Progressing Towards Conservatism

A Gramscian Challenge to the Conceptualisation of Class, Agency, Corruption and Reform in ‘Progressive’ Analyses of Policing

by

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A thesis presented to the University of Western Sydney in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

November 2004
Acknowledgements

Thank you to my friend and academic supervisor Dr Elizabeth Watson. Also many thanks to comrades Lorraine Murphy, Dr Kelvin McQueen and my colleagues Dr Abbas Brashi, Dr Ru Ying and Jianle (Frank) Ni from Nantong Medical College.

It is very important to me that I pay a special tribute to some departed friends who contributed enormously to my work. My dear friend Joan Locke a lawyer who I first met as a detective under cross-examination died in 2003. Another good and kind friend Robert Lowe died in December 2003. My Colleague Captaine Pierre-Yves Le Bivic from the Brigade de Protection des Mineurs in Paris died in March 2004. He insisted that Paris was the seat of all revolutions, a considerable concession for a Breton. Lastly Tony Brizzi a friend from the other side of the fence, so to speak. A serious gangster and a man of his word who died on 28th October 2004.


My good friends from the Solomon and Patchett families can either accept part of the blame or take most of the credit for the ‘academic’ shove.

Finally, thank you to my wonderful wife Narelle.
Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

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Abbreviations

ABC    Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ABCI   Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence
ACC    Australian Crime Commission
AFP    Australian Federal Police
ASIO   Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
BCI    Bureau of Crime Intelligence
CIB    Criminal Investigation Branch
CIU    Crime Intelligence Unit
DEA    Drug Enforcement Agency
DPP    Director of Public Prosecutions
GD’s   General Duty [uniform] policing
HOD    Hurt on Duty
ICAC   Independent Commission Against Corruption
IPSU   Internal Police Security Unit
JDTF   Joint Drug Task Force (also JTF)
JTF    Joint Task Force (also JDTF)
MP     Member of Parliament
NCA    National Crime Authority
NSW    New South Wales
NSWCC  New South Wales Crime Commission (State Crime Commission)
NYPD   New York Police Department
OCR    Operations and Crime Review.
PIB    Professional Integrity Branch
PIC    Police Integrity Commission
PQA    Pre qualifying assessment for promotion
PRAM   Police Regulation (Allegations of Misconduct) Act 1983
Abstract

This thesis about rank and file police takes place from within a class framework with its foundations in the works of Marx, Engels and Gramsci who theorised that revolution is the result of the contradictions in class society reaching breaking point. A key argument in this thesis is that achieving a new common sense and a new social order requires the development of a counter hegemony embodying a consciousness of the unity of working class interests and that this consciousness develops organically from within the working class. To Marx, consciousness is not the creation of theory developed by the intelligentsia, a group he did not see as a revolutionary vanguard, as many intellectuals have since argued.

This thesis contends that ‘progressive’ intellectuals, journalists and politicians act, as Gramsci theorised, as the ‘subalterns’ of the state by creating a ‘moral panic’ about police corruption. They ignore the wider spread of corruption within a criminal justice system that is shaped and reinforced by a highly politicised criminal justice establishment. In this process operational police have been theorised as class enemies or denied membership of the working class by being presented as part of the ruling class rather than just the state’s low-level functionaries used to enforce ruling class interests. In legitimising this worldview, ‘progressives’ have conflated the powers exercised by the ‘rule maker’ with that of the ‘rule enforcer’. The subsequent antipathy that is directed at the policing vocation is augmented by an ‘interactionist’ inquiry method. In this process the alienating factors that are causing resistance, misconduct and corruption amongst rank and file police are ignored from a structural perspective, whilst on the other hand they are amplified by a contemporary neo-liberal reform agenda that is agency focused.

The supporting data of this argument is provided in open ended, semi structured interviews with operational police. This is integrated with material from media sources, parliamentary inquiries, commissions of inquiry, legal transcripts and various published data from journals, newspaper articles, personal diaries, conference papers, Internet publications and policy documents.
INTRODUCTION

On 4 August 2004 Detective Sergeant Steven Leach, who had been for many years a senior investigator in the Homicide Squad and had recently finished a lengthy secondment at the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal in Kosovo, came into the office at Police Headquarters in Sydney and shot himself dead with a police firearm. He was, according to the media reports, a good and well respected policeman who had finally found the pressures of the job too much to handle (Stevenson 2004). ‘In every way, Detective Sergeant Leach epitomised the professional police officer,’ Police Commissioner Ken Moroney said at the funeral. ‘Mr Moroney has awarded Det Sgt Leach the Commissioner's Commendation posthumously “in recognition of his tenacity, dedication and commitment” to inquiries into Samantha Knight’s disappearance,’ (Davies 2004) it was reported in *The Australian*. The statement issued to the media by the New South Wales Police hierarchy declared that although ‘Leach's file did not indicate he had any problems at work’ (Barrett and Warne-Smith 2004), he had clearly been in a suicidal depression, silently suffering from the ‘horrors and evil’ of homicide investigation work (Stevenson 2004) and, it was surmised, his stint in Kosovo had obviously pushed him to breaking point. This position was seemingly reinforced by the fact that he had come into the office, although he was on sick leave, to commit suicide and that he did not leave any explanation as to his state of mind.

In fact, Leach was on sick report because of an injury to his knee and, after thirty-five years of front line criminal investigation work, it seems hard to imagine that he would not have been able to handle any of the horrors that a War Crimes Tribunal might produce. At Steve Leach’s funeral I overheard a senior uniform officer comment to another colleague, ‘But, mate, he went off sick with a crook knee. It’s not as if he was disgruntled’. Although the clarity of the issue had been officially related to the media, Leach’s senior officers were clearly less certain about the crisis that led up to his suicide. Surely he couldn’t have been just another of those well-known ‘disgruntled’ coppers? (Carlton 2002b) they were asking each other. His friends and colleagues were less uncertain and clearly less mystified. Recently passed over for promotion in a managerial system that gave precedence to higher education qualifications, devalued operational experience and rewarded the ability to satisfy managerial ‘role play’ situations, Leach had reacted bitterly to his lack of promotion. His own expertise was demonstrable in his service record—he had joined the force at age 16 in 1969—and his vocation was policing not acting. If he had realised that this was necessary for success in the police service he would have enrolled at NIDA—the National Institute for Dramatic Art—
instead, he had told his friends. Leach was unable to obtain any benefit from the ‘merit’ based promotion system put in place as part of the ‘new broom’ of the neo-liberal management regime even though he had been eulogised at his funeral by a Police Commissioner who said he ‘epitomised the professional police officer’. In November 2005 a *Sydney Morning Herald* by line read ‘Again a Policeman Clocks on, Kills Himself’. 31 year old Patrick Cleary had only been a police officer since 1999. Three years after becoming a policeman Cleary began work in the highly sensitive and specialised area of child abuse. After barely six years he was an acting Sergeant in charge of a Joint Investigation Response Team [JIRT]. The experience and history of these two officers are quite different. Deputy Commissioner Andrew Scipione explained that “No one ever knows why these tragedies happen. We may never know,”? When an individual chooses to end their life in their work place the least an employer could do is consider the possibility that the individual concerned is attempting to convey a work related message. At least three other officers in the past four years have taken their own lives in stations with their own service weapons (Kennedy 2005a). Even if these officers had told their senior management about their dissatisfaction, they and their ‘progressive’ reform advisors would have likely made a very different—although equally unrealistic—assessment of his position. The officers concerned would not only have been ‘disgruntled’ but ‘resistant to change’ as well. Both Leach and Cleary were unable to fit into the new police service and they had succumbed to despair. They are not the first and it is unlikely that they will be the last to take such a drastic step (Fields and Jones 1999; Gibbs 2002; Morfesse 2002; Ferkenhoff and Janega 2002; Sutton 2003a; Kennedy 2005a).

In the case of Leach it was, however, not very likely that any of this would have been said publicly even if it was known for sure because the senior management was in damage control mode at the time due to a police incident earlier in the year stubbornly refusing to be laid to rest by the media. Only the previous week on the *ABC 4 Corners* programme investigative journalist and member of the Police Advisory Board Chris Masters had presented a forum, *Training Day*, that had been billed as ‘Chris Masters talks to bent cops and police chiefs around Australia about the painful costs of corruption, the effectiveness of anti corruption measures and the need for constant vigilance’ (Masters 2004). During this, Masters declared that the reform within the NSW Police Service following the Report of the Wood Royal Commission in 1997 was radically transforming what had been a ‘culture of corruption’ into an efficient, modern policing institution based on a progressive managerial framework. There was resistance, the audience was told by Masters in sympathetic tones, and there was still a section of the force suffering from ‘poor morale’ as a result of the changes. Sidelining this issue of morale, Deborah Locke, former senior constable in the NSW police and for the past
decade a high profile whistleblower and anti-corruption ‘expert’ as well as a widely read author, said dismissively, ‘I think the morale’s low because people are sad the party’s over. They’re more answerable, and they’re scared’.

Part way through the programme Masters informed the television audience in measured tones about the huge struggle and the legacy behind this reform.

Masters: The massive changes to have occurred in policing were not just as a result of royal commissions. But just as the luminal exposes the blood traces, an uncompromising search of the past identifies the buried corpse of corruption (Masters 2004).

In his response to this less than modest statement New South Wales Police Commissioner Ken Moroney replied:

Moroney: Yes, it was worth it. It was hard. It was hard. But I believe that we are a better organisation for it, both in terms of our service delivery and our ethics and our integrity (Masters 2004).

This was good television. The repeated phrase, ‘It was hard’, implied a long and arduous journey and the emotion told viewers that Moroney had personally been through a veritable ‘pilgrims progress’ to turn the police service around. His use of the words ‘ethics’ and ‘integrity’ were reassuring to an audience well used to media exposures of ‘corruption’ and the professionalism of police management was highlighted by the idea of ‘service delivery’ rather than enforcement—this was a police service headed by an educated management team not just a hierarchy of officers who had risen through the ranks and bludgeoned their way to the top.

However, the unspoken question that lay hidden behind Moroney’s emotional response and Masters grand gestures—who benefits by this system?—was only posed by those operational police who responded to the online discussion after the programme. It is unlikely that Detective Sergeant Steven Leach would have agreed with the enthusiastic self-congratulation of either Masters or Moroney or spared much sympathy for the Commissioner’s intrepid journey through the ‘slough of despond’ to the metaphorical high ground. Clearly not everyone who joined the on-line discussion after the programme was convinced as well. In his concluding remark, as he signed off the online segment, Masters effectively rebuked the voices of those who had tried to give another point of view by declaring:

Thanks to the contributors. As usual it seemed pretty much the Police Gazette on line. I am sorry some police officers took offence. I was trying to make a programme that said reform bought
progress as well as pain… The programme took a lot of effort and I might say a little thought. I hope I am right in saying it will be the last programme I will do on the cops. But then, I have said that before (Masters 2004).

The dissident voices were in this way summarily dismissed for their ingratitude. There is something rather scathing about Masters’ use of the phrase ‘I was trying…’ and something rather ominous about his closing admonition ‘But then, I have said that before’. It is clear that the battle is not yet won, he was inferring and the undermining influence of those ‘cops’ who are resistant to change, resent the ‘pain’ caused by ‘reform’ and continue to stand in the way of ‘progress’, or are ‘sad the party’s over’ or ‘scared’ that they might still be caught out will continue to reject the changes. Resistance is futile, he might well have added, because complaints are effectively contained. The fact that ‘contributors’ to the on-line discussion were rejecting his insistence that there had been ‘progress as well as pain’ was never addressed at all. There is no room in the ‘progressive’ lexicon to accommodate such an idea.

It is obvious that this was basically planned as a ‘feel good’ programme—presumably this is why it ‘took a lot of effort’—mobilising a forum of largely positive sounding senior police management and acknowledged whistleblowers, with remorseful, reformed and suitably meek former corrupt policemen sitting alongside happily retired coppers seemingly ruminating, largely ineffectually, about the ‘good old days’ to add a tiny taste of the past to the mix. In his summing up at the end of the programme itself Masters had made the following statement direct to camera:

One of the ways a society measures the ageing process is by looking into the faces of its police. The passing of so many from the old guard means that in Australia, they really are getting younger. And they just might be getting better. From the ’60s to the ’90s, when the old guard ruled, crime rates in most categories rose steadily. They then levelled off and in some instances even began to fall. Australia is the only Western nation to experience a heroin drought. The succession of scandals over the last decades can hide the good news and the progress.

What is also written on the faces of our police is experience, sometimes brave and sometimes bitter. That broad experience and more unravelling secrets makes an undeniable case for serious and uncompromising reform in Victoria, in danger of being left well behind while elsewhere the cycle of change moves on (Masters 2004).

Too much positivism would have been bad television and there had, of course, been the merest whiffs of debate, such as when Chris Masters said that ‘[t]he NSW Police Integrity
Commission has reported with pessimism the progress of cultural reform’ and Moroney predictably rose to the defence.

Moroney: I see the work being done by my police officers today, particularly those young in service. I see the increased supervision, I see the increased leadership, and, yes, that’s all come at a price, a very hurtful price in one sense. And I think it's a little harsh to say that there’s been no change in the culture, because I believe that there has in a most demonstrable way.

Moroney had good reason to want to stress the dedication that lay behind the restructuring of his value-added, reformed and better educated police service for he had just received an report that gave little reason for self-congratulation as it was extremely critical of the performance of senior police. Moroney’s ‘increased supervision’ was certainly valid but there was plenty of room for dispute that the ‘pain’ had also brought ‘progress’ in the shape of ‘increased leadership’.

In terms of positive publicity, Training Day was a public relations success, as was Moroney’s handling of the suicide of Steven Leach. However, this glow was short-lived. For two weeks after the Four Corners programme and a week after Steven Leach’s funeral the content of the critical report was leaked to the New South Wales media. The inquiry related to a disturbance that had taken place in the inner city suburb of Redfern, an area with a large concentration of marginalised Aboriginal families. In the ensuing riot fifty rank and file police had been injured and, the Daily Telegraph reported (Sofios 2004, p.9), operational police had left the scene of the riot ‘… “disgusted” and “embarrassed” with how their bosses had handled Sydney’s worst civil disturbance in decades…’.

Deputy Police Commissioner Dave Madden explained that the problems experienced by rank and file police were a combination of both individual agency—a poor assessment of the situation by a number of the senior police involved—and also a series of structural failures. ‘That night, a whole series of system errors occurred, which meant that each compounded on the other and we didn’t respond as we should have,’ he told journalists at a press conference (ABC Newsonline 2004a). It was unfortunate, he emphasised, but it was not a fault of the system itself. The relevant senior police who had mismanaged the response would not be subjected to any disciplinary procedures, he declared.

Nor were they—a response that would have left the less fortunate rank and file secure in the knowledge that a double standard was firmly in place in the police service. For, as John McKoy, a former chief inspector in the Victorian police had told Chris Masters in the Training Day forum:
Some police work their butt off for 20 years, they get several commendations, which means nothing. If they get into one minor management problem or allegation of corruption, that doesn’t mean a thing. So there's not loyalty, generally speaking, from the top to the bottom. And I think the general police officer knows that, they know they’re just a number (Masters 2004).

Although McKoy had introduced an important issue, nothing more was said about this. Instead Chris Masters had deflected the potential escalation of criticism on that front by asserting sympathetically, ‘It was as if overnight the cops no longer valued the 1,000 years of experience represented here’, allowing the debate to briefly touch upon the less controversial matter of education and experience—‘there is anger about the new strangle of regulations and the new breed of so-called “academic cops” now favoured,’ Masters had added (2004). This discussion got nowhere, however, as Masters steered debate back to the well-worn path by saying that ‘[e]ven those whose lives were wrecked by the old codes of brotherhood can hold to its virtues’ (Masters 2004). This was a programme about ‘progress’, albeit made harsh by ‘pain’, and the idea that the new value-added police management might not be performing splendidly was not on the programme’s agenda.

Nor was it on the agenda when the Premier, Mr Carr, was asked to comment on the emergence of an adverse report a fortnight later. Carr was quick to explain that he had not seen the report because it had been prepared for the coroner not the Government, disclaiming any prior knowledge of its contents (ABC Newsonline 2004a) and therefore transferring official explanations for the management debacle back onto the Police Commissioner. Despite the fact that the coroner had indicated that he did not care when the report was released, Deputy Commissioner Madden defended the decision not to publicly release the report at the time by saying that it was thought that it should not be released until after the coronal inquest into the death of TJ Hickey, the incident that had initially sparked the Redfern disturbance (Sofios 2004, p.9) and brought an immediate hail of accusations down upon the heads of the operational police involved. Ironically in February 2005 there was a serious public disturbance in the lower socio economic area of Macquarie Fields. A number of young people died when a motor vehicle that was being pursued by the police crashed. Madden was stood down shortly after this incident over an unrelated matter and in January 2006 still had not returned to work (Connolly and Kennedy 2005). Numerous young males were charged with Riot and Affray and all but one received a custodial sentence. Totaro (2005) explains that despite the rhetoric associated with this ‘serious’ matter by Commissioner Moroney he advised a New South Wales Parliamentary inquiry in December 2005 that the matter was not a riot but a disturbance.
Although the NSW Premier Bob Carr and Police Commissioner Moroney immediately blamed alcohol, grief over a boy’s death and the unrelenting heat for the Redfern riot (Totaro, Levett and Jacobsen 2004), making no mention made of the social decay widespread in the community, the underlying assumption was that Redfern police already had a reputation for being racist and for systematically harassing this Indigenous community (Chan 1997, p.11, pp.65–66, pp.214–217; Brockie 1992). If the media were initially interested in embarrassing police management (Sofios 2004; ABC Newsonline 2004a; Kamper 2004; O’Rourke 2004), the subject was soon dropped. Interestingly, throughout the brief public life of the entire incident the ‘progressive’ academics who supported the neo-liberal management reforms were conspicuously quiet about the incompetence exposed in this new educated elite of police managers and the probability that such ‘systems errors’ were being explained away far too glibly. They had been considerably less charitable in assessing incidences of incompetence of operational police in the past, as this thesis will show.

The issues that can be seen to converge during this three week period between late July and early August 2004 lie at the heart of this thesis for they represent the continuity of unresolved issues that have regularly surfaced for nearly two decades. The double standard visible in the nexus of these three incidents is important in the context of this thesis as this, more often than not, goes unmentioned. For the fact that management failure has never been allowed to become a major issue is not just a failing of policing organisations to carry out very necessary critical self-assessment but is also a failing of ‘progressivism’ itself.

For the uncritical support given to neo-liberal managerialism reflects the wider inability of ‘progressive’ theorists to adequately define the police service and locate this within the larger institutional, political, economic and social framework. This failing of theories to adequately locate operational policing into a theoretical framework has obscured a large part of the conceptual landscape. The focus on the agency failings of operational police and the management of those ‘unreformed’ senior officers who previously rose through the ranks to become the police hierarchy (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.162; Hatton 1996a; Lagan 1995) has skewed what is seen as ‘reform’. The ‘progressive’ position, seeing itself as ‘radical’ (Becker 1966;Scranton 1985; Carrington 1998; Chan 1997, 1999; Chan, Devery and Doran 2003; Dixon 1999b, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003; Maher 1997; Maher and Dixon 1999; Maher, Dixon, Swift and Nguyen 1997), has increasingly drawn closer to the conservative position, denying the complexity of this very important subject. For operational police, this thesis will argue, have fallen into a theoretical ‘black hole’.
This thesis aims to address this conceptual failure by theorising an holistic approach to policing. To do this it analyses the ‘progressive’ decline of the radical critique, demonstrating how ‘progressive’ intellectuals have persistently and relentlessly chosen to focus upon the large and very ‘soft’ target presented by the unpopular rank and file as they champion the underclass of ‘rule breakers’ and ignore the ‘rule makers’ in this concentration on the ‘problem’ posed by the ‘rule enforcers’. In doing so they miss the wider spread that should be the focus of their research and distort their class analysis in such a way that it becomes a parody of itself. Rank and file police are removed from their place within the working class—or proletariat—and elevated into a position within the ruling class that they by no means occupy. Rendered invisible as the site of a problem of alienation, they are denied a ‘voice’ in the analysis and their point of view is barely considered at all.

This thesis aims to address this invisibility not only by rebuilding a theory of the criminal justice system but also by giving the operational police a chance to air their viewpoint and enable this to be assessed alongside that of the other protagonists. To do this, interviews were carried out with a number of operational, or formerly operational police officers and their experiences have been included in the wider analysis.

In general, liberal reformers have proposed from the sanctuary of intellectual freedom the enabling of civilian review boards, the managerial reform of police administrations, and the demilitarisation and rigid control of the actions of the operational police by blanketing these as the powers wielded by an essentially corrupt culture. What is seldom considered is that the ‘reform’ based inquisitorial hearings they have put in motion to achieve this end have a discriminatory and anti-liberal human impact. As one of my research subjects explained:

‘Barney’: That’s all become part of these changes [reform] though. Y’know [the hierarchy] say, “Oh we have some problems here. So we have got to attack the cops on the street and bear down on them a little bit harder”. Y’know the Royal Commission just took the wind out of the sails. It just devastated a lot of police that wondered why should they go out and do anything (‘Barney’ 2002).

The Wood Royal Commission (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997) put great stress on operational police—who are, after all, usually ordinary working class men and women—and was responsible for numerous suicides (Clark 1996)—a fact that is seldom raised by any of those in ‘progressive’ intellectual circles, who decry instead any encroachment on their own intellectual freedom (Hogg and Lee 1999) as they make
accusations about police corruption on the basis of rumour and innuendo and without checking their sources (Carrington 1998).

Certainly, from a radical perspective the ‘rule of law’ is part of the capitalist superstructure (Kamenka 1991, p.306) but this does not necessarily mean that its agents—and, particularly, its low level functionaries—are the rulers rather than the ruled. A causal explanation for the deviance of both working class ‘rule-breakers’ and ‘rule-enforcers’ is that the actual existing law is the precursor that alienates social beings from their social core. McLennan (2003, p.44) explains that generally this is where individuals are separated from the product of their own work activity, which in this instance includes the manner in which rank and file police are separated from their creative and collective social core. Hands (2000, p.72) makes it clear that, from a Marxist standpoint, alienation is the feeling of being isolated or estranged from broader society. In terms of the ‘rule of law’ Karl Marx explains that the alienating process detached the concept of a legal subject, their legal duties and subsequently their legal rights from real human beings and their material reality (Kamenka 1991, p.306). At the same time the ‘rule-maker’ imposes on the broader population the ‘rule of law’, which tolerates and encourages economic, religious and social oppression. This strained existence divorces the individual legal subject from the individual legal citizen and the individual within civil society.

In the case of rank and file police the alienation that is associated with the division of labour is one that relates to a non-productive workplace in terms of material goods. However the contemporary policing institution is a hierarchical, para-military organisation, where competence is measured in terms of productivity (Davis and Coleman 2000; Hay Group Consulting Consortium 2000; New South Wales Police Service 2000). The aggressive competition at the hub of this neo-liberal performance management strategy is designed to quantify and measure individual productivity. This framework of thinking is even applied to the assessment of victims. For example in November 2005 Commissioner Moroney made a statement regarding a brutal assault upon a young female named Lauren Huxley who at the time was staging a fierce fight for life. Commissioner Ken Moroney said …This is the worst attack I have ever seen in 40 years as a police officer where someone has survived…(Daily
This type of media release exemplifies the competitive, neo liberal framework of contemporary policing. In this attempt to quantify all aspects of policing even individuals who are not the ‘best’ victims are relegated to second place. For many experienced operational police it is quite inappropriate with criminal justice procedures to measure the suffering of victims at this level. But what this also reveals is the immaturity and limited operational experience of any police officer that publishes an emotional attempt to measure a victims suffering. Particularly when the suffering is part of a criminal investigation that falls within the parameters of an adversarial criminal justice system.

When this style of performance management is applied to day to day policing, ‘merit’ based promotion or workplace opportunity the gap within the existing division of labour immediately widened by the onset of aggressive competition (Mohun 1991, p.157). This neo-liberal workplace environment enhances worker alienation and subsequently any struggle or conflict, which is an integral part of any existing social division of labour. Cliff (1982) explains that in these circumstances workers who have lost their loyalty to their traditional organisations and their social core are forced into extreme, explosive struggles on their own.

In order to understand the contradictions that are associated with this exploitative workplace from a radical standpoint it is important to connect with the *German Ideology* in which Marx and Engels theorised the way in which class division moulds individuals in the society that they, themselves, create and how this, in turn, creates them (1983, pp.162–165). However, if we are to critically use this type of approach within the criminal justice system there must be an earnest desire to change that system in its entirety rather than simply to attack a visible part of it. Worsley (2002, p.46, 102) explains that there are some radicals who argue that there is not much that people can do about changing society and, unfortunately, this anti-humanist feature rests mostly within the ‘progressive’ ranks of traditional intellectuals. It is scarcely possible from an organic intellectual or radical perspective to accept such inadequacies and massive inequalities. This is particularly the case in regards to the oppression and class bias that is an integral part of the legal system. Non-Marxist ‘radicals’ argue that Marx and Engels were simply ‘economic determinists’ but, in so doing, they misunderstand the dialectic position of the materialist conception of history, which posits that the production and reproduction of social life is at the heart of all social process. Theoretically, the economic situation lays the foundation—the base—but the dialectic explains how people make themselves in the same instance that this makes them. The ideological and political elements of the superstructure are also produced during this process and it is the interaction—as
opposed to determination—of the base and superstructure that generates class conflict and shapes the world in which we live.

Antonio Gramsci, whose *Prison Notebooks* were written in the early 1930s, was a revolutionary activist who insisted that the work of Karl Marx must not be seen simply as a detached theory but should be a guide to radical action (Burke 1999; Harman 1983; Hoffman 1986; Sassoon 1991). Praxis was, therefore, as important as theory to Gramsci—if not more so. Building on Marx’s *Theses on Feuerbach*, written in 1845, that ‘[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it!’, Gramsci set about to theorise and effect social change rather than just oppose injustice and inequality produced by the capitalist mode of production. This thesis, pursuing the line suggested by both Marx and Gramsci, is concerned with praxis but to achieve this it has first to go back to the theory and reapply this to a much distorted context—the operational police. This is, in this way, about class struggle and how this is circumvented if only a small part of that context is attacked. The ensuing chapters will, therefore, analyse the place occupied by rank and file police in a society that is insidiously divided on class lines and will examine not only the main agencies of change but also the seemingly ‘radical’ obstacles to that change. What this work will do is to challenge those ‘Marxists’, ‘progressives’, moderates and liberals who display an elite unwillingness to question their own ideas and acknowledge their own theoretical blindness. For, as Worsley (2002, p.103) has argued, regardless of how politically ‘radical’ this heterogeneous group might portray themselves or think themselves, in their intellectual activity they are both conservative and uncritical. How this has come about is, sadly, one of the failures and pitfalls of radical thought.

Since the 1960s social democrats, liberal ‘progressives’ and even self-styled Marxists have initiated what appears on the surface to be a radical debate—a crusade that, quite often, has the intention of generating genuine radical social reform. However, as evidenced in the book *Can of Worms* (Whitton 1986) which talks about the problems of trying to reform the criminal justice system, this crusade has made itself incapable of actually achieving change because it has narrowed its field of inquiry to an extent that its ability to recognise its holism is obscured.

I will be discussing the evolution of this ‘progressivism’ throughout this thesis, where I will argue that these critics operate as the ‘subalterns’ of the state rather than the protectors of society and, especially, its powerless victims. I will demonstrate how the state is reinforced and legitimised by this ‘progressive’ intelligentsia, who often work in concert with ‘party-political power’ in order to reinforce the coercive hegemony of the state (Anderson 1976;
Ralph Miliband has defined the state as ‘essentially the institution whereby a dominant and exploiting class imposes and defends its power and privileges against the class or classes, which it dominates and exploits’ (Miliband 1991, p.523) and it is the contention of this thesis that the elite intellectual core of the contemporary ‘progressive’ reforming police culture does nothing less than reinforce the coercive hegemony of the state.

I will be continually stressing throughout this thesis that rank and file police are part of the state’s coercive arm and that, as a consequence, some of their number inevitably engage in deviant and questionable activity. What needs to be reinforced here, however, is the limited power that rank and file police exercise in the criminal justice system as a whole. They are, at the very most, only its low level functionaries and exclusively attacking the operational police is not the way to reform corruption in the system or prevent the criminal justice system from coercing those it is supposed to protect.

A central part of my argument is that rank and file police are a fundamental part of the working class (Marx and Engels 1997, p.176), an unpopular line of reasoning which is, nevertheless, upheld by Bernstein et al (1975), Reiner (1978, p.5), Silver (1967, p.12) and Wright (1979, p.94). The police should be included, rather than demonised, in ‘radical’ analysis. Obviously the simplest explanation for such intellectual bias is that most social beings pursue those particular interests and goals which relate to their own class location (Marx and Engels 1999, pp.38-39) and, as a result, class-bias is commonly located throughout the traditional intellectual community and the legal establishment. However, the fact that such bias has been allowed, to uncritically dominate analyses of the criminal justice system is, at the least, unprofessional and, at worst, reprehensible.

Research Methodology

The Data

As part of a critical analysis of policing institutions, this research includes a number of in-depth interviews with rank and file police. However, to avoid any suggestion that these interviews are purely subjective, I have integrated this ethnographic data with a wealth of other published data from interviews that have taken place with similar research subjects. The additional interview data has been obtained from published sources such as media interviews, parliamentary inquiries, commissions of inquiry and legal transcripts from published court proceedings. Many of the interview subjects in the published data were subjected to rigorous
questioning and cross-examination, which was not the case in the voluntary, semi-structured interviews that I conducted. The interview data from this project was then cross-referenced with research material obtained from a literature review. This data was sourced from various journals, newspaper articles, personal diaries, conference papers, internet publications, policy documents, public inquiries and various commission recommendations. I also have made use of various records and transcripts from parliamentary Hansard.

Research Subjects

During the fieldwork stage of this research I conducted twenty-four semi-structured interviews which, when transcribed, consist of 138,868 words. The twenty-four research subjects have between them three hundred and eighty nine years of operational policing experience. Sixteen of them were male and eight were female. Sixteen of the officers were serving police, one had retired, five had resigned and two were retired on medical grounds. Fifteen of them were detectives, although four had served more time in uniform than in detective duties. Nine of the research subjects were uniformed officers. Two of the detectives and one uniform officer had resigned within a short time of being interviewed. Seven of the research subjects had higher education qualifications and two were qualified lawyers. Their ages ranged from 25 years to 66 years and their length of service ranged from five years to thirty-six years. All of them were operational police who had worked almost exclusively in Sydney’s lower socio economic areas. Of the twenty-four research subjects, twenty-one were married or had been married, seventeen had children, seven had been divorced and two of the research subjects had lost their partner through death. Two were homosexual and insisted that I documented in this thesis that they were both involved in long-term partnerships, although not with each other.
List of Research Participants

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<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Gender</th>
<th>Married / Divorced</th>
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The Interviews

The ethical requirement of this research required all of the subjects to read and sign an informed consent document that outlined the risks and benefits of participating in the study. Some of the research data was very sensitive and at times detailed negative and traumatic personal experiences, which was related to their policing experiences. However, because of my own lengthy operational policing history, I was able to observe the proceedings from the standpoint of the research subjects. Subsequently I was particularly focused on ensuring that the research subjects did not leave the interview proceedings in a worse state of mind than when they arrived (Crotty 1998, p.76).

All of the research subjects had been located through the snowballing or chain referral effect, which entails using referrals from one or a few of the already interviewed subjects. In turn the
researcher receives more referrals from the latest interview subjects. This does not mean that each person directly knows, interacts with, or is influenced by every other person. Rather it means that, taken as a whole with direct and indirect links, most are part of an interconnected web (Neuman 2000, p.200). In the case of rank and file police the direct linkage is that all research subjects were part of the same vocation but do not necessarily know or interacted with each other.

The interviews contained a series of open-ended questions. The purpose for the guide, included in Appendix A, was to ensure a similar semi-structured format for the onset of each interview. However the open-ended emphasis on the guide was always a qualitative and not a quantitative component. Subsequently research subjects were able to tell their own story from their own life’s experience. As such they focused upon the aspects of policing that had the most impact upon their lives and not upon my life or my preoccupations. This meant that the working class research subject was not restricted to answering the ‘educated’ researcher’s questions. The advantage of this strategy is a rich qualitative archive of research data, which contains common themes and a common thread relating to vocational coercion, the division of labour, alienation, class bias, resistance and struggle. In this style of semi-structured interview it is particularly difficult to quantify or manipulate the research data.

During the transcription and analysis of the recorded interviews I used a broad-based code to integrate the various themes of hegemony, exploitation, alienation, class, division of labour, productivity, aggressive competition, managerialism, performance management and so on with the transcription data. The interview data was integrated with the literature review data that is developed throughout the thesis. This was obtained from a wide range of authors and texts, including journals, newspaper articles, dissertations, conference papers, internet publications, policy documents and television current affairs programs. I have also included some published ethnographic media research with police and some contemporaneous notes from my own personal diaries. The research data not only compares but also reflects on the politicising of the criminal justice system and the policing vocation not only in Australia but also in the USA and Britain. There is particular emphasis upon the social impact that this politicisation process has had upon rank and file police. The combined data was then critically analysed alongside a broad range of theoretical work regarding police and the policing vocation. Particular attention was given to the ‘progressive’ or moderate notion of ‘reform’ as opposed to the more radical concept of a new common sense or a new social order. I also was careful to emphasise the concepts of misconduct, criminal behaviour and deviance rather than the ‘corruption’ cliché. In a capitalist society, or to be more precise in a class based criminal
justice system, the concept of ‘corruption’ can shrink to the size of a microdot or grow to the size of a Pacific fishing-fleet drift net. This variation, I will argue, depends upon whether the discussion is focused upon the ‘rule-maker’, the ‘rule-enforcer’ or the ‘rule breaker’.

The Thesis Structure

The critical analysis of the research data gathered for this thesis will be presented in six substantive chapters, flanked by this introduction and a conclusion that suggests the way forward in this important debate.

Chapter One, ‘Theorising Policing’, incorporates a literature review and examines contemporary analyses of policing and, in particular, the position occupied by rank and file police. It is argued that operational police have been theoretically constructed within a ‘progressive’ framework that reifies the division between the ‘policed’ and the ‘police’ and that the traditional ‘liberal’ and ‘radical’ standpoints—that focused on the rights of the individual and the rights of the most powerless classes in society respectively—have become virtually indistinguishable from the ‘conservative’ standpoint that maintains the hegemonic power of the state. I will argue that the theoretical impoverishment of the radical and middle ground has in fact made ‘progressive’ intellectuals who often view themselves as radical into the ‘subalterns’ of the conservative state they appear to oppose.

Chapter Two, ‘We had a Revolution About that Sort of Thing’, examines the issue of police misconduct and corruption and the way this has, with the active complicity of ‘progressive’ academics and investigative journalists, been used as an excuse to consolidate state power. This is not an attempt to maintain that corruption does not exist within policing institutions or put forward a ‘rotten apple’ theory to explain the existence of this. Instead, this chapter discusses the narrow and class biased application of this exposure of corruption and the way this has used coercive tactics and a distorted sense of justice in an anti-corruption campaign that has used the tactics of the ‘show trial’ whilst leaving the wider implications of the issue confronting the criminal justice system largely untouched.

Chapter Three, ‘The Politics of Reform’, examines how this neo-liberal concept of police reform was manipulated to impose a more effective top down structure of ‘political management’ that enhances the already concentrated layers of power that make up the executive power within the state. As a consequence of ‘reform’, policing strategy has become an electorally driven response with department heads becoming political appointments and political advisors exercising an increasing amount of largely unaccountable and undemocratic
power to manipulate policing policies that represent limited political interests rather than cohesive ‘big picture’ social contract strategies.

Chapter Four, ‘I am a Team, Aren’t We?’, examines the way in which neo-liberal ‘reform’ concepts of performance-management, with its data driven foundations that push ‘zero tolerance’ policing, are an economic rationalist strategy enshrining ‘cost-effective’ policing to the detriment of operational efficiency. Most ‘progressive’ intellectuals have argued vehemently in favour of these politicised reforms, maintaining that these are directed against a ‘culture of corruption’ (Dixon 1999b) and designed to break ‘the code of silence’ (Brown 1997), despite the fact that they transparently initiate top down ‘reform’ with bottom up accountability, ensuring that the lowest level functionaries remain the scapegoats for the numerous contradictions and struggles that exist between the ‘rule-makers’, ‘rule-breakers’ and rule-enforcers’ in the criminal justice system. Senior management have become bound by performance agreement contracts that measure competency in quantitative rather than qualitative terms, hence increasing the need for the manipulation—‘massaging’—of crime related data (Wilkinson 2002a). In practice, an integral part of the managerialist concept means the fragmentation of the working class solidarity, which once existed within the policing vocation.

Chapter Five, ‘The Narrowing Possibilities of the Closed Mind’, examines the way in which operational police have been largely typecast as ‘corrupt’ in both ‘progressive’ academe and the investigative media and how this has been portrayed as a rank and file ‘problem’, endemic that has as its ‘solution’ the implementation of managerialist neo-liberal reforms that rigidify the already existing division of labour and effectively increase the gulf between the operational and managerial ranks of policing institutions. In all of these analyses the experiences of the operational rank and file remain a largely uncharted territory, their problems unheeded and, indeed, their efforts to put forward their viewpoint put down to the rumblings of ‘disgruntled’ police and ‘bent coppers’ proving themselves to be resistant to change’.

Chapter Six, ‘Us Down Here, Them Up There’, analyses the alienation process that has driven an almost impassable political wedge between the rank and file police and their senior counterparts and created an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality that has destroyed the necessary teamwork that is an important part of effective policing. In this chapter operational police are given a chance to put their case. It is time that ‘progressives’ address the fact that operational police are not leaving the police service because they are ‘incompetent’ or ‘resistant to
change’ but because of the poor morale and lack of workplace solidarity that has become a fact of life in the police service. Continued scapegoating is driving a wedge between the operational police and their senior management as well as, and perhaps more insidiously, between them and the public most of them join the police to serve. Increasingly alienated in their vocation, they are alienated from the social core as well.

Detective Sergeant Steven Leach was ‘a good and well respected policeman who had finally found the pressures of the job too much to handle’ (Stevenson 2004), despite the fact that 35 years of experience meant that ‘[i]n every way… [he] epitomised the professional police officer’ (Davies 2004). It is probable that, as it was suggested in the media, Leach was suffering from a suicidal depression as a result of his work, but it is certainly debateable that his secondment to the War Crimes Tribunal in Kosovo was the cause of his final despair. It should be a matter of public as well as institutional concern to try to discover what factors had really pushed him to breaking point. This thesis aims to go a long way towards explaining this crisis point in the life of a policeman who could be commended unreservedly for his work but was passed over in what makes great claims to be a ‘merit’ based promotion system.
CHAPTER ONE: Theorising Policing: Policing, the Police and the Policed

The ‘Right’, the ‘Left’ and the ‘Progressive’ Middle

Historically, academic analysis of the development of policing institutions has, broadly speaking, taken two traditional paths that can be characterised as the ‘conservative’ and the ‘progressive’ positions. These have a tendency to coincide with a party-political delineation of left-wing and right-wing politics—in the United Kingdom, this could be defined in terms of Conservative Party or Labour Party politics; in the United States, Republican or Democratic politics; and in Australia, the politics of the Coalition of Liberal and National Parties as opposed to the Labor Party. Of course, there are many alternatives that come between these extremes and, in particular, a sizable ‘small-l’ liberal standpoint overlaps with parts of both tradition, supporting the institutions but wanting these to observe the basic human rights and libertarian viewpoints enshrined in liberalism. One approach is a quasi-structural analysis; the other, an agency analysis but, despite these discernible political differences, all of these positions, it will be shown, come from within the dominant ideology and tend to support the capitalist hegemony. For this reason, as Jones, Newburn and Smith (1994, p.3) argue, these two traditions of researching and writing both share a common concern about the governance of police and, from the 1970s, a concern with what the police do and how they do it. The aim is ‘reform’ not revolutionary change. Only that small and now dwindling minority of researchers, writing from a Marxist standpoint, have ever come close to addressing the wider positioning of the criminal justice system, directing their analysis to its role as a political arm of the state and the role of the police within this framework.

The ‘Conservative’ Standpoint

The ‘Right’—or conservative—standpoint maintains that policing institutions carry with them universal ‘social order’ benefits, particularly to individuals within the lower socio-economic groups of society who otherwise will be left powerless to defend themselves (Reiner 2000). Giddens has argued that conservatism was created in large part as a defence of the ruling-class ancien regime whilst liberalism was born from the need to dissolve that regime (1994, p.51) and that, out of this, a nascent socialism was born. However, ‘conservatism’ is not simply the residual ideological position described in this dichotomy. For it, too, is now a part of the capitalist hegemony and is the viewpoint from which the political ‘right’ endeavours to preserve—conserve—its interests (Dawe 1971).
The following statement by Margaret Thatcher, who as British Prime Minister from 1979–1990 stamped the age with her own brand of aggressive conservatism and carried this into an initially rumbling political afterlife as Baroness Thatcher in the House of Lords, has become almost a cliché. Nevertheless it captures the essence of the conservative standpoint.

I think we've been through a period where too many people have been given to understand that if they have a problem, it’s the government’s job to cope with it. ‘I have a problem, I’ll get a grant’. ‘I'm homeless, the government must house me’. They’re casting their problem on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbour.

People have got the entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations. There’s no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation… (Thatcher 1987)

This quintessential statement of conservatism represents Margaret Thatcher’s view of the welfare state but it is a classic statement of conservatism as well. As the founder of the Conservative Party in the nineteenth century, Benjamin Disraeli also argued in terms of responsibility and obligation, although for him the concept of entitlement would have been so alien as to be greeted with astonishment. The conservative commentator Charles Murray (1984, 1990) argues that the ‘underclass’ of welfare recipients—what Marxists would term the lumpenproletariat (Bottomore 1991, p.327)—are not so much the poor in general, but those whose lives and whose children’s lives and prospects in turn are poor from their own choice. They choose not meet their obligations but to demand these of others without any sense of reciprocity in the exchange. Apparently influenced by others like themselves or by other corrupting role models, they exploit welfare provisions that, in turn, weaken personal discipline. In particular, the carriers of this underclass culture, according to Murray’s diagnosis, are young people who are out of work primarily because they do not want to work and have no work ethic. Single-parent families, in which the adults live outside the ‘norm’ of the nuclear-family, are seen by conservatives as a source of social problems as well. This category of deviants also includes habitual delinquents and criminals. According to Murray, these groups are concentrated at low-income levels but, nevertheless, they bring poverty on themselves by choosing to continue to live this way of life. High unemployment and ever-rising rates of illegitimacy, lone-parenthood and record levels of crime are only proxy-indicators of their growth in numbers. Although still a minority, the spread of this underclass...
culture is a threat to social integrity because ‘[t]here’s no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation’ (Thatcher 1987). Clearly, the implications for the role of police arising from this conservative viewpoint are profound. The police are there to keep the underclass and recalcitrant working class coerced into fulfilling their social ‘obligations’. Policing enforces the ‘rule of law’ and in crisis situations this requires special levels of coercive enforcement—‘zero-tolerance’ policing—to ensure social submission.

The first conservative studies of policing were legal and administrative in their focus and mapped the demise of the old constabulary and the evolution of the criminal justice professions (Williams 2003, p.1). Giddens (1994, p.2, pp.22–25) argues that conservatives are rarely overly theoretical and that they counter the left with contrasting theories of history, tradition and morality, while engaging in a radical concept of re-establishment that looks back to the past. In regard to police reform, this explains the conservatives’ implication that policing institutions were structured in response to the incompetence and corruption associated with the former constabulary (Harring 1981, p.297). The modern policing institution is promoted as a utilitarian formation that was developed through a democratic process in response to social unrest and threats to social order (Reiner 1992, p.24). However, according to Sir Leon Radzinowicz (1968, p.190), all of the initial cross-class resistance to institutionalised policing had ceased to be an issue within five years of its implementation in 1829, except in the most radical of circles. As implausible as this ‘consenting’ standpoint might appear, Radzinowicz explains that the lower classes endorsed the role of the police after the benefits accruing from the benign, non-coercive policing institution became apparent. Critchley (1978, p.21) explains that the initial breakdown in law and order marched in step with the progress of industrialisation and that the police were a non-political, state-sponsored institution, which upheld the common good and the neutrality of the state’s order (Critchley 1978, p.55).

The conservatives claim that the working class and underclass had most to gain from the protection of police because they were previously powerless to defend themselves (Critchley 1978, p.28). Brodgen (1982, p.173-174) maintains that any opposition to the police was fragmented and not socially or economically based, although he does agree that there was some working-class dissent from being policed. Despite evidence that demonstrates mass protests (Bernstein et al 1975, Finanne 2002, Harring 1981, Reiner 2000, and Storch 1975), Brodgen (1982), Critchley (1978) and Radzinowicz (1968) all maintain that dissent towards the police gradually disappeared during the nineteenth century and by the earlier parts of the twentieth century the working class was generally supportive. Brodgen claims that from the
latter part of the Edwardian period all social classes received a similar benefit from policing institutions, glossing the impact on the working class demonstrated by the passing of strikebreaking legislation after both the First and Second World Wars. Gilroy and Sim (1987, p.75), in contrast, examine a series of dockland disputes in Surry, Belfast and London, where virtually every industrial strike between 1940 and 1951 became a criminal offence. Rank and file police, and in particular detectives and the Special Branch, were integral to the Attlee Labour Government’s strategy of fragmenting the solidarity of the dock workers who were involved in industrial disputes. There was similar industrial turmoil in Australia in 1949, during which the Chifley Labor government used the police and military in a determined effort to maintain the power of the state and fragment the solidarity of the striking coal miners (Baker 2001, p.200). These are all good examples of how the ‘left-wing’ party political arm of the state will engage in conservative strategies to preserve its ruling-class power base.

Brogden (1982), Critchley (1978), Radzinowicz (1968) and Reith (1940) all argue that to quell social unrest the state must use rank and file police and coercive strategies for the greater good. This coercive power is apparently used ‘democratically’ to achieve the efficient engineering of social harmony (Bernstein et al 1975). When ‘progressives’ such as Hogg and Brown (1998, pp.130–131) can label Radzinowicz as a ‘left liberal’ and a ‘radical’ critic, it is obvious that the philosophic ground between the conservative and liberal accounts of policing has become inexorably shrouded in fog. In a broad sense, Brogden’s conservative account of policing follows on from the work of Charles Reith (1940), who describes the police as an impartial umpire and a symbol of national unity. The ‘utilitarian’ benefits maintained desirable moral attitudes. A similar argument is used by Haldane (1995, p.303) who, in commenting specifically on the police in Victoria, argues that ‘the police force was shaped by the community—it served the people of Victoria… successive generations of Victorians have collectively influenced the force in ways that have ensured it a significant level of support and goodwill’. The common thread in these conservative accounts is that it is ultimately non-coercive and conducted with the public consent.

Clearly, this was the belief held by former New South Wales Police Commissioner John Avery, who argued that if society has consented to be controlled by its police, its police cannot help but view themselves as society’s controllers. Avery, in what was seen by some to be a concession to ‘progressive’ demands for police reform at the time, decentralised the operational arm of policing and implemented an operational strategy of ‘community policing’ seemingly based more on the ‘humanity of the law’ rather than the ‘rule of law’. Incongruously, this new strategy was designed and implemented by an even more centralised,
non-operational police administration (Avery 1981, p.77) developed along the lines of an intensified managerialism and a military-corporate model of policing (Bernstein et al 1975, p.76). This micro-interventionist policing strategy certainly served the long-term interest of the state by reinforcing its political power, but it also, McCulloch (2001, p.3) argues, flew in the face of any accepted orthodoxy about real community-based policing. This ‘reform’, as this thesis will show, came from the political leadership rather than the public or the public service and its managerialism was about re-positioning political power away from the public service and heads of departments to the political arm of the state (Emy and Hughes 1991, pp.404-407, p.516).

Despite the overwhelming evidence of this re-centralisation and intensification of political control of the police, Avery has been praised by some ‘progressive’ academics as a highly respected ‘reformer’ who demonstrated a commitment to decentralisation and community-based policing during his period as Commissioner from 1984 to 1991 (Dixon 1999b, p.2). That Avery was a conservative, however, is beyond dispute. In no way was he averse to using police in their traditionally coercive role or increasing surveillance and punishment. In Police: Force or Service, John Avery (1981) might have flirted with a ‘progressive’ argument that the state should attempt to deal with non-criminal matters by non-criminal strategies but immediately returned to his conservative position by suggesting the resurrection of what he saw to be the ancient, yet useful, weapon of community ‘odium’ or prejudice in assisting to control anti-social behaviour. Moving even further to the right, Avery suggested that the family of a vandal should be made responsible for the damage done because this would force the family to monitor the behaviour of its members. He even suggested that the state should send letters to neighbours alerting them to the proximity of individuals convicted of drink driving offences. The letters would advise neighbours that the perpetrator was a disqualified driver and had demonstrated a disregard for the safety of others. Despite Avery admitting that these ‘vigilante’ type conservative strategies might offend liberals and civil libertarians (Avery 1981, pp.1-5), many ‘progressive’ scholars still regard Avery as a reformer (Dixon 1999b; Etter 1995; Miller, Blackler and Alexandra 1997). Janet Chan (1997, p.3), in fact, praises Avery as a progressive and reform-oriented Police Commissioner whose broad agenda of police reform was designed to reverse the characterisation of policing as corrupt and racist and shape the police service into a force that serves the needs of a multicultural society.

There is, of course, little evidence to suppose that Avery is anything but a conservative. Fleming and Lafferty (2003, pp.47-50) argue that the minority status of women in the New South Wales Police Service owed much to him and his castigation of the anti-discrimination
lobby for demonstrating ‘a TV-stimulated imagination’ about the role of women in policing—a stance that clearly presents his conservatism. Avery argued that women were neither aggressive nor muscular enough to be ‘effective or… helpful in various areas of police work’, although they could fulfil a role by ‘pacifying’ individuals or working in ‘welfare’ type situations. There was no place for them where ‘violent confrontation’ might be an issue or where ‘heavy lifting’ was required. The employment of women police officers, Avery believed, should be tempered by ‘decisions based on solid experience’ rather than ‘anti-discrimination philosophy’ (Avery 1981, pp.81-84). Far from being a reformer, Avery’s policies are aligned with the very hub of conservative ‘resistance’ to policing reform—the male dominance of the service inherent in ‘cop culture’ and a police hierarchy with a close relationship with a patriarchal government (Fleming and Lafferty 2003, pp.47–50). The power shift that intensified under Avery’s managerialist reforms might blur the convergence of the power-sharing arrangements of the police hierarchy and the political arm of the state but it had very little impact on the conservative views of the politically appointed police hierarchy. Concern for electoral damage and the moral panic associated with ‘law and order’ elections is crucial to these politicised partnerships but so, too, is the coercion mode of traditional conservatism.

It is important to understand the essential conservatism of Avery’s ‘reform’ position when evaluating the negative relationships that sometimes exist between rank and file police and minority groups, such as indigenous and ethnic communities (Maher, Dixon, Swift, Nguyen and Tram 1997, p.56; Dixon 1999; Chan 1997; Etter 1995; Miller, Blackler & Alexandra 1997) or when evaluating the criticism that they are resistant to reform on class or gender-based issues (McCulloch 2001, p.52). Such attacks are no doubt valid but Avery himself never hid his conservatism, explaining that his ‘community policing’ vision would cause the ‘involved’ community to applaud such sensible efforts to limit the irresponsible and dangerous activities of a minority and this would reduce indifference to the process of social control (Avery 1981, p.1). By praising Avery as a liberal ‘reformer’, Janet Chan not only ignores his essential conservatism but, more importantly, fails to recognise her own mutation towards this same conservative viewpoint.

Paul Gordon (1987, Ch.4), in his chapter entitled ‘Community Policing: Towards the Local Police State’, discusses the mythical status of the public consent that enshrined Avery’s ‘community policing’ model and the way this harked back to an elusive and ultimately non-existent ‘golden age’. Both ‘community’ policing and its apparent opposite, ‘zero tolerance’ policing, are management-controlled forms of policing that, running in parallel with
intensified managerialism, are designed to rationalise costs and create a business style approach rather than really create a community based and community accountable service structure for policing (Kennedy, M. 2001, p.7). This ability to align positive sounding liberal terms such as ‘community’ with more conservative coercive policing and management strategies masked the conservative hegemony by the 1990s. The explicitly conservative account of policing had dominated research after the radical perspective virtually disappeared from academic literature after radical intellectuals lost their university positions during the first half of the century (Greenberg 1981, p.2). Haldane (1995, p.258), who was an Australian police officer from the Victorian force, explains that until the 1970s most expressions of public dissent and resistance to the state were met with the classical police response of confrontation and suppression.

Under the mantle of ‘police reform’ and propelled from both sides of the party divide during the last decade, policing institutions around the world are embracing conservatism with the use of the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) data driven, ‘zero tolerance’ strategy, which is directly aligned with neo-liberal productivity and performance management (Bratton and Knobler 1998; Cowdery 2001; Davis and Coleman 2000; Harcourt 2001; Hay Group Consulting Consortium 2000; Hopkins-Burke 1998; Kelling and Coles 1996; Kennedy 2001; New South Wales Police Service 1999; New South Wales Police Service 2000; Silverman 1999; Skolnick 1999; Witkin 1993). One of the principal architects of the ‘zero tolerance’ strategy is the former Mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani who, from retirement in 2002, was paid US$4.3 million by a Mexican business consortium to implement ‘zero-tolerance’ policing in Mexico City (Walker 2002). Giuliani is publicly perceived as a reformer because he has pushed the same neo-liberal managerial ‘reforms’ in the NYPD as those proposed by the ‘progressives’. The line blurs and continues to become ever more meaningless. In fact, to chart the convergence of the conservative and ‘progressive’ viewpoints, it is necessary to go back and reflect on precisely how the liberal viewpoint once defined itself in relation to conservatism.

The ‘Liberal' Standpoint

In its classical sense, ‘liberalism’ is a philosophy whose ideological pillars are a conception of society that emphasises the primacy of individuals and their rights and liberties within a social order based on consensus or the consent based arrangements of a social contract. Parkin (1994, pp.233-253) states that, historically, liberalism was the ideology of the emerging capitalist class—the bourgeoisie—that used the revolutionary theme of freedom of the
individual to undermine the old aristocratic privilege that had structured the feudal order of medieval Europe. Liberals conceptualised a society based on human rights, the rule of law and ‘liberty’. Liberty in this sense entailed freedom from coercive labour, from the tyranny of absolutist rule and from guild-based commercial control. In economic terms, liberalism legitimised capitalism and the market mechanism for production and exchange (Emy and Hughes 1991, p.542). It advocated individual rights and private property, thus legitimising the bourgeois ownership of the means of production, the private accumulation of capital and wealth, and market mechanisms that individualised and commodified exchange relations (Parkin 1998, p.445). McBarney (1981, p.156) argues, however, that the rhetoric of the classical liberal tradition, which enshrines democratic process and provides a formal statement of equality for all citizens in relation to legal representation and due process, can also be called upon to defend privileged individuals, their rights and their markets.

The liberal standpoint, embraced for the most part by humanists and intellectuals, is also regarded as embodying an empathy for human suffering and this is often revealed in discussions about human rights and civil rights or civil liberties—the ‘humanity of the law’ as opposed to the rigid ‘rule of law’. It is, therefore, a short step from ‘liberalism’ to what is often glossed as ‘small “l” liberalism’ and the libertarian views championed by ‘liberal progressives’, whose fragmented view of society as individuals bound together in a social contract has created an intelligentsia possessing a reforming zeal untroubled either by history or by theory. To this group, reform does not mean searching for a new common sense or new social order but reforming the prevailing liberal social order and, in so doing, preserving the hegemony that maintains the capitalist state.

During the past half century there has been the growth of a more ‘radical’ liberal analysis of policing that has drawn away from the conservative standpoint of the ‘rule of law’ to focus on the ‘humanity of the law’—the adverse impact policing institutions have on human individuals in society rather than their role in enforcing the terms of the social contract—the ‘rule of law’. This intellectual movement intensified in the 1960s as a new breed of researchers in sympathy with the ‘alternate’ sixties radicalism, began to take its place within the intelligentsia. The radical sixties gave a new and apparently radical meaning to ‘progressivism’ and, at the same time, a new—if blurry—meaning to ‘radicalism’. This new generation of critics implied with crusading zeal that in their alternative view of society analysis could be made on the dichotomy of the ‘privileged’ and the ‘underprivileged’ or the ‘powerful’ and the ‘powerless’ and that the police, who had been mobilised by the conservative establishment dominating the state to oppose their counter cultural activities at
peace rallies, ‘moratoriums’ and during student ‘sit-ins’, were instantly recognised as being on the side of the ‘privileged’ and ‘powerful’. The police, in many ways, stood for conservatism and established but moribund social values.

Developing with student radicalism in the later 1960s, Becker (1966) and Matza’s (1969) interactionist approach produced an instantaneous appeal for ‘progressive’ self-styled counter cultural intellectuals and students who were active in civil rights and the anti-war movement or were unsympathetic to the ideas of the conservative establishment. This interactionist method of inquiry, which was based on a theory of agency, popularised the concept of observing people’s lives and mapping the movement from one interaction to another. Allied to ‘pop’ psychology, this seemed to offer greater insights into people’s motivations and the lived realities of people’s lives than sweeping established structuralist explanations. With the 1973 oil crisis generating global stagflation—a combination of rising unemployment and rising inflation (Perry 1991, pp.30–33; Springborg 1994, Ch.9) and structural unemployment becoming a permanent part of economic life under late capitalism—there was, by the early 1980s, a high level of unemployment generating wide scale global unrest. The state’s methodical suppression of this unrest created conflict between the police, the unemployed, and unionists who were struggling against recession. Violent clashes between the police and workers drew the fire of ‘progressive’ intellectuals and journalists, heightening their already existing level of antipathy towards the operational police. In *The State of the Police and Law, Order and the Authoritarian State*, Phil Scraton concentrated on condemning police action without considering the responsibility of the state for this action (1985; 1987), detailing the many instances of police brutality occurring during this prolonged period of industrial and social unrest. This tended to reduce the issue in his book into a battle between the operational police and the workers.

In his writings, Scraton (1985, 1987, 1993) was engaging in a type of cultural relativism—another theory that was to win a wide appeal for intellectuals at this time (Greenberg 1981, p.3). Greenberg argues that the theme of individual agency dominating this theoretical framework arose from the contention that the criminal law is not determined either by moral consensus or by the utilitarian interests of a broader society. Rather, the law is determined by the relative power of certain groups—the police, in this instance—who are determined to use the criminal law for their own special interests or to impose their moral preferences on others. Unfortunately, this analysis of the agency of rank and file police turns the formula for deviant behaviour on its head. Deviance is not a propensity inherent in any particular form of behaviour; rather it is a judgement that is passed on that behaviour by the people who come
into direct or indirect contact with ‘deviant’ behaviour (Erikson 1966, p.6). According to Meiksins-Wood (1997, p.3), this type of ‘agency’ theorising was the dominant theme of 1960s student radicalism but, as we will see, it is now appearing in the guise of neo-Marxist theory that gives an increasing prominence to the role of students and intellectuals as vanguards of resistance and to ‘cultural’ revolution in place of working-class struggle.

Now the liberal viewpoint, which traditionally focused on the rights of the individual and the social contract involved in the rule of law, had swung its focus onto the humanity of the law. Liberalism was increasingly being dominated by this interactionist or libertarian viewpoint—a move that has generally been seen as a ‘progressive’ and even a ‘radical’ one as it championed the plight of the underclass against the conservative ‘corrupt’ and deviant power of the rank and file police. Mann (1992) argues that this underclass can include groups that view themselves as separate—single parents, the long-term unemployed, drug-users, the homeless, the young, groups marginalised in ring-road council estates or inner-city ghettos—but they are seen as a block threatening the moral fabric and social stability of capitalist society. Bottomore (1991, p.327) explains that in a capitalist society the disquiet generated by the underclass detaches individuals from their class interests and relations and constructs a ‘free floating’ mass receptive to reactionary ideologies and movements. This becomes the moral outrage of the reactionary working class that supports the power of the state. The academic narrowing focus on the deviancy and ‘corrupt’ conduct of rank and file police, this thesis will show, is a deeply flawed analysis that also, unfortunately, achieves much the same end. Far from being a product of ‘radical’ and ‘critical’ thinking about the criminal justice system, it simply allows the development of an unprecedented level of individualised antipathy and class bias towards the working class of which rank and file police are undeniably a part.

It is one thing for ordinary people—those patronised by intellectuals as the uninformed requiring enlightened leadership—to find themselves unconsciously supporting reaction; it is quite another when the ‘progressive’ intellectuals and reforming political leaders themselves become part of this, manipulating and further orchestrating such conservatism. The problem, it is continually asserted, is the police and the fact that the police service remains stubbornly corrupt and resistant to change. This analysis makes it possible to treat resistance as recalcitrance. The ‘radical’ effect achieved by such liberal ‘progressivism’ to date is to legitimise the role of the legal-establishment by training the spotlight constantly on its most vulnerable and lowest level functionaries—its working class members. The dominance of this viewpoint ensures that attention is seldom given to the concentrated layers of power that constructs the hegemony of the state, both maintaining and reinforcing the class bias that
exists not only within the criminal justice system but within the highly paid professions in the media and academe.

According to Jock Young (1997, p.479) the interactionist or agency method may well be useful in terms of mapping acts of police brutality and deviance but unless this argument is examined from a structural framework, it only serves to promote the notion that the fault lies not with the structure of society or the powerful state but with the individual. From this perspective it is easy to understand the argument by Stuart Hall et al (1978) that ‘moral panics’ are encouraged by governments because they are useful in mobilising political support by creating the perception of a common threat and a common enemy. Those ‘progressive’ critics who focus their anger on rank and file police should, however, bear in mind that while this group may well reinforce the coercive power of the state (Bocock 1986, p.33) they are, in turn, equally complicit in this reinforcement. In other words, by portraying rank and file police as ‘folk devils’ (Cohen 1978), the ‘progressives’ are doing nothing less that creating yet another ‘moral panic’.

An interactionist viewpoint maintains that those marginalised by society—the underclass—is representative of the working class and some argue that criminal activity should be conceptualised as a legitimate form of productive labour. In Sexed Work (Maher 1997) and Anh Hai (Maher, Dixon, Swift and Nguyen 1997), it is inferred that prostitutes and heroin addicts are simply a part of the labour market and that any associated criminal activity, which is mostly economic or drug related, should be seen as a type of productive labour. Miller (2003,pp.27-29) argues that this is one of the …ingenious arguments…that arises from the markets anarchist or libertarian standpoint, whereby goods could be provided through the markets by individuals collectively agreeing to contribute to their production. However the ‘progressive’ anti state component of the argument presented by Maher et al (1997) never rises above the states low-levelled functionaries. Subsequently the social process presented gives the perception of a cultural conflict that exists between the marginalised and the police. Ironically David Dixon argues…what is 'cultural' about 'police culture' is taken for granted…Indeed it has become a cliché, which provides pat explanations…Alvesson is blunt: culture 'is a word for the lazy'…(1997,p.19). Never the less this dilemma is presented as an agency relationship of ‘victim’ and ‘victimiser’ (Scranton 1985; 1987; Kelling and Coles 1996; Wilson and Kelling 1982), even though Scraton and Wilson and Kelling would view themselves as working at opposite ends of the intellectual continuum. Despite this perception, Reiner (2000, p.80) argues that their ‘progressive’ style of research focus has been of
enormous significance in legitimising the conversion of studies of policing into an overtly cultural issue at the expense of any structural explanation.

It seems extraordinary that the *Outsiders* (Becker 1966), which is a study of the state’s oppression of the marginalised individual, has nurtured a marked intellectual support for more intrusive coercive state policies in relation to working-class individuals in the policing organisation. The high levels of public disquiet about rising unemployment and increasing poverty has been a global experience for the working class in all capitalist countries (Perry 1991, p.34) but, at the same time as economies sag and restructure, conservative governments promoting market reforms in the workforce (Hughes 1994, p.364) have used the investigative research of ‘progressive’ liberal intellectuals to bolster support for conservative ‘zero-tolerance’ policing policies. It is no coincidence that there has been a simultaneous rise in the number of government inquiries into policing organisations such as the Knapp Commission (1972), the Scarman Inquiry (1981), the Mollen Commission (1994), the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) and the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1997) in England, the United States and Australia. These inquiries all focus upon the agency of police and police deviance as forms of misconduct and corruption (Henry 1994; McDonnell 2001; Reiner 2000, p.62) and there is a marked similarity in their terms of focus—changing the principal operational strategies of policing institutions by moving towards more explicit policy statements so that results can be measured (Silverman 1998, pp.57-67). During this time the executive branch of policing institutions has been locked into a framework linked to the machinery of the party politics of neo-liberal governments. Subsequently, the evaluation of policy has been on its quantitative measurement and not on its qualitative results. I have already explained how the obsession with quantifying policing has even been extended to measuring a victims suffering in terms of the ‘worst’ (*Daily Telegraph* 2005, 26 November, p.1). This is a dangerous practice, which relegates too second place the suffering of all other victims.

Over a decade ago, Jock Young and some of his colleagues at Middlesex University began to formulate what they saw to be ‘left realism’ in order to redress what they saw as the misguided attempts of intellectuals supporting ‘left idealism’ with regard to criminological analysis (Young 1991; 1994; 1997; Young and Matthews 1992); Indermaur, Brown, Egger and Hogg 2002, pp.145–146). It was both an ambitious and a seemingly radical move. Young’s theme was ‘taking crime seriously’—a position with which Australian academic ‘progressives’ Brown and Hogg (1992) were to be ‘identified’ within Australian ‘radical’ criminology—because, Young claims, it is radical in its criminology and realistic in its
appraisal of crime. Its radicalism is that it views crime as endemic—as a product of the power relations of both social class and patriarchy. Crime arises from within the core institutions of society and is related to class and gender inequality as well as the dominance of bourgeois values such as competitive individualism and aggressive masculinity. According to Young, the re-emergence of ‘conservative or neo-liberal governments’ radicalised many academics who could not accept the limitations of the left-idealist agency standpoint, with its origins in the libertarianism of the 1960s. As Young argues, one of the key problems left realists isolated was a lack of analysis of the actions and reactions that led to ‘rule breaking’ and ‘rule making’. An understanding of human action and reaction is essential to the study of crime and deviance, although relativism tends to deny the causal factors inherent within the capitalist system (Young and Matthews 1992, p.76).

Much academic research still takes the form of debates between the party political ‘left’ and ‘right’ but, with the global onset of intensified managerialism and neo-liberal economics, a good deal of this debate has become caught up in the ‘political power’ discourse that is concerned with party-political issues and, as such, has little to do with actually criticising the state. Although some of the critical work done by liberals on policing is very useful in exposing serious weaknesses in mainstream scholarship, its diversity and opportunistic inconsistency usually makes it difficult to use in a radical analysis. The two positions have come so close together that, as I have already explained in the previous section, former New South Wales Commissioner John Avery can be considered by some ‘progressive’ intellectuals to be a ‘liberal’ reformer, although as I have argued he is undoubtedly a conservative in philosophical terms. There is another important aspect of Avery that touches on the significance of his strong Christian beliefs that he shared with his deputy Jeff Jarratt. In this regard Benjamin Franklin argued … A man compounded of law and gospel is able to cheat a hole country with his religion and then destroy them under colour of law … (Issacson 2003, p.3). Although this might seem like a rather strong assessment I will clarify its significance later in this thesis. The matter will be briefly raised again with regards to the ‘progressive’ commentary that attempted to supporting Jarratt at the time of his dismissal in 2003 (Wainwright 2003). At this point it should be remembered that both Avery and Jarratt were senior executives who maintained a rigid, high moral ground with regards to rank and file police and ‘reform’. Ironically it is also significant that many of the criticisms levelled at the so-called individualist discriminatory practices of rank and file police by ‘progressive’ reformers such as Etter and Palmer (1995), Chan (1997) and Dixon (1999b) are seldom aired in their assessments of the senior executive which directed the policing strategies. Radicals, such as Bernstein et al (1975) and Gordon (1987), long ago
argued that this ‘progressivism’ is simply another strand of ruling-class conservatism, differing only in its rejection of the coercive and brutal repression that was the traditional role of the police supported by the conservative viewpoint. Liberal ‘progressivism’, in this way, is a theoretical dead-end—trapped by its conceptual lack of rigour, by its focus on individual or organisational agency, and by its own class bias. Its exponents, in championing the powerless and disadvantaged, cannot move above this marginalised class fraction, giving little attention to the establishment of a society in which more than just the underclass can find justice.

The ‘Radical Left’ Standpoint

In contrast to the self-styled radicalism of ‘progressive’ liberalism, the radical standpoint, based on the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, is a counter hegemonic force that opposes rather than supports the hegemony of capitalist ideas. Marx argues that western society is characterised by the capitalist mode of production—the economic base—that shapes and is shaped by the lives of its individual members. The legal system, which is a key part of the state, is part of the superstructure of capitalist society but ultimately it, too, is produced and produces the lives and both commonsense and theoretical beliefs of its members. The Marxist account analyses capitalism’s class-based exploitation and the state-based oppression that accompanies the accumulation of capital (Hands 2000, p.34). It shows how the powerful ruling and governing class within the capitalist system uses the law and the criminal justice system to advance its own values and interests over those of the working class (Greenberg 1981, p.190). In a nutshell, the ruling class owns and controls the means of production in capitalist society and the working class does not, having nothing to sell but their labour power. The key here is ownership of the means of production and, despite gradations of apparent power within the working class, this ownership has ultimately to be the litmus test of class membership.

The role of rank and file police within capitalist society for this reason confounds many would-be radicals because it is at a level of appearances a contradictory one. Reiner (2000, p.43) argues that some Marxists—or revisionists, as he terms them—claim that the police are a coercive instrument of the state used to maintain the capitalist system—a position from which they oppress the working class. Certainly, the police are ‘rule-enforcers’ but this is not the same as being the ‘rule-makers’ because they do not own the means of production and act under their direction. They are, as I will show in this thesis, easily expendable parts of the legal system as they enforce the interests of the ruling class rather than those of their own class (Marx and Engels 1977, p.176). Quite often they are called upon to unconsciously, and
sometimes consciously, act entirely against their own working-class interests. This, quite simply, is one of the contradictions in capitalism and, as Marx argued, it is these contradictions that generate class conflict and will ultimately lead to revolution. Therefore, whilst the rank and file police may be deployed as powerful support units of the state, they must never be conflated with that state or their power with that held by the ruling class. They might not have developed a consciousness of their position within that class but this does not affect their membership of this. Class is not an ideological category; it is an economic, political and social relation.

In a Marxist analysis rank and file police are indisputably and unmistakably a part of the working class, unlike some of the other professions within the legal system. It is the operation of the law rather than the agency of rank and file police that divorces the individual as a legal subject and political citizen from the economic individual (Kamenka 1991, p.306). As low-level functionaries within the state’s legal system—its ‘rule-enforcers’—they certainly appear at times to be the ‘caretakers’ and at other times the perpetrators of some of the mess of created by capitalist social relations (Gouldner 1968; Wilson 1968) but Marxist theory penetrates below this level of appearances. For instance, as the state’s delegated agents of social control, it is clear that the police have to enforce the class, racial, sexual and cultural oppressions that are an integral part of the capitalism economy (Bernstein et al 1975, p.11), engaging in coercive social control to enforce class-based bourgeois ‘morality’ and ‘decency’ (White and Perrone 1997, p.58). The power of rank and file police fits into the layers of powers that make up the state but, Jerome Skolnick (1972, p.41) explains, they are a social organisation created and sustained by a political process to enforce dominant conceptions of public order. In fact, the power of rank and file police is increased or decreased at the whim of the capitalist state and as such, Lenin argues, their fundamental class position as members of the working class makes them an important force for change in a new social order (Anderson 1976, p.76).

In *Rethinking Law and Order*, Hogg and Brown (1998, p.x) explain that the hub of their research is to link law and order issues with questions of social marginality, associative democracy, pluralism and the development of forms of positive regulation. These factors they consider to be inclusive and re-integrative, drawing on notions of civility, citizenship, equality and equity. This aim appears to be radical and, certainly, it is genuine in its search for change within law and order issues. However, it tries to do this without considering such concepts as the division of labour, class consciousness, alienation, resistance or class struggle and with a hazy view of what constitutes class. The authors manage to pry apart the neo-conservative and
neo-liberal position and attempt to fill the vacuum once held by the radical left before its chronic decline in support since the early 1980s. Marx, it would seem, is no longer relevant as ‘revolution looks less and less like an idea whose time has come’ (Hogg and Brown 1998, pp.121–139). This response demonstrates a lack of understanding of Marxist philosophy, for it is the contradictions in capitalism that generate class struggle, creating the dynamic that will ultimately bring about revolution. A Marxist analysis of existing social relations demonstrates that social conflict is still very real. It is, indeed, lying unrecognised at the heart of ‘progressive’ liberal research.

Class consciousness—the consciousness that the seemingly competitive fractures of the working class are really part of the same class (Thompson 1963)—will ultimately fuse these apparently disparate groups behind a single organic leadership (Harman 1983, p.10). Before these class fractions disappear, however, radical class struggle can be any social action, from demonstrating disapproval to writing a letter, which challenges the governing or ruling class. This is the heart of the matter, for resistance to state oppression is not the same thing as opposing the state itself. Marx and Engels both stressed that revolution could not be forced upon a society that was not ready (Hands 2000, pp.35, p.57)—that was not conscious of its real economic, political and social relations. Until then the most useful struggle for a radical movement is not always a direct assault upon state power. Gramsci (1971) argues that a radical alternative is to engage in a struggle for hegemony, or ideological domination. Harman (1983, p.17) explains this takes the shape of a counter hegemonic construction and this is not the province of the intelligentsia but will be a long, drawn-out organic social process.

Where does this leave Australian ‘radicals’ such as Brown and Hogg (1992) who have adopted Young’s left-realist standpoint? In particular, what is their understanding of core Marxist concepts explaining class and gender, competitive individualism and aggressive masculinity? (Young 1997, p.473). The fundamental problem of left-realism is that it narrows the understandings of who are the ‘victims’ and fails to consider the crimes of the powerful. It searches instead for the immediate enemy—the expendable functionaries in the criminal justice system. Interestingly, it also over-predicts the criminality of both socially and economically marginalised groups and their enemies, the ‘rule enforcers’. A genuinely radical analysis should also point to the unexamined acceptance of the ‘progressive’ viewpoint regarding individualisation and agency rhetoric (Sandland 1994, p.232).

An example of this inadequate understanding can be seen in Hogg and Brown’s (1998, p.103, pp.108–109) analysis of the social crisis associated with heroin dependency. Heroin addicts
have a substantial impact on the day-to-day work of rank and file police, not to mention the enormous impact that the heroin trade has upon generating the potential for police misconduct and corruption. Hogg and Brown accept that there is a well-founded belief that heroin dependency is linked to high levels of property crime but they sympathetically—or, perhaps, as Gouldner (1968) puts it, ‘quaintly’—acknowledge the plight of heroin users, whilst nevertheless portraying what is predominantly an under-class or lumpenproletarian as a ‘criminal class’. They inadvertently caricature heroin ‘markets’ as a type of petit-bourgeois small business, ignoring their earlier sympathy for those suffering from heroin dependency and its ruthlessly competitive counter culture. It becomes unclear within their analysis whether heroin users are victims or entrepreneurs. Strongly framing their liberal values, they validate capitalist ideology that views the market as a natural law legitimising a market-based mechanism for production and distribution (Parkin 1998, p.445). In fact the position of Hogg and Brown has shifted towards Millers argument regarding libertarians or market anarchists. Whereby goods could be provided by people banding together as a market and agreeing to contribute to their production (Miller 2003, p.27). Their solution is a self-regulating market that will enshrine that neo-liberal standard of ‘choice’. From this standpoint, individual addicts become responsible for their own destiny. Dismissing Marxism without any conceptual awareness of this philosophy, they fail to see that Marx and Engels (1998, p.41) also accurately explained the tendency of capitalist ideology to produce precisely this intellectual response. For, in The Communist Manifesto, it is argued that the ‘educated’ classes will attempt to eliminate social problems by searching for panaceas and use these as the basis of a reform movement in which ‘reform’ will damage neither capital nor profit. Hence the standpoint of Hogg and Brown may well mirror the framework of French philosopher Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (1972), whereby the vanguard of revolutionary social change is dependent upon the educated class and the lumpenproletariat. Apart from the obvious fact that neither intellectuals nor the lumpenproletariat represent the class interests of the masses, the post-structural framework presented by Hogg and Brown represents neither a new social order nor a new common sense. It is about reforming the existing capitalist system to protect a small fraction of the class it exploits and, in the process, facilitating the exploitation of other fractions of the working class and conserving the existing social order. It is ironic indeed that the original authors of left-realism Young and Matthew (2003 p.15) take the stance by Hogg and Brown one step further. They explain that although some critics acknowledge the structural origins of crime, whether by the police or the policed. The discussion of structure ends up being seen as an administrative problem. In the next breath the
problem is reduced from one of social structure to one of inadequate management. Thus the transformative problem becomes managerialised and reform based.

Relegating Hogg and Brown’s progressive ‘markets’ based approach for harm-reduction to the middle ground, Cotton (1994, p.1641) proposes an even more ‘radical’ model of reform utilising regulated, state-funded medical treatment for heroin dependency by recognising that drug abuse is a medical and social problem and not just a criminal problem. This option rejects both the conservative call for the criminalisation of drug users and the ‘progressive’ liberal ‘harm reduction’ proposal to legalise illicit narcotics as a ‘market’. The state-funded alternative would provide a realistic alternative to the aggressive competition—the central bane of left realism—generated by Hogg and Brown’s ‘market’ solution. This sounds radical, but is it? Is resistance to the state by one class fraction a disease to be cured or a market to be tamed? It is, of course, neither in a Marxist analysis.

A substantial portion of Young’s initial theory is Marxist in relation to crime but this has been reduced by its narrow application and the fact that it stops short of holism. Hogg and Brown’s version of this ‘improved’ Marxist strategy is fatally flawed—a strategy that could be either a liberal anarchist or a neo-liberal economic concept about the efficacy of competition and the ‘free-market’ framework. Consequently, the call by Hogg and Brown (1998, pp.4-7) for a new radical law and order commonsense transparently proclaims the support of a bourgeois hegemony. They do this by reinforcing the markets and the governing power of the state and its criminal justice establishment, at the same time venting anger at the working class functionaries who enforce the law. There is nothing remotely counter hegemonic in the ideas purveyed by this intellectual vanguard and because of its theoretical failings it can never be so.

Rebels Without a Cause

In this way, whilst the ‘right’, the ‘left’ and the ‘radical’ should be viewed, traditionally, as poles apart, these seemingly disparate positions are now not necessarily all that distinct. For, as Greenberg (1981, p.3) argues, although the process of labelling theorists does lay the groundwork for an inquiry into theories about the criminal law and criminality by introducing the concept of intellectual and social power positions, it does not necessarily identify just which interests and moral preferences have been embodied in their critique.

During the past forty years the seemingly radical and very heated debate that has developed around criminality and the law has become almost exclusively hegemonic rather than counter
hegemonic. In all but its most radical moments there has been a perceptible shift away from the classical Marxist argument focused on social class, the coercive power of the state and the need for a new social order towards an apparently radical liberal stance—a ‘progressive’ debate that uses conceptualisations of micro-power and individual agency or a culturalist agenda as analytical tools for ‘reforming’ the social order. The unfortunate consequence of this is that the hegemony and concentrated power of the capitalist state are no longer clearly understood and we now have an intelligentsia that is almost entirely incapable of challenging that power. The tragedy is that radicalism is now an empty word—an increment of scale rather than approach—and the now dominant ‘progressive’ analysis has lost its conceptual edge. Most intellectuals have lost sight of the holism of the issue and are left instead with a narrow reformist vision that leaves them analysing hierarchical detail.

As Williams (2003, p.1) argues, researchers into policing institutions—whether in terms of structure or agency or as conservatives, liberals or radicals—almost invariably share a preoccupation with the politics of policing reform. Certainly ‘reform’ is demanded by all forms of the media, both popular and academic—documentaries, magazine articles, newspapers, books and learned journals. Innumerable conferences are held on this topic and an endless procession of conference papers examine its similar possibilities but, almost invariably, popular criticism moves in one direction—towards the right—and the focus of the critique is on one major power group—the rank and file police. Chris Masters and Jennie Brockie, as journalists working for the ABC, have clocked up large television ratings on the subject. The focus of academic analysis presented in Chan (1997), Dixon (1999b), Maher, Dixon, Swift and Nguyen (1997) and Scraton (1985; 1987) is on the force with which police have subjugated the working class and the brutality that police have inflicted upon that class, particularly on those marginalised sections of the urban working class. Titles such as Changing Police Culture (Chan 1997), A Culture of Corruption (Dixon 1999b), ‘Violence and Police Culture’ (Dixon 2000), The State of the Police (Scraton 1985), and ‘Bent Coppers: A Survey of Police Corruption’ (Scraton 1993) leave little room for speculation about just who is the villain in this landscape of victims.

Greenberg (1981, p.190) argues that until the 1960s most research into the criminal justice system addressed a limited set of assumptions—some things were certain, such as the discretion exercised by rank and file police in making arrests and the prosecutor’s discretion in selecting which matters to place before the court. There was also the judge’s discretion in setting sentences and the parole board’s discretion in releasing prisoners from custody. This changed, however, when the concept of individual agency as the starting point for
criminological research was popularised in the 1960s by the interactionist work of Becker (1966), who published *The Outsiders* in 1966. As Humphries and Greenberg (1981, p.211) explain, in Becker’s work the legal rules that prohibit certain anti-social conduct do not spring from nowhere but are created by ‘moral entrepreneurs’ who crusade for the adoption of rules they wish to see legislated, even at the expense of others. The interactionist method of inquiry seeks to identify the narrowly precise social agents responsible for changes in criminalisation, thus apparently supplying what is missing from structuralist theory. However, Becker’s methodology has since been extended to include groups, or collectives, as well as individuals and the concept of ‘corruption’ has become firmly attached to the agency operating behind discretion.

Becker (1966, p.61–63) argues that although rule enforcers may have no stake in the content of particular rules themselves, they often develop their own private evaluation of the importance of various kinds of rules and infractions of them and these often differ considerably from those held by the general public. One complication is that, as a consequence of professional enforcers’ lack of enthusiasm in dealing with certain aspects of deviance, they may get into trouble with the rule-makers. The rule-makers are solely concerned with the content of the rules that interest them and they see these rules as the means by which deviance can be stamped out. However, a problem arises because the rule-makers may not understand the rule-enforcers’ long-range or strategic approach and cannot see why all the deviance that is apparent cannot be stamped out at once. The rule-enforcers are denounced for taking deviance too lightly and for failing to do their duty. The moral entrepreneurs re-establish their position, however, by maintaining that the outcome of the last crusade was not satisfactory, or that the gains once made have been whittled away and lost.

Within this interactionist context, Becker’s (1967) dissertation, *Whose Side Are We On* held that in all research there is an obligation to takes sides. The radical researcher will, of course, support the underdog—a group characterised in his work *Outsiders* (Becker 1966) by the rule-breakers and having nothing to do with class. Unfortunately Becker’s underdog is always a class fraction and those who exploit them—their enemies—are no less than other fractions of that class. This is a problem that goes unnoticed in the midst of all this seemingly ‘radical’ theory. Chan (1997, p.11) argues from a similar perspective in her research into police racism and the Australian Aboriginal community. She maintains that a clear distinction can be drawn between the ‘two sides’—that is, between the oppressed minorities and the racist police. Her answer to the question of taking sides is simple—she is unequivocally on the side of the oppressed and categorically opposed to the working class police. Taking sides, however,
should play no part in the law and, in particular, should play no part in radical criminological research that has as its aim the task of reforming the system. At best, it is simplistic; at worst it breaks all the safeguards of objective research and is transparently manipulative and biased.

Chan (1999, Ch.5) clearly states that her analysis of police culture uses this interactionist perspective and, as such, its failings are consistent with those other interactionist analyses of the police. The main failing, from a class perspective, is in finding a clear answer to which class fraction is the most oppressed and ranking oppression from such a subjective perspective. Even Becker (1966) suggests in *Outsiders* that there are always ‘three sides’ to the equation—the ‘rule-maker’ as moral entrepreneur, the ‘rule-enforcer’, and the ‘rule-breaker’. In Chan’s work, apart from Chapter 2 in which the discussion temporarily swerves from an interactionist focus on agency to the ‘structural and cultural organisation of police work’, the oppression of Aboriginal people is often reduced to a micro-‘agency’ debate (Chan 1997, p.11) and economic, social and political exploitation are mentioned only in passing. Nor is the role of the rule-maker discussed in the context of police misconduct. It never seems to occur to Chan that the rank and file police may be resisting the same rule-maker and the same exploitative state as the Aboriginal community she champions. Interestingly, ‘oppression’ has replaced the ‘exploitation’ of labour power in these so-called radical analyses. The conceptualisation of the underclass of unemployed and dislocated into a category reified as a marginalised victim has radically deflected the focus of radical theory from the exploitation of the working class to the oppression of this fraction of this class position. Now it is the working class who oppresses the unemployed and marginalised and the focus of reform is directed internally at the power of this class fraction. The ruling class has been effectively positioned outside the theoretical field of vision, its actions obscured and indistinct.

This is not to argue that operational police—the rule-enforcers—do not amplify the alienation experienced minority and disadvantaged groups, for in many instances some rank and file police enthusiastically carry out their role as the state’s instrument of ruling-class exploitation (Finnane 1994, p.10). However, it is important to keep in mind that, as a fraction of the working class, rank and file police are also exploited and that they have been inserted into a structural, and not an agency, conflict in their relations with their own class (Bernstein et al 1975). Rank and file police are expected to be the caretakers of the capitalism system and are managed, at arm’s length, by the state’s administrative elites (Gouldner 1968). Even from the standpoint of Becker (1966; 1967), individual rank and file police can do very little about the structural power relations that exist between themselves and the dominant moral entrepreneurs who are often part of the political arm of the state. This is even more the case after the
working-class solidarity of rank and file police has been eroded by managerialism and neolibal policies—policies that purport to foster more accountability but actually increase the surveillance and coercion of the workforce. From this basis, the competence of rank and file police is measured in terms of increased productivity—this will be discussed in more detail at a later stage of this thesis. The emphasis here is that the aggressive/competitive aspects of managerialism are key elements in fragmenting the solidarity of the working class, including that of rank and file police.

Some interactionist’s define the relationship between the police and the policed and examine what they regard as the ‘wide discretion’ of operational police and, when this limited evidence is attached to the Bourdieuan concept of habitus, this research perceives police to be ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Chan 1997, pp.44, p.65). This is taken to an extreme point by academics such as Chan, who infer that rank and file police are not directed to perform their duties but have to be personally convinced that various legal proofs have been met before their duties are carried out. This resolves itself into police seemingly legislating on the run and acting as judge, jury and executioner in splendid isolation. Maher and Dixon (1999, p.492), however, view police officers as part of a highly structured and intensively organised government department who are, as such, directed in what duties to perform each day.

Interestingly, Antonio Gramsci made reference to research that ignored structural imperatives well before the current rise of interactionist methodology was focussing on individual agency. He wrote that when notions of agency dominated those of structure in research, then ‘critical’ activity is reduced ‘to the exposure of swindles, to creating scandals, and the prying into the pockets of public figures’ (Gramsci 1971, p.378). The accuracy of Gramsci’s insight is borne out by the fact that, during the recent ‘progressive’ reform period of the NSW Police Service, most of the academic work was concentrated on the notion of a ‘reformed’ police institution. This work sees no problem with the idea that the existing senior management within the police and criminal justice establishment should modify the agency of rank and file police. The concentrated layers of power making up the criminal justice hierarchy or the governing arm of the state are invisible to such criticism (Avery 1981; Kennedy and McQueen 2002; McGrath 1999).

Some ‘progressives’ who are associated with the ‘reform’ process claim their work to be ‘radical’ because it has exposed the everyday corruption and brutality of that oppressive instrument of the state, the police. Greenberg (1981, p.3) argues that this line of reasoning diverts research from the wider study of the relationship between criminality and the state to
the narrow study of the day-to-day operations of policing institutions, hobbling any constructive sympathy they may express towards socially degraded groups and vocations (Cuff et al 1990, p.139). Hall and Scratton (1981, p.488) argue that, using an interactionist approach, the process of criminalisation is, in fact, the application of a criminal label to a particular social category. They question how acts are labelled and who has the power to label. In The State of the Police, Scratton (1985) deals with the police violence that occurred in the wake of the miners’ strike in England during the Thatcher Government of 1979–1990. Scratton rejects the idea that the incidence of police violence during the miners’ strike reflects a significant change in policing tradition, pointing to a long history of police violence that has its origins in the formation of contemporary militarised policing institutions and concluding that the behaviour of rank and file police should be more closely monitored and that police institutions should be opened to public scrutiny if this tradition is to be stamped out. It is interesting to note that both Scratton and NSW Police Commissioner Avery, working from both sides of the political spectrum, both promote a solution to ‘reform’ that amounts to nothing more than controlling the existing order by more supervision and more controls on the state’s low level functionaries.

Ironically, Scratton has observed elsewhere the role of the state and the dominant class in initiating conflict between rank and file police and their working class counterparts, arguing that the law and order platform closely associated with the politics of Thatcherism was constructed successfully on an appeal to the commonsense notion that society had become more violent. Support was thus high for those new laws to maintain authoritarian social control promised in the 1979 Conservative Party Manifesto (Scranton and Chadwick 1987, p.221). Scratton argues that the police authorities are ‘powerless’ to control their rank and file or make them accountable (Scraton 1985, p.86, Scraton 1987). This ignores the question of who, if not the administrative elites within the policing institutions and the state, deploys the rank and file police to crush working class resistance in the first place (see also, Gilroy and Sim 1987, p.89). This position was adopted by Janet Chan in Changing Police Culture, in which she argues that policing policies are made by the ‘street level bureaucrats’—rank and file police—rather than their senior counterparts. Chan writes in fairly positive terms about the overall performance of the New South Wales Police Service, implying that it was only the operational police who were resistant to change, although she criticises the lack of police accountability in dealing with minority groups, arguing in much the same way as Scraton (1985) that the police are racist and discriminate against certain social groups through the use of their specific powers (Chan 1997, pp.65–66, pp.214–217).
While Scraton (1987) and Chan (1997) believe that policing is determined from the bottom up, they provide no evidence to support this assertion and demonstrate little awareness of the realities of operational policing. Margaret Thatcher’s response to this heightened level of social unrest and industrial disputes earned her the name of the Iron Lady, as she demanded tougher policing tactics and effectively declared war on the demonstrators. Police were provided with better equipment and wider powers with the result that, as Reiner (2000, p.68) explains, the levels of injury being inflicted on both civilians and police were of a magnitude that had not been seen for some fifty years. This was despite the reservations of some senior police who were horrified by the government response. Chief Constable John Alderson declared, ‘There has to be a better way than blind repression’. This is not to say that many other police were not supportive of the policy but what has to be understood is the leading role played by the Thatcher Conservative Government in this social conflict. The state mobilised working-class police to crush this resistance within the working class and its ‘underclass’. For instance, when newspaper magnate Conrad Black set out to crush union opposition he asked Margaret Thatcher to support him.

After lunch I gently began to ask [Prime Minister Thatcher] what would happen if, in the unlikely event we had a work stoppage at the Daily Telegraph over introduction of the most modern newspaper technology in our new plants and had to import production personnel from Canada, and I got no farther. ‘I would sign the work permits myself,’ she declared (cited in Donaldson and Poynting 2004).

The important point here is that this conflict has been scrutinised in terms of the role and agency of the rank and file police rather than the role of the state’s elites during a deliberately provoked crisis (Perry 1991, p.34). When police were injured, this fact was used to support more coercion. This process has all of the trademarks of the most brutal of human blood sports, where the opposing combatants are determined to win, but the real winners who threw the combatants into the ring can look on critically at arm’s length.

The Educational Divide

Antonio Gramsci (1971, pp.144-145) argues that in every society there are the leaders and the led but by this he was not, of course, referring to the division of labour between rank and file police and their senior counterparts. This is, he said, an organic process, developing from within alongside the growth of class consciousness. Professional intellectuals, however, appear to believe that the only legitimate leadership is that imposed by the intelligentsia or ‘educated’ reformer. They see themselves as an academic priesthood with the intellectual
qualifications for leadership. Indeed, in the reformed Police Service, academic credentials by far outrank operational experience. Educated managers believe they have little to learn from operational police who are directed entirely by a non-operational leadership.

In *The State of The Police*, Scraton (1985) at no time addresses the core issue that any effective struggle against the concentrated layers of power that govern the state requires processes that unify rather than fragment (Meiksins-Wood 1997, p.13). By supporting oppressive managerialism and the data-led performance management that accompanies neoliberal ‘reform’, they are reinforcing fragmentation. Fortunately, however, intensified managerialism is also forcing rank and file police into struggles of resistance (Harman 1983, p.25), acts that make the failure of Scraton (1985), Carrington (1998), Chan (1997), Dixon (1999b) and Maher et al (1997) to theorise their part in the intensification of this alienating process—or any other causal factors relating to police deviance, for that matter—doubly ironic.

From the position of a class based analysis, it is important to stress that traditional intellectuals are rarely the allies of the working class in any struggle for a new social order. Gramsci (1971, p.334) argues that any loyalty extended by ‘progressive’ intellectuals towards the working class movements is necessarily remote. Harman (1983, pp.25-26) maintains that this ambiguity provides an excuse for some intellectuals to pretend—and maybe even believe—that they are fighting for a new social order through ‘reform’ or a ‘theoretical process’ or a ‘struggle for intellectual hegemony’, when in fact they are only advancing their own positions and careers within the state. Gouldner (1968) makes a similar observation about the relationship between researchers using the interactionist method of inquiry and rank and file police. Gouldner refers to operational police as ‘rule enforcers’ and ‘caretakers’ and is critical of Becker and other ‘sentimental’ interactionists’ convenient lack of interest in the ‘rule maker’ and their restricted examination of the ‘rule-enforcer’. What is seldom examined in these instances is the ‘in group’ or ‘out group’ status of the opposing groups (Kennedy, M.2001b, p.16). The level of racist, ethnocentric or xenophobic behaviour exhibited by rank and file police is due not to their individual agency but to the alienation and division of labour that is associated with their necessarily contradictory class position (Wright 1979, p.95) being exacerbated by managerialism and performance based work practices.

Part of the liberal or ‘progressive’ criticism of rank and file police is that few demonstrate any serious attempt to change the criminal justice system by becoming better-informed managers and caretakers rather than just enforcers (Becker 1966; Chan 1997; Scraton 1985). In
particular, Howard Becker (1966, 1967) has argued that the deviance of the ‘rule breaker’ is a consequence of their mismanagement by the ‘rule enforcer’. It is not their personal failings, but the failings or others and, in particular, police recalcitrance that is at the root of the criticism. Strangely enough, as victims of society, the rule-breakers are not expected to attempt to change the system that alienates them. The thinking here is that those in the criminal community are powerless to manage their own affairs but rank and file police must be able to do so from their place at the bottom of the political power structure that in turn coerces them. The rule-breakers' deviance is constructed by the oppressive capitalist structure (Becker 1966, 1967; Downes 1979; Gouldner 1968; Maher and Dixon 1999) but that of the police in the ranks is not.

Greenberg (1981, p.193) explains that there are two trends in the radical class-based argument about the role of policing. One trend characterises the law as ‘instrumental’ because it is an instrument or a tool used by the ruling class to protect its interests. The other structuralist argument maintains that, although the law is grounded in class relations—especially class conflict—a single class does not necessarily control it. If instrumentalists have exaggerated the level of discrimination by the powerful as a feature of policing, Greenberg argues that structuralists have been equally at fault by minimising the level of discrimination. In other words, one is too particular, the other too sweeping. Focus on the discriminatory power of police, however, has consolidated the radical appraisal around the question of police agency. Under the lash of criticism that it was too blunt an analytical tool, the focus had shifted from a study of the agency of the state—a type of structuralism, especially when applied to the state’s leadership—to a study of the day-to-day interactions of the police force and disadvantaged groups in an attempt to supply the subtlety of analysis that structuralism appeared to lack. It was at this time that theories of agency came to be dominant.

The apparent fragmentation of the debate on policing that focuses on agency is explained by Ellen Meiksins-Wood, who argues that many of these points of view emphasise ‘difference’—those particular identities such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality; their various particular and separate oppressions and struggles; and particular ‘knowledges’, including even sciences being particular to ethnic groups.

It should be obvious that the main thread running through all these post-modern [post structural] principles is an emphasis on the fragmented nature of the world and of human knowledge. The political implications of all of this are fairly clear: the human self is so fluid and fragmented, and our identities are so variable, uncertain and fragile that there can be no basis for solidarity and
collective action founded on common social ‘identity’ such as class, a common experience and a
common interest… (Meiksins-Wood 1997, p.7)

Habermas (1994, p.131) also criticises post-modernist and post-structuralist intellectuals as
their untheorised anti-authority position makes them neo-conservative. He believes they
become conservative because they have no conceptual means of being otherwise, using highly
selective and relativistic context-dependent criticism which, in his view, abandons the force of
the better argument and also abandons the aspirations that always have been at the core of all
forms of non-conservative politics. Criticism is on an agency level and the obvious targets are
low level, relatively uncredentialed functionaries.

For the past thirty years in the United States, Bradley and Cioccareli (1994, Ch.6) argue,
reformers have been pushing the idea that higher education is the key to effective policing
organisations. The idea is that already ‘well educated’ recruits will be provided with in-
service technical police training—the easy part of policing, it seems is the operational aspect.
Carter, Sapp and Stevens (1989) support this, arguing that evidence available from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation shows that college educated police officers are rated higher than non-
college educated colleagues by their managers because they are said to be better at policing
and to be less racist and attract less complaints from the public.

Clearly, the use of higher ‘education’ as a panacea for social or administrative ills is a
academically popular one but its efficacy has not been borne out by events. Indeed, the
resignation in June 2001 of Louis Freeh, former New York prosecutor and Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), should pose some serious questions for this argument.
Freeh resigned two years before the end of his ten-year contract after weathering storms over
a number of issues—including the discovery of a high-ranking Russian spy in the FBI; the
disastrous 1993 raid on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, that left 80 people
dead; the discovery that security guard Richard Jewell had been wrongly identified as the
chief suspect in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics bombing; the 1997 scandal over the integrity of
FBI forensic procedures; and the investigation of a Chinese-born nuclear scientist, Wen Ho
Lee, who was accused wrongly of stealing nuclear secrets and sending them to Beijing. These
problems all arose from within a policing institution that volubly takes pride in the fact that all
its recruits have a better than average education (Prenzler 2002, p.8; Riley 2001a).

In New South Wales the affirmative action recruitment policy for police has targeted those
with higher education qualifications and offered a generous public service policy as an
inducement. This is apparently designed to make police competitive in promotion but this ‘competitiveness’ has meant that any ‘knowledge’ brought into the service by these educated police is not often shared with their colleagues or used collectively to benefit the organisation. Rather, an individualistic and competitive culture becomes part of a managerialist trend in the police service. Introduced in the early 1980s to allegedly break the back of the ossified ‘elites’ within the ranks of detectives and reshape the organisation in accordance with the broader vision of Commissioner Avery (Avery 1981), managerialism, ‘merit based’ promotion and productivity became part of a new principal operational strategy of the New South Wales Police (Kennedy, M. 2001a, p.37). However, far from fulfilling an egalitarian function, members of the newly ‘educated’ police executive refer to their rank and file counterparts as ‘units’ and pressurise them to increase productivity. Being highly competitive, their aim is to convert this productivity into a positive competency assessment to ensure their personal promotion (Kennedy and McQueen 2002). Once achieved, this style of management appears vindicated. As a consequence, less-educated and often unambitious but nevertheless effective operational police with practical experience are pushed to one side by many of the newly educated elites.

The Hay Group Consulting Consortium (2000, p.61) believe that rank and file police are scapegoats managed by terror and demonstrate a growing awareness of the gap between the rhetoric and reality of reform. This is aggravated by a lack of operational respect, leading to a developing cynicism and demoralisation (Jones 1980). Research into such police management styles showed two decades ago that these magnify stress within the lower ranks and encourage conformity, compliance, and sycophancy towards the senior ranks (Smith and Gray 1983). Management has been found to be dangerously introspective, prone to ‘groupthink’ and illusions of infallibility when the control structure of conventional policing pivots on the administrative process—a process which is, Jim Ife (1995, p.126-127) argues, based on hierarchical assumptions of power and competence—the higher one is in a bureaucracy, the more skilled and competent they should be. As such, all wisdom is considered to be at the apex of the organisation. Far from demonstrating hierarchical wisdom, however, the management structure of policing institutions is perforated by structured failings rather than the superficial irregularities exposed by ‘progressive’ research (Bittner 1990).

McGrath (1999) portrays Avery as an enlightened Commissioner with enormous political and public momentum behind him and supported by a well-educated executive team. However a good deal of the ‘reform’ process of the time was orchestrated by Avery and his executive to reposition themselves as the elites within the organisation and wrest control from the ranks of
vocationally educated detectives who were the organic intellectuals of the organisation. To cement their success, this classically ‘educated’ executive team were simultaneously aligning themselves with the ‘progressive’ intellectual community and the legal establishment—a feat that the organic intellectuals of the old ‘elite’ within detectives had never managed to achieve.

The Subalterns of the State

It is useful to examine the notion of ‘well educated’ rank and file police from the point of view of Antonio Gramsci (1971, pp.12–18, pp.60–61, p.76), who argues that in a pre-industrial society there was a rational formula behind divisions in the education system. Vocational education produced the ‘instrumental’ classes whilst classical education produced the dominant classes—including intellectuals. However, with industrialisation a new type of organic urban intellectual developed and in recent times the ‘educated’ strand of the working class and the number of academics has undergone an unprecedented expansion. The contemporary bureaucratic system has given rise to a great mass of functions, which are not all justified by the necessity of productivity. Rather they are justified by the political necessities of the dominant group. As a consequence, the number of intellectuals has grown and their function can be compared to that of a subaltern or junior officer in the army.

In this model, intellectuals are the dominant group’s ‘deputies’, exercising the subaltern functions of constructing social hegemony and maintaining political power. Many middle-class intellectuals become influential through the organic nature of their relation to the social groups they represent. In other words, conservative and moderate intellectuals can be the organic vanguard of the ruling class. Gramsci explains that it is the intellectuals who organise the web of beliefs and institutional and social relations into a hegemonic construction (Sassoon 1991, p.222) and are very successful in diverting public attention from the kernel of society to the husk and fragmenting notions of commonality (Gramsci 1976, p.76). However, as Gramsci wrote in one of his letters to a student: ‘Whatever we desire—whether it is despotism or republic or anything else—let us not seek division among ourselves; with this guiding principle, the world can collapse and we will still find the way again’.

There is, as Gramsci theorised, a social division between the vocationally and the classically educated and this, to a significant extent, still reflects the division of labour within capitalist societies. The operational police are at the bottom of the organisation; the managerial and senior police are ranged hierarchically above them. The intellectual elitism of the academically educated managers over the vocationally educated operational police generates exclusion rather than inclusion and mimics the already existing gulf that is revealed in the
regular joint agency meetings between the operational police and the Department of Public Prosecutions, the Health Department and the Department of Family and Community Services. The average police officer struggles to understand the excluding language or the politics driving the criminal justice debate and they are intellectually excluded by their own educated colleagues and the broader group of criminal justice professionals.

Many of the struggles—and resistance—within the police service arise from the conflict between these ‘highly educated’ intellectuals at an administrative level and organic working class intellectuals at an operational level. The expertise of the operational police is rarely consulted. Their viewpoint is rarely considered and they are almost never asked to explain the situation that confronts them in their daily work. This thesis will go a small way towards redressing this imbalance and, at least within these pages, operational research subjects will be given a voice. In general, however, educated managers and commentators provide the ‘solutions’ from above. Academic ‘experts’ provide the priesthood leading the way to reform, demanding for themselves extraordinary levels of intellectual freedom to expose ‘corruption’ and misconduct in the rank and file police (Hogg and Lee 1999). With the current intellectual support for neo-liberal ‘reform’ focussing upon rationalisation, professionalism and managerial efficiency, politicians, investigative journalists and academic reformers are pushing the operational expectations placed upon rank and file police to excessive limits. That this is based on academic ignorance is necessarily a considerable problem. The fact that this is also based on a blind refusal to acknowledge the specialist expertise of the practical side of policing makes this problem insoluble.

Developing a Radical Account of Policing

A truly radical critique must aim to analyse the economic, political and ideological basis of policing, the police and the policed and, in so doing, will make sense of the intellectual conflict surrounding policing institutions. Robert Reiner argues that the hub of the Marxist legal argument about class conflict is captured by Engels’ reflection that ‘because the English Bourgeois finds himself reproduced in his law, as he does his God, the policeman’s truncheon… has for him a wonderfully soothing power. But for the workingman [the experience is] something quite otherwise…!’ (cited in Reiner 2000, p.24). Unless a radical analysis can reintegrate the contradictions that are currently focussing debate on what is ultimately just another fraction of the working class (Lenin 1999, p.42, Anderson 1976, p.76) and construct instead an holistic and meaningful analysis, research into policing will remain a tool of the ideological hegemony of capitalism.
Engels, according to Greenberg (1991, pp.116-118), argued that crime was predominantly attributable to the atomising effect of the capitalism—an economy based on competition. Crime, Engels maintained, was a manifestation of this competition as the suffering and exploitation created by capitalism meant that the only option available to a section of the working class was to make an inarticulate rebellion against that system. Yet, Engels recognised, any struggle by alienated individuals would fail to change the conditions imposed upon the working class by the capitalist structure. Coercive police measures could only contain rather than eliminate the resistances embodied in the crime committed by alienated individuals. For this same reason, repressive measures against rank and file police will only contain rather than eliminate the resistances that are embodied in instances of misconduct or corruption. What they will achieve, even more effectively, is to build on the alienation of the different parts of that class from each other, blocking the ability of class consciousness to evolve and, in so doing, preserve the power of the ruling class. The misconduct or corruption of police or any other public institution is not simply a matter of individual or organisational agency and their corruption cannot really be distinguished, as it has been in the last thirty years, from the wholesale structured corruption of other major social, political and economic institutions.

The Contradiction of Rank-and-File Police

A major block to understanding the real class position of operational police is the contradictory role they have historically played in the state’s repressive apparatus. With the spread of industrial capitalism, rank and file police exercised social control to protect the private property of the emerging bourgeoisie, safeguard ruling-class security and stabilise their social order (Brogden 1982, p.71). British police were explicitly used to contain industrial disputes and political demonstrations on behalf of the state (Reiner 2000, p.53). The basic rule of capital was that labour power as a commodity should be purchased at the cheapest possible price and the workers, having nothing to sell but their labour, could not change this as long as they acted as individual units in competition with each other. Trade unions were rigorously suppressed by the state and strikes were brutally crushed, as were food riots, the destruction of machinery and any form of political protest that threatened property rights and social order. All such actions were deemed to be ‘criminal’ (Bernstein, Cooper, Currie, Frappier, Harring, Platt, Poyner, Ray, Scruggs and Trujillo 1975, p.24) and police officers who attacked striking workers or the alienated underclass appeared to be ‘violent partisans’ and part of the establishment, powerful representatives of the government or the capitalists (Baker 2001, p.203).
It is not surprising, given the militaristic profile of these early policing institutions that attention became fixed on the power wielded by those police in the front line (Harring 1981, pp.303-304). What went unnoticed was the fact that the police were also rigidly controlled and prevented from forming unions to better their own conditions (Palmer 1994, p.84). Hated by their real class, rank and file police would probably have identified with the bourgeoisie rather than the working class. Harring says that, when any rank and file police did sympathise with striking workers, neither their colleagues nor the strikers gave them any support. For example, as Mark Finnan (2002, p.28) explains, when police in Victoria attempted to unionise in 1923, they encountered such a hostile government response that they were eventually left with little option other than to engage in industrial action and strike. During the strike, mobs roamed the streets, two people were killed and hundreds were injured (Haldane 1995). The government dismissed all of the striking police and none of the dismissed officers were ever re-employed in the force. Nor was this an outcome peculiar to Australia for, as Homel (1994, p.10) argues, industrial action by rank and file police in other countries was crushed in precisely the same way.

A prominent debate about crime has focused on its relationship to disadvantage. The argument is that disadvantaged communities experience strains and anxieties because of their harsh social conditions but their continued powerlessness, in turn, makes them soft targets for the coercive or pre-emptive operational strategies of policing institutions (Hobbs 1997, p.805; Young 1997, p.479). Because they are the victims of the state they are also the most likely victims of police repression. In the ‘reformed’ policing institutions, options other than making an arrest that were previously available to rank and file police—such as giving a caution, having an informal discussion or the trading of information—have been limited or even withdrawn on the basis that a strong and visible law enforcement action by police, supported by quantified data, will prevent more serious crime and social unrest. Many ‘progressive’ intellectuals, amongst them Janet Chan (1997, p.78), are very critical of the police discretionary powers previously used to stop, search, detain and use force. Such criticism, however, fails to see that the most important discretionary police power of ‘not to arrest’ has also been whittled away by tighter regulations and other ‘reform’ measures designed to curb the opportunities for misconduct and corruption (Kennedy, M. 2000, p.82, Booth 2000; Cunneen 1999; Green 1999; Hopkins Burke 1998; Humphries 2000; Maher, Dixon, Swift and Nguyen 1997; Noble, Poynting and Tabar 1999; Palmer 1997; Penberthy, Melki and Trute 2000; Poynting 1999; Reiner 1992; Shapiro 1997; Skolnick 1999). Even James Q. Wilson, best known for introducing the conservative ‘Broken Windows’ theory (Wilson and Kelling
and a major contributor to the concept of ‘zero tolerance’ policing, has argued in his earlier works that when policing ignores the notion of discretion and focuses on rules and regulations, the response from the broader community will be aggressive resistance and from the state often more aggressive policing (Wilson 1968). ‘Progressives’ demand ‘the humanity of the law’ but the very reforms they praise point inexorably towards the ‘rule of law’.

Corruption, Misconduct and Resistance

Working class resistance as collective disorder is regarded by many intellectuals as part of the legitimate bargaining process used by the working class to improve its economic relations or working and living conditions and some even suggest that this serves as a form of communication between the classes (Spizer and Scull 1977b; Thompson 1971). However, for conservative thinkers, Hobsbawm (1959, p.116) says, this resistance and collective disorder is traditionally portrayed as a threat to social and political order, requiring aggressive intervention by the state. It is quite revealing therefore that, historically, misconduct and corruption within policing institutions were not the key issues examined from the original progressive standpoint (Harring 1981; Spitzer and Scull 1977a,b) but related entirely to the conservative viewpoint.

As rank and file police are just another fraction of the working class police misconduct and corruption should, at times, be legitimately construed as a form of class-based resistance (Kennedy and McQueen 2002). On the contrary, interactionist researchers such as Spitzer and Scull insist that when corruption and misconduct attain epidemic proportions they must, therefore, be seen as indicative of a structural problem within police work (Bernstein et al 1975, p.187). Following this line of reasoning, it could also be argued that when frame breaking, industrial espionage, theft and all other crimes against property reached epidemic proportions in Britain as a result of the dislocation of British society by industrialisation, they must, therefore, be seen as a structural problem in the working class during the first half of the nineteenth century and that this should be met with a similar response to that proposed by interactionist critics—the type of response that provoked Percy Bysshe Shelley to denounce the extremely conservative Liverpool Government in his angry poem ‘England in 1819’, perhaps? Presumably, more timely action against the structural problems besetting this working class would have done away with the need for the Great Charter, the formation of the Trade Union Congress, the Factory Acts, the Eight Hour Day movement, the Reform Bills of 1832, 1868, 1884, 1918 and 1928, the Beveridge Report and the development of the welfare state after the Second World War. As Humphries and Greenberg (1981, p.212) contend, such
interactionist assertions are necessarily limited by the absence of any theory relating to the source of power that shapes corruption or even an adequate theory to explain the powerlessness, lack of meaning and self worth that is at the core of alienation (Wood 2004, p.9). Clearly, this leads to another dilemma because, notwithstanding the levels of corruption that have been exposed, there has been little attempt to define either exactly what this corruption entails or exactly from which level of power it emanates within the legal system.

A large number of contemporary analyses of policing refer to the formative nature of a ‘culture of corruption’ within policing or make the bland assertion that corruption is ‘endemic’ in the rank and file police (Dixon 1999b, 2000). Both of these positions are not only ahistorical but also excessively melodramatic. An entire ‘culture’ cannot be dismissed as ‘corrupt’—the concept is far too complex for this, as intellectuals such as David Dixon well know. And to assert that it is ‘endemic’—defined in the Macquarie Dictionary as ‘peculiar to a particular people or locality, as a disease’—is testing the credulity of an intelligent audience somewhat. Starting from such a provokingly subjective and, indeed, irrational position, it is hardly surprising that these critics fail to theorise corruption within the broader legal system or the economic and political structure. Indeed, their moral indignation renders them incapable of doing so. Research from authors such as Braune (1998), Brockie (1992), Brown and Hogg (1996), Carrington (1998), Chan (1997), Dixon (1999b), Henry (1994), the Knapp Commission (1972), the Mollen Commission (1994), Perry (2002), Prenzler and Ransley (2002), the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1997) and Shapiro (1997) all describe, in moralistic language, the various levels of deviance and misconduct prolific among rank and file police. The problem is that ‘corruption’ is identified within a breadth of definition that ranges from receiving free Krispy Kreme doughnuts ‘There'll be no freebie doughnuts on my beat, [police] chief orders’ (Kidman 2005), half-price McDonald’s hamburgers or using racist language, to stealing money, dealing drugs or planting evidence or committing perjury to secure a conviction. There are no shades of grey or mitigating circumstances when the issue is police corruption. No holds are barred.

Reiner (2000, p.25) explains that ‘progressive’ reformers dwell on the inefficiency of the police as well as their misconduct. It is very likely that the initial—and possible more ‘progressive’—radical standpoint of the 1960s saw corruption and misconduct as a trademark of the capitalist structure that dominated society and the legal system. There was very little oversight of policing institutions by the community and, in any event, some radical progressives at the time saw the issue in terms of public control by the police as being flawed and prone to abuse. Bernstein et al (1975, p.38) explain that in some parts of the United States
radicals felt that the classical reliance by police upon fear and brute force had to be replaced. However, in line with the conservatives whom they ostensibly opposed, they also believed that it was critical for the elimination of corruption that the management of policing should become centralised within a state bureaucracy so that rank and file police were not too close to their local communities nor at the beck and call of the petite bourgeoisie. Whatever the style of management proposed, arguments about the centralised management of policing, even set within a framework of community based initiatives, never really suggested full community control (Gordon 1987; Scraton 1985, p.139). The state’s legitimisation of the modern centralised policing institution is, for this reason, a hegemonic construction unchallenged by most critics of policing. When police corruption is concerned, their focus is solidly on the rule of law, the separation of powers and police accountability, no matter in which of the two traditional accounts of policing they position themselves.

‘Divide and Rule’: The Subaltern’s Role in Social Control

It could not maintained with any degree of seriousness that the political arm of the state and the bourgeoisie do not wield enormous influence over policing institutions. One of the major measures of adequate policing strategies is in terms of the successful protection of private property and the prevention of the dislocation to capital generated by social disorder (Storch 1975) and it is but a small step from this to the acknowledgement that there must be a class position involved in the interstices of this debate. Unfortunately, although effectiveness is always mentioned, the class dimension rarely is because the analysis gets so far but no further. Indignation clogs the ‘progressive’ mind, rendering it incapable of drawing rational conclusions. For the conservatives, the fact that the police are recruited from the working class makes opposing corruption simply a matter of the protection of interests—the police become unreliable if they are allowed to become too politicised or class-polarised. The campaign against corruption in the rank and file is completely explicable from this direction. However, the single mindedness of the ‘progressive’ campaign against corruption is a far more dangerous trend for it actively blocks useful research into the criminal justice system. It draws a line over which research never ventures and it removes an entire viewpoint from its field of analysis.

For some early radical researchers, as long as the police were managed by the state and controlled by the ruling class the problems of misconduct, violence and oppression would remain because social disorder was associated with capitalist development (Pierce 1981). The classical radical standpoint is that there are contradictions in the way power is used by
policing institutions. This is probably best summed up by Bernstein et al (1975, p.11), who argue that the actual role of the police in most capitalist societies should not be oversimplified.

Although the police are ... a repressive institution that operates to contain the poor and the powerless, they are also themselves exploited, not only by miserable working conditions and social isolation but also as instruments of laws and policies, which they neither control nor benefit from. The police protect private property but do not own it; as guardians of the peace, they defend government policies of imperialism and racism but do not derive any significant profit from them; and in their repression of popular movements, the police legitimise a political order, which they do not create. Control of the police, therefore, should take into account their dual role as both victimisers and victims, and we should examine possibilities for organising police resentment into political action (Bernstein et al 1975, p.144).

This was written in 1975 but Bernstein and her colleagues were of a different generation and the academic tide was turning even then against their focus. By the 1980s intellectuals, including one of Bernstein's co-authors Sidney Harring (1981), Hogg and Brown (1998) and Scraton (1985) were reluctant to locate rank and file police within the working class, even if this required a theoretical sleight of hand on their part, because they were apparently mesmerised by the fact that the police are involved in the execution of the state’s coercive policies and the enforcement of the state’s ideology. They must be, it was and still is argued, in some sort of employer/employee relationship with ‘rule-breakers’.

Clearly, this argument is not convincing. In fact, it raises the question of the need to deal satisfactorily with the ambiguities and divisions in the class structure that make some positions visibly occupy objectively contradictory locations within class relations (Wright 1979, p.95). Fundamentally, exploring the class position of rank and file police removes the issues of misconduct, resistance, violence, oppression and corruption from the confines of moral censure and places them within the wider scope of an analysis of the capitalist social structure. On this point, Hall, Critcher, Jefferson and Roberts (1978) argue that police deviance and misconduct have to be examined within the broader contexts of police power and its relationship to the more concentrated power of the capitalist state. For their argument, Hall et al (1978) draw heavily upon the work of Antonio Gramsci and his concept of hegemony.
In Gramsci’s mature writings, hegemony achieves the consent of those who are led (Gramsci 1971, pp.144-145) but, in his earlier writings, Gramsci saw hegemony as a working class strategy in terms of the systems of networks and allies that had to be created in order to overthrow the bourgeois state (Gramsci 1978, p.443). By the time of writing *The Prison Notebooks*, however, Gramsci had called this ‘counter hegemony’ and applied the concept of hegemony to mean the process by which the bourgeoisie established and maintained its rule. Gramsci argued that a class maintains its dominance not simply through special organisation of force such as the armed services and the police but also by going beyond its narrow corporate interests to exert a general moral and intellectual leadership of social actions. This takes place as the dominant group engages in a series of compromises with a network of allies that are unified into a social bloc—referred to as an ‘historical bloc’ (Sassoon 1991a, p.230). Gramsci explained that it is intellectuals who sustain the framework of institutional and ideological relations—the social superstructure, as such—including promoting various beliefs through the media and the state’s educational institutions. Intellectuals maintain hegemony and may be defined as all those who have an organisational role in society (Sassoon 1991, pp.221-223). Gramsci (1971, p.160) argued that the construction of hegemony is truly political because it goes beyond the immediate economic interests and must rest on the active consent of a collective will around which various groups in society unite. Gramsci (1971) explained that this hegemonic construction, in turn, educates the broader population into accepting contradictory oppressive values and the world-view of the dominant class.

Miliband (1991, p.523) argues that the coercive and consenting aspects that are located within the state’s hegemony take institutional form, where ‘a dominant and exploiting class imposes and defends its power and privileges against the class or classes, which it dominates and exploits’. The liberal idea that the capitalist state takes into consideration the broader population’s world-view to create consensus must be analysed from within a broader framework that proposes that such consent is always reinforced by coercion. Gramsci (1971, p.263) explained that the state is a coercive force plus consent, or that ideological hegemony is armoured by coercion. Political society organises force and civil society provides consent. However, it must be made very clear that Gramsci used the word ‘state’ in different ways in a determined effort to reveal the vague and imprecise ‘grey area’ that divides political and civil society (Sassoon 1991, p.223). In light of this, the Marxist standpoint is generally less concerned with explaining the individualised action or agency and more concerned with explaining the structural imperatives that shape society and the parameters within which individuals take action (Settle 1990, p.68). If on these terms we critically examine the
misconduct associated with the coercive, social control role of rank and file police, it becomes very apparent that the exposure of certain types of police deviance are serving as a diversionary strategy to keep the general public pre-occupied with the spectacle of conflict between rank and file police and the various fractions of the working class. Instead of being the enemies of working class interests, the ruling class and their subalterns become crusaders against working class oppression.

At this point it is useful to return to the work of Bernstein et al (1975), which argues the importance of recognising the subversive potential of the actions of rank and file police in the struggle to overthrow the capitalist state and build a socialist democracy. Against those who would argue that rank and file police can have no revolutionary role, Perry Anderson (1976, p.76) argues that in any revolutionary context it is in the nature of the agents of state coercion to displace the ideological apparatuses of parliamentary representation in order to maintain their position in the existing structure of ruling-class power. The coercive power of the state is the ultimate barrier to revolution and can only be broken by counter-coercion as the state’s ‘rule enforcers’—or a part of them, as occurred at the storming of the Bastille during the French revolution—come to support the revolution. Since the nineteenth century the barricades have provided a traditional symbol of class struggle and its battle against coercive state power, from the storming of the Bastille to overthrow feudal authority to the mass demonstrations against global economics that are a symbol of twenty-first century resistance to late capitalism. According to Perry Anderson ‘these barricade fortifications often had a moral rather than a military function: their purpose was classically as much a fraternisation with soldiers as a weapon against them’.

For in any revolution the task of a proletarian vanguard, in Lenin’s words, is not merely to fight against the troops but for the troops. This does not mean he emphasised, mere verbal persuasion to join the camp of the proletariat, but a ‘physical struggle’ by the masses to win them over to the side of the revolution (Anderson 1976, p.76).

Spitzer (1975) argues that in a capitalist society the population is treated as deviant when it disrupts existing social relations or the smooth functioning of the economy. With nothing to sell but their labour power, wages, work conditions and management structures are important issues in all working class struggle. Rank and file police are no exception and, far from being ‘street level bureaucrats’ as Janet Chan (1997, pp.65–66, pp.214–217) and Lisa Maher (1997, p.100) believe, they are just as vulnerable in terms of job insecurity and economic instability.
as any other part of the working class. In many instances, the quest for economic security is
the reason many working class people ‘choose’ to work for the state, particularly in those
countries where the state controls the public transport system, welfare and health provision,
telecommunications and education. However, this relationship with the state does not remove
them from exploitation or from being just as vulnerable, oppressed or alienated as other
members of the working class in the private sector. Wood (2004, p.9) explains that Marx
comes close to describing alienation as a lack of meaning and self worth. Wood argues that
according to Marx alienated workers are people ‘robbed of all actual life content’ and
rendered ‘worthless, devoid of dignity’. Rank and file police are fundamental members of the
working class and as such are not immune or exempt to the concept of being alienated from
their social core and I will discuss this in great detail throughout this thesis.

Although there is no doubt that rank and file police victimise certain segments of the working
class—and, in particular, its softest members in the disadvantaged underclass—as part of their
social control responsibility for the state, they are not the ‘rule makers’ and are not
responsible for formulating the rules they enforce or the policies and strategies they use to do
this. As ‘progressives’, Humphries and Greenberg (1993, p.467) attempt to argue this away by
asserting that an exploited class will seek to diminish or eliminate its exploitation but an
exploiting class will attempt to preserve exploitative class relations and intensify the rate of
exploitation. They view rank and file police, therefore, primarily in their role as exploiters and
only secondarily in their lesser role as the exploited. Lenin, on the other hand, as a
revolutionary theorist with every reason to fear the policing arm of the Tsarist state, chose
instead to believe that the task of an organic proletarian vanguard was not merely fighting
against the troops but for ‘the troops’. In his concept of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ he
emphasised that this did not mean enforcing class consciousness but a ‘physical struggle’
during which the proletariat would develop consciousness of their class as the prelude to
revolution (Anderson 1976, p.76). It is small wonder that rank and file police are not yet
conscious of their true class membership for the intellectual vanguard of the proletariat are not
only confused about their own class alliance but are parsimonious about attributing working
class membership to all but a select few.

Functional social theories often assume that capitalist society is predominantly a cohesive and
homogenous organism and that social unrest and industrial disputes are simple glitches within
this because the broad consensus is for social harmony. For some ‘progressive’ liberals, such
as Critchley (1978, p.55), social order means reconciliation between interest groups and not
the oppression of one class by another. From a Marxist perspective, of course, this denies the
dynamic of class struggle that will lead to revolution (Lenin 1999, p.16) and tries to suppress the counter hegemonic ideas that will make socialism the common sense of the new epoch. This involves two things: a radical critique of the prevailing social order and an affirmation that an entirely different social order is not only desirable but also possible. Operational police, like any other class fraction within capitalism, will organically develop class consciousness but whether they accept that sooner rather than later should be a matter of great concern to intellectuals looking for justice.
CHAPTER TWO: We had a Revolution About that Sort of Thing

In 1996 I was in Paris and was visiting a police officer colleague, Commissaire Patrick Yvars from the Bureau De Repression du Proxenetisme, which is situated in rue de Lutece. We walked to the Palais de Justice, which is directly over the road from his office. I entered the court and bowed, something that I had done out of habit. After a short time I decided to leave and as I left I bowed again. Outside the courtroom I said to Patrick, ‘I noticed you didn’t bow when you entered or left the court?’ He said in a very animated manner with raised eyebrows. ‘Yes, I saw what you did’. I said, ‘You don’t bow when you enter courts in France?’ Patrick said, ‘No Michel! We had a revolution about that sort of thing and people lost their heads’.

Not so in Britain, where a purely bourgeois revolution overthrew the ruling class of the aristocracy and replaced the predominance of the House of Lords with that of the House of Commons. Apart from the Charles I, who could not accept the power of the victorious bourgeoisie, those who were toppled kept their heads. The legacy of this is the retention of the majesty of a law that is designed to awe and dominate, demonstrating the existence of a higher authority in Britain and Commonwealth countries such as Australia. Outside the court there is an appearance of democracy; inside there is still the unmistakable appearance of a feudal state with the Lord sitting in judgement. Showing respect for the court and the law, it is now labelled but it is really still a sign of deference and humility and showing ‘contempt of court’ is a serious offence. The law sits solemnly above the people handing down its apparently impartial verdicts and, in so doing, coercing them into obedience.

It is, after all, the court of law and the criminal justice system that ultimately enforces the law. The police are just one small and ultimately lowly arm of a system, the alleged impartiality of which is seemingly a product of elaborate checks and balances but ultimately a matter of ideology and hegemony. The law lays down the ground rules for harmonious coexistence. Everyone, it is proclaimed, is equal before the law and subject to its strictures. One sticking point here, of course, is that some are clearly more powerful than others and no amount of fine words or high thoughts about inalienable human rights will change this situation. Another is that some interests are also more powerful than others and the ruling class uses coercion to preserve its interests. To alter this situation is a matter of revolution not reform and attacking one arm of the system in the name of reform will never change its ultimate structure.
In France, revolution came from below in its overthrow of feudalism and, because so many people ‘lost their heads’, was extremely effective in removing feudal trappings—‘that sort of thing’—from the layers of political power. It was less successful, however, in removing injustice because, after the chaos following the Reign of Terror, it too simply replaced one ruling class—the nobility based on ancestry—with a new ruling class based on capital and a new ideological hegemony—the intellectual paradigms that inform commonsense—to support these new interests. The law, like the new laws brought into being less bloodily by the purely bourgeois revolutions in Britain and America, became those laws necessary to protect private property and capital accumulation, thus keeping the bourgeoisie state firmly in place. Despite this, the revolution was not a straightforward affair but a long drawn out process. Heads might have toppled in the moral crusade against the corruption of feudal domination but not all of those condemned were necessarily part of a singular movement inexorably leading towards individual freedom and democracy. Many were, in fact, innocent victims caught in the crossfire as elites systematically established their power bases.

For at its height, the ‘Reign of Terror’ represented little more than a struggle for power by rival political factions fighting to achieve their own self-interests behind the banner of a moral crusade on behalf of ‘the people’. Rivals were exposed for corruption and labelled as enemies of the people; denounced and publicly humiliated in spectacular show trials that systematically destroyed their possibilities for becoming martyrs; and mercilessly executed with all the vengeance of a morally affronted populace that was more like an orchestrated lynch mob than a support for individual freedoms and judicial process. To denounce from a position of power was quite sufficient to destroy potential rivals, work through personal grudges, and payback long-standing political vendettas. Terror also coerced, minimising competition at the top and stifling dissenting voices from below as informers and spies were encouraged to observe and report on fellow citizens. Behind this, a vast propaganda machine created by the popular press was pushing the image of a moral crusade based on its new intellectual paradigms and a new common sense.

All this happened a long time ago but that same model of coercion, as this chapter will demonstrate, is with us still.

The Police and the Policed

The concept of intellectual objectivity is a variant of the same apparent impartiality declared by the justice system and the idea that research can be totally objective is just as difficult a
claim to argue. Like judges and lawyers, researchers are people, products of their education and class position and influenced by the ideas and prejudices of their network of friends and colleagues. Some ‘objects of study’ are easier for some researchers to identify; others present serious problems of identification and prejudice or misplaced and misrecognised empathy play a large part in this mental dilemma. If research, like the law, is allegedly impartial and treats people as equals, how is it that interactionist research can seriously ask its exponents to initially decide ‘whose side’ they are ‘on’ and to hold that in all research there is an obligation to support the underdog (Becker 1967, 1966; Chan 1997)? If the law is impartial and based on the presumption of innocence, how could the Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service in 1996—which will be considered a little later in this chapter—have been given an organisationally very restricted field of inquiry and allowed to act as if the presumption of guilt, public humiliation and trial by ordeal were cornerstones of the Australian justice system? If taking sides is a necessary investigative decision actively made by academic researchers and publicly displayed by the judiciary in a court of law, where does that leave those unpopular research subjects such the rank and file police? The answer, quite simply, is out in the cold.

The work of Alvin Gouldner was regarded by ‘progressives’ as an extensive, diverse and extremely necessary critique on the conservatism inherent in the dominant structuralist paradigm of the time (Sim, Scraton and Gordon 1987, p.2) but what they failed to notice is that Gouldner’s most direct attack is towards the ‘progressive’ interactionist standpoint embodied in so much of their own work. Although designed to expose how the interests of the powerful are advanced at the expense of the powerless (Becker and Horowitz 1972), research simply targets the micro-power associated with rank and file police, implying that the problem simply reflects a division between the powerful police and the powerless ‘policed’. Research energies have turned away from the social problems actions created by the ‘rule breaker’ and the ‘rule maker’ towards the problems created by ‘rule enforcement’ agencies. Police actions, it is argued, are more likely to increase rather than decrease illegal activity due to the stigmatising effect that labels such as ‘delinquent’ or ‘criminal’ must have on those already alienated. This begs the question of why the same theory about alienation is never applied to those rank and file police who are regularly identified as part of a ‘culture of corruption’ and pilloried as the real villains. Until the ‘progressive’ position opens itself to critical analysis and accepts that it is fallible—that its prejudices frame its questions and make its research findings both conservative and subjective rather than objective—this question will remain unheard and unanswered, as will its continued legitimisation of the hegemony of the state. To
do this it is necessary to address the factors that produce this theoretical blindness and lack of objectivity.

A critical component of such blindness is, of course, class bias and this, as I have argued, is given form by the construction of dominant ideas within both the legal system and academe. This is not a matter of either conspiracy or design but a product of the mystifying nature of ideology itself. For as Gouldner (1968, pp.103-116) explains, interactionist research carefully examines the behaviour of ‘rule enforcers’ from a fixed viewpoint—the position of ‘the rule breaker’—seeing no reason to analyse its object of research from their own standpoint, preferring instead to identify themselves sentimentally—and totally inappropriately—with the underdog and the outsider. Reverting to idealistic sixties radicalism, these critics subjectively ‘relate’ to what they have constructed as a reified class of underdogs, although they can never by any stretch of the imagination claim either membership or understanding of the realities of life for that class fraction.

Deviance in this way is a one-way street with a viewpoint that is not only rigid and fixed but also idealistically elevated. Instead the focus must be from several different directions—on the conflict generated by the operations of all the individuals, groups and organisations in society that install, enforce and break rules; and on the provenance of the social policies, strategies and dislocations that provide both the rationale and the need for these. Later in this thesis I will examine the work of Carrington (1998), Chan (1999), Hobbs (1988), Holdaway (1983) and Maher, Dixon, Swift and Nguyen (1997) who examine the deviance of rank and file police as if it was an act of bad faith and individual agency without asking why this is happening and what might be done to redress these contradictions. If, as Bilton, Bonnett, Jones, Skinner, Stanworth and Webster, (1996, p.623) argue, the interactionist approach has a liberal and humanistic character which refuses to judge or condemn and instead seeks to understand social life on its own terms, it must do this in terms of the whole research subject not just a selected and reified part of this.

In *Doing the Business*, Hobbs (1988) presented an ethnographic study of the police and the policed in the East End of London—a working class culture that emphasises independence, tough masculinity, a traditional deviant identity and entrepreneurial ability. His interactionist critics, for example Devine and Heath (1999, p.135), praised Hobbs for his analysis of the East End working class but roundly condemned his use of a structural class argument that suggested that the victims in this study were not only the policed but also the police—an idea that was clearly unacceptable to interactionist methodological ideas about how such an
analysis should have been conducted. His argument, they said, was destroyed by ‘the remit of his research on detectives’ and the fact that ‘he proffers less than a critical account of malpractice within the Metropolitan CID than might have been the case if a non local had researched the topic’ (Devine and Heath 1999, p.131). Hobbs had not bare-facedly declared ‘whose side’ he was ‘on’ and his ‘local’ knowledge had prevented him from seeing the East End working-class was just the policed rather than both the police and the policed (Devine and Heath 1999, p.140). The interactionist viewpoint prefers research such as Simon Holdaway’s *Inside the British Police* (Holdaway 1983), which declares its enmity towards the rank and file officers in an analysis that fragments responses into a range of cultural issues such as race, gender, ethnicity and identity (Holdaway 1983, pp.1–15).

At the time this research was undertaken Simon Holdaway was a university educated sergeant of police with eleven years experience. Using his role as a supervisor, he covertly subjected his subordinates to participant observation research, despite a total absence of their informed consent. The reward for his surveillance was a subjective expose of what he labelled as the deviant and corrupt activity of his rank and file subordinates (Holdaway 1983, p.1.5). Incredibly, neither he nor his academic supporters ever questioned this subjectivity or the way in which such covert research must, indeed, be flawed. Holdaway admitted that his colleagues were suspicious of his behaviour and deliberately taunted him but he saw no reason to question his research methodology or its effectivity, justifying his strategy by explaining that only covert surveillance could pierce his subordinates’ ‘protective shield’ (Holdaway 1983, p.5). In their critique of Hobbs’ (1988) study of police and policed in the East End of London, Devine and Heath (1999, p.148) had argued that there should have been a more comprehensive discussion of the ethics of research and how this influenced his substantive finding. Interestingly, they make no such criticism about Holdaway’s obviously flawed research methodology. Instead they congratulate him on his emphasis that policing, like crime, is mostly socially constructed and ‘that police activities play a substantial role in constructing crime’ (Devine and Heath 1999, p.133).

Unsurprisingly, Holdaway’s research both supported and legitimised his preconceived ideas about working-class police without really examining the actions of any other involved group. Effectively declaring war on his research subjects, Holdaway employed a highly questionable research practice to endorse the class bias and power relations embodied in his own contradictory role as enforcer for the governing state. Some years earlier Van Maanen (1978, p.322) had argued that ‘deceit, evasiveness, duplicity, lying, innuendo, secrecy, double talk’ are the traits of most interactions involving police. Ironically, Holdaway’s research data, it
could be argued, served to reinforce this finding, unfortunately in regard to himself. These traits, it could also be argued, could equally apply to most other vocations and professions within the broader criminal justice system (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA.543-1033) and are quite clearly demonstrated in the aims, structure and processes of the Wood Inquiry into the NSW Police, as will be shown later in this chapter. In fact, as the Chicago Tribune revealed in 1999, these are failings that are far from unique:

With impunity, prosecutors across the country [USA] have violated their oaths and the law, committing the worst kinds of deception in the most serious of cases. They have prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the real killers were white. They have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her husband committed suicide. They have prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their daughter was killed by wild dogs. They do it to win. They do it because they won't get punished. They have done it to defendants who came within hours of being executed, only to be exonerated.

(Armstrong and Possley 1999a)

Holdaway’s research began after his graduation from university and his return to work as a sergeant supervisor. In fact, apart from its academic application in this instance, this type of research is typical of that carried out by senior management as part of any managerialist system. At the same time as the academic community were being encouraged to critically examine rank and file police and the subject of police corruption, Police Commissioner Murphy of the NYPD was announcing his intention of replacing the organic leadership of senior police with a classically educated management that was more sympathetic to his ‘reform’ policies (Silverman 1999, p.34). Henry explains that the younger and more aggressive police saw this policy driven by the ‘anti-corruption’ theme as opportunity for accelerated advancement. In this ‘reform’ process many of the non-operational administrative police were promoted to executive positions. This coalition of new police managers was offered rewards and incentives if they ‘exposed’ any police engaging in or tolerating misconduct or corrupt practices. Clearly this is not a scenario that would inspire confidence in either objective research or the exposure of genuine levels of corruption.

The antipathy that Holdaway demonstrates towards his subordinate rank and file colleagues is symptomatic of his inability, and the inability of other ‘progressive’ research colleagues and senior police, to recognise the alienation and class contradictions that exist amongst rank and file police (Barry 1995; Petrovic 1991a). Holdaway is demonstrably aware of the social stress and poverty that confront the ‘policed’ in his research area because on the very first page of
Inside the British Police he explains that they ‘lived in houses which frankly you nor I would choose to inhabit… A social survey of the area identified its housing conditions as the worst in the borough; only one fifth of the 53,000 people who lived in Hilton has access to hot water, bath and an inside lavatory… [and] one family in six was headed by a single parent…’ (Holdaway 1983, p.1). Clearly, the researcher at once assumed that he and his reader shared the same social status—who else, he appears to be implying, would be reading his research? Not the underclass community or the rank and file police apparently. From this basis of mutual understanding he constructed his research analysis and, in so doing, he attempted to portray the most disadvantaged as being socially constructed by the rank and file police, arguing that this underclass is the creation of the relations that exist between the police and the community. Yet many of the rank and file police Holdaway was researching also lived in Hilton and were also presumably influenced by its poor housing conditions and lack of amenities. Hobbs had realised this in his investigation in the East End but had been roundly condemned for this. Using a Marxist analysis, it is clear that social neglect had created an explosive situation in both these areas and that using alienated rank and file police as the social control mechanism to manage class conflict and maintain public order only exacerbated this situation. It is poverty and alienation, not the agency of rank and file police, that shapes the deviancy of disadvantaged communities and it seems absurd to argue otherwise.

In 1998 Operations and Crime Review (OCR) was introduced into the New South Wales Police Service as a management strategy (Davis and Coleman 2000; Hay Group Consulting Consortium 2000) and ‘Operation Innsbruck’—a ‘zero tolerance’ strategy—was implemented at the same time as an operational strategy to deal with street crime in a lower socio economic area named Lakemba—a suburb not unlike Holdaway’s research area of Hilton. By November of that year the policing situation in this area was reaching crisis point as the police and many young people in this area had clashed violently and thirteen bullets had been fired into Lakemba police station (Doherty 1999; Morris 1999; Wynhausen and Safe 1998). In spite of this delicate situation Tony Stewart, a member of the NSW Parliament and ‘zero tolerance’ campaigner, chose this time to declare to the media the existence of a ‘local underworld’ whose ‘Mr Biggs’ distribute drugs and extort money (Dennis 1998; English 1998; Marsh 1998; Morris 1999; Murphy 1998; Noble, Poynting and Tabar 1999, p.130; Wynhausen and Safe 1998). Making full use of the media during an election campaign, Stewart claimed that he had been shot at in his car and had waited eighteen minutes before police assistance arrived. Complaining to the Police Minister about the time delay, he began waging another campaign to ‘make local police more accountable for their activities’ (Chulov 1997a). Local
unemployment rates had been between three and five times the national level for over ten years and Lakemba was in an advanced stage of social neglect. Yet, these socio economic issues were never raised by the high profile Mr Stewart as being at the hub of the local area’s problem (Collins, Noble, Poynting and Tabar 2001, p.109). His interests and energies had been diverted elsewhere.

Critics such as Stewart, Devine and Heath (1999), Holdaway (1983) and Van Maanen (1984) all fail to explain how rank and file police are supposed to change the social and economic disadvantages suffered by the working-class populations of the East End of London, Hilton or their Australian equivalent, Lakemba. It is widely recognised that the disadvantaged poor use theft and petty crime to insulate themselves from their poverty and hardship. Findlay (2000, p.126) argues that the employment of young people at the base level of drug commerce is no more difficult to appreciate than the loyalties any disadvantaged family or group have towards the success of any enterprise. There is no magic relating to the context of groups and gangs of young people who are drug runners within the family and the entrepreneurial context of organised crime. It is simply proof that one of the few options available to a disadvantaged group, economically and socially marginalised by a society that fails to incorporate their interests, is crime.

It is at this point that I must return to the question that appears to be at the core of the interactionist standpoint in relation to underclass deviance—what will prevent people from engaging in deviant acts? (Cuff et al 1990, p.138). This is a question that is seldom if ever asked in relation to the deviance of rank and file police because, to the interactionist researcher, police misconduct is the cause of underclass deviance not the result of working-class alienation (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.162). As Reiner argues (1992, p.252), the rationalist and moral argument that more sanctions equals less offending has been shown to be a demonstrably ineffective means of controlling crime and there is certainly no reason why this should be any more effective in regard to corruption in the rank and file police. Increased surveillance and harsher penalties will not eliminate misconduct and corruption. There can be no doubt that some police fail to recognise the negative side of their occupation and use ‘dirty hands’ and ‘dirty means’ too frequently. The line in the sand for dirty hands falls between those who claim the job can always be done with clean hands and those who are far too quick to get dirty hands. Klockars (1979) argues that open and frank discussion, which obliges rank and file police to understand and confront the consequences of their actions, is a sure way of developing moral maturity.
But are ‘dirty hands’ and ‘dirty means’ simply the products of lack of education and individual moral immaturity? It is clear that ‘progressive’ academics are unwilling to conceptualise workplace solidarity to discover why this might be necessary in a ‘dirty hands’ and predominantly working-class occupation. Instead they misrepresent contradictions as social or political disorders because, as Kay and Mott (1982 p.124) have argued, the abstraction of force is seen as something apart from its fundamental role of social control—the protection of life and property. The state’s protection of the interests of the dominant class against those of the working class requires a field of force to smooth the contradictions—a force that can only be established and held in place by force. Resistance against oppression requires a continual state of tension and the structural force by which the state maintains this tension is fundamental for order. This is done by deploying the means of coercion at arm’s length and by mobilising intellectuals as subalterns in an extension of the illusion of ‘consent’. This ‘consent’ is always reinforced by the coercive powers that are enforced by working-class rank and file police, who are in turn coerced by dominant ideas about reform.

Both Punch (1983, p.248) and Manning (1971; 1977) see police institutions as a fragmented, shifting kaleidoscopic world of situated interactions, accounts and shared understandings. Certainly this is as good a way as any of emphasising difference and relieving research of the need to analyse a complex system holistically. Focusing on the micro-power and agency of rank and file police gives a clear path for achieving visible, if meaningless, reform. However Michel Foucault (1979, p.53) has described this concept of ‘micro-power’ in terms of the working-class executioner—part of the coercive arm of the state enforcing its sovereign-power but sharing its infamy as a forfeit. The sovereign-power that authorised execution controls the limited power wielded by the executioner. This can be seen with spectacular effect than when his role as executioner is interrupted with a letter of pardon from the state. The role of the rank and file police operate in the same power context as the executioner—as low-levelled functionaries who are part of the apparently fragmented world of situated interactions, accounts and shared understandings that Punch (1983, p.248) and Manning (1971; 1977) so intricately describe.

The reform alternative, of course, is to rigidly control coercive power by managing it efficiently—coercively. The force of the force is held in line by the threat of punishment and public shaming. There is a rigid enforcement of general rules, orders and regulations which specify the acts for which police can be punished. These often include the right most police organisations retain to withhold, as a condition of employment, any legal due process rights in order to expedite a dismissal or a disciplinary action. A result of this is that many police learn
either to lie or say nothing. As Klockars (1979) explains, one of the greatest difficulties in understanding a ‘dirty-hands’ vocation is acknowledging the extremes from which it is being scrutinised. Police resistance, quite simply, comes in all shapes and sizes, as does the resistance of the working class and underclass fraction they are expected to control.

Contrarily, most intellectuals and commentators argue vociferously and moralistically that we cannot accept that police corruption or deviance is a form of resistance towards the state but that it is simply an abuse of power.

In the Police Integrity Commission yesterday, Patison blamed his relapse on overwork and lack of support and transfer opportunities. For the second time in two days, the suspended senior constable broke down and sobbed in the witness stand as he recounted how he took money from drug dealers and gave others the nod to sell drugs or commit robberies… He returned to his crooked ways on November 22, 1999, after being cleared of corrupt behaviour by Internal Affairs. He lied to anti-corruption officers who suggested he be transferred to a low-risk unit such as the fraud squad. But when the transfer failed and, with a reduced staff and a mounting workload, Patison became bitter with the service. ‘It was probably because I thought, ‘Well, here's another opportunity, stuff them!' and I reverted back to that,’ he said. (Kennedy, L. 2001b)

Much the same as other working-class groups, when rank and file police feel subjugated and oppressed it can be ‘theft’ that is at the heart of their resistance. It is important to recognise that resistance is the inverting of the master/servant relationship and is often viewed as robbing the robber (McNally 1997, p.33).

At this point it is important to move away from the assumptions embodied in the interactionist position and discuss the impact this type of research has had on police officers themselves. Apart from the rise in government inquiries exposing police deviance and corruption and demanding a rise in educational and training standards, there has been a huge erosion of public confidence. Punch (1983, p.86) argues that police corruption scandals in the United States and in Amsterdam provide evidence of the effects of discontinuity between the organisation of the police and the culture of their public—certainly this should include the New South Wales and British police as well. Expanding on his argument, Punch (1983, p.235) then suggests that rank and file police, in keeping with other closed groups such as boarding schools, prisons, the criminal fraternity and secret societies, operate by a code of silence that dictates that you do not ‘rat on your mates’. He argues that patrolman Frank Serpico and
Sergeant David Durk, who exposed the misconduct and corruption in the New York Police Department that led to the Knapp Commission in 1972 (Silverman, 1999, p.29), were ostracised and threatened and Serpico was perhaps even set up in a shooting.

It is interesting that the idea of a ‘code of silence’ used by Punch has also been used extensively by intellectuals and the police hierarchy on issues relating to policing. This code is seldom extended to include any of the other professions and vocations within the criminal justice system, particularly the roles of the politician or the legislator or the scholar. Perhaps a part answer to this anomaly has been explained by Scott Poynting and Mike Donaldson (2002) when they argue that the curious masculinity of ruling-class males is dependent on liberal ‘market’ concepts that sanctify the individual. The ‘ruling-class education’, which is prevalent in elite boarding schools, is then extended to a university college and finally to boardrooms. This masculinity of ‘ruling-class’ individual success separates emotion from the friendships that men can have for each other and degrades concepts of caring and affection, unless it is demonstrated in class specific terms and language. Ruling class masculinity is essentially about separating the notions of rationality and emotion. The importance of what Poynting and Donaldson have to say can be linked to the work of Connell (2003, p.29) who argues that the neo-liberal agenda is seeking to reconstruct the education of society on the organisational model of ruling-class education. Apart from this, it seems ridiculous to suppose that a class fraction occupying a contradictory position in relation to the rest of their class; routinely pilloried in the media and through this by the general public as corrupt and coercive; imputed to exercise a controlling coercive power that is merely a delegated authority; forced to be the scapegoats for policies and strategies that are dictated to them by a hierarchy seemingly immune from criticism; and never asked for their viewpoint about the problems of their profession, would be anything other than reticent in its dealings with outsiders.

Ridiculous or not, the state—aided by academics such as Holdaway—uses rank and file police as a buffer between itself and disadvantaged communities and in the process both groups, as Hobbs research suggests, are ultimately its scapegoats. The community is accused of being lawless and the police of being corrupt and violent and there is no avenue from which either group can refute these labels. The public eye is diverted from poverty and unemployment as well as from the ruling class’ coercive preservation of its own interests. It is diverted from the failings of the capitalist system onto the individual or group agency of the operational police.

Yet academics such as Simon Holdaway and the interactionist school proclaim their opposition to the rank and file police in the subjective shape of their research. They condemn
the attempts of other intellectuals such as Hobbs who had the temerity to attempt to widen the scope of this debate by breaking through the constraints of the ‘progressive’ reform paradigm that dominates academic analysis. The declaration of war in the terms chosen by the political and judicial arms of the state during such inquiries as the Knapp Commission in New York in 1972 and Justice Wood’s Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service in 1996 brought a whole new dimension to this battlefield.

Do What I Say Not What I Do

Fuelled by a media blitz by high profile crusaders including politicians such as independent MP John Hatton and former Police Minister Ted Pickering, investigative journalists such as the ABC’s Quentin Dempster and a solid backup of academic consultants such as David Dixon, the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service was launched with a spectacular fanfare upon an already primed public. The tone of the debate had been set quite early but the corruption crusading MP John Hatton admirably kept up the pressure as events unfolded by publicly declaring in the *Sydney Morning Herald* that the Police Service would need to be ‘pushed every inch of the way’ to make the necessary changes [reforms]. What this town needs is a good public hanging. We need to send a few of those crooked police to jail to get the message through…’ (Bearup 1996b). Such coloured language left little room for the ordinary newspaper reader to evaluate the complexity of the issue. ‘A good public hanging’ of a few rank and file police might have satisfied both John Hatton and an hysterical lynch mob and orchestrate panic about public safety but this should not be given out as fact rather than opinion and relayed in the news as report ‘findings’. It would not be difficult to speculate about how ‘progressive’ academics, journalists and high profile ‘anti-corruption campaigners’ such as John Hatton himself would react if these threats were being made so cavalierly about members of other professions and this degree of blame for the ills of society were laid at their door.

The extremely liberal handed, if not necessarily liberal minded, attitude of Justice Wood ensured that the media coverage became prime time television viewing with tantalising evidence released to the media on a daily basis, converting the news into a high rating daily soap opera and spicing up investigative reports denouncing police corruption and misconduct, intellectualised by a series of sober looking ‘talking heads’ as ‘experts’ demanded police reform. The police, it seemed, were ‘the problem’. So sensational was the media coverage before, during and after the sittings of the Wood Inquiry, it provoked even that most conservative of political commentators, Gerard Henderson, to be moved to protest.
Public humiliation goes hand in hand with prime-time titillation when the media choose to name names and royal commissioners release sensational video footage. Public hangings may be a thing of the past. But public humiliation is all the rage… It’s almost three weeks since Sydney television stations led their evening news with video footage of a policeman having sex with a prostitute, pocketing drugs and discussing the availability of child pornography. The tape had been shown as evidence earlier that day at the Royal Commission into corruption within the NSW police force. The Royal Commissioner, Justice James Wood, specifically refused a request to suppress all, or part, of the footage… Already, replays of the policeman/prostitute liaison are in vogue. If you missed the real thing, Quentin Dempster ran edited highlights on ABC TV’s 7.30 Report recently. No doubt more will follow—perhaps at the hand of (one-issue) Dempster, who is all too willing to throw the first stone when allegations of corruption (his favourite topic) are in the air (Henderson 1996a).

It is particularly interesting that Wood ‘specifically refused a request to suppress all, or part, of the footage’ because in 2004 the same Justice Wood was instrumental in overturning a jury conviction explaining that:

‘In the case of sensational media publicity that gives a jury access to damaging inadmissible material there may be cases where the jury’s capacity to ignore the material may be put into serious doubt,’ President Mason and Justice Wood said in their judgment (Sydney Morning Herald, 2004, 4 March, editorial).

As commissions of inquiry have been commonplace since the inception of modern policing this general concept has to be considered in the political context from which such inquiries originate. The moral crusade approach is designed to popularise indignation and has more to do with irrationality than serious intellectual debate. Public outrage promotes an inquisitorial rather than an investigative process. This is public spectacle punishment that humiliates and, in the process, degrades all of the participants in the spectacle from the accuser to the accused. Sarah Nalle certainly challenges any suggestion that the present day inquisitors are more enlightened or better educated than their feudal predecessors (1993). These inquiries are about how to maintain public order by enforcing obedience and submissiveness amongst both the police and the policed and such is the power of dominant ideas that they seem to take place not just with public consent but by public demand.
Historically, the show trial is a tool used by the state to crush opposition. It is an ideological extravaganza that eliminates political opponents primarily by discrediting them whilst, simultaneously, creating the terror necessary to discourage other potential opposition. The ‘Reign of Terror’ during the French Revolution provides one extremely effective instance; Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ victims provide another. The show trial is often a tool used by dictators—Stalin’s disposed of opponents such as Zinoviev and Kamenev in this way and Hitler used the technique to spectacular effect to engineer the national emergency enabling him to seize absolute power after the burning of the Reichstag. Democracy also uses show trials to telling effect. The Nuremberg Trials proclaimed the victory of the Allies and the defeat of the Third Reich. The show trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg generated the fear to escalate the onset of cold war between the free ‘west’ and the ‘unfree communist bloc’. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies was less successful than expected with the Royal Commission into the Petrov affair but the United States government used the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) to great advantage over several decades in its moral crusade against communism. More recently, Mahatir Mohamad enjoyed several years of good results with his exposure and sentencing of his democratic opponent Anwar Ibrahim.

Fundamentally, as the show trial highlights deviance and creates a moral panic around subversion, it provides a host of political possibilities. During the last three decades there have been a run of mini show trials exposing police corruption in Australia, Britain and the United States. These have only been ‘mini’ in the sense that they did not result in beheading, hanging, execution by firing squad or in the gas chamber, or impossibly long gaol sentences, although the suicides that resulted from the calculated humiliation served out during the Wood Inquiry should perhaps be taken into account here. Rank and file police in New South Wales who were not willing to accept the blanket condemnation of senior management, intellectuals, the judiciary, the media and, as a by-product of all these factors, the general public or accept the dictates of neo-liberal managerialism designed to bludgeon them into line were permitted to take the option of making a ‘dignified exit’—which, in essence, meant symbolically putting their hands up to either corruption or ineptitude.

The solution proposed by the Wood Inquiry simply facilitated the opportunism and careerism already evident in the managerialist solution implemented years earlier by Commissioner Murphy from the NYPD (Henry 1994) and already introduced into the NSW Police Service by Police Commissioner Avery.
‘[T]he senior staff who have left must collectively accept some of the blame for the poor supervision and inept management which allowed the state of affairs detected to exist. They have been replaced by a new group of officers who it is expected will have the youth, vigour and commitment to force a profound change of culture and to promote professionalism and integrity...’


This was a regime change that meant out with the ‘old guard’ and in with the ‘new’. In another sense, therefore, these were not ‘mini’ show trials at all because they had the combined weight of the modern media behind them, making them extremely effective as weapons of terror and coercion in the pursuit of their ultimate goals.

Leaders of the Pack

The Wood Inquiry was not, in any way, a leap in the dark. It had selected its prey and the results were a forgone conclusion. For it had a powerful forerunner in the Knapp Inquiry into the NYPD in 1972 and the political and management reforms that were the result of this had been in operation for over two decades. Once the inquisitorial machinery had been set rolling, the findings pushed through a political agenda producing desired political and administrative consequences. Although corruption and misconduct allegations were also the catalyst for the Knapp Commission, it is interesting to note that in this case the inquiry was convened not through the recommendations of senior police, but largely as a result of Patrolman Frank Serpico and Sergeant David Durk making public allegations about organised police corruption (Henry 1994, p.162). In fact, unable to interest senior police in their concerns, these patrolmen had decided to go to the media, where their revelations received a rapt audience. Politically, their allegations were dynamite and the Knapp Commission changed the lives of the rank and file forever—a fact that rankled and led to the ostracism of the ‘whistleblowers’. Senior police and administrative elites at first attempted to ‘whitewash’ the inquiry but when the New York Times published tape recordings of police acting corruptly, they too threw their weight into the crusade.

Apart from a few ritual sacrifices, however, the Knapp Commission had little repercussions on most of those in the hierarchy. It led, however, to the strengthening of the political base directing operations from above and, as a by-product, spring-boarded lawyers such as Rudolph Giuliani in their ascent to the heights of political power. Aged 29, Giuliani was put in charge of the police-corruption cases resulting from the inquiry and, building his reputation on these, went on to become the No. 3 man in Ronald Reagan's Justice Department in
Washington and the Mayor who cleaned up New York (Pooley 2000, pp.28-46). In short, Giuliani used his position as part of the Knapp Commission for his own political ends, overtly politicising the power base of the state’s criminal justice system in the process (Silverman 1999, pp.78–79). As an anti-corruption progressive, he was able to build himself a reputation as a reformer of the corrupt police culture and to use this to introduce a rationalised and politicised concept of managerialism for government departments. Under this veneer of reform, therefore, his inherent conservatism could flourish. This conservatism can be seen in his introduction of ‘zero tolerance’ policing as a principal law and order operational strategy (Bratton and Knobler 1998; Edwards 1999, p.54) and the social fall-out for operational police that these entail. It is symptomatic of the failure of academic criticism that, despite his blatant and conservative political positioning, Giuliani’s reforms provide the models for subsequent ‘progressive’ reforms.

Managing the Menagerie: Meat Eaters, Grass Eaters and Birds

Neither the Wood Inquiry nor the Knapp Inquiry were predominantly about corruption, although the media coverage dwelt lingeringly on this. The failings of operational police management were highlighted in the findings and, as an apparent solution to corruption in the police service, the tenets of neo-liberal management were introduced in New York City and, in the process, the ‘political power’ once embodied in the police organisation was transferred from the operational level to the newly politicised administrative level. In the decades that followed, the ‘political power’ of policing organisations in Britain and Australia has also been shifted from the bureaucracy or the government department to the political arm of the state. In this process vocationally educated organic leadership has been replaced with formally educated and credentialled management and, to further this reform, various clichés and metaphors are used to enlist the support of general public worried by continual reports of corruption.

Commissioner Knapp and Assistant Chief Inspector Sydney Cooper maintain that there was a corrupt police culture in the NYPD (Henry 1994,p.168; Kleinig 2002, p.288).This distinguished between clean and dirty graft, seeing narcotics related bribery as dirty but taking money from night club owners, gamblers and prostitutes as clean. In Commissioner Murphy’s contemptuous view, corrupt police could be simply divided into two distinct groups. The vast majority were labelled as ‘grass eaters’ because they accepted, but did not aggressively pursue, corrupt payments. In contrast, the ‘meat eaters’ spent most of their working hours aggressively seeking situations for personal gain (Henry 1994, pp.168–169). A third group of
police, who were not seen as corrupt, were labelled as ‘birds’ because they flew above
corruption from a safe refuge in the non-operation administrative positions that limited their
contact with corrupt activities (Henry 1994, p.163). Commissioner Murphy, who implemented
many reforms within the NYPD with the stated aim of combating corruption, subsequently
saw many of these ‘birds’ promoted to executive positions.

The key to reforming the NYPD was command accountability, whereby commanders at all
ranks were answerable for both their actions and those of their subordinates (Silverman 1999,
p.33). Murphy’s new hierarchy of ‘birds’ was very well aware that undetected corruption
could mean the end of promotion aspirations. Perhaps more importantly, they were also aware
that their careers would flourish with every dishonest cop they exposed. The result for an
inspirational supervisor under this regime would presumably be a poor record of exposing
corruption because subordinates would not be corrupt. A results-based system such as this
must operate on the assumption that corruption will be found rather than that it should not be
present. This reward and punishment system engendered feelings of distrust between
individual officers and many rank and file police were aware of the distinct possibility that co-
worker could be only too happy to enhance their own careers at the expense of their
colleagues or subordinates.

In the following quote, one of my research subjects—‘Lazlo’—explains the outcome of ‘merit
based’ promotion and managerialism:

Police who get promoted, and the whole promotion system is set up for police who don’t do
policing. Police who are able to sit for eight hours a day and do assignment, do external c ourses,
study for all of the different things that they think at some stage is going to help are the police that
are getting promoted? I would say that if things stay the way they are, in maybe next ten years, the
entire police hierarchy will just be police who never actually have done any policing work.
(‘Lazlo’ 2002)

It is, of course, cost-effective management rather than simply operational policing that is the
focus of this new corporate-style police system. The ‘birds’ were not required to have
practical knowledge of operational policing—in fact, it was safer in career terms if they did
not. Their job was to verbally fashion policing into a model of generic management practices.
It is this type of simplistic thinking has allowed the senior executive of many police
institutions to propose ‘integrity testing’ as an anti-corruption strategy (Williamson 2000,
p.25). This is, in many ways, the class-divide or measure that has determined who are and
who are not the policed both within the broader community and within policing institutions.
The ‘birds’ in Commissioner Murphy’s senior management positions initiated integrity testing, whilst at the same time promoting the notion that many junior police were informants to the administration. New South Wales Police Commissioner John Avery (1981, p.5), arguing that Murphy was one of the best and most highly respected American policemen, had started initiating many similar ‘reforms’ into the New South Wales organisation in the decade before the Wood Inquiry packaged these in its findings. In 1999 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary also conducted an integrity review of British Police (Williamson 2000, p.18), building an anti-corruption and integrity based testing strategy hinging on the undercover techniques and technology pioneered by the NYPD and the Metropolitan Police in England. According to Williamson, police organisations around the world now admire the standard of integrity set by British officers, although British rank and file police and their counterparts in New South Wales who endured the same process after Commissioner Peter Ryan was recruited from the Metropolitan Police in the wake of the Wood Inquiry, might disagree with this assessment.

Ryan was to resign after an inquiry into the competence of his management team, where one of the issues in question was their use of integrity testing to settle personnel disputes. It could well be asked just whose integrity is being tested in the following instance, for example:

‘...Opening the day's mail at home earlier this year, Steve Barrett couldn't believe his eyes. Someone had sent him a copy of Listening Device Warrant number 266 of 2000, which had been issued on September 14 that year—the day before the opening of the Sydney Olympics. What was extraordinary was the number of people named—the warrant authorised the bugging of more than 100 former and serving NSW police, including some of the state's most senior and respected detectives. The warrant had been issued by Justice Virginia Bell [ex Wood Royal Commission Senior Counsel], who said she was satisfied there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the following offences were about to be, or likely to be committed: money laundering, corruption, conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and tampering with evidence. On the face of it, the warrant suggested large-scale corruption among some of the most experienced investigators in NSW... In a letter last week from R.J. Redfern, acting Superintendent in the office of the Senior Assistant Commissioner, he was told: "The inclusion of your name should not be taken to infer that you were suspected of being involved in any criminal activity..."In making application for a listening device warrant... it is necessary to include the names of any people whose conversations it is reasonably expected may be recorded..."The inclusion of a name... does not mean that the person is involved in, or even suspected of being involved in, wrongdoing."...Both the former commissioner, Peter Ryan, and the current Commissioner, Ken Moroney, have said there were more than 100 people named because the person wearing the listening device, an officer
codenamed M5, was going to a social function. Mr Ryan told 60 Minutes last April: "From what I can gather, the officer was going to a function at which a lot of people would be present and therefore he may be talking to a hundred people all of whom had to be named in the warrant. "If I was at that function my name would have probably been on the warrant too."… But Barrett, a producer at 60 Minutes, and detectives spoken to by the Herald say bluntly there was never going to be a social function held during the three weeks when the warrant was valid—September 14 to October 5. "There was no function—it's bullshit, it's absolutely outrageous," said one senior police officer… An inquiry earlier this year by the then inspector of the Police Integrity Commission, Mervyn Finlay, QC, did not touch on the question of the function. But he found the warrant was justifiably sought and that "the huge number of persons is explicable by the magnitude of this exceptional investigation...”…But Mr Finlay did find there was an irregularity in that of the 114 people named, affidavits giving reasons for the application had not been lodged for two people as required by law...' (Mercer 2002h)

The interesting factor in all of this is that, despite this labelling and stereotyping, campaigning and reforming, the focus on agency is transparently about the establishing a new governance within the criminal justice establishment and police hierarchy and the shifting of the ‘political power’ that is part of the criminal justice system. As the power of ideology is to transform political oppression at a level of appearances, it has been extremely effective in this regard.

As Vincent Henry (1994) and Eli Silverman (1999) explain, media and marketing have always played an influential role in the ‘reform’ process. The police are made the scapegoats while the new administrative elites such as the ‘birds’ are given a ‘halo effect’. The academic community, encouraged to critically examine the NYPD and the subject of police corruption in the lead up to the Knapp Inquiry, become ‘progressive’ commentators or ‘anti-corruption campaigners. The ‘zero tolerance’ policing of potential ‘rule-breakers’ meets with media approval, as does the administrative ‘zero tolerance’ policing of rank and file police. The idea of ‘zero tolerance’ policing of the entire community, however, is never canvassed because it is the wider community that is needed to support these ‘reforms’. Considering the ‘integrity testing’ response that was described above, it is hard to imagine that the wisdom of monitoring the conversations of the entire population in case they came in contact with a ‘rule-breaker’ would receive much public support. This, of course, would be unthinkable in democratic societies. The public are comfortable with the surveillance of a selected group of people perceived as villains—the underclass and the police (Alderson 1998; Collins, Noble, Poynting and Tabar 2000; Cunneen 1999; Kennedy 2000; McFadden 2002)—but they are not comfortable with the principles of an authoritarian state being imposed on their own personal freedoms.
Inaugurating a New Reign of Terror

One Inquiry that is rarely mentioned by ‘progressive’ academics is the Mollen Inquiry that took place in New York in 1994—two years prior to the Wood Inquiry. The reasons for this will become obvious once its research findings are mentioned for it would be counter-productive for them to do so. For, although starting out with all the zest of yet another corruption scandal in New York, Commission Mollen’s findings revealed that senior management within the NYPD had repeatedly looked the other way when the corruption activities were brought to their attention whenever there was a ‘value for money’ aspect to the problem. The ‘birds’ at NYPD headquarters had rejected repeated requests for funding and equipment to deal with internal policing and the animosity between operational rank and file police and their administrative senior counterparts had become an open wound. Eli Silverman (2001, pp.212-214) explains, the impact of highly politicised performance management strategies and …demands to produce numbers… along with inadequate pay and lowered educational entrance requirements was producing high turnover and low morale. Consequently rank and file members of the ‘reformed’ NYPD became uncertain and demoralised at the same time their organisation seemed to move from one crisis to another.

Although the structural failings of managerialism and aggressive data-led policing are continually exposed a similar style of managerialism still headed the recommendations put forward by the Wood Inquiry ‘experts’ and still dominates the policy debate in Australia today. Young and Matthews (2003.pp.3, 15) explain that as far back as 1986 the London Metropolitan Police argued that the increases in crime was directly linked to a treasury led monetarist policy, which gave rise to massive unemployment. They argued that the sole gaol of Treasury driven social policy was -the reduction of inflation. Any adverse social by products were considered to be collateral damage. It does appear that despite the acknowledgement that the interrelatedness of crime, poverty and inequality has structural origins the problem was reduced from one of social structure to one of social administration. Subsequently the problem is seen to managerial rather than transformative.

Deputy Commissioner Jeff Jarratt allegedly told regional commanders to warn staff anyone exceeding budget would be 'relieved of their commands'… Some commanders perceive that there is still a strong message that 'if you don't toe the line, you will be removed', … (Miranda 2001)

Deputy Commissioner Jarratt provides a classical example of the NYPD ‘birds’ style managerialism (Henry 1994, p.168) that rapidly escalated the ‘reform’ of the New South
Wales Police since the Wood Inquiry. Jarratt had been a police officer for many years and was a very serious political player. He had almost no front line or operational experience but was clearly well versed in top-level police politics that saw the ‘political power’ of the organisation shift from the operational level to the administrative level and then from the organisation to the Police Minister’s office (Priest and Basham 2003, pp.18–19). Ironically, it was completely in line with his own management policies that his dismissal from office was communicated by fax and he was first alerted to his demise by a journalist (Mercer 2002g). Despite this being consistent with his own method for dismissing subordinates, Jarratt was able to secure a substantial termination payment after a Supreme Court judgment found his dismissal to be legally flawed because of a technicality in his executive contract that did not link his competency to performance (Devine 2002b; Priest and Basham 2003, p.233).

Although the concept of ‘process corruption’ briefly addressed executive accountability and the role of top down policy in shaping unacceptable levels of organisational deviance, the enthusiasm of exposing this at a senior and executive level was rare. This is demonstrated in an audit report, issued by the Hay Group Consulting Consortium (2000), into the ‘anti corruption’ reform strategy referred to as Operations and Crime Review (OCR) (Davis and Coleman 2000).

The style of the OCR meeting, in our view, reinforces the culture of ‘fear and punishment’ that is said to be characteristic of the past. Our observation is that commanders and other staff attending the OCR meetings are not generally witnessing role models of the leadership style they have been instructed to demonstrate themselves (The Hay Group Consulting Consortium 2000).

At the conclusion of his inquiry into the NYPD in 1994, Commissioner Mollen stated categorically that ‘[t]he leadership is where the real problem lies…’ (Mollen 1994a). This was a failure by those senior police who model their politicised management style on Murphy’s ‘birds’ and this conclusion seems to be a recurring theme in other jurisdictions (Henry 1994, p.168). Certainly, until ordinary police can have confidence in their leadership and their organisation, nothing substantial will change (Kennedy, M. 2002).

Defining ‘Corruption’

What is not in dispute anywhere in this thesis is the fact that corruption did—and does—exist in the rank and file police and that some officers abuse their power and authority, especially in dealing with soft targets such as prostitutes, drug dealers, heroin addicts from marginalised
ethnic or underclass communities. All of this is well documented in the research literature and is an accepted tenet of this thesis (Becker 1966; Bernstein et al 1975; Bittner 1975; Brockie 1992; Brown and Hogg 1996; Bui-Trong 1996; Butler-Sloss 1993; Carrington 1998; Chan 1999; Cohen 1972; Collins et al 2000; Cunneen 1999; Dixon 2000; Findlay 2000; Fleming and Lewis 2002; Gilbert 1947; Goldstein 1975; Green 1986; Harring and Ray 1999; Hopkins-Bourke 1998; Kennedy, M. 2001b; Klockars, Geller and Bruce 1999; Witkin 1995; Young 1994). Whether this is unique and what constitutes this corruption is, of course, a different matter.

Punch (1983, p.232) has defined corruption as doing or not doing something in return for gifts and/or money. Walsh and Poole’s definition (1982, p.48) in The Dictionary of Criminology is that corruption is the perversion of integrity by bribery or favour. During the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police (1997), however, Justice Wood completely redefined police corruption as ‘deliberate unlawful conduct (whether by act or omission) on the part of a member of the Police Service, utilising his or her position, whether on or off duty, and the exercise of police powers in bad faith’. Wood also specified more detailed inclusions.

It includes participation by a member of the Police Service in any arrangement or course of conduct, as an incident of which that member, or any other member:

- is expected or encouraged to neglect his or her duty, or to be improperly influenced in the exercise of his or her functions.

- fabricates or plants evidence, gives false evidence or applies trickery, excessive force or threats or other improper tactics to procure a confession or conviction or improperly interferes with or subverts the prosecution process.

- conceals any form of misconduct by another member of the Police Service or assists that member to escape internal or criminal investigation; or

- engages himself or herself as a principal or accessory in serious criminal behaviour

In each case, the relevant conduct is considered to be corrupt, whether motivated by an expectation of financial or personal benefit or not, and whether successful or not (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police 1997, p.25).
During and after the inquiry the expectations about the actions of rank and file police became more and more bizarre with intellectuals and journalists focussing down onto micro analyses of individual agency. Corrupt behaviour such as accepting half price McDonald’s hamburgers and the act of drinking on duty, even if this did not result in an officer being drunk whilst on duty and even if these had never been proscribed conduct until after the Wood Inquiry and were therefore retrospective examples of corruption on the job.

The Code of Silence

The final report issued by Supreme Court Justice Wood, which was publicly released on the 15 May 1997, makes constant reference to the existence of a ‘culture of corruption’ in the NSW Police Service and a ‘wall of silence’ or ‘code of silence’ holding this culture in place. Although he had ready suggestions for various ‘reform’ strategies to overcome these problems within policing (Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service 1997, Vol.1), he had no similar suggestions about how to deal with the misconduct that had been repeatedly exposed in evidence as existing within the other professions of the criminal justice system, the higher ranks of the police management, the Australian Federal Police Service or, for that matter, within the investigative team employed by the Wood Inquiry itself. Indeed, there is extensive evidence that professional misconduct is held in place by a ‘code of silence’ and that this is a recurring feature at every level of the criminal justice system (Prenzler 2002, p.15; Armstrong and Possley 1999; Commonwealth of Australia 2003, p.884; Riley 2001a; Tara Brown 2003) and, indeed, in most professions and occupations. Wood had nothing to say about this. Nor was it mentioned by Dixon (1999b, p.172-174) in his book A Culture of Corruption or by Brown (1997) in his work Breaking the Code of Silence. The fact is that protective solidarity can extend from academe to the practising lawyer and on to those who become politicians and legislators.

Whilst both Dixon and Brown question in passing the wisdom of not examining this wider scope of corruption, neither pursue this in any detail, focussing on that easier target of police misconduct. In doing so they beg the obvious question about where the ‘culture of corruption’ actually begins and ends or how ‘breaking the code of silence’ might be extended to include the broader legal system. What Dixon and Brown neglected to mention was that the apparently impassable corruption divide existing in the Wood Inquiry was a product of the terms of reference given to that inquiry. The focus was the operational police and corruption elsewhere was conveniently placed outside the scope of that investigation. Any consideration that corruption is an organic component of the broader criminal justice system is never really
entered into by Dixon or Brown. Of course to discuss deviance in these structured terms is to acknowledge that generally corruption will only conditionally attach itself to the ‘progressive left’ or the ‘conservative right’. One of the conditions is that the structures mentioned are part of the concentrated layers of political power that shape both society and the criminal justice system.

That there are other sources of corruption was abundantly demonstrated in the evidence that was later given to the Commonwealth Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs—Crime in the Community in 2003. Unfortunately, despite its apparently wider scope, the level of publicity given to this committee was muted and restrained (Commonwealth of Australia 2003) even though the inquiry could have had the potential to release equally ‘titillating’ evidence about the misconduct of administrative elites within the criminal justice hierarchy. A major reason for this was the fact that the committee was no less unwilling than the Wood Inquiry to hear the evidence of police witnesses.

Witness: I think there is a crisis within the criminal justice system. I think all parties—

Chair: Nobody is going to deny that.

Mr Melham: You are harassing the witness, Madam Chair. Let him answer.

Witness: I think all parties have to accept their responsibility.

Chair: I am not denying that. I want to know the difference between the two.

Witness: Let me explain, because I do not think it is simple. I think that the legal community saw a perfect opportunity to get the spotlight off themselves and onto the low-level functionaries, the police.

Chair: Where?

Witness: At the Wood Royal Commission. And I think—

Chair: Which legal people?

Witness: The legal community.

Chair: Why would they want to do that?

Witness: That is the big ideological question: why?
Chair: The legal community was not a problem. The Wood Royal Commission was set up because there were questions about police corruption (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA. pp.883–884).

Although this reads like a comic sketch in a satirical television program it was no such thing. Witnesses were prevented from giving evidence by the hostile interjections of conservative MP, Bronwyn Bishop, who was the committee’s chairperson. Nor was this exchange an isolated case. When another witness attempted to give evidence, stating that employees from the Wood Inquiry were supplying heroin to drug addicts in order to conduct integrity testing upon rank and file police, a similar obstruction occurred.

Chair: We decided yesterday with regard to evidence that has been given—this is the evidence of this witness—that it can be tested or refuted by others. Witness, I would ask you at this stage: regarding the evidence you are giving here, did you say it could be corroborated?

Witness: Yes, it can.

Chair: Could you repeat the name of the person who can corroborate that?

Witness: The detective I have referred to was former Detective Sergeant Ray Lambie…

Mr Kerr: Why would you use the words, ‘Mr Wood, Mr Wood, it’s too strong,’ unless you were speaking to Mr Wood?

Witness: No, my understanding of the evidence is that the informant was talking into his body wire—he was taped up; he was wired up. He was trying to alert the Royal Commission to the fact that the heroin that they were given was too strong and was killing the druggies up in Kings Cross.

Chair: He was not talking to anyone.

Witness: He was talking to anybody; he knew that he was wired up. The Royal Commission had wired him up and he knew that the message was going back to the Royal Commission.

Mr Melham: So the basis was that, by saying that onto the transcript, he hoped that Justice Wood would have read that transcript and that was his third party plea to Justice Wood—not a direct conversation to him.

Witness: It certainly was a third party—

Chair: I think it is fair to say right here and now that Mr Justice Wood is a man who enjoys an excellent reputation.

Mr Kerr: He did until this circumstance—
Chair: He conducted the commission in a proper way, and I do not think that any of the evidence that we have heard impinges upon Mr Justice Wood himself.

Mr Kerr: That, Ms Bishop, is the most extraordinarily absurd proposition that I have heard from your mouth throughout these proceedings. This is a direct attack on the conduct and management of the Royal Commission conducted by Mr Justice Wood—rising, as this witness has said, to the most senior levels.

Mr Melham: And you have allowed it, Madam Chair, in a public domain with cameras rolling. It is a gross defamation. If the witness said this outside this hearing, he would be taken to the cleaners (Commonwealth of Australia. 2003, LCA. p.630).

Again this reads like a satirical piece, designed to show that ‘justice’ is not only blind but exceedingly ‘dense’ as well. In this spectacular example of a double standard, the ‘Mr Melham’ cited in this transcript is Darryl Melham MP, a foundation member and past Assistant Secretary of the ‘left-wing’ NSW Society of Labor Lawyers. When he made reference to the propriety of allowing allegations in a public hearing that were ‘a gross defamation’ of Commissioner Wood he conveniently overlooked the media and marketing strategies of the Wood Inquiry itself, which included for some witnesses the humiliating aspects of a ritual sacrifice that made their evidence into a public spectacle (Henderson 1996a; 1996b). Melham’s interjection was nothing less than an attempt to gag this witness, demanding what amounts to a ‘code of silence’ built on different criteria by invoking the laws of defamation. What is denounced in one set of circumstances, it seems, is demanded in another.

Reporting Corruption

Despite the insistence of the Wood Inquiry’s senior investigator that ‘[w]histle blowing should be an accepted part of that [police] culture and it should not be seen as dobbing in one’s mates. Whistle blowing is to be commended…’ (Adelaide Advertiser, 1990, 13 October. editorial), there was scant evidence that hyperbole applied to anyone other than operational police. In fact, when some rank and file police attempted to give evidence about corrupt activities of their senior and junior counterparts in accordance with Wood’s definition, they were denied the opportunity unless their evidence was deemed to fit in with the Inquiry’s extremely rigid parameters. Repeated instances of this blocking tactic were later raised at the 2003 committee hearings of the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs:

Witness: He resigned in the middle of an interview with the AFP [Australian Federal Police] over the fact that he was dealing in drugs. The AFP put nothing on his file. The Ombudsman’s office
recruited him as an investigator, knowing full well that he had just walked away. This man was then going to interchange between the Ombudsman’s office and ICAC [Independent Commission Against Corruption]. Everybody knew what he had been up to. Yet, when I complained about all of this—his name is in the letter at paragraph 1; I am not going to raise it now—I got a letter back.

Chair: Is this bloke—whom we will call Mr P, if you like—still there?

Witness: No. They became aware of an allegation that he was dealing drugs in the Ombudsman’s office and they re-advertised his position. A friend of mine actually got the job, and he obviously did not get it. He left the Ombudsman’s office—he resigned and did not get his job back when it was re-advertised—and he worked in a brothel for a bit of a time after that as a bodyguard.

Ms Julie Bishop MP: How long was he at the New South Wales Ombudsman’s office? …

Chair: Did this matter end up in the Royal Commission?

Witness: No, of course not. I tried to raise it, but, unfortunately, they would not let me give evidence at the Royal Commission.

Chair: Do go ahead; you are the second person who has said they were not allowed to give evidence. What happened to you?

Witness: Do you have 10 years?

Chair: Tell me how you tried to give evidence, what the evidence was about and what happened.

Witness: It is part of my submission, which I am going on with. I do not want to lose my place. What I will say to you is that I tried desperately to give evidence. They even interviewed me. I welcomed them into my house and said, ‘I cannot wait to get there.’

Chair: Who interviewed you?

Witness: A fellow called McGinlay came out to see me. Another time a fellow called Stevens and a woman came—I forget the woman’s name. I will get onto that.

Chair: We have heard of Mr McGinlay before.

Witness: I did not have any issue with him—he treated me quite well, because I was willing to go there. I said, ‘Why can’t I get a seat down there?’ He said, ‘Because Mr Agius [Senior Counsel at Royal Commission] said that you are a loose cannon.’ I said, ‘Well, I am a loose cannon’… (Commonwealth of Australia 2003 LCA pp.845–846).
Clearly, ‘whistleblowing’ was not always easy and the ‘code of silence’ was as rigorously enforced as it was rigorously condemned by the inquiry. Another example was clearly uncovered by a later investigation reported in the *Courier Mail*:

My concerns led me to revisit the transcript of the Wood Royal Commission and the revelations by the disgraced solicitor KR5 who provided evidence regarding clients at the boys’ brothel Costello’s, in the following terms: ‘But it was an amazing place, there were lawyers there, judges’. Unfortunately KR5 was interrupted mid-sentence by counsel assisting Paddy Bergin, and now Justice Bergin, in the following terms: ‘Just pausing there’. The issue of who the judges were was never answered. My inquiries as to when these serious allegations would be dealt with were replied to in the following terms: ‘We’ve decided not to revisit any of that because the public would lose confidence in the judiciary…’ (*Courier Mail* 13 March. 2002, p.13)

While the ‘paedophile’ segment of the Wood Inquiry unintentionally revealed a few of the indiscretions of the judiciary to later investigators, little if anything was published about these, ostensibly ‘because the public would lose confidence in the judiciary’ (Glascott 1997). Apparently it was all right for the police to ‘lose confidence’ in the police service but not in the rest of the criminal justice system! Nor was this an isolated occurrence during the inquiry as this later report in the *Sydney Morning Herald* in 2003 demonstrates.

For a small team [of police] set up to investigate a small band of alleged paedophiles, Strike Force Cori made a lot of noise. The International Commission of Jurists, the NSW Bar Association, the NSW Law Society, the NSW Ombudsman and the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions all lined up to question Cori's work on just one investigation. That inquiry had resulted in charges of buggery and indecent assault being laid against the District Court Judge Philip Bell; charges that were tossed out in 1999 by a magistrate who declared there was no reasonable prospect of a jury ever convicting… The strike force also looked into allegations surrounding the High Court Justice Michael Kirby, but found nothing to substantiate the claims… As with the Bell case, the Kirby allegations had been examined by the Wood Royal Commission, which found they had no substance (Gibbs 2003c).

The unconditional acceptance that the legal profession can objectively investigate its members is reinforced by the increasing politicisation of the judiciary, where judges are politically appointed and often come from within the ranks of retired politicians. NSW Supreme Court
Justice Shaw has said that while the ‘doctrine of the separation of powers might not apply in the strictest sense to a state parliament, judicial independence was also central to our liberal democracy’. There was, he said, a ‘culture of civility’ existing ‘between those who made the laws—politicians—and those who enforced them—judges’ and that this ‘was also imperative’ (Totaro 2003b). The reality is, of course, that the frameworks that maintain this class based notion of ‘civility’ are extremely stable and form a good protection against public humiliation and condemnation.

Like any show trial, the Wood Inquiry had a political agenda. It was set up with the aim of enforcing the sovereign power of the state—in this case the transfer of political power from the Commissioner of Police to the Minister of Police—by using the rank and file police as the scapegoats in the exercise. In this sense it had nothing to do with dispensing justice and, although justice was said to have been seen to be done this was only at a level of appearances. Despite Mr Kerr’s reservations and Mr Melham’s remonstrations, it would appear that Commissioner Wood and his team emerged unscathed from the proceedings that pilloried the ordinary rank and file police who were caught up in the fallout or tried to give evidence. The subsequent double-digit suicides that occurred as a consequence of the Wood Inquiry would reinforce the notion that a substantial element of sovereign power was retained within the entirely unscathed legal system (Mitchell and Kidman 2001; Gibbs 2002; Morfesse 2002).

According to Dr Jan Westerink, a former chief psychologist of the NSW Police Department and now a full-time lecturer at the Australian Graduate School of Police Management, suicide can be directly attributed to the inquisitorial and humiliating strategies of inquiries like the Wood Inquiry.

Dr Westerink says that on the scale of traumas, being named in a commission seems to be ‘pretty high up there’. She said most of her clients had been suicidal at some stage. ‘The first thing that happens to someone named in the commission is usually a feeling of shock; it comes out of the blue that they have been named and this is followed by a feeling of helplessness,’ Dr Westerink says. ‘The other thing that happens is that there is this feeling of public disgrace, the feeling of not being able to clear their name and the feeling of being shamed in public, whether they are guilty or not.’ … (Clark 1996).

Indeed, in 1999, Commissioner Wood told a legal conference that, because of the risk of suicides, similar investigations would be advised to retain a psychologist (Morfesse 2002).
These factors alone make the remarks made in 2003 by committee members Darryl Melham MP and Malcolm Kerr MP in relation to ‘attack’ and public criticism of Wood and his Inquiry quite ironic. However their actions and the subsequent unconditional endorsement by the chairperson that ‘Mr Justice Wood is a man who enjoys an excellent reputation’ is a clear indication of the gulf of class relations that separates both members of the legal profession and politicians from rank and file operational police.

The police witnesses may have been momentarily thwarted but the gag was obviously applied too late. Within two weeks of the Parliamentary hearing Tara Brown (2003) from the Nine Network’s current affairs programme *Sixty Minutes* exposed the fact that the inquiry’s investigative strategy of police integrity testing had sanctioned and monitored the distribution of heroin through coercing criminals, resulting in the death of 13 heroin addicts as extra-strong heroin had been supplied during one of the operations. AFP Commander Nigel Hadgkiss, Royal Commissioner James Wood, senior counsel John Agius and investigator Kieren Miller all declined to be interviewed about such questionable procedures, citing in mitigation the Royal Commission's secrecy provisions to support the legality of their own ‘code of silence’. Senator Bronwyn Bishop, the chairperson of the 2003 Commonwealth Select Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs—Crime in the Community, stoically supported their right to maintain this silence, announcing simply that ‘We found out last week there is an express prohibition in the legislation establishing the Wood Royal Commission that prevents complaints being made against any of the people there’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, p.884). There were no quibbles raised about this or about its obvious justice implications but it seems incredible that a high ranking inquiry designed to extinguish the ‘culture of corruption’ existing in the NSW Police Service and to destroy its ‘code of silence’ should declare that those within its highest levels, and indeed some senior police, should be largely unaccountable for their actions. In 2005 when *Sympathy for the Devil* was released by ABC Books by author Sean Padraic (2005) many factors relating to the Royal Commissions inadequacies were raised. However there was no critical examination regarding the misconduct of Royal Commission staff as evidenced by *Sixty Minutes* (Brown 2003). Hadgkiss had also been a member of the Joint State/Federal Task Force, which was exposed as being a hub of corrupt activity. Yet his name was not amongst the list of members published on page eighty seven [p.87]. The questionable relationship between Agius and corrupt police at the Joint Task Force (Coultan 1995a, 1995b) was also not mentioned. Not surprisingly it has since been revealed that the authors name Sean Padraic is a pseudonym. This text is yet another example of attempts by the media, particularly the ABC, to legitimise
and reinforce the questionable activity of a criminal justice/party political establishment at the expense of rank and file police and the broader public.

It is curious that when the Wood Inquiry revealed substantial levels of corruption within the NSW police, Commissioner Wood placed on the record his view that Mr Lauer’s decision to ‘retire’ would be the ‘honourable’ thing to do and yet, despite all of the inquiries into the very costly, in terms of human life, and questionable investigative strategies employed by the Wood Inquiry, Wood is still a Supreme Court Justice and obviously does not consider that it is ‘his duty’ to do the ‘honourable’ thing. Commissioner Wood’s recommendations in relation to professionalism and integrity amongst rank and file police also sounds somewhat hollow in the face of evidence that a significant number of his own staff—including lawyers and seconded police—were unable to live up to these expectations themselves (Brown 2003; Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA pp.543–623, pp.627–688; Kidman 2002f). This, of course, has never been addressed. In fact, when the final two volume report, The Standing Committee of Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Crime in the Community: Victims, Offenders and Fear of Crime was released in October 2004, it did not contain a single mention of any of the evidence given at the inquiry concerning the Wood Royal Commission and the issues of corruption in the Federal or State Police senior management. In fact, almost none of the evidence given by serving or ex NSW Police, apart from a few mentions regarding incidents at Cabramatta, were included in the final report (Commonwealth of Australia 2004).

**Blind Justice**

It is sometimes inferred by ‘progressive’ reformers that when it is a matter of duty within the law, an action becomes legal and subsequently ethical. Hannah Arendt (1994) has described how Adolf Eichmann used this form of Kantian defence to justify his role in the holocaust. Rejected in the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, it became known pejoratively as the ‘Nuremberg Defence’ but is nevertheless still invoked.

The first indication of Eichmann’s vague notion that there was more involved in this whole business than the question of the soldiers carrying out orders that are clearly criminal in nature and intent appeared during the police examination, when he suddenly declared great emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant’s moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition of duty. This was outrageous on the face of it, and so incomprehensible since Kant’s moral philosophy is so closely bound up with man’s faculty of judgement, which rules out blind obedience (Arendt 1994, p.135).
Despite this failure at Nuremberg, intellectuals continue to argue that if an action is authorised by the judiciary as part of an investigation then it is legal and subsequently ethical. At the time of the Wood Inquiry Associate Professor in Law George Zdenkowski (1995) argued, in an article headlined ‘Wood’s Tough Tactics’ in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, that although the release of a surveillance video of a police officer involved in illegal drug dealing and the recording of a sexual encounter between a prostitute and the police officer had caused embarrassment to the officer’s wife and family, this was justified if police corruption could be exposed. There would, he suggested, be innocent casualties in this struggle against corruption.

Nor was this the only such instance of a duplicitous ‘justice’ that allows ‘illegality’ to become ‘legality’. Another of the unaccountable and questionable strategies used by the Wood Inquiry related to its subverting of the illegality of conducting telephone intercepts (Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service 1997, p.21). During the NSW Wood Royal Commission telephone intercepts were covertly arranged and facilitated through the NSW Crime Commission (Kennedy and Bernie 2001, p.19-20). This situation was arguably illegal on the basis that NSW Crime Commission can only authorise telephone intercepts relating to approved NSW Crime Commission targets and not simply be directed by a Royal Commissioner. Yet when this issue was canvassed by witnesses giving evidence before the Commonwealth Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs—Crime in the Community they met with no constructive response and their verifiable evidence was not only ignored but subsequently omitted from the final report of this inquiry (Commonwealth of Australia 2004).

Witness [an ex-police officer]: The second scenario is contained in letters 8 and 9 of annexure A—letters from Irene Moss [Chairperson at the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption] and from the Ombudsman, Bruce Barbour. This complaint is a complaint I put in while I was in [the NSW Council for] Civil Liberties. Basically, the letter I put in related to the fact that during the Wood Royal Commission the New South Wales Crime Commission allowed the Wood Royal Commission to use its telephone intercept facilities, which they were not supposed to do.

CHAIR [Senator Bronwyn Bishop]: Could you tell us more about that? They were not entitled to do that?
Witness: The telephone intercept facilities of the New South Wales Crime Commission are restricted to New South Wales Crime Commission targets that are approved by the body that runs it. The New South Wales Crime Commission telephone intercept facility was used by the Wood Royal Commission and it should not have been. The Wood Royal Commission targets were not approved by the Crime Commission. That is a technicality but nevertheless it was a reality.

CHAIR: Is it a legislative requirement that they must be approved?

Witness: Yes, I believe so. The target selection committee has to approve of the target in order for the telephone intercept requirements of the Crime Commission to be met...

CHAIR: This is a safeguard against anyone just going in and putting a tap on anybody’s phone?

Witness: It is a safeguard against the manipulation of the system... The problem was that the Wood Royal Commission did not have telephone intercept facilities, so they simply used the Crime Commission facilities without getting proper approval. I was asked to draft a letter to ICAC about it, which I did. I do not have a copy of the letter I sent. However, after some time I received a letter from the Commissioner, Irene Moss, basically saying that they had forwarded the complaints on to the Ombudsman’s office and, sometime later—my letter from Ms Moss was in January.

Ms Julie Bishop: What date was the letter from Irene Moss?

Witness: May 2001. The letter from the Ombudsman’s office was on 28 August 2001. Basically, Mr Barbour explained that all he could do was perform an oversight role. The end paragraph of his letter stated: Apart from my compliance inspection functions relating to telecommunications interception and controlled operations, I have no jurisdiction to investigate the conduct of officers of the Crime Commission. The staff of the Police Royal Commission were likewise beyond my jurisdiction.

Witness: …Even more concerning is that organisations such as the Crime Commission are not bound by the Public Sector Management Act 1988, regarding the appointment of the staff. So not only are they not accountable but they can employ who they like. [This provides] [t]he opportunity for these organisations to engage in a ‘Hooverist’ type activity—I am referring to the
activities of J. Edgar Hoover, who I am sure you are all familiar with, during his reign at the FBI… (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA. 842-843).

Despite this damning evidence there was no admission by the investigation team that they had used illegal surveillance and there was to be no follow up in the wake of the 2003 *Sixty Minutes* programme by Tara Brown (2003) that corroborated the evidence regarding this drug distribution (Commonwealth of Australia. 2003, LCA. 630). In fact, there was no ‘moral outrage’ or substantive media and political support at all and *Sixty Minutes* producer Steven Barratt resigned with weeks of the programme going to air. The same cannot be said of the Wood Royal Commission, however. The outcome of this process was that while 79 rank and file police were adversely named during the Wood Inquiry (Verrender 1997) and there had also been a dozen or so suicides, only twenty-two officers were dismissed (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.152). Exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, however, because the Royal Commission and the State Government continues to show a marked reluctance to release any statistics relating to this issue (Gibbs 2001; Glascott 1997; Hilferty and McDougall 1995).

**Changing Police Culture**

In *Changing Police Culture*, Janet Chan (1997, p.43) cited Simon Holdaway’s ethnographic research of routine police work (1983) to argue that ‘police culture’ was that layer of often illegal occupational norms and values that operate informally under the apparently rigid hierarchical structure of the police service. What she failed to stress, however, was that bad management—rather than individual agency—nurtures such bad informal practices. Simon Holdaway did nothing to stop the matters he observed. Nor did he report them except in his research, presumably because it would limit the overall possibilities open to this. For example:

> Three nights later I dealt with a man who had threatened his wife with a pistol. He pleaded his innocence and a police officer kicked him on the backside, not with excessive force but just to remind him that his explanation was not acceptable. The incident was recorded but I omitted from my notes that fact that the prisoner had been kicked; for good or ill, it was too sensitive for me to accept. Similar situations arose and I recorded them in my diary… This causes a strain for the sociological observer (Holdaway 1983, p.7).

It also caused a problem for his subordinates who learnt that such unorthodox procedures were apparently permissible. The issue Chan should have raised here is that Holdaway’s
actions came within the definition of corruption laid down by Justice Wood for his silence ‘conceals any form of misconduct by another member of the Police Service’ (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police 1997, p.25). His illegal ethnographic observations were also corrupt, as was the fact that whilst gathering supportive evidence for his research he was ‘encouraged to neglect his or her duty, or to be improperly influenced in the exercise of his or her functions’ (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police 1997, p.25). Far from being a passive observer of individual police misconduct, Holdaway’s research reflects not only a management failure but also a concrete example of how self-interest can develop operational bad practice and, ultimately, misconduct and even corruption.

As I have already explained, management failures were implicated in misconduct and corruption was a major finding of the Mollen Commission into the NYPD in 1994. Holdaway’s professional duty conflicted with the aims of his research and, in the process, he became one of the problems he was observing. So, when Chan (1997) cited Holdaway to demonstrate the existence of a corrupt ‘police culture’ and a powerful resistance from the lower ranks to the change being implemented by new educated police managers, she failed to recognise that in many instances this aggressively competitive management style would also be a major part of the problem. Radelet (1980, p.79) has argued that the toleration of misconduct and corruption is affected by the supervisor’s assessment of personal gain or loss. Rewards were offered to ambitious police during Commissioner Murphy’s ‘reform’ period of the NYPD (Silverman 1999, p.34) and a supervisor concealing deviance or demonstrating an unwillingness to report this for management performance reasons sends just as clear a signal to the rank and file that misconduct or corrupt practices are tolerated (Kutnjak and Klockars 2000).

The law, as I have said, is impartial in the same degree as research is objective. It is disingenuous for academics such as Janet Chan to protest that the problem with the police service is a matter of individual police agency—resistance to change and the bad practice of ‘street level bureaucrats’. Clearly, there is a double standard at the heart of Chan’s research. Simon Holdaway’s dereliction of management duties and the Wood Inquiry’s illegal investigative activities and culpable strategies for integrity testing have been differently judged in her work and in the work of her other ‘progressive’ colleagues who campaign to expose the corruption of operational police culture. Similarly, when ‘progressive’ academics Russell Hogg and Murray Lee (1999) rallied to protect Associate Professor Kerry Carrington from the embarrassing prospect of being questioned by the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission hearing in 1999 about the sources of her allegations that rank and file police
sexually assaulted a number of teenage girls during the investigation of the Leigh Leigh case (Georgina Safe 1999), they also invoked a different code of accountability and a different code of silence.

As it emerged, Carrington’s information was nothing more than unsubstantiated rumour and innuendo and the allegations she had made in her book, *Who Killed Leigh Leigh* (1998), unjustly injured the reputations of a number of operational police. It was not until 2001 that Carrington’s allegations against the rank and file police were finally dismissed (*Newcastle Herald* 17 October. 2001, p.3.editorial). Crucially, no members of the ‘progressive’, ‘realist’, liberal or interactionist academic community has ever criticised Carrington’s ‘case theory’ or questioned the ethics of her research. Nor have they considered the role that her antipathy to the rank and file police has informed not only her selectivity but theirs as well. The law is the law unless it is a different law, it would seem. Some groups are, unashamedly, to be judged on different terms. An Associate Professor of Criminology can be exempted from giving evidence to cover up defamation and shoddy scholarship whilst a police constable would be demonstrating bad ‘case theory’ or the existence of a questionable ‘code of silence’ binding together a corrupt ‘police culture’.

Such instances provide clear evidence of the division of labour that exists within the criminal justice system. Uncovering corruption in the ranks requires moral and intellectual flexibility. Enforcing the law itself does not. For researchers such as Holdaway and Carrington, the rationale for this is that the police exert a coercive power that needs to be controlled. ‘When such an institution is over protective its members restrict the right to privacy that they possess,’ Holdaway (1983, p.5) declared. If that is true then it should also relate to the whole of the criminal justice system and to academe and the media, not simply to the operational police. Clearly antipathy, elitism, bias and class based prejudice towards rank and file police are the most visibly present ‘corruptions’ in this virulently moral campaign.

The View from Above

In 1999, Sydney Magistrate Pat O’Shane dismissed a number of matters before her court in relation to a man who, without any reasonable cause, had shot and wounded uniformed police during a routine traffic stop. Although the Department of Public Prosecutions intervened, the *Sydney Morning Herald* (16 December.1999, p.19) featured an article by David Dixon headlined *Means, ends and the rule of law* (Dixon 1999a), which argued that O’Shane’s judgement was lawful and, as such, should be upheld. In his argument Dixon proposed that two questions lay at the heart of the matter. When do ends justify means? And should courts
police the police? Relegating the shooting to an invisible backdrop, his argument was that if police are subject to the rule of law, the law must impose some real control on police activity if it is not to become mere rhetoric. This is a curious argument in the light of Dixon’s failure to expose the questionable legal procedures and investigative strategies such as integrity testing employed by the Wood Inquiry, to which he had acted as a consultant (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.xviii). Clearly the inquiry had not slipped his mind either, simply its tactics, because he also argued that the general public should take note of the revelations emerging from this; revelations that demonstrated how public and political self-interest and complacency should bear considerable responsibility for police misconduct.

Dixon failed to notice that there is another side to the question of when do ends justify means? Just as there was no mention made to the Wood Inquiry, nor was there any consideration as to whether shooting a policeman during a traffic stop, whether this was a matter of routine or harassment, constitutes an appropriate action. In Dixon’s limited vision this was not the issue. Policing—and resisting—the police, it seems, engenders a whole new interpretation of the question. To argue otherwise is irresponsible as it supports self-interest, and oozes complacency and maintains the ‘culture of corruption’ endemic in the operational police. In his argument Dixon saw no further than issuing a reprimand to those who were opposing O’Shane’s judgement. They should, he argued, be considering the role that our magistrates and judges perform. This is an interesting point indeed. It is, it seems, the magistrate’s job to do nothing more than control the actions of rank and file police even if this means a failure to uphold the law in regard to a provoked or unprovoked shooting incident. The crime, Dixon has argued, does not matter for it is, after all, the police who are the problem. Once again it is the misconduct of rank and file police on trial.

If the judiciary is the ultimate coercive check on police action, what provides the check on the coercive powers of the judiciary? This is a question Dixon never asks and, indeed, never thinks of asking as his class bias allows it to lie unobserved behind his argument. Once the ‘rule of law’ and the doctrine of the separation of powers was supposed to give a necessary corrective but this class bias in the ladling out of condemnation never addresses the fact that all judicial appointments in Australia are now political appointments, not merit based promotions. There is an assumption in Dixon’s argument that, despite party-political self-interest, the ‘integrity’ of the legal profession will ensure the continued independence of the legal system from the party-political system.
The idea that the judiciary are above reproach and incorruptible appears to be a readily accepted viewpoint although it does not always go uncriticised. In an appeal to the full bench of the NSW Supreme Court regarding the matter of Taouk (1992), the suggestion of Mr Gruzman Q.C. that members of the judiciary were beyond reproach, was totally rejected by Justice Badgery-Parker:

To assume, as Mr Gruzman submitted we should, that the public accepts that all judges are incorruptible seems to me to invite the court to make an assumption of breathtaking arrogance…

If the judiciary takes the view that an attempt to corrupt a judicial officer is of little consequence because of an arrogant assumption that all judicial officers are incorruptible, the public may well be led to have little confidence in the integrity of judicial officers and their incorruptibility…

(Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Criminal Appeal 1992, p.7)

Even Pat O'Shane, who radically opposes any threat to her own judicial independence made by both the conservative and ‘progressive’ elements of her profession, demonstrates a viewpoint imbued with class bias. When Chief Justice Spigelman rebuked her before an audience of judges, lawyers and politicians she attacked the NSW Judicial Commission for upholding complaints made against her by rank and file police, saying that ‘the head of jurisdiction does not have power to discipline a fellow judicial officer’ (Marr 2000). Later, she challenged the arrogance of the Judicial Commission for even entertaining an allegation from rank and file police in regards herself as ‘a judicial office’ (Ackland 2001e). In November 2005 Magistrate O’Shane was criticised by the full bench of the New South Wales Court of appeal for behaving … in an inappropriately adversarial way… The matter over which she presided will be re listed on the grounds that one of the litigants in the matter …was denied procedural fairness…(Pelly 2005) On this basis it is difficult to argue that even the most radical of the judiciary do not regard themselves as a ruling elite that stand above the society they judge. Although this class bias is unsurprising, it is seldom so publicly displayed, especially by a member of the radical judiciary. This makes a mockery of the argument by ‘progressive’ commentators such as Dixon that a politically appointed judiciary must police the police and independently assist to ‘reform’ policing organisations.

What becomes abundantly clear in all this is how the dominant layers of power within the criminal justice system are not only unscrutinised but are tacitly legitimised by administrative elites within the political arm of the state. The very government institutions that are set up to oversight instances of corrupt conduct by the state’s low-levelled functionaries—particularly
regarding electronic surveillance—are politicised to the extent that they only have limited authority. The jurisdiction of these ‘watch dog’ organisations is simply not extended to the administrative and judicial elites, which take the shape of private sector organisations where senior management are recruited or ‘headhunted’ from within a party-political framework and outside of the public service guidelines. This enables the neo-liberal concept of ‘managerialism’ to have an enormous impact upon policing institutions and intelligence organisations, particularly when key government organisations that oversee the police and policing type organisations are controlled by government ministers. In the main, party political power is reinforced when the Minister allocate a politicised performance contract rather than delegate authority to a permanent department head (Austin 2003; Stewart 1994; Wanna 1994).

In any study of the reforms proposed by the Wood Inquiry it is important to remember that the origins of this was, in fact, centred around a ‘political power’ dispute between the Minister of Police and the Commissioner of Police and that corruption allegations were used as a springboard to achieve this underlying purpose (Hatton 1996a). I will discuss the politicised motive and its outcome of the conflict in more detail in the next chapter and the impact of its suggested managerial reforms in Chapter 4 but here it is important to consider the very questionable integrity of many of the findings of this powerfully public royal commission.

Sir John Fielding, who had been blinded in his youth and was nicknamed ‘the blind magistrate’, was popularly said to have been able to recognise the thieves who frequently came before his court in Bow Street London, just by the sound of their voices. A key intellectual figure in the policing of the London underworld in the second half of the eighteenth century, he had become an early ‘expert’ in the sites of working-class and underclass criminality but was less than concerned with the reasons for this, being preoccupied with ideas about how to deal with criminality instead. In many ways current ‘expert’ opinion operates upon the same principles. It can recognise the major site of corruption by its occupational status and by its accent and is full of ‘progressive’ reform measures to control this site but it doesn’t choose to map the full extent of corruption in the wider criminal justice system and does not ask why police misconduct and corruption exists in the first place. It is ‘blind’ in its pursuit of the enemy and ‘blind’ to the injustices it creates in the course of this pursuit. If the first casualty of any such moral campaign is truth, the ultimate casualty is justice. With justice allegorically blindfolded in the courts, it is also intellectually blindfolded in academe and in the media. The result is trial by a strictly limited assertion, the
creation of public hysteria and moral outrage, and judicial and media orchestrated lynch mobs that prematurely act as judge, jury and executioner.
CHAPTER THREE: The Politics of ‘Reform’

In his analysis of the Wood Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, David Brown (1997) argues that the establishment of this represents a straightforward victory for anti-corruption campaigner John Hatton and a corresponding defeat for ‘the forces of complacency’ represented by former Commissioner Tony Lauer. In terms of the major players and their objectives, his assessment is correct, however in terms of his assessment of the issues involved the analysis is less than satisfactory. Indeed, its simplistic ‘good’ and ‘evil’ viewpoint is both subjective and naïve. Brown sees this as a clash between the moral crusader and the complacent senior old guard operational copper who rose through the ranks and is a product of the system. In praising Hatton as a ‘progressive’, primarily motivated by utilitarian and anti-corruption principles, he has, in interactionist terms, chosen his ‘side’. For an ‘expert’ who has studied the Wood Inquiry in detail must know that there is a far more complex agenda behind this inquisitorial tribunal.

Hatton was exercising what Hoffman (1984, p.174) describes as the classic tactics with which the political arm of the state deals with all counter hegemonic resistance. As Hatton’s crusade was backed by the media and gathered populist support, political party opposites could be seen to be adopting a bipartisan approach. Nor did they need to be pressured. For they were combining to oppose the ‘political power’ being used against them by the Police Commissioner Tony Lauer—the too-assertive head of a government department and, therefore, an obstacle to the politicisation of this organisation. There was, in fact, nothing remotely ‘complacent’ about Police Commissioner Tony Lauer. As my argument will demonstrate, once the political arm of the state regained its dominant position within the layers of power that make up the state’s governing bodies, the party political positions could once again untangle themselves and return to competition for the governing position in the new regime. To understand this background to the struggle it is, of course, necessary to move analysis a long way past this simple level of appearances and uncover the politicised heart of the confrontation.

Crusading Against ‘Corruption’: Pickering, Hatton and the ‘White Knights’

In late 1990 the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIS) published a report criticising the NSW Police organisation for having the worst clear up rate in Australia in relation to reported crime despite the fact that the organisation was the best funded of all the states. The response
of Police Minister Ted Pickering was to instruct Commissioner Avery to write to the AIS demanding reasons why their relationship with the police should be extended, whilst at the same time banning any further release of crime data and cancelling a joint research project (Hogg and Brown 1998, p.26–27). It was a high-handed political response but Pickering had an established history of politicising his role and his relations with the broader police organisation. In his guise of a moral entrepreneur, however, he was to become estranged not only from rank and file police but also from many of his political colleagues. Yet, in the same process, he was gathering other allies and these included a number of journalists, bureaucrats, lawyers and ambitious senior police—the self-styled ‘White Knights’.

The previous year Police Minister Pickering had been the subject of a no confidence motion in the New South Wales parliament over his questionable handling of his portfolio. Both before and after this parliamentary attack, Pickering had vigorously engaged in internal wedge politics whilst fuelling a very public debate that the NSW police were under siege by organised criminal elements within the organisation.

In October last year, John Avery, the ‘White Knight’ who had run the NSW Police Force for five years, was having a few days off… Ted Pickering, had dropped a bombshell. The police force, he told a tense Parliament, was under siege, locked in an intense battle being waged by organised criminal elements… While Pickering thundered that the Commissioner ‘knew his enemies’, his call to arms had been made without Avery’s knowledge or approval… It is now clear that it was Mr Pickering’s future that was under threat. He made his speech in the heat of a no-confidence motion against him over his performance as Police Minister. [According to Pickering] The force would be rocked by allegations that ‘Black Knights’—corrupt serving and former police—were out to destroy Avery and his ‘White Knights’. The allegations reached their peak when one newspaper reported that the Commissioner had upgraded his security and was carrying a gun for protection against the ‘Black Knights’. Avery told the Herald this week that this report was absurd… Looking back on the war against the Avery administration by the ‘Black Knights’, today it is hard to find the supporting evidence (Wilkinson and Lyons 1990).

Pickering had announced that, to combat that threat, Commissioner Avery had decided to remain at his post until 1992 so a problem developed when Commissioner Avery informed the media that at no time had he seriously contemplated retiring and that he was unaware of any serious move to unseat him.
Politically, Pickering had been in deep trouble because, as a member of the upper house, he was open to attack as the opposition parties controlled that chamber. During that tense session of Parliament, Pickering saved himself from the no-confidence motion by delivering his now famous address on the war against the Avery administration. In the atmosphere of the day, it fanned the flames of the conspiracy theories that ‘Black Knights’—corrupt serving and former police—were out to destroy Avery and his ‘White Knights’. Pickering’s outburst would, over the next four months, create more problems for Commissioner Avery and the New South Wales Police. Nevertheless, a good deal of the ‘Black Knights’ and ‘White Knights’ propaganda was used by the ‘White Knights’ and relayed to an alarmed public by journalists such as Bob Bottom and Gary Sturgess with the support of a broader network that included John Hatton, Ted Pickering, John Avery, Tony Lauer and Australian Federal Police officers Peter Lamb and Nigel Hadgkiss. Although this group was to constantly mutate, shedding members and co-opting others, it maintained the goal of establishing a hegemonic bloc within the broader State and Commonwealth network of law enforcement.

Policy makers within the New South Wales political hierarchy had embraced Bottom as a fellow corruption and crime-fighter some years earlier and wholeheartedly supported his entourage of other journalists and public sector associates (Kennedy, M. 2000, p.89). This bloc was instrumental in lobbying government on the structure of the National Crime Authority, the NSW State Crime Commission and the Independent Commission Against Corruption. As part of this bloc, Lauer, Sturgess and Lamb were appointed to senior positions within these organisations and to other bodies such as the Police Board. Members of this bloc had worked in confidential areas of both the State and Federal Police and for years classified information and photographs had been unlawfully distributed to journalists. In the regime change resulting from the Wood Inquiry, Sturgess tried to orchestrate the appointment of Peter Lamb as NSW Police Commissioner (William 2002, p.149) but failed spectacularly when the position was offered to Peter Ryan, formerly of the Metropolitan Police who had been recruited from Britain.

The events leading up to the Wood Inquiry provide an example of how the concentrated layers of party-political power within the state align themselves with a willing media in order to reinforce and legitimise the hegemony of the state. Always a remarkable self-publicist, Sturgess had seized every opportunity he could to present himself politically as an anti-corruption campaigner fired with a high moral purpose. In 1986, having been informed that a very dangerous prisoner was going to be escorted to visit his elderly mother at her house, he had decided to maximise the ‘moral panic’ advantage of the action by approaching the house
with a television reporter to obtain dramatic footage for public viewing. On another occasion Sturgess leaked very sensitive information to his media contacts after the Prison Minister had granted him special permission to interview an ex-police officer who was in gaol and assisting police with inquiries relating to high level drug related corruption. The interview had been approved entirely on the basis that it remained strictly confidential as it was feared the prisoner could be killed or assaulted by other prisoners if he was discovered to be an informant. Within twenty-four hours, however, a *Daily Telegraph* report announced that a ‘former policeman in Parklea Jail for a heroin-related offence has been approached by a top NSW MP after learning of a $10,000 contract which had been put on his life’ (Clark 1986). Other leaked material was reported in two Bob Bottom publications: *The Godfather in Australia* (1979) and *The Shadow of Shame* (1988). Symptomatically, the unlawful distribution of, and access to, this data was never questioned by Hatton, Pickering or for that matter any other of the ‘White Knights’ during their anti corruption crusade. In the light of this, the politicising of ‘corruption’ by this bloc of moral entrepreneurs reduces the concept to far more than a cliché.

Chan (1997, p.196–197) admits that the ‘so-called’ rivalry between ‘Black Knights’ and ‘White Knights’ had resulted in the victimisation of some innocent officers but argues, quite unapologetically, in terms of ‘the ends justify the means’. Senior police had to be merciless and single minded in their efforts to eradicate corruption. Chan fails to address the injustice and deviance that was levelled at rank and file police during this battle for control of the police service, seeing this as a battle between the ‘goodies’, who supposedly wanted to expose the rottenness, and the ‘baddies’, who profited from this corruption (Kennedy, M. 2000, p.80). Before long anyone who could not be seen to be enthusiastically supporting the ‘White Knights’ became a ‘Black Knight’. Vocal support, of course, is one form of legitimisation but silence is another thing altogether, a fact that the simple ‘goodies’ and ‘baddies’ concept totally ignores.

By 1992 Lauer had been promoted to Police Commissioner and was very soon locked in a public dispute with Police Minister Pickering. A Parliamentary Inquiry followed and Pickering lost the portfolio for misleading Parliament. Coultan (1992) explains that the Pickering crisis posed a new set of problems for the accountability of the police force because the thrust of his conservative politics was to remove the old notions of tenure and job security and replace them with the neo-liberal notions of performance management. Coultan argues that, despite the fact everyone in a neo-liberal environment lives or dies on their competence, in New South Wales a judge or a police commissioner cannot be sacked for incompetence—
only for wrong-doing. Coultan cites the separation of powers as a good reason to retain this contradiction because, he argues, ‘You cannot have a police commissioner who is there at the behest of the government of the day—for nothing could be more conducive to corruption and politicisation of the police force’. The dilemma was, of course, how to make a police commissioner independent but at the same time accountable?

During this crisis between Lauer and Pickering the ‘White Knights’ mutated once again and Lauer was cast in the contradictory position of being a ‘Black Knight’ to some and a ‘White Knight’ to others. Vass (1995) explains that John Hatton became a critic of Mr Lauer in 1993 after his ally Ted Pickering was forced to resign after a Parliamentary inquiry and soon after began to make references to Lauer and ‘the brotherhood of corruption’ within the police. On Saturday August 5, 1995, The Sydney Morning Herald published an article by Bernard Lagan stating that in 1987 Lauer had met secretly and covertly with Pickering and political adviser Sturgess for the purpose of ingratiating himself with the future conservative Liberal government. The article was an attempt to portray Lauer as deceitful and untrustworthy and it was obviously orchestrated by the ‘White Knights’ who had transferred Lauer to the ranks of the ‘Black Knights’. It was to take seven years and an action brought by Lauer in the Sydney Supreme Court before the paper admitted the inaccuracy of the information, retracting the accusations in an article entitled ‘Apology to Mr Tony Lauer’ (Sydney Morning Herald 15 February, 2002, editorial).

Former NSW police commissioner Tony Lauer told the Supreme Court yesterday corruption had not only existed at a high level within the police force, but also in different governments. In the witness box at his damages case against John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd and former police board member Gary Sturgess, Mr Lauer said corruption had ‘involved the government of both political views’. He said he was supported in that view by the Lusher report—a judicial inquiry that in 1981 reported on the administration of the police force, and also the relationship between it and government (Lamont 2002a).

The Sydney Morning Herald unreservedly withdrew any suggestion made in the article that Mr Lauer acted in any deceitful or untrustworthy manner and apologised for the damage and hurt caused to Mr Lauer by the publication, agreeing to pay Mr Lauer an undisclosed sum in settlement of the proceedings. The retraction came far too late, however, as the damage had already been done. The reports of the Wood Inquiry, which publicly damned Lauer in the media, led to his resignation soon after. Lauer stated that he was disappointed that Gary
Sturgess and Minister Pickering never took the opportunity to correct the allegations. He then reiterated ‘Note the still stony silence of the other actors,’ referring in part to retired politician John Hatton (Lamont 2002d).

Do What I Say Not What I Do

Police Commissioner Lauer resigned in 1996 and John Hatton marked the occasion by making a statement that indirectly answered the question posed by Coultan (1992) that ‘[t]he dilemma was how do you make a police commissioner independent and at the same time accountable?’ In an article published in The Daily Telegraph (16 January 1996) Hatton argues that although ‘Mr Lauer always was, and remains today a popular figure within the force… it was that popularity and convincing public performance, which led to his downfall. He felt so powerful that he ‘took on’ his Police Minister Ted Pickering. Mr Pickering resigned but the resulting Parliamentary Committee Inquiry damaged Mr Lauer’s reputation. The inquiry left politicians on both sides of Parliament feeling uneasy about Mr Lauer and the stage was set for the Royal Commission…’ (Hatton 1996a).

Hatton published several other articles along similar lines (Hatton 1997d, 1997a, 1997c) but it was in one particular argument, ‘Police Royal Commission—The Verdict’ published in the Daily Telegraph on 16 May (Hatton 1997b), that his attack upon Lauer reveals the complex and contradictory political agenda behind Hatton’s crusade. For by lifting the political veneer and shifting away from the theme of corruption Hatton was exposing the fact that the position of the ‘White Knights’ was predominantly about a struggle for the centralised layers of power that would dominate a regime change within the police organisation and shift the ‘political power’ from the department to the government. In this lengthy article about police corruption and reform Hatton indulges in a virulent personal assault on Lauer that is designed to annihilate any remaining reputation he might possess. ‘The commission curiously failed to ask Lauer the tough questions,’ he writes, and ‘he resigned on full pension,’ he adds maliciously. ‘The final report attributed no blame to him,’ he continues, but ‘[i]f he didn't know of the corruption, he was too stupid to be commissioner’. Hatton reassures his readers that the ‘Police Integrity Commission’ will be able to make some ‘quick kills’ now that the newly appointed Peter Ryan has been given ‘wider powers’. The entire organisation will be razed under new political lines as ‘Ryan has shown himself to be capable, tough and prepared to be ruthless, to pull down the structures that allowed such massive corruption to take root and flourish’.

At the end of this polemic, Hatton reveals the possibilities for his future agenda:
The report admits the legal profession has for three decades known police routinely verballed defendants, sometimes loaded them up and committed perjury. The court process has been distorted. This cannot happen unless there are corrupt lawyers facilitating the process, and, at best, naive judges. How many people are in jail that shouldn't be there? Where were the officers on fat salaries whose job it is to safeguard the system's integrity. The chief justice, the chief magistrate, attorneys-general, the Law Society and the Bar Association did nothing. Will politicians at last show some courage and ongoing commitment? And who will take on the lawyers and the legal system? If the major challenges thrown up in the final report are not properly addressed, expect another explosion in 5 to 10 years. See you at the opening of another police royal commission after the closing ceremony for the Olympic Games? I hope not! (Hatton 1997b).

Although Hatton made a closing reference to the possibility that there should be an inquiry into the broader criminal justice system, he has never launched another crusade to make this happen. Indeed, whenever he has referred to the broader political and criminal justice system, commentators remark, his allegations become ‘uninformed and speculative’ (Campbell, Toohey and Pinwill 1992, p.256). Moreover, as his closing remarks demonstrate, his eyes are still fixed on the rank and file police and his expectations are that ‘in 5 to 10 years’ he will be crusading ‘at the opening of another police royal commission’.

Unfortunately, as Hatton’s articles reveal, this heroic battle between the ‘White’ and ‘Black Knights’ has a demonstrably political ‘payback’ agenda. After the political demise of Police Minister Pickering and the triumph of Lauer the Police Commissioner, politicians from both sides of the parliament were happy to support Hatton’s call for a Royal Commission into the criminal justice system, providing that it was restricted to the operational police. When Hatton congratulated himself and his fellow Independents for their victory in the Wood Inquiry, he expressed vindication for that previous defeat when Lauer, the police officer, had publicly exposed the misconduct of the Pickering, the politician, in forcing him to resign. Hatton’s vindictive remark that if Lauer ‘didn’t know of the corruption, he was too stupid to be commissioner’ also represents his victory over Lauer as a class enemy. This triumph could also have been sweet to any one of a number of others who had been threatened by this same enemy. The silence of the media, politicians and the intellectual community in regard to the political fight to the death that they were watching from the sidelines should be seen as reinforcing this unconscious enmity regarding the class-divide that exists within capitalist society.
Stretching the Political Truth

Hatton’s valedictory account in the *Daily Telegraph* (1997b), in which he exchanges whistle-blowing for trumpet-blowing, stretches the political truth about the findings of the Wood Inquiry. He claims that ‘two hundred police were mentioned in the commission’ and that ‘ninety four have been given notice of dismissal’ but the Commissioner’s final report (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.152) indicates that only twenty-two officers were dismissed—a quarter of the number he splashed across his article. During the inquiry six hundred and thirty witnesses gave evidence at a cost to the taxpayer of more than $100,000,000.00 (Glascott 1997) but the cost in human terms was even qualitatively higher as almost 1,000 officers resigned during the three years of the hearings, while another 317 retired (Verrender 1997). However, as there was no attempt by the police organisation to conduct exit interviews or to link the resignations with the various findings, it is hard to say to which particular aspect of the Commission these retiring police were objecting.

Although Hatton relishes the fact that ‘two hundred police were mentioned in the commission’, by 2001 many of the allegations against police had been tested before the courts and the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions, Nicholas Cowdery Q.C., indicated that almost eighty five per cent of police charged with offences arising from the Royal Commission had been cleared (Gibbs 2001a). Of fifty-two officers charged with offences arising from the Royal Commission, three have been found guilty by judge or jury; nine have pleaded guilty; and three are yet to face court, with the balance all being acquitted. Hatton (1997b) also argued that more than 1100 plain-clothes police, including 55 detectives had been returned to uniform but, as Commissioner Ryan indicated, this is a gross distortion of the truth for, in fact, only 110 junior plain-clothes officers, who were not detectives, were returned to uniform as part of the new reform package and ‘progressive’ war against crime (Williams 2002, p.215).

Away from the hype and marketing style reportage of the Royal Commission in which academics, journalists, administrative elites and politicians all demonstrated their ability to produce a seemingly endless barrage of cliché’s and metaphors, the qualitative results of the inquiry are ambiguous. The ‘solution’ to police misconduct proposed by the Wood Inquiry is little more than a change in the layers of state power and ‘reform’ along managerialist lines and both, rather unsuccessfully, implemented years earlier by Commissioner Murphy from the NYPD (Henry 1994).
‘[T]he senior staff who have left must collectively accept some of the blame for the poor supervision and inept management which allowed the state of affairs detected to exist. They have been replaced by a new group of officers who it is expected will have the youth, vigour and commitment to force a profound change of culture and to promote professionalism and integrity...’


Fine words indeed but these sound rather hollow as ‘solutions’ to a ‘culture of corruption’ that was never examined at more than a rank and file level.

Altogether there are numerous contradictions regarding the Royal Commission data but, to date, there has been no effort to establish a clear and transparent record of the commission’s real outcomes. One thing is, however, certain. Given the exaggerated claims made in Hatton’s victory speech its factual content must be regarded as very questionable ‘scientific’ data indeed. Hatton’s reputation as a dedicated and unbiased anti-corruption campaigner would be publicly tarnished if it was realised that the results he trumpeted so loudly amounted to simply a political power change. It would be even further tarnished if it was reported in the media that long before he called for a Royal Commission—in fact, on Wednesday 19 September 1990, Thursday 29 February 1991 and Thursday 28 November 1991 to be precise—officers from the New South Wales police had provided him with detailed information about corruption and misconduct within the senior ranks of the joint New South Wales-Australian Federal Police Task Force. Hatton was unresponsive to their ‘whistle-blowing’ and expressed ambivalence towards the information provided because it exposed corruption in some of his own associates and information sources and was not in line with the narrow ‘corruption’ focus he wished to present (Kennedy, L. 1991, pp.77, 111). It is interesting that Hatton did not reveal these disclosures in his initial Parliamentary address calling for a Royal Commission in 1994 and supported the narrow focus given to its brief without comment (New South Wales Legislative Assembly 1994).

Although there is a degree of expectation that the media will sensationalise and politicise information in the interests of ‘prime time titillation’ (Henderson 1996a; 1996b) and print Hatton’s thinly disguised gloating as ‘a good story’, one would expect a serious analysis of corruption within the criminal justice system to restrict the use of these half-truths and avoid such blatant propagandising. The extent of the problem becomes all the more obvious when intellectuals, such as Brown (1997, pp.222–224), constantly use these same clichés and metaphors in their scholarly analyses of the Royal Commission and argue further that the
media images created by the inquiry represent a strong public and political demand rather than a successful attempt to create public outrage. There is no attempt to explain in what other way the public demand for reform has been manifested. By recycling the media’s metaphors and clichés, Brown trivialises the contradictions and hypocrisy unveiled during the proceedings and contemptuously ignores the suffering of those who were innocently dragged into this inquiry—an inquiry that used ‘corruption’ as a political tool to reinforce the hegemony of the criminal justice system.

The Struggle for Political Power Between State and Federal Police

One problem revealed during the Wood Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1997, Ch.5) was that there was serious and entrenched corruption within the area of narcotics investigations. Allied to this, however, was the less often mentioned exposure of misconduct committed by the Joint Task Force (JTF) of combined NSW State and Federal police investigators (Brown 1997, p.222). Brown’s account in *Breaking the Code of Silence* stresses the commonly used metaphor describing the police ‘brotherhood’ that remains silent when questioned about the misconduct of their colleagues (Brown 1997) and this is an accusation mostly levelled at the rank and file. However, six years before the Wood Inquiry it had been revealed to senior Federal and State police in Australia that the Joint Task Force (JTF) was a predominantly flawed organisation staffed since its inception in 1979 by many corrupt State and Federal police (Padraic 2005; Warnock 1989). To silence this awareness, Australian Federal Police officer Nigel Hadgkiss—a member of the ‘White Knights’ and later to be manager of investigations for the Wood Inquiry—approached New South Wales Police who might be publicly critical of the JTF and its network of in the State and Federal colleagues, suggesting that this would not be a good idea.

On 1 November 1988 Hadgkiss conducted an electronic interview with a New South Wales Police officer who stated his willingness to proceed as a whistle-blower.

> I would call on the Federal Government to hold a Royal Commission into allegations of corruption and criminal behaviour by certain members of the [Federal Police] Sydney Drug Unit. I would only be too willing to hand over the information and give evidence to a properly convened judicial inquiry… Not only do I believe that the motivation to discredit us is corrupt in the extreme, but certain members of the Australian Federal Police under your command, Mr Hadgkiss, for which you must accept responsibility, have engaged in criminal behaviour. It is my belief that offences have been committed against the laws of New South Wales. I am not satisfied that the Australian Federal Police is committed
to excising corruption from its ranks, as evidenced by your lack of resolve to investigate allegations made to you last year of frequent drug use by members of the Sydney Drug Unit. Your propriety in handling this investigation should be reviewed by your senior officers… (Commonwealth of Australia 2003,LCA.857).

In 1992 evidence was given before the New South Wales Supreme Court in the matter of *Taouk* (1992 65 A Crim R 387) revealing that in 1988 Nigel Hadgkiss had been informed that there was entrenched corruption within the Joint Task Force and the Federal Police and that his response to this information had been the establishment of ‘Operation Twig’ which was designed to silence any further critics (Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal 1992). On 27 August 1990 similar evidence was given to Justice Barry Thorley, who was Chairman of the State Crime Commission and the Chairman of the New South Wales Police Board (Kennedy, M. 1999, p.68). Commissioner Thorley set up an investigation code-named ‘Operation Cedar’ in response to the evidence that there were allegations of misconduct and criminal activity by Assistant Commissioner Donaldson and Superintendent Lysaght whilst they were attached to the JTF. It was not, however, until years later that both of these senior police from the New South Wales organisation were dismissed when the same allegations were revealed during the Wood Inquiry. During the evidence given before Commissioner Thorley it was revealed that his daughter Hanna was a member of the Australian Federal Police and that she had requested a transfer from the Organised Crime Unit after she became aware of allegations of misconduct by members of the Joint Task Force. Interestingly it was Hadgkiss who managed the Organised Crime Unit and it was from this base that he supervised the investigation and prosecution of the New South Wales Police who had been attempting to draw attention to the misconduct and corruption with the JTF.

The JTF had been ‘politically’ marketed as an elite squad set up to deal with narcotics investigation (Padraic 2005; Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, pp.184–187) and, as such, any outside police who accused members of the JTF of being corrupt were pitting themselves against a politically powerful and remarkably successful image building network. An example of this elitism can be seen in the following press release:

An elite, covert organisation, its members drove around in expensive cars and travelled extensively overseas—using a budget previously unheard of in police work… It was a move that puzzled many, considering the group’s success, and the legacy the Joint Task Force (JTF) leaves behind speaks for itself. Between 1979 and its closure, the organisation shut down 27 major drug
trafficking groups and 16 minor ones, with 305 offenders facing 626 charges… Staffed by 11 NSW police officers and 10 Australian Federal Police officers, the JTF built up a level of camaraderie and commitment that has become legendary in police circles… The JTF’s last commander, Detective Superintendent Ray Donaldson, 46, now acting commander of the State Drug Group (Thomas 1988).

Rank and file officers who attempted to pit themselves against this power base would be setting themselves up to disparagement by reporters such as the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s Mike Carlton under headlines such as ‘Whistleblower’s conspiracy theories running out of puff’ (Carlton 2002). Public humiliation for whistle-blowing pales somewhat beside being branded as corrupt but it is humiliation nevertheless. These officers were formidable opponents. Managerialism and aggressive competition were very much the driving forces behind that ‘elite, covert organisation’ known as the JTF. As one officer told the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1997, p.186), the mind-set of JTF members about corruption ‘came from being selected to go to the task force. You weren’t there to lose. You were there to win. If that meant bending the rules so be it’.

From the start there had been concerns about New South Wales police working at the Royal Commission. Conveniently, Hatton’s terms of reference cited a perceived conflict of interest, so no NSW police officer could be hired by the inquiry. According to the media rhetoric accompanying the politicisation of the inquiry, this was a decisive strategy designed to eliminate leaks to ‘mates’ within the ‘insular’ NSW police culture. Predictably, there was little concern shown about the ‘police culture’ within the JTF and Commissioner Wood accordingly hired ex-JTF and Federal Police investigator Nigel Hadgkiss as his head of operations. This choice was not out of character with the whole concept of careerism and opportunism that is encompassed under the doctrine of managerialism but what is particularly relevant is the notion that, under managerialism, the political arm of the state will increasingly select managers such as Hadgkiss with records that are sympathetic to their personal and political standpoint (Emy and Hughes 1991, p.422). He was the perfect recruit because, in keeping with the neo-liberal requirement of aggressive competition, Hadgkiss had the personal motto: ‘Who dares wins’ (Dempster 1997).

It was not until 2003 that many of the contradictions in relation to Hadgkiss were to be explained publicly and then this was only in evidence presented to the Standing Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs—Crime in the Community hearings and, therefore, not widely reported in the media.

Witness: What happened was that—and I am going to go into it—I was charged by the Federal Police with falsely accusing members of the Joint Drug Task Force of being corrupt in 1988. I was convicted because I pleaded guilty. I was absolutely done over… Those people from the Joint Drug Task Force were all exposed in the Wood Royal Commission as being corrupt. The man who charged me was Nigel Hadgkiss. The man who revealed them years later was Nigel Hadgkiss. I have still got the conviction… and of course I was forced to seek psychiatric treatment—which is part of everything (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, p.LCA 849,879).

During these hearing journalists, police and administrative personnel were all present and a small group of media and marketing personnel from the Commissioner’s Office also made their presence felt. A characteristic ‘progressive’ response by a member of the media was can be seen in the following report in the Sydney Morning Herald filed by Mike Carlton:

The next attack upon honest senior police will come early next year from a federal parliamentary committee, chaired by the attention-deprived Bronwyn Bishop. The same old ratbag crew of disgruntled ex-coppers and academic poseurs wants to rake over the cold ashes of crime in Cabramatta yet again, before the state election in March. Lies will be told, reputations trashed…’

(Carlton 2002b)

Carlton, who is an extremely influential journalist and recognisably a supporter of his friend Peter Ryan, the ex-Police Commissioner who replaced Tony Lauer (Lalor 2002), is hardly a critical source. He was educated in one of Sydney’s more prestigious private schools and could never be accused of showing a lack of class bias. The upshot of Carlton’s remark is that traditionally educated and politically appointed senior police can be automatically assumed to be honest whilst the rank and file ‘coppers’ who are attempting to expose the misconduct of their ‘educated’ senior counterparts are not whistle-blowers but a ‘ratbag crew of disgruntled ex-coppers’. The single academic who offered intellectual support Carlton simply dismisses as an academic ‘poseur’. What is consistently absent in all of this ‘discussion’ is a version of events giving the viewpoint of the rank and file or admitting that corruption is not peculiar to the New South Wales Police Service but resides at the highest levels of the Australian Federal Police and the Wood Inquiry investigation team as well.
The Reforming Power of the Half-truth

With politicians and the mainstream media drawing the boundaries of the law and order debate it is hardly surprising that it is structured on half-truths or few truths. A debate charged with a high level of emotional and metaphorically driven language is a useful political tool—hence the all-pervasive theme of a ‘culture of corruption’ in both academic and popular accounts (Stenson 2000, p.217). At a basic level this reduces debate to a matter of either anger or fear. The general public becomes ‘furious’; its weaker members become ‘worried’ and ‘anxious’ about their safety as ‘a culture of corruption’ will do little to ‘manage crime effectively’. This comment by ex-policeman ‘Athol’ shows that, for rank and file police, encroaching managerialism combined with the bad publicity generated by the Wood Inquiry spread uncertainty.

There seems to be more corruption now than what probably existed before. Whether it’s because there is a lack of communication, lack of supervision by people talking to the young ones and advising them as to the limits and parameters as they go, well I don’t know. But, I think there is just as much corruption about” (‘Athol’ 2002).

It is debatable whether corruption is declining or increasing but it has certainly never been a monopoly of the rank and file operational police in the NSW Police Service. By tracking the career of Nigel Hadgkiss, it is possible to see how the ‘political power’ operates as an incentive in a ruthlessly competitive environment. In turn this situation can be reconstructed at another level of power and shifted in favour of the state. Although I will discuss this matter further in a later chapter it is important to mention that Hadgkiss has never publicly answered for any of his actions or, in some instances, lack of action. This is despite the fact that during the Wood Inquiry significant numbers of his staff from AFP Organised Crime Squad and his old colleagues from the JTF were exposed as being corrupt (Padraic 2005; Brown 1995a).

Nigel Hadgkiss’ career path is just one of many examples of the ‘merit based’ promotion system introduced by managerialism and the way his special ‘skills’ have enabled him to fill key roles in the concentrated levels of political power. As both a ‘White Knight’ and a prominent investigator for the Wood Inquiry, his value-added credentials were more than plain. Certainly they were to Tony Abbot, who as the Industrial Relations Minister in the conservative Coalition Government, selected Hadgkiss to hold the position of Investigations Manager at The Building Industry Royal Commission Task Force (Grigg 2003) in the attempt to deregister this troublesome trade union (Grigg 2003; Pratley 2003).
Breaking down the resistance of the trade union movement has always been a fundamental industrial strategy of conservative governments (Scraton 1985; Finnane 2002). This is summed up in Abbott’s address at the National Press Club—‘Restoring the Rule of Law in the Construction Industry’.

The problems of the industry have been established beyond credible doubt and the question now is: what needs to be done about it? Nothing, says the CFMEU, because it’s alright to break the law in the best interests of the working class. Leading union officials take the view that, in a tough industry, only wimps take the law seriously. The news that ‘only’ thirty one individuals had been recommended to face criminal charges was greeted with something approaching jubilation, as if the industry’s code of silence based on fear had largely kept the Royal Commission at bay (Abbott 2003).

Abbott is, of course, reusing the ‘code of silence’ attack perfected by Hatton (1996) and Commissioner Wood (1997) and inflecting it with a similar degree of class bias. He takes this bias one step further when arguing that ‘[t]he enduring image of this industry should not be noisy marchers replaying the ideological struggles of the 1970s and raising clenched fists against authorities they don’t like’ (Abbott 2003). Although ultimately unsuccessful, Nigel Hadgkiss had brought with him to the job his not inconsiderable experience in media to market these highly disputed ‘successful’ outcomes.

None of the 32 cases used to justify the establishment of the multi-million dollar Building Industry Task Force has resulted in court action, much less a successful prosecution. Task Force director, Nigel Hadgkiss, confirmed that after investigations by his officers not one of the cases referred by Building Industry Commissioner Terence Cole had been forwarded to prosecuting authorities… The CFMEU based a ‘bias’ claim against Royal Commissioner Terence Cole on the fact that he called for its establishment before he had completed hearing evidence… Bias allegations have now been levelled against the Task Force. ETU officials in Brisbane have alleged their telephones have been bugged since Hadgkiss’ organisation set up shop in the city. They also claimed his staff offered advice and support to hardline employers after enterprise bargaining talks broke down… CFMEU national secretary, John Sutton, said the failure to proceed with any of Cole's 30 original cases was unsurprising (Workers On Line 13 June. 2003, editorial)
As a champion of justice, Hadgkiss had once again demonstrated his willingness to use electronic surveillance and a heightened level of scrutiny in his crusade (Walker 1994; Dempster 1997). ‘Reform’ advocates dismiss this intrusion, claiming that this is part of the price that has to be paid (Miller, Blackler and Alexander (1997, pp.vii – xiii) but it is symptomatic that it has only to be paid by the working class. This is evidenced by a submission to the Federal Government by Hadgkiss seeking special ‘zero tolerance’ coercive powers to investigate allegations of criminal activity and corruption within the building industry. Hadgkiss (2004,p.22) places special emphasis upon the CFMEU as it is the union representing building industry workers.

Abbott also employed Hadgkiss for another key political task and was rewarded when, in August 2003 Pauline Hanson and David Ettridge, the executives of a non-mainstream conservative political party called the ‘One Nation Party’, were convicted of electoral fraud and sent to gaol for three years. As foundation members of a small political party, they had gathered considerable electoral support from voters who felt their interests had been forgotten by the two major political parties—Labor and the Coalition (Seccombe 2003). Unwilling to address this electoral concern either at a policy level or in constructive debate, the mainstream parties and the media at first contented themselves with trying to discredit the personalities of Hanson and Ettridge. In doing so, they patronised the movement and further alienated its electoral supporters by using mockery and innuendo in an extremely class biased attack on Pauline Hanson, focussing on her political naïvété, her accent and her social background. Despite, or perhaps because of these endeavours, at its height the One Nation Party seemed poised to split the conservative vote.

To combat this possibility Minister Tony Abbott became the trustee of a fund used to investigate the internal management of the One Nation political party. The other trustees were Peter Coleman and John Wheeldon and the fund was named ‘Trustee of Australians For Honest Politics’. Peter Coleman was a retired conservative politician from the Liberal Party, and the father-in-law of the Federal Treasurer Peter Costello. John Wheeldon was a conservative Labor Party politician but he was close to Coleman through their association with the journal named Quadrant. The trust fund was used to promote legal action against One Nation as well as to pay the legal fees of disaffected One Nation members. Defending his actions later, Abbot claimed that One Nation posed a grave threat to Australia’s social stability. When initially asked about his role, however, he did not mention this high-minded reason, preferring to deny any involvement. It was only after details of the fund and its uses became public that he acknowledged the connection but maintained there was nothing wrong
under electoral law with people of one political persuasion setting up a slush fund to legally harass people of another political persuasion (Kingston 2003).

The initial ‘success’ of this joint venture, however, proved to be a pyrrhic victory. For after being exposed for their questionable political tactics and the unmistakeable element of ‘payback’ in the virulent way the campaign was managed, Hanson’s opponents had to weather an unexpected tirade of public anger. Unwittingly, they had elevated their defeated prey into an underdog and many of those who had never supported One Nation were angry that Pauline Hanson had been set up by her more powerful and cynical opponents. As political commentator Margot Kingston explains:

> The Australian people are outraged that the system has jailed Hanson, the symptom of public disillusionment with politics, while the disease—the behaviour of the cartel, which owns politics today—divides the spoils of power and privilege. They're outraged because the big end of politics gets away with just about anything, despite the fact that their experience, knowledge and resources mean that they have no excuse, while a bunch of amateur-hour political novices get thrown in jail for foolishly trying to work the system their way (Kingston 2003).

Following this statement Prime Minister John Howard tried to justify this strategy of dealing with party political adversaries by glibly saying, ‘[i]t’s the job of the Liberal Party to politically attack other parties—there’s nothing wrong with that’ (Seccombe and Murphy 2003). If you go into politics or the public service, it seems, you have to expect to engage in a power struggle that will try at all costs to destroy your personal reputation because that’s what politics is all about—especially if you’re ‘a bunch of amateur-hour political novices’. It’s a cynical approach but meshes in well with show trials such as the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1997) and the Building Industry Royal Commission (Grigg 2003) as it uses the veneer of a crusade against corruption and injustice to push the campaign along. A few days later Prime Minister Howard clarified this remark even further by accusing the Labor Party of ‘secretly and on occasions not so secretly’ supporting the Abbott-led campaign. ‘It is the height of hypocrisy for the Labor Party now to turn around and say “outrageous, shocking new disclosures—slush fund revealed…”…’ Howard said because ‘[t]hey knew about it, and they remained silent about it...’ (Riley 2003). This is hardly a satisfactory response but it embodies the level of aggressive competition that has become a standard approach for reinforcing the governing power of the state. Interestingly, it also amply demonstrates the large part that class bias plays in this enmity.
In my interview with ‘Gonzo’, who has been a policeman for over twenty-five years, he explains his understanding of the class bias that is now at the hub of so much conflict between the rank and file police and the traditionally educated members of the legal profession:

The judiciary wants to apply that standard to the police [guilt by association] but they can’t apply it to themselves. There were judges [during the Wood Royal Commission] who were paedophiles, judges who played up in the toilets at the Town Hall Railway Station. There were judges who were doing all sorts of things, members of the legal profession who were screwing [having sex] with their clients and taking trust fund money. A third of the work with the Commercial Crime Agency is devoted to the legal profession so that really tells you something about the standards of the legal profession. We don’t hear about it all. I would love to open the coffers of the Law Society and look at those who were disciplined or the covers ups that were involved over what’s contained in there’ (‘Gonzo’ 2002).

The Coercion of Political Power and the Consent of Rhetoric

In the face of this evidence it seems absurd to suppose that the problems besetting the criminal justice system can be solved by a new structure of managerialism and increased coercion and surveillance on the activities of rank and file operational police (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997). Indeed, even this brief analysis of the concentrated layers of power associated with the events leading up to the Wood Inquiry demonstrates that a remarkable cast of constantly recurring characters styling themselves as the ‘White Knights’ comprised the ‘anti-corruption’ crusade’s movers and shakers. This was no crusade but a cynical manipulation of justice to achieve political ends. Although ‘White Knights’ sometimes mutated—shedding members such as John Avery and Tony Lauer by transferring these to the ranks of their enemies, the ‘Black Knights’—this powerful group included senior NSW Police Officer Clive Small and senior Australian Federal Police officers Peter Lamb and Nigel Hadgkiss, who had all been members of the JTF; influential journalists such as Evan Whitton and Bob Bottom; and political advisors or politicians such as Police Board members John Marsden, former Coalition Police Minister Ted Pickering, independent M.P. John Hatton, and political advisor Gary Sturgess—‘the architect of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)’ (Riley 1996b).

Not always in harmony with each other, they were sometimes split bitterly over approach but rarely about goals. For example, Tony Lauer became a ‘Black Knight’ when he opposed fellow ‘White Knight’ Ted Pickering. Gary Sturgess criticised the appointment of Peter Ryan as Police Commissioner after the Wood Inquiry had led to Tony Lauer’s resignation
(Williams 2002, p.165), nominating his friend Peter Lamb of the National Crime Authority instead. The manipulation behind these politically orchestrated regime changes becomes all the more apparent when it is realised that the JTF was an inherently corrupt organisation and that moral crusaders were quite willing to use questionable ends to achieve their goals (McClymont 1995,1995a; Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997). Yet little has ever been revealed or written about the fact that Small, Lamb and Hadgkiss had all worked at the JTF as supervisors or that Hadgkiss had managed to prevent an earlier 1988 investigation into the activities of his colleagues there (Commonwealth of Australia 2003. LCA 859; Sun Herald 10 July 1988. p.40, editorial). This is not part of the debate and seems unlikely to ever become so.

If ‘progressive’ intellectuals such as David Brown (1997) can still support John Hatton and present him as a credible source of information after he has declared in the Sydney Morning Herald that ‘[w]hat this town needs is a good public hanging… We need to send a few of those crooked police to jail to get the message through…’ (Bearup 1996b), it is not difficult to understand the role being played by academics in this debate. Part of Brown’s criticism of the Wood Inquiry is that the research reports received from consultant academics were not published by the inquiry and he argues that this is a clear indication of the value accorded to social science and criminological research (Brown 1997, p.222). Regardless of their unpublished status, however, this is also a clear indication of the role the state has allocated to the intellectual community in the construction of hegemony. It is a subaltern role and the silence of traditional intellectuals and academics is as much of a contribution to reinforcing the existing class structure as is their ‘value free’ and ‘scholarly’ evaluation of the problem.

It is very evident that during the lead up to the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1997) the ‘White Knights’ had put their politicised version of ‘reform’ back into the criminal justice business plan. Their notion of ‘criminal justice’ is similar to the notion put forward by Abbott (2003) and Hadgkiss (2004,p.22) in relation to Building Industry reform. Hadgkiss argues that.

> Breaches of the Act are considered by some in the building and construction industry to be minor offences, but such behaviour affects the quality of life for people who have to live with the behaviours and their consequences every day. Over time, as the ‘small’ offences have been ignored, the normal social controls for maintaining public civility on construction sites have been eroded (Hadgkiss 2004,p.22).
The irony of this unoriginal standpoint by Hadgkiss is that it mirrors a 1982 article in *The Atlantic Weekly*, by neo conservative criminologists James Q Wilson and George Kelling.

The notion is that if a factory or office window is left broken, passers by will presume that no one cares and no one is in control, soon other windows would be broken. Soon that decay will broaden to the adjoining streets, which will become menacing and hostile (Wilson and Kelling 1982).

This is the very foundation of most contemporary police ‘reform’ that is shaped within the corporate-military ‘rule of law’ model of ‘zero tolerance’ policing. This strategy is, according to Bernstein et al (1975, p.76), designed to reorganise the police into an effective and docile combat organisation.

One of my research subjects—‘Dirk’—has fifteen years experience as a uniform officer and a detective and explains what impact the ‘reform’ process has had on operational police.

I think the cops today is being ruined, not only by policy changes that are not effective. But, you see these twelve-hour shifts on the truck, police doing twelve-hour shifts. Not only does it destroy camaraderie. It destroys each police officer to have ownership... The standard of briefs from uniform cops has just died, because they have to be out doing RBT [roadside breath tests] and they have no time, because they are not at work very often... They have to do so many RBTs per shift, they have to give an Intel report per officer per shift. Y’know they have a tasking sheet at the start of the shift, where they have to patrol certain streets. They have to drive past a certain address, which might be a targeted drug house... This is about quantity and I want quality. Everything is about numbers and that’s what the COPS [computer system] is all about. Easily downloadable data. Y’know, ‘How many cases have you done this year”? And ‘How many of you have done this”? Sure it might have a place in someone’s office somewhere but it doesn’t really change the way that Mrs Smith down the road has a problem with break and enters at her house, does it... they have no ownership, they are just clerical. They just go out take the report put it on COPS and ‘next please’. There is no ‘We’ll think about being a police officer’… There has to be some sort of lee-way for people that deal with blood and scum all of their life and get paid not much for it. Then get shit on for nothing. I think the only thing that I am focused on in this job is the negatives unfortunately. The more I think about it, the more I think I can’t stay in this organisation’ (‘Dirk’ 2002).

Within twelve months of this interview ‘Dirk’ had resigned from the police service. He was not offered an exit interview because his manager stated that he was far too busy applying for a promotion. Reiner (1978, p.6) argues that the conservative ‘war against crime’ imagery maintains that a military model is the most suitable for police. This became clearly evident...
post Wood Royal Commission when Commissioner Ryan announced the introduction of ‘…highly visible... accessible, rapidly deployed’ and ultimately ‘uncompromising’ policing strategies…’ (New South Wales Police Service 2000, p.3). The practical basis for this strategy, however, is a data-led, performance management strategy imported from the NYPD named Compstat—renamed by the NSW Police as Operations and Crime Reviews (OCR) in 1998 (Davis and Coleman 2000) but both strategies are commonly and crudely referred to as ‘zero tolerance policing’ (Davis and Coleman 2000, p.22-23; Kennedy, M. 2001, p.viii). Yet, as operational policemen like ‘Dirk’ in the interview above have found, this is a ‘birds’ structured management practice that has little to do with the skills required for good policing.
CHAPTER FOUR: I am a Team, Aren’t We?

Once ‘progressive’ intellectuals, journalists, politicians and Royal Commissioners have constructed social, economic and political contradictions as specific ‘problems’ of ultimately individualised agency, it becomes easy for them to provide ready ‘solutions’ as well. In fact, in an extremely politicised value-for-money society, intellectuals and other ‘experts’ are supposed to produce knowledge geared towards practical quantifiable results rather than just qualitative knowledge and theoretical understanding. In the wake of the Wood Inquiry, where the ‘problem’ had been readily identified as the agency of operational police and their ‘culture of corruption’, the solutions were obvious—‘changing police culture’ and ‘breaking the code of silence’ by building an organisation structured along the lines of rigorous management practices. This ‘new’ managerial regime would produce effective and measured performance results by embodying the principles of neo-liberal management and recruiting and training better educated, culturally sensitive police officers. Associate Professor Sandra Egger of the University of NSW, who was a member of the Police Board before the Wood Inquiry and was appointed to the community consultative group advising the Police Commissioner after this was abolished, is a great believer in the incorruptibility of the educated policeman.

I think it’s an entire professional attitude towards policing. I think that professionalism has to be encouraged at all levels. I think they certainly do need to have a fairly heavy dose, both in the initial training and education programs and all the way through, of ethics and so on (Egger and Lobez 1995).

Corruption, it seems, is purely an ethical failing and tighter supervision, recruitment incentives to senior police combined with ‘a fairly heavy dose’ of ‘education programs’ and training in ‘ethics’ will work miracles. There is a touching naivety in this idea that only the poorly educated commit crime or become corrupt.

The Policing Business Plan

To this achieve this end, the contemporary structure of modern police organisations has become a curious mix of corporate ideas, such as business plans, and para-military strategies, such as ‘zero-tolerance policing. The system uses the neo-liberal ‘markets’ framework and ‘managerialism’ to establish the administrative and operational policies but these must, overall, be cost-effective (Bernstein et al 1975, p.76) because, as Paul Barry (1995, p.157) argues, at the very core of this is the privatisation of the welfare state and its various agencies. The police force, like the army, would seem to be incapable of being privatised but this means
nothing to managers who have a tertiary education in corporate management practices. Imbued with such ideas, Superintendent Shearer of the New South Wales Police can say, in fashionable corporate language that dresses up homilies as profound observations, that ‘the force’ will have ‘to meet the needs of all shareholders of the community’ (Sutton 2004). This reference to the law abiding general public as ‘shareholders’ might appear to be only a small point and a question of semantics but, logically, the term is one intrinsically associated with the private sector and not the public sector. The inference is that management is running the organisation for the benefit of its shareholders—or ‘stakeholders’—but the reality is that in a capitalist society the most direct way for a business to make a profit and sustain capital growth is to lower the amount paid out in wages.

In the *Future Directions* policy of the New South Wales Police Service in 2000 it was stated that the commissioner will improve the monitoring of individual productivity and organise a ‘dignified’ exit for those officers who are no longer able to undertake the difficult and stressful work of ethical cost effective policing (New South Wales Police Service, 2000, p.6) but what this also says is that former public servants who cannot accept the move away from serving as a policeman in the community into the contradictory world of producing measurable cost effective results for the shareholders will be encouraged to leave the force as quickly as possible. Within this corporate framework, senior management are offered ‘perks’ such as bonuses and lucrative retirement benefits, over and above their generous salaries. For senior police any promotion prospects are directly aligned to whatever contribution they have been deemed to have made to their organisation’s ‘growth’ (Worsley 2002, pp.50-51). This involves the use of performance contracts to measure the competency of senior police in terms of increased supervision and ‘productivity’ demands on the rank and file to keep within the allocated budgetary constraints imposed from above (New South Wales Police 2002a). This reinforces the existing division of labour between administrative and operational police and separates the demands of management from the actual needs of the job.

‘Market discipline’ is applied to public service provisions in the name of obtaining better ‘value for money’. A good deal of this neo-liberal thinking about the police service echoes criticisms of public service provision generally but the argument is that because police are the monopoly suppliers of a service they have no pecuniary incentives towards economically efficient behaviour. Consequently, the bargaining power of the customer is negligible and competition is non-existent. The problem for such a neo-liberal, market-based analysis is that the ‘customer’ for the application of policing services is really the political arm of the state
and not the general public, and who these services will be directed for or against is determined by government and the administrative elites of the police service.

In New South Wales, achieving a ‘successful’ outcome for a senior policeman’s performance contract is a bonus that equates to 12.5% of the commissioned officer’s annual salary. This bonus is accrued over the five-year term of the contract and, in real terms, assists to offset additional taxation and superannuation contributions that are incurred when police are promoted to commissioned ranks (New South Wales Police Service 2002a). This bonus, of course, is achieved by exploitation—a factor that reinforces the division of labour that already exists between the political arm of the state, these commissioned officers and their rank and file counterparts. For these additional contributions have to be met whether or not the bonus is paid, meaning that, in essence, commissioned officers are coerced by these contract arrangements into enforcing a political agenda. In a neo-liberal political environment this additional supervision and aggressive competition that is produced by demands for increased productivity is a standard workplace expectation. Reinforcing this managerialism, Brockie (2000) explains that, for members of the police executive, additional productivity is only acceptable if it is accompanied with a business plan and the results can be quantified.

This neo-liberal ‘reform’ strategy is now much the same in New South Wales as it is in Los Angeles and New York where the ‘managerialist’ framework has intentionally limited resources and increased expectations. Policing is increasingly restricted to daylight hours, keeping shift penalties to a minimum, and the access to overtime is also restricted (Butterfield 2004). Perhaps Butterfield grossly overstates the problem. Never the less contemporary performance based ‘business’ style policing strategies ensure that any benefit for the police organisation is at the expense of the rank and file operational police, which ironically impacts upon the efficiency of the organisation. Although the ‘reform’ process and performance management policies were implemented with the agreement of the police union, rank and file police did not entirely support them. In a 2001 survey of 544 rank and file police, 513 thought union executives had been ‘compromised’ in their positions as both serving police and union representatives. Of these officers, 541 believed that the executive structure of their union, headed by President Ian Ball, was failing to represent their interests and most officers believed that it was inappropriately aligned to police administration and the state government (Kidman 2001a).

Administration, however, has an expansionary budget in comparison to the straitened cost cutting measures applied to operational policing. The Commissioner and his advisory group
almost tripled the manpower of criminal investigation units with the expressed aim of instituting ‘police reform’.

The Organisational Policy and Development (OPD) directorate boasts 109 personnel with space for an additional 89 staff. The list includes places for 67 frontline officers, including 26 sergeants, 14 inspectors and three superintendents. The group... oversees the contentious area of police reform... police sources claim local commands across the State are running at barely functional levels. Deputy Commissioner Ken Moroney said yesterday that the OPD played an important role in creating policing solutions and had made an enormous contribution to policy initiatives (Kidman 2001d)

By 2003 this ‘reform’ process had created a budgetary crisis for many local commands.

Western Sydney police are facing a cash crisis, with one station so broke it has been forced to issue officers with hand me down uniforms. Wage blow outs triggered by the January bush fires and an influx of recruits before the state election have been blamed for the problem... The situation is so parlous that staff... have been ordered to seek executive approval before spending more than $50, according to senior sources ... According to the New South Wales Police Association officials, bicycle police at Cabramatta have been forced to squeeze into ill fitting uniforms left by outgoing colleagues because the station cannot afford new gear... overtime restrictions are in place across the force’s Greater Metropolitan Region. A Police Association memo earlier this month warned that junior officers were being asked to work extra hours without pay. More police are also being rostered on morning shifts because it is cheaper... The cost cutting follows revelations in December that NSW crime squads had been ordered to restrict spending on fuel, phones and overtime (Kidman 2003a)

Yes Minister

With ministerial portfolios integrated to form large politicised departments with the top down structures that enable the ‘political management’ of day to day policy, the fate of a government minister or political party depends more and more on the visible performance of their department and, for this reason, the choice of advisors and department heads becomes crucial. Heads of departments no longer have tenure and this, Paola Totaro argues, ‘has resulted in an erosion of independence and an increasing reluctance among senior bureaucrats to stand up to their ministers’ (Totaro 2004). Instead, they are bound by performance agreement contracts that measure competency in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. The job description of the NSW Police Commissioner is now, according to journalist Marian Wilkinson, ‘thankless in part because it is so intensely political. Massaging crime statistics,
beating off corruption claims, managing police resources in marginal electorates are the bread and butter of law and order politics as practised in NSW’ (Wilkinson 2002a).

‘Massaging’, of course, is a kinder word than ‘manipulating’. ‘Beating off’ is another way of describing ‘covering up’ or ‘watering down.’ ‘Managing police resources’ on the other hand is simply an idiomatic expression relating directly to value for money policing (Emy and Hughes 1991, p.422). It is now standard practice to shape policing policies and strategies around the need to minimise electoral damage or maximise electoral opportunity rather than the needs of efficient operational policing. This is particularly the case in the more fashionable ‘law and order’ elections (Collins et al 2000, pp.4-5; Cowdery 2001, p.22). What is particularly interesting in Wilkinson’s argument is the description of the Commissioner’s job as ‘thankless’. In this context Wilkinson’s remarks appear to legitimise the administrative sleight of hand necessary for the manipulation of data and resources—surely, misconduct at an executive level. Although NSW Commissioner Peter Ryan implemented aggressive policing as part of the reform process, he publicly expressed surprise when senior staff manipulated data to achieve the necessary results.

Deputy Commissioner Jeff Jarratt claimed that crime had dropped, contradicting the findings of the head of the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Dr Don Weatherburn. Weatherburn hit back that very same day, saying that crime had gone up in all categories except murder, armed robbery and store theft. Jarratt then claimed he’d been using different police data. Ryan felt compelled to intervene, declaring Weatherburn to be the expert and rebuking Jarratt for using internal statistics that shouldn’t be quoted publicly. ‘Some of Jeff’s decisions worried me and I felt he wasn’t always ready to take responsibility for them,’ says, Ryan… (Williams 2002, p.297).

This incident was eventually seen to be the cause of Jarratt’s dismissal—an action described by anti-corruption campaigner David Dixon as ‘disgraceful, a crudely handled, dubiously motivated exercise of power against one of Australia’s most respected police officers’ (Dixon 2003).

With the Police Minister’s portfolio directly in the media firing line, additional funding is immediately made available in the event of a policing crisis—particularly one that could incur ‘electoral damage’ to the government (Emy and Hughes 1991, p.422). In everyday practice this means that although day to day criminal investigation remains restricted around New South Wales, electoral flash points are special funded and para-military action is immediately
directed into the front line (Parnell 2004). Once the immediate crisis is over, however, the Police Commissioner immediately removes this funding, explaining that if additional funding is still needed a ‘business’ plan must be prepared so that the Police Minister can justify the additional resources necessary for a permanent task force. The irony of this situation is that in Redfern, for example, both the Aboriginal community and the police organisation must provide a ‘business’ plan to secure state funding for policing this trouble spot. Labelled as efficient management and cost-effective policing, this is no more than an initiative to cut costs at the expense of services.

Of course, in terms of day-to-day conflict, the lack of community resources and social services for marginalised groups also has an impact. Over the years there have been many clashes between police and the Aboriginal community in the Sydney suburb of Redfern, an area with high unemployment, overcrowded housing, rampant poverty, poor community health and widespread drug, alcohol and family violence issues (Commonwealth of Australia 2001a, Gilling 1992, Griffiths 1995, Watson 2002a). Yet, in the most recent clash, which took place in 2004 during Sydney’s summer season, police were severely under-resourced and under-manned and forty rank and file police were injured after being showered with bricks and Molotov cocktails (Totaro, Levett and Jacobsen 2004). Despite the obvious structural link between social unrest, crime and poverty, the NSW Premier Bob Carr and Police Commissioner Moroney initially chose to blame alcohol, grief over a boy’s death and the unrelenting heat for the riot. No mention was made of the social decay widespread in the community.

As the riots in Redfern indicate, the uneasy mix of corporate cost-cutting and para-military tactics imposed upon rank and file police demonstrates very little grasp of the mechanics of policing. What is demanded is ‘increased productivity’ combined with ‘value for money’ work practices bolstered by a coercive promotion system that deceptively manipulates rank and file police into aggressive competition with each other. Much is said about ‘team players’ but it is hard to see how pitting one member of the ‘team’ against the others could possibly produce this. In the wake of the Redfern riot the division of labour within policing ranks was clearly exposed when a rank and file officer explained that there was a lack of co-ordination and support during the riots, with new recruits handed riot gear and ordered to the frontline without any instructions. This lack of leadership saw ‘[o]ne water bottle was passed along the line among twenty cops… There was no logistics or tactical support. There’s a feeling of annoyance at the way things were run there.’ Another rank and file officer criticised the lack of leadership displayed by commissioned officers who ‘stood around in a circle on their
mobile phones instead of directing operation’ (Kamper 2004). What this situation demonstrates is the lack of operational knowledge by the new highly educated officer managers as well as exposing the class bias towards rank and file police that does not seem to notice this ignorance or reward experience and expertise.

Urgent State Government funding for the redevelopment of the Redfern community area has been delayed, a government spokesperson explained, because ‘it had “always been the understanding” that the project would be privately financed’ (O’Rourke 2004). The heart of the problem in this instance is that such disadvantaged and minority communities hold very little electoral sway until they are caught up in a crisis and the fact that the police organisation’s annual budget fell short by $38 million (O’Malley 2004) goes some way towards explaining why there was a lack of resources for operational police. However, with the media focus turned onto the poor relations existing between the Aboriginal community and operational police rather than on the structural aspects of this social problem, and these bad relations being primarily put down to the racist attitudes of the police rank and file, a convenient scapegoat once more reduces electoral fallout.

When, as part of a law and order election strategy, the New South Wales Government had recruited 620 officers more than the budget could pay (Cowdery 2001, p.22; Kamper and Lipari 2003; Totaro 2003c), this budgetary crisis was explained to the media quite glibly as ‘the authorised strength of NSW Police is 14,454, but numbers fluctuate as classes graduate and older police retire… the service now has 620 unfunded officers in its ranks’ (O’Malley 2004). The real issue, of course, was political expediency but the core of the problem remains as lack of resources.

**Accountability at an Arms Length**

With its consultants pointing to the structure of the top down management organisation of the old Police Service (Dixon 1999b, p.148), the Wood Royal Commission asserted that ‘at the core of many of the problems that have emerged lies the traditional approach of the organisation to its staff’ and the ‘limited authoritarian and conservative outlook… [that] has permeated the upper levels of the service in the past’ (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, pp.207–208). Reform the organisational structure and it will heal itself of corruption. The new broom of managerialism, it seems to Dixon and Wood, will sweep all this corruption away, despite the findings handed down two years previously in the
Mollen Report that in the managerialist structure of the ‘reformed’ NYPD, set up after the Knapp Inquiry, ‘[t]he leadership is where the real problem lies’ (Mollen 1994a).

As I have already explained, however, the Wood Inquiry was far more than a moral crusade against corruption and had extremely politicised agendas mobilising an intellectual force of supportive subalterns. It was initiated as a strategy in a broader political crisis, sparked by the power struggle between Commissioner Lauer and Minister Pickering and played itself out against a background of class biased theories and an organisational ‘civil war’ between power bases in the NSW Police Service and those in the Australian Federal Police. This initial conflict was not the first instance in which a police minister had lost his portfolio due to the actions of the police department or the department head. During the 1970s police ministers from Queensland and New South Wales were forced to resign and in Victoria the rank and file police engaged in industrial action to avert a corruption inquiry (Finnane 2002). In South Australia throughout the 1970s there was continuous industrial action and resistance directed at what was considered as a ‘progressive’ state government. In 1979 a review of police industrial action concluded that police militancy was at its highest in fifty years (Finnane 2002, p.1). The political context behind so much of this industrial action is that, during the 1970s, ‘progressive’ state governments were already attempting to reduce the power of the public service and, as a part of this, the police force.

Ted Pickering, of course, was a minister in the conservative NSW State Government with its social and economic policy in line with the philosophy promoted by Francis Fukuyama (1992). In his book *The End of History and the Last Man* Fukuyama presented a new-right or neo-liberal point of view (Giddens 1994, p.9), speedily adopted by Pickering and the Greiner Government. The core focus of this Fukuyama inspired ‘reform’ was a value for money outcome and an expectation that workers—in this case the rank and file police—would increase their productivity to create this value-added ingredient. About this political background the analyses of Brown (1997), Dixon (1999b) and Hogg and Brown (1998) are conspicuously silent—their focus, it would seem, is single-mindedly upon management ‘reform’ and destroying the ‘culture of corruption’ by restricting the agency of the police. In so doing they answer the interactionist question of ‘whose side are you on?’ (Becker 1966, 1967) by demonstrating without doubt that they are subalterns of the state and that collateral damage—the self-esteem and workplace security of ordinary working class police—is clearly irrelevant in the wider crusade.
It is important to understand the impact that media and marketing—or ‘spin’ as it is now called—have had not only upon public support for these politically constructed ‘reforms’ and agendas but on the way intellectual ideas are both constructed and promoted. Journalism and publishing are ‘industries’ that hand out large rewards to those who catch the ratings or ‘sell’ newspapers and books as columnists and authors. Academic careers are also fundamental parts of this ratings power play. In a university environment that also treats education as an ‘industry’ and measures performance by the quantity rather than the quality of publications and gauges expertise by public visibility, the rewards for self-promotion are considerable. Academics act as consultants to Royal Commissioners and give advice to the Police Commissioner, the Police Minister and the Premier. New South Wales Premier Bob Carr has been described as ‘the maestro of communications, otherwise known as media manipulation’ which ‘means maintaining the strictest control of all government information that is potentially damaging’ (Mitchell 2003) and his subalterns rise alongside him as political advisors and are much in demand as ‘talking heads’ on current affairs programs such as Four Corners, the Seven Thirty Report or Sixty Minutes. Former high ranking police managers become advisers as well. When Assistant Commissioner Clive Small had his executive contract cancelled by Police Commissioner Ken Moroney in September 2003 he was immediately seconded to work as a crime prevention ‘adviser’ for Premier Bob Carr as it was widely held that he was been a strong performer in reducing electoral liability (Gibbs 2003e). For the Police Commissioner and his deputy have become little more than mouthpieces as well, ‘[m]assaging crime statistics, beating off corruption claims’ and ‘managing police resources in marginal electorate’ (Wilkinson 2002a).

The effect is obvious. Public servants, whose job literally is to serve the public, finish up serving the political interests of the ruling party because they are afraid of the career destroying consequences of making a mistake or stepping out of line… (Mitchell 2003).

As Cowdery (2001, p.22) explains, creating ‘moral outrage’ issues associated with lawlessness and broadly marketing the responses to these as ‘radical’ initiatives and ‘progressive’ actions, consistently maintains an image of business-like ‘performance’ and social control.

Political Advisors The Divine Right of the Chosen Few

In Australia, when the Commonwealth Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee was examining the role of government advisers in 2003, a retired intelligence officer
suggested to the inquiry that ministerial advisers should be legally compelled to appear before parliamentary inquiries so that ministers cannot avoid accountability for their actions. He said, ‘They have become experts as spin doctors designed to confuse and mislead the public’.

The truth is that the increasing role of ministerial advisers, with their lack of accountability, is one of the significant means by which ministers avoid public scrutiny and are able to keep Parliament and the public in the dark (Marriner 2003).

The Senate inquiry was also told how, as more and more control is politically exerted, the public service has been cowed into complying with the Government’s political objectives. It was interesting that they needed to be told. Although there is a growing level of debate about whether or not politicians and bureaucrats can be held accountable for their actions, as the political elite determine the outcome of this potential abuse of ‘political power’, it will be a reform that is slow in happening.

Political advisers are privy to the inner sanctum of government and wield enormous power which is shielded from public scrutiny. During the time Sturgess was a government advisor Police Minister Pickering came into conflict with Commissioner Lauer. According to Gibbs (1997), it after a meeting held between those opposed to Commissioner Lauer that Sturgess suggested that this was the right political climate for a Royal Commission. Sturgess and NSW Premier Greiner had already tried to get ICAC to take up police corruption but Sturgess was convinced that this would never happen. To get things moving, he spoke to independent MP John Hatton and his advisor Arthur King and offered them information on police corruption that he had obtained in his role as government advisor (Gibbs 1997). He had information at his fingertips because, as Marriner (2003a) relates in an article in the Sydney Morning Herald, ‘Bringing Advisers to Account’, junior public servants can be easily bullied by advisers to provide the information or advice that a minister wants. ‘In the present time,’ he said, ‘there is some reason to believe people are being rewarded for behaving inappropriately because it’s politically astute’.

In the case of the Wood Inquiry there are many who claim that it was their evidence that initiated the Royal Commission—amongst them an ex-police officer, Deborah Locke (Gibbs 1997)—but such evidence had been available to John Hatton for some time and could have been used long before if necessary. The time to expose corruption arrived only when it was decided that such evidence could be used against Tony Lauer. Only then was Deborah Locke publicly proclaimed as ‘one of Australia’s most high-profile whistleblowers’ whose actions
were potentially life threatening (Curtis 2003, pp. 12-17). This is a far cry from Mike Carlton’s scathing dismissal of inconvenient whistle-blowers as a ‘ratbag crew of disgruntled ex-coppers…’ (Carlton 2002b) or the treatment received by another New South Wales detective who, put in fear of his life because of a similar set of circumstances involving senior-police from the corrupt JTF network who were aligned with Sturgess and Hatton (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA 865-866; Williams 2002, p. 149), also tried to speak out. In this instance the Commonwealth Ombudsman replied that ‘[w]hy this should have been so is not entirely clear. This detective and his fears were irrational, as was his conduct in general’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA 869-870).

Interestingly, at the conclusion of the Wood Inquiry there were no sustained allegations regarding ex-Police Commissioner Lauer, in spite of the evidence of ‘one of Australia's most high-profile whistleblowers’. In fact Lauer later prosecuted Sturgess successfully in a civil action, despite the fact that Deborah Locke had given such apparently dramatic evidence against him (Lamont 2002c). The party-political connections between police ‘corruption’ and police ‘reform’ became unusually transparent on this occasion when a Labor Party advisor, police board member and academic at the University of New South Wales School of Law, Dr Sandra Egger, gave evidence for Lauer. Egger was a political party advisor on the opposite side of the ‘political power’ continuum to Sturgess. Yet, in describing the Wood Inquiry she used the same idiomatic language also used by Sturgess and her colleague Professor Brown (1997). Dr Egger commented that ‘allegations of serious police corruption had been “tumbling out” of the Police Royal Commission’ (Lamont 2002b). Whilst giving evidence for ex-Commissioner Lauer against Sturgess, she maintained the ‘corruption’ spotlight at the base of the policing institution while supporting the police hierarchy and legitimising the hegemony of the legal establishment and the state. She also assisted in the process of shifting the ‘political power’ from the department head to the Ministers office in one swift action. In Gramsci’s terms (1972) such traditional intellectuals are not just subalterns but are also opportunists and careerists. As such they are used and manipulated by the state but are, in the process, its very willing victims.

The Wood Inquiry investigation team and the JTF network also enjoyed very close links with the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office, where the head of that department is also a political appointment (Commonwealth of Australia 2002, 2002a). Ideally the relationship between the Ombudsman and the police is supposed to be at arms length but at a Commonwealth level this has not been the case. Former Minister for Justice, Duncan Kerr, once raised this issue in Federal Parliament.
In 1998 John Taylor, the then head of the Ombudsman’s law enforcement team, wrote to Mr X to explain the reasons for a decision. Mr Taylor is a former New South Wales public prosecutor. He maintained close social links with senior AFP staff, including those from Internal Investigations, whose work he was tasked to review. He is now Senior Assistant Ombudsman… (Commonwealth of Australia 2002a)

Kerr went on to explain the relationship between the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s office and senior police:

I have twice spoken in recent weeks about my concerns about the way in which the office of the Ombudsman appears to be structured so that apparent conflicts of interest exist between senior investigative staff or at least the relationships that exist between those officers and those in internal investigations within the AFP may be seen to be too close. I have become aware of one particular matter, that in relation to Mr X, which appears to have been dealt with within the Ombudsman’s office in a way which gives rise to the profoundly disturbing inference that there was a determination within the office of the Ombudsman that the complaint not be fully and effectively examined in an independent and fully satisfactory way (Commonwealth of Australia 2002b)

The centralising of political power by way of the state’s party political machinery is well documented. In September 2003 Police Commissioner Ken Moroney cancelled the executive contract of Assistant Commissioner Clive Small but refused to give any public reason and was not required to do so—Small was one of four police officers being investigated over allegations of professional misconduct (Saleh 2003). Although Police Commissioner Moroney is the head of a publicly funded state institution and not a private company, he had informed Small some time earlier that his contract would not be renewed but the decision would not be made public until a budget estimates hearing had been concluded. Despite the appearance that the Commissioner is independent, any attempt to legitimise the process by placing it under the mantle of government ‘business’ simply substantiates the political machinery influence in relation to government institutions.

However, Small had already been seconded to work as a crime prevention ‘adviser’ for Premier Bob Carr, to reduce electoral liability. ‘I hope my service has been and will continue to be of benefit to the people of NSW,’ (Gibbs 2003e) he announced after his forced
resignation and consequent re-employment. Small’s critics were not fooled, accusing Small of ‘bully tactics’ and arguing that government advisors positioned themselves above accountability (Marriner 2003a). ‘What Clive Small did... was to silence the dissidents,’ one of his critics said. ‘He wasn’t about fixing the problems, he was about silencing the voices of discontent,’ agreed another. Yet another said, ‘He used bullying tactics to prevent further outcry’ (Saleh 2003).

Clearly, under managerialism the separation of powers between the political arm of the state and government departments has now become so narrow that in some instances it does not exist at all. In Small’s case no reason was given for his dismissal because none was needed. As one advisor to the Police Commissioner stated, ‘It is not NSW Police policy to publicly comment on internal investigations’ (Saleh 2003). Perhaps this might be a reasonable argument if it was an accurate reflection of all such internal investigations, including those carried out on rank and file police in similar circumstances. In their case, however, it is not unusual for audio-visual data to be released through the media liaison unit, ensuring such action remains at an arms length from the police executive and the government. It is not unusual for this to take place even before formal allegations of misconduct are provided to the concerned rank and file police (Cornford 2002; Devine 2001; Kidman 2002a; Masters 2001; Mercer and Kennedy 2002; White 2001). Clearly, status and connections are very important factors in determining how such internal matters will be handled. This point is born out during my interview with ‘Gonzo’—a police officer with almost thirty years experience—who says, ‘I think the overall organisation makes the average officer feel worthless’ (‘Gonzo’ 2002). Apart from reinforcing the argument by Marx that alienated workers are people ‘robbed of all actual life content’ and rendered ‘worthless, devoid of dignity’ (Wood 2004,p.9), in this instance the division of labour has become emphasised not minimised under this ‘reformed’ regime with its powerful group of managers perched unreachably and lucratively above working class police.

‘Policing the Police’: The Federal Model of Progressive ‘Reform’

As a consequence of the Stewart Royal Commission into Drug Trafficking and the Mr Asia Syndicate in 1981 a corrupt and criminal relationship between organised crime figure Terry Clark, his ‘Mr Asia’ drug syndicate and the broader Federal Narcotics Bureau was exposed (Bottom 1988, p.151). As a result the Narcotics Bureau was restructured and many of its agents, including those suspected of criminal involvement regarding the importation and distribution of heroin, were transferred to other law enforcement agencies such as the
Australian Customs Service and a newly formed Australian Federal Police (AFP). Under the Australian Federal Police Act of 1979 officers were also integrated from the Australian Commonwealth Police and the Australian Capital Territory Police. This, too, was a centralising process designed to shift the organisational power of these policing institutions from the department head to the minister’s office. The AFP was a regionalised organisation with a presence in each of the seven states comprising the Commonwealth of Australia. In this federal model each of the states is reliant upon the Commonwealth for funding, inviting enormous levels of conflict and allowing lines of accountability to become extremely blurred. Because New South Wales has the largest population it follows that it also has the largest police organisation and subsequently the most sophisticated infrastructure. In 1979 some of the agents from the Federal Narcotics Bureau who were shifted to the AFP became part of the AFP/NSW Joint Task Force (JTF) into drug trafficking described in the previous chapter and in 1997 Commissioner Wood indicated to the International Anti Corruption Conference that this group was by far the main focus of his corruption inquiries (Wood 1997, pp.2.5, 2.6).

However, at the time the Federal and State Governments had decided to close the unit in 1988, there was very little publicity. As one officer commented: ‘Staffed by 11 NSW police officers and 10 Australian Federal Police officers, the JTF built up a level of camaraderie and commitment that has become legendary in police circles…’ (Thomas 1988). So, although the ‘criminal activities’ of the JTF had become well known, it was also well known that any attempt to expose their activities would be stymied by politically connected officers within the New South Wales and Federal Police most of whom were directly connected to JTF investigations. Attempts to complain about intimidation or the subsequent inaction given to these complaints met a similar fate (Commonwealth of Australia 2001, NCA. 42), (Commonwealth of Australia 2002, pp.8633-8635), (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, pp. LCA 656, LCA 844-885). Despite, or perhaps because of this history, the executive of the Australian Federal Police successfully managed to become a dominant ‘political’ force within the various Australian policing institutions with good deal of their status hinged on their reputation for ‘policing the police’—a media and marketing reputation in line with J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI in the United States.

As this was a reputation earned at the expense of many jurisdictions other than their own, it is not surprising that political advisors such as Gary Sturgess would look to this body to recruit senior management sympathetic to their needs. Sturgess made it clear that he supported ex-AFP executive and ex-JTF member Peter Lamb as a replacement senior executive within the New South Wales organisation (Williams 2002, p.149).
Despite the fact that some senior executives within the various policing institutions appear to wield enormous levels of power, this power is still dominated by the government. Gramsci (1971, pp.12–14) explains this ‘mirage’ of sharing power between the administrative elites and the political arm of the state by conceptualising this in terms of measuring the organic quality of the various layers of power and the degree of connection with a fundamental social group. The different layers of power correspond, on the one hand, to the function of ‘hegemony’, which is embedded by the dominant group throughout society. On the other hand there is the power associated with the direct domination exercised through the governing power of the state. The functions in question are absolutely connected by the intellectuals or administrative elites or senior executives within the state’s governing institutions and these are the ruling class ‘deputies’ or ‘subalterns’. As I have explained although in theory the deputies are not equals in terms of ‘political power’ to the governing group in practice they exercise and engage in the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.

During the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs—Crime in the Community hearing one ex-police officer gave evidence about how managerialism had been structured to benefit ambitious opportunists and careerists at the senior levels of policing institutions.

Witness: The bureaucrats doing these things are obviously not feeding information to our elected representatives. They are misleading them and being dishonest with them and they are doing so for the purposes of careerism and opportunism. That is one thing amongst politicians, because it is dealt with internally and quite effectively. Amongst bureaucrats, it is another thing, because it means that they engage in a political process and they are not supposed to. It becomes difficult because they move between [political] parties wherever the carrot is being dangled. They do whatever has to be done in order to move themselves forward. I do not believe that either [political] party is interested in what is happening—but it is happening (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA. 875).

In New South Wales the aggressive competition associated with managerialism was apparent within the ambitious factions of the senior management well before the Wood Inquiry. The ‘Black Knights’ and ‘White Knight’ struggles were a part of this, being nothing more than ‘wedge-politics’ and a crude metaphor for power-play between the state and federal law enforcement agencies even though these were to take place within an ‘anti corruption’ framework. This explains why there is an evident over-abundance of managers yet a distinct lack of leadership within state and federal policing institutions. It is factionalism not ideas that drives the disputes forward. Ken Moroney—later to become NSW Police Commissioner—and
six other senior officers have since been named at the Police Integrity Commission as being members of the legendary ‘Black Knights’ who had allegedly undermined corruption reform of the service (Kennedy, L. 2001a). Yet Gary Sturgess, described as ‘the intellectual driving force of the former Coalition Government as head of the Cabinet office and the architect of the Independent Commission Against Corruption [ICAC]’ (Riley 1996b), ensured that members of the Federal Police executive were placed into the senior management roles at the ICAC, the Wood Inquiry, and the National Crime Authority. The absurd contradiction here is that a highly influential contingent of the AFP senior executive favoured by Sturgess had also been part of the disgraced Joint Task Force or the redundant and corrupt Narcotics Bureau.

What appears to have happened in New South Wales is that the criminal justice establishment within the state’s governing institutions was prepared, in the pursuit of its own interests but under the mantle of ‘reform’, to use the antagonisms of this ‘civil-war’ between these two policing organisations to create an aggressive and highly publicised regime change in the NSW Police Service. The strategy, as I have shown, was a success but the investigative team had to remain immune from criticism, even after questions were raised regarding ‘corruption’ in the executive ranks of the AFP (Ramsey 1996). Parrying this, the Harrison Inquiry into the Federal Police was allowed to proceed but, at its conclusion only four weeks later, the Federal Attorney General Williams announced that the Commonwealth Government was not prepared to release the inquiry’s finding to the public.

Mr Harrison’s Report will not be publicly released. Because of the nature of the matters investigated by him, the Report necessarily canvasses in considerable detail the allegations made to him, the facts found by him, and the conclusions and recommendations formed by him. In so doing, it names many individuals—both within and outside the AFP, both innocent and potentially otherwise. For operational and privacy reasons, and consistent with the long-standing practice of all Governments, it is neither appropriate nor desirable that detail of this nature should now be placed in the public domain (Commonwealth Attorney General 1997).

Political reporter Alan Ramsey explained to mystified readers of the Sydney Morning Herald that, under Section 50 of the Australian Federal Police Complaints Act 1981, nobody could be compelled to tell Harrison anything. This is ‘a curious way to investigate allegations of corruption in what is supposed to be the country’s premier police force,’ he added wapsishly. With memories of the glaring publicity that had accompanied the Wood Inquiry into the NSW Police Service still fresh in the public psyche, it did indeed appear to be ‘a curious’ and
seemingly incomprehensible decision—unless, of course, it is seen in the light of its political ‘reform’ agenda.

Heading the Inquiry was Ian Harrison S.C., an established member of the elite Sydney legal establishment who had little experience in criminal law. The recommendation that he should head this inquiry came from the same Justice Wood (Ramsey 1996) whose own inquisitorial investigations had allowed the release of such lurid media revelations that these had moved even the conservative Gerard Henderson to damn the spectacle as ‘prime time titillation’ (Henderson 1996a; 1996b). Harrison’s suitability for the task was legitimised by the silence of the Commonwealth Attorney General and this, in turn, goes a long way towards explaining why such ‘a curious way to investigate allegations of corruption in what is supposed to be the country’s premier police force’ (Ramsey 1996) was adopted in the first place. This ‘Corruption Hunt’, far from being ‘A Lib El Cheapo’ as Alan Ramsay’s Sydney Morning Herald article contemptuously suggests, was obviously a well planned political approach to a potentially damaging political problem. The state’s governing power could be reinforced by Harrison, whose mysteriously silent crusade was publicly shrouded in privacy regulations. ‘Reform’ had been achieved and its enforcement agents must be protected.

The outcome of this prolonged series of staged battles in New South Wales was the implementation of a ‘reform’ strategy identical to the corporate-military model of policing identified two decades earlier by Bernstein et al (1975, p.76). In 2004 this reactionary model of ‘reform’ is now firmly in place despite Hatton’s rhetoric maintaining that ‘[t]here must be reforms to decentralise power and mechanisms put in place for true accountability at all levels. Most important of all perhaps, the force must drop its emphasis on the military model where there is unquestioning loyalty and a culture of not ‘dobbing in your mates’. The closed, protective culture, which runs from the policy academy to retirement, must be challenged’ (cited in Coultan 1995) but not if it is the political strategists’ ‘mates’ who are in the firing line for being ‘dodged in’. If the Wood Inquiry set out to publicise ‘dobbing’ in a glare of media hype, the Harrison Inquiry was its direct opposite, muffling the best attempts of the whistle blowers to be heard outside the closed room.

In this way, although managerialism is supposed to address the concern that public bureaucracies are too powerful, rigid and lacking in accountability (Stewart 1994; Wanna 1994), in practice the ‘reform’ process is about the re-location of power and the building of new structures that are largely unaccountable
One of my research subjects—former AFP officer ‘Kath’, who resigned after thirteen years service—only later questioned the actions of some of her senior colleagues who rose to prominence in the ‘reformed’ managerialist epoch legitimised by the Harrison Inquiry.

When I start to think about it. Because, I try not to! It’s frightening because it’s almost like they are an organised crime syndicate. Y’know what I mean, like when you get it down to the basics (Kath 2002).

Under ‘reform’ government advisors became even more powerful than public sector managers had once been (Stewart 1994, pp.186-192) but they ‘formally’ retain the impression of a separation of powers remaining between the minister and department. In actuality, ‘managerialism’ narrows the separation of powers because heads of departments are no longer specialised, they do not have tenure and their contracts are performance based. The proliferation of advisory bodies, ‘think tanks’ and consultancies that are at the beck and call of both the politicised department heads and the state’s party political machinery means that outside information and support is always sourced to justify a chosen policy framework with the result that all policy is ultimately decided upon by the state’s governing institutions.

That this has been intentional, can be seen in the cynical opinion expressed by Workplace Relations Minister Tony Abbott when he declared bluntly that ‘there are some things the public has no particular right to know’ (Kingston 2003a). Nor, he might have added, are they likely to be told.

Enter the Graduate School of Management

According to Dixon (1999b, p.148), the Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University was a major influence on the Wood Inquiry’s recommendations about what should constitute the ‘reform’ process and the influence of this school is obvious in the published findings of this inquiry, with its insistence that managerial change is at the heart of the reform. In the final report of the Wood Royal Commission it was explained that process change could be engineered from within by setting proper professional standards to maintain the performance of rank and file police (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.330). These ‘reforms’, however, had already been introduced into the Police Service prior to this report, although it would not have been convenient to stress that this was so at the time. ‘Solutions’ must appear new, even if they have been taking place for some time, and the considerable problems they are experiencing need to be glossed as ‘resistance to change’.
These management ‘reforms’, Edwards (1999, p.306) explains, have benefited educated senior officers at the expense of their rank and file counterparts to the extent that, as Stewart (1994, p.188-192) has argued, a university degree has now become a prerequisite to a reasonable chance of promotion. In the New South Wales Public Service, a Senior Executive Service (SES) had already been introduced to politicise organisational control under the banner of merit based employment. Outside applicants could apply to be members of the police executive (King 1995) and performance management contracts were becoming a compulsory component of employment and could be terminated on the basis of unsatisfactory performance. The final report of the Wood Inquiry asserted that a tense relationship between the executive and the rank and file union had not helped in securing joint progress towards reform (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997 p.211) without mentioning that unrealistic demands for increased productivity and a heightened division of labour had resulted in rank and file alienation and a heightened perception by operational police that they were worthless and denied any dignity of service. Certainly, this had fed the conflict between the executive and the rank and file (Wood 2004, p.9) and the ensuing confrontation had even led to the union attempting to by-pass the Police Commissioner by approaching the Police Minister or the opposition Police Minister in order to debate change. The result, as I have shown, was the label of ‘resistance to change’.

The Wood Inquiry’s ‘transformation change and reform process consultant’ was Dr Peter Crawford from the Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University (Dixon 1999b, p.149). Crawford’s ideas, maintaining that change is the hub of the reform process because it allows police officers to progress by lifting their performance and setting proper professional standards, fail to identify that such ‘reform’ supplants valuable initiatives developing organically through operational experience with those imposed from above by their senior management and learnt in university institutions such as Macquarie’s Graduate School of Management. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that intellectuals are increasingly seeing themselves as a priesthood generating the power of ideas with nothing to learn from those outside their elite circle of intellectuals. With a flatter management structure, it is said, the emphasis is on values and codes of ethics but, ultimately, the task of management becomes little more than the policing of the police and keeping the ideas the organisation in line with the electoral needs of the state and the current fashions in vogue in academe.

There is something quite disconcerting about the ‘major influence’ played by the Macquarie University Graduate School of Management in legitimising the ‘solutions’ provided by Wood Inquiry and its subsequent ‘reform’ initiatives. In 2000 NSW Police Commissioner Peter
Ryan was awarded an honorary PhD by the Graduate School of Management and in his acceptance speech he reinforced the virtue of competitive and aggressive management by elaborating upon the importance of individual competition within large organisations. Subsequently Ryan became a member of the newly established Advisory Council of the Graduate School of Management (Macquarie University News June 2000 p.13). Interestingly, in May 2000 HR Monthly (Davis and Coleman 2000) had announced that, in a jointly funded project, the NSW Police Service and the Graduate School of Management were researching the effectiveness of the Operations and Crime Review (OCR) performance management strategy that had been introduced into the NSW Police Service in 1998 as part of the Wood Inquiry recommendations.

The Graduate School of Management could hardly be considered an independent and impartial body ready to undertake this necessary research. The OCR ‘reform’ process involves data-led, aggressive policing and increased productivity at a base level and is directly modelled on the NYPD ‘Compstat’ model of performance management widely referred to as ‘zero tolerance’ policing (Kennedy, M. 2000, p.16; Kelling and Coles 1996). Ultimately, this ‘reform’ initiative is about control and, as it is designed to combat the problems of social breakdown on a massive scale (Hopkins-Burke 1998a; Greene 1999; Palmer 1997; Shapiro 1997; Skolnick 1999), it serves a remarkably political function. The Hay Group Consulting Consortium (2000, p.61) reports that the adversarial approach adopted by senior management in the course of Operations and Crime Review (OCR) meetings reinforces the culture of ‘fear and punishment’, allegedly characteristic of the past organisation but, in effect, heightened in the present ‘reformed’ institution. They believe that rank and file police are the scapegoats of the ‘reform’ agenda and, as they are managed by terror, they demonstrate a growing awareness of the gap between the rhetoric and reality of reform. This is aggravated by a lack of operational respect, leading to a developing cynicism and demoralisation (Jones 1980).

In terms of policing crime troublespots and policing the police, however, this methodology is presented as being ‘highly visible, ‘accessible’ and capable of being ‘rapidly deployed’ to provide an ultimately ‘uncompromising’ policing strategy (New South Wales Police Service 2000, p.3). In order to achieve these data-led objectives, however, discretion and the more difficult to measure qualitative information are whittled away in pursuit of productivity gains. These have been integrated by corporate marketing and image shaping into an apparent model of corporate ‘reform’. In practice, however, when the New South Wales ‘anti-corruption reforms’ were audited, the results were far from complimentary:
Reforms aimed at fire proofing the police force against corruption were systematically limited, inconsistent, misguided and fragmented… The 300-page report was commissioned by the Police Integrity Commission (PIC) and prepared by the Hay Group consulting consortium… The report also found staff were confused and officers felt they were being ruled by fear… [The audit report] also found Mr Ryan’s pursuit of cost-effective crime reduction differed from the Wood royal commission recommendations… According to the report, some senior police believed they were being ruled with ‘management-by-fear’ (Miranda 2001).

The Impact of ‘Progressive Reform’ on the Police and Policed

In her book, Sexed Work, Lisa Maher (1997, p.1) analyses the involvement of women in crime and deviance, explaining that women are portrayed as either passive victims of oppressive social structures who are devoid of any choice and only serve to reinforce these oppressive structures, or as active subjects who seek to maximise ‘deviant’ or ‘criminal’ chances in a new world that is without structure, power and discrimination. Maher asserts that both arguments over simplify the relationships between the broader socio, economic and cultural formations that exist. Subsequently, Maher (1997, p.100) argues that within the ‘highly gendered’ context of a street level drug economy in New York, individual police officers exercise considerable discretion in deciding what to ignore, what to police and what not to police. Maher concludes that many police harass women drug users simply because they can do so with impunity.

In doing so she fails to see that the choice of discretion for rank and file police has been whittled away by the performance management policy. Any analysis of the degree of coercion and consent that is within the reach of police discretion has to be observed from the highly politicised, data driven structure of ‘zero tolerance’ policing. In this instance, of course, the contradictions of discretion and increased productivity have to be measured against a community of women drug users and prostitutes who exist as a soft policing target. Harassment represents a data driven response rather than simply an agency choice. As Green (1999, pp.171–187) explains, there is an almost total lack of choice in ‘zero-tolerance’ policing. Popularised in 1993 by the high profile Mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, the policy put a major emphasis on the aggressive policing of the beggars, peddlers, drug-dealers, graffiti scribblers and prostitutes who occupied the streets in high-crime neighbourhoods—the precise group that Lisa Maher (1997) was to champion in her critique of the operational police. Giuliani’s campaign promise was to reclaim the streets of New York for law-abiding citizens and these types of disorderly persons and small-time criminals fitted a flesh-and-
blood profile of those who get in the way during such a campaign. They also fit in with the ‘broken windows’ theory of policing first promoted by Wilson and Kelling (1982). Far from being a matter of individual agency and the coercive actions of ‘street level bureaucrats’ as Janet Chan (1997, pp.65–66, pp.214–217) and Lisa Maher (1997, p.100) choose to believe, operational police are increasingly directed by politicised policies developed at management level. As a result, they become scapegoats and, as my research subjects invariably relate, morale plummets.

‘Athol’ is an ex police officer with over thirty years experience and he has recently retired. He is astutely aware of the extent to which ‘managerialism’ and the shift in ‘political power’ has impacted upon the policing vocation and destabilised the police as an organisation. ‘Athol’ doesn’t pretend that corruption is nonexistent but he is aware that aggressive competition has been fostered and encouraged by the executive of the ‘reformed’ New South Wales police organisation:

I would like to see a stability come back into the department. But, I am pretty sure it won’t for many years because it will go through. It will go through a re-formation or reformation on a lot of things. They have recently said that they are going back to have some squads. Now, there was nothing wrong with the squads there has always been bad apples everywhere. It will not be a corruption free force, it doesn’t matter what happens, the young ones joining today, there is more young police and this is only a society trend, more young police using drugs before they get into the job. There are police using drugs whilst they are in the job and we are just a [reflection] of society… basically you choose the police from society, you choose your teachers for society and that’s it, that’s all we are. Of course in my day when I joined values were different. You would not challenge. Now young kids at school are taught to challenge everything they are told. Aggression today is unbelievable, aggression in driving. I mean it’s a society that is to my way of thinking has to get by on being aggressive. And it’s wrong, it’s wrong (‘Athol’ 2002).

‘Lazlo’ is a police officer with almost fifteen years service and he is concerned about the extent to which ambition and promotion has impacted upon the day-to-day life of rank and file police. He is alarmed about the productivity and data-led characteristics of managerialism and how they have impacted upon policing institutions as a whole. He explains how senior police have shaped a work environment where individual rank and file police are coerced into competing with each by having their productivity placed on the work-place notice board (‘Lazlo’ 2002). This productivity indicator is then used as a performance measure to ascertain the competency of individual rank and file police. There can be no doubt that this procedure is aligned to an earlier discussion regarding the non-executive commissioned officers
performance contracts, which have a 12.5% bonus facet (New South Wales Police Service 2002a).

In order to place this into a ‘world-view’ perspective it is important to examine the priorities being presented to the public and how these have a bearing not only on the coercive aspects of policing but also on the discretionary choices that are available to rank and file police. In 2002 NSW Premier Bob Carr maintained that NSW had become a better and safer place under Commissioner Peter Ryan (Gibbs 2002c) despite the fact that the data indicated that crime rose in almost all categories during this time. Less than twelve months later that same Carr Government was still lauding statistics as proof that data driven high-visibility policing was working.

[T]he new Police Commissioner Ken Moroney says they are the best crime statistics in a decade…

With the release of the State’s official crime statistics yesterday showing crime has gone down in six separate categories, Premier Bob Carr and Police Minister Michael Costa joined Mr Moroney in trumpeting their efforts in reducing crime in NSW (Kamper and Lipari 2003).

However the qualitative side of data-led policing is born out by events that took place in the New South Wales town of Dubbo in 2003.

[M]ore than 130 officers and a helicopter brought in from across NSW to answer a public outcry that crime was up and police numbers down… Police are reeling from the negative response to Operation Vikings 23… The two-day blitz was aimed at theft and anti-social behaviour but it ended up a PR nightmare… One driver complained of being breath tested seven times in one night… The state’s youngest councillor, Ben Shields, said police were unfairly harassing teenagers and the whole operation was an election stunt. Police pulled over more than 4300 cars, more than a quarter of the town’s drivers, and breath tested 4157 people. Eleven people were arrested and more than 400 were fined for speeding and traffic offences (Sofios 2003).

The reasons behind this incident were adequately explained by ex-policeman Mark Fenlon, when he gave evidence before the Commonwealth Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs—Crime in the Community.

Mr Fenlon: In November 2001, I penned a complaint to the Police Integrity Commission and to the New South Wales Ombudsman in relation to the falsification of statistics surrounding the Police and Public Safety Act, namely move-ons and night searches that were being conducted. My
contention, based on the statistical returns that I had examined at Blacktown LAC and at other local area commands in the western suburbs of Sydney, was that the statistics in relation to night searches were being artificially inflated… the two proactive arms of the Blacktown police station, were engaging in misconduct in order to drive up those statistics. Basically they were creating false knife searches and conducting knife searches without reasonable cause consistent with the confines of the act… I made a complaint basically to highlight and to demonstrate the managerial organisational culture that exists within the Police Force and our managers’ complicity in political policing. In other words, the New South Wales government introduced the Police and Public Safety Act as a direct response to negative publicity it was receiving in terms of street crime. It introduced the legislation, got it passed and then gave it to the Police Service for implementation. The police senior executive had to demonstrate that the legislation works… It goes down the chain of command. It goes from state command, in this case Jarratt [Assistant Commissioner] and Ryan [Commissioner], down to the regional commanders and then down to the local area commanders to enforce this legislation to ensure that we get results. I really do not blame people like Les Wales [Commander at Blacktown] it is not their fault that they are weak-willed men. If they do not comply, they face non-renewable contracts…

CHAIR: Could you explain about non-renewable contracts?

Mr Fenlon: They [Senior Police] are all on contracts.

CHAIR: Who are?

Mr Fenlon: The superintendents. Local area commanders and above—superintendents and above—are on employment contracts of, I think, four years… That is the situation facing local area commanders. You comply and you provide the statistics that are required of you or face the Spanish Inquisition [OCR or in New York Compstat]. This is what has gone on: you face the Operational Crime Review; you are beaten about the head with the statistics for your local area command and you might be looking at the non-renewal of your contract at the end of the day…

CHAIR: Who determines whether it gets renewed or not?

Mr Fenlon: The Commissioner of Police.

CHAIR: So it is at his discretion totally?

Mr Fenlon: Yes, absolutely. It is as if there is an axe held over the neck of every local area commander: ‘You will comply and you will do as you are told, or else. And you will make this legislation work and you will make it appear as though it is working, or else.’ That is what has happened in this case (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003, LCA. 824-825).
In giving this evidence Fenlon outlined the rationale behind the highly politicised strategy of ‘zero-tolerance’ policing in which the performance contracts of senior police have become a coercive tool to ensure the desired results. As long as data from arrests and searches are used to assess productivity this manipulation will continue. Fenlon’s evidence is a clear outline of the oppressive power now being wielded within the allegedly flatter management structure introduced during neo-liberal reform.

At this point I want to return to the interview with ‘Lazlo’ (2002), where he explains that the competitive component of policing is a game between rank and file police their senior counterparts and the government. In this instance the division of labour within policing institutions is portrayed as a match and the result is about who can play the game the best. The problem in this competitive process, however, is that rank and file police are alienated from their collective social core and their collective vocational solidarity when they play this game (Lovegrove 2003). It is, therefore, hardly surprising, given the weight of opinion against them and the structure of the reforms that pit them one against the other, that the solidarity of these working class policemen should be fragmenting (Sivanandan (1990, p.16). Nor is it any wonder that contradictions might be escalating and the resistance and misconduct that is part of deviant behaviour, however minor, would increase rather than decrease. What is necessary, of course, is not to focus on fragmentary experience but to draw these into positive political action (Bernstein et al 1975, p.144) but neither conservatism nor ‘progressivism’ can do this as they enhance the division that leads to control. And so, instead of teamwork, the focus is on personal survival and individual competition.

Lazlo: Police now don’t talk about jobs [criminal investigation] when they socialise. They just talk about who got promoted and when the next promotion is going to be up and how you can get promoted. That’s all they discuss.

Interviewer: Is that one of the big down sides of the new police?

Lazlo: It’s horrible.

Interviewer: How would you describe police work to an outsider?

Lazlo: You just imagine a person who puts data into a computer.

Interviewer: It’s just about numbers?

Lazlo: That’s all it is. This massive mess where your policing abilities get justified by how many intelligence reports that you submit. Not how many people you lock up or not actual policing. But, how many intelligence reports you submit per month determines whether you are a good police
officer or a bad one… every month, every month the list comes out. A beautiful graph, it costs thousands of dollars to put it together.

Interviewer: Whereabouts is the graph?

Lazlo: Well each LAC [Local Area Command or Police Station]. Each individual and then each command, each LAC and then it goes up and up.

Interviewer: And so everyone sees it. Everyone knows who is not doing anything and who is doing something?

Lazlo: Well who is not putting in intelligence reports and who is.

Interviewer: But is it about quality or quantity?

Lazlo: No it about quantity. And the problem is and I say this a lot. Maybe one or two out of an office of people or an LAC would know the value of intell reports. The rest put it in to get that number that they have to get, it’s like a quota… I think that policing has always been a game. It’s just who plays it better (‘Lazlo’ 2002).

Although Fenlon was a uniformed officer and ‘Lazlo’ is a detective both perspectives are from an operational standpoint and both of these interviewees offer an insight into the aggressive competition that has been installed amongst rank and file police by neo-liberal ‘reform’. This particular insight reveals how aggressive competition exists and mutates amongst rank and file police who struggle and feed from the process whilst they are attempting to resist (Cliff 1982). Despite the fact that the mutation period is often one of conflict and struggle, some individuals maintain their competitiveness whilst others fall away and are quickly replaced. Ultimately it is the aggressive competition that determines the agency of the rank and file police because, although it is an alienating process, they have to reinforce and feed from the process if they want to remain in the policing institution. Harman (1983, pp.24–25) argues that this alienation simply transforms itself from a collective struggle to an individual struggle and takes the shape of either resistance to the state or compliance that is aligned to careerism and ambition. Cliff (1982, p.234) explains that in these circumstances workers who have lost their loyalty to their traditional organisations are forced into extreme, explosive struggles on their own. These explanations all give reasons why many senior police and administrative elites share similar socially constructed peculiarities in terms of their rank and file colleagues.

On the other hand, another of my research subjects—‘Sandra’—is an Intelligence Officer [Intell] and a veteran of a twenty-one year operational/intelligence policing career in the lower
socio-economic suburbs of Western Sydney. ‘Sandra’ understands the resistance and struggle of her operational colleagues, saying:

They [senior-management] seem to be focusing a lot of statistics. So if they can reduce the statistics that’s fine. But they seem to be more focused on that, crime statistics (‘Sandra’ 2002).

When I asked ‘Sandra’ about budget allocations for operational policing and the relationship to statistics, she interrupted me and stated very passionately:

It’s budgets, its budgets. I would say a good percentage of it would be determined by crime statistics… It would be hard to say [how much]. It really would. But, just on that subject alone. This morning at a parade [shift change over] I said that our robberies are down, extremely low, which is excellent. The comment [from management] was well that will be great for the budget, y’know we won’t be spending more money investigating. Instead of investigating twenty robberies we will only be investigating six. It should have nothing to do with the budget whatsoever. If you have got a crime it should be investigated to the nth degree, until such time as you have an offender or you have exhausted all avenues of inquiry. I will freely admit I have bought things out of my own pocket for my office. Ranging from photo albums to other miscellaneous type items of stationary, in order to produce a product that I think needs to be produced. Either because they haven’t got it upstairs in the stores, or because they have not got the money (‘Sandra’ 2002).

The empirical data gathered for this thesis confirms the connections between managerialism, data gathering, aggressive policing, performance management and executive contracts and the interviews also show how the collective solidarity of rank and file police is being fragmented by the ambition and opportunism of senior police. Kidman (2003c) explains that the New South Wales Ombudsman had conducted a year long investigation into the allegations by Mark Fenlon and had determined that the data compiled at one of Sydney’s busiest commands has been ‘substantially inflated’. Kidman explains that senior police concede that similarly ‘inaccurate recording’ may have happened across the state—presumably as part of that fundamental task during which crime statistics are ‘massaged’ for political purposes (Wilkinson 2002a).

As a result, Police Commissioner Ken Moroney has been asked to advise Bureau of Crime Statistics chief Dr Don Weatherburn of the risks involved in relying on this data for future research. Dr Weatherburn said the Ombudsman’s findings had effectively tainted almost five years of the bureau’s records. Watson (2003) explains that six months prior to this Deputy Commissioner Dave Madden has been elated by the 2002 crime figures, which were released
by the Bureau of Crime Statistics. In line with the politicised electoral implications of this managerialist standpoint, Commissioner Moroney called for Australia’s first comprehensive survey into fear of crime. In this process he appeared to genuinely concede that unease over crime rates is a debilitating problem. However the real substance of the allegations pertaining to data manipulation arise from the fact that the performance contract of Commissioner Moroney is assessed on ‘overall crime rates as well as perceptions (Wainwright 2003).

The Crumbling Solidarity of Operational Police

One of my research subjects—‘KD’—is a fifteen-year veteran of policing in Sydney’s lower socio economic areas and a specialist in child abuse investigation who resigned shortly after this interview. ‘Gabby’ is an officer who has spent ten years policing the same lower socio economic areas. When they agreed to be interviewed ‘KD’ and ‘Gabby’ requested that they could be interviewed together and both insisted that I made it known that they were both lesbian police officers but are not partners. Apart from their insistence another reason that I mention their sexuality is that this displays overall that I have interviewed a broad range of interview participants regarding their policing experiences. When I asked ‘KD’ and ‘Gabby’ about the reformed New South Wales organisation they replied in turn:

‘KD’: It’s across the board, everyone is jumping over each other.

‘Gabby’: Everyone has got the shits.

‘KD’: You know they are trying to get promoted. Everyone is spending more time with job applications and studying for PQAs [pre qualifying assessment for promotion] than doing their work, it’s pathetic.

‘Gabby’: The knives are out [back stabbing], they bag [criticise] each other constantly and it becomes really vicious.

‘KD’: That’s all people are worried about today I have noticed around my rank [Senior Constable] especially. They think it is their right by the time they have been in the job [police] ten years or so. Whoever’s idea it was to reduce it to five years, like as soon as you reach five years you can become a sergeant, well it’s just ridiculous. It should be ten years minimum as far as I am concerned. You have to do your time and get the experience.

‘Gabby’: And grow up.

‘KD”: You have got seven year constables out there, that are one day bloody senior constable and the next day a sergeant, seven years in the job.
Interviewer: Well I suppose the next question is. Is there any hope for the future?

‘Gabby’ and ‘KD’: No (KD and Gabby 2002).

Nathan Vass (2001) explains the frustration of rank and file police in dealing with the promotion system, where police Internal Affairs was investigating claims of widespread misconduct regarding the promotions system. The appointment of some three hundred management positions was called into dispute by claims that some applicants had advance notice of test questions. Kidman (2001c) relates that senior executive officers were repeatedly alerted to the problems with the promotion system over a two years period but failed to act. When I asked ‘KD’ and ‘Gabby’ about the outcome of the Wood Royal Commission they returned to the same emphasis that was being placed on workplace competition.

‘KD’: At the moment the organisation is all about people jumping on top of one another trying to be promoted. That’s mostly what the people do in my office. And I don’t know if it’s like that in your office Gabby? But that’s all people seem to be worrying about. And because it’s from five years onwards it’s the majority of people out there.

‘Gabby’: The pool is huge.

‘KD’: It’s a huge pool and they worry more about that than doing their job and it’s sad (KD and Gabby 2002).

It was quite interesting that both of these officers agreed with the sentiment expressed by the retired officer ‘Athol’ and yet had never met him. At one point during the interview KD turned to Gabby and asked:

‘KD’: Why do you want to leave Gabby?

‘Gabby’: Because I can not think of anything worse than being forty years of age working on a [Uniform Patrol] GDs truck and that’s the only place that I feel I can go to. The chance of promotion is very minimal. Yeah I don’t see it [the police] as a career anymore… I think I will be very disgruntled in another eight years.

Interviewer: What about you ‘KD’? Why do you want to leave?

‘KD’: Like I said it is management more than anything and also the fact that our job [police] just becomes more and more difficult. There is more to know. You can’t know everything, but my head spins some days with the memo’s that get sent to you and policy changes and legislative changes and you just can’t keep up with it. Like I said once I aspired to be a sergeant and now I think that it just doesn’t mean anything. And I loathe having to go through that frigging assessment centre, which you have to, only in child protection mind you. No other sergeant’s
position that I would apply for would I have to go through an assessment centre, but in child protection you do. And I don’t agree with it. I just don’t agree with the process and it’s really hard to be part of it when you just don’t agree with it, at all. Like I said there is no respect anymore anyway, it just means nothing. So why bother? (‘KD’ and ‘Gabby’ 2002).

‘Dianne’ is a working class married mother of three and a veteran officer of thirteen years who has worked in some of Sydney’s most marginalised socio-economic areas. I spoke to ‘Dianne’ about the ‘reform’ aspects that had impacted upon rank and file police and she discussed the heightened surveillance and supervision of rank and file police but stressed the lack of management support. ‘Dianne’ explained how incompetent senior police would not make decisions and would not accept any responsibility for their own role. What made this all the more interesting was that I knew both of the managers that she was referring to and the criticism regarding their lack of leadership and management skills came as no surprise. ‘Dianne’ also differentiated between the working class and the underclass community members. In this process she explained that whilst the working class seemed to understand the role of the police the underclass remained hostile.

‘Dianne’: We are more accountable for everything that we do. And we make the slightest error and then you are the worst person in the world, they [management] jump on you straight away.

Interviewer: Internally or externally?

‘Dianne’: I find more internally. Externally if you go, or depending on what areas that you go to the unemployed they are more inclined to blame us for everything. The worker, so to speak, they appreciate what we are doing and they are happy with the line of work and how we are going and they understand how difficult it is, or that the job is. But internally, you get I suppose forced to go out constantly [on patrol] to do your work and you never get the time to do paperwork. They [the hierarchy] never give you a break and you never feel appreciated for what you are doing. You make the slightest mistake and straight away you are getting investigated (‘Dianne’ 2002).

‘Dianne’ explained that one of the most difficult issues at her workplace was that the senior commissioned officer was known to many of the rank and file police as having much less experience in terms of years and operational duty. In fact within twelve months of this interview this officer was removed from his operational command and placed in an administrative role in the NSW Police headquarters. Ironically along with many others he is now referred to by rank and file as one of the many ‘OIC [Officers in charge] of corridors’.

‘Dianne’: The main problem is that he will just not make a decision… about anything, and then we have [the second in charge]… you know him as well. I am not talking to him at the moment. I
actually had an argument with him about two weeks ago, because of a probationary seven weeks in the job. I worked with him for one day or half a day and then I handed him back to his buddy [training officer] that he was supposed to be with for the next six weeks. And it turns out when I had finished with him I told his buddy about what was happening about an accident that we went to. The probationary did not finish the accident off properly on the COPS [Police Data Base] and he wasn’t back at work for another week or so. The second in charge was complaining about that. I said, ‘Well it is not the probationer’s fault because he does not know any better. He is only going off what we say’. So they cannot just go straight away criticising the pro’s [Probationers] they have got to look at something like training then and ensuring that they know what to do right, instead of just criticising them. This is what we have to put up with all of the time. (‘Dianne’ 2002).

At the time I interviewed ‘Dianne’ there was a very public debate about the quality and attrition rates of new recruits. A good deal of this was linked to the poor supervision but little was ever said publicly about the managerialism and the lack of meaningful leadership for rank and file police. Jacobsen (2001) explains that the NSW Police Academy training course is being reviewed after nearly half its students failed to complete their first year.

‘Larry’ is a young detective with eight years service. He is a university-educated policeman from a public service family in Canberra rather than a traditional working class family. Nevertheless, he has worked in some of the most violent and explosive suburbs in outer Sydney. When I concluded the interview with ‘Larry’ I asked him if there was anything further he would like to say, expecting that he would say nothing. However, ‘Larry’ explained his reservations about the recruiting policy and the notion that all police needed to be university educated:

‘Larry’: I think in recruiting it’s hard to know what to do if they are going for numbers and not quality, but maybe they need numbers. I don’t think the forced education of police is a good idea. I don’t think that making police compulsorily do university education is a good idea. And I am someone who wholly supports universities in relation to the police. But unless you want to do it, unless you are going to benefit there is no point… It’s to the benefit of police, but providing they do it properly (‘Larry’ 2002).

Despite the managerialist rhetoric, the logistics of the fierce competition involved in an allegedly merit-based promotions system creates a workplace that is directly antagonistic to teamwork. Brown reports the case of one senior officer distributing internal knowledge to others in the team, but the officer admitted that this was done in order to built up a network of colleagues who could assist him to become president of the police union (2001h).
Unsurprisingly, with police union representatives seeing this as a personal career move, the union’s rank and file members feel unrepresented because the police association executive maintains the party political standpoint that keeps the rank and file in place (Jacobsen 2001). There is now a demonstrably high attrition rate in policing—of the five hundred students who start the policing course it is far from unusual for only two hundred and eighty to graduate. Nor is this attrition rate directly related to higher educational policing expectations.

‘Joe’ is an officer with eighteen years experience and, prior to joining the police, he served an apprenticeship in the metal industry. He has worked as a detective in the lower socio-economic areas all of his service. Whilst being interviewed he volunteered comments about the failure rate of police recruits. In the process he reinforced the notion that conflict is generated by the different networks existing between vocationally and university educated police. ‘Joe’ made reference to the new police recruits being ‘cake eaters’. This was, in fact, a reference to the perceived belief that new recruits had a pre-occupation for drinking coffee and eating cake, which according to rank and file police is what academics and the ‘talking classes’ do best.

‘Joe’: They are all cake eaters the new police. You may have just heard that 50% of the police that should have passed out in a recent passing out parade failed their physical. The problem with that is its because we are now an academic police force they go through the university system and don’t have the checks and balances they used to have. Where before you would be allowed in the police force you would have to do a physical and be accepted as physically fit… and I’m not saying a university mentality is wrong that’s fine for university… but we are a paramilitary organisation and because they have come through the university system they don’t really have the discipline of the police academy system. Even though it is actually at the police academy. So quite a lot of the time they don’t do as they are told and when you try and pull them into line in a supervisory capacity they cry and whinge and carry on, literally cry yeah. I had one ring me up last night crying because, well it was two, one was crying, and one was almost crying. Because they thought they were not appreciated (‘Joe’ 2001).

Morris (2001a) states that eight hundred new recruits joined the police service during 2001 but, as Jacobsen (2001) explains, there is a problem as the police academy drop out rate makes it impossible to balance the vacancies created by the fifty to eighty officers leaving the service every month. What is even more interesting is that there is almost no intellectual discussion regarding poor management and the lack of executive leadership in terms of police misconduct. Yet this problem amplifies the alienation and lack of self worth that already
exists as a consequence of the existing division of labour between rank and file police and their senior counterparts.

‘Charlie’ is a 30 year-old police officer with six years policing experience. Initially he was stationed in the inner suburbs of Sydney as an operational plain-clothes officer. Some months prior to this interview ‘Charlie’ moved to an administrative position as an instructor at the Police Academy. When I asked him about managerialism and policing he said, ‘Well the current focus on it is politically/media driven, it’s not about actually what we do, it’s about the appearances of a police force rather than the reality of it’ (‘Charlie’ 2002). This comment is corroborated by Mitchell’s findings (2003) that are detailed in his article ‘Lord Of The Spin: Carr's Culture Of Iron-clad Control’.

As I discussed with ‘Charlie’ the various ‘reform’ issues that were impacting upon rank and file police, a number of idiomatic expressions commonly used when referring to the ‘police culture’ arose, such as ‘the brotherhood’ or ‘the culture of silence’ (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.204) or ‘the code of silence’ (Brown 1997). It is not unusual to hear these expressions used or implied in the same breath as police unionism (Finnane 2002) but, as I have already explained, the relationship between rank and file police and their union is now somewhat tenuous to say the least, exhibiting far closer links with the state’s party-political institutions and the police hierarchy than the rank and file (Kidman 2001a). In the interview with ‘Charlie’ he was very quick to point out his disappointment with the police union, whilst at the same time he dismissed any widely promoted notion of ‘the Police Brotherhood’

‘Charlie’: The myth of the police family and the great culture of brotherhood and all of that bullshit just does not exist. People forget that this is a politically run organisation to a large extent to be run entirely at the will of the Labor Party. We have got members not only in our police force, but our union who are card-carrying Labor Party members. So how can we have truly a separation of interests of our union, of our police force (‘Charlie’ 2002).

‘Lazlo’ was also critical of the police union and his remarks corroborated the concerns expressed by ‘Charlie’. He had applied for legal assistance and the union rejected this. However, the problem was that the same application for assistance was supported by the police organisation, which made ‘Lazlo’ very suspicious because he had little confidence in the police hierarchy. ‘Lazlo’ went on to explain why he believed the union executive were being contradictory and did not adequately represent the interests of rank and file police as it appears to be acting in concert with the police hierarchy. On the other hand some senior police
would be torn between an allegiance to their rank and file colleagues and their executive obligation to the political arm of the state. I asked ‘Lazlo’, ‘What about the role of the Union in all of this? Are they useful?’

‘Lazlo’: What Union? Our Union?

Interviewer: Yes.

‘Lazlo’: I tell you how useful they are. I pulled out twelve months ago.

Interviewer: Why did you pull out?’

‘Lazlo’: Because, in the thirteen years before they have done absolutely nothing for me. Nothing! They have knocked me back on assisting with the legal system. Which, then the police department actually gave me legal assistance…

Interviewer: Do you think the union does anything for the rank and file?

‘Lazlo’: They don’t. They [union executive] are all police, that have to come back to the police, and they are to scared to do anything.

Interviewer: What about the fact they represent senior police as well?

‘Lazlo’: Traditionally their [commissioned officers] association was a lot stronger. I think now the senior police are starting to realise what a mistake it was to combine the two. That’s from the mouth of senior police who are becoming anti association (‘Lazlo’ 2002).

It appears from this that if police want to pursue their career at the conclusion of their secondment to the union then it is in their broader interests to do the bidding of the state’s governing and party political institutions, which includes the police hierarchy. ‘Doc’ is university educated and had had twenty-two years experience as an operational detective when he resigned. He was also a member of the Police Union executive for many years. ‘Doc’ was quite blunt about the disappointing performance of the police union in the post ‘reform’ period of the Wood Inquiry era. He sighted the careerism of the contemporary union executive and an unhealthy alignment with the police organisation as a major source of rank and file discontent with their union. Wendy Austin (2004, p.29), who is a policewoman and an active unionist in New South Wales, argues that this sort of ‘careerism’ is the symptom displayed by ambitious police. Whilst these ambitious police show outward signs of leadership, they will always choose what is best for themselves or their career. Austin argues that, whilst not corrupt in the contemporary sense of the word, their behaviour is often morally unacceptable. Austin explains how careerists, similar to the NYPD ‘birds’ (Henry 1994 pp.165–68), engage
in a ‘dirty-hands’ vocation whilst maintaining ‘clean-hands’ (Klockars 1979, p.23). She explains that this workplace strategy is adopted to order to ensure that their record is unblemished and their ambition is never jeopardised. When I interviewed ‘Doc’, who is an ex-policeman, I asked him, ‘What is the major reason that ordinary police are not happy with their Union’?

‘Doc’: Because they don’t think they are getting that support …because they [the union] are aligned to the Commissioned Officers, who are aligned to the hierarchy. They [the Union] are aligned to the very bosses who caused a lot of the heart-ache for the general membership... I have always thought that a lot of the office bearers of the association use that as a stepping stone to get to commissioned ranks themselves. And that’s why they will not go too hard against the department [police] or against the government because they want to protect their own careers. Once they have finished their tenure or whatever within the Association if they go in and use a boots and all attitude and busting heads or causing trouble when their time comes and they come back into the main fold and go back to the patrols. Away from the Association people will not touch them because of, ‘This guy is a trouble maker’ and ‘When he was with the Association he caused X, Y and Z [problems] and this comes back and bites them in a big way. So they are not willing to take that risk, not if they are career minded and most of them are (‘Doc’ 2002).

An outcome of this collective apathy created by the contradictory, or at best ambiguous, behaviour of trade union officials is the amplified and undignified alienation of its rank and file members. This is accompanied by a loss of loyalty to their social and vocational core as is evidenced in the qualitative interview data. Cliff (1982, p.234) explains that in these circumstances workers who have lost their loyalty to their traditional organisations are forced into extreme, explosive struggles on their own. For a rank and file officer this struggle can take the shape of criminal and corrupt behaviour or, as in the case of ‘Lazlo’, resigning from the union in protest.

During the interview with ‘Charlie’ I asked him, ‘Do you think there is a difference between the corrupt practices of ordinary police and that of senior police?’ His response was much the same as other rank and file police who had been given an opportunity to air their views.

‘Charlie’: You have got a much more important issue of people rising to their own level of incompetence, sponsorship and promotion …Having a sponsor at a higher rank who will sign the reports and submissions for you… It’s almost like an Amway system… Well it’s very frustrating to see people’s career ambitions derived in their decision making. To the point where it appears, that people are afraid to speak out against something that’s an absolute incompetent decision because they don’t want to be the one to cut their legs off their career. …But at the end of the day
it’s transparent that they are only doing what they have to do to keep their promotion or their job… There is a push towards making policing a profession and increasing its respectability and all that. Unfortunately what that does, is it allows the academics [university educated police] to shine …the amount of grass cutting that goes on here [Holborn Police Academy] with projects and promotion, it happens everywhere I guess. As far as the senior management the corruption at that level well it’s hard to look at it without seeming like a disgruntled whatever. But certainly I have been exposed to questionable decision making for political motivation from the absolute top few floors of the Avery Building… You have got to wonder what the hell these people are thinking when they make their decisions (’Charlie’ 2002).

’Svetlana’ is university educated and she is an operational detective. She is married to a police officer and has eleven years policing experience in Sydney’s lower socio economic areas. ‘Svetlana’ is also from a working class European immigrant family and resides in the outer west of Sydney. When I spoke to her about police ‘reform’ and ‘managerialism’ she explained to me that rank and file police are extremely accountable to a broad variety of investigative organisations. ‘Svetlana’ reinforced the notion of managerialism as a structured form of the state’s governing influence upon senior police. In the process she demonstrated that rank and file police do have an understanding of how their organisation has become politicised and in the process how the rank and file have been further fragmented and divided along class lines.

’Svetlana’: They would be more exposed to taking advantage of their office at a much higher level, something that I would not be aware of …the scrutiny that we are put under is scrutiny by not only management but by the Ombudsman by your other bodies that make sure that the police are doing the right thing and there are a number of other bodies that continually are looking at you. Whereas management would be exposed to the media, politicians and I guess in some respects the courts. So it’s an entirely different level of scrutiny (’Svetlana’ 2002).

For most of his policing career ‘Techa’ has worked in Sydney’s outer west and has twenty years experience. He is not university educated and has worked predominately in the Highway Patrol or as a patrol officer. During our interview I asked ‘Techa’, ‘Do have any views about the way the service is managed and about the competence of those in management positions’? In his answer ‘Techa’ reinforced the hostility that exists between vocationally and university educated police. From his perspective this conflict appears to be more of a divide between operational and administrative police and does not appear to be directed at university educated police who remain operational. ‘Techa’ is certainly critical about the different levels of ‘political power’ that exists between the university educated police and operational police but does not apply this criticism towards university educated ‘street cops’.

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Techa’: I think a lot of them have lost touch with reality. A lot of them have just been merely because of their degrees that they have got and not because their competence. You see I can only look at this from a street copper’s point of view and I think they have lost all touch with reality. They have been in headquarters and they have been so far removed from what’s going down on the street. So I have not a lot of confidence in them or the decisions they make (‘Techa’ 2002).

‘Gonzo’ has worked in specialist squads and highly politicised areas of policing for more than thirty years and has been a detective for most of this time. He has struggled very bravely through personal tragedy and hardship and could be referred to as a ‘knockabout copper’. I asked ‘Gonzo’ what would cause him to resign from the police and although I have known ‘Gonzo’ for some time I was surprised with his blunt answer.

‘Gonzo’: I think there are plenty of reasons to leave. It’s really having the courage to make that decision. The reasons would be the incompetence of the upper level management. The interference of government, the superiority of lawyers and judges, our promotion system and the infiltration of arm chair police officers into positions of power that could be occupied by police who have experience (‘Gonzo’ 2003).

‘Vlad’ was a detective for almost twenty years and he resigned to work in the private sector. I asked him about the ‘reform’ process and its impact upon the role of rank and file police. ‘Vlad’ referred to a practice that was prevalent during the era of Commissioner Avery, whereby if there was the slightest suspicion that a rank and file officer had engaged in criminal behaviour or misconduct it was generally considered acceptable to charge the individual officer either criminal or departmentally and allow the matter to run its course. This practice took place under the legislation referred to as the PRAM Act—the Police Regulation (Allegations of Misconduct) Act 1983. Former Police Minister Anderson said later of this legislation.

I doubt that anyone believed that it would remain substantially unchanged for almost 10 years. I anticipated a review of the legislation after approximately five years. Had that occurred, I believe a considerable amount of misery may have been avoided, and I use the word misery in its true sense… (New South Wales Legislative Assembly 1993).

The problem is that in Australia there is an adversarial legal system, which does not pursue the truth. As former NSW Police Minister Peter Anderson argued, ‘the system did not allow those men, or others on their behalf, to get to the truth of the matter…’ (New South Wales
Despite this, the police hierarchy and the state’s political and governing institutions sanctioned this vigorous prosecution of police.

‘Vlad’: I think it’s a band-aid effort with that sort of approach. It’s like the old story about throwing coppers in [charging and placed before the court] it makes the statistics for anti corruption look good. Y’ know I don’t think that it’s a real indicator they are really doing anything to solve corruption. I mean if somebody fails an integrity test and they go and pinch money or they do whatever it is they do, what’s led them to do that in the first place. Now I am into safety management system with this work that I do. So you look at the worker and say, ‘Why had that incident happened? What was he doing there in the first place?’ And then you work backwards from that. That’s what I think should be really happening in the situation with these integrity tests. It’s almost like jumping over the trench’s and charging a machine gun nest, alright you get killed but no General ever gets pulled on for making the stupid decision that led them there is the first place (‘Vlad’ 2002).

When former Police Minister Peter Anderson made a lengthy speech in parliament regarding the PRAM Act 1983, he conceded that it was unfairly implemented and cited numerous instances in which innocent police had been subjected to this unfair prosecution—some went to gaol, some had nervous breakdowns, still more simply leave the service.

Anderson: People have said to me, ‘As part of the discipline package of 1983, you were the creator of the internal security unit’. Others call it the internal police security unit, or IPSU. Quite frankly, I do not care what they call it—I created it: it was the internal security unit. It has now gone—it has been renamed and reformed. I have no regrets about the concept but I have some regrets about what happened beyond it. Police engaged in internal affairs, by whatever name, have a responsibility to play by the rules. I do not believe that anyone who has an objective look at what happened in Operation Raindrop, for example, can say that fairness was exercised… A couple of police went to gaol; one had a stroke; one had a breakdown. Of the 10 police involved, with a couple of exceptions, all have left the New South Wales Police Service… But even when they were found to be innocent, the service could not cope and did not know how to, or would not, deal with them appropriately… People tell me that former Senior Constable Trevor Otten was the greatest street policeman of the past decade, yet he is no longer a member of the service. He was charged with departmental charges, but before they could be determined he resigned during a hearing of the tribunal, I understand, on a piece of toilet paper, and then suffered a major epileptic seizure… The motivation of those involved was probably good, but their methods were not, nor
was the outcome. People’s lives were destroyed… Paul Kenny and two other former policemen, McMillan and Maxwell. For six-and-a-half years Kenny and the others had sought justice… In Operation Raindrop two heroin dealers and subsequently admitted perjurers were granted indemnity on the condition that they told the truth in the witness box. They did not and conceded they did not… But too often matters are not looked at on their merits and we end up with situations like the Blackburn matter, in which people of enormous rank are dealt with by processes. The only person involved in the Blackburn inquiry to be convicted of an offence was the most junior, a constable with very little service. All those with stripes and pips remain… but the constable wore it… (New South Wales Legislative Assembly 1993).

In the interview with ‘Vlad’ the need for a structural examination of work related incidents, whether these incidents are simple errors or accidents or even misconduct, was emphasised. The analogy of the General and the trench was also raised by former Minister Anderson regarding the Blackburn matter. The fact is that para-military style bureaucracies traditionally enforce policy from the top down, regardless of how flat the organisation structure purports to be. As both ‘Vlad’ and ex Police Minister Anderson explain, there are numerous graphic examples of just how the institution’s political power accountability remains, despite rhetoric to the contrary that it is from the bottom up.

Who are the Outsiders?

Choice or consent in any working class occupation is seldom a simple matter and the Wood Inquiry finding that ‘corruption is ultimately a matter of individual choice’ (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.162) is certainly a glib response. Rank and file police officers may well appear to be performing their duty by consent and, at least in Maher’s terms because of the desire to exercise power, but the reality of this consent is, as these interviews show, necessarily armoured by coercion. At this point I want to briefly return to the interactionist concept of ‘outsiders’, introduced by Becker (1967) in his book Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance and rigidly applied to the ‘underdogs’ who make up the underclass of society. If, as Becker (1966) and his later followers such as Maher (1997) and Chan (1997) imply, ‘whose side are you on?’ is an important research question to ask, it is obvious that it is necessary to look more closely into the logistics of contemporary policing rather than simply concentrate on a blatantly subjective assumption.
Taking ‘sides’, it might appear that many police harass women drug users, petty criminals or traffic violators simply because they have the power to do so with impunity. But how can this still be the case in the ‘reformed’ managerialist police service with its politically responsive, data driven regime of ‘zero tolerance’ policing and its flattened management structures held together by checks and balances? Operational police have been deprived of the ability to exercise personal discretion and the demands of increased productivity, as these interviews demonstrate, force officers to focus on soft policing targets—such as Maher’s (1997) ‘sex workers’ in New York City—to maintain the appearance that a lot of community focused action is taking place. Harassment, as I have shown, now represents a data driven response rather than simply an agency choice as quantity has replaced the idea of quality in policing.

The ‘zero-tolerance’ policing introduced into New York in 1993 by the successful Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and pushed by Premier Bob Carr in NSW is an aggressive policing tactic that inefficiently targets petty crime for electorally-driven purposes. Clearly, under the oppressive framework of managerialism and such legislative ‘solutions’ as the PRAM Act of 1983, the question of what makes a person do deviant things is not just a matter pertinent to the underclass. It is pertinent to rank and file police who could well consider themselves to be ‘outsiders’ as well.

Certainly, the personal experiences in these research subjects’ responses portray, from a rank and file perspective, a gloomy and negative picture of policing. Add to these the fact that in 2004 as many as ‘one in two NSW police officers have been attacked or hurt in the line of duty during the past year’, as figures released by the Police Association reveal, and the work environment for operational police officers appears very bleak indeed. ‘There were 8536 cases of injury and assault last year, almost double the number 10 years ago,’ Association President Ball announced to the media. Although Ball ‘criticised the courts for not imposing tougher penalties for assaults on police’ (Markson, 2004), it should also be asked what has changed in policing during that time and how this might have had an impact.

At this point I want to examine the way in which the criminal justice establishment, in general, and the ‘educated’ legal practitioner, in particular, enable vocationally educated rank and file police to make their ‘choices’. The evidence I will be presenting is not part of contemporary academic literature or inquiry but it is this silence itself that legitimises the actions of their legal practitioner counterparts.

‘Julie’, who grew up in Sydney and is 25 years of age, has been married for eighteen months and was a member of the New South Wales Police for 5 years from 1998. ‘Julie’ is from a
working class family and joined the police because she had her heart set on helping the community. Her most exiting memory was her graduation from the Police Academy, a goal which she explained was an achievement in itself because she had not completed Year 12 at school. When I asked ‘Julie’ if she was a member of the police union she answered that she was and that she had joined because she was told to do so. In fact, she explained, the union had been of little value and had done nothing to assist her when a conflict had arisen earlier in her career.

‘Julie’: We had our Association meetings every two months or whatever. I found with them most of the time there was a lot of talk and no action. A lot of people would sit there and complain but they would not stick together and say ‘hang on’ we are going to fight this tooth and nail to actually get somewhere. A lot of people are frightened of voicing their opinion that they might be alienated, they might be isolated, they might be picked on or things like that. I believe through talk and gossip that people who have tried to make a stand have been transferred from one command to another command. They [senior police] move the trouble somewhere else so they don’t have to deal with it and that’s how they fix it (‘Julie’ 2002).

I asked ‘Julie’ what had prompted her to resign from the police after five years and she explained that a major reason was that during her second year of employment she had been involved in an internal investigation. On exit she was never given the reason for, or the results of, the investigation that was conducted by the Police Integrity Commission. At one point when the complaint first arose ‘Julie’ had wanted to resign but reasoned this might send the wrong message to her colleagues and senior counterparts.

‘Julie’: I was under the belief that if I left then the people investigating me would believe that I was guilty. So I wanted to retain that I was innocent so I decided to hang around and prove that I could fight through the pressures and the investigation that I was in (‘Julie’ 2003).

At the core of her conflict was a problem that arose when was at the Burwood Local Court with a number of colleagues. It was a busy court day and the court area was crowded with lawyers, police, onlookers and numerous defendants who mostly were accompanied by a support person. During the course of the day one of Julie’s colleagues was discussing an up and coming court matter with a local criminal and a solicitor approached the group of police and began to shout at them for talking to his client. The interaction became aggressive and emotional and people began to push each other and the solicitor was so excited that he was spitting as he was talking. One of the police warned the solicitor that things were getting out of hand and if he did not cease being belligerent in the foyer of the court then he would be arrested—a strategy that simply escalated the dispute. Eventually the solicitor was arrested...
and he was issued with a summons for assaulting police. Although ‘Julie’ did not take part in the verbal or physical confrontation, she was a witness. The solicitor involved was on very friendly terms with the police prosecutor and this was of some concern to the rank and file police. Later, when the matter was listed for hearing at court, ‘Julie’ attended but was very nervous because of her limited court experience. During the proceedings she observed the behaviour of the police prosecutor.

‘Julie’: Somehow [during] the talk between the prosecutor [who is a police officer not a lawyer] and the magistrate and the defence and the police officers involved… everybody came to the best conclusion that the best option was to withdraw the matter… (‘Julie’ 2003).

While she was seated in the courtroom the high profile lawyer walked by and said. ‘It’s not over yet!’ ‘Julie’ said, ‘I had no idea what that meant because I thought, well the court matter is over.’

‘Julie’ was subjected to extremely questionable behaviour by a Police Integrity Commission investigator and was obviously limited in the consent and choices of her options of what to do. She had no idea what the allegation was and was not allowed to discuss the matter with anybody, including her supervisor or union representative. ‘Julie’ did not even know if this was related to the recent court matter with the high profile solicitor because the PIC
Investigator appeared to be interested in an incident at all that related to police misconduct. I then asked ‘Julie’, ‘Did you end up going there to the Police Integrity Commission?’

‘Julie’: Yes. We were told one date and we went in. Oh that’s right! As soon as we got the paperwork a few days later we arranged to go and see the Legal Branch. I spoke to a legal representative in there I cannot recall his name. He pretty much asked me what this was all about. I said I had no idea and asked him to fill me in on what is going on. He said that he believed one of the people involved in the investigation that the Integrity Commission was looking at for something. I asked him. ‘What do you mean’? He said, ‘I don’t know. Has somebody done anything wrong in the group of police that were involved in the incident’? I said, ‘I don’t even know these other people except for the people I work with at [the Police Station]’. You see I think there were three other people.

Interviewer: Is that the Police Association?

‘Julie’: This is the legal section in at the Police Integrity Commission with the solicitors’.

Interviewer: Are they PIC solicitors?

‘Julie’: I remember the room and I am not sure if it is part of the Attorney General’s Department or what branch they fall under… The bloke [solicitor] that I spoke to, he couldn’t tell me much and asked me to disclose anything that I believed that I did wrong. I had nothing to offer. I said to him. ‘I have no idea what this is all about’. He then indicated to me that he believed that maybe somebody has done something unforeseen to their statement, which is why the matter ended up at PIC and I said. ‘I don’t know what you are talking about’ (‘Julie’ 2003).

It appears that when ‘Julie’ did speak to a lawyer he would not tell her what the inquiry was about. On the other hand he was very prepared for her to disclose any incidents of misconduct that involved herself or for that matter anyone else. ‘Julie’ eventually gave evidence at the inquiry and was questioned for many hours about the incidents at Burwood Court involving the high profile solicitor. At the conclusion she was allowed to leave and was again told not to discuss the matter with anybody. She indicated that she did not know what she could discuss because she had no idea what the inquiry was about.

Interviewer: Did you see the Police Association about this?

‘Julie’: The Association didn’t really tell me a great deal as far as what was going on. I was told that I was not allowed to explain anything to anybody. I wasn’t allowed to tell anybody that I was served with the paper work. I wasn’t allowed to tell anybody that I was summonsed to go to PIC and give evidence. I was not allowed to talk about the whole incident to anybody. This was from the gentleman from PIC and then I was also told that by my legal representative[ From PIC] also’.
Interviewer: What did the Police Association say?

‘Julie’: They told me that there were counsellors that I could speak to [interviewee laughing with contempt]. So I made a phone call to the Police Welfare branch. I asked them about the situation and they said to me that I was allowed, well I can’t remember exactly whether it was three, three hour sessions with the one counsellor and that was it, or three one-hour sessions. I was allowed three of something.

Interviewer: Did the Association offer any legal advice or tell you what you could or could not do?

‘Julie’: I think we got some brochures [laughing again] which the bloke from PIC gave us but I can’t remember what. I didn’t really get much assistance as far as what was going on. I had no idea.

Interviewer: Do you know to this day what was going on?

‘Julie’: No!

Interviewer: Has anyone explained to you?


A consistent theme emerging in all of the interviews I conducted as part of this research was the lack of support given to rank and file officers by the senior police. In this instance this lack of support is exacerbated by a basic lack of ‘due process’ from a legal perspective as well. ‘Julie’ retired feeling powerless and isolated because of ‘the lack of support from your superiors’.

‘Julie’: I found this with both of the Superintendents that ran the patrol that I worked at whilst in the service. They didn’t really have much interaction with the junior people being the constables and senior constables, down on the floor level. They stayed in their offices and didn’t really say much. You only ever got spoken to by them if you wanted something or were in trouble or it was at a meeting or something like that… You are out there busting your gut every day, doing a job that is very demanding. The only criticism you get is when you do something wrong. However when you do something fantastic and you put your life on the line or whatever, you don’t get anything. Not that you want gratitude, but you don’t really even get a thanks from your boss (‘Julie’ 2003).

What ‘Julie’ reveals in her discussion is the lack of organic leadership within the ranks of the senior police during her period of service. I have already discussed that this aspect of managerialism has come about as a consequence of the ‘merit’ based promotion system that
measures ‘competency’ in terms of ‘productivity’. In the case described by ‘Julie’ it is obvious that the ‘birds’ style of management recommended by the Wood Inquiry (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.162) has inserted a wedge between the ranks and their managers. As in the New York experience—and exposed in the Mollen Inquiry (Mollen 1994; Henry 1994 pp.165-68)—ambitious, administrative police who have been put in positions of authority ensure their promotion aspirations by hiding possible instances of misconduct amongst their subordinates. In Mollen’s words: ‘The leadership is where the real problem lies’ (Mollen 1994a). Despite the fact this incident was investigated by the Police Integrity Commission there were no adverse findings regarding the actions of rank and file police. A problem did arise however, when the police prosecutor withdrew the criminal matter before the court. This action left the door open for the lawyer to pursue civil proceedings regarding an unlawful arrest. Wallace (2005) explains that in October 2005 the NSW Supreme Court awarded a payout of $145,000 to the high profile lawyer after he prosecuted the state for wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Whilst this civil action obviously had merit it should be seen in light of the fact that civil prosecutions are very expensive and out of the reach of most ordinary citizens. Furthermore the burden of proof in civil matters is not the same as in a criminal proceeding. In this instance a search for the truth was conducted in a separate jurisdiction, but it only ever related to police misconduct. Both the criminal and civil proceedings were part of an adversarial process.

Based on this experience, it is understandable why ‘Julie’ felt she no longer wanted to stay in the police service but it is also understandable why she didn’t want to leave at the time of the investigation because, as she said, ‘then the people investigating me would believe that I was guilty’. In order for her to demonstrate ‘that I was innocent’ she felt it necessary to ‘prove that I could fight through the pressures and the investigation’ process (‘Julie’ 2002). ‘Julie’ could see that the prosecutor and the high profiled solicitor during this incident ‘seemed pretty friendly’ and she felt that it was likely that ‘they were looking after each other in that instance’ (‘Julie’ 2003). Australian law is predicated on the presumption of innocence and it is guilt that has to be proved—unless, it would seem, an unspecified investigation is directed at a member of the rank and file police. Former NSW Police Minister Peter Anderson recognised that anomaly when he admitted in parliament that ‘[p]olice engaged in internal affairs, by whatever name, have a responsibility to play by the rules’ and that even when an accused is ‘found to be innocent’, the service does not always admit the mistake and ‘deal with them appropriately’. Anderson regrets that ‘[p]eople’s lives were destroyed’ by misplaced allegations and that ‘too often matters are not looked at on their merits and… people of
enormous rank are dealt with by processes’ whilst ‘the most junior’ officers are those who ‘wore it’ (New South Wales Legislative Assembly 1993). Unfortunately, admissions like this are rarely heard and incidents—such as in the case described by ‘Julie’—largely go unreported and very rarely come to light.

Interestingly, a similar situation involving a conflict of interest between a magistrate and a police prosecutor at the same court complex displays an enormous difference in approach. As Lamont (2003) explains, when a police prosecutor appearing before a magistrate at Burwood Local Court on charges of falsely claiming overtime, travel allowance and use of a police motor vehicle, the magistrate hearing the case accidentally sent a facsimile to a police officer with the same name as the prosecutor indicating the weaknesses in the case. The matter was sent to the Judicial Commission where the magistrate claimed that the email was simply a mistake. The Chairperson of the Commission dismissed any allegations of impropriety against the magistrate by arguing:

> It must be remembered that the problem is exacerbated by the fact that a police prosecutor and a magistrate, who work closely together over long periods of time within the relatively small compass of a courtroom, will, in many cases, build up a relationship, and in some cases, some sort of friendship (Lamont 2003).

Clearly, this is another example of the division of labour that exists openly within the criminal justice system. The magistrate in the above case could not be named and the matter was dealt with at a closed commission setting. It would be nonsensical to argue that this is not class bias or that the alienating factors resulting from such anomalies would not be factors explaining the deviance and misconduct of a few rank and file police or create the feelings of powerlessness that drive many operational police—including ‘Julie’—from the service.
CHAPTER FIVE: The Narrowing Possibilities of the Closed Mind

Everyone knows that the police are corrupt, although for the majority this knowledge represents only rumour and hearsay. Only a minority of people have any experience of being affected by this corruption and most people’s relations with the police are relatively innocuous—being redirected because of an accident or an incident or pulled over for a random breath test; reporting a traffic accident, a theft or a burglary; or, perhaps, being booked for minor traffic offences for the most part. Whilst these incidents might be annoying, embarrassing or sometimes even downright stressful, for the majority of the population they are rarely any more than this. However, the known fact that the police—or most of them—are aggressive, coercive, deviant and just plain corrupt is a basic assumption of everyday life. It is heard and seen all the time on the radio and on television—on the news, in current affairs programs and documentaries, in cop shows and movies. The assumption that the police are corrupt and that corruption is endemic in policing organisations has become, like death and taxes, a fundamental pillar of everyday life.

In the words of ‘Vlad’, an experienced detective who is one of the research subjects interviewed for this thesis:

They [the general public] would just read what’s in the paper and say, ‘Yep, dead set true. I know that about the coppers that is dead set right.’ They would not take into account why. Well we do because it’s focused on us; we are in the gun sights. But, they [the general public] would not take into account why they [journalists] have written it, that they have left in all of the juicy bits and left out the other stuff (‘Vlad’ 2002).

The fact that this is so is hardly surprising when it is realised that careers have been built on criticising the rank and file police and exposing corruption and that it is an occupational preoccupation for a not inconsiderable number of journalists, academics and intellectuals who have made it their mission to crusade against this pernicious scourge. However, considering corruption has been so rigorously aired and exposed, it is curious that it is suspiciously flexible in its definition. Its parameters are immense and the scope for the individual police officer to be accused of corruption is correspondingly enormous.

This chapter examines the way misconduct and corruption amongst the rank and file police has been dealt with in the media and compares this treatment to that handed out to other vocations and professions, not only within the broader criminal justice system but also within
the workforce in general. It also examines the concept of misconduct and corruption as it is seen within the various operational and administrative stands of the policing vocation. Why are police seen to be mainly corrupt and how do they feel about this stereotyping? How has this affected their work, their health and their private lives and what has the ‘reformed’ model of management unleashed upon them? To answer these questions this chapter will be analysing media coverage—in particular an interview conducted by Chris Masters with Ray Peattie, a former detective who has been gaolled for corrupt activities—and comparing this with responses of my rank and file police research subjects.

Exposing Corruption

In February, 2003 journalist Mick O’Donnell explained on the ABC current affairs program *The 7.30 Report* that ten West Australian police officers had been stood down over accusations about a deeply disturbing ‘culture of corruption’ (O’Donnell 2003). O’Donnell, who argued that this situation was indicative of much the same institutionalised culture exposed in New South Wales during the Wood Inquiry in 1996, used a brief visual ‘grab’ of barrister Richard Utting declaring, ‘I think it [the police organisation] had improved but you will always get violence within the police force’. Backing this assertion O’Donnell moved to an interview with an academic expert, Wayne Snell who had studied the Wood Inquiry, saying learnedly, ‘I think there is evidence to suggest that there was a significant use of violence as a tool at various times’. In this way O’Donnell consolidated his point that the fact that ten police officers had been stood down was sufficient to support, indisputably, his opening gambit that this was a ‘culture of corruption’ that had been exposed.

To further support his assertions, he then raised an issue that had taken place in 1992 at the Fremantle police station, following this once more with Richard Utting saying, ‘I think violence does become a bit of a culture if it’s left unchecked. So if you get away with breaking the jaw of a kid [Fremantle incident in 1992], then you can get away with a lot of things [in 2003]’. Although O’Donnell conceded that action had been taken over a decade ago against the officer concerned in the Fremantle incident—he had been criminally charged, found guilty, penalised and dismissed from the police, in fact—he still felt able to use this to demonstrate that the police felt they could ‘get away with a lot of things’, ingeniously entangling an incident vindicated in the past involving violence with misconduct, corruption and negligence in his evidence of an unchecked and, therefore, still entrenched culture of corruption. As it turned out, some of the corruption allegations fell flat when tested in the commission but, to reinforce his ‘cultural’ point of view, O’Donnell introduced an Aboriginal
death in custody issue from 1988 and also presented this as a contemporary example of an unchecked and corrupt police culture.

During the West Australian inquiry all witnesses were compelled to give evidence, as is the case with inquisitorial hearings, and subsequently evidence in the death in custody matter reduced a number of corruption allegations to the status of a series of negligent errors amplified by incompetence, neglect and also fear. The rank and file police in this instance had always assumed that they would be sacrificed by their organisation as a ‘symbolic’ gesture and were given no reason to doubt this fear. Consistent with a significant portion of ‘progressive’ journalists, the carefully crafted content of O’Donnell’s investigation created widespread public concern in the issue. However, upon even this level of critical scrutiny, it is a very flimsy piece of argument indeed—little more than a shoddy trick to escalate an incident in its early stages and an approach that reveals O’Donnell’s unveiled antipathy and class bias towards rank and file police and his preconceived ideas presuming guilt rather than innocence.

At a crucial point in the program the argument became visibly frayed when O’Donnell, who was questioning Snell again, asked knowingly, ‘So we could still have the model of a force with bad apples but not a force that’s rotten to the core?’ To this Snell replied, in more measured tones and obviously unexpectedly:

For it to be institutionalised, we have to show a link to say this is the way police officers are trained or instructed or policy. Whether that policy is written or unwritten, that these were the rules of engagement, the rules of doing business with the community. I don't think we've seen evidence of that’ (O’Donnell 2003).

Although visibly shaken, O’Donnell finished his commentary strongly as if nothing important had happened but the end result of the O’Donnell report should have left more critical observers in somewhat of a dilemma. The argument had been based around comparisons with the level of corruption uncovered in the Wood Inquiry but this Inquiry had failed to meet Snell’s definition of institutionalised corruption. It could, in fact, be argued that when Snell’s definition of institutionalised corruption is measured against the various allegations of misconduct, criminal activity and corruption mentioned in Brown (2003) and Commonwealth of Australia (2003), it is by far the questionable activity of the Wood Inquiry rather than the rank and file police that adequately meet the qualification of being institutionally corrupt. Predictably this was not the glossed impact of the report but, upon scrutiny, the argument sank itself with its own evidence.
Clearly O’Donnell was angling to establish a wide enough pattern of violent and corrupt behaviour to prove that corruption in the West Australian police was as endemic as the corruption exposed in New South Wales during the Wood Inquiry. Prepared and trying to counter O’Donnell’s attack, the West Australian Police Union unwittingly gave him aid in pushing his argument forward by arguing that although the standing down of ten officers created no surprise, this did not compare in any way to the kind of institutionalised corruption shown in the NSW Wood Inquiry. Arguing from the refuge of scale, therefore, a police union official asserted that the Wood Inquiry had stood down one hundred and eighty rank and file police in NSW over four years—data which is nowhere to be found in the Wood Inquiry final report that indicates that between 1994 and 1997 ninety-two officers were adversely mentioned and that only twenty-two of these were dismissed (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, pp.152-153). Admittedly, the data compiled and published by the Wood Inquiry is extremely ambiguous and lends itself to misleading uses (Emy and Hughes 1991, p.422; Stewart 1994, p.189), blending together what are subjectively referred to as ‘suspicious’ resignations of police during the inquiry with the ordinary day-to-day retirements and disengagements that occur in all organisations. The report also fails to distinguish between vague allegations and proven convictions and including the heading ‘Officers Separations from the NSW Police Service May 1994 to March 1997’—the period during which the inquiry took place—qualified, in small print at the bottom of the page, by the words: ‘[t]he inclusion of an officer in any category is not a finding of corruption’ (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, pp.152-153).

The ambiguity of this report has served the cause of ‘progressive’ reformers well and O’Donnell was not alone in his efforts to invoke its certainties. Investigative journalists and academics have used it lavishly as a benchmark to maintain public awareness on the cultural aspects of police deviancy and keep these well removed from the complexity of the big—conceptual—picture. What ‘progressive’ critics such as O’Donnell seldom consider is the way these issues are understood by the rank and file they so blithely vilify. Nor do they discuss the impact the ‘reforms’ they are pushing will have on this same rank and file. They ask ‘experts’—intellectuals, academics and other journalists, even the now very unrepresentative Police Union ‘representatives’—but they never ask the real subjects of their criticism—the rank and file police. Their opinions, it seems, are irrelevant—they represent Mike Carlton’s ‘same old ratbag crew of disgruntled ex-coppers’ whose corruption will only mean that ‘[l]ies will be told, reputations trashed…’ (Carlton 2002b). Based on this assumption of guilt, ‘reform’ is aggressively imposed from above by a species of superior and blameless intellects.
There is no thought that such an approach presupposes either corruption or ineptitude and that this will create frustration and resentment, indifference and apathy and exploitative work practices that can lead directly to the death in custody case mentioned by O’Donnell (Harman 1983, p.25). When rank and file police lose loyalty to their social and vocational core and can no longer depend upon collective or unionised response, they are forced into extreme and explosive struggles of their own—struggles that include misconduct and deviant behaviour (Cliff 1982).

‘Progressive’ reformers tout their actions in the media as a crusade against the forces of evil. In his victory address John Hatton (1997c) said that the Wood Inquiry was evidence that Parliament can take on the most powerful corrupt police and win and maintained that the community owed Justice James Wood, Gary Crook QC, Nigel Hadgkiss and their respective teams a great debt. Hatton said that because of the inquiry into police corruption more than four hundred of the top policing positions were vacant and new appointments had been made. Another ‘progressive’ media crusader, ABC journalist Quentin Dempster, also eulogised this highly politicised inquiry.

Wood has not strayed into NSW politics. Apparently there were no contemporary evidentiary leads… former minister Ted Pickering and former Independent John Hatton, seem to have historically redeemed the NSW Parliament and the politicians in the 1990s by their strident attacks on police corruption (Dempster 1997).

Debra Locke’s Watching The Detectives (Locke 2003), which was published and released by ABC Books, had ABC journalist Quentin Dempster prominently displayed at its highly politicised launch. Once again inflated statistics were conjured up and aired—this time it was two hundred officers who were adversely named (Curtis 2003). On 1 October 2003 at the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology Annual Conference in Sydney Locke informed the conference participants that there was systemic widespread corruption amongst rank and file police in New South Wales, stating that five hundred police had resigned as a consequence of the Wood Inquiry. Only when challenged by one participant, did she agree that the figure was very ambiguous and that in fact the activities of the Royal Commission itself were themselves questionable (Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology 2003). Yet, soon after, Locke was again repeating the same misinformation to a very receptive Australian Mensa Society audience at Beverly Hills in Sydney. A colleague who attended observed that listeners were wringing their hands and nodding their heads at Locke’s barrage
of negative cliché’s and metaphors regarding the link between corruption and the policing vocation. Of course this audience reaction has to be balanced with the reality that Mensa was founded on eugenic principles. Its leading proponent and founding member Sir Cyril Burt attempted for many years to discount the importance of culture in the development of intelligence (Hood and Jansz 2001, p.167). It is difficult to establish how rank and file police fit into this elite and biologically-determined framework. But the notion, that in the intelligence stakes, rank and file police are ‘the other’ cannot be easily discarded. As at the earlier conference, accuracy is a casualty when it comes to publicising a book and facts must never get in the way of a ‘good story’.

Defining Corruption

Whilst I must repeatedly qualify my argument by stating that this does not mean that corruption did not—or does not—exist within the New South Wales Police Service, it is important to question the approach adopted by the journalists, lawyers and academics who all fail to critically examine so many of the corruption allegations that are being levelled, seemingly with impunity. The aggressive competition in these industries as much as in the police, coupled with the persistent search for a public scapegoat with the proven ability to provide a marketable ‘deviant police culture’, is being pursued for the most part at the expense of any rational structural or causal explanation. A critical structural analysis would undoubtedly expose a corrosive and decaying core within the dominant layers of power that make up the criminal justice establishment but the problem here would be that the public spotlight would become trained on the state’s governing institutions. Hence the attractiveness of critiques that examine state institutions from the bottom up and within a culturally determinist framework that isolates the most powerless in the structure.

Whilst Mick O’Donnell’s investigation on the ABC’s 7.30 Report in Western Australia demonstrates the extremely flexible nature of such a media approach with its short grabs and cleverly constructed disjunctures that seemingly weld a number of disparate opinion clips into a semblance of an holistic argument whilst actually blurring the edges of inconsistency, O’Donnell is not amongst the biggest players in Australian current affairs. To demonstrate this I will examine an ‘in-depth’ interview conducted by the ABC’s Chris Masters—self-styled expert and member of the reformed Police Advisory Board—with former detective—and self-confessed ‘baddie’—Ray Peattie that was screened on the Four Corners programme under the somewhat loaded title of Undoing the Badness (Masters 2002a). Peattie, who was jailed for four years, was charged with four counts of accepting bribes totalling $1600 from
other alleged corrupt officers at Manly police after raids on the homes of four alleged drug dealers between May and December 2000 and was a small player in the corruption stakes. Judge Finnane, who had been appointed to the District Court after representing the New South Wales Police at the Wood Inquiry, said Peattie had not been on all of the operations but took the money when offered it instead of reporting the officers, ‘as was his duty’. Judge Finnane found Peattie warranted a substantial discount in his sentence because he had not only admitted his guilt—‘unlike other police witnesses who he [Finnane] had observed as legal counsel during the Wood Royal Commission’—and had also been honest enough to provide fresh evidence on other corrupt police.

It is worth taking a minor pause here to examine the political setting in which Master’s interview with Peattie took place. For Finnane’s praise for Peattie’s helpfulness and the corresponding unhelpfulness displayed by other officers has an interesting history. During the Wood Royal Commission one of my research subjects—‘Brett’—had been ordered by the Acting-Commissioner to speak to Finnane in his capacity as senior-legal counsel for the New South Wales Police Service (Lamont 2005). Finnane gave ‘Brett’ a list, which contained the names of police officers, and directed him to obtain statutory declarations from them in regard to a broad range of allegations made during the Wood Inquiry. After ‘Brett’ contacted some of the police concerned there was a complaint made to the Royal Commission that the police service was ‘digging up dirt’ on a key Royal Commission witness (Brown and Bearup 1995) and ‘Brett’ became one of many police who were publicly berated by Commissioner Wood through the media (Lamont 2005). ‘Brett’ recalls the event that led up to his demise as a policeman in this way:

Finnane did not defend me by saying, ‘There is a mistake here. I am the one who is having him investigate Haken. Not any policeman [who is giving the orders], it’s me [Finnane]. And he [research subject referring to himself] was recommended by the Acting Commissioner’. So he [Finnane] did nothing. So I rang up and went and saw him and said. ‘What’s going on here”?… He said. ‘Oh there has been a misunderstanding’. I said. ‘Well mate get your arse down there [Royal Commission] and sort it out’. We went down there, but by that stage every man and his dog was avoiding me like the plague, all the senior police, and there was never any retraction in the paper. And from then on my career was finished it was over. They [The Police Board] said they were not going to promote me. And I remember she [Mary Christopher Secretary of the Police Board] laughed. The bitch, she said. ‘We will have to see what we are going to do with people like you who have not been adversely mentioned, but whose careers are in jeopardy’? (Brett 2002).
This account not only explains the way in which unaccountable senior counsel during the Wood Inquiry were willing to destroy the careers of innocent operational police but also highlights the very biased nature of the Police Board itself (Lamont 2005).

Thus praised for his honesty, Peattie—a 46-year-old alcoholic, addicted gambler and father of five children from three marriages—was sentenced by Judge Finnane and made eligible for parole in one year. Peattie made a public apology in writing to all New South Wales police and, cumulating his humiliation, also agreed to make this remorseful video with ABC journalist Chris Masters detailing how he became corrupt and attempting to explain the manner in which this had happened (Kennedy, L. 2002a). At the time Masters was part of a panel of community experts that were advising the Police Commissioner, serving alongside political advisor and academic Associate Professor Sandra Egger of the University of NSW; Wood Inquiry Senior Counsel John Agius; Tim Sage of the newly formed Police Integrity Commission; senior public defender Mark Tedeschi QC; leading Sydney anthropologist Richard Basham; Judge David Shillington of the NSW District Court; and David Bennett QC and Rick Burbidge QC of the NSW Bar Association’ (Papadopoulos 1997). As a ‘progressive’ ABC journalist, Masters had made a name for himself as a media crusader but his association with members of this successor of the Police Board makes him an interesting choice as interviewer.

This mutated Police Board is another symbol of the communication gulf existing between the sense of ‘justice’ applied to rank and file police, such as ‘Brett’ and Ray Peattie, and that applied elsewhere. It, too, has an interesting history. In 1997 Justice Wood had expressed the belief that the Police Board should be disbanded because the reputations of the board members, including Associate Professor Egger, appeared to be as tarnished as the police. Naturally the board objected strongly. Although not slackening her assertions that allegations of serious police corruption had been ‘tumbling out’ of the Police Royal Commission and that there was evidence of widespread corruption (Lamont 2002b), Egger and her fellow Police Board members considered taking legal proceedings at the public expense to quash the part of the Wood Inquiry Report that condemned the Police Board (Brown 1996a). Policing was too important to be left solely in the hands of the police, Egger (1997) explained, and Wood’s recommendation for the establishment of a vast array of police community consultative panels to replace the Police Board was based on the flawed assumption that community consultative committees would provide a suitable substitute. However, Egger’s condemnations were cut short when she was appointed to this flawed committee advising Commissioner Ryan and she became an integral part of that ‘panel of community experts hand-picked by the NSW Police
Service to help fight organised crime, drug trafficking, kidnapping and money laundering’ (Papadopoulos 1997).

The new Police Board was then intellectually elevated into a democratic institution to act as a ‘non-politicised’ mechanism for the governance of police (Egger 1997). Egger might have been correct when she argued that policing is too important to be left solely in the hands of the police but such a blatant opinion change by Egger does little to dispel the idea that academics will do little more than promote their own interests and legitimise the oppressive ‘reform’ policies that are being implemented by the political arm of the state to shape society and its criminal justice system.

Perhaps Finnane’s leniency towards the remorseful Ray Peattie should also be put into perspective here. For his judgement bears no resemblance to leniency when the four year gaol sentence imposed upon Peattie is compared with that imposed by Justice David Kirby on William Howard in 2003. Howard was an accountant convicted of fraud in relation to the five billion dollar HIH Insurance collapse in Sydney some years earlier and he had pleaded guilty to improperly paying more than $730,000 from HIH to a company associated with another businessman. Justice Kirby sentenced Howard to a three-year suspended sentence and explained that he deserved leniency because of his early admission of guilt and commitment to help the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ABC New On Line 2003b). Certainly there is a curious flexibility applied to the leniency afforded to Howard and a corresponding inflexibility applying to Peattie. Where does this all fit within the ‘rule of law’? Clearly if there is equality in the eyes of the law some are more equal than others and Police Board members, academics, investigative journalists and judges are more concerned with corruption in the police than they are with accountants convicted for major fraud.

Straight from the Horse’s Mouth

The ABC Four Corners interview with ex Detective Sergeant Ray Peattie (Masters 2002a) started with his history. He was a twenty-one year old working class man when he joined the police after working as a roof-tiler and spending some time working on the government buses. When he joined the police in 1977 he had no grand expectations of exactly what he wanted to do but in the back of his mind he was interested in the Police Rescue Unit or something like that. Other than this he was prepared to see what the police offered and take it from there. Peattie explained that he had a good upbringing from his honest family, playing a lot of football but quite experienced in life by the time he joined the police. He re-affirmed that he definitely knew right from wrong and that these values were well entrenched within him.
Peattie explained that when he came away from the Police Academy he was starry eyed and the whole time he was assessing different characters and the way different people did different jobs.

Right from the beginning it was obvious to him that some police were good and some were not so good at normal police work. It also became obvious from an early stage that there was a police versus the community attitude amongst police. From the very beginning there were some people who liked police and some that didn’t. Peattie explains that when he joined the police his football team members were divided over his decision—some were accepting of the police, others disliked them. In much the same sense he explains there were good and bad police and in any era there is every opportunity for young police to decide which way they want to go and what they want to do. He outlined that some police can sit down and do nothing and that there were plenty of ‘hidey holes’—non-operational or administrative roles—for those not motivated or the very ambitious.

At this point Masters cut in to redirect the interview in the direction he wanted it to be taking. Investigative journalism is a career after all and the interview format is as much if not more to do with the presenter as it is with the investigation. The base point for this interview was obviously to be that the police service nurtured an ‘endemic culture of corruption’ and this was the non-negotiable assumption behind the interview. He asked a question based on the ABC drama series ‘Scales of Justice’ and gave his own authoritative account of the police service based on this drama that contradicted the real material world of policing that Peattie was trying to explain. The media ‘confession’ is, after all, a blatant form of show trial and the audience wants not a correction of assumptions but moral condemnation and ritual humiliation or at least the mitigation of the innocent victim of the corrupt system. As the ‘judge’ and ‘inquisitor’ in this ‘investigation’, Masters said there was an ‘old boys’ group who forced junior police to comply with their own ‘corrupt’ culture. As a member of the Police Board and a fearless moral crusader he inserted a necessary redirection. He had seen the series and this interview must demonstrate its authenticity against anything that Peattie might want to explain.

Masters: So somebody who wants to do the right thing, to be an honest police officer, is press ganged, if you like, into a career with the other side. Is it as simple as that, I mean is that the sort of thing that happened to you?

Peattie: I was 21 when I joined so I was mature enough as the 19-year-olds were at the time too, to make decision for myself. Naturally you make those decisions based on your experiences and
what you see around you. I know several police that were very honest in everything that they did, very ethical and would... no matter what pressure would not go to the other side, if I could call it that. And I think that everyone that does goes in with open eyes and knows what they’re doing, the temptations are definitely there to take the easy way out or to take a different course of action than perhaps the best one. As far as I was concerned, I feel that I made all my decisions to do what I did. Whilst you feel a bit of pressure, it wasn't that immense that you can't say no... It was definitely a feeling of if you didn’t do certain things you would suffer the consequences later. Now I’m not saying that the consequences were all that drastic but just the mere fact of you doing something that was perhaps corrupt, sorry, you not doing something that was perhaps corrupt, you were not going to be like dragged off and beaten and things like that, but you would certainly be excluded to a degree in things by certain people and naturally there were other people who would fully support everything you did. But I would say that back in 1977 I joined, yeah 1977, a policeman’s interpretation of corruption would have been vastly different than that of a member of the public and things that certain police did—and I feel safe to say, I wouldn’t say the vast majority but I’d say certainly a good percentage of the things that people did on a corrupt nature back then were pretty well broadly accepted by the rest of the police force, be it straight or corrupt police? (Masters 2002a).

What Peattie appeared to be trying to say was that although there were always various sub-cultural aspects of corruption and misconduct amongst police that these cultures were not shaped and determined by the structure of the various policing institutions. Corruption is an organic component of the political framework in any society, in particular a highly competitive capitalist society. For Peattie there was corruption within the police service but there was corruption within the wider society as well. What Masters wanted, however, was an itemised admission of institutional corruption.

Masters: What are some examples?”

Peattie: Well take it down to the bottom of the scale, just say drinking on duty and things like that. It is interesting that this example of corruption hinges on police drinking alcohol whilst on duty, which up until the Wood Inquiry was never a disciplinary or misconduct matter unless the police were intoxicated or impaired by alcohol. Peattie, however, explained that there was no homogenous culture in relation to drinking on duty. He made it clear that despite the fact there were some police who would not drink on duty, a larger percentage would do so if the opportunity presented itself. Peattie argued that those who would go for a drink would not castigate or criticise the others too strongly. But, later in his career when it got to discussing money and other unlawful activity it was never accepted practice to discuss anything to do
with this openly within the general police community. One did not discuss openly what you did or who else did it and the individual involvement was a personal choice. Peattie argued that he chose to be corrupt and could not really speak for everyone (Masters 2002a).

Peattie explained that the first time he ever accepted money was at 21 Division, which later became the Gaming Squad. He was executing a ‘gaming’ warrant on a card school somewhere in the city metropolitan area and was one of a group of police who went into the premises where there was evidence people playing cards illegally. The permanent Gaming Squad staff took the boss of the card school away to have a discreet discussion. After the conversation he came out and nominated those people to be taken but the boss of the card game was not included. The other persons present were charged with unlawful gambling. At the conclusion of that shift Peattie was handed $100 by another detective. He explained that he didn't say anything about it at all and did not ask any thing about it at all. At the time Peattie said that he thought it was just a one off situation. Peattie stressed that he had every opportunity to say ‘No’ but that he took the money although he knew in his mind that he didn't want it. It made him ‘feel crook’ [sick], he said, to even think this was the first ‘crook [corrupt] thing’ he had ever done. Peattie reiterated that he was not forced to do anything although he had heard that some people were forced to accept bribes and he accepted that what was happening was a regular practise (Masters 2002a).

It will be useful at this point to compare Peattie’s account with that of a retired police officer who was one of the research subjects interviewed for this thesis. ‘Athol’ also touches on his experience whilst working at Twenty One Division in the early 1960s—an earlier generation to Peattie, although it was still considered a detectives training ground. ‘Athol’ explains how he was marginalised because he could not afford to drink and that he strongly disapproved of supervisors who aligned an officer’s competence by the amount they could drink. ‘Athol’ was part of the generation that would have supervised Peattie and his story reveals a much earlier generation of police that perhaps were part of a ‘corrupt culture’ but were also part of a much different social structure.

‘Athol’: When I went to Twenty One Division, which was the training ground and I didn’t want to join plain clothes, I was asked to join, I didn’t seek a career in plain clothes. But, at Twenty One Division because financially I was strapped [broke], recently married; I was renting there were no funds left over. I had daughter then and I was asked to go out for a drink. I said. ‘No I can’t go and have a drink.’ And so they [other police] thought, and it went right around the area that … [‘Athol’] was queer and you cannot trust him because he doesn’t drink. Now that didn’t upset me at all, that part, because I have my own views and my own personality and if I could have afforded
to have a drink I would have. [As a consequence] I have been very conscious right throughout my service of not trying to foist what I consider. [What I mean is] if I wanted to go to lunch and some young fellow couldn’t afford it he would not be forced. I know men! I know men [interviewee is very angry] and I won’t name him here in case you put him on the record. Who only judged the quality of his workmates by how many schooners he could drink. Now that to me is an absolute denigration of everything that you should stand for. Of course as far as I am concerned you don’t sort of put a young person in the capacity to either do something that they feel that they should do just to be part of the team. That’s not my way of thinking at all (‘Athol’ 2002).

Despite Peattie maintaining his standpoint that not all police were involved in corrupt activity, Masters persisted on directing the interview to extract such an admission.

Masters: So a big alarm bell rang but you didn't feel you had any real option but to do what you'd done, take the money?

Peattie: No, I knew I had an option but I knew it wasn’t my preferred option.

Masters: What would have happened if you'd have gone to a superior and said you'd been offered this bribe and you'd been given this money, I mean would that have been the right thing to do?

Peattie: Oh that definitely would have been the right thing to do and at the time there was a Superintendent Merv Beck was in charge. From all reports who was a very honest sort of hard working bloke. He would have been an easy person to go and approach with it but in the structure of Twenty One Division he was the boss up above, it wasn't a common thing for a trainee detective to go straight to the boss and by-pass a chain of command… So I could have gone to Mr Beck, yeah, and I imagine on reputation he would have done something about it but even a bloke of his reputation I wouldn't have expected—I may well be wrong, he may well have, you know, gone the whole way and formalised a complaint and had the...ending in the bloke being charged or something. I don't know, but it was more, without trying to say exactly what Mr Beck would have done, my feeling at that time would have been that the bloke probably would have been brought in and slapped on the wrist and told not to do it again as opposed to any real formal complaint going in... that was even... that’s only my opinion, as I say it could be wrong but that’s… that was my expectation then of what would happen if you did.

Masters: You would have been ostracised?

Attempting to assert that this reaction was not part of the ‘moral code’ of the time and was not an indicator of an all-embracing deviant ‘police culture’, Peattie persisted with trying to express that the situation was never really as simple as Masters seemed to believe it to be.
Peattie: Well, yeah, it would have obviously got back to him that I was the one that dobbed [informed] on him in and then I definitely wouldn't have... you know, it’s two different things, to say, no, and not accept it is one thing, so long as you don’t dob on ‘em you'd be allowed to survive in the place, with small pressures of being left out of things and, you know, people thinking you’re a bit of a dog [gaol talk for informant]. But, had I actually gone the full way and dobbed on him, as such, yeah, I’d have been ostracised big time (Masters 2002a).

Unsuccessful in this approach, Masters then returned to the vague issue of drinking on duty and inferred that it had always been part of police misconduct, despite the fact that Peattie had already reinforced and agreed to what had been argued during the Wood Inquiry—that drinking to excess on duty had become a harmful sub-culture within the police culture and this impacted upon to 48% of male police and 41% of female police. It is important to remember, however, that the ‘zero-tolerance’ policy regarding drinking on duty—as opposed to drinking to excess—only became ‘misconduct’ after the Wood Inquiry recommendations were enforced in 1996 (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, pp.504-509). Certainly, there is a substantial body of evidence to support the notion that drinking to excess for rank and file police can be a slippery slope to misconduct, criminal activity and of course the broader concept of ‘corruption’. However, this is a far cry from the ‘high moral ground’ which Masters repeatedly chose to occupy using statements such as ‘[t]en royal commissions wouldn’t reform it [NSW Police] to a sober, law-abiding force…’(Macken 1998).

There are some aspects of this dilemma that Masters neglected to mention, perhaps because he had sets the benchmark far too high in a practical sense. An initial response might be to question the entrapment possibilities relating to the enormous proportion of free alcohol and free meals that were—and still are—provided by journalists when they are ‘networking’ various groups of operational and administrative police in their search for information. Journalist Neil Mercer, a former ABC journalist and colleague of Masters, unconsciously provides the following example from a personal reminiscence. The incident involved a senior officer, who was a contender for the position of Commissioner and possessed a long-standing association with Sydney’s ‘progressive’ intellectual community.

Clive Small’s new job keeps a top cop where he is needed, reports Neil Mercer. FLASHBACK, 1982: Two NSW detectives and two reporters are tucking into lunch at Fishwives restaurant in Surry Hills. As the conversation flows, the senior officer leans over to one of the journalists and,
indicating his colleague, Detective Sergeant Clive Small, says: ‘You want to keep an eye on him, he’s going to be commissioner one day’. (Mercer 2002b).

An investigative journalist or academic could make a lot of points about police corruption using this example but that is not the point in question here and I am not going to pursue this rather moralistic line or, for that matter, talk about ‘cheque book journalism’. Certainly, during the search for newsworthy material, these relationships and networks are reinforced over meals and involve alcohol. Although police drinking on duty, no matter how much or how little, is clearly a major concern held by Masters, Mercer appears to be drawing a differentiating line at the company being kept in the process. According to Masters to be seen in the company of other colleagues who are ‘on-duty’ is viewed as misconduct and unacceptable and to be seen in the company of criminals is equally if not more unacceptable—a somewhat difficult rule to keep bearing in mind the practical realities of police work. However, it would appear from Mercer’s account that if police are chaperoned in the company of intellectuals and journalists then the issue becomes entirely different.

Let me explain this in more detail using my old police diary to illuminate events that took place immediately after Federal Police Assistant Commissioner Colin Winchester was murdered in Canberra on the 10th of January 1989 (Campbell et al 1992, p.vii). On 12 January 1989 some time after 2.30pm I was at the Major Crime Squad in Flemington, Sydney and received a phone call from ‘D’, a researcher with Television Network 10 (Sydney) for a current affairs programme named Page One and headed by Chris Masters. ‘D’ mentioned that after she had unsuccessfully attempted to contact AFP Assistant Commissioner Peter Lamb in Canberra regarding the death of Winchester, she had been contacted within minutes by journalist Bob Bottom. ‘D’ was told that Bottom was ringing from Lamb’s office and that he wanted to speak to Masters urgently. At the time Masters was overseas and so Lamb spoke to ‘D’ regarding a television interview about the murder of Winchester (Kennedy, M. 1989, p.19).

Some time later I met up with Masters at an Italian restaurant in the vicinity of Network Ten when he was with other colleagues. Masters was seated next to his female research assistant, who later assisted to develop a programme about the death of Winchester, which went to air on 24 April 1989. At the restaurant I felt extremely uncomfortable in Masters’ company as it appeared that he had consumed a considerable amount of red wine. After some criticism regarding my non-participation, I accepted some red wine to avoid any further conflict (Kennedy, M. 1989, p.19). The irony is that, although I generally do not consume alcohol, I do not have an issue with alcohol consumption. Nor do I consider myself easily manipulated.
The problem in this instance was that the journalist ‘D’ was a good friend and I was concerned that she could be victimised if I was not compliant with Masters’ persistent requests. If there is a deviant sub-culture in relation to police and alcohol, clearly it is structurally determined from both the inside and the outside of the organisation and the pressure to conform is not always applied from within the policing institution.

Alongside rank and file police, journalists, politicians and administrative elites have also been exposed for their alcoholic indulgences whilst ‘doing their duty’ but only the rank and file have had to submit to random breath testing on the job. In New South Wales for example the Treasurer Michael Egan readily supported the ‘reform’ recommendations of the Wood Inquiry that included the random alcohol testing of rank-and-file police (New South Wales Police Service 1999; 2000) but was quick to blame party political divisions when the Speaker of the House in the NSW Parliament, Max Willis, was forced to resign, without the loss of any benefits, after being exposed asleep and drunk during a parliamentary sitting. This had little to do with drunkenness and everything to do with point scoring, it would seem. ‘In recent times we have heard again the first erratic beats of a drum calling Australians to a divisive form of politics we hoped had long ago been abandoned in our community,’ he said. ‘The political institutions of this country, including this House, must declare themselves against this dull, thudding intolerance’. Fine words indeed and during this special sitting other members of parliament took the opportunity to emphasise the rigors, strains and long hours that amplified the stressful conditions of parliamentary life for its members (New South Wales Government 1998). Never once was it suggested that there should be parliamentary ‘reform’ that included the random alcohol testing of parliamentarians whilst they were on duty. Most of these double standards simply go unchallenged because they are unquestioned.

The inflexible antipathy displayed by Masters and other ‘progressive’ elements of the media towards the police must be seen as an attempt to ruthlessly push their case about institutionalised police corruption by grasping at the easiest ammunition they can find. Ironically this is also the view of many police in regards the media. Although this factor is seldom explained to the general public, one of my research subjects—‘Gonzo’—was quite blunt regarding the media as a whole.

‘Gonzo’: The media is there to sell newspapers or soap flakes and cornflakes, whatever. So even the average man knows that it’s driven by that motivation and so the ‘headline’ is the most important thing to the media. I think the accuracy of the facts is a secondary consideration (‘Gonzo’ 2003).
Unfortunately many of the ‘progressive’ critics of rank and file police, including Masters, seem unable to grasp the progressive theoretical foundations of the construction of a culture, whereby the task of criticism should not be so much to expose a particular interest group but rather to decipher the social tendencies which are expressed in the structural or construction process (Marcuse 1968, p.30). Exposure makes a ‘good story’.

From the above evidence it becomes clear that any deviance associated with the consumption or over-consumption of alcohol is not solely restricted to the policing organisation, let alone its rank and file members. For example, in December 2003 Andrew Bartlett, leader of the Australian Democrats and a prominent politician in a party that was originally set up to ‘keep the bastards [members of the mainstream political parties] honest’, grabbed Liberal M.P. Jeannie Ferris by the arm on the floor of the Senate in Canberra. It was reported in the media that he had been drinking alcohol and he expressed repentance at the stupidity of his actions. There was little suggestion in the media, however, that this was the slippery slope to corruption in politics or that such behaviour was indicative of a corrupt culture existing in the political arena. Nor did the media ever suggest that the bar in parliament house, the scene of much investigative reporting as politicians and the press gallery exchange confidences and make deals, should be closed down in case such a culture might develop. In contrast, the media quoted Labor politician Kevin Rudd exposing the loneliness that accompanies a political vocation.

You could die in your office in Parliament House and not be found until a month later… he said.

…At a purely human level, observing what Andrew Bartlett's gone through, he’s not the first and he won't be the last… (Farr 2003).

Bartlett was publicly humiliated, it is true, but he was not dismissed from parliament. Nor did he resign as leader of the Australian Democrats. Still less was his personal failing used to taint the apple barrel as entirely rotten. He was simply another of society’s ‘victims’—this time a victim of occupational loneliness.

Supreme Court Justice Jeff Shaw, who was the New South Wales Attorney General throughout the Wood Royal Commission into police corruption, provides another instance of this. In October 2004 Shaw was taken to hospital after his vehicle crashed and hospital staff took two blood samples, giving one to the judge as is normal procedure. But the sample that was to go to police for analysis was misplaced (Stafford 2004,p.13). New South Wales Police were investigating the disappearance of the blood sample car when Shaw, conceding that he had an alcohol related medical problem, declined a request from investigating police to
surrender the second blood sample (Gibbs, Nicholls and Pollard 2004). In the ensuing debate about the ethical, moral and legal obligations it was argued by the President of the New South Wales Bar Association Ian Harrison that Justice Shaw should be treated like anyone else in society and was under no legal obligation to surrender his blood sample. Ian Harrison S.C was also the chairman of the 1996 Harrison Inquiry into Federal Police corruption, the report of which has never been released to the public—this was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Harrison maintained his ‘classless’ standpoint despite the obvious privileges that are associated with such a politically appointed judicial position after Shaw’s resignation as Attorney General. Even by his own admissions Shaw concedes that he is not the same as everybody else (Totaro 2003b). Bar Association President Ian Harrison S.C. further suggested that an independent inquiry into the missing blood sample would be over the top and he argued that a well-meaning person had probably managed to ‘disappear’ the blood sample (Stafford 2004,p.13). With this in mind it is quite ironic that Harrison was recently appointed Deputy Commissioner to the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, whilst at the same time a parliamentary oversight committee is attempting to remove the capacity of ICAC to brand politicians and public servants, which in this instant does not include police, as corrupt (Nicholls and Davies 2004). Upon Harrison’s appointment he was cited to be the man who in the 1990s cleaned out corrupt elements in the Australian Federal Police (Mitchell 2004,p.13). What arises from this situation is the clear inference that the legal establishment, which overlaps with the political arm of the state, is comfortable with the notion that inquiries into the criminal justice system should be begin with the rank and file police or working class functionaries.

According to Health Department officials the missing blood sample was placed into a sealed container. When police opened the container it was revealed that that the sample was missing. Each year 20,000 similar blood samples are taken and to date Justice Shaw’s is the only one that had disappeared before it could be analysed (Stafford 2004,p.13). Due to the perceived conflict of interest, the Minister for Police redirected the investigation into the missing sample to the Police Integrity Commission ‘to investigate the conduct of NSW Police officers and others involved in events arising from the accident’ (Gibbs and Nicholls 2004). In turn the Independent Commission Against Corruption, which is in the process of having its powers curbed with regards to public servants and politicians, will oversight the inquiry. Gibbs, Nicholls and Pollard (2004) explain that in the meantime the politically appointed Justice Shaw is on sick leave and will be seeking treatment for an alcohol related medical problem. Harvey, Owens and Mercer (2004,p.3) confirm that Shaw’s political and judicial colleagues
have known for some time about his struggle with alcohol. At the same time these colleagues from the criminal justice hierarchy are at pains to explain that this medical problem at no stage has impacted upon his judgment or competency. In concert with the media, Shaw’s colleagues are blatantly attempting to remove the overtone of corruption that is applied to rank and file police in similar circumstances. Whilst undergoing treatment, Shaw, who is according to ‘progressive’ commentators just the same as any other citizen, will continue to receive his $6000 weekly salary and other entitlements.

Comparing situations such as these with the media justice metered out by investigative journalists in programs such as ‘Undoing the Badness’, rank and file police are clearly treated differently to others in public office. The following quote from one of my research subjects—‘Kath’—demonstrates why the construction of ‘corruption’ needs to be seen in terms of the politicised relationship existing between the media, academe, senior police and the political arm of the state. At the time Masters conducted his interview with Ray Peattie he was also an advisor to the Police Commissioner (Papadopoulos 1997) and, since the 1980s, has maintained a close relationship with senior police, academics and administrative elites of the NSW Criminal Justice System (Campbell et al 1992, pp.9, 41, 200; Papadopoulos 1997). Masters has clearly found this network of senior police and academics useful.

Kath: I think like anything in the media they sort of tend to go over the top. It sends a very bad image to the public and basically makes, or can often make mountains out of molehills. Things that they see us being corrupt for probably goes on every day in general industry. Obviously it happens in politics in Canberra and yet they can certainly make a big thing out of nothing’.

Interviewer: Do you think that the police are relying on the media a bit too much these days, the hierarchy?

Kath: I think so yeah. Again they are probably using it for their own benefit. It can be a good thing or a bad thing. It just depends on the side that they take I guess (Kath 2002).

Two other of my research subjects—‘KD’ and ‘Gabby’ who were interviewed together—agreed with ‘Kath’, although they had not worked or interacted socially with her. All three shared the same perspective.

Interviewer: What impact do you think the media has on corruption?

‘Gabby’: It destroys the police service. Because then we all get tarred with the same brush.

Interviewer: But there is only one brush!
‘KD’: They [the media] always focus on the negative.

‘Gabby’: It’s the bristles, there are lots of bristles in the brush.

‘KD’: It’s just the nature of policing and what’s newsworthy. You are not going to get front-page headlines because some copper has done a great job. It’s just always focusing on the negative aspects because that’s newsworthy, that’s what the public want to see.

Interviewer: Do you think the media have aligned themselves to closely with the political arm of the state?

‘Gabby’: Yes definitely.

Interviewer: Were they independent once?

‘Gabby’: Well they are not now and there are no two ways about it. It’s a great political tool isn’t it really (‘KD’ and ‘Gabby’ 2002).

Returning to the ABC interview with Peattie, Masters then tried to push the investigation deeper by asking, ‘What about some other examples, like what was your first experience of getting around the rules when it came to say drinking on the job?’ In response, Peattie explained an incident in 1977 where he accompanied a supervisor to a colleague’s farewell and that other police on duty covered for those at the farewell function at a local hotel. Peattie reasoned that he came from a football social background and it was nothing new to me to go and have a drink for the night. Added to this he was being told by the superior that his actions were covered and everything was all right. Again Masters attempted to overlap the aspects of misconduct through drinking alcohol with criminal behaviour yet, surprisingly, he never raised the occupational health and safety issue that in New South Wales police generally carry a firearm. This alone should prohibit any drinking of alcohol whilst on duty.

Instead Masters merely suggested that police ‘culture’ needs, for unspecified reasons, to be seen as different to the other ‘cultures’ such as lawyers, politicians and journalists who are involved in the criminal justice system. Masters inferred that if rank and file police consume alcohol on duty this will automatically impair their ‘rule enforcement’ judgement and, more importantly, affect their integrity and honesty. Masters made his point by attempting to portray drinking alcohol on duty as a slippery slope to corruption, although why police officers are the only ones who might have their actions impaired by alcohol—clearly politicians and journalists would be similarly impaired—he did not specify. Surely as ‘rule enforcers’ need to be controlled, so too should the ‘rule makers’ and that higher class of ‘enforcers’—the lawyers who are both prosecuting defendants and defending clients and the
judges who send people to gaol. The journalists’ ‘boozy’ lunch is associated with research, ‘networking’ and the exercise of the ‘freedom of the press’. For the rank and file police this is a short step to ‘corruption’. It is the sheer arrogance of this double standard that makes Masters’ occupation of the high moral ground all the more exasperating.

Masters, of course, pushed his moral argument to milk as much public humiliation as possible from his research subject, demanding nothing less than self-abnegation as his prize. It is this deviance of rank and file police that leads to the destruction of the family within the policing family unit, he suggested.

Masters: You came to really regret that first moment where you took that $100. What about regretting, say this sort of practise, like drinking on the job, did that have a price further down the line?

Peattie: Only on reflection, right through my career from that first time, as I said, there was ample opportunity at any time, particularly in plainclothes to go drinking… I’ve had three marriages and that. You’d probably have to interview the ex’s to get the real story of that but no doubt my drinking was a huge part in it (Masters 2002a).

Masters is not alone in his blatant exercise of the double standard and few commentators on policing have the ability to differentiate between what they construct as the various police sub-cultures and the existing social and organisational structures operating at the time in the wider world. In my interview with ‘Athol’ (2002), this ex-policeman explained how the drinking sub-culture had, in fact, changed from one epoch to another. Perhaps the drinking of alcohol still existed but by the time Peattie had become a police officer in 1977 the link aligning the amount of beer that an officer could consume in a shift to his competency and performance was no longer a way of life. This is not to say that it didn’t exist. It is simply reinforcing the point made by ‘Athol’ (2002) that the organisation’s structure had changed, as had its culture—something that Masters fails to grasp or is unwilling to grasp.

Masters: What other common practices that were corrupt were accepted at the time, like for example, you hear a lot about tow truck rackets, etc, was that common place?

Answering this, Peattie explained that it was common knowledge that corruption in the tow truck industry had been almost exclusively in the Western Suburbs and he had worked most of his career on the Northern beaches area. Masters had attempted to make this into a widespread problem and take it out of its limited context but as his interview with Peattie took place in 2002 and the highly publicised inquiry into police and the tow truck industry took place in the
mid 1970s, this fell somewhat flat. This inquiry had indicated that some police were being paid a spotter’s fee to report an accident to a tow truck company and that this practice was mostly exposed at the Parramatta Police Station. It involved officers from all ranks from the bottom to the top and was an institutionalised problem at Parramatta and definitely part of the culture or way of life amongst the fifty or so police at Parramatta. However it had never been suggested that this was an endemic or institutionalised part of the broader policing organisation. In fact during 1992 the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption conducted an inquiry into the unauthorised release of information and not a single instance was raised in relation to the police and the tow truck industry, although a relationship between the panel beating industry and the Department of Motor Transport was exposed (New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption 1992). Of course this is not to say that misconduct and unlawful behaviour did not exist at all, rather it is to indicate how out of touch Masters was with his ‘cultural’ assumptions and how he used his questions to roam freely across the decades to try to develop areas of misconduct both past and present into a current ‘culture of corruption’.

Failing to be able to extend this line, Masters then pursued questions about inappropriate relationships between lawyers and police. This was a very short-lived avenue as Peattie response was very blunt: ‘There’s not too many cops that have got too many solicitor friends’ (Masters 2002a). Peattie could only speculate about rumours that some lawyers paid a spotter’s fee if police directed a client to them. One of my research subjects—‘Larry’—elaborated a little bit more on this speculation.

‘Larry’: Everyone should be accountable, particularly those who exercise a great deal of power… but, the great unknown is the political parties and the Law Society and all that sort of stuff. To my mind the Royal Commissions get to a certain point and that’s it. [They are] closed down. The recent Royal Commission [Wood Royal Commission] really got to a certain point and started looking at a few judges and it stopped. Corruption doesn’t just go through the police and stop at the police… I don’t suspect that there is a big conspiracy theory that the whole of society is corrupt, but certainly there are corrupt elements, there must be (‘Larry’ 2002).

Although a relatively junior policeman like ‘Larry’ is able to differentiate between conspiracy and class bias, Masters persisted with his search for an ‘institutionalised’ culture of corruption peculiar to the rank and file, asking about the practice of stealing from the body or home of a deceased person. Peattie was again very blunt:
Peattie: …even amongst hardened police that are, er, you know, pretty broad minded and pretty accepting of most sort of things, that that was a low act… you don't hear that sort of stuff anymore that people are doing that sort of thing anymore and you’d certainly hope it isn’t, but that wasn’t in any way glorified, it was definitely frowned upon.

Thwarted again, Masters then targeted the deviance associated with police evidence, regardless of the fact that criticism relating to ‘verballing’ and ‘loading’ has to a large degree been eliminated from policing procedures with the mandatory use of audio-video interviews. Although there are concerns that performance management linking competency with quantitative ideas of productivity will see a resurgence of police verballing and the fabrication of evidence (Davis and Coleman 2000), to date this could only impact on summary offences where the majority of quantitative data is sourced (Harcourt 2001; Stenson 2001; Ratcliffe 2003). This, however, is not the point Masters was trying to make as he systematically wove between historical and contemporary aspects of deviancy within the agency of rank and file police and his approach is, for this reason, quite misleading.

This is all the more pernicious when it becomes obvious that Masters did understand the structural impact upon the agency of military and para-military organisations. Four months before in a Four Corners program entitled ‘No Prisoners’, he had argued that when Australian soldiers were seen to be engaging in deviant and unlawful behaviour in Singapore during World War 2 that cultural deviance was being amplified by structural neglect. As he then explained:

There is no doubt some Australian soldiers did desert the fighting in Singapore 60 years ago.

There is no doubt there was a breakdown of order in those last chaotic days when British and Australian leadership failed. Not surprising, considering this was a battle lost by our leaders before the soldiers arrived. So to blame the men—to blame the victims—is cruel and absurd (Masters 2002c).

I make this point not to defend Peattie but rather to amplify the class bias of the questions Masters chose to ask. Masters demonstrated a tolerant rather than a genuine understanding of these soldiers’ situation but his brief in that program was not to attack veteran soldiers. The deviance is different when it applies to the criminally convicted, alcoholic, gambling addict and three times married ex-policeman Ray Peattie. This he cannot tolerate and, despite his ‘expert’ status as an accredited investigator into police corruption, he demonstrably doesn’t understand it either.
To move Peattie’s expiation along, Masters initiated a form of historical search to corroborate his standpoint in relation to contemporary police corruption.

Masters: The crims often say that verbaling and loading is a low act, verbaling being manufacturing evidence, loading being planting evidence. What was the police attitude towards verbaling and loading, say 20 years ago?

Peattie: Well once again from my experience I can’t say everyone did it, right. I would say, however, that in 1970s, 80s, probably up to about 1992 when the Evidence Act changed, verbaling was as common as anything. Once again, I’m not gonna say every policeman did it, there’s plenty obviously that don’t and I can’t speak for all them but in my experience it was a tool used by police to, in their eyes, put away crooks that otherwise would go free… I imagine there were some that frowned on it but the vast majority were accepting of it and you were virtually looking back you were doin’ the right thing. Blokes that wouldn’t do it were ostracised to the point where, for example, if I was doing a job and I knew I had to go and get a particularly hard crook or a seasoned criminal, for example, I wouldn't be taking someone with me that I had prior knowledge of not being willing to verbal a bloke, I'd probably handpick a bloke that would… I also still remember that when the Evidence Act changed in '92 how that took a lot of pressure off you to do it… when the Evidence Act changed in 1992, it was no longer an embarrassment to let a bloke go as such (Masters 2002a).

Judging the ‘Culture of Corruption’

Again and again Peattie tried to reinforce that he could only explain his own perception of corrupt behaviour and, despite the Masters’ constant insistence that deviance was a way of life for all rank and file police, Peattie affirmed that ‘corruption’—ranging from drinking on duty to manufacturing evidence—would not necessarily be the way of life of other police officers. An interesting part of this analysis is that Masters at no stage goes any further than the ‘naughty’ or ‘bad’ deviant agency of rank and file police. By this action he infers ‘conservatively’ that misconduct and corruption are the responsibility of the individual but are also part of the vocational agency of rank and file police. He avoids the impact that structural causes may have upon the agency of rank and file police and, in so doing, he infers that their senior counterparts, administrative elites and influential others within the criminal justice system are almost blameless and do not exist as a culture of corruption. They are being evaluated differently (Masters 2002a). Masters’ class bias brushes aside the structural causes of misconduct and corruption, especially as these might reflect as side effects of a discriminatory, neo-liberal, data-led policing strategies and the competitive promotion system.
This standpoint is not just restricted to Masters, of course. Although the ABC presents itself as a ‘progressive’ organisation, a little insight into the practice of marketing makes it easier to understand why ex-policewoman Deborah Locke became such a popular guest on ABC radio. Promoting her book ‘Watching The Detectives’ (Locke 2003), published by ABC books and launched by ABC journalist and presenter Quentin Dempster in company with Liberal Party advisor/journalist Morgan Ogg (McClymont 2003), she flippantly fielded ABC interviewer Terry Lane’s remark that ‘we can’t overlook the fact that the entire Drug Squad in Victoria had to be disbanded because it was so thoroughly rotten with corruption,’ by replying, ‘Well it’s a bit like the Drug Squad do drugs, the Vice do vice, and the Fraud Squad does fraud, and the Gaming Squad does gaming. I mean that’s what we had in New South Wales’. Terry Lane’s ‘That’s right…’ (Lane 2003) fortified his simplistic but ostensibly ‘progressive’ standpoint that the ‘corrupt’ policing culture has a reason to be ‘resistant to change’ as this poses a threat to the traditions and way of life that currently exist.

As we have seen Locke’s banal and clichéd argument in support of Lane’s prejudice is so unsubstantiated that it was not even touched upon by the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (1997). These squads have been corrupt for so long, they have to be disbanded as it is impossible to change them, Locke and Lane were asserting. The ‘resistance to change’ argument is also promoted by Janet Chan (1997, pp.206-211), one of the academic consultants to the Wood Inquiry. Changing Police Culture (1997) and analysing Police Culture (1999) has been Chan’s major focus since the time of the Wood Inquiry and she continually makes her contempt for operational police abundantly clear, although there is some ambiguity in the way she explains the difference between commissioned and non-commissioned officers. This becomes particularly obvious where she infers that resistance to change can be seen within the ranks of the middle-management that are in the main rank and file non-commissioned officers. Promoting her co-authored book ‘Fair Cop: Learning the Art of Policing’ (Chan, Devery and Doran 2003), Chan (2003) shared the Terry Lane interview slot with Locke.

As interviewer, Lane’s suggestion that practice should create theory reinforces what appears to be the dominant ‘agency’ standpoint amongst ABC journalists in relation to the ‘police culture’. He also patiently suggested to his radio audience that, as a consequence of their own personal experiences, they would agree that all rank and file police harbour racist and ethnocentric prejudices. Encapsulating this, he said:
…that you could send the most tolerant police recruit to a country town with a large Aboriginal population, and within six months you would have a thoroughgoing racist on your hands. So it does look as though experience tends to take the edge off idealism… (Lane 2003)

Chan initially provided reinforcement for this wildly generalised stereotype by agreeing that rank and file police are culturally deficient and share an innate inability to resist being racist. However, she qualified this in saying:

Well I think what you said there was true, Terry, that if you, day in and day out, deal with people who are either violent or dishonest or breaking the law and have no respect for the police, I think that the easiest way is to then form these stereotypes. And it’s very interesting because I don’t think that this across the board kind of, or at least that’s not what everyone would admit to the interviewers… (Lane 2003).

Chan’s reply allowed her to satisfy the pleasantries of the interview format, ambiguously supporting Lane’s obvious personal bias towards rank and file police, whilst at the same time trying to neutralise any suggestion that she might be blatantly stereotyping and labelling them as innately and irrevocably racist and ethnocentric. As a display of academic expertise it was not particularly enlightening but then such interviews are promotions not intellectual arguments. And, as the thrust of her book was to help police in ‘learning the art of policing’, this presupposes that it is possible that this can be taught. Chan needed to appear positive and optimistic as a contrast to Locke and Lane’s gloomy negativity.

What is quite remarkable in this ABC radio interview was that Chan could be seen to back away from her previously held standpoint that a subculture can be seen as independent and understood in terms of itself (Outhwaite 1991, p.129). Whilst expanding upon rank and file police she unexpectedly admitted that it is necessary to make sense of the social predispositions, which are expressed in the structural or construction process. Embracing the work of Marcuse (1968), Chan acknowledged the structural impact that the criminal justice hierarchy and senior police have imposed upon individual agency and subsequently ‘the culture’ of rank and file police. She argued in effect that rank and file police say, ‘Well our experience is that people don’t thank the police, they don’t really care about the police, we do a lot of the hard work, and all we get is abuse,’ and then put this argument into a structural framework by explaining to Lane and Locke:
I think that’s the other part that you have to really put into the equation, is that they become very cynical about the police organisation, about the brass, the managers and so on. They feel that they’re out of touch, they feel that they’re not really doing anything for the [rank and file] police, and with the Royal Commission on, they felt that they’re not protected … And there was this fear of mistake, which I found very interesting, that they talk about it all the time, you know, they don’t want to stuff up because they’re worried that one wrong step and they could be complained against, or they could be disciplined and so on. And so this fear or aversion to doing anything positive, I think it’s a very damaging way of organising the police force, that people are always scared of doing the wrong thing (Lane 2003).

My interview with one of my research subjects—‘Joe’—reinforces the structural causes of misconduct and corruption amongst operational police. ‘Joe’ expands on the explanation made by Chan about the level of aggressive competition that is expected of rank and file police by their senior executive counterparts. What he also explains is the manner in which the performance based and data-led competency requirements of rank and file police are implemented and evaluated by senior-police and members of the police-executive.

‘Joe’: Well my notion of corrupt police is someone who takes a bribe or plants evidence or fabricates verbals, fabricates admissions, confessions that sort of stuff. But no! You can’t do policing without doing some things wrong. Otherwise no crooks would ever get locked up, no victims would ever be satisfied with what you were doing. And quite often you have to bend the rules a little bit to get a result. And when I say bend the rules, not to do anything corrupt, but y’know you could be bending police procedure by doing certain things and arresting people in a certain way. You could be inducing people in some small way to make admissions, knowing they are guilty of course and they may make the admission they are guilty but that’s the sort of stuff that I think you have to do really… there are different levels [of corruption] there is like your noble cause corruption and there is you full on corruption like we have seen at Manly [Operation Florida and Ray Peattie]. Detectives copping money off drug dealers and bribes and that sort of stuff. And then your noble cause corruption where, even noble cause corruption isn’t right, I’m not saying it is but that is a different degree of corruption. And then there is your… It’s because they [police] know the person is guilty and it because the hierarchy has got the pressure on you for the numbers, it’s a numbers game. The hierarchy want these people locked up. So if you don’t perform, you cop a razz [criticism] off the hierarchy (‘Joe’ 2001).

What ‘Joe’ reveals is the arms length division of labour between operational police and their senior counterparts in the performance management policy. It is the supervision and sanction aspect of this data-led policy that contains the causal and structural link for misconduct. I asked ‘Joe’ if the performance based and data-led competency requirements were linked to the promotion system.
'Joe': Well technically it’s not but if you can go along to a promotional interview or do a promotional application and it’s a competency based application and interview. If you can give examples, different examples for each competency in relation to an arrest or an operation that you have run, then yes it can be used that way (‘Joe’ 2001).

Rank and file police are expected to engage in aggressive competition with their colleagues for promotion and satisfy community demands for a data-led demonstration of success and this influences the way in which they carry out their work.

At this point I want to return to the Masters and Peattie interview and the point at which Masters introduced the subject of the fabrication of evidence by operational police. Peattie was clear in his response that ‘I’m not gonna say every policeman did it, there’s plenty obviously that don’t’ but, with little regard for Peattie’s explanations, Masters attempted to amplify this criminal behaviour by ignoring what he was saying so adamantly. ‘So the presumption obviously was that they were right for it even if they didn’t actually do it they did something else,’ he suggests to Peattie, completely scrambling what was actually said. Reducing this corrupt practice once more to individual agency, he portrayed deviancy as if it was the agreed rule rather than the exception, as Peattie was continually stressing (Masters 2002a). The counter argument to justify this strategy might be ‘but that doesn’t make it right’, however this would present as simply a crude, banal and ‘moral’ response to a very complex structural problem to even the most receptive audience.

Peattie’s response was that there is even a line in the sand, which he referred to as a line in the mind, determining what some police will and will not do in terms of deviant behaviour. He explained that although there are police who are prepared to fabricate evidence this does not mean that those same police will be prepared take money. Peattie then tried to explain what might influence police to engage in corruption and take money from drug dealers.

Peattie: See your local area, you’ve got absolutely no resources. For example when I started the Drug Unit in 1989 we were given a car that had a... it was an old marked police car with the badges taken off but it still had the glue imprint around the white sedan. It was a police car without colour. And you’ve got no money to pay informants. There’s no way of generating the information and things like that... (Masters 2002a).

As Peattie has tried to clearly explain, part of the structural explanation for misconduct and corruption lies in the contradiction that competency for rank and file police is measured in terms of data based performance and lack of resources is never taken into account in terms of effectivity. At one point Peattie even stressed that, in his situation, the idea was never just to
go out and steal money but to increase the crime statistics and reduce the case loads of drug investigation. He conceded, however, that he knew if money was found that it would likely be taken but the initial focus was productivity and statistics.

The Slippery Slope from McDonalds to Politics

With admissions at an obvious dead end, Masters next approach was a line of questioning about police ‘mateship’ that ended with the implication that this is nothing less than the precursor of an institutional ‘culture of corruption’ and its attendant ‘code of silence’.

Masters: So does this mateship grow always out of strength, I mean is it always a good thing, because clearly when mates are also acculturating other mates into bad practices you know that’s not so good, your mate's not really doing you a good turn?

Mateship has suddenly become inextricably linked with ‘acculturating other mates into bad practices’, allowing Masters to directly rebuke Peattie for something he had not even said with, ‘you know that’s not so good’. Leading again, Masters then said:

Masters: So do you think that there is something of a culture of mutual blackmail, that the secrets tend to be kept and the bonds tend to be tight, because people have something on one another… That’s not a good thing is it, I mean that's sort of sinister in a way isn’t it?

‘Sinister’ is a loaded word to describe friendship or mateship and ‘mutual blackmail’ is an even more loaded way to view the solidarity that comes from operational team work. To bolster this, however, Masters developed a storyline in which some police concoct lies about motor vehicle accidents where no other vehicle is involved by arguing that a dog ran out in front of the car and they swerved to miss it resulting in an accident. It is a plausible scenario and one to which an audience can easily relate. In fact, its very plausibility makes it sound like a true event and the inference is that this is happening all the time. With the scene thus peopled with lying police, Masters was then able to move directly to the question of whether or not accepting half price McDonalds’ hamburgers should also be seen as a form of corruption, finishing with a triumphant, ‘So even in small ways police can be compromised?’

To this Peattie had to agree, passively allowing Masters to develop another scenario and ask another a leading question, ‘What do you think about that practice of police putting on their uniform on the weekend to go in and get a half price [McDonalds]?’ With nowhere else to go Peattie explained that he had heard rumours of this happening and regarded the individuals concerned as pretty mean.
Masters: Pretty cheap yeah. But I mean to say... What’s really wrong with it? Is it wrong because you are getting a service, it is an us and them thing, you are getting a service that normal members of the public can't get and secondly, you’re gonna give a service that isn’t necessarily fair, that you’ll obviously look after the people who look after you?

By using the words ‘that isn’t necessarily fair’ and suggesting that police are being given something that the viewer won’t be getting, Masters enhanced the ‘us and them’ theme. To this Peattie again had to agree as there was no room in the argument for him to do otherwise. Yet again, he had been cleverly ‘verballed’ by Masters in a journalistic sense and was left looking decided shady.

It will be useful at this point to consider what one of my research subjects—’Athol’—also had to say on this well-worn issue:

’Athol’: Well of course if you are going to get McDonalds for nothing it’s a bit different. But, if you have gone there to buy and that’s a policy that you only pay a reduced rate that’s not corruption (’Athol’ 2002).

Another research subject—’Doc’—combines the notion of half price McDonalds with the managerialism and data-led performance management of contemporary policing institution, raising the contradiction that although younger police have been told that accepting half price McDonalds is corrupt, they demonstrate no awareness that the bigger danger is the manner in which they satisfy the demands of their senior colleagues for ‘more results’. Predictably, this is an issue that is not ever raised by Masters in his interview with Peattie. ‘Doc’ said:

’Doc’: The young people coming out of the academy now look at things like taking their 50% of McDonalds as corruption, some of them. I think a lot of it depends on the way they have been indoctrinated. The way they have been taught, as to what their actual view of corruption is... The hierarchy is so big now on figures and results and being so proactive they want to see the runs on the board. I think that in itself pushes the police to possibly push the limits a little bit more than what they normally would. So I suppose that does induce some sort of corrupt behaviour (’Doc’ 2002).

Yet another research subject—’Kath’—also discusses the issue of half price McDonalds as compared to the aggressive competition of the police promotion system.

’Kath’: There is a moral type of corruption. Half price McDonalds I mean who cares really? Who is it affecting? I mean it’s not hurting anybody. Whereas treading on someone else to get to your own position, that might effect that person (Kath 2002).
Operational police do not have to be told by journalists what constitutes corruption for my research subjects each have a definite opinion about what this means in the context of ordinary policing.

‘Greg’: Well I don’t think that it’s the half price McDonalds or the cup of coffee or any of that sort of thing. If you are speaking of corruption you are generally speaking of an abuse of position. The general context is seen to be the taking of money for favour (‘Greg’ 2002)

‘Julie’: I am of the belief that corrupt behaviour is unlawful conduct. So if it’s against a written law then it’s unlawful. There is no law saying that you are not allowed to have 50% off McDonalds. It’s a good gesture given by McDonalds to the Police Service. I don’t see anything wrong with that (‘Julie’ 2003).

Asking ‘Kath’ what she enjoyed about being a police officer, she said quickly:

‘Kath’: It certainly wasn’t the half price McDonalds, they don’t get that anymore though do they?

Interviewer: Yeah.

‘Kath’: Oh really! I thought it was stopped. Well the AFP [Australian Federal Police] are not allowed to take it. It’s a slippery slope to corruption… It’s the mind-set that if you get something for free that you are corruptible. We have a training session from our Internal Security about it. ‘You are not to accept anything…’ (Kath 2002).

Whilst interviewing ‘Vlad’ the subject of journalists came up, launching him into a discussion about a recent meeting with a number of Sydney journalists in which the subject of police corruption and McDonalds had been raised as part of a serious discussion.

‘Vlad’: I had this discussion a couple of weeks ago with some people outside the coppers. They were, well the subject of corruption came up, which may be jumping ahead in your programme here [interview]. But the subject of corruption came up and funnily enough I threw up this thing, I said. ‘Look.’ and they were all journo’s and ex journo’s [journalists]. I said. ‘Corruption to you is perks of the job for you as well’. Like what’s corruption to you as far as a policeman is concerned is like half priced McDonalds. I threw up the half price at McDonalds. I did that without knowing there would be an article in the weekend paper (01.07.02), just gone passed, about a question raised in Parliament… it was in Saturday’s *Telegraph*. Some politician raised the question to Costa [Minister for Police] and said. ‘What are you doing about McDonalds trying to corrupt our police by offering them free or half priced hamburgers at McDonalds?’ I laughed when I saw this because a week before that I was at this dinner party and we were talking about police corruption. I threw in the questions and said. ‘Well what do you call corruption. What’s corruption? Or what is the intent of corruption? They said. ‘Well it’s designed to make you not do your job’. Or
something like that, I can’t remember exactly what they said. I said, ‘Right ok’. Well back in my day in 1988 when Pickering [ex Police Minister] was the Police Minister and they [Liberal-Coalition Government] were going for re-election, Pickering made the point that he would do something about getting rid of half price McDonalds hamburgers for police. Some stupid Assistant Commissioner jumped onto the bandwagon in Victoria and said something along the same lines. I said, ‘Ok if you consider that corruption?’ …On your definition of corruption, which is something to stop me from doing my job are you seriously suggesting here that if I get a half price McDonalds hamburger and I am walking through the main street of Hurstville and I turn around and see a bloke coming out of a bank with a balaclava and a .32 automatic in his hands and he pulls his balaclava off and it’s the manager of McDonalds and he says, ‘Hang on you can’t do anything to me I gave you half priced hamburgers at McDonalds.’ And you go, ‘Shit your right I can’t. Sorry about that mate. Ok thanks very much.’ Is this what you are seriously suggesting with this whole deal.’ Anyway of course they could not have an answer to it. But then as I see it it’s still an issue because it came up in the paper on the weekend (‘Vlad’ 2002).

To ‘Larry’ the parameters of corruption have been set far too wide.

‘Larry’: …corruption is such a wide thing. It goes from the classic example of getting half price McDonalds, to giving false evidence, selling drugs and committing murder. That’s as wide as it goes. I think it’s a situation thing like I personally don’t think that getting half price McDonalds is that big an issue. It’s a corporate discount and it’s the same as other firms that offer corporate discounts. Unless the manager is saying, ‘Well you got a half price hamburger yesterday. I want you to go to my ex-wife’s new boyfriends house and give him a kick up the arse (‘Larry’ 2002).

In all these instances the ‘half price McDonalds’ argument is an easily recognised ploy, useful in the construction of ‘moral outrage’. Its ambiguity is its strength in this regard, exacerbated even further by prejudice and social tension between collective and individualistic values. What is particularly revealing is the contradictory manner in which the moral argument in relation to McDonalds is regularly utilised to exert power and garner electoral support in a politicised police service. For example, as ‘Vlad’ (2002) explains, it was Police Minister Pickering who attempted to use the half price McDonalds issue and it’s links to corruption as political leverage.

Ironically, Police Minister Pickering himself had to stand down because he misled parliament about an issue involving police misconduct, although he was not required to resign from parliament and his dismissal was subsequently instrumental in using the Police Royal Commission to retaliate against Commissioner Lauer and the broader police organisation. On his resignation from parliament Pickering told the upper house that he was determined to go ahead with a program to reform the Police Service and reduce their corrupt conduct (Lagan
The irony of a moral crusader being forced to resign for deliberately misleading the
parliament was lost not only on Pickering, Hatton and their allies in the ‘White Knights’ but
tirely lost on ‘progressive’ intellectuals and the media as well.

Instead, it was argued that the conflict between Pickering and Lauer did not involve
corruption hence there was no reason for the matter to be examined by the New South Wales
Independent Commission Against Corruption. Further to this the NSW Ombudsman is not
empowered to inquire into the behaviour of politicians nor is the Ombudsman empowered to
investigate any of the staff of the Police Royal Commission (Commonwealth of Australia
2003, LCA. 842; Coultan 1992). It is clear, however, that if the actions of Pickering were
measured against the definition of corruption implemented by the Wood Royal Commission
there should have been a very different outcome if justice and equality before the law were to
be upheld. With this level of political leeway being given to politicians such as Pickering by a
media all too willing to define accepting half price McDonalds’ hamburgers as corrupt
behaviour, it is hard to accept that their real aim is to uphold ‘morality’ and ensure
accountability in the interests of the public.

Logic has little role to play in investigative television, of course. There is a broad public
acceptance of the double standard that allows moral entrepreneurs such as Chris Masters and
politicians such as Ted Pickering and John Hatton to remain unaccountable and still, at the
same time demand total accountability down to the last hamburger from rank and file police.
During the interview between Masters and Peattie an invisible foundation of class bias was
used to reinforce and further develop an existing framework of ‘moral panic’. It is never as
much as hinted that the substance of Masters’ critique could be universally applied to other
professions and vocations. An example of this can be seen at the point at which Masters
reinforced the meaning of his program title, ‘Undoing the Badness’:

Masters: There’s been a long-standing attitude that bad publicity affects us all and that was a good
reason to keep the badness hidden. Do you think that that actually is a good reason, that we need a
bit more openness and transparency for the public to understand policing a little bit better?
(Masters 2002a).

It would be impossible to answer this question without agreeing with Masters’ basic truism.
But, by agreeing, Peattie was made to look as if he was supporting Masters’ version of a
corrupt police culture keeping ‘the badness hidden’ by ‘a code of silence’ that needs to be
replaced by ‘more openness and transparency’. Although there is a lot of truth in Masters’
argument, it would be more convincing if it was not so dogmatic and was made to apply
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versally, extending accountability to the activities of politicians such as Pickering or Hatton; to the questionable investigative strategies used during the Wood Inquiry (Brown 2003); and to the activities and behaviour of journalists such as Masters who use their own line of prolix and sophistry to construct leading questions and to push their own opinions into the mouths of ‘captive’ interviewees such as Peattie.

Hatton knew that ‘[c]orruption is entrenched in senior levels of the New South Wales Police Service’ and acknowledged the impact of this in parliament before the Wood Inquiry was even set up.

Internal Affairs is corrupt. Senior police officers in New South Wales close ranks to prevent exposure of corrupt activities. Those not part of this culture are spectators too afraid to do anything about the corruption or are whistleblowers who are immediately isolated, vilified and have their career paths curtailed (New South Wales Legislative Assembly 1994).

However, he was never to crusade on this issue or act on this knowledge. Nor has Chris Masters. In fact, as I have shown, there has been a considerable effort by politicians, particularly those who have ties to the legal establishment, to have any evidence relating to these matters withheld from the public—for example, the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA. 630-689) and the Harrison Inquiry into the Federal Police (Commonwealth Attorney General 1997). Masters himself has argued in relation to his own public slippages that unethical behaviour has more to do with the unrealistic demands made about the ethics of journalism than it has to do with moral failings. In journalism, he declared, there is always going to be a chance of errors because this is a profession that can’t be practiced mistake-free. Ethical standards ensure ‘the bar is far too high’ (Masters and O’Reagan 2002). Perhaps defining the acceptance by police officers of half price McDonalds’ hamburgers as corrupt behaviour should be seen as setting ‘the bar… far too high’ as well?

Towards the end of the interview Peattie made a vain attempt to give Masters various examples of incidents that form the corrosive relationships between rank and file police and their senior counterparts. He explained that a particular Assistant Commissioner [Jeff Jarratt] was visiting the Armed Hold Up Squad one day and delivering some paperwork:

Peattie: One of the detective sergeants asked him to accompany him to an interview room where the other detectives were interviewing an offender. He grabbed his hand and put it on the offender. He said at least you can say you’ve touched one now. He was famous for it. The same bloke
topped the overtime for the state in about 1981 from corridors, doing nothing, which to the
working cop that’s sitting out there, and in those days taking a risk of perjuring himself,
verballing, loading, doing whatever, very little was thought of that particular fellow and he wasn’t
on his own. There’s plenty of them out there (Masters 2002a).

To this Masters conceded that there clearly was a real need for active rank and file police
officers but he studiously avoided addressing the issues being raised by Peattie and bypassed
Peattie’s further suggestion—subsequently supported by Dr Janet Chan in Lane (2003) and
Chan et al (2003)—that aggressive competition in the work environment and promotion
stakes reinforced by a data-led performance management ‘reform’ process is only going to
aggravate the existing crisis amongst rank and file police.

Peattie: If you and I were going for a job in today’s current promotional sys-
tem and you and I
were the only two applicants, I could anonymously wipe you out of contention just with... smother
you in paperwork with complaints. I won't go into the promotional system but I think it’s quite
well accepted that it’s a sham at the moment, it’s a joke, but morale wise it does very little for the
police that are actually out there working... Blokes are worried about getting complained about,
worried about false allegations... (Masters 2002a).

The concern raised by Peattie is supported by one of my research subjects—‘Lazlo’—who
explains how the promotion system has consumed rank and file police to the point that it has
become more important than policing.

‘Lazlo’: Well the baddies are still the enemy. But the real enemy is the people who forget that you
are called a policeman because you actually have to do policing. You are not called a policeman
because you want to become a sergeant and then an inspector and then a superintendent. That’s
the real enemy... You would have to say there is probably a sixty/fifty breakdown of police who
want to become higher ranked and forty percent who just want to do policing. Whereas I think in
the past it would have been completely different... Police now don’t talk about jobs [criminal
activity] when they socialise. They just talk about who got promoted and when the next promotion
is going to be up and how you can get promoted. That’s all they discuss... It’s horrible (‘Lazlo’
2002).

Despite Peattie’s repeated attempts to explain the corrosive and negative impact that
managerialism and aggressive competition have upon the structure of policing institutions
Masters responded with an aggressive reply.

Masters: But you know it’s no fault of anybody other than the police at Manly who allowed that
green lighting to go on, that’s created this situation, wouldn’t you say? …I suppose what I'm
getting at Ray, is you know do you think you can get the balance right between ensuring that
Police are active and get out there and work hard but at the same time aren’t drawn into misbehaviour, doing the wrong thing (Masters 2002a).

Peattie: But then it’s up to the Service to provide them with the means to do so. Proper video equipment and things like that, proper supervision, letting supervisors supervise, not putting six hats on the one person because other people are on leave and he’s filling in or relieving up or whatever… (Masters 2002a).

The gap between the idealistic and ultimately unrealistic demands expected by moral crusaders such as Masters bases itself on a double standard of behaviour coupled with an ignorance and unwillingness to find out about the problems confronting rank and file police. As one of my research subjects—‘Sandra’—explains, many senior police show poor leadership skills because their focus is on promotion and organisational management not operational policing.

‘Sandra’: But also it’s a sad indictment of this service if you have a Commander, male or female, that you feel you cannot go to them and get something off your chest without getting crucified… We are not getting the support that we used to get… we have one member [rank and file officer] who is off sick and has been for quite some time due to an incident or two incidents in fact. His strict instructions now are, ‘I don’t want Duty Officers or the Commander to ring me at home.’ Now what does that tell you? Years ago it did not matter. If you felt that, I mean if the boss rang you, whether it was a Superintendent or an Inspector you would think well somebody cares about me. Now we have people telling us that we don’t want to speak to any Commissioned Rank because they don’t care (‘Sandra’ 2002).

The View from Below

The public images of police corruption mostly come from the media in which exposes of police corruption or ineptitude are intermingled with images of racism, harassment, brutality and abuses of power—for example, the Rodney King beating (Prenzler 2002, p.8) or police behaving aggressively during anti-globalisation demonstrations (Cornford 2003) or harassing ethnic minorities whilst on the beat in Cabramatta (Hardaker 1997). Jennie Brockie used such images to the advantage of her visual argument about the police in her Australian documentary *Cop It Sweet* (Brockie 1992). At times the impact of these images is amplified by the overwhelming arrogance and blatant denial of the offending rank and file police and their senior counterparts and this is augmented when government officials and their advisors immediately begin to minimise any electoral damage by unquestioningly placing the spotlight on the victim and sacrificing the police without examining any of the structural issues or
causal factors relating to such misconduct and the abuse of power (Kennedy, L. 2000b; Emy and Hughes 1991, p.422). Such prejudice is reinforced by interviews such as the Terry Lane promotional segment involving Deborah Locke and Janet Chan (Lane 2003) and the Chris Masters conversation with Ray Peattie that I have described above (2002a).

If they were really given a voice in the media, however, the operational police would be able to tell their side of the story. Their viewpoint, however, is rarely aired.

‘Athol’ is a retired detective and he joined the police in the 1960s. I asked him what his views were on corruption and he said:

‘Athol’: Yes well of course these things go back years. Many police Commissioners wouldn’t recognise that the Thirty Three Club even existed. Thomo’s Two Up [gambling], every criminal, every working policeman knew where Thomo’s Two Up was. But, no Commissioner ever seemed to know where it was.

Interviewer: Do you think that some form of corruption is inevitable?

‘Athol’: Absolutely yes, it’s human nature. You are going to get that in any walk of life, it doesn’t have to be police officers. It doesn’t matter where you go you are going to get corruption.

Interviewer: What do you consider constitutes corrupt behaviour in the context of ordinary police work?

‘Athol’: I’d say as what one old sergeant said to me many years ago. ‘Athol’ I don’t mind if you get something for doing your job. But, never let me catch you getting something for not doing your job. Now he didn’t mean that as expressed as what he said. Basically if I caught doing something by not doing my job I would be in serious trouble, which is fair enough I think. But, if someone who wants to give, and it could be at Christmas time, you have done something for someone and someone came along with a little gift. And I am not talking money; it could be a bottle of whiskey; it could be just a handkerchief; it could be something for your wife; it could be a bunch of flowers, that style of thing for doing your job, that’s not corruption in my mind. Nor is it corruption if you have made an offer to pay for something and someone wants to give you a discount, I don’t consider that any form of corruption. If you go out to tout some business from someone and try to use your position of authority, like going to a sporting fixture and saying that you are working there or using your authority to get in. Well that is a form of corruption there is no doubt about that. And of course the absolute issue would be either taking money if you found it during a search or someone offered it too you to neglect your duty that is the form of corruption that just couldn’t be countenanced under any circumstances (‘Athol’ 2003).
‘Max’ is a Vietnam veteran and a lawyer. He was a uniformed police officer for eleven years and when he became a lawyer worked for many years as a public prosecutor. I have already outlined the politicised definition of corruption as defined by the Wood Inquiry (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.162) and I have argued that it bears no resemblance to any other definition in existence. ‘Athol’s account of corruption corresponds well with White and Perrone’s definition of corruption as ‘[t]he misuse of office for personal gain’ (1997, p.50). It also equates with the definition given by Punch (1983, p.232) as doing or not doing something in return for gifts and/or money. When I asked ‘Max’ his answer is far more complex.

‘Max’: My definition would be a lot narrower than I suspect would have originated out of the Wood Royal Commission, for example. But, I tend to adopt the narrower view of corruption as being the receipt of rewards in return for the non-performance of your duty. Or, the more serious corruption is just straight out using your job to conduct criminal activity. I think my attitude is that you need to adopt a mature attitude that you are never going to have a hundred percent detection of corruption. But, I think it needs to be realistically viewed. A lot of so called corruption is police exceeding their authority, for example in what they perceive is the greater public good is deemed as being corruption, I don’t view that as being corruption. It might be a disciplinary problem, and administrative or a management problem but I don’t view that as being corruption. I think as far as corruption is concerned equally for those who take money to avoid doing their job are those people who in a position of the executive or management positions of police or generally in leadership positions who are incompetent. I view that in fact as being a form of corruption because it has the same effect and that is the non protection of the community or the enforcement of law effectively the crims still walk free so which is the more serious criminals walking free because of incompetent policing or criminals walking free because of police collecting money (‘Max’ 2002).

What becomes clear is that both ‘Max’ and ‘Athol’ are able to understand both the agency and structural aspects of corrupt behaviour by police. Neither is an apologist for dishonesty and both allude to the broader structural features that create the causal factors regarding misconduct and deviance. They also draw on an interesting concept that the disempowering of police accused of misconduct and dishonesty must be an organic process as well as a legislative or mandatory process. ‘Guilt by association’ constructs the ‘outsider’ in policing institutions in the same manner as the interactionists such as Becker (1966, 1967) see their ‘outsider’ constructed in the broader society. Interestingly, these traits are also part of the central values of the radical ‘left realist’ standpoint that incorporates competitive individualism and aggressive masculinity as a major contributor towards deviance in society (Young 1997, pp.473, 483, 484). ‘Max’ even raises the division of labour and class bias
associated with incompetent leadership and asserts this is also a form of corruption. On this note ‘Athol’ agrees.

‘Athol’: Well probably there is a difference to this extent that the working police are hands on and their corrupt practices could be minor compared to the corrupt practices of senior police if they are using. [These are] totally different areas, I mean senior police may use corrupt practices in giving someone a position to work with them, or for them, promote someone that shouldn’t be promoted. Those are corrupt practices; it doesn’t have to be an issue where it is involving money. There are corrupt practices that can be conducted everywhere (‘Athol’ 2002).

When I asked ‘Athol’ where he thought the line should be drawn and if some corrupt behaviour is more objectionable than another he was not sympathetic at all to the betrayal of duty.

‘Athol’: Well I think it comes back down to what that old fellow said to me. If you get something for doing your job, it may still hinge on corruption. But, to get something for not doing your job that is the total part of corruption. You can’t get away from that. I mean you cannot, you cannot expect any leniency anywhere if you have compromised your position. You’ve compromised the people you work with for your own gratification. That’s just not on’ (‘Athol’ 2002).

‘Barney’, who has been a detective for almost 22 years, raised the same issue as ‘Max’ in terms of police exceeding their authority for the ‘greater-good’. ‘Barney’ also saw this as a leadership, training and management issue.

‘Barney’: Well I suppose it’s hard to define. I could probably give you a number of examples. Corrupt behaviour is I suppose anything that firstly is against the law and I know that with the Wood Royal Commission they spoke about noble cause corruption. Maybe that has been an issue for a lot of police and it comes back to I suppose. Where do we get educated? We go to Police College. I can only gauge this situation this way. You talk about ethical behaviour and that’s fair enough. But as far as corruption is concerned my understanding would be anything that is outside whatever you do by law and what would be ethically expected of you I suppose. It is only in recent times that this has become a subject of study [in the police]. I don’t know when it was brought in. I know probably for at least maybe five years that they have brought that into recruit training. I know that I did a course when I did my Bachelor of Policing and that was one of the topics. But, y’know the thing about ethics is that it is very much a personal thing, isn’t it. About your own standard and what is ethical at that time. You have to make those decisions at the spur of the moment, they talk about the ‘Dirty Harry’ syndrome and all those sort of things… You have certain guides like your handbooks and all of that sort of stuff and really you have got access now to information that we never had before, like the police intranet. So everybody is a-tune to that and they look up a certain topic and read what the procedure is, then should not be any major problems
with it all, then again it is just getting police to do that. We go to the Academy and we come out. But, all of those films that we have seen for years and years, you cannot tell me that they don’t have some sort of impact, although they might be very subtle. But they have some impact about how policing should be done. I am talking in general I am not talking from my own perspective (‘Barney’ 2002).

As I have shown, in the interview with Ray Peattie the wealth of avenues opened up for exploring the complexity of the issue were —whether deliberately or ineptly—ignored by Chris Masters. Each of these was halted abruptly as Masters returned inexorably to his preconceived ideas and larded these with the same old clichés. The same can be said of Jennie Brockie’s Australian documentary, *Cop It Sweet* (Brockie 1992) which was also screened on ABC television. This was supposed to be reality television and the camera moved amongst ordinary rank and file officers, recording their actions and reactions and, in so doing, allegedly allowed them to incriminate themselves in their natural state. The program created a public furore because, according to Janet Chan (1997, p.2), it portrayed in graphic detail the level of police racism against the Aboriginal population in the inner Sydney suburb of Redfern. It confirmed the media’s worst fears—that the Australian police were ignorant racist thugs with too much power to misuse as they saw fit.

Yet, Chan maintains, this paled against the brutal beating of Rodney King in full view of the cameras in the United States. This may be so. However, levels of violence and, indeed, indignation are one thing but analysis is another. Chan fails to explain why the beating of King was racist in terms of the agency of the individual rank and file police, relying on the obvious fact that King was an African American male and leaving the rest to conjecture and assumption. Jude McCulloch (2001), on the other hand, does focus on the structural aspects of both policing and the policed and argues throughout *Blue Army* that it is impossible to defend the police institution against the accusation of institutionalised racism. In so doing, she employs a much different argument to Chan’s interactionist method of explanation that concentrates on advancing a structural explanation for the deviance of the rule-breaker (Becker 1974) without considering the situation of the ‘rule-enforcer’.

Bernstein et al (1975, pp.11, 76) have argued that the corporate-military model of policing is necessary to enforce the class, racial, sexual and cultural oppression that is an integral part of capitalism and both Robert Reiner (2000, p.67) *The Politics of The Police* and Jude McCulloch (2001) *Blue Army* stress this in their analyses, explaining how the political arm of the state is the driving force behind the policy of data-led, para-military, ‘zero-tolerance’
policing. Deviance or racism by the rule-enforcer is not simply the product of individual agency that Chan, Brockie and Masters merely assume that it is.

Chan (1997, p.3) argues that John Avery, who was the NSW Police Commissioner from 1984–1992, was a dedicated progressive reformer with a mission to clean up the force. Yet Avery was an influential part of the police executive in 1982 when the Tactical Response Group (TRG) and the Special Weapons Operations Squad (SWOS) were introduced, bringing with them an enormous deterioration of police public relations amongst minority groups. This military style of aggressive policing is the cause of a good deal of conflict between uniform police and the policed to this very day (Collins et al 2000, p.182-185; Totaro, Levett and Jacobsen 2004). In the recent incident in Redfern, discussed earlier, rank and file police were directed to utilise uncompromising strategies to deal with social unrest in a marginalised inner city Aboriginal community that is weighed down with poverty and drug and alcohol abuse. It is important to keep in mind that it was Redfern police officers who were the subject of criticism after the screening of *Cop It Sweet* in 1992.

Up to 150 police officers will meet at Redfern Town Hall today to discuss industrial action after more than 40 of their colleagues were injured during the Redfern riots. Officers claim they were ill-equipped and given no leadership in handling the angry mob… Riots erupted late on Sunday, February 15, following news teenager Thomas "TJ" Hickey had died after allegedly been pursued by police. …Officers claim there was a lack of co-ordination and support during the riots, with new recruits handed riot gear and ordered to the frontline without any instructions… Other officers’ concerns likely to be raised during today’s meeting include actions by senior officers, who one policeman said ‘stood around in a circle on their mobile phones’ instead of directing operations… (Kamper 2004)

Aggressive and uncompromising policing strategies create a similar situation in New York. Silverman (1999, p.187) explains that in February 1999 four plain police from a ‘data driven’ plain clothes ‘Street Crime Unit (SCU), fired forty one times at Amadou Diallo, a black African immigrant who had no criminal record. Diallo died after being struck by nineteen bullets and, Silverman argues, critics have every right to complain. However, he adds, they have it wrong if they believe that this is about racism from an individual perspective or insensitive white cops systematically targeting minorities because of their ethnicity and colour. As he explains, ‘What they [police] are doing is more of what they have been doing and that is the real problem’. It is, Silverman says, a matter of scale. Policing necessitates both
negative and positive citizen relationships and when the negative outweighs the positive, much the same as in Australia and Britain with the introduction of ‘aggressive policing’, public confidence declines.

Harring (2000, p.9) believes that the acquittal of the four officers who shot Diallo was a travesty. Not because they were found to be ‘not guilty’, however, but because this demonstrated the District Attorney’s office failure to challenge the police version of the facts. Consequently the trial legally justified the aggressive ‘zero-tolerance’ policing policy of Mayor Giuliani and demonstrated to the general public that the killing of Diallo was an ‘accident’—an unavoidable consequence of the class bias and division of labour required for ‘good’ police work. In earlier research Harring and Ray (1999, p.63) explained that the brutal killing of Diallo actually reflected the division of labour between the police executive and their rank and file counterparts and the alienating character that police institutions and the criminal law has had on police procedure. Harring and Ray argue that in the 1970s many social commentators were concerned with the changing role of the police institution and attempted to negotiate change by transforming the way that the police are viewed and educated. At the same time, nobody in the 1970s anticipated the way in which the neo-liberal conservative law-and-order agenda would become the organisationally law-and-order agenda of the 1990s.

Harring, Ray and Silverman’s argument is supported by the qualitative interview data of research subjects such as ‘Athol’, ‘Max’ and ‘Barney’ demonstrating that managerialism, the division of labour, alienation and class bias associated with the ‘politicised’ structure of policing and the criminal justice system are major contributors to misconduct, violence and corruption. Dixon (2000, p.371), however, in his review of Violence and Police Culture, complains about the ‘dearth’ of empirical research into police shootings, praising the work of his colleague Janet Chan and mentioning her work Changing Police Culture (1997)—research endorsed and funded by the criminal justice establishment and members of the police executive who selected the police research subjects to be interviewed (McGrath 1999), none of whom were rank and file officers. Using this selected data, Chan was able to determine that the police use violence as a punishment to provide swift, street-level sanctions to deter, punish, and establish their authority (Dixon 2000, p.371).

Another of my research subjects—‘Arnold’—has been a uniformed policeman for over fifteen years although he now works in a specialised area. Prior to this he was a patrol officer in the inner west of Sydney, where there has been enormous levels of ethnic tension and social
unrest (Kennedy 2000, M. p.86). In his interview ‘Arnold’ explains that although intolerance and racism are factors in policing practice, it is the class issue that cannot be ignored.

‘Arnold’: I remember when the [Wood] Commission was going on and the general public thought that y’know a lot of the coppers were corrupt and were up to this and what not. It’s a real kick in the face because I can honestly say that y’know for the fifteen years I have been in the police that I have never been part of it [corruption] and never really seen it. And it’s a bit of a pain to be out there busting your bum, y’know working Sunday night and Saturday night and weekends and y’know all hours of the night, putting up with what you have got to put up with and then have the public have this view of you. But, as the years go on you become more and more hardened to that sort of thing and it becomes like water off a duck’s back after a while… you join because you think that you are a decent sort of bloke, and you want to do the best that you can, and you want a decent job. I was quite proud to be a policeman (‘Arnold’ 2002).’

‘Arnold’ does not complain about the tense relationship between the public and the police. Rather he has an issue with the publicised ‘world-view’ of rank and file police that was created during the Wood Inquiry. ‘Arnold’ explains how the ‘birds’ style of senior management has impacted upon rank and file police (Henry 1994 p.165). He also discusses the pre-meditation of entrepreneurial corrupt behaviour involving drugs and money during ‘Operation Florida’ at the Manly Police Station (Mercer 2001t).

‘Arnold’ also emphasises the ‘dirty hands’ aspects of policing, whereby police engage in aggressive and violent behaviour as a means to an end (Klockars 1979). This is a clear indication that police are prepared to use violence in order to establish authority and maintain the upper hand but this falls a long way short of the argument, used by Chan, that police use violence as a practice of punishment to provide swift, street-level sanctions to deter, punish, and establish authority. The simple fact is that ‘Arnold’ does not want to come off second best when there is an aggressive and violent eruption during an arrest. If one considers the serious outcome of gaol that faces many people who are arrested then there is every reason to anticipate rigorous resistance. The problem is that there is no quantitative manner by which this predicament can be measured. In any event who benefits from this? Does he break the law? Is he corrupt? There are other aspects of his argument that I have already discussed in terms of ‘rule enforcers’, ‘rule breakers’ and ‘rule makers’ (Gouldner 1968). Where Arnold differs with ‘Athol’, ‘Max’ and ‘Barney’ is that he has spent almost all of his policing as a patrol officer and he sees the use of force and violence as being quite complex. However, he does not differ in terms of corruption that involves the entrepreneurial and pre-mediated theft of money and drugs.
‘Arnold’: I honestly think that the management of police these days is ‘shithouse’ I’ll be blunt. There is too much emphasis placed on crime statistics and reporting of crime and better education for cops and just crossing your Ps and Qs and make sure this is right, and that’s rights. There is no push towards getting out and mixing with the people on the street, the crooks on the street and learning the basics of policing, which is getting out there… Corruption means to me. It means. Look corruption to me is pre-planned. In basic sort of talk so that people can understand it. It’s going to work, using your position as a copper to gain things from being a policeman, like those Manly coppers. They were obtaining money, they are selling drugs, they are putting themselves in a position of obtaining benefit from what they are doing. As I said before I don’t think corruption is working on the street, it’s three o’clock in the morning, you are trying to lock some bloke up, he is playing up a treat, you biff [hit] him, you get him into the back of a truck it’s on for young and old, you get him back to the police station and then you are hauled in and are in all sorts of trouble for what you have done. It’s a shitty business being a GD copper and these types of thing happen (‘Arnold’ 2002).

‘Kath’ is a mature aged policewoman who is university educated and has five years experience as a patrol officer. She has worked exclusively in the lower socio-economic areas of Sydney. ‘Kath’ talks about corruption in terms of the broad based definition used by the Wood Inquiry and many academics such as Punch (2003, p.5) where dishonesty, theft, violence and racism are all interwoven and then separated into categories of ‘corruption for the job’ as opposed to ‘corruption on the job’. Where Punch differentiates himself from the notion of corruption used in the Wood Inquiry is when he argues that an organisation’s policy makers and administrative elites ask rank and file police to bend the rules for institutional ends in contrast to rank and file police like ‘Arnold’ who become creative at getting around rules, regulations and procedures, sometimes to achieve results.

Interviewer: There has been a lot of talk about corruption and malpractice. What do you think or what would you consider would be corrupt behaviour amongst ordinary police?

‘Kath’: Like GDs. Anything can be considered to be corrupt these days, accepting chocolates over the counter for the good work you have done, that is seen to be corrupt… I guess taking advantage of something for your own benefit, your own advancement. Crawling over other people to get to the top. I guess abusing the system. I haven’t come across it too often in terms of my own colleagues. I haven’t seen what I would call absolute corruption. I guess the worst I have ever seen, even if you would call it [corruption] would be people taking advantage of well. We are out in the truck [police vehicle] for a day. Whilst we are out I’ll just duck into the next LAC [Local Area Command] because I want to catch up with my friend ‘Joe’ who has just popped into town. Using the police vehicle, y’know that sort of thing is the most major thing that I have ever seen. In my mind that is not corrupt it’s taking advantage of a situation, that providing you are not
forgoing your requirements or your responsibilities, it’s quiet and if you’re available to do, you do it (Kath 2002).

What becomes clear in all these interviews is that there is no single definition about what constitutes corruption other than the pre-meditated theft of money and drugs and the associated actions of falsifying evidence in order to minimise suspicion and maximise the benefit of the corrupt act. The work of Doreen McBarnet immediately comes to mind when acknowledging that there is such confusion for rank and file police as to what actually is corruption and misconduct other than the obvious overlap with criminal behaviour. In a critical analysis of the broad-based expectation of rank and file police in relation to misconduct and corruption, McBarnet (1981, p.156) argues that there is a distinct gap between the substance and the ideology of the law. Whilst the rules and regulations governing police practice are broad enough to give police wide powers of discretion, the rules and regulations that are put in place by the administrative elites and political arm of the state have a dual purpose. This discretion allows the political arm of the state to monitor rank and file police through the positions of authority that are made up from within the politically appointed criminal justice establishment. As I have already argued McBarnet challenges the notion by Skolnick (1996), Van Maanen (1978, p.322) and others that deceit, evasiveness, duplicity, lying, innuendo, secrecy, double talk are the traits of most interactions involving police. She maintains that this simply makes rank and file police the ‘fall guys’ of the legal system who are then expected to take the blame for the legal systems injustices.

Interviewer: What do you think the difference is between corrupt ordinary police and corrupt senior police?

‘Kath’: In my mind I think senior police are probably doing it for a power thing, to further advance their position. Whereas I would imagine junior police would be doing it for their own self worth in terms of money or something like that. But that’s just an image that I get. I really haven’t dealt with it on a personal basis so it’s only what I hear and read (Kath 2002).

In this regard ‘Kath’ touches on the very essence of why corruption exists and why the definition is so broad and vague for rank and file police and, just as interestingly, she can only make an educated guess about this because, although she has been an operational policewoman for five years, she also has to explain that what she is working from is simply hearsay—‘just an image that I get’ because ‘I really haven’t dealt with it on a personal basis so it’s only what I hear and read’. What Kath does know is that rank and file police feel
marginalised because of the division of labour that exists with their senior counterparts and the broader criminal justice system.

‘Kath’: There’s always corruption in anything. Anything where there is power there will be corruption (Kath 2002).

Justice for All?

At the time of the Wood Inquiry, George Zdenkowski was an Associate Professor in Law but he is now a magistrate in New South Wales. Considered by some to be a supporter of human rights, he demonstrates definitely conservative ideas about the legal due process to which rank and file police and their families are entitled. His position is consistent with the interactionist standpoint of Becker, Scraton, Maher et al and Chan, except that it is taken just a little bit further in terms of bias. Zdenkowski believes that there should be a different level of legal ‘due process’ afforded to police and their families in order that something can be done about ‘police corruption’. This notion dismisses the structural causes of any deviance and implies that the misconduct and corruption associated with the individual or vocational agency of rank and file police is somehow different or more corrosive than other misconduct and corruption that is located within the politicised structure and managerialism of the capitalist legal system.

The larger implication of this ‘progressive’ standpoint is that rank and file police are entitled to a different form of justice from the rest of the community. It is from within this ideological framework that the class biased definition of corruption investigation was developed and implemented by the Wood Inquiry (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997, p.162). Zdenkowski (1995) argued that the release of surveillance videos and tapes would seem to be violations of due process and could result in innocent casualties and that the media treatment of this often left a good deal to be desired but kept such criticisms essentially nebulous. These were ‘tough tactics’ in the war against misconduct and corruption—an unimportant side effect rather than a key part of the process. Serving the needs of such ‘progressive’ reformers, these iniquities were only noticed by conservatives such as Gerard Henderson (1996, 1996a), who criticised the media and marketing arm of the Wood Inquiry for facilitating the distribution of the titillating information rather than concentrating on the requirements of a just and democratic society.

Justice is certainly still blind but ‘she’ is also now apparently deaf and her scales it would seem are badly in need of recalibration. The real goal of ‘progressive’ commentators such as Zdenkowski is not justice but retribution. As subalterns of the capitalist legal system they
have become oblivious not only of their own class position and class bias but also the position of their designated opponents occupy within the division of labour. Their narrow idea of the ‘outsider’ has reified the worthlessness and lack of dignity that is associated with concept of alienation and exploitation, reducing this to a tiny fragment of its social existence.

In an interesting reversal of this, within twelve months of Zdenkowski’s sage acceptance of the collateral damage created by the Wood Inquiry, he presented an argument totally condemning such a situation whilst commenting on the legal due-process entitlements of Martin Bryant, a man who was accused of multiple murders during a shooting spree in Port Arthur, Tasmania.

The fundamental principles are clear and apply throughout the country. Each accused person is entitled to the presumption of innocence. The prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. This case must be based solely on evidence properly admitted at the trial… It is the mark of a civilised and democratic society that capricious justice not be allowed to prevail because the crimes involved are grotesque… Due process principles are not the preserve of a bunch of lawyers, pompous or otherwise. They form part of the organic structure of our democratic society. Failure to abide by them can lead to grave injustices. Sometimes it is possible to solve problems arising out of media comments by appropriate judicial directions to juries. In extreme situations this is very difficult (Zdenkowski 1996).

It is hard not to agree with this argument for ‘the presumption of innocence’ is, indeed, one of the ‘fundamental principles’ of our legal system and its must clearly be seen to ‘apply throughout the country’ because ‘it is the mark of a civilised and democratic society that capricious justice not be allowed to prevail’. As the Wood Inquiry demonstrated, ‘[f]ailure to abide by them can lead to grave injustices’ and the ‘prime time titillation’ (Henderson 1996) distributed to the media and handed down as justice during this show trial proved that it is clearly not ‘possible to solve problems arising out of media comments’ in the absence of ‘appropriate judicial directions’. As Zdenkowski feared ‘[i]n extreme situations this is very difficult’. In Zdenkowski’s mind, however, whilst this ‘due-process’ entitlement might relate to Bryant, it does not relate to the rank and file police and their families persecuted and humiliated during the Wood Inquiry (Zdenkowski 1995). Obviously, human rights must be universal or they are a sham. In Zdenkowski’s terms, then, human rights are clearly nothing. In fact this ‘civilised’ version of rights or liberties has a tendency to prescribe limits that reinforce the alienating process by separating human beings from each other. Subsequently,
more appropriately, ironically the rights prescribed by Zdenkowski are individual rights or liberties that only serve to encourage us to view our fellow human beings as a threat. For Marx a progressive standpoint would require at least the impression that human life is supposed to be lived for the sake of others (Wolff 2003, p.44). All that Zdenkowski’s standpoint has to offer is protection from each other.
CHAPTER SIX: Us Down Here, Them Up There

As this thesis has argued, journalists such as Masters and O’Donnell, Wilkinson and Bottom, as well as academics such as Chan, Dixon and Zdenkowski support a double standard of justice and legitimise the actions of the police executive whilst maintaining a moral ‘high ground’ groundswell of pressure on the rank and file operational police. The result is an alienation process that has driven an almost impassable political wedge between the rank and file police and their senior counterparts and created an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality that destroys the necessary teamwork that is an important part of effective policing. This mentality exacerbates the already existing division of labour and brings with it a plunging morale and an increasing sense that operational police will always be the scapegoats of political and bureaucratic blunders and that any policing problem will be attributed either to their corruption or incompetence. As the public scapegoats of an invariably hostile media, police are fractured even further from their working class consciousness and fractured from the belief in their own sense of social purpose.

Despite the massive politicisation that has occurred within the policing organisation, academics and media commentators have diligently retained a touching belief in the romanticised and somewhat tarnished theoretical concept of the separation of powers. A main tenet of a democratic society, this ‘separation’ is hypothetically between the government, the legal establishment and senior police and is a symbol of democracy and equality before the law. Liberal scholars such as Blackford (1997, p.267) still seriously argue that the separation of judicial power provides a level of protection for individual rights and liberties. No matter that even the most confirmed optimist would find it impossible to explain how liberal concepts can be used to vindicate why, on the basis of ‘public interest’, the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions has a special office to prosecute rank and file police. Not surprisingly, considering that this office does not extend to the prosecution of members of the legal profession, the judiciary, politicians or in cases members of the police executive, radical ‘progressive’ intellectuals are very quiet about this anomaly.

Brown (1997), who is a leading ‘progressive’ intellectual in the ‘left-realist’ tradition (Indermaur, Brown, Egger and Hogg 2002, pp.145–158), argues that crime is an endemic product of class and gender reinforced by central neo-liberal values such as competitive individualism and aggressive masculinity (Young 1997). His analysis of the alienated working class, however, does not include working class police operatives. In his analysis of the Wood
Inquiry Brown prevaricated, claiming that he would not be making reference to the paedophilia aspects that were briefly raised in the inquiry as this deserved a special analysis at a later stage (Brown 1997). This strand of the inquiry involved prominent members of the legal establishment (Clarke 1996; Glascott 1997; Lagan 1997) and would have made an interesting research topic for an academic concerned about corruption but, seven years later, this analysis has not yet materialised. It would be hard to argue that any allegations of misconduct or criminal activity by members of the legal establishment have not been afforded ‘special’ treatment by the ‘progressive’ intellectual community. Indeed, there are few academic works on this intriguing subject as the censorship afforded to academic literature by the ‘peer review’ successfully limits the possibility for anyone straying outside the accepted research parameters to be published in the prestige academic press or become the subject of interested media attention. There is but one paradigm in academic and media journalism and its subject is well known and well received. The road to publication is a well trodden path.

An example of this type of class bias related censorship can be seen in David Dixon’s treatment in *A Culture of Corruption* (1999b, p.153), of the decision to replace the Special Branch after it was discredited by revelations of its questionable and politicised activities. Dixon ignores the involvement of members of the politico-legal establishment who were implicated in the activities that have discredited rank and file police. Indeed, the additional ‘players’ include a former NSW Attorney General and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and these activities included the internal-investigation of the suspected paedophile activity of a Supreme Court Justice (Clark 1996, Brown 1996a, McClymont 1996a, Glascott 1997, Lagan 1997). This is all the more remarkable as Commissioner Wood had become visibly frustrated when rank and file police failed to remember certain details regarding allegations made against a Supreme Court Justice and, on the basis of these ‘memory lapses’, he demanded to know why Special Branch police were covering this matter up.

The incident related to allegations that the late Supreme Court Judge David Yeldham had been accused of sexual misconduct with young schoolboys in public toilets (McClymont 1996a). However, when the former Chief Justice, Sir Laurence Street, appeared before his colleague Commissioner Wood, he admitted to having ‘a defect in my memory’ regarding his confrontation with Justice Yeldham about the sexual assault allegations. So bad was Street’s memory that in a later television interview he would not accept he had given incomplete evidence to the royal commission (Lagan 1997). Unlike his irascible criticism of rank and file police Commissioner Wood made no overt criticism of his judicial colleague’s amnesia. The division of labour regarding rank and file police and the criminal justice system is continually
being reinforced and a legal strand of the intellectual community more often than not legitimises the class bias contained in this process. For example in 2004, during a high profile coronial inquiry into the death of a young Aboriginal man riding a bicycle to escape from what he wrongly believed to be a police pursuit, a woman police officer repeatedly told the court she could not recall many of the details, including any conversations with the driver of a car or whether she saw the young man on the footpath prior to his death. Counsel assisting the coroner, Elizabeth Fullerton, SC, pressed the young officer to remember, despite the fact that the witness had repeatedly emphasised that she could not recall the details in question.

‘…given the importance of this incident nationwide, and given the fact that the boy is now deceased… [a] failure to recall is sometimes not an honest answer,’ Ms Fullerton said (Jacobsen 2004).

Aware of the existence of such a double standard, rank and file police demonstrate an understandable level of scepticism towards the works of ‘progressive’ intellectuals and academics—especially the ‘left-realists’. Two of my research subjects—‘Dwayne’ and ‘Joe’—are police officers who used to work in the Cabramatta area, which has a large Asian population and a media trumpeted reputation for being the heroin capital of NSW (Mitchell 2001; Sydney Morning Herald 6 March 1999, editorial). During their time at Cabramatta, a ‘critical’ piece of research later entitled Anh Hai (1997) was being carried out in the area by prominent academics Maher, Dixon, Swift and Nguyen. This purported to be a detailed examination of the relationship between Asian drug users and the Cabramatta police and its authors claimed to have uncovered ‘deep-seated suspicions and in many cases, an outright hostility towards the police on the part of the older generations of Indo Chinese Australians’. There ‘is then little wonder that the so-called “wall of silence” persists’, they concluded (Maher et al 1997, p.58).

Although there is no doubt that some police abuse their authority and engage in corrupt activity, particularly in relation to marginalised groups and drug users, the ‘wall of silence’ suggested by Maher et al has always been seriously disputed by police who were at Cabramatta at the time.

‘Joe’: I think about drug addicts and how I am sympathetic to them. There are plenty of cops that are not and that’s fair enough if that’s what they want to believe… I have generally got a very good relationship with both my victims, witnesses and offenders… Generally with crooks I get on quite well with them… so I know I was fairly well regarded in Asian crime circles and the Asian
crooks knew that I wasn’t going to fuck them around or load them up and so I think that I am pretty well regarded (‘Joe’ 2001).

‘Dwayne’: I had been very close to her family when her brother was murdered, who was a ST gang leader. I was actually on a day off and that family requested that I come and speak to them. They outlined to me for the next five hours about every criminal enterprise that he had been involved in over the last ten years (Dwayne 2002).

As an interactionist approach to analysis, at no time does Anh Hai (Maher et al 1997, p.v) examine, other than superficially, the structural and causal factors behind the actions of the ‘rule-breaker’—in this instance, the heroin addict—and how these could inform the deviant reaction by the ‘rule-enforcer’. In Anh Hai the parameters of debate have been drawn around the ‘outsiders’ and the research subjects that provide most of the research data have been fielded from the ranks of intravenous heroin users. No police officers were interviewed or used to provide a scientific ‘control’ sample and the research findings, as such, should have been critically evaluated for credibility and reliability. Not so, for the research was hailed with a wave of academic and media approval and no mention was made about the possibility that these research subjects might not have produced critically impeccable evidence.

This naïve acceptance is all the more curious when David Dixon, who was one of the authors, has argued elsewhere (Dixon 1999b, p.51) that ‘prison-informants’ and drug addicts should not be used in areas of police work because they are unreliable as sources and are inevitably linked to corruption. Although they are inevitably at the core of drug law enforcement, he argues that the use of such informants can produce ‘pressure to obstruct justice’, especially when they are provided with incentives to come up with information. As a researcher in Anh Hai, however, Dixon found no fault with such informants and was more than happy to accept the evidence of heroin addicts who received recompense for their participation ‘in accordance with standard research practice’ (Maher et al 1997, p.6).

The ‘super grass’ is the British initiative of ‘Mr Clean’—Commissioner Sir Robert Mark. Mark, who was responsible for ‘reforming’ the ‘corrupt’ Scotland Yard in the 1970s, supported the extensive use of informers—a strategy that was later used in Northern Ireland with equally doubtful and questionable results (Reiner 2000, p.63). Dixon himself has criticised British Commissioners Mark and McNee who ‘unashamedly stated that their officers had to cut corners in order to work effectively’ (Dixon 1997, p.44). One of Dixon’s research partners in Anh Hai, Lisa Maher, is an academic ‘expert’ in the area of prison reform and was formerly a prison-officer. As such she would have been aware of the ‘super grass’
calamity and the fact that heroin addicts are particularly vulnerable and easily manipulated when being used as informants by either the police, prison officer’s or academic researchers.

It appears that Dixon’s wariness about the reliability of heroin addicts or prison informants, particularly in regard to ‘incentives’, does not always hold sway. He is critical of them when these are used by rank and file police but totally supportive when the same informants become paid research subjects or, indeed, when corrupt police become ‘super grass’ or ‘roll-over’ informants as they were referred to in the Wood Inquiry (Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service 1997) which then becomes part of a proactive investigation (Dixon 1999b, p.142).

Carl Klockars (1979, pp.261–81), who examined this very scenario in his work Dirty Hands and Deviant Subjects, argues that police have to endure the censure that arises from their ‘dirty hands’ work as the state’s social control agents. This, he explains, is part of the price that has to be paid by the competent and professional police but a serious issue arises when rank and file police hold onto an illusion that they can do their work with clean hands because it requires a distortion of reality regarding their ‘social control’ function to sustain it. However, Klockars explains that a similar situation arises in research when the field worker adopts the ‘world-view’ of the deviant research subject by ‘going native’ and adopting the subject’s view as their own. In Anh Hai the situation of the marginalised Asian ‘heroin addict’ community—the ‘outsiders’—is only examined at a cursory and superficial level for the unwavering target in this research is the rank and file police and all else is, seemingly, irrelevant. Anh Hai views the drug addict as a powerless underdog who is a victim of police coercion and strategic mismanagement but the problem with this analysis is that a vantage point of the well-meaning intellectual far removed from the underdog provides a safer radical career choice than criticising the economic and social institutions that create the problem or the administrative elites who shape the policy of the policing institution.

Who's Master, Who's Man

As far back as 1946 during the Nuremberg show trials that followed the Second World War, Major (Dr) Gustave Gilbert exposed the core of a structural argument about who directs policy, who supports it, and who carries these out. In an interview with Gilbert, Hermann Goering said:

But after all it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a
parliament, or a communist dictatorship... Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger (Gilbert 1947).

With first hand experience in this regard, Goering well knew what he was talking about but I feel that his explanation does presuppose a rather universal level of passivity. Rank and file police must accept a level of responsibility for their actions, as must any other group in society—including the interactionists’ underclass of ‘outsiders’. Unfortunately, this equality of responsibility is something that many scholars fail to observe in their research. Building on this, my point is that those who shape society and the values of individuals within society—Goering’s ‘leaders of the country who determine the policy’, a group that includes members of the media and the intelligentsia as well as politicians and the hierarchy within the criminal justice system—have to accept responsibility for their often extremely cynical actions as well. These are often especially pernicious if the truth is distorted in order to persuade others ‘to [do] the bidding of the leaders’. As in the Third Reich, the state’s propaganda machine in a democracy can ensure support for its policies by telling the people that ‘they are being attacked’—by ‘pacifists’ who are ‘exposing the country to danger’; by a criminal element that is endangering public safety; or by a corrupt police force that is orchestrating crime in the community. This is an issue that is largely ignored by Maher et al (1997) in their ‘critical’ work Anh Hai, a fact that was not lost on the former police commander from Cabramatta who tried to air this subject by arguing that the police hierarchy and their uncompromising and data driven policies were a negative factor that was largely ignored in relation to the drug related crime problem in the Cabramatta area.

A former Cabramatta police chief has lashed out at the NSW police hierarchy, blaming the suburb’s crime and drug problems on ‘questionable management practices’ and a failure to take the problems seriously. Retired superintendent Alan Leek, local area commander from 1991 to 1995, also singled out Deputy Police Commissioner Jeff Jarratt for criticism, saying he lacked empathy for the people of Cabramatta (Jacobsen 2000a).

Nor was retired Superintendent Leek without substantial support from his colleagues in this regard. In an audit on the police executive conducted by the Hay Group there was substantial criticism of both managerialism and Jarratt (Hay Group Consulting Consortium 2000).
According to the report, some senior police believed they were being ruled with ‘management-by-fear’. It cited one example where Deputy Commissioner Jeff Jarratt allegedly told regional commanders to warn staff anyone exceeding budget would be ‘relieved of their commands’ ‘Some commanders perceive that there is still a strong message that ‘if you don’t toe the line, you will be removed’, the report said (Miranda 2001).

This executive ‘bullying’ is part of the organisational emphasis on performance management, whereby competency is linked to performance (Kennedy and McQueen 2001, pp.19-21). However additional pressure in relation to the level of drug related crime was also bought to bear upon rank and file when a campaign that was launched by the small business community in Cabramatta.

Shopkeepers have launched legal action against the police for failing to respond to crime in a troubled Sydney suburb. Small business owners in Cabramatta have taken the unprecedented action after complaining to police for months about their response times. The business owners claim police failure to clamp down on drug dealing in the area has hit business, frightening away customers and forcing some shops to close (Saleh and Miranda 2001).

This highly publicised and extremely politicised campaign by the small business community in Cabramatta soon re-appeared as a party political campaign driven by New South Wales Premier Bob Carr, who ostentatiously took up the assault on the police on behalf of the Cabramatta community. In an obvious effort to minimise any electoral damage, he reinforced his own conservative personal policy and expressed his determination to get tough on drug related crime.

The Premier has delivered a broadside to Sydney police, from frontline officers to senior ranks, accusing them of ‘taking their eye off the ball’ over the drugs problem at Cabramatta… Mr Carr says the Government is demanding tougher action and use of new sweeping police powers to crash through the problem…[He] said he wanted an ‘unrelenting focus on drugs and heroin’ rather than ‘talking heads’ publicly debating problems in the Police Service (Wainwright and Mercer 2001a).

Appearing intensively on radio and television news and current affairs programmes, Carr presented himself as an indignant yet reassuring crusader for justice with far-reaching plans for ‘tougher action’ and ‘sweeping new police powers’—‘zero-tolerance’ policing—to clean
up the problem. His ‘broadside to Sydney police’, his seemingly instantaneous assessment that the situation had been created by the police ‘taking their eye off the ball’, and his readiness to roll up his sleeves and assume command at a moment’s notice exposes the concentrated levels of state ‘political power’ that now shape the debate about crime. Increased levels of crime are indicative of a failing in policing, he says, not a problem of government sponsored policy or a social malaise requiring a different level of government intervention. It is the individual and organisational actions of the police service that creates the crime, not the society that nurtures it or the cost effective policing regime that the government supports.

In such media ‘grabs’ Bob Carr is, of course, trying to demonstrate leadership not rationally engage in intellectual debate so he operates his argument at the same level of orchestrated community concern as those he is trying to woo. The academic analysis in Anh Hai, however, should go far beyond this instantaneous problem and solution level. Interestingly, although the research addresses the contradictions of drug related crime, it does this from an interactionist and harm reduction perspective that still principally views the problem as a policing failure. The research, therefore, seems to rise above a simple ‘taking their eye off the ball’ explanation by reversing it and making this a problem of ‘the over policing of young Asian background people, a systematic pattern of harassment, intimidation and mistreatment instances of apparent corruption’ (Maher et al 1997, p.56). To support this the research critically examines the relationship between the ‘rule breaker’ and the ‘rule enforcer’ but, by leaving the analysis at this level, it really advances no further than Carr’s populist responses. If drug related crime in the Cabramatta community is created by this antagonistic relationship between ‘young Asian background people’ and the police it would seem that, presumably, the former could not exist without the latter. One of the many ineffective aspects of the Anh Hai research is that it operates unashamedly from the point of view of the ‘outsider’—the underclass is the victim and the police are their oppressors. Using a class analysis, however, Anh Hai’s ‘outsiders’—mainly heroin-addicts—are predominantly an underclass of the working class that Marx referred to as the ‘lumpenproletariat’ (Bottomore 1991; Marx and Engels 1983, pp.287323) and rank and file police are a fundamental part of the working class itself (Bernstein et al 1975, p.144; Marx and Engels 1983, p.176; Wright 1979, p.194). These ‘rule enforcers’ are not members of the ‘ruling class’ that oppresses the workers—nor do they create the policy and create the rules.

This is not to say that the authors of Anh Hai are incorrect in arguing ‘the findings of this study are disturbing’ (Maher et al 1997, p.56), for indeed they are but for different reasons than the analysis suggests. For what is even more disturbing, of course, is this simplistic
‘goodies’ and ‘baddies’ approach masquerading as intellectual analysis. In any rigorous radical class analysis ‘heroin addicts’ and ‘young Asian background people’, as part of the fragmented and individualised working class and ‘lumpenproletariat’, cannot be said to represent any singular ethnic or mainstream community. Nor are they even representative of the working class, although they are still a marginalised part of that class. By reifying the ‘outsider’ into an oppressed ‘class’ rather than a class fraction, and confusing the less helpful concept of ethnicity as an important marker of this ‘class’, they can declare that this ‘class’ is being coerced by what must be an apparently ruling class of rank and file police. In so doing any semblance of a rational radical analysis effectively vanishes. The Cabramatta shopkeepers and small business owners, who frequently share the same ethnicity as the underclass they have appealed to Bob Carr to combat, would not agree that they are downtrodden ‘outsiders’ and share the same class position as ‘drug addicts’. If ethnicity is to be an effective marker of ‘class’ it must equate with that class and not cross class boundaries as this group most obviously does.

There is a kernel of truth in the Anh Hai argument that ‘[t]hese practices harm relations between police and community; in particular, they inhibit the community’s willingness to co-operate with the police and are counterproductive’ (Maher et al 1997, p.58) but this is only insofar as the tension between the criminal based actions of the heroin addict and the questionable ‘zero-tolerance’ policy response of the police organisation serves to exacerbate an already existing social problem. Unfortunately the complexity of this issue is rarely addressed because it lies unrecognised outside the parameters of the researchers’ interactionist question. What Anh Hai fails to factor in as well is the political pressure that has been pushing ‘zero-tolerance’ policing in the first place and the role that data driven performance management ‘progressive’ reforms have in pressuring the rank and file police into ‘getting tough’ on drug related crime.

**Spreading the Word: The Media Lends a Hand**

In 1997 the ABC current affairs programme *Four Corners* used the Anh Hai research in the making of an investigative documentary they called *Cabramatta* (Hardaker 1997), disseminating this level of analysis to a media audience that considers itself to be well-informed and a cut above the usual current affairs watching public. The result was a critique of rank and file police at Cabramatta, exposing their failure, through either ineptitude or corruption, to control drug dealing in this area and the way they were actively harassing ethnic youth in a manner that indicated high levels of cultural insensitivity. It was powerful and
influential documentary demonstrating a contrast between the volubly articulate academic experts investigating the concerns of the public and the ill-educated and much less articulate operational police. The programme had powerful backing from the ‘progressive’ reformers as a substantial number of academics as I have shown are journalists, or network closely with journalists, and many work, or have worked, as press secretaries and political advisors—the NSW Premier Bob Carr was himself a journalist before entering politics and presently manages a cabinet that contains twenty-nine press secretaries (Crichton 2002; Papadopoulos 1997; Totaro 2002). The police media unit, which has eighteen media staff, has funding of more than $1,000,000 a year and this does not include the media staff seconded to the Police Commissioner (Penberthy 2000). There was, in short, no dearth of research material with which to work.

Given this overwhelmingly supportive press it is little wonder that the Anh Hai research findings remain largely uncontested. Any attempt to put forward an alternative point of view can be simply explained away in the time honoured way by representing the police in Mike Carlton’s (2002b) manner as that ‘same old ratbag crew’ of ‘disgruntled’ coppers and ‘ex-coppers’ telling lies as a result of being ‘caught out’. Clearly the researchers operated from this position.

It is unfortunate that some early reactions to the project have been more malicious: certain members of the NSW Police Service have attacked the integrity of the principal researchers by making false, indeed defamatory, allegations (Maher et al 1997, p.vii).

Criticism is, it seems, ‘malicious’ when it comes from the defensive position and such labelling effectively removes the need to address any of these criticisms or listen to the explanations of the rank and file police involved. ‘Joe’, one of my research subjects who was a detective working at Cabramatta at the time of the Anh Hai research and the filming of the Cabramatta documentary, relates how he became aware of the implications of this research only through the media.

‘Joe’: I was only aware of it through a Four Corners journalist actually. There was one with a Dr Maher. She was going around handing out $20 at a time to drug dealers and drug users for whatever agenda I don’t know. I was aware of the study only through a fellow named David Hardaker at Channel 2 [Four Corners ABC]… I couldn’t quite work it out. I thought that there must have been an agenda and I didn’t know what the agenda was whether it was, well it would seem that the agenda was a bias against the police, for whatever reason (‘Joe’ 2001).
‘Dwayne’, another police officer who worked at Cabramatta during the *Anh Hai* research project, also expressed a instinctual wariness.

‘Dwayne’: In 1995, about seven years ago, although it only become known later that particular people were doing research. Maher and I don’t know the other person who was Dixon, were interviewing the young heroin dealers from Cabramatta. From what I have heard she was paying them twenty dollars or thirty dollars to basically incite them to make allegations that the police were acting corruptly… The only time I saw her was when she was on television. I don’t know whether she had hidden agendas or anything. Unfortunately I think that her whole research was clouded with bias, she never actually had the time to sit down and actually speak to the police who were out there trying to stem a heroin epidemic that was taking place in Cabramatta. I think she would have had a different view of what was actually going on... (Dwayne 2002).

Both ‘Dwayne’ and ‘Joe’ were asked to assist with the research for the ABC documentary *Cabramatta* (Hardaker 1997) by introducing the ABC’s journalist, David Hardaker, to people who were part of the criminal and mainstream Asian community. They also tried to outline to Hardaker drug related crime issues from the perspective of rank and file police. Neither ‘Dwayne’ nor ‘Joe’ supported the ‘zero-tolerance’ initiative that had been put into practice at Cabramatta by the senior executive of the police organisation on behalf of the government (Wainwright and Mercer 2001a), although this never came out in the documentary.

‘Dwayne’: zero tolerance [was inappropriate] in that instance! No. These were only young kids. Education is always going to be the best remedy for this type of activity, when you have got young twelve and thirteen year old kids seeing their friends leave school and make a thousand dollars a day, well of course they are going to follow suit. They don’t look at the long-term consequences of how drugs can just ruin their whole lives (‘Dwayne’ 2002).

The researchers of *Anh Hai* argue that most previous academic studies of policing have focussed on the police, which indeed they have as this thesis has shown, but more obscurely, they also argue that most research sees policing from the perspective of the police (Maher et al 1997, p.1). Such an assertion would be difficult to justify and no attempt is made to do so but this assertion is used to explain why no operational police needed to be included in the research subjects. Neither ‘Dwayne’ and ‘Joe’ were aware that this represented interactionist research and that the specific intention of the researchers was to adopt the point of view of the most disadvantaged—hence the choice of heroin addicts as research subjects. They might well be puzzled that reputable intellectuals would do this, creating research data that was so obviously flawed by their categorical declaration that this underclass was a victim of
oppressive tactics initiated by rank and file police because of their personal failings and cultural insensitivity.

Whilst the authors of *Anh Hai* were able to disseminate their viewpoint to a supportive academic forum and use the media to put their findings before a concerned public, the operational police had no such luxury. They had been scripted as ‘the baddies’ in this scenario and their resistance to this brought only complaints to the media about police obstruction, conjuring up proof for the same old argument about a ‘culture of corruption’ and a ‘code of silence’. Rendered defenceless, my research subjects such as ‘Dwayne’ had little or no opportunity to protect themselves or their family members from allegations and misinformation that arose from this research. My interviews with ‘Dwayne’ and ‘Joe’ contradict some of the broad based conclusions made in *Anh Hai* about the ‘wall of silence’ and the relationship between drug addicts and rank and file police and add a new and more insidious dimension to the expose.

‘Dwayne’: I met David Hardaker, who told me that he was interested in doing a show on the heroin dealing or whatever from *Four Corners*. We agreed to show him around Cabramatta… During the course of this I became aware that David Hardaker was acting on allegations from Lisa Maher that I was a corrupt policeman and he was going to hit me with all of these allegations on television …We took him and showed him where the heroin trouble spots were and helped or went out of our way. We had to go through the bosses to get consent, no credit to ourselves, non-whatsoever, to assist this person [Hardaker] to feather his own cap and he was going to ambush me… All I know is that I got a phone call …to say this was what was going to happen. [A colleague] advised me that it would be quite dangerous to take part in the interview with him on television. I was basically going to be assassinated and hit with all of these allegations that had no substance. All I know now is that all of these allegations now appear in my Internal Affairs file and again that is going to be with me for the rest of my life and it will effect any type of promotion that I go for… I think that he had all of the stuff that Lisa Maher had got. I am not sure of the way it worked….

Interviewer: When it was played to air what was your view? Do you remember when you saw it?

‘Dwayne’: I don’t think that in the end the show had any impact because I believe that he wanted to bring this sensational headline that the police in Cabramatta were corrupt. In the end all he had was Lisa Maher appearing on there saying that she has interviewed all of these people and they said that the police were corrupt. But again she never interviewed any police officers.

Interviewer: What happened to you personally?
Dwayne: Somewhere along the line all of these allegations were put into my Internal Affairs record or CIS file as it is called now. That is going to be with me for the rest of my life and there is no way that I can get rid of these allegation… That my wife was a heroin user. I was taking heroin from them [drug addicts] and giving it to my wife. My wife is an outstanding manager she had excelled and has never touched drugs in her life. They said we owned the Stardust Hotel all of these unfounded allegations, my wife was a prostitute. I have never been interviewed [by Internal Affairs] to this day.

Interviewer: Well how do you know these allegations were made against you?

Dwayne: Because when I went for, at the time I was working for the Drug Enforcement Agency and in 1995 I was called to the office and told that I had an integrity problem so I was asked to leave without any explanation… [by] Clive Small [Assistant Commissioner] and I was never told what it was. In the end I became so frustrated I asked to look at my Internal Affairs record. We used to joke in the old days that your Internal Affairs records were in boxes and boxes. I used to think well mine would be a manila folder because I had never had a complaint made against me in all of my time… You never get told how. All I do know is that perhaps it was a complaint. It wasn’t a complaint against me. It was a complaint against myself and… other police …For some reason it always seems to have hindered my progress in the police but with others it has not… (Dwayne 2002).

Dwayne suspected the complaint had originated from Lisa Maher, yet it appears that it originated from one of his senior counterparts in an attempt to shift the spotlight onto the agency of individual rank and file police and away from the division of labour and the failure of the aggressive, data-led ‘reform’ strategies (New South Wales Government 2001).

Dwayne told me that ‘to this day and I would say it publicly that I cannot stand Clive Small and his management skills’—reforms that Lisa Maher and her colleagues were never prepared to question. Instead, lack of support for the researchers by officers such as Dwayne was labelled as ‘malicious’ and any attempt to parry the researcher’s assumptions was seen to be an attack on ‘the integrity of the principal researchers by making false, indeed defamatory, allegations’.

It is a disappointing indication of how far the reform process has to go that some members of the Police Service consider that the response to critical research is to challenge the researchers’ integrity by making such allegations against them (Maher et al 1997, p.vii).

What Lisa Maher, David Dixon and their research team have displayed in Anh Hai is the ‘progressive’ class bias and antipathy towards rank and file police that I have discussed
throughout this thesis. Their work is an attack on a largely undefended group of the relatively powerless working class and can only serve further to alienate these officers not only from the general public they serve but also from each other as their collective solidarity fragments under the impact of such intellectual aggression. The fact that Maher et al can refer to any resistance in this corrosive setting in terms of being ‘defamatory’ is an indication of the elitist framework that has shaped the Anh Hai project from the beginning. Unfortunately, as this thesis has shown, this has become an all too familiar feature of ‘critical’ and ‘progressive’ research into rank and file police. Clearly, if the Anh Hai project had wished to undertake an accurate analysis of the problems facing the Cabramatta community, they would have needed to look far beyond the narrow focus of their interactionist research parameters and examine the issue in all of its complexity. Even if it was possible to accept the One Dimensional Man notion developed by Marcuse (1972, pp.199-200) that ‘the last reservoir of revolutionary energy’ lies with the educated classes and the lumpenproletariat, Anh Hai clearly demonstrates that neither of these fractions champion the interests of the working class other than from a very superficial and, to use Gouldner’s expression, ‘quaint’ standpoint (1968).

Widening the Investigation

In order to understand this complexity it is necessary to come in off the street for a moment and redirect attention onto those less visibly culpable but more powerful positions that direct the ‘rule enforcers’—Hermann Goering’s ‘leaders of the country who determine the policy’ and those powerful subalterns who know ‘it is easy’ to manipulate ‘the people’ to do ‘the bidding of the leaders’ (Gilbert 1947). The power of political leaders such as the Premier and to a lesser extent his various Police Ministers directly impacts on this, as does the only marginally less direct power of crusading politicians such as John Hatton. The Police Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner in this new politicised Police Service provide another point of reference, as does the managerialist structure of the senior police. Of course, the Anh Hai project and almost all intellectual academic debate does not want to spoil a ‘good story’ by re-focusing on their allies, no more than they want to scrutinise the responsibility of their media colleagues. These avenues, however, are important if a total picture of the situation is to be developed.

Class bias, of course, blocks the perceived need for this. In 2003, when Assistant Commissioner Clive Small retired from the NSW Police after his executive contract was not renewed, radio announcer and former ABC journalist Mike Carlton reported that Small’s farewell was well attended—‘a lot of the cream of the coppers turned up; the dregs did not,’
he glibly asserted. Far from asking why this man’s contract had not been renewed, Carlton eulogised Small and argued that his departure wasn’t much thanks for forty years of committed policing (Bone 2000; Carlton 2003). No mention was made of the fact that he was among four police officers being investigated over allegations of professional misconduct and that Commissioner Moroney had refused to give details about this, stating that ‘[i]t is not NSW Police policy to publicly comment on internal investigations,’ (Saleh 2003).

Immediately after ‘retiring’, unlike those amongst my research subjects who leave or are forced to take stress leave because they have become alienated from their vocation, Clive Small was moved sideways into an appointment as senior advisor to New South Wales Premier Bob Carr. The reason for the non-renewal of contract was not seen as a choice between corruption or ineptitude. Far from it, as this article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* entitled ‘Top detective loses job, but doesn’t know why’, amply demonstrates:

The Premier, Bob Carr, for whom Mr Small has been working on secondment as a crime prevention adviser for 18 months, would like him to stay in his office. Mr Small, 57, has been a strong performer for the Government and was seen to have reduced electoral liabilities such as rampant crime in Cabramatta (Gibbs 2003e).

Needless to say my research subject codenamed ‘Dwayne’ did not attend Small’s retirement farewell. Nor would he agree that Small had been effective in removing ‘rampant crime in Cabramatta’.

Clive Small’s apparent lack of comprehension about why a ‘top detective’ could have ‘lost his job’ without knowing why demonstrates a remarkable lack of insight into the workings of the managerialist system he helped to ‘reform’ into existence. Although he, too, would later be mystified by the same performance contract mechanism, Deputy Commissioner Jeff Jarratt was able to sum this up succinctly when he gave evidence at the Inquiry into Police Resources at Cabramatta in May 2001. The Police Service ‘is not a democratic set-up,’ he declared when asked whether any ‘of the officers were transferred against their will’? Despite this, there were, he assured the Inquiry, a number of avenues that could give support.

Jarratt: I do not know of any specific examples but let me be clear. The Commissioner, under the little piece of paper we all sign, can transfer any of us anywhere any time he likes. It is not a democratic set-up. You sign up to do as you are told and that means if you are told to work somewhere else you go and work somewhere else… If there was someone who felt that they were being punished by a transfer, again there are many ways in which they could bring that to light and have it acutely examined to ensure that that was not the case… they can write a complaint to
the Ombudsman. They can go to their HR manager. They can go to the local area commander. They can go to the regional commander. They can go as far up as me or the Commissioner to bring to light the fact that they are being mistreated… (New South Wales Government 2001)

Yet, in other inquiries it has been made very clear that the office of the New South Wales Ombudsman will not involve itself in, what are seen to be, ‘management’ issues when dealing with rank and file police who challenge their own organisation (New South Wales Audit Office 2002; Commonwealth of Australia 2003).

Managerialism gives the impression that it is suited to a liberal democracy but, as Jeff Jarratt readily admitted, ‘[i]t is not a democratic set-up. You sign up to do as you are told…’. Nor is the chain of accountability and fairness as straightforward as Jarratt describes. The Hay Group Consulting Consortium’s review of Operations and Crime Reviews (OCR) revealed that the New South Wales Ombudsman was of the opinion that commanders should be held accountable, in the context of the OCR, for their effective management of complaints and disciplinary matters (New South Wales Police Service 2000, p.3). However it was explained that there were no measures in place by which performance could be meaningfully assessed.

What is more, the Hay Group argued that the style of the OCR meeting reinforced the culture of ‘fear and punishment’ that was said to be characteristic of the past. The reviewer’s observation was that commanders and other staff attending the OCR meetings were not witnessing role models of the leadership style they have been instructed to demonstrate themselves (Hay Group Consulting Consortium 2000, pp.59–61). Despite this negative evaluation, Jarratt refused to accept the Chair’s suggestion ‘that the OCR process somehow creates fear and concern among many policemen in area’.

Jarratt: I was interested to note that none of those officers have ever been to OCR, so it is interesting that they developed that fear without ever having been subject to it.

The Hon. J. Hatzistergos: The comment was made on the basis that, when the LAC prepares to go to a meeting, fear permeates the ranks of the local force preparing for that meeting.

Jarratt: It is a high-accountability process. I think there is a degree of agitation, but I do not know that any fear is prolonged. I think a natural nervousness might precede an appearance, but there is also a great deal of satisfaction when a team comes along and is able to demonstrate its excellent performance, which is endorsed accordingly.

Chair: Has its effectiveness been evaluated?
Jarratt: Professor Ed Davis from Macquarie University [Macquarie University Graduate School of Management] is in the process of concluding an evaluation of the OCR…

The Hon. J. Hatzistergos: You said that Professor Davis is conducting an evaluation according to an agreed framework. Does that framework take into account criticisms that may be directed at the current procedure, particularly by junior officers?

Jarratt: Quite a wide survey was conducted, and Professor Davis will report on those findings.

The Hon. J. Hatzistergos: Will it be public?

Jarratt: It will be a report to the commissioner [Commissioner Ryan] so I do not know that it will be made public automatically. However, there is no reason why it would not be. It will be available to the Minister (New South Wales Government 2001).

It will be immediately obvious that Jarratt skirted Hatzistergos’ question about considering the criticisms of ‘junior officers’ by saying blandly that ‘[q]uite a wide survey was conducted, and Professor Davis will report on those findings’. Despite the Hay Group Consulting Consortium Report’s condemnation and the evidence of alienation, feelings of worthlessness and stress revealed by the discovery that 750 senior officers were on long-term sick leave (Sutton 2001a), senior police simply commissioned another review from the Macquarie University Graduate School of Management.

It is at this point I think it is necessary to re-emphasise the client relationship existing between the state’s governing institutions, academics and senior police. Dr Peter Crawford from Macquarie University Graduate School of Management advised the Wood Inquiry in regard to the managerial change that was at the heart of the police reform process (Dixon 1999b, p.149)—‘reform’ that came in the shape of OCR, which is in crude terms, ‘top down’ performance management and ‘bottom up’ accountability (Chemerinsky 2000; Kennedy, M. 2000, p.63)—so this is not a disinterested academic institution. Senior police such as Peter Ryan and Jeff Jarratt were keen supporters of the ‘Davis Report’ on OCR but they never made this a public document. Moreover, Peter Ryan’s enthusiasm for this institution was to be unusually rewarded when he was awarded an Honorary PhD and made a member of the newly established Advisory Council of the Graduate School of Management. In Ryan’s address to the School of Management students, he emphasised ‘the importance of the strengths of individuals within large organisations’ (Macquarie University News 2000). What he did not mention was that the ‘managerialist’ policies praised by this school were serving to reinforce a master-servant relationship (New South Wales Police Service 2000, 2000a; Stewart 1994;
Wanna 1994) that was creating huge levels of stress leave and a flood of retirements from the Police Service.

Both Dixon (1999b) and Chan (1997, p.232) have argued that the danger with managerialism is that organisational cultures can be changed to improve corporate performance, although this has not prevented them from embracing the terms of bottom up ‘reform’ from an individualist level. Dixon argues that ‘the role of an academic in this area is to use specialist research skills, thereby possibly assisting the police to do their job. It is not to do their job for them’ (Dixon 2000). They can point the way to reform but they cannot ensure ‘procedural fairness’.

The manner in which Jeff Jarratt was dismissed was disgraceful, a crudely handled, dubiously motivated exercise of power against one of Australia’s most respected police officers. The Court of Appeal’s ruling that such power is unrestrained rubs salt into the wound. The least that the Government should do is to pay the legal costs. Then it should legislate to require procedural fairness in such matters. Until it does, who would apply for a senior post in the NSW police? (Dixon 2003).

Dixon mentions the concept of ‘procedural fairness’ and bemoans Jarratt’s treatment with a subjective assessment based on the reputation he had developed within academe and the media (Bearup 1996; Chan 1997, p.ix; Coulton and Bearup 1996; Doherty 2000; Humphries 1997b; Miranda 2001b). However, Jarratt demonstrated his own arbitrary notion of procedural fairness on many occasions. For instance, former police detective Deborah Locke (2003, p.181) has described a meeting with Jarratt and another senior officer whilst attempting to combat an unfair complaint that had been lodged against herself and a colleague. Jarratt refused to allow the meeting to be recorded other than in the form of written notes. At the conclusion, when Locke attempted to hand Jarratt a copy of the complaint and clarify that her supervisor had actually authorised the very essence of the complaint issue, he replied ‘I know about the complaint. But even if the DPP [Department of Public Prosecutions] say you are to be charged, the decision is up to me.’

Despite Dixon’s assessment of Jarratt as ‘one of Australia’s most respected police officers (Dixon 2003), he was dismissed for non-performance within the very performance management structure that he had assisted to introduce (Milligan 2003, p.8). Nevertheless, retired Commissioner John Avery also rose to Jarratt’s defence, lobbying the media about the injustice of the dismissal. Although an avowed managerialist, Avery argued that the State Government should reconsider any legislation that allowed senior public servants to be
dismissed without reason and with no right of appeal (Avery 2003; Wainwright 2003)—as if they were the same as rank and file police officers, he should have added by way of explanation. Avery conveniently ignored the fact that Jarratt had manipulated crime statistics in an effort to project an image that criminal activity was less than in previous years and that the police organisation had demonstrably improved its performance under his management framework (Devine 2001; Jacobsen 2000a) and that, while Jarratt and other senior police had been doing this, Commissioner Ryan had been warning rank and file police that ‘attempts to fiddle crime statistics would compromise “the ethical and professional standards” of the service’ (Kennedy, L.1999a). This is probably a very appropriate time to reflect again on the argument by Benjamin Franklin that … A man compounded of law and gospel is able to cheat a hole country with his religion and then destroy them under colour of law … (Issacson 2003, p.3).

Against the background of this indignation, there is a noticeable poverty of discussion regarding ‘procedural fairness’ in relation to rank and file police. Many of these ‘progressives’ supported the Wood Inquiry and Dixon was an academic consultant to the same inquiry but nobody remembered the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service was in response to the fact that ‘[c]orruption is entrenched in senior levels of the New South Wales Police Service. Internal Affairs is corrupt. Senior police officers in New South Wales close ranks to prevent exposure of corrupt activities…’ (New South Wales Legislative Assembly 1994). But, as in the Wood Inquiry itself, such matters clearly lay outside the parameters of the debate.

The Sacrificial Functionaries: The Tradesmen’s Entrance is at the Rear

In mid 2000 Reuben Sakey, a relatively junior, plain-clothes constable with five years experience, was part of NSW Police Anti Theft Squad—the equivalent of NYPD Street Crime Unit (SCU). In an arrest incident, Sakey was disarmed by an offender and threatened with his own police firearm. At the time there was no-one working in the police welfare section, and only three full-time and one part-time psychologists were employed to deal with the emotional problems of a service which numbered 14,500 officers. At the time of this incident seven hundred police—five per cent of the service—were on long-term sick report (Kennedy, L.2000). However this was not the end of this incident. Sakey’s commanding officer was Assistant Commissioner Lola Scott, whose executive performance contract specified that sick leave was to be reduced amongst the rank and file police under her command (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, LCA.543-625, pp.752-888). Subsequently Sakey was directed back to work as an operational police officer after two weeks sick leave.
Shortly after returning to work Sakey wrote to the police psychologist explaining that he had problems getting out on the road and was feeling ‘really twitchy’. She recommended that he seek private treatment and, less than a week later, he was charged with murder after shooting a suspect named Edison Berrio through the window of a stolen car (Peterson 2001). This incident caused a major split and provoked bitterness between rank and file investigators and their senior counterparts. Some police wanted a coronial inquiry and barely three days into the investigation Detective Inspector Paul Meagher withdrew his services because of ‘illness’. Despite the support of his colleagues, Sakey was eventually charged with murder at the direction of another member of the police executive, Crime Agencies Commander, Assistant Commissioner Clive Small (Kennedy, L. 2000b). It was necessary to stand firm about ‘police shootings’, regardless of the circumstances was the basis of this decision.

There are aspects which, once explained, question the motivation of this ‘politicised’ executive decision. Any coronial inquest could have exposed the ‘politicised’ structural issues relating to welfare service cuts, the lack of support from the organisation’s executive officers, the effect of performance contract agreements and so on. This became a formality, however, as the committal hearing at the lower court could only determine whether or not a prima facie case could be established against the accused person. As it turned out, Magistrate Brian Lulham found there was not enough evidence to satisfy a jury that Constable Reuben Sakey was guilty of the murder of 22-year-old Edison Berrio and he also indicated that Sakey could not be charged with manslaughter (*Sydney Morning Herald* 23 August. 2001, p.10. editorial).

The media reporting of this decision resulted in heated scenes outside the court, with publicly orchestrated anger over the death of Edison Berrio obviously directed solely at the Sakey’s individual agency as a rank and file police officer involved in a shooting (Peterson 2001). Once again the political arm of the state and the police executive had successfully diverted the spotlight away from any causal factors.

There was still no mention in the media of the management role played by Assistant Commissioner Scott during this episode when her executive contract was terminated in December 2002. Nor was it publicised that this termination followed from a three-year misconduct inquiry, during which fifteen complaints against her were found to have been sustained (Sutton and Kidman 2002). Instead, the media rallied to her aid, making politicised attempts to reduce this executive misconduct issue into a gender argument. Mike Carlton’s report was particularly interesting, as he attributed that her downfall was probably caused by excessive duty of care.
Another reason may be her unswerving support for one Constable Reuben Sakey, a young officer who became, in 2001, the first-ever NSW copper to be charged with murder while on duty. His gun had killed a gang-member in a stolen car (Carlton 2002a).

It is unlikely that former Constable Reuben Sakey would have agreed with Carlton’s assessment of his unstinting benefactor but then he was never asked to comment.

The Alienation of Rank and File Police

My research subjects demonstrate that most rank and file police initially believe when they join the police service that they can make a creative difference and that they are part of a vocation that could collectively provide a service and improve society.

‘Athol’: I though well he [the local policeman] treated me very decently and I though maybe the police force is something that I should look toward (‘Athol’ 2002).

‘Barney’: And that’s how I saw the role when I joined the police was to try and do that at least, try and react to some sort of badness and have some sort of input (‘Barney’ 2002).

‘Kath’: I guess ultimately to help people. I suppose a lot of people have the idea in their mind that not so much to make a big change. But, they can change things and make a difference (‘Kath’ 2002).

‘KD’: And I guess I thought that I wanted to help people and just not work in retail. And I wanted to have a job that meant something and was important (‘KD’ 2002).

‘Julie’: It was something I have always wanted to do... I suppose the major thing was to help the community (‘Julie’ 2003).

‘Greg’: I saw it as a career that I thought I would be very good at. I initially had the idea that I wanted to make a difference (‘Greg’ 2002).

The disillusionment experienced by rank and file police when they find themselves the unsupported scapegoats of a system of control rather than service provides a tangible cause of alienation. Scapegoating is rapidly fragmenting any solidarity and sense of collective worth within the rank and file, although, Mercer (2003e, p.4-5) says that after repeated instances of political and hierarchical interference into ‘high profile’ police investigations, there was only a mild resistance directed at the executive by rank and file police and this was in response to what was immense pressure from politicians, police headquarters and the media for immediate TV style results, which were considered unrealistic.
There is no doubt, however, that such causal factors can lead to alienation and resistance that can easily take the shape of misconduct and corruption that is, in turn, extremely damaging. Associate Professor Sandra Egger who was a member of the Police Board, expresses strong views about police misconduct.

For example, what we have heard in New South Wales is that a great deal of the police corruption allegations before the Royal Commission have been concerned with the illegal drug market and with the prostitution industry. Wherever you have those kinds of conditions, where you have a substantial and very lucrative black market, then you really have the conditions for police corruption. And you will never wipe it out unless you actually tackle those markets… (Egger and Lobez 1995).

This sounds sensible enough as an observation on the surface and even acknowledges the deep-seated social and legal context of police corruption. The problem is that Egger’s less than masterful appraisal of ‘the problem’ often begins with an acknowledgement of the deep-seated structural problems. But as I have explained throughout this thesis her critique then shifts to a cultural appraisal of policing ‘reform’ through managerialism. Young and Matthews (2003, p.15) explain a similar situation exists within the neo-liberal Blair Labor Government in the United Kingdom, whereby structural causes of crime and corruption are clearly outlined and acknowledged. However there is a clear ambiguity as to whether these problems can be located in the deep structures of society and its divisions of class. Subsequently deviance carries with it a notion of reform and inadequate management rather than a transformative issue. In the neo-liberal ‘reform’ mindset the only barrier to corruption or crime is force. All rank and file police officers will become corrupt if given the opportunity, this viewpoint seems to say—a bias about the rank and file that might be expected from the Duke of Wellington in the early nineteenth century but sounds somewhat out of place when it emanates from a university professor in a society that makes great claims to be classless. This viewpoint demonstrates not only a resounding lack of faith in the working class but also an extremely bleak or even anti humanistic view of human nature. Egger maintains that at the root of the issue is a lack of education and professionalism. This would seem to indicate that despite being given impossible tasks in the area of drug enforcement, these could somehow become achievable if levels of education are elevated and the operational police professionalised.

Susanna Lobez: How do you imagine police officers could be educated to resist temptation into corruption, or to resist unacceptable use of force?
Sandra Egger: Well I think it’s an entire professional attitude towards policing. I think that professionalism has to be encouraged at all levels. I think they certainly do need to have a fairly heavy dose, both in the initial training and education programs and all the way through, of ethics and so on (Egger and Lobez 1995).

Egger’s standpoint is sufficiently vague to be meaningless but it sounds good. Catching this as a disconnected grab on the evening news or current affairs programme, it might even sound sensible. It is the knowledgeable voice of the academic ‘expert’ assuring the concerned public that rising levels of crime can be solved if organisational management, education and training gets the force back on track. All is not lost. Expert help is at hand. Corruption is a matter of individual agency and bad faith but a tightened rein, an administrative reorganisation and ‘a fairly heavy dose’ of ethical education and training provides the key.

Which Theory? Which Practice?

Like Professor Egger, the Anh Hai researchers argue that the problem existing at Cabramatta is a matter of individual agency. Although the official guidelines supported harm reduction in regard to the problem of drugs in the community, this policy commitment had not filtered down to rank and file police who were still harassing drug addicts in the area (Maher et al 1997, p.v1). Despite arguing that their report was not intended as an exposé of police misconduct and corruption (Maher et al 1997, p.58), in the seventy odd pages of the report almost every page challenged the agency of rank and file police and made constant reference to allegations regarding their negligence, misconduct or corruption. This standpoint was reiterated to a larger television audience when the report was used as the argument behind the Cabramatta report on the high profile ABC programme Four Corners (Hardaker 1997). Four Corners called for yet another inquiry and more ‘reform’. Undoubtedly some police do engage in deviant behaviour, whether it is misconduct or corrupt, but the situation in Cabramatta is far more complex than this as any decent level of research analysis into the different policy directives in the area would have shown. In their conclusion Maher et al (1997, p.58) only cursorily argue, however, that their analysis wants to direct attention not just at the action of rank and file police but also to those responsible for creating and maintaining the power and laws which they enforce. This is a token gesture, however, and goes no further. Nor was it included in any sense in the Four Corners Programme.

Such a lack of intellectual rigour in relation to these vital causal factors legitimises the structural oppression that is alienating rank and file police. As the scapegoats of a competitive managerialist agenda, they find themselves at the whim of their executive counterparts, who
use them as pawns to further their own ambitions. Rank and file police are judged differently to others; their behaviour is measured using a different benchmark to that expected in other professions and in the hierarchy of the criminal justice system. As the most powerless members of this system they are subjected to the demands and disciplines of others within their own vocation and the capricious expectations of those outside it. Their employment conditions demand data driven ‘performance’ measured by quantity rather than quality—the higher the level of apparent crime the more effective they appear. It is an illogical measure that is based on coercion—senior police coerce the rank and file whilst they, in turn, are ordered to coerce the working class and, most specifically, its softest target—the underclass. Interestingly, although the police executive is also bound by performance contracts, it is the performance of those at the bottom that creates the ultimate measure. As a result the pressure from all these levels becomes concentrated at the bottom of the organisation.

A further complication in this managerialist model of policing is its theoretical insistence that the aim is not coercion at all but organisational efficiency to ensure social harmony. Whilst in theory the police must fulfil their social contract within a democratic state, in practice harm reduction policies sit uneasily beside a ‘zero tolerance’ enforcement strategy—especially in areas with severe drug problems such as Cabramatta and Kings Cross.

Sydney chapel shooting gallery defies the odds to stay open. Police have so far ignored an illegal heroin shooting gallery now operating in Sydney’s Kings Cross, despite assertions by Premier Bob Carr that they are determined to uphold the law... Earlier, Mr Carr maintained his zero-tolerance approach to drugs, but said it was up to police to decide whether to raid the shooting gallery: ‘Police are in charge of that and determined to uphold the law,’ he said (Morris 1999).

There is no sense of contradiction here, either in the way these words have been reported or in the sense that they have apparently been spoken. Carr can maintain ‘his zero-tolerance approach to drugs’ by leaving the ‘police to decide whether to raid the shooting gallery’ while determinedly managing to ‘uphold the law’. There are two agendas here, of course, and both offer large amounts of electoral support. Premier Carr’s personal attitude to heroin addicts is well known—it is human agency that is to blame and an addict is a person who is ‘silly enough to pick up a needle and inject an addictive poison into their veins’ (cited in Akerman 1999). His attitude to the rank and file police is also well known—he publicly reprimands them with ‘a broadside’ accusing them of ‘taking their eye off the ball’ in regard to ‘the drugs problem at Cabramatta’ (Wainwright and Mercer 2001a). In the same breath as the
‘progressive’ arm of the intellectual community, Bob Carr and his political advisors insist that rank and file police require ‘reform’ and ‘education’ (Egger and Lobez 1995) to keep them institutionally responsible, they are also being given the task of determining whether or not ‘to raid the shooting gallery’ in Kings Cross, Sydney—that notorious haunt of crime and corruption.

What the political arm of the state requires when it is pressured by any interest group in the community is, of course, a scapegoat. The demand is that the rank and file police engage in coercive ‘social control’ rather than a consenting ‘social contract’ to maintain social harmony but not to appear to be doing this and to take the blame if it becomes apparent. Admittedly some police have always been willing to be the state’s agents of coercive social control but others, as I have shown, have entered policing from the preserving social harmony perspective. The political demands made on policing has made it, as former Commissioner Jarratt states baldly, ‘not a democratic set up’ at all (New South Wales 2001) even though it must masquerade as democratic institution. It is now a practical agent of autocratic control and coercion nestling inside the theoretical expectation of carrying out a democratic social contract.

The political—and intellectual—opportunism that is associated with crime and policing was demonstrated when it was announced that there would be a New South Wales Legislative Council inquiry into policing resources at Cabramatta in 2001. Immediately there was a flurry of political activity.

Premier Bob Carr unleashed another 90 police officers on drug-riddled Cabramatta last week. Will it make a difference? …On Tuesday, Premier Bob Carr also proposed changes to the law, giving police greater search and seizure powers ‘…If they want to give heroin to registered addicts, if they want to give out needles, fine,’ [Local Publican] Treyvaud says. ‘But let them do it in every pharmacy in NSW. Let them do it in Hunters Hill or Maroubra. For 10 months I had a needle van outside my hotel. Why should we be the honey pot for drug dealers and users in Sydney?’ (West 2001)

What becomes apparent is that the harm reduction strategy promoted by Maher et al (1997) and adopted at arm’s length by Premier Bob Carr and the New South Wales Police Service is trying to satisfy two different electoral responses. Carr proposes ‘giving police greater search and seizure powers’ and simultaneously makes a feint of appearing ‘to uphold the law’ (Carr,
cited in Morris 1999) by allowing ‘a needle van’ to park unmolested outside a local hotel. Such obvious anomalies force the rank and file police to make a contradictory display in problem areas but do nothing to change the law as it applies elsewhere, making already heavily publicised ‘drug-riddled’ trouble spots such as Sydney’s Kings Cross and Cabramatta into a ‘honey pot for drug dealers and users’ and a deadly trap in which those interests wishing to demonstrate that rank and file police officers are corrupt or inefficient can find ready evidence at hand. There is support for ‘zero-tolerance’ policing and there is support for the more radical concept of harm reduction. Both need to be simultaneously satisfied by the same officers.

Medicalisation, which would automatically re-position drug addiction as a health problem rather than a policing problem (Cotton 1994), is a ‘social contract’ notion recommended by the 1999 Drug Summit in New South Wales (Totaro 2003). The police organisation’s new policy arising from the same Drug Summit (New South Wales Police Service 2002) involves the implementation of ‘a number of innovative projects’ involving steering drug users toward treatment rather than the criminal system. However, at the same time the New South Wales Government and the police executive persist in pursuing a ‘zero tolerance’ policy in tandem with this. This might produce a ‘win-win’ situation for the NSW State Government and the politicised police hierarchy but it creates a ‘no win’ situation for the rank and file operational police.

Police are increasingly using dogs to detect drug dealers and users (Buttner and Munro 2001) but after one operation involving three hundred police in nightclub raids, only fourteen people were charged with possessing drugs. Nevertheless, Commander Dick Adams told a press conference that the use of sniffer dogs was a huge success, adding that the cost considerations were irrelevant. At the time, however, the Government had indicated that police resources would be focused on the supply and trafficking of drugs and not possession for personal use. Cameron Murphy, the director of the NSW Council for Civil Liberties knew precisely who to blame, asserting that ‘[t]he approach to drugs in NSW is filled with duplicity.. [T]he police have taken a totally opposite path, taking the whole approach to the streets and users. The Government and the police seem to be going in different directions.’ With Bob Carr continually promising to do everything in his power, including amending legislation, to keep up the pressure and sniffer dogs on the beat, Murphy makes the assumption that the government and police are at odds with each other. Regardless of these politicised policy contradictions, however, the answer is constantly at hand—police reform (Williams 2003). According to Sofios, Saleh and Penberthy (2003) many residents at Cabramatta say things
have improved since a parliamentary report in 2001 resulted in local police management being overhauled and reinforced with new move-on legislation to target heroin dealers. However, regardless of this reform, dealers had apparently stepped up their heroin dealing in broad daylight, making a mockery of the pre-election boast from the Carr Government that the reformed police organisation was winning the war on drugs.

To do this, of course, the best ‘expert’ to consult should be the operational police who deal on a daily basis with such issues. This, however, rarely happens. In August 2003 Superintendent Darcy, an operational officer from New South Wales police, delivered a conference paper regarding various aspects of ‘disorder’, which included an analysis of the heroin problem. Darcy, who is in charge of the Kings Cross patrol which has many of the drug related problems experienced at Cabramatta, explained that crime statistics are deceptively simple figures that can be relatively easily obtained and, on the face of it, just as easily interpreted. In relation to street level drug dealing, the majority of data is generated by police activity and the statistics can vary enormously depending upon the focus of this activity. As a consequence many of the causal issues are not so easily measured and when a measurement is provided, it doesn’t really indicate too much in a qualitative sense. From Darcy’s operational experience he had found that it was apparently irrelevant to the community what drug was being sold; what made them feel unsafe was the overt nature of the drug distribution. Although the Kings Cross community have clearly indicated that they expect police to take action about drug dealing, they also appear sympathetic to the difficulties of completely eradicating the problem. To serve the needs of the community, Darcy believes the police have a responsibility in terms of harm minimisation (Darcy 2003, pp.3,4,19).

Based on Darcy’s observations, it becomes clear why the concerned community at Cabramatta is looking for a harm reduction strategy that moves closer towards a medicalisation model, whilst looking to rigorous policing to remove the perceived menace of drug dealing from the streets. They do not mind if ‘heroin [is given] to registered addicts’ or if needles are also given out but they don’t want ‘a needle van’ parked permanently in the street providing a ‘honey pot for drug dealers and users’ as this makes locals feel understandably uneasy about walking in the streets. Medicalisation, they feel, will distribute the task of servicing these addicts to ‘every pharmacy in NSW’ and take drug dealing off the streets (West 2001). Heroin dependency is also linked to high levels of property crime (Hogg and Brown 1998, p.103) and the harm-reduction model does nothing to address illegal drug dealing. Only the medicalisation model would diminish the value of the illegal heroin market. In December 2003 Dr Don Weatherburn from the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and
Research released research finding that indicated heroin addiction in New South Wales had risen from 670 people in 1967 to roughly 67,000 in 1997, that this state has the highest robbery rate in Australia and that there was a direct link between the two statistics.

Dr Weatherburn explained that the Federal and State governments could combat this problem by forcing up the price of heroin through interception at borders, increasing the number of users in drug treatment and committing more resources into the investigation of robbery. He added that ‘[e]ncouraging heroin users into methadone maintenance treatment is also important because such treatment has been shown to be very effective in reducing their rates of involvement in crime’ (O'Malley 2003). In a typical politicised response the NSW Police Minister first blamed the Federal government for making Sydney a centre for heroin importation. Then the Premier, Bob Carr, unwillingly backed down on his earlier claim that the police were ‘winning the battle and everyone ought to back the police’, issuing a revised statement saying, ‘I didn't say police were beating this, I said police were making arrests and laying charges, the police deserve to be supported but not for a moment am I talking the language of complacency’ (O'Malley 2003).

In December 2003 Kings Cross commander Dave Darcy told journalists that there are now so many drug dealers around Australia’s first supervised injecting room that his rank and file officers were powerless to stop the heroin distribution taking place in its vicinity. Darcy said that local residents were not critical of harm reduction strategies but felt that these did not go far enough. The distribution market was still controlled by criminals, unlike the medicalisation model where distribution would be controlled by the state (Cotton 1994). Darcy even suggested that critics should read his conference paper (Darcy 2003). Unfortunately, Commander Dick Adams immediate response was a less than helpful damage control procedure, amounting only to a denial of any suggestion that the supervised heroin injecting room in Sydney's Kings Cross was creating a ‘honey pot’ effect for heroin dealers. From the vantage point of his managerial position, Adams argued that Darcy had been misquoted in a newspaper article suggesting that drug dealing would never be eradicated by police intervention and reaffirmed that the injecting room would remain open (ABC News Online 2003a). Adams had obviously never read Darcy’s published conference paper (Darcy 2003) or, if he had, he completely missed the point of what it said or felt that he had nothing to learn from the experience of the operational police. His emphatic denial that the injecting room had a ‘honey pot effect’ for heroin dealers, showed him to be seemingly oblivious of the fact that heroin was being distributed illegally, as he argued instead on the basis that there were 2000 registered heroin-injecting users living in the area. ‘If you take that they would use
probably three injections per day,’ he said, ‘that’s 6000 injections of heroin, just between those registered users’. No police force in the world, he added sagely, was able to completely do away with drugs. Reassuring the concerned public Adams said. ‘Police are not powerless and police are doing an excellent job to keep the drug dealing in Kings Cross and in other places under control’ (Morris and Lawrence 2003).

After Adams publicly rebutted the claims of his operational colleague Dave Darcy, the Special Minister for State was able to patiently explain that the injecting centre had met all political expectations. ‘The Government is satisfied the medically supervised injecting room trial is saving lives, is preventing overdoses, is a gateway to treatment for street-based addicts,’ he said (Morris and Lawrence 2003a). In so doing they unwittingly reinforced Darcy’s criticism of using quantitative data to develop policing policies in that ‘crime statistics are a deceptively simple figures that can be relatively easily obtained and on the face of it easily interpreted’ (Darcy 2003, p.3). This scenario also illustrates the contradictory and coercive nature of policing—rank and file police are often coerced into acting against their operational judgement and the public is persuaded that the administration is dealing effectively with any policing problem, putting any failure back onto the ineptitude or corruption of the rank and file.

Whilst some police are quite happy to engage in aggressive coercion, others, like Dave Darcy are not, wanting to find effective solutions to fulfil their social contract with the community they serve. Adams’ politicised response reaffirming police authority makes this point very adequately, as does the fact that Adams, a former Commissioned Officer in the Army Reserve (King 2003), is also the same member of the police executive who justified the use of capsicum spray to disperse demonstrators protesting against the war in Iraq, arguing that ‘the protest had considerable potential to cause disturbances’ (ABC News Online 2003). Whatever their personal opinion, rank and file police operate on the directions given by their senior managers and, when these prove to be misguided, they must bear the odium of public disapproval as well as academic and media condemnation.

Two of my research subjects—‘Dwayne’ and ‘Joe’—expressed support for Darcy’s analysis of the situation and they are not alone in this. As one former NSW police officer who gave evidence at the Commonwealth Standing Committee of Legal and Constitutional Affairs explained, ‘I was not concerned about drug addicts. In fact, I had a lot of empathy for them. We tried to push the idea that drugs should be legalised’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2003, p.LCA 879). Yet, when reporting about this inquiry, ‘progressive’ media commentator Mike
Carlton typecast such police witnesses as ‘disgruntled ex-coppers and academic poseurs’ trying ‘to rake over the cold ashes of crime in Cabramatta yet again, before the state election in March’, implanting in his audience the idea that ‘[l]ies will be told, reputations trashed (Carlton 2002b) if the operational police tried to refute the wisdom behind senior management’s politicised decisions.

If there is little effective leadership, there is even less support offered to operational police. One of my research subjects—‘Greg’—a former policeman now on a medical pension, left the service after making a complaint against a senior police officer.

‘Greg’: Well that was another reason why I left. I was deemed to be a whistleblower after I. Or should I say my position to return [to the police] was untenable because I was deemed to be a whistle blower after I complained about Mal Brammer [Assistant Commissioner OIC Internal Affairs].

Interviewer: Did they provide you with any internal witness [support]?

‘Greg’: The Internal Witness Support Unit. They should just call them the Internal Witness Unit because there was no support there. No! They made all sorts of promises to come out and see me. They made all sorts of promises to do the right thing by me. To make sure that it [the internal affairs investigation] was deal with to my satisfaction. But, it never occurred. I never saw the person who handled it (‘Greg’ 2002).

Another former policeman and research subject—‘Brett’—who has also received a medical discharge, explains the reason why he left the police (Lamont 2005).

‘Brett’: [There was a] total lack of support from the hierarchy of the Police Service. I had been called down to give evidence at the Royal Commission [Wood Royal Commission] and over my association with a senior officer who they alleged had done things wrong ten or fifteen years before I ever met him… But, the support process in the police force for people who are suffering from some sort of stress. There is no support at all.

Interviewer: What sort of support did you get from the PMO [Police Medical Officer]?

‘Brett’: None.

Interviewer: Did anyone ever come out to see you?

‘Brett’: No.

Interviewer: Did anyone say that they would?
‘Brett’: We [‘Brett’ and his wife] wrote to them several times and complained about things but nobody ever came out. We wrote to the Ombudsman, wrote to the Commissioner!

Interviewer: Did anyone ever ring you or write back?

‘Brett’: After a couple of years they started to write back. It took them a couple of years to answer my letters (Brett 2002).

Another research subject—‘KD’—also complained about lack of support from senior police

‘KD’: John Heslopp [now a retired Commander] for example is heading the Child Protection Agencies that has never spoken to a victim or a perpetrator and they have never had to put a brief of evidence together. They don’t know the process. It’s never a pat on the back ‘Good on you’. It’s always ‘Hurry up’. They are quick to criticise… the difficulty is once again that it is made more difficult by the management. If you spoke to, well this would be an interesting thing to do, with respect to people working in Child Protection that have left JIT [Joint Investigation Teams] and ask them why they have left… they would say that they love the work and it does not bother them, y’know it doesn’t bother them sitting down talking to five year olds about how they have been anally penetrated. It’s the factors they relate to their management and the workload and they have all got their rings [backsides] hanging out with high case loads and getting no support or understanding from anywhere. They just get jack of it [sick of it] and leave because they are burnt out (KD 2002).

‘Dirk’, another research subject, also worked in the Child Protection area and shortly after I interviewed him he also resigned from the police after 14 years service. When asked to describe contemporary police work, he responded quickly with ‘a thankless job!’

‘Dirk’: A job, which does have some satisfaction. A job where you are very highly accountable. A job that comes with a fair amount of stress, because of its nature. … You don’t know when something from your past might pop up. Although you have done nothing wrong or dishonest, you don’t know what lies in your future. There is no certainty in your employment anymore. You go to work and you do the right thing and you investigate to the best of your knowledge and all that sort of carry on. But you don’t seem to have the support in place… There had to be some sort of leeway for people that deal with blood and scum all of their life and get paid not much for it. Then get shit on, for nothing. I think the only thing that I am focused on in this job is the negatives, unfortunately. The more I think about it, the more I think I can’t stay in this organisation’ (‘Dirk’ 2002).

‘Gonzo’, a detective with thirty years experience, explains how the contemporary policing organisation has affected his health and alienated him so much from what was his chosen vocation that he is counting the days until retirement.
‘Gonzo’: Well no. But I suppose I can add this. The sooner I am out of the organisation the sooner I will come home from work without being in a constant state of anxiety and my chest is tight and not talking to my family about things that I have been involved in during the day. I will be a much happier man (‘Gonzo’ 2002).

The managerial structure of the politicised policing organisation so beloved of media and academic crusaders has clearly failed committed operational police officers such as ‘Gonzo’, ‘Dirk’, ‘KD’, ‘Brett’ and ‘Greg’. Indeed, the interactionist standpoint has pilloried them and caricatured them as the villainous enemies of their misunderstood and victimised ‘outsiders’, laying the blame for the alienation of this underclass squarely upon rank and file agency. The failure of such ‘progressive’ intellectuals to develop an holistic class analysis and to identify the structured alienation process that they are exacerbating to further fragment class solidarity has disconnected rank and file police not only from their vocation but from their social core. Performance managed ‘reform’ has produced a dysfunctional policing organisation that is effectively divided in a civil war between its politicised elite with their politically ambitious managers and its operational rank and file. The contemporary policing organisation is ‘managed’ and not led; it is about individual survival not teamwork; it is about coercion not service or duty. As long as policy direction is determined by the political arm of the state and supported by their subalterns—the intellectual and managerial ‘experts’ rather than by operational experience—the only priority will continue to be the minimising of electoral damage and the preservation of the conservative hegemony.
CONCLUSION: Which Way Is Forward?

In this thesis I have made an appraisal of the radical critique of policing and the ‘progressive’ reforms it suggests as the way to address the problems besetting rule enforcement in contemporary capitalist societies. My analysis has concentrated on the way in which intellectual debate both in academe and the media has, by focussing on the agency of rank and file police, deflected attention away from the real extent of what remains a very real problem. The ‘villain’ of the piece—the operational police—has, by way of its position within the broader criminal justice system, become the convenient scapegoat of a much wider political and social malaise and, as such, a counter revolutionary force alienated from any consciousness of its own class position. This, I have argued, is hardly surprising as this class position seems to lie outside the vision of most of its critics as well. A crucial catalyst of the restricted vision of most radical critique is the politically turbulent period of the 1960s, during which the ‘progressive’ and aggressive radical individualist movements engendered a passionate desire for an amorphous and under-theorised sense of ‘change’ that filled the need for—and sublimated the desire for—revolution.

The times might have been changing since the 1960s but the social template did no such thing as capitalism consolidated rather than decreased its power. Soon the vocal demand for ‘change’ became an ephemeral excuse for self-promotion; careers built on ‘radicalism’ networked with the emerging political and judicial establishment that had been nurtured by the same distorted sense of this change. ‘Change became a euphemism for action, reaching absurd heights under a politicised managerialist system where changing the internal shape of a department or an organisation became equated with efficiency, dynamic management and innovation. In academic terms, as revolution became reform, the theoretical canvas became a microcosm of economic, political and social analysis. The ‘big picture’ became obscured by minutiae and subjective research unashamedly displayed its conceptual poverty and class bias by elevating the underclass—the ‘outsider’ reified by the interactionist researchers (Becker 1966, 1967)—in a parody of a class analysis. Gender, race, ethnicity and sexual preference replaced a rigorous conceptual approach to class in the determined search for new ‘victims’ to champion in the struggle against oppression. In the process, the very real but also extremely limited coercive power delegated to working class operational police—the lower echelons of the ‘rule enforcers’—became one with the overarching power exercised by the ruling class—the ‘rule makers’—despite the obvious disparity of scale and control.
The neo-liberal politics of the last few decades has produced a society moulded tightly around the ‘market’ and competitive individualism, destroying class solidarity and raising in its place a heightened sense of the insularity of class fractions. The idea of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is no longer a matter of class struggle but one of intra-class class struggle. As Ellen Meiksins-Wood (1997) explains, the ‘golden age’ of capitalism has in fact spawned ambivalence towards the liberalism of enlightenment ideas and pessimism about the concepts of humanism and progress. These new social ‘critics’ are, despite their radical rhetoric and contrary to their personal beliefs, enemies of the working class who can no longer theorise this as an organic oppositional force with the potential to inaugurate a new common sense and a new social order. As the self-styled ‘vanguards’ of progress and reform the intellectuals and ‘experts’ in academe, the hierarchy of the criminal justice system, politics and the investigative media have nothing to learn from a working class that they believe to be devoid of any revolutionary energy (Marcuse 1972, p.199–200). They study this class as if it was an alien species and reify fractions of this class into different ‘problem areas’, with different gradations of ‘victim’ status requiring different levels of sympathy or intervention. These are not social theorists but philanthropists in the full sense of that Victorian ideal and with all the flaws and elitism that attached to that concept. The self-appointed role of this intelligentsia is to lead not listen—to protect some and to educate, train, control and professionalise others into the malleable shape that suits capitalism’s hegemonic ideas and its distorted concept of ‘reform’. In the process this ‘progressive’ reform vanguard has adopted all the tenets of a Disraelian conservatism and become the subaltern of the concentrated layers of power of the state. As subalterns, those in the vanguard actively legitimise and reinforce the coercion of that organic working class resistance against capitalism that builds on its contradictions and has the function of becoming a revolutionary dynamic of change within this mode of production.

I have focussed extensively on the role of the traditional intellectual community because its perception of itself as radical, if not revolutionary, has a corrosive self-congratulatory quality that actively blocks the path to change. The media, the propaganda arm of the state, is part of this vanguard and it, too, takes up the analysis acritically and keeps the favourite props of this ‘progressive’ reform—police ineptitude or corruption and the erosion of public safety—continually in the public consciousness, In the process the media has elevated the intelligentsia’s preoccupation about corrupt police into a moral crusade against those forces of evil holding in thrall the general public as its powerless victims. That some police are corrupt is not in dispute in this thesis but that all police are corrupt and, moreover, that corruption is the hallmark of this class fraction is very much in dispute throughout my work. I believe that
it is socially corrosive and extremely culpable for the media and its supporting academics to advance the biased theory that there is a ‘culture’ of police ‘corruption’ so that this becomes a basic assumption of contemporary commonsense, as does the idea that rank and file police are like an unexploded bomb in the heart of society, needing to be constantly defused with wide-ranging coercion.

Another focus in this thesis has been the way that ‘progressive’ reform is a consciously stage-managed production. The Wood Inquiry, with its rigid and extremely selective parameters of investigation, played a major role in facilitating a struggle for power within the political arm of the state itself. The aim was the politicisation of the ‘public service’—in this case, the Police Service. By pushing the concept of ‘corruption’ as ‘endemic’ in the rank and file police, the Wood Inquiry used all the techniques of the ‘show trial’ as a tool with which to replace a not entirely malleable Police Commissioner with one that was overtly a political appointment, thus consolidating political control and making ‘rule enforcement’ entirely an electorally driven process. The conceptual casualty was no less than that once sanctified doctrine of the ‘separation of powers’ residing at the centre of the democratic process. The social casualties were far more numerous—the career, self-image and self-respect of those innocent rank and file police officers who were caught in the crossfire that brought down their largely unrepresentative corrupt colleagues.

Whilst this struggle for power within the state has, in the focus of this thesis, played itself out during the Wood Inquiry into the NSW Police Service, it was prefigured in New York City in the Knapp Inquiry into the NYPD in the 1972. In NSW this politicised show trial, orchestrated by the intelligentsia and media, was given investigative impetus by a dispute between members of the Australian Federal Police and the NSW Police Service. Using this already existing animosity, the rank and file operational police in NSW were effectively remade into a politicised response unit acting in the electoral interests of the ruling political party. Police operational strategies became political policies designed to fulfil specific electoral functions. Policy failures or inconsistencies could be externalised, with the rank and file police acting as easily dispensable scapegoats to deflect electoral animosities.

Throughout this thesis the concept of ideological hegemony, developed first by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1983, pp.162-165) and later refined by Antonio Gramsci (1971), has been fundamental to the analysis. Ideology operates at a level of appearances and is that which informs commonsense views of the world. Theory penetrates beneath the surface and uncovers the real connections hidden beneath. For the purposes of this thesis, the hegemony
of commonsense ideas gives the appearance that consent is part of the framework of state coercion. Gramsci (1971, p.263) explains that intellectuals become the subalterns of the state because they support the paradigm that naturalises force plus consent, or hegemony armoured by coercion (Sassoon 1991, pp.221-223). As a consequence, this hegemonic construction of power under capitalism is embodied in liberalism and its market based concept of competitive individualism. The essentially conservative core of the intellectual and academic ‘progressive’ establishment will explain deviance as a problem of individual agency, denying the social, political and economic contradictions that create alienation and resistance. The liberal argument is that some psychological or cultural motivation creates the dysfunctional individual (Young 1997, p.479—in the case of rank and file police, this is a ‘culture of corruption’ within the operational police that schools individuals to accept corruption as normal behaviour (Dixon 1999b, Masters 2002a). Individual police officers become corrupt because corruption is endemic in the police service but there is also an element of choice—of individual agency and, hence, culpability—that is the ultimate decider about whether to accept or reject membership of this corrupt culture.

Marx believed socialism would eventually emerge organically in economically advanced countries once political rights had been clearly established and the organised working class had developed its consciousness of itself as a class. The development of counter hegemonic ideologies would overthrow the capitalist hegemony and make socialism—no longer operating at a level of appearances and therefore no longer hegemonic—the new common sense of the times (Miliband 1990, p.363). In this way the counter hegemony involves a radical critique of the prevailing social order based on class and, as a result, removes the obfuscation of class bias. Unfortunately, during the last few decades ‘radical’ critique by the ‘progressive’ intellectual community has operated solely at a level of appearances and has been built entirely upon foundations naturalised by class bias. ‘Progressive’ intellectuals almost invariably fail to conceptualise the division of labour existing between the operational police and the politicised police executive. They fail to theorise class or class struggle. Any rigorous level of radical theoretical analysis would position rank and file police as an exploited part of the working class—the tool of the concentrated layers of power that make up the state but not part of those concentrated layers at all (Miliband 1991, p.523). Instead we have operational police making rules on the run as ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Chan 1997, pp.44-65), being resistant to change as well as racist and discriminatory against certain races or ethnic groups (Chan 1997, pp.65–66, 214–217) or, within the ‘highly gendered’ context of a street level drug economy, harassing women drug users simply because they can do so with
impunity (Maher 1997, p.100). The fact that operational police are instructed from above to act simultaneously using two politicised policy strategies—‘zero-tolerance’ and ‘harm reduction’ policing—is never acknowledged in these critiques.

As policing reform in the ‘progressive’ sense also means the introduction of the neo-liberal structure of managerialism, this thesis has concerned itself with the impact on the police service of these ideas—particularly in New South Wales but also in New York City, where these were first introduced after the Knapp Inquiry in 1972. Managerialism brings with it workplace strategies that promote competitive careerism under the rhetoric of teamwork and coerce rank and file police to advance the interests of their managers with a continuous increase in workplace productivity and data driven performance measurements. This coercive policy is directly linked to performance contracts and bonus provisions for senior police but the overt aim is for value for money policing dictated by the budget rather than by operational necessity. Whilst budgets can be augmented in order to deal with electoral flashpoints, this is purely a politicised response and has nothing to do with the requirements of effective policing. Indeed, as ‘crisis’ situations develop in trouble spots such as Cabramatta, operational police are often directed to simultaneously pursue opposing policies—‘zero-tolerance strategies and harm reduction strategies—and are scapegoated for their failure to achieve these. That managerialist reforms and politicised policies increase the exploitation and alienation of rank and file police and their non-executive commissioned officer counterparts, was a finding of the Mollen Report on the NYPD in 1994 but this is rarely mentioned in ‘progressive’ analyses.

In this thesis there has necessarily been a lengthy discussion about police corruption, the wide scope of its various definitions, and about why demonstrable levels of corruption in the higher levels of the criminal justice system—and, indeed, elsewhere—does not receive the same attention in the academic literature and the media. That there are many gradations of what this constitutes in the corruption and deviance debate is well known, with corruption ranging from accepting the offer of half-price hamburgers from McDonalds to having a drink whilst on duty, accepting small or large bribes, falsifying evidence, drug dealing and murder. As ‘Larry’—one of my research subjects—remarks cynically, ‘That’s as wide as it goes…’ Certainly Chris Masters, prominent anti-corruption campaigner, member of the Police Advisory Panel and investigative journalist for the ABC Four Corners Programme, seemed to be obsessed with the McDonalds hamburger and having a drink whilst on duty aspects in his interview, ‘Undoing the Badness’, with self-confessed ‘corrupt’ detective Ray Peattie (Masters 2002a). This preoccupation with levels of corruption that would be seen in other
occupations or professions as ‘perks’ or ‘client entertaining’ becomes ‘corruption’ when it concerns the rank and file police. Certainly Masters, who has publicly complained that there are unreal expectations put on journalists that their investigations should ‘always… be something… mistake-free’ and that ‘the bar is far too high’ for this reason (Masters and O’Reagan 2002), could perhaps have shown less inflexibility in this regard. If defaming innocent people in a high profile investigative current affairs programme should be seen as setting ‘the bar… far too high’, harping on the acceptance of half price McDonalds’ hamburgers sounds suspiciously like carping. The reality is that, as this thesis has continually shown, there is a double standard in operation. Indeed, ‘the bar is far too high’ for operational police.

From the very beginning of this thesis I have argued that the contradiction between the ‘rule of law’ and the ‘humanity of the law’ is one of the fundamental areas of conflict in the ‘progressive’ debate about the rank and file police. Many ‘progressive’ scholars have an expectation that policing practice in regard to that underclass of ‘outsiders’ should be based on the ‘humanity of the law’ and policy should reflect harm minimisation rather than rigid enforcement. Unfortunately, these same critics demand that rank and file police should be inflexibly judged by the ‘rule of law’ and that any concept of the ‘humanity of the law’ does not apply, for in cases of police ‘corruption’ there are no mitigating circumstances. There is, again, another double standard in operation here. It is not the contention of this thesis that corruption does not exist in the police service but merely that this is not, as some ‘progressives’ vociferously appear to argue, ‘endemic’ to the operational police but exists not only within the entire criminal justice system but within journalism, academe, the judiciary and any other of the profession or occupations existing in society.

That there should be equality of treatment within the law is a fundamental assumption of democratic societies, as is the presumption of innocence rather than guilt in societies with their common law roots in British justice. Such inviolate assumptions, however, are the first casualties of ‘progressive’ anti-corruption investigations and show trials such as the Wood Inquiry. So, too, is objectivity in academic research. The interactionists’ standpoint that the researcher needs to publicly denounce the slightest whiff of corruption by the ‘rule-enforcer’, whilst publicly supporting and empathising with the criminal ‘rule breaker’, is a breathtaking admission of the subjective research that currently dominates in this area. The agency of rank and file police, this theory also advances, is responsible for the crime and deviancy located within marginalised and disadvantaged communities (Holdaway 1983, p.5). The underclass is the ‘victim’ of the oppressive structure of capitalist society and its aggressive competition but
the functionaries of the police service, oppressed by a coercive managerialist system that dominates their working conditions, are free agents choosing deviance and corruption over the path of righteousness.

For any of these policing reform agendas to be meaningful, they have to be directly aligned with a broader definition of social reform and should have organic relevancy to encourage the notion for rank and file police that their vocation is part of a broader collective social core. From a responsible standpoint the only way to limit police misconduct and prevent deviance escalating any further is to bring to an end the aggressive competition associated with promotion and reassess the impact of data driven performance management strategies whereby competency is aligned to productivity—quantity rather than quality in policing. Any truly ‘progressive’ police reform has to be aligned to concepts of social reform, which pursues a new social order and a new common sense. In the *Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove* Bernstein et al (1975, p.144) explain that in any critical examination of policing we should take into account their dual role as both victimisers and victims. In order to bring about radical social change, possibilities should be examined to take charge of the alienated resistance of working class police and convert this struggle into political action.

It is perhaps ironic that the only way to move forward in this debate is to stop and look backwards over the road that has been travelled since the 1960s. For, as this thesis has shown, radical analysis has moved further and further away from the point at which it can claim to be making a truly ‘radical’ impact on the society that it wants to change. At the present ‘progressive’ reform is but a variant of conservatism. It wants to change the shape of social process but it does not want to change the society itself or, more importantly, the capitalist mode of production itself. It wants to champion the oppressed but has taken a very narrow view of oppression and has lost sight of exploitation altogether. It wants to champion the working class but has a truncated view of what constitutes this class. It wants to oppose the ruling class but has an extremely eclectic view of who should be seen as members of this class. It needs, in short, to reassess its theoretical bases and purge itself of the antipathy and class bias as well as the conceptual inconsistencies these engender; inconsistencies that distort its view of the debate. Above all, it needs to turn back from the thicket of theoretical minutiae ranging from ethnicity, race, gender and marginalisation and frame a viewpoint to take in the big picture of class and class conflict and to allow class consciousness to develop organically, unrestrained by double standards masked as positive discrimination and corruption campaigns. It needs, in essence, to find the way back, to take stock and to reassess the road forward.
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Glossary

Alienation: A product of social relations whereby individuals are isolated or estranged from society and their collective social core. As such they are limited in their capacity for social development and therefore individual development.

Anarchist: Believers in the theory that society does not need government.

Bourgeoisie: The middle classes who developed capitalism and took power from the aristocracy.

Class: Marx analysed class in relation to the ownership of capital and the means of production. This is the economically determined and inherently conflicting division of society into those who own property and the means of producing material goods and those who are property less and are forced to sell their labour to exist. However Marx also identifies other classes and groupings that influence the outcome of political and social conflicts.

Compstat: Performance management strategy developed by NYPD often referred to as ‘Zero-Tolerance’.

Corruption: The abandonment of expected standards of behaviour by those in authority for the sake of unsanctioned personal advantage. This definition must be tempered by the knowledge that in many societies corrupt practices that are specified by legal or administrative rules are customary and widely accepted as normal behaviour. Collins Australian Pocket Dictionary (1981, p.199) defines corruption as Depravity; Bribery; Decay; Something corrupted.

Capitalist: An economic system where there is private property and relatively free markets where good are sold for money.

Commodity: An object for use that us produced for sale.

Dialectical Materialism: Marxist way of studying the relationship between the real world and the world of ideas.

Division of Labour: A technical division of labour that consists of the sub division of work tasks, a hierarchy of skills and a structure of power and authority that is revealed in the relationship between managers and workers.

Economic base: The way the economy is structured in society.
Humanism: Believing that man rather than God or nature is the central tenant of human existence and hence social change. Humanist Marxist sociology is that which takes social structure as its central focus on the basis that the structure is made up of social human beings.

Hegemony: The ideological and cultural domination of one class by another. Constructing ‘consent’ or engineering consensus by controlling the content of cultural forms and major institutions achieves hegemony.

Idealist: One who believes that there is a divine force of some kind, which, is responsible for the development of the ideas and beliefs of mankind. It is the belief that the material world is dependent upon ideas.

Ideology: World view; the perception people have of the world around them that all ideas are as a result of life in the material world and not the result of intervention by a divine or supernatural force.

Intellectual: A traditional intellectual is a person who is typically well educated and engages their intellect in work that they believe to be culturally important. There is also an intelligentsia strand within this group who see themselves as being responsible for guiding the future welfare and development of a nation.

Interactionism: Action is distinguished from behaviour in that it involves meaning or intention. Interactionism is the analysis of action starting with individual actors.

Liberalism: A set of ideas that in social and political thought which emphasises individuals’ rights, and individuals freedom of choice. The role of the state is primarily to protect these rights. At the same time liberalism rejects any authoritarian forms of government. However the liberal notions of choice, individual freedom and the right to own private property are also embedded within ‘free market’ laissez faire economics. This economic framework is the basis of contemporary neo-liberal economics and globalisation.

Libertarian: A radical liberal viewpoint that asserts it is possible for human agents to act freely. This view also favours very narrow limits to action by the state and assumes that conflicts and needs are best resolved by markets mechanisms.

OCR: Data led performance management strategy Operations and Crime Review implemented by NSW Police as a reform. OCR was modelled on the NYPD management tool named Compstat aligned with ‘zero tolerance’ policing.
Praxis: A central concept within the Marxist ‘praxis’ draws attention to the socially constructed nature of economic and social institutions and the possibility of change.

Progressive: One who believes that society should advance forward in terms of the development of the forces of production and the collective needs of all socialised beings. Rather than the alternative concept of society moving forward through individuals acquiring their own private property.

Proletariat: The working class who do not own the mean of producing material goods or intellectual property. The working class exist by selling their labour power in exchange for wages.

Radical: The notion that fundamental change in a political system has to be obtained through physically altering the basis of society.

The State: The state is a set of governing institutions comprising of the legislature, executive, central and local administration, judiciary, police and armed forces. The core characteristics of the state are that it acts as the institutional system of political domination and has a monopoly regarding the legitimate use of violence. The state is directly tied to the interests of the ruling class and their domination of capitals and economic affairs.

Rank and File Police: The working class low-levelled functionaries of policing institutions.

Revolution: The overthrow of one ruling class by another, resulting in major changes to the structure of society.

Ruling Class: Synonymous with the economically dominant class. This is also the ruling minority, which in any society forms the state, which governs the majority. It is important to distinguish that the ruling class does not govern. It is satisfied to rule the governing class by virtue of its control over ideologies and dominant ideas (Hegemony), which stem from its economic influence.

Vanguard: Leaders of a political movement who aim to educate the working class or proletariat who are also referred to as the masses.
Appendix: Draft Interview Guide

The draft interview guide contained the following questions:

‘Factual’ questions

Can I begin by asking you for a few details about yourself?

Your age, marital status, where were you born?

What year did you join the police service?

Are you still a serving officer? (and if not when you left the police service and what you are doing now).

Are you fluent in a language other than English?

History and experience in the police force

Why did you join?

What rank have you reached?

What kind of policing have you done?

Do you intend to remain in the police service?

If not. Why not?

What would prompt you to leave? Or why did you leave?

Did you intend to stay in the police service until retirement when you first joined?

Capturing the essence of police work

Can you recall particular incidents and experiences that, to you, capture or epitomize actual policing?

What is your most vivid memory of being a police officer or what do you/did you like about being a police officer?

What don’t you/didn’t you like about being a police officer?

How would you describe police work to an outsider in a sentence or phrase or two?
The things of most concern about policing, the organisation and the future of police work

How would you describe the changes in policy direction that have taken place in recent years?

What are the things that most concern you about the way policing is changing?

What things do you like about the new environment?

Do you have any views about the way the police service is managed?

Do you have any views about the competence and behaviour of those in management positions?

What changes would you like to see put in place?

How do you see this being done and do you think such changes are likely?

Corruption, malpractice and unprofessional behaviour

What do you consider as constituting corrupt behaviour in the context of ordinary police work?

Do you think there are differences between the corrupt practice of ordinary police and that of senior police?

Do you think that some corruption is inevitable?

Where do you think the line should be drawn or what would you see as going ‘too far’?

Do you see some corrupt behaviour as more objectionable than other corrupt practice? What impact do you see the media coverage of corruption having on ordinary police? What would you consider as a reasonable kind of organisational ‘surveillance’ or monitoring of police behaviour?

What would you consider to be effective and fair means of determining disciplining police who overstep the mark?

The Future

What do you see as the likely future course of so-called reform and policy in the NSW police force?
What do you think lies ahead?

Are you hopeful?

**What else needs to be said?**

Is there anything else you would like to comment on in relation to ordinary police, police work or other matters?