MUSICAL UTTERANCE AS A WAY OF KNOWING: A CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY OF MUSIC

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PLEASE NOTE

The greatest amount of care has been taken while scanning this thesis,

and the best possible result has been obtained.
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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

This thesis contains no material that has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any other university and, to the best of my belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by any other person except where due reference is made in the text.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis takes its start from the identification of a gap in knowledge between the act of musical utterance and its significance for human being. Based on the proposition that music education could benefit from what it most appears to lack, a deep epistemology, the study first examines the knowledge gap as an epistemological omission in music curriculum and discourse, and then argues the case for retrieval of a Logos epistemology to rectify the omission.

The word 'retrieval' is emphasised because much of the literature does not acknowledge the human being as an historical being endowed with a noetic biography. It is argued that a valid critique of musical knowing, musical culture and the human faculty referred to as musicality can be made only when awareness of temporality - in both senses of consciousness evolution and music as a temporal art - is developed as an essential factor in the deliberation.

The discussion centres around the observation that it is historically significant that in the absence of an appropriate epistemology, music education has instead accommodated modes of thought that have evolved in disciplines other than its own, and that this has effectively blocked the bigger questions that would otherwise inquire after music’s provenance, mission, mode of operation and reason for being. Specifically, it is argued that the pervasive influence of a positivist mode of cognition has inhibited the commitment to musical meaning beyond the audible, the consequences of which are, on the one hand, the emergence of something of an identity crisis in Western music and music education, and on the other, nescience with respect to the human potential for epistemic awareness in the engagement with music.

Underlying my reasoning is the concept that the nature of the human-other relation is dual, and that it is historically and ethically significant that the human being is the battlefield on which the reconciliation of polar contraries is staged. Accordingly, there is in musical knowing an unnoticed Platonic dialectic of sensibility and meaning (or ‘intelligibility’ in Plato’s terminology) in which an original musical experience, towards which all subsequent musical
efforts (unsuccessfully) aspire, is repeated. The ethical polarity embedded in this act is that no original experience can be repeated without a loss of meaning. The consequence of the historical emergence of the repetitive manipulation of experience, itself a symptom of dualism, is loss of awareness of the significance of musical utterance to human purpose and destiny. The case is put that, whereas music originally inspired a paideutic ethos as witnessed in archaic thought, this has been obscured over time by the emergence of a psychology of individual production through which the former educational and didactic roles of music have been supplanted by more recent sensational and utilitarian roles.

The recovery of the meaning of the musical act, it is argued, is an ethical, biographical initiative taken up by the individual who senses the need to strive towards freedom of moral decision. Recovery consists in developing an epistemology specific to human utterance, namely, a Logos epistemology. Since the Logos is an original form-bestowing power whose sanctuary is the human being, it seeks and finds expression in uttered forms, and it is through fully conscious observation of one’s own contribution to the emergence of these forms that one can find oneself as knower. It is significant that it is characteristic of the Logos in the current era, however, that it is hidden from the (dual) perspective which humanity has taken up in its cognitive evolution. The condition of its recovery, then, is that it must be ‘unconcealed,’ for it is obscured by its own forms, and consequently, by aesthetic and linguistic theory derived, not from efforts made towards enhanced musical experience, but inferred from the sense-perceptible elements of experience. It is argued that it is educationally responsible to cultivate the individual’s latent epistemic resources, namely, self-observed, consciously directed intentionality, so that the meaning of the original experience of musical phenomena, tone and interval, can be raised to awareness, and musical culture renewed.
CHAPTER ONE

THE RESEARCH TOPIC AND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INQUIRY

"The wisdom of man is also the wisdom of the world, for all the secrets of the world are at work in the human being, in order to struggle upwards to new stages of manifestation through the metamorphoses of his consciousness" (Marie Steiner 1993:78).

PART A - PRELIMINARY DELIBERATION AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Establishing the Mystery Status of Musical Utterance

First Scenario - The Poetic

To Music - Rainer Maria Rilke. Translated J.B. Leishman.

Music: breathing of statues. Perhaps:
stillness of pictures. You speech, where speeches end. You time,
vertically posed on the courses of vanishing hearts.

Feelings for what? Oh, you transformation
Of feelings into ... audible landscape!
You stranger: Music. Space that's outgrown us,
heart-space. Innermost us, transcendently
surging away from us – holiest parting,
where what is within surrounds us
as practised horizon, as other
side of the air,
pure,
gigantic,
no longer lived in.
From *Sein wir wieder gut* - Hugo von Hofmannsthal. Translated Patrick Lawrence.

Music is a holy art
That gathers together all forms of courage
like cherubs around a shining throne,
and thus the holiest of all arts is
blessed music!

From *The Merchant of Venice* - William Shakespeare.

Sit, Jessica. Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
There’s not the smallest orb, which thou beholdst,
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubims.
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But, whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.

From *Arcades* - John Milton.

Such sweet compulsion doth in music lie
To lull the daughters of Necessity,
And keep unsteady nature to her law
And the low world in measured motion draw
After the heavenly tune, which none can hear
Of human mould with gross unpurged ear;
And yet such music worthiest were to blaze
The peerless height of her immortal praise,
Whose lustre leads us, and for her most fit,
If my inferior hand or voice could hit
Inimitable sounds.

From *A song for St Cecilia’s Day* - John Dryden.

What passion cannot music raise and quell?

When Jubal struck the corded shell
His listening brethren stood around
And wondering on their faces fell
To worship that celestial sound:
Less than a god they thought there could not dwell
Within the hollow of that shell
That spoke so sweetly and so well.
What passion cannot music raise and quell!

The thoughts about music bequeathed to us by these and other poets amount to only a slim volume, yet to my mind they say more of epistemological and ontological import than the entire literature of music theory and pedagogy, psychology, physiology and cognitive theory. That their number is limited, at least by comparison with the corpus of these latter disciplines, may be attributed to the difficulty of saying anything about music that is not better said by music itself.

The poets impress upon us that the musical experience is, or can be, sublime, and that, although its significance goes unnoticed in daily life, the capacity for making intelligible sounds is perhaps the most enduring mystery (in the sense of a puzzle or riddle) of human existence.

Second Scenario - The Philosophical

In the sixth century AD, the Roman scholar, Böethius, proffered a tripartite treatise of musical utterance comprising musica mundana (music of the universe), musica humana (literally, but not actually, human music), and musica instrumentalis (musical tones actually produced by human means.) Although Böethius’ theory is invariably cited in musical discourses with esoteric and metaphysical leanings, distinguished, significantly, from those whose aim and content is strictly didactic, I believe that the second category, musica humana, has not been fully appreciated by either persuasion for one important reason; its concept, as Maynard (1973) points out, is a figurative one: “... by the human music was meant a harmony of the parts in the entire human being, a ‘tempering’ or tuning so that body and reason and instincts combined in the right proportion and so echoed or copied the harmony of heaven” (1973:240). The idea of the balance of the human temperament, through music, reflecting the universal symmetry, musica mundana, was current up until the seventeenth century (although it has its origins in Greek philosophy) as evidenced in
one of the cosmological plays of the tenth-century German nun, Roswitha (Cantor 1965), and in the astrological psychology of later medieval scholars such as Marsilio Ficino.¹

Böethius’ (largely neo-<py>Pythagorean</py>) philosophy evokes a distinctly enigmatic picture of music’s mode of operation: it has its own unique non-verbal syntax; it has imputed cosmological properties; it has the power to effect changes in human consciousness. Crucially, both Böethius and the poets bear witness to the idea that the study of the mystery of musical utterance is inseparable - any such separation would be artificial - from the study of that other imponderable mystery: human being itself.

Third Scenario - The Biographical: A Personal Introspection on the Experience of Form Creation

In this connection, I want to relate certain of my early experiences around the creation of musical forms, experiences which I felt to be puzzling at the time, and in this manner consolidate music’s status as an epistemological mystery. I wish also to show how the absence of questions about music as a sublime mystery and the educational reluctance to grapple with the concomitant perplexity have contributed to the emergence of my research topic and to the direction of my work as a whole.

My life-long engagement with music commenced with piano lessons at the age of six. Later I went on to tertiary training, established a career as a player, conductor, arranger and occasional composer. In later years, I have also worked as a lecturer, educator and clinician.

From the start, the emphasis in my formal education was on getting me to play without error. This goal of exactitude seemed achievable only by hours of repetitive digital exercises in a confined space and the equally repetitive memorisation of Italian musical terms and the rules of logical harmonic progression. I do not recall any discussion about why this way of learning was good for me, or even about why it was considered important

¹ Since my study incorporates the idea of the historicity of knowledge it is significant, as I will later discuss, that “… it was not until mid-17th century … that [this theme’s] imaginative potency [indeed, almost all vestiges of figurative thought] drained away and came to seem a mere flight of fancy” (Maynard 1973:240). It is by dint of this radical change of consciousness [coinciding with the arrival of modern physical science] that the poetic excerpts I quoted above may seem, at least to the literal mind, unreal, or at best, merely figurative. Up to the seventeenth century, they would not have seemed at all remote from reality. For a recent study of Ficino’s musical thought and its imputed implications for psychological health today see Moore (1990).
to be musically articulate.

At the same time, I devoured, *in secret*, romantic and historical novels, mythology, heroic sagas and tales of the ancient Greeks and Roman conquerors. I say secretly because my budding imagination was interpreted by school authorities as daydreaming, and accordingly, not to be encouraged since it had no bearing on absorbing the prescribed curriculum. My appetite had something to do with wanting to be a hero, just like those I read about. I wanted to be unique, different, to achieve something unusual. Although I felt at the time these inner stirrings as my own, I believe that most young people experience broadly similar feelings. To me, these stirrings are closely related to the emergence of one's individuality, an event that involves a certain psychological disorientation in that period between puberty and adulthood known as *adolescence*.

Adolescence is the in-between. One is neither a child, nor an adult. It is a period marked by rapid physical expansion, but at the same time, enormous inner contraction, increasing doubt, extreme sensitivity to criticism, uncertainty about who one is and how one is situated with respect to the world, the culmination of a process of separation from the world (Wilkinson 1996). I know that I felt isolated and alone, and I was certainly not asked about the feelings I had, or given any hint about what they might mean in the context of growing up.

Adolescence is a time of *formative* experiences, in the senses both of giving form and of being formed. In my case one such incident stands out now as having shaped to some degree my subsequent progress as a student and my whole attitude to the world. I had a good treble voice and had previously won prizes at annual eisteddfod. On the day of this eisteddfod, I walked to centre-stage. My accompanist, who was also my piano teacher, played the introduction. I opened my mouth to sing, but there was no sound. She repeated the introduction. The best I could manage was an incoherent croaking. My voice seemed to have gone its own way, as if it had a mind of its own. I was panic-stricken, overcome by confusion, anxiety and embarrassment. I had to walk from the stage, unable to sing at all.

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2 References to the archetypal hero's journey in literature and music are numerous. Critiques and commentaries on it can be found in Joseph Campbell (1968), David Grene (1967), J.V. Luce (1975), Carol Pearson (1998) Carlo Pietzner (1993), and of course, in the work of Carl Jung.

3 My emphasis on 'adolescence' (from the Latin *adolesco* - growing up) will accrue significance in Part B of this chapter.
I was devastated, shamed beyond consolation. Indeed, there was no consolation. My voice had broken at the very moment I was to achieve my heroic status. I want to highlight early this correlation between being formed while doing the forming, and also, the significance of the ‘broken’ singing voice, distinguished from the speaking voice, to a young person predisposed to music.

A part of me died that day. Perhaps it was my innocence. In any event, I have not since become immured from the authority of the original experience, insofar as the loss of innocence was correlative to the loss of voice, and thus, to the loss of empowerment implicit in the creation of coherent forms. Although the feeling at the time was one of confusion and disorientation, I have become aware, with hindsight, that it has transformed itself into a debilitating wound with the distinct complexion of anxiety. I know I have relived it every time I have picked up an instrument or conducted an ensemble. The original injustice has remained an unexplained, though very much alive, influence on my performance, indeed, on my capacity to perform.

I have related this incident and the circumstances around it because only recently have I given pause to reflect on the effect it has exerted on my relation to my art and on my productivity as a performer and educator of performers. To per-form means to give, to bring to, form. What is it about the creation of temporal forms (speech and music) that can be so elating, yet, for many performers, also terrifying? It is true that my worst and best experiences have been in some way associated with this forming.

With the benefit of hermeneutic reflection I have tried to make sense of this and other formative experiences associated with the mystery of utterance. Why was there so much emphasis given to the do-able, the mechanical, the technical and the theoretical, while nothing was ever said about learning to play or to sing through the experience of my own responses? Why was mystery never mentioned? And why was my imaginal activity not respected?

This personal narrative is best summarised as follows:

- Learning to play was tedious in the extreme regardless of any other compensating factors.
- My youthful imagination was active, but not honoured as such.
- My persona, through the hero factor, was beginning to emerge.
I had a formative but disorienting experience associated with the production of form.

The whole scenario is connected with the human act of utterance.

The common thread in all this is the creation of forms, structures: making forms on the piano, making images, forming my persona, attempting to create audible forms with the voice, but being thwarted in the act.

Insofar as the whole notion of the creation of coherent forms is linked to the human being as an emergent persona, musical utterance is an epistemological mystery.

These three scenarios, the poetic, the philosophical, and the biographical attempt to confer significance on what is otherwise today a commonplace: the musical event. The kind of thinking they employ is not everyday thinking; it is performed only on rare occasions, when it is called, at least in the case of poetry, art. In addition, the scenarios hint, each after its own fashion, that the mystery that is music possesses some clue, or perhaps even a cipher or key, to the solution of the great metaphysical mystery that is human being, and vice versa.

My aim thus far has been to establish music’s status as mystery, and to acknowledge its parallel in humanity. From whatever direction it is approached, musical utterance is shot through with perplexity. Yet, that profound sense of mystery invoked by the poets, the medieval scholars, and in my own biography, is generally neglected by traditional music education today.

The Extra-sensory Dimension

In that it makes possible the expression and communication of ideas, and occasionally, what we regard as the most profound truths (in this manner distinguishing the human being from the animal), the capacity for speech and music cannot be said authoritatively to have its genesis in the instinctual realm. One need only make an acquaintance with the genial minds of Plato, Goethe, Aquinas, St John the Evangelist, Kepler, Blake, Emerson, Coleridge, Heidegger, Bach, Beethoven and Rudolf Steiner, to name a few, to conclude that the picture bequeathed to us by evolution theory and psychological theory influenced by it, namely, that of the human mind having its origins in,
and existing on, the same plane as biological instinct, is greatly in need of revision. Indeed, it is only in revising that picture that a sense of mystery can be invoked at all.\(^4\)

Every person who speaks, sings, or renders soundful a musical instrument is, by virtue of access to a \textit{precursor} of soundful expression - what might be termed variously, a preconscious, formative principle, given knowledge, precognitive knowledge, or as it is known in heuristic research, the ‘tacit dimension’ (Moustakas 1990, Polanyi 1966) - not only enabled, but somehow ‘willed’ to give external existence to that principle in specific, intelligible forms, and is empowered by that act. I do not yet refer to the conceptual or emotional \textit{content} of those forms, whether they be of linguistic or musical contour, nor even to their specific timbre, but to the \textit{fact} of utterance.\(^5\) That knowledge and that empowerment, which we are accustomed to take for granted, are implicit in our very existence as human beings, in our becoming human.\(^6\)

Ordinary observation reveals another facet of the mystery: musical experience is both sensory \textit{and} extra-sensory, that is to say, something fundamental to the act of knowing which might be said to \textit{be} the \textit{musical} experience takes place \textit{after}, or as a result of, sense-experience (hearing). That we can be moved to tears suggests that the sense-experience gives rise to an experience that is not physical although its effects may be felt physically. (I hesitate to give it the popular appellation ‘emotional’ for reasons that will unfold in Chapter Seven.) Significantly, only the \textit{acoustic} experience and the theories erected on it usually comprise the prescribed curriculum in institutional education today.\(^7\)

I have drawn attention early to this distinction between the acoustic and the musical experience to show that the failure to take account of the extra-sensory dimension amounts to

\(^4\) At the risk of pre-empting my main research aims, I wish to state here that one of my tasks as I proceed will be to contrast sharply the biological and entelechial models of human being which are often thought to comprise the complete picture of the human condition.

\(^5\) Throughout the project I will employ the word ‘utterance’ to encompass all human activity that creates meaning-bearing forms, and so distinguish it from the terms ‘expression’ and ‘communication,’ which carry more specific directional and spatio-temporal connotations. I will use the epithet ‘musical’ when I wish to distinguish musical utterance from other kinds.

\(^6\) Since I am not describing a ‘perfect’ being, it follows that ignorance, self-deception and powerlessness are equally characteristic. This antithesis will assume importance in Chapters Seven and Ten.

\(^7\) Although I will develop this distinction in some depth in Chapter Four, I want here to highlight the authority of sensory cognition by drawing an analogy with the linear, sequential character of language. In the same way that the meaning of a phrase or sentence “...is not present in the same linear manner as the words, [but rather], the tension which the writer experiences is between the linearity of the words and the nonlinear meaning,” (Bortoft 1996:62 my emphasis) the meaning of a musical interval, phrase, or even an entire work, consists just in its “active absence” (1996:16).
to an unnoticed abjuration of the mystery implicated in the capacity for musical utterance and perception. I regard intelligible musical utterance as no less than a superlative achievement of humanity, albeit nascent outside awareness. How is it that this finest product of the human mind is extra-mental? The point I wish to make is that the question arises because musical utterance is an ontological mystery.

The Epistemological Omission

I have come to believe that there is a disjunction perpetuated in teaching practices today amounting to an educational injustice. Why does the abovementioned one-sidedness persist? Why is primacy given to the doing and the do-able at the expense of meaning about, and out of, the doing? Why is it assumed that a person can, with practice, do music, but have no need to explore in any systematic way the thoughts and feelings arising from, and contributing to, the experience as being in any way essential to the business of learning?

I am careful not to project my personal experience, divulged above, as universal experience. My experience as an educator, however, is that disorienting experiences of one sort or another associated with the production of musical forms are common in young people. Although my thesis is not about anxiety per se, I wish to register at this point my conviction, drawn from observation and personal experience, that there is anxiety associated with the act of musical utterance, that is, form-making, and further, to speculate that it is linked in some way to the early experience of woundedness, loss, shame, isolation, rejection, ridicule, abandonment and emerging individuality, the whole complexity having a bearing on the attainment of a person’s freedom (of expression).

I have endeavoured to bring clarity to the rather indistinct sense I had that something vital and living, something of the nature of an ultimate truth that might have illuminated the mystery, was overlooked in my schooling. Was there some clue or wisdom which, had it been articulated, might have shed some light, not only on my voice loss, but on the mystery-laden connection between the act of giving rise to musical form and my innate humanity? And might that clue have given me something substantial by way of the nourishment of meaning to equip me for a life in what is a difficult profession?
My biography is littered with experiences and concepts that I failed at the time to digest. Their accumulated weight sits heavily in my epistemic metabolism. I believe I was taught the art of music, but I was not taught artistically. I mean by this obvious paradox that no attempt was made to connect theory with experience, my own feelings around the experiences were not taken into account as a fundamental resource in the learning process, and I was not encouraged to engage my imagination, potent at this age, as a way of approaching the production of musical forms. I was not instructed in a way that turned my gaze on the experience so that I could learn to value it. Another way of putting this is that there appeared to be no genuine concern for soul. I sensed this absence of meaningful connections right through my schooling without knowing at the time how to explain it or make sense of it. At various times I have given up performance altogether because it seemed such an empty ritual. I see the absence of connections as an epistemological omission.

The Major Conceptual Proposition

I believe there is a discontinuity between formal music curriculum and pedagogy and the implications of experience in and through music for human knowing and purpose, a disjunction which is evident, for example, in our being moved by music but then showing reluctance to explore with any strong sense of purpose the very sublimity by which we are moved, or even accommodating the exploring itself in music curriculum. The problem is not so much that music theory, pedagogy, performance practice and discourse do not explicitly acknowledge epistemological assumptions and limitations. Given music's complexity of idea, such an admission would be understandable. Rather, it is that epistemological questions are not asked in the current age because there appears to be no

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8 Is it that we believe ourselves powerless to do so? In any event, the reluctance already foregrounds the difference between exploration and explanation, although the two are evidently confused. If authentic exploration of musical impulses, effects, forces, responses, in short, inwardness of any sort, were to be incorporated in formal curriculum, then explanation of the intended aims, scope, purpose, rationale and assessment criteria would need to be included in a course document of some sort. The poets have shown us how difficult a task it is to explain musical responses. I only wish to point out that exploration, and even explanation, of inner dynamics can, and for my stated aim (below) of epistemic awareness, must, be conducted wordlessly, and that this presents a problem for music education. I will describe the procedure for non-verbal response and its rationale in Chapter Three. I must add that, since my view may be seen as 'absolutist,' it is institutionalised music education delivered by way of formal curriculum that I am speaking about. I am not suggesting that deep exploratory work is not being conducted independently by other people in other places.

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awareness of the necessity of asking them.\textsuperscript{9} Music is something we do; but it is not doing about which we are mindful. I am not alluding to questions of technical production, but to questions about musical knowing. It seems to me that the presence or absence of wonder about any aspect of human behaviour will determine the questions that are asked about it, indeed, whether questions are asked at all. Wonder may be considered the "precursor of holistic, deep and integrated] knowledge" (Wilkinson 1992:74) because it nurtures and maintains an attitude to a thing that includes its mystery.

The absence of such questions suggests that the need to ask them correlates to the status one accords the phenomenon with which one is engaged; that is to say, if a thing is not identified as a mystery for want of a sense of wonder, and valued as such (or alternatively, if it is seen as a commonplace), it will not attract the esteem it needs to lead to new knowledge about it. (I will argue that, given that music was regarded up until the seventeenth century as a sublime mystery, and is no longer, is historically significant, and that the attempt to 'solve' a mystery in no sense diminishes its status as mystery.) The value of a human deed is connected with diminishing epistemic awareness, in the sense that the value depreciates apace with the frequency with which the deed is repeated without reflection. I am suggesting that the act of musical utterance is by no means value-neutral, that there is a certain reductionism associated with automatism, whether perceiving or producing, and that whether or not one brings awareness to bear on the deed (I do not mean its physical execution) has far-reaching consequences in the realm of meaning for the practitioner and, I suggest, for humanity as a whole. Another way of putting this is to say that ordinary consciousness allows the habits of perceiving and doing to devalue the phenomenon; and the habit of devaluing the phenomenon consolidates our more-or-less indifferent attitude towards it and its meaning for us. Strenuous practice - for it does not come automatically - of reverence for the phenomenon (a Goethean ethic) is, for me, a research (and life) first principle.

Let me clarify. The omission of questions about a phenomenon that do not elicit permissible answers (perhaps because the complexity of mystery is deemed impenetrable by educational thought as well as by common-sense, or because it is deemed more

\textsuperscript{9} I will give evidence of epistemologies of music with historical origins as far back as Pythagoras. The problem, then, is not that they do not exist, but that lack of cognisance of their value for musical cognition presently has meant their oblivion. This suggests, not that they are inherently inadequate, but that they are
productive to be ensconced in a kind of epistemological ennui) is symptomatic of a state of epistemic un-awareness. This omission presents for the student (and equally, I maintain, for the profession of music today) an epistemological dilemma, the nature of which I identify in the text as ‘uncertain purpose.’ It seems on closer inspection that musical utterance might also be a mystery in the realm of ethics.

In light of my exegesis of musical utterance as mystery, then, with this having a bearing on the emergence of the dilemma of uncertain purpose out of the omission of questions, I submit that music education would benefit from access to a robust, phenomenological basis of understanding. It seems to me that epistemic awareness is essential for disclosure and understanding of the pre-emergent principles and emergent qualities of music, and by implication, for understanding of the very nature of the music-humanness relation and its significance for the individual and for the art of music. Epistemic awareness could bring the individual to a heightened level of understanding and allow him/her to produce and perceive in a more conscious, revivified, meaningful, responsible and autonomous manner.

The Research Topic

This thesis develops a deep epistemology of musical utterance by examining the epistemological omission and reconstructing the fundamentals of educational and musical thought in order to understand the journey from the operational and theoretical to the sublime.

To elaborate, my proposition is based on the observation that there is an epistemological mismatch of musical instruction, whether theoretical or practical, with the experience of music, and because that experience is undervalued as a learning opportunity, there is a lack of awareness about how musical knowing is positioned with regard to the questions of individual autonomy, human purpose and destiny. I have referred to this state of affairs as the epistemological omission.

The topic as I have stated it implies exploration of the enigmatic correspondences between musical experience and theoretical knowledge on the one hand, and those between

unacknowledged because current consciousness, for reasons that will become apparent, can no longer relate to them.
experience and knowledge and epistemic awareness on the other. In summary, I will examine the problem that is the epistemological omission and its influence in promoting and perpetuating the epistemological dilemma, and then, out of that examination together with my own emerging awareness, strive to identify fundamental principles that might serve as an epistemological foundation for the development of music education in the future. In interrogating the whole basis on which we claim to know musically, I expect the outcome to amount to another order of interpretation of musical knowing.

PART B - PROLEGOMENA FOR THE INQUIRY

The Frame of Reference and the Scope of the Inquiry

I can best achieve a picture of the scope and general purport of the inquiry by explaining the factors comprising my own epistemic orientation. I am aware that under the usual circumstances pertaining to the preparation of a thesis, my own deeply-held belief system, or ‘life-view,’ would not in itself (since it is mine) need to be a convincing argument. Nevertheless, for reasons I will explain in Chapter Three, the epistemological position undergirding the topic, and therefore guiding the logic by which I write, is itself part of the research and is inseparable from it. Since my epistemic orientation is the frame of reference - in the sense of departing from and returning to it - that defines the boundaries or scope of the inquiry, it is incumbent upon me to state explicitly how it guides the logic and direction of my thought and the degree to which it will undoubtedly influence the intended outcomes.

Rationale for the Epistemic Orientation

First, however, I should elaborate briefly what I have just said so that the rationale for including my ‘life-view’ here is clear.¹⁰ As the Catholic philosopher and novelist, G.K. Chesterton puts it: “The most important, and most practical thing about a person is his

¹⁰I mean by the term ‘life-view’ distinguished from ‘world-view,’ not merely an Anshauung or ‘outlook,’ but more importantly, an in-look. As Albert Schweitzer (1967) most insightfully discussed, a worldview can easily lose “... all connection with the elementary questions which man must ask of life ...” (1967:5 my emphasis); and a worldview that is not a product of a life-view will be “lacking in civilisation” (1967:6). It is possible to have a worldview without the viewer having the slightest sense of reverence for, or wonder about, the world of which (s)he has a view. Although I cannot discuss it here, there is much in Schweitzer’s claim
worldview” (1950:7 my emphasis), meaning, one’s life-view (I think this is what Chesterton means) does affect practical affairs. Or, as the historiographer, John Lucaks, suggests: “What people think and what they believe is, more than ever before, the main element of their histories” (1997:xxxiii), a statement that already foreshadows the position that knowledge is historical, and historical in a personal way. History is not only the study of civilisation, but also the study of personal biography, a study of how a person can make claims to knowledge and how knowing itself may change at particular moments in a life-course.

Although I appreciate the efficacy of current research methodologies, I have found that most are rather deficient on the question of how best to begin a research project. This problem has been exacerbated in my case by my choice of topic, which is taken from an expressive and communicative medium that is essentially non-verbal. This might explain, in part at least, why epistemological questions in music are not asked. However, since my thesis deals with the absence of such questions, it assumes an epistemological position to begin with. (Since I was not cognisant of this at the start of the inquiry, I will explain in Chapter Three how it influenced my research plan.) In any event, given my stated aim of epistemic awareness, not to begin with articulating a personal epistemological frame of reference of some sort would be in one sense to perpetuate the very omission I am endeavouring to rectify.

To complicate matters, my particular position, just because it takes its formulation in a medium not governed or limited by a logico-semantic framework,11 entertains an unlimited conception of knowledge (see Appendix A), a conception on which the research outcomes and even the emergence and consolidation of the topic are dependent. One of the ‘problems’ - if that is the right word - of authentic musical experience, as I will try to demonstrate, is that the experience is not only theory-free, but that it can also be relatively independent of the constitutive function of human representation that takes its cue from a particular perspective in time and space. I suggest, then, that musical knowing as action, knowing beyond the theory, cannot be accounted for in a language that imposes on it its

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11 It is perhaps not gratuitous to suggest here that musical experience must not be mistaken for the technical language that has evolved to make its pedagogy intelligible and its theory comprehensible.
own spatio-temporal perspective. (I will explain in Chapter Three how this caveat influenced my choice of research design.)

In other words, the very conception of the research topic itself is conditional on having at least a rudimentary epistemological framework, which, I am now trying to make explicit. To place a statement of that framework strategically at the beginning of my thesis I believe is critical, since all my experiential work is interpreted in light of it. For me, an epistemology is not just a theory of knowing, but a life-view, and my particular epistemic orientation is the context by which I read and understand the phenomenal text.

The other, no less important reason for explaining my orientation is that I want it to be read by other musicians and educators. There is a sizeable literature pertaining to many of the ideas I am about to present. However, given that music is a practical, highly specialised discipline that is learned by doing it, and thus its allure, it is understandable that most musicians will be unfamiliar with the literature pertaining to the ecology of knowledge, or be prompted to read it. Rather than merely refer to the literature here, then, I prefer my orientation to be read in my own words.

For the sake of brevity, I will elucidate as succinctly as possible the main features of my position, knowing that the need for brevity precludes adequate demonstration, especially of those precepts and concepts that may be considered controversial. For that reason I will include a fuller explication of some of these in Appendix A and Chapter Two. Since it might be considered unusual to place an already complex, and, I suggest, by today’s notions heterodox, framework at the beginning of a thesis, I appeal to the reader’s forbearance in suggesting that it is useful to regard what I will unfold here as prolegomena essential for orientation in the examination of an enduring mystery.

The Status of Knowledge for the Purposes of the Thesis

The research topic followed from my observation that there is something of the nature of a metaphysical riddle, awareness of the significance of which is omitted in the delivery of musical instruction. To formulate this proposition already suggests either, that there is some form of knowledge that is deemed unknowable, or, that it is of limited usefulness, otherwise it would not be omitted. In any event, it is neglected. I see this admission as a self-evident contradiction. To acknowledge - specifically by way of omission - that there is
something we cannot know is itself a statement of knowledge. If I say there is something about which I know nothing, I am already positing the existence of that something. I am saying that I know that I know nothing about it, which is to say that I know something.

Perhaps the confusion is generated by not differentiating between knowing that something exists, knowing what it is, and believing that it matters. To confess that there is something, but that we do not know what it is, is understandable. It is untenable, however, to go on to infer that, because we cannot know what that something is, it does not matter, and that it should therefore be left entirely out of the scope of an inquiry.

I have underlined here the classic dichotomy of knowledge and belief. I have done so not only to give early indications that my thesis has a certain argumentative density, but more importantly, to state my conviction that the knowledge-belief antithesis is no longer an adequate basis to begin an inquiry. It severely limits the questions that can be asked, and the creation of the contexts in which they can emerge. The omission of those questions is entirely pertinent to the educational outcomes of my thesis. As the educator, Bernie Neville suggests: “... we can learn very little by being told answers to questions we have not asked” (1992:12).

I have thought long on the knowledge-belief duality. I am convinced that its stubbornness - and its error - lies in the assumption that whatever falls into the category of belief cannot be transformed into actual knowledge. The duality has consolidated in our minds the idea that what we call knowledge is transitory. This idea holds water only so long as it is sense-knowledge, knowledge of finite things we are talking about, knowledge for which there is demonstrable proof. I hear sounds inside me. Since they are inside, there is no demonstration or proof. Do I merely believe that I hear these sounds; or do I know their occurrence to be true?

When we speak of knowledge, we usually mean evidential certitude, which translates as empirical evidence. Even now, there is a widespread tendency to keep knowledge obtained by sense-perception separate from anything that is a matter of belief (Bortoft 1996, Ouspensky 1949, Sherrard 1987, Steiner 1988a and 1988b). Knowledge belongs to rigorous methodological inquiry; belief belongs to religious faith. In other words, it is thought that to bridge the schism of external knowledge and belief is not possible.
Moreover, the methods used to gain material knowledge cannot be applied to non-material knowledge. Extra-sensory knowledge must remain belief or revelation or faith.

In my view this antithesis has outlived its usefulness. The very claim to know that we know nothing about something demonstrates in a most immediate way that our ability to make so-called ‘free’ decisions is founded precisely on our lack of knowledge. Because we do not recognise this contradiction, however, anything that is deemed to be impossible to know is left out of the scope of inquiry and thrust into the category of belief, where it remains undigested, under the surface of awareness, playing its role in every act of cognition.

I submit, then, that there is no circumstance where knowledge can be knowledge by omission. If there is knowledge that is tacit or preconscious, it is still knowledge. If it is knowledge and not nothing it is available, in principle, as knowledge. Any other position, whatever the philosophy informing it, must be determinist, for it denies the very human agency that makes free decisions. I maintain that what is left out by reason of its being deemed impossible to know must be included in the frame of reference if the inquiry is not to be compromised from the start. As the philosopher, Colin Wilson affirms: “… the ultimate definition of education [even if it is self-education] is the power to uncover man’s hidden evolutionary potential” (1992:4).

The knowledge about which we say of it that we cannot know what it is can be raised to understanding by the effort of awareness. Awareness is fundamentally a different phenomenon from knowledge. Awareness is know-ing (the verb). To disentangle knowing from its product, knowledge, is to become aware of awareness itself, in which case the knowledge-belief dichotomy disintegrates. Knowing can participate in its own processes rather than merely contemplate its product. I make this statement on the basis that consciousness seeks ultimately to grasp its own existence.

*The Unlimitedness of Knowledge and the Invariance of Meaning*

The scope of an inquiry is defined by what the researcher is trying to find out, and perhaps more importantly, as I have discussed, by what (s)he believes it is possible to find out. For example, I have suggested that wonder, which is really a state of mind, a
cognitional attitude, can influence what one seeks to know about a thing by elevating it to the status of mystery.

In the simplest terms, my thesis is about the search for meaning, specifically the meaning of musical utterance to human utterers. That stated, and given the self-imposed frame of reference defined by one’s belief in what it is possible to know, I want to articulate a notional working definition of mystery, namely, the presence of meaning not yet discovered, or if discovered, temporarily occluded for reasons known or unknown.\(^{12}\)

The possibility of finding out will be influenced largely by the belief in where and how it is believed meaning is to be found. If, for example, I believe that meaning is ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, as if somehow attached to the external phenomena, and that, by definition, my usual manner of observation and mode of consciousness require no special adjustment, then the scope of the inquiry and the findings will be affected accordingly.

The problem with this view is that it presupposes that meaning is invariant, that meaning is the same for all people at all times and in all places.\(^{13}\) The assumption of the invariance of meaning has, in turn, led to the belief that new discoveries, in physical science as elsewhere, are made by adherence to authoritative and self-governing methodologies. Given my discussion in the previous section, I hold to a contrary view, namely, that new discoveries arise from new ways of perceiving; that is to say, knowledge does not consist in new things, but new ways of seeing those things we already know, and it is out of this transformation of cognitive perception that meaning can ensue.\(^{14}\) For this reason, knowing is inherently historical.

\(^{12}\) It is not my intention here to follow the path of infinite regress by attempting to define the meaning of meaning, but rather, to establish a frame of reference appropriate to the acquisition of meaning as it pertains to a human deed that becomes decidedly enigmatic when thinking is brought to bear on it.

\(^{13}\) This assumption has been responsible, I think, for a host of attitudinal changes in scholarship, particularly in the history and philosophy of science, one outcome of which, according to Lukacs (1997) and Windschuttle (1996), has been the death of history as an academic discipline. Very recently, a growing cohort of scholars, including the two mentioned, is responding by reaffirming the historicity of knowledge and mind.

\(^{14}\) The difference is well illustrated in the scientific concept (current since the Reformation) of the earth as a planet, juxtaposed with the Australian aborigines’ picture of the earth as a Mother. In the former case, the perspective is on the earth, whereas in the latter, it is out of the earth, which suggests a mode of knowing in which thinking and perceiving are to some extent a unified process. I am speaking here of two radically divergent perspectives. (I feel the personal need to add that the plight of indigenous peoples is exacerbated by the habit, prevalent in the West only since the seventeenth century, of seeing their world rationally, that is, with an analytical mode of consciousness.)
Observational discovery is not made through the sensorium alone, but rather, in combination with a consciousness that can and does change its perspective. Through a transformed perspective, a change in the meaning that is the thing observed can bring about a change in the meaning of what is observed.

Meaning, then, is entirely dependent on the kind of mind that observes, the mode of consciousness,\textsuperscript{15} which, again, suggests that knowledge is, in principle, unlimited. What is meant by the term, ‘the search for meaning,’ is awareness of the changing relation between mind and other, although it has another dimension that I will add below.

My aim so far has been to establish, for the purposes of this thesis, first, that there are in principle no limits to the depth to which the knowable can be known, second, that any such limits in practice are imposed by the belief in what it is possible to know, which in turn is predicated on the assumption that meaning is fixed, and third, that the apprehension of meaning might be dependent ultimately on a certain de-automatisation of perception.

\textit{The Primacy of Relation in the Music-Humanness Equation}

Insofar as there is coherent musical utterance, and given my earlier observation that philosophies, phenomenologies and poetics of music (at least prior to the seventeenth century and going as far back as Pythagoras) all postulate music as a key to the solution of the metaphysical mysteries pertaining to human existence, the study on which I am embarking is one that assumes the primacy of relation, that is, it must accommodate both \textit{musica} and \textit{huma}, not as discrete units, but as relational entities. The meaning of the musical act will arise out of the ‘between’ in this relation. The only grounds on which a study of music has any claim to validity is in the context of human being. Music is a

\textsuperscript{15} Given the direction taken by my commentary so far, it is timely that I explain my understanding of the concept ‘consciousness.’ I do not mean intellectuality, intelligence, or the whole complex of psychological function, that is, thought, feeling and sensation, but something different. If consciousness were these things, I would always be aware of what I was thinking and feeling, which is clearly not the case. A particular state of consciousness can pertain to them, but is independent of them. If that is so, it is in some way observable independently. By consciousness, then, I mean the extent to which I can be awake to my own being as this relates to all other being. I must add that in this project I do not write with the specialist in psychology or philosophy in mind, in which case my use of the word, ‘consciousness’ would require exactitude of terminology. Unless otherwise stated, my use of this and related terms, which in specialised circumstances would be considered troublesome, is an appeal to general readership despite the admittedly complex ideas circumscribed by the topic.
human phenomenon. Exploring a musical way of being necessarily implies a depth exploration of humanness.\textsuperscript{16}

It is critical that I emphasise this connectedness at the outset. Although it is possible to study \textit{either} music \textit{or} human behaviour as separate fields, as is the usual custom, this specialisation (which was anathema to scholars up until the end of the Middle Ages) seems to miss what is essential to both: their indissoluble relation; what they \textit{do} to each other, their relative dependence on each other, how and for what reasons their relation has evolved. It seems to me, then, that to study \textit{either} the human being \textit{or} music can result in incomplete conceptions of both, which are then taken as models that often guide practice in those fields dealing with them and the methods whereby inquiry into them proceeds.

This connectedness suggests that it is not only the cognising mind that ‘behaves,’ to borrow a term from behavioural psychology (Skinner 1976), but also the other with which the mind is engaged. This adjustment in attitude immediately confers ‘life’ on the other, whether it is an external phenomenon or one’s own internal dynamic. Rather than believe that a phenomenon is an object that is simply ‘there,’ and that it is perceived by way of the sensorium, we can view it as a dimension of mind (Steiner 1992), which would mean revising the usual view of mind, as Bortoft suggests: “We are accustomed to thinking of mind as if it were inside us - ‘in our heads.’ But it is the other way around. We live within a dimension of mind which is, for the most part, as invisible to us as the air we breathe. We usually only discover it when there is a breakdown” (1996:132) or, as I will discuss in Chapter Three, when we make our own activity of mind visible through appropriate exercises. Musical phenomena, then, can be considered importunate: they ‘seek’ to be known, specifically as a dimension of mind, and not as passive objects. ‘Seeking’ is not inert quiescence; it is behaviour. I believe this further aspect of behaving has been missed by contemporary trends in philosophy, and for that reason it is difficult to grasp the full import of Marie Steiner’s epigraph at the beginning of this thesis.

My inquiry begins from the basis that an explanation of how and why we know musically is sought only in the music-humanness relation, and that it is free to emerge only by entertaining an expanded conception of \textit{homo musicus}. When this conception is

\textsuperscript{16} I am not disregarding the idea that matter, plants and animals may be affected by musical stimuli, in which case I would be speaking of ‘material,’ ‘plant’ and ‘animal’ phenomena respectively.
extended to embrace an horizon of latent possibilities the ordinary becomes extraordinary, and reverence for humanness and music is retained at every step in the inquiry. 

*The Dual Perspective and Resolution of the Dyad*

Even to speak of relation and a between presupposes a *dyad*, a mind-other mode of existence, or dualism. Böethius’ system has in common with all other metaphysical schemas the resolution of the dyad, that is, a reconciliation of the life of consciousness with the experience of external events. Despite the trends of latter twentieth-century thought (Appendix A), I, like Coleridge, see the notion of relation as, “… the underlying reality in the natural, moral, philosophical and personal worlds” (Perkins 1994:275). This belief implies an underlying intelligible order or unity of thought and experience to which we unconsciously aspire, and as far as my epistemological position is concerned, that is in our power to know.

Knowledge about, and resolution of, the dyad, through enhanced awareness of the dynamics of relation in the musical experience is for my research a question of ultimate concern. Nothing exists in isolation. This is as much a principle of nature as it is of mind. There is always relation, which is to say, living connectedness, whether it is the relation of part with whole, idea with object, tone with interval, or mind with world. As I noted above, however, dual relation implies a ‘between.’ For the purpose of this research, I define the relation of a human subject with another entity as conditioned by the dynamics of the between as a perspective (see Appendix A for elaboration). The perspective through which knowledge is currently acquired is a *dual* perspective distinguished by the action of a subject *on* or *over against* an object. The perspective, however, has not historically always been the same one; rather it changes, depending on, among other things, the concept of evidential certitude I mentioned above. This notion of an evolving perspective applies to all individuals in any encounter with external events as they make the transition from infancy to adulthood, and equally, to humanity at large at any particular moment in its cognitive

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17 This developmental view of the human being as possibility, can be found, for example in Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology, on which Blackham comments: “His [the human being’s] existence is in his choice of the possibilities which are open to him, and since this choice is never final, once for all, his existence is indeterminate because not terminated” (1961:88). Further: “Personal existence is self-projecting, it is not what it is but what it will be, because it is not formed and finished but has an open future ...” (1961:95).
development. The *kind* of knowledge gained is dependent on the perspective taken up by humanity, which in turn defines the *kind* of relation it has with the other.

As I noted above, I regard it as a modern epistemological error to view the *other* in a perspectival relation as *not behaving*, as being a passive object of knowledge. Rather, to envisage the other as having an *active* role in a dual relation is to ascribe to it *equal* importance, and to give back to it the ‘aliveness’ which, historically, the dual perspective has taken *from* it. By exercising one’s human *agency* (overlooked by determinist philosophies) one can take up freely the role of the *other* in the cognitive act and so come to know it for itself instead of as an object of human utility. I call this inversion of roles - critical to the kind of knowledge acquired, and thence, to meaning - the *inverse perspective* (Chapter Three).

It is through perspective transformation (actually a change in the mode of consciousness) that one can acquire *awareness* of the sort of (extra-sensory) knowledge unavailable in the dual perspective and thereby, bring about a change of meaning. Human knowing is conditioned, not by sense-knowledge alone, but also by extra-sensory knowledge. That knowledge is knowable *consciously* because it is already present unconsciously in experience. It is a question of raising experience to consciousness.

To proceed further, the ‘between’ I have alluded to, the complex of dynamics that takes place between the two entities comprising the perspective, is conditioned largely by the (again) *changing* experience of the space-time nexus. (This is of particular importance in the study of the music-humanness relation because of the popular allusion to music as a *temporal* art, that is to say, its medium of appearance is believed to be predominantly that of time.) For that reason the dual perspective can be alternatively termed, the *spatio-diachronic* perspective, meaning awareness of distance or spatial depth and time between things and events and also between myself and the thing or event.

In my epistemological schema, what I have called ‘the between’ is the opportunity for the emergence of meaning. I can now adjust what is meant by the term, ‘the search for meaning,’ to read: a search for the *extra-sensory* dimension of knowledge of which most are at present unaware, but which is nevertheless available as knowledge, conditional on a human agency surmounting the (dual) perspective which until now has been determined *for* it, that agency thereby taking in hand its own evolution. Dualism is there to be surpassed. I
suggest that ‘the between’ is best viewed as a kind of epistemic *threshold* between the realms of sense and spirit. I have again emphasised ‘between’ for the reason that I believe that holism, at least as I understand it, is a nebulous ideal insofar as the historical and teleological implications of the dual relation, to which holism is a reaction, have not been fully understood (see Appendix A for further commentary). A *holos*, from a dual perspective, is a cognitive and logical impossibility for the reason that there must be a self-conscious individual separate from some other for *sense*-knowledge to be a possibility at all. (That there is knowledge available that is not *sense*-knowledge is a primary concern of my thesis. This will become apparent in Chapter Three.)

*The Fundamentals of Dual Reality*

As I discussed above, knowledge is always the outcome of a relation between a self and some other, even when the latter is an aspect of the self. The self is not independent of the other; rather, the relation is one of mutual interdependence whose dynamics are not noticed in ordinary perception. The dual relation involves an existential separation of knower and known.\(^{18}\) Because this fragmentation of reality is sensed by humans on some level, there is an unrecognised mental movement to create wholes, that is, to impose order by unifying the various elements of *sense* experience. In this, the range of *sense*-percepts seen in an object - four legs, topside, underside, flat surface and so on - are unified to form the concept, ‘table.’ It does not matter what shape, size or colour the table may be; it is always a table. It can be seen in this unifying activity that the particulars on each encounter with the object are overlooked. I merely need to glance at it to know that it is a table. This synthesising habit is the basis of our cognitive independence. It is not, however, *knowing* the object; rather, it is making an expedient judgement about it.

The mind structures experience by *imposing* on reality an organisational framework. All linear progression and spatial organisation is such an imposition. Ordinarily, the mind does not see this because its activity is transparent. It is directed at the object of knowing and not at its own structuring activity (Steiner 1992). For that reason, thinking is not participatory, but abstract. For *abstract* thinking, wholeness “... is the *synthetic* unity of an organisational synthesis” (Borto 1996:58). It is not an *experienced* unity. What are seen as “just two separate and contingent facts” (1996:69) are made a *pseudo* whole by the mind

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\(^{18}\) In view of my emphasis on dualism, I will cite some of the key authors associated with it as I proceed.
(see Appendix A for further discussion). The authentic unity of the phenomenon is missed by the analytical mind "... because it is not visible in the analytical mode of consciousness, and therefore must compensate for what is missing by adding on its own thought construction to the phenomenon as it is presented to sensory experience" (1996:69).

Knowledge of the external world is not an advance in understanding. It is only the retrospective recognition that things have been discovered about it that previously were not known. As I have argued, it is on the basis of not knowing that we make claims to knowledge of the world. Knowledge comes about by transforming that world from within; for it is in the inner realm that world knowledge is played out. Since it is this realm we know very little about it is crucial for new understandings to arise to know the extent of our relation to the world in cognition. As the Barfield scholar, John Ulreich, puts this idea: "... genuine knowledge, as distinct from superficial understanding, always requires the participation of the knower in the known" (1983:123). In my framework this requirement is satisfied by intense exploration of the whole concept of perspective, that is, how and why there is relation conditioned by a between, a space between myself and the things and between the things themselves as they appear to cognitive perception.

**Polar Reality - An Alternative to Dualism**

Since dual reality is not participatory but abstract, I suggest that it is more useful to regard all dualities as polarities. I mean that the two entities comprising a duality are not, as is usually assumed, exclusive, antagonistic, irreconcilable opposites, but polar opposites whose difference is essential for knowledge. The two interpenetrate each other; they exist for each other and, simultaneously, at the expense of each other (Barfield 1967 and 1973). In polarity, it is difference that is emphasised and valued. Polarity gives duality a reason to be (historically) what it is, and provides a basis for its transformation. I see all duality as polar relation become historically disjunct.

When we say that something 'is,' we can do so only on the basis that the sole means and condition of its 'is-ness' is the existence of a polar opposite. It is in the polar relation between opposites that a meaningful world can come into existence. The contrariety of opposites comprises a whole, a unity, because the opposites, although antithetical, are two dimensions of a single power: Logos. Finite-infinite, transitory-permanent, temporality-eternity, prosaic-poetic, thesis-antithesis, concept-percept, mind-matter, void-plenum,
subject-object, the historical-the ahistorical; these are all dichotomies held together by a mutually beneficial tension in which the opposites are maintained in their difference. Since they are two aspects of a single power, they tend to reconciliation.

What goes under the one name, Logos, and is apprehended in cognition as a unity, is actually the mutual cooperation of opposites. Heidegger (after Heraclitus) makes this apparent: “Unity is the belonging together of antagonisms. This is original oneness” (1987:138). Unity, wholeness, then, is not freedom from opposition, but a holding together in which opposites maintain a tension, an equipoise, or what I referred to above as ‘the between.’¹⁹ (The difference between wonder and utility discussed above is an adequate picture of the function of polarity, and it presages as an outcome both a loss of value and a gain of pragmatic expediency). The difference between participatory and abstract definitions of a whole as seen from (extensive) dual and (intensive) polar perspectives is explained most strikingly by Bortoft. Whereas an extensive definition of wholeness is “unity in multiplicity,” an intensive definition is “multiplicity in unity” (1996:342). The whole contains a multeity within itself in such a way that each part of it is the whole.

The reconciliation of opposites needs an agent: consciousness. Their resolution does not consist in their (synthetic) unification, but in recognition of their interdependence, which inheres in their difference. Unity is not a bland merging of one with the other in which the opposites surrender their difference. On the contrary, they sustain each other because of their difference. This is an authentic holos. In my epistemological schema, consciousness or mind, to the extent that it is conscious, is the agent of reconciliation of polar opposition.

To sum up, I regard the cognitive, epistemic, ethical, cultural and spiritual advancement of humanity as being dependent, not on the accumulation of knowledge, but on the (historical) acquisition of new understandings, new meanings. These are located in the epistemic threshold. However, the goal of the threshold, as I will later argue, is obstructed by the ‘disbelief’ of positivism, which is inherently sceptical towards human

¹⁹ Polarity as Logos is a central theme of my project. It is possible to conceive of the principle of polarity without connecting it with the Logos, as is the case with Goethe, for example. On the other hand, one can conceive of the Logos without associating it explicitly with polarity, as is the case with the pre-Socratic thinker, Heraclitus. In the literary criticism of Coleridge, however, the two are brought together. They are essentially the same principle. It is important for the reader to bear this in mind as my discussion unfolds.
agency (seeing it more as an instrument) and thus, towards the whole notion of human autonomy (chapters Four and Five).

**The Logic of the Thesis**

Although the particular relevance of this discussion to musical utterance has yet to be established, I trust that my reasons for undertaking this explication at the beginning of my thesis are now more apparent. If knowledge is dependent on a particular perspective, and if that perspective, and by definition, the consciousness that places itself *in* the perspective, are historical, then an epistemology - which is after all the study of cognition itself - that omits these considerations must be flawed from the start.

As I will discuss in Chapter Three, the outcome of these deliberations is a new (inverse) perspective that changes every facet of the observer-observed relation including the logic of thought, which is transformed from the analytical to the imaginative mode.

This is to state that the style of demonstration in this thesis is by way of logic, but a logic arising from the explication of the particular life-view I have given here. The word, 'logic,' has acquired a number of pejorative connotations in recent years, as Kirk indicates: "... the principles of 'classical' logic are no longer unconditional: new concepts of truth are recognised" (1997:xviii). I should, then, clarify what I mean by logic for the purposes of this study.

The reader will have discerned that my reasoning so far reflects what I see as the need to go to the root, the origin, of things as a way of researching which, for me, is synonymous with discovering their meaning. As I see it, the first (and continuing) task of an epistemology is to distinguish the essential from the inessential, to identify (and where possible, expurgate) all pre-suppositions at the outset (Steiner 1981 and 1992) rather than merely declare they are there, and then proceed as if they were not. The retrieval of music's mystery status is an example, in that bringing thought to bear on the musical act offers up a dimension normally hidden, namely, a cognitive darkness or unknowing (evident, as I have noted, in our *doing* music without feeling obliged to grapple with that perplexity.)

The process of demonstration, then, is one of *unconcealing* what is there to be unconcealed - which includes the 'thing' and the relations between things - as if stripping
away the layers of cognitive habit and cultural convention. (The word, distinguished from ‘revealing,’ belongs to Heidegger, whose phenomenology will assume stature in the text.) The topic requires, then, a logic that has an *expository* form. The aim of awareness of the extra-sensory dimension - which I see as a move on the part of humanity to determine its own trajectory from epistemic adolescence to adulthood - is to be achieved, not by recourse to vague mysticism, abstract idealism, or quantitative intellectualism, but by clearing away the detritus of the inessential so that the essential is allowed to stand out in sharp relief. This might be interpreted as letting a thing show itself in its true light.

In this connection, there is another dimension to the mystery that I have held over until now: the hearable, distinguished from the seeable is a special category of mystery for the reason that temporal events leave in their wake no *material* traces or evidence. It is possible to *scrutinise* them only in retrospect (an act, which, if performed authentically, would consist in placing oneself in the mind of the auditor who was present at the time the event occurred.) The logic by which my reasoning proceeds, then, must acknowledge temporality, in the sense of its collusion in the manifestation of musical phenomena, and also in the sense of historical consciousness. Kirk affirms: “... the truths of history, the real meanings, are to be discovered in what history can teach us about the framework of the Logos .... about the significance of human existence ....” (1997:xii).

Here, Kirk anticipates my own logic by providing an apposite example of polarity, which, recall, is at the same time the *Logos* principle. His comment implies that history is the ideal teacher about what history is not: the ahistorical, history’s polar opposite. The idea of the temporal cannot even be conceived unless *contrasted* with the atemporal, the eternal.20 Another example: When I say of a thing that it changes, I am saying necessarily that there is something that does *not* change. This is a polarity of the perishable and the permanent.

*Logos* logic is the logic of polarity (that recognises the *necessity* of co-existing opposites - for example, subject and object - or no unity is possible), distinguished from duality (which seeks to reduce difference to sameness), the logic, not of ‘either-or,’ but of ‘both-and.’ I am trying to say that, for the purposes of this thesis, epistemic awareness is

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20 Heidegger’s essay on time begins with that very postulate: “If time finds its meaning in eternity, then it must be understood starting from eternity” (1996:1E).
synonymous with *Logos* awareness, and that the goal of *Logos* awareness demands its own expository logic regardless of any discomfiting truth exposed by it.

A further facet of the *Logos* doctrine is that every 'thing' is utterance of some kind. In this context my earlier distinction between the hearable and the seeable is crucial, since it suggests that even the seeable is utterance. It is worth noting that the Greek roots of the word, 'epistemology,' are *episteme*, knowing, and *Logos*, accurately but not extensively interpreted as, word. One interpretation of epistemology, then, is: knowing of and/or by the word, bearing in mind that the word, 'word' itself needs rigorous negotiation. (I will not go into this further here, but direct the reader to Chapter Two where the theme is explored more fully.) All this suggests that an epistemology of utterance is an epistemology of *Origin*. The only epistemology appropriate for an investigation of *utterance*, distinguished from other epistemologies, is one that bears its own logic within itself, namely, a *Logos* epistemology.

I want to indicate at this stage that the logic by which I write is not the kind governed by the law of logical contradiction or syllogism, but *Logos* logic, the logic of polarity that discloses familiar concepts and events to show them in a new light.

For me, an epistemology of *utterance* is also an *ethics* and *ecology* of the Word. I say this by way of declaring my belief that there are certain fundamental concepts, of which the *Logos* is one, that cannot be grasped in terms of relativities. Relativist doctrine holds, for example, that truth can never be a certainty, only a possibility, and that therefore a person can only ever make a *claim* to truth. In my opinion this is a confusion of (polar) relation with (dual) relativity. What the *Logos* principle (which is my frame of reference) teaches, I think, is that certitude and doubt, truth and falsehood, cannot be equivalent *possibilities*. They are either *both* true or they are *both* false. Sooner or later, a commitment must be made to one or the other of these positions if ethical *action* in the world is not to be paralysed. I say this knowing that paralysis, inaction, and postponement may not always be dependent on a prerequisite of truth.

I am raising the issue here only to show that, as is the case with the history of music itself (Chapter Eleven), what is dissonant for one person is consonant for another; and what is dissonant for one *epoch* is consonant for another. That is *not* to say that dissonance - because of preferred consonance - is untrue. It says only that it is *not* consonance.
Consonance and dissonance are as necessary for an experienceable world as they are for an experienceable music, that is, wholeness. This prompts me to suggest that an epistemological consensus cannot consist in an idealistic fusion of disparate and divergent world-views in which differences of opinion are held in abeyance for the common good. This only perpetuates the conflict inherent in 'pseudo-holism', which I see as paying lip service to difference (perhaps because it serves unseen but no less specific agendas) while secretly feeling threatened by it.

What the Logos is not is a logic of personal comfort that falls into line with the demands of the human will. For that reason its use will in all likelihood seem adversarial; for it always comes down on the side of the phenomenon, and in this manner exposes hidden personal and partisan agendas.

Logos logic is a logic of authentic wholes, distinguished from pseudo wholes. Holism of a sort is indeed possible, not as an edifice of thought or an abstract or subjectivist ideal, but as a perceptual actuality that evolves out of transformed dualism. I am only too aware as I write just how antagonistic this view might seem. Yet, it is an example of the expository logic I have described, and is almost impossible to soften or 'tone-down,' as it were.

The logic I have described leads to an explanation of the discursive strategy employed throughout the thesis. Although repetition and circularity are often considered undesirable in a thesis, they are the hallmarks of musical argument. In this thesis, the development of meaning is negotiated by the introduction of themes and ideas in such a way that they behave dialectically, inductively and cumulatively, by which I mean that the force of the argument increases by degrees through the successive addition of themes that are introduced, temporarily withheld, and integrated subsequently into the whole. In that the whole resembles a structural device known in music as theme metamorphosis or cyclic transformation, it moves forward by repeatedly turning back on itself.

The Influence of Rudolf Steiner

This, then, is my epistemic orientation and frame of reference. Although it may sound like wild assertion in this severely abbreviated form, I should state that its consolidation in my mind and its explication here largely in my own words have been
achieved with more than usual effort. For that reason, I am aware that I may already have placed more than usual demands on the reader. However, in that its principles amount to an ethic that I endeavour to live by, it may be regarded as my life-view and my research paradigm. I intend to argue its veracity in context as I proceed.

I consider it important to declare the sources of my orientation. It has been achieved in the first place through study of the epistemological texts of Rudolf Steiner and the works of more recent authors influenced by Steiner, principally Owen Barfield, Henri Bertoft, Georg Kühlewind and Robert Sardello (see Bibliography), and also by scholars not so influenced despite substantial convergence of opinion with that of Steiner, second, by way of extensive inner work based on Steiner’s epistemological indications, and third, through the implementation of experiential courses I have designed for others.

I wish to state here my alignment with Steiner’s philosophy, and to inform the reader that throughout the inquiry I intend to position myself within Steiner’s epistemological framework. As far as my aim of epistemic awareness is concerned, I regard Steiner’s work as a master discourse informing all others. This is not to say that other discourses are not valid. Rather, I believe that Steiner’s discoveries about the human psychosomatic organism and his theory of the threefold human being force us to radically revise the most fundamental precepts of knowing, and for my purposes, musical knowing. I know that my own deeply entrenched veridical beliefs have been vigorously challenged and subsequently transformed through contact with Steiner’s writings. What I previously regarded as self-evident truths (because unquestioned) have dissolved during contact with Steiner’s narrative.

By way of clarifying and substantiating my position, Chapter Two surveys the root concepts of Steiner’s epistemology. Since I quote there more freely from Steiner’s texts, and those of the other authors mentioned, the reader will be able to discern, I hope, how I have arrived at my framework. For the moment, I want only to explain how Steiner’s epistemology stands with respect to recent trends in the science of knowing.

Until the 1930’s, it was believed that the scientific paradigm was the only and ultimate measure of evidential certitude or objective truth. Certain streams of contemporary philosophy, however have come to doubt the possibility of objective knowledge, and assert, rather, that humans can never be neutral observers in the strict scientific sense of making
observations that generate 'true' theories because they correspond with the so-called objective world. They argue that we are participants in the world, and that we construct theories based on our personal and social experiences, needs and psychosomatic organisation. This, it is believed, has opened the way for subjective elements such as feelings and values to be admitted into the knowing equation.

Steiner's epistemology is independent of both objectivist and subjectivist theories of knowing for one important reason. Although it is now understood that knowing is not given totally in sense-experience, but is in part a construction by the knower whereby the parts of a phenomenal totality are put together in cognition, Steiner shows that the cognitive unity is not achieved by the mind imposing the unity on sense-perception, but that the unity actually resides there in the phenomenon, which means that the function of the mind is one of non-sensory perception. The distinction is between what is perceived and the way of perceiving. Appreciation of this distinction exposes an epistemological initiative which, when taken up by individuals can redeem them from the helplessness of the existential void through the recognition that it is the very basis of their freedom. This leads to a number of revised notions pertaining to cognition.

First and foremost, truth, in a final sense, can be discovered or created by the potentially free individual.

Second, this implies acknowledging the necessity of dual reality. From a dual perspective, reinforced by the grammatical structure of language, it will seem that the entity that knows precedes cognition, as evidenced, for example in the statement, 'I hear a sound.' (It is significant to note that, because of this disjunction, "... epistemologically there is no difference in kind between cognitive perception in science and everyday cognitive perception" (Bortoft 1996:359), although science may be said to involve a more comprehensive kind of ordinary perception.) In polar awareness, however, the knowing entity is derivative, that is, it arises as a result of the process of cognition. The perceiving subject and what is perceived coalesce in a correlative or polar manner, showing a relation of meaning in which one cannot be without the other. It is a feature of humanity's noetic evolution that it come to awareness of this distinction and, through it, self-discovery of the knowing entity that is capable of evolution, namely, the 'I,' the individual spirit, the "... unconscious kernel of conscious personality..." (Barfield 1970:62).
Third, there is an ethics of knowing correlative to the realisation that the constructive framework we do impose on our experience is ultimately not done for our own convenience. A true reading of the phenomenon “... does not force the [phenomenal] text into the mold of the reader’s personality, or into the requirements of his previous knowledge” (Bortoft 1996:7). Since the cognitive unity belongs to itself, and not to a synthetic construction imposed by the mind, the phenomenon with which the mind is engaged can be consciously experienced. Because of the assumption that cognition happens of its own accord, however, and requires no special effort from the knower, unity by way of a cognitive synthesis is achieved easily. Authentic cognitive unity, on the other hand, because it is motivated by concern for the truth of the phenomenon, is achieved with practice. On this basis, Steiner posits a theory of participatory knowing, distinguished from abstract or representational knowing.

These themes will be developed contextually in the subsequent discussion.

The Research as the Practice of Ethical Individualism

What I have outlined is spiritual work, at least in the sense of a belief that knowing can reach beyond our current knowledge of the world. Accordingly, I have come to the conviction that new understandings in music are simply not available if the related notions of historical consciousness, unlimited knowledge and an expanded conception of human being are consistently excluded from the research paradigm. I see epistemic awareness, then, as ethical practice. Also, since it is tied up with individual biography, the research is not merely a discrete ‘body’ of work; it is a personal path of knowing. Given this stipulation, I want to affirm that my research cannot acquire validity through the experience of others. Although I do not reject the notion of intersubjectivity as a means of validating human inquiry, I regard the desire to seek perspective transformation in the first place as germane to personal ethical and spiritual progress and for that reason, should not be imposed on others. I believe that each person has to be willing to take that step as and when he or she feels it is biographically timely.

The Musical Context

The word ‘music’ as it is used in this project needs some boundary negotiation. My own musical training is centred firmly in the Western tradition, namely, art-music and more
recent forms of improvised music. In this thesis, it is that tradition I refer to when I speak of music. Although I will allude occasionally to Eastern philosophies in terms of how they compare with those of the West, it is beyond the scope of my inquiry and cultural experience to attempt to accommodate the great musical traditions of the East.

Towards a Contemporary Epistemology of Music

I have stated that my aim is to develop a deep epistemology of music through examining and, if possible, rectifying the epistemological omission by bringing epistemic awareness to the act of musical utterance. Central to that aim and to my own framework is the notion that human consciousness is subject over time to periodic changes. Accordingly, my epistemological thought seeks to develop human agency in cognition. I see the dynamic of thinking as a latent human potential.

In the teleological sense of bringing some future evolutionary potential to bear on the present, thereby using the thinking agent to assist his/her own biographical evolution, my attempt to develop an epistemology of music can be called contemporary. It is a theory of musical knowing which I believe to be appropriate for the times. Although I deliberated over the use of the word, its inclusion was based on the need to distinguish an emerging epistemology, in the sense of its timeliness, from the word ‘modern,’ which has in recent times acquired specific connotations in sociological discourse, cultural theory and literary criticism. By contemporary, then, I do mean modern, but not in the sense of celebrating the feverish excitement of new agendas for their own sake, most often by negating the value of past influences, an attitude implying confidence in technological advancement and in the unconstrained energy of material growth and ‘progress.’ I mean rather, contemporary in the sense of a timely initiative, consciously employed, that seeks to understand and transform the hidden impulses stimulating such materialist thinking before it passes from its fluid state into the congealed mould of mindset or cognitional attitude. I say this knowing that a belief these days in historical teleology is often open to derision. Despite that, Coleridge’s comment in his essay, Progress, rings true for me: “let us allow and believe that there is a progress in the species towards unattainable perfection” (1987:148).
Advocacy and Conflict

Finally, although I will address in Chapter Three how reflection on my personal biography has contributed to the emergence of the research topic, I want to draw the reader's attention here to the influence of some biographical concerns on my discoursing.

One of the discoveries I made about myself during the research tenure was a pronounced tendency to defend what I can only call a musical way of being. By defence I mean my own responses to energies which I sense are reductionist, and therefore hostile to that way of being.

In view of what I have said about musical experience being in some degree (yet to be clarified) an inverse perspective, I think this powerful feeling of advocacy is driven by the sense for evidence or truth which I believe the continual immersion in that perspective is able to elicit. In a life-course committed to music, that particular sense for logical clarity can become a way of living in the world. But it is problematic. More and more during the research tenure, as I have become aware of the limitations of literalism through the systematic cultivation of an inverse perspective, I have changed, and I have found myself more frequently than I would have liked in conflict with the abovementioned reductionist models of the human being. On each encounter with such forces, I have had the distinct sense that I was being 'done-over' or 'got-at,' as if the attempt was being made to compromise my integrity and the integrity of utterance itself in some way. The antagonism here poses a question: Is epistemic awareness won at the expense of an adversary, and if so, what is its nature?

All this is by way of explaining in advance a tendency to reveal my 'absolutist' position while reviewing those legitimate but nevertheless hostile points of view that have consolidated as formal doctrine or unconscious convention.

Yet, in some measure, this conflict is what my thesis is about. Philosophically, it is embedded in the tension between notions of the absolute and the relative, (and the tendency of both to become the other), complexity and simplicity, the sensory and the extra-sensory, and in other pairs of seemingly antagonistic opposites.
The tension is an ever-present reality also in everyday experience. It is felt in the difference between high ideals and the commonplace celebration of the banal, between professionalism and amateurism, between artistic striving and the human tendency to revert to slothfulness and mediocrity, between what we know we are capable of and what we actually produce. Such is the lot of the aware musician. And if one becomes mindful of the conflict, each day presents an almost impossible choice between sympathy for and antipathy towards, other users of music, be they players, educators, concert promoters, authors, administrators, managers, recording companies and even students. I see this conflict as an ethical dilemma that gathers intensity as one experiences the tensions provoked by shifting backwards and forwards between dual and inverse perspectives. Since the conflict is ‘lived,’ and is apparent in my work, I trust that the often forceful tone of my writing will be taken in the light of that lived conflict.

The conflict is most marked in those chapters dealing with logical positivism. It does, however, finally work its way through to something of a resolution or conclusion. While living the conflict within myself and observing it about me frequently, I found a way, as I earlier indicated, of coming to terms with it, namely, by treating pairs of opposites, not as mutually exclusive, but as essential to each other.

Since I treat these tensions in a hyperliterate manner, the reader would be justified in wondering what the content of some chapters has to do with music. Because the discovery and resolution of the conflict in myself is an essential aspect of my heuristic process, I decided to let it stand in my writing. I thought that I should explain, however, that, if the reader finds my polemic in some chapters offensive, that is because it is de-fensive. If there is any truth in the idea that ultimately I create my own reality, perhaps the adversary, after all, is myself.
PART C - SYNOPSIS OF CONTENT

Introduction

Broadly, the thesis falls into two parts: Chapters One to Seven define and discuss the nature of the problem, that is, the epistemological omission, while Chapters Eight to Thirteen deal with the second part of the research topic, namely, the reconstruction of educational and musical thought in order to trace an epistemological framework grounded in the discovery of the veracities of the music-humanness relation.

Synopsis

Chapter Two - The Encounter with Rudolf Steiner

In the event that my readership is unfamiliar with the work of Rudolf Steiner, Chapter Two identifies the main features of his epistemological thought, understanding of which is central to my work.

Chapter Three - The Research Design

The research design itself exhibits a philosophically reflective approach to the topic in that it evidences the struggle to find a plan appropriate to a non-verbal medium of human expression with the designation 'mystery.' The commentary demonstrates the need for a design that is at once heuristic, phenomenological and speculative, and argues that new meanings pertaining to musical utterance are available only to a research approach to musical phenomena that is at the same time a path or progress of knowing on the part of the researcher. At its centre is a personal curriculum of work whose purpose is to transform the dual perspective into an inverse perspective as a prerequisite for knowing musical phenomena.

Chapter Four - The Epistemological Omission and Its Influence on Musical Perception and Cognition

A discussion of how music has been affected by not having a thought-out and articulated epistemology, evidenced particularly in the failure to make the distinctions between hearing and listening, tone and interval, acoustic and musical experience
(introduced in Chapter One) and sensory and extra-sensory knowledge is the focus of this chapter. It argues also that as a consequence of this omission, music has unwittingly absorbed ways of thinking that have evolved outside itself, namely, the tenets of positivism.

Chapter Five - The Influence of the Positivist Paradigm in Music Education Today

Chapter Five argues that the effects of the positivist paradigm on music education have been profoundly disorienting. Insofar as it reinforces the authority of a dual perspective, positivism has undermined our confidence in our own cognitive and epistemic resources, and so precludes exploration, and even the posing, of foundational questions pertaining to music’s status as a sublime mystery. Positivist tenets, in principle and practice, are shown to be inadequate to the task of educating sensing, ethicising, human beings.

Chapter Six - The Influence of Subjectivist Thought

Chapter Six discusses how positivism, through its objectivist, sensationalist and materialist excrescences has silenced sustained discourse around questions of ultimate concern and how music has become a marginalised art through recourse to subjectivist principles. It is shown how subjectivism, based on the presumption that music’s purpose is primarily the expression and communication of ‘emotion,’ has popularly but erroneously come to be seen as the natural enemy of, and therefore, only possible alternative to, objectivism.

Chapter Seven - Implications of the Epistemological Omission for the Pursuit of Mastery and for the Development of a Self

This chapter attempts to demonstrate that, inasmuch as it bypasses verbally-led cognition, and therefore defies description, music is without a concept, and that consequently what is known as ‘musicality’ (or talent) is thought, again erroneously, to consist in its operation, that is, in a demonstration of executive facility. The chapter then examines what is involved in the attainment of musical mastery, and shows that by directing awareness to the distinction between truth and error as they pertain to the arduous journey towards mastery, musicality can be a profoundly influential teacher of the self, particularly in the realm of ethics.
Chapter Eight - The Recovery of Intelligibility

At this point, the thesis begins the task of recovering the meaning or intelligibility of the musical act through an examination of the music-mathematics relation, the historical connection of music with Pythagorean and Platonic ethics, the void-plenum polarity and the Logos as the essential ‘principle of measure’ informing musical utterance.

Chapter Nine - The Evolution of the Spatial Perspective and the Implications for Cognition of the Dominance of Vision

As a continuation of Chapter Eight, this chapter falls into three parts. First, a review is undertaken of the main points encompassed by the inquiry up to and including Chapter Eight. Second, an exegesis is made of the referents necessary for orientation in the direction taken by the inquiry in this and the two subsequent chapters. The referents are the historicity and teleology of the cognising mind and the historical emergence of the self-conscious individual. Epistemic awareness, it is asserted, cannot be separated from historical awareness. Third, the discussion contrasts a Logos conception of utterance with human activity in which awareness of that conception is absent. The discussion argues that the historical ascendancy of a specific way of knowing, namely, the spatial perspective, together with the domination of knowing by the visual part of the sensorium, are symptomatic of, and homologous with, the emergence of radical, distinguished from ethical, individualism, the former showing itself in a psychology of control of, and by, the word.

Chapter Ten - Towards an Understanding of the Logos Origin of Utterance by Way of Comparison with Approaches to the Mind in Positivist Psychology and Evolution Theory

This chapter begins by examining the extent to which the act of musical utterance is conscious. It then strives for a definition of musical consciousness by juxtaposing the Greek with the modern conception of nous or mind as the latter is evidenced in functional psychology and Darwinian evolution theory. Two examples of the influence of mechanomorphism on current musical thought are discussed. These examples, it is argued, demonstrate that a mechanistic view of human being and action prevails, and that its evolution has dealt a fatal blow to human conscience, which itself is vital to an awareness
of Origin and to the task of revealing the lost integrity of the Word, and also to exposing the psychology of control.

Chapter Eleven - Musical Cognition as a Model of the Historical Mind

Here, the aim is to demonstrate that historical consciousness is apparent in the history of music, and that the case can be made for the capacity for musical utterance as having, paradoxically, an ahistorical, superconscious origin. Further, it is argued that this origin can be known as such by the individual through the conversion of a psychology of revelation (preconscious knowledge) into a psychology of imagination (conscious knowing).

Chapter Twelve - Logos Awareness in Utterance and in Education

This penultimate chapter aims to establish truth as a spiritual project by way of addressing the distinction between Logos and logic. It asserts also the educational primacy of the individual and argues the case for curative education delivered in curriculum that addresses the unbalanced and, therefore, damaging education of the past.

Chapter Thirteen - Denouement

The final chapter brings to a head the discussion around the foundational questions introduced throughout the thesis. It does so by means of a series of phenomenological depictions, or musings which, it is intended, will form the epistemological basis for a transformed music education in the future.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ENCOUNTER WITH RUDOLF STEINER

Introduction

In Chapter One, I explained my worldview and indicated that it had been formed through an encounter with Rudolf Steiner’s anthroposophical paradigm for living. In this chapter, I want to undertake a brief exposition of that paradigm. Although Steiner is the source of the ideas, concepts and insights that have influenced my development, I will draw freely on the writings of others where I consider their expression to be more accessible or intelligible. In any event, I trust it will become evident why Steiner’s thought, which I regard as prescient and sagacious, cannot be studied with a spectator attitude. It is in every way a view that calls for personal action.

I feel that I must preface this explication of Steiner’s work with two explanatory remarks. First, Steiner’s epistemology is difficult to grasp. One of the problems of converting the outcomes of his epistemological method into words is that many more words than would be sufficient for ordinary conceptual thought are needed. For that reason, the reader may find the content of this chapter to be to some extent a duplication of what has already been said. Moreover, the greater part of Steiner’s thought pertaining to matters of ultimate concern was delivered by way of public lectures that were published subsequently in written form. This permits the observation not only that Steiner was particularly discerning about the character and level of understanding of his audiences, but that the nature of his material is better suited to oral (rather than written) speech, the characteristics of which are repetition and circularity as I noted in Chapter One. Accordingly, I see no harm in presenting the same conceptual content in different words.

Second, the commentary, as I indicated above, includes the views of other authors who have been influenced by Steiner. In this sense, the commentary may be considered an overview of Steinerian thought, though by no means an exhaustive one. I am more concerned to leave the reader with a picture of the ‘leading thoughts’ of Steiner’s
epistemology so that what I have proclaimed as a master discourse giving focus and meaning to my own work is made transparent.

Before embarking on a review of his work, I think it is essential to address the question of Steiner’s status in the panoply of world knowledge. Steiner left some 350 texts (Wilkinson 1996) comprising 50 books and over 250 volumes of lectures, a prodigious output by any standards, constituting as it does an “overwhelming legacy of insights in a dozen fields” (McDermott 1991:159), including philosophy, history, epistemology, natural science, medicine, bio-dynamic agriculture, ecology, astrology, geometry, the (individual) arts, education, care of the handicapped and much else. Given this astonishing corpus and its undeniable implications for the understanding of the world and humanity, I have been puzzled to discover during my reading a profound neglect of it not only by academe, but by almost all the specialist fields I have mentioned. I find this neglect incomprehensible given that Steiner’s output, together with the work of those who have extended it (since his death in 1925), constitutes a large and consummately reasoned body of literature which is nothing if not prophetic in its implications for the advancement of humanity.

Steiner and the Occult

What is behind this indifference? I will proffer a few opinions, all of which I think have merit, but which collectively suggest an alternative explanation towards which I will work in this review. McDermott, for example, writes: “The difficulty with Steiner’s disclosures from the perspective of a more conventional philosophical position is simply that he bequeathed too much information and particularly too much that runs against, or falls outside, our usual ways of knowing (1991:159). Also, his “concern with ‘occult’ realities” may be “responsible for the widespread neglect and rejection of his thought” (1991:159).

David Ray Griffin believes that Steiner “... challenged the reigning orthodoxy of the day, especially in scientific circles ....” Further, since “attempts to present all-embracing interpretations of the universe have been out of fashion for most of this century,” Steiner’s philosophy “has been outside the mainstream of intellectual thought” (1991:185).
Finally, David Oppenheim argues: "... given where the hearts of most people in the First World are currently, many will hardly hear the challenging call ... of Rudolf Steiner to enter ... onto the path of spiritual science" (1991:185).

What did Steiner mean by 'the occult?' The answer, I think, can be traced to his persistence in trying to establish a basis of meaning for human existence and world destiny, a difficult task in his own time, distinguished as it was by a rampant materialism that conferred legitimacy on reductionist models of the human being.

Heidegger, (who was unknown to me prior to this project, and in whom I have been delighted to discover many points of contact with Steiner) directs attention through the study of the earliest Greek philosophers, Parmenides and Heraclitus, to the folly of defining human being in a concept which, in his view, had its fallacious roots in the "pale and empty dichotomy of 'being and thinking'" (1987:141). This definition of the human being, the "rational animal" (1987:142), is a zoological one which has supplied the model for the "Western doctrine of man - all psychology, ethics, theory of knowledge and anthropology ... . For years we have been thrashing around in a confused mixture of ideas and concepts drawn from these disciplines" (1987:142).

Having noted this confusion, Heidegger continues:

To be sure, there are books entitled: "What is man?" But the title merely stands in letters on the cover. There is no questioning. Not only because people have been so busy writing books that they have forgotten how to question, but because the writers already possess an answer and what is more an answer that forbids questioning (1987:142 my emphasis).

Heidegger is intent on demonstrating that the consequence of "the paralysis of all passion for questioning" is the distortion of perspective. He insists that the "determination of the essence of man is never an answer but essentially a question" (1987:143), and "only where being discloses itself in questioning does history happen and with it the being of man" (1987:143). It is only as a questioning, historical being that a person becomes a self. The question, 'What is man?' is a deception. "Because man as a historical being is himself, the question about his own being must be reformulated. Rather than 'What is man?' we should say 'Who is man?'" (1987:144).
Although I can find no evidence that Heidegger was influenced by Steiner, there is doubtless an affinity between their philosophies. Both believed that it is the biographical right and destiny of every individual to know truth, which, by definition, must encompass spiritual knowledge in addition to other kinds. This 'essence of man' is a questioning, a striving to find itself. Steiner's epistemology is essentially about that journey. It is an answer to the question, 'Who is man?' His epistemology contradicts most other formal epistemologies in this respect: whereas the others assume from the start that cognition occurs only as a result of a person's relation to the external world, and that this relation constitutes the extent of attainable knowledge, he demonstrates that there is a realm of knowledge (the supersensible world) beyond the boundaries of ordinary conscious life that is not merely believable, but knowable. By transforming knowledge of this hidden (occult) realm - in much earlier times kept from the general populace by secret societies and Mystery Schools - into a systematic science, Steiner's intention is to make it available to all who are inclined to make the effort. Crucially, the psychological (soul) conditions necessary for access to this higher knowledge cannot be "presupposed as a given fact of man's being" (1996b:3), but rather, must be acquired by means of specific exercise (1986b). The conflict between Steiner's approach to knowledge, and that of positivism, of which atomistic science is the epitome, is not one of methodology (Steiner himself was a scientist), but of the levels of consciousness from which the knower does the observing. In his view, there is still experience there to be had, but it is experience beyond the sense realm.

Given that anything described by ordinary conceptual language bears the imprint of the sense-world, the word 'occult' has no conceptual meaning in the realm of sense-experience, and so, for most, carries a disquieting - because uncogised - connotation. Rather, the concept is available only to spiritual investigation, which Steiner sees as a strictly systematised "developmental path of the human soul" (1996b:24). Misinterpretation can be avoided, then, by regarding Steiner's (occult) method, not as an intention to indulge in ecstatic mystical practices, channelling, mediumship or anything of that sort, but as a "striving for direct instinctive vision" (1996b:24) by means of a shift of attention from the sense-perceptible to the supersensible world. I see Steiner's meta-
narrative as an affirmation that beyond positivism, something more meaningful is possible, even if, I have to add, it might be denounced, however compellingly, by postmodernism.\footnote{Although warning the reader that for reasons of economy his definition is an oversimplification, Jean-Francois Lyotard suggests that the postmodern may be understood as “incredulity towards meta-narratives” (1993:xxiv). It is that sense of disbelief, or at least the reluctance to suspend it that I am alluding to.}

It is noteworthy that Steiner himself acknowledged that the objection that his method is not ‘rational’ (at least to the analytical mind) is difficult to refute, but that is because, “… on leaving the sense world, it [spiritual investigation] always takes the rational element along with it, retaining it as an integrating component and skeleton of supersensible experience in all supersensible perception” (1996b:25). Kühlewind puts this thought in another way, and at the same time gives an indication of the difficulty of penetrating Steiner’s thought generally if the motive is mere curiosity:

There can be no information about the realms that lie behind the world of facts, behind the world of things and processes available to the senses, because these realms are the world through which facts, things and sensibly perceptible processes become, the world of becoming. Information says: A is like B. In the world of the spirit there is no such thing as is (1988:156).

It is perhaps understandable, then, why there has been so much scepticism regarding the supersensible, which, for Steiner, is the polar opposite but essential complement of the world of sense, and why such a non-materialist conception of knowledge in materialistic times would attract derision or even outright rejection. In Griffin’s words: “To affirm occult qualities and powers is to challenge modernity at its very centre because nothing was more central to the founding of the modern worldview than the rejection of occult qualities and powers …” (1991:5).

**Fundamental Epistemological Principles**

Steiner saw that behind all research activity there is, or ought to be, an impulse to look for the fundamental nature of things. But if research endeavour is directed at human knowing itself by examining our experience, our efforts are most often hindered by what we perceive to be grasorable in the form of past experience, together with the ways we employ our cognitive faculties as they are presently (psychophysiologically) constituted. “A theory of knowledge,” argues Steiner, “must leave open, to begin with, the question of whether we
can arrive at a judgement solely by means of experience, or by some other means as well” (1981:33). Steiner demonstrates that experience itself may contain something not apparent to ordinary consciousness, which, in becoming conscious experience, “would guarantee the validity” of its own “insight” (1981:34). With all observation, the collaboration of the observer with the observed (including one’s own interiority) is dependent in the first instance on the quality of preparedness of the mind doing the observing. In the act of observation, I can notice what I am used to thinking, and even while observing, may not notice what is there in the phenomenon if its idea is foreign to my thinking.

For Steiner, a real epistemology must come to grips with the two components of knowing: the act, and the laws by which the act is accomplished, and through which its reliability and its limitations are determined. In Steiner’s case, the word ‘laws’ is commensurable with his view that there are objective truths available (although the word ‘objective,’ too, needs re-definition) even if their cognition is obstructed by the limitations of present-day experience and knowledge. The word ‘laws’ bespeaks his particular epistemological position, which distinguishes between natural or physical law and moral law.

Again, it is important to know that these comprise a polarity. Steiner makes the point, for example, that if the macrocosm did not continually die in us, we would not be human in the true sense. It is just because it does die in us that we are self-conscious beings capable of thought about the universe:

But these thoughts are the corpse of the universe. A past world dies in us, down to its very matter and energy. [Consider, for example, the process of metabolism, in which the macrocosm in the form of raw foodstuff is taken into the body, whereupon it is reduced to zero and metamorphosed in another form in order to serve the continuance of life. The stuff consumed cannot remain in the body in the form in which it was taken in, or death would result. The same process is true of vibration, which does not serve soul-life, but is transformed in the ear into sound. The difference in the case of

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2 I am aware that there is far from unanimity of view as far as the recourse to ‘laws’ today is concerned. I should say in Steiner’s defence, however, that he is referring to the dual (polar) principle that he sees as being at the ground of the universal process of creation. What the Western mind since the Greeks tends to regard as a fixed and immutable reality, the apparent dual nature of things, manifesting as Wilber points out, as “truth vs. falsity, whose study is called ‘logic,’” “good vs. evil, called ethics;” and as “appearance vs. reality, named ‘epistemology,’” (1993:18) is an error, but a necessary one. For example, every myth (the Fall), every proverb (the moral of the story is …..), every fable (Jack and the Beanstalk), and every nursery rhyme (Humpty Dumpty), is an unqualified statement of a dual principle, namely, that where there is gratification there is also retribution.
hearing is that the ear does not enter into a material relation with what it takes in.] It is only because a new universe at once begins to dawn that we do not notice this dying of matter and its immediate rebirth. Through man's theoretical thinking, matter - substantiality - is brought to its end [matter may be seen as the death of the creative principle]; through his moral thinking, matter and cosmic energy are imbued with new life. Thus what goes on inside the human skin is connected with the dying and birth of worlds. This is how the moral order and the natural order are connected. The natural world dies away in man; in the realm of the moral a new natural world comes to birth (1958:37).

In the human organism, material phenomena are reborn on a higher plane.\(^3\)

*Critical reflection*, then, on the laws according to which one thinks and creates, and not the unreflective naivety - whether of the realistic or, in the case of psychology, the rationalistic kind - behind the thought, is the distinguishing feature, in Steiner's opinion, of an epistemology. It seeks to "demonstrate the laws inherent in cognition" (1981:48).

**Knowing, Truth and Freedom**

We prize knowing above all else; knowing is at the very core of our existence. For the human being today, *freedom* of knowing translates as I who know, I who am without doubt. *Who* I am is correlative to *what* I know, not to how I know it. Although most are largely indifferent to the latter question, in it lies the truth of our relation to the world, a relation which, when seen for how it truly is, reveals the distinction between intuitive and constructed knowledge. It is *intuition* that Steiner is most insistent we learn to develop. I should point out that intuition for Steiner is not some vague accidental insight, but the highest *fully conscious* mode of human knowing, "an experience - in pure spirit - of a purely spiritual content" (Steiner 1992:12), or as Bamford defines it, "a higher cognising activity that unites feeling and willing [through thinking] in a single deed of *love*" (1984:15).

Why do we not see the distinction? Although there is a healthy desire in every person, (even when it is denied), to know something of the mystery of the world and our

\(^3\) For a detailed account of the operation of the law of polarity in the human body and in the natural environment, see Schwenk (1990). For its application to human hearing, the reader is referred to Soesman (1989).
place in it, Steiner holds that we are imprisoned in our knowing because we place self-imposed limits on what we can know. (The reason will become clear in due course.)

"We seem to believe," writes education researcher, Elliot Eisner, "that what we cannot say, we cannot know. Some go even further to claim that thinking itself depends upon the ability to put thoughts into words, a kind of sub-vocal speech" (1988:16). While doing this research, I have been forced to ponder in some depth the knowledge-speech connection and its bearing on human freedom. To take up Steiner's indication, one of the ways in which we limit our knowledge, it seems, is through our conceptual use of language, and that is because we have little sense for the word in the Logos connotation.

Actually, we know far more than we can say. (If we could say what music is, for example, we would have no need of it.) It is just that in our knowing, we need certainty. Our knowing is motivated by doubt. It is the doubt, the uncertainty, the ambiguity we cannot tolerate.

When we do not understand, then, we make things understandable. We force the world to fit a narrow and confined vessel (space) of consciousness, an onlooker consciousness that tends "to enclose the individual in himself, a prey to scepticism and unsure purpose" (Davy 1978:142).

What is meant by 'unsure purpose'? When something is too problematic, we pretend to know, to understand. The pretence of knowing gives us authority over the thing (not) known, and also, over those who do not understand, or who have long since denied themselves the 'healthy desire' to know. In the latter case, the experts, we tell ourselves, must be right. They have their technical language; they sound as if they know; they are doubtless. Can it be claimed with absolute certainty and honesty that we know other, whatever it may be, if we have already reduced it to the limited referents of our own understanding?

The virulence of doubt stems from the observation that ordinary consciousness which, as I suggested above, has placed its own limitations on what can be known, is aware of its content (thoughts, feelings) but not of the act of knowing, because "... the act is a world act

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4 I posit in Chapter Ten a psychology of lying and discuss what I perceive to be a current example.
that we have come to take as our own, thereby producing an impenetrable veil over the world” (Sardello 1992:28).

It is the pretence of certainty that has, through the many celebrated achievements of our time, diminished our sense of the connection to the ineffable, the ambiguous, the unsayable.

It is indeed a small step from the certitude of knowing to the conceit of knowing. We see knowledge as a possession, with all the attendant ramifications of exploitation and manipulation implied by possession, rather than as a continuing epiphany of experience. Furthermore, we are addicted to what is communicable. That is why knowledge is no longer equated with wisdom, but with information, and why language has become a mere convention, a transaction.²

In actuality, we say a good deal more than we know. And because we cannot (at least without the schooling Steiner envisages) know the unsayable, we content ourselves with half-truths, half-realities. This is gainsaying, a manifest demonstration of the human ability to deceive others by first of all deluding oneself. Knowing in this superficial sense may be gratifying, but it is not knowing. It is only a very narrow passage leading to a much broader, deeper and more satisfying cognition of things. We do not see this because we are today disposed towards premature resolution in our knowing.

What is it we can know, but cannot say? It is truth. Truth is an ethical ideal (distinguished from subjective and abstract ideals) which has become a part of one’s being. The final sentence in Steiner’s locus classicus reads: “One must confront the idea in living experience, or else fall into its bondage” (1992:178). Steiner is insisting that it is not good enough to be a willing slave of the senses, beyond which there is a realm of ideas. It is not good enough to be “a merely passive recipient of truth” (1992:177) because a person is then always “assailed by doubt” and will forever find “his powers lamed” (1992:177). The confidence individuals desperately need in developing their individual powers can only come through recognition of truth. Only this enables a person to find a “... goal for his

² I have found Lyotard’s critique on the postmodern commodification of knowledge useful. He makes the strong point that knowledge is now considered worthy only if “learning is translated into quantities of information” (1993:4). He continues: “We can predict that anything in the constituted body of knowledge that is not translatable in this way will be abandoned and that the direction of new research will be dictated by the possibility of its eventual results being translatable into computer language” (1993:5).
creativity" (1992:175). Crucially, truth is knowable only by uncovering or unconcealing it, precisely by removing the opacity of a priori ideas and concepts.

Until I become adept at listening to what I cannot say, I am condemned to doubt and to the fear it provokes. Language limits until I find out what its truth is. What is the Logos in me? To resolve to seek an answer to this question is to gain a glimpse of the spiritual freedom that is my biographical goal. For the word is no mere tool of communication; it is at the very ground of our humanity.⁶ Kühlewind writes:

Without speech [meaning conscious utterance of any sort] man is not man. Therefore he could not possibly have ‘created’ the first language. To create already implies speech - is speech. Speech, the word, makes human beings human. Even a particular language is so powerful a ‘thought’ that a human being could never bring it forth (1985:20).

He continues: “Logos is not word, law, sense, reason, measure etc. It is everything that makes these possible: a common relationship to the world, a common world” (1985:21).

Here is a superconscious provenance of language, and by implication, of thought (both specifically human), because “finished thinking that has reached consciousness has a verbal form” (Kühlewind 1988:161 my emphasis). Both are preconscious or superconscious abilities. One “cannot say, even afterward, how a thought was formulated. Whatever directed thinking in its path is also active in the arrangement of words” (1988:161). Crucially, neither thinking nor utterance can originate in the world they themselves construct (and thus their hiddenness). Their superconscious ontology is actually obscured by the very ‘finished’ forms to which they give birth.

The extent to which this obscuration has eradicated from our awareness the superconscious origins of human utterance and, correlatively, the Logos - ‘I’ principle, is evident from Kühlewind’s later remark:

Nominalism assumes that thinking is identical with words, that there is no thinking without words. Nominalism forgets that words receive their meaning from and

⁶For an account of the influence of cosmic occurrences on the evolution of speech, see Steiner (1959). Also, Barfield (1967b, 1984 and 1988) and Kühlewind (1988 and 1990) subject the accepted dogma of linguistics to
through thinking, and does not see that this *something* to which a word refers, must already be *that*. To get a name, a thing must first be an ‘idea.’ The belief that anything could exist without an idea is anti-Logos (1985:172).

“Since linguistics became an ‘objective [meaning positivist] science’, states poet, Paul Matthews, “it is no longer respectable to refer to language as a *living organism* which can flourish or die according to how we nurture it ...” (1994:17 my emphasis). In a lecture titled *The Alphabet*, given in Dornach on 18th December 1921, Steiner traces the development of language, and points out how “in very ancient times, speech was something that Man formed out of himself as his most primal ability; how, with the help of his organs of speech he was able to manifest the divine spiritual forces living within him,” and further, how in the transition from the Greek to the Latin culture, “something living in speech, something eminently concrete changes into abstraction” (1982:1). He continues: “It might be said that what belongs to the alphabet was applied later to external objects, and forgotten was all that can be revealed to Man through his speech about the mystery of his soul and spirit. *Man’s original word of truth, his word of wisdom, was lost*” (1982:3 my emphasis). Here again is a timely reference to a lost Logos principle.

Clearly, Steiner’s is a Logos epistemology. The spiritual core of the human being is the ‘I’ or ‘I am,’ the conscious principle, and our epistemological dilemma stems from not knowing *who* this Logos principle is, and that is because today’s consciousness is a consciousness of the past. Consciousness is always fixed on the already-formed structures of past thought. Although it can be argued that such habits of consciousness are inculcated by environmental influences after infancy, the capacity upon which the building is predicated is nevertheless superconscious. Only think-ing, the formless, fluid parent of thought, has the power to cognise the Logos principle; it is the Logos principle.

It is *this* ability we should come to know. The *fact* of utterance before we attribute to it any historical, cultural or personal significance is testimony, not that we *do* know a non-subjective reality, but that we *can* know. Although human knowing can be viewed - and certainly is in modern relativist terms - as contingent, human intentionality demonstrates that there is an attempt, a striving, to proceed beyond contingency to certainty. We must acknowledge not only knowing, but also that which drives the need to know.

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a compelling critique, and argue, rather, for a historical view of language as something out of which ‘things’ had their nascence and their being.
Mirrored consciousness, past consciousness, can and does shape knowledge, but it does not see its own formative, shap-ing dynamics, its power to shape. To cognise this is to know the origin of truth, for the same (Lagos) power shapes, gives form to, everything in nature and in spirit. (It is possible, for example, to see musical principles at work in the shape of the human hand, or in the gesture of a tree.) Knowledge of the truth, then, derives from active participation in our knowing, "... as makers rather than mere spectators" (Ulreich 1983:125). This participation can free us from our current prison of self-deception and ignorance.

Steiner’s conception of knowledge is not propositional, that is, subject to proof or disproof, at least in the usual empirical sense. In his view, to insist on principled limits to knowledge is also to limit human freedom. For him, this was behind the malaise of modernity: unprecedented psychological dysfunction and sociocultural disintegration. The solution, however, is not simply a matter of contradicting positivism and its materialist consequences. What is significant is the power of these influences, and developing the ability to cognise them, not through their deeds, but as power.

Materialism stops at the body, the matter, and goes no further. Where does a person turn, then, asks Steiner, to satisfy the desire for knowledge beyond matter? His answer, as I have already stated, is a science of the soul and spirit: Anthroposophy (anthropos - human being, Sophia - world wisdom.) I see Steiner’s epistemology as a supersensible vision of the project that is human being. It is at the same time an ethics of being, not in the narrow sense of gratuitous moralising, but in the sense of being free to love. The promotion of love is, for him, wisdom.

Latent Cognitive Possibilities - The Path to Freedom

Steiner’s epistemology recognises that humans have latent cognitional possibilities, the development of which would mean rising above their biology.

The current conflict I described above between knowledge as wisdom and knowledge as commodity, together with the crisis in education, where the commodification of knowledge is explained and even justified by the constant recourse to numbers and figures, signalling, I suspect, a triumph of pragmatism over principle, suggests to me some sort of
cognitional stalemate, the solution for which can only be conscious changes in the way we think.

Kühlewind makes a strong point in this regard: “Unused capacities or positive possibilities transform themselves into something harmful, into diseases or negative symptoms: this amounts to a law of nature as well as a law of consciousness” (1988:37).

What are these dormant cognitional possibilities? To find an answer to this question, one must first isolate a common anomaly in the disciplines of history, anthropology, genetics, linguistics and almost all areas of modern science, namely, that in reviewing the history of humanity, one factor goes continually unrecognised: consciousness, distinguished from the physical world it cognises, is subject to periodic change.

For Steiner, consciousness is evolutionary. This claim is central to his entire philosophy. To recognise its validity is to understand that there is a contextual explanation for human behaviour at any point in its evolution. The current state of ‘mind’ is addressed by Steiner in many of his discourses as the age of the ‘consciousness soul.’ He means by this term that consciousness has become aware of itself in its individualised human agents, and is therefore, provisionally free. Barfield explains it in another way:

The Consciousness Soul indicates the maximum point of self-consciousness, the point at which the individual feels himself to be entirely cut off from the surrounding cosmos and is for that reason fully conscious of himself as an individual. He has attained complete self-consciousness - at the cost of practically everything else (1967a:72).

Given this consciousness evolution, the abovementioned cognitional possibilities may be regarded as capacities of consciousness which have evolved as humanity gained its freedom - meaning acquisition of the consciousness soul - from the natural world order, but which have not yet been taken up by the majority as an impetus towards the realisation of a new order, the moral world order. By moral, Steiner means a way of apprehending the world that sees in ideas the essential being of things and which understands knowledge to be an actual living into their essential being. In a lecture titled The Ear, given in Stuttgart on 9th December, 1922, Steiner stressed the moral in its connection with the task of finding our complete humanity. We must, he implores: “... educate the human being so that he feels the moral element within him as an essential part of his own individuality and feels
himself crippled when he lacks it - feels that he is not the full human being when he does not possess it” (p 32 my emphasis).?

The link Steiner creates between ethics and individuality is most important, for it illustrates his belief that the condition of a person’s soul at any time during its biography affects the world as a whole. Thus, the emphasis given to self-transformation:

... the welfare and misfortune of the individual is intimately bound up with the welfare or misfortune of the whole world. The human being comes to understand that he injures the whole universe and all its beings by not developing his forces in the proper way. If he lays waste his life by losing the relationship with the supersensible, he not only destroys something in his own inner being - the decaying of which can lead him finally to despair - but because of his weakness he creates a hindrance to the evolution of the whole world in which he lives (Steiner 1972:15-16).

As our physical bodies are reborn each day by virtue of the nourishment given by our metabolism, so the cosmos is nourished by our mental life.

The non-recognition of latent capacities has led to the mistaken belief that we are free, a belief which at this stage in our evolution manifests as a pronounced sense of self. The freedom of which Steiner speaks is a moral freedom in accord with the Goethean principle that “only in ideas do the things themselves speak” (1988c:265), and that there is no need (contra Kant) to look behind the phenomenon for a noumenon or a thing-in-itself (developed in Chapter Eight). “The idea is the guideline and love is the driving power” in the Goethean sense of the moral, and duty, (again not to be confused with Kant’s notion), is “where one loves what one commands oneself to do” (1988c:266). A free act is a moral act, undetermined by duty, compulsion or instinct, but only by a desire to perform a consciously chosen course of action.

The tendency to distrust our perception and knowing is evident, writes Howard, in the oft-invoked expression: ‘But that’s only an idea!’ “It would be impossible for the speaker to make such an objection if he were not already familiar with the form thoughts take in contradistinction to the form our perceptions take” (1985:30).

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7 As far as I am aware, this lecture has not yet been published. It is, however, available in type at the Michael Centre library, Warranwood, Melbourne.
But this freedom, inseparable from ethics and epistemology, it is important to understand, is only a tender shoot which can mature or wither on the vine depending on whether we learn to cognize it or not. The non-recognition of latent capacities, on the other hand, has led to the mistaken belief that we are already free, an illusion manifesting, as I said above, as a pronounced individualism, or egotism, which itself anaesthetises the capacity for freedom by denying human agency in cognition and in this way limiting knowledge. As long as earlier civilisations up to and including the Greek, and even into the Middle Ages, were deeply aware of a supersensible wisdom and theocracy at work in the world, they were far less concerned with questions of personality and individual independence. But they were unfree. At present, there is the individual over against the world, the classic subject-object antithesis. This gaining of a personal perspective on the world by means of a loosening of the bonds of external law and, simultaneously, an awareness of oneself as a self, is what is usually meant by the word freedom. As I have pointed out, it is an illusion, (which in no way negates the fact that while separation from the world is the current reality, we also osmose in some way with the world, although we are less aware of it.)

Kühlewind (1988) believes this current condition (of unfreedom) to be nothing short of a pandemic, a disease of consciousness, and he claims that it has gone undetected because it is collective. Western humanity as a whole is afflicted by it. Its defining symptom is an abject refusal to acknowledge ourselves as 'I' or Logos beings, each with a biography, and instead, the installing of, and obsessive reliance on, an intellect dependent for its operation on the physical (biological) senses.

The consciousness of today, precisely because it denies its own essence or 'I'-ness, and therefore suffers from ignorance of itself, is most unfree, being bound to authority in all its forms: the authority of expert opinion, the media, the state, the church, the popular cultural icon; the authority of a Darwin, a Freud, a Newton, a Descartes, and in this century, a Piaget or even a Gates; the authority of technological autocracy and economic fundamentalism.

Additionally, the individual is nowhere more bound than by the authoritative habits of his/her own thought and feeling life, which are firmly anchored in the past. (How often do
we think or feel anything new?) If left to themselves, these processes eventually consume us.

A further example of unfreedom (in the sense of obedience to authority) concerns the frequent appearance in twentieth century discourse of the maxim, _the only constant is change_. Progress, it is thought, resides in change. When placed in the context of the abovementioned conceit of knowing, this neat little formula translates as change _for the common good_. As collective attitudes and opinions change, so do the public regulations, laws and by-laws governing them. The dynamism of change is freely interpreted - and again legitimised by expert opinion - as 'what everyone wants.' But since wants, driven by boredom and the lust for newness, are changeable from one day to the next, obsolescence has become the predominant feature of our thought processes. As Sardello argues: "[the cliche of change] does not compel living in change as the constant of the present. Nor does it speak to the necessity of forming the capacity to experience change as an activity instead of as only a product" (1992:31).

The _constant_ in change is completely overlooked because change is the outcome of want. If we are to find certitude in our knowing, it cannot be by constructing a self on the spurious ground of want, which merely perpetuates the ills it creates. For Steiner, the constant, the enduring in change, is found only in ethical deeds.

As I stated above, ethics, for Steiner, are not about rules of conduct, behavioural restrictions and the like; for these, too, are rooted in egotism. For example, the illusion of knowing and our total reliance on its "safety of the conception of the world as a literal place" (Sardello 1992:31), leads us to assume that we can control by "enacting measures of restraint on destructive forms of consciousness ..." (1992:29-30). Ecological, political, economic, societal and cultural awareness-raising does not make the difference, for as Sardello (and Kühlewind whom I quoted earlier on this point) affirm, the "real problem is diseased consciousness" (1992:30).8

Fromm's (1960) contribution to the authority-freedom problem is his suggestion that the existence of authority is predicated by the insignificance and powerlessness of the _individual_, which in Steiner's terms translates as the 'I.' As Fromm sees it, the

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8 It is useful also to read Krishnamurti on the notion of a radical transformation of consciousness. His _Commentaries on Living_ (1991) is a stimulating introduction to his thought.
conventional view of individual autonomy is that, having overcome the prohibitions of external reality, the individual has achieved individuation, and society as a whole, democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not to be subject to external authority, that is, to have the choice to express thoughts and feelings and to be able to act accordingly is no guarantee of individuality. Fromm insists that “the right to express our thoughts ... means something only if we are able to have thoughts of our own,” and that “freedom from external authority is a lasting gain only if the inner psychological conditions are such that we are able to establish our own individuality” (1960:207-208).

Fromm does not imply here that our own ideas must be original in the sense that they have not been thought previously by others, but rather, that these ideas should originate in the individual as the result of his/her own activity. In other words, for a self to be freely, that is, ethically, expressed, it must become a self in the first place by accepting the responsibility of choice.

And it is this self that can be the only source of information, observation, interpretation, meaning, direction and action. Accordingly, Steiner rejected all ontological positions not grounded in personal experience, for one would then be subservient to authority, and therefore disenfranchised.

Consciousness-raising is not the solution to the unfreedom implicit in obedience to authority, but rather, “a radical alteration of consciousness itself” (Sardello 1992:30).

Since the spirit of the times is to impede the progression towards true individuality, what Steiner calls for is an intensification, not of (unfree) ego-consciousness, but of ‘I’-consciousness, Logos-consciousness, and he does so by invoking a new evolutionary dimension: human freedom. Although finding oneself as an ‘I’ means initially isolation and alienation, this can be redeemed in the conscious rediscovery of world wisdom, of the presence of the world soul. A change of this sort is indeed radical, a metamorphosis in fact, or what Sardello calls a “metanoia” (1992:115), a turnaround, a reversal of emphasis, a complete change of character (meta - a change in place or form; noia - from nous, mind.)

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9 See Sardello (1992,1995) for an insightful elaboration of this idea.
The Subject-Object Antithesis

According to Steiner there is a functional factor in ordinary consciousness that is so transparent that it was not seen by the philosophical heavyweights, Schelling, Hegel, Fichte and Kant. Their mistake, writes Steiner, was that they “sought knowledge of the highest truths without having laid a foundation by investigating the nature of knowing itself” (1981:10). They “did not understand the significance of the sphere of pure ideas and its relationship to the realm of sense perceptions ...” (1981:10-11). Although Kant established a new direction in thought, his question, ‘How is knowledge possible?’ is also flawed. We may not, insists Steiner, place this question at the forefront of an epistemology: “If I ask about the possibility of a thing, then I must first have examined this thing beforehand” (1988c:105).

While investigating the origins of the various worldviews - materialism, idealism, monism, dualism, mysticism and so on - Steiner makes a seminal claim: “In regard to all these points of view it must be emphasised that it is in our consciousness that we first encounter the original and fundamental polarity” (1992:26 my emphasis). Perception and thinking, the two “fundamental pillars” of human spiritual striving, comprise an antithesis which is necessary for human knowing, an antithesis which “must precede all others” (1992:29). It is out of this antithesis, insists Steiner, that all other binary opposition is constructed: “idea and reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, the I and the not I, idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, the conscious and the unconscious” (1992:29).

The original dichotomy functions as follows: what we encounter in the world outside our bodies we designate as the given, while what takes place within we designate as our response to the given. This duality we experience as inner-outer; subjective-objective. One part of the reality, thinking, goes unnoticed because we are the producers of it: “Especially characteristic of thinking is the fact that it is an activity which is directed solely on what is being perceived and not on the thinking individual” (1992:31 my emphasis). “The thinker forgets thinking while doing it. What occupies his attention is not thinking, but the subject of his thinking which he is perceiving” (1992:32-33).

The non-awareness of our thinking processes results in a bizarre spectacle. We live today on the one hand as naive observers who experience things in the soul life
sympathetically or antipathetically, and on the other, as methodical scientific observers with narrowly prescribed objects of perception. In the latter case we exclude certain perceptions (such as life itself) from the restricted procedures we have devised, and make judgements instead. Judgements, it is essential to understand, are not perceptions.

Steiner exposes this dichotomy so often that the reader unfamiliar with his works might be forgiven for concluding that the thinking-perceiving polarity he describes is not only inevitable, (which it is at this stage in human evolution), but that it is unchangeable. This would be a superficial reading of the matter. While acknowledging the duality, Steiner emphatically rejected dualism. We must see that because of our ‘organisation’ (psychophysiological disposition), the one fact of our existence in the current age is that each of us is separate from the objects of our observation, and moreover, that this is the very basis of our freedom. Thus:

...ordinary consciousness comes about because the bodily, corporeal nature of man sucks up his supersensible being, as it were, and works in its place. Ordinary perception of the sense world is that activity of the human organism which occurs through transformation of the supersensible human being into a sensible one (1988a:33).

It is only in the later chapters of The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity that Steiner affirms that it is indeed possible to enter the “exceptional state” (1992:30) that makes possible the observation of one’s own thinking, and thus, of spiritual activity.

The evolutionary dichotomy upon which freedom depends is self-created. In constructing all binary opposition, we project the ‘original and fundamental’ antithesis onto all experience. Furthermore, we dualise our own persons by separating perceptual organs from organs of cognition. These organs, our instrumentality, as distinct from our agency (’I’), however, cannot perceive and cognise respectively. Rather, they are, as Davy, Edelglass et al point out, the instruments of the mind that uses them: “The gulf that is bridged by cognition is not between our own personal material bodies and external objects. Rather, it is the divide between the knowing mind and what is perceived wherever it may be located” (1992:115 my emphasis).

The price paid for this limited perspectival freedom is failure (or refusal) to see the dichotomising activity. Reif Hughes explains:
All this designating and splitting is ordinarily so transparent that we fail to see it and fail to see that we have constructed it, as we might fail to see a glass wall. This glass wall of apparent restriction constitutes a supposed limit that is really an illusion. We create this dualising ourselves. And we ourselves can stop it. It is not done to us but by us (1991:47).

Modern consciousness is a bifurcating instrumentality invisible to itself. Crucial to Steiner’s project, however, consciousness is also its own agency, and because we discredit that agency, we fail to see that it is also the instrument of coalescence.

Steiner’s epistemology, then, is a monism\(^{10}\) which, as I have said, acknowledges an original duality while eschewing all other dualities we construct by means of it. It must, then, by definition, reject the two established forms of monism which the original duality has rendered, namely, positivism (materialism), which denies the existence of spirit, and (monistic) idealism, which disavows the existence of matter (Steiner 1992).

Resolution of the Dichotomy

The resolution of the endless dichotomies constructed by dualising consciousness and the solution to the illusion of freedom suffered by humanity is Steiner’s epistemological monism. Freedom, autonomous thinking, perceiving and doing is synonymous with becoming aware of ourselves as ‘I’-beings. ‘I’ is a universal idea (every person in every culture uses this pronoun with exclusive reference only to him/herself), and ‘I’ as an individual am a particular example of the idea ‘I’. In disclosing myself as ‘I’ in a manifoldness of ‘I’s, I simultaneously disclose universal being.\(^{11}\) ‘I’-ness is precisely what all human beings have in common (Kühlewind 1988). This awareness of our true individuality, our ‘I’-ness is achieved by learning to observe, as it is happening, our own contribution to knowing, our intentionality, which, for Steiner, is synonymous with spiritual activity. Thinking joins the concept or idea of a thing to its corresponding percept to form the complete reality so that we know it as a thing. Reif Hughes explains:

\(^{10}\) Reif Hughes explains Steiner’s use of the word: “Following standard practice, Steiner ordinarily used ‘monism’ to refer to world views classified under materialism, but in The Philosophy of Freedom [the earlier title of the 1992 text] he uses monism to refer to the dynamic whereby subjectivity and objectivity cohere in spiritual perception and conflict only in physical perception” (1991:52).

\(^{11}\) Towards the end of his life, Merleau-Ponty also evidently came to this conclusion: “My life appears to me absolutely individual and absolutely universal” (Kwant 1978:28).
Thinking is that part of reality that our psychophysical organisation removes from what we ordinarily experience as reality. When we think, we unite what our organisation has separated. Ordinarily we don’t notice this activity, so we project onto reality the incompleteness that our own organisation has put there (1991:51).

In learning to observe this ‘incompleteness’ I learn to perceive my spiritual core. The core entity that achieves the illumination of the content of thought or knowledge and which, at the same time, determines the direction taken by thought, is the ‘I.’ Since the process is self-generated, it is an expression of personal freedom. “When we manage to observe ... thinking in progress, we are intuiting our own individuality as a function of our universality. This intuiting-perceiving is a supersensory, or spiritual activity” (Reif Hughes 1991:50).

Contrary to popular (and even conventional philosophical) opinion, concepts (the thinking element in observation) are not private, but shared. In reconciling the sensible (perception)-supersensible (thinking) dichotomy, I achieve a union by means of the development of intuitive knowing.

The Primacy of (Body-free) Thinking

Steiner’s epistemology demonstrates the widespread confusion concerning the nature of perception, confusion he sees as being caused by a reluctance to consider the central role played by thinking. Thinking, recall, is that part of the (polarised) act of observation that goes unnoticed by the thinker-observer. The usual dismissal of thinking as subjective and therefore unreliable is evident today in the inability to determine what is real: the familiar world we all know through the senses, or the inferred world of atomistic science (Barfield 1963).

Steiner not only establishes the possibility of knowing in the fullest sense (1981 and 1992), but demonstrates, as I have already discussed, that the self-imposed limits to knowing can be surmounted if thinking itself is enhanced to the point where it becomes a perceptual organ. The picture of the given which we create in knowing “contains considerably more than what the senses - which are after all the mediators of experience - can provide” (Steiner 1988c:106). Thinking provides what perceiving does not, and it is only thinking that has the power to grasp the truth that is independent of sense-perception.
Thinking, then, developed to the status of perceptual organ, becomes pure intuition, free of the illusions of the world of the senses, and becomes perceptible, instead, as spirit. However, far from seeing spirit as a mere construct of the mind, or as illusion, as does positivist philosophy, Steiner holds that thinking can lead to real knowledge of spirit in the world.

This perspective is decidedly teleological. It is the faculty of thinking that humanity has won in its move towards freedom. But if thinking presupposes all action (Steiner 1992), it is also the point of departure for the further evolution of the soul. Leber clarifies:

If one becomes aware of the nature of thinking, one experiences, firstly, its illumined clarity; secondly, that the thinker is himself actively involved in the formation of its content; and thirdly, that the content thus gained can be communicated to others - because it has both an objective and a shared quality. Only thinking [compared with feeling and willing] has a dual nature in that it bears a subjective, individual character as it arises - that is, it is dependent upon a thinker's subjectivity - and yet on the other hand the ideas thus produced reflect an objective common validity. The concept that I create or 'think' is not only meaningful for me but is equally so for all people, for it grasps and reproduces a spiritual correspondence - of which we cannot become aware simply through our senses - which forms, indwells and permeates phenomena (1995:3).

Steiner (1981) holds (contra Kant and Schopenhauer) that we can know the noumenon, Kant’s thing-in-itself, rather than merely registering its appearance as representation, as phenomenon. Our sensory apparatus and our intellect are not up to the task of discerning unity. On the contrary, reliance on sense perception alone for confirmation of reality inevitably obscures that 'spiritual correspondence' because it extinguishes imaginal or sense-free thinking. The representation is alive, Steiner insists, but since it is somatically conditioned, it is dampened, smothered or deadened as a fire might be. Our ordinary representations are the dead ashes of the past.

Further, insofar as representation or ideation is shaped by neural activity, it has its basis in the body. But it also has a basis in the noetic or spiritual. In this latter direction away from the body, the soul is related to the noetically real which is the basis for representation. But the noetic reality can be experienced only through body-free cognition, that is, in the form of coherently linked imaginations. The spiritual, Steiner insists,
underpins the physical object. In musical terms, the representation of the tonal shape is the acoustic experience, but it is not yet the musical experience.

The next epistemological step, then, is crucial. As I become more aware (by means of the meditative practice of sense-free thinking) of my ‘I’ as the spiritual kernel of my being, I also become aware of the illusion, “a necessary illusion” (Steiner 1996b:31 my emphasis), that “the ‘I’ is … an essence [located] absolutely within the body …” (1996b:30-31). Steiner demonstrates the common materialist fallacy here, perpetrated initially by the critical idealism of Kant and taken as given by almost every philosopher since, namely, that the object of perception is represented in a mental picture by means of a “materially conceived flow over into the latter” (1996b:27). The object, then, is misconceived as matter rather than spirit. Further, in seeing the ‘I’ as existing outside the object, ‘critical idealism’ (the term given to Kant’s doctrine) misapprehends the relation between the ‘I’ and cognition. Since the ‘I’ is always situated outside the phenomenon, critical idealism must then search for something lying behind the phenomenon.

This latter assumption, for Steiner, is untenable. By demonstrating that there is no difference between purely abstract mathematical thinking and the application of that thinking to empirical fact outside consciousness, Steiner shows that the ‘I’ stands in the phenomenon. The ‘I’ does not indeed inhere in the physical body, thereby receiving its impressions externally, but rather, exists in “the lawfulness of the things themselves” (1996b:28). The body is the instrument (mirror) of consciousness, not its agent. The senses reflect back to the ‘I’ the perceptual content. The kernel of a person’s being “receives its experiences from the physical organisation as mirror images of its life in mental pictures” (1996b:31). Indeed, consciousness is made possible by this mirroring of mental pictures.

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12 I have not been able to establish to what extent, if at all, current thought has entertained this, although one writer refers to the “so-called crisis of representation, in which essentially realistic epistemology, which conceives of representation as the reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it - projects a mirror theory of knowledge and art, whose fundamental evaluative categories are those of adequacy, accuracy and Truth itself” (Jameson 1993:iv).
13 The illusion again is related to perspectival consciousness, the faculty of spatial depth won by current consciousness. (Evidently very early humanity did not possess this perspective.) The words ‘core’ and ‘kernel’ can be misleading if interpreted through an anthropocentric perspective typical of today’s consciousness. They connote a spiritual centre. But self-knowledge, in reality, leads one outward towards a share, not in finite being, but in the eternal. Persistent attempts at self-analysis can inadvertently hold a person in, and thus, prevent interaction with the world. In other words, the activity is still egocentric.
According to Steiner, without the physical organisation, we would be, but not self-consciously. It is essential to conceive of this body-‘I’ distinction not as a spatial separation, but as a “dynamic disassociation” (1996b:31). The empirical facts of consciousness, then, are related to the content inwardly experienced by the ‘I’, in the way that “the mirror image is related to the being of the one who looks at himself in the mirror” (1996b:28). Steiner’s radical epistemological move is this: The ‘I’ exists independently of the physical organization. Organic, bodily activity only represents the living mirror “... by which the life of the ‘I’ (lying in the real) is mirrored...” (1996b:28). The activity of the ‘I’ in the phenomenon is not realised in ordinary consciousness. Kant could not see this because of the illusion of barricading the ‘I’ in the body. (See also Steiner 1989 for further clarification of this difficult idea.) This realisation, then, clears the way for observation of one’s own thinking in the making: body-free, sense-free or imaginal thinking. Through thinking, then, “... I take hold of a portion of reality, of true existence” (Leber 1995:4). This, for Steiner, is an ethical act. An ethical individual will, out of his/her “moral imagination,” and for no other reason, practise “experienceable thinking” (1992:165), which Steiner regards as the only way to overcome the self-deception in dualism. This moral initiative, ‘ethical individualism’ (1992) has a direct bearing on world destiny because this world in which we humans are situated (and not an inferred metaphysical world of a beyond or of things-in-themselves) “contains within itself everything our spirit requires to explain it”(1992:163).\footnote{It is essential that I point out this fundamental difference between Steiner’s epistemology and the mystical traditions of the East. The self cannot be found in withdrawal from physical existence or from ‘normal’ cognitive process, for this would be a failure to recognise that ‘I’ is only a fragment of a universal ‘I.’ Griffin reports: Many forms of spiritual discipline are predicated on the belief that spiritual growth can occur only through diminishment, perhaps elimination, of all thoughts and feelings, including all emotional responses [and all contact with physical necessity]” (1991:20). This is emphatically not the case with Steiner’s method. It is precisely because these processes happen, and do so mostly out of awareness, that a beginning must be made with them, and not with some remote spiritual ideal. There is nothing to be gained by denying}

I believe it is here that the real reason for the neglect of Steiner’s epistemology becomes evident. The corporeal organisation is essential for past consciousness, ordinary consciousness, but not for the superconscious. Note my allusion to the temporal here. To say ‘I am’ of myself (which I never do) and to know what it means to say it is to free myself from any connection to time. ‘I am,’ “in the present, because one cannot say: the Logos was,” writes Kühlewind (1985:28). Identification with the atemporal ‘I’ frees consciousness of its attachment to the body. It is a frightening prospect to take this step
because it suggests extinguishment, becoming nothing, a sensory death. "Even nothing is still a representation, which I fear to become" (1985:30).

"The basic error of our entire present-day conception of the world," writes Sardello, "lies in thinking that spirit and soul make their appearance outside the physical world" (1992:35). The consequence of so thinking disengages consciousness "from participation with the things of the world, resulting in control over them" (1992:35). By demonstrating that a person's (thinking) agency is (and can be so discovered by that person to be) free of the body, Steiner uncovers the human capacity to engage consciously, freely, and therefore, responsibly, with the world. This capacity, the polar opposite of control, is love. And we achieve it "by encouraging imagination to cohere with thinking" (Sardello 1992:35), by using body-free image-making to access and to know what is actually there.

Imaginal thinking regenerates itself endlessly because it is not dependent on corporeality. "It discards old meanings, shatters fixed dogmas, and revives eternal truths, forever re-clothing them in the light of the new" (Cook 1974:9). As a mode of knowing it is just as legitimate as representation. Moreover, what is represented is not viewed as an adversary, something to be exploited. Steiner sees imagination as the bridge between sense-experience and the spiritual origins of sense, or to put it otherwise, the vital link in the chain between mutually-conditioning opposites.

Again, the fear "derives from the feeling of being identical with the body" (Kühlewind 1985:30). It is this, what I have and what I know, that I risk losing. Who, today, will take that risk?

**Implications of Steiner’s Epistemology for the Study of Music**

If music as produced by the individual reflects inner life, and given that there is inner striving (towards freedom), then outer musical life must flourish. A renewal of culture (which is Steiner's aim) is possible, however, only if the inner life becomes perceptible, and only conscious (imaginal) thinking has the power to illuminate the content of the inner life, a process which, I have argued, is best viewed as awakening to latent possibilities of cognition.

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biological or psychological realities, as if sitting above the untidy, unruly and shadowy aspects of my ordinary existence. Steiner acknowledges the *individual* spirit.
This means also revealing the unparticipated nature of ordinary representational thinking typical of egotism. The personalised music that is characteristic of modernity has absolutely no connection with what Steiner refers to as ‘I’, with true individuality. It is not in ego-preservation, but in conscious self-surrender that one finds what one is generally unwilling to acknowledge, one’s ‘I,’ and simultaneously, the essential Logos being of music. One’s complete humanity is dependent on this progression, and one’s humanity is one’s mission. Music’s mission must enter my awareness so that my own mission is defined. To be music’s mission rather than an ego that takes its cue from personal drives and wants is to allow the being of music, through the ‘I’, to speak for itself as it unfolds through my ethical actions. Participation of this sort in music is described by Barfield as “... self and not-self identified in the same moment of experience” (1988:32).

To work creatively with this polarity means approaching music educationally from two directions, one of which involves the removal, and the other, the inculcation of something. We must discard an overtly authoritative pedagogy so that there is freedom of expression. A person is enabled in this way to retain his/her own spirit of correction and artistic trajectory. While honouring this individual agency, we ought to promote and nurture imaginative striving so that the supersensible ideas are able to germinate in the fertile cognitive soil that has been turned for them.
CHAPTER THREE

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

In this chapter I present my research strategy, explain the rationale for my choice, and discuss some anticipated objections to the design.

In my statement of the research topic I juxtaposed 'the operational and theoretical' with 'the sublime', and inferred that the perceived discontinuity of the two warranted a review of the fundamentals of educational thought, that is, the common metaphors, accepted wisdom, and dominant discourses. An investigation of this sort, I surmised, might lead to epistemic awareness.

Given that proposition, it became obvious to me as I embarked on inner contemplation of my own experiences, specifically my sense that something was missing in my education (the epistemological omission), that my usual manner of thinking was simply not up to the task. To state as much may seem relatively unimportant. Had I known at the beginning, however, that my own thought-habits would pose the greatest obstacle to my progress, the search for a design appropriate to my chosen topic might have been less tormenting; for in that search I have encountered one dead-end after another.

The insight that my thinking was in some way deficient was a major breakthrough. I had first to gain an epistemic orientation of my own. It was imperative to remove any epistemic limitations before I could even approach the problem. My solution has been to find a paradigm out of the transformation of my thinking, a paradigm, which, to reiterate, incorporates an expanded conception of human being and a developmental picture of consciousness that enables a transformed perceptual perspective.

I am confident that I now have the cognitive equipment to do justice to the topic. Its complexity of idea, however, suggests that no one methodology is sufficient in itself to contain
my inquiry. For that reason I will state briefly my three-pronged approach, and then discuss each part in turn.

First, my design is heuristic in that it is a “process of discovery [that] leads investigators to new images and meanings regarding human phenomena, [and] also to realisations relevant to their own experiences and lives” (Moustakas 1990:9). The heuristic approach is really the beginning of the inquiry, and involves consistent immersion in, and reflection on, the factors (including my early experience) which have influenced the emergence of the topic and the conceptual proposition, together with the search for a methodology appropriate to the topic. One outcome of this process was the insight that new meanings are unlikely to emerge unless my usual perspective is altered in some way, (a move that led to the consolidation of my own epistemic orientation presented in Chapter One.) T.S. Eliot, in the last stanza of Burnt Norton, expresses this well: “Or say that the end precedes the beginning/And the end and the beginning were always there/Before the beginning and after the end.”

The second strategy, then, is transformational, and was, and continues to be, pursued by way of a personal curriculum of work to be explained below.

Third, a study of lived experience past and present and through that, the study of the ‘essential’ in musical phenomena, leads me to the need for a phenomenological component. “Phenomenology asks for the very nature of a phenomenon, for that which makes a ‘thing’ what it is (and without which it could not be what it is)” (van Manen 1984:38). Exploring musical phenomena and gaining a picture and a description of their behaviour should enable me, first, to evaluate and comment more authoritatively on the fundamentals of educational and musical thought and the epistemological omission, second, to speculate on the elusive but meaningful correspondences between music and human being, and, third, to culminate the inquiry with a denouement of phenomenologically-derived depictions of music and musical knowing. (Some of these will be scattered throughout the text, while most will be reserved for the final chapter.) All aspects of the research process have an active contemplative method, while evaluation, speculation, and the phenomenological denouement, are the written outcomes of the process. The interrelation of these steps is illustrated in Figure 1:
As I stated above, the heuristic immersion was the work undertaken at the beginning of the research tenure. Although I did not at first envisage that it would be so extensive, the results of that work are contained largely in Chapter One and Appendix A. Perspective transformation through the curriculum, and phenomenological inquiry are conducted concurrently, and are on-going. When a problem is encountered in the phenomenological investigation or description, the plan is to refer back to progress made in the curriculum in order to find a new or revised approach to the problem. As progress is made in the curriculum and the phenomenological inquiry, a clearer picture should begin to emerge with regard to past and current educational thought, pedagogy and musical discourse. At the same time it should be possible to approach the music-humanness relation from a deeper and richer philosophical background than I believe current educational thought is capable of accommodating.
Since my research is in part *heuristic*, it may be useful to trace some of the deliberation that led to the realisation that my thinking needed to change. For reasons that will become apparent, the thinking and self-discouraging around how best to conduct the research is itself *part* of the research.

**Heurism and the Search for a Methodological *Locus***

The word ‘methodology’ connotes a *prototype*, a pre-determined model, structure or system whose purpose is to give order, consistency, coherence and, in as much as they are documented, permanence to events. A methodology is a means of *containing* those events, much as a vessel might restrain a wayward liquid. (Do the events still occur when not so contained?)

But a methodology is more than an academic prototype. It is a standing, time-honoured way of conducting *oneself*. It is *conduct*, or line of conduct, a path, a trajectory, an orbit, a way. As conduct, methodology is a *value*.

Does a prototype conceal more than it reveals? Is it only the ordered, the consistent, the coherent, the permanent that have value? What of the temporal, the perishable and the improvised? Do *they* have value? Is value synonymous with *validity*?

If methodology is the posthumous recording of events, can it be said that documenting pastness is valid? To what extent is pastness valid? What of the now? Is that not valid? And what of the future? Can a vessel contain, restrain the future? Does it in any way assist the quest, the pursuit, the search, which implies a goal not yet reached?

How can one conduct a *search*, distinguished from re-search, methodically? If I lose a thing, I can retrace my steps; I can track the past. Is *that* a methodology, a prototype? So what if what is driving *my* search is loss itself? My goal is finding, rediscovering, understanding loss. And what if I have lost myself? Can I retrace my steps in the hope of finding myself? Does the prototype provide landmarks to assist in my retrospective search? And is not my *habit* of forgetfulness a serious threat to my selfhood? If I try to track where I lost myself, is not the recollected past inevitably a diminished past?

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If conduct is a value, how do I conduct myself if it is myself I seek? Is my thinking not perishable, not improvised? Is my thinking, then, invalid? Does it not have value?

Are the sole criteria of my mental activity consistency, order, coherence and permanence? Can my entire life of knowing be reduced to a prototype, a model, a system of objective functions, in short, to analytic objectivism? What principle guides such a methodical way of thinking?

This rather knotty self-dialogue illustrates the heuristic process and shows something of my resolve to retain the integrity of my own inner work in the research. Although desultory and confused, the intensity of the questioning reveals also my hesitancy about the need for, and the adequacy of, a container (methodology) to hold my ‘lived’ engagement with music while keeping the experience alive in the findings. The genuineness of the relation of researcher (seeker) to the phenomenon must, in my view, be preserved at all costs. The quality of that relation it seems to me is essential to the generation of knowledge. Even as I write, I still have some reservations about methodology as a concept, as a valid response to musical experience, even when the methodology might be a flexible one.

As I began to gain some understanding of the methodological options, the reason for my intuitive resistance to the very notion of methodology in reference to musical experience and phenomena became clearer. Essentially, there are three points of conflict.

First, although musical knowing is highly ordered, perhaps more so than any other experience (Gardner 1973), its very operation tends, paradoxically, to extinguish personal identity. How, then, can a person share, much less report on, his/her experience after the event if (s)he was in some sense not present, or at least not conscious of being present, while it was happening?

Second, there is a significant disparity between the musical experience, and the accurate recording or documenting of it. As David Burrows states: “Music can be its own occasion, rather than a contributor to other occasions; ... it becomes a self-sufficient enclave of attention” (1980:189).
Third, and in light of the previous observation, it seems initially that musical experience denies itself all acknowledged methods of verification, which might perhaps explain why it is so often relegated to the realm of mere taste or chance, implying that it lacks objectivity. Anthony Storr writes: “Because music neither represents the phenomenal world, nor makes statements about it, it bypasses both the pictorial and the verbal” (1992:140). To some degree, then, musical experience is, in a manner of speaking, out on an epistemological limb, that is, marginalised. The root of the problem is that music is sensible, but not intelligible. This Platonic distinction is central to my thesis. Intelligibility confirms that a thing is understandable, and therefore definable from its sense-perceptible manifestations. The musical experience is real enough, but its meaning to us is obscure. If music were definable, would not my project be superfluous?

Given these observations, all methodological approaches seemed to me reductive and manipulative, and insofar as the musical experience itself is immediate, transitory and self-contained, second-hand.

This dilemma occupied my thinking for a considerable time. Can musical experience and its cognitive processes be made intelligible in terms other than those of its own method of operation? Is it the spiritual dimension (ascribed to music in the seminal texts of almost every culture) that is at the heart of the dilemma? But even to suspect as much, am I not obliged to include it? If it is epistemic awareness I seek, would not exclusion of that dimension invalidate the whole project? Is this why examination of it is more likely to be found in a book than a thesis?

It finally dawned on me that my task was not merely to interpret and document educational thought by way of explaining musical experience as it is presently had (an academic requirement), but in addition, to find a method that is powerful enough to raise current musical experience and cognitive processes to consciousness as a way of understanding them and their significance for human being in the world (an ontological and epistemological requirement). A second breakthrough occurred, then, when I realised that my topic calls for a methodology that not only is systematic in its inquiry, but is (in part) truly a ‘path’ of transition - in the original Greek sense of the word - for me the researcher. My methodology, as I
explained above, is a parallel, interactive and co-evolving process involving a *curriculum* of personal transformation leading to meanings not yet evident. I think Coleridge puts this well: "The term, method, cannot ..., otherwise than by abuse, be applied to a mere dead arrangement, containing in itself no principle of *progression*" (1987:156 my emphasis).¹

I reasoned that the nature and meaning of musical utterance are not accessible to intellectual engagement. I mean by this that the intellect, which seems usually to limit what we can know, cannot reach the musical experience, distinguished from the acoustic experience, because it can only come to grips with things for which there are sensible manifestations.² The cognitive resources had to be developed so that new understandings through personal development could be realised.

Further thinking on this matter went as follows. To summarise a musical experience in words only partially represents the outcome because the experience *is* the outcome. Although in my experiential exploration I could develop a movement-based 'language' of expression in keeping with the nature of musical experience and thus avoid nominalism, as far as the *depiction* of experience was concerned, I was constrained, unavoidably, to verbal communication.

Neither was the technological option available to me for the purpose of demonstration. To have video-taped my curricular work would most certainly have been intrusive, destroying the sense of safety essential in work of this sort, and producing in me the very self-consciousness which, I think, inhibits authentic musical expression, and which I was keen to avoid. The use of visual technology to conserve the temporal experience is no proof that the experience actually occurred.

Jorgensen argues that people often behave unnaturally "if they are aware that they are

¹ Coleridge implies that a life is a progress, not an arrival somewhere. It is worse not to be, in the sense of realising one's human potential, than it is to be (recall Hamlet's dilemma). In a creative act, I properly become. But in view of the well-documented problem of *being* a self, this becoming brings with it a burden: to become human in the most complete sense, that is, not just a self, but a transcendent self. In other words, the only research that has any worth in being made public is that which I have performed in my striving towards humanness; that is to say, my pursuit of epistemic enlightenment in this thesis ought to be a pursuit of the more general art of being human.

² I will explore this distinction in some detail in Chapter Four.
being studied" (1989:15), even when, I have to add, the observer is a video camera. He claims, rightly I believe, that a prominent (although little recognised) feature of human experience is to conceal or obscure either deliberately or unintentionally, the meaning of an experience from an outsider's gaze. He argues, further, that it is not possible to acquire knowledge of the world of the "insider" unless and until one understands "the culture and language that is used to communicate its meanings" (1989:14).

Added to the difficulty of accounting for the musical experience by way of translation into recorded image and/or word is the equally troublesome notion of applying a method of observation and reporting to an experience that is not in the least bit reflective of, or correlative to, the "psychology of daily existence" (Burrows 1980:189).

Contemplation of these factors led to five desiderata. I needed to find a methodology that would: 1) gain access to a normally inaccessible dimension of my experience, 2) do justice to the viscerality, spontaneity and presentness of the musical experience without diminishing the sense of wonder, 3) not intrude on my artistic integrity and safety, 4) seek to make musical experience intelligible by strengthening the consciousness involved, and 5) advance our knowledge.

Having worked towards perspective transformation through the curriculum, this enhanced perspective would then enable me to reflect with increased authority on my past experience, to examine and critique the fundamentals of educational thought, pedagogical practice and discourse about music, to speculate on the correspondences between the historical development of music and the development of human consciousness, and to undertake a phenomenological denouement of the concrete (ontic) and the essential (ontological) nature of the musical experience.

At this early stage of the inquiry, then, I undertook three steps that are indispensable in heuristic methodology. They typify the heuristic ideal, namely, to train one to think and discover for oneself, and serve to document the means by which I arrived at the above resolution.
Immersion in the Topic

The topic began as a perceived discrepancy in my musical experience, and by association, my education, to date. The question that was as-yet-unarticulated, but nevertheless sensed, was: Is that all there is to music? Daily immersion in this vagueness provoked an inner dialogue that brought other related questions to the surface: Is musical experience today a limited one? Is higher knowledge possible? How? What does it mean to be musical? What particular significance does my being musical have for my being human? Does music hold secrets that are concealed to me, and if so, how do I disclose their nature? Have we theorised everything to the point where we have regulated ourselves out of life?

I began to reflect on how music is taught, how we use it, and on what it means to those who teach it, and to those who make a living from it. At this stage I undertook also a great deal of reading, mindful that I had only a very limited background in educational theory, psychology, ecology, social science, the history and philosophy of natural science, cultural studies, in short, most of the corpus of existing knowledge that might inform my thinking. Significantly, nothing in my specialised musical education (which, recall, is a training to do) had prepared me for writing this thesis, and I became aware of the size and scope of my inquiry.

The Encounter with the Self

An essential feature of heuristic methodology is the review of one's personal biography, for it, too, is one of the factors which is taken into consideration in the consolidation of the research topic. In any event, my topic foregrounds a need to look into the inner space, for there is something compelling in the notion of music as an indigenous utterance of the inner life.

The inner review is especially important because, as I hinted above, musical expression tends to disidentify the utterer, if I can put it thus; it subsists at the expense of the executant's identity. One can produce music with childlike innocence without knowing anything of oneself. Indeed, my association with accomplished musicians has shown me that, to many, self is of little acknowledged interest. I think it is essential to come to an understanding of the dynamics contained in this paradox, not least within myself, because it places in doubt the
popular notion of music as self-expression.

The Encounter with Rudolf Steiner

The self-dialogue was already in progress in a sporadic way when I began this thesis. I had two years previous to my tenure completed a unique two-year course of inner schooling known as Philophonetics (love of sounds) which, among other techniques, employs the gestural sounds of speech (not the words) as a way of accessing, knowing, enhancing and healing the deeper layers of one's experience. Although the course was devised for the modern practitioner, its content is based on indications left by Rudolf Steiner, of whom I had no knowledge at the time.

As I came into contact with Steiner's exoteric work and its more recent areas of influence, not only as a course of reading and understanding, but as a way of living, I began to appreciate the fullness of the implications of music as a way of interpreting the human condition. It was reflection on this daily contact with Steiner that impressed on me the folly of trying to explore the music-humanness relation only in terms of my past experience and knowledge. As I have already submitted, experience raised to awareness is essential to a fuller understanding of the relation.

One aspect of my research plan, then, is to carry Steiner's epistemological indications (discussed in Chapter Two) into the present as a way of approaching musical knowing.

Perspective Transformation and the Curriculum

The above commentary is a documentation - in accordance with the tenets of heurism - of my endeavour to find a research locus, a starting point. Several insights about music itself were attained during this search. More importantly, I discovered that I needed an approach to my chosen topic that is best suited to the illumination of new understandings about musical events and experiences and the whole nature of the music-humanness relation.

New understandings, in turn, require transformed faculties of knowing. Accordingly, my research plan, in its transformative function, may be regarded as a curriculum, and insofar as
this aspect of it concerns my personal experience, a curriculum vitae, that is, a specific, self-designed course of action incorporating observation of a path of personal transition, progress or trajectory.\footnote{The Latin currere means 'to run.' I use the word 'course,' then, in the sense of a race-way or path.}

Chapter One gave an overview of perspective transformation as an epistemological goal in the context of historical consciousness. In this section I will outline what it entails in curricular form, and explain the rationale for employing it.

A useful definition of perspective transformation as proposed by Mezirow is:

Perspective transformation is the emancipatory process of becoming critically aware of how and why the structure of psycho-cultural assumptions has come to constrain the way we see ourselves and our relationships, reconstituting this structure to permit a more inclusive and discriminating integration of experience and acting upon these new understandings (1981:145 my emphasis).

For me, the emancipation from ‘psycho-cultural assumptions’ translates as moving beyond detached observation. If the quality of the relation between the phenomena and myself is crucial to the quality of the knowledge generated, then the very way I cognise, the way I perceive, think and feel, will determine the quality of what and how I know. The relation I have been speaking about, then, is not in the first instance that between myself and music, but the one between myself and my own knowing.

Having already alluded to this insight as a major breakthrough, I want to reiterate briefly my reasoning.

My sensation of separateness here within the boundaries of my body is almost inextricable from the increased ability to think in the abstract, and in this way, to dichotomize life and the experience of it, especially by use of the word. I do not perceive, but mostly, judge. Human being becomes abstract, not actual. Consequently, if I am no longer immediately present to myself, awake to my being, in effect, estranged from my own interiority, I am isolated. I no longer derive life from presentness (as does the child) but from recycled thoughts, associations, and habits of will which, in the terms of life, are already dead.
I am blind and deaf to that which unites because my representational activity functions in a way that divides, separates, and isolates. I make judgements about the world out of a me-world relation. Insofar as the world, then, is not truly perceived, I have constructed an illusory duality in which thinking and perceiving are forever dichotomized.

In my knowing, I am a creature of habit. My knowing inevitably takes a predetermined path. My ordinary observation is detached from the objects and events of observation. There is every evidence to suggest that the manner of apprehension native to a dual perspective allows only a specific kind of questioning that seeks in advance conventionally prescribed answers. My thinking is an impediment to my learning and cognising. Yet, contemplation of my musical experience tells me in some way that this very evidence cannot itself lead beyond the dualistic thinking that occasioned it.

Ordinary observation employs object-centred, point-wise thinking. Were I not able to think in this apparently detached manner, however, the objects and events of the sense realm would appear to me undifferentiated, incoherent and chaotic. These objects and events, then, must have about them something of the nature of thought. They are sensible, but they are also thought-like. “Everything that we experience through the senses as formed,” writes Bockemühl, “is ... thought-quality in an individualized condition” (1985:5). When I stated above that the quality of my thinking was not good enough to apprehend the essential in musical phenomena, it was this thinking to which I was referring.

The emphasis, then, in perspective transformation, should be placed on developing the relation with my own cognising as it conjoins with musical phenomena in the act of apprehension. Bockemühl points to the path beyond detached observation: “Only by tracing the way questions originate in us, can we free ourselves from the conventionally determined way of answering” (1985:ix). If dualism is to be avoided, researchers, in schooling their cognitive faculties must “unfold a consciousness different from the usual one in order to transcend the boundaries of knowledge as these are today generally assumed to be” (P.E. Schiller 1981:15).

My methodological task, then, as far as perspective transformation is concerned, is to
become acquainted with my *intentionality*, and in this manner, achieve not only a sound epistemological footing from which to evaluate all past and future experience, but a revivified musical experience. The *terra incognita*, as it were, of knowing, should become, with enhanced acquaintance of itself, the *terra firma* of knowing.

What do I mean by ‘intentionality?’ The mind ‘stretches’ itself in order to find its object. I use the metaphor (from the Latin *intendere*, to stretch) to allude to the tendency of consciousness to be *of* something, to *have* an object. The fundamental nature of our response to existence is intentional, although we are normally unaware of it. Consciousness has an intentional relation to things that may not in every instance be real, but which nevertheless have objectivity. Although not necessarily articulated, every aim must have a corresponding goal. There can be no hearing, for example, without something heard. In its simplest meaning, then, intentionality is the observer’s own inner activity exercised during perception. It describes the inclination, seeking or reaching-out of consciousness to contact or connect with the world, but without necessarily becoming aware of this ‘stretching’ because of the automatic and repetitive nature of perception.

In accordance with Steiner’s threefold model of the intentional human being, thinking, feeling, and willing each have a structure and a goal (intention) in *sensible* terms. They have an *immanent* function. But they can also be active in the Thomistic sense - and this will assume increasing importance as I proceed - of the *spiritual* or ‘intentional’ reception of forms. As I commented above, intelligibility - and this appears to be the central problem with the reception of musical forms - cannot be the outcome of sense-experience. To make a sense-experience intelligible, I would have to learn to observe my own intentionality, its own stretching towards its goal. Intentionality, then, also has a *transcendent* function that rests in shifting through previously mapped layers of sense-knowledge.

If intentionality, by virtue of a dual perspective, is compelled to function in a representational way, I should clarify my understanding of ‘representation.’ Here, I draw on Steiner’s epistemology: “In our knowing ... we create a picture of the directly given that contains considerably more than what the senses - which are after all the mediators of all experience - can provide” (1988c:106). The picturing activity to which Steiner refers is that
process by which the sensual reception of the previously undifferentiated given (the ‘given’ of physical science) is converted into clearly differentiated objects. This conversion of sensations into things Barfield calls “figuration” (1988:24). The entire process (sometimes called ‘ideation’) is a representational one. Importantly, this activity is unconscious, and so the phenomena we encounter are, for us, things. John Ulreich writes: “Our collective representations are based on the supposition that truth is ‘objective’ and sensible rather than supersensibly participated” (1983:128).

Thus, representation is the capacity of consciousness to reproduce or recreate as images what we experience of the outer world. It is intentional, thinking activity. And because it is unseen, thinking “… integrates its activities (not only its conceptual results) into the phenomena of the world in such a way that it perceives these as its phenomena” (Müller and Rapp 1985:97).

Thinking, however, is not just a question of joining mental pictures to objects. Intentionality is not just thinking activity. Feeling and willing, those other aspects of the intentional human being also have about them something of the nature of thinking. Kühlewind observes the intentionality of feeling:

If you ask yourself how you know that something is logical or illogical and why, then you will find that you do not really make a comparison with the formalities of logical theory. Such comparisons would also require the faculty you do in fact use, which is a feeling, a cognising feeling of logicality, in accord with which your thinking proceeds if it is real thinking (1988:32).

Feeling in its unfinished operation, feeling that does not merely feel itself associatively, has a cognitive function. This is feeling that has the sense for evidence, feeling that knows, thinking-feeling that is “a distinct feeling of clarity” (1988:32), cognitive or non-subjective feeling.

The sense for what is evident also applies to volition. The normal activity of the bodily functions, for example, metabolism and breathing, takes place out of awareness. Kühlewind observes, however, what happens when we follow thinking in meditation:

We consciously determine what we will think about, then we let thinking itself take over, while we calm our subjective wilfulness as much as possible. There is a particular kind
of will hidden within this will that we have allowed to take control. I do not think a particular thing; I don’t even know what thought will come up in the next moment (1988:32).

In this case, volition is at one with thinking.

Thinking, feeling and willing, are the immanent functions of intentionality. The next point is crucial. These dynamics are not only active in the individualised consciousness. If intentionality has the proclivity to find itself in its object, then surely it is possible to work in the opposite direction, that is, to start with the object and proceed to the source of its becoming. This was precisely Goethe’s observational method of the plant and animal kingdoms, enabling him to discover the Urpfänze and Urphänomenon (Bortoft 1996 and Steiner 1988c). If consciousness can recreate phenomena as images, then it must also have the thinking-power, through the observer’s agency, to apprehend its own figuration. Drawing from the realm of the senses, it can uncover the noetic complement of the sense realm, which is not evident in the phenomenal appearances. In other words, it can re-vision. This is the transcendent function of intentionality. For consciousness to become aware of its own inclination or intention to meet its desired goals is an act of transcendence.4 To grasp this significance of intentionality is to reveal, according to Colin Wilson, “the objective meaningfulness of the world” (1986:531). Our cognitive habit is to devalue the world by virtue of the unconscious nature of the will. “Man’s trouble,” claims Wilson, “is not so much the narrowness of his consciousness, (which is important and necessary [for cognitive efficiency]) as that he lives perpetually on a far lower level of value than the universe merits” (1986:531). Wilson is embracing Heidegger’s (1962) notion of ‘the forgetfulness of existence.’

Perspective transformation, then, is a participatory methodology. Crucially, observation of one’s intentionality, which now seeks consciously to find itself, ensures the ‘truth’ of the observation, and as such, removes the need for hypotheses, the latter being essential to hypothetico-deductive methodology that is based on the already supposed detachment of the observer from the observed. As Müller and Rapp assert: “When thinking itself [meaning intentionality as a whole] becomes experience, experience is presuppositionless (1985:126).

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4 I am aware that what I have just stated may provoke an objection. I will qualify my statement later in this chapter. Here I wish only to affirm that the step towards conscious intentionality, namely, observation of the
Thinking can produce "that presuppositionless concurrence of knowing and happening ..." (1985:128).\(^5\)

Thinking, feeling and willing and, through them, perception, tend towards habit formation in the individual, but as capacities they are unfinished, fluid, mobile. Not only the body is sentient. Thinking and feeling, through the will, can also become organs of sense, but only on the condition that they remain in their unfinished, mobile state. This has enormous implications for my project, for it suggests that epistemic awareness can be gained not so much by thinking about thinking, which can only take place after thinking has run its course but, rather, thinking out of thinking, that is, thinking while it is happening.

This transformed perspective is the inverse perspective I discussed in Chapter One as the move towards an epistemic threshold. Here, I want to discuss the particular techniques or methods involved in that move. They comprise the transformational curriculum, which is at the heart of my research. It will become clear how the curriculum is the method.

**The Curriculum as Method**

I have discussed the need to become acquainted with my own intentionality, my thinking, feeling and willing as a prerequisite for undertaking the phenomenological observation of musical phenomena and their cognitive processes. As a researcher undertaking this sort of transformation, my responsibility is to "construct methods that will explicate meanings and patterns of experience relevant to the question [or topic] ..." (Moustakas 1990:44). But since, in Steinerian terms, a "problem can be neither understood nor solved from the same level of consciousness on which it lies, but only from a higher level" (Kühlewind 1990:113), I am obliged to construct my methods accordingly.

The methods in this case are specific techniques that together comprise the curriculum of transformation for me, the researcher. As Keen sees it: "The goal of every technique is to help the phenomenon reveal itself more completely than it does in ordinary experience. This goal

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\(^5\) This is Steinerian epistemology. In Steiner's terms, the only thing that can be taken as given is thinking itself (1981, 1992).
may be stated as to uncover as many meanings as possible and their relations to one another as the phenomenon presents itself in [enhanced] experience” (1975:41).

The object of the techniques I am about to present, then, is to achieve a revival in consciousness of what the phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty, calls the me-world “antecedent unity” (1968:261), an experiential unity or equilibrium, a polarity in which I am “no longer subjective, no longer a subject,” and meaning is “no longer objective, no longer an object” (Heidegger 1979:123), “a communion, ... a coition” (Merleau-Ponty 1962:320), in short, Logos. Barfield puts this aim another way: “So far from denying our psycho-somatic unity ... we have deliberately to make use of it. But to do that we must first achieve it. That is something quite different from leaving it to achieve itself in us. For then it makes use of us. Then it degenerates to mere instinct” (1963:187).

There are five complementary techniques comprising my curriculum, all of which I practise on a daily basis: Enlivening Attention, Awakening Imagination, Musing, Hearkening and Emptying Consciousness. In view of the above heuristic explanation of my thought leading to the research methodology, I must emphasise that what follows are descriptions of the techniques, and not their results, even though the results cannot experientially be disconnected from the means.

**Enlivening Attention**

It is the volitional aspect of intentionality that should first be strengthened since it is this which, in my opinion, has been considerably weakened through excessive exposure to, and subsequent confidence in, sense-stimulation. The outcome of excessive and habitual sensation is debilitation of attention. (I will discuss this with reference to auditory stimulation in Chapter Four.) If one is constantly reliant on sense-experience for action, one can hardly attend to anything. Thinking becomes desultory, unable to focus with intensity on its own content. Attention, then, can be an enhanced faculty of perception in much the same way that a muscle or limb can be toned and made more supple and ready for action by means of regular exercise. It is this will element, the attention, that is brought to bear on thinking and feeling which, in turn, can function as organs of perception or “precision instruments” for investigating quality,
“just as we take enormous pains to develop external precision instruments for investigating quantity” (Barfield 1963:188). Thinking and feeling can then begin to conceive in a pictorial way.

I select a manufactured object, say, a cup, and hold the image of the object in the mind, focussing only on its shape, colour and the purpose for which it was designed. It becomes apparent very quickly just how feeble attention really is in ordinary perception, and just how overloaded and habitual the conceptual mind is. The idea is to repeat the exercise each day with the same image but conceive of its attributes in a different order. The point is that the attention must not become sequential, that is, habitual, but remain in an unfinished and improvisatory condition. Further, after several days the temptation to forego the practice is strongest because the exercise will seem boring when compared with the sensory experience of the actual object. The aim is to persist with the exercise so that the image-making is always fresh. It is the activity, the movement that is important. Although not aware of it in the beginning, one is participating in, and observing the beginnings of one’s own intentionality.

Awakening Imagination

The second exercise develops the thinking element in intentionality (distinguished from the thinking in volition and feeling), that is, thinking in its own nature. Here I will give an overview of thinking and describe its activity in its particular form as imagination.

There is a capacity in the mind, a pre- eminent part of our general intelligence that is active in our ordinary perceptions, but which we do not see. It is necessary for the conjunction of thoughts and things, concepts and percepts, so that normal human discourse by means of agreement is possible. It is what we draw from within to meet sense-impressions, enabling us to grasp forms in the first place. Its operation is gestural, wanting to bring things to form; it is rhythmic, functional in time. Although in its normal operation as sense-perception it is conceptual, it is in its own nature metaphoric. Its products as thoughts, concepts, distinguished from its activity, are viscous. They cling, not wanting to let go, to disperse, to dissolve. Through such products, collective representations, we share a common world.

In many of his discourses, Steiner writes of this capacity as a free energy, a formative
force, that which brings to form in the organic realm.\textsuperscript{6} In addition, however, it is operational in the human mind, where it is active in the formation of thoughts before they become thoughts.

It has its own life. Paradoxically, when attention is given it, all conceptual activity, all image production ceases. That is because it is essentially a questioning. Under normal circumstances, when using this capacity, we are not conscious of doing it. And we are not conscious of it because we are doing it. It is thinking (Steiner 1981, 1992).

Our form-ing capacity is not just a function of sensibility. It is possible to become familiar with this capacity in its role as a part of the actual creation of sense-experience, and then to become adept at using it as intentionality before it comes to rest as fixed forms, fixed images. When I attend to it, then, I am free to be the creator of the images it would otherwise create. This thinking is imagination, termed variously in Steiner’s discourses, sense-free, experienceable, body-free thinking or imaginal cognition. Since in its nature it is free, and is given us in the first instance as an unfinished capacity, imagination is not ours, and so is inexhaustible.

Crucially, Warnock attributes to imagination an ethical function: “There is in all human beings a capacity to go beyond what is immediately in front of their noses. Indeed there is an absolute necessity for them to do so” (1980:201). On what basis does she make this claim? In its activity as thinking, in its function of joining concept to percept, it is active in us only when we are not paying attention. This is perception become automatic. There is a formative polarity involved. The principle of repetition at the ground of consciousness, making memory possible, is also the principle of duplication, or machine-like replication, or as some writers have envisaged it, Blake, Coleridge and Barfield for example, the death of consciousness itself.

Wordsworth, in The Prelude, writes of this polar principle as, “salvation from the universe of death.” Barfield, in his play Orpheus, has Persephone, the spouse of Hades, utter to Orpheus and Euridice on their journey back towards the light: “Be not deceived when death pretends to offer life.” Persephone is alluding to the fate of Sisyphus, one of the permanent

\textsuperscript{6} Steiner called the formative force, after the Greeks, the \textit{etheric}. Its activity in the singular human being he called the \textit{etheric body} or the \textit{body of formative forces}.  

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inhabitants of Hades, whose task is to push a huge boulder up a hill, only to have it roll back on him at every attempt. Not having thought earnestly about his absurd predicament - for he cannot truly think at all - Sisyphus is nevertheless grateful to have a job. He equates mindless repetition with life. It has not occurred to him to question the mechanism of his action. The number two was apparently the favourite of Hades. The will to ‘go beyond what is immediately in front of [our] noses,’ then, is an exhortation to use thinking consciously, in its improvisatory function as imagination, so that perception and representation are not automatic. Rather, the moment we become conscious, we are enabled to “see into the life of things” (Warnock 1980:202), and “... meanings spring up round us ...” (1980:207).

With imagination, experienced thinking, the activity of image-making (which is thinking) itself becomes a picture, but a mobile one. Thinking’s activity is one of movement, the archetypal phenomenon of movement (Müller and Rapp 1985; Steiner 1992.) Thinking brings itself into action as unfinished conceptualising (not the finished concepts.) In being itself in its fluidity, it erases any connection with the sense-percepts. At this point thinking is perspective-free, and can therefore adopt any perspective. Pure thinking does not congeal in the sensory link with the phenomenon.

Thinking, then, in its revitalised function as imagination, is emancipated from sense-perception. Since ordinary thinking (representation) is cued by sense-stimulation, one always perceives habitually by virtue of an after-image. This deisive splitting of things into concept and percept, which enables us to avoid a perceptual chaos by distinguishing one object or event from another, is essential to our present psychological stability.

But with imagination, cognition is different. One begins with a fore-image. One begins to understand things in the light of their death. We usually attribute life to things only when they move. When formed, they are already decaying, dying. Imagination remains in a liquid state, never formed. Since it is the life-principle, it is able to let the living die. There is always new life. Imagination destroys old images in order to resurrect them as meaning.

I feel compelled to emphasise that imagination is not mere fantasy or illusion, but a purposeful new construction from the inside out. The warmth of affection that arises within
when words begin to fall away, and old images dissolve, and when the idea of a thing is grasped first, in picture form, then as idea, is real. And the idea is more real then the thing itself. That feeling is not present in ordinary sense-perception because the energies, the formative forces, are not consciously directed. Attention is not exercised.

"If below the level of consciousness, our imagination is at work tidying up the chaos of sense experience, at a different level it may, as it were, untidy it again" (Warnock 1980:208). To reawaken what was once new and vital, to stir up the solidified sediment of past experience at the bottom of the well of the representational mind so that the light is able to penetrate; this is primarily how I intend to use imagination.

Since imagination is a key concept in my project, I will return to it as concept frequently throughout the text, although it will be clothed from time to time in other names and descriptions.

**Musing**

Here I will describe the application of imaginal cognition to musical phenomena. The word I use for this thinking aspect of musical knowing is musing. Musing is the activity that enables me to construct a window of intelligibility with regard to music's provenance, with the aim of developing a secure epistemological and ontological basis for evaluating experience and, in the future, for formulating institutional curriculum. As I noted above, imaginal thinking is both knowing and the organ of knowing, the reference point for musical experience. Musing seeks the essence of musical phenomena and attempts to explain them by way of phenomenological depiction.

**Hearkening**

I think there can be no doubt that musical experience lies primarily in the realm of feeling. The last paragraph then, may seem contradictory. Given that thinking is about image-making, and given my earlier claim that musical experience bypasses the verbal and the pictorial, I may have given the impression that I am now saying that musing is something like using imagery as a way of producing musical phenomena. This is not the case. Musing is
pictorial thinking, not during the act of utterance, but about musical knowing. It is a way of pursuing phenomenological investigation and depiction of what musical utterance might mean to us.

Hearkening focuses on the thinking element in feeling, which I described above as objective or cognitive feeling. I have revived an old English word to describe the act of bringing the will (attention) to bear on feeling: hearkening.

Musical feeling may be devoid of pictures and words, but it does have shape induced by movement. Hearkening is best described as total listening, restorative listening, which, if practised regularly, could supplant the prescriptive listening taught in institutional education. (I will discuss the difference in Chapter Five). Hearkening is the developed capacity (distinguished from habit) to employ at will the rhythmic polarity of inner and outer listening simultaneously. One becomes adept at finding the ‘felt’ picture, if I can describe it thus, or the feeling for the shape of the original experience. The felt picture is essentially gestural. Employing this kind of listening as a matter of course, particularly to the experience of musical intervals, leads over quite naturally to the articulation of the experiential shape in the form of a moving gesture. One catches, as it were, the intentional will, the movement-intention behind the acoustic experience. This gestural externalisation is, in a manner of speaking, an objectification of one’s musical experience. It is worth noting that this listening-in to one’s experience can be applied to the prehension of any percept, whether spatial or temporal, outer or inner (for feelings, too, are percepts) and so is eminently sharable and communicable. Its benefits are described by Smit: “…if one enters with one’s feelings into every sense impression in a deep and differentiated way (for each impression has its own specific echo), one can give rise to an inner imagination that is richly imbued with feelings” (1992:14).

I have found that a prelude to awakening this technique is to practise moving, that is, walking, throwing a ball, or any ordinary everyday task, in such a way that the movement is qualitative. By bringing to mind one of the four formative elements well known to civilisation prior to the Renaissance, and which in any case comprise the physical body, namely, earth, fire, air or water, one can walk, say, in a watery way, or throw a ball to a partner in an airy way. As I said, the focus is on the quality of the movement; not on water, but on the essence of
wateriness, fluidity, or the lightness and selflessness of air. Insofar as one is bringing to
consciousness an habitual movement by attending to it, and therefore giving oneself freely to
the movement intention, one is, as it were, moving with soul. And this giving, this creating, as
I see it, is the practice of moral activity. I believe hearkening, total sensing, has enormous
implications for music pedagogy in the future.

Since musing and hearkening are both method and research outcome, my description of
them here has been necessarily brief. I intend to provide creative depictions of them in the
denouement.

Emptying Consciousness

What I have described as musing and hearkening are the practice of authentic perceptual
holism. However, one cannot live in this state permanently. It is important, therefore, at the
conclusion of practice to spend a short period of time with a still or empty consciousness. This
should in no way be construed as inactivity. It is rather, incubation, the provision of the
opportunity for the power of what has been energised to do its work.

The Phenomenological Inquiry

The transformational work undertaken by way of the curriculum, then, should in time
bring me to a revivified contact with music through the practice of my own mindfulness. I
cannot comment on the lived experience if it always evades mindfulness. As van Manen
comments, there is “a hermeneutic dialectic between lived life and art” (1984:51). If I can
learn to observe my own intentionality through patient and persistent practice of hearkening
and musing, I should be able, in Heidegger’s terms, to “let that which shows itself be seen from
itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (1962:58).

Investigation of musical phenomena as I experience them should enable me to revisit the
topic with what has been awakened, and to take three courses of action: first, hermeneutic
interpretation or “progressive uncovering and explication” (Packer 1985:1089) of the
fundamentals of educational thought and of the larger social context of meaning; second,
speculation on the correspondences between human historical consciousness and musical
evolution; third, *phenomenological untangling and depiction* (denouement) of the processes of musical knowing (hearkening and musing), music’s provenance and its significance to human being.

Evaluation and depiction are self-explanatory. I should, however, clarify what is meant by speculation.

The Speculative Approach to Musical Research

Two concerns arising during initial immersion in the topic were, the fragmentation of knowledge into an ever-increasing number of specialised compartments and the early identification of young people according to vocational priorities, which, it seems to me, are only two symptoms of an attitude that views both knowledge and people only in terms of their usefulness. In contrast, I spoke in Chapter One of an expanded conception of human being, a conception that avoids reducing people and what they know to a set of problems to be solved. This attitude is clearly more conducive to finding richer correspondences between musical knowledge and people without at the same time resorting to mere fanciful sentiment. While causal thinking might be an appropriate way of approaching those correspondences in the physical sphere, the relation between the history of music and the history of the human psyche is best explored by an approach that might be called correlative, or better, *speculative*. I do not use the word in its pejorative connotation of a conclusion arrived at by conjecture. I mean it in the sense of a *speculum*, a mirror.

A mirror serves two functions. First, it “can ... shed light in dark corners where the sun cannot penetrate. The light will be modified, shaped or coloured by the nature of the mirror” (Godwin 1982:373). The mirror, then, assists and enhances vision. Second, a mirror reflects images. When used as suggested, it can help show that music has an astrological or cosmic biography that is mirrored in my own; reflected, for example, in the scale, symmetry and proportion of my physical form, in my countenance, my fingerprint, and, more pertinently, in my voiceprint. One might say that cosmic evolution is inscribed in human evolution and vice versa, so that the two are homologous. Thomas Moore, in elaborating the astro-musicology of the fifteenth-century scholar, Marsilio Ficino states: “... the two, planet and person play a
dialectical drama, a reflecting dance in which one cannot exist without the other” (1990:1).

If the various fields of knowledge are seen as mirrors, as ways of casting light on the riddles of the world, music may be regarded accordingly as a way of “looking at the cosmos musically, and at music cosmically” (Godwin 1982:373). Robert Fludd and Johannes Kepler, for example, were speculative musicians who researched music in this way.

I must be clear here and say that I do not intend to pursue music by way of harmonic symbolism, the Pythagorean Table, or hermetic numerology and diagrams. Others in addition to those mentioned, including Albert von Thimus (1972), Hans Kayser (1970), and more recently, Heiner Ruland (1992), Anny von Lange (1992) and Ernest McClain (1976 and 1984), have already undertaken these tasks with great diligence and erudition. My view is that their work is too recondite for the modern mind to grasp. It is difficult today to get excited about claims for numbers beyond their practical arithmetic application.

I do not wish to diminish in any way the research of these speculative musicians. What I am resolved to retain in my own work, however, is their spirit of endeavour, the same ‘high feeling’ for my topic, namely, to view music not only in the present limited sense of personal, emotional or creative expression, but as a sacred science of identity beyond cult, religion, and utility, a way of thinking into the universe which, for archaic thought, justified its exalted place, together with arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, in the Quadrivium.

What we know as sound was and is for speculative music a physical correlative of a metaphysic, a metapattern. When looked at in this way, the practice and the composition of music, although valuable commentaries on the human condition at any historic moment, become secondary considerations to music’s claim to an elevated order of significance. I suggest there is merit in the ancient Hermetic notion of the acoustic and the Divine as a unity become fragmented by human thought. The fragmentation itself, however, is significant in evolutionary terms, for it suggests an antecedent absolute, an ideal, a goal, towards which ensouled human beings strive. I say this knowing that all talk about absolutes these days is most unfashionable. Yet, I cannot avoid the universal-relative opposition without in some way reducing the scope of my inquiry and the depth of my thought.
A recurrent theme in my project is the difficulty, but as I see it, the necessity, of relocating the modern mind, in place and time, in the archaic mind; for (as I discuss in Chapter Eleven) the pre-Christian, and perhaps to a lesser extent, the Medieval, beholder of reality was not cut adrift from his/her representations but, rather, was confluent with them. In contrast, the modern ‘self’ according to many scholars is experienced as an independent, and often alienated, counterpart of an externally real. It is here that the deliberate cultivation of the inverse perspective in my curriculum comes to my assistance.

Finally, I must introduce a caveat. Speculation, as I have defined it, may be seen both as a potential strength and weakness of my project. The process throws up a seemingly infinite multiplication of correspondences the contemplation of which leads to depth. At the same time, there is the risk of losing focus and economy of thought. My wish is to do justice to the speculative aspect of my inquiry by maintaining an appropriate balance.

**Anticipated Objections to the Method**

My curriculum is largely about the recovery, for the modern mind, of Platonic-Goethean epistemology, that is, the practice of imagination - in contradistinction to what I conceive to be the literalism of modernity - in such a way that it might illuminate the mystery of human utterance, specifically the musical kind.\(^7\)

Insofar as the reader is enjoined to co-enact some parts of the text while reading them, the attention demanded of him/her is considerable, perhaps greater than I have a right to expect in a thesis. Nevertheless, given my belief that there is an ethical imperative contained in, and fulfilled by, historical consciousness, juxtaposed with the abovementioned literalist climate, I wish to submit that not to employ the underrated and under-used faculty of imaginal cognition as a legitimate means of arriving at knowledge of reality is no less an act of epistemological

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\(^7\) I am aware that a ‘recovery’ model may seem contradictory to contemporary notions of human progress insofar as it presupposes a mythical ‘Golden Age’ regarded by some scholars as merely a projection of our wishful thinking. I will argue in Chapters Nine and Eleven that present human responses to musical phenomena evidence a historical consciousness in which the past is very much alive, and that developing awareness of this leads to an adjustment of the usual notion of history as a linear progression to one in which history is a cumulative whole not existing in time, in which case the temporal notions of earlier and later become redundant in cognition. In this sense, then, the connections between a recovery and the development of a more awake or attuned state of mind are significant.
neglect than would be stumbling through life with one's eyes permanently blinkered and one's ears permanently plugged.

Since the curriculum, that is, musing and hearkening, may be seen as heterodox, however, I think I should in this section address what I am anticipating might be objections to it as method. My concern falls into three categories: pragmatism, verification and rigour.

First, then, I am keen to forestall the conception that the curriculum is in any way pragmatic, that it must measure the validity of its epistemological tenets by demonstrating practical musical outcomes. It is true, I think, that one inheritance of rationalist methodology is that there must always be a self-evident solution. The educational philosopher, L. Arnaud Reid, argues that pragmatism as the way of knowing most often "destroys 'knowledge' by its emphasis on what we do, to the exclusion of what we find, and what there is to be found" (1957:187). This attitude to the practical is especially entrenched in music education (Chapters Four and Seven).

I have already discussed the difficulty, even futility, of sharing, by way of discussion, what I contribute to musical experience, namely my (unfinished) feeling and thinking, with the intention at least of validating it. I should add, then, that it is not my musical prowess that I wish to demonstrate. I do not claim that my curriculum will make me a more authoritative musical voice through claims to incontrovertible evidence by way of the audible facts. I am more concerned to recover the meaning in music by bringing mindfulness to bear on the act. I believe there is a certain pragmatic naivety in regarding, without question, the audible demonstration as the only valid outcome, particularly when, as I commented above, the experience, not the demonstration of it, is the outcome.

This dilemma has caused me to question the viability of the whole project; for a literal reading of my text can result in misunderstanding. If what I seek to achieve in the curricular aspects of the research is inner growth through understanding musical processes and phenomena, my descriptions of the same can be at best only shadowy representations of an original, lively reality. Verbal explanation is more amenable to retrospective description of experiences that have come about through a sense-relation with the external physical world.
Since I will argue that musical impulses do not derive from knowledge of the physical world, and for this reason (among others) find their expression in tone and not word, the inherent difficulty in converting musical experience into word places at least some of my discourse at the outer limits of verbal description. It is precisely the non-linguistic experience of music - whatever isomorphic or structural similarities may be found with language - that justifies its existence as music (Maniates 1983). The predicament for any reader is this: that it is compelling to inadvertently substitute sense-experience, the usual ‘common sense’ basis for claims to truth, for non-sensory experience.

This brings me to the second of my concerns: the question of verification. In what way does my research hold true for others? It is clear from my discussion in this chapter that what I am attempting to achieve cannot be quantified. Rather, my curriculum is a quest, a depth questioning of music as experienced in order to restore the sense of what it means to utter musically. This aim is not, as van Manen explains, “a problem in need of a solution but a mystery in need of evocative comprehension” (1984:49), and as such, can be only one interpretation.

The principle of verification, in the words of W.H.F. Barnes, “... is a way of formulating the basic doctrines of empiricism in terms, not of what sorts of things can exist, but of what sorts of things can be said” (1957:125). To put this another way, it is the statement about the experience that has meaning. It is not ideas which assume primacy, but language, discourse, speech about ideas. There is a danger I think that the whole concept of verification can lead to the position that a statement or question has meaning only if it is verifiable empirically. Although I will come to grips with positivist orthodoxy in Chapter Four, I should state here that insofar as my own epistemic position, substantiated by the curriculum, involves not only holding a belief about the value of the extra-sensory, but actually coming to know it, it could, in strictly positivist terms, be rejected as meaningless.

As I have explained, imaginal cognition is both the act of knowing and the known. How does the experiencer evaluate meaning when (s)he is at the same time the experienced, that is, when the subject becomes its own object, present to itself?
Although I may appear to be taking an adversarial stance, it seems to me that what might be unacceptable to empiricism is the (inverse) perspective of the subject, namely, that of the subject observing him/herself. I can understand why it might be thought impossible to observe, and then change, one’s own so-called unconscious processes of perception and cognition. Is this view not predicated on the assumption that what goes on in the mind in the act of knowing is a habit of thought? Is it not true to say that this is a determinist position which, in taking the view of thinking as automatic and habitual, and therefore unchangeable, overlooks or denies human agency in cognition?

If that is so, then it is fundamentally at odds with the imaginative approach to knowing as I have described it, since the latter cannot even be attempted without an act of will on my part, that is, a free, ethical choice. Kühlewind views the determinist position thus: “If thinking, perceiving and cognising are strictly predetermined processes, then we might as well stop talking about them. No one can expect to influence a natural process by means of discussion; no one can hope to convince a plum tree to bear figs next year” (1988:47).

Kühlewind resorts to the analogy, first, in order to show just how deeply entrenched is the determinist view, which must, if consistent, also hold that the observer-observed relation has always been the same as it now is (Appendix A), and second, by way of positing a superconscious: human agency, the conscious principle, the ‘I.’ He argues that the usual bifurcation of consciousness into two seemingly irreconcilable realms, the conscious and the unconscious (the latter being hidden to the former) is an artificial construct of positivist psychology, which takes for granted that “consciousness is somehow secondary to material forms” so that “the unconscious and its symbols” are reduced to “bodily processes” (Barfield 1963:147). For Kühlewind, and for me, the notion of a knowable superconscious should not be discarded in advance.

Surely an agency that creates a habit also has it within its power to change it, which implies that thinking, perceiving and cognising are not ‘strictly predetermined processes’ at all.

Would discovery of anything of the world outside us be possible if thoughts were confined to the organism? Does not a thing take on form because it is first a thought, a world-
creating intelligence? If, when observing a thing, I am observing that very forming, that is, my own thinking, then the subject-object dichotomy is eliminated because the universal reality of thinking embraces both subjective and objective validity. The content of my thinking is the essential in the phenomenon.

Steiner’s position (and that of Kühlewind) is that what continually goes unnoticed is that every statement that can be made about the nature of knowledge presupposes an act of thought, and that the usual division of consciousness into a duality is itself a product of that thought. For these researchers, thought is a superconscious reality adapted, through human agency, to sub-lunar conditions. That agency, the ‘I,’ is superconscious.

Is there not more to evidence than the empirical kind? Certainly, the world of audible musical sounds is known empirically, but as I have discussed, there is an extra-sensory dimension to this experience that persists in spite of all attempts to ignore it. One can know the unobserved by non-empirical means. This statement is problematic only because the general view is that consciousness that observes, and by implication, the perspective, has always been the same dualising kind. I suggest, then, that this knowing, as I intend to develop it as method in my curriculum, might be better viewed as metempirical. In order to avoid any hint of mysticism, however, I should add that, given the transformed sensing I have described, in which the act of knowing and the known are one and the same thing, the metempirical, too, is transformed. It becomes empirical for the researcher by virtue of thinking itself become sentient. It is just that it cannot be verified by the usual means because the usual fixed observer-observed relation is radically altered.

As I see it, the way ahead is to expand the definition of verification to include the notion of sensing not being limited to the usual organs of sense.

The third of my concerns is that the reader may have the reservation that imaginal thinking, a radically different method, lacks academic rigour. I understand this word to mean the assurance one can give with respect to the discipline required in the generation of data and the consistency of interpretation one makes with the data. Ultimately, rigour is intended to confer legitimacy on the methods and the overall research design.
The concept rigour is a long-standing value of empirical epistemology, which, by definition, legitimates its research outcomes by virtue of agreement on the so-called ‘facts’. And it is here that my concern is foregrounded. I do not in any sense absolve myself of the ethical responsibility for presenting evidence as the primary concern of a research project; neither do I neglect to discriminate between disciplined inquiry and naive conjecture. What I do hesitate to accept is the possible rejection of the findings as incommensurable when it is possible there is no agreement. My belief is that human experience cannot be isolated and measured without in some way segmenting it. As David Butler argues: “Experimental rigour is measured largely by the degree to which stimuli, the test environment, and the responses of the listener are controlled by the experimenter” (1992:5), and, I feel obliged to add, even when the experimenter is also the subject. This arose partly out of my need to avoid self-deception by learning to take control of my own unconscious processes.

I should explain that for two years of my tenure I diligently collected data by way of the written reflections of a number of co-researchers who are adult students in the Philophonetics classes I mentioned above. This material would no doubt have made for a very powerful thesis. It became evident, however, that for the majority, musical expression carries so many dormant biographical associations around issues such as woundedness, blocked expression, inner conflict and fear, that I felt unable to cope with the intensely personal nature of these concerns as they came up during the classes. I decided that to ask students to record in words their responses to the exercises by separating them out from the bigger life issues which so troubled them was not only unethical, but futile. Despite the potential of this rich resource, I felt it better to abandon the data collection altogether with the view that it is better suited to long-term post-doctoral work.

Further, it seems to me that the a priori value of empirical ideology, that there must be substantiation by agreement, assumes from the start an irreconcilable subject-object duality and detached observation. In contradistinction, I have argued that my own intentionality, when raised to consciousness, should ensure the truth of the observations. What I observe is dependent on the concepts that guide my observing. Bockemühl argues this distinction:

The more inward aspects of phenomena - be they stones or organisms [or musical sounds] must remain hidden from us as long as we observe from outside. The attitude
of the detached observer consists precisely in bringing all that is inward, into the form of externality ... . The conceptions gained from such external observation cannot be mentally transferred back inside without violating our sense of truthfulness (1985:9).

As I argued above, the whole rationale of experienced intentionality is that the need to formulate speculative hypotheses is abolished. Hypothesising merely forces (non-experienced) thinking, which after all produces the hypotheses in the first place, into pre-determined channels in much the same way that a river’s flow is determined by the rigid boundaries of its banks. Instead, by including the experience of one’s intentionality in the act of observation, reality in its totality is made evident. As Müller and Rapp assert: “The capacity of thinking to observe itself breaks down the dogma that all valid experience must be sense experience”(1985:126).

This suggests to me that it is possible to see in music much more than what sensibility (hearing) provides, and that in such seeing, very much more is enabled to come to expression than was originally there. The audible dimension of music is merely heard. The sort of image-making I propose attempts to illuminate the very nature of the musical, which I see at the same time as my own nature. The dialectic is significant. Can music teach me something about myself? Can that self-knowledge teach me something about music? These questions imply neither linearity of being nor detached observation, but rather, simultaneous self-disclosure and phenomenal disclosure, and the embracing of a unifying cosmology.

If I claim, then, along Steinerean lines that nothing is so important in redeeming musical utterance as intentionality consciously experienced and directed, where does that leave me with respect to rigour? If the phenomenal appearances are not an actual experience for the researcher, that is, grasped directly by him/her, when the critical element of the phenomena, the researcher’s contribution from within to their very appearance has not been perceived as such, but merely inferred from the appearance, then rigour as it is usually understood cannot really stand as an unambiguous research value.

I repeat; I am not in any way opposed to rigour as a research requirement. I am only concerned to establish that, conceptually, rigour is traditionally defined in empirical terms, that is, in the absence of a unifying cosmology, which my work embraces as indispensable to its outcomes. It is customary today to regard fundamental cosmological questions very lightly.
Perhaps, as was the case with Goethe, a more beneficial way of looking at the problem is that a science of the supersensible can rank alongside a science of the sensible; that is to say, the noetic and the empirical are, or can be, complementary. Both are necessary for a claim to knowledge of reality. Without the counterbalancing inner work I am proposing, however, complementarity is extraordinarily difficult to bring about.

For the purposes of this research, I have argued in accordance with Steiner’s indications that, together with precise observation of the phenomenal world, there can be a corresponding, equally rigorous path of inner schooling that emancipates thinking (representation) from sense experience. As I noted in Chapter One, however, it cannot, for ethical and biographical reasons, be coerced in others. Such a path, then, is not, as might at first be supposed, alien to orthodox research method. On the contrary, I think it fully satisfies the rigorous requirements and beyond, of that method. As I commented above, imaginal thinking requires the consistent effort of daily practice, so that it becomes a way of reading the phenomenal world. As method, it is at least as rigorous as empirical sense-derived models. It is only that the conclusions cannot be separated from the method of thought.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL OMISSION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON MUSICAL PERCEPTION AND COGNITION

Introduction

Critical to my inquiry are the observations that led me to the epistemological omission (Chapter One), which in turn helped me to define the research topic.

The epistemological omission amounts to an absence in awareness, and thence, in formal education, of any explanation for the cognitive discontinuity between the musical knower and the known, and between the musical known and the unknown. To clarify, the knower is informed both by pre-conscious knowledge and acquired knowledge, but has no conscious connection with the knowledge that makes the acquired knowledge possible. The production of musical forms would be out of the question without pre-conscious knowledge. But this knowledge, which I have referred to elsewhere as the formative principle or generating forces, is usually of no interest to the executant. To put it another way, those forces at work in the production and recognition of musical forms, distinguished from the physical and neural means of expression, do not find conscious development in the executant’s thought. Rather, (s)he is led by them. It must be supposed that the pre-cognitive, formative principle is applied to all examples of the tone-form, and further, that the principle exists as such, even if there is no audible production. Clearly, then, sense-experience (hearing) shows us what musical knowing can create, but it does not show us how the creating occurs.

In this chapter, I want to show how lack of awareness of this vital non-sensory precursor of form production, which shows up presently as a basic misapprehension of the qualitative nature of the forms, has led to a great deal of confusion - interpreted paradoxically as clarity - in the direction taken by music education, practice, discourse, research and criticism at least since the genesis of physical science. Specifically, I will argue that the confusion is self-perpetuating, that it has grown out of, and continues to sustain, an inadequate musical epistemology which, in turn, is evidenced in a sensationalist
doctrine with regard to form production, in a product-oriented pedagogy, and in a utilitarian or instrumentalist mindset towards music as art in cultural life.¹

What began as a vague impression that something essential was not addressed in my formal education, and which has since remained unexplained in my professional practice as a performer and educator has, with continued practice of my curriculum over the period of the research tenure, gained increasing clarity with regard to what was left unexplained and the reasons thereto.

There are two distinct yet interrelated concerns at the basis of my thinking in this chapter. First, there is the question of the emergent qualities of the musical forms themselves. Second, there is the question of the organ or agency fundamental to the production of these forms. I say fundamental with regard to the latter for the reason that any field of endeavour that seeks to understand itself - as it must if its professional practice and the education that fosters it are to be grounded in reality - ought to make observations about the consciousness involved, including the perspective adopted by it; for it is this agency that presupposes and makes possible the very existence of that endeavour.

In the ensuing discussion, I will attempt to show how failure to engage with these two concerns both in terms of their distinction and their relatedness has resulted in an inadequate musical epistemology for current consciousness, and thereby in the confusion to which I alluded above.

The Forms and Their Qualities

I can best begin by examining the phenomena by which musical utterance is achieved, both in terms of their difference and their interdependence, and in conjunction with that, the perceptual faculties involved.

Music can be said to comprise only two essential constituents upon which its inexhaustible manifoldness depends, and without which it would not be music: the sounds produced and heard and, since these are produced in succession in time, the spaces between

¹ In this chapter and also in Chapters Five and Six, the phenomenological observations will be woven into the critical evaluation so that they stand out in sharp relief.
them. These are the 'bare essentials,' so to speak, of music, prior to any personal, cultural or historical determinations. Together, sound and interval construct an experienceable music. That being the case, a person would have every reason to expect at some time during his or her specialist education to undergo an extensive depth examination of the behaviour of these two fundamentals as they are experienced by the human psyche. I argue that this is typically not the case.

For working purposes I will call the musical sound, or the 'substance' by which the pre-emergent sounds take body and through which they are externalised, tone. Insofar as they are distinguished from one another in time, the single units I will refer to as tones.

For the executant, the sensation of tone consists in making the pre-emergent principle audible, and in this act, concentrating the attention on the tones produced by means of the organ designed for that purpose: the ear. In the act of forming the tones, the tones are perceptible, while the forming is not.

The second constituent, the space between two tones is known as an interval.\textsuperscript{2} I will retain this terminology in my writing, but will also give the interval other names depending on the context.

The tone and the interval (not as names but as experienced phenomena) are obviously conditional upon a causal opportunity: hearing. I want to be quite clear, however, about what is meant by this truism and what it implies for my work and for future musical knowing; for it is at the ground of every assumption made, every conclusion drawn, every decision reached, every curriculum conceived and every word spoken or written about music. It is, in short, a perceptual and educational first principle.

What the word 'hearing' denotes is a physical and neural response. That is all. In the sense that seeing perceives the surfaces of things, hearing is seeing, as it were, with the ear.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{2} Actually, the words by which these two constituents are identified say little about the phenomena themselves. They are only labels that enable us to communicate verbally what they are conceptually, without telling us anything of how they are experienced. It is often overlooked in music education that ostensive definition, or pointing to the object and naming it, does not guarantee cognitive certainty; nor has it always been, in my opinion, the \textit{sine qua non} of musical knowing. I will pursue this important theme in a subsequent section.

\textsuperscript{3} The French listening specialist, Alfred Tomatis (1991), is perhaps the first scientifically-trained researcher to point this out. Actually, hearing differs in quite radical ways from seeing, biologically, perceptually, cognitively and noetically. A further question arising from this distinction is whether phenomenological
It is not yet listening, which needs a listener, an intentional, cognising subject. Listening is a highly focussed activity. Hearing denotes the physiology, listening the psychology; one is recipient (the noun), the other perciipient (the adjective). The ear does not cognise, that is, know; it mediates. Listening takes the listener beyond the surfaces and into the thing heard. Listening draws the listener into the ‘heart of the matter,’ into the soul of things. The listener can recognise, for example, distress in the bellow of a cow, aggression in the bark of a dog, or the myriad shades of meaning in the sound of the human voice. The listener can be uncertain about whether a vase (s)he sees is metal, painted glass or china. To tap it, however, is to know what it is made of, its substance.

To listen is to respond inwardly to what has been heard. Moreover, the nature of what has been heard will influence profoundly how the listener responds. My experiential work tells me that the sound made by a living organism will induce in me a very different response from the sound made by a lifeless object that is struck; and it is an experiential truth that music will elicit in me a very different response from both of these. Furthermore, inner listening (hearkening) shows that in each instance, a different part of my being is engaged.

It would be unnecessary to highlight this distinction between hearing and listening were it not that when the earlier distinction between tone and interval - rarely examined in depth - is brought into the equation, the outcome in educational terms is fatal.

The ear can ‘hear,’ respond to, only what is there: the tones. The tones have spatial dimensions, in the first instance, as vibrational disturbance. The ear’s receptive operation in this is purely mechanical. It cannot hear what is not there, namely, the temporal intervals

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inquiry can explain why, at birth, the organ of hearing is concealed from view in the hardest (petrous) bone in the body, while the organ of sight is situated on the periphery of the body, whereas in the embryo, the opposite is the case (Soesman 1989). I mention it here by way of responding to the tendency of perceptual philosophy to deal only with sight and tactility, and then to conclude that what is true for these senses is also true for hearing. In my opinion it is an error of phenomenological judgement to lump together the senses in this way. Foremost of the distinctions between hearing and seeing, for example, is the observation that it is possible to conceptualise (verbally describe), say, a tree, for a blind person, who still has the option of touching, smelling and hearing it, whereas it is not possible to conceptualise a sound for someone who is born deaf. This distinction demonstrates that, unlike other forms of communication, sound must not only be expressed differently, but it must be received differently. It communicates immaterially.

4 As the French structuralist, Roland Barthes, puts it: “Hearing is a physiological phenomenon; listening is a psychological act. It is possible to describe the physical conditions of hearing (its mechanisms) by recourse to acoustics and to the physiology of the ear; but listening cannot be defined only by its object or, one might say, by its goal” (1985:245). Here already is an allusion to the spatial and temporal dimensions of listening being incidental to its essence, which, by definition, must lie elsewhere.

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of pitch and duration whose very appearance it is the sole function of the tones to bring about. Since the intervals are not audible, in the sense of having measurable acoustic dimensions, they are not forms in the way that tones are forms, but relations. A musical interval is the extra-sensory association of one tone with another in time. Only I, the perceiving agent, not my ear, can apprehend the latter.

This largely overlooked distinction is crucial to my observation that humanity appears to be moving towards greater awareness of extra-sensory knowledge. If I say there is more to hearing than meets the ear, I am not being deliberately obtuse. Sound is the consequence of hearing, not its cause. Music, in its essential nature, cannot be ascribed to the ear, but the possibility for it to actualise resides in beings having a proclivity to listening. The beauty is not in the ear of the beholder, if by beauty is meant the qualitative nature of the intervals. All I can ever hear by virtue of having a physical ear is sound. Intervallic relations, those particular associations created by the tones with each other as they occur in time, and to which we give the name music, are not sensational, not perceptible by the ear, but are nevertheless apprehended in some way by a ‘listening’ subject.\(^5\)

Insofar as they can be heard, tones obey physical laws regardless of their specific tone colour, and only on the basis of this lawfulness could the science of acoustics, and its applied form, recording technology, have evolved. Intervals, on the other hand, are conditional upon other factors beyond the physical. The executant uses the audible tones as an expedient of the inaudible intervals, whether they are pitch or rhythm relations. The ingenuity and felicity with which this is achieved will determine the artistry of the expression. It is useful to envisage the intervals as empty vessels that are coloured by the particular nuance of the executant’s pre-cognitive experience.

The interval’s ‘life’ must be inwardly co-enacted by the listener, whether (s)he be at the same time the executant or not. The sole purpose of the heard tones is to serve an

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\(^5\) When a conductor is impelled to exhort his/her charges to ‘play what the composer wrote,’ it is an appeal to inner listening, not reading, (s)he is making. The composer cannot write what is inaudible. (S)he can only notate the symbols for what is audible. If musicians were able to play strictly what the composer wrote there would be no music at all, for the composer cannot notate what is not audible, namely, the experience of intervals.
inaudible *musical* experience.\(^6\) If I were able in some way to remove the tones, it would be the musical *experience* I would be left with. Another way of saying this is that the interval is no-thing, but it is not nothing.

It is just that for cognition conditioned extensively (distinguished from intensively) by physical sensation this distinction is difficult to grasp. The problem disappears in the *experience* if one is listening to it. Clearly, the tone and the interval comprise a polarity, a complementarity principle. They cooperate in each other’s appearance through human agency.

To consolidate, a pitch interval that I experience as opaque and full, and another as transparent and empty are obviously different from each other in their qualities. However, when I say two things are different, I say also that they are similar, and that is because the *idea* common to both does not change. The thing common to intervals is the *idea of intervalness*. Since intervalness is an organising idea, it is in its own nature wordless, which is why I must invent a word for it. However, if I have to speak about it, perhaps the closest I can get to its function is the word ‘measure.’ Common to the intervals is the experience, through the idea, of measure, which I have not ‘heard’ at all, in the same way that the light that illuminates objects is something I do not see, but rather, by which I see. The tones are in one sense *what* I hear, but in another sense they are what I hear the interval *by*. The best *visible* illustration of measure I can think of is the violinist’s finger on the fingerboard as it moves from one position to another creating a measured distance between tones. But I do not see this *movement*; rather, I see the finger that moves and comes to rest after its traversal of the space between. I do not *see* movement, for movement is not an object. It is my thinking that moves. Thinking is movement’s agent. Müller and Rapp explain:

> The experience of the movement of our own thinking makes it seem as though movement is perceived through the senses. Thus, we ‘see’ movement because, by means of a half-conscious inner activity, we bring the mental picture of movement to meet the sense percepts. Only as the movement of our own organism is movement itself a sense percept (1985:93).

\(^6\) In this connection, I am reminded of Goethe’s aphorism: “One can put into things only what one has experienced within oneself”(Steiner 1988c:263). One’s experience is poured into the expression, that is, into the intervals bordered by the acoustic tones. But the experience has to be there to begin with, and honoured as such.
Measure is a movement of some kind. Once the movement is completed, it ceases to be measure in the true sense. In other words, it is a thought-process that has come to a standstill. I cannot emphasise enough the implications of the knowledge that the relation of the observer to movement is productive as well as receptive.

Perhaps an analogy will serve to clarify the polar relation, the distinction and interdependence of tone and interval. The tones that are the interval’s occasion behave like the individual letters in a word. Although the letters l, p, n, t and a, taken at random, each have a specific sound - bearing in mind that reading is accomplished with the ear - on their own they make no sense. Only when I bring them into a coherent relation with each other do they make a kosmos out of a kaos, an ordered whole, a pattern: plant.

The individual letters comprising the word are not the word, not its meaning. The word makes sense only when it is read, that is, heard as a word, (and words have meaning only by virtue of human pre-cognitive awareness.) The relation between the letters, although not visible or audible, gives the word its meaning. To utter the individual letters is spelling, not reading. Similarly, if it were possible, which it clearly is not, to have only the tones, I would be spelling. In some way, for the moment inexplicable, I move past the individual acoustic tones in order to get to the musical experience located between them. (I will discuss how I think this takes place in Chapter Seven.)

Again, the musical experience, distinguished from the acoustic sensation, is inaudible. If I could not move beyond musical spelling to reading (I do not mean in the sense of reading notation), there would be no musical experience as such. There would be only the acoustic experience, and an acoustic experience in music makes no sense at all, as the individual letters comprising a word make no sense. A totally acoustic experience in music is impossible, unless it is the single tone, in which case it is not music.

To have said as much already is perhaps to have proceeded too quickly. It has been important to establish at the outset that this distinction between the tone and the interval is an obvious one in experience, although not conscious experience. Conceptually, however - and my teaching experience, and indeed, the absence of the distinction in formal curriculum, bears this out - it is difficult to grasp. Even so, it is central to my thesis, and through epistemic awareness, for future education. I believe that in placing it at the centre of epistemological thought, we will almost certainly be forced to take a radically revised
approach to musical learning. Indeed, in my own teaching I have already assumed as much. What this polarity might mean in terms of a ‘higher’ significance I will hold over for further discussion in the *denouement*.

The interval, experienced as such, seems to be of a decidedly higher order than our usual doctrinaire judgement and highly prescriptive sense-perception will accommodate.

I cannot be any more lucid than this. The intivallic phenomenon itself evokes awe, while its verbal descriptions do not. Yet it is just this awe, this ‘precursor’ of acquired knowledge that we experienced as infants in our initial encounters with music, that is missing in education. If there is no wonder, there is no mystery. The mystery consists in this: the tone is sensory; the interval is extra-sensory. My question - for the moment rhetorical - is this: Why would we humans go to the lengths we do to create something that is literally inaudible?

**The Epistemological Omission as an Educational and Ethical Dilemma**

It would be difficult to conceive of a phenomenon so compellingly human, and for my purposes, so ripe for investigation, as the musical interval, and by implication, *all* intervals, the spaces between things. The quality I have called *intervalness* cries out for attention. I am aware, however, how vigorously a phenomenon tends to expand the moment one attempts to approach its mystery. I have already hinted that contemplation of it calls up a bewildering host of other associations with ontology, epistemology, evolution, autonomy, teleology, polarity, space-time relations and ethics.

With that complexity firmly in view, what educational implications do the distinctions between hearing and listening, tone and interval, and the acoustic and the musical experience (introduced in Chapter One) have for my thesis and for music education? The ear, as every respectable music curriculum evidences, is amenable to training. It would be begging the question, however, to assume that it is a sharpened level of auditory acuity, that is, the degree of responsiveness of a *physical* organ, that actually makes the difference in a truly musical experience or in an artistic outcome. Although I

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*In addition to, and separate from, my institutional work, I take experiential classes comprising adults who are keen to plumb the musical mystery by ‘discovering’ their voice through hearkening and musing, and thereby, the extra-sensory dimension.*

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state it inelegantly, I am convinced that we in education are training the wrong organ, or at least refining one organ whose responses can be tested while ignoring another receptive faculty whose responses cannot. (For the reader who has not undergone aural training, I will explain what it involves in a subsequent section of this chapter.)

Yet it is just this literalist assumption, and the quantitative doctrine spawned by it that constitute the devastating superficiality of most formal music curriculum presently. Failure to find ways of addressing the above distinctions (providing always that there is awareness of them) constitutes such a tangled web of apparent contradiction that it is difficult to overestimate just how serious a dilemma it poses for the recipients of institutional curriculum, whether they are aware of it or not. This is due, as I have already noted, to failure to ask the right (epistemological) questions to begin with. Crucially for curriculum and pedagogy, the absence of epistemic awareness shows up in the habitual proclivity to simplistic reduction, as social theorist, Barbara Adam explains: “We tend to eradicate complexity to a point where that reality becomes conceptually manageable. Worse still, the simplified aspects are then taken as the basis from which to understand and explain the whole” (1994:4).

As I have already stated, auditory acuity is ‘manageable’ because its perceptual function is to discern one measurable acoustic phenomenon from another. But the sensate experience on its own does not constitute the musical experience. Moreover, it does not guarantee musical efficacy for the executant. It cannot, for the reason that, as Goethe affirmed, one’s extra-sensory experience has to be poured precisely into the inaudible. This is another way of saying that having the experience is conditional on one’s listening to it, and not only to the sensory phenomena which occasioned it. I may seem pedantic in reinforcing this distinction, but it is crucial to my arriving at a clear picture of the complexity of the epistemological omission and its consequent dilemma. As Plato has Socrates state in *Timaeus*: “... in all kinds of representation one represents best and most easily what lies within one’s experience, while what lies outside that experience is difficult to represent in action ... .” (1977:32 my emphasis). Awareness of the distinction, then, ‘in action,’ would constitute the difference between having expressive choices or not. Steiner’s argument (Chapter Two) is that there is new experience to be had by raising to consciousness what is already present in unconscious cognitive processes.
The dilemma for students consists in this: that they are left without any sort of framework - intellectual, conceptual, epistemological, ethical or spiritual - for understanding the omission, let alone for developing awareness of it. They are given no clues on the proper use or development of the epistemic resources residing within themselves. The very agency that creates lacks all criteria - other than the formally acknowledged one of acoustic evaluation - for observing the creating, and for ascertaining the value of what it creates. I am aware that this claim requires demonstration, which I will undertake as I proceed. For the moment, however, I merely want to add that evaluation of a musical experience (distinguished from assessment of the recognition of acoustic phenomena) cannot of course be quantified. Furthermore, although some courses in Australia include a formal study of aesthetics, I know from having taught this subject for a short period how difficult it is even to establish what an aesthetic is. (The whole problem of ethical relativism, which I will address from time to time is just one of many to issue from this dilemma.)

Educationally, the consequence of not being conceptually aware of the above distinctions is that what, literally, is heard, takes priority in curriculum over what is not heard, but nevertheless experienced. Favouring the former over the latter results in a shallow, literalist curriculum, one that unwittingly promotes over time the notion of “a consciousness which is trying to develop thoughts about phenomena without in any way getting involved in the phenomena themselves” (Waterman 1961:66). In effect, the student’s musical experience, his/her participation in the phenomena, is dishonoured because attention is not drawn to it. My concern is that our lack of knowledge about the how of musical knowing, distinguished from acoustic perception, is very likely to show itself not only in a devaluation of music as art, but cause us to ground our curricula, pedagogy and discourse, in short, all our activity, in half-truths.

At the risk of being repetitive, music is more than the audible forms by which it is actualised. We can ‘hear’ music, but we do not hear that in it, and by implication, that in ourselves, that makes it music. The ‘that’ is extra-sensory but is present in the forms. It is the essential in the music, its musicness, before we confer on it any personal dynamic. If the intervals were not qualitatively different from each other (in whatever tradition or
system they have evolved and are employed) and at the same time *universally apprehensible*, no musical communication would be possible."

The epistemological dilemma, failure to appreciate the significance (for educational and ethical purposes) of the distinction between the heard and the unheard, the material and the qualitatively different, is here highlighted by John Davy, a writer on sensory development. Listening, he states:

leads us most strongly ‘out of ourselves’ into a totally different ‘space’ which is essentially ‘weightless’: we can observe this most strongly when listening to music. If we could trust our senses, we would realise that a symphony is not in the air waves of the concert hall, but that we perceive the music through these waves, and with the help of our ears can reach directly into a reality of which the air waves are merely the bearer, and not the cause (1989:155).

The *experience* of hearing comprises more than the sensation of sound. What we know as tone is that which brings about what is to be experienced. It is not tone that is dependent on a physical apparatus, the ear, and its neural processes, but the *experience* of hearing. To state it succinctly, *musical cognition is not bound by the conditions of sentient receptivity*. If it were, there would be no *musical* experience.

The *epistemological omission* (from which the dilemma follows), then, may be defined as the ‘gap’ in our knowledge, one consequence of which is the absence of awareness in the apprehension of the complementary correspondences between the acoustic and the musical experience, hearing and listening, human agency and instrumentality, object and space, space and time, depth and surface. These polarities go unnoticed as polarities because of the one-sided perceptual emphasis on the audible, the literal, the measurable, and the nominal, an emphasis which, when taken as the unexamined basis for formal curriculum, perpetuates and exacerbates the lack of awareness and epistemic disorientation from which it took its start.

There is a gap between what we know *about* music, which is a great deal, and what

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8 In accordance with Goethe’s claim that he saw his own ideas, the idea of the interval, which ordinary cognition does not see, is a universal, an archetype, regardless of the particular colour each person might bring to it. Although the characteristics of the experience might be entirely individual, the resulting expression is nevertheless the essential being of the thing expressed (Steiner 1988c).
we know about how it comes to be, which is nothing. I believe the latter can be attributed to lack of awareness of what the executant brings to the production of forms, of all that might be said to comprise his/her intentionality. This brings me to the second aspect at the basis of my thinking, which I described as the organ or agency fundamental to the production of forms. If that agency is taken as an unexamined given, there is a danger that an entire edifice of thought and practice can be built on presuppositions which have no foundation in reality, rather as an engineer, in neglecting to test the ground, might set about erecting a tall building only to discover later that the foundations were laid on unstable and shifting soil.

By way of reinforcing the distinction between our knowledge of music and our lack of knowledge about our intentionality, I invite the reader to enter my commentary here by bringing a tone, a phrase or a melody to mind, hearing it inwardly, as it were, but without actually sounding it. My question, for the moment, relates not to what particular configuration was thought, nor to what it might sound like if coloured by your own voice, but to how it got there in the mind as a distinct form. In addition, it will be noticed that whatever you heard inwardly was brought to some sort of audition by the simultaneous movement of the larynx, however slight. It was the sound of your own voice that was heard. Importantly, the whole operation, simple though it may have seemed, was conducted without external stimulation. I will not at this stage engage with questions of will or memory. Rather, I merely wish to point out that what has just been accomplished usually goes on outside awareness. And even when it is done consciously, the questions of how you did it and what made you choose that particular tone or configuration remain unanswered. (I will refer to this exercise from time to time in other contexts.)

In stating above that we know ‘nothing’ about how music comes to be, I may have provoked the objection that a number of thinkers, Emile Jacques-Dalcroze (1982 and Dobbs 1976), Carl Orff (Horton 1976), Zoltan Kodaly (Russel-Smith 1976 and Vajda 1974) and Shinichi Suzuki (1969) among them, have given us theories of musical cognition and development, which, moreover, are supported by very workable pedagogies. I have no argument with that objection. I want only to clarify that, however successful or not those methods may be in delivering practical outcomes by developing expressive facility, they all start from the position of musicality as given. They lead to no understanding of musical
cognition itself - other than the imperative that it be developed - because the problem of musical knowing has not been correctly formulated to begin with.

The Misapprehension and Abuse of Productive Spaces as a Consequence of the Epistemological Omission

One of my tasks so far has been to establish not only that the interval is a productive space, but that it is really (in its cooperation with its sensory counterpart, the tone) the musical event. I have suggested also that there might be an equally productive space or gap between the executant’s intentionality and the musical outcome. Not to investigate these spaces is to succumb to an experiential habit or an epistemological prejudice which, in the case of the tone-interval polarity, reveals itself both in cognition and curriculum as emphasis of interest on the sensory, the sound, and in the case of the human agent, only the literal, the production of forms. The misplaced emphasis on the sensory and the literal at the expense of the gaps or spaces between things carries significant implications for gaining an accurate picture of musical knowing.

There is a direct correlation between the gap in our knowledge, that is, between the intentionality and the production, and the perception and apprehension of the gaps or spaces (including musical intervals) between manifest objects and events. The gap - actually a disjunction - between what we know about music from audible experience and written historical records, and how we know it, amounts to no less than a cognitional, ontological and epistemological lacuna. This is likely to be experienced as a vacuum, in which case something else is free to install itself, often the least desirable influence. This invasion of the lacuna will impact inevitably on human sensing (in both the sensory and non-sensory connotations.)

This, I believe, is what has happened, and my experience of it led me - not immediately, but over a period of time - to the conclusion that there is a perceptible, and in some cases, overt, tendency in music today to include in it elements that are not only unmusical, but pointedly antagonistic, destructive, and even barbaric. (Rather than give specific examples here, I feel certain that the reader will get the gist of what I mean as I continue.) I can phrase this another way by saying that there is a tendency to use music in such a way that what is purely musical in it (recall, this is not audible), is somehow filtered out of it. I do not refer only to the more meretricious forms of electronically-boosted rock
music, but to most forms of music, including that form in which it would be least expected: Western art music. *Doing* music does not mean that it *is* music.

I am aware that this is a highly disputatious claim and that it may incur the ire of some scholars. I should elaborate, then, and say that music in the modern Western world (and perhaps increasingly in the East), is perceived, conceived and communicated in a manner in which the practitioner and listener alike are only dimly aware of its effulgence. There seems to me to be a discrepancy in the nature of musical experience itself, as if many have become inwardly inflexible or hardened with regard to the discernment of the qualitative nature of musical intervals. Listeners today are not within the *musical* element, even though they may be sensitive towards it. This diminished quality of experience I am for the moment calling ‘artistic feeling.’ I see it as an ever-receding - because unexercised - capacity of soul. And although it is not my intention to be portentous, I see Western music presently as a greatly impoverished art bordering on the category of endangered (social) species.

Consider, for example, the proliferation of, and appetite for, electro-acoustic reproduction in recent decades. For the sensitive listener, the world has become a very noisy place. Sound, not stillness, or silence, or music for that matter, is our everyday experience. We collect sound like any other material object. We array it around us, fill our living spaces with it; kitchen, lounge, bathroom, car, elevator, shopping centre and telephone. And we fill our personal inner spaces with it. We use it to keep us company, as ‘background’ for eating, drinking and discoursing, to ‘rev’ us up, even to wake us up in the morning or to send us to sleep at night; and all to avoid looking inward. There is hardly a space or a moment in our waking hours when it is not present. If we are surrounded on all sides by electronically-generated sound to which we are not ‘listening,’ what does this habit do for our faculty of *attention*?

“Noise,” asserts Roy Wilkinson, “is the plague of our culture; we have to make an effort *not* to hear” (1996:11-12). And again: “Probably the greatest attack upon the essentially human in all of us today is that through the human senses ...” (1996:11). Yet only a few protesting luddites like myself would consider it pollution. Barthes writes in connection with this ‘attack:’

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It is against the audible background that listening occurs, as if it were the exercise of a function of intelligence, i.e., of selection. If the audible background invades the whole of phonic space (if the ambient noise is too loud), then selection or intelligence of space is no longer possible, listening is injured; the ecological phenomenon which is today called pollution - and which is becoming a black myth of our technological civilisation - is precisely the intolerable corruption of human space, in so far as humanity needs to recognize itself in that space… (1985:247).

All this suggests to me a long overdue ecology of human sensing - again I do not mean only the physiology - in order to counter dehumanising tendencies. As Barthes, again, emphasises: "... there is an audio-pollution which is deleterious to the living being's very intelligence, which is, stricto sensu, its power of communicating effectively with its Umwelt: pollution prevents listening" (1985:247).

We are deceived when we believe that the efficacy and veracity of music consists in its permanence, that is, in its recorded and electronically communicated form. Tones are not fixed. To hearing, they appear given, that is, completed. Actually, they are past forms. They become and unbecome in time, for that is their essential nature. That we have not understood that space is too confining for music's changing forms is evident in the invention of machines to which we erroneously attribute the capacity to conserve them for all time. The inaudible, the extra-sensory, of course, cannot be preserved because it comes to expression in time, and is in its very nature perishable. Tones live only in so far as they are going out of existence. That which lives in time cannot be conserved and still maintain its own nature. Yet, is not this artificial preservation - despite the usual recourse to the imperative of documentation of audible phenomena for whatever reasons, educational,

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9 It was just on this basis that Rudolf Steiner initiated the educational movement bearing his name. It is important to know, however, that when Steiner speaks of the senses, he means the whole human being as a sensory organism, and not just the physical senses. In his educational schema, there are not five senses (although the kinesthetic sense and sense of balance are more often acknowledged now by physiology), but additional senses for which there are no obvious organs. These are: the sense of warmth, the sense of life, the sense of articulate sound, word or language (note that this is not the same as the sense of hearing), the sense of concept or thought and, at the top of the hierarchy of sensing, the ego sense or the sense of the 'I' of another human being. These latter three senses are possessed only by humans, and for that reason are in Steiner's framework indicative of the specifically human, meaning outside nature. Since they are evidence of the higher or, spiritual, nature of the human being, they are unable to be approached as yet by scientific method. Word (in its essence), thought, and 'I' are for the modern intellect only abstractions, and since they are not perceptible empirically it is not surprising to find that they are not acknowledged as senses. For two excellent Steinerian texts dealing with the operation and ecology of the senses, see Aeppli (no year given but listed in the Bibliography) and Soesman (1989).
academic, historical or simply leisure - an endeavour to liberate human hearing from the limitations of music’s own element: time?

When we are forced to shut out more than we can take in, we are not listening. And it does not take long to forget how to listen. Listening, or as I described it in Chapter Three, hearkening, serves our true human function. When that is denied us, human health and action in the sociocultural sphere mal-function. That is because “... freedom of listening is as necessary as freedom of speech.” (Barthes 1985:260). If I am to truly know the world I hear around me, I become, in my listening, that world; for listening compels me simultaneously to externalise myself (go out towards and even enter the other) and to relinquish temporarily my inwardness, (which is really the same thing). The least I can do for the phenomena is be present. My listener’s silence, my poised attention, and the world’s utterance comprise an interlocution in which the silent attention is at least as active as the utterance. I gather “… all of myself in my ear” (1985:252). In this active listener’s silence, listening utters.

In short, there has been an unnoticed impoverishment of the extra-sensory by way of misapprehension and abuse of the lacunae in which, it seems to me, the extra-sensory resides. To put it in warmer terms, I believe that soul resides between and around things.

I am suggesting again that spaces that appear to be still, inactive, empty, passive or lonely, whether they be external spaces, musical intervals, gaps in our knowledge, or internal mind spaces (voids) are bound to be filled, and this can happen only if they are seen as unproductive spaces, places where nothing happens.10 Although it is not an entirely satisfactory analogy, the first thing one notices when beginning a meditation is the rapidity with which thoughts appear unwilled in the mind, their sheer number, and the feeling of panic when trying to erase them. There is a strong tendency for them to cling to the mind as if not wanting to be forgotten. They crowd and clutter the mind like children vying for attention. They resist the very still space one is endeavouring to create.

10 I mean by this that there is a strong human tendency to turn void into form (or plenum) because they are cognised as opposites. (Recall my discussion in Chapter Three about the immanent function of intentionality as, seeking its object.) Form, we believe, brings order to apparent chaos, interpreted by us as formlessness or even arbitrariness. As Charles Olson (1953) puts it in the poem, I. Maximus of Gloucester, To You. 4: “One loves only form, and form only comes/ into existence when/ the thing is born.” Form is implicated in almost all cognitive activity. Even the very notion of logic arises from an innate sense of organisation. The fear of the void is the fear of being unformed, which is synonymous with being uncreated, that is, un-born. This fear is perhaps the abiding paranoia of modernity.
Meanwhile, as if projecting this crowdedness outside us: “All distances in space and time are shrinking” (Heidegger 1975:165). Heidegger goes on to evidence the speed with which we can traverse the globe by air travel and receive information almost instantaneously by means of telecommunications technology. There is also the two-minute timeframe in which we can witness on film the gradual, seasonal germination, growth and flowering of a plant. He intends to show that in reducing the distances between things, the spaces, we also rule out the experience of nearness. “Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance” (1975:165). Is cyberspace the ‘frantic abolition of all distances’ taken to its logical, or rather, illogical conclusion?

We have brought about a uniform distancelessness between things, a conquest of the space between things and between things and ourselves. And yet, “nearness ... remains absent” (Heidegger 1975:166).

“What is it that unsettles and thus terrifies?” (1975:166) asks Heidegger. It is the void, the emptiness. When speaking of a jug (the thing), he says: “The vessel’s thingness does not lie at all in the material of which it consists, but in the void that holds” (1975:166). Yet, because we seem unable to reach the void, the space, the interval, on its own terms as a space, we annihilate ‘the thing’ as well because its thingness (which consists precisely in its voidness), remains hidden. “The nature of the thing never comes to light, that is, it never gets a hearing” (1975:170 my emphasis).

Barfield, too, contributes to the troublesome notion of space, and by implication, spaces: “We only use the word ‘space’ when we want to think about the absence of ‘things’. The concept of space is our attempt to think about nothing as though it were something” (1963:136).

I have made a brief digression in order to show that we treat the very spaces where authentic productivity can occur - indeed, as we treat all phenomena - as objects wholly extrinsic to us. Those spaces are not seen as our spaces. In other words, although we theorise - increasingly in recent times - that all phenomena are correlative to consciousness, our behaviour belies the theory. We go on treating all the phenomena as if they had “an origin and evolution of their own independent of man’s evolution and origin ...” (Barfield 1988:65).
Does any of this sound familiar? I began this chapter with a distinction between tone and interval. The intervals, those time-spaces (not the most precise word but I use it synonymously) which are defined and, in effect, given life by the tones that exist apart from one another, provide a relationship, in this case temporal nearness and farness, that gives to the music its quality, its beauty, its truth, its very character. Those spaces, productive by virtue of their being relationships in their own right, if not apprehended as such, will be filled at every opportunity with content inconsistent with their own character. The result is often an excessively subjective, self-conscious and idiosyncratic form of music making which, in not recognising the inherent productivity of intervallic spaces, encourages and even celebrates their contorted characterisation by the in-pouring of the executant’s personal psychological content.

The interval is misapprehended as a void, a redundant space, abhorred by nature perhaps; feared by the cluttered sensationalist mind certainly, a mind that has no other means of verifying the veracity of knowledge of the non-subjective world other than by means of sensory stimulation. I see it as the triumph of the real over the imagined; of the authority of the literal over the metaphoric; the void become concrete.

The philosophic poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, in This is the Creature, one of the Sonnets to Orpheus (the archetypal musician) is able to say more than I am able about the potency of a space and how it can come alive when imaginal cognition is brought to bear on it:

This is the creature there has never been.
They never knew it, and yet, none the less,
they loved the way it moved, its suppleness,
its neck, its very gaze, mild and serene.

\[11\] Character is the elusive though essential factor that musicians strive to manifest in their production. Character is that without which Mozart would not be Mozart, Brahms would not be Brahms. At school and university level it is what is most often missing in ensemble work. It is not a question of disagreement caused by many interpretations of a phrase or piece, or differences in the biological rhythms of the players. It is, rather, that there is no concept of character at all. As I argued above, artistic feeling is almost absent; it is absent because there is a morbid fear of voidness or emptiness, of being unformed, as I mentioned above. The mere ‘placing’ of two tones - whether of the same or differing pitch - in a precise relation in (not necessarily strict) time is characterisation. It is the difference between music and mere note-spinning, listening and hearing, experience of the interval and sentient receptivity of the tones.

\[12\] This translation is by J.B. Leishman in Possibility of Being (1977).
Not there, because they loved it, it behaved as though it were. *They always left some space.*
*And in that clear unpeopled space they saved* it lightly reared its head, with scarce *a trace* of *not being there.* They fed it, not with corn, but only with the possibility of being. And that was able to confer such strength, its brow put forth a horn. *One horn.* Whitely it stole up to a maid – *to be* within the silver mirror and in her.

The portion of stanzas two and three I have italicised is given in an alternative translation by C.F. MacIntyre (1960):

> And they left a space
> always, till in this clear uncluttered place lightly he raised his head and scarcely needed to be.

Rilke wants us to know - by way of an oblique reference to Plato’s distinction between sensibility and intelligibility - that the very assumption of the existence of meaning will assure the possibility of its eventual apprehension. Meaning is not revealed in phenomenal appearances, in manifestation. But the *purpose* of the phenomenal manifestations can be discovered with *trust* in the *potential* for their existence. For Rilke, the confidence in the actual is merely our flawed perception of it.

My belief is that the literal is not at all literal, that is, what it *appears* to be; rather, it is a cipher that unlocks “… a sense of … privileged access to a world of experience from which we would otherwise be excluded” (Hudson 1972:84). But it is imperative to *know* that. The *key* to its meaning is the latent, unbounded power of imaginative thought to grasp the idea of a thing. The imagined can become real according to the potency of the imagining. As I pointed out when discussing my curriculum, the metempirical becomes empirical.
Why is the void so problematic? The space, any space, the distance between things is represented (misapprehended) as death, or more accurately, as non-life, nothingness, an abyss. We fill it to give us the illusion of life.\textsuperscript{13} One dare not take refuge in a void, in negation, even in an interval. One dare not believe in what appears to be nothing at all, for that would be to dive into emptiness. "Out of this abhorrence of a vacuum," writes P.D. Ouspensky, "come all dualistic theories which recognize ‘spirit’ and ‘matter’ existing simultaneously and independently of one another" (1949:16).

All this is of course dependent on our learning to conceptualise space in other than physical terms, in which case it is easier to understand why the space, in its misapprehended form as an unproductive void, is a well researched phenomenon of contemporary human life, at least in the West.\textsuperscript{14} Its symptoms of emptiness and meaninglessness are known generically as "the existential vacuum" (Frankl 1984:166) or, as Coleridge would have it, "the pain of vacancy" (1987:146).

Most who have read Frankl’s story (he is an Auschwitz survivor and inventor of the method of psychotherapy known as logotherapy) would find him difficult to refute. It is by no means coincidental that Rollo May, among many other younger researchers who did not share Frankl’s horrendous experience, can nevertheless, in perhaps less overtly aggressive times, identify the danger in “collective emptiness”: “We need only remind ourselves that the ethical and emotional emptiness in European society two and three decades ago was an open invitation to fascist dictatorships to step in and fill the vacuum” (1993:25). If the vacuity goes unrecognised, the symptoms of anxiety and despair can lead, if not corrected, to “the blocking off of the most precious qualities of the human being. Its end results are the dwarfing and impoverishment of persons psychologically, or else surrender to some destructive authoritarianism” (1993:26).

I maintain that the (mis)apprehension of the intervals between things, which give to the things their very thingness, is intimately bound up with the degeneration of artistic feeling and, by association, with the epistemic disorientation I believe is prevalent in

\textsuperscript{13} I am aware that this is a rather controversial comment when stated baldly like this. I cannot elaborate it here; rather, what I mean by it will be clarified in the denouement.

\textsuperscript{14} Rather than interrupt my main line of thought by making a lengthy digression here, I commend to the reader Adams (1965), Adams and Whicher (1949), Bockemühl (1985) and Müller and Rapp (1985), who have researched a non-physical realm or dimension of space identified in Steiner’s science as ‘etheric space.’
education today, in short, with the freedom of moral decision.

**The Emergence of Positivism and Its Influence on Musical Thought**

The reader will by now have detected the advocacy of the phenomena in my tone. I can only reiterate that my logic is an expository kind that clashes with the agendas of the human will and for that reason appears to side with the phenomena. Having, I hope, restored the phenomena to their rightful place in this commentary, it will doubtless appear contradictory when I argue later in the thesis - although I have hinted at it already - that the spatial and temporal contexts are incidental to the essence of listening. The point I wish to make in advance is that it is possible to arrive at this position only by working patiently and diligently for a picture of the essential in the phenomenal appearances - as I have been doing here - as they present themselves to human experience. In other words, their existence as phenomena (rather than the unexamined belief that they serve human utility) should be respected if they are to be truly known.

I will argue in this section that it is just because the phenomena are not examined in this intimate manner that the vacancy has been occupied instead by a dominant epistemology that has evolved outside music, and for that reason is totally inadequate for knowledge of musical phenomena.

In returning now to the central epistemological problem which I identified as the gap in our knowledge, it may come as no surprise to the reader that what I contend has infiltrated this potent space is the authority of the positivist paradigm, that way of thinking and perceiving that not only rejects all speculation concerning ultimate origins or causes, but that also regards nothing as ascertainable or apprehensible beyond the so-called ‘facts’ of physical science and sense-perception in general. As I see it, the natural progeny of positivism are literalism, materialism and sensationalism, the last being the theory that all activities of consciousness are modified sensation, and that all knowledge has its origins in sense-stimulation. Coleridge writes just as powerfully, but in more allegoric tone, of such unnoticed intrusions (concomitant with all much celebrated contingencies of change) as, leaving “the mistress of the house (the soul I mean) flat and exhausted, incapable of attending to her own concerns, and unfitted for the conversation of more rational guests” (1987:146). Consciousness is object-centred, that is, focussed sensationally on ‘things,’ on the so-called ‘given,’ on what is literally, sensibly and materially there.
Although it is often *formally* denied that these theories together no longer comprise the dominant discourse in *academe*, and in modern physical science in particular, as ways of viewing the world they are the *experience* of the majority. The noise factor in human experience could not otherwise have evolved. For they all depend for their operation on a duality of subject and object, on a certain tension - a stronger word would be ‘anxiety’ - between the phenomena, especially the productive (but anxiety-filled) spaces to which I have referred, and our own experience of them. The tension is that which, in John Ulreich’s words, “we commonly experience as an alienating dichotomy of matter and mind...” (1983:123).

I think this is the heart of the matter. Where there is alienation that persists in the uncognised disjunction of phenomenon and observer, there can be no wonder for, or *empathy* with, the observed, because the voice of the observed itself - *to which I unknowingly contribute* - is not being heard. I am driven always to close up the space, or to fill the gap, to obliterate in some way the only place where it could possibly be heard: my own interior space. There is no *listening* taking place, and the phenomenon cannot be allowed to be what it is in its essence, to utter itself, to have its otherness.

By *empathy*, I mean that distinctively human capacity - which I termed *hearkening* - to engage the other from *its* point of view, to feel as *it* feels, to hear *and heed* its voice. That, for me, is what it means to be ethical. I think it is what Heidegger means when he suggests that the alternative to the “self-assertive imposition of the human will on things regardless of their own essential natures” is a move towards the non-representational, the “full concreteness, the onefoldedness of the manifold, of actual life-experience” (Hofstadter 1975: xvii). The distinction constitutes for me the difference between control (because unconscious) *of* the phenomena and love (because conscious) *for* the phenomena. This latter alternative is central to my project, since I see it as an *ethical* imperative *inalienable* from the very notion of what it means to think epistemically.

The idea of empathy (which lies beyond the sympathy-antipathy antithesis, and rather, is the reconciliation of it) can be put another way: If we do not limit our conception of things and events to a specific one-sidedness by taking our way of apprehending them “from the spirit of the beholder,” but rather, “from the nature of what is beheld,” then we can avoid the error that arises “when a way of thinking which is valid for *one* category of
objects is declared to be universal” (Steiner 1988b:15 my emphasis). Steiner is speaking of Goethe’s way of knowing termed ‘exact percipient fancy’ (exakte sinnliche Phantasie), which I have called in this thesis imaginal cognition.

I maintain that at a certain time in the history of the mind, the positivist paradigm and its other excrescences colonised human cognitive processes and determined not only the direction taken by physical science - although it is here that we see its strongest claim to authority - but the whole direction taken by human thought (Merry 1980, Sherrard 1987 and Steiner 1973).\footnote{I should explain at this stage of the thesis that the first part of my research topic, namely the examination of the epistemological omission, and from there, my establishing the need for an epistemology adequate for music, is not dependent on accepting my belief in consciousness evolution. The second part of the topic, however, which attempts to reconstruct the fundamentals of thought as a way of recovering meaning in the journey to the sublime cannot avoid an historical examination of human agency. That music is an historical art is evident in our performing - excessively in the opinion of some - music of the past, and the progression taken by consciousness is evident not only in the perceived syntactical and architectonic differences between music of successive epochs, but in the differences in the way musical phenomena are regarded (as mystery or not) and cognised. I have made the point that music is, or ought to be, a contextual study, that is, it cannot, other than by artificial means, be separated out from the context of humanness, which must include a study of the agency that creates music. In other words the history of consciousness is evident in the history of music (Chapter Nine). I will show in Chapter Ten that consciousness evolution is evident also in the history of language, in the way the meaning of a word contracts and/or expands in accordance with parallel movements of consciousness. All this is by way of declaring my awareness of the contentious nature of consciousness evolution, despite its being totally consistent with the framework of others, Barfield, Kühlwind, Lukacs and Steiner, for example, and also to ask the reader to bear in mind that it is difficult, indeed, at times inadvisable, to keep the two parts of the research topic and their referents in separate compartments.}

How mind related to other prior to this development is another question. The point I am making here is that the heterogeneity of mind and other is the common experience today because it has crystallised as collective representation in human consciousness. The extent of our participation in the phenomena’s emergence is through the senses.

By way of explaining the absence of the ethical in the dichotomy, and where it led, Barfield writes: “There was a time, and quite a long one, before we had learned to call that experienced heterogeneity [of mind and other] scientific ‘method’ and, with its consequential increase, to substitute closed-mindedness for open-mindedness as the criterion of the scientific ‘spirit’” (1984:224).

I keep returning to the dual nature of collective representation, which presupposes the detachment of the observer from the observed (and infers from this that it is the only possible way of acquiring knowledge of reality), and to its influence brought to the extreme.
in the authority of the intensely focussed (dual) perspective of physical science. The progression from ‘open-mindedness’ to ‘closed-mindedness’ suggests again a space closing to a non-space, a contraction from wide and expansive to a point, a filling of the void resulting in the homogenisation of near and far.

Take, for example, the contradiction in the currently incompatible observations of, on the one hand, science’s own explicitly apologetic view that scientific inquiry today has limited scope and that its theories should be regarded merely as working hypotheses which should not be taken literally outside of physical inquiry itself, and on the other, the equivocation found in public utterances about science by its spokespersons:

For the same ones [the scientists] who have just been stressing this unpretentious view of scientific theory will frequently let drop some phrase as ‘some day we may know’ - or even ‘we now know’ - when speaking, not of some particular hypothesis, but of quite general conclusions about the nature of universe, earth or man. Moreover, if the occasion is a formal one, we often get some reference to the history of science, in terms of ‘advancing the frontiers of knowledge’, and so forth. All this indicates a very different conception of science and strongly suggests to the audience that modern science, so far from being disentitled to claim the status of knowledge, is the only reliable knowledge available to us” (Barfield 1988:54).

It is one thing to give the impression publicly that the method and ‘findings’ of a discipline do not “... have some sort of absolute validity” (1988:54). It is quite another to actually believe it. Behind these conflicting messages is the concept of method, but a method that is marked by contradiction in its aim. From the start, its users exclude human values from the objects of its observation, and then insist the method has human value. That is to say, wonder and reverence are first excised and then supplanted by sophistication of method as a value, which we are then expected to regard with reverence and awe.

It should be borne in mind that what goes by the name of ‘method’ is not knowledge, but only one of a number of ways of testing knowledge. When that hole - and I believe it is of an ethical nature - in the scientific approach is revealed, it, too, will be filled, as theorising in recent decades in the philosophy of science suggests.

The reader may object that I am not up to date, that recent thinking has ousted and superseded the positivist paradigm. I do not agree. As far as I can determine, positivism
and its offspring are, in one form or another in the popular mind at least, far from extinct. Reason and Heron, too, make a similar claim:

While sophisticated theoretical discussion may argue that science has moved beyond this [positivist] position, in fundamental ways many people remain attached to it: It underlies our Western civilization and is the basis of its success and of its troubles, and is extremely difficult and anxiety provoking to get away from (1986:464).

The positivist paradigm by way of scientism found, at a certain moment in our history, a place in which to lodge, to the extent that our collective representation is even now largely influenced by it. Recent holistically inclined disciplines such as ecology would otherwise have been unnecessary.

Positivism entered human consciousness just because it could; the conditions were right for it. (Its appearance is bound up with humanity gaining its freedom from natural law.) It was felt primarily to be a logical way of explaining the physical constitution of the universe, and for those important but limited purposes it was, and still is, successful. The problem is that the world of ever-smaller particles is not my experience of it. To infer, however, that the real world is the world of particles while the world I perceive with my unaided senses is my own construction, and therefore, not to be trusted, is, crucially, to dishonour my humanness. The distinction is nowhere more intense than in the opposing views of the contemporaries, Newton and Goethe, who at the time both presented theories of colour, the one using strict scientific method and reasoning, the other, imagination.\(^\text{16}\)

The question is why science continues to place so much confidence in a molecular world that we do not perceive but infer from the world we perceive, rather than in the represented world. I ask this because the molecular world is unrepresentable. The acoustic wave-form is literally unvisualisable, unconceptualisable. What is magical is the conversion of vibrational disturbance into tone that takes place in the ear, a phenomenon that has so far evaded the scope and method of science.

Listening is not achieved with the ear alone. Theories of perception agree that every act of audition is accomplished with the help of one’s interiority: thinking, feeling, memory, associations, dream-images and, insofar as it is listening, will. To know this should tell us

\(^{16}\) See Bortoft (1996) for an account of the clash and its implications for current research.

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something about ourselves; and indeed it does, as the presence of so much noise in the world suggests. But we do not know it consciously; for if we did, we would practise listening in such a way that we became aware of the extent to which we abuse our listening ‘apparatus’ (again I do not mean only the ear) and more importantly, music itself. Noise would be seen for what it is: a crippled and crippling reflection of our own state of mind. The opposite of tone is not silence or stillness, but noise.

I have spoken about productive spaces. Of course, we will never see such spaces if we are disinclined to look into our own correlative spaces to see/hear what is happening there, or even to invite something to be there. Inner and outer spaces are the very same spaces.

To digress briefly, it is informative to note that, as far as I am aware, there is still no formal positivist position on aesthetics. Barnes (1957) suggests, however, that, given the rejection of absolute values in ethics, it is perhaps safe to assume that positivism would incline towards subjectivism in aesthetics; that is to say, it would view aesthetic feeling merely as a subjective response, a matter of taste. Consistency to its own paradigm, Barnes maintains, would allow no other position. I am inclined to speculate further that the persistent threat to the existence of the humanities in Australian universities is intimately associated with the ethical and aesthetic ‘agnosticism’ of positivism.17

I see the consequences of positivism - not just as a formal theory, but as an everyday way of observing - and its offspring as follows: If they are true to themselves, they are bound to dismiss, on the grounds of lacking any objective significance, the conviction that humans are receptive to what is at one and the same time sensory and ethical, and furthermore, that humans are entirely capable (given the enhancement of cognition I envisage) of acting consciously within this sphere. It is a truth, verifiable in our being deeply moved, that in musical encounter the physical perception of the audible interacts with the non-physical apprehension of the ethical. Moreover, in the act of expression, the executant is able to express him/herself in musical forms only because they express themselves in him/her. In my opinion, it is in music perhaps more than in any other sphere

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17 I have chosen the word, ‘agnosticism,’ not in its connotation of a non-committal attitude or even trenchant denial of religious doctrine, but rather, in the sense of disbelief. It is fundamentally an attitude of doubt commensurate with the view that knowing is limited with regard to the ultimate reasons for things.
that dualism, conditional on developing awareness of it, can be overcome.

However, since the successful operation of positivist thought depends precisely on the non-participation of the knower in the known, it excludes, by definition, the ethical element. And if the ethical turns out to be the essential in the phenomenon, its absence from cognitive processes will have a bearing on all appearances of the phenomenon, that is, on the way it is perceived, and even on the willingness to perceive.

I made the point in discussing my methodology that, in the case of the sensationalist doctrine, positivism’s influence penetrates right into the sphere of human volition, upon which, in action, human autonomy depends:

The brute acceptance of phenomena at their face value ..., is paralleled, in the sphere of the will, by the sensuality which seeks repose or self-extinction in the contacts of the senses, taken as ends in themselves. Both are passive ‘expense’ of spirit, replacing its active manifestation (Barfield 1988:10).

It is not only the ‘brute acceptance’ of phenomena that concerns me, but the equally devastating acquiescence in the theory founded on that sensuality, and the connection of both with moral autonomy: “Freedom is lost ... by uncritical acceptance of prefabricated [positivist] concepts which paralyse individual thinking. Lack of initiative in thinking creates a mental vacuum into which alien concepts flow unchallenged” (Winkler 1960:39 my emphasis).

In view of positivism penetrating the epistemological lacuna, the gap in our knowledge, and determining the direction taken by human cognition and action, it would be naive to assume that music, by virtue of some special mystical power of immunity, has not been affected by it. It is precisely because music is an art of sense, or better, sens-ing, and not ratiocination, that it is highly vulnerable to the excesses of both. Indeed, this is the contention with which I started. The dehumanisation brought about by positivist science has been well documented, and its consequences in the physical sphere need no elaboration here. The point is that music practitioners too, are human; and music is a human activity. I am more concerned, then, with the implications of the positivist frame of mind and its
excrences for action in the creative-ethical sphere.

I suspect that for many ordinary listeners, and perhaps even for a number of those whose profession it is to perform or teach it, music, robbed of its radiance, has become, on the one hand, a refined - or is it unrefined? - form of sense-stimulation with reduced nutritional value, and on the other, a quantitative abstraction of diminished moral power.\footnote{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{18}}} 

The inherent power of music to lift the attentive executant or listener to heightened levels of consciousness is not in question here. Nevertheless, I maintain that the spirit of the times has brought it about that what I call the ecosophical heart of music - which is not its audible manifestations - has been enervated to the degree that its superconscious ontology has almost, but not quite, been lost to us.\footnote{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{19}}} These developments, I believe, have gone more or less unnoticed; and if they have been noticed, the sensitive observer has felt powerless to halt their advance. There is today a compelling need to listen into the inner space.

I am acutely aware that my contention may seem heterodox, but I am committed to understanding how these developments have occurred and to accounting for the forces behind them; for they have doubtless influenced the path music has taken in recent times. In this discussion of the gap in our knowledge, I think I have made a start in that direction.

Rigorous pursuit of the series of distinctions I have underscored in this chapter could, I believe, eventuate in some understanding about why and how humans are musical prior to any conjecture about what music is. I cannot recall in my education, however, \textit{this} distinction ever having been made; nor is it, as far as I am aware, to be found in any accredited Australian curriculum.

I can see why it is not made. To speculate on what presumably cannot be verified empirically would be to infringe one of the laws of conventional research. The distinction, though, is beyond history, and for that reason there is no springboard of pre-existing evidence, or shared experience for that matter, from which to launch oneself into the

\footnote{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{18}}} Many in recent decades have sensed that between these extremes of naïve realism and abstract idealism there lies a middle path: \textit{mysticism} (Steiner 1988c). I just want to register that I do not follow this path; for I see it as a monism that too readily denies the physical aspect of reality.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{19}}} In using the word, 'superconscious,' I am preempting the second part of the research topic. I will strive for a precise contextual definition in Chapter Eleven.
inquiry. This distinction, and the others I have addressed, cannot be approached at a remove; for they all point to fundamentals, origins, first principles.

For my purposes, it is time for musical *experience* to be observed with new faculties; for the nature of what I want to find out demands nothing less. If epistemology is the study of what all other fields of inquiry presuppose, namely, cognition itself, then to quote Steiner again is timely: “The object of [musical] knowledge is not to *repeat* in conceptual form something which already exists, but rather to create a completely new sphere, which when combined with the world given to our senses, constitutes complete reality” (1981:11). It is that new sphere I seek to know.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE INFLUENCE OF THE POSITIVIST PARADIGM IN MUSIC EDUCATION TODAY

Introduction

In the previous chapter I discussed the influence of the epistemological omission on musical perception and cognition and I emphasised how this has resulted in the failure to appreciate that spaces are correlative to consciousness. I termed this the ‘epistemological gap.’ The observing consciousness, I argued, is productive as well as receptive. It is we who create the spaces, and in music, the intervals.¹ Our ability as thinking, conceptualising beings, makes this possible. The reason we know them is that we are of them. The very possibility of interpretation lies in this identification of the observer with the observed. The perceived intervals must correspond to something in us to be credible. Not being aware of this, we believe the spaces to be actually ‘there.’ This illusion - and illusion is after all a form of perception² - compels us to view them as voids, or unoccupied, unproductive spaces, which we then fill or allow to be filled with influences that are deleterious to them, and correlative, to us. ‘Things’ are what they are, in their difference, their thingness, only by virtue of their boundaries, that is, because of the spaces between them. In deforming the very spaces we create, we deform ourselves.

I want to reiterate before proceeding that the misapprehension of the qualitative nature of spaces is evident in the one-sided, object-centred emphasis given in music pedagogy to sound production. Tones, presumably, are more ‘real’ than the inaudible time-spaces they serve. Yet

¹ To explain my understanding of this correlation here would again necessitate a digression. I intend to deal with the reasons for the creation of temporal spaces in Chapter Eleven.

² Again, I feel the need to reiterate that human consciousness is not a ‘thing’ that can be studied by somehow being apart from it. The positivist belief that whatever is found by such distancing is a discovery about reality rather than a construction by the observer “conceals,” according to Willis Harman, “a metaphysical assumption that things can be found which exist independent of observers” (1993:12). Steiner also takes that position: “It is due to our limitations that things appear to us as if they had a separate existence, when in fact they are not separate at all” (1992:60).

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the extra-sensory productive void is precisely where artistic feeling is active. It is here, between things, that character resides. It has not been understood that the tones are the manifestation of music in the sense-realm only, and that only when the interval is unified with the experience, with the activity of the consciousness that created it, can it be called artistic. Alternatively, it cannot be called artistic if the particularity of each of those spaces is not a real experience for the executant.

Importantly, the cognitive 'measuring' performed in the creation and apprehension of the musical interval is achieved without conscious recourse to mathematical rule or formula. Yet, each interval is a singularly qualitative example of the idea of measure. Artistry consists just in this act of measuring, an act which can be envisaged as the filling of an empty space which has first been created for it, and which has universal validity.

Again, not to be aware of all this constitutes an epistemological dilemma of a decidedly disorienting kind for the student of music, because it paralyses freedom of moral decision and leads to uncertain purpose.

I believe that conscious experience - meaning that experience is not given but discovered, or better, re-covered through systematic effort - of the essential nature of the intervals, their qualitative opposition to the tones (the two comprising a polarity), and through that experience, comprehension of the epistemological gap and the dilemma, would constitute epistemic awareness. Epistemic awareness, in turn, I see as constituting the borderline between aesthetic passion, (which I described earlier as artistic feeling), and its grosser correlative, naive automatism. When this is finally understood I believe the way will be left open to examine musical utterance from the point of view of its provenance (Chapter Thirteen). I see it as

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3 Again, I maintain that there is feeling that is not associative, but cognitive (Chapter Three). Terence Davies, a researcher of sense-free cognition, defines it as “passion acting in lucidity” (1986:34). He discusses its mode of operation: “The feeling is momentarily active before the state of lucidity is achieved; it plays a part in producing that state but is dispelled by the lucidity which it has brought into being” (1986:34). Passion is here defined as, “deep feeling stirred by an idea which is essentially noble.” (1986:34 my emphasis). Lucidity refers to something light, perspicuous, clear, shining, translucent, the creative penetrating its own creation. This is feeling of the nature of thinking, feeling that is noble in its ethos, distinguished from pathos.

4 That we have lost the feeling for the intervals is evident in the pedagogical habit of 'learning the notes' first and only later adding the expression, a practice best analysed by cooking a meal and throwing in the spices just before serving. I will discuss this habit in Chapter Seven.
essential to uncover and so, dis-cover the source of musical creativity if its future as aesthetic passion is to be assured.

In this chapter I want to discuss the current state of music education in the context of the epistemological omission, that is, how music theory and curriculum have been influenced by external factors and, more importantly, on what basis education formulates pedagogic and curricular decisions. It is important that my critique be read in view of the positivist ideology discussed in the previous chapter and the historic dual perspective by which it is distinguished.

The Epistemological Omission in Music Education

The Disjunction of Experience and Theory - An Anomaly

I have already made the point that, in focussing attention on the acoustic element, and therefore, not giving the musical interval its due, the source of the student’s musical experience is in a sense disavowed. I want first, then, to explore how this state of affairs comes about, and how it impacts upon the content and delivery of formal curriculum. It concerns me because it appears that the immediate, non-verbal experience of musical phenomena, particularly intervals, is no longer a legitimate foundation for evaluating them. In other words, it is assumed that musical perception is enhanced only as stimulated responses are informed by theoretical or conceptual precepts, in which case intuitive response must be seen as not only different from, but less than, conceptual identification. Could this be because identification is not understood to be correlative to moral value? Why is empathetic listening (hearkening) not the standard practice?

To begin, then, what explanation can be offered for the disparity between what is taught as a theory of music, and what actually goes on in human consciousness when it is engaged in listening to and/or making music? And how do we explain the uncertainty that arises when the auditory-neural process known and taught as aural perception is compared with what takes place inwardly when one listens actively to a favourite symphony performed live? Musical experience does not consist in ostensive definition. I mean that naming a musical phenomenon is not knowing it, although it may be an expedient means of identifying it for purposes other than knowing it.
Given the set of polarities discussed in the previous chapter, particularly those between tone and interval and hearing and listening, the uncertainty - actually a contradiction - I have just emphasised is perhaps the most obvious example of a theory-experience disjunction, one which, I maintain, is tantamount to perceptual disorientation in the student. Indeed, aural training, a compulsory subject for all students, is symptomatic of the conflict between an art whose responses defy precise measurement and a positivist paradigm that insists on "identifiable measures of achievement" (Pratt 1990:1).

For example, in response to an interval played on the piano, the student is required to measure the distance between the two tones in much the same way that one might measure the distance in metres between two trees (by pacing it out), and then to identify that measurement by name: C to G is a perfect 5th, D to F a minor 3rd, and so on. What is being tested is the ability to identify the interval by name, that is, what it is called, rather than what it is and how it feels. Moreover, the response is either right, or it is wrong. In other words, the testable dimension of the phenomenon is taken to be the experience of it, indeed, actually supplants the experience, and then finally becomes the only basis from which to explain it (Pratt 1990). Although this may seem an obvious anomaly, my experience in practical education is that there is barely any awareness of it. To be sure, nominal identification is a useful way of conceptualising an interval and communicating it theoretically; but as I noted previously, the experience is ultimately wordless. Such arbitrary labelling could be extended to calling a major 3rd 'happy,' and a minor 3rd 'sad,' but this practice is no less nominalist.

Bearing in mind that aural training often begins in conjunction with the first lessons, the student’s attention over the longer term is diverted from his/her experiential space, the only place where the phenomenon could be truly ‘heard’, and is redirected at an auditive response that, in any event, can only discern pitch and duration. The intervallic experience, since it is not heard, does not enter consciousness, and stays in the ear, as it were. It is the explanation, the identification by name of the phenomenon that is given primacy. The interval is not felt, that is to say, the movement between that is the measure is not ‘lived in.’

Music does not explain. If it could explain, we would use words and not tones. Words carry concepts; music does not. Furthermore, it is easy to see that such a mensural method of
identification gives the student blessed (or cursed) with perfect pitch a distinct advantage for the purposes of assessment. To the qualities of artistic phrasing (which depends entirely on sensing intervallic relation), articulation, timbre and the integrity of tempo fluctuation (agogic), in short, all that might be called musical character, such a student may be indifferent.

The identification by name of a musical phenomenon can be assessed but, as Bernie Neville points out, "there can be no marks for being grabbed by a ... sonata, unless this translates into a motivation to analyse the artifact thoroughly and competently" (1992:10). One wonders whether on completion of tertiary studies the student still has the capacity to be grabbed. If the student and, by definition, music, are to be "progressively de-souled"(1992:10) nominalism is almost certainly the way to go about it. Aural perception it may be; experiential deception it undoubtedly is. As I noted in Chapter Four, the space, the interval, is precisely that in the phenomenon that is not audible, and is therefore, immeasurable, at least in the positivist sense of measure. That is not to suggest that it is not objective. Objectivity must not be confused with mensurability. Indeed, Ouspensky makes a strong point here: "Mensurability is too rough an indication of existence, because mensurability itself is too conditioned a conception" (1949:50). And further: "... much that is immeasurable exists just as really as, and even more really than, much that is measurable" (1949:50).

That they have been confused, however, and continue to be so, amounts, as I asserted above, to a denial of the student’s musical experience, which itself might be defined, to borrow a phrase from Susanne Langer, as, "the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt" (1953:27 my emphasis). The damage caused by learning not to trust one’s extrasensory experience can influence attitudes to learning. Indeed, I believe the habit can actually close a mind to learning, an event that might be seen as yet another narrowing of a productive space. The problem, I suggest, is that what ought to be an experience in the realm of feeling is forced into the realm of ratiocination. The felt experience becomes a cerebral operation.

Pratt (1990) reports on the general resistance of musicians to aural training and on the emphasis given it in curriculum: “An alarmingly large proportion of musicians questioned about their own experiences of aural training, admit that they disliked it, thought they were bad at it, and have found it largely irrelevant to their subsequent engagement in music” (1990:1). In
this context, Paul Newham comments on the split between the formal and intuitive modes of perception: “We must recognise that the glorification of logical operations and the process of equating them with worth and proficiency represents a particularly damaging contribution to the general prejudice with which non-verbal people [and systems] are viewed” (1993:33).

Newham discusses the ‘damage’ by citing the work of Jeanne Bamberger and Howard Gardner, who have extensively researched the intuitive mode over a decade or more in a Harvard University project known as Project Zero. Bamberger refers to such damage as the ‘wipe-out effect’. She discovered that “the more proficient children became in musical notation the less able they were to sense and describe the mood of a piece or to recreate their impressions through improvisation” (1993:32).

It is not difficult to see how continued curricular emphasis on the acoustic, the literal, and its notational symbols can transform a vital capacity into a habit. A capacity, of course, cannot be compelled in a mechanical manner. Newham views this sort of training “as much as a process of extinguishing a natural skill as the acquisition of a new one” (1993:32), as indeed it must be if the naming negates the experience of the phenomenon which the name is supposed to signify. It is precisely artistic feeling that is ignored in the act of interval identification.

All this is to suggest that the frequency with which a student is required to label what (s)he has heard is proportional directly to the enervation of the capacity to get in touch with the experience as the consequence of hearing. Although I will not address it explicitly at this stage, my response to this state of affairs is to ask the question: How does measure, the distance between two poles, change when awareness shifts from nominal identification (re-cognition) to the actual experience in extra-sensory audition (cognition)?

I submit this anomaly as one example of the inheritance of positivist thought in music. I want to emphasise, however, that I do not reject the theory of music as it is widely taught. Rather, I think it is important to reflect periodically on where that theory came from, why it is in the curriculum, what purpose it is intended to serve, and what its limitations are. Awareness and review of these factors should ensure that the hypertrophy of acoustic evaluation is balanced by activity that encourages a deepening of external perception leading to an
awakening of inner life, that is, to a hygienic rhythm - which I have described as hearkening - between authentic cognition and re-cognition. In other words, coming to grips with these questions could provide a balance-check to the entrenched and, as I see it, unethical practice of regarding students as instruments to be trained only in positivist (empirical) methods of identification. Another method that raises the feeling component of intentionality to awareness is necessary. It is this organ, for which there is no physical counterpart, that needs development. Some writers would call it soul.

The Origins of the Anomaly

Since this latter is a strong claim I will identify and discuss in this section what I believe to be the origin of the anomaly I have just identified. I have argued that music education has a profoundly inadequate epistemology. In the absence of the right questions an alternative, which I identified as the positivist paradigm, is very likely to be accommodated. In this case, music will be taught after the manner of a normative science with reliance almost totally on a basis of causal explanation and the presuppositions of sensationalism. The problem here is that the ontological assumptions made within the positivist paradigm rule out the necessity of posing epistemological questions. However, in view of my argument that music education should endeavour in every respect to be knower-centred, the ontology-epistemology relation, which I see as mutually determining, cannot be examined by beginning with the same assumptions.

Yet this is what has transpired, as illustrated by the anomaly I have just identified. To restate the anomaly succinctly, if starkly: In training people musically, we actively constrict their musicality. I contend that in the absence of an epistemology pertinent to itself, music education has, by epistemological omission, inherited modes of thinking which have evolved in disciplines other than its own - predominantly those marked by mechanomorphic assumptions - to which it has then tried to force-fit its own requirements. As a consequence, a whole realm of ideas and insights which, had there been an appropriate epistemology, ought to have been considered worthy of examination, have generally been overlooked. I refer to ideas regarding music's origins, mission, mode of operation and reason for being, questions that can spring to the lips only by constantly affirming music's mystery status rather than its utilitarian value.
Undeniably, these are difficult questions. But that is no reason to discard them as ineligible for inquiry. Indeed, in an unrelentingly literalist climate, our failure to appreciate the full implications of them for the emerging life-view of the student, whether (s)he is aware of them or not, when compared with the actual content of curriculum, can be observed in general, though unarticulated, student dissatisfaction with the latter.

In view of the anomaly, what are the indications that things are not quite as they should be? In the first place, it is impossible to build a meaningful curriculum around questions that have not been asked. I mean by this that the search for solutions to the mystery of expressive life, the struggle for meaning, is most often revealed, not by our asking the right questions - an omission which again constitutes a redundant space ripe for intrusion - but rather, by clutching at theories and minutiae and dissecting them in a thoroughly pathological manner.

For example, is there really any point in analysing a Beethoven sonata or a Bach partita if the inner experience of them has not been noticed? This is studying the way music behaves without in any way getting involved in the way music behaves in me. Yet, these analytical practices are common (Neville 1992). What gain is there in studying history if that history does not live in me; if I have not noticed how the difference between a phrase of Bach and a phrase of Beethoven arises in me; if I have not given my full attention to the difference in feeling? Would not the difference in feeling show me something of the historical consciousness involved? Could not this enhanced intentional faculty become an organ of evaluation?

We allow such diversionary activity to overshadow the whole question of our humanness. We allow wonder, that precursor of knowledge, to be excised from our purview. Why is music education not motivated to investigate the unknown, rather than teaching not only what has become commonplace, but what is patently untrue?

Theologian and historian, Philip Sherrard, discusses the distinction:

… knowledge and what is done under the influence of a particular form of knowledge can never in the nature of things be neutral. For knowledge is either true knowledge based on a true recognition of the reality of things, or it is false knowledge, based on a mistaken idea of the reality of things (1987:115).
If music education sets out from a ‘mistaken idea’ of the relation of the sensory to the extra-sensory - and I have shown that it does - the conclusions it reaches regarding the content and delivery of its curriculum will of necessity be false.

A literalist mindset obstinately seeks to establish correlations between audible phenomena only, by regarding each heard tone as the effect of another heard tone, while not comprehending that the interval, the extra-sensory correlative, is the sole means and condition of the inaudible’s manifestation. The audible is produced only by pre-cognitive knowledge of the inaudible. Therefore, understanding the audible can only come from understanding the inaudible which, as I have asserted, is accomplished through an inversion of the positivist perspective.

The degree to which music education accepts the hypotheses of positivism as axiomatic is obvious from its failure to question them. If it does not question them, then it must be supposed that it accommodates these hypotheses. Given that music has failed to inquire after its own ontology, and to the extent that this gap has been found by the positivist paradigm, music education, I believe, has been a willing, if unaware, participant in a prevarication of silence. (I choose the word carefully in order to avoid any connotation of premeditation.)

McClary reminds us in Jacques Attali’s, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music*, of “the mechanisms that have already done so much to silence the human and social dimensions of our music ...” (1985:149): “But the theories of music,” she continues, “that have shaped our perceptions and consumption of music have been instrumental in conditioning us not to recognize silencing - not to realise that something vital may be missing from our experience” (1985:150).

Music education’s epistemological objectives, at least since the genesis of modern scientism, have never been defined. Instead, students must busy themselves in theoretical deconstruction of the phenomena, as if in this act the ‘silenced’ value will somehow be magically revealed. But this value, this hidden extra-sensory quality, constituting as it does the difference between art and triviality, revelation and abomination, is taken as a given rather than
as an ethical construction needing depth exploration, and is therefore not considered worthy of enhancement through the systematic practice of empathetic listening.

Ontological presuppositions of the sort common to empirical research method may be adequate for inquiry specific to some disciplines. I have no argument with that method for, as I have said, in its technical application to the physical world, it is successful. It has given us untold gains in physics, medicine, biology and genetics, to name a few. However, as a way of observing and evaluating realms of inherently human endeavour that have as an unequivocal prerequisite the unmediated participation of the knower in the known, of the creator in the creation, it is entirely inadequate.

A theory of music ought rightly to be in keeping with the nature of musical experience itself, that is, how music behaves in us. What has transpired, however, is a very different picture. Our knowledge of music implicit in what is taught as the theory evokes questions for which that theory cannot find answers. If that is so, why is it not explicitly acknowledged in all courses of instruction? The answer must be that the anomaly has not been detected.

I think that is why McClary emphasises the unnoticed influence of the positivist paradigm:

The tendency to deal with music by means of acoustics, mathematics, or mechanistic models preserves its mystery (accessible only to a trained priesthood), lends it higher prestige in a culture that values quantifiable knowledge over mere expression, and conceals the ideological basis of its conventions and repertoires (1985:150).

Although I am wary of some of McClary’s opinions elsewhere, I concur with her argument that a certain concealment by a facade of positivist modelling can and does silence, or bar the way to a mode of knowing that is more in keeping with music’s qualities, a mode that meets the music on its own terms. I am tempted, however, to make one semantic alteration by suggesting that ‘the mystery’ is not, indeed, preserved, but asphyxiated, as evidenced in the modern inclination to explain it - since it appears to be inaccessible by any other method - in terms of nerve physiology, stimulated cerebral synapses and the like. To give music any such status today, at least on the grounds that it is experienced as mystery, would make my project
unnecessary. It is just this sense of mystery, the missing ‘vital element,’ that is played-down, silenced, or pushed out of view, so that any reflection on it or claims for it along these lines are inevitably tamed.

Rather, access to, and possible cognisance of, the sublime is stymied by a positivist mindset that limits projects only to questions having predictable (translating as ‘factual’) answers. It follows that the methods of empirical musical research - because they leave human responses out of the equation - and the content of curriculum, must appear intelligible in order to gain academic credibility. Questions of the sort I am raising, then, are not even posed, for to ask them would be to disclaim positivist models and lead instead to speculation which, of course, is forbidden by empiricist method.

Where, then, does this leave the student? In the absence of an epistemology that educates genuine human responses (distinguished from merely assuming them), and could thus lead the student to self-knowledge, (s)he is forced towards the opposite pole of analytic objectivism, namely, the belief “that music is primarily ... the art of emotional expression in sound and that all other ideals - architectural or pictorial, sensual or intellectual - are secondary and incidental” (Cooper 1967:7 my emphasis), an equally simplistic reduction in my opinion. (I will discuss the subjectivist position in Chapter Six.)

It is clearly impossible to understand music through that alone which is sensible; for the qualitative element is not subject to verification by sense. If that is true, no amount of aural training as it is currently delivered can evidence the presence of the qualitative element in musical phenomena. Indeed, cognition of the extra-sensory can be the only guiding principle and standard because it is the expression, in the sense realm, of music in its essence. We know that the experience of the sublime does not consist in acoustic recognition. “It is ridiculous,” writes Sherrard, “to suppose that man can have an experience of which he does not possess the possibility” (1987:29). Yet, as I discussed in Chapter One, it is precisely the imposition of artificial limits on the possibility of experience that positivist practices in music assume. To ignore the potential for experience is to limit actual experience and therefore, the very possibility of meaning.
All this suggests to me that education, having been unable to gain access to the qualities of the metaphysical ‘measure’ in music, which can only be experienced in an extra-sensory manner, will permit itself only certain types of questions, again by the omission of others. This means that the sights are set only on expediting a prescribed curriculum in which, after all, only credible and creditable knowledge can be assessed. As I have consistently asserted, questions that ask after only the sensational appearances of musical forms can elicit only conventionally prescribed answers.

Further, when human experience is formalised into a normative category, that is, converted into ‘universal facts’ or dogma, it becomes frozen. Experience that in music is (or was) restorative, becomes prescriptive. To elaborate, the ostensive definition of intervals in terms of the measured distance between one tone and the next is what I call prescriptive listening. (Again I ask the reader to bear in mind that the extra-sensory cannot be named, or it would be sensory.) On hearing a pitch interval, the auditor is obliged to choose one (correct) answer out of a possible twelve. Qualitatively (in feeling), however, one interval is no different from another because listening is not directed at the experience of the movement of measure itself, the inner movement. If, as I suggested in Chapter Three, the inner experience is listened to with equal attention, the shape of the experience as movement can in time be discerned and named by way of gesture, that is, in a manner consistent with the intrinsic nature of measure itself. In this way nominalism is avoided. This manner of listening (hearkening) that attends to the inner movement between two acoustic phenomena I call restorative.

The Elimination of Foundational Questions

The reluctance - or perhaps it is the powerlessness - to ask the foundational questions of musical knowing, to inquire after the beginnings, the how of knowing, suggests that we are in some measure incapacitated in the effort to comprehend the very possibility of a human art of musical expression, much less build an epistemology founded on that comprehension. Yet, as I have pointed out, it must be acknowledged that an art that denies itself an epistemology will not find a firm ground from which to evaluate its own educational precepts and artistic productivity; rather, it will be led unwittingly into all manner of error in its perception, thought and doctrine.
If my contention is true that music’s foundational questions, namely, those which cluster persistently and thematically around provenance, origins, mode of operation and reason for being, have been silenced by the interposition of positivist thought, then in strictly epistemological terms music curriculum can only be distinguished as much by what it is not as by what it is. The metaphysical void I have just discussed, the disjunction of theory and experience, is one such example. It translates for the student as a dilemma of epistemic orientation, namely, being caught between objectivism and the instinctive reaction to it, subjectivism.

If the foundational questions - all that might be regarded as comprising the epistemological omission - are mute, this does not mean they are not there. I believe they are there. It is just that music education currently lacks the resources to bring them to light; for it would then be incumbent upon education to provide the answers. In this gap of silence a ‘bluetack’ curriculum has emerged, a curriculum that disintegrates by virtue of the rootlessness of its own precepts, and consequently adjusts, chameleon-like, by making itself relevant to every passing fad of the music ‘industry’ and to a succession of new rationalist theories. In all this, we do not search for the constant, the core experience.

Nor is it enough to say - and one hears it often - that music is its own meaning; for that is to say, in effect nothing.

As I see it, positivist observation does not acknowledge difference, but only sameness. It cannot tolerate ambiguity, equivocation, the seemingly inexplicable or ineffable, the metaphysical (although its very approach is based on just such a metaphysical assumption), intuitive and non-rational cognition, or inwardness. Positivism knows that if the mystery of music is revealed in its own terms rather than in strictly literal or material terms, it cannot do business. It must, then, silence the mystery.

Questions that take mystery as a given are bound to be markedly different from those in which any hint of mystery is absent or deliberately eliminated.
Examination of the standard texts currently used - which, coincidentally, do not acknowledge the knower beyond the assumption of giftedness⁵ - suggests this epistemological omission to be the situation in Australian music education at present. I mean that for the most part these texts are strictly didactic. Their specific function is to impart information in subjects such as music craft, aural training, critical studies, professional studies, fundamentals of musicological research, and so on.

In my appraisal of Australian tertiary music curricula, nowhere have I found questions that give lie to the suspicion that the individual knower (in its expanded conception) is the neglected element in the learning equation.⁶

I list here some of the questions that might be of more than passing interest to the student, They fall into three categories: sensing (in the expanded sense of which I have discussed), social connectedness and personal autonomy.

Sensing

What form of consciousness is involved in musical knowing?

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⁵ I find it more than curious that in spite of the (supposed) enormous accumulation of knowledge in our century, we still speak of musical talent as a gift. A gift from whom? In order for a thing to qualify as a gift, does it not have to be received?

⁶ I cannot claim to have observed first-hand the actual delivery of curricula in the twenty-six institutions comprising the membership of the National Council of Tertiary Music Schools in Australia. Perusal of the written content of a representative sample of their handbooks, however, gives every impression that the sorts of questions and distinctions I am raising here are not the departure-point of curricula. Even in my own institution, which underwent an extensive curriculum audit in 1999, the convenor, Professor Ken Robinson, Chair of the Blair Government's National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education, made epistemology the very core of his keynote address because he regards it as a curricula imperative in today's climate. Robinson stresses, albeit pragmatically, that epistemology must be the central concern because "the problem that we have in the arts is that the education system is dominated by an economic model which is supported by an intellectual ideology," an ideology that sees intelligence of the kind competent with "verbal reasoning, propositional knowledge and certain sorts of mathematical reasoning" as "a sign or indicator of a general intellectual capacity." Robinson also argues the critical relation between epistemology and curriculum in the sense that "the curriculum is intended to be a map of knowledge," that is, it ought to be a clearly demonstrable reflection of the epistemology. If not, "the managerial functions of the curriculum eventually overpower the epistemological functions." (Note the double function (in his view) of a curriculum. He continues: "An initial map is taken to be a kind of indelible framework. This framework is meant to be enabling for people's learning. I think very rapidly most institutions move from being a framework to becoming a cage. People can't get out of it. It's because the epistemology becomes buttressed by managerial positions." It is significant that the word "epistemology" has not been uttered on one occasion in the many committee and staff meetings held in my school since the audit. In other words, Robinson's message has been ignored. I am not being cynical when I say that I suspect that few members of staff know what the word means, and that those who are unfamiliar with it have not bothered to pursue its meaning.
Where, in the body do I experience the tone colours of the various instruments, and can I say anything about their character from this?

Is total listening (pure perception) free of judgement possible? If so, how do I learn it?

What sense allows me, out of the broad spectrum of sound, to discern musical phenomena? How do I distinguish, for example, between music and speech?

To what extent do the senses of spatial perspective and finished form influence the production of measure in time?

How does a technology-inspired consciousness reveal itself in the perception and production of musical forms?

What is the relation of the audible phenomenon to what is transmitted through the executant?

Social Connectedness

Why does music as a vocation often imply a ‘fringe’ existence for the practitioner, as if isolated, not grounded in the ‘real’ world?

What implications does this have for living in the world?

Personal Autonomy

How is it that music can be the source of otherwise inexpressible elation and wholeness, yet for the executant, often the source of disappointment, frustration and anguish?

Why do many seem to lack the confidence to develop desired musical aptitudes? What influence is exerted by judgement, competition and shame?

Why do I create musical forms? What human purpose do they serve?

The point I wish to make in listing these questions is that to begin by asking them would transform curriculum altogether: the approach, the language, the pedagogic emphasis, the
research practices and the outcomes. But curriculum delivery would change in a far more fundamental way; for teaching that starts from the epistemological assumptions embedded in the positivist paradigm cannot apply itself artistically. That is because the silencing of core experiences ensures that the teaching cannot open up the artistic development of the student.

The consequences of silencing are indeed great. When a sphere of activity becomes increasingly routine by virtue of the inertia of its own (inherited) paradigm - what Coleridge called the “lethargy of custom” (1987:192) - it can happen that the most fundamental of emerging (learner-related) problems escape its notice, or alternatively, if they prove to be beyond the scope of established curriculum, overlooked because they are too difficult to accommodate.

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1 I can best support this claim by giving two rudimentary example of the distinction between teaching that begins with imaginative principles and that which begins from a basis of aetiological explanation. I recall in my childhood being handed a list of Italian musical terms and being asked to memorise the English definitions. This process of musical literacy is undergone by all children who are taught in accordance with the graded curriculum and examination criteria of the Australian Music Examinations Board. One such term - and I could choose any one - was sforzando which, according to the prescribed list meant, ‘forcing the tone.’ I was never encouraged to play with the sound of the original word. A similar word, sfumato, refers to a technique used by Leonardo da Vinci in his paintings. By means of a veiling effect, the viewer is drawn to certain characteristics of the painting, as if looking through a smoke-filled space. The sf is common to both words. Observation of the ancient Hermetic conceptual model of the four elements, earth, fire, air and water, of which da Vinci was fully aware, reveals that both s and f are the audible counterparts (in speech) of fire. Stewart comments that “the Four Elements may be understood as four principles of all observable phenomena both objective and subjective” (1987:72). The concrete experience of fire (warmth) was one of relative incandescence and acceleration. Repetitive sounding of s and f (in such a way that they naturally stimulate the body to gesture) reveals just these properties. But there is another discovery to be made. When a bucket of water is thrown on a fire, the result can be imagined. The fire gives off smoke, but more importantly, it produces a more energetic sound: sssssssssssssss. This is a far cry from ‘forcing the tone.’ To play with the sound of the word can actually tell the executant something of its meaning. This is not an exercise in conceptual abstraction; it is concrete experience stimulated by the faculty of imagination. It is an illustration of what I meant in Chapter One when I stated my concern that I was taught the art of music but I was not taught artistically. Shakespeare, who is credited with introducing over two thousand new words into the English language, knew this well. My point is that for the child all this is discoverable; for his/her imagination is still intact. Is it not ironic that an art that relies for its very existence on listening does not nurture listening? The danger is that to begin an education with such definitions ensures that the student will conceive too narrowly the phenomena to which they refer. For the second example of the encroachment of intellectualism on childhood and how the teaching itself can be made artistic, I cite psychologist, Franz Winkler: “The child who asks why a flower grows upwards is usually satisfied when told that the living plant is a child of the sky, to which it wants to return, just as the stone he held in his hand wanted to return to the earth” (1960:203). Every child can relate to the concept, ‘home.’ In response to the child’s question about why the flower grows skyward, the adult could, of course respond by giving a protracted explanation of photosynthesis, an abstraction that would “... leave [the child] confused and dissatisfied, even duly resentful” (1960:203). Winkler concludes: “The child who knows a flower, who learns to love it and to watch it climb toward the sun, will have no difficulty in recalling its name and the details of its life” (1960:204). The flower is alive because the imagination is alive. “As a rule, no one is very much interested in the names and habits of strangers, and will not remember them for long. Names and habits of friends, however, are important” (1960:204).
In such a climate it is indeed easy to lose sight of the real needs of the knower as (s)he progresses and grows. Alternatively, a knower-centred curriculum, based on the exercise of imagination, can fire the will of the student to a love of learning because it meets his/her human needs. And (with apologies to Socrates), if a curriculum cannot kindle the fire that is the will, it is obliged by default to fill buckets.

**Summary**

Before concluding this chapter, I think it would be helpful to summarise some of its content and align it with a few of the main points raised in the previous chapter.

I have identified the epistemological omission as a cognitive lacuna or gap. Positivism, which could not have evolved without the subject-object split, has actively interposed itself between subject and object because these are sensed as opposite and therefore irreconcilable in the act of cognition. Since what is there, literally, in the world, is seen to be in the public domain, and therefore ‘real,’ it cannot have any connection with the private domain of the cognisor. Indeed, in my (illicit) attempts to supplant prescriptive listening by restorative listening in institutional curriculum, I have found that the extent to which this split is entrenched in the minds of formally trained students is evident in their deep-seated reluctance to value, even to contact, their own inner realm.

In view of that problem, I have argued that the recipients of formal education are placed in a moral dilemma, one that they themselves do not recognise. If subject and object are an habitual antithesis, perpetuated and reinforced by the curriculum, there can be no recognition of the fruitfulness of the space between the two, and students are, in effect, forced to stop listening to their interiority, the only place where binary opposition can be apprehended and reconciled. Since the content of inwardness cannot be assessed, students actually learn to distrust it. Rather, they must accept, and finally, believe, that the audible phenomena which, recall, can only be right or wrong, are the only reality. It is sound and sense-perception that have worth and validity. In effect, students are forbidden to develop formally the reception of musical phenomena outside the extent to which they provoke physical sensation. Since students are unconscious participants in their own phenomena, it can be said that the phenomena are
themselves impoverished according to the degree to which consciousness is unaware of its participation in them.

The major consequence of the epistemological gap in education is the disjunction between awareness of the extra-sensory experience, and theory inferred from sensory experience. As I have asserted, this state of affairs must be attributed to the inheritance of, and confidence in, positivist ways of observing, which understand space and time (intervals being time-spaces) to be properties of the world only, and not of consciousness. The damage caused by keeping this disjunction alive creates havoc in the student who is seeking life-orientation in what (s)he does.

Further, I have made the point that the anxiety present in the subject-object dichotomy, felt but not comprehended, is most noticeable in the urge to reduce farness to nearness (by virtue of the unarticulated need for intimacy with the phenomena), resulting in the qualitative distortion of both, the whole amounting to avoidance of the void. I believe, however, that although this latter currently manifests as unprecedented psychological confusion, it offers just the opportunity to call forth the opposite inclination, namely, a fully conscious reconciliation of dualism. It is precisely the influences of positivism, which, once recognised, can direct the attention of many to renewed creative impulses.

Finally, I wish to point out again that the vacuum, after all, is the polar opposite of matter. In our cognition, we habitually contrast the two, the physical and the non-physical. To modern consciousness, anything beyond the horizon of the literal, the actual, is only a vacuum. It cannot imagine any form of life without materiality. One thinks of the pejoratives in the common lexicon: empty-headed, vacuous, absent-minded. They all infer that mindfulness is about fullness, intelligence about fleshiness. I have tried to show on the contrary that the sense-realm, where music is concerned, is a limited horizon. One cannot fill (with freely chosen content) a receptacle that is already full. If we could learn to understand the world as thought, as a dimension of mind, we could rid ourselves of the idea of the negative void; for “all human knowing, without exception, is founded on human faculties” (Davy, Edelglass et al 1992:103-104).
To reiterate, the particular frame of mind that unknowingly reflects positivist ‘disbelief’ has undermined our confidence in our own cognitive and epistemic resources, and so precludes the posing and exploration of foundational questions, barring the way to knowledge of the sublime. Positivist disbelief limits what it is possible to know because it is applied to all categories of ‘things.’ It confuses the no-thing with nothing because awareness is awareness of something.

The question is whether knowing all this would make any difference to the way we engage with music. Would we do it and teach it differently? Can this knowledge possibly sensitise music education to other sorts of questions which, in the very asking, seek to impart to music the fundamentals of its own epistemological ground?

Finally, although the reader may have formed the opinion that the polemic in my critique of institutionalised music education is combative, I submit that it is not gratuitous; rather, it has fuelled my commitment to the project.
CHAPTER SIX

THE INFLUENCE OF SUBJECTIVIST THOUGHT

Introduction

In Chapter Five, I discussed the inheritance of the positivist paradigm by musical thought, and argued that its intrusion in education via curriculum delivery amounts to disavowal of extra-sensory experience, and that this results in the inhibition of musicality. I drew attention to the epistemic disorientation of students insofar as confidence in their own cognitive resources is undermined. Since they sense positivist explanations as being objectivist, and therefore, incompatible with actual musical experience, they incline instead to the alternative explanation that music is really an expression of human emotions. Although it is not formally recognised, this divergence of view in the case of aural training amounts to a contradiction, namely, that what the students believe to be subjective responses are treated as if they were objective truths. Perceptions that would naturally run their course in the feeling realm are converted into judgements in the realm of ratiocination by way of verbal identification. Objectivism, then, is consistent with the positivist paradigm, and curriculum based on positivist explanation perpetuates the subject-object split.

The author of the essay on aesthetics in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan Publishers) states: “The traditional classification into subjectivist and objectivist theories of aesthetic value is a natural one” (1972:52 my emphasis). The aims of the present chapter take their start from this statement. Before stating them, however, I want to clarify what is meant by the ‘classification’ into subjectivist and objectivist theories for the purposes of my discussion here. Mystery is an ambiguity, an uncertainty, and so, is not explainable by the objectivist canon. In objectivist terms, sense-data correspond with reality and yet, exist somehow independently of perception, which implies they are undistorted by any personal emotion.
Subjectivism, on the other hand, means, proceeding from, or relating to, the interiority of the thinking and feeling subject and not the particular object under consideration.¹

I question to what extent this classification is ‘natural,’ as the above author suggests, for there is a contradiction embedded in it. It is true that the inclination to subjectivity does not reside only with trained musicians; rather, it is common in Western cultures to associate music with subjective response. Why, despite this, is formal curriculum nevertheless delivered in a predominantly objectivist manner? In this chapter, I want to trace some of the thought that has contributed to this contradiction, with particular emphasis on the emergence and the effects of the subjectivist canon. As I will discuss in the next section, one of the major consequences of perpetuating the binary opposition is the elimination of foundational questions pertaining to music, specifically through the preclusion of meaningful discourse, this time by adherence of musicians themselves to the subjectivist canon. Because there is always a difference in meaning between musical experience and statements made about it, music’s value beyond sensuous delectation and aesthetic taste is consistently overlooked. Ultimately, neither objectivism nor subjectivism is prepared to embrace the ambiguity of ‘the between,’ and work with the subject-object relation beyond the conventional binary classification.

As I proceed I intend to demonstrate that, for the musician, subjectivism is not a formal philosophical doctrine or even a ‘natural’ inclination, but rather, a perceived need in a predominantly verbal world to seek certitude of purpose in some sort of explanatory framework, however untested, that serves to legitimise the socio-cultural - distinguished from the ethical - value of the musical act, which, after all, defies description. It will be noted that neither in positivist nor subjectivist canons are absolute ethical values admitted.² In both cases it is the sense data only that are presumed to correspond with reality since, as I have pointed out, the extra-sensory dimension of cognitive perception is not touched on in education and is excluded, by definition, by the dual perspective. I am saying that subjectivist explanations are

¹ As far as I am aware, subjectivism as a formal doctrine arose as a philosophical response to the perceived reductionist practices of that branch of neuroscience known as functionalism, which seeks to explain mental activity entirely in terms of brain mechanism, an assumption so far untested. Functionalism, however, was itself an attempt by neuroscience to avoid the problems implicit in the Cartesian dualist model of the mind. (See Glover 1991 for a more detailed account of these developments.)
²The Collins Dictionary defines this feature of the subjectivist canon: “Subjectivism is the doctrine that there are no absolute moral values but that these are variable in the same way that taste is.”
still fundamentally positivist because both take their start from the synthetic abstract whole based on the sense-experience, and not from the perceived whole. In the final analysis, both are explanatory schemas that preclude the development of a musical epistemology.

The Preclusion of Verbal Discourse and its Consequences

I can best begin by again affirming that no conceptual schema is able to give an adequate explanation of musical experience, because music contains within itself the principles of its own explanation, but it does not itself explain. Conceptualisation is neither its reason for being nor its mode of operation. It does not ask for a medium not itself to explain what and how it is. Explanation is the province of language. The conceptual content of utterance is exclusive to speech. A word spoken carries meaning. A vowel sung (melisma) does not. Its experience does not refer to, denote, connote or signify anything but itself. Julia White expresses that distinction allegorically:

Speech is already and always delivered with authority, [whereas] the sensitivities and equivocations of sung material are only construed as weaknesses. Speech is the domain of concepts. The act of speech is authority. The singing voice may waver and sigh and pause lengthily but the speaking voice will not be forgiven. The timing of authority must carry conviction (1997:10).

This distinction reveals a more crucial one: speech is the expression of a human-world relation, while music is the expression of a human-human relation, that is, a relation of the utterer with him/herself (Steiner 1932, 1987). Speech points away from itself to something other than itself. The something other is the thing to which the speech refers, at least in its representational function. But the speech is not the thing. Music, on the other hand, draws attention to itself and represents nothing else. The categories of language insist on an extensive concept-percept separation that is not there in the musical experience, which is intensive. This suggests that the appearance of what is heard and the act of musical hearing are one and the same thing. If musical utterance has no conceptual content (distinguished from the words used to explain its architecture and syntax), then it cannot be an expression of a human relation with external objects.
The distinction between the conceptual authority of speech and the seemingly subjective content of musical utterance is an important factor in finding an explanation for the musician’s dilemma. Although I will assume for the moment that tone and word have the same origin, in function, they are poles apart. Educationally, the problem is that formal curriculum is devised and delivered by way of the authority of conceptual language. The research of Davidson and Welsh, for example, supports that observation: “... in music schools, musicians tend not to be interested in the processes involved in arriving at solutions to musical problems [problem solving necessitating verbal explanation], but only in musically successful products” (1988:261). I suggest this disinterest is due to the unwillingness to think conceptually, that is, verbally, when musical activity is so compellingly non-verbal and non-conceptual.

The distinction highlights a problem peculiar to artistic endeavour in general. The interest of musicians only in ‘musically successful products’ and not in processes suggests a certain reluctance on their part to engage in discourse about music. I do not refer to discussion between musicians about preferred performances and the responses they elicit, or to matters of technical or executory importance. I mean, rather, a pronounced unwillingness to engage verbally with what might be called ‘big questions.’ It is no exaggeration to say that, for some, such discussion is a waste of time, and is regarded with suspicion. As Barthes affirms: “... a discourse [is a] rare phenomenon for a musician” (1985:263). A discourse, it must be supposed, does not fall into the category of musically successful product. Musicologist, Maria Rika Maniates, writes: “... for those to whom music speaks, its truth has an immediacy of impact that fades substantially in descriptive discourse” (1983:76). She argues that “the lack of isomorphism between musical ideas and descriptive statements about them is endemic to talking about music and certainly poses methodological problems of accuracy and appropriateness ...” (1987:76).

I noted in Chapter Three that music bypasses verbal expression, and so, defies description. Another prominent musicologist, David Burrows, comments: “The point isn’t that music slips through the net of language - for what after all, does not, to one degree or another? - but there can be few gaps between an experience and its representation wider than the one between music and its analyses and descriptions” (1990:12).
When we do talk about music, at least when attempting to communicate descriptions of its heard qualities, its resistance to appurtenant verbalisation forces us to rely on spatial analogue, metaphor and inter-sense transfer. One will often hear a conductor or pedagogue speak of a 'velvety,' 'dry' or 'dark' sonority, a 'creamy' or 'translucent' texture, a 'tapered' phrase, a 'shading' of brilliance, a 'sweet' melody, a 'cotton-wool' ending, 'shimmering' strings, and so on. The terms, 'sharp' and 'flat,' 'up-bow' and 'down-bow,' are spatial analogues. Even at this descriptive level one is struck by the difficulty of converting musical qualities into word-pictures.

Further, theorists and music critics who talk and write authoritatively about music most often circumlocute, understandably, the big questions, which I see as not strictly aesthetic, technical, historical or musicological, but epistemological. As Maniates, again, points out: "... it may very well be that attempts to capture musical truth in the inadequate medium of language puts philosophy of music in an untenable position" (1983:76). The problem, as I noted, is that music does not explain its own experience; it is the experience.

It is worth pointing out that this resistance of musical phenomena and experience to the superimposition of a linguistic framework is a symptom of a long-standing antinomy in the philosophy of art generally, as A. Boyce Gibson identifies: "The arts are a world of their own. The arts are part of the world" (1972:31). The antinomy is kept alive by the belief "that [music] cannot be compassed by understanding. No amount of translation can render sensuous immediacy in terms of concepts" (1972:12). Susan Sontag expresses the artists' distrust rather more bleakly: "Practiced in a world furnished with second-hand perceptions, and specifically confounded by the treachery of words, the artist's activity is cursed with mediacy" (1969:5). Put bluntly, the descriptions of music are not music.

The human relation with the world is largely linguistic because it is conceptual. It is conceptual in that a concept is married in sensory observation to a percept. In other words, the human relation with the external world is distinguished by a dual perspective, without which any conceptualisation is impossible. Moreover, conceptual consciousness is a consciousness of the past; the concepts brought up to meet percepts are remembered concepts. The problem, then, appears to lie in the distinction between time and non-time, between a linguistic medium
of expression that relies on pastness, and one that relies on ‘sensuous immediacy,’ or a
cognitive state of non-verbal presentness.

I will not go further into the problem here, (preferring to hold it over until Chapter
Thirteen.) Suffice it to say that it sponsors an unfortunate conflict between the practitioners,
and those who in the practitioners’ opinion merely talk about it, and who may be seen by them
as pedants.3 As I have pointed out, the scepticism, and even cynicism, of many musicians
towards the conceptual element and its verbalisation are already conditioned while they are still
students. For the practising musician, it is, in the final analysis, more relevant and more honest
to get on with making musically successful products.

One major outcome of this antagonism is that since the emergence of the positivist
paradigm, a culture and a climate that might be appropriate for discourse about the foundational
questions has not evolved, at least one that does not unwittingly perpetuate the objectivism-
subjectivism opposition. There would appear to be an unarticulated recognition of the futility
of addressing such questions, a situation exacerbated I think by the educational effort today
given to forcing curriculum to match vocational requirements.

I am inclined to the view that neither attitude, the one apparently reflecting analytic
objectivism, and the other, subjectivist belief, accounts for the fact of music, that is, “why in the
struggle for existence, a peculiar sensibility to certain sequences of non-natural sounds should
ever have been developed” (Sullivan 1951:15). At worst, verbal responses to the questions that
might at least lay the tentative foundations for an evolving contemporary epistemology of
musical practice are ‘gagged’, as it were, at their source.

It is true that the moment I begin to ask questions about music - What is it? - How do I
know it? - What is its reason for being? - I am no longer pursuing music, but philosophy.
Despite the potential for distortion, theorising of this sort should not, however, disqualify music
as a candidate for a philosophy appropriate to its practice and pedagogy in modern times.

By way of summarising this predicament, then, it seems that many musicians and

3 See Sontag (1969) for a most erudite essay on the conflict and its consequences in art generally.
educators will respond with some impatience to any dialogue or text that is not pragmatic, that does not assist the goal of musically successful product. (The technical language of much philosophy does not, of course, invite intense interest.) Discourses not meeting this requirement are rejected, one supposes, out of hand by musicians on the grounds of experiential irrelevance, and are written and read only by theorists. My conversations with professional musicians, most of whom have received a very specialised, product-oriented tertiary training, suggest that they often have the vague feeling that works of the latter type do not satisfy their ‘deepest’ needs.⁴ Perhaps they are right. This feeling, however, is not limited to musicians, and seems to be symptomatic of the general suspicion that emerges when any claim to reality is made other than what can be experienced sense-perceptibly. What, after all, are those deepest needs? Revealing them would require verbal description.

There is, then, a philosophical impasse, one major consequence of which I think is the marginalisation of music in aesthetics, general arts discourse, and more urgently for my purposes, in education.⁵ It amounts to an ideological emasculation of an art, which, because it can say precious little about itself, is totally indefensible against forces hostile to it, namely, the authoritatively expressed, seemingly reductionist content of speech-derived, conceptual thought. The preclusion of discourse about music’s foundational questions, I believe, only compounds the musician’s dilemma, which, to remind the reader, is of the nature of uncertain purpose.

Given the intransigence towards foundational questions, not now by education, but by practitioners themselves, music is hampered by an absence of meaningful discourse manifesting in the seemingly innate rancour of musicians towards dialogue seen by many of them see as irrelevant. The dichotomy of doing and discoursing is reflected in the relative marginalisation of the musician and the art-form, both to some extent isolated in their

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⁴ I am referring again to the seemingly irredeemable seduction of pragmatism in education today, according to which optimum emphasis is given to vocational ‘training’ (certainly at graduate level). Epistemic knowledge does not proceed apace. As the Platonic philosopher, Sir Charles Morris sees it, the pragmatic generation tells itself “… that philosophers have been arguing for very many centuries without reaching any agreement, and that disputing about questions which cannot be finally answered is very apt to be obstructive rather than stimulative when action is required …” (1957:42). In my view, the emphasis on pragmatism is paralleled by disintegration of principle.

⁵ See, for example, Neville (1992) on the emphasis given in Australian schools to the ‘essential’ curriculum at the expense of affective domain education.
reluctance to be forced into any category of social or economic relevance which rationalist models would otherwise define for them.\(^6\)

The conflict is evident, not as open hostility, for that would necessitate recourse to the authority of speech, which the practitioner rejects in any case, but rather, as silent inertia. Aesthetic passion, then, for the musician, consists in this: that music’s truth cannot be said.\(^7\) Sontag expresses succinctly the artists’ withdrawal from the authority of logico-linguistic explanation: “Silence is a metaphor for a cleansed, non-interfering vision … inviolable in [its] essential integrity by human scrutiny” (1969:16). I see this inertia as a stand-off in which there is no gain for anyone. The problem is a singularly epistemological one. As I noted previously, students are given no hint as to the epistemic resources they carry within, the development of which might give them the (non-verbal) tools to pose and to think deeply into the foundational questions.

Although I share the musicians’ concern that much aesthetic discourse, at least that cued by sensationalism, has taken a reductionist path, I feel compelled to assert that scholarly inquiry need not be a deceit, a substitute for what the thinker appears not to be: an artist. On the contrary, confined to doing, music suffers in the current rationalist climate not only an uncertain cultural, economic and educational future, but perhaps more importantly, rapidly diminishing confidence in itself. What the conflict means for the majority of musicians, however, is that they take up instinctively an unarticulated subjectivist position. I believe it is possible while thinking about music to avoid conceptual reductionism, if by that is meant compromising in some way the ‘essential integrity’ of the musical phenomena themselves, but only on the condition that “the concepts are devised to follow the sinuosities of a not-so-conceptual experience” (Gibson 1972:16). Gibson’s comment, I think, points the way to what I call Logos awareness, which is non-verbal.

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\(^6\) The set of questions around the theme of social connectedness which I listed in the previous chapter and which are not included in curriculum are relevant to my point here. I pose them again: Why does music as a vocation often imply a ‘fringe’ existence for the practitioner, as if isolated, not grounded in the ‘real’ world? What implications does this have for living in the world?

\(^7\) Perhaps Barfield gets closer than anyone to an explanation for the musician’s silence: “The Meaning of life is continually being dried up, as it were, and left for dead in the human mind by the operation of a purely discursive intellectual activity, of which language - built, as it is, on the impact of sense perceptions - is the necessary tool” (1984:179).
Revelation versus Sensation - Music Marginalised

Under this head I will attempt to show how the leaning towards subjectivism, and its status as the inevitable pole of positivism, have been provoked. Bernard Levin asks:

Why should anyone have bothered, why should anyone bother now, to attend upon, and be deeply affected by, a proceeding that is literally meaningless? - How does an act [musical expression] that denies itself all acknowledged forms of communication none the less communicate its meaning with such power (1987:175)?

It is a good question. For me, it is an urgent question; for there is a sense of resignation in Levin’s tone, as if he has reconciled himself to the conclusion that even to begin the search for an answer would be futile. The most convincing demonstration that in the musical process there is something vital beyond the grasp of the intellect is the obstinate resistance of that process to systematic scrutiny. Is it not exquisitely ironic that the very expression of our confidence in a process that is ‘meaningless’ lies in our ignorance of it?

It is understandable that most musicians cannot be bothered with Levin’s question. To them it is futile to ask retrospectively about an event distinguished by the sensation of presentness. I suspect they would, instead, embrace Beethoven’s prophetic allegory: “... music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and philosophy, the wine which inspires one to new generative processes,” and “... those who understand it must be freed by it from all the miseries which the others drag around with themselves” (Sullivan 1951:11).

Beethoven’s poignant advocacy of music as a ‘higher’ revelation only highlights the bind I have been discussing. Such a noble sentiment is all very well for a genius, even one who recognised the ‘misery’ of life (the Industrial Revolution was already in full swing) in an intellectual climate uncongenial to many. If we simply acquiesce in the revelation theory, if we make no attempt to interrogate the presumed simple truth that whatever music communicates can only ever be conveyed musically - and this seems inevitably to mean sensually - the abovementioned silence and the malignant scepticism behind it are not only perpetuated, but in

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8 Inevitable in the sense that the age-old subject-object dichotomy and the debate about it has reinforced the notion that there can only be one or the other position and that no other position is possible.
a sense, legitimised. If revelation were all there were to it, then it would be better to abandon the search for meaning altogether. It seems to me, however, that underlying the recourse to revelation and other such final statements is the presumption that since music really is something other than self-evident sensation, something other transcending its sonorous appearances, it would be futile to try to make intelligible that something other by thinking about it. (I just want to make the point here for future reference that thinking does not have to be abstract. Thinking can experience itself.)

Why bother? Why does it matter? In my opinion it matters because, in not addressing Levin’s question, the intellectual climate that Beethoven found in his own time so unpalatable, and to which he is known to have reacted forcefully (Barthes 1985, Dickinson 1945, James 1960), continues to exert an even stronger influence on modern perception, thinking and knowing. As I commented above, this realisation translates as a rather desolate educational and social future.

The kind of reductionist thinking I mean abhors revelation, and must, if it is consistent, sieve out any revelatory ‘power’ of communication (the mystery) which Levin, Beethoven, and perhaps the majority of musicians claim for it, leading to its annihilation. The resulting void, as I previously discussed, is already apparent as cultural banality or intellectual abstraction. Clearly, the void is a metaphysical one. To recognise it is one thing. My contention, however, is that the implication in modern times that sense-knowledge in and of itself has sufficient ethical substance to fill it is misguided. (I will argue this through in subsequent chapters, leading to a resolution in the denouement.) As the composer, Iannis Xenakis inquires: “Modern knowledge accepts the void, but is it truly a non-Being? Or simply the designation of an unclarified complement?” (1971:203). There is nothing to be gained by prolonging the revelatory power versus conceptual knowledge opposition.

Finally, it matters because it is very tempting to give music a special place among the arts as many scholars - for example, Goethe, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer - have done, not now because of any claimed revelatory power, for that would of course stymie all discourse, but

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9 I refer the reader to the critiques along these lines of Theodor Adorno (1976) and E.C. Merry (1980).
because of what Levin suggests is its “oddness” (1987:175), its meaninglessness, its unfathomable resistance to insertion into any context of relevance whatever.

I think the musician, as an actual human agent, has a vague awareness on some level of this conflict. To allow reductionist thought - and all thought in this instance must be sensed as reductionist - to invade the revelation would be to allow the mystery, regarded implicitly by the musician as somehow sacred, to be exposed. The mystery, then, should remain occluded by virtue of self-imposed censorship. It is better to keep the mystery alive by remaining silent; for to uncover it in any way other than that germane to it, namely, magical non-verbal tone-forms, would imply relinquishing the sacredness, and thus, the marginalised status, which in a perverse way can also be seen as a sort of cultural exclusivity, a mute shibboleth. Although I will address in some detail in a subsequent chapter the devastating consequences of personal marginalisation, I only want to state here that many practitioners of what is widely considered to be the social art are, paradoxically, non-participants in the fullest sense in the general culture in which they make a living. On the contrary, many despise the artistic climate in which they are obliged to pursue their vocation, whether it be the teacher compelled to work in an unsympathetic school environment, or the player whose contractual obligation demands performance of contemporary or populist music not matching his/her definition of art. Many practitioners live a cultural-fringe existence.

There would seem to be no way out of the predicament. If revelation is accepted without further explanation, then music must remain odd, different, sublime, inspiring, and sadly, marginalised. I have already alluded to the dangers inherent in that predicament.

Given this bind, the best music can achieve (in the absence of understanding of its processes) is to make an appeal to the collective ear. It must be made sensible, as if the ‘proof’ of its revolutionary power lies in its sounding, (when, as I have argued on the contrary, revolutionary power, for want of a better term, lies in the soundless dimension.) In my opinion, it is just this sensationalist assumption that has forced music into an ethical wasteland, as it were. There is no mystery. Music has become largely a mere slave of the sensorium, the puffed-up sentiments of jaded appetites, nihilistic utilitarianism, sensory addiction, with the
concomitant loss of the belief - common up to the seventeenth century - in some sort of guiding metempirical order of relevance.

To be mistaken about the provenance of a thing through the abjuration of foundational questions is surely to be mistaken about its result. I argue, contra sensationalism, that the key to music as revelation is not the ear, since it is not the demands of that particular organ that are satisfied by music. In the same way that a person who can read fluently might be totally indifferent to the beauty contained in the collected works of Emerson, Coleridge or Rilke, so music may be manifested in vain for someone who can hear but who is not sufficiently disposed to pursue the mystery of his/her own hearing.

The danger, as I see it, lies in leaving revelation unexplained, for the inwardness on which musical knowing seems to depend, and which is of course anathema to objectivist ways of thinking, must always be seen in strictly rationalist terms as taboo. It cannot be rationalised, which seems inevitably to mean that it can never be objective, and must, by default, be subjective. Gertrude Reif Hughes explains the consequences of that habitual bifurcation:

...binary opposition then produces oversimplified, sentimental claims about the compensatory, even redemptive value of such marginalised ways of knowing as ‘intuitive,’ ‘connected,’ ‘rational,’ or ‘right-brain’ modes, which are often coded female. But merely celebrating such modes without interrogating the fixed opposition that sponsors their status as Other will replicate the marginalisation, not remedy it (1991:45).

Finally, then, music as an inexplicable way of knowing must suffer the undeserved but, so it would seem, inevitable, status of “trivial mystery” (Sullivan 1951:15 my emphasis). Trivial, because those assumptions that characterise the dual outlook of the modern era “...make plausible the idea that [music] is an activity expressive wholly of the peculiarities of the human constitution,” that it is not, or ever was, a revelation of reality. The perspective on the world that describes it as mass, force, location, time-space, particles and determinacy is compelled also to see “the human mind, itself, in some way, the product of these abstractions,”

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10 I will argue the case in Chapter Eleven for a conversion of revelationary knowledge into something offering more certainty of meaning and purpose, and thus, epistemic empowerment for the practitioner.
which must then construct "values expressive of its own constitution" (1951:15 my emphasis). Its own constitution is, of course, always immanent. This, in a nutshell, so to speak, is subjectivism. (In Appendix A, I address the commonly-held view that mind developed independently of matter.) Such ‘values’ are, it is assumed, not an integral part of reality, because they can "throw no light on the constitution of the universe, [and] they point to no universal purpose in things" (1951:15). Subjectivism can say nothing of those values.

Musical response - interpreted always as subjective response and therefore thrust into the category of (variable) taste - cannot be moulded into the aetiological explanations of positivism, and so permits no reduction to its methods or to the norms of statistical procedure. It remains an irritating exception.

Aesthetic Emotion Theory

Although an art that is a trivial mystery because "nothing but an accidental and non-essential appetite appears to be involved" (Sullivan 1951:15) (and from a positivist viewpoint can logically reveal nothing of the nature of reality), appears incompatible with the positivist outlook, it is for all intents and purposes consistent with it. Since it perpetuates the binary opposition it fits conveniently a theory of "aesthetic emotion" (1951:15) which is the corollary of the sensationalist belief.

The recourse to aesthetic emotion may be seen as an attempt to explain subjective responses to art in order to avoid inexplicable revelation. It supposes that out of the entire panoply of feeling experienced by human sensibilities, only one emotion is stimulated by beauty, and by nothing else. The emotion itself, it is supposed, has a sliding scale of intensity up to a maximum - most often analogised by the experience of sexual orgasm - depending on the corresponding degree of perfection of the work of art that stimulated it. "The same value," argues Sullivan, "must be attributed to all ... works [of art] since they are all completely successful in the function of a work of art, which is to excite the aesthetic emotion to its maximum" (1951:16). The perfect work of art might be a symphony, a melody, a poem, a piece of pottery, a flower arrangement or a Turkish rug.
According to Sullivan, this view fails to account for the most important feature of aesthetic reaction, namely, that the response to a work is not always of the same kind. Not only is the classification of art into perfect and imperfect inadequate, but it would be absurd to assume that the difference between, say, a Bach cello suite and a tapestry consists only in a specific emotion being more or less excited, whether both works possess the quality of beauty or not.

Interestingly, Sullivan argues that this belief “derives all its plausibility merely from the poverty of language” (1951:16). He asserts that language is an historical accident, and is deficient in names for a whole range of subjective states, and consequently, in labels for the imputed properties of objects and events by which those states are provoked. Even such words as ‘love’ and ‘hate,’ Sullivan continues:

dealing with emotions to which mankind has always paid great attention, are merely portmanteau words. Within their meanings are not only differences of degree, but differences of kind. To conclude, because the word ‘beauty’ exists almost in isolation, that it refers to some definite quality of objects, or that it is descriptive of some one subjective state, is to mistake a deficiency in language for a key to truth (1951:16-17).

The recourse to aesthetic emotion is clearly an attempt, through the use of language, to confer objective credibility on subjective response. I feel compelled to add here that, although I endorse Sullivan’s polemic on reductionist aesthetics, I cannot agree with his assertion that language is an historical accident. That naming has become nominalism does not make language an accident. That speech has become a prosaic transaction, meaning that it is today an intelligible structure of symbols referring to and communicating the properties of external things, accounts for its paucity of words to describe subjective states. As I contended above, musical utterance is not an expression of a me-world relation.

For my purposes the salient question is this: If language is poor in names for subjective states, why does the musician employ musical forms rather than words as a means of expressing those states? Here I think is the birth of the confusion in our thinking about music, and the origin of the predicament. How often one hears it said that music is the expression of
human emotions. As Edwards says: “Art is an expression of human feeling’ is a stock formula, and most students of art respond to it at once” (1972:46). This formula, however, assumes to begin with that aesthetic passion (which, recall, I described as a different order of knowing altogether) is synonymous with ‘subjective states,’ thereby thinking out of, and in effect, perpetuating the subject-object dichotomy. Dualistic thinking - whether it aligns itself with objectivity or subjectivity - presupposes that subjective states cannot be at the same time objective states. It is under the authority of this ready-made binary opposition, perpetuated since the seventeenth century, that the accepted notion prevails that what is not expressive must necessarily be cold and intellectual. I have argued in response that binary opposition is a habit of thought, that there are historical reasons for its appearance as a way of observing and thinking, and, moreover, that subject and object can be coalescent.

The Presumption of Self-Expression

I am concerned here to establish how the predicament described above grew out of confused thought and dialogue, the outcome of which I believe is the simplistic epistemological position that all musical expression is subjective, meaning emphatically, not objective. This position gives credence to the reasoning that since music is subjective, and since subjectivity is personal, all musical expression, then, must be self-expression. This, I think, is an erroneous syllogism which, in turn, is predicated on the unexamined metaphysical notion that it is not the body that is the instrument of expression, but the consciousness of its owner. I do not reject any merit there may be in the notion of consciousness as instrument, but rather, I ask that if it is true, why does formal curriculum not reflect it? If it did, would not we reasonably expect to see some sort of systematic consciousness training or ‘tuning’ of the instrument of expression in courses of instruction? Might we not even expect it to be the central pillar of curriculum?

We cannot continue to have it both ways. If self is both the instrument and content of expression, then for this self not to have acquired intimate knowledge of the very instrument by or through which it is itself expressed seems to me an untenable position.

This contradiction prompts an additional thought. I wonder if there is a begrudging and secretly-held belief in the minds of many professional musicians and educators that there is
something in the notion of music as expression of self that does not quite ring true. If so, why can it not be publicly acknowledged? Could it be that such an admission might not fit the conceptual theorising of much educational thought, thereby excluding music as a respectable academic pursuit?

If it is true that expression in music is also expression of self, then it must be agreed that what is expressed is a reflection of the sort of self being expressed. To reason one step further, it might even be surmised that, in the absence of anything other than a superficial knowledge of itself, this might well be a proud, defiant, vainglorious, cynical, mercenary, instinctive or amoral self. Clearly, music transmits qualities beyond the personal.

It would of course be wrong-headed to argue that musical expression is not in some way self-expression, but I argue that unbiased observation of experience shows that it is more than this. Because there is, or can be, something in the act of expression of the nature of self-sacrifice, it could more properly be called self-less expression. I argue, moreover, that unless that expression is in some degree selfless, it is not music. To go on insisting that music is an expression of human emotion, of the self, with no knowledge of who or what this self is, together with the emotion it is purported to express, makes music no better than a warm bed or a good meal. For the majority of practitioners, music is clearly more important than this.

As I have already observed, music can erase the musician’s identity and name. In the act of utterance (s)he forgets him/herself. The assertion, then, that music is self-expression already assumes something internal that externalises itself. To conceive of music as the expression of self is to attribute to it a rather superficial existence by recourse to an unknown interiority. The main point I wish to make is that, if music were entirely about self-expression and emotional content, nothing would be expressed about music itself, its idea, the unlimited possibilities and enduring fullness of its own content. What has been missed is that the feeling element of intentionality has a transcendent function. Feeling is not only personal. If it were, it would feel only itself.
Summary

In this chapter I have discussed how the positivist assumptions that typify the objectivist outlook - only very recently being subjected to critical re-appraisal - are to be found also in modern aesthetics, surprisingly, as subjectivist assertions. These assumptions are symptomatic of a dual perspective that cannot penetrate the mystery of music on its own terms. (I discussed in Chapter Three how I had to admit to my own futile attempts in that regard.) Foundational questions cannot be answered, indeed, cannot even be posed with the paradigmatic limitations of positivist orthodoxy and its explanatory framework; nor can the philosophical predicament posed by the binary opposition of objectivist and subjectivist positions be resolved by stubborn recourse to either. The student's dilemma, uncertain purpose, is only perpetuated because the fundamental significance of being musical is obscured by conceptual opacity. I will argue in subsequent discussion that the nature of the dilemma is ethical.
CHAPTER SEVEN

IMPLICATIONS OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL OMISSION FOR THE PURSUIT OF MASTERY AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF

Introduction

So far, I have discussed the gap between the theoretical and the sublime. In epistemological terms, the distance between what we know about music in theory and what we know about its provenance, or how it comes to be, may be regarded as the difference in our understanding between the theoretical and the sublime. Another way of saying this is that the 'big' questions reside in the space between what we know about music and what we merely infer from what we know, but that the space is distinguished by our reluctance to engage with it. I have discussed how that space has been penetrated by positivist-literalist-sensationalist-materialist, and added to that, subjectivist, assumptions that provide no real foundation from which to evaluate musical experience and from which to begin to make the act of musical utterance intelligible. On the contrary, they reduce a mystery to an explanation by perpetuating the error that perception is made up of sensations. The whole edifice of positivism is implicit in the assumption that perception can be analysed into primary sensations. I have argued that perception is in large part extra-sensory, and that it is tied up with the cognition of potent spaces that are not sense-perceptible.

In this chapter I will examine the gap separating the operational and the sublime. Together with the theoretical gap, it is indicative of the epistemological omission, awareness of which could make for intelligibility of the act of musical utterance.

By way of preparing the discussion, I suggest that the notion of the potent space is applicable also to the executory act. I have discussed that the musical resides largely in productive spaces, those intervals of measure between audible events. At the same time there is a human proclivity to fill spaces because they are not cognised as such; rather, they are sensed in some way as representing the uncreated and are thus seen as abhorrent. The quality of

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betweenness is not grasped as being essential in the appearance of sense-perceptible objects or events. Rather, there is a compulsion to narrow the spaces (perhaps in the need for nearness or intimacy) to the point where they become object-like, converted into plenum, matter, 'real' sensual objects. However, an interval cannot be real in this objective sense because it is not an object. It is a movement (of consciousness). There is no object called movement. Because it is in its essence absent, and therefore not apprehended sensually, the interval is a no-thing. However, because it is misapprehended as nothing, there is a compulsion to transform the nothing into something, to lend to it substantial existence.

We seem to be unaware that these very intervals are created by us in the first place by our own configuring activity. They must, however, exist as possibility prior to their employment. Our knowledge, distinguished from our awareness of them, is precognitive and pre-conscious. What is lacking, then, is first, awareness of the quality of intervalness or measure, and second, an adequate concept for it.

Importantly, the omission, the space of unknowing, if I may call it that, cannot be accounted for either in objectivist or subjectivist terms. Ultimately, neither suffices to illuminate the significance of the act of musical utterance to human being in the world. To take refuge in silence is no solution to the problem, for silence itself is part of the problem.

I have emphasised the word 'act' for the reason that music, like all art, is about making, constructing, doing. The musician's aim is to attain a level of executory mastery that facilitates the doing at a high level of production. If the doing is uninformed by any frame of reference, any overarching principle that might confer meaning on the masterful act, are there not significant consequences for the master? What if there is no concept of measure to inform the doing?

The popular notion of mastery consists in the executant controlling the tool of production; that is to say, the emphasis is placed on the skill with which the executant produces the tones, the heard events. What is not seen is that these audible events are produced to serve a temporal event that is, in essence, spatial. The unnoticed polarity of the sensory and the

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extra-sensory, which persists even in this fundamental act of production, should give some idea of the depth of the dilemma faced by the student who is working towards the goal of mastery.

My first task in this chapter will be to argue that the epistemological gap in our knowledge between what we know and what we do not know, and also in the correlative sense of lack of awareness of the potency of intervalness, have left music without a concept, by which I mean a vital picture of what measure is, how it comes to be and what its significance is for the attainment of selfhood. I will not in this chapter embark on sustained and detailed discussion of that concept itself, except that in order to make my discussion comprehensible I will need to make allusions to its function as measure. Rather, my commentary will focus on what the consequences of the absence of a concept might be for a person in the pursuit of musical mastery, and how awareness of that absent knowledge can serve self-knowledge. There are consequences for the individual insofar as Western education conducts instruction "... as though musical knowledge can be acquired primarily by internalizing a set of task-performance skills" (Keane 1982:327). If this is the process by which we ... learn music," Keane continues, "... the rigidity of traditional music instruction with its complete disregard for personal exploration and its dogmatic clinging to a skill-development basis for musical comprehension actually impedes the development of some kinds of experiential musical knowledge" (1982:327-328).

The discussion takes its cue from the previously discussed leaning of the musician towards subjectivity, or the notion of music as self-expression, which I suggested has in turn emerged as a result of the instinctive rejection of analytical and seemingly objectivist approaches to musical productivity. It is because only an objectivist model is presented in formal curriculum that students turn to subjectivity. I see the persistence of this dichotomy as itself a lingering legacy of positivist thought.

My response to subjectivist notions has been to assert that musical expression is in some degree self-less expression. The basis for so arguing is the observation that musical utterance in some way actually erases the self because it is sensed by the musician to be ultimately more important than the self. The self, then, is of little interest. That observation poses an obvious anomaly. If music is conceived as self-expression, and by popular association, the expression
of human emotion, would not mastery consist in gaining intimate knowledge of who or what that self is? If so, how is that knowledge possible if the very self being referred to is extinguished during the act of expression. I will argue that the solution to the dilemma - and it is an ethical one - is to know who that self is. But this knowledge is dependent on appreciating the distinction between the immanent and transcendent functions of intentionality. Not to grasp the difference as it pertains to the act of production is to tread a path of uncertain purpose.

These two concerns, then, the absence of an adequate concept for music, and its connection with the pursuit of mastery, specifically as it concerns the development of a sense of self, comprise the basis of the discussion in this chapter.

**Music Without a Concept**

I discussed in Chapter Six the problems intrinsic to discourse about music. It is the case that our ordinary shared concepts are often too enervated to express what we want to say about what we do musically. On the other hand, the extent to which musical experience is influenced by the concepts we form about it, and the words we use to convey those concepts is rarely acknowledged. If, as I believe, conceptual muddle can diminish our ability to think into the musical deed, it is necessary for the purpose of epistemic awareness to interrogate familiar concepts whose contours are poorly delineated. This will allow us to see how common concepts are made homogeneous and, eventually redundant, as a result of the closure of conceptual space.

What is meant, for example, when it is said of somebody that (s)he is ‘musical?’ What particular quality or qualities must a person demonstrate to attract the appellation, ‘musical?’ Is it not in the first instance executory skill? Such a person knows his/her way around the instrument or voice. Can it be said, then, of somebody who is not an executant, that (s)he is not musical? Similarly, is somebody who is born mute unmusical?

I argue that the adjective ‘musical’ has lost its meaning and functions merely as a convenient rhetorical device. Its noun, ‘music’, too, is a sort of shorthand, a verbal signpost.

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1. I will argue below that there is a vital distinction to be made between musical talent and facility, or the means of expression. In order to avoid a lengthy digression here I will assume that difference for the moment.
As an abstract noun, it is a statement about, rather than a concentration of, reality. The word is not what music is; it is not correlative to the actual experience.

Further, I cannot recall in my education or in my professional life ever having heard the active verb for music: musing. In the English language at least, it has long since disappeared from the pedagogical lexicon. We speak, instead, of 'making music.' A sculptor sculpts, a painter paints, an actor acts, but a musician makes music.

There is a curious disjunction between the intention and the outcome. Does the exclusion of the verb, to muse, from musical discourse suggest that its conceptual meaning is too esoteric to be taken seriously, or that its cognitive function is lodged somewhere in the (presumably) unobservable unconscious, and is therefore too subjective to be considered a valid way of knowing?

What is certain is that the logico-linguistic representation is not adequate to the musical construction. Language overruns the fact of musical experience, and so, misrepresents it. I believe there is no longer any conception of what music really is. There is no concept for music.

I have argued that positivism has found this gap. An experience needs a space to run its course. This space can be closed by inadequate concepts. If a troublesome concept, or, in this case, a non-concept, cannot be accounted for in terms of a limited empiricist ideology and concomitant verbal explanation, its fate seems to be elimination from the field of inquiry altogether, in which case, various theories must be ‘thought up’ which then serve the reductionist purpose of filling the void. In the terms of the positivist paradigm, inherited by the discipline of music, there is a naive belief that the theory, whether the theory of acoustics, the

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2 Like the concept of musica humana, ‘musing’ is figurative language, which, except for its use in poetry has all but vanished from modern English (Barfield 1963). This in itself suggests a historicity of language and a correlative historicity of mind. We cannot escape the observation that many of the words in our language were once used differently according to the perspective taken by humanity. This is the case especially prior to the scientific revolution. To ignore this is to deliberately shut our ears to history. As Barfield writes: “... the meanings of nearly all words are bursting with history,” and, he continues, “stiff with assumptions” (1963:105).

3 For the musician - and I include those who are not accomplished executants - the experience is self-evident and requires no further proof. The mathematical laws presupposing and informing the production are true because their denial would be logically impossible.
theory of physiology, the theory of aesthetics, the theory of harmony, of musical grammar, of
the harmonic series, of analysis, and so on, can somehow be connected with the experience, and
that the resulting synthesis can then pass for an explanation of music. The abundance of
theoretical knowledge, however, itself founded on sensory experience, is not balanced by any
corresponding increase in extra-sensory knowledge. Merely by using the word ‘music,’ we
take over all the assumptions of positivism, precisely because of the absence of a vital concept.
The tacit assumptions we form about things are embedded in everyday speech and for this
reason are difficult to avoid.

*The Confusion Generated by the Absence of a Concept*

In an age when humanity has devised ways to observe, analyse and explain the most
complex phenomena, I find the absence of a concept for music yet another anomaly. In order
to arrive at an explanation for it, I will briefly retrace the confusion it has generated.

First, my epistemological deliberation so far has focussed almost exclusively on the
interval. My rationale is that it is not noticed by music education that the (inaudible) musical
element, distinguished from the (audible) acoustic element, resides there. I have not yet
addressed the audible counterpart of the interval, namely, tone, and the properties of the tones
bounding the interval, except to point out that these audible elements of music conform to
physical laws. That they are measurable is the cause of a great deal of confusion about the
concepts ‘sound’ and ‘tone.’ The scientific explanation for tone is something along the lines of
force being applied to an inert body, the resulting vibrations causing longitudinal waves in the
air. But this is tone no longer spoken of in terms of its human experience. It is, rather, a
ready-made explanation inferred from scientific measurement. It is not a concept for tone at
all. Most students, however, distinguish between tone and sound by associating the former

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4 What has been most obvious from my asking students to explain tone is their proclivity to assume that it is an external phenomenon and that the inference of externalisation, while it accommodates the self, automatically excludes the noetic in the definition. Conceptual thought seems to involve the assumption of spatial extension insofar as tone has to be actually produced to be considered ‘real.’
with the word ‘colour’ (*Klangfarbe*). This visual analogue, too, is inadequate. Tone is an event in its own right, and not a symbol for something else.

Neither performer nor auditor listens to music with an awareness of wave-forms or any other physical law for that matter. Even if it were possible to apprehend in this manner, it could be achieved only if the listener were disengaged from the experience that is otherwise the deciding factor in an authentic encounter with music. Acoustic explanations, then, are strictly materialistic. What they explain is sound, not tone. The properties of *sound* are measurable, whether generated by a human voice, instrument, or machine. The sound, then, might be envisaged as the body of the tone, as the water is the substance of the wave-form that generates it but is not the wave. Tone is not the sound of it. Tone is not measurable; for tone is an idea. (Although I risk pre-empting my subsequent conclusions, I wish to assert in advance that it is essential for epistemological purposes not to confuse the entelechy of a thing with its physical dimensions, a distinction I will address in depth in subsequent chapters.)

Ong writes insightfully about this confusion: “We are accustomed to spatialise [tone] as we are to spatialising time. Our physics treats [tone] in terms of space, measuring it in waves and wave ‘lengths’ and representing it by ... oscillographic patterns” (1981:44). As I stated above, these patterns are not tone. “Although something of what happens when a [tone] occurs can be thus represented, [tone] itself in its full existential actuality cannot’ (1981:44). Tone occurs only because of its “direct involvement in time,..., which measurement and spatial patterns do not entail. Strange though it seems to us, [tone] in its own actuality cannot be measured. Its reality eludes diagrammatic representation” (1981:44). The point here is that ease of recourse to materialistic explanations through visual-spatial representation again

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5 These answers to the question, ‘What is tone?’ were obtained from a class of postgraduate students: “A quality of sound that best places the performer of, or listener to, a particular musical instrument, playing in a particular style.” “The subjective interpretation the individual makes of sounds.” “Sound quality and shape.” “The clarity of sound.” “A quality of sound that can’t be verbalised.” “The defining characteristics of a musical sound.” “The shape and colour of a musical sound.”

6 I have bracketed the word ‘tone’ in Ong’s writing for the reason that he uses the word ‘sound.’ Although I make the distinction between the two, the tenor of Ong’s message is nevertheless clear.
induces a sort of epistemic complacency that rules out the need to ask and be guided by ontological questions.  

To derive a concept of music from the physical realm, then, insofar as that concept is incomplete, is obviously inconsistent with the musical experience. Indeed, I would go one step further and argue that for the listener, music is alive precisely when it is not functioning solely in accordance with the laws of acoustics, but rather, when it is influenced by other ontological factors which save it from the materialistic fate it would undergo if it were. It is more accurate to say, I think, that the flow of forces into the listener’s physical organism from without is met by another flow of forces from within, and that in this meeting sound is transfigured into tone. The physical laws die and re-sound on another level. I do not hear 200 vibrations per second; I hear tone.

Second, when a phenomenon fails to explain itself physically, and, as I have already discussed, resists the verbalisation appurtenant to physicality, the alternative approach is to direct attention to the physiology of the (hearing) subject, presumably because this is observable. But such investigation also proves fruitless, although this is rarely admitted, as physicist and formulator of the quantum, Erwin Schrödinger, explains:

Science, we believe, can, in principle, describe in full detail all that happens in ... our sensorium and 'motorium' from the moment the waves of compression and dilation reach our ear to the moment when certain glands secrete a salty fluid that emerges from our eyes. But of the feelings of delight and sorrow that accompany the process science is completely ignorant - and therefore reticent (1996:97).

We do not explain the experience of music by tracing neural pathways. As I commented above, the explanations of neuroscience rely on a notion of the human subject as a function;

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7 The reason why the question, ‘What is tone?’ is difficult to answer is that the question itself is asked from a dual perspective, in which the subject and object are conceived as being antecedent to, and independent of, cognition. It is not seen that tone exists within a contextual totality and only has meaning within that context, namely, intervalness. There is no tone-on-its-own experience. As soon as we say, 'I hear a tone,' we assume that an entity called 'I' and an entity called 'tone' exist independently of each other, which are subsequently joined together in some way. (In language that joining function is performed by the verb.) In accordance with Steiner, Bortoft makes the point that the mistake “… is the assumption that there is such an I-entity preceding cognition. Such an ‘entity’ is in fact the self-consciousness, or I-consciousness, which arises as a result of the process of cognitive perception” (1996:354).
that the mind is what the brain does. Mind is conceived to be an epiphenomenon of the (individualised) brain. Furthermore, all such approaches begin with isolation of the phenomenon, or parts of it, a practice analagised pithily by Emerson as “hunting for life in graveyards” (1907:592).

Nevertheless, these positivist explanations have become a habit of thought in the ordinary mind, to the extent that, for many, music is no longer experienced, but merely observed. There is no doubt that the mechanistic conception, whether psychological or physiological, carries a lot of weight. Many puzzles of the physical world have been solved in this manner. However, as Davy argues, “... the ordinary man is inclined to suppose that it must be right also in its wider interpretations” (1978:19). He asserts, moreover, that ordinary experience provides no foundation for questioning it. Its allure lies in the fact that it is convincing.

It is not obvious, then, that although music is made specifically by human beings, its essential constituents, tone and interval have an additional significance beyond that specificity independent of the physical world and the realm of sense. That, in short, is its mystery. I have suggested that the reason it is not obvious is that although most are aware of having the experience, few revere it sufficiently to examine it and in this way elevate it to the level of cognitive awareness.

Third, although there has been in recent decades a growing sense that there is something amiss in reductionist practices - which are in essence linguistic - the reaction against them as it pertains to music tends to fall into three distinct categories, all nevertheless motivated by the same concern. I will discuss them here.

First, there is the popular claim for music as a ‘universal language’. Again, the cliché tells us nothing about music, or language for that matter. Does it imply that music shares with language the sole purpose of communication? That music behaves like a language does not mean that it is one. I argue that music’s provenance is not communicative, but expressive.  

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8 I discussed in Chapter One how music can be said to comprise only two essentials, namely, tones and the spaces between, regardless of how these are systemically, historically or culturally organised.

9 I will argue in a later chapter that musical utterance was the tonal progenitor of speech in human evolution and that its content was not conceptual.
(The question of what it expresses remains for the moment unanswered.) It is perhaps more correct to say that music (in its essential constituents of interval and tone) is a human discovery of archetypal significance which, like speech, accepts any colour (again the visual analogue) imposed on it, but which, unlike speech, will not accept any dialect. It remains ‘true to form.’

The clue to the difference between language and music lies in the word ‘tone.’ I see the pure tone in vowel formation as protomusical activity before it solidifies as speech-forms in conjoining with consonants. (It is the consonants, not the vowels, that undergo change in speech, as exemplified in the Hebrew language, in which there are no written symbols for the vowels; they are passed on from one generation to the next.) I regard the phonemes of speech as metaphysical archetypes. The consonants are an expression of the substance, the physicality of things, while the vowels, which are extendable in their enunciation, thus making song possible, are more ethereal and expressive of the qualities (not the substances) of airiness and fluidity, that is, the invisible, the un-formed.

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10 I have tested this distinction in classes by asking the participants, working in pairs, to undertake the following experiment: One participant in each pair will state his/her given name, including in the tone of voice a particular quality of his/her persona, which might be vanity, childlikeness, pride, anger, resentment, coyness or some other. I then ask the same participants to sing their names, and to retain the same personal quality. They find this far more difficult. Finally, I ask that they sing the name with attention focussed entirely on the quality of tone, an act, which, of necessity, excludes the personal quality. The greater the attention given to musical (toneful) utterance, the more difficult it is to include the self. In giving oneself over to qualitative utterance in tone, the self is by degrees actually extinguished. At every stage, the second participant in each pair will gesture back to the utterer the effect of the utterance. The gesturer provides a living mirror of the utterer and objective verification of the experience. I am also inclined to the belief that the more musical an utterance becomes, the more difficult it is to identify the singer (given a reasonable singing voice) by audition alone. The purer the tone, the less individual it becomes, suggesting that it is closer to an archetype. (There is a method of therapeutic singing known as The School of Uncovering the Voice, developed by the Swedish soprano, Valborg Werbeck-Svärdström (1985), and based on this very idea of the archetypal voice and the archetypal tone. See Bibliography for details.)

11 It is impossible to articulate this experiential distinction in words. I can, however, give some indication of the difference in terms of its effect. During the research tenure, I conducted two four-day intensives in collaboration with a drama colleague for students undergoing training in Philophonetics counselling. The only instrument of expression used throughout was the voice. The drama component consisted largely of exploration of the ‘feelings’ associated with the utterance of consonants, while in the music sessions the students explored the qualities in the vowels, the basis of song. The class was divided into two groups, one beginning each day with drama, the other with music. The groups changed curriculum after the lunch break. The class that came to music in the afternoon, having experienced three hours of intense consonant work told me both verbally and in gesture that they felt bruised, heavy, gravitational, ‘punch-drunk.’ After three hours of work with vowels they ‘floated out the door.’ In my exploration I have found that intensive sounding of vowels with attention focussed on the pictures emerging from their sounding, places the sounder in a weightless space, as if outside the body. For this reason, I have taken to concluding a session with the sounding of consonants in order to ‘ground’ or make present the student prior to the drive home.
For a consonant to be uttered, something has to be closed off, locked in the body. (This is particularly noticeable with the ‘harder’ consonants g, k, d and t. Notice how far back in the throat g is compared with p.) Consonants sculpt, give shape. The vowels are less constricted, less dense, than consonants. They float, as if otherworldly, muse-ical. What is there in them to communicate if not that otherworldliness? If they are communicating (as vowels and not words), their content is not conceptual because not strictly verbal.

*Qualitative* reality is frozen into fixed concepts by *modern* language and is therefore not expressible in speech-forms, unless they are poetic metaphor, which functions precisely by *destroying* conceptual thought. Although discursive activity is entirely dependent on human *self*-consciousness, music can only *be* music in the true sense when it is expressing archetypes,\(^\text{12}\) that is, when consciousness is to some extent *not* consciousness of self, thereby allowing the ‘wisdom’ of the vowel to speak for itself.

A word can have a lexical meaning in its own right, whereas a single tone on its own is not music. A tone can be ‘explained’ only in terms of the tone that preceded it, which may very well be the *same* phoneme (vowel).

It is just because music is *not* a language that it has the power to communicate truths that are inexpressible by any other means. Positivism has not grasped this distinction.

The second alternative, as I have suggested, is recourse to the view of music as the expression of self, of human *emotions*. Is the sounding itself the *decisive* element in music? If music is conceived to be the expression of a nebulous inner realm, it is a one-way expression, an uninformed out-forming. If that *directionality* is music itself, then the nature of music can never be other than the expression of mortality, of the terrestrial citizen, a concept, which, as I will show below, would have been anathema to earlier civilisations.

This needs clarification. ‘Interior’ and ‘exterior’ are themselves concepts borrowed from the visual, spatial realm, which suggests that when we talk about utterance we cannot avoid

\(^{12}\) I do not mean archetypes in the Jungian sense of symbols, sounds reduced to images. The *sounds* of speech are not semblance; they are real here-and-now events. As such, they can provide a direct route to actuality, and since they happen *now*, to simultaneity and presentness.
thinking of it in association with visual permanence. Ong writes about this: “One thinks of Bergson’s misgivings in Time and Free Will about the tendency of the past few centuries to overspatialise the universe so that everything is reduced to models picturable in space, and what is unpicturable (‘unimaginable’ is often the term invoked) is discarded as impossible or unreal” (1981:7). (I have already discussed that, concomitant with the arrival of object-centred consciousness and the demise of correlative spaces comes the assumption of permanence, which means independence of the engagement with music in time, its native medium of appearance.)

Interiority is an intensive, not extensive dimension of experience. I am not at all denying that musical expression is expression of an inner realm, and that to express that content is not to tell something of that realm. Only I want to be clear (by pointing to the tendency to spatialisation) what is meant by it. If we persist with the imagery provoked by the common words we use, we risk getting the wrong concepts. The word ‘expression’ gives every suggestion of an exteriorisation of inner content, rather as toothpaste might be squeezed from a tube. The metaphor (the ‘expression’ of emotions, inner content) conceals that the relation is actually one of intension, that is, from interior to interior as interiors and not an extensive projection from interior to exterior. As Ong argues: “To exteriorise oneself without interiorisation is to devote oneself to things, which alone are not satisfying” (1981:125). Communication with another through voice is to join his/her interior through my own. This principle holds good even in the inorganic realm, where one instrument can make another vibrate internally by sympathetic resonance. The instrument vibrating reveals its inwardness. There is a kind of community of intension even here. Only insofar as the human has interiority can (s)he relate to others, who are also interiors.

“It would appear,” says Ong, “that precisely because sound is so interiorising and thus exploitable by man at depths unknown to less interiorised creatures, it implements socialisation or even forces it as nothing else can” (1981:124 my emphasis). It should be grasped, then, that when we use these spatial terms, we can miss the interior to interior relation. This relation is intensive; it is one of dynamic depth, not spatial depth, which is why I italicised ‘depths unknown’ in the quotation above. Indeed it is not a spatial concept at all. This is not a sensory phenomenon I am speaking about. If the expression is from interior to interior, it suggests that
I, the expresser, am present in the interior of another who has temporarily surrendered his/her own interiority to allow mine to be present. This mystery, I suggest, is beyond ordinary concepts, which are possible only by way of extensive definition. (I will discuss this further in Chapter Thirteen.)

Finally - and this is the third body of complaint - there has been of late a growing body of literature that resorts to a semi-mystical exegesis of music. It advocates a return to a musical past through contemplation of Pythagorean number theory, complementary series and hermetic diagrams and symbols.13 (I discussed in Chapter Three my concern that this form of symbolism is too abstract for the modern mind.) Alternatively, there are the claims of New Age philosophies which, in their practical application, propound a therapeutic benefit through involvement in African drumming, chanting, totemic dancing and the like, all of which serve the well-intentioned though, in my view, dangerous, goal of losing oneself cathartically in the event. When it is all over, one is still none the wiser about how the catharsis was achieved.14

The Problem of Operationalism

Nothing of what I have so far discussed is an adequate concept of what music is. If music is without a concept, is it not vulnerable to other influences which, if left to their own devices, would insist on conceptualising it for us? This question prepares the way for discussion of what I believe to be the current problem, namely, that what we understand now as concept is most often synonymous with the development of positivist method, that is, behaviourism in the social sciences and operationalism in the physical sciences. The feature common to both is what Herbert Marcuse calls “a total empiricism in the treatment of concepts; their meaning is restricted to the representation of particular operations and behaviour” (1972:27). (What is commonly regarded as a concept is not a concept at all, but rather, a form of habitual (spatial)

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13 See, for example, Cousto (1987); Crandall (1986); Goldman, (1992); McClellan (1988); Ruland (1992) and Stewart (1987).

14 That music does possess this power should not be overlooked, as Storr explains: “There can be no doubt that, by heightening crowd emotions and by ensuring that those emotions peak together rather than separately, music can powerfully contribute to the loss of critical judgement, the blind surrender to the feelings of the moment, which is so dangerously characteristic of crowd behaviour” (1992:46). But if music can induce such radical changes in consciousness, can it not be argued that whatever it is in music that brings about those changes is really a freeing-up or mobilising of capacities that are already present in consciousness?
recognition which, in effect, veils the real concept, the free, fluid and wordless counterpart of the percept, and which, together with the percept, comprises the complete reality.

Significantly, Marcuse describes the operational viewpoint as “one dimensional thought” (1972:27), a way of observing which, he asserts, obscures the way to ‘real knowledge’, if by the latter term is meant understanding “the relationship between what you know and what you do” (Saul 1997:5). Not understanding that relation is, in essence, the epistemological problem. The discontinuity of the two constitutes the dilemma, the result of which, as I have argued, is uncertain purpose. Operationalism, Marcuse goes on, is a habit of thought that becomes the “established universe of discourse and action, needs and aspirations” (1972:26-27). This is another way of saying that an ideology can be swallowed by a dominant quantitative system, whereby it then becomes the dominant ideology, in this case operationalism. The result is that all concepts are interpreted in terms of their quantitative extensions. Ideology is absorbed into reality.  

Marcuse argues that when operational thought becomes the ‘established universe,’ its influence is felt in every sphere. “The radical empiricist onslaught” he continues, “thus provides the methodological justification for the debunking” of the mind, a positivism, which, “in its denial of the transcending elements of Reason, forms the academic counterpart of the socially required behaviour” (1972:25).

Marcuse’s text, it is true, is not recent. I am also aware that operationalism is no longer a dominant formal theory. Despite this, I find Marcuse’s thesis compelling in its implications for musical production, which, recall is doing. There is a certain premature resolution associated with the sort of perspective that demands empirical verification as proof that something is, rather than with considering it fruitful to grapple with perplexity. As I intend to show, the operation has a profound bearing on musical thought and action, and by implication, on my project; for I am convinced that operationalism - another term might be automatism - when contrasted with earlier perspectives, that is, when viewed historically, is a prominent tendency.

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15 I will argue subsequently that this state of affairs is a complete reversal of that predominant in the Greek civilisation.

16 I cannot resist, as a topical example, the selling-out of the dynamism of civilised development once aspired to, and represented by, Australian universities to corporatist ideology and associated administrative practices.
in human behaviour. I mean this in the sense that musical utterance is achieved automatically because it is informed by given or revelatory knowledge, that is to say, pre-cognitive, and therefore, unconscious knowledge. Behind it is the principle of mechanism, meaning that an original experience (yet to be defined) cannot be repeated without losing its meaning. (I presented this Platonic distinction in Chapter Three.)

To bring his point home, Marcuse cites a much earlier text, The Logic of Modern Physics (1928) by physicist P.W. Bridgman.\(^{17}\) In my view, Bridgman’s message is as fresh now as it was in 1928:

\[\text{We evidently know what we mean by length if we can tell what the length of any and every object is, and for the physicist nothing more is required. To find the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which length is measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves as much and nothing more than the set of operations by which length is determined. In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations (1972:24-25).}\]

Bridgman is saying that we theorise or abstract ‘length’ rather than bother to cognise it. His statement accords with my earlier observation that interval recognition in aural training is achieved in just such an abstract manner, though without the use of purpose-designed measuring instruments. Bridgman concludes:

\[\text{To adopt the operational point of view involves much more than a mere restriction of the sense in which we understand ‘concept’, but means a far-reaching change in all our habits of thought, in that we shall no longer permit ourselves to use as tools in our thinking concepts of which we cannot give an adequate account in terms of operations (1972:25 my emphasis).}\]

I regard the thinking of modernity as so vorticised by the measurable as physical evidence that it cannot see that its own operation negates the very concept of measure.\(^{18}\) As Heidegger

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\(^{17}\) I have not been able to acquire a copy of Bridgman’s text.

\(^{18}\) Again, I ask the reader to bear in mind that my discussion of measure in Chapter Four involved establishing it not only as a musical first principle, but as an extra-sensory phenomenon, and is accordingly resistant to precise logico-linguistic definition. It is in some way central to the very concept of musical knowing. To deal with it in
sees it: “We can reckon with numbers - but not with the nature of number” (1975:224). Measuring, as it is usually conceived, that is, when “something unknown is stepped off and thus made known, and so is confined within a quantity and order which can always be determined at a glance” (1975:224) does not teach us anything of the nature of measure. Consider, too, Emerson’s quaint retort: “The senses imprison us, and we help them with meters as limitary - with a pair of scales and a foot-rule and a clock” (1907:598).

Music and Operationalism

The reader may have guessed where I am heading. By returning to my statement that musicality is likely to be gauged by a demonstration of executory skill, it will be seen why there is today no concept for music. It is a deflating irony that musical utterance, if it is about anything, is about operation, repetitive action, unreflective doing. In that it is physical production, it is strictly operational. It is about number and measure as Pythagoras, Plato, Didymus, Zarlino, Vincenzo Galilei, Kircher, Fludd, Kepler, Newton and Leibnitz affirmed. The major insight here is that it is the skill of execution, by way of (pre-cognitive) knowledge of number and measure, that is the primary source of artistic delight for the executant today. (I will argue later that this has not always been the case.) Doing overruns awareness.

Significantly, the most operational things are the most elusive to conceptualisation. Operationalism demonstrates what a thing does, not what or how it is. As operation, music could not be more ordinary, and yet, (when raised to thinking) more profound. Operationalism does. Doing equals making. We make music. In making, knowledge is converted into action, and this is where the process stops. It is not reciprocal. To put it otherwise, doing music does not lead over to contemplation of it. To reflect on measure in our time is to be doing mathematics or philosophy, not music. In Greek times and well into the Middle Ages the three were inseparable.

It is for this reason, I believe, that the concepts of music as I described them at the beginning of this chapter have been developed entirely in mundane terms. Music’s analyses

detail here would entail a lengthy digression. Rather, I have held it in reserve for extended examination in Chapter Eight.
and descriptions are unfortunately generated out of an ideology of product, which, in my opinion, is not conducive to understanding the *phenomenon*, which, to use Steiner’s term, is the “forming of itself in accordance with itself” (1988c:70). “After all,” argues Douglas Sloan, “pure operationalism, in the strict sense, says nothing about anything; it only operates” (1991:34). Moreover, to “restrict knowledge to the purely operational begs the question even of how any communication of nonoperational meanings is possible” (1991:34). It is that question that has gone begging since the scientific revolution, and that has resulted, in my opinion, in the loss of music’s mystery status.

In our culture, the operation is so highly valued that in one-sidedly cultivating the doing, the making, we have diminished all sense of music’s meaning. In terms of historical consciousness, operationalism has not only erased all trace of meaning with regard to the act of musical production, but has supplanted the whole developmental concept of human being with notions of optimum executory efficiency. Louis Dupré attributes this to the denial in our time of the “... passive side of selfhood: its dependence and insufficiency” (1976:viii). Or, as William Lynch writes: “We are often forced by our culture to deny dependence, passivity, the wish and *ability* to receive” (1965:236 my emphasis). It is for this reason, the displacement of contemplation by operation, that music as art is not taught *artistically* as one might have every right to expect, that is, by mobilising the imagination in order to grasp the concept of measure, but prescriptively. One is taught only what one needs to know in order to make, to do, while the purpose of the doing as it serves a human biography has become redundant. It is possible, then, given the aptitude and the right coaching, to develop a superior level of facility and yet remain profoundly ignorant about foundational matters, the whole question of meaning.

I asserted elsewhere that because music *is* measure and number, it is susceptible to quantitative exploitation by way of amplification and recording technologies. That is because measure is misconceived as an abstraction and not the concrete extra-sensory ‘geometrising’ that Plato (1977) conceived it to be. In action, it is the distinction between instinct and spirit. For the *experience* of measure, then, the *acoustician’s* calculations have no significance whatever.

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19 I will argue below that this has resulted in our time in a misguided emphasis on the refinement of the means of execution without any corresponding development of musical *talent*.
Blake knew this too when in one of his *Proverbs of Hell* he penned the line: “Bring out weight & measure in a year of dearth,” a line for which Davy provides a modern interpretation: “When imagination fails, the measurable becomes the measure of all things” (1978:71).

Music can be unmusical only because in its essence, its extra-sensory measure, it is musical. If I go deaf, there is the question of whether my deafness occurs because of disease or loss of function, or alternatively, because of overindulgence. My deafness, my inability to perceive and respond to measure may derive from an excess of measuring. Unless the musical experience is actually had - which means being aware of it - all theories, all analyses, all descriptions become meaningless. Acquiescence in this way can lead to the imprisonment of the imagination that Blake was so concerned to avoid.

*Operationalism, Mastery and the Self*

To take stock, the whole notion of measure, then, has been misapprehended in becoming a mere mensural tool enabling skill - taken to an extreme in our age - in execution. (I will argue in Chapter Eight that the recovery of meaning of the act of execution is possible only by bringing sense-free thinking to bear on the idea of measure. As I will demonstrate, to persist with the emphasis on doing without reflection on what it means to do is merely to perpetuate the epistemological omission and its concomitant dilemma.)

The problem with operational thinking is that it does not perceive the conceptualising, its own movement, but only the tools of operation, which it mistakes for concepts. That is because the movement of conceptualising is not given to our usual form of thought “in which only the perceptible or logical aspects of phenomena are grasped” (Müller and Rapp 1985:116).

What are the consequences of operating in a way that celebrates almost exclusively the making, but which does not involve contemplation of the knowledge that precedes and presupposes the mak-ing? I maintain that we can only truly hear what we have a concept for. (I do not mean ‘hear’ in the sensationalist sense. On the contrary, the hearing I mean is beyond ordinary sensibility and involves awareness.) In my discussion I will show that, in light of the observed connection between the acquisition of technique and operationalism, an epistemology of music is inextricable from an epistemology of self. As I proceed the reader will notice that
the intimacy of the self-music relation is underscored by way of building a compendium of aspects essential to selfhood.

In the first place, the strictly operational nature of musical production gives rise to a disquieting paradox, the results of which I encounter often in music students who are so perplexed by it that some give up performance altogether. The paradox consists in this: Although the child begins lessons motivated by the sheer joy of making music, the joy begins to lose currency as the (s)he begins to understand the inescapable and unforgiving imperative of mastery, namely, that progress is possible only through hours of repetitious practice of scales, arpeggios, exercises and studies, all of which must be undergone in physical and social isolation. One begins with a felt ideal that in order to be actualised must become craft. How does the executant reconcile the contradiction between the profound and the operational, the ideal and the reality; and to what extent can artistic, distinguished from executory, success, be said to have been achieved in that reconciliation? Is it that artistry is never attained because it is forever sought for?

Embedded in this paradox is a serious question of psychological health and artistic survival, understanding of which is entirely dependent on sustained examination of the motivation behind the pursuit of mastery. What is the driving force? I suggest that self-interrogation along these lines will make the difference between personal freedom and enslavement to otherwise hidden factors. It is the performer’s moral autonomy that is at stake. I will engage with a more direct philosophical discussion on the question of freedom in a subsequent chapter. Here, though, I only want to show that not understanding the motivation has serious consequences for the performer. An approach to the question may be made by taking a closer look at mastery itself, at how it behaves, and at what is involved on the part of the executant.

The attainment of a degree of executory mastery involves an operational dialectic of complex to simple and simple to complex. I mean that from the first lessons, the psychomotor

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20 Over a period of five years teaching postgraduate classes in music, I have noticed that this theme, the recovery of joy in music, comes up time and time again as a topic for theses and seminars. It is a deeply problematic one for formally trained musicians, yet I know of no effort being made to address it formally in education.
function - eye-hand coordination, digital dexterity, awareness of self-movement, muscular control, and so on - is experienced as difficult. While progress is made in improved facility, the literature to be learned becomes commensurably complex and technically difficult.

From the first lesson in this process, mastery is conceived to be the progressive elimination of the probability of error. The more skilful one becomes, the more the probability of error is reduced. Over a period of time, one makes fewer and fewer 'mistakes.' Progress as such is dependent primarily on the aptitude of the executant, but, in addition, it is generally supposed that progress is gauged according to the regularity and duration of physical contact with the instrument. At the more advanced stages of technical development, this latter requirement can be relentless. I want to emphasise here the repetition of the physical act.

It is here that the 'passive side of selfhood' as Dupré (1976) called it, becomes significant. It does so for the reason that the encounter with truth or evidential certitude rests on some sort of personal action. However, the recognition of an 'audible' truth depends on making a crucial distinction, namely, that there are two ways of approaching the question of evidential certitude: "We must know the truth; and we must avoid error; - these are our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws" (William James 1967:31). James later puts the distinction more concisely: "Believe truth! Shun error!" (1967:31).

James writes here about a general epistemological principle. What does it imply, however, if the recipient of truth or error is also the creator? In action, the distinction is crucial. Avoiding error is not the same thing as revealing truth; the former can cancel out the latter. Bear in mind that for a truth to be disclosed, it must previously have been concealed. There is a great deal of anxiety around the disclosure of truth, in the sense that such a disclosure is simultaneously a disclosure of oneself. To err while attempting it can be a threat to one's sense of identity. If we have come to the point where error is to be avoided at all costs, specifically by denying its role in the attainment of selfhood, is it not better to risk the loss of truth, and thereby, remain concealed, than to risk the probability of error? Does not the disclosure of truth involve a personal risk of such magnitude that it is better not to acknowledge the erring self at all?
I want to build the ensuing discussion around this critical distinction. To return to the
dialectic of executory progress and the elimination of error, it is significant that a degree of
mastery is deemed to have been acquired when one has learnt the notes, or, in the vernacular,
when one has ‘got the notes right.’ But the insistence on learning the notes first, and only later
adding the expression is a widespread and, in my view, highly questionable practice, as I intend
to show. It is a routine analogous to adding water to dried mushrooms, as if fleshing out the
desiccated objects for human consumption. In other words, the purely sensational and
operational function of musical learning, articulation of the notes, is given primacy.

This practice suggests not only that self-listening is performed in a highly prescriptive
manner, but that there is indeed a tacit admission that there are objective or absolute elements
(the ‘right’ notes) and subjective or hermeneutic elements (the expression), which can be
separated from each other in the act of execution and in the learning process. I take it that one
is deemed to be successful when one can play a piece through from beginning to end without
articulating a wrong note. To have acquired this level of facility, though, implies that the
sequential pattern of the perceived objective constituents has been repeated many times over.
By evidential certitude, then, is meant the right notes. Yet here, again, is the paradox: although
repetition is the basis of memory, it is at the same time (when not recognised as such) the
principle of mechanism. When movement is introduced into number and measure, the result is
the machine. A machine is an automaton whose concept is in the ‘mind’ of its inventor, not in
the machine. I assert again that the repetition of an original experience or act necessarily incurs
a loss of meaning.

This, then, is a rudimentary description of what is involved in the attainment of mastery.
It is not, of course, what makes a real master, as I will show. Let me approach the question
from another direction in order to clarify what wrong actually means in this dialectic; for the
meaning of error has enormous implications for the self, and its exposure will show that the
thinking behind what I have just described is fallacious. It is, in short, the consequence of
operationalism.

Imagine, for a moment, a scenario in which a skilled executant (master) is about to play
this simple, easily recognised melody by Albinoni:
Through some unfortunate and inexplicable lapse in concentration, the executant plays instead:

The reader might think: “But this is not the end of the world.” For the hapless performer, it might as well be. What has taken place? The executant has played a wrong note. The crucial point is that a note on its own cannot be wrong. It can be false only in relation to what preceded it, and also in the context of the whole, the system of functional tonality in which it is lawfully placed. It is not a false note, but a false relation. The interval, the measure, is wrong. The executant has perpetuated an extra-sensory untruth, a falsehood, a lie, one that has been publicly detected as such. (As I have discussed at length, the interval does not exist in the sense realm, but is nevertheless a perceptible reality.) And, indeed, this is the way it will be received by both master and listener. The experience for both is shocking. To be responsible
for such a gross fabrication is no small matter. The self, then, is intrinsically involved, which in no way contradicts my claim that musical utterance is selfless. As I will endeavour to demonstrate as I proceed, the important question is: which self?

At the risk of repeating myself, when a ‘snippet’ of melody such as the above is heard, the listener is reminded that it belongs to an organic whole, which (s)he somehow completes in her cognition. The wrong note has significance only because (s)he inwardly hears the whole. The wrong note is framed in a larger context of meaning, a relational context of the whole, one which, when altered by a wrong interval, is no longer what it purports to be. In revealing evidential certitude, there is thus a unifying element at work, the function of which allows the listener to determine how one event belongs with other events. Although the unity unfolds in time, the listener’s connection is to the context of the whole tonal system, which is there in consciousness prior to temporal completion of the work. A note that interrupts - in this case rudely - the coherence of the unitary context will disturb greatly one’s reception of the whole. That is why the untrue interval is received as a perceptual chaos. It brings one abruptly and irritatingly ‘back to earth.’

To be sure, the master has inflicted a wound on the unequivocal law of measure, on the ethics of number, the evidential truth. Again, language assists here. The executant is a phoney (from the Greek phone, sound or voice), an impostor, an impersonator who has manifested a fake, a false and spurious voice.21 What is implied when we use the phrase, ‘the measure of the man?’ Does it not imply that a person is true to his/her word; that (s)he would not deceive; that (s)he is a moral person? An unintentional fluctuation of tempo, inconsistent tone, flawed articulation and even untasteful phrasing might perhaps be forgiven, and even forgotten, but not a wrong interval (measure), and certainly not one that gives to the melody its very character.

21 There is in this question of error a serious distinction between discovery and judgement. Given the previous observation that in artistic utterance the identity of the executant is to a large extent effaced, I have noticed the strong tendency of some individuals who have been engaged as judges for student recitals to ‘despise’ the student who, despite otherwise relatively impeccable production, commits errors of the sort I have been discussing. In such extreme cases of aesthetic judgement, conditioned as they are by highly prescriptive listening habits, the judge has become a moral evangelist. The judge, having been conditioned by his/her own self-effacement, is then disposed to personal insult when not effaced, that is, when listening to somebody else from another perspective. Such a judge has no compassion; for (s)he has forgotten the ethical value of error in the developmental path to mastery. The auditor has become merely a judge, indifferent to discovery. His/her truth is one that must be, in every instance, and without compromise, operationally verified.
The error is a *cacophony* (again from *phone* and *kakos*, meaning bad, not in accord, disagreeable), the opposite of *euphony*.

The perpetrator will feel his/her *error* very keenly. There is no circumstance that could be less forgiving, less humiliating. The performer might feel the shame for days, weeks, perhaps even for a lifetime if (s)he is so disposed to recall the incident. Where measure is concerned, there is absolutely no room for error. One can, with training, change one’s given ‘tone of voice,’ but one cannot tamper with archetypal intervallic relations without seeming unethical. (Ideally, self-effacement is at the same time self-disclosure. In that one has been successful in allowing the wisdom of measure to unconceal itself, it is an *ethical* self-disclosure.)

In erring, in misrepresenting the formative principle itself, that is, the pre-conscious knowledge of number and measure given to us all in some degree, the performer is disgraced.

Why is the event so humiliating? The answer is to be found in the concept of the listening, measuring, subject. Who listens? Who measures? It is that part of the performer’s being that is beyond time. When I am in *error*, I meet a higher judge than my temporal self, my *persona* (in the original sense of mask - per-sona means ‘sounding through’ the mask, telling the truth) and the humiliation is devastating. Absolution is not a consideration in the attempt at disclosure of musical perfection.

*The Implications of Error for the Attainment of Moral Autonomy*

I would find this scenario acceptable if I were convinced that the performer knew the nature of the wound (s)he has both inflicted and sustained, and appreciated its significance for his/her future development in the art of being human. The tragic glimpse of one’s mere humanness in the incident provides an important key to self-discovery. For “truth and error ... have meaning only through freedom.” Not to know this “... destroys the possibility of cognition and of moral action” (Kühlewind 1988:216). Here, perhaps, is a succinct definition of the epistemological dilemma.
The absence of a concept for music, and the unheeded operational nature of musical production necessitate a personal investment in mastery that is, or can be, uncompromising in human terms. It frequently happens that the price of mastery is that mastery (meaning, in this case, faultless notational execution) becomes the master. One’s entire identity and self-worth become inextricably wedded to what one does with the instrument. Moreover, I believe there is something seriously awry when one’s entire worth as a person is dependent on never erring, on never being wrong. (I am reminded of the cliché: students do not learn to be right; they learn not to be wrong.) The eradication of error is one thing; to be always right suggests a tacit collusion in the denial of one’s humanness. The real struggle in this case is not a striving to fulfill one’s artistic promise as a morally creative human being, but a striving against that promise. Mastery is a natural, alluring, but when not recognised as such, freedom-denyng challenge. I think this is what Stove alludes to when he states, paradoxically: “... in very many domains, perfectionism is especially apt to produce performance which is actually further from perfection than the average for that domain” (1998:177). My concern here is the almost inhuman expectations of the operational mind.22

My concern for the practitioners of art music is that the despair occasioned by error can be so consuming that its effects on the already fragile condition of the mind can be permanently disabling unless one has developed the strength of recovery that can only come from knowing who one is. It is really a question of knowing who or what sets the artistic standard, and why; and I do not mean the self-deception “induced by the trade-off between anxiety and awareness” (Goleman 1998:21), the common habit of shielding oneself from anxiety by diminishing attention to a truth that is painful.

I do not at this stage wish to enter a lengthy philosophical discourse on the topic of human freedom. I think, however, that I must undertake a short excursion into that territory in order to show what I mean by self-knowledge and its implications for the pursuit of mastery as I have described it.

22 Consider, too, the disappointment of an unsuspecting public who, having had its sensory expectations conditioned and modified by a manipulated (digitally mastered?) product, when the live performance does not measure-up to those expectations.
Although Socrates' exhortation, "Know thyself" stands like a foundation stone at the threshold of Western philosophy, "[it] is difficult," writes Dupré, "to imagine a more neglected principle in contemporary thought" (1976:vii). The neglect, he surmises, is not due to a lack of introspection: "Seldom has man been more concerned with himself than today. But which self? Little self-understanding can be gathered from the closed circuit of everyday consciousness" (1976:vii). Dupré means, I think, that a person is more than a succession of sub-lunar experiences. An "adequate concept of the self," he asserts, "must include the self-surpassing states and experiences" rather than only "... what can be described in purely immanent terms" (1976:vii).

Although the process of self-perfection leading the soul - through the experience of proportional numbers in the sound of music - back to its origin is first encountered in the thinking of Pythagoras, it is in Socrates' philosophy that we first find the concept of a slumbering individual soul in the process of awakening. In other words, the idea of a self-conscious individual comes into the foreground for the first time in the history of humanity. It is this event, above all else, that distinguishes Socrates, through his self-professed method - midwifing the truth - from his predecessors. Socrates' philosophy, whether reported by either of the two recognised sources, Plato and Xenaphon, is entirely an expression of his independence. Steiner writes about the emergence of the self-conscious individual in the person of Socrates:

This personality carries in itself the awareness that, whoever expresses his personal opinion out of the true ground of the soul, expresses something that is more than just human opinion, something that is a manifestation of the purposes of the world order through human thinking (1973:35 my emphasis).

In the human soul, he continues, "the reason of the world speaks what it intends to reveal to man"(1973:36). The cognising power that up until this time was sought by the Greeks in the oracles is now present as thought in the individual human soul. Thought has brought the individual soul to consciousness of itself.23 (See Chapter Two for a description of Steiner's

23 By way of anticipating my subsequent discussion, what can be seen in the emergence of the self-conscious self is the transition from mythological to conceptual consciousness. In the former, the noumenal or supersensible world was perceived by way of clairvoyance and clairaudience, in short, supersensible cognition. In the latter, thought becomes more internalised and akin to tragedy. The transition might be seen as the incarnation of an
notion of the 'consciousness-soul.') I must emphasise here that Steiner is referring to the
 genesis of the self-conscious individual, which in our time has become radical individualism, if
 by the latter term is meant the rugged, intensely competitive sort of individuality celebrated
today.

I cannot emphasise enough the historicity of this event, namely the arrival in human
consciousness of the sense of an independent self, and of its significance for future
development. For the image it evokes is one of the persona as only a transitory personality,
and perhaps more importantly, that there is the possibility of transcending it. Central to this
insight, then, is the recognition and possible realisation of latent inner faculties which are
critical to the further biographical development of the self, and insofar as the 'purposes of the
world order' appear in the individual soul, to the evolution of the world soul through the self-
conscious individual. Note that soul is not only personal. Whatever exists in the world is to be
found in and through the human being. If I would know the world, I need look no further than
myself. If I would know myself, I need to grasp the world-significance of truth and error.

In view of that insight, and by way of keeping the question in the foreground of my
discussion, I will ask it again: In the pursuit of mastery, who - 'which self' in Dupré's words -
sets the standard? If there is a self that can commit and recognise error, and be deeply
anguished by it, there is a self that, in its awareness of itself, also contains the possibility of
moral action, that is, a free self. Conversely, if one can know truth, then one also has the
possibility within to lie.

I am adumbrating here the dialectical nature of ethical freedom, which Fromm (1960)
characterises usefully as 'freedom from' and 'freedom to.' Freedom from error (mastery)
enables one to express fully, to disclose truth. But one is not then free from the possibility of
failure in that task. The more masterful one becomes, the more one has to lose in a sense. If
the risk of error is minimised, so is the possibility of negative judgement. There is a
considerable risk, then, in achieving success. The fear of success is the fear of failure.

intellect dependent on the physical senses leading to the development of the personality, the whole process
regarded by the Greeks - in contradistinction to the modern view - as a descent from a past Golden Age.

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For the executant for whom music merely operates, there is a dangerous illusion concealed in the success-failure dialectic, and by implication, in the freedom dialectic. It is this: (s)he who sets out on the path to mastery leaves error behind.

Error, however, is not accidental, and to conceive of it as such is to belittle any possibility of purposive existence or further human progress. In the dialectic of failure and success, error and truth, is there not a perceptible movement towards a destination, even one that might connect the end to the beginning? Is not order brought into chaos in this progression?

I suggest that error has meaning over and above its obvious connection with failure. Error makes self-correction possible and necessary. The question I have not asked in my pursuit of the goal of errorless mastery is this: Who am I trying to be? It is a biographical question. But I cannot approach this question unless and until I have some idea of just who is meant when I say ‘I.’ To put this another way, the dilemma inherent in the freedom dialectic originates in a moral source. To stand before an audience (note the distinction between a seeing and hearing public) and tell a universal truth, knowing that it can move deeply, is indeed a morally responsible, yet anxiety inducing goal which very few achieve in a lifetime.

It is the suffering wrought in the gap between failure and success, and its ethical value as a teacher of the self I am interested in. To see that progression as biographically meaningful is to admit the possibility of self-transcendence, that is, a purposive trajectory from lower to higher qualities of selfhood. The error in the above scenario is a poignant reminder to the executant of what (s)he is not yet, but strives to become: human. To clarify, musical executants see themselves in the deepest layers of the unconscious as not being truly human unless and until they perform perfectly. This kind of musical fundamentalism obscures awareness of the fruitfulness of error as a moral guide.

One alternative, victimhood, is “... to see oneself twitching on the strings of circumstance, [and that] is the most tragic and debilitating malaise of this age” (Bryant 1993:224). Perhaps the most painful lesson I have learned during my research tenure is that victimhood, while revelling in the habit of apportioning blame, is always in control - and I do mean it in the pejorative sense - of the source of victimisation. It sets up the occasion of its own suffering; for
it is disposed, not to discovery, but to judgement, to always being right, to self-righteousness, to taking the moral high ground. When something untoward happens to me, I can always say, ‘There! I told you so. I just knew this would happen. It always happens to me.’ I see this sort of behaviour as typical of the denial of the probability of error.

Again: which self? Bryant seems to be alluding to the possibility of a self that can ultimately choose to act morally or not. It is in choice that a person truly is him/herself, for there is an ultimate responsibility demanded of the individual by musical utterance, a responsibility that cannot be shrugged-off. Choice is an inescapable necessity in the gaining of autonomy. I think it is the knowing, the cognising of error as fruitful that makes the difference in that choice.

Socrates’ method evidences, I believe, that awareness of a self is a relatively late event in human consciousness. Socrates knew that its emergence signalled the roots of egotism, the seeking of confirmation that ‘I am.’ But for the deluded ego, the persona, the self-confirmation is sought in external sources. “But man can only feel himself because of something - everything that serves him in this way, everything important and ‘necessary,’ everything he clings to” (Kühlwind 1988:53).

Kühlwind intends to show that the struggle for success, in the sense of self-confirmation, is not normal. It is (or can be) a symptom of egotism: “Everyone needs success, and no frustrations, please! Do you really think that it was always this way? That people simply fell apart when they weren’t successful in something?” (1988:55).

It is only with the nascence of a consciousness of self that error also becomes a reality, and with it, the reality of suffering. That is the significance of the emergence of the Greek tragedy.24 I can choose to engage with the pursuit of mastery out of a need for ego-preservation, out of a need to maintain the mask of persona, or out of love for the act itself, in which case I disclose my true self, who I really am.25 Because it divides and isolates,

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24 As Burnett James says: “… freedom demands the acceptance of tragedy” (1960:59), and goes on to cite Berdyayev: “The admission of a fundamental opposition between freedom and necessity, spirit and nature, subject and object, personality and society, the individual and the general, postulates a tragic philosophy” (1960:59).

25 There is a modern equivalent of this distinction - although it is done for all the wrong reasons - where candidates for vacant positions in symphony orchestras audition behind screens so that their identity is concealed from the
egocentricity makes self-knowledge almost impossible to achieve. Transcendence of ego implies starting from the other, renewing one’s acquaintance, through mindfulness, of music’s wisdom and what it can teach me about my erring self.

The Experiential Cocoon

What, then, of the suffering of the musician who is trying to achieve mastery? What is its purpose and value? I can best approach these questions by putting up a modern scenario. It is a matter of some concern to orchestral managements both here and abroad that many musicians are unable to work due to stress-related disorders. What is puzzling about this phenomenon is that although music is now recognised as one of the most potent therapeutic agents available to us for the promotion of psychological and physical healing (Campbell 1989, Gerber 1988), the creators of it seem not to be the beneficiaries of its healing value.

I want here to invoke an image of the cocoon, a metaphor for the existential vacuum to which I have frequently alluded. I see the cocoon as the shell, the pubescent biographical garment of protection one weaves for oneself about the space in which suffering is endured, and out of which one seeks confirmation that one is. Rightly conceived, however, the cocoon is the space of loneliness (distinguished from alienation) out of which one strives to fulfil one’s artistic destiny by speaking the truth.

Although one begins there, however, the truth cannot be spoken from a perspective within the cocoon. A caterpillar is not a self-conscious being, and yet it knows when the time is right

\[\text{members of the audition panel. The practice seems to suggest that objectivity can be the reality only when the persona (and gender) of the player do not influence the decision of the listener. This literal effacement of the individual, the imposed disconnection of the musical outcome from the individual making it, is objectivity with a vengeance. It is confirmation of the exalted status given to their art by those who practice it, but at the same time, the most palpable example of the reality that the ethical value of error, its significance to individual progress, has not been recognised.}\]

\[\text{26 The source of my information is a report by John Jones, the Occupational Health and Safety representative in the Melbourne Symphony, who was selected by the Symphony Orchestra Musicians Association to attend the worldwide conference entitled Health and the Musician, conducted at the University of York, England, in March 23-27, 1997. The conference, attended by 300 delegates, heard a research paper presented by Dr Ian James, Consultant Physician at the Royal Free Hospital in London and Reader in Medicine at London University. James’s survey, which attracted respondents from orchestras in all parts of the world, showed that “performance anxiety sufficient to adversely affect performance is felt by some 70% of orchestral musicians. This occurs more than once a week in one out of every five players.” The report continues: “The size of the problem is considerable since nearly 10% of orchestral musicians are off work for longer than a month in every year.”}\]

\[\text{27 See Gerber (1988) for an erudite account of the history, concept and use of vibrational medicine.}\]
to fulfil its preordained promise by revealing itself to the light in its final glorious form as a creature of the light: a butterfly. It has no choice in this metamorphosis. Its sole purpose is replication of the species butterfly. It cannot be more butterfly than it is.

The human being, on the other hand, having become a conscious being in which (recall Socrates) the reason of the world speaks what it intends to reveal to him/her, is capable of reacting strongly against the uncognised mantle of his/her loneliness, or alternatively, exacerbating it by conformity to social mores. In neither case are a person’s true colours revealed. The fear of exposure means not revealing oneself as a self. For, unlike the caterpillar, the idea in action behind the human striving to become is the true self, the hero in all of us, the ‘I am.’ Unlike the butterfly, the human being can always be more human than (s)he is.

The hero, Pietzner suggests, is “the one who wants to do something exceptional, something individual, something singular” (1993:20) in his/her life-course. But the hero “is singular, and because he is singular, he is lonely. Out of a thwarted, frustrated wish to be something singular, an intense feeling of loneliness often results” (1993:20). Here is the biographical tension between self-transcendence, or confirmation of the need to be a unique individual, and the need to belong.

“The answer to the question, ‘What is truth?’ ...” Pietzner continues, “can only take place within the space of our loneliness” (1993:30). Self-confirmation, then, implies not seeking confirmation outside the cocoon of isolation, but rather, involves truly accepting my proclivity to insufficiency, to error. For “... without an awareness of basic inadequacy no genuine awareness of transcendence can exist” (Dupré 1976:49). Far from reacting against my isolation in the space of my aloneness, I must become aware of the “gentle possibilities” (Pietzner 1993:27) it carries for finding out who I really am. In Pietzner’s and my terms, this is the mark of a real master, the ‘measure of the man.’ (S)he finally owns his/her own suffering.

The alternative, and indeed what most often happens at this point, is withdrawal from the struggle, avoidance of suffering, and therefore of the possibility of a self-surpassing self. Nor

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28 For the Greeks, the butterfly was a metaphor for the psyche.
does handing one’s psyche over to the experts provide any real solace. One can, after all, leave the psyche at the clinic while one does the weekly shopping, then pick it up again afterwards. The expert, according to Dupré, can put “a common label on mental anguish,” but we are mislead “if we expect the label to reveal the true ‘nature’ of the experience” (Dupré 1976:49).

Why is this? It is because the suffering cannot be shared. It is my suffering, and to believe otherwise is legerdemain. Its cognition is my responsibility. Suffering has a private nature “... which means no ‘nature’ at all. It speaks out of the most intimate privacy [the cocoon] of my selfhood” (Dupré 1976:49).

To utter a musical tone is a me-universe event. It is to set myself apart from the world, from others, further intensifying the sense of isolation I already feel. I cannot be a nobody. To sing, to play, is to undress, to show my true individuality, but only on the condition that I have seen it thus. It is not a physical nudity, but a spiritual one; an exposure from the inside-out, conditional on my having the choice to do it at all, that is, if I have determinedly accepted my loneliness, my inadequacy, my error and my suffering. “If I know how to ‘be’,” writes Thomas, “then I am able to ‘do’” (1991: 32).

This discussion prompts me to suggest that it is indeed possible to make music while remaining masked. Paradoxically, I can sound while remaining silent. I can simply operate, go through the motions, as it were. I can appear to be masterful by seeking confirmation of my existence anywhere but in the privacy of my isolation. But all this is a ruse, for sooner or later I must face my suffering. The sounding silence is the persona, the public self, the legitimised self, which in no way reflects my inner self, and indeed, may even replace it altogether. It is a deception that is for most very difficult to detect. Thomas views it this way:

The role played by personality tends to become second nature, and we forget that it is a role; or we struggle to change our personality to make it more acceptable and successful. The success of the image is the image of success - whether it is Michael Jackson’s painful and expensive cosmetic surgery to make his ‘mask’ more appealing or Margaret Thatcher changing her ‘persona’ by manufacturing a new voice (1991:28).
To remain ‘silent’ in this way is safe. It is also a lie. I can remain fully clothed. My illusion is that my true individuality, my uniqueness, (which is at the same time my universality) is somehow reflected in the clothing, in how I appear. I ought to have detected the deception that public notoriety is no measure of artistic success, nor a guarantee of the reduction of suffering for that matter.

I have already discussed the avoidance syndrome exhibited by students. This, I suggest is a fear of being found unworthy, by reason of being in error, a fear of showing the world who one really is. As I suggested, the ideal time to be heard is never the present. Education does not grant permission to be an individual (in the sense of acknowledging biographical progress), that is, who one truly is, but it does approve a persona, a concealed yet publicly acceptable conformist.

Tragically, it is the doing self, not the choosing self that is applauded in our culture. And the doing must be right.29 Error plays no valued part in this because both it and the suffering are denied. In a “… society that equates normality with hiding the inner self,” writes Dupré (1976:45), the possibility of spiritual freedom is denied, and one becomes estranged from one’s own soul content. It is in view of that state of unawareness that Winkler writes: “The artist seeks to achieve in the outer world what our ego [he means ego in the higher sense of moral agency] should do within: the building of a bridge between the perfect [formless] thought of creation and the imperfect form of the created. This is healing in the deepest sense” (1960:251).

Selfhood in the pursuit of mastery cannot, if it is mastery, be avoided. One remains otherwise a non-self, a not-‘I’, a caterpillar. One’s inadequacy must not be, indeed, merely acknowledged, but warmly embraced in the path of learning. Again, Dupré makes the distinction: “In the evaluation of selfhood the primary distinction is not the one that divides the sick from the well [a fine line in any case], but that which separates the developed from the undeveloped”(1976:44). This distinction suggests to me that learning is less about the pursuit

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29 The extent to which sheer mechanism, that is, doing minus human error, is valued in society, is best illustrated in the latest advances in information technology, which proudly trumpets the immanent reality of ‘autonomous intelligence,’ and of quantification, no less, of an experience through the medium of digital video, as if the production of the automaton were the highpoint of humanity’s achievement.
of socially conditioned concepts of personal happiness than it is about gaining awareness of the sort of experience that will assist one's biographical trajectory.

Which self? It is only this self, the developing, evolving self, through the freedom of moral decision, out of love for the act that can set the standard, for only this free self can make the judgement. It is only this self that then has the insight that from the very beginning the standard has always been set by somebody else; the teacher, the colleague, the peer, the institution, the profession. What every student needs is self-confirmation that what (s)he has produced is indeed artistic. (An ethical ideal does not need external reinforcement. It is alive in moral imagination.) Self-confirmation, by definition, cannot be acquired correspondingly, that is, at the hands of a pedagogue. This insight brings with it the further realisation that on the path to mastery it is acceptable to fall from one's own standard (which is in any case an ethical one tied up with one's personal biography), the only one for which responsibility can be taken. One's vulnerability on this path is also the source of one's strength, providing it is acknowledged as such.

If my power of self-correction is taken from me, I am morally disempowered. It is in being aware of my human predisposition to, and valuation of, error, failure and the suffering that ensues, that something truly creative, truly masterful, can emerge. What emerges, however unacceptable it may be presently, can set me on the path to real autonomy because I have given myself permission, in the face of all socially contrived formulae, to be human. I have disarmed the anxiety-provoking self-deception that is the character of the persona. In my acknowledgment of the capacity for error, I am empowered because I have chosen a tragic, distinguished from determinist, philosophy. It is at this point that I burst my skin, as it were. I am no longer a mere mouthpiece of conformity to external authority. I am no longer the spiritual homunculus that a culture in denial of its humanness would have me be. The only authority can be myself.

Talent and Facility

My discussion in this and the previous chapter has pointed to a pronounced lack of awareness with regard to the significance of musical utterance to human purpose and progress,
one example of which is the loss of meaning and its replacement by a sort of musical automatism. I believe as a consequence that the whole relation between human consciousness and musical expression has been misapprehended in modern times.

The resulting confusion is evidenced in the failure to make a basic distinction. I argued above that executory skill is likely to be the one factor that attracts the adjective, ‘musical.’ I think this is a misapprehension. Executory skill is evidence of musicality; it is not musicality itself. Yet, from the moment a child commences lessons on a musical instrument, up to the day (s)he completes tertiary education, it is not musicality - which from here I will term talent - that has been identified, refined, educated or extended, but facility, or the tools of expression.

The distinction is never made. Yet, it is obvious that every person, educated or not, must begin with something. A flame cannot be fanned into life if it is not there to begin with. It is known, for example, that the English composer, Frederick Delius, sang on a monotone. Had he been asked for a demonstration of his non-existent note matching ability, he would no doubt have been promptly ejected from the school choir. The ability to mobilise and coordinate complex networks of musculature and attendant nervous system is not in itself a demonstration of talent. Facility has to be acquired.

I do not claim that facility is not also an essential skill. On the contrary, without it, talent would - and does in the majority of cases - remain little more than an untapped resource. Nevertheless, dispelling this pernicious myth in order to reconstruct the confidence of the victims of it has been over a good many years a test of my patience and persistence as an educator. A common story in my classes for non-professionals is a pronounced feeling of inadequacy. I hear it said repeatedly that, ‘I am musically illiterate,’ or, ‘I am tone deaf,’ or, ‘I cannot sing to save myself,’ and other such self-deprecatory remarks. Such beliefs are often the consequence of a person having been told in childhood that they cannot sing or play, that they are unmusical, a ‘final’ judgement that effectively excludes them from group activities. In other words, the social integration that comes of being a member of a whole united in a single purpose is denied them. I have come to believe that perhaps the surest and cruelest way of crippling someone for life is to tell him/her that (s)he is musically untalented. Indeed, many in our community attend concerts that provide opportunities for them to gaze admiringly (from the
safety of the cocoon) at the artists on the stage who are the surrogates for the very qualities they miss in themselves. I am speaking here of a question of epistemic empowerment.

Music Becomes a Technical Art

I equate epistemic empowerment with spiritual autonomy. In the same way that the capacity for language is not language itself, and the former empowering a person to both tell and recognise a truth when it is told, musicality is not a physical attribute, but an ethical one (elaborated in Chapter Thirteen). I want to bring my previous discussion to a focus here by suggesting that the inalienable connection of the structures of consciousness with those of music, a connection regarded so highly by Greek and Medieval scholars in that it provided such a rich source of supersensible wisdom, was lost in the transition from a cosmological to a scientific view of the universe. Moore argues that the rationalistic reduction which began here asserts itself with increasing force up until the end of the medieval era, when finally, the scientific work of the alchemists, which embraced astrology, chemistry and mathematics came to be regarded as occult quackery. "It is less recognised," Moore writes, "that music suffered a similar purification, losing its religious and mythological foundations to become a refined art" (1990:193). He continues: "From the point of view of a psychologist who values imagery, of course, these developments were hardly evolutionary in any positive, progressive sense. What was lost is at least equal in importance to what was gained" (1990:193).

This transition, encapsulated in the term, 'refined art,' is crucial to my distinction between talent and facility. The historical transformation highlighted by Moore is that of music as a contemplative mystery becoming a physical art. Music lost its supersensible ontology in the process of becoming a technical art. As supersensible vision receded, the fascination for, and delight in, the skill of production took over to the extent that it became an unconscious process, in short, what I have discussed as operationalism. The instrument is now externalised and sound is initiated from within. This event could occur only by way of a dialectic: the emergence of the independent, freely-choosing self, and a simultaneous loss of imaginal
cognition. In other words, there is a transition from humans being moved to doing the moving, amounting to human appropriation of cosmological impulses.\textsuperscript{30}

The gain of free will translates as the pleasure of freely-chosen action. In the passion for action, however, it is all too easy to forget the aim that motivated the act. Rather, the puissant act itself becomes the aim, and the aim is even sacrificed in order to preserve the act, the doing. Operational tendencies can produce greater technical perfection (meaning that expression is externalised in a more purified form) but at a loss of vitality and expressive power, and more importantly, meaning. The culmination of these events is a psychology of perfectionism.

I cannot overemphasise that this historical transition from cosmological but quiescent awareness to acting, which amounts to a transition from one mode of consciousness to another, has been overlooked, and has led to the general view that humanity has always expressed itself primarily in technical production, or tool-making. Mumford questions “... both the assumptions and the predictions upon which our commitment to the present forms of technical and scientific progress, treated as ends in themselves, has been based” (1967:4). This current over-commitment to technics, he argues, is in part due to “a radical misinterpretation of the whole course of human development...” (1967:4). “In treating tool-making as central to early man’s survival, biologists and anthropologists for long underplayed, or neglected, a mass of activities in which many other species were for long more knowledgeable than man” (1967:4). He means that there is at first nothing uniquely human in tool-making, and that technical proficiency alone is not “... sufficient to identify and foster intelligence” (1967:5). Mumford concludes:

Yet from the moment Homo sapiens, at least, makes his appearance, we find evidences in his attitude toward death, toward ancestral spirits, toward future existence, toward sun and sky, that betray a consciousness that forces and beings, distant in space and time, unapproachable if not invisible, may nevertheless play a controlling part in man’s life. This was a true intuition... “ (1967:21).

\textsuperscript{30}This loss need not be a disaster if, as I will discuss in Chapter Thirteen, it is seen as a necessary step in the progress of consciousness towards spiritual autonomy.
The Technical Becomes the Mechanical

There is a further point to be made out of this loss-gain dialectic. Technique today is an external affair. I mean that it is not based on knowledge and awareness of the whole human being. It is a purely physical - distinguished from imaginative - course of learning in which the body is forced to assume postures that are without a basis of understanding of the possibilities of movement in the limbs. In accordance with the veracity of imaginal cognition, I maintain that technique should be less about learning prescribed physiologically-derived movements which are applied to mechanical principles of production than it should be about developing the possibilities of movement which are already inherent in the human form.

The transition, however, helps to clarify a good deal of the puzzlement with which I have been engaged in this and the previous chapter, and specifically the present concern. In my opinion, the gap between the professional musician and those who listen has become wider in recent times due to the sophistication of recording technology, which, as I have argued, takes no cognisance of the notion that music might be more than a physical phenomenon. That it might just have an intimate and indissoluble link with human spirituality and world destiny is not a consideration at all, and so the link is omitted in education. The ordinary person is constantly reminded - significantly without his/her permission having been sought - by means of the ‘hard evidence,’ the compact disc, that his/her own efforts at music are the source of shame, since (s)he cannot possibly compete with the digitally-devised, and, inasmuch as it is unpeopled while being heard, sanitised product.

The recording process is a symptom of a desire to repeat with as little effort as possible experiences of soul. This can be achieved only by preserving mechanically the spatial dimensions of music. In this manner music is consumed. Its use is ab-use. Its mystery is absent. In that the will has overpowered knowing, the recording process provides a convenient solution to the problem of the limitations of aural retention. I mean by this that the problem with musical phenomena is that they cannot be held still for long enough to observe them. But nor should they be. Music is made and heard in time, and if it is ensouled, should be made and heard every time as if for the first time. As I have already stated, the beauty of music does not lie in its permanence, as if the compact disc is some sort of preserved proof of the musician’s
talent. I see the recording process as sonic photography. Surely, the ‘soul’ of a performance is created in the space in which the per-forming takes place. This takes into account the contribution made by the listeners at the time to that communion. Obviously this ambience cannot be transferred by the use of electricity onto a material medium and recreated elsewhere.

Yet, perhaps nothing is more characteristic of this century than the microphone, the instrument invented to amplify, to make bigger, the human voice. How disempowered the individual becomes when the intimacy and the delicate perishability of his/her voice-print is made to fall silent in passive submission to increasing exploitation by mechanised, reproduced sound which, not insignificantly, is consumed with drug-like dependency. It is worth speculating whether, without this technical manipulation of the physical aspects of the human voice, the Nazi Party could have gained such dominance of a nation by having a dictator broadcast the sound of his own voice, compelling millions to surrender their freedom in forgetting the human necessity of moral choice.

**Humanity is Essentially Musical**

It is not difficult to see how the ordinary listener has been intimidated by this machine and by the ‘industry’ that has promoted its indiscriminate use. Silenced indeed.

I state this forcefully for the reason that the intimacy of the relation between hearing and uttering, so essential to human empowerment, and therefore, to biographical progress, has been assaulted without our noticing the ramifications. When I earlier invited the reader to sound the tone inwardly, I pointed out that it is one’s own voice that is heard. This demonstrates unequivocally that hearing cannot be disconnected, as a separate sense, from uttering, for uttering requires an act of will on the sounder’s part. Moreover, the ear, recall, is hidden from view in the cave of the head, while the eye is situated on the body’s surface. It might be said that in this position, the eye receives all and expresses all. The ear on the other hand receives

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31 I am keenly aware that my view may be seen as heterodox. I submit that my stance, though uncompromising, is not an exercise in false virtue. Rather, it is a fully conscious decision to ‘draw the line’ somewhere out of respect - which I have had to win back - for music. There is, after all, a reason (to be explained in the denouement ) why music is a perishable and not a plastic art. That applied science has made it permanent only bears out my point that musical cognition has become operational. In reality there is barely a trace left of its significance to human function and purpose.
all but expresses nothing. The ear is hidden for a reason. It is only half a sense; its expressive function is taken up by the larynx with which it is connected physiologically and psychologically (von Lange 1992). Any attack on the hearing sense, then, is an attack on the power of utterance, and on the will to utter, that is, on the very creative impulse that gives to humanness its meaning. All of humanity shares in the organ of form, the larynx, whose forms are not permanent.

I hasten to add that the entire scenario could only have arisen in a culture whose whole attitude to human utterance has become mechanistic by virtue of the loss of mystery. If we would truly understand the difference between talent and facility, we must learn to apprehend the formative (not formed) processes that occur in time, and in so doing, penetrate to what lives beyond the physical appearances of forms, to what governs them before they appear. It is this unbornness, the uncreated, the unevolved, available to everyone who hears, that cries out for nurture. The question is: What is the inaudible reality out of which the audible emanates?

This question points to a path of exploration of music not limited to its commodification, to its usefulness to the human will, and also to a more sustainable way of apprehending artistic truth than the twentieth century reliance on, and idolatry of, the personal psychological dynamics of the celebrated performer, especially when they are foisted on us by way of the microphone.

Musical phenomena remain ‘things’ as long as one merely hears them. Although it is true that some are blessed with greater facility than others, it does not follow that for all, music cannot be known in its essence. Human intentionality, rightly prepared, is the organ of apprehension, the organ through which music can reveal its abundant secrets. This insight is not restricted to those endowed with refined levels of facility. On the contrary, I believe it is the birthright of every individual. A person can be profoundly musical without being an accomplished executant.

As I have asserted, the development of musicality (talent) consists first in cultivating a condition of soul - disposition, frame of mind, readiness, receptiveness - which is able to relate to music in its own nature. Although it may seem unnecessary to state it, the confusion of
which I have spoken, which sees talent and facility as synonymous, and which can no longer distinguish between ensouled and desouled utterance, suggests a dehumanisation of the life-structure of musical phenomena.

Music seeks creation by the sounder who is both listener and muser. It takes on the multifarious forms imparted to it by that listener, that muser, who becomes a self, and yet, becomes selfless, in the act of giving being. Music sounds in me about itself; it becomes conscious in me to the extent that it is my act. It seeks its own audition. No person's efforts at musical utterance, however inadequately they may compare with others, should be evaluated in purely sensible terms. To do so is to devalue the moral striving germane to that person's biography.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE RECOVERY OF INTELLIGIBILITY

Introduction

In the previous chapter I endeavoured to show something of the intimacy of the relation between the self and musical utterance by way of the dilemma encountered by the individual when the meaning of the act of utterance is lost in the historical progression from contemplative mystery to technical art, that is, in the shift from the profound to the operational. In the current age it is the skill of execution that most absorbs the player or singer. Prior to that, in Chapters Five and Six, I worked through some of the problems embedded in the progression from the theoretical to the sublime. My rationale for that course of action was to try to account for the epistemological gap in our knowledge.

If the sheer automatism of music’s production today occludes any recognisable affinity between the act and the wisdom informing it, where does the absence of meaning - intelligibility in Platonic terminology - leave music at the beginning of the twenty-first century? As I see it, music has no point of reference beyond its sensible results, no capacious conception (Vorstellung) to make sense of what it does, because modern consciousness has lost all knowledge of an earlier picture of musical phenomena as physical reflections of a higher order of significance. In the absence of a metaphysical afflatus proper to it, or a sense that there might be some higher order or ethos framing its productivity, the window of intelligibility remains obscured. Music finds itself instead in a competitive funding crisis with a sensationalist and relativist aesthetic and a shallow and literalist education. Rather than see voidness, the state of emptiness, as an opportunity for the recovery of meaning, modernity
obstinately shuts out the light with its own conceptual, verbally-prompted thought content and its accrued operationalism. But in drawing the blinds quickly, the light cannot be kept in.

Although there are still margins of resistance to the idea, it is now widely acknowledged that music, unlike language and vision, is free of external associations (Betti 1994, Hegel 1993, Steiner 1987, Storr 1992 and von Lange 1992). It would be premature to conclude from this, however, that music is "... no more than a disembodied system of relationships between sounds," as Storr (1992:3) puts it. On the contrary, given the knowledge that music is neither representational nor propositional, and that it clearly means more to many people than mere entertainment, it would be reasonable to expect not only research endeavour that attempts to gain intelligibility from the inside-out, but that even to suspect a spiritual connection does not have to mean not researching it at all. I believe it is precisely that connection that has been consistently omitted in modern times.

As I argued in the previous chapter, it is a modern pedagogical aberration that the production of the 'notes' be given primacy in the pursuit of mastery, while the intervals, the spaces between, attention to which, it is thought, can be withheld for a later time, are somehow incidental, and therefore, subjective. I maintain that playing the 'right notes' is a misconception. Although the executant is usually unaware of it, what (s)he really means is playing the right intervals; for a tone cannot be wrong. It is only ever and always the interval, the relation between the tones that can be false. There can be no music without intervallic measure. Yet, one never hears the expression, 'I must get the intervals right,' or 'I must get the measure right.' Why, then, is this misconception not seen for what it is? Why is this first principle, measure, given only a secondary order in the learning process, as if the intervals can be skipped over arbitrarily in the effort to get the notes right?

It is not so obvious, then, that the identification of a person with extra-sensory measure, rather than sensory production, is what is meant when we speak of musicality. Measure, as I will try to demonstrate below by analysis of Pythagorean and Platonic thought, is at the ground

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1 Again, I wish to note that, among its guiding principles, positivism is "a universal rejection of metaphysics" (Hartman 1967:359) on the grounds that it is "sterile" (Carnap 1967:360) and that its "so-called statements ... are meaningless" (1967:360). The aim of positivism is to eliminate metaphysics through logical analysis of language.
of all musical ‘correctness’ and, I venture to argue, ethical behaviour within the realm of artistic performance. It is in some way tied up with the very idea of humanness in the sense of a transcendent self. It will be one of my tasks, then, to show that the opposite is the case: the intervals, insofar as they are examples of the uncompromising, inviolable ideal of measure, and therefore ‘pure,’ are non-subjective, while the notes (what is heard) are better able to accommodate the individual stamp of the executant with some degree of impunity; that is to say, they will still retain the essential characteristics of tone regardless of the personal ‘print’ given them by the executant.

The Relevance of History in the Recovery of Meaning

I agree with Storr that one of the ways in which an approach can be made to “... the problem of the significance of music in human life” is to “examine its origins” (1992:3). Its meaning is not to be found in its current theory or in its operation, which have become highly complex, but in imaginative contemplation of its provenance and its history, that is, in what it meant to earlier civilisations and how it was used by them. In this chapter I will take the first tentative steps toward the recovery of intelligibility by retrieving awareness of measure as an historical metaphysic. Although measure has come to mean a mensural calculation of the dimensions of that which actually exists, and in these terms is a conditioned concept, I will try to show that a real understanding of measure which, recall, is where the purely musical lies consists in expanding the definition of ‘actually exists.’

I will take up the task of metaphysical retrieval by isolating and elaborating an historical precedent. I will argue that the Greek musical experience was at the same time an experience of measure, but that the particular character of this experience, namely, its ethic, diminished in the transition to a psychology of production.

Before beginning, however, I think it is important to explain why I believe recourse to history can serve to illuminate epistemological questions. “Psychic modes of behaviour,” according to Jung, “are indeed, of an eminently historical nature” (1983:v). For him, the

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2 I use this word to refer to a visionary philosophy of things outside the realm of sense-experience, and not in the pejorative connotation of mere theory.
history of humanity is the history of its individuation. For my purposes, the abovementioned transition to a psychology of production is tied up with individuation. I think it is possible to demonstrate that the more individuated civilisation becomes, the more history becomes important to it. Archaic humanity was not very interested in history because it was not yet individuated; rather, the "crude product of nature, the object fashioned by the industry of man, acquire their reality, their identity, only to the extent of their participation in a transcendent reality" (Eliade 1971:5).

The present moment is not ahistorical. On the contrary, its experience contains the sum total of the past. The history of music is the sum total of the psychological history of its practitioners. Lukacs puts this well when he says that, "... history, for us, has become a form of thought" (1997:5), which we apply "... consciously or otherwise - to every kind of human experience" (1997:5). In other words, the past continues to work in us. Humans of every epoch participate in it.

I believe that the conscious application of history will show that the consequence of the abovementioned transition is that there is no longer a 'true' conception of what the function of music is. Accordingly, epistemic re-orientation is dependent on understanding that function, which can be ascertained, in part, through knowledge of the earlier mode of musical cognition. As Dupre asserts: "... genuine understanding can originate only in a re-reading of the past ... ." Further:

A philosophical critique of our culture must include a reflection upon its own past critique. The idea of an instantaneous judgement on our culture fails through the very error which hermeneutic philosophy attempted to correct, namely, a consciousness from which the awareness of temporality is absent (1976:7).

This awareness of temporality is especially important because it is after all temporal measure I have been speaking about. From here onwards, my work will assume a distinctly historical focus in which awareness of temporality is used as a speculative method of retrieval. Accordingly, the remaining chapters may be viewed as my attempt to fill the gap in our knowledge with content that is more in keeping with the manner in which musical phenomena themselves behave when the human will is not so bent on their utility.
To reinforce my recourse to historical awareness, the philosophical study of earlier visions “... can become a critical reflection on our age, our cultural life as a whole - but only if the inclusion is open to the value in the differences” (Levin 1988:13) rather than in their suppression. Like Levin, I regard this enhancement of the “endowment [of vision, which] is not only a biological program [but] also an existential capacity, a potentiality-for-being...” as nothing less than a modern epistemological imperative: “The life-world of this vision is rapidly being gathered, today, into a frontal ontology” (1988:8), meaning, the “Being of beings is now something to be confronted, placed (gestelli) directly in front - that is to say, in a position which gives priority to the demand for optimum clarity, certainty and control” (1988:8).

Knowledge of the Ideal Form

Avoidance of the Form

I can best begin to build a conception of an earlier metaphysic by citing a contradiction I have often deliberately provoked in the institution where I am employed. The institution is situated directly opposite parkland and botanical gardens. On days when the weather has been fine, I have suggested to students that much could be achieved by practising outdoors rather than being confined in the air-conditioned cubicle in which they normally work. The response is almost always the same: ‘But somebody might hear me!’ Similarly, if I ask a student to play a piece in Performance Seminar, a forum written into the curriculum for the express purpose of performance, the response is often: ‘Well alright, but this is work in progress,’ or, ‘It is not ready yet.’ I wonder, then about the institution spending in the order of $3,000,000 annually on training students to be heard, when many of them exhibit a pronounced reluctance to be heard. For the student, there is an ideal time to be heard, and it is never now, the present.

The avoidance behaviour exhibited in this scenario suggests that the student possesses pre-conscious knowledge of an artistic ideal or absolute that is of the nature of an ethos. To bring a musical phenomenon to manifestation in less than its ideal form is a potentially confronting experience because the result is in some sense felt to be unethical. (Recall my discussion in Chapter Seven around the theme of truth and error.) My task here is to put the case that an ideal of this sort is an essential condition of artistic production and that it is critical
for the executant to know that the ideal guides artistic behaviour. In this light I will further argue that the ideal as ethos has a historical precedent that is worth keeping by raising it to consciousness, and accordingly, that the tenets of modern ethical and cultural relativism are not useful concepts.

_The Ideal Form as Ethos and the Problem of Relativism_

Whatever has become had first to become. All things have a model, a form. In the case of a tree, for example, the form is already contained in its seed. If a thing has a pre-ordained form, such a form must be the _best of its kind_. And if there is a ‘best,’ the manifoldness of things must aspire to it. The waves in the ocean are of differing size and velocity, but they are all wave-forms. Yet, none is a _perfect_ wave. The manifest can never _measure up_ to the form. Further, in the mental realm, there can be only one concept for triangle, regardless of how the three lines that mark it off are arranged.

We are so accustomed to thinking, unavoidably, that things consist of form _and_ matter. It should be understood, however, that matter without form is literally unimaginable. No one has ever seen matter without form. This is because form pertains to _all_ things. Although matter without form is unthinkable, the converse is not true; form _can_ be thought without matter. Things can be _present to us_ in their potential form as _pure organising idea_. The things of the world exist not only in the forms in which they are perceived by us, but in other forms which under normal circumstances we do not sense. If we learn to _think_ things in their other categories, there is the possibility of apprehending them in their totality.

I am positing both an _absolute_ and something relative to it, although I am aware that claims these days to absolutes may invite derision.3 For example, it is a brave commentator who today will go out on a limb and declare without qualification that Bach is better than the Beatles. The impartiality of modern cultural relativism makes such a claim a social aberration, since all social phenomena are deemed to be equivalent, of equal relevance. All human beings have emotions after all, and have a right to express them.

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3 By ‘absolute’ I mean an unconditional, uncompromised model or ideal whose very conception carries ethical implications. The actual produced phenomena are qualitatively relative to that model.
I have no argument with the latter proposition, but I do wonder whether the social ideal of equivalence is an attempt to avoid what is today called elitism. The inescapable reality is that art is elitist. If I were to ask the reader whether (s)he would care to listen to a symphony by Beethoven or a symphony by Bignell, the answer is surely a foregone conclusion. On what basis is that choice made if not some ideal that makes the choice both meaningful and possible? (Elitism in no way negates what I said towards the end of the previous chapter about musicality being every person’s birthright. The distinction is between product and the contemplative reception of it.)

Relativism itself has become absolute, a self-contradictory position, an “impossible combination of words” (Tillich 1967:65). If it is to be avoided, “relativism itself becomes relative,” and therefore “an element of absoluteness is not only a possibility but even a necessity, otherwise no assertion at all can be made” (1967:65) either theoretically or practically.

I agree with the thesis that if someone is moved by a particular arrangement of musical sounds it would be irrelevant to question the factual basis of their being moved. The reasoning is perplexing, however, that assumes from the start that there are no fundamental and abiding qualities that are essentially human, that human consciousness has no inherently moral dynamism of its own, so that all psychological phenomena are to be interpreted in terms of adaptation to shifting social and cultural patterns. An art can be lost in this way. It is true, I think, that we all begin with presuppositions. My starting point, and that of the scholars I present in this chapter, however, is that there are ideals (perfect forms), knowledge of which, and perhaps only which, a person is free to be human in the fullest sense, that is, by aspiring to the best of a kind. Furthermore, only by developing the deeply-felt conviction that there is something at work in music that is higher than humanity’s use of it can humanity itself evolve to something higher. As I noted in Chapter Seven, the human being can always be more human than (s)he is.

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4 Moral philosopher, Raimond Gaita, suggests that works of art that are ‘high culture’ do not have to be “condemned as elitist in a sense that implies that they express values disdainful of ordinary people and their lives” if they inspire a “worthy love.” This opinion appeared in his article titled, Re-enchantment of learning in The Australian’s Review of Books, March 2000.
Is the binary opposition avoidable? Tillich advises thinking of absoluteness not as an absolute ‘thing,’ but as pairs of terms such as infinite and finite, the conditional and the unconditional. Thinking in this way allows “something that resists the stream of relativities” (1967:67). For Tillich, knowledge, like love, is an original unity become divided into the ambiguous subject-object duality, the parts of which then seek each other in order to find unity again. The duality is essential for truth to be an actual reality, but it is also problematic; for “in every moment of truth we have overcome in some way this split between subject and object” (1967:68). Without something that endures “in the stream of changing relativities” (1967:70), the mind would become disoriented, lose itself, unable to maintain self-awareness or present-centredness. Inescapably, overcoming the split brings with it ethical responsibilities.

If we accept the existence of an absolute, even in faith, then we must also accept that there are forms relative to it. There would otherwise be no evaluational benchmark. Further, since knowledge of an absolute is measured by creative deeds, a relativist who objects to my belief in an absolute to be true must necessarily also object to my acting as if I believed it to be true. If that is so, no art is possible. No deed would be worth repeating; the pursuit of executory mastery would be a worthless enterprise. If a deed inspired by knowledge of an absolute does not differ in any fundamental way from a deed inspired by sense knowledge alone, then there is no point in talking about ethics. All such talk would be utterly superfluous. “It is only by opposing [this] determinism with freedom,” writes James, “that we can properly account for mankind’s endless struggle towards an ethical world-view, and for the fact of creative activity as made manifest... through art...” (1960:60).

What has happened I think is a confusion of an original ethos with socio-cultural phenomena. For that reason, I cannot align myself with the view of some modern relativists that human concepts are only mental constructions, that human knowing amounts to a concoction of mere fictions where objective values become a “celebration” (Guba and Lincoln 1990:146) of subjectivity, and where the “objects, elements and meanings that constitute our ‘existential reality’ are social constructions” (Gough 1991:32). There is a danger in this, namely, that the confidence in the creative freedom of the individual, founded as it is on the presupposition that the individual is free to begin with, can too easily slip over into hedonism or nihilism, that is, to the unbounded primacy of my needs, my stories, my fictions, in which case I
can never know anything of the potential of other things for themselves. I have pointed out, on the contrary, that the avoidance behaviour exhibited by many students suggests that human utterance is dependent on a self that is not free, otherwise there would be nothing enduring beyond the temporal self to aspire to. In subscribing, albeit unconsciously, to an ontological ethos, the executant attempts to transcend the self and in this way become free.

In my opinion this particular leaning of relativism has overlooked its own history. It can be traced back to the classic Cartesian dualism, Descartes’ ‘proof,’ a “... proof [that] really celebrated the power of human reason, the priority of ‘Man’ before God, the independence, self-determination, and self-affirmation of the subject” (Levin 1988:3). This is subjectivity grounded in objective reason. “When subjectivity triumphed, it imposed its will on things and brought into being a world ruled by objectivity. But in a world of objectivity, there is no place, no home, for the subject, whose subjectivity - that is to say, experience - is denied value, meaning, and ultimately any truth or reality” (1988:4). Kant subsequently concludes that things-in-themselves (noumena) exist, but that they are unknowable. Kant begins his epistemology with individual subjectivity as given, however, and overlooks the power of the moral agent.5 Nietzsche’s later endorsement of Kant’s doctrine that the “subject alone is

5 Steiner points out in The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity (1992) that to begin a theory of knowledge with subjectivity as given is unjustifiable. Barfield (1984) condenses Steiner’s argument in somewhat easier language. Since this point is at the heart of my own reasoning, it is worth quoting Barfield’s precis in full. Why is Kant’s assumption not justifiable? “Because, if we examine the thinking activity carefully, by subsequent reflection on it, we shall find that in the act of thinking, or knowing, no such distinction of consciousness exists. We are not conscious of ourselves thinking about something, but simply of something. The dualism only arises later, when the particular thought has been associated, in me, with some part of my perceptual world, whether inner or outer (sense or feeling), and has thus taken on the form of an idee - my idea. The case is quite different with feeling. Consequently, in thinking about thinking, if we are determined to make no assumptions at the outset, we dare not start with the distinction of self and not-self; for that distinction actually disappears every time we think” (1984: 208). In Steiner’s words: “Thinking must never be regarded as a merely subjective activity. Thinking transcends the distinction of subject and object. It produces these two concepts just as it produces all others. When, therefore, I, as thinking subject, refer a concept to an object, we must not regard this reference as something purely subjective. It is not the subject, but thought, which makes the reference. The subject does not think because it is a subject, rather it conceives itself to be a subject because it can think. The activity of consciousness, in so far as it thinks, is thus not merely subjective. Rather, it is neither subjective nor objective; it transcends both these concepts. I ought never to say that I, as individual subject, think, but rather that I, as subject, exist myself by the grace of thought” (1992:51-52). Notice the inversion of Descartes’ maxim. Barfield (after Steiner) sees Kant’s reasoning as based both on “an historical” and “psychological delusion” (1984:187), one which has continued to have “acknowledged supremacy” but a far wider unacknowledged influence. For that reason, he asks: “How many children, I wonder, are nowadays informed at an early age by some elder brother or some guide, philosopher, and friend, that what they see and hear and smell is not ‘nature’ but the activity of their own nerves?”(1984:184).
demonstrable” (Nietzsche 1967:307), and his affirmation that reality is only what human perspectives confer on it suggest only an endlessly self-referential world in which no genuine contact can be made with things in their essential being. To construct an epistemology on the basis of a presupposed (rather than derivative) individual subject again leads to the idea that the human agent cannot (through enhanced intentionality) be free to know reality that is not subjective, by transcending the illusion of the subject-object duality. In other words, in subscribing to the primacy of the socialised self, relativism implicitly places limits on what can be known. Because the ethical individual, the true basis of agency, is denied, the ‘God is dead’ parable is symptomatic of the accelerated “… spread of a latent culture of nihilism, cancer of the spirit, contagion of despair” (Levin 1988:4).

One contemporary scholar asserts that the problem with the liberally neutral brand of relativism that promotes “the equivalence of all assertions,” whether political, aesthetic, historical, sexual, ethnic or ethical, is that “… it requires that you suspend those very urgencies that move you to act in the world….”6 “Convictions and life allegiances are turned into preferences, much as free-speech doctrine turns all utterances into opinions.” The outcome of suspended life-urgencies, he argues, is ethical emaciation, or in his own words, “a self rendered morally thin,” and so, unable to act at all for fear of impinging “on the activities and choices of others.” I must add that when this happens, it is difficult for the person who utters musically to recognise that in giving oneself over completely - and this must be a morally free decision - to the articulation of audible beauty, in this way extinguishing the socialised self, one is behaving ethically, as I discussed in Chapter Seven. I wish to point out that if an idea is the same idea in two minds, thus allowing those minds to produce and recognise coherent forms, and be deeply moved by them, then that idea cannot be the product of those minds any more than the air they both hear by is the product of them. The organising idea is, ontologically, primordially, before it is individualised.

I am saying that an ethos is a universal idea that has become an artistic ideal, and is temporally anterior to culture; it is, in short, an absolute. In these terms, then, relativism in art

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6 I am quoting Stanley Fish in the Higher Education Supplement in the Australian newspaper of 26 January, 2000. It is his own adaptation from his very recent book, The Trouble with Principle, published in December 1999, a copy of which I have at the time of writing been unable to acquire.
is tantamount to non-art, or artifice. When the ethical ideal, distinguished from abstract ideals, is disavowed, value is removed, and the result is bathos, or polished surfaces. For me, that is the state of artistic production today. Here, it is the hedonistic self, the creative genius that assumes prominence. (This too, is a relatively late arrival in humanity’s history, as I will discuss in the Chapter Eleven.) The pursuit of self-justification in art, however, signifies a loss of an ethos, which is an artistic absurdity. (This equation of the absolute with ethics is apparent historically in Plato’s absolutism, which I will discuss below.)

The connection of relativism with a literal reading of the world should not be overlooked. Literalism says things are; absolutism says there is the best of a kind, that there is a thing that is better in its class than other things. The problem consists in this: a thing that is best, that has the last word, as it were, must be eternal, for nobody has yet ‘heard,’ literally, the perfect form. Notwithstanding the problems associated with positing an eternal, what is it that gives the musical deed any value at all if not knowledge of a ‘best,’ a superlative, an “exemplary model” (Eliade 1971:xiv), which, by definition, is not physically attainable and is therefore archetypal?

Does not the term ‘purity of expression’ put the emphasis back on the utterance itself by presupposing some untainted ideal free of any overtly personal dynamic? Would not musicality, in its essence, consist in knowing that archetype, in the sense of striving for non-subjective certitude that it is? The musician knows this form on some level. As I discussed in Chapter Seven, however, a problem associated with knowing it consists in taking responsibility for it, for responsibility implies nakedness. There are no excuses to hide behind when there is the ever-present possibility that what one produces is not the best of its kind. Nevertheless, surely the notions of truth and error - error being synonymous with an ethical untruth - make sense only in the light of something that is beyond change, beyond the relative. Would it not be that by which the relative is measured? Does that absolute ‘actually exist?’

The conflict is embedded in the epistemological distinction between knowing the ideal, and knowing that I know it. It is the classic Aristotelean problem: How is it I can know something well enough to seek it, and even recognise it when I encounter it, yet not know it so that I am compelled to seek it in the first place? Musical utterance, if it is artistic, strives for the highest good. In other words, there is an ethics of utterance, (the history of which I will
present as I proceed.) “A moral question,” says William James, “is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist” (1967:34). Things that are good and that do exist are relative to a highest good. Moral questions are questions of worth, of value. But the value of a thing cannot be gauged from its sensible appearance. It is as impossible to know the value of the highest good from sensible manifestations as it is to know the value of a coin from the numbers stamped on its surface.

By way of emphasising that it is an ethical ideal I am speaking about, I will defer to other authors. Witzenmann, for example, writes: “Today it is no longer possible to answer this question instinctively, as in former times, by leaving artistic activity to its own devices. What instinct once achieved can only survive as decadence” (1986:43-44). Kühlewind, a prolific writer on cognition, puts this thought another way: “It is not hard to realise that creativity cannot be traced back to its own products. For consciousness, there remains the task to turn itself to the sources of its creativity” (1990:39). Winkler addresses this ethical dilemma with perhaps more frankness than the nihilistic self is yet ready to entertain. He regards the specific nature of it as the dissolution of the individual’s “freedom of moral decision” (1960:46): “Man is a spiritual as well as a physical being. He lives in a world of ideas and in a world of tangible objects. If he loses confidence in the reality of one of them, he automatically destroys the validity of the other. What remains is chaos” (1960:43).

My aim so far has been to establish that the enduring absolute (the history and dimensions of which I have yet to explore) is the ideal form, which, just because it is not relative, enables the production of manifest forms relative to it, and in this way brings into play an ethical function, conscious knowledge of which would necessitate taking responsibility for it. Telling the artistic truth means to tear off the mask of social convention or compliance in order to become an individual.

Every genuine attempt to create musically is at the same time an instance of an ethical deed, which, because it raises human behaviour above the instinctive, puts the executant in the position of reliving Hamlet’s dilemma: to be or not. That is an ethical question. We are, certainly; but we are also what we are not. The greatest difficulty of being human is that the human being is, unavoidably, a self. It is not, however, a social difficulty, but an ethical one,
rooted in the ontology of the capacity for moral decision. The lover and the holy person can after all be both humble and rapacious, depending on whether moral decision has been exercised or not. It is for that reason that Chesterton argues that “... a permanent possibility of selfishness [and selflessness] arises from the mere fact of having a self, and not from any accident of education or ill-treatment” (1950:73); nor, I feel obliged to add, from conformity to any social idealism.

A musically artistic way of being, then, is a task of ethical individuation, “... a task which can only be achieved if we are committed, as individuals, to developing our potentiality-for-being - and to doing this in ongoing responsiveness to the question of being as it figures in our historical experience” (Levin 1988:11). The task of ethical individuation is one that points beyond the socialised self, and for that reason alone, impacts on the society to which it belongs by contributing to its renewal. Community derives from individuals. The whole is not the sum of the parts. The individual is the society, the culture, the collectivity. Ethical individuation is a spiritual project.

The Music-Mathematics Equation in History

One way of discovering just how society has arrived at the split between the act and the wisdom informing it, which, for the student translates as the now disjunct relation between the ideal form and the product, is to apply phenomenological and speculative method to its origins and its history.

It is informative, for example, to observe that prior to the advent of modern physical science around the seventeenth century - where “... the machine appears [for the first time] as paradigm...” (Levin 1988:3) - and the apocalyptic changes it brought with regard to humanity’s relation to the physical world, the laws of intevalvic relations were the only cognitive certainties (in the sense that it was the ear above all that provided assurance of number in the absence of mathematical notation as we know it), while the physical world was enigmatic in the extreme (Godwin 1982). That relation is very different today. Although many of the riddles of the physical world have been solved - solved at least in physical terms - with the result that the world has become a safer place, most of its citizens have not the faintest inkling of the mystery
inherent in numerical and tonal ratios. There is, writes Godwin, a “musical mathematics” lying “at the very centre of archaic thought” (1982:373). According to R.J. Stewart, it is significant that modern musicology has been unable to grasp not only “this complex texture of musical symbolism” but also “the remarkable power of pre-literate musical memory” (1987:146).³

With that picture in mind, a question emerges which I see as critical for the more evolved consciousness of today. On the face of it, poetry, by virtue of its rhythm and metre, would seem to bear a closer resemblance to music than number. Is there something in number of a poetic nature that eludes present-day apprehension? I ask the question for the reason that most modern musicians appear to show little interest in (theoretical) mathematics.⁴ After all, the formal study of mathematics is not included in music curriculum today, whereas in the period between the Egypto-Chalcean civilisation up until well into the Middle Ages, music and mathematics were scholastically inseparable. Does the loss of the sense for ‘musical mathematics’ suggest that in our intellectual evolution we have reduced a mensural dynamic to a theoretical abstraction of reckoning? Can we say that we modern humans are mathematicians in some inexplicably clairaudient sense about which we have lost all awareness? I believe the answers to these questions are affirmative, as I will endeavour to show.

The connection of music with mathematics and geometry dates even before the Pythagorean Brotherhood, which, however, formalised the relation. For the Pythagoreans, the musical experience, the very one that can move us to tears, was a recognition, not of numbers, but the very nature of number, of measure. Why the encounter with number should be so moving is indeed an enigma. Indeed, even to speak of number and deep feeling in the same breath seems contradictory at best.

My view is that to conceive of music as number theory is in one sense a correct conception, but only if we regard both as having independence of the physical world as Plato

³ Godwin calls for a revision of the common view of the so-called ‘primitive’ mind: “For if one does not merely read and learn the facts, but makes the imaginative effort of recreating these facts and systems in a largely illiterate culture, then the capacity of the ancients for juggling notes and numbers in their heads, and their enormous enthusiasm for doing so, become simply awesome. It leads one to a complete reversal of the common view of our ancestors’ intelligence and sophistication” (1982:378).
⁴ I recall in my own schooling the concepts of trigonometry and calculus being totally alien. My failure to grasp them resulted in my failing every test. I am sure this abysmal effort contributed to my general feeling of academic ineptitude.
divined. The number Plato had in mind is a cosmic measure. To paraphrase Emerson, musical forms are “apparent copies of unapparent natures” (1907:596). “Is mathematics invention or discovery?” (1990:126) inquires Roger Penrose. Is mathematics an elaborate edifice of human consciousness, or is it a revelation of pre-existent truth?

It is evident from Plato’s dialogues, The Republic and The Timaeus, that for the Pythagoreans, numbers were the expression of the highest truths, and that the phenomenal world in its entirety was interpreted by them numerically. (I will address Plato’s epistemology in more depth in the next section.) For the Pythagoreans, numerical relations were not just facts; they were experiences. This is difficult for us to envisage.

Even so, I want to make the point that numbers have a qualitative dimension, the direct apprehension of which seems to have been lost to us. (For verification it is worth reading McClain’s groundbreaking text (1984) in which he interprets - perhaps a better word would be ‘translates’ - Plato’s notoriously ambiguous discourses by means of Pythagorean number code. I emphasise the latter because at this time Greek scholars were members of Mystery Schools whose scholarship was conducted in secret in order to preserve the mysteries, and whose knowledge was for that reason withheld from the populace at large.) For the Pythagoreans, the numerical relations in music were actually experienced as numerical relations, and not just heard. Music for them was the unmediated experience of numerical laws (see also Kayser 1970).

For us now, there is no obvious sensible connection between numeracy and musical qualities. (For this reason I maintain that reversion to number theory as a means of accessing music’s noumena is inappropriate, though doubtless, fascinating, for modern consciousness.) Nevertheless, we cannot deny that there is tone quality and interval quality, which are not experienced by us in this manner any longer. The question is why that experience is no longer the norm. What has changed it, and in what ways has it changed?

Both music and mathematics are concerned with abstract relations. The difference between them, according to Storr, is that “... the theorems of mathematics can be proved, whereas the ‘truths’ of music are of a different order” (1992:182). This is a highly contentious
statement in view of Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, which maintains that the proof that a system of mathematics is consistent cannot be verified within that system. Can this be because the systems are no longer experienced, but merely abstracted from experience as mathematical symbolism and used as operational devices? All tonal systems are after all mathematical systems, as acoustic science demonstrates. The recording technology we all assume as a fact of modern life would be out of the question without this mathematical reckoning.

Storr goes on to assert that the ‘different order’ of certitude for human cognition is that the measure in music is not apprehended logically, but aesthetically. This further distinction, however, sheds no light on the riddle. What, after all, distinguishes logical from aesthetic apprehension?

Hegel provides an initial clue about a supersensible manner of apprehension by pointing out that modern mathematics “proceeds on the surface, does not touch the thing itself, its essence or Notion, and therefore fails to comprehend it” (1977:26). Perception has changed since Greek times in fundamental ways, to the extent that true perception no longer happens at all, but rather, judging, comparing, drawing conclusions based on theoretical symbolism that has been previously learned (Heidegger 1987, Steiner 1973 and 1982). It is not perception that deceives, as we are often led to believe, but rather, judgement, perception for the sake of human utility or instrumentality. The view that theory has supplanted experience seems at first glance to accord with that of the modern relativist position that all knowledge is ‘theory-laden,’ a view I shall take up in due course.

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6 “It has been demonstrated by Gödel that every embodiment of classical mathematics in a formalism must be incomplete; there are always mathematical truths which are not embodied in theorem-formulae” (Körner 1960:88).
10 It is worth noting that in the Pythagorean Plato is seen the absence of notational devices. By the time the mathematical philosopher Leibnitz arrives in the eighteenth century, such cognitive mastery of complicated deductions is impossible without an appropriate symbolism (Körner 1960).
11 Hegel, one of few philosophers to present an argued-through discourse on a spiritual aesthetic in which art reveals the absolute, maintains that art was at its highest point in the Greek civilization and never recovered thereafter (1993).
Music as Ethos - The Greek Experience

A useful way of approaching the riddle is to examine what the word ‘theory’ meant to the Greeks; for it would seem that between their time and ours number theory has converted a concrete experience into something it is not. In other words, measuring by formula has not only replaced the experience of the phenomenon, but now precludes it, to the extent that the phenomenon is no longer participated. In other words, the experience is no longer as complete as it once was.

Heidegger argues that it is crucial to understand the transformation undergone by numerical values in the transition from the Greek to the Roman epochs, a transformation corresponding with a particular change in consciousness from noumenal perception - another term, though with undesirable connotations in the current age might be atavistic clairvoyance\(^\text{12}\) - to phenomenal perception, amounting to a loss of qualitative perception. In tracing the meaning of the word theoria, Heidegger uncovers the transition from experience to theory:

That particular way of life (bios) that receives its determination from theorein and devotes itself to it the Greeks call bios theoreitikos, the way of life of the beholder, the one who looks upon the pure shining-forth of that which presences... for the Greeks, bios theoreitikos, the life of beholding, is, essentially in its purest form as thinking, the highest doing.\(^\text{13}\) Theoria, in itself, and not only through the utility attached to it, is the consummate form of human existence (1977:164).

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\(^\text{12}\) Clairvoyance in its simplest connotation means clear seeing.

\(^\text{13}\) I have been drawn while reading Heidegger to his frequent use of the verb ‘to behold’ in all its forms; for it is used often by Goethe and thereafter by Steiner, who studied Goethe’s phenomenological method of observation: beholding. Briefly described, beholding is the art of creating perspective on one’s experience of a thing or event by means of inner mental pictures (Vorstellung) that correlate to the inner dynamics of the reality experienced. Insofar as image-making is more than a regurgitation of residual mental pictures from the past, it may be seen as a challenge to the theory of representation. In beholding, the human being becomes a living mirror of the noumenal realm. It is, in short, the method I have described as imaginal cognition, and for my own musical purposes, musing. For an evocative example of the distinction between theoretical investigation and experience as ways of arriving at knowledge of reality, it is worth noting Goethe’s emphatic repudiation of Newton’s theory of colour, which reduces colour (quality) to formula. Scientific instruments in this case brought about a quantification of reality. For Goethe, colour was not reducible to anything else, especially number. Colour, for him, was the outcome of the battle between the forces of light and darkness. He did not theorise this; he beheld it (Bortoft 1986, Steiner 1988c).
Heidegger’s segment gives some idea of the high regard ascribed by the Greeks to thinking as non-instrumental, non-utilitarian, thinking out of love for the act of thinking, thinking as ethos, thinking as Being.

The later Roman perspective, which evidences a change in the mode of consciousness, converted theoria into contemplatio, meaning, according to Heidegger, “a looking-at that sunders and compartmentalises” (1977:166), or subjugation of the thing to measurement. Beholding becomes representation, perception becomes judgement, and love of the act of beholding becomes wilful control of the thing. In this transition the Greek experience is lost, and with it, supersensible wisdom.¹⁴ (I will argue subsequently that the same fate was suffered by language, although this historical shift seems also to have been overlooked by both positivism and relativism.)

Levin writes (after Heidegger) of the transition:

The sense of what it means for human beings - mortals - to undertake a theoretical observation of nature, a sense which, if we are silent and very attentive, we may still hear in the ancient Greek words, is completely missing today, buried and forgotten long ago under many sedimental layers of errant and narrowed awareness. In the triumph of theoretical-instrumental vision, much has been gained - but much, perhaps too much, has been sacrificed (1988:100).

Heidegger himself points out that after the Greek experience, things are regarded as being merely finished and as such available to everyone, already there, no longer embodying any world - now man does as he pleases with what is available. The essent (every being) becomes an object, either to be beheld (view, image) or to be acted upon (product and calculation). The original world-making power, Physis, degenerates into prototype to be copied and imitated. Nature becomes a special field,

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¹⁴ Merry describes this transition in another way: “In the Greek civilisation, consciousness deepened itself in Feeling; and through Feeling, Thought was truly inspired. To love wisdom was to be a philosopher. To feel wisdom, was to be a sculptor .... Later, Rome brought the predominance of the idea of the State, and the purity of the older culture began to decline” (1980:5). The reason Merry gives the State prominence here is to emphasise that for the first time human cognition begins to doubt itself, as it must if it can no longer participate in its phenomena. In the shift from cognitive feeling to representational thought is seen the beginnings of the demise of a previously undoubted spiritual world, itself the natural outcome of supersensible vision. The uncertainty was to do with the emerging question of just what authority was to oversee world destiny. Was it to be the Gods, or humanity?
differentiated from art and everything that can be fashioned according to plan. The original emergence and standing of energies, the phainesthai, or appearance in the great sense of a world epiphany, becomes a visibility of things that are already there and can be pointed out. The eye, the vision, which originally projected the project into potency, becomes a mere looking at or looking over or gaping at. Vision has degenerated into mere optics ... (1987:62-63).

I want to pursue further the notion of the concrete experience of numerical relations in the Greek civilisation. What Heidegger seems to be asserting is that, for the Greeks, the world of numerical values was as yet unsullied by the dead abstraction it was to become; that is to say, for the Greeks, the experience of number was concrete in cognition. Today these relations are either felt by virtue of their becoming sentient body-based experiences as "an unconscious counting exercise of the soul" (von Lange 1992:94) if we believe Leibnitz, or, they are thought about through separation of thought and feeling, or, to use a modern metaphor, head and heart. The more obvious manifestation of the latter is the historical parting of the ways of science (acoustics) and aesthetic experience (art), a split, which, for the Greeks, would have been unthinkable.

Von Lange suggests, however, that this Greek manner of musical apprehension itself constituted a significant cognitional shift from that characteristic of the preceding Egyptian civilisation. She writes that it occurred at a time when "human consciousness had to accomplish the transition from the mythological [the pictorial] to the conceptual" (1992:19). "One can understand," she continues, "the great transforming deed of Pythagoras, who established this conceptual element by identifying the relationship of musical intervals with number, in order to strengthen the development of logical thought by way of musical feeling" (1992:19). It is ironic that music was "the first physical science to become fully mathematized" (McClain 1984:3). In that instruments were tuned to the laws of mathematics, the idea of music became phenomenal, that is, audible to the physical ear of the beholder, the earthly citizen. This latter comment may seem far-fetched if the effort is not made, as I stated in Chapter Three, to place oneself in the Greek mind. "We must realise," states von Lange, "that the symbols 1,2,3 etc., grown so abstract today, released in the soul of Pythagoras a deep experience of the music of the spheres" (von Lange 1992:27 my emphasis).
Here, finally, is the psycho-astrological connection. What we see happening is a musical experience of the nature of thought and feeling, experienced intentionality achieved through the felt experience of music. "Thought appeared in the garment of number" (1992:27). The picture here is one, not of personal feeling, but of cognitive feeling, feeling imbued with thought, enabling the apprehension of evidential coherence. The sense of order, pattern and structure is of the nature of feeling.

That pattern engages feeling is evident, according to Storr, in the observation that its antithesis, chaos, is distressing. Pattern alleviates the distress of perceptual chaos, which is ultimately disorienting. When feeling is absent there is no 'measure and grace,' in Platonic terminology (see quotation below). "We take delight," Storr continues, "in perceiving coherence where there was none before; we take pleasure in contemplating perfect form" (1992:182 my emphasis). (The higher structuring of our experience into ideal patterns of relation may be a notional definition of art.) The ideal form for the Greeks, however, was not the sensual form of modern aesthetics; it was the form that is the outcome of beholding. These are two fundamentally different forms of receptivity, understanding of which is vital to my contention that musical utterance is an ethical way of knowing. The distinction lies in the immanent and transcendent functions of the feeling element in intentionality.

All this suggests that the modern mind has lost the qualitative connection with number insofar as it relates to it in an entirely different (predominantly physical, self-conscious distinguished from self-less) manner from the Greeks. If I am right, this loss has enormous implications for my work; for it means that quality (the unadulterated purity of the living formative principle) has been previously, and can be now, experienced, but only on the condition that listening become selfless in a fully conscious manner. In this way the listener "reaches through [the] senses to the ethical" (von Lange1992:ii), one might say, 'beholds' the ethical. "An inner acoustic awakens, which can become an organ for the moral world-order lying at the basis of artistic creation" (1992:ii).
Plato’s Absolutism

That there was a vitally felt ethical content in Greek musical culture can be seen in the dialogues of Plato, for whom there was no compromise whatever on the judicious application of the Greek musical modes to daily life. “There is no talk in … Plato about some action being ‘right in the circumstances,’ or ‘right for the particular person who did it.’ Plato’s teachings are … without qualification” (Morris 1957:38). Plato’s acute sensibilities enabled him to discern that certain modes (scales) could excite the baser passions while others had a calming effect.\(^\text{15}\)

Consider this passage in *Timaeus*:

All sound is given us for the sake of harmony, which has motions akin to the orbits of our soul, and which, as anyone who makes intelligent use of the arts knows, is not to be used, as is commonly thought, to give irrational pleasure, but as a heaven-sent ally in reducing to order and harmony any disharmony in the revolutions within us. Rhythm, again, was given us from the same heavenly source to help us in the same way; for most of us lack measure and grace (1977:65 my emphasis).

The salient point here is the equation of measure and order with a state of grace or ethos.\(^\text{16}\) In Plato’s absolutism, aesthetic pleasure was not to be cultivated for its own sake as it is now, for the latter relies on listening that is not selfless, and rather, serves personal gratification by way of arousal. The highest form of love (empathy) for Plato was entirely a thing of the spirit, and had nothing to do with gratification of the needs of the embodied self, that is, in striving to subordinate the love of beholding to personal needs and desires.

I think Plato was right. For him “... mathematics is a timeless truth which lies beyond the apparent look of things and is a critic of our fleeting opinions.” In his view, “mathematics measures us and not we it” (Bigger 1968:8-9). “We shall see,” writes Bigger,

\(^{15}\) I am not speaking here of the organising principles of melody, harmony or rhythm inducing responses in the listener, but of basic modes achieving that result. For the Greeks, the mode was melody (melos). It would be difficult to induce such a response in the average listener today by way of the diatonic scale.

\(^{16}\) It is perhaps not surprising that early Christian doctrine was Platonic. Consider St. Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Thologica*, where he posits God as the measure of Grace. “St Paul (Eph. 4:7) says, ‘To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ’ ” (Glenn 1963:181). But since Grace itself admits no degrees, it can be greater of lesser only according to the capacity and readiness of the recipient. Grace can only ever be received, not given. Measure must be taken, that is, appropriated by human beings and taken to another order of relevance altogether from its divine status. This theme will gain significance in my discussion below.
that soul in Plato is constructed in accordance with same and other divided by
harmonic and geometric ratios (Timaeus, 34C-36D): this, to speak in a more modern
mode, is to state the fact that there are mathematical conditions to which any
interactive transaction must conform (1968:161 my emphasis).

It is music as ethos I am trying to illuminate here. Even for the pre-Pythagorean Greeks,
music was most often associated with the god Apollo (he who knows all but is nothing) and not
Dionysus (he who is all but knows nothing.) The polarity is one of morality over against
instinct, beholding over against sensuality.

This musical ethos persisted through the Middle Ages up until the advent of modern
science, or better, the scientific way of thinking, as Jamie James reports:

For Kepler just as for Pythagoras, the major third, which is defined by the ratio 4:5, is
not a pair of notes to be twanged on a lyre or plucked on the keyboard of a virginal,
although those are valid expressions of it; rather it is a mathematical ideal of a divine
substance, that need not even be expressed in order to exist, for it is eternal

In the Greek mind, all harmony - meaning order - and not just the musical kind, is a kind
of musical receptivity in which the beholder recognises and classifies continuous qualities by
correlation with numerical and geometrical configurations that are archetypal.

The main finding of my historical search is the insight that the emergence of the modern
(though still in some quarters somewhat heterodox) view of music as an expression of ‘nothing
but itself’ can be ascribed to the reasoning that if music is reducible neither to logico-linguistic
explanation nor to image, it cannot therefore logically be an expression of anything. But this
deduction draws on the very logic it purports to reject, and in so doing lays open the
epistemological omission. The experience of the Pythagoreans as revealed in Plato’s dialogues
forces us to revise that view; for it is clear that music was, indeed, an expression of something,
namely, the harmony of the spheres. Music did express a vision of the universe outside itself.
However, as knowledge of cosmic wisdom diminished it left an epistemic vacuum of the
distinct complexion of doubt.

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For Greek philosophy, musical utterance is the answer to ourselves as cosmic question. However nebulous this may seem for us, it would be premature to denounce the Greek experience as primitive, sentimental, unfounded, or worse, merely the product of an overactive imagination. In my opinion, the belief that music refers to nothing outside itself is one reason for its aesthetic seclusion, marginalisation as a trivial mystery, and finally, its classification by Hegel (1993) and others as an insignificant entertainment. Indeed, it is interesting to observe in the last 300 years how aesthetic theory incorporating an aesthetic of the spiritual clashes fundamentally with theory based primarily on sensuality. What is missing is knowledge of the supersensible archetype of measure, which is at the same time the ethos. In this complexity lies an explanation for the epistemological omission.

By far the most important aesthetic, educational and ethical implications for my work in what I have discussed is this: *qualitative* listening (hearkening) in the sense in which the Greeks - and subsequently Goethe, Heidegger, Coleridge, Steiner and others - understood it (beholding) is not concerned with attention to dynamic, intonation, tempo fluctuation, tone quality, phrasing, in short, all the aesthetic elements which we today value as music, and which make such a strong appeal to the self-conscious mind, but on the formative principle working *in* them. This does not in the least imply that music for the Greeks was sterile or devoid of feeling, but rather, that they regarded the numerical relations of which it is composed as absolutes, that is, archetypes of unequivocal truth, ‘the pure shining forth of that which presences.’ Their apprehension is by way of cognitive, and not personal, feeling. When the archetypal forms are beheld, distinguished from represented, nothing needs to be *added* to the experience. Nothing needs to be asserted by the knower. It is the qualitative in *this* sense only that opens the window to non-subjective intelligible experience. ‘Non-subjective’ here means permitting oneself to be shaped by the inner nature of the phenomenon with which one is engaged, that is, by *participating* in the phenomenon, beholding it, a method of apprehension which, by definition, excludes personal sympathy, antipathy, association, personal opinion, judgement based on memory, utility and instrumentality. This manner of beholding by way of non-subjective feeling is what Heidegger (1962) terms ‘letting come forth.’
Intuitionist Mathematics and Plato’s Forms

Like most modern musicians I show no particular interest in theoretical mathematics. It is perhaps obvious from the discussion above, however, that I have had to take an interest in its philosophy at least. In my reading I have uncovered a close resemblance between Pythagorean number theory and a modern branch of mathematics known as Intuitionism, which not only rejects conventional mathematical symbolism, but holds that “the subject matter … is intuited non-perceptual objects and constructions which are introspectively self-evident” (Körner 1960:120). The important shift here is from inspection to introspection, for since Greek times the progression has been in the opposite direction from introspection to inspection. To the intuitionist, “the logic of mathematics is validated by self-evident mathematical constructions” (1960:140) which, by definition, need no further evidence, and thus, have no need either of logic or language. I am particularly drawn to this segment written by the intuitionist, L.E.J. Brouwer:

The first act of intuitionism completely separates mathematics from mathematical language, in particular from the phenomena of language which are described by theoretical logic, and recognises that intuitionist mathematics is an essentially languageless activity of the mind having its origin in the perception of a move of time, i.e. of the falling apart of a life moment into two distinct things, one of which gives way to the other, but is retained by memory. If the two-ity thus born is divested of all quality, there remains the empty form of the common substratum of all two-ities. It is this common substratum, this empty form, which is the basic intuition of mathematics (Körner 1960:122).

This statement is of the sort whose flavour intensifies incrementally with repeated readings. It contains so much that it is difficult to know just where to begin to unpack it. What attracted me to it initially, however, was the cluster of references that accord with Plato’s philosophy, namely, languageless, cognitive activity, temporal movement, the principle of polarity and the empty form.

17 The truth status of the intuitionist claim is noted also by Kühlewind: “In modern times, the ability to produce the truth out of oneself is revealed in the abstract capacity to work out the truths of mathematics and pure physics quite independently of sense-perception and experiment” (1985:90).
One way of approaching these elements is to summarise the essentials of Pythagorean epistemology and those of Plato whose own epistemology derives from them, and then compare them with the content of the above segment. In this way I intend to show that human knowing is influenced today by general, though unformulated, metaphysical convictions about measure that are inherent in consciousness as prescription rather than description.

The essentials of Pythagorean theory are these:

- The precise numerical ratios in musical intervals, for example, 1:2, 2:3, 3:4 are considered the key to the comprehension of all order, even into the biophysical realm.

- Musical order is the paradigm for universal order.

- The contextual field of sound as a whole is reduced to order by imposing the system of ratios on it.

- Abstractions are reduced to number; the number two, for example represents evil while the number four represents justice, and so on, suggesting an ethics of number. Number is metaphoric.

- Contemplation of the mathematical constructions (measure) of the Divine kosmos (the term was coined by Pythagoras to mean orderly and unchanging) leads to the thinker resembling that reality, that is, the better one knows the Divine cosmic measure, the more one comes to resemble it. This might be considered a definition of beholding.

- The notion of the soul (the word psyche belongs to Pythagoras), distinguished from the physical body is introduced into philosophy.

While not wishing to avoid the detail, I want to point out here the intense concern with kosmos, that is, with consciousness of Origin, and with maintaining that connection. Pythagoras offers an orderly world, a kosmos that is at the same time an ethos, a world of light, of thought-feeling, of transparency. Notice, however, that already there is a polarity of soul and body, which suggests an unrest and upward surging of the (fallen) soul in the act of striving to re-establish union with a former state of cosmic order or grace.
In moving on to Plato, it is important to distinguish between, first, reality and appearance, and second, knowledge (episteme) and belief (doxa). Reality for Plato is a noumenal realm, a realm of Forms, what later philosophy was to call Ideas. The numbers 1, 2, 3 and so on are Forms, that is, objective, invariant, absolute principles that do not derive from convention or empirical agreement. (I must emphasise that these numbers are not the visible symbols we use to denote quantities of things, but Forms.) The Forms are not sense-perceptible, and are apprehended only in thought while the variant objects of belief, or appearances, are apprehended by the senses.

A sense-impression is a particular example of a universal Form, an absolute, and cannot amount to knowledge of what is perceived. The sense-impression, then, must be made to correlate with a universal, the real object of thought or reason, if we are to truly know it. (Knowledge of beauty, for example, is a mental state, distinguished from belief in beautiful objects; for the latter is not cognisance of beauty itself, but only sense knowledge, which is to say in Plato’s terms, not knowledge at all.)

Here Plato is continuing the theme of polarity - in the sense that every Form must produce a manifest opposite as the condition of its existence - which Pythagoras had already established.

For Plato, then, humanity contains within itself two worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal, the form and the Form, the latter apprehensible by the mind.\(^\text{18}\) (This polarity has been taken up as duality since Plato’s time by many philosophers and comes to its strongest

\(^{18}\) I have emphasised ‘two worlds’ in order to clear up a common misunderstanding pertaining to Plato’s epistemology. Many scholars attribute - erroneously and unfairly in my view - the beginning of dualism to Plato. It is the current extensive perspective that assumes that Plato is literal-minded, when his reading of the world is actually metaphoric. The Forms cannot be understood by a way of thinking that is based on experience of the world of solidity, that is, by way of the spatio-diachronic perspective. Bortol suggests that, “… it is the extensive perspective which is the source of the two-world theory” (1996:346). He explains: “It has often been supposed that Plato made the mistake of hypothesizing a mental abstraction and then separating it from the things from which it has been abstracted. For example, according to this view, the Form which is Beauty is the result of abstracting what is common to many particular instances of beauty, and then imagining that Beauty itself is somehow supposed to exist apart from these instances. In other words, it seems as if Plato had made the mistake of duplicating the world unnecessarily - the resulting dualism is often called the two-world theory. However, careful reading of Plato soon makes it clear that this confusion exists in the minds of those who attribute it to Plato and not in that of Plato himself” (1996:346). It is actually neo-Platonism that perpetuated the error of dualism. Plato shows how the sensible and supersensible realms are reconciled. His epistemology is not one of a Cartesian-grounded duality, but a theory of polarity.

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and most detailed explication in Kant.) Importantly, the two worlds are not two different things, but different degrees of manifestation of the \textit{same} thing.\textsuperscript{19} Heidegger etymologises the word \textit{Phänomenon} as, \textit{"that which shows itself in itself"} (1992:51).

The very nature of the noumenal realm (of Forms) is that it cannot be comprehended by the same method by which the phenomenal realm is comprehended. However, (contra Kant) the noumenal \textit{can} be cognised by us \textit{through} the phenomenon; for the mystery, its hidden meaning, is reflected \textit{in} it.\textsuperscript{20} Ouspensky explains: \textit{"... each phenomenon is the finite expression, in the sphere of our knowledge through the organs of sense, of something infinite"}(1949:116). The phenomenon is the expression in space and/or time of a given noumenon. (Steiner’s whole epistemological project (1981 and1992), and mine in this thesis, consists, after the Platonic Goethe, in developing the perceptual faculties to which the noumenon \textit{is} available.) Just as Goethe’s \textit{Urpflanze} is the entity that is active in the creation of all plant phenomena, so the archetypal tone and interval comprise the creative ground of all musical manifestations.

In Plato’s terms, an \textit{art} of human utterance must surely encompass, if not begin from, the study of the hidden in the real, the inaudible in the audible; for the law of the audible (form) is that it arises out of the inaudible (Form). The \textit{art}, distinguished from sense-perception of the phenomena, must begin within, that is, in contemplative beholding.

\textsuperscript{19} In contradistinction to Kant (1965), Goethe realised that there is no ‘behind-the-phenomena.’ Kant admitted the \textit{possibility} of the existence of a spiritual, conscious world, while Goethe insisted on the possibility of communion with it. How? The communion must be sense-free. \textit{Thinking} discovers what is hidden to the senses: the noumenon. The \textit{idea} that lives in the mind is what is contained in the object, and as such, is non-subjective. It is in this way that Goethe discovered the \textit{Urphänomenon}, the archetype, the supersensible form or principle that manifests in an individualised way in each thing. It does not exist physically, but \textit{can} be perceived by thinking sufficiently potentised. The same spiritual principle that works in the phenomenon also works in the human mind. To put this another way, thinking is latent in the unconscious of the human organism as a mental faculty; but this is the very same thing that is working within the phenomenon formatively. Goethe practised Platonic epistemology.

\textsuperscript{20} Although \textit{noumenon} or thing-in-itself is a Kantian term, Schopenhauer had earlier asserted that human perception is limited by the senses and cognition, and perhaps more pertinently, by our concepts of space, time and causality. For both Schopenhauer and Kant the noumenal realm is not accessible \textit{by any means}. The best we can do is \textit{represent} this realm as phenomena. Storr, however, makes an important comment: “But, if this is true, it must follow, as a correlative concept, that things-in-themselves exist, and that they have their being in an underlying reality to which our categories of space, time and causality do not apply. For it makes no sense to say that our perceptions are subjective or partial unless there is a reality which is supposedly objective and complete, even if we have no access to it” (1992:129).
How does this revelation of polarity pertain to the ethical? For the philosopher-poet, Plato, the mystery of music is also the mystery of our pre-conscious knowledge. (His theory of anamnesis translates as the recollection of pre-earthly existence, or cosmic memory.) Music ‘embodies’ the secrets of the universe. For Plato ... sound was the primary guide to ‘interiority.’ Movement is the ‘embodied movement’ of the soul through which creation becomes manifest. Without ordered movement [applicable to human conduct] we are in the field of ‘non-being.’ Music, being an art of pure relations, offers the primary examples of aesthetic ‘being’ (McClain 1984:31).

The psyche is conceived as a musical mirror (musica speculativa) of the kosmos. When Plato exhorts the citizens to become ethical, he means, profoundly musical, not by playing a musical instrument, but by giving attention to, and taking responsibility for, the movements of the psyche, by noting which modes correspond to which moods or temperaments. (For this reason, his ideal State (polis), the republic, is to be constructed according to musical principles, intervallic relations.)

Plato is speaking of (inverse) perspective; for he knew it was the psyche-kosmos relation that determines the way a person is and acts. When he speaks of measure (Timaeus) he infers that mathematics moves, as does the constellation of the soul. The notion is one of sympathetic resonance. Music gives “form to the very structures of ... consciousness,” says Moore (1990:195 my emphasis). Plato is speaking of music as the very condition of psychological health and conduct, the attainment of which consists in the citizens becoming masters of their own cognitive forces. The imposition of order, he avers, is evoked from within.

Knowing is ethical insofar as it is the ethical, the ‘letting come forth,’ that guides knowing. The Form or idea does not draw the sense experience together; it brings about what is to be experienced. The automatic, the habitual, the sheer automatism of cognitive activity is amoral, and prompts Plato to teach that the person who keeps an eye to “the eternally unchanging” (Form) as the “pattern for the form and function of his product” (1977:41) must achieve a good result. To use as a model something that has already come to be is to replicate unmindfully, and the result is not good. What is eternal and unchanging is clearly, for Plato, the source of intelligibility, and thus, of real knowledge. It is not possible for the sensible form
to have the attribute of permanency, of timelessness, for it is subject to the ravages of time, and thus, decay. Plato’s distinction between “that which always is and never becomes and that which is always becoming but never is” (1977:40) comprises the polarity of the enduring and the perishable. Notice the poise of tension between the two. Importantly, this polarity is (contra Darwinism) by design, for it is precisely design or intelligence that is excluded by chance. Plato makes us cognisant of the mortality, the transitoriness of the physical existence of things. For Plato, permanency, the enduring, is immaterial. It is crucial to appreciate that this perspective is the inverse of the modern materialistic mindset.

I believe there are in Platonic philosophy distinct indications of an epistemological education the relevance of which for modernity has been consistently overlooked, and for musical education as ethical education. In my opinion Plato’s dialogues have been interpreted largely by way of detached intellectual curiosity rather than cognitive participation in their content. His writing is metaphoric and analogic because it could not be otherwise. His knowing was still the participatory kind. His insistence on the juxtaposition of Being and becoming, Form and form, macrocosmos (World Soul) and microcosmos (individual soul), Reason and sense, together suggest, not duality, but a complementarity principle (in numerical/musical relations translating as cyclical reciprocity), and further, that he was fully aware of the amorality inherent in duality and automatic representation which were beginning to show themselves in human consciousness at this time. For this reason his discourses are didactic. Although the realm of Being contains the source (through contemplation of the Forms) of rational understanding, mathematical operations included, Plato’s didactic activity is really an effort to explain how things come to be, their provenance. No certitude in knowing is possible, however, without contemplation of the constant in change, the complement of the realm of becoming, the realm of constantly changing sense-perceptible things. His reference to the immortal unchanging, the Form, as “an eternal Living Being” (1977:51) is significant.

The Empty Form

My exegesis of Pythagorean and Platonic epistemology is central to my thesis. My aim is to show, first, that the absolute Form I postulated above has a precedent in antiquity, namely, Greek philosophy, but philosophy that is at the same time experience, and second, that if the
Greek experiential world is different from ours, it is because theirs was a different method of receptivity. (I am not advocating a sentimental return to a past way of thinking and knowing, as will become clear in the denouement.) Plato’s Form is a supersensible reality, a sentient idea, participatory cognition. The difficulty this presents for us is our apparent imprisonment in the sense realm, not knowing how to discern where that realm ends and where the other begins.

In this section I want to show that the Form or idea is recoverable in conscious cognition. What does Brauwer mean when he states that the ‘empty form is the basic intuition of mathematics?’ As I discussed in Chapter Six, the ‘passion’ for music (and mathematics) consists in their ‘unsayableness.’ That which cannot be said cannot be theoretically logical, and thus the rejection of both language and theoretical logic by intuitionism. But we know more than we can say. The self-evidence (axiomatic truth) of which Brauwer speaks is the knowledge (in the Platonic sense) that things do exist that are not reducible to logico-linguistic referentials.  

Again, Plato illuminates this problem. I noted above that Plato’s dialogues are really his efforts to ‘teach’ the polarity of Being. He knew this had to be explained conceptually to a consciousness becoming dualised. His explanations attempt to ‘save the appearances.’ No single thing has permanent reality and should not therefore be designated with a word that expresses such permanence. Rather, all things have a continually recurrent quality. (A thing that is in a process of change has quality, and is not yet a thing.) As long as thought is kept in motion, there is no past image. Things can only become things when thought itself comes to a standstill, that is, as past thought, as recycled images, and thus, Plato’s rejection of what is now called representation. Thought kept in motion does not suffer congelation, and so a language of ‘things’ is not only unnecessary; it is impossible. Plato was aware that the word was becoming a tool for the practical purpose of communication between persons, whereas previously it had been a “duet with nature” (Barfield 1963:149). Words and the thought within them were once inseparably one.

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21 I suggest that the ‘silence’ of the intuitionists is of the same kind, and has the same motivation as the ‘silent inertia’ of the musician.
This rejection of permanence and language-assisted apprehension leaves us with emptiness, or better, an empty form. Credibility in this matter depends in the first instance in trusting that the empty form - another term might be the formless Form - ‘actually exists.’

Recall the soundless tone I asked the reader to imagine in Chapter Four. This form precedes its being imagined. It is ‘there’ before being brought up to awareness. The point I am making is that musical knowing is not bound by the conditions of sentient receptivity. If it were, there would be no musical experience.

In the exercise of thinking a tone (form), I am bringing to awareness a form that was not there, in awareness, a moment ago. It is, however, in consciousness. I can choose to let this form go, or replace it with another. Further, whatever form I brought to mind dissolved what was already there. The exercise shows me (because I am observing my own thinking), that under normal circumstances consciousness is in a continuous state of configuration (forming) and dissolution. It shows me also that consciousness contains the possibility of all forms, for I can dissolve at will one form by letting it flow into another. The capacity itself is one of movement, that is to say, not form, but form-ing. It is just that in my usual mirroring consciousness I do not see the motion, the forming and dissolving activity. Mirroring consciousness, past consciousness, only ever becomes conscious of fixed forms, forms which, significantly, sprang previously and imperceptibly from movement. Kühlwein explains: “For [rational] consciousness, the [superconscious] is formless, a ‘nothing,’ since this is a past-consciousness and so it can only conceive of static forms and circumstances, while it has to borrow from the [superconscious] (which is all movement) to account even for its own motion” (1990:65).

Although we attribute little or no significance to it, this forming is a superconscious ability. The question is whether I attribute this capacity to my own cleverness, or to some other origin. I postulate a supersensible, superconscious origin for music.\footnote{Although it is true that musical knowledge is shaped by formal musical systems - whether notated or aurally inherited - endemic in all cultures, the forces that predicate the shaping are themselves acultural, ahistorical and apedagogical. The distinction is most noticeable in children, who, for reasons beyond their control (and to which they are indifferent in any case) when raised in a culture foreign to the one into which they have been born, learn with apparent ease the language of that culture. This ability is given to begin with. For something to be learned, there has first to be the capacity to learn. Something is received so that con-ceiving is possible. Moreover, given}
Plato the Form is not a static object, but a moving image, visible cognition. I believe that these cognitive forces are no longer experienced as such because the finished forms they produce obscure the movement out of which they arose. Yet, this ability is the very source of rational consciousness. It is not seen by us because positivism, by way of "psychological Darwinism," as Kühlwind calls it, "... consists in seeking the origin of the subconscious in a biological direction, in the body, and imagining consciousness as arising from the subconscious [under consciousness]. Human freedom cannot be founded on such a theory, and its existence is denied - although psychotherapy tacitly presupposes such freedom" (1990:63).23

I regard Plato's epistemology as nothing less than a blueprint for human freedom, attainable only in the ethical participation of the knower in the dialectic of Being and becoming. In the current age the forms of music are grasped empirically, even though every executant uses them non-empirically. (S)he participates in the unconscious thinking going on in musical production. The past is re-enacted in unconscious experience. The whole of music pedagogy and curriculum is constructed on this non-empirical basis, but without awareness of it. As I argued in Chapter Six, the problem in our time is that the moment anything becomes cognitive in the supersensible (over consciousness) sense, it is automatically relegated to the subjective realm:

The creativity of human beings, rediscovered from time to time, is relegated to this private area, and it goes unrecognised that cognition, communication, conversation - in art as well - would all be impossible if creativity were really subjective and not universal, or 'intersubjective' as it's called today (Kühlwind1990:62).

Kühlwind is arguing that form and formlessness are relative. To rational consciousness, the mobility of forming appears formless. But to a higher level of consciousness, the

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23 I should add here that one of the distinguishing features of positivism is that it sees consciousness as secondary to physical forms, and it is that assumption "... on which the whole current picture of world evolution is based and therefore the assumption in the light of which all phenomena are interpreted and all experiments conducted. So that any other kind of interpretation is ruled out in advance " (Barfield 1963:147-148). Barfield calls the accumulated historical weight of this assumption, the "colossal inertia of ancient custom" (1963:148). It was this assumption that invited another common to the notion of mechanical causality, namely, "... that the truth about the structure and origin of things is only to be found by investigating their smallest components; the chase after the particles, atoms, molecules, genes, and the way they act on each other" (1963:130).
superconscious, it is form, "a moving form, to be sure, not static form" (1990:63).

Brauver's empty form, then, is for us a void, because we cannot imagine it as a movement in time. And this movement is a capacity, superindividual feeling and will impulses that have become cognitive forces, but no longer experienced as such. Brauver's statement now begins to make sense. The empty form, the move of time, 'gives way' to its product, the manifest form. In this manner, duality, or 'two-ity' is born.

The visible forms to be seen in much archaic art, custom and behaviour are actually attempts to preserve, in a filled-out manner, the empty or formless form. Schneider explains:

The ultimate common denominator of all the different manifestations is described graphically as 'empty form.' The essence of a latent creative primordial force, a rhythmically flowing fundamental energy that one can never imagine in sufficiently abstract terms, can be symbolised by just such an empty shell. Although one can recognise its mode of operation, its inner essence cannot be described in words (1989:54).

Its 'inner essence,' then, must be 'described' in a medium sympathetic to it: musical pattern, which is at the same time numerical ratio.

Another way of approaching the problem of the empty form is through observation of the difference between contemporary thought, for which matter, namely the physical body and the instrument, create sound, while for ancient cosmogonies the contrary is the case: sound, or rather, the 'rhythmically-flowing' principle in it, forms matter.

The response of matter to this principle, the empty shell, or Plato's Form, has been demonstrated in a branch of science, although a little-known one. In the eighteenth century Ernst Chladni discovered that, by placing a quantity of sand on a metal plate attached to a violin, and by then drawing the bow across the strings, the sand organised itself into intricate geometrical patterns very similar to those seen in organic tissue (Berendt 1988; McClellan 1988.)
After a century of neglect, the nineteenth century Swiss scientist, Hans Jenny, developed Chladni’s rudimentary discovery into a fully-fledged science to which he devoted his life, and which he called Cymatics. Jenny learned that many kinds of matter, when subjected to vibration evolved in repeated growth patterns resembling those of living organisms. Part of Jenny’s effort was devoted to the exposure of substances, solid and liquid, to the sounds of the ancient Hebrew and Sanskrit languages. The (photographed) results, though astonishing, seem to have attracted little interest from the materialist science of the day, despite the conduct of the research under the strictest clinical conditions. Jenny found that when the matter was subjected to the vibration in the speech sounds mentioned, it formed itself into the written symbols corresponding to the spoken phonemes. Importantly, there was no such response from modern languages. Jenny reports on the entire process: “It would be true to say that one can hear what one sees and see what one hears … . The masses affected by a tone are, of course, naturally forced into the forms corresponding to the vibrational effect” (1967:21, 27).

Jenny later speaks of these effects as the “universal triadic phenomenon.” “Every effect of vibration,” he says, “bears the signature of configuration, movement and a play of forces” (1967:176). If the same configurations appear repeatedly, all clinical conditions being equal, does it not suggest that they are pre-existent, that is, empty? Things move into the ordered patterns (which already exist for them as empty, precursory forms) because they cannot do otherwise. And if this configuring is active in matter, making it visible to the naked eye, is it not active also in the air by which it is borne? If so, then it is also active in consciousness, though not perceived as such.24 This does not imply that the configuring movement is not

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24 I should explain that between the poles of Form and form, Plato postulates a third term, the ‘receptacle’ of becoming. All matter needs a container. (A river without banks is not a river at all, but a flood, that is, chaos.) The receptacle is that by which the Form takes on form. “And the things which pass in and out of it [the receptacle] are copies of the eternal realities, whose form they take . . . .” (Plato 1977:69). Again, the receptacle is not apprehended by the senses but by a “spurious reasoning” (1977:71). Plato stipulates that the receptacle is free of the characteristics of that which it is to receive, since its own character is to receive all things. It surrenders itself for this purpose; it is compliant. The receptacle is invisible and formless. I have explained this for the reason that most Plato scholars have interpreted the receptacle as space. In my view, space is too constraining a concept for something as ethereal as temporal Form, a ‘move in time.’ It is known that the Greeks had no word for space. I believe this is because consciousness had not yet taken on the third dimension: depth. Whereas space for us is conceived as emptiness, for the Greeks it was synonymous with the place occupied by a thing. The space of which Plato speaks is not physical, perceptual space, but rather, a temporal space in which things become, an anti-space, space that fills from the outside-in. A thing does not occupy a position in space by being contained in it, but by containing it. All modern physical and spatial analogies fail in reference to Plato’s receptacle because the perspective now is one marked by spatial extension. The receptacle is simply not explainable in words.

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available to inner sight, for it structures the experience of the observer. (Soul, for Plato, is the source of movement. Movement can be initiated only by an ensouled being, a creature of will, whether human being, planet or God.)

I believe that it is just this activity, the ‘self-moving number’ that Plato experienced. He was able to experience his own participation, see his own activity of figuration, whereas the patterns, the rational relations, are for us now only acoustic experiences. The physicist, David Bohm (1980), postulates something of this kind in the term ‘implicate order,’ a holomovement (moving empty form) which is at the bottom of all and orders and unifies all.

Plato was practising projective (non-Euclidian) geometry. His ‘moving number’ is the continuous (meaning self-reproducing) quantities of flow and projection. Flow and projection are not mathematical, but geometrical. In this sort of mental activity lies the crucial distinction between mathematics and ratio. Mathematical symbols tell us nothing of relation or movement. The simple arithmetic computation 1+1= 2 is not a concrete reality but an abstract proposition of comparison. It shows that 1+1 is the same as 2. It does not say how 1 differs from 2. On the other hand, the ratio 1:2 shows that 1 is divided, the division creating another entity. But the tone and interval created out of the division 1:2 syntonises with the original 1, since 1 is invariant. All ratios, no matter how expressed are integers of 1, not fractions of 1. To arrive at the abstraction 1+1 at all necessitates a division of 1. What does this mean in musical terms? In functional diatonic harmony, all tones and intervals owe their existence and their ‘lawfulness’ to the tonic, which is known alternatively as the ground, the prime, in short, the ONE. But ONE is an animated, that is to say, not abstract, ONE. The ratios created out of it are multiples of ONE, progressing lawfully from it but integrated in it as a ‘function’ of it. They are temporal versions of that ONE. The ratios sound ‘right’ because they sound lawful.

In music, then, 1+1= ONE, not 2, for a whole has been divided into two individual yet indivisible entities, as one minim and one minim equal one semibreve. Each I contains the

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25 I have experienced similar configurations when I have become aware of them, that is, when I close my eyes and look for them, although I have occasionally witnessed this forming activity even while my eyes have been open. They are of the nature of holograms. The form, which is constantly moving and changing its configuration, appears from the periphery of vision, as if inserting itself in the darkness, and forms a spiral or some such form. It then dissolves or disappears from sight, whereupon a replica takes its place in the same manner. The appearance is rhythmic and at no time is the form static. It becomes and unbecomes, as if constantly turning itself inside out.
ONE and is contained by the ONE. ONE, the whole, is pre-numerical. Plato’s (1997) highly pertinent term for all this is ‘geometrising’. His thinking is geometrical because it accommodates relation, and therefore, pattern. His thinking is measuring.

This geometrising is intuitionist mathematics, which is a non-numerical arithmetic, that is, an arithmetic of the becoming and dying of form. This is not an arithmetic of number (abstract numerical symbols) at all. Borto’s sees it as an arithmetic of distinction: “It calculates with the form of distinction instead of with the form of quantity. Since the act of distinguishing is prior to counting, the calculus of distinction is a pre-numerical arithmetic” (1996:343). It is “… the non-numerical arithmetic of the intensive dimension of ONE” (1996:343), the arithmetic of wholeness. “ONE is not a number in the quantitative sense because it includes many, whereas one is such a number and therefore it must exclude many. The arithmetic of quantity is the arithmetic of one. It is the calculus of the extensive dimension of unity in multiplicity” (1996:343), whereas in the pre-numerical dimension, the whole can be divided while remaining whole.

The Plenum - The Function of the Void

ONE, the whole, is an empty Form. To make the suggestion of an empty form at all, a form that can be filled out as it were, implies some sort of human pre-disposition to its being thought. I cannot record all the references to it in the literature. A few will suffice as evidence that it is a potent symbol. Werbeck-Svärdsström, for example, speaks of it as an empty vessel into which “the unconstrained flowing principle” (1985:58) is poured. At the moment the form is given its body as sound, music ceases. Here again is reference to continuous movement.

Consider these lines from Stephen Spender’s On the Third Day: “And the use of the ear is only a gate/To receive into the mind the sound’s soundless form.”

Schneider believes that “seen anthropocosmically,” the empty archetypal form “fulfills its emptiness as one would a desire” (1989:54).

Again, in the exercise of thinking the tone, the bringing-forward of the empty Form and conferring on it soundful qualities, one creates a state of fullness, and in so doing brings about a
polarity. ('If the two-ity thus born is divested of all quality, there remains the empty form of the common substratum of all two-ities.') Fullness, however, implies the presence of its opposite, emptiness (which I will refer to from here on as vacancy), and depends on that presence. Vacancy must produce a complement to be what it is. Sontag describes the relation as “a full void, an enriching emptiness, a resonating or eloquent silence” (1969:11).

I regard the musical tone as such an empty Form, full in its vacancy. It is just that the Form for us is a void because we are not aware of ourselves thinking it; yet it is the very condition by which a potentiality becomes an actuality. “In order to perceive fullness, one must retain an acute sense of the emptiness which marks it off; conversely, in order to perceive emptiness, one must apprehend other zones of the world as full” (Sontag 1969:10).

Vacancy is qualitative. Absolute vacancy would be absolute fullness, plenitude.

In view of this interpretation, I see the senses working in this way: We use them to feel our way in the phenomenal world, that is, in an ocean of sensation. We use the senses as instruments of sentient reception. We orientate ourselves in a world of foreign things by making them familiar, that is, by the act of constitution. Phenomena are constituted by differentiation, distinction. We differentiate out of the world of sensation without being aware of the qualitative way it is achieved, namely, by the creation of intervals of space or duration between things. The absence of awareness may be seen as a sort of cognitive blindness and deafness.

Further, ugliness can appear only because there is beauty. They are not a duality, but a polarity. The difference is determined according to the manner in which the cognizer allows the inaudible and the invisible to show itself, namely, according to how (s)he differentiates by the creation of spaces between things, how (s)he orders things.

A master knows on some level not only that it is possible to perceive differently, but even that it is impossible not to perceive differently, and that is because (s)he appreciates the psychological difference between one space and another, one interval and another. Vacancy is qualitative. Space is not merely space; silence is not merely silence; measuring, geometrising, is not merely a mensural activity. In the differentiation of things vacancy becomes plural.
Vacancy has a voice. It is only by virtue of our cognitive deafness and blindness that we assume the similarity, the equivalence, of spaces, although musical behaviour can demonstrate otherwise. And music, perhaps more than any other activity, shows that the differences are entirely real, that they ‘exist.’ The phenomenal tones are the means for expression of pre-conscious knowledge of a noumenal world.

The essence of a thing is contained in its function, and its function, put simply, is to be known. Its phenomenality allows us, on the condition that we behold it, to access its function. The problem is that we regard the phenomenal appearance of a thing, its finished form, as its reality, when its true attributes should be sought in its becoming and unbecoming. If we were mindful - or better, mind-empty - of the latter, nothing would be taken for granted; everything would appear in its newness, would show itself in itself. Our physical senses are too coarse and our ordinary representation too hasty to permit the subtle differentiation needed to discern a thing’s function from its appearance. (Only the power of imaginal cognition, sense-free thinking, can achieve this.) It is the spaces between things that determine their difference. Without such distinction intervals would not be possible. But the difference is achieved in the extra-sensory, noumenal realm, that is in thinking, and not in the sense realm. The sense objects appear as differentiated so that they can serve a function: knowledge.

The Externalised Will - From Ritual to Tekhne

Again, the empty form is not a concept, but an organising idea. However, because dialectical awareness is not the cognitive norm, it is difficult to grasp. Despite its difficulty, however, it is essential to any commentary attempting to understand measure.

In this section I want to attempt an historical overview of the cognitive transition from the Greek civilisation to our own. Knowing how this transition has been achieved and in what ways supersensible wisdom has been transformed might shed more light on the problem of measure and its connection with the will

As I have discussed, in the Greek consciousness, cognition is an experienced activity of mental picturing, but in Pythagoras it begins to penetrate into the life of feeling. Another way of saying this is that the feeling element of intentionality enters mental life for the first time.
But the feeling to which I am referring does not have the vagueness typical of ordinary feeling. This is not self-feeling. Nevertheless, it suffuses what has a sober character: thinking. One might say it suffuses number with poetry, or measure with metaphor. (Thus is poetic metre born.) When mental images undergo this transformation, or ‘deepening,’ as von Lange called it, they take on a new complexion. Crucially, as transformed images suffused with feeling, the will is now directly stimulated to action. Metre, measure, becomes wilful. Mental life becomes tekhnē.

The fusion of thinking and feeling signals the arrival of voluntarism, or radical individualism. At this point the stimulated will finds expression. It does so in ritual, or ritualised constructing, making, doing. But the expression at this time still has a direct connection to supersensible content. “We may even add that, for a certain time, man was creative on the cosmic plane, initiating this periodic cosmogony… and participating in it” (Eliade 1971:158). For the Greeks, building an outer structure was an externalisation of what was first formed in them from out of the cosmos. (What was internalised was largely musical. The seven tones of the scale or melos correspond to the seven moving planets and the twelve semitones measured by Pythagoras to the twelve fixed stars, the whole representing a cosmic scale of the soul, a cosmos in miniature, a microcosmos.) For this reason, the external structures are not utilitarian; they are geometrising made sensible. (The Parthenon, constructed along musical lines, is hardly a useful structure.) Rather, the Greek structures, which include drama, sculpture, music and even physical movement (competitive sporting events including the Olympics) are rituals that grow out of the Greek way of experiencing knowledge. The use of the external structure is a symbol through which the original cognitive connection with the cosmos can be felt again. (Again, I emphasise feeling.) Eliade insists that the behaviour of the ancients reveals that, “neither the objects of the external world nor human acts, properly speaking, have any autonomous intrinsic value” (1971:3). Both “acquire a value, and in so doing become real, because they participate, after one fashion or another in a reality that transcends them” (1971:3-4).

In the outer form, then, something of a supersensible nature is concentrated. (Does the peculiar unpeopled ‘emptiness’ of the Parthenon and other Greek buildings, and even the seemingly insubstantial luminosity or ‘non-subjectivity’ of Greek lyric verse perhaps speak to
us now of the absence of the supersensible?) Crucially, the ritual is not a superstructure imposed on the mundaneness of life; it is rather a deliberate celebration of the supersensible extraordinariness of the ordinary. It is not an attempt to ‘raise’ the spirit; the spirit is already present. The external structure and the ceremonies conducted in or by way of it are periodic re-enactments of the mysteries in order to preserve their mystery status, not to solve or dissolve them. The external structure is a ritualised gesture. For the archaic mind, the “...conscious repetition of given paradigmatic gestures reveals an original ontology” (Eliade1971:5). The gesture that is the structure or deed acquires its meaning only to the extent that it repeats a primordial deed.

It is important to understand, however, that since the Greek epoch, in which there is as yet little idea of the individual as a separate entity, the intellect, the thinking function of intentionality has become stronger in its logical operation. In its strengthened form it seeks an outlet corresponding to the external Greek ritual, but is itself not ritual. (The demise of the ritual parallels the loss of the supersensible picture, because the discursive calculating intellect has become the sole arbiter of truth.) Where the inner geometrising experience diminishes, the human being now builds external structures devoid of inner content, structures in which there appears to be no feeling of the cognitive sort. The repetitive gesture today involves a loss, not preservation, of the original ontology. These structures are useful technological devices. (The computer, the microscope and the astrotelescope hardly qualify as objects of deep feeling.) What survives today as vestiges of the earlier ritual are the religious ceremonies. However, as Davy suggests: “... such rituals as we retain have the purpose rather of endeavouring to restore contact with a fading current which is widely suspected to have no real existence” (1978:161).

All this should alert us to a crucial distinction in Platonic epistemology. Art in the true sense is not about external forms. The forms are only art’s products, its edifices. Art is an imaginative way of being, of living, not a specialisation or a psychology of production. There can be art in one’s life, which is to say a poetic life, although one may not be surrounded by works of art. Art in the Platonic sense is a disclosure of truth, not a pleasing effect or engaging study. It serves, not sensibility, but ethical edification, which is synonymous with summoning and ritualistically reactualising “the tremendous events that occurred at the beginning of time”
(Eliade 1971:xiv). The historical critique reveals music as a superindividual force increasingly sacrificed to individual expression, and finally, to entertainment.

**Taking the Measure**

This historical transition can lead to an understanding of measure, and thence, to a recovery of meaning. Clearly, measure is no ordinary physical concept. Plato’s allusion to humans lacking measure and grace is a reference to the inadequacy of representational thought for higher perception; for it is already heterogeneous with what is to be known. Knowing, Heidegger insists, must be “responsive to Being” (1967:436). What is to be known remains concealed and therefore unannounced, as it must if the personal will is now imposed on things to such an extent that the superindividual will is no longer apparent.

Here, then, I want to edge closer to an understanding of measure by highlighting the connection of measure with the emergent individual will. In paraphrasing Heidegger, Hofstadter states that the human being has “the [distinctive] ability to take the measure of the world” (1975:xiv my emphasis). It is meant that the human being is the measure of the world, that there is something in the notion of measure that is essentially human. For Heidegger, unless we are guided in our knowing by an acquired (distinguished from conventional) picture of humanness, that is, a picture - which of necessity must be worked for - derived from the essential ground of humanness itself, which, in his view is taking the measure, we will not see humanness for the humans.

The measure of which Heidegger speaks can assume two meanings and can take one of two paths. Taking the measure implies that, potentially, the human being is both muser and maker, both poet and producer. Human nature can take the measure, know a thing as its idea (its divine measure in Platonic epistemology), that is, know it for itself or, alternatively, it can use the thing as an object of representation, and thereafter, as an externalised product of its making, as a made object.

Historically, the measuring ability has taken two paths: beholding and constructing. The measuring ability is in essence poetic, the ‘consummate form of human existence’ or beholding ‘the pure shining forth of that which presences.’ But the human being has also become a being
who wills, and is therefore a constructing being. Humanity builds its world. The original measuring ability finds a utilitarian outlet. The human being extends its influence over the world and becomes an artist, a technician. This distinction between an ontological or primary act of distinguishing that at the same time relates or discloses, and one that separates or fragments is critical to my work.

When the making, the constructing, assumes dominance, the thing’s nature is purloined in becoming useful, that is, it serves the wilful, self-fulfilling, making aspect of measuring. The human will, in its ability to take the measure, makes things do its bidding. Heidegger comments elsewhere on this historic action as, “the reinterpretation of the spirit as intelligence, or mere cleverness in examining and calculating given things and the possibility of changing them and complementing them to make new things” (1987:46). He continues by making a far-reaching judgement on the misinterpretation of the measuring ability: “The attitude of the littérateur and aesthete is merely a late consequence and variation of the spirit falsified into intelligence. Mere intelligence is a semblance of spirit, masking its absence” (1987:47).

The problem lies in the automatism, the habit, of making, distinguished from the poetic ability to take the measure. Making is doing, doing as utterance, as building, as externalisation of measuring ability, whether tone, word or made object. Making is a reification of the ontological ability to take the measure.

We need not, however, put a stop to the constructing. It is only necessary to understand that the constructing has run ahead of us, veiled our measuring ability, our word-like nature, the common principle of humanity. The world has become instead a technological world, with all the attendant problems of dehumanisation implied by technical application.26 This is indeed a very long way from taking the measure.

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26 The emergence of the human will, the individual, and the correlative ability to act independently, which we perceive as positive gains is in another sense the Twilight of the Gods. Moore puts it rather forcefully: “Take away the Gods and dehumanisation sets in” (1990:12). Or, as that master of verbal excoriatio, Chesterton, has it: “Take away the supernatural, and what remains is the unnatural” (1950:94). This comment, attributed to W.V.O. Quine, is also timely: “In point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the Gods differ only in degree and not in kind” (Payne 1996:383).
Measurement in the sense of calculation becomes historically possible only with a quantitative way of observing. The result is that although we wilfully control and manipulate the phenomena with which we engage, we can do so only at a cost: the loss of direct experience of the phenomena. It is for this reason that we feel ourselves separate from, and different from, the phenomena, so that the phenomena begin to appear inanimate, as if they do not behave. Davy articulates this well:

The thoughts we embody in measurement are only applicable to dead phenomena - for measurement means dividing up into units which can be counted, and no living thing can be thus fragmented without dying. It is a form of thought entirely appropriate to the inanimate world, but quite inadequate for apprehending life (1985:8).

When Heidegger speaks of taking the measure he implies that the measure is already there for the taking, and that it has been taken. The measuring activity of mind has ceased to be visible to itself. What humanity does not recognise is that in the imposition of the human will on things “regardless of their own essential natures” (Hofstadter 1975:xv), the human being him/herself becomes material for utility, that is, control.

How does this happen? The original ability to take the measure can only be applied at a cost, namely, temporary extinction of the human being in the sphere of the will. In applying the original poetic ability to take the measure, the human being lets the measure destroy him. The conqueror, in a sense, becomes the conquered. König explains:

Our hands take hold of [the thing] and use or misuse it. Every creative process in whatever realm it occurs is an act of possession in the sphere of the will. Whether I write or paint, plough or build, speak or model - the object undergoes an act of submission to my will. The final result is usually a distinctive feeling of humiliation which remains in the soul (1973:29).

Here is the ethical connection. Why is it not seen? The volitional element is unconscious, or at least, the least conscious of the three elements of intentionality. For this reason, the deepest creative and destructive human tendencies live in the will. It is because the act of exacting measure on the world is unconscious, and carries the price of humiliation, that the human being can become the material for manipulation by its own kind, or, “vicious
automata of self-will" (Hofstadter 1975:xv). “The cleverness itself is subject to the possibility of organization, which is never true of the spirit” (Heidegger 1987:47).

However, it is awareness of the ability to take the measure, which has become, since the Greeks, idolatry of the things represented and the things subsequently produced that will allow us to recover awareness of our poetic, measuring nature. What otherwise takes place outside awareness, namely, taking the measure, provides at the same time an opportunity to lift the individualised will into the domain of conscious will.

The Logos Measures

Again, measure is not a physical concept. Its idea is not contained in mathematical symbols or in logical thought. Physical explanation comes to a standstill before this problem because it cannot account for measure, a superconscious ability. In the case of measuring by calculation we never really enter measure itself. When we perform measurements, as we do constantly in music, we remain outside direct contemplation of measure. Measuring as a primary act of distinguishing is not calculation. It is necessary, then, to move away from spatial and temporal concepts, including ostensive definition, in order to find an explanation.

I submit that in the ability to take the measure, consciousness seeks to grasp its own existence by the creation of opposites, which then seek reunification, as Tillich argued. Merleau-Ponty (1968), too, discusses the human-world dialogue as an intentional dualisation in which the original unity bifurcates itself into subject and object because only in this way can reality (Being) become accessible to itself as a seeing and hearing subject.\(^\text{27}\) The measure gives distinction, boundary, difference. But the polar opposition is the dual manifestation of a single power. That single power is Logos. To say as much immediately places my investigation of measure in the meta-physical realm, by which is meant, beyond the physics.

Again, the scholar who, for me, works most thoroughly and convincingly towards a phenomenological explanation of this most difficult of ideas is Heidegger. In the ensuing paragraphs my deliberations borrow from his analysis of the Greek language by way of

\(^{27}\) See also Wilber (1993) for a systematic and erudite working through of this idea.
working towards an explanation of measure as *Logos*.

In the first place, it is perhaps true to say that *Logos* seems such a remote or ‘empty’ philosophical concept for the modern intellect. Yet, any attempt to understand measure must come to grips with it. Heidegger (1987) insists that as long as we cling to the notion that *Logos* means understanding and reason, and worse, logic, we will never understand it. Moreover, he argues that *Logos* does in one sense mean word, speech, discourse, but that originally it did not carry this meaning. “Its fundamental meaning stands in no direct relation to language” (1987:124). Heidegger eschews these inherited notions of *Logos*, and rather, begins his investigation with an analysis of the writings of the two pre-Socratic thinkers who are widely regarded as marking the beginnings of Greek philosophy: Heraclitus and Parmenides.

*Lego, legein*, is the same as the German word *lesen*, to gather, to collect, to read. In *gathering* is implied the relation of the one to the other. *Logos* deals with relation, or gathering together in *just* relation, permanent togetherness. It would be an error, however, to assume that the togetherness is synonymous with “… the harmony that is mere compromise, destruction of tension, flattening …” (1987:133), that is, with the pseudo-whole (discussed in Chapter One and Appendix A.) Rather, in the gathering, the collecting, “the one is [at the same time] marked off against the other” (1987:124). Opposites are antagonistic, set apart, yet they belong together. In the gathering, things are held apart, yet they interpenetrate. When the *Logos* is present, the tension in difference is maintained. Something of this sort is apparent in this statement attributed to Theon of Smyrna:

> The Pythagoreans, whom Plato follows in many respects, call music the harmonization of opposites, the unification of different things, and the conciliation of warring elements . . . . Music, as they say, is the basis of agreement among things in nature and of the best government in the universe. As a rule it assumes the guise of harmony in the universe, of lawful government in a state, and of a sensible way of life in the home. It brings together and unites (Rowell 1983:40-41).

On every level, things *are* in their difference. In that difference there is a common bond. Difference is what opposites have in common. In their difference they are the same. But sameness is not “mere equivalence” (Heidegger 1987:138), not relativism. Things do not fall
apart haphazardly, but are kept in ordered relation. The absence of tension between implies merely a detritus, a heap of unrelated things.

This tension bespeaks an original polarity in which one cannot be without the other: Logos. And in all polar relations there is a threshold, a between. “The threshold bears the between,” says Heidegger (1975:204).

The between is the residence of ‘intimacy.’ Heidegger means by this word an accouplement, a marriage, a communion, coition or coherence in which the difference is not sacrificed. It is a chiasma. “The intimacy ... is present in the separation of the between; it is present in the dif-ference” (1987:202). “Intimacy,” he continues, “obtains only where the intimate divides itself cleanly and remains separated. In the midst of the two, in the between ..., in their inter, division prevails: a difference” (1987:202).

Measure is the way of the Logos itself. The unification of dissimilar components into an ordered whole is possible in the first place because there is difference. That which is at variance with itself is in agreement with itself through the variance. In the ratio 1:2, two entities are created that mutually illuminate each other. Each corresponds exactly to the other. This is no chance occurrence. It is the measure that holds them apart yet unifies them in their apartness. In that tension is the intimacy. The measure, then, is not an extensive measure of distance, but an intensive measure of difference. It is the between, the inter, the ‘is to,’ the : in the ratio.

The Play of Forces in the Measure

We have forgotten - Heidegger’s phrase in Being and Time (1962) is ‘the forgetfulness of existence’ - the meaning of the original poetic ability to take the measure, which, in terms of constructing our world, has an original deed: utterance. It is human utterance, or logosing, according to the early Greeks that is the earthly embodiment of the Divine will. Since it falls outside the usual view of things, this latter claim might need clarification. I will attempt to explain what I mean by placing the concept of measure in the context of both language and music.
Measure is the between separating the letters, \(f\), \(o\), \(r\) and \(m\). In the measuring, the word, as a word and not the letters, makes sense. The measure is the abode of relation, of intimacy, of meaning. We do not hear the differences between these sounds, for they have meaning only as words and sentences. It is in their difference that they can cohere to form a meaning-bearing word. These letters are separate, yet they belong together.\(^\text{28}\) In this dialectic they are intimate with each other. The meaning turns vowels and consonants - which are sounds before they are written symbols - into words and sentences.

As I previously noted, however, words carry external associations. Words represent, indicate, codify, signify and betoken. Accordingly, Zuckerkandl asks: “What is it, then, that is meaningful in tones that allows us to distinguish sense from nonsense in successions of tones” (1973a:16)? It is a fact that we do not hear a mere succession of tones; we hear melody. We understand music’s ‘language’ without further contemplation, meaning that most can distinguish between a series of tones that makes sense and a series that does not.

To go further into this distinction leads to the realisation that a melody does not begin with the sounding of a single first tone, but with its cessation, and the subsequent sounding of another tone. As I previously pointed out, the life of a tone consists just in its evanescence. A tone demands interruption to be music. A single tone makes no sense. When it is succeeded by another, however, it immediately accrues a quality that was not evident before; that is to say it takes on a quality only because of the relation. Only on its death, then, can that quality be heard in the first tone itself. It demands a further tonal event to give meaning to its existence. This demand, however, is heard only in the timeless moment, that is, in the experience of it.

The quality accrued by the first tone in the relation with the further tonal event is Jenny’s ‘play of forces.’ A tone in the context of another (an interval) exhibits a certain quality of

\(^{28}\) My emphasis here is to highlight the distinction Heidegger makes between ‘belonging together’ and ‘belonging together,’ which are actually two different perspectives, the former of which comes naturally to us, while the latter has to be achieved. Bortoft takes up the distinction: “… in the perspective of ‘belonging together’ [Heidegger] sees the belonging as being determined by the together; whereas in the perspective of ‘belonging together’ the reverse is the case, and the together is determined by the belonging. In the first case, he says that ‘to belong’ means to be placed in the order of a ‘together,’ i.e., a unity which is the unity of an organised system. But in the latter case, ‘belonging together,’ there is the possibility of no longer representing belonging in terms of the unity of the together, but rather of experiencing this together in terms of belonging. The perspective of ‘belonging together’ clearly corresponds to the unity which is unification, and this suggests that the perspective of ‘belonging together’ corresponds to unity without unification” (1996:59-60), or Logos.
attraction, which I do not think would be excessive to term *longing*. The tone longs for completion in another, and in this intimate relation, is itself. There can be no *musical* tone without that quality of attraction. It is that, and only that, by which a tone makes sense. Otherwise there would only be acoustic differences in pitch. There is nothing more intimate than this space that is not a space. And the quality of longing exhibited by every tone is satisfied in its annihilation and the appearance of another tone.  

Knowledge - if indeed it can be called that - of that intimacy of longing that accrues to a tone is what distinguishes the master from the technical perfectionist. It is my opinion that persons who are less musically developed - and this, controversial though it may seem, can include the most polished executants - have lost touch with the intimacy of longing inherent in the tone, and by definition, in themselves. This, for me, is what I have been calling 'artistic feeling,' what is essential in being musical, and its retrieval needs to be brought into an epistemology and thence into the pedagogy of music. It is on that basis of understanding, I think, that Shelley, in *Epipsychidion*, asks:

We - are we not formed, as notes of music are,  
For one another, though dissimilar?

Again, the quality of which I speak is not a physical phenomenon. This can be verified by means of the oscilloscope, where only the physical dimensions are graphically registered. There is nothing in the physical event, the sound, that corresponds to the tone as a *musical* event. As Zuckerkandl puts it: “When we hear a melody, we hear things that have no counterpart in physical nature” (1973a:23).

Let me take this a step further by introducing the element of tonality, or key. Of the Greek ecclesiastical modes, only two have survived to form the basis of the Western tonal system. They are what we refer to as the major and minor scales. The seven numbers comprising the diatonic scale form together an *ideal*, not physical, system. The structure of these scales remains the same regardless of the key they are given; that is to say the relation of

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29 I will deal with longing as a first principle in some depth in the *denouement.*

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the tones within the scale structure is unalterable. But this structure must be given a key to become functional. *The inner structure exists independently*, but can only become phenomenal in the context of a given key. Where, then, does that structure exist, if it is not phenomenal? And what does the key confer on the structure?

As I noted in my discussion on Pythagorean ratio, all tones in a tonal system express their relation to the prime, the pre-numerical ONE. I am not yet speaking about key. The whole system is functional in each individual tone, and each tone has its position in the whole and is related to the ONE. All a tone needs to become active, to awaken, as it were, is a key. (It does not need to be in a melody for this.) The key unlocks the potential dynamism of the system and every tone in it. Every tone in a given key carries within itself the *ideal* relation to a larger contextual whole. The moment a tone is given a key, it cannot avoid behaving in *particular* ways in relation to the ONE. There is nothing arbitrary in this behaviour, although it clearly cannot be expressed verbally. As I argued in the previous chapter, this lawfulness cannot be avoided or distorted without incurring temporary damage in human sensibilities. If the system or scale is a mirror of the ‘orbits of the soul,’ to use Plato’s terminology, any such alteration of the ideal is an affront to the very soul of human being.30

The seven-tone structure (heptaphony) is a self-contained system in itself, which, when *spread out in time* in a given key, becomes phenomenal. Yet, in itself, it is time-less. This observation is crucial. If the system in itself is timeless, it follows that all seven tones (the octave being a duplicate of the tonic) and their intervals are contained in a *single tone*, the ONE, although we do not ‘hear’ this ‘belonging together.’ *We hear* it only when we bring it into time. Yet, it is *there*. In the single tone the secret of measure is contained. The key - in the sense of a cipher - is the *Logos*, that which collects and holds together what tends apart.

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30 It is on this basis that von Lange claims that the “seven and twelve-note structures [diatonic system] are built organically into the being of man, and in whatever continually changing forms and subtle differentiations the tonal systems may be clothed in the course of the centuries, there will always be a sevenfoldness - possibly in a new form, but still with a voice to be heard” (1992:ii-iii). She suggests, further, that the cosmic background of the system “…is for the most part unknown today. It is waiting [in my terminology, ‘seeking’] for human beings ready and inwardly capable of revealing it” (1992:ii).
Tones, like humans, long for each other in their phenomenal difference; and in their togetherness in difference, intimacy abides. They belong together.\textsuperscript{31}

I leave it to Zuckerkandl to complete this part of my discussion:

It appears, then, that the very first result of [this] investigation brings us into sharp conflict with a basic principle of the modern view of the universe: the observation that we hear something in the tones of music which does not fit into the general context of the physical world is irreconcilably opposed to the assertions that our senses are organs for perceiving the physical world and that the world perceived through the senses is physical throughout (1973a:24).

Distinguishing and Unit ing

A single tone reveals the innermost nature of the human being. Although the sceptic might react sharply to what I am about to submit, I believe that in the reception of the single tone, providing always that it is truly ‘heard,’ lies the pre-eminent question for every person: Do you wish to be human? In the play of forces, in the constant repetition of the longing and its temporary satisfaction is revealed a human desire to create pattern. Pattern is a coherent relation between entities, a measure. It is the betweenness, which we ourselves create by first distinguishing between things, that offers the opportunity for artistic arrangement, that is, the ideal arrangement of entities.

The relation is not sense-perceptible, yet it is sensed. In other words, there is an ideal relation, a beau idéal, the highest conceivable standard of excellence or beauty, an exemplary model of temporal perfection. The sense-stimuli are not given to us in coherently discrete units of perfection. We ourselves distinguish by interrupting a continuity of sensation into discrete units, which we then reunite into a pattern in linked relation. We create this Gestalt by bringing it into time. We can achieve this only because it is not temporal, but eternal.

We must interrupt, discretely and artistically, the continuum of sound in order to have a

\textsuperscript{31} Others have drawn attention to this polarity. “Coleridge [for example] asserted the necessity for the human individual to find his individuality as a universal [Lagos] principle; to recognise that his selfhood was held in common with others; and this fulfils his own humanity” (Perkins 1994:54-55).
succession of sounds that together comprise a complete relation. We interrupt the experience of tone because the single tone in itself does not satisfy our needs. Nothing exists by itself. The fragmenting of an antecedent unity and the subsequent reintegration of the parts in ideal relation is achieved by us. The Logos requires creation of human intelligence so that we might have experience of it. We first create the diachronic as a means of experiencing the synchronic. We use time in order to glimpse the timeless, the now, eternal presence.

Conclusion

In this chapter my concern has been to establish on historical grounds a metaphysical status for music. The thread weaving through my discussion has been the idea of measure, which I have dealt with by citing an epistemological lineage from Heraclitus and Plato to Heidegger and beyond. What these scholars all demonstrate is an attitude to the phenomena that does not seek to explain them by establishing theoretical principles beyond which inquiry may not proceed. Rather, they attempt to live up to the phenomena by expanding intentionality itself. They are content to let the phenomena throw up the sort of questions that should be asked about them. What phenomena are can be determined only according to the nature of the experience through which they are encountered, which, for these scholars, is emphatically not the activity of a subject upon an object, but one in which “... the practice of truth ... lets things come forth, lets things present themselves in their own way - on their own terms, and not, instead, on ours” (Levin 1988:423). In short, their whole epistemological attitude is one of reverence for the phenomena.

This lineage, then, is distinguished by a middle path between scientific objectivism and more recent approaches to knowledge that refute the possibility of non-subjective knowledge by claiming, rather, that such knowledge is determined in advance by theory. However, a middle path is, by definition, a path of non-interference with the becoming of the phenomena. Rather, responsibility is taken for them because subject and object are not independent of each other. The human subject is an integral part of the world process. This leaves the scholars mentioned in an absolutist position in which the phenomena are invested with superindividual power and value. In other words, their approach to knowing is above all ethical.

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What this means for my work is that intelligibility is correlative to an ethical way of life with regard to knowing, which, for Plato at least, is synonymous with the unfolding of humanity. The question arises then: If every act of musical utterance were to be referred to this first principle as I have discussed it, would music become impracticable? Although I will deal in a direct way with this question in Chapter Thirteen, I only want at this point to establish that the question has relevance beyond the predictable theory-pragmatism opposition it invokes. Chesterton, for example, responds:

A man’s opinion on tramcars matters; his opinion on Botticelli matters; his opinion on all things does not matter. He may turn over and explore a million objects, but he must not find that strange object, the universe; for if he does he will have a religion, and be lost. Everything matters - except everything (1950:7).

Chesterton is suggesting that cosmic truth is so irrelevant for modernity that it cannot matter what any person says about it. Yet, it must be granted that we are musical in a far more capacious sense than ‘doing’ music implies. Loss of that overarching wisdom, and its substitution by indifference to the question of how the phenomena come to be, their provenance, is the equivalent of a moral fall that permeates almost every area of human activity. What it means for music, however, is that music education does not reflect on its own supersensible ground. It continually takes its departure from that ground but is asleep to the departure. Its own ground eludes it because it is not intelligible, and is understood, rather, as nothing. In this progression from ethos to bathos, there is, as I have consistently asserted, a gaping chasm today between the production and what is regarded only on reflection as profound or sublime.

Although such vacancy ought to offer just the opportunity to imbue the space left by concept with the lost ethos once inalienable from music’s existence, and which guided its practice and evolution, the current scenario is very different indeed. Unconscious indulgence in auditory sensuality can typify a nihilistic and irresponsible attitude to musical knowing. The reason artistic feeling as I have described it (feeling with nothing added) is in decline is that we are exposed to too much music, particularly the kind that does not contain artistic feeling. Were the appearances of the phenomena to be practised with an ear to their non-subjective qualities, enabling discernment of a potency specific to each of them, music at large would
cease to be a surface entertainment whose value is measured only by its power to induce self-feeling and self-forgetting, that is, in its power to arouse, seduce, titillate and affect. This is a literal attitude to music, and literalism is passive, as Moore affirms: “Literalism ... is tantamount to sleep; for in literalism, the psyche doesn’t have to do its job of seeing everything twice, working for significance and digging for depth” (1990:151). In music, the beau idéal, the ‘exemplary model,’ has been supplanted by the product, the evidence, and by the claim of art for art’s sake. But the mere outpouring of inner content not mastered by knowledge of the ideal is only sentimental pastiche. To avoid such ideological notions as self-expression that have assumed the status of axioms is especially difficult.

On the other hand, and in keeping with the epistemological method of the abovementioned scholars, the musical soul “… comes to life in the turn from the literal into the imaginal” (Moore 1990:151). Once we abandon the assumption - that it is accepted by millions does not make it any less implausible - that musical utterance is principally self-expression, we become able, for the first time perhaps since the seventeenth century, to observe musical phenomena in a truly unprejudiced way.

I sense in many of those with whom I come into contact through music a longing to retrieve that lost realm of which Plato speaks. Their moral connectedness to music demands that we in education give attention to it. Notwithstanding his eccentricity as a writer of prose, perhaps Percy Grainger’s letter to his mother on 10 November, 1910, speaks well enough for the others:

To give way to human feelings, to overflow & swim in human feelings is human enough, but the farthest north of humanness (my emphasis) is, for me, to be a lightning conductor of such feelings in such a way that they are particularly fitted to fill niches in coming men’s minds & sit itchingly and inflamingly like small fish hooks in men’s consciousness throout changing customs & different rules for playing cricket (Dreyfus 1985:387).

That lost realm, that place or state further north than ordinary humanness and for which humans strive, is not dimensional. It has no extension in space or time. The problem in accessing this realm is this: to start again where the actual form ends, and to lift the veil to
witness the forming is to start again from the beginning. Since it takes time for the seed of a new concept to germinate, the will to do the work must be strong to begin with. I can only state that the attention given does gradually open the sense of hearing. Whereas one previously heard the sounding of two tones in their (measured) acoustic difference, with schooling one now connects them with their inner quality. It is feeling that does the teaching. This feeling ought to progress apace with technical and theoretical development.

The ideal needs a space cleared for it. It is not a literal space, but a space created by the recognition that what is listened for is qualitatively the same as that which is listening. The appearance of what is heard and the ‘hearing’ are the same thing. What is currently understood as nothing, and therefore remains forgotten, is in reality that which is something. In vacancy, the fullness of being comes to light.

I am the clearing, the void, in which reality presences itself in my knowing it. I sing both of self and not-self as an integrated whole. In this integrity of purpose I become an individual (meaning indivisible). I exist in this orientation to the uttered other, and am formed through the development and enhancement of this orientation. In this orientation only can music be called self-expression. Again, can I determine where the music stops and where I begin? I cannot. In disclosing the essential in music, whether as sounder or listener, I am at the same time always disclosing my ethical self. I am the music while the music lasts, to paraphrase T.S Eliot.
CHAPTER NINE

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR COGNITION OF THE DOMINANCE OF VISION

Introduction

Before proceeding, it might be useful to assist further orientation by way of a brief review of the main points encompassed by the inquiry so far so that the context for the direction I take from here is clear.

Interim Review

In Chapter One I established a mystery status for music. I argued that in regarding that status as a prerequisite and in maintaining it throughout the inquiry the possibilities of coming to new understandings about the significance of musical utterance to humanity in our time could be greatly enhanced. Alternatively, to lose sight of the mystery, as is evidenced in music curriculum, is in a sense to succumb to a certain automatism of production, or operationalism. Since this has gone largely unnoticed, it comprises an epistemological problem, namely, a loss of meaning, or intelligibility in Platonic terminology. In concentrating exclusively on the operational and theoretical, there is an epistemological omission, a contemporary gap in our knowledge, which education is unable to address, primarily because it seems to be unaware of it. Doing music does not lead over to contemplation of its foundational questions.

This absence, I contended, comprises an epistemological and ethical dilemma - the nature of which is uncertain purpose - for the student of music, for the executant and for the teacher. In other words, modern music practitioners are generally not aware of the nature of the impulse they are resolved to make effective in the world. They do not know where and how their articulated forms originate, and so, they do not know what they mean. Although he is addressing the lack of a secure philosophy for music educators, I think Reimer’s articulation of this dilemma is applicable to all music practitioners:
What is lacking in all this practical material is a centre that holds everything together. A lack of a unifying core is felt deeply at the psychological level by many music educators who are able to function acceptably in specific practices but who have a sense of emptiness inside because the specifics do not add up to a meaningful whole. When the tremendous amount of energy it takes to be an effective music educator is not being fuelled from a concentrated source of inner power, it begins to wane, feeding on itself and dissipating in endless but uncoordinated activity (1989:11).

In Chapters Four to Seven, I examined the omission. I argued particularly that the two elements fundamental to musical construction, tone and interval, are rarely examined with a view to understanding their ontology, which would mean knowing them in their own right as phenomena, and not as objects of utility. I contended that what has evolved instead by omission, is a culture of production that has taken two paths: on the one hand, overt abuse of those elements, the outcome of which is aesthetic banality, and on the other, a psychology of perfectionism or executory fundamentalism and its theoretical correlative, abstract idealism. I maintained that the culture of production, which in one sense may be seen as an historical gain, has developed inversely with the loss of ontological significance and artistic feeling.¹

These unnoticed developments are the symptoms of positivist thought - also the common-sense view - which has become in effect a kind of cerebral substitute for what is missing: a robust epistemology. To employ a common metaphor, education places great store in the

¹ When the allure of executory production overwhelms all other considerations to the extent that it assumes an ‘only the best will do’ attitude, the production of tone, and not the extra-sensory absence it is supposed to evoke, becomes an end in itself. In a sense, tones become objects. If the auditory perception of the executant is focussed primarily on making and hearing perfect replicas of a tonal ideal, the inaudible spaces between these credible (because empirically evident) events can be subsumed. In a way, the intervals become an incidental by-product. That is because the executant is not a participant in his/her own cognitive processes (intentionality). I have elaborated this again here in order to make the point that to miss the distinction is also to miss that all evils are not equally evil. Although physical perfection of the audible is a laudable goal in itself, it can result in carelessness with respect to other factors if the deed of producing is not informed or guided by some form of epistemic awareness and orientation that gives it meaning. In this connection Stove writes: “The perfectionist, by his exclusive concentration on the ideal, is prevented from attending to the differences which exist among cases in which that ideal is not satisfied: even though such cases may include all the actual ones (the ideal being so high), and even though the differences are very great between some of these cases and others” (1998:178). I regard the psychology of technical perfection as an end in itself in music as a symptom of a more general, global obsession with utility. As I argued in Chapter Eight, however, it is not the case that perfect production must cease. Rather, the paradigm, if I may use that word, of musical production, must include some sort of actual awareness of, rather than presupposed faith in, the extra-sensory, intensive dimension if artistic feeling is to be optimally retained and if inner listening is not to become inflexible for want of exercise. My response to this situation is hearkening, the exercise of participating in one’s own cognitive feeling.

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curriculum as the territory, when it is really the map. The map is a useless document if it fails to orientate the seeker in the territory, which in this case is non-existent. One can only lose one’s way. Positivist disbelief has inserted itself in this gap in our knowledge, effectively ‘silencing’ the way to credible inquiry into what Koestler calls the “... sense of ‘oceanic wonder’ - the most sublimated expression of self-transcending emotions...” (1969:329). Neville puts the neglect succinctly: “... the possibilities for soul-making are neglected in an obsession with utility” (1992:11).

Sensing the inadequacy of objectivist tenets for music, the artist responds instinctively by accommodating notions of subjectivity, or, music as the expression of personal emotion (believing this to be the only alternative), while not appreciating that subjectivism can only be positivism by default. Although it has become usual to describe musical experiences as ‘emotional,’ this is a misleading word. It is true that musical experience cannot be dissociated from the rest of a person’s nature or life-experience. The error we make is in assuming that that nature and that experience are conscious and personal. It is in this context that we place the concept, ‘experience.’ The theory always ignores the experience because it cannot explain it if it is actually unconscious and transpersonal. What explanation can be offered for the sheer puissance of musical experience? This epistemological question is avoided. That there is something more involved than ephemeral pleasure is obvious from what the poets have written about music; it is evident, too, in the testimonies of ordinary people. The experience is clearly not the same thing as happiness, contentment or pleasure. Nor is it a sufficiently compelling answer to say that it is the experience of a sense of order; for that does not explain how order can be so moving. Subjectivism only perpetuates the Cartesian duality, and is really an effort to derive a theory of aesthetic response that is compatible with a positivist framework. It omits (ethical) values because it sees values as added-on to, rather than inherent in, reality.

This examination brought me to Chapter Eight, where I commenced the process of reconstructing the journey from the theoretical and operational to the sublime by citing and discussing an historical precedent for music as a divine afflatus, a physical or earthly reflection of a metaphysical truth which, for the Greeks, was also an ethical way of being. For them, music was not synonymous with making, doing, producing. Rather, music’s operation was regarded as didactic. Music was made only insofar as it taught people something about
themselves in the context of universal Being. Its ultimate purpose was epistemological. Number, proportion, pattern, figure and coherence were recognition of the actual forms of finite reality while being at the same time a priori truths. This search brought me to the finding that music, after all, is an expression of something beyond itself, namely, the harmony of the spheres, whose macrocosmic ratios, in the Pythagorean framework, echo in the microcosmos, the human soul. The arithmetical basis of the system of musical intervals was adopted as the very principle of the constitution of the universe and similarly, the behaviour of the soul of the perceiver. Attributing to the heavenly bodies the same ratios - their motion as calculated by the distances between them - as those comprising the musical 'forces' inherent in concordance and discordance, is an extraordinary vision. That this vision seems for us nebulous or unbelievable - and so has not been taken up seriously by mainstream research since its demise in the seventeenth century - is not, I maintain, due to a deficiency in Greek and medieval cognition, but to modern positivist disbelief reliant on a dual perspective for confirmation of reality.²

Also in Chapter Eight I took recourse to history as a way of taking the first steps towards an understanding of measure, alternative cognitive terms for which are (Platonic) geometrising and logosing. Measure is the extra-sensory element, the 'active absence' in human cognitive processes and in the intervals. It is the 'poetic ability' that enables consciousness to make distinctions, to differentiate between one object or event and another. This 'calculus of distinction' is non-numerical or pre-numerical and, insofar as it is a cognitive process, pre-conscious. Measuring, in the original sense as 'given' to humankind, is the geometrising of the intensive dimension of ONE, in other words, the arithmetic of the whole as this consists in the relation between things. ONE is not a number. Distinguishing is historically antecedent to counting; that is to say, the whole can be divided (into a pattern for example) while

²The Greek experience demonstrates that music does not have intrinsic, self-grounding foundations. The view that music is a closed self-referential loop expressing nothing but itself is actually a debunking of the subjectivist position, and can be attributed to our carrying over our habits of extensive definition into discourse about music even when the experience is shouting at us that it is not extensive. That musical experience cannot be communicated in terms other than those peculiar to it, that it exists to convey what cannot otherwise be conveyed does not, by corollary, mean that it has no reference to anything else. Are we to assume that coherence, pattern, structure and motion apply only to musical experience? This seems to be the argument. That music does not seem to express extra-musical ideas, or refer to objects beyond itself, or that we cannot give names to musical states, does not have to mean that it expresses only itself. Music does not exist to embellish human existence; it is not an end in itself. To assert as much only tears music out of its (historical) context. My historical search suggests that it utters the divine existence in human existence. The key to this as experience is awareness, not just knowledge.
nevertheless remaining whole. In the case of music, the single tone is the seed containing the scale, which is dispersed and made manifest diachronically (through time), while all tones are structurally inseparable from the original tone.

The transparency of cognition today does not allow us to see this, and so the primal ability to take the measure of the world is overshadowed by the act of measuring itself. In other words, *the act of distinguishing is confused with the act of dividing or dualising*. For that reason, the ontological human ability to take the measure of the world can find its outlet, its practical application, in moral or amoral deeds, depending on whether the measuring ability is used for the purpose of selfless love of the act of beholding and poetic making (distinguishing), or, self-conscious manipulation of events for the purpose of control (dividing). It is only relatively recently, however, that the measure has been taken in this latter way, as the difference between the meaning of the word ‘theory’ for the Greeks and modernity demonstrates.

*Invocation*

Before explaining where I will take the inquiry from here, it will not hurt to reaffirm why I am engaged in this study. Reimer writes: “... a continuing need of the [music] profession is a statement of philosophy which captures the sense of where the profession stands and where it is going and which provides a common point of reference from which new and differing ideas can spring” (1989:3). It is a ‘continuing need’ because it is not a matter of indifference whether or not the essential concepts, values, knowledge and beliefs one develops about a field of endeavour enter as motivation into the deed. It is true that “… everything that [musicians] do in their jobs carries out in practice their beliefs about their subject. Every time a choice is made a belief is applied” (1989:7); and the quality of those choices, indeed, whether a choice is even able to be made, is contingent on the quality of understanding one has of the reasons one is engaged in making music in the first place.

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3 The real has become the object (of measurement) to be appropriated by a subject in order to make it quantifiable, to divide the whole. “Man finds and confuses himself as the authoritative measure for all standards of measure with which whatever can be accounted as certain - i.e. as true, i.e. as in being - is measured off and measured out (reckoned up)” (Heidegger 1977:151).
A deep, penetrating epistemology is needed which offers affirmation that the musical deed matters, that it has an intrinsic and ultimate value in the larger context of human existence. This, in turn means asking the right questions about utterance itself. As I have asserted, that they are not asked does not mean they are not there. Yet, we go on behaving as if they were not. This behaviour reflects the peculiar belief that knowledge can be knowledge by omission. I argue that students deserve better than this epistemological delusion, otherwise an epistemology of musical utterance would be unnecessary.

The Aim of the Present Chapter

This brings me to the concerns of the present chapter. I am convinced that elimination of the epistemological dilemma consists in supplying what has been omitted from musical thought and practice since the genesis in the seventeenth century of the positivist way of knowing. (As I have already argued, positivism is not just the perspective of scientism, but the dominant - dual and extensive - mode of knowing.) What has been omitted by way of positivist disbelief is a previous vision of music as a cosmological psychology (or universal mind, Logos) and awareness of that vision shrinking over time to a personal psychology of production. In a sense, the current absence of awareness of that loss of vision is positivism. In other words, the radical change of mind that occurred between the Greek civilisation and what is called the Reformation, and the dual perspective it has taken up in relation to its phenomena, have not been noticed by the mind itself.

Let me consolidate this further. To the extent that musical utterance has become tekhnē, that is, a refined, personal, executory art of skilful execution, the extraordinary vision in which its origin, mode of operation and reason for being are enfolded has become merely incidental, or more accurately, unremembered. The outcome is a kind of ontological myopia. It is only through the gradual narrowing and eventual closure of that extraordinary vision, however, that music could become a personal and technical art at all. Indeed, to place the extraordinary vision before one's mind permanently today would result in one simply being overawed by it and unable to act, to engage in physical production at all. Awareness of this gain-loss dialectic is critical in my framework, for it suggests not just an historical, but a teleological significance, which I will explain in a moment. (As I discussed above, its occurrence has meant an inner
hardening or congelation of ‘cognitive feeling’ - inherent in the scale and its intervals - sometimes even in the most refined executants. To make sound, to learn to manipulate a musical instrument can be achieved today without the slightest trace of artistic feeling, providing one has a normal degree of control over one’s body.

This dialectic suggests that the personal will actioned by humans in taking the measure has emerged historically to overpower thinking and feeling. The loss of both a primal artistic feeling and extraordinary vision that has occurred of a piece with the gain of productive competence is symptomatic of a cognitive imbalance. The polarity, the balance, the equipoise that is the ideal (polar) expression of the Logos has become disjunct. That the disjunction has gone unnoticed is highly significant epistemologically.

When I said in Chapter One that my aim was the search for meaning, it was awareness of the historical disjunction and recovery of Logos awareness I was speaking about. For the Pythagoreans, the one word Logos encapsulated several meanings that are nevertheless related, namely, ratio, thought, reason, mind and word, all of which are connected with the act of distinguishing. Logos is inseparable, however, from kosmos, meaning, order, harmony, an antecedent, ordered whole, or a universal system perfect in its organisation of differentials. Logos, then, was identified with kosmos, the divine principle of universal order.

I see the recovery of Logos awareness in cognition as at the same time recovery of its balance, its integrity, which is its ideal expression. It is this step in full consciousness that I believe is the ‘unifying core,’ the ‘centre that holds everything together.’

The recovery of meaning that consists in the recovery of the integrity of the Logos is my aim from here. This implies that I must demonstrate in quite specific ways how awareness of the Logos has been lost, and in this manner enable a clearer picture of what I have called its ‘integrity’ to emerge.

4 In practical terms, the threefold nature of intentionality is exercised by bringing the will (which today is the strongest but least conscious element) to bear on the recovery of diminished artistic feeling embodied in the intervals (their qualitative difference) by recovering in the first instance the lost vision. By beginning with the vision, by musing it deliberately and systematically, one is then able to practice reception of the intervals (hearkening) by means of a fore-image (rather than relying entirely on thinking triggered by sense-stimulation), and in this manner retrieve the historical feeling that has been lost. Balance, integrity, is restored.
I have experienced time and again how easy it is to lose one's way in the great complexity implied in this idea, and for that reason I will provide in advance a brief description of the goal, by way of an evocative picture, which I hope to have validated by the time I conclude the next three chapters. To begin with the end in view will help to keep the discussion, as it were, on track, and give a sense of coherence to the many elements I must pull together into a whole.

*The Hermeneutic Picture*

The picture I have in mind is this. The fact of human utterance remains, not unexplained, but ignored. That humans utter coherently at all is taken largely for granted. Utterance in general is as habitual as walking.

Yet, reflection shows that humans are wording and word-like beings. They take the measure, distinguish, create forms, disclose by way of wording, through personal voice, or 'voice-print,' insofar as the wisdom of the Word (Logos wisdom) has localised in individual centres of consciousness. In the case of the physical realm (external nature), disclosure is achieved by way of ostensive definition, that is, wording, gesturing, pointing (which has become, but is not the same as, nominalism.) In the non-physical realm it is achieved largely by another form of definition, namely, singing or toning. It is through uttering, even when it is silent, that a meaningful and shared world of (material and immaterial) forms comes into being.

Unlike the plant and the animal, the human is organised physically and noetically for *coherent* utterance, and through utterance, is an integral factor in the actualisation of the universe at a higher level and at a higher stage of development than the bio-physical realm (nature). Although the *distinction* can be made between (s)he who utters and what (s)he utters, the two cannot be separated. It is just this act of *division* that *has* occurred, resulting in the widespread view that the very utterance by which humanity raises itself above the instinctual has its origins in the bio-physical realm.

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5 The explanation can be discerned in one form or another in an epistemological lineage beginning with Heraclitus and weaving like a connecting thread through Plato, Coleridge, Goethe, Heidegger, Steiner and more recent scholars including Barfield, Gadamer, Bortoff, Kühlewind and Sardello. This may well be a limited sample, since it is only as far as my literature search extends.
Crucially, although humans have the capacity to utter and recognise truth when they encounter it, they also have within them the capacity for untruth, the ability to lie. To see this distinction clearly is to recognise that in the world today there is a battle being fought for control of, and by, the word.

The Logos, as primal utterance, is synonymous with love and communication, which have always been there. The care and development of every person's utterance advances humanity as a whole, for as I have noted, the whole of humanity shares in the organ of form, the larynx. It is not an irrelevant matter, then, whether the individual acquires awareness that his/her personal 'voiceprint' is the vehicle of grace and truth.

Prolegomena for Chapters Nine, Ten and Eleven

I must emphasise that the depiction I have just given is the description of a picture, the result of sense-free, imaginal cognition. It is not the picturing activity itself. It is not drawn from the sense realm. The depiction is a distillation of a number of seemingly disparate referents which have been drawn together after a prolonged period of meditation or musing. These referents together comprise the fundamentals of an emerging epistemology of utterance, distinguished from other kinds of human activity. The essential difference is that an epistemology of utterance grapples with the provenance of cognition in addition to its processes, and in this sense is a Logos epistemology. Before embarking on my aim of recovery of the integrity of the Logos through Logos awareness, then, I must similarly explicate these referents as they coalesce into a whole. I have called them prolegomena because together they comprise the prerequisite framework undergirding the commentary in this and the subsequent chapters, and must be understood as such. Furthermore, I am aware that I am imposing considerable demands on the reader, for the inner activity required to grasp what I am about to present is essentially picturing, not conceptualising.
The Primal Polarity and the Teleology of Mind

To begin, I draw again upon Heidegger, who asserts that the first of all questions is this: “Why are there essents rather than nothing” (1987:1)? Schaeffer argues that this “is the incontestable and irreducible minimum for beginning to move as a [human being]. I cannot say nothing is there; it is quite plain that something is there” (1979:19). “Furthermore,” he continues, “it is also clear that this something that is there has two parts. I am there and something in contrast to myself is there” (1979:19). Of the possibilities to be derived from examination of Heidegger’s question, Schaeffer suggests that one only is worthy of sustained thought: “There is and always has been a dualism” (1979:19). (I introduced this in Chapter One as Dual Reality.) That Heidegger’s ‘first question’ has rarely been subjected to close analysis is evident in humanity at large taking up an alternative, albeit unconscious, consensus, namely, “… the consensus of the Western World in the twentieth century,” and also “…the consensus of almost all Eastern thinking” (1979:20) that “once there was absolutely nothing and now there is something” (1979:19).

According to Schaeffer this latter belief throws up, by definition, two almost insuperable problems: the notion of a mindless universe, and its corollary, an “impersonal beginning” (1979:20). Two observations arise from this:

First, there is no real explanation for the fact that the external world not only exists but has a specific form. Despite its frequent attempt to reduce the concept of the personal to the area of chemical or psychological conditioning, scientific study demonstrates that the universe has an express form. … In other words, as I look at the Being which is the external universe, it is obviously not just a handful of pebbles thrown out there. What is there has form. If we assert the existence of the impersonal as the beginning of the universe, we simply have no explanation for this kind of situation (1979:20).

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6 The word ‘essents’ is coined by Ralph Manheim, translator of Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics (1987), and means, ‘existents’ or ‘things that are.’ For the sake of general understanding, I think it would not be distorting Heidegger to translate the question thus: Why is there something and not nothing?
An impersonal beginning explains neither the fact of human personality, nor that things have a definite form.7 Being a person in the first place is inseparable from there being, for that person, a familiar world of clearly delineated forms, and not just amorphous particles of matter.

If the belief that first there was nothing and now there is something is taken seriously it would mean, for it to be true, that ‘nothing’ must really be absolutely nothing; no matter, no motion, no energy, no life. According to Schaeffer it is for this reason that the proposition has not been seriously put by anyone. It cannot be put seriously because it eventually cancels itself out. It is an impossible statement. Nevertheless, it is the popular belief.8 Despite the evidence for the persistent claim in recent science and its philosophy that mind is intrinsically implicated in observational outcomes (discussed in Appendix A), that what appears and how it appears are necessarily correlative, we behave as if the ‘familiar [world of forms] is and was there without the help of either conscious or unconscious mind’ (Barfield 1963:114). Like Schaeffer, Barfield asserts that, “… this assumption is ruled out, both by ordinary psychological analysis (as distinct from psycho-analysis) and by physical science. It is a delusion and, when we project it that way into the past, I call it a ‘spectre’” (1963:114). In other words, it has gone generally unnoticed that despite there being an ‘incontestable’ personal ‘I’ who is there, and something that is there in contrast to, or different from ‘I,’ the question of how the two function together with no apparent reason for doing so is left consistently unanswered. It could be argued that it is the epistemological assumption.

It is also a question of ultimate concern. Moreover, if I am trying to develop an epistemology of something as intimately connected with the appearance of forms as personal utterance, I cannot leave it out of the inquiry without doing the whole topic a grave injustice, specifically by perpetrating yet another delusion. Given my thinking into, and reading about, the assumption, I can only declare here my alignment with Schaeffer’s view, namely, that rather than address the question directly and go into this dualism, we instead “… press on [unconsciously] behind the dualism and its particulars toward a unity by which to comprehend

7 The absence of an explanation for the latter has led in science to the focus of attention on ever-smaller units: cells, atoms, electrons, particles, and the like.
8 This was fortuitously brought home to me as I was writing this chapter, specifically by way of a new, high-budget television series called, Universe, which begins with the authoritative but misleading statement: “Twelve million years ago there was absolutely nothing.”
the duality” (1979:19). It is again imperative that I qualify that the duality of which Schaeffer speaks is in my framework an eternal polarity (authentic unity) that has become disjunct, and so, is experienced as a duality.

To think this idea through is to come eventually to an inescapable position, namely, that there is not now, nor has there ever been, a detached, pre-existing outer world. What humans perceive is structurally inalienable from what they think. All unity, without exception, depends upon the implicit participation of consciousness of one sort or another in the ‘becoming,’ the forming, of things. That the participation goes on below the threshold of awareness does not invalidate the position. It means only that the participation as such is not usually experienced. What is experienced is the ‘become,’ the already formed.

It is on this basis that Tennyson argues (after Barfield) that what is “... essentially mental exists before what is material comes into being” (1999:xxxii). For Tennyson this implies ultimately that “the human mind must first exercise the interior function of the Imagination before the external world can have any meaning for it” (1999:xxxii). Only by virtue of human participation in the phenomena can meaning arise at all. Indeed, to insist (or forget) that it is otherwise is to deny (by subscribing unwittingly to a causal theory of perception) that the experience of the Greeks was not real. That their experience was not literal does not mean that it was not real. Literalism tells us more about the state of the current mind than it does about the Greek mind.

The point I am leading up to is that if the receptivity of the Greeks was different from ours, it cannot mean that only the phenomena have evolved. Their cognitive correlative has changed with them, because the two comprise a structural polarity of belonging together. It is the kind of participation that has changed. Forms (as distinct from matter) cannot appear without mind. If the effort is made to suspend the dual (onlooker) perspective, it will be seen

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9 Bortoft says the reason this seems to lack credibility is that “… we do not take into account the fact that we ourselves, i.e., as human beings, are an integral part of the process of the world. What appears in the light of consciousness manifests appearingly - in fact, it manifests. This is then its mode of being. But we believe that consciousness is separated from an already formed world, i.e., a world that is finished independently of humanity and is ‘just there,’ as it appears when seen, regardless of whether it is seen or not” (1996:389). He concludes by saying: “Without humanity the world could only be nonappearing” (1996:389).
that consciousness, in whatever state, is implicit in the coming-into-being of the manifold forms of the world.\(^\text{10}\)

It follows from this - since the Greek experience was different from ours - that there is a changing relation between mind, (which is more, or less, ‘personal’ at given moments in the history of civilisation), and the external world. Moreover, if we can, indeed, accept that we ‘press on’ to a unity by which to comprehend the duality, it implies that the changing relation that results at any given moment from that historical striving has a telos, an end inscribed in itself, in its beginning. That unity is the Logos. As I have already noted, one cannot work from a unity, only towards it. The working towards is significant. There is a duality implied from the start, but a duality that is purposive. Another way of saying this is that there is an unconscious kind of consciousness at work in all current cognitive processes, and that the teleological goal of consciousness is to become conscious of itself, which goal it cannot achieve by itself (since this is largely unconscious), but only in conjunction with a concrete other that is both like and unlike it.\(^\text{11}\)

A duality that is distinguished by its being purposive, (implying some sort of long-term resolution of antecedent contrary qualities), is a polarity.\(^\text{12}\) Polarity is unity. Heidegger has this in mind when he says: “Conflict does not split, much less destroy unity. It constitutes unity, it is a binding-together, logos” (1987:62). A polarity of contraries is there at the beginning, and at the end. Reality is not dual, but polar; and awareness of polarity would constitute authentic

\(^{10}\) That the so-called normal state of mind is changeable is beyond doubt. Stanislav Grof, for example, who acknowledges the influence on his work of David Bohm (the holographic model of the ‘implicate order,’) and Karl Pigram (holographic principles in the model of the brain), has coined the term holotropic (from the Greek kolos and trepein, meaning oriented or moving towards the direction of wholeness) states for non-ordinary states of consciousness which are “characterized by specific transformations of consciousness associated with perceptual changes in all sensory areas... and profound transformations in thought processes” (1998:5).

\(^{11}\) This is not a contradiction. A sense of it may be got when we consider that one of the properties of thinking (the terms thinking and consciousness in Steiner’s framework are interchangeable) is that it may be stimulated to action by perception of objects (sensationalism). Thinking, however, has another property, namely, the self-willed creation of forms not activated by sense-impressions (imagination). That this can be achieved at all is due to a bifurcation of thinking and perceiving. I am surrounded by things that reveal themselves to my senses, but I am also aware of an inner life. I am part of nature, yet feel myself to be separate from it. If I pause, however, to ask what in me is related to nature or external reality that is not object, not matter, the answer must be: that which has separated from external reality, so much so that it is attributed only to a human subject, namely, thinking, the activity of mind. The forms of the external world have about them something of the nature of thought.

\(^{12}\) As heidegger says: “Being meant for the Greeks: permanence in a twofold sense...” (1987:63). It is worth noting also that the notion of an original bifurcation of reality is consistent with Eastern philosophies (Wilber 1993) but its temporal resolution is not. I will address this distinction again in Chapter Thirteen.
wholeness. To come to this knowledge concretely is what Steiner (1992) means by the term *epistemological monism*. This is consistent with the notion I posited in Chapter One that knowledge does not consist in learning new things, but in knowing (for the first time) the things we already know. The shift is from the known (which is known in the cognitive sense but really unknown in the epistemological sense) to the knowing of the known. It means deliberately refocussing attention on the *act* of cognising rather than on what is cognised. This initiative is what Kühlewind means when he says: “The *Logos* teaching is a cognitive teaching, the only possible one, since the primal reality is cognition” (1985:31).

In my *Logos* framework, then, there is a teleology of knowing, whose historical realisation would consist in mind assisting its own movement towards unity (in multeity) by becoming conscious of the dynamics of the existing polar relation between itself as individual or personal mind and the concrete (mind-like) other. In other words, it consists in becoming aware of the *Logos*. As logosing (wording and wordlike) beings, this means transforming the ‘gift’ of cognitive empowerment (*taking* the measure) into epistemic empowerment (awareness of what it means to *have* that *ability* to take the measure.)

*The Primacy of Historical Awareness in the Recovery of Logos Awareness*

Clearly, it is the structure of the mind, the mode of consciousness, that is the determining element in the perception of reality, for this structures the perspective, the relation of mind to the familiar world of forms. Tillich affirms this point: “Whoever gives a new theory of logic or semantics uses logic or semantics in order to do this. He presupposes that about which he wants to give a theory. It is the structure of the mind that enables any theory, even one about the structure of the mind, to do what it attempts to do” (1967:69-70). Tillich does not, however, imply that the structure is fixed and unchangeable. Yet that, too, is frequently presupposed. The reason is that the mind does not perceive *its own* activity exercised during perception (Chapter Two).

Let me give an example by elaborating an observation I made in Chapter Eight, and then subjecting that example to analysis. I discussed the question of Greek consciousness being
affected by musical encounter in such a way that the individual consciousness expanded into
cosmic consciousness, the ONE.

This is where modern inquiry stops abruptly. It is as if, having arrived at this conclusion,
and acknowledged it as such, to then research it, for itself, would be considered mere
conjecture. The difficulty, as I said, is that although we acknowledge that musical experience
happens, the modern mind cannot gain access to it because it is not conscious of having the
experience while it is happening. It can reflect on it and explain it only after the event. It is of
course interesting and informative to find out how the modern mind responds to musical
stimuli, and this is the thrust of much of the research outside musicology. This line of inquiry,
at least within the parameters of psychophysiology, has been well documented (in, for example,
Deutsche 1982, Lundin 1985 and Sloboda 1985). Research of this kind, however, reveals
nothing of the musical experience (either for past civilisations or for us); and even if it could, it
would still tell us nothing of the significance of observed changes in consciousness in the larger
context of human existence, that is, why, for what purpose, the musical experience should ever
have evolved in the first place.\textsuperscript{13} The question that is hardly ever asked, then, is the inverse of
the kind of research that seeks to examine responses to musical stimuli. Instead of asking how
the mind and its attendant physiology respond to musical stimuli, we could ask: In what ways,
to what extent, and to what end is the perception of musical phenomena conditioned by
periodic changes in consciousness, and, to be blunt, by accrued habits of thought?

To take this further, I submit that the latter, and harder, question is not asked because of
those habits, at least the habit of assuming that because our experience, conditioned as it is by a
particular (specific and localised) structure of mind, is applicable to the cognition of past
civilisations and those of the future.

Let me, with Bortoft’s assistance subject this assumption to a brief analysis. The
perception of structure (not just the objects and parts comprising it) is non-sensory, and this is,
according to Bortoft, the “...perception of meaning” (1996:52). For example, the coherence

\footnote{As I have consistently argued, it is positivist belief, which is after all a particular structure of mind, that has intervened. As Koestler writes: “... the mind abhors gaps in the lawful order as nature abhors the vacuum” (1969:329). Even today (despite the recognition of an ancient doctrine that the domains of science and art form a}
formed by separate tones and the intervals between them, which together we give the name, ‘melody,’ would otherwise be a meaningless succession of noises without the mind’s intervention or participation. That coherence is the meaning, ‘melody.’ “This is not the meaning of what is [heard],” insists Bortoft, “but the meaning which is what is [heard]” (1996:52). The separate tones have no meaning at all, which they would have to have were they merely sense-data. The meaning that is what is heard is not ‘heard’ (in the sense of audition) in the sense-perceptible tones, even if it appears that way. To hear these tones as a ‘melody’ is already to hear meaning. “There cannot be a perception of meaningless data, because in the act of [hearing] the event it is meaning that we [hear]” (1996:52-53), which implies that we hear in a melody way, as it were.

The perception of structural coherence, pattern and motion that appear to be given in the sense-data makes it seem that these are achieved by pure sense-experience. Bortoft argues, however, that “… we know from pathological and other cases that the state of purely sensory experience does exist, and that it is a state which corresponds to the complete absence of meaning” (1996:53).14 “So the philosophy of empiricism,” he continues, “which believes that knowledge of the world comes directly through the senses, is fundamentally misleading” (1996:53). As I commented above, it is not that this insight does not remain unexplained; rather, it remains unheeded.

We mistake tones for material objects and meaning for matter, and so, miss the dimension of mind, our own contribution, in perception.15 We do not see our own intentionality at work, and believe it is not there. Yet it is to intentionality (mind searching for its object) that the invisibility of consciousness can be ascribed, and this, in turn, determines that “… the meaning that is what is [heard] becomes [inaudible] as such and appears as something other than it is, namely, a sensory object. Hence, we are left with only a secondary notion of meaning, namely, the meaning of what is [heard]. This is secondary because what is

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14 It is worth reading in Monika Langer (1989) how Merleau-Ponty develops aspects of his phenomenology of perception out of observation of pathological cases.

15 Ordinary cognition (the empirical way of sensing) is not concerned directly with what are termed ‘sense-data,’ but with what Bortoft calls “condensations of meaning” (1996:53).
[heard] is meaning already” (1996:55).

What this means for us is that the structure of mind in cognition has completely vanished in the sense of it being experienced; (and this is the ground upon which positivism became not only a scholarly discourse, but the common-sense view, and remains so in my opinion). I am discussing it here because I maintain that this state of affairs was not the case for the Greeks. Rather, the meaning that is what is perceived, and the meaning of what is perceived were one. It is only since this time that the two have become gradually disjunct because intentionality and perception have become disjunct (Appendix A and Steiner 1981, 1992.) (As I said above, it is hearkening and musing that restore the balance, the unity, because they are intentionality made conscious.)

If I appear to be insistent about this issue, it is because it is a major referent for my thesis and what I do with it from here. Placing the example I have just discussed in the context of another observation will lead me to the main point I wish to make, namely, that just as there is an historicity of knowledge (what is known), there is an historicity of consciousness (that which knows), the significance of which, when seen in the light of a telos, would mean that to participate willingly in the coming-to-be of a phenomenon, (which is its thought-likeness) is to participate in one’s own intentionality.

By directing phenomenological observation at current musical receptivity, it will be noticed that we perceive the music of say, J.S. Bach, as being different from that of Brahms, and both as being different from the experience of Gregorian chant. Furthermore, the experience of melody is different from the experience of harmony and these in turn are different from the experience of rhythm.16 Are we to assume that the experienced difference in each case consists only in changes in the ways composers have arbitrarily manipulated the two musical elements, tone and interval, and not in fundamental changes in the mind that perceives? If the difference could be explained on that basis alone, why did polyphony not appear centuries earlier than it did? Why are composers presently not writing in the style of Bach?

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16 The most obvious example is the powerful influence of rhythm on the will, inducing a person (in the absence of self-restraint) to move the body, sometimes wildly, in time with a pulse, whereas melody and harmony do not induce physical movement to the same extent.
Would not our assumption imply that the mind of Pythagoras was the same structure as that of, say, Gorecki? Clearly, this cannot be so. As Barfield has Dunn say in his Socratic dialogue, *Worlds Apart*: "... the obvious is the hardest thing of all to point out to anyone who is genuinely unaware of it" (1963:97).

It is safe to argue, I think, that the apprehension of music changes, and accordingly, the way it is used by a civilisation, because the manner of receptivity, the structure of mind in relation to its phenomena changes. Gregorian chant *sounds* different from the music of Brahms to us because the mind has changed in the time that has elapsed between them. As the mind changes, so does the perspective, the observer-observed relation. As I will discuss in depth later in this chapter, the structure of mind changes in accordance with the influence of time and space on perception. Indeed, it will be seen that the experience of space and time plays a role in structuring the mind itself.

Without knowing it, humans today possess a different - in the case of uttered forms, diachronic - perspective from that of previous generations. Yet, we can participate (again, unconsciously) in the cumulative past each time we listen to music of a previous era, and we achieve this specifically by participating in the structure of the mind of the time and its perspective. Rhythm, melody and harmony, for example, were not there together in the beginning. They are experienced differently because their respective ideas were taken up through humanity at different times according to a changing spatio-temporal perspective (to be discussed further in this chapter). They evolved; and we share in this evolution. To put it another way, humanity has a *noetic* history (distinguished from, and perhaps in collaboration with, a biological history) and this is communicated in the tonal system. Lukacs expresses this idea evocatively:

... our personal knowledge of the past is part of the universal history of mankind, ... we are human repositories of all mankind's historical experiences in the past, which is why we potentially understand everything that is historical while, conversely, everything that is historical is potentially understandable. It is this that our tiny actual, and our enormous potential, knowledge of the past are two components of the same condition. They are, more than often, charged with meaning through the functioning of our imagination and of our memory (1997:248).
Merleau-Ponty puts the historicity of knowing another way: "Since we are all hemmed-in by history, it is up to us to understand that whatever truth we may have is to be gotten not in spite of but through our historical inherence" (1964:109).

If the notion of historical consciousness is embraced, the case can be put that polyphony could not have appeared prior to the moment when it did because the particular structure of the mind was not yet ready to take up the musical structure peculiar to polyphony. Moreover, this realisation lends an entirely different definition to history; for it implies that history is not limited to sequential, lineal progression; rather, the cognition of a previous epoch is absorbed organically in a succeeding epoch, and is in some sense subsequently unremembered but not forgotten. It implies also that history can never strictly be the study 'of' something, whether it be of the earth, of ideas, of science or of civilisation; for history is also a requary, a living record of the mind that studies these things.

In my framework, then, epistemic awareness cannot be separated from historical awareness. As I have discussed, history is cumulative. Another way of putting this is that the history of knowing is knowing, which realisation leads, I think, to the compelling position that an epistemology cannot be only the study of the current way of knowing; for current knowing is inherently historical. It is awareness of our own historical consciousness that will enable us to understand discoveries in music - Pythagoras' discovery, for example - in terms of the way of hearing, rather than only in terms of what is heard.

It is because we have not heeded this epistemological message, I believe, that we have not seen, or rather, struggle to see the supersensible, transpersonal ground of music, whereas for earlier civilisations, this was all they saw. They saw it because their less individuated consciousness was still in some sense identical with the phenomena and events of their experience. As Heidegger affirms: "What is invisible in that which [for us now] stands over against belongs to the interior and immanence of consciousness" (1975:125).

The Polarity of the Historical and the Teleological

I have discussed so far that musical knowing, in my framework, has both a teleology and a historicity, or to put it another way, temporality in two directions. In a sense, the recovery of
meaning consists in knowing where music, which, recall, is structurally inseparable from musical consciousness, has come from and where it is going, which is really the same timeless point. History has an origin and an end, which is the origin. It is my task here to explain how I see the historical and the teleological interpenetrating, that is, how they are related in polarity.

I can best achieve this by taking another look at Pythagoras’ insight with the historical consciousness I have been postulating. In the first place, it is important to appreciate that Pythagoras did not invent the tonal system, the scale and the intervals that comprise it; he discovered it, which is to say it was already ‘there’ prior to its discovery. What he discovered are the universally applicable mathematical correlatives of the Logos principle, the formative principle, the principle of polarity, the intensive dimension of ONE. The principle of distinction (again, not dividing, segregating, disconnecting, severing, Sundering, estranging or alienating) is inherent in the single tone, the ONE. The single tone and the scale comprise an ‘exemplary model’ of multeity in unity, the Logos. The whole, the single tone, is divided by making the parts sequential or successive, by bringing the ONE into time. As I discussed in Chapter Eight, only in this temporal manner is it made audible. By ‘succession’ is meant the creation of intervals of distinction between the multiple parts (the related tones) so dispersed. The parts, although different from each other just because of those time-spaces, are nevertheless connected to the ONE, the prime, by force of relation, otherwise they would make no sense. They belong together in a ‘logical’ system. Logos logic (making sense) is a logic of the whole, that is, a logic of polarity (or distinction), not duality (or division).

What does this multeity in unity suggest? It is this: all temporal phenomena have a timeless origin. The very concept of temporal sequence presupposes an absolute, timeless structure within the flow of temporal succession. The temporal and the abiding belong together as a polarity. Every time a musician plays or sings a melody (which is not merely an unrelated succession of tones), although its creation is ‘new’ in the sense that it was not there perceptible

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17 The distinction is supported by the Eighteenth-century speculative musician, Fabre d’Olivet, who was steeped in the Pythagorean tradition: “Music ... should not be considered as the invention of one man, for there has never been a man on earth capable of inventing a science.... No science is invented. It is a gift that the human spirit makes to humanity by means of one of his inspirational faculties. Any inspired science descends in principle...” (1997:85-86). It is worth noting that the text from which this passage is taken has only very recently (1997) been translated into English by Joscelyn Godwin, himself a Pythagorean and speculative scholar.
to the ear a moment ago, the act is a restoration in that moment of something not only very ancient, but eternal. In the common scales and intervals, as they unfold out of the ONE, lies the historical structure of the mind of past civilisations. To experience the intervals is to dwell historically, cumulatively. Intentionality, recall, has a transcendental function.

Insofar as they are tone (singular idea), all tones (multiples) are equivalent; until, that is, they become different from each other by the mind’s act of distinction, and it is only then that they become active by accruing the forces latent in the intensive dimension of ONE. It is the quality of the interval that makes the musical difference. Not all distinctions, then, are equivalent. That is why each interval is perceived as having its own quality. The only way I can explain this is to say that there is a hierarchy of distinction that is bound up with the evolution of the structure of the mind as it equates with the experience of space and time. Without at this stage being historically specific, an earlier civilisation, the Greek, for example, would have identified with certain intervals because they accorded with the kind of distinction made by the structure of mind specific to that historical moment, while the same civilisation would not have identified (as intimately) with other intervals which came later to human experience. (I will deal with this idea in more detail later in Chapter Eleven. I mention it here only by way of validating my recourse to historical consciousness and also to set up subsequent inquiry.)

This leads me to suggest that the recovery of the integrity of the Logos, the ONE, is pursued by way of determining in what ways cognitive perception is changed by the influence of the temporal (the sequential) and the spatial (the extensive). As the approach to the atemporal is made through the temporal, so the ahistorical must be approached through the historical. I articulated in the previous chapter, that because the past (including the distant past) continues to work in us, history is relevant in the recovery of meaning. As I discussed above, it is this historical sense that enables us to distinguish one period of music from another, or to discern one interval from another. The mind is an historical mind, a condition of our knowing, or as Lukacs, again, puts it: “... history, for us, has become a form of thought” (1997:5). Importantly, it has not always been a form of thought. It has become a form of thought only because intentionality separated at some point from its phenomena. A structure of mind that is
one with its phenomena has no need of the past, indeed, cannot even reflect on it because it has no memory.

Again, I can only point out at this stage that my description of the musical experience in this historical sense will seem incredible, not because the experience is not as I described it, but because (s)he who has the experience is not conscious of having it at the same time as it is happening, and thus, its latency. (But that is why an epistemology is necessary.) Another way of saying this is that we in the present time can only truly know the ontological, the timeless, the ahistorical, by virtue of our being historical beings. The solution to the mystery of musical utterance is teleological, however, and lies in its very temporality in both the historical and receptive senses. I mean that to attend seriously to the act of historical-musical cognition as it is happening instead of its results after the event is a teleological initiative.

**The Teleological Initiative as Ethical Individualism**

Why am I insisting on this teleological initiative? Why is it is important to action the proposition that by throwing light on the past (what has become) as it is happening in us in the present, we can uncover indications for the future (the becoming)? As I have suggested, genuine human ‘freedom,’ which is synonymous with individuation, is dependent, not on acquiring new knowledge, but on acquiring enhanced perception for the purpose of learning to make conscious what we already know; in short, on epistemic awareness.\(^{18}\) To pursue this actively means that the responsibility for knowing is thrown back on the agency that knows. The agency that knows is itself historical. In this important sense genuine human progress is, in part, retroactive, providing the latent experience is raised to consciousness. I am saying that the teleological initiative is at the same time an ethical initiative. It is what Steiner (1992) meant by the term ethical individualism.

\(^{18}\) It is critical to my inquiry that the word ‘freedom’ is not misconstrued. In the German language, Freiheit, which translates to English literally as ‘freedom,’ refers to an inner state or condition. It is in this sense that I use the word. I do not mean it in the usual sense of freedom of thought, speech or religion, although these meanings, whose connotations are taken from political and constitutional expediency, are included. Added to these, however, is the inner poise - free of obedience to any authority - of spiritual autonomy, which is not given, but attained by inner effort. The reader may already have gained that impression from my style of argument and from the content of the previous chapter. For a more detailed discussion of freedom in this sense, I refer the reader to Michael Wilson’s (1963) edition of Steiner’s, *The Philosophy of Freedom*, cited in my Bibliography as the re-titled, *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* (1992). Chapter Two also gives some idea of what Steiner means epistemologically by the word ‘Freiheit.’
I see the recovery of Logos awareness and, through this, its 'integrity' (polar but undivided unity) as the path to ethical individualism because the impoverishment of artistic feeling I have discussed is of a piece with the disintegration of the moral world order which, in turn is symptomatic of the absence of awareness in our participation in the world of phenomena. Since there is great complexity in this idea I will need to elaborate it in the context of historical consciousness so that the connection is apparent.

The reader will recall that when the ability to take the measure becomes automatic, and thus, utilitarian, (which, recall, is synonymous with the loss of intelligibility), it is, at least in Platonic terms, the equivalent of a moral fall.\(^{19}\) The moral fall is tied up with the failure to differentiate between distinguishing and dividing, which, in turn, is linked to the influence of the space-time continuum on cognition, and that is because it is only spatially or temporally that a Form (or idea) can be made a sense-perceptible form. When the ONE is divided (in the sense of fragmenting or dualising) all sense of the Logos (the antecedent unity that is the belonging together of antagonisms in Heidegger's terms, or the interpenetration of contrary qualities in Barfield's terms) is lost. Heidegger (1987) strove assiduously to show this (as did Steiner 1973) by comparing the change in consciousness that occurred between the pre-Socratic Greeks, Heraclitus and Parmenides, and the post-Socratic philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. In other words, a moral fall is an epistemological fall because it is fundamentally a space-time fall. (In this way are the timeless and the temporal polar opposites.) The lost integrity of the Logos can be attributed to the radical change in the manner of receptivity between the Greek civilisation and our own, (which latter I will argue below has become predominantly visual, and therefore, spatial.) The difference, then, between distinguishing and dividing, or polarising and dualising, must be understood epistemologically in the inherently historical sense if we are to know the Logos origin and nature of cognition.

\(^{19}\) The study of Greek thought and art evidences a theopathic culture in which the universe has material and moral foundations. For this reason, scholars were also initiates, members of various Brotherhodds and Mystery Centres, who esteemed mystery knowledge sufficiently for it to be regarded as recondite, numinosus wisdom. For this reason, it was imparted didactically to the populace by way of the imaginative, poetic and morally instructive form of the _drama_ (from _dromenon_, meaning 'deed,' 'work,' but also 'holy mystery-cult'). During this time, however, can be seen the signs of increasing individuation, a transition from a consciousness that is something of the nature of atavistic clairvoyance, to something more personal and self-conscious. Individuation, in turn, is tied up with an increasingly physical experience of the world, even in Plato's time, as d'Olivet points out: "... minds strongly inclined towards materialism offered to everything physical a foothold that metaphysics could no longer find there" (1997:69).
What all this means for the direction I will take from here is that an ethical path of knowing (and annulment of the dilemma) consists in recovery of the integrity of the Logos, which is to say, "... the [re]discovery of authentic wholeness" (Bortoft 1996:26). As I said, I see this as an epistemological goal. The recovery is essential for education based, not on applied ends, that is, autocratic agendas or vocational priorities, which, as I have argued, are symptoms of the ethical dilemma whose nature is uncertain purpose, but on a path leading to ethical individualism. Plato must have had more than an inkling of this when he insisted that his musical teachings were epistemological and educational in the ethical sense. It is in this light that Bortoft asserts the epistemological, the ethical and the teleological together: "It is [no longer] enough to dwell in nature [the world] sentimentally and aesthetically, grafting such awareness to a scientific [positivist] infrastructure which denies nature" (1996:26).

The problem, of course, is that the Logos, the origin, resides concealed; but that is why I am arguing that its unconcealment represents for humanity the possibility of freedom, or ethical individualism. It was concealed in becoming flesh (St John’s Gospel), matter, darkness without light, a theme to which I will attend in some depth in the denouement. Its unconcealment is historical in the teleological or purposive sense.

To give an example, my previous explication of the emergence of the kind of knowing that is nihilistic (and by definition the suffering implicated in it) is part of that history. It can be found in Nietzsche’s philosophy, where it appears as the beginning of the modern view that human beings find themselves in a meaningless universe. What usually goes unnoticed, however, as Bortoft again points out, is that there is a positive aspect to nihilism that is tied up with the questions of meaning and human freedom:

Faced with a meaningless universe, as it seems to us, we can create meaning, and in so doing we take a step of freedom, which is a developmental step for us. We have to do this for ourselves - otherwise it would not be freedom - herein lies the difficulty, which necessarily accompanies any developmental opportunity" (1996:366).

I am arguing that historical awareness and the study of historical consciousness, which is to say, a study of itself, is just that ‘developmental opportunity’ that can clear the way (beyond nihilism) for the retrieval of other possibilities of meaning and thus, for freedom. Anything less
is a *naïve* freedom. As Schaeffer writes: "History is going somewhere - there is a flow to history" (1989:30). That direction, as I said, is epistemological, since the moral fall is at the same time an epistemological fall. I think it is in this specifically ethical-epistemological sense that Lukács affirms the historicity of human knowing: "Those of us who want to maintain the sanity of our minds must therefore recognize the time that has come in the evolution of consciousness: we must begin thinking, not about ideas, but about thinking itself" (1997:xxxvi). He continues: "... we must realize that epistemology - the study of the conditions of knowledge, of how we know things - can no longer be seen as a mere, a secondary, branch of philosophy. The awareness - the historical awareness - of how we know things is the essential condition of all philosophy now" (1997:xlii). Schaeffer takes up this idea: "It is either not knowing or denying the createdness of things [distinguished from an original absolute nothingness] that is at the root of the blackness of modern man's difficulties. Give up creation [he does not mean creation-ism] as *space-time, historic reality*, and all that is left is what Simone Weil called uncreatedness" (1979:30 my emphasis). History is truth rooted in space and time. That is why "... the principal task of historical thinking is the reduction of *untruths* - a task which is now inextricably involved with the degeneration of our languages" (Lukács 1997:264 my emphasis).

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20 I trust I have made apparent that to look at things in this way necessarily implies a teleological, rather than an aetiological position, which is today no doubt controversial. Nevertheless, Sheldrake argues that the rejection of a telos (an end inscribed in itself) for mind, which includes nature, is an inheritance of positivist orthodoxy: "... the whole course of nature is supposed to be pushed by causes from behind rather than moving towards and drawn by attractions or motivations from ahead" (1997:16-17). Again, it is always *external* nature that is referred to. Such a view overlooks human intentionality, the movement of consciousness toward something, about which Rollo May writes: "To me [intentionality] seems to be the core of our whole quest; its presence there in the centre is a perpetual reminder that our meanings are never purely 'intellectual' or our acts purely results of pushes from the past; but in both we are moving *toward something*" (1970:229).

21 Some sense of the urgency of this initiative can be discerned in a discourse between author, Joel Kovel, and philosopher, David Michael Levin. Kovel writes: "... as history has yielded a fragmented society, so may it be undone, i.e., transcended, at the level of a fragment. As personal life is a principal one of these [social] fragments, the question of transcendence may validly be asked of it" (1982:249). Levin responds to this: "What Kovel is calling 'the question of transcendence' is a question which calls upon the self to question itself with regard for its visionary capacity, and for the roles, routines and practices in which this capacity is channelled in response to the task. In our time, this questioning does not bring to light a Cartesian self, a self of reason completely purged of body and feeling, a self without shadows, a self totally transparent to itself, totally knowing of itself, totally self-possessed, totally certain of itself. On the contrary, the self which responds to this question is an embodied historical self feeling, today, very empty, very much alone, very unsure of itself: a self in fragments, a self in the fury of Being. It is this historical experience of ourselves which forms the basis, the starting point, for our attempt to set in motion a practice of the self very different from Descartes'; and indeed very different from the modern: a practice which assigns to our visionary capacity an historical task in response to our need" (1988:15).
Finally, the tensions discerned no doubt by the reader in this discussion originate in the single tension inherent in the historical dialectic I revealed in Chapter Eight, namely, the loss implied in the demise of an extraordinary Logos vision and the gain implied in humanity's taking the measure. The shift has taken place historically; but its possibility was already present before history. The crucial point I wish to make is that when these contrarieties become optimally divergent, which they have, I think, in the present age, they can manifest in typically polar fashion either as love or control. Both are built into the primal polarity, the Logos. At the chiasma, the point where they polarise, however, lies the possibility of their reconciliation as awareness. The awareness of which I speak cancels out the either-or duality and becomes an inner-outer hygienic rhythm.

This completes the explication of the prolegomena essential to the inquiry in the next three chapters. As I said, they comprise the fundamentals, as I see them, of an epistemology of utterance. I feel obliged to add, however, that I am aware that, despite its compelling truth in my mind, the notion of consciousness evolution does not sit comfortably with the orthodox view. Yet, neither, I suspect, does the whole notion of a Logos epistemology. As I have suggested a number of times, the problem lies in these notions being essentially pictorial, not conceptual. I have no way of resolving this problem in words. I can only reiterate what I said in Chapter Four, namely, that although consciousness evolution is not a necessary precept for building a case for a musical epistemology appropriate for our time, it is necessary in order to determine the kind of epistemology that might be. In addition, I think it can be shown to be consistent with musical experience itself as this is raised to consciousness through the practice of hearkening, musing and hermeneutic phenomenology.

Accordingly, it will be my task in this and the following chapters to further examine consciousness from the standpoint of its evolution in the individual and in humanity as a whole, and to work through the contention that by living this progression, imaginal cognition has the power to bring the Logos forces active in musical consciousness, as it has evolved, to light. As I see it, the most effective way to achieve this is to continue to compare and contrast archaic and modern thought and behaviour by reference to various modern fields of human inquiry.
To reiterate, in light of these fundamentals, this chapter begins the task of recovering the lost integrity of the *Logos* by examining how consciousness, and accordingly, the perspective, have evolved between the Greek civilisation and our own, specifically by determining the extent of the influence of the space-time continuum on cognitive perception. This latter, I will argue, has considerable implications for musical cognition in our time.

In keeping with the notion of the *Logos* as a *picture*, perhaps the most evocative, if adversarial, way of arriving at a conception of what *Logos* awareness is, is to show what it is not. If I discuss examples of human endeavour in which I believe *Logos* awareness is *absent* by juxtaposing them deliberately with the model I have just explicated, I think it will become evident how far and in what ways the original *Logos* vision has receded from the current worldview and to what extent this loss has influenced musical cognition and the course of music history.

**The Evolution and Influence of the Solid World Mode of Cognition**

First, it is essential that I outline what I conceive to be the fundamentals of the current mode of cognition.

Musical utterance, when we pause to reflect on it, continues to hold its mystery status in that what I have referred to as ordinary (representational) consciousness cannot illuminate a form of consciousness that functions in a different way and on a different level. Ordinary consciousness is constructed in such a way that it sees many ones, rather than ONE in the form of many. (I argued in the previous chapter that the single tone contains the entire diatonic system of intervals. Yet, the single tone, the unison, is not for us a concrete *musical* experience although it is an acoustic experience. It is only when we divide the ONE, the unison, that *musical* experience as such arises. It follows that seeing ONE in the form of many requires a transformation of consciousness - since it is the mode of consciousness that is the determining element in musical experience - and thence, transformation of perspective, because it is the *dividing* consciousness that obscures the intensive dimension that is ONE. Ordinary consciousness, then, is unrelentingly extensive, that is, predisposed to spatial and temporal extension.

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In view of what I have said about the Greek experience, it would be an assumption to regard consciousness as always having been the fixed, specialised and localised state that is our mind; otherwise any suggestion of historical consciousness and the possibility of other modes of knowing would be out of the question. As I tried to show in the previous chapter, the Greek conception of reality was ethereal, whereas ours is based on the experience of solidity. As the botanist, Jochen Bockemühl, points out: "... we come to firm conclusions, ... we are always limited to the surface of things and see them as separate, exactly because the qualities of solidity, impenetrability and separateness are rooted in our cognitional attitude itself" (1985:9). By contrast, the Greeks, at least pre-Socrates, could never think predicatively. Their experience was one of living in the experience of becoming, and for that reason they could not be conscious of it. If a person were conscious in the becoming of a thing, (s)he could not get outside it sufficiently to be conscious of it. (S)he would have no perspective, no sense of a space between. To have perspective is to think predicatively, that is, to think only 'is.' We cannot, avers Barfield, "... really think 'becomes,' except as a kind of cinematographic succession of states or 'is's" (1999:144). So, it is only in "the light of this underlying 'becoming' quality of Greek thinking" (1999:144) that the "puzzles about the One and the Many, about Being and Not-Being, and whether Not-Being is, and so forth..." (1999:144) begin to become intelligible.

The dominant feature of the current cognitional perspective is the state of is-ness, of solidity and extension. How does this reveal itself? I drew attention above to the difference between dividing and distinguishing. Barfield underlines the difference when he speaks about the "... obsessive confusion" (1999:130) between the two, that "...terribly contemporary fallacy which supposes that we must only distinguish things that we are also able to divide" (1999:130). He goes on to say that this obsession is "closely allied to an obsession with space as the criterion of reality. When we divide things, we set them, either in fact or in imagination, side by side in space" (1999:130). "But space," he continues, "is not the be-all and end-all, and there are many things that, by reason of their interpenetration - I repeat, because of their interpenetration - cannot be divided, though they are easily distinguished" (1999:130). This double obsession, according to Barfield, is evidenced in science by the focus of attention on increasingly smaller units. However beneficial this may be for technology, there is no
justification for the conclusion (actually, the assumption) to which it seems, inevitably, to lead, namely, “that the parts preceded the wholes, and that the world was actually built by putting together the units into which our minds divide it, as a house is built by putting bricks together” (1999:131).

The perception of solid bodies, of the already become, of ‘is-ness,’ is an act of division, which is allied to the influence of spatial depth in the perspective. Space, as I discussed in Chapter Four, “… is not a physical field of physical forces, but one which is homogeneous with our thinking” (Barfield 1963:143). We do not recognise that the world of solid, separate, bodies is not already ‘there’ given to the senses, but is one (specific and localised) way of perceiving that world. When we speak of the ‘external’ world it is the world of solid bodies we are speaking about. Bortoft says about this:

We take it for granted that the world of solid bodies [meaning the external world] is the world, existing as such independently, whereas it is in fact the world that appears in the light of the ‘solid world’ mode of conception. Indeed, this very image of a separately existing world, independent as such of our knowing it (and yet appearing just as it is when we do know it), is itself an instance of the ‘solid world’ conception. What is seen cannot be separated from the way it is seen: The solid world is the cognitive correlate of the ‘solid world’ mode of conception (1996:176).

The solid world mode of conception comes before cognition. It seems that the dual perspective is characterised by just this irredeemable solid world mode of conception. It is a perspective of quantity, not distinction, of extension, not intension. Crucially, the object-centred perspective not only determines the way we see the world of visible forms, but also thwarts our knowing of temporal events by interpreting them after they have occurred. Furthermore, we believe this retrospective, referential analysis to constitute the final proof of those events. Importantly, when the belief in this specific and localised way of observing is applied to temporality as history and, even more so, to pre-history, the outcome, according to Barfield, is “logomorphism,” the result of “projecting post-logical thoughts back into a pre-logical age...” (1984:90). It is the divided, predicated, lineal, solid world experience that is projected. Barfield expresses this differently elsewhere: “History of thought [distinguished from thinking] is illusory just because we tend to think back in this way in our own terms, to
project into the minds of our ancestors a kind of thinking which was only made possible by the subsequent events of that very history" (1999:141). I have already alluded to this difficulty several times. The general misreading of Plato’s epistemology I highlighted in the previous chapter is an apposite example. “You cannot,” avers Barfield, “study the history of thought without thinking the thoughts whose history you are studying” (1999:128). The solution is to *unthink* the logomorphic way of thought. I am convinced that it is just this unthinking that often occurs in musical encounter, at least in the listener. It is just that (s)he is not normally aware of it because consciousness is one with the experience. In short, there is no perspective *on* the experience.

The solid world mode of conception influences seeing (the spatial), but can influence hearing, (the temporal-historical). It would be an error, however, to project it back into the Greek mind, because it is precisely *not* the solid world that is the dominant feature of the Greek experience. If the effort is made to unthink logomorphism, and rather, place oneself in the Greek mind, it can be clearly seen, as I have asserted, that the Greek mode of conception, which is to say, the Greek mind, was an expansive, cosmological one. Moreover, since musical phenomena are precisely *not* solid objects, *not* spatial phenomena, and *refer* to nothing of material substance at all, they cannot have evolved out of the solid world mode of cognition. I want to emphasise this before proceeding further.

For ease of identification, I will refer from here to the projection of the solid world mode of cognition onto space as *visual* or *spatial extension*, while I will borrow Barfield’s term, *logomorphism*, when I want to refer to its projection into the temporal (past). I intend to show that the two have been confused in that the visual-spatial projection in cognitive perception has come to dominate the auditive-temporal dimension, and also that these developments have occurred simultaneously with the loss of the integrity of the *Logos*. Levin expresses this notion of the hegemony of *seeing* as “... the complicity of vision - vision elevated to the position of paradigm for knowledge and rationality - in the historical domination of our ‘universal’ metaphysics” (1988:7).
The Dominance of Vision - The Spatialisation of the Temporal in Utterance

Under this head, I will begin the task of showing in what ways and to what extent the extensive, solid-world, predicated and divisive perspective, which is the dual perspective, has impacted upon various fields of knowledge, beginning with language; for it would seem that, for the Greeks, words and the thought within them were inseparably one, and that at some time, thinking detached itself as meaning from the sounds used to express that meaning. The word became a mere tool of practical expedience.

As the reader is ‘reading’ my text, (s)he is obliged to face the text (since (s)he cannot see by not being in front of it, and so, is situated in succession. To see the text, the reader must turn the eyes, taking in one word after another, that is, in sequence. The seeing is achieved always in the same direction from left to right, and top to bottom (for Western readers.) The reader is not conscious of all this. (I mean this in the sense that if we say a person is conscious, we are saying (s)he is conscious of something.)

The words I have emphasised all derive from spatial extension, from seeing, a visual perspective. The words are also preserved on the page in a permanent condition. In a sense, they are solid objects. It is true to say that almost all present-day activity in science, literature, technology, education, and even to a large extent in music, is grounded in literacy, if by literacy is meant an original sonic utterance preserved in, one might even say, reduced to, visualist terms. Yet utterance, in its original sonic form, has nothing to do with writing, or in the case of music, with notation. Everything that falls under the heading of communicative utterance in the abovementioned fields has evolved out of oral performance, and not the other way around. Ong says about this: “... because it consists of silent words, writing introduces a whole new set of structures within the psyche: communication, encounter with one who is not present, participation in the thought of others without commitment or involvement” (1981:126).

Sound, uttered speech, on the other hand, is indissolubly connected with the passage of time, with living duration, and “... cultures which do not reduce words to space but know them only as oral-aural phenomena, in actuality or in the imagination, naturally regard words as more powerful than do literate cultures” (Ong 1981:112). That is because sound is more existential,
more real, more dynamic, for it "... must be in active production in order to exist at all" (1981:112). I cannot emphasise enough that sound comes only with unmediated involvement in time, and that to sound in time is to empower. When the word is, as it were devocalised, the spatial outcome 'silences' the reader in the sense that (s)he is obliged to follow, if not accept the dictates of the written word and the writer and/or publisher far more than (s)he realises.

Few readers are aware that their *spatial* assimilation of the word (reading) is possible at all only because of an historic occurrence. By virtue of our being historical beings, "... our understanding of life, and our vision of reason, are historically situated. It also means that our visionary capacity, our visionary endowment, is historically conditioned" (Levin 1988:35-36).

I feel the need to keep reiterating that how one perceives (looks and hears) a thing is something going on in consciousness, and not a change in the external thing, or in the sensorium. The thing changes only because the cognitional attitude, the perspective, changes. The eye, at least in Western cultures, has *assumed* dominance by shifting the sensory balance from the aural to the visual. This is nothing less than a puissant paradigm shift, for prior to the invention of the written word, the human being is oral-aural, "... not merely in that his words are all spoken and heard words, never visually perceived marks on a surface, but in that his whole response to actuality is thereby organised differently from that of typographic man" (Ong 1981:8). The spatialisation of utterance goes hand in hand with a changing perspective on the world, so much so that the word as a living thing, apprehension of which is dependent on a highly sensitive *auditory* sensorium, is smothered by the change to a visual perspective. To put it more forcefully, modernity has become comparatively deaf, for utterance now stands in an entirely different relation to the awareness by which pre-literate civilisation found itself situated in its world. Utterance, in the final analysis is originally sonic, even when it is not sounding. It would be a mistake, however, to regard pre-literate, pre-visual cultures as *merely* preliterate, that is, only in terms of a relation to *scripted* utterance. On the contrary, it is the re-discovery of oral-aural utterance, I believe, that will make us realise how imprisoned we have become in a literate culture, and how, only with the greatest effort, we can develop the feeling for what the Word actually is.
The visual sensorium has become a highly specialised way of knowing. The
spatialisation of utterance, which began with the emergence of the alphabet, a spatial and
sequential organisation of symbols, allowed, and was reinforced by, the typographical advances
made in the fifteenth century (Levin 1988). It was the alphabet that condemned oral utterance
to spatial permanence. That is because alphabetic type is independent of time. It is both
preservable and movable. "Operations with the alphabet," says Ong, "imply that words - not
the things which words refer to, but words themselves as sounds - can somehow be present all
at once, that they can," he continues, "be somehow dissected into little spatial parts called
letters of the alphabet which are independent of the one-directional flow of time [which cannot
be reversed] and which can be handled and reassembled independently of this flow" (1981:42).

It is easy to underestimate the full extent of the influence the discovery of the alphabet
has had on knowing. I want to discuss briefly when and how the discovery was made, and in
this way contrast alphabetic civilisation with its predecessor. 22

The utterance of the letters of the alphabet was in Greek times accompanied by
revolutionary thought-pictures because the letters were words in themselves. In repeating the
alphabet - the sounds alpha, beta, and so on - the ancient Greek did not express anything
related to external objects or events, but rather, what "... the divine ... mystery of his being
brought to expression through his larynx..." (Steiner 1982:3), the living organ of speech. The
mystery of human being, which is dormant in the sound of the individual letters of the alphabet,
and which can reveal to the utterer the original truth of his/her own being, namely,
supernatural wisdom, was lost in becoming nominalism, in the application of speech to
external things and events. The alphabet became a cultural homunculus in the transition from
Greek to Roman-Latin civilisation (from whom, significantly, we inherit such logical notions as
jurisprudence.) The letters lost their value as names and now have value only as the sounds, A,
B, C and so on. This was the whole basis on which speech could become alphabetised and later
made typographic.

22 The main source of my thinking here is a lecture given by Steiner, titled, The Alphabet: An Expression of the
Mystery of Man (1982).
Steiner’s researches suggest that although words do express physical reality, the utterance itself, not what it refers to, is not physical, not solid. To regain the livingness of speech contained in the archetypal element, one has to retrace the steps from its current utilitarian usage to a time when Being ‘unconcealed’ itself in the speech organism of the human being. To dive beneath the surface of consciousness is to see beyond the visual symbols and even the sonic externals, and recognise the source of truth and untruth. It is as if one is listening not only to the sounds of speech, but listening for their echo in oneself. (An echo is a reflection, a sounding back.) In every speech sound something is reflected in the interior realm of what originates in the cosmos. The Word, in its primal state, echoes in the human organism right into the physical realm.\(^\text{23}\) Steiner continues his lecture by explaining the ascent through the hierarchy of the seven liberal arts - grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, arithmetic, geometry, music

\(^{23}\) A sense of what I have been discussing here can be acquired by prolonged experimentation with individual consonants and vowels. Although I discussed something of this work in Chapter Four, it will not hurt to elaborate it here. Work with the phonemes reveals a distinct experiential difference between consonants and vowels. Whereas the inwardsness of the vowels can be seen insofar as their organ of production, the larynx, is deeper in the body, the production of the consonants is achieved by those parts of the speech apparatus closest to the surface of the body, namely, the teeth, lips, palate and tongue. The vowel element in speech has nothing whatever to do with the physical world, nor with the physical element of the human body. It is always vowels that carry expressions of joy, grief, pain, intense pleasure. That is because they are sustainable. The vowels move; they are movements. One can move from one pitch to another by using the vowel, and even from one vowel to another on the same or changing pitches without interrupting the flow, without needing to rearticulate. Yet every consonant, when sounded, finishes in a vowel. (I will address this subtle phenomenon in a subsequent chapter.) If I apply these discoveries to the enunciation of the phonemes that make up my own Christian name, Barry, I begin to get a sense of who I am. What, after all, does this particular sequence of sounds, b, a, r, y, signify. As a word, it is meaningless. If a person meets me for the first time, they see my body, countenance; they hear my voice and gestures. Yet, all this is the very least portion of me. The sounds in my name are me, but they are me beyond the physicality, beyond my human form. The individual sounds comprising my name have been uttered for eons. My very name, then, contains the memory of the origins of speech. When uttered together they express something of my essence, my humanness, which is not physical. This is beyond the name as actual word. The name, which was given to me at birth, harmonises with the universal all-embracing name condensed into the one sound, ‘I,’ the one name shared by all humanity. A primal wisdom is represented in this concrete sonic experience. I have taught this exercise in workshops many times, sometimes with astounding results. Participants develop heightened sensitivity to the sound of their own names and request that others in the group, when addressing them by name, do so with these (sometimes subtle) changes present. One participant even changed her name altogether, because the name she had been given was not, in her mind, an accurate enough sonic reflection of who she is. When the exercise is completed in a ritual, where each participant is ‘called’ by their name, the result is deeply moving to observe, and ultimately empowering for the participant. I include here, as an example, a brief extract from the writings of an American participant in the exercise. “The work with our name was particularly profound. Through experimenting with Barb and Barbara (she is addressed by both) and the energetic feel of each, I discovered a new appreciation for my name and how clearly it held the essence of who I am – the expansiveness of ‘a,’ the grounded earthiness of ‘b’ and the free flowing airiness of ‘r.’ I was deeply touched when the group spoke my name, ceasing only when I found the gesture that expressed the fundamental spirit of BARBARA. I quite clearly heard my name being called by my sisters, aunts and cousins, even though there were no American accents in the group.” (I should declare that permission to include this participant’s inner work in my thesis was given in writing.)
and astronomy - undertaken by the medieval scholar. Grammar at this time was the study of
the individual letters, which, Steiner notes, hid cosmic secrets. Whereas grammar today has
become an abstraction, for the medieval scholar knowledge of the stars was acquired through
speech, the vowels and consonants. When something was uttered, it was astronomy that was
expressed. All these subjects, then, share the same cosmological origin.

Steiner discusses arithmetic, for example, as the mystery in the movement of the relation
of numbers (which I discussed from the Greek perspective in Chapter Eight. It will help to
reiterate here.) Division today is actually addition. One thinks of 2, for example, as two
separate entities side by side. 2 is the symbol for that division. One entity plus another entity
equals 2. In the Middle Ages, however, a scholar began with 1, which was split into two parts.
2 was not obtained by adding one to another, by putting them together in a lineal arrangement.
Rather, 2 was still an expression of 1. 1 embraces all numbers. 1 is the highest number, the
largest. Today, it is the lowest, the smallest, and is valued as such. Numbers today are
conceived atomistically, not organically. Clearly, adding 1 to 1 says nothing of relation.

*The Solid World Mode of Cognition in Visual Art - The Evolution of Perspective*

In all this there is clearly a change of perspective taking place, culminating in the “… all-
pervasive technology of the alphabet” (McLuhan 1971:95). The change can be confirmed by a
study of visual art, which, in a sense, is a history of perspective. At around the same time
alphabetic typography is asserting itself, visual art is undergoing an equally profound change in
the treatment of the visible subject. If one inspects paintings, icons and mosaics completed
prior to the Renaissance, one can be left with the peculiar sensation that one is, to some extent,
in the picture, rather than outside it. The paintings are one-dimensional. What we mean by
perspective is awareness of spatial extension, the third dimension, or depth. The technical
name for it is recession (some objects are in the foreground while others are made to recede
into the background), and is closely related to another term, chiaroscuro, which refers to the
use of light to create the impression of depth. For the citizens of the Middle Ages recession
(behind and in-front-of) was not the dominant experience. Visual perspective had not yet been
discovered. Perspective, then, may be regarded as a cognitive ‘position’ - meaning fixed in
space - from which things are represented by way of separation.
We are right to ask why the visual art of the time did not contain recession (the very element that characterises our representation), why, for pre-Renaissance observers, nothing 'stood out,' as it were. Barfield says: "... they did not need it. Before the scientific revolution the world was more like a garment men wore about them than a stage on which they moved. In such a world the convention of perspective was unnecessary" (1988:94). From this perspective without depth, then, the observers were themselves elements of the total picture along with the things of their observation. This is to say, they observed with eyes like ours, but with unlike minds.

We can gain some idea of the medieval perspective from Jean Paris, who speaks here of The Pantocrator, a mosaic from the thirteenth century:

If there is no depth in Byzantine mosaics, if the divine space prevents our intrusion by opposing a dazzling wall of gold to our own 'regard,' as a supernatural frontier which reveals and at the same time forbids to absolute infinity of the Being, clearly the third dimension is not to be found at the background of the image, but in front of it, protruding straight forward as the very Regard of Transcendence itself: we are the third dimension, we are the picture!” (1975:39).

Perspective is of little interest to pre-fourteenth century observers, then, because it characterises the physical world, the world of solid bodies, which is tantamount to "imposing (binocular vision) on divine space" and that amounts to "sacrilege" (Paris 1975:69). The Renaissance discovery of perspective "codified... a new way of looking at human and inanimate nature" (Levin 1988:115). The progression to perspective, however, is one of closure, receding vision, at the expense of other (imaginial) aspects of vision; the 'cognitonal attitude' has become, finally, the onlooker perspective. The perspective has inverted.

It is reasonable from this study of perspective to argue that when we are observing long-term changes in the mode of consciousness, we are observing changes in the world itself, and that the division between an inner and outer world is fallacious. There is another way of viewing this altogether: that consciousness is the inside of the world, and is in this sense

24 Wilkinson puts this change in simpler terms: "The earliest painters used a golden background which gives the pictures an atmosphere of holiness, in reality a reflection of the spiritual world. Gradually, paintings came to have
transpersonal. When the world is observed by an *individual* mind, it can be said that it is being observed *from* its inner aspect. Mind and world comprise an integrated whole. Barfield (1999) makes the point that just because inner and outer *are* so easy to *distinguish*, philosophy, beginning with Descartes, has gone on to assume that they are *divided*. Descartes, however, did not *cause* the division; he merely formalised it. He did so because the predominantly visual perspective had already become a habit of thought.

It is a short step from the discovery of perspective in visual art to the invention of the camera. Perspective actually "... reduces depth to surface and flattens three dimensions into only two" (Barfield 1999:52), which is a kind of optical untruth.\(^5\) Yet, that "is the *immediate* experience so faithfully recorded by the camera. If there were no such immediate experience," Barfield continues, "photographs would not be ‘lifelike.’ [Life is equated with the experience of solid bodies.] That is also why the camera is a caricature of imagination, [the other aspect of vision], although it is a true emblem of perspective" (1999:52). This distinction is crucial for the content of the discussion in the following section. Barfield concludes: "Imagination is living, perspective only ‘lifelike.’ It used to be said that the camera cannot lie. But in fact it always does lie. Just because it looks only in that immediate way, the camera looks always *at* and never *into* what it sees" (1999:52). (Perceiving *into*, as I pointed out in Chapter Four, is the role of the *auditory* sensorium.)

*The Emergence of the Self-Conscious Individual and the Psychology of Control*

It must be said that perspective, whether the lineal sort implied in the alphabet, or the spatial extension of the solid-world, imposes an overwhelming sense of order and control on the world, as it must if its habit is always to look *at*. It seems that "the concepts of order and control are themselves kinesthetically and visually grounded, formed chiefly out of sensory experience involved with space" (Ong 1981:45).

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\(^a\) A more earthly aspect. Perspective was introduced and a background of trees and hills. An individual quality comes to expression in human faces (1996:70).

\(^5\) It is worth noting that the Renaissance perspective is sometimes referred to as the "artificial" or "scientific" perspective. The extra dimension was essential to the genesis of the whole concept of atomistic or particle science as we know it.
That vision in this perspectival sense is unconscionably aggressive and controlling is confirmed in Levin's remark:

The eyes are privileged organs for long-range, comprehensive sensing: surveying what the field gives them to behold, grasping at a distance without need to be in touch or penetrate into opaque depths of things, they make it possible for us to acquire a superficial, representative knowledge which is already, in a certain rudimentary way, abstracted and idealised. Thus, not surprisingly, our vision became the source of our historical paradigm for knowledge; in this sense, then, it would, I think, be accurate to say that it constitutes an 'incipient science' ... However, inherent in the nature of the gaze, there is an inveterate tendency to develop only one aspect of its primordial ontological potential, viz., its detached, dispassionate, theoretically disinterested power to survey, encompass, and calculate or categorise with one sweep of a glance (1988:97-98).

Crucially, the "... development of this [single] aspect of our vision... unquestionably privileges a metaphysics of permanence, constancy, fixity, simultaneous co-presence, substance, and totalisation" (1988:95).

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that formal logic, the logic of predication, could be invented only in a visualist, alphabetic culture, dominated as it is by the solid world mode of cognition. Consciousness, however, is not only a visual process. "Yet during all our centuries of phonetic literacy," says McLuhan, "we have favoured the chain of inferences as the mark of logic and reason" (1971:95).26 I am saying that extensive perception has become axiomatic, a contemporary habit of perception, and for that reason is almost impossible to dispute.

What changed the depthless perspective? As I observed elsewhere, consciousness, or as we know it today, self-consciousness, requires for its operation separation from the thing observed. Barfield writes accordingly: "It is only when space... has become simply the absence of phenomena, conceived in the phenomenal mode - that perspective takes the place of participation" (1988:149). The absence of recession in painting up until the Renaissance

26 Although I cite McLuhan in support of my line of thought, I must add that I do not, like him, argue that individuality is a 'by-product' of the invention of printing (1971), but rather, that its growth or evolution coincides with it.
suggests a consciousness only partially identified with, or partially incarnated in, the body. So, the onset of the spatial perspective, the solid world mode of knowing, occurs simultaneously with the arrival of self-consciousness, which is really the cognitional attitude, literally, the world-view, of the modern ego-subject "... whose will to power has finally appropriated visionary being" (Levin 1988:115). The dominance of vision is synonymous with the usurping of the world by the subjective will, that is, with radical individualism, an occurrence that had to take place for cognitive freedom, freedom of individual decision, to become a reality. As Paris and Levin pointed out above, however, the cognitive freedom that is won through the spatial perspective does not guarantee freedom of moral decision. On the contrary, the historical cost of self-conscious freedom is loss of the integrity of the Logos, as I will endeavour to show in the remainder of this chapter by juxtaposing sharply two attitudes towards the word and its use so that the integrity of which I have spoken takes on clearer definition.

I was attracted during my reading to this allegorical statement by Steiner,27 in which he attempts to show something of the philology ('laws' of the word) of the Greeks and the influence of the divine will (distinguished from the personalised will) on human utterance, an occurrence Barfield describes as "... an unobscured participation in the divine Mind, or Word, itself" (1988:47):

In the feeling we have today when we hear the word 'Word' there remains nothing at all of what the writer of the Gospel of St. John [written in Greek] felt when he wrote 'In the beginning was the Word.'... To the Greeks the word was still a call to the human will. When a syllable was uttered, the body of a Greek would tingle to express this syllable through his whole being also... . The word did not only live in the organ of speech but in the whole of man's organism of movement.

There was a tingling, an urge in the human being to let the will reveal itself through the limbs, with every syllable, with every word, with the rhythm and measure (recall Plato) of every phrase. He realised how the word could become creative in every movement. But in those days he knew still more. Words were to him expressions for the forces of cloud formation, the forces lying in the growth of plants and all natural phenomena. The word rumbled in the rolling waves, worked in the whistling wind.

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27 The source of Steiner's words is apparently a series of twelve lectures he gave in Ilkley, England, in 1923, entitled, Education and Modern Spiritual Life. They are cited here by Frits Julius (1993).
Just as the word lives in my breath so that I make a corresponding movement, so did the Greek find all that was living in the word in the raging wind, in the surging wave, even in the rumbling earthquake. These were words pouring out of the earth (Julius 1993:51-52).

The human being is an utterance-endowed being. The divine will ‘speaks’ through the human will, which, in this picture, is clearly unconscious. In this way, a world of things comes into being. Consider this passage by Wegman, where the Aristotelean distinction between form and matter and its connection with the Logos and thus, with language, is made. Notice also the association of the word with forming beyond the corporeal sense:

Man is himself a word of the Gods, and therefore matter in the Aristotelean sense. But he is himself speaking, and is therefore form [which is not matter]. Yet in speaking he not only forms the air but also himself. So according to his form the whole human being is organized with a view to speech, and speech is most intimately connected with the formative forces in man (1995:72).

The utterer has the power to create form from matter by the use of the Word, to organise chaos into order, in other words, to distinguish.

The following segment by Edmunds establishes a further connection, through the word, of the will with morality:

So it is with children in their infant years - it is not the words as words that reach them but what lives as disposition of heart and will in the words - it is this that reaches them, and what lives as moral force in our actions. It is this, not the mere outer gesture, that they imitate, and by doing so become one with us. Imitation for the little child is not just copying. They live by the force of imitation which is beyond the picture and the word, beyond imagination and inspiration (1990:119).

By connecting this picture with the two previous, one can envisage the Greek civilisation as humanity as a whole in its pubescence. I have presented these comments of other authors in order to create a picture of the human word as something extraordinary, a picture that has long since receded from our world-view. The Greeks, as participants in their own, and, as they saw it, divine, utterance, ‘understood’ the word because they stood under it; they revered its power; they obeyed it as the Logos, the beginning, the Origin. In this light, Kühlewind’s view begins
to make sense: “Everything we do to, for, and against each other is speech of some kind, or ought to be. Yet we are interested in anything but words, those very words by means of which we do everything else. Because we don’t know what words are, we don’t know what humans are” (1988:8).

Keeping this lofty vision of the human being as word in mind, I want now to contrast it sharply with a range of modern views that paint quite another picture. Jameson, in a discussion of Lyotard’s report on knowledge, describes language today:

An unstable exchange between its speakers, whose utterances are now seen less as a process of the transmission of information or messages, or in terms of some network of signs or even signifying systems, than as, to use one of Lyotard’s favourite figures, ‘taking of tricks,’ the trumping of a communicational adversary, an essential conflictual relationship between tricksters… (1993:xi).

Lyotard’s view of current language is that of a Wittgensteinian semantic game, the use of the word as paralogism, the deliberately false word, lying as the semantic norm. Consider, then, Heidegger’s remark:

... there rages round the earth an unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man. When this relation of dominance gets inverted, man hits upon strange maneuvers. Language becomes the means of expression. As expression, language can decay into a mere medium for the printed word (1975:215).

Notice the transformation of the sonic word into spatial symbol. In an exposition of his work, Blackham further synthesises Heidegger’s phenomenology of language, which, he argues, properly used, ought to communicate truth:

But everyday language in constant use loses touch with the objects to which it ostensibly refers; as Bacon says, words are substituted for things. Language then spreads untruth and establishes inauthentic existence. Instead of mediating my being-in-the-world by revealing intelligible objects of use and enjoyment, it obscures them by covering them with itself. Everyday language which spreads untruth becomes more authoritative than the truth because the reference by which it should be
authenticated (the Logos) is obscured and forgotten and therefore raises no questions; what commonly ‘is said’ passes because there is nobody there to be challenged. Losing touch with real existents, we turn from one thing to another, seeking accomplishments, insatiable in curiosity, living a ‘full’, ‘intellectual’, ‘interesting’ life, becoming alienated, uprooted, severed from oneself, others, and the world (1961:93-94).

A more recent critique with the same slant is this by Richard Neville, which appeared in an article titled, The business of being human, in the Melbourne Age on Saturday, 23 August, 1997:

The rise of the megacorp, global marketing and the decline of the nation state are major forces shaping the future. Where can we debate their impact? Media forums are controlled by the very institutions that have most to gain by the process continuing. This is turning our culture into a closed loop of compliance with the corporate world view.

Neville is arguing that there are major profits to be made from the word (as information) because the appetite for it has been deliberately and stealthily cultivated. “Ungratified desire is a key cog of the consumer society.” He asserts, rightly in my view, that culture, which is supposed to provide civilisation with meaning, is unlikely to be reconciled with the corporate world view because the latter’s raison d’etre is to return a financial gain even if it means peddling untruth. If they can be reconciled, there is, perhaps not surprisingly, little effort made to achieve it. “This denial,” he argues, “fuels our thirst for distraction, glorifies the ugly and endangers the ecosystem.”

Knowledge as an informational commodity is likely to become, if it is not already, the “major stake in the worldwide competition for power” (Lyotard 1993:5). Lyotard does not mean the power of the nation-state, for that has already been disarmed by the perfidious control and release of information on the basis of whether it is useful to the corporations concerned for the State to have it. (The State is merely a user of the word like everyone else.) He means, rather, global economic power.

Finally, this comment by von Lange completes a rather bleak picture: “There is murder, and pleasure in it, within the realm of the soul, and this governs human intercourse much more
than is admitted. How often attack, wounding, calumny and even ‘murder’ take place through the ... word...” (1992:17).

Although this view seems extreme, what von Lange and the others are saying is that modernity seems to have lost all sense of the meaning of integrity because it has lost all sense of the human being as word. Utterance of any sort ought, if it serves human knowing, to disclose truth. If it is used for personal or partisan advantage, it is more likely that truth will remain hidden.

One of the striking characteristics of our time, then, it seems to me, is that integrity is often regarded as an irrelevancy; impracticable, inefficient, or even eccentric. A person’s word does not count for much. I argue that the visualist perspective, which evolved concurrently with radical individualism, is synonymous with a psychology of control. Control by - and it can be seen in every field from journalism to education, from science to art - means contorting even the simplest events, often with staggering ingenuity, into a form of (visual) ‘evidence’ that justifies the control of. This is so, I think, because it has become increasingly difficult to relate to utterance as a happening, rather than a record. Ong expresses this distinction well:

The expression of truth [in oral-aural cultures] is felt as itself always an event. In this sense, the contact of an oral culture with truth, vague and evanescent though it may be by some literate standards, retains a reality which literate cultures achieve only reflexively and by dint of great conscious effort. For oral-aural man, utterance remains always of a piece with his life situation. It is never remote. Thus it provides a kind of raw, if circumscribed, contact with actuality and with truth, which literacy alone can never give and to achieve which literate cultures must rather desperately shore up with other new resources their more spatialised verbal structures (1981:33).

A person’s word does not count for much because the sense of the word as sound, as something uttered, and also the sense of the human being as word, can hardly avoid being modified by vision, which as I discussed above is conditioned by sensory experience involving space.28 The strength of this can be read in Heidegger (1977), where he speaks (again) of the

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28 I have spoken about the delusion of perspective and how the camera lies. Barfield writes about the end result: “We live in a camera civilisation. Our entertainment is camera entertainment. Our holidays are camera holidays. We make them so by paying more attention to the camera we brought with us than to the waterfall we are pointing at. Our science is almost entirely a camera science. One thinks of the photographs of electrons on screens and in

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significance of the transition from the Greek *theoria* to the Roman *contemplatio* (to compartmentalise): "A type of encroaching advance by successive interrelated steps towards that which is to be grasped by the eye makes itself normative in knowing" (1977:166). I think it is here that all falsifications originate: in politics, business, education, science, the media, and even art. The distinction is one between human knowing as ethical, as motivated by *love for the act* of knowing, and *control of the object* of attention, which is achieved only through the assertion of the word as instrumental rather than disclosive. Ouspensky gives some insight into how control by the word functions:

People pretend that they know all sorts of things: about God, about the future life, about the universe, about the origin of man, about evolution, about everything; but in reality they do not know anything, even about themselves. And every time they speak about something they do not know as though they knew it, they lie. Consequently the study of lying becomes of the first importance in psychology (1991:35).

As if to reinforce this: "We cannot know the truth but we pretend that we know. And this is lying" (1991:35). Lying is synonymous with self-deception, and it is perpetrated by speaking, by the word of the self-conscious individual. On the other hand, when a thing is allowed to disclose itself in its own terms, it speaks, utters itself. The thing is language. Language is seen today, not as a revelation of divine or cosmic truth, but as a tool of what Peter Craven calls "strategic solipsism."
Summary

In summary, the literature throws up two radically divergent images of human being in association with the word and its use. There is the Logos evolutionary view in which the whole manifold splendour that is the cosmos is condensed into the human being insofar as(s)he utters coherently at all. The Word is seen to be the common, shared principle of humanity, since it is the medium of encounter between utterer and hearer. The fulfilment of the Word’s nature relies on the common experience of language (which is originally oral-aural). This is achieved through an act of will on the part of the individual who utters, and another on the part of the individual who listens, otherwise no communication is taking place. Note that it is not only language that is the common experience; individuality, too, is held in common with all other individuals. The Word, then, is humanity insofar as the individual’s humanness is fulfilled in the Word. This notion of individuality (‘I’) as universal principle has to be attained, for the cosmological picture (or ‘extraordinary vision’ as I called it elsewhere) receded in typically polar fashion as free will was gained. By reason of this insight Steiner writes: “Only when in every individual thing there echoes a consciousness of Man being an expression of the whole cosmos, will the way be cleared for the forces needed for Man’s progress, if civilisation is not to decline into utter barbarism” (1982:16). In his view, then, as long as the cosmological picture of humanity is not attained, or as long as it is not at least striven for, lying, self-deception, careless use of, and abuse by, the word, will remain the social norm. This other picture is one of the whole ‘cognitional attitude’ of vision not allowing a thing to disclose itself in its own terms, but only as it serves human utility. As Levin writes: “The triumph of subjectivity is self-destructive, because it has inflated the human ego without developing self-respect, the true basis of agency and the social character of human vision” (1988:4).

This juxtaposition of pictures, however, arose out of the exercise of imagination, those other (latent) intensive aspects of vision which have been dominated by the solid world aspect of vision. Ordinary consciousness, then, has no awareness of what has been discussed here, because it has no reason to question its own vision, which has come to control the world through its inveterate habits of spatial extension and lineal logic. The habits are extraordinarily difficult to detect because of the allure of free will, with which they are historically associated. To give one example of that difficulty, Thomas Kuhn (1970), who, by virtue of the historicity
of knowledge realised that a massive change was needed in our conception of truth and reality, wrote: "... none of these crisis-promoting subjects [he means recent research in philosophy, psychology, linguistics and art-history] has yet produced a viable alternative to the traditional epistemological paradigm" (1970:121). Bortoft argues that despite the sophistication of his argument, "... Kuhn was also unable to extricate himself from this paradigm" (1996:353). He could not do so because he did not see that perspective is only a relatively late arrival in the human relation with the world and as such, promotes the delusion that subject and object are permanently independent of each other, rather than interdependent. (The difference again is between distinction and division, intension and extension, unity in multitude and multitude in unity.) He did not see what Ong sees, namely, that the culture into which a person is born will not only influence, but exploit, one or other specific sense, and that "... knowledge of the sensorium exploited within a specific culture" could lead to knowledge of "the culture as a whole in virtually all its aspects" (1981:6).

I assure the reader that it is not my intention to discredit Kuhn or the tremendous upheaval in, and re-evaluation of, science inspired by him and his contemporaries. I have chosen this example because, although the re-evaluation may have had a lasting impact in formal research by putting in place certain checks and balances on an admittedly destructive atomistic paradigm, leading to the belief that research is somehow more holistic, it has not had the effect of creating awareness of, and change in, a predominantly visualist perspective that is fundamentally one of control. In short, it has not been a consideration that "the history of Man should be studied in accordance with the development of his consciousness" (Steiner 1982:15). The study of history is also the study of the mind that is historical. That historical mind cannot study itself from a fixed perspective, that is, in an extensively analytical or logomorphic manner, but only imaginatively.
CHAPTER TEN

TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGOS ORIGIN OF UTTERANCE BY WAY OF COMPARISON WITH APPROACHES TO THE MIND IN POSITIVIST PSYCHOLOGY AND EVOLUTION THEORY

Introduction

In this Chapter I want to continue the initiative taken up in Chapter Nine. First, I want to show how the solidity of cognition, the visualist perspective and the spatialisation of language, the appearance of which occurred simultaneously with humanity’s individuation, have influenced two important disciplines, namely, psychology and evolution theory. Second, I will discuss how knowledge specific to these disciplines has impinged on music, specifically by precluding a psychology of imagination which, and only which, I will argue, has the power to recover the ‘extraordinary vision’ discussed in Chapter Nine and, thereby, a true picture of music’s superconscious or Logos provenance.

To reaffirm my motivation, I maintain that the meaning of music to humanity consists in understanding what the Logos is, and in knowing that the conflict between the integrity of imaginal consciousness and the authoritative language of a post-psychological conception of consciousness is a very real and, I maintain, necessary obstacle on the path to understanding the sublime.¹ I am concerned, then, that there has been a certain injustice perpetrated by

¹ I have emphasised the word ‘integrity’ only to remind the reader that knowing in my framework is ethical because it is tied up with the attainment of spiritual freedom. Although freedom of knowing depends initially on the desire to know, its realisation depends ultimately on taking up the ‘developmental opportunity’ of imaginal consciousness. For this reason, Steiner (1992) referred to the new faculty as ‘moral imagination.’ According to Steiner, the “link between concept and percept is the mental picture” (1992:124). In ordinary representational consciousness, we are given this pictorial link from the start, and it is the basis of action. However, when an unfree person “wants to bring something about he does it as he has seen it done, or as he is ordered to do in the particular instance” (1992:124). In other words, the habitual images exert unnoticed authority over a person and in this way determine the way (s)he behaves. However, learning to use consciously this inner activity, which goes on in us hidden from view, “is the source of the free spirit’s action” (1992:125). So, moral imagination is there in all of us as the basis of effective realisation of our ideas as moral action. It is important to know this because logical positivism treats ethical statements as being concerned only with attitudes and not with actions. Imagination, then, is the difference between individualism and ‘ethical individualism,’ ego and ‘I.’
positivist thought, and disingenuousness in its medium of communication, the word.

I should mention again that in resorting to speculative technique - the imaginal opposite of logomorphism - I am not proposing a return to an archaic way of knowing, for this would be both unnecessary and undesirable. Greek and medieval civilisation derived its knowledge through a different kind and level of consciousness from our own. Our task is a different one from theirs. In the gradual discovery of perspective can be seen a mind striving to take up a position outside a structure of reality as it was lived, so as to be able to conceive of it, or, as Barfield says, “to turn thinking into thought” (1999:147). Since we are already outside that structure, modernity’s problem is the converse of this. “Our task is twofold, first to realise that it is still there, and then to learn how to get back into it, how to rise once more from thought into thinking, taking with us, however, that fuller self-consciousness which the Greeks never knew, and which could never have been ours if they had not laboured to turn thinking into thought” (1999:147-148).

Consciousness and Musical Utterance

With that task in view, I want to begin by making a few observations about the act of musical utterance in order to give some idea of the extent to which it is a conscious act. I am taking this action because in the subsequent discussion I will argue that conventional psychological concepts are not very helpful in defining what a musical consciousness, and following that, a Logos epistemology, might be. Rather, I seek to demonstrate the unfounded habit-based manner in which generally accepted explanations take hold in society. In this way, I intend to work my way to the position that the ‘task’ I have just discussed will be made to seem morally inescapable.

A person who makes coherent musical sound knows that (s)he does it, but not why (s)he does it, why (s)he is impelled to do it, how this impulse has arisen, how doing it functions in the context of his/her existence, or how it is significant in the socio-cultural context. Musical expression is sometimes, but not always, a conscious act. Even when it is conscious, it often contains elements of unconsciousness. It could be said that musical consciousness is only rarely conscious.
A further pertinent observation is that the executant is moved in some way to express that by which (s)he is moved. Whatever that might be remains for the moment undefined. What is certain is that such a person is musical for the reason that, for him/her, the constituents of pulse, rhythm, interval and tone are not mere phenomena of acoustics, but a more or less deeply felt experience. When these elements are woven together into a coherent association with each other, the executant utters an experience of soul.

In examining the act of utterance more closely, it will be noticed that when the executant produces the tone, whether self-willed or in response to some other signal such as a conductor’s gesture, it exists for as long as it takes for the ear and neural process to confirm that it was, indeed, the intended sound. The tone has been actualised.

Nothing of what takes place in consciousness prior to the sounding is present to awareness. The unusual feature of this sequence of events is that the executant is a conscious participant in it only from the moment the sound is articulated. To put it another way, the only part of the process of which the executant is conscious is the appearance of the sound itself (which, in Platonic terms, is already its death.) Its nascence is merely acquiesced in. Although it is not an entirely satisfactory analogy, the event is rather like being pregnant, but not knowing it until the moment of delivery.

It is generally assumed that the executant ‘hears’ the sound in a conscious, concrete way before it is produced. This is certainly possible, but only on the condition that the executant has the time to separate the inner hearing from the actual sounded tone. I am inclined to think that, for the majority, it is an untenable claim, although it may be true in the case of a person with an inordinately developed sense of pitch. It is more likely that there is some sort of muscle memory involved, that the ‘hearing’ is somehow led by the “habitual body,” (Monika Langer 1989:32). Movements that in the beginning were consciously chosen and learned have become habitual. The executant knows how and where to position limbs, muscles, tissue and so on with such speed and accuracy that the body has adapted itself to production. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of instruments in which the production mechanism is visible, for example, the piano, harp, guitar and keyboard percussion. As Langer (after Merleau-Ponty) sees it: “Acquiring such habits is a question ... of the bodily comprehension of a motor
significance which enables me to lend myself completely to expressing the music without having to think about the position of my fingers ...” (1989:47). It is probably more correct to say, then, that the parts of the body responsible for production, including the physical ear, ‘hear’, as it were, by way of motor conditioning (kinaesthetics and proprioception), and that the experience that would otherwise be a whole body experience never enters consciousness. The execution is the experience. The experience is checked or held-up in the body. This leads to what I discussed in Chapter Seven as operationalism.

Given all this, what I find profoundly mystifying about the production of coherent sound is that despite a lack of conceptual knowledge of mathematics and theoretical acoustics, and formal understanding of the rules of ratio and proportion, the executant - and I include in this the child who sings - is able to place in the air a form of precise frequency and amplitude, and in so doing, achieve a mathematical feat of the highest order.

As I suggested in Chapter One, it must be supposed that the executant already possesses knowledge of the principles (logoi) necessary for the production of sounds and intervallic relations, and that (s)he then applies this knowledge to the production of all such forms. Most importantly, this knowledge exists per se, even when there is no audible production.

Knowledge of a creative principle does not, however, imply awareness of it. I can know about a thing, even a dynamic of consciousness, yet, at the same time be unaware of it. That principle can live in consciousness as pure concept or idea. The procedure demonstrates very clearly that there is something outside ordinary consciousness that is not usually accessible to itself, and moreover, that consciousness is not the same thing as awareness.

My point is that most accept the validity of consciousness without inquiring after its nature. When we speak about consciousness we usually mean awareness, but as Steiner pointed out, it is untrue to say that when asleep, we are without consciousness. Rather, we are

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3 That the musical experience is an experience of the total organism cannot be doubted. Quite apart from the scientific evidence of marked changes in respiration, cardio function and skin tension, anyone who has taught children of preschool age will know that in the presence of music they have great difficulty in restraining their limbs. Their bodies are somehow willed to move.

3 Francis Edmunds (1990) charts the history of Steiner’s insight. Whereas Socrates began his deliberations about Being with the statement, ‘I know that I know nothing,’ Descartes deduced, ‘I doubt.’ He could not doubt, however, if he could not think. Thus, ‘I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am.’ His own existence was
without awareness. I do not carry around in my awareness the sum total of my (sonic) experience. Rather, it is resident in, and available to, consciousness, and my awareness of it is subsequently triggered by the auditory stimuli. If unawareness is a fact, it is possible to be asleep to some extent while in the waking state. I suspect that this is how it is for most of us most of the time: asleep to our own experience. The state of unawakeness does not mean, as I suggested above, that I cease to be. On the contrary, this state is just the self-projecting developmental opportunity, the indeterminate open future that gives meaning to the whole concept of awareness.

The Mechanomorphic View of Mind

With these few observations of the extent of (un)awareness of the musical act in mind, I want to juxtapose psychology, the study of mind, as it was known to the Greeks, with what is understood by that word today. I will argue that the study of nous, which for the Greeks was mind and spirit, rightly belongs in the realm of philosophy, not psychology. Further, I will bring the discussion to a head by arguing that the resolution of the conflict that I perceive to exist between positivist and imaginative approaches to the study of consciousness consists in a metanoia, a change of mind or heart, as this is felt in conscience.

P.D. Ouspensky, whose life’s work was devoted to methods for the development of consciousness and, correlatively, to the problems of human existence, argues that psychology is not the new science we believe it to be: “Psychology is, perhaps, the oldest science, and, unfortunately, in its most essential features a forgotten science” (1991:7). He asserts that psychology “... has lost all touch with its origin and its meaning so that now it is even difficult

confirmed by beginning with doubt. Edmunds then points out that when Steiner enters the picture, he “questions the validity” of Descartes’ maxim by asking: ‘Do I cease to exist when I do not think, for example, when I am asleep?’ By inverting the maxim to, ‘I am, therefore I think,’ Steiner leaves the virulent syllogistic open to the question of “where I am, in what realm and in what state of consciousness...” (1990:130).

4 If I visit a gallery and come across a work of art that I recognise, I can say that my awareness has been triggered only because of a previous encounter with the work. The present encounter acts to retrieve the impression left in consciousness by bringing it up to the surface of awareness. It is a crucial distinction to make, for it leaves open the possibility that if such acts of retrieval of the immediate past can be accomplished, consciousness might have the vitality to recall other, more distant content, including preconscious knowledge. That is precisely Steiner’s teleological claim for consciousness.
to define the term psychology: that is, to say what psychology is and what it studies” (1991:7).\footnote{The same criticism of psychology on the grounds of its refusal to acknowledge its philosophical origins (Psyche and Logos), and its subsequent struggle to gain acceptance as a valid science can be found also in Edmunds (1990), Gardner (1993), Hillman (1996), König (1973), Pietzner (1993), Sardello (1992) and Winkler (1960).} Ouspensky’s use of the word ‘meaning’ here already reveals something of its problematic nature; for it contrasts the more current notion of meaning as contextual, that is, emerging over time within dynamic communities and contexts, with another notion of meaning as existing in some ‘purer’ archaic sense which over time has suffered a loss of potency. I will attempt to show something of this difference of opinion in the ensuing discussion.

In a recent (June 1997) article entitled, *The Problem of Consciousness*, the authors, Francis Crick and Christof Koch, explain how psychology has only in very recent times taken up the study of consciousness. This seems a surprising admission from a science deriving its name from the Greek word, *Psyche*.

The main obstacle to the pursuit of knowledge of consciousness has apparently been the “dominance of the behaviourist movement,” making “consciousness a taboo concept in American psychology ... . With the emergence of cognitive science in the mid-1950s, it became possible once more for psychologists to consider mental processes as opposed to merely observing behaviour” (Crick and Koch 1997:19). Despite the gradual dissolution of the behaviourist obstacle, most cognitive scientists have continued to be somewhat wary of consciousness. “The problem,” claim the authors, “was felt to be either purely ‘philosophical,’ or too elusive to study experimentally” (1997:19). Notice the disclaimer here of the philosophical basis of consciousness, in the sense of asking questions about truth. Importantly, the authors do not see the philosophical problem of mind placing any limitation on their experimental research approach: “The only sensible approach is to press the experimental attack until we are confronted with dilemmas that call for new ways of thinking” (1997:19).

Interestingly, these researchers, whose efforts are already given a very specific trajectory by their defining consciousness as “the relation between mind and brain,” see no problem in commencing their investigation by using strict scientific (neurobiological) method, that is, before any attempt to define their own subject, namely, ‘mind,’ and without the slightest
reflection on the origins of their science. (This absence of reflection may be what Ouspensky is alluding to.) They believe, rather, that “it is not productive to worry too much over aspects of the problem that cannot be solved ... solely by using existing scientific ideas” (1997:19). Notice also the disjunction of scientific ideas and the ever-elusive consciousness.

This attitude to human research seems to me to illustrate Ouspensky’s point most effectively, namely, that ignoring the ontological relation between origin and meaning, which might provide a referential platform from which to launch into research, creates confusion. If the ‘existing scientific ideas’ are without a context to begin with, apart, that is, from the established experimental paradigm, can a solution sought in historical isolation be a solution at all?

Fuller argues that the crisis in psychology is one of objectivism:

... the reduction of all meanings to the status of epiphenomena, mere appearances in an inner and private realm of the subjective, inner models differing in kind from the ‘real’ world ‘out there,’ something like that world at best, which ‘world’ only a science in the Galilean style is judged capable of representing as it ‘truly’ is (1990:59).

Moreover, states Fuller: “The objectivistic presupposition as adopted by conventional psychology is based on the will to predict and change behaviour ...” (1990:59). This ideology of control Fuller attributes to the “presuppositions underlying psychology’s concepts” which, he insists, “have to be brought under careful scrutiny.” What is needed, he avers, is a “critical philosophical approach to psychology” (1990:59-60 my emphasis).

The confusion is best illustrated by contrasting the approach of Crick and Koch with that of another researcher, David Chalmers, who writes in the same journal that even to approach the problem of consciousness, “philosophical reasoning is vital” (1997:31).}

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6 Barfield (1963) devotes an entire study by way of polemic dialogue to solving the crisis in modern science, which, he says, “conveys a disagreeable impression of watertight compartments” (1963:9). (Crick, coincidentally, rates a mention.) The divergence of opinion to be seen in reputable review journals is obvious, though not in itself problematic. What is more obvious, and in Barfield’s opinion, disturbing, is that each review has behind it “a whole network of unspoken assumptions about the nature of life and the universe which were completely incompatible with the corresponding network behind the review on the next page” (1963:9).

7 For a rigorous working through of this problem the reader is referred to Chalmers’ formidable (1996) text.
Significantly, this writer, who has been a student of philosophy, maintains that most researchers in his field deal with “easy problems.” The hard problem, he argues, “is the question of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience” (1997:35). “Consciousness,” claims Chalmers, “is a different sort of problem entirely, as it goes beyond the scientific explanation of structure and function” 1997:35). “Nobody knows why these physical processes are accompanied by conscious experience at all” (1997:34).

The frustrating absence of an explanation of ‘structure and function’ would, of necessity, lead to the more manageable - because contained and conceptualised as a receptacle - notion of an ‘unconscious,’ both personal and collective. However, as Barfield comments: “I believe it will seem very strange to the historian of the future, that a literal-minded generation began to accept the actuality of a ‘collective unconscious’ before it could even admit the possibility of a ‘collective conscious’ - in the shape of the phenomenal world” (1988:135). Barfield is here alluding to the potentially meaningful but unnoticed structural coalescence and interdependence of the knower and the known, mind and phenomenon, a relation without which the ‘phenomenal world’ would not be possible in the first place.

Accordingly, Barfield argues that the mistake made by Freud and Jung, in as much as they held the belief that dream-imagery, myth and archetypes were representations of the collective unconscious, was in assuming that the representations are, and have always been “neatly insulated from the world of nature with which, according to their own account, they were mingled or united” (1988:134). Again, representational thought, our way of cognising, involving detachment from the phenomena, has not always been the only way of arriving at knowledge of reality. To assume otherwise has had, and continues to have what Barfield calls a “fatally blighting” influence: “It never seems to have occurred to Freud that an individual man’s ‘unconscious mind’ could be anything but a ‘somewhat’ lodged inside the box of his bones. Representation, as a principle, is accepted by him as a matter of course ...” (1988:134).

Having surveyed 35 recent (1984 -1989) textbooks on introductory psychology as preparatory research for his own text, Fuller concludes: “All were found to adopt the viewpoint of modern philosophy - a viewpoint that owes its origins to Rene Descartes - and, more
particularly, all were found to share a basic theoretical viewpoint on the place and status of meaning” (1990:2).

The grounding of conventional psychology in modern philosophy, and particularly in the syllogism of Descartes, is significant, for the latter coincided, not accidentally, with the emergence of modern (Galilean) science, which made, and still makes, a sharp distinction between the subjective and objective realms; the classic Cartesian duality which, in the latter part of the nineteenth century became objectivism, “... a simple monism of objective processes” (Fuller 1990:13). The basic philosophical motive in which conventional psychology is grounded - as an integral part of modern philosophy - is its projection of “human behaviour [in] a certain way in order to gain mastery over it. It has its historically determined presuppositions - objectivistic preconceiving of human being and its meanings - even when these have gone underground to function as if they didn’t exist at all” (1990:20-21 my emphasis).

I would go one step further, and say that the consequence of modern psychology’s disavowal of its philosophical and ethical origins up to the appearance of, and subsequent and convenient alignment with what has in a shorthand fashion been termed, the Cartesian dichotomy, is a science whose whole paradigm is arrow-headed, that is, sharp, probing and ultimately, invasive. The appearance in the lexicon in recent decades of the term, ‘cutting edge’, seems to me to best analogue its approach. If the only instrument of thought available is a scalpel, it can happen that in the blind determination to win the race to explain the psyche in order to predict its - distinguished from his or her - behaviour, there will be a tendency to regard every phenomenon as if it were a corpse. This, despite the common-sense recognition that no amount of vivisection, medical or intellectual, can explain the butterflyness of the butterfly. The very act of pinning it to a board kills that in it that makes it a butterfly: life. Even very primitive civilisations sensed intuitively that a thing had existential meaning only when ‘explained’ from the inside out, that is, by dancing, singing or speaking it, all of which amount to the same thing: beholding it by becoming it, uttering it for itself. This inverse perspective can be witnessed even today in the ‘dream-time’ consciousness of the Australian Aborigine.
Despite lip-service to the contrary, it seems apparent that the mechanomorphic view of mind - and it is always the mind, the singular human mind, that is meant and never mind in the larger sense - is still di rigueur. Reality has been split into two parts with the qualitative aspect of experience, the 'in-here', the so-called subjective aspect, incorporating art, spirituality and ethical idealism, having no validity whatsoever in explaining the 'real' nature of the universe, the 'out-there.' Galilean physics, especially through biology, and Descartesian philosophy, have together determined the content and the method of modern psychology, while its (inaudible) human subject has been reduced, finally, to a noetic nonentity.

I am aware that my polemic may seem unreasonable, but as I have noted, the sentiment that approaches to human research have in recent times taken a more holistic path is belied in many instances by the behaviour. Indeed, what I find most unsettling about the 'experimental attack' of Crick and Koch is first, the belief that the philosophical questions about consciousness, which have after all occupied some fairly astute minds over the centuries, can be shamelessly shoved aside, and second, and consequently, that it is not considered unconscionable to conjure up untested assumptions such as this: “Everyone agrees that what we know as mind is closely related to certain aspects of the behaviour of the brain, not to the heart, as Aristotle thought” (Crick and Koch 1997:19).*

We know nothing of the sort, even if, in our technical ignorance, the authoritative voice of expert knowledge is bent on convincing us that we ought to believe it. I cannot see how minds such as these, whose stated aim after all is to investigate mind are best placed to assume what my mind thinks, much less what Aristotle's thought. What Aristotle thought, or better, how he thought cannot be known without a conscious effort of empathetic identification with his way of thinking.† If the effort is made, it will be seen that his was an altogether different,

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* Elsewhere, Francis Crick, Nobel prizewinner and discoverer of the structure of DNA writes: “I, myself, like many scientists, believe that the soul is imaginary and that what we call our mind is simply a way of talking about the functions of our brains.” He states, moreover, that “once one has become adjusted to the idea that we are here because we have evolved from simple chemical compounds by a process of natural selection it is remarkable how many of the problems of the modern world take on a completely new light” (Sherrard 1987:78). Notice the recourse to Darwinism in support of his claim, and the reduction of soul and mind to brain function.
† While researching another problem altogether I fortuitously came across a reference in Steiner's Philosophy and Anthroposophy (1988a) that may explain the assumption of Crick and Koch. Steiner explains that by the end of the Middle Ages, an adulterated form of Aristotelianism, a "cognitional plague" (1988a:14) as he calls it, was being practised, "because a deep gulf had opened between reason and its thought technique on the one hand and supersensible truth on the other" (1988a:15). As was later to be the case with Darwinism, the adherents of
though no less capacious and veracious way of cognising from our own. The philosophical distinction here is summed up aphoristically by another luminary, the Austrian naturalist, Viktor Schauburger: “The heart doesn’t pump, it is pumped” (Alexandersson 1990:155).\footnote{In his classic, War and Peace, Tolstoy presents a powerful description of the difference between observed coincidences and our predisposition to argue cause and effect: “Whenever I look at my watch and its hands point to ten, I hear the bells of the neighbouring church; but I have no right to assume that because the bells begin to ring when the hands of the watch reach ten, the movement of the bells is caused by the position of the hands of the watch” (1972:91).}

Seeing soul as merely imaginary, and mind as merely a way of talking about brain function only highlights the attitude behind the word ‘mere,’ as if both soul and mind are ‘nothing but,’ thus discrediting any notion of creating a plausible ground for even the possibility of higher knowledge.

Does not the description of mind as a strictly mechanical or biophysical phenomenon underscore the distinction between the imaginal and the literal? Kühlewind provides an amusing - if it were not so devastating - anecdote in order to illustrate the “superstition that a physical process can cause something other than a physical process” (1988:44):

Doctor Skullskins would like to prove that my brain is responsible for my thoughts. He attaches electrodes from an encephalograph to my head and proposes to show me the different signals and graph curves that the machine writes out according to whether I am thinking, fantasizing, or dreaming. I sit down in a chair, and everything is prepared. Then Doctor Skullskins turns to me and says, ‘Now, Mr. Kühlewind, please think the following thought:’ “Two plus two equals four.” Did you hear that? He asks me; I am supposed to think two plus two. And he asks me so politely! But if my brain were the cause of all thought, why should he address me, what do I have to do with it all? He should deal with my brain, if that is the cause. Or does he intend me to pass on his request to my brain? (1988:45).

The functional description of mind discredits the whole notion of human agency, even when it is that agency that can choose to think functionally in the first place. “I bear the responsibility for who I am,” objects Kühlewind. “And by addressing me, as he must to begin
the experiment, the doctor shows that he is also of this opinion. Only he doesn’t know it yet. And what is more, no one besides myself can know what I am thinking” (1988:46). The point is that if it were possible to speak to the brain directly by by-passing a human will, and if the brain functioned as a consciousness, “... then consciousness would be superfluous” (1988:46).

In his small but erudite essay, *Thinking about Knowing* (1985), Alan Howard argues that the intense preoccupation with physiological explanation has caused us to lose sight of the reality that the human being is a *knowing* being, and this by hindering any development of our knowing potential:

> Perception is now considered to be sufficiently explained by the mechanism of the senses, and the thinking which turns perception into knowledge by the mechanism of the brain. But just as the senses, like the camera, cannot see the image they make, but only make the image possible, so the brain cannot really be said to think. The brain is the ground on which thoughts emerge (1985:30).

In other words, there is little of real knowledge to be gained by persisting with the delusion that matter can think. This pithy remark, ascribed to William James, underscores the delusion: “Several empirical sciences have been invented to study the brain. On the other hand, the brain, for its part, has not the slightest interest in or ability to study the mind. Philosophy, as our common ancestor, Socrates, taught us is a study of the mind (*nous*)” (Edie 1987:xii).

Let me elaborate Kühlewind’s remark above. What, after all, does it signify that I can *speak* about myself? If I were able to utter ‘I am’ (which I rarely do) only in terms of my *physical* existence, that is, as earth substance, plant substance, biological growth, corporeal structure, and so on, I would not *be* an ‘I.’ That I *can* utter at all these two seemingly insignificant words in reference to some part of my being that is *not* physical (for it is indeed not my skeleton in its fleshy garment to which I refer) suggests that this part is not comprised of anything remotely associated with matter, biological processes, or the laws of causality.

Is not ‘I am’ itself a *thought*? But I cannot have such a thought, or any thought, unless *I am*. That which is both ‘I’ and thought is not anything physical. I think *because* I am. To say
‘I am’ implies that I am not a nobody. If I am not a nobody, ‘I’ cannot be matter. Matter is matter, substance not person-alised.

Further, how do I know about motion? I did not learn it by watching things that move. I stand upright and walk across the earth’s surface. I am related in thinking to motion. How did I learn to think? It was not by watching the substance of the brain? How did I learn to speak? It is because I am word-like; I am word; I am ‘I.’

The point I am trying to make is that the view of mind as brain function is itself the product of positivist, matter-bound thought. No such view is possible when think-ing (the verb) is taking place.

The Influence of Biophysical Darwinism on the Concept of Human Being

Perhaps the overwhelming consequence for music and for human utterance generally of the mechanistic conception has been the emergence, through Darwinian evolution theory, of the belief that the arts originated in a progressive - implying always from simple to complex - intellectual and emotional development of the human mind. The entrenched assumptions of the fixity of mind and the correlative solidity of reality help to explain the predominance in this century of biological explanations for every aspect of human evolution, including utterance. As early as 1908, Jakob Bronowski claims that science, in looking for a language that “mimics or mirrors the structure of reality,” does it “in exactly the same way in which human language evolved from animal language...” (1978:47). Eighty years on, the neurobiologists, Maturana and Varela, want to convince us that “all cognitive experience [including that cued by language] involves the knower in a personal way, rooted in his biological structure” (1987:16). In the 90’s, the evolutionary psychologists, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1992), while acknowledging pre-cognitive knowledge and mind as evolved phenomena, argue that the apparent complexity of mind can only be put down to biological evolution evidenced in natural selection. The spectre of Darwin hovers so authoritatively here that, as I have already suggested, it is difficult, at least from the compelling evidence of the solid world, to imagine life without corporeality.
Further, it is not widely recognised that the entire system of education in the West, modelled almost exclusively on Piagetean doctrine, itself a cognitional correlative of Darwinism, is founded on evolution theory. Why it has continued to have such a strong appeal, however, is something of an enigma. Indeed, the perpetuation of the concept of the human being in toto as an advanced primate descended from the ape is especially surprising given that it is now known that not only have Darwin’s discoveries been widely misrepresented and misquoted by neo-Darwinists, but that they have in recent times been vigorously challenged.\textsuperscript{11}

Paul Newham, for example, recognises the contribution made by Piaget to the understanding of human cognition in childhood. At the same time he argues: “Neither has any other researcher caused so much damage” (1993:30). While citing as the “most comprehensive critique and criticism of Piaget’s schema” (1993:31) the work of Howard Gardner and Jeanne Bamberger, whose research in Project Zero, “an interdisciplinary programme based at Harvard University, the aim of which is to investigate the non-logical process of artistic creativity and development, particularly in children,” (1993:32) Newham writes:

\begin{quote}
Despite the work of those such as Gardner and Bamberger, the most widespread popular attitudes still hold cognitive abstraction and scientific logic in far higher esteem than operations based on intuition and sensory experience. Consequently, the process of transition from intuitive and spontaneous expression of affect to cognitive encoding of fixed linguistic symbols of meaning in the development of the infant is viewed as a progression from a primitive position to a more sophisticated one. Furthermore, this process of so-called advancement is mirrored in the way in which communication in the human species evolved from primal tonal utterances to verbal language and is unfortunately and unjustifiably as synonymous with the notion of progress in the human race as in the individual (1993:33).
\end{quote}

“Were it true,” states Winkler (after reading Darwin), “that the human spirit is merely a higher form of animal consciousness, its first recorded expressions could not have dealt with

\textsuperscript{11} For an excellent review of the debate that has raged around Darwin’s attempt to demonstrate irrefutably that natural selection is the sole agent of evolutionary change, and for information about opponents of the theory, see Vorzimmer (1972).
the supernatural” (1960:120). He continues: “Were it true that human wisdom is solely the fruit of trial and error, of social experience, and established habits of civilisation, we - or at least our leaders - should have wisdom far exceeding that of the leaders of mankind at the dawn of recorded history” (1960:120). In this text, Winkler challenges the “widespread belief” that Darwin solved the “greatest mystery” of humanity’s evolution. He argues that any solution of the kind propounded by the Darwinists “would have to concern, above all, the human brain. But was Darwin right about the brain?” (1960:120). Eisely takes up just that question by discussing the view of Anthony Wallace, Darwin’s great contemporary:

Finally, Wallace challenged the whole Darwinian position upon man by insisting that artistic, mathematical, and musical abilities could not be explained on the basis of natural selection and the struggle for existence. Something else, he contended, some unknown spiritual element must have been at work in the elaboration of the human brain. Why else should men of simple cultures possess the same basic intellectual powers which the Darwinists maintained could only be elaborated by competitive struggle?” (1955:12).

This ‘suspicion’ of Wallace underscores the basic opposition of a Logos conception of human evolution with a biological one.12 What is missing from the latter? Barfield answers the question:

If ‘evolution’ today were not merely a theory for men, but an actual experience, it would be impossible for them, when speaking of it, to omit all reference to its meaning - which is the evolution of consciousness. The spell-bound teachers and parents, who must go on inculcating this lifeless, repressive dogma, do not introduce Shakespeare to their children by repeating what psychologists have said about the causes of the impulse to clap hands. This is because the genius of Shakespeare is, not somebody else’s theory, invented to explain the repeated phenomenon of hand-clapping, but a concrete experience of the individual soul. There is no such experience of evolution (1999:147).

In other words, evolution theory is a striking example, in part at least, of logomorphic

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12 It is worth noting that Wallace “placed music, alone of the arts, among thirteen ‘minimal categories of religious behaviour’ that are associated with ritual in all societies” (Burrows 1980:190).
One cannot study evolution (by deliberately excluding consciousness) and then go on to make assumptions about the evolution of the consciousness that was excluded in the first place. When it is utterance, that is, language or music, for example, that is being studied, one is studying evolution "... from within, and therefore studying consciousness itself" (1999:135), which is neither an 'inner world,' dislocated from an outer one, nor "... a tiny bit of the world stuck onto the rest of it" (Barfield 1999:132), but, as I have already discussed, the inside of the world.

Just as any subsequent biological theory presupposes evolution but may not be about evolution, so any study of the history of language or music (or the historical study of anything else for that matter) presupposes a history of consciousness although it may not be about consciousness.

Although the Darwinian concept of the human being as an imperfect biological model evolving, through adaptation, into a more sophisticated one has undoubtedly guided, since its publication, not only modern scientific enterprise but all our thinking, there is another, and for me, thoroughly plausible Steinerian picture of evolution which is the one I have been arguing; that of human consciousness. It may be seen as a parallel noetic evolution to Darwinian biological evolution, a descent from an original noetic state through adaptation into a more physical organism. Along with the organic corporeal development, consciousness becomes personalised. As I discussed in the previous chapter, something of this kind can be seen in the

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Bortoft notes also that it is a striking example of rhetoric insofar as Darwin was committed to the Newtonian concept that one could not be an efficient observer unless one was also a competent theoriser. He writes: "As with Newton's publication of his new theory about light and colours, Darwin's account of evolution by natural selection ... is really a careful exercise in rhetoric, arranged to persuade the reader while at the same time leading him or her to believe that the conclusions come directly from observations. What Darwin presented was not a new factual discovery, or even a multitude of such discoveries, but a new organizing idea. The factual content is presented in the mode of this organizing idea, and hence it can easily seem that evolution by natural selection is a fact" (1996:377-378). Further, Darwin did not discover the idea of evolution, since it was already being discussed in scholarly circles. He embraced the idea and proposed a particular interpretation of it; he "...proposed a mechanism for it" (1996:399 my emphasis). The notion of mechanism is particularly important here, since it demonstrates in a most compelling manner how the fundamental concepts of a scientific attitude are reflections of a socio-historical basis. Others who at the time were theorising about natural selection were significantly, also British, and were thoroughly entrenched in the free market economics and capitalist (Whig) notions of society which then were gaining momentum. Bortoft writes: "A key factor here is the way that the ideas of Malthus on population and competition were incorporated directly into Darwin's theory, influencing the very form of the mechanism (as he thought of it) for evolution which he proposed. Nature and free-trade society were both driven by competition and selection: organic and social evolution were fundamentally similar in Darwin's view" (1996:398).
superindividual psychology of the kind that existed up until the Greek civilisation, changing gradually (and gaining perspective along the way) to an individual psychology. Thus, according to Steiner, there are two evolutionary streams, and the noetic progress of the human being is one from cosmic citizen to terrestrial citizen. It is the task of humanity by way of that individuated, earthly psychology, to swing back, as it were, through Logos knowledge to its Origin. (I will elaborate this idea as it pertains to musical cognition in the denouement.) Again I feel the need to add that this other stream cannot be envisaged by the kind of ‘seeing’ that is corporeally attuned, but by thinking become seeing.

Two Examples of Mechanomorphism in Music

At this point I want to contextualise the preceding discussion in two current examples of what I conceive to be the one-sidedness of biophysical and functionalist explanation. My aim is to show how these have infiltrated and shaped our ‘cognitional attitude,’ so much so that we take their assumptions as a priori facts of existence. My argument is that since they are by nature materialist, they amount to a denial of Logos.

The first example is taken from the brochure of the 1995 Brisbane Biennial International Music Festival, the artistic advisers for which are two prominent Australian musicians. One of the advertised events of the festival is an escorted walk in Brisbane’s Forest Park:

Listen to the natural symphonies of the bush as it comes alive at dawn. [Was it dead during the night?] Environmentally Sound [the name of the event] is a bushwalk at Mt Coot-tha led by ornithologists and indigenous musicians from the Philippines for whom bird calls are a natural way of communicating. When you focus on the sounds of nature, the origin of all music, the plagiarism of composers throughout the ages will become evident (my emphasis).

Let me put this Darwinian assumption to the test. All creatures make sounds. It would be a mistake, however, to claim that these sounds are the models from which music found its way into the world. Imitation is one thing; invention is another, just as communication is

14 ‘The notion of human history as progress is a relatively late arrival in thought, its emergence occurring simultaneously with, and replacing, “... the medieval and classical conviction that the history of mankind as a whole was a process of degeneration.” History at this time was regarded as “a descent from a Golden Age in the past; now it began to be thought of as an ascent into a golden age in the future” (Barfield 1967b:16).
different from expression. The assumption is that human sound evolved for the purpose of communication. Why bother to imitate what is already there?

There is no reason to assume that communication came before expression. "Nature, as such, involves the absence, just as history as such involves the presence, of individual human activity, as distinct from 'instinctive behaviour'" (Barfield 1967b:91). I think Barfield is asking whether the adherents to Darwinism who, by definition, must see the human being as the end-point in the evolutionary chain, are able to identify by its tone of voice an individual canary from the genus canary.

Let me explore this further phenomenologically. Birds are creatures of the air, and generally the smaller they are, the higher their pitch. In other words, their connection with gravity, with the earth, is minimal. Generally, the less subject to mass and gravity an animal is, the higher the pitch of its call. This is true also of the human being, who as (s)he grows up, becomes connected more deeply with gravitational matter, with solidarity, so that the voice 'drops' in pitch. (Actually the term 'growing-up' is a misnomer. In view of the disproportionate size of the head - that 'globe that holds the midnight sky' - in the infant, it is perhaps more accurate to say that (s)he grows down.\(^\text{16}\))

Silvano Arieti writes of the connection of the sounds of nature with music:

> Music is not concerned with connotation, with the defining of concepts. Neither is it interested in denoting objects, except in those cases where, for extra-musical purposes, it is employed in the imitation of sounds made by objects in the external world. ... In cases such as these a sound is used both to denote and to represent the object denoted (1976:238-239 my emphasis).

\(^{15}\) The phrase belongs to Eisely: "We have been so busy tracing the tangible aspects of evolution in the forms of animals that our heads, the little globes which hold the midnight sky and the shining universes of thought, have been taken as much for granted as the growth of a yellow pumpkin in the fall" (1955:10).

\(^{16}\) We humans are born without orientation in the outer world. We cannot yet stand, walk or speak, but we sleep and dream a great deal. We have not yet entered into a relation with gravity. Orientation is achieved by learning to become upright and learning to walk, and in this way an earthly perspective is acquired. We are not made with this perspective. If we were, we could only sleep and dream. The gaining of perspective, then, facilitates utterance, that is singing, but especially speaking. Learning to utter coherently is a second act of adaptation to a physical frontier.
He later affirms: "But interesting as is the subject of acoustic imitation in music [including the imitation of birds], as it is used to further narrative and descriptive intentions, ... such uses rarely figure in absolute, or pure, music" (1976:239).

Although the calls of birds may be attractive, and may even in some cases be pure tone, they are not music. That is because the birds’ behaviour is instinctive. Birds are compelled to repeat the same song, for they are not self-conscious beings; they are not individuals. It is obvious that, insofar as they are endowed with a personalised will, only human beings can reach with the voice into the supersensible realm by elevating themselves above the instinctive, that is, precisely by not adapting to the environment, but by emancipating themselves from it. The whole purpose of human utterance is to raise the utterer above the instinctive and the earthly.

Ordinary observation reveals as much. If human beings are able to mimic the sounds of nature for the purpose of communication, it is because those sounds are inseparable from the physical environment in which they are found. To put it another way, sounds, not music (tones and intervals), are associated with a sense of place. To listen, for example, to a film soundtrack that reproduces the sounds of a Brazilian rainforest, birds, frogs, monkeys, water dripping onto leaves and so on, is to place oneself in that environment. Similarly, the sounds made by a sizzling steak or an espresso machine can bring one to a busy cafe or bistro. The tone of a lute, cello or oboe does not invoke in us the same sense of place; it does not usually call up in us a picture of the acoustic environment in which it is normally generated and heard. The tones of music are beyond place. I do not walk around making the sounds of a rainforest or an espresso machine, or even a bird. I sing, or hum, or whistle. A musical way of being is to be emancipated from place. If I were content to listen to birdsong, what need would I feel to compose a symphony? The ‘natural’ in sound has already been exhaustively uttered by nature, by the birds and other creatures.

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17 This notion of human specialisation developing, not as a matter of environmental adaptation, but out of the organism itself as a “‘higher fact’ of progressive emancipation” (Bortoft 1996:299) is “... a particular characteristic of ‘biological progress’ which has not yet been granted any fundamental evolutionary significance” (Davy 1985:88).
There is nothing in nature that resembles music. Insofar as it was devised by humans for humans, with no correspondence at all with the physical world, music is species specific. I will return to this theme below. I only wanted to show by this example that Darwinian evolution theory is still influential in most minds, even musical ones.

I do not argue that the theory is incorrect. I do claim that on its own it is so authoritative a feature of the extensive, perspectival mode of cognition that it does not allow us to see what it leaves out, namely, progressive emancipation from the environment to personhood. That is because it looks in the opposite direction to the other view of evolution, which requires an inverse perspective. If this other view is thought through to its origin it leads to another conclusion altogether with respect to music’s purpose, which I will try to explicate here.

Essentially, Darwin’s theory and its derivatives, which see the human being as a biological end-point in the evolutionary chain, as a more perfectly evolved primate, as the highest product of nature whose speech and music have evolved from the territorial and mating calls of animals is an incomplete picture of humanity. As I have emphasised, the theory of mimesis, imitation of nature, could only have derived from this strictly biological theory of humanity. It is a theory minus the picture-script, minus Logos awareness. The foundation of this view is the assumption that music exists in the physical world, rather than, on the contrary, that it had first to be created in the physical world. Music is not an expression of physical existence. Just this insight led Goethe to remark: “The dignity of art appears to the greatest advantage perhaps in music, because that art contains no material to be deducted. It is wholly form and intrinsic value, and it elevates and ennobles everything which it expresses” (Spender 1977:271 my emphasis).

We osmose something of the universal mind into ourselves before we can make music. “It was out of a spirit attuned state that the artistic urge proceeded” (1986a:17), Steiner insists. Alternatively, “any age strictly naturalistic must, to be true to itself, become inartistic, philistine” (1986a:17). It was only by participating, however unconsciously, in given, ‘revealed’ knowledge, in the generating forces as I have called them, that the impulse to express in personalised forms in the first place was felt. This was not an expression of anything physical; for physical awareness, as I have shown by observation of the Greek mind,
much less the pre-historic mind, was not yet incarnate. Theirs was only to a limited extent a solid world.

The difference between the two evolutionary views begs the question: If music is supposed to express and communicate personal emotions (which as I have discussed is really cognitive feeling or ethos), and yet, has its origins in the natural world, both of which are the popular views, where, in the natural world are these emotions? I have tried to show they are not there. What is there is instinct, unconscious attachment or fused identification with the earth. Before something can be felt, there has to be the capacity to feel in the first place. The urge to give vent to inwardsness or awareness of self does not take its cue from the natural world. The inner life of a human being cannot unfold in the physical world unless (s)he is capable of creating forms congenial to his/her non-physical nature. As I have maintained, there is nothing physical, ontologically, about musical utterance.

If the human being is truly the highest product of nature, the culmination of “a linear scale of increasing developmental perfection” (1995:15) in Fox’s words, then believing that to be so, would we not have to be content with that anthropocentric status? As the highest refinement of nature, then, it would be entirely unnecessary to strive to create works of art that transcend natural law, or in terms of Goethean phenomenology, to strive to perfect what imperfect nature has not herself perfected. A person would feel no urge at all to be musical. The very production of tone and interval, indeed, all art, is a manifest contradiction of this determinist fallacy. Rather, a being who is of the natural world utters something that is not. I am saying that music became music only because its idea was taken up through human consciousness, which separated from nature by becoming its inside. Unlike constructed concepts, music is, in accordance with Platonic epistemology, an eternal idea “antecedent to personal thinking” (Storr 1992:135). This wilful seizing of the idea could happen only because humanity lost consciousness of Origin, lost awareness of the Logos. Humanity now sounds it back, sounds it again ….. and again ….. and again.

The second example of the radical difference between the two evolutionary views, and for me, an apposite illustration of the demise of participation in the phenomena (as distinct from taking a perspective on them) is this taken from the research column of the monthly
publication of a prominent Australian University. The publication, entitled UniNEWS appeared in February 1995, and the article, *Striking a Digital Chord*, celebrates the setting-up of an electronic music studio in the music department. The educator responsible, who, I assume is also the author of the article, envisages students “using playback facilities which can simulate a full orchestra.” He “takes his [computerised] system into the realms of virtual reality to create music of great tonal richness and complexity.” The rationale behind the initiative reads as follows: “Back in the days of Leonardo da Vinci, the lot of a composer was arduous. Each note had to be scored by hand and the composer could only imagine how the piece would sound in full instrumental or vocal splendour” (my emphasis).

The question is not whether da Vinci might have used the technology had it been available to him, which would be the predictable argument, but rather, that for the writer of this article music must be accounted for only in its physical category, and that is all there is to be accounted for in it. It is just because ‘virtual reality’, in which the entire sensory input is delivered by a machine, was not a consideration for da Vinci, that he could imagine it in a way almost lost to us.

Can we say that how we see the world - in this case electronically - is a reflection of the state of our inner world? It was the emergence of mechanistic thinking - and the correlative loss of the *Logos* picture - with its unavoidable mechanomorphic world-conception that induced the fascination for the physical in the first place, and the subsequent culture of the machine as paradigm (Mumford 1967). (Modern technology is really only the fascination for the physically do-able, tool-making, taken to its logical extreme.) The very ‘virtual’ technology this academic celebrates could only have become a ‘reality’ in a culture of diminished *virtu* and imagination. “The change in imagination from Michelangelo to Benjamin Franklin [electricity] has given man the capacity of creating an imitation world” (Sardello 1992:116). Electro-technology is the *product* of poor listening. It threatens our social environment and our need to communicate far more than most of us realise.

If composing as da Vinci did is ‘arduous’ for this academic, there is no reason to assume the same for da Vinci. Writing *in his own hand* may well have been for him an indispensable aspect of the ‘flow’ of the creative process. Moreover, it has not occurred to this academic that
it is only because the physical properties of sound obey certain natural laws, that they are eminently calculable, and therefore, infinitely manipulable. It is this vulnerability alone that enables their reproduction, and thus, dislocation from their non-physical origin. Electronic reproduction, however, is precisely a withdrawal of original creative forces, a state of inertia in which every tonal event occurs strictly as it happened previously without human intervention. Such exactitude is not possible or even desirable in the alternative scenario, where the sound is generated by an active human will, and where human flesh has contact with the sound from its beginning to its end.

Da Vinci was cognisant of this (universal) will element in organic processes, and did not confuse it with its opposite, inertia. "Nothing without a mind - insensate - moves by itself; its movement is caused by others," writes da Vinci in his quaint way, cited here by Julius (1993:29). The origin of force, then, "lies in those bodies which have senses" (1993:29).

Here is a premonition of, and premature challenge to, the later discovery of the theory of motion, one of many such which, it was found, could be expressed entirely in mathematical symbols independent of observation. The law of motion states that all phenomena in the inanimate realm of nature consist merely in changes of position on the part of a substance. Da Vinci strove to create as the Divine Logos-Name-Will created, rather than as his own persona dictated. That is the point; da Vinci allowed music, Logos wisdom, to disclose itself. He knew that "in this cosmic system there can be no motion-event from the simplest to the most complex whose ultimate cause does not lie in the will-impulse [rather than the brain] of a being who wills" (Wachsmuth 1932:235). All motion phenomena are will-impelled, including air-borne wave-forms, and because they are, they are the bearers of that which possesses being and will. This is not a mathematical formula, a mere acoustic phenomenon.

The motion phenomenon is significant in another respect. "With electronic technology," states Sardello, "an acceleration of the world occurs, and with acceleration comes the loss of qualities; colour, texture, lustre are replaced by mathematical logic" (1992:115-116 my emphasis). Under normal circumstances, things take place in their own time, in a temporality peculiar to them. Technology can be viewed indeed, not as motion, but as the control of motion as speed. Speed (including the drug that goes by the same name) is a substitute for
qualities of the world that are no longer perceived. If I walk through a landscape, I can take in these qualities through the exercise of my attention and my sense organs. Should I choose to make the journey on a bicycle, I already have significantly less time to notice qualities and the subtleties of their changing, and even less time while travelling in a car or train. In a jet aircraft I take in virtually nothing, so little in fact that I am ‘lagged.’ I am the speed.

If the speed phenomenon is taken to its extreme, as it is with electro-acoustic technology, it can be seen that it not only shrinks all distances in space and time (recall Heidegger and my claim in Chapter Four that this is what has happened in musical perception), but that it actually expunges and finally replaces qualities, and becomes “... the outward sign of the creation of an imitation world” (Sardello 1992:117). When this happens, we are literally unbalanced. Soul qualities no longer play a part in our cognising the world if speed is substituted for them. “The manic urge to create a technological world arises when soul can no longer be felt as a creative force in the world” (1992:117).

For da Vinci, as for the Greeks, the concept of music being internally organised, stored in, and replicated by, an electronic box would have been anathema, because it was literally unimaginable. Yet there is perhaps nothing more characteristic of our time than this concept - an unethical one for the Greek and the medieval mind - become a reality. Obviously it would be absurd to claim that a computer possesses free will. “We can speak of true music,” writes Julius, “only when the instrument is built in such a way and the playing is done so that the sound can free itself from its material bonds” (1993:43-44 my emphasis).

Julius is inferring that electro-mechanism is a lie, and alternatively, that the experience of (sonic) truth, especially in one’s formative years, is fundamental to ethical orientation in the world. A young person - including, and perhaps more especially, one who will enter the music profession - becomes musical depending on the veracity of the sonic surroundings, on the way in which the environment expresses, not mechanism, but humanness. There can be no lie, no sham, no contrivance, no dishonesty in this. Musical utterance is ‘true’ or it is not utterance, not music. Although strictly speaking they are technical tools, musical instruments are made in such a way that the materials from which they are constructed have been removed from their natural earthly condition and transformed into the opposite of that condition (Soesman 1989).
A violin, once a tree, (which in this state can only produce a dull thud when struck) must be
dried and hardened, for the material cannot otherwise reflect sound. It cannot re-sound. The
same is true of metals, which are taken out of the earth, the impurities removed and the metal
hardened in order to produce the klang of a bell or the ring of a brass instrument. This is the
principle of resonance (resonare - to sound back, to sound again) and at the same time the
principle of renascence. Musical tones are a sub-lunary mirror of supersensible principles and
events, not synthesised replicas of each other, the whole generated by an electric current.

I want to pause here for a moment to consider the distinction between the technology of
which the violin and the horn are examples, and the technology of the computer. The principle
difference is the electric current, electricity, about which even now we understand very little.
Sardello (1992) makes the point that we know how it works, but not what it is. When used to
reproduce image or sound, it is an imitation world we are talking about. Sound produced by an
electric current is a synthetic replication of what is, or was, real. A stroll through any modern
shopping centre will demonstrate, not only that for many the distinction has already ceased to
exist, but that there is no responsibility taken for the falsehood on the part of the retailer who
inflicts it upon others. Sardello calls this loss of perception “... a training in disassociation”
(1992: 107). This is to say that thinking is reduced to one dimension, “while the other
dimensions of thought and imagination lose reality” (1992:107). He exposes the deception in
the widespread belief that electronic technology somehow creates a new “soul of the world.
This is true - it is the psychopathic soul” (1992:107).

The Death of Conscience as an Integral Part of Cognition

This will seem a strong, even offensive claim to some. It nevertheless sits comfortably
with my earlier points, namely, the pathology of lying and the psychology of control from
which it is inseparable. Sardello is a psychotherapist of particularly phenomenological
leaning, and I think it would be useful here to explore the state of mind to which he refers. I
believe it is one that evidences that, as the mania for the electronic accelerates and becomes the
‘normal’ way of doing things and of viewing the world, there is an inverse impoverishment in
the realm of humanness. The psychopath is described thus:
Psychopathy is a kind of programming in life, a learning how to ‘de-bug’ life. The psychopath does everything effortlessly, freely, without any sense of inhibition, restraint, or suppression. Nothing of the world makes a claim on the soul of the psychopath. Cheating, lying, saying one thing and doing just the opposite without the least concern, changing a position from one moment to the next in order to satisfy the situation, the psychopath is always a winner. Psychopathy: appearing better than one actually is; successfully gliding along the surface, intelligently, but without insight; passing through the world without being emotionally moved, without feelings of the heart, only feelings programmed to suit the situation. Psychopathy constantly assumes that everything works smoothly, efficiently, always to one’s advantage. Everything is a game: feelings, emotions, courtesy, love, sympathy, care - the psychopath can imitate any form of behaviour without it going through the heart (1992:107).

Does this description bear any resemblance to the one given in Chapter Nine that addressed the word as an instrument of control? It takes that notion further by evoking a picture of the behavioural symptoms of the sort of mind-soul that equates itself with the possibilities, super-efficiency and ease of manipulation endemic in technological operation.18

All this can be summed-up as the absence of conscience. Conscience is no intellectual concept. Conscience is felt. If I were to ask the reader, where, in the body (s)he feels the presence of conscience, where would (s)he place the hand? “The heart does not strive after meaning,” says Sardello, “but rather allows the things to disclose themselves” (1992:46).19 That self-disclosure is beauty. How do I know? Sardello suggests that I can open the door and engage directly the experience of my own heart and its language; not the pump, but the place

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18 It is that picture that led to this piece of excoriation, attributed to Koestler: “We have heard a whole chorus of Nobel Laureates in physics informing us that matter is dead, causality is dead, determinism is dead. If that be so, let us give them a decent burial, with a requiem of electronic music” (Kirk 1997:xix).
19 In Anthroposophical medicine the heart is regarded as an order-bestowing organ with functions beyond the mechanical. It is viewed as an organ of sense and, the focus of the life of feeling. For this reason, Steiner gives special medical consideration to the study of the heart. See Lowndes (1998) for a description of Steiner’s meditations pertaining to the heart.
where conscience is felt. The quality of the experience I can find there defies explanation in strictly mechanistic terms.

This leads me back to where I started. In the search for the solution to the 'problem' of mind, the neurosciences have avoided the problems implicit in the dual model by explaining mental activity entirely in terms of brain mechanism. “But the account of our experiences is reductionist: there is no role for any states or events without physical embodiment” (1991:85) retorts Glover. We cannot reduce cognition to functional referents. Humanity is in all physical sensing directed to externals, to the world. As I have tried to show, however, music, has no such links with externals. It is about inwardness, even if the content is made effective in the world. This should alert us to the truth that utterance has its origins in the non-physical realm. If one gives attention to the activity in and around the heart while singing or listening to song, one will find an evocative picture of song as the ‘I’ having vacated for a time the physical organisation altogether. It floats between.

It is important to keep in mind that the formation of the disassociation Sardello describes began long before the arrival of computer technology. With the emergence of the theory of biological evolution, for example, the whole notion of a world soul as Plato, Aristotle, and the Mystery Centres of the Middle Ages thought of it, was extinguished. When medical science began dissecting the dead matter of the human corpse, no evidence of an individual soul could be found. For human consciousness, at least in the West, soul of any sort ceased to exist as a cognised reality. In the established church, it remained only as a belief system, and in scientific thinking it disappeared altogether. In acoustic science, music became the victim of materialism. The tones which become music only by virtue of being generated by an ensouled

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20 It seems to me that the truth of this claim is self-evidencing. The intellectual difference between conscience and guilt, for example, is almost impossible to ascertain. But attention reveals an experiential difference. Whereas conscience is felt in the heart, guilt is felt in the gut. I recently attended a lecture given by Professor Kevin Hart from the Monash University English Department in Melbourne. His subject was the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, who, according to Hart, came to the conclusion that we can only ever affirm in (what might today be seen as) a negative mode, that is, out of conscience. The magistrate, for example, who merely applies the law and who then retires home for a good night’s sleep is not necessarily being just, for he can never be certain that he has been just. If he truly appreciates the difference between the law and justice, his conscience will be functional; for the notion of justice is superimposed over the law. It is what makes the law infinitely applicable. My point is this: regardless of the lengths we might go to in order to conceptualise the distinction, I believe that it can be shown that justice is not the exclusive province of the law. Rather, it is the province of a primal human conscience.
being, a being endowed with heart/conscience as a felt reality, became preservable and reproducible.

In the Mystery Schools, the study of origins was known as initiation knowledge. The attitude towards knowledge was one of respect for its 'givenness.' Initiation knowledge was seen as original or "revealed knowledge" (Wachsmuth 1932:237), which enabled the student to apprehend the true nature of the world and of his/her own being, and to use this knowledge in accordance with the moral nature of his/her will. As I have tried to show through the personage of Plato, what was 'embodied' in art was knowledge derived fundamentally from imaginations of cosmic principles. The arts, in their origins, were sought only in their connection with the complex cosmic evolution of human consciousness.

As I have discussed, the scenario today is very different, in that modern theory attributes artistic beginnings to a biological rather than a cosmic evolution. Research into artistic capacities is, by definition, confined largely to genetics and/or environmental adaptation. This conception, I believe, could only have arisen as cosmic imaginations, the capacity to cognise in pictures, began to decline. The earlier cognitional faculties diminished inversely in accordance with the increasing perception of a physical world (the perspective). This progression can be seen as one from 'original participation' in the phenomena to a detached human consciousness, if original participation is understood "as the unconscious identity of man with his Creator" (Barfield 1988:169).

The distinction between the two evolutionary pictures, as I have rendered them, and by definition, between the classical and medieval world-outlooks and our own, is summed up powerfully by Godwin:

This [dark and terrifying] picture of the cosmos which so many people share today reflects the aspirations and fears of modern humanity at the very end of a world cycle; and like every other epoch, this one has formed its world view largely in its own image: not in the image of its physical body, but in the image that reflects what it has made of the human mind. Where once gateways opened to the heavens, now there gape black holes, ready to swallow everything into oblivion. Such is the view many people hold of death: a doorway to the extinction of consciousness. Where once the planetary angels guided their astral chariots, now mindless forces propel
stars and planets inexorably to their doom. And the creative song or word of God is reduced pitifully to a 'big bang' (1989:7).

With this distinction in view, it is easy to see why a prominent teaching of the Mystery Schools was the *incompleteness* of the human being. Their psychological doctrine supported a study of the human being not only from the standpoint of "what (s)he is or seems to be, but from the point of view of what (s)he may become; that is, from the point of view of his/her *possible evolution*" (Ouspensky 1991:9). *This* psychological system is the original one claims Ouspensky, "or in any case the oldest and only [it] can explain the forgotten origin and the meaning of psychology" (1991:9). If psychology is the study of foundations, of the secrets of humanity's evolution, then it is a psychology of *perpetuity*, of both beginnings and possibilities.

"We have built up a world-conception," writes Edmunds, "seeking by logic to interpret observation confined to the outer appearance of phenomena. But this logic which we have inherited from the Greeks has lost its inner grasp of existence and turned into mere abstractionism" (1990:138). Can we, then, bring ourselves to entertain a picture of individual artistic judgement forming out of a universe-conception that permeates *potentially* autonomous human beings? If not, a whole realm of experience is, and will continue to be, denied us. It was this very permeation which gave rise to culture in the first place, as the Greek testimony evidences. *This* is art.

Knowledge without imagination is a barren landscape. When it became predominantly utilitarian, art ceased to be art in the true sense (Steiner 1987). The task, then, is to build a *picture* (musing) of musical practice alongside the willed act of utterance, and which complements this act. This is not, as I have tried to explain, an artificial or arbitrary connection. Without it, the individual will cannot be fired.

It is my opinion that as long as the mechanomorphic picture of human being, together with the idolatry of, and control by, electronic technology (the *physical* word) continue to dominate our thought and action, individual volition, conscience and the integrity of utterance
succumb to a slow death. Furthermore, the uttered forms themselves ought to illuminate the knowing. Without the idea of beginnings and purpose, music must remain, as must all art and action, materialistic, and therefore, vulnerable to the excesses of positivism.

**Conclusion**

What influence does ‘training in disassociation’ have on musical thought and practice today? My understanding is that music has not lost the power to mirror the very depths of the soul. It is just that the metaphor has lost so much of its archaic allegoric power in becoming a platitude. It is the potency of theimaginative picture-script, and with it the integrity of utterance that we have lost, as the “transformation of awareness from astrological to astronomical consciousness has hardened somewhat our thrill at the night sky” (Moore 1990:2).

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21 This combination of words, namely, will, conscience, integrity and death, is connected in myriad ways with the vertical posture typifying the human orientation in the world about which I spoke above. I can best illustrate the connection by citing an incident concerning Alfred Tomatis, the researcher of human audition about whom I have already spoken. In an interview with Tim Wilson, Tomatis spoke of his visit to a Benedictine Monastery in France where, after the Second Vatican Council, a new abbot had eliminated the daily chanting, believing it to serve no useful purpose. The monks have an extraordinary work schedule, rising at 5:00 am and retiring at 1:00 am. During this period they chant for up to eight hours a day, the remaining time spent at physical work. After the chanting was removed from the daily schedule, the monks became increasingly tired until, finally, they were unable to work at all. The decision was made to change the regimen. They were to retire early and rise at a reasonable hour like everyone else. They became more tired than ever, and medical experts and dietitians were called in. The verdict was that the monks were undernourished. They changed from a vegetarian diet (which the order had maintained since the twelfth century) and began to include meat in their diet. At this point, the abbot summoned Tomatis, who relates that he “found 70 of the 90 monks ... slumping in their cells like wet dishrags. Over the next several months, ... I began the treatment of re-awakening their ears.” Tomatis states that his first step was to re-introduce the chanting immediately. ‘By November, almost all of them had gone back to their normal activities, that is, their prayer, their few hours of sleep, and the legendary Benedictine work schedule’ (1989:210-212). Wilson’s commentary on this tale is as follows: “Verticality, it could be argued, is the backbone of Tomatis’ thinking. The image of upward ascension informs both his physiological researches and his metaphysical speculations. It is also a rich source of allusions, many of them biblical. It was not a casual observation that he found the aurally depleted monks ‘slumping’ in their cells. Not only, he discovered, does a different posture change the way one hears, but the converse. He observes that the word ‘malady’ etymologically implies bad posture, and suggests that his listening ‘cure’ is nothing more than the reversal of this” (1989:213-214). In the human, of course, the blood flows vertically, that is, in defiance of gravity, and not horizontally as it does in the (instinctive) earth-bound animal kingdom. This concentration of allusions to the will, namely, morality, uprightness, backbone, listening, utterance, orientation, and also their ‘death’ is echoed in Goethe, who refers to verticality as the “spiritual staff, a law-giving power in the midst” (Adams and Whicher 1949:11), and also in Herder in whose philosophy Goethe apparently took particular interest: “The erect posture inherent in the human organisation and everything connected with it is the fundamental prerequisite for his activity of reason” (Steiner 1988c:31).
Given that loss, Plato’s *simulacrum* (not the original, but the copy of a copy of a copy and so on), the violated ethic of imitation is in current times taken to ridiculous lengths. (I will explain the *simulacrum* in more detail in Chapter Eleven.) Civilisation has moved so far away from the original that it has become almost impossible to discern the difference between artistry and craft and talent and facility. The ideal is now heard always in terms of the principles of its technical production, that is, in terms of the operation of body and instrument. But if the re-production is always equated with the physical means of production, the outcomes can only ever be “closed and self-referring systems of semiotic exchange” (Frow 1997:68), and so “… the real becomes indefinitely reproducible, an effect, merely, of the codes which continue to generate it” (1997:68). That fallacy is behind electro-acoustic technology. The forgetting of an original referent is a disjunction of form and meaning, sensuality and intelligibility, if meaning is taken to be recovered knowledge of an original.

In my opinion Western art-music has become a craft of imitation without awareness, replication marked by extraordinary levels of physical skill but little heart. Craft is the mere replication or copying of what one has heard. Artistry is making evident what one has not heard, but felt.

When music is not felt in the cognitive sense, it is artificial; inflated, bloodless, cool, self-sufficient, showy, vain, mannered, idiosyncratic; it is craft without conscience.

Music, particularly the modern kind that pays no due to the continuity of the past is morally insensible, inert, paralysed for the need of feeling or ethical aesthetic. The strategy for the resuscitation of feeling in music will have to be a change in the way we receive it, indeed, learning to use vision in this creative way in first place. Encouraging music through the mobility, the fluidity of image-consciousness can only liberate the moral element in it so that it can do its work. Image-making is a free, uncoerced, selfless giving of one’s conscience to the world, to music, to Logos.

The urgent question as I see it is whether we continue to take the mechanistic path, which seems to colour much current thought, and see neural organs and function purely in physiological terms, or whether we attribute to them from out of the deepest regions of our
conscience a complementary entelechical significance alongside the physical. The latter involves a *metanoia*, a turn-around, an inverse perspective (Sardello 1992).

How is the original knowable? Only in the deepest attention, in listening to the heart’s response, which is a question of choice, of free will. The sort of listening I mean stretches the one who listens, imparting selflessness, patience and expectancy, which are the conditions for true perception. The heart listens, and this leads to uprightness, not just in the physical, but also in the ethical sense.

To adopt Sardello’s initiative (1992, 1995), this is training of a different sort. I am convinced that to school oneself to truly listen to the utterance of another person *and* to the truth of one’s own response is to become a virtuoso in the art of humanness.

This picture itself is an appeal to the imagination. Surely, without it, we can only have, at best, a pale and washed-out concept of what it means to be human. Barfield, again, goes to the heart of things in writing: “Knowledge without imagination is not knowledge at all, but only a kind of cataloguing.” and “knowledge without love cannot be knowledge with imagination” (1983:9).

I can best conclude this chapter by reaffirming the conviction that to continue to practice and educate in a careless way without the orientation that only an epistemology of *utterance* can provide, is in effect, to not educate musically at all, but to educate against musicality *and* humanness.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

MUSICAL COGNITION AS A MODEL OF THE HISTORICAL MIND

Introduction

At this stage I want to summarise the main points made in the previous two chapters by couching them in a broad discussion of the content of this chapter, and then state my specific aims.

Interim Summary

It is indeed puzzling that although we make coherent sound, whether speech or tone-forms, many times daily, most have little or no understanding at all about how it is achieved. As I have stated frequently, knowledge by omission cannot be knowing, because it is not correlative to awareness. If consciousness is historical, however, (and I am aware that the reader may not yet be convinced of this) I think there is merit in the notion that there is an ever stronger impulse for mind to assist in its own evolution. Is it at all reasonable, then, to accept our ignorance as a fait accompli, to accept that non-participation in our own utterance is as permanent as it is inevitable?

I believe this state of unawareness, since its transformation is dependent on discovering what the Logos principle is, and thereby, what human being is, lies behind one of the central issues of our times: the conflict between an image of the human being as essentially and irrevocably nihilistic, that is, self-centred and exploitative, and the ecopsychological ideal, one might say, of a non-anthropocentric universe.

The conflict arises only because these views are seen as irreconcilable opposites. I argue, on the contrary, that both are correct because both are necessary if the notion of historical consciousness - in the sense of a move towards freedom - is admitted into the equation. They have teleological significance.
Historically, the conflict occurs only when self-consciousness or individuation, and thereby, the subject-object perspective become reality. Accordingly, I have submitted that earlier civilisations were conscious of the provenance of humanly-generated utterance and that they were participants in the nascence of their own song and speech insofar as they could hear and see, more or less, by means of supersensible vision, the Logos. For them, song and speech were a sublunary reflection of what goes on in higher realms in the form of movement. This participation was available to them just because they were not individuated in the sense in which we understand the term. For this reason, they could not, of their own volition, sing and speak. The cost, for us, of attainment of individuation, and thus, freedom of action, is precisely the loss of awareness of that (superconscious) intervention.

I will explain in this chapter something of this progression in the history of music itself, where there is evidence that the feeling element in the experience of intervals becomes progressively more personalised (or perhaps less cognitive) up to the nineteenth century, and where the division of a unison into an increasing number of parts suggests fragmentation of a unity of consciousness into a plurality of fully incarnated consciousnesses. Significantly, in this progression may also be witnessed a transformation of the sacred into the secular.

It will become apparent that this progression culminates in the twentieth century in a highly personalised musical language in which can be seen for the first time a diversity of compositional styles, a fragmentation of the nature of a creativity crisis that originates in an unresolved confusion as to the syntax of composition; for example, minimalism versus complexity, neoclassicism versus serialism. It will be noticed that, whereas previously, major works conform to predictable schemas, compositions now are often unique one-of-a-kind events with their own expressive language, understanding of which is acquired only after repeated hearings.

Given these developments, my experience as a conductor suggests that there is, not only in the popular mind, but also among professional musicians, a degree of resistance to latter twentieth-century musical syntax, or rather, a natural inclination towards the tonality of earlier periods. One could argue that it takes time for the ear to ‘catch-up,’ as it were, to innovations in compositional technique, as if there is some sort of law of diminishing returns at work.
Alternatively, however, one can view those innovations as a symptom of the culmination of a stage in the progression of consciousness from superindividual to individual, from expansive to contracted. The latter is the way I view it. The wider always accommodates the narrower, and not the other way around. History, like time itself, is irreversible, and so this musical evolution is not by any means complete.

Seeing music history this way lends credibility to the proposition I made at the conclusion of Chapter Ten, namely, that historical consciousness shows definite signs of a recovery of meaning of the sort known by the Greek civilisation, but that this goal will be attained only by a civilisation that takes conscious steps to participate in its own phenomena. By venturing deeply into the parts, tone and interval, in feeling, one can attain a picture of the whole progression. (I will reserve the details of that picture for the denouement.)

If my insistence on historical consciousness has any merit at all, the implication for the present is that we are, not by accident, but by definition, excluded from our own representations, that is, the totality of the phenomena. The task remaining is to become participants in the transition from potential (that which is hidden to us) to phenomenal (that which is not) existence, if being "is potential existence" and "existence actualises being" (Barfield 1988:88). This is not, Barfield emphasises, a transition from non-being to being. What is certain is that we cannot approach this polarity, if we wish to understand it, from the standpoint of our own representations. Something more vital than sense-perception and the onlooker consciousness are needed for the apprehension of potential existence. It is the metanoia I discussed in the previous chapter.

It is the function of being to be known and, accordingly, the function of human being to know. The life of a person has no meaning at all aside from the act of knowing, for the human being is a knowing being. I think a person ceases to feel the 'pain of vacancy' or the absence of meaning only when (s)he understands this, and begins to strive consciously for that which (s)he previously applied unconsciously. I refer, of course, to knowing that serves more than utilitarian ends.
Whether or not the reader will regard my thesis as mere conjecture, the part of the human organism most intimately connected with the soul, or mind, or whatever word we may choose to label inwardness, and by which the organism is empowered to make known its innermost nature, is the larynx.

I will try to put this another way. One cannot be an invisible singer or speaker. What one externalises is an expression of one's particularity, which is at the same time of a universal nature. One's inwardness, then, is not exclusive. Subjectivity, as I have sought to demonstrate, does not in the least imply non-objectivity. Thinkers such as Goethe, Heidegger, and more recently, Hillman and Sardello, together with a host of poets, have relocated soul from the self into the world. My project is not about becoming a non-self by transcending ego. It is rather a question of transforming ego into 'I.' We all disclose 'I'-ness in our every utterance, but we are not aware of it. That is why the social abuse of the word and tone, whether it be political, cultural, educational, legal or corporate, is at the same time abuse of a person's spiritual - meaning neither subjective nor objective - disposition, one which I suspect many in the current age feel as an assault on their sensibilities without understanding the reason for it.

**Aims of the Present Chapter**

With these thoughts in view, I will define the aims of this chapter. I want to stipulate in advance, however, that what I will discuss here is an outcome of my curricula work, namely, hearkening. Hearkening is that particular focus of inner listening that involves entering the experience of the single phenomenon, especially the interval, then externalising the experience of feeling by way of gesture. Hearkening gives perspective on temporal events as they are happening. If hearkening is practiced, it restores cognitive feeling, the transcendent aspect of the feeling element in intentionality.

Hearkening enabled me, for example, to discuss in Chapter Nine how we recognise the music of the past. I suggested that we achieve this because we retain the experience of the past in some way. I mentioned that Pythagoras' discovery was the discovery of a kosmos, a moving system perfect in its arrangement. This cosmic and musical system has come down to
us, as it were, by stages in human experience. In purely experiential terms it has evolved, but every stage of that evolution is available to us now each time we are exposed to the elements of the tonal system. The problem, as I said, is that we are unaware of it. I explained this by way of the paradox that the distant past is unremembered but not forgotten. In other words, the experience of the past is available to us in some way other than short-term memory. I have referred to this retention also as a kind of unconscious consciousness. That we are able to draw on the past in this way without experiencing it as history is due, in part, as I discussed subsequently, to music not evoking a sense of place, which is to say, by way of the spatial dimension. We do not see it. It is experienced, rather, as a weightless space, or timelessness. This problem I find profoundly bewildering; for it implies that the absence of spatial perspective enables a kind of long-term recall of noetic events even though they have been unremembered.

In any event, it seems certain to me that how we recognise the music of the past is due to the evolution of the structure of the mind. (Again it must be emphasised that by evolution I do not mean a before-after sequence of events, but the sense in which a present state or condition has metamorphosed out of a previous condition and which gives to both their meaning. Musical cognition, I think, functions in precisely that way.)

Given the absence of awareness of the 'unremembering' I have just discussed, it seems reasonable to argue that musical consciousness may not be immune to those features of historical consciousness I explicated in Chapter Nine, namely, the gradual onset of spatial depth in the total field of perception, the domination of cognition by vision that grew out of the spatialisation of the alphabet, the development of linear logic, and together with all this, the genesis of the self-conscious ego. How these features have evolved, then, as they pertain to the history of music and the development of musicality in the individual, is the focus of this chapter.

To reiterate my rationale, consciousness, the ground of thinking in the progress of human life, evolves. Because thinking has changed, bringing about marked changes in the progress of consciousness, it is given to thinking to know its own ground: consciousness. To put this
another way, the fluidity (*non*-fixedness) and universal validity of thinking are the very means and condition of observing itself.

**Music as a Model of Historical Consciousness**

I mentioned that, perhaps more than any other human phenomenon, music illustrates historical consciousness. (In accordance with my frame of reference in Chapter One, I mean this only in its application to the history of art-music in the Western world.) Even a cursory glance at the historical progression from Gregorian chant, through tenth century *organum*, the horizontal polyphony of the Baroque, the vertical homophony of Beethoven, to twentieth century serial technique and beyond, reveals a history of mind to be found nowhere else with the same immediacy of recognition. This is because music, as I have asserted, has no association with the physical world or with spatial perspective, and rather, shows its changes most strikingly in linear time. In that it is diachronic, music is *one*-dimensional. It is perceived in a *line* of time, and in that way the consciousness operative in its identification differs markedly from the spatial extension characteristic of visual perception. Notated musical systems conveniently allow us to *see* that progression, even when the corresponding performances are not available to us.

If this progression is entered more deeply by hearkening, two features will be detected which, in my opinion, evidence quite radical changes in *musical* consciousness, and which raise a cluster of questions that may not previously have been considered worthy of sustained attention. The first concerns the accumulation over time of additional parts or voices, beginning with the *monody* (unison) of Gregorian Chant, proceeding through the *diophony* (two voices) of organum and the *polyphony* (many voices) of Bach, to the *homophony* (chordal progression - harmony) of the so-called Classical and Romantic periods. In other words, there is evidence over time of the *division* (by addition) of a perceived unity (unison) into a successively greater number of parts, demonstrating the steady consolidation of a form of consciousness predisposed to individuation.

The second feature, manifesting in parallel with the first, is what I call a *shrinking interval* of experience. Manuscripts from the time show that in medieval *organum*
(approximately the tenth to the fourteenth centuries) the participants sang in parallel 4\textsuperscript{th}s and 5\textsuperscript{th}s. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} was largely unknown because it was not at this time a felt experience in the emotional sense (Steiner 1925, 1932, 1987 and von Lange 1992), suggesting that consciousness was not yet in toto consciousness of self. Rather, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} was considered dissonant, even harmful, while the 4\textsuperscript{th}, 5\textsuperscript{th} and octave were considered perfect because they were pure and undistorted by any element of personal feeling. Today, however, these intervals by comparison with the 3\textsuperscript{rd}s are felt by the majority to be almost colourless, empty or somehow more ‘objective’ whereas the major and minor 3\textsuperscript{rd}s are the determining intervals of our musical experience.\textsuperscript{22} These intervals are heartfelt, that is, experienced in the body; the listener is conscious of him/herself responding to the stimulus. It is in the arrival of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} as the primary interval in human experience that we see the individuality of the composer emerging. Personal experience is in a sense consolidated by the advent of the 3\textsuperscript{rd}. There is every reason to suggest that the ‘perfect’ intervals, the 4\textsuperscript{th} and 5\textsuperscript{th}, took the same role in the evocation of mood in medieval consciousness as the 3\textsuperscript{rd} does for today’s consciousness. This is not to infer, however, that the medieval experience was identical with ours. To jump to this conclusion would be practising logomorphism. What it does infer is that soul life then and now are different.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, when Debussy and Ravel enter the picture after the consolidation of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} as the primary interval of experience, the major 2\textsuperscript{nd}, felt at the time as dissonant, begins its journey in human consciousness towards a consonant status (harmonically as a superimposed 9\textsuperscript{th}). In other words, the experiential evolution of the intervals may be seen as a gradual and historically inevitable broadening of the definition of consonance. This progression as a whole reveals a gradual experiential contraction of the space between the tones (recall the homogenisation of temporal and spatial distances I discussed in Chapter Four) corresponding with a parallel centripetal contraction, to a point, of

\textsuperscript{22} The connection of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} with the chordal progression of functional harmony mentioned in the previous paragraph is significant in another respect. Chords (what is known in eighteenth century harmony as triads) are built up of superimposed 3rds. As I discussed previously, this verticalisation of a linear (melodic) movement is historically significant. What was previously heard in time has become an object in space. In that the melody becomes a harmony, a vertical structure, it no longer contains time. The horizontal melody has, as it were, taken on a body, become a spatial object.
the consciousness involved.\textsuperscript{23} Bear in mind that what is perceived is something occurring in the mind.

Although history ascribes the responsibility for this continuous transformation to a handful of composers in each case, it is worth noting that the composers concerned entered civilisation at the end-point and not the beginning of each epoch. The epochs overlap. I am suggesting, not only that these composers were, in a sense, instruments of musical consciousness as it evolves, but that there is a wisdom in music itself far greater than we, its vessels. So great, that in spite of the hardening and contracting of consciousness I have posited, music is still able to uncover something of its, and our own, ontology. As Nietzsche points out, however: “To understand the picture one must divine the painter” (1997:141). He does not mean the composer, but music itself.

Significantly, then, humanity has not superannuated its musical past. While theories of the physical world are discarded and forgotten - at least for all practical (applied) purposes - as they are replaced by new ones, this is not the case with music. Gregorian chant (the horizontal unison) continues to be popular. For me, at least, the continued interest in the philosophy of the Greeks for illumination of the mystery of utterance is by no means misplaced. Storr suggests that it would be folly to discount ancient opinion:

The great music of the past is great today. Bach’s Mass in B Minor has not been displaced by Beethoven’s Missa Solemnis. Bartok’s quartets have not supplanted those of Beethoven. Modern masterpieces of music enlarge our sensibilities; but they do not surpass or replace those masterpieces which have preceded them. The views of Plato and Aristotle on music ... are not outdated. They are not like theories about the physical world which can be proved or disproved. They are as worthy of critical appraisal as they were when they were first formulated (1992:45).

\textsuperscript{23} Barfield has charted this contraction and its consequences for cognition through the examination of the evolution of words. He writes: “The elimination of original participation involves a contraction of human consciousness from periphery to centre - a contraction from the cosmos of wisdom to something like a purely brain activity - but by the same token it involves an awakening. For we awake out of universal - into self-consciousness” (1988:182). Just how wide were the distances between tones for pre-historic consciousness I will not speculate on here. I will say, however, that if the intervals of our experience have evolved precisely in accordance with a consciousness now contracted in the body, it is reasonable to assume that the intervals of their experience would have been greater than the octave. It should be borne in mind that music prior to this contraction would not yet have been an executory or personal art, in actuality, not an art at all.
Compare, though, this statement with another by Pierre Boulez, arguably the most influential composer-performer of the latter half of the twentieth century:

I believe that a civilisation which tends towards conservatism is a declining civilisation because it is afraid to go forward and ascribes more importance to its memories than its future. Strong, expanding civilisations have no memory; they reject, they forget the past. They feel strong enough to be destructive because they know they can replace what has been destroyed. From this viewpoint our musical civilisation shows distinct signs of decay (1976:31).

Perhaps Boulez unintentionally overstates his case. I am inclined to the view that the ‘decay’ - if indeed it is that - of musical civilisation he contends ought not to be attributed to the nostalgic retention and enshrinement of a predominantly tonal repertoire spanning the period approximately 1700 to 1900, but to the inability of the unconscious human will bent on progress to divine the infinite in the finite, the unchanging in change, what I call the essential ‘gesture’ of a musical work, whatever period or piece we may be talking about. Much of the music after this period is described in Attali’s words as, lacking a “criterion of truth” (1985:112). The ‘criterion’ to which he refers is the hierarchy of intervallic relations germane to (Pythagorean) tonality, which twentieth-century composers in the search for a new and individual musical voice abandoned in favour of atonality, serialism and beyond.24 In the case of serialism, the semitone becomes the primary unit of measurement. It is, however, an abstraction resulting from acoustic evaluation, and not a felt measurement. The qualitative ethos of the intervals which, recall, is a relation of the many co-existing in the ONE, is supplanted by something more of the nature of intellectualism.25 The thinking element of intentionality is ascendant.

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24 Although phenomenological research has been conducted by Godwin (1989), Ruland (1992), von Lange (1992) and Stiener (1987), there has been, as far as I am aware, only one attempt in psychology (Smith and Williams (1999) to examine responses to the qualities of isolated intervals, distinguished from intervals subsumed in the context of a whole melody or musical work. In this project, untrained listeners of diverse cultural background were shown to respond uniformly to individual intervals, a consistency of response suggesting that perception of musical meaning is universal rather than idiosyncratic. The researchers report that, “... there is the possibility of... cognition in response to music even at a very young age, and certainly before the musical associations of one’s culture are taught” (1999:385).

25 I wish to explain at this point that I am not opposed in principle to twentieth century composition practices. My aim here is to place those developments in an historical context so that my commentary on, and wider discourse about, them may lead to the emergence of meaning about how and why they evolved.
The decay of which Boulez speaks consists, I think, in the ‘forgetfulness of existence,’ in the utilitarian abuse of music, whether it be for the purpose of feeling something that is not present in everyday experience or for the purpose of reinforcing abstract ideals. We are fortunate, I think, that the cumulative rather than contingent feature of music bespeaks a ready temporal blueprint for the observation of mind and its historical transformations. As I have already stated, the cumulative past lives on in our very cognitive processes, which is why it can be retrieved.

When all is said, we continue to perform and enjoy music that is over 300 years old, and in the case of Gregorian chant, much older. Music, then, although it exhibits in its syntax an historical development parallel to that of visual art, namely, the evolution of perspectival (from participatory to representational) consciousness, nevertheless retains by virtue of its diachronic rather than spatial nature something of a participating consciousness. I do not claim that it is entirely free of the spatial perspective. On the contrary, it is because that perspective is ‘normal’ when one is not, as it were, in the musical frame of mind, and also because there is no awareness of the difference, that thinking about music and curriculum have taken a positivist path. As I discussed in Chapter Eight, in the absence of this awareness, the productive void becomes a plenum.26

Despite all attempts of modern musical thought to pass off the older repertoire as anachronistic, the latter has not been supplanted by the new complexity, but accommodates it, however gradually. It does so in contradiction of the usual view of history, which, according to Barfield, is “…the habit of looking on the past as a sort of seed, of which the present is the transformation or fruit,” a way of thinking which, significantly, “is hardly more than two or three centuries old” (1967b:15). The genesis of that view in the seventeenth century, coinciding with the period of music I have been discussing, occurred in conjunction with a further change in the approach to the past, namely, “the abandonment of the medieval and

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26 Recall that perspective takes the place of participation when space is perceived as empty, that what we call space is “homogeneous with our own thinking” (Barfield 1963:143). The Greeks had no word for space. Space was the place occupied by a thing, and the thing is an image on a particular spot of the whole world. Where the human form is an actual pictured microcosm of the reality of the macrocosm, there is no need for space. In other words, more than the physical body is seen. The world of solid bodies is not yet the norm, and so there is no need for harmony as we know it.
classical [Greek] conviction that the history of mankind as a whole was a process of degeneration and the substitution therefore of the conviction that the history of man is one of progress” (1967b:16). As I have asserted, history is not a before-after progression. This notion of sequence arose with perspective and the spatialisation of the alphabet.

In *Timaeus*, Plato speaks of time as “the moving image of eternity” (1977:51). In the midst of temporal change, is there a constant that is unchanging? I have argued that such, indeed, is the case; that there is a timeless origin for all musical (because temporal) phenomena, and moreover, that current consciousness, in spite of the reversal of thought of which I have just spoken, still retains in some sense the capacity, albeit out of awareness, to synchronise itself with that timelessness. Take, for example, the following comment by Gregory Bateson in conversation with Daniel Goleman:

With the exception of music, we have been trained to think of patterns as fixed affairs. The truth is that the right way to begin to think about the pattern which connects is as a dance of interacting parts, secondarily pegged down by various sorts of physical limits and by habits, and by the naming of states and component entities (1998:7).

Science today would not, I suspect, find anything to dispute in Bateson’s claim; but notice the ‘exception’ of music in this statement as a sort of *unfixed* template, suggesting, as I discussed in Chapter Eight, that there is a pattern or order in the universe that is of the nature of mind itself, an eternal element that, although manifesting in time, is paradoxically beyond temporal succession, allowing us to make the music of the distant past experienceable and present for us now.

I use ‘paradox’ here in order to highlight the puzzle of music as an art of time and, simultaneously, timelessness. I think the distinction is an intellectual one. Experientially it is non-existent. A consciousness that habitually dualises, divides ONE into two cannot help seeing things always as dichotomous. But if pattern is not a fixed affair, if eternity moves, then it is clear that change and constancy are not dual, but polar, opposites. Change is constancy, and constancy is change, in musical terms at least. Thinking, which, in itself is mobile, is the constant (Steiner 1992); it is just that consciousness is not aware of itself.
Nevertheless, the confusion embedded in this polarity throws up a cluster of questions. Does the particular state of consciousness that for want of a better word can be called ‘musical’ resolve its own paradox? If so, would not the listener then be a *non*-perspectival consciousness? Would this not mean that such a consciousness is unsituated? Would we not, then, have every reason to suppose that it is not ‘fleshy,’ not ensconced permanently in the body?

I will not endeavour to answer these questions directly here. Although I do not for a moment underestimate their difficulty, I raise them only to reiterate at this point that this *unsituatedness* is the complicating but generally unseen factor in the subject-object relation as it pertains to musical consciousness. As I discussed in Chapter Ten, we are so used to thinking of mind as a definite ‘something’ lodged in a (biologically-evolved) body that it is difficult for us to imagine life or intelligence without that location and corporeality.

I will reserve elaboration of the unsituatedness of mind for the *denouement*. I have raised the issue here only in order to establish that, in the historical progression of music itself there is a clue which, if traced to its source, will reveal that musical consciousness was, and to some degree, still is, different from ordinary states of awareness, that in the case of music and perhaps no other, there is a form of consciousness that endures beyond temporal change, and that it is possible by employing the imaginal cognition I envisage to know that state. Given the will to try, the meaning of music inherent in its progression as mind is accessible, not to logomorphism, but only to the active imagination of the listener, who will *re-vision* on the basis of the perceptual given, the mind of the medieval listener, the Greek listener, and perhaps even the mind of the individual who uttered the first tone. (My emphasis on ‘vision’ will become significant below.)

Again, I must reiterate the distinction between an art that is distinguished by its horizontal connectedness, or the ‘pattern which connects’ in Bateson’s words, an art whose ontology and mode of operation have no connection whatever with the physical world or with spatial extension, the usual means by which knowledge of the world is acquired, and the verbal and pictorial communication of the latter. Why, then, am I insisting on the pictorial as a way of knowing that ontology and that mode of operation?
In order to engage this seeming contradiction, I must forge a deeper path into the question of musical consciousness, and in this way establish what can be known about the act of musical utterance by means of speculative observation. In this way I hope to clear the way for the proposal that image-making can raise the content of musical consciousness to epistemic awareness. The polarity of the temporal and the constant points, I think, to just that developmental opportunity.

Preconscious Knowledge is Superconscious

I have already pointed out that a musical phenomenon cannot evolve from nowhere or from no-thing. It must have a source. What is certain is that knowledge of that source is not available to sense-perception, and therefore, to empirical method. To what agency, then, is it available?

I argue that the division of consciousness into a conscious and an unconscious is an artificial fragmentation, an operation characteristic of dualism. Consciousness could more properly be regarded as a field or, in Wilber’s (1993) words, ‘a spectrum,’ meaning one entity active on more than one level, a sort of hierarchy of consciousness. Wilber’s rationale is that “different modes of knowing correspond to different levels of consciousness ...” (1993:40).

If what is meant by ‘the unconscious’ is only one level of the spectrum of consciousness, a level hidden to itself, it is reasonable to argue that there are pre-conscious processes that “precede our everyday reflective consciousness and from which this reflective (mirror-) consciousness arises” (Kühlewind 1985:11). Nor is there any reason, unless it be the hiddenness to which I have referred, to relegate those processes to a spurious and unknown sub-conscious. If they are to be made available to awareness, their content would mean approaching them from a level that does not correspond to their unconscious status, but from a different mode of knowing, a higher realm: a superconscious. Formative dynamics, since they are sense-free, are perceptible only by their own kind; or, as Wilber puts it conversely: “... the error of dualism forms the root of intellection and is therefore next to impossible to uproot by intellection ...” (1993:19).
The distinction I made above between (un)consciousness and awareness suggests to me that consciousness is manifold. This is so clearly at odds with the popular view that it is almost gratuitous to state it. Yet, there is no firm evidence to discount the notion of a non-individualised principle becoming an individual one resident in every human being; a mobile formlessness contracting over time to a sort of requary, the individual consciousness, whose sole biographical purpose is to serve, by way of evolving beyond its current dual state, that broader consciousness.²⁷ (If visual awareness goes with the eye, tactile awareness with the skin, aural awareness with the ear, with what sense does extra-sensory awareness correspond?) The features in the history of music I isolated above seem to confirm that teleology and direction.²⁸

Further evidence of a contraction of consciousness, or, individuation, is observable in the metaphor, or rather, conventional cliché, of the ‘creative artist,’ which has entered language only very recently, where it connotes a psychology of individual genius. Barfield points out that the genius was originally a “spirit-being, other than the poet himself...” (1967b:78). He continues: “The Romans (for it is a Latin word) would never have said of a man that he is a genius. They would have said that he had, or was accompanied or inspired by, a genius. We prefer to say that he is one” (1967b:78). (I discussed this in the previous chapter in connection with the genesis of nihilism.)

This psychology of revelation (Barfield’s term is ‘inspiration’) was functional up until the seventeenth century. “It is the doctrine of mania, or divine madness - of enthousiasmus - of possession by a God or by the Muses - and then of possession by a godling, whom the

²⁷ Kühlewind describes the superconscious as follows: “Insofar as the cognitive capacities of everyday consciousness stem from a ‘more understanding’ element normally attainable by consciousness only as a limit experience, this element can be called the [superconscious]” (1990:19). Ordinary consciousness is an individualised replica of the superconscious. “The [superconscious] is form-free, and is cognitive for this very reason, the possibility of all forms...” (1990:19).
²⁸ One can get some idea of this ‘birth’ of consciousness as it is expressed in the so-called Romance languages, where words that “... have to do with thinking processes are identical with words in the realm of gynaecology. For instance, the Italian words for world conception are usually concezione del mondo, which means conception by the being of the world” (Betti 1994:88), that is to say, impregnation by a superconscious that must become individuated.
particular poet refers to as *his* Muse; but in any case possession by some spirit other than the poet’s own individual ego” (1967b:77).  

Neither would a psychology of individual genius have made any sense to Plato for whom a work of art was a mere imitation of nature. But in his view nature herself is already an imperfect imitation of an enduring reality. For Plato, then, the artwork is a copy of a copy, a *simulacrum*. Frow describes the *simulacrum*: “Violating an ethics of imitation, its untruth is defined by its distance from the original and by its exposure of the scandal that an imitation can in its turn function as a reality to be copied (and so on endlessly)” (1997:68). As I pointed out in Chapter Eight, to lose sight of this original referent was for Plato a loss tantamount to a descent into amorality. Indeed, Plato’s original, I fear, now falls to some extent on deaf ears.

The point I wish to make here is that in the period between Plato and the advent of modern science around 300 years ago, in historical terms a very short span of time indeed, can be witnessed a progression from an unbounded, expansive notion of consciousness as the creative stimulus, down to “its possibly arrogant notion of creation as the artist’s true function” (Barfield 1967b:75). Barfield later expresses this progression as, “retrospect through a comparatively recent past, which has been characterised by self-conscious activity of the subject over against the object - into a very much longer preceding one, which was characterised by relative passivity of the subject over against its object” (1967b:93). In other words, in this period of time, there has taken place a radical (and accelerating) inversion of the subject-object relation, in which both entities undergo a change of character.

The notion of consciousness as expansive and undifferentiated contracting over time into individual centres of consciousness - thereby contradicting the prevailing belief of modern science that matter is the ultimate ground from which *life* gradually emerged - is echoed by so many poets that the choice is overwhelming. John Dryden, in *St. Cecilia’s Day*, for example, shows that progression very cogently. Note that the appropriation of a universal harmony, a cosmic vastness, by individuals, is one of closure, in the sense of an ineffable cosmic frame being reduced, by human appropriation, to a workable model (diapason meaning range, scope

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29 I should point out that the doctrine of an accompanying genius is by no means obsolete. Depth psychologist, James Hillman (1996), for example, submits a compelling argument in its favour.
or compass of voice or system), and in the other sense of that reduction being a narrowing of focus:

From harmony, from heavenly harmony
This universal frame began:
From harmony to harmony
Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
The diapason closing full in Man.

To a literal mind, Dryden’s verse may seem nothing more than medieval daydreaming. I submit, however, that if all ancient cosmologies, including those of the Greeks and the thinkers of the Middle Ages, spoke about music in terms of a divine or cosmic measure, source, or power,30 not only is there every reason to believe that their consciousness was markedly different from ours, but that, in the intervening period, this cosmic experience has contracted or shrunk or receded into pre-conscious knowledge, and thus, has become knowledge concealed to itself, or, if I may say, knowledge by omission. In the terms of a Logos epistemology, this is how I see it. In any case, there is certainly no evidence to doubt that their experience was real enough, even if their descriptions of it are redolent of childlike nostalgia to us.

The contemporary problem for education as I see it is that, in contradistinction to much earlier expansive states, most conventional psychological theory does not acknowledge states of consciousness on the spectrum that are usually described as transpersonal. In concentrating its efforts on understanding those faculties associated with the self, (which seems always to imply a consciousness located in a body), other faculties which might be active beyond the self, beyond specific location, are generally excluded from research endeavour, and by implication, from education. Rather, education is predisposed to educating ‘ordinary’ states of consciousness, and is reluctant to embrace anything outside what it regards as ‘normal.’31 It

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30 Although I have chosen in this thesis not to draw comparisons with non-Western cultures, I am compelled to record that references to the beginning of the universe as attributable to a conscious entity, and moreover, a musical or sonic one, are, in addition to the Judeo-Christian Bible, to be found in the equivalent holy texts of Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and almost all pre-Christian and primitive belief systems.

31 See, for example, Neville (1992) for an extensive critique of that reluctance in the design and delivery of prescribed curriculum.
follows, I think, that where there are no points of reference beyond the self, the only responsibility can be to oneself, and to the satisfaction of one's own desires and wants. As long as mind remains a prisoner of the individual body, the world is seen to have no inside, no mind of its own. This is indeed the central assumption of positivism.

*The Superconscious Allows for an Inverse Perspective*

I made the point in Chapter One but will reiterate here my conviction that although history, particularly the history of art and music, evidences the development of cognitive faculties as if by a process of natural progression, that is, without any human assistance or intervention, there are as-yet-untapped cognitive faculties which it is in our power to uncover. If music embodies a universal truth, albeit veiled to ordinary cognition, and if, as I have asserted, there are signs that the time has come for humanity to take conscious control of its own cognitive destiny by not merely believing in, but by knowing that truth, is it not fatuous to prolong the deception that we can manipulate musical phenomena without in any way being conscious participants in their appearance? I am calling for a Platonic re-souling of music by shifting the focus of attention from the 'creative artist' to the being of music itself: the *Logos*.

I do not make this call on the grounds of spurious conjecture, but on observation of the way music behaves, and on the way humans behave when in the presence of music. Clearly, the experience of hearing (when one is attending to it) comprises more than the sensation of sound. The plastic artists, the sculptor, painter, designer and architect, all place their picture-inspired creations in the world in physical forms, forms that have taken on spatial permanence. They are, in a sense, preserved as semblance. However, I reiterate that music, on the contrary, must be re-created anew each time. In other words, the human agency that performs, the entity that has knowledge of forming, must enter repeatedly, through the temporal constituents of melody, harmony and rhythm, into a sensible embodiment out of a supersensible beginning.

I am aware that to make such a claim today is to invite suspicion. Why, when music itself speaks of that superconscious source? I reiterate that I see it as the *revelation* of the supersensible in the sensible. The distinction is crucial, for if we embrace without question the recent cult of the (ego-centric) creative artist, that is, the subject-object relation characterised
by self-conscious activity of the subject over against the object, and furthermore, accept that it has always been this way, then we must, by definition, accept that the singer is now, and has always been, the originator of the sounds (s)he produces, and that this is all there is to it. Consciousness has forever been the same wilful kind it now is. The singer, whose consciousness presumably is some sort of sophisticated storage facility of pre-learned sounds, is always, as it were, on the way towards the creation of those sounds.

What is actually involved? In song, the air is sculpted. The intoned vowels are gestures in the fluid stream of breath. What is the nature of these air-gestures? What is brought to expression in them? Even to pose such questions, or rather, to make the observation that prompted them, already takes the attention some distance from the literalist notion of the singer as originator. To attend to the questions without assumptions leads at least to the possibility that what underlies the capacity for sculpting the air in this way has its origins in the innermost realm of the human being. I can take it further and say that this capacity does not take its start in the physical organisation, the brain, but elsewhere. It is true that I am an intentional being always disposed to making the other appear. It is also true that I can transcend the immanent function of intentionality and the physical senses. This suggests that there is more to a person than pre-determined ways of behaving. One can gain a certain mastery over one’s habits of knowing. Although it is true that the gestures I mentioned just now find their sounding in the physical element of air, they are still (universal) gestures when not so air-bound.

For me, this says something about the human being that is not bound-up with physiology, namely, the longing, by way of the gesture of song, to stretch outward from the physical realm into the non-physical realm.\(^{32}\) Although sense-perceptible utterance proceeds outward for the purposes of expression and communication, the capacity for utterance streams into the physical organisation of the human being. I mean that there is something of a supersensible nature that finds application in the sensible physical realm. Song is in actuality a surpassing of that part of the human being determined by physical circumstances and conditions. In this sense, singing has nothing to do with earthly conditions.

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\(^{32}\) This line from Keats’ poem, *The Eve of St. Agnes*, gives some indication of the optimal intensity of the longing: “The music, yearning like a God in pain.”

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In view of these observations, then, I find the belief that the singer is the *originator* of the song untenable. I subscribe to another explanation altogether: that the ‘song’ is already there, on the way to the singer, and that (s)he simply makes the final selection. I say ‘simply’ because, as I have explained, the act is achieved without conscious thought or reflection of any sort.³³

In committing myself to this view I am acutely aware of infringing a contemporary ‘taboo,’ as Barfield calls it. It goes something like this: Inwardness, subjectivity, whatever it might denote presently, “is not merely associated with, but is always the product of a stimulated organism” (1967b:104). Moreover, “the ‘public’ world (which is what we have in common with others) consists entirely of what we perceive and the private world of each consists of what he thinks” (1967b:104).

This classic sensationalist doctrine is firmly entrenched in the popular mind. Barfield challenges it by stating that, “on a strictly distributive analysis of the complex blend of thought and perceptions which constitutes what we normally experience as outside of and other than ourselves,” the opposite is the case. “It is the thought content which we share with others, while our percepts (so far as they are undetermined by any element of thought) are private to ourselves” (1967b:105).

If the reader will recall the simple exercise (s)he was invited to perform while reading Chapter Four, the thrust of Barfield’s argument will become clear. We can all think a tone before sounding it. As I discussed there, if the *concept or idea* of a tone is the same for all of us, regardless of its particularity *when sounded*, we cannot be the originators of it.³⁴ Or, as Ouspensky puts it: “We fail to understand that a particular thing is merely an artificial definition by our senses of some indefinable cause infinitely surpassing that thing” (1949:171).

Further, in opposition to the sensationalist belief that inwardness is the effect of external stimulation, it is essential to clarify the relation between knowing and doing, for it is a

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³⁴ If there were general agreement on this point, it would precipitate, to give one example, a challenge to that academic prerogative known as ‘intellectual property,’ for there could be no proprietorship on ideas. Who, today, would be content to relinquish ownership?
dialectical one. Producing a musical form is doing, a deed *initiated* - but not, I argue, originated - from within, which the abovementioned exercise also bears out. (Can the reader identify where, in the body, the tone originated?) As creative activity, it is moral doing, distinguished from instinctive or conditioned doing, and so is, regardless of unawareness, the very opposite of the sensationalist doctrine. The *organising idea*, tone, is not stimulated to appear in consciousness from without through the ear. It is already present in consciousness to begin with. In converting the idea into a deed by making the tone audible, I *perceptualise*, as it were, the idea. Howard explains: "What can be known first appears as percept which is completed [in thinking] by the concept; what is to be *done* first appears as concept which is then completed by the percept" (1985:50). So, "... in all deeds that rise above the instinctive and habitual, the knowing process is reversed" (1985:50). The supersensible concept or idea (not a *product* of any organism), in becoming deed, is placed in the realm of the sense-perceptible. "It becomes knowable as deed" (1985:50).

It is this very act that pre-historic humanity could not achieve; for percept and concept (perception and thinking) were one, as-yet-undivided, as they are for the modern infant.\(^{35}\) They did not sing. They *were* sung, un-self-consciously, and thus, unfreely. It is just because later consciousness, by virtue of perspective, was able to separate concept and percept, that the choice of what, how and when to sing became a reality, and together with it, the capacity for moral decision.

**The Pre-conscious is a Psychology of Revelation**

That we all draw on pre-conscious knowledge for our actions suggests a psychology of revelation (discussed in Chapter Six). In this section I will try to clarify the concept ‘revelation.’ The admission of pre-conscious knowledge actually says nothing about consciousness *or* knowledge except that there is something ‘given’ in our cognitive processes. It is really an admission that with respect to music’s beginnings we are ignorant, and therefore reticent. That is why pre-conscious knowledge can be regarded as knowledge by omission. Musical processes are inevitably explained away as *enthousiasmous*, or in current terminology,

\(^{35}\) This allusion to the correlation of early consciousness in the historical sense with early consciousness in the individual will be elaborated later in this chapter.
giftedness. As I noted previously, for a gift to be a gift, it has to be received, that is, acknowledged as a gift. Giving may be anonymous, but receiving is not.

I explained above that the executant is a passive participant in the conception of musical forms, and is conscious only of the produced forms. The distinction here is a Platonic one between the form-giving principle, idea or concept, and the audible form, a distinction that is rarely contemplated. The transcendent yet immanent idea is that which gives to the form its essence, its universal communicability. Is the tone a tone by virtue of the air that carries it? What of the tone I can hear in my airless interior as I write this sentence? What of the tones I hear in my dreams? The air is only the medium in which tone finds its physical expression as sound. The tone-form is present in all tones. The form is arrived at by means of an idea, which, as idea, can bring a universal, an archetype, to expression. The ear can only grasp particular examples of it. The sound of a tone is only one dimension of its being. The tone is an entelechy, literally divorced, in the individual consciousness, from its physical counterpart as sound. The ear is the organ in which the tone comes to manifestation. Without the ear, the idea, which in Schopenhauer's opinion, "... is the unity that has fallen into plurality by virtue of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension" (1966:234-235), would be present in essence, but its manifestation would not then be possible. To paraphrase Steiner: "...[sound] is not conditional upon the [ear], but the [ear] is the cause of its manifestation" (1988c:223).36 The audible phenomenon exists; the idea exists. But they exist differently. What we know as phenomena are manifestations of consciousness seen and/or heard from a spatio-diachronic perspective.

I have gone to the trouble to highlight once more this double distinction between physical and mental process and formative principle and actual form in order to emphasise that in musical cognition there is an unconscious kind of consciousness at work. We are

36 I posit, along Aristotellean lines, that the ear already is, actually, what the sound is potentially, that the ear is in this sense something of the nature of what it receives into itself. I do so on the basis of Aristotle's polarisation of mind and world into the verbs 'to do' and 'to suffer,' bearing in mind always that Aristotle was still capable of participating in some measure in his phenomena, and that the further we journey back in history, the more participatory do the words used to describe cognitive processes become. The ear, then, "'suffers' something unlike itself, but in doing so becomes like what it suffers. The actualisation of percept and of perception are one and the same thing" (Barfield 1988:100).
unconscious participants in our own musical representations. I call this unconscious participation *revelation*.

The problem with revelation is that it is quiescent, that is, not correlative to thinking. If it were, it would not be revelation I am talking about, but something more conscious. The executant is directed by 'given' knowledge. With revelation, I am "excluded from retracing or accompanying the stages which give rise to it" (Leber 1995:8). This exclusion can be seen most clearly in children. Keane explains:

> For the first year or so, the child engages in discovering sounds that he can make himself and the possibilities for transforming and repeating those sounds which appeal to him, discarding those which do not. *This activity does not differ in any important way from the basic process in which the composer writes music* (1982:326 my emphasis).

Keane is making the case for this pre-conscious improvisational play as *protomusical* activity. Already, the child possesses (given) knowledge of measure before symbolic references to it and before knowledge of any spatial juxtaposition of his/her body, that is, before any knowledge of self. Inches, centimetres, major 3rd, one and two, are not measure and number, but the words, the verbal symbols for measure and number. "The infant," Keane continues, "engages in musical activities long before it has acquired the symbolic means of storing information. Nevertheless, the infant has no difficulty in producing events of identical length or with the same number of subdivisions within an event" (1982:331).

The picture here is one of pre-conscious computation by the mind, without which there could not be any audible utterance at all. The measuring activity present in, and practised by, the infant, long before any instruction on symbolic identification and remembering of it, is verification of Leibnitz's observation that musical cognition is a veiled arithmetic exercise by the mind unaware of its own measuring. In other words, musical consciousness is a *psychology of revelation*.

Musical experience does not speak English. Protomusical activity is practised by the infant prior to the conceptual thought that matches a word with a representation. I am suggesting that in the development of *self*-consciousness *musical* knowledge precedes speech.
Keane cites Burton L. White, who remarks that the child of fourteen months to two years old "uses long collections of sounds arranged in sentence-like form, with inflections and emphases, but with no recognisable word meaning" (1982:325). Significantly, White then states: "I have no notion as to the significance of this gibberish" (1982:325).

I wish to proffer an explanation. According to Barfield (1967b) and Matthews (1994) the science of linguistics asserts that speech has its origins in 'root' concepts, short, single utterances that refer to or imitate nature. I do not subscribe to this view. Rather, only by equating the evolution of consciousness in humanity as a whole with the incarnation of consciousness in the individual of any epoch, does the 'gibberish' reveal its significance. Neither infantile consciousness - which is not yet a dualising self-consciousness - nor archaic consciousness is capable of grasping generalisations such as 'tree' or 'rock.' Neither is and was able to make such distinctions. "The assumption [of linguistic theory] ... that men had on their lips the roots and in their minds the meanings, very much as we have words and their meanings today, and then proceeded to 'apply' them to a varied selection of phenomena" (1988:120) is inconsistent, says Barfield, with the facts. "Among very primitive and otherwise almost wordless peoples very short words are exactly what we do not find" (1988:121). Rather, words "grow longer, not shorter, the nearer we get to the end of our backward journey towards the origin of speech" (1988:121). The 'length' suggests that the words were intoned, as they must be when consciousness and world have not become sufficiently polarised for consciousness, by way of memory, to make a distinction between one tree and another in order to arrive at the generic concept, 'tree.' These intonations were vowel-like, that is, fluid, susceptible of elongation, pure tone. The consonants, expressions of the physical world, were added only with increasing awareness of the solidity of matter, including the utterer's own body, and 'pictures,' when spatial depth stimulated identification by name of things as separate from the self. Language, then, unless it is metaphoric, is deeply dualistic. That I can speak coherently at all is due to a dual perspective; for language pictures for the utterer a dualised world.37

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37 It follows that our concepts are indeed limited by linguistic activity. The eternal NOW of Plato cannot be expressed in words because speech itself brings about dualism. Speech can only express is-ness, the already become.
It is just this phenomenon, the holophone, the “long rambling conglomeration of sound and meaning” (Barfield 1988:121) that can be observed in the utterance of the infant. Perhaps the closest we can get to a feeling for this is an exercise I am fond of doing with my classes. It involves ‘playing’ with the syllables, oo-loo-roo. Notice how ‘watery’ the l is, and how ‘airy’ the r is. Notice particularly how the lips move away from the teeth when uttering the thrice-occurring vowel u (oo) as if leading the body to point to some distant horizon. Compare it with the vowel a (ah) which seems to emerge from deep in the body. We may pause to wonder what vital and vivid picture emerged in the mind of the ancient Aborigine as this elemental word (Uluru) was uttered. The English equivalent denotes a mere physical object or the abstract concept for it, a label: Ayer’s Rock.

The infant constructs vocal sounds over the “natural ostinato” of breathing, the “antecedent-consequent relationship of inhalation followed by exhalation” (Keane 1982:325). This compositional activity that is not yet word, is practised by the infant left to his/her own devices, that is, without adult intervention. (S)he is immersed in, absorbed by, the act itself. Is the in-breath mere breathing, or is something more than air taken up in the act of inspiration? What intelligence prompts the sucking-in? Is it the potential existence of which I spoke above becoming actual existence on the out-breath? Does not Being need a location and an occasion to reveal itself?

The babbling of the infant and the holophone of primitive humanity are the antecedents of speech and thought; for both are possible only for a consciousness incapable of making a distinction between self and things. The holophone is an expression of a process not yet come to completion in a finished thing; it is process in action. Barfield writes: “The farther back we penetrate, the more indistinguishable would his [the primitive human being’s] acts and utterances become from processes taking place in what has since become ‘outer’ nature” (1988:123). Further: “Roots are the echo of nature herself sounding in man. Or rather, they are the echo of what once sounded and fashioned in both of them at the same time” (1988:123).

38 In using the word ‘play’ I do not have careless, occasional attention in mind. Rather, I mean the total immersion in, and intense interest exhibited by, the child when engaged in learning something new, that is to say, in the act of creation.
Significantly, Keane argues that protomusical activity is soon “overwhelmed by language development” (1982:326 my emphasis). In the infant and in primitive humanity I see an identical developmental process occurring. From the standpoint of consciousness, ontogenic development is directly correlative to phylogensis. I stated in Chapter Three that music denies or even erases the identity of the executant. In other words, musical activity occurs prior to the evolution of self-consciousness. I see the transition from protomusical activity to speech as the activity of consciousness struggling to find itself in the finite, to come to an individual focus. Thingness mandates us to name it in its division into a multiplicity of things, labelling which then obstructs our perception of those things in their thingness. This is at the same time a finding of oneself, becoming an ‘I’. The subject-object split has become a reality.

What is the cost? Steiner comments: “To the extent we are in the physical world, we develop antipathy against everything spiritual; thus, we reflect pre-natal, spiritual reality as an unconscious antipathy” (1996a:53).

Infants cannot say ‘I’ in reference to themselves until around the third year of life. Their utterance, prior to this event, then, cannot be a projection or expression of self. The early speaking-not-yet-speech is a speaking of the being of the thing itself, of music. Contrary to one of the major precepts of constructivism, (see for example, Fry and Willis 1989 and Guba and Lincoln 1990), I believe that human beings are not the creators of knowledge, but recipients. As I earlier pointed out, one cannot be an anonymous recipient and simultaneously a conscious recipient. In receivership, one must, in time, become an individual, an ‘I’. To go further and acknowledge the receiving consciously and therefore responsibly, would be an act of Grace (see Chapter Thirteen).

For the infant today knowing is as participatory (or non-perspectival) as it was for primitive humanity. However, it is knowing out of the nature of Being itself, and not knowledge about Being, and thus its unconscious nature. Zimmerman elaborates Heidegger’s phenomenological insight on this point:

‘The understanding of ‘being,’ he explained, is not to be construed as an achievement of the subject, as when we say, for example, that, ‘he finally understood the problem.’ Instead, ‘the understanding of being’ is in effect identical with the
event of being itself: the event of disclosedness or presencing by virtue of which entities show themselves (1990:148).

Merleau-Ponty, too, seems to have come to a similar conclusion with regard to the reciprocity of being. Kwant cites a note that was evidently never intended for publication: “Being is that which demands creation of us in order that we may have experience of it” (1978:33). Merleau-Ponty’s aphorism, like most philosophies of perception, deals with the visual and tactile faculties, but it has legitimate application to the auditory. For Merleau-Ponty, sensing of any sort is expressive in that it constitutes reality. The ordinary reception of sensory input is a highly creative act: “I am not merely consciousness of myself. In my [hearing] the audible world becomes conscious of itself. I am a ‘fragment’ of Being ... in which Being becomes conscious of itself” (1978:43). It is clear that the simultaneous disclosure of Being and ‘I’ comprises a synergistic, mutually advantageous relation:

Hearing does not occur because there is an ‘I,’ but an ‘I,’ a subject comes to be because there is hearing. The fact that a part of audible reality begins to hear implies the coming to be of a subject, a becoming-‘I’ of Being. The subject does not stand opposite Being, but arises out of being by segregating itself as Being-which-hears from being-that-does-not hear. Hearing ... also implies that Being is constituted an audible field. This field is constituted from Being by the one who hears (1978:43).

Coherent utterance became and becomes a necessity because consciousness individuates in a human being who takes possession of that about which it loses consciousness. Being fragments itself. There is no need or context for utterance otherwise. One cannot speak or sing coherently (and I do not refer to the infantile babbling but to what succeeds it) out of a unity, a holos. “The very concept of knowledge requires a dichotomy between the thing which is known and the knower, and such dichotomies ... cannot exist in the underlying unity, in which all opposites have disappeared (Storr 1997:131). But with the arrival in human consciousness of conceptual thought and speech, the cosmic process begins to reflect itself in the microcosm. The Logos enters and becomes time, becomes incarnate.

The infant has no need to identify the things around him/her by name. Naming comes with distinguishing between oneself and the thing named. Naming gives consciousness authority over the thing. That is the basis of individual freedom. When the child speaks
his/her first *words*, the utterance is an expression of his/her relationship *to the world*. Perspective has supplanted participation.

But *musical* utterance, as I have argued, is not entirely conditioned by the image, the conceptual element. Its expression is not of an 'I'-world relation. There is no object involved; only movement. That is why so-called subjective states cannot be adequately *named*. The words in the lexicon are few. In musical utterance, the subject *is* the state of being subjective, as (s)he must be if there is no physical object and no naming. These utterances are events in time, events in which the subjective state has its own non-subjective validity, in which the subject becomes its own object. I have referred to it consistently as cognitive feeling, feeling resulting in *evidential coherence*, a synchronicity of the utterer with the event, an interlocution.

I have isolated another paradox, one implicit in musical consciousness itself. If the very concept of knowledge requires a dichotomy of knower and known, and if the observation of a unity is dependent on *not* being conscious of relation, how is it that for the infant, the division between mind and matter, self and other does not apply? How is it that (s)he nevertheless manages to produce discrete audible events of identical duration? How, when *awareness* of time can only come into being for a consciousness that makes distinctions, that is, *from* a spatio-diachronic perspective? The infant undoubtedly knows far more than (s)he can yet *say*.

Is there a solution to this puzzle in Heidegger's claim? "Where history is authentic it does not die by merely ceasing; it does not just stop living ...; it can only die historically" (1987:189). History, what takes place over time, is not linear. A musical event (a tone) does not simply come to an abrupt end. It dies only by being subsumed in an event that grows out of its death. Something lives on. Something *evolves* out of it. Every musical phenomenon, like every consciousness that initiates it, has a biography that is simultaneously synchrony. In the inorganic realm, if I divide a piece of matter, say a stick of chalk, in two, there is no change of state. I still have chalk. If, however, there is division of something living into two, there *is* a change of state. One part serves the *life* of the other.
From a Psychology of Revelation to a Psychology of Imagination

I equated above the evolution of consciousness in humanity as a whole with the development of consciousness in the individual by stating that for both, dualising, differentiating, was and is impossible respectively. In other words, in terms of my model of consciousness, phylogenesis is directly correlative to ontogenic development.

What function is served, in infancy, by being a recipient of revelationary knowledge? My purpose in asking that question at this point is to effect a transition from the previous section to this one, and to emphasise again that given knowledge is that which enables us, paradoxically, not only to perceive, but to bring about experience which is simultaneously diachronic and synchronic. This seems to apply only to music, and not to any other form of expression.

The gibberish of the infant suggests that the “creation of coherent patterns need not be the consequence of conscious deliberation. It is a mental activity which is proceeding in all of us with little intermission” (Storr 1992:175). The prehension of pattern and structure is essential not only to aesthetic appreciation, but to individual cognitive freedom since, as I have argued, the latter is dependent on the gradually acquired ability to distinguish between one thing or event and another. However, the appearance of this ability in the infant, who begins with no formal knowledge of structure, shows very clearly that it is knowledge independent of the physical world. How else could the infant discover these structures and patterns? Is there something in Plato’s doctrine that all knowledge is ultimately a rediscovery of what we already know?

I do not wish to reduce this mystery to a problem; but before proceeding I do want to emphasise again that with revelation we remain in a quasi-archaic state of fused identification with the objects and events of experience. We are, in a sense, seduced into a dreamlike stasis of passivity. The infant is the uttered event.

I do not by any means wish to demean the dreamlike state itself, for it had, and still has, its importance in the larger context of knowing. Phylogenetically, Barfield (1988) has called that revelationary state ‘original participation.’ Of more importance to my project is the
recognition that in the history of mind, revelation comes before image, and thence, before speech, and that is because it is not consciously received; it is not free, and therefore, not responsible. At this point, then, I can answer the question I posed above: Why am I insisting on the pictorial as a way of knowing music’s ontology and mode of operation? I submit that only thinking, image-making, can liberate ‘given’ or revelatory knowledge from its unconscious status. Barfield expresses these thoughts differently: “... a process of awakening can be retrospectively surveyed by the sleeper only after his awakening is complete; for only then is he free enough of his dreams to look back on and interpret them” (1988:182-183).

What if the fully-awake state is not achieved? Music calls, awaits its own manifestation. Musicality is a calling, my intentionality predisposing me to be musical insofar as music is the other-than-self, and to become a self in and through this calling and not self-interest. Self and music comprise a reciprocal giving and receiving of meaning, a relation by virtue of which music becomes conscious of itself in me, sounding in me about itself. As this is not a consciously cultivated relation, I fool myself that music is mine, that I originate it. In reality, I am a solipsist, constantly denying the life of the other, and thereby suffocating all meaning including the meaning of self. In giving myself to my projected image through music, I am guilty of self-idolatry. This is not love. Love requires that I start with music, and I can only do this through a conscious act of empathy with it, which demands an effort on my part.

What is it, after all, that is given? It is thinking, the conscious principle. Music reveals the laws of the ‘I’, the Logos. My own existence is a gift. It is on that basis of givenness that my freedom can expand. That means receiving the gift consciously, knowing, as I earlier remarked, that it is given anonymously. Not to do this precipitates, in the opinion of the existentialist, Gabriel Marcel, “the possibility of a spiritual denial of self, or, what comes to the same thing, of an impious and demonic affirmation of self which amounts to a radical rejection of being” (1955:173).

It is on this basis that I propose a timely transition from a psychology of revelation to a psychology of imagination. We must open our sensing to include the inaudible, extra-sensory world, schooling ourselves to see the noetic counterpart of the audio-neural process. Thinking that participates in its own phenomena in this way is a reversal of analytical thought, of ‘purely

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brain activity.’ What emerges from its practice ‘... can also become the beginning of a new path for man’s striving for knowledge” (Lindenau 1985:210), the function of human being.

At this point, I wish to clear up a common misapprehension. Although it is said with predictable regularity that musical production is dependent on the activity of the imagination, I argue that this claim is made without reflection. Imagination may be true of the visual arts, bearing in mind that the appearance of an image in the mind is precipitated only by a subject-object duality. When the division occurs, a once original reality is retained in memory and is then available to the subject as representation. A representation must, after all, be representative of something. As I have discussed, however, the musical mind is in some sense symbiotic with its temporal event. The visual image, then, is precisely what does not arise in the musical mind. As perplexing as it might seem, imagination is an unused faculty in musical cognition. I struggle to find a word for what does appear. Perhaps the closest I can get is ‘gesture,’ or ‘movement-intention,’ or ‘felt picture, or ‘non-spatial image.’

I have argued that unity (as polarity) exists prior to fragmentation. Although it is extraordinarily difficult to think through, I believe that on some level of the consciousness spectrum we know that unity, and that the time-timelessness polarity is embedded in it. However, reconciliation insists on our recognising that there has first been fragmentation. A meeting is not possible through revelatory knowledge, a way of knowing that offers no cognitive choice, but only through what I have called (after Barfield) a psychology of imagination. As Barfield notes, this conscious act of surrender, vulnerability, getting out of the way, is not a given in current times, but a positive act involving no less than,

an actual transition from one kind of event to another kind. It is a transition from the being taken hold of by something, some force or being, or some element of not-self, without any personal effort on the part of the [utterer], to an active taking hold of something by the [utterer] - a producing, an animating, or reanimating of something within himself, which only his personal effort can make available to him. The content of his [expression] changes from something that is ‘given’ to something that has to be actively grasped, or achieved (1967b:84-85).

Participation in our phenomena has ceased to be conscious participation for the reason that the observer, on becoming a self in infancy, is isolated from the observed and no longer
needs to practice attention. The phenomena are simply there. Inattention brings it about that thought makes use of us, for it perpetuates the split between the observer and the observed. However, because participation is no longer conscious, it does not follow that it ceases to be a fact; it only ceases to be participation of the 'original' kind.

Imagination of the sort I have proposed involves bringing participation in musical phenomena to consciousness by attending to it. It is just in paying attention - an acquired ability - that all unwilled image production ceases. Time ceases. Only then is one free to think, to use image-power to cognise its own kind. Optimum attention negates habitual patterns of response. Accordingly, musical knowing would mean learning to reconstruct imaginatively and not merely theoretically, the nature of the representations, and so, experience them as participated.

Imagination is thinking, that is to say, thinking before it becomes individualised by freezing into image or word. Attention must be given to thinking as it arises, so that its dual nature can not only be seen, but surpassed. Leber comments:

It is precisely because of the dual nature of thinking - the subjective act of thinking and its objective result [concept or thought content] - that the knowledge thus gained always retains a controlled lucidity which is inherent in the nature of thinking itself. Such lucidity is not characteristic of communications which are simply 'revealed.' From the outcome, the result of a thought process, it is possible to discover and retrace the path that thinking took, whereas this is quite out of the question in the case of revelation, which is received as a gift which simply "comes over one." (1995:8).

The feature of this attention to intentionality, whose attitude is inner vigilance, is that it is non-conceptual awareness. It goes beyond concept or word. As long as verbalisation is present in thinking, one separates oneself from the experience. Ordinary thinking crystallises its movement into concepts. When verbalisation is absent, the experiencer and the experienced are ONE.
CHAPTER TWELVE

LOGOS AWARENESS IN UtTERANCE AND IN EDUCATION

Introduction

In this penultimate chapter I want to take stock of previous discussion, strive for a clearer picture (in words, a conceptualisation at best) of the Logos, suggest how I see the shape of future education and discuss how Logos awareness might influence an ordinary institutional event, the orchestra rehearsal.

My critique of the current intellectual climate may have seemed harsh. It is harsh; but not, I think, high-handed. Given the epistemic disorientation I believe is now at crisis point in institutionalised education, I am concerned that most students are deceived by an epistemological sleight-of-hand. Positivism in all its thought-forms has penetrated music education and musical cognition unnoticed, and therefore, uncontested. It is precisely because humanity has not deepened its relation to the artistic impulse in the last three centuries that musical art has almost been swept away by the torrent of technics and become an imitation culture. Art and education have taken out "premature citizenship" in "the ... electronically connected cosmopolis ..." (Sontag1969:34). As I see it, this event corresponds entirely to the current state of human consciousness, which is radically individualistic. Since the cultural plight has largely escaped popular awareness, what it amounts to in epistemological terms is a lost integrity of utterance. What I endeavoured to show in the two previous chapters was that if the Logos provenance and ontology of utterance disappear from awareness, so, by definition, does any thought of human provenance and ontology.

I suggest, then, that there is not much value in tackling an evolving epistemology if that supersensible psychology which, in curricular terms, translates as a psychology of imagination, is left perpetually out of the equation.
It is true, I think, that the current intellectual climate is one that gives every impression of striving towards epistemological consensus. However, accelerated paradigm upheaval in this century has not so much assisted the move toward what I described as an epistemic threshold between the realms of sense and spirit, as it has brought about the relativisation of truth. There is, in academic circles at least, more than a modicum of doubt about what, ontologically, epistemologically and historically, constitutes subject, and what, object; so much doubt in fact that there is considerable dispute about whether there is even an entity called the 'self.'\(^1\) I can only declare my alignment with Steiner’s ethical individualism, which holds that the real self is that supersensible entity not limited to the frontier of the body. It is *this* self that is not known and therefore not acknowledged by the radical individualist, the strategic solipsist.

**Agnosticism and the Relativisation of Truth**

I have discussed the impact of the growth of radical individualism on the use of language. Here I will discuss the socio-cultural and political consequences.

Given that I am committed to a *Logos* frame of reference with respect to human utterance, I suggest accordingly that, contrary to popular opinion there has not, indeed, been in the twentieth century an expansion of knowledge, but an accelerating expansion of *nescience*. By this I mean that the extent of what we do *not* know has overrun the extent of what we *do* know. The belief that there has been an expansion of knowledge (as distinct from an expansion of certain kinds of knowledge) is a delusion. In *academe*, at least, the previous axiomatic foundations in almost every field have either been repudiated or assiduously interrogated.\(^2\) (The difference between the sort of consciousness existing at the end of the Middle Ages and consciousness at the beginning of this century, however, is that the extent of what was *not* known was not so clearly seen as it is now.) This prompts me to suggest that if we pause to consider just what has been gained by way of *new* knowledge, the answer must be: very little. Rather, what has transpired is the removal of conventional epistemological limitations which, for the most part, have not been replaced by anything more empowering epistemically. Yet, as

\(^1\) See Glover (1991) for an account of the recent abandonment of the self in academic philosophy.

\(^2\) See Stove (1998) for a recent review and critique of these developments.
Sontag remarks: "It seems unlikely that the possibilities of continually undermining one's assumptions can go on unfolding indefinitely into the future, without being eventually checked by despair or by a laugh that leaves one without any breath at all" (1969:34).

I submit that the interrogation of the scientific paradigm has only uncovered a deep-rooted agnosticism at the heart of Western civilisation, the less noticeable symptoms of which are diminution of integrity in utterance and the growth of sciolism, the use of the word as the instrument of the half-truth. The consequent allure of mechanomorphism and the idolatry of hardware progress have precluded biographical progress towards true selfhood, ethical individualism or 'I'-ness. "The central human questions - economic, political, educational, spiritual - are more and more cast in exclusively scientific and technological terms .... The mechanistic philosophy is more pervasive than ever. Intelligence as control continues to produce a technology that shows every sign of being increasingly out of control" (Glover 1991:38). The current trend of industrial and post-industrial societies is not, as might be expected, towards liberal individuality, but economic collectivities (the global market) in which the ethical individual counts for less and less. The analogy I have in mind to describe this plight of the individual is that of the snake (regarded in many cultures as the symbol of wisdom) whose native response to the presence of danger is arrested, its animation suspended, its will paralysed, seduced by the wily locutions of the snake-charmer. It is poised, but cannot act.

I cannot help thinking that the main problem currently challenging society is not one of economics, genetics or biology, but of ethics. In view of the contrary evolutionary picture I described in the previous chapters, namely, that of a Logos epistemology, I regard as erroneous that view perpetrated in the first instance by Freud, that all social problems stem from the biological constitution of the human being. This view regards the individual as "fundamentally anti-social" (Fromm 1960:7). In society placing a restraint on a person's "basic impulses" the "suppressed drives" are transformed into "strivings that are culturally valuable and thus become the basis for culture" (1960:7).

It is worth dwelling on this theme briefly, for it has psychological and ethical implications far beyond the obvious. This view actually has an eighteenth-century origin, once
again in the philosophy of Nietzsche, specifically in the ‘God is dead’ proclamation. The human being is ‘nothing but’ a diseased animal. Not only is humanness equated with animal instinct, but the human animal, however intelligent (s)he might be, is regarded imperiously as the outcome of education and cultural conditioning. The intelligence with which the human animal is endowed is seen as a rationalising one, enabling a sort of self-civilising process through reflection on, and structuring of, experience. The intelligent animal, then, could calculate that it is in its own interests to behave in accordance with a conventional benchmark of morality. In other words, the individual is not seen to be in possession of any inherent and abiding property that could properly be called ethical outside of his/her social situatedness, any empathetic capacity that might dispose him/her to benign, even creative behaviour of the sort that is free enough to let the phenomena ‘come forth.’

Although it is true that human beings can behave without integrity, as my discussion in Chapter Ten sought to show, I nevertheless regard the view of human being I have just discussed as an overtly cynical one. To think it through is to see that, in the absence of any faculty surpassing instinct, all order must be imposed by institutions: the school, the state, the church, the law, the industry, the profession and perhaps less obviously, in the form of policy, convention, tradition, method or doctrine. That is to say, the human animal lives only in accordance with the parameters of institutional authority, and is obedient to them, for they control all social relations by means of behavioural prohibitions. Should there be any doubt about the confidence in this psychology of control, I recommend careful reading of one of its proponents, namely, the behaviourist, B.F. Skinner (1976), despite rejection of his view by many recent psychologically related discourses.

Acquiescence in this view is widespread because of the failure to recognise that what I have called humanness, the potential for further biographical development and the capacity for higher knowledge, is not rooted in biological and social adaptation, but in tragedy, that is, the sense of isolation, powerlessness and obedience to external authority. What the individual seeks is unity rooted in difference.\(^3\) The acceptance of a dissenting or uncongenial opinion, or

\(^3\) This idea is by no means new, it being the central tenet of the Logos doctrine attributed to the philosopher Heraclitus. Again, given that the whole point of a Logos epistemology is that it is wordless, I find poetry a more evocative medium than prose as a way of conveying its veracity. I commend to the reader T.S. Eliot’s, Burnt Norton, which is written after a fragment of Heraclitus, and which deals specifically with the Logos idea.
even a strident disagreement extends only as far as the general convention of tolerance allows. But it is not true communion. What is not grasped is the significance of the impulse felt by the self-conscious ego to assert itself because its freedom is only relative. It is, in short, a spiritual problem.

Furthermore, the institutional controls humanity puts in place to manage its conduct are the mind. The alternative to structural restraint is, of course, ethical freedom, precisely what humanity fears, but which must ultimately be taken up in order to disengage from institutional authority. As D.G. Gillham puts it (after his subject, William Blake): Love cannot flourish "in a world of perfected institutions. For love to grow it must have an opportunity to exercise resource; it must make its own decisions" (1966:10).

Unconcealing the Hidden Logos Identity

In all this, the 'I,' the hidden Logos identity, has been discredited. I maintain that the popular mind is still hypnotised by positivism and all its permutations, and that this is evident, as I have discussed, in the prevailing belief that physio-mechanical phenomena can be the cause of psychological phenomena. At the root of it all is the unheeded dual perspective, which carries a spiritual and ethical significance for consciousness evolution. I will attempt as I proceed to make this apparent.

In the period between the seventeenth-century advent of modern science and the relatively recent interrogation of its paradigm, inner experience came to be regarded as something given, something static and final, something that does not change. However, science also regarded it as something vague and dubious, and therefore in need of verification by its own objective methods. The limits of the psyche and knowledge of it were considered definite, established and unchangeable. In other words, only in the case of objective knowledge was the possibility of expansion of knowledge admitted. The contradiction is obvious: How can knowledge expand if it is founded on limited inner experience? The cognitive connection between the observed and that which observes was overlooked - or at least distrusted - and in my view, still is. My thesis would otherwise be unnecessary.
If I can reiterate, unambiguous observational judgements consist in bringing up ordinary concepts - significantly, by way of a spatio-diachronic perspective - to meet the physical domain of identifiable objects and events. Division of a noetic whole is still the usual and habitual way of knowing. An ontic whole is divided into perception and thinking. This original polarity has led to the realism-idealism and subjectivism-analytic objectivism dualities and importantly, all semantic outcroppings. (My emphasis will become relevant below.)

Positivism, or at least the disbelief by which it is distinguished, is still alive as a dominant ideology. The academic removal of axiomatic limitations under “the pressure of chronic interrogation” (Sontag 1969:33) does not guarantee an automatic expansion of knowledge. The positivist account of progress consists in the assumption that the hidden (the extent of what we do not know) will, as time goes on, undoubtedly be unveiled. The ‘hidden’ in this framework, however, is inevitably phenomenal, not noumenal. The deep-seated delusion at the root of this reasoning is not so easy to detect. It may, indeed, be possible for positivist methods to reveal all there is to know about the human form, its biology, genetics, physical constitution, habits, sensing, movement, and so on. This very cognitive attitude, however, veils a truth, namely, that we can never know the human being beyond the form and the domain of ordinary experience unless (s)he utters it. Clearly, knowledge of that realm is possible only by an entirely different method.

So-called objective knowledge does not study reality; it studies the perception of reality, which is to say that ‘the real’ is limited to the conditions of its perception, in short, the perspective. The isolation from the whole of a strictly limited number of ‘facts’ that are referred to as objective reality does not by any means exhaust all that exists. It has not been recognised that the specific and localised conditions of ordinary cognition, which I have identified as spatial and temporal extension and predication, are only the first conditions of objective existence, and that they are created by beings who cognise. What we denote as materiality, the physicality of things, is only the condition of existence in space and time, which means, from a corresponding spatio-diachronic perspective in which, significantly, only a single phenomenon can occur at one time in one place. Solidity is not a substance, but a condition of existence. I quote Ouspensky again: “... a particular thing is merely an artificial definition by our senses, of some indefinable cause infinitely surpassing that thing” (1949:171).
In my opinion, that cause is not yet available to our solid world mode of cognition, and the result is that everything is conditional, and epistemic disorientation normal. Despite our confidence in it, a substantial ‘thing’ does not exist in space and time. Rather, it exists for us only because we impose its spatial and/or temporal form upon it. But that is why there cannot have been an impersonal beginning; it is also why there is something and not nothing. Human beings ‘take the measure of the world.’ As I have argued, however, we could not achieve this act of figuration unless our configuring ability was of the nature of the Logos itself. This we have not seen.

The Confusion of Logos and Logic

Under this head I will try to edge closer to a Logos epistemology by contrasting it with the positivist ‘semantic outcroppings’ I emphasised above. It will be seen that utterance of every kind is inevitably coloured by the view we ultimately form of human being.

In the discipline of logic (derived from Logos) the word is the object. “An idea, in order to become the object of logical reasoning, in order to be subjected to the laws of logic, must be expressed in a word. What cannot be expressed in a word cannot enter into a logical system. Moreover, a word can enter into a logical system and be subjected to logical laws only as a concept” (Ouspensky 1949:222-223). The propositions of logic, then, according to Ouspensky, are true only as they relate to finite and invariant reality. Bear in mind that music cannot be expressed in words. In strictly logical terms, music is non-word and is therefore outside logic; it is, in short, an illogicality. Music can be expressed only as Logos. In other words, the laws of logic must be untrue in relation to variant and infinite reality, that is, to musicality, to hidden meanings. I am arguing that logical propositions are deducible from observation of sense-phenomena only. In other words, they are correct only in a conditional sense.

Since music is not word, and its meaning consists in its extra-sensory absence, it cannot figure in, or be contained by, a conventional system of logic. Rather, music might be called transfinite, translinguistic reality. In the terms of predicate logic, this statement will sound absurd. But that is precisely the point I wish to make. The moment one begins to think in terms other than predicate logic, one comes across a magnitude of such patent absurdities from
the perspective of logical reasoning. Musical truths are inexpressible in *conceptual* terms, and so any attempt to explain them conceptually will appear from a spatio-diachronic perspective to be illogical and absurd. The encounter with absurdity, however, does not mean that the things that cannot be so reduced to logical concepts are not real; it means only that the concepts are not applicable to the infinite and variant reality. The propositions embraced by a *Logos* epistemology, then, are not, by default, those comprising some vague and unattainable ‘logic,’ but attempts to explain it in conceptual terms. It is true that not everything can be expressed in words, in concepts. In itself that is significant; for it follows that not everything can be logical. It does not follow that it cannot be *Logos*.

My historical search revealed a discontinuity between the musical act and its significance for human being in the world. Study of the Greeks suggests that as long as the external world was not synonymous with *matter*, it was natural for humanity to attribute the provenance of a phenomenon that did *not* fit material dimensions to God, the gods or to some sort of world soul, and that this attribution was only later to become the *laws* of nature. The receding focus of the logical intellect eventuating in closure has ejected these from the external world and relocated them as immaterial principles segregated in their own *inner* world. Predicate logic, for which no material source of immaterial phenomena is available, has forced those phenomena into the interior as feelings, emotions, associations, and the like, which are then supposedly *projected* into the external world. This notion of an irreconcilable inner-outer duality has sunk down deeply into the ordinary mind.

I maintain that the retrieval of the *Logos* identity, the universal ‘I,’ is entirely dependent on the perspective humanity *chooses*, in ethical freedom, to adopt, since that perspective will determine how both human being and utterance are viewed. That the choice has *not* been made as yet by society as a whole is evident in the failure to engage with the question of Origin.

Let me clarify. I have speculated that earlier states of consciousness were, in a sense, more dream-like, or half-awake. The stage on which dream-consciousness is acted out is not the stage to which the senses are directed. What goes on in dreams leaves no trace in the material world, as music, actually, *all* oral-aural phenomena leave no material trace unless recorded. (It is essential to make the distinction between the appellations, ‘external’ and
‘material.’) I have called what runs its course in the interior, ‘forces.’ (This is an admittedly dry word, but for the moment it will suffice. I will provide a more evocative description in Chapter Thirteen.) Rather than perpetuate an inner-outer dichotomy, I maintain that the ‘forces’ usually attributed to the external world are active also in the internal realm. We only recognise them, however, through their material effects. That is because everything we perceive with the senses is of a material nature. Every sensation comprises two elements: one with an external source, the physical, and another with an internal source, the psychological. In my model, however, what is sensed internally is a quality of the external thing sensed; that is to say, the external world is shot through with interiority. In other words, the external and the internal worlds are not separate worlds at all, although for the ordinary observer, they seem to be.

As I discussed in Chapter Nine, a good deal can be discovered about the confusion between logic and Logos by returning to the observation of utterance itself. The language we speak is a language of perspective, of perspectival thought, of judgement, of division, of duality. Language, particularly its chirographic form, is a medium of expression that humanity has adapted to spatial orientation and tangible reality, and so, is cued by knowledge of external things. (We choose other forms of utterance to express internal things.) Since our mental pictures are usually prompted verbally, thinking, too, has adapted to material conditions, that is, to spatial extension and tangibility.

The illusion of two separate realms is perpetuated in the language we use. We must not forget, argues Zuckerkandl, “that our language, which conforms to our mode of thought, provides a vocabulary for physical phenomena and for psychic phenomena, but none for phenomena that belong to neither class: a source of frequently insuperable difficulties in all investigations that do not readily fit into the traditional pattern of thought” (1973a:59-60).

The point I am working up to is this: musical forces, distinguished from their acoustic correlatives, cannot be described either in physical or psychological terms. As I argued

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4 The play of forces involved in musical knowing does not correlate with the physical consequences, which, after all, are only sound. There is no ordinary physical sense or instrument that is able to determine the presence of music. As I have argued, the acoustic properties of tones are in no way connected to the inherent forces they possess, except that they sound.
previously, a melody in any given context can certainly possess qualities that might be described as majesty, gaiety, sadness, solemnity, vivacity, and so on, but the melody (melos) is none of these. Rather, there is a third pole of (formative) forces. The given musical phenomena are only the ‘substance’ in which the play of forces reveals itself (recall Jenny’s discoveries in Cymatics). The forces I identified (in words) in Chapter Eight as being active in music and in the observer, namely, longing, intimacy and will, these forces are active in the world. (It would be a mistake, however, to regard them as personal emotions.) They were available in cognition to an earlier dream-like consciousness, but not to ours. As I see it, music belongs to that third pole of forces. It compensates for the absence of a logical vocabulary that might otherwise be adequate for it.

If this observation is fitted to my earlier speculation that speech formation evolved from primal tone, that is, song (vowel utterance), it can be seen that speech and tone were once undifferentiated due just to the absence of perspective.5

Speech is impossible without tone, and tone, as I have discussed, exists in principle before it manifests in the various speech forms. Speech, however, was conceived only when consonantal utterance, by way of the gradual evolution of a solid world mode of cognition, the spatial perspective, was added to vowel utterance, or tone. The consonants represent, according to Steiner, “the complete sculptural form of the human organisation” (1987:33). In that these sculpting consonants are played upon, as it were, by the vowels, pure tonal utterance, utterance minus the consonants, is emancipation from the physical nature of things.

One (forgotten) aspect of human being, then, is entirely contained in the context of what is revealed in tonal utterance. In taking my argument further, I can speak or sing only by means of the cooperation of air. But the observation that I can inwardly sound (intone) a tone suggests that tone is not of the nature of the air on which it rises. As I have argued, the materialist concept that tone is perceptible vibrational disturbance is erroneous. Air is physical; tone is not. The moment my intention reaches the air, the physical element that carries it, there

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5 Even as late as the Greek civilisation there is in speech a system whereby certain syllables are accented not by means of dynamic stress but by means of variations of pitch. “Such a language contains its own melody, the logodes melos or ‘speech melody’ attributed to Greek even as late as the time of Augustus” (Anderson 1968:3).
appears in sense-perception a physical reflection of something non-physical. Tonal utterance is an expression of everything about the human being that is not physical.

The art of music can arise only out of knowledge of the vowel. Pure tonal utterance (because it is not word) cannot be other than ethical, for one is forced to give undivided attention (if it is art) to something non-physical, and not to the personal gain that can accrue from speech.6 Speech can be used to unite or to divide. (In Biblical Christianity it was speech, not tone or song, on which the malediction of Babel descended.)7 With tone, consciously invoked, one cannot lie, for as I explained earlier, the more one gives oneself to tone’s production, the less individual it becomes. That is the essential difference between speech and tone. If I think a word, I already have a mental picture or concept of the thing the word symbolises. If I think the word, ‘tone,’ there is no such picture, for tone is not a thing. The only concept for tone can be a materialist one. I can only think tone by in-toning it, by sounding it. It has no mental picture, and so is not speech. Tone in speech has no spatial reference without the addition of consonants, the physical element. I am speaking of two different perspectives. It is for this reason that I maintain that human being, at its (Logos) core, is not biological, but ethical.

We cannot continue to interpret the metempirical along empirical lines, or, the supersensible by means of physical referents, to put it another way. In keeping with my claim that the human being is a Logos being, a knowing being, a being predisposed to coherent utterance, it follows that knowledge, although it may be socially and culturally shaped, is not socially and culturally determined. Knowledge (the noun) is certainly contingent on possession of a psychophysiological organisation, and correlatively, of a place in space and time, but know-ing (the act) has no such determinants or conditions. Knowing is, or can be, an autonomous activity because it has no principled limits.8

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6 I must emphasise that I am not by any means advocating a radical transcendence of language, but a retrieval of its integrity, the first principle of a Logos epistemology. My goal is the re-humanising of utterance. I regard all human utterance as translinguistic in origin.

7 The Tower of Babel is about the plurality of language, the confusio linguarum, or “confusion of tongues” (Eco 1999:37).

8 I make this claim through my understanding of Steiner’s epistemology and my curriculum based on it. As I have discussed in Chapter Two, the cognitive given for Steiner is neither the subject nor the object, but thinking. Thinking is antecedent to all.
It follows that to regard the human being as something to be trained is to assume from the start that (s)he is ethically incomplete. (Recall my earlier point about the exposure of ‘disbelief,’ and the correlative view of the mind existing on the same level as biological instinct.) I argue that human being is complete in itself, and that what it needs to be at its best is the opposite of the positivist ideal: liberation from the physical body. The vehicle for this is conscious utterance, and specifically, conscious tonal utterance.

Let me try to put this in the context of musical expression. Materialism would say that it is the physicality, the matter, of the human form that produces the tone. This, of course, can be the only possible statement. Similarly, if tone is conceived to be physical vibration, then it will be treated as matter. If, as I have argued, however, tone is not of material origin, then the function of the body will be to free the tone from its physical instrument, to let it shine through, as it were.

Tone manifests itself (by virtue of its Logos origin) out of the inaudible realm. It is not on a physical level that tone is conceived. It can be called optimally beautiful, then, only when nothing of a material nature hinders its emergence. The inaudible, the ideal, produces the tone only on the basis that there is a physical instrument, the body. In human terms, then, the materialist orientation must be inverted, both with regard to the tone and human being. If tone is a human phenomenon, then humans are by (Logos) nature toneful. The entire organism, and not just the physical body, is predisposed to toneful utterance. It is the entire organism that sounds. For me, it follows that the object of education ought to be the creation of the conditions wherein human being (tonefulness) can manifest.

The origin of the current challenge facing education, then, is the false conception that has been formed of human being, a conception that has arisen out of a dual perspective, of which positivism appears to be the prevailing cognitional attitude. As I tried to show in the previous chapters, the (illogical) outcome, mechanomorphism, became a reality only because a Logos conception of human being sank below the surface of awareness. Consistency to its own view would see mechanistic principles as the determinants in the production of coherent utterance, as if the sublime can be the effect of sublimation. In this manner is the ‘I,’ the conscious principle, the Logos, discredited. Kühlewind sees it as follows:
When we deny cognition as autonomous truth we also deny the subject, the I as a being: we become complicated automatons, and these automatons are then supposed to assert that they are automatons. But if they were exclusively automatons, there is no way that they could have acquired such ideas. The idea of a nonautomaton must have arisen somehow. A rule is only known and formulated on the basis of at least one exception ...” (1988:50).

Anyone who doubts the reality of automatism need only become acquainted with the mechanistic methods employed in voice training these days.

Contrary to positivist agnosticism, then, it is not a matter of indifference whether the concepts one forms about something, in this case, human being and utterance, correspond or not with sensible reality. One’s innermost ‘disposition of heart and will’ has an actual effect in practical matters. How the concepts that are formed about something are brought as motivation into the deed of utterance will determine how every muscle, sinew, cartilage, limb and bone behaves. To put it another way, if this distinguishing feature of human being, utterance, or voice, is viewed as needing emancipation from the physical instrument, distinguished from forcing and contorting it in order to conform to mechano-physical preconceptions of production, the result will eventually show up in the physical voice. The hearing changes in accordance with the change of consciousness by which the hearing is proceeding, so that the quality of what is uttered also changes. (Recall my point that the ear is inseparable from the larynx.)

I have expressed my concern that through the positivist conception of tone and human being, the earlier wonder and reverence for both has been lost. Rather, qualities of perception have been supplanted by materialist concepts that penetrate right into the physical realm. What remains is outer sensual pleasure, ego-centric delight in sensation. Matter dominates soul. The outcome is an actual hardening of the physical organism, the organs of receptivity. If the ear becomes inflexible, so does the natural organ of production to which it is physically and spiritually connected: the larynx. The larynx can only produce what the ear hears (Tomatis 1991). Werbeck-Svärdström (1985) asserts that humans possess only half the vocal range of earlier times, which is to say that mechanistic concepts formed about the organs involved in vocal production have locked tone into the body because the thinking behind it has hardened.
Further, the excessive stimulation of the nervous system that today goes under the name of hearing, "gives the passive, empty soul an illusory sense of life. Ultimately, however, noise stimulation, like all outward stimulants, leads to total enervation, devastation of the soul - or more plainly, to dead boredom" (Schriever 1985:8). (As I argued in Chapter Four, the presence of so much noise in the world illustrates that we have lost all sense of the wonder of utterance and reverence for its human instrument.)

Contrary to all this, I have consistently argued for consideration of an alternative scenario. The experience of music can only become intelligible when it fructifies out of inner hearing (hearkening), and this, I believe, justifies an intensive education of intentionality, that is, perception, thinking, feeling and willing. The goal ought to be the developed powers of discrimination and prognostication. This implies that even though music is about 'making,' every advance in (physical) facility should at the same time be accompanied by the feeling that one's entire being is engaged in a process of transformation by way of the shift to another perspective.

Exact acoustic observation of the sort taught in aural training is no longer enough. Acoustic evaluation is not ethical aesthetics. Objective observation must be redefined to include that which seeks unconcealment. What ought to be learned in addition to advanced auditory acuity is penetration to the exemplary model, the Original. In this way one learns to savour the experience of perceiving for itself, and to see its significance. External receptivity is complemented by supersensible perception. This sort of listening is an art in itself, and like all art, it needs practice. In my opinion this is the way to overcome the numbness and literalness that has penetrated human receptivity.

The epistemological foundation for music education is located, not in positivist orthodoxy, but in actual experience insofar as attention is drawn to it. It is not the body that plays the instrument; it is the listener, the 'I' - Logos identity that plays the instrument that is the body. It is not the physical apparatus, but the listening organism in toto that gives birth to tone by means of the sound.
Truth as a Spiritual Project

I claim that what modernity regards as knowledge is limited within the finite boundaries of spatial and temporal existence. The expansion or extension of non-subjective knowledge is possible only in the event that the perceiving consciousness itself is expanded or extended. No manufactured apparatus or instrument is capable of transcending the limitations of its own perspective. I am arguing that truth is not the agreement of the apprehension of an object or event with the object or event itself. In Steiner’s framework, consciousness contains the principle of cognitive certainty within itself, and does not need to seek it in external production. I maintain, accordingly, that there has been no real advance in this direction since the arrival of positivist disbelief in human consciousness.

As I have discussed, however, I see the current relativisation of truth as spiritual unrest, although it is generally not identified as such. Sontag expresses well the nature of the upheaval: “It is the nature of all spiritual projects to tend to consume themselves - exhausting their own sense, the very meaning of the terms in which they are couched. ... All genuinely ultimate projects of consciousness eventually become projects for the unravelling of thought itself” (1969:33 my emphasis).

Proactive Idealisation as the Aim of Future Education

The Logos identity that is human being, its wordlikeness, is not touched at all in education. The pedagogical ideal of holism now held up in many fields is in my view impossible to achieve without the awareness of what, after, all, has been lost. Given this picture, I am obliged to argue that from whatever direction I approach the problem of the lost integrity of utterance as it persists in educational thought, I am led again and again to the conviction that adult education in music in the future should be above all curative. By curative I mean a curriculum that seeks to transform the damage of the past by providing the tools of epistemic orientation, empowerment and resourcefulness. To borrow a phrase from humanistic psychology, it ought to be one of “proactive idealisation” (distinguished sharply from neurotic idealisation), or “the envisioning of ourselves as being different from what we are” (Bonner 1967:64). 382
In view of the penetration of music by thought originating outside it, I see the pitfalls of institutional curriculum as conceptual dryness, personal inner inactivity and indigestibility of knowledge, all of which promote 'training in disassociation' as Sardello called it, and disconnection from Logos awareness. The effects show up in a confluence of behavioural symptoms such as boredom, listlessness, anxiety, nervous debilitation, unwillingness to learn, and so on. Institutional education tends to disclaim any responsibility for these 'personal' symptoms of unrest, and has come to regard them as behavioural 'norms.' It is the student's responsibility to identify and resolve for his/her own peace of mind these unfortunate impediments to learning. Perhaps ultimately it is, but I can find nothing in formal music education that explicitly acknowledges personal development and self-knowledge as curricular aims. I maintain that cognitive certainty, and flowing from that, freedom of moral decision, will depend largely on how a person digests his/her experiences, on whether (s)he has the will (which, recall has already been significantly weakened) to face them, or whether they are allowed to devastate him/her.

How, then, can students be expected to take responsibility for their own lack of orientation when there is no institutional recognition of orientation as an epistemic need in the first place?

The scenario is further complicated by what appears to be the current fixation on competitive individualism, workforce economics, efficiency norms, in short, narrow vocational and economic priorities. However, in the absence of any meaningful discourse around the consequences, in human terms, of those priorities, education believes it has constructed an attractive (because socially relevant and progressive) alternative to the unwanted positivism of earlier times, when in reality is has merely congealed in the paradigm that already exists. It confuses vocational employment with inner employment or calling, social and economic relevance with innermost needs. In my view, a system of education that measures its performance by such narrow definitions of success has lost its right to be taken seriously. It continues to measure things because they happen to be measurable.

To go on insisting on an artistic development without a corresponding personal development is an epistemological contradiction. Either we value the individual, or we do not.
If we do, must we not see to it that curriculum reflect that ideal in practical content that seeks to rectify an unprecedented disintegration of cognitive life? Should not education nurture all parts of the individual, physical, psychological and spiritual, according to his/her biographical needs?

Conraad van Houten feels that the total human being in education today must lie at the basis of curriculum in order to come to grips with the deleterious effects of the onesidedness of, and overemphasis on, certain types of (sense) knowledge, and routine. Since his text parallels very closely my own thoughts on the matter, I think it is worth quoting in full:

A common attitude is that in the educational system students are learning and being taught, while the personal element, the students mental, emotional and physical well-being is their own business. The faculty is to leave the student’s completely free, because all the above-mentioned is their own responsibility, is not part of the responsibility of the teachers. This requires the following replies …:

Firstly, that many participants are already damaged by their environment, culture or education when they enter the course.

Secondly, that during an effective, serious learning process, many dormant and undigested inner problems will rise to the surface.

Thirdly, that the teaching itself may have a one-sided, damaging or destructive effect.

Fourthly, that in our time and age, all people are in a threshold situation – more or less consciously – in which sense-perceptible and supersensible elements play into each other in a confusing way.

This means that the old attitude cannot be maintained any longer; rather, the learning situation demands personal assistance and shared responsibility (1995:108).

Interestingly, van Houten heads this section, *The Hygienic Element in Adult Learning*. In educational terms, the word ‘hygiene’ may seem an odd choice. I think it is apposite if taken in the sense of preventative measures put in place in order to avert the onset of disease. For van Houten, this means “a rhythmical alternation between inner and outer activity …” (1995:109), which translates into *music* curriculum as hearkening and musing.

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The Orchestra Rehearsal

I can best illustrate the rhythm van Houten means, and also the difference between the positivist and Logos attitudes by discussing a scenario common in tertiary music schools, one which is replicated in the profession, with the single exception that students are not remunerated for their work: the orchestra rehearsal. (I preface my commentary by stating that I do not attribute any blame whatever to the victims.)

What is a rehearsal? It is a gathering, or better, a social organism, the purpose of which is to prepare notated works for performance. In a vocational sense, the rehearsal is that part of the curriculum most closely resembling that which occurs daily in the profession. It takes place at a pre-determined hour, often on a regular basis, and for an allotted period of time.

I have taken the trouble to reinforce the obvious for the reason that it will become evident that these ‘administrative’ details which are publicised in order to avert the chaos that can otherwise ensue when any large number of individuals gathers in the same space are least obvious for those for whom they are promulgated. On the contrary, the event is a ready example of the absence of the ‘shared responsibility’ held up by van Houten as a value.

If the notion of a human gathering as a social organism - which might be seen as a principle of Logos awareness - is not brought to the awareness of the student, it is hardly surprising to find that no responsibility is taken for it. Community consists of individuals, and ideally, free individuals, that is, individuals who have acquired in their education at least some self-knowledge.

Let me assume for the moment that personal development in the form of epistemic orientation is at the core of curriculum and that these individuals are to some degree autonomous, that is, free to make ethical decisions. What would be the scenario? How would it differ from the usual?

In the first place, there would be some notion in the mind of gathering in order to serve a higher purpose, a purpose beyond the routine or the mundane. The aim is for 60 to 80 individuals to create a unity in euphony through a unity of intention. It would mean that the
individual would be disposed to take great joy in preparation rather than being compelled to 'watch the clock.' It is not a question of getting to the end of a work or rehearsal, but of contributing to, and being present in, every moment of the process. The student would know that personal preparation begins prior to the gathering. (S)he would not arrive two minutes before the start time convinced that (s)he is on time. And because it is a significant event in the sense that one has given it value, personal preparation would involve more than warming-up the physical body parts involved in sound production. These personal strategies would ensure that meaningful artistic productivity occurs from the outset because consciousness has been prepared for it. Insofar as the first 20 minutes or so of rehearsal time are often wasted in assembling scattered consciousnesses, the lack of preparation is palpable in the space. The current misapprehension that it is the responsibility of one person, the conductor, to bring about the ideal conditions for authentic artistic production would disappear. The usual attitude of the student is that (s)he is there, not to learn, but to be taught. This attitude appears also in the profession.

All this before a sound is made. Because the joy of preparation is not the norm - how can it be when responsibility is not taken? - its absence determines the behaviour of the group, which in turn shapes the 'tone' of the rehearsal. This self-perpetuating loop is impenetrable to the free play of artistic forces. It inhibits the flow of energies between participants, especially those between conductor and players, diminishes almost irretrievably any awareness of gathering with like-minds for a creative event, and extinguishes the capacity to respond to the presence of creative forces in the space because they are not envisaged as being there in the first place. I mean by the latter that, if we are mindful about moving forms through or across space, which is surely the whole aim of performance, we communicate from interior to interior whatever is present in that space, and so, create possibilities for community. In awakening the imagination in this way we are free then to observe that the air, whose very nature is to move in adapting itself to a stimulus, surrenders itself for our purpose, bearing the extra-sensory forces to the receptivity of others.
The Educational Primacy of the Individual

This sort of thinking does not comprise the core of current curriculum. The scenario I have outlined is not helped in any way by the modern notion of the solitary artist, and the highly secretive nature of individual practice. I do not deny the normal human need for privacy, or the need of the musician for a noiseless space in which to pursue the goal of musical perfection. I question, rather, the impaired sense of connectedness between human participants and the social consequences of isolation, which is not a question of perceived physical distance, but of an inner void.

It seems to me that the individual, not having fully digested the experience of inner isolation, is not free to make empathetic decisions which, in this case, consist in choosing to give oneself to the group, the occasion, and to the music. The student's attendance is vicarious. (S)he is not 'there' in the space. Since (s)he is not available, (s)he cannot adequately respond.

It is very easy to dismiss the symptoms of unrest as normal behaviour. Perhaps they have become normal imperceptibly. Nevertheless, my observation of this behaviour over a good many years suggests that students struggle in vain against considerable odds in an endeavour to find meaning in what they do. I mean by the word 'meaning' in this context, the certitude of resolve that comes of knowing that one is not, indeed, compelled to conform unquestioningly to what is on offer by teachers, institutions and the profession, but rather, that one is able to find moral nobility in one's 'calling' and in one's artistic contribution in and to the world without compromising one's individuality.

I think the behaviour to which I have referred is a symptom of a much deeper malaise. The solution is connected with biographical evolution. I have discussed how the evolution of Western music (in reality, all utterance) runs parallel to the evolution of individuation. As I see it, this development has highly significant implications for education of the future. The stratification of society in earlier times determined the delivery of education in such a way that

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9 I have already mentioned that success in music performance is singularly dependent on mastery of the instrument. Accordingly, it is not uncommon for students to spend many hours each day in pursuit of that goal. The effects of self-imposed isolation on personal development in the social sphere should not be overlooked. As I have already remarked, the practice often amounts to a denial of one's human worth except on the occasions when one has the instrument attached to the body, as it were.
young people were empowered to meet life in circumstances particular to them, for they each belonged to a class. Fortunately, this stratification has been to a large extent eliminated. Despite that, the individual today is isolated. It follows that each person is entitled to an education that cultivates his/her individual needs. If consciousness has contracted from a periphery, as I have argued, and its result is self-consciousness, then it is the single unit that must become the focus of educational interest. This imperative is entirely in keeping with Steiner’s ethical individualism, which sees the conscious transformation of point back into sphere. The latter is not merely a geometrical principle, but a model for the evolutionary goal of the metamorphosis of a psychology of self into free (meaning conscious) being. The shift is from earthly citizenship to cosmic citizenship, which, by another name is ethical individualism.

Conclusion

I do not envisage that all educators will accept my model of what constitutes a modern music education. It is only necessary that they make their own models explicit. That this has not been done bears out the failure to make the distinction between logic and Logos, and between the ethical individual and the automaton.

It takes time and effort to think about music in the way I have proposed. I make bold to state the obvious because I feel it necessary to draw attention to the thesis that music, after all, is about audible proof. I have no argument with the requirement to produce audible outcomes; but the significance of the act to human development cannot be ignored. Being a pragmatist does not absolve one of the necessity and responsibility of thinking. Although it is true that one best learns to sing or play by doing it, it does not follow that pragmatism is the only way to be musical. “In human actions,” states Reid, “there is always an idea and a purpose, and the important question is whether the purpose is acknowledged or critically scrutinised ... (1957:201).
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

DENOUEMENT

Introduction

"In music lies the power to complete the great circle of the evolution of human consciousness" (Steiner 1925:32). In this statement Steiner is proclaiming his confidence in music as an epistemological cipher or key of universal significance. As Godwin puts it, "... Steiner gives a psychological justification for the use of music as a source of universal understanding" (1982:385). However, it is of the nature of a key to lock or unlock depending on whether one is bent on discovery or security. Steiner's view is that the task of music is to release the human spirit, not barricade it in the organism.

Music is the key. What, though, does Steiner imply in his use of the circle as an evolutionary symbol? Astrophysicists now regard the universe as curving back on itself. It has no outside. However, it takes an insight of non-dual thinking to grasp that if a thing has no outside, then it cannot have an inside. Rather, out is in and vice versa. In other words, the universe is a polarity of mutual interpenetration, and, since it is played out in the human being, mutual identification. Steiner came upon this insight through the practice of projective or synthetic geometry - a purely imaginative activity - long before astrophysics came to its calculation. In simple terms what it means is that if I set out in a line, I will not go on indefinitely in the same direction, but will eventually return to the starting point from behind. Time, then, is not infinite.

The epistemological path, the path of knowing, is an orbit leading from the essential in me to the essential in the universe, and takes place, significantly, through time. We should learn to know what we already know, meaning that to know what is already inscribed into our destiny is the epistemological goal of humanity. In the circle is life circumscribed. Steiner's aphorism speaks of an incomplete circle, the completion of which would mark a whole, a new beginning, but a beginning that has always been there. An incomplete circle would swing back
to that new beginning. Having set out from a point, a source, return to it would presumably be a state of union, completeness, a purposive revolution in fact.¹ For Steiner, the intense study of music and its cognitive processes represents the model by which humanity can best come to know the significance of knowing to its own evolution. Through musical experience more than any other, what goes on in the spectrum of consciousness can be known to itself.

Steiner’s comment deserves careful study. For him, the circle represents the completion of a process of consciousness. However, since reality is not dual, but polar, the completion of the evolutionary orbit demands that we come to know the universal (polar) process of creation, which may be seen in one direction as a progression from ethereal to solid, fine to coarse, singularity through division to multiplicity. But that is only half the cycle. There is another (generally unnoticed) reciprocal progression in the opposite direction and towards the opposite but correlative state of consciousness, that is, from a pluralistic and divided state towards the dissolution of artificial boundaries between things and their fusing into progressively larger wholes. Crucially, the outcome in both cases is the single unit, the individual.

There would seem to be a contradiction implicit in the concept of the individual. It is a contradiction only from a dual perspective. The concept can be viewed another way. The more a singular unit strives to be a part of the whole, the more individual it becomes on a finer plane. Thomas expresses well this notion of the individual consciousness growing towards awareness of itself: “Being-efforts are the driving force of evolution: while I try to realise my own nature I become a part of a higher ... system and enter into the order-creating (syntropic) process” (1991:117). Whatever work I undertake towards awareness in fulfilling my true individuality is at the same time a contribution to individuality on a higher level, that is, to universal ‘I’-ness. Consciousness is not a passive accompaniment to, but an essential participant in, the evolutionary process. As the geneticist, Theodosius Dobzhansky, puts it: “The meaning of an individual life is its inclusion in the evolutionary upswing of noogenesis. ... Noogenesis leads to affirmation, not to levelling of individuality” (1969:135). The concept is actually a polarity. The individual, the single entity, is simultaneously one among many and

¹ Stravinsky relates the story told by G.K. Chesterton who meets an innkeeper in Calais. The innkeeper complains about the increasing lack of personal freedom despite three revolutions. Chesterton apparently responded by pointing out that “a revolution, in the true sense of the word, was the movement of an object in motion that described a closed curve, and thus always returned to the point where it has started ...” (1970:13).
one in which the many are contained, an integer, a thing complete in itself. Awareness of this unity without unification is an authentic *holos*.

Again, these two processes only *appear* to be contradictory. The first creative process, impelled toward differentiated physical creation, always moves in the direction of becoming *something*. The second *returns* to the insubstantial starting point, to undifferentiated unity (which is not nothing.) It is this realm to which *awareness* of musical processes can rise.

The first process might be described as involutionary, the second evolutionary. Again, involution is the process of increasing density during which the start point, the correlative consciousness, is obscured. It is present *in* the creation on the physical plane but is hidden. With evolution, consciousness begins to emerge from that obscurity. The Latin word is *evolvere*, meaning ‘to roll out,’ that is, to become less dense.

Evolution is not strictly a *reversal* of involution. It is not a dissolution and absorption of the manifest in the unmanifest, that is, a nebulous holism. It is the appearance of a higher form of consciousness *within* its creation on the physical plane, an *intensification*, not a dissolution of individuality.

It may be that Steiner is alluding to an *ontological* revolution. I believe that what he means in addition is an *epistemological* process involving increasing awareness of the creative principle of polarity or *Logos*. Another way of saying this is that the teleological mode of explanation is suitable for historical purposes, while the correlative or polar mode is suitable for ‘life’ processes. The polar state, when experienced, might be said to be of the nature of an epistemic threshold. It takes place for and in the individuals and unites them in greater and greater wholes. Grof reports on the *threshold* experience of those who arrive at ‘holotropic’ states. The universal principle of polarity, he says, offers not only an infinite number of possibilities for becoming a separate individual, but also an equally rich and ingenious range of opportunities for dissolution of boundaries and fusion that mediate experiential return to the source. The unitive experiences make it possible for the individual units of consciousness to overcome their alienation and free themselves from the delusion of their separateness. This
transcendence of what earlier appeared to be absolute boundaries and the resulting

I have explained these complementary processes of creation for the reason that, as a
model of polarity, they have application on many levels.

First, I have titled the final chapter denouement because I intend to complete the process
of unravelling the continuously expanding tangle of issues and concerns, which, for the most
part, I have only adumbrated in the preceding chapters. This aspect of the thesis has been
involutionary. But the chapter is a denouement in another sense, namely, the gathering and
fusing together into a comprehensible whole the many loose ends necessarily implicated in
grappling with anything that has assumed a mystery status. This aspect is evolutionary.
Denouement, then, has a twofold function; it distinguishes and unites. In this application,
polarity is architectural.

That twofoldness applies also in the cognitive domain. If the concept of a thing consists
in the many sense-percepts that combine to make it what it is, knowing the thing would mean
distinguishing between the percepts in order to find out how those particulars unite in thinking
to form the thing’s concept. In this manner the concept itself, precisely that unifying element
which in ordinary cognition remains unseen, comes into view. (Consistent with this is my
argument that where there is an unseen concept, or none at all, predicate logic inserts itself in
the gap.) That is to say, knowledge of the concept is a higher (evolutionary) level of knowing.

On yet a third plane, the examination and discovery of what it is that connects the
theoretical and operational to the sublime, what comprises the epistemological and educational
omission, is a journey into largely uncharted territory, the terra incognita. It, too, is an
evolutionary process.

I have emphasised the word ‘journey’ in order to reinforce the notion of my work as a
progression, an on-going evolution of increasing awareness, rather than as an arrival
somewhere. This distinction is by way of explaining the content and mode of delivery of the
chapter. I do not wish to conjure-up a universally useful answer to the question, ‘why music?’
that will serve for all time as a touchstone of identification. Such definitions, in becoming

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convention, lose their sense of evolving and eventually cease to have any meaning at all. Heidegger puts this well when he speaks of the exploration of language, but his comment applies equally to that other mystery of utterance, music. I paraphrase: “We do not wish to assault [music] in order to force it into the grip of ideas already fixed beforehand” (1975:190). And later: “… we do not want to get anywhere. We would like only, for once, to get to just where we are already” (1975:190). T.S Eliot, too, in The Four Quartets, describes the circulatory journey:

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

The many questions and concerns that have gone begging in previous chapters seek, then, in this chapter, not just explanation, but comprehension. The search is for meaning, not causes. I reiterate that I want to find for music its own way of manifesting, a concept for music in its own musicness and not only as something serving human utility.

The denouement design comprises four parts: a) a synopsis in which I will sieve previously presented content into finer material, b) a discussion of the foundational principles of a curriculum that emerges out of the epistemology of musical utterance I have developed here, and which I am calling Philomusika, c) a series of creative phenomenological depictions, or musings, on the epistemological essentials of the music-humanness relation, and d) a brief thesis conclusion.

PART A - SYNOPSIS

Leading Educational Principles

The synopsis discussion circumscribes a number of related leading principles that I have extracted from the commentary in previous chapters:
1) Music is a specifically human medium of expression. Its origins, provenance, ontology, purpose, mode of operation and reason for being all have a bearing on how human being was and is. The depth of meaning embedded in this structure of relation is not recoverable by ordinary representational apprehension.

2) The *primary* function of music is educational, not productive or specialised.

3) Because that is the case, every person is entitled to a *musical*, distinguished from a product-oriented, education.

4) Musical education as advocated in this thesis should in the future consist in the recovery of music’s ethical, paideutic and curative functions through intensified awareness of the relation between music and the perceiving, thinking, feeling and willing human being.

5) One method - advocated in this thesis - of the recovery of awareness could be through the application of a curriculum based on a psychology of imagination.

*The Primacy of an Epistemology of Musical Utterance for Our Time*

In order to confirm how I arrived at the above guiding principles, I will need to revisit a number of my early propositions, namely, that there has been an historical enervation of artistic (cognitive) feeling, that this loss is connected with the corresponding loss of the notion of music as mystery, and that both are implicated in the involution-evolution polarity of creation.

We attribute to music its mystery status only when we are inclined to think about it. Otherwise the mystery goes unnoticed and unattended. “So it has come about,” Zuckerkandl observes, “that the very generations that have known more glorious music, and learned to observe it more closely than any that preceded them have on the whole stopped thinking about music” (1973a:5).² Paradoxically, however, the mystery persists (when we *do* think about it) because music is impervious to the very *logical* thought we bring to bear on it. Logical

² I have argued that previous epochs *did* think about music, or rather, thought *out of* it, because they were more aware of its astrological significance, but that there has been a substitution of thought by deed.
thinking is incapable of explaining or enumerating all the characteristics of what makes music evident. Another way of saying this is that music remains a mystery because it has proved impossible to force-fit into the dominant analytical framework of a positivist mode of thinking. Zuckerkandl writes:

It seems that decades of positivist thinking have robbed us of the ability even to see problems of the sort that music raises. It is true that the century which preceded ours was the first to develop a separate science of music; however, like all nineteenth-century science, it was oriented after the pattern of natural science (1973a:5).

On the other hand, that sentimental view is erroneous, I believe, that objects - perhaps out of impatience with verbal discourse - that music can retain its mystery status just by not thinking about it.\footnote{This comment is in line with my previous argument that music could emerge as a do-able art precisely because it ceased to be thought about. Every act of soundful creation involves an act of will, and (embodied) willing is the least conscious of human faculties. Willing bypasses thinking. That meaning diminishes inversely with the repetitive manipulation of experience is a root concept of being in the world.} That music is an ontological mystery deserving reverence and wonder does not disqualify it as a subject of thought. As Zuckerkandl, again, retorts: “Thought that is true to its subject does not annul miracles. It penetrates the fog around them; it brings them out of the darkness into light” (1973a:6). Music is no less a wonder for having been thought about. Rather, it is a mystery awaiting timely comprehension.

Although I think it is fair to say that both modes of thought, the one attempting to gain access to the mystery by way of analytical penetration, and the other by taking recourse to claims of intuitive, feminine, right-brain thinking, are particular kinds of thought. Neither, in my opinion, takes into account the evolution of its own perspective, which is in all essentials dual. I have argued that one need look no further than music itself for evidence of perspective evolution. To affirm:

We should not lose sight of the fact that a genuine musical scale (or tonality, in a more fundamental sense) is, in a way, an organic phenomenon, a materialised product of our inmost psychic functions, which, like everything else live and organic, is bound to grow, to expand, to evolve continuously. It is essentially an evolving, not a static phenomenon (Yasser 1975:3).
That we have lost sight of it, and that the aesthetic feeling for tone and interval has diminished, can be seen in the positivist assumption that progress, cognitive and material, is inevitably a movement from primitive to sophisticated, from simple to complex. In musical endeavour, it is an assumption "that makes some modern composers, who earnestly long for increased tonal material, lean to a 'short-cut' solution to this problem, namely, to a purely mechanical division of the equally tempered intervals of our present system into quarter tones or sixth tones or even smaller fractions" (1975:4). Yasser's comment points to the involutionary process in evolution. (Recall my contention that consciousness has contracted, and that this movement corresponds to the shrinking and homogenisation of distances and the onset of operational thought, or mechanical measuring - measuring minus feeling - of the spaces between sense-perceptible phenomena.) It has gone unnoticed that at any moment in consciousness involution, consciousness itself, through its perspective, is the measure.

Although such 'short-cut solutions' are perhaps historically inevitable, and so, serve to illustrate my point, they are artistically unjustified because they are not ontologically organic, as Yasser argues. Progress should not be confused with increasing complexity, for as I have discussed, progress is a two-way proposition. The general purport of my project has been to establish the desiderata for an education that might assist music to continue to evolve in a way that accords with what is essential or purely musical in it. My response has been to submit that further progress consists in consciousness taking in hand its own evolution, and that observation of the trajectory taken by consciousness suggests that epistemic awareness could result from an adjustment to the binary model through which we ordinarily lay claim to cognitive coherence. Although it is true that binary opposition in observation results in some form of knowledge, it is entirely dependent on a particular observational perspective.

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4 One notion on which Plato and Aristotle agreed was that a thing's essence (distinguished from accident or chance) is not a matter of convention, meaning that it is not determined by agreement on the ways we are wont to describe it. If such were the case, what is essential in a thing would change in accordance with changes in language. Essence is neither nominal nor atomic. It is immutable. I quote Kühlwind on this: "It is well known that the Aristotelian categories cannot be explained, nor can they be somehow 'derived.' They did not, for instance, arise by abstracting from a multitude of observations; the very ordering of these observations into coherent groups presupposes an ordering principle [Logos or measure], and this is itself the category. The category 'being' does not come about by observation of many existent things; rather, I recognise them as existent because the category of 'being' is known to me before it has a verbal expression. The categories are purely intuitive formations; only in retrospect can they become 'abstract' i.e., not experienced, giving up their life by entering into everyday consciousness, formulated and overlaid with words" (1990:17-18). These "living ideals" (1990:18) are revivified or brought back to life, as it were, in the mind that has been prepared for them.
Accordingly, I have argued that epistemological monism is a projection or continuation into the supersensible domain of the already evidential dual (physical) perspective, and that the move to take up this new perspective is one homologous with, and not contrary to, the more familiar doctrine of biological evolution. The two are complementary.

In invoking epistemological monism (the epistemic threshold between sense and spirit) as the evolutionary path of consciousness, I believe there is a special case to be made for a modern epistemology of that most human of human capacities, coherent utterance, distinguished from any other kind, in short, a Logos epistemology.\(^5\) Humanity is what and how it utters. It is, in its essence, word-like.

My curricular work, however, has led me to the experience that any theory of utterance seeking to understand, rather than merely utilise, utterance, can scarcely avoid the conflict between a biological and entelechical ontology. Yet, if they are constantly held apart (perhaps in the desire for epistemological consensus), their discordance will eventually be unnoticed, and little by way of resolution can be gained. I have come rather late to the idea that by bringing the two into sharp discord, there is an opportunity to establish their concord. (I will discuss below how the Pythagorean notion of harmonia is a perfect model of polarity exhibiting possibilities for resolution of the involution-evolution dichotomy.) As Barfield says: “Some violence is inevitable when men are called on, in any sphere, not to correct their previous ideas by removing some error, but actually to move forward to a new plane that includes, rather than replaces, the old” (1988:174). If, as I have argued, human beings are by nature utterance-like, then for this insight to settle into cognition induces profound wonder. When the experience being described, then, exceeds in its immensity every conception the intellect can form about it, the discussion must proceed negatively; for the truth is not given, but uncovered in the removal of all unwanted obscurantist material, rather as the sculptor chips away at the stone to reveal the countenance of his/her subject.

\(^{5}\) I should perhaps reaffirm in keeping with Steiner’s spiritual philosophy that I regard epistemic awareness as an ethical ideal. As my previous Platonic commentary suggests, the one overarching Good is knowing; not knowledge how (or in the vernacular, know-how) but knowledge that, or epistemological knowledge. The distinction is explicit in Socrates, (who, as I suggested, is the historical representative of humanity’s move to self-conscious adolescence) in the oft-cited phrase: ‘I know that I know nothing.’ This is not a veiled disavowal of human agency. Rather, it is an epistemological statement of the ethical individual.
One critical aspect of such an epistemology, then, would be establishing and experiencing the fundamental differences between verbal and musical utterance, that is, how they behave, while at the same time acknowledging their common provenance.

I will attempt here to gather up and bring to a head my previous discussion on that issue. Words are signs, symbols. But if we penetrate the fact of their coherent sounding, of their being uttered, it will be found that they are in their origin not at all symbolic. (This latter applies of course to music also.) Soundful utterance is eminently real. Only life is able to produce utterance. (Inorganic nature does not sound.) The sense for utterance, then, is closest to the sense for life. But where there is life, there is mind, even in a single-celled amoeba. Only self-conscious life, however, is able to produce coherent utterance. This further aspect of self-conscious mind distinguishes the human from the animal. If there has always been life, there has always been mind, and where there has always been mind, there has never been a toneless world. Zuckerkandl comments: “It was not the [to us, soundless] motion of the spheres but their harmony, their sounding together, of which men talked when they thought of the universe as alive. It seemed to them that the universal life must reveal itself as something audible rather than visible” (1973a:2). But it is tone heard so deeply that it is not ‘heard’ at all, to draw again on the poetic thought of T.S Eliot.

Experiential work and deeper thinking into this mind-life-sound trierarchy brings into sharp relief the essential distinction between toneful utterance and verbal utterance, or song and speech, and also their shared origin. As I argued in Chapter Nine, words, especially by way of technological delivery, are the source of all human power over the phenomenal world (even when they are not explicitly articulated), for they emerge and merge together with things as they appear. Words are of the phenomenal nature of things. Their utterance brings a sense-perceptible, solid, world into existence for us. However, we have no awareness that such is the case. Awareness would necessitate our using words more consciously, which, as I have pointedly argued, is not the case. How does verbal utterance come to exercise such power?

Words are the medium of configuration, of thought that differentiates. Words draw the outlines of things. The things so designated seek a name. They are compliant, accepting, submissive. Their naming brings them into focus, configures, defines them. In that very act of
definition, however, they are ignored. In a sense, they cease to be. Their animism is frozen, framed by the word. Their vitality becomes identical with their definition. The words then become 'things' per se. "Segmentation of nature is an aspect of grammar ..." (1956:240), as Benjamin Lee Whorf affirms. Actually, "... there is no acceptable way to describe a unitary transaction of the organism-environment field without ascribing the action to either the organism or the environment, thus presenting the convincing illusion that the two are actually separate. Language - the most basic constituent of the Biosocial Band - is the prototypical reinforcer of dualisms ..." (Wilber 1993:123). As I argued in Chapter Nine, this has not always been the case, as the Greek experience evidences.

Words are not powerless. On the contrary, they are so powerful as to overpower awareness of the word-ing, the say-ing, the nam-ing, and the thing, in its essence, so named. Furthermore, words can promote and encourage ignorance, injustice, and in extreme cases, annihilation of life.

I have found that exploration of words, or better, word-ing, leads to the discovery that the only kind of sonic utterance that does not remain connected with the external world of objects is musical utterance, that is, tone and interval. (Even words that express emotional states are conceptual, and are not the states so named.) Words define (in the sense of configuring) a three-dimensional world, delimit it. Music is fundamentally one-dimensional, yet, in a manner for the moment inexplicable, moves beyond dimensionality, especially the dimension of spatial depth. Yet, there is so much depth that the extensive 'in-front-of, 'behind' and 'side-by-side' distinctions common to spatial configuration in visible reality cease to have any meaning at all. This intensive depth is inaccessible by ordinary words.

That ordinary language is denied access to this depth, however, does not in the least imply that no such domain exists. (Intensive depth is accessible, for example, to metaphor, to poetic language.) It is just that it is not the kind of space that is able to contain words, whose whole nature is to expand, to spread-out, as it were, over the world.

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6 I include in this lyrical and dramatic verse, which, although word-like, are essentially musical.
What we have not seen is that the sound of the word, or the tone element in it, reaches beyond what it designates or signifies. The depth is accessible to the separate constituents of language, the primeval phonemes, before they combine to become words. It is just that words, in becoming words, create their own limits. That is their purpose. They limit themselves by becoming the medium of configuring, of naming, of delineating the boundaries of things, of measuring in the pejorative sense.

This constraint of verbal thought does not mean, however, that what cannot be said cannot be known, contra Wittgenstein (1990), who argued that the limits to his language meant the limits to his world. The unknowable is unknowable absolutely only from a perspective that is extensive, logical and linguistic. Nor does it mean that that intensive depth beyond which the word cannot penetrate is unutterable. The intensive depth is not toneless. What cannot be known can be sung. Actually, that is just what I, as a self-conscious human, do. What I am most intimate with I sing about; so intimate, in fact, that I do not see the intimacy. It might be said that words are the ideal (extensive) medium of uttering distinction, whereas tone is the most apt medium of uttering unity in distinction. (I will elaborate this further below.)

No account of utterance, then, in terms of verbal images and representations will suffice for increased awareness of its provenance; for the relation which I believe ethical individualism now requires of Western thinking is not one of wilful, self-assertive power over things, but one of awareness to, and awareness of, how they, and, by definition, we, come to be. The things are not over against us; they are of us. But if we are to truly know this, a radical inversion of the knower-known relation, a metanoia, (an inversion) is essential. Cognitively, the distinction is one between power over things, and empowerment of those things to be what they are.7

7 In the classical Logos doctrine, to classify a thing is to name it. To name a thing is to have power over its soul, for the name of a thing is its soul. (The mythical figure of Orpheus seeks to represent this.) But to have power over it is at the same time to empower it, to ensoul it, and thus the reciprocal ontological relation between word-endowed human and thing. Logosing may be regarded as naming in the sense that naming (distinguished from habitual nominalism), by virtue of cosmic reason (Logos), gives order and intelligibility to the world. This is conscious naming. To give a trivial example, a brick is not an inert physical object, a mere building block, but rather, the outcome of a process of the elemental qualities of earth and fire, or clay and heat in substantial terms. To truly name it would mean discovering (by finding the sound or sounds for it) how awareness of the meeting of those elements guides the organs of speech in the task of finding its name. Its name will be inseparable, not from what it is, but from how it came to be, that is to say, not in its external appearance, but in its essence. To divine a
My discussion here is by way of suggesting that with respect to an epistemology of utterance, there is a world of difference between thinking about epistemology, which is achieved verbally, and epistemic thinking, which is not. I make this distinction because the objection is so often made that music is about feeling. All too often this objection implies that where music is concerned there is no room for thinking. The objection holds true in one sense only, namely, that it is made from a dual perspective. It maintains the illusion of duality and power. It dichotomises thinking and feeling as mutually exclusive by assuming from the start that all thinking is verbal. (Even in the case of the brick, an act of ontological speaking has been imbued with feeling.) In response, I have argued that where musical knowing is concerned, and ideally, all cognition, there is feeling not so easily distinguishable - not at least from a dual perspective - from thinking, feeling that is of the nature of thinking, cognitive feeling. Mind is not ratiocination only.

Since I have made the point that an epistemology worthy of the name ought to substantiate itself through its curriculum, an epistemology of utterance (and perhaps any epistemology) that leaves feeling as a way of knowing out of its method can only survey the perimeter of utterance. It will lack depth. It will be object-focused. As I discuss in Appendix A, our sense of cognitive independence, our sense of being autonomous agents in the world, is founded on just the illusion that we have the power of free decision, when, in reality, we are entirely dependent on the presence (through our wording of it) of the phenomenal world of things, the perception of which is an artificial definition achieved by us.

It is by virtue of this illusion that words have come to exercise such puissance over things. The words, uttered habitually and unconsciously, keep the illusion alive. They aid the process of identification of things, as they must, but they limit the capacity to know them by bringing to a standstill the movement of knowing's improvisatory qualities. Words stand between us and the things. Music, on the other hand, which is about the absence of things, and by definition, the absence of concepts, or thing-ing, is closer in this sense to the Word than is the ordinary word. Their common Logos origin, however, will remain indefinitely obscured.

name for the object in this way is to find its idea, and so, confer soul on it, and in so doing, bring it into being. See Sardello (1992) for some highly evocative examples of ensouling or logosing.
unless the *deed* of utterance is raised to the realm of consciousness. *Self-awareness* must become *Logos* awareness.

I have emphasised ‘deed’ for the reason that I want to draw attention to the other missing element demanding consideration in an epistemology of musical utterance, namely, *volition*. There was not first humanity who conceived of music to make life more pleasant or bearable, or to occupy leisure time. This is largely the cultural position to which music, in becoming an art (in the sense of being an appendix to ordinary life), has been relegated today. But human being and music are so homologous and syntonic in their genesis that they are ontologically inseparable. To so separate them as modernity has done, by reallocating music to contingency, and biology to necessity, is an illogical contradiction.

In my opinion, a civilisation not committed to a *Logos* provenance can only become committed to itself (nihilism). Its only object must be itself. Accordingly, the view that institutional authority, including education, can keep the lid on the behavioural Pandora’s Box, and so, restrain human conceit, self-adoration, and materialistic idolatry, is mistaken. It overlooks (because unconscious) the *ethical* dimension of human volition, that is, *free will*.

Knowledge must be taught and grasped in more than the theoretical sense. When it is taught and grasped with feeling and willing, reverence for what is taught becomes an *actual experience*. Feeling and willing are experienced as actual powers active in the world.

**PART B - PHILOMUSIKA: THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF A CURRICULUM FOR THE FUTURE**

**Introduction**

In this part I will outline the foundational principles to guide a curriculum of musical utterance as I see them according with ethical individualism. What I write here might constitute the philosophical fundamentals informing the actual curriculum document that would be handed to students who choose to undertake a future curriculum as a personal
initiative in coming to epistemic awareness, which, as I have argued, is a critical goal in personal and world biography.

**Definition:** Philomusika translates as 'love of music.'

**Maxim:** There is a profound purpose underlying human utterance, the meaning of which it is in the power of every individual to discover, to know, and to put to use. This curriculum concerns musical utterance as a path of personal biographical development and communal enrichment.

**Curriculum Aim:** To reawaken personal sensitivity to musical phenomena through the conscious use of one's own voice and body and through contemplation of the significance of music for the unfolding of one's biography and the evolution of humanity as a whole.

**Rationale:** As living, conscious organisms, humans possess within the means of creating audible forms that have no associative meaning, but nevertheless, meaning of some sort. Such forms are musical. The word 'means' does not allude to our morphogenetic endowment but something transcending this. Music's forms and patterns, duly contemplated, reveal a largely forgotten richness of wisdom recoverable in and by human consciousness, its superindividual correlative. Heidegger's observation that the usual view of poetry as a higher mode of ordinary language is incorrect, and rather, that the opposite is the case, that "everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer" (1975:208) is no less true of music. Musical utterance has become commonplace, its ontology forgotten, its feeling exhausted, and its articulation facile but inartistic, spurning an "industry of bad taste in general" (Thomas 1991:114). Its production is not correlative to actual thinking. Despite this degeneration, the lost connection between Logos and human agency, rediscovered, can metamorphose into an intuition of the provenance of musical utterance and its genesis in the life of the spirit. The recovery of meaning comes about through the practice of empathy (the inverse perspective or metanoia) with the two essentials comprising a truly universal music, namely, tone and interval. By beginning with an image, one gives audition a context of meaning and at the same time extricates oneself from the sensationalist doctrine.
Guiding Philosophy: Humanity today faces unprecedented challenges that specialised knowledge and accumulated belief are unable to meet. The incessant contradiction of, and scepticism towards, a unitary truth, has laid bare an inner void which certain types of knowledge have filled to overflowing, and which cannot possibly be digested. The collective cognitive metabolism has been fed by the illusion that human being in its entirety consists in a permanent and specialised condition of cognition. The inconsistency - rather than the productive rhythm - we live between inner and outer guidance is almost too acute to tolerate. The development of a new human organ, through the practice of a new (inverse) perspective is required to meet these challenges. It cannot evolve by way of expert opinion or ready-made theories. Only human freedom can address the problems, for only individuals can be responsible in their freedom. The common good is rooted in the free (conscious) individual. But the free individual must be encouraged through empowerment, as Guba and Lincoln affirm:

It is certainly possible to coerce people into compliance, but it is impossible to coerce them into excellence – by anyone’s definition. Only empowerment can invest people with a sense of self-sufficiency, which enables them to act in productive ways. Only empowerment can encourage risk-taking, unleash energy, stimulate creativity, instill pride, build commitment, prompt the taking of responsibility, and evoke a sense of investment and ownership (1989:226-227).

What is meant by (epistemic) empowerment? All problems of knowledge are problems of utterance. No amount of knowledge is of any use unless one has the wisdom to externalise it in such a way that it serves the continuance of life. Yet the one feature missing in most conventional fields of knowledge is human development that serves its own ends, human development without economic and autocratic agendas. How is it possible to use knowledge in a responsible way if the learner is not authorised to connect with it on a deeper level, if one’s knowing is constrained always within the membran of conventional disbelief? It is through the tools of epistemic orientation that individuals can be empowered to discover and put to use the full range of their epistemic resources. The tool or instrument of empowerment is utterance made conscious; utterance in all its forms, namely, speech, song and gesture, and even spatial structures, all of which share a common provenance and a common aim, namely, to ‘give voice’ to human being in the true meaning of Logos.
One advantage of *musical* utterance is that differences between musical cultures are easier to bridge than those between particular languages. Although all utterance has an acultural origin, music is better able to transcend whatever cultural differences there may be because the forces active in it, namely, those which I have characterised as longing, intimacy and will, are not associative, but belong to a third pole of forces which are not only personally, but universally valid. Differences in historical enculturation, worldview, emotion, logic, dialect and so on, endemic in speech forms, can be accommodated in the *vowels* common to all languages and all voices, that is, in song. For this reason, the *essential* in music can show the way to a shared humanity, for it has a universally human foundation. Stravinsky's claim is only a relatively recent statement of a reality known to major philosophical systems for millennia before him: "... the profound meaning of music and its essential aim, ... is to promote a communion, a union of man with his fellow man and with the Supreme Being" (1970:25).

*Purity* of expression, expression with nothing added, also transcends the self, and is eminently sharable by others. Common to all music is the immanent (tragic) wisdom that antecedes its discovery and formulation by human intelligence. The wisdom - not its product - is apparent in the babbling of infants in all cultures. These sounds are not language-specific, but early attempts at pattern making which are discovered and performed without any adult intervention or supervision.

Intelligibility consists in renewing one's acquaintance with this capacity (which only later becomes a habit) by connecting with it *in* oneself, in reaching into the depth to touch the source of one's form-making ability. This is not a task only for the trained musician or the popular cultural icon. On the contrary, I wish to dispel

... the aesthetic that is embodied in late twentieth-century Western institutions of musical production, distribution, and consumption - an aesthetic which is essentially consumer-orientated in that music is treated as a kind of commodity whose value is realised in the gratification of the [passive] listener. This represents a distinctly restrictive approach to music..." (Cook 1992:7-8).
The recently evolved cult of the creative genius must be abandoned. Although it is true that composition and performance require specialised knowledge and application, the *reception* of music “does not, as a precondition, depend upon the listener having any kind of trained understanding of what he hears” (1992:2). The capacity to recognise - distinguished from produce - coherent, and even highly-refined, sonic pattern is innate. John Blacking, for example, is most emphatic about this:

In most industrial societies, merit is generally judged according to signs of immediate productivity and profits, and postulated usefulness, within the boundaries of a given system. Latent ability is rarely recognized or nurtured, unless its bearer belongs to the right social class or happens to show evidence of what people have learned to regard as talent. Thus, children are judged to be musical or unmusical on the basis of their ability to *perform* music. And yet the very existence of a professional performer, as well as his necessary financial support, depends on listeners who in one important respect must be no less musically proficient than he is. They must be able to distinguish and interrelate different patterns of sound (1974:9 my emphasis).

Although different cultures each have their own idea of what qualifies as music, the formative principles upon which sonic events are organised are arrived at by some sort of consensus. “No such consensus can exist,” writes Blacking, “until there is some common ground of experience …” (1974:10).

Although I acknowledge that musicality is perhaps *the* most problematic concept in music research, acknowledgment of this ‘common ground of experience’ leads me to assert that the typological classification of humanity into musical and unmusical is in itself spurious and unjustified. Musicality is not merely the possession of a small number of individuals, but an essential and, as I see it, biographically relevant faculty of humanity, a capacity that invokes the very idea - even if ineffable - of what it is to be human. It is a premature conception that draws a line between a privileged minority who are supposedly gifted, that is, musical, and the rest of humanity that, presumptuously, is unmusical.\(^5\) (I have argued the distinction between

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\(^5\) It is worth reiterating my earlier speculation that as music became less a way of thinking into the cosmos (a practice observable in the Greek *psyche*) it became more a means of *personal* expression. Furthermore, as music became more a practical expedient (the gain) the more awareness of the cosmos-human correspondence diminished (the loss). At this point, the ‘instrument’ became detached from the *psyche* and was constructed and
talent and executory skill or facility.) Zuckerkandl relates how, in the Platonic discourse, the *Phaedo*, Socrates, on the eve of his death, came to realise the limitations of logical thinking through rational discourse, and saw that music, "the other power which, along with language, fully defines man as a spiritual being" (1973b:2-3). He explains:

>In the *Phaedo*[,] musicality is not the property of individuals but an essential attribute of the human species. The implication is not that some men are musical while others are not, but that man is a musical animal, that is, a being predisposed to music and in need of music, a being that for its full realization must express itself in tones and owes it to itself and to the world to produce music. In this sense, musicality is not something one may or may not have, but something that - along with other factors - is constitutive of man. So defined, the concept cannot have a negative counterpart; to call a man unmusical would be meaningless, self-contradictory. Nobody is being singled out and set apart. Music is the concern of all, not of a privileged elite, and if musicality represents an asset, it is not the prerogative of a chosen few, but an endowment of man as man (1973b:7-8).

Music is best viewed as a continuing regeneration of humanness, and humanness at its best. Consistency to a musical-unmusical opposition must lead ultimately to the absurd corollary that someone who is not musical is not ontologically human. In reality, there cannot be a musical person juxtaposed with an unmusical person; for the difference is one of degree, not kind. *Homo sapiens* is, by definition, *homo musicus*. It follows that although physiological and psychological criteria represent "valuable indices for the diagnosis of musicality" (Révész 1954:131 my emphasis), a realistic concept of musicality in the sense of it being ontologically 'constitutive' of, and not merely incidental to, human being, is clearly beyond the application of such criteria. It is an ineluctable truth that the human attribute to which we give the name 'musicality,' seeks, and is satisfied, not only by sensuous effect. What is sought in addition, then, is not constituted by the sense-perceptible, and is therefore not susceptible of those concepts that seek to so constrain it. The degree to which a person is musical is dependent on the willingness to respond, to listen, to be attentive, which implies the

situated outside the body. Music became a physical art. Significantly, the Greek word for skill in the artistic sense is *tekhne*.
willingness to take up one’s humanness in full, which I see as ethical individuality. For me, this is a question of a decidedly spiritual kind. I will address it in Part C.

The ongoing human dialogue with music is the source of the answer to the human being as question. It is the lack of an answer to the human existential question that drives the search for meaning. Every person senses the presence of this question even if it is not explicitly voiced. Philomusika, then, may be seen as the task of retracing the trajectory, the previous stages of the involution-evolution polarity of human utterance, which are embodied cumulatively - in more than the enculturated or morphogenetic sense - in each of us, to the source of that ‘talent,’ the true mother-tongue. The common ground is not the individual tone of voice (although this is of indisputable significance to personal empowerment and biography) but the patterns uttered by it; not the onymous voiceprint, but the blueprint of voice. The singer is not the genius; the genius is the Logos.

Again, I am not advocating a sentimental reversion to, or fixation in, the past. The emergence of the self-asserting individual had to happen. The step into the future, however, will be taken by those individuals who desire to know, above all, how music finds its expression in them. Awareness, not exclusion, of temporality, then, is a springboard into epistemic and ontic awareness.

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9 Among those attributes specific to humans is their ability to ethicise, distinguished from the content of ethical tenets. Various schools of thought attribute the content to cultural evolution, and the ability to biological evolution as “genetic instinctoid drives” (Dobzhansky 1969:86). Consistency to these theories would see music, indeed, all art, as cultural elaboration or symbolic embellishment at best. I intend to show through my musings that ethical values do not evolve culturally. The phenomenon known as performance anxiety demonstrates that ethical values are a condition of human existence. Actually, an ethic cannot exist without the ability to envisage alternative courses of action, and choose freely between them. In other words, it is spiritually significant that, since humanity is the only conscious life-form, it can direct its own evolution. That evolution has a teleology, pre-destination, or “orientation,” to use Teilhard de Chardin’s (1964) word, does not in the least rule out freedom. Humans not only know, but can know that they know.

10 It is critical to my thinking to appreciate that what is known today as ‘art music’ is a beginning, an origin, that has culminated in a highly sophisticated development over a brief span of time of only 300 years or so. An exceptional legacy of refinement though it is, musical expression, as such, is an endowment of humanity as a whole. I suspect that it is just because music has undergone this extraordinary refinement that we who are in this century the beneficiaries of it are also the farthest removed from its beginnings, which have receded to the point that they have disappeared from view. Accordingly, I must affirm that I am not opposed to music-making of the highest refinement. I am, after all, a performing musician in the Western art tradition. What I am opposed to is the denial of access of every person to a musical education in the contemplative sense. Any such denial is tantamount to the denial of the notion of human development, which is every person’s entitlement.
The involution-evolution polarity exhibits an historical tension that points to the emergence of the ethically autonomous individual disengaging from institutional authority while simultaneously gaining awareness of the power-empowerment distinction. I believe not only that the history of music encapsulates this development, but also provides a vital clue as to the direction to be taken by consciousness. The clue is hidden in the concept of harmony, which I will take up in Part C.

PART C - MUSING

Introduction

It is not surprising that the word, musing, and its auditory counterpart, hearkening, have been condemned to lexical obscurity. They refer to inwardness of the most inward kind. What the word ‘music’ names is something beyond the perspective that names it. In naming phenomena such as tone and interval into existence as a matter of course, we risk them becoming objects of intellectual curiosity, objects per se. The nominal link to the world cannot be found anywhere in musical experience. The meaning of the musical experience, then, is at best obscure.

Musing is the creative activity of picture-building that seeks to make the essential in music and its use by human beings intelligible. It seeks to recover meaning of all that is implied in being musical. Musing (imagination) in the words of Coleridge, is “that synthetic and magical power” that shows itself “in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness with difference; … the idea with the image; the individual and the representative; … a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order” (1921: 33). Musing’s attitude is the thinking-beholding, fully awake state of awareness. It refers to the thinking element (distinguished from feeling and willing) of intentionality, thinking in its own element.

If attention is directed to any experience, thinking has the innate - though in our time latent - power to transform representation, habitual cognition, into images. The images so
produced are not copies of phenomena, whether external objects or inner events. The imaging activity (which can also be called re-visioning) is the play of formative forces which actually belong to the being of an object or event, but which normally go unperceived. The picturing corresponds to the inner nature of the thing perceived.

Why is musing necessary? In order to answer the question I must bring forward another that was asked in Chapter Three: Can musical experience and its cognitive processes be made intelligible in other than music’s own terms? My response was to draw on the Platonic distinction between sensibility and intelligibility, a distinction that suggests that music is not understandable from its audible manifestations. This distinction runs through all my musings, for it is the root concept of dualism, which has built into it a gain-loss polarity. As I have consistently argued, every experience has an unremembered original, and an original is not replicable as a deed without losing its meaning.

It is repetition that anaesthetises. Humans are condemned to repeat, which is dualising activity. To repeat is to attempt to make perfect, to make flawless. Yet it is the repetition, the routine, the mechanical, that brings to an end the necessity of searching for meaning, which suggests at the very least understanding ‘perfection’ as a concept. Maxine Greene says about this dilemma: “A special sort of critical understanding is required … if persons are not to be overwhelmed by the necessities and determinants that work on every life” (1988:4).

She means imaginal cognition, or musing. According to John Dewey, imagination [which destroys old images in order to create new ones] “is the only gateway through which these meanings [derived from earlier experiences] can find their way into a present interaction; or rather … the conscious adjustment of the new and old is imagination” (1934:272). Routine behaviours, operationalism, sense-habits, the tendency to accede to the given; all these are obstructions of meaning; for they are not conscious functions, that is, correlative to actual thought. Greene summarises Dewey on this: “The word, the concept ‘conscious’ must be emphasised. Experience, for Dewey, becomes ‘human and conscious’ only when what is ‘given here and now is extended by meanings and values drawn from what is absent in fact and present only imaginatively’” (1988:125).
Meaning, intelligibility, is recovered knowledge of that original experience before it became habit. The original experience remains in consciousness (but not in awareness) as an echo not subject to space, and so is recoverable only by thinking that is sense-free. The echo of experience resounds in me. My choice is to attend to it or not. To reclaim the echo, to revision the traces left by an original experience, to become master of its otherwise wayward activity, to digest it by learning to speak its language, is the activity I call musing. I regard musing as inner articulateness, no less than a testimony of love. In the deep attention of musing, divinity sounds in me.

In keeping with Steiner’s aphorism at the beginning of this chapter, I am committed to the view that what is involved in musical experience is a cyclic revolution of interactive soul-spiritual experiences that can be brought to epistemic awareness only by sense-free thinking. What follows is a series of phenomenological depictions or musings. Together they represent my personal curricular effort to illuminate the mystery of musical utterance and the nature of the music-humanness relation, or, to put it perhaps more warmly, to bring my deepest nature in harmony with the creative Word, the source of my knowing. The musings have evolved as the outcome of daily practice of musing, hearkening and phenomenological observation over a period of five years.\footnote{I should perhaps inform the reader that during the research tenure I have been employed on a part-time basis in a tertiary music institution in Melbourne. The remainder of each week has been spent at my home in the remote Strzelecki Ranges. The house, which I purchased at the beginning of the research tenure, is not connected to the power grid. This has meant that I have been unable to use electricity-driven conveniences of any sort. In living this dual life, I have been able to experience the ‘adjustment pains’ provoked by regular withdrawal from sensestimulation, particularly the artificial kind, and re-entry into that environment.}

Before proceeding I wish to offer a few words of explanation as to how the musings have evolved. Their pictorial start-point is the Genesis myth, which, although attributed to Christian theology, is echoed in the mythology of provenance of almost every culture, Eastern and Western. It is itself one of my musings, but also represents the source and context of meaning for the musings that follow it. I will attempt to make clear through the musings that what has become known as the Void is the residence of original experiences, and that meaning consists in retrieving and digesting those experiences as a personal biographical initiative. The experiences leave their traces in the organism but are in themselves formless (the Void implies
formlessness). Hurt, loss, longing, shame, fear and ardour all have originals that are repeated time and time again throughout a life-course. I see these experiences as wordless answers to the questions put to us by the unusual events of life. We must learn to listen to these vestiges of an original utterance, which are more of the nature of gesture or primeval language. It is they, not I, who do the speaking, and each has its own way of showing itself.

They overpower their owner; they do so just because (s)he refuses to own them. Those originals, then, must be given form appropriate to their particular character if they are to be digested at all. It is precisely because they are nebulous that they overpower us when we least need them to do so.

The dilemma, however, is this. Void and form comprise a polarity, although we rarely consider them that way. The experiences to which I refer may be formless, but they are nevertheless existentially anarchic; and anarchy, in life as in music, is generally shunned. The content of the Void, then, is a source of continuing a-void-ance, for its formlessness is misconstrued as nothingness. The fear of being unformed, uncreated, is perhaps the abiding paranoia of modernity. Freedom is the Void.

The solution is to see the original experiences as ethical guides in one’s biographical progress, in which case they are not to be avoided, but warmly embraced. In giving form to their vagueness, in digesting them, their formless anarchy is disarmed, and I have affirmed my freedom by not ensnaring myself in the cause-effect nexus. As Charles Taylor (after his subject, Hegel) puts this sense of ownership: “The struggle to be free - against limitations, oppression, distortions of inner and outer origin - is powered by an affirmation of this defining situation as ours” (1977:160).

Finally, before proceeding with the musings I must introduce a caveat. In converting musing into a noun I risk misunderstanding. Musing is action; fluid, wordless, living thinking. It is important to appreciate that the musings that follow are not musing itself, the activity, but verbal descriptions, the preserved sediment of musing. To be fully understood, the practitioner must engage in living thinking as it takes place in the moment.
Musing I - The Fall from Grace

Self-absorbed positivism shuts its eyes and ears to the tragedy of human being, to the inconvenient reality of death, despair, suffering, pain and loss. One way of understanding these experiences at the ground of the human condition is through the invocation of myth.

I employ the myth, in this case a Biblical one, with a word of caution. For the literal mind, such stories and allegories will often induce some discomfort. They sound unreal, childlike and irrelevant. Even their parabolic language can be embarrassing. But perhaps the inner contraction experienced by some when such stories are invoked is itself a revealing comment on our disbelief, and an indication of just how far language has come from its figurative beginnings. Barfield expresses this sentiment in another way: "Is it not clear that we [by comparison with a relatively pubescent humanity in the Middle Ages] find allegory desiccated precisely because, for us, mere words are themselves desiccated - or rather because, for us, words are 'mere'"? (1988:86).

The point is to view such stories as myth. This does not mean that they are true or untrue. Myth "is one form of the analogical approach to the absolute, and represents a clothing of the Infinite in positive, metaphorical, and finite terms" (Wilber 1993:101). Myth is a way of saying what is otherwise unsayable, an appeal to imagination, which, in the opinion of many of the authors I have cited throughout my text, is the only way out of the dualistic bind in which humanity presently finds itself. I use the Genesis myth of the Fall from Grace, then, as a way of accessing the tragedy of human being, namely, the loss of meaning in dualism, in the repetitive manipulation of experience. "The fall," as Kühlewind suggests, "is an event of consciousness" (1985:78).

The story relates that Adam and Eve are androgynous, and beyond temptation.\textsuperscript{12} Before the Fall, the two trees, the tree of life and the tree of knowledge are one tree. This tree is not only the source of knowledge (of good and evil), but of know-ing. The wisdom of the serpent

\textsuperscript{12} The statement in Genesis 2:25 makes this clear: "The man and his wife were both naked, and they felt no shame." This is taken from the New International Version of the Bible, published by Hodder and Stoughton, Oxford University Press, 1988.
awakes Adam and Eve from the dreamy state of innocence by tempting them to eat of the tree of *knowledge*. Their *eyes* are opened. They become sentient beings.

Humanity at large is represented by this first *couple*, bearing in mind that in myth, male and female do not refer to gender, but to *duality* (Watts 1970). The tree of knowledge is the tree of dualities, of binary opposition, of good and evil, life and death, pleasure and pain. What Adam and Eve awaken to is sentient awareness, to self-consciousness and mutual recognition of each other’s difference, in short to earthly existence. ‘Existence’ implies *dual* existence and experience of the tensions embedded in the many dynamic life-polarities. The notion of duality is implicit in human existence from the start. (The serpent appears *after* the division of Adam - who was previously one with the garden - into two personages, and was powerless prior to that division.)

However, the Fall is not just a fall into duality. It signifies also the genesis of the non-participating consciousness, if the consciousness of Adam and Eve is seen as the “unconscious identity of man with his Creator” (Barfield 1988:169). A non-participating consciousness is an isolated one that makes things do its bidding, obey its will. It is a self-centred consciousness. If a non-participating consciousness cannot avoid distinguishing between the concept of humanity in general and the concept of a human being, then it is unlikely that, in its conceit, it will accept the original sin of Adam as its own, because “Adam (if he existed) was after all - somebody else! This has brought with it the loss of the whole concept of the ‘fallen’ as an essential element in the make-up of human beings; which in its turn is responsible for the devastating shallowness of so much contemporary ethics and contemporary psychology” (1988:183-184).

In the story of the Fall there is implied both gain and loss. The non-participating consciousness is *self*-consciousness, which signifies the origin of the ability to ‘take the measure’ and of the origin of utterance. (Humans can take the measure only by being *outside* life.) It is this fact of coherent utterance that makes human history different from biological history. Humanity gains its own *will* and freedom from blissful ignorance. But the Fall is after all a fall *from* Grace, a previous state of unitary perfection. (Both concepts, will and Grace, will assume increasing importance as I proceed with the musings.) In effect, the Fall is a
disconnection from the source, dislocation from a state and place - which implies the genesis of the concepts of space and time - the root process whereby dualisms are made, “the primordial act of severance” (1993:98) as Wilber calls it.

This root concept of the Fall is what is meant by the tragedy of humankind, the glory and the pain of being human. Crucially, absolute perfection, like absolute health, does not exist as a ‘fleshy’ reality. A perfectly healthy person would no longer be a person, but a creature without aspiration, will or motivation. It is just because the human being is not perfect and not entirely healthy that the appetite for knowledge exists. As the Spanish philosopher, Miguel De Unamuno, puts it: “And this disease which gives us the appetite of knowing for the sole pleasure of knowing, for the delight of tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge..., is a real disease and a tragic one” (1954:21). De Unamuno, however, warns of the necessity of distinguishing between knowledge that is given or unconscious, “… knowing for the sake of living” (1954:21) common to humans and animals, and knowing of the reflective kind, or, knowing that we know. In the hunger for knowledge, human being became what it was condemned irrevocably to be: human. The driving force of progress - whatever interpretation the word may carry - is this “primary disease” (1954:20), the endless (meaning repetitive) pursuit of knowledge, or what Wilber termed the ‘primordial act of severance;’ for the very idea of knowledge is predicated on a dualism of a knower and a known. In the Genesis story it was not only eating that was forbidden, but taking; for “‘stretching the hand out for something’ (Gen 3.22), and taking it is possible only in objectivity, in standing-over-against” (1985:78), as Kühlwind points out.

Although the tree of knowledge is the source of the Fall, it is also its redemption. According to the myth, Adam and Eve are given the fruit of the tree of life, and all things are created for them - not by them - prior to their disobeying the command not to eat of the tree of knowledge. As I stated above, there is only one tree. It is a condition of the Fall that sentient knowledge conduct the spirit (dualism); it is a condition of recovery that sentient knowledge embrace the spirit (monism). Redemption is built into the myth as an epistemological possibility and imperative: knowing that we know, conscious knowing, balances or redeems knowledge that does not know itself. It is for this reason that Davy argues that the Fall is not “… a once-for-all event” (1978:155); rather, the notion of progress, history, biography is
implied. The Fall is a fall away from the source and back to it, a revolution as Steiner’s aphorism above pictures it. In the legend is embedded the possibility of a metanoia, a new state of awareness, a conversion that can happen only through time; for the Kingdom is spoken of as a timeless state to be achieved inwardly.

Musing II - The Loss

No utterance at all would be possible if its Logos ontology had not been unremembered. That is because the human will had to take possession of the formative Logos principle in order to make it a practicable, audible reality. It might be put another way: the universe once sounded in humanity because consciousness was one with the sounding, and it was this oneness that humanity fell from. The singular condition of self-conscious freedom and thus, of the attainment of utterance and power over things (the gain) is the loss of awareness of that supersensible provenance. Unremembering constitutes one step towards individual autonomy. Without that loss of superconscious awareness, one would be simply overawed by it and unable to utter of one’s volition at all.

Let me put all this in the first person. In order to become aware of myself as a self, I must somehow extinguish the memory of that to which I once belonged, an antecedent state of unity. I go out of myself as it were, set myself apart. In this limited sense, I find myself. Yet I am not able to entirely erase the sense of loss which I then feel to be my gain, my ability to take the measure of the world. The notion of moral doing otherwise makes no sense. All doing, all making and constructing would be amoral self-interest. Artistic doing is a testament to that sense of loss, notwithstanding that it, too, can easily cross over into the amoral realm.

What remains in me from this becoming aware of myself is the force of memory. What remains in me of the antecedent unity, the state of Grace, is the moral force of love whereby I am enabled to expand my influence in the world. In love, should I choose to use it, is an echo of the cosmic unison that I now experience as a loss.

Unremembering, then, is a condition of my earthly citizenship. But in unremembering, although I extinguish meaning, I do not fully erase the sense of loss (even when I try to deny it), as Fuller suggests:
It is the meanings themselves that we remember and forget ... and not memories; meanings are imaged in recall, and not images. When we recall the loss of something of some significance to us, it is the loss itself that has come to life once again in its impact. The loss itself is what is paying us a visit and weighing us down, the loss itself that we are coming back to and not some objective or subjective in-itself (Fuller 1990:269).

Steiner has it that "... the facts of the remote past have not disappeared." They live on in the "spiritual foundations of the world" (1972:104-105). The Fall is a beginning, a 'remote past' shared by all, which, when recognised for the tragedy it is, has the power to dissolve all differences there may be between people. The fact of duality, the loss of unison, lives on in (cosmic) memory. "Cognising [it] in the deepest depths," writes Kühlewind, "means simultaneous identity and distinction of I and world, and this occurs only for an 'I'" (1985:23).

*Remembering* is the next step in the journey to freedom, and it is that step which humanity in general is unwilling to take, for it implies losing what has been gained. The loss of which I have spoken is present for us, real for us, although what has been lost, its occasion, is no longer there in awareness. "The inability to remember ... is not a failure to get through to some memory objectively stored in-itself, but a failure, a refusal perhaps..., to assume that disposition as would permit the venturing of a certain context of meaning" (Fuller 1990:269). This 'refusal' for me, is an explanation for the epistemological omission.

**Musing III - The Wound**

We are reluctant to remember for the reason that the loss leaves its imprint as a wound, although it is not visible, or even particular. As Fuller, again, affirms: "... it is the painful incident that we refuse to grant a place in our lives" (1990:269). Woundedness is a condition of 'free' utterance. Although the significance of the wound is an important theme in some branches of recent psychiatric practice, its role in transcendent selfhood is barely recognised. The wound is most often construed as anxiety. Indeed, I think it is true to say that it is not regarded in conventional psychology as an *ontological* wound at all.

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Woundedness is occasioned by an original *hurt*, namely, the loss of which I have just spoken. Since the wound is only a symptom, the original hurt must be dealt with if the wounded is to find a truly ‘free’ voice. Hurt is the most profound impediment to coherent musical utterance, and is tied up with the question of human empowerment, and of musicality as ‘constitutive’ of human being. Is expression really ‘free’, as we so often claim it to be? If so, why do so many find it uncomfortable to express themselves musically or verbally in public? Does utterance come at a cost, and what is its nature?

If we go on insisting that it is really a ‘self’ - and what is more, a free self - that is expressed, then it is reasonable to suppose that our thinking about the problem of anxiety must, by definition, take a certain *hypothetical* path with inferences made about behaviour taken from the phenomenon of anxiety. To put it another way, the emergence of anxiety will not be grasped directly or immediately; it will not be cognised. The manageable explanation for anxiety is that human beings are ‘genetically vulnerable,’ implying that the predisposition for anxiety is genetically programmed. In my opinion, this view is perhaps the most specious positivist misinterpretation of a spiritual-ontological problem to have been perpetrated in the history of psychology. 14 It already contains the inference that human volition is ultimately powerless with respect to biological determinism, that we can never really be free of genetic inheritance, that we cannot be autonomous, and ultimately, that there is no human agency in knowing. This is a meaningless proposition; in reality, an exaggeration of our own capacities to deal with a spiritual dilemma. Again, it is the state of disbelief in which we live most of the time that forces what is not understood into the realms of genetics and heredity. How cold, how neutral these explanations are. They are the products of thought that contains no feeling.

Time and time again it has been my performance experience and experience gained

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14 Even the evolutionary psychologists Cosmides and Tooby (1992) argue that the mind *in toto* can be understood only by regarding it as the outcome of biological evolution. As Mithen points out, however, this “evolution by natural selection” as the “the only known process by which such complexity can have arisen” (1998:42) is arrived at by omission, specifically by ignoring noetic evolution. Lukacs comments on the crudeness of the Darwinian/Mendelian, biological categorisation thus: It “… tried to ascertain what is and what is not inherited, rather than what are human characteristics. It concentrated on the mechanical causes of these characteristics rather than on the myriad functions of the characteristics themselves” (1997:255). Foremost among those characteristics is *free* will, the acquisition of which does not happen through genetics or environment. It is not merely an unconscious, mechanical, chemical or automatic process. The possessor of will is able to transcend influences both of environment and heredity.
while counselling students that the knowledge that anxiety is ‘normal’ provides no comfort at all for the afflicted, and no real change in the state. Anxiety may well be the observed statistical norm, but it is quite another thing to conclude from the obvious that it is normal. It is normal only in the sense that it is symptomatic of the tragedy that is dualism. There are modern texts, for example, Roland (1997), that set out to provide well-intentioned advice for the sufferer by suggesting strategies for the so-called conscious mind. Reason, it is assumed, can combat a pathology that is unreasonable. (In music education, it is constantly asserted that the solution to the problem is to perform more often, as if the pathology of anxiety can be treated by more anxiety.) This presents a fundamental difficulty for psychology, as Kühlewind explains:

The psychologist faces another person’s modes of feeling from the outside; however, since he only has command of mirrored thinking as autonomous mental function, he is forced to understand by means of rationality the non-rational element in the other’s soul, and this despite the insight that the psychological entity causing the problem is never rationally intelligible (1990:11).

I have foregrounded this challenge by way of suggesting that in contradistinction to the fight-or-flight metaphor grounded in evolution theory, anxiety may well have another origin and serve another purpose, neither of which has attracted sufficient attention.

I will argue below that anxiety, as it relates to performance, has an ontology that belongs to the ethical and spiritual orientation of humanity. The reason the problem of anxiety is not understood is that the ontology of utterance is not understood, or better, human being as utterance. “This is why the return from the realm of objects and their representation [including anxiety as an object of representation] into the innermost region of the heart’s space can be accomplished, if anywhere, only in this precinct” (Heidegger 1975:132). My belief is that the whole problem of anxiety must be approached from a different level of consciousness - which must first be achieved - if it is to be understood; for as I suggested above, it is anarchic. If cognitive feeling is brought to bear on the experience, it is possible to avoid theory abstracted from it. Anxiety has its source in the existential hurt that is tied up with the acquisition of self-consciousness. I will address it below in the musing titled *Shame and Fear*. 

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Musing IV - Longing

The only possible starting point for a theory of meaning must be what has become meaningless. To take Fuller’s lead, then, I venture a context of meaning. The original experience of hurt is the loss of Grace, or being thrown into existence (ex means ‘out’); the sense of disconnection from the source, the echo of which continues to resound in consciousness but not in awareness. (Any notion of recovery would otherwise be meaningless.) Woundedness is the price paid for human dis-position, for the gift of self-generated creativity, (a gift that is never acknowledged as such because it is rarely seen as other than the product of genetic inheritance. As I have argued elsewhere, for creativity to qualify as a gift, the human gesture of receiving is necessary.) If something important has been lost, I am impelled to seek it again, even if I am not aware of precisely what it is I seek. But that is why I seek it. Musical experience gives me a glimpse of my capacity for transcendence of the real, the literal. But anything less than the lost state of perfection (Grace) is disappointing. So I try again….. and again….. and again. How is it that music, perhaps more than any other phenomenon I know about has the power to move me, to stir my blood? How, when it is above all repetitious? My woundedness is my motivation; and since I am endowed with that human attribute that distinguishes me from the rest of nature, namely, my ability to wilfully repeat or prolong an experience, the real, the literal, the made, becomes the temporal substitute for an enduring Other, the echoing consolation for resonant wonders once heard and lost, now dimly remembered.

If I look behind the literal, the making, the doing, what is the particular complexion of my hurt? It is longing. The French have a term for it: Nostalgie du Paradis. Is not nostalgia (from the Greek nostos, a return home, and algos, pain) a severe and poignant homesickness, the longing for something far away or long ago?

The original hurt is the loss, the loss - of that measure and Grace that Plato averred we lack - that has been unremembered, the loss ‘that we refuse to grant a place in our lives.’ The original hurt nevertheless leaves its wound in the resonant layers of my being, in my cosmic memory. (Plato’s anamnesis is not so much recalling as it is unforgetting; to be reminded of
what one already knows.) When what has been lost is of the nature of home, it provokes yearning, the depths of which even I do not fathom.

Longing is a critical theme in musical knowing, and the recovery of its behaviour must assume a prominent place in any epistemology.

Every life function produces an organ that serves it. The ear serves sound, the eye vision, and so on. These organs must be kept in use if they are not to atrophy. They are exercised by the constant appearance of the stimuli they serve, and for which they long. This dynamic of desire is in everything. The unfolding leaf wants to become, to repeat itself. Ordinarily we only perceive the effects of these intentions after the event.

When the doctor takes my pulse, what is (s)he doing? (S)he is timing the frequency with which the beats of the heart occur. (S)he is not timing the beats, but the interval between the beats. As I have discussed, the interval is the measure of distance between one event and another. The interval is measure brought into time. This measure of distance between is no physical event. It is only the beats bounding the measure (which the doctor hears with the ear or feels with the hand) that are physical. Although the doctor does not see it this way, what (s)he is measuring is the longing of the heart in its pulsing for more blood, the life-fluid it serves. Similarly, the lungs inspire in their longing for new air. In the interval between inspiration and expiration is longing. In the breathing function we live a repetitive rhythm of longing and satisfaction between the interior and exterior worlds.

Similarly, tone longs for interval as consonant longs for vowel. One might say they desire each other’s company in order to be complete in their difference. A tone can be a tone only in the context of the interval preceding it; otherwise it would be merely an extended sound. It must begin and cease in order to be a tone. Each tone in a melody will accrue a certain quality to itself depending on how its longing to become an interval is perceived.

The main feature of longing is that it is never complete, never entirely satisfied. A beautiful melody demands to be heard again. The listener is left yearning for more. Music takes advantage of this quality by repeating it. Recapitulation is the basic element of musical
structure, evident as *expectation* on the part of the listener. Repetition in itself is rhythm. As I pointed out above, the repetitive pulse of the heart is rhythmic, as is the breathing of the lungs.

When I truly ‘hear’ music, it is, for the period of time I am listening, identical with my own existence. The longing exhibited by the music is identical with my own. Longing is *intentional*; it always seeks an object or goal. What is intentionality if not the desire *for*? But *what* goal, ultimately, is sought? The longing itself does not provide the answer. That is why it is repetitive in its restlessness.

Sometimes we search
We chase here, there
We linger, pensive and perturbed
Seek what?
Find where?
The object of our longing eludes us
Regardless, we persist
No, it persists
This insatiable desire for we know not what
Shall we name it the unnameable?

*It*, the longing, persists. The author of these lines, Frances Moran (1998), traces longing to the Void: “Restless spirits speak out of the experience of an inner void … the contours of [which] are shaped by a uniquely constituted lack” [and that the] “the dimensions of this lack include … the lack of a sense of … belonging, of a place, the lack of a sense of certainty, … of a sense of *meaning*” (1998:22 my emphasis).

The longing *is* the void. The void is the threshold, the empty space of restless longing, the between, “the disjunction between the lived self and the self yet to be lived” (1998:23), and also between what I long for and what I produce artistically.

“What unites [these] opposites is the rift … that has become the dif-ference, the pain of the threshold that joins” (Hofstadter 1975:xiii). “The pain presences unflagging in the threshold, as pain” (Heidegger 1975:204). “Pain is the joining of the rift. The joining is the threshold” (1975:204).
What I produce is ultimately unsatisfying. So the yearning is always present. As I suggested above, nostalgia, longing, is above all repetitive, pulse-like. It is repetitive because it is never satisfied, or it ceases to be longing. It is never satisfied because the state of union, oneness, homecoming, reconnection with the source, is never achieved in the repetition (duality) of experience. The empty space of longing is not ultimately fulfilled by the satisfaction of desire itself, but by awareness of the significance of the original experience of longing. I ignore the experience of longing at my peril. (The Latin root of the word ‘experience’ is peri, implying that in experience there is always the possibility of something going awry.) The void of longing is a pain of the heart, or aesthetic pain, and it is the feeling of the heart (the organ of imagination) that has the power to find meaning in longing.

The uncognised anxiety present in the formless void, the threshold, is the opportunity for longing to give form to itself. The longing would be (and for some, is) unbearable without form, or fullness.

The original hurt that is the loss has never been digested. Only a sponge that has first been squeezed and emptied of content is capable of absorbing, and thus, aesthetic pain and the shedding of tears. Consider this passage by Tolstoy, in which Prince Andrei is listening to Natasha sing:

He looked at [her] as she sang, and something new and blissful stirred in his soul. He felt happy and at the same time sad. He had absolutely nothing to weep about, yet he was ready to weep. ... The chief reason for his wanting to weep was a sudden acute sense of the terrible contrast between something infinitely great and illimitable existing within him and the narrow material something which he, and even she, was. The contrast made his heart ache, and rejoiced him while she sang (1972:548).

This contrast penetrates to the heart of the human condition. Aesthetic pain is the immediate and repetitive irritation of the wound left by the ontological hurt, which now manifests as the longing that is the threshold between what (and where) one is and what (and where) one longs to be, but cannot be.
Musing V - Shame and Fear

I alluded above to an alternative explanation for what is today known as performance anxiety, and suggested that it may have another origin and serve another purpose beyond the instinctive. My reason for so arguing was the question: Why do so many find it uncomfortable to express themselves verbally or musically in public? Contrary to the notion of genetic programming, this musing deals with the source of anxiety as an ontological polarity of shame and fear.

Emerson writes: “Every man beholds his human condition with a degree of melancholy. But it is when we see there can be no anarchy in Nature, that all things cohere and shame us out of our idolatories” (1958:25). Emerson is suggesting that the encounter with order or evidential coherence can be an occasion of shame insofar as that order is at the same time an immediate recognition of the usually chaotic state of the mind. In other words there is something about the ordering principle - providing always that one has taken the trouble to contemplate it - that is infinitely greater than oneself. In an encounter with it, there is the recognition of one’s humility in the face of something over which one has no ultimate control, in which case any human imperfection can be seen as a cause of shame.

What are the particular characteristics of shame? Again, language evidences a number of clues. Shame can be invoked as the result of a misfortune. When some event does not turn out as one envisaged it, the response is often, ‘What a shame!’ We speak of a person who defies social convention by showing immodesty or indecency as being shameless, or having no shame. A person or thing pretending to be something that (s)he or it is not, we call a ‘sham.’ Such a sham is a dis-grace. König points out that “the terms ‘Scham’ and ‘Schamgefühl’ in German carry the implication of uncovering nudity, and ‘Scham’ is part of the compound words referring particularly to the female genitals” (1973:65). These organs are known, revealingly, in the German language as Schamteile, or shame-parts.

Language demonstrates that the experience of shame carries characteristics of the most intimate privacy and morality, and that it is valued tacitly as a check on otherwise unethical, chaotic or anarchic behaviour. Despite its privacy, however, shame has a visible public
dimension. The feeling of being ashamed is one of confusion. The confusion that announces itself overpowers my will. I want to avert my eyes, to hide myself. I blush with shame. What is this red covering? Is it not a dressing over my uncovered nakedness, which may not necessarily be a part of my body, but could be a very private part of my noetic character? Why should this exposure be so shameful? Why would I prefer the feeling of being ashamed to remain unexposed?

I submit that shame has its origin in the Fall, in the original act of severance. Adam and Eve cover themselves when they lose their innocence and realise for the first time that they are naked. The public unveiling of the private domain of a person’s being can be the occasion of shame because it is a sudden recognition of one’s humanness, which one knows to be imperfect. My musical expression is my attempt to transcend that ethical imperfection, my effort to be more than I am. I am ashamed of what I, through knowledge, am compelled to be: human. Shame is recognition of my naked physical birth. I cover my face in shame. Every experience of shame is a memory of that moment of being born, of entering into physical existence, of being ejected from the womb into the world. As König remarks: “Blushing brings home to us the tragedy of being born; of being sent into this world, naked…” (1973:66) and imperfect.

What is the connection of shame with public musical utterance? With one’s birth comes an endowment: the ability and the responsibility of taking the measure of the world, of giving form. To give birth to utterance, to exercise the Logos, is to relive the moment of my birth. With every act of public utterance I reveal this most intimate aspect of my being. Ultimately, shame is an act of self-recognition. Since musical expression is an attempt on my part to be more than this self, the act of utterance brings on a sudden recognition of my mere human existence. I am unavoidably judged. I come face to face with my ‘I,’ my Logos nature, a higher judge whose voice resonates in the depths of my conscience.

Crucially, none of this takes place until I can say ‘I.’ And this word I learn to utter only at around the third year of life, that is, only after I have learned to utter many other sounds and only when I have become aware of my own physical boundaries; when I have, as it were, taken hold of my body, and entered into the experience of gravity. Shame becomes an experience
only when I have separated from the world around me. It is in this context that Keane observes that musical discovery is carried on by the infant, "particularly when (s)he is unaware of the presence of others in the room" (1982:325). Note the implied privacy of musical discovery. Keane presents a compelling argument for the case that protomusical exploration is overwhelmed by the onset of language primarily because of impatient adult intervention. He writes: "But when the infant is in the presence of adults, any sound which can be construed or misconstrued, as language is encouraged. Any sound which is clearly not language is considered useless by the adults and is therefore discouraged" (1982:326). Crucially, Keane continues: "This discouragement may well be a major factor in the infant’s inhibition for free sound exploration in the presence of others..." (1982:326). In other words, the infant learns very early not only to be ashamed of innocent musical efforts, but is actively encouraged to substitute for them that form of utterance that reinforces all dualisms.

The important point here is that musical activity takes place as primeval forming activity prior to speech, and prior to the onset of self-consciousness. Since it is expression that bypasses concept or object, it is a free and improvised discovery of pure form. It orders consciousness because it is consciousness. I suspect that this is the reason for its morality and its privacy. With the onset of self-recognition, the feeling of shame is triggered by this higher forming activity that is essentially a function of that entity called ‘I.’

I submit that the experience of shame is the inescapable pre-condition of per-forming. It is an ethical guide that appears only as the self needs it. But this is generally not recognised, and shame is therefore problematic. If the history of humanity is the history of its individuation, a contradiction arises with respect to shame. The fact of the independent individual demands that the experience of shame be, not shared, but suffered in isolation. As I have argued, its nature is intensely private. Yet, it is given tacit acceptance as a socio-ethical value. Given the cult of individualism, (which I see as a misinterpretation of true individuality), there appears to be a private denial of the experience of shame. Ontological shame is overlaid with notions of social respectability; that is to say, there is a general unwillingness to embrace shame as anything more than a social determinant. (My distinction here is between social respectability and moral nobility.) It is not privately acknowledged, then, that ontological shame censures one’s thought and action, since this does not fit the
picture of the rugged individual whose expression is supposedly free. I am saying that in denying shame as a moral guide, a condition of one's being human, one learns to be ashamed of shame. Shame becomes a phobia.

The dilemma is obvious. I already feel within myself shame for being what I am, otherwise shame could not arise. My very birth has prepared me for the experience of shame, which repeats itself on each and every occasion I expose my Logos nature in public. Because I have not acknowledged that shame's task is to guide me, to point the way, as it were, to order, because I have not resolved to own it, every time I err in my performing - which I must do since I am cannot approach perfection - I experience a small death. And death is the polar opposite of birth. The opposite of shame is fear, bearing in mind that the true nature of a polarity is that the opposites interpenetrate.

If original shame is the recognition of my birth, fear lurks behind it as the reminder of my death. The tragedy of human being is not complete without death. When fear is present, the blood behaves in a manner contrary to shame. The skin does not 'shine' or expand as it does when one feels shame; rather the skin turns to a pallor; one turns white with fear because the blood contracts, withdraws from its orbit at the periphery of the skin. In the Genesis myth, Adam and Eve not only experience shame, but fear before God, and their fear arises out of their disobedience. (I will elaborate this theme below.)

Shame expands; fear grips. Fear is always future oriented. What am I frightened of? It has not happened yet. If shame glances backwards to the threshold of birth, fear looks forward to the moment of death. This experience is a sudden recognition of my mortality, my transitoriness, and a new beginning, which again I refuse to acknowledge.

These polar experiences exist in order to teach me something about myself. They point to my provenance, my origins. However, they are anarchic; they create havoc unless I am resolved to face them. They appear when I am not sufficiently mature to judge a threatening situation (which public performance clearly is) in terms of its morally experiential value. Because I am not in control, shame and fear speak in absence of 'I.' If I am to truly utter in freedom, I must first take ownership of their presence, that is, listen to what they are telling
me. If I ignore them, I remain uncertain with respect to their purpose, and meaning remains obscure. Gaining understanding of these ethical entities means taking up an inverse perspective. I gain perspective on them not by exercising reason, but by behaving as they behave, by first entering the experience of them, and then by building a picture of them by becoming them. I behold them.

Musing VI - Time, Motion and the Birth-Death Polarity

Time is perhaps the most formidable concept confronting humanity. Although the temptation to avoid it is strong, an epistemology of music must at some time come to grips with it, if only to re-examine the accepted notion of music as an art of time.\(^{15}\) To say as much sets music apart in fundamental ways from the plastic arts. Many scholars maintain that whereas the encounter with a painting or sculpture consists in apprehending the whole in a moment, musical apprehension depends on the observer making a special effort to remember what has already been heard so as to relate that with the sounds occurring in the present. This view conceives of time as a horizontal flow, time as an ‘ever rolling stream,’ and the temporal progression of the musical work as an analogue of time. Is this popular metaphor of music as a temporal art correct? Although I may take some time to get to the point, I will attempt not only to answer this question, but will argue that the whole question of time cannot be approached in isolation. Rather, it is linked to the birth-death continuum discussed above. Again, my discussion takes its start in the Fall, which represents not only a descent into material existence, but also a descent from a state of timelessness into time.

I spoke above of fear as the anticipation of the moment of death. T.S. Eliot wrote in *Burnt Norton*: ‘... that which is only living/ Can only die.’ He means that the one certainty of human physical existence is death, and that dying begins at the moment of birth. For most, however, that certainty cannot be faced because death implies nothingness, total extinguishment, the Void. Refusal to include death as a concept in our thinking fundamentally affects the way we view life. Because life is usually conceptualised as something that begins at birth and ends at death, life and death are set against each other. Many spiritual disciplines,

\(^{15}\) I wish to declare that my thinking into this theme has been inspired principally by Ouspensky (1949, 1971, 1991), Steiner (1959,1972,1986b) and Wilber (1993).
however, regard birth and death as two different ways of viewing the reality of the present moment, the only place where non-dual reality can be the experienced. The birth-death circle begins and ends at the same point, which means that what is called time is an illusion. From a physico-biological viewpoint, however, such a point will be conceived as non-existence. Clearly, the birth-death continuum cannot be contemplated without its relation to the concept of time.

I summarise here Wilber’s (1993) investigations into the tenets of the abovementioned traditions. In what Wilber calls “the absolute Present” (1993:110), there is no past as such, and that which has no past is something that is newly born. Birth, he suggests, is the state of having no past. Nor is there a future in the present moment. What has no future is something that has just died. Death is the state of being futureless. The present, then, since it has no past, is new-born; and since it has no future, it is simultaneously dead. Birth and death, then are two ways of talking about the same timeless moment.

That past and future are illusory for these traditions can be attributed to the (undeveloped mind’s) inability to escape the dual perspective of temporal succession. If that were possible, one would experience what has been and what is to be simultaneously, in which case the usual dualisms of form versus void and life versus death would not arise. But because one identifies so closely with one’s own psychosomatic organism - a dualism (psyche versus soma) in itself - one cannot bear the thought that the unequivocal outcome of life might be annihilation and nothingness. So, the unity of life and death, the timeless, is severed and projected as a battle of life against death.

Consider Western society’s fetish for longevity, eternal youth, and the fervour with which it approaches the preservation of material life. (The intense focus on physical fitness, cosmetics, life-support systems and so on has generated a multi-billion dollar industry, not to mention more recent experiments with cloning.) However, in keeping things alive, in trying to ‘cheat’ death, we actually diminish life. Refusing death is tantamount to refusing to have no future, and therefore, to denial of the reality of the futureless, timeless moment. I can no longer exist now; I can only exist in time. I no longer take joy in living today, for I must also live tomorrow and a succession of tomorrows.
To live in the present, that is, beyond time, would be to have no future, and to have no future would be to accept death. This I cannot do. Yet, not accepting the possibility of death is not living now, and not living now is not living at all. Norman O. Brown puts all this most succinctly:

This incapacity to die, ironically but inevitably, throws mankind out of the actuality of living, which for all normal animals is at the same time dying; the result is the denial of life. The incapacity to accept death turns the death instinct into its distinctively human and distinctively morbid form. The distraction of human life to the war against death, by the same inevitable irony, results in death’s dominion over life. The war against death takes the form of a preoccupation with the past and the future, and the present tense, the tense of life is lost - the present which Whitehead says ‘holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity’ (1959:284).

In the delusion that I can avoid a certain death, I am ejected out of the now and into time, into a race for the future in the attempt to escape the death represented by the timeless moment.

This dualism influences almost all of our actions, foremost of which is the construction of an idealised image of ourselves whose name is ego, one of the most significant features of which ‘... is that ... it is, in essence, nothing but a bag of edited memories’ (Wilber 1993:124).

All this is very compelling. I have taken the trouble to explain it because it has troubled me for a good many years. Although it sounds convincing, I have nevertheless sensed something about it that does not ring true. Only recently have I become aware that this view is highly problematic for a civilisation that takes its history - at least post-Hellenic history - from the so-called ‘turning point of time,’ that is, from a Christian beginning, whether explicit or not. Davy writes: “The Eastern view recognises what has seldom been recognised in the West: that human consciousness has undergone a narrowing and veiling during its journey through time from the Source” (1978:159). This I can accept; it is a fundamental proposition of my thesis. What can be gleaned from the above exegesis, however, is that from the Eastern perspective nothing that happens in time has any ultimate importance, which means that the
historical significance of the gain of personal freedom and its essentially dual perspective is not taken seriously. The Divine, as Davy suggests, is "... not outside the flux and fever of mortal life" (1978:159). (In fact, the whole of material existence for these mystical philosophies is an illusion.) In the Christian tradition, the Divine descends into time, which implies that resistance is built into the Genesis story; that is to say, something in human being resists the timeless Divine will. A material and temporal universe cannot come into being without that resistance on the part of the human knower, for there would be "nothing to suggest a prior condition which matter has fallen from" (1978:162). It is for this reason that the Fall, an historical occurrence as I have suggested, offers the possibility of redemption.

Although there are points of convergence between the Eastern and the Western views - the latter being, in its beginnings at least, Platonic and Aristotelian - I will attempt here to explicate another view of time, motion and the birth-death polarity, which will lead me eventually to the connection with musical experience.

Humans have a time-sense, a sense of what previously was, what becomes now, and what will follow subsequently. The idea of motion is bound up with this sense of time. By time is meant the distance separating successive events and also the sense for combining them into coherent wholes or patterns. It is impossible to speak of time without also speaking of motion; for all motion proceeds in, and never out of, time.

What is the time-sense? In order to answer this question, I proffer an analogy. Imagine looking through a keyhole out onto a hallway or corridor. My purview is obviously limited. Yet that is how I usually relate to temporal events. If a person walks past my position at the door, what I see, since it is happening now, I designate the present. What has just been but is not there any longer, I call the past. What I do not see, but might anticipate seeing - since I have already seen something, I designate the future. Should another person walk past my keyhole, I already have the idea of temporal succession. I can choose to measure the lapse of time between successive appearances and conceive the idea of chronological time.

It is clear that this idea of time is linked to the notion of causality. From my keyhole perspective, I regard each event as the effect of another, and this effect as the cause of a
successive event. The moment I begin to think in terms of functional interdependence, I am thinking about things as they occur in time. I am prompted to say: no time, no causality.

What absorbs me most at my keyhole is what is happening now. It is the events occurring presently that consume my interest. Ouspensky makes a strong point: “By the present we mean the moment of transition of the future into the past, i.e., the moment of transition of a phenomenon from one non-existence into another non-existence” (1949:33). If my attention is so firmly fixed on what is occurring now, neither the past nor the future holds any interest for me. In a sense they do not exist. So, for this moment only that I designate the present does a phenomenon exist in reality. But surely this single moment on its own is an illusion, for it has no measurement. I can never capture it, catch it, hold it still. That which I captured is always the past. There cannot be such a thing as the ‘temporal present’ because it is a contradiction in terms.

Because I see and hear life as if through a keyhole, what exists can only exist now. This view can be analogised by saying that the bedroom I was in just a moment ago no longer exists, and the bathroom I am about to enter is still being constructed and will be completed just as I arrive there. Upon my arrival in the kitchen, the bathroom, too, will cease to exist. In other words I repress, push into the background, the otherwise entire temporal context in order to live the present moment. I end up with a ‘chain’ of successive occurrences, all of which, from my keyhole are present moments. I freeze a moment in time.

The point I am trying to make is the illusion that, because of my fixedness on the present, nothing ever returns. This is a horizontal, linear, view of time (and history) in which everything passes into non-existence. Actually, the past and the future do influence inexorably the way I perceive what is happening in the present moment, although I do not ordinarily recognise that influence.

If that is true, the question must be asked: What, then, does exist? My keyhole perspective prompts me to answer: It is the present. I am forever dissecting a continuity into discrete moments which I call the present. But this response cannot be correct because, as I suggested above, the present is not graspable. It is a continuous transition of the future into the
past, into non-existence. If I insist on holding to this belief, then nothing exists. Yet, that is clearly untenable because I know that I am sensing and living the whole time.

Something is there. Something does exist. To maintain that Spring will come next month, although it does not yet exist, and similarly, that the Autumn that has just been will not return because it does not exist is a delusion. The error in all this, according to Ouspensky, is that “... we give no thought to how that can appear which is not” (1949:34).

Let me employ another analogy. From the keyhole, the narrow focus of the beam of consciousness lights up only a tiny pin-prick of reality so that the surrounding darkness and what is present in it does not exist. But the past and the future cannot not exist, for if they do not exist, then neither does the present.

This statement most would categorically deny. I argue that what we designate past, present and future do exist as a whole, but that, because of our selective attention their belonging together is not available to ordinary temporal awareness. Actually, the present cannot be without relation, and so it includes past and future. To claim that I really see and hear would be possible only in the event that I could include the past and the future, that is, what I now believe does not exist. This would be possible, however, only for a consciousness not limited to the usual senses and not subject to the so-called ‘flow’ of time. This perspective would be able to perceive beyond the limited focus of the keyhole, and include the whole of time in its purview. It would be able to perceive the events occurring in time in the same way that it can take in the whole painting at a glance. Whatever takes place over a minute or an hour would be perceived simultaneously. The past, then, does not become obsolete or forgotten through the new present. That is the error in our thinking. The new present does become obsolete if we cannot be there, if we are always ahead of it.

How does this alternative scenario compare with the Eastern view? I have argued that the events of the remote past live on. In this manner is the past recalled. The past is the ‘stuff’ of memory. It is true that the past is problematic insofar as it influences, and in effect, diverts awareness away from who I am and what I am living now. But it would be incorrect to conclude from this that the past is an illusion. Rather, it is the exclusive identification with it.
for the purpose of cognition that is illusory. There is a world of difference between remembering the past and identifying with it, acting as if it determines who I am and how I act now. It is the determination of the content of the present moment by way of the unconscious repetition of past experience that generates the illusion.

Moving on, the divergence of opinion on the question of time consists mostly in our conception of the future. The fear of death is real enough, but its portent consists in envisaging death as non-existence. The future that I sense, but nevertheless deny as non-existent, is a certainty, not a non-certainty. It is not fear of the unknown that I feel, but fear of the known. It is precisely because I do sense a future, that loss, longing, shame and the rest are significant for my biographical development. The pain that accompanies these is considerable. The problem is that I regard pain as an affliction rather than as an opportunity for biographical advancement.

Wilber is right to argue that the fear of death is the fear of not having a future; but it is a fear of not having a living future. Being dead is not a future at all. It is just that death is misconstrued as non-life; and this because I identify with the undying image of a self, which is a past self.

How does this fear of not having a living future affect my behaviour? I do not want this moment. Rather, I overlook it in craving other moments in advance of the resolution of the present one. So, I keep jumping from this moment to another, neither of which I savour for itself. I keep interrupting and repeating my experience. The outcome is that this moment might as well be dead; indeed, it is dead. This demand for the future moment, and the non-existent happiness it represents but can never fulfil, is a refusal of the certainty of death. Because I deny the reality of death represented by this moment, I refuse life. The saving grace, then, is the redemption of the living moment, which is redemption of the death that is new life.

The present moment is not a closure, a reduction to a point that excludes past and future. It is not a narrow focus of the keyhole perspective. Rather, it is time expanded in which events occurring in temporal succession are lived in a moment.
What the East does not recognise is the role of the individual in consciousness evolution. Coming to awareness of how the past and future influence our actions now I regard as the epistemological goal of humanity as a whole; and this is at the same time the attainment of ethical individualism. As I have consistently asserted, the human being is an historical being. One cannot attain true individuality by remaining in a perpetual state of unconception, by not dealing with the messy ‘life-stuff,’ the things that bind, the things that occur in time. (If it were possible to remain permanently outside time, to be permanently in this moment, one would not be mortal.) Rather, individuality consists in progressing through spiritual infancy, puberty and adolescence to maturity, in short, in growing up.

The remaining feature of this discussion of time, and of music as a so-called ‘art of time,’ is motion. In using the keyhole analogy, I was alluding to the creation and apprehension of coherent schemas as the dominant feature of human consciousness. The creation goes on, writes Storr, “… at every conceivable level in our mental hierarchy, from the simplest auditory and visual perceptions to the creation of new models of the universe, philosophies, belief systems, and great works of art, including music” (1992:168).

Perception is never the perception of particulars, but of patterns of relation, although we are convinced that we perceive particulars. Every particular has a context or ground that is repressed by the perceiver. The reader currently scanning this text can do so only because the background, the otherwise blank sheet called a page is repressed and the individual black symbols selected for attention. The symbols are marked off against the page by distinction. The unity of blank page and symbols is no longer visible; in fact, it has been severed. A ‘thing’ is a narrow portion of selective attention that can emerge only by ignoring the total sensory ground or context. This thing is not a pre-existent entity that is simply there for the perceiving.

The same applies to our perception - more accurately, creation - of events in time, or more specifically, movement in time. The series of separate pictures thrown onto the screen by a cinema projector at the rapid rate of three frames per second is interpreted by the perceiver as movement. But there is no actual movement occurring. Rather, the movement is added by the perceiver. This is also true of music. Despite the many words that have been
written about music as ‘flow,’ motion in time, and so on, music itself does not move. As Storr points out: “For movement to occur, the same object must successively be in different places. Nothing of this kind happens in music” (1992:170). What does happen is a series of tonal events separated by discrete intervals of time which we, the perceivers, then reorganise into a coherent melody, which is itself a temporal pattern of relation.

The illusion of movement is created by our own perception. Thinking moves. It is just that the movement does not appear to be constructed by thinking that it is attributed to the observed object. In other words, the mental picture of movement is brought up to correspond with the sense data.

Let me clarify. Thinking produces the continuum, that is, the differentiation and fusion of the phenomena. In the case of the so-called flow of music, the division of ONE into separate tones that only now have temporal relation is of our own making, a product of the keyhole perspective. As I previously discussed, what we denote as the phenomenally real, temporal events, is only the condition of their existence in time, which means that in temporal terms only a single phenomenon can occur at one time. These separate events are then reorganised into temporal succession so that the motion appears to occur of its own account.

A power of imagination is necessary to transcend the limits of ordinary temporal perception. If I were able to take a thing, in this case, a tone, out of space and time, what would it mean? It would mean that all tones that have been, that exist now, and that will exist, exist together; that is to say, they would occupy one and the same ‘place.’ (This is not the right word, but there is no other in the lexicon as far as I am aware.) One tone includes within itself the characteristics of all possible tones. When we use the word ‘tone,’ we have in mind something having the properties of all tones, in short, an idea. But the tone I am now speaking about possesses not only those common characteristics, but also the individual characteristics of all separate tones. There is diversity in unity.

Further, if all tonal events were co-located together as a unity, the relation between them would still exist, but not in time. The entire schema of temporal relation would exist as a whole. It is only in their making, in their being made audible that time and motion come into
being. I submit that music exists precisely because there are no words to describe this idea. If there were, they would be untrue. Such a language could only be one without verbs, because verbs express what one thing or event does (motion) to another thing or event, which can only happen in space and/or time, and space and time come into being only in the division of things. The perception of time and motion is illusory; for it is not a question of one event following another, but of one event metamorphosing out of another.

The perception of motion in time recedes with the expansion of consciousness, in which the experience becomes time minus duration. But this stillness is not time. What, then, is it? Music teaches us about ideal relations, for which the medium of space is too confining. Language is inadequate for the spatial expression of temporal relations. The stillness of which I am speaking is a further dimension of space that is currently experienced as intensity, space without extension, space that is a state of awareness. The stilling of time does not mean that nothing exists, but that everything exists together always, as all tones exist in the one tone before they are manifested in time. There is no before and after in this realm. Everything exists in the present.

Since by now the reader may be wondering where I am taking all this, and how it is relevant to music, I want to draw the discussion together by observing what actually happens in musical perception; for although most are unaware of it, musical utterance is an expression of the birth-death polarity. (The rhythm of inner-outer listening, or hearkening, which I will describe in the next musing, results in awareness that such is the case.) Before proceeding, however, I want once again to affirm that music has no relation to the physical world, except that it sounds.

Imagine a singer who has unlimited air supply. The singer produces a single tone. As a listener, my initial response is one of attention. I am compelled to listen. Coupled with that attention, however, is a sense of expectation. Assume the singer prolongs this tone indefinitely. I very quickly lose interest. My attention dissipates. That is because the tone is now monotonous. It dominates the auditory field to the exclusion of all else. What does this (mono) tone need if my attention is to be revived and my expectation fulfilled? It needs another tone. In other words the tone must cease; it must die if music is to be the outcome.
When it does, another tone is born out of its death. The moment the tone ceases, it becomes background. It is past. That past, however, which consists in its death, lives on by influencing the next present, the new tone. The idea of tone must be repeated. It can be repeated only because the tonal experience is interrupted. Something is repressed so that these individual tones can come to perceptual focus.

What is that context or ground? The usual response would be, ‘silence.’ Contrary to the popular view, it is not silence that is the context of a tone’s appearance, as the blank page is the context for the written text. The unitary context, what is repressed, is time as a whole. But time as a whole is timeless. I am speaking here of eternity, time expanded, in which the present tone dies in becoming a past so that a new future can be born. The acoustic element of music has to die so that (extra-sensory) music can be born. Where one (acoustic) world ceases, another begins. A melody is not a mere succession of notes. It only appears that way because of our ability to repress the (whole of time) context and choose one tone at a time for audition. If we were unable to repress knowledge of time as a whole, there would be no audible music. In the very act of giving voice to a tone, I foreground it and repress the historical context. Every tone has a history, which means a past and a future. It only becomes music by accruing that history. A tone succeeds one event and precedes another, even before it has happened. (Try playing a C Major scale, stopping short on the B. You are already ‘there’ before the new event.) As Monika Langer says: “[the present]... not only brings about

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16 It is worth noting that, although Aristotle endorsed Plato’s Pythagorean notion of the harmony of the spheres, he felt the need to explain why an observer was unable to perceive with the ear the ‘surpassing loudness’ made by the spheres. Jamie James explains: “Aristotle explains that ‘the sound is in our ears from the very moment of birth and is thus indistinguishable from its contrary silence, since sound and silence are discriminated by mutual contrast.’ An analogy was drawn with the coppersmith, who spends all of his time surrounded by the din of his shop, until finally he grows oblivious to it. Only Pythagoras, according to the tradition of the Brotherhood, could hear and comprehend that celestial harmony” (1994:40). Given this picture, it is interesting to observe that the organ of hearing is already fully developed in the foetus at the fourth month, suggesting that in evolutionary terms it is a much older sense organ than the others, and also, that silence is not the sonic background. Rather, listening is attending to, and selecting from, the many sound combinations presented to the ear simultaneously. Weeks reports that “… the foetus hears the maternal heart and respiration as well as her intestinal gurgling” (1989:173), a constant background noise. Amid all this biological cacophony, to what does the foetus listen? Weeks asks: “what is the only sound which comes and goes at irregular intervals? The voice of the mother. According to Tomatis, only the voice of the mother can penetrate via her bones … to the intrauterine world. The child’s attention is fixed on this irregular sound which may serve as the foetus’ first target of communication” (1989:173). The foetus hears by way of bone conduction, that is, via the mother’s spine. The bones literally speak or sing. This, for me is a powerful image, given that the Greeks referred to the spine with its attendant system of nerve fibres radiating outwards as the Lyre of Apollo.

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a transformation of its predecessor, but helps to determine the shape of its own successor” (1989:127). Contrary to the popular view, then, I erase, not remember, the past tones in reassembling them to create a pattern of relation, which, while heard in succession, is a togetherness of tonal events. And indeed, that is the way it is received by the listener: as a whole. The past and future are drawn into now. In the experience, time stands still.

Let me reiterate. I said that each tone has a history, a past and a future, but that awareness of its history is repressed. The tone’s history is created by its relation to a preceding tone and a succeeding tone. I am referring to the interval, which, as I have argued, is extra-sensory. The moment a tone dies, music begins, because movement in time begins. The acoustic (physical) tone dies because it must. Otherwise there is no history. Sensory awareness (selective attention), however, construes the acoustic tone as life, which in the physical sense it is. What follows it - and it can only follow for attention that selects - is the space or interval, which is construed as a death; and indeed it is insofar as it is the death of the physical tone. But the space is far from being a dead space. It is in reality the living past of the dead tone, which is at the same time the living future or anticipation of the new tone yet to appear. The empty space is new life. The next tone will be new life in the material or mortal sense, but it will also be the death (which is inwardly erased) of the immaterial or non-mortal life that existed in the interval. Movement is not just movement; not just a dry concept. That movement in time is history, the biography of the tone, which I recognise only by virtue of my own biography.

In musical processes we live in a realm in which (physical) space has no meaning. Space is an external, extensive reality. The element of time, however, is permanent. Certainly, past events fade in the memory; but they remain. They are only past for ordinary cognition. An experience I had in my adolescence, for example, losing my voice, grows faint after a period of 40 years. It must be this way for normal psychological stability. If I lived in that event as the constant present, I could not act for lack of orientation in time. I would have no past to act from. This does not mean that the past event ceases to exist. History, whether personal or collective, dies only to the extent that it is a present no longer lived. It ceases to exist only in that it is an unremembered past. It is not forgotten.
In drawing to a close this discussion of time, my main point, and perhaps the primary insight of my work, is this: Contrary to the usual view, musical talent is not the ability to manipulate musical phenomena by playing a musical instrument; it is, rather, the repressed capacity to experience, albeit out of awareness, the largest polarity of all; the rhythm of life and death. Tones die as fast as they are born. The fetish for longevity - and this is the problem with the monotone - dishonours life because it denies the necessity of a thing to die. Time causes things to die, yet by destroying them sustains life. Tones can only die in time. At their death they cease to contain time. It is only for the ordinary dualising mind that evanescence is a shortcoming. Yet every tear shed in response to music is recognition (but not yet cognition) of that unsayable truth that is the life-death polarity.

As (s)he has words for joy and suffering, only the human being has words for life and death. The animal, however, is joy and suffering, is life and death. Time has no meaning for the animal. But the animal does not have the gift of coherent utterance. Only the human being is ‘free,’ yet condemned to utter coherently. Contrary to the socio-cultural cliché, then, utterance is not gratis; it is not free of charge. An idea needs to be received. It is received through humanity. Utterance would be free only in the event that the gift is received, which means cognising the conditions of its givenness, namely, loss, longing, shame, fear and the birth-death polarity.

**Musing VII - Hearkening: An Exercise in Obedience**

This musing is a description of that highly attentive form of listening to which I have given the name hearkening. I have chosen the word in order to distinguish listening from hearkening which, as I have noted, is an enhanced form of listening.

Chambers Twentieth-century Dictionary defines the verb to hearken as, to hear attentively, to pay attention to, heed, to seek by inquiry, while the Macquarie Dictionary defines it as, to give heed or attend to what is said.

A further etymological search shows that the verb, ‘to listen,’ derives from the old English Lysnan. Lyst is hearing. It is also cognate with the old English lystan, meaning lust or desire. The verb ‘to list’ is also poetic for listening. It means to lean, to incline to one side.

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Its archaic meaning is to wish or choose, that is, it connates the desire or wish to lean towards, to be unbalanced yet poised.

To listen means to have the desire to give ear to, to attend to or upon, to pay attention (implying a cost of some sort), to give oneself for the benefit of another, to give heed, to be compliant or obedient, to give, yet, to receive.

Clearly, one has to want to listen in the first place. The very notion of heeding implies putting one's own constructs aside, getting out of the way, acting as if one were a blank canvass upon which the phenomenon paints, if I may use that visual analogy.

The attitude is one of inclination. There is no point in hearing if one does not have the heart to listen (incline) in the first place. There is no point in listening if one does not have the heart to obey (heed)\(^\text{17}\).

It is no accident that the subject of Milton's epic poem, *Paradise Lost*, is human disobedience, or, not heeding. The price paid is the loss of Paradise. In the poem, chaos is described as darkness. Disobedience might be envisaged as turning a deaf ear, not listening, disregarding the cost involved in the acquisition of the freedom that comes with sense-experience and knowledge. If chaos is darkness, cosmos is the light of order. If worldly knowledge is disobedience, real listening is obedience, which implies a loss of self and a state of selflessness. As the listening specialist, Weeks, affirms: "... strenuous listening stretches the listener and, in turn, imparts a selflessness, a patience and a stillness which clears the way for

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\(^\text{17}\) I cannot resist the allusion to the heart as a metaphor for listening and obeying. Tomatis explains in an interview with Tim Wilson that the word occurring most frequently in biblical scripture is, 'listen.' It is on this basis that he pursues his science. He relates that "the Rule of St. Benoit, the founder of the Benedictine Order whose members abide by the tradition of the Gregorian chant is: Hear, O my son, the words of the Lord, and incline thy heart's ear" (1989:225). Weeks writes about his contemplation of this dictum "I thought of the heart's auricles (aur), flaps above each atria whose function is unknown. [The association of the Latin auricle with hearing is not coincidental. The Oxford Dictionary defines the adjective 'auricular' as: pertaining to the ear; told privately in the ear, as -confession; witness, one who tells what he has heard; pertaining to the auricle of the heart.] Weeks then ponders the connection of the heart with listening. The Latin verb for 'listen' is *ab audire*, which means in a literal sense 'to go towards that which is heard.' Weeks notes that the Latin verb translates into French as *obeir*, 'to obey.' He submits that this "etymological sequence" suggests that listening "is an exercise in obedience. At best, true listening is an approximation of selflessness whereby a person opens not only his ears, but his heart to [the utterance of] another" (1989:179). Wilson, who trained in the Tomatis method, concludes: "And the psychological problem that I find most widespread today is that we have forgotten the notion, not only of listening, but of obeying" (1989:225).
true perception of the phenomenon” (1989:183). Listening with a preconceived agenda is not listening; it is autism.

Milton subsequently implies an evolutionary redemption in *Paradise Regained* whereby a conversion occurs of self-consciousness into ‘I’-consciousness through the obedience of listening:

I who erewhile the happy Garden sung,
By one man’s disobedience lost, now sing
Recover’d Paradise to all mankind,
By one man’s firm obedience fully tri’d.

Hearkening is a new prescription for listening, a more conscious way, listening with the heart, listening without identification, listening without the inner commentary. It is listening governed neither by the physical production of sound, nor by the theory. Hearkening is a radical transition from sleeping through the audible event to sentient awareness.

I have discussed at length the me-world dualism, which veils the reality that that which allows me to picture a thing or event as a whole always comes out of me. In not being aware of this, it is easy to withdraw from the (sonic) world convinced that I know its nature, having learned to manipulate the things in it. The intense interest in things that I had as an infant diminishes, and can be rekindled only when a fundamental change is made by me in relation to my own faculties of knowing. In the absence of that change, there is an abyss between audible physical events and the life of the mind that can be bridged neither by ordinary listening, which is inattentive, nor by highly prescriptive listening, which is judgemental. In the latter case, terms such as interval, tone, major 3rd, melodic progression, and so on, are graphic, and would be unobjectionable if they did not convey less than the experience they denote. What these words enable me to do is seize the result of listening only, and view the way in which it was obtained as of little consequence. It is by virtue of this gap that Steiner writes: “Discovery of this abyss leads to gaining insight into true reality by filling the abyss with cognitional experiences which are not yet present at all in ordinary human consciousness but must first be developed out of this” (1988a:5). The Void (empty consciousness) teaches listening without fear of getting it wrong. Hearkening is listening whose intention is not instrumental, in the
sense of forcing what I hear to conform to a prescribed menu of ready-made (linguistic or acoustic) responses. To listen into the emptiness, the measure of an interval, (which my thinking, my Logos nature after all has created) is to perceive, not judge, its fullness and my own. The former is misappropriation, the latter, translinguistic and transpersonal apprehension.

Hearkening is more receiving than it is grasping. The ‘object’ of my attention does not come to final form; for the moment it congeals, it is dead. A thing that never arrives at a final form can be apprehended only by its likeness, that is, by a feeling-thinking that itself never arrives at a final form as long as listening is active. Indeed, where this fluid feeling-thinking is not employed, the livingness of the phenomenon is missed altogether.

Hearkening, above all, is an initiative that seeks to recover lost artistic feeling, to make conscious the unconscious evolutionary experience that is embedded in the intervals. This is living in the inaudible musical element, rather than being merely sensitive towards it. I have already discussed the intimate connection of music and movement and the notion of music as a whole organism experience, and also the observation that in learning to play or sing, what would otherwise be that whole person experience is reduced and retained by those parts of the body (including the ear) involved in the sound production. This is not, however, the original musical experience. Our learning to manipulate the auditory environment - which earlier civilisations could not achieve to the same degree because they were not makers (but participants) - determines to a very large extent what and how we hear and experience, as Robin Maconie explains:

This manipulation of the auditory field is expressed in two main strategies: (1) physical movement which changes the intensity and positional relationships of events in the perceptual field, and (2) vocalization or other sound production (including music) which introduces a controllable and dominating element into an otherwise uncontrolled auditory environment. We like to dance and we like to sing and play (1990:24).

The link between these two ‘strategies’ should not be overlooked; for it is out of the movement common to them that moving gesture, the expressive correlative of hearkening
evolves. Hearkening has a history. My musing on the nature of listening has produced the picture of the early human being (and the modern infant) not as a self-willed utterer (mover) who manipulated the auditory field, but as a being uttered (moved). Since what was heard primordially were infinitely larger intervals not created by the listener, the whole organism responded to the stimulus, for it could not do otherwise. (This movement of the universal will still resounds in us. We do not, after all, dance while viewing a painting or sculpture; we dance in the presence of music.) Music appropriates human being, calls it into being. It possesses human being, which in turn possesses it. Humanity learned to take the measure, and the roles of mover and moved were reversed. The evolution of music echoes in the human organism right into its physical structure.

The only way that humanity could possess music, exert its own will, and so learn to take the measure, was by reducing the vast cosmic intervals into a schemata that is temporal and linear, and therefore, manageable. This schemata is the mode (melos) or scale, in which all that was previously ‘heard’ - I am not referring to physical hearing - as sounding together, was then expressible as a microcosmos. (Although it may seem fanciful, tenuous, or even absurd, the Pythagorean system, that inexhaustible network of tones and intervals still in use two and a half millennia after its discovery, contains in condensed form the latent experience of the entire evolution of the musical mind.) Accordingly, what began as a gesture (of obedience) of the whole body was condensed or contracted into a gesture (of self-generated expression) of the larynx. Humanness is brought into its own in this transition, in that the very (Logos) being of music needs the listening of the human in order to sound in the human about itself. Human being sounds only insofar as it listens, a truism that warrants the deepest contemplation.

In effect, hearkening is the reversal of this transition; that is to say, it re-traces the experience as expressed by movement of the body. Diligent practice of listening to the intervals and externalising the experience by allowing the body to move what is heard, reveals that each interval has a specific gesture, a particular movement. It is only the movement that has importance here, and not the completed gesture; for once the gesture is complete, it is dead. One is listening not for what has been sounded, but for what is trying to be heard.
The question that emerges from this practice, a question that I have never heard asked in music education, is this: Why are the intervals different from each other? Why are they not uniform? Why is there only one perfect 5th and one major 7th. Recall that I noted in Chapter Eleven that the interval of experience marking successive epochs has been shrinking. The intervals in which the current human experience is embodied are the 3rds, (although the major 2nds could almost qualify.) But the intervals that previously formed the experience prior to the 3rds are by no means superseded. Rather, all that has gone before is included, but experienced by us in a different way. It is crucial to understand that in earlier times, not only was the interval of experience different from ours, but that the experience itself was different. The two are mutually conditioning. I drew attention to the notion that the perspective was different, earlier civilisations being more in the experiential picture, whereas we stand outside it.

Hearkening does not only listen to the external stimulus, but listens for the echo, the resounding traces of music’s evolution, the entire temporal context. The shrinking interval is really the distance travelled by consciousness from the source, or in the terms of the Genesis myth, the distance travelled by the human soul since the Fall. The intervals are different because the measure (of the difference) is different. If that evolutionary development (the previous history of consciousness) is repressed, as I suggested in the previous musing, it follows that it is unlikely that the interval will be felt for itself; for it is felt by a consciousness that has further evolved and that is above all selective. We now long to experience the intervals in the body, with which we most strongly identify, and which is where consciousness is now fully incarnated. I am convinced that, in the shrinking interval can be observed the gradual move of consciousness to experience the unison which, for most today is a neutral experience. That is why the practice of hearkening reveals the experience of the 2nd as a question. The 2nd is only a short distance from the unison. The uni-son is not a single tone, a single acoustic phenomenon. It is an experience in which all previous intervals (the repressed history) exist together as Logos, a gathering, a collecting collectedness. Time ceases in this experience. The temporal becomes spatial.

Each interval is a defining moment in the evolution of (contracting) consciousness, in the movement of consciousness to experience itself in the expansive, undifferentiated timelessness
from which it evolved. The unison is that phenomenon in which the entire schemata of relation is retained, but not *physically* experienced.

Further, in the scale - the temporal involution of the unison when articulated - all the intervallic relations are contained in a single structure. Each interval formed out of the scale is a living portrait of the progress of the mind through time. In the scale is the biography (not yet complete) of humanity contained. The scale has within itself ‘the complete sum of existence,’ the ‘whole amplitude of time’ in Brown’s words. The movable (from key to key) geometrical schemata called the scale could not otherwise have evolved. The scale is nothing physical until it is heard. It exists as pure idea.

Hearkening, then, is the recovery, not the erasure, of those previous stages of consciousness evolution, listening *for* the measure *in* oneself, where it echoes. I claim that hearkening heals the wound that the alienation of the human knower from the source has inflicted upon both.

At this point I call upon Heidegger once more:

* A strange measure for ordinary and in particular also for all merely scientific ideas, certainly not a palpable stick or rod but in truth simpler to handle than they, provided our hands do not abruptly grasp but are guided by gestures befitting the measure here to be taken. This is done by a taking which at no time clutches at the standard but rather takes it in a concentrated perception, a gathered taking-in, that remains a listening (1975:223).

Hearkening is feeling-thinking that experiences itself as *movement*. This cognition, liberated from matter, participates in its own movement. (There is already in ordinary musical experience an indication of that.) Thinking in its own element, thinking that observes itself, “(and it would not be thinking without some degree of such self-observation) ... appears as the archetypal phenomenon of movement” (Müller and Rapp 1985:116). This movement that is thinking is not a sense-percept. Where there is continuous movement, there is no residual image, for everything is in a continuous condition of becoming and dying. “It is the nature of thinking [that observes itself] to turn ‘become’ into ‘becoming,’ to add to the created world the
creative gestures” (1985:116). That is why music is free of image. Images are only the ‘flesh,’ the substance of thinking after thinking has run its course.

The reason why music is more successful than any other sensory stimulus in inducing movement (in matter and in the human will) is that the observer is not fixed in space. Spatial orientation is surpassed because the point of observation is constantly changing. One is, as it were, the measure itself. This is living in change as the constant of the present. Newness, change, is a permanent condition, not fixed, but moving. (The new skin of the snake is in place before the old is cast-off.) That constantly changing perspective is constancy itself.

The incessant movement of change in all things could never become sense-perceptible unless by way of contrast to some principle of stability and constancy known by us. All things spring from and are renewed by that principle. Every moment is new. Nothing is secure but transition, in which the past is swallowed, but not diminished. In this way, every tone may be experienced as a prophecy of the next. It is only chronological time that drew me out of eternity, timelessness, world harmony.

Musing VIII - Ardour

I discussed previously how the recovery of joy in music-making is a recurrent choice of topic for seminar papers given by my post-graduate students; and I suggest that it is a major concern for professional musicians at some point or other in their careers. What happens when joy, the love for the act, the original currency of making, departs, and is displaced by the need to earn a living, duty, or indeed, by any other motivation that is not love for the act? One is not free. If one were able to catch, as it were, that intentional movement just prior to the artistic act, one would understand that, preceding every deed is, or was, the will to do it. Longing has disappeared because the act has been repeated so many times without awareness, without hearkening. One suffers repetitive strain injury of the will.

I argue that the original love for the deed makes its departure because original longing has not been cognised. To cognise it fully, and so, be able to consciously direct it, is to recover it. But in that recovery, longing is metamorphosed by virtue of becoming conscious. That original stirring within to commit the act of utterance becomes ardour.
Ardour - from the Latin *ardere*, meaning burning, a flame, a fire - is the warmth or intensity of passion or affection, a great heat as of the sun. In other words, ardour is a firing or recovery of the will. Ardour is no ordinary volition. It is the consequence of understanding of the *longing* to take the measure. Ardour, unlike physical attraction or sense-stimulation, endures, because it is conscious. The practice of musing and hearkening, which *is* intentionality consciously directed, revives the will.

**Musing IX - Harmonia: A Musical Model of Polarity and Ethical Individualism**

The modern conception of harmony is one in which the parts are vertically superimposed one on top of each other. They are *blended* to make a triad, a chord, or better, they are in accord with each other. Is this an adequate conception of harmony for current times?

It can be seen in this conception that although the individual voice plays its part in determining the *effect* of the whole, it loses its identity. Harmony in this sense is consistent with the loss of singularity. The loss of identity is commensurate with the absence of time, for the chord on its own is a spatial configuration. A melody, a succession of related tones in time, has been turned upright. The chord does not move, does not go anywhere. (It can, of course, be followed by other chords in accordance with the rules of functional harmony, but I am speaking here of the single vertical configuration as distinct from the melody.) If I can be permitted to put it another way, there is no longing in it for succession (except for the chords of the tonic and dominant) as there is in the single tone. Harmony in this sense of spatial extension is consistent with death, which is the *absence* of time.

It is useful to contrast this notion of harmony with that found in polyphony. In a fugue comprising, say, four parts, the voices make sense *together*, that is, as a unity, just because they each preserve their independence, their singularity. There is relation in separateness, unity in individuality. In polyphony (many voices) is originated harmonic order of a higher kind.

To glance further back, it is known that in the Greek civilisation vertical tonal relations were non-existent. The Greek consciousness was not yet fully consistent with spatial depth. Anderson reports on the Greek *harmonia*: "If Nicomachus (44B10) is relaying an accurate
tradition, Philolaus defined it as a 'union of things that are much mixed' or 'of the heterogeneous' and also 'agreement among those who have been at odds in their thinking'" (1968:37). Here, harmony has a socio-political connotation in which agreement is arrived at by the gathering and holding together of opposing views. Maynard writes:

One thing is clear, and Pythagoras' monochord is a reminder of it: it is not harmony in the sense of hymn-like chords, and we must train our inner ears not to hear it that way. The Greek harmoniai were scales, and when we try to imagine the harmony of the spheres, we should be listening for a series of intervals such as make up an octave scale (1973:239).

Harmony in the Pythagorean sense, conceptually at least, is polyphony, temporal harmony, harmony that sounds, not together, but simultaneously. A true harmony is one in which the voices are individually distinguishable from each other while still contributing to the organisation and progression of the whole. Each part contains time, each flows successively side by side in the same direction, and none loses identity. The parts cooperate with each other by not facing each other, which would mean coming to a standstill. They exist for each other at the expense of each other. There is dissonance in harmony. Harmony is not free of dissonance, of disagreement. Dissonance proceeds to, resolves in, consonance. Harmony is not a holism, not a mix or melting pot, but a clear and distinct delineation of individuals each of which proceeds inevitably toward the same goal, a goal that is there before the beginning, a telos. The telos is structured into the scale or mode itself, and as Hillman remarks: "The idea of telos gives value to what happens by regarding each occurrence as having purpose [and] intention ..." (1996:204).

In polyphonic harmony each part is empowered, not overpowered, by the others. In the empowerment, each part is enabled to give voice. Each voice is one among many, yet the whole is contained in each. The very concept of the individual has meaning only in the context of other individuals of like and lawful purpose. It is only in this sense, too, that the concept of democracy has meaning. There is multeity in unity.

Moore suggests that the original meaning of harmony (harmonia) in the Pythagorean sense can be derived from Homer's Odyssey, where Odysseus binds the planks together to
create the deck (thus creating the means of mobility) of his raft. “The image of lashing
together several logs is closer to Pythagorean harmonia than memories of fifty-voice choirs
singing rich, pleasant chord progressions” (1990:195). Merely to merge into a whole is to
accept annihilation and avoid the problems of individuality.

Although it was not the musical practice of the time, harmonia in this earlier conceptual
sense is closer than the modern conception of a concordant whole to the thing we have won,
and which we most value: individuality. Harmony is a fitting together of individual parts, or
more formally, a structural multiplicity exhibiting the interpenetration of sounding states. The
fugue, polyphony taken to its highest refinement, is a lateral succession of parts marked by
dissonance, consonance, movement, directionality and a future goal, the telos. (It is drawn by
the future goal.) Each individual part has a biography in the context of the biography of the
whole, and the whole has a biography in the individual. Harmony, then, is inseparable from
temporality, from movement towards an implied goal.

In harmonia, there is an association formed by the freedom of the individual voices. In
the fugue is evident a system of independent, yet mutually dependent variables. But the
freedom consists in the order implicit in the whole. One is tempted to say that there is justice,
that is, an authentic equanimity between people on the basis of agreement, rather than justice
imposed by an external authority. Polyphonic harmony is a manifest model for conscious
human coexistence, for ethical freedom, the alternative to structured restraint. The system of
institutional controls put in place in order to control human behaviour and affairs is inorganic,
and as history has evidenced time and again, unjust. Disengagement from institutional
controls, however, does not imply lawlessness. Human being is at its core ethical, that is,
musical. “Today,” avers Steiner, “even the voice of conscience has become external, and
moral laws are no longer traceable to divine impulses” (1994:24). According to this view, the
authoritarian ethic that demands compliance merely side-steps the whole ethical question
because it denies the reality of the independent individual.

An ethos, in the musical sense, is a relation conditioned, not by (unfree) notions of duty,
obligation or obedience to an external authority, but by inherent self-determining lawfulness.
In harmonia, the order is implicit in the intervals appropriately arranged, that is, in the lawful
nature of their temporal association, as Wellesz, after the Greek experience, affirms: “It is by
the properly organised succession of intervals that the ethos ... or character of a mode is
defined” (1961:37). Note the coupling of melody, temporal succession, with moral character.
The whole notion of evolution in the sense of the ethical individual is built into polyphonic
harmonia in which the order is imposed from within, that is, out of inner necessity. (I
discussed previously how the emergence of the cult of the creative genius led away from
polyphony towards dramatic self-expression in the Romantic Age, corresponding with the
verticalisation of the linear.) The intervals are not arbitrary. The perfect 5th, the major 7th, the
minor 3rd; these are not ‘things’ that can be altered at will, at least not without a loss of their
essential character. They are not ‘real.’ They cannot be collected and kept in a bottle. The
intervals are the ONE distinguished by their being the many; they are born out of the
synchronic unison. And if they are so born, they must be contained in the unison to begin
with, although we do not ‘hear,’ literally, their togetherness.

Given my earlier commentary about the word’s power, it is worth comparing harmony in
the musical sense in which I have just described it with a hypothetical fugue comprising four
speakers. The result can only be chaotic and incomprehensible. In the attempt to speak of
reality, we must employ concepts, and all concepts are dualisms because they are mistaken for
percepts. The difference is between symbolic knowledge and knowledge of intimacy.
Knowledge is verifiable only if there is agreement on the codes of communication. The clash
occurs because there is no such agreement; for conventional conceptual knowledge can only
be conveyed in the abstract terms of symbolic, referential, representational thought, which in a
fugue comprising four speakers would occur simultaneously. Musical knowing (or intimate
knowledge) is free of conceptual elaboration. It is just that, after the experience, we revert to
our ordinary symbolic and referential perspective. Everyday consciousness, dualising
consciousness, knows its object by facing it, standing over against it. Zuckerkandl explains the
difference: “Whereas words turn people toward each other, as it were, make them look at each

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18 The confluence of the superindividual origin of the modes, history, and musical ethos is captured by d’Olivet.
Although the invention of the Lydian, Phrygian and Dorian systems is usually attributed to Amphion, Marsyas
and Thamyris respectively, these latter are not physical personages. We must realise, writes d’Olivet, “that at this
remote epoch history did not concern itself with individuals. These three names signify moral, not human beings:
they designate as inventors of these systems the actual ideas that presided over their invention” (1997:125). This
realisation, he argues, depends on our drawing “... the line of demarcation that separates allegorical and moral
history from the positive and civic type” (1997:127).
other, tones turn them all in the same direction: everyone [in a choir] follows tones on their way out and on their way back” (1973b:28).

The word goes out from me, the speaker, and remains with the recipient (who might then reply.) On the other hand, as a singer of tones and intervals, I go out of myself and simultaneously, as listener, return to myself with that with which I set out. The dividing line between myself and the phenomena, and also between myself and the other singers, dissipates. With the spoken word, I am the speaker, identified with what has been spoken. I am a member of the manifest world, the world of material things, the world of identities. With tone and interval, I am not. Speech shows my relation to the world, and reinforces that relation, whereas music shows the relation to myself, my ethical self. And it is the same for the other selves. ‘I’ is both particular and universal. That is why a chorus of many voices is successful. The process is not one of merging, but of conscious participation; a process in which the potential of each participating part is freely realised. The individuals sing the same script, which is not of the world. They all obey music’s call. The Logos is the principle that brings the many back to the ONE. The Fall has its source in freedom. It arose because the two human protagonists turned towards each other and away from the divine.

In the case of harmonia, there is no barrier between self and the not-self. The participants do not have an experience; they are their experience; for an experience can be had only in retrospect. The experience is one of timelessness, of synchrony. The other voices are not defined (as they usually are habitually and dualistically) by negation, that is, by defining them in terms of what I am not. Rather, they are everything I am. As Schrödinger asserts: “All consciousness is numerically one” (1964:21).

But there is a threshold. The threshold, the chiasma, is neither sense nor spirit, but is at the same time both of these. The threshold is where intimacy prevails and where all dualities cease. Intimacy is present in difference, in singularity. In the threshold, in the traversal of the between, things are at one. At one, they are intimate. The threshold is “the fulcrum, the point of balance between the opposites, the unmanifested ‘still point’ where they are reconciled” (Godwin 1982:377).
Finally, this picture of harmony is also for me a description of human love. One has intimate human relationship in the context of one’s singularity, which is not the same thing as struggling to maintain an island of singularity in the context of relationship. In the latter case there is always the risk that one can lose oneself in the embrace of another, in merging, becoming one with him/her in the avoidance of individuality. I can give myself freely to other persons; but I cannot give them what they most need: themselves. Again, in this latter case, there is no movement, no evolution for want of perspective. Alternatively, to take the hand of another of like, but different, mind, and walk together toward a shared goal is to get somewhere; perhaps, in time, even to that end that precedes the beginning.

PART D - CONCLUSION

Introduction

One reason I chose to take this degree in social ecology and not music is that I have found my own discipline, music, the least amenable to the ideas which have been simmering formlessly in my mind for years and which I have tried to make coherent in this thesis. The pleasure of action, of doing music, can exert such power over the doer that anything said, or even thought, about music’s provenance is bound to seem, when compared at least with the allure of doing, an irrelevant “… set of second-order meanings that … encumber, compromise and adulterate” (Sontag 1969:15). Yet, as I have endeavoured to explain, a deep epistemology, the principles of which can be communicated (although not practised) only in words, is necessary in the first instance for the doing to accrue meaning, and subsequently to avoid error in pedagogy and curriculum. Failing this, an inappropriate and conceptually and practically mismatched epistemology has prevailed. However, as I stated rather bluntly in Chapter Five, to continue in the same way is, in effect, to not educate musically at all, but rather, to educate against musicality and humanness.

The study has been concerned ultimately with knowing, specifically the cognitive relation between the act and the wisdom informing it. What do I mean when I say I know something? Usually, I do not bother to make the distinction between knowing how and
knowing *that*.¹⁹ There is, after all, a great deal of difference between knowing *how* to play the trumpet, and knowing *that* the flow of air across an attenuated membrane results in vibration which, when coordinated with the digital manipulation of a metal valve activates an invisible, mechanical system of airways, the whole producing what I recognise as tone. On the other hand, there is a difference between knowing *that* each chord in a Bach prelude progresses logically or axiomatically from the preceding chord, and knowing *how* that progression comes to be logical.

These are only elementary examples. The point I wish to make is that, with human activity, knowing *how* to do something presupposes knowledge *that*, whether the latter is construed as axioms, facts, truths or principles. Does it follow from this distinction that a specialised discipline such as music is conducted in such a way that while engaged in doing what it does, it discovers knowledge (in the form of axioms, facts, truths or principles) about the act? Would it not be reasonable to expect that the specialist, in addition to knowing how to act, knows also how his/her thinking and feeling about it fit into or influence the way the act is performed? The musician and the music pedagogue, then, would not only reflect on theories, methods and principles of sound production, and evaluate musical events, but would also reflect on what it is to *know* musically. To think about musical knowing, its criteria, forms and limitations, we would have every right to expect to be part of the business of doing music.

My initial task has been to demonstrate that this epistemological expectation is far from being met in music education. Accordingly, I have examined what I identified as an epistemological omission in curriculum, and then tried to reconstruct the fundamentals of educational thought based on what I believe is currently missing in it, the whole providing an epistemological foundation from which to begin to understand the journey from the operational and theoretical to the sublime.

**The Epistemological Omission is the Logos**

What, indeed, is that missing element? My first observation was that music is an enduring mystery. It is a mystery because what is essential *in* it escapes recognition or

¹⁹ I am indebted to the philosopher, Wilfrid Sellars (1968), for this distinction.
detection, or say, there is more to it than meets the ear. As I have discussed at length, the ‘essential’ has nothing to do with time, for time has a relation only to the phenomenal world. Hearing in time is a sense experience. The essential, however, is what is enduring and unchanging through time, what informs the musical act. The manifoldness of tones in succession has no connection whatever with the usual concepts of commencement, duration and cessation because time does not exist before the tones, but “… first arises where the essential being of something comes to outer manifestation” (Steiner 1988c:213). The error in our thinking occurs because we conceptualise time as preceding the heard facts, when in reality what is enduring in the particular sequence of tones that characterises every musical work is not what is audible in it. A form expressed through time - and it cannot be expressed without time - is an audible phenomenon with a hidden idea. It is clear, then, that the way to understanding of what I keep referring to as the ‘essential’ cannot be found by doing music. Neither can it be found by listening to music in the usual manner.

Yet, it is the essential that moves us. Moreover, that it does have this power is the reason for our designating it profound or sublime. The ‘journey,’ then, consists in coming to know what the essential is, which has been the main aim of this project.

I have identified the essential as the Logos, perhaps the most difficult of all ideas. It is difficult because it is wordless, silent, and so defies definition. As Sontag so beautifully puts it: “As language points to its own transcendence in silence, silence points to its own transcendence - to a speech beyond silence” (1969:18). Notwithstanding the obvious difficulty of explaining it, breaking through to awareness of that Word beyond silence has been the main ‘finding’ - if that is the right word for a phenomenon that makes every finding and every explanation possible - of my research. I admit that I have been tempted often to give up the search. What I sought to know seemed so remote, so elusive, that I have despaired at thinking that I could even approach it, at least until I realised that in order to discover something new, human research must begin with who we are and what we have, for the truth of our (Logos) being is to be found here.
I do not wish to be misunderstood in making this comment. What I do not mean is that who we are and what we have should, as is so often the case, be assumed as the given, upon which we then set about ‘expanding’ knowledge by forcing it, paradoxically, into hermetically-sealed compartments of professional specialisation. I mean, rather, that the attitude to be taken from the start must be such that the ‘ordinary’ activities of human sensing, perceiving, imitating, uttering, communicating, memorising, forgetting, growing, learning, changing, moving, thinking, feeling and willing, shed their ordinary status and become instead phenomena of intense interest and wonder. Regrettably, this caveat can only be regarded as a gratuitous obstacle for much specialised research endeavour, because the search for knowledge is always a ‘race.’ Resolution is always assumed as the inevitable outcome, and is in any event so often premature. What is an assumption if not an ‘essential’ that has become so ordinary that it is no longer deemed to warrant wonder and reverence, and so, is left inadvertently out of the research equation? It is amazing what one notices when one abandons the habit of being stimulated, or worse, entertained by the appearances of things.

It is precisely the ordinary, the assumed, that demands extraordinary sensitivity on my part as an observer and researcher. To repeat what I said in Chapter One, music can tell me nothing about itself unless I, from the outset, resist any inclination to approach the whole question of human utterance as ordinary or commonplace; for an attitude that does not, as a matter of course, esteem its subject while seeking to learn more about it cannot lead to new knowledge of it. New understandings rely initially on this singular capacity to remain unjaded, which means making the conscious, and therefore responsible, effort to practise wonder, to resuscitate and maintain the sense of reverence for the phenomena. As I have consistently argued, physical sensing is directed to externals. Music, however, has no link with externals except that its physical dimension comes to manifestation externally. Rather, it is about inwardness. That education has not acknowledged this distinction is evident in what I described as prescriptive listening, meaning, listening to the phenomenon (which is essentially a question) with the answer in mind, rather than leaving the question open in order to discover what is there. Such premature conclusions show habitual impatience with the phenomenon, an
unwillingness to sense it on its own terms. Although it may seem unusual to state it, wonder and reverence can be practised.

The *Logos is Veiled by its Product*

I believe that it is because wonder and reverence are absent in ordinary observation that there are principled limits placed on knowledge. This attitude conceals, I think, a deep distrust of the human being as cognisor, of the human capacity to know. It is evident, for example, in the statement: ‘There are things that we cannot know.’ Close inspection shows this to be an impossible statement, a self-negating statement. ‘At the very moment we say that of something we are about to cognise it. The moment we stand at the boundary, the boundary has been crossed’ (Kühlewind 1985:14-15). In other words, the statement is impossible because the act of uttering the statement is concealed (because unremembered) behind what has been uttered. To utter the statement is already an act of knowing. “Truth consists in the correspondence of the asserting as such with the assertion” (1985:131). Truth is confused with correctness of content. The utterance itself is truth. We attribute the truth that is utterance to the ability of the speaker, when it is really utterance that speaks the speaker.

What continually goes unnoticed is that the content of the communication is incidental (ontologically) to the fact of communication. Ordinary perception apprehends always only the ‘something’ that is uttered, and not that which determines its status as something, nor that towards which the utterance points. That utterance happens at all is the important thing. This precursor of audible utterance, which I have discussed as *Logos*, could never have been invented by humanity. Rather, its habitual use by humanity obscures its invention. *Logosing* is achieved by us in every communication, whether pointing, speaking or singing, and even in not uttering at all, but the presence of the *Logos* is veiled by its being a ‘this’ or ‘that.’ It is our inability, or reluctance perhaps, to know the *Logos* that limits our knowing per se, and prompts statements such as that above. The *Logos* is beyond all ordinary communication and dialectic even though it makes these possible. And this ‘invention’ also conceals the utterer. The utterer is that entity behind the visible appearance of (s)he who utters, and even behind the content of the utterance; the *Logos*, the “I-am-here” (1985:64) as Kühlewind calls it. If I could
say what the *Logos* is - and I can only ever say of it that it *is*, never *was* - there would be no need to say anything. It is because we do *not* know that we use so many words.

That we can utter coherently at all is what makes us human. The human is both utterer and uttered. It follows that any violence to utterance is violence to humanity in its essence, which is *Logos*. Violence can be ignorance, wilful deception, excessive cleverness, carelessness, or operational knowledge, all of which can persist indefinitely (because unconscious) without any sense that there may be something wrong. That alien ways of thinking have filled this wordless space (its *plenitude* lies just in its emptiness) is evident in the positivist theory - anathema to the Greeks - of motion, namely, that a body can go on moving indefinitely without an ensouled mover, a theory that modernity has unquestioningly accommodated, as Barfield affirms: “The whole point of a machine is, that, for as long as it goes on moving, it ‘goes on by itself,’ without man’s participation” (1988:51). It is not easy to see that behind the race to analyse the phenomenon, to get it out of the way, as it were, to observe without reverence for it, there is similarly concealed a mechanistic model of the human knower.

**The Path to Logos Awareness is Observation that Observes Itself**

This deception, which we ought by now to have detected, has deeply influenced the pursuit of knowledge and what counts as knowledge. Accordingly, I have argued that musical theorising, distinguished from what actually happens in musical cognition, is not immune to it, and that it has shaped the content and purport of curriculum. Education has borrowed the perspective and terminology of empirical verification and has been deeply coloured by them. As I have argued, the *theory* of music with which we in the West are familiar deals only with systematics, that is, the externals.

It is truer to say, then, not that there are things that we cannot know, but that there are *ways of knowing* that we do not yet know about. It is by reason of this distinction that I have insisted on thinking “... intensified to inner visibility” (Steiner 1988a:35). “It is not important *what* one thinks,” Steiner writes, “but *that* one becomes conscious of an activity which is never exercised by ordinary consciousness” (1988a:34). In other words, conventional investigation -
observation that does not observe itself – is obliged always to stop short of the supersensible in theorising about knowing. This places depth investigation of anything associated with what is exclusively human, in this case coherent utterance, in a bind: because the supersensible cannot be investigated in the terms of empirical validity, it does not exist; and because it does not exist, it cannot be investigated. It must, by default, be omitted.

The implications of this dilemma for research, pedagogy, curriculum, and especially for the development of a valid epistemology for music are profound. Steiner’s comment above points to an axiomatic truth, namely, that the ‘method’ of research is always observation, however it may be explained or formalised, for example, as correspondence theory, empirical orthodoxy, person-centred research, phenomenology, and so on. What is crucial to the findings of research is the type of observation being exercised. If observation is ultimately what counts in research – and there can be no research without observation – it follows that observation, the presupposed in any methodology, must itself be developed to its highest level. Only then can the extent of its reliability and the validity of its outcomes be determined.

Ordinarily, one observes out of the past. There is a great deal of difference between the first experience of something and its ‘memory.’ Moreover, whenever one expresses an observation in words, it is always past observation that is expressed.\(^\text{20}\) The problem is that past consciousness, the consciousness that is observing, does not experience itself. For that reason, one cannot speak out of presentness, but only out of pastness. (One sings out of presence because presence is not identified with the corporeal body. That is why one cannot speak with vowels alone, which are exclusive to music, to song. The primeval ‘language’ was one of vowels, for there was not yet awareness of physicality. This was an improvised language, a language of forms without fixed meanings. Improvisation can occur only in presence.)

The only way out of the bind is to take that ordinary observation that is the presupposed of all method and every statement about what can or cannot be known to another stage of

\(^{20}\) Again, take the example of the examiner who ‘judges’ a student recital. When did (s)he hear the ‘ideal’ performance by which (s)he judges the performance (s)he is hearing now? (S)he has never ‘heard’ it in the literal sense. Yet, it is somehow there, in consciousness, even if not in awareness. It is only because there is this difference between the original experience and the memory of it that (s)he can make a judgement at all. It is just that (s)he does not know it.
development. The memory - and I am now speaking of ordinary memory - must be erased so that one can observe freely; for as I said above, ordinary consciousness has autonomy only with respect to its own past. Observation is a deed, and is knowable as deed. It is just that when we speak about a deed, we have in mind something corporeal that has external validity. Further, this prompts me to suggest that experiencing the contents of what is uttered in this thesis is its validity.

It is this enhanced observational method that eventually enables participation in a thing. The single question (which is at once attitude, paradigm and method) that distinguishes a participatory - and for my purposes, musical - mode of knowing from any other is: How does the music feel? To ask it consciously on every encounter with music places one immediately in an inverse perspective. One becomes by choice, what one observes.

Conscious Utterance is an Act of Love

The elucidation of the fundamentals of a Logos epistemology for music, then, is the outcome of my study. A Logos epistemology is what has been omitted, and it supplants the positivist thought that has filled the gap in our knowledge. Clearly, Logos awareness has profound implications for the content and delivery of curriculum that seeks to educate musicians. It is important that I state, however, that I have not in this thesis attempted to elaborate or interpret through that awareness the many functional elements of music such as rhythm, metre, pitch, the rest, duration, the difference between major and minor, and the specific nature of each interval. These would comprise the experiential details of a working curriculum. My interest here has been, rather, to uncover the epistemological precepts that are the essentials of musical knowing; for they are never acknowledged in music education.

Perhaps the most important implication for education that has emerged out of my search for Logos awareness is the absolute validity of personal experience. What students do not understand is that the habit of comparing themselves with the experts and with the expectations of the profession is an artificial comparison because it is a socio-cultural accretion. Ultimately, an individual can compare him/herself only with music itself, for it is the essential in it that is the guide. The individual can be the only authority in this because
one's responses are bound up with one's personal biographical progress. Education should see to it that a person work towards understanding the truth that where musical utterance is concerned, one places unconscious expectations on oneself ontologically before the expectations of others are even a consideration. As I have argued, comparison with this antecedent ideal is an ethical condition of coherent utterance, and determines the veracity and the appeal of the outcome. Ultimately, it is the individual who gives meaning to his/her actions, and this can happen only when (s)he "advances beyond merely following ... instinctive life and obeying the commands of others" (Steiner 1992:164).

Music has an ethical and not just a sensible aesthetic, although the two are inseparable. In every act of musical utterance, I am judged. In taking the measure of the world, I am measured. Judged by, and against, what? By my Logos nature, my 'I', against the Logos, the 'I am here.' Self-effacement, or, in the vernacular, 'loss of face,' and the experience of shame comprise the price paid for utterance. Until one comes to awareness of this original cost, there is no freedom of expression, because there is no choice made. A choice made without some sort of resistance is not a choice at all. We deceive ourselves when we persist with this fallacy. Freedom of expression is not given, but achieved. One grows towards it. Practice of self-observation produces the insight that "it is inherent in [the individual's] nature to progress along the road toward ethical intuitions and their realisation" (Steiner 1992:165). That is why I see the soul dynamics of loss, hurt, longing, shame, fear and the recovery of ardour comprising the essential core of music curriculum. They can all be cognised (distinguished from re-cognised), however painful. It is infinitely more painful not to cognise them. They are all knowable because they are 'essentially' Logos dynamics anterior to socio-cultural ones. Knowing them is the path to individual freedom. One learns to know them by gaining perspective on them. I believe that to act in this fully conscious way is to advance, finally, to receiving the gift that is the Logos. Utterance and its organ are formed out of the cosmic Word or Logos. We unremember this wisdom in order to utter at all. Yet, we do not forget it. It is resident in us as pre-conscious knowledge. Bringing it to consciousness is an act of love.


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APPENDIX A

ELABORATION OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The purpose of this Appendix is to elaborate the epistemic orientation outlined in Chapter One, that is, to explain in more detail the thinking comprising my particular frame of reference.

The Evolutionary Interregnum

The scholarly discourse of the last half-century is encapsulated most strikingly in the radical opposition of the practice of science on the one hand, and the history and philosophy of science and the emergence of the new humanities on the other. My reading of it (which has been necessarily judicious and not extensive) suggests one (almost inviolable) insight, namely, that the nature of the relation between human consciousness and the world of which it is purportedly conscious, can never be assumed. I am not saying that this recent idea is beyond dispute, but rather, that it is generally agreed that to make such an assumption immediately brings up the question of the status of knowledge (what can or cannot be known) and truth (whether there is such a thing).

Since my thesis deals to some extent with that very question, I have tried to find out how and for what reasons scholarship has arrived at this juncture, primarily because I sensed (in the same way that I sensed there was something missing in my education) that there was something in the debate - much of which has raged around the question of the use of language - that did not ring true for me.\(^1\) I will endeavour to identify what this is; for it has been profoundly

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\(^1\) One trenchant critique of the debate is given by Stove (1998), who argues that the furor generated in recent decades by science studies, namely that centred largely around the seeming opposition of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend to Karl Popper and Larry Laudan is unnecessary because what these protagonists all have in common is a use of language "which effectively disguises the implausibility of their position" (1998:21), namely, the denial that "there has been a great accumulation or growth of knowledge in the last four hundred years" (1998:21). If they are to be consistent, Stove asserts, they must be reluctant to admit "that there has ever been a growth of knowledge at all" (1998:22). Further, because they all "conflate questions of fact with questions of logical value, or the history with the philosophy of science" (1998:23), they make the implausible plausible. For that reason
influential on the development of my life-view, on my choice of topic and on the whole direction taken by my inquiry.

In the first place, it is true, I think, that the twentieth century has seen an epidemic of psycho-philosophical and epistemological theorising unparalleled at any other time in the history of ideas. At the end of the nineteenth century, positivism (with all its other rationalist, literalist and materialist permutations) was not only the dominant philosophical discourse, but also the common worldview. Since that time scholars in all parts of the Western world have been busy postulating one or another explanation for how we humans are placed cognitively with respect to the world we inhabit. We have seen dualism, pluralism, behaviourism, fundamentalism, relativism, absolutism, idealism, mysticism, nihilism, solipsism, constructivism, pragmatism, creationism, structuralism, modernism, post-modernism, holism; the list is endless. Although many of these have their origins in the thought of earlier philosophy as far back as the pre-Socratic Greeks, I have nevertheless given pause to wonder why there has been in this brief span of time such a fever of philosophical activity, particularly in the fields of literary criticism, social theory and the history and philosophy of science. What power or force is driving this accelerated ‘stretching’ of the mind in our time to confirm the truth of things?

The rapidity - peculiar to our age - with which old theories have been supplanted by new ones, the revived interest in Eastern spirituality (and concomitant disinterest in the established churches), the increased incidence of drug abuse, and the sheer quantity of literature, academic and popular, issuing from historians and philosophers of the physical and social sciences in addition to those of New Age persuasion, are only a few of the indices that prompt me to think that Western civilisation is in the midst of an historical interregnum (of perhaps unprecedented turbulence), the outcome of which is likely to be the painful birth of a new relation between

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Stove argues that to expose this “plausible irrationalism” (1998:23) generated by the philosophy of science, we “need a catalogue of the actual literary devices by which this trick is turned” (1998:24). Personally, I cannot agree with Stove’s broad assertion that there has been an expansion of knowledge in toto. Rather, I believe there has been an expansion of certain kinds of knowledge, while other kinds of knowledge have contracted, and that this polar behaviour of knowledge, or rather, know-ing, has occurred of a piece with the expansion and contraction of meaning in the evolution of words. The rhetorical devices to which Stove objects, indeed all language forms, have themselves evolved along with the consciousness that uses them, as Barfield’s entire corpus so convincingly demonstrates (see Bibliography).

2 See Stove (1998) and Windschuttle (1996) for a thorough history and critique of these latter developments.
human consciousness and that of which it is conscious. For ease of identification and definition
I have called the relation (which is conditioned in part by popular and philosophical notions of
the space-time complex), the perspective.

_Awareness of Perspective and the Historicity of Knowledge_

There is no simple combination of words to explain this key concept, so I will need to
elaborate somewhat in order to clarify it. It is the single most pertinent concept of my
framework.

Humans are creatures endowed with, among other behavioural attributes, volition, or will.
Knowing the world (developing a worldview) is to a degree overridden by the human proclivity
to behave in a way that wilfully controls it, and for that reason, fails to know it _for itself._ The
result is that thought _itself_ is involved in a dualism of knowing and willing. "To this dualism,"
writes Schweitzer, "all the problems with which human thought has busied itself ultimately go
back" (1967:10). "Every fragment of the thought of mankind," he continues, "which has any
bearing on man's conception of the universe - whether in the world religions or in philosophy -
is an attempt to resolve this dualism" (1967:10).

Let me give one example of this attempt (brevity necessitates my giving only one) and try
to determine to what extent it has been successful, if at all. One of the outcomes - a flow-on
from the major insight identified above - of the demise in our time of the scientific paradigm is
that it is now relatively undisputed that there is a difference between the molecular structure of
things and their appearance to the sensing consciousness _as_ things, and that human

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3 Although I undertake an ontological examination of it in Chapter Eleven, I wish briefly here to emphasise the
allure of control and its effects on motivation, cognition and the status of knowledge and truth. I quote, for
example, Altner: "The cognising self that isolates itself from nature in the subject-object relationship subjects
nature to the methodology of its own experimentation and calculation. It degrades nature [and itself] as a living
encounter; the self destroys the wholeness of nature in making it an object of human experience" (1987:341). I
suggest that on some level, we are aware of this human cognitional fault, for we then "... attempt to gain credit by
disguising or concealing control" (Skinner 1976:33), or better, we "... conceal control to avoid losing credit or to
claim credit not really due to us" (1976:52). Skinner gives a rudimentary, and perhaps harmless, example of this
self-deception: "The television speaker uses a prompter which is out of sight, and the lecturer glances only
surreptitiously at his notes, and both then appear to be speaking either from memory or extemporaneously, when
they are in fact - and less commendably - reading" (1976:53).
consciousness participates to one degree or another in the creation of its phenomena. That is where the mainstream debate stops. What has not been examined in any depth is whether humanity has learned to organise its experience into patterns of relation, which of necessity would mean taking an historical view of cognition and knowledge, and in turn, recognising that the kind of participation has not always been historically the same as it is presently.

Yet, despite this advance in understanding, it is precisely the relation between the observing consciousness and the observed phenomena, the very same which it is agreed cannot be assumed, that is rarely, in my opinion, taken seriously in most fields of knowledge, if it is noticed at all, even in that sphere where it would be least expected: history, whether it is the history of science, the history of the earth, the history of civilisation or the history of ideas (Lukacs 1997, Windschuttle 1996). (I will return to the consequences for the history of ideas in my summary below.) In other words, having established that there is a difference between the "macroscopic world" (Barfield 1988:6), the world we all perceive with our senses, and the microscopic world, the implications of that difference for claims to truth, and even knowledge, are overlooked. Barfield writes of this anomaly as follows:

... having established the gulf which yawns between the atomic physical structure of nature and the appearance of the familiar world, it is of course possible, it is certainly usual - if we are physicists, to continue undisturbed with our investigations of the unappearing atomic structure, and if we are philosophers, to leave it at that, being content with the metaphysical curiosity we have produced. It is usual: but it is not really necessary to do so (1988:12-13).

In other words, it is already a significant achievement to have recognised this difference; it is quite another thing to inquire after its meaning. Which begs a question: Is the transformation of a thing from its 'unappearing,' unrepresented, molecular form to the form in which I actually perceive it (or give to it), merely a human construction by way of a perceptual expedient, or does it have some 'higher' or, at the very least, historical, meaning?

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4 A thing would otherwise be a formless conglomerate of particles and chemical processes and, in the case of sound, wavelengths, if it did not, in the act of perception, have my formative cooperation. Ordinary perception is a forming activity, that is, it is not just receptive, but creative. I do not see a pile of molecules; I see a tree. I do not hear longitudinal waves or vibrations; I hear a sound. In my perception, I convert sensations into things, a process known as formulation or figuration. In Chapter Three, I address the phenomenon known as representation, of which formulation is a function.
I can best illustrate Barfield’s ‘metaphysical curiosity’ by citing an example that amounts to a bizarre contradiction. The view of the evolutionists is that nature expanded in linear progression from mineral, to plant, to animal, finally culminating in the human form. All this was supposedly achieved with a non-consciousness, or as Barfield puts it, “a kind of existential objectivity without a subject” (1967b:102). Nature and consciousness are not correlative. In other words, physical nature (and it is always external nature, nature minus an inside that is meant) preceded the arrival of mind in the history of the universe.

It is astonishing how compelling (and pervasive) this view is, even when presented with this contradiction: If the retrodictive evolutionary picture of the expanding phenomenal world existing for many millennia prior to the arrival of consciousness is true, why are we now told (as discussed above) that consciousness is correlative to the phenomena, that the phenomenal appearances are irrevocably affected by what we bring to their observation. If nature has changed, and specifically by way of expansion, then surely consciousness (of some sort), if it is correlative to the phenomena, would always have to have accompanied in some way the appearances of the phenomena, since the notion of a pre-existent but unobserved observed is nonsensical. If nature has evolved, then surely consciousness must have evolved accordingly.

It is this inconsistency that did not ‘ring true’ for me, and, so I have discovered, for a handful of others. It prompts Barfield, for example, to assert that even those “who are convinced that the so-called ‘laws of nature’ are part of the mind, are content to go on treating them as though they were part of nature” (1979:85). It is why Bortoft observes: “The failure to notice … the … tendency to think in terms of an external rearrangement of already existing elements (the data), is [an] instance of beginning from the finished product instead of following through the coming-into-being” (1996:159). Finally, it is why Lukacs calls for the “restoration of common sense” by arguing that “the epistemological recognition of the centrality of human nature is complemented by two corresponding recognitions of great importance: by the restoration of our situation in the centre of the universe (in space) and in the centre of history (in time)” (1997:269). (Note, for later discussion, the link between the centrality of human nature and the space-time complex.) This proclamation, Lukacs qualifies, is not “high-flown;” nor is it “… merely a poetic but a pragmatic statement. It springs, first and foremost,” he says, “from the recognition that it is senseless to talk about a universe which exists apart from our
minds” (1997:269). This, I must add, is valid whether it is the post-mechanistic or the pre-historic mind, or simply, mind we are speaking about.

Awareness of this inconsistency is fundamental to my research paradigm, which is also my life-view. In summary, the duality of will and knowing spawns, for me, three anomalies. First, although it is accepted that there is a history of ideas, the same credibility is not granted to a history of ideation, that which thinks or intuits the ideas. (To maintain that ideas change, rather than that people change their ideas “... is not,” according to Lukacs, “a lie; but it is a deception” (1997:xxxvi); for it is a determinist denial of the agency of mind.

Second, we should constantly remind ourselves that the gulf between the atomic structure of things and their familiar form exists, otherwise we also overlook our participation in the phenomena. We can choose to keep the gulf firmly in view instead of forgetting it on every encounter with sentient reality, and then, Barfield advises, “see what effect that has on our knowledge of other things, such as the evolution of nature and of man himself” (1988:13). The effect, I suggest is profound; otherwise my explication would be unnecessary.

Third, there is the gulf which is rarely taken into account by the physical sciences, and equally, I suggest, by “... the newly dominant theorists within the humanities and social sciences” (Windschut 1996:2), namely, the one (posited first by Plato) between the phenomenon and what it represents, the very positing of which suggests an earlier sort of participation in the phenomenon of which we in the present age are unaware. Notwithstanding Windschut’s desire to challenge the new social theorists, what this implies is that knowing is historical. Humans not only participate in their phenomena, but the kind and degree of participation have been different at various times in the history of the world and its correlative, consciousness. To claim an expansion of knowledge - as if that knowledge is simply there

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5 I should explain that Windschut mounts a frontal assault on cultural relativism and post-modernism, as is obvious from the title of his book, The Killing of History: How a Discipline is Being Murdered by Literary Critics and Social Theorists. His aim is to discredit the “... academic prominence of a relatively new array of literary social theories” (1996:2), and thereby restore the study of history as the backbone of the humanities. His rationale: the theorists so mentioned “... assert that it is impossible to tell the truth about the past or to use history to produce knowledge in any objective sense at all. They claim that we can only see the past through the perspective of our own cultures and, hence, what we see in history are our own interests and concerns reflected back at us” (1996:2). The ahistorical view he attacks is in one essential no different from Darwinian evolution theory, in that it is clearly suspicious of, or sceptical about, the ability of the human agent to change his/her habits of perception. Is it not inconsistent to ask someone to ‘keep a point in mind’ when mind is an explanatory fiction?
waiting to be found - without a corresponding movement of the mind that discovers it is an untenable position.

What has been happening, then, in this interregnum? The radical onslaught on scientific orthodoxy grew out of awareness that the consequences of scientism for the physical world, as the new science now appreciates, have been horrific, and that a more holistic paradigm was necessary. What I have tried to show in the preceding discussion, however, is that the value that emerged, namely, the primacy of not assuming the nature of the observer-observed relation, which for science was the assumption of an irreconcilable subject-object dyad, is precisely what has been assumed. What if the movements and content of consciousness (which, recall, is correlative to its phenomena), which would include movements and content of which the observer is unaware (will and control, for example) intervene in the observation of events? Mumford responds: “What perception sees and hears appears to be real because it permits into awareness only what conforms to the wishes (meaning the will) of the perceiver” (1985:iii).

The reason the assumption still has currency, and the reason the debate, I suggest, has been going around in circles, is the lack of awareness that when we speak of relation, we are speaking of a perspective, that is, the dynamic interlocution formed between two co-existing entities, (although it is usually translated as the particular vantage point taken up by a being endowed with consciousness.)

Awareness of perspective and all it implies for cognition is the main point I wanted to establish, for as I will discuss, epistemic awareness is difficult to achieve if there is confusion as to this alternative meaning.

The Dual Perspective

The word ‘perspective’ (from the Latin perspicio-spect - to look at, the right position of relative positions, apparent relation between objects, mental view of the relative importance of things, the relation of parts to one another and to the whole) is normally interpreted as the view point one takes on a think. That, indeed, is what is meant when it is said that one has a ‘point of view.’ There is always a ‘this’ who looks and a ‘that’ looked at. This one-way dynamic, in
which the observer is unwittingly detached from the world (s)he observes, a world (it is thought) devoid of mind, as if that world proceeds by itself, is the way the perspective has been only since the seventeenth century. (I discuss musical and linguistic evidence in the thesis to support the view that the perspective, that is, the whole complex of observer-observed conditions, was different prior to that.) What it is crucial to notice about a relation is what the two entities do to each other. There is not an active observer and a passive observed; there is not mind and non-mind.

Perspective is endemic in any sort of perception and cognition. Whether we like it or not, the perspective today is dual, a subject-object relation classified frequently as ‘dualism.’ Human consciousness today participates in its phenomena as an onlooker, for the reason that ordinary perception requires an observer, an observed, and a degree of space in between. (I cannot identify an object if it is immediately in front of my face. Only when it is some distance from me can I say what it is.)

This dual perspective is built into the subject-object and subject-predicate structure of our language, and that split structure is the primary tool of our knowing. The dual perspective is the whole basis by which we arrive at the judgement that something is what it presents itself to be.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) Again, perspective is relational. In a dual perspective one is always doing something in relation to some other, even when it is reduced to a basic ‘I do’ or ‘I think;’ for one must always think or do a that.’ In the case of the subject-object structure, the subject and object are separated by a verb, that is, the relation is defined by the verb, as Wittgenstein (1990) pointed out. The statements ‘I love you’ and ‘I hate you’ are antithetical in their content but identical in their structure. What of the subject-predicate structure? ‘Predication,’ says Barfield, ‘may be unconventionally, but not really inaccurately, defined as, ‘Whatever is done by the word is, in such a sentence as: a horse is an animal; the earth is a planet’’ (1988:31). The problem is that the observer, embedded as (s)he is in a dual perspective, does not actually see a horse, but makes the habitual judgement that the object (s)he perceives is a horse. Perception is actually less perceptive than it is inherently judgemental. In a dual perspective it cannot avoid being so. That is what is meant by the word representation. Barfield compares this cognitive operation, normal for our time, with that of earlier civilisation: ‘It is characteristic of our phenomena - and indeed it is this, above all, which distinguishes them from those of the past - that our participation in them, and therefore also their representational nature, is excluded from our immediate awareness’ (1988:40). To elaborate, the meaning of a phenomenon was given to primitive civilisations in their representations, but the phenomenon was not experienced for itself, as itself. By contrast, consciousness today knows the phenomenon as a thing, but its meaning is no longer given in the representation because the representation is no longer experienced. The object is now a thing, and not a representation. The thing is experienced independently of consciousness. We now participate unconsciously in the object’s appearance, and for this reason, the meaning that is the thing, distinguished from the meaning of the thing escapes our awareness.
The point I am working towards is that the objectionable elimination of wholes from the scientific description of the world (by virtue of the focus on quantitative results) was not only the perspective of atomistic science; it is inescapably the usual method of knowing. Furthermore, this same perspective is there now in those recent discourses that have revised scientific method in their desire to establish a more holistic paradigm. The absence of wholes in the scientific paradigm was, and still is, the result of a perspective reliant on an historical consciousness increasingly disposed to “the experience of manipulating physical bodies [and which] gives us the object-based logic which Henri Bergson called ‘the logic of solids’” (Bortoft 1996:16). This ‘fleshiness’ of perception is the origin of the now outmoded terms, ‘solid facts’ and ‘hard evidence.’ Clearly, a dual perspective is one in which the observer ‘understands’ by being one step removed from the experience of the phenomenon in favour of identifying it. The dual perspective is the sine qua non of sense-perception. Consider, for example, Umberto Eco’s comment, which is intended to demonstrate the authority of sense-perception in the act of cognition despite any scientific attempt to abstract general law from experience and then to substitute for the experience a model in order to preserve the fiction of the detached observer:

Today we know that the Ptolemaic hypothesis [that the sun moved around the earth, and leading, among other accidents, to the discovery of the Americas] was scientifically false. And yet, if our knowledge is by now Copernican, our perception is still Ptolemaic: we not only see the sun rise in the east and travel through the arc of the day, but we behave as if the sun turns and we remain immobile. And we say, ‘the sun rises,’ ‘the sun is high in the sky,’ ‘it sinks,’ ‘it sets.’ Even your astronomy professors speak Ptolemaically (1999:23).

By perspective, then, I do not mean the popular lexical connotation of physical reality observed by historical contemporaries from differing viewpoints, that is, a multitude of

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1 It is astounding how even a cursory examination of the common terminology we use reveals that our cognitive behaviour betrays the theories we develop about it. Barfield argues that “the most fundamental assumptions of any age are those that are implicit in the meanings of its common words” (1967b:44). The dual perspective is implicit in research terminology and in the common lexicon. Do not the words ‘standpoint,’ ‘worldview,’ ‘position,’ ‘stance,’ ‘vantage-point,’ ‘outlook,’ ‘survey’ and ‘overlook’ all suggest a one-way, non-participatory, cognitively expedient separation of the observing consciousness and its phenomena, that is, a dual perspective? The meanings of words change because the perspective changes.
perspectives, but the whole existential basis by which humanity as a whole derives veridical claims to knowledge of reality, in short, our very attitude to, or on, things.

It is this *perspectival* meaning of the subject-object relation that I believe has been generally overlooked. So, it has also not been noticed that knowledge, in kind and degree, is relative, not to multiple perspectives, but to the one (changing) perspective inhabited by human knowers. The point is to see perspective as a cognitional, and in the case of the dual perspective, historical necessity, which is not the same thing as saying it is an inevitable fixity.

*The Evolving Perspective*

An alternative, perhaps more accurate, term for the dual perspective is *spatio-diachronic* perspective, for the important reason - to which I have already alluded - that any perspective is tied up with perceptions conditioned by experience of the space-time nexus. The term ‘spatio-diachronic’ connotes awareness of some distance or depth in space and/or time between me and the thing or event, which is another way of saying that the dual perspective is distinguished by extension rather than intension.

If it has gone unnoticed that when we speak of the observer-observed relation we are actually speaking of perspective, and in our time that means a dual perspective, it is also easy to make the consequent mistake of regarding the perspective as *fixed*, which amounts to saying that the relation between consciousness and that of which it is conscious (or just as importantly, *not* conscious) has always been the same kind of relation. For me, this is untenable, because the experience of space (I alluded above, for example, to the dual perspective being, in part, determined by the relatively late experience of spatial depth) and time (the difference, for example, between awareness of duration and the much later intellectual notion of mathematical time) have changed, as has the relation between them (for example, the spatialisation of time).

If knowledge has changed (because participation in the phenomena has not always been the kind with which *we* are familiar), the perspective has changed along with it.⁸ Further, if the

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⁸ A look at the history of human cognition backwards from the end of the Middle Ages to the beginnings of recorded history, for example, reveals a progression through hermeticism, myth, mystery wisdom, animism, totemism, pantheism, alchemy and other forms of spiritualism. There is no reason to assume, unless it be a refusal to budge from a dual perspective, that the manifestation of the supersensible forces everywhere and in every thing
perspective has changed it would be just as untenable to maintain that only one entity in the relation, namely, external nature, has evolved, leaving it without an inside, in short, mind, while its correlative, consciousness, has always been the same. Rather, both evolve. To put it otherwise, material and immaterial processes, organic substance and thought-power, were, and are, the same process.9

Just as it would be absurd to assert that reality is always the same when seen by different viewers from different angles, so it is untenable to argue that reality always remains the same when the perspective taken by humanity at large changes.

I submit, then, that the belief that human being in its entirety consists in a permanent and specialised condition of cognition (in which only the familiar has primacy) is fallacious. I suggest, rather, that there is value in viewing present consciousness, in its specific, localised, state, as a psycho-physiological organism constructed in a way that enables it to deal with a correspondingly specific and localised world of phenomena. The current spatio-diachronic conditions by which current consciousness is constrained are impermanent. Further, I believe that humanity adopts at any particular moment in its evolution that perspective which best corresponds to the sorts of experiences which, in its epistemic peregrinations, it senses it is ready to have on its long journey to cognitive freedom and knowledge of truth.

It is important to appreciate that the dual perspective has served, and for most, still serves, to bring about experiences that are suited to the particular perspectival strategy just mentioned, that these experiences are overwhelmingly of the sensory kind, and accordingly, that what generally comes under the word ‘knowledge’ is limited, from a dual perspective, to sensory knowledge.10 As the phenomenologist, Henri Bortoft, explains: “... empiricism, and common sense, both interpret experience to mean sensory experience [rather than the active absence that

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9 Barfield (1963, 1967b, 1984, 1988) and Merry (1980 after Steiner) argue that consciousness is both evolutionary and dialectical, that nature evolves by way of expansion, while mind has evolved by way of contraction. This might explain why certain types of knowledge (of the physical world, for example) have been acquired while others, (mystery knowledge, for example), have been lost. All this has enormous implications for epistemology.

10 That changes in consciousness, from mild to cathartic, are possible is beyond doubt, as much of the developmental psychology of recent times demonstrates (Grof 1988 and1998, Ornstein 1991, Thomas 1991 and Wilber 1993).
is extra-sensory experience]" (1996:50). "There is always," he continues, "a nonsensory factor in cognitive perception... . Knowing even the simplest fact goes beyond the purely sensory" (1996:51). I reiterate: the dual perspective generates the production of all theoretical thought, but crucially, not the experience of thought. As Davy, Edelglass et al. state, controversy no doubt: "Despite its inner longings the modern psyche embraces the contemporary materialistic world view of science on some level" (1992:126). This, I maintain, is the case because, despite the realisation of the disastrous consequences of scientific materialism and the desire to embrace a holistic alternative, it has not been understood that the conditions of the perspective have not changed fundamentally since the seventeenth century, that is, since the emergence of the positivist paradigm, of which scientific method is only the common-sense view brought to an extreme in the focus of the microscope. The recent claim that all scientific observation is theory-laden is itself based on the same kind of (dual) observation (Bortoft 1996).

_Pseudo-holism and the Search for a New Perspective_

The kind and intensity of the debate in the interregnum suggests to me that humanity is in a cognitional bind, fumbling in the cognitive dark for a new perspective, an observation supported by comments such as this, which are common in the literature today: "At this crucial evolutionary crossroads, mankind is groping for a new model, a new philosophy, a new paradigm, a new consciousness to replace the old" (Singh 1988:144). Before discussing what that new perspective might be, I want to foreground one more consequence of the failure to grasp the full implications of the dual perspective for knowing.

What the dual perspective provides above all else - and this relates to the notion of the manipulation of perception for the purpose of cognitive expediency or control - is cognitive independence, that is, freedom from archaic superstition, worldly ignorance and the unpredictable behaviour of the so-called laws of nature. Personal autonomy, by way of the perspective, is germane to a sense of self, and that self is dislocated from the objects of its knowing, otherwise cognition as we think of it would not be possible.\footnote{I wish to emphasise that although the subject-object split is sensed by us (since we also sense that we somehow osmose with the world) it is confirmed by the anthropological, historical and linguistic study of earlier civilisations.} The disjunction is

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endemic in dualism. What I fail to notice, however, is that my dependence on everything that 
is not self is the very means and condition of my perceived in-dependence. I cannot be a self 
without some other. My very claim to cognitive independence is based on none other than my 
dependence on the other. It is just that I do not know it. It is delusory even to speak of 
autonomy (freedom of expression, of thought, of action) until I understand this living co-
dependence. In actuality, I am not free until I do.

The illusion of cognitive freedom, then, is grounded in the one-sidedness of ordinary 
cognition, the dual perspective, which, as I have discussed, is biased in favour of the cognisor 
by virtue of the will to control. As I argued above, the other is not known for itself, but only as 
an object of utility. Indeed, it is because of the dual perspective that the other is an object, and 
cannot be anything else. That is why its wholeness is not an actual perceptual reality. It is not 
easy to see that ascribing all the action - in what is after all a relation - to (s)he who sees and 
hears only perpetuates the fiction that only human observers, and not nature, possess mind. In 
this way, the world loses its ‘flavour;’ the animate can become inanimate. Moreover, 
conferring absolute primacy on the subject and, in effect, repudiating any notion of objective 
truth, as modern relativism has done, is only extending the illusion. Ultimately, things lose 
their mystery.

The failure of the dual perspective lies just in its success, which is, the illusion of 
cognitive independence rather than living interdependence. Dualism tacitly, unknowingly, 
colludes (however sophisticated may be the diversionary discourses) in the compelling 
authority of its own perspective, because any suggestion of an alternative would imply loss of 
precisely what is valued above all else: a purportedly free (volitional) self. It is a perspective 
marked by control of the other, and not noblesse oblige, or, seeing the other as an equal. It is 
this illusion that makes it difficult to take seriously any other perspective, indeed, even to be 
aware of it. As I see it, cognitive privilege entails responsibility, which is, to raise ordinary 
dual cognition to a living encounter with reality.

Having grasped this, it is perhaps not so difficult to appreciate that it is impossible 
through the exercise of sense-perception alone, that is, from a dual perspective (which, recall, is 
extensive) to cognise a whole, (even though we re-cognise wholes constantly). Of necessity,
the dual perspective denies the primacy of the whole, and that is because the actual perception of unity is extra-sensory. As I pointed out in the example of reading (Chapter One), the organisation of experience that is the unity of the sentence is not given in the sense-data. The same is true of music. The sense-data have no meaning at all unless they are organised, that is, brought together into a whole, which is achieved by their correlative: consciousness. Consciousness clearly has an element of unconsciousness. We know the whole that is the sentence or the musical phrase, but we do not know that we know it.

What I am leading up to is this: the approbatory status given holism is in my opinion so far unfounded because dualism, in the perspectival sense has not been fully understood, and has come to be regarded as a kind of human imperfection, when it is actually the basis of personal freedom. “A baby,” write Edelglass, Maier et al., “must first distinguish between itself and its surroundings before it can utter the word ‘I’ (1992:117), indeed, communicate coherently at all. It is the dimension of spatial depth (extension) in the perspective that confers cognitive autonomy on the human infant. Without this distance, the world would be a chaotic, formless blur of sensation without distinction.

The dual perspective is the very basis of self-actualisation, and it is only from this privileged position of cognitive independence (which is nevertheless felt on some level to be a severance from the world) that the move to an authentic alternative can be initiated. (To bring about a meeting, there must first be awareness on some level that there has been a prior separation.)

I argue that it is only by understanding both the unveracities and the positive gains implicit in the dual perspective that the case for a more holistic alternative can be made; otherwise holism is little more than a term of convenience. In other words, the move to a new perspective, to new observer-observed conditions can only be made as a fully conscious exercise of the will. This ethical imperative cannot happen as if by itself.

Although I discussed in Chapter One what I conceived a holos to be, I want to elaborate here by saying that, despite the deep-seated dissatisfaction with the artifices of dualism, it is not what might be expected, namely, a synthesis brought about by merging disparate entities into a
unity. There are three reasons for so arguing: first, in reducing the many to one, a dual perspective, the cognitive norm, sacrifices the differences there are between the parts for the sake of uniformity, implying that the whole comes after the parts (when it is already there), second, unity is apprehended in perception (not abstract judgement) although it is not a sensory element, and third, to manipulate such a synthesis is still an exercise in control, for it denies the ethical right of the individual to choose unity.

The second of these is not a contradiction. What it means is that the intellect is concerned with uniformity for its own cognitive convenience, and so unity by way of conceptual synthesis is achieved with ease because it is dual to begin with, which is why meaning has to be attributed to it. It is facile. Bortoft (1996) argues that the current trend for unity in multeity is an abstraction, meaning, not experienced, while multeity in unity is experientially comprehensive and concrete. Holism is an abstraction if it reduces many to one. Awareness of unity by way of perception, on the other hand takes an effort, for it is “unity without unification” (1996:57), unity that emerges precisely out of the essential differences between things. The difference between the two methods is an ethical one.

We sense on some level that we have done with dualism. Yet, it is futile to posit a holos and then proceed to study it as if it were a thing, for the perspective is still one of extension. A whole is precisely a no-thing, which is not the same as nothing. Suffice it for me to say that one cannot work, as a being of free will, from a holos, only towards it, and that is because, from a unity, I would have nothing to work for, since my consciousness would be undifferentiated from the whole to begin with. There would be no free will to exercise. Cognition as we understand it would be impossible. I would not be an ‘I.’ In other words, a holos, which must remain an unknown from a strictly conceptual viewpoint, is an idealistic response to less desirable dualism; it is not yet a sentient actuality. Although holism is a laudable goal in itself, there is a risk that in missing the necessity of difference, we can mistake a unity for a harmony of non-individuals or anonymous functionaries.

Despite the recognition that the endless dualities generated by the perspective perpetuate ongoing conflict, the holism postulated and held up as a value in the recent scholarly debate I regard as dualism in another disguise, pseudo-holism. Bortoft supports this view and
simultaneously hints that the alternative perspective is an intensive inverse of the extensive dual perspective:

... whereas extensively we see many in the form of one (i.e., uniformity), intensively we see One in the form of many. Hence in the intensive perspective each of the many is the very same One, and yet in a way includes difference instead of eradicating it. This is the difference between a genuinely holistic perspective and the analytical counterfeit (1996:88).

Bortoft’s description of the dualistic practice of standing off from the phenomenon in order to gain an overview, and then generalising from that observation, as a “counterfeit whole” (1996:22), distinguished from “… the discovery of authentic wholeness” (1996:26), suggests (in the use of the word ‘counterfeit’) an element of premeditation. For me, that is not the case. Rather, it is lack of epistemic awareness I am talking about, and for that reason I prefer the appellation, ‘pseudo.’

As I see it, dualism had and has its place in the greater scheme of the evolution of nature and humanity. (Why in recent decades has there been an articulated need to address the problems intrinsic to scientism and to take a more holistic attitude to the world? Did not somebody, somewhere, sense the need to move beyond the limitations of dualism?) Unless we understand the historical nature of consciousness (which includes nature), however, and the dynamics of the dual perspective, holism will always remain a theory of pseudo-wholes. To see it otherwise is to subscribe unwittingly to determinism, meaning that we see ourselves as hopelessly and inevitably the victims of genetics, environmental adaptation, chance and the like. I believe the contrary: humanity adapts precisely by not adapting. I mean by this that the change to holism (which for many translates as confidence in a vague multiplicity) is not dependent on abandoning dualism, but on surpassing it by transforming it, which implies, in turn, recognising that in the will resides our agency to bring about this change in the perspective by a radical change of consciousness, “… a transformation [amounting to] a restructuring of consciousness itself” (Bortoft 1996:63), in short, a *melanoia*. It is this (provisionally) free will that psychologist, Robert Ornstein, has in mind when he writes: “Our biological evolution is, for all practical purposes, at its end. There will be no further biological evolution without conscious evolution” (1991:267). G.N.M Tyrell supports that view:
Few as yet realise the full implications of the discovery that the conscious mind [which, recall, is only partly conscious] does not exhaust human personality. We may not see much at first in the knowledge that there is more in us than we are conscious of; but reflection shows it to be more and more significant, until the perspective of the entire human being begins to change (1954:25 my emphasis).

It is time for consciousness to become conscious of itself.

Summary

All that I have discussed here, the interminable confusion arising in the last half-century from the tenet that the nature of the relation between the conscious and that of which it is conscious can never be assumed, is symptomatic of an historical interregnum, which represents for me a period of cognitional adolescence, the in-between, moving to perspectival or formative maturity. Things happen in the transition from one perspective to another that carry enormous implications for attainment of that which we seem to value above all: our freedom. The as-yet-unidentified ferment taking place in the interregnum suggests to me an unprecedented struggle taking place in humanity, the nature of which I identify as a surging of the human will to experience the threshold between the realms of the sensible and the supersensible. Moreover, I regard this development as it is happening now as perhaps the most significant secret of our time. I direct the reader to the epigraph at the beginning of the thesis.