Conscience and Time

Can conscience, as it is described by Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time*, be considered as a temporal phenomenon?

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Statement of Original Authorship

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

Signature:

Date:
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Abstract

In 1927, Martin Heidegger published his magnum opus, *Being and Time*, which sought to ground the nature of the specifically human existence in temporality. Of primary importance in understanding the nature of being in general, was to understand the human experience - that he labelled Dasein - as a historical process, an occurrence; the movement of which defined the very nature of being. Heidegger differentiated between two potential modes of being of Dasein, one grounded in the world with others, into which it is thrown (inauthentic), and another wherein Dasein could be grounded in itself (authentic). In order to move authentically Dasein required a kind of access to itself that became possible only by way of a particular phenomenon, labelled as conscience *[Gewissen]*. Conscience and Gewissen are terms both derived ultimately from the Greek συνείδησις [syneidesis] and have evolved and developed throughout the history of philosophy, from its beginnings in Homer, through Paul the Apostle and many others, to find itself firmly implanted in popular culture. However, the conceptions of conscience visible throughout its history differ radically from the conscience that is outlined in *Being and Time*.

Like those that came before it, Heidegger’s conception of conscience is involved with being guilty, it calls and attests, but Heidegger’s formulation is unique in that it lacks any specific content. In fact, instead of offering something to be heard, conscience is itself carefully designated by Heidegger as a specific type of listening, a hearkening *[Horchen]*, which is further characterised as a type of resolved preparation: a readiness for being able to be summoned.¹ This essay proposes that such a description intimates a specific temporality of conscience. This is not to say that Heidegger’s conscience is something that occurs as an experience within a sequence of events. Instead, the phenomenon must be grounded as an occurrence, that is as something necessarily temporal and historical. This argument is secured by equating Heidegger’s conscience with the ancient Greek concept of the καιρός [kairos] with which it shares a great deal. Ultimately, this examination leads us to reconsider the specific temporality of discourse as something that might itself be described as “kairological”. By considering conscience in this manner, and describing it in temporal terms, it becomes possible to situate the phenomenon more securely within the unity of Dasein as care.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

§ 1 - DEFINING THE QUESTION

“But there remains solely the saga of the way
(along which there opens up) how it stands with to-be
for along this (way) many indications of it are given;
how Being without genesis and without decay,
complete, standing fully there alone,
without trembling in itself and not at all in need of finishing;
nor was it before, nor will it be someday,
for as the present, it is all-at-once, unique unifying united
gathering itself in itself from itself (holding itself together full of presentness)”
- Heidegger’s translation of Parmenides Fragment 8 (Lines 1-6)²

In 1927, Martin Heidegger published his magnum opus, Being and Time, which sought to address the question of the meaning of being. Of primary importance in understanding the nature of being in general, was to understand the experience specific to the human being, that he labelled: Dasein. Heidegger’s solution to this question remained ultimately unfinished, but attempted to elucidate the specific temporality of Dasein, the movement of which he saw as defining the very nature of being. He positioned Dasein as an historical process, an occurrence, the unfolding of which could occur in different ways. To Heidegger, initially and for the most part, Dasein would exist as inauthentic [uneigentlich], thrown into and grounded in the world with others like it and unfolding itself in a time shared with them. However, Dasein could also be potentially authentic [eigentlich] by modifying its historical movement in such a way that it could ground itself in itself. In order to unfold authentically, Dasein required access to itself, that it might gather “itself in itself from itself.” This was shown to be possible only by way of a particular phenomenon known as conscience [Gewissen].

Conscience is described by Heidegger as being a “call” [Ruf], one that comes over Dasein, calling from afar to afar. As a call, conscience is a phenomenon grounded in the primordial movement of Dasein as “discourse”. When we speak of discourse here we are

referring ultimately to Dasein’s disclosure, that is its nature as that which reveals its world, and perhaps itself. Discourse [Rede] is a term used by Heidegger that he relates directly to the ancient Greek concept of λόγος, which refers to the peculiar capacity of the human to use language to communicate its openness to its world. Dasein’s coming into language is something that it does primordially, and is bound up with its being from the outset. To Heidegger, “language” is an expression in the communal world of this internal capacity of discourse, and it orients Dasein in a specific manner toward its world, and itself, that determines its movement. Communal coming into words is named by Heidegger as “idle talk” [Gerede], and tends to cover over the truth of experience rather than unveiling or opening it for Dasein. Although discourse is made explicit as the manner of access to beings and the place in which beings were to be encountered, Dasein itself is described as something ineluctably enigmatic, avoiding definition and uncovering in the very nature of its being. For this reason, Dasein’s gaining access to itself through discourse is not a simple process.

Heidegger explains that in order to be authentic, Dasein must first find itself, must be “shown to itself”, despite its nature as that which avoids disclosure. Heidegger locates the appropriate access in an expression of discourse that he labels “attestation” [Bezeugung], which unlike language professes or purports to bring something forth without actually producing it as objectively given. Instead of through language or speech, the access of Dasein to itself comes by way of a particular kind of listening [hören]. What is listened for is the silent attestation of conscience, a phenomenon of Dasein itself. It is a strange and silent call, that comes over Dasein but also from Dasein. The enigmatic and abysmal character of Dasein is closely related to the character of silence, as the possible location of that which cannot be made clear. In order to hear something specifically lacking in content, however, a special kind of listening is required. One ‘listens out for’ the call, rather than ‘listening to’ it, and this specific listening out is termed “hearkening” [horchen] by Heidegger: a reticent waiting for the call. Unlike speech, which has the character of making present, hearkening is instead to do with something that is expected as a possibility, which speaks to the nature of conscience itself as outstanding or anticipated. Our primary task will be to uncover the character of this anticipation.

In Being and Time, Heidegger makes clear from the outset of his discussion that his conception of conscience differs fundamentally from that of his antecedents. Conscience first finds its roots in the Greek σύνοιδα word group. As a verb, this root is expressed in various

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3 Ryan Coyne, Heidegger's Confessions (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2015) p136
4 Frank Schalow, Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred (Dordrecht, Springer Science+Business Media) p54
forms from the 6th Century BCE, generally indicating a being conscious of something or someone. As with conscience, σύνοιδα and its derivations are composite verbs. The prefix “σύν-” strictly means “with”, and “οιδα” is itself the perfect indicative active form of the verb εἰδῶ, which roughly translates as “to know”. Essentially, σύνοιδα was a capacity to see, to “understand”, an idea that one shares with others. Rather paradoxically, what was delineated as a sharing of understanding with another, σύνοιδα and its derivatives could take a reflexive as well as a non-reflexive form. What is meant by this is that the subject can “know with” another (non-reflexive), or simply with one’s self (reflexive). Although unclear in its nature, the “with-ness” of the ancient conscience evoked a sense of conscience as a “voice”, a coming into language, which we established already as being fundamentally distant from Heidegger’s formulation. Conscience, in its evolution into the latin language, particularly in Cicero, came to represent something that followed along with the definite deeds of Dasein, having an essentially critical function. This conscience had to do with the law, written into the being of men, that represented the source of guilt.

Heidegger’s conscience was also “guilty” [schuldig], but his own conception of this idea was radically at odds with Cicero’s, having necessarily nothing to do with concrete goings on in the world. This is not to align Heidegger’s conscience with something spiritual or beyond this world, as he also distances his conception from the modern Christian form of conscience as the voice of God. To Heidegger, conscience is not to do with a sense of “good” or “evil”, nor is it something like Paul the Apostle’s conscience that “reprimands” or “warns”. In order to understand Heidegger’s specific conception of conscience we must separate it significantly from its previous formulations. However, it is in his study of Paul that Heidegger’s own journey into the concept may have taken flight, and it is here we begin to see threads of language common to Heidegger’s conception, of “attestation” and “giving testament”, beginning to emerge in a different sense. It is also through Heidegger’s own deconstruction of the writings of Paul, outlined in The Phenomenology of Religion, that our analysis of conscience as temporal takes root.

Although Heidegger’s thought is still in its infancy when the lectures are delivered in 1920/21, we see in them already the language of conscience coming forth, intertwined with Heidegger’s novel sense of temporality. Heidegger here begins to elevate the historical as something vital to any attempt at philosophy. To Heidegger, if philosophy was going to avoid reduction into a science, it would need to identify concrete sciences themselves in their enactment, and the scientific process would need to be laid out in its foundations as

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3 Heidegger, Being and Time, p278

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Heidegger indicated that we must subject the knowledge of science and the history of religion both to a phenomenological “destruction” [Destruktion], which represents a return to the “things in themselves” as they occur within the enactment-historical situation. Thus, in The Phenomenology of Religion, Heidegger’s task is to attempt to uncover the “experience” [Erfahrung] that lies beneath Paul’s explication. This process uncovers a specific kind of temporality, wherein: “The present time has already reached its end and a new [αιον] has begun since the death of Christ”\(^7\). In light of this imminent ending, the early Christian is forced to consider the nature of their comportment or “enactment” [Vollzug] of life. For Paul, conscience has to do with a kind of moral guide or law, but more primordially it relates to the relationship between the Christian and God. The conscience of the authentic Christian demands they recognise the already coming to an end of this world, the παρουσία, and to take on an attitude toward life that is fitting of this truth. Thus, for Heidegger’s Paul it is the conscience that lies upon a sort of boundary between the “when” of the παρουσία and the “how” of enactment. Heidegger focuses on the role of proclamation for the authentic Christian, which he aligns with the idea of a “call”. The Christian, like authentic Dasein, in hearing a call, finds themself in a special moment, a specific kind of temporality, that radically redefines the enactment of life itself. This moment is the καιρός [kairos]: the right or opportune time. Thus, we see a way that “attestation”, the “call” and “conscience” may be involved with temporality.

Following The Phenomenology of Religion, specifically in those writings leading up to Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to establish the specific nature of the being of Dasein as temporal. The answer to the question of the meaning of being demands a phenomenological approach for Heidegger, but he recognised that even this was complicated by the hermeneutic situation. He saw that any attempt to understand the nature of being, even science, would be grounded necessarily in the perspective of the interpreter. This very fact, however, represents the starting point for access to Dasein in Being and Time: that is the sense of “always-already”. Dasein is thrust into a world that contains ideas, values and influences and is concerned with them necessarily, and this is reflective of the basic nature of Dasein as “care” [Sorgen]. The always-already becomes a horizon for understanding the very movement of Dasein, as something that has a kind of “past”, more appropriately labelled as a “history” [Geschichte]. Dasein is not involved with its history in a detached sense but rather engages with it actively, concernedly, in a movement that is dynamic and plastic. Dasein is primordially concerned with how it will be, based upon that which it already is. The past of

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\(^7\) Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, p69
Dasein is perpetually in movement with the future to create the movement of Dasein in the present. Thus, Dasein is shown to be primordially temporal: a movement, an occurrence, that is grounded essentially on these temporal ecstasies [Ekstasen] or horizons.

The problem for Dasein is that it is thrust into the world at birth, a world with others like it. This being-with others prevents Dasein from establishing itself as authentic from the outset. Dasein is even brought into a kind of common time, capable of being shared but impossible to grasp as entire. Dasein is able to alter its movement, and disentangle itself from its dispersal in others, but only through a unique relationship with its situation. By taking a position toward its death, and accepting the anxiety that such a stance brings, Dasein is capable of grounding itself in a new completeness, as that which is stretched out between its birth and death. This sense of completeness is extremely complex, and will be further outlined below. For now we must simply acknowledge that Dasein’s authentic stance towards itself and its history is made possible by conscience: the silent call that “jolts” Dasein from its everyday understanding of its situation. Conscience is specifically outlined by Heidegger to be the “call of care”, a “phenomenon of Dasein.” If we are to understand the caller of conscience to be Dasein itself, and Dasein as primordially temporal, then it follows that there must be a way to describe conscience in temporal terms.

There is a kind of temporality implicit in Heidegger’s identification of conscience as a modifying force, something that spurs a kind of change. In Being and Time, conscience is nothing like a voice that appears in a series of present experiences, not something that can be present then fall out of being into the forgotten. Vitally though, it is also not a persistently occurring experience. In a sense, authentic understanding “follows” the call, but not as something annexed to conscience, that occurs as conscience ends. Instead, authenticity and the call must be understood as part of the unity of experience that is Dasein. Essentially, the call of conscience has to do with the situation of Dasein itself, as part of Dasein and wrapped up in its movement as occurrence. Earlier we made reference to the nature of conscience as a “silent call”, to do not with a speaking but rather a hearing. This hearing was characterised as a kind of readiness, a waiting resolute in the face of something impending. What this indicates is that conscience is a kind of possibility for Dasein, part of its understanding nature and thus involved with its temporal ecstasies. However, conscience is not something that remains always as something “not yet”, as it comes over Dasein in a way. The “moment” of conscience, is something that comes as an abrupt arousal, with the character of a “jolt”. The temporal movement of conscience as described above is reminiscent of another ancient Greek concept, a specific kind of temporality that is always impending but equally sudden in its coming: the καιρός. 
The καιρός itself is no simple phenomenon either, but finds various expressions throughout the history of philosophy. From its beginnings as a kind of mortal blow, the term morphs and develops to indicate a kind of “opportunity”, not just the right action but also to do with timing. Later, in the works of Plato, the καιρός has evolved to come to mean something like the “right time”, in which something of importance can happen, and it essentially constitutes the basis of historical decision and action. Through Aristotle, the καιρός becomes tied to φρόνησῐς. Φρόνησῐς was a primary focus of Heidegger’s, and relates in many ways to his formulation of authenticity. In Aristotle, the καιρός represents that which stands on the boundary between the situation and “phronetic” enactment. As born out of the situation, and thus the history of the individual, the καιρός is always present in a way similar to that of conscience, and also comes abruptly and without warning in a moment without duration. The καιρός to Aristotle is a modifying force that lends itself to, or even demands, new activity. As aforementioned, in the writings of Paul, the καιρός refers to a specific temporality, similar to that of the authentic time established in the Second Division of Being and Time, and access to it is opened by “proclamation”: a special kind of call. In Aristotle and Paul both, the καιρός, like Heidegger’s conscience, represents that moment in which the individual takes heed of their situation, historical and deeply personal, and moves to engage their world in a way that takes the “truth” of their situation into account. It is an occurrence, bound up with and born out of the occurrence of Dasein itself, that has a modifying force. Already we can see that a description of conscience in temporal terms, by way of a comparison with the καιρός, makes more explicit the way that conscience might be situated within the unity of Dasein as temporal.

As aforementioned, Heidegger’s Dasein and its conscience are enigmatic subjects. The mystery of conscience is only made more pronounced by its, perhaps ironically, sudden appearance in Heidegger’s work in Being and Time. Little in his earlier works deals directly with conscience (these mentions are outlined below) making it difficult to establish the evolution of the idea in his works as a whole. Even more remarkable than this is the disappearance entirely of the idea from the thinking of Heidegger, as displayed in his later works, despite its truly pivotal position in the arc Being and Time. As a result of this, our analysis not only seeks to highlight the position of conscience within the overall movement of Dasein, but also to justify its position through an analysis of the works leading up to the 1927 text. What becomes clear in this is that the language he has used in his description of conscience resonates most deeply with his analysis found within the first part of The Phenomenology of Religious Life. Further, this specific text represents the meeting place of

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Heidegger’s treatment of theological ideas, such as conscience, and the unique temporality we will find fully expressed in *Being and Time*.

To begin this journey, however, we must begin with a discussion of the nature of discourse, as that in which Heidegger ultimately grounds his conception of conscience. We will then move to a discussion of the historical formulations of conscience, in order to clearly delineate that from which Heidegger’s formulation differs and the reasons why. This chapter leads inevitably into the discussion of the role of conscience in Paul, and then to Heidegger’s own analysis of those works. It is here that the interrelation between conscience and temporality begins to take shape, and an outline of the temporality of Dasein and then specifically conscience in *Being and Time*, follows. The most crucial chapters of the work come at the end, where an exploration of the concept of the καιρός reveals its striking similarities to the Heideggerian conception of conscience. In the exploration of this resemblance the specific temporality of conscience is then made even more explicit. It must be remembered that we are not attempting to make something new of conscience by drawing this comparison, that it may be delimited from the other structures of Dasein, but rather to further settle the phenomenon within the unity of Dasein itself. As Heidegger explains: “With regard to the fore-having of the whole of Dasein, which must necessarily be obtained, we must ask whether this being, as something existing, can become accessible at all in its being a whole.”9 Once conscience is more firmly established as temporal, the final movement of this work will be to attempt a brief explanation of the specific temporality of discourse, that is found only in its infancy in *Being and Time*. Ultimately our ambition is to reveal the place and importance of conscience in Heidegger’s lifetime of work as a whole.

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9 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p227 (emphasis added)
Chapter 2 - Conscience and Discourse

§ 2 - DISCOURSE AND CARE

In order to unpack the temporality of conscience we are tasked with the explication of an array of ideas all encapsulated within this single question. We are tasked at the least with describing the specific movement of conscience, which in itself is nothing straightforward, but at the most with the burden of exploring the nature of time itself. In addition, we cannot ignore the human being itself, as the figure that sits amidst these phenomena. Thus, in order to restrict our question somewhat, and to ensure coherence in our answer, it will be necessary to remain close to Being and Time, and strictly not to stray too far from Heidegger’s argument therein. The overarching ambition of Heidegger in Being and Time was one of unification: to bring those disparate elements of philosophy and experience together such they could be understood in their relation. This unity became understandable by tracing the movement of Dasein to a singular and most primordial phenomenon: Care. Heidegger outlines that “a primordial coherence is woven [within] which constitutes the totality of the structural whole that we are seeking.”

This coherence is born of the very concern that Dasein has for being, its own particular being and beings it encounters in the world.

Although described as primordial or “basic”, Heidegger explains that the phenomenon of care is nevertheless “not simple”. In Being and Time, care comes to be defined as “being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-as-being-together-with”, a compound phrase that speaks to the compound nature of the phenomenon itself. Care is ultimately concluded to be expressed as “temporality”, and Dasein thus labelled as an occurrence, a being “of” time. As temporal, care expresses itself in a variety of distinct phenomena each of which have their own distinct temporality. Of these, we must crucially understand three: Understanding [Verstehen], Attunement [Befindlichkeit] and Discourse. Understanding speaks to the “being-ahead-itself” of care, that is the futural aspect of concernful Dasein; its being concerned with its project as that which is not yet. Attunement in contrast speaks to the “already-being-in” of Dasein, which has to do with the nature of Dasein as already “delivered over to” or “thrust into” a world, a history and a people. Both of these represent important features of the temporality of Dasein, which will be further outlined later in this exposition. For now our focus will settle on the remaining phenomenon: discourse.

10 Heidegger, Being and Time, p185
Discourse has a specific character that is described by Heidegger as a “making present”, but this must not be confused with “the” present, a distinction that will also be made clear later on. Heidegger in his later works in particular will emphasise the role of discourse as having a “privileged constitutive function” for Dasein. The nature of this privilege is the starting point for our analysis.

The Greeks, and specifically Aristotle, identified the λόγος as that which comprised the fundamental determination of being human. The human being was designated by them as an animal endowed with reason (ζῷον λόγον ἔχον) later translated to be the “animal rationale”. Indeed to the Greeks, λόγος referred in part to the ability to use language, as the ability to speak, but more than this they saw it to represent the capacity to discover par excellence. Heidegger translates this definition of the human as “a living thing that has its genuine being-there in conversation and in discourse.”

His own initial position on the role of language is established through his analysis of Aristotle, and this is outlined in his 1921/22 lectures, now published under the title Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. In this he writes:

Insofar as they are objects of circumspection or indeed of that kind of understanding that in its autonomy simply looks at them, beings are addressed with respect to the way they look (εἰδῶ [idea, form]). The understanding that simply looks at beings explicates itself by addressing and discussing (λέγειν) these beings. The “what” of these objects that is addressed (λόγος [discourse]) and their look (εἰδῶ) are in a sense the same. And this means that what is addressed in λόγος makes up as such these beings in the authentic sense. With the objects it addresses, λέγειν takes beings in the beingness (οὐσία [substance]) of their look into true safekeeping.

What this passage elucidates is the visual orientation that Heidegger gives to his translation of Aristotle and his descriptions of knowledge. When we speak of “knowledge” in the setting of Being and Time we are simultaneously referring to the disclosing nature of Dasein, which refers also to truth (Wahrheit). Heidegger equates these ideas roughly with the Greek concept of ἀλήθεια. Ἀλήθεια, can be literally translated as the coming out of

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concealment of being, the bringing into light or out of the shadows, out of hiding. The term is a negative expression, an uncovering, and speaks for Heidegger of the primordially concealing or distorting nature of existence and being in general, from which Dasein must “wrest” the truth and actively make being available. In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the way that Dasein uncovers its world as a bringing things into its “lumen naturale”, its clearing [Lichtung], within which its world is illuminated. This making transparent or making manifest, is in part to do with the movement of λόγος (or discourse) as that which makes something visible [δηλοῦν].

Discourse is thus maintained by Heidegger as holding a privileged access to the entity, that is, as a primordial form of human life’s disclosedness. Thus, statements, and language in general, are considered an act of discovery, part of its unveiling nature that Dasein sets in motion in its relationship with beings in general. The function of language, throughout Heidegger’s lifetime of work, goes on to be described in a variety of different ways including as “actualising”, “unfolding”, “gathering”, “safekeeping” to name a few. In Being and Time, discourse is defined as the articulation of the intelligibility of being in general. Heidegger describes the process of coming into discourse as a type of collecting. He writes: “Lego, legein, Latin legere, is the same word as our lesen (to collect): gleaning, collecting wood, harvesting grapes, making a selection; "reading (lesen) a book" is just a variant of "gathering“ in the authentic sense.” This gathering has the capacity to bring beings into light, and the result is a certain power and “solidity” that Heidegger describes as an “emerging sway”, a “constancy” of presence that comes to be φύσις, being as such. Ultimately, discourse involves a “letting the object “appear” for itself (middle voice) from out of itself and as it is in itself.” Middle voice refers to a kind of verb form wherein the subject of the verb cannot be categorised as either agent or patient specifically. This is reflective of the description above, wherein he makes explicit that the “understanding… explicates itself.” As such, the kind of appearing made possible through discourse is a kind of coming forth that occurs as a result of a receptivity, not through any specific action of the object or subject involved in the bringing forth into unconcealment. However, as we can already see, the unconcealment specific to discourse is not simple, but its nature is of fundamental importance if we are to understand Heidegger’s formulation of conscience.

14 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, Trans. R Rojcewicz & A Schuwer (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997) p11
15 Heidegger, Being and Time, p129
16 Escudero, Heidegger on Discourse and Idle Talk, p6
17 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p131
18 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, p131-2

Conscience and Time
§ 3 - DISCOURSE AND THE PHENOMENON

“Phenomenon” comes from the Greek φαίνω which means “to bring into daylight” or “to place in brightness.” In Being and Time it is defined specifically as “what shows itself, the self-showing, the manifest.” Dasein is a being that: “sees”; is “circumspect; “unveils”, “uncovers and “brings to light”; it makes things “transparent”. This is not to say that Dasein uses its eyes to understand itself, but these words have been derived in many ways from the Greek ἀλήθεια by Heidegger. As McNeill outlines: “This apparent priority of vision, and its associated language, comes about not only (as Aristotle claims) because things appear to be most clearly delimited through vision, in terms of their outline, figure, or form, but also because they thereby appear most constantly present…only vision grants the possible apprehending of a relative constancy of presence, even while allowing for change.”

Heidegger describes vision as a way of “holding” things in their presence, maintaining them in a state of being manifest. What makes the λόγος (or discourse) distinct is that, despite its nature as disclosing, the kind of determinacy attributed to the vision of ἀλήθεια is not necessarily characteristic of its movement.

Strictly speaking, λόγος means “to let something be seen in its togetherness with something, to let something be seen as something” and as such it “acquires with this structure of synthesis the possibility of covering up.” This synthetic aspect of λόγος, but language in particular, has to do with the relational nature of language, particularly in the use of words as signifiers. As Coyne illustrates: “To give a sign is to reveal a totality in which various pieces of equipment have been assigned certain roles; to take something as a sign is to be led to this totality and to access it as a whole.” In bringing beings into voice out of the collecting aspect of discourse, that is applying to them a sign, Dasein is already involved in the opportunity for concealment. Thus, those that listen to what is spoken about in discourse “do not seize it as a unity, whether they have not yet heard or have already heard…do not get through to λόγος, even if they try to do so with words, ἔπεα.”

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19 Heidegger, Being and Time, p27


21 Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet, p159-60

22 Heidegger, Being and Time, p31

23 Coyne, Heidegger's Confessions, p135

24 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p136
Dasein is usually and maintained in the mode of being together-with innerworldly beings. In this world of beings Dasein also uncovers beings like itself, that have a specific effect on the Dasein and the nature of the interaction that occurs. This “being-with” others has the effect of bringing Dasein into the use of language, something that it is inherently familiar with in some way, as a result of a fundamental capacity that is discourse. Bringing into statement carries with it the possibility of covering up of the truth of being, as that which is said can be lost in misinterpretation, a covering up of disclosure made possible by its reliance on signification. Uncovering is no longer simply a matter of looking, as things can “show themselves as they are not in themselves” and only as they “seem” to be. As a being always to do with other beings like it, Dasein is always already discovering its world in a way that is related to others or influenced by others. Essentially, Dasein uncovers its world with “their” perspective as a kind of visor that determines its vision in a particular way. Heidegger explains that “factual life not only takes itself up and cares for itself as a significant occurrence standing before it and as worldly importance but also speaks the language of the world whenever speaking about itself.” The question for Heidegger is whether, therefore, Dasein is always relegated to a vision affected by partial or even complete concealment in its interaction with its world and itself. Is there a way of being of Dasein that might allow it to discourse in a different way, in order to uncover its world, and itself, in its primordial truth?

§ 4 - THE TRUTH OF BEING - THE POSSIBILITY OF AUTHENTICITY

The great difficulty for Heidegger is to identify and describe an access to that being that is always already involved with its own concealment in some way. Dasein is itself that which discloses; it is its disclosedness. As such, it is always already involved in uncovering its world and its self simultaneously. Heidegger explains that essentially Dasein is its world, and is thus thrown into and entangled in a world and itself from the outset. Dasein is defined in Being and Time as a being that constantly evades itself, unique in the fact that it is concerned with its being in its very being, but simultaneously ineluctably enigmatic, evading its own disclosure. Dasein turns away from itself, concerned about facing the ever looming anxiety [Angst] and uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit] natural to it, instead tranquilising itself in

25 Heidegger, Being and Time, p27

the every day talk of others. It, even from the outset, is accustomed to understanding itself from the soothing perspective of others, rather than the uncomfortable position of its own natural truth. The exact nature of this anxiety is complex, and explained more fully later on. Regardless, in turning away from itself Dasein is “buried over” in its being. Dasein could be said to “mishear” itself, but as Heidegger states: “A definite kind of being of Dasein lies in every failure to hear the call or in a mishearing of oneself”27.

Heidegger, in his earlier works, has already established that this mishearing is itself a positive phenomenon. This “claiming” to show itself might in fact be the only way that anything is available to us at all, and this type of showing is particularly pertinent to Dasein, as something that does not show itself.28 He writes: “An object that is always seen only in semi-darkness can be correctly understood in its semi-dark givenness only by a detour passing through an overly clear elucidation of it.”29 As a negative term, Dasein’s primordial capacity of ἀλήθεια in a sense presupposes a prior concealment (λήθη). We must here also take note of the greek term κρύπτεσθαι, again a middle voice term that describes the hiding of oneself that is natural to Dasein and its world. We can relate this term to Heraclitus, who famously states that "Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ", that nature is accustomed, or indeed loves, to be covered over.30 Heidegger explains that “what remains concealed in an exceptional sense…is not this or that being but rather…the being of beings.”31 The hiding is primordial to being, in the sense that it is the simultaneous quality necessary for the coming into light of disclosure. Although many of these ideas are not brought into discussion until Heidegger’s much later works, what is clear even in Being and Time is that this “covering up” of being to Dasein, and therefore itself, is an inherent component of the movement of Dasein. But are we, in establishing this, any closer to identifying the manner of access of Dasein to itself? Heidegger answers:

“Life is difficult in accord with the basic sense of its being, not in the sense of a contingent feature. If it is the case that factical life authentically is what it is in this

27 Heidegger, Being and Time, p268
28 Ibid p28
29 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle, p127
31 Heidegger, Being and Time, p33
being-hard and being-difficult, then the genuinely fitting way of gaining access to it and truly safekeeping it can only consist in making itself hard for itself.”

The technique of phenomenology that Heidegger utilises is described expressly as that which runs counter to covering up. The bewildering process of showing or unveiling that which is involved with and in essence the very covering over of that which it is, is a process he simply cannot explain fully in *Being and Time*. However, due to its attribute of potentially covering up as it discloses, discourse becomes of new interest. It is important to make explicit here that discourse is not always a linguistic communication between Dasein and others. It is not simply “words”, but rather an attunement-with or understanding-with that communicates. Discourse is an articulation of some intelligibility, not necessarily made explicit, but possibly expressed in a variety of different ways including, importantly, silence. Linguistic communication is only one type of discourse, and is related to a form of discourse Heidegger labels as signs [Zeichen]: “an item of equipment whose specific character consists in showing or indicating.” Early in Division One, testimony [Zeugnis] is distinguished from these signs. The act of testifying is an expression of oneself “primordially, unaffected by any theoretical interpretation and without aiming to propose any.” As Coyne remarks: “Testimony in this sense has a disclosive capacity analogous to that of signs. But rather than illuminating a totality of equipment, testimony consists in the self-expression that lights up the totality of Dasein’s Being…unlike the sign, attestation is identical with what it discloses.” The mode of access of Dasein to itself comes by way of a special form of this attestation [Bezeugung].

In brief summary, in being-with others, Dasein discourses in a mode that conceals its world and itself; existing and understanding itself with this distorted eye. The “they” silently disburdens Dasein of not only that which is present to it, but those choices that it might make of itself and its world: its possibilities. This is Dasein in inauthenticity. In order to be given the choice over its project, to be authentic, Dasein must reveal itself as itself in the midst of that into which it is thrown. Dasein can not lift itself out of its world to do so, instead, Dasein must make itself transparent to itself and notice itself in its inauthentic movement. This revelation cannot be clear and simple, as Dasein is none of these things itself, but equally

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32 Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle*, p113
33 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p76
34 Ibid p190
35 Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p136

Conscience and Time
that which is uncovered must be “true”. Heidegger resolves that Dasein can find itself, through a particular phenomenon classified as an attestation, that he labels as conscience.

Conscience, as attestation, discloses. It gives Dasein something to understand: specifically the possibility of taking over its own thrown ground. As something that conveys its specific kind of “information” in the manner unique to attestation, it is labelled by Heidegger as a call \( [\text{Ruf}] \), that summons \( [\text{anruft}] \) Dasein to itself. It is important to be clear that, to Heidegger: “We are not comparing this phenomenon with a call, but we are understanding it as discourse, in terms of the disclosedness of Dasein.”\(^{36}\) In simultaneity, Heidegger describes the movement of conscience as a call, yet distances it from anything like a call as the term is commonly used. The distinction Heidegger is trying to maintain is that the call is nothing like a communication from one Dasein to another, not a sign. It calls Dasein to something, but what it finds is nothing that can come into words. Thus, the call is ultimately “silent”.

Heidegger has already established in \textit{Being and Time} that discourse can express itself in silence. He writes: “The person who is silent can “let something be understood,” that is, one can develop an understanding more authentically than the person who never runs out of words…One who is mute still has the tendency to “speak”.”\(^{37}\) As established prior, there is an understanding that comes before anything like speech, primordial to language. The seat of this capacity is in a listening. Heidegger states that: “Listening to...is the existential being-open of Dasein as being-with for the other.”\(^{38}\) In listening, as open, Dasein is thrown into that to which it listens. Listening does not here refer to acoustic perception, but like language, is to do with the primordial capacity of discourse. Heidegger distinguishes a kind of “listening along to” of day-to-day communication from the more primordial hearing that he labels as hearkening \( [\text{horchen}] \), a hearing that understands. Heidegger writes: “human beings do hear, and they hear words, but in this hearing they cannot "hearken" to—that is, follow—what is not audible like words, what is not talk but \( \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\omicron \).”\(^{39}\) Specifically, “listening even constitutes the primary and authentic openness of Dasein for its ownmost potentiality of being.”\(^{40}\) Thus, Heidegger establishes that the mode of access of Dasein to itself is by way of this special kind of listening. The difficulty with this is that Dasein can only hear truly

\(^{36}\) Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p261

\(^{37}\) Ibid p159

\(^{38}\) Ibid p158

\(^{39}\) Heidegger, \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}, p137

\(^{40}\) Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p158
when it is already hearkening, and thus hearing must be “intrinsically directed” in advance toward Being.41

How, then, is Dasein to grasp its being from out of this self-propagating entangling darkness? The question becomes one of receptivity, a kind of making oneself available to hear the call of conscience, in advance. This is not to say that one prepares for the call, hears it, and then finds itself, in a kind of sequence of events. Instead, hearing the call of conscience is synonymous with this preparation. The being ready for the call is in fact the hearing of it, and the change in enactment of existence, that is the change to a movement as authentic, is the result of this making ready of Dasein. The hearkening for conscience, is conscience. It is not a discussion between parties, nothing like a conversation in which one calls and one listens. Instead its movement finds its basis in the very facet of Dasein from which it springs, that is discourse. The “listening out” of Dasein has to do with an awaiting or expecting of a certain possibility for being. We must recall that the being of Dasein is defined as “being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-as-being-together-with”, and the revelation of this being is in a sense a revelation of its possibility. Dasein is not brought forth as something objectively present, not as something to be communicated, but rather as the very ungraspable movement that it is. Brogan makes such a reading of conscience explicit in his essay Listening to the Silence: Reticence and the Call of Conscience in Heidegger’s Philosophy.

In Brogan’s reading of conscience, the preparation of Dasein for the call is bound up with a readiness for death. He draws our attention to a passage in Being and Time: “Anticipation discloses to existence that its extreme inmost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one’s clinging to whatever existence one has reached.”42 It is death that allows Dasein the opportunity to separate itself from its coverings in the world of being-with, to which it clings. Heidegger explains that: “In anticipating the indefinite certainty of death, Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising from its own there. Being-towards-the-end must hold itself in this very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty.”43 Thus, anticipation allows an opportunity for Dasein to reveal its lostness, by providing it with a perspective that is free of the coverings of the they, and instead capable of being itself in “passionate [leidenschaftlichen] anxious freedom toward death.”44 These concepts of death and anxiety will be dealt with in greater

41 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p137/140
42 Heidegger, Being and Time, p253
43 Ibid p254
44 Ibid p255
detail in further chapters. For now our task is to make explicit that for Dasein, uncovering itself is a shattering and disturbing experience.

Brogan makes clear that the choice to confront itself is not an easy one, as Dasein has a predilection for turning away from itself even when its self has been revealed. Thus, Dasein must make a choice “ahead of time”, and remain resolute in the decision if it is to succeed. However, this “choosing to choose…is not an actual choice in the specific sense of choosing this or that thing. It is rather a matter of recovering our capacity for choosing.” In making this choice, Dasein is not choosing to hear the call of conscience, but wanting to have a conscience and standing ready for it as “resolutely prepared”. Dasein cannot seek conscience as something that can be looked for but, as prepared, Dasein is receptive to itself in a particular way. What conscience represents is a kind of noticing made possible by the preparation, in which Dasein realises itself as not being itself, and is “called” to understand itself as itself in its there-ness, in its thrownness. Ultimately, being receptive to the call and itself is the way that conscience is heard by Dasein. Brogan explains: “Another way of saying this is to say that understanding the call is a matter of holding ourselves ready for and open to the call. The call of conscience can only be heard in holding ourselves out towards having a conscience as a possibility for being. That is, as was said earlier, “it is a matter of choosing to have a conscience, wanting to have a conscience rather than possessing it.”

§ 5 - THE CONFUSION OF CONSCIENCE

The question that the essay aims to now raise is of the appropriateness of the language that Heidegger chooses to describe the movement of conscience. Conscience [Gewissen] is a term in English and German both that carries with it a dense and complex history. The conscience described by Heidegger in Being and Time is explicitly distanced from any historical conception of conscience, as a voice or command. The conscience that we are familiar with in common usage is explored in the following chapter, but the point that must be made here is that in choosing the term conscience, Heidegger is attaching his interpretation to a considerable philosophical baggage. In his footnotes in Chapter 56, Heidegger situates his analysis within a wider debate about the nature and evolution of conscience throughout pagan and Christian history. Such a manoeuvre has the effect of,


46 Brogan, Listening to the Silence, p34

47 Ibid p39
perhaps unnecessarily, entwining his argument within a great deal of conceptual unclarity. Many theories already exist as to why Heidegger may have chosen this path. Some propose that Heidegger’s attempt is to ground the common or historical interpretations of conscience in a phenomenological approach, and thus to incorporate conscience within the overall activity of *Being and Time* as a destructive process. What this essay proposes is that in fact the decision to utilise the language of conscience is far more complex than this, and involves the evolution of Heidegger’s own thinking through a wide variety of philosophical influences.

Schalow in his book *Quest for the Sacred*, attempts to situate Heidegger’s argument within a Christian context. This move is not unreasonable in light of Heidegger’s early theological works and his extensive references to other Christian philosophers including Kant, Kierkegaard and Eckhart to name a few. Schalow makes the argument that Heidegger, "having been struck by Eckhart's enigmatic fusing of the logos with the soul's innermost responsiveness as the "little spark" of conscience, Heidegger had discovered the path to describe conscience in phenomenological terms, namely, as the silent call of care."48 Such a position is based upon the assumption that Eckhart’s work on the idea of silence was a major influence on Heidegger’s particular emphasis of listening as a ground for the meaning of being. Eckhart’s sermons make reference to a the role of silence in man: 'First we will take the words: 'In the midst of silence there was spoken within me a secret word’…Yet in that ground [of the soul] is the silent ‘middle’."49 The silent middle here is linked by Schalow to the “soundlessness of uncanniness” and the “stillness” of the Dasein that is called and calling in the movement of conscience.50 Schalow ultimately comes to argue that “Heidegger’s description of conscience retrieves primal Christianity as the attempt to locate the abysmal character of the self in the silence of language.”51 Such an argument is of tremendous interest from the theological perspective, but the “little spark” of the soul to which Eckhart refers carries little that would be capable of being situated into the greater argument of *Being and Time*. Thus, the theological aspect of conscience does little to clarify its nature in *Being and Time*, especially given that Heidegger actively and quite radically distances himself from these interpretations.

48 Schalow, *Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred*, p61


50 Schalow, *Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred*, p61

51 Ibid p54
However, to exclude any theological influence on Heidegger’s thought (particularly in respect to conscience) is naive, as Heidegger himself is clearly conscious of and interested in the content of theology, albeit ultimately from a primarily phenomenological perspective. Much of the language Heidegger attaches to his conscience is manifestly theological, from the use of attestation, witness, announcement and even λόγος itself. Logos, in the Christian world was almost explicitly the word of one being alone, that is God. It came to be the word of Jesus Christ in his coming, and this itself transformed the idea of the internal mind and voice of man. Heidegger himself notes that to the Christian: “the announcement of the Cross is Christ Himself; He is the logos of salvation, of eternal life, ‘logos zoes’.”52 Schalow poses that one might overlook the religious side to Heidegger's analysis of conscience, because in Being and Time it appears to include a link to φρόνησις and action that is situated firmly within Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle around this time.53 However, to overlook the complex interplay between Heidegger’s analysis of the Greeks, in particular Aristotle and Plato, and Paul with whom he is grappling in the lead up to writing Being and Time, is to simplify his analysis of conscience too far. In truth, to Heidegger, these schools are not disparate, but represent a continuum of humanity’s attempt to grapple with the nature of existence. Heidegger explains: “Heraclitus’s teaching on logos is taken as a predecessor of the logos mentioned in the New Testament, in the prologue to the Gospel of John. The logos is Christ. Now because Heraclitus already speaks of the logos, the Greeks arrived at the very doorstep of absolute truth—namely, the revealed truth of Christianity.”54

What should be clear from the analysis above is that when we speak of conscience as it appears in Being and Time we are not describing something straightforward nor easily situated into the history of the term. This difficulty raises the possibility of conscience falling away into, or at least seeming to stand in, obscurity. As obscured in this way, conscience lies in apparent disconnect from those other ideas found more strongly unified in Being and Time. The nature of listening as preparation blurs the boundaries between the concepts of discourse and time, and makes little sense in the setting of the common historical usages of these terms. This essay will thus seek to clarify the nature of conscience, such that it can be more robustly situated within the greater argument of Being and Time. In order to do so it must attempt to unravel the way Heidegger’s ideas may have developed. This process will rely heavily on the interconnections made visible in the language used by Heidegger, but also on his descriptions of the movement of Dasein in general, in his explications prior to

52 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p143
53 Schalow, Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred, p61
54 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p134
Ultimately, the purpose of the essay will be to situate the listening specific to conscience within the source of the unity of Being and Time itself, that is the temporality of Dasein as care.
§ 6 - THE VULGAR VERSUS THE EXISTENTIAL

In the last chapter we established the specific relationship of Heidegger’s conception of conscience with the primordial phenomenon of Dasein that is its capacity for discourse. This delivered us to a phenomenon specifically without content, a silent call, that has to do entirely with a listening and not at all to do with a vocal or linguistic expression. This characterisation is so vastly different to the idea of conscience familiar to the western world, that it seems in many ways to be describing something entirely new. The novelty of Heidegger’s conscience is made even more intriguing by the fact that the term vanishes entirely from his writings after Being and Time, despite the pivotal role it plays in the arc of this text. Heidegger himself distinguishes his formulation from the historical, labelling his own as an “existential interpretation” and the more familiar as the “vulgar interpretations”. He recognises that the two conceptions are not obviously correlated:

“Conscience is a call of care from the uncanniness of being-in-the-world that summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-guilty. We showed that wanting-to-have-a-conscience corresponded to understanding the summons. Both of these characterisations are not immediately harmonious with the vulgar interpretation of conscience.”

The primary question we wish to address in this chapter is whether these interpretations share anything fundamental at all, and secondary to this, why Heidegger has chosen this language to describe a phenomenon that shares so little with its namesakes. In order to answer these questions we must turn to Heidegger’s analysis of the “vulgar” interpretations, in an attempt to unravel the tendrils that intertwine the two conceptions. In so doing, we hope to elucidate the passage along which Heidegger’s own thought may have developed, to the point that it emerges in Being and Time. Any analysis of conscience cannot ignore those conceptions found throughout the history of Christianity, but also it etymological ties to the ancient Greek. As aforementioned, in his footnote to chapter 56 Heidegger himself makes reference M. Kahler, A. Ritschl and H.G. Stoker, individuals who had attempted to trace the etymology of Gewissen. In addition to these, we will draw reference specifically from the works of P. Bosman, P. Sorabji and P. Strohm, who each undertake a similar historical analysis of the word and its meanings and derivations.

35 Heidegger, Being and Time, p277
§ 7 - THE ETYMOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE

Heidegger’s use of language, particularly in *Being and Time*, is unique. The ideas he attempts to explicate are steeped in history which opens them to misinterpretation. As such, his use of language relies on a precision, but also a “plurivocity” of terms, which in a sense allows him to secure his ideas within the annals of human thought, but equally to give them a freedom from the tethers of the history of philosophy that threaten to level them down. To Heidegger, philosophical “understanding” consists not merely in taking up the past in order to accrue knowledge, but rather in repeating in an original manner what is understood in the past, in terms of and for the sake of one’s very own situation. The pursuing of the various directions in the meaning and uses of a word is the potential means of reaching the respective object meant in each use. He writes: “Such a focus on plurivocity [that which is said in many ways] is not a mere poking around in the meanings of isolated words but rather an expression of a radical tendency to gain access to the meant objects themselves and to make available the motivational source of the different ways they are meant.”

Heidegger utilises the term conscience [*Gewissen*] despite its complex history, and we must assume given the care and attention he gives to linguistic expression in the rest of *Being and Time* that this is purposeful. Given the vast array of uses and meanings of this term through history, the question we must answer is to “what” Heidegger is pointing in his use of it, and perhaps more importantly, to “whom”.

To begin, we must remind ourselves that although this analysis and much of the secondary literature is written in English, and based upon English translations, that Heidegger himself wrote in German. Thus, as we seek to derive the historical divisions of conscience we must delineate between the English term “conscience” and the German *Gewissen*. Thankfully, as we will see, both words share a similar lineage and carry with them a great deal of common associations. For now we will trace the origins of *Gewissen* alongside “conscience”, differentiating them only when such a distinction reveals itself to be significant. *Gewissen* importantly perhaps, has gewiss [certain] as one of its derivatives and hence implies a way of becoming-certain [*Gewisswerden*]. In this way *Gewissen* has semantic ties that distinguishes it from “conscience”. Here we should also take note of the relationship between “conscience” and the term “consciousness”. These terms were indivisible concepts in English until the 17th century, and likely represent an attribution of Eastern thought to the Western vocabulary.

In French, conscience can be directly translated to either of these English terms, only to be delineated by the context of its use, adding further

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56 Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle*, p115

to the complexity. We do not see a similar word to consciousness, however, emerging from the German *Gewissen*. Thus, the Heideggerian conscience, although to do with our very selves, cannot be simply relegated to a reformulation of consciousness.

Consensus is that “conscience” first finds its roots in the Greek σύνοιδα word group. As a verb, this root is expressed in various forms from the 6th Century BCE. Its Latin cousin *conscientia*, seemingly shares more with the English term than the German, but etymologically it is also an offspring, rather than a cousin, of this σύνοιδα group of words. Bosman writes: “the derivatives in Western Languages are, via Latin, morphologically dependent on the Greek forms...[but] the dependence reaches beyond morphology to include conceptuality.”\(^{58}\) Σύνοιδα is utilised initially as a verb, as an activity undertaken by the individual. Loosely it can be translated as ‘to be conscious of’, as σύνοιδα was utilised in the context of being conscious of something or someone. Σύνοιδα and its derivations are composite verbs and can be broken into two components. First, “σύν-“ taken alone strictly means “with”, and when taken into a composite means “any kind of union, connection or participation with a thing.”\(^{59}\) The root word “-οιδα” is itself the perfect indicative active form of the verb εἰδῶ, which roughly translates as “to know” or “to understand”. εἰδῶ is closely related to the word εἶδος which refers to that which is seen: form, shape. Essentially, the originary conscience was a capacity to see an idea, an understanding, that one shares with others.

Rather paradoxically, what was delineated as a sharing of understanding with another, σύνοιδα and its derivatives can take a reflexive, as well as a non-reflexive form: the subject can “know with” another (non-reflexive), or simply with one’s self (reflexive). But how does the latter differ from simply knowing by oneself? If we take the non-reflexive form, one might say for instance that: “I know with others that the sky is blue.” This kind of knowledge is shared directly with others as something that both parties can and do explicitly know. The meaning of the reflexive form is less clear. In his apology, Plato’s Socrates famously states: ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ομιχρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷσοφὸς ὤν.\(^{60}\) Roughly translated this means: “For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little.” This use of the reflexive term raises an important question about the nature of the ancient conscience. Does Socrates know of himself that which others also know: that he is not wise? Or does Socrates know with himself that he is not wise? The reflexive verb in this setting

\(^{58}\) Phillip Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul* (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2003) p4

\(^{59}\) Ibid p19

would imply that indeed he is knowing this ‘with’ himself, but this implies a sense of division or separation within Socrates.

We are alerted here to the Socratic δαίμων, his kind of guiding spirit, a conception of which can be traced back as far as Heraclitus. The δαίμων of Socrates and Heraclitus has specifically no relation to the σύνοιδα word group. In his famous Fragment 119, Heraclitus remarks: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων [Man’s character is his daemon]. In this setting, δαίμων is often translated as fate, rather than an internal spirit or being, to which it is translated more often in modernity. Martin Kähler, establishes in his vital work Das Gewissen that the δαίμων only has bearing on what Socrates considered to be a very personal calling as philosopher. To attempt an explication of this issue is beyond the scope of this study, but what is clear is that the “with-ness” of conscience is extremely complex, and at odds with Heidegger’s formulation. Heidegger describes his call as one from Dasein to Dasein, the implication being a kind of division within Dasein that allows this phenomenon to occur. But we must recall that for Heidegger Dasein is always and necessarily a whole, and this unity of Dasein as care does not permit of division in such a way. Such a division is more reminiscent of Dasein in inauthenticity, when it is dispersed, lost and entangled in the “they”. This dichotomy elucidates a clear difficulty that exists in Heidegger’s use of the term conscience, even at a most basic and fundamental level. Dasein is not “with” itself in any explicit sense in Being and Time, and the implication that it is in many ways draws the reader into an interpretation of the phenomenon that leads us away from understanding of Dasein as unified.

It is not until much later in history, in the first Century BCE, that the substantive form of the σύνοιδα group of words emerges, that is: συνείδος. It was in the works especially of Paul and Philo, in the first Century BCE, that this form came into its own, and perhaps along with a shift in its meaning. However, there was some evidence of its beginning to emerge much earlier than this in the writings of Demosthenes, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Diodorus Siculus. These usages of συνείδος were sporadic, appearing around ten times in over three centuries in writings available today. Many current scholars agree that the substantive form may have come into being in colloquial use. This is substantiated by its somewhat sudden appearance in the first century BCE. The letters of Paul seem to assume the reader is fully aware of the conception, and his use holds many

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63 Bosman, Conscience and Time, p50
meanings as given without need for explanation. Essentially, what we see historically is a gradual migration from the pagan use of conscience as something close to self-knowledge into a broader, more complex and evinced concept. Conscience transformed from a verb, a simply mental action that one happened to be capable of performing, into something of an entity, a necessary human experience that became delineated from other mental faculties in a very significant, but decidedly non-specific way. It is also here that the “otherly” character of conscience is made distinct, as an entity and no longer a capacity of the human. This division is held within the concept of conscience through its evolution, particularly into the Christian conception, where conscience is defined as the voice of God.

Eckstein, undoubtedly an important influence on Heidegger’s religious thinking, brings substance to conscience as a means for understanding its various features. From the time of evolution of the substantive form of συνείδος through to its usage in Paul, conscience holds a character of substance, and Eckstein interprets this as the presence of some kind of inner entity evidenced by the call. This entity has the capacity to judge, control and make aware. To Eckstein, such a formulation does not induce a change to conscience itself, but allows a rejuvenation of that moral-religious consciousness that is limited when one attempts to simplify conscience into a descriptive term. This explains, in part, why the substantive form may have resonated so deeply with Paul, as illustrated by his writings and use of the term. However, as an entity distinct from Dasein, conscience is again distanced from its unity that was made possible through care. Heidegger makes it clear that such a reading is not in accordance with his own, as Dasein does not encounter itself as something objectively present, and it is not that case that we are justified in looking for the caller of conscience outside of Dasein. The indefiniteness, as we will see, is a vital component of Heidegger’s formulation. Regardless, one thing now is clear and that is that an examination of the various historical formulations of conscience seems to bring confusion rather than clarity to the phenomenon as we find it described in Being and Time.

§ 8 - THE GUILTY CONSCIENCE

Other early examples of the use of the σύνοιδα group are more commonly descriptions of a kind of “knowledge”. Early in its use the σύνοιδα group is found also in affirmative statements, or statements lacking value judgements. For example, in Plato we

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64 Heidegger, Being and Time, p265
65 Ibid p264
find Alcibiades exclaim: καὶ ἔτι γε νῦν σύνοιδ ἐμαυτῷ ὅτι εἰ ἐθέλομι παρέχειν τὰ ὑπά [Even now I am still conscious that if I consented to lend him my ear]. Bosman goes as far as to say that: “the content of the knowledge shared with the self can be divergent as the content of any other kind of knowledge.” This said, conscience of something wrong or lacking in the individual is certainly the more common usage of the ancient term, especially as it evolves throughout the following centuries to involve a sense of moral insufficiency. This idea of a ‘guilty conscience’ becomes, in the Christian tradition, the primary (if not the exclusive) sense of the term. Heidegger is certainly aware of this, and purports his task in Being and Time to be to reveal this ‘guilt’ as an existential, fundamental trait of Dasein, not something applied to it from some place external but coming into being necessarily from Dasein itself.

As aforementioned, Heidegger makes reference to the works of Martin Kähler in his description of conscience. Kähler writes specifically in support of the conception of conscience in primarily moral terms. To him, σύνοιδα is not primarily a knowing something of oneself, but rather a judging of one’s conduct in a moral sense. In many ways, Kähler has assumed a role for guilt in conscience and read it into his etymological examination. The term ‘guilt’, shares issue in the moral realm with the legal. The Latin offspring term conscientia, was championed by Cicero, who is by far the most prolific author on this topic in the Latin language, mentioning the idea 77 times in his surviving writings. He writes: “There is indeed a true law, right reason [recta ratio], agreeing with nature, diffused among all, unchanging, everlasting, which calls to duty by commanding, deters from wrong by forbidding; which, however, neither commands nor forbids the good in vain, nor affects the wicked by commanding or forbidding.” The legal sense of guilt, as the transgression of a specific law, is directly opposed to Heidegger’s formulation which is something impossible to be shared. Further, conscientia is more often than σύνοιδα associated with terms such a bona, praeclara or even optima and is therefore not at all bound up with guilt necessarily. The description of guilt that we find in Being and Time is deliberately distanced from this formulation.

Heidegger defines guilt as something necessarily non-relational, that is not dependent on a shared judgement between Dasein and others. The common “guilt” outlined above is instead based on a primary indebtedness, made possible only on the basis of a

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67 Bosman, Conscience in Philo and Paul, p75

68 Cicero by way of Lactantius, Divine Institutes, Trans. A Bowen and P Garnsey (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2003) 6.8/p70
primordial being guilty. This primordial guilt has to do with the temporality of Dasein, and specifically with its character as a “not-yet”. Dasein, as a result of its “understanding” nature, exists as that which it is not yet, the interpretation of which is grounded always in that which it already is. As always already thrown, Dasein is “never to gain power over one’s ownmost being from the ground up.” Dasein can be its own ground but can never get “behind itself” and gain power over its ground, beyond its capacity to throw itself into itself and its situation. Such a description ultimately does little to assuage our confusion, and leaves open far more questions about the “dialectic of negation” to which Heidegger professes that it points. Such an undertaking is far beyond the scope of this piece. Instead, what this discussion reveals to us is the importance to Heidegger of grounding guilt within the movement of Dasein as temporal, and ultimately into the unity of Dasein as care. The introduction of the terms guilt and conscience into the temporal unity of the whole of Being and Time certainly is interesting, but in doing so Heidegger is opening his argument to a obfuscation and semantic complexity that requires an extensive justification, that could have been possibly avoided with the use of different language.

§ 10 - CONSCIENCE IN PAUL THE APOSTLE

Any discussion of the concept of Christian conscience cannot help but come back to Paul. Of all the biblical writers, Paul mentions conscience the most, with 21 separate references throughout his works. Kähler aligns Paul’s use with what he categorises as an “anthropoligical” use of the term, and distances it from anything like the “vox dei” with which it later comes into line. His determination of conscience aligns more closely with the Latin conscientia as a substantive internal judge of moral actions. However, given that Paul authored his letters in Greek, and exclusively used the term συνείδησις, we can already see the way the concept has become complicated. Heidegger, as we will later see, looks in great detail at Paul’s writings in his early philosophical life, but in this work places very little emphasis on an investigation of conscience. The reason for this is unclear, but interestingly much of the language Heidegger uses in his description of conscience is echoed in his analysis of Paul. To Paul, conscience is something that each individual has of their own; he describes “my conscience”, “your conscience”, “conscience of another” and “conscience by every speaker.” Paul writes: “Any man who is an unbeliever, or who takes no part in your ministrations, should enter the place of meeting, he is convicted in conscience by every speaker, he feels himself judged by all.” Paulian conscience displays that marked obscurity

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69 Heidegger, Being and Time, p273

70 The New Oxford Annotated Bible. Ed. M Coogan (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 Cor 14
as to the nature of its “shared-ness”, as a phenomenon shared both with others and the self simultaneously.

Regardless, Paul’s conscience is clearly something with which the individual must contend, as something that follows along or “bears witness” to the conduct of the individual, gives testament and as such condemns the individual in their actions. Paul writes: “For when the Gentiles, having not the Law, do by nature the works of the Law...since they manifest the work of the Law written in their hearts; while their conscience also bears its witness, and their inward thoughts answering one to the other, accuse, or else defend them.”\textsuperscript{71} Sorabji describes Paulian conscience as something that co-witnesses (symmartyrei).\textsuperscript{72} It is not the case that conscience is the unwavering law itself, but rather it is that which reveals our possession of it in our hearts. From his earliest study with Carl Braig, as Ott points out, Heidegger was alert to the phenomenon of conscienta as “self-awareness”, as the birth of self-understanding which reflects the uniqueness of one’s relation to God.\textsuperscript{73} The purpose of this analysis is not to be exhaustive, but instead simply to make clear that, as with the ancient Greek conception, very little correlation can be found between Paul’s interpretation of conscience and Heidegger’s, beyond some of the language he uses in their description.

We might thus think to seek out answers in thinkers more contemporary to Heidegger to substantiate his use of the term. Heidegger himself examines a myriad of thinkers who bring this idea into discussion. Heidegger’s commentary on the works of Jerome and Aquinas, and their descriptions of conscience, bears little resemblance to Heidegger’s description in \textit{Being and Time}. Heidegger himself in \textit{The Concept of Time} makes note of Yorck’s conception, but this is described in a way radically opposed to Heidegger’s, as something that can come into “total externalisation”.\textsuperscript{74} We may seek clarification in the moralistic-idealistic formulations of exponents like Kant, Hegel and Hartmann but this brings us no closer. In many ways the closest we come to Heidegger’s formulation is in the naturalistic and sociological theories of conscience, such as those of Darwin, Nietzsche and particularly Freud.\textsuperscript{75} Ultimately, however, this mode of analysis brings us into greater confusion rather than clarity.

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\textsuperscript{71} \textit{The New Oxford Annotated Bible}. Ed. M Coogan (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007) Romans 2:14-16

\textsuperscript{72} Richard Sorabji, \textit{Moral Conscience through the Ages: Fifth Century BCE to the Present} (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) p14


\textsuperscript{74} Heidegger, \textit{The Concept of Time}, p10

\textsuperscript{75} Bosman, \textit{Conscience in Philo and Paul}, p20
In many ways the issue we have uncovered speaks to our earlier discussion of plurivocality. Bosman takes up this idea describing it as a debate, that he labels the “Gewordenes-Seiendes” debate. The “Gewordenes” position holds that a linguistic form of expression spontaneously arises when that particular stage of human evolution is reached where the phenomenon can come into existence. The “Seiendes” point of view supposes that the referent is a constant reality but that the linguistic development may be traced until a single concept or symbol represents the phenomenon or referent in its totality. What is notable about this debate is that both positions hold that the role of the language in either case is to make available a phenomenon to expression. The idea that the plurivocal nature of a term indicates some kind of underlying “truth” of a meant object is Heidegger’s own, which justifies our attention to the detail here. But little of the analysis to this point has justified a temporal reading of conscience, that we nominated as the goal at the outset. However, if we look closely at the language Heidegger utilises to describe conscience, we see a great deal of correlation with his own examination of Paul, clearly a vital player in the development of Heidegger’s thinking. The next chapter will move into an interpretation of Heidegger’s work, *The Phenomenology of Religion*, where a path to the unification of conscience and Dasein’s primordial temporality is brought to light.

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36 Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul*, p43
Chapter 4 - Heidegger and Paul the Apostle

The previous chapter makes clear that in utilising the language of conscience, Heidegger is involving his analysis in a complex history. The “vulgar” conceptions are identified by Heidegger as “levelling down” the phenomenon of conscience into something “ontologically suspect”. However, the technique by which he arrives at his own formulation of it in *Being and Time* is not made explicit there, and the question of our own access to the phenomenon proper remains unanswered. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to better understand the nature of Heidegger’s ontological process. We seek a way to understand how theological or philosophical ideas similar to conscience might be uncovered in their authentic sense. The path to this revelation, that is a deconstruction of theological principles, will come by way of an analysis of Heidegger’s own deconstruction outlined in *The Phenomenology of Religion*. This text outlines the technique that Heidegger has used to isolate within the theological that which he sees as levelled down in theory, and thus to form an understanding of the place of Heidegger’s conscience within his thinking as a whole. It is also here that the possibility of a temporal reading of conscience comes to light.

§ 11 - HEIDEGGER’S THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION

The “vulgar” interpretations of conscience reveal the strong connections of the term with theology, but what Heidegger’s conception shares with these remain at large. Heidegger does not claim in *Being and Time* that he is drawing inspiration from theology, but does point to his own method as a Destruktion, an attempt to arrive at those primordial experiences that determine our understanding of Being. Ben Vedder argues that it is clear from the evolution of Heidegger’s thought that he is undertaking to radically reformulate those ideas into which he was born. Heidegger’s father, a sexton, raised the family in a house next to a church and fostered within his family a strong sense of God and Heidegger himself (in a letter written to Karl Jaspers) indicates it was his intention to “explicate the religious tradition in which he had been raised.”

But Heidegger was not content with only a description of his world, and Vedder states that to Heidegger, “the task of the thinker is to clarify and explicate the place of the holy. The question of god in relation to the question of

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being, and the question of the holy in its relation to the question of being, need to be strictly separated.”

In a sense, Heidegger’s approach became a stripping away of the religious from theology, an attempt to bring about an atheistic theology of sorts. Heidegger puts it bluntly that “he does not know god; he can only describe god’s absence.” This is not a way of rejecting a sense of God or spirituality, but as he explains in *Identity and Difference* that “the god-less thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god as *causa sui*, is thus perhaps closer to the divine God.” Finding the “real truth” in theology does not mean to turn religion into science, as to do so is to prevent religion from emerging to the philosopher “from religion itself qua religion.” Heidegger explains that blind subscription to any set of ideas is unphilosophical, and approaching philosophy with any preset ideas not born out of experience itself is essentially dogmatic. Heidegger’s task is thus also to “liberate” philosophy from its “secularization” to a science. To elevate science to the ultimate method of investigation, and to treat its principles as eternal and therefore necessarily and universally valid, is to ignore the fact that even science is dependent on the “particular, factual-historical situation of science.”

The goal of any philosophical enquiry to Heidegger, and indeed in general, might be said to be to describe experience “truly”. However, any claims of truth or originality, to Heidegger, depend on their historical “location” and the hermeneutic situation. We cannot discard the effects of this situation simply by being aware of it. A “detached” study even of the history of philosophy or things in general, is already a treatment of objects in time, implying from the outset a temporality, a becoming, as a result of their “historical context”. Rather, any such study reveals anew the fact that the human being, in their reaching for “authentic” life, is engaged already in a struggle for originality, one that “incessantly accompanies, like a shadow, each attempt at a new creation.” This specific struggle cannot be overcome, but instead must be clearly understood, by grounding an understanding of the

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78 Ibid p8
79 Vedder, *Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion*, p4
80 Martin Heidegger, *Early Writings, GA 1:2–3*: “so wird begreiflich, daß in seiner Erkenntnistheorie das Realitätsproblem keinen Platz finden konnte.”
81 Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, p27
82 Ibid p10-11
83 Ibid p31
84 Ibid p37
“historical problem” from the position of factical life, rather than the other way around.85 The human being, instead of in history, is defined as a kind of “object in becoming, standing within time” and thus itself has the characteristic of being historical.86 Heidegger describes this reconception as a “Copernican act”, as a revolutionary and “destructive” event.

To Heidegger, this being historical comes to mean the “becoming, emergence, proceeding in time, a characterization that befits a reality.”87 This ambiguous definition requires a clarification that will go on to dominate the majority of Heidegger’s early works. Heidegger’s method is to approach a study of history from “things” [Gegenstand], not objects, but rather from that which is experienced directly in factical life: “Red, color, sensual quality, experience, genus, species, essence, are things.”88 These “things” are not the theoretical conceptions these words signify, not something “objectively”, nor “subjectively” defined, but instead moments of understanding that arise from out of the living present. Heidegger calls for a return to the phenomena themselves. Thus, the proper action of philosophy is not to place a phenomenon in a formal category as a thing, but instead to accept that there are different ways that we can characterise that which comes into being at all. Heidegger states that such a stance “is opposed to science in the highest degree.”89 Where science attempts to establish an exact methodology, where correctness is in some sense “guaranteed” at the outset, phenomenology attempts to understand that which occurs from out of the enactment of world as such.

What Heidegger is seeking to establish is a turn from the object-historical complex to the enactment-historical situation, derived from the phenomena of factical life experience. Even time itself can be said to depend first on its expression in experience rather than as something inflicted upon experience secondarily. Heidegger explains, “the time of factical life is to be gained from the complex of enactment of factical life itself, and from there the static or dynamic character of the situation is to be determined.”90 Thus, even the present itself must be seen as historical, which is nothing else but an “ebb and flow of the becoming of being which rests in its midst.”91 Thus, when Heidegger returns to the problem at hand, that is a way to understand theology “truly”, he does not seek to eradicate or ignore the

83 Ibid p35
86 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, p35
87 Ibid p32
88 Ibid p59
89 Ibid p63
90 Ibid p93
91 Ibid p44
knowledge that is the “modern history of religion”. Rather, he moves to approach its content as explications of the lives of the Christian individuals, who to Heidegger live “temporality as such”. In order to understand the “knowledge” of theology he looks to the movement and temporality expressed in the explication of the individual’s own factical experience. However, even in this he must hold in mind the ever present influence of his own experience that determines what is seen. Only in this way is it possible to reach a determination of a thing, a phenomenon, in the way that it “is”. This is Heidegger’s phenomenology, his “Destruktion” and the source of his ontological process.

§ 12 - THE PAULIAN EXPERIENCE

The next step in our analysis is to attempt to understand the way that Heidegger himself has deconstructed Paul’s explication. This process will be essentially phenomenological, and represents Heidegger’s attempt to unveil Paul’s experience of world and his situation. Heidegger outlines his ambition directly:

“Why exactly the Christian religiosity lies in the focus of our study, that is a difficult question; it is answerable only through the solution of the problem of the historical connections. The task is to gain a real and original relationship to history, which is to be explicated from out of our own historical situation and facticity. At issue is what the sense of history can signify for us, so that the “objectivity” of the historical “in itself” disappears. History exists only from out of a present. Only thus can the possibility of a philosophy of religion be begun.”

Paul represents to Heidegger the exemplar or “originary” Christian, and thus is a key point of reference for understanding of the idea of conscience. The term “Christian” applies in this setting to a very particular, and rather unusual kind of relationship. Paul, like most Christians, was writing in a time years distant from the “death” of Christ. Thus, when Paul speaks of Christ he is describing an “historical” relationship, that is one that involves a position toward something that has already occurred. The “reality” or “world” (Heidegger’s translations for the term αἰόν) for Paul is of a nature different to that of the non-believer. In this reality: “The present time has already reached its end and a new [αἰόν] has begun since the death of Christ.”

This is not to relegate the present to the past, but to say that this “ending” is a component and vitally interwoven part of any present of which we may speak.

92 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, p124

93 Ibid p69
This brings us to the concept of the παρουσία, which Heidegger defines as “the appearing again of the already appeared Messiah,” which we again must be careful not to interpret literally, as Heidegger himself warns.\textsuperscript{94} The παρουσία is the “second coming” of the Messiah, which represents essentially the end of the world. It is a concept closely related to the ἔσχατον [the “last”] and the καιρός [the right time] - which are important concepts to keep in mind for later. The παρουσία is something not yet present, and the Christian position toward it is a sense of “awaiting”, but as Heidegger states: “The structure of Christian hope, which in truth is the relational sense of παρουσία is radically different from all expectation.”\textsuperscript{95} Paul addresses the παρουσία not in terms any kind of “objective” time nor the “when” of something to come, but rather as something imminent, something already upon the Christian in a particular way. Heidegger points out: “The entire question for Paul is not a cognitive question…He does not say, “at this or that time the Lord will come again”; he also does not say, “I do not know when he will come again”—rather he says: “You know exactly…”\textsuperscript{96} To Heidegger’s Paul, the knowledge of the παρουσία is one that the Christian knows with themselves, a deeply personal and unsharable certainty of the already coming of the end.

This deeply personal faith and relationship to the παρουσία we will cautiously label as “authentic faith”. In authentic faith, the question of the “when” of the παρουσία is brought back to a dependence on the life of the Christian themselves. The problem for the life of the Christian then is one of enactment, and more specifically of comportment: how to live in the knowledge of that which is already at an end. The imminence of the ending robs the Christian of any security, and this is of primary importance to the conduct required of them. Heidegger describes Paul’s answer to the question of the “when” of the παρουσία as “an urging to awaken and to be sober.” It is not the case that one should be passive and mourn something lost, nor that one should burden oneself overly with worry about the concrete detail of day-to-day dealings. The question for the Christian is more personal, and has to do with “the enactment of factual life experience in each of its moments.”\textsuperscript{97}

§ 13 - CONSCIENCE AND THE ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ

This essay proposes that for Paul and Heidegger both, the conscience lies upon a kind of boundary between the “when” of the παρουσία and the “how” of self-comportment.

\textsuperscript{94} Heidegger, \textit{The Phenomenology of Religious Life}, p101

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid p71

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid p103

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid p106 - emphasis added
The nature of this boundary will be clarified with greater detail in Chapter 8 of this essay. In *Being and Time*, conscience lies on the boundary between authentic and inauthentic existence and temporality. For Heidegger’s Paul it is a comportment, impregnated with the constant presence of a guiding conscience, that retains the individual in a position toward the \( \pi \alpha \rho \alpha \mu \nu \theta \alpha \alpha \) and the specific temporality it demands. To both, conscience has to do with enactment appropriate to the “situation”, it is a coming to be aware of the situation in such a way that comportment becomes an immediate issue. Both see the conscience as radically individual, that is personal and historical. At once we see how, instead of semantically, these ideas are linked much more fundamentally, the closeness of which is driven by the temporal sense that they share. However, as aforementioned, the language chosen by Heidegger in his description of conscience in *Being and Time* was done so deliberately and within it the ties to his interpretation of the history of the phenomenon will be found.

Although deeply individual, the experience of the Christian is not isolated, but its specific temporality is “co-experienced”, such that a relationship to the \( \pi \alpha \rho \alpha \mu \nu \theta \alpha \alpha \) can be shared. This does not mean that early Christians shared their specific relationship with Christ and life, rather that their enactment of life is common in a fundamental way.\(^98\) The sharing of this altered enactment is mediated, at least initially, by proclamation. Proclamation is a sharing of the need to alter enactment in view of a relationship with the \( \pi \alpha \rho \alpha \mu \nu \theta \alpha \alpha \) as imminent. This knowledge with others, to do with enactment, rings heavily of our conception of Paulian conscience afore established. This tie runs further in the language used by Heidegger, wherein he highlights “the connection of calling, proclamation, doctrine, warning.”\(^99\) The calling of the Christian in their proclamation is of a very specific character, which on closer examination is tied closely to the temporal.

If we consider the nature of a call in general, we immediately see that it carries itself a unique temporality. A call is a communication that comes from “afar”. It has the character the opposite of a secret. Its content is not to be hidden and acted upon slowly and carefully at a time not yet, but revealed in the immediate as something that cannot wait. What defines it is a sense of “urgency”, an abruptness that brings one to attention. Clearly, one does not call to keep things as they are, but to spur a vital change: one does not proclaim nor call the mundane. Paul in his proclamation is calling others to his particular character of the moment, to a realisation of the nature of the situation in its urgency and secondarily calling for a change in enactment. Paul also uses the term \( \upsilon \pi \epsilon \varsigma \kappa \pi \epsilon \alpha \sigma \mu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) to describe the situation made evident by the proclamation, which is commonly translated to “most earnest”. It

\(^{98}\) Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, p81

\(^{99}\) Ibid p79
carries with it a sense of great abundance and even violence. Heidegger himself translates the term as “a very strong expression for “urgent”.” Thus, we are led to a specific temporality of Paul’s call. Those who hear the call are “in more imminent expectation of the παρουσία” and “no longer work and loiter idly.” They are called out of the temporality of the masses, those who are bound up with “all the bustling activity of talk and idling”, those who “occupy themselves with the question, whether the Lord will come immediately” and into a sharper awareness of the urgency of the situation.

Another important association with the παρουσία and the call, is that they carry with them a unique, but necessary θλῖψις - translated by Heidegger as Bedrängnis [distress]. Heidegger writes: “The experience is an absolute distress which belongs to the life of the Christian himself. The acceptance is an entering-onself-into anguish.” In answering the call, the Christian is faced with the anguish of the already-coming-to-an-end. The anguish is in fact a sign of the acceptance of God, the ἔνδειγμα, proof of the calling that is distinctive of the Christian and distinguishing those who are called from those he has rejected. Although the language used is not identical, the relationship between this θλῖψις and the anxiety [Angst] of Being and Time is not easily overlooked, especially given the nature of its relationship to the calling. A more detailed discussion of the idea of anxiety will be found in the next chapter. Regardless, the movement of Heidegger’s destruction is becoming more clear, and it becomes evident that what comes to be authenticity in Being and Time is extremely closely related to what we labelled as “authentic faith” as described in The Phenomenology of Religious Life. Heidegger’s task in this is a massive one, one he himself compared with the revolution of Copernicus, and its gradual evolution took him decades to clarify, only to leave the task incomplete in Being and Time. This is not to say that the lines between these works are straight, and that the correlations we have drawn here are direct, but simply that Heidegger’s process began in the theological and opened itself into the ontological. What we must be aware of is the persistence of a conception of temporality in Heidegger’s works, as that which underpins any understanding of the human condition.

Heidegger’s position so far can be summarised by his own summation found in §30, where he writes:

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100 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, p100
101 Ibid p76
102 Ibid p107
103 Ibid p97
"The factual life experience of the Christians is historically determined insofar as it always begins with the proclamation…The significances of life remain, but a new comportment arises. We want to follow further the problem of proclamation in such a way that we leave matters of content entirely aside; now it must be shown that Christian religiosity lives temporality…Christian factual life experience is historically determined by its emergence with the proclamation that hits the people in a moment, and then is unceasingly also alive in the enactment of life.”

In moving into the realm of true faith, which we have tied to authenticity, the individual takes on a different sense of time, that represents a modification, not a moving out of, common time. To Heidegger and Paul, the Christian does not step out of this world by answering the call, but is instead radically reorganised in the way that they remain. Let us here take note that Heidegger translates the phrase from 1 Thes 5:1: “περὶ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καίρων” as “time and moment” [Zeit und Augenblick]. The Christian, in their new position toward the end, finds their present changed into a new kind of temporality that Heidegger defines as the “moment” [Augenblick]. This moment is characterised by a particularity, a decisiveness, that is unique to the ancient concept of the καιρός. The moment for the Christian comes suddenly, and not without its struggle. Heidegger later calls to the Christian to “Put on the armor!” in preparation for impending strife [Kampf]. The call, the coming of the moment, “for those who have no hope and thus despair, but have seeming happiness and security, it comes as “sudden” and inescapable; unexpected, unprepared for it; no means for overcoming and taking a stance; they are handed over to it.” The καιρός (“the appointed time”) comes suddenly and remains compressed, but its anticipation spurs on the individual to alter their comportment: their enactment of life. No longer do they remain hidden in darkness, but are brought to themselves: “They do not “look” at it, and run away from themselves.”

We have thus established a little of the nature of the temporality of the Christian, as compressed, sudden and urgent, as they come to themselves. The future is made present, and the ending (παρουσία) moves to stand as something imminent, constantly present as possibility. The past, as the previous coming, equally comes into the moment as the already here and as that which is to be repeated. Much more than this we need not explore here, for

104 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, p116
105 Ibid p118
106 Ibid p149
107 Ibid p150
these features of “the moment” will be explored in the following chapters. All we need identify at this point is that the Christian, like authentic Dasein, in hearing a call finds themself in a special moment that radically redefines their enactment. This moment relates in a particular way to the καιρός (the appointed time), but this relation is not yet clear. Importantly, this relation is not made explicit in The Phenomenology of Religious Life. Still, at this point, Heidegger is of the opinion that “the Christian is conscious that this facticity cannot be won out of his own strength, but rather originates from God—the phenomenon of the effects of grace.”108 What he will ultimately seek is to find a path through which Dasein’s authenticity can be achieved out of its own being, as whole in itself.

108 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, p121
§ 14 - THE MOVEMENT OF DASEIN AS OCCURRENCE

In the previous chapter we laid out a specific formulation of temporality that Heidegger uncovered in his analysis of the works of Paul. Paul’s factical relation to the παρουσία carries with it a sense of both future, past and present. That which has occurred already, determines the future and its inevitable repetition of that past, and this is occurring in a kind of meeting point of these horizons: the present. The καιρός is that appointed time, the coming that has already come. It is imminently present as the possibility that is always outstanding for the Christian. Such a temporality is extremely complex and enigmatic, and represents part of that problem that Heidegger seeks to answer in Being and Time. Such a temporality closely reflects the specific temporality that we find described as “authentic time” in the Second Division of Heidegger’s famous text. We will come to see the various reasons that such a comparison is justified, but ultimately, the question that needs to be answered is how this temporality might apply beyond the Christian existence. Does any such possibility for authenticity exist for humankind universally, or is this concept to remain exclusively bound to the religious?

In many ways, Heidegger’s approach to the question of temporality is bound up with his approach to philosophy itself. Ultimately, as outlined above, Heidegger sees that any explication of the human condition will be necessarily bound to the situation of the explicator. To Heidegger, recognising this situation does not create an inexplicable “loop” of reason, but of itself represents a positive phenomenon requiring of explanation. The problem that Heidegger is trying to solve is that of hermeneutics. Any attempt to understand the nature of being is grounded necessarily in the perspective of the interpreter, who carries necessarily a set of preconceptions rooted in their historical setting. This very fact represents Heidegger’s starting point in Being and Time, that is the sense of “always-already”. Dasein is always already in a world, populated with beings both like and unlike itself. It is always already in a mood, in a place and “in” time. It is thrust, rather born, into a world that contains ideas, values and influences. The “always-already” becomes a horizon for understanding the very movement of Dasein, as something that has a kind of “past”, more appropriately labelled as a “history”. Dasein is thrown into existence and is concerned with that which it finds necessarily. This concern, or “care”, is that which causes Dasein to take its history and
its world into question. Dasein is essentially and primordially this concern. As care, Dasein
is not involved with its history in a detached sense but engages with it actively.

What this means is that Dasein is not a static or objective presence, but fundamentally a kind of movement. In a sense, Dasein is always moving even when it is still; it does not rest as it is, but is rather perpetually concerned with how it will be. This constant “preparation” is determined by that which it has been, but in its process it is constantly reworking and “understanding” its past. The past is perpetually in movement with the future to create the movement of Dasein as temporal. Care, that is concern with existence, is to be understood as something temporal. Heidegger, thus describes Dasein not as an object or a subject, a body or a soul, not as a mind or a psyche or even as an idea or concept, but instead as an “occurrence”. He writes: “The movement of existence is not the motion of something objectively present. It is determined from the stretching along of Dasein. The specific movement of the stretched out stretching itself along, we call the occurrence [Geschehen] of Dasein.”

Geschehen is a German word that finds its roots in the proto-Germanic “*skehaną” which literally translates to “spring up”, which gradually developed to mean something close to emergence or happening. Dasein is not something that “is” in the sense of a being encountered in the world, but a type of movement that happens: it is an event. As an event, it is ultimately a historical concern, not as an object for historiographical study, but as something essentially temporal and thus constituted by historicity.

§ 15 - DASEIN, DEATH AND AUTHENTIC TIME

We established previously that to Heidegger, Dasein is always already thrust into a world, and that world is comprised of other beings. Beings like Dasein have a distinctive effect on Dasein that cause it to lose sight of itself. Dasein, as care, concerns itself with others and that which they are concerned with, and in so doing it disperses itself amongst them. It loses touch with that which is true for itself, and busies itself in a world of ideas and opinions that are “levelled down” to the point that they become “untruths”. Dasein becomes fragmented, concealed to itself, and ultimately lost in a history that “has become unrecognisable to it.” Dasein, in its absorption into the “they”, loses even a sense of time, and instead finds itself adrift in a shared time that is ultimately divided. This common time can be broken down into days, hours or even seconds, but no matter how small the divisions are made it cannot ever encompass a “moment” that Dasein can take hold of as its own. If Dasein is to take hold of itself, and make itself free to decide on its project, it must “pull

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109 Heidegger, Being and Time, p358
110 Ibid p372
itself together”. The temporality of Dasein afore described leaves us to consider Dasein as something always outstanding, incomplete, to do with its constantly becoming other than it is. We will remember that it is in this way that Dasein can possibly be guilty, as in its very essence it is always lacking. It lacks essentially, and carries this sense with it always. What possibility is there then for Dasein to reveal itself as complete?

Completeness can possibly come to Dasein by means of a modification of its movement in time. We have established that Dasein involves a special kind of futural movement, one that means it is always what it is becoming. The question for Heidegger is whether this (perhaps) infinite succession comes to an end, and this brings him logically to death. Heidegger writes: “In Dasein there is inevitably a constant “lack of wholeness” which finds its end in death.” Death brings with it two vital elements to the movement of Dasein that create the possibility of completeness. The first is the idea of an end, being the cessation of progression. The cessation of what is outstanding in Dasein is in fact the cessation of the being of Dasein itself. However, the nature of Dasein means that what is outstanding in Dasein already belongs to it, and is never something to be added on. Heidegger on this point makes reference to Paul, who already in his time had seen the way that death was in fact together with life. Dasein is not finished or necessarily fulfilled by the addition of something that is death, it is not somehow completely available as a result of dying. Instead, Dasein, as something which is always already outstanding in a way, already has its end as part of it: it is its end. “Because death is already integrated into the dynamic movement of existence, the act of anticipating it concretizes care as an unbroken totality, without remainder.” Thus, the coming-to-its-end and the no-longer-Dasein forms part of the not-yet-at-an-end, that is the temporality of Dasein, and ultimately dying is grounded in care.

The second is that death is absolutely non-relational. Dasein is initially introduced to death through a witnessing of the deaths of other beings like Dasein. This reminds Dasein of its inevitable end and provides the realisation of the possibility of the transition between the being of Dasein to no-longer-Dasein. But such an experience is not parallel with an experience of the death of Dasein itself, for “the real having coming to an end of the deceased is precisely not experienced.” Death, for Dasein, is its very own possibility of no longer being able to be there. In accepting death as something imminent for it alone, Dasein

\[111\] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p233
\[112\] Ibid footnote 6, p239
\[113\] Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p133
\[114\] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p233 and p242
\[115\] Ibid p230
is completely thrown back upon its ownmost potentiality of being. The possibility of its own impossibility shakes Dasein to its very core, and denies it of the possibilities available to it in the world of everydayness and all relations to others are dissolved.

The task for authentic Dasein is not to “become certain” about its own death, as this is not the “truth” of death either. The empirical certainty of death is a treatment of death as a mere theoretical consideration. In this way, one can be assured that death will come, but not that it simply always may come. It is the indefiniteness of death that brings Dasein before itself authentically. An authentic understanding of death is as Dasein’s ownmost, non-relational, insuperable possibility that is as such indefinite. Death as a possibility cannot be something that is taken care of in the world, with a view towards its actualisation. To Heidegger, we must be towards death in a way that he terms anticipation, rather than expectation. As such, the death of Dasein is not being at an end but rather being toward its end. Dasein is thrown into death from the moment of birth, and as such it belongs essentially to the thrownness of Dasein that reveals itself in attunement. This particular but non-specific attunement is anxiety.

In the anticipation of death, Dasein must bring itself into acceptance of the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general. Such a state of being is fundamentally anxiety provoking for Dasein. Anxiety is not simply a mood of Dasein, rather its primordial attunement, that has to do with the very fact of being-in-the-world itself. Anxiety is not a fear of one's demise, it does not come into being secondary to some situation, but instead it represents the primordial fact that Dasein is a being that exists as thrown-being-towards-its-end. Accepting death as a perpetual possibility, Dasein must remain in anxiety, and not turn from it into the tranquillising certainty of its definite coming, that is characteristic of the public attitude toward death. To Heidegger, the fact that Dasein’s attitude or stance towards death can be levelled down in being-with others is not evidence that this being-toward does not belong to it universally, but instead reveals something more primordial about Dasein’s relation to death. In being-with others “one subscribes to the silent decree that it is proper to have an indifferent calm toward death. Such a position estranges Dasein from its ownmost nonrelational potentiality of being.”

Dasein in fact attempts to turn away from its concern with its ownmost end, tranquillising itself into a mode of untroubled indifference, in order to assuage the anxiety. But such an existence does not silence anxiety, instead it places Dasein into perpetual discontent, torn between the unease of being followed around its world by a nagging uncanniness, or thrust out of its tranquillised calm by waves of anxiety. Anxiety is

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116 Heidegger, Being and Time, p244
that which brings the being of Dasein before itself as itself, no longer awash in the uncanniness of world with others, but radically aware of itself as a being already dying.

Heidegger elucidates the irony of the public attitude toward death made apparent by his analysis of anxiety. In the public realm dwelling or even thinking about death represents a “cowardly fear” and a “gloomy flight from the world.”117 Paradoxically, the superior, untroubled indifference to death of the “they” is reoriented by Heidegger to represent the paragon of cowardice. The one who turns from death in this way “does not dare” turn to face it and the anxiety it brings. In order to exist authentically, one must show “courage”, “conviction”, “must not be weakened” and “endure” the vulnerability and discomfort of its coming. One must remain in “anticipation” of the possibility of death, and not turn from it as a mere “fact” of existence. In this we are brought again to conscience. The anticipation of death is of vital import if we are to understand the specific temporality of conscience as something expected and prepared for. The movement of death and conscience is ultimately one, and that is the movement of care as temporality. Heidegger defines temporality as the primordial condition of the possibility of care, and that an “equiprimordial connection” between death, guilt and conscience is rooted in this.118

Ultimately, the question of authenticity comes to be attached to the issue of freedom. As always already bound up with its world, does Dasein ever have the capacity to regain control over its possibilities? The answer to Heidegger is a historical concern, and in many ways involves a redefinition of freedom as it was previously defined. As guilty, we will recall, Dasein exists as that which it is not yet, the interpretation of which is grounded in that which it is already. Thus, to some extent, Dasein is “never to gain power over one’s ownmost being from the ground up.”119 Instead, the way in which Dasein might be free is to throw itself into itself, that is ground its self in itself in the situation in which and that it is. By becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation one is capable of being liberated from the “lostness in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us.”120 However, death is only one end of the story for Dasein and the complete picture of freedom is only made possible if the other end, birth, is taken into consideration. Dasein is not only its possible end, but ultimately the being between birth and death. The “self” of Dasein is nothing like the “sum of momentary realities of experiences”, nor is it a framework that is gradually filled up, as it

117 Heidegger, Being and Time, p244
118 Ibid p355
119 Ibid p273
120 Ibid p253
is defined by the communal world. The self of Dasein, Heidegger states, is a “stretching out” of Dasein between its ends, and this stretching represents the “connection of life” that represents the complete self of Dasein.

Birth and death are part of Dasein from the outset, and any kind of freedom it can potentially be attributed must take this into account. Dasein is born into a history that is “handed down” and is always still having an effect. The common view of history is as something in the past, but Heidegger raises the pertinent question of why “the having been predominantly determines what is historical when, after all, having-been temporalises itself equiprimordially with present and future.” Such a formulation of history should remind us here of the specific temporality of the “authentic Christian”, which we previously correlated with authentic time. In authentic time, Dasein approaches its history, or as Heidegger names its heritage [Erbe] as something present. Heidegger writes: “Resolute coming back to thrownness involves handing oneself over to traditional possibilities, although not necessarily as traditional ones.” Thus, freedom (authenticity) consists not in the creation of radically new ways of being, but from choosing which of those to repeat from that which is available to Dasein in its situation. Heidegger explains:

“When one has death before one as certain and lays hold of it as such, one’s life becomes visible in itself. When death is in this manner, it gives to life a certain way of seeing itself and constantly leads it before its ownmost present and past, a past that, burgeoning within life itself, comes toward it from behind it.”

Thus, in repetition, Dasein takes hold of its situation and can “be in the Moment for its time.” This idea of the “moment” [Augenblick] will be revisited later on, but for now it is important that we understand the nature of authentic time as a position toward birth and death, that realises the situation of Dasein as thrown-being-towards-its-end, and is thus able to choose authentically its own possibilities.

Finally, we are drawn back to the original question at hand. Now the nature of authentic temporality has been defined as distinct from the inauthentic, and the analysis of death has revealed the necessity for a position of anticipation in order for this to be accessed, we must return to the role of conscience. As always already entangled, Dasein must find a

121 Ibid 357
122 Heidegger, Being and Time, p365
123 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle, p119
124 Heidegger, Being and Time, p366
way to disentangle itself. As whole, Dasein must source this capacity from itself; it must come from part of its experience as that which represents the starting point for any analysis of the phenomenon of Dasein at all. Coyne makes explicit that: “The analysis of death suggests that conscience will accomplish this, indirectly revealing the nature of testimony and attestation: “Manifestly Dasein itself must, in its Being, present [vorgeben] us with the possibility and the manner of its authentic existence, unless such existence is something that can be imposed upon it ontically, or ontologically fabricated. The attestation [Bezeugung] of an authentic potentiality-for-Being is given by conscience.”125

125 Coyne, Heidegger’s Confessions, p136 translation from SŽ p234
Chapter 6 - The Temporality of Conscience

§ 16 - CONSCIENCE AS PREPARATION

“We cannot decide to bring the voice of conscience to bear on inauthenticity, although we can want [Wollen] to have a conscience in the sense that we can stand ready for it and resolutely prepared for it. Authentic speaking has to be made room for and allowed to be made manifest. It is not a matter, either, of going looking for it in the form of curiosity. It comes suddenly for one who is prepared. It speaks to us.”

- Brogan, Listening to the Silence, p36

Authenticity is not something that Dasein may simply choose. Instead, as Brogan explains, authenticity relies on a kind of preparation that Dasein must undertake, that has to do with its stance toward itself. The nature of this preparation requires a making transparent or making still of Dasein, that it might notice itself, in order to ground itself in itself. Heidegger explains that it is an attunement that “brings Dasein, more or less explicitly and authentically, before its “that it is, and as the being that it is, has to be as a potentiality of being.”” An anxiety is that specific attunement in which the world falls away and leaves Dasein open for disclosure. In anxiety, and its relation to death, Dasein is “brought before itself”, and then, “individualised to itself in its uncanniness, is absolutely unmistakable to itself.” In choosing to listen for conscience and wanting to hear it, Dasein is preparing itself, making itself ready, for the anxiety that conscience essentially is. One prepares for conscience “ahead of time”. During a period when one is unable to hear one “awaits” conscience as something not expected but desired. What such ideas, that is “awaiting” and “being ready”, bring to our attention is the decidedly temporal nature of conscience. It seems at times Dasein is not gathered together, but then “following” the call there is some happening - a movement or a change in Dasein. The nature of this “following” is what must be made explicit.

126 Heidegger, Being and Time, p179
127 Ibid p269
From the outset we must establish that conscience is clearly described as a “phenomenon of Dasein”. It is not an entity or objectively present being, nor is it an event that occurs amidst others encountered by Dasein as a being-in-the-world with other beings. As Heidegger explains: “It “is” only in the kind of being of Dasein and makes itself known as a fact only in factical existence.”\(^{128}\) This immediately distinguishes Heidegger’s idea of conscience from the “vulgar” sense of the word as a moment of speaking or vocalisation. A statement is notable within in the passage of the flow of events and, as something shared, it can be brought into statement and thus into a communal, inauthentic, sense of time. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes conscience as something that is not “occasionally present”. This is not to say that it is always present, but crucially it must not be viewed as a voice that “turns up” in its place in a series of present experiences and then is absent.\(^{129}\) The caller of conscience is nothing else than Dasein itself, as such it is in no way communal and its temporality is of an explicitly different nature. As Heidegger explains: “The order of succession in which experiences run their course does not yield the phenomenal structure of existing.”\(^{130}\) Instead, to Heidegger, the moment of conscience is an event as Dasein is an event, it occurs as Dasein occurs, as a result of its primordial grounding in care. We must remember that Heidegger makes it explicit that Dasein is the caller and the called “at the same time.”

We will recall that conscience is characterised by Heidegger as a call, and thus as a mode of discourse. In his description of the phenomenon, although bound up with discourse inextricably, the “call” of conscience is also established as something “silent”; nothing like a coming into words. The call is not to do with expression, but with listening. It is a harkening, as opposed to a readiness to speak; authentic existence relies on a readiness to hear, a reticence in the face of something impending. Hearkening is a making clear, a making still of being, such that what needs to be understood can remain or become clear. Heidegger uses the term *Bereit* [preparation] to describe this “readiness for being able to be summoned.”\(^{131}\) Brogan brings this specific temporality to light, aligning the listening for conscience to a specific prepared openness. He writes:

> “Understanding the call is a matter of holding ourselves ready for and open to the call. The call of conscience can only be heard in holding ourselves out towards

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\(^{128}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p259

\(^{129}\) Ibid p278

\(^{130}\) Ibid p279

\(^{131}\) Ibid p276
having a conscience as a possibility for being. That is...it is a matter of choosing to have a conscience, wanting to have a conscience rather than possessing it."\(^{132}\)

This making ready is closely aligned with Heidegger’s own description of resoluteness, which is a position of Dasein toward impending anxiety and death. Anxiety, in the form of uncanniness, follows Dasein always, not as something taken note of as present, but as something engaged with experience as a whole. In resoluteness, anxiety is held crucially as a potentiality. As with anxiety, one can turn away from conscience, running into the tranquillising temptation of the “they”. The stillness and reticence that prepares Dasein to come “face-to-face” with anxiety is that same stance that Dasein must take in order to “hear” conscience, to move into authenticity.

Heidegger’s sense of authentic time is described as a movement expressed through multiple ecstasies. These ecstasies do not delineate events as moving from one to another, but make possible any kind of movement at all. In ecstatic terms, there is a kind of following that is distinct from that following of events in the world. He writes: “The authentic understanding “following” the call is not an addition annexed to the phenomenon of conscience, a process that can occur or else be lacking. The complete experience of conscience can only be grasped from understanding the summons together with it.”\(^{133}\) What this indicates again is that conscience is part of the overall ecstatic movement of Dasein as authentic. It is not the case that conscience occurs, nor is it the case that Dasein is authentic, in the way that an object might have an attribute. Rather, conscience opens up (a kind of calling forth) Dasein to a different kind of experience that was always available and equally a part of Dasein all along. One does not say of conscience that it has been heard nor that it is always heard, but there is a sense that it is always available for Dasein. It is always possibly involved in the being of Dasein. Thus, in a very significant way we can characterise conscience as something futural, to do with the understanding nature of Dasein, the movement of that which is not-yet. But to relegate conscience to a single ecstasy is to ignore its other major attributes. Ultimately, as a phenomenon of Dasein and thus involved in the whole movement of Dasein as temporal, all of the three ecstasies of present, past and future must move as one in the movement of conscience. Conscience is a component or occurrence of the overall occurrence of Dasein that it essentially is.

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\(^{132}\) Brogan, *Listening to the Silence*, p39

\(^{133}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p268
§ 17 - THE JOLT OF CONSCIENCE

The change or modification of Dasein mediated by conscience is not gentle. Conscience is a call that comes over Dasein and abruptly brings it into a different mode of being. He writes explicitly: “In the tendency toward disclosure of the call lies the factor of a jolt, of an abrupt arousal.”134 The word Stoss, much like its English equivalent “jolt”, came into meaning not as a mental but as a physical phenomenon. As early as the 8th century AD, Stoss was used to describe a short, violent impact, jerky purposeful movement, and developed to mean something like a strike. In the First World War, the term became used in combination with troop, as “Stoßtruppen” [shock troops] who were specifically trained to fight with "infiltration tactics", a rapid, sudden method of attack on enemy trenches.135 Both “jolt” and Stoss over time came to gather associations until both were being utilised to signify a surprise, a shock that disturbs one's mental composure. Coyne translates it as a push.136 Brogan emphasises the collapse [zusammensinken] of the they-self that results from having heard the call.137 It is clear that conscience to Heidegger is nothing gentle. Thus, the “presentness” of conscience has a specific kind of character. Where it is always present in a way for Dasein, as a possibility that must be laid bare, but it seems to “happen” in a way that is sudden and disruptive. It lingers and follows, but simultaneously comes over Dasein with a powerful and surprising rapidity.

In Being and Time we find a description of anxiety that unmistakably echoes this description of conscience. In anxiety, “what is threatening cannot come closer from a definite direction within nearness, it is already “there” - and yet nowhere.”138 This enigmatic nearness harmonises clearly with the “not-yet” of conscience, as something pursuing Dasein in a way, but not as something ready-to-hand. Anxiety, as uncanniness, remains in the shadows so to speak, but “in the dark there is emphatically “nothing” to see, although the world is still “there” more obtrusively.”139 Anxiety, rather than jolting, “collapses” [zusammenbrechen] the familiarity of fallen Dasein. The term Zusammenbruch, like Stoss, implies a sense of force, a violence and shattering. It is not a gradual event,

134 Heidegger, Being and Time, p261
136 Ryan Coyne, Heidegger’s Confessions, p137
137 Brogan, Listening to the Silence, p37
138 Heidegger, Being and Time, p180
139 Ibid p183

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something that comes over Dasein slowly or insidiously but literally at times “takes away one’s breath.”

It is not unreasonable to posit that conscience is attuned, so closely does it move with uncanniness and anxiety. We have already established the way that conscience is present and anticipated as possibility, but we might also speak of the “always-already” of conscience, the following and almost haunting movement of the call. Unlike attunement, however, the temporality of conscience is not clearly explained in *Being and Time*. Attunement is described as that which reveals the already being there of Dasein: it is largely to do with the past. Conscience shares the revelatory aspect of attunement, that is it brings to light something of the already there of Dasein, but in contrast to attunement is not something clearly or specifically related to this single temporal ecstasy. As the essential attunement of Dasein, anxiety is a vital and primordial expression of care. Conscience as the “call of care”, is an expression of the same movement, and as attuned it has to do with the past. Earlier we aligned Heidegger’s idea of past with history, but can we say that conscience is historical?

§ 18 - CONSCIENCE AND THE SITUATION

Heidegger himself identifies that conscience has ties to the historical, but this is not simply an engagement with a “past” as defined technically. We will recall that to Heidegger, history is a process that we are constantly engaged in. Dasein is historical, not in the sense that it is a cumulation of the ends which have transpired before it, but that it is constantly engaged in the process of determining how it will be, out of what it has been. Dasein is not simply its place in a series of events, but instead a way of being that corresponds to its interaction with its history. Its situation equally is not simply an inevitability of a series of discrete events, measurable in time, but a complex experience of Dasein as that which reveals any kind of world at all. It indeed is enmeshed in the creation of its world, and as such the facts of its history as factual experience. The situation involves Dasein’s active interpretation of that which it is thrust into, based upon that which it expects, and in so doing makes present that which it can possibly encounter. In a sense Dasein is its situation. When we speak of conscience we do not refer to any “substance” that might be present, but really of its effects and its role in the movement of Dasein into authenticity. What conscience does is draw Dasein into a “noticing” of itself. Engagement “with” conscience, by which we mean the resolute reticence of Dasein, does not reveal any thing such as a conscience but instead brings Dasein to itself. Thus, in noticing itself, Dasein reveals that which it is: its situation. This is nothing like a “now” or “present” as we might define chronologically, but instead a

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140 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p180

50 Conscience and Time
position toward that which might be for Dasein in a world of that which already is: “Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the actual situation of the there in such a way that existence circumspectly takes care of the factical things at hand in the surrounding world in action.”141

Thus, the conscience might be described as the process of the situation becoming aware of itself. Heidegger writes: “In contrast to circumstances, the situation of factical life means the stand taken by life in which it has made itself transparent to itself in its falling and has, in worrying about itself in a concrete manner at the particular time, seized upon itself and stirred itself in its possibility of a motion running counter to the falling of its care.”142 We must take note of the inclusion of the phrase “particular time” here in the description of the situation. We can relate the seizing and stirring of Dasein to conscience, as that which jolts Dasein to an authentic movement, although the specific nature of the jolt remains somewhat at large. It is temporal and has to do with the situation of Dasein, but this notion of the “particular time” brings to light something vital about the occurrence of this phenomenon as yet not made clear.

We have afore established that conscience exists in that moment that permits the movement into authenticity. The authenticity of Dasein is a certain and specific relationship of Dasein to its own history, that we might define as a bringing into light the “facts” of its history. Authenticity is at its core a repetition. Thus, conscience is involved in the interaction between that which already has been and that which is intended. It lies on boundary of sorts, a horizon, an interaction or even conflict, between the past and the future. As Dasein, it is bounded between an “already” and a “not-yet.” There is a specific kind of boundary that conscience represents, and it is this that we seek to clarify. If we take it for a given that conscience is temporal, what we must seek is a way of clarifying the temporality specific to this boundary. Our previous analysis of ancient Greek thought, through to the foundations of authentic Christian existence, we in many ways have already found our potential answer. As with conscience itself, equally misinterpreted, ignored and “levelled down”, traceable through Homer, the ancients, into Plato and Aristotle and revitalised and brought to significance by Paul, even touched on by Freud, we find - alongside conscience, logos and chronological or common time - the idea of the καιρός, and a sense of time we will term as “kairological”. It is to here that our analysis must turn.

141 Heidegger, Being and Time, p311
142 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, p118
Chapter 7 - What is Kairological Time?

§ 19 - THE HISTORY OF THE ΚΑΙΡΟΣ

What we seek in this next chapter is to bring the concepts of the καιρός and conscience together, in such a way that we bring greater clarity to Heidegger’s conception of conscience. In doing so, a great deal of caution will be required not to distort either concept in the attempt to align the two disparate philosophical terms. As such, the process will follow a similar course to that which we followed in delineating conscience, that is to first ground the concept in its history. As with Heidegger in his delineation of conscience, it is vital that the term is not simply interpreted as it has come to be known, but instead we seek to identify its specific movement through its usage and trace it to its origin. Thus, the journey is necessarily etymological, but equally if there is to be consistency in method it must be maintained that ultimately the concepts at issue are phenomenological concerns. Thus, the ultimate ambition is not semantic, but rather if we are to align these ideas we must look closely at how they emerge in factual life. Once their specific movement can be clarified, only then can we potentially show some synchronicity between them.

No discussion of the concept of καιρός can ignore the work of Doro Levi, who in his 1923 essay on The Concept of Kairos and the Philosophy of Plato brought the concept back into discussion, although it would be largely lost again for some time. The history of the term καιρός, as with συνείδησις, finds its beginnings in the earliest writings of the ancient Greeks, specifically in Homer. In Homer, according to Levi, καιρός originally meant “mortal,” and refers to a location on the physical body which, when moved upon appropriately, can result in the death of an enemy.143 This definition evolved gradually until its use by Theognis, which revealed it had by then gathered a temporal sense, and the idea of καιρός as “opportunity” begins to emerge. Again, in the tragedies of Aeschylus it becomes more clearly a “time” rather than a location to strike. By the time of the writings of Euripides, the temporality of the καιρός begins to carry a sense of “decisive” or “opportune,” both in the verb and noun forms. Sipiora writes: “From death or “truncation of life,” the meaning shifts to decision or “truncation of doubt.””144

143 Doro Levi, “Kairos in Greek Literature’ in Rendiconti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei Classe di scienze morali RV 32 (1923) p265


52 Conscience and Time
By the Fifth-Century BCE, καιρός has at last come near to its modern interpretation as the “right time” or “best opportunity”. It also by then bears with it a sense of action, and in that action not only timing but also a sense of “just measure”, and a sense of what is necessary. As with conscience, from the point of the writings of Plato and Aristotle, καιρός begins to be used in a variety of different settings, in each gathering a new set of associations. It is at this point that our analysis of the history of the term must pause, as already it is possible to see how naturally the concept lends itself to discussion of the issues related to conscience. This pause is justified also because Heidegger’s own process in *Being and Time* focussed heavily on the Greeks (in particular Aristotle and Plato) and tended to guide his analysis of the early Christian concepts, such as conscience, which we have already discussed at length.

In Plato, we begin to see how καιρός can come to be understood in the factual experience of the human being, and how it as a temporal concept differs from its counterpart χρόνος. Χρόνος was a representation of time in a largely linear or sequential sense. Such a sense of time becomes the focus of Aristotle’s analysis of time in his *Physics*, and represents (perhaps until Heidegger) the primary basis for philosophical and scientific understanding of time for the next two millennia. Aristotle’s interpretation of time is as a continuous phenomenon, “made continuous by the indivisible, present now-moment, which links the past to the future by serving as the termination of the past and the beginning of the future, just as a mathematical point dissects a line…and is therefore divisible ad infinitum.”

Time, through the great minds of Plotinus and Augustine, carries with it this sense of measurement, a phenomenon bound up with mathematics, motion and ultimately number. This is what has come to be known as “chronological time”. Smith describes χρόνος as a time that is like “a grid upon which events can be plotted for the purpose of historical writing and interpretation.” He rightly points out, however, that such a conception of time “…leaves us without the purpose, the significance and the evaluating interest which are the necessary ingredients both of historical action and of historical interpretation.”

In the *Philebus*, Plato places a heightened emphasis on the active nature of the καιρός, and brings to it even more keenly a sense of proper measure. To Plato, any action or movement is necessarily bound up with time and situation and thus right action is as such situationally and thus historically determined. Plato seizes upon the καιρός as the right

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146 Smith, *Time, Times, and the ‘Right Time’*, p3
147 Ibid p3
time in which something of importance can happen, and this comes to constitute the basis of historical decision and action.\textsuperscript{149} Such a connection is easily aligned with Heidegger himself, to whom time is bound up with action absolutely. Murchado writes: “Heidegger understood time not from the experience of measurement and of measures – as, for example, Aristotle did – but rather from the experience of acting. This means that the ‘original time’, the ‘initiating [anfängliche]’ time – time in its own emerging – is traceable in action.”\textsuperscript{150} What we must make clear though is that the καιρός, although involved with action, was no longer to do with the physical action itself, but represented a moment, a situation, in which a certain type of action was able to take place.

\textsection{20 - ΚΑΙΡΟΣ AND ΛΟΓΟΣ}

It is in Isocrates that we find another determination of καιρός, not unique to him, but one that is taken on into the ideas of Aristotle. Sipiora argues that “Isocrates postulates a symbiotic relationship between φρόνησις and effective discourse.”\textsuperscript{151} What we must keep in mind here is that discourse, or λόγος, is fluidly taken up into the concept of καιρός, in such a way that they become inseparable in later discussions of καιρός. Isocrates writes: “Whom, then, do I call educated?…First, those who manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who possess a judgement which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action; next, those who are decent and honourable in their intercourse with all with whom they associate.”\textsuperscript{152} To Isocrates, the καιρός is not only the right time for action, but action bound up with expression: Πρᾶξις is bound up with λόγος. The καιρός was also, in philosophical discourse, to do with the right time to present a certain argument, that it would have the maximal and proper effect. However, in order to speak at the right time, the individual must necessarily enact the right processes of thought alongside and in symphony with speech. “The mystery of καιρος enables rhetors to choose one λόγος over another, making one and the same thing seem great or small, beautiful or ugly, new or old.”\textsuperscript{153} As such, the καιρός came to be a situation

\textsuperscript{149} Smith, \textit{Time, Times, and the ‘Right Time’}, p7


\textsuperscript{151} Sipiora, \textit{Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos}, p9


\textsuperscript{153} Sipiora, \textit{Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos}, p4

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happened upon by the individual, and expressed and bound up in λόγος, as a primary human trait.

It is in Isocrates also that λόγος, πρᾶξις and καιρός come together in symphony to be with φρόνησῐς. He writes: “We shall find that none of the things which are done with φρόνησῐς takes place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom.” 154 Further, in Antidosis he states “Those who most apply their minds to discourse situations and are able to discern the consequences which for the most part grow out of them, will most often meet these occasions in the right way.” 155 So we are led through this progression of the idea of the καιρός into the works or Aristotle, and it is from here we can being to draw parallels with Heidegger’s thinking in general. In his delineation of the modes of knowledge according to Aristotle, Heidegger elucidates the two major categories as “epistemonikon” and “logistikon”. Φρόνησῐς falls under the heading of “logistikon”, and immediately we can identify its relation to discourse. The λόγοι are “teachable and learnable” which Heidegger concludes are necessarily bound up in “natural speech” to Aristotle. 156 What this elucidates is the fact that λόγος, φρόνησῐς and πρᾶξις are not divided simply from one another. Our next task will be to show the way in which these ideas are related to temporality in Heidegger and Aristotle both.

§ 21 - ΚΑΙΡΟΣ, CONSCIENCE AND ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ

To Heidegger’s Aristotle, those kinds of knowledge that deal with “that which is, insofar as it always is, is not in time” fall under the category of “epistemonikon”. 157 For Aristotle those things that are not “in time” are still temporal, but only in the sense that they are eternal. We must remember that to Aristotle, as outlined in his Physics, time has to do with measurement and related to movement and decay. As measurement, time is defined by its division and thus a series of changes and number. He writes: “Hence, plainly, things which are always are not, as such, in time, for they are not contained by time, nor is their being measured by time.” 158 Φρόνησις, in contrast has to do with those things that are

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154 Isocrates, Nicocles or the Cyprians in Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes, Trans. G Norlin (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980) Section 9


156 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, p25

157 Ibid p24

changeable, that is, necessarily “in” time. What is clear from Heidegger’s lectures is that prudential deliberation is a reflective task, to do with a taking notice of the situation.

Φρόνησῐς, to Heidegger’s Aristotle, is bound up with Dasein’s history, that is to do with what “has already been experienced, noted and learned”, yet somehow equally it is “in each case new.” It is historical, concerned with that which is already, but from out of this springs something that was not yet. That which is new is a kind of πρᾶξις that is expressed within the world. Heidegger writes: “All going about dealings has its circumspection, and what such circumspection provides for these dealings is a certain guiding foresight into their with-which and the kind of authenticity it is possible to achieve at the particular time regarding it.” So, it is not the case that φρόνησῐς is set into the world simply as a necessary and determined event that follows from that which proceeds it, but comes as fresh, new and bold into its position in a different kind of time. It is not something that occurs and then is past either, as unlike other forms of knowledge or art it cannot be forgotten: “As regards φρόνησῐς, there is no possibility of falling into forgetting.”

Heidegger, in explanation of the ‘unforgettable’ nature of φρόνησῐς brings us immediately to conscience. We have above established that conscience is that necessary condition for Dasein to be aware of itself, in such a way, that it is able to bring itself before itself, in completeness. Existence in truth and wholeness, can sink into concealment with the coming of any new circumstance, allowing for the movement of being brought back. That which brings the φρόνημος or Dasein back is the call of conscience according to Heidegger. Heidegger makes this process explicit in Plato’s Sophist: “Conscience cannot be forgotten. But it is quite possible that what is disclosed by conscience can be distorted and allowed to be ineffective through…the passions”. In addition to this, Heidegger posits that conscience “always announces itself”. So, as with the Dasein of Being and Time, the φρόνημος is bound by it moods, that is to say both that in which it already finds itself and the pains and pleasures of confronting itself and its situation. Heidegger goes as far as to specifically state that “φρόνησῐς is nothing other than the conscience set into motion.” Thus conscience has a revelatory effect on the human being and is concerned with the way in which they move in the world. Heidegger puts it plainly that the role of conscience is to make “action” transparent. But action must here not be relegated to practical action in the world, as we must distinguish the action with which φρόνησῐς is concerned from that with

159 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, p39
160 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, p119
161 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, p39
162 Ibid p39
Instead, the action of the φρόνημος has to do with life as a whole. Φρόνησῐς is distinct in that it is not to be simply defined as aptitude in practical action, yet equally it is not something theoretical. Coyne aptly describes:

“The fact that practical reasoning is not susceptible to forgetting...proves for Aristotle that it cannot be considered theoretical knowledge or episteme. For his part, Heidegger takes this insusceptibility as signifying the constancy of human being-there-with-itself. And for him the homology between the unity of action in practical reasoning and the unity of finitude in anticipating death is instructive: in both cases the most extreme element of the relation in question—the end of action in the case of practical reasoning; death in the case of Dasein—is immanentized, included within an intentional impulse that constitutes this impulse as a whole.”

Essentially, conscience and φρόνησῐς both have to do with the situation of Dasein as temporal, and its temporalising nature as a whole. The reasoning and subsequent action specific to the φρόνημος is to do with the situation, in the sense that it is born out of the specific circumstances with which they are faced. In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes this explicit: “And if this is true of the general theory of ethics, still less is exact precision possible in dealing with particular cases of conduct; for these come under no science or professional tradition, but the agents themselves have to consider what is suited to the circumstances on each occasion [καιρόν].” Action, as directed by the conscience, for Heidegger’s Aristotle, is born from a deliberation of circumstances that are specific to the individual at a particular time. Prudent action takes place in accordance with its occasion. Essentially, the καιρός is the situation made aware of itself, a kind of announcing of itself that directs the individual to act accordingly.

Heidegger himself uses the term καιρός in Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle to signify the specific kind of announcement of the situation that occurs in periods of acute apprehension. He describes this absolute apprehension in factual life as something like “torment”, which is closely related to the anxiety [Angst] we find in Being and Time. These ideas are further related in that Heidegger describes this torment as communicating something to Dasein that “does not mediate or even intend any cognition.” Essentially, the καιρός makes itself known through an acute expression of care that brings Dasein into an

163 Coyne, Heidegger’s Confessions, p120
165 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, p104
awareness of itself. This awareness can be lost again in a “becoming frantic over itself and confused”, or it can be held onto by a specific kind of “sitting still” that opens Dasein to its specific history and allows it to “have” time in a distinct and personal way. What we find in these lectures is a prelude to the idea of conscience outlined in *Being and Time*. However, such a reading of the idea of the καιρός is at odds with the consensus interpretations of the καιρός in *Being and Time*. The following chapter will attempt to address this specific issue.
Chapter 8 - The Kairos in *Being and Time*

§ 22 - THE ΚΑΙΡΌΣ AND THE AUGENBLICK

Theodore Kisiel writes: “Even though the idea of καιρός is never used, the idea overtly dominates the entire Second Division of *Being and Time*” of which the discussion of conscience is part. The Second Division deals with Heidegger’s analysis of temporality, and his explication of his conceptions of authentic and inauthentic time. The καιρός has generally been interpreted through Heidegger’s earlier works to be aligned in this division with concept of the Augenblick [moment]. The Augenblick in this setting represents the holding of Dasein in authenticity and authentic time, a period in which Dasein remains open to itself. With the inauthentic time being so clearly reminiscent of the chronological, the authentic “presenting” of the Augenblick is outwardly an obvious candidate for the “kairological” variant. However, as Maggini concludes in his exploration of this link, “the affinity of the two themes is complex and…no direct line is to be drawn between Heidegger's early development of factual kairology and ecstatic momentariness in fundamental ontology.”

Augenblick roughly translates to “the moment”, but its modern usages are more reminiscent of a particularly short period of time, rather like in English when someone says: “I’ll be with you in a second!” We must also in our translation distance ourselves from the idea of the “now”, a concept championed originally by Aristotle. Such a position is absolutely to be dismissed as Heidegger himself states: “Aristotle already saw the phenomenon of the instant, the καιρός, and he defined it in the sixth book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*; but, again, he did it in such a way that he failed to bring the specific time character of the καιρός into connection with what he otherwise knows as time.” We should translate the “fail” in this statement as a lack of desire to align the concepts, rather than that he attempted but was unable to.


Thus, we must investigate in what way the “now” is different from the καιρός. From the above discussion, there is a feature of the καιρός that lies distinct from that of the “now” and that is the idea content and context. The “now” to Aristotle is an instant, a marker of time against others; a way of calculating and making public of time. The καιρός is distinctly not public, it is individual and “historicitical”, and involves the entire situation of Dasein. Aristotle aligned the concept with φρόνησῐς, which is a knowledge possessed by an individual with regard to their own being in entirety. As such, we must be careful to bring these ideas too closely together - that the καιρός is temporal in the sense of a moment (a “now”) - and attempt to draw out whether it relates instead to Heidegger’s conception of the moment [das Augenblick] that we find in Being and Time.

The concept of the Augenblick remains part of Heidegger’s thinking long after Being and Time is published, and in many ways only becomes clearer in his later works. In Introduction to Metaphysics, he explains:

> “Only in the resolute self-disclosure of Dasein to itself, in the Augenblick, does it make use of that which properly makes it possible, namely time as the Augenblick itself. The Augenblick is nothing other than the look of resolute disclosedness in which the full situation of an action opens itself and keeps itself open. What time as entrancing accordingly keeps to itself, and in keeping it to itself simultaneously announces and tells of as something that can be given to be free, giving it to be known as possibility, is something of that time itself and it alone can be: the Augenblick.”

Within this complex definition a familiar phrasing emerges, that of the “resolute self-disclosure” and “announcing”. This is language directly borrowing from Heidegger’s examination of conscience in Being and Time. Resoluteness we will remember is a stance toward anxiety, a determination to remain in and endure anxiety. It is a position toward conscience, a “wanting to have a conscience” that has been described variously as a listening, an expecting, literally an “unlocked-ness”: a kind of attuned waiting. Such a description leads us easily into a comparison with καιρός. Καιρός is a crucial event, a happening, which one cannot manufacture but must be prepared for adequately. One awaits the καιρός, not as one expects a train to arrive at a certain time, but instead as a stance towards the situation. As aforementioned the καιρός announces itself as a time for action, an enactment of a different kind of being in the world.

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169 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p149
The announcing of the καιρός, as sudden and abrupt, is something like an opening. In some sense the Augenblick also is permeated with a sense of suddenness, an announcing into its openness. The literal meaning of Augenblick is: the blink of an eye. Derrida, in his attempt to unravel this phenomenon, equates the Augenblick distinctly with a period of altered vision. Bennington outlines this position thus: “[to Derrida] the Augenblick is not a moment (however short) of pure or full seeing or insight at all, but that its apparent simplicity and self-identity harbors an alterity that means both that it has a duration (it is not the pure στιγμή of the νῦν) and that that duration is not a duration of presence—a time of seeing during which the eye is open—but an interruption.”\(^{170}\) The “event” of the Augenblick thus has a kind of opening. In Being and Time the conscience represents this opening, as that sudden jolt that transports Dasein into the Augenblick of authentic time. Again we must be cautious not do delineate the Augenblick as something that “follows” the conscience in a chronological sense, but the correlation between these ideas is quite pronounced. For now we will leave this correlation, but it should be kept in mind that the opening of the Augenblick as conscience shares a great deal with the Aristotelian καιρός. For now let us focus on this idea of a beginning to the moment, which brings along into question the idea of its end.

The Augenblick, as something that is not always, seems to possess some kind of finite duration, characterised by its ability to be held [gehalten]. Its opening through conscience seems to come to an end not simply described, and a return to entanglement. As Zangeneh pertinently describes: “Any elucidation of the concept of Augenblick must understand the latter as designating an activity, an ἔκστασις, some manner of processuality, something expressible by an infinitive verb, and not a state, a period, or anything which would be conventionally nominal.”\(^{171}\) The process to which Zanganeh is referring is most closely displayed in the movement of resoluteness. Heidegger himself states: “Resoluteness has its own constancy in itself, so that I do not at all need to repeat the resolution. If I must repeat the resolution, I prove that I am not yet resolved. Resoluteness is a distinctive event [ausgezeichnetes Geschehnis] in a happening [Geschehen].”\(^{172}\) So one can “remain” resolved, can exist in such a way as to persist in resolution. Heidegger writes: “The present that is held in resoluteness and springs from it we call the Augenblick…In the Augenblick as an ecstasis the existent Dasein is carried away, as resolved, into the current factically


\(^{172}\) Martin Heidegger, Logic as the Question of the Nature of Language, Trans W Gregory (New York, State University of New York Press, 2009), p77
determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation of its action. The instant is that which, arising from resoluteness, has an eye first of all and solely for what constitutes the situation of action.”\textsuperscript{173} So the duration of resoluteness can be seen to be interlinked with the duration of the Augenblick.

The holding of the Augenblick cannot be equated to anything like “being-in-timelessness”: it is not something measurable. McNeill makes explicit this idea that the Augenblick persists: “The Augenblick…is not to be understood as a ‘moment of time’ in the sense of an ‘instant.’ Rather, it refers to the unfolding disclosure of the presencing of a situation in the duration appropriate to it. The Augenblick does not preclude, but indeed demands a certain duration, albeit a finite one.”\textsuperscript{174} If we look to our analysis in previous chapters, we shall see that this idea of duration holds very little connection to the idea of the καιρός. In the history of the use of the word, including by Aristotle, not one thinker characterises the καιρός as something that lingers beyond its momentary significance. As such, in some ways the Augenblick can be said to correlate with the καιρός, but it is rather the opening, the conscience, with which it shares a greater affinity. However, we must constantly remind ourselves that the experience of Dasein must be taken as a whole, and that all these ideas comprise something of the unity of experience that is the temporality of the human being there.

One of the few major pieces written in criticism of the linking of the καιρός with the Augenblick is an essay by Zangeneh on the topic of Phenomenological Problems for the Kairological Reading of Augenblick in Being and Time. In his argument against drawing the καιρός and the Augenblick into alignment, Zangeneh draws our attention to the difficulties in correlating φρόνησις with authenticity, the basic tenet upon which this alignment is often based. A famous essay examining the interconnection between Heidegger and Aristotle written by Franco Volpi, spawned a school of sorts focussed on investigation of the link between φρόνησις and authenticity, with authentic existence thus understood as a type of “phronetic praxis.” This link is further championed by McNeill as previously referred, whose reading focusses on aligning Heidegger’s early interpretations of Aristotle with those ideas put forward in Being and Time. Zangeneh challenges the link between the καιρός of φρόνησις and authenticity in a number of ways, but particularly by drawing our attention to the language used by Heidegger in his translation of the movement of φρόνησις. Heidegger quite uniquely translates a vital passages in the Nicomachean Ethics thus:

\textsuperscript{173} Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p287

\textsuperscript{174} McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, p116

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“Thus let us begin by assuming that the modes in which the soul brings and takes beings into true safekeeping as unveiled—actualizing this by means of explication in speech which either affirms or denies—are five in number: procedures in which one is directed to certain tasks and produces [Τέχνη (art)]; defining by way of looking at, discussing, and identifying [ἐπιστήμη (scientific understanding)]; the kind of seeing around one which has to do with care for human well-being (circumspection) [φρόνησίς (prudence)]; the kind of understanding which sees in an authentic manner [οοφία (wisdom)]; and pure and simple perceiving [νοῦς (intelligence)].”

What this passage elucidates is that we cannot draw a simple straight line between the ideas of φρόνησίς and authenticity, as even in the language used we can see immediately a closeness of authenticity to οοφία rather than φρόνησίς. McNeill writes: “Phronesis can be phronesis, a virtue and an excellence, only if it is also already sophia, only if the latter always already infuses and informs it.” McNeill himself establishes that the modes of knowledge, if we are to assume a direct correlation with the ideas of Being and Time, would require a blurring of the delineations established by Aristotle. φρόνησίς, as having direct effects on πρᾶξις, is delineated as a primarily practical concern by Aristotle, and alone aligns itself more closely with inauthenticity, that is being in the world with things at hand.

Heidegger himself asserts that “Aristotle’s Rhetoric must be understood as the first systematic hermeneutics of the everydayness of being-with-one-another,” everydayness being a term specifically applied to inauthenticity. Zangeneh makes the point that: “the interpretation of the phronological καιρός...is irredeemably tied up with descriptions of inauthentic pragmatic concernful Dasein” and solidifies this correlation by elucidating Heidegger’s use of the terms “Umgang, Fürsorge, Besorgen, Weswegen/Wozu, das Jetzt” which are shared in Heidegger’s discussions of inauthenticity and φρόνησίς both. This does not, however, mean that φρόνησίς does not share some key structures with authenticity as we find it described in Being and Time, but simply that we cannot correlate the ideas immediately and exactly. As Dreyfus makes clear in his interpretation of the work, we cannot conclude that Being and Time is simply a reaction to Aristotle. For Heidegger the question

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175 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, p130
176 McNeill, Glance of the Eye, p100
177 Heidegger, Being and Time, p184
178 Zangeneh, Phenomenological Problems for the Kairological Reading of Augenblick in Being and Time, p548
was never simply to bring Aristotle’s conception of being into modernity, but rather to bring those philosophical ideas of his time and the history of philosophy in general into “reconception”. As such we must be cautious to place the καιρός and the Augenblick side by side as “twins”, when in reality their similarities are only part of a much more complex picture.

§ 23 - THE ESCHATOLOGICAL ΚΑΙΡΟΣ

Although the καιρός of Being and Time can be related to Heidegger’s treatment of Aristotle, a simple translation of it as the Augenblick does not do justice to the complexity of either concept. Thus, it becomes necessary to turn to some of Heidegger’s earlier theological works in order to seek clarity. As we outlined previously, in his earlier writings, Heidegger deals with the concept of καιρός according to Paul, and attempts to outline its main structures. In this, Heidegger focusses on the καιρός as having two distinct traits. The first is that it has to do with the coming of the Messiah, an event not yet occurrent but equally inevitable. As such we might attempt to correlate the Paulian καιρός as something linked to an ending. In Aristotle, καιρός also carried this attribute as end to some extent, as the end of deliberation and the time for action. In Paul, it is to do with the end of the world itself. On closer analysis, however, we see that to conceptualise καιρός as an ending is not really accurate. Even in Aristotle, the coming to end of deliberation has to do with the καιρός, but more specifically this moment of end is referred to as the ἔσχατον.

Although certainly related to the καιρός, the ἔσχατον brings with it a sense of finality that the καιρός does not share. For Aristotle, the καιρός “seems much less dramatic and more associated with everyday practices, even if it does, as moment of decision, nonetheless have an interruptive quality with respect to the regular time of χρόνος.”

Equally in Paul and other biblical authors, the term καιρός, although associated with the ending of the world, the way in which it is used is to represent something that is already present. In 1 Corinthians 6:2, Paul writes: “For he saith, I have heard thee in a time accepted, and in the day of salvation have I succoured thee: behold, now is the accepted time [καιρός]; behold, now is the day of salvation.” For Paul the καιρός is upon the people, and does not represent the end but a new a distinct hope. This is reflected in many other biblical passages that follow, in Mark 1:15, for example: “And saying, The time [καιρός] is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand.”

\(^{180}\) Bennington, Scatter 1, p151

\(^{181}\) The New Oxford Annotated Bible. Ed. M Coogan (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 Cor 6:2

Paul utilises several terms in reference to the final coming, and one passage in 1 Corinthians is of particular importance in this regard. The passage reads: “in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet; for the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed.” Here we see three distinct terms come together in a description of the end: the moment, the twinkling of an eye, and the last. It would be remiss of us not to take note of the tremendous interrelation between these terms and the Augenblick. However, and of utmost importance, if we look to the ancient Greek from which these translations came, we find three distinct terms: ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ ὀφθαλμοῦ and ἐσχάτῃ respectively. As Dreyfus himself pointed out about this passage and others like it: “all the terms that refer to a total transformation of identity and/or world get lumped together and identified with the Greek moment of decisive action or καιρός. What is surprising is that those concerned with the use of these terms in Heidegger do not bother to sort out the various phenomena to which they refer.” I do not pretend to carry the same conviction in this matter as Dreyfus himself, but the sentiment is clear: The bringing together of the καιρός with the Augenblick, even in Paul, is not so simple as a translation, and a great deal of care needs to be taken before we draw these ideas too closely together.

To Heidegger, the Paulian sense of true or “authentic faith”, as afore established, has the characteristic of a making present of something futural. It is an attitude toward the future as something already upon us and essentially past, to live each moment in the knowledge (the holding) of its already having come to an end. The coming of Christ contained within it the inevitability of His return, and as something historical it has the character of already having been. But equally, the present is of categorical importance to Paul, as that time for the individual to live in a way that constantly keeps in mind the future coming. As authentic, faith must have the quality of always holding fast to the past, but in such a way that it is repeated and carried forward. As such, the “eschatological kairos” as it has been labelled, blends multiple ecstasies into one, engaged with history in a certain way, but particularly amalgamating the future with the present. Early Heidegger established this position as something akin to “hope”, that is “it places the accent on a preparatory stance in the present, it is a description of a certain comportment which is current.” In essence, the καιρός has a strange character of being always present, but equally something waited and to be prepared for, that will come with a suddenness, and unexpected violence. Certainly we can relate many of these features with the concept of the Augenblick in its entirety as described in

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*Being and Time*, but what stands out in particular is its striking similarity to Heidegger’s description of conscience.
Chapter 9 - Concluding Remarks

§ 24 - CONSCIENCE AS ΚΑΙΡΌΣ

We sought at the outset of this exposition to address a question: Can conscience, as it is described in *Being and Time*, be considered as a temporal phenomenon? The impetus for asking this was to clarify, as much as possible, the strange and enigmatic nature of Heidegger’s description. Although vague in its movement, conscience was established by Heidegger as the “call of care”, the call of Dasein to Dasein, and thus was necessarily to do with its overall movement as occurrence. Thus, part of the purpose of this work is also to situate conscience more clearly within the movement of Dasein. From the outset, it was made clear that conscience is not something that “happens” as an event in the series of recordable events “in” time, but still occurs in a specific way. Conscience is not something to be waited for, but rather held as a possibility, to be listened out for. This speaks to authentic Dasein’s position towards death, as something to be held in the possibility that death essentially always is. The attunement of conscience as anxiety showed the way it is always already there, pursuing Dasein in uncanniness. For this reason, the nature of the preparation - that was established as conscience itself - was correlated with a kind of courage, a resoluteness and stillness in the face of anxiety and that which conscience brings to light. The temporal nature of guilt was also clarified, as to do with the always outstanding nature of Dasein. Thus, the phenomena of death, anxiety, guilt among others were fitted neatly within the ecstatic construction of Dasein as it is unfolded in *Being and Time*.

We must not forget, however, that these phenomena cannot be understood in isolation from one another, nor from conscience, as they all form part of the unity of Dasein as care. Thus, in clarifying the temporality of these phenomena we in a way also bringing conscience into greater clarity. However, conscience stands distinct from these other phenomena for two reasons. First, conscience is explicitly described by Heidegger as discourse, part of its overall disclosive movement. And second, where the temporality of these phenomena can be made apparent relatively simply, conscience is necessarily enigmatic. Thus, despite our efforts, conscience remained excepted from care in some sense, largely due to the difficulty in locating the specific temporality of discourse. However, our analysis of Heidegger’s Paul, through *The Phenomenology of Religion*, revealed to us a hope of drawing together the distinct ideas of attestation, the call and conscience with the conceptions of authentic time, history and enactment. We showed that, although juvenile in

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its formulation in this early work, the καιρός is of vital import in understanding authenticity and conscience as described in *Being and Time*.

From Heidegger’s convoluted and vague descriptions of the phenomenon, we have been able to identify that there is a kind of movement inherent in conscience, as something that is involved with change. In the preceding chapters we have shown conscience to have the character of something both expected and to be prepared for, but equally sudden and disruptive in its coming to be present. It has a transformative role, that effects Dasein’s position towards its history and temporality: Dasein itself. Importantly, the occurrence of conscience is distinctly demarcated from the flow of time that is shared with others, although bound up with it in a specific way. What was reveal in the previous chapter was that these aspects reflect distinctly the specific temporality of the καιρός. The καιρός, to Heidegger’s Paul, is an inevitability, an imminent event that is a call to preparation. In its coming it is also sudden, violent in its way, and comes over the individual as something vital and individual. Where to Aristotle it is a call for a certain kind of action, to Paul it is more than that; it is a reason for a transformation of enactment, the very movement of life, time and history all. It is temporal; distinct from yet bound up with the χρόνος that is sharable and measurable. We have also displayed through Aristotle and Isocrates both, the way that it is bound up with λόγος absolutely. Thus, this essay posits that conscience is temporal, so closely does it resemble the “kairological” temporality here described.

In order to locate this specific temporal movement within the overall movement of Dasein, we must be cautious not to rely to heavily on either Aristotle or Paul, but keep in mind that both of these influences were brought together in a complex reworking in *Being and Time*. As afore established, it is possible to relate the καιρός, based on translations by Heidegger himself, to the Augenblick, but such a correlation is not direct. What stands out about the καιρός is its character as a kind of opening; its abruptness and suddenness are not capable of being held. The Augenblick of *Being and Time* is thus at odds with the καιρός, as its significance lies in its being held. One does not hold conscience, as with the καιρός, but awaits it or prepares for it as possibility. For this reason, rather than the Augenblick, the conscience - as that which opens up the authentic moment - is itself more akin to the καιρός. However, as unified, Dasein in authenticity is not to be considered as a composite entity, the Augenblick does not “follow”, is not “annexed” to, conscience, but rather these movements must be understood together. Any “kairological” reading of the Second Division of *Being and Time* cannot restrict its interpretation to the discussion of the “moment”, but must take into account this unity and involve conscience from the outset. Thus, we conclude that conscience is in a sense “kairological”, and as temporal in this way it is secured more firmly as a phenomenon “of” time, an expression of the movement of care. What remains at large,
however, is how the discoursing nature of Dasein - that conscience essentially is - coheres to this temporal structure.

§ 25 - THE TEMPORALITY OF DISCOURSE

The temporality of discourse in Being and Time is clearly complex, but its explicit explanation spans little more than a single page, a minor subsection of §68. At the time of its writing in 1927, discourse to Heidegger does not necessarily belong to any one of the three distinct temporal ecstasies, but rather is described as being “in itself temporal.” Discourse is disclosure, and disclosure has to do with all that Dasein is in all its temporal movements. Heidegger explains that: “The disclosedness of the there and the fundamental existentiell possibilities of Dasein, authenticity and inauthenticity, are founded in temporality. But disclosedness always pertains equiprimordially to the whole of being-in-the-world...” In a sense, discourse is able to range over all of the ecstasies, due to its ability to engage with them, that is disclose them, in its expression. Dasein is essentially its disclosure, and thus discourse - as part of the disclosive movement - moves temporally as Dasein does. But this description does little to unravel the enigma of discourse, particularly in its silent expression.

In Being and Time, as Powell makes explicit, temporality might even be said to be dependent on discourse in a way, as a result of understanding and attunement being determined through the being of language that is "equiprimordially determined by discourse." The nature of this relation remains one of the mysteries of Dasein at the close of the Second Division. The conclusion of Being and Time leaves the reader with a sense that much is left unclarified, not only because it is unfinished, but also because its subject, Dasein, remains largely in the shadows. This is perhaps because Heidegger is sees he is grappling with necessarily mystifying and enigmatic subjects. Brogan describes this enigmatic quality of Dasein as a kind of “strangeness”, and equates this to Dasein’s distance from itself. He writes:

“In this doubling of distance, Dasein is open to the estrangement of its own being as its most proper way of being. Dasein is a stranger to itself. It is clear that this sense of not being at home with oneself is more than the discomfort of Das Man in its evasion, though it is certainly the source of this. More so, I think, this call from afar,

186 Heidegger, Being and Time, p333
187 Ibid p334
this voice of conscience, is the horizon of Dasein’s being that is never to be overcome or surpassed.”

Conscience in Being and Time represents this “stranger” or the unnamed “friend” that every Dasein carries with it, which brings us also to the strangeness of discourse itself. Heidegger, in his later works, describes the λόγος as fundamentally difficult to grasp, as that which is too close to Dasein to be made clear: “The logos is what human beings are continually amid and what they are away from all the same, absently present; they are thus the axunetoí, those who do not grasp.” Yet somehow, it is from out of this silent mysteriousness, that the nature of being or beings finds its expression. Heidegger makes this explicit in his Letter on Humanism, writing: “Language is the house of being, which is propiated by being and pervaded by being. And so it is proper to think the essence of language from its correspondence to being and indeed as this correspondence, that is, as the home of the human beings essence.” Thus, this essay asserts not that conscience needs to be redetermined as only a temporal phenomenon, but rather that perhaps discourse and temporality might be considered together, as the uncertain, enigmatic and amorphous ground upon which all aspects of experience are made possible.

Krzysztof Ziarek, in his essay Giving Its Word: Event (as) Language, attempts to highlight more clearly the specific movement of discourse as an occurrence or an event. Ziarek’s focus is on two later writings of Heidegger’s: Contributions to Philosophy and On the Way to Language and what he describes as a “turnabout from the notion of Rede (discourse) in Being and Time to the notions of saying (Sage), way-making (Bewëgung), word (Wort), and signs (Wörter).” By this stage in Heidegger’s thought, “words” are not those written or spoken expressions that come into being with others, but instead the term is used to “describe a different dimension of language, one that constitutes its originary or originative momentum. This momentum is the leap, the origin (Ur-sprung), of language, which, by giving being to beings, makes room for signification and signs.” In On the Way to Language the “word” is described as “the word of being, which means the reticence of the
decision [Austrag] (event [Ereignis]), originary clearing”

It is described as a stillness, the in-between, the “there” of being.
The word is essentially silent, marked by its failure to come into expression.

This new conceptualisation of discourse resonates distinctly with conscience as described in Being and Time. Essentially, the word is the origin place of language, it marks the movement of Dasein from its abysmal silence into being and a relation to beings in general. The coming to words of discourse evolves for Heidegger to become the basis for understanding the temporality of Dasein in its most primordial realm. As an “event”, discourse is situated within experience as something that constitutes any coming into time at all. Ziarek outlines that: “the event “tunes” (stimmt) the humans to how being has, in the blink of an eye, always already unfolded in its spatio-temporal leap/origin into the “here and now,” that is, unfolded as the moment (Augenblick).”

A kind of event that opens Dasein to the moment is easily brought into alignment with our earlier description of conscience.

What is perhaps most remarkable about Heidegger’s conception of conscience, is its apparent disappearance, after a very brief period of emphasis in Being and Time alone. Heidegger had countless opportunities to investigate the idea, particularly in his work on Paul, but did not do so. In his work on Aristotle, he remarks on it only in passing, despite his establishing it as the ground for φρόνησις, one of the most important Aristotellean concepts that he investigates at great length. Seemingly quite suddenly in Being and Time, it appears as a fundamental and most vital component of Dasein’s path to authenticity, only to apparently disappear in later works. But, only a few years after the publishing of Being and Time, Polt describes an apparent revolution of thinking for Heidegger. He writes: “In the fall of 1933, Professor and Rector Martin Heidegger announces to his students that he has overturned his former understanding of language and silence. Whereas Being and Time described speaking and keeping silent as two modes of discourse, Heidegger now sees speech and discourse themselves as founded on a deep silence in which the world is disclosed.”

It seems to be that our question of conscience, the rather confusing silent call, finds a new emphasis in Heidegger’s later thinking.

At the outset of this essay we brought the language of conscience into question, asking whether Heidegger was justified in labelling this phenomenon as “conscience” [Gewissen] at all. In a poetic sense, his choice of language was clearly

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195 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p72

196 Ziarek, Giving Its Word: Event (as) Language, p108

warranted. We cannot ignore that the historical usages of the term *Gewissen*, as a kind of inner voice that follows along, resonate deeply with the silent “birthplace” of authentic voice outlined in *Being and Time*. Further, its close relation *Gewiss* [certain], aligns nicely with Heidegger’s idea of authenticity. Such interconnections are of clear importance. Our temporal reading of conscience, however, seems to indicate that the label of the καιρός might perhaps be more appropriate for the phenomenon, given its clear similarities. Indeed, Heidegger’s conception of conscience can, and must, be considered as something temporal, which we established at the outset as the source of unity for Dasein in *Being and Time*. However, to rename Heidegger’s conscience as καιρός is to make its vital interrelation with discourse less distinct. Thus, we must here make explicit that our temporal reading of conscience does not seek to distance conscience from its classification as discourse, rather its purpose is to elucidate the fact that, to Heidegger, temporality and discourse should be considered as seated together in the very most primordial movement of Dasein as whole. Such a relationship is found only in its infancy in *Being and Time*, and thus this essay points to a further investigation of Heidegger’s later work and an examination of the specific relationship between temporality and discourse that remains as yet in the shadows.
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