‘Negative Pacifism’ and ‘Positive Pacifism’:
Japan’s Changing Security Identity and Implications for International Peace and Security

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities and Languages, the University of Western Sydney

November 2011
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Statement of Authenticity

I declare that this thesis is the result of my original work and all sources have been acknowledged.

Daisuke Akimoto
18 November 2011
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Abstract

This thesis examines Japan’s changing pacifism and its implications for Japan’s security identity from 1945 to the present. Existing literature overlooks a correlation between the shift in the nature of Japan’s pacifism and its changing security identity. Moreover, earlier scholarship tends to focus on a particular theoretical perspective, and, therefore, offers limited theoretical analyses. Accordingly, the main aim of the thesis is to contribute to filling this research gap by applying an alternative framework combined with an eclectic approach and offering a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s pacifism and security identity.

To examine the shift in Japanese pacifism, the thesis employed the concept of ‘negative pacifism’ (Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution) and ‘positive pacifism’ (the Preamble of the Constitution) as an analytical framework. The conceptualisation is derived from a definition of ‘negative-positive peace’ (Galtung 1969). To analyse multiple factors which facilitated the shift in Japan’s pacifism, the thesis applied ‘analytical eclecticism’ (Katzenstein 2008) and integrated the analytical framework (negative-positive pacifism) with orthodox international relations theories and approach. In an application of analytical eclecticism, the thesis proposed four theoretical perspectives of Japan’s security identity (constructivism): (a) pacifist state (classical liberalism/negative pacifism); (b) UN peacekeeper (neo-liberalism/positive pacifism); (c) normal state (classical realism/domestic pressure); and (d) US ally (neo-realism/external-structural pressure).

The main argument of the thesis is that there has been an incremental shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism in response to domestic and external pressures and that this shift has influenced Japan’s security identity. The core questions asked were: 1) What factors caused the shifts from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’?; 2) Has Japan been ‘normalising’ its military power by participating in international peace operations?; and 3) How have the shifts to ‘positive pacifism’ influenced Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist state’?

In order to substantiate the main argument and examine the questions, the thesis investigated the following case studies: (a) Japan’s security policy from 1945-1990; (b) Japan’s contributions to UNPKO in Cambodia and East Timor; (c) Japan’s responses to the US-led War on Terror; (d) Japan’s security cooperation with Australia and its implications for regional security; and (e) the Japanese constitutional revision issue in relation to Japan’s core security identity as a global image. This study concluded that although Japan’s security identity is fluctuating between the four models above, its core security identity has become, and remains that of a ‘global pacifist state’. The findings of this research demonstrated that an analysis based on the concept of negative-positive pacifism as an analytical framework combined with analytical eclecticism as an alternative research method assists in a comprehensive understanding of Japan’s pacifism and security identity. In this way, the thesis made an important contribution to the study of Japanese pacifism, security policy and international relations theory.
List of Abbreviation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Afghan Interim Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia New Zealand and United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Associaao Social Democratica Timor (Timorese Social Democratic Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN ISIS</td>
<td>ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS CSCAP</td>
<td>Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSMIN</td>
<td>Australia-United States Ministerial Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDGK</td>
<td>Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far Eastern Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPPAC</td>
<td>Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fretilin</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAER</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICORC</td>
<td>International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JANZUS</td>
<td>Japan Australia New Zealand and United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japanese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDSC</td>
<td>Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFIR</td>
<td>Japan Forum on International Relations</td>
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</table>
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSP   Japan Socialist Party
KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
LDP   Liberal Democratic Party
MSDF  Maritime Self-Defence Forces
MOD  Ministry of Defence Japan
MOJ  Ministry of Justice Japan
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
NARA Nippon-Australia Relations Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCR  Non-Communist Resistance
NDL  National Diet Library
NDPG National Defence Program Guidelines
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT  Non-Proliferation Treaty
ODA  Official Development Assistance
PBF  Peace-Building Force
PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PKF  Peacekeeping Forces
PKO  Peacekeeping Operations
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific
SCAP Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
SDI  Strategic Defence Initiative
SDF Self-Defence Forces
SDP  Social Democratic Party
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SNC  Supreme National Council
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TSD  Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
UDT  Uniao Democrataca Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union)
UK   United Kingdom
UN   United Nations
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAVEM 2 United Nations Angola Verification Mission 2
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNF  United Nations Forces
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor
UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOTIL United Nations Office in Timor-Leste
UNPKO United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNSAS UN Stand-by Arrangement
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM UN Special Commission
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNSMA</td>
<td>UN Special Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Note on Spelling

Spelling will follow English conventions. Accordingly, Japanese names will be spelt with the given name followed by the surname.
‘Negative Pacifism’ and ‘Positive Pacifism’:
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A Thesis
submitted in fulfilment
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by
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  b. Positive Pacifism: Japan as a ‘UN Peacekeeper’  
  c. Classical Realism: Japan as a ‘Normal State’  
  d. Neo-Realism: Japan as a ‘US Ally’  
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Bibliography
Abstract

This thesis examines changing Japan’s pacifism and its implications for Japan’s security identity from 1945 to the present. The existing literature neglects a correlation between the shift in the nature of Japan’s pacifism and changing Japan’s security identity. Moreover, earlier scholarship has failed to apply an eclectic approach, and therefore, offers limited analyses due to the limitations of theoretical perspectives. Accordingly, the main aim of the thesis is to contribute to filling this research gap by applying an alternative framework combined with an eclectic approach and offering a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s pacifism and security identity.

To examine the shift in Japanese pacifism, the thesis employed the concept of ‘negative pacifism’ (Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution) and ‘positive pacifism’ (the Preamble of the Constitution) as an analytical framework. The conceptualisation is derived from a definition of ‘negative-positive peace’ (Galtung 1969). To analyse multiple factors which facilitated the shift in Japan’s pacifism, the thesis applied ‘analytical eclecticism’ (Katzenstein 2008) and integrated the analytical framework (negative-positive pacifism) with orthodox international relations theories and approach. In an application of analytical eclecticism, the thesis proposed four theoretical perspectives of Japan’s security identity: (a) pacifist state (classical liberalism/negative pacifism); (b) UN peacekeeper (neo-liberalism/positive pacifism); (c) normal state (classical
realism/domestic pressure); and (d) US ally (neo-realism/external-structural pressure). The main argument of the thesis is that there has been an incremental shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism in response to domestic and external pressures and that this shift has influenced Japan’s security identity.

The core questions asked were: 1) What factors caused the shifts from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’?; 2) Has Japan been ‘normalising’ its military power by participating in international peace operations?; and 3) How have the shifts to ‘positive pacifism’ influenced Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist state’?

To substantiate the main argument and examine the questions, the thesis investigated the following case studies: (a) Japan’s security policy from 1945-1990; (b) Japan’s contributions to UNPKO in Cambodia and East Timor; (c) Japan’s responses to the US-led War on Terror; (d) Japan’s security cooperation with Australia and its implications for regional security; and (e) the Japanese constitutional revision issue in relation to Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a global image. This study concluded that although Japan’s security identity is fluctuating between four models above, its core security identity has become, and remains that of a ‘global pacifist state’. The findings of this research demonstrated that an analysis based on the concept of ‘negative-positive pacifism’ as an analytical framework combined with ‘analytical eclecticism’ as an alternative
research method assists in a comprehensive understanding of Japan’s pacifism and security identity. In this way, the thesis made an important contribution to the study of Japanese pacifism, security policy and international relations theory.
Introduction

Pacifism and Security Identity of Japan

Japan’s pacifism and security identity have been constantly changing and elusive. Indeed to the casual observer, Japanese security identity may seem to have exhibited schizophrenic tendencies.1 In spite of its infamous status as an ultra-nationalistic ‘militarist state’ during the Pacific War, Japan became a ‘pacifist state’ as a result of defeat in the Second World War and thorough disarmament during the occupation period.2 Based on the ideal of the so-called ‘Peace Constitution’, the Japanese government was determined to preserve its security, ‘trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.’3 Nevertheless, Japan started rebuilding its self-defence capabilities in response to requests from the United States after the outbreak of the 1950 Korean War. Although it was a part of the US-led alliance system during the Cold War, Japan refrained

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1 ‘Security Identity’ is defined as ‘a set of collectively held principals that have attracted broad political support regarding the appropriate role of state action in the security arena and are institutionalised into the policy-making process.’ Cited from Oros, Normalizing Japan, 9. Also, Donna Weeks examined Japan’s security identity. See Weeks, ‘Softly, softly to Iraq’. This thesis, however, does not examine Japan’s ‘identity’ in general or nihonjinron (uniqueness of Japan). For research on Japan’s identity, see Klien, Rethinking Japan’s Identity.


from making a military contribution to the Korea and Vietnam Wars.

Moreover, despite the unstable international security environment during the Cold War, Japan did not complete its military normalisation and never dispatched Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to overseas countries even for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO).4

Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis forced the Japanese government to reconsider its conventional security policy, especially its policy on overseas dispatch of SDF. The United States, in particular, put pressure on Japan to deploy the SDF in the Persian Gulf, but the Japanese government failed to pass the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill through the Diet. Japan’s inability to make a human contribution to the UN-authorised military action caused international criticism and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (MOFA) made efforts to create a new legal framework to send the SDF to UNPKO. In this context, the Japanese government enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law, or the International Peacekeeping Operations Law (the so-called PKO Law). In 1992 the SDF were dispatched to Cambodia and subsequent Japanese governments have continued to make contributions to UN sponsored PKOs.5 As a result of the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and the 2003 Iraq War, Japan dispatched the SDF to the

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Indian Ocean and Iraq. Emergency Legislations, moreover, were created in 2002 and 2004 in case of armed attack from outside of Japan.\(^6\) Furthermore, in 2007 the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) was upgraded to the Ministry of Defence Japan (MOD), and the Japanese government passed a National Referendum Legislation as a step towards constitutional revision, which was supposed to facilitate Japan’s military normalisation.

These developments highlight the fact that Japan is not only maintaining status as a ‘pacifist state’ based on the Peace Constitution, but is also becoming a ‘normal state’ with normal military capability commensurate with its economic power. In fact, Japan's annual military expenditure is one of the highest in the world.\(^7\) Notwithstanding the progress of military normalisation, it is unlikely that Japan will become an aggressive military power or a nuclear state. Significantly, in spite of a military alliance with the United States and membership in the United Nations, the exercise of the right of collective self-defence and participation in the collective security system have been strictly prohibited by Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. Thus, Japan possesses complicated and ostensibly paradoxical security identities. Here, two questions immediately arise. How does research on Japanese security policy deal with the complexity of Japan’s ‘pacifism’ and ‘security identity’? Do theories of international

\(^6\) The emergency legislation had been a ‘taboo’ in post-war Japanese politics because creation of the war law was considered incompatible with the Peace Constitution.

relations provide a satisfactory explanation to the changing and mutually contradictory security identities?

A problem in the study of pacifism in Japanese politics is that although ‘pacifism’ is a core norm that constructs security identity of Japan, existing research and theories cannot provide sufficient explanations for the shift of Japanese pacifism to a ‘new pacifism’ in the post-Cold War period. Particularly, earlier research on the ‘new pacifism’ lacks theoretically comprehensive conceptualisation and analyses. Consequently, a redefinition of Japanese pacifism as an analytical framework, combined with theories of international politics, is necessary to comprehend how and why Japan’s security identity has been changing in this period. For this reason, without taking an eclectic approach, it is difficult to examine the changing Japan’s pacifism and its implications to the multiple security identities.

Likewise, a problem in applying international relations theories to analysis of Japan’s security policy is that none alone is sufficient in providing a satisfactory explanation. Classical and neo-realism as dominant theories of international relations provide detailed explanations on why Japan began normalising its military capability and supporting

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8 Yet there is a scholarly work, which analyses a shift in Japanese norm from ‘culture of anti-militarism’ to ‘peacekeeping’ in terms of Japan’s participation in UNPKO. For instance, see Dobson, H. *Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Responses*, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
military alliance with the United States. However, realist theories do not elucidate why Japan has been extremely hesitant to complete military normalisation and to develop nuclear weapons. In contrast to realist schools, analyses based on classical liberalism (idealism) and constructivism expound how and why Japan’s complete rearmament has been prohibited by influence of the anti-war pacifism and a post-war culture of anti-militarism. These normative constraints, however, do not account for Japan’s military normalisation process and military alliance with the United States. Moreover, the normative constraints on Japan’s security policy themselves have been weakened by the influence of domestic desire for rearmament in a changing international environment. Meanwhile, the premise of neo-liberalism as another orthodox theory explains why Japan’s pacifism has shifted in order to make an international contribution. Whereas anti-war and anti-militarist pacifism, consistent with classical liberalism, negates the existence of the SDF and its overseas dispatch for any purposes, ‘new pacifism’ is compatible with neo-liberalism and affirms the utilisation of Japanese military power for post-conflict peace operations. Yet, like other theories, neo-liberalism is not perfect, and cannot explain why Japan could not

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9 As for the argument of classical realism, see Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*. As for argument of neo-realism (structural realism), see Waltz, *Men, the State and War*. Also see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Also see Waltz, ‘Emerging Structure of International Politics’.

10 Genealogy of classical liberalism (idealism) is salient in the study of the Japanese ‘Peace Constitution’ and peace research. For example, see Kimijima, ‘Futsū no Kindai Kokka’. As for analysis of influence of ‘norms’ on Japanese security, see Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan’s National Security*. Also see Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*. As for constructivist analysis with culture of anti-militarism, see Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum’, 119-150. Also see Berger, *Culture of Anti-militarism*.

11 As for neo-liberal perspectives, see Krasner, *International Regimes*. Also see Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. Also see Keohane, *After Hegemony*. As for analysis of Japanese liberalism, see Berger, ‘Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State’.
participate in UNPKO until 1992, and why it supported the US-led wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, each theory of international relations is incomplete, and provides only a partial explanation of Japan’s security identity. Hence, the problem in the theoretical analysis of Japanese security policy lies in the lack of an eclectic and comprehensive approach in the existing scholarship.

Research Aims and Core Questions

Accordingly, the principal aim of the thesis is to contribute to the resolution of the research problems raised above. First, the thesis aims to make a contribution to the study of Japanese politics by providing an alternative explanation for debates regarding Japanese pacifism and its implication for security identity. Second, the thesis attempts to contribute to the study of international relations by demonstrating the applicability of an eclectic theoretical methodology. Therefore, the analysis of the thesis focuses primarily on changing Japanese ‘pacifism’ and ‘security policy’, rather than national ‘defence policy’. To analyse changing pacifism and security identity, the thesis examines the period from 1945 to 2009, which was mainly dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In order

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12 The thesis mainly uses the terms ‘security policy’ rather than ‘defence policy’. This is because the word ‘security’ is wider and more various in the meaning than ‘defence’. As for concept of security and variety of security policy, see Ayson, ‘Concepts for Strategy and Security’. See also Dupont, ‘Transnational Security’. In the field of the study of Japanese politics, the word ‘security’ (anzen hoshō) became commonly used instead of ‘national defence’ (kokubō) after the end of the Pacific War. See Satō, “Kokubō ga naze ‘Anzenhoshō’”, 5.

13 The thesis does not cover the security policy of the DPJ government due to time constraint.
to make these contributions, the thesis will examine the following three principal and subset research questions:

1) **What factors caused the shifts from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’?**

What were the domestic and external factors that have influenced the shift to ‘positive pacifism’? Does the shift indicate that ‘negative pacifism’ has lost its political influence as a defence constraint? How has Japan’s contribution to post-conflict peace operations changed since 1992?

2) **Has Japan been ‘normalising’ its military power by participating in international peace operations?**

How has a changing international security environment influenced Japan’s military normalisation process? Has Japan’s participation in post-conflict peace operations coincided with its military normalisation process? Is Japan becoming a ‘normal state’ through revision of the ‘Peace Constitution’?

3) **How have the shifts to ‘positive pacifism’ influenced Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist state’?**
Is ‘positive pacifism’ compatible with the Japan-US military alliance? Have the shifts to ‘positive pacifism’ facilitated Japan’s participation in post-Cold War peace operations? What is the implication of the shift to ‘positive pacifism’ for Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist state’? In order to explore the research questions above, the thesis begins with an overview of existing literature and theoretical frameworks in an attempt to provide alternative analytical framework and theoretical perspectives.

**Literature Review and Theoretical Frameworks**

*An Overview of the Definition and Rationale of ‘Pacifism’*

In order to accomplish the research aims and answer the core questions, it is essential to clarify a rationale and definition of the term ‘pacifism’ as an analytical framework in conjunction with theories of international relations. Osamu Fujiwara has argued that the word ‘pacifism’ has consistently been a keyword in post-war Japanese politics. Yet the definition of pacifism in relation to Japanese politics has not necessarily been clear.14 Broadly speaking, pacifism is defined as a belief that ‘all participation in or support for war [is] wrong,’15 or as a philosophy that ‘rejects violence as a method of exercising political influence, even for a

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just cause.’\textsuperscript{16} As a narrow definition, however, pacifism can be divided into ‘absolute pacifism’ and ‘relative pacifism’.\textsuperscript{17} Whereas the former denies any kind of use of force, the latter accepts the legitimacy of its use under a certain conditions, such as self-defence. Absolute pacifism, in this regard, is the same concept as ‘non-violence’,\textsuperscript{18} whereas relative pacifism is quite similar to the definition of ‘pacificism’.\textsuperscript{19} In fact, the pacifism of the Japanese Constitution has been interpreted as both absolute pacifism and relative pacifism.\textsuperscript{20} In spite of interpretation of Article 9 as absolute pacifism, the Japanese government has adopted relative pacifism as its national defence and security policy. Despite the fact that it has been one of the significant the keywords in post-war Japanese politics, ‘pacifism’ has been scarcely scrutinised from the perspective of international relations theory.

It needs to be emphasised that the concept of pacifism has a profound connection with international relations theory. Notably, pacifism shares the same theoretical background with ‘idealism’ or ‘classical liberalism’. In terms of international relations theory, pacifism is defined as ‘the liberal

\textsuperscript{16} Kegley and Raymond, \textit{How Nations Make Peace}, 258.
\textsuperscript{18} Pacifism itself is often considered as ‘non-violence’. In this case, the pacifism is categorised as ‘absolute pacifism’. See Ishida, \textit{Heiwa no Seijigaku}, 147.
\textsuperscript{19} ‘Pacificism’ is generally regarded as the same concept as ‘pacifism’. For example, pacifism can be defined as ‘a philosophy that rejects violence as a method of exercising political influence, even for a just cause.’ See Kegley and Raymond, \textit{How Nations Make Peace}, 258. However, there is an interpretation that pacifism recognises use of force to prevent wars. For instance, see Ceadel, \textit{Pacifism in Britain}, 13, cited in Yamamoto, \textit{Grassroots Pacifism in Post-war Japan}, 9. Also see Morrissey, \textit{A Political Approach to Pacifism}, ii.
\textsuperscript{20} On the difference between ‘absolute pacifism’ and ‘relative pacifism’ in relation with the Japanese Constitution, see Sawano, \textit{Heiwa Shugi to Kaikenrongi}, 112-123. Tamon Asô analyses ‘ethical pacifism’ in relation with Article 9. See Asô, \textit{Heiwa Shugi no Rinrisei}, 205.
idealist school of ethical thought that recognises no conditions that justify the taking of another human’s life, even when authorised by a head of state.’ In this sense, the definition of pacifism as the ‘liberal idealist school’ is also categorised as absolute pacifism. Martin Ceadel pointed out that ‘pacifism’ eventually evolved into ‘liberalism’ as a theory of international relations. Kantian pacifism exemplifies idealist and liberal pacifism. Immanuel Kant as a pacifist and liberal philosopher proposed to sign a complete ‘peace treaty’, abolish ‘standing armies’, and refrain from ‘forcible sovereign interference’. Furthermore, as another condition to attain ‘perpetual peace’, Kant also suggested that a ‘pacific alliance’ (foedus pacificum) be established. Theoretically speaking, ‘pacifism’ in its nature closely resembles ‘idealism’ or ‘classical liberalism’ at an early stage of international relations theory, which was criticised as ‘utopianism’ by E. H. Carr. While Carr was critical of the efficacy of morality, such as the doctrine of ‘non-resistance’ and ‘pacifism’ exemplified by Jesus and Gandhi, he also mentioned that ‘it is as fatal in politics to ignore power as it is to ignore morality.’ Carr concluded that ‘it is essential part of any compromise that both factors [power and morality] shall be taken into account.’ Hence, there is a necessity of analysing ‘pacifism’ as morality in the field of political science. In addition, ‘pacifism’

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21 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 404.
22 Ceadel, Origin of War Prevention, 41, cited in Yamamoto, Grassroots Pacifism, 8.
23 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 2, 4, 6.
24 Kant noted that the pacific alliance is ‘different from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) inasmuch as it would for ever terminate all wars, whereas the latter only finishes one.’ See ibid., 21.
25 See, Carr Twenty Year’s Crisis, 1919-1939.
26 Ibid., 98-100.
27 Ibid., 97.
28 Ibid., 101.
can be a keyword as an analytical framework from the perspective of ‘constructivism’. This is because constructivism, as an alternative approach to orthodox international relations theory, places more emphasis on ‘ideas, ideals, identities, images, and norms’, which construct and influence actors in international politics.\(^{29}\) As mentioned above, in the light of liberalism and constructivism, pacifism as a normative framework could be applicable in conceptualising the pacifism of post-war Japanese politics. In other words, these theoretical implications indicate that Japan’s pacifism can be conceptualised in conjunction with other theoretical perspectives.

**Conceptualisation of ‘Negative Pacifism’ and ‘Positive Pacifism’**

From a constructivist perspective, pacifism is a key ‘norm’ that represents Japan’s security identity. Analysis of norms is significant, because as Bruce Russett pointed out, norms themselves ‘may be more important than any particular institutional structure (two-party/multiparty, republican/parliamentary) or formal constitutional provision.’\(^{30}\) Indeed, Peter Katzenstein argued that ‘norm’ has played an influential role in Japan’s security policy. He also pointed out that analysis of norm can be an alternative analytical approach to orthodox international relations

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\(^{29}\) Although constructivism is sometimes called ‘constructivist theory’, it is not a theory of international politics in a strict classification. As for the explanation of constructivist approach, see Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, 49. Also see *International Relations Theory*, cited from, [http://internationalrelationstheory.googlepages.com/constructivism.htm](http://internationalrelationstheory.googlepages.com/constructivism.htm) (accessed at 11 Sep 08).

\(^{30}\) Bruce Russett analysed the possibility of ‘democratic norms and culture’ in correlation with peaceful resolution of international disputes. See Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 31 and Chapter 2.
such as realism and liberalism.\textsuperscript{31} The significance of the reinterpretation of Japanese pacifism lies in the fact that Japan's constitutional pacifism as a ‘legal norm’ is unique among democratic countries and that this norm has considerable influence on security policymaking processes.\textsuperscript{32} As Hook and McCormack observed, pacifism denoted in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is ‘state pacifism’, which has continuously influenced anti-war public opinion and Japan’s national security policy.\textsuperscript{33} In this sense, conceptualisation of pacifism codified in the Japanese Constitution is of significance as a norm that symbolises Japan’s security identity. In relation to analysis of norm and identity, Ōga pointed out that constructivists should not confuse ‘identity’ with ‘norm’, and emphasised that concepts such as ‘pacifism’ and ‘economic power’ are not Japan’s ‘identity’ but Japan’s ‘norms’.\textsuperscript{34} In short, pacifism has been a key norm that constructs Japan’s security identity as a ‘pacifist’ state.

The conceptualisation of ‘negative-positive pacifism’ in this thesis stems from the definition of ‘negative-positive peace’ conceptualised by Johan Galtung.\textsuperscript{35} Galtung argued that peace is not only the absence of ‘direct violence’, such as war, armed conflict, and terrorism, but also the absence of ‘structural violence’, such as economic inequity, poverty, social and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Katzenstein noted that both realism and liberalism are ‘not wrong but incomplete’. See Katzenstein, \textit{Cultural Norms}, 22.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara analysed Japan’s ‘legal norms’ in relation to its constitution, foreign policy. The legal norms in Japan are also unique in that the norms cause litigation regarding constitutionality of the Self-Defence Forces. See Katzenstein and Okawara, \textit{Japan’s National Security}, 118.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Japan’s ‘state pacifism’ as a norm has been analysed by Hook and McCormack. See, Hook and McCormack, \textit{Japan’s Contested Constitution}, 8-22.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ōga, ‘Nihon Gaikōshi niokeru Kyōkai no Seijigaku’, 39-40.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, 167-191.
\end{itemize}
racial discrimination and any kind of indirect violence that prevents individuals from achieving the full potential. According to his definition, absence of direct violence is ‘negative peace’, whereas absence of structural violence is ‘positive peace’.

Notably, an analogy between Galtung’s peace theory (negative-positive peace) and the Japanese Constitution (Article 9 and the Preamble) can be identified. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates the ‘renunciation of war’ in the first paragraph and ‘non-possession of armed forces’ in the second paragraph. Article 9 of the Constitution read:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of the belligerency of the state will not be recognised.36

Article 9, which is often described as a ‘peace clause’, declares a non-violent policy including renunciation of war and non-possession of military forces. In other words, the purpose of Article 9 is to negate direct violence in order to attain ‘negative peace’. In this respect, Article 9 can be categorised as ‘negative pacifism’. ‘Negative pacifism’ is consistent with

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the ‘culture of anti-militarism’ as argued by Thomas Berger.\(^\text{37}\) However, ‘negative pacifism’ alone cannot explain the development of ‘positive pacifism’ of Japan.

‘Positive pacifism’, which tends to be overlooked as an analytical framework, is inscribed in the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution. The Preamble describes its negative pacifism in its first paragraph, declaring that the Japanese people ‘resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government.’\(^\text{38}\) In the second paragraph, the Preamble stipulates that Japan desires ‘perpetual peace’ based on ‘international pacifism’.\(^\text{39}\) On the other hand, the third and fourth paragraphs are consistent with ‘positive pacifism’. The third paragraph describes Japan’s aspiration for preserving international peace and removing ‘structural violence’ (tyranny, slavery, oppression, intolerance, fear and want). Indeed, the third paragraph expresses creation of ‘positive peace’, stating that ‘we recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.’\(^\text{40}\)

\(^{37}\) Thomas Berger analysed the influence of ‘culture of anti-militarism’ on post-war security policy of Japan. See Berger. ‘From Sword to Chrysanthememum’.

\(^{38}\) Paragraph 1 of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, see NDL, the Constitution of Japan, cited from, [http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html](http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html) (accessed at 5 September 2009).

\(^{39}\) Paragraph 2 of the Preamble stipulates that ‘We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. ’, see NDL, the Constitution of Japan, cited from, [http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html](http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html) (accessed at 5 September 2009).

\(^{40}\) Paragraph 3 of the Preamble states: ‘We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.’ See Ibid.
Finally, the fourth paragraph of the Preamble describes Japan’s responsibility for ‘international cooperation’.41

Therefore, the purpose of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution is not only to attain ‘negative peace’ but also to achieve ‘positive peace’, which guarantees the ‘right to live in peace’ and removes ‘structural violence’. Hence, the Preamble can be categorised as ‘positive pacifism’. Thus, negative and positive pacifism based on the Japanese Constitution can be viewed as important normative framework, which has influenced the decision-making processes of security policy. 42 Accordingly, negative-positive pacifism, which constructs Japan’s security identity, can be framed in orthodox international relations theories.

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41 Paragraph 4 of the Preamble stipulates that ‘We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone but that laws of political morality are universal, and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.’ See NDL, the Constitution of Japan, cited from, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 5 September 2009).

42 See Table 1.
Table 1: Analogy between Galtung’s Definition of Peace and the Japanese Constitution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Peace</th>
<th>Positive Peace</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Direct Violence (War, Conflict and Terrorism)</td>
<td>Absence of Structural Violence (Poverty, Inequity and Oppression)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Negative Peace (Ceasefire, Peace Treaty and Disarmament)</td>
<td>Presence of Positive Peace (Reconciliation, Post-War Peace Operations and Human Security)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Japan’s Negative Pacifism**
- Article 9 of the Peace Constitution
- Negative Pacifism (Renunciation of War and Non-Possession of Offensive Military Capability)

**Japan’s Positive Pacifism**
- The Preamble of the Constitution
- Positive Pacifism (The Right to Live in Peace, Responsibility and International Cooperation)

Note: Details in blankets are modified interpretation by the author based on Galtung’s definition of peace and the Japanese Constitution.

Indeed, some Japanese realist and constitutionalist observers have attempted to employ the concept of negative-positive pacifism to explain changing Japanese pacifism or to advocate Japan’s security policy. Ken’ichi Itō, for instance, argued from a realist viewpoint that positive pacifism should be Japan’s new security policy. According to his definition, negative pacifism is ‘one-nation pacifism’ that makes Japan’s security policy ‘negative’ and inactive with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. On the other hand, Itō advocated positive pacifism as a realist security policy so that Japan can make ‘positive’ and active contributions to international security. 43 Itō’s conceptualisation is not based on Galtung’s definition. He justifies Japan’s

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use of force as exercise of the right of collective self-defence or participation in the collective security system. For instance, Itō argued that Japan should have participated in the multinational forces during the 1991 Gulf War. He further considered the 2003 Iraq War as legitimate collective military sanctions rather than illegal use of force.  

In this regard, Itō’s concept of positive pacifism is not compatible with a general definition of pacifism, but with traditional realism. As a result of depending too much on realist perspective, his analysis tends to overlook the political influence of negative pacifism. By contrast, this thesis argues that negative pacifism is still influential in Japan’s security policy, and that positive pacifism is compatible with negative pacifism until the current Japanese Constitution is revised to allow the building of a normal army.

Meanwhile, Yoshikazu Sawano, a Japanese constitutionalist, has employed the notion of negative and positive pacifism to explain two different types of Japanese pacifism based on Article 9 and the Preamble of the Constitution. Unlike Itō’s definition, Sawano’s concept of negative and positive pacifism is consistent with Galtung’s definition and this thesis. Yet, like Itō’s analysis, Sawano’s study did not utilise negative-positive pacifism as an analytical framework in conjunction with theories

44 Ibid.
45 As same realist analysis of ‘positive pacifism’, See, National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) Sekkyokuteki Heiwashugi o Mezashite. Also nationalist researchers employed ‘positive pacifism’ in the same realist perspective. For instance, see Hamaguchi, ‘Sekai Heiwa o rido suru’.
46 Sawano, Heiwa Shugi to Kaikenrongi, 126. Likewise, other constitutionalists and peace researchers employed ‘positive pacifism’ in the same meaning. For instance, see Kawakami, Genten kara Kangae na Nihonkoku Kenpō. Also see Meiji University, Institute for Disarmament and Peace Studies Home Page 2005, Kenpō no Heiwashugi Project.
of international politics. Sawano’s analysis focused on Japanese pacifism from a perspective of legal studies, but he has ignored realist factors that influence shifts in Japanese pacifism. As a result, Sawano’s analysis, like other constitutionalists and peace researchers, tends to be idealistic and even utopian by adhering to negative pacifism as a constitutional constraint on security policy. In short, existing realist and constitutionalist research on negative-positive pacifism shows a lack of theoretical corroboration in conceptualisation as well as eclectic and holistic perspectives. Therefore, they cannot provide comprehensive theoretical explanations on shifts in Japanese pacifism and changing Japanese security identity. In contrast to earlier research, this thesis seeks to apply an eclectic method by integrating negative-positive pacifism as an analytical framework into orthodox theories of international relations.

**Methodological Applicability of ‘Analytical Eclecticism’**

As examined above, negative-positive pacifism can be a theoretical framework in analysing Japanese security policy. However, as E. H. Carr pointed out, a one-sided analysis based on morality that lacks realistic viewpoints and balanced perspective is not a sufficient analytical methodology.\(^47\) For this reason, pacifism needs to be integrated into other international relation theories in an eclectic and comprehensive way. To

\(^{47}\) Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis*.\]
this end, the rationale and necessity of ‘analytical eclecticism’ is examined below.

The concept of analytical eclecticism in scrutinising Japanese security policy was first articulated by Peter Katzenstein. Due to the ‘broadening of the theoretical spectrum’, research on Japan’s security policy has differed from analyst to analyst (realist, liberalist and constructivist), and tends to have ‘sidestepped metatheoretical debates.’\textsuperscript{48} Katzenstein suggested the application of the analytical eclecticism as follows:

Some writings on Japanese security may, in the future, be able to take a more eclectic turn, by incorporating elements drawn from three different styles of analysis – the testing of alternative explanations, the rendering of synthetic accounts, and historically informed narratives.\textsuperscript{49}

In fact, the necessity of analytical eclecticism can be found in international relations theories and approaches. Firstly, the significance of an eclectic analysis approach can be identified in an analysis of E. H. Carr, one of the founders of classical realism and international politics. Although his main work, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939} is categorised as one of the major texts of classical realism, ‘this simplistic reading of Carr has begun to be re-evaluated as a number of scholars have pointed to areas of common concern of both ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’.’\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, Carr’s ‘motives

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
in writing the book were both realist and utopian.’

In spite of his stance as a critic of utopianism, Carr dedicated the book to ‘the makers of the coming peace’, i.e. to the creators of utopia. Moreover, Carr’s another well-known work, *The Conditions of Peace* (1942), includes the tenets of idealism, i.e. conditions for utopia. In this regard, although he criticised Sir Norman Angell as utopian, Angell’s viewpoint was ‘not very far removed from the Carr of the final chapter *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* and of *Conditions of Peace*.’

Also, whereas Carr’s main argument focused on criticism of the extremely idealistic nature of international relations theory developed after the First World War, he pointed out the limitations of realism itself. Carr also asserted the importance of ‘balanced analysis’ with both realist and utopian perspectives. He unequivocally emphasised the importance of the ‘combination’ of both idealism and realism, and repetitively underlined this point thus:

Immature thought is predominantly purposive and utopian. Thought which rejects purpose altogether is the thought of old age. Mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis. Utopia and reality are thus the two factors of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place.

Political science must be based on a recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice, which can be attained only through a combination of utopia and reality.

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51 Dunne, ‘Theories as Weapons’, 221.
52 Ibid.
53 Wilson, ‘Carr and his Early Critics’, 185.
54 Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis*, Chapter 6. Carr noted that ‘the impossibility of being a consistent and thorough-going realist is one of the most certain and most curious lessons of political science.’ Ibid., 89.
55 Ibid., 10.
56 Ibid., 13.
Significantly, Carr reached the ‘conclusion that any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality.’\textsuperscript{57} His insistence on the necessity of a ‘combined’ way of analysis in the study of political science and international relations provides strong support for the methodological validity of analytical eclecticism.

Likewise, writings of other major realists indicate an eclectic nature in their realist logic. The argument of Thomas Hobbes, a renowned ‘realist’, also contains ‘liberal’ characteristics. Hobbes considered human beings as egoistic in their natural state, which was described as a ‘war of all against all.’\textsuperscript{58} However, he also argued that human beings would be able to cooperate to establish an artificial state, ‘Leviathan’, by cooperative social contracts rather than their egoistic individualism.\textsuperscript{59} As Tomoko Okagaki pointed out, this perspective is similar to that of neo-liberalist viewpoints, which insist that international cooperation is possible, even though states egotistically pursue maximisation of power and interests.\textsuperscript{60} Similarly, analyses of Thucydides also possessed idealist and liberalist perspectives. For instance, Bruce Russett noted that the observations of Thucydides on the nature of democracy are ‘more familiar in contemporary liberal-institutionalist and idealist paradigms that compete with realism.’\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{58} See Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. Still Hobbes did not apply the idea of establishing ‘Leviathan’ to the analysis of international politics.
\textsuperscript{60} In the field of political philosophy, Hobbes is also categorised as ‘liberalist’ who influenced Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Jeremy Bentham. As for the analysis of liberalist aspect of Hobbes, see Okagaki, ‘Thomas Hobbes to Kokusai Seiji’, 67, 81.
Notably, even Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism (structural realism), acknowledged the theoretical unassailability of the idealist logic of establishing the world government as a means of abolishing international wars, although he considered it unattainable in reality.62

In addition to classical and structural realism, neo-liberalism, the English school, and constructivism also underline the efficacy of eclectic approaches. Firstly, neo-liberalism acknowledges some neo-realist conditions, such as the significance of national interest as state goals and the existence of anarchy in the global system,63 although neo-liberals are positive that sustainable international cooperation is possible even under anarchy.64 In this regard, neo-liberalism is theoretically ‘eclectic’ in comparison to classical liberalism. Secondly, the so-called ‘English School’, also demonstrated the possibility of analytical eclecticism. For instance, Hedley Bull’s analysis shows that although ‘anarchy’ is the nature of the international system as neo-realists argue, ‘international order’ exists in the anarchical society.65 Bull classified traditional political philosophy into three types: the Hobbesian (realist tradition); the Kantian (universalist tradition); and the Grotian (internationalist tradition).66 He maintained that it is important to balance ‘realism’ (Hobbesian tradition) and

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62 While admitting the logical accuracy of world government theory, Waltz provided pessimistic conclusions that ‘it is of course true that with world government there would no longer be international wars, though with an ineffective world government there would no doubt be civil wars.’ ‘The obvious conclusion of a third-image analysis is that world government is the remedy for world war. The remedy, though it may be unassailable in logic, is unattainable in practice.’ Waltz, Men, the State and War, 228, 238.
63 Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 44.
64 As for neo-liberal argument, see Keohane, After Hegemony.
65 Bull, Anarchical Society, 22-50.
66 This classification can be interpreted as respectively, realism, idealism and liberalism. See ibid., 25.
‘liberalism’ (Kantian tradition).\textsuperscript{67} Thirdly, constructivism, a ‘liberal-realist theoretical approach’,\textsuperscript{68} also shows the utility of eclectic analysis. On the one hand, constructivism accepts conditions suggested by realism and neorealism, such as the significance of states as the key actors in international politics, and the self-centredness of states in pursuit of national interests.\textsuperscript{69} On the other hand, constructivism theoretically stems from idealism and liberalism\textsuperscript{70} and underscores the significance of the ‘institutional transformation of identities and interests.’\textsuperscript{71} Constructivism, therefore, takes an eclectic approach in an attempt to ‘bridge the gap between neo-liberal and neo-realist theories.’\textsuperscript{72} In this sense, constructivist approach is more eclectic than realist and liberalist perspectives. As examined above, each theory and approach of international politics demonstrates the methodological applicability of analytical eclecticism.

**Japan’s Pacifism and Security Identity in Analytical Eclecticism**

In the case of Japanese security identity, an eclectic approach offers clarity and a comprehensive understanding of changes over time. William Heinrich Jr., for example, applied a ‘multilevel analysis’ combining ‘domestic and structural factors’ in examining Japan’s security policy.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Strictly speaking, ‘constructivism is not a theory of international politics’ but more of theoretical approach. See Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, 52.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Also, Alexander Wendt regards ‘constructivism’ as ‘social idealism’. See Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 1.
\textsuperscript{71} Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, 391-425, 394.
\textsuperscript{72} Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, 53.
\textsuperscript{73} William, *Seeking An Honored Place*.  

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Yoshihide Soeya’s analysis also shows that Japanese security policy has been influenced by both normative constraint and structural imperatives. He referred to the significance of eclectic analysis on Japan’s ‘dual identity’ (as a pacifist state and US ally), arguing that ‘both realism and constructivism (social norm of pacifism and political culture of antimilitarism) are relevant in explaining Japan’s security thinking and behaviour.’ Also, Jennifer Lind employed eclectic approach and argued that Japan’s pacifism, or ‘culture of anti-militarism’, is a constructivist norm and that Japan’s buck-passing policy was a realist strategy.75 Similarly, Amy Catalinac provided eclectic explanations of Japan’s security policy. While Catalinac offered analyses from the perspectives of neo-liberalism and neo-realism, she also pointed out limitations of both theories and advocated ‘identity theory’ (constructivism) as an alternative approach.76 Likewise, Richard Samuels provided an eclectic analysis and proposed four stances on Japanese security policy (Neo-autonomists, Normal Nation-alists, Pacifists, and Middle-Power Internationalists).77 Yet both neo-autonomist and normal-nationalist perspectives can be categorised as classical realist perspective. In short, eclectic analyses of existing literature are limited to only two or three theoretical dimensions (realism, liberalism and constructivism). Unlike previous scholarship, this thesis integrates all these theoretical perspectives and provides the four models of Japanese security identity: Japan as a pacifist state (classical

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75 Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck?’, 92-121.
77 Samuels, ‘Securing Japan’, 125-152.
liberalism/negative pacifism); as a UN peacekeeper (neo-liberalism/positive pacifism); as a normal state (classical realism); and as a US ally (neo-realism). The four perspectives as a set of eclectic method will help to clarify and analyse changing Japanese security identity.

Table 2: Four Models of Japan’s Security Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pacifist State</th>
<th>UN Peacekeeper</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Negative Pacifism</td>
<td>b. Positive Pacifism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Classical Liberalism)</td>
<td>(Neo-Liberalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 9 (1947 Constitution)</td>
<td>The Preamble (1947 Constitution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renunciation of War</td>
<td>The Right to Live in Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture of Anti-militarism</td>
<td>International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unarmed Neutrality (Unattained)</td>
<td>The PKO Law (1992)</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normal State</th>
<th>US Ally</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. Domestic Pressure</td>
<td>d. External/Structural Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Classical Realism)</td>
<td>(Neo-Realism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire for Power</td>
<td>Balance of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SDF Law (1954)</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Treaty (1951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Normalisation (The Right of</td>
<td>The Right of Collective Self-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defence) (In Progress)</td>
<td>Defence (Not Exercised Yet)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Richard Samuels also utilised the similar figure (Neo-autonomists, Normal Nationalists, Pacifists, and Middle-Power Internationalists).

a. Negative Pacifism: Japan as a ‘Pacifist State’

‘Classical liberalism (idealism)’ as ‘negative pacifism’ explains why Japan has been reluctant to become a major military power. As well, negative

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78 See Table 2.
79 See Samuels, ‘Securing Japan’, 128. Samuel’s argument of ‘neo-autonomist’ is consistent with nationalistic militarism or ‘offensive realism’. This is because Japanese neo-autonomists wish to maximise Japan’s military power, including nuclear weapons. Although ‘neo-autonomist’ is a part of Japan’s security identity, the thesis does not include ‘offensive realist’ factor. This is because, at least at this stage, it is highly unlikely that Japan drastically rears back to pre-war-type major military power or independent nuclear state. Likewise, this thesis does not describe Japan’s security identity as a ‘non-violent state’ based on ‘absolute pacifism’, because Article 9 of the Peace Constitution has been interpreted as ‘relative pacifism’ by the successive Japanese governments.
pacifism is the reason why Japan has been ‘reactive’ with regard to foreign and security policies.\textsuperscript{80} As defined already, negative pacifism, inscribed in Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, stipulates renunciation of war and non-possession of armed forces.\textsuperscript{81} In the case of the Japanese security identity, Japan’s negative pacifism can be seen as classical liberalism, since both concepts stem from anti-war idealism.\textsuperscript{82} Theoretically, idealism as classical liberalism is based on a belief that human beings inherently possess good nature and reason for peace and cooperation.\textsuperscript{83} In relation to the anti-war idealism in Japan, Thomas Berger observed that the ‘culture of anti-militarism’ has been deeply rooted and prevalent in Japanese society to an extent which constrains the excessive increase of Japan’s military capability.\textsuperscript{84} Likewise, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama argued that renunciation of war described in Article 9 has normative influence on Japan’s security policy.\textsuperscript{85} Without doubt, negative pacifism (anti-war, anti-militarist and anti-nuclear pacifism) has been a core norm which constructs Japan’s security identity as a ‘pacifist state’ in post-war Japanese politics. Socialist and communist parties, in particular, have adhered to negative pacifism in Japan.

\textsuperscript{80} Japan as a ‘reactive state’ in terms of foreign and economic policy has been argued by Kent Calder. See Calder, \textit{Crisis and Compensation}. Also see Calder, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation.

\textsuperscript{81} The Japanese Peace Constitution was described as ‘complete non-violence’ by the London Economist of 9 November 1946. Cited in Schlichtmann, ‘Article Nine in Context’.

\textsuperscript{82} Significance of the Peace Constitution as ‘non-violent pacifism’ has been espoused by the academics of constitutional protectors. This argument is the antithesis of the ‘normal state’ debate. For instance, see Kimijima, ‘Futsū no Kindai Kokka’, 17.

\textsuperscript{83} Idealism and (classical) liberalism can be used interchangeably because the advocates of liberalism were inspired by idealism after the First World War. See Kegley and Wittkopf, \textit{World Politics}, 30.

\textsuperscript{84} See Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum’. Also see Berger, \textit{Cultural Norms}.

\textsuperscript{85} Tsuchiyama, ‘War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy’, Chapter 3, 47-73.
Furthermore, Japan’s negative pacifism is consistent with Kantian idealism or pacifism. In his writing, *Perpetual Peace*, Immanuel Kant proposed preliminary articles for perpetual peace such as: ‘no state shall by force interfere with either constitution or government of another state (Article 3 of Chapter 1);’ and ‘standing armies shall in time be totally abolished (Article 5 of Chapter 1).’ Resemblance between Kantian pacifism and Japan’s anti-war pacifism based on Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution can be identified. Firstly, both Article 3 of Chapter 1 in Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* and Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution express ‘illegalisation of war or use of force’. Secondly, the purpose of Article 5 of Chapter 1 in *Perpetual Peace* and Paragraph 2 in Article 9 of the Constitution is complete disarmament. In this sense, Kant’s classical liberalism and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution share fundamentally similar anti-war and anti-militarist philosophy, namely negative pacifism.

Classical liberalism as an early stage of international politics after the First World War has similarities with the negative pacifism of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Both forms of pacifism were influenced and developed by the devastating experience of the world wars. In the light of international laws, the renunciation of war stipulated in Article 9 is in line with the stream of the illegalisation of war such as, the League of Nations Covenant (1920), the Paris Non-War Pact (1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact), and

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86 See Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 4, 6.
the Charter of the United Nations (1945). 87 In comparison with these international anti-war arrangements, Article 9 is not only anti-war but also antinuclear pacifism due to experience of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 88 Japan’s anti-war pacifism reflected in Article 9 was theorised as an ‘unarmed neutrality’ policy advocated by opposition parties and pacifist intellectuals. 89 Similarly, those who adhere to negative pacifism tend to protect Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and moreover try to internationalise it. 90 Indeed, on the basis of negative pacifism, some Japanese politicians, academics and peace activists attempt to abolish nuclear weapons by internationalising Hiroshima. 91

Anti-war pacifism and the culture of anti-militarism forbade any overseas dispatch of the SDF in the Upper House resolution in 1954. On the basis of negative pacifism, the Japanese government banned Japan’s arms export, adopted three non-nuclear principles, and placed a ceiling on the defence budget of 1% of GNP. Without doubt, the negative pacifism of Article 9 has functioned as Japan’s ‘defence constraint’. 92 On the basis of Article 9, Japanese citizens took legal actions claiming that the existence

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88 Therefore, there is a difference between the pacifism of the UN Charter (before Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombs) and that of the Japanese Constitution (after Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombs). See Abe, Ukai, and Morisu, Sensō no Kokufuku, 71-72.
89 As for the philosophy and strategy of ‘unarmed neutrality’, see Miyata, Hibusō Kokumin Teikō no Shisō.
90 As a typical example, Hikari Ohta and Shinichi Nakazawa argued that Article 9 should be ‘world heritage’. See Ohta and Nakazawa, Kenpō Kyūjō o Sekai Isanni.
91 See Hiraoka, Kibō no Hiroshima.
92 The influence of defence constraints in Japan was argued by Joseph Keddell. See Keddell, Politics of Defense in Japan.
of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty was unconstitutional. Moreover, negative pacifists argue that Japan's participation in UNPKO should have no connection with the SDF.

Japan's anti-war pacifism and culture of anti-militarism acted as a prohibitive factor to refrain the SDF from participating in international peace operations. Notably, the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill, which aimed at sending the SDF to the Persian Gulf, was scrapped by strong opposition in the Diet based on antiwar-anti-militarist pacifism. Even after the Japanese government created legal frameworks to dispatch the SDF to UNPKO, the Indian Ocean and Iraq, exercise of the right of the collective self-defence has been restricted. These factors indicate that negative pacifism as a defence constraint has been and will be influential until Article 9 is revised or deleted by constitutional amendment. Although there have been shifts to positive pacifism and Japan has normalised its military capability, negative pacifism remains an influential normative restraint and forms Japan's security identity as a pacifist state.

93 For instance, the Suzuki Case (1952) on the National Police Reserve, the Sunakawa Case (1959) on the US base, the Eniwa Case (1962) on the SDF, the Naganuma Nike Case (1969) on the ASDF base, and the Hyakuri Case (1977) on the ASDF base. The Japanese courts, however, sidestepped the clear judgment on the constitutionality of the SDF and the Security Treaty arguing these issues were highly political and the governmental act (tōchi köi). See Beyer, 'Hyakuri Base Case', 4-19.
95 Japan’s culture of anti-militarism which opposed the dispatch of the SDF for UNPKO was analysed by Hugo Dobson. See Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping.
96 Helen Hardacre pointed out the influence of the pacifist party, Kōmeitō and its pacifist supporting group, the Sōka Gakkai (Japanese Buddhist organisation), as prohibitive actors in terms of constitutional revision and exercise of the right of collective self-defence. See Hardacre, ‘Constitutional Revision and Japanese Religions’. 
b. Positive Pacifism: Japan as a ‘UN Peacekeeper’

Japan’s contributions to UNPKO and post-conflict peace operations after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq can be interpreted as Japan’s positive pacifism and neo-liberalism based on international cooperation inscribed in the Preamble. As Gō Itō argued, the term ‘international contribution’ (kokusai kōken) was a key word to legalise SDF dispatch for UNPKO.97 Theoretically speaking, the term international contribution is compatible with the argument of ‘neo-liberalism’ that international cooperation is possible even under the anarchic international system.98 Japan’s security policy, which contributes to international cooperation on the basis of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, is compatible with neo-liberalism (liberal institutionalism).99 For instance, Thomas Berger argued that the motivation of Japan’s international contribution is fundamentally based on the liberal philosophy of international relations theory.100 Whereas Japan’s classical liberalism as negative pacifism prohibited the SDF from participating in international peacekeeping operations, Japan’s neo-liberalism as positive pacifism based on the Preamble of the Constitution has facilitated Japan’s participation in post-conflict peace operations.

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97 Itō, ‘Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, Chapter 4, 76-95.
98 For the theoretical explanation on neo-liberalism, see Kegley and Wittkopf, World Politics, 40-42.
100 Berger described Japan’s policy on international peacekeeping as ‘Japanese liberalism’ or ‘pragmatic liberalism’. He characterised Japan’s foreign policy as an ‘adaptive state’. See Berger, ‘Pragmatic Liberalism’, 260-261.
The Preamble of the UN Charter and the counterpart of the Japanese Constitution share the similar norms that construct ‘positive pacifism’. The former reaffirms ‘fundamental human rights’, the ‘dignity of the human person’ and ‘better standards of life in larger freedom.’\footnote{See United Nations, the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, cited from, \url{http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/preamble.shtml} (accessed at 17 May 2009).} The latter reconfirms ‘the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and intolerance’, ‘the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.’\footnote{See NDL, the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan, cited from, \url{http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html} (accessed at 17 May 2009).} Both Preambles seek the attainment of ‘positive peace’ on the basis of factors of ‘positive pacifism’, such as human rights and the right to live in peace. Japan’s participation in UNPKO is, therefore, consistent with positive pacifism and international cooperation represented in the Preamble of the Constitution and the UN Charter. From the neo-liberalist perspective, Japan contributes to post-conflict peace operations not only for national interests, but also for international interests. As a supportive argument to this view, Michael Pugh argues that PKO policy is not necessarily dependent on the national interests but more on ‘altruism’ based on international interests.\footnote{Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, 19-34, cited in Ishizuka, \textit{Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Köchiku}, vii.} Roland Paris applied ‘liberal institutionalist theory’ to peace-building operations, arguing that ‘democratisation’ was the common purpose of peace-building operations.\footnote{Paris, \textit{At War’s End}, 19, cited from Ishizuka, \textit{Kokuren PKO}, vii.} Indeed the nature of UN peace operations complements ‘positive pacifism’ as peacekeeping operations seek to remove the structural violence and to empower human potential in the area devastated by armed conflicts. In this way, UN peace
operations, such as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace-building defined in *An Agenda for Peace* by Boutros Boutros Ghali, are compatible with the aims of ‘positive pacifism’.\(^{105}\)

Furthermore, peacekeeping and peace-building operations based on the premise of positive pacifism are compatible with the concept of ‘human security’. As a matter of fact, there is similarity between the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and the concept of human security proposed by the United Nations Development Program in 1994. Whereas the Preamble states: we recognise that all people of the world have the right to live in peace, ‘free from fear and want’, the purpose of human security is to attain ‘freedom from want, freedom from fear.’\(^ {106}\) In other words, both the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and the concept of human security are consistent with positive pacifism and justify Japan’s contributions to UN peace operations. In addition, the Japanese government dispatched the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq by referring to the Preamble as well as UN resolutions as legal bases.\(^ {107}\) Thus, positive pacifism and international cooperation based on the Preamble of the Constitution justify Japan’s participation in post-conflict international peace operations. Japan’s participation in peace operations is based not only on its national

\(^{105}\) See Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*.


interest but also on the positive pacifism of the Preamble consistent with a neo-liberal international cooperation.

c. Classical Realism: Japan as a ‘Normal State’

Classical realism or ‘human nature’ realism provides explanations for why Japan has pursued a security policy towards a ‘normal state’ that possesses normal or stronger military power. From a realist perspective, Japan has sought to maximise not only its economic power but also its military power. In both the political arena and academia, the argument that Japan desires to be a ‘normal state’ has been a central issue of Japan’s security policy. In fact, the original purpose of establishing the LDP was to revise the ‘Peace Constitution’ so as to normalise Japan’s military power. Classical realism supports the fact that the LDP government had pursued not only maximisation of economic power but also normalisation of military power, although its pace was slow due to the influence of negative pacifism.

108 Classical realism or human nature realism insists that each state egoistically pursues its own ‘national interests’ such as economic and military power. In relation to this argument, Hans Morgenthau pointed out six principle of political realism. See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.

109 Herman Kahn predicted that Japan would become a ‘superstate’ by normalising and strengthening its military power. See Kahn, Emerging Japanese Superstate.

110 As for normalisation of Japan from the perspective of politicians, see Ishihara, Japan That Can Say No, 32. Also see Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, 91-100. Also see Koizumi, ‘Statement on the Diet’s Approval’. Also see Abe, Utsukushii Kuni e, 132. As for academic analyses of Japan’s military normalisation, see Auer, Post-war Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces. Also see Green, Arming Japan. Also see Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan. Also see Dupont, Unsheathing the Samurai Sword. Also see Hughes, Japan’s Re-Emergence. Also see Pyle, Japan Rising. Also see Samuels, Securing Japan. Also see Oros, Normalizing Japan. Also see Middlebrooks, Beyond Pacifism. Also see Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation.

111 One of the main reasons why Hatoyama-led Democratic Party and Yoshida-led Liberal Party merged to establish the LDP was because they needed two-thirds of seats in the Diet to revise the Constitution. Abe, Utsukushii Kuni e, 27-29. In fact, on 15 November 1955, the LDP expressed that the party aimed to revise the Constitution and expand Japan’s military capability. See LDP Homepage 2009, cited from, http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/jimin/rittou/index.html (accessed at 22 January 2010).
In classical realism, even leftist political parties tend to pursue national military power. E. H. Carr believed that once a leftist political party comes to power, the party would abandon theoretical utopianism and become more realistic.\textsuperscript{112} As a matter of fact, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), notable for its absolute pacifist policy of ‘unarmed neutrality’, which denied the Japan-US Security Treaty and the SDF, changed policy once Tomiichi Murayama from the JSP became the Prime Minister in coalition with the LDP in 1994. Murayama overturned JSP policy and recognised the existence of the SDF and the Security Treaty.\textsuperscript{113} Not only the LDP’s security policy but also the example of the policy shift of the JSP supports the argument of classical realism.

From the perspective of Japan as a normal state, Japan’s remilitarisation through the establishment of the National Police Reserve (1950), the Police Preservation Corps (1952) and the Self Defence Forces (1954) can be interpreted as the first stages of military normalisation. The second stage of the military normalisation can be recognised after the end of the Cold War. The disappearance of the military threat of the USSR provided opportunity for the JDA to normalise Japan’s military power. In particular, the dispatch of SDF to overseas countries since 1992 can be interpreted as

\textsuperscript{112} Carr, \textit{Twenty Years’ Crisis}, 20.
a part of the processes towards a normal state. In this respect, Japan’s participation in UNPKO has been based on realistic motives which desired maximisation or normalisation of military power.\textsuperscript{114} It is also possible to conceive that the Japanese government intends to gain international prestige, specifically a permanent seat of the UN Security Council (UNSC) by making contributions to UNPKO. Since being a permanent UNSC member state would contribute to enhancing Japan’s political influence in international politics, Japan’s participation in UNPKO is based on a realistic motivation, i.e., pursuit of national interest.\textsuperscript{115} The third stage of the normalisation process is seen after the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks in 2001 and the subsequent US-led Wars on Terror. Whereas Japan’s relative national power has been declining,\textsuperscript{116} Prime Minister Jun’ichiō Koizumi attempted to maximise Japan’s military power. The Koizumi government swiftly enacted the Anti-Terrorism legislation and dispatched the Maritime SDF (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean in 2001. Likewise, the Iraq Special Measures Legislation was enacted in 2003 and the following year, the Ground SDF (GSDF) was deployed in the ‘non-combat zone’ in Iraq.\textsuperscript{117} In 2007, the JDA was upgraded into the MOD, and the National Referendum Law was enacted as a step towards

\textsuperscript{114} Katsumi Ishizuka pointed out that Japan’s participating in UNPKO is also based on national interest. See Ishizuka, \textit{Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Kōchiku}, 48-50. Also see Ishizuka, ‘Perspectives on UN Peacekeeping Collaboration’, 144-163.

\textsuperscript{115} See Drifte, \textit{Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat}.


\textsuperscript{117} As for the detailed analyses on the role and the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi and his office (\textit{kantei}) in the processes of the SDF dispatch to these areas, see, Shinoda, \textit{Koizumi Diplomacy}. 
constitutional revision.118 These series of processes in Japan’s military normalisation exemplify the argument of classical realism. From a realist perspective, it can be interpreted that Japan has been moving away from its ‘quasi-pacifism’ based on the Peace Constitution to a normal state based on pragmatic realism and a domestic desire to maximise national interests.119

d. Neo-Realism: Japan as a ‘US Ally’

Classical realism supports the argument for Japan as a normal state and Japan’s militarisation from the domestic perspective. On the other hand, neo-realism or structural realism would justify Japan’s militarisation from the perspective that Japan is a US ally.120 This is because neo-realism argues that an international structure of anarchy121 and the United States as a hegemonic state122 determine the behaviours of other countries. From a structural realist perspective, Japan’s security policies have been

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118 The legislation was promulgated on 18 May 2007 and took into effect on 18 May 2010. This law, however, does not specifically intend to revise Article 9. See http://law.e-gov.go.jp/announce/H19HO051.html (accessed at 23 January 2010).
119 Being a ‘normal state’, however, does not necessarily coincide with Japan’s reawakening of martial tradition. See Dupont, ‘Schizophrenic Superpower’, 43–51. Japan’s militarism and expansionism during the Second World War can be categorised as ‘offensive realism’ as theorised by John Measheimer, although the thesis focuses on Japan’s post-war security policy. See Measheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.
120 In fact, because study of Japanese security policy is inseparable from a perspective of the military alliance with the United States, researchers tend to focus on the bilateral security relationship. See Curtis, *Japanese Security Policies*, 852–874. Also see Inoguchi, ‘Japan’s Images and Options’, 95-119. Also see George, *Japan and the United States*, 237-296. Also see Mochizuki, *Toward A True Alliance*.
121 As for significance of analysing international structure as a determinant, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.
122 As for explanations on hegemonic states in international politics, see Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*. 
decided by international structure. The anarchic self-help system and the Cold War structure forced Japan to conclude the Japan-US security policy and remilitarise. Japan's pacifist intellectuals argued that the security treaty should be 'comprehensive' rather than partial. Still, the fact that Japan chose the 'partial' peace treaty indicates that the international structure and the United States as a hegemon determined direction of Japan's post-war security policy. In addition, neo-realism justifies Japan's nuclear armament. As for Japan's nuclear policy, Prime Minister Kishi stated that although his government did not intend to militarise with nuclear weapons, possession of nuclear weapons for self-defence was not necessarily unconstitutional. The statement of the Prime Minister was influenced by the Cold War structure which justified the constitutionality of Japan's nuclear armament for self defence. In fact, Kenneth Waltz supported Japan's nuclear armament in that Japan is technologically capable of possessing them and is surrounded by nuclear states. Moreover, theoretical support of structural realism for Japan's nuclear armament influenced Japanese realists. For instance, Kan Itô

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123 Pyle analysed Japan's foreign and security policy in response to the change of international structure. See, Pyle, Japan Rising. As for the structural influence on national security debate, Shinoda argues that Japan’s media and public opinion on security policy have been influenced by international structure. See Shinoda, 'Becoming More Realistic', 171-190.

124 Regarding Japanese pacifism in relation with the security treaty and democracy, see Kersten, Democracy in Post-war Japan, 164-198.


126 Kenneth Waltz wrote that 'How long can Japan and Germany live alongside other nuclear states while denying themselves similar capabilities?' and 'The probability of both countries [Japan and Germany] becoming nuclear powers in due course is all the higher because they can so easily do so.' See Waltz, 'Emerging Structure', 66, 67.
insisted on Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons on the basis of Waltz’s theory, ‘minimum necessary nuclear deterrence’ in the anarchic and self-help international system. Although Japan has not armed with nuclear weapons, Japan has depended on US ‘nuclear umbrella’ through the Japan-US military alliance. Thus, structural anarchy influences Japan’s security policies, i.e. remilitarisation with the SDF and the military dependence on the United States. As structural realism supports the hegemonic stability theory, US hegemony made it possible for Japan to focus on its economic development through the Yoshida Doctrine.

Even in the ‘post-hegemonic world’, external pressure mainly from the United States and the change of the international environment has determined Japan’s foreign and security policy. For neo-realists, the Cold War structure facilitated Japan’s policy on official development assistance (ODA) for countries in the Western camp. Because of the structural dependence on the United States in the self-help system, Japan’s security policy, in spite of its ‘Peace Constitution’, has been influenced by external pressure especially from the United States. Japan’s responsive security policy characterised as ‘pressure and response’ and incremental militarisation is attributed to its military dependence on the United States. In order to reduce criticism of being a ‘free rider’ in an

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127 Necessity of Japan’ nuclear armament was argued by Terumasa Nakanishi, Kimindo Kusaka, Yoshihiro Sakurai, Tetsuya Nishioka, Kan Ito and Nisohachi Hyodo. See Nakanishi, ‘Nihon Kakubusō’ no Ronten, 133, 138.
128 Akaha, ‘Japan’s Security Policy’.
129 Structure of Japan’s military dependence on the US was critically pointed out by Chalmers Johnson, although Johnson himself is not a structural realist, see Johnson, Teikoku America to Nihon.
an anarchic world, Japan was forced to share the strategic burdens with the United States. Furthermore, structural transformations such as the end of the Cold War and the following 1991 Gulf War caused Japan to reconsider its security policy and eventually enabled the SDF to participate in UNPKO. Thus, Japan’s participation in UNPKO was determined by external pressure (gaiatsu) especially from the United States. Curiously, Prime Minister Murayama stated the reason why the JSP changed its security policy and recognised the constitutionality of the SDF was because of the collapse of the Cold War structure. As significant as the end of the Cold War structure, the 2001 terrorist attacks and the outbreak of the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq also brought about the incremental shifts in Japan’s security policies. For instance, the unusually speedy passages of the two legal frameworks, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism legislation and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures legislation indicate how international structure and external pressures determine and influence Japan’s security policy. As Tomohito Shinoda has shown, Japanese security policy and public opinion in the post-Cold War period became more realistic due to

130 In this regard, Waltz argued that ‘the increased international activity of Japan and Germany reflects the changing structure of international politics’. See Waltz, ‘Emerging Structure’. As for Japan’s response to the 1990 Gulf Crisis, see Inoguchi, ‘Japan’s Response to the Gulf Crisis’, 257-273.
131 As for the influence of ‘external pressure’ which facilitated Japan’s PKO policy, see Mulgan, ‘Japan’s Participation in U. N. Peacekeeping’, 560-575.
133 Although the enactment processes of these legislations were under the strong leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi as Tomohito Shinoda pointed out, there were undeniable factors that the Koizumi government had been ‘pressured’ by the changing international environment, such as the 2001 terrorist attacks and the following wars on terror. As for detailed analysis on Japan’s response to the US-led Wars on Terror, see Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy.
Thus, the perspective of structural realism shows that Japan’s UN peacekeeping policy has been not only based on the egotistic or altruistic nature of the state but also on the structural nature of the international system. International structure and the United States cause external pressure and the Japanese government as a US ally has responded to these international pressures in its security policy making processes.

In short, this thesis proposes four analytical models of Japan’s security identity: (a) Japan as a pacifist state; (b) Japan as a UN peacekeeper; (c) Japan as a normal state; and (d) Japan as a US ally. These four perspectives of Japan’s security identity based respectively on classical liberalism (negative pacifism), neo-liberalism (positive pacifism), classical realism (domestic pressure), and neo-realism (external/structural pressure) will assist in providing comprehensive theoretical explanation to the shifts in Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, this study examines incremental shifts from negative pacifism to positive pacifism in response to domestic and external pressures. Domestic pressures have been mainly caused by Japanese realists and nationalists who desire Japan as a normal state or an independent military power. External and structural pressures are explicitly placed by the United States and changing international security environment. The case studies in the following chapters will demonstrate that the shifts have occurred at

134 See Shinoda, ‘Becoming More Realistic’.
the political and public levels. Especially, the shifts are salient in the legislative processes in the National Diet and opinion polls conducted by major Japanese newspapers.¹³⁵

The Main Arguments of the Thesis

In this context, the thesis makes three major arguments:

First, there have been incremental shifts from negative pacifism to positive pacifism in response to domestic and external factors. This means that Japan’s pacifism has been gradually transforming from negative pacifism (based on Article 9) to positive pacifism (based on the Preamble) in response to domestic and external pressure for military normalisation and to international security environment. In particular, this shift has been salient in the legislative processes to legalise SDF dispatch for international peacekeeping operations. It does not signify, however, that negative pacifism lost its influence.

Second, Japan’s security identity has been alternating between pacifist state, UN peacekeeper, normal state, and US ally. That is to say, it has been fluctuating between pacifist state (negative pacifism), UN peacekeeper (positive pacifism), normal state (classical realism), and US ally (neo-realism) in response to changing domestic and external factors.

¹³⁵ This thesis does not focus on the change of identity of individual SDF personnel. As for the shifting identify of the SDF members in relation to participation in UNPKO, see Kurashina, Peacekeeping Participation and Identity Changes.
Third, although Japan’s security identity is changing between the four models, its ‘core security identity’ is a ‘global pacifist state’. This means that Japan’s core security identity has become, and still remains, a global pacifist state on the basis of the current Japanese Constitution (negative and positive pacifism) until Article 9 is revised to authorise possession of a ‘normal army’.

The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 1 contextualises the historical background of the Japanese security policy from 1945 to 1990. It examines the origin of ‘negative pacifism’ during the occupation and overview its influence through the post-war and Cold War period. The chapter illustrates why Japan had been able to remain a pacifist state based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, despite external pressures from the United States to rearm. The chapter also traces Japan’s reluctant remilitarisation during the Cold War and how complete rearmament of Japan was restrained by negative pacifism. In the end, this chapter emphasises that up to 1990, use of force abroad, even SDF dispatch for international peace operations was prohibited by negative pacifism.

Chapter 2 examines Japan’s participation in the UNPKO in Cambodia as a first case study. It outlines Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian peace
process as well as the SDF dispatch for peacekeeping operations. The chapter aims to clarify how the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism occurred in the legislative process in the early 1990s. In contrast to the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation legislation, which was scrapped on 8 November 1990 in accordance with Article 9 (negative pacifism), the 1992 PKO Law was enacted on 15 June 1992 on the basis of the Preamble (positive pacifism).

In Chapter 3, Japan’s contribution to UNPKO in East Timor makes a second case study, which examines why Japan’s commitment to peace-enforcement operation and the early stages of PKO in East Timor were prohibited, and how Japan’s contributions to several UNPKO in East Timor became possible. The Japanese government modified the PKO Law before sending the SDF to East Timor. It was a significant revision of the law because the revised PKO Law allowed the SDF to participate in the operation of Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) which was ‘frozen’ in the previous legislation.

Chapter 4 analyses Japan’s response to the US-led War on Terror, especially the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. First, this chapter explains the reasons why Japan could not dispatch the SDF to Afghanistan and highlights Japan’s ‘non-military’ contributions to peace-building in Afghanistan. This chapter focuses more on Japan’s response to the 2003 Iraq War than the case of the 2001 Afghanistan War. The case
study demonstrates that there were shifts from negative pacifism to positive pacifism in the legislative processes of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Law. Unlike the cases of UNPKO in Cambodia and East Timor, the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq was military assistance for the United States. Still, UN Resolutions justified the SDF dispatches to support post-war peace operations. In comparison with the previous case studies, this chapter examines Japan as a US ally and its contributions to post-war humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan and peace-building operation in Iraq.

In Chapter 5, the implication of negative pacifism and positive pacifism is examined from the perspective of Japan-Australia relations in a regional context. The chapter analyses the development of the Japan-Australia security partnership by focusing on peacekeeping cooperation in Cambodia and East Timor and security cooperation after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the chapter considers the meaning of a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) and investigated why the JDSC was not upgraded into the full security treaty. The chapter also explores whether bilateral security partnership would contribute to regional integration of the Asia Pacific area.

Chapter 6 examines changing Japanese pacifism and security identity in relation to the possibility of constitutional revision. The constitutional
revision debate is critical to Japanese security policy because revision of Article 9 will drastically change Japan’s security identity. From Chapter 2 to 6, the thesis focuses on an analysis of incremental shifts in Japanese pacifism, and it argues that Japan’s security identity has constantly alternated between: pacifist state; UN peacekeeper; normal state; and a US ally. Nevertheless, this chapter seeks to clarify Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as an image in global politics. It will show that Japan’s core security identity is a global pacifist state based on the current Japanese Constitution (negative and positive pacifism). Finally, the Conclusion summarises the findings and reviews the contribution and implications of the study for the future research of Japan’s pacifism and security identity.
Chapter One


Introduction

As stated in the Introduction, Japanese post-war anti-militarism and anti-war pacifism based on Article 9 and the traumatic experience of the Second World War can be categorised as ‘negative pacifism’. Negative pacifism has consistently influenced post-war Japan’s security policy and prohibited its military participation in international disputes. The study of foreign and security policy in post-war Japan tends to focus on the Yoshida government. This is primarily because the Yoshida Doctrine, which focused on economic development (with minimal defence expenditure), became a foundation of post-war Japanese foreign and security policy.¹ This chapter, however, will analyse Japan’s security policy from the perspective of ‘negative pacifism’ as a defence constraint. Notably, negative pacifism has been frequently used to resist US pressure on Japan to remilitarise. Indeed, successive Japanese Prime Ministers have used Article 9 of the ‘Peace Constitution’ as a pretext to turn down requests for remilitarisation from the United States. On the other hand, negative pacifism as anti-war pacifism or the culture of anti-militarism has been embraced by the majority of the Japanese people and has heavily influenced Japan’s security policymaking.

Japan’s post-war security policy from 1945 to the present, according to Takashi Inoguchi, can be placed into five 15 year periods (1945-60, 1960-75, 1975-1990, 1990-2005, and 2005-2020).² Inoguchi categorised the first

¹ According to Kenneth Pyle, Yoshida himself never used the word, ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ but for the sake of expediency, this term has been frequently used when discussing post-war Japanese politics. See Pyle, Japanese Question, 25.
² This categorisation is based on a 15 year categorisation of Japan’s policymaking which was proposed by Henry A. Kissinger and applied by Takashi Inoguchi. See Inoguchi, ‘Japan as a Global Ordinary
stage (1945-1960) as a period of confrontation between pro-alliance (Security Treaty) and anti-alliance (Constitution). The second stage (1960-1975) was defined as a period of the ‘free rider’ of the Security Treaty (Yoshida Doctrine in action). For the third period (1975-1990), he described Japan as a ‘systemic supporter’; for the fourth period (1990-2005) as a ‘global civilian power’; and for the fifth period (2005-2020) as a ‘global ordinary power’.3

On the basis of this 15-year classification, this chapter examines the correlation between negative pacifism and security policy in Japan from 1945 to 1990. The first section contextualises the origin of ‘negative pacifism’ in relation to the process of demilitarisation (Peace Constitution) and remilitarisation (SDF and Security Treaty). The second section reviews the ‘free rider’ period in relation to ‘income doubling plan’ and ‘three non-nuclear policies’. The third section examines the influence of ‘negative pacifism’, such as the 1% ceiling on the defence budget, comprehensive security policy, lack of constitutional revision during the Nakasone administration, and rejection of the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill.4 The main questions to be examined in this chapter are: 1) how did ‘negative pacifism’ take root in post-war Japanese politics? And 2) how did ‘negative pacifism’ influence and limit Japan’s security policy from 1945 to 1990?

**Japan’s Security Policy 1945-1960**

*The Beginning of Negative Pacifism in Post-War Japan*

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3 Ibid.

4 Subsequent shifts in Japan’s security policy occurred from 1990 to 2005 are covered as case studies in other chapters.
As defined in the Introduction, ‘negative pacifism’, such as anti-war-antinuclear pacifism or a culture of anti-militarism, stems from the devastation of the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War, Japan was forced to dismantle its former army and navy under the directives of the US-led allied occupation of Japan. The Allied Powers planned Japan’s ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘democratisation’ in order to deprive Japan of the capability to invade other countries. The objectives of the occupation by the Allied Powers were already expressed in the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945. At first, Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki ‘silently ignored’ the Declaration on 28 July and ultimately ‘embraced’ it on 14 August. The Potsdam Declaration was ‘imposed’ and hence post-war Japanese security policy was inevitably shaped by the allied occupying forces. Reforms during the early years of the occupation period included the purging of Japanese army officers, the establishment of the Tōkyō war-criminal trials (the International Military Tribunal for the Far East) to punish war criminals, the creation of the Peace Constitution, and the attempt to dismantle pre-war industrial-financial combines (zaibatsu), such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda.

During this period Japan was not an independent state and was deprived of its sovereignty. Yet General Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers or SCAP) played a role as a moderating influence during the occupation period. Hence, the Japanese government was allowed to function and the government was able to negotiate with General Headquarters (GHQ) and was indirectly involved in making

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5 The top priorities of the US-led occupation were: (a) to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world and (b) to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideas and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. See Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 76-77.

6 Article 9 and 10 of the Potsdam Declaration demanded ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘democratisation’ as follows: ‘The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives; The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, or religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established’. See NDL, The Potsdam Declaration, cited from, [http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html](http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html) (accessed at 19 March 2008).
decisions on foreign and security policy. According to Glenn Hook, the demilitarisation process had four layers or dimensions: ‘1) military; as the armed forces were physically abolished; 2) political; as the military was banned in the new Constitution and military influence on the policy-making process was eliminated; 3) economic; as the great arms industry of the zaibatsu were dismantled; and 4) social; as the military and all it stood for were rejected by most at the mass level.’ These multi-dimensional reforms were conducted under the instruction of the GHQ. The demilitarisation process was, therefore, not necessarily the decision of the Japanese government. Similarly, the draft of the Peace Constitution was prepared by GHQ. In this context, the demilitarisation policy planned by the GHQ became the precondition for Japan as a ‘pacifist state’ that embraced negative pacifism.

*Creation of the Japanese ‘Peace Constitution’*

The process of revising the Meiji Constitution in the immediate post-war period exemplifies the initial post-war pattern of external pressure and domestic response in Japan’s security policymaking. MacArthur played a central role by placing pressure on Japanese leaders to accept the SCAP draft of the Peace Constitution. In the process of revising the Meiji Constitution, ‘the Japanese understood and accepted U.S. pressure’. Indeed, the prototype of Article 9 (the MacArthur Note) was drafted by MacArthur himself, and Japanese officials revised and ‘Japanised’ the GHQ draft as a response. Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara (1945-1946), MacArthur, and the Japanese Emperor Hirohito, were in charge of the constitutional revision during this period. Although MacArthur was the first person who drafted the prototype of Article 9, it has been uncertain

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7 Buckley noted that MacArthur carried out the occupation reforms with his political sympathies as moderate left as well as ambition to run for US Presidency. See Buckley, *Japan Today*, 6-7.
11 Iokibe, ‘Senryōka Nihon no ‘Gaikō’”, 21-64.
who originally suggested the inclusion of the ‘no-war clause’. MacArthur insisted that the idea came from Prime Minister Shidehara.\textsuperscript{12} Notably, Shidehara and General MacArthur shared the view that ‘pacifism’ based on the constitution should be Japan’s primary national principle. Shidehara’s pacifism was based on internationalism and economic pragmatism. MacArthur’s view on pacifism was cultivated by his involvement in the drafting of the 1935 Philippines’ Constitution, which was influenced by the 1928 Kellog-Briand Paris Non-War Treaty.\textsuperscript{13} Jōji Matsumoto, a Minister of State and a chair of the Constitution Problem Investigation Committee (Matsumoto Committee), created a draft of the new Constitution heavily based on the Meiji Constitution. Matsumoto’s draft directly readopted 39 of the 76 Articles from the Meiji Constitution and intended to preserve Japan’s monarchy with the Emperor as the highest authority of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{14} MacArthur, of course, did not accept this ‘Matsumoto Plan’ and ordered three American lawyers, General Courtney Whitney, Colonel Charles L. Kades, and Colonel Milo E. Rowell, to draft the Constitution with the so-called ‘MacArthur Note’, a prototype of Article 9. The Mac Arthur Note (three basic points stated by Supreme Commander to be ‘musts’ in constitutional revision) were composed of ‘limited monarchy (the emperor as the symbol of the state)’, ‘renunciation of war’, and ‘abolition of feudalism’.\textsuperscript{15} The MacArthur Note stated:

\begin{quote}
The Emperor is at the head of the State. His succession is dynastic. His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsive to the basic will of the people as provided therein.

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[13] MacArthur had a sense of mission to implant pacifism and democracy (the American civilisation) in Asia. He shook hands with Shidehara with a tear when he realised that they shared the values on pacifism. See Iokibe, ‘Senryōka Nihon no ‘Gaikō’’, 45, 47. Also see Kataoka, \textit{Price of a Constitution}, 37.
\item[14] Hane, \textit{Eastern Phoenix}, 31. See also \textit{Mainichi Shimbun}, 1 Feb 1946.
\item[15] NDL, MacArthur Note (Three Basic Points stated by Supreme Commander to be ‘Musts’ in Constitutional Revision), cited from, \texttt{http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/072shoshi.html} (accessed at 24 Feb 2008).
\end{footnotes}
its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.

The feudal system of Japan will cease. No rights of peerage except those of the Imperial family will extend beyond the lives of those now existent. No patent of nobility will from this time forth embody within itself any National or Civic power of Government. Pattern budget after British system.\(^{16}\)

Paragraph 2 of the MacArthur Note became the prototype of Article 9. The most remarkable characteristic of the paragraph 2 was that Japan was to renounce war, even as a right of self-defence. In this regard, the MacArthur Note can be categorised as ‘absolute pacifism’ and different from Article 9, which has room for flexible interpretation to justify self-defence based on ‘relative pacifism’. Charles L. Kades, who was in charge of writing the GHQ draft, deleted the phrase ‘even for preserving its own security’. This was because Kades thought renunciation of self-defence was extremely unrealistic given the reality of international politics and would most likely lead to eventual revision of the Peace Constitution by Japanese nationalists. Both MacArthur and Courtney Whitney approved of the ‘Kades revision’.\(^{17}\) Consequently, the draft of the Constitution written by the General Headquarters on 12 February 1946 did not explicitly deny the right of self-defence. The GHQ draft noted:

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\text{War as a sovereign right of nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means for settling disputes with any other nation. No army, navy, air force, or other war potential will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the State.}^{18}\]

The difference in nuance between the GHQ draft and the Japanese draft was the result of being translated and revised by Japanese legislators. In

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\(^{16}\) Ibid.
\(^{17}\) Iokibe, ‘Senryōka Nihon no ‘Gaikō’’, 49.
fact, in the deliberation at the Diet from July to August, Hitoshi Ashida made a significant modification to the draft of the peace clause with the insertion of ‘in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph’. By adding this sentence, Japan’s non-armament policy became conditional. The aim of the preceding paragraph is renunciation of war. Still, the first paragraph does not explicitly deny Japan’s self-defence right. In other words, it became possible to interpret the attitude to mean that Japan could possess ‘defence capability’ for self-defence which is not banned in the first paragraph of Article 9. The insertion itself stemmed from the idea of Tokujirō Kanamori, the Minister of State for the Constitution, who intended to make remilitarisation possible in the future. Whereas Kades acquiesced in the intention of the ‘Ashida Revision’, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, expressed their concerns about the possibility of Japan’s remilitarisation. Thus, the ‘Ashida revision’ made it possible for Japan to remilitarise by changing the interpretation of the article. In this context, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) instructed Japan to insert the so-called bunmin jōkō (civilian clause) to control Japanese military power by democracy. As indicated above, however, the constitutional revision was more ‘instructed’ than ‘imposed’ by the United States. According to the testimony of MacArthur and the biography of Shidehara, it was Shidehara who initially insisted that ‘a new Constitution should incorporate a renunciation of war’. Although the draft was originally written by SCAP and confused those who wished to maintain the content of the Meiji Constitution, the revised draft was deliberated, ‘Japanised’, and eventually passed by the Diet. Not surprisingly, the Japanese people

20 Uemura, Jieitai wa Dare no monoka?, 21.
23 Dower, Embracing Defeat. Also see Hane, Eastern Phoenix, 33.
who survived the war devastation willingly accepted the Peace Constitution. The new Constitution of Japan was promulgated on 3 November 1946, and came into effect on 3 May 1947. Article 9 stated:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.24

Needless to say, Article 9 resembles the MacArthur Note and the GHQ draft. Article 9 has been a symbol of anti-war pacifism and the culture of anti-militarism, namely ‘negative pacifism’. In other words, the origin of negative pacifism in Japan was heavily influenced by the Allied Powers, especially the United States. The most intense pressure on negative pacifism was brought about by the outbreak of the Korean War.

The 1950 Korean War and Japan’s Limited ‘Remilitarisation’

As described above, the Peace Constitution was created as a result of pressure from the United States, especially the idealistic pacifism of MacArthur who originally did not desire Japan’s rearmament. MacArthur stated in March 1947 that Japan’s security should be supplemented by the United Nations.25 In 1948, MacArthur explicitly explained the reasons why Japan should not need to rearm: 1) opposition from neighbouring countries; 2) two conflicting policies (demilitarisation and remilitarisation in Japan) that would decrease credibility of the United States; 3) lack of national power to fully protect against the USSR; 4) hindrance to economic recovery; and 5) lack of motivation for rearmament by Japanese

25 Kusunoki, ‘Sengo Nihon no ‘Anzenhoshō to Kenpō’’, 145.
people. As shown in his remark, MacArthur believed that Japan’s rearment was unnecessary.

The outbreak of the Korean War drastically changed his attitude, however. Japan’s security policy was structurally influenced by the Cold War and incorporated by the US anticommunist strategy. George F. Kennan warned of the possibility of Japan’s ‘Communisation’, and his opinion regarding Japan’s strategic significance as a bulwark against the USSR was widely shared in the United States. In spite of the policy of demilitarisation implemented as part of occupation reform, the demilitarisation of Japan did not last long and external pressure resulted in the undertaking of rearment. Three days before the outbreak of the Korean War, John Foster Dulles visited Japan to demand Japan’s remilitarisation. Yoshida, however, avoided discussing security issues, and negotiation for the Peace Treaty was also postponed.28

The Korean War, which broke out on 25 June 1950, strengthened US pressure on Japan to remilitarise. At the beginning of the Korean War, MacArthur called on the Japanese government to establish the National Police Reserve (keisatsu yobitai). After US troops were deployed to the Korean Peninsula, Japan was forced to fill a ‘security vacuum’. As a result, the National Police Reserve (75,000 troops with light infantry weapons) was formed on 10 August 1950. The US-led UN force crossed the 38th parallel near the border of China. The Chinese People’s Volunteer Army intervened in the war in late October. When 200,000 Chinese troops joined in late November, the American forces had to retreat and Seoul was

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26 Ōtake, Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu, 60. See also Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1948, Vol. 6, 706-712. In addition, on 3 March 1949, MacArthur expressed the view that Japan should be the ‘Switzerland of the Orient’. Although Swiss possesses armed forces, it can be interpreted that MacArthur wanted to emphasise ‘neutrality’ of Japan. Kusunoki, ‘Sengo Nihon no ‘Anzenhoshō to Kenpō”, 145.
27 Hosoya, Nihon Gaikō no Kiseki, 113-114.
28 Dulles expressed his dissatisfaction on the meeting that it was as if he were ‘Alice in Wonderland’. See Sakamoto, ‘Dokuritsukoku no Jōken’.
occupied by North Korea. The intensified situation in the Korean Peninsula necessitated Japan’s militarisation and US pressure became much more intense.

The Korean War led not only to Japan’s economic and military development but also to the enhancement of Japan’s strategic value. If it were not for military bases in Japan, the US-led UN Force might have faced crucial difficulties in continuing military operations on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the significance of Japan’s geographical and strategic value to the United States was immense. Japan did not get involved in the use of force in the Korean War, but cooperated during this period. In response to a request from the United States, Yoshida secretly dispatched Japanese Coast Guard minesweepers to the sea around the Korean Peninsula. Japanese minesweepers operated during the war (October to December 1950). Their contribution was to ‘dispose of mines North Korea had laid and to secure the path for the landing American forces’. This secret dispatch of minesweepers is a typical example of the pressure and response pattern in Japanese security policymaking. It is logical to assume that Yoshida had to keep the dispatch of minesweepers top secret because he did not want to stimulate anti-war pacifism or anti-militarism.

**The 1951 Peace Treaty and Japan-US Security Treaty**


In negotiation for the Peace Treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida and John Foster Dulles had confrontational views on the extent of Japan’s ‘rearmament’. Whereas the United States demanded that Japan should rearm with full military force, Yoshida rejected this request for three reasons: 1) public opinion in Japan did not support a rearmament policy; 2) the Japanese economy was not ready for military expenditure; and 3) rearmament would harm relations with neighbouring countries.\(^{32}\) The first reason indicates that Japan’s post-war anti-militarism and pacifism had a substantial influence on Japan security policy in this period. Japanese pacifists, communists and socialists argued that Japan should sign the ‘comprehensive’ Peace Treaty (zenmen kōwa) that included the USSR and other non-western alliance countries. This position was demanded in the Peace Problems Symposium published as a paper entitled, ‘A Third Statement on Peace’ (Mitabi Heiwa ni Tsuite) in the journal, Sekai.\(^{33}\) Furthermore, although Prime Minister Yoshida seemed to be able to reject pressure from the United States, his administration gradually increased military forces. On 8 September 1951, the Peace Treaty was signed in San Francisco. Notably China did not appear at the Conference and the USSR did not sign the Treaty.\(^{34}\) It should be noted that the Peace Treaty confirmed Japan’s right of individual or collective self-defence and most importantly recognised that Japan would be able to voluntarily contribute to ‘collective security arrangements’.\(^{35}\) At the same time as the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, Japan signed a bilateral Security Treaty with the United States. Based on the 1951 Security Treaty, Japan started providing bases for the United States and US forces began stationing in the bases to maintain the security of Japan and the Far East. The Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty, therefore, reflected American national interests, which recognised Japan’s strategic value as a

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\(^{32}\) Uemura, Jicitai wa Dareno monoka?, 29-30.
\(^{34}\) Hosoya, Nihon Gaikō no Kiseki, 119.
\(^{35}\) Maswood, Japanese Defence, 30.
‘bulwark’ against communist countries. Moreover, the Peace Treaty permitted Japan’s remilitarisation with the right of self-defence and even commitment to collective defence.

*The Self-Defence Forces and ‘Non-Dispatch’ Policy in 1954*

Japan’s remilitarisation process during this period was facilitated by US pressure. Still, due to the influence of negative pacifism, the Japanese government was reluctant to rearm. Notably, Prime Minister Yoshida took an ambiguous attitude towards a policy on rearmament during the first visit of US envoy John Foster Dulles to Japan, on 22 June 1950.36 However, in response to a strong request from MacArthur in July, Japan undertook rearmament by establishing the National Police Reserve.37 As the Korean War intensified and UN forces faced difficulties with China’s participation, Dulles again demanded further militarisation during a visit to Tōkyō on 25 January 1951. Again, Prime Minister Yoshida expressed his reluctance to Japan’s complete rearmament.38 The Japanese government, however, reformed the National Police Reserve as the National Safety Forces (*hoantai*) on 15 October 1952 instead of completing remilitarisation. Yoshida’s reluctance to complete rearmament was not only based on priority of economic recovery but also on the influence of an anti-militaristic pacifism prevalent in Japan.

There are significant examples of US pressure for Japan to remilitarise and Japanese resistance in the early 1950s. In October 1953, the Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council and future Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda was sent by Yoshida to Washington to discuss Japan’s rearmament policy. In talks with Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, Ikeda explained that Japan could not conduct complete rearmament due to the Peace Constitution, pacifism and poverty among

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36 Sakamoto, ‘Dokuritsukoku no Jōken’, 68.
37 Ibid., 66.
38 Ibid., 70.
the public, and to the lack of a conscription system.³⁹ Kiichi Miyazawa, another future Prime Minister accompanying Ikeda as an interpreter, argued that the talks had a significant impact on the following post-war Japanese politics and economy and helped put an end to the US request for a complete rearmament.⁴⁰ As Miyazawa described in his memoirs, the Ikeda-Robertson talks focused on negotiation between the United States demanding Japan’s militarisation and Japan requesting more US financial aid. More importantly, Ikeda referred to the ‘constitutional problem’ and made use of ‘Article 9’ to explain why the large-scale armament was impossible.⁴¹

In this sense, Article 9 played an effective role in the Ikeda-Robertson talks. US pressure, however, did not cease after the talks. In November 1953, US Vice President Richard Nixon visited Japan and commented that Japan’s post-war demilitarisation reform was a mistake. At this time, the United States suggested the necessity of Japan’s constitutional revision, and more specifically the ‘scraping’ of Article 9 to allow Japan’s full remilitarisation.⁴² Thus, during the Korean War and due to the power politics of the Cold War, the United States intended to weaken Article 9 and Japan’s anti-war pacifism.

Two defence bills (the Defence Agency Establishment Bill and the Self Defence Forces Law) were passed by the Diet in 1954 and came into force which enabled Japan to reorganise the National Safety Forces into the Self Defence Forces (SDF) on 1 July. Despite the fact that the Yoshida government explained that the SDF were not normal armed forces, Japan’s rearmament became self-evident. As argued by Ōtake, Yoshida was pressured domestically and externally to rearm Japan. Domestically

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³⁹ Ibid., 76.
Yoshida was pressured by both those who desired complete rearmament such as Ashida and by those who insisted on complete disarmament, such as the Socialist and Communist Parties. \(^{43}\) Internationally, Yoshida had to deal with the US pressures for Japan’s remilitarisation while placating the concerns from neighbouring states.

As described above, the Yoshida Government intentionally made use of Article 9 to repulse US request for a full-rearmament while concentrating on its economic growth. As Ichirō Ozawa pointed out, in the long term, Yoshida himself hoped that Japan should be independent in terms of ‘national defence’. \(^{44}\) Article 9 was a useful pretext because it was supported by the majority of Japanese people who shared the culture of anti-militarism. On the other hand, the Japanese government itself ‘constrained’ Japan’s military power. In fact, the House of Councilors officially banned the overseas dispatch of the SDF on 2 June 1954 stating ‘in the establishment of the SDF, in the light of the chapters of the Constitution and keen peace-loving spirit of the citizens, we would like to confirm that overseas dispatch shall not be conducted’. \(^{45}\) The ‘non-dispatch policy’ denied Japan’s contribution for maintenance of international peace and security under the auspice of the United Nations. On 5 February 1957, the chief of the Defence Agency, Akira Kodaki, announced that ‘even if Japan entered the United Nations, Japan would not dispatch SDF overseas and there is no necessity for it’. \(^{46}\)

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\(^{43}\) Ibid., 41. Also See Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 6, 1246-48, 1255-57. Also see Mainichi Shim bun, 9 August 1950, Asahi Shimbun, 10 August 1950.

\(^{44}\) In fact, in 1963, Yoshida stated ‘Even a Japan that stands in the world’s top ranks economically, technically, and scholastically will remain something of a crippled nation if it remains dependent on others for its own defence. It is a position that cannot be respected in international diplomatic circles.’ See, Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, 99.


remark shows, the ‘non-dispatch policy’ was significant for Japan’s security policy because the policy prevents Japan not only from supporting US-led wars but also from making a contribution to international peacekeeping operations.

The 1955 System and the Revision of the Security Treaty

Whereas the Yoshida Government rejected the idea of complete rearmament through constitutional revision, Hatoyama’s Democratic Party insisted on the necessity of constitutional revision so that Japan could legitimately possess military power. The merger of the two major conservative parties (Liberal Party and Japan Democratic Party) was facilitated by Bukichi Miki to confront the merger of the left and right Socialist Parties. As a result of conservative alliance (hoshugōdō), the LDP was established and Ichiro Hatoyama became the first Prime Minister. Nonetheless, the Japan Socialist Party, although unable to carry out its security policy of ‘unarmed neutrality’, succeeded in blocking constitutional revision by holding one-third of Diet seats. Thus, the 1955 system and the political dominance of national politics by the LDP, which had been constrained by ‘negative pacifism’, began. It can be argued that the pervasive influence of negative pacifism prevented the LDP government from revising the ‘Peace Constitution’. Hatoyama also explored the revision of the Security Treaty with the United States. In

47 Hane, Eastern Phoenix, 45. See also Sims, Japanese Political History, 274. Article 96 stipulates: Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution. Cited from NDL, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed at 10 March 2008).

48 In the 1953 General Election, Kaishintō and Hatoyama sect of the Liberal Party that supported for rearmament and constitutional revision lost seats due to influence of anti-war and anti-militarist pacifism. Hatoyama defected from the Liberal Party and created the Japan Democratic Party. On the other hand, the left wing Socialist Party gained seats because of its stance on anti-rearmament. This election influenced the mergers of parties in 1955. See Ōtake, Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu, 208-210.
August 1955, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu visited the United States and negotiated for revising ‘unequal’ Security Treaty, which did not stipulate US obligation to protect Japan. The main reason why Japan desired the revision of the Security Treaty was because the treaty was unfair to Japan.\textsuperscript{49} The four major ‘unfair’ points of the Treaty were as follows: 1) The protection of Japan was not an obligation for US forces; 2) US forces were allowed to intervene in domestic conflicts; 3) The provision of ‘the Far East’ implied that Japan might be involved in future US-led wars as an ally; 4) Japan had to consult with the United States before providing bases to other countries; and 5) The expiration of the Treaty was not decided.\textsuperscript{50} In particular, the Security Treaty stated that the US forces ‘may’ be utilised to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, but did not stipulate the obligation to protect Japan in case of an armed attack. Despite the lack of a clear promise to defend Japan, the Security Treaty permitted the use of bases and stationing of the US troops in Japan.\textsuperscript{51} However, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles ‘rejected’ Japan’s mutual defence proposal stating it was ‘premature’ in 1955. He explained that in order to upgrade the 1951 Security Treaty into an ‘equal’ Security Treaty, Japan should become ‘strong enough to counter communism’.\textsuperscript{52}

In 1956, the Hatoyama government succeeded in normalising diplomatic relations with the USSR and in being admitted to the United Nations. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu stated that Japan would like to contribute to world peace as a

\textsuperscript{49} Kusunoki, ‘Sengo Nihon no ‘Anzenhoshō to Kenpō’’, 157.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Article 1 of the 1951 Security Treaty stipulated: Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power of Powers. See Kataoka, \textit{Price of a Constitution}, 225.
\textsuperscript{52} Also Dulles pointed out the Japanese government needed to ‘secure Diet support’. \textit{Japan Times}, 9 July 2010, ‘Tōkyō Wanted ‘Equal’? Defence Pact Revised in ’55; U.S. said No.’ cited from, \url{http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20100709a4.html} (accessed at 28 July 2010).
‘bridge between the West and the East’. In the speech, Shigemitsu quoted pacifism in the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and mentioned that the belief of the Japanese citizens is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.\(^{53}\) While Hatoyama normalised diplomatic ties with the USSR and gained UN membership, his political ambition was to revise the Constitution to normalise Japan’s military power. His successor, Tanzan Ishibashi, shared his view on constitutional revision, but he was only in office for two months due to illness.\(^{54}\) Nobusuke Kishi, who succeeded Ishibashi, also believed that Japan needed to revise the constitution so as to strengthen the SDF, the police, and the influence of the Emperor. Kishi sought to remove Communists from school and tried to limit the power of the Diet.\(^{55}\) His security policy was strongly influenced by the Cold War.

In 1957, the Kishi government expressed three principles of diplomacy: 1) United Nations centrism; 2) Cooperation with liberalist countries; and 3) Adherence to the position as a member of Asia.\(^{56}\) Although Japan was elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 1958, Japan had to decline the request of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold that the SDF be despatched for UN peacekeeping operations. Needless to say, the decision was based on constitutional restraints and prevailing anti-war pacifism. As Foreign Minister Shigemitsu stated in his speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Kishi government also sought to establish a position as a member of Asia and to contribute to post-war reparations. Unlike the Southeast Asian countries, relationship with China and Korea caused political difficulties for Japan. In addition, Prime Minister Kishi contributed to the revision of the Security Treaty with the Untied States. The revised Security Treaty, signed in January 1960 in Washington, was

\(^{54}\) Ōtake, *Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu*, 177-191.
\(^{55}\) Hane, *Eastern Phoenix*, 46.
\(^{56}\) See the first volume of *Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan* published in 1957.
aggressively railroaded through the Lower House and caused massive
demonstrations and strikes which ultimately forced Kishi to step down as
Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{57} The widespread demonstrations, moreover, prevented
President Dwight D. Eisenhower from visiting Japan. The revised
Security Treaty ensured ‘US responsibility to defend Japan if it comes
under attack’\textsuperscript{58}, although Japan’s military obligation to protect the United
States was not included. In short, during the period from 1945 to 1960,
‘negative pacifism’ based on anti-war pacifism and anti-militarism
supported by the opposition parties placed considerable influence on
Japanese politics and security policy.

\textbf{Japan’s Security Policy 1960-1975: Pursuit of Economic Power}

‘\textit{Income Doubling Plan’ and the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Policies’}

Japan-US Security Arrangements have had several key milestones: in
particular, the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1951; the revised Security
Treaty in 1960; the automatic extension of the Japan-US Security Treaty
in 1970; the former Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation in 1978
(the Former Guideline); the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in
1996 (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks); and the New Guidelines for Japan-US
Defence Cooperation in 1997 (the New Guidelines).\textsuperscript{59} Among these
security arrangements, the revised Japan-US Security Treaty has been
the most significant for Japan’s security policy.\textsuperscript{60} In terms of Japan’s
defence policy, the military alliance with the United States was

\textsuperscript{57} Sakamoto, ‘Dokuritsukoku no Jōken’, 88-104.
\textsuperscript{58} Japan Times, 9 July 2010, ‘Broadening Security Treaty Worried Kishi’, cited from,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20100709a5.html (accessed at 28 July 2010).
\textsuperscript{59} MOD, \textit{Defence of Japan 2007}, 270.
\textsuperscript{60} Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United Sates
(Japan-US Security Treaty) stipulates that: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either
Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions
of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Ibid., 593.
technically supplementary to the collective security system of the United Nations. In the event of armed attacks, US Forces in Japan can defend Japan until the United Nations Security Council takes coercive measures. In reality, the UN Security Council was ineffectual due to Cold War politics and the United States was crucial for the security of Japan. Moreover during the Cold War the Japan-US Security Treaty acted as a deterrent from potential attacks from the neighbouring countries such as North Korea, China and USSR. Article 6 of the Security Treaty guarantees international peace and security in the Far East. 61 These Japan-US Security Arrangements were mostly accepted by Japanese people after Kishi stepped down and anti-security treaty sentiment softened.

After the Kishi government, successive LDP prime ministers tended to avoid discussion on constitutional revision. Notably, the United States also refrained from demanding Japan’s rearmament in public. 62 Like Kishi, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda originally insisted that it was constitutionally possible to possess nuclear weapons although Japan would not adopt the policy. 63 Nevertheless, Ikeda chose to eschew controversial issues, such as security issues and constitutional revision, and decided to concentrate on economic growth. Indeed, he chose economic development with the ‘income doubling plan (shotoku baizō keikaku)’. In February 1961, Kōtō Matsudaira, Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations, argued that Japan should participate in UN Peacekeeping operations. However, this remark was condemned by the opposition parties and he had to withdraw his statement. 64 This indicates that the

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61 Article 6 of the Treaty stipulates: For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tōkyō on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon. Ibid., 594.
62 Katō, Nihon no Anzenhoshō to Kenpō, 89, 74.
63 Uemura, Jieitai wa Dare no monoka?, 96.
64 Tadokoro, ‘Keizai Taikoku no Gaikō no Genkei’, 106, 123.
Ikeda government was not ready at this point for an international contribution by dispatching the SDF.

Japan’s post-war pacifism was influential at the outbreak of the Vietnam War. Even if other US allies such as Australia and Korea sent their forces to Vietnam, the Japanese government could not dispatch the SDF. Instead, Japan offered the usage of the US bases in Japan. Anti-war movements were active throughout Japan during the Vietnam War. As was the case with the Korean War, Japanese leaders used Article 9 as a reason for not dispatching the SDF. As a consequence, the international competitiveness and trade income were strengthened as a result of ‘Vietnam procurement’.65

Negative pacifism made research on contingency law a ‘taboo’. In a statement in the Diet in February 1965, Haruo Okada from the Socialist Party disclosed a secret research project on war, the so-called ‘Mitsuya Research’, conducted by members of the Defence Agency. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded with surprise and anger, ‘If what you said is true, it is totally unacceptable. It is really regrettable that such a plan was made behind the back of the government.’66 The Japanese government, opposition parties and the public were not ready for ‘contingency law’ (yūji hōsei). It turned out that enactment of the contingency legislation had been impossible for more than 35 years.67

During the late 1960s Prime Minister Sato had to deal with both anti-American pacifism and pro-American realism as the Vietnam War escalated. Whereas US Allies such as Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand and Australia dispatched their forces to Vietnam,

65 Hosoya, Nihon Gaikō no Kiseki, 167.
66 The ‘Mitsuya research’ was research on simulation of emergency under the postulation that North Korea and China bombed Seoul and the military forces of both countries invaded South Korea. The Defence Agency secretly researched how Japan should take measures on this situation. See Koike, Sensō to Yūji Hōsei, 31-32.
67 The Koizumi government enacted the legislations in 2003. As for details, see Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy.
Japan did not directly participate in the war. However, US troops in Okinawa were sent, and the bases in Yokosuka and Sasebo played logistical roles. In 1967, the Satō government announced the guidelines which would prohibit Japan from exporting weapons to: 1) communist-block countries to which weapons exports are proscribed by Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM); 2) countries to which UN resolutions discourage exports; and 3) nations that are likely to become party to international disputes. Although the limitation on export to communist countries was partial to the United States, limitations of export based on UN resolutions and the international disputes were a reflection of Japan’s constitutional pacifism.

More significantly, Satō, on 27 January 1968, expressed the ‘three non-nuclear principles’, which promised non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons, and three days later, he presented four nuclear policies at the Diet. The four nuclear policies included the three non-nuclear principles, abolition of nuclear weapon, dependence on the US nuclear umbrella, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The third principle of the three non-nuclear policies, ‘non-introduction’, is problematic and controversial. The United States interpreted this to mean that although ‘introduction’ was prohibited, ‘transit’ was not forbidden. In fact, it was admitted by those who were in charge of US military policy that the US brought nuclear weapons into Japan. Also, Prime Minister Satō made a ‘secret promise’ to President Nixon that the United States would introduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa in case of armed attack. It is logical to reason that Satō had to conceal this nuclear-cooperation deal with the United States because of constitutional pacifism.

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68 Wada, Sengo Kokusai Kankyō no Henka to Kenpō, 58.
69 Kaushik, ‘Japan’s Defence Policy’, 86.
70 Tadokoro, ‘Keizai Taikoku no Gaikō no Genkei’, 126, 137-138.
71 Uemura, Jieitai wa Dare no monoka?, 116-117.
The strategic importance of Okinawa to the United States as a logistics base was demonstrated during the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{73} Okinawa was returned to Japan on 15 May 1972. Notably, the American bases, which were supposed to be scaled down, remain because of the perceived USSR threat. Yet a more fundamental reason was that Japan could not carry out complete rearmament because of constitutional constraints. The three non-nuclear policies and the US bases in Okinawa have close links to negative pacifism. Due to anti-war and antinuclear pacifism, the Japanese government adopted the non-nuclear policies. Similarly, due to the negative pacifism of Article 9, Japan needed to be militarily dependent on US military power in the Cold War international structure. Ironically, the military alliance with the United States was considered to be one of the key factors that restrained Japan from becoming a major military power.\textsuperscript{74} In short, the period between 1960 and 1975 was 15 years of the Yoshida line and ‘free riding’. Although Japan’s security policy had been swayed by international changes, the Yoshida doctrine ensured that Japan sought assistance with economic development while maintaining a tight control over defence expenditure.

\textbf{Japan’s Security Policy 1975-1990}

\textit{‘1% Ceiling’ of Defence Budget and the 1977 ‘Fukuda Doctrine’}

In addition to the Basic Policy for National Defence established by the Kishi government in 1957, the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), formulated by the Miki administration in 1976 (and revised in 1995), stated the basic principles of Japan’s security policy and the

\textsuperscript{73} Sims, \textit{Japanese Political History}, 298.
capability of the SDF. Some pacifist scholars have pointed out that the NDPG implied the possibility of ‘conscription’ if it became necessary. However, the Miki government did not necessarily intend to expand Japan’s military capability. In fact, on 5 November 1976, the government decided to limit the military budget to 1% of Gross National Product (GNP). According to Hook, the 1% ceiling was a symbol of Japan’s identity as a demilitarised country that sought to avoid becoming a military big power. This was because Japan hoped to be perceived as a non-threatening country by neighbouring countries and to minimize its defence expenditure. ‘One percent ceiling’ of military budget as Japan’s security policy was also a reflection of Japan’s anti-militarism and constitutional pacifism. Accordingly, in August 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda announced the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’, which promised that Japan would not become a military power, and proposed a policy for mutual trust between Japan and the ASEAN countries.

‘Comprehensive Security Policy’

In 1978 Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira, influenced by the liberal Fukuda Doctrine, announced ‘the Pacific Basin Community Idea’ (kan taiheiyō rentai kōsō), which emphasised interdependency in the Asia Pacific rather than power politics. Notably, despite pressure from the United States to increase military capability, Japan focused on increasing ODA. This security policy, which included strategic economic assistance, was called ‘comprehensive security’ (sōgō anzenhōshō). The report published by the Ōhira study group suggested that the US military and

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75 The two objectives and three approaches of the NDPG are as follows: 1) To prevent any threat from reaching Japan, and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimise any damage and; 2) To improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. In order to achieve the two objectives, there are three approaches: 1) Japan’s own efforts; 2) Collaboration with Japan’s alliance partners; and 3) Collaboration with the international community. See Defence of Japan 2007, 121.
76 See Maeda, ‘Chōheisei no arukuni ni?’, 21.
77 Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 55.
economic hegemony showed clear decline and would not provide Japan with comprehensive security. Therefore the comprehensive national security policy was Japan’s response to the changing international environment and relatively reduced American power. This comprehensive security policy indicated vulnerability due to its dependence on external markets for resource, energy and food. The main themes of the Ōhira Study Group were: 1) closer cooperation with the United States; 2) the Strengthening of the Self-Defence Forces; 3) the improved management of relations with the USSR and China; 4) maintaining energy security; and 5) maintaining food security.

It was Japan's ‘self-perceived vulnerability’ and sense of economic insecurity that made the Ōhira Cabinet adopt this security policy. Yet, the JDA criticised the comprehensive security insisting that ‘non-military defence is impossible in the current world climate.’ As a part of its economic security or comprehensive security policy, the Japanese government financially supported the stationing of US troops in Japan. From 1978, Tōkyō began to provide the US troops with 62 billion yen which was called sympathy budget, or host nation support (omoiyari yosan), by the Head of the Defence Agency Shin Kanemaru. By making a financial contribution to US troops, the Japanese government intended to minimise the asymmetric aspect of the Japan-US alliance. Due to constitutional constraints, the government had no choice but to share the economic burden of the alliance. Japan’s participation in joint military exercises was similarly part of an alliance burden sharing and an effective way to reduce Japan’s military vulnerability.

In 1980, the SDF entered into joint military drills in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) with the United Sates, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

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79 Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 29.
80 Ōhira Study Group, 1980 cited from Weeks, ‘Softly, Softly to Iraq’, 457.
81 Ibid. Also see Chapman, J. W. M., Drifte, Japan’s Quest for Comprehensive Security.
82 Maswood, Japanese Defence, 39. Also see Rix, ‘Japan’s Comprehensive Security and Australia’, 79.
83 Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 63.
In 1981, the SDF participated in a joint command port exercise in California and the US and Japan initiated additional joint exercises on anti-submarine warfare which included Australia.\(^{84}\) On 27 August 1980, the then Justice Minister, Seisuke Okuno expressed his opinion that Japan needed to create an ‘independent constitution’ by revising the present one which was drafted under the pressure of the occupation.\(^{85}\) Okuno’s remark implied that the comprehensive security policy itself did not mitigate Japan’s sense of insecurity and America’s desire for Japan’s defence build-up. In March 1981, Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defence of the United States, requested Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito to improve Japan’s air and sea defence capability.\(^{86}\) Yet, dovish Prime Minister Zenkō Suzuki did not give way to US pressure. In talks with President Ronald Reagan in May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki stated that ‘a drastic increase of defence expenditure will lead to strong criticism of the LDP. If the Socialist Party takes power, Japan-US ties will be meaningless’. Like other prime ministers, Suzuki faced difficulty in using the term ‘alliance’ to describe the relationship with the United States. He insisted that ‘the alliance does not include the implication of the military’.\(^{87}\) Like Prime Minister Suzuki, the Japanese government has continued making this kind of pretext to deflect pressures from the United States. Prime Minister Suzuki’s remark that ‘the SDF would secure two sea lanes, up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan’ became a focus of debate.\(^{88}\) Suzuki’s remarks caused misunderstanding between the United States and Japan because the US regarded sea lane defence as Japan’s ‘military’ responsibility. This ‘defence friction’ between the United States and Japan strengthened the US demand for an increase in Japanese military expenditure.\(^{89}\) The United States criticised Japan’s security policy as a ‘free rider’ and insisted on Japan’s burden-sharing in terms of

\(^{85}\) Kaushik, ‘Japan’s Defence Policy’, 87.
\(^{86}\) Murata, “‘Kokusai Kokka’ no Shimei to Kunō”, 196.
\(^{87}\) Ibid., 197-198.
\(^{88}\) Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 39.
\(^{89}\) Murata, “‘Kokusai Kokka’ no Shimei to Kunō”, 198-199.
military expenditure of American bases in Japan. Furthermore, Japan was pressured to purchase weapons made in the United States.90

The Nakasone Cabinet and Constrained Remilitarisation

Japan’s constitutional pacifist and anti-militarist security policies, such as the three non-nuclear policies, comprehensive security policy, and the 1% of GNP as defence budget ceiling, led to criticism from the United States. However, Yasuhiro Nakasone desired to remilitarise Japan and to strengthen the security partnership with the United States. Nakasone as Head of the Defence Agency in the 1970s sought to expand Japan’s Defence Capacity, and he carried out a defence build-up after he became the prime minister. During the Nakasone period (1982-1987), US pressure on Japan to increase its defence spending diminished. Nakasone’s argument for constitutional revision was based on his ‘patriotic’ defence perspective and thus became one of his main political ambitions. Nonetheless, during his prime ministership Nakasone could not tackle constitutional revision. Herbert Bix argued that constitutional revision was regarded as unnecessary because of its flexibility in interpretation.91 However, it is reasonable to consider that Nakasone avoided initiating the constitutional revision debate so as not to stimulate unnecessary opposition based on anti-militarism and constitutional pacifism. On 17 January 1983, Nakasone visited Washington. In his meeting with President Reagan, Nakasone stated that Japan and the United States ‘share the same destiny’ (unmei kyōdōtai). The Washington Post featured Prime Minister Nakasone’s remark that the Japanese archipelago is an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’. The Nakasone government officially withdrew the policy on the 1% ceiling of defence budget in 1987. This was warmly received in the United States.92 Nonetheless, Chief Cabinet

90 Wada, ‘Sengo Kokusai Kankyō no Henka to Kenpō’, 60. Also see Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 58-60.
91 Maswood, Japanese Defence, 48, 46.
92 Murata, ‘‘Kokusai Kokka’ no Shimei to Kunō’, 202-203, 206.
Secretary Takao Fujinami pledged that Japan's defence capability would remain ‘strictly defensive’ and would not become a ‘military power’. The government also gave assurance that Japan would expand its foreign economic assistance.93

The Cold War security environment and the increased threat from the Soviet Union’s military build up in Asia prompted Japan to strengthen its defence capabilities. The purchase of early-warning aircraft, advanced radar systems, air tankers for midair refuelling and interceptor fighters reflected insecurity about the USSR and pressure from the United States.94 During the 1980s, the United States introduced military technology and information into Japan so as to contribute to US strategic interests. This was because the Pentagon expected the Japanese government and private sector to adopt and develop American dual use technology, such as integrated circuits, optical fibres, and computers. Moreover, in 1986, the Japanese government decided to participate in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) with the United States.95 These imports of military equipments and technology are characteristics of Japan’s security policy and can be defined as ‘national production-isation’ (kokusanka)96 and ‘techno-nationalism’97 in Japan’s military industry. Nakasone promised Reagan that Japan would proactively contribute to the removal of naval mines in the Persian Gulf. However, overseas dispatch of the SDF and the exercise of the right of collective self-defence caused opposition within the Japanese Cabinet (opposed by Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotōda).98 Constitutional pacifism prevented Nakasone from dispatching the SDF. Under the Ron-Yasu (Reagan-Nakasone) partnership, Nakasone originally desired constitutional

95 Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 53-54.
96 Green, Arming Japan, 2.
97 Techno-nationalism was used by Richard Samuels who analysed rearmament of Japan’s military industry. See Samuels, Rich Nation Strong Army.
98 Wada, ‘Sengo Kokusai Kankyō no Henka to Kenpō’, 62.
revision. Pressure from groups advocating constitutional pacifism and post-war anti-militarism forced Nakasone to abandon his plan of constitutional revision and military contribution to the United States. Basically, American politicians tended to pressure Japan to build up its military power. Nonetheless, US pressure was limited at the same time. As Henry Kissinger warned in January 1987, there was a possibility that Japan could unnecessarily rearm.99 In other words, Washington preferred Japan as a loyal US ally rather than nationalistic military power which might bring back memories of the ‘Pearl Harbour’ incident. Therefore, ironically, the Japan-US security treaty functioned as a structural constraint on Japan’s complete remilitarisation.

Realist scholar Masataka Kōsaka argued in 1985 that Japan did not need to increase it military capability drastically but rather should adhere to the Yoshida Doctrine. He gave three reasons: 1) Because of the stalemate between the two nuclear superpowers, the positive uses of military power were few; 2) Since protecting Japan and maintaining peace in the Pacific were in America’s own national interest, ‘it may not be necessary for us to pay a large share of the cost’; and 3) Since Japan was a source of essential credit and exports to the United States, the Japanese-American relationship could not easily be broken even if Japan do not contribute more militarily. 100 Thus, Kōsaka ruled out the necessity of drastic armament or complete rearmament from a realist perspective.

As well as these realist perspectives, negative pacifism also prevented Prime Minister Nakasone from conducting complete rearmament. First, Nakasone was constrained by the 1 percent limit on defence budget. His plans to withdraw it were opposed by LDP politicians who feared an electoral backlash from the anti-militaristic public. The Prime Minister’s Office opinion poll in 1985 showed that a majority of Japanese preferred

100 Pyle, Japanese Question, 105.
keeping the 1% defence budget ceiling, and after Nakasone expressed his plan to scrap the 1% defence cap, his Cabinet approval rating dropped 11%. \footnote{George, ‘Japan and the United States’, 267, 293-294.} Second, the prime minister, in spite of his hawkish political stance, could not carry out military normalisation through constitutional revision because ‘the necessary consensus amongst the nation at large was missing.’ \footnote{Ibid., 279.} In this sense, not only realism, but also influence of negative pacifism affected the security policy of the Nakasone government.

In May 1988, the Takeshita Cabinet announced the three pillars of international cooperation. \footnote{The three pillars were: 1) cooperation for peace; 2) facilitation of cultural exchange; and 3) increase of the amount of ODA. See Nishikawa, *Kokusai Heiwa Kyōryoku Ron*, 213-214.} Rather than military normalisation, Takeshita explored ways to make an international contribution without dispatching SDF. Meanwhile, in 1988 during the Takeshita government, the United States insisted that Japan should allocate 3% of GNP for military expenditure. In addition, there was a suggestion that tax should be imposed on all imports from Japan. \footnote{Nagahisa, ‘Sengo Nihon no ‘Anzenhoshō to Kenpō’’, 106.} During the 1980s, Japan explicitly expanded its military capability according to the pressure from the United States. As Shapiro pointed out, Japan had to balance ‘no-war ethics’ (pacifism) and pressure for arms build-up (realism) placed by the United States. \footnote{Shapiro, ‘Japan Tries to Balance No-War Ethics, Arms Buildup’ *The Washington Post*, 1 May 1988.} It was apparent that the United States had not been satisfied with Japan’s reluctant rearmament and passive security policy, which prevented the SDF from cooperating with the UN Forces in Korea and Vietnam. However, the end of the Cold War demanded a redefinition of the meaning of the SDF and the Japan-US security treaty. During the Nakasone period, the Japanese government was enthusiastic about increasing Japan’s military power. Still, the government could not implement constitutional revision, which was necessary for military normalisation. As demonstrated above, Japan’s security policy had been consistently constrained by ‘negative pacifism’ from 1945 to 1990.
Japanese post-war foreign and security policies, such as the Yoshida Doctrine, non-dispatch of the SDF, income doubling plan, the three non-nuclear policies, comprehensive security policy, and 1% ceiling for the defence budget, were adopted largely as a result of the political influence of ‘negative pacifism’. The most significant defence constraint was the policy on the ‘non-dispatch of SDF’ to overseas countries. As an exception, Prime Minister Yoshida ‘secretly’ dispatched Japan’s minesweepers after the Korean War. Notably, the policy on SDF dispatch was reviewed in response to a changing international environment and shifted in the early 1990s.

The 1990 Gulf Crisis and Japan’s Reluctant Response

As already mentioned, the initial purpose of the establishment of the SDF was to protect Japan against the communist countries in the context of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, therefore, forced the Japan Defence Agency to find a new raison d’être for the SDF. In this context, although the 1990 Gulf Crisis was ‘a bolt from out of the blue’ to the Japanese government, it turned out to be an opportunity for the JDA to render the SDF a new responsibility and identity. Japan’s responses to the Gulf Crisis, which broke out on 2 August 1990, can be analysed at both the government and public levels. At the governmental level, the Japanese government had been pressured by the United States and LDP hardliners (such as Ichirō Ozawa) to dispatch SDF, and by opposition parties (particularly the Socialist Party) not to make any military commitment. At the public level, opinion polls showed strong opposition to a dispatch of SDF to the Gulf. In response to the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese government quickly imposed an economic embargo on 5 August that froze...
On 14 August, President George H. W. Bush requested a contribution from Japan for the US-led Multinational Forces. Prime Minister Kaifu responded that Japan considered what contributions were possible. From the Bush-Kaifu phone conversation, the United States started placing pressure on Japan stating, ‘Japan would be left alone in the international community unless it makes clear contribution.’ The United States made lists for Japan’s contributions, including the increase of financial contribution to the US Forces in Japan, economic contribution for the Multinational Forces deployed in Saudi Arabia, dispatch of personnel, supply of vehicle, medicine, and financial aids to the Middle East countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared Japan’s ‘international isolation’, ‘Japan bashing’, and the deterioration of American public opinion and the Japan-US alliance, by not making contributions. President Bush explicitly demanded that Japan overcome its constitutional constraints.

On 26 August, Ozawa visited the office of the Prime Minister (kantei) and demanded that Japan should prepare the legal framework to support the UN-centred collective security system. He insisted that it was possible for Japan to contribute to the UN collective security under the current constitution. His argument was that ‘collective security’ (shūdan anzenhoshō) authorised by the UN Charter and ‘collective self-defence’ (shūdanteki jieiken) forbidden under the Japanese Constitution were different.
On 29 November, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised the use of force by Resolution 678, which stipulated ‘all necessary means.’ With the UN resolution calling for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, the US government demanded its allies contribute to the multinational military operations. In response to this, the Japanese government decided to contribute $100 million. When this turned out to be inadequate, the government pledged a further contribution of $4 billion.115 As a matter of fact, there was US pressure on Japan before the Japanese government made the decision to contribute $4 billion. On 28 August, US Ambassador Michael H. Armacost criticised Japan’s response: ‘Japan does not take a risk and only supplies financial aid’; and ‘The United States desires Japanese presence in the Persian Gulf’.116 The US Congress also threatened that unless Japan made sufficient contribution plans, the US would withdraw military forces from Japan.117

Under immense pressure from the United States, Kaifu stated in a press conference on 29 August that Japan could contribute in a non-military area without dispatching SDF. Still Mutsuki Katō, chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council, contended that ‘even though Article 9 forbids the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, Paragraph 2 of Article 98 stipulates the abidance by the treaty concluded by Japan.’118 Katō meant that Article 98 as well as Japan-US Security Treaty and the UN Charter would be legal justification for a SDF dispatch to the Multinational Forces. Unlike dovish Prime Minister Kaifu, Ozawa and Katō caused domestic pressure on the issue of SDF dispatch. In addition to domestic pressures, the changing international security environment caused by the end of the

115 Inoguchi, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 99.
116 Tanaka, Kenpo Kyūjō no Sengoshi, 134.
Cold War strengthened US pressure on a SDF dispatch.\footnote{Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 31 August 1990, cited from, http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/176.htm (accessed at 6 June 08).} Ambassador Armacost criticised Japan’s planned contribution thus: ‘The participation of the Maritime SDF would have been possible even within the framework of the current Constitution.’\footnote{Ibid, 1 September 1990, cited from, http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/177.htm (accessed at 6 June 08).} On 10 September, Senator John McKayne stated that ‘Japanese aid without substance will only invite the world’s contempt and American anger.’\footnote{Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 82-83.} There was a threat from members of the US Congress demanding ‘meaningful voluntary restraints on Japanese exports of automobiles to the United States, if Japan failed to make a satisfactory contribution to the Gulf effort.’\footnote{Ibid.} The American media was also critical, reporting that: ‘Japan, which is far more reliant on the Gulf than any other rich country, buys its energy security with the lives of young Americans’.\footnote{Ibid.}

On 29 November, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised the use of force by Resolution 678, stipulating ‘all necessary means.’\footnote{See UNSC Resolution 678, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm (accessed at 17 August 2010).} The US government expected Japan to participate in the Gulf Crisis proactively because Japan was dependent on US military power and oil from the Middle East. Therefore, Washington called on Japan to deploy transport craft to carry military supplies, supply ships, and military tankers. The Japanese government refused, citing constitutional constraints. The government instead lent about 80 Japanese civilian aircraft for the US-led military operations. The United States, however, expected that the aircraft would carry Japanese flags.\footnote{Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, 36-38.} The incident exemplifies a perception gap between Tōkyō and Washington on the role of the military alliance and the influence of negative pacifism. The Japanese government’s reluctance to respond was due to intense division...
within Japan. Even within the LDP, opinion regarding the dispatch of SDF was divided. Dovish Yōhei Kōno, a head of the LDP Research Commission on Diplomacy, showed his caution against the dispatch of the SDF, insisting that Japan’s contribution to the Gulf Crisis should be limited to economic support. Hawkish Shizuka Kamei, the chairman of Comrades for the State’s Basic Problems, refuted Kōno’s view, arguing that the Japanese Constitution had to be revised rather than repeatedly reinterpreted, so that Japan can dispatch the SDF for international peacekeeping operations. Takako Doi, of the Socialist Party, was the most conspicuous politician advocating anti-militarism. Doi opposed even Japan’s financial contribution for the multinational forces, arguing that if the money was spent for the war, it would be a breach of Article 9. Kōshirō Ishida of Kōmeitō also insisted that it was unacceptable to offer financial support if Japan’s contribution was to be used for arms and ammunition. Opposition to the SDF dispatch was strongly supported by lawmakers from the SPJ, JCP, Kōmeitō and even from within LDP circles.

When Kaifu discussed the dispatch of the Air Self-Defence Forces (ADSF) to aid the transport of refugees, Doi censured it as a ‘fascist act and a denial of parliamentary procedures’ The Communist Party also denounced the proposal as ‘unconditional support for the war.’ Nor did Kōmeitō support the plan on the grounds of Article 9. Basically, the Socialist Party was opposed to any despatch of the SDF. Instead, the party insisted on the despatch of Japanese civilian personnel for ‘non-military activities’ under UN resolutions. Kōmeitō agreed that the party would support the despatch of the SDF for electoral, medical and refugee-related activities. The Communist Party did not support any despatch of the SDF, stating that the existence of the SDF itself was

127 Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 65.
128 Ibid., 67-68.
129 Ibid.
unconstitutional. At the popular level, more than two-thirds of the Japanese people showed their antipathy against the government’s support for the US-led Multinational Forces. Even though more than two-thirds of the Japanese surveyed showed that they supported the policy that Japan should make more ‘international contribution’, they insisted that the contribution needed to be limited to ‘pacifist’ means. On 27 September 1990, 23,000 people protested against Kaifu’s announcement that a ‘United Nations Peace Cooperation Team’ be sent to Saudi Arabia. The Kaifu government needed to deliberate on a bill to dispatch SDF to the Persian Gulf and faced considerable opposition in the Diet and in the public arena.

_Rejection of the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill_

The influence of negative pacifism can be seen in the rejection of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill. MOFA had been keen for Japan’s participation in UNPKO. In applying for entry into the United Nations, Foreign Minister Okazaki promised on 16 June 1952 to implement the obligations as a UN member state ‘by all means at its disposal’. Clearly MOFA had anticipated that Japan would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, MOFA regarded the 1990 Gulf Crisis as a chance for the overseas dispatch of SDF and played a central role in drafting the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill. On 12 October 1990, the Kaifu government submitted the UN Peace Cooperation Bill to the Diet. On 17 October in 1990, the LDP government announced a security policy towards the UN-authorised military operations and made a distinction between ‘participation’ (sanka) and ‘cooperation’ (kyōryoku). The government explained ‘participation’ was unconstitutional because it

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130 Ibid.
131 Inoguchi further analysed the three major factors of Japan’s response to the crisis, 1) uncertainty and anxiety; 2) historical learning; and 3) self-confidence. See Inoguchi, _Japan’s Foreign Policy_, 100-114.
132 Cooney, _Japan’s Foreign Policy_, 39-40.
133 Shinyo, _Shin Kokuren Ron_, 127.
134 Inoguchi, _Japan’s Foreign Policy_, 99.
meant the despatch of SDF and required the use of force under the command of UN military activities. On the other hand, ‘cooperation’ was explained as constitutional because it was outside the command of the UN Secretary General and did not carry the risk of use of force as a decision of the Japanese government. In spite of the government’s explanation of the constitutionality of ‘participation’, the UN Peace Cooperation Bill was scrapped at the 190th Diet Session on 8 November 1990. The withdrawal of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill demonstrated the influence of opposition parties and the public on this issue (negative pacifism).

At the public level, negative pacifism prevailed over the overseas dispatch of SDF. According to the Asahi Shimbun opinion poll of November 1990, only 15% of interviewees supported that ‘overseas despatch of the SDF as OK if international conflicts break out’ whereas as many as 78% were opposed. In December 1990, the Asahi Shimbun poll indicated that 9% supported the dispatch of the SDF and 33% were in favour of financial contribution only. The withdrawal of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill and public opinion polls indicated that negative pacifism was influential enough to prevent the SDF from being despatched. There are other reasons why the UN Peace Cooperation Bill could not pass the Diet however. First of all, Prime Minister Kaifu underestimated the antipathy of the public towards the despatch of SDF. Even after the end of the Cold War, the Japanese people still maintained anti-war sentiments and did not support the bill. Secondly, Prime Minister Kaifu attempted to rush the bill and failed to gain consensus in the Diet. Thirdly, the bill was considered to be too dependent on the United States and did not focus on the United Nations. In other words, the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill was rejected because it was designed not for UNPKO but for UN-

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135 Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 69.
136 Tanaka, Kenpō Kyūjō no Sengoshi, 136-140.
137 Sasaki, Umi o Wataru Jieitai, 49.
138 Tanaka, Kenpō Kyūjō no Sengoshi, 136-140.
authorised military operations, which entailed the use of force and therefore contravened Article 9.

More fundamentally, the power balance in the Diet was a decisive factor in the withdrawal of the bill. Although the LDP held a majority of seats in the House of Representatives,\textsuperscript{140} the opposition parties enjoyed a majority in the House of Councilors and therefore could block the passing of the bill.\textsuperscript{141} The LDP, moreover, failed to persuade the second largest opposition party, Kōmeitō to support the bill.\textsuperscript{142} In the legislative process, Kōmeitō’s opposition was a ‘major obstacle’ for the government, as Kōmeitō’s support was ‘essential to enable the bill to pass’.\textsuperscript{143} In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Tetsuzō Fuyushiba from Kōmeitō stated that the invasion was unforgivable and recognised the legitimacy of a resolution by the UN Security Council. At the same time, Fuyushiba confirmed the resolution, which decided not to dispatch the SDF overseas, adopted by the House of Councilors on 2 June 1954. He insisted that the dispatch of the SDF in support of the US-led Multinational Forces was unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{144} At the Lower House plenary session on 16 October 1990, Kōshirō Ishida from Kōmeitō expressed his opposition to the SDF dispatch to the Multinational Force because it would violate the Peace Constitution especially the principle of non-exercise of the collective self-defence right and non-overseas dispatch of the SDF. He proposed the establishment of unarmed ‘UN Peace Cooperation Corps’ (kokuren heiwa

\textsuperscript{140} In the Lower House, the LDP needed the majority of 257 seats to pass the bill. The LDP held 275 seats by its own. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, \textit{Japan Parliamentary Chamber: Shūgiin, Election held in 1990}, cited from \url{http://www.ipu.org/parlinfo/e-reports/arc/2161_90.htm} (accessed at 20 October 2009).

\textsuperscript{141} In the Upper House, the LDP needed the majority of 127 seats to pass the bill. However, the LDP held only 109. Therefore, Kōmeitō’s support for the bill was necessary for the LDP as Kōmeitō held 20 seats. See Inter-Parliamentary Unit, \textit{Japan Parliamentary Chamber: Sangiin, Election held in 1989}, cited from \url{http://www.ipu.org/parlinfo/e-reports/arc/2162_89.htm} (accessed at 20 October 2009).

\textsuperscript{142} Tanaka, ‘Kokuren Heiwa Katsudō to Nihon’, 141-142.

\textsuperscript{143} Stockwin, \textit{Governing Japan}, 2008, 78.

kyōryokutai separately from the SDF to contribute to the non-military activities such as medical service, transportation, telecommunication, construction and refugee rescue. He emphasised that the participation of the SDF should not be permitted. Ishida also argued that on the basis of its ‘UN-centrism’, Japan should actively participate in UNPKO.145

In response to Ishida’s reference on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, Prime Minister Kaifu answered that the bill did not intend to legalise the exercise of the collective self-defence right. Kaifu explained that the bill was designed to provide the logistical support for the Multinational Forces rather than participating in the use of force with US-led forces. He also mentioned that his government did not intend to work on constitutional revision and to reinterpret the concept of the collective self-defence right.146 On the basis of anti-war pacifism, however, Kōmeitō did not support the SDF dispatch for logistic support of Multinational Forces. Kōmeitō’s anti-war pacifism (negative pacifism), therefore, played a ‘pivotal role’ in scrapping the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill.147

In sum, ‘negative pacifism’ based on Article 9 was the primary reason why the Japanese government could not pass the bill. The rejection of the bill exemplified one of the strongest defence constraints in Japan, namely ‘non-exercise of the right of collective self-defence’. At the same time, the rejection of the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill raised Japan’s dilemma of choosing between ‘one-nation pacifism’ (ikkoku heiwa shugi) and


international pacifism. Ironically, as a result of national pacifism, Japan could not contribute to international pacifism (despite UNPKO receiving a Nobel Peace Prize in 1988). Since the beginning of post-war Japanese politics, ‘negative pacifism’ had influenced and limited Japan’s militarisation and commitment to international conflicts. Due to ‘negative pacifism’, Japan could not make a military contribution to UNPKO. Nonetheless, the 1991 Gulf War became a ‘turning-point’ in a shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ for international peacekeeping operations.

**Analytical Eclecticism**

As examined above, negative pacifism offers strong explanations why and how Japanese security policy for complete rearmament during the post-war era had been limited. Opinion polls conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun* from 1957 to 2005 revealed that the Japanese public had consistently opposed complete remilitarisation through constitutional revision from 1957 to 1990. According to the poll, almost 80% of respondents were against constitutional revision, while only approximately 13% were in favour. This is the most conspicuous example of influence of negative pacifism or anti-militarist sentiment as a defence constraint. Yet analysis based only on classical liberalism (negative pacifism) might overlook other aspects that influenced Japanese security policy. In fact, according to opinion polls conducted by the public relations department of the Japanese Cabinet from 1957 to the mid 1980s, the majority of Japanese people had consistently admitted the existence of the SDF during this period. This shows that negative pacifism is not the only factor that influenced post-war Japanese security policy. In spite of its security identity as a ‘pacifist state’, the Japanese government began limited

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150 Ibid., 109.
rearmament and the public accepted the existence of the SDF. In order to explain the factors that determined Japanese security policy, the next section attempts to provide a supplemental analysis from other theoretical perspectives (neo-liberalism, classical and neo-realism) as an application of analytical eclecticism.

**Perspective from Neo-Liberalism**

Interpretation from a perspective of neo-liberal institutionalism could suggest that Japan decided to remain a ‘pacifist state’ for international cooperation as a member of international society. Japanese post-war ‘Peace Constitution’ created under instruction of the GHQ became a foundation for Japan’s neo-liberal pacifist stance. Neo-liberals have argued that the Peace Constitution, especially the clauses on renunciation of war and civilian control, constrained the right of belligerency. The Yoshida Doctrine is consistent with neo-liberalism which values economic policy over security and military issues. In addition, Japanese foreign policy based on the Yoshida line functioned thanks to the existence of neo-liberal ‘international regimes’, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1956 during the Hatoyama government, Japan obtained membership of the United Nations. In 1957 the Kishi government adopted ‘UN-centrism’ as one of the three pillars of Japanese diplomatic policy. The adoption of the ‘three non-nuclear policies’ in 1968 and Japan’s participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system in 1970 are also consistent with international regime theory. Moreover, liberal multilateralism based on ‘interdependency’ can be seen in the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine and Prime Minister Ōhira’s idea of ‘the Pacific Basin Community’.

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151 By democratic decision-making process, the right of belligerence of the state can be controlled. Especially, democratic states tend not to wage war against other democratic states. See Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*.

152 Japan became a member of IMF in 1952 and of GATT in 1955. As for regime theory, see, Krasner, *International Regimes*.

153 See Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.
‘comprehensive security policy’ in the 1980s was also in line with neo-liberal foreign policy with ‘greater emphasis on economic and diplomatic means than on military means.’ In spite of these neo-liberal policies and UN-centrism, Japan could not dispatch the SDF for the UN-authorised Multinational Forces in the 1990 Gulf Crisis. This indicates that Japanese foreign and security policies were more ‘reactive’ constrained by ‘anti-militarist pacifism’ than ‘adaptive’ based on ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’.

As examined in this chapter, Japanese foreign and security policy have been heavily influenced by negative pacifism during the period from 1945 to 1990. Yet, during this period, Japan was a ‘one-nation pacifist state’ based on negative pacifism rather than ‘global pacifist state’ based on positive pacifism. With regard to SDF dispatch to UNPKO, it was after the 1990s that Japan ‘has come to be guided by an essentially [neo] liberal view of international politics.’ Indeed it was not until the 1990s that Japan began reconsidering international peacemaking and peacekeeping as its own responsibility. In the following chapters, incremental shifts from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’, which allowed SDF dispatch for post-conflict peace operations, will be examined.

**Perspectives from Classical and Neo-Realism**

From a classical realist perspective, sovereign states are expected to maximise their national interests, especially military power. Nevertheless, Japan chose not to maximise its military power but to remain a pacifist state with a limited self-defence capability. Even after the Japanese economy recovered, Japan decided not to completely normalise its military power. In the light of classical realism, however, this can be

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155 As for Japan’s foreign policy as an ‘adaptive state’, see Berger, ‘Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State’, 259-299.
156 Ibid., 268.
explained in terms of Japanese leaders making realistic judgements that maximisation of economic power was more contributory to Japanese national interests than military power would be. From experience of the Pacific War, Japanese leaders learned that territorial and military expansion was not consistent with national interests. As Rosecrance pointed out, the ‘Japanese period’ in world politics arrived because Japan peacefully replaced the ‘military-political and territorial system’\(^{157}\) with a trading strategy. This was because territorial expansion based on military maximisation became ‘too costly, dangerous and uncertain’\(^{158}\) after the Second World War. Being a mercantilist state was, therefore, a result of logical and strategic decision-making by Japanese realist leaders. Heginbotham and Samuels, for instance, explained Japanese foreign and security policy, which prioritised economy over military, by theorising a concept of ‘mercantile realism’\(^{159}\). Huntington also observed:

> For decades Japan has acted in a way totally consistent with the ‘realist’ theory of international relations, which holds that international politics is basically anarchic and that to insure their security states act to maximise their power. Realist theorists have focused overwhelming on military power. Japan has accepted all the assumptions of realism but applied them purely in the economic realm.\(^{160}\)

Therefore, Japan’s policy, which focused more on economic power than military power, is not at odds with precepts of ‘mercantile realism’ and ‘classical realism’. Not only cultural and constitutional restraints (negative pacifism) but also mercantile realism (mercantilist and classical realism) limited Japanese security and military policies.

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\(^{158}\) Ibid.


Likewise, neo-realism (structural realism) explains why Japan did not need to normalise or maximise its military capability despite US pressure and changing international security environment in the Cold War. As Heginbotham and Samuels observed, ‘although Japan failed to maintain a well-rounded and independent defence force and did not expend significant resources to maintain its alliance connection, this too is not necessarily inconsistent with structural realism.’\(^{161}\) Indeed, to a certain extent, the bipolar structure during the Cold War determined Japan’s foreign and security policies which focused more on maximisation of economic power than on that of military power. In this context, the asymmetrical nature of the military alliance with the United States made Japan’s complete military normalisation unnecessary. According to Henry Kissinger, the presence of US troops in Japan and the US nuclear umbrella secured Japan’s national sovereignty and have functioned as a ‘brake on Japanese expansionism and militarism’.\(^{162}\) On the other hand, the United States had been aware of Japan’s geopolitical significance which was demonstrated in the 1950 Korean War. Because of the Cold War structure, the United States needed the military alliance with Japan, even though the alliance was asymmetrical. The Cold War structure and the military alliance made Japan pursue the stability of an international system through balance of power (defensive realism) rather than maximisation of military power based on unlimited desire (offensive realism).\(^{163}\)

Japan’s economic growth based on the asymmetrical military alliance was the reason why the United States criticised Japan as a ‘free rider’. Yet from a structural realist perspective, the Japanese free rider strategy was determined by the bipolar Cold War structure. More precisely, Japan’s foreign and security policies during this period were not necessarily that

\(^{161}\) Heginbotham and Samuels, ‘Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy’, 176.

\(^{162}\) Burr, Kissinger Transcripts, 84.

\(^{163}\) As for a distinction between defensive realism and offensive realism, see Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
of a free rider but nonetheless were ‘profitable’ for Japan. Furthermore, as Inoguchi pointed out, Japan became more of a ‘supporter’ of the US strategic interests than just a free rider. Indeed, during the Nakasone period, Tōkyō invigorated the Japan-US alliance by enhancing Japanese strategic roles, interoperability, and reciprocity in military technology. Moreover, the policy of the Nakasone government implicitly guaranteed ‘future Japanese participation in the US Strategic Defence Initiative program’. Thus Japan supported the US Cold War strategy while taking advantage of the asymmetrical nature of the alliance. By concentrating on a maximisation of economic power, while taking balance of power and bandwagoning strategy, Japan had been able to remain a ‘pacifist state’ despite the anarchic confrontation during the Cold War. In spite of being a key US military ally, Japan could not make a military contribution to the US-led Multinational Forces during the 1991 Gulf War. US pressure and criticism during this period traumatised Japanese leaders and brought about the creation of a new legal framework to dispatch SDF to Cambodia in 1992. Thus, not only domestic constraints (negative pacifism or classical liberalism) but also post-war international regimes (neo-liberalism), a domestic desire for the maximisation of economic power (classical realism) and the asymmetrical structure of the Japan-US alliance (neo-realism) allowed Japan to remain a ‘pacifist state’ from 1945 to 1990.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed and analysed how Japan’s security policy from 1945 to 1990 had been constrained by ‘negative pacifism’. The chapter has contextualised how ‘negative pacifism’ had been formed during the early

164 Heginbotham and Samuels, ‘Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy’, 176.
165 See Inoguchi, ‘Japan’s Images and Options’, 95-119. Also see Inoguchi, ‘Japan as a Global Ordinary Power’.
167 As for detailed analysis on balance of power and bandwagoning strategy, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics. See also Walt, Origins of Alliances.
post-war era, especially the occupation period. The ‘Peace Constitution’ was created as a consequence not only of anti-war pacifism in Japan but primarily as a result of immense pressure from GHQ. Anti-war sentiments and the culture of anti-militarism based on the memory of the Second World War as well as Article 9 influenced Japan’s economic, foreign and security policies. Key policies, such as the Yoshida Doctrine, non-dispatch of the SDF, income doubling plan, three non-nuclear policies, comprehensive security policy, and the 1% ceiling defence budget were shaped by these influences. Due to ‘negative pacifism’, successive Japanese governments were able to focus on economic development rather than an increase in military power and defence expenditure. Similarly, because of ‘negative pacifism’, Japan avoided sharing military responsibility as a US ally in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. On the other hand, international conflicts during the Cold War forced Japan to remilitarise. Whereas ‘negative pacifism’ had been an influential defence constraint, it had been weakened in response to internal and external pressures such as domestic desire for rearmament and US strategic interests.

Still, US pressure on Japan had not been consistent in regard to complete remilitarisation. The United States realised that Japanese anti-war pacifism was influential in Japan’s security policymaking. As well, Washington feared that Japan might unnecessarily rearm and become an aggressive military power. A fully remilitarised Japan, moreover, would be a destabilising factor in the Asian region. US pressure on Japan changed after the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis. Instead of demanding a military build-up, the United States required Japan to send the SDF to the Persian Gulf. In response, the Japanese government attempted to enact the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, but it was defeated by strong opposition in the Diet, in particular due to lack of support from Kōmeitō. This exemplifies the essence of negative pacifism which constrains Japanese military power. The 1991 Gulf War,
however, encouraged the Japanese government to enact the PKO Bill to participate in UNPKO in Cambodia. In the legislative process, Kōmeitō played a significant role necessary for the enactment of the bill. Traditional Japanese anti-war pacifism based on Article 9 (negative pacifism) was criticised as egotistic ‘one-nation pacifism’, which denied Japan’s contribution for international peace. Yet the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War marked a watershed in Japan’s pacifism and policy on SDF dispatch for international peace operations. The following chapters will investigate the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ based on Article 9 of the Constitution to ‘positive pacifism’ based on the Preamble of the Constitution.
Chapter Two

Japan as a ‘UN Peace-Keeper’ in Cambodia

Introduction

In the previous chapter, Japan’s security policy during the Cold War period, which had been constrained by ‘negative pacifism’, was examined. In contrast, this chapter analyses an emerging role of ‘positive pacifism’ which enabled Japan to contribute to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). It was the first opportunity for the Japanese government to dispatch the SDF for UNPKO. Prior to participation in UNTAC, the Japanese government had been involved in the resolution of the Cambodian imbroglio which involved domestic (four political factions), regional (Vietnam, Thailand, China) and international (the US and the USSR) confrontations. Historically, the Japanese government recognised the Sihanouk government (1953-1970), the Lon Nol government (1970-1975), and the Pol Pot government (1975-1979). Notably the Japanese government, which followed the US position, did not recognise the Heng Samrin government (1979-1991). Japan’s diplomatic policy on Cambodia was influenced by the overall US strategy of containment of global communism, as well as regional responses from China and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Throughout the 1989 Paris Conference, 1990 Tōkyō Conference, and 1991 Paris Agreements, Japanese diplomacy on Cambodia had been unusually active. As a part of these diplomatic efforts, MOFA sought opportunities to dispatch SDF to participate in UNTAC.

After the enactment of the PKO Law on 15 June 1992, the Japanese government dispatched for the first time three civilian electoral observers

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1 Uesugi, Kawariyuka Kokuren PKO.
2 Kumaoka, Kanbojia Saizensen, 194-195.
to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 2 (UNAVEM 2) to supervise the national legislative and presidential elections on 29 and 30 September 1992. UNTAC however, was the first UNPKO in which the Japanese government dispatched SDF and civilian personnel to participate in civilian policing, electoral monitoring and engineering for the reconstruction of roads and bridges. The dispatch of the SDF to overseas countries had been technically impossible due to Article 9 and the resolution of the ‘ban on overseas dispatch of the SDF’ adopted by the Upper House in June 1954. Moreover, as Kumao Nishimura, Head of Treaty Department MOFA, pointed out, Japan joined the United Nation on conditions that it would not take any military responsibility. Japan did not intend to participate in UN-led collective sanctions or peacekeeping operations. As a matter of fact, Japan rejected the official request from the UN office to participate in a UNPKO in Lebanon in 1957. In this respect, Japan’s participation in UNTAC was a major turning-point in the history of Japan’s foreign and security policies. The intervention into Cambodia by the United Nations with an unprecedented mandate of ‘transitional authority’ can be categorised as one of the early stages of ‘new interventionism’. The intervention by the UNPKO was carried out although Cambodia was on brink of the ‘civil war’ due to violence committed by the Khmer Rouge. Notwithstanding, the nature of UNPKO in Cambodia was neutral peaceful activities and the SDF had to be retrained to carry out unfamiliar operations. In this context, SDF participation in UNTAC can be perceived as a step towards Japan’s military normalisation as SDF benefited from firsthand military

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4 Takahashi and Toda, Kanbojia to Jietai, 71.

5 Ogata, Kokuren kara no Shiten, 218.


7 Saiki. Sekai no PKO Butai, 133.
experience. At the same time, the participation in UNTAC transformed the nature of the SDF from a military power into an international peacekeeper. During the Cold War, Johan Galtung proposed the concept, ‘trans-armament’, which is the transformation of the military nature from ‘offensive defence forces’ to ‘defensive defence forces’ as an alternative to the concept of disarmament. During the Cold War, Japan did not need to conduct ‘trans-armament’ because Japanese military capability had been already ‘defensive defence power’. Notably, the concept of ‘trans-armament’ suggests a new usage of military power. In other words, military transformation from ‘defence power’ to ‘international peacekeeper’ can be another type of ‘trans-armament’. Indeed, in the post-Cold War period, Japan conducted another form of ‘trans-armament’ by transforming its military nature from ‘defensive defence forces’ to ‘international peacekeeper’. At the same time, there had been a shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ through the enactment of the PKO Law and SDF participation in UNTAC. For these reasons, the SDF dispatch to UNTAC marked meaningful turning-points for Japan’s security policy.

The purpose of the chapter is to examine: 1) whether the commitment to the Cambodian peace process and UNTAC by the Japanese government was reactive or active foreign policy; 2) whether Japan’s participation in UNTAC was a process of Japanese military normalisation or trans-armament as a UN peacekeeper; and 3) what factors facilitated the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. In order to analyse the questions, this chapter begins with an historical review of the Japan’s diplomacy on the Cambodian peace process. Secondly, the SDF participation in UNTAC is examined. Thirdly, four theoretical frameworks

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8 Galtung, *Transarmament and the Cold War*.
10 As derivation of the definition of Galtung, this thesis describes transformation of Japanese military capability from ‘defensive power’ to ‘international peacekeeper’ as ‘trans-armament’.
(analytical eclecticism) are applied to examine the second and third questions.

Historical Background of the Cambodian Conflict

In August 1863, Cambodia willingly became a French protectorate to avoid becoming a subject state of Thailand or Vietnam. However, during the Second World War, the Japanese Imperial Army marched into the Indochina Peninsula and was stationed in Cambodia by July 1941. Although Prince Norodom Sihanouk declared independence after the defeat of Japan in 1945, France became a ‘suzerain’ again and the independence of Cambodia became invalid. In the wake of the Vietnamese movement for independence, Prince Sihanouk began the campaign to regain independence in 1953. In October 1953, the French turned over its politico-military control to the Cambodian authority. In November of the same year, Cambodia became independent under the leadership of Sihanouk. Sihanouk declared non-alliance neutrality as a diplomatic policy, although he was relatively sympathetic towards communist countries, such as USSR, China and North Vietnam. As the Vietnam War intensified, Sihanouk broke off diplomatic relationship with the United States. Sihanouk’s erratic economic policies created domestic unrest and offered pro-American General Lon Nol the opportunity to launch a successful coup d’etat in 1970.11 The defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War in 1975 and the withdrawal of US forces, however, lessened the political power of the Lon Nol government. Thus, the international environment of the Cold War inevitably influenced the domestic politics of Cambodia.

The Khmer Rouge, an extreme Maoist-style communist group under the leadership of Pol Pot, took power from the Lon Nol government in April

11 Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History, 67-72, 197-199. As for more historic work, Chandler suggested three visions of the Cambodian politics, royalism, parliamentarianism, and socialism, see Chandler, ‘Three Visions of Politics in Cambodia’. Also see Kono, Wahei Kōsaku, 8-10.
1975 and established Democratic Kampuchea. Pol Pot became the first Prime Minister and Sihanouk returned to his throne but Pol Pot confined Sihanouk to the Royal Palace in April 1976. On the basis of its extreme communist belief, the Pol Pot government invaded all towns, executed all leaders of the Lon Nol regime, carried out the expatriation of Vietnamese people, and deployed their armed forces to the Vietnamese border. Furthermore, the government carried out an infamous ‘genocide’ program which made the government internationally isolated. Men and women were separated and children over five or six years old were also separated from their parents and forced to work. Vietnamese, Chinese, Muslims, and Buddhist monks were deported or died as a result of starvation or execution. The number of people who died by the genocide policy of the Pol Pot was not known, but it amounted to approximately two million or 30% of the entire population at that time.

The Pol Pot government attempted to create a border conflict with Vietnam to turn attention away from the domestic issues. In response, the Vietnamese government decided to invade Cambodia on 25 December 1978 and the Khmer Rouge fled to Cambodia’s border with Thailand. In response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China invaded Vietnam as a ‘lesson’, although Chinese forces withdrew after 16 days. At the time when genocide was conducted by the Khmer Rouge, the international community appeared not to understand the enormity of human rights violations in Cambodia. On the contrary, the permanent members of the

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14 Although Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was internationally criticised as illegal, the act of aggression rescued the Cambodian people. There is a dilemma between humanitarian intervention and the right to self-determination and principle of non-intervention. See Kikkawa, Llewelyn, Walton, *Pacifist State in a Hostile Region*, 174.
UN Security Council attempted to condemn the Vietnam-led invasion as aggression and a breach of peace based on Chapter 7 in the Charter of the United Nations. Notably, the Soviet Union exercised its veto power in an attempt to block a UN Security Council resolution which was aimed to censure Vietnam in early 1979. Instead, the annual General Assembly adopted resolutions on Cambodia such as ‘withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, creation of an interim administering authority, national reconciliation under Prince Sihanouk, restoration of Cambodia’s independence and territorial integrity, the right of Cambodians to determine their own destiny free of outside intervention, and effective guarantees to achieve these ends’.15

After the invasion, Vietnam supported Heng Samrin in establishing a new government in January 1979. Once in power, the Heng Samrin government announced that as many as three million people were killed by the Pol Pot regime. It is inferred that this inflated number was designated to justify the Vietnamese invasion as ‘humanitarian intervention’.16 The Heng Samrin government was not widely recognised as the legitimate government of Cambodia, however. Instead, the Pol Pot faction occupied the seat in the United Nations.17 The United States and US allies, including Japan, recognised the Pol Pot’s seat in the United Nations while ignoring the Heng Samrin regime as a result of the US strategy of containing Communist states. In response to the intervention, Prime Minister Ōhira warned Vietnam that Japan would not make a financial contribution unless Vietnam took peaceful measures against Cambodia.18 The Ōhira government attempted to make a diplomatic contribution to resolving the conflict by making use of its economic influence. This is an example of Japan’s active involvement in the Cambodian Peace Process.

15 Song, ‘Political Dynamics of the Peacekeeping’, 59-60.
16 Kiljunen, Kampuchea, 30.
17 Fukuda, Kokuren to PKO, 175.
In opposition to the Heng Samrin government, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CDGK) was composed of the Sihanouk faction (under the leadership of Sihanouk), the Son Sann faction (based on the former Prime Minister Son Sann during the Lon Nol government), and the Pol Pot faction (the most influential military and economic power among the three parties). Their confrontation continued throughout the 1980s, until the international community became involved in brokering a peace process after the end of the Cold War. Thus, the Cambodian Civil War was influenced by the East-West confrontation and its peace process involved not only neighbouring countries (ASEAN) but also all permanent members of the UN Security Council, Australia and Japan. The Cambodian conflict is often called a ‘proxy war’. The confrontations of the Cambodian conflict has threefold structures composed of domestic struggle for power, regional hegemonic competition and the rivalry between the East and the West. In order to change Cambodia from the ‘killing field’ to the ‘filling field’, the international community began cooperating for post-conflict peace operations. In this context, Japan attempted to make a direct diplomatic effort during the 1989 Paris Peace Conference.

*Japan’s Peace Diplomacy and the 1989 Paris Peace Conference*

Japan’s diplomatic policies on Cambodia were based on the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine which expressed Japan’s contribution for ‘the peace and prosperity of the Indochina countries’ and on the three principles of international cooperation, announced by Prime Minister Takeshita in 1988. In July 1989, Japan won the joint chairmanship with Australia for the third committee for the Paris Conference. Participation in the international conference for the peace process was a remarkable

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19 Kōno, Wahei Kōsaku, 11-17.
20 Uesugi, Kawariyuku Kokuren PKO, 222-223.
achievement for post-war Japanese diplomacy.\textsuperscript{21} However, the first Paris Conference itself was not necessarily satisfactory because of the power-sharing arrangement among the Cambodian factions. Moreover, Prince Sihanouk publicly criticised other factions and the conference resulted in failure. On 26 September 1989, the Vietnamese government declared the pullout of its troops from Cambodia and the civil war became fierce. The US Secretary of State James Baker proposed the idea of ‘neutralisation’ of Cambodia under the transitional authority of the United Nations. His proposal the ‘Baker initiative’ triggered the involvement of the ‘P-5 (the five permanent members of the Security Council) process’ in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{22} On 24 November 1989, the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans announced a proposal, based on the so called ‘Red Book’, which was similar to the Baker initiative in a Parliamentary speech. The main two objectives of the Red Book were:

1) To achieve conditions in which the Cambodian people can freely, secure from intimidation or coercion, choose their own leaders and determine their own future, by means of free and fair elections; and 2) to achieve a reconstructed Cambodia with internationally guaranteed sovereignty, independence and neutrality.\textsuperscript{23}

The Red Book also contained a plan of UN transitional authority.\textsuperscript{24} The Baker initiative and the Evans’ proposal for the Cambodian peace process contributed to the establishment of UNTAC. Japan’s direct involvement in the Cambodian peace process was not smooth. The Heng Samrin government was supported by Vietnam which had been in a state of war with the United States. Moreover, the United States supported the Non-Communist Resistance (NCR), composed of the Sihanouk faction, or United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and

\textsuperscript{21} Paris meeting was composed of four committees and Japan and Australia were in charge of aid for the post-war reconstruction and return of refugees. See Kōno, \textit{Wahei Kōsaku}, 24-28.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 33-34.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 34-35.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. As for the Australia’s peace proposal, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), \textit{Cambodia: an Australian Peace Proposal}. Frost, \textit{Peace Process in Cambodia}. Berry, \textit{Cambodia from Red to Blue}. Evans, \textit{Cooperating for Peace}, 107-108.
Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Son Sann faction, or Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). As the US ally, the Japanese government needed to make careful diplomatic commitment to Cambodia because of the deteriorated relationship between the United States and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{25} Senior MOFA official Masaharu Kōno, in charge of the South East Asian, visited Washington in an attempt to persuade the United States to support Japan’s diplomatic involvement for the Cambodian peace process. Kōno mentioned ‘No taxation without representation’, emphasising that Japan had a right to play a political role rather than only contributing in a financial manner. In the end, Washington agreed to Japan’s diplomatic contact with the Heng Samrin Cambodia and MOFA decided to make contact with the Phnom Penh government and dispatched Kōno in February 1990. Kōno met the government officials and succeeded in revitalising the diplomatic relationship with the Heng Samrin regime.\textsuperscript{26} Kōno’s negotiation with the US government indicates Japan’s activeness and readiness for greater commitment into the Cambodian conflict. This diplomatic effort led to the Tōkyō Conference in 1990.

\textit{The 1990 Tōkyō Conference: A Step for the Peace Process}

On 4 and 5 June 1990, Japan sponsored the ‘Tōkyō Conference’ which allowed Prince Sihanouk, Hun Sen, and Son Sann to discuss the Sihanouk’s vision for peace. The purpose of the conference was to break the military deadlock after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and political impasse after the break down of the third Jakarta Informal Meeting held in February 1990. The Tōkyō Conference was of significance since it was one of the rare cases of Japan’s direct involvement in the international peace process in the post-war diplomatic history.\textsuperscript{27} However

\textsuperscript{25} Kōno, \textit{Wahei Kōsaku}, 52-54.
\textsuperscript{26} Kikkawa, Llewelyn, Walton, \textit{Pacifist State in a Hostile Region}, 180-181. Also see Kōno, \textit{Wahei Kōsaku}, 52-56.
\textsuperscript{27} Takeda, \textit{Kanbojia Wahei Tōkyō Kaigi}, 1.
there were some criticisms. Song described the conference as a failure because ‘the Khmer Rouge refused to abide by any agreement it had not signed’ and ‘Sihanouk would make no progress without the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge and the full endorsement of Beijing’. Nonetheless, the conference was unprecedented diplomatic contribution and created opportunities for the Cambodian peace process. Successful aspects of the Tōkyō Conference included the fact that Prince Sihanouk, Prime Minister Hun Sen, signed a joint communiqué which included a number of agreements such as the establishment of the Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC) to balance the representatives from the two governments. Unfortunately, Khieu Samphan from the Khmer Rouge did not join the Tōkyō Conference despite attempts by the Japanese government. As a result, the Khmer Rouge became more isolated. The United States criticised the Tōkyō Conference for not gaining support from China and ASEAN countries. After the conference, the Japanese government started using shuttle diplomacy to foster greater levels of trust. To this end, Ambassador Yukio Imagawa was dispatched to Phnom Penh in February 1991. Prime Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama met Prime Minister Son Sann in March 1991 in Tōkyō. Foreign Minister Nakayama met Prince Sihanouk in April in Beijing and Hisashi Ōwada, Vice Minister of MOFA, talked with Hun Sen.

The Tōkyō Conference and the following diplomatic talks garnered trust from Cambodian leaders. Ambassador Imagawa recalled that one of the reasons why the establishment of the SNC in the Tōkyō Conference was successful was partially due to the absence of the Khmer Rouge. Khieu Samphan was not satisfied with the Conference which was prepared as the Sihanouk-Hun Sen talk. According to Imagawa, if the Khmer Rouge participated in the process of setting up the SNC, the Conference would

28 Song, ‘Political Dynamics of the Peacekeeping’, 72.
29 Ibid. As well, $880 million pledged at the Tōkyō Conference was not donated due to a technical delay. Less than $100 million was disbursed by February 1993. See, Uphoff Kato, ‘Quick Impact, Slow Rehabilitation’, 190.
have fallen through.\textsuperscript{31} Although Khieu Samphan did not participate in the Conference, the Khmer Rouge accepted the power sharing of the SNC three months after the Conference.\textsuperscript{32} The ratio of the SNC decided in the Tōkyō Conference (Hun Sen faction 6, Sihanouk faction 2, Son Sann faction 2, and the Khmer Rouge faction 2) was approved by the four Cambodian factions including the Khmer Rouge as well as the P5 and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{33} The establishment with appropriate power sharing of four factions was one of the most important aspects in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. Thus the Tōkyō Conference demonstrated Japan’s capacity to be effective in diplomacy and was a significant step forward in the Cambodian peace process.

\textit{The 1991 Paris Agreements: A Blueprint for UNTAC}

On 23 October 1991 the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (Paris Agreements), which prescribed a ceasefire and peaceful liberal democracy of Cambodia were signed. The agreements were signed by the SNC, as a representative and legitimate authority of Cambodia, and 18 other countries in the presence of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The significance of the Paris Agreements lies in the fact that the agreements officially meant the end of the 20 year long war in Cambodia.\textsuperscript{34} The agreements concluded that the factional armies had to be disarmed and demobilised. In short, democratisation and demilitarisation were to be used to establish a peaceful democratic government. Until the general election was held in May 1993, the SNC was to take charge of the sovereign authority. In November 1991, Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh as President of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Imagawa, \textit{Kanbojia to Nihon}, 98-99.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ikeda, \textit{Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi}, 78-85.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 102.
\item \textsuperscript{34} The 18 countries were Australia, Brunei, Darussalam, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. See Suntharalingam, ‘Cambodian Settlement Agreements’, 82.
\end{itemize}
SNC and the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was organised.\(^{35}\) UNAMIC was set up with the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire and mine-clearance program based on UN Security Council Resolution 717 of 16 October 1991.\(^{36}\) UNAMIC functioned as 'placeholder' so its role was not as full-scale as that of UNTAC with 379 peacekeepers composed of civilian and military staff, logistics and support personnel as well as a military mine awareness unit which were later absorbed by UNTAC.\(^{37}\) During the period of UNAMIC operation, the Japanese government was still in the middle of deliberation about whether the SDF could participate in post-conflict peace operations. Even after the establishment of UNTAC, Japan could not deploy the SDF without the enactment of PKO Legislation.

The Paris Agreement authorised political legitimacy of the SNC and stipulated the establishment of UNTAC.\(^{38}\) According to Doyle the roles of UNTAC set up in the Paris Agreements were mainly traditional UN peacekeeping operations:

1) To monitor the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces and to supervise the cantonment and demobilisation of Cambodian military forces; 2) to control and supervise crucial aspects of civilian administration; 3) to organise and monitor the elections as a first step toward a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism; 4) to coordinate with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the repatriation of more than 370,000 refugees living in camps on the Thai side of the border; 5) to foster an environment ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and 6) to help plan and raise funds for the social and economic rehabilitation of Cambodia.\(^{39}\)


Doyle pointed out that the Paris Agreements placed emphasis on creating a ‘neutral political environment’ and holding ‘free and fair election’. More importantly, the Paris Agreements contributed to establishing ‘liberal democracy’ by setting up the Cambodian Constitution.\(^{40}\) Despite these positive efforts, the Khmer Rouge did not accept UNTAC operations and repeatedly violated the ceasefire disturbing and attacking peacekeepers, and arguing that UNTAC operations increased the influence of Vietnam.\(^{41}\) Nonetheless, in the context of its diplomatic commitments through the 1989 Paris Conference, the 1990 Tōkyō Conference, and the authorisation of the 1991 Paris Agreements, the Japanese government explored ways to dispatch SDF to UNTAC.

**Dispatch of the Self-Defence Forces to UNTAC**

As discussed in previous chapters, the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the 1991 Gulf War led to international criticism of Japan for what was referred to as ‘chequebook diplomacy’. This humiliating experience shocked Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and academics, and the sense of disbelief felt in Tōkyō is referred to as ‘Gulf War Syndrome’. The genuine dismay generated from international criticism had a profound impact on the reconsideration of Japanese diplomatic and security policy.\(^{42}\) Indeed the Gulf War became a turning point in post-war Japan’s security policy. The decision to dispatch SDF overseas as a part of a UN Peacekeeping force reflected a shift from ‘negative pacifism’ (Article 9) to ‘positive pacifism’ (the Preamble).

UNTAC, the largest PKO in the UN history at that time, was organised to ensure the implementation of the Paris Agreements based on the UN

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\(^{40}\) Ibid., 28-29.
\(^{41}\) Imagawa, *Kanbojia to Nihon*, see Chapter 8.
\(^{42}\) Ibid., 179.
Security Council Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992. Under-Secretary General Akashi Yasushi was designated as a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Chief of Mission for Cambodia and Lieutenant-General John Sanderson was nominated as the Force Commander. As many as 15,991 troops were deployed and approximately $1.6 billion was spent on UNTAC. The fact that Akashi was appointed to the SRSG was fortunate for Japan because of a desire in Tōkyō to change from passive diplomacy to a more active and creative approach. In addition to Akashi, Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was responsible for repatriation of approximately 370,000 Cambodian refugees. The existence of these two Japanese working for the United Nations assisted Japan’s efforts at proactive diplomacy in Asia and at the United Nations. Meanwhile, Cambodia requested that Japan make a contribution to an UNTAC operation. On 22 March 1992, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Tōkyō and asked Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe to dispatch SDF to Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk told Ambassador Yukio Imagawa that ‘the Japanese Self-Defence Forces are the most ideal for the UNTAC operation because the Japanese Constitution completely renounces act of aggression.’ One of the reasons why the Socialist Party and other opposition parties were against the dispatch of the SDF was opposition from the Asian countries. However, the direct request from Cambodia as a conflict party placed pressure on Diet deliberations on the PKO Bill. The requests from Prime Minister Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk were significant factors in the enactment of the PKO Bill.

45 Imagawa, Kanbojia to Nihon, 154-155, 162-163.
46 Ibid., 164.
47 Miyoshi, Kanbojia PKO, 57-58.
UNTAC operations were divided into several divisions and multifunctional in comparison with conventional UNPKO. The SDF participated in the civilian policy component, electoral component, military observers (ceasefire units) and engineering units. The PKO Law allowed the SDF to work for election monitoring, supervising police and administration, instructing for administration, providing medical service and necessities, constructing facilities for refugees, recovery of social service and environment, and for setting and repairing other mechanical equipments. Not only the personnel of the SDF, but also 75 civilian police officers were dispatched for the UNTAC operation and were assigned to provincial and local police stations to deal with investigation and actual criminal cases as well as to control the rush-hour traffic in Phnom Penh and other cities. To assist these components of the UNTAC, the Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia was held in Tōkyō and contributed $880 million and established the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC). The characteristics of UNTAC operations were unique and unprecedented in that its peacekeeping operations were comprehensive and ‘multidimensional peace operations’. In particular, the United Nations played a significant role as a temporary transitional authority. These multidimensional operations in UNTAC required special training of

48 The divisions were military component, refugee repatriation component, rehabilitation component, human rights component, civilian police component, electoral component, administrative component, headquarters, military observers (ceasefire monitors), infantry units, engineering units, air support units, logistic units, communications units, medical units, military police, and maritime operations group. See, MOFA, *Outline of UNTAC*, cited from, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph96/2_3.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph96/2_3.html) (accessed at 4 Oct. 08).

49 Ibid.

50 Yamauchi reported that the most effective contribution of the SDF in UNTAC was considered to be ‘medical service’. See Yamauchi, *Kokuren Kanbojia Heiwa Iji Katsudō*, 9.


52 Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, 30.


SDF contingents for peacekeeping operations. This training needs to be considered as a major turning point in Japan’s security policy.

**SDF Preparation for UNTAC: Training as a UN Peacekeeper**

As reviewed in the previous chapter, during the deliberation of the PKO Bill, the possibility of an SDF dispatch for UNPKO was criticised by leftist parties as a step towards Japan’s military normalisation. In reality, it is natural to consider that Japanese realists and nationalists intended to normalise Japan’s military power through the overseas dispatch of SDF. However, it is also plausible to argue that SDF dispatch to UNTAC was part of Japan’s ‘trans-armament’ transforming military power to international peacekeepers. The Japanese government dispatched International Peace Cooperation Examiners ( kokusai heiwa chōsadan) to investigate actual conditions in a UNPKO on 1 July 1992. On 27 July, representatives from JDA staff participated in UN training centre in Sweden to acquire general know-how. After an official request from the United Nations on 3 September, the Japanese government decided on the ‘programme on UNTAC operation ( kanbojia kokusai heiwa kyōryoku gyōmu jisshiki keikaku) in the Cabinet Council on 8 September.55 Before participating in UNTAC, the GSDF personnel were retrained as international peacekeepers at the Sweden UN Centre. This included information on UNPKO, conditions of the field, English language course, and health and hygiene matters.56 The MSDF and the ASDF conducted in-depth research through participation in the International Peace Cooperation Examiners.57 Because of the training programs, unlike other countries the government could not dispatch SDF to UNPKO straight away. This process can be considered as the first step for Japan’s military normalisation which enabled the SDF to contribute to international peacekeeping operations. At the same time, however, the training of the

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55 JDA (Japan Defence Agency) *Defence of Japan 1993 (Bōei Hakusho or Defence White Book)*, 179.
56 Ibid., 181-183.
57 Ibid., 183-185.
SDF at the UN Centre in Sweden enabled the SDF to carry out the tasks of an international peacekeeper.

*SDF Participation in UNTAC: Activities as a UN Peacekeeper*

Japan's participation in UNTAC can be interpreted as a process of both military normalisation and trans-armament. The military normalisation process was not an example of aggressive militarism as feared by leftist politicians in Japan and regional neighbour states. Indeed most of the activities of the SDF in UNTAC were of a non-military nature. The first battalion of the GSDF departed the Komaki base by C-130 aircraft on 23 and 24 September 1992, and arrived in Cambodia on 25 and 26 September and all of 600 members of the first battalion reached Cambodia by 14 October. The first battalion carried out peacekeeping operations for about six months and returned Japan on 10 April 1993. The second battalion arrived on 8 April 1993. After moving to Takeo (stronghold of the SDF), GSDF operated the search and clearing of the bomb disposals. On 28 October, the commencement ceremony of the road maintenance operation was held in the presence of JDA chief Miyashita and UNTAC military commander Sanderson. The SDF paid attention to the security of the members and the ceasefire agreement.58 The primary mission of the first 600-member engineering contingents was to reconstruct the roads and bridges destroyed by the civil war. At the request from UNTAC, peacekeeping roles of the SDF were expanded with water, fuel, food, medical service, transportation, and lodging facilities, and preservation of material related to the election.59 The second battalion was organised on 8 March 1993 and departed from Japan on 29 March and all 600 members completely arrived by 11 April. The second battalion succeeded the first one and undertook the same operations. Due to death of Japanese UNTAC staff, the second battalion took measures with necessary weapons, bullet-

58 Ibid., 185-187.
proof vest, and iron helmet. The second battalion also carried out the support for parliamentary elections such as transportation of election-related equipment, construction of large awnings for ballot-counting station, and safekeeping of the emergency food under the instruction of prime minister and UNTAC.\textsuperscript{60} Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge did not stop attacking the UNTAC peacekeepers. As a result, in a meeting of the expanded P5, the United States and Australia suggested implementation of military sanctions against the Khmer Rouge on the basis of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. France and Japan contended that the United Nations should take non-military but effective measures so as not to violate the Paris Peace Agreements and the Five Principles of the PKO Law. The UN Security Council as well as Japan cooperated to write a compromise plan as UNSC Resolution 792 which stipulated ‘measures’ (not sanctions) against the Khmer Rouge including a ban on the supply of petroleum products, timber, ore and jewel. It was rare case for Japanese diplomacy that Japan was actively involved in writing the UN Security Council Resolution.\textsuperscript{61} The Japanese government’s involvement in writing UN resolution 792 symbolises the dilemma between normative constraint of the Five Principals and reality in Cambodia. SDF participation in UNTAC turned out to be Japan’s first experience of international peacekeeping. At the same time, SDF contingents were able to obtain firsthand military experience in an overseas country.

\textit{Impact of the Death of Japanese Citizens in Cambodia}

As a professional military organisation, SDF contingents were able to protect themselves but UN volunteers and police officers were defenceless against attacks from the Khmer Rouge. On 8 April 1993, United Nations Volunteer Atsuhito Nakata was shot dead. Akashi clearly upset by the death reportedly stated ‘if one more electoral worker is killed, the UN

\textsuperscript{60} JDA, \textit{Defence of Japan} 1993, 189-190.

\textsuperscript{61} Ikeda, \textit{Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi}, 194-196.
Volunteers (the principal electoral organisers) would be withdrawn."62 On 3 May, a civilian police Haruyuki Takada was murdered by the Khmer Rouge forces while moving with Dutch troops.63 These incidents happened because UN Volunteers and Civilian Police did not choose safe places unlike the SDF. In fact before Nakata and Takada were murdered, Ambassador Imagawa expressed concern about the security situation of civilian police on 6 January.64 Akashi stated that ‘this sacrifice rather strengthened our determination to carry out our purpose’65 and that ‘Prince Sihanouk promised the Secretary General (Boutros Ghali) and me to wholly support the UNTAC operation.’66

Sanderson recognised the importance of this arrangement because it explicitly indicated that the UNTAC would not allow the Khmer Rouge to disrupt the National Assembly Election. Akashi also supported military assistance from the Phnom Penh government as long as it did not exceed the exercise of the self-defence right or violate the ceasefire decided in the Paris Agreement.67 The decision of the Defence Arrangement without the agreement of the Khmer Rouge as a key conflict party could have invalidated the ‘neutrality’ of the United Nations. Yet, this decision was based on a realistic evaluation of the situation that the Khmer Rouge did not possess sufficient military power to disrupt the entire election.68 After the death of Nakata and Takada, debate in Japan about the SDF and possible withdrawal from Cambodia surged. A particularly topical issue was concern over the fact that the Khmer Rouge did not accept disarmament and had become more rebellious and violent. Terrorism, violence, and military raids occurred as the day of the National Assembly Election approached. In the wake of the death of two Japanese citizens, the opposition parties in Japan began arguing that the Japanese

62 Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 58.
63 Imagawa, Kanbojia to Nihon, 196-203.
64 Kondō, Yureugolita 372 Nichi, 27, 37.
65 Miyoshi, Kanbojia PKO, 176.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 183-184.
68 Ibid.
government should pull out the SDF on the basis of the Five Principles. Opposition parties also argued that a ceasefire and 70% disarmament stipulated in the Paris Agreements became difficult to achieve.69

Furthermore, the plan to withdraw the SDF was discussed within the LDP government, and according to Akashi, even Chief Cabinet Secretary Yōhei Kōno was supportive of the pullout plan. However, Prime Minister Miyazawa made a final decision not to withdraw the SDF and the government explained to the public that peacekeeping operations might entail danger but that the ‘noble mission’ has to be completed. He also stated that Japan cannot withdraw the SDF when other countries’ troops remain.70 Thus, the Miyazawa government expressed its support for UNTAC to carry out the National Assembly Election. Even if the security situation worsened in a certain area, it was not considered as a violation of ceasefire. This was because the ceasefire was a must for peacekeeping operations and the SDF had to be pulled out if the condition was not satisfied. ‘Five Principles’ on UNPKO were interpreted as not being violated. 71 Moreover, the SDF conducted ‘patrols’ to prevent the Khmer Rouge from disrupting the election. Still, patrolling activity might have violated the PKO Law if there was unnecessary use of force by the SDF. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Miyazawa considered patrolling was necessary to protect the unarmed Japanese people participating in the election.72 Deaths of Japanese UN volunteer and civilian police indicate that UNPKO requires self-defence capability. In spite of the deaths of Japanese citizens, Prime Minister Miyazawa made a pragmatic decision not to withdraw Japanese peacekeepers.

The General Assembly Election in Cambodia

69 Ikeda, Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi, 181-182.
70 Miyoshi, Kanbojia PKO, 198-206.
71 Ikeda, Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi, 188, 193.
To support the National Assembly Election which enacted the Cambodian Constitution, five national government officers, 13 local government officers, and 23 individuals from the private sectors were dispatched from Japan. They stayed at schools and temples in Takeo and Phnom Penh to monitor the process of the election. As a result of the support from UNTAC, the National Assembly Election was held from 23 to 28 March 1993.\(^73\) The SDF patrolled the election areas to support the Japanese electoral monitors, although it was a dangerous operation. The ‘patrol’ of the SDF turned out to be effective and possible armed attacks by the Pol Pot were prevented.\(^74\) However, despite the success of the election, its process was not necessarily ‘free and fair’. On 21 April 1993 Akashi stated:

A victory marred by violence and intimidation is not worth having. UNTAC and the international community will judge the freeness and fairness of the election by three criteria: the technical conduct of the poll; the extent to which the campaign is marred by violence, intimidation, and harassment; and the extent to which the incumbent party enjoys unfair advantages, whether by using the apparatus of state for its own political ends or by denying opposition parties access to public media.\(^75\)

In spite of violent disturbance by the Khmer Rouge, the National Assembly Election was carried out and the Phnom Penh government, which had been in power for 13 years, was defeated by FUNCINPEC. 89.56% of eligible voters (4.26 million people) voted in the election. The participation of the overwhelming number of voters indicated the success of the election and it was partly due to the ‘Radio UNTAC’ which notified the details of the elections around the entire country. From 7 April to 19 May, the radio supplied the information about: (a) the election itself; (b) political opinion presented by each political party; and (c) opportunity for objection when a political party is unreasonably slandered. The radio was broadcast based on the ‘media guideline’ such as ‘free and democratic


\(^74\) Yanagihara, *Kanbojia PKO Taikenki*, 54-55.

\(^75\) Doyle, ‘Authority and Elections in Cambodia’, 153.
broadcast’ and ban of ‘malice slander, war propaganda, as well as abuse of media to cause nationalistic, ethnic, and religious animosity and violence.’FUNCINPEC established the coalition government with the former Phnom Penh government. The United States and the UN headquarters as well as UNTAC questioned if it harmed the principle of democracy. However, both Akashi and Sanderson came to the conclusion that radio broadcasts were the best option. In September 1993, the new Constitution was promulgated and the Constitutional Monarchy reinstated with an inauguration of Sihanouk. The General Assembly Election turned out to be successful due to the all of the decisions made by Akashi.

Post-Election Peace-Building Operations in Cambodia

After the parliamentary election, the SDF continued peace-building operations in Cambodia. The post-election peace-building activities can be also interpreted as both military normalisation and trans-armament. The second battalion was ordered by UNTAC to construct the container storage space at Sihanoukville port. The activities were supported by the headquarter control troops made up of about 220 members in charge of measures against meal and water supply, bathing, maintenance of vehicles, fuel, and medical and sanitary affairs, especially preventing Malaria. The two MSDF transport ships Miura and Ojika and the MSDF replenishment ship Towada were dispatched from Kure port to Cambodia on 17 September and arrived in Sihanoukville on 2 October 1992. These MSDF ships contributed to accommodation support for about 5000 people, produced about 14000 meals, and offered medical support for about 200 people. The ASDF troops had been dispatched to Thailand, the Philippines and Cambodia since 21 September 1992 to support the air-transport for the first battalion. Six C-130H crafts deported from the Komaki base on 23

77 Akashi, Kokusai Rengō, 62.
and 24 September and other six were dispatched on 1 and 2 October. The purpose of these ASDF airplanes was to support activities on the spot with replenishment tools.\textsuperscript{78} Eight GSDF personnel participated in the ceasefire observation in cooperation with other countries’ troops. The first eight ceasefire observers were dispatched from September 1992 to March 1993. The second eight personnel were dispatched from March to September 1993. Their peacekeeping mission was rather hazardous as the operation required not only monitoring ceasefire but also supervising encampments, controlling disarmed weapons, monitoring the border to prevent infiltration of other forces, smuggling of weapons and ammunitions. According to SDF personnel who participated in UNTAC, they felt proud of new roles of SDF as international peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, post-election peace-building operations changed the identity of the SDF contingents as international peacekeepers. At the same time, it contributed to Japan’s military normalisation as these activities provided opportunity to improve military skills and expertise.

\textit{An Assessment of SDF Participation in UNTAC}

Although it is difficult to assess the successfulness of SDF’s participation in UNTAC, measurable achievements in the operation can be raised. According to Akashi, the UNTAC operation was relatively successful compared to other conflict resolutions in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Afghanistan because of the effectiveness of the Paris Agreements, participation of P-5 and other neighbouring countries. The fact that peacekeeping operations in Cambodia did not expand its mandate to include military sanctions based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter raised another reason for its success. This is because if UNTAC peacekeepers got involved in military sanctions, the Paris Agreements and the UNTAC

\textsuperscript{78} JDA, \textit{Defence of Japan 1993}, 190-195.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 196-199.
Also see MOFA, \textit{Japanese Participation in UN Peacekeeping}, cited from, \url{http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph96/02_2.html} (accessed at 5 Oct. 08).
operation itself would be invalid and the peacekeepers could be one of the conflict parties against the Khmer Rouge. As mentioned already, Japan’s contribution to the Cambodian peace process included dissuading the United States from applying military sanctions and advising the United States to take non-military measures within the Paris Agreements. In this regard, the Japanese government successfully negotiated with the US government. As described, the SDF participated in peacekeeping and peace-building in Cambodia and did not play a particularly military role due to lack of offensive weapons. Yet, the presence of the SDF functioned as a ‘deterrent’ against the Khmer Rouge. In fact, one of the leaders of Khmer Rouge told Ambassador Imagawa after the UNTAC operation had finished that the Khmer Rouge did not attack the base of the SDF because they assumed that the SDF brought brand-new and expensive equipments and weapons including at least 200 machine guns. This is symbolic of Japan’s military normalisation since SDF personnel were able to accumulate real military experience in which military expertise and capability is required. Furthermore, former US Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright was impressed by observing the peacekeeping operations of the SDF and repeatedly (three times) told Ambassador Imagawa that ‘Japan is entitled to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council.’ This represents Japan’s motivation to increase international profile and political influence by sending SDF to UNTAC. Although these two Imagawa’s episodes do not necessarily mean that Japan increased its military power and international prestige through peacekeeping activities, those signify successfulness of SDF participation in UNTAC. Simultaneously, Japan succeeded in transforming its self-defence force into international peacekeepers. More fundamentally, the SDF dispatch contributed to the successes of the UNTAC operation itself. As Doyle pointed out, UNTAC contributed to the

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81 Ikeda, Kanbojia Wahei eno Michi, 224.
82 Imagawa, Kanbojia to Nihon, 184.
83 Ibid., 186-187.
independence of Cambodia which was colonised by France, invaded by Japan and Vietnam, influenced by the power politics of China, Russia, and the United States in the Cold War. Secondly, the presence of UNTAC troops had an impact on the ceasefire of the Cambodian Civil War. As described above, even the presence of the Japanese Self Defence Forces acted as a deterrent against the Khmer Rouge. Thirdly, repatriation of 370,000 refugees from Thailand conducted by the Repatriation Component of UNTAC (staffed by UNHCR) was also successful. UNHCR under the leadership of Sadako Ogata took a greater responsibility in the repatriation process of Cambodian refugees. Fourthly, implementation of the election based on ‘democracy’ was characteristic of peacekeeping operations of UNTAC. As noted by Doyle, given the ongoing threat of violence by the Khmer Rouge, the ‘most momentous action Special Representative Akashi took was to recommend moving ahead toward the election.’ Although Japanese UN volunteer and civilian police were victimised, SDF participation in UNTAC was regarded as a success.

Analytical Eclecticism

*Negative Pacifism: Article 9 as a Normative Constraint*

Negative pacifism such as Article 9 and culture of anti-militarism has been a restrictive factor to overseas dispatch of the SDF. The most effective example of influence of negative pacifism was the rejection of the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill. The ‘Five Principles’ of the PKO Law and the ‘freeze’ of PKF participation moreover were by-products of ‘negative pacifism’ based on anti-war and anti-militarism sentiments. In fact, according to the opinion poll of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 53.6% favoured the ‘freeze’ of PKF participation whereas 22.7% opposed it. Moreover, 56% of

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84 Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, 32-34, 57-58. As for the refugee repatriation, see Williams, ‘Returning Home’.
85 Ibid.
the same group still considered the SDF’s overseas deployment ‘problematic’ in terms of Article 9 of the Constitution.86 This means that the Japanese public was sceptical of Japan’s ‘military’ role in UNPKO.

Not surprisingly, the overseas dispatch of the SDF was opposed by Japanese leftist politicians. On 11 November 1991, during the deliberation of the PKO Bill at the Diet, Makoto Tanabe from the JSP denied the necessity of the SDF dispatch to Cambodia stating:

Which country and people of the area on earth demand [Japan’s] international contribution indicated by the PKO bill? Is it Cambodia? Cambodia is only one Asian country which has suffered from conflict, although the Peace Agreements were signed and The United Nations is supposed to dispatch a small scale of PKO there. Are there any requests for Japan’s Self-Defence Forces to join [UNPKO in Cambodia]? The contribution plans of our country have more urgent and important ones, don’t they? We should stop making a desperate effort for the unconstitutional dispatch of the SDF and the PKO Bill which has no basis of reality should be withdrawn. A recent opinion poll also made it clear that a majority of people shows strong opposition and concern [against the PKO Bill].87

Tanabe also insisted that the PKO Bill presented by the government which mainly aimed at an overseas dispatch of the SDF is inappropriate to meet the needs of the Cambodian people.88 In short, the Socialist Party insisted on the withdrawal of the PKO Bill to consider a ‘non-military’ contribution as a peace country, based on Article 9. As well, Kōichirō Ueda from the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) also expressed his opposition

to the bill, paying attention to Article 9 and the ‘ban on the overseas deployment of the SDF’ adopted by the House of Councilors in 1954.89

The LDP diet members moreover, were cautious about the dispatch of the SDF. Prime Minister Miyazawa stated ‘UNTAC entered the second phase and the Khmer Rouge refuses to disarm. Cooperation and agreements are important for the four factions.’90 Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato stated that ‘we would like to consider the dispatch after the Pol Pot faction agrees to the second phase [of the Paris Agreements].’91 In addition, LDP Vice President Kanemaru also argued that ‘unless the Pol Pot faction agrees to disarmament, [the SDF] should not go.’92 Similarly, as observed in the previous chapter, Komeito was not supportive of SDF dispatch for UNPKO at the beginning of the deliberation.

Based on negative pacifism, a group of Japanese citizens filed a lawsuit against the Japanese government.93 The group, who opposed to the overseas dispatch of SDF, sued the government arguing that the PKO Law interfered with Article 9 and was unconstitutional.94 According to an investigation conducted by the plaintiffs, the SDF set up a base at the former base established by the Japanese Imperial Army so the SDF was called ‘Japanese Army’ by Cambodian people. They pointed out that more than 10 SDF staff out of 600 turned out to be HIV positive after returning from Cambodia. They also criticised immorality of the SDF as well as the comment of Akashi who mentioned that ‘young, healthy soldiers are doing

90 Kenmochi et al., Kanbojia PKO: Bunseki to Shiryo, 123-124.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Originally, the litigation was against Japan’s financial contribution to the multinational forces. The first lawsuit was filed to the Tōkyō District Court on 4th March 1991. Kenmochi and Ōkubo, Kanbojia PKO Iken Soshō, 10-15.
94 Ibid.
hard tasks so they have rights to go out to chase beautiful women.’\textsuperscript{95} They also referred to the announcement by UNTAC that 200 people died, 338 injured, 114 kidnapped and argued the violation of the five principles. As an alternative, they suggested that the Japanese government could have contributed to UNTAC by non-military means such as medical service and human rights as carried by the Sweden government.\textsuperscript{96} Although the plaintiffs lost the case, Article 9 was still a source of argumentation when it came to Japan’s participation in UNTAC. The citizens group for anti-PKO law and anti-SDF dispatch attempted to dissuade the SDF staff to join UNTAC referring to Article 99. In other words, they contended that SDF dispatch was unconstitutional under Article 9 and that SDF as public officers were obliged to abide by the Constitution on the basis of Article 99.\textsuperscript{97} In short, the citizens group, therefore, was against SDF dispatch to UNPKO and the PKO Law on the basis of negative pacifism.

As well, Kenmochi as a representative of the citizens group also pointed out that the government did not explain the relationship between the violation of the ceasefire by the Khmer Rouge and the ‘Five Principles’ of the PKO participation. The Khmer Rouge demanded the dismissal of Akashi claiming: ‘In order to implement the Paris Agreements, we can not trust the ability of Akashi who speaks for the economic interest of Japan.’\textsuperscript{98} In fact, Akashi stated at the Diet on 12 May 1992 that the United Nations is a useful tool and means to realise the national interest of Japan. Kenmochi noted that Akashi’s remark at the Diet was inappropriate as a representative of the United Nations which is supposed

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 80-85.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} Iida, ‘Jieikan no ‘Sugata naki Koe’’, 138.
Article 99 stated: ‘The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution’. See NDL, cited from, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s10 (accessed at 18 Oct. 08).
\textsuperscript{98} Kenmochi, ‘Kanbojia Haken Keikaku’, 239.
to be neutral and argued that the demand for Akashi’s dismissal symbolised the decreasing credibility of UNTAC.99

In the wake of the deaths of UN Volunteer Nakata and the Civilian Police Takada, even the LDP members began considering the withdrawal of the SDF from Cambodia. Jun’ichirō Koizumi, then Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, argued in the Diet that the deaths of Nakata and Takada were not something the Japanese government assumed at the outset in the Cambodian peacekeeping operations. Koizumi did not agree with the idea that the Japanese peacekeepers should sacrifice their lives for UNPKO. Instead, he held the belief that the Japanese people need to shed their bloods at the time when the peace of Japan is breached and suggested the limitation of the PKO Law as well as the necessity of the withdrawal of the SDF out of Cambodia.100 His opposition indicates how influential negative pacifism was as Japan dealt with its first experience in a UNPKO. At the stage of UNTAC participation, Japan had not reached a consensus regarding practicability of the SDF dispatch to UNPKO. This uncertainty as well as negative pacifism such as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, anti-war pacifism and culture of anti-militarism led to opposition to the SDF participation in UNTAC. As explained in the next section, the Japanese government shifted focus from negative pacifism to

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positive pacifism such as international cooperation and peaceful coexistence right based on the Preamble of the Constitution.

*Positive Pacifism: SDF Dispatch for International Cooperation*

As analysed in the previous chapter, Japanese Diet members began quoting the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism) to legalise SDF dispatch for post-war peace operations. The Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in the International Community, the so-called, ‘Ozawa Committee’ played a central role as a domestic pressure group on security policy shift which eventually enabled the SDF to participate in UNTAC. The content of the Ozawa committee was made up of ‘reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution’ and ‘suggestions for Japan’s security policy’. The reinterpretation of the Constitution by the Ozawa Committee quoted the Preamble and referred to the concept of ‘positive pacifism’ which facilitates Japan’s international contribution. The report of the Ozawa Committee noted:

The Preamble of the Constitution expresses a spirit to cooperate with international society and to make efforts for maintenance of world peace and order, and Article 9 is in line with the spirit of the Preamble. The spirit of the Constitution is positive and active pacifism and completely different from negative pacifism.

In the light of the spirit of positive pacifism indicated in the Preamble of the Constitution, the use of force for maintenance and recovery of international peace under international cooperation should not be denied.\(^{101}\)

The Ozawa report explicitly distinguished ‘negative pacifism’ from ‘positive pacifism’ to justify Japan’s contribution for maintenance of international peace and security.

\(^{101}\) Okumiya, *PKO to Kenpō to Kokusai Shakai*, 161.
Notably, not only the LDP government but also Kōmeitō supported the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. On 24 September 1991, Ichiro Watanabe from Kōmeitō stated that:

Participation in UNPKO is consistent with the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution: We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth.\textsuperscript{102}

Furthermore, Watanabe pointed out that participation in UNPKO is congruous with ‘UN centrist’ as Japan’s diplomatic policy.\textsuperscript{103} Although Kōmeitō was an opposition party at that time, they shared the view with the government that the Preamble can be a constitutional base to justify Japan’s participation in UNPKO. In response to the statement of Watanabe, Prime Minister Kaifu responded that:

I completely agree with the idea that participation in UNPKO is consonant with the Preamble of the Constitution as well as UN centrist as a diplomatic stance of our country... In addition, pacifism and internationalism of our [country's] Constitution share the same ideals as the maintenance of international peace and security which is the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{104}

As Watanabe and Kaifu stated, the Preamble as ‘positive pacifism’ was a keyword to legitimise the SDF dispatch for post-war peacekeeping operations. This quotation of the ‘Preamble’ can be interpreted as ‘positive pacifism’ because its purpose is to remove the structural violence and attain positive peace.


\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.

Likewise, Prime Minister Miyazawa quoted the Preamble to justify the legitimacy of the PKO Bill, stating that:

The contents of the PKO Bill are obviously what the Constitution of our country and its Preamble expects, and there is no doubt that it is the peaceful international contribution.\(^{105}\)

Miyazawa also referred to Austria and Switzerland which expressed their participation in UNPKO in spite of the policy of neutrality. He emphasised that the nature of UNPKO was ‘neutral’ and ‘authorised’ by the United Nations and such kind of ‘international contribution’ is something Japan should make on the basis of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution.\(^{106}\)

In addition, immediately after the enactment of the PKO Law on 15 June 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa reconfirmed the legitimacy of SDF participation in UNPKO referring to ‘pacifism’ and ‘international cooperation’ of the Constitution (positive pacifism):

The SDF will play an important role of international contribution through UNPKO. What the SDF will carry out as military units is to participate in UNPKO based on the ‘Five Principles’ such as agreement of ceasefire among conflict parties and acceptance for UNPKO from the conflict parties. Needless to say, this is consistent with the spirit of pacifism of our Constitution which desires the eternal peace under the international cooperation.\(^{107}\)

These statements show that the Japanese government decided to justify the SDF dispatch for UNPKO based on the Preamble instead of Article 9.


Although Komeito was an opposition party, the party assisted SDF participation in UNTAC on the basis of the Preamble. These shifts and emphases on the Preamble (positive pacifism) were also facilitated by domestic and external realist factors as will be examined.

**Domestic Pressure: SDF Dispatch towards a Normal State**

From a classical realist viewpoint, it can be hypothesised that Japan’s SDF dispatch to UNTAC was facilitated by domestic pressure to make Japan a ‘normal state’. As classical realists explained, it is natural for the country to maximise its national interests especially the military power. The ‘normal state’ debate argued by the LDP politicians and realist scholars was aimed at pursuit of power and national interests. In order to legitimatise overseas dispatch of the SDF, the Japanese government criticised those who opposed the SDF dispatch for post-war peacekeeping operations as ‘one-nation pacifism’ (*ikkoku heiwa shugi*) which stems from Article 9. On the contrary, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution was frequently quoted by the Japanese government to justify the SDF dispatch.\(^{108}\) Indeed, from a realist perspective, ‘an honoured place’ in the Preamble can be interpreted as ‘international prestige’ Japan pursues as its significant national interest. Japanese realists pointed out a gap

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between Article 9 and the Preamble as well as a contradiction between Article 9 and UN centrism.\textsuperscript{109} Whereas Article 9 prohibited Japan from contributing to UNPKO, the Preambles of the Japanese Constitution and the UN Charter justify Japan’s contribution for international peace. As well, Japanese realists criticise those who reject Japan’s international military contribution as ‘irresponsible absolute pacifism’. According to the realist view, unlike absolute pacifism, Japan’s ‘irresponsible pacifism’ does not possess determination and preparedness to respond to an armed attack with purely non-violent means.\textsuperscript{110} Besides, by dispatching the SDF to post-conflict peace operations, the Japanese government contributed to ‘security burden sharing’ as a US ally.\textsuperscript{111} By participating in UNPKO, Japan could enhance its international political influence which would help to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{112} In fact, in December 1992, in response to the request from Ambassador Imagawa, P 5 was expanded to include Indonesia, Japan, Australia and Thailand.\textsuperscript{113} As this fact suggests, Japan’s active involvement in the Cambodian peace process and UNTAC contributed to Japan’s regional political influence to a certain degree. More importantly, the SDF dispatch to UNPKO can be considered as a step towards Japan’s military normalisation. A Japanese realist argued that SDF participation in UNTAC based on the PKO Law was the first step to put an end to ‘one country pacifism’.\textsuperscript{114} Japanese realists insisted on participating in UNPKO but it needs to keep in mind that their real intentions were to make Japan a militarily ‘normal state’.

While criticising one-nation pacifism, Japanese realists made use of ‘positive pacifism’ based on the Preamble. For instance, reinterpretation of the Constitution suggested by the Ozawa Committee intended to make

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\textsuperscript{109} Ijiri, ‘Kyūjō Kaishakuron’, 218-222.
\textsuperscript{110} Satō, ‘Sekinin aru Heiwashugi towa’, 18.
\textsuperscript{111} As for difference between ‘security burden sharing’ and conventional ‘defence burden sharing’, see Satake, \textit{From ‘Collective Defence’ to ‘International Security’}.
\textsuperscript{112} Amaha, \textit{Umi o Watatta Jieitai}, 6.
\textsuperscript{113} Germany joined later 1992 into the Expanded P 5 for the third largest financial contribution to the UN. Ibid., 145-146.
\textsuperscript{114} Higuchi, \textit{Ikkoku Heiwashugi no Sakkaku}, 204.
\end{flushright}
Japan a ‘normal state’ which can take international responsibility as a member state of the United Nations. In order to normalise Japan, the SDF has to be normalised as a ‘normal army’. The ultimate purpose of the Ozawa report was to dispatch SDF to military operations with the United Nations and the United States. Ozawa’s view on Japanese security policy towards a ‘normal state’ is not only based on ‘UN centrism’ but also on Japan’s national interest to normalise its military power. Ozawa made use of the concept of ‘positive pacifism’ to justify overseas dispatch of the SDF with a view to normalise Japanese military power.

Thus, political realism explains why the Japanese government made efforts to enact the 1992 PKO Law to dispatch the SDF to UNTAC. By participating in UNTAC, the SDF personnel learned practical military experience as normal military troops. The military normalisation is the primary national interest for Japanese realist in dispatching the SDF to UNTAC. In the case of the deaths of Japanese UN Volunteer Nakata and Civilian Police Takada, the Sankei Shimbun criticised the idea of pulling out commenting that the withdrawal would be Japan’s ‘shame’ in international society. Sankei’s description implies that the SDF dispatch to UNTAC contributed to the increase of Japan’s international prestige. Japan’s political motivation in dispatching the SDF for UNTAC was based on ‘national interest’. Therefore, Japan’s contribution for UNTAC was deeply connected with its own national interests. These realist motivations influenced the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’. Japanese realists utilised ‘positive pacifism’ of the Preamble to justify Japan’s military normalisation. For Japanese realist politicians, participation in UNTAC was a process towards a ‘normal state’.

115 Asai, *PKO to Nihon no Shinro*, 33.
116 Watanabe, ‘Kanbojia PKO’, 94.
Influences of External and Structural Pressure

From a structural realist perspective, it can be hypothesised that change of international structure and international pressures on Japan’s military normalisation might have facilitated the SDF dispatch to UNTAC. In particular, the end of the bipolar structure of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis inevitably influenced Japan’s policy shift.

The outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the establishment of the US-led Multinational Forces authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 678 caused external pressure on overseas dispatch of SDF. As examined already, Japan’s non-SDF dispatch policy after the 1990 Gulf Crisis caused ‘Japan bashing’.119 The United States and US allies expected Japan’s participation in the multinational forces because Japan heavily depends on the oil import from the Middle East. However unlike other UN member states, Japan’s attempt to dispatch the SDF to support the Multinational Forces resulted in failure. Japan’s financial contribution to the Multinational Forces which amounted to 13 billion dollars in total was criticised as ‘chequebook diplomacy’. International criticism of Japan’s ‘non-bloodshed policy’ during this period caused ‘Gulf War syndrome’ and seriously influenced LDP politicians’ view on foreign and security policies. The external pressure stimulated a shift in its security policy from ‘one-nation pacifism’ to ‘international pacifism’. Without the Soviet Union as a mutual enemy of Japan and the United States, the significance of the Japan-US security treaty decreased after the end of the Cold War. Likewise the disintegration of the USSR as an ‘imaginary enemy’ and

changes of the international structure of the Cold War forced the SDF to explore a new ‘raison d’etre’. In response to the change of international environment and external pressures, the Japanese government enacted the PKO Law in 1992. In this sense, structural changes and the outbreak of the Cold War caused Japan to reconsider its security policy especially participation in UNPKO. Also, criticism from the United States on Japan’s chequebook diplomacy had a major impact on Japan. As a key US ally, Japan reconsidered its conventional security policy and decided to dispatch the SDF for post-war peace operations. Thus the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, Gulf War and the requests from the United States were major external pressures on Japan’s security policy for SDF dispatch. As neorealists contend, the changing international environment and military alliance directly influenced Japan’s security policy.

In addition to the United States, some UNPKO contributory countries pressured and encouraged Japan’s SDF dispatch to the Persian Gulf. Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke suggested that Japan dispatch its troops to the Gulf.\(^\text{120}\) In the case of UNTAC, Sweden Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson met Prime Minister Kaifu in Japan in March 1991. Sweden conducted the joint military drills with Denmark, Norway, and Finland for UNPKO. Carlsson stated that ‘Japan can play an important role in PKO. The experience of our country will be useful and we would like to cooperate [with Japan].’ In addition, in May 1991, a Canadian diplomat (Head of UN department) visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan and showed his strong interest in Japan’s participation in UNPKO.\(^\text{121}\) Sweden’s participation in UNPKO is significant because the country takes a ‘neutrality policy’. In spite of a policy of neutrality, Sweden decided to creatively utilise its military power for UNPKO. The case of Sweden was meaningful to the SDF dispatch which had been restricted by Article 9 and anti-militarism. The pressure and

\(^{120}\) Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 85.
\(^{121}\) Yomiuri Shimbun ed., Blue Helmet no Sugao, 142-143.
encouragement from major UNPKO contributors were recognised as justification for Japan’s use of force for post-conflict peace operations.

The Cambodian government also expressed its interest in Japan’s participation in UNPKO. In March 1992, Prime Minister Hun Senn requested to Prime Minister Miyazawa, Foreign Minister Watanabe, Ishida from Kōmeitō, and Tanabe from the Socialist Party that ‘The Cambodian people are wondering why Japan do not join UNTAC despite that 20 countries have already taken part in. We hope the participation of the SDF by cooperation among the political parties.’ In response, Miyazawa explained that SDF might not be welcomed by the local people due to the memory of the Second World War. In response to this, Hun Senn stated that ‘it is true that there is an unfortunate memory, but it is the past. Japan should carry out an operation for world peace.’ In response to the request from Cambodia, the Japanese government and even the opposition parties, such as Kōmeitō and the Democratic Socialist Party showed their support to create a new legal framework to dispatch the SDF to UNTAC. On 14 January 1992 in Phnom Penh, Prince Sihanouk also expressed that ‘it is really sad that Japan does not dispatch the SDF. If the dispatch of the SDF and police are difficult, we would like Japan to send civilians.’ On 31 March 1992, Kakizaki, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of MOFA stated at a press conference in MOFA that Australian Lieutenant General Sanderson from UNTAC requested SDF’s participation in medical service, transportation, telecommunication, and training for landmine cleaning. These requests from Cambodia can be interpreted as external pressures as well. Direct requests from the conflict country were important for the Japanese government to confirm that the SDF dispatch to UNTAC was in demand.

122 Okumiya, PKO to Kenpō to Kokusai Shakai, 174-175.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Okumiya, PKO to Kenpō to Kokusai Shakai, 176-177.
Moreover, there was a request from Lieutenant General John Sanderson, commander of UNTAC, to dispatch SDF to Cambodia. In an interview with Taizō Shibano, a Japanese analyst of international affairs, Sanderson stated:

Of course, I understand there is a concern about Japan’s participation in UN [peacekeeping] operations. However, what we are doing in Cambodia is pure peacekeeping operations... This dispatch [of peacekeepers to Cambodia] is strongly supported from the humanitarian perspective. Japan should greatly contribute to the operations. I mean, we hope Japan’s contributions and this is beneficial to Japan considering the humanitarian viewpoint of this PKO. Therefore, I believe that Japan can contribute to the peacekeeping forces and UNTAC.126

Sanderson’s comment on Japan’s participation in UNTAC represents international support which authorised Japan’s PKO policy. Even after the enactment of the PKO Law, the official requests from the United Nations on 3 September 1992, smoothed the process of the cabinet approvals on dispatch of the SDF for peacekeeping operations adopted on 8 September. Similarly, when it came to the election, the official request from the United Nations on 13 April 1993 made the Japanese government modify the program of the dispatch on 27 April.127 Considering ‘UN-Centrism’ as Japan’s one of the three main diplomatic principles, requests from the United Nations were authoritative pressures which legitimatise the SDF participation in UNTAC.

These external pressures from the United States and international support from UNPKO contributory countries, Cambodia and the United Nations, were useful for Japanese realists who wished to expand the role of the SDF. As neo-realists argue, Japan’s PKO policy and the shift to positive pacifism were influenced by external pressures and international environment. Both domestic pressure towards a normal state and external

126 Interview with John Sanderson with Taizō Shibano. Translated by the author. Cited in Shibano, Kanbojia no Shinjitsu, 205-206.
127 Shinyo, Kokusai Heiwa Kyōryoku Nyūmon, 221.
pressure mainly from the United States facilitated Japan's participation in UNTAC.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ in the SDF dispatch to UNTAC. Firstly, the diplomatic commitment of the Japanese government on the Cambodian peace process was not active during the Cold War. Still, it was not necessarily inactive. Japanese diplomatic commitment became gradually active in the 1989 Paris Conference, 1990 Tōkyō Conference which led to the sign of the 1991 Paris Agreements and participation in UNTAC. Secondly, the SDF dispatch to UNTAC can be considered as both a military normalisation process towards a ‘normal state’ and ‘trans-armament’ as an ‘international peacekeeper’. The dispatch of SDF to UNTAC was a step towards normalisation of Japan’s military power. This is understandable from a realist perspective that sovereign nations pursue power. The roles of SDF members, however, were limited due to the freeze on PKF participation. At the same time, SDF experienced trans-armament through training as international peacekeepers in the UN Centre and firsthand peacekeeping activities.

Four perspectives, negative pacifism, positive pacifism, classical realism and neo-realism were applied as analytical eclecticism to examine how the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism occurred. SDF dispatch for the Gulf War was prohibited by opposition based on anti-militarism of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (negative pacifism). However, the SDF dispatch to UNTAC was approved in the Diet on the basis of international cooperation in the Preamble of the Constitution (positive pacifism). The shift was stimulated by both internal and external pressures. From a classical realist perspective, Japan's motivation for SDF dispatch can be explained as a means to normalise or maximise its
military power. This is because through participating in UNPKO the Japanese government succeeded in bypassing the constitutional constraint on use of military power outside Japan. At the same time, contributing to UNPKO enhanced Japan’s international profile. From a neo-realist viewpoint, it is possible to perceive that the international structure influenced Japan’s overseas dispatch of SDF. The end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis inevitably made Japan reconsider its defence policy and PKO policy. External pressures from the United States and other nations also facilitated enactment of the PKO Legislation. An eclectic analysis, therefore, offers a more comprehensive understanding of the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism during Japan’s participation in UNTAC.

The SDF’s participation in UNTAC can be considered successful for a number of reasons. Akashi pointed out that ‘we were able to put an end to UNTAC with a certain degree of success.’ \(^{128}\) In addition, the UNTAC operation should be regarded as successful in comparison with other UNPKOs in Somalia and Bosnia. \(^{129}\) UNTAC was easier to operate because of the Paris Agreements and easiness of the election monitoring. \(^{130}\) In terms of accomplishments, such as the end of civil war and independence, return of 370,000 refugees, and 90% of voting rate in the National Assembly Election with democratic methods, UNTAC can be concluded as successful. \(^{131}\) Therefore, Japan’s participation in UNTAC itself can be also considered a success. By dispatching the SDF to UNTAC, the Japanese government succeeded in facilitating the military normalisation process and enhancing its international prestige. This became a turning-point in Japan’s security policy and it was a shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’.

\(^{129}\) Ibid. Also see Sanderson, ‘UNTAC Military Component’, 134. Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition’, 117.
\(^{130}\) Ibid.
\(^{131}\) Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 32-34. Also see Doyle, ‘Strategy for Peace’, 372.
Chapter Three

Japan as a ‘UN Peace-Builder’ in East Timor

Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, participation in UNTAC was a turning-point for Japan’s security policy. Japanese pacifism shifted from one-nation pacifism constrained by Article 9 (negative pacifism) to international pacifism based on the Preamble of the Constitution (positive pacifism). After sending the SDF to Cambodia, the Japanese government dispatched peacekeepers to the following UN peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian operations: Mozambique (1993); El Salvador (1994); Congo (1994); Golan Heights (1995, 1996); Bosnia (1998); and Kosovo (1999).1 Thus, since participation in the UNTAC operation, Japan has continued to make contributions to post-conflict peace operations as a ‘UN peacekeeper’. In this context, the Japanese government attempted to make a greater contribution to peacekeeping operations in East Timor.

The UN-led peace operations in East Timor were comprehensive and can be divided into four major stages. First, the United Nations Mission in East Timor, (UNAMET), led by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ian Martin was established on 11 June 1999 in order to observe the national referendum. Second, the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) under the command of Major General Peter Cosgrove began on 15 September 1999 as a peace-enforcement operation authorised by the United Nations. Third, as a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) led by the SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello was set up on 25 October 1999. Fourth, as a post-independent peace-building

operation, the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) under the leadership of the SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa from Japan was organised on 20 May 2002. In summary, the conflict resolution process in East Timor consists of four peace operations, preventive diplomacy (UNAMET as a preventive deployment), peacemaking (INTERFET as peace-enforcement), peacekeeping (UNTAET), and post-conflict peace-building (UNMISET).2

At this time Japan could not dispatch the SDF to INTERFET due to Article 9. Instead, the Japanese government made a financial contribution of US $100 million to the INTERFET Trust Fund.3 Although the SDF dispatch to INTERFET was constrained by constitutional limitation, Japan made a comprehensive contribution by dispatching civilian police to UNAMET (1999), civilian electoral monitors to UNTAET (2001), and deployed the SDF to UNTAET and UNMISET (2002).4

The purpose of this chapter is to examine: 1) how Japan’s commitment towards the peace process and UNPKO in East Timor changed from inactive to active and 2) what factors facilitated a shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism in the SDF dispatch to peace operations in East Timor. To answer the above questions, the historical background of conflict in East Timor, multifunctional UN peace operations, and Japan’s contribution to UN-authorised peace operations (UNAMET, INTERFET, UNTAET, and UNMISET etc) in East Timor will be analysed.

2 Although the INTERFET operation was authorised by the UN resolution, the military operation was a Multinational Force (not a UN peace-enforcement unit). UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali had proposed ‘preventive diplomacy’ as peaceful actions before a conflict arises. UNAMET can be categorised as preventive diplomacy in that it was a ‘preventive deployment’ to prevent the conflict from spreading and prevent violence during the ballot. INTERFET was not a UN force but authorised by the UN resolution so it can be categorised as ‘peace-enforcement’. UNTAET was based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter but in reality peacekeeping activities were UNTAC-type peacekeeping operations and UNMISET can be categorised as post-conflict peace-building. See Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. Also, Inada made a similar argument although he did not make definitions in detail. See Inada, Funsō to Fukkō Shien, especially Chapter 11, 229.

3 Downer, East Timor: Japanese Contribution to Interfet.

Historical and Political Context of the East Timor Conflict

The history of colonization and successive occupation by Portugal, the Netherlands, Japan, and Indonesia and the failure of decolonisation were causes of the East Timor conflict. In 1520 Portugal colonised the Timorese Island and the Netherlands occupied West Timor in 1640. In 1859, Portugal and the Netherlands signed the Lisbon Treaty which allowed Portugal to retain control of the Eastern portion of the island and the Netherlands to control West Timor. On 18 February 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army invaded East Timor. During this period, ‘comfort places’ (ianjo) were set up in almost all of the places where the Japanese army occupied and a large number of East Timorese women and girls were forced to become ‘comfort women’ (ianfu). After the Second World War, Portugal reoccupied East Timor and West Timor remained part of the Republic of Indonesia. Portugal ruled East Timor until the fall of the Caetano regime in 1974. The movement for independence in East Timor strengthened in the wake of the coup d'etat in Portugal (the so-called ‘Carnation Revolution’) and the subsequent departure of the Portuguese administrators.

The movement for independence was accelerated by the establishment of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT: the Uniao Democratica Timorense), and the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT: the Associasao Social Democratica Timor), which changed its name later to the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frelelin: Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente) in May 1974. UDT and Frelelin later formed a coalition for the purpose of independence in

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January 1975. As a result of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, the new government abrogated the right to possess ‘overseas provinces’ in June 1974 and declared independence of colonies based on the right to ‘self-determination’.7 In 1975, confrontation over the future of East Timor between the pro-independent Fretilln and the anti-independent group turned into a civil war. In December the same year, Indonesia responded to an invitation by UDT to intervene. Indonesia responded quickly with a military occupation due to a fear that East Timor would become a Communist country and an ‘Asian Cuba’ under a Fretilln controlled government.8 Two months after the Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, approximately 60,000 Timorese men, women and children, approximately one fourth to one third of the entire population, were exterminated. This ratio is the worst in the history of genocide since the Second World War.9

In response to the human rights violation in East Timor, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 384 on 22 December 1975. The resolution ‘deplored’ the intervention of armed forces from Indonesia based on the inalienable rights of East Timor and the principle of self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.10

In spite of the unanimous adoption of Resolution 384, Western countries especially the United States and its allies acquiesced to Indonesia’s plan of annexing East Timor. Australian Prime Minister Whitlam unofficially met Indonesian President Suharto in September 1974 and two days before the Indonesian National Army, or the Tentara Nasional Indonesia, attacked Dili, US President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had talks with Suharto. During these talks, the issue of East Timor was not

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7 Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 15-16.
8 Ishizuka, Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Köchiku, 98.
9 Ibid.
raised. In other words, the US-led Western camp did not prevent Indonesia from invading East Timor. This was attributed to the Cold War structure and the Western countries’ desire to contain communist countries in the post-Vietnam War period and to deal with subsequent birth of communist countries such as Laos and Cambodia. Notably also Indonesian troops used weapons imported from the United States. In a geostrategic context, Indonesia was and remains significant as a waterway of the US nuclear submarines between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

In 1976, the Indonesian government declared East Timor the 27th province of Indonesia. Under the Suharto regime, human rights violations and bloodshed developed due to the guerrilla wars between the Indonesian army and Fretilin forces. The UN resolutions, which demanded withdrawal of the Indonesian troops from East Timor, were ignored, yet the international community did not take appropriate action because of the influence of the Cold War. On 12 November 1991, the murder of pro-independence protestors at the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili by the Indonesian security forces sparked international condemnation. In 1992 Indonesian troops arrested Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmao. According to the 1993 report of Amnesty International, thousands of East Timorese women were sexually abused and assaulted by the Indonesian troops. Moreover, according to the 1996 report of the United Nations, the infant mortality rate in East Timor was one of the worst in the world and the average longevity of East Timorese was also reported as one of the lowest in the developing countries.

12 Ibid.
13 Death toll was estimated from 50 to 200. See Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 17. Also see Takahashi, Higashi Timor, 112.
In 1998, Suharto resigned as Indonesian President and was succeeded by vice-President Habibie. The transition in leadership offered opportunities to resolve the East Timor issue. President Habibie began seeking solutions for the East Timor conflict including the possibility of independence for East Timor from Indonesia.\textsuperscript{15} Even after President Habibie announced the pullout of the troops, he did not properly implement the withdrawal due to the deterioration of the security situation. According to Takahashi, Indonesia plotted to set up a scenario of ‘civil war’ in East Timor in order to justify the stationing of Indonesian troops in East Timor.\textsuperscript{16} Due to the violence by pro-integration militias, approximately 500,000 East Timorese became IDP. The Indonesian government did not take any measures to maintain the security of East Timor.\textsuperscript{17} In this context, the United Nations took charge of the East Timor conflict by establishing multifunctional peacekeeping operations.

\textit{Japan’s Relationship with East Timor 1942-1998}

Historically, Japan considered the Timorese Island a ‘treasure island in the Western Pacific Ocean’ because of its natural resources.\textsuperscript{18} A diplomatic relationship between Japan and East Timor as a colony of Portugal did not exist until the outbreak of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{19} During the Pacific War, however, East Timor became strategically important for Imperial Japan. Japan deployed as many as 10,000 troops to the Timor Island. The entire population during the war in East Timor was around 45,000 indicating how strategically significant the island was.\textsuperscript{20} It has also been suggested that another reason Japan was interested in East Timor is its

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Takahashi, \textit{Higashi Timor 2}, 16-17.
\textsuperscript{17} Nishikawa, \textit{Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises}, 104.
\textsuperscript{18} The Timorese Island was called ‘treasure island’ because of ‘golden sands’ produced in the island. See Gotô, \textit{Higashi Timor Kokusai Kankeishi}, 136-137.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Nishikawa, \textit{Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises}, 105.
seabed oil, which was known since 19th century. After Japan lost the Pacific War, Japan-East Timor relations became disconnected again.

In the post-war period from 1945 to 1998, Japan had almost ignored East Timor on account of its strong political connection with Indonesia. Even during the time of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, Japan voted against the 1975 UN General Assembly Resolution 3485 condemning Indonesia’s invasion and the subsequent seven similar General Assembly’s Resolutions. In addition, Japan abstained from voting for Security Council Resolution 389 on 22 April 1976.

Japan’s opposition to General Assembly Resolution 3485 was not consistent with the Japanese ‘Peace Constitution’ which desires international peace. In other words, the Japanese government had prioritised good political relations with Indonesia over humanitarian issues in East Timor. In the case of the UNSC Resolution 389, not only Japan but also the United States abstained. Japan’s abstention was an indication that Japan’s policy on East Timor was influenced by the United States position. Both Japan and the United States avoided condemning Indonesia which was a bulwark against communism. Even after the 1991 Santa Cruz shootings, political and economic interests ensured that Tōkyō continued to support Jakarta. Because of its economic interests, Japan ‘played a pivotal role in Jakarta’s policy calculations after the massacre.’ Japan’s strategic interests in Indonesia had restrained Japan’s condemnation of human rights violations in East Timor.

The United States had also been supportive towards Indonesia because of national interest considerations influenced by the Cold War. However, US

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22 Gorjao, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy and East Timor’, 754-756.
25 Gorjao, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy and East Timor’, 757-758.
policy shifted during the Clinton administration and began raising human rights violations in East Timor. Japan nonetheless did not change its policy on East Timor. When the leader's conference of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was held in Jakarta on 14 November 1994, 21 East Timorese asylum seekers came into the Japanese Embassy. However this incident did not have any impact in Japan.\(^{26}\) The incident which changed Japan’s policy on Indonesia and East Timor was the 1997 ‘Asian financial crisis.’ The Indonesian economy in particular suffered serious damage. This crisis was a major factor forcing Suharto to step down as President in May 1998. Habibie was sworn as the new Indonesian President and as a result of international pressure conducted a referendum in East Timor on its future. These economic and political changes in Indonesia influenced Japan’s policy on East Timor and provided Japan with an opportunity to make more active diplomatic commitment on East Timor.\(^{27}\) According to the archives of MOFA, Japan’s contribution for assistance to East Timor became active in 1999.\(^{28}\) In addition to financial assistance, the Koizumi government was enthusiastic about sending SDF for international peacekeeping and thus played a major role in the shift in the Japanese policy on East Timor.\(^{29}\)

Thus, the Japanese policy on East Timor was shaped by the relationship with Indonesia. However, Japan’s East Timor policy began changing and becoming more active after the involvement of the United Nations. Eventually, the Japanese government supported the following UN-authorised peace operations: UNAMET, INTERFET, UNTAET, and UNMISET. Japan’s policy on East Timor from 1942 to 1998 had been influenced by the relationship with Indonesia. Moreover, Japan could not dispatch the SDF to INTERFET due to constitutional constraints and the influence of negative pacifism. In the post 1999 period, however, Japan’s

\(^{26}\) Shoji, ‘Higashi Timor Kiki’, 83-84.
\(^{27}\) Walton, ‘Japan and East Timor’, 239.
\(^{29}\) Shōji, ‘Higashi Timor Kiki’, 86-87.
policy on East Timor changed due to positive pacifism. As was evident in SDF dispatch to UNTAC, a shift in Japan’s security policy allowed Japan to contribute to post-conflict peacekeeping operations in East Timor.

\textit{Japan’s Contribution to UNAMET}

UNAMET can be categorised as ‘preventive deployment’ for independence. Normally, preventive diplomacy is considered prevention of conflict and there already existed conflict between East Timor and Indonesia. Still, UNAMET was a UN peace operation to prevent violence during the referendum period. In spite of its peaceful nature, Japan did not dispatch the SDF and reluctantly sent three civilian police officers.

On 5 May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement to resolve conflict over East Timor. An agreement was also reached on a ‘direct, secret, and universal ballot’ to determine the future of East Timor and to setup an appropriate United Nations mission to oversee the process.\textsuperscript{30} On 11 June 1999, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1246 to establish UNAMET. The mandate of UNAMET was to:

\begin{quote}
Organise and conduct a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia, in accordance with the General Agreement and to enable the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibility under Paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

In response to the requests from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to dispatch a political affairs officer and three civilian police officers. In addition Japan contributed 10.11 million dollars to the


UN Trust Fund, and provided 2,000 radios.\textsuperscript{32} As for the significance of Japan’s material contribution to UNAMET, Ian Martin noted that ‘Asia’s economic collapse was UNAMET’s good fortune; stocks of vehicles were available to be flown to East Timor from Tōkyō.’\textsuperscript{33} Due to the death of police officer, Takada in the UNTAC operation, a cautious debate took place in Tōkyō dispatching three civilian police officers were dispatched.\textsuperscript{34} In spite of the small number of participants, Japan was recognised as a ‘major contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET.’\textsuperscript{35}

According to UNAMET, as many as 446,666 East Timorese people registered for the ballot. The direct ballot in East Timor was carried out on 30 August and 98.6% registered voters participated in the process. The result of the vote was that 78.5% voters rejected the proposed plan of special autonomy and 21.5% voted in favour of being governed by the special authority of the Indonesian government.\textsuperscript{36} Immediately after the result of the ballot was known however, anti-independent (pro-integration) groups burned down houses and killed people. UNAMET spokesman David Wimhurst pointed out that the UNAMET was ‘defenceless’ because ‘UNAMET had always been an unarmed mission and that security had always been the province of the Indonesian authorities.’\textsuperscript{37}

By 5 September, as many as 150,000 people, one fourth of the entire population, became refugees due to the violence and destruction.

\textsuperscript{33} Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 39.
\textsuperscript{35} Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, ‘United Nations and East Timor’, 130.
Meanwhile, 1,200 members of the Australian Defence Forces implemented military drills near Darwin and waited until the UNSC adopted the resolution to authorise the armed intervention of the multinational forces.\textsuperscript{38} Takahashi noted human rights violations in East Timor in detail. At least 25 people were victimised in Dili on 5 September. On 6 September, a private residence of Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, used as a shelter for 2000 people, was set on the fire. On the same day in Suai, the Indonesian militia raided a church and 200 people and three Priests were killed. On 8 September, at a police station in Maliana, there was a public execution in which 47 people including children were killed in about one hour. In Baucau, the 745 troops of the Indonesian army killed five East Timorese and put fire on a large number of houses. In Lospalos, nine people including a priest and nun were shot to death by the 745 troops. As much as 70% of buildings (90% in Dili) were destroyed and approximately 270,000 people, one-thirds of the entire population, became refugees.\textsuperscript{39} UNAMET itself was successful in that it completed its mission to hold the ballot but it could not prevent the ‘crimes against humanity’ and major cities in East Timor became ‘killing fields’.\textsuperscript{40} These mass killings in East Timor were beyond the reach of mandate of UNAMET and necessitated military intervention by INTERFET.

\textit{Japan’s Financial Contribution to INTERFET}

On 15 September, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, recognising the security situation in East Timor as a threat to peace and security. The Security Council Resolution 1264 authorised the establishment of a multinational force.\textsuperscript{41} Indonesia insisted that a multinational force needed to be formed by the forces mainly based on ‘Asian troops’ and Canada

\textsuperscript{38} Ishizuka, \textit{Kokurei PKO to Heiwa Kōchiku}, 121-122.
\textsuperscript{39} Takahashi, \textit{Higashi Timor} 2, 7-10, 13, and 20.
\textsuperscript{40} See Dunn, \textit{Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor}.
suggested that a multinational force should be ‘a UN Force’. However, UN Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan made a decision to form a multinational force mainly composed of Australian Defence Forces.\(^{42}\) This is probably due to time constraints involved in assembling a UN peacekeeping force and the fact that Australia was experienced at both peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

INTERFET was established to ‘restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its task (and within force capabilities) and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations’. It is noteworthy that Resolution 1264 authorised use of force stipulating ‘all necessary measures to fulfil [its] mandate.’\(^{43}\) The approximate number of the ‘coalitions of the willing’ soldiers was 13,000 from ‘Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States as well as Australia’.\(^{44}\) The mission of INTERFET troops was to crack down on and disarm the East Timorese militia, which had been created by the Indonesian army.\(^{45}\) In this sense, the INTERFET mission was more difficult to carry out than other UN peace operations.

Indonesians were deeply offended by Australia’s leadership role in INTERFET and Indonesian President Habibie repealed the Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement on 16 September. The Indonesian National Army did not prevent INTERFET from carrying out its activities, but the pro-integration militias resorted to violence resistance. US President Clinton condemned Indonesia’s complicit involvement arguing that it was obvious that the Indonesian National Army supported and agitated the Indonesian militia.\(^{46}\) As justification for military intervention, Australian Prime Minister Howard also implied to Habibie that he had difficulty in

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\(^{42}\) Matsuno, *Higashi Timor Dokuritsu*, 244.

\(^{43}\) Cobb, *East Timor and Australia’s Security Role*.

\(^{44}\) Dee, ‘‘Coalitions of the Willing’ and Humanitarian Intervention’, 1.

\(^{45}\) Isezaki, *Busō Kaijo*, 64-65.

protecting Australian citizens in East Timor. Australian private companies in East Timor were forced to temporarily stop and to evacuate employees. Notably Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka insisted that Japan would not change its ODA policy for Indonesia. In terms of ‘national interest’, Australia’s military commitment to East Timor was predicated on the strategic importance of ensuring that East Timor did not become a failed state. Moreover, many analysts have argued that the ‘seabed oil’ or so-called ‘Timor Gap’ between East Timor and Australia has been a critical although unofficial factor. On the contrary, the United States was not active in dispatching its troops to INTERFET on because of lack of national interest and the traumatic experience in Somalia. INTERFET was sometimes argued as a case for ‘humanitarian intervention.’ Yet, unlike the other military interventions which were conducted against the will of the conflict parties, the Indonesian government eventually consented to the INTERFET operation.

Meanwhile, Numata, MOFA Press Secretary, obfuscated the issue of dispatching SDF to INTERFET. He stated that ‘I think it is a bit premature for me to go further into the details of what sort of possible participation there might be in the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces’. It is plausible that Numata avoided mentioning SDF dispatch to INTERFET, because of Japan’s constitutional restraints. The dispatch of SDF to the multinational military operations was technically impossible and therefore the Japanese government decided to financially support the launch of INTERFET by providing a fund of US$100 million.

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47 Hanazaki, ‘Sekiyu Tennengan Shūnyū’.
49 Yamada, ‘Higashi Timor niokeru Kokuren’, 128.
The contribution of the INTERFET Trust Fund was US$107 million.52 Unlike the case of the Gulf Crisis in 1990, the humanitarian crisis in East Timor did not cause strong external pressure on Japan to discuss constitutional revision and provide military contribution for INTERFET.

In response to the worsening security situation in East Timor, the Japanese government decided to contribute an additional 2 million dollars as an emergency assistance fund. $1 million were donated to UNHCR and another million was contributed to the World Food Programme.53 This immediate response from Japan indicated that the Japanese government believed that it was constitutionally impossible to dispatch the SDF to a multinational force. In this regard, the culture of anti-militarism and anti-war pacifism based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution influenced Japan’s security policy. In fact, at a press conference, the MOFA Press Secretary rejected the possibility of a dispatch of SDF to INTERFET on the grounds of lack of legal framework.54

To make contributions to UN peace operations in East Timor, the Japanese government started to reconsider conventional PKO policy. These decisions by the Japanese government for non-military contribution to the security crisis of post-ballot East Timor were made based on the PKO Law. While making decisions for humanitarian aid, the Japanese government attempted to lift the ‘freeze on PKF operations’. In this context, the LDP, the Liberal Party, and Kōmeitō signed the ‘Three Party Accord’ on 4 October 1999.55 On 14 October, the Japanese government announced plans to dispatch a field study mission, made up of officials from the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Prime

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52 Dee, ‘“Coalitions of the Willing” and Humanitarian Intervention’, 10. Also see McDermott, ‘Japan’s Financial Contribution to the UN System’, 64-88.
55 The Three Parties Accord stipulated the necessity of lift on the freeze of PKF. As for the details on lift of the freeze of PKF participation, see Shoji, ‘Policy Process of Ending the Freeze of PKF’, 97-108.
Minister’s Office, MOFA and JDA to East Timor. The government hoped to contribute towards the transportation of UNHCR goods by the plane through the ASDF.\(^{56}\) As material assistance for East Timor based on the PKO Law, the Japanese government contributed assistance goods such as 500 tents, 9,000 blankets, 11,140 sleeping mats, 20,000 water containers and 5,120 plastic sheets for the displaced East Timorese.\(^{57}\) In response to a request from UNHCR and in accordance with the PKO Law, the Japanese government decided to dispatch four aircraft (C-130H) as transport planes of the ASDF and a multi-purpose assistance plane (U-4) with six liaison officers between Surabaya (Java Island) and Kupang (West Timor).\(^{58}\) On 4 November 1999, Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi explained that it was necessary for Japan to make a contribution to the ‘logistics support for multinational forces’ within the current interpretation of the Constitution.\(^{59}\)

INTERFET comprised of 9,400 troops (4,500 Australian troops) from 19 countries.\(^{60}\) Japan could not dispatch the SDF to INTERFET due to constitutional restrictions. Unlike the case of the 1991 Gulf War, Japan was not pushed to make a military contribution to INTERFET. Instead, Japan was expected to make a substantial financial contribution to

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INTERFET. As a result, friction had arisen between Australia and Japan when Canberra pressured Japan to bankroll the operation of INTERFET. Pressures from Australia in September APEC 1999 meeting in Auckland and personal request from Prime Minister Howard to Prime Minister Obuchi caused tension and even unpleasantness in Tōkyō. As well, Japanese media, the Asahi Shimbun for instance, showed Japan’s displeasure about Australia’s initiative in INTERFET implying that it was ‘un-Asian, insensitive approach.’ In response to the Australian pressure, however, the Japanese government contributed US$ 100 million to the UN Trust Fund. Article 9 influenced Japan’s security policy and the government had no choice but to make a financial contribution rather than military contribution. Yet, the Japanese government explored the option to dispatch the SDF to East Timor in the post-INTERFET operations.

Japan’s Contribution to UNTAET

The mandate of the UNTAET operation was based on the chapter 7 of the UN Charter including ‘peace-enforcement’. Yet the UNTAET operation can be categorised as an UNTAC-type peacekeeping operation. Although the nature of UNTAET was peacekeeping operations rather than coercive actions, Japan could not deploy SDF to UNTAET due to constitutional constraints. Instead, Japan dispatched the SDF to Indonesia and West Timor to support UNHCR in 1999.

On 20 October 1999, the Indonesian government decided to withdraw from East Timor and the UNSC set up UNTAET based on Resolution 1272. The mandate of UNTAET ranged from jurisdiction, legislation, to administration and its purposes were to:

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Provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor, establish an effective administration, assist in the development of civil and social services, ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance, support capacity-building for self-government, and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.63

The word ‘Timorisation’ became a slogan to empower East Timor and the nation-building process and was also a process of ‘democratisation.’64 UNTAET was composed of three pillars: military, Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER) and Governance and Public Administration. The HAER was conducted under the leadership of Akira Takahashi who later became Special Adviser on Development and Humanitarian Affairs to the SRSG. The HAER was ‘instrumental in coordinating a range of relief and humanitarian organizations and working with the East Timorese to determine relief assistance priorities.’65 Unlike PKF activities, humanitarian assistance is an area to which Japanese peacekeepers make a substantial contribution. In addition to humanitarian assistance, the Japanese government dispatched a lawyer to UNTAET to support the establishment of the legal system in East Timor.66 So, the leadership of Takahashi in HAER assisted Japan’s contribution in the field of humanitarian aid.

UNSC Resolution 1272 stated that the operations were under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the Untied Nations and authorised ‘UNTAET to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate.’67 For this reason, the Force

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64 Isezaki, Busō Kaijo, 46.
65 Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, 62-63.
Commander of UNTAET PKF, Lieutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit categorised UNTAET as peace-enforcement operations. However, UNTAET operations were virtually Chapter 6-type peacekeeping operations. As a matter of fact, UNTAET PKF Individual Guidance on the Use of Force stated:

You have the right to use the MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY up to and including deadly force FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME NECESSARY in defence of yourself, your unit, other UN personnel and those it is your duty to protect.68

UNTAET was, therefore, an unprecedented UN peace operation based on Chapter 7-style coercion but also more multifunctional than UNTAC in that it took over all of the departments of the East Timorese government including ‘finance, justice, infrastructure, economic and social affairs.’69

On 26 October 1999, MOFA Press Secretary Numata announced that Japan was willing to make a contribution to UNTAET in response to the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1272, although he did not mention the possibility of the dispatch of SDF to UNTAET.70 Akira Takahashi, Special Advisor to the President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, was appointed by the UN Secretary General as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation of UNTAET.71 Takeshi Kamiyama, a MOFA official, was appointed as a senior civil affairs officer of UNTAET to take charge of the Environmental Protection Unit of the Governance and Public Administration Component of UNTAET.72 These appointments of

69 Ibid.
Japanese officials to pivotal positions of UNTAET reflect MOFA’s efforts to make a contribution to peace operations in East Timor.

On 19 November 1999, in response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese government decided to dispatch 113 ASDF members to Indonesia and West Timor (Kupang) to transport the aid material. The ASDF left from the Komaki base and transported 400 tons of material and UNHCR appreciated Japan’s participation which made it possible to provide aid for 120,000 East Timorese refugees.73 Yoshio Mochizuki, a Parliamentary Secretary for MOFA, visited East Timor from 11 to 13 April 2001 to meet leaders of East Timor, including President Xanana Gusmao, Vice-President Jose Ramos-Horta. Mochizuki, in the meetings, emphasised Japan’s contribution in the three fields such as agriculture, human resources development, and infrastructure.74 Dispatch of ASDF personnel to Indonesia and West Timor and Mochizuki’s visit to East Timor show non-military and indirect nature of Japan’s contribution to the UNTAET operation.

In response to the request from the United Nations, the Japanese government dispatched observers to the election of representatives to the Constituent Assembly of East Timor based on the PKO Law.75 In regards to the election, the Japanese government decided to make extra emergency contribution of US$1,191,000 through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to support:

International electoral observers, training of East Timorese electoral managers, information and communication technology support to improve the accuracy of voter registration, the implementation of civilian education, as

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73 JDA, Defence of Japan 2000, 175-176.
74 MOFA, 16 April 2001, The Visit to the Republic of Indonesia and East Timor of Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs Yoshio Mochizuki (Outline and Evaluation), cited from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/psv0104.html (accessed at 8 Nov. 08)
On 30 August 2001, the Constituent Assembly Elections were held with the vote rate of 91.3%. 88 Assembly members were elected in a peaceful democratic process. The voter turnout at the elections indicates the success of the UN peace operations through the electoral observation.

In February 2002, in response to strong requests and expectations from the United Nations and the leaders of East Timor, the Japanese government decided to dispatch 680 GSDF personnel in Engineer Units and 10 PKF headquarters personnel to post-interdependence peace-building operations conducted by UNTAET. In the meeting with Prime Minister Jun'ichirō Koizumi, Chief Minister Mari Alkatiri welcomed Japan’s military contribution to UNTAET. In response to a request from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to dispatch the electoral observers to the Presidential Election to be held on 14 April 2002 in East Timor. On 29 April 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited East Timor to inspect a SDF engineer unit serving in UNTAET. For Japan, the participation in UNTAET and the Constituent Assembly Elections and the Presidential Election without causalities itself was a symbol of success. If SDF personnel had been killed, the Japanese government would have

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had to consider the withdrawal of the SDF. Moreover, the UNTAET operation itself was generally successful.\textsuperscript{82}

The Constituent Assembly Election was one of the ‘successful factors’ of UNTAET.\textsuperscript{83} Suhrke pointed out that ‘the lessons of UNTAET suggest that peacekeeping-com-governance missions should be separated, not integrated, contrary to the Brahimi Report’s recommendation.’ \textsuperscript{84} Yet UNTAET, as a step for post-conflict peace-building operation towards independence, was not complete ‘peacekeeping-com-governance’ operations and necessitated other measures of post-independence ‘peace-building operations’, which were emphasised by the Brahimi Report.\textsuperscript{85} Like the case of UNTAC, there are some successes and lessons in UNTAET, and the operation was generally successful.\textsuperscript{86} Fortunately, the success of the UNTAET operation guaranteed the successfulness of Japan’s participation.

\textit{Japan’s Contribution to Post-Independent Peace-Building}

UNMISET under the leadership of the SRSG Sukeno Hasegawa from Japan can be categorised as a post-conflict peace-building operation. Based on new diplomatic concepts such as ‘human security’ and ‘consolidation of peace’, the Japanese government dispatched 2,300 SDF personnel to East Timor in total. In addition to UNMISET, Japan made a contribution to the subsequent UN peace operations in East Timor based on the concept of human security and consolidation of peace which coincides with ‘positive pacifism’.

\textsuperscript{82} Da Costa and Soesastro, experts on East Timor pointed out 20 successful points in UNTAET such as establishment of security, humanitarian aid, and implementation of democratic election. Ishizuka, \textit{Kokuren PKO to Heiwa Köchiku}, 132-133. Also see Da Costa and Soesastro, ‘Building East Timor’s Economy’, 118-120.

\textsuperscript{83} Uesugi, ‘Kono Kunino katachi wo Kimeyo!’, 70.

\textsuperscript{84} Suhrke, ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders’, 1.


\textsuperscript{86} As for ‘conditions for success’, see Smith and Dee, \textit{Peacekeeping in East Timor}, 97.
East Timor gained independence from Indonesia on 20 May 2002 and UNTAET was replaced by UNMISET beginning its operations on the same day. The mandate of UNMISET based on the UNSC Resolution 1410 was:

1) To provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the vitality and political stability of East Timor;
2) to provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service; and 3) to contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor. 87

The deployment of up to 5,000 military personnel, including 120 military observers, and 1,250 civilian police officers were authorised based on UNSC Resolution 1410. 88

The independence of East Timor allowed Japanese peacekeepers to play a greater role. The Koizumi government decided at a Cabinet meeting to reassign a Japan GSDF Engineer Unit of 680 members including seven female personnel and PKF headquarters personnel dispatched to UNTAET for the post-interdependence nation-building operations of UNMISET. 89 The JDA organised 295 vehicles for the GSDF, two fleets for transportation and escort for the MSDF, and seven C-130H transportation aircrafts and a U-4 multifunctional support aircraft for the ASDF. The SDF was stationed in main cities such as Dili, Maliana and Suai, and Oecusse (Pante Macassar) to construct roads and bridges and to support for water and food supplies. 90 In addition, the SDF carried out some

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cultural exchanges with the Korean forces working in Oecusse. Working for international peace-building operations with the Korean soldiers was meaningful for the SDF. Participation of the SDF personnel in UNPKO, therefore, contributed to confidence-building measures with Korea.

Japan’s commitment to peace-building operations in East Timor gradually decreased as the UNMISET mission was carried out. The changeover of Japanese peacekeepers was conducted in the presence of Toshio Kojima, Parliamentary Secretary for JDA on 13 March 2002. Responding to a request from the United Nations, the SDF Engineer Unit was diminished from 680 to 522 and personnel dispatched to the PKF headquarters were reduced from ten to seven. On June 14 2002 in New York, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced the appointment of Sukehiro Hasegawa as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and Deputy Head of Mission. The United Nations decided the extension of the mandate of UNMISET in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1480 to 20 May 2004 and the Japanese government also decided to extend the term of the GSDF Engineer Group and headquarters personnel operating in East Timor. Following the gradual withdrawal of UNMISET, the Japanese government reduced the number of SDF from 522 to 405. Prime Minister Koizumi and East Timorese President Gusmao had talks in Tōkyō on 23 February 2004. President Gusmao expressed his gratitude for the SDF’s participation in UNMISET and Prime Minister Koizumi promised to make a further contribution of 100 million yen for East Timor. Since the mandate of UNMISET expired on 20 May 2004, the Japanese government

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91 JDA, Defence White Book 2003, 215. Also see JDA, PKO to the Next Stage, 2003, 12.
decided full withdrawal of the Fourth SDF personnel and transfer materials used in nation-building operations to donate for East Timor. Still the mandate of UNMISET was extended from 20 May 2004 for one year as a maximum period.96 The total number of the SDF personnel dispatched to UNMISET amounted to approximately 2,300 SDF personnel, including 25 female personnel. The nation-building of the SDF consisted of 120 projects that included maintenance and repair of roads, bridges and infrastructures, levelling land of the filed of elementary school, and construction of waste disposal facilities.97 Through the Trust Fund for human security, the Japanese government decided to support the program ‘100 School Project: Improving the Quality of Primary Education in East Timor’ conducted by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF).98 Thus, through participating in UNMISET, Japan became a ‘UN peace-builder’ contributing post-independent peace-building and nation-building operations.

Following the expiration of mandate of UNMISET on 20 May 2005, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a UN special political mission, was established for a one-year mandate. In April 2005, a large scale 20 day demonstration was organised by the citizens complaining about the religious education program suggested by the government. In April 2006, ex-national army troops dropped out of the army due to the discrimination and led demonstrations. The East Timorese government intervened with the national army and approximately 100,000 people became IDP, which was 60% of the entire population of Dili (180,000). In response to the security crisis, the Japanese government decided to provide emergency contribution of US$5 million for emergency shelter,
water, and health care etc. The security situation in East Timor deteriorated and the mandate of UNOTIL was extended until 20 August 2006. The Australia-led security forces composed of approximately 3,000 troops were deployed responding to the request from the East Timorese government. After UNOTIL expired, UNSC Resolution 1704 authorised the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Responding to a request from the United Nations, Japan dispatched two civilian police officers to UNMIT. For the presidential and parliamentary elections in East Timor, Japan provided emergency grant aid of US$723,855 though UNDP and dispatched 14 electoral observers. In spite of all these peace-nation-building operations, the security situation in East Timor has been not necessarily stable and the Australian Defence Forces stayed until the security situation became stable. Although the security situation in East Timor became unstable after the independence, this does not mean that UN peace operations failed in East Timor. All in all, the SDF made substantial contributions to UN peace-building operations in East Timor. To place issues in a context,


100 Ibid.


103 President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao were attacked by an armed group and President Ramos-Horta was injured on 11 February 2008. See MOFA, 11 February 2008, *Statement by Press Secretary / Director-General for Press and Public Relations, MOFA, on Attacks on the President and Prime Minister of Timor-Leste*, cited from, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/2/1177741_980.html (accessed at 10 Nov. 08).
reasons and factors which restrained and facilitated Japan’s SDF dispatch to East Timor will be examined from four analytical frameworks.

**Analytical Eclecticism**

*Negative Pacifism: A Defence Constraint on SDF Dispatch*

Negative pacifism based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and anti-war culture as a defence constraint restricted Japan’s participation in peacekeeping and peace-building operations in East Timor. First of all, it was difficult for Japan to proactively contribute to the first UN peace operation, UNAMET. Even though an official request was made from the United Nations, the Japanese government feared the impact of fatalities on public support. This was deeply connected with the death of police officer Takada in the UNTAC operation. In the case of UNTAC, Japanese civilian police officers were forced to take more risks than the SDF which could choose a safer place to operate and had the ability to collectively protect themselves. The fact that Japan dispatched only 2 civilian police officers to Dili and one civilian police officer to Jakarta was as a result of deaths of Japanese citizens in UNTAC.\(^\text{104}\)

In 1999 Japan could not dispatch the SDF to INTERFET even for the logistical support because of negative pacifism. The mandate of the Australian-led INTERFET included the use of force under the Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Instead of creating a new legal framework or amending the Constitution to send SDF to INTERFET, the Japanese government chose to support ASEAN countries such as Thailand and the Philippines which had financial difficulties in dispatching their troops to INTERFET.\(^\text{105}\) As Prime Minister Obuchi stated, all Japan was able to do was make a contribution to INTERFET ‘within the Constitution’ (*kenpō no*...


The Japanese government did not give any thought to reconsider its policy on the right of ‘collective self-defence’. This shows how the government was constrained by constitutional limitations and negative pacifism. As David Envall pointed out, the similarities in responses of the Japanese government to the Gulf Crisis and East Timor Crisis were ‘depressingly large’. The inability to contribute to INTERFET ‘highlights the impotence of the JDA and the JSDF if Japan is to make a substantial contribution to building a more stable security environment in the region’. Indeed, Japan’s military impotence stems from ‘negative pacifism’. At time of the 1991 Gulf War, not only US President George Bush but also Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke encouraged Japan to dispatch the SDF to the US-led multinational forces. On the contrary, in the case of INTERFET, both the United States and Australia were more appreciative of Japan’s constitutional limitations and did not pressure Japan to dispatch the SDF to INTERFET. This indicates that negative pacifism functioned as a defence constraint on SDF dispatch to East Timor.

In the case of participation in UNTAET, Japan needed to take its mandate into account because the mandate of UNTAET operation was based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which authorises the use of force for collective security. In other words, Japan faced the same problem with regard to SDF dispatch to the PKF operation in East Timor. To solve the problem, the Japanese government revised the PKO Law in December 2001 so as to lift the ‘freeze’ on PKF. The ‘freeze’ on participation in PKF activities or participation in the ‘substantial activities’ was one of the most symbolic examples of negative pacifism. Following the revision of the PKO

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107 Envall argued that this Japan’s military impotence created ‘credibility gap’ nationally and internationally. See Envall, *Role of the JDA and JSDF*.

108 Ibid.
Law, the use of weapon was also unrestricted and the SDF became able to use force to protect not only themselves but also people under the control of the SDF. In addition, Article 95 of the SDF Law was also modified so that SDF members could defend themselves and protect their weapons.\textsuperscript{109} Thus, negative pacifism was influential but became incrementally weaker as a result of revision of the PKO Law.

When it came to the dispatch of SDF to PKF operation in East Timor, Japanese NGOs expressed their opposition to the dispatch to Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi, Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations Sergio De Mello, and political and religious leaders in East Timor. Their argument was not only based on Article 9 but also on the historical fact that the Japanese imperial army sexually exploited women in East Timor and forced the East Timorese people to work against their will during the Second World War. The representatives of Japanese Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) insisted that there was no necessity for the Japanese government to dispatch SDF to UNTAET given other countries had already dispatched their troops for PKF activities.\textsuperscript{110} Even in the case of UNPKO in East Timor, negative pacifism such as Article 9 and culture of anti-militarism still acted as defence constraint. However, as shown with the lifting of the ‘freeze’ on the PKF participation, the defence constraints gradually slipped away. Instead, positive pacifism became the justification for SDF dispatch to East Timor.

\textit{Positive Pacifism: Peace-Building for Human Security}

Japan’s contributions to peace operations in East Timor were based not only on ‘positive pacifism’ of the Preamble of the Constitution but also on a concept of ‘human security’. As raised in Chapter 1, the concept of human


\textsuperscript{110} Yayasan HAK et al., \textit{Nihon Jieitai Haken ni Hantai}. 
security as a keyword for post-conflict peace-building operation coincides with the notion of positive pacifism of the Preamble of the Japanese constitution. This is because both concepts share the same purpose, ‘freedom from fear and want’, which is a precondition for the removal of ‘structural violence’, namely ‘positive peace’.

Whereas human security consists of two keywords ‘freedom from fear, freedom from want’, the Preamble of the Constitution also includes the keywords ‘free from fear and want’: ‘we recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.’

In other words, the goal of the concept of human security and the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution is the same, removal of structural violence and attainment of positive peace. The non-military nature of the concept of human security suits Japanese foreign policy. Therefore, positive pacifism based both on the Preamble of the Constitution and on the concept of human security became the justification for dispatching the SDF to UNPKO in East Timor.

In fact, the then Foreign Minister Yōhei Kōno implied that not only negative peace (absence of war) but also positive peace (absence of structural violence) are important in Japan’s contribution to UNPKO in Kosovo and East Timor. Kōno stated that:

The future we need to have should not only be absence of war or conflict but also should be the one in which individuals can lead a humanlike life. So as to open such a future, we would like to strengthen our commitment to poverty, global environment issues, internationally organised crimes, terrorism, dignity of individuals, and several issues related to life, bearing a viewpoint of human rights in mind.

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The absence of war and conflict is negative pacifism and the absence of poverty, environmental issue, and violation of human dignity is positive pacifism. Human security which is consistent with Preamble of the Japanese Constitution is positive pacifism. Although article 9 prevented Japan from dispatching the SDF to INTERFET, the Preamble and the PKO Law are consistent with the concept of human security which enabled Japan’s contribution for post-conflict peace-building operations in East Timor.¹¹³

Notably, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that the Japanese government participated in UNPKO in East Timor on the basis of Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, citing:

> We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.¹¹⁴

Therefore, the aim of peace-building operations is to contribute to basic human needs or human security, namely ‘positive peace’. In this sense, Japan’s contribution for post-conflict peace-building operations in East


¹¹⁴ Koizumi also stated that the anti-terrorism activities in the Indian Ocean are also based on Preamble. Koizumi also emphasised that these international cooperation is to occupy ‘an honoured place’ in the international community. See, NDL, Statement of Jun’ichirō Koizumi, *Proceeding of the 159th Diet Session, Lower House Plenary Session*, 19 January 2004, cited from, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=15195&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=8&DOC_ID=8340&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=8&DPOS=3&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=9339 (accessed at 30 November 2009).
Timor was based on positive pacifism. The significance of the concept of human security (positive pacifism) in the post-conflict peace-building was also emphasised by Special Representative of Secretary General, Sukehiro Hasegawa as recommendations for the Japanese government. 115 His recommendations based on his experience in East Timor indicate how post-conflict peace-building operations suit the way Japan contribute to international peace and security on the basis of the spirit of the Preamble of the Constitution. Nishikawa noted Japan’s ‘humanitarianism’ in East Timor crisis since 1999 and by conducting in-depth interviews she proved that humanitarian ideas have been shared by the Japanese people. 116 The concept of humanitarianism is also congruent with positive pacifism in that they focus on removing structural violence in East Timor.

From the perspective of positive pacifism, Japan contributed to post-conflict peace-building rather than negative pacifism. The shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism in SDF dispatch to UNPKO in East Timor, however, was facilitated by both domestic and international pressures.

Classical Realism: Domestic Pressure and the Revised PKO Law

As discussed already, classical realism and national interest decided Japan’s position on the conflict between Indonesia and East Timor. Since

115 The list of the recommendations are as follows: (a) establish the peace building support as the key pillar of its UN policy and propose to have Timor-Leste listed along with Brundi and Sierra Leone on the agenda of the UN Peace-building Commission; (b) play a leading role in the newly created UN Peace-building Commission and for this purpose the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bring together those involved in peace-building support activities from JICA and NGOs; (c) work for the upgrading of the UN Peace-building Support Office into a full fledged Department along with DPKO and DPA; (d) aim at increasing the number of Japanese staff working in UN peace operations from the current level of 20 to 100 within the next five years; (e) establish a fund for supporting internships for Japanese graduate students to work in UN organizations; (f) train Japanese specialists in governance and conflict resolution so that a larger number of them can work in peace-building operations; (g) continue infrastructure and other projects designed to facilitate economic recovery and employment generation; (h) enable the Japanese defence forces and police personnel to actively participate in UN peace operations; and (i) allocate funds saved from the assessed contributions for voluntary contributions to UN funds and programmes for peace-building support. See Hasegawa, ‘Peace-building’, 307.
116 Nishikawa, Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises, Chapter 4.
Indonesia is politically and economically significant to Japan, the Japanese government supported Indonesia even after the invasion of East Timor in 1975. In terms of economic security, imported oil from the Middle East to Japan passes through the Malacca Strait and Lombok Strait. In addition, Indonesia itself exports oil, natural gas, timber, marine products such as prawn to Japan. From a trading perspective, Indonesia has been one of the centres of exports when Japan exports manufactured goods to other Southeast Asian countries. Even after the breakout of the Santa Cruz incident, Japan did not change its ODA policy towards Indonesia despite the fact that the Western countries stopped their supports for Indonesia.\textsuperscript{117} In comparison with policy towards East Timor, Indonesia has been vital from the perspective of Japanese national interests.

Similarly, the Japanese government revised the PKO law so that Japan can normalise the military capability in the name of UNPKO. Prior to participation in UNPKO in East Timor, the Japanese government revised the 1992 PKO Law in June 1998 as a step for Japanese military normalisation. Significantly, the revised 1998 PKO Law widened the range of use of weapons. The 1998 PKO Law allowed the SDF to use weapons not only by personal decisions but also by the orders of superior officers.\textsuperscript{118} In this regard, the revision of the PKO Law normalised Japan’s military capability.

In addition, as mentioned previously, prior to participation in UNTAET, the PKO Law was revised in December 2001. The 2001 PKO can be also interpreted as a step for Japan’s military normalisation since it lifted the

\textsuperscript{117} Takahashi, \textit{Higashi Timor 2}, 60.
\textsuperscript{118} The 1998 PKO Law enabled Japan to: 1) to participate in international electoral observatory mission in accordance with the requests from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); 2) to make material contribution for international humanitarian aids conducted by the international organizations such as UNHCR, even if ceasefire is not agreed and; 3) to use weapons for self-defence not only by individual judgments but also by the orders of superior officers. Article 24 of the PKO Law which stipulates the use of weapon for self-defence was not regarded as violation of Article 9 of the Constitution. See Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office, cited from, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/data/law/law_data03.html (accessed at 15 Nov. 08).
‘freeze’ on PKF operations which had been viewed to be violation of Article 9. The 2001 PKO Law allowed the SDF to use weapons for protecting not only themselves but also those who are under control of the SDF staff. This provision on the use of weapons is problematic given the fact that the SDF can exercise individual self-defence right but not the right of ‘collective self-defence’. This change also normalised the military operations of the SDF. Therefore, the revision of the PKO Law and SDF dispatch to the PKF in UNTAET became steps towards Japan’s military normalisation.

In part, the reason why the Japanese government revised the PKO Law was ‘domestic pressure’ to revise the Japanese Constitution. It had been unrealistic to revise the Constitution due to the lack of support in the Diet, the government needed to modify the PKO Law rather than amend the Constitution. Hence, these revisions of the PKO Law in 1998 and 2001 can be considered to be steps towards constitutional revision. By revising the PKO Law and dispatching the SDF to the PKF operation, the Japanese government succeeded in making incremental changes to interpretation of the Constitution and military policy without constitutional amendment.

In fact, arguments in the Diet that the revisions of the PKO Law contribute to the national interests of Japan were presented. Yuriko Koike as a representative of the coalition government expressed the view that:

The revision of the PKO Law would enhance the possibility of Japan’s international contribution by leaps and bounds in the future and it also accords with national interests in that it could strengthen the our country’s position in the international society.119

Koike’s argument regarding national interests in revising the PKO Law is consistent with the concept of classical realism. By revising the PKO Law and dispatching the SDF to UNPKO, Japan hoped to gain more international political influence and more importantly, could increase eligibility for a permanent seat of UN Security Council. Thus, classical realism facilitated the revision of the PKO Law in relation to participating in UNPKO in East Timor.

Furthermore, Japan’s policies on East Timor in terms of PKO and ODA were consistent with Japan’s national interests, especially gaining a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. While East Timor issue was controversial in the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Masahiko Kōmura emphasised the necessity of Japan’s entry as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Notably, Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta told Vice-Minister (Parliamentary) for MOFA Kiyohiko Tōyama that East Timor supports Japan’s permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. The remark by Ramos-Horta exemplified how Japan enhanced its international political influence by making a contribution to international peacekeeping operations.

**Neo-Realism: Structural and External Factors**

According to neo-realists, the international structure determines the national interests and decision making of sovereign states. In fact, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the conflict resolution process in the case of East Timor was heavily influenced by the structural factors

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of the Cold War. The Western countries hesitated to criticise Indonesia as it was a bulwark against communist countries. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted eight Resolutions to condemned Indonesia every year from 1975 to 1982. Remarkably, the United States voted against such resolutions seven times and abstained once. The United Kingdom and France abstained on all eight occasions. Australia opposed five times and abstained three times. As mentioned previously, Japan voted against all of the UN General Assembly resolutions.122

External pressures and the anarchic nature of the international community also explain the motives of Japan to make a more proactive contribution to UNPKO in East Timor. There were domestic pressures to revise the PKO Law in 1998 and 2001 so that Japan can enhance its international political power and normalise its military power. Likewise, external pressures facilitated Japan’s participation in UNPKO in East Timor. As for the first revision of the PKO Law, the launch of a ballistic missile from North Korea (Taepodon-1) over Japan landing in the high seas off the Sanriku coast of Japan on 31 August 1998 was a sharp external factor on Japan’s security policy.123 Japan was pressured to improve its defence power as a result of the threat posed by the capabilities of the North Korean ballistic missile. In this context, the Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan was enacted in May 1999.124 The structural factor especially anarchic nature and the existence of threat forced Japan to upgrade its national defence power. Considering the North Korea factor in the anarchic world, it is natural for Japan to strengthen its military capability. In this sense, Japan’s participation in UNTAET including the PKF activities can be explained by neo-realist premise that the international structure is a determinant of state

122 Takahashi, Higashi Timor, 67.
behaviour. The North Korean threat can be considered a direct factor in the changes to Japan’s national defence policy as well as security policy including SDF deployment to East Timor.

More significantly, as will be analysed in the next chapter, the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 triggered an upgrade of Japanese security policy. Japan did not dispatch the SDF to post-war peace operations in Afghanistan. Coincidentally however, the Japanese government revised the PKO Law one month after the terrorist attacks. The changing international environment thus, inevitably placed an influence on Japan’s PKO policy which gave rise to SDF participation in UNTAET in February 2002. The anarchical international structure and international pressures influenced Japan’s security policy and SDF dispatch to UNTAET.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined Japan’s transition towards active commitment to post-conflict peace operations in East Timor. Japan’s policy on East Timor had been undoubtedly ‘inactive’ due to the relationship with Indonesia and structural factors during the Cold War. First of all, Japan did not dispatch the SDF to UNAMET and INTERFET and the early stage of UNTAET operations because of negative pacifism, which stopped the SDF from participating in PKF operations. However, Japan’s policy on East Timor shifted from inactive ‘negative pacifism’ to active ‘positive pacifism’. As in the case of UNTAC, the PKO Law was the legal basis for SDF dispatch to UNTAET. The PKO Law was enacted on the basis of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism) as analysed in the previous chapter. In this sense, Japan’s participation in UNPKO in East Timor was based on positive pacifism. Moreover, the Japanese government also adopted the concept of human security as a core foreign policy when the SDF dispatch to East Timor was discussed. The concept of human security
is also consistent with positive pacifism as examined in this chapter. In other words, positive pacifism inscribed in the Preamble of the Constitution and the concept of human security was a facilitative factor of Japan’s participation in peace operations in East Timor.

The shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism when it came to post-conflict peace operations in East Timor occurred as a response to domestic and international factors. From the perspective of classical realism, Japan’s participation in UNPKO in East Timor contributes to Japan’s national interests, namely normalisation of military power and pursuit of political influence in international society. Japan’s desire to normalise its military power and pursue national interests facilitated the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. In fact, the revised PKO Law lifted the freeze on PKF participation and contributed to normalisation of Japanese military power to a certain extent. As well, the international structure also influenced the shift in Japan’s national defence policy and PKO policy. The anarchic nature of the international system necessitated Japan to upgrade its defence power in response to North Korean missile threat. Finally, the PKO Law was revised as a result of the changes of international environment, especially the terrorist attacks on the United States. Before dispatching the MSDF to the Indian Ocean, the Japanese government revised the PKO Law to enable the SDF to participate in PKF operations. Although Japan could not deploy the SDF to Afghanistan, the government succeeded in sending SDF to the PKF in East Timor. This was a significant step in Japanese security policy in terms of Japanese military normalisation. Therefore, Japan’s security identity shifted from a ‘pacifist state’ (based on negative pacifism) to a ‘UN peacekeeper’ (based on positive pacifism) in the process of Japanese military normalisation and as a response to the changing international environment.
Chapter Four

Japan as a ‘US Ally’ in Response to the War on Terror

Introduction

The outbreak of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent US-led response in Afghanistan and Iraq provided Japan with opportunities to strengthen the military alliance with the United States. As was the case with peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and East Timor, post-war peace operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were authorised by the United Nations. In response to the changing international security environment, the Koizumi government decided to dispatch the Aegis destroyers to the Indian Ocean in 2002 and the GSDF to Iraq in 2004 as part of security cooperation arrangements with the United States.

The purpose of this chapter is: 1) to examine whether there were shifts from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ in relation to legislative processes in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Legislation and the following SDF dispatches;1 2) to explore the question of whether the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq facilitated Japan’s military normalisation and trans-armament; and 3) to investigate the extent to which domestic and external factors influenced Japan’s SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. This chapter focuses on Japan’s security policy response to the Iraq War rather than the Afghanistan War because Japan did not dispatch the SDF to post-conflict peace-building operations in Afghanistan. The chapter begins with an analysis of Japan’s response to the September 11th Terrorist

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1 This chapter does not contextualise the civil wars in Afghanistan which had been affected by the ‘great game’ between the United Kingdom and Russia. For historical background on the civil wars in Afghanistan, see UNAMA, Historical Perspective, cited from http://www.unama-afg.org/about/info.htm (accessed at 29 Dec. 08). As for the conflict in Afghanistan during the Cold War, especially after the invention by the USSR, see The UN General Assembly adopted the first of a series of “Situation in Afghanistan” resolutions, cited from Ibid.
Attacks in the United States, and examine Japan’s response to the US-led ‘War on Terror’ and subsequent post-war peace operations.

Japan’s Response to September 11 and the Afghanistan War

Immediately after the terrorist attacks on US soil on 11 September 2001, US President George W. Bush stated that it was necessary to exercise the right of ‘individual and collective self-defence’ including ‘pre-emptive self-defence strikes’. In response to the terrorist attacks, member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) applied Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and Australia invoked the Australia New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty to exercise the right of collective self-defence.2 Japan’s response to September 11, however, was constrained by Article 9.3 Nonetheless, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed Japan’s ‘support’ for the US-led War on Terror.4 The UN Security Council recognised terrorist attacks as a threat to international peace and security, and UN Resolution 1368 authorised member states to combat terrorism.5 On 19 September, Koizumi stated that the Japanese government regarded terrorist attacks as ‘Japan’s own security issue’ and would dispatch the SDF for medical services and transportation to supply the United States Forces fight against international terrorism in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1368.6

On 7 October 2001, the United States began the war on Afghanistan and the next day, Prime Minister Koizumi supported the War on Terror and

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2 Shigeta, ‘Nihon nitotteno Isuramu Kagekiha’, 77.
3 Ibid.
4 In the press conference on 12 September, Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi stated that ‘Japan strongly support the United States and is resolved to spare no effort in providing necessary assistance and cooperation. We must stand firmly together with the concerned nations of the world to ensure that such acts are never repeated’. See Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi, 12 September 2001, [http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e.html) (accessed at 6 May 2008).
expressed a determination to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Legislation as promptly as possible. Prime Minister Koizumi’s swift response indicated how his cabinet prioritised the Japan-US military alliance. According to the opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun on 14 October 2001, 57% of respondents supported the creation of legislation allowing the dispatch of the SDF and 37% opposed. Likewise, an opinion poll of the Asahi Shimbun published on 16 October 2001 revealed that 51% supported the legislation while 29% were opposed. With regard to the constitutionality of the dispatch, the government emphasised ‘international cooperation’ in the Preamble of the Constitution. In addition, Prime Minister Koizumi insisted that Japan should put an end to ‘theological arguments’ regarding Article 9.

The Japanese government needed to create a new legal framework for anti-terrorism operations because the PKO Law and the ‘Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan’ (shūhen jítai hō) were not applicable. In order to facilitate the dispatch of the SDF by enacting the Anti-Terrorism legislation, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that: ‘there is a gap [sukima] between the Preamble of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Constitution.’ Thus, Koizumi made use of positive pacifism based on the Preamble as a justification for enactment of the Anti-Terrorism legislation. With unusual speed, the Anti-Terrorism Legislation including measures based on amendments to the SDF Law, and the Japan Coast Guard Law, was passed in the Diet on 29 October 2001 and took effect on

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7 Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi, 8 October 2001

8 Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 30 October, NFL,


11 NDL, Koizumi’s Statement, Proceedings of the 153rd Diet Session, Lower House Special Committee on Preventing International Terrorism and Japan’s Cooperation, 11 October 2001,
2 November 2001.\textsuperscript{12} The Japanese government dispatched two escort ships and one replenishment vessel to the Indian Ocean on 9 November 2001 based on the Anti-Terrorism Law and the JDA Law. In addition, the Anti-Terrorism Law allowed the ASDF to transport supplies, such as personnel, water, and food. They were not, however, allowed to carry weapons and ammunitions for the US forces.\textsuperscript{13} The Anti-Terrorism legislation was different from the 1992 PKO Law. This is because the former approved ‘non-combat logistical support’ for ‘combat operations’.\textsuperscript{14} Gō Itō compared the time taken to pass the bills and noted that whereas the 1992 PKO Law took 179 hours, and the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law required 154 hours, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation was enacted after just 62 hours of debate.\textsuperscript{15} This indicates that the Koizumi government regarded support for the US-led and UN-authorised anti-terrorism activities as significant for Japanese national interests.

It would appear that it was under US pressure that the Japanese government managed to pass the Anti-Terrorism Legislation in such a short period of time. In a top secret meeting with Japanese Ambassador Shunji Yanai on 15 September, Richard Armitage requested that Japan dispatch SDF and show the Japanese national flag (hinomaru) as a token of alliance cooperation. Armitage said he understood the constitutional restraints and did not hope for Japan’s participation in combat activities. Instead, he pressured Japan to contribute towards logistic support by emphasising the fact that even non-US allies, such as India and Pakistan made contributions to the US-led military operations. It is commonly considered that Armitage stated the phrase ‘show the flag’ to pressure Japan into making an active contribution. However, there is a possibility

\textsuperscript{14} Midford, ‘Japan’s Response to Terror’, 332.
that the phrase was in fact ‘manufactured’ external pressure. For instance, as Hisae noted, no reference to ‘show the flag’ was found in the official Yanai-Armitage talks. Hisae suggested that the word ‘show the flag’ was used by officials of the Pentagon before the Yanai-Armitage meeting. Likewise, Former Ambassador Naoto Amaki argued that the Japanese government requested that Washington place pressure on Tōkyō in order to facilitate a contribution to the US-led military operations. He pointed out the possibility that ‘external pressure’ was ‘manufactured’ by the Japanese government. According to Amaki, a US government official stated that Armitage had not used the phrase ‘show the flag’.

After the outbreak of the 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks, officers from the MSDF requested American gaiatsu from the American naval officers to allow Japan to cooperate in the war on terror. In April 2002, the MSDF officers visited a top US naval officer to request more gaiatsu on Japan to dispatch the Aegis destroyers and P3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft to the Indian Ocean. Thus, in addition to US expectation of Japan’s military cooperation, the Japanese officials ‘manufactured’ gaiatsu to facilitate the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism legislation, as well as MSDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean.

Tomohito Shinoda argued the Koizumi government was able to rapidly pass the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law because of Koizumi’s leadership and his ‘top-down’ decision-making style. Notably the Cabinet (not MOFA) was in charge of the Anti-Terrorism legislation and Koizumi prioritised winning approval from Kōmeitō before reaching an agreement within the LDP to facilitate the passage of the bill. Tomohito Shinoda

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16 Hisae, 9.11 to Nihon Gaikō, 22-24.
17 Amaki, Saraba Gaimushō!, 77-79.
18 Also, Midford noted the shift in the balance of power as a result of the coalition between the LDP and Kōmeitō. Kōmeitō was against the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill, but the party supported the passing of the PKO Bill and the Anti-Terrorism Legislation. See Midford, ‘Japan’s Response to Terror’, 336-337.
19 See Shinoda, ‘Koizumi’s Top-Down Leadership’.
20 Shinoda, Reisengo no Nihon Gaikō, 92-93.
observed that Kōmeitō supported the legislation because of concern within the party that Koizumi might dissolve the coalition.21

Kōmeitō supported the LDP’s legislative process on the basis of the positive pacifism of the Preamble in combination with Article 98 of the Constitution. During the deliberation of the Anti-Terrorism legislation in the Diet, Natsuo Yamaguchi of Kōmeitō implied that the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law would fill a gap between Article 9 as a prohibitive factor and the Preamble as well as Article 98, which were facilitative factors with regards to overseas dispatch of the SDF. In response to this statement, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that the Anti-Terrorism Legislation was a new law which is compatible with the Constitution.22 Thus, the legal basis of the Anti-Terrorism Legislation was not only the Preamble, but also Article 98 in conjunction with the UN resolution.

In addition, Masahiro Tabata of Kōmeitō mentioned that for the purpose of humanitarian aid and combating international terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Legislation could be enacted within the scope of the Constitution and UN Resolution 1368.23 In fact, UNSC Resolution 1368 can be interpreted as authorisation for a speedy enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Legislation. UN Resolution 1368 ‘calls on all states to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks.’24 These statements regarding UN resolutions indicate that Kōmeitō supported the Anti-Terrorism

21 Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 97. Also see Shinoda, Reisengo no Nihon Gaikō, 92-93.
Legislation on the basis of positive pacifism as well as ‘UN-centrism’. Koizumi’s charismatic leadership gained as much as 79% of cabinet’s approval rating in July 2001 and 70% of the respondents supported Koizumi’s decision to provide logistic support for the US anti-terrorist strategies.  

Japanese major newspapers, such as Yomiuri, Mainichi, Sankei, and Nikkei, also responded affirmatively to Koizumi’s response to September 11, although the Asahi Shimbun argued ‘we should not bend over backwards to support the US.’  

As examined in the previous chapter, the Japanese government dispatched the SDF to East Timor in 2002 under the revised PKO Law. In December 2002, an Aegis destroyer (kirishima), was dispatched to the Indian Ocean despite domestic opposition, including Kōmeitō as LDP’s coalition partner, based on the unconstitutionality of ‘collective self-defence’ style military support for the United States.  

‘Non-Military’ Contribution to Peace-Building in Afghanistan  

The Japanese government made a strong commitment to non-military aid to Afghanistan. Initially, this included support for the ‘Japan Platform’, which was composed of a variety of Japanese NGOs working in Afghanistan, and subsidisation of 580 million yen to assist Afghanistan refugees in Pakistan. Unlike the SDF, Japanese NGOs in Afghanistan could engage in humanitarian activities, such as aiding refugees and gathering information on the humanitarian situation. The Japanese government had already announced an extension of its ‘grant aid of 1.7 billion yen’ for Afghan refugee rescues.  

25 Ibid., 90.  

26 Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 93, 165-166.  


28 Kōmeitō had been opposed to the dispatch of the Aegis destroyer because there was uncertainty whether the Aegis destroyer would be involved in joint military operations, which were prohibited by the Constitution. Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 5 December 2002, cited from, http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/273.htm (accessed at 14 Jun 2008).  

contribute material assistance through the UNHCR. This included ‘315 tents (capable of accommodating a total of roughly 3,150), 200 blankets, 20 sleeping mats, 400 water tanks, and 75 plastic sheets’ transported by six ASDF aircrafts (C-130H) to Islamabad in Pakistan.

A ‘Donor Alert’, requesting a total of 580 million dollars for humanitarian assistance for over six months, was announced by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The Japanese government responded that it would donate 129 million US dollars, which was 20% of the entire amount requested. Through the World Food Programme, the Japanese government decided to extend its contribution to food aid for Afghanistan to 500 million yen as part of a 4.7 billion yen grant for the ‘Emergency Economic Assistance for Pakistan’. In addition, the Japanese government provided UNHCR with 500 tents, which could accommodate 5,000 people, to support Afghan refugee rescues in Pakistan. The government also announced that it would contribute aid materials to Tajikistan where some 15,000 Afghan refugees resided. This involved a further ‘175 tents, 1,500 blankets and 1,500 sleeping bags’ and ‘about 2 million dollars as part of the emergency grant aid’. As an emergency grant aid for Afghan refugees, the Japanese government increased its donation to UNHCR by 3.3 million dollars.

Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata, as a Special Representative of Prime Minister of Japan for assistance of Afghanistan, participated in a ‘Senior Officials Meeting on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan’, held in Washington on November 2001. Japan and the

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35 Ibid.
United States took charge of the joint chair of the meeting. On 5 December 2001, Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka announced Japan’s support for the establishment of an Interim Authority in Afghanistan, which would:

1) Enjoy broad support of all people and parties of Afghanistan, 2) observe international law, 3) be widely accepted by the international community, and 4) maintain friendly relations with neighbouring countries and others.

Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the ‘Uraga’ and the other MSDF ships were dispatched to Karachi in Pakistan on 25 November 2001 transporting relief materials, including: 1) 1,025 tents (for 10,250 persons); 2) 18,600 blankets; 3) 19,600 collapsible water containers; 4) 7,925 plastic sheets; and 5) 19,980 sleeping mats. At the inauguration ceremony of the interim authority, Senior Vice-Minister Uetake had talks with Chairman Karzai. As a result, Uetake:

(a) Recognised the Interim Authority in Afghanistan; (b) given the importance of the role that must be played by the Interim Authority in building stability to Afghanistan, pledged that Japan would contribute US$ 1 million to the Trust Fund established within the UNDP; and (c) requested that Chairman Karzai attend the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan to be held in Tōkyō on 21 and 22 January, 2002.

Thus, although Japan could not send the SDF to Afghanistan, it made a significant financial contribution to post-war peace-building operations.

*The 2001 Bonn Agreement as a Blueprint for the Peace Process*

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As for the details of the meeting such as participant countries and results, see MOFA, 27 November 2001, cited from, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/meet0111.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/meet0111.html) (accessed at 2 Dec. 08).
From 27 November to 5 December 2001, the United Nations met to discuss the new authority of Afghanistan with the attendance of four Afghan groups: 1) Northern Alliance; 2) Rome Group; 3) Cyprus Group; and 4) Peshawar Group in Bonn, Germany. The Japanese government was represented by Ambassador Issei Nomura and other Embassy staff in Germany. The participants reached an Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, the so-called ‘Bonn Agreement.’ The outline of the Bonn Agreement consisted of four major points:

1) The establishment of the Interim Authority as a transitional government which includes equivalent of a Cabinet and National Assembly and traditional advisory body (Loya Jirga); 2) the Interim Authority consists of equivalents of 30 Ministers and Prime Minister (Chairman); 3) taking place of an Emergency Loya Jirga and a Constitutional Loya Jirga after the establishment of the Interim Authority; and 4) request for the deployment of the UN authorised force and withdrawal of all the forces other than the UN mandated force.41

On 6 December, the day after the signing of the Bonn Agreement, UNSC Resolution 1383 officially endorsed the agreement.42 On 20 December 2001, UNSC Resolution 1386 authorised the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) based on the Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.43 On 21 December, SRSG Brahimi and members of the UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMAG) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) entered Kabul.44

44 Also see UNAMA, Political Affairs, cited from, http://www.unama-afg.org/about_/pa/political_affairs.htm (accessed at 26 Dec. 08).
Meanwhile, on 20 and 21 December 2001, the first meeting on the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group in Brussels was co-chaired by Japan, the United States, the European Union (EU), and Saudi Arabia. The main points discussed were ‘education, landmines, health and nutrition, energy, water and sanitation, shelter, employment, and assistance for local public bodies.’ On 18 January 2002, the Japanese government decided to increase its donation for reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan to 59,495,790 dollars through several UN agencies.

**The 2002 Tōkyō Conference on Reconstruction Assistance**

The 2002 Tōkyō Conference demonstrated Japan’s willingness to contribute to post-war reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan. Japan’s direct involvement in the Afghan peace process began with the hosting of the 2002 Tōkyō International Conference. On 21 and 22 January 2002, the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan was held in Tōkyō, with 61 countries and 21 international organisations attending, and with the presence of the chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) Hamid Karzai and other representatives of the AIA. Japan was co-chair of the Conference with the United States, the EU, and Saudi Arabia. Not only ministers but also international NGOs and experts participated to tackle the issue of peace-building, such as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR), demining, and counter-narcotics. Japan promised to provide humanitarian assistance of 500 million dollars within two years and six months and also expressed its willingness to contribute to peace-building in terms of ‘refugee rescue,
demining, education, health and medical care, and support for women.”

At the conference, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that US$10 billion is necessary for the reconstruction in Afghanistan and US$1.3 billion was thought to be needed for 2002. Hence, the Japanese government was active in hosting the 2002 Tōkyō conference, and thereby, making a non-military contribution to the post-war reconstruction of war-torn Afghanistan.

Instead of dispatching SDF, the Japanese government decided to send a preparatory mission for supporting Afghanistan, consisting of officials of MOFA and staff of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), from 1 to 15 March 2002. The mission was a follow-up to the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan and undertook several tasks such as ‘assistance for education, health and medical care, media infrastructure (TV stations, etc.), women, and re-settlement of refugees.’ After the preparatory mission, the Japanese government decided on an extension of 1,607 million yen in emergency grant aid to the Afghanistan Interim Administration because less than 15% of Afghan people had access to medical and health care. The government, moreover, decided to extend its financial support by providing 98 million yen for the Japanese NGOs working for Afghan refugees in Peshawar and Quetta.

A second preparatory mission was dispatched by the Japanese government from 5 to 19 April 2002. Based on the results from the first

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mission, the second mission worked on education and medical and health care: ‘urgent rehabilitation work for elementary, junior high and high schools (including girl’s schools), and also medical facilities.’53 To support the holding of an Emergency *Loya Jirga* (Grand Assembly), the Japanese government extended its financial contribution by 2,700,000 US dollars through the UNDP on 26 April 2002. The financial support helped to subsidise international observers and election processes in the Emergency *Loya Jirga*.54 The Japanese government also decided to expand its support for the Japanese NGOs by 187,750 US dollars. The NGOs’ activities were: ‘1) well drilling in Northern Afghanistan; 2) rehabilitation of Karte Seh Hospital, west side of Kabul; and 3) mechanical mine clearance in and around Kabul International Airport.’55

Meanwhile, on 1 and 2 May 2002, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi paid an official visit to Afghanistan to hold talks with Chairman Karzai, Foreign Minister Abdullah, Vice Chairman and Finance Minister Arsala, former King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah, Vice Chairman and Minister for Women’s Affairs Sima Samar, and the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi. Kawaguchi explained the ‘Register for Peace’ which registers former combatants to ensure that they can become reintegrated into society through vocational training. She also expressed the ‘Vision for Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan’ which contributed to the convening of the Emergency *Loya Jirga*, improvement of education, and combat against narcotics. In the meeting with Brahimi, who was a creator of the Bonn Agreement, Kawaguchi promised that Japan would make more contributions to DDR. In response, Brahimi welcomed Japan’s initiative for the ‘Register for

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Peace’ as a part of DDR activities.\textsuperscript{56} Japan’s response to the terrorist attacks in the United States, therefore, has a strong influence on Japan’s security policy. Because of constitutional constraints, Japan could not send the SDF to Afghanistan and made financial contributions for post-war peace-building in Afghanistan instead.\textsuperscript{57} Japan’s contribution in that respect was mainly a non-military role except for the MSDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean. As a strong supporter of the Bush administration, Prime Minister Koizumi desired to strengthen the Japan-US military alliance. In this context, the Koizumi government became more involved in the US-led War on Terror, which influenced the decision to dispatch the SDF to Iraq.

\textit{The 2003 Iraq War and Response of the International Community}

In his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, US President George W. Bush called Iran, Iraq and North Korea the ‘Axis of Evil’ and expressed his determination to fight against terrorism and countries which develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and support terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{58} On 17 September 2002, President Bush announced the National Security Strategy of the United States, the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’, which included the right to launch a ‘pre-emptive strike’ in order to defend the United States against terrorists and terrorist-supporting countries.\textsuperscript{59} The United States under President G.W. Bush took a ‘unilateralist’ approach towards Iraq which stemmed from its overwhelming military power in comparison to European and other countries.\textsuperscript{60} In September 2002, French President Jacques Chirac

criticised the pre-emptive strike strategy of the Bush Doctrine on the grounds that it was extremely dangerous. President Bush demanded that the UN Security Council adopt a new resolution to unconditionally and unlimitedly conduct the inspection of the WMD in Iraq as an opportunity to avoid war. Notably the United States did not rule out the possibility of peaceful resolutions on the Iraq issue as late as October 2002. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had insisted that a certain country should not use force against another country without ‘legitimacy’, implying the illegality of the use of force. At the same time, however, he criticised Iraq for not having accepted the investigation of the WMD.

Annan had been critical of the war in Iraq but he stated if Iraq continued ignoring UN resolutions, UNSC would have to face the responsibility. As the United States demanded, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1441 to facilitate the inspection of the WMD in Iraq. Still, it was obvious that the real intention of the United States was to utilise the resolution to justify the use of force against Iraq. In response to a new UNSC resolution, Iraq criticised it as an ‘evil resolution’ and that the procedure for adopting the resolution violated both international law and the UN Charter. Yet, other Arab countries agreed to Resolution 1441, and eventually, on 13 November 2002, the Iraqi government accepted inspection for the WMD based on Resolution 1441. On the basis of Iraq’s acceptance of the inspection, the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was given the responsibility of inspecting chemical and biological weapons and missiles. As well, the International

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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took charge of investigating the development of nuclear weapons. According to a report of UNMOVIC to UNSC, Iraq’s cooperation for inspection had been helpful but not substantial or sufficient. Meanwhile, IAEA reported that ‘no evidence was detected of prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities although inspection activities were still ongoing.’ Both reports of UNMOVIC and IAEA showed that the inspection in Iraq needed to be extended.

In Europe, France, Germany and Russia were critical of the US policy on Iraq. French President Jacques Chirac expressed his opposition to the US and UK policy on Iraq arguing that ‘Iraq does not today present an immediate threat warranting an immediate war. France appeals to everyone to act responsibly to ensure the respect of international legality.’ In France, opposition parties also stated that France should stop the United States even by the exercise of veto power in the UN Security Council. According to an opinion poll in the Le Figaro, approximately 77% opposed the US decision to attack Iraq. Russian criticism was based on vested oil interests in Iraq and a strategic desire to stop the United States from controlling oil deposits there. German Chancellor Gerhard Shroder, who had just won a general election, publicly criticised the US policy on Iraq in his political campaign. Even though a military ally of the United States, the Shroder government explained that it recognised that the military attack on Iraq was different from the war on terror in Afghanistan. In response to the German decision and criticism, the United States implied that it would not support Germany for a

permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Despite Washington's threat, Germany decided not to follow the United States. The German Constitution (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), like Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, bans waging aggressive wars and Shroder even denied the possibility of a German financial contribution for the attack on Iraq. On the other hand, Germany intended to increase the dispatch of its troops to Afghanistan instead. Thus, European countries, including NATO member states, showed their opposition to the 2003 US-led Iraq War in spite of a military alliance with the United States.

As a neighbouring country of Iraq, the Turkish government did not desire the outbreak of the Iraq War which would affect its economy and could lead to an influx of refugees. In Turkey, 87% of the people polled were opposed to the attack on Iraq. If Turkey supported the Iraq attack, it would lose the chance to gain membership in the EU. Despite all these reasons, the United States demanded Turkey be granted membership in NATO to allow the US to use its military bases. The leaders of the other Arabian countries tended to refrain from making clear statements on the Iraq attack because they thought the final decision depended only on the United States. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated that if Iraq showed any sign of refusing to be inspected, the United States would surely attack it.

The United States needed a new UNSC resolution to authorise the use of force in February 2003. Opposition from France, Germany and Russia ensured that the new resolution would not be adopted. In spite of the

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opposition by the UNSC members, the Coalition of the Willing, which mainly consisted of the United States and the United Kingdom, began waging war on Iraq on 20 March 2003 without a new UNSC resolution.\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{Legitimacy of the War from the Perspective of International Law}

The reasons for the attack on Iraq raised by the United States were that Iraq: possessed WMD; had massacred the Kurd population; disregarded UNSC resolutions to get rid of WMD; did not sufficiently cooperate in the inspection of WMD; and supported an international terrorist group, \textit{Al-Qaeda}. Toppling the Hussein regime to release suppressed citizens and establishing democracy in Iraq were also raised as compelling reasons.\textsuperscript{79} The connection between Iraq and \textit{Al-Qaeda} was considered the most convincing reason to pre-emptively strike Iraq, because the Iraqi government could potentially hand over the WMD to terrorists.\textsuperscript{80} Although fear of WMD was the main reason for bombing Iraq, a US inspection report on 6 October 2004 concluded that Iraq did not possess WMD.\textsuperscript{81} In addition, it was uncertain if Iraq actually supported the terrorist activities of \textit{Al-Qaeda}. Osama Bin Ladin called Saddam Hussein an ‘apostate’ who did not deserve to be Muslim.\textsuperscript{82} Eventually, a report from a Special Committee of the US Senate completely denied the possibility of a cooperative relationship between the Hussein government and \textit{Al-Qaeda} on 8 September 2006.\textsuperscript{83} Hussein, moreover, feared Islamic

\textsuperscript{78} Iokibe, \textit{Sengo Nihon Gaikōshi}, 270.
\textsuperscript{80} As for other reasons, ‘control over oil in Iraq, security of Israel and establishment of democracy in the Middle East’ were considered as motives for the war. Iokibe, \textit{Sengo Nihon Gaikōshi}, 270.
fundamentalists as they were a challenge to his autocracy.84 In short, the legitimacy of the 2003 Iraq War was questionable.85

From the perspective of international law, particularly the Charter of the United Nations (Paragraph 4 of Article 2), the use of force (aggressive war) and threat by force as means of resolving international conflict are prohibited.86 Based on international law, two exceptions regarding use of force are recognised. Firstly, it is not illegal to use force for individual and collective self-defence rights in case of aggression.87 Secondly, use of force is authorised for collective security based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.88 On 7 October 2001, the United States waged a war on Afghanistan as an exercise of the right of ‘self-defence’ to protect against international terrorism and to topple the Taliban government in Afghanistan. However, Article 51 does not authorise ‘pre-emptive strike’ as an exercise of the right to self-defence. In general, self-defence is interpreted as defence against the presence of an armed attack or imminent danger of military strike. Unlike the case of the September 11 terrorist attacks, no UN member states were directly attacked. Also, unlike the case of the 1990 Gulf Crisis, Iraq had not carried out military actions against any country. If pre-emptive strike based on self-defence is permitted by international law, every country could wage war in the name of ‘pre-emptive’ self-defence and international law itself would lose its legitimacy.

From the perspective of those who supported the 2003 Iraq War, UNSC Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441 can be invoked as a legal basis for the use

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84 Ibid. There was a concern about a political vacuum after the collapse of the Hussein government. In particular, it was thought that Shiite people in southern Iraq and Kurdish in north would make movements for independence. See Asahi Shimbun (Chōkan), 3 January 2003, cited from, http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/011.htm (accessed at 7 Jan. 09).
85 Still, the Bush administration did not raise ‘oil’ as a reason for attacking Iraq. See Kawabe, Nihon no Gaikō, 98.
86 See Paragraph 4, Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
87 See Article 51 of the UN Charter.
88 Since establishing a UN Force is unrealistic, the UN Security Council is supposed to adopt a resolution to authorise use of force by multinational force. As for provisions of collective sanctions, see Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, especially, Article 42 and 43.
of force. At the time when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UNSC adopted Resolution 678 based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The UNSC Resolution 678 authorised the UN member states to use ‘all necessary means’ including military actions to restore peace and security in the Persian Gulf.\(^89\) After military operations by the US-led multinational forces, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687 as a condition for ceasefire. In the resolution, the UNSC welcomed the restoration of the territorial integrity of Kuwait and demanded that Iraq should unconditionally remove WMD, such as ‘all chemical and biological weapons’, as well as ‘all ballistic missiles’ with a range more than 150 kilometres. In addition, the resolution dissuaded Iraq from developing nuclear weapons and encouraged Iraq to join the NPT.\(^90\) Still, those resolutions were adopted for the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the 1991 Gulf War and not for the war on Iraq in 2003. However, on 8 November 2002, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 recalling Resolution 678 and 687 to convince Iraq to accept the inspection of the WMD.\(^91\) Resolution 1441 demanded that Iraq carry out ‘immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted’ inspections of the WMD by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA. The resolution warned that Iraq ‘will face serious consequences’ as a result of violations of obligations for the inspection.\(^92\) Resolution 1441 ‘implied’ the use of force as a serious consequence. Nevertheless, it did not ‘authorise’ the use of force at that point and a further UNSC resolution to legalise the use of force was necessitated, but it did not eventuate. In short, Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 did not provide a sufficient legal basis for the US-led Iraq War. This lack of legitimacy was the main reason why the majority of the international community, including NATO states, opposed the war.

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\(^92\) Ibid.
The 2003 Iraq War and Response of the Japanese Government

In spite of opposition from the majority of the international community, especially France, Germany, and Russia, and a lack of a new UNSC resolution to authorise the use of force against Iraq, the Japanese government expressed its support for the US-led War on Iraq. On 18 March Prime Minister Koizumi made it clear that he would support the war if it broke out. As a legal basis for the war, Koizumi pointed out that a series of UN Resolutions, such as 678, 687 and 1441, could legitimise the use of force. Not surprisingly, however, he also stated that Japan would not participate in military operations with the United States.93 Yoshimitsu Nishikawa argued that: ‘Koizumi had no option but to support Japan’s key ally, since it has only limited military capabilities to protect itself from threats, such as North Korea’s suspected development of nuclear weapons.’94 The Koizumi government clearly supported the United States on the basis of the ‘Japan-US military alliance.’ Along with the support for the war, Koizumi expressed the Action Guidelines as Japan’s response to the Iraq War.95 Koizumi referred to the dispatch of the SDF based on the PKO Law and continuance of the oil refuelling by the MSDF

94 The Japan Times, 19 March 2003.
95 The Action Guidelines were: 1) the Government of Japan (GOJ) will take every possible measure to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals in Iraq and its surrounding areas; 2) the GOJ will enhance and thoroughly implement security measures at home, including protection of key facilities of US Forces in Japan, and diplomatic establishments; 3) the GOJ will take necessary measures to ensure the safety of navigation of vessels of Japanese affiliation; 4) to prevent confusion in economic systems in the world and in Japan, including the oil supply, the GOJ will, responding changing situations, and in cooperation with relevant countries, take appropriate measures; and 5) to help the affected population, the GOJ will provide emergency humanitarian assistance, through international organizations and NGOs, and through such activities as transport of humanitarian supplies by the Self Defence Forces aircraft based on the International Peace Cooperation Law for the neighbouring countries’. He also expressed the measures to take: 1) the GOJ will provide assistance to countries neighbouring Iraq that are economically affected by the military actions, in order to mitigate its impacts; 2) the GOJ will take necessary measures for disposal of weapons of mass destruction, for disposal of mines at sea, and for rehabilitation as well as humanitarian assistance in Iraq; and 3) the GOJ will also continue and strengthen its support, according to the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, to military and other activities of its partners engaging in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and other areas. Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi, 20 March 2003, cited from, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/03/20danwa_e.html (accessed at 9 May 2008).
ship at the Indian Ocean based on the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law. However, he could not mention the possibility of logistic support for the US-led Iraq War. In this regard, Article 9 was a constraint in the process of policymaking on Iraq. Although Koizumi expressed strong support for UN policies, he also stressed that Japan desired a peaceful resolution and made every effort for the Iraqi government to cooperate with the international community. In the press conference, Koizumi explained the necessity of creating a new legal framework to enable Japan to take a responsible approach to the humanitarian aid and reconstruction of Iraq. In this context, the Iraq Special Measures Legislation was deliberated in the Diet.

Japanese Response to the 2003 Iraq War in Analytical Eclecticism

Classical and Neo-Realism: Support in Japan for the Iraq War

Classical and neo-realism provide explanations why the Koizumi government supported the Iraq War. Ironically, Koizumi had opposed the dispatch of the SDF to the Persian Gulf, whereas Ozawa had been a strong supporter of UN-authorised Multinational Forces. As discussed in Chapter 3, after the death of civilian police in Cambodia, Koizumi, then Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, argued that the Japanese government should consider the withdrawal of the SDF from Cambodia. Nevertheless, Koizumi as Prime Minister made the decision based on national interests and structural factors, such a desire for a stronger Japan-US alliance, oil dependence on the Middle East, and the potential threat from North Korea. Kōmeitō, as a coalition government partner of the LDP, did not directly support the Iraq War but stated that it was understandable the Japanese government supported the Iraq War because

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http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/03/20kaiken_e.html

97 Indeed, as Kliman observed, Japan depended on the Middle East ‘for 88 percent of its crude oil’ export. See Kliman, *Japan’s Security Strategy*, 120.
Iraq ignored the UNSC resolutions 17 times over 12 years and did not faithfully follow Resolution 1441.\(^8\) Although the LDP and Kōmeitō wished for a legitimate resolution based on unanimity of the UN Security Council, it can be argued that the domestic desire for Japanese national interests, as well as the influence of structural pressures determined the response of the Japanese government to the US-led War on Iraq.

Likewise, Japanese realist scholars supported the Iraq War. For instance, realist researchers, such as Hisahiko Okazaki and Tadae Takubo regarded UNSC Resolution 1441 as permission for the use of military power. They criticised those in Japan who opposed the Iraq War based on anti-Americanism and anti-UN-centrism, and argued that such emotionalism did not recognise the reality of international politics and showed no understanding of the significance of the security treaty with the United States and limitations of the United Nations.\(^9\) Okazaki, in particular, insisted that the support of the Japanese government in the Iraq War based on the Japan-US military alliance was one of the major achievements of the Koizumi government in post-war Japanese politics.\(^10\)

From a realist viewpoint, Koizumi’s decision to support the Iraq attack strengthened the military alliance with the United States, and therefore, was in the national interest. Shinichi Kitaoka (then Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations) argued that both the Iraq War and the continuation of inspection had considerable demerits and that no satisfactory conclusions for the legitimacy of the war could be determined. At the same time, he insisted that the decisive factors regarding war and peace were military technology, structure of international politics and international public opinion, but not international law.\(^11\)

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Shintarō Ishihara, Governor of Tōkyō, supported the Iraq War for two reasons: proliferation of the WMD produced by Iraq and the potential for an attack by North Korea, both of which posed a threat to Japan’s security. He pointed out that Iraq violated 17 UN resolutions and that the Japan-US Security Treaty did not necessarily guarantee that the United States would protect Japan in the event of armed attacks by North Korea.102 Takashi Inoguchi supported the Iraq War pointing out that the condition of the ceasefire in the 1991 Gulf War was the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq had violated the resolution for 12 years. He argued that if the UN resolution was not observed, the use of force on Iraq would resume. As well, from a realist perspective, he defined ‘enforcement diplomacy’ as a sort of diplomacy with a threat by a military power, or hard power, to force a certain action and resolve a conflict. The purpose of the diplomacy was to cope with terrorism, human rights violations, and weapons of mass destruction.103 Meanwhile, Makoto Iokibe argued that although Japan should have advised the United States not to wage an illegitimate war, it was the right decision for the Japanese government to support the war as a US military ally.104

The anarchical nature of the international system and the existence of a hypothetical enemy and threat it posed were other reasons why Japan supported the US-led Iraqi War. Former JDA chief, Gen Nakatani stressed that the support for the Iraqi War was in Japan’s national interests. Nakatani argued that ‘given North Korea’s nuclear threat to

Japan, it’s not within Japan’s interests that Japan takes a view or attitudes different from those of the U.S.”\textsuperscript{105} Also, Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori also stated that ‘If we on the part of Japan did not support the U.S. this time, we would face a severe U.S. public opinion to [sic] Japan when we seek support from the U.S. in the event of contingencies caused by North Korea.’\textsuperscript{106}

Military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa criticised those who opposed the Iraq War. He argued that the Koizumi government made the right decision given the fear that the Iraqi government might develop and consequently hand over WMD to international terrorists. Ogawa insisted that it was second guessing to argue that the Iraq War was wrong just because the WMD could not be found. He also contended that if Iraq did not possess WMD, they should have immediately agreed to the inspection rather than refusing and violating the UNSC resolutions.\textsuperscript{107} From a realist perspective, the United Nations is not capable of dealing with international security, and requires powerful states to intervene. Sassa insisted that there would have been no war on Iraq, if Saddam Hussein had followed the UN resolutions.\textsuperscript{108} These pros on the Iraq War were consistent with the arguments of classical and structural realism. The Japanese government judged that support for the US-led Iraq War would contribute to its own national interests. The North Korea threat was another critical reason why the Japanese government was intent on enhancing the functionality of the Japan-US military alliance. Needless to say, this decision was influenced by the anarchic nature of international system.

\textit{Classical and Neo-Liberalism: Japanese Opposition to the War}

\textsuperscript{105} Statement of former JDA chief, Gen Nakatani, cited in Kliman, \textit{Japan’s Security Strategy}, 123.

\textsuperscript{106} Statement of former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, cited in Ibid., 123-124.

\textsuperscript{107} At the same time, Ogawa contradicted the argument that the Japanese government had no choice but to support the Iraq War because of the North Korea issue. He argued that even though Japan did not express its support, the United States would counterattack against North Korea with nuclear weapon if North Korea attacks Japan with the WMD. See Ogawa, \textit{Nihon no ‘Sensōryoku’}, 178-187.

Those who opposed the Iraq War in Japan were composed of pacifists who support Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and liberals who were against the war on the basis of international law, especially the Charter of the United Nations. The former is consistent with classical liberalism or negative pacifism which is opposed to any war in general on ethical grounds.\(^{109}\) The latter is congruent with neo-liberalism which criticises the illegitimate use of force in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Opposition parties in Japan criticised the government for supporting the US-led Iraq War. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) argued that the use of force against Iraq was unnecessary, because Iraq had eventually agreed to an inspection. Secondly, the pre-emptive strike was a violation of international law, especially the Charter of the United Nations (Paragraph 4 of Article 2). Article 51 of the UN Charter allows the UN members to use their military forces to exercise of the right of self-defence, ‘if an armed attack occurs’. The SDP insisted that Prime Minister Koizumi should stop supporting the Iraq War as UNSC Resolution 1441 could not legitimise the use of force. The SDP pointed out that Iraq followed this resolution by admitting the inspection and the UNSC did not regard ‘serious consequences’ in the resolution as the use of force.\(^{110}\) The JCP also expressed their opposition to the Iraq War and the subsequent decision made by the Koizumi government on the basis of international law.\(^{111}\)

\(^{109}\) For instance, Yukio Okamoto, advisor of the Prime Minister, opposed to the war for an ethical reason. Okamoto contended that once the war breaks out, countless of Iraqi people would be involved into the killings and animosity to the United States would increase. He criticised that the United States was losing its virtue of tolerance. See Okamoto, Y., in Mainichi Shimbun (Chōkan), 25 November 2002, cited from, http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/00484/contents/219.htm (accessed at 10 Jan. 09).


Ichiro Ozawa, then the leader of the Liberal Party (Jiyūto), also opposed the use of force without a new UNSC resolution. He criticised Koizumi’s support for the United States based on the Japan-US alliance, arguing that: Article 1 of the Japan-US Security Treaty stipulated the peaceful settlement of the international conflict resolution consistent with the purposes of the United Nations. In other words, his legal interpretation was that the 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty was bound not only by the 1947 Japanese Constitution, but also by the 1945 UN Charter. Ozawa emphasised that Japan should not have supported the US-led Iraq War based on the military alliance, because it was not supported by the UN Security Council. Likewise, Naoto Kan, the then leader of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), opposed the Iraq War on the grounds that it was possible for international society to inspect the WMD in Iraq rather than to undertake military sanctions without legitimacy. He criticised the Koizumi government for supporting the Iraq War because of the threat of North Korea. He implied that even if Japan did not support the Iraq War, the United States would have a responsibility to protect Japan in the event of armed attacks by North Korea. Their opposition was based on neo-liberal arguments which value international law. From the perspective of international law, Yasuaki Ōnuma argued that Japan should arouse the awareness of morality in the United States. He pointed out that UNSC Resolution 1441 did not legalise the use of force on Iraq and that the use of force without a new UNSC resolution was a violation of international law. Moreover, Ōnuma warned that the use of force on Iraq would lead to more terrorism and international insecurity and that the Iraq War which ignored international law would harm the international leadership of the United States. This opposition to the Iraq War was based on both classical and neo-liberalism. Japanese pacifists and liberals

alike opposed the war as well as the response of the Japanese government based on ethical and legal concerns.

The Enactment of the Iraq Special Measures Legislation

Three weeks after the Iraq War broke out, the US-UK coalition forces entered Baghdad and on 1 May 2003 President Bush declared victory. The remnants of the former Iraq troops started guerrilla warfare and terrorists also began attacking occupation troops.\(^{115}\) In response to the worsening situation in Iraq and requests from the international community, the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Iraq Special Measures Law), based on UNSC Resolution 1483, was enacted on 26 July and came into force on 1 August 2003. The three ruling parties (LDP, Kōmeitō and the Conservative Party) used their powerful majority in the Diet to railroad the legislation despite objections from all the opposition parties.\(^{116}\) Notably, the Iraq Special Measures Law as a new legal framework was required to legitimise the SDF dispatch to Iraq. UNPKOs normally operate in the post-conflict areas with the agreement of the conflict party countries, but functional government did not exist in Iraq at that time. The Anti-Terrorism Legislation was not applicable because the law was specifically written to dispatch the MSDF ship for oil refuelling in the Indian Ocean as a part of anti-terrorism activities. The case of peace-building in Iraq did not comply with the purpose of the PKO Law and the Anti-Terrorism Law. For this reason the Iraq Special Measures Law was required.\(^{117}\) The necessity of the new legal framework reveals how Article 9 functioned as a ‘defence constraint’ to the overseas dispatch of the SDF.

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\(^{115}\) Iokibe, *Sengo Nihon Gaikōshi*, 271.

\(^{116}\) In response to the forcible passage, 4 opposition parties submitted a no-confidence motion against the Cabinet which was rejected based on the majority decision. During the deliberation of this law, the opposition parties’ lawmakers caused physical disorder at the Diet. See, *Asahi.com*, 26 July 2003, cited from, [http://www2.asahi.com/special/iraqrecovery/TKY200307250294.html](http://www2.asahi.com/special/iraqrecovery/TKY200307250294.html) (accessed at 25 Jan. 09).

Prime Minister Koizumi emphasised that the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq was for the reconstruction of Iraq ‘in cooperation with the United Nations and other countries concerned’ based upon ‘requests from the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.’ In the statement, Koizumi emphasised the United Nations rather than the Japan-US alliance to highlight that the Iraq Special Measures Law was written for Japan’s international credentials. For several years after participation in UNTAC, as many as 80% of respondents had supported Japan’s participation in UNPKO whereas only about 2% opposed SDF dispatch to UNPKO. The Iraq Special Measures legislation was enacted at an unusually rapid pace. Notably, Koizumi, who used a similar strategy with the Anti-Terrorism Law, persuaded Kōmeitō to agree to the enactment of the Iraq Special Measures Law before he reached the consensus within the LDP. Writing a draft of the law was also led by the Cabinet rather than MOFA and the JDA. Moreover, unlike the case of the PKO Bill and the Anti-Terrorism Law, the JDA (and not MOFA) was more involved in the writing of the draft. The speed with which Koizumi enacted the Iraq Special Measures Law suggested that the prime minister recognised that the legislation was vital for Japan’s national interests.

The SDP opposed the Iraq Special Measures Law on the grounds of the illegality of the Iraq War. The SDP was against the SDF dispatch to Iraq under the ‘occupation’ after the unlawful war even though the UNSC adopted a resolution for post-war reconstruction in Iraq. They argued that the UNSC resolution 1483 did not necessarily demand the dispatch of the military forces. In spite of the SDF dispatch, the SDP suggested that Japan should contribute to non-military functions, such as medical care.

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120 Shinoda, Reisengo no Nihon Gaikō, 94-95.
food supply, and the reconstruction of infrastructure without sending SDF personnel. As well, the SDP pointed out that it was virtually impossible to discern the difference between combatant areas and ‘non-combatant areas’ (hi sentō chiiki).121

Takako Doi, the then leader of the SDP, accused the Iraq Special Measures Bill of violation of Article 9, because Iraq was still at war even after the declaration of victory by the US President. She contended that it was ‘overseas deployment of military forces’ (kaigai hahei) rather than ‘overseas dispatch of personnel’ (kaigai haken), if the government dispatched the SDF to an area in which the guerrilla war was taking place.122 In short, the opposition of the SDP was attributed to the protection of the ‘Peace Constitution’, namely negative pacifism.

The DPJ opposed the Iraq Special Measures Law for the following four reasons. First, any immediate need for the SDF dispatch could not be identified. Second, a distinction between combat and non-combat areas could not be identified. Third, the possibility that SDF could be targeted by anti-American troops in Iraq was a serious concern. Fourth, it was not specified how long the SDF troops were needed to operate. The second point in particular was controversial because ‘as long as there was no clear difference between combat and non-combat areas, sending the SDF might violate Article 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits Japan’s belligerency.’123 In other words, if the SDF contingents were attacked and

used weapons for self-defence, the ‘non-combat’ area became ‘combat’ area and the operations would become unconstitutional. The DPJ submitted its own bill to the Diet, and the Diet deliberations were not boycotted by all the opposition parties. According to an opinion poll conducted by *the Asahi Shimbun*, 46% of the respondents supported the Iraq Special Measures Legislation while 43% opposed it. Public opinion was thus divided evenly. Among the five major newspapers, only *Asahi* showed its opposition to the legislation. *The Asahi Shimbun* criticised the definition of ‘non-combat’ area and opposed the legislation, stating ‘the Iraq Special Measure Law can be a step towards making the SDF a ‘normal army’.’ As well, even LDP members doubted whether ‘non-combat’ areas really existed in Iraq. The Hashimoto faction was unsupportive of the legislation mainly because they were ‘anti-Koizumi.’ The opposition within the LDP was therefore not based on anti-militarist pacifism but on their own political interests. Because the four opposition parties were against the extension of the regular Diet session, the three ruling parties had to railroad the legislation through the Diet. Nevertheless, Cabinet approval rating was 49% (opposition was 38%) and support for the Iraq Special Measures Law was 43% (with 41% disapproval). With favourable public sentiment and the support of the other ruling parties, the Koizumi government passed the law. The opposition to the dispatch of SDF to Iraq underscored the influence of anti-war pacifism and the culture of anti-militarism. At the same time, the enactment of the Iraq Special Measures law can be regarded as a step towards a ‘normal state’ with a normal military power.

Although the missions of the JSDF under the terms of the new legal framework were not conducted as UNPKO, the operations were post-war

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124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
127 They made a compromise that the Iraq Special Measures Law does not include an operation for dealing with the WMD. See Shinoda, *Reisengo no Nihon Gaikô*, 96-98.
128 Ibid., 98.
peacekeeping and peace-building activities. The main duties of the GSDF as stipulated by the Iraq Special Measures Law were medical care, water supply, and reconstruction of schools and other public facilities. The mission of the MSDF and the ASDF was to transport the SDF personnel as well as materials for humanitarian aid. Management of hospitals and advice to Iraqi doctors, purification of river water, and irrigation were in demand but the SDF was not allowed to commit to the security maintenance. The ASDF personnel, nonetheless, trained to deal with attacks by missiles and rockets. Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Iraq Special Measures Law reconfirmed that the SDF personnel were not allowed to get involved in ‘use or threat of force’ so as not to violate Article 9 of the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of Article 2 in the law stipulated that the SDF would operate in the ‘non-combat’ zone, which became a dispute in the Diet. The controversial passage of the Iraq Special Measures Bill is consistent with US strategic interests. In relation to the enactment of the law, Richard Armitage stated that ‘most of the [Armitage] report was realised.’ His statement was evidence that Japan took a firm step to share the military burden of the United States although it still did not permit the exercise of collective self-defence right.

Deaths of SRSG De Mello and Two Japanese Diplomats

Even though President Bush announced the end of the war on 1 May 2003, the conflict in Iraq continued and led to casualties. On 19 August, a terrorist attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad killed more than 20

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people, including SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello. The fact that the UN headquarters in Baghdad was targeted by the terrorists, and that SRSG De Mello who cooperated with Japan in peace-building in East Timor, was killed, was a surprise and shock in Japan.134 More disturbing was the death of two Japanese diplomats. On 29 November 2003, Ambassador Katsuhiko Oku and First Secretary Masamori Inoue were killed on their way to attend a conference on the reconstruction of Iraq.135 This incident evoked deep concern about sending the SDF to Iraq and opposition from a majority of the Japanese public towards the Iraq Special Measures Law.136 Even LDP members became unsupportive of the legislation, stating that ‘the invasion of Iraq was a mistake and Japanese troops should not be dispatched.’137 The day after the deaths, Mizuho Fukushima, the leader of the SDP, emphasised that Iraq was still at war and that no clear distinction between ‘combatant and non-combatant area’ existed.138 The JCP also expressed opposition to the SDF dispatch to Iraq in the wake of the murders of the two Japanese diplomats.139 Thus, the deaths of the Japanese diplomats stimulated Japanese anti-war pacifism. However, it was possible to argue that the two diplomats were killed because they were unarmed and that the SDF should be dispatched to protect other diplomats and to deter armed attacks of terrorists. Prime Minister Koizumi, however, was adamant that the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq would be carried out regardless of this incident.140

136 Simkin, ‘Japan’s Iraq commitment 2003’.
137 Koichi Katō, Makoto Koga, and Shizuka Kamei from the LDP were against the legislation. Ibid. See also Asahi.com, 31 January 2004, http://www2.asahi.com/special/ijeitai/TKY200401300308.html (accessed at 21 June 2010).
138 Fukushima, Iraq deno Nihonjin Gaikōkan.
140 Asahi.com, 1 December 2003, cited from, http://www2.asahi.com/special/iraqrecovery/TKY200311300195.html (accessed at 30 May 2008). Oku and Inoue did not request the escort of the US troops and were moving by the car with bullet-proof windows which were not strong enough. The incident was thought to be avoidable and attributed not only to the security situation in Iraq but also to the lack of crisis management. See Ogawa, Nihon no Sensōryoku, 192-193. On top of the deaths of the Japanese diplomats, an Iraqi leader for democratisation visited Tōkyō and expressed he opposed to the SDF dispatch to Iraq. He stated that the
Based on the Cabinet Decision of 8 December 2003, the JDA carefully planned the SDF’s peace-building activities in Iraq so that the SDF personnel could avoid danger, and that Japan could build amicable relations with the society and people in Iraq. The area where the SDF could operate was dependent on local conditions, such as the necessity of assistance and absence of belligerency. Samawa city in Musanna prefecture, the south eastern area of Iraq, was selected as a non-combatant area where the SDF would carry out state-building activities. Medical care, water supply, reconstruction of public facilities, and transportation of humanitarian aid materials were the tasks of the SDF as humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Also, the transportation of weapons and ammunitions was permitted.\(^\text{141}\) In making the statement of the Basic Plan on the measures based on the Iraq Special Measures Law on 9 December, Prime Minister Koizumi again mentioned UNSC Resolution 1511, which was unanimously adopted on 16 October 2003, to ensure that the ‘international community is united in its efforts to achieve the reconstruction and stability in Iraq.’\(^\text{142}\) In the statement, Koizumi stressed that the despatch of the SDF was ‘authorised’ by the UN resolution. He did not mention the significance of the Japan-US alliance here but argued that the stability of Iraq was in Japan’s national interests, stating: ‘Reconstruction of Iraq is extremely significant for the stability of the entire Middle East and ultimately the international community, and serves the interests of Japan.’\(^\text{143}\) Koizumi again utilised the UNSC resolution as a ‘certificate’ for dispatch of the SDF to Iraq.

At the Press Conference on 9 December 2003, Shigeru Ishiba, the then Director General of the JDA, was faced with difficult questions regarding the transportation of weapons and ammunitions. He could not articulate whether it was possible for the SDF to transport other countries’ troops who were equipped with weapons. Instead, he said that he did not remember every statement made in the Diet and at the press conferences, adding that the government would make decisions according to the differing situations. In addition, Ishiba pointed out that the fact that Prime Minister Koizumi referred to the ‘Preamble of the Constitution’ at the press conference on the same day was significant. As Koizumi pointed out, the SDF dispatch was justified with the UN resolution 1511 as well as the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution. Notably the enactments of the PKO Law, the Anti-Terrorism Law, and the Iraq Special Measures Law were facilitated on the basis of positive pacifism.

**SDF Dispatch to Iraq in Analytical Eclecticism**

*Shift to Positive Pacifism and SDF Dispatch to Iraq*

Prime Minister Koizumi tried to justify the SDF dispatch to Iraq on the basis of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution. In a press conference on the same day, the prime minister emphasised Japan’s responsibility to contribute to the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq as a member of the international community. Besides, he stated that the basis of Japanese foreign policy must lie in ‘both the Japan-US Security alliance and international coordination.’ Through these remarks, Koizumi implied that the SDF dispatch was Japan’s responsibility for ‘international peace’ as a member of the United Nations. The Prime Minister emphasised that the SDF would be involved in humanitarian and

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reconstruction activities only.\textsuperscript{146} Thus, Koizumi paid attention not only to the Japan-US alliance and the United Nations, but also to the Preamble to legitimise the SDF dispatch to Iraq. He regarded the Preamble as ‘the very principles of Japan.’ Furthermore, he read out this portion of the Preamble of the Constitution:

\begin{quote}
We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}

As his remarks show, these statements were his attempts to justify the SDF dispatch to Iraq based on positive pacifism and international pacifism, which in turn was based on the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution. So as to circumvent the legal constraint of negative pacifism in Article 9, positive pacifism was indirectly utilised in Koizumi’s rhetoric to justify the SDF dispatch. On 19 January 2004, Koizumi cited the same part of the Preamble of the Constitution to reemphasise the constitutionality of the dispatch. Koizumi reiterated the word ‘peace’ three times to reconfirm the image of the SDF dispatch on the base of ‘international pacifism’. He stated: ‘Merely arguing is not enough to realize peace. Peace is something that can only be built by the combined capabilities of the international community. Understanding that Japan’s security and prosperity is intertwined with world peace and stability.’\textsuperscript{148} Koizumi also stated that: ‘We must fulfil our responsibility as a member of the international community through action.’\textsuperscript{149} Koizumi’s international


\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. Also see the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution.


\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
pacifism indicates that it was not necessary to revise the Constitution to dispatch the SDF for reconstruction of Iraq because it was authorised by the Preamble of the Constitution.\(^{150}\) The concept of international pacifism mentioned by Prime Minister Koizumi coincides with positive pacifism, which was used as justification and legalisation for the dispatch of the SDF. Emphasizing the Preamble (positive pacifism), Koizumi had consciously avoided mentioning Article 9 (negative pacifism).\(^{151}\) This was because negative pacifism was still influential when the SDF was dispatched. All politicians of opposition parties were absent from the Diet when the Lower House decided to dispatch the SDF.\(^{152}\) Thus, the Iraq Special Measures Legislation was supported with emphasis on the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism).

Meanwhile, Kōmeitō began supporting the Iraq Special Measures Bill on the basis of positive pacifism. During the deliberation of the Iraq Special Measures Legislation, it became more evident that Kōmeitō tried to reinterpret pacifism to justify the SDF dispatch. Masao Akamatsu of Kōmeitō categorised Japan’s pacifism after the 1992 Gulf War as ‘new pacifism’ (atarashii heiwa shugi), distinguishing it from ‘one-nation pacifism’ (ikkoku heiwa shugi) before the 1991 Gulf War. He implied that Japan should make a contribution towards ‘peace-building’ in Iraq based on the ‘new pacifism.’\(^{153}\) Notably, Toshiko Hamayotus of Kōmeitō also criticised ‘one-nation pacifism’ as ‘egoism’, which overlooked those who suffered from war, conflict, poverty and diseases. She reinforced the legal

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legitimacy of the Iraq Special Measures Legislation.\textsuperscript{154} Kōmeitō's support was crucial for Prime Minister Koizumi because anti-Koizumi members in the LDP criticised the legislation. For instance, Hiromu Nonaka, former LDP secretary general, expressed his anti-Koizumi stance, arguing that 'we do not have to dispatch the SDF. Humanitarian and reconstruction activities can be conducted by civilians.'\textsuperscript{155} Kōmeitō adopted the new pacifism, namely 'positive pacifism' to contribute to post-war reconstruction.

The Iraq Special Measures Law was legitimatised with UN Resolution 1483, which was consistent with the 'new pacifism' (positive pacifism). In fact, Kōmeitō Diet members stressed that UN Resolution 1483 was the legal authorisation for the deployment of SDF to Iraq. Kaori Maruya of Kōmeitō mentioned UNICEF's appreciation of Japan's financial contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq. Maruya also referred to the dispatch of the SDF based on UN Resolution 1483,\textsuperscript{156} which encouraged UN member states to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{157} Kiyohiko Tōyama of Kōmeitō also mentioned that the spirit of UNSC Resolution 1483 was based on a 'humanitarian' request. He argued that the dispatch of the SDF was necessary for post-war reconstruction because the SDF possess the


\textsuperscript{155} Shinoda, \textit{Koizumi Diplomacy}, 120.


ability to complete the mission by themselves (jiko kanketsu sei). Indeed, although the SDF needed protection by Dutch Forces and Australian Defence Forces, dispatch of non-SDF organisations would have required more protection than the SDF.

Shortly before the GSDF personnel were deployed to Iraq, Masao Akamatsu described Kōmeitō’s pacifism as ‘active pacifism’ (kōdō suru heiwa shugi) which can be justified within the Constitution. He argued that the SDF dispatch to Iraq for post-war humanitarian assistance is compatible with Kōmeitō’s pacifism. Even after the death of the two Japanese diplomats Inoue and Oku on 29 November 2003, Kōmeitō did not express opposition to the dispatch of SDF dispatch. After the GSDF arrived in Iraq, Kazuo Kitagawa reaffirmed its legitimacy, referring not only to UN resolution 1483 but also to UN Resolution 1511.

Shinoda argued that the swift passing of the Iraq Special Measures Law was Koizumi’s ‘top down’ policy based on the Iraq Team of the Cabinet Secretariat rather than conventional ‘bottom up’ approach used by MOFA drafting a bill. On the other hand, MOFA and JDA had been researching Japan’s contribution to Iraq and were ready for the creation of

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159 Akamatsu, M., Iraq eno Jieitai Haken to Kōmeitō no Heiwashugi (SDF Dispatch to Iraq and Pacifism of Kōmeitō), Kōmei Shimbun, 2 February 2004 and 3 February 2004.


the new legal framework. In making a bill of the Iraq Special Measures, the Japanese government decided to utilise not only the ‘Japan-US alliance’ but also ‘international cooperation (UN)’ as a legal framework to justify the dispatch of the SDF. Therefore, the United Nations Policy Division in the National Security Division of Foreign Policy Bureau was responsible for the legislation (rather than the Legal Affairs Division of Treaty Bureau). In JDA, the Defence Policy Bureau and the Plans and Program Division of the Staff Office of the SDF got involved in the legislation process under the Cabinet Secretariat. Koizumi’s ‘top down’ decision making process was possible on the condition that he took advantage of positive pacifism and international cooperation-ism of the Preamble of the Peace Constitution. The lawmaking process of the Iraq Special Measures Law was not based on the legitimacy of the Iraq War but on the legitimacy of the dispatch of SDF. The legitimacy of the SDF dispatch to Iraq was justified in the name of the Preamble.

As Seigel has pointed out, the phrase ‘positive pacifism’ was used in the Constitution Review Committee of the House of Councillors in 2005. The report of the Upper House insisted that Article 9 (negative pacifism) was insufficient for making a positive contribution to international peace and security and articulated the significance of positive pacifism:

> With regard to pacifism, it is not sufficient to simply relinquish warfare as a means of solving international disputes. The intention of positively contributing to peace in international society should be made clear. A clause dealing with international cooperation should be included in the text of the Constitution clearly showing the rationale for Japan’s international cooperation and specifying cooperation in activities carried out jointly international society...

> For Japan, based on the experience of war, a pure pacifism that totally rejects armed forces, the means of war, has set the tone. In the twenty-first century, in place of this kind of pure pacifism, a forward-looking

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163 Shinoda, ‘Japan’s Top-Down Policy’, 76.
164 Shinoda, Reisengo no Nihon Gaikō, 99.
165 Seigel, ‘Questioning the Rationale’, 79.
strong pacifism is needed. The shape that our country should aim to take in the twenty-first century is one of positive pacifism. It should aim at being a country of peace and humanitarianism, a country that contributes to international society.\textsuperscript{166}

In the report written in Japanese, different words for pacifism, such as ‘pure (junsuina) pacifism’, ‘strong (kyōjinna) pacifism’ and ‘positive pacifism’ were used. However, the term negative pacifism was not evident. Nonetheless, the meaning of pure pacifism can be interpreted as negative pacifism. Similarly, it is remarkable that the report asserted that the concept of ‘human security’ needs to be incorporated into ‘Japan’s pacifism’ so that Japan can proactively make a commitment to fighting terrorism, poverty, war, global environment, population, and infectious diseases. Furthermore, the report indicated that the concept of human security is important when it came to considering human rights in Iraq and North Korea.\textsuperscript{167} Thus, at the political level, positive pacifism has been considered as Japan’s new security policy and also as conceptual justification for dispatching the SDF for international peacekeeping operations.

The shifts from negative pacifism to positive pacifism lubricated Japanese defence policy, especially the enactment of the ‘Emergency Legislation.’ On 13 June 2003, just before the Iraq Special Measures Law was enacted on 26 July, the three laws regarding response to armed attacks were created. Seven other emergency-related laws were enacted on 14 June 2004.\textsuperscript{168} The emphasis on positive pacifism made the SDF dispatch to Iraq possible, but it also eroded negative pacifism. This is because although the

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 68-69.
Also see, Prime Minister’s Office, Statement of Prime Minister Koizumi, 6 June 2003, cited from, \url{http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/06/06danwa_e.html} (accessed at 13 Jun. 08).
contingency legislation was designed to protect Japan against armed attacks, the creation of the legislation had been ‘taboo’ due to the influence of anti-militarist pacifism in post-war Japan as shown in Chapter 2. In other words, the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism coincided with Japan’s military normalisation process. This is because the shift was facilitated by both domestic and international pressures on Japan’s security policy.

*Classical and Neo-Realism: Dispatch of the SDF to Iraq*

Classical realism and structural realism clarify the factors which caused the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. Firstly, the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq was crucial to the Japanese economy in terms of maintaining the supply of oil. Before the enactment of the Iraq Special Measures Law, Prime Minister Koizumi referred to the economic damage caused by the 1973 first oil crisis triggered by the Yom Kippur War suggesting how important oil from Iraq was to Japan.169 Japan’s economic vulnerability due to the lack of resources was a crucial issue. The Director General of the Defence Agency Shigeru Ishiba raised oil as the most significant reason why the Japanese government should dispatch the SDF to Iraq which had the second largest oil deposit in the world. Whereas the United States, the United Kingdom and France dependence on the oil in the Middle East was respectively 20%, 10% and 20%, Japan’s dependency was more than 90%. Therefore, if Iraq became more stable and friendly to the Western countries due to the democratisation after the war, Iraq would be able to influence the decision-making at the oil price negotiations among the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Japan could considerably benefit from it. While France could

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depend on nuclear energy, the Japanese people still felt concerned about the use of atomic power in Japan. For this reason, according to public opinion in Iraq conducted by the Oxford Research Institute from March to April 2004, Japan was chosen as the most favoured country to make a contribution to post-war reconstruction for Iraq. 170

The SDF dispatch to Iraq was also part of Japan’s attempt to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC. Significantly, at the 59 session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed Japan’s ambition to gain a permanent membership of the UNSC by reforming the United Nations. He emphasised Japan’s contributions to humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Iraq through the dispatch of SDF and the financial assistance of five billion dollars. In his address, the Prime Minister clearly stated that ‘we believe that the role that Japan has played provides a solid basis for its assumption of permanent membership on the Security Council.’ 171

The issue of gaining permanent membership on the UNSC is related to the issue of exercising the collective self-defence right by revising the Constitution. The permanent members of the UNSC are responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and are supposed to take collective military actions based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. If Japan gains permanent membership of the UNSC, Japan would inevitably be required to modify its Constitution so as to make military contributions. As a matter of fact, in August 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell mentioned that Japan needed to review Article 9 of the Constitution if it intended to become a permanent member of the UNSC. 172 The SDF dispatch to Iraq was related to the desire for political

170 Ishiba, Kokubō, 43-46.
172 Kitaoka, ‘Kokuren Taishi, Genbakara no Teigen’.
and military power. Through a contribution to the reconstruction in Iraq, the Japanese government sought to enhance the possibility of winning a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In addition, through the SDF dispatch to Iraq, the Koizumi government facilitated normalisation of its military power.

Japan’s motivation to participate in the post-war reconstruction in Iraq can be explained by structural factors such as a direct threat from North Korea and military dependence on the United States. From a Japanese perspective, the threat from North Korea was more urgent than the threat posed by Iraq and international terrorism. As discussed previously, several realists argued that Japan should support the United States in order to strengthen the alliance. They contended that if Japan did not support the Iraq War and assist the post-war reconstruction, the United States might not protect Japan from an attack by North Korea. As already discussed, there was also an argument that the United States was supposed to protect Japan even if Japan would not support the Iraq War. As Ishiba insisted, the Japan-US treaty was based not only on a signed agreement but also on mutual trust. Support for the US-led Iraq War and the following post-war state-building was obviously designed to enhance the Japan-US alliance and was in Japan’s national interests. In theory, the United States will protect Japan based on the Japan-US Security Treaty. Japan’s obligation is to provide the US forces with military bases. Even when the United States is attacked by other countries, Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defence to protect the United States. Therefore, the asymmetrical nature of the alliance caused a sense of obligation in Tōkyō which led Japan to contribute to post-war peace operations in Iraq.

From a Japanese perspective, the Iraqi issue and North Korean threat were closely connected prior to the 2003 Iraq War. In 1998, the United

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173 Ishiba, Kokubō, 47-50.
States expressed its intention to attack Iraq on the grounds that Iraq did not carry out its obligation of UNSC resolutions. Whereas Russia, France and China showed their objections against the military sanctions against Iraq, Japan, as a non-permanent UNSC member, supported the plan. If anything, Japan along with the United Kingdom suggested that unless Iraq accepted the inspection for the WMD, it would face the ‘severest consequences’. The phrase ‘severest consequences’ adopted as a UNSC Resolution 1154 was stronger than the phrase of ‘serious consequences’ of Resolution 1441.\textsuperscript{174} Based on UN Resolution 1154, the United States and the United Kingdom began bombing Iraq on 17 December 1998. As Kawabe pointed out, coincidentally, Japan was faced with the North Korea crisis in 1998 and again in 2003.\textsuperscript{175} In fact, on 31 August 1998, North Korea conducted experiments to launch Taepodong missiles. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) expressed its concern about the nuclear development of North Korea. North Korea expelled staff of the IAEA in December 2002 and seceded from NPT in January 2003 and resumed operation of its nuclear reactor.\textsuperscript{176} In the face of the North Korean threat, the Japanese government desired to assure the functionality of the Japan-US military alliance. In short, the North Korean issue and the Japan-US alliance as structural factors determined Japan’s response to the 2003 Iraq War and motivated Japan to contribute to the post-war reconstruction in Iraq.

More fundamentally, however, Japan’s structural dependence on US military power inevitably led the Japanese government to support the Iraq War and post-war reconstruction. The nature of the Japan-US Security Treaty is clearly different from that of NATO in that the Japan-

\textsuperscript{174} See Kawabe, \textit{Nihon no Gaikō}, 71-74.  
\textsuperscript{175} Kawabe, \textit{Nihon no Gaikō}, 94.  
US Security Treaty is ‘asymmetrical’ because Japan’s military power for collective self-defence is constitutionally limited. Unlike Japan, NATO countries have normal military capabilities and could protect themselves even without assistance from the United States. In addition, NATO members did not face a direct military threat (in the post-Cold War period) unlike Japan which had been threatened by North Korea. Structural factors stemming from international anarchy and Japan’s military and structural dependence on the United States necessitated the Japanese government’s support for the Iraq War and the SDF dispatch for post-war peace-building operations.

*Japan’s Contribution to Post-War Peace-Building in Iraq*

As described already, the peace-building operations of the SDF in Iraq were mainly focused on medical care, water supply and reconstruction of public facilities and transportation of humanitarian supplies. The members of the Advance Air Transport Unit team left the Komaki Air Base for Kuwait on 26 December 2003. A JSDF Unit for humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Iraq was newly formed at the Ichigaya base on 16 January 2004. 110 members of the main unit of the ASDF left Japan on 22 January 2004 and three C-130 transport planes carrying the second JSDF Unit took off from the Komaki Airbase for Kuwait on 26 January. On 30 January 2004, the second group of the Air Transport Unit touched down in Kuwait. Even after the dispatch of the SDF personnel by the C-130 transportation aircraft, there were concerns that the SDF staff might not be safe in ‘non-combat’ areas. Ishiba was questioned regarding the safety of the SDF under the protection by the Dutch troops. After coming back from visits to Europe, he mentioned that both Defence

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Ministers of the United Kingdom and Holland encouraged Japan to contribute to post-war peace operations in Iraq.\(^{179}\)

As for the necessity and significance of the SDF dispatch to Iraq, Ishiba contended that there were obvious needs of the Iraqi people who desired infrastructure, education, medical care and so on. He also argued that the dispatch of the SDF would contribute to Japan’s national interests based on the fact that 90% of imported oil came from the Middle East. In terms of the Japan-US alliance as Japan’s most important security interest, Ishiba suggested that the dispatch of the SDF could enhance mutual trust between Japan and the United States. Responding to a question about the use of force in Iraq, Ishiba made it clear that the self-defence of the SDF personnel even in Iraq was not incompatible with Article 9. Ishiba stated that he regarded the dispatch of the SDF as the ‘implementation of international obligation.’\(^{180}\)

At the National Diet on 24 February 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his appreciation for the SDF dispatch to Samawa and encouraged Japan’s constant commitment to humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Iraq. At the same time, Kofi Annan mentioned Japan’s plans for UN reform regarding the enemy clause of the UN Charter, and unequal sharing of UN budget.\(^{181}\) It can be argued that the statement of UNSG provided a credential to justify the SDF dispatch to Iraq with the Japanese government.

The archives of MOD show that SDF activities in Iraq were ‘non-military’ peace-building operations, such as transportation of humanitarian

material,\textsuperscript{182} water supply, medical technological support, and construction works.\textsuperscript{183} Japan's contribution to peace-building in Iraq did not cause the deaths of GSDF staff. The operations of GSDF in Iraq were more peace-building than peacekeeping. Japan’s contribution to Iraq was to promote ‘positive peace’ based on basic human needs of the Iraqis. The peace-building experience in Iraq enhanced military normalisation of the SDF. Still, at the same time, participation in humanitarian aid in Iraq provided the opportunity for SDF personnel to train themselves as international peacekeepers.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has examined the responses of the Japanese government to international terrorism after 11 September 2001, and the following US-led wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. In spite of the lack of a new UNSC resolution, international and domestic opposition against the wars, the Koizumi government decided to support the Bush administration and dispatched the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. These decision making processes were of course influenced by Japan’s national interests, such as its military alliance with the United States, dependence on oil from the Middle East, the direct threat from North Korea, Japan's military normalisation and ambition for a UNSC permanent seat. These internal and external pressures facilitated the shift from negative pacifism, which opposed Japan’s involvement in the US-led War on Terror, to positive pacifism, which attempted to contribute to human security in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Legislation were justified by the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism) rather than Article 9 (negative pacifism). International cooperation-ism and international responsibility in the Preamble, as well as the resolutions of the UNSC, also justified SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. UN resolution 1368 was used to justify the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Legislation. Likewise, UN Resolution 1483 was also utilised for justification in the passage of the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Legislation. The SDF dispatch to Iraq was also justified by UN Resolution 1511. Prime Minister Koizumi’s ‘top down’ security policymaking approach was, therefore, based on international cooperation-ism and positive pacifism of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution as well as these UN resolutions. The SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq can be regarded as steps towards a ‘normal state’. Japan’s military power was not necessarily strengthened by participating in post-war peacekeeping activities. However, military support in oil refuelling in the Indian Ocean and peace-building in Iraq contributed to normalising Japan’s military capability. The SDF dispatch to Iraq contributes to Japan’s military trans-armament as an international peace-builder. Therefore, the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism coincided with shifts towards not only a normal state but also an international peacekeeper. Japan’s participation in the UNPKO and security cooperation with the United States contributed to its security partnership with Australia as will be analysed in the next chapter.
Chapter Five

Japan-Australia Security Cooperation for Regional Stability and Global Peace

Introduction

This chapter analyses the Japan-Australia relationship in terms of the security partnership and its implications for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The significance of this case study lies in the hypothesis that the Joint Declaration on the Security Cooperation (JDSC) demonstrates that Australia is Japan’s indispensable regional partner for international peacekeeping and institutionalisation in the Asia-Pacific. The Japan-Australia security partnership has developed in spite of political and military differences. Unlike Australia, the SDF is constrained by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which prevents participation in collective security measures. The size of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) is approximately one-sixth of that of the SDF. Nonetheless, the ADF is more skilful in terms of military deployment and more experienced with UN peacekeeping missions. In spite of these constitutional and organisational differences, both the SDF and the ADF have demonstrated security cooperation as UN peacekeepers and US allies.

The development of the Japan-Australia security partnership culminated in the signing of the JDSC on 13 March 2007. Here, three questions may be raised about the Japan-Australia security partnership: 1) Was it part of

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1 Ball, ‘Security Cooperation between Japan and Australia’, 165-166.
2 Australia’s current security policy stems from ‘forward defence’ strategy, which aimed to prevent threats from reaching the Australian continent. The forward defence policy was, however, a military strategy during the Cold War. Today, security of Australia and its neighbourhood is Australia’s strategic priority. According to the Defence White Paper 2009, Australia’s major four security interests are: a secure Australia; a secure neighbourhood; a stable Asia-Pacific; and a rules-based global order. For current Australia’s security policy, see Lyon and Davies, ‘Assessing the Defence White Paper 2009’. For ‘forward defence’ strategy, see Millar, Australia’s Defence, especially Chapter 3. Also see Takeda, ‘Gaikō/Anzenhoshō’, 184.
an evolutionary process or a revolutionary development that emerged ‘out of the blue’?; 2) Why has it not been upgraded into a full security treaty?; and 3) What are its implications for regional integration in the Asia-Pacific? To answer these questions, this chapter will begin with the historical background because the Japan-Australia relationship has been based not only on strong economic interests but also on political and security ties described as ‘political alignment’ and ‘security policy networks.’ This chapter will then examine, in a comparative fashion, the Japan-Australia peacekeeping and security cooperation for Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This will be followed by an analysis of the JDSC before, finally, exploring the possibility of establishing Asia-Pacific regional architecture in relation to Japan-Australia security partnership.

**Historical Background of Japan-Australia Relations 1901-1951**

Historically, the relationship between Japan and Australia has been through periods of suspicion, animosity and friendship. Australian foreign and defence policy was suspicious of Japan’s aggressive militarism during the period of 1901 to 1951. Although Japan and Australia have never been direct military allies, the two countries have been indirect allies through the alliances with the United Kingdom (1902-1922) and the United States (1951-). After Japan’s triumph of the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, Australia had misgivings about Japan’s imperialistic and expansionist policies. In 1902, Japan concluded the ‘Anglo-Japanese Alliance’ but Australia remained concerned that Japan intended to take advantage of the Anglo-Japanese

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3 Rix, *Australia-Japan Political Alignment*.
4 Walton, ‘Australia-Japan and the Region’.
alliance to pursue a southward advance to Australia. Australia regarded the southern expansion of Russia as a threat to Australian security and British strategic interests, and therefore Japan, which fought against Russia from 1904 to 1905, was viewed as an informal ally. In fact, the Australian Defence Department exported 9,957 horses to Japan during the Japanese-Russo War. Furthermore, the Japanese Imperial Army imported wool from Australia which contributed to the Australian economy. The mutually shared strategic threat from Russia and the military alliance with the United Kingdom would be key factors in amicable relations before the Great War of 1914 and again before the Pacific War. The important shift in the Australia’s security policy occurred when the main British Far East fleet left Australia for Europe immediately after the Japanese-Russo War. From that time on, Australia began regarding Japan as a direct threat and in 1911 began organising independent maritime forces. Australia’s military vulnerability and the threat posed by Japan facilitated the development of an independent Australian military force. Australia’s military independence moreover, was necessitated by the beginning of the Second World War and the Pacific War, especially the fall of the British military base in Singapore on 15 February and the bombing on Darwin on 19 February 1942.

During Japan’s post-war occupation period, Australia’s foreign policy focused on containing Japan’s remilitarisation. Australian Foreign Minister Evatt demanded a punitive peace treaty so that Japan would not be able to remilitarise and threaten Australian security in the future. The fundamental principle of Australian foreign and security policy during this period was to incorporate Australia into the US-centred defence system. A core factor in Australia’s security policy was, therefore, the fear of

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8 Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 109-120, 126-127.
9 The reason why the main British Far East fleet left for Europe was because the United Kingdom started regarding Germany as a new threat after Russia was defeated. See, Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 134-135, 140-141.
10 Camilleri, Ōsutoraria no Gaikō Seisaku, 32-33.
remilitarisation of Japan. On 19 March 1947, Robert Menzies, then opposition leader, stated that ‘Japan must never again be permitted to develop the means of waging war.’ Nevertheless the outbreak of the 1950 Korean War modified Australia’s policy towards Japan. The Korean War made the United States and Australia realise the strategic importance of Japan as a bulwark against communism. After communism replaced Japan as Australia’s major threat, the Ministers of External Affairs after Evatt did not maintain a hardline policy on Japan. Richard Casey recognised the necessity of Japan having a self-defence force. On 21 June 1951, Casey stated that ‘since the US occupation of Japan could not be expected to continue indefinitely, Japan must be allowed to make some provision for her own security and Australia must accept this.’

Australia’s fear towards Japan’s military resurgence facilitated signing the ANZUS Treaty. During the post-war occupation period, Australia originally opposed a post-war peace treaty which recognised Japan’s individual and collective self-defence rights based on Article 51 in the Charter of the United Nations. However, Australia finally agreed to Japan’s self-defence power as the San Francisco Peace Treaty recognised Japan’s ‘inherent right to self-defence’ based on Article 51 of the UN Charter. As discussed already, for Australia, Japan had been a main source of threat from the Sino-Japanese and Russia-Japanese wars until the beginning of the Cold War. As these historical perspectives indicate, it is no exaggeration to argue that Japan’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region was a major concern in shaping Australia’s foreign and security policy during the period from 1905 to 1951. More importantly, Australian foreign and security policy, like the case of Japan, has been inevitably

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11 Ibid., 54.
13 Ibid., 121, 124.
15 Ibid., 176-177, 180.
16 Millar, *Australia in Peace and War*, 269-270. For details of the ANZUS Treaty, see Ibid., Chapter 11, 197-222.
influenced by the international structure of the Cold War and decision making of its super power ally.

*Japan-Australia Political and Economic Partnership 1952-1991*

The Japan-Australia relationship had been influenced by the Cold War international structure. Despite the strong anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia during the 1950s, the Menzies government concluded the Commerce Agreement with Japan in July 1957. For Australia, the Commerce Agreement with Japan had economic and political implications. Firstly, Australia was faced with decreasing trade with the United Kingdom and other European countries. Moreover, as the 1956 Japanese Economic White Book demonstrated, the Japanese economy had almost completely recovered from the war. Australia needed to cultivate new economic markets in Asia through Japan.\(^{18}\) The second reason was that Australia feared that Japan would become a Communist state and cooperate with the USSR. In a parliamentary debate in 1954, Foreign Minister Richard Casey pointed out that Japanese politics was in a chaotic situation and the communist groups had strengthened their political influence. Casey also noted that in 1955 there was an anti-war peace movement, and the right and left socialist parties in Japan had united and strengthened their political influence. The Japan-Australia Commerce Agreement was therefore concluded as Australia’s anti-communist policy.\(^{19}\) The Commerce Agreement was revised in 1963, and Australia withdrew the application of Article 35 of GATT, which was a discriminatory policy against Japan. In 1965, a long-term contract for iron ore and coal was signed, and consequently, Japan became the No.1 trade partner of Australia surpassing the United Kingdom in 1966.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) Takeda, *Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi*, 200-203.

\(^{19}\) To persuade those who insisted on anti-Japanese feelings, Menzies took advantage of the communist threat and gained support from the Democratic Labour Party and the Catholic Church. See Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Mori, ‘Nichigō Kankei’, 318.
As an ally of the United States, Australia’s security policy during the Cold War was heavily based on its anti-communist policy. As well as the ANZUS Treaty, Australia concluded the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955 and the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) in 1971. SEATO was an anti-communist military alliance to contain China and North Vietnam with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines. The FPDA is an ongoing defence agreement among the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore to protect Malaysia and Singapore. Unlike Japan, Australia had been able to participate in the military actions with the United States in the Korean War and the Vietnam War based on the ANZUS Treaty and the SEATO.21

Owing to the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock, Japan had to invalidate long-term trade contracts with Australia regarding sugar, beef, coal, and iron ore. Subsequently, economic friction between the two countries arose.22 In order to restore the economic relationship, the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan, also known as the Nippon-Australia Relations Agreement (NARA Treaty) was concluded in 1976.23 The NARA Treaty had been negotiated by the Whitlam ALP government and signed off by the Fraser Liberal government. The fact that the signing of the treaty was supported by the opposition party underlined the significance of the treaty for the then Australian government.24

The NARA Treaty enhanced the more amicable bilateral relations, and also possessed strategic meaning at the time when the United States and

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21 The SEATO was dissolved in 1977 because of the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War. The FPDA remains valid even after the end of the Cold War. See Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 204-206.
22 Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 218-219.
24 For more details on negotiation for the Treaty, see Dec, Friendship and Co-operation.
the USSR competed in their military expansion. From an Australian perspective, the USSR was a threat because imported oil from the Middle East passed through the Indian Ocean and was susceptible to Soviet submarines. In fact, Australia’s oil dependence on the Middle East was more than 30% during the Fraser period. Moreover, Australia feared expansion of communism because of its proximity to Asian countries. These were the principal reasons for Prime Minister Fraser’s realist foreign policy approach which was based on the US nuclear umbrella.25 During the 1970s and the 1980s, Japan and Australia gradually expanded defence cooperation and the NARA Treaty was a meaningful outcome.26

Even though bilateral relations during the Cold War period had been basically a commercial/economic relationship, the Australian Intelligence Community and the Japanese counterpart organisations began formal intelligence cooperation in the mid 1970s and the end of the 1980s witnessed a beginning of exchanges of defence officials. In order to reappraise the possibility of bilateral defence cooperation, General Peter Gration, the Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, was dispatched to Tōkyō in 1989, and Yōzō Ishikawa visited Australia as the first Director General of the Defence Agency in 1990. As well as the economic partnership, both countries began to consider a potential security partnership.27 This reciprocal defence exchange can be seen as a significant change in the bilateral relationship based largely on mutual economic interests. Still, on account of the constitutional restrictions, the SDF had never conducted security cooperation with the ADF during the Cold War period.

UN Peacekeeping Cooperation in Cambodia and East Timor

27 Dupont, Unsheathing the Samurai Sword, 47-48.
Since Japan resumed diplomatic relations with Australia, bilateral ties have been primarily based on economic and trade interests. The Cold War structure enabled the economic partnership between the two countries to develop. At the same time, as well as the economic partnership, both countries had developed a political relationship. In fact, economic relations entailed political and diplomatic aspects, and also both countries cooperated for the resolution of regional conflicts.\(^{28}\) In addition, there were some defence exchanges between the two nations. At this stage, however, the SDF and the ADF had not carried out military or peacekeeping operations in the field of the conflict resolutions.

As examined in the previous chapters, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis dramatically changed Japan’s security policy. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke requested that Japan dispatch its troops to the Gulf.\(^{29}\) However, the Japanese government had no choice but to decline the request. Consequently, Japan’s security policy was criticised by the international community, especially the United States, as a ‘non-bloodshed policy’, or ‘chequebook diplomacy’ which led to ‘Gulf War syndrome’. Responding to international criticism, the Japanese government passed the PKO Bill to participate in UNPKO. In terms of the Japan-Australia relations, Japan’s participation in UNTAC in 1992 was a remarkable turning point and the beginning of a partnership between the SDF and the ADF for peacekeeping cooperation.

Australia’s policy on UNPKO has a much longer history than Japan. Before sending forces to UNTAC, Australia accumulated experience as an international peacekeeper during the Cold War era.\(^{30}\) The Australian

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\(^{30}\) Australia dispatched the ADF to Indonesia (1947), Korea (1948), India-Pakistan (1950), Congo (1960), West Irian (1962), Yemen (1963). From 1947 to 1963, the ADF had operated as military observers rather than PKF. For PKF operations, the ADF was sent to Cyprus (1964), India-Pakistan.
government contributed greatly to the peace process and peacekeeping operation in Cambodia as pointed out in the Cambodia chapter. In 1989, the Australian Foreign and Trade Minister Gareth Evans announced a peace proposal for Cambodia, the so-called ‘Red Book’, suggesting the neutrality of Cambodia governed by the United Nations Transitional Authority.31

Australia did not have a vested interest in Cambodia and became involved in the peace process as a non-threatening third party. Although there were some negative reactions from the ASEAN countries, Australia as a middle power and a third party played an effective role in the peace process.32 Being a middle power made it possible for Australia to make the peace proposal and neutral intervention in a non-obtrusive manner. This ‘middle power’ factor is important for the Japan-Australia peacekeeping partnership. Furthermore, because the Special Representative of Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi was Japanese and the military component was led by an Australian (Major General John Sanderson), opportunities emerged for cooperation between the SDF and ADF. As a novice peacekeeper, the SDF appreciated working with the experienced Australian soldiers on the ground. The UNTAC military commander John Sanderson paid special attention to cooperating with the SDF in order to ensure the successful completion of Japan’s first participation in UNPKO.33

After the peacekeeping cooperation in UNTAC, both Japanese and Australian Prime Ministers recognised the significance of a bilateral security partnership. The Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan
Partnership was signed by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and Prime Minister Paul Keating on 26 May 1995. The declaration pledged that the partnership would strengthen its security cooperation in such areas as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the declaration expressed Australia’s support for Japan’s membership on the UNSC. This Joint Declaration indicates that the Japan-Australia security partnership has developed as a result of Japan’s contribution to UNTAC in which both the SDF and the ADF worked together.

At a dinner hosted by Prime Minister John Howard in 1997, Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto stated that he regarded the bilateral relationship as political as well as economic. His reference to political referred to the ‘politico-military talks’ initiated in 1996 and the visit of the MSDF fleet to Australia. During the joint press conference, in response to a question about the upgrade of the security partnership with such arrangements as annual meetings of foreign and defence ministers, both Hashimoto and Howard responded affirmatively that the security partnership should evolve step by step. Similarly, Prime Minister Howard emphasised the bilateral security partnership, stating that ‘both the Japanese Prime Minister and I see the defence relationship as becoming part of the bilateral association.’

Australia’s commitment to the peace operations in East Timor demonstrated the most fundamental difference between the SDF and the ADF. Unlike the SDF constrained by Article 9, Australia was involved in the peace-enforcement operation authorised by the United Nations. The INTERFET operation under the Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove

authorised by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter preconditioned the feasibility of the following peacekeeping and peace-building operations. Unlike the case of the Gulf Crisis, Australia did not demand that Japan should dispatch the SDF to INTERFET but requested Japan’s financial contribution which led to a tension in the bilateral relationship.37 The Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer urged Japan to make its financial contribution ‘as soon as possible.’38 Japan’s military incapability due to the constitutional constraints created a tension between Japan and Australia. The post-INTERFET peacekeeping operation, UNTAET was operating under the Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and the Japanese government hesitated to dispatch the SDF due to Article 9.

On 1 May 2001, the Japanese Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi and the Australian Prime Minister John Howard issued the ‘Sydney Declaration for Australia-Japan Creative Partnership’. The declaration pledged that both countries would cooperate in the field of strategic and political fields including peacekeeping training.39 In this context, Alexander Downer made an overture to his Japanese counterpart, Makiko Tanaka that Australia was hoping for the dispatch of the SDF to East Timor as well as for Tōkyō’s financial contribution. In March 2002, approximately 690 SDF members of the engineering battalion were dispatched to UNTAET.40 This does not mean that Australian pressure was the only factor behind the SDF dispatch to East Timor. The decision of the Koizumi government was based on national interests and, in particular, on the move towards normalisation of military power.

37 Walton, ‘Japan and East Timor’, 241-244.
40 See Gorjao, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy and East Timor’, 768, cited from Ishizuka, ‘Perspectives on UN Peacekeeping Collaboration’, 156.
Subsequently, Akira Takahashi was placed in charge of humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation and was also deputy to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General during the UNTAET operation. UNMISET was multifunctional peacekeeping and peace-building operations and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (Sukehiko Hasegawa) was Japanese. In this way, the SDF and the ADF cooperated in East Timor. Japan-Australia peacekeeping cooperation in Cambodia and East Timor indicates the feasibility of the Japan-Australia security partnership.

Security Cooperation as US Allies in Post-September 11 Period

The end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War created the stimuli in the shifts in Japan’s security policy. The 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the following wars in Afghanistan and Iraq brought about further changes to their bilateral security partnership. As described in the previous chapters, the Koizumi government swiftly created new legal frameworks to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Japan’s Aegis fleet in the Indian Ocean replenished oil for the Australian maritime ship and additional ADF personnel were dispatched to Iraq to protect the SDF. Unlike peacekeeping cooperation in Cambodia and East Timor, the Japan-Australia security partnership became visually evident in their military cooperation as key US allies.

As Prime Minister Koizumi expressed his support for the combat of international terrorism after the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard also stated that Australia would fight against terrorism side by side with the United States by invoking Article 4 of the ANZUS Treaty to deal with the

‘common danger.’

The terrorist attacks in the United States led to 90 deaths of Australians and it was the first time that the ANZUS Treaty was invoked. Unlike the asymmetrical nature of the Japan-US Security Treaty, the member states of the ANZUS Treaty possess ‘military obligations’ and Article 4 of the Treaty stipulates that:

An armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

The Howard government and even opposition Labor Party ‘wholeheartedly endorsed’ the government’s decision to take military action against international terrorism. As a member of the ‘coalition of the willing’, Australia made a military commitment to fight Al-Qaeda by mobilising ‘navy frigates, long-range maritime aircraft, tanker aircraft, FA-18 fighters, and 150 Special Air Service troops’ to Afghanistan. Based on the military alliance with the United States, the Howard government dispatched 1,500 ADF personnel to Operation ‘Enduring Freedom.’ Japan, on the other hand, could not invoke the Japan-US Security Treaty because of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, asanalysed in the previous chapters, the Koizumi government enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Special Measures Law to support the United States in the form of dispatching the Aegis fleet to the Indian Ocean for oil replenishment and sending the SDF to Iraq for post-war peace-building operations.

In the case of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the SDF and the ADF did not cooperate in the field. However, Japan made a contribution in the field of DDR with a concept of ‘consolidation of peace’. Like the case of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the SDF and the ADF did not cooperate in the field. However, Japan made a contribution in the field of DDR with a concept of ‘consolidation of peace’. Like the case of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the SDF and the ADF did not cooperate in the field. However, Japan made a contribution in the field of DDR with a concept of ‘consolidation of peace’. Like the case of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the SDF and the ADF did not cooperate in the field. However, Japan made a contribution in the field of DDR with a concept of ‘consolidation of peace’. Like the case of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the SDF and the ADF did not cooperate in the field. However, Japan made a contribution in the field of DDR with a concept of ‘consolidation of peace’. Like the case of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the SDF and the ADF did not cooperate in the field. However, Japan made a contribution in the field of DDR with a concept of ‘consolidation of peace’.

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43 Ibid.
45 Siracusa, ‘John Howard, Australia, and the Coalition’.
operations in East Timor, the ADF became involved in peacemaking in the ISAF and Japan made a contribution to oil replenishment and humanitarian assistance. In this way, both the SDF and the ADF indirectly cooperated for the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan.

On 1 May 2002, the ‘Joint Press Statement on Australia-Japan Creative Partnership’ was declared by Prime Ministers Howard and Koizumi, confirming bilateral ties based on their nations’ shared values, such as democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. In the security field, both countries promised cooperation for the combat against international terrorism and reaffirmed their commitment to the peace-building process in Afghanistan. Australia expressed its support for Japan’s permanent membership of the UNSC. Prime Minister Howard welcomed Japan’s ‘valuable contribution’ to the UNPKO in East Timor.47 Based on the arrangement for the creative partnership, defence dialogues took place in Canberra on 2 and 3 September 2002. Security cooperation, especially counter-terrorism, was strengthened after the bombing attacks in Bali where Australians were targeted on 12 October 2002.48 In response to the terrorism which led to the deaths of 202 people including 88 Australian citizens, Prime Minister Howard stated that Australia would consider launching a ‘pre-emptive strike’ on countries which harbour terrorists. This statement on pre-emptive strikes shows that Australia’s security policy is fundamentally different from that of Japan. Australia can use force for collective military sanctions as a US ally. Australia participated in the military actions on Iraq with the United States and the United Kingdom in 2003. In fact, the Howard government dispatched 2000 ADF

troops including 150 SAS to Iraq. The US-led Wars on Terror exemplified the different military nature of the SDF and the ADF.

On 29 September 2003, Shigeru Ishiba, the Director General of the JDA and Robert Hill, the Australian Minister for Defence, signed a Memorandum based on the Japan-Australia summit meeting, which had been held in Canberra on 1 May 2002. The Memorandum further confirmed the common defence interests shared by both countries and ensured defence exchanges for the peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The Memorandum made arrangements, such as:

(a) ‘High level exchanges’ between the officials including Defence Ministers; (b) ‘working level exchanges’ by the military-military consultation and regular staff talks between the GSDF and the Australian Army, the MSDF and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and between the ASDF and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF); (c) ‘unit-to-unit exchanges’ through the friendship exercises of the SDF and the ADF; (d) ‘others’ such as exchanges of defence students, participation in the Tōkyō Defence Forum, and visit of the MSDF Icebreaker ‘Shirase’ to Australia.

These arrangements were comprehensive and were an important indicator of the development of the security partnership not only as UN peacekeepers but also US allies. Indeed, post-war reconstruction in Iraq marked a significant divergence in the Japan-Australia security partnership. When the Dutch government decided to withdraw its troops which had protected the SDF in Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi, in April 2005, requested Prime Minister Howard to dispatch additional ADF personnel to Iraq in order to protect the SDF. In response, Howard willingly promised to dispatch an additional 450 ADF to supplement the existing deployment of 450 soldiers. It was unusual for the Japanese government to request other countries to protect the SDF in post-conflict peace operations, especially considering that the Japanese government

50 Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword*, 48. For the full text of the Memorandum, see Ibid., 65-67.
judged that Samawah was a ‘non-combat area’. The decision made by
Howard indicates that Japan and Australia cooperated in the field of
maintenance of international peace and security.

As key US military allies, Japan and Australia played an important and
symbolic role in anti-terrorism activities and the post-war peace-building
in Afghanistan and Iraq. A Strategic Dialogue between Japan and the
United States and a Security Dialogue among Japan, Australia and the
United States at the level of senior officials were held on 23 and 24
October 2005.\(^{52}\) In this context, ‘Building a Comprehensive Strategic
Relationship’ was announced by Foreign Ministers Tarō Asō and
Alexander Downer on 18 March 2006. Asō and Downer confirmed their
mutual concerns with regards to regional and international security
cooperation in the light of peace operations in East Timor, Afghanistan,
Iraq, as well as the Tsunami of 2004 and the threat of Avian Influenza.
They also commemorated the 30\(^{th}\) anniversary of the 1976 NARA Treaty
and the 2006 Year of Exchange.\(^{53}\)

On the same day, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) was held by the
Japanese and Australian Prime Ministers as well as US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. Whereas the TSD supported the ‘emergence and
consolidation of democracies’ in the Asia-Pacific region, it also welcomed
‘China’s constructive engagement’ in the region. Furthermore, the TSD
emphasised the significance of the Six-Party talks.\(^{54}\) The TSD sent clear
messages intended to relieve China’s apprehensions and to urge North
Korea’s cooperation. In this way, the TSD dealt with sensitive political
and security issues while strengthening strategic ties among three nations.

(accessed at 15 March 09).

\(^{53}\) MOFA, 18 March 2006, Building a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, cited from,

\(^{54}\) MOFA, 18 March 2006, Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United
March 2009).
Downer visited Japan the same year to discuss bilateral relations and international situations. For Australia, it was thought to be good timing to negotiate a security agreement between the two nations as well as pursuing a free trade agreement. Downer stated that Australia desired a full-fledged security treaty with Japan. During the negotiation for the security agreement, Downer said: ‘Australia-Japan relations are undergoing a complete transformation; ‘We talked about a security agreement during my recent visit’; and that ‘This was by far the best trip I have had to Japan as Foreign Minister.’ After the talks with Abe, Downer mentioned that he was ‘struck by how upbeat he [Abe] was about the relationship with Australia.’ These statements show how actively Downer pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve the signing of a security agreement with Japan and also that Abe was supportive. In spite of his enthusiastic attitude and diplomacy, Downer’s initiative only resulted in the signing of a ‘Joint Declaration’ rather than a treaty.

Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

In the context of accumulated peacekeeping and security cooperation in Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq and in the field of anti-terrorism and disaster relief, Japan and Australia upgraded their security ties by signing the JDSC on 13 March 2007. The JDSC affirmed the bilateral strategic partnership based on:

Democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship and

57 Ibid.
58 History reveals that Alexander Downer Sr., father of Foreign Minister Downer, was an anti-Japanese politician who was a prisoner of war during WW2. See Ibid. Ironically, during the post-Pacific War period, Australia rejected the idea of security pact between Australia, New Zealand, the United States, including Japan. See Renouf, Frightened Country, 65.
59 MOFA, 13 March 2007, Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, cited from,
the areas of security cooperation ranging from law enforcement on combating transnational crimes, border security, counter-terrorism, disarmament and counter-proliferation of the WMD, peace operations, exchange of the strategic assessments, maritime and aviation security, humanitarian aids and disaster relief, to measures against contingencies including pandemics.60

These fields of strategic and security cooperation arranged in the JDSC were based on the accumulated military cooperation between the SDF and the ADF. These new arrangements, however, were 2 + 2 annual meetings of foreign ministers and defence ministers of the two countries.61 This was the first arrangement for Japan to hold the 2 + 2 talks other than the United States. In fact, the first 2 + 2 meeting, held in Tōkyō on 6 June 2007, confirmed that the security partnership had developed through peacekeeping cooperation in Cambodia, East Timor, Iraq and international disaster relief. The meeting resolved to enhance the joint training of the SDF and the ADF. Significantly, both countries would carry out desktop exercises for international disaster relief under the auspices of the ARF.62 Just as the NARA Treaty formalised, stabilised and broadened the Japan-Australia relations63, so the JDSC would formalise, stabilise and broaden the bilateral security partnership.

Nonetheless, the JDSC was not a security treaty or military alliance, unlike the Japan-US Security Treaty or the ANZUS Treaty which entails the legally binding defence obligations in the event of armed attacks. As mentioned above, Canberra was more enthusiastic about the upgrade of the security partnership into a ‘pact’ than was Tōkyō. Prime Minister Abe wrote in his book Utsukushii Kuni e (Towards a Beautiful Country) that Japan needed to expand its security cooperation not only with the United

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
63 Owada, ‘Nichigō Yūkō Kyōryoku Kihon Jōyaku’, 123.
States but also with Australia and India, which share the same values, such as democracy, human rights, freedom, and rule of law.\textsuperscript{64}

However, the conclusion of a new security treaty other than with the United States was unrealistic in terms of necessity and Article 9. The Japan-US Security Treaty might have been thought to be sufficient to protect the sovereignty of Japan. In the first place, the security treaty with the United States has been ‘asymmetrical’ with regard to the obligation for protection. With regard to security policy, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has been an unaltered constraint. The most conspicuous example of the difficulty in signing the security treaty was the movement against the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960 under the Kishi government. Therefore, the constitutional constraints and deep-rooted culture of anti-militarism were primary reasons why Japan was unable to form a military alliance with Australia. For Australia, a security treaty with Japan would have caused awkward relations with China. From a Chinese perspective, such a treaty on top of the Japan-US Security Treaty and the ANZUS Treaty could be considered a military ‘block’ to contain China. Considering the rising Chinese economy, Australia did not want to jeopardise the promising Chinese market and would-be best trading partnership. The JDSC was, therefore, signed instead.

Moreover, the need for creating a bilateral military alliance is less strategically required in the Post-Cold War period. During the Cold War period, it was proposed by Makoto Momoi of the National Defence College that both Japan and Australia could strengthen ‘their naval and air capabilities in order to replace the role of the U.S. 7th Fleet.’\textsuperscript{65} Momoi argued that cooperation of such a kind would ensure the mutual trust in the US nuclear umbrella, and work as a more effective deterrence. His

\textsuperscript{64} Abe, \textit{Utsukushii Kuni e}, 159-161.
\textsuperscript{65} Momoi, ‘Australia and Japan’, 59. Also see Frei, ‘Kan Taiheiyō no Kansetsu teki Dōmei’, 105.
idea of ‘an Australia-Japan-US system’ for trilateral strategic cooperation represents typical realism during the Cold War. However, he also suggested the idea of ‘an Australia-Japan-Asia system.’ The Head of the Joint Staff Committee of the SDF, Hiro’omi Kurisu, also stated that both countries should strengthen their defence cooperation including joint military drills, exchange of intelligence, and the signing of the military alliance.

In 1978, the Australian academic William Tow suggested the idea of a ‘JANZUS’ framework among Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the United States as security partners. The JANZUS arrangement was raised as a strategic supplement to NATO to measure against the Soviet maritime power in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War period. However, a notion of signing a bilateral or multilateral security treaty with Japan was thought to be unnecessary by most Australian leaders during the 1980s. In the first place, Japan’s foreign and security policy was not compatible with this strategy. The JANZUS debate was raised at the Australia-United States Ministerial Meeting (AUSMIN) in Canberra on 30 July 2001 when the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and US Secretary of State Colin Powell examined its feasibility. Still, the idea of a formal JANZUS ‘died’ again because it was a wrong initiative at a wrong time. The JANZUS was a typical example of Cold-War strategy by which Japan and Australia were to technically upgrade the security partnership into a military alliance.

During the post-Cold War period, the Japanese military expert, Naoko Sajima advocated ‘JANZUS arrangements’. While emphasising the

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66 Paper confirmed that Professor Momoi’s defence policy did not reflect the opinions of the Japanese government or of the National Defence College. Momoi, ‘Australia and Japan’, 53, 59-60.
69 Meaney, _Japanese Connection_, 85.
70 This time, Robert Blackwill advocated an ‘Asian NATO’ type but the JANZUS idea was still not attainable. See Tow and Trood, ‘Anchors’ Collaborative Security’, 76-77.
significance of New Zealand troops in the field of peacekeeping operations, Sajima suggested that an accumulation of ‘arrangements’ would be a more realistic and achievable option than the conclusion of a military alliance. Sajima observed that Japan and Australia might ‘shift from being northern and southern anchors to important security partners as part of a democratic community in the Asia-Pacific region’ and concluded that a reliable security partnership was ‘plausible’. Yet the idea of the JANZUS has problems in relation to China and New Zealand. First, the JANZUS arrangement was the collective defence strategy during the Cold War as a military measure against the USSR. If the JANZUS arrangement were made at the time when China is rising as an Asian military and economic power, it would cause a security dilemma between China and JANZUS member states. Second, New Zealand has taken a different security policy from Australia and the United States in terms of nuclear weapons and the Wars on Terror. Thus, it seems unlikely that the four countries would take such an initiative in their current situations.

In order to avoid a security dilemma with China while strengthening security ties between Japan and Australia, Alan Dupont made seven recommendations:

1) Encouragement for the Japan's military normalisation;
2) Avoidance of the mutual misunderstanding with China;
3) Agreement for the security cooperation;
4) Militarily educational exchange through establishment of a peacekeeping training centre in Japan;
5) Establishment of a new security architecture for Northeast Asia;
6) Development of a more ‘collegial’ partnership among Japan, Australia and the US; and
7) Setup for an Eminent Persons Group for the security cooperation.

71 Sajima suggested an arrangement like Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) which was not a full military alliance but arrangements for material supply and military drills. See Sajima, ‘Senryakuteki Kankei no Kōchiku’, 28-29.
73 Ibid.
In particular, Dupont stressed the significance of the Japan-Australia security partnership: ‘it is imperative that Australia and Japan develop a clear road map for future collaboration on defence and security in the form of an overarching framework agreement that would complement existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements.’ Unlike the JANZUS idea, Dupont’s suggestions for strengthening the security partnership are consistent with the JDSC.

Ultimately, as David Walton has observed, it is highly unlikely that Japan and Australia will solidify a formal military alliance. He points out that the military alliance with the United States makes the upgrade of full security ties unnecessary. Paradoxically, the United States acts as an agent to the Japan-Australia security partnership, but simultaneously, the military dependence on the United States is a barrier to the Japan-Australia security agreement. In addition, Walton pointed out that the Japanese Constitution, a rising China, and the changes of Japanese and Australian prime ministers made the full-blown security agreement all but unattainable. To Japan, revision of Article 9 to exercise the right of collective self-defence has been considerably difficult due to the opposition parties and culture of anti-militarism. Yet the full military alliance necessitates the obligation of mutual defence. As discussed, the Japan-US Security Treaty is asymmetrical and it would be more difficult for Japan to sign another security treaty with Australia.

As for the China factor, the Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed his concern about the talks among Prime Minister Abe, Prime Minister Howard and President Bush at Sydney in September 2007. Besides, Japan, Australia, the United States, India, and Singapore conducted a joint military maritime exercise in the Indian Ocean. For China, this kind

75 Dupont, Unsheathing the Samurai Sword, viii-xiii.
77 Walton, ‘Australia and Japan’, 73-86.
78 Mainichi Shimbun, 6 September 2007, ‘APEC Chūgoku Shuseki, Nichi Bei Gō Shunō Kaidan o Kensei (APEC Chinese President Checked Japan-US-Australia Meeting)’.
of security cooperation excluding China is tantamount to an ‘Asia-Pacific NATO’.\textsuperscript{79} China has been concerned about the TSD and condemned it as ‘mini NATO’ or ‘little NATO’ in the Asia-Pacific to contain China. Within the framework of the TSD, the Japan-Australia security partnership would be regarded as ‘shadow alliance’ as described by Purnendra Jain and John Bruni.\textsuperscript{80} Although the TSD is a ‘dialogue’ rather than a military arrangement, the dialogue excluding China is a strategic ‘containment’ of China, and it would cause a security dilemma. Another factor that made the security treaty almost impossible is the changes in prime ministers. The political and diplomatic stances of both the DPJ and the Australian Labor Party balance the US alliance with policy on China. Kevin Rudd did not choose Japan as a first diplomatic trip after he became the prime minister. His decision not to visit Japan in his first official trip caused criticism that he underestimated its important role as a trading partner.\textsuperscript{81} This was a symbolic incident to the failure of the Japan-Australia security treaty. This indicates that Rudd valued political proximity with China and perceived a relative decrease of Japan’s significance. The policy on Japan and China of the Rudd government, therefore, influenced the development of the Japan-Australia security partnership.\textsuperscript{82} These multiple factors prevented the Japan-Australia security partnership from evolving into the full-fledged military alliance.

\textbf{Japan-Australia Security Partnership in Analytical Eclecticism}

\textit{Classical and Neo-Realism: Motives for a Military Alliance}

In spite of the prohibitive factors discussed above, both Japanese and Australian negotiators regarded the JDSC as a ‘stepping stone to a formal

\textsuperscript{79} BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 13 September 2007, London, BBC Monitoring Quotes from China, Taiwan Press.

\textsuperscript{80} Jain and Bruni, ‘American Acolytes’, 95-97.

\textsuperscript{81} Asahi.com, 2 April 2008, Rudd Gō Shushō, Nihon Keishi Hihan no naka Rokugatsu no Hōnichi Keikaku o Happyō (Prime Minister Rudd Announced a Plan to Visit Japan While Being Criticised that He Underestimates Japan) (accessed at 26 March 2009).

security treaty some time in the future.\textsuperscript{83} In particular, the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer believed in the necessity and possibility of a security agreement with Japan. In other words, Abe as the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister provided a certain expectation with the Australian government about the feasibility of the Japan-Australia Security Agreement. So, why was Australia convinced that it was possible to upgrade the bilateral security partnership into a real military alliance?

Political and structural realism provides some theoretical explanations for this question. Firstly, Australia expected that Japan would normalise its military capability to the extent that it could sign a security pact. In fact, both Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe publicly expressed their desire for constitutional revision so as to make Japan a militarily ‘normal state’. As Jain and Bruni described it:

\begin{quote}
More than any prime minister in recent years, Koizumi is keen on breaking away from some of Japan’s self-limiting constitutional constraints on the use of military force and ‘Koizumi represents the aspirations of a new generation of politicians and civil servants who want Japan to become know as a ‘normal nation’.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

Similarly, at the 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the birth of the Japanese Constitution, Abe stated that Japan needed to revise the current Constitution, and he took an obvious step to constitutional reform by passing a ‘national referendum bill’ for a smoother procedure.\textsuperscript{85} These two prime ministers and other conservative LDP members believe that constitutional amendment is necessary because the post-war Constitution was ‘imposed’ by the American Occupation Forces and is a ‘hindrance’ for Japan’s national interest, which is to play a greater role in maintenance of

\textsuperscript{84} Jain and Bruni, ‘American Acolytes’, 93-94.
\textsuperscript{85} A National Referendum Bill as a prerequisite for the constitutional revision was advocated by Abe before he took office. See Mito, ‘Japan’s Constitutional Revision Debate’, 61.
international peace and security.\textsuperscript{86} As important as the initiative for the national referendum, the JDA was upgraded as the MOD on 9 January 2007. This was a symbolic example that Japan was searching for a way to become a militarily normal state. As well as the United States, Australian officials were involved in the transition from the JDA to the MOD.\textsuperscript{87} The upgrade of the JDA to the MOD and involvement of the Australian officials was another indication that Australia came to believe that a signing of a prospective security agreement was feasible. From the perspective of political realism, it was natural for the prime ministers to attempt to maximise Japan’s national interests by removing constitutional constraints. Their aspirations and initiatives for constitutional revision provided Australia with a strong reason to take the feasibility of a security agreement seriously.

Structural realism also provides some explanations for Australia’s belief that the signing of a security agreement was desirable and possible. As examined in the previous chapters, during the prime ministership of Koizumi and Abe, Richard Armitage and the Secretary of State Collin Powell pressured Japan to revise Article 9 so that Japan could make direct cooperation for the global strategy of the United States. It is natural for Canberra to follow the US strategic stance on Japanese military normalisation. Furthermore, growing Chinese military power and the ballistic missiles of North Korea were direct threats to Japan. From a strategic perspective, it was natural for the Japan-Australia-US governments to improve its defensive capabilities against these threats. These were the reasons why Japan sought to ensure its security via bilateral and trilateral security arrangements. In fact, Japan and Australia supported the US strategy of Missile Defence program. For the United States, containment of China is one of the top strategic priorities considering Chinese military and economic growth. Therefore, it can be

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{87} Walton, ‘Australia and Japan’, 76.
argued that the Japan-Australia security partnership and the TSD have developed as a balance of power and structural competition searching for hegemony. From a viewpoint of structural realism, the Japan-Australia security partnership is the ‘new American-led Security Architecture’ to contain China.\textsuperscript{88} Desmond Ball predicted that the SDF and the ADF would cooperate not only in the field of peacekeeping operations but also in ‘actual combat’ areas. Furthermore, he argued that the strategic policies of the United States would determine the ‘directions, pace and dimensions’ of the Japan-Australia security cooperation.\textsuperscript{89} Ball’s analysis is consistent with the argument of neo-realism. Thus, from classical and structural realist perspectives, political interest of Japanese Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe to make Japan a normal state and strategic interest of the United States strengthened the security ties between Japan and Australia to the extent that Australia became convinced that the security treaty was possible.

\textit{Negative Pacifism: Barrier to a Bilateral Security Treaty}

Political and structural realism provide explanations for Japan’s motivation to enhance its military power commensurate with its economic power and to upgrade its security ties with Australia within a global strategy of the United States. The Howard government attempted to sign a full security treaty with Japan, even though it could jeopardise its trust as ‘honest broker’ in Japan-China relations.\textsuperscript{90} According to the statement raised above, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was convinced that Australia would be able to sign the formal security agreement with Japan. So, why was the Downer initiative rejected by Tōkyō?

\textsuperscript{88} Tanter, ‘New American-Led Security Architecture’.
\textsuperscript{90} Mulgan, ‘Australia – Japan Relations: New Directions’.
The main reason for Japan’s rejection was the pervasive influence of ‘negative pacifism’ based on Article 9, which technically makes Japan’s exercise of the right of collective self-defence impossible. Greg Sheridan observed in The Australian that: ‘Japanese government lawyers believed it would be legally and politically too difficult to square with their constitution’. 91 Sheridan’s analysis indicates that the Japanese constitutional constraint (Article 9) was the fundamental hindrance to the signing of a Japan-Australia security treaty. Likewise, Paul Kelly argued:

Kelly also suggested that Japan’s ‘Pacifist Constitution’ did not allow Japan to sign the Australia’s proposal for the security treaty. In talks with Defence Minister Kyūma, Prime Minister Howard referred to the Japanese constitutional limitations in the development of the bilateral military cooperation, and expressed his expectation that both countries would cooperate more frequently in the future. 93 Although Howard commented that it ‘won’t be a full treaty but it might ultimately lead to that’94, his remark implies that he expected Japan to revise its Peace Constitution, especially its peace clause, so that it could exercise the right of collective self-defence in order to conduct normal military operations with Australia and the United States.

Hence, the direct and fundamental inhibitive factor to the signing of the Japan-Australia Security Treaty was negative pacifism based on Article 9. In addition to the constitutional limitations, another critical factor was the pacifist stance of the LDP’s coalition partner, Kōmeitō. Even though

Kōmeitō cooperated with the LDP as a coalition government partner, its stances on security issues, especially Article 9 and the right of the collective self-defence, differ from those of the LDP. Whereas Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe insisted on the necessity of constitutional revision and sought to make the exercise of the right of collective self-defence constitutional, Kōmeitō did not agree with these ideas. Instead of deleting or modifying Paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 9, Kōmeitō advocated the inclusion of a third paragraph to recognise the existence of the SDF and SDF dispatch to post-conflict peace operations.95

The fact that the LDP/Kōmeitō coalition government did not share the same views on the right of collective self-defence became more conspicuous during Abe’s prime ministership. When Abe took office, he stated that his government would:

> Thoroughly study individual, specific cases to identify what kind of case falls under the exercise of the right of collective self-defence which is forbidden under the Constitution, so that the Japan-US alliance functions more effectively and peace is maintained.96

Furthermore, Abe announced that his government would seek to revise the post-war Constitution because it ‘was formulated nearly 60 years ago when Japan was under military occupation’.97 The following day, Akihiro Ohta, the leader of Kōmeitō, made it clear that Kōmeitō would not recognise the exercise of the collective self-defence right.98 In addition to the then opposition parties, different security policies between the LDP and Kōmeitō prohibited the Abe government from changing the policy on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence through constitutional

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97 Ibid.
In other words, Kōmeitō’s negative pacifism was an indirect hindrance to the Abe government attempt to ratify a full security treaty with Australia.100

**Positive Pacifism in the Joint Declaration**

As examined above, negative pacifism based on Article 9 prevented the Japanese government from ratifying the security treaty with Australia. On the other hand, positive pacifism based on the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution is compatible with the purpose of the JDSC. The JDSC includes keywords of positive pacifism of the Japanese Constitution such as democracy, human rights, freedom, the rule of law, mutual respect, trust, and deep friendship. Both countries decided to improve their security cooperation in the field, such as counter-international crime border-maritime-aviation security, counter-terrorism, disarmament, counter-proliferation of the WMD, counter-pandemics, and peace operations. In particular, the JDSC states that both countries would deepen their security cooperation, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations through ‘the United Nations and other international and regional organisations and fora.’101 Thus, while the Japan-Australia Security Treaty was not signed because of negative pacifism, it can be argued that the JDSC was formulated based on shared values which are compatible with positive pacifism of the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations. As previous case studies have shown, international peace operations are compatible with the concept of positive pacifism. Moreover, as discussed already, the concept of human security, which is composed of ‘different types of

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99 Strictly speaking, the Buddhist pacifist stance of the Sōka Gakkai (supporting group of Kōmeitō) was a hindrance to constitutional reform and exercise of the right of collective self-defence. See, Hardacre, ‘Constitutional Revision and Japanese Religions’.

100 Likewise, pacifism of the SDP, a coalition government partner of the DPJ, can be considered as one of the hindrances for signing of the defence agreement. See, Alford, P., ‘Defence Deal Looms with Japan’, The Australian, 22 September 2009.

freedoms: freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf,\textsuperscript{102} is consistent with the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, which stipulates ‘we recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want’\textsuperscript{103} and with the Preamble of the UN Charter which determined to ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights’ and to promote ‘better standards of life in larger freedom’.\textsuperscript{104} Just as the dispatch of the SDF to UNPKO and other peace operations were legalised based on positive pacifism, the JDSC was also created based on the concepts of positive pacifism.

Japan and Australia in the Asia-Pacific Region

Japan-Australia Relations and Integration of the Asia-Pacific

The analysis above has demonstrated that the possibility of the signing of the Japan-Australia security treaty is highly unlikely because of Japan’s constitutional constraint and anti-militarist pacifism. At the same time, it can be argued that the Japan-Australia security partnership represented in the JDSC is based on shared values, such as human rights and freedom, which are consistent with positive pacifism.

Unlike a military alliance based on a neo-realist paradigm (balance of power), the nature of the JDSC is consistent with the agenda of neo-liberalism (international cooperation and institutionalism). In this regard, it is fair to argue that the Japan-Australia security partnership is more likely to develop into comprehensive multilateralism (within the framework of regional and international organisations, such as the United Nations and the ARF) rather than an exclusive bilateral, triangle or


\textsuperscript{103} NDL, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, cited from, \url{http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html} (accessed at 20 Feb 09).

quadrilateral military bloc (among Japan, Australia, US and India). If that is the case, what are the implications of the JDSC for the integration of the Asia-pacific region, in particular through establishing the Asia-pacific Community, which is equivalent to the European Union (EU)?

It has been argued that the regional institutionalism of the Asia-pacific is different from the integration of European countries. Indeed, the integration of the Asia-pacific region has some differences in many ways. First, unlike the case of Europe, Asia-pacific countries, which are separated by oceans, have difficulties in the disarmament of maritime power. Second, whereas European countries share their history, culture, and religions, countries in the Asia-pacific are more diverse. On-going disputes, such as China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and Japan-North Korea, moreover, make it difficult for the Asia-pacific countries to carry out drastic and comprehensive disarmament. Third, the Asia-pacific region does not have a regional military organisation like NATO. Nonetheless, there are some similarities. For instance, both regions have economic interdependency among countries. In addition, countries in both regions are conscious of their own regionalism and regional integration.

Therefore, although there seem to be difficulties, it is premature to rule out the possibility of an integrated Asia-pacific region.

**Bilateral Cooperation for Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific**

Both Japan and Australia have contributed to the development of the Asia-Pacific area by setting up several regional organisations. In other words, the history of the Japan-Australia partnership is that of regional integration of the Asia-pacific. In particular, since the signing of the 1976 NARA Treaty, both Japan and Australia have made efforts to form the regional institutions in the Asia-pacific region, such as the

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105 Tsubouchi, ‘OSCE Purosesu to ASEAN’, 64.
Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development, suggested in the Crawford-Ōkita Report in 1976, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1983, the APEC in 1989 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994.\textsuperscript{108} The process of regional integration in the Asia-pacific, like that of Europe, would lead to economic unification and cooperation which could eventually ‘spill-over’ to the field of political and security cooperation.\textsuperscript{109}

In the establishment of the APEC, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira proposed the idea of Kan Taiheiyo Rentai Kosō (Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept) in 1979. In 1980, Ōhira visited Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and reached an agreement in the Pacific Community Seminar chaired by John Crawford. The Canberra Conference was held in the same year and the PECC was organised in 1983. The bilateral cooperation for building economic institution led to the set up of APEC announced by Robert Hawke in Seoul in January 1989.\textsuperscript{110} The success of establishing the APEC forum can be considered to be a barometer of the efficacy of the Japan-Australia partnership for economic integration in the Asia-pacific. The 1995 Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership articulated that both countries would contribute to building ‘an enduring and steadfast partnership which is a strong positive force for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.’\textsuperscript{111}

In terms of regional economic integration, Japan and Australia not only cooperated for regional economic integration but also began negotiating for the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). As Mulgan observed, it is notable that the JDSC and FTA negotiations were addressed at the same time.\textsuperscript{112} Yet the signing of the bilateral FTA seems as difficult as the signing of the bilateral alliance treaty. This is because the FTA with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Terada, ‘Thirty Years of the Australia-Japan Partnership’, 536-551.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} The ‘spill-over theory’ was advocated by Ernst, B. Haas as neo-functionalism in international relations theory. On the theoretical contribution of Haas, see Ruggie, Katzenstein, Keohane, andSchmitter, ‘Transformation in World Politics’.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Takeda, Monogatari Ōsutoraria no Rekishi, 256.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Kersten, ‘Japan and Australia’, 292.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Mulgan, ‘Australia-Japan Relations’.
\end{itemize}
Australia is considered to cause huge agricultural damage to Japan.113 Nevertheless, the processes towards full security and a FTA between Japan and Australia need to be considered cautiously because both nations have played a significant role in regional integration in the field of political, economic and security. In this regard, the bilateral security and trade negotiation can been viewed as a part of on-going integration in the Asia-pacific region.

Political and Security Integration in the Asia-Pacific

The integration process of the Asia-pacific region can be seen in the field of politics and security. One of the first initiatives for political and security integration in this area was the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961. However, the member states were only Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and excluded Japan and Australia. Besides, it was organised by anti-communist countries and could not facilitate political integration in the region. The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 was also organised by anti-communist member states, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.114 Even though the ASEAN was organised by non-communist members, territorial conflicts between the Philippines and Malaysia and Malaysia and Indonesia existed. Malaysia and the Philippines even broke their diplomatic relations in 1968 despite their ASEAN membership, although they were restored one year later. In 1971, the ASEAN countries expressed their security policy as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). After the end of the Cold War, Vietnam became an ASEAN member and ASEAN explored regionalism in Southeast Asia which can be described as ‘Pax Aseana’.115 From the perspective of

113 For instance, the Agriculture Department of the Hokkaido Government estimated that damage to Hokkaido’s agriculture will be **1 trillion 300 billion yen** and 90,000 people will be unemployed, if the FTA is concluded. See Hokkaido Government, Agriculture Department, Official Website, cited from, [http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/nsi/nouseihp/EPA.htm](http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/nsi/nouseihp/EPA.htm) (accessed at 9 July 2010).
Southeast Asian regionalism, ASEAN has greatly contributed to political integration in the Asia-Pacific.

As already discussed, the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine declared that Japan’s Southeast Asian policy would contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, Prime Minister Ōhira’s ‘concept of Asia-Pacific Alignment’ shows that Japan would be willing to play a proactive role in the integration of the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Australia has been keen on the integration of the Asia-Pacific area not only in terms of economic cooperation but also in the field of politics and security. For Australia, peace and security in the Asia-Pacific have been the main focus of its defence and security policy. The withdrawal of the British troops from Southeast Asia and the US decision to refrain from making a military commitment in Asia in the Post-Vietnam War period were decisive factors. Hence, it was natural for Australia to take responsibility for the maintenance of security cooperation in the area. In this context, in July 1990, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans expressed a proposal to establish the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) as an analogy of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Although his proposal to reduce the scale of US naval forces in the Pacific worried Japan and the United States, it contributed to facilitating consultation with his Japanese counterpart Nakayama and stimulated the establishment of the regional security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific Region.

From liberal-institutionalist viewpoints, Australia as a middle power has played an important role in establishing the ARF. The main objectives of the ARF are:

116 For a discussion of the Fukuda Doctrine in relation with ASEAN, see Sudō, Evolution of ASEAN-Japan Relations, especially Chapter 2.
1) To foster constructive dialogue and consultation on politics and security issues of common interest and concern and 2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF participants range from the ASEAN countries to the United States, Russia and China as well as the European Union. \[119\]

Thus, in comparison with the ASEAN, the ARF includes a more comprehensive range of countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia has been actively involved in the ARF as a founding member since 1994. In particular, Australia encourages the ARF to make strategic and security contributions in the areas of anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation, as well as nuclear weapon and missile issues particularly concerning North Korea. Five Australian security experts are registered in the ARF Register of Experts and Eminent Persons for the purpose of enhancing the capabilities of the ARF in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolutions. \[120\]

Furthermore, Australia is actively committed to the ‘second track (non-official)’ institutions, such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS), and the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (AUS-CSCAP). \[121\] The CSCAP was established on 8 June 1993 in Kuala Lumpur as a result of a non-governmental strategic study meeting held in Seoul from 1 to 3 November 1992, with representatives from Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States. Unlike the first track diplomacy, the CSCAP enables its members, composed of scholars and officials, to discuss strategic and security issues in a more informal way. According to the Charter of the CSCAP, the purpose of the organisation is to provide ‘a structured process


\[121\] Ibid.
for regional confidence building and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific Region.\textsuperscript{122}

CSCAP as second track security cooperation is supplemental to the first track security cooperation by the ARF. According to MOFA, the ARF has three phases in its approaches to conflict resolution: ‘1) confidence building (seminar, workshop, security dialogue, and defence exchange); 2) preventive diplomacy (ministerial meeting); and 3) conflict resolution.’\textsuperscript{123} Although the ARF is a first track security cooperation, the ARF member states have never dispatched their troops to peace operations under the auspices of the ARF unlike NATO. In other words, the ARF is not a military organisation and is still uncertain in the actual field of international conflict resolutions.

The nature of the JDSC overlaps in many ways with the objectives of the ARF, such as anti-terrorism, counter-proliferation, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. More specifically, the JDSC affirms that the Japan-Australia security partnership would work together with the ARF to achieve these kinds of objectives.\textsuperscript{124} In this regard, the Japan-Australia security partnership, based on the JDSC, can be regarded as a bilateral initiative to strengthen the ARF so that both countries can supplement the weaknesses of the regional security system. In short, the bilateral security cooperation can be perceived as a part of security cooperation for regional integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the signing of the NARA Treaty in 1976, Japan and Australia have made efforts to enhance economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Likewise, the JDSC appears to have displayed a bilateral determination in which both


countries can take leadership in maintaining the peace and security in the Asia-Pacific area.

_Bilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific_

Both Japan and Australia had a long indirect defence and strategic relationship as the ‘Northern and Southern Anchors’ of the ‘Free World’ during the Cold War. As analysed previously, the military roles of Japan and Australia as US allies during the periods of the Korean and Vietnam Wars considerably differed due to Japan’s constitutional constraints. While Japan provided military bases and assistance for the US forces, Australia dispatched the ADF to Korea and Vietnam. Unlike Japan, Australia has consistently made a commitment to ‘other people’s wars’ as a loyal junior partner of the United States. Both countries have played different roles as key US allies but for the same purposes in the Cold War period.

During the 1980s, Japan and Australia were becoming more conscious that both would be able to play principal roles in helping to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The Preamble of the 1976 NARA Treaty suggests that both countries noticed their ‘regional responsibility’ in the Asia-Pacific area. The Preamble of the 1976 Treaty stipulates that:

Co-operation between the two countries should have in view not only their own mutual benefit but also their common interest in the prosperity and welfare of other countries, including those in the Asian and Pacific region, of which they are part.

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126 Ibid.
127 Lim, ‘Australia’s Stake in Asia-Pacific Regional Security’, 77.
Article 3 of the Treaty clarified that their mutual interests are not only economic but also political.\textsuperscript{130} Iwamoto also concluded that both Japan and Australia attempted to establish a new ‘regional institution’ in the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{131}

For Japan, some issues regarding the legacy of the Pacific War, especially in regards to China and North and South Koreas, still exist. The negative image of Imperial Japan as an aggressor and military expansionist country has continuously haunted Japan and it constrains Japan’s political and diplomatic assertiveness in Asia.\textsuperscript{132} How Japan deals with its negative historical legacy is a key to playing a greater role in regional integration in the Asia-Pacific. Coincidentally, Australia also has an historically negative legacy caused by the White Australia policy. For Australia, the question is ‘how Australia fits in with Asia’ as John Gunther explored.\textsuperscript{133} Not only Japan and Australia but also the Asia-Pacific region itself possesses negative historical assets of imperialism, the Pacific War and the Cold War. In order to overcome these negative historical legacies, Japan and Australia chose to search for a multilateral security system rather than bilateral or trilateral strategic cooperation. From this perspective, the plans for security cooperation confirmed in the JDSC will function better in the field of peacekeeping/humanitarian cooperation rather than strategic/military cooperation. More importantly, it would be better if the agendas arranged in the JDSC proceeds with wider perspectives in cooperation with the ARF framework.

The regional implication of the Japan-Australia security declaration is that the bilateral security partnership could function not only as so-called ‘hub and spokes’ but also as ‘webs’, which ‘would promote a sense of

\textsuperscript{130} Iwamoto, ‘1970 Nendai no Nichigō Kankei, 118.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 122.
\textsuperscript{133} Watanabe, ‘Japan and Australia’, 8.
security community across the region as a whole.'\textsuperscript{134} This means that the bilateral security cooperation is likely to function beyond the US junior partners or the Northern and Southern Anchors under the US military alliance system. As Yoshinobu Yamamoto pointed out, a hub-spokes system and multilateral cooperative security system are not necessarily contradictory but rather mutually supplemental in the light of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. He also argued that ‘Japan’s security policies have to be more multi-faceted than they were in the Cold War.’\textsuperscript{135} In this regard, the Japan-Australia security partnership needs to strengthen both bilaterally and multilaterally.

From the perspective of both bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, Japan and Australia will be able to facilitate the establishment of a ‘Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre for the Asia-Pacific Region.’\textsuperscript{136} This Asia-Pacific PKO Centre will be similar to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada.\textsuperscript{137} Australia, like Canada, is a major contributory country to international peacekeeping operations and has accumulated expertise. As analysed already, although one of the main purposes of the ARF is conflict resolution, including international peacekeeping operations, the ARF could not commit itself to any peace operations. The establishment of the Asia-pacific PKO Centre will strengthen conflict resolution capabilities in order to deal with the weakness of the ARF. More significantly, the PKO Centre would be able to contribute to the decrease of military and political tensions between Japan and other antagonising countries, especially China, and both North and South Korea. Through this PKO Centre, Japan will be able to enhance its confidence building with other Asia-pacific countries. The fact that the SDF has already worked together with the Korean forces in peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{134} See Blair and Hanley, ‘From Wheels to Webs’, 7-17., cited from Bisley, ‘Japan-Australia Security Declaration’, 46.
\textsuperscript{136} Ishizuka, ‘Japan’s Policy towards Peacekeeping Operations’, 83.
operations and that China accepted the SDF in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake suggest that China and South Korea might be more agreeable to the nature of the SDF as an international peacekeeper rather than an offensive power. The experience of the ADF and spacious Australian continent are suitable for the joint peacekeeping drills. Japan, in cooperation with other Asia-Pacific countries, will be able to bankroll the establishment of the PKO Centre. The JDSC can be interpreted that both Japan and Australia confirmed their willingness to take assertive leadership in the field of peacekeeping operations. The creation of the Asia-Pacific PKO Centre will be a meaningful step towards the embodiment of the Asia-Pacific Community.

As a part of the preventive diplomacy initiatives, the Asia-Pacific PKO Centre can be used to train defence officers and troops in the field of pre-post conflict peace operations. The security situation in the Asia-Pacific area is relatively stable but there are still some regional conflicts, such as the Spratly Island, the Takeshima Islands, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and Japan-North Korea. If the countries of the Asia-Pacific region cooperate in the field of the peacekeeping operations through the PKO Centre, it will be able to facilitate dialogues among military personnel and defence officials of conflict parties. The establishment of the PKO Centre will be beneficial for strengthening the ARF and the political and security integration in the Asia-Pacific region.

In 2008, the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed the idea of establishing an EU-type ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ based on FTA between Australia, Japan, the United States and India by 2020. He also stated that Australia would expand security cooperation based on the JDSC. The

fact that Kevin Rudd suggested a new vision for the Asia-Pacific integration to Prime Minister Fukuda points to the future orientation of the bilateral security partnership. In this regard, the JDSC can be interpreted as a cornerstone of integration for the Asia-Pacific region. In their talks, both Prime Ministers Fukuda and Rudd confirmed that both countries would make a commitment to contribute to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japan-Australia security partnership, including the JDSC, is a stepping stone towards the institutionalisation of the Asia-Pacific Community. The Japan-Australia security partnership contributes to negative peace through disarmament and non-proliferation and to positive pacifism through peace-building and the integration of the Asia-Pacific region.

Takashi Inoguchi once raised four scenarios of the integration of the Asia-Pacific regions: 1) Pax Americana Phase (peace by the United States); 2) Pax Ameripponica (peace by the United States and Japan); 3) Pax Consortis (peace by agreements); and 4) Pax Nipponica (peace by Japan). The ‘Pax Consortis’ in the Asia-Pacific region is compatible with the Japan-Australia partnership in establishing the Asia-Pacific Community. Japan, as the sole state which experienced nuclear bombings, and Australia, as a uranium export state which initiated the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, can together contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament (negative pacifism). From the perspective of positive pacifism, both states support the UN Charter and contribute to peace-building operations for human rights and to institutionalising the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific. With the shared goal of regional institutionalisation, the Japan-Australia security partnership...

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140 Inoguchi, *Japan’s Foreign Policy*, 173-176.
142 As for bilateral cooperation for disarmament (negative peace), see Hamel-Green, ‘Japan, Australia and the UN Disarmament’. 
partnership contributes to negative peace and positive peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the development of the Japan-Australia security partnership in relation to the JDSC, as well as its implications for regional integration in the Asia-Pacific. The Japan-Australia security partnership has evolved gradually over the years, based on shared strategic interests as US allies.

During the 1990 Gulf Crisis, Japan refused the suggestion from Bob Hawke to dispatch the SDF to the Persian Gulf. Yet the 1992 PKO Law based on positive pacifism made Japan’s peacekeeping cooperation with Australia possible. The UNTAC operation was the first example of security cooperation between the SDF and ADF. In particular, the SDF and the ADF worked together under the leadership of the Special Representative of Secretary-General Akashi Yasushi and Major General John Sanderson. Peacekeeping collaboration in East Timor showed how mature the security partnership had become, when Japan responded to Australia’s request by dispatching some 690 SDF personnel to UNTAET in March 2002. As in the case of UNTAC, Sukehiko Hasegawa was appointed to the Special Representative of Secretary-General and coordinated peacebuilding operations. The case of INTERFET in the East Timor conflict demonstrated the differences, as well as the complementary nature of the SDF and the ADF. The responses to the US-led wars on Afghanistan and Iraq also showed the organisational difference of the SDF and the ADF. However, the complementary nature of both troops was confirmed again in the decision to dispatch an additional 450 ADF personnel to Iraq to protect the SDF. Therefore, through a post-war peacekeeping collaboration in Iraq in 2005, the Japan-Australia security partnership became an
accomplished fact. The JDSC did not come about as a ‘bolt out of the blue’ but was part of the development of the security partnership.

In spite of these peacekeeping collaborations, Australia’s offer to sign a full defence agreement was rejected due to Article 9 (negative pacifism). For this reason, a much softer and non-threatening type of arrangement (the JDSC) was made. Significantly, the JDSC is consistent with key factors of positive pacifism, such as human rights and freedom. The regional implications of the JDSC indicate that the bilateral security partnership is ready to contribute to the integration of the Asia-Pacific region especially in terms of peacekeeping operations. In the final analysis, the development of the Japan-Australia security partnership can be seen as a part of the security integration in the Asia-Pacific community, although there still remain barriers, such as the different motivations of political leaders and the residual legacies of the Pacific War and the Cold War in the region.143

143 Although Prime Minister Julia Gillard, successor to Kevin Rudd, is not supportive of the plan, the Asia-Pacific community proposal is ‘still alive’. See Kerin, J., ‘Rudd’s Asia Vision Still in Play’, *Australian Financial Review*, 6 July 2010. Moreover, it is important to recall that the Asia-Pacific Community plan was supported by US President Barack Obama. See *the Australian*, 4 February 2010, ‘Obama to Bolster Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Plan’.
Chapter Six

Japan as a ‘Global Pacifist State’: The Future of the Peace Constitution and Japan’s Core Security Identity

Introduction

In the previous chapters, the shifts from negative pacifism to positive pacifism have been examined in relation to Japan’s contribution to international peace operations. Importantly, as shown with the changing public opinion during the early 1990s, the shift to positive pacifism coincided with the shift towards constitutional revision. Indeed, a direct correlation between public recognition of the significance of SDF dispatch and support for constitutional revision can be seen. The constitutional revision issue is a crucial one because revision would entail drastic change to Japan’s security identity, in particular its pacifist identity. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Japanese constitutional revision debate in relation to implications for Japan’s pacifism and security identity. The aims of this chapter are to: 1) clarify the arguments of the Japanese constitutional debate; 2) examine the implications of constitutional revision with regard to changing Japanese pacifism and security identity; and 3) analyse the concept of the global pacifist state model as Japan’s core security identity.

Several reasons have been presented for why the Japanese Constitution needs to be modified. For example, it has been argued that ‘new human rights’, such as the right to privacy and to the environment, need to be added to the current Constitution. The argument essentially is that the

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1 Still, there is an interpretation that ‘new human rights’, such as the rights to privacy and environment are guaranteed by the current Constitution, especially based on Article 13. See Abe, ‘Kenpō o Aratamereba’, 97-99. Article 13 reads: ‘All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does no interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.’ See NDL,
current Constitution is outdated and needs to be modified so that it matches current political and legal circumstances. However, the main reason why Japan’s constitutional revision has been so controversial is that constitutional reform, especially revision or deletion of Article 9, has the potential to drastically change Japan’s security identity. There has been a fear among Japanese people (negative pacifism) that constitutional revision would lead to the return of an aggressive ‘militarist state’. Moreover, it is believed that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is special in terms of renunciation of war. Of course, the constitution and laws of other countries, as well as international law, especially the Charter of the United Nations, prohibit acts of aggression (aggressive war). Yet most Japanese constitutional scholars support the interpretation that the Japanese Constitution prohibits any use of force including self-defence (defensive war). Despite this academic interpretation, the Japanese government has regarded the SDF as constitutional. This gap between the ideal of the Peace Constitution and the reality of politics has been a cause of longstanding nationwide controversy and passionate debate. Arguments put forward in the constitutional revision debate therefore, need to be clarified.

Protectors and Revisionists of the Japanese Constitution

Constitutional Protectors: Japanese Idealism and Pragmatism

Those who try to protect the Japanese Constitution (constitutional protectors or gokenha) tend to regard Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution as a special ‘peace clause’ compared to other countries’ constitutions. Constitutional protectors also regard the current Constitution as self-created rather than being ‘imposed’. For instance, Takamichi Mito argued that the current Constitution was not imposed by

SCAP. He pointed out that Shidehara in his book *Gaikō Gojūnen* (Fifty Years of Diplomacy) made it clear that no one imposed the Constitution on Japan. ² Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1, although the draft was originally prepared by the GHQ, it was written in and through a process of ‘Japanisation’. Mito also warned that constitutional revision would not increase Japan’s independence and international prestige.³ The main reason why Japanese constitutional protectors oppose revision of the current Japanese Constitution is that they wish Japan to remain a pacifist state or to become a ‘non-violent state’ (unarmed neutrality). Here, whereas a pacifist state is based on relative pacifism, a non-violent state is based on absolute pacifism. Therefore, two types of constitutional protectors based on negative pacifism can be identified. Whereas relative pacifists prefer retaining the status quo (pacifist state), absolute pacifists insist on unarmed neutrality (non-violent state).

Most Japanese constitutionalists are categorised as the constitutional protectors. Moreover, most Japanese constitutional lawyers have accepted an interpretation that Article 9 prohibits possession of military power even for the purpose of self-defence. In other words, they regard Article 9 as absolute pacifism.⁴ Kōji Aikyō argued that Japanese politicians are obliged to ‘respect and uphold’ the Japanese Constitution on the basis of Article 99 which stipulates that it is not citizens but public officials that have obligations to protect the Constitution.⁵ As Yasuo Hasebe argued, the Japanese Peace Constitution stems from the historical fact that the Imperial Japanese Army obstructed democracy and eventually led Japan into the Second World War. He implied that if the Japanese government

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³ Ibid.
⁵ Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates: ‘The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution’. See NDL, Article 99 of the Japanese Constitution, cited from, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s10 (accessed at 4 August 2009).
revises Article 9 to legalise the exercise of right of the collective self-defence, Japan would be directly involved in US-led wars.\(^6\)

Constitutions and laws in the Philippines, France, Poland, Italy, and Germany also forbid aggressive war (acts of aggression), but permit defensive war (self-defence). From the perspective of a constitutional protector, it can be perceived that Article 9 is more thorough in its pacifism since it even prohibits Japan from maintaining armed forces and waging ‘defensive war’.\(^7\) Even in comparison to Article 12 of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Article 9 can be interpreted as a more ‘non-violent’ peace clause.\(^8\) This is because, although Article 12 of the Constitution of Costa Rica bans possessing an ‘army’, it admits to organising ‘military forces’ in case of an armed attack as an exercise of the rights of the ‘individual and collective self-defence’.\(^9\) Hence, from a perspective of constitutional studies, whereas Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution can be interpreted to prohibit the defensive war and possession of ‘war potential’, Article 12 of the Costa Rica Constitution authorises the organisation of the military forces in the event of armed attacks. Furthermore, whereas Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution was created before signing the 1951 Security Treaty with the United States, Article 12 of the 1949 Costa Rica Constitution was based on the collective security system of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.\(^10\) Therefore, unlike Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Article 12 of the Costa Rica Constitution allows its government to exercise

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\(^6\) Hasebe, ‘Nihon no Rikkenshugi yo’, 122, 125.

\(^7\) Miyata, Hibusō Kokumintekiō no Shisō, 14. Also see, Imai, Kenpō Kyūjō Kokumin Tōhyō, 108-109.

\(^8\) Imai, Kenpō Kyūjō Kokumin Tōhyō, 110.

\(^9\) Article 12 of the Costa Rica Constitution stipulates: ‘the Army as a permanent institution is abolished. There shall be the necessary police forces for surveillance and the preservation of the public order. Military forces may only be organized under a continental agreement or for the national defense; in either case, they shall always be subordinate to the civil power: they may not deliberate or make statements or representatives individually or collectively’. Cited from, Legal Services of Costa Rica Investment, the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, http://www.costa-rica-investment.com/costa_rica_constitution (accessed at 4 August 2009).

the right of collective defence and participate in a collective security
system. Thus, Japanese constitutionalists interpret Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution as the only ‘non-violent pacifist’ clause which
stipulates the renunciation of war and non-possession of armed forces
even for self-defence. Based on non-violent pacifism, some constitutional
protectors believe that existence of both the SDF and the Japan-US
Security Treaty are unconstitutional. Toshio Hoshino pointed out that
Article 9 can be considered as an historical process of the illegalisation of
war. In other words, Article 9 can be situated as the crystallisation of
efforts for the illegalisation of war that began with the Covenant of the
League of Nations (1920), the Paris Non-War Treaty (1928), and the
Nakazawa argued that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is worthy of
‘world heritage’ status. Yet, as Toshiki Mogami contended, there is a
fundamental difference between Article 9 and the UN Charter. Whereas
the UN Charter authorise use of force as exercises of the right of
individual and collective self-defence as well as collective sanctions, Article
9 values non-violence and does not authorise any kind of use of force as a
means of settling international disputes. In other words, it can be
considered that pacifism of Article 9 is absolute pacifism, whereas that of
the UN Charter is relative pacifism.

Moreover, Yōichi Higuchi pointed out the functionality of Article 9 in the
contemporary world arguing that if it were not for Article 9, the SDF could
have participated in the US-led Wars. From this viewpoint, constitutional
protectors insist that Article 9 is still functional even though it has been wrongly interpreted. Shōjiro Sakaguchi argued that
Article 9 is not one-nation pacifism (ikkoku heiwashugi) but international
pacifism. The reason for this is that Article 9 was created based on

11 For instance, see Mizushima, ‘Genjitsu to Yūri shiteshimatta Kenpō wa’, 151.
13 Ohta and Nakazawa, Kenpō Kyūjö o Sekai Isan ni.
international pacifism and the historical fact that Japan invaded neighbouring countries during the Second World War. As a matter of fact, Article 9 describes ‘international peace’ in the first sentence as its first priority. On the basis of Article 9, constitutional protectors sued the Japanese government for dispatching the SDF to Iraq. They believe that SDF dispatch to Iraq was unconstitutional. In addition, they insisted that SDF deployment to Iraq violated the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Law, which limited SDF activities only in ‘non-combat’ area.

Opposition parties, especially the Socialist and Communist parties, have opposed constitutional revision. As argued previously, the JSP proposed the policy of unarmed neutrality. The political goals of the JCP are the abolition of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty as the JCP believes these military powers and alliance are ‘unconstitutional’. In the 10th regular national convention in February 2006, the SDP, as the successor to the JSP, expressed its objection to any kind of constitutional revision and contended that the SDF should be gradually diminished and transformed into an unarmed organisation. The SDP also expressed opposition to the Japan-US Security Treaty and suggested that the Security Treaty needed to be changed to the Peace Treaty and demanded that US troops be withdrawn from Japan. In short, Japanese idealists and pacifists are opposed to constitutional revision because they believe that the revision would change Japan into a ‘militarist state’ that can wage wars.

As Richard Samuels pointed out, Japanese pragmatists also tend to avoid revising the current Constitution. For instance, Japanese pragmatic Prime Ministers such as Shigeru Yoshida, Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Satō, and

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16 Sakaguchi, ‘Kenpō toittemo Hō no Hitotsu’, 90.
20 Samuels, *Constitutional Revision in Japan*. 
Kiichi Miyazawa regarded Article 9 as a useful excuse to focus on economic development in spite of US pressure on Japan to rearm. Still, the pragmatists’ stance has been conditioned by the existence of leftist and pacifist politicians who held one-third of the seats in the Diet. In other words, pragmatist politicians had no choice but to maintain the 1947 Constitution due to the strong influence of the culture of anti-militarism (negative pacifism) pervasive in society. Although pragmatists recognised the significance of constitutional reform, their economy-prioritised foreign and security policy was influential enough to block revisionists’ ambition for rearmament through constitutional revision throughout the post-war history of Japanese constitutional politics.

Japanese Realism: Proponents of Constitutional Revision

Those who insist on constitutional revision (constitutional revisionists or kaikenha) argue that the 1947 Constitution needs to be amended because they wish to normalise or maximise Japanese military power. There are two types of constitutional revisionists based on defensive and offensive realism. Whereas defensive realists prefer normalisation of military power, offensive realists desire maximisation of military power. In other words, the former wishes Japan to be a normal state, the latter wants Japan to be a militarist state independent from the United States.

Constitutional revisionists have two main reasons why the current Constitution should be revised. First, constitutional revisionists believe that Japan should possess a ‘normal army’ and therefore regard Article 9 as a hindrance to achieve this political goal. They also argue that Article 9 gives rise to contradiction and misunderstanding regarding the

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21 Ibid., 6.
22 For the distinction between defensive realism (balance of power) and offensive realism (infinite desire for power), see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
constitutionality of the SDF. Second, revisionists desire autonomy from the alliance with the United States. They insist that the Constitution was imposed by the GHQ and created during the occupation period which extraordinarily limited Japan’s own decision making process.

Retrospectively, the original political platform of the LDP was comprised of two pillars: constitutional revision and rearmament. For these two ultimate goals, the conflicting two conservative parties, Yoshida-led Liberal Party and Hatoyama-led Democratic Party decided to merge, seeking to gain two-thirds of the seats at the Diet, which is one of the conditions for constitutional revision. The first LDP Prime Minister Ichirō Hatoyama unequivocally stated that constitutional revision was necessary so as to avoid misunderstanding regarding interpretation of Article 9 and the SDF. While insisting on the necessity of constitutional revision, Hatoyama desired to adopt a single-seat electoral district system, which was designed to undercut the influence of opposition parties and carry out constitutional revision. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s successor Nobusuke Kishi also expressed his strong motivation for constitutional revision. Kishi stated that Japanese people should create an ‘original and independent’ constitution by revising the 1947 Constitution. He also

24 Constitutional revisionists especially wish Paragraph 2 of Article 9 to be deleted or revised so that the Constitution fits into the reality of international politics. However, this does not necessarily mean that Japan should be a militarily aggressive or powerful state. See Tanaka, Atarashii Chusei, 251.

25 For instance, Hyōdō Nisohachi called the 1947 Japanese Constitution ‘Mac Kenpō (Constitution made by MacArthur)’ and he insisted that Japan should abandon the imposed Constitution. See Hyōdō, Nihon Yūji.

26 Abe, Utsukushii Kuni e, 27-29. Conditions of Constitutional Amendments are stipulated in Paragraph 1 of Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution: ‘Amendments to the Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify’. Cited from the Constitution of Japan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s9 (accessed at 5 August 2009).


28 Hatoyama’s ambitious plan to adopt the single-seat electoral district system was not supported however.
contended that a single-seat constituency system is desirable not for constitutional revision but for a more democratic two-party system. Kishi’s remark on the creation of independent Constitution implied that he believed that the 1947 Constitution was imposed by the GHQ. Likewise, Japan’s Commission on the Constitution noted that ‘it was the majority opinion in the commission that the present Constitution was not enacted on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.’ After Kishi was forced to step down from his prime ministership as a result of the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty, successive prime ministers have eschewed arguing constitutional revision at the National Diet. Instead, LDP Prime Ministers focused on kaishaku kaiken, i.e. constitutional revision by changing the interpretation of the Constitution. Even Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, famous as a constitutional revisionist, mentioned that his cabinet had no intention to tackle constitutional revision.

It was Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi who resumed the debate on constitutional revision. On 9 May 2001 Koizumi advocated the need for constitutional revision, although he stated the basic policies, such as democracy, pacifism and human rights, did not need to be modified. He argued that constitutional revision was necessary if Japan wishes to

30 Japan’s Commission on the Constitution held its first meeting on 13 August 1957. The report was translated and edited by John M. Maki. See Maki, Japan’s Commission of the Constitution, 375.
exercise the right of collective self-defence. Still, he stated that it would be difficult to tackle the issue. At the same time, he pointed out that there was a ‘gap’ (sukima) between Article 9 and the Preamble. Rather than revising Article 9, Koizumi ‘utilised’ the Preamble as a legal basis to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq as shown in Chapter 5.33 In spite of his aspiration for constitutional reform, Koizumi could not take concrete actions. Instead of revising the Constitution, the Koizumi government created new legal frameworks to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Still, Koizumi expressed his belief that the Constitution needed to be revised in the future in order to put an end to the debate on the interpretation of Article 9.34

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, known as a conservative hawk and constitutional revisionist, expressed his belief that the 1947 Constitution should be revised for the following three reasons: 1) the current Constitution was created during the occupation period; 2) it did not fit into the present situation because 60 years had passed since its creation; and 3) present Japanese people need to consider their ideals and draw up their own Constitution.35 Based on these beliefs, Abe stated that he would exert his leadership and take action for constitutional revision as a political

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As a first step towards constitutional revision, he proposed to enact national referendum legislation as a procedure of the revision. Thus, the national referendum legislation, which was aimed to facilitate constitutional reform, was enacted on 18 May 2007.

After Abe stepped down from the Cabinet, his successor, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda did not consider constitutional revision as his political priority, although he mentioned that there were some parts which should be added and revised in the current Constitution in the future. The debate on constitutional revision was toned down further after Taro Asō assumed office. Prime Minister Asō did not express his intention for constitutional revision, although he implied the necessity of a one-chamber system to revise the Constitution. Thus, none of the LDP Prime Ministers have dared to initiate constitutional reform in the Diet.

Idealists (pacifists), pragmatists and revisionists provided strong reasons why the Constitution should and should not be revised. These arguments of opposition and support for constitutional revision, however, do not offer

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38 As for the text of the National Referendum Law, see http://law.e-gov.go.jp/announce/H19HO051.html (accessed at 9 August 2009).


implications for Japanese security identities. Moreover, they do not take the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism into consideration. The central question to be explored in the following sections is: what are the implications of constitutional revision to changing Japanese pacifism and security identity? Since constitutional revision will fundamentally change the nature of Japanese pacifism and security identity, this needs to be carefully examined. To study the wider implications of constitutional revision, the next section will apply the analytical eclectic approach.

The Constitutional Revision Debate in Analytical Eclecticism

Negative Pacifism: Will Japan Remain a Pacifist State?

Constitutional protectionists (idealists or pacifists) wish Japan either to remain a pacifist state (relative pacifism) or to become a ‘non-violent’ state (absolute pacifism). The former prefers to maintain status quo, the latter dreams of Japan becoming a state of unarmed neutrality. If negative pacifism is losing its influence, is Japan losing its security identity as a pacifist state?

First of all, this section reconfirms the argument of constitutional protectors that Article 9 as negative pacifism was not necessarily imposed by the GHQ. According to MacArthur’s Reminiscence, the current Japanese Constitution, especially its peace clause, was not imposed but ‘proposed’ by Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara. Prime Minister Shidehara’s pacifism stemmed from the reality of war devastation. He recalled how he came up with the ‘non-war’ and ‘non-armament’ clause. Shidehara wrote:

Contrary to expectation I was entrusted with putting together a cabinet... at that time I recalled a scene on the train soon after the surrender. This thought suddenly rose in my head when I took over the office of Prime Minister. I had decided to follow the call and somehow use my office to
carry out the will of the people. I decided to thoroughly change the ways of politics so that war would be made impossible for all time, and to write this into the constitution. In other words, to renounce war (sensō o hōki shi), and to completely abolish armaments. These goals must be brought about under conditions of democracy. For me this is an absolute conviction which I have spoken of [many times] before. This thought was dominant in my head like a spell (isshu no maryoku)... Today Americans often come to Japan and ask if the new Constitution is of Japanese origin, or if the Japanese had been forced to write it by the Americans; but I must say that for me this is irrelevant, since I was under compulsion from nobody.41

As constitutional supporters argued, Shidehara’s memoir demonstrates that the current Constitution was not imposed as constitutional protectors argue. Furthermore, the GHQ draft was ‘welcomed’ by the Japanese people. In fact, according to an opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun in May 1946, 70% considered the anti-war clause as necessary, whereas 28% expressed opposition to it. As well, 85% supported the continuation of the Emperor system and 86% opposed its abolition.42 The reason the Japanese people accepted the anti-war clause in the draft of the new Japanese Constitution with overwhelming support was because of wartime devastation, in particular the experience of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Based on the ‘culture of anti-militarism’ (negative pacifism), constitutional protectors began promoting ‘Japan as a peace nation’ (pacifist state), which alone among the world countries experienced the devastation of nuclear weapons.43 Therefore, the Peace Constitution was willingly accepted by the Japanese people rather than imposed.

Tōru Mutō pointed out that the current Japanese Constitution was created as a result of efforts of human beings in accordance with Article 97. Moreover, he also suggested that Article 9 should be shared as an ‘asset’ in

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41 Shidehara, Gaikō Gojūnen, 213.
43 See Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum’, 139.
the world. Masahiro Naruse argued that human beings could not stop wars even after the First and Second World Wars which caused deaths of more than 60 million people. Since the Second World War, almost 30 million people died in the armed conflicts. He therefore insisted that Article 9 should be shared as a constraint to the war.

Constitutional protectors are not necessarily absolute pacifists who follow Gandian ‘non-violence’, however. In fact, pacifism of constitutional defenders can be categorised as absolute pacifism and relative pacifism. The former interpret Article 9 as pacifism of non-violence and unarmed neutrality. On the other hand, the latter regards Article 9 as renunciation of war but accepts the use of the SDF in case of emergency. In fact, even though the JCP regards the SDF as ‘unconstitutional’ under Article 9, the party permits the use of the SDF in case of emergent and unjust violation of sovereignty and large-scale natural disaster. Furthermore, Tatsuo Inoue argued that constitutional protectors should make political efforts to revise the Constitution to make the SDF and the Security Treaty officially ‘unconstitutional’. He also denounced that some of constitutional protectors expressed that they would ‘escape’ in case of armed attack. Thus, constitutional supporters are faced with a dilemma between ideals and reality.

To overcome the limitation of constitutional protection in domestic affairs, some constitutional protectors strategise the internationalisation of Article 9. Based on the philosophy of Kant and unarmed absolute pacifism, they argue that Japan should not only protect Article 9 but also gradually

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46 Sawano, Heiwashugi to Kaiken Rongi, 112.
propagate it to the world. 49 Yoshikazu Sawano suggested that Japan should make diplomatic efforts to internationalise unarmed neutrality based on Article 9. 50 In relation to internationalisation of Article 9, Shinobu Tabata proposed that the Japanese government should declare in the UN General Assembly that the UN Charter and all the countries shall adopt Article 9. 51

As already mentioned, Ohta believed that Article 9 should be a world heritage. Furthermore, constitutional defenders also pointed out that the idea of internationalising Article 9 is already shared in the world. For instance, Charles Overby organised a movement to propagate Article 9 in the world on the basis of the belief that Article 9 is ‘the world’s greatest Rule of Law.’ 52 Likewise, the Hague Peace Appeal in 1999 expressed in the first article that all nations should adopt anti-war clause like Article 9. Also, Jody Williams, a Nobel Peace Laureate in 1997, supported the idea that all countries should possess Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. In addition, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), which was established with strong support from the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, also insisted on the internationalisation of Article 9. 53

As a matter of fact, in the first Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War, ‘the world has begun to choose Article 9’, held in Japan in May 2008, a number of international peace activists expressed their supports for internationalising Article 9. Keynote speaker Mairead Corrigan Maguire, who contributed to the end of the Northern Ireland conflict and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1976, stated that ‘Article 9 continues to inspire many

49 For instance, Tamon Asō pointed out that Japan can internationalise the ideal of ‘unarmed absolute pacifism’. See Asō, Heiwa Shugi no Rinrisei, 205.
50 Sawano, ‘Nihon no Anpo, Gaikō Seisaku’, 172.
51 Ibid.
people throughout the world.’\textsuperscript{54} She also expressed her concern about constitutional revision which intends to abandon Article 9. Another keynote speaker, Cora Weiss, the president of the Hague Appeal for Peace, articulated that ‘I have come to help spread Article 9. Japan is not alone. You have support from around the world.’\textsuperscript{55} Beate Sirota Gordon, who was involved in revising the Meiji Constitution, spoke in Japanese and stated that ‘I believe Article 9 can be a model for the entire world.’\textsuperscript{56}

Whereas the internationalisation of Article 9 has been facilitated by constitutional defenders, even LDP supporters have shared the culture of anti-militarism which represents Article 9. An example of Japan’s anti-war idealism or deeply rooted culture of anti-militarism is the result of the 2007 Upper House election. As Ikuo Kabashima and Tōru Hayano pointed out, even LDP supporters had an ‘uncomfortable feeling’ (iwakan) or ‘smell like war’ (sensō no nioi) towards Prime Minister Abe’s motivation for revising Article 9. As a result, the Abe administration failed to maintain a majority of seats in the Upper House. In other words, the result of the election exemplifies the Japanese public did not support Abe’s initiative of constitutional revision.\textsuperscript{57} Similarly, the result of the 2008 opinion poll on constitutional revision can be raised as another indicator of anti-war pacifism in Japan. According to the opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in March 2008, opposition to constitutional revision outweighed that of support for the revision for the first time since 1993.\textsuperscript{58} Clearly, the 2008 opinion poll represents a deep-rooted anti-war pacifism and prudence towards revision of Article 9.

As shown in the results of the 2007 Upper House Election and the 2008 opinion poll, although it is highly unlikely that Japan will become a non-

\textsuperscript{54} Junkerman, ‘The Global Article 9 Conference’.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} She is the only person involved in creating the 1947 Constitution that remains alive. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Kabashima and Hayano, ‘Abe Shushō wa Kenpō ni Yabureta’, 70.
violent state on the basis of unarmed neutrality, the Japanese public still desires Japan to remain a pacifist state. Therefore, unless the current Constitution is revised, it is likely that Japan will remain a pacifist state based on negative pacifism, although Japanese pacifism is shifting towards positive pacifism (UN peacekeeper), as has been demonstrated in this thesis.

Positive Pacifism: Will Japan Remain a UN Peacekeeper?

From the perspective of neo-liberalism, Japan’s constitutional revision will contribute to Japan’s wider role in UN peace operations. In addition, as each case study has shown, Japan’s participation in post-conflict peace operations is consistent with the idea of neo-liberal international cooperation. In this regard, neo-liberals would argue that Japan could revise the Constitution to make a greater contribution to international cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations.

To explore the question of whether Japan will remain a UN peacekeeper or become a UN centrist state that joins all UN peace operations, including the UN-authorised military sanctions (such as the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 INTERFET operation), it is important to compare international pacifism of the Japanese Constitution and that of the Charter of the United Nations. The Japanese Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations share similar views on pacifism. The Preamble of the UN Charter articulates the main purpose of the United Nations, which is ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’ 59 Similarly, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution also describes that the Japanese people ‘resolved that never again shall we be visited by the horrors of war through the action of government.’ 60 That is

to say, both the Preambles of the UN Charter and the Japanese Constitution share ‘anti-war pacifism’ based on the experience of war devastation. Their primary purposes are, therefore, prevention of war (negative pacifism). To implement this purpose, the UN Charter stipulates in Paragraph 4 of Article 2 that ‘all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force.’ Likewise, Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that Japan will ‘forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes.’ In this context, both approaches prohibit the threat or use of force as a means of international conflict resolutions.

Unlike the Japanese Constitution, however, the UN Charter authorises the use of force in certain conditions. Whereas the UN Charter authorises the exercise of the rights of individual and collective self-defence in Article 51, Paragraph 2 of Article 9 prohibits possession of any ‘war potential' and also denies ‘the right of belligerency of the state.’ Furthermore, Article 43 of the UN Charter stipulates that:

All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Still, owing to its own self-constraint of Article 9, Japan cannot make military contributions for the ultimate purpose of the United Nations,

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namely maintenance of international peace and security by the ‘collective security system’. This is the main discrepancy between pacifism of the UN Charter and that of the Japanese Constitution, and therefore, the Japanese Constitution is more ‘pacifist’ than the UN Charter.

Nonetheless, as Hitoshi Nasu has pointed out, it is significant to examine the Japanese Constitution from the perspective of international law, especially the UN Charter in accordance with Article 98 of the Constitution as well as Article 25 of the Charter. 66 Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution articulates Japan’s obligation to abide by international laws. In addition, Article 25 of the UN Charter stipulates that ‘the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.’ 67 In addition, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution describes Japan’s willingness and responsibility for international peace, stipulating: ‘we desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace’; ‘we believe that no nation is responsible for itself alone’ and that; ‘we, the Japanese people, pledge out national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.’ 68 In short, pacifism of the Japanese Constitution is consistent with that of the UN Charter and therefore, Japan is technically obliged to make contributions to all kinds of UN peace operations. Accordingly, in theory, the Japanese Constitution is incorporated into the UN Charter and contribution for UN-centred collective security can be legally justifiable.

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As analysed above, Japanese constitutional revision can be justified so that Japan will be capable of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security as a member of the United Nations. Therefore, unlike classical liberalism, which objects to any kind of SDF dispatch for UNPKO and constitutional revision, neo-liberalism in Japan justifies constitutional revision so that Japan can make a more active international contribution. For instance, while Japanese liberals tend to insist on ‘constitutional protection’ and ‘anti-Americanism’, Yukio Hatoyama, leader of the Democratic Party Japan in 1999, argued that Japanese constitutional revision should be justified on the basis of the concept of ‘new liberalism’. Hatoyama also drafted his own proposal for constitutional revision and argued that Article 9 needs to be revised so that the Constitution strengthens Japan’s pacifism and ‘international cooperation-ism’ (kokusai kyōchōshugi). It is remarkable that he added ‘limitation of sovereign right’ to cooperate with international organisations, such as the United Nations. In his proposal, Hatoyama redefined international cooperation in the Preamble. He pointed out that international cooperation in the current Preamble is rather passive and ambiguous. His proposal declares the shift from ‘one-nation pacifist state’ (ikkoku heiwa kokka) to ‘international peace-creator state’ (kokusai heiwa sōzō kokka). Like Hatoyama, constitutional revisionists tend to make use of ‘international cooperation’ in the Preamble of the Constitution, which is compatible with the argument of ‘neo-liberalism’. They also tend to take national interests into consideration when it comes to international cooperation. Neo-liberalism also accepts that each state is supposed to make ‘rational decisions’ based on national interests as realist and neorealist believe. Hatoyama’s draft for revision, especially its

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69 Hatoyama, ‘New Liberal Kaikenron’.
70 Hatoyama, ‘Kenpō Kaisei Shian no Chūkan Hōkoku’
71 For instance, Hatoyama disagrees with the idea that Japan should join all UN peace operations. He argued that Japan’s participation in UNPKO should be selective according to Japan’s national interests. See, Hatoyama, ‘New Liberal Kaikenron’.
emphasis on international cooperation-ism, fits into the argument of neo-liberalism.72

Notably, a constitutional revision draft in the same year by Ichiro Ozawa (then leader of the Liberal Party) was even more ‘liberal’ and ‘idealistic’. Ozawa proposed that the Japanese government contribute to the establishment of the standing UN Forces (UNF) based on Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations. Ozawa insisted that Japan cannot protect itself only by exercising the rights of individual or collective self-defence. He believed that the SDF should be diminished and incorporated into the global police power, namely, the UNF. He argued that Japan should try to persuade the United States and other countries to create the UNF and Japan can be the first state which provides its military power to the United Nations.73 In short, Ozawa’s plan for constitutional revision and the establishment of the UNF is consistent with neo-liberal institutionalism and based on the ‘UN centrism’.

Kōmeitō also began supporting constitutional revision on the basis of positive pacifism and international cooperation. After the enactment of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Isamu Ueda of Kōmeitō touched on the possibility of constitutional revision. He insisted that Paragraph 1 of Article 9 needs to be pristine, but implied that the existence of the SDF for self-defence and international cooperation could be recognised by revising the Constitution.74 Likewise, in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War, Masao Akamatsu pointed out the limitations of Article 9 in the changing

72 For instance, Mayumi Itoh categorised Hatoyama’s draft as ‘neo-liberal’, Ozawa’s draft as ‘neo-conservative’ and Nakasone’s draft as ‘orthodox conservative’. She emphasised significance of Hatoyama’s draft which influenced other progressive politicians such as Naoto Kan. See Itoh, ‘A Neo-Liberal Proposal for Article 9’, 310-327.
73 See Ozawa, ‘Nihon Koku Kenpō Kaisei Shian’. In 2006, Ozawa argued that Japan should create a ‘UN Force’, separately from the SDF. See Ozawa, Ozawa-Shugi, 157-161.
international environment and implied the necessity of constitutional revision. In 2004, Kōmeitō officially began insisting on constitutional amendment by the addition to the Constitution (kaken) rather than protection (goken) or revision (kaiken). Yosuke Takagi of Kōmeitō explicitly insisted that ‘international contribution’ can be added to the current Constitution. The intention of the kaken method is an alternative plan to prevent the ‘hawkish constitutional revision’, which aimed at the entire revision or deletion of Article 9. Furthermore, the kaken method attempts to preserve Paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 9 and does not recognise exercise of the right of the collective self-defence. Additionally, Kōmeitō argued that the individual self-defence right, environmental right, and the right to privacy need to be written into the Constitution. Kōmeitō viewpoint for constitutional revision is similar to that of Ichiro Ozawa in that both prefer keeping Paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 9, while adding the third paragraph to recognise the SDF and its overseas dispatch for international peace operations. Still, unlike Ozawa’s proposal, Kōmeitō does not wish to recognise the exercise of the right of collective self-defence or participation in the UN-authorised military operations.

As analysed above, neo-liberalism provides an explanation and justification for constitutional revisionists. Indeed, Japan’s constitutional revision will be able to enhance Japan’s contribution to international cooperation, especially in the field of maintenance of international peace and security. Still, no consensus has been reached among Japanese neo-


liberal constitutional revisionists regarding how to revise Article 9. If Article 9 is not revised, Japan will remain a UN peacekeeper. If Article 9 is modified to allow the possession of a normal army, Japan will be able to become a UN centrist state that can contribute to all UN peace operations, including UN-authorised collective military sanctions. Therefore, neoliberal perspectives justify Japan's constitutional revision to support the United Nations collective security system.

Classical Realism: Towards a Normal State?

The arguments of constitutional revisionists in Japan coincide with those of classical realists in international relations. Constitutional revisionists wish Japan to become either a normal state with ordinary defensive military power (defensive realism) or a militarist state with greater offensive military capability (offensive realism). Constitutional reformers based on defensive realism believe that Japan's military power should be commensurate with its economic influence. In contrast, revisionists of offensive realism contend that Japan should become an independent military state, even armed with nuclear weapons. The question to be explored in this section is whether Japan is becoming a normal state, or an offensive militarist state.

As discussed already, the main reason the political rivals, Yoshida Liberal Party and Hatoyama Democratic Party, agreed to establish the Liberal Democratic Party as a conservative coalition in 1955 was to achieve Japan's rearmament through constitutional revision. The LDP was established, therefore, to increase Japan's military power by constitutional amendment. When Yoshida 'swallowed his pride' and asked Hatoyama to return to the former Seiyūkai in November 1953, Hatoyama agreed to this on condition of establishing the 'Constitutional Investigation Commission'. In this regard, the purpose of establishing the LDP is

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consistent with the argument of the classical realism which argues that each state behaves according to its national interests and maximises its power (including military power).

Through the reinterpretation of the Constitution (kaishaku kaiken), the Japanese government authorised the constitutionality of the SDF. On 27 January 1954, Prime Minister Yoshida explained that Japan should possess the SDF as a self-defence power (jieiryoku) according to national power (kokuryoku). Then, where did this ‘realistic’ recognition of the self-defence come from in spite of Article 9? As examined in Chapter 2, at least at the stage of the MacArthur Note, Japan was not supposed to possess even the right of self-defence and self-defence capability. Still, the MacArthur Note was ‘revised’ by Colonel Charles L. Kades so that Article 9 did not deny Japan’s right of self-defence. Kades ‘deleted’ the sentence in the MacArthur Note which stipulates, ‘even for preserving its own security’, because he thought that renunciation of national ‘self-defence’ was ‘unrealistic’. Renunciation of war stipulated in Paragraph 1 of Article 9 is consistent with that of the 1928 Paris Non-War Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations. Theodore McNelly pointed out that Kades revised the MacArthur Note so that it was not incongruent with Article 51 of the UN Charter. At this point, Article 9 did not necessarily deny Japan’s defensive war. However, as already pointed out, Prime Minister Yoshida himself argued that Article 9 denied even the right to

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81 MacArthur Note states: ‘War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection.’ See NDL, Three Basic Points stated By Supreme Commander to be “Musts” in Constitutional Revision, about 4 February 1946, cited from, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/072/072tx.html (accessed at 13 August 2009).

82 On this point, Osamu Nishi confirmed by interviewing Colonel Kades, See Nishi, Ten Days Inside General Headquarters, 47.

wage war for self-defence at the Diet on 28 June 1946. Responding to Yoshida’s remarks, Ashida attempted to revise the anti-war clause again to ensure that defensive war could be constitutional. On hearing the modification, Kades was relieved because Japan would be able to remilitarise when it became a UN member state. In response to the Ashida revision, GHQ agreed to the content of the amendment which allowed Japan to have the right to self-defence. In return, the FEC requested the inclusion of the ‘civilian clause’ in order to democratically control Japan’s future military power. Osamu Nishi, a revisionist constitutional scholar, pointed out that the creation process of the current Constitution, especially the existence of the Kades revision and the intention of the Ashida amendment, had not been recognised not only by the Japanese people but also by the post-war Japanese government. If these processes had been clarified earlier, interpretation of Article 9 would not have been so argumentative.

The process of the birth of the 1947 Constitution justifies Japan’s right of self-defence and the constitutionality of the SDF. The Japanese government interpreted that Japan can possess the SDF because Article 9 does not deny ‘use of minimum force necessary for self-defence.’ Therefore, Japan can exercise the right of individual self-defence without revising the Constitution under the following three conditions:

1) There is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; 2) there is no appropriate means to repel this aggression other than the use of the right of self-defence; and 3) the use of armed strength is confined to the minimum level necessary for repelling.

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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Nishi, Sekai no Genkō Kenpō.
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
Thus, the interpretation of the exercise of the right of self-defence under Article 9 by the Japanese government is nothing more than ‘normal’ in comparison with other countries’ rights of self-defence. This realism for ‘self-defence’ can be seen in Article 3 of the SDF Law which justifies the exercise of self-defence right to maintain Japan’s sovereignty against aggression. 90

As discussed in previous chapters, in order to justify Japan’s military power and its overseas dispatch, the Japanese government created the 1954 SDF Law, the 1992 PKO Law, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law, the 2002 Contingency Law, and the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Law. Successive Japanese governments have succeeded to create the legal and military ‘fait accompli’. Among these legal frameworks, the Emergency Law was of significance in that they incrementally ‘normalised’ Japan’s self-defence power. Especially, the ‘Armed Attack Situation Response Law’ enacted in 2002 is practical, because it is more specific than the SDF Law in the event of armed attack. Furthermore, the 2004 ‘Civil Protection Law’ enhanced the completeness of the Emergency Law.91

These normalising processes by the Japanese government since 1950 will be completed by revising or deleting Article 9 so that Japan can possess a ‘normal army’. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the LDP’s draft for the new Japanese Constitution stipulates that Japan protects its peace and independence as well as the security of the country and people by possessing the Self-Defence Army (jieigun) under the control of the Prime Minister.92 Yoichi Masuzoe, who played a major role in writing the draft, insisted that the SDF should be officially recognised as the ‘army’ rather

than telling lies that they were not. In response to the LDP’s draft, the DPJ as the largest opposition party in 2005 emphasised the difference between the LDP and the DPJ is that the DPJ values the pacifism of the current Constitution. The DPJ argued that Japan should be a ‘peace-creating state’ (heiwa sōzō kokka) rather than passively enjoying peace created by the international society. The DPJ stressed that the SDF could contribute to international peacekeeping and collective security under the United Nations, rather than just normalising military power.

Meanwhile, the JCP criticised the LDP Draft for constitutional revision arguing that the LDP Draft would ‘destroy peace’. The JCP contended that revising Paragraph 2 of Article 9 is the same as the deletion of Article 9 itself. The party also argued that if the constraint (hadome) of Article 9 is removed, Japan would be able to participate in a war like the Iraq war.

Mizuho Fukushima from the SDP also opposed the LDP Draft, which revises not only Paragraph 2 of Article 9 but also Japan’s declaration for ‘perpetual peace’ and ‘peaceful coexistence right’ in the Preamble. The SDP suspected that the LDP tried to revise the Constitution to change Japan into a ‘country that can wage war’ (sensō no dekiru kuni).

However, it is worth pointing out that the JCP used to insist that Article 9 did not deny the right of ‘defensive war’ or self-defence as a ‘just war’, when Prime Minister Yoshida interpreted Article 9 as not recognising war even for self-defence. Furthermore, the JSP, the predecessor of the SDP, changed its unarmed neutrality security policy and admitted to the

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93 Ibid.
constitutionality of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty during the Murayama government. These realistic aspects of the leftwing parties imply that even leftist parties would be permissive to Japan's military normalisation when they come to power. This point can be supported by the argument of the classical realist, E. H. Carr. Japan's normalisation of its defence power was, therefore, supported by the leftist parities which oppose constitutional revision at the present.

More significantly, the influence of the leftist politicians to block constitutional reform has diminished. Japan's normalisation of its military power will be completed by constitutional revision and this process towards a 'normal' state proves the premise of classical realism that each nation desires maximisation of power, especially military power. If the current Constitution is revised, it would facilitate or complete Japan's military normalisation. However, as shown in the case studies, the Japanese way of military normalisation has been step by step by creating legal framework rather than drastic constitutional reform. This is due to drastic military normalisation having been constrained by negative pacifism. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that Japan will become a military state with offensive power, such as nuclear weapons. Whether Japan becomes an independent military state or not will be conditioned by structural reasons, such as changes in the international security environment and its military alliance with the United States. For this reason, as well as a domestic desire for power, structural influences on the constitutional revision needs to be examined.

99 On this point, Carr wrote: 'History everywhere shews that, when Left parties or politicians are brought into contact with reality through the assumption of political office, they tend to abandon their ‘doctrinaire’ utopianism and move towards the Right, often retaining their Left labels and thereby adding to the confusion of political terminology.’ See Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 20.
Neo-Realism: Will Japan Become an Equal US Ally?

The question to be explored in this section is: will Japan remain an ‘unequal US ally’ or become an ‘equal US ally’ that exercises the right of collective self-defence? Structural realism (neo-realism) provides an explanation regarding constitutional revision. Structural realists argue that international structure (anarchy) and hegemonic state (the United States) determine the behaviour of the countries, especially their foreign and security policies. For instance, Akio Watanabe analysed that the Cold War and the end of the Cold War influenced Japan’s security policy, as well as its interpretation of the ‘Peace Constitution’.100

As discussed in Chapter 1, the Allied Powers, especially the United States, decided to revise the Meiji Constitution as part of the process of demilitarisation and the democratisation of Japan.101 Japan’s constitutional revision was therefore ‘induced’ by a SCAP initiative and interference by the FEC.102 McNelly argued ‘that a principal purpose of Article 9 was the preservation of the monarchy.’103 However, it can be argued that the GHQ draft was imposed, because ‘Americans threatened to indict the Tennnō [Emperor] as a war criminal if Cabinet did not accept the GHQ draft as the basis for a new constitution.’104 Thus, US pressure significantly influenced Japan’s decision on constitutional revision.

From the structural realist perspective, ‘for a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly’ because of structural anarchy.105 In terms of this view, existence of the SDF and the Security Treaty and military normalisation process towards constitutional revision

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100 Watanabe, ‘Japan’s Post-war Constitution’, 35-49.
101 In fact, General MacArthur determined to replace the Meiji Constitution with a new Constitution. See Dower, Embracing Defeat, 346-373.
103 Ibid., 102.
104 Stockwin, Governing Japan, 205.
are theoretically understandable. Indeed, Japan’s rearmament was facilitated by structural factors, especially the Cold War and the Korean War. On account of the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States ‘determined’ Japan’s rearmament with the creation of the National Police Reserve (keisatsu yobitai) in 1950 which later became the SDF. In relation to Japan’s security policy constrained by Article 9, the then US Vice President Richard Nixon visited Japan in November 1953 and mentioned that the demilitarisation policy during the occupation period was wrong and demanded that Japan scrap Article 9. Moreover, the escalation of the US-USSR confrontation in the Cold War inevitably caused the dysfunction of the UN Security Council and Japan chose to secure its sovereignty by signing the Security Treaty with the United States. Thus, as neo-realists argue, the changing international structure and external pressures from the United States diluted the influence of Article 9 (negative pacifism) as a normative constraint on Japan’s remilitarisation. In this context, the interpretation of Article 9 as absolute pacifism became invalid because of the existence of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty. One of the reasons why Article 9 has been a ‘dead letter’ is because of ‘the absence of an effective supranational supervisory agency.’ In other words, Article 9 has been less functional as a normative constraint on Japan’s remilitarisation because the world is under ‘anarchy’ as neo-realism contends. Thus, Article 9 could not prevent Japan’s remilitarisation and military alliance because of the reality of international system as anarchy as neo-realist pointed out.

As discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, structural realism provides a strong explanation for why the Japanese public abruptly showed support for constitutional revision in the post-Cold War period. This drastic change was brought about by the changes in the international structure,
such as the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War which led to Japan’s international contribution by the SDF dispatch. Indeed, Waltz observed that ‘the increased international activity of Japan and Germany reflects the changing structure of international politics.’\textsuperscript{109} As a result of changing international security environment, the Japanese became aware of the importance of making international contributions by dispatching the SDF. Therefore they began supporting constitutional revision.

The United States began pressuring Japan to revise Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution so that Japan could cooperate militarily as an ‘equal’ US alliance partner. The so-called ‘Armitage Report’ (INSS Special Report, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership) written by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye expressed the view that:

Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner.\textsuperscript{110}

Without a doubt, this report implies that Washington desires Japan’s constitutional revision so that Japan could exercise the right of collective self-defence. Pressure on Japan’s security policy and constitutional revision based on Washington’s strategic interest became more obvious after the outbreak of the US-led War on Terror. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 4, it is considered that Richard Armitage stated that Japan ‘show the flag’ by contributing to the fight against international terrorism

\textsuperscript{109} Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, 64.
and put ‘boots on the ground’ by dispatching the SDF to Iraq.\textsuperscript{111} On 21 July 2004, Armitage spoke to Hidenao Nakagawa of the LDP that Article 9 is a hindrance to the Japan-US military alliance as well as to acquiring permanent membership on the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{112} Similarly, on 12 August 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powel stated that if Japan wishes to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Article 9 needs to be reviewed.\textsuperscript{113}

In response, the Japanese government created a legal framework to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. At the same time, the government enacted the Emergency legislation to streamline military cooperation with the United States in case of armed attacks. These upgrades of Japan’s security policy suggest that Japan responded to pressure from the United States. At the same time, it can be observed that the Japanese government has created a new legal framework as a ‘fait accompli’ to justify constitutional revision. From this viewpoint, international structure and external pressure influenced the upgrades of Japan’s defence laws as processes towards constitutional revision.

Tomohito Shinoda analysed the correlation between the changing international security environment and Japan’s media and public opinion on national security issues, including constitutional revision. He argued that the changing international structure facilitated the transformation of Japanese public opinion to ‘a more realistic one’, i.e. support for constitutional revision.\textsuperscript{114} In 1957, major Japanese newspapers were against constitutional revision except for the \textit{Sanken Shimbun}.\textsuperscript{115} However, the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis influenced the change of


\textsuperscript{114} Shinoda, ‘Becoming More Realistic’, 171-190.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 186.
public opinion on constitutional revision. In 1992, the Yomiuri Shimbun announced its support for revising Article 9 and published its original proposal for a new Constitution in 1994. Likewise, since 2000, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun began supporting constitutional revision. Clearly, these shifts in support for constitutional revision were caused by the changing international security environment.

Neo-realist scholars argue that ‘Japan must play an international role in the framework of the US-Japan alliance.’ For this purpose, the LDP government had made efforts to revise the 1947 Constitution. From the viewpoint of Japanese realist politicians, Article 9 does not fit into the reality of a changing international environment. From the viewpoint of Washington, the military alliance would be strengthened, if Japan did exercise the right of collective self-defence. Thus, neo-realism provides persuasive arguments for the reason Japan should revise its current Constitution. If Article 9 of the Constitution is revised, Japan will be able to become a more ‘equal’ security partner of the United States. Yet, if Article 9 is ‘deleted’, it is possible that Japan would seek a greater power in a way which might destabilise the regional security and separate Japan from the US alliance system. If Japan revises the Constitution on the basis of ‘defensive realism’, it would stay in the US military alliance system. If Japan completely deletes Article 9 on the basis of ‘offensive realism’, it might desire a greater military power possibly with nuclear weapons and seek independence from the United States.

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116 Ibid., 186-187.
117 Ibid., 172.
119 Kenneth Waltz can be categorised as a defensive realist, but as examined in the thesis, he insinuated that Japan would rearm with nuclear weapons. In this regard, there is a possibility that Japan could become a nuclear state by revising the Constitution while staying in the military alliance system. In this scenario, Japan would be in a state of self-defensive war and ‘borrow’ nuclear weapons from the United States until it creates its own nuclear weapons. Yet, this scenario is highly unlikely in that negative pacifism is deeply instilled as an anti-militarist culture in Japan and it will decrease Japan’s international credibility which is Japan’s national interest.
Japan’s Core Security Identity as a ‘Global Pacifist State’

So far, four different perspectives on the constitutional revision debate have been examined. Each has a strong explanation and justification for revision and protection of the 1947 Constitution. In addition, each perspective indicates that the nature of Japan’s security identity will be drastically changed if the Constitution is revised to allow a normal army. Although it has been argued that Japan’s security identity has been changing, this section attempts to clarify Japan’s ‘core security identity’ in relation to constitutional revision.

As the case studies have demonstrated, Japan has incrementally normalised its military power by dispatching the SDF to international peace operations. In this respect, the thesis does not disagree with the argument of Takashi Inoguchi that Japan is incrementally becoming a ‘global ordinary power’. Remarkably, Inoguchi predicted that ‘constitutional revisions are more likely to take place during the 2005-2020 period.’ Nevertheless, it is important to stress that Inoguchi did not jump to the conclusion that Japan will become a ‘normal state’ with a normal army by revising Article 9. He also pointed out the difficulty of revising Article 9 for the ‘endorsement of the ordinary use of force in the settlement of international disputes’ due to the strong pacifism of Kōmeitō. Nevertheless, Inoguchi’s ‘global ordinary power’ is different from the argument put forth in the thesis. This is because the global ordinary power model suggests that Japan will eventually become a normal state with ordinary military power, which is free from current constitutional constraints. Although Japan’s security identity has shifted towards a global ordinary power or normal state, its military normalisation process is still in progress and has not yet been completed. For this reason, the thesis argues that Japan’s ‘core security identity’ has

120 See Inoguchi, ‘Japan as a Global Ordinary Power’.
121 Inoguchi and Bacon, ‘Japan’s Emerging Role’, 17.
122 Ibid.
become, and still remains, a ‘global pacifist state’ based on the current Constitution (negative and positive pacifism).

The concept of a global pacifist state is similar to Inoguchi’s fourth category, Japan as a global civilian power (1990-2005). The concept of a global civilian power has also been advocated by Yoichi Funabashi. Funabashi astutely observed that the ‘emergence of a more internationalist and actively engaged Japanese pacifism could play a constructive role in making Japan a global civilian power.’\footnote{Funabashi, ‘Japan and the New World Order’, 65.} Furthermore, he argued that Japan ‘has proven its ability as a global civilian power in Cambodia (removal of landmines), East Timor (building of infrastructure), and Afghanistan (collection of weapons).’\footnote{See Funabashi, ‘Japan as Global Civilian Power’.} Funabashi’s observation of ‘a more internationalist and actively engaged Japanese pacifism’ is consistent with positive pacifism employed in this thesis. Moreover, his analysis of Japan’s non-military pacifist role is consistent with the case studies of this thesis (Chapter 2, 3 and 4). The thesis, therefore, agrees with the concept of global civilian power to describe Japan’s international role and identity. Nevertheless, a distinction between a ‘global civilian power’ and a ‘global pacifist state’ lies in the fact that Funabashi does not employ the concept of negative-positive pacifism as a key analytical framework. As shown in the thesis, the shift in Japan’s security identity is closely linked to the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. Moreover, the word ‘civilian’ as an opposite meaning of ‘military’ is not necessarily the same meaning as ‘pacifist’. For instance, Germany, which has a culture of anti-militarism like Japan, can be categorised as a global ‘civilian power’.\footnote{As for an analysis of Germany and Japan as ‘civilian power’, see Maull, ‘Germany and Japan’, 91-106. As for research on culture of anti-militarism of Germany and Japan, see Berger, A Culture of Anti-militarism.} Nonetheless, a clear difference between Germany and Japan is that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defence (unlike Germany). In fact, Germany deployed 3,900 soldiers to support the US-led war on Afghanistan in 2001, and despatched 1,200 troops for UN-
authorised post-war peace operations (ISAF). These different security policies between Germany and Japan stem from the normative influence of Article 9 (negative pacifism) which constrained the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan as discussed in Chapter 4. Unlike the argument of global ordinary power or global civilian power, this thesis argues that Japan’s security identity has been changing from a (one-nation) pacifist state to a global pacifist state. In addition, as Diagram 1 indicates, Japan’s security identity is changing (between pacifist state, UN peacekeeper, normal state and US ally). Still, Japan’s ‘core security identity’ is a global pacifist state based on the current Peace Constitution (negative pacifism and positive pacifism).

Diagram 1: Global Pacifist State

The case studies have examined shifts from negative pacifism based on Article 9 to positive pacifism based on the Preamble both in the governmental level (in the Diet) and the public level (public opinion). At the governmental level, the legal framework to legitimatise the SDF dispatch for post-conflict peace-building operations was enacted on the

126 Berger, ‘Germany, Japan and the War on Terror’, 22. Similarly, in September 2001, 58% of German public supported Germany’s participation in US-led War on Afghanistan. See Katzenstein, ‘Same War, Different Views’, 429.
basis of positive pacifism of the Preamble as examined in Chapter 2, 3 and 4. Likewise, there were shifts during the 1990s in Japanese public opinion on constitutional revision as discussed in Introduction of the thesis. The majority of the Japanese public began supporting the existence of the SDF, overseas dispatch of the SDF for post-conflict peace operations, and constitutional revision. The shifts from negative pacifism to positive pacifism at both parliament and public levels, examined in the case studies, signify the increasing probability of constitutional revision. This is because the shifts in parliament and public levels have been reaching conditions for constitutional revision stipulated in Article 96.

In fact, an opinion poll in *the Asahi Shimbun* on 3 March 2006 showed that 55% supported constitutional revision, while 32% were opposed. Furthermore, 43% were for revision of Article 9, whereas 42% were against. Similarly, the opinion poll of *the Yomiuri Shimbun* published on the same day showed that 65% were in favour of constitutional revision, and 27% were opposed. In addition, 49% agreed to revision of Article 9, while 41% disagreed. This was a significant shift because although the majority of the public had been supportive to constitutional revision since 1993, the majority were unsupportive to the revision of Article 9 itself. In addition, approximately 90% of the Diet members supported the enactment of the Emergency Law except for the parties of the constitutional defender, the JCP and the SDP. The fact that about 90% Diet members approved the Contingency Legislation indicates the probability of ‘initiation’ of constitutional amendment.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that negative pacifism has been, and will remain, an influential constraint on drastic constitutional revision. It was the reason constitutional defenders (43.1%) outnumbered constitutional revisionist (42.5%) in the opinion poll conducted by *the Yomiuri Shimbun*

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127 According to Shigenobu Tamura’s analysis, the shift in the public opinion was due to the change of the question regarding how to revise Article 9. See, Tamura, ‘Jimintō Shin Kenpō Sōan’, 30.
128 Ibid., 34.
in March 2008. As discussed in Chapter 2, public opinion has consistently supported constitutional revision since the early 1990s. In 2008, however, the public was cautious about Prime Minister Abe’s more aggressive articulation of constitutional reform. Although revisionists outnumbered protectionists in March 2009 again, it should be noted that anti-militarist and anti-war pacifism still prevails among Japanese people, who support constitutional revision but do not support the deletion of Article 9.129 For this reason, constitutional revision will need to entail central aspects of negative pacifism in order to persuade the majority of the public.

‘Trans-armament’ can be an acceptable alternative to constitutional revision. The concept of trans-armament, as advocated by Johan Galtung, meant that military power can be ‘transformed’ for ‘defensive defence’ or more peaceful purposes.130 Johan Galtung argued that: ‘ultimately, the historical significance of the Peace Constitution is to be found in its redefinition of the military’131 and that ‘the task is not to abolish the military but to redefine its role.’132 Indeed, the Japanese government ‘transformed’ the nature of the SDF to ‘international peacekeeper’ in 1992 as shown in Chapter 2. Significantly, in 2007, MOD declared ‘international peace cooperation’ as a primary mission of the SDF.133 Likewise, Ronald Dore noted that the 1947 Constitution ‘could be amended in a pacifist way.’134 Also, Akio Watanabe also mentioned that ‘becoming a normal state need not entail discarding the pacifist Constitution’135 and ‘any amendment of the Constitution needs to preserve the document’s peace-loving spirit.’136 In application of this concept, the SDF could be trans-armed into a peaceful organisation. Ozawa contended

130 Galtung, Transarmament.
131 Galtung and Ikeda Choose Peace, 33.
132 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
in his draft that the SDF would end its historical mission and could be transformed into the ‘UN Standby Forces’. However, Ozawa’s trans-armingment entails the exercise of collective-self defence and participation in collective security operations. Ozawa’s argument, in this sense, is consistent with Inoguchi’s framework, global ordinary power. This aspect is incompatible with negative pacifism, and therefore will not be achieved until the Constitution is revised to authorise possession of a normal army.

A number of alternatives have been raised in relation to Japan’s trans-armingment. First of all, in order to strengthen Japanese constitutional pacifism, Shirō Ōkubo proposed to codify the non-nuclear policy. From this perspective, constitutional revision would strengthen its anti-war and anti-nuclear pacifism (negative pacifism) which is a precondition for trans-armingment. On the basis of the anti-war/anti-nuclear pacifism, how can Japan implement trans-armingment without conducting complete disarmament? There is a suggestion that SDF participation in UN peace operations can be authorised in accordance with Article 47 of the UN Charter (not with Article 43 which includes peace-enforcement). Katsumi Ishizuka suggested that Japan should join a UN Stand-by Arrangement (UNSAS) and establish a Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre for the Asia-Pacific Region. Takamichi Mito also proposed that Japan can establish a new ‘multinational Peace-Building Force (PBF) of the United Nations by transforming the SDF facilities and donating 1% of GNP.’ Thus, Japan can transform the SDF into UN Peace-Building Forces. As a confidence-building measure, Japan will be able to cooperate with China and South Korea in terms of peace operations and disaster relief. Notably, Japan dispatched the SDF to China in the wake of the

137 Ozawa, ‘Nihon Koku Kenpō Kaisei Shian’.
138 Ōkubo, ‘Japan’s Constitutional Pacifism’, 111.
139 Dore, Japan, Internationalism and the UN, 106.
140 Ishizuka, ‘Japan’s Policy towards UN Peacekeeping Operations’, 82-83.
141 Mito, ‘Japan’s Constitutional Revision Debate’, 68-69.
Sichuan earthquake in 2008. As already discussed in the East Timor case study, Japan has cooperated with Korea in the field of the UNPKO. If a constitutional revision draft included creation of a UNPBF through the trans-armament of the SDF, it will be more likely to be accepted by a wider population. Still, it would be more acceptable if such kind of clause is added separately from Article 9. This is because constitutional defenders and the culture of anti-militarism (negative pacifism) wish to present Article 9 as world heritage. The establishment of the UNPBF and the PKO Training Centre in the Asia Pacific is compatible with the concepts of negative pacifism and positive pacifism of the Japanese Constitution. This will enhance Japan’s international status as an international (global) pacifist state, reduce scepticism of China and South Korea towards Japan’s constitutional revision as well as strengthen Japan’s bid for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council. If Japan became a permanent member of the UNSC, it should contribute to negative pacifism, such as worldwide renunciation of war, nuclear disarmament as well as positive pacifism, such as international peace operations and disaster relief. This type of constitutional revision which includes both negative pacifism and positive pacifism will be domestically acceptable and internationally desirable.

Unlike a conventional one-nation pacifist state argument, a global pacifist state does not hesitate to dispatch SDF to international peace operations. Unlike a ‘UN centrist state’, Japan as a global pacifist state does not need to participate in UN-authorised military operations (e.g. the 1950 Korean War, 1991 Gulf War, and 1999 INTERFET). In contrast to the normal state argument, the global pacifist state does not possess a normal military capability, much less offensive weapons such as nuclear weapons. In addition, the global pacifist state does not exercise the right of collective self-defence, unlike the equal US ally model. Even though Japan’s

142 Japan dispatched the MSDF fleet ‘Sazanami’ to China for the first time after the Second World War. This was a part of defence exchange between the two countries. See, Asahi.com, 25 June 2008, cited from, http://www.asahi.com/special/08004/TKY200806240340.html (accessed at 27 August 2009).
pacifism and security identity are changing, Japan’s core security identity will remain a global pacifist state until the Peace Constitution is revised and becomes a normal state.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has analysed the implications of the Japanese constitutional revision debate for Japanese pacifism and security identity. First, it was pointed out that both Japanese constitutional protectionists (idealists and pragmatists) and revisionists tend to overlook eclectic and comprehensive analyses on Japanese constitutional revision. The chapter has provided four perspectives of constitutional reform to examine changing Japanese pacifism and security identity.

As a classical liberalist (idealist) perspective shows, it is desirable for Japanese constitutional protectors that the peace clause (Article 9) of the current Constitution is not revised. Even if the article is to be revised, there is no necessity for Japan to remove Paragraph 1 (renunciation of war). This is because Paragraph 1 of Article 9 is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The first paragraph of Article 9 will remain as a core security norm (negative pacifism). Therefore, it is likely that a pacifist state based on negative pacifism will remain one of Japan’s security identities, even if the current Constitution is revised. In this scenario, the possibility of Japan becoming a nonviolent state (unarmed neutrality) is technically ruled out. From a neo-liberal perspective, the Japanese government might attempt to revise the current Constitution not only to make UNPKO explicitly constitutional but also to make contributions to the UN collective security system. In this scenario, the security identity of Japan will shift from a UN peacekeeper to a UN centrist state. In order to make military contributions to UN peace-enforcement operations, the Japanese government needs to modify Article 9 and become a normal state. Yet,
unlike military normalisation, based on classical realism and offensive realism, Japan as a UN centrist state will not seek to maximise its military power.

Based on the postulation of classical realism, a future Japanese government might well maximise its military power through constitutional reform. The important point in Japan’s military normalisation is whether Japan desires to become a normal state as a middle power or turn back into an offensive militarist state. If Japan seeks to maximise its military power as a ‘self-help’ policy, it is likely that Japan becomes an independent military state and abrogates the Japan-US Security Treaty. In this scenario, Japan might desire to arm with nuclear weapons. However, given the fact that negative pacifism as a normative constraint on Japanese militarism remains influential, it is unlikely that Japan will become an offensive military power. In terms of neo-realist viewpoint, the future Japanese government might delete Article 9 to exercise the right of collective self-defence so that Japan can become an equal US ally. In this case, Japan will be able to participate in US-led military operations. In order to become an equal US ally, Japan needs to become a normal state.

As argued in the thesis, the shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism is a determinant of Japan’s security identity. The case studies demonstrate that both negative and positive pacifism will remain core Japanese security norms. As a global pacifist state, Japan is trying to internationalise its negative pacifism, such as abolition of war (Article 9) and nuclear weapons. Unlike a one-nation pacifist state, the global pacifist state is willing to dispatch SDF to international peace operations. Japan as a global state contributes to UN peace operations with the exception of UN-authorised military sanctions. Japan as a global pacifist state possesses defensive military capability but not offensive military power. The global pacifist state cooperates with the United States for global peace
but does not exercise the right of collective self-defence to invade other countries. In conclusion, although Japan's security identity is fluctuating, Japan’s core security identity has become, and still remains, a global pacifist state based on negative pacifism and positive pacifism.
Conclusion

This thesis made a contribution to the study of Japanese politics and theory of international relations by providing alternative theoretical perspectives concerning Japanese pacifism and its security identity. As pointed out in the Introduction, existing research on Japanese security policy lacks a theoretical conceptualisation of Japanese pacifism and eclectic approach to examine the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ and its influence on Japan’s security identity. In contrast, this study has applied ‘negative and positive pacifism’ as an analytical framework and employed analytical eclecticism to examine several case studies.

Theoretical Implications

Before examining the case studies, the thesis began with a conceptualisation of negative and positive pacifism as an analytical framework. Prominent Japanese realist scholars and political leaders such as Kenichi Ito and Ichiro Ozawa used the concept, ‘positive pacifism’ to criticise ‘negative pacifism’ represented in Article 9 as egotistic and irresponsible ‘one-nation pacifism’. At the same time, they sought to justify Japan’s contributions to UN-authorised or US-led military operations, such as the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, in the name of ‘positive pacifism’. By contrast, this thesis conceptualised ‘negative pacifism’ and ‘positive pacifism’ based on the definition of peace as proposed by Johan Galtung. Japanese constitutional scholars also utilised concepts of ‘negative-positive pacifism’ consistent with Galtung’s definition. Their analyses, however, tend to overlook realist interpretations of international politics by focusing too much on idealist sentiments implicit in the Peace Constitution. Consequently, both realist and constitutionalist analyses of ‘negative and positive pacifism’ lack balanced perspectives and have limitations. To overcome this problem, the thesis has correlated the
concept of ‘negative-positive pacifism’ with orthodox theories of international relations.

Each theory and approach of international politics provides plausible but partial explanations on changing Japanese security policy. Classical and neo-liberalism cannot offer adequate theoretical explanations on why Japan needs the SDF and the Security Treaty with the United States and why Japan’s contribution to UNPKO had been constrained during the Cold War era. Likewise, classical and neo-realism cannot sufficiently explain why Japan has been unable to become a normal state and an equal US ally. A main theoretical shortcoming of analyses based on theories on international relations, therefore, is the lack of a comprehensive theoretical approach. To fill a gap between the theories, this thesis has employed ‘analytical eclecticism’ to explain the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ and examine changing Japanese security identity. In an application of theoretical eclecticism (classical and neo-liberalism, classical and neo-liberalism, and constructivism), the thesis has proposed four models of Japanese security identity (pacifist state, UN peacekeeper, normal state, and US ally) to examine the shift in pacifism and security identity. Significantly, the case studies have demonstrated the utility of analytical eclecticism to identify factors which influenced the shift in Japan's pacifism and security policy.

Lingering Influence of Negative Pacifism

The study pointed out that the influence of negative pacifism in Japan has been gradually weakened as a result of the changing international security environment. At the same time, however, the study substantiated that negative pacifism has constantly acted as a normative constraint on Japan’s military normalisation and that it retains its normative influence. As shown in Chapter 1, the influence of the Cold War structure, especially the outbreak of the 1950 Korean War, inevitably facilitated Japan’s
remilitarisation process. Japan was forced to create a self-defence capability and sign a Security Treaty with the United States. Nonetheless, Japan’s military normalisation has been limited and incomplete due to the influence of negative pacifism. In the mid 1950s, Prime Ministers Ichiro Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi, who had strong aspirations for rearming Japan through constitution revision, could not complete the normalisation of military power. In the 1960s, Prime Ministers Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato also realised that it was virtually impossible to achieve this goal and instead chose to focus on economic growth. In 1968, Prime Minister Sato expressed the ‘three non-nuclear principles’ which symbolised Japan’s anti-war and anti-nuclear pacifism. Even after the Vietnam War became intensified, Japan was unable to dispatch the SDF due to negative pacifism. The self-imposed ‘1% of GNP ceiling on defence expenditure’ was a symbol of Japan’s identity as a demilitarised ‘pacifist state’ and Prime Minister Fukuda declared in 1977 that Japan would not become a military power (would remain a ‘pacifist state’) and pursue peaceful relationships with the Southeast Asian countries. During the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone could not put his political ambition, (constitutional reform for military normalisation), into practice due to the influence of negative pacifism. Even after the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis, ‘negative pacifism’ acted as a normative constraint on Japan’s security policy, and the Japanese government could not dispatch the SDF during the 1991 Gulf War. Moreover, as case studies on SDF dispatches to international peace operations revealed, the influence of negative pacifism has not been lost as a normative constraint on Japan’s security policy.

*Increasing Significance of Positive Pacifism*

In the early 1990s, there was a shift in Japanese pacifism and security policy. In response to international criticism of Japan’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’ during the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis, the Japanese government made the 1992 PKO Law to dispatch SDF to UNPKO in Cambodia. During
the PKO debate, the LDP politicians deliberately quoted the Preamble of the Constitution which expresses significance of ‘freedom from fear and want’, ‘the right to live in peace’ and ‘international cooperation’ (positive pacifism) to justify the SDF dispatch for UNPKO. The enactment of the 1992 PKO Law marked a watershed in Japan’s security policy given the 1954 Upper House resolution on non-distribution of SDF abroad. Therefore, the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ is consistent with the shift from a (one-nation) ‘pacifist state’ to a ‘UN peacekeeper’. At the same time, however, Japanese realist politicians and academics utilised the Preamble (positive pacifism) to change Japan from a ‘pacifist state’ to a ‘normal state’. They criticised opposition to SDF dispatch to UNPKO based on Article 9 (negative pacifism) as irresponsible and egotistic ‘one-nation pacifism’ and facilitated normalisation process in the name of ‘positive pacifism’. The shift to ‘positive pacifism’ was also conditioned by changes in the international structure and external pressures. The end of the Cold War, the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis, and pressure from the United States influenced the shift in Japan’s security policy on UNPKO. Like Japanese realists, the United States desired Japan to become a ‘normal state’ and an ‘equal US ally’. In this sense, Japan’s policy shift on the use of force abroad was viewed favourably in Washington. These domestic and external factors facilitated the shift to ‘positive pacifism’. As a ‘UN peacekeeper’, Japan contributed to UNPKO in other countries through the 1990s. In addition to the Preamble of the Constitution, concepts such as ‘UN centrism’ and ‘human security’ were utilised as a justification for Japan’s participation in international peace operations. The case studies on SDF dispatch to international peace operations demonstrate that the shift to ‘positive pacifism’ coincided with a shift in Japan’s security identity from one-nation ‘pacifist state’ to a ‘UN peacekeeper’. The findings showed that the significance of positive pacifism in Japan’s security policy has increased, while negative pacifism has been becoming less influential on Japan’s use of military power abroad. Nonetheless, both negative pacifism and positive pacifism in
Japanese politics have co-existed since the Japanese government has never initiated constitutional revision.

The Role of Domestic and External Pressures

The shift to ‘positive pacifism’ also concurred with a shift from a ‘pacifist state’ to a ‘normal state’ and an ‘equal US ally’. Japanese political leaders made use of the ‘Preamble’ of the Japanese Constitution (positive pacifism) to normalise Japanese military capability. At the same time, the changing international security environment and pressure from the United States played significant roles in the normalisation process of Japanese military power. As demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 3, Japan incrementally ‘normalised’ its military capability through participation in international peace operations. The PKO Law was revised in 1998 and 2001 as discussed in Chapter 3. The 1998 PKO Law broadened the use of weapons by allowing SDF personnel to use weapons based on orders by superior officers. Furthermore, the 2001 PKO Law lifted a ‘freeze’ on PKF participation allowing the SDF to use weapons for self-defence and to defend those under supervision of Japanese peacekeepers. As well as participating in UNPKO, the Japanese government ‘normalised’ its military power and strengthened the alliance system by the dispatch of an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean in 2002 and the GSDF contingents to Iraq in 2004. Significantly, during this period, external pressure from the United States was explicit as was exemplified by the request that Japan ‘show the flag’ and put ‘boots on the ground’. While normalising its military power, the Koizumi government strengthened the military alliance with the United States. In addition, by cooperating with the Australian Defence Forces for post-war reconstruction in Iraq in 2005, Japan upgraded its security partnership with Australia as examined in Chapter 5. The signing of the JDSC with in 2007 moreover, was facilitated by realist factors which valued Japan’s military normalisation. In addition, as shown in Chapter 1 and 6, the majority of the Japanese public had
begun supporting constitutional revision from the early 1990s. This shift in public opinion regarding constitutional revision coincided with the shift towards a ‘normal state’. Likewise, Japan’s military normalisation process has been continuously stimulated by structural changes (e.g. the 1990 Gulf Crisis, the 1991 Gulf War, the 1998 North Korean Missiles, the 2001 Terrorist Attacks, and 2003 Iraq War) and subsequent US pressures. Therefore, as eclectic analyses in the case studies have demonstrated, the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ was facilitated by ‘domestic and external pressure’.

**Implications of Japan’s Core Security Identity**

Significantly, this research has revealed Japan’s ‘core security identity’ as a ‘global pacifist state’. The global pacifist state model is consistent with both the ‘pacifist state’ and ‘UN peacekeeper’ models. As examined in the case studies, the shift from ‘negative pacifism’ to ‘positive pacifism’ does not mean that negative pacifism has lost its influence or that Japan is no longer a pacifist state. Indeed, Japan contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security based on both negative and positive pacifism. As case studies show, the global pacifist state made contributions to UNPKO in Cambodia and East Timor, and to UN-authorised post-war peace operations for Afghanistan and Iraq. **In sum, the finding of the case studies demonstrates that Japan’s contributions to international peace operation have been active, and justifies the argument that Japan’s core security identity has become, and still remains, a global pacifist state. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to argue that Japan as a global pacifist state model assists in understanding post-Cold War Japanese foreign and security policy.**

In addition, this study has highlighted the changing nature of Japan’s pacifism and security identity in response to domestic and external factors. ‘Negative pacifism’, as examined in Chapter 1, has been deeply rooted in
Japan’s security identity as a ‘pacifist state’. As shown in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, ‘positive pacifism’ has become a significant norm in Japan’s security identity as a ‘UN Peacekeeper’. Again, this does not mean that Japan lost its security identity as a ‘pacifist state’ based on ‘negative pacifism’. This is because the shift to ‘positive pacifism’ has been incremental and Japan’s security identity is changing in response to domestic and external factors. Although Japan’s security identity fluctuates between four perspectives, (pacifist state, UN peacekeeper, normal state, and US ally), the ‘global pacifist state’ is Japan’s core security identity. The analysis of changing Japan’s security identity indicate that the different security identities are mutually compatible based on the core security identity and easily changeable according to the changing international environment.

The thesis analysed the Japanese constitutional revision issue which might drastically change Japan’s pacifism and security identity. If the current Japanese Constitution is revised in a way that Japan can possess a ‘normal army’, Japan’s core security identity will become a ‘normal state’. Even so, the thesis argues that Japan’s security identity will alternate between an independent ‘militarist state’, ‘equal US ally’, and ‘UN centrist state’ as examined in Chapter 6. As demonstrated in this thesis, an analysis based on the concept of negative-positive pacifism combined with theoretical eclecticism assists in understanding changing Japanese pacifism and security identity. Hence, the thesis has made a substantial contribution towards the study of Japanese politics and international relations. Finally, this study concluded that although Japan’s security identity is changing in response to domestic and external factors, Japan’s core security identity is stable, and will remain a ‘global pacifist state’ based on ‘negative and positive pacifism’ for the foreseeable future.
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