained in the Qur’an and Hadith, including gender relationships. However, unlike the first category, those moderate orientations do not always read and understand the religious texts literally. Sometimes they use contextual methods depending upon the need (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004).

As suggested earlier, scholars of the moderate category are generally Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah adherents. In his books, Munawar Chalil, one of prominent scholars in Muhammadiyah in 1930s, Kesopanan Perempuan (WomenCourtesy) (1936) and Nilai Wanita (Women’s Values)(1954), advances moderate ideas. According to Chalil (1954), Islam neither posits a woman as unvalued nor seeks to deify her as a human being nor sees her as one hundred per cent similar to men. According to Islamic tenets, men and women are different but equal creatures: they have different roles and responsibilities depending upon their given kodrats. In the next section, I will provide further examples of moderate ideas presented by HAMKA and Indonesian Marriage Law vis-a-vis gender issues such as polygamy, inheritance and family.

5.2.3. Progressive/contextualist

The main theme of writers in the progressive/contextualist category is equality between men and women in all aspects of life. The progressive/contextualist group accept feminist notions such as men and women having equal rights in the economic, social and political spheres. Although they recognise that men and women are biologically different, they maintain that both sexes should enjoy equal status,
position and rights in the family, society and state. Musdah Mulia (2005), for example, argues that the only hierarchy ordained by God is between the the *Kholiq* (God/Creator) and God’s *makhluk* (creatures). Among the creatures of God - actually among human creatures in general - there is no right to claim (a) as number one and (b) as number two. A king is not the God of the people; the husband is not the lord of the wife. Based on the most fundamental Islamic concept of *tauhid* (Oneness), Mulia argues that people can only make total submission to God and practise *tauhid*: they cannot discriminate against or oppress their fellow beings. She further asserts that the most honourable person in the sight of Allah/God is the one who is most pious, whether a man or a woman. The pious person is the one who implements the basic values of Islam, i.e., peace, justice, honesty, friendship, equality and generosity. He/she avoids bad deeds such as injustice, inequality, oppression, discrimination, marginalisation, dishonesty and arrogance.

The progressive/contextualists’ ideas contrast with the literalists’ ideas; on occasion, they in line with moderate thought. Progressive writers who claim that any interpretation that supports gender equality is possible, generally hold that the position of Muslim women was much more egalitarian in the early years of Islam. By the 10th century some male legalists introduced a final codification of Islamic law, which sought to circumscribe women’s public activities in the interests of maintaining a patriarchal order and embodying their values in the law, embodying God’s intervention for all time (Afsaruddin, 1999; Musdah Mulia, 2005). Mulia’s (2005) analysis of legal scholarship shows that the closer an Islamic scholar’s life was to the time of the Holy Prophet Muhammad’s era, the less gender bias he evinced. The relationship between the Holy Prophet Muhammad and his first wife, Khadija, is an evident. Abu Hanifah, the founder of the oldest *imam madzab* (School
of Islamic law), offered a more flexible interpretation than those of the three \textit{imams} who founded the later classical school of thought on Islamic law. Conversely, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the youngest \textit{imam madzab}, formulated the strictest interpretation of religious texts address gender issues.

The supporters of progressive/contextualist thought are mostly from neo-modernist circles, the young generation of NU or Muhammadiyah (Saeed, 2005), groups such as \textit{Rahima}, YKF (\textit{Yayasan Kesejahteraan Fatayat}) and Amal Hayati-\textit{Rifka Annisa} (women’s crisis Centre), FK3 (Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning) and Yasanti. The leading scholars among these groups include Musdah Mulia (2005), Ruhaini Dzuhayatin (2001), Cicik Farha (1999), Lily Zakiyah Munir (2002), Nasaruddin Umar (1999), Hamim Ilyas (2009) and Muhammad Husein (2001).

From this review, it is evident that there is no single Indonesian Muslim understanding of gender issues. The different ways in which Indonesian Muslim Scholars understand the Islamic texts today, and the paradigms through which they evaluate Western ideas, generate plural understandings. The moderate and progressive/contextual groups are likely to have positions close to what Western thought would see as ‘feminist’ positions. And although some may be reluctant to use the term ‘feminism’, as I suggested in Chapter Four, it cannot be denied that they use feminist approaches as tools for developing their understanding of gender in Islam; and, this influences their actions. In the following section I will review nine selected gender issues that are problematic in Islam, that have served as a basis for my research.

\textbf{5.3. Selected Gender Issues in Islam}

In this section I will explore Muslim’s understandings of nine selected gender issues by classifying them into three approaches (literalist, moderate and progressive). I will
discuss each gender issue in accordance with Islamic texts from the Qur’an and Hadith: this will be followed by explanation of literalists, moderate and progressive understandings of gender issues from Muslims’ view points, both feminist and non-feminist scholars.

5.3.1. Equality of Gender Roles in The Home and Workplace

In Islam, the equality of men and women’s roles in the home and workplace relates to the notion of *kodrat* (God-given nature), which in this context is the nature with which God imbued women and men. More broadly speaking, it is a power, an ability or capacity that allows someone to do a particular thing: it was determined by God, and humankind cannot change or reject it. One Qur’anic verse to which Muslim scholars refer when commenting on women’s God-given nature is Al Ahzab (33):

33:

And stay quietly in your houses, and make not a dazzling display, like that of the former Times of Ignorance; and establish regular Prayer, and give regular Charity; and obey Allah and His Messenger. And Allah only wishes to remove all abomination from you, ye members of the Family, and to make you pure and spotless (Ali, 1975, p. 601).

According to Al-Ilmu (2008) and Burhanudin and Fathurahman (2004), literalists understand this text as declaring that men and women are equal; but God imbued them with different *kodrat* (God-given nature), and for this reason they perform different *roles*. Women’s *kodrat* (God-given nature), is giving birth, breast feeding and taking care of the children: men’s is earning money for the family. According to this categorisation, *kodrat* are given by God; therefore, human beings cannot change them. Because men and women have different *kodrat*, they have different roles and positions in society and the family. Women’s roles are located in the domestic sphere and involve reproduction: men’s are located in the public sphere,
involve the production of goods for the support of the family and as a contribution to society. Thus, these roles are assigned to create gender positions which for women are as mother and wife. According to this categorisation, women do not need to work to earn money: nor should they be politicians, because the political arena is the men’s responsibility. In addition, this interpretation holds that if a woman earns money outside of the home, her children will grow up ignorant and bad-mannered because they did not receive a proper education from their mothers. The woman’s main responsibilities are to serve her husband’s needs, take care of their children and look after her husband’s property.

This moderate thought is similar to that of the literalist group with respect to the roles for men and women albeit it has more flexibility. According to views categorised as ‘moderate’, women are naturally responsible for the domestic sphere, whereas men are naturally active in the public domain. However, under certain conditions, the moderates deem it acceptable for women to contribute to family income. However, their contribution is considered additional family income. This idea has been implemented widely in Indonesian culture through ‘state ibuism’ (an ideology imposed by the Suharto government promoting the idea that women are first and foremost wives and mothers) principle initiated during the New Order Era (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004). Moderates also argue that one of the main responsibilities for women is to be a mother taking care of her children. If women neglect this responsibility, their other activities will be useless (Faidah, 2000).

Zaitunah Subhan (2008), argues that although men and women have different kodrat, they have equal roles in public and domestic life. Men and women’s creation is from the same essence; therefore, they should be encouraged to become actively involved in both the domestic and public spheres (Subhan, 2008). According to the
YKF (Yayasan Kesejahteraan Fatayat) manual and other material, childbirth and breastfeeding are regarded as *kodrat* (natural or inborn qualities), whereas raising a child and doing housework are seen as socially constructed roles and therefore tasks that can be done by both men and women (Rinaldo, 2008).

**5.3.2. Equality of Sexual Rights**

When I use the term ‘equal sexual right’ I am referring to the sexual relationship between a husband and wife. One problematic Hadith relating to sexuality states: if the husband wants to have sexual intercourse and the wife rejects the husband’s demand then an angel will curse the wife until the morning” Mulia (2005, p. 249).

Other Qur’anic verses referring to sexuality include: Al Baqoroh (2): 187: “Permitted to you, on the night of the fasts, is the approach to your wives [for sexual relations]. They are your garments and you are their garments” (Mohsin, 2011b, p. 1)\(^ {23} \), Al Baqoroh (2): 223: ”Your wives are as a tilth unto you; so approach your tilth when or how ye will; but do some good act for your souls beforehand; and fear Allah. And know that ye are to meet Him (in the Hereafter), and give (these) good tidings to those who believe” (Mohsin, 2011c, p. 1). An-Nisa’ (4):19 states:

> O you who believe! You are forbidden to inherit women against their will; and you should not treat them with harshness, that you may take away part of the Mahr you have given them, unless they commit open illegal sexual intercourse; and live with them honourably. If you dislike them, it may be that you dislike a thing and Allah brings through it a great deal of good (Mohsin, 2011f, p. 1).

People interpret these texts differently: some interpret them literally and others contextually and comprehensively. The different interpretations are influenced by the ways in which people construct sexuality (Mas'udi, 1997) and the marriage

\(^ {23} \) Mohsin Khan’s translation is used in this research because he provides explicit explanations in-text, making it more easily understood by readers.
institution (Qibtiyah, 2003). From a literalist approach it is evident in conservative fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) teachings in which sex for women is thought of as both compulsory and for procreation. Marriage for this group is perceived as 'aqad *tamlık*’ (ownership contract) in which the husband is both owner and the controller of his wife’s body. Therefore, the literalist group insist that serving the husband sexually is obligatory wherever and whenever he wishes. This is one of the husband’s rights that need to be fulfilled by the wife (Mayai, 1999; Nipan, 2000). In the classical book, *Uqud al-Lujain*, it is written that if the wife delays her husband’s request to have sexual intercourse, then all her good deeds will be deleted and she will go to hell (Nipan, 2000).

Moderate scholars share similar interpretations to the literalist group on this issue. However, in terms of understanding problematic Hadith, they suggest that the reason why the wife rejects the husband’s request to fulfil his sexual need should be considered. According to Ibn Hajar Al-`Asqalani (cited in Mulia, 2005), if there is a rational reason for the wife’s rejection of her the husband’s demand, then the curse will not fall on her. Al-Zuhaili also in (cited in Mulia, 2005) provides an additional explanation for the Hadith expression, ”An angel will curse the wife until the morning”, claiming it could mean that if the husband is angry until the morning, the curse on his wife will be implemented. But, if the husband is not angry, then the wife will be free of that curse.

Different from the literalist group, the progressives people regard sexual intercourse not only for creation but also for recreation, as part of God’s blessing (Qibtiyah, 2003). Marriage according to this group, is defined as ’aqad *ibadah*’ (permissible contract) for something that was earlier prohibited. The wife still has autonomy and control of her own body. So, sexual matters are based upon a mutual
relationship. In the *tasawuf seks* (sex in sufism), orgasm is considered one of the ways to unite God’s creation with Himself (Qibtiyah, 2003; Roqib, 2007; Umar, 2000). Therefore, both wife and husband have the same right to enjoy sexual pleasure and expression (Qibtiyah, 2003; Subhan, 1999).

When interpreting the above problematic Hadith of sexual relationships, progressive scholars assert that the texts cannot be understood literally. Literal interpretation will lead to an understanding that sexual pleasure is the husband’s right and the wife’s obligation to provide. This contrasts with some verses in the Qur’an (2:223 and 4:19) which state that the wife and the husband should *mu asyarah bil ma’ruf* (protect and respect each other and enjoy good relationships) (Qibtiyah, 2003; Subhan, 1999). Mas’udi (1997) a progressive scholar, argues that although this particular Hadith is valid, because it was narrated by Bukhari-Muslim, it was unthinkable that the Holy Prophet Muhammad advocated the inequality of women.

### 5.3.3. Equal Power to Make Decisions in Family Life

Decision making in the family hinges upon gender roles in the public and domestic spheres. People tend to link the issue with the concept of leadership in the family described in the Qur’an in An-Nisa (4): 34: “Men are the protectors and maintainers [Qowwam] of women, because Allah has made one of them to excel the other and because they spend (to support them) from their means” (Mohsin, 2011a, p. 1). Based on this verse, literalists believe that all family decision making should be done by the head of the family, i.e., the father and husband. Scholars from the literalist group argue that a man is the head of the family because he is the breadwinner (Ahmadinejad, 2010; Nasif, 2001). A woman is responsible for taking care of her
husband’s house and the household (Nasif, 2001). Their arguments are based upon the following Hadith:

All of you are the leaders and have to be responsible to all followers. A man is a leader for his family and a woman is a leader and responsible for her husband’s house and his offspring; so all of you are leaders and responsible for your followers (Nasif, 2001, p. 244).

Furthermore, people in this group say that the man is head of the family because men are both physically and psychologically more capable than woman (Nasif, 2001).

Moderate people who advocate equal power to make decisions in family life based on that particular Hadith and the marriage law 1974\(^24\), maintain that because a father/husband is head of the family, and a mother/wife is head of household, it is better that men make decisions regarding issues of public life and women make decisions in the areas of domestic life (Nasif, 2001). However, people in this group insist that to be head of a family is a responsibility, not a privilege, for men. Therefore, a man cannot undermine his wife because of his position as head of the family (Nasif, 2001). The different responsibilities and positions between men and women in the family are thus only functional, not hierarchical (Subhan, 2008).

Different from the previous approaches, progressive scholars contend that decision-making in the family can be carried out by all family members, including children, based on their competencies. Progressive people’s views are not only constructed around verses in the Qur’an but also based on social reality, taking into account the Indonesian Child Protection Law no 23 year 2002 article 10\(^25\) (Musda

\(^{24}\) Marriage Law year 1974 Article 31:3 *Suami adalah Kepala Keluarga dan isteri ibu rumah tangga* [husband is the head of the family and the wife the housewife] (“Undang-undang Perkawinan,” 1974).

\(^{25}\) Indonesian Child Protection Law no 23 year 2002 article 10 states that “*Setiap anak berhak menyatakan dan didengar pendapatnya, menerima, mencari, dan memberikan informasi sesuai dengan tingkat kecerdasan dan usianya demi pengembangan dirinya sesuai dengan nilai-nilai kesuksesan dan kepatutan*” [Every child has the right to express and to hear, receive, search, and provide information in accordance with the level of intelligence and age to develop themselves in accordance with the values of decency and propriety] (“Undang-Undang RI Tentang Perlindungan Anak,” 2002)
Mulia, 2005). In addition, progressive scholars argue that the head of the family may not necessarily be a man: it could be a woman, as far as she has the capability to lead (Faishal, 2002). Musdah (2005), criticising the term “kepala keluarga” (head of family) in the Marriage Law 1974, claims that in society the term kepala is often misused and given authoritarian implications. This misunderstanding leads many lesser educated people to interpret the law inappropriately; for example, the wife has to do all of the domestic tasks and serve all of her husband’s needs. In addition, Musdah proposes amending the Marriage Law by removing the term kepala keluarga, because in reality, 1 out of 9 heads of families in Indonesia is female. Therefore, the Law is out of date.

5.3.4. Equal Rights to Inheritance

As Romli (2010) and Nasif (2001) point out, before the time of the Holy Prophet Muhammad, women and children in Arab tribes could not claim inheritance; in fact, they were even part of inheritance itself. Heirs were only adult men who carried weapons and protected their tribes. Therefore, according to Subhan (2008), when Islam changed this tradition by giving women half the portion allocated to men, it seemed quite radical. Discussion of inheritance in Islam generally refers to the Qur’anic passages An-Nisa (4): 7 and 11, which state that both sons and daughters have rights to inheritance, although daughters should have a half portion only. But, over time, interpretations have changed. In the Muslim world today not only men should protect and give nafkah to their families but also women. This suggests that some Muslim scholars today interpret verses differently. Some continue to understand them textually, and others offer new contextual readings.
Literalist scholars argue that men should get double the inheritance of women. This difference in treatment between men and women is usually explained by reference to the Qur’an and relates to the concept of *nafkah*, i.e., that a wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband in terms of shelter, clothing, food and medical care (Departemen Agama, 1996; Nasif, 2001; Siraj & Hilary, 2005; Yunus, 1993). Some literalists argue that this differential treatment (2:1) is based upon the reckoning that women lack rationality and, that if they receive an inheritance, they may squander it on jewellery, dresses and other frivolities (Subhan, 2008).

Meanwhile, the moderates agree with the literalists regarding inheritance; but, latter encourage other charitable acts such as giving presents to or making a will (*hibah*) in favour of a woman, making her portion equal to that of a man. In the Indonesian context, this idea is similar to the Compilation of Islamic Law (*Kompilasi Hukum Islam/KHI*) No 1 year 1991 article 176, which state that inheritance should be divided based on gender, i.e., a daughter gets a half of that of her brother. Article 183 states that the family could sign an agreement for dividing the inheritance after all of the heirs are aware of their share (*Kompilasi Hukum Islam, Impres, 1991*). But, Indonesian communities that enjoy an egalitarian culture, may interpret this Law differently from the majority literalists. The former will decide that all men and women should share an equal right in inheritance as long as all inheriting members agree (Subhan, 2008).

The progressive/contextualists who disagree with the literalist and moderate notions about inheritance, argue that the double portion for men and the single portion for women in the Qur’anic text was simply a tool to create justice in society at that time; and, that is a transitional text, not an absolute text (Subhan, 2008). Both men and women should share an equal portion of an inheritance; a woman or man
may even get a larger portion than the other depending upon the need (Musdah Mulia, 2005; Subhan, 2008). A number of NGOs and liberals in Muslim countries have called for equal inheritance rights, claiming that the different treatment on the basis of gender violates international human rights. However, a more progressive position is the common position, even taken by some Muslim women, that what God has ordained for shares cannot be changed (Siraj & Hilary, 2005).

5.3.5. Equal Value as A Witness

The religious texts that have been considered ‘misogynist’ by some Muslim scholars include those about the value of women as witnesses. In Al-Baqara (2): 282, the Qur’an literally states that a woman’s value as a witness is half that of a man. Verse 2:282 states:

O you who believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed period, write it down. Let a scribe write it down in justice between you. Let not the scribe refuse to write as Allah has taught him, so let him write. Let him (the debtor) who incurs the liability dictate, and he must fear Allah, his Lord, and diminish not anything of what he owes. But if the debtor is of poor understanding or weak, or is unable to dictate for himself, then let his guardian dictate in justice. And get two witnesses out of your own men. And if there are not two men (available), then a man and two women, such as you agree for witnesses, so that if one of them (two women) errs, the other can remind her... (Mohsin, 2011a, p. 1)

One Hadith narrated by Abu Said Al-Khudri in Shohih Bukhori (Book 6: Menstrual Periods No 301) also addresses the witness issue:

Narrated Abu Said Al-Khudri: Once Allah's Apostle went out to the Musalla (to offer the prayer) o 'Id-al-Adha or Al-Fitr prayer. Then he passed by the women and said, "O women! Give alms, as I have seen that the majority of the dwellers of Hell-fire were you (women)." They asked, "Why is it so, O Allah's Apostle?" He replied, "You curse frequently and are ungrateful to your husbands. I have not seen anyone more deficient in intelligence and religion than you. A cautious sensible man could be led astray by some of you." The women asked, "O Allah's Apostle! What is deficient in our
intelligence and religion?" He said, "Is not the evidence of two women equal to the witness of one man?" They replied in the affirmative. He said, "This is the deficiency in her intelligence. Isn't it true that a woman can neither pray nor fast during her menses?" The women replied in the affirmative. He said, "This is the deficiency in her religion" (Bukhari, 2011a, p. 6:301)

Like other gender issues, some Muslim scholars accept the literal meaning and implement it as law in Islamic jurisprudence: others reinterpret and even reject these texts because the ideas are contrary to other universal principles mentioned in the Qur’an and Hadith.

Literalists hold that whatever is stated in the Qur’an is law. Therefore, Muslims should follow the law in the Qur’an and Hadith, including on the matter of witnesses. Literalists accept the Qur’anic verse (2):282 states that men have a higher status than women because they have more intellectual capability, leadership ability, and rights than women. This verse is supported by An-Nisa (4):34 (about leadership) and the Hadith, i.e., that women have half of the intellectual capacity and also half of the religious value of men. Based on these literal interpretations, some textualist scholars, for example al-Asfhani from Iran, conclude that the value of two female witnesses is the same as that of one male witness (Ilyas, 2009). Ali Ahmad Jurhani in *Tafsir Al-Qur’an al-Karim*, (2:1), argues that the witness matter relates to the fact that men are considered more rational than women; conversely, women are more emotional than men (Departemen Agama, 1996).

Members of the moderate group according to Aziz (2002), Ilyas (2009), and Subhan (2008), criticise these texts saying that in the course of history, many Muslim women have been recognised as having more intellectual capability than men. For example, Aziz (2002) notes that ‘Aisyah, the Prophet Muhammad’s wife, is known as a woman narrator of half the Hadith from the Prophet Muhammad. They also argue that the witness text was revealed as a response to a business issue, e.g., trade
and debt of the time. Historically, not many women were good traders: most of them stayed at home doing domestic tasks; therefore, their experience in business matters did not equal that of men (Aziz, 2002; Ilyas, 2009; Subhan, 2008). Another reason is that the Hadith use the word “some of you” not “all of you”, meaning that not all women’s intellectual capacity is less than men’s (Al Fatih, 2003; Aziz, 2002). Therefore, the moderates conclude, that just one female witness is acceptable if she is capable or an expert on the issues under scrutiny.

Progressive scholars reject the witness Hadith and reinterpret the Qur’anic passages because the literalist interpretations are not in line with the universal values of the Qur’an. In addition, they are contradicted by the fact that throughout history many great women have achieved great reputations (Aziz, 2002). According to Subhan (2008), an Indonesian progressive Muslim woman, many Indonesian women have become actively involved in public life; so, clearly attributing only half the value of men to female witnesses is not acceptable. The progressives claim that the evidence supports the fact that both men and women can perform equally well intellectually; in Indonesian universities, for example, many of the best students are women (Martono & Mintarti; Resyalia, 2010). Asghar Ali Engineer argues that the witness texts are open to reinterpretation because they are only representative of women’s experience in business at that time (Engineer, 1994).

5.3.6. Symbolic Equality of Women in The Creation Story

Gender differences that afford men a higher status than women cannot be separated from the Muslim society’s beliefs regarding the creation of human beings. Like Judaism’s Torah and Christianity’s bible (Maxwell, 1994), Islam’s canonical text, the Qur’an, has a creation story in which the first human being was a man (Adam), who
was then followed by a woman (Eve/Hawwa). Among Muslims, the interpretation of the creation story has become controversial, particularly in regard to the issue of the order of the creation of woman. While some Muslim scholars believe the story implies that man and woman were created from different material, others say it implies that both man and woman were created from the same material and by the same process. Texts about creation of the first human beings are found in Hadiths related by Abu Hurairah as well as in the Qur’an:

An-Nisa (4): 1: O mankind! Be circumspect in keeping your duty to your Sustainers who created you (plural) from one being (nafsin wahidah) and spread from her (minha), her mate a (zaujahah) and spread from these two human beings many men and women (Hasan, 1999, p. 469).

Narrated by Abu Huraira, Allah's Apostle said: "The woman is like a rib; if you try to straighten her, she will break. So if you want to get benefit from her, do so while she still has some crookedness" (Bukhari, 2011d, p. 62:113).

Narrated by Abu Huraira, Allah's Apostle said: "Treat women nicely, for a woman is created from a rib, and the most curved portion of the rib is its upper portion, so, if you should try to straighten it, it will break, but if you leave it as it is, it will remain crooked. So treat women nicely" (Bukhari, 2011b, p. 55:548).

According to Najib (2009), there are three attitudes towards these Hadiths. First, literalist scholars say that they are shahih (authentic) and that their meaning suggests that woman was created from a man’s rib; as a result, woman is inferior to man. Scholars from the second group, who I categorise as moderates, argue that these texts are also shahih (authentic); but, the interpretation is different from that of the first group’s. As they interpret these Hadiths as a metaphor, it only means that a woman should be treated nicely and carefully. I have classified the last group of scholars, as progressives; employing a hermeneutic method, they argue that these Hadiths must be rejected because the meaning is not in accord with the basic values of the Qur’an, which stress the equality of all human beings. The Qur’an is the first
and highest source; so, the Hadith, as the second source, should not contradict the
spirit of the first source.

Najib (2009) argues that the first interpretation neither fits the Qur’anic
values nor the feminist argument that man and woman should be valued equally. As
regards the second group, although they interpret the texts differently using
metaphors, problematic implications persist. It means that because men and women
are different, they should be treated differently. But, although they should be treated
differently, this group seems, nevertheless to emphasise that although they are
different, they have the same status and rights.

Progressive scholars argue that the statement in the Hadith that claiming
woman was created from the rib of a man contradicts the Qur’anic statement in
verses An-Nisa (4), 5:1 and Al A’raf, (7):189 that man and woman were created
from the same kind of substance or from a single soul. In terms of understanding An-
Nisa (4):1, they analyse three terms that are of considerable importance: kholaqokum
(خلقكم), min nafsi wahidah (نفس مُوحدة); and, zaujaha (زوجها). The first means ‘I
create you’, and applies to either man or woman. In the Arabic language, kum can be
used for both man and woman. The second, min nafsi wahidah, means a single soul
or essence. According to Amina Wadud (1999), conceptually this term is neither
masculine nor feminine. She argues that these words were never used in the Qur’an
with reference to any created self other than human kind and that God never intended
to begin the creation of human kind with a male. Engineer (1994), agrees with
Wadud’s interpretation of this term emphasises that whatever its meaning, it
indicates that man and woman are from the same kind. The last, zaujaha, means
‘mate’, either male or female. The Qur’an makes no mention of Hawwa/Eve being
created from Adam’s rib, for it implies inferiority. The Qur’an never suggests that
Adam marked the beginning of the human race. Therefore, there is no discrimination against woman and her creation, according to this particular of interpretation.

Thus, clearly in the Qur’an there is no difference between the creation of men and women. However, it is unclear in the Hadiths reported by Al Bukhari and Al Muslim, who state: “A woman is like a crooked rib or she was created from a rib: it will break if you try to straighten it”. If one looks at these Hadiths again closely, they say that “a woman is created from a rib or a woman is like a rib.” It does not state that woman was created from man's rib. The ‘rib’ in these texts does not belong to somebody specific: nor does it belong to man or Adam. Therefore, it is inappropriate for people to interpret them by adding the terms ‘man's rib’ or ‘Adam's rib’ to these texts. Furthermore, these Hadiths were drawn from traditional works; so there is no guarantee that they indicate original Islamic teachings (Qibtiyah, 2006).

Abu Hurairah cites all of Hadith passages that talk about women’s creation: “[He] was a companion who was regarded controversial by many early Muslim scholars, including Abu Hanifah, a founder of the largest Sunni school of law” (Hasan, 1999, p. 473). Some transmitters of women’s creation Hadiths are considered to be single reporters and unreliable. As a result, “these Hadiths are gharib and daif (weak and the lowest grade of Hadith classification)” (Hasan, 1999, p. 473).

Historically, Islam is the latest monotheistic religion, after Judaism and Christianity. Christians are taught a popular story about Adam and Eve and their role in human creation (see Genesis 2:18–24). Therefore, according to Najib (2009), the Hadiths account of the creation of women may have been influenced by the dominant beliefs of the time. In addition, the prevailing patriarchal culture may also have impacted upon the Hadiths. Generally speaking, the Hadiths may be understood as
products of the culture of the time. But, culture change over time; so, people cannot simply take for granted a culture from the past as it appears from the vantage point of today’s cultures.

The purpose of women’s creation is not to serve man but to serve God. This duty is the same for men. Hasan (1999) states: “The Qur’an does not create a hierarchy in which men are placed higher than women. Nor does it pit men against women in an adversary relationship” (p. 109). Honourable people are not chosen based on their sex, nationality, skin colour, race and performance. God will consider people honourable based on their behaviour and faith in God and on how they treat other creatures. Therefore, it is not true that man has a higher position in the sight of God. The Qur’anic teachings say that men and women are absolutely equal: they are members of society and protectors of each other (the Qur’an At Taubah 9:72).

5.3.7. Polygamy

Polygamy is a plural marriage in which a man takes more than one wife, and lives with her over the same time period. Polygamy has been and continues to be practiced and recognised as lawful sexual behaviour in many regions, both before and after the time when the Islamic faith was revealed. Atman and Ginat (1996), quoting Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) data, show that the percentage of world cultures practicing polygamy in recent time is 77% (193 societies out of the 250 on which the HRAF have data). Monogamy is practiced in only 17% (43/250), and polyandry is just 1% (2/250). Therefore, polygamy does not only take place in Islamic societies but also in other cultures. For example, Khrisna in the Hindu legends had several hundred wives (Engineers, 2002). Even in contemporary U.S. society, until recent
times, polygamy is practiced in certain religious groups; for example, by adherents to
the Mormon religion faith (Atman & Ginat, 1996).

Within the Islamic community, polygamy is a controversial subject
centering women, one that invites some debate and research among Muslim
scholars. Some groups believe that polygamy is allowed in Islam because the Qur’an
sanctions it. On the other hand, some groups argue that the verses relating to
polygamy in the Qur’an are not instructions but limitations. Muslims who support
polygamy generally view women as objects, while those against it view women as
active subjects (Ilyas, 2002). Considering women as objects means that women are
seen as passive and as lacking the ability to make decisions for themselves. In cases
of polygamy, sometimes they become the sexual objects of their husbands.

The Qur’an discusses polygamy in Surah; An-Nisa (4): 3, 20, and 129. The
most commonly cited text containing a debate on polygamy is the Qur’anic passage
An-Nisa (4): 3

And if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphan-girls
then marry (other) women of your choice, two or three, or four; but if you
fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one or (the
slaves) that your right hands possess. That is nearer to prevent you from
doing injustice (Mohsin, 2011e, p. 1)

While there are several Hadiths that discuss polygamy, there are none that
actually instruct men to engage in polygamy. Some delineate its limitations and
restrictions (Qibtiyah, 2006). The first Hadith says: “Aisyah said that the Prophet
did not marry again when he lived together with Khadijah until she died” (Sahih
Muslim 2:371). The last Hadith, which advocates limitations of polygamy, reads as
follows:

Narrated by Al-Miswar bin Makhrama: I heard Allah's Apostle who was on
the pulpit, saying, "Banu Hisham bin Al-Mughira have requested me to allow
them to marry their daughter to Ali bin Abu Talib, but I don't give
permission, and will not give permission unless 'Ali bin Abi Talib divorces
my daughter in order to marry their daughter, because Fatima is a part of my
body, and I hate what she hates to see, and what hurts her, hurts me”(Bukhari,

The ways in which Islamist/literalists understand religious texts literally
shape their attitudes towards polygamy. They interpret An-Nisa (4): 3 to mean that
the original marriage law in Islam advocates polygamy and declares it compulsory. If
a man fears that he cannot be a just husband to all of his wives, only then it is good to
be monogamous (Islamy, 2009). According to Doorn-Harder (2006), the literalists
view polygamy as part of the beauty of Islamic teaching. They have declared their
support for early marriage and polygamy to prevent the sin of adultery. They have
tried to connect polygamy and early marriage to morality (Doorn-Harder, 2006) in
the belief that it is better for a man to have several wives than to engage in extra
marital sex with a prostitute. They also believe that it is being better to marry early
than to commit adultery (zina), because zina is one of the greatest sins against
marriage (which is honourable).

Another literal interpretation of the Qur’an regarding polygamy was written
by Jusuf Wibisono, who writes: “Polygamy is not only necessary in the case of an
excess of women; it is also an active means of contending against the social evils
rampant in Europe” (cited in Vreede-de Stuers, 1960, p. 107). This statement is the
key word for people who are against the feminist ideas that conflict with the West
and the East, Muslim and non-Muslim, Islamic and unIslamic. Literalists also believe
that polygamy texts were revealed to fulfil men’s sexual needs given their belief that
men are more sexually charged than women (Philip & Jameelah, 1999).

In Malaysia, in 2009, one literalist group, the Obedience Wife Club (OWC),
affiliated with Conservative Global Ikhwan. In 2011, this club launched a “polygamy
club” and a 115-page book titled *Islamic Sex, Fighting Jews to Return Islamic Sex to the World*. This group called upon Muslim husbands to have sex with all of their wives in the same time (France-Presse, 2011). Currently it has approximately 800 members in Malaysia, and branches in Singapore, Indonesia and Jordan (MacKinnon, 2011). In Indonesia, the OWC was founded by Dr Ing. Gina Puspita in June 2011 (Suryakusuma, 2011).

As regards polygamy, a moderate scholar like HAMKA, in his *Tafsir Al Azhar*, argued that polygamy is lawful under certain conditions, e.g., if the wife is infertile or cannot serve her husband sexually (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004; HAMKA; Yusuf, 2005). Polygamy is acceptable only when the husband can treat all wives and children psychologically and economically equally and justly as part of the main pre-requisite.

The Indonesian government’s position is closer to the moderate approach in its implementation of the polygamy law in the Family and Marriage Law no 1/1974, which states that a husband may practise polygamy but only with permission of the courts. This permission is granted based upon the following criteria: the wife cannot bear children; the wife is chronically sick or disabled; the wife cannot fulfil her ‘conjugal duties’. This law also decrees that polygamy may be practiced with the consent of the wife. This guarantees that the husband will fulfil all economic needs and that he will treat all of his wives and children justly (Mudzakir, 2005). Progressive scholars criticise the law as seemingly protecting women from discrimination resulting from polygamy; they claim it is gender-biased, ignores women’s rights, and attributes all of the faults to the wife. The law does not make any mention of the husband’s condition, e.g., if he is disabled and/or impotent or does not fulfil his obligations as a husband.
Therefore, it seems that polygamy is allowed because of the failure or fault of women (Qibtiyah, 2006).

According to Inayah Rohmaniyah (2002), although the law decrees that polygamy may only be practiced with the wife’s consent, this does not suggest that the wife has the real autonomy to object. Rohmaniyah stresses that in Indonesian society, most women are economically dependent upon their husbands. So, they may choose to endure a polygamous situation rather than be divorced and suffer economically. In addition, Islamic society considers divorce negatively. Thus, the wife will consent to her husband taking another wife because she has no other real choice.

Progressive scholars argue that polygamy is unacceptable because it is out of step with contemporary thought and like slavery (Prawiro, 2008), it creates more social problems than it solves, particularly for women and children (Mulia, 2004). According to progressive Muslim gender activists and scholars, the polygamy texts were a response to social problems; the Uhud battle left many unprotected orphans and widows. Nowadays, the situation of women, particularly of widows, is vastly different from those who lived in the Prophet Muhammad’s era. For example, today widows may remarry and be more economically and psychologically independent than before. So, locking them into polygamous marriages will do little to make their lives better. Clearly, polygamy is no longer an effective social justice institution to deal with women’s and children’s problems. The establishment of social justice institutions that focus on widows and orphans may be more helpful and less traumatic than exercising polygamy to deal with their problems (Qibtiyah, 2006; Qibtiyah & Susilaningsih, 2010).
According to Asikin (2003), after the Prophet Muhammad died, many Muslims practised and continue to practice polygamy; but, the number has decreased as polygamy in the Muslim communities has become less acceptable. Nowadays, many members of polygamous families, particularly children and wives, are not proud to be part of a polygamous family. A Muslim woman, who shared her experience with Asikin (2003) in a seminar on polygamy, said that although her father was a polygamist, he did not agree to his daughter having a polygamous husband. This suggests not only a certain perversity, but also that polygamy does not make someone proud. It defines women as objects and is an oppressive condition. Society negatively stigmatises polygamists in the belief that most polygamists practice polygamy for sexual reasons and creates many family problems. Most polygamists do not marry widows: the second or third wives are usually younger than the first. Sometimes, the first wife’s son may be older than his father’s second wife.

5.3.8. Equal Status of Women

Are there gender issues for Muslims vis-a-vis whether women and men are equal and, if so, in what way? Are they equal because they are the same; or, are women and men equal in their different but complementary roles? Basically, the answer are implicit in the debate between equal complementary and equal partnerships. As mentioned earlier, the phrase ‘equal complementary’ (setara tapi berbeda/saling melengkapi) captures the idea of difference or minimiser according to which men and women are equal but also different. Difference, however, does not suggest that one is higher or better than the other. This assumption tends to support the maintenance of traditional gender roles. In contrast, ‘equal partnership’ (setara) captures the idea of sameness or maximiser: men and women should have equal
access to resources, participate in equal opportunities to join in public and private activities, have equal access to power opportunities to make decisions, and get equal benefit from the decisions made. According to this orientation who is in charge of certain activities or who is in a certain position should not depend upon one’s sex (male or female) but on the person’s abilities. This is also in accordance with the sameness-difference debate or the minimiser – maximiser theory discussed in the introduction. Whereas the sameness or maximiser theory argues that women should be seen through a prism which emphasises their similarities to men, the difference or minimiser theory holds that women are fundamentally different from men (Bacchi, 1990; Bulbeck, 1998; C. A. MacKinnon, 1987; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993).

In the Islamic context, there are several religious texts with implications for assigning status to men and women. Literalists commonly cite An-Nisa (4): 34: “Men are the protectors and maintainers [Qowwam] of women, because Allah has made one of them to excel the other and because they spend (to support them) from their means” (Mohsin, 2011g, p. 1). They also cite Al-Baqara (2): 282:

O you who believe! When you contract a debt for [a] fixed period, write it down. Let a scribe write it down in justice between you. Let not the scribe refuse to write as Allah has taught him, so let him write. Let him (the debtor) who incurs the liability dictate, and he must fear Allah, his Lord, and diminish not anything of what he owes. But if the debtor is of poor understanding, or weak, or is unable to dictate himself, then let his guardian dictate in justice. And get two witnesses out of your own men. And if there are not two men (available), then a man and two women, such as you agree for witnesses, so that if one of them (the two women) errs, the other can remind her. And the witnesses should not refuse when they are called (for evidence). You should not become weary to write it (your contract), whether it be small or big, for its fixed term, which is more just with Allah; more solid as evidence, and more convenient to prevent doubts among yourselves, then there is no sin on you if you do not write it down. But take witnesses whenever you make a commercial contract. Let neither scribe nor witness suffer any harm, but if you do (such harm), it would be wickedness in you. So be afraid of Allah; and Allah teaches you. And Allah is the All-Knower of each and everything (Mohsin, 2011d, p. 1).
When discussing women’s status, they also cite Al Qur’an Al-Ahzab (33):33:
“And stay in your houses, and do not display yourselves like that of the times of ignorance” (Mohsin, 2011a, p. 1). As with others gender issues in Islam, Muslim scholars have different interpretation of women’s status based on these texts.

Literalist scholars maintain that men and women are different because men have a higher status than women. Men are physically stronger than women, intellectually smarter than women, religiously more religious than women, and sexually have more sexual drive than women (Departemen Agama, 1996; Ilyas, 2009; Najib, 2009). In the matter of creation, the first woman created (Eve) was created from a man’s rib (Adam); as a consequence, a man has a higher status than a woman, because Adam, the first human being was followed by Eve (Najib, 2009).

Unlike the literalists, moderate scholars argue than men and women are equal because they are complementary. They are equal in the eyes of God; but, they have different kodrat or God-given natures and so have different roles at home, in society and in ritual activities. The differences do not mean that one has a higher status than the other; the relationship is not hierarchical, but functional (Subhan, 2008). The different kodrat (God-given nature), is part of the uniqueness and strength of each sex. Therefore, one cannot say that one is less valued or makes a lesser contribution than the other, or vice versa (Nasif, 2001).

Along similar lines to the moderate group, progressive scholars argue that men and women are meant to enjoy an equal partnership. Not only should they be equal in the eyes of God but they should also have equal gender roles in the family, society and in ritual activities. Progressive scholars, aware of the fact that men and women are biologically different, claim that women have more reproductive tasks.
than men. But, this does not imply that women’s status is higher than men’s or vice versa (Mulia, 2005; Subhan, 2008).

5.3.9. Women’s Right to Lead Public Mixed-Gender Prayers (*Imam sholat*)

Notions of women’s leadership over men or mixed groups have sparked controversy among Muslim scholars. In the Indonesian context, it became an issue of great debate when Megawati Soekarno Putri ran for president in 2001. In Islamic teaching, as suggested previously, leadership is discussed in religious texts in An-Nisa (4):34 and a popular Hadith, for example: “It would not be happy for the people who handed their problems over to women's affairs” (Bukhari, p. 236). With reference to a female leading the prayers (*imam sholat*) of a mixed group, one famous Hadith from Imam Abu Daud and Ibn Hanbal legitimises this role for women, stating:

Narrated by Umm Waraqah daughter of Nawfal: When the Prophet (peace be upon him) proceeded for the Battle of Badr, I said to him: Apostle of Allah allow me to accompany you in the battle. I shall act as a nurse for patients. It is possible that Allah might bestow martyrdom upon me. He said: Stay at your home. Allah, the Almighty, will bestow martyrdom upon you. The narrator said: Hence she was called martyr. She read the Qur'an. She sought permission from the Prophet (peace be upon him) to have a *mu'adhdhin* in her house. He, therefore, permitted her (to do so) (Abu-Dawud, 2011, p. 2:0591; al-Asyats, 1952).

The Prophet Muhammad used to visit Umm Waraqah at her home, he chose the muezzin (pray caller) to her and told her to become the family *imam* for *sholat* in her home."Abdurrahman said: the muezzin is a man who was more senior"(al-Azim, p. 301).

In contrast, one Hadith narrated by Ibnu Majah (cited in Subhan, 2008) that prohibits women from leading mixed-gender prayer groups reads: “From Jabir bin Abdillah

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26 *Sholat* is a specific ritual or worship activity to God with certain actions and *do’a* accepted by all Muslims. These include the obligatory prayers (five times a day) and voluntarily prayers offered at certain times.
from the Prophet, he said: never choose a woman to be an imam sholat for men, Bedouin Arabs for Muhajirs, and bad person for the believers” (p. 126). While Muslim scholars interpret these texts differently, and many scholars agree that it is acceptable for women to be leaders of both men and women in secular contexts, very few consider permissible for women to lead men in prayer (i.e. be an imam sholat).

Literalist scholars, who interpret the leadership passage literally, argue that the Qur’an and Hadith state that a woman may not be a leader of men, especially as far as sholat is concerned. They link their decision with their belief that men have a higher status than women and are heads of their families because they are more capable than women both physically and psychologically (Departemen Agama, 1996; Ilyas, 2009; Najib, 2009). The MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/Indonesian Council of Ulema) had raised the issue of female leadership National meeting in 1998. Two decisions were reached: first, a woman cannot be a leader of men because women cannot be guardians. Their ability to be witnesses is not equal to men’s, and they lack of leadership ability; second, a woman may be a leader of men but only subject to strict requirements such as having a strong faith and devotion, strong personal integrity, being a good rule model in society and having good leadership skills (Mulia, 2005).

Moderate scholars argue that women may be leaders of men in all areas except sholat as long as they show leadership ability (as required by some of the MUI members above) (Mulia, 2005). They further argue that historically, in the early period of Islam, there was no model of a woman leading a mixed group of sholat. They studied the Umm Waraqah’s Hadith and concluded that the Hadith saying that Umm Waraqah was chosen by the Prophet Muhammad to be imam sholat for her
family was invalid and could not be used as a *hujjah* (reason to make a law/rule in *fiqh*) for women’s leadership of *sholat* (Al Fatih, 2003).

Adopting a different stance from other scholars, the progressives understand the leadership texts as arguing that women have the right to be leaders even in religious services (*sholat*). They may be *imams* and lead prayer services, for both adult males and/or mixed groups (Al Fatih, 2003; Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004; Subhan, 2008). According to Subhan (2008), both rejecting and supporting Hadiths for women *imams* are weak (*dhaif*), albeit the level of weakness is different. The Hadith that prohibits a female *imam* from leading adult men’s prayer, narrated by Ibnu Majah, is weaker than the Hadith that claim female *imam* of adult men’s prayer is legitimate narrated by Abu Dawud. Therefore, female *imams* leading the prayers of mixed groups or adult males can be used as a *hujjah* to make a law/rule in ritual activity. She further suggests that the important requirement for being an *imam sholat*, irrespective of gender, is having religious knowledge and being able to recite the Qur’an.

In 2010, the *Majelis Tarjeh Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah* (Legal Affairs Committee and Development of Islamic Thought National Board of Muhammadiyah) held a national discussion on this issue in Malang, East Java, at which the participants agreed that under certain conditions (e.g., when in remote areas or when a husband has just converted to Islam), a woman who is capable and knowledgeable may serve as an *imam sholat* for adult males if there is no capable and knowledgeable male available (Qibtiyah & Susilaningsih, 2010).
Summary

In the preceding pages, I have documented the diversity of thought among Muslim intellectuals on gender issues in the light of their faith. I have also reviewed several approaches to categorising different kinds of exegesis pertinent to gender, and introduced the schema I will use in the following chapter. It becomes clear that ‘literalist’ and ‘progressive’ scholars evince the most strongly contrasting views on gender issues in Islam. ‘Moderates’ present their views relatively flexibly: sometimes their views match those of the literalists: sometimes they align closely with the progressives. Based on their views and the argument they mount, moderates’ and progressives’ views seem close to the stance adopted by many Western feminists. For a brief summary of the positions of all nine selected gender issues, from three different perspectives, see Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Issues</th>
<th>Literalist</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Progressive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality of gender roles in the home and workplace (Equal Gender Roles)</td>
<td>Women’s <em>kodrat</em> (God-given nature) is best expressed by being at home, doing domestic work and raising a child, whereas men’s <em>kodrat</em> is properly expressed in public and by earning money. Therefore, it is not appropriate for a husband to do domestic tasks such as washing, ironing, cooking,</td>
<td>Islamic teaching prioritises women’s domestic roles and requires women to have a major role in bringing up the children; however, a woman can work outside of the home but it is not necessary to develop her career because her main responsibility should be in the domestic sphere. Women earn money for additional income.</td>
<td>Childbirth and breastfeeding are women’s <em>kodrat</em> (natural or inborn qualities), whereas raising a child and doing housework are socially constructed. Therefore, gender roles and domestic tasks can be done by either men or women. Both men and women should be encouraged to take their place in the public and domestic spheres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Explanation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Dishes and Child Care</td>
<td>A wife must not reject her husband’s sexual advances because that is what is decreed in Islamic texts.</td>
<td>Men and women have equal rights to sexual pleasure and expression; but, the husband’s sexual needs should be prioritised before the wife’s. A wife may reject her husband’s request to have sexual intercourse as long as there is a rational reason for her rejection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Power to Make Decisions in Family Life</td>
<td>Only the husband/father has the right to make decisions in the family, because he is the head of the family.</td>
<td>Every family member has equal right to make decision in the family depending on their capability and capacity. A man or woman can be a leader of a family depending on their ability to lead. In the Indonesian context, head of family (<em>kepala keluarga</em>) is no longer relevant.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Rights to Inheritance</td>
<td>Men should have a double portion whereas women should have a single portion of inheritance because a man is the main breadwinner in the family.</td>
<td>Both a woman and a man should inherit an equal portion according to whoever needs more, regardless of gender, because today many women have the same responsibilities as the main male breadwinner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of Sexual Rights</td>
<td>A wife must not reject her husband’s sexual advances because that is what is decreed in Islamic texts.</td>
<td>Men and women have equal rights to sexual pleasure and expression. A couple can discuss and communicate when deciding what kinds of sexual expression they want.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Value as a Witness</td>
<td>It is proper that one male witness is equal to two females in Islamic law because men are smarter than women.</td>
<td>One female witness is acceptable if she is capable or an expert on the relevant issues. In history, many Muslim women were recognised as having more intellectual capability than men.</td>
<td>Men and women are equally capable of being witnesses. In the Indonesian context, within which many women become actively involved in public life, the proportion that two female witnesses equal one male is not acceptable. The spirit of women’s witness Hadith contradicts the basic values of the Quran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic equality of women in the creation story</td>
<td>According to the texts, woman was created from man’s rib.</td>
<td>Woman was created from man’s ribs is only an analogy.</td>
<td>Men and women were created from the same essence. The spirit of the creation of women Hadith contradicts with the basic value in the Quran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polygamy</td>
<td>To have more than one wife is natural because men are naturally polygamous and women are naturally monogamous. The original Islamic teaching is of marriage as polygamous.</td>
<td>Polygamy is acceptable only where the conditions of the universal concepts of justice prevail such as protecting orphans and widows.</td>
<td>Polygamy is unacceptable right now because it is out of date with the present time and causes lots of problems. The principle marriage in Islam is monogamy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Status of Women</td>
<td>Men enjoy a higher status than women because many Islamic texts tell about men’s privileges such as leadership,</td>
<td>Men and women are complementary. They have different kodrat and roles but these differential matters are to be used to undermine others.</td>
<td>Men and women are equal. Allah create them from the same essence therefore they have equal roles in domestic and public lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s right to lead public mixed-gender prayers (imam sholat)</td>
<td>Women cannot be leaders of men according to the religious texts.</td>
<td>Women can be leaders of men as long as they have the capability to lead, strong personal integrity, are good role models in the society. But, they cannot lead mixed-gender sholat.</td>
<td>Women can be leaders of adult men if they have the capability. This includes in sholat. The important requirement for being imam sholat is the knowledge and reciting of the Qur’an, irrespective of gender.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON THE PSWS/PSG ACTIVISTS’ UNDERSTANDINGS OF ISLAMIC TEACHINGS ON GENDER

Introduction

Following my discussion of the contentious gender issues in the wider Indonesian intellectual Muslim community in Chapter Five, Chapter Six analyses the understandings of gender issues amongst Indonesian Muslim gender activists and scholars at Yogyakarta universities. In considering these cases, this chapter shows not only the different views that those associated with PSWs/PSG hold about gender in Islam, but also the arguments they mount for their positions.

My analysis focuses on three main ways of approaching religious texts: the so-called ‘literalist’, moderate and ‘progressive’ approaches. People adopting a literalist approach tend to interpret religious texts literally; on the other hand, a progressive understands said texts contextually and applies a hermeneutical approach. Between the two lies moderate thought, which interprets religious texts inconsistently, sometimes using the textual/literal approach and at others - or for other issues - using the contextual approach. The different sexes (male and female) and people with different university affiliations (public and Islamic university) will be compared when analysing the data. I will indicate the gender issues male and female respondents from public and Islamic universities tended to agree upon and gender issues about which they generally held different and contrasting views.

My analysis in this chapter is based upon the responses from PSWs/PSG people at six universities in Yogyakarta. One hundred and sixty-five participated in my short-answer survey and 25 in my in-depth interviews. My analyses of the data reveal substantial disagreement amongst Indonesian Muslim gender activists and scholars at universities over many gender issues, although the majority adopted a progressive approach to most issues. In each of these sections, and for every issue, I
will present the variability of responses to the short-answer questions and then present material from the in-depth interviews which reveals why the participants adopted their various positions.

I will first review responses to the issues on which almost all respondents took a progressive approach namely equality in gender roles, equality of sexual expression, and equality in decision-making in the family. Second, I will review the responses to the issues towards which a high percentage adopted a progressive approach but a relatively substantial percentage endorsed a non-progressive position. These issues include of equal rights to inheritance, equal value as a witness, and the creation of the first woman. Third, I will present my findings on the gender issues of polygamy and the status of women in general which divided respondents fairly equally between progressive and non-progressive views. Finally, I will review the responses to the one issue on which the majority held a moderate position: women’s leadership of prayers/sholat (imam sholat).

6.1. Issues Eliciting Almost All Progressive Responses

Respondents tended to be progressive regarding gender issues that are not taken to religious court and not related to ritual activities. Even concerning one issue, i.e., the Hadith that clearly advocates equal sexual expression between husband and wife, respondents tended to be progressive. Other gender issues, to which almost all respondents took a progressive approach, were equal gender roles and equal power to make decisions in the family. This section will discuss respondents’ responses to all of the above gender issues. The presentation of survey data will first list the answers of all of the respondents. This will be followed by a comparison of the percentages of the different sexes and of those with different types of university affiliation. The
results of the in-depth interviews vis-a-vis each gender issue will be presented, and the reasons for the progressive, moderate and literalist positions of the respondents explained.

6.1.1. Equality of Gender Roles in the Home and Workplace

My survey data reveals that gender roles in the home and workplace were not contentious among people in the PSWs/PSGs. Almost all of the respondents agreed that both men and women should have equal place in public and domestic life. However, examination of the detailed data revealed a variety of different views of this gender issue based on gender and university affiliations, although the difference was not significant. In contrast, in the in-depth interviews, respondents provided mixed responses. Even the progressives evinced contrasting views on gender roles, especially when discussing who should accept the main responsibility for being pencari nafkah (breadwinner).

Before exploring the debate about the concept of nafkah\textsuperscript{27} (i.e., obligation of giving a living for the family) among gender activists and scholars at universities, I will first present my survey data pertaining to gender roles in the public and domestic spheres. Table 6 shows that almost all of the respondents (95.8\%) took a progressive position regarding gender roles in the home and workplace. Only one respondent (0.6\%) advocated a literalist approach. Comparing people with different gender or university affiliation, Table 6 shows that overall there was no significant difference in their views on gender roles. However, female respondents showed a slightly higher percentage of progressive and literalist responses than male respondents.

\textsuperscript{27}Nafkah includes food expenses, accommodation, security and protection to the family.
Table 6: Respondents’ Understandings of Equality of Gender Roles in the Home and Workplace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents’ understandings of the equality of gender roles in the home and workplace in Islam</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>University Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (N=70)</td>
<td>Female (N=95)</td>
<td>Islamic (N=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>It is not appropriate for a husband to do domestic tasks such as laundry, ironing, cooking, washing dishes and child care.</td>
<td>0.%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
<td>0.%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>A woman may work but it is not necessary to develop her career because her main responsibility should be in the domestic sphere</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Both men and women should be encouraged to have a place in the public and domestic spheres.</td>
<td>94.29%</td>
<td>96.84%</td>
<td>95.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Sample T Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>t = .397</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed) = .692</th>
<th>Confidence level 95%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University Affiliation</td>
<td>t = .056</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) = .955</td>
<td>Confidence level 95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Thesis author’ compilation

I will now discuss how people explained their positions in the in-depth interviews. Related to the issue of equal gender roles in public and domestic life was the issue of who should be the main breadwinner. This is one of the particularly contentious gender issues in Islam. Even among Muslim gender activists and scholars whose responses tended towards the progressive, a variety of understandings were revealed in the in-depth interviews. The different views about who is the main breadwinner (pencari nafkah) among progressive people hinged upon the fact that women are biologically different from men. Reproductive tasks such as pregnancy and breast feeding cannot be undertaken by men. Thus, one position taken was that women’s reproductive tasks need to be given special attention. Therefore, she should not be burdened with responsibility to be main breadwinner. On the other hand, some
respondents pointed out, that reproductive tasks are negotiable and can be managed. Thus, by involving men in reproductive tasks and domestic tasks, women will be doubly burdened.

Although all of the respondents were employed at universities as lecturers, researchers or other staff, they had different ideas about the concept of who is the main breadwinner. Some argued that nafkah (food expenses, accommodation, security and protection to the family) is the responsibility of both men and women, others that nafkah is the man’s responsibility.

Some respondents, who expressed a progressive view, argued that both the husband and wife have the same responsibility to be breadwinners; but, the responsibility will be flexible given that the wife’s reproductive tasks cannot be undertaken by her husband. This means that if a wife is engaged in reproductive tasks such as pregnancy or breast feeding, then the main responsibility for nafkah must be borne by husband. Permata and Rama argued that the involvement of both partners as breadwinners is not rigid but should be flexible:

I think women’s kodrat is not a barrier for a woman to get involved in contributing to the family income as long as there is cooperation from her husband to be involved in the consequences of reproduction and other domestic tasks. For example, when the wife breast feeds at night the husband helps her to prepare food if she needs some (Permata, interview, 22 June 2010).

In my opinion, ideally both partners have the same responsibility for earning nafkah … because for me women’s kodrat such as pregnancy is negotiable and socially constructed, although in society many people believe that it is the man’s responsibility and therefore, he has more chance and authority to contribute financially to the family. For me, this is not the ideal condition … (Rama, interview, 11 June 2010).

According to Ita, a female respondent from a public university, the family will get more benefit if both the husband and wife contribute to the family income. In
this way, the economic burden will be alleviated particularly as in the current
situation the prices of basic necessities have increased significantly. Therefore, if
both parties have paid jobs the family will have more healthy food (Ita, interview, 27
May 2010). Another female respondent Tria (interview, 20 May, 2010) argued that a
dual breadwinner family will enjoy advantages for both the husband and the wife.
For the husband, in the competitive era of today, sometimes it will be difficult to find
a good job; so, if the wife shares the responsibility to fulfil the family’s needs, the
husband will be relieved of this burden and stress. Perhaps more importantly from a
gender perspective, for the wife, it erases the notion that the economic contribution
of a woman to the family is not simply an additional or complementary income. She
can be considered a main breadwinner in her own right, creating a balance in the
relationship and assuming an equal share of power in the family.

Moderate respondents argued that nafkah is the man’s responsibility because
women have difficult and complex reproductive tasks. If a woman has the same duty
as a man to earn money, it will be a double burden for her. For example, Sita, a
female respondent from an Islamic university claimed that nafkah is a man’s
obligation because:

In the Qur’an it [nafkah] is the husband’s responsibility because in Al
Baqoroh ... Islam recognises women’s reproductive tasks ... the fundamental
values which in nafkah is designed to support them. If a wife earns money, it
is for herself normatively ... in society the problem is not about nafkah but the
logical consequences behind that. People often say that nafkah is the
husband’s duty then as a consequence, he must be obeyed and have absolute
authority ... this is the logic of capitalism. When the Qur’an states nafkah, it is
as a reminder that the reproductive tasks for a woman are very hard, so she
does not need to earn nafkah ... actually, the Qur’an does not state that it is an
obligation (wajib) or not, it emphasises that earning nafkah for the husband is
equal to reproductive tasks for the wife. It does not mean that just because he
earns nafkah he automatically becomes head of the family. For me it is not
the case (Sita, interview, 3 June 2010).
Some literalist respondents argued that the main responsibility of the husband/father was to provide *nafkah* because it is part of his duty. If a wife or a mother earns money, then the money is only considered as additional or complementary *nafkah* for the family. A woman’s main duty is not to earn money but to take care of the children and doing the domestic tasks. For example, Joko (interview, 24 May 2010), a male respondent from an Islamic university, reported that *nafkah* is the husband’s obligation and that if the wife earns money, it is part of her *shodagoh* (charity) to the family. Hary a male respondent from a public university, asserted that the husband has to fulfil the needs of his wife and children (Hary, interview, 2 June 2010). Laila, a female respondent from a public university, said that *nafkah* is a man’s obligation because:

Physically a man is stronger to work and to deal with problems in the work place. He also has more freedom in the community than a woman. In Islam, a woman has to get her husband’s consent to go out in public … if a woman goes to paid work then the money belongs to her, it is not a *nafkah* for her family although in fact there are many working women who spend their money on their families. So, a woman’s salary is a woman’s by right ... it depends on her how and for what the money will be spent (Laila, interview, 3 June 20110).

### 6.1.2. Equality of Sexual Rights

Equality of sexual rights between the husband and the wife were not contentious among gender activists and scholars at PSWs/PSG. Almost all of them agreed that men and women have equal rights to sexual pleasure and expression. Both males and females posited almost a similar percentage from the progressive approach. However, in the in-depth interviews, respondents presented different arguments to justify their views. A comparison of people from different university backgrounds showed that more people in public universities than in Islamic universities expressed
a moderate viewpoint: men and women have equal rights to sexual pleasure and expression, but the husband’s sexual need should be prioritised before the wife’s.

Table 7:
Respondents’ Understanding of Equality of Sexual Rights between Husband and Wife

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents understandings of equality of sexual rights between husband and wife in Islam</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>University Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=70)</td>
<td>(N=95)</td>
<td>(N=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>A wife must not reject her husband’s sexual advances.</td>
<td>0.%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
<td>0.%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Men and women have equal rights to sexual pleasure and expression; but, the husband’s sexual needs should be prioritised over the wife’s.</td>
<td>4.29%</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Men and women have equal rights to sexual pleasure and expression.</td>
<td>95.71%</td>
<td>95.79%</td>
<td>97.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Sample T Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>t = 0.266</th>
<th>t = 1.188</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>= .790</td>
<td>= .239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence level</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Thesis author’s compilation

Before presenting people’s justification of their positions, I will show my survey data on the equality of sexual rights and expression. Overall, more than 95% of respondents advocated a progressive position. Comparing the sub groups, Table 7 shows that men and women did not provide significantly different responses: nor did people from the different types of universities (secular vs Islamic) (Sig. (2-tailed) = .790 and .239) regarding equal sexual rights. The percentage of progressive position was almost the same as between male respondents (95.71%) and female respondents (95.79%). Although almost all of the respondents from Islamic and public universities took the progressive approach, they showed slightly different
percentages on this particular gender issue. Respondents from Islamic university accounted for 97.14% and those from public universities for 93.33%. In the literalist category, no respondents affiliated to Islamic universities advocated this position: only 1.67 per cent of respondents from public universities took this position. This means that more people in public universities than in Islamic universities opined that a wife must not reject her husband’s sexual advances.

I will now explain respondents’ justification of their positions regarding the issue of sexual rights between men and women expresses in the in-depth interviews. Although my survey data shows that most of the respondents agreed that men and women have equal right to sexual pleasure and expression, the justification they gave differed. To elicit their understandings of this issue, I asked them for their interpretation of the Hadith regarding the sexual relationships between a husband and a wife. The Hadith says that if the husband wants to have sexual intercourse and the wife rejects the husband’s demand then an angel will curse the wife until the morning. In general, the answers they gave revealed that some respondents did not agree with this Hadith while others agreed, but provided different explanations.

Zaki and Abdullah, two progressive respondents, argued that the Hadith should be interpreted based on the principle of an equal relationship. Zaki explained:

We cannot take this Hadith literally. It emphasises the importance of a harmonious relationship between the husband and the wife. It is not only about the husband’s needs but also the wife’s needs...if the wife asks her husband and he rejects her without any appropriate reason then it [curse] also happens to the husband. The message of this Hadith is not to hurt each other (Zaki, interview, 27 May 2010).

Abadullah said:

We have to understand this Hadith contextually...a sexual relationship between husband and wife should be based on mutual willingness...and an equal relationship...one day when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers came back from the war, he asked his followers not to go directly home but to
stay for a while and asked one of his followers to send a message to their wives that their husbands have almost reached the home, so they can prepare for him by cutting their ‘hair’. On another occasion, the Prophet also instructed a man not to have [ejaculation] before fulfilling his wife sexual needs (Abdullah, interview, 22 May 2010).

Some moderate respondents agreed with the Hadith albeit conditionally. Joko (interview, 24 May 2010) believed the Hadith to be true; but, if the wife was having her period or feeling unwell, she could reject sexual intercourse with her husband, because both wife and husband should enjoy the sexual pleasure equally. If only one of them find it enjoyable, it will hurt his/her spouse. Mimi (interview, 16 June 2010) observed that if a husband forces the wife to have sexual intercourse, he is a *dzolim* (oppressor). Permata commented:

> It is the husband’s right to be served by the wife but at the same time it is his responsibility to understand his wife’s condition such as if the wife is fatigued or psychologically not ready…so for me if the husband still forces his wife to have sex with him I think it is not an equal relationship (Joko, interview, 24 June 2010).

Laila, one of the literalist respondents, agreed with the Hadith, claiming that rejection of sexual intercourse without any rational reason could negatively impact on both parties. She further argued that it is a husband’s privilege to have his sexual needs served by his wife:

> In terms of a sexual relationship between the husband and the wife, both of them have rights and obligation to each other. But as a wife the Hadith indicates that she must serve her husband in any condition whether she likes or not … because if the husband’s sexual need is delayed it will cause a negative impact … in the Qur’an it states that your wife is as a garment for you, and you are as a garment for her ... it is not about a sexual relationship but it is about keeping dignity … between the couple ... so, that verse in the Qur’an does not have any relationship with that Hadith (Laila, interview, 3 June 2010).
6.1.3. Equal Power to Make Decisions in the Family Life

Equal power to make decisions in the family involving all family members was not contentious among PSWs/PSG. Almost all of the respondents agreed with the progressive approach, namely that every family member, father, mother, and children have the right to make decisions based on each one’s competency. Seeking their views of this issue I questioned them regarding the concept of a *kepala keluarga* (the head of family) in the in-depth interviews. Progressives offered arguments and explanations about the concept of *kepala keluarga* that differed from other positions taken.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents understandings of equal power to make decision in family life in Islam</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>University Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (N=70)</td>
<td>Female (N=95)</td>
<td>Islamic (N=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
<td>0.%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>Only a husband or father has the right to make decisions.</td>
<td>4.29%</td>
<td>0.%</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>It would be better if a husband/father has the right to make decisions in the public sphere and a wife/mother has the right to make decisions in the domestic sphere.</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Every family member, father, mother, and children have the right to make decisions based on each one’s competency.</td>
<td>92.86%</td>
<td>95.79%</td>
<td>95.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Independent Sample T Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>t = -.807</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed) = .21</th>
<th>Confidence level 95%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 1.029</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) = .307</td>
<td>Confidence level 95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Thesis author’ compilation
Before presenting the different arguments people mounted regarding kepala keluarga, I will first show the survey data on making decisions in the family. In respect to the two previous gender issues, that are, equal gender role and sexual right, almost all respondent (94.55%) took a progressive position (see Table 8) on making equal decisions in the family. However, close examination of Table 8 reveals a different percentage for progressive men and women. The percentage of female respondents taking the progressive positions was higher (95.79%) than male respondents (92.86%). There were also differences between people from public and Islamic universities. Fewer respondents from public universities than Islamic universities adopted moderate and progressive approaches (public universities = 2% moderate and 93% progressive: Islamic universities = 4% moderate and 95% progressive).

Having presented the quantitative data, I will now present the qualitative data from the in-depth interviews. The concept of kepala keluarga is related to gender issues, i.e., equal right to make decisions regarding the family. I will show (1) few progressive responses; (2) a moderate response; and (3) a literalist response.

Some progressive respondents asserted that the family does not need a head because in reality many families are managed by all family members. Both men and women can be heads of families, depending upon their capabilities and the commitment among family members. Wira, a male respondent from an Islamic university, stated:

The prophet Muhammad said that if you are in a group or travelling choose a leader. In my understanding, the head of family ... can be someone who can give guidance ... and for me it could be a man or a woman ... for example, in prayer the first requirement is Aklamuhulfi ilmissolah, who has more
knowledge in prayer, ... so the head of family is still relevant ... and it is functional not hierarchical (Wira, interview, 8 May 2010).

According to Gizela, a female respondent from an Islamic university, the concept of head of family itself needs to be reconstructed:

What does it mean being the head of the family? ... if it means someone who has a role as a decision maker, then it is not necessarily single but can be collective. In an Indonesian context, there are many single parents, therefore it is not relevant if the head of the family is a man (Gizela, interview, 25 May 2010).

Some moderate respondents argued that if in the government system the family should have a head of family then it is only a formal administration and not hierarchical rather just functional. Ana, a female respondent from a public university stated:

It does not matter that a man is the head of the family ... because it is appropriate according to the state, I just want to follow the state rule ... but if there is no man then a woman can be the head of family ... the head of the family is functional not hierarchical (Ana, interview, 1 June 2010).

Mimi, a literalist female respondent from an Islamic university argued that the head of a family should be a man:

For me, a man as the head of the family is still relevant because that is the rule ... one of the jobs of the head of the family is making decisions for the family ... if he could not make decisions for psychological reasons such as having mental disorder, then the job can be transferred to his wife ... the husband is the leader and the wife is the manager (Mimi, interview, 16 June 2010).

6.2. Issues Eliciting High Progressive but Substantial non-Progressive Responses

In this section, I will discuss the issues to which there were not only high percentages of progressive responses, but also substantial numbers of non-progressive responses. Those gender issues included equal rights to inheritance, equal value as a witness, and the creation of the first woman. Two of these issues involve the religious court
should there be dispute about such matters. The significance of this will be discussed in the interpretation of findings. But, I noted that respondents tended to be careful when passing their opinions on gender issues that related to the religious court. As in the previous section, I will first present the survey results, showing the responses of all of the respondents. Then I will compare the views of male and female respondents, and of people from the different types of universities. This will be followed by presentation of the results of the in-depth interviews.

6.2.1 Equal Rights to Inheritance

Inheritance is one of the gender issues that evoked a range of responses other than just progressive. Respondents’ views on equal rights to inheritance between men and women were predominantly progressive-oriented followed by moderate and literalist orientation. Compare with other literalist approaches to gender issues in Islam, inheritance accounted for the highest percentage. Despite the fact that most of the respondents viewed the right to inheritance for men and women as equal, or the inheritance being divided based on need rather than gender, a 2:1 distribution of inheritance between men and women was acceptable to the literalists. The in-depth interviews revealed the contrasting arguments people voiced on inheritance.

I will now present the quantitative results regarding inheritance before exploring the various arguments people proposed to support their positions. As seen in Table 9, more than half of all respondents adopted a progressive approach to the distributing of inheritance equally regardless of gender (57%): nearly one third took a more qualified (moderate) approach (29.1%), suggesting that other types of charity should be found for women in cases where men receive a double portion and women
receive a single portion. The remainder (13.9%) assumed the literalist position, arguing that men should receive a double portion and women a single portion.

Table 9:
Respondents’ Understanding of Equal Rights to Inheritance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents’ understandings of equal rights to inheritance in Islam</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>University Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (N=70)</td>
<td>Female (N=95)</td>
<td>Islamic (N=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>Men should receive a double portion whereas women should receive a single portion in inheritance.</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>16.84%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Because men should be given a double portion of inheritance and women a single portion, other types of charity should be found for women</td>
<td>31.43%</td>
<td>27.37%</td>
<td>31.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Women should inherit portion equal to that of a man (or whoever needs more) regardless of gender.</td>
<td>58.57%</td>
<td>55.79%</td>
<td>55.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% 100% 100% 100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Sample T Test</td>
<td>t = .856 Sig. (2-tailed) = .393 Confidence level 95%</td>
<td>t = -.260 Sig. (2-tailed) = .795 Confidence level 95%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Thesis author’ compilation

A propose of sub groups, Table 9 shows that, in general, there was no significant difference in response to the issue of inheritance by male and female heirs when the responses of men and women were aggregated. However, close examination of Table 9 reveals small differences between male and female respondents on this issue. Table 9 shows that in the case of the progressives, the male respondents’ percentage (58.57%) was slightly higher than that of the female respondents (55.79%). A similar trend was shown in the moderate position: male respondents accounted for a slightly higher percentage than female respondents. This
result implies that more male respondents agreed with the equal distribution of inheritance than female respondents. Conversely, more female respondents considered that men should receive a double portion whereas women should receive a single portion only. Comparing people from different types of universities the Table 10 shows slight differences between respondents from the two types of universities, i.e., public and Islamic. The percentage of literalist and progressive respondents from Islamic universities was slightly less than of those from public universities.

I will now discuss how people explained and justified their arguments vis-à-vis inheritance in Islam in the in-depth interviews. Almost all of the respondents argued that the important value of inheritance involves how to uphold \textit{adl} (justice). But, respondents had different views of understanding justice. I will first show a few progressive responses, then moderate responses and lastly the literalist responses.

Some progressive respondents argued that the different distributions of inheritance between men and women in the contemporary Indonesian context do not portray the justice value of Islam. In addition they argued that the important thing was \textit{adl} (justice), not the portion itself. Most of them took a progressive approach i.e., that men and women should inherit equally or that an inheritance should be divided based on need, regardless of gender. The following views expressed by Tria, Aisyah and Abdullah respectively.

Tria explained that although the Qur’an clearly states two portions for men and one for women, this cannot be implemented in the current situation.

There are many cases in the family that a man is richer than his sister ... if a woman receives a half portion compare his brother, it will cause her to become poorer and vulnerable. I think it is not fair, because he is a man he gets double compared to his sister. For me, in Islam the basic value is justice and care for the needy. I imagine that the inheritance text was revealed to
respond to the context at that time when women were part of the property, therefore they did not inherit property; from their parents even they are part of inheritance itself (Tria, interview, 20 May 2010).

Asiyah argued in favour of a double portion for men ‘at that time’ because there was a reason for it. Today there is no any reason to divide an inheritance differently between men and women. Because both men and women have the same opportunities the inheritance should be divided equally (Aisyah, interview, 23 June 2010). Abdullah’s response was different. He argued that two portions for men and one for women was not fair because in the current situation both men and women are responsible for earning nafkah.

This is an interesting issue. For me, the inheritance text in the Qur’an is part of Madaniyah [revealed in Madinah]; therefore it can be contextualised with current situation ... it is not fixed verse ... in reality when in the family both men and women contribute earning nafkah then the number also should be changed because division 2:1 comes from the reality that a man is the only a breadwinner at that time ... also many ulamas in different Islamic schools of thought have different interpretation of inheritance distribution. It means that the inheritance text can be contextualised (Abdullah, interview, 22 May 2010).

Two examples of respondents who adopted a moderate position were Darma and Permata. The former argued that although the religious text states two portion for men and a single portion for women, in reality it can be interpreted in different ways based on certain circumstance in the family.

In my understanding, theologically Allah and the Prophet have reason that might be Muslim couldn’t understand why women got a half inheritance to men. I try to understand what Allah thinks about inheritance. For me ... we could still implement 2:1 but we have to raise an awareness to share property to the one who needs most. Secondly, my interpretation is the parents should divide inheritance equally between men and women and ask their sons to feel that they got double ... that’s what happened in my family (Darma, interview, 9 May 2010).
Permata, a female respondent from an Islamic university, argued that the Islamic system of philanthropy placed very good value on inheritance. Unfortunately, this particular Islamic system is not implemented well in Indonesia.

Long time ago in the Prophet Muhammad era, if there was a widow, her brother or her uncle will fulfil her basic need; therefore, although women got a single portion it was not a problem, because there is somebody helping her to fulfil her basic needs ... but this system does not exist anymore. As a result, it seems that Islamic law on inheritance 2:1 is not fair ... I will tell my case in my family. My oldest brother yelled at all heirs to ask his portion double compared to female heirs. But then I asked him to be responsible in nafkah to my older sister who was a widow until she got married again. My oldest brother did not agree with this idea. Then, the inheritance was divided equally between men and women in my family based on consensus among family members (Permata, interview, 22 June 2010).

Some examples of literalist respondents who agreed to two portions for male heirs and one for female heirs were presented by Laila and Maman. Laila, a female respondent from a public university, stated:

Men have a double portion in inheritance compared to women, so the heir members should negotiate and give other types of charity for women. The negotiation is in the best interests of all heir members. For example, if a female heir is poor and a male heir is rich, the inheritance should be given to the female heir with no force. But, if the male heir does not want to share or give inheritance he possessed, it is his right (Laila, interview, 3 June 2010).

Maman, a male respondent from an Islamic university explained that 2:1 portion is equal because if it is combined in the family, the husband gets two portions from his family and the wife gets one portion from her family: then the result is 3 portions. So, two portions for male heirs and one portion for female heirs is equal (Maman, interview, 5 May 2010).
6.2.2. Equal Value as a Witness

The responses regarding witness as part of gender issues were high variable. Respondents’ views on equal value as a witness between men and women markedly leaned towards the progressive position, namely that of men’s and women’s equal value as witnesses. However, examination of the quantitative results showed a significant difference in percentages between respondents from secular and Islamic universities. The views of people from public universities were more progressive than those from Islamic universities. The reason may have been related to views regarding the unpopular Hadith about witness held by people from public universities and revealed in the in-depth interviews.

Before reviewing the different arguments that people proposed regarding the issue of witness in the in-depth interviews, I will present the quantitative data from my survey. Table 10 shows that the majority (67%) of respondents evinced a progressive view of the equality of witnesses. Although the highest percentage favoured a progressive approach, the percentage of other approaches was still substantial, almost more than a third of total respondents. A comparison of male and female views revealed that overall there was a substantially different percentage among those who favoured a moderate approach (male respondents 31.43%; female respondents 16.84%). In contrast, more female respondents adopted a progressive position (72.63%) than male respondents (60%).

Comparing people from different universities, Table 10 shows that although the majority of respondents from both Islamic and public universities took the progressive approach, there were significant differences in the percentages on witness (t = -2.455 and Sig. (2-tailed) = .015). As regards the literalist and moderate approaches, the percentages of respondents affiliated to Islamic universities almost
doubled those of affiliates to public universities. A considerably higher percentage of respondents from public universities (80%) adopted a progressive position than those from Islamic universities (60%).

Table 10:
Respondents’ Understandings of Equal Value of Males and Females as Witnesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents’ understandings of equal value of witnesses in Islam</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>University Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (N=70)</td>
<td>Female (N=95)</td>
<td>Islamic (N=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>Should one male witness equal two female witnesses in Islamic law.</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
<td>11.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>One female witness is acceptable if she is capable or an expert on the issues.</td>
<td>31.43%</td>
<td>16.84%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Men and women are equally capable of being witnesses.</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>72.63%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Sample T Test

- \( t = -1.025 \)  
- Sig. (2-tailed) = .307  
- Confidence level 95%

- \( t = -2.455 \)  
- Sig. (2-tailed) = .015  
- Confidence level 95%

Sources: Thesis author’ compilation

The responses to my in-depth interviews show how people explained their views on the value of men and women as witnesses. The perception of equal value as witness in Islam usually relates to women’s rationality and the following Hadith commonly cited by Indonesian Muslim scholars: *perempuan itu setengah akal dan setengah agama daripada laki-laki* (women have half the brain and half the religious capacity of men). Based on this Hadith, in the in-depth interviews I asked the participants questions about the interpretation of that Hadith. However, many respondents did not have an Islamic studies background: some did not know about
the Hadith; and, some respondents who did not agree with the Hadith raised a variety of arguments.

For example, Abdullah, a male progressive respondent from an Islamic university, argued that the term ‘a half brain’ was insulting. He stated:

I think at that time (in the prophet Muhammad era) many women stayed at home only; therefore, they did not maximise their intellectual potential. As a result, their ability to be witnesses was only accounted a half to men. I have read many books explaining that it does not mean that women have a half brain to men ... it’s just a matter of how to optimise the brain. Long time ago we did not have woman judges but now there are many women judges in Indonesia ... it is important to read the Hadiths and link them to the spirit of the Qur’an (Abdullah, interview, 22 May 2010).

Another progressive respondent from an Islamic university, Wira, argued that considering women’s values as half of that of men to be witness is implicit in the interpretations of women’s creation, i.e., that women were created from men’s ribs. The implication of this belief is that women tend to be emotional and men tend to be rational. As a consequence, women’s value as witnesses is half that of men. Wira observed:

The belief that women were created from men’s ribs led to the other gender issues such as women lack of brains, thus women cannot be witnesses, women cannot be guardians ... so for me the interpretation of women’s creation should be explained properly ... In the Qur’an there is a story about the Queen of Bilqis who was known as *laha ansyur adhim* (meaning she possessed superpower). This title was not given to the prophet Sulaiman in the Qur’an but to a woman, the Queen of Bilqis (Wira, interview, 8 May 2010).

Many respondents, who usually took the literalist or moderate position such as Joko (interview, 24 May 2010), Laila (interview, 3 June 2010), Hidaya (*interview*, 19 June 2010), Aibar (interview, 3 June 2010), Wulan (interview, 17 June 2010), and Giarto (interview, 2 June 2010), claimed that they were neither familiar with nor had
ever heard or read the Hadith saying that women have a half brain to men and a half of religion.

The in-depth interviews facilitated an understanding of why more respondents in public universities advocate for progressive than people in Islamic universities. This may have been because many of them were not familiar with the Hadith stating that women are a half brain of men. Therefore, they answered the survey question about witness based on common sense and their lived everyday experience that men and women have equal intellectual capability.

6.2.3. Symbolic Equality of Women in the Creation Story

The creation of women is a particularly contentious gender issue in Islam given that relates to question surrounding the first human creation. The debate centres on whether woman was created from the same essence as man or whether she was created from men’s ribs or whether she was created like ribs. The majority of respondents favoured progressive approach, namely, that men and women were created from the same essence. Comparing male and female views, the survey data shows that more female respondents adopted the progressive approach than male respondents. The in-depth interviews revealed the variety of arguments that people gave to support their views from different positions.

I will now review my survey data pertaining to the creation of human beings; then I will explore the different arguments from each position in the in-depth interviews. Table 11 shows a substantial majority (78%) took the progressive approach (although not as high as towards some other issues relating to the religious court). Turning to the comparison of sub groups in the sample, the male respondents (20%) were more likely than females (13.68%) to assume a moderate position. In
contrast, female respondents took a progressive position (83.16%) more often than males (72.86%). A comparison of people from different universities revealed that the majority of respondents from both Islamic and public universities took the progressive approach; but, there were slightly different percentages on this issue, a slightly higher percentage (80%) for public university respondents than from Islamic university respondents (78%). Conversely, a slightly higher percentage (18.10%) of Islamic university respondents than from public university respondents (13.33%) claimed the moderate position. Literalist respondents affiliated to public universities almost doubles the percentage of those from Islamic universities.

Table 11:
Respondents’ Understanding of the Symbolic Equality of Women in the Creation Story

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents’ understandings of the symbolic equality of women in the creation story</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>University Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (N=70)</td>
<td>Female (N=95)</td>
<td>Islamic (N=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>Woman was created from a man’s rib.</td>
<td>7.14%</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Woman was created from a man’s rib is only an analogy.</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13.68%</td>
<td>18.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Men and women were created from the same essence.</td>
<td>72.86%</td>
<td>83.16%</td>
<td>78.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Sample T Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Confidence level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>=-1.627</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>=.106</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>=.916</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Thesis author’s compilation

I will now review the variety of arguments people proposed on the creation of human beings. The in-depth interviews revealed how respondents understood the creation story according to the scriptures. Some progressive respondents argued that the creation of the first woman was the same as that of the first man. Moderate
respondents asserted that the first woman was created from a man’s rib was just an analogy, i.e., how to treat women nicely. Strongly literalist respondents argued the difference between the creation of the first woman and the first man.

Nisa and Zihan attempted to explain why progressive respondents rejected the idea that men and women were created differently. Nisa argued that the notion of women being created from men’s ribs was only a tool to dominate women.

Women are human beings and human beings are created from blood and the combination between sperm and egg. I do not agree with the idea that women were created from a rib. This idea is a weapon for people who do not like women ... for me men and women were created from the same essence (Nisa, interview, 17 May 2010).

Zihan, a male respondent from an Islamic university, argued that the idea of women’s creation from men’s ribs is inherent in the Christian tradition (the Old Testament). “For me, men and women were created from the same essence” (interview, 19 May 2010).

Employing a moderate approach, some respondents argued that the first woman was created from a man’s ribs is only an analogy. Basically, men and women were created from the same essence. Laila observed:

Men and women should be created from the same material ... the term ‘rib’ is only a symbol that women are part of men. But in terms of creation, logically they were created from the same essence which was clay. In the current situation men and women are created from the same materials (interview, 3 June 2010).

Ana, a female respondent from a public university, made a different argument about women’s creation from a moderate stand point. She argued that the suggestion that woman was created from man’s rib was only an analogy.

The men’s and women’s creation is the same. The Hadith saying that a woman was created from man’s rib is only an analogy. This means that rib closes to the hearth. Therefore, a woman should be loved and protected. Woman was not created from a skull because she should not be worshipped.
and not from a leg bone because women should not be trampled underfoot (Ana, interview, 25 May 2010).

Literalist respondents argued in favour of the truth that men and women were created from different material. Zaki, a male respondent from a public university, supported the Hadith saying that woman was created from a rib as valid and true.

Although there are many interpretations about women creation, I believe that the Hadith [a woman was created from a rib] is valid. I do not ignore that Hadith. In the process, a woman was created from a rib and Adam was created from clay. I believe this is only in the creation process and does not justify discrimination against women. When a man and woman become human beings, they have the same fitrah and have the same opportunity (interview, 27 May 2010).

Joko, a male respondent from an Islamic university argued that men and women may have been created from different material because biologically they have different chromosomes, XY for men and XX for women. He guessed that the X chromosome may from a man’s rib; but, he was not sure because he has never conducted research into this issue (Joko, interview, 24 May 2010).

6.3. Issues Eliciting Almost Half Moderate and Half Progressive Responses

This section will present the various respondents’ responses to the issue of polygamy and the equal status of women. On both of these issues, the respondents were almost equally divided between the moderate and progressive positions. The issue of polygamy has remained contentious up until the present time: it is an issue on which men and women tend to strongly disagree. The almost similar percentage between moderate and progressive positions on women’s status reflected the sameness-difference debate discussed in the Introduction. In this section, I present the survey results for all of the respondents first; then, I compare sexes and people from public
and Islamic university affiliated organisations. Finally, I explain their positions in the in-depth interviews.

6.3.1. Polygamy

Polygamy has been one of most controversial issues in the history of feminist/gender debate. Since the first National Women Congress in 1928, lawful polygamy has sparked debate among Congress members. Analysis of my surveyed data shows that polygamy is contentious gender issue in Islam with a high variable because the number of respondents who took the moderate position was almost similar to those who took the progressive position. This means that the issue of polygamy has remained contentious up until the present. Another interesting finding was that male and female interviewees tended to have different positions on polygamy. And, although they were gender activists, the males tended to accept polygamy. In contrast, females were of the view that polygamy is unacceptable.

Before reviewing the contrasting views on polygamy between men and women in more detail, I will first present my survey results on this issue. Table 12 shows that overall similar percentages of people adopted the moderate and progressive approaches. This indicates relatively little support for the progressive approach to polygamy compared with the preceding issues. Only 3 per cent respondents evinced a literalist attitude towards this issue. As regards, comparisons of sub groups in the sample, Table 12 shows the significantly different views of polygamy shared by male and female respondents (t=-2.932 and Sig. (2-tailed) =.004). As well, it shows that 54.29% of male respondents took a moderate approach while female respondents’ views were predominantly progressive (61.05%).

A comparison of people from different types of universities revealed that, in general, there was no significant difference in their views of polygamy between
respondents affiliated to Islamic universities and those affiliated to public universities. However, close examination of Table 12 shows with regard to the literalist and moderate positions, that respondents from Islamic universities had higher percentages than those from public universities, approximately 4% and 47% respectively. The figures for the public universities were 2% literalist and 42% moderate. In contrast, respondents from public universities evinced a higher proclivity to be progressive (56.67%) that those from Islamic universities (49.52%). This means that in the main, people in public universities reject polygamy more broadly than those in Islamic universities. Conversely, more people from Islamic universities accept polygamy than those in public universities.

Table 12: Respondents’ Understandings of Polygamy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents’ understandings of polygamy in Islam</th>
<th>Male (N=70)</th>
<th>Female (N=95)</th>
<th>Islamic (N=105)</th>
<th>Public (N=60)</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>To have more than one wife is natural because men are naturally polygamous and women are naturally monogamous.</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Polygamy is acceptable only where the conditions of the universal concept of justice prevail such as protecting orphans and widows.</td>
<td>54.29%</td>
<td>37.89%</td>
<td>46.67%</td>
<td>41.67%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Polygamy is unacceptable right now because it is out of step with contemporary thought and causes lots of problems especially for women and children.</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
<td>61.05%</td>
<td>49.52%</td>
<td>56.67%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Sample T Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>t = -2.931</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed) = .004</th>
<th>Confidence level 95%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = -1.046</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) = .297</td>
<td>Confidence level 95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Thesis author’ compilation
The in-depth interview responses suggest a variety of reasons for accepting and rejecting polygamy. Some progressive respondents proposed a variety of reasons for rejecting or limiting polygamy. For example, Sita, a female respondent from an Islamic university, disagreed with polygamy, arguing that it is part of pre-Islamic culture and Islam came to respond to it as part of dealing with social problems, not sexual problems. She claimed that in Indonesia, no single case of polygamy follows the Indonesian Law.

Islam does not encourage polygamy. Polygamy is part of the culture in the society and Islam came to respond it. For me, I agree with Islamic leaders in Tunisia that polygamy is a pre-Islamic culture and therefore Muslims should leave it…Indonesia prohibits slavery although the Qur’an allows that, so I think the same for polygamy. By the Indonesian Marriage Law 1971 actually it’s difficult for men to practise polygamy. Historically, no single case of polygamy in Indonesia follows the Law such as the couple come to court to get consent from the judge and then if the judge gives consent, the couple will follow up the consent by looking for another women to solve their problem ... the first wife usually gives consent for her husband to have another wife, because in many cases the first wife depends on her husband economically. If the first wife is economically independent she usually prefers to have divorce…first of all polygamy was one solution to deal with social problems not sexual problems (Sita, interview, 3 June 2010).

Providing another reason for rejecting polygamy, Gizela, a female respondent from an Islamic university, argued that in the Qur’an, surah Al Baqoroh states that no one can be adl to all wives: it is impossible. Polygamy is practised in the best interests of men, not in the interests of women. The Indonesian Muslim community do not need polygamous marriages to protect orphans.

Talking about polygamy is talking about justice [adl] ... in the Qur’an surah Al Baqoroh explains that nobody can be a just person to all wives ... it is impossible; no polygamy practise is done because of the interest of women. If there is choice, a woman will not share her husband with others ... so, for me, in the Indonesian context, polygamy should be banned by state law not religious law because it has created more injustice problems not solving the social problems ... polygamy is not relevant in Indonesia in the current time ... because according to the Qur’an, historically polygamy was practiced ... to protect orphans. In the present time, the state can protect orphans not by having sexual institution like polygamy (Gizela, interview, 25 May 2010).
Sita and Gizela mounted a strong argument in favour of rejecting polygamous practices in Indonesia. They argued that polygamy was part of pre-Islamic culture and to be *adl* husband (justice) to all wives, as in the Qur’anic surah Al Baqoroh advocates, is impossible. According to Sita (Sita, personal interview, 3 June 2010), polygamous practices in Indonesia create many problems for women and children; therefore, polygamy should be banned in Indonesia like in Tunisia, by State Law, not by religious law.

Some examples of the moderate position were proposed by Zaki and Permata. The former argued that polygamy is acceptable and legal (not *haram*) as long as the husband fulfils the requirement to be *adl* to all wives, as stated in the Qur’an.

The Qur’an gives a chance for men to have more than one wife as far as he could be a just husband to all wives...I don’t agree with Musdah Mulia who *mengharamkan* (prohibits) Polygamy. Maybe she said like that because many polygamous people do not follow the spirit of the Qur’an...I will not say *haram* on polygamy because Qur’an does not state *haram* on polygamy. It is legal as far as fulfilling the justice requirement, for example, but do not tend to love one wife more than others (Zaki, interview, 27 May 2010).

Permata argued that polygamy is legal but not for her husband. She maintained that polygamous practice in contemporary times does not reflect the Prophet Muhammad’s spirit and reasoning and renders women vulnerable.

For me, polygamy is legal as far as it does not happen to my husband. I think polygamy causes vulnerability for women because usually the husband will ignore the first wife and in the current situation many polygamous people do not follow the prophet Muhammad’s reason such as for widows’ and children’s protection (Permata, interview, 22 June 2010).

Mimi, a literalist respondent, argued similarly to Zaki and Permata that polygamy is legal and should be *adl* to all wives although she realised that *adl* in love is impossible. For her, it was acceptable as long as the husband paid equal visits and gave equal food and property to all of his wives.
I am pro-polygamy as far as he could have *adl* (justice) although I realise that *adl* in love is impossible. For me it is enough if the husband has equal visits and gives equal food and property to all wives...for me it’s good there is someone else who helps the wife, because sometime I am tired...that is the husband’s right...I am a conventional Muslim and I don’t really love my husband because I had an arranged marriage (Mimi, interview, 16 June 2010).

Scrutiny of the respondent’s arguments revealed that basically they agreed with polygamy because it is approved in the Qur’an. They noted the conditions that the polygamous husband has to fulfil, i.e., the justice requirement. However, some of respondents did not agree with polygamy personally, as evident in Permata’s statement: “For me, polygamy is legal as far as it does not happen to my husband”. Mimi offering a different reason, agreed with polygamy because she is in an arranged marriage and does not love her husband; so, it does not matter so much to her if her husband takes another wife.

6.3.2. Equal Status of Women

Women’s status with respect to men is a somewhat contentious issue in Islam. The research revealed almost equal percentages of moderate and progressive respondents. A comparison of the different sexes and university backgrounds, revealed no significant difference in the percentages between male and female respondents and between public and Islamic university associates. They showed a similar pattern: the highest percentage represented the progressive approach and the lowest the literalist approach. The debate in the in-depth interviews revealed the concept of equal complementary and equal partnership of men’s and women’s statuses.

Before discussing the debate surrounding equal complementary and equal partnership, I will show the survey data results of this issue. As with the practice
polygamy, on the issue of women’s status, overall my respondents were fairly evenly balanced between progressives and moderates. As Table 13 shows, approximately 52% of all respondents adopted a progressive position; 47% endorsed a moderate position. That means that while more people adopted progressive position rather than a moderate one, the difference was insubstantial. Only 1.2 per cent of respondents, i.e., 2 out of 165 believed that men occupy a higher social status than women. As regards approaches adopted, Table 13 shows that male and female respondents followed similar pattern. The most popular choice was a progressive approach, followed by the moderate approach. Last was the literalist approach. There is almost equal balance of the percentage between male and female respondents in all approaches. The progressive approach was adopted by approximately 1% of literalists of both sexes with 46% male and 47% female moderates, and 53% male and 52% female progressives.

The different responses of people from Islamic and public universities can also be seen in Table 13. There was almost equal balance of percentage between respondents from Islamic universities and those are from public university in all approaches, approximately 1%, 48 % and 51% respectively for respondents from Islamic university, while public universities accounted for 2% literalist, 45% moderate and 53% progressive. More secular university people than Islamic university people were likely to take a progressive approach; but, amongst the small group of people adopting a literalist approach, public university people predominated.
Table 13: Respondents’ Understandings of Equal Status of Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents’ understandings of women’s status in Islam</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>University Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (N=70)</td>
<td>Female (N=95)</td>
<td>Islamic (N=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>Men have a higher status than women</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Men and women are complementary</td>
<td>45.71%</td>
<td>47.37%</td>
<td>47.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Men and women are equal</td>
<td>52.86%</td>
<td>51.58%</td>
<td>51.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Sample T Test
- t = .108
- Sig. (2-tailed) = .914
- Confidence level 95%

F = -.139
- Sig. (2-tailed) = .890
- Confidence level 95%

Sources: Thesis author’s compilation

In order to understand how people explain their views on women’s status with respect to men, I will review the data from the in-depth interviews. I asked the respondents whether she/he tended to see women’s status as ‘equal complementary’ or ‘equal partnership’ with men’s. In the Muslim community, there is assumption that men should share equal status with women in all aspects of life (equal partnership). In contrast, there is another belief that men should be accorded a higher status than women. Again, some believe that although men should occupy a higher status than women, in effect they complement each other equally.

The term ‘equal complementary’ (setara tapi berbeda/saling melengkapi) captures the notion that men and women are not only equal but also different. But, this difference does not mean that one is higher or better than the other, a concept that tends to support the maintenance of traditional gender roles. In contrast, ‘equal partnership’ (setara) suggests that men and women should have equal access to resources, participate in equal opportunities to join in public and private activities, have equal access to power opportunities, to making decisions, and get equal benefit.
from the decisions made. According to this orientation, whoever is in charge of
certain activity or a certain position should not depend upon one’s sex (male or
female) but on the person’s abilities.

In general, almost all of the respondents declared men and women’s status
equal in the eyes of Allah; but, there were a variety of responses when discussing
different gender issues such as gender roles in the public and domestic spheres, equal
rights to inheritance, and equal opportunity to be able to lead in prayer. Some
progressive respondents tended to see men and women as equal partner whereas
many moderate respondents tended to see them as equal complementary. Strongly
literalist respondents believed that men occupy a higher status than women.

Progressive respondents argued that men and women can claim equal
partnership both theologically and philosophically; but, their existence as human
beings in the world is equal complementary. For example, Wira, a male respondent
from an Islamic university, argued that theologically and philosophically men and
women enjoy equal partnership. Theologically, men and women share the same
status and the same sacred duties because everyone is created equal and the most
honourable person in the eyes of God is the most pious. Piety is gender neutral. Wira
argued that in their existence as human beings, they are equal complementary
because men cannot live without women, and conversely, women cannot live without
men. They are *azwaj* (couples) and they need each other (Wira, interview, 8 May
2010). Gizela similarly observed:

I am as a person who has a direct access to the religious text and I argue that
there is no single text legitimizing men and women should be treated
differently substantially. The only consideration is their piety (*ketaqwaan*) to
God and only God knows and can measure a person’s piety (Gizela,
interview, 25 May 2010).
One example, Maman, a male respondent from an Islamic university, and an example of moderate respondent, argued that male and female relationships are not sub-ordinate but complementary; and, the different gender roles between men and women are not hierarchical but functional.

In my opinion based on many resources, the women’s position [to men] in Islam is not top down [vertical] but the position is complementary ... men or women are not perfect human beings, but if they get together they will be a perfect unity. Although they have different positions they have equal value. I don’t agree if the domestic sphere is less valued than the public sphere. So, for me men and women are complementary not sub-ordinary (Maman, interview, 5 May 2010).

Laila, a literalist female respondent from a public university, observed that men’s and women’s different statuses depend upon their *kodrat* (God-given nature). Men seem to have higher status than women because many of the instructions in the Qur’an are addressed to men not to women.

For me, the status between men and women depends on their tasks and their *kodrat*, so whether men have higher status than women depends on their context ... I feel that in the Qur’an Allah’s commands tend to men instead of women; for example, command for Friday prayer is compulsory for men ... but, if it is true or not, I am not really sure that men are chosen as *imams* for women (Laila, interview, 3 June 2010).

When I asked a further question about the Javanese adat (belief) relating to women’s status that a woman is a ‘*konco wingking*’ (‘kitchen friend’; that is, the husband’s companion who stays in the kitchen), or ‘*surgo nunut neraka katut*’ (a woman who will go wherever her husband goes, to hell or heaven) not all of the respondents agreed with this belief. The following are some examples of disagreement presented by some respondents: I do not like the Javanese belief that woman is ‘*konco wingking*’. A man should go to the kitchen too. So, I do not agree with these beliefs (Aibar, interview, 3 June 2010). The belief was for very long time ago in the dark time in which women were dependent upon their husbands ... and for
current situation these beliefs are not relevant anymore (Nisa, interview, 17 May 2010).

Other respondents reported that these beliefs were rarely found in contemporary society: they are part of a patriarchal culture. Hary and Rama, male respondents from public university, claimed that:

In the rural community ... *konco wingking* means follower. And in fact the implementation of that belief is very rare. In my research among agricultural families in Bantul, the main contributor to agriculture industry is women because most men go to the city to work (Hary, interview, 2 June 2010).

Rama argued that Javanese beliefs such as *perempuan konco wingking* are part of an entrenched patriarchal culture.

I think that is one of patriarchal culture or masculinism that men are smarter, more pure, etc. This will appear differently in different times or different cultures. So, there was a time where men were more dominant in interpreting the culture and creating the values that support their position including in Java (Rama, interview, 11 June 2010).

### 6.4. The Majority Moderate Issue: Women’s Right to Lead Public Mixed Gender Prayers (*Imam Sholat*)

Women leadership in prayer/sholat was the only gender issue upon which the majority of respondents took a moderate position. But, the different gender and university affiliations did not alter their positions on women’s leadership significantly. This finding was remarkable given the controversy surrounding this issue. Although a minority agreed with the progressive position, it was a surprisingly large minority. The reasons why the people took these positions will be elaborated in the in-depth interviews.

Before exploring the different arguments people mounted in support of their positions on women’s leadership, I will first review the survey data on this issue in Table 14 which shows that a strong majority, approximately 70% of respondents, adopted a moderate approach to the question of women’s leadership of prayer. But
very few took a literalist position (only 1.8%). Twenty seven point three per cent of respondents endorsed the progressive position that fully approved women leading mixed groups, even in prayer/sholat. Comparing people from different sexes and university backgrounds, Table 14 shows they followed the same pattern, i.e., the moderate position score highest followed by the progressive, then the literalist. Interestingly, males scored a slightly higher (28.57%) than females (26.32%) in terms of the legitimacy of women imam leading adult men. Among the literalist, not one single male suggested that women cannot be leaders of men, whereas the percentage of female respondents reached approximately 2%.

Table 14: Respondents’ Understandings of Women’s Right to Lead Public Mixed Gender Prayers (Imam Sholat)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents’ understandings of women’s right to lead public mixed gender prayers (Imam Sholat)</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>University Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>1.43% 2.11% 1.90% 1.67% 1.8%</td>
<td>Male (N=70)</td>
<td>Female (N=95)</td>
<td>Islamic (N=105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literalist</td>
<td>Women cannot be leaders of men</td>
<td>0.0% 2.11% 1.90% 0.0% 1.2%</td>
<td>100% 100% 100% 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Women can be leaders of men as long as they have the capability, but not of sholat/prayer</td>
<td>70% 69.47% 67.62% 73.33% 69.7%</td>
<td>100% 100% 100% 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Women can be leaders of adult men if they have the capability, including sholat/prayer</td>
<td>28.57% 26.32% 28.57% 25% 27.3%</td>
<td>100% 100% 100% 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% 100% 100% 100% 100%</td>
<td>100% 100% 100% 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Sample T Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>t = .660</th>
<th>t = .135</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>=.510</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence level</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Confidence level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>=.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Confidence level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Thesis author’ compilation

Based on the different types of universities, the Table 15 shows that respondents from public universities favoured the moderate approach (73.33%) more than those from Islamic universities (67.62%). Conversely, respondents from Islamic
universities supporting the progressive approach scored 28.57% as against those from public universities (25%) when it come the question of women’s leadership. People from Islamic universities were more likely to accept female imams for mixed sholat than people from public universities. Only two persons from an Islamic university objected to women leading men in any situation.

The in-depth interviews revealed the contrasting notion that justified people’s views of female imams. Some respondents believed that in prayer, there should be an equal partnership between men and women, meaning that whoever has more knowledge of the prayer and religious teaching should lead. This means both men and women should have the opportunity to be imams. Conversely, some respondents argued that in ritual activities including sholat, the difference between men and women is simply that only a man can be an imam for mixed groups. A woman should not be allowed to serve as an imam for adult men in sholat even though in terms of knowledge of sholat she may be more advanced than a male imam. The role of a leader of prayer is functional, not hierarchical. Whether or not God will accept the prayer depends not upon the imam but upon the person. This reveals the equal complementary understanding of gender. Although the survey revealed a small number adopting the literalist approach, among the in-depth interviews I could not find one literalist answer suggesting that women cannot be leaders of men.

Some examples of progressive respondents were presented by Wira, Darma and Gizela, respondents from an Islamic university, who argued that the critical qualification for being an imam is religious knowledge; so, the man or woman who has more knowledge of sholat should be the imam (Wira, interview, 8 May 2010). Darma (interview, 9 May 2010) argued that the type of gender was not a criterion for being an imam. Any male or female, who has knowledge of and an understanding of
the Qur’an (fasih), can be an imam. For those with the same capability, consideration must be given to who will start the prayer first.

For me [a male respondent], it is usual to be makmum [follower in sholat] when my mother or my wife start praying at first...one day [for the first time] I have just come from Yogyakarta and I saw my mother was performing sholat and after taking wudlu [purification] then I just followed her praying. My mother didn’t say anything at that time meaning that she agreed with what I had done...she said to me that the important thing is jamaah [togetherness], not who the imam is (Darma, interview, 9 May 2010).

Gizela, a female respondent from an Islamic university stated:

For me, in prayer is equal partnership [whoever has a better capability, she or he is in charge] and it is presents the basic values of Islam, including in sholat. If we examine texts [Al Qur’an and Hadith], it shows that there is no single valid text that prohibits a woman to be imam for an adult men. Hadith that allows a woman to be an imam is more valid than the one that prohibits (Gizela, interview, 25 May 2010).

Some respondents, who took the progressive approach in terms of women’s leadership, do not practise their beliefs in daily life for strategic reasons. Hera argued that she agreed with the progressive idea, but does not practise female imam for adult male because people around her do not accept a woman imam for adult men (interview, 1 June 2010). Another female respondent, Sita explained that for strategic reasons she does not socialise with women imams in the Indonesian society, because Indonesia is very diverse and heterogynous and sometime the culture is violent (interview, 3 June 2010). For this reason, Muslim gender activists tend not to generally publicise their research into women imams because it could prove counterproductive with women’s struggles over gender issues. Thus for strategic reasons, when it comes to imam sholat some gender activists go along with the equal complementary position in society while theologically they subscribe to equal partnership. This means that they believe that a man or woman who has the required
amount of knowledge and ability vis-a-vis *sholat* may legitimately (*sah*) be an *imam sholat*, irrespective of gender.

Joko and Maman, male respondents also from an Islamic university, took what I call a moderate approach to women’s leadership (Joko, interview, 14 May 2010; Maman, interview, 5 May 2010). They disagreed with a woman being an *imam sholat* for adult men because they believed that in ritual activity the roles have been fixed. But, they agreed that women may lead a mixed group in other situations (e.g., at work, in the society, at the domestic sphere).

**Discussion**

6.5.1. Issues Eliciting Almost All Progressive Responses

Issues of equal gender roles in the home and workplace, equal sexual expression and equal power to make decisions in the family are not contentious among PSWs/PSG. Almost all of the respondents took a progressive approach. In terms of equal gender roles, the fact that the majority of respondents advocated a progressive approach may have been related to their social backgrounds as employees at universities. It is very common for both men and women to work outside of the home in Indonesia, particularly the young generation. But, there is still gender stereotyping in the workplace (Kementrian Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak, 2010; Peter, 2001).

A propos of equal sexual expression, almost all of the respondents, both male and female agreed with the progressive stance that men and women should have equal right to sexual pleasure and expression. However, more people in the public universities than in the Islamic held literal and moderate views. Whereas the literal view insists that the wife must not reject her husband’s sexual advances, the moderate view states that men and women have equal right to sexual pleasure and
expression; but, they claim, the husband’s sexual needs should be prioritised over the wife’s. Why did the majority of respondents favour the progressive position? This may have been in line with the *kakawin* world in which both men and women have the right to enjoy a pleasurable sexual relationship. Another reason may have been linked to the fact that there is no religious law governing the sexual relationship between husband and wife. Therefore, the majority of respondents seemed to feel free to express a progressive view.

Second, why did more people in public universities than Islamic universities opt for the literal and moderate position on equal sexual right issue? The answer may lie in the popularity of the Hadith that dictate the terms of the sexual relationships between husbands and wives. Literal understandings of this Hadith have been socialised in wedding ceremonies or in *majelis ta’lim* (dakwah activity). In the Islamic universities, usually progressive scholars and gender activists study and interpret the Hadith contextually; but, this thought has not as yet been socialised widely. As a result, there is still a gap between Islamic and public universities in terms of understanding this Hadith. Hera, a respondent from public university, said that she and her husband, both of whom are gender activists, reached an agreement that sexual activity should be initiated by the wife, not by the husband. This would avoid the stipulation in the Hadith, i.e., that if the husband initiates and the wife is not compliant, the latter will be cursed until morning (interview, 1 June 2010).

In terms of equal power to make decisions in the family, almost all of the respondents agreed to the progressive approach, namely, that every family member, e.g., father, mother, and children have the right to make decisions based on their respective competencies. Equal power to make decisions in the family may be

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inherent in the bilateral kinship relations in Indonesia, particularly in Java (as suggested in Chapter one). Many Indonesian families are not particularly rigid in terms of the functions of the heads of families. Usually they refer to the head of the family for guidance on formal matters such as creating a *Kartu Keluarga* (Family Card). PSW UIN Yogyakarta and other women’s NGOs in Indonesia are working to amend the Marriage Law 1974, which stipulates that the husband is the head of the family and the wife is the head of the household. If the head of the family must be a man, then the law is not applicable to a single mother family. Musdah Mulia (2005) proposes amending the Marriage Law by removing the term *kepala keluarga*, because in reality 1 in 9 heads of families in Indonesia is a woman. Thus, clearly the Law is out of date. Indonesian women activists, led by PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga, have presented a Bill to the parliament advocating that husbands and wives have equal responsibility to take care of their families.

### 6.5.2. Issues Eliciting High Progressive but Substantial non-Progressive Responses

One of the expectations of this research has been that all gender activist respondents and scholars concerned with gender issues would orient more towards the feminist position, that is, adopt a progressive approach or at least a moderate position. The research findings confirm that this hypothesis is acceptable. However, not all of the respondents, including gender researchers and activists, opt in favour of a progressive or moderate approach regarding some gender issues. The data shows that gender issues such as equal rights to inheritance, equal value as witness, and the belief surrounding the creation of first woman not only reveals a high rate of progressive responses but also a substantial number of non-progressive responses.

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29 In Indonesia, every family has to have a Family Card which consists of information about all family members including who is the head of family.
Two of these gender issues touch upon matters that may be taken to religious court should there be any dispute. Some respondents expressed opinions close to those of the traditionalist religious scholars (ulama) on gender issues that may be taken to the religious court.

In terms of equal right to inheritance, the findings show that many respondents still believed that men should inherit twice the amount allocated to women. The inheritance issue attracted the highest percentage (14%) of literalist responses. Despite the fact that most of the respondents claimed that inheritance should be equal, or should be divided based on need irrespective of gender, the literalists favoured the 2:1 distribution of inheritance between men and women. Almost 1 in 7 respondents from the PSWs/PSG deemed it acceptable. This is understandable because in Islamic tradition there is a special area of knowledge about inheritance called faroid; thus, Islamic universities usually they offer courses on inheritance.

Second, why do many people opt not to adopt a progressive view of inheritance? Their decisions may be influenced by reference to the religious court. People tend to be wary when giving their opinions of issues relating to Islamic law. If there is a dispute among heirs, recourse will be to the religious court. According to Compilation of Islamic Law No 1 year 1991 (Kompilasi Hukum Islam/KHI) article 176: inheritance should be divided based on gender: this means that a daughter receives only half of the amount inherited by her brother. Article 183 states that the family may agree to divide the inheritance after all of the heirs have been advised of their respective share (Kompilasi Hukum Islam, Impres, 1991). This Article is close to the moderate position which encourages male heirs to give other types of charity.
to women because the latter receive only half of the inheritance paid to their male counterparts.

Respondents’ responses in the in-depth interviews helped delineated their arguments for the moderate and progressive approaches adopted by some respondents. For example, in an in-depth interview, although Permata claimed a moderate position, in reality her views regarding inheritance were progressive.

It seems that Islamic law on inheritance 2:1 is not fair ... I will tell my case in my family. My oldest brother yelled at all heirs demanding his portion doubled compared to female heirs. But then I asked him to be responsible in nafkah to my older sister who was widow until she got marriage again. My oldest brother did not agree with this idea. Then, the inheritance was divided equally between men and women in my family based on consensus among family members (Permata, interview, 22 June 2010).

One perplexing finding was: Why did more female respondents favour the literalist approach than males? This may have been related to gender values associated with nafkah or provision for the family, as reported by Permata above. The majority of Indonesians support the notion that a man should be the main breadwinner for his family (Departemen Agama, 1996; Nasif, 2001; Siraj & Hilary, 2005; Yunus, 1993). This cultural understanding may be referenced to the New Order government’s concept of ‘state ibuism’ (promoting the roles of women as first and foremost wives and mothers) as discussed in Chapter Two. This decree was reinforced by Marriage Law, 1974, article 34 which states that the husband has to protect his wife and provide all her needs based on his capability\(^{30}\) (Undang-undang Republik Indonesia tentang Perkawinan, 1974).

Witness was another gender issue to which the responses varied greatly. Although the highest percentage advocated the progressive approach, the percentages

\(^{30}\) (Suami wajib melindungi isterinya dan memberikan segala sesuatu keperluan hidup berumah tangga sesuai dengan kemampuannya) (“Undang-undang Perkawinan,” 1974).
of other approaches were nonetheless considerable, totalling almost a third of total respondents. Witness may involve court proceedings; therefore, people tend to be very wary when expressing view different from those promulgated by the ulama.

This was the only gender issue that resulted in significantly different percentages between respondents from Islamic and public universities. More people in Islamic universities than in public universities considered that men and women should not be valued equally in witness. In contrast, more respondents from public universities than from Islamic universities chose the progressive approach. This was perhaps related to the fact that usually Islamic universities include a course fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) which deals with witness in Islam.

Why did more women than men consider female equally capable of being witnesses? This opinion may have been motivated by backgrounds of the respondents, all of whom were academics. They emphasised that both men and women can perform equally well intellectually. In fact in Indonesian universities, many of the best students are women (Martono & Mintari, 2009; Resyalia, 2010).

The other gender issue attracting a high rate of progressive but substantial number of non-progressive responses was women’s creation and the circumstances thereof. Although this topic does not involve the courts, it is nonetheless a contentious gender issue in Islam as it relates to the first human creation. The debate centres on whether a woman was created from the same essence as man or she was created from men’s ribs or she was created like a rib. Approximately 5 per cent of respondents believed the creation story which depicts women as having been created as lesser beings. Perhaps this acceptance of what appears to be justification for patriarchal values is acceptable to many because it appears to be only a theological issue, i.e., has no bearing on everyday gender practices. Something like this was
suggested in the in-depth interviews responses. Although Joko and Zaki, for example, claimed that men and women were created from different material, they insisted that it did not mean that men and women are not equal. As Zaki cogently argued, the different material used in the creation process did not justify discrimination against women. Similar to Zaki, the 5 per cent of respondents who took the literalist approach in the survey did not necessarily express gender bias when explaining their understanding of women’s creation. Women were much less likely than men to agree that the first woman was created from a man’s rib.

6.5.3. Issue Eliciting Almost Half Moderate and Half Progressive

Two gender issues that sparked considerable controversy among women in general as well as among gender activists and scholars were polygamy and women’s status (women as equal to men/setara vs women as complementary but equal to men/setara tapi berbeda). My survey data show that these gender issues saw opinions divided almost equally between progressives and others. Respondents adopting a progressive attitude towards polygamy numbered approximately 52%, 45% endorsed a moderate position, and 47% supported women’s position. Why were so many gender activists and researchers reluctant to support a progressive view? It may be because polygamy has been one of the most controversial gender issues in the history of the women’s movement. Controversy dates back to the first National Women Congress in 1928, when lawful polygamy sparked debate among the Congress members. Before the Marriage Law was legislated in 1974, of which polygamy is one of the issue, polygamy was highly politicised (Martyn, 2004).

Also why did females express significantly different opinions from males, although both were concerned on gender equality? The findings reveal that men and
women in the PSWs/PSG tend to disagree strongly. The only gender issue that males and females view differently is polygamy. Despite being gender activists, males tend to accept polygamy. In contrast, females in the main consider polygamy unacceptable. Why do more women than men take the progressive position? This could be related to women’s emotional involvement regarding polygamy. For a woman, sharing her love for her husband with other women would be very difficult for many women. Compared to inheritance and witness issues, polygamy is a far more sensitive issue for women. A woman might experience inheritance distribution only once or twice in her life time: many women may never experience witness or have to deal with witness issue. But, if she has polygamous husband, she will have to deal with the impact in her everyday lived reality. Thus, one can see the level of implication of this particular gender issue. Polygamy has implications for a woman’s personal life, whereas inheritance will impact at the family level and witness experience at the community level. Usually people have to be more careful when making decisions that have implications for their personal lives rather than for family and community lives. This is why women are likely to be more resistant to polygamy than to other gender issues.

Another gender issue to which progressive responses were weak (finely balanced between moderate (47%) and progressive (52%) positions) was women’s status, i.e., the question of whether women and men are equal or complementary. The in-depth interview responses help to clarify this. Although many respondents took a moderate approach (men and women are complementary), the arguments they mounted revealed egalitarian views. Basically, respondents argued that theologically they believed that men and women are in equal partnership but physically they are equal complementary. As suggested earlier in the thesis, the ‘equal complementary’
(setara tapi berbeda/saling melengkapi) captures the notion that men and women are not only equal: they are different. But, this difference does not mean that one is higher or better than the other; rather, this concept tends to support the maintenance of traditional gender roles. In contrast, ‘equal partnership’ (setara) advocates that men and women should have equal access to resources, enjoy equal opportunities to join in public and private activities, have equal access to power opportunities to make decisions, and get equal benefit from any or all decisions made. According to this orientation whoever is in charge of certain activities or hold a certain position should not depend upon one’s sex (male or female) but on one’s abilities.

The debate about women’s roles in PSWs/PSG also reflects Indonesia’s egalitarian culture. As shown in the literature review, the predominant kinship pattern in Indonesia, particularly in Java, is bilateral (Atkinson & Errington, 1990; Goody, 1976). In such systems, children commonly do not have a family name related to one of their parents but have their own specific name. This contrasts with naming practices in other cultures like that of Saudi Arabia where descent is traced through the male line and children take the family names of their fathers. The bilateral Javanese kinship system perhaps contributes to egalitarian social relations in Yogyakarta. The majority of respondents (83%) were from Java. The preponderance of Javanese in my sample may well have contributed to my finding that respondents tended to be egalitarian.

The egalitarianism of my respondents is also in accordance with both the sameness–difference and minimiser–maximiser theories discussed in the introduction. These theories suggest that women tend to be seen as either similar or different to men (Bacchi, 1990; Bulbeck, 1998; MacKinnon, 1987; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993).
6.5.4. The Majority Moderate Issue: Women’s Leadership of Prayer (Imam Sholat)

Women’s leadership in ritual activities, particularly women serving as prayer leaders or imams for adult men in sholat, is condemned almost universally in public discourse in Indonesia, as in other Muslim communities across the world. Thus, not surprisingly, the notion of women imams was the only gender issue towards which the majority of respondents evinced a moderate position (namely, a woman is allowed to be a leader of men but not in prayer). The finding was remarkable given the controversy surrounding this issue. While a very small minority agreed with the progressive position, it was a surprisingly large minority.

Why did majority people adopt a moderate standpoint? This is perhaps because prayer is a ibadah (ritual) that regulates the relationship between human beings and God. The Qur’an does not specifically prohibit women from acting as imams for adult men. But, long established practice in the arena of sacred may discourage innovative reinterpretation of the practice along gender lines.

However, examining the history of thought on female imams for adult men, it may be that the practice will become more popular and acceptable in the near future. For example, prior to the late 1980s, notion of women imams in sholat was unthinkable. But, since the early 2000s, it has become the subject of controversial discourses and academic research projects (Al Fatih, 2003; Subhan, 2008). In 2010, the Majelis Tarjeh Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah (Legal Affairs Committee and Development of Islamic Thought National Board of Muhammadiyah) held a national discussion on this issue in Malang, East Java at which the delegates agreed that a capable and knowledgeable woman could be a sholat imam for adult men should
there be no capable and knowledgeable men available (Qibtiyah & Susilaningsih, 2010).

**Summary**

Almost all of the respondents viewed gender issues that are not taken to the religious court progressively. They were less progressive in cases of court-related such as inheritance, witness and polygamy, and regarding issues related to ritual (ibadah) activity. This was evident in findings pertaining to women’s leadership of prayer for mixed-gender groups. The majority respondents opted for the moderate position.

The gender issue of equal value as witness was the only issue that showed significantly different percentage allies between respondents from Islamic and public universities. More people from Islamic universities stated that men and women should not be valued equally in witness. In contrast, more respondents from public universities chose the progressive approach.

Respondents’ views were split - half moderate and half progressive – when it came to polygamy and women’s status. This discrepancy reflected the polygamy debate and women’s experience in everyday life. The only gender issue for which male and female responses diffred significantly was polygamy. The highest percentage of male respondents advocated a moderate approach, whereas the highest percentage of female respondents supported a progressive approach. Polygamy is more problematic for women than for men. Although the respondents were the gender activists, in general males tended to accept polygamy. In contrast, females viewed polygamy as unacceptable. A closely similar percentage between moderate and progressive positions on women’s status reflected sameness-difference debate. Whereas sameness theory asserts that women should be seen through a prism which
emphasises their similarities with men, the difference theory holds that women are fundamentally different from men.

Many Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities argue that theologically and philosophically men and women are *equal partnership* biologically; in other words, they are equal complementary. Analysis of the respondents’ arguments showed that respondents who advocated moderate and progressive approaches were likely to be close to feminist position. Those who advocated a moderate approach were more likely to be oriented towards a different theory position and progressive to sameness theory position.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

While Indonesia has had a long history of gender activism, starting in the late colonial period and extending into the Independence period, feminist discourse is relatively new. Its development date back to the late 1980s, when the Indonesian government founded Centres for Women's Studies/PSW/Pusat Studi Wanita or Centres for Gender Studies/PSG/Pusat Studi Gender, to promote women’s equality, in universities across the country starting in Yogyakarta and Jakarta. The PSWs and PSGs have become important sites for the weighing and propagating of the thought of nationally and internationally prominent scholars on feminism and of how gender issues should be understood from an Islamic perspective, particularly in Indonesian Islamic universities. The above Centres promote gender equality and feminist advocacy.

This study, which has investigated the attitudes of Muslim gender activists in six universities in Yogyakarta (both public and Islamic) towards feminism, attempt to show what said activists understand by the term ‘feminism’, how common it is for them to identify as ‘feminists’, and why. It has also shown the variety of positions these activists take, as Muslims, on nine highly important gender issues. The study also reveals the variety of opinions Muslim gender activists in the selected Yogyakarta universities espouse vis-à-vis these nine issues.

7.1. The Gender Equality Movement in Indonesia and the Emergence of Feminist Discourse

The history of the gender equality movement in Indonesia has seen the advancement of different priorities for setting agendas and making strategies. The women’s
organisations that have formed the core of the movement have experienced different levels of autonomy over time.

My examination of the history of the issues that women’s organisations have addressed reveals that in the late colonial era, women’s organisations’ attention was focused on child marriage, education, women’s suffrage and marriage laws (polygamy). In the early Independence period, they expanded their focus to include their contribution to the building of a new state by concentrating on socio-economic problems and the marriage laws. In more recent times, since the establishment of the New Order in 1968 and in the Reformation period thereafter, the women’s movements for the first time considered the acceptability of the term “feminist” and how the terms “feminist” and “gender” should be used. The movement also debated marriage laws, the trafficking of women and children, the quotas of women in the political arena, the practice of polygamy and the Pornography Bill that was first proposed to Parliament in 1999 and passed with amendments in 2008. The issue of marriage laws, particularly concerning polygamy and women’s right to divorce, has proven the most controversial issue since the birth of the movement.

The relationship between male and female organisations has changed over time. From the late colonial to the early independence period, few women’s religious organisations were fully independent of the all-male parent organisations to which they were attached. It is only recently that fully independent women’s religious organisations have formed. By contrast, independent secular women’s organisations have a long history in Indonesia. This indicates that women’s independence and the equal status of men and women have been historically more problematic in the religious sphere than in Indonesian culture in general. Nonetheless, Indonesia has
seen roughly equal numbers of dependent/subsidiary and semi-autonomous women’s organisations from both the religious and secular camps.

This study has shown that the gender equality movement has garnered support from other movements and from the government. It has also enjoyed the support of the progressive Islamic *pembaharuan* (reform) movement and of women activists globally. However, it has been challenged by the Islamist movement in Indonesia. Successive Indonesian governments have also sometimes inhibited gender equality. In the immediate post-independence period, the Old Order did not pay much attention to women’s issues because its focus was more upon nation building. In contrast, the New Order paid more attention to women’s organisations, using them to support government policy while pressuring women into subsidiary roles to men. Yet since the 1980s, despite the New Order’s repressive gender ideology, criticism of Indonesia’s patriarchal culture has found voice. During this time, feminist ideas were strengthened; Indonesian academics began to show a great concern for gender issues.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the New Order government, although generally conservative regarding gender issues, actually moved to significantly support gender equality. It established Centres (PSWs/PSGs) for promoting gender equality across Indonesia. In the Reformation Era, successive governments have actively promoted gender equality through The Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection and the PSWs/PSGs.

PSWs/PSGs in Indonesia’s universities are important social justice Centres and part of the gender equality movements. Thus, they play significant roles in increasing gender equality awareness, in both academic circles and in the Indonesian community at large. The number of PSW/PSG since the first establishment has increased significantly from 16 PSWs in 1988 to 123 in 2003. Among selected
PSWs/PSG in Yogyakarta universities, there are some notable similarities and differences. All Centres focus more upon gender issues than on feminism. Also, they all have males as core staff, albeit there is disagreement over whether a male should be top leader of the Centre. Through their programs, e.g., training, seminars, social services and publications, the six selected Centres in Yogyakarta have been working hard to achieve their missions. For example, PSW UIN Yogyakarta is one of the leading Women’s Studies Centres in Yogyakarta, perhaps in Indonesia. The people at this Centre have achieved significant results in their efforts to create gender justice from Islamic perspectives by producing new egalitarian interpretations of the Islamic texts on gender issues and spreading that information to Islamic judges, Islamic leaders and scholars across the country.

7.2. Findings of Attitudes towards Feminism among Gender Activists at PSWs and PSG, Yogyakarta

My research has shown that although all of the respondents who assisted my study were either gender activists or people concerned with women’s or gender issues, not all of them identified as ‘feminists’. Overall, more activists at PSWs and PSG in Yogyakarta universities identified as ‘non-feminists’ (56%) than ‘feminist’ (44%). My attempts to ascertain why people identify as ‘feminist’ and other do not, revealed that people who have more knowledge of feminism are less prejudiced and thus more likely to identify as ‘feminist’. Also, those who adopt a progressive approach towards contentious gender issues in Islam are more likely to identify as ‘feminists’.

Looking at the respondents’ social backgrounds, I found that some social background factors have no effect upon the choice of feminist identity. Age group, ethnicity (Javanese and non Javanese), type of educational background (social
science/non-social science backgrounds) and overseas experience are not significantly associated with self-identifying as ‘feminist’.

But, one social background factor definitely influences whether one identifies as ‘feminist’ or not: gender. Being male or female influences feminist identity choice; but, in a somewhat surprising way. The percentage of female respondents who self-identified as ‘non feminist’ was significantly higher (35 per cent) than that of male respondents (21 per cent). This result suggested that females are less likely to identify as ‘feminists’ than male gender activists.

Another social background factor that influences feminist identity choice is the type of university wherein people work; but, again, the findings were surprising. Feminist identity is more common in Islamic universities’ Centres than in public universities. The percentage of respondents from Islamic universities who self-identified as ‘feminist’ (31 per cent) was almost the same as those who self-identified as ‘non-feminist’ (32 per cent). However, the percentage of respondents from public universities who self-identified as ‘feminist’ was significantly lower (13 per cent) than the percentage of those who self-identified as ‘non-feminist’ (24 per cent).

Gender activists used a variety of terms to identify themselves: ‘Islamic Feminist’ (feminis Islam), ‘Muslim Feminist’ (feminist Muslim), ‘Gender Activist’ (aktivis gender), ‘Women Activist’ (aktivis perempuan), Gender Strugglers (pejuang Gender), Sholeeha Feminist (feminist sholiyah), Liberal Feminist (feminist Liberal), Feminist Plus (feminis plus) and Empowering Women (pemberdaya perempuan). The term ‘Muslim Feminist’ was more commonly used by those who self-identified as ‘feminist’ whereas ‘Gender Activist’ was the most preferred label among ‘non-feminist’.
I also explored the activists’ understandings of the term ‘feminist’ and looked at the association between feminist identity and views on a variety of gender issues. Self-identifying as ‘feminist’ or ‘non-feminist’ is contingent to the various understandings surrounding the terms ‘feminist’, and the positive and the negative connotations they convey to society. What self-identified feminists meant by ‘feminist’ can be summarised as: men/women who concerned with women’s issues, who support the notion that women are human beings imbued with the same range of capabilities as men who are aware of the extant gender inequality, but who do not necessarily participate in demonstrations or join women’s NGOs.

I found that while some respondents opt not to identify as ‘feminist’, they nonetheless define ‘feminist’ in a positive manner. They opted not to identify as ‘feminist’ for two specific of reasons: first, some people felt they lacked sufficient knowledge and involvement. They seemed to think that to be ‘feminist’, needs advanced knowledge, should take part in certain types of activities such as demonstrations or joining women-related NGOs, and actively advocate and become involved in issues dealing with women and gender publicly. Second, some expressed concern regarding the public’s negative perceptions of women who call themselves ‘feminists’. In Indonesian society there are many negative understandings of the term ‘feminist’, such as: feminists refute women’s kodrat (God-given nature), they want to dominate men, they accept lesbianism, are too extreme, too radical, and are men-haters. The negative connotations shown in this research are mostly attached to women, making self-identification as ‘feminist’ a higher risk for women than for men in Indonesian society. For this reasons, some people reject identifying themselves socially as ‘feminist’, although they personally or internally may not have any problem with their ‘feminist’ identity. The rejection of self-identification as
‘feminist’ is, therefore, a part of strategic positioning in society. While, some gender activists and scholars reject a ‘feminist’ identity because they see the term ‘feminist’ as imbued with negative connotations (see above), others misunderstandings the meaning of the term ‘feminist’, sometimes it is perceived as motherhood or womanhood, something that relates to a woman’s personality and femininity.

I also investigated gender activists’ perceptions of the foreignness of feminism and its place in Islam. Most respondents argued that universal values such as gender equality, gender justice, and their recognition of women as human beings were based either on their own sources pertaining to Islamic tradition (the Qur’an and Hadith) or on local tradition; thus their ideas were not imported from Western feminism. However, some respondents reported that many Western feminist concepts and strategies have influenced and shaped their thought and strategies in dealing with women and gender issues in Indonesia, e.g., challenging Indonesia’s patriarchal culture. They favour the contextual approach that encourages Indonesian gender activists to be more critical and use gender and feminism as tools for analysis of gender power relationships. Many respondents acknowledged Western feminists’ ability to raise awareness of gender issues, strengthen feminist identity, and build up faith in Islam among Indonesian Muslim gender activists.

However, not all gender activists agreed with these propositions. Some Indonesian Muslim gender activists disagreed with some Western feminist ideas, claiming they are not relevant to the Indonesian context. Their objections included what they saw as feminists’ rejection of the institution of family, the notion that men and women must have the same rights in all aspects of life, the idea of challenging and questioning the religious notion of women’s leadership in prayer and in the
family, the notion of lesbianism (which is sometimes associated with feminism), and
the concept of men as the enemy, something they also associated with feminism.

Although the gender activists who participated in my study disagreed on
many points regarding feminism, all agreed that the concept of having a family is
non-negotiable – everyone is obliged to marry and have children. This contrasts with
the notions of feminists in Western countries, where feminists are often single
women or women in couples who may opt not to have children.

7.3. Findings on Attitudes towards Key Gender Issues Understood in the Light
of Islamic Teachings

On all but one issue (women’s right to lead public mixed gender prayers (imam
sholat)), I rated the majority of respondents’ views as ‘progressive’, with less than
half holding either a ‘moderate’ or ‘literalist’ view. This was understandable given
the involvement of all of the respondents in gender activism. But what could not be
anticipated was the variation in the responses to the different types of issues, and the
exceedingly high rate of progressive responses to some particular issues.

On three issues, over 90% of respondents expressed progressive views. These
were: equality in gender roles, equality of sexual expression, and equality in
decision-making in the family. People tended to progressive on these issues. My
interpretation of this finding is that these issues are not particularly religiously
contentious because they are not issues taken to religious courts.

On other issues, while a strong majority expressed progressive views,
substantial numbers of moderate and (to a considerably lesser extent) textualist views
were expressed. These issues included inheritance, witness, and woman’s creation.
People tended to be wary when expressing their views on these matters because (a)
inheritance and witness issues are taken to the religious court, and (b) the issue of woman’s creation relates to a creation story that is strongly socialised in the Indonesian society.

On a further two issues, progressive and moderate responses constituted the vast majority; but, they were fairly evenly weighted, with progressives only a small majority. These issues included polygamy and the equality of women’s status over men in the family and society. The weaker progressive response can be explained by the fact that these matters have sparked controversy throughout history, even among women activists themselves.

Finally, on one issue only approximately two out of three respondents chose a moderate position, with less than a third taking a progressive position. This was the acceptability of women acting as prayer leaders for both men and women. It seemed that the respondents were less progressive on the issue of women’s right to lead public mixed gender prayers (imam sholat) than on other issues because this matter relates to ritual activity (ibadah) that is seen as specified in the original revelation via the Qur’an and Hadiths.

7.4. Reflections and Recommendations for Further Research

This research has focused in the main upon feminist identity and conceptualisations of gender issues by Muslim gender studies elites in Yogyakarta. Some recommendations can be made for further research. First, since my sample was limited to universities in one city, it would be good to extend it to activists in other regional PSWs and PSGs elsewhere in Indonesia. One would expect to find less progressive attitudes in regions outside of Yogyakarta, second, learn more about the general public’s attitudes towards feminism and gender equality in Islam we need to
survey other university people not associated with the Gender Studies Centres, i.e., students, staff and decision makers. One would expect to find less well educated people outside of the universities evincing less progressive attitudes towards gender issues in Islam. Extending the research to a cross-national survey, that is, to other regions of the world, could produce markedly different results in line with potential respondents’ different cultural, geographical and politico-economical backgrounds.

My study of feminism and the gender equality movement in Indonesia suggests that the people of countries with more heavily restrictive patrilineal kinship systems and lower levels of education and economic development, may be less progressives vis-a-vis their views of feminism and gender equality.
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Yogyakarta: CISForm, UIN Sunan Kalijaga, pp. 228–56.


Undang-undang Republik Indonesia tentang Perkawinan (1974).

Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia tentang Perlindungan Anak (2002).


Appendix 1: Survey Instrument

Questionnaire No 1

1. Age : ........................years old
2. Ethnicity : .................................
3. University : □ Islamic □ Public (UIN,UMY,UII,UGM,UNY,UPN)
4. Sex : □ Male □ Female
5. Educational backgrounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Year of Graduation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Involvement in Project/programs/courses relating to gender and/or feminism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of project/program/course</th>
<th>Please give appropriate position by giving the number: 1=Participants, 2= committee, 3= speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Publication on gender or feminism in Islam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of publication and Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9a. How familiar are you with feminist literature? Please circle the number that reflects your familiarity: 10 indicates the least familiar and 100 indicates very familiar.

10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
b. If you have read or learned anything about the following types of feminism, please tick those you have learned something about.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feminism</th>
<th>✓</th>
<th>Feminism</th>
<th>✓</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal feminism</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Radical Feminism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist-socialist Feminism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stand Point feminism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco feminism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural Feminism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmodern Feminism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Psychoanalytic feminism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Feminism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Would you please name one or a few feminist writings that have impressed you (Western or Muslim feminists)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. If you have been impressed by particular feminist scholars (Muslim or Western), please name one or a few of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Feminists’ Names</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Feminists’ Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Do you consider yourself a feminist?  Yes  No

13. What do you mean by feminist when you say that you are/are not a feminist?

_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________

14. a. If you consider yourself a feminist, which of these terms do you prefer to use to identify yourself
   1). ‘Islamic feminist’, 2). ‘Muslim feminist’, 3). Both 4) Others ...............
b. If you consider yourself not a feminist, which of these terms do you prefer to use to identify yourself

**Questionnaire No 2**

**Instruction** Please choose the appropriate statement by putting a tick √ in the columns provided:
- If you are neutral please tick zero (0)
- If you choose Strongly Agree please tick scores 1 to 5 ( 1 indicates Strongly Agree)
- If you choose Strongly Disagree please tick scores 6 to 10 ( 10 indicates Strongly Disagree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A feminist is not a good Muslim</td>
<td>N SS STS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Feminists are people who have been westernised.</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Feminists cannot be family focused</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A feminist a trouble maker</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The worth of a human being is measured by how she/he does the right thing in the right situation.</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Muslims do not need to learn and adopt Western advances in education, science and politics to strengthen and modernise the Muslim community.</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A fresh interpretation of Islamic sources and a reformulation of Islam are urgently needed.</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Historical and contextual elements need to be taken into account to reinterpret and understand Islamic texts.</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hermeneutic method does not fit an understanding of the Qur’an and Hadith.</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Islamic teachings may not be changed even slightly because they remain valid in</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
all periods of time and all places.

11 Understanding Arabic language is not important to find the original message because the Qur’an and Hadith have been translated into local language.

12 An appropriate understanding Islam should go back to the canonical texts (Al Qur’an and Al Hadith) and broaden the scope for *ijtihad* (interpretation).

13 A literal interpretation of Islamic texts tends to produce gender inequality understanding.

14 A contextual interpretation of Islamic texts tends to produce gender equality understanding.

### Questionnaire No 3

**Multiple choice Questionnaire**

**Please choose the statement (a, b or c) that most accurately reflects your views**

1. **Status**
   - a. Men have a higher status than women
   - b. Men and women are complementary
   - c. Men and women are equal

2. **Kodrat** (natural or inborn quality),
   - a. Women’s *kodrat* is best expressed by being at home and doing domestic work and raising her children, whereas men’s *kodrat* is properly expressed in public and earning money.
   - b. Childbirth and breastfeeding are *kodrat* (natural or inborn quality), but raising a child and doing housework are socially constructed roles, tasks that can be done by men or women.
   - c. Islamic teaching prioritises woman’s domestic roles and requires them to have a major role in bringing up the children.

3. **Roles**
   - a. A woman can work but it is not necessary to develop her career because her main responsibility should be in the domestic sphere.
   - b. Both men and women should be encouraged to take their places in the public and domestic spheres.
   - c. It is not appropriate for a husband to do domestic tasks such as washing, ironing, cooking, and doing dishes and child care.

4. **Leadership**
   - a. Women cannot be leaders of men
   - b. Women can be leaders of men as long as they have the capability, but not in *sholat*
   - c. Women can be leaders of adult men if they have the capability, including in *sholat*
5. Inheritance
   a. Because men have a double portion of inheritance whereas women have a single portion, other types of charity should be found for women.
   b. Either woman should inherit an equal portion to a man or whoever needs the more regardless of gender.
   c. Men should have a double portion whereas women should have a single portion in inheritance.

6. Witness
   a. It is proper that one male witness is equal to two females in Islamic law.
   b. One female witness is acceptable if she is capable or an expert on the issue.
   c. Men and women are equally capable of being witnesses.

7. Human Creation
   a. Woman was created from man’s rib is only an analogy.
   b. Woman was created from man’s rib
   c. Men and women were created from the same essence.

8. Polygamy
   a. Polygamy is acceptable only where conditions of the universal concepts of justice prevail such as protecting orphans and widows.
   b. To have more than one wife is natural because men are naturally polygamous and women are naturally monogamous.
   c. Polygamy is unacceptable because it is out of date with the present time and causes multiple problems.

9. Sexual Relationship
   a. The wife must not reject the husband’s sexual advances.
   b. Men and women have equal rights to sexual pleasure and expression, but the husband’s sexual need should be prioritised before the wife.
   c. Men and women have equal rights to sexual pleasure and expression

10. Decision making in the family
    a. Only the husband/father has the right to make decisions in the family
    b. It is better for the wife/mother to make decisions regarding the domestic tasks and for the husband/father in the public domain.
    c. Every family member has an equal right to make decisions in the family depending upon on their capability and capacity.
Appendix 2: Lists and ways of operationalising variables

Operationalising Variables

Hypotheses:
1. People with a clear understanding of the concept of feminism tend to identify themselves as feminists. The more people understand feminist scholarship, the more likely they are to call themselves ‘feminists’.
2. People who call themselves ‘feminists’ will show less prejudice towards feminism than people who do not.
3. People in the PSWs, who are well acquainted with neo-Modernist Islamic scholarship on gender and Western feminist scholarship are more likely to consider themselves as feminists than those who are not well acquainted with such literature.
4. Younger people are more likely to call themselves ‘feminists’ than older people.
5. People in the PSWs who have some tertiary-level education in the social sciences are more likely to consider themselves feminists than those who have not.
6. Feminist-identified participants from Islamic universities are more likely to call themselves ‘Islamic feminists’ than ‘Muslim feminists’, whereas feminist-identified participants from secular universities are more likely to call themselves ‘Muslim feminists’ than ‘Islamic feminists’.
7. Participants from Islamic universities are more likely to have positions close to ‘liberal’ orientations on feminism and gender than participants from secular universities.
8. Female participants are more likely to refer to themselves ‘feminists’ than male participants.

List of Variables
A. Social background characteristics: age, institutional affiliation, sex, and social science education.
B. How knowledgeable people are about feminist scholarship
C. Strength of negative stereotypes of feminists
D. Identity: feminist vs. not feminist identified
E. How knowledgeable people are about Islamic Renewal scholarship (Pembaharuan)
F. Approach to understanding gender in Islam

A. Social Background Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>H 4</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Institution (Islamic Vs Secular University)</td>
<td>H 6 and 7</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>H8</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Social science Education</td>
<td>H 5</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### B. How Knowledge People are about Feminist scholarship (Hypothesis no 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Operationalising the Variables</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Self-assessment of level of feminist knowledge</td>
<td>Short Answer Question No. 7a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Self-assessment of level of familiarity with different types of feminist thought (such as liberal, radical, Marxist-socialist and standpoint)</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 7b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ability to identify some prominent feminists from the West and the Islamic world</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ability to identify important feminist literature written by western feminists and Muslim feminists.</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Extent of involvement in projects, programs, and/or courses relating to gender and/or feminism.</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Number of publications on gender or feminism in Islam</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### C. Strength of negative stereotyping of feminists (Hypothesis 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Operationalising the Variables</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>’Good Muslim Stereotype</td>
<td>Thurstone Q. no 1,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Westernised Stereotype</td>
<td>Thurstone Q. no.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Family Focus Stereotype</td>
<td>Thurstone Q. no.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Open-ended response to understanding of ‘feminist’</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire, Q. No 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### D. Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Operationalising the Variables</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Feminist-identified or Non-feminist-identified</td>
<td>No 1, 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>‘Islamic feminists’-, or ‘Muslim feminists’-, or other-identified</td>
<td>No 6</td>
<td>Short Answer Questionnaire No 12</td>
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</table>

### E. How Knowledgeable about Pembaharuan. (Hypothesis No 3)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>No</th>
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<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Acquainted with the basic ideas of neo-modernist Islamic scholarship</td>
<td>Thurstone Qs No 4,5, and 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Understand the neo-modernist approach to interpreting religious text: contextual and</td>
<td>Thurstone Qs No 7,8,9,10 and 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Operationalising the Variables</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1  | Holds Islamist, moderate or liberal views on gender in Islam in these areas:  

1) Status  
2) Roles/ Kodrat  
3) Human Creation  
4) Leadership  
5) Inheritance  
6) Witness  
7) Polygamy  
8) Sexuality  
9) Making decision in the family | Multiple choice Qs. No 1 - 10 |
Appendix 3: List of In-depth Interviews

Interview Schedule for In-depth interviews (Respondents)

List of Variables
A. Social background activities
B. Knowledge of feminist scholarship
C. Approach to understanding gender in Islam
   1. Equal partnership vs Equal complementary

Interview Schedule for In-depth interviews
Variables A and B

1. When did you first become interested in gender issues?
2. Could you please tell me how you started to become involved in the PSW?
3. How long have you been involved with the PSW?
4. What is your position in the PSW?
5. What are your roles in the PSW?
6. Do you have any other activities or positions outside PSW relating to gender or women issues? Where and what is your role?
7. What program/subject did you take? And what is your research topic?
8. Would you please tell me more about your publications? Why did you write about that issue?
9. In the questionnaire you said that you are/aren’t feminist. Would you please tell me more, what you mean by 'feminist'?
10. If you consider yourself a feminist, which form of identification do you prefer? a. Islamic feminist or b. Muslim feminist or, c. Other: ............... why?
11. Are there any western feminist ideas that you consider inappropriate or wrong for Indonesian Muslim women? Why?
12. What western feminist ideas have inspired you and shaped your thinking?

Interview Schedule for In-depth interview
Variables C

1. Some Muslims believe that men have a higher status than women based on the Qur’an verse 34. How do you interpret that verse?
2. People say that women’s kodrat is in “kasur, dapur, sumur” (bed, kitchen, doing household jobs). What do you think about this interpretation?
3. Do you agree that man is head of the family? Is it still relevant today? Why or why not?
4. Who has the responsibility for Na’fkah (earning money)? Why?
5. Men and women relationships should be equal partnership or equal complementary? Why?
6. How do you understand what Islam teaches about women and leadership? Can a woman be an Imam for adult men? Why you argue this way?
7. How do you interpret the human creation verse (An Nisa’: 1)?
8. Do you think that the classical understanding of Islamic inheritance law (that males should get a double portion and females a single) is relevant in the present time? Why/why not?
9. One Hadith states that a woman has half the brain of man. What is your understanding of that Hadith?
10. How do you understand what the Qur’an teaches about polygamy, e.g., in An-Nisa’: 3.
11. One Hadith says that “If the husband wants the wife to serve his sexual needs, and the wife rejects him, the Angel will curse the wife until the morning (subuh)”. What is your understanding of this Hadith?
12. Do you think that men and women have different innate sexuality? Do men have more sexual drive than women?

**Interview Schedule for In-depth interviews**

(Ethnography PSWs/PSG)

**A. For directors/founders/leaders of PSWs (Institutional questions)**
1. Could you please tell me about the history of PSW establishment?
2. Why was PSW established at your university?
3. Who were the founding mothers/fathers of the PSW in your institution?
4. What are the significant contributions and roles of PSW in the university and in society?
5. Are there any requirements to be staff or activist in PSW?
6. How many staff do you have?
7. How did they come to be PSW staff?
8. What are the programs? Which is the most successful program? Why?
9. What strategies do you use to promote gender equality programs?
10. Do you have the support of university leaders? If yes, what kinds of support do they give to the Centre?
11. Do you have resources access such as library or website about the discourse?
12. Do you collaborate with other institutions? Please explain.

**B. For Ministry of Women’s Empowerment Staff (Institutional questions)**
1. Could you please tell me about the history of PSW establishment in Indonesia?
2. Why is it necessary to have PSWs in Indonesian universities?
3. Over time, how many PSWs have been established in Indonesia? How many are there now?
4. Do you have special programs for PSWs across Indonesian universities?
5. Is there any classification or level of PSW?
6. What challenges do PSWs have?
7. To date, have any other institutions collaborated with the Ministry of Women’s empowerment to manage and improve the quality and quantity of PSWs?
8. What are the roles and contributions of PSWs for Government?
9. What are your expectations of PSWs?
Appendix 4: Staff and Contact Address of PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta

Board Members of PSW UIN in 2009-2010
Advisory Board: Prof. Dr. Amin Abdullah (Rector) and Drs. Susilaningsih, MA.
Director: Dr. Ema Marhumah,
Executive Secretary: Inayah Rohmaniyah, S.Ag.M.Hum, MA,
Members: Drs. Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, MA, Dr. Siti Syamsiyatun, MA, Drs. Muh Isnanto, M.Si, Drs. M Sodik, S.Sos, M.Si., Alimatul Qibtiyah, S.Ag.M.Si. MA, and Dr. Waryono Abdul Ghafur, M.Ag (PSW, 2009).

Contact Address:
PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta
Jln. Marsda Adisucipto 1 Yogyakarta Phone: 274 550779
Email: pswsuka@yahoo.co.id

Table 15:
List of Activities, PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>‘Rights from Home for Democracy’ Workshop</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Facilitated Annual Strategic Planning on Gender Mainstreaming in UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta Workshop</td>
<td>MORA and CIDA Canada</td>
<td>2002-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Domestic Rights is Better; Towards Equal Partnership for Islamic Judges, KUA Staff, Islamic Organisations Workshop on</td>
<td>DANIDA-Canada Denmark</td>
<td>2001-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gender Awareness for IAIN Students Workshop</td>
<td>IAIN Sunan Kalijaga</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Annual East Asian Short Course on Islam, Gender and Reproductive Health</td>
<td>The Ford Foundation</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gender Responsive Management in UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta Workshop</td>
<td>MORA-CIDA Canada</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gender Inclusive Course Design for Islamic School Workshop</td>
<td>MORA-CIDA Canada</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gender Mainstreaming in UIN/IAIN Curriculum Workshop</td>
<td>Mora-CIDA Canada</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Gender Awareness for Faculty Members of Islamic Higher Education in Yogyakarta and</td>
<td>CIDA-Canada IISEP,</td>
<td>1996-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminars and Conferences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>International Workshop: Gender, Women and Technology</td>
<td>MORA-CIDA Canada</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>One Day Seminar: Gender and Technology, Government of Indonesia</td>
<td>Ministry of RISTEK</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Seminar: Amendment of National Marriage Law for the Protection of Women and Children</td>
<td>DANIDA-Denmark</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>One Day Seminar: Amendment to the Indonesian National Compilation of Marriage Law</td>
<td>MORA</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>International Conference: Islam, Women and the New World Order</td>
<td>DANIDA-Denmark</td>
<td>2005</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baseline study: Muslim judges’ and kua staff’s gender perspectives in Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Students’ preference for selecting faculty and academic concentration at UIN Sunan Kalijaga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3 | Research for Female Lecturers:  
  a. Double burden for women: the male lectures’ families in UIN Sunan Kalijaga.  
  c. Female and male worker’s motivation at the Faculty of Islamic Theology and Philosophy UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta  
  d. Child workers in the informal sector in Magelang  
  e. Domestic violence in Imogiri Yogyakarta | IISEP-CIDA | 2005 |
| 4 | Impact study on the effectiveness of training for various stakeholders | CIDA | 2005 |
| 5 | Research into Sexuality in Islam:  
  a. Female circumcision in the Hadith  
  b. Female circumcision between Prophetic Sunnah and Tradition  
  c. Female circumcision in Islamic Law schools jurisprudence  
  d. Female circumcision from Mahmud Syaltut’s perspective  
  e. Menstruation in Fakhruddin al-Razy’s Tafsir  
  f. Female private rights in iddah  
  g. Is sirri (unregistered married age) | CIDA | 2004 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Title/Theme</th>
<th>Author/Editor/Edition</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Gender and Islam, between Text</td>
<td>(Eds) Waryono Abdul. Ghofur</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Authors/Sub-Authors</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Islam and the Construction of Sexuality</td>
<td>Iwan Abdullah, Nasaruddin Umar, Sarsanto W. Sarwono, Saparinah Sadli (Eds) S. Edy Santosa</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Rethink Sexuality Discourse</td>
<td>(Eds) M. Sodik</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Gender Mainstreaming in IAIN Curricula</td>
<td>Tim PSW</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>The Integration of Human Rights Issues in Syariah Faculty Curricula</td>
<td>Siti Ruhiaini Dzuhayatin, dkk</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Authors/Editors</td>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>The Dilemma of Women across Culture and Religion (Dilema Perempuan dalam Lintas Agama dan Budaya)</td>
<td>Dr. Nurun Najwah (Eds). Mochamad Sodik</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Gender Best Practice (Pengarusan Utamaan Gender dalam Universitas Negeri Sunan Kalijaga)</td>
<td>Andayani, Mohammad Sodik dan Rachmad Hidayat (Eds). Rachmad Hidayat</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Build a Blessing Family (Membina Keluarga Barokah)</td>
<td>Hamim Ilyas dan Rachmad Hidayat</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Translation: Science Question in Feminism (Diskursus Sains dan Feminisme)</td>
<td>Sandra Harding Penerjemah: Siti Syamsiyatun, Alimatul Qibliyah, Inayah Rohmaniyah (Eds). Siti Syamsiyatun</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Impact Studies on Gender Mainstreaming PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga</td>
<td>Waryono Abdul Ghafur, Rahmat Hidayat, Muh Isnanto</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Men’s Involvement in Reproductive Health (two languages: Bahasa and English)</td>
<td>Hamim Ilyas, Sekar Ayu Aryani, Rahmat Hidayat</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Centre for Women’s Studies: State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta (two languages: Bahasa and English)</td>
<td>PSW UIN Sunan Kalijaga</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Poligami (polygamy)</td>
<td>Vol. 1, No. 1</td>
<td>March, 2002</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Pornografi (pornography)</td>
<td>Vol. 4, No. 1</td>
<td>April, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Menstrual Taboo</td>
<td>Vol. 5, No. 2</td>
<td>April, 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Perempuan dan Spiritualitas (Women and Spirituality)</td>
<td>Vol. 6 No. 2</td>
<td>April, 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5: Staff and Contact Address of PSG UII, Yogyakarta

Board Members of PSG UII in 2010-2014
Director: Ninik Sri Rahayu, SE., MM.
Secretary: Abdur Rohman, S.Sos., M.Si.

Contact Address:
PSG UII
Jalan Kaliurang Km. 14,5 Gedung D3 FE UII Lantai 4 Yogyakarta Indonesia 55584
phone number: 0274-6540862/ 0274-898459 email: psguii@yahoo.com and psg@uui.ac.id

Table 17:
List of Activities PSG UII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Media/Funding/Researcher</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Book review “The main issues with regard to feminism and its relevance, “- legalization of polygamy, not just for sex (“Kajian buku Permasalahan Pokok Mengenai Feminisme dan Relevansinya” – Poligami Disahkan bukan atas Dorongan Seks Semata”)</td>
<td>Koran harian Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>21 January 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Panel Discussion “Muslim Women Past, Present and Tomorrow” Many Women Still Reluctant to Get Achievement “ (Diskusi Panel “Wanita Muslim Dulu, Kini dan Esok “Masih Banyak Perempuan Gamang Meraih Prestasi”)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>28 May 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Book review: Challenge Violence Against Women (Bedah Buku “Menggugat Kekerasan pada Perempuan”)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>6 October 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Talk Show Sexual Harassment in Educational Institutions (Perspective Religion, Law and Psychology) – Cases of Sexual Abuse Rise (Talk Show Pelecehan Seksual di Lembaga</td>
<td>Harian Bernas</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Seminar: Picture of Student Life at Student Boarding House in Yogyakarta, Needs Serious Attention (Seminar Potret Kehidupan Pelajar-Mahasiswa Kos/Pondokan di Yogyakarta Soal Pondokan Perlu Perhatian Serius)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>23 May 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Seminar: Picture of Student Life at Student Dormitory in Yogyakarta: Dormitory is not Industrialization (Seminar Potret Kehidupan Pelajar-Mahasiswa Kos/Pondokan di Yogyakarta Rumah Pondokan Bukan Industrialisasi)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
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**Articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Women in Development Planning: The Role of Women often Ignored (Wanita Dalam Pembangunan: Perencanaan Pembangunan Sering Abaikan Peran Wanita)</td>
<td>Koran Harian Bernas</td>
<td>1 November 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Women In Development: Employment Opportunities for Women Increase but the Wage is not Sufficient (Wanita Dalam Pembangunan: Peluang Kerja bagi Wanita Meningkat tapi Tingkat Upah tidak Layak)</td>
<td>Koran Harian Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>2 November 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Exploitation of Women Worsened (Eksploitasi terhadap Perempuan Semakin Menggila)</td>
<td>Koran Harian Bernas</td>
<td>21 November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sexual Harassment in Higher Education Institutions (1) In Many Cases of Sexual Harassment comes to Late (Pelecehan Seksual di Lembaga Pendidikan Tinggi (1)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>29 March 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sexual Harassment in Higher Education Institutions (2) Protection of Victims: Law is Weak (Pelecehan Seksual di Lembaga Pendidikan Tinggi (2) Perlindungan Hukum Korban Masih Lemah)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>30 March 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sexual Harassment in Higher Education Institutions (3) The Need for Special Treatment in Universities (Pelecehan Seksual di Lembaga Pendidikan Tinggi (3) Perlu Unit Konseling Khusus di PT)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>30 March 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dormitory Students Need Attention: Cultural Politics (Mahasiswa Pondokan Butuh Perhatia: Rekayasa Kultural)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>23 August 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Analysis of Aid Management (Analisis-Manajemen Bantuan)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>23 November 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Be Aware of The Dangers of Vehicle Exhaust Fumes (Sadarilah, Bahaya Asap Knalpot Kendaraan)</td>
<td>Kedaulatan Rakyat</td>
<td>23 June 2002</td>
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**Research**

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<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Parenting with Gender Perspective as an Effort to Increase the Role of Women (Pola Asuh Berwawasan Jender sebagai Upaya Peningkatan Peran Wanita)</th>
<th>PSW-UII with DIKTI.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Attitudes towards Gender Equality in Democratic Parenting Families (Sikap terhadap Kesetaraan Jender ditinjau dari Pola Asuh Demokratis Orang Tua)</td>
<td>Qurotul Uyun, S.Psi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Violence Against Wives in the Family according to Islam: An Effort to Interpret Religious Texts Critically (Kekerasan terhadap Istri dalam Keluarga menurut Agama Islam (Upaya mencari sebuah Penafsiran Ulang secara Kritis terhadap Dalil-dalil)</td>
<td>Drs. Syarief Zubaidah, M.Ag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Riffat Hasan’s Thought about Feminism and its Relevance (Pemikiran Riffat Hasan tentang Feminisme dan Relevansinya)</td>
<td>Dra. Sri Haningsih, M.Ag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Study of the Profile of Child Achievement Parents in DIY (Studi tentang Profil Orang Tua yang Memiliki Anak-anak Berprestasi di DIY)</td>
<td>H. Fuad Nashori, S.Psi., M.Si.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Profile of Position and Role of Education: Staff from a Gender Perspective at UII (Profil Kedudukan dan Peran Pegawai Edukatif UII dalam Perspektif Jender)</td>
<td>Dra. Trias Setiawati, M.Si.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Implementation of Environmental Management in DIY from a</td>
<td>Sri Hastuti Puspitasari, SH.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gender Perspective (Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup Berwawasan Jender di Kodya Yogyakarta)</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gender analysis of Fiqh scholars thought about the requirement to be Judges and Witnesses in the Islamic Court System (Analisis Jender terhadap Pemikiran Ulama Fiqh tentang Syarat Hakim dan Saksi dalam Sistem Peradilan Islam)</td>
<td>Drs. H. Tamzis M, Dpl., MA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Employee stress levels of UII Education Staff in terms of Husband Support (Tingkat Stress Karyawan Bagian Edukatif UII ditinjau dari Dukungan Suami)</td>
<td>Kumolohadi, S.Psi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The influence of the dynamics of formal and informal groups towards an increase of Family Welfare (Pengaruh Dinamika Kelompok Formal dan Informal terhadap Peningkatan Keluarga Sejahtera)</td>
<td>PSW-BKKBN</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>The Implementation of the improving of Women’s roles in DIY (Pelaksanaan Program Peningkatan Peranan Wanita di Propinsi DIY)</td>
<td>Forkom – Penda</td>
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</table>

**Consultation**

PSG UII has online consultation about women’s issues via phone and Yahoo messenger at psguii@yahoo.com. Available on Monday –Friday from 09.00 a.m. – 03.00 p.m.
Appendix 6: Staff and Contact Address of PSW UMY

Board Members of PSW UMY

Contact address:
Pusat Studi Wanita Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Kampus Terpadu UMY Jl.Lingkar Selatan Tamantirto, Bantul Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 55183 Telp.(0274) 387656 (hunting) Fax.(0274) 387646 Psw.186.

Table 18:
List of Activities PSW UMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Funding/Researcher</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National seminars: issues surrounding the lives of children <em>(Seminar Nasional tentang Masalah Seputar Kehidupan Anak)</em></td>
<td>Collaboration PSW UMY-UII-UNY</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Seminar: gender bias in the interpretation of al Qur’an <em>(Seminar Nasional Bias Gender dalam Penafsiran Al Qur’an)</em></td>
<td>PSW UMY</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Accreditation workshop: scientific journals <em>(Workshop Akreditasi Jurnal Ilmiah)</em></td>
<td>PSW UMY</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Talk show: violence against women in the media <em>(Talkshow Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan di Media Massa)</em></td>
<td>Collaboration between PSW-UMY and Women’s Boarding School, Ahmad Dahlan</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>sirri marriage seminars between benefits and harm <em>(Seminar Nikah Sirri: Antara Manfaat dan Mudharat)</em></td>
<td>Collaboration between PSW-UMY and IMM UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Seminars: veil between the intellect and appearance <em>(Seminar Jilbab, Antara Intelektualitas dan Penampilan)</em></td>
<td>Collaboration between PSW-UMY and LPPI-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Panel discussion: The Role of Indonesian Women in Politics <em>(Diskusi Panel Peran Politik Perempuan Indonesia)</em></td>
<td>Collaboration between PSW-UMY Yand Aufklarung Discussion Forum</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gender Analysis Training <em>(Pelatihan Analisis)</em></td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Regional Seminar: Women’s Reproductive Health (Seminar Regional Kesehatan Reproduksi Wanita)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td><strong>Research</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gender Development Data Inventory in DIY (Inventarisasi Pengembangan Data Gender di Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>Collaboration with Health Services and Social Welfare DIY</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gender Bias in the Learning Process in Elementary School, Muhammadiyah I Yogyakarta Sukonandi (Bias Gender dalam Proses Pembelajaran di Sekolah Dasar Muhammadiyah I Sukonandi Yogyakarta)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Discourse of Gender and Women's Political Roles in the Context of Political Power (Wacana Gender dan Peranan Politik Perempuan dalam Konteks Kekuasaan Politik)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gender Bias in Islamic Religious Education Curriculum: Content Analysis and Materials Munakahat Mawaris (Bias Gender dalam Kurikulum Pendidikan Agama Islam: Analisis Isi Materi Munakahat dan Mawaris)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Political Participation of Women in State Institutions and Influence against the Policymaking Process and Policy Generated (Partisipasi Politik Perempuan dalam institusi Kenegaraan dan Pengaruh Terhadap Proses pengambilan kebijakan dan Kebijakan yang Dihasilka)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Position of the Victim and the Crime of Rape (Kedudukan Korban dan Tindak Pidana Perkosaan)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Community Services</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poor low-cost market for communities around UMY campuses (Pasar murah untuk Masyarakat miskin di sekitar Kampus Terpadu UMY)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The establishment of Child Care UMY: For UMY staff and the Public (Pendirian Taman Asuh Anak UMY: Civitas Akademika UMY dan masyarakat umum yang membutuhkan)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gender socialisation for students in DIY (Sosialisasi Gender untuk Mahasiswa seluruh PT di DIY)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pap Smear examinations for the public (Pemeriksaan Papsmear untuk umum)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Giving guidance to the community UMY (Penyuluhan pada masyarakat di desa Bina UMY)</td>
<td>PSW-UMY</td>
<td>2001-2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 7: Staff and Contact Address of PSW UGM Yogyakarta

Board Members of PSW UGM

Contact address:
PSW UGM posits at Jalan Asem Kranji Blok K-5, Sekip Bulaksumur Yogyakarta Phone/fac 62 (0274) 583546 e-mail address: info@psw-ugm.web.id, psw_ugm@yahoo.co.id Website is http://www.psw-ugm.web.id/profil/. The Centre is located in office (similar to) a house that separated from the main UGM buildings. The library is located in the same place with office.

Table 19:
List of Activities PSW UGM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Training:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>a. Gender research methodology</td>
<td>PSW UGM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Planning for gender mainstreaming</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c. Gender Perspective of Leadership</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d. Gender analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Policy analysis development on responsive gender for small industry and trade through PSW roles</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Discussion:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Women’s issues (polygamy, women’s empowerment)</td>
<td>PSW UGM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Reproductive health</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c. Adolescent girls</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Gender issues in education, agriculture, law</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Seminars:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>a. Women’s leadership at Millennium III</td>
<td>PSW UGM</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Women’s participation in problems facing the nation</td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Women’s resurrection in raising Indonesian local potential</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>d. Women and political representation of the equivalent</td>
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<td>e. Women in Globalisation</td>
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<td>International seminars:</td>
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<td>a. Two days international conference: Women in the public sector</td>
<td>PSW UGM</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Women’s Empowerment Through Utilisation of Local Perceptions That Caring Environment to Enhance the Quality of Women’s Lives In Kokap District, Kulon Progo DIY</td>
<td>Sastriyani, susilowati, Soeprapto, Niken</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Gender Mainstreaming in Bantul District</td>
<td>Sastriyani, Niken, Iswinda</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Poverty Elevation Model for Women of Consecutive Disasters through the Development of Local Perceptions of Gender-Related Education</td>
<td>Sumartoyah, Sastriyani, Niken, Natin</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Women and Forest Economy</td>
<td>Sastriyani, Harsono, Ida Tungga, Indah, Niken</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Development Model for Socialisation of Reproductive Health of Adolescents</td>
<td>Noerhajati, Sastriyani, Susilowati, Soeprapto, Harsoyo, Retno, Niken, Yudith, Errys</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Mapping Violence against Teenage Girls in Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Supriyanto, Paskalis, Fatrawati, Niken, Yudith</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Development Model for Women’s empowerment in the Tourism Sector through the Utilisation of Local Potential concerning the Environment by Enhancing the Quality of Family life in Bantul District, Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Sastriyani, Niken, Ida Tungga</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Women’s Empowerment through the UMKM (MSMEs) in Gunung Kidul District</td>
<td>Sastriyani, Ida Tungga, Susilowati, Putut Wiryawan</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Enhancing the Quality of Life for Victimised Families through the Empowerment of Women in Sleman District, Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Supriyanto, Paskalis, Fatrawati, Niken, Yudith</td>
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<td>Study of Development of Local Potential Based on Bengkalis Regency</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Mapping the Smoking Habits of Children in Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>Sastriyani, Susilowati, Natin, Sisparyadi</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Criminality towards Children (Delinquent Children) in South Sumatra</td>
<td>Sastriyani, Susilowati, Sisparyadi</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Integration of Gender in Disaster Management</td>
<td>Sastriyani, Susilowati, Supriyanto, Niken, Yudith, Sarwi</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Gender Integration Policy Analysis of Community Empowerment for Poverty</td>
<td>Sastriyani, Harsoyo, Tuty Gandarsih, wibowo,</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Model Development Role for the Child Protection Society through Dasawisma</td>
<td>Susilowati, Niken, Yudith, Sarwi, Latifah Mega</td>
<td>2008</td>
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**Publications**

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<th>Title</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Profile of Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) in Sleman Distric</td>
<td>Profil Gender Development Index (GDI) dan Gender Empowerenment Measure (GEM) Kabupaten Sleman</td>
<td>2006</td>
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**Community Services**

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Working on Gender Profiles in the Regions Working on the Position Paper Mapping Gender Issues in the Regions Monitoring and Evaluating the Implementation of Gender Mainstreaming</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Giving Advocacy for Women’s Cooperation in DIY Areas (Kopwan Teratai)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Giving Assistance to Preparing Policy/Program/Activities Giving Advocacy for Preparing a National/Local Action Plan (GAP Analysis/Proba</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Giving Assistance to Gender Budgeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluating Programs in some Schools in DIY</td>
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</table>
Appendix 8: Staff and Contact Address of PSW UNY

Board Members of PSW UNY
Director: Marzuki, M.Ag.
Secretary: Nur Djazifah ER., M.Si.

Contact Address:
PSW UNY located in and around the University and contact number: Telephone: +62 274 550840; Fax: +62 274 550839, website is http://www.uny.ac.id/penelitian-dan-pengabdian/lemlit/pusat-studi-wanita/visi-misi

Appendix 9: Staff and Contact Address of PSW UPN ‘Veteran Pembangunan’ Yogyakarta

Board Members of PSW UPN
Advisory Board: Dr. Ir. Didit Welly Udjianto, MS. (rector) and Prof. Dr. Sari Bahagiaarti, M.SC.
Director: Dr. Ir. Siti Hamidah, MP,
Assistant Director: Dr. Ir. Dyah Rini Ratnaningsih, MT, Secretary: Ir. Sari Virgwawati, MT., Treasurer: Ir. Tuti Setyaningrum, M.Si. Research Division: Dr. Ir. Siti Syamsiar, MS., Community service Division: Dra. Istiana Rahmatwati, M.Si.
Training and Conference Division: Ir. Gunawan Nusanto, MT.
Network Division: Dr. Ir. Widayati, MT.

Contact address:
PSW UPN located in LPPM UPN “Veteran” Yogyakarta, Jl. SWK 104, Ringroad Utara Condongcatur, Sleman DIY, 55283 Indonesia, phone number: +62 274 486733/487792, Fax number: +62 274 487792.

Table 20:
List of Activities PSW UPN

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<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Taking Course on Gender Research Methodology</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Celebrating Kartini’s Day</td>
<td>April 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Production of TV program about Gender Equality and Equity (Serambi Jender)</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>at Jogja TV monthly</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Develop a Village Model Based on Community Empowerment/Life Skills</td>
<td>October-December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Presenting 3 papers on the International Seminar on Women in the Public Sector held by PSW UGM</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Presenting 2 papers at National Seminar on Women’s Leadership from a Gender Perspective convened by PSW UGM</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
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