The Presentation of Political Actors on the Stage of Human Life

Framing Complex Australian Decisions about Ottoman-Armenian Deaths

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my son, Evren, with a Muslim mother and a Catholic father. I hope that you will take the multicultural attitude we try to foster at home and bring it out into the world with you; I hope that you will love and respect all, no matter what their last name is or where they were born. And finally, I hope that you will always feel at home, no matter where you are. May your generation be the one that experiences true change and reconciliation.
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This thesis is for anyone who has ever felt like they didn’t belong in their home, and for anyone who felt they couldn’t speak out about feeling isolated. It is for the Hrant Dinks and the Sarik Ariyaks of the world, who have lost their lives as a result of this endless dispute. Hrant Dink once said: "I challenge the accepted version of history, because I do not write about things in black and white. People here are used to black and white; that's why they are astonished that there are other shades, too." This thesis is for the political actors, who do not always see the shades of grey in the world – I hope this will be a step forward in opening your eyes to the available spectrum.
The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

Signature: ______________________________
Date: ______________

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Abstract

The debate about whether to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians in the early twentieth century as “genocide” has emerged in geographically distant Australian parliamentary discussions and decisions. The struggle to use and refuse such terms is deeply felt by the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish ethnic-migrant communities, for each of which the reframing is a question of cultural identity and a source of tension. This thesis explores how and why contentious international debates on the histories affecting the Armenians and Turks make their way into Australian State Parliaments, and how the debates and political decisions impact and play out on the lives of the two communities so far removed from the realities of the past. The thesis considers the impacts of these on Australia’s ‘normative’ concepts of multiculturalism.

This thesis also provides an overview of the historical background to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians in the early twentieth century, and highlights the areas of contention and scholarly disagreement. The purpose of this thesis is not to determine a label for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians. The roles of political actors, lobby groups, and the Australian media (both ethnic and mainstream) in framing debates, setting agendas and labels, and promoting activism are considered. Key media and political narratives are examined, to understand the ramifications of the New South Wales and South Australian Parliamentary decisions to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”. This thesis captures how culture, religious background, education and historical experiences impact unity and distances within and between the two diasporic communities, and presents an understanding of the decreased sense of belonging experienced by members of the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities through qualitative and quantitative research findings.

This thesis also examines the challenges facing Australia, a geographically distant nation in relation to ongoing struggles between the Armenians and Turks, and argues that the country is no longer “immune” to international warfare affecting ethnic-migrant communities living in Australia. It argues that multiculturalism cannot truly be embraced until the frames and labels, which oversimplify complex discourses and conflicted narratives, are understood.
Chapter One
Introduction

1.1 Nükte’s Story
The cultural mosaic that is Western Sydney is, and always has been, my home. Western Sydney assaults your senses daily; the mouth-watering aromas that filter through the streets of Auburn, the resplendent red, green and orange saris draping beautiful women in Liverpool, and the hustle and bustle of Parramatta. Each Western Sydney suburb has something unique, from across the globe, to offer all Australians.

This diversity has given me the courage to venture out of my little corner of the world, to embrace the richness that comes with other cultures. Yet I always return home, where cultures, identities and beliefs are fused; where I am comfortable. This comfort, however, is newly acquired. It came with the realisation that there are things an individual cannot change. For instance, debates taking place in the migrant “homeland” have the potential to taint Australian multiculturalism; this I cannot change. Nor can I change the debates that are often framed by political actors and the media to manage perceptions and satisfy agendas. In this work I endeavour to understand how the framing of historically contentious international issues affects ethnic-migrant communities, multiculturalism, national identity and political communication in Australia.

Tension among cultural groups in Australia is not uncommon. As a child, I would come home from school crying, begging my parents to let me go back home. Where did I think home was? Was I not already there? I had never lived anywhere outside of Australia, yet I had a firm belief that Sydney was not my home. I could not possibly belong here, could I? This place where I was teased, unaccepted and quite frankly, unhappy. This place was filled with stereotypes and embedded with racism. Could this be my home? Is this what home is, I would ask?
I was 10 years old on the day the first threads of thought arose for what would lead to this thesis. On this day, I sat with my father on our front porch; he pondered a work dilemma over a tumbler of whisky while I pondered my own misfortune over a glass of lemonade. Earlier in the day my Armenian friend had told me I could not come to his birthday party because his parents would go "nuts" if they knew he was friends with a Turk. Until then, I had not known of the century-old conflict. I had come home crestfallen, hence the lemonade, which I was rarely allowed. My father and I sat in silence till finally, I burst out. "Why do you not hate them?" He stared at me, the silence continued.

It was a simple question, or so I thought. Little did I know the same words would be repeated in my thesis many years later. I asked this question because, at the time, I did not understand the concept of hate, and I expected an explanation from my parents, one that encapsulated their personal outlook. As an obedient child, I was determined to feel what my parents did; to believe what they believed; to be on the side they were on. Today, more fascinating is that, as a 10-year-old, I had already seen that people were separated into categories: "us" and "them"; worse yet, I had done it myself.

Who are "they"? For the child staring into her lemonade, “they” were those who dared judge her simply on cultural background. On that particular day, the silence broke eventually and the answer, while unexpected, was simple. "I have no reason to hate," said my father. "I didn't experience anything first-hand. Either way, there are at least two sides to every story and I don't know both sides."

There was much more to think about, more than a child is capable of and, as such, that particular conversation was mentally shelved for a number of years. Eventually, those words would taunt me, forcing pen to paper, in the hopes of providing relief to others mourning over their lemonade.

No longer a child, this adult questions what she is told; whether the discourse takes place in a newspaper, a lecture theatre, or the front porch. Political, media and historical analysis today guide these questions. At first glance, one may believe this thesis is about revealing “what really happened”. This would be a mistake. My intention is not to argue what is and is not true. As a researcher, I am presenting yet another frame. What separates this particular frame is its unique positioning; written from the perspective of someone who has first-hand experience of the tense narratives.
between Australian ethnic-migrant groups. It is written, keeping in mind, the layers of bias and conflicting opinions that have the potential to taint the discussions that arise from this thesis. It is written with the realisation that individual interpretations of this multi-faceted debate are not necessarily fact.

In the last few decades, an increasing number of governments have recognised the deportation and subsequent deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915 to 1916 as “genocide”. Uruguay was the first nation to recognise the deaths as an act of “genocide” in 1965. Uruguay has since been followed by 20 other countries and certain states, including the New South Wales and South Australian State Parliaments. While the Australian Federal Government has refrained from using the “genocide” label, the New South Wales and South Australian State Parliaments have not followed suit. In 1997, the New South Wales Parliament’s recognition of the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians during World War I as “genocide” became the first such acknowledgement by an Australian legislative body. The term “genocide” was also later recognised by the South Australian Parliament in 2009. Both State Parliaments passed a motion designating 24 April as a day of remembrance. In response, some members of Australia’s migrant communities have raised the question of whether or not it is appropriate for governments to assign the label of “genocide”. The term “genocide” holds a place in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as such; it is a legal term with severe repercussions (9 December 1948). What we are currently seeing is a host of governments around the world, both federal and state, that are passing their own verdicts regarding matters of “genocide” without any prior legal proceeding, such as the Nuremberg Trials.

Regardless of the label used to describe the deaths from 1915 to 1916, the recounts passed down to the generations are chilling. Public debate over this tragedy has continued for almost a century, peaking every few decades. Tensions mounted in 2005, when Turkey officially began negotiations for European Union (EU) membership. Many member nations demanded that Turkey recognise the actions of the Ottoman-Turks as an act of “genocide” before they would support their bid. Recognition of the “genocide” label by EU member nations has reignited debate among key publics, particularly those of Armenian and Turkish descent, the tension spreading as far as Australia. Friction between those asserting and those refuting “genocide” increased once more in 2012 when the French Senate made it illegal to
recognise the deaths as anything other than “genocide”. While the French Constitutional Court soon quashed the motion, it was enough to spark debates across the globe again.

Back in Australia, the NSW Parliament took its recognition one step further, and in 2013 also labelled the deaths of Greeks and Assyrians during the same era as an act of “genocide”, allegedly committed by the Ottoman-Turks. The motion, spearheaded by President of the Australian Christian Party, Fred Nile, called for the “rectification of the historical injustice” and also demanded the Republic of Turkey recognise the deaths as “genocide” and apologise (Jovic, 2013).

Founded in 2008, the Armenian Historical Society of Australia (AHSA) has been calling for the “genocide” of the Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks to be included in the NSW Board of Studies Syllabus (Armenian Genocide Education Australia, 2017).

“We now want to bring it to Australian curriculum of the history for schools, as part of the existing subjects," states Dr Panayiotis Diamadis, from the Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies (Jovic, 2013). Armenian Genocide Education Australia has created a table stating which aspects of the “genocide” are best suited for which history topics (Armenian Genocide Education Australia, 2017). However, the motion to recognise “genocide” was not unanimous, and Members of Parliament, namely Barbara Perry and Tony Issa, refused to support the 2013 motion due to fears of instability in their multicultural communities. The previous “genocide” recognition motion in 2009 was met by a large public outcry from the Australian-Turkish community, and reports of their diminished sense of belonging in Australia began to be published in local Australian-Turkish press. The second “genocide” Parliamentary motion in NSW was met with the same response, with organised protests in front of the NSW Parliament. The protests, however, did not result in change.

Two labels head the current debate; the first is “genocide”; the second, “civil war”. Both narratives agree on the fundamentals – that many Ottoman-Armenians were relocated towards the end of World War I amidst Ottoman Government fears of revolutionaries cooperating with the Russian invaders of Eastern Anatolia to seize Ottoman cities, and that it was the civilians who perished in the crossfire and during relocation. Yet, there are great discrepancies between the final labels assigned (Suny,
2009; McCarthy, 2005). For decades, political actors from the Armenian and Turkish Governments have used the media to frame the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians in a light favourable to their agendas, effectively declaring an “information war”, which continues to this day. Such actors have spun nationalistic tales, which are not conducive to reconciliation.

Jupp (2003) says Australia was formerly “immune” to international influences due to its geographically remote location, however, globalisation has increased the media’s presence in politics. Events taking place in Australia are broadcast internationally, allowing heavy criticism of Australian politics; “nothing done here at the ends of the earth can remain immune from instant international comment” (p.202). Similarly, international agendas can also make their way into the Australian domain and influence political narratives, as has been the case with discussions regarding the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915 to 1916.

The question of why discussions of an event, which happened on the other side of the world, almost a century ago, are still prevalent in Australian parliamentary debates is multi-faceted. Is it because questions surrounding national identity are debated more intensely in expatriate countries, and parliamentary discussions mirror constituent discussions? How does the disseminated perception, particularly after legal recognition, then affect interpersonal communication among Australia’s many ethnic communities? Finally, what role did the Howard Government’s negligence of multiculturalism policy and Pauline Hanson’s attack on the concept of multiculturalism, play in the New South Wales and South Australian State Parliaments’ dismissal of the consequences of “genocide recognition” for Australian multiculturalism? This research presents the argument that the attention the two State Parliaments have given to the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians during World War I puts the ideal of Australian multiculturalism as a normative concept at risk by disengaging the affected community. This is felt deepest by the first generation of Australian-Turkish migrants, as they still have strong emotional ties to their homeland. By recognising the plight of one ethnic minority in Australia over another, each government has left the other feeling like an outcast and disengaged from the community. Communication tools such as framing, priming, agenda-setting and perception management can generate far-reaching tensions. The statements made by the New South Wales and South Australian Parliaments may not be legislative
changes, nor do they bind the governments, however, they heighten tensions and are not without repercussions for Australian ethnic communities. Unrest is to be expected when only one side of an argument is heard in a political setting.

Also detrimental to social cohesion is that the definition of “genocide” is not accepted across the board. The Federal Government and other State Governments have not adopted the term “genocide” in discussions surrounding the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians. Former Australian Foreign Affairs Minister (and former NSW Premier) Bob Carr’s “U-turn” regarding the assignment of labels in this case further highlights the potential for repercussions on both a national and international scale. As the Premier of New South Wales, Carr was an advocate of “genocide recognition”. In 1997, Carr led his government to become the first in Australia to recognise the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians during World War I as “genocide”. The decision was unanimous. He called on the Federal Government at the time to pass the same motion. However, after becoming the Federal Foreign Affairs Minister, Carr stepped away from the label. When asked about his then current position by Armenian National Committee (ANC) Australia Executive Director, Vache Kahramanian, Carr responded with: “As a government, we don’t take a stand on this historic dispute”. ANC Australia has since condemned Carr for stepping back from the “genocide” label (“Bob Carr U-Turns on Armenian Genocide,” 2013, February 23). Whether Carr stepped back in order to toe the party line, or because he believed there was some level of “dispute” over the final label, is irrelevant. His change in stance, from advocating to dismissing, raises the question; what are the potential repercussions of parliamentary assigned labels, particularly before legal recognition?

1.2. The Focus of this Thesis

This thesis reviews the potential repercussions of Australian state governments labelling contentious international events, in the context of multicultural Australia, by examining key media and political narratives. It evaluates how political actors use the media and key terms to frame certain historic events, conducting an “information war” with the aspiration to manage public perceptions. Representations of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915 to 1916, will form the main case study and will be used to ask the following core questions:
• how and why do contentious international debates make their way into Australian State Parliaments?
• how does the inclusion of contentious international debates in the Australian context impact the normative concept of multiculturalism?
• does the inclusion of these debates results in tense narratives between Australia’s different ethnic-migrant groups, particularly the Australian-Armenians and the Australian-Turks (gauged through activism as reported in the media, and through interviews)?
• what role does the media (both ethnic and mainstream) play in framing debates, setting agendas, setting forth labels, and promoting activism?

The object is not to revise historical accounts, or to provide the historical “facts”, but to evaluate how the accounts have been revised and retold from multiple perspectives, examining the role of the political actors.

Use of language has played a substantial role in shaping debates surrounding the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians. Words are a powerful tool, to say the least; they possess the potential to undermine regimes and create conflict between groups. Words have the capacity to reframe history and even justify war. Technology and media advancements have, and continue to, alter cultural and social relations (Meyrowitz, 1986).

This thesis will capture the apparent reasons for the adoption of particular frames in political communication, as well as the consequences of spreading one-sided framing on an international scale. One such consequence is legal recognition; such high levels of recognition can create equally high levels of stigma for the individuals in question. The background of the political actors raising and supporting key motions in parliaments will be presented to gather insight into their motivations for instigating the debate in an Australian context, as will the forms of arguments and appeals they are making. This thesis will also assess how theories such as framing, priming and agenda-setting are used by political actors, who have revised and retold historical accounts from multiple perspectives, to influence the ways an historic event is perceived, and the ensuing consequences these differing perspectives hold for multicultural Australia.
Did the Ottoman-Armenians who perished during World War I lose their lives due to civil war, or were they casualties of the first genocide in the 20th Century? This question deserves extensive archival research and informed debate, neither of which this thesis can provide; therefore, it will not hazard an opinion. The aim of this thesis is to examine why this question is being fiercely debated in Australian state politics and ethnic community domains. Focusing on the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915 to 1916, it will analyse how media representation of contentious international issues results in tense narratives among Australia’s ethnic-migrant communities.

Cultural identity, social equality and social cohesion have been identified by Greig, Lewins and White (2003) as the three themes, which require addressing in discussions regarding Australian ethnic relations. For this reason, to answer the research question, cultural identity factors, ethnic representation methods and opportunities, and community conflicts and tensions (as tracked through key media sources) will be analysed and discussed. It is necessary to link these themes in order to understand the problems “cultural pluralism” faces, and the influence of ethnic narratives on political discourses, and vice versa (Greig, Lewins & White, 2003).

Debates surrounding contentious international issues, the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians for instance, can fuel sentiments of exclusion and prejudice, turning Australia’s cultural mosaic into segregated clusters. Geographically distant from the inception point of international debates, Australia still provides a forum for them to be aired. According to the SBS report titled Connecting Diversity: Paradoxes of Multicultural Australia, young citizens from diverse backgrounds, who identify themselves as “Australian”, feel disconnected to their Australian heritage when faced with instances of what they perceive as ignorance and prejudice. Unfortunately, “many Australians have experienced or observed instances of prejudice, discrimination and intolerance first-hand” (Ang, Brand, Noble & Sternberg, 2006, p.7), leaving numerous Australians from ethnic backgrounds not feeling a “complete sense of belonging” (Ang, Brand, Noble & Wilding, 2002, p.7). This thesis will present an argument for how the framing of contentious international issues, in political environments, influences national identity and political communication in Australia. It portrays the disconnection of the Australian-Turkish and Australian-Armenian communities from
mainstream Australian society, because of their ongoing feuding over a century-old war they did not personally experience.

1.3. Key Terms

Multiple labels have been used to date to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians, from 1915 to 1916, including “genocide”, “civil war”, “tragedy”, “issue”, “holocaust”, “calamity”, “event”, “massacre”, and “question”, amongst others. Conflicting narratives surround the events of this period, and currently, if anything, the mass of available labels serves only to further confound the issue. As it is not the purpose of this thesis to determine whether the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians were the result of “genocide”, “civil war”, or any other label, the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915 to 1916 are referred to as “the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916” in this thesis, or “the mass killing” if referred to directly after or in a table.

If these events are described by terms such as “civil war” or “genocide” by other researchers, they will be placed within quotation marks. Using none of the popular terms appears to be the most even-handed approach to representing the situation’s many differing perspectives.

“Media”, as used in this thesis, specifically refers to journalism and news media, whether it is print, broadcast or online. The focal point will be political communication published by the media, in particular that surrounding historic events. Constricting this definition is essential to understanding the agenda-setting capability of political journalism, and how it can influence public perceptions.

The term “political actors” is also used in this thesis. Alongside elected members of parliament, government spokespeople and politically active “agents” capable of sculpting messages and communicating themes to audiences, will also be considered “political actors”.

“Multiculturalism” in this thesis refers specifically to the Australian multiculturalism policy context of managing cultural diversity and social integration. Australian multiculturalism supports “assisted social integration”; it allows Australian migrants to maintain a portion of their cultural identities and lifestyles, as long as respect for the majority of the population is maintained (Pakulski, 2013).
Multiculturalism recognises the fact that diversity can be beneficial for the upward mobility of a nation.

The use of the term “belonging” in this paper refers specifically to the sense of belonging to the nation of residence, experienced by individuals of an ethnic-migrant background.

The definition of lobbying, set forth by Gurbanzade (2012), as “the process of seeking to influence a government and its institutions to execute policies that serve interests of a group of individuals,” is accepted by this thesis.

References to the “other” indicate the presentation, by a political actor, of a person or persons with opposing views as an enemy.

1.4. From Gaps in Knowledge to Social Conflict

The differing cases for characterisations of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 are made on assumptions and misinformation; many necessary questions are not asked as their answers are presumed. The mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is consequently left floating in what Pierre Bourdieu called the “universe of the undiscussed”, where the role played by perception management techniques is not consciously considered and their impact is left undebated (Bourdieu, 1977).

With so much remaining unsaid, the creation of social conflict becomes inevitable. The residing conflict manipulates debates, dominates media content and alters impressions. “Periods of heightened social conflict and crisis profoundly transmute individual and collective realities... It alters diplomatic relations. It shapes foreign policy among nation states” (Mander, 1999, p.3). The resulting social conflict and tense narratives are capable of affecting national identity, influencing political communication and of prompting legislative changes.

Framing, priming, agenda-setting and perception management all have strengths, weaknesses and, ultimately, limitations. This thesis gauges the effectiveness of each method by applying topical literature to relevant case studies. Furthermore, analysis of media representation of contentious international issues, such as the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, highlights tense exchanges of narratives between Australian ethnic-migrant community groups. The thesis reviews
the labels employed by political actors to exclude critical discussion and to wage an “information war” in order to manage perceptions and set agendas. In doing so, it gauges the effectiveness of key communication tools, such as framing, priming and agenda-setting.

1.5. Addressing Bias and Recognising Facts

In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to ascertain personal points of bias; how and why events are interpreted in a specific manner. “The history that now affects every man is world history,” argues Mills (1959, p. 4). This may be the case, yet only a handful of individuals spend the necessary time and energy to make the connections between past and present. Though we live in an “age of fact”, acquiring information and reasoning skills is draining for there is an abundance of outlets delivering both. For this reason, individuals require more than information and reasoning skills; they require a “quality of mind” that will allow them to use their skills to analyse the readily available “facts”. Mills refers to this quality of mind as the “sociological imagination” (1959, p. 5).

Achieving “quality of mind” is a more plausible venture if one first accepts one’s own bias. With “quality of mind”, a reviewed text “can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings” (Gadamer, 2006, pp. 271-272). Piercing the barriers of bias is by no means a simple task. The researcher must keep his or her own bias in mind, as well as that of other researchers, the situations in which they are found, and the time period during which the reviewed text was produced; these factors all contribute to the perspective a text takes (Said, 1997). As Hallett (1961) suggests: “Study the historian before you study the facts” (p.26). Overcoming the barrier of bias is only possible if “self awareness” is present to interpret views that are “distant and alien but human nonetheless,” observes Said (1997, p. 244).

As an Australian-Turk, I personally felt stigmatised when I first learned about the New South Wales and South Australian Governments’ motions to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916; I initially found the motions passed by the two governments to be offensive. Having said that, I was glaringly aware of this bias, and worked objectively to ensure it would not colour my analysis of the
data or the presentation of this research. The research was undertaken using a reflexive approach, which is detailed as part of the methodology in Chapter Four. Every effort has been made to analyse the data while keeping my own bias, and the biases of other researchers, in mind.

Debates surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians often have a national undertow; the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians is considered to form a part of each concerned nation’s cultural identity. Undoubtedly, those involved feel a strong affinity towards the respective arguments. As Hall (1994) observes, the development of each individual’s cultural identity is reliant on the past as much as the future. “Cultural identity is constantly negotiated between the retelling of history and an ongoing struggle about power and knowledge,” argues Madmoni-Gerber (2009, p. 181). Unfortunately, retellings of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and the differing opinions surrounding it, result in conflict, which is further intensified by media coverage (Tichenor, Donohue & Olien, 1999). While conflict can be a necessary part of social diversity and liberty of speech, in this instance – the labelling of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in a multicultural nation – the arising conflict is socially damaging.

“The fact is that precious little in the way of dialogue and exchange – both of which occur in scholarly debate, in artistic production, in the encounters between ordinary human beings who do business, interact, and generally talk to, as opposed to at, each other – makes it into the domain so dominated by the mass media,” argues Said (2005, pp. 592-593). Journalists are not commonly expected to dig through archives or dedicate themselves to scholarly research; that is normally considered to be the role of the historian. Media practitioners instead often quote political actors, who use the opportunity to disseminate their reductive arguments, structured around simplistic labels. Consequently, off-the-cuff comments are broadcast as “absolute reality”. It is unreasonable to expect journalists to perform the role of the historian. Arguably, however, it is not unreasonable to expect journalists to at least attempt the inclusion of all perspectives and definitions surrounding a topic. Deadlines, however, rarely allow for this. The engagement of journalists with political sources, and the subsequent progression to “fact”, are analysed in this thesis.

Relevant statements made by key political actors, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Serzh Sargsyan and Barack Obama, are also reviewed in this thesis to track
their influence on public perceptions. Furthermore, this thesis considers questions of ethics that arise when journalists and media members communicate reductive arguments based on opinion, without supporting data; “opinion”, once broadcast, is often seen as “fact”. Critical assessment of society and politics is central to ethical processes (Butler, 2005).

Facts are never pure; “they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder” (Hallett, 1961, p.24). By identifying the potential dilemmas biased perspectives and contentious terminologies can create, it is possible to overcome the obstacles these issues present. Only then can the pertinent analysis of media representation of contentious international issues, and their effects on ethnic-migrant discourses, be undertaken; a significant task to improving community relations in multicultural Australia, where over 28 per cent of the population was born overseas (ABS, 2017), and many Australians from non-English speaking backgrounds “do not feel a complete sense of belonging” (Ang, Brand, Noble & Wilding, 2002, p.7).

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into 10 chapters, each bound by the common theme that political actors, active “agents” capable of sculpting messages and communicating themes to audiences, use the media to influence perceptions and gain support for their political agendas. Together, these chapters will answer the research question: How does the representation of contentious international issues create tense narratives between the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish ethnic-migrant communities? The narratives surrounding the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities will form the main case study. Specific case studies are introduced to present the argument that political actors use the media to disseminate sculpted messages, in order to influence perceptions and gain support for their political agendas, which can have a detrimental effect on the two communities. The effects, otherwise described as a continuing sense of grievance, are documented by looking at various media and online forums.

Chapter One of this thesis introduces the research topic and identifies and clarifies the key terms and the manner in which they are used. It addressed the issue of bias and explains why “the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-
1916” is necessary to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915 to 1916, for the purposes of this thesis, in place of more commonly used descriptors, such as “genocide”, “civil war”, “massacre” and “tragedy”. This chapter explains why the researcher was drawn to this topic, and presents the debates and research important to understanding the ruptures in ethnic-migrant communities, and the effect on multiculturalism.

While the central theme explores how political messages circulated via the media can influence opinions, behaviours, and create tension and conflict between ethnic migrant communities, the historic events, which caused this perception and the consequential repercussions, have not been ignored. History, politics and the media are undeniably intertwined. Chapter Two reviews the literature on Australian migration history and theory, and subsequent multiculturalism policies and theories, discussing what has worked and what has caused disillusionment, especially among ethnic-migrant communities. It considers Australian multiculturalism, identity and nationalism in political and social contexts. This chapter takes into account Geoffrey Brahm Levey’s (2011) review of “thick” cultural nationalism, “thin” liberal nationalism and the “civic and post-nationalist” position, and his final position that while there is and should be a “national culture”, we need to distinguish between those parts of it which governments must seek to define and those parts that must remain in the hands of Australian communities (p.76). Based on these works, the responsibilities of the political actors, who have played a role in defining the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in the Australian context, are discussed. The assumed responsibilities of cultural leaders are also discussed, particularly in consideration of the Galbally Report (1978). Chapter Two also reviews how multiculturalism has influenced media practise in Australia, considering the Special Broadcasting Services’ (SBS) approach in particular.

Chapter Three provides a timeline for discussions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in the South Australian and New South Wales State Parliaments, with the history for the South Australian resolution, as well as the two New South Wales resolutions. Furthermore, this chapter reviews arguments that a shift from multiculturalism to post-multiculturalism is evident in some nations, however, suggests that this is not the case in the Australian context and considers the possibility that the problem facing Australian multiculturalism is not the concept itself
but rather the terminology surrounding it. The works of Greg Noble (2009), Scott Poynting (2004) and Jan Pakulski (2013), who suggest that an increasingly racial quality is applied to Australian debates regarding national identity, social structures, unity, and cultural differences, particularly in instances where the actual social problem at hand is difficult to comprehend, are presented. The inherent dilemmas to multiculturalism as a normative concept are reviewed. The works of James Jupp (2011) and the joint work of Stephen Castles, Bill Cope, Mary Kalantzis and Michael Morrissey (1992) are considered, with reference to arguments that national borders are becoming redundant in a global setting.

The theoretical approaches that underpin the argument presented in this thesis are reviewed as they become necessary, across all chapters. The objective is to provide the ideas that formed the theoretical foundation of this study as they become relevant to the argument at hand.

Chapter Four is dedicated to the theoretical framework, by which the narratives surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 are assessed, including theories of migration, multiculturalism, framing, agenda setting, perception management and labelling.

Chapter Five looks at the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish community demographics, presenting their history and reasons for migration and the subsequent decisions to settle in certain areas of Australia. It explains the relationship between spatial dispersion to political strength and cohesion. It looks at how class has shaped the social and political participatory experiences of these communities, reviewing the ability and desire, or lack thereof, of the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities to form persuasive lobby groups around the issues they care about, namely labels surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. This chapter also examines the idea that participation in political endeavours, such as lobbying, is fuelled by life experiences; specifically, that hardships have the ability to unite members of a community (Castles et al., 1992). As such, it reviews the experiences that have united the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities into their own clusters.

It is essential to understand the significant historical developments, which led to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 before we can understand why the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is still
relevant in Australia today, and why there is a continuing fight to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

Chapter Six provides a summary of the key secondary sources that review the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. It presents the historians and their backgrounds in order to offer not just their position about the label that best represents the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 but also the context in which their research was undertaken. It presents the events, which are and are not disputed, and offers the reasons and references that scholars have cited when they have disputed another scholar’s work. The contributions that Armenia and Turkey have made in the dissemination of labels for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 are also reviewed. By providing the differing perspectives, this chapter provides the background into the current political and social climate, and offers possibilities for why the debates surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 continue in Australia, as well as among Armenian and Turkish migrants.

Chapter Seven explores the political presence of ethnic communities in Australia, specifically exploring the “ethnic seat paradox” and the level of political participation by the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities. It looks at the idea of political representation, and considers who has the legitimacy to politically represent a group. It also considers the relationship between political participation and the communities’ ability and desire, or lack thereof, to form persuasive lobby groups around the issues surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. It considers what is required to make a strong lobby group, and why the Australian-Armenian community has been able to do this while the Australian-Turkish community has not. The analysis draws on key aspects of the work of Sawer and Zappala (2001), Fitzgerald (2006) and Phillips (1995).

Chapter Eight presents the key motions that have resulted in heightened debate over the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The media content analysed was restricted to the month before and after four key events. The first is the passing of a New South Wales Government motion, on 17 April 1997, recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”. The second is the passing of a South Australian Government motion, on 25 March 2009, recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of
“genocide”. The third is the Sarkozy Government’s attempt to illegalise denial of an “Armenian genocide”. This Bill was passed by the French Senate on 23 January 2012, and later deemed anti-constitutional by the French Constitutional Court and quashed on 28 February 2012. The third event took place from 23 January to 28 February, therefore the data analysis period for this event began one month before 23 January and ended one month after 28 February. The fourth event took place on 8 May 2013, when the New South Wales Government recognised the mass killings between 1915-1916 also as Assyrian, Armenian and Greek “genocides”. Chapter Eight also includes the findings from interviews with political actors who have been responsible for the sculpting of messages in the debates surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The perspectives and experiences of the said political actors are discussed, and their views on the use of labels are explored.

Chapter Nine presents the discussion of the research findings, including the benefits and drawbacks of legal recognition, and the resulting stigma for the two ethnic-migrant community groups. The outcomes are evaluated to determine the challenges facing the notion of Australian multiculturalism, national identity and unity of the two feuding groups.

Chapter Ten concludes the thesis by summarising the issues surrounding political and national identity, multiculturalism policies, and community participation. It reviews the implications for Australians of ethnic-migrant origins, particularly the members of the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities. It looks at key political debates and media responses, reiterating the role of political actors and the media in framing, priming, labelling and agenda setting. It offers an explanation about how these techniques are used to manage public perceptions and influence policy-making. The chapter reaffirms the argument that it is not the place of governments to define contentious historical events, such as the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, if the issues have not yet faced the scrutiny of an international court hearing. It recapitulates the effects of tense narratives regarding contentious international issues in the Australian context, and the resulting challenges inherent to multiculturalism.

The ability of political actors to frame historic events ways that aid the setting of agendas, and ultimately manages public perceptions, is central to this thesis. The chapters in this thesis present an understanding of how media representation of
contentious international issues can result in tense narratives between Australia’s different ethnic-migrant community groups, and what this means for multiculturalism as a normative concept.

1.7. Expected Contribution

“Man is a history-making creature who can neither repeat his past nor leave it behind,” said Auden (1989, p.278). The Turkish and Armenian Governments offer a great deal of credibility to Auden’s words. Neither side has moved on, trapping themselves and other international communities; effectively disadvantaging their own citizens and economies.

This thesis offers insight into how political actors use the media and key labels to frame events and manage perceptions, particularly in the case of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. It discusses the arising conflicts that are found in relevant narratives and explains how international narratives make their way into the Australian political arena, and the tension they consequently create among ethnic-migrant community groups.

Democracy requires “self-observatories” to review the processes of cultural institutions and their attempts at reform. Upon achievement of these conditions, “the policy sciences of democracy can then advance more rapidly from their present state of promising through imperfect development to maximum usefulness,” argues Laswell (1976, p. 173). This thesis holds the political actors claiming to offer “self-observatories” to a level of accountability; and, as such, it provides an avenue for self-observation itself.

Successful cultural development requires dynamism, diversity and dispute. Yet, often, attitudes towards conformism, fundamentalism, paternalism, exoticism, globalism and, importantly, ethnocentrism are instead adopted. These attitudes, in turn, halt cultural development (Hamelink & Anderson, 1989). This thesis provides a diverse line of inquiry, in the form of comparative analysis, to step away from ethnocentrism and come closer to grasping cultural development and multiculturalism.

The case of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 requires critical and analytical inquiry. The Living Diversity: Australia’s Multicultural Future report states “support for cultural diversity increases distinctly with education” (Ang, Brand, Noble & Wilding, 2002, p.6). The university environment, capable of
maintaining structured and accountable debate, is an ideal backdrop to conduct the necessary research and educational support. As argued by Boas Sanjero “the road to achieving true peace goes through exposing and agreeing on the past, not through hiding it” (Madmoni-Gerber, 2009, p. 192) – a feat which restrictive framing has prohibited to date.

This research is unique in the fact that it attempts to take a step towards providing closure to the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities, who have long since clung to the trauma they experienced in their homelands. Rather than choosing one perspective over another, it examines why these people are struggling to come to terms with a war they did not personally experience, and why their debates are filtering into Australian politics and the media. It is possible that rather than a definition or a label for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, what these people need for closure is an apology from the current Turkish Government, for the trauma experienced during the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 – much like Kevin Rudd’s apology to Indigenous Australians, which took an important step towards healing some of the trauma that still affects Indigenous communities to this day. Having said that, any form of “solution” to the current political climate between the Armenians and Turks on a global scale is well outside of the scope of this thesis. Instead this thesis recognises that Australians stand to benefit from understanding Turkish and Armenian political motivations. Trading successfully with these countries requires an understanding of the events that trigger the actions of their people. Furthermore, with members from both diasporas residing in Australia, this knowledge can serve to enhance community relations between Australian-Armenians and Australian-Turks, alongside other community members and support the development of cultural diversity (Ang, Brand, Noble & Wilding, 2002). By moving beyond “confrontation and reductive hostility”, Edward Said (2005, p. 595) believes individuals can learn to respect the details of human experiences and gain understanding, which stems from compassion, alongside moral and intellectual knowledge. “[I]n the process we can dispose finally of both residual hatred and the offensive generality of labels like ‘the Muslim’, ‘the Persian’, ‘the Turk’, ‘the Arab’ or ‘the Westerner’...” Multiculturalism cannot be truly embraced until the frames and labels, which oversimplify complex discourses and tense narratives, are understood.
Chapter Two
Australian Migration and Multiculturalism:
History, Policies and Theories

“A major problem in discussing multiculturalism rationally is that it means many
different things to many different people in many different situations.”

(Jupp, 2011, p.41)

Chapter One of this thesis established the presence of migrants from Armenian and
Turkish backgrounds in Australia; the place they hold in Australian society, and the
place their historic memories hold. It argued that, for the purposes of this thesis, the
use of “the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916” is necessary to
describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians, in place of more commonly used
descriptors, such as “genocide”, “civil war”, “massacre” and “tragedy”. It also
introduced the notion that while the use of labels cannot alter historical “reality”, it
can alter audience perceptions of “reality”, and essentially “amend” perceptions of
events to present a perspective that political actors favour, and influences policy on a
global scale.

Chapter Two presents the history of Australian multiculturalism and public
policies in order to develop the context for this thesis. It also explores the concept of
multiculturalism as a civil ideal and sets forth this author’s own concept of
multiculturalism. Debates about the practice of multiculturalism are often made more
difficult by the many differing understanding of what multiculturalism is. As indicated
in the introduction to this thesis, the practice of multiculturalism is marred by media
representation of nationalistic quarrels, which have the ability to create tensions
among Australian ethnic-migrant communities. This chapter begins by examining the
history of migration to Australia. It is important to note that immigration and
multiculturalism, while intertwined, are two separate policy areas. However, for the
purpose of creating the context in which to review the past, present and future of
Australian multiculturalism, it is essential to review the migration policies that led to
its advent. This chapter establishes a historical context regarding policy development and discusses the challenges facing multiculturalism.

In this thesis, the term multiculturalism specifically refers to the Australian multiculturalism policy of managing cultural diversity and social integration. This thesis accepts the principle that Australian multiculturalism supports assisted social integration, allowing Australian immigrants to maintain a portion of their cultural identities and lifestyles as long as they respect and obey civic norms common to all people residing in Australia. Multiculturalism recognises that ethnic diversity has the potential to improve the social structure of a nation (Pakulski, 2013). Following the shifts from assimilation to integration to multiculturalism policies, this chapter reflects on the implications of these shifts for the ethnic-Australian and wider-Australian communities. In order to do so, the works of Jupp (2011), Castles (1992) and Galbally (1978) are presented. There is discussion on the various theoretical positions on Australian multiculturalism and the assumed responsibility of political actors, media professionals and community leaders in multicultural Australia, specifically examining their role in portraying the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The chapter also considers the different conceptualisations of multiculturalism, in particular, how multiculturalism may be viewed as a normative concept. It reflects on Levey’s (2011) view of the need for a “national culture” and review of “thick” cultural nationalism, “civic and post-nationalism” and “liberal nationalism” (p.76). Levey’s essay asks whether it is possible to maintain a national-cultural identity while also supporting cultural diversity, and his work is used here to distinguish between those parts of “national culture” that governments must seek to define and those parts that must remain in the hands of Australian communities. The impact of white nationalism and white paranoia, as evaluated by Hage (2000, 2002) is also detailed. Multiculturalism is presented as both a policy and a concept. This thesis argues that while the concept and the policies supporting multiculturalism are still alive in Australia, there has been a retreat from research into multiculturalism and discussions about multiculturalism (Banting & Kymlicka, 2012, 2013). It also argues that multiculturalism in the Australian context requires revitalisation if it is to be accepted as a normative concept.
2.1. From Immigration Restriction to Integration

The *Immigration Restriction Act* (Commonwealth of Australia, 1901), commonly known as the White Australia Policy, was passed in 1901 to “place certain restrictions on Immigration and to provide for the removal from the Commonwealth of prohibited Immigrants”, in other words, to impede the migration of non-Europeans. Although, European migrants did not receive what may be called a warm welcome; particularly during the Depression, when work was scarce and there were open displays of hostility and attempts to exclude non-British immigrants from the workforce (Castles, et al. 1992, p.9).

Australia accepted few immigrants from 1930 to 1945, however, this changed with the end of World War II and Australia relaxed its preference for British migrants and accepted Christian migrants from Europe (Jupp, 2011). In the post-war era, certain nations were conspicuous in their pro-immigration population policies; Australia, Israel, Canada and the United States. However, in relation to its population, no country accepted as high a percentage of immigrants as Australia. As a “First World society with low birth rates”, Australia actively recruited to double its population “to a significant extent through immigration in 40 years” (Castles, et al. 1992, p.1). While Christian immigrants became more desirable during the post-war era, the Australian Government was still wary of the intake of Europeans from different religious backgrounds. Following World War II, however, the Australian Government allowed an influx of Jewish refugees escaping Nazis, after pressure from the United Nations (Kepple, 2009). The sudden shift in policy was not met favourably by the public and conservative political actors, and the general expectation was that the wider Australian community should not have to support the new refugees. As a result, the Australian-Jewish community was left to oversee and support their settlement (Jupp, 2011; Kepple, 2009).

Between 1947 and 1954, 171,000 “displaced persons” immigrated under assistance package schemes. The mass immigration from 1947 to 1954 was to become as challenging as the migration of the Chinese goldminers during the 1850s. The assumption and stated policy goal was, however, that the White Australia Policy would see to their swift assimilation. The public policy of the time presupposed that migrants, who “looked Australian”, would leave behind their language, cultural norms
and “ancient quarrels” for the chance to become Australian. It was assumed that the new Australians would fit in and maintain social harmony if they abided by the policy. As such, the burden to fit the ideal of the “common” Australian was placed upon the new migrant population. The Government did not shoulder the burden nor did it question the difficulties that may be inherent with leaving behind one’s cultural norms, it merely expected the migrants to readily accept the Australian national identity; after all, wasn’t the life they could have as an Australian so much better than their previous experiences? The limited assistance provided to non-English speaking migrants from 1947 to 1954 came in the form of a place to stay, in the migrant hostels. Another form of assistance was the Colombo Plan. Started in 1950 by the Commonwealth nations, the Colombo Plan saw “wealthy donor countries” donating “capital and technical assistance to poor Asian nations” (Tavan, 2005, p.84). While the plan allowed for thousands of Asian students to receive an education in Australia, the number of international Asian students that were enrolled privately still greatly outweighed the number of students who received a scholarship (Tavan, 2005).

While the Australian Government expressed the need for immigrants to leave behind their cultural norms, it did not feel necessary to act against certain homeland feuds that lingered on, such as the resentment towards repression experienced under the Nazi German regime and the Soviet Union – a feud, which served the Australian Government’s purposes with the development of the Cold War (Jupp, 2011).

The displaced persons to migrate from 1947 to 1954 were mainly Christian Europeans, which provided the wider Australian community with comfort; cohesion was expected to be secured through the common religious heritage of Australia’s new diverse ethnic groups (Jupp, 2011). Despite the plan, the Government soon found itself having to recruit immigrants that were a “darker shade of white” (Hage, 2002, p.424). The majority of those migrating were from Italy, Greece, Malta, Holland and Germany (Jupp, 2011). Although the Australian Government continued to prefer British migrants, to the point where it financed recruitment efforts in Britain, the decision to allow immigrants from the Mediterranean and southern Europe, the arrival of the new immigrants still left some Australians feeling a racial and cultural threat. Under the guise of these threats, the White Australia Policy and the ideology of assimilation gained further support within the Government (Hage, 2002). Eventually, their arrival and the arrival of others prompted more intense study of ethnicity in Australia. Prior
to the 1960s, the study of ethnicity and immigration was limited to the 1920s work of Jens Lyng and the 1930s work of Augustin Lodewyckx. The introduction of displaced persons to Australian society led to the 1950s and 1960s works of Charles Price, Jerzy Zubrzycki, Wilfred David Borrie, Jean Martin and Roy T. Appleyard (Jupp, 2011, p.44; Rowse, 2005, p.152). Of these academics, it was Borrie who researched assimilation in Australia, initially focusing on the Italians and Germans who migrated to Australia, and worked towards finding a consensus of the policy ideal of assimilation (Rowse, 2005).

Some of the first attitude surveys regarding ethnicity came from the Melbourne University Psychology Department, where Oscar Oeser created them. The use of attitude surveys found public opinion to be influenced by racial categorisation. According to the results, at the time, the most popular migrants were those of British, German and Dutch descent. The least popular were “Negroes” and those of Chinese or Jewish descent (Jupp, 2011).

It quickly became apparent to the Anglo-Australian community that ethnic variety was becoming a permanent part of the Australian landscape. The assimilation policies in place to deal with this ethnic variety, however, were aggravating relations between the wider Australian community and the European populace, who were attempting to obtain residency. The expectation that the latter should leave behind their cultural norms was creating bitterness among the migrant communities. On the other hand, the Anglo-Australian population did not realise how irksome the migrant communities found the expectation to assimilate. There are, after all, certain things the migrant communities could not change – and, understandably, did not want to change – which impacted their ability to assimilate; such as physical appearance, historical events, cultural values (Jupp, 2011).

“The crude expectation that individuals would somehow change their personality, language, behaviour and beliefs to become ‘real Australians’ was not only silly but created a great deal of resentment and was a barrier to effective integration into Australian society...” (Jupp, 2011, p.45)

The growing resentment by the European migrants towards an assimilation policy that forced them to ignore their cultures was a clear indication that the governmental policy
of assimilation was not working and not delivering the Government’s promise of social harmony. Said harmony was expected to occur when the new migrants changed their habits and attitudes, to adopt what was considered the ideal Australian way of life. The expected change in habits, however, was not the easy feat that had been imagined by the Australian Government, and the outcome was that both the white Australian public and the migrant populace felt that the Government was not meeting its obligations. Furthermore, assimilation policies left the Australian migrant community feeling detached from the Anglo-Australian community. Despite growing detachments between Australia’s different ethnic communities, studies of ethnicity and immigration remained few and far between, other than the research mentioned earlier in this chapter. It is possible that greater investigation would have resulted in the earlier abandonment of assimilation policies (Jupp, 2011).

With an increasing desire among the settled Australian public to see migrants who ‘looked Australian’ to ‘become Australian’, calls to end the White Australia Policy also increased and received renewed support with the retirement of former Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies (from 1939 to 1941 and from 1949 to 1966), and Federal Leader of the Labor Party (1960 to 1967) and former Minister for Immigration (1945 to 1949) Arthur Calwell. By the late 1960s, immigrants who were “even lesser shades of white” were making their way to Australian shores, and it became clear that assimilation was not working. The post-war migrants “had not simply become Australian…. They did not shed their previous cultural practices, and they did not become indistinguishable from the population of British origin, at least not as quickly as expected.” (Hage, 2002, p.426) With that, the Federal Government began to realise that “assimilation was not easy for everyone. Immigration policy turned to highlighting integration recognising the increasing diversity of the immigration intake” (DIAC, 2011, p.4).

In 1964, the Assimilation Division in the Immigration Department became the Integration Division, which saw to a redefinition of the department’s political and social objectives. Under the new policy of integration, it was accepted that immigrants would not willingly give up ethnic media and clubs, as had been assumed under assimilation policies. By doing so, the Government accepted its responsibility to coordinate the different cultural interests, to an extent, to achieve an acceptable level of social harmony. This did not, however, entail a change to the selection of migrants.
The shift from assimilation to integration has been described as a means to placate white paranoia. “In this sense integration was saying that assimilation took more time than expected, and it was an invitation to the White population not to panic in the face of the now visible non-British ethnic presence in public spaces,” states Hage (2002, p.426).

There was still much suspicion targeted at immigrants, particularly from blatantly discriminatory community groups such as the Good Neighbour Council, which opposed the provision of membership to “overtly ethnic” community organisations (Jupp, 2011, p.46). In contrast, trade unions began to consider and provide for their new migrant members, and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) began to abandon its suspicions of migrants. This trend continued with the election of new leader, Gough Whitlam, in 1971. Whitlam realised that labourers of Italian, Greek, Yugoslavian and Maltese heritage were potential ALP voters, and this recognition led to Labor receiving support from areas inhabited by large immigrant populations (Jupp, 2011).

With the election of Whitlam, the “fantasy of a White European Australia” was no long the deciding factor in the creation of government policies, and the first small strides towards a multicultural Australia were taken (Hage, 2002, p.427). The Whitlam Government went on to abolish the Immigration Department. Whitlam asserted the Department was “racist” and that its continual commitment to the creation of a White Australia would not be tolerated. He was backed by then Immigration Minister, Al Grassby (Jupp, 2011).

Integration was never defined in political policy and was let go of during the Whitlam Government’s 1970s overhaul of immigration policy. The move allowed for the introduction of multiculturalism. Jupp (2011) believes that the smooth transition from integration to multiculturalism was a result of the policies’ compatibility. There was no significant difference in the assumptions made by the concepts of integration and multiculturalism, nor were the obligations the policies imposed on governments and other political actors contradictory. Essentially, the move from integration to multiculturalism was a case of re-labelling. The same could not be said for the transition from assimilation to integration; a dramatic shift from expecting migrants to leave behind their cultural behaviours and beliefs, to those same behaviours and beliefs being accepted.
The support of the Government was essential to the success of multiculturalism’s uptake. The support of Gough Whitlam and later Malcolm Fraser presented a renewed commitment to the policy. Fraser was the first to use the term 'multicultural society' in parliament, on 20 March, 1974, during his criticism of Al Grassby's speech; *A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future*. In his speech, Grassby stated: “The social and cultural rights of migrant Australians are just as compelling as the rights of other Australians. The full realisation of these rights would lead to reduced conflicts and tensions between the groups which are weaving an ever more complex fabric for Australian society as we hurry towards the turn of the century”. (Grassby, 1973, p.9) Fraser, despite criticising the speech, and stating it lacked substance, acknowledged the ideal of multiculturalism was “essentially hopeful” (Koleth, 2010).

The support the multiculturalism policy received from State Premiers Neville Wran in New South Wales and Don Dunstan in South Australia was necessary for its adoption. Wran, in particular, created the first Anti-Discrimination Board, the first Ethnic Affairs Commission, the first NSW Review of Public Administration, the first Office for Women, and followed these with many other civil rights initiatives. The main source of political opposition stemmed from Queensland’s conservative Joh Bjelke-Petersen (Jupp, 2011). Queensland’s then Premier, Bjelke-Petersen, claimed: “If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is a duck.” (Lim, 2007) Prime Minister Whitlam described the conservative Premier as a “Bible-bashing bastard” (West, 2014). Whitlam’s own stance was clearly stated during his election speech, in which he said, “We should no longer expect migrants to settle for the second rate, particularly when so much of what passes for our best is itself second rate by the standards of the countries with which we compare ourselves” (Whitlam, 1971).

In *Origins of Multiculturalism*, Lopez (2000) argues a small group of activists in Melbourne lobbied to influence Whitlam and the Victorian ALP. However, Jupp (2011) asserts that while this may have been the case, it is an unrealistic notion of how multiculturalism was “dreamed up” (p.48). Jupp maintains that there were comparable developments in Sydney and Adelaide during the 1970s. He also draws attention to the achievements of the Migrant Education Action and the Migrant Workers Conference (Jupp, 2011). The final nail was placed in the White Australia Policy.
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coffin in 1979 when then Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser opened Australia’s door to refugees escaping post-war Vietnam (Jupp, 2011; Tavan, 2005).

While there were many contributing factors that sparked the gradual move of policy from assimilation to integration to multiculturalism, Hage (2000) argues the changes came to fruition because Australia’s demographics and social culture changed to a point where assimilation was no longer feasible. “Let us be clear about this, the spread of culturally diverse social forms and processes was happening regardless of assimilation and, if a new policy was not created to help encompass this spread, the latter would have had to remain outside the realm of policy, and as such ungovernable,” states Hage (2000, p.236). In other words, ethnic media and other forms of diversity did not start to appear because they were being supported by the Government – their appearance made it necessary for the Government to create a policy that would recognise and allow them to govern said diversity, allowing them to secure a level of cohesion that had not been possible under assimilation or integration (Hage, 2000).

2.2. Multiculturalism: Australia’s Social and Political Landscape Changes

The last century has seen Australia move from a white nation that effectively promoted assimilation, towards one that supports equality and cultural diversity. “If the White Australia policy and assimilation were about treating Australians from a non-English–speaking background as outsiders, multiculturalism is about fully accepting them as Australians,” states Hage (2000, p.102). That is the intent of multiculturalism at least. The latter may not yet be accepted across the board in Australia, however this does not signal the failure of multiculturalism (Jupp, 2011).

What is multiculturalism? As often as the question is asked, the answers are just as often contested. It is, however, possible to sidestep the confusion the term multiculturalism brings by focusing on multiculturalism policies instead of the terminology (Jupp, 2011). Australian multiculturalism, if viewed as a policy, was designed to manage cultural diversity and social integration. It is, however, confused with notions of ethno-cultural pluralism, assimilation and even compared to the melting pot; notions that have resulted in the segmentation of ethnic communities and attempts to introduce plural judicial and political systems in other nations (Pakulski,
Australian multiculturalism is none of these things, it supports assisted social integration; it allows Australian migrants to maintain a portion of their cultural identities and lifestyles, as long as respect for the majority of the population is maintained (Banting & Kymlicka, 2012). The idealised version of the concept, however, does not always match up to the way the policy is exercised in reality.

This thesis argues that the New South Wales and South Australian Governments have not always upheld the principles of multiculturalism. In particular, it questions if the obligations that state governments have to their communities and multiculturalism are being met. Chapters Three, Eight and Nine of this thesis highlight the New South Wales and South Australian parliamentary resolutions to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” and ask if the actions of these Governments were in direct opposition to the principles of multiculturalism, as they have been identified in this chapter.

2.2.1. The Policy of Multiculturalism and its Terminology. James Jupp (2011) presents multiculturalism as more than an administrative issue. Jupp sees Australian multiculturalism endeavouring to separate Australia from formerly accepted notions of racial purity. However, multiculturalism will initially be discussed as a policy in this chapter. As a policy, it was designed to manage cultural diversity and social integration. In this way, Australian multiculturalism supports “assisted social integration” and allows Australian migrants to maintain a portion of their cultural identities and lifestyles, as long as respect for the majority of the population is maintained. Essentially, it recognises that diversity can improve social structures (Pakulski, 2013).

Al Grassby in his 1973 speech first used the term “multiculturalism”, in an official sense. At the time, he was the Whitlam Government’s Immigration Minister. The term was to become a policy, adopted by the Fraser Government (Castles, et al. 1992), which was then reviewed for social policy implications by Frank Galbally in the 1978 *Report of the Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants*, more commonly known as the *Galbally Report* (1978).

In recognition of the fact that diversity can be beneficial for the upward mobility of a nation, the *Galbally Report* (1978) advised:
“We are convinced that migrants have the right to maintain their cultural and racial identity and that it is clearly in the best interests of our nation that they should be encouraged and assisted to do so if they wish. Provided that ethnic identity is not stressed at the expense of the society at large, but is interwoven into the fabric of our nationhood by the process of multicultural interaction, the community as a whole will benefit substantially and its democratic nature will be reinforced.” (p.104)

Jupp (2011) argues multiculturalism is more than an administrative approach; it endeavours to separate Australia from its former attitudes to “building a new British nation” (p.43). Australian multiculturalism is not like the melting pot found in the United States, which expects that migrants assume American values. Nor is it the negligent British approach, which tolerated social segmentation to its own detriment and resulted in closed communities that bred contempt for the majority of the populace. Neither should Australian multiculturalism be associated with the liberal assimilation practices of France and Germany. The latter served only to create a dissatisfied Turkish minority in Germany; one which worked under the harshest of conditions but was denied the rights of German citizens (Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak, 2013; Pakulski, 2013). Australian multiculturalism is not even comparable to Canadian multiculturalism, regardless of the fact that Canadian multiculturalism was implemented long before the term multiculturalism was uttered in Australia. Canada’s approach has focused on securing minorities special rights, which has never been a goal of Australian multiculturalism (Pakulski, 2013), and resulted in fears of parallel societies (Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak, 2013). However, it is important to note that there is a parallel between Australian and Canadian multiculturalism, in addition to the adoption of multiculturalism policies, there are “strongly integrationist strategies” in place in both countries for their immigrant population (Banting & Kymlicka, 2012, p.11). What can be seen by Australian and Canadian multiculturalism is that their policies work hand-in-hand with civic integration, which includes learning the national language (English), a focus on employment, and the adoption of the nation’s liberal values (Banting & Kymlicka, 2012, 2013). One caveat is the French factor in
Canada, which complicated federal approaches in the context of a separatist Quebec polity. The most important distinction, however, is that Australian multiculturalism rejects ethno-cultural segmentation and the introduction of a plural judicial and political system. Instead it highlights the need to achieve unity through diversity (Pakulski, 2013).

When moving away from the remnants of assimilation, Galbally (1978) placed an emphasis on language ability. He also drew attention to the need for ethnic communities to advise governments of immigrant needs, in the place of mainstream welfare organisations. Furthermore, ethnic welfare services were expected to be the responsibility of the Immigration Department, with the teaching of English to adults to become the main focus and cost, and new policies were to be related to settlement.

The guiding principles presented in the Galbally Report stated that:

(a) All members of our society must have equal opportunity to realise their full potential and must have equal access to programs and services;

(b) Every person should be able to maintain his or her culture without prejudice or disadvantage and should be encouraged to understand and embrace other cultures;

(c) Needs of migrants should, in general, be met by programs and services available to the whole community but special services and programs are necessary at present to ensure equality of access and provision;

(d) Services and programs should be designed and operated in full consultation with clients, and self-help should be encouraged as much as possible with a view of helping migrants to become self-reliant quickly. (Galbally, 1978, p.4)

The Galbally Report (1978) defined Australian multiculturalism in the form of a policy review. The report saw funds transferred from the discriminatory Good Neighbour Councils – that supported British migrants but refused to be associated with the “overtly ethnic” (Jupp, 2011, p.46) – to ethnic welfare organisations, it fought for the voice of “ethnic” community members to be heard when determining community
needs, and stressed that ethnic languages and cultural variety would not be damaging to the wider Australian community.

The Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Council of Australia (FECCA) was founded soon after the *Galbally Report*, in 1979, in order to begin funding local ethnic community councils (FECCA, 2011; Jupp, 2011). The Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) Radio had already been launched on January 1, 1975. SBS Television was later launched on October 24, 1980. “SBS was founded on the belief that all Australians, regardless of geography, age, cultural background or language skills should have access to high quality, independent, culturally-relevant Australian media.” (SBS, 2012)

The principles of multiculturalism, as they are applied at SBS, are a practical example of a multicultural society, which poses equal treatment of ethnic groups. The SBS Charter, in section 6 of the Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991, states:

1. The principal function of SBS is to provide multilingual and multicultural radio, television and digital media services that inform, educate and entertain all Australians, and, in doing so, reflect Australia’s multicultural society.
2. SBS, in performing its principal function, must:
   a. contribute to meeting the communications needs of Australia’s multicultural society, including ethnic, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities; and
   b. increase awareness of the contribution of a diversity of cultures to the continuing development of Australian society; and
   c. promote understanding and acceptance of the cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity of the Australian people; and
   d. contribute to the retention and continuing development of language and other cultural skills; and
   e. as far as practicable, inform, educate and entertain Australians in their preferred languages; and
   f. make use of Australia’s diverse creative resources; and
   g. to the extent to which the function relates to radio and television services – contribute to the overall diversity of Australian television and radio services, particularly taking into
account the contribution of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the community broadcasting sector; and h. to the extent to which the function relates to radio and television services – contribute to extending the range of Australian television and radio services, and reflect the changing nature of Australian society, by presenting many points of view and using innovative forms of expression. (SBS, 2014).

To fulfil its charter, SBS encourages the expression of cultural identity across its broadcasts. Instead of imposing its own labels on cultural groups, SBS respects the self-identification that cultural groups provide. Importantly, “SBS is not subject to the desires of any one group as to how any other group is to be identified” (SBS, 2014, p.4). The broadcast provider also clearly states: “While SBS accepts self-identification of cultural groups, this policy has no implications other than recognition of group identity within the Australian community. It should not be interpreted as recognition of any historical or political claims or conferring official authority on activities counter to the policies or practices of other governments.” (SBS, 2014, p.4) As such, SBS maintains impartiality during its own English language broadcasts, however it allows bi-lingual journalists the freedom to present the news as they see it during their own broadcasts. In reference to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, this means that SBS either uses the term “alleged genocide” or provides a brief description of the events, in place of using the “genocide” or “civil war” labels. However, journalists during the Armenian language broadcasts are free to use the term “genocide” and journalists during the Turkish language broadcasts are free to use “event” or any other term they deem fitting. This allows SBS to treat each ethnic group equally and fairly, while remaining impartial itself. It should be noted as a practical model that Australian governments should also consider following, if they hope to uphold the ideals of multiculturalism; the acceptance of cultural diversity while maintaining respect for the majority of the population.

Governmental reviews that have been undertaken into multiculturalism policy and services include the 1978 Participation report, authorised by the NSW Government; the Access and Equity report, authorised by the Victorian Government in
There are two notable features of the *Galbally Report*. Firstly, it was presented to then Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, instead of Immigration Minister Michael MacKellar, which would have normally been the case. Secondly, the report was published in 10 languages (Galbally, 1978) as a symbolic gesture to the many ethnic communities it referred to (Jupp, 2011). The report focused on immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds, excluding those from the United Kingdom, other English-speaking nations and Indigenous Australians (Galbally, 1978; Jupp, 2011).

While it has proven to be an effective document in the development of multiculturalism, it is not without problems. The principle that “[e]very person should be able to maintain his or her culture without prejudice or disadvantage and should be encouraged to understand and embrace other cultures” has proven to be contentious and difficult to enact in some contexts. A particular example is discussions surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in the Australian context. Members of the Australian-Armenian community primarily use the term “genocide” to label the events, whereas members of the Australian-Turkish community are more likely to use the term “event”. This thesis argues that, by drawing attention to the need for ethnic communities to advise governments of immigrant needs, Galbally created an opportunity for the Armenian and Turkish communities in Australia to assert their views regarding a contentious piece of international history in the Australian context. The retelling of an event that forms a large part of the cultural identities of these groups fits within the principle, however the stark contrast in the retellings does not allow for the communities to grasp each other’s culture or collective memory of history. What makes these discussions that much more contentious in the Australian context is that their retellings have resulted in the New South Wales and South Australian Parliaments passing motions that officially recognise the actions of the Ottoman-Turks as an act of “genocide”.

Another policy document that should be considered in discussions of multiculturalism is the *National Agenda for Multicultural Australia*, produced by the Office of Multicultural Affairs (1989). The series of policies aimed to meet both long-term and short-term reform needs. It was created because the “vast majority of Australians, some 93%, now accept that in a descriptive sense, Australia has become
a multicultural society. Australia’s present and future interests demand that
governments fully recognize the reality and implications of that diversity.” (Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989, p.1) This Agenda described multiculturalism as “a policy for managing the consequences of cultural diversity in the interests of the individual and society as a whole” (Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989, p.vii). It was believed that the creation of these policies would lead to greater social cohesion, with all Australians working together for the betterment of the nation. The Agenda had three focal points; cultural identity, social justice and economic efficiency. It stated that Australians could express their cultural heritage “within carefully defined limits”, deserved “equality of treatment and opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth,” and explained the “need to maintain, develop and utilise effectively the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background” (Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989, p.vii).

2.2.2. Multiculturalism and Political Theory. Pakulski (2013) contends multiculturalism was a strategy designed to smoothly and effectively manage migrant integration, particularly the large numbers that migrated following WWII. The four principles it was built on were social cohesion and integration; equality of opportunity and access; maintenance of cultural identity; and duty of participation and engagement. In comparison, Castles et al. (1992), define multiculturalism as “an ideology [that] calls for a celebration of cultural diversity as a continuing feature of Australian society” (p.5). However, this raises debates regarding the development of cohesion in a society where ethnic pluralism is a dominant feature. What should a society’s national identity be when there is no shared core history, language, culture or traditions? (Castles, et al. 1992)

While there is and should be an Australian national culture, Australians need to distinguish between those parts of it which governments must seek to define and those parts that must remain in the hands of Australian communities. This chapter now moves from a historical account of what has been meant by multiculturalism to expressing a normative view. It takes into account Geoffrey Brahm Levey’s (2011) review of “thick” cultural nationalism, “thin” liberal nationalism and the “civic and post-nationalist” position, in order to consider the roles that governments and communities must undertake (p.76).
Levey (2011) believes that the state cannot be culturally neutral because it prescribes and rests on certain “cultural practices and traditions” (p.75). If these practices and traditions are those of the nation’s cultural majority, then what are the cultural rights and responsibilities of the nation’s minorities? That leads us to consider if there is a way to preserve the value of national-cultural identity while also accommodating cultural difference.

In order to examine this question, Levey (2011) summarises Australian discussions into “thick” cultural nationalism, “thin” liberal nationalism and the “civic and post-nationalist” position. “Thick” cultural nationalism values Anglo-Australian character and identity, and requires migrant cultures to adopt it. “Thick” discussions reject the concept of “multiculturalism” stating that it is disruptive to the nation’s unity (p.76). These arguments are criticised by Levey, who asserts that Australian multiculturalism allows for individual choice and diversity within ethnic groups, while also allowing migrants to adopt aspects of the Australian way of life, should they wish to do so.

In comparison, the “civic and post-nationalist” position denies the existence of an Anglo-Australian character and identity and argues that Australian society is cohesive without it. According to these views, the Australian identity should be “multiculturalism” itself (Levey, 2011, p.78). Levey (2011) responds to these views by stating that nations need strong identities, and that multiculturalism, which is essentially a series of “political and administrative measures”, cannot serve as the nation’s identity, which requires a sense of cultural distinction (p.79).

Finally, “thin” liberal nationalism acknowledges both the existence of and the need for an Australian identity, while also acknowledging the need to accept cultural minorities. Liberal nationalists believe that both can be maintained through a “societal culture” (Levey, 2011, p.81). However, not all liberal nationalists accept this position. Levey’s objection to this position is that it does not give enough weight to national character, which he believes is a real element in Australian political life, even though it may not be managed or controlled by governments. Secondly, he argues that liberal nationalists do not consider the workings of civil society institutions, which are embedded in a national culture. He provides the example of queuing – whether it is to buy a cup of coffee or to borrow a library book, queuing is a daily practice in Australia – however, it is not a common practice amongst certain other cultures.
The review of these three positions brings Levey (2011) to the conclusion that while there is and should be a national culture, we need to distinguish between those parts of it, which governments must seek to shape and those parts that must remain beyond the reach of government. Much of what ethnic groups do, in the maintenance of their distinct identities, they do without either encouragement or discouragement by the state; institutions of civil society, such as churches, clubs, the ethnic press, schools, are effective in the reproduction of ethnic cultures. The cultural work that they do is allowed by the state, in a multicultural society, but it is not the work of the state itself, and nor should it be. The previously mentioned SBS model is ideal for dealing with contentious ethnic narratives; SBS provides space for each ethnic group to project its own identity, and it does not take sides when ethnic groups promote their preferred stories about themselves.

Looking specifically at debates surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in the Australian context, as a nation that has ratified the Genocide Convention, it could and ought to be argued that Australia should not tolerate instances of genocide. However, what needs to be considered in this context – where no definitive label has been set forth by an international court, and historians have not been able to provide an undisputed account – is if Australian Governments should themselves be applying the label of “genocide” to events whose nature is disputed. To this point, this thesis argues that it is not the duty of any government to recognise or label an event as “genocide” because it is not merely a descriptive or scholarly term; it is a legal term that carries severe implications for those who are accused of perpetrating “genocide”, and for those who identify with the national group to which “genocide” has been attributed.

Levey (2011) argues that there are certain features of ethnicity that should remain beyond the interference of Australia’s laws and policies. Expressions of ethnic honour – as long as the forms of these expressions do not break any Australia laws – are among the matters in which the state has no business. Ethnic communities have the right to believe whatever account of history they choose to; this is a basic right in Australia. As such, arguably, it is not the place of Australian parliaments to comment or take action on definitions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, even if this results in disagreements between the communities as they attack each other’s accounts. It should only be the place of a government to take action if an
Australian or international law has been broken, in the eyes of a court, which was not the case before the question of what the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 should be labelled made its way into the New South Wales and South Australian Parliaments.

It is reasonable that Australian Governments are actively involved in defining Australian history and Australian national symbols. Levey (2011) notes:

> There are aspects of national identity that are duly the province of government, such as the inculcation and transmission of a national language, the teachings of the nation’s history, and the establishment of national institutions, holidays and memorials. And there are aspects of national identity that properly belong in the realm of civil society and beyond the business of government, such as how people dress, call themselves, or spend their leisure, what languages they speak to each other, and even in what accent they speak their English. (p.84-85)

If we are to accept the liberal nationalist perspective – that acknowledges an existence of the Australian identity as well as the identity of cultural minorities in Australia – it is not appropriate for Australian governments to interfere in matters of national pride, such as the history and symbols of other nations; or, in this instance, the differing collective memories of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and its definition amongst the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities. This level of involvement could be seen as contrary to Australian multiculturalism policies, which support diversity and the acceptance of individual and group cultural practices, as long as they remain within the law.

Neoliberalism has also changed the way multiculturalism, and the principles it is built on, are viewed in Australia. Kymlicka (2013) identifies the fundamentals to the concept of neoliberalism as “enhancing economic competitiveness and innovation, shifting responsibility from the state to civil society, promoting decentralization, deemphasizing national solidarity in favor of local bonds or transnational ties, viewing cultural diversity as an economic asset or commodity in a global market” (p.111). The neoliberal approach to multiculturalism is less concerned with equality for all citizens and uniting citizens to work towards the betterment of the nation. Instead its aim is to
create a nation that can trade effectively on the world scale. Neoliberal multiculturalism – despite being opposed by neoliberals at first, for the provision of state support to ethnic projects, and the assumption that it would lead to a welfare state – became possible when it was realised that ethnicity and the multiculturalism policies that support the treatment of ethnic-migrants as equals could be harnessed in order to create social capital and boost market participation. In this way, the neoliberals are able to “legitimize ethnicity, to justify MCPs [multiculturalism policies] that shelter those ethnic projects, and to reinterpret these policies in line with neoliberalism’s core ideas” (Kymlicka, 2013, p110-111). The connection that ethnic-migrant Australians have to their previous homelands becomes an asset in Australia’s ability to create a new national identity, one which supports the creation of commercial links. It may then be argued that by harnessing this connection, the migrant communities once again exist in Australia for their ability to enhance the dominant white culture, and to continue supporting the “White nation fantasy” (Hage, 2000, p.121). In other words, “the capacity to appreciate and productively exploit diversity,” as stated by Hage (2000, p.201).

However, trading successfully with their homeland countries requires an understanding of the historic events and cultural values that have affected these nations and the actions of their people. The knowledge presented in this thesis not only has the ability to boost market participation, but it has the potential to enhance community relations between Australian-Armenians and Australian-Turks, alongside other community members and support the development of cultural diversity (Ang, Brand, Noble & Wilding, 2002).

2.3. The Inherent Difficulties to the Concept of Multiculturalism

Where the responsibility of multiculturalism policy lies is almost as uncertain as the term itself, which the Howard Government did little to rectify. John Howard saw the multiculturalism public policy area moved to Immigration in 1996. The state and territory governments, of course, have their own policies in place, which has been the case since the 1980s when they began to take up multiculturalism policies. While multiculturalism continued to receive support from the majority of Australian Governments, Howard was always a critic. In 1988, during debates surrounding the
bicentenary of British settlement, Howard and a few other conservatives claimed “‘billions of dollars’ were sloshing around uncontrolled to the benefits of migrants” (Jupp, 2011). The argument was supported by Pauline Hanson and One Nation in 1996. Jupp (2011) described the expressions of Howard and Hanson as “an excellent example of the oft-repeated lie, which eventually becomes the accepted fact”, explaining that the largest expenditure was English language lessons to adults and children (p.49).

One of Howard’s first acts as Prime Minister was to abolish the multiculturalism research and advocacy agencies, such as the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA), the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research (BIMPR) and the Immigration Departmental Library (Koleth, 2010). Jupp (2011) asserts that the axing of these institutions saved little money and instead severely depleted the Government’s ability to undertake extensive research. Howard may be seen as an example of “thick” nationalism, valuing the Anglo-Australian character and identity and requiring migrant cultures to adopt it (Levey, 2011, p.78). As such, it is not surprising that he attempted to have the term “multiculturalism” replaced with “One Australia”, stating the latter “respects our cultural diversity and acknowledges that we are drawn from many parts of the world but requires of all of us a loyalty to Australia at all times and to her institutions and her values and her traditions which transcends loyalty to any other set of values anywhere in the world” (Jupp, 2002, p.106).

The most crucial ideological move made by Howard was giving “credibility to the fantasy of a core Australian culture that, while changing, is still in deep continuity with the Australian culture of the assimilationist era: no room for multiculturalism here,” states Hage (2002, p.432). Howard was known for expressing his “White paranoia” with the idea that multiculturalism has seen the Australian people move away from Australia’s “core values” and there is a need to return to those values. White paranoia and the debates that erupt from it result in the creation of an “unintegrated other”, a migrant population that is separated from the Anglo-Australian population (Hage, 2002, p.433).

Despite the changes implemented by the conservative Howard Government, Banting, Johnston, Kymlicka and Soroka (2006) argue that Australia and Canada have the strongest multiculturalism policies in the world. They add that while the
fundamentals of Australian multiculturalism were questioned and challenged by the Howard Government, the “programme withstood radical change” and survived to be celebrated by Howard’s Labor successors (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013, p.589). However, it may be argued that moves such as abolishing the multiculturalism research and advocacy agencies mentioned – leaving succeeding governments unable undertake extensive research – and cutting funding to support services, such as English language classes for those who have migrated to Australia, will have long reaching effects on the future success of Australian multiculturalism. Banting et al. (2006) accept that while Australia maintains its multiculturalism policies, the term multiculturalism is used less than it was in the 1990s. Although Banting et al. (2006) identify Australia as having “strong” multiculturalism policies (p.58), Miller (2006) argues that “a society may retreat ideologically from multiculturalism without abandoning multicultural policies”. He states that Australian multiculturalism reached its high point in the 1980s, and “the picture since then has been a steady retreat from the idea among politicians and others engaged in public debate”. While multiculturalism policies may still be in place, funding to the programs they support have seen extensive cuts, and their continued presence at this point may be chalked up to “institutional inertia and the political pressure exerted by client groups, and partly because they serve integrationist as well as multicultural aims” (327).

The Howard Government has not been multiculturalism’s only political enemy. Already referred to, Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party saw to the revival of “white” attitudes amongst a portion of the Australia public. One Nation called for the assimilation of immigrants and the Indigenous population, and the abolition of multiculturalism. This attitude saw the party receiving one million votes across Queensland and rural districts in New South Wales and Western Australia, and to Independent Pauline Hanson winning the Queensland Oxley seat in 1996 (Jupp, 2011). These regions are among the most mono-cultural, “white” districts in Australia. Hanson, in her maiden speech, stated:

I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished... Of course I will be called racist but, if I can invite whom I want into my home, I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country. (Hanson, 1996)
The success of Pauline Hanson and One Nation, though short lived at the time, proved that notions of a white Australia had not been completely abandoned with the introduction of multiculturalism, as had been the hope in the 1970s and subsequent years (Jupp, 2011). Instead, it appears an era of “reverse racism” has been entered, where the likes of Pauline Hanson and their “White paranoia” view political correctness as encroaching on their white privilege (Hage, 2002, p.431). “White paranoia” is defined as “a pathological form of fear based on an excessively fragile conception of the self as constantly threatened. It is also a tendency to perceive a threat where none exists or, if it exists, to inflate its capacity to harm the self,” by Hage (2002, p.419). This form of white paranoia is born from the fear of losing the lifestyle and privileges that Australia’s white population has experienced to date, otherwise known as white privilege (Hage, 2002). Increasing immigration from Asia, together with the move from an Australian multiculturalism that was seen as a type of welfare to an Australian multiculturalism that is instead concerned with national identity, has seen to the reappearance of “White paranoia”, although it seems now that it had never left (Hage, 2002, 429). Instead, Australia had just entered a period where “there was no serious political force in Australia willing to prop up the racial expressions of White paranoia and give them a privileged position in public (Hage, 2002, 425). Howard and Hanson arguably saw an end to that period of retreat.

Hanson’s 2016 re-election to the Senate is proof that the notion of a white Australia and White paranoia still lives on. “The White Australia Policy was designed with Asians in mind, and in 1996 Hanson was still being swamped with Asians. In the last couple of years, however, probably to the relief of Asians, White paranoia has shifted its gaze towards a more global threat: Muslims and Islam,” argues Hage (2002, p.435). In her second maiden speech, Hanson was quick to set her targets on Muslim Australians:

In my first speech in 1996 I said we were in danger of being swamped by Asians. This was not said out of disrespect for Asians but was meant as a slap in the face to both the Liberal and Labor governments who opened the floodgates to immigration, targeting cultures purely for the vote… Now we are in danger of being swamped by Muslims, who bear a culture and ideology that is incompatible with our own. (Hanson, 2016)
Hanson continued to call for “stopping further Muslim immigration and banning the burqa”, stating: “Islam cannot have a significant presence in Australia if we are to live in an open, secular and cohesive society.” (Hanson, 2016) In current day Australia, Muslims are the new Asians, they are the other who threatens the Australian way of life. However, Muslims in Australia are perceived as a more dangerous threat because they are also “portrayed as actively hostile to Western civilization. If the Asian was perceived as an assimilation problem, the Muslim is perceived as both an assimilation and a national-defense problem,” argues Hage (2002, p.435).

The white privilege that feeds white paranoia is identified as an inherent difficulty to the concept of multiculturalism by Hage (2000). He cites an example of Phillip Ruddock who once said “I look around me and I see Australians” to a room full of people with an Australian-Lebanese background. The fact that Ruddock felt the need to say that to Australians, who did not necessarily need the validity of their Australian identity verified, shows that Ruddock considers himself the “White acceptor, decreeing the Australianess of the ethnic other,” argues Hage (2000, p.102). If it “goes without saying” that citizens who migrated to Australia are Australians, than “there would be no need to say it… Acceptance translated into doubt,” adds Hage (2000, p.103).

Arguably, the ongoing attack on multiculturalism from the Howard Government and successive Liberal Governments partially paved the way for the return of Pauline Hanson and One Nation. The advancement of “Hansonism” can be a powerful political tool used in “containing non-White (both migrant and Aboriginal) political demands for a more central political role in Australian politics,” states Hage (2000, p.24). The use of this tool in a country where there is already political under representation of ethnic-migrants is significantly problematic to their voice being heard. The political presence of Australian ethnic groups is further discussed in Chapter Seven.

The word “multiculturalism” was used less and less by the Howard Government during its reign, from 1996 to 2007 (Banting et al., 2006; Galligan & Roberts, 2013). His Government stated that citizenship was the key to national unity in the wake of threats to the Australian way of life in a post September 11 world (Galligan & Roberts, 2013). Some state governments picked up this trend as well.
During this era, migration policy moved towards requiring higher education levels as well as English speaking competency. The few exceptions to the rule were those who migrated under the family reunion and humanitarian streams. “By the late 1990s the emphasis had not only shifted from multiculturalism to integration, but also from welfare to compliance and even repression,” asserts Jupp (2011, p.50). The Immigration Department redirected its budget towards compliance and border protection, adopting certain asylum seeker proposals that had been put forth by Hanson’s Party (Jupp, 2011). The move ensured that the resentment towards ethnic minorities, felt particularly in mono-cultural Australian regions, did not die with the collapse of One Nation. It may also be argued that this approach later saw to the revival of Hanson and One Nation. It would be a mistake to lump immigrants and asylum seekers into the same category, however, the policies employed to decide who is welcome and unwelcome in Australia are not dissimilar.

Australian multiculturalism faltered under the leadership of the Howard Government, and it staggered under the attacks of Pauline Hanson and One Nation. Was it the inability, or unwillingness, of the Australian Federal Government to safeguard the principles of multiculturalism that led to state governments ignoring their obligations to managing cultural diversity? More specifically, had it not been for the weakening of multiculturalism at the hands of Howard and Hanson, would the New South Wales and South Australian State Governments have passed resolutions recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”? While the resolutions may have satisfied the Australian-Armenian community, they outraged most of the Australian-Turkish community, and did little to manage cultural diversity and social integration. The divide between the two ethnic-migrant groups in Australia is greater than ever. Essentially, the resolutions were against much of what multiculturalism was intended to represent; unity through diversity. State parliament members are only one group of political actors responsible for safeguarding multiculturalism, however, they do have a key role to play and a duty to observe if they choose to represent international and nationalistic quarrels in Australia, which arguably does not even fall under the list of responsibilities of a state government. A successful multicultural society must impose equal treatment of ethnic groups.
2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the broad context of Australian multiculturalism, keeping in mind the history of migration to Australia, which influenced the development of multiculturalism policies. It identified and discussed the difficulties inherent to accepting multiculturalism as a normative concept and marked issues that require consideration in studies of multiculturalism, particularly when discussing ethnic-migrant communities.

The study of multiculturalism, in the Australian context, must take into account the different theoretical perspectives that inform approaches to identity, nationalism and citizenship. This discussion drew attention to the problems associated with the rhetoric surrounding multiculturalism, and demonstrated that there is no universally agreed upon concept. As such, it set forth its own concept; one of unity through diversity, where ethnic groups are treated equally. It established that Australian multiculturalism is best understood by focusing on multiculturalism policies. It also signalled a need for Australian governments to distinguish between their responsibility and the responsibility of ethnic communities in providing definitions of national culture, in order to protect unity through diversity.
Chapter Three

Multiculturalism Under Attack:
Opening the Door for Discussing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Parliaments

The previous chapter reviewed the history of migration to Australia and its policies, as well as the history of Australian multiculturalism and its public policies, developing the context for this thesis. It also explored the concept of multiculturalism as a civil ideal and sets forth my own concept of multiculturalism, which accepts the principle that Australian multiculturalism supports assisted social integration and allows Australian immigrants to maintain a portion of their cultural identities and lifestyles if they respect and obey civic norms common to all Australians (Pakulski, 2013).

Chapter Two clarified that the term “multiculturalism”, when used in this thesis, specifically refers to the Australian multiculturalism policy of managing cultural diversity and social integration. It presented multiculturalism, as both a policy and a concept, and argued that while it still alive in Australia, multiculturalism requires revitalisation if it is to be accepted as a normative concept.

This chapter reviews arguments that a shift from multiculturalism to post-multiculturalism is evident in some nations, however, suggests that this is not the case in the Australian context and considers the possibility that the problem facing Australian multiculturalism is not the concept itself but rather the terminology surrounding it. The works of Greg Noble (2009), Scott Poynting (2004) and Jan Pakulski (2013) are reflected upon. They suggest that an increasingly racial quality is applied to Australian debates regarding national identity, social structures, unity, and cultural differences, particularly in instances when the actual social problem at hand is difficult to comprehend.

To understand the adverse reactions resulting from the State Parliament decisions to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”, it is necessary to understand the events, or rather, significant moments in Australian history, that have acted as intrinsic difficulties to the acceptance of multiculturalism as a normative concept. As such, some specific events that have
created a particular challenge to the acceptance of multiculturalism as a normative concept are reviewed. The works of James Jupp (2011) and the joint work of Stephen Castles, Bill Cope, Mary Kalantzis and Michael Morrissey (1992) are also considered, with reference to arguments that national borders have become redundant in a global village.

After reviewing some of the instances where multiculturalism was challenged, this chapter provides a timeline for discussions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in the South Australian and New South Wales State Parliaments. It also provides the context in which the South Australian resolution and two New South Wales resolutions were raised.

This chapter suggests that while multiculturalism remains under attack, from political actors in particular, the views of certain ethnic-migrant Australians will continue to make their way into Australian parliaments over other voices, resulting in the creation of a decreased sense of belonging for other ethnic-migrant communities.

3.1. The Need to Revitalise Australian Multiculturalism

Australia was one of the first democratic nations to create national policies dedicated to multiculturalism, however, the scholarly attention received by Australian multiculturalism had been slow to develop until recent years. In the context of an apparent decline in support for multiculturalism as a normative concept, there has been renewed interest in contemporary political theory discussions regarding multiculturalism. Discussions of multiculturalism and political theory, in the Australian context, require further examination if the implications of managing a culturally diverse nation are to be understood.

3.1.1. Being of Middle Eastern Appearance after the Cronulla Riots.

Discussions surrounding multiculturalism ignited in the 1970s following the realisation that the “Australian way of life”, where “every man had his home and garden, his Holden and his hobby” was in fact a sexist misrepresentation (Castles, et al. 1992, p.12). Following that period, however, the scholarly attention received by Australian multiculturalism has been slow to advance, arguably due partly to a sense of wariness of those “different” that developed following the September 11 terror
attacks and the Cronulla riots (Collins, 2009). Events such as the Cronulla riots and protests following the anti-Muslim film, *Innocence of Muslims*, have changed the way multiculturalism is viewed in the Australian context.

Since the September 11 terror attacks, the main “ethnic” concern has been those of “Middle Eastern appearance”, a stereotypical description that has been fused with Muslims, which has created a great deal of apprehension towards Muslim migrants. As such, it is unsurprising that the interpretation of the Cronulla riots included the argument that "multiculturalism" had failed and that its failure threatened “the Australian way of life” (Noble, 2009, p.1). Taking place on Sunday, December 11, 2005 at Cronulla Beach in Sydney, the ethnically fuelled protest targeted people of "Middle-Eastern Appearance". The riots were sparked by a dispute entered into by a group of Lebanese men with some off-duty lifesavers, regarding the use of beach space the previous weekend. The result was a series of revenge attacks that sparked racial violence in Australia (Collins, 2009; Dunn, 2009; Jakubowicz, 2009; Levey & Moses, 2009; Noble, 2009; Wise, 2009).

The attempts of thousands of Anglo males to “take back our beaches” during the Cronulla riots, and the following retaliatory attacks, has been perceived by certain citizens as evidence of the multiculturalism experiment’s failure. However, those critics failed to note that the immigration policy that brought the ‘unwanted’ migrant Australians, from which the Anglo-males were taking back their beaches, is different altogether to the policy of multiculturalism. Collins (2009) argues that, if anything, the riots drew attention to the need for more multiculturalism; a “revitalisation” of the “strategies related to education, employment, local policing and media” (p.30). Collins (2009) describes multiculturalism as the “safety net” that assists immigrants to “settle and become economically secure”, guiding “our culturally diverse society towards social cohesion and away from social conflict between ethnic groups” (p.41). Multiculturalism policies are still reeling from the Howard regime’s negligence of the policy area (Collins, 2009). Multiculturalism policies – that once “safety net” (Galbally, 1978; Collins 2009) – need further attention, not less. “Today we see the need for a revitalisation of Australian multiculturalism, not an abandonment of it in the face of a racialised discourse about immigrant crime,” states Collins (2009, p.40).

For days, images of the riots dominated Australian media and also circulated around the world. The Cronulla riots represented "lines of fracture that test the limits
of multiculturalism and nationalism in Australia," asserted Noble (2009, p.2-3). The consequences of these actions are still prevalent in Australian society, to the point where the once revered Southern Cross has become a symbol of racism and attempts of exclusion amongst some white Australians, with fears it could become the next swastika. "Aboriginal people have used the Southern Cross for the last 40,000 years as a beacon guiding them to travel through country for survival, and I'm starting to see that star system symbol being used as a very racist nationalistic emblem – and that is seriously worrying me," declared Warwick Thornton, 2010 Australian of the Year nominee. "We don't want to turn the Southern Cross into a swastika - that's bloody important” (AAP, 2010, January 21). The semiotic transformation of the symbol has been significant; from a guide used by Indigenous Australians, to a symbol of nationhood for multicultural Australia, to a sign of racism and separatism following the Cronulla riots.

The events at Cronulla resulted in the re-emergence of the “Arab Other”, an “other” that carried connotations to distinctly separate events; terrorism, rape and gang warfare (Collins, 2009; Poynting et al., 2004; Noble, 2009). The other is presented as an enemy, which threatens security, cannot be reasoned with and requires elimination (Hamelink, 1997; Terzis 2008). Levey and Moses (2009) compare the Australian “Muslim other” to the Nazi German “Jewish other”, though granted the violence committed in the former example was considerably less extreme. Regardless, in both cases, the “other” was seen to resist assimilation and the violence against the victim was justified by denigrating their character.

Simplistic and constricting descriptions, such as the “other”, can create conflict between nations and communities, particularly in a multicultural environment such as Australia. The image of the “other” was reinforced by the Australian mainstream media during the Cronulla riots (Jakubowicz, 2009), giving those who are critical of the principles of multiculturalism an “other” to blame for what they perceive to be a failed experiment.

Interestingly, the Hazzard Report, a review of police response to the riots, led by Norm Hazzard, former Assistant Commissioner for Counter Terrorism and Public Order Management, found there was no evidence to suggest crime in the Southern Shire was committed by Middle Eastern men. In fact, crime in the area, in most instances, was committed by local residents (Noble, 2009, p.2; Strike Force Neil,
Still, it was the “other” who was vilified, challenging our understanding of what it means to be members of an Australian community.

Being the demonised “Muslim other” is an experience certain members of the Australian-Turkish community were familiar with, even before the riots and protests. Yet the state parliaments showed little thought to the anti-Muslim feelings their resolutions had the potential to further fuel, when they passed resolutions recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in 1997, 2009 and 2013. The decision to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” was seen by the Australian-Turkish community as a decision against a Muslim minority, for a Christian minority, and resulted in certain members of that community feeling that anti-Muslim sentiment is widespread in Australia. The fact that Australian-Turkish community members, including legal professionals, were not called on to present their views before voting on the resolution did not go unnoticed by the community, nor did the fact that Australians from non-Turkish backgrounds were allowed the opportunity to make presentations. It is impossible to say if the members of parliament acted out of anti-Muslim sentiment, however, one should hope this was not the case and, most likely, it was not. Still, the ripples of the resolution are still being felt even years after the fact.

Globalisation is another challenge to our understanding of what it means to be a community in Australia. With the lines between nations blurred, it becomes easy to racialise social problems. An increasingly racial quality is being applied to Australian debates regarding national identity, social structures and unity, and cultural differences (Noble, 2009; Poynting et al., 2004). “It’s easier to direct blame at one group than address complex problems, which we can’t easily comprehend,” argues Noble (2009, p.15). The perception of “outsiders” in Anglo-Australian communities is significant, particularly when considering the “outsiders” too are Australian. Tensions that are often identified as “cultural differences” actually stem from political, social and economic friction (Noble, 2009, p.15). The events at Cronulla were too “grotesque” to be about ethnicity alone, contends Pakulski (2013). Mixed in with fears of the “other” was alcohol, a clash over turf and competition, as was seen when cricket bats became weapons (Pakulski, 2013).
3.1.2. Australia and International Influences. The protests against a film negatively depicting the Prophet Mohammed were another example of a complex issue over-simplified to fit the “ethnic” category. Outrage towards the film resulted in protests in Sydney, London and across the Middle East, as well as in many other locations (“As it happened,” 2012, September 16). The protests, however, were not a clash of ethnicities, but rather a forum in which Islamic communities could voice their disapproval at the depiction of the Prophet Mohammed. The racial focus portrayed by the mainstream media was misleading; these protests were not an example of multiculturalism’s failure, but rather of the ability of international issues to affect Australian communities (Pakulski, 2013). Furthermore, following the extreme reactions by the militant Muslim protestors, Muslim community organisations and leaders critiqued the violent actions of the young men involved and made explicit the Muslim community’s understanding of the obligations multiculturalism imposes. “Muslim community organisations and leaders have taken a strong stance against the protest in Sydney because of the ugly scenes involved and because of the immense damage done to social cohesion, but also because of the frustration of trying to control an anarchic element,” states Dr Shakira Hussein, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Melbourne (Simmons, 2012, September 21). The presence of international issues in the Australian context, where certain ethnicities or religions are the focus of attention, are capable of negatively affecting public views of multiculturalism. Furthermore, according to a Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commissions (HREOC) study, such events escalate prejudice based on race and religion (Collins, 2009).

The importance of the role taken on by community leaders and their ability to guide their communities was also highlighted by Scott Stephens, online editor of the ABC’s Religion and Ethics and former theology and ethics lecturer. “The answer to such violence isn't less seriousness about Islam and its tradition, but more. This is why well-educated, theologically literate Muslim leaders, scholars and teachers (as opposed to what Khaled Abou El Fadl refers to as "illiterate puritanical supremacists"), who can embody and remind their communities of the teachings of the Koran and hadith, are so important,” he argues. “Such leaders dedicating themselves to the instruction and moral formation of their communities will, ultimately, be the best antidote against illiterate extremism.” (Simmons, 2012, September 21)
With the ability to instantly spread information, as seen in both the Cronulla riots and the protests against the anti-Muslim film, political actors must be that much more vigilant if they are to uphold their obligation to multiculturalism and social cohesion. Jupp (2003) explains Australia was formerly “immune” to international influences due to its geographically remote location, however, globalisation of media, combined with the ethnic and religious diversification of the Australian population have produced a political culture in which international and domestic tensions may reinforce each other. Events, which take place in Australia are broadcast internationally, allowing heavy criticism of Australian politics; “nothing done here at the ends of the earth can remain immune from instant international comment” (p.202). International agendas can now also make their way into the Australian domain and influence political narratives.

Similarly, Castles et al (1992) call attention to the increasing redundancy of national borders in a globalised era and the creation of a universalised culture, arguing that such developments bring historical processes and cultural diversity “closer to home” (p.180). The researchers emphasised; “[i]n Australia, increasing global economic integration on the one hand, and policies to manage cultural diversity domestically in the form of multiculturalism and Aboriginal self-determination of the other hand, have further reduced the viability of the Australian nation-state”. (p. 188) Castles et al (1992) view this “brave new world” as a rejection of the “baggage” former nationalist views brought. Unlike the likes of Pauline Hanson, they are not critical of multiculturalism because it supports equity amongst all Australians, but rather critical because they believe the policy is outdated and does not focus on addressing the practices that support inequality.

Such protests and riots raise the question of “what is Australian identity?” There is no longer a neat cultural divide between ‘Australian’ and ‘not-Australian’, and whether there actually ever was one is questionable. One Cronulla riot victim was quoted stating: “I got beaten up by 50 people. I am half Lebanese, part-Aboriginal [Indigenous Australian]. I am more Australian than the Anglos” (Dunn, 2009, p.83). Dunn (2009) argues the riots were a series of contested performances in an attempt to assert national identities. Nationalistic icons, such as the Southern Cross, life savers, sporting gear and even utes, were used by Anglo Australians to display what it means
to be as “Aussie”. Instead, what became clear is that there are many layers to national identity in multicultural Australia.

Noble (2009) uses the term “hyperdiverse” to describe the Australian community. With an abundance of differences, and tensions that arise from said differences, the level of diversity supersedes previous experiences. This is due partly to a “layering” of differences, where items such as nation, language, religion, age, gender and class all overlap. Furthermore, with intermarriage, there are even more layers than ever before, with many Australians identifying with multiple national identities. The “differentiation of difference” causes a weakening in supposed ethnic identities and multiculturalism itself, creating angst in this hyperdiverse society (p.16).

3.2. Opening the Door to Discussing the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Australian Parliaments

Nothing happens in a vacuum. With Australian multiculturalism constantly being challenged, it is unsurprising that discussions around the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 were eventually raised in Australian state parliaments, and the label set forth by one ethnic-migrant group was chosen over the other, regardless of the potential to further harm multiculturalism by discussing a period in history that remains highly contentious and carries racial elements. This is not to say that parliaments should not discuss issues that are contentious – that is part of their role, of course. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, the resolutions fall outside the scope and responsibility of state governments; their role is not to discuss international issues, particularly if they have the potential to harm Australian multiculturalism. The discussion of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in the NSW and South Australian Parliaments has been led by key influencers. Timelines mapping the periods of discourse can be seen on the following pages (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2).

Since the first mention of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in a NSW Parliamentary discussion, until July 2017 (when Hansard transcripts were no longer monitored for the purposes of this thesis), there have been 97 mentions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Only the transcripts that specifically refer to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between

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1915-1916 have been included in the timeline. There were other transcripts that included some of the key words, such as “Armenians” and “genocide”, however, upon closer review, these were found to be in reference to Armenians escaping from Russia and, as such, they were not included.

Opposition Leader, Peter Collins, initially raised the motion recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” on 17 April 1997. Collins was the Member for Willoughby; which is reportedly home to the largest concentration of Australian-Armenians (Collins & Castillo, 1998).

Another such motion was raised in 2013 by Christian Democrat MP, Reverend Fred Nile, in the Legislative Council, and then Premier Barry O'Farrell in the Legislative Assembly. Premier O’Farrell moved the motion recognising the deaths of the Ottoman-Christian Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks as an act of “genocide” after he was lobbied by Christian Reverend Nile, who was believed to hold the “the balance of power in the New South Wales Upper House” at the time (Sales, 2015, April 16).
30/04/1996: Private Members’ Statements: Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Assembly
02/05/1996: Private Members’ Statements: Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Assembly
17/04/1997: Motions: Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Assembly
29/04/1998: Motions: Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Assembly
05/05/1998: Motions: Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Assembly
05/05/1998: Motions: Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Council
21/05/1998: Questions Without Notice: Private Members’ Statements; Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Assembly
18/06/1998: Private Members’ Statements: Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Assembly
12/05/1999: Business of the House: Reordering Of General Business – Legislative Assembly
13/05/1999: Motions: Armenian Genocide Commemoration – Legislative Assembly
03/05/2000: Adjournment: Eastern Mediterranean University Scholarships – Legislative Council
11/04/2001: Private Members’ Statements: Ryde Electorate Armenian Celebrations – Legislative Assembly
20/11/2003: Motions: Ukraine Famine Seventieth Anniversary – Legislative Assembly
24/02/2004: Questions Without Notice: Anti-Semitism – Legislative Assembly
04/05/2005: Private Members’ Statements: Armenian Genocide Ninetieth Anniversary – Legislative Assembly
05/05/2005: Private Members’ Statements: Armenian Genocide Ninetieth Anniversary – Legislative Assembly
24/05/2005: Adjournment: Armenian Genocide Ninetieth Anniversary – Legislative Council
26/05/2005: Adjournment: Holocaust Victims Commemoration – Legislative Council
08/04/2008: Private Members’ Statements: Armenian Community In Davidson – Legislative Assembly
13/05/2008: Adjournment: Armenian Genocide Ninety-Third Anniversary – Legislative Council
25/09/2008: Motions: Great Ukrainian Famine – Legislative Council
12/05/2009: Adjournment: Armenian Genocide – Legislative Council
05/06/2009: Private Members’ Statements: Armenian Genocide – Legislative Assembly
22/04/2010: Motions: Anzac Day – Legislative Council
23/06/2010: Private Members’ Statements: Assyrian Genocide – Legislative Assembly
23/06/2010: Adjournment: Assyrian Genocide Monument – Legislative Council
24/09/2010: Private Members’ Statements: Armenia – Legislative Assembly
21/06/2017: Private Members’ Statements: Ottoman Turkish Empire Genocide – Legislative Assembly
26/05/2011: Adjournment: Armenian Genocide And Nagorno Karabakh Republic – Legislative Council
01/06/2011: Members: Inaugural Speeches – Legislative Assembly
- 02/08/2011: Adjournment: Srebrenica Massacre Anniversary – Legislative Council
- 25/08/2011: Private Members' Statements: Pittwater Armenian Community – Legislative Assembly
- 14/02/2012: Adjournment: Genocide Personal Study Tour – Legislative Council
- 22/02/2012: Adjournment: Armenian Genocide – Legislative Council
- 29/03/2012: Adjournment: Syriac Orthodox Church – Legislative Council
- 01/05/2012: Adjournment: April Commemorations – Legislative Council
- 09/05/2012: Adjournment: Armenian Genocide – Legislative Council
- 24/05/2012: Adjournment: Tribute to Varant Meguerditchian – Legislative Council
- 14/08/2012: Private Members' Statements: Fairfield Assyrian Community – Legislative Assembly
- 21/08/2012: Private Members' Statements: Assyrian Martyrs and Genocide Remembrance Day – Legislative Assembly
- 16/10/2012: Private Members' Statements: Tribute to Archbishop Aghan Baliozian – Legislative Assembly
- 18/10/2012: Bills: Graffiti Control Amendment (Racist Graffiti) Bill 2012 – Legislative Council
- 15/11/2012: Motions: Armenian National Committee Annual Banquet – Legislative Council
- 28/02/2013: Motions: Parliamentary Friends of Israel Study Tour – Legislative Council
- 30/04/2013: Adjournment: Western Armenia Study Tour – Legislative Council
- 01/05/2013: Start Of Day: Start Of Day – Legislative Council
- 01/05/2013: Motions: Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides – Legislative Council
- 01/05/2013: Adjournment: Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides – Legislative Council
- 02/05/2013: Start Of Day: Start Of Day – Legislative Assembly
- 02/05/2013: Community Recognition Statements: Armenian Genocide Ninety-Eighth Anniversary – Legislative Assembly
- 08/05/2013: Start Of Day: Start Of Day – Legislative Assembly
- 08/05/2013: Question Time: Electricity Prices – Legislative Assembly
- 08/05/2013: Business of the House: Order of Business: Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides – Legislative Assembly
- 08/05/2013: Motions: Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides – Legislative Assembly
- 09/05/2013: Adjournment: Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides – Legislative Council
- 21/05/2013: Start Of Day: Start Of Day – Legislative Council
- 21/05/2013: Adjournment: Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides – Legislative Council
- 22/05/2013: Start Of Day: Start Of Day – Legislative Assembly
- 22/05/2013: Community Recognition Statements: Armenian Genocide Ninety-Eighth Anniversary – Legislative Assembly
- 28/05/2013: Motions: Dr Stepan Kerkvasharian, AO – Legislative Council
- 30/05/2013: Private Members' Statements: Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Genocides – Legislative Assembly
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<td>21/06/2017</td>
<td>(Uncorrected) Community Recognition Statements: The Promise – Legislative Assembly</td>
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Figure 3.1: New South Wales Parliament Hansard Timeline – Mentions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916

It should also be noted that then Transport Minister (now NSW Premier), Gladys Berejiklian is also of Armenian heritage and a supporter of the “genocide” label. Berejiklian has a history of influencing discussions around the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Notably, she withdrew from a panel
discussion that was to take place following a screening of The Cut, a film that takes place in 1915, just before the events that led to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Berejiklian allegedly withdrew because the panel also contained "genocide deniers", resulting in the event being cancelled (Hawker, 2015) and making it impossible for the existence of expert-informed debate in this instance.

In South Australia, from the first mention of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in 2009, until July 2017 (the end of the data collection period), there were eight mentions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 found in the transcripts. Of these, the first five mentions listed in the above timeline were unique, whereas the last three were mentions in summaries of the substantive resolutions to be passed in a 14-month period. The considerable difference in number of time the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 has been raised in the South Australian Parliament may possibly be attributed to the significantly smaller Australian-Armenian population in South Australia.

According to the Armenian Cultural Association of South Australia (2017), “There is not much known about the original settlement of the Armenians in South Australia and no exact information is available about the fluctuating [sic] population. Currently, the Armenian Community in South Australia is mainly based in Adelaide.” Therefore it is difficult to theorise about the reasons for the passing of the motion recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The only connection that is known comes from the motion itself, where it was stated that it “acknowledges the significant humanitarian contribution made by the people of South Australia to the victims and survivors of the Armenian Genocide” (Parliament of South Australia, Legislative Assembly, March 25, 2009, p.181).

The South Australian motion was introduced by David Ridgway MLC, Leader of the Liberal Opposition in Legislative Council, and it was seconded by Bernard Finnigan, Member of the Labor Government in Legislative Council. The motion went through unopposed. It appears the greatest factor for the South Australian Parliament’s motion was the lobbying efforts of ANC Australia. Ridgway later commended the Armenian-Australian community and ANC Australia for their “excellent leadership”. "I am grateful to be in an ongoing working relationship with the Armenian community,” he said. "The Armenian National Committee is dedicated to a campaign which advocates recognition of the genocide, and today's motion is also a tribute to its
tireless efforts on behalf of the Armenian community.” (“South Australia Passes Armenian Genocide motion,” 2009, March 22) The role played by lobbying will be further discussed in Chapter Seven. The parliamentary motions themselves will be discussed further in Chapter Eight, where excerpts from the Hansard transcripts are also provided.

Figure 3.2: South Australian Parliament Hansard Timeline – Mentions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916

3.3. The Death of Multiculturalism?

With racially biased agendas making their way into parliamentary discussions, has multiculturalism reached its end? Critics of multiculturalism would lead us to believe it has. Following September 11 and the bombings in Madrid and London, European multiculturalism was viewed as an inadequate approach to managing cultural diversity. Statements that it was promoting “home-grown terrorism” soon followed (Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak, 2013). It is easy enough to state that European and Australian multiculturalism is dead, and the era of post-multiculturalism has come to life. Yet, what does such a statement mean? If we are to consider that the majority of problems surrounding multiculturalism policies develop from uncertainty, and the descriptions of post-multiculturalism are just as vague, if not more vague, then has
multiculturalism truly passed? In light of this view, how can post-multiculturalism be the opportunity to overcome the shortcomings of multiculturalism?

Regardless of the announcements about the death of multiculturalism, it can be argued that it is too early to call the Australian case – 30 per cent of Australia’s 24 million population was born overseas (Salt, 2016). Yet Australia’s achievement as one of the world’s most multicultural nation’s is rarely recognised. Australia has come a long way, from the White Australia Policy to a nation that provides ESL (English as a Second Language) classes in schools. Castles et al. (1992) describe it as “one of the most advanced experiments in practical post-nationalism in the world” (p. 207). There is, however, an argument to be made for its restructure and revival (Collins, 2009; Jupp, 2011). Jupp (2011) believes this restructure can be achieved with encouragement and support from governments, particularly the Federal Government. “Australia has built an excellent if under-funded strategy for sustaining social harmony and it would be a pity to waste it,” argues Jupp (2011, p.52).

Unfortunately, Australian multiculturalism policy is not where it could have been, its development having been stymied while under the 11-year attack of the conservative Howard Government. Multiculturalism lost much of its appeal during this era (Jupp, 2011). Regardless, its attempts to work with and cultivate ethnic diversity are nothing to be disparaged. Diversity supports integration and upward mobility by maintaining social harmony and individual wellbeing. It is much more productive than notions of uniformity, as put forth by assimilation (Baldassar, 2013; Jupp, 2011; Pakulski, 2013).

Multiculturalism policy is a must if Australia is to avoid a return to blatant racist attitudes. However, this is no guarantee of its survival. Critics, including Castles et al. (1992) have described it as limited and contradictory. The authors believe governmental efforts should not be focused on multiculturalism, but rather on addressing the structural practices that see to the preservation of social inequality. The provision of social justice for all Australians would see to the development of a “community without nation” (p.148), which they believe is necessary in order to secure self-determination and identity. They argue that if human identity were to become transnational, Australians would realise they are in the “same boat”, regarding economy, ecology and politics (p.13). The current structural practices in the New South Wales and South Australian Parliaments saw the historical memory and identity
of the Australian-Armenians held up over that of the Australian-Turks, leaving the latter feeling that social justice had not taken place and that they were not in the “same boat”.

Jupp (2011) argues that multiculturalism will live on because Australia cannot possibly return to the days of being a mono-cultural society. This, however, does not mean that a certain level of acculturation will not occur. Acculturation, to a certain extent, is inevitable; particularly for minority languages which have a history of fading. Still, multiculturalism will see to efforts for all Australians to being treated equitably.

The problem in Australia is not with the concept of multiculturalism, but with the rhetoric surrounding it. A parallel may be drawn between the rhetoric surrounding asylum seekers and multiculturalism. Manderson (2013) argues that Australia does not have an asylum problem but rather an “asylum problem problem”. Essentially, it is the language being used to describe the “refugee problem” that actually creates the problem. Asylum seekers are described as “illegals” by many political actors, including former Prime Minister Tony Abbott, leaving many Australians with the view that asylum seekers are “immoral”. Rarely is their right to seek refuge discussed, or is the completely inappropriate use of the term “illegal” questioned. Instead refugees are shipped away to remote locations, or locked away in detention centres. Manderson (2013) claims such actions prevent normalisation from taking place, leaving refugees to be viewed as a threat; “a person in a dark alley”. However, greater interaction between the general Australian public and those seeking asylum in Australia could lead to normalisation, and for the surrounding rhetoric to become implausible.

Similarly, it can be argued that Australian multiculturalism is not the problem. There is, instead, a “multiculturalism problem problem”. Much of the dissatisfaction around multiculturalism stems from the confusion the term creates. As Jupp (2011) claimed “A major problem in discussing multiculturalism rationally is that it means many different things to many different people in many different situations.” (p.41)

Multiculturalism has never been a static entity, and reviews of it as such are nothing short of problematic. While Castles et al. (1992) described the Australian multiculturalism experiment as “successful and peaceful” they recognised its instability, which has only increased in the new millennium. However, at the time, the authors attributed this instability to economic, cultural and political changes. The
development of international economic institutions, the homogenisation of world culture and the weakening of nation-states have resulted in a decrease in differences. This loss is, however, counteracted by efforts to preserve “static” ethnic culture; individuals hold onto the one thing they can “identity” (p.141).

Banting and Kymlicka (2012) have also identified Australian multiculturalism as a success, with a particular reference to policy adoption. However, while they believe multiculturalism is in no way dead, and there has not been a significant retreat from the policies that support multiculturalism, there has been a retreat from the use of the term multiculturalism in government conversations (Banting & Kymlicka, 2012, 2013).

Australian multiculturalism is not without criticism. Gozdecka, Ercan and Kmak (2013) identify what they consider the two main problems facing multiculturalism. The first is its inability to address cultural identities as fluid. “Cultural identity is constantly negotiated between the retelling of history and an ongoing struggle about power and knowledge,” argues Madmoni-Gerber (2009, p. 181). The second is the inability to deal with or suggest a way to deal with, “illiberal” or “problematic” cultures, which can otherwise be described as those in direct opposition to the norms accepted by the majority of Australians (Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak, 2013). At its present state, multiculturalism policy underestimates the entrenched racism in Australian social and economic structures. Castles et al. (1992) suggest a need to “draw boundaries of inclusion and exclusion” so that all Australians are, in fact, treated as equals (p.13).

3.4. Conclusion

Should multiculturalism one day “die”, it would be the policy that has passed, not the ideology. Or, at least, one would hope that to be the case in Australia. Without the ideology of multiculturalism – unity through diversity – Australia may as well return to the principles of the White Australia Policy, or at least to a strongly assimilationist policy. Regardless of whether governments and other political actors are acting under multiculturalism policies or one day post-multiculturalism policies, they have a responsibility to represent ethnic-migrant groups equally. Does this make the State Government resolutions to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between
1915-1916 as “genocide” racist? Most likely not; it would be unconscionable for the State Parliaments to support the resolutions based on a racial inference. However, does this mean that social justice and equality prevailed? No, it does not. Referring back to Chapter Two and the review of Levey (2011), the resolutions fall outside the responsibility of state governments. The labelling of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is an international issue and, as such, the label set forth by one ethnic-migrant group should not have been chosen over the other; not in Australia, and not under these circumstances.

While the act of labelling undertaken by the State Governments was not racist, it did allow for the manifestation of racism in the media, particularly in the ethnic press. References to members of the Australian-Turkish community as “butchers” and the Australian-Armenian community as “liars” surfaced soon after the resolutions were passed. The decision of the State Governments to represent Armenian and Turkish history in a specific light may not have directly encouraged a racist reaction in the media, however it did not discourage it either (the State Government resolutions and the content of media articles surrounding the resolutions will be further analysed and discussed in Chapter Eight).

Multiculturalism, as both a concept and a policy, is not dead. However, the principles of multiculturalism require greater consideration by Australian governments if they are to be accepted as a normative concept. A successful multicultural society must impose equal treatment of ethnic groups if it is to thrive.
Chapter Four
Theoretical Framework

4.1. Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides the theoretical framework for this thesis, exploring theories of framing, priming and agenda-setting. It then delves into the research questions and methodology. This chapter also examines how political actors’ application of theories, such as framing and agenda setting, can influence the way a historic event is perceived. It evaluates how differing perspectives impact ethnic-migrant communities, and affect life in multicultural Australia.

4.1.1. Labels and the “Other”. Much debate has surrounded the contentious label of “genocide”. Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (December 9, 1948) states:

Article II In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
The “United Nations Treaty Collection” (2019, May 19) confirms that 151 nation states have either ratified or acceded the United Nations Genocide Convention. The countries that had not signed the convention when it came into force can now only accede to it. It should be noted that the treaty was ratified by Australia in 1949, acceded by Turkey in 1950 and acceded by Armenia in 1993 (see Appendix B for a list of the full 19 articles, on a copy of the original treaty).

This widely accepted definition has one particularly problematic phrase: “intent to destroy”. From a legal perspective, none of the acts that are listed in the Genocide Convention are considered “genocide” if there is no proof of intent. As a genocide and legal studies scholar, Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) explains “the whole thing is about intent... motive is not important”. He adds that “motive is in a sense irrelevant to criminal law.” The concept of intent is further discussed in Chapter Eight, however it is important to note here that Peter considers the UN Convention definition of “genocide” to be “so wide as to be unfunny”, as the lack of specificity currently makes it difficult to define “genocide”.

There is no doubt as to whether Ottoman-Armenians were killed, however, as previously stated in this thesis, unless the deaths were planned and carried out systematically, a high death toll does not automatically signal “genocide”. The large discrepancies in the claimed Ottoman-Armenian population, and the final death toll (ranging from 600,000 to 1,500,000 (Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2009)), are also problematic. Particularly because, as mentioned in Chapter One, there are no definite census records, making absolute claims misleading. Still, cases of communication professionals making unfounded claims are not unheard of. “Instead of scholarship, we often find only journalists making extravagant statements, which are picked up and further dramatised by the media,” purports Said (2005, p. 586) in relation to the coverage surrounding the occupation of Palestine. Even Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk made the unsubstantiated claim that a million Armenians died at the hands of the Turks (“Turk 'Genocide' Author Faces Jail,” 2005, September 1).

According to McCarthy, political actors and others who are not experts in the field of Ottoman history make claims without having properly studied all angles. “That’s an example of what prejudice is like,” explains McCarthy (Gurgin, 2008). Those in positions to influence publics, debatably, do not always exercise acceptable levels of social responsibility. “All relationships between people and nations involve two
sides,” adds Said (2005, p. 595). While neither side must like or approve of the other, they must at the very least acknowledge the existence of another point of view, however incredulous it may seem. “This is not a matter of innocence or guilt, or patriotism and treason. Neither side commands reality so totally as to disregard the ‘other’.” (Said, 2005, p. 595)

Yet, the “other” is commonly excluded, particularly from the coverage of contentious issues. This form of censorship “is a productive form of power” (Butler, 1997, p.133). By censoring a differing point of argument, creating the appearance that there is only one possible stance, political actors are left able to create their own reality, wielding the “power” that Butler (1997) mentions. That the “other” perspective is excluded from debates, or simply condemned, by both sides, is chilling in itself. Essentially it is an act of disregarding precious memories and revising history. Historians sympathetic to Armenians often disregard the Turkish perspective, being fearful that any attempt to explain the “other’s” actions may result in the concession of “ground to the deniers” – even though under other circumstances, reviewing and re-reviewing data is a regular academic practice. It is a commonplace fear that rationalisation will lead to justification (Suny, 2009, p. 932). Accordingly, the claim that 523,000 Turks were killed during the same period is neglected from most literature (Arsu, 2005; Ertan & Savran, 1999). In comparison, those sympathetic to the Turkish, often simplify the plight of Ottoman-Armenians as “tragic”, without delving into what made it so.

Are these acts of exclusion intentional? Do certain memories fade with time, and is their retelling unintentionally altered? According to Anna Haebich (2000), the collective memory, at times, finds it necessary to forget events which could “belie the image of a moral community” (p. 256); in which case, it could be argued the Armenian and Turkish collectives’ reluctance to review differing perspectives is caused not by the desire to maintain ground, but rather by an altered collective memory which cannot fathom another rational perspective.

Both the Armenian and Turkish Governments present themselves as the “victim” in political discourse, granted one more successfully than the other. Both governments frame events to relieve themselves of any guilt; the Armenians leaving out the Ottoman-Turkish casualties from their discourse, and the Turks claiming that while the Ottoman-Armenian casualties were tragic, they were an acceptable part of
“war” (McCarthy, 2005; Suny, 2009). There is no telling which side – the Armenian or Turkish perspective – if not both sides, has an altered “collective memory”.

Even more problematic is the unquestioning acceptance of political discourse by the general public. “Patriotism and blind support for the government has replaced sceptical reflections and moral seriousness”, argues Said (2005, p. 598) referring to the state of Israel. The same blind support and repetition of official propaganda is present in Armenia and Turkey. Consequently, legitimate academic attempts to reframe or redefine contentious issues, particularly those recognised by a legislative body, are often met with heavy criticism, as discovered by Australia’s Antony Loewenstein when he examined the right of Israel to exist in Palestinian land (Loewenstein, 2006, p. xi). Speaking at “The Journalist and Islam: competing agendas, political correctness and the war on terror” conference in 2006, Loewenstein explained how he is considered a pariah by members of the Jewish community, however that he believes he is honouring his community by keeping them accountable (personal communication, December 7, 2006).

Similarly, Steven Spielberg was criticised for directing Munich, which recaptures the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics and questions Israel’s retaliatory actions. “So many fundamentalists in my own community, the Jewish community, have grown very angry at me for allowing the Palestinians simply to have dialogue,” explained Spielberg (Haaretz, 2006, January 30). For his efforts to provide the “other” with a voice, Spielberg, who is in fact a Zionist, was heavily criticised.

One cannot help but wonder why official government perspectives are so readily accepted by the general public, and even academics. Few would deny political communication is one-sided, so why are attempts to review other perspectives condemned, in Armenia, Turkey and even in Australia? Furthermore, why does the possible provision of new labels – for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in particular – incite outrage and contempt? It should not automatically be assumed those questioning the accepted perspective of their nations are turning their backs on said nation, nor should it be assumed that lines of questioning are always motivated by nationalistic agendas. Critical examination of the “other” is essential as accurate assessment is reliant on the analysis of all perspectives. The analysis of political, media and historical narratives, undertaken by this research, is essential in answering these questions.
4.1.2. Discrimination and Stigma. One reason for choosing not to further examine the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and its labels could be the stigma that is attracted by narratives surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The term “stigma” refers to “an attribute that is deeply discrediting” (Goffman, 1963, p. 3). As a result of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Turks and Armenians across the world are stigmatised – by each other and other members of the international community – for merely belonging to a family that descended from the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The stigmatised person is seen as less than human and discriminated against, which can effectively endanger their life (Goffman, 1963). Numerous Turks and Armenians have been threatened, and even killed, for voicing their opinions too loudly; the murder of journalist Hrant Dink in 2007 by a fanatical Turkish nationalist is only one example (Christensen, 2007).

Stigma from discussions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 has also led to death in Australia. In 1980, the Sydney Turkish Consul General, Sarik Ariyak, and his bodyguard were gunned down. The Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide claimed the attack as an act, however, the assassins were never caught. At the time, Australian police stated the attack occurred as a result of a "longstanding hatred against the Turkish people" (“Group warns of further attacks,” 1986, November 24). Another attack took place in 1986. This time a car bomb was placed in the Melbourne Turkish Consulate basement level car park, however, the bomb exploded prematurely killing bomber, Hagop Levonian. The second bomber, Levon Demirian, was charged with Levonian’s murder, for which he served 10 years in gaol (Nicholson, 2012).

It is important to note that the stigmatised individual does not see him or herself as any different from other members of the public. They too are “normal” and deserve a “fair break”. Yet, often, this break is long awaited. The “other” does not “accept” the stigmatised as an “equal” (Goffman, 1963, p. 7). Such unacceptance pushes these individuals to the outskirts of society and subsequently influences group alignments. The individuals form their “own group” (Goffman, p. 114; Mander, 1999), wherein group members will have lived through “similar learning experiences” and “similar changes in conception of self” (Goffman, 1963, p. 32). In doing so, the stigmatised may establish a sense of belonging; however, they also prime their minds for the entry
of popularly accepted “fact”, which promotes separatism, as that is what the stigmatised know (Goffman, 1963, p. 32).

The result of stigma is the creation of a vicious cycle lasting generations (Mander, 1999). One such cycle is evident amongst Australian-Aboriginals who are still at a disadvantage in terms of education, employment opportunities and income (NSW Aboriginal Land Council, 2001). It can be seen in Israel, where the Holocaust is used to rationalise hostile actions against Palestinians (Loewenstein, 2006). This same cycle entraps Armenians and Turks, who almost a century on are still assigning blame and promoting separatism around the globe, instead of working together on a historical commission that could shed light on the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and create an avenue for reconciliation.

Escaping this cycle is by no means simple as it is filled with “self-belittling” thoughts (Goffman, 1963, p. 33); the stigmatised search for an escape from the predicament in which they are trapped. Often a “desirable pattern of revealing and concealing” is used. Guilt is attributed to the “other” to relieve oneself from the weight of stigma (Goffman, 1963, p. 109). However, alongside the stigmatised, political actors can also be accused of shifting accountability. In order to maintain support, the political actor often employs “avoidance of responsibility” (Laswell, 1976, p. 90), and broadcasts said avoidance via media outlets. Once more, social responsibility is disregarded, and multiculturalism endangered, for the purposes of self-advancement.

4.1.3. Framing, Agenda Setting and Priming. The placement of the Turkish description of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in the “universe of the undisputed” is a result of the case’s initial framing. Framing is a process of presenting “persistent patterns of selection, emphasis and exclusion that furnish a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events” (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003, p. 4). This can be achieved by the use of “predominant labels” to guide public discourse, and is a powerful tool in the hands of lobbyists (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 13). For those determined to write history, framing is a means by which to present one’s own perspective to the world. The way a historic event is framed changes “perceptions” rather than “actual reality”, yet this is enough to manipulate public opinion (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003). Inspired by emotions, journalistic communication is biased (Angel & Gibbs, 2006; Uysal, 2008, 2009), and this biased presentation of
historic issues in news reports significantly affects the audience’s comprehension of an issue (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007), which in turn can affect domestic policy and even international relations (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003). Closer to home, framed, one-sided media coverage can result in tense narratives amongst Australian ethnic-migrant community groups.

Framing simplifies otherwise complex issues by presenting them in a manner which coincides with the viewer’s “cognitive schemas”; previous memories created when the original frame was presented (Goffman, 1986; Meyrowitz, 1986; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12). Certainly, framing is ideal for journalists working to strict deadlines, who are too time poor to rummage through archives for a differing perspective.

There are two methods of investigative political journalism. The first is to speak to the key source or sources at the centre of an issue. The second is to interview everyone who had some involvement or knowledge of the issue and to then report the “consensus view” (Richardson, 2002, p.181). It is difficult to obtain an accurate assessment with the first approach, as it could easily be coming from a biased perspective. The second, however, requires time, resources and access to interviewees who may be reluctant to share information (Richardson, 2002). Rarely do journalists utilise archives and the Freedom of Information Act to verify information, according to a study conducted by the University of Tasmania. Instead, other sources are used, such as political actors and activists, to pick up stories and sound bites. “This undermines not only their own interests but their responsibility to society,” argue Ricketson and Snell (2002, p.154).

Lobbying can also skew the view being presented to the general public and parliamentary members. Chapter Seven discusses in detail how constant lobbying of an issue, from a decided angle, makes that perspective accessible and easier to commit to memory; increasing the chances of that issue surfacing to the public agenda. Lobbying is one of the most effective techniques an interest group can employ. However, providing all constituents with a voice is impossible; opposing groups will undoubtedly have differing opinions. Frequently, it is the less politically active minorities who are left unheeded, though their opinion may be just as valid (Lasswell, 1976). Furthermore, with a monopoly on media ownership in Australia, it is common to see the same news being circulated across different media platforms.
Migrant citizens constitute a large portion of the minority groups in Australia, as explained by Jupp (1984). “The political dilemma of the ‘ethnic’...is that while he or she may be legally a citizen...his or her access to power is restricted by majority prejudice and the preservation of long-established elites.” (p.5) Consequently, underrepresentation of certain Australian migrant communities, in political environments, particularly during the creation and passing of legislation, becomes unavoidable.

Framing is not the only tool at the disposal of political actors; agenda setting and priming, while different from framing, have the ability to work hand-in-hand. Agenda setting is the process of using news stories to form public agendas (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). However, agenda setting does not have a life of its own. If it is used to raise issues, it is done so because there are journalists, political actors and social networks which deem these issues to be significant (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). “The activities of interest groups, policymakers, journalists, and other groups interested in shaping media agendas and frames can have an impact on both the volume and character of news messages about a particular issue” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12). While the media does not tell citizens what to think, it does influence what they think about (Mackey, 2000). The constant barrage of images and sound bites communicated to media audiences results in “strong, long-term effects” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 10). A high volume of media coverage results in an increase of attention and the subsequent creation of an agenda (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Butler (1993) too highlights the importance of repetition in the acceptance of a performance; referring to the theory of iterability – “a regularized and constrained repetition of norms” (p.95) – as developed by Derrida (1981). “‘[P]erformance’ is not a singular ‘act’ or event, but a ritualised production.” (Butler, 1993, p.95) Constant repetition of this ritual allows the actor to maintain a position of power (Butler, 1993).

Use of the media in these terms can work for and against political actors. While constant coverage does have the ability to set agendas, frequent coverage of political actors can also wear away the mysticism surrounding said actor, leaving citizens underwhelmed by the ordinary individual on their paper or screen. To successfully communicate their message, political actors require the correct balance of media exposure (Meyrowitz, 1986).
Priming, on the other hand, takes place when “news content suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for evaluating the performance of leaders and governments” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). Essentially, priming changes the way in which the general public evaluates political actors. Like agenda setting, priming is a memory-based model, which assumes information at the forefront of an individual’s memory, will be used to form decisions (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Political actors can prime constituents to take certain factors into account by disseminating agenda-setting messages via the media, which outline the aspects to be considered when evaluating a political issue (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).

Framing, agenda setting and priming work best when working together. The use of “predominant labels” by interest groups to frame an issue and guide public discourse accordingly is a powerful strategy, yet it is the increased presence of these labels in the public agenda that ensures the message is successfully communicated.

4.1.4. The Label Maker and its Timely Use. The mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is interpreted by assigned labels, communicated via the media. The Armenian Government describes the events as “genocide”, as does much of the international community, though this label is not without problems. For a mass killing to be considered genocide there must be “intent to destroy”, and there are historians who claim evidence of “intent to destroy” has not been provided, only intent to relocate (Suny, 2009; McCarthy, 2005). Opposing the label of “genocide” is “civil war” – as both Ottoman-Turkish and Ottoman-Armenian lives were lost (McCarthy, 2005). Though again, this label is problematic. Those sympathetic to the Armenian plight claim the Ottoman-Turkish casualties were a result of the Ottoman-Armenian “resistance” against the alleged “genocide” (Suny, 2009). Then, there is the Turkish Government stance that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was an “event”; one which consisted of atrocities being committed, and Ottoman-Armenians being killed as a result of ethnic fighting and forced deportations. However, the Turkish Government maintains the deaths were not part of a systematic plan, stating “the complete story of the vast suffering of this period has not yet been written”, and referring to facts often excluded from the mainstream discussions, including the deaths of 2.5 million Ottoman-Turks and other Ottoman-Muslims, to
causes such as forced migration, famine and disease, during the same period (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

One of greatest tools in the hands of a sculptor managing perceptions is the label maker. “Media can create a sense of sharing and belonging or a feeling of exclusion and isolation. Media can reinforce a “them vs. us” feeling or they can undermine it.” (Meyrowitz, 1986, p.7) With the use of a few carefully selected terms, political actors are able to present those with opposing views as the “other”—an enemy (Hamelink, 1997; Meyrowitz, 1986; Terzis 2008). Actors suggest to the target audience that the “other” threatens security, cannot be reasoned with, and requires elimination (Hamelink, 1997; Terzis 2008). The justification of war requires framing the “other” as inhuman, opposed to “our” liberal views (Butler, 2009). Daniel Goldhagen (1996) claims this technique was employed by the Nazi German media to influence public opinion towards the “evil” Jewish people. “In order to disseminate hatred on a massive scale, the Nazis constructed a tightly-controlled and carefully organized propaganda machine,” explain Freedman and Freedman (1995, p. 78). This included labelling the Jewish populace as “villains” and the Nazis as “heroes” (Freedman & Freedman, 1995, p. 54), and through the use of defamatory labels, a “persuasion monopoly” was created, which resulted in the participation of the masses in the Holocaust (Freedman & Freedman, 1995, p. 83). Vulgar thoughts can simplify a complex, multifaceted issue into a superficial definition, such as “genocide” or “civil war” (Goldhagen, 1996). Simplistic and constricting descriptions, in turn, can create conflict between nations and communities, particularly in a multicultural environment such as Australia.

Language is often used to justify brute force, so much so that Freedman and Freedman (1995) pose the following question: “can language, when manipulated by a particular political organisation, convince people who might be either indifferent or passively hostile toward a particular minority group to take violent action against that group, or to remain silent and inactive while perceiving others taking violent action?” (p. 71). This question remains to be answered, though it is hoped this thesis will be a start. It is more widely accepted that language is often used to alleviate guilt, or to supply reason to the unreasonable. Psychologist Stanley Milgram performed an infamous experiment on obedience at Yale University in the early 1960s, now known as the “concentration camp experiment”. Milgram had the subjects inflict pain upon
their partners by administering electric shocks; what they did not know is their partners were actors who were merely feigning pain. Still, they continued to administer the shocks to levels, which could have theoretically resulted in death. The results revealed individuals can emotionally distance themselves from an event, and from guilt, if the correct language techniques, or labels, are used when their role is initially described (Freedman & Freedman, 1995; Parker, 2000; Wilson, 2003). Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett argue the position in which a person finds themselves greatly influences their actions (Parker, 2000). While language, more specifically, key terms, are used to define a situation, they alone cannot successfully manage perceptions. The level of perception management success achieved from imposing simplistic terms relies upon timely action.

Timely responses play a large role in crisis and perception management (Huang & Su, 2009). By seizing the initiative, political actors can sculpt messages to suit their own agenda; forcing their opposition into a reactive position, where they are forced to defend their actions. Arguably, once the seeds of an idea have been planted in a timely manner, the idea spreads and has the ability to manipulate social outcomes.

“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.” (Bernays, 2004)

Following World War I, Turkey was preoccupied with post-war reconstruction and the assembly of the new republic. Consequently, the administration was not the first to set forth a label describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Furthermore, it was slow in responding to “genocide accusations”. The result was a simplification of the issue into “victims and villains” (McCarthy, 1996a). Responding in a timely manner is critical to effective crisis and perception management. “Audiences tend to accept the self projected by the individual performer during any current performance as a responsible representative,” asserts Goffman (1959, p. 235). Consequently, a political actor who seizes the initiative, and supplies the first acceptable representation, is capable of swaying swinging audiences to a particular side (Huang & Su, 2009). The representation portrayed, often based on
moral perspectives, is communicated aggressively; to the point where, at times, the message carries less weight than the conviction with which it is portrayed. “Credibility replaces fact and truth,” argues Suny (2009). “[P]lausible explanations that people are willing to accept seem adequate” (p. 931).

When it comes to accepting a perspective, Freud (1922) claims that individuals move with the collective, rather than against it, to secure a position of heightened power and advantage. According to crowd psychology, the mind of a crowd member merges with the collective’s thought, decreasing the member’s awareness of his or her own actions (Freud, 1922), much like the citizens of Oceania in Orwell’s *1984* (1954). “The individual is told that if he adopts the right line (which line depending on who is talking), he will have to come to terms with himself and be a whole man; he will be an adult with dignity and self-respect,” explains Goffman (1963). “And in truth he will have accepted a self for himself; but this self is, as it necessarily must be, a resident alien, a voice of the group that speaks for and through him” (p. 123). The same is not so for an individual removed from the crowd, who maintains a greater level of personal awareness (Freud, 1922).

Had it not been for factors such as timeliness, the framing of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 may have greatly differed, as would the popularly accepted version of events. This, however, is not to say the differing version would not again have been a simplification of the event into “victims and villains”. It is likely there would again be a demonised character. Painting characters as torturers who believe that “murder is the greatest human preoccupation,” as in Octave Mirbeau’s *The Torture Garden* (2008, p. 1), is not difficult. Genuine as these characters may appear, this does not make their existence any more real than those created by Mirbeau. “Sometimes politicians do the wrong thing to do what’s right for their country,” explains McCarthy (Nancipelosi, 2008). In the case of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, both sides have set forth labels relieving their people and governments of any guilt. In terms of crisis management, had the political actors accepted some level of responsibility, then the debate may not have lasted this long (Johnston & Zawawi, 2000), and reconciliation may have already been grasped. Instead, tension continues to filter through community groups who continue to see the “other” as a “villain”.

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4.1.5. Manufacturing Consent and Dissent. Few governments have been more successful than the United States in managing perceptions. Though perception management, as a form of “information warfare” or “public diplomacy”, is widely present in the international political arena (Transnational Crisis Project, 2008), more often than not, it is the United States who are accused of “manufacturing consent” through the media (Chomsky & Herman, 2002).

Looking back, perception management was used by the Reagan-Bush administrations to influence post-Vietnam War public opinions (Parry, 2004). It was used again by John Rendon to “sell” the Iraq War to the American public (Bamford, 2005; Leslie, 2005). In addition, of course, there is the War on Terror. The opening lines of a paper by Andrew Garfield, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and US Director of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies, clearly indicates the US stance towards perception management. “In the ongoing ‘War against Terrorism’, it is absolutely vital that the Perception Management campaign of the United States and its allies be coordinated at the highest possible level... such a campaign could be a war-winning capability... Even a poorly chosen word, used in the heat of the moment (e.g. ‘crusade’), can have significant negative consequences,” writes Garfield (2002, p. 30).

Indeed, political actors must be precise with the terms they use if they are to successfully manage crises; a topic which Mark Regev knows much about. Australian-born Regev is an Israeli diplomat. He was the official spokesperson for the Israeli Prime Minister, from 2007 to 2015, and is now Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. As a political actor and a spokesperson, he has held a record independent of the Prime Minister, and the capability to unify the offices of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministry, to deliver a cohesive message when managing a crisis (Leydon, 2007). Regev’s sculptures are often broadcast by CNN, Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and other foreign press. “It means you need to be very careful about what you say,” explains the “spin-meister par excellence”. “[I]t’s my job to articulate the message of the entire Government,” Regev explains (Koutsoukis, 2008). Meyrowitz (1986) also highlight the need to take care in the selection of words. “[M]any persons of high authority must control their images so carefully that they do not seem to be controlling their images.” (Meyrowitz, 1986, p.67)
Unlike Regev, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan rarely employs labels precisely; a contributing factor to the country’s shortcomings in internationally distributing labels. Erdogan lacks the gentle art of persuasion. Following resolutions in the United States and Sweden to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians as “genocide”, Erdogan stated that Turkey was turning a “blind eye” to 100,000 illegal Armenian immigrants. “Tomorrow, I may tell these 100,000 to go back to their country, if it becomes necessary.” (“Turkey Could ‘Deport the Armenians’,” 2010, March 17) The statement merely exemplified how the Prime Minister uses intimidation techniques; threats which he does not intend to follow through. This threat has been heard multiples times since 2010, when it was first announced, and no action towards deportation has been taken.

“Government and other political actors can shape news coverage,” explain Norris et al. (2003, p. 294), and understandably, citizens unknowingly construct perceptions, which at times ignore empirical research (Felson, 1984; Lewy, 2005b). “The meaning of events depends on what people make of them, and what people make of them naturally depends on how events are presented to them. The representation of an event must therefore always be considered part of the event; how the public sees the incident becomes the truth for all except the smallest handful,” explains Madmoni-Gerber (2009, p. 14). By framing events in a particular light, political actors sculpt messages that propel themselves and their allies, to leadership positions.

Erdogan’s directive to Turkish Government institutions to use the term “olaylar”, translated to “events”, when describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, is an example of perception construction (Aydemir, 2007). The use of “event” alludes to a natural calamity and diminishes accountability. Erdogan’s label shrugs off social responsibility and does not show the deserved importance to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, much in the same way the term “genocide” ignores the deaths of the Ottoman-Turks. Erdogan’s position, however, is no different from his predecessors, nor is Armenian President Sargsyan’s for that matter. Both actors are playing a role established decades prior to their reign; a role they must maintain in order to maintain their position (Goffman, 1959).

Roles are initially established to promote favourable first impressions; they conceal the true agenda of any actor. As characterised by Goffman (1959), “[the]
object of a performer is to sustain a particular definition of the situation, thus representing, as it were, his claim as to what reality is.” (p. 90) It subsequently becomes difficult to deny the power inherent in a successful political actor. “We’re an empire now, and when we act we create our own reality... We’re history’s actors... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do,” a White House aide once said to journalist Ron Suskind (2004) during the Bush administration. Clearly, this particular actor had no doubts in his role and subsequent ability to influence perceptions on a global scale.

The actions of the Armenian and Turkish Governments may have influenced the approach political actors in the United States, and many other nations, apply to perception management; however, clearly, the US is the leader in the field. Edward Bernays, often cited as the “father of public relations” (“Edward Bernays, ‘Father of Public Relations’,” 1995), was a pioneer in the manipulation of public opinion. Bernays (2004) believed “expert opinions” could be used to influence the masses and, essentially, rule countries. Political actors distribute carefully drafted messages to maintain the support of their constituents; if they lose support, they lose power. “Power is an interpersonal situation; those who hold power are empowered. They depend upon and continue only so long as there is a continuing stream of empowering responses,” explains Laswell (1976, p. 10). The extent of a political actor’s power, however, is determined by how they “clothe” their position, the position of others, and distributed messages. The means they employ to dramatise the self-determines the extent of the effect (Goffman, 1959, p. 235).

The interplay between power and personality, for the political actor, is such that every decision made favours “power opportunities”. (Laswell, 1976, p. 21). This includes modernising political actors, such as Kemal Ataturk, and anti-democratic leaders, such as Adolf Hitler. Clearly there is a vast difference between the importance given to power by these political actors and the means employed to maintain it, yet a similarity is found in their deep-seated desire to preserve their place. The political actor’s effort is often described as being in the “public interest”, and so the struggle to retain “crystallized support... by winning over the indifferent and hostile continues” (Laswell, 1976, p. 38).

It cannot, however, be assumed that all political actors manage the perceptions of their audiences for “self-interest”. “A cynical individual may delude his audience
for what he considers to be their own good or for the good of the community,” explains Goffman (1959, p. 29). It is equally possible for an actor to be taken in by their own performance, to truly believe the impressions they foster, to be convinced they are acting within the “public interest” (Goffman, 1959, p. 29). One only needs to look at George Bush’s conviction that the US invasion of Iraq was just and the results necessary. The former President’s decision to initiate war was based chiefly on his “instincts” (Suskind, 2004). While the Bush administration may still be criticised at the current moment, whether this level of criticism will remain in the coming years is questionable. Bush’s biography, Decision Points outlines the critical decisions and actions he undertook; it presents his own definitive version of the administration’s history (Bush, 2010). Essentially, it is a perception management interface, and it is not the only one to have been provided by the Bush administration. Donald Rumsfeld (2011) has contributed Known and Unknown, and Dick Cheney (2011) has joined their ranks with In My Life. When former President Bush was asked during an interview if he had restored dignity and honour to the Presidential Office, as initially promised, he answered “history is going to have to judge” (Silva, 2007). However, with a collaboratively placed definitive version of his administration, it appears the final verdict may be revised (Krauthammer, 2008).

“Journalists must always consider the possibility that they are wrong.” (Waterford, 2002, p.40). A seemingly honest source is quite capable of unknowingly communicating biased or even inaccurate “fact” (Waterford, 2002, p.40), particularly if they are taken in by their own performance (Goffman, 1959; Meyrowitz, 1986). “The selves we project are not simply the masks we slip on...but personalities we become attached to. The longer we play a given role, the more the role comes to seem real, not only to our audiences, but also ourselves,” argues Meyrowitz (1986, p.31).

The listed language tools, while evidently influential if wielded correctly, would possess merely minute clout if not for the media. Members of the media play a key role in persuading societies to “negotiate” in a specific manner (Allan & Zelitzer, 2004; Bond, 2005; Terzis, 2003, 2008). “Media forms become tools for translating the unknown, the abstruse into the understood, and the strange into the familiar” (Mander, 1999, p. 3). The media becomes what Fredric Jameson recognised as the “political unconscious”; building an individual’s “understanding” of events, on a national and
international scale, and influencing the parameters of discussions surrounding social change (Mander, 1999, p. 3).

“Communication techniques such as innuendo, strategic ambiguity, and crucial omissions allow the misinformer to profit from lies without, technically, telling any. The mass media have their own version of this and demonstrate that by judicious camera angles and editing,” explains Goffman (1959, p. 90). Still, it is important to keep in mind that while the mass media do have the ability to influence audiences, the strength and consequent effects of this influence depends on the audience’s personal bias and ability to process the message (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Furthermore, the level of audience attention determines the strength of message transmission. Audiences best remember information when there is a level of captivation (Eveland, 2004; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007), and priming is most successful when audiences continue contemplating the political issue after the initial presentation. This, however, requires previous political knowledge (Hwang, Gottlieb, Nah & McLeod, 2007). The aforementioned points are problematic to the concept of framing, more so than agenda setting; one can argue that constant exposure is enough for the creation of an agenda (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).

Journalists were once believed to be watchdogs – granted some still are – however, there are increasingly fewer journalists akin to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, who blew open the Watergate scandal and, despite all risks, brought down President Nixon. The theory of the Fourth Estate, key to social responsibility and the provision of an unbiased watchdog, seems to be merely a theory in modern times. Rarely is it employed in practice if a deadline is looming in a hyper commercialised media environment (McChesney, 2015). Journalists are required to be committed to “honesty, fairness, independence and respect for the rights of others”, as outlined in the Journalist Code of Ethics, set forth by the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA, 2017). This commitment can be summarised as social responsibility; “the notion that journalists are required not only to present the facts but have a social responsibility to probe behind them and establish the truth for social good” (Clem 2002, p.5). If the necessary time to “responsibly” and “fairly” represent a contentious issue cannot be set aside, then it is arguably more responsible to leave coverage of that issue till a more appropriate time; a time at which the necessary in-depth investigation can be conducted. Otherwise, reductive arguments around “us” and “them” are
created, which serve only to create tension between community groups. This in no way adheres to the *Journalist Code of Ethics* (MEAA, 2017).

Some may argue such intentional exclusion is tantamount to censorship, which, at times, is more destructive than prejudice. There are, however, moments where it may be deemed necessary (Butler, 1997). Having said this, Butler argues censorship attempts often only serve to further disseminate the language they were introduced to subjugate. Considering that the effects of discourse are dependent on the context in which they are relayed, censorship can easily become an ineffective practice.

Each of the mentioned theories has a set of strengths, weaknesses and limitations. Regardless, when used with care, they have the power to simplify complex political communication in order to manage perceptions. The term “facts speak for themselves” is not uncommon. It is, however, inaccurate; it is the historian, or in this case, the political actor or media member, who gives them life. Facts are chosen, analysed and interpreted. Moreover, “individual interpretations, unavoidably, are fated to be biased,” explains Hallett (1961, p.25). Such biased arguments are capable of creating conflicting and reductive arguments between those of differing cultural backgrounds. These arguments shirk social responsibility, affect national identity, and are a barrier to reconciliation processes.

As mentioned, the literature pertaining to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and perception management techniques, is extensive. This section provided a glimpse at the matter at hand, to highlight the potential tensions media coverage of contentious international issues can create amongst ethnic-migrant communities. These theories will be further explored in Chapter Eight, as their use in the analysed media content is examined. This chapter also includes a discussion of the theories that underpin this thesis, as their use is considered together with the qualitative data collected from interviewing political actors and label makers.

The research question, together with the concepts of multiculturalism and socially responsible media and political practises, will be inclusively explored in this thesis.
4.2. Research Questions & Methodology

This research explores the potential repercussions of discussing contentious international debates in multicultural Australia. The ways in which political actors have used the media and key labels, to frame historic events and manage perceptions, are evaluated. Key media and political narratives are examined, using academic theory, to understand the ramifications of the New South Wales and South Australian Parliamentary decisions to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”. The general aim has been to consider how political actors have revised and retold historical accounts from multiple perspectives, often to the detriment to at least one ethnic-migrant community.

The specific objectives are to:

- determine the demography of Australian-Armenians and Australian-Turks
- understand how cultural and religious background, education and experiences impact unity within the two diasporic communities
- provide an overview of the historical background to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and highlight the areas of contention and scholarly disagreement
- identify the many layers of work and networking that make a successful lobby
- describe how the Australian-Armenians and Australian-Turkish communities respond to their decreased sense of belonging.

The thesis answers the following core questions:

- how and why do contentious international debates make their way into Australian State Parliaments?
- how does the inclusion of contentious international debates in the Australian context impact the normative concept of multiculturalism?
- does the inclusion of these debates results in tense narratives between Australia’s different ethnic-migrant groups, particularly the Australian-Armenians and the Australian-Turks (gauged through activism as reported in the media, and through interviews)?
• what role does the media (both ethnic and mainstream) play in framing debates, setting agendas, setting forth labels, and promoting activism?

This thesis explores the challenges facing ethnic-migrant communities in Australia; a geographically distant nation that is no longer “immune” to international influences. Globalisation has seen to people feeling “home”, no matter where they are in the world (Appadurai, 1990).

4.2.1. Analysis of Australian Ethnic and Mainstream Media. The content analysis of ethnic media helps to understand how and why one ethnic group is able to frame a debate and set the agenda, while the other is not. In-depth content analysis, presented in Chapter Eight, adds to the understanding of why the Armenian diaspora is able to unite, while the Turkish diaspora remain disconnected. Reviewing ethnic media also made it clear that ethnic media does not feed mainstream media, however, in the Australian-Armenian case; ethnic media can serve as a uniting tool that supports activism. This level of activism is then what informs not only mainstream media, but also parliamentary debates.

The publications chosen for review are: The Sydney Morning Herald, The Australian, The Age, Adelaide Now, Armenia Weekly (later to become Armenia Online), and Yeni Vatan Turkish Newspaper. While other media sources have consistently been monitored for relevant coverage, the content of their coverage was not analysed. The four main case studies – the NSW Government’s 1997 recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”; the South Australian Government’s 2009 recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”; the French Senate’s 2012 attempt to create a “genocide” Denial Bill; and the NSW Government’s 2013 decision to pass a motion that recognised the deaths of other Christian minorities under the Ottoman Empire as “genocide” – determined the data collection periods.

When the study first began in 2010, only the first two parliamentary motions had been passed. Looking at the media coverage surrounding these parliamentary motions, it was determined that analysing media content from one month preceding and one month following the motions would be sufficient.
Within two years, the French Senate proposed the “genocide” Denial Bill, and the shockwaves spread as far as Australia. It was then determined that the Denial Bill – its passing and later abolishment – made such an impact on the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities, that its inclusion as a third case study was necessary, despite the fact that the event itself was taking place abroad. By 2013, the NSW Government had decided to amend its first motion, to include the mention of other Christian minorities, and so a fourth case study was added.

While the media coverage from case studies three and four is available online, the ethnic media coverage from 1997 and 2009 is not. These articles were obtained during field trips to the NSW State Library, where they have been saved to microfilm. These field trips revealed another significant problem; Armenia Weekly (later to become Armenia Online) was written chiefly in Armenian. Attempts to find an Armenian-English translator were unsuccessful, and after careful review of the articles that were in English, it was determined that the English content would be sufficient to undertake the analysis. This decision was based on the premise that the articles and advertisements intended for agenda-setting purposes were the ones published in English, or published in both Armenian and English. Considering that this study analyses the role of the media in setting agendas, there was an adequate amount of content to undertake the review. In fact, it was soon realised that even with this setback, there were still more articles in Armenia Weekly than there were in Yeni Vatan.

The themes and categories listed below were identified based on their ability to set agendas through repetition, and to frame debates and manage perceptions through language and image choices. Using NVivo, the data from the selected media coverage periods were coded based on the identified key themes and categories below:

- number and type of published articles (e.g. news story, feature story);
- month of publication;
- publication type (mainstream or local ethnic media);
- type of coverage (pre-emptive, reactive, present tense, neither);
- use of emotive language;
- use of negative language or condemnation;
- label used to describe of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916;
4.2.2. Interviews with Political Actors Who Label the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The interviews with political actors provide insight into their motivations for choosing a specific label for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 over others, or for choosing not to label the mass killing at all. The discussion around the interview findings, in Chapter Eight, also explores if parliamentary and media settings are the right places for the debates around the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians to be taking place.

The potential interviewees who were identified were political actors who were involved with labelling the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. As defined in Chapter One, the term political actors is used in this thesis when referring to elected members of parliament, government spokespersons and politically active agents capable of sculpting messages and communicating themes to audiences. In some instances, the identified political actors set forth and advocated for a specific label, and in other instances their research may have been used to create a label. Political actors were the focus of the interviews because it is the labels they create, use and refuse that are influencing the recognition of the mass killing of the Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

The interviewees were recruited via an email, inviting them to participate in the research. Follow-up phone calls were made at times to secure the time and location of the interview. While the interviewees provided invaluable insight, it should be noted that over 20 potential interviewees were approached, and of those only five agreed to participate in the research. However, the inclusion of these interviews was essential to the reflexive approach used when undertaking this research (as detailed further in this chapter).

The trust of the interviewees was gained by allowing them to choose how they would like to be interviewed, to allow them greater comfort. They were also offered the interview guide beforehand, and any questions they had were answered. The
The interview guide was shaped together with the supervisory panel, to ensure that it was aligned with the core thesis questions.

Interviews were conducted via email and face-to-face, based on the interviewees’ preference and location. The option of telephone interviews was also provided however none of the interviewees chose that option. Those who opted for an email interview did so because either they were located overseas, or they wanted time to think over their responses. Keeping in line with the semi-structured interview, follow up questions were sent via email when necessary.

The interviews explored not only what these political actors wanted to happen, but also why they believed it should happen. The data gained from these interviews was analysed using NVivo coding to identify and align the themes prevalent across the interviews.

The names of interviewees have been changed, in order to protect their anonymity, in accordance with ethics approval requirements. A reference list of the interview participants may be found in Appendix D, although it has been created using their pseudonyms, again to protect their anonymity. Descriptions of the interviewees’ professions may be found in the Chapter Eight discussion of the interview findings. The interview guide has been included as Appendix C. The interview transcripts have not been included in the Appendix, again to protect the anonymity of the interviewees.

4.2.3. A Reflexive Approach to Data Collection and Analysis. While a reflexive approach is important to all research, regardless of whether it is in the field of science, social science, or the arts, it was particularly important to this thesis to ensure the work was not influenced by any potential unconscious bias. The term reflexivity can have many different practices, however the process applied throughout this thesis is best explained by Tim May and Beth Perry (2017), as an “examination of the frameworks of thought themselves” (p.3). It was apparent from the early stages of research that a reflexive practise would be necessary to ensure there was a systematic approach to the creation of knowledge within this thesis. After all, the idea for this thesis was born after two state governments passed bills based on their assumption of the facts, a bill that has the potential to be detrimental to the ethnic-migrant communities living in Australia. Their decisions are a glaring reminder that there is a constant need to evaluate what is considered to be “self-evident” (May &
Perry, 2017, p. 3) – “we need reflexive communities of inquiry sensitive to contemporary concerns and prepared to speak out when powerful forces seek to mould our practices in their images” (May & Perry, 2017, p.146). While this thesis aims to hold political actors accountable, so that they are considering the needs of multicultural Australia, the research within this thesis and the processes taken to create knowledge within this thesis must also be held accountable by being considered in a reflexive manner.

“Reflexivity is a guard against what we might call a hypodermic realism: that is, the assumption that there is an unproblematic relationship between us and the world, including social scientific practices and its products, which results in a valid and reliable representation of the world.” (May & Perry, 2017, p.4) Any researcher would be naïve to believe their experiences of the world, the context in which they came to be who they are, do not colour their view of the world. The impact of these experiences on our decision-making processes is referred to as “unconscious bias”. Pritlove, Juando-Prats, Ala-leppilampi and Parsons (2019) state unconscious bias, otherwise known as implicit bias “rests on the belief that people act on the basis of internalised schemas of which they are unaware and thus can, and often do, engage in discriminatory behaviours without conscious intent” (p.502). “[R]esearch into implicit bias is still developing,” states Bailey (2018, para. 10). However, he explains that while the “unconscious tendency to associate particular characteristics with particular groups” is “not malicious”, it can result in the “disparate treatment of individuals and groups” (Bailey, 2018, para.11). Unconscious bias has been attributed to the brain being flooded with information, which can create “bias blind spots,” states Bailey (2018, para 16). In other words, our brain only hones in on the information it needs to secure our survival. This can mean that other, relevant information can be left in the periphery. If we live in an environment that constantly views people in a certain light, it become easy for our own brain to automatically make the same judgements and assumptions. However, as May and Perry (2017) explain, with the practise of reflexivity we can question the assumptions created by the context we live in and our resulting unconscious bias, or as they describe it – “the spheres of perception through which we make sense of the world” – and safeguard against these assumptions (p.4).

Key to adopting a reflexive approach is understanding who we are in the world. “[T]he researcher must reflect on how he or she has influenced the situation and the
people being studied in order to monitor reactivity, so as to minimize any distorting effect on the research findings,” states Hammersley (2011, p.2). In order to be reflexive to a point where we can also reflect upon reactivity, we require the “quality of mind” that is referred to as the “sociological imagination” by Mills (1959, p.5), which allows us to step away from the lens through which we see the world, so that we are viewing not only the world but also that lens. It allows us to question that lens and why we see what we see through it. Only then, can we realize that as researchers we have our limitations. Bailey (2018) refers to this process as the “self-audit, an objective examination of one’s work,” which he recognizes as one of the most important tools in recognizing unconscious bias (para.47).

Similarly, Mosley agrees that “[b]y actually understanding the complexities of our own personal biases, we can improve our work and deepen our coverage of important issues like race and identity” (0:27). Recognizing my limitations as a researcher, to ensure that I achieved quality research outputs, I evaluated my work in international contexts. This included presenting at conferences, where communications and culture experts from around the world gauged my work and held it and me accountable, exposing me to multiple perspectives. I submitted my work to thesis writing circles, again as another avenue of evaluation. Most importantly, this research was shared with two Australian-Armenian academics, to ensure their very unique and important perspective and feedback was obtained and considered before finalising this thesis. May and Perry (2017, p.171) state researchers must be “vigilant” in their research practices in order to create “better research”. In the context of this research, that vigilance was obtained by showing it to people who have both conscious and unconscious biases against it. This thesis, the frameworks of thought that hold it together, were reflected on in many different contexts. “By embracing the power of bias, we can move beyond it,” states Mosley (2016, 1:04).

May and Perry (2017, p.174) conclude that “a framework for reflexive thought begins by considering oscillations between the dimensions of endogenous and referential reflexivity and which inhere within social life itself”. Conducting interviews was a necessary component to considering the “oscillations” referred to by May and Perry (2017, p.174), which is why they were included in this thesis despite the difficulties faced during the recruitment process. The insights provided by the semi-structured interviewees ensured the different perspectives at hand were
incorporated. It also allowed me the opportunity to discuss my views with those of differing opinions, to shed light on any unconscious biases I may have had. After undertaking these interviews, and seeing the unique and differing viewpoints they offered, my goal became to create a space within this thesis where I could bring these views together in the form of a discussion. Such a discussion has not taken place until now because it has proven impossible to bring these parties with such differing perspectives into one room for an open debate about their views on the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and the labels that are used to describe those mass killings today.

A significant limitation to any research is that “there is no place from which to claim a privileged objectivity, no voice from nowhere, even within the laboratory,” argue May and Perry (2017, p. 146). We do not have an “Olympian perspective” of the world (Hammersley, 2011), rather we are members of the world that we study, which is why we should reflect on our research processes, and provide details about that process and the data collected so readers can analyse the findings within their own context. For this reason, I have detailed the steps taken in my research process, the content analysis data has been included in the form of tables, and the interview questions have also been included in the Appendix of this thesis. The full interview transcripts have not been included to protect the anonymity of the interviewees. The information within the transcripts could lead to the identification of the interviewees, which was expressly prohibited by the ethics committee when granting approval for the undertaking of this research.

Finally, a key element to achieving the “quality of mind” referred to by Mills (1959, p.5) is asking ourselves, “Who am I?” This question is a necessity in determining who the researcher is, how others view them, and what experiences prompt their actions and views (May & Perry, 2017). So, who am I? I am a second generation Australian-Turk, but I am also a daughter, a wife, a soccer player, a community volunteer, a journalist, a teacher and many other things. Most important to this thesis, I am an academic, and that brings with it a level of professionalism that can be seen from my commitment and skill. Part of this professionalism entails being aware of and managing my different selves. Of course my cultural background is a key part to any work that I produce, but my research skills, commitment to accuracy, reflexivity and mindfulness play a much more significant role in any work I undertake,
as they allow me to step away from the lens that is my experiences and my personal context. These are the resources necessary to undertake this study, and these were the resources that were harnessed during every step of literature review, interviews, content analysis, and the evaluation of the findings. So yes, I am an Australian-Turk, but when I am working on this or any research, the self that I am honing is my academic identity, the version of myself that is first and foremost a committed and skilled research professional.

4.2.4. Presenting the Data. The data collected from content analysis is presented in Chapter Eight, in the form of tables, pie charts (created in Microsoft Excel, using Excel’s formula for percentages) and word clouds (created in Tagul at tagul.com). In some instances, when there was very little data available, a table or chart was not used. Word clouds were found to be an ideal way for visually presenting the prominent voices and themes that occurred across the media content. The word cloud parameters were set so that the size of each word is proportional to the number of times that theme or voice occurred, making those more prominent the largest and easiest to distinguish.

The research questions and theoretical framework presented in this chapter will be further discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine, together with content analysis and interview findings.
Chapter Five

Armenian and Turkish Migration to Australia: The People and their Stories

This chapter begins by examining the people who are most affected by recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Australia; the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities. In order to establish the unique roles these communities hold in multicultural Australia, a detailed demographic review of these two communities is presented. This chapter also considers the reasons the Armenian and Turkish people had for migration to Australia, their subsequent settlement decisions, and the relationships they have maintained since migrating. The participatory experiences of the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities are discussed in relation to the political strength and cohesion of the communities.

Ethnicity and ethnic community are realised in different ways in the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish cases, both in their behaviours as a community and statistically. Because of the Australian-Armenian community’s poorly documented demographics, ethnic community for Australian-Armenians is not identified by country of origin but by ancestry, language, religious affiliation, and the shaping of a collective memory (the latter is further discussed in subsequent chapters). In contrast, the Turkish ethnic community is defined by country of origin of a person, or country of origin of a person’s parents. The demographics of this “ethnic category” are better known because the statistical practices of Australia have long made “country of origin” an important category.

5.1. The Australian-Armenian Community: Migration and Demographics

The number of people with Armenian ancestry is somewhat of a mystery. Armenians are what Kirkland (1980, p.iv) refers to as a “rare population” in that there is minimal official statistical data available. This is the case not just in Australia, but also in the
global context. Approximately half of those of Armenian origins live outside of Armenia (Collins & Castillo, 1998), with many not having been born in Armenia. The migrants who comprised the Australian-Armenian community in 1980 had originated from 43 different nations (Kirkland, 1980), which greatly complicates the collection of Census data. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) also does not collect detailed data about the Australian-Armenians, as this data is collected based on country of origin, and very few of those who identify as Australian-Armenian were actually born in Armenia.

5.1.1. Origins of the Armenian People. The origin of Armenians can be traced back 3,000 years to Anatolia and the Caucasus. Their people struggled for unity until AD 406, when the Armenian alphabet was created. Before then, the Armenian community had been divided between those who were educated in Sumerian and Greek. The creation of the alphabet succeeded in protecting the Armenian language and fusing its people (Oam, 2001, p.172).

Armenians have also been united in their struggles; historically, they have known little peace. The first mass migration of Armenians was in 1238, after the Mongols defeated the capital city of Ani. This move saw the first instance of cohabitation between the Armenians and the Turks; affluent Armenian families migrated to Byzantium, now known as Istanbul. The remaining refugees moved to other European nations, including Hungary, Poland, Holland, France, Italy and Ukraine (Oam, 2001).

The art of craftsmanship has been passed down through generations of Armenians, and it was this capability that saw the Tsar of Russia, Peter the Great, invite Armenians who lived under Ottoman rule to Russia, where they were expected to pass on their knowledge of craftsmanship. The invitation created a strong tie between the two peoples, which continues to this day (Oam, 2001). This tie is arguably what resulted in the Ottoman Empire’s fears that Armenian revolutionaries would cooperate with the Russian invaders of Eastern Anatolia to seize Ottoman cities during World War I. Consequently, the relocation of Ottoman-Armenians began, during which hundreds of thousands perished in the crossfire and under the harsh conditions of relocation (McCarthy, 2005; Suny, 2009).
Mass emigration from Anatolia took place during and following World War I. Ottoman-Armenians sought refuge in neighbouring Middle Eastern lands, such as Egypt, Iraq and Greater Syria (now Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan). Over the decades they worked, prospered, and later moved to more politically and financially stable countries; including Australia (Oam, 2001).

These struggles faced by the Armenian people created what Castles et al. (1992) refer to as “historical trauma”. Communities that have experienced an “easily identifiable historical trauma” – which the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 arguably is, particularly for the Armenian communities around the world who do not believe the “genocide” label can be disputed – experience more intense feelings of nationalism (p.142). These feelings easily unite diaspora communities, bonding Armenians in Australia and around the world.

5.1.2. The Australian-Armenian Community. According to the Armenian National Committee of Australia (ANC Australia), the Australian-Armenian community is made up of an estimated 50,000 people. The majority of this population (40,000) is believed to reside in Sydney, while the remaining 10,000 is located in Melbourne. In both Sydney and Melbourne there are a number of organisations that meet the Australian-Armenian community’s educational, welfare, religious, sporting and cultural needs (ANC Australia, 2010b). This chapter discusses these organisations in greater detail following an explanation of domestic and international Armenian demography.

Before his passing in 2012, the Archbishop, Aghan Baliozian Oam, had listed the main concern facing Australian-Armenians as the difficulty in identifying Armenian population numbers due to their diverse backgrounds (Oam, 2001). In the Australian context, he argues, this diversity results in: reduced census counts; difficulties in providing elders of the community, who lack fluent English, welfare services; and the struggle to maintain religious and cultural identity among subsequent generations born in Australia. Oam (2001) explained: “Tireless efforts are being devoted in the hope that future generations may embrace the history of their ancestors and add to their personal depth as committed and dedicated members of the wider community.” (p.174)
5.1.3. Australian-Armenian Demography. Armenia is not included in the 107 countries of origin, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, for which the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) has provided Community Information Summaries in the past (the data for which is sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics). The Community Information Summaries, based on the 2011 Census, were the last to be published by DIAC (now the Department of Immigration and Border Protection). Similar information future censuses will be available on the ABS Quick Stats website, however, while data from the 2016 Census had been collated at the time of writing this chapter, the detailed data about ancestry had not yet been published at the time.

This unavailability of Census data further complicates the task of finding more accurate numbers of Australians with Armenian ancestry – Australian-Armenians, unlike Australian-Turks, do not have one specific country of origin. However, the Australian Census data can be used to quantify the Armenian community by taking two questions about ancestry and language spoken in the home as measures of “ethnicity”. During the 2011 Census, people from only seven of those 107 countries stated that they considered themselves to be Armenian. These countries were Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey (a decrease since the 2006 Census, when there were also people from Israel who considered themselves Armenian). The Australian-Armenians from these countries either spoke Armenian in their home or considered their heritage to be Armenian.

Little is known about the Armenians who migrated from Egypt and Iraq. Data from the censuses of 1901 and 1947 support the conclusion that “Many of the Egypt-born migrants who settled in Australia after World War II were of Italian, Maltese, Greek and Armenian descent” (DIAC, 2014a, p.1). The published information about the Australian-Armenians who were born in Iraq does not go into further detail than to state that Australia's Iraq-born population includes people with Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian, Turkish, Turkmen and Israeli ethnicities (DIAC, 2014c, p.1).

Slightly more is known about the Australian-Armenians who migrated from Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. The 2011 Census found that of the 34,453 Australians who were born in Iran (a 52.8% increase from 2006), 1,506 (4.2%) considered themselves to be Armenian. That is, the question regarding “ancestry” in the Census allowed each enumerated person to classify him/herself (or be classified
by the co-resident respondent) as both of Armenian ancestry and of Iranian ancestry. As well, 3.8% of the Iran-born Australians stated that they spoke Armenian in their homes (DIAC, 2014b).

Figure 5.1: Ancestry of Iran-Born Australians

Figure 5.2: Language Spoken at Home by Iran-Born Australians
In 2011, 4,621 Australians were recorded as being born in Jordan. Of these, 4.8% considered their ancestry to be Armenian and 3.5% spoke Armenian at home (DIAC, 2014d).

Figure 5.3: Ancestry of Jordan-Born Australians

Figure 5.4: Language Spoken at Home by Jordan-Born Australians
Those born in Syria made up only 8,392 of the Australians counted in the 2011 Census. Of these Australians, 875 (9.8%) considered themselves to have Armenian ancestry and 8.5% spoke Armenian at home (DIAC, 2014f).

Figure 5.5: Ancestry of Syria-Born Australians

Figure 5.6: Language Spoken at Home by Syria-Born Australians
There were 32,845 Turkey-born Australians in 2011 (an increase of 7.7% from the 2006 Census). Of these, 2.8% (approximately 954 people) considered their ancestry to be Armenian and 1.8% spoke Armenian in their home (DIAC, 2014g).

Figure 5.7: Ancestry of Turkey-Born Australians

Figure 5.8: Language Spoken at Home by Turkey-Born Australians
Of the 76,451 Australians born in Lebanon, 1.3% (992 people) stated they spoke Armenian at home. However, again, Armenian was not one of top ancestries recognised by Lebanon-born Australians. As such, the specific percentage of Lebanon-born Australians who consider themselves to be of Armenian ancestry is not available. Still, following the trend from other nations, it may be assumed that the number of Lebanon-born Australians who consider themselves to be of Armenian ancestry is not less than the 1.3% who speak Armenian at home (DIAC, 2014e).

Figure 5.9: Ancestry of Lebanon-Born Australians

Figure 5.10: Language Spoken at Home by Lebanon-Born Australians
The percentages of those born in Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, who speak Armenian and who claim Armenian ancestry, can be expressed as a number of persons (as seen in Table 3.1). The same cannot be done for those of Armenian ancestry born in Iraq and Egypt, as the necessary data are not available. In each case, the total number of Armenian speakers is a similar number to the total claiming Armenian ancestry. However, each of the totals falls short of what ANC Australia estimates to be size of the Australian-Armenian community; 50,000 (ANC Australia, 2010b). Notably, when comparing the data from the 2006 and 2011 Censuses, there is a small drop from the people who considered themselves to be of Armenian ancestry in 2006 (> 4,644) to those in 2011 (> 4,549).

Table 5.1. Australians with Armenian Ancestry Recorded in the 2011 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries of origin before migration to Australia</th>
<th>Total no to migrate from</th>
<th>% of migrants with Armenian heritage</th>
<th>% to speak Armenian</th>
<th>Total no to speak Armenian</th>
<th>Total no of Armenians to migrate</th>
<th>% of estimated total 50,000 Armenians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>34,453</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>≈ 1309</td>
<td>1506</td>
<td>3.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4621</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>≈ 222</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>8392</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>32,845</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>≈ 591</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>76,451</td>
<td>&gt; 1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>&gt; 992</td>
<td>&gt; 1.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>48,170</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>36,533</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data sourced from 2011 Census:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries of origin before migration to Australia</th>
<th>Total no to migrate from</th>
<th>% of migrants with Armenian heritage</th>
<th>% to speak Armenian</th>
<th>Total no to speak Armenian</th>
<th>Total no of Armenians to migrate</th>
<th>% of estimated total 50,000 Armenians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>22,550</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>3.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>6,070</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>24,770</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>8,195</td>
<td>&gt; 1.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>&gt; 139</td>
<td>&gt; 0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>68,960</td>
<td>&gt; 1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>&gt; 896</td>
<td>&gt; 1.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>32,520</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>33,490</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Any further information is available only due to the efforts of community groups and individuals with an interest in the Australian-Armenian community. Academics James Kirkland (1980) and James Jupp (2001), as well as ANC Australia (2010b) are the main sources. Kirkland (1980) undertook a social survey of the Armenian community in Sydney, where the largest Australian-Armenian population resides, in order to collect data for his PhD thesis on Armenian migration, settlement and adjustment in Australia. Archbishop of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Aghan Baliozian Oam (2001), as published in Jupp (2001), is well placed as a leader of the Australian-Armenian community to comment on the community’s demography, however his statements should be considered plausible claims of a political nature; notwithstanding his undoubted commitment to advance the concerns of the Australian-Armenian community, there is no reason to doubt his claims are broadly true. Still, based on the data presented in Table 5.1, only 10% of Oam’s population estimate is accounted for, and it seems unlikely that the remaining 90% could be unaccounted for if they identified as Armenian.
The close correspondence between the number of Australians who speak Armenian and the number of Australians who consider their ancestry to be Armenian suggests that language is a key marker for how the Armenian diaspora views their identity. The Australian-Armenian community and its organisations maintain schools that teach the Armenian language; they seek to recruit pupils whose parents identify as being of Armenian ancestry.

5.1.4. Armenian Migration to Australia. The first Armenians who migrated to Australia made the journey in the 1850s, during the Gold Rush. However, the numbers of Armenians migrating at the time were minimal, as were the numbers of Armenians to migrate following the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and other political disturbances (ANC Australia, 2010b; Collins & Castillo, 1998). It was not until after World War II that sizeable Armenian migration to Australia took place. At this point, Australia had started softening its migration policy, diversifying its sources so as to include countries other than the United Kingdom, in order to increase its population and the Armenian people were among the minorities to migrate (Oam, 2001).

The first sizeable migration of Armenians to Australia took place in the 1960s, 1970s and the mid-1980s, from over 40 different countries. The Armenian migrants identified under 20 different nationalities and spoke more than 30 languages (Collins & Castillo, 1998). The Australian-Armenian community is a diverse group. The majority of Armenians to migrate to Australia, according to the data collected by Kirkland (1980) and Oam (2001) were well educated and wealthy; 72% having left white-collar or skilled occupations in order to make the journey to Australia. As educated people, many of whom already spoke English, they were ready to take advantage of the economic prosperity Australia offered. The number of Armenians in Australia reached 500 by 1960, jumped to 5,000 by 1976, and doubled to 10,000 by 1986 (Kirkland, 1980; Oam, 2001). Although the statements made by Kirkland (1980) and Oam (2001) cannot be backed by Census data, their stance is agreed upon by ANC Australia (2010b), the Australian-Armenian community’s representative organisation. Having said this, there is also no way to verify the estimate set forth by ANC Australia, and it is important to note that ANC Australia acts as a lobby group and has a clear agenda of furthering the Armenian cause in Australia.

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With high levels of education and multi-identity (the Armenian migrants identifying under numerous other nationalities, as well as Armenian) the Australian-Armenians became uniquely placed to quickly adjust to the “Australian way of life”. The “family reunion” project also aided the quick adjustment (Kirkland, 1980). Other ethnic groups in this period that were able to migrate to Australia under the Family Migration Programme or the General Skilled Migration Programme did not have the same high level of education as the Armenian migrants (DIAC, 2006), nor were they as comfortable positioning themselves amongst numerous ethnic groups, as the Armenian migrants could (Kirkland, 1980).

Melbourne and Sydney became “hubs” for the post World War II Armenian migrants (Oam, 2001). ANC Australia believes that 40,000 Australian-Armenians reside in Sydney and 10,000 Australian-Armenians reside in Melbourne (ANC Australia, 2010b). Within Sydney, the Armenian population mostly resides in the North Shore suburbs of Willoughby and Chatswood. While there are now a number of schools, churches, community organisations and, interestingly, Australian-Armenian owned petrol stations that keep the community together in the area, it was a refrigerator factory that initially drew them to these suburbs. However, the factory, now closed, is not what kept community ties strong (Collins & Castillo, 1998). Rather, it was the prompt establishment of churches. The first Armenian Apostolic Church was founded in Chatswood, Sydney, in 1957. It then relocated to a larger site in 1966. The new premises was still within the boundaries of Chatswood; community members had chosen residences within close proximity to the church, which is why there are established Armenian communities in Sydney’s Northern suburbs today (Oam, 2001).

The Armenian Apostolic Church has been seen as a binding force for the Armenian community since AD301, when Armenia accepted Christianity as the religion of its state; it was the first nation to do so. Since then, the church has been the point of origin for the community’s many welfare and social service provisions. “The success of all these services is undeniably due to the presence of the church and its dual role of spiritual and cultural guidance. It is this umbrella of guidance and leadership that draws members of the community to it”, asserted Archbishop Aghan Baliozian Oam (2001, p.173).

According to Oam’s estimates, the majority (85%) of the Australian-Armenian community are members of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The remainder are
Catholic or Protestant. Members of the church are all Armenian, and non-Armenians can become a member of the church only if they marry into the community. The Armenian Evangelical Church, the Armenian Brethren Church, the Armenian Evangelical Brotherhood and the Armenian Evangelical Nazarance Church are all considered branches of the Armenian Apostolic Church; the “mother church”. These churches all publish regular newsletters, keeping the community informed and ensuring their bonds do not fray (Oam, 2001, p.173).

The community’s communication strategy also includes regular radio segments on Radio 3ZZZ, SBS Radio and Radio 3CR. The other main media source is Armenia, a monthly newspaper that circulates across the community. The newspaper also has an online presence; Armenia Online. Furthermore, there are now the options of subscribing to pay satellite channels and streaming content from overseas.

To keep a sense of unity amongst community members, the Australian-Armenian community has worked to set-up Armenian primary schools and language schools, which range from beginners to high school levels. In addition, the Australian-Armenian community began developing community organisations in the 1960s, when numbers of Armenian immigrants increased substantially. Some of their organisations include:

- Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU)
- Alexander Primary School (funded by AGBU)
- Armenian Relief Society
- Armenian Community Welfare Centre
- Armenian Aged Day Care Centre(s)
- Armenian Rest Home Association
- Austral Armenian Association
- Galstaun College
- Hamazkaine Armenian Educational and Cultural Society
- Happy Kids Kindergarten
- Homenetmen and Homenmen Sporting Associations
- New Generation Cultural Society
- St Gregory’s Armenian School (day school)
Arguably, the development of community organisations ensured that the Armenian-Australians maintained their strong ties. “The community as a whole maintains a high level of social cohesion and can be characterised as a community that sources its leadership from its church – the Armenian Apostolic – and operates rather effectively through a complex infrastructure of social, cultural and economic networks.” (Oam, 2001, p.173) Upon discussions with an Australian-Armenian academic, who has read through this overview, however wishes to remain unnamed, it appears that the Australian-Armenian community has not expanded its community services in any notable way since 2001.

5.2. The Australian-Turkish Community: Migration and Demographics

Seen as an “honourable enemy” (Inglis, 2011), the Turks were not only the first Muslim migrants to settle in Australia, but also the first “Asian” migrants. The 2011 Census recorded 32,345 Turkey-born Australians (an increase of 7.7% from the 2006 Census), with half residing in Victoria (16,487), followed by New South Wales (12,997), Queensland (1384), Western Australia (1046), South Australia (623), the Australian Capital Territory (211), Tasmania (74) and the Northern Territory (43). As seen in Figure 5.8, 80.6% (27,650) of the Turkey-born Australians considered themselves to have Turkish ancestry, followed by Kurdish (4%) and Armenian (2.8%) (DIAC, 2014g). The high distribution of Australian-Turks across Victoria (50.2%) and New South Wales (39.5%) can be attributed to the initial settlement of the Turkish migrants in areas where there was work for labourers and unskilled workers in factories, as well as the location of government hostels (see Figure 5.11). The settlement of Turkish migrants in Australia and their subsequent employment is further discussed later in the chapter.
5.2.1. Australian-Turkish Demography. Figure 5.8 shows that 83% of Turkish people still speak Turkish in their Australian homes. The languages that follow are English (8.1%), Greek (2.2%) and Armenian (1.8%) (DIAC, 2014). The remaining 4.9% is made up from more than 40 languages (Inglis, 2011). Families still consider speaking Turkish to be an important part of Turkish culture and seek to maintain it by sending their children to Saturday language schools. Still, there is a significant drop in Turkish being spoken at home, from the 94.2% that was recorded in the 1996 census (Babacan, 2001).

Great emphasis is placed on education by first generation Australian-Turkish parents (Babacan, 2001). However, studies have found that while second and third generation Australian-Turkish students are attaining higher levels of secondary education, they are struggling to capitalise on these achievements in post-secondary schooling and university entrance is unlikely. Relatively low education attainment is
commonly observed in the lower socio-economic areas where the Australian-Turkish community resides (Babacan, 2001; Keceli & Cahill, 2010). “Turkish-Australian young people are still predominantly growing up in families where material disadvantage, and a family experience of limited English, and often limited formal education, are the norm,” states Inglis et al. (1992). As a result, Australian-Turkish families, while supporting further education, are not able to provide a practical level of assistance to their children (Inglis et al., 1992).

Almost 70% of people to migrate to Australia in the new century are skilled, which follows the new Australian migration program target (Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2017). The recent immigrants from Turkey also follow this trend and consist predominantly of white collar professionals – unlike the first wave of Turkish migration to Australia in 1967 following the bilateral agreement on assisted migration – which has resulted in fewer Turkey-born being eligible to migrate to Australia and therefore fewer Turks arriving on Australian shores. Many of those Turkey-born who do migrate to Australia, however, find themselves unable to find employment in their former profession due to their limited English and inability to gain recognition for their qualifications (Babacan, 2001). While there is no literature on the more recent trends of Turkish migration to Australia, the ABS data still supports Babacan’s (2001) claims. It should also be noted that Professor Hurriyet Babacan is a member of the Australian-Turkish community. As an academic whose research interests include ethnic diversity and social cohesion, there is no reason to doubt that these claims are broadly true, however they too should be treated as plausible claims of a political nature.

Figures 5.12 and 5.13 below, based on the 2011 Census, compare the qualifications of Turkey-born Australians and the occupations in which Turkey-born Australians are employed with those of the total Australian population. It is evident that, in comparison to the total Australian population, there is a higher percentage of Turkey-born Australians who are tradespeople, labourers and machine operators and drivers. They are less likely to find employment in the professional and administration fields, however slightly more likely to find managerial positions (DIAC, 2014g). The graph still shows the effects of the 1970s policy of recruitment from Turkey; 70% unskilled: 30% skilled (DIAC, 2014g). To favour the migration of the unskilled from Turkey was the official Australian policy at the time because the Turkish Government,
as a developing nation, did not want to lose skilled labour and its agreement with Australia did not allow for the mass migration of skilled labour (Babacan, 2001). The intake of unskilled workers was higher than 70% in the late 1960s and 1970s because large-scale recruitment was necessary for industry if the Australian economy were to continue to thrive (Jupp, 2001).

Figure 5.12: Qualifications of Turkey-Born Australians

Figure 5.13: Occupations of Turkey-Born Australians
What Figure 5.13 does not present are the Australian-Turkish people who have sought employment in rural areas. There are small Australian-Turkish communities in Shepparton, Victoria, who grow and harvest cherries; Sunraysia, Victoria, who tend to vineyards and citrus trees; and Griffith, New South Wales, where onions are grown and harvested. These communities have, however, been adversely affected by the economic hardships brought on by the harsh Australian climate (Babacan, 2001; Inglis, 2011).

The difficulty of Turkish-Australians to enter professional fields manifests in the average weekly income of individuals. In 2011, the average weekly income for a Turkey-born Australian (aged over 15 years) was $360. In comparison, other overseas-born Australians received an average of $538 and Australian-born persons received an average of $597. The average weekly income of the total number of Australians was $577 at the time (DIAC, 2014g). Data on education, occupation and income are not available for the Australian-Armenian community. As previously mentioned, the difficulty in identifying numbers of the Australian-Armenian population, as a result of their many countries of origin, has resulted in reduced Census counts and minimal further information about the Armenian community being gathered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, according to Oam (2001) and ANC Australia (2010b). Having said this, it is difficult to validate their assumption of a reduced Census count when there is no way to precisely quantify Australian-Armenians, in terms that enable comparison with Australian-Turks.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, ethnicity and ethnic community are realised in different ways by the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish people; both in their behaviours as a community and statistically. Because of the Australian-Armenian community’s poorly documented demographics, ethnic community for Australian-Armenians is not identified by country of origin but by ancestry, language, religious affiliation, and the shaping of a collective memory, which has been demonstrated by the available Census data and the opinions of community leaders. In this way, the Australian-Turkish ethnic community is quite different, as they are defined by the country of origin of a person, or country of origin of a person’s parents. The demographics of this “ethnic category” are better known because Australian statistical practices make “country of origin” an important category.
Turkey-born Australians also face a higher unemployment rate than the average Australian; 9.3% compared to 5.6% in the 2011 census (DIAC, 2014g). Again, this may be attributed to their limited English, inability to gain recognition for their qualifications and schooling disadvantages (Babacan, 2001).

5.2.2. Turkish Migration to Australia. People of Turkish ancestry have held a place in Australian society since the early nineteenth century. Granted, back then, the numbers were miniscule in comparison to the current day; with only 20 people of Turkish origins across all of Australia during the early 1800s. This number climbed to 300 by 1911 and then dropped straight back down with the declaration of World War I, in which the Australians and the Turks fought on opposing sides (Babacan, 2001). Still, it was arguably the experiences that took place on the battlefields of Gallipoli, which paved the way for larger scale Turkish migration to Australia following World War II.

The signing of a migration treaty with Turkey, in 1967, led to the first substantial influx of Muslims to Australia. The Turkish Australian Agreement was officially introduced in 1968, which supported the passage of Turkish migrants to Australian soil (Castles, et al. 1992; Jupp, 2001). Within four years, 10,000 Turks had migrated to the Australia (Jupp, 2001). Turkey became one of the two nations from where the majority of Australia’s Muslims originated. The Turkish migrants spread out across Melbourne, Wollongong and Sydney. The migration of these “exotic” people did not create alarm at the time (Jupp, 2001, p.75). That is not to say that some did not still hold on to “racist stereotypes” (Castles, et al. 1992); particularly because Turkey had been a German ally in World War I (Jupp, 2001). Castles, et al. (1992), cites the 1968 parliamentary comment made by Clyde Cameron, the minister responsible for immigration at the time. Cameron set forth assurances that the Turkish were not “dark-skinned people who have nothing in common with the Australian people” (p.55).

Until the signing of the 1967 bilateral agreement, there were very few Turkish people in Australia. While demographics were not recorded regularly in the early and mid-1900s for the Australian-Turkish community, the 1947 count of people of Turkish origins residing in Australia recorded only 252 people (Babacan, 2001). The first groups of Turkish immigrants were from Turkey’s rural areas and arrived with little
information about Australia and Australians. Still, migration was a risk they were willing to take because, following World War II, when Turkish people suffered severe casualties and Turkey was devastated both physically and economically; they faced landlessness and unemployment in their homeland (Babacan, 2001). The Australian Government was desperate for workers to support its growing economy, as such, the Turkish immigrants were promised both accommodation and jobs (Castles, et al. 1992). What they found, however, was that there were no support structures in place for the new arrivals. Furthermore, the Turkish community already in Australia was not economically well off and, consequently, unable to provide support to its newest additions (Babacan, 2001).

The Australian Government preferred Turkish immigrants that were married and families that had children. The policy of Australian governments has long been that the immigrants would settle in Australia for the long-term, not like the “guest workers” that were migrating from Turkey to European countries. Permanent residency, however, was not at the forefront of the minds of many Turkish immigrants. Babacan (2001) explains that many thought they “would be going for two years”. Babacan (2001) said that it was common for Turkish migrants to assume that their stay in Australia would be short; it is my impression that this is still a common view in the Australian-Turkish community (p.710).

The majority of migrants from Turkey were Muslim, unskilled workers. Like other unskilled workers, they settled in the inner-city industrial suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne, working either as labourers or in factories. A smaller group made their way to Wollongong, where there was another government hostel (Collins & Castillo, 1998; Inglis, 2011; Jupp, 2001). The majority of the Turkish migrants had never worked in factories before, however, they had few options (Babacan, 2001).

In Melbourne, the largest concentration of the Turkish community is found in the suburbs of Broadmeadows, where 38% of Victorians with Turkish ancestry reside. The suburbs that follow are Brimbank and Moreland, each housing 9% of Victorians with Turkish ancestry, and Whittlesea (5%). Broadmeadows was the first stop for many families who stayed in the government hostel. The location had the added benefit of being close to factories such as Ford, General Motors Holden, Ericsson, Yakka and Arnott’s. There was plenty of work for “factory fodder” – with stories of
Turkish migrants stepping into a factory within only three days of landing in Australia – the only requirement was a willingness to get your hands dirty (Inglis, 2011).

Image: Turkish Migrants and Other New Arrivals at General Motors Holden, Port Melbourne.
(Source: Turkiye to Australia: Turkish Settlement in Victoria, 2011)

The Turkish migrants found it quite difficult to practise their religion at first arrival. The majority were from either the Muslim Sunni sect or the Alevi sect. To come from a country where 99.8% of people are Muslim, to one where there was not even a mosque, was an immense adjustment. The early arrivals prayed in a weatherboard house in Prestons, where other Muslim groups met at the time. The first Turkish mosque was not opened until 1977, in Coburg, Melbourne. The mosque’s construction was organised by the Turkish Islamic Society, which had been founded in 1970 and elected its board in 1971 (Inglis, 2011).

Islam is the predominant religion amongst the Turkish community (Inglis, 2011). Turkey is, however, a secular nation. Changes were made to the country’s institutional structure and cultural codes, by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (translated as Father Turk), the nation’s first President, to bring forth an era of modernisation and secular nationalism when the Turkish Republic was newly formed. Most importantly, religion was stripped of its public role (Uysal, 2009). As a result of the Turkish Islamic secular character, and the legacy of Ataturk, Turkish identity is formed by a collective memory of the formation of the secular Turkish Republic, not a collective memory of
the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, which is largely why the Turkish community has never worked collectively to present a label to describe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The same cannot be said for Armenian identity, which is largely determined by remembering the legacy of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The secular nature of Turkey and its people results in religion not being a unifying force for the Australian-Turkish community, again in contrast to the Australian-Armenian community.

Auburn, in Sydney, referred to as “little Turkey” (Collins & Castillo, 1998, p.248), is home to one of Sydney’s largest mosques, significantly named “Gallipoli Mosque”. However, while the Turkish migrants had been in the area since 1968, the mosque’s construction did not begin until 1986. Furthermore, it was not completed until 1998. It was not the promise of a mosque that brought the Turks to Auburn, but rather the local factories and the railways. Gallipoli Mosque welcomes Muslims from all ethnic backgrounds, not only those who recognize themselves as Turkish. Furthermore, it welcomes all Australians who wish to learn more about the Islamic practices. While all community members are welcome every day, an open day is held once a year as well.

Auburn is a “kaleidoscope of Turkish restaurants, sweet shops, groceries and cafes” (Collins & Castillo, 1998, p.246), however, the Turks are not the area’s predominant ethnic group. In 1998, there were immigrants from more than 54 countries residing in Auburn, including those of Lebanese, Vietnamese, African and Bosnian descent. Little has changed in Auburn since, the area remaining home to many different cultures (Collins & Castillo, 1998). The majority of those local industries are now abandoned though. Still, Collins and Castillo (1998) describe Auburn as a “dormitory suburb” for the working class (p.248).

5.2.3. Australian-Turkish Community Development. The official end of the White Australia Policy in 1973 at first changed little for the Turkish people migrating to Australia. The 1967 migration treaty with Turkey had already helped large numbers of Turks to enter Australia. Other Muslims had also been welcomed before the demise of the White Australia Policy, such as those who migrated following the 1970 migration agreement with Yugoslavia, and the Lebanese Muslims who doubled the size of their community to 24,218 between the years 1966 to 1971. From the signing
of the 1967 bilateral agreement to the end of the White Australia Policy, the Turkish community had already increased in size fivefold until it reached 11,589 (Jupp, 2001).

The greatest change to the Turkish community was the implementation of the recommendations of the 1978 Galbally Report (detailed in Chapter Two), which recommended support structures, community groups and local ethnic press for all Non-English Speaking (NES) migrant communities. Furthermore, by the 1970s the Turkish people had become more accustomed to Australia and, with governmental support, started to establish community organisations (Jupp, 2001). Important community organisations included the New South Wales Turkish Associations Federation and the Sydney Turkish Peoples House, which aided Turkish migrants with Australian legal, social and welfare matters. The years to follow saw the opening of the Turkish Welfare Association and the Australian Turkish Social and Cultural Trust Inc, as well as schools, which taught Quran lessons (Collins & Castillo, 1998). The number of government-funded Turkish community organisations is, however, declining, and by 2000 had dropped from more than 20 to only a few agencies in Melbourne and Sydney (Babacan, 2001). Members of the Australian-Turkish community attribute this fall to a lack of cohesion amongst the committee members of the community organisations and leadership struggles. Declining membership to Australian-Turkish community organisations is further discussed in Chapter Eight, based on my own interviews with committee members. Since it is these organisations that lobby on behalf of the Turkish community in Australia, the decrease in memberships greatly impacts the ability of the Australian-Turkish community to voice its views. It is important to note, however, that a new organisation was formed in 2014, when this thesis was being written. The Australian Turkish Advocacy Alliance (ATAA) is attempting to bring together all Australian-Turkish community organisations, in order to address a “series of smear campaigns and insults by some who distort and aim to rewrite the history for the sake of damaging the friendship between Turkey and Australia and extensively harming our multicultural society”. Whether ATAA will bring the Australian-Turkish community and its organisations together and achieve its mission statement – to “advance and represent the interests of the Australian Turkish community within Australia and abroad and to encourage, improve, support and empower the Australian Turkish community” – remains to be seen (ATAA, 2014).
Migration from Turkey to Australia began to drop off in the late 1970s. However, the Turkish military coup d’état in 1980, followed by high inflation and unemployment, saw the numbers rise again in the mid-1980s (Babacan, 2001; DIAC, 2014g). By 1980, however, the requirements for intake of Turkish people had changed. The Australian Government instead wanted greater English proficiency, lower age and higher education levels, which encouraged the arrival of middle-class Turkish immigrants (Babacan, 2001). By the 1990s, Turkish migration to Australia was either a result of the Family Migration Programme or the General Skilled Migration Programme (DIAC, 2006h), as was the case with many ethnic groups.

There are a few days in the calendar when the Turkish community stands out in particular amongst the many different cultures residing in Australia. The obvious is ANZAC Day; in the ways that Australians now remember Gallipoli, the Turks are honoured, as if the hostilities of 1915 secured a bond between the Turks and the ANZACs. Other days of importance include Australia Turkish Day, which is really more of a month than a day. In the month of October many events celebrate the arrival of Turkish immigrants to Australian shores in 1968. These events are hosted in the Auburn Botanic Gardens, where each year a pine tree – brought from Gallipoli – is planted in recognition of Australian and Turkish unity, to a parade via the Opera House. Other days of Turkish-Australian celebration include October 29, Turkish Republic Day; November 10, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk Remembrance Day; and May 19, Youth and Sport Day (Collins & Castillo, 1998).

Besides specific events that celebrate the Australian-Turkish community, Turkish media sources, including newspapers (Yeni Vatan, Turkish News Weekly, Dunya, Hurriyet, Milliyet and Zaman), radio (SBS and Radio 3ZZZ) and television (SBS and pay satellite channels) help Turks in Australian to remain in touch with their homeland. There is also the Internet, with devices such as tablets having the ability to stream free-to-air channels from Turkey. Through these sources, the Australian-Turkish community maintains an active connection to Turkey. Frequent trips to see relatives and purchase DVDs, CDs and books are also common.

The strength of their affiliation with the homeland results in close monitoring of political events taking place in Turkey. “The political and social change that has taken place in Turkey is often reflected in the Turkish community in Australia,” commented Babacan. “Community organisations have been formed as a result of
events occurring in Turkey. Many people still bring their political views and closely follow what happens in Turkish politics,” Babacan argues (2001, p.715). It is not uncommon to walk into a Turkish household to find that the weather report for Turkey is being watched. However, one should not be surprised if met with a blank stare when asking what the weather holds for the next day in Australia. Members of the Australian-Turkish community tease each other for knowing who the Turkish finance minister is without knowing the Australian counterpart. Australian-Turks are ambivalent about participating in Australian society. Babacan (2001) accounts for this as their lack of English language proficiency, particularly amongst first generation migrants. I believe Babacan’s argument, which reflected conditions in the 1990s, still applies today.

Babacan (2001) argues the Turkish community in Australia, at the turn of the century, was still in the “settlement” phase. He refers to the definition of “settlement” as set forth by the Australian Population Council, which is “the process by which an immigrant establishes economic viability and social networks following immigration in order to contribute to, and make full use of, opportunities generally available to the receiving society” (p.714). Babacan (2001) states that because the community is still facing the “consequences of structural inequality”, Turks are not able to participate in and contribute to Australian society. Babacan’s (2001) statement refers to the limited English, material disadvantage and limited formal education that Inglis et al. (1992) had also highlighted. This is traced back to the failure to provide accessible English language classes to first generation Turkish migrants. Illiteracy in migrating generations is a large factor contributing to their non-participation in Australian community organisations, including lobby groups. Specific data on the literacy of second generation Australian-Turks is not available from ABS. However, based on personal experiences, I believe illiteracy is still a problem for the community. As a child, I recall members of the Australian-Turkish community knocking on my door whenever they needed help to fill in even a basic form. My parents, who both attained the equivalent of TAFE diplomas in Turkey, had the highest education level of the community members in Merrylands at the time. They could provide help, for the most part, however, it would fall to me, a child only just learning English, to help when they could not. My Redhouse English to Turkish Dictionary served me well when I was faced with questions such as “next of kin”, which had not yet come up in my school
spelling lists. Over 20 years later, I am still occasionally approached by illiterate Australian-Turkish community members who need assistance with paperwork their second-generation children cannot themselves provide.

With increased access to information and further funding in the 1980s, members of the Australian-Turkish community sought to join political parties. Still, there are few representatives of the Australian-Turkish community in Australian politics, and representation has been greatest in the Victorian Parliaments. The first to be elected in Victoria was Tayfun Eren, who was elected in 1996 as the Labor member for Doutta Galla, Victoria, as a result of a by-election. Eren was disendorsed in 1999 (Parliament of Victoria, 2011). He was followed by Adem Somyurek; elected as the Member for the South-east Metropolitan in 2002, and John Hamdi Eren; elected as the Member for Lara in 2002 (ATAA, 2017). It was only in the 2013 Federal Election that the first Turkey-born Australian, Mehmet Tillem, was elected to the National Parliament, as a Labor Senator (Parliament of Australia, 2013). In comparison, members of the Australian-Armenian community have had significantly better representation in Australian parliaments, including names like current NSW Premier Gladys Berejiklian and former Federal Treasurer Joe Hockey.

5.3. Conclusion

The Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities have made significant contributions to multicultural Australia, both economic and cultural. The Australian-Armenians provided skilled labour at a time when Australia was in need, and the Australian-Turks made a significant non-skilled labour contribution to develop Australian industries. Due to the higher education levels, English speaking ability and place in the labour force, the Armenian migrants quickly adapted to “the Australian way of life”. The same cannot be said of the Turkish migrants, who still shy away from participating in Australian social organisations and activities. This is evident from their lack of political presence and their inability to maintain community organisations. The Australian-Turkish community does not have the same ties that bind the Australian-Armenian community. Turks are united by their belief that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was not genocide, by their religion (predominantly Islam, and shared with many other nationalities), and by their
collective memory of Ataturk as a (secular) national founder. Compared to the ethnic ties among Australian-Armenians, these shared “ethnic” features of Australian-Turks are not very strong. As such, while first generation Australian-Turks have a strong belief that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was not an act of “genocide” they have failed to present a strong and united front against persuasive Australian-Armenian lobbies. Furthermore, a lack of cohesion amongst first generation Australian-Turks has resulted in second and third generations becoming uncertain of their culture and history. In the absence of any historical memory regarding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 being passed down by generations of Australian-Turks, there is no united Australian-Turkish view of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Subsequently, the recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” by the New South Wales and South Australian State Parliaments is not surprising. If the Australian-Turks had been a stronger ethnic group, they might have at least been in a position to present their own perspective to the two State Parliaments before the motion was voted on. The question of whether this level of recognition is appropriate in an Australian context will continue to be discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter Six

Competing Historiographies:

Armenian, Turkish and Scholarly Accounts of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916

This chapter reviews the discourses surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, which journeyed together with the Armenian and Turkish migrants. The competing historiographies offered by scholars are considered to provide background to the current political and social climate. In order to understand why discussions and political decisions surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 are taking place in Australian, I will present the significant historical developments, which led to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, followed by the competing academic historiographies. When reviewing literature regarding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 it is not uncommon to come across distorted, one-sided texts, laced with animosity, from both sides of the debate. Whether they are from the Armenian or Turkish side, such accounts oversimplify a complex historical time. What follows is not an account of the historical reality, or a presentation of evidence; any attempt to do so would result in yet another overly simplified text. Rather, what follows is a review of the competing observations presented in secondary sources. It is not and does not claim to present the “reality” of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, which is far beyond the scope of this thesis.

6.1. Summary of Historical Narratives

All historical narratives agree on the fundamentals – that many Ottoman-Armenians were relocated towards the end of World War I amidst Ottoman Government fears of revolutionaries cooperating with the Russian invaders of Eastern Anatolia to seize Ottoman cities, and that it was the civilians who perished in the crossfire and during relocation. The death toll is estimated at between 600,000 and 1.5 million (Gaunt,
2006; Schaller & Zimmerer, 2008), though at least one estimate goes as high as four million (Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2009). Yet, there are great discrepancies between the final labels assigned (Suny, 2009; McCarthy, 2005).

There are many labels for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, including “genocide”, “holocaust”, “massacre” and “great crime” (“Medz Yeghern” in Armenian). Amongst the many labels, these four in particular are used interchangeably by some publics who believe the Armenian people were targeted for systematic extermination by the Ottoman Empire, the region that is now recognised as the Republic of Turkey. However, not all would agree that these terms are synonyms. For example, Guenter Lewy (2005a; 2005b), who uses “massacre” to refer to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 has been criticised as a “genocide denier” by academics such as Taner Akcam (2008, April).

Those who believe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was a systematic attempt at extermination present it as a two-step process; the killing of the fit male population by murder and forced labour, and the death marches of women, children, elderly and those with poor health (Sarafian, 2000; Walker, 1980). Some scholars claim that the Ottoman authorities targeted other minority groups as well, such as the Assyrians and Greeks (Gaunt, 2006; Schaller & Zimmerer, 2008).

The mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is believed to have been one of the stories that prompted Raphael Lemkin to coin the term “genocide”; a combination of the Greek word for race (“genos”) with the Latin word for killing (“cide”) (Hyde, 2008). However, the idea that stories of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 were a motivator to coin the term “genocide” does not necessarily mean that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 meets the criteria of “genocide”, which is the argument set forth by academics such as Lewy (2005a).

April 24, 1915, signifies the start of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 according to “genocide” believers. The fact that around 250 Armenian political, community and intellectual leaders were arrested on this date is not disputed. Nor is it disputed that, following that initial move, the Ottoman Council of Ministers forced Ottoman-Armenians living in Eastern Anatolia to relocate to the region that is now Syria. Also not in dispute is the fact that hundreds of thousands perished during the relocation process (Akcam, 2006; ANC Australia, 2010c). What
is disputed is the intention of the Ottoman state in forcing the deportations. Professor Colin Tatz (2003), director of the Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, is among the scholars who label the relocation process a “death march”, with the intent to destroy the Ottoman-Armenians (p.123). In contrast, Professor Justin McCarthy (2005) puts this ‘death march’ into the context of the Ottoman State’s capacity. He argues that the Ottoman Government was poorly prepared for the relocation process and that the large numbers that died from illness and starvation along the way included soldiers in the Ottoman army. If the death tolls of both Ottoman-Armenians and Ottoman soldiers were so high, it is not plausible to attribute intention to Ottoman policy. Furthermore, McCarthy (2005) argues, the areas where the relocation took place on foot were, at the time, areas where there were limited or no railways. In other instances, the relocation took place via crowded trains and sheep trucks (Luscombe, 1970). So, the death toll was higher in areas with limited means of transport due to state capacity, not due to a policy around extermination (McCarthy, 2005). This again is in opposition to claims of intent to destroy. So while there is no disagreement over the high death toll, there is disagreement over how high the death toll was, and whether Ottoman Government officials planned the killings of Ottoman-Armenian civilians.

6.1.1. Life in the Ottoman Empire, Pre-World War I. From 1839, Great Britain, France and Russia, the main European powers, began pressuring the Ottoman Government to provide equal rights to all its citizens. Succumbing to the pressure, the Ottoman Government passed the “Tanzimat” reforms, which were to provide equal rights to all citizens, although the majority were deemed to be unsuccessful by the European powers, and non-Muslims, including Armenians, continued to suffer discrimination (Dadrian, 1995). Because of this, Armenians who sought education in the 1870s attended university in Europe or studied in American missionary schools. The Armenian Communal Council lobbied for the complaints of the Ottoman-Armenian community to be addressed by the Ottoman Government. The Ottoman Government assured it would punish those who treated its Christian minorities poorly, though the assurances were not followed through. In 1875, Great Britain, France and Russia, declared that the 1856 Treaty of Paris gave them the authority to protect the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Abdul Hamid II responded by
forming a constitutional monarchy with a parliament in order to begin negotiations with the powers. However, it was not long before the parliament was discontinued (Akcam, 2006).

The “Armenian Question” (1876 to 1914) remained a concern of Great Britain, Germany, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. During the Russo-Turkish War (1877 to 1878), many Ottoman-Armenians, unhappy with their living conditions, turned to the Russian Empire for support, in the hope of attaining an autonomous state (Hovannisian, 1997).

The Russian Caucasus Corps were led by a group of Armenian commanders. By the end of the Russo-Turkish War, the Ottoman regions of Batum, Ardahan, Kars, Olti, Sarikamis and Erzurum had been conquered by the Russian Empire, though Erzurum was eventually returned to the Ottomans (Walker, 2011). The Peace Treaty of San-Stefano marked the end of the war, under Article 16 of which there were supposed to be “improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians...to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians” (Hertslet, 1891). However, the treaty was revised following British concerns, and while the text regarding the Armenians remained and was moved to Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, the expected reforms did not follow. Armenian intellectuals in Europe and Russia, doubting that the reforms would ever be implemented, created political parties and revolutionary societies in the 1880s and 1890s, beginning the Armenian revolutionary movement (Hovannisian, 1997). The three main political parties making up the movement were the Ramkavar (Constitutional-Democrat; Armenakan), the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party and the Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation). The ideologies of the parties differed, however, they shared the goal of raising the Armenians’ social status in the Ottoman Empire (Libaridian, 2011). The parties went much further than this, however, supporting militant movements, with the aim of establishing an autonomous Armenian State in what the Ottoman authorities regarded as Ottoman territory (Chahinian, 2008). The Hunchakian Party and Armenian Revolutionary Federation manifestos included “the murder of both Ottoman officials and Armenians who opposed them” (McCarthy, 2005).

Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who headed the Ottoman Empire from 1876 to 1909, attempted to stall the implementation of the Berlin Treaty, stating that the reports
regarding abuse of the Ottoman-Armenians were exaggerated. In 1890, he commissioned Kurdish “irregulars” to form the “Hamidiye”, a paramilitary force. Akcam (2006) asserts Ottoman officials knowingly provoked rebellions in towns where there was a significant Armenian population, often via over-taxation. Such rebellions occurred in Sasun in 1894 and Zeitun from 1895 to 1896; there the Armenian communities, armed by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, took on the Ottoman military and Kurdish paramilitary forces. Regardless of their overwhelming numbers, the Ottoman forces were repeatedly defeated by the Armenian resistance. The conflict reached a resolution only when European powers intervened. This allowed for the Hunchak activists to seek the safety of exile and for the tax burden to decrease in 1895 (Dadrian, 1995). Hamid II was forced to sign a reform package that restricted the powers of the “Hamidiye”, however, he again delayed their implementation, which resulted in 2,000 Ottoman-Armenians gathering in Constantinople (now Istanbul) for a rally. The event turned violent and was broken up by authorities. What followed was a series of violent outbreaks in the provinces of Bitlis, Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Harput, Sivas, Trabzon and Van. The total death toll is not available, and there is no evidence that Hamid II ordered any killings. Regardless, the incident where the Ottoman and Kurdish forces are believed to have killed the Ottoman-Armenians is now referred to as the Hamidian Massacres (Akcam, 2006).

McCarthy (1996, para. 4) argues the rebellions of the late 1800s created “distrust” between the Armenian and Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire. “Muslims and Armenians were now divided into sides, antagonists. Each group believed that in a war they would be killed if they did not kill first, a classic self-fulfilling prophecy”. He attributes the attacks of Muslim villagers on Ottoman-Armenians during the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 to this “distrust”.

Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s reign ended on 24 July 1908, when officers in the Turkish Third Army staged a bloodless coup d'état in order to re-establish a constitutional monarchy. The move was celebrated by Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Arabs, Bulgarians and Turks across the Ottoman Empire. These same officers, who were dedicated to reforming the Empire so that it met European standards, formed the Young Turk movement. The Young Turks were comprised of secular liberal constitutionalists and nationalists. The liberals took an egalitarian approach, allowing
the Armenians into their ranks, while the nationalists were more hesitant. Still, they were persuaded by the heads of the liberals, Prince Sabahaddin and Ahmed Riza Bey, to ensure the rights of minority groups, including the Armenians (Balakian, 2003).

It was not long before the new constitutional rule was threatened by a countercoup, in April 1909. Reactionaries targeted the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a faction within the Young Turk movement, and seized Istanbul. While the reactionaries had targeted the Young Turks, the Armenian populace who were believed to be supporters of the Young Turk movement were also attacked (Akcam, 2006). Babikyan Efendi, an Ottoman-Armenian member of parliament, reported that 21,001 Armenians and 1,850 Turks were killed during the uprising (Gurun, 2007), which is now called the Adana Massacre (Akcam, 2006). Erickson (2001) suggests the large number of Armenian deaths in the Adana Massacre was a result of an Armenian revolt, not of the countercoup. However, Akcam (2006) attributes the deaths to a separatist perception of the Armenian population, resentment over the Armenian community in Adana’s prosperity, and increased Turkish nationalism sentiments.

After an unknown number of days of fighting, the CUP regained control and court-martialled the reactionaries. Those who were implicated with the Adana Massacre were tried in the July of 1909. Following the trial, 124 Muslims and seven Armenians were sentenced to death and subsequently executed. In September that same year, the CUP signed an agreement with the Dashnaks that both parties would "work together for progress, the Constitution, and unity". Furthermore, the CUP ensured that there was at least one Armenian minister in all governments from 6 August 1909 (Akcam, 2006, p.69-70).

The first Balkan War of 1912 saw Ottoman defeat by the Balkan states, and the Empire lost 85 per cent of its European land. Large numbers of Muslims, including the Circassians and the Chechens, were expelled from the Balkans and the Caucasus. Around 850,000 refugees settled in Anatolia, particularly in areas where there was a substantial Armenian community (Akcam, 2006).

**6.1.2. Ottoman Empire Entry into World War I.** The Ottoman Empire entered World War I on 2 November 1914, on the side of the Central Powers. The Empire largely fought against the British and Russians. Armenian involvement was
primarily during the Caucasus and Persian campaigns. Before the Empire entered the War, the Ottoman Government requested allegiance from the Ottoman-Armenians, and their assistance in sparking a Russian-Armenian rebellion against the Tsarist army, in the event that a Russian attack on the Ottoman Empire came from the Caucasus (Akcam, 2006; Hovannisian, 2004). In return for supporting the Ottoman Government, the Ottoman-Armenians would be offered autonomy. The Tsar made a similar offer to the Russian-Armenians, promising six Turkish-Armenian vilayets (provinces) and two Russian-Armenian provinces. The Tsar’s proposal was accepted by the Russian Armenians and around 200,000 Armenians served under Russian command in the War, against the Ottomans. In contrast, the Ottoman-Armenians rejected the Ottoman Government’s offer of autonomy, stating that they would not advocate a Russian-Armenian rebellion. Accordingly, many Ottoman-Armenians did not serve when called by the Ottoman army. This decision had grave consequences for the Ottoman-Armenians, who came to be recognised by the Ottoman Government as a liability when word of a possible Russian-Armenian invasion against the Anatolia reached the Ottoman Government (McCarthy, 2005).

The Ottoman-Armenian rejection of the autonomy proposal, and the following Battle of Sarikamis (from December 1914 to January 1915), marked the start of Ottoman loss in the East in World War I (McCarthy, 2005). The Russian defeat of the Ottoman Government at Sarikamis can be traced back to Minister of War Enver Pasha’s strategy to surround the Russian Caucasus Army at Sarikamis in order to regain formerly Ottoman territory that had been lost during the Russo-Turkish War. The battle, which took place from 22 December 1914 to 17 January 1915, formed part of the greater Caucasus Campaign that continued between the Russian and Ottoman Empires until 1918. The attack did not go to plan for Enver Pasha; the Ottoman troops, poorly prepared for the harsh winter conditions, were almost completely annihilated. Of Enver Pasha’s 95,000 troops, 75,000 died. Some were killed in combat, while others died of starvation, or froze to death. The Russian Caucasus Army in Sarikamis consisted largely of Armenian volunteer units that had no official obligation to Russia (Balakian, 2003; Hovannisian, 2004; McCarthy, 2005).

On his return to Constantinople, Enver Pasha blamed his battalion’s defeat on the region’s Armenians having sided with the Russians Caucasus Army. On 25 February 1915, Enver Pasha ordered all Armenians in the Ottoman military’s active
forces be reassigned to unarmed labour battalions, explaining that he feared that, if they remained armed, they would cooperate with the Russian invaders (Gurun, 2007). Balakian (2003) argues the move was actually a pre-meditated strategy that would allow for the Ottoman-Armenians to be executed at the hands of Turkish gangs.

The Siege of Van followed soon after. The events at Van have played a key role in portrayals of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. On April 19, 1915, Cevdet Bey called to service 4,000 soldiers from the eastern city of Van. The Armenian populace, however, did not answer the call. Balakian (2003) states that the city’s Armenian population believed Cevdet planned to massacre the men so that there would be no one left to defend Armenian communities.

According to the memoirs of Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador to Constantinople, the siege started on 20 April 1915. His accounts state Ottoman soldiers seized an Armenian woman who attempted to enter Van. The two Armenian men who came to the aid of the harassed Armenian woman were killed by the soldiers, which led to the Armenians in Van uniting and seizing the city (Morgenthau, 1918). In comparison, McCarthy (2005) argues that the Armenian revolt in Van on 20 April had been planned beforehand, due to the city’s function as the centre of the Ottoman Administration. He notes that the Armenian men were wearing military uniforms. The revolt saw the city’s Ottoman contingent forced into the citadel, from where they were evacuated on 17 May (McCarthy, 2005). Van was held by the Armenians until late May, when they were relieved by the Russian Army, which had gained significant territory by that point (McCarthy, 2005; Morgenthau, 1918). There is dispute among historians about the events leading to the siege. Lowry (1990) and Lewy (2005a) found there to be discrepancies between Morgenthau’s personal archives and his memoirs, and they could find no evidence in the former to support his allegations that Ottoman leaders supported the infliction of terror upon Ottoman-Armenian civilians. Instead, they state that Morgenthau’s allegations were falsehoods, constructed to serve the purposes of his Christian minority.

Akcam (2006) argues that the Van uprising requires separate review because the Ottoman Government used its account of what happened at Van to justify its decision to deport Ottoman-Armenians. He further states that “what really happened” has not yet been “researched thoroughly” (p.200). Regardless of what may have happened at Van, Akcam states that the decision to deport Armenians from the region
could not have been a result of the Van events because the decision was made in earlier months. Akcam (2006) cites the following telegram from Talaat Pasha, sent on 2 March 1915, to this effect.

“It is confirmed that the Armenians should be transferred to the indicated region as communicated in the Feb. 13th telegram. As the situation has been evaluated by the state, the probability of rebellion and protest indicates the need to take action. The increasing possibility of Armenian uprisings requires that every effective means of suppression needs to be applied.” (p.159)

The authenticity of this and other telegrams from Interior Minister, Talaat Pasha – cited to support the more critical accounts of Ottoman conduct towards the Armenians – is disputed. Lewy (2005a; 2005b) argues they are fakes, while Akcam (2008, April) argues the authenticity of the telegrams was confirmed by the testimony provided at the Turkish Court Martial of 1919 to 1920, and the 1921 trial of Soghomon Tehlirian; the Ottoman-Armenian member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation who was alleged to have assassinated Talaat Pasha in Berlin, and who was tried and acquitted in a German court. Lewy (2006) questions the evidence of the military tribunals because the only record of them is in the Ottoman Government Gazette, a publication whose accuracy is open to doubt. Furthermore, according to the stenographic record from the Soghomon Tehlirian trial, the documents that are said to have been authenticated by the German court were not actually introduced to the court. The defence council “withdrew his motion to introduce the five telegrams into evidence before their authenticity could be verified” (Lewy, 2005b). In McCarthy’s view (2005), the telegrams do not serve as proof that the Ottoman authorities considered deporting before the Van events, however, he finds it plausible that they did consider just this. After all, there had been a history of tensions between the Ottoman Government and the Ottoman-Armenians, and the Ottoman Government had requested allegiance from the Ottoman-Armenians before entering World War I. Given that the Ottoman-Armenians refused to advocate and aid an uprising amongst the Russian-Armenians, it is reasonable to infer that the Ottoman Empire had
considered relocating Armenians perceived as disloyal from a region vulnerable to a Russian attack (McCarthy, 2005).

The motivations behind Talaat Pasha’s decisions may not be clear, but it is known and not disputed that he ordered the arrest of approximately 250 Armenian political, community and intellectual leaders on 24 April 1915 (ANC Australia, 2010c; Gurun, 2007). Talaat claimed the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire had displayed more than once that they were willing to cooperate with Russian-Armenians, citing Sarikamis and Van amongst the examples. April 24 is seen as the commencement of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and remembered as Genocide Remembrance Day. While this was not a day of violence (Gurun, 2007), there is no dispute that the ensuing movement by Ottoman-Armenians – which I refer to as “the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916” – caused heavy loss of life. What is in dispute is whether we should understand the mass killing as an Ottoman-Turkish “genocide” against Ottoman-Armenians.

Scholars that accept the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as a case of “genocide” claim that what followed 24 April was a series of massacres, mass burnings, drowning, overdoses via poison and drugs and toxic gas. The use of drugs and gas were confirmed by Dr Ragib, Dr Vehib, Dr Ziya Fuad and Dr Adnan (Dadrian, 1986; 1997). Historians such as Lewy, however, have questioned their testimonies, because they were obtained in a trial where there was no cross-examination or witnesses (Lewy, 2006). There is no dispute that Armenian cultural, religious and historical sites were destroyed (Dadrian, 1986; 1997).

6.1.3. Deportations. On 2 May 1915, Enver Pasha sent a message to Talaat Pasha stating there was a risk of Armenian rebellion where large Armenian communities resided, as there had been in Van (Balakian, 2003; Gurun, 2007). He suggested the Ottoman-Armenians either be deported to Russia, as the Russians had forced the Muslims into Anatolia, or that they be relocated to other Anatolian regions. On 26 May 1915, Ottoman officials decided that the Ottoman-Armenians, in areas where military operations were to take place, would be relocated. The Ottoman Government believed this would prevent a rebellion. The plan to prevent a rebellion included three main points; in no area would the Armenian population be allowed to exceed 10 per cent of the Muslim population; each village would not have more than
50 Armenian households and the Ottoman-Armenians could not change their residence once relocated (Gurun, 2007).

On 27 May 1915, a Temporary Law of Deportation ("Tehjir Law") was passed by the Ottoman Council of Ministers, allowing the Ottoman Military to relocate individuals that were considered to be a risk to the Empire’s security (Balakian, 2003; Gurun, 2007). Gurun (2007) referred to the law, which stated:

“In wartime should the commanders of the Army, the Army Corps, or the divisions face any opposition, armed aggression, or resistance to operations related to... the defence of the country... they are authorised and compelled to immediately implement punishment through the Armed Forces, and to suppress the aggression and resistance.

“The commanders of the Army, the Army Corps, or the divisions may transfer and settle in other quarters the inhabitants of villages and towns should they engage in spying, treason, or in view of military exigencies” (quoted by Gurun, 2007, p.264-265)

On 15 September, further regulations regarding relocation were passed by the Council of Ministers (Gurun, 2007). Article 21 stated, “should emigrants be attacked on their journey or in camps, the assailants will be immediately arrested, and sent to martial law court” (p.267). Following those decisions, another temporary law was proposed; the Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation (Dadrian, 1995; Gurun, 2007). The law stated that abandoned properties would be “liquidated” and “deposited for safekeeping in the name of the owner to the financial office” (Gurun, 2007, p.267). The law was passed by the Council of Ministers, despite protests from Ottoman Parliamentary Representative, Ahmed Riza, who stated the law was immoral because the assets had not been voluntarily “abandoned” by the Ottoman-Armenians, who were forced to relocate (Dadrian, 1995).

Much of what happened during the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 has been attributed to the “Special Organisation” (Teşkilat-i Mahsusa) founded by the CUP in 1903 (it was not until 1913 that the Special
Organisation received its name). Dadrian (1995) states, “their mission was to deploy in remote areas of Turkey’s interior and to ambush and destroy convoys of Armenian deportees” (p.236-237). The secret group undertook guerrilla warfare, and its ranks were joined by convicts who had been released on the condition that they agree to be conscripted (Balakian, 2003). Lewy (2005b), however, contests the claims that the Special Organisation was a “death squad” with the purpose of exterminating the populace. He asserts that there is no documentation, beyond court accusations following World War I, to confirm such claims. Furthermore, Lewy argues that the release of convicts for conscription was not uncommon, with the United States and Britain having set the precedent.

Ottoman Court Martials took place from 1919 to 1920, during which 112 people were tried for wartime profiteering, undermining the constitution and massacring Ottoman-Armenians and Greeks. Following the proceedings, 18 officials were sentenced to death for the role they played in taking the Empire to World War I and for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Akcam, 2011; Tatz, 2003). The Turkish court martial system, however, is quite different from western military courts. There was no cross-examination, no witnesses and, because there was no jury, the judge decided whether the prosecution had been sustained (Lewy, 2005a; McCarthy, 2005).

Ottoman representatives signed the Treaty of Sèvres, between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies, on August 10, 1920. The articles of relevance to this thesis are Article 88, Article 89 and Article 230. A translated version is referred to by Gurun (2007), in which they state:

Article 88. Turkey notifies, as the other states have, that she recognizes Armenia as an independent and free State.
Article 89. Like the other signatories, Turkey and Armenia have decided to submit the task of determining the borders between Turkey and Armenia in the provinces of Van, Erzurum, Trabzon, and Bitlis, the President of the U.S.A., and to accept his [sic] decision on the issue, as well as the other statutes he [sic] may offer concerning the Armenian’s [sic] access to the sea, the demilitarization of all Ottoman Lands bordering on the said frontier.
Article 230. The Ottoman Government is responsible for surrendering the individuals, requested by the Allied Powers, who were responsible for the mass killings, which occurred during the war in any area, which was part of the Ottoman Empire on August 1, 1914. (p.313)

In response to Article 230, Ottoman politicians, military officials and intellectuals were transferred to Malta. British officials, however, sceptical of the justice administered by the Ottoman court martials, did not use the findings from the court martials. Instead, those accused were held in Malta while the Ottoman archives in Constantinople (now Istanbul) were searched for evidence. They were held there for three years before being released due to lack of evidence. A prisoner exchange for British citizens saw those gaoled in Malta make their way back home to what had become a new Turkey (Dadrian, 1999a).

Those who considered the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” retaliated via other means. As previously mentioned, Talaat Pasha was assassinated on 15 March 1921, in Berlin, Germany as an act of revenge by an Armenian assassin, Soghomon Tehlirian (Akcam, 2006). When Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’, in 1944, he drew on material generated by the subsequent trial of Tehlirian (Bloxham, 2005).

Many academics have set forth competing histographies when describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The different opinions are greatly attributed to what they deem to be “reliable” sources of evidence. Many of the academics that do not use the “genocide” label when referring to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 have cited the unreliability of using documents that have not been verified, and testimonies that were obtained in courts where there was no cross-examination or other witnesses.

6.1.4. Ottoman-Armenian Population Figures. The large discrepancies in the available data are problematic to both sides of the debate. The estimated Ottoman-Armenian death toll ranges from 600,000 to 1,500,000. There are even higher estimates: posters for *Ravished Armenia*, the film based on the life of Arshaluys
Mardiganian, claimed 4,000,000 Ottoman-Armenians perished (Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2009).

McCarthy (1983) estimated the total population of Ottoman-Armenians in 1915 to be 1,698,301. This figure was calculated from the 1895-1896, 1905 and 1911-1912 Census data, using the population stability pyramid. However, the demographer’s claims have been criticised and disregarded by certain academics who argue that the 1911-1912 Census data was based on the 1905 population figures, not an official Census (Dadrian, 1992; 1999b, Kaiser, 2000). Encyclopaedia Britannica refers to both McCarthy’s calculations, and those of Arnold J. Toynbee, who was a British intelligence officer for the Foreign Office during the war. Toynbee believed 1,800,000 Ottoman-Armenians lived in Anatolia before the outbreak of World War I, after which approximately 600,000 were killed during deportations, 600,000 were deported safely, and 600,000 escaped the process altogether. Britannica gives prominence to these figures as data from Armenian and Turkish sources are considered to be unreliable and the “propaganda” in the data serves only to bewilder researchers. It lists the final “reasonable [population] representation” as 1,750,000 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2011). The apparent discrepancies in the literature have served only to further fuel the debate and obstruct reconciliation.

Toynbee, together with Viscount Bryce and James Bryce, compiled a collection of eyewitness accounts that described the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as a systematic “massacre”. The collection was titled, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and is often referred to as the Blue Book (Sarafian, 2000). The validity of the testimonies has since been questioned by Akcam (2005) who argues that the book was written for the purpose of war propaganda. However, he asks: “does it follow that all information which is used for propaganda purposes is necessarily false?” (p.5) The Blue Book has also been criticised because the eyewitnesses were initially kept anonymous and there is no reference to Ottoman sources, only to British “intelligence”. Nevertheless, a handful of academics, including professors Herbert Fisher and Gilbert Murray, have stated the testimonies are authentic (Dadrian, 1995).
6.2. Contradictory Stances: Reviewing or Revising the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916?

Denying that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was an act of “genocide” is considered to be a form of hate speech in nations such as France and Switzerland, where parliaments have recognised the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” (International Service of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). Furthermore, there are many academics that consider denial of “genocide” to be an act of politically influenced historical revisionism (Tatz, 2003).

Tatz (2003) refers to Richard Hovannisian’s 1997 lecture on comparative denial, where he brands those who deny the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as a case of “genocide” as “assassins of memory” (p.129). Tatz, who also uses the label of “genocide” for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 states the “pernicious, outrageous and continued nature of the Turkish denial industry saves it from being dismissed as comic hysteria... The entire apparatus of the state is attuned to denial... The actions are spectacular, often bizarre...” (p.129). Tatz lists the Turkish Government threat to sever ties with France over its “genocide recognition bill” as one of many examples. He suggests the reasons for “denial” are “suppression of guilt and shame”, “a cultural and social ethos of honour”, fears of financial reparations, fears of social fragmentation in a country still in transition, a momentum of denial that is “beyond recall”, and “a ‘logical’ belief that genocide committed with impunity... is both warrant and licence to commit denial with impunity” (p.130-131).

However, some academics argue that there is a place for revisionism in the scholarly process of historical writing. These include professors Bernard Lewis, Guenter Lewy and Justin McCarthy. Re-examination and re-evaluation is necessary as the dialogue continues, as it has in the case of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Bernard Lewis (1962; 2002b), Cleveland E. Dodge, Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, is one such academic who has revised his definition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. As a respected academic in his field, having often advised United States and United Kingdom Government officials and policymakers, in regards to their
relationships with the Middle East (Pew Research Centre, 2006), his is perhaps the most notable change of stance upon further investigation.

Below are excerpts from the 1962 and 2002 editions of Lewis’ book, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. The notable changes have been highlighted.

Now a desperate struggle between them [i.e., the Turks and Armenians] began, a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland, that ended with the terrible *holocaust* of 1915, when a million and a half Armenians perished (Lewis, 1962, p. 356).

Now a desperate struggle between them [i.e., the Turks and Armenians] began, a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland, that ended with the terrible *slaughter* of 1915, when, *according to estimates*, more than a million Armenians perished, as well as an unknown number of Turks (Lewis, 2002b, p. 356).

The revised text, from 2002, has replaced the word “holocaust” with “slaughter”, and the number of Armenian deaths has been changed from “a million and a half Armenians perished” to “according to estimates, more than a million Armenians perished”. Finally, reference to “an unknown number of Turks” that “perished” has also been included (Lewis, 1962; 2002b, p. 356).

Balakian (2003) accuses Lewis of “dispens[ing] of the Armenian Genocide in a couple of sentences” without “substantiation” (p.432). Balakian goes on to state that Lewis does not explain how the Armenians, an unarmed minority, could have struggled against the Ottoman Empire for their homeland. Tatz (2003) too accuses “the otherwise admirable Bernard Lewis” for becoming an acolyte of the “Turkish denial industry” (p.124).

Balakian (2003) is correct in stating the changed comments in *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* are not substantiated by Lewis (2002b). However, Lewis (2002a) has referred to supporting material in other sources. Lewis’ response to what distinguishes the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 from “genocide” is as follows:
Great numbers of Armenians, including members of the armed forces, deserted, crossed the frontier and joined the Russian forces invading Turkey. Armenian rebels actually seized the city of Van and held it for a while intending to hand it over to the invaders. There was guerrilla warfare all over Anatolia. And it is what we nowadays call the National Movement of Armenians Against Turkey. The Turks certainly resorted to very ferocious methods in repelling it (p.1).

Lewis explains that while there is “clear evidence” of the Ottoman Government decision to deport the Armenian population from “sensitive areas” there is “no evidence of a decision to massacre”. The Armenians in the Ottoman-Arab provinces were not deported because they were not considered a threat in that region. “Irregulars” and “villagers”, responding to what they considered to be their own ill treatment, carried out the “tremendous massacres”. There is, however, “considerable evidence of attempts to prevent [the massacres], which were not very successful”. While there remains uncertainty around the death toll, Lewis states that a million Armenian may have died. Regardless, Lewis (2002a) argues the failure to find evidence of a Government decision to carry out “genocide”, and the finding of evidence of Government attempts to prevent “massacres”, makes the “genocide” label inapplicable. “This is a question of definition and nowadays the word "genocide" is used very loosely,” maintains Lewis (2002a, p.1).

Guenter Lewy, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, is in agreement with many of Lewis’ conclusions, for which he too is often criticised as a “genocide denier”. Lewy holds a unique place in the debate surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as he too agrees neither with the “genocide” or “civil war” labels. In *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*, Lewy (2005a) reviews the competing historiographies of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, focusing particularly on the original sources referenced by researchers and writers. Lewy (2005a) states that he aimed to "subject the rich historical evidence available to the test of consistency and attempt to sort out the validity of the rival arguments" (p. x).
After reviewing the sources supporting claims that Ottoman-Armenians were systematically massacred as part of a “genocide” planned by the Young Turks, and the sources supporting claims that the Ottoman-Turks were forced to deport the Ottoman-Armenians from vulnerable war region – which resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths – Lewy (2005a) argues that supporters of both the “genocide” and “civil war” labels have a history of using primary sources selectively and out of context. He argues that there are few sources of primary evidence that support either position. Lewy (2005a) contends that while there were instances of Armenian rebellions, particularly in Van, the threats were minimal and did not necessitate deportation. Furthermore, he asserts that if there was a planned intent to destroy the Ottoman-Armenians, a more reliable method than deportation was available to the Ottoman Government and that the government would have killed the Ottoman-Armenians in Western Anatolia as well. McCarthy (2005) agrees with the latter point, stating that the “Armenians of Istanbul lived through the war, their churches open”. Based on these arguments, Lewy (2005a) instead offers the alternative viewpoint that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 occurred as a result of the Ottoman Empires logistical shortages, which resulted in the failure of the forced mass migration. Inadequate supervision and support resulted in massacres, starvation and disease.

Lewy (2005a) is especially critical of the works of Vahakn N. Dadrian, who is considered an “Armenian genocide” expert. Dadrian was a Professor of Sociology at the State University College at Geneseo. He is now the Director of Genocide Research at Zoryan Institute. Lewy (2005a) contends Dadrian frequently misquotes, misrepresents sources and neglects to include the context under which the sources were created, making him an unreliable source despite his “expert” status. “[B]y falsely attributing an opinion to a source, even when not citing it verbatim, he [Dadrian] once again commits a serious violation of scholarly ethics.” (p.94) Historians, Donald Bloxham and Hilmar Kaiser, have both also questioned the legitimacy of Dadrian's methodology, citations and subsequent conclusions (Erickson, 2006).

Lewy (2005a) neither denies nor confirms that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was an act of “genocide”. Rather, he avoids the question altogether and simply identiﬁes the inconsistencies in the sources used by “genocide” and “civil war” historiographies, stating that further research is required
before a conclusion regarding the definition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 can be reached. Finally, he argues that popular opinion does not contribute to the determination of historical fact and that the involvement of the media and governments serves only to exclude scholarly investigation. “If we look to politicians for the confirmation of historical facts we may create more confusion than clarification.” (p.262)

Both McCarthy (2007) and Dadrian (2006) criticise Lewy (2005a) for his lack of Turkish sources. McCarthy (2007) states that extensive Turkish documents from the Ottoman archives, that would have benefited the study, were excluded from Lewy’s study because they have not been translated into English. McCarthy attributes Lewy’s minimisation of Ottoman justification for relocation to his limited access to sources. Regardless, he states the sources Lewy did access were enough to find inconsistencies in the “genocide” argument. Both McCarthy (2007) and Erickson (2006) state that by identifying instances where “authentic historical evidence” has not been used (p.379), Lewy has called for further historical scholarship that relies on primary, not only secondary sources.

Dadrian (2006), however, accuses Lewy (2005a) of misinterpreting evidence in constructing a “revisionist account”. Dadrian (2006) refers to court documents from the Ottoman criminal justice system. Evidence under the inquisitorial system consisted of “confessions, witness and expert testimony, official records, discovery, judicial notice, searches and seizure”. He states that “several dozen Turkish witnesses, including two army commanders, several other high-ranking military officers, physicians, and governors testified. The ensuing verdicts confirmed the premeditation of the Armenians' mass murder”. In response, Lewy (2006) questions the reliability of the “confessions, witness and expert testimony, official records, discovery, judicial notice, searches and seizure” because there was no process of cross-examination and the original documents from the trials were lost. The references to trial documents are instead from copies of the Ottoman Government Gazette. He states that, “Dadrian again displays his skill in the use of selective evidence”.

Professor Justin McCarthy, a demographer at the University of Louisville who specialises in the histories of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, has often been the subject of criticism and referred to as a “genocide denier”. McCarthy’s analysis of the population data from the Ottoman Empire had led to his position that the mass killing
of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 resulted from a civil war that was initiated by World War I. When a motion was raised in the United States House of Representative to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”, McCarthy was one of the historians called before the House to provide testimony regarding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. He stated that his testimony should not confirm nor refute Turkish guilt of “one-sided genocide against the Armenians”. His explanation for this controversial statement was as follows:

“The historical questions are too involved for easy answers or quick condemnations. History should be determined by the normal procedures of historians. We should write our books and engage in debates until we gradually come to accepted conclusions. Turkish scholars, Armenian scholars, and those of us who are neither Turks nor Armenians should not feel that Congress has decided that the issue is resolved, when we know that is not the case. Such action can only hinder real investigation of the historical question. There is very real threat to scholarship when one group of scholars must face the awful and undeserved title of Genocide deniers when they do their proper work” (McCarthy, 1996b).

As such, when the House of Representatives voted against the motion to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”, supporters of the motion held McCarthy to be culpable. In McCarthy’s (1996a; 1996b) opinion, widely accepted western histories of the Ottoman Empire are biased because they rely upon the testimonies of biased observers: Christian missionaries, and officials from Christian nations who were at war with the Ottoman Empire. This bias is seen in the neglect of western historians to mention the millions of Muslims and Jews that were killed by Christian forces, including the Armenian militia, in Anatolia during the same World War I period. McCarthy (1996a) contends that the “genocide” label achieved prominence because, following World War I, Turkey was preoccupied with post-war reconstruction and the assembly of the new republic. Consequently, the Turkish administration neglected to set forth its own label describing the mass killing of
Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, before the “genocide” narrative had gained wide acceptance. Furthermore, it was slow in responding to genocide accusations. The result was a simplification of the issue into “victims and villains”.

McCarthy (1996a; 1996b; 2005) argues that the Ottoman-Armenian rebellions at Sarikamis and Van were the main motives for the Ottoman Government to relocate Ottoman-Armenians from the region. He states that while hundreds of thousands of Armenians were massacred during the World War I era, deaths also resulted from other causes such as wartime clashes and the spread of disease and famine. That is, the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians were not a result of a policy of systematic genocide. McCarthy (2005) has stated that many scholars refuse to look further into the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in fear of being labelled a “denier”.

McCarthy has been accused of creating “junk history” which “shamelessly” follows a “Turkish nationalistic agenda” (Imber, 1999, p.307). The comment was made in relation to McCarthy’s *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History*. In this book, McCarthy (1997) refers to the expulsion and killings of Turks and other Muslims, by the Balkan nationalists and the Russians, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Imber (1999) states, “This is a matter very little known in the English-speaking world, and clearly relevant to late Ottoman history, but as presented here, it reads very much like nationalist polemic and, in particular, as an official Turkish response to Armenian claims of genocide.” (p.307) In return, McCarthy (2005) argues that it is necessary to review not only the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 but the context which resulted in the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 taking place. He states that while there were final factors, which prompted the decision to relocate Ottoman-Armenians, the Ottoman Government made the decision after 100 years of conflict.

6.3. The Republic of Turkey and the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916

The Republic of Turkey is clear on its stance that it does not believe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was an act of genocide. Still, while the Armenian Government and the Armenian diaspora are unwavering in their commitment to the label of “genocide”, the Turkish Government has not made a strong
claim to any of the labels used by scholars, including “civil war” and “massacre”. In 2007, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, issued a directive to Turkish Government institutions to use the term “olaylar” – translated to “events” – instead of “alleged genocide” when referring to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Aydemir, 2007). The inability of the Turkish Government to set forth a definitive label has arguably left Turkey on the back foot, forced to respond to Armenian claims that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was an act of “genocide”, instead of setting forth its own interpretation. This stance has left the nation unable to move beyond a reactive position since the creation of the Turkish Republic.

The Government announced what it called the “Initiative to Resolve Armenian Allegations Regarding 1915” and on 10 April 2005, Erdogan invited the Armenian President, Robert Kocharian, to establish a joint historical commission. Erdogan suggested historians and experts from Turkey, Armenia and other nations be appointed to review the archives in Turkey, Armenia and other relevant nations (namely, the United States), with the key task of investigating the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, so that the Armenian and Turkish people may reconcile (Aydemir, 2007). The invitation has not been taken up by the Armenian Government to date, although a number of American scholars (many of whom are referred to in this chapter) have accepted the invitation to review the archives in Turkey.

Turkish Government efforts to silence references to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” have resulted in numerous controversies. Journalism is not unrestricted in Turkey. While freedom of expression is guaranteed by Article 28 of the Turkish constitution (Satana, 2008), it is undermined by Article 301 (Freedom House, 2004) Notwithstanding recent amendments, Article 301 restricts freedom of expression when it is believed, by the chief prosecutor or head of state, to denigrate the Turkish nation (European Journalism Centre, 2008).

Prosecutors have used Article 301 to prohibit labelling the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”, however, the resulting controversies have troubled the Turkish Republic. For example, after being prosecuted under Article 301 three times for “insulting the Turkish identity” and given a six-month suspended sentence in 2006, Hrant Dink was shot by a national extremist in
front of the Istanbul offices of Agos, the Turkish-Armenian newspaper that he edited (Christensen, 2007). His death and his initial message, which the Turkish Government had fought to suppress, were covered globally (“Sydney’s Armenians Protest Dink’s Murder,” 2007, January 21).

Similarly, Nobel laureate, Orhan Pamuk, was also prosecuted under Article 301, accused of making the unsubstantiated claim that a million Armenians died at the hands of the Turks (“Turk ‘Genocide' Author Faces Jail,” 2005, September 1). Pamuk left Turkey after the article was published, returning for his day in court. “What happened to the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 was a major thing that was hidden from the Turkish nation; it was a taboo,” Pamuk stated in a BBC interview. “But we have to be able to talk about the past.” (Rainsford, 2005) The charges against him were eventually dropped, as is often the case with Article 301 hearings (Finkel, 2009). To the Government’s embarrassment, international media covered the charges against Pamuk.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the differing discourses surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, including the historical developments that led to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 – both disputed and undisputed. It has reviewed the competing historiographies in order to identify the recurring labels used to describe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 – “genocide”, “civil war”, “massacre” and “event”.

The competing historiographies presented across this chapter have highlighted the need for further research regarding the definition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and a return to primary sources. As it currently stands, there are few sources of undisputed primary evidence that support any of the labels being employed when describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.
"If we are serious about representative democracy, then we need to think much harder about the increasingly complex world of representation."
(Sawer & Zappala, 2001, p.292)

Chapters Five and Six of this thesis referred to the experiences that have united the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities. Nationalism fuels participation in political endeavours, such as lobbying. The analysis considered the role that life experiences play in fuelling nationalism and lobbying; specifically, that “historical trauma” has the ability to unite members of a community (Castles et al., 1992).

Chapter Seven explores the political presence of ethnic communities in Australia, more specifically, the “ethnic seat paradox” and the level of participation by the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities. Ethnic representation is lower than non-ethnic representation across all tiers of government in Australia, despite the cultural diversity of the nation’s population. This chapter also considers the idea of political representation, and considers who has the legitimacy to politically represent a group. Technically, all Australians are politically represented, because each citizen has the right to vote for a representative in parliament during a fair election. This chapter, however, presents the argument that representative democracy is at times ineffective because it is formed by a group of powerful elites who may not necessarily be influenced by the citizens who voted for them. It also considers the relationship between political participation and the communities’ ability and desire, or lack thereof, to form persuasive lobby groups around the issues they have intense attachments to, namely labels surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-
Armenians between 1915-1916. The chapter ends with an evaluation of what is required to make a strong lobby group, and why the Australian-Armenian community has been able to form a strong lobby and the Australian-Turkish community has not. The analysis is framed around key aspects of the work of Sawer and Zappala (2001), Fitzgerald (2006) and Phillips (1995).

7.1. The Political Presence of Australian Ethnic Groups

Ethnic political representation in Australia is complex; riddled with paradoxes. Both the ethnicity of the political representative and the ethnicity of the constituency affect a community’s political drive and how it is represented (Zappala, 2001). While the number of parliamentary representatives from non-English speaking backgrounds has been increasing, Zappala (2001) believes their numbers are still not significant enough to have their “presence... felt on policies and agendas”, adding that “present numbers of first – and second – generation MPs of non-English speaking background need to at least double (and also better reflect women)” (p.281).

In order to examine ethnic representation in the Australian context, it is necessary to consider the meaning of the terms “ethnic” and “representation”. This chapter will use the definition of “ethnic” set forth by Zappala (2001); “immigrants (and their offspring) from non-British origins” (p.134-135). When necessary, this chapter will distinguish between immigrants from a non-English speaking background (NESB) and immigrants from an English-speaking background (ESB). Zappala (2001) admits the given definition of “ethnic” is in fact “flawed” because it does not take into account factors such as intermarriage. Still, this definition is useful for the purpose of reviewing political representation of minority groups in Australia (p.135). It is also important to note the unique place the Australian-Armenians hold in regards to the definitions set forth by Zappala (2001). While the community group is clearly from an “ethnic” background, and intermarriage is rare, making the definition quite fitting, they are not necessarily from a NESB background despite their “ethnic” status. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Australian-Armenians migrated from many different nations, and many do not share a common language. In fact, most arrived in Australia as educated people who already spoke English and, as such, they were able to benefit
from the economic prosperity Australia offered at the time in a way that other “ethnic”
migrants (including the Australian-Turks) were not.

While representative democracy is defined as “a system in which citizens elect
a member of Parliament to represent their interests” (Singleton, 2006, p.127), the
definition of representation by Pitkin (1967) is instead deemed adequate for the
purpose of this thesis; “acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner
responsive to them” (p.209). This definition has been preferred because, while
Australians have the right to elect their representative in fair and regular elections,
their representatives are usually formed by an elite group, who do not necessarily
represent the views of their less influential constituents – representative democracy
does not necessarily result in responsive government (Singleton et al, 2006).

As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, Australian multiculturalism is one
of the more successful models across the world, or at least it was, until the policy of
multiculturalism came under attack by the Howard Government. However, despite
Australia’s ethnic diversity, ethnic representation is lower than non-ethnic
representation across all tiers of government. Critics have evaluated the comparatively
lower level of representation to be inadequate (Jupp, et al., 1989; Zappala, 2001).
Ethnic representation is most frequently seen at the local level, followed by state and,
lastly, federal. To date, Australian political parties have not opted to advocate policies
that encourage and support NESB members to run for office. The closest a party came
to supporting the election of NESB members was during the 1970s and 1980s, when
Labor created ethnic branches (as discussed in Chapter Two) (Zappala, 2001).

The previous encouragement showed by Labor, however, has not resulted in
NESB Australians representing their ethnic community. This is largely due to the
“ethnic seat paradox”. Zappala (2001) describes the paradox as an obstacle faced by
the Labor Party’s "aspiring ethnic candidates” because, historically, ethnic electorates
have been “safe” Labor seats. As a result, the electorates where NESB members have
the best chance of being successful are instead reserved for the “ministerial aspirants
and power holders within the party” (p.147-148). The “ethnic seat paradox” was
created because the “safe” electorate are reserved for the political candidates that
essentially create Labor’s backbone. The creation of this “paradox” creates multiple
problems for the Labor Party. The “ethnic seat paradox” has caused an increase in
conservative ethnic MPs. This paradox can also dissuade potential candidates from
participating in the political process at all, particularly if they are staunch Labor supporters (Zappala, 2001, p.147-148). To clarify, there is no reason why a political aspirant cannot be ethnic; it is, however, uncommon.

Representation, in general, has become a problematic notion in Australia. Citizens, who have lost faith that their elected member adequately represents their views, distance themselves from political institutions and the political system. There is also the argument that Australia’s major political parties now answer to the middle and upper classes, with less consideration of the everyday Australian (Sawer & Zappala, 2001). This is of particular concern for Labor’s working-class supporters, who are no longer adequately represented by the party that once claimed to have the interests of blue collar Australians at heart. The Labor Party “no longer mirrors the characteristics of its most loyal voters – including its ethnic and Indigenous constituencies.” (Sawer & Zappala, 2001, p.2) The Australian-Turkish community, largely comprised of working-class Australians (as discussed in Chapter Five), supports a party that no longer voices its concerns. Regardless, the Australian-Turkish community’s members remain staunch Labor supporters.

Labor’s Barbara Perry remained the Member for Auburn from 2001 until 2015, stepping down before the last State Election in order to secure the “safe seat” for State Labor Leader, Luke Foley. As expected, Labor won the seat of Auburn, despite Liberal candidate, Ronney Oueik, stating that if elected he would rally for the NSW Government to review its decision to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 an act of “genocide”. The fact that Foley is a member of the Armenian-Australian Parliamentary Friendship Group did not diminish the support of Australian-Turkish voters either (Murphy, 2015). During a 2014 Australian Turkish Advocacy Alliance (ATAA) seminar, one speaker explained that his attempts to speak to political members about issues of importance to the Australian-Turkish community are fruitless and even “laughed at” because political members are certain they will win the Australian-Turkish vote, regardless of their policies; a point proved precisely by the 2015 NSW State Election.

While Labor has strayed far from its earliest ideals of advocating the interests of the working class, ethnic Australians still have other avenues for representation. There are two other methods of including the representation of ethnic minority groups in the parliamentary process: the creation of consultative bodies and by consulting
associations formed by the ethnic communities. The latter can be associations that represent one ethnic group, or multiple ethnic groups (such as the Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Council of Australia (FECCA)).

These two methods of representation are considered to be problematic by multiculturalism critics, Zappala (2001) explains:

"Critics of multiculturalism... argue that the ethnics-related consultative groups, committees and institutions established since the late 1970s have led to the creation of an 'ethnic lobby'. This lobby, they argue, exercises influence over political parties and leaders, and has allowed Australians of NESB to become over-represented in the Australian political process. This supposed influence ranges from immigration and fiscal to foreign and social policy." (p.151)

The role played by ethnic lobbies can be crucial to an ethnic community’s political representation. Zappala (2001) defines “ethnic organisations and institutions” as “key institutions for increasing the representation of ethnic groups” (p.161). Of the ethnic councillors surveyed, two-thirds were members of ethnic organisations and one-third stated they received political support from their organisation (Zappala, 2001). ANC Australia, for example, holds political fundraisers and even publishes the ANC Australia Guide to the NSW State Election, as well as other election guides. The election guides clearly state the candidates that have promised to develop Australian-Armenian community and cultural projects, and are concerned with the recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”. The guides are published by Armenia Online, ensuring widespread readership.

The “key challenges” that face the creation of a “vibrant ethnic associational life and democracy” include the resolution of what measures are necessary and how these measures should be undertaken (Zappala, 2001, p.161). In the case of the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities, the vastly different approaches have resulted in the strengthening of the Australian-Armenian cultural identity and integration into the Australian political system, and further decreased the level of participation of the Australian-Turkish community in the political system.
ANC Australia has ensured that the needs of its community are served by political representatives, regardless of the representative’s ethnic background.

At the previously mentioned 2014 ATAA seminar, a lobbyist shared his experience from earlier in the year, when he had approached a member of the NSW Parliament who had voted for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 to be recognised as an act of "genocide". Soon into the conversation, where the lobbyist shared the Turkish perspective of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, the parliamentarian laughed and asked, "why has no one from the Turkish community come knocking on my door before now?" The idea that the Australian-Turkish side had an argument, but simply did not bother presenting it, was considered funny by the parliamentarian. The Australian-Turkish lobbyist explained that their group was 30 years behind the Australian-Armenian lobby, that had spent decades chipping away at the state parliaments in order to have the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 recognised as an act of "genocide". He believes it will take years before the Australian-Turkish perspective is considered seriously by the state parliaments. For now, however, he is pleased that the Federal Government has heard their voice, and Foreign Affairs Minister, Julie Bishop, openly stated that the Federal Australian Government does not consider the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 to be an act of "genocide" (see Appendix A). Regardless, it is still far too early to tell if ATAA will be able aid the integration of the Australian-Turkish community into the broader Australian political system. In fact, Tal Buenos, an Israeli political science doctoral student, at the University of Utah, focusing on genocide studies, stated in his address to NSW Parliament on 24 November 2014, that he considered the “well-articulated letter” by the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister to be a “favour to Turkey, to which a price is attached.” Buenos believes the Australian Government is using the indirect promotion of “genocide” claims, in the media and state parliaments, in order to place pressure on the Turkish Government. The letter in question is then a “coupon that Turkey is expected to accept”; a form of “double play”, which leaves the Turkish Government feeling in debt to the Australian Government (Buenos, 2014). If this political game is actually taking place and, rather than “hearing” ATAA, Bishop is “playing the game”, then ATAA is even further away than it currently appears from achieving its goals because they are not on the track to making a difference, as they believe.
Other criticisms of non-parliamentary consultation include the view that such consultation can prevent ethnic minorities from actual parliamentary representation, and also that the Anglo-Australian majority consider the process to be awarding ethnic minorities special privileges, which can result in the formation of political parties such as One Nation (Castles, 1992; Zappala, 2001). Criticisms of non-parliamentary consultation have been responded to with arguments that consultation with ethnic and multi-ethnic groups allows for the representation of organised ethnic views, which may otherwise not be present in parliament due to the ethnic population's under-representation (Jupp, 1993; Zappala, 2001).

It is not that ethnic-Australians do not have the same rights as Anglo-Australians – they clearly do. If they are citizens, ethnic-Australians have the right to run for office and organise politically. These rights, however, do not ensure the ability of minority ethnic groups to publicise their views, or to ensure that they are represented in politics. Phillips (1995) states, “[p]olitical equality does carry with it an equal right to participate in politics—an equal right to be politically present. Translating this into an equal right to serve as a representative simply presumes what has yet to be established.” (p.36) Because of their NESB, ethnic-Australians are already starting on the back foot (Zappala, 2001). Phillips (1995) argues that groups who have experienced a history of “of inequality, deprivation, or exclusion” are placed in a position where they have “different relationships to economic resources and political power, we do not treat them equally when we treat them as if they are the same” (p.93). As such, treating ethnic-Australians equally with Anglo-Australians actually disadvantages the former.

Zappala (2001) notes the "symbolic importance" of having ethnic representatives present in the formation of parliamentary legislation in Australia, a nation, which is undergoing changing views of national identity as a result of mass migration. He explains that, "[a]s key institutions where symbolic struggle often take place, parliaments should contain representatives of different 'interpreters' of the symbols of nation" (p.137).

Zappala (2001) argues that there are two key ways in which ethnicity and political representation intertwine; “the ethnicity of the electorate, and the ethnicity of the elected representative”. In addition, there are two main places where ethnicity and political representation intertwine; parliament – “the official face of representation” –
and the constituency – “the less official face of representation” (p.139). Both the “official” and “less official” faces are significant because what a political representative does and says in one environment may be completely different to the other. This is the case for all levels of government.

It is difficult to conclusively determine if MPs with ethnic backgrounds have different responses to non-ethnic MPs, when it comes to "ethnic issues". This is because the latter largely outnumbers the former. Zappala (2001) did, however, in a 1995 study, find that:

"MPs from ethnic background have been found to be more responsive to ethnic constituents, as measured by the extent and type of interventions they raised in parliament. This was the case, irrespective of the ethnicity of the electorate they represented...
The findings also indicated that these MPs were taking on representational roles that went beyond the geographical confines of their immediate electorate." (p.141)

Zappala’s (2001) findings were for both the federal and state tiers of government in Australia. At a local government level, councillors with an ethnic background reported experiencing a "special relationship" – a bond – with their ethnic constituents because of their cultural links (p.142). Zappala (2001) also found that MPs from ethnic electorates were more likely to raise issues of “homeland politics” in Australian political discussions. Furthermore, “strong and tight-knit” ethnic communities were able to influence their representative even if the rest of the electorate was from an ESB.

The response of ethnic electorates to a political representative was found to depend on that MP’s approach to their constituents, as opposed to that MP’s stance on particular policies, because ethnic voters usually live in lower socio-economic areas, and so they prefer representation that "privileges the constituency face" (Zappala, 2001, p.143). MPs have been found to adjust their representational style to meet the needs of their constituents. In largely ethnic electorates, this includes attending community events, such as homeland national days and even weddings. "What matters to ethnic constituents is not that the MP is from a NESB, but the MP's presence and availability at 'their' spaces and places." (Zappala, 2001, p.143) Does this necessarily result in adequate representation? Of course not. It does, however, leave lower socio-
economic voters, such as the Australian-Turkish voters, feeling as if they are being adequately represented.

In response to the views presented by both ends of the spectrum, it may be argued that non-parliamentary consultation with ethnic minority groups is problematic when the views of only one ethnic minority are represented – in political discussions that involve more than one view, such as the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 – and when this form of representation functions as a long-term solution. The representation of organised ethnic views, mentioned by Jupp (1993) and Zappala (2001), can result in unorganised ethnic views remaining unheard. In these instances, consultation should be with a consultative committee, which represents all the ethnic groups concerned, formed specifically for the purpose of informing parliament on the matter at hand. Consultation with only one ethnic group can be tantamount to a lobby.

Secondly, it may be argued that non-parliamentary consultation with ethnic minority groups should only be used as a short-term solution. In the short-term, non-parliamentary consultation is a necessity because it allows the voice of ethnic-Australians in parliament – a voice that is not currently adequately represented. In order to provide equality, disadvantaged groups, including NESB Australians who are unable to actively participate in government due to language barriers, should be granted special considerations, otherwise they will remain a disadvantaged group. In the long-term, however, as Australian political history has shown us, this approach can lead to members of the Anglo-Australian community resenting the ethnic minority and result in the rise of anti-multicultural sentiments, such as the voice of Jacqui Lambie, who attempted to ban the burqa in Australia (Bourke, 2014, September 21) and stated that supporters of Islamic sharia law are, "maniacs and depraved humans" who will commit "cold-blooded butchery and rapes until every woman in Australia wears a burqa" (Jennett, 2014, October 30). Lambie also refused an invitation to a Sydney mosque because it was not her “moral upbringing” (Anderson, 2014, October 22).

In addition, as a long-term approach, non-parliamentary consultation is problematic because it can result in unorganised ethnic groups becoming complacent and preventing members of ethnic groups from seeking their own voice in parliament, as they already feel that there is sufficient representation. In order to prevent non-
parliamentary consultation from becoming a permanent answer to the under-representation of ethnic minority groups in Australian parliaments, policies that encourage and support NESB Australians to seek a seat in parliament should be adopted. These policies also need to address the 'ethnic seat paradox', to allow ethnic candidates, who would potentially have an advantage in a largely ethnic-Australian electorate, to make use of that advantage. Forcing parties to hand their safe seats over from their most influential members to new political candidates is clearly not a plausible solution, and would most likely result in a weakening of the parties. It may, however, be plausible to consider an exemption process, which allows for a certain number of safe seats in predominantly ethnic electorates to be run for by ethnic-Australian members, with this number slowly increasing each election year, until there is adequate representation of ethnic minority groups.

Finding solutions to under representation of ethnic minority groups is one of the considerable obstacles facing the Australian political process. It is in no way a simple task and requires much further discussion than what is possible within the confines of this thesis. How this issue is addressed will be a key factor in determining how democracy progresses in multicultural Australia.

7.2. Who has the Legitimacy to Politically Represent a Group?

An ideal democratic parliament should represent and recognise the voices of all constituent groups, even the disadvantaged and minorities. Without the mechanisms in place to ensure this, however, we are left with governments that create policy based on the needs and wants of the dominant majority.

Political exclusion usually occurs either because the electoral system over-represents certain views, as a result of influences such as funding and lobbying, or because constituents have limited access to political participation. Phillips (1995) states that political participation “has proved particularly skewed according to social class” (p.1). Demands for equal political presence for women and ethnic groups – “groups that have come to see themselves as marginalised or silenced or excluded” – are dominating arguments over the democratic process (p.5). Phillips (1995) refers to Lijphart (1984), who argues that, “majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous, because minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel
excluded and discriminated against and will lose their allegiance to the regime” (p.14). Phillips (1995) explains that of particular concern is that when “policies are worked out for rather than with a politically excluded constituency, they are unlikely to engage with all relevant concerns (p.13). Political presence shapes political agendas, which is why a greater emphasis in being placed on the equal inclusion of females and ethnic groups.

The equal inclusion of ethnic groups and their perspective is much more difficult than the inclusion of equal gender representation, particularly because there are ethnic majorities and minorities within what is already a minority group. Furthermore, certain ethnic groups have a tendency to lean towards “sub-division” by intermarrying with members of ESB and other NESB. This form of “sub-division” is particularly common within the Australian-Turkish community. Phillips (1995) argues that these complexities, coupled with the “disturbing historical associations that attach to racial or ethnic quotas” make it difficult “to justify quotas as the best way of dealing with racial or ethnic exclusions” (p.168).

Phillips (1995) highlights deliberative democracy as a possibility to start the process of “reflective transformation” and to deal with issues of political inclusion. Advocates of deliberative democracy promote the use of “discussion-based democracy”, as they believe differences can only be resolved by participating in public debate. Phillips (1995) emphasises that “[d]eliberation matters only because there is difference” (p.151). However, for discussion-based democracy to be successful, each of the different perspectives must first have a voice in parliament.

Phillips (1995) refers to the Verba et al (1987) study of political participation across seven countries, where they found that those from higher social classes, with financial means, were given political advantage. This was only slightly corrected when less advantaged groups, such as ethnic minorities, were able to become organised and present a unified group perspective. The presentation of ethnic perspectives in this manner can become problematic when certain ethnic groups, such as the Australian-Armenian group, are consistently more active than other ethnic groups. In this instance, Parry et al (1992) argue that, “the elites are in danger of mistaking the pressures of these grouping for the views of their citizenry as a whole” (p.416). Even if an ethnic minority that has a history of political exclusion manages to voice its opinion in parliament, Phillips (1995) believes it will still struggle to affect political
agenda and have its preferred policy instated, which can have serious repercussions, such as the recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Phillips (1995) argues a “greater element of policy-related competition has to be introduced into what are otherwise uncontested safe seats, for, unless there is more explicit political debate and choice, representatives will be ‘representative’ only in a mirror or descriptive sense”. (p.105)

7.3. Ethnic Lobbying in Australia

Zetter (2011) states that a "simple and straightforward" definition of lobbying is, "the process of seeking to shape the public policy agenda in order to influence government (and its institutions) and the legislative programme"; in other words, “the art of political persuasion." (p.3) Gurbanzade (2012) adds that the process of “seeking to influence a government and its institutions,” is for the purpose of achieving the execution of “policies that serve interests of a group of individuals”. According to Fitzgerald (2006), the term itself is derived from "the lobbies outside chambers of parliaments where people gathered to talk to a politician, to plead for a favour or to influence his vote on a piece of legislation. The aim was to intercept the politician on his way between his office and the chamber, to communicate with him directly rather than through an intermediary" (p.19).

The term "lobby group" can be used interchangeably with terms such as "pressure group" and "interest group". Each of these bodies is considered a lobby group if they "seek to influence legislative process", whether it is directly or indirectly (the latter which may include providing analysed data to be used in lobbying) (Fitzgerald, 2006, p.15). These terms, however, will not be used interchangeably in this thesis. The role each lobby group plays will be specified, as will the term under which their lobbying takes place.

Lobbying in Australia is currently unregulated. Fitzgerald (2006) asserts, "[l]obbying – often undetected and unreported – has become an increasingly important part of the political process”. (p.12) It is important to consider why lobbying is picking up pace, in both Australia and around the world. However, according to Zetter (2011) the answer is simple. "Why do companies, charities, trade associations, trade unions, pressure groups and professional bodies lobby government?" he asks. "The answer is
very simple: governments represent either a threat or opportunity to those organisations. It is about acquiring – or maintaining – a competitive advantage." (p.29)

Political actors, wishing to maintain power, must be attentive to the petitions and lobbies presented by their constituents. If not, the loss of support is almost guaranteed. Constant lobbying of an issue, from a decided angle, makes that perspective accessible and easier to commit to memory; increasing the chances of that issue surfacing to the public agenda. Lobbying is one of the most effective techniques an interest group can employ. However, providing all constituents with a voice is impossible; opposing groups will undoubtedly have differing opinions. Frequently, it is the minorities who are left unheard, though their opinion may be just as valid (Lasswell, 1976).

There is a common argument that not only is there a place for lobby groups in the political process; it is also an essential element. Fitzgerald (2006) refers to Peter Shergold, then Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, who stated it is “imperative for public servants to be informed by the perspectives of those organisations who have a stake in the policy decisions of government" (p.16). Similarly, former lobbyist and Minister for Industry, Ian McFarlane, also argues that lobbying is "essential". McFarlane is quoted as stating, "The good ones [lobbyists] are an important part of delivering all sides of a policy argument and are a pool of specialist knowledge" (Fitzgerald, 2006, p.17).

Certain parliamentarians, such as former Premier of Western Australia, Dr Carmen Lawrence, have been recorded stating that there is a cause for alarm when it comes to lobbying. Fitzgerald (2006, p.18) quoted Lawrence saying: "Since we are aware of only a small proportion of the lobbying that goes on, there is reasonable suspicion that a great many more decisions are being shaped without our knowledge and without the vested interest group having to face public scrutiny of their claims and arguments." Fitzgerald (2006) states, "the public does not know who dines with the Prime Minister at The Lodge or Kirribilli House. But we can be sure that more than cricket is on the table for discussion" (p.18).

However, what happens when all sides of a policy argument are not delivered? Considering that the goal of lobbying is "competitive advantage", as argued by Zetter (2011, p.29), is it reasonable to believe that all sides will be presented? I argue that it is not. While there may be nothing wrong with lobbying – it can be a useful tool to
inform governments – it becomes problematic when it is one-sided ethnic lobbying. I maintain that there is no place for one ethnic group to have "competitive advantage" over another ethnic group in multicultural Australia.

When considering the potential a lobby group has to persuade, it is also necessary to consider where the party, or parties, the group is attempting to persuade receive their funding from. Fitzgerald (2006) refers to figures published by the Australian Electoral Commission which, at the time of publication, revealed that Labor received $46.4 million from private donations and $16 million in public election funding, and the Liberals received $33.3 million from private donations and $20 million in public election funding (p.47). The Australian-Armenian lobby clearly states the parliamentarians that it supports in each of the electorates where there is a strong Australian-Armenian community. Alongside promising their vote, the community then holds fundraisers for these parliamentarians. There is, of course, an expectation that the parliamentarians will support their cause. Parliamentarians who are considered ‘friends’ to the Australian-Armenian cause are often awarded the Friend of the Armenian- Australian Community Award by ANC Australia. Recipients of the award include Bob Carr, Joe Hockey and Michael Atkinson, amongst other notable names.

7.4. What Makes a Strong Lobby?

Zetter (2011) lists the five key rules to lobbying as: "communicate from your audience's perspective, not yours"; "put emotional messages at the heart of your communications strategy"; "use accessible, easily understood everyday ideas, words and images to readily communicate a simple, clear message"; "do not be afraid of education and evidence"; and "have confidence in your message and communicate that confidence."(p.35) The Australian-Turkish community has struggled to implement these five rules until ATTA’s recent, more successful, attempts. Part of the difficulty may be attributed to the community’s low education levels (as discussed in Chapter Five). For many Australian-Turks, there is still a significant language barrier present; leaving them without the skills to communicate clear and concise messages. In comparison, without a language barrier, the Australian-Armenian community has been
effectively using emotional messages to clearly communicate their own perspective for decades.

Lobbying can be one-sided for a multitude of reasons, notwithstanding finances and the will and ability to organise a group. Fitzgerald (2006, p.19) refers to an estimation for the price of successful lobbying, made by Parliamentary Press Gallery journalist, Jason Koutsoukis, who states it can easily cost up to $500,000, which includes presentations to politicians, including backbenchers; wining and dining political actors around the nation, and raising media awareness. The necessary infrastructure to support a successful lobby group in the long-term requires a national office, state office, paid staff, volunteer staff, up-to-date technology and software, information technicians, an annual national conference, telephone conference calls, mobile phones, email accounts, websites, a postal address, and media monitoring and relationship building (Fitzgerald, 2006, p.143).

The Australian-Armenian lobby has been built on the listed, necessary infrastructure. Seeking legislative recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” has been a priority for the Australian-Armenian lobby, as is frequently the case with the Armenian diaspora. A united, if not sizeable, community supports this lobby effort. Organisations, such ANC Australia, have played a substantial role in supporting Australian-Armenian lobbyists. ANC Australia states its main goals are: “To influence and guide Australian Government policy on matters of interest to the Armenian-Australian community” and “To represent the collective Armenian-Australian viewpoint on matters of public policy, while serving as liaison between the community and their elected officials”. ANC Australia represents the currently active 36 Australian-Armenian organisations, as well as the wider Australian-Armenian community (ANC Australia, 2010a).

Considering the vast difference in socio-economic standing between the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities (high socio-economic profile vs. low socio-economic profile, as discussed in Chapter Five), it is not surprising that the former has had the ability to raise political and public awareness of their views on the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and the latter has not.

The tools, systems and people, listed above, are necessary to ensuring a lobby group has the means to make a timely response. As a public affairs consultant, whose
professional career includes both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, Zetter (2011) believes one golden rule of lobbying is getting your message across in a timely manner. "[T]he earlier you get involved in the process the greater your chance of success." (p.4) Unlike the Armenian lobby, the Turkish lobby does not have a history of acting in a timely manner. Gurbanzade (2012) claims that part of the Armenian diaspora’s strength as a lobby group lies in the weakness of prior Turkish lobbies. The Turks were not the first to set forth a label regarding the mass killing of Ottoman Armenians between 1915-1916 and have a history of reacting to accusations, rather than pre-emptively lobbying their own (McCarthy, 1996a).

Zetter (2011) describes the most effective campaigns as "concise and direct" and, importantly, "run by people who believe in them" (p.22). A huge problem for the Turkish side of the argument is that they have still not set forth an alternative label to “genocide”. The current Turkish Government’s commitment to using the term “event” to describe the mass killing of Ottoman Armenians between 1915-1916 is not an alternative characterisation. If anything, the vague term simply refuses to characterise.

When establishing a campaign, it is critical to "make a case that involves people" and "make a common cause" (p.22). The former ensures that the target audience will be able to identify with the campaign and consider the impact it has on actual people, while the latter serves to present a united front. Lobby groups that are united in their approach are able to keep their target audience focused on their key issues. "Keeping these group campaigns together is often a greater skill than having the foresight to put them together in the first place," states Zetter (2011, p.23). Finally, Zetter (2011) lists making threats as one of the biggest mistakes a lobby group can make.

Rallying the public at a protest is an oft-used strategy, however, it is not the most successful in influencing the opinions of parliamentarians. According to Fitzgerald (2006), public servants prefer well-researched notes, which they can use when preparing a policy brief for a minister. "A public attack is usually evidence of a failed attempt to influence government in private" (p.20). In the case of the Australian-Turkish lobby, public attacks were preferred because there was not an entity capable of forming a private persuasive attack. The community’s previous attempts to create lobby groups have resulted in in-fighting and the eventual dismantlement of the groups (to be further discussed in Chapter Eight).
Fitzgerald (2006) also regards petitions as a "waste of time", citing that around 500 petitions are submitted to the House of Representatives each year, many of which are disregarded. However, there is one positive to petitions that Fitzgerald (2006) admits to: "despite their lack of effectiveness... organising it will involve many of your supporters, help bring them together, and attract the attention of those asked to sign it (p.169).

The lobby group's spokesperson needs to keep the message simple and the heading punchy. In the case of the Australian-Armenian lobby, the message is simple: "Armenian genocide". In comparison, the title currently being used by the Australian-Turkish lobby’s latest brochure-style publication is: “the events of 1915, a brief history of the Turkish-Armenian conflict”. The promise of a “brief” history seems unlikely, considering that even the title of the publication is not brief. Clearly, the Turkish lobby’s message is neither simple nor punchy. The responsibility of seeking recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” plays an immense role in the Armenian nationalistic spirit, even for the Armenian diaspora in Australia. ANC Australia (2010g) states: “The Armenian Genocide is a moral and ethical issue. We owe it not only to the victims and survivors of the Genocide but to mankind, to prevent future crimes against humanity.” Castles et al. (1992) claim nationalism and community cohesion can be strengthened if the community is invested in “a particular state consciousness of unique responsibility for some chiliastic mission” (p.143). Furthermore, the creation of the nationalist spirit is reliant upon “symbolic manifestations”, which are often created under the cover of conflict with other nations, usually in relation to territory. The great sense of “community and cohesion” found in some nations, and diasporas, can result from the belief that “the national myth is explicit, passionately internalized by the bulk of the population and largely immune from question, dissent or satire at the level of public discourse” (Castles et al., 1992, p.142). That the Armenian community faced conflict in WWI is undisputable – despite the label of that conflict being disputed. This conflict arguably resulted in a “national myth” the Armenian community considers to be undisputable, which has resulted in the formation of a cohesive community. As such, the argument laid forth by Castles et al. could be used to explain the unwavering commitment of the Australian-Armenian lobby to the recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide".
In addition, Castles et al. (1992) assess that feelings of nationalism are more intense amongst communities that became a nation following an “easily identifiable historical trauma” (p.142). As discussed in Chapter Five, this thesis considers the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 to be seen as “historical trauma” by the Armenian communities, which supports the identification of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as what bonds the Armenian community, both in Australia and around the world. Following the same argument, it could be reasoned that the Turkish community, if it views the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “civil war” – a term, while not set forth by the Government, that adequately describes the views of the majority of the Turkish community – would also have an “easily identifiable historical trauma”. However, as Turkey was fighting battles across multiple borders, the conflict between the Ottoman-Armenians was not unique for the Ottoman-Turks and does not alone make up the entirety of their trauma, making the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 less significant and not a unifying force. If McCarthy’s (1996a) assessment of post-World War I Turkey is considered, the Turkish sense of “unique responsibility” was focused on building the Republic of Turkey – after all of the trauma suffered in WWI – not in defining the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. This may explain why the Turks have often exhibited great signs of the nationalistic spirit, however, have rarely worked together to lobby for their definition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

While it seems that ATAA is stronger than any Turkish lobby group formed to date – which was not a difficult goal to achieve – there is no evidence to suggest that the Turkish community will present the united front necessary for ATAA to achieve its goals. At the last 2014 protest organised by ATAA, the group aimed to attract media attention for their cause by breaking the Guinness World Record for the number of people in a halay (a Turkish folk dance, which requires the formation of a chain by holding hands). They needed 1,000 people in attendance to break the record. They fell short of 300. While media monitoring conducted for this thesis confirmed that the attempt to break the halay record was not well advertised, the protest itself was, surprisingly, advertised for weeks in advance in the local ethnic newspapers. Whatever the reason for the Australian-Turkish community’s reluctance to participate in political representation, it appears that ATAA has a long road ahead.
7.5. Conclusion

This chapter presents the difficulties inherent to ethnic representation in Australian politics. It explores the concept of the “ethnic seat paradox”, and explains how it affects the Australian-Turkish community in particular. While all Australians are politically represented, as each adult citizen votes for a representative in parliament during a fair election, it is argued that representative democracy is at times ineffective because it is formed by a group of powerful elites who may not necessarily be influenced by the citizens who voted for them. This chapter also considers the relationship between political participation and the ability ethnic communities to form persuasive lobby groups around the issues they have intense attachments to, namely labels surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. It discusses how higher educational attainment, stronger English language skills, and “historic trauma” has united the Australian-Armenians and strengthened their lobbying efforts, while explaining that language barriers and a lower socio-economic background have prevented Australian-Turks from undertaking the same level of political participation.

Greater political presence of ethnic groups should be a requirement in responsible, representative government. While a political member does not need to be of NESB to represent the perspective of an ethnic group, NESB members have been more likely to do so. In light of the modern political system, where party platforms are declining, we are seeing independent representatives having more influence, making the perspective of individual representatives all that much more significant. If “discussion-based democracy”, as suggested by Phillips (1995), were to be used in this environment, we might find new voices and new resolutions making their way into parliament, creating a parliament that better represents the perspectives found in multicultural Australia.
Chapter Eight
Research Findings

This chapter provides an overview of the four case studies, which focus on events that have resulted in heightened debate about labelling the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and presents the findings from the media coverage data collected in the months surrounding the case studies, discussing them with reference to the theoretical framework previously set out.

This thesis has considered the power of the internet in successfully disseminating messages, information, and amassing debates about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Chapter Eight, however, specifically presents an in-depth analysis of the differences inherent in the disseminated print and online communications surrounding the 1997, 2009, 2011-2012 and 2013 media content. The increasing use of the Internet to prompt political participation is considered. The study also presents the use of the Internet to support forums that allow tense and negative discourses between Australian ethnic-migrant communities. Blogs and social media have not been included in the analysis because, at the time when the content analysis for this research began, they did not play a significant role in the dissemination of labels for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Potentially, a study of these two media platforms, might have added richness to this research. While this is a limitation, the lack of inclusion has not impacted the work in a significant way.

8.1. Data Collection Period One: 17 March to 21 May 1997

The label “genocide” emerged in geographically distant Australian parliamentary discussions, when the New South Wales Parliament unanimously passed a motion labelling the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”, on 17 April 1997. The motion condemned the act of “genocide”, and commemorated the Ottoman-Armenian lives lost during this period. The motion stated:
Whereas 24 April 1997 marks the occasion of the 82nd anniversary of the commemoration of the Genocide of the Armenians by the then Ottoman Turkish Government between 1915-1922; This House:

1. Join the members of the New South Wales Armenian Community in honouring the memory of the 1.5 million men, women and children who fell victim of the first genocide of the 20th century;
2. Condemn the Genocide of the Armenians and all other acts of genocide committed during our century as the ultimate act of racial, religious and cultural intolerance;
3. Recognize the importance of remembering and learning from such dark chapters in human history to ensure that such crimes against humanity are not allowed to repeated;
4. Condemn and prevent all attempts to use the passage of time to deny or distort the historical truth of the Genocide of the Armenians and other acts of genocide committed during this century;
5. Designate 24 April in every year hereafter throughout New South Wales as a day of remembrance of the 1.5 million Armenians who fell victim to the first genocide of this century;
6. Calls on the Commonwealth Government officially to condemn the Genocide of the Armenians and any attempts to deny such crimes against humanity. (Parliament of New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, 17 April 1997, p.7737-7738)

8.1.1. Analysis of Australian Ethnic Media. Yeni Vatan Turkish Newspaper did not report on the decision of the NSW Government to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of genocide during the 1997 data collection period. The inability of the newspaper’s journalists to pick up on a news story, that the Turkish community has since highlighted to be of importance to its members, is a sign of how undertrained and inexperienced the journalists reporting for the Turkish newspapers in Australia were, and arguably still are. There was only one article in the data collection period that contained any of the key words. The story was about the then Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s visit to the Armenians of
Istanbul. The short article noted that reconciliation with Armenia might be possible under Petrosyan’s leadership. That has not been the case.

Articles in the six weeks following the data collection period were also reviewed in this instance, in order to determine whether the NSW Government resolution would eventually make its way into the print media, however, it remained unreported. This confirmed the data collection period of one month following the passing of the resolution was an adequate time period. It was noted that three articles containing key words turned up during this six-week period. These articles were about the bombing of the Turkish Embassy in Brussels by the terror organisation known as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, a brief summary of an academic debate regarding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 between Prof Peter Balakian and Prof Justin McCarthy, and that Greece’s Chief of General Staff had visited Armenia.

The lack of reporting on the NSW Government resolution – an important issue with news value – points to the ethnic media not being operated by trained journalists. This particularly applies to Yeni Vatan. This newspaper was not started for the purpose of running down leads and reporting on hard news stories, but rather for the purpose of connecting the Australian-Turkish community in their “new homeland”, which is the direct translation of “yeni vatan”. The Australian-Turkish community, generally, has not been interested in bringing old homeland quarrels to Australia, so discussions regarding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 were of little concern until the community learned (much later) about the passing of the NSW Government resolution to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 an act of “genocide”.

Armenia Weekly printed 34 articles on this decision during the same period. This was fewer than expected, however, the passing of the NSW resolution coincided with renewed problems in Karabakh (gold mining and alleged illegal arms trading), which resulted in wider coverage of the Azerbaijan conflict. The Armenians and Azerbaijans have long disputed the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Although the area falls within Azerbaijan’s territory, the area’s population is largely Armenian. An estimated 30,000 people have died in the conflict, which was sparked following a vote by the people in the Nagorno-Karabakh region to join neighbouring Armenia, in 1998. Armenian forces occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions soon after,
reducing the size of Azerbaijan by approximately 15 per cent. A ceasefire in 1994 saw a stop to the violence, however fighting still erupts at times (“Nagorno-Karabakh profile,” 2016; “The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh,” 2016). Notably, there were 43 articles about the Nargo-Karabakh conflict in total, during the data collection period, four of which also discussed the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and were further analysed.

When noting the main themes in the Armenia Weekly articles collected for analysis (listed in Table 8.1), it became clear that while the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was a prominent theme, the NSW resolution itself was not one of the major themes across the publication during the data collection period. Despite having achieved one goal of recognition, there were continued calls for recognition both in Australia and overseas. Some articles had more than one theme, as such, the total number of themes does not add up to the total number of articles.
Table 8.1: Main Themes in *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (March 17-May 21, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW Government resolution on the mass killings from 1915-1916</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book censorship in Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian/Turkish reconciliation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for US to recognise the mass killings as “genocide”</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC Freedom Award</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and commemoration events about the mass killings</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic condemned</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking recognition of mass killings as “genocide”</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karabakh conflict</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal for inclusion of mass killings in curriculum</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book promotion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most common theme was *seeking recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”* (evident in 13 of the 34 articles – 38%), followed by *education and commemoration events about the mass killings* (32%), *calls for the United States to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”* (15%) and the *NSW Government resolution* (12%). Figure 8.1 provides a visual presentation of the prominence of the mentioned themes.
In most instances, the articles published in Armenia Weekly were news articles (53%) – as detailed in Table 8.2 and Figure 8.2 – giving the content an authoritative tone. The articles also included Hansard transcript excerpts, letters to parliamentarians, and press releases. The inclusion of press releases, in particular, is usually considered particularly poor journalism – PR is not news. Having said this, unorthodox as they may be, press releases are an effective lobbying technique, and a sign of how the Australian-Armenian press and lobby group works together.
Table 8.2. Types of Articles Published in *Armenia Weekly* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (March 17-May 21, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Articles</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad/Event reminder</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter to Editor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter to Parliamentarian</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt of Hansard transcript</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter from Parliamentarian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press release</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Articles: 34

![Pie chart showing the distribution of types of articles](image)

Figure 8.2: Types of Articles Published in *Armenia Weekly* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, March 17-May 21, 1997 (n=34)
Advertisements for events were printed in both Armenian and English, allowing for the messages to be spread to a wider audience. Having a target audience that is fluent in English, as the Australian-Armenians are, provides the opportunity to publish in English – to an audience larger than the ethnic community. Curan (2011) writes, “The world’s poor tend to be disadvantaged also by linguistic inequality”, providing the example of the Marathi-speaking Indians, whose population greatly exceeds Britain, “yet an article in Marathi, however eloquent, will be understood by far fewer people in the world than one written in English” (p.11). The Australian-Armenian community is significantly more prosperous and better educated than the Australian-Turkish community, giving them an advantage when publishing news, setting agendas, and reaching target and other audiences.

Notably, one of the prominent voices (listed in Table 8.3 and Figure 8.3) that was given space in Armenia Weekly articles was Peter Collins, the Member for Willoughby at the time, who initially moved the motion in the NSW Parliament to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”. Collins’ seat of Willoughby is where the largest Australian-Armenian community is found. Unsurprisingly, Gladys Berejiklian, who is of Armenian descent, and has also been a spokesperson for the Australian-Armenian community, succeeded him. Communication with political figures was also published, which has become commonplace in the newspaper across the years.
Table 8.3: Prominent Voices included in *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (March 17-May 21, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prominent Voices</th>
<th>Title/Role in 1997</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>His Holiness Karekin I</td>
<td>Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC Australia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof Colin Tatz</td>
<td>Historian and genocide studies scholar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Comparative Genocide Studies</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC America</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof Vahakn Dadrian</td>
<td>Historian</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tro Kortian</td>
<td>ANC Australia President</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Youth Federation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Watkins</td>
<td>Member for Gladesville, 1995 – 1999</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Carr</td>
<td>NSW Premier, 1995 – 2005</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Collins</td>
<td>Member for Willoughby, 1981–2003</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Revolutionary Federation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillip Ruddock</td>
<td>Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1996 – 2003</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Howard</td>
<td>Australian Prime Minister</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the articles published in *Armenia Weekly*, 24 per cent were pre-emptive, calling on the Armenian community to engage in activism and share stories of “confronting Turkish revisionism.” (“Political Stage of Genocide Discussed at Commemoration,” 1997, April 30, p.49)

There was also present-day coverage (24%), in which the articles also outlined the work being done by the Armenian lobby: “Earlier that day, the AYF visited the offices of all 540 members of the House and Senate to educate them about the Genocide and advocate passage of the Armenian Genocide bill.” (“AYF Urges Congress to Support Armenian Genocide Recognition,” 1997, May 14, p.24).
Table 8.4: Type of Coverage in *Armenia Weekly* about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (March 17-May 21, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present coverage</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Articles: 34

Table 8.5: Spread of Articles Published on the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in *Armenia Weekly* (March 17-May 21, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Months</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.6: Features of Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 Published in *Armenia Weekly* (March 17-May 21, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Articles (out of 34 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article used emotive language</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article was negative/ condemned “other”</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article described the mass killings as “genocide”</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article’s headline clearly pointed to the mass killings</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the articles published, 62% used emotive language (Table 8.6). The majority of articles that did not employ emotive language were advertisements. The use of emotive quotes was commonplace, compelling readers to constantly live “[t]he vivid recollection of the terrible tragedy that lies at the heart of the Armenian experience this century,” (“Armenian Genocide Commemoration,” 1997, May 7, p.9) and reminding the community that “the Armenian Genocide cannot be forgotten and justice must be gained for it if there is to be justice in this world” (“Genocide Commemorated During Capitol Hill Reception,” 1997, May 21, p.41)

In comparison, academics such as Heath Lowry, from Princeton University, that offered a different perspective, were labelled as a “genocide revisionist”. Their personal indiscretions, such as using crass language were published, in gossip-style magazine fashion, in an attempt to condemn their scholarship (“Revisionist Lowry Leaves Post,” 1997, April 9, p.6-7). It is quite common for academics that question the label of “genocide” to be labelled revisionists, arguably making it less likely for academics to delve into the question, or to even suggest that there may be a question.

The articles published by Armenia Weekly were consistent in their approach to discussing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Each of the 34 articles described the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”. Amongst these, 22 (65%) of the headlines clearly pointed to the fact that the newspaper piece was about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and 16 of the articles (47%) either condemned the “other” or presented the “other” and their perspective in a negative or disparaging light, whether the “other” was considered to be academics, politicians, the Turkish Government or, in some cases, the Turkish people.

The majority of Armenia Weekly articles were original works (56%, as seen in Table 8.7. and Figure 8.4, below), however, lobby and community groups also provided information. A small percentage of the content was derived from Hansard transcripts (6%). One such excerpt to be printed was a comment from the then NSW Premier, Bob Carr. The statement read:

Why is it important that the New South Wales Parliament commemorate the Armenian Genocide? First, because it was the first known genocide of the twentieth century.... Second, it is appropriate that Parliament carry this motion because the
Armenian community is part of the Australian community. Armenians in Australia understand that we welcome them to our shores as part of one of the world’s unique cultures, and they wear Australian citizenship with pride. That is what we mean by multiculturalism. They are the reasons why it is appropriate for the Parliament to weigh the implications of this motion and endorse it with all members. (“Armenian Genocide Commemoration,” 1997, May 7, p.9)

While this particular excerpt will be discussed further in the following chapter, it draws attention to the fact that the Australian-Armenian voice was heard in a parliamentary setting, and that level of recognition then made its way from a parliamentary motion to a newspaper, where it could become common knowledge and gain popularity through media reporting and framing. At the same time, the Australian-Turkish community’s voice was not heard and the community was unaware of the discussion taking place.

While this thesis has already drawn attention to the problems associated with the rhetoric surrounding multiculturalism, and demonstrated that there is no universally agreed upon concept, it did set forth its own concept of multiculturalism: unity through diversity, where ethnic groups are treated equally. This level of representation for one ethnic community, at the social detriment of others, in not necessarily equal treatment, nor does it promote multiculturalism. Is the Turkish community not “part of the Australian community”, in the same way the Armenian community is? Or are they not “welcome to our shores” in the same way? Arguably, it may become difficult for an ethnic community to “wear Australian citizenship with pride” if their homeland quarrels are being brought to Australia, and they are not provided with a right of reply.
Table 8.7: *Armenia Weekly* Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (March 17-May 21, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC Australia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia Weekly</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Genocide Commemorative Committee</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Revolutionary Federation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hansard</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Watkins Electorate Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter to Editor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.4: *Armenia Weekly* Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, March 17-May 21, 1997 (n=34)
The use of images across *Armenia Weekly* articles made the news items more engaging. Images are a useful tool in grabbing a reader’s attention. Images of political actors were the most common, and made up 42% of the visuals used (detailed in Table 8.8 and Figure 8.5).

Table 8.8: Image Themes across *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (March 17-May 21, 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Themes</th>
<th>Number of Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political actors</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Genocide Commemorative Committee (AGCC) logo</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Images: 19

Figure 8.5: Image Themes across *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, March 17-May 21, 1997 (n=19)
8.1.2. Analysis of Australian Mainstream Media. There was no mention of any key terms in the Australian mainstream press outlets chosen for review, during the data collection period. The NSW State Parliament’s decision was either considered not important enough for their target audiences to warrant reporting, or journalists were unaware of the motion or its significance at the time.

8.2. Data Collection Period Two: 25 February to 25 April, 2009

The South Australian Parliament became the second Australian legislative body to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”. In 2009, a motion was passed, designating April 24 as a day of remembrance. The motion also recognised the deaths of the other minorities in the region, and stated:

“That, whereas the genocide by the Ottoman state between 1915-1923 of Armenians, Hellenes, Syrian and other minorities in Asia Minor is one of the greatest crimes against humanity, the people of South Australia and this House, join the members of the Armenian-Australian, Pontian Greek-Australian and Syrian-Australian communities in honouring the memory of the innocent men, women and children who fell victim to the first modern genocide;
Condemns the genocide of the Armenians, Pontian Greeks, Syrian Orthodox and other Christian minorities, and all other acts of Genocide as the ultimate act of racial, religious and cultural intolerance;
Recognises the importance of remembering and learning from such dark chapters in human history to ensure that such crimes against humanity are not allowed to be repeated; condemns and prevents all attempts to use the passage of time to deny or distort the historical truth of the Genocide of the Armenians and other acts of Genocide committed during this century;
Acknowledges the significant humanitarian contribution made by the people of South Australia to the victims and survivors of the Armenian Genocide and the Pontian Genocide; and calls on the Commonwealth
Parliament officially to condemn the Genocide.” (Parliament of South Australia, Legislative Assembly, March 25, 2009, p.181)

8.2.1. Analysis of Australian Ethnic Media. During the second data collection period Armenia Weekly published 39 articles (breakdown available in Table 8.11 and Figure 8.7). Again, while the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was a prominent theme across the publication, the parliamentary resolution itself was not one of the major themes during the data collection period (which are listed in Table 8.9 and visually represented in Figure 8.6). This time, education and commemoration events about the mass killings (36%) were the most prominent theme (this particular theme had been the second most prominent in 1997, at 32%). It was followed by calls for the United States to recognise the mass killings as “genocide” (18%) and apology demands from senator (10%). The latter refers to a series of articles written for the purpose of pressuring Senator Alan Ferguson to apologise for stating the label of “genocide” for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was “debatable” (“ANC Australia Demands Senator Ferguson’s Apology,” 2009, April 1, p.6). Senator Ferguson appeared to have bowed to the pressure from ANCA and issued a formal apology, published in Armenia Weekly two weeks later (“Senator Ferguson Apologises for Statement,” 2009, April 15, p.6). Coverage of the South Australian Parliament’s motion was the next theme, receiving coverage in only three articles (8%), together with the Karabakh conflict, which was also mentioned in three articles.

There was only one article about the Turkey and Armenia Accords, although debate about the accords was heating up at the time. The protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia on 10 October 2009 went on to “constitute a significant threshold in the relationship between the two countries” (Eralp, 2010, p.1), or so it was thought. The accord was signed in an attempt to establish diplomatic ties between the two nations; however, it has met strong opposition ever since. The Armenian diaspora, in particular, is resisting the ratification of the document by the Armenian Government due to a clause, which could result in the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 being reframed. The protocol calls for a joint Armenian-Turkish historical commission to investigate the deaths of the Ottoman-Armenians towards the end of World War I (Eralp, 2010; Kanli, 2009). The establishment of an historical
commission would only initiate a document exchange; the final decision about what to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 would still be left to an international court (Eralp, 2010). Still, for the Armenian diaspora, the Armenian Government’s acceptance of the problematic clause and its concession that the historical question requires further examination is tantamount to a large leap back from almost a century’s worth of claims that the “absolute reality” of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was “genocide” (Kanli, 2009). Arguably, the diaspora’s resistance to the Armenian Government’s approach to the protocols may be why there was not further coverage.

The articles also covered the ANCA’s support for Joe Hockey in his appointment to Shadow Treasurer. Hockey, who is of Armenian descent, has spoken openly about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in parliament, calling for the “heinous crime” to be recognised. (ANC Australia Congratulates Joe Hockey,” 2009, March 4, p.6). An event at Parliament was also highlighted, and Varant Meguerditchian, ANC Australia President was quoted saying, “We were encouraged by the willingness of Senators and Members of Parliament to join the Australia-Armenia Parliamentary Friendship Group and advocate issues of concern to our community.” (“Genocide Exhibition Headlines Canberra Visit,”” 2009, March 18, p.6) Both themes highlight the close ties the Australian-Armenian community has within Australian parliaments.

In comparison, there were no clear themes across the articles published in Yeni Vatan during the data collection period. Only five articles were published, each with a different theme (see Table 8.10). Despite the minimal coverage, it was clear that the motion was considered offensive. The words, “South Australian politicians continue to insult Turkish history for a few thousand Greek votes,” clearly state the newspaper’s stance, even if the stance was quickly forgotten (“Was it all for votes?” 2009, April 16, p.1).
Table 8.9: Main Themes in *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC activities/developments</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Turkey and Armenia Accords</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event at Parliament House</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australian Parliament recognises the mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for US/Obama to recognise the mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCA demands apology from senator</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and commemoration events for the mass killing</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic condemned</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karabakh conflict</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.6: Main Themes in Armenia Weekly Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009).

Table 8.10: Main Themes in Yeni Vatan Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remembering the Khojaly &quot;genocide&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Gabriel seeking recognition of the mass killing as &quot;genocide&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapproval of Senate speech</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australian Parliament recognises the mass killing as &quot;genocide&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama does not label the mass killing as &quot;genocide&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Again, the majority of articles published in Armenia Weekly were news articles (56%), as detailed in Table 8.11 and Figure 8.7. Advertisements, in the form of event reminders, were the second largest form of content (33%).

In comparison, all five stories in Yeni Vatan were news stories. As a community that is disconnected from the past, there is little in the way of commemorative events, as is frequently the case for the Australian-Armenian community.

Table 8.11: Types of Articles Published in Armenia Weekly about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Articles</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad/Event reminder</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excerpt of Hansard transcript</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Articles:</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.7: Types of Articles Published in *Armenia Weekly* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Feb 25 – April 25, 2009 (n=39).

Varant Meguerditchian, ANC Australia President, was again among the prominent voices in *Armenia Weekly*, stating; “issues such as recognition of the Armenian Genocide as an unpunished dark chapter of human history is a global battle and our committee is responsible for raising awareness throughout Australia….The past two years we have met with over 100 legislators and politicians throughout Australia... We have discussed issues including the Armenian Genocide, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia-Australia relations and specific community concerns,” states Meguerditchian (“ANCA Australia Spreads its wings,” 2009, March 4, p.6).

The Australian-Armenian lobby also successfully obtained an apology from Senator Ferguson for calling the label “genocide” for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 “debatable”. Leaders of the Australian-Armenian community reportedly provided “immediately presented objective academic material,” after which Ferguson apologised to their community. Ferguson’s letter of apology stated, “his speech was never intended to cause distress.” (“Senator Ferguson Apologises for Statement,” 2009, April 15, p.6)

Other prominent voices in *Armenia Weekly* are listed in Table 8.12 and Figure 8.8, and again consist of politicians and others of influence.
Table 8.12: Prominent Voices included in *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prominent Voices</th>
<th>Title/Role in 2009</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joe Hockey</td>
<td>Shadow Treasurer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC Australia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varant Meguerditchian</td>
<td>ANC Australia President</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Genocide</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Youth Federation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC America</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aram Hamparian</td>
<td>ANC America President</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof Colin Tatz</td>
<td>Historian and genocide studies scholar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicken Babkenian</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama</td>
<td>United States President</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilary Clinton</td>
<td>United States Senator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Schiff</td>
<td>US House of Representatives Member</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Paul Bartrop</td>
<td>Historian</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Institute for Holocaust Studies</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Ferguson</td>
<td>South Australian Senator</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia-Australia Parliamentary Friendship Group</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.8: Prominent Voices included in *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009).
There are no clearly prominent voices amongst Yeni Vatan’s coverage, as seen in Table 8.13 and Figure 8.9. There was, however, anger over Senator Ferguson’s decision to backpedal due to pressure from voters. “Was it all for votes?” the community was found asking (“Was it all for votes?” 2009, April 16).

Despite the Australian-Turkish community’s fury with the comments about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 made by Michael Atkinson, the former Member for Croydon, Yeni Vatan still presented Atkinson’s views in a prominent place in the publication. At the time, in Croydon, according to Yeni Vatan, there were only 12 registered voters of Turkish heritage and 900 voters who identified as being of Greek heritage (“Was it all for votes?” 2009, April 16, p.6).

Table 8.13: Prominent Voices included in Yeni Vatan Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prominent Voices</th>
<th>Title/Role in 2009</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Turkish Support League</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Azerbaijan Turkish Friendship League</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan Guild</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan Voice Radio</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Gabriel</td>
<td>English singer-songwriter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Atkinson</td>
<td>Member for Croydon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Ferguson</td>
<td>South Australian Senator</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murat Ersavci</td>
<td>Turkish Ambassador to Australia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama</td>
<td>United States President</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Fisk</td>
<td>English writer and journalist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the articles published in *Armenia Weekly*, again the majority were either pre-emptive (23%) or consisted of present-day coverage (28%), as presented in Table 8.14. Activities such as workshops on activism were publicised, to encourage activism at a grassroots level, both nationally and internationally (“ANCA Eastern Region Hosts Successful Mid-Atlantic Workshop,” 2009, April 1, p.8).

On the other hand, none of the articles in *Yeni Vatan* were pre-emptive or consisted of timely coverage. Instead, they were left reacting to coverage from other sources (as seen in Table 8.15).
Table 8.14: Type of Coverage in *Armenia Weekly* about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present coverage</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Articles:** 39

Table 8.15: Type of Coverage in *Yeni Vatan* about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present coverage</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Articles:** 5
Table 8.16: Spread of Articles Published on the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Armenia Weekly (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Months</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.17: Spread of Articles Published on the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Yeni Vatan (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Months</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emotive language was again prominent in the Armenia Weekly articles, with 62% of articles using the language technique (Table 8.18). Examples of the descriptive language used included: “horrorific nature”, “child survivors of the attempt to exterminate” (“South Australia Passes Armenian Genocide Motion,” 2009, April 1, p.6); and “heinous crime” (“ANC Australia Congratulates Joe Hockey,” 2009, March 4, p.6).

Each of the 39 articles described the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”. Amongst these, 20 (51%) of the headlines clearly showed that the piece was about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and 22 of the articles (56%) either condemned the “other” or presented the “other” and their perspective in a negative or disparaging light – a 9% increase from the percentage of negative articles in 1997.
Table 8.18: Features of Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 Published in Armenia Weekly (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Articles (out of 39 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article used emotive language</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article was negative/ condemned “other”</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article described the mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article’s headline clearly pointed to the mass killing</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The language used by *Yeni Vatan* when describing the “Khojaly genocide” – where 613 Azeri civilians, including 169 women and children were reported killed while trying to escape Khojaly in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, on 26 February, 1992 (McGuinness, 2012) – was particularly emotive. The article covered a commemoration event, where “the audience was unable to hold their tears at times, as the savagery experienced in Khojaly was recounted,” (“The Khojaly genocide was recounted,” 2009, February 26, p.2). Interestingly, despite the Turkish community’s resentment over the word “genocide” being used when describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, this same word is used, at times, when describing the events at Khojaly (although more often the term “massacre” is used). Of the five articles published, two (40%) were negative and condemned the “other” (as seen in Table 8.19).

While none of the articles in *Yeni Vatan* described the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”, they also did not set forth a consistent label. Alternative labels included a vague reference of “responsibility” towards the Turkish soldiers who lost their lives in combat against Armenian forces, where the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is only alluded to, not specifically labelled. There was also an excerpt from an article by Robert Fisk, where he reprimands former President of the United States, Barrack Obama, for not using the label “genocide” to describe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Again, *Yeni Vatan* did not set forth its own label. Then, there is the use of the “alleged genocide” term.
In addition, none of the headlines clearly pointed to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The elusive headlines used were: “Hocali Genocide told of in Sydney”, “Peter Gabriel Supports Armenian Thesis”, “Answer to Pontian MP from Ferguson”, “Was it all for Votes?”, and “He was Sneaky and Did Not Keep His Promise”. Each headline is long, cumbersome and often obscure.

Table 8.19: Features of Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 Published in *Yeni Vatan* (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Articles (out of 5 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article used emotive language</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article was negative/ condemned “other”</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article described the mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article’s headline clearly pointed to the mass killing</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this data collection period, 51% of the articles published in *Armenia Weekly* were sourced from ANC Australia (as seen in Table 8.20 and Figure 8.10). This time, only 31% of articles were original stories, a drop of 25% from the 1997 data collection period. The increase of material from ANC Australia significantly increased their agenda-setting capability. All articles in *Yeni Vatan* were original pieces and were not sourced from elsewhere.
Table 8.20: *Armenia Weekly* Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC Australia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia Weekly</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Youth Federation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Courier (Harut Sassounian)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.10: *Armenia Weekly* Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Feb 25 – April 25, 2009 (n=39)

Both *Armenia Weekly* and *Yeni Vatan* used images to portray the various agendas their stories pushed for, including photographs of event presenters and political actors (as seen in Tables 8.21 and 8.22 and Figures 8.11 and 8.12). *Armenia Weekly* also included event audiences in some instances, which is an ideal method of connecting with audiences and seeming more approachable.
Table 8.21: Image Themes across *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Themes</th>
<th>Number of Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event presenters</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event audience</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event organisers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wreath laying</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Youth Federation logo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Images: 20

Figure 8.11: Image Themes across *Armenia Weekly* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Feb 25 – April 25, 2009 (n=20)
Table 8.22: Image Themes across *Yeni Vatan* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (Feb 25 – April 25, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Themes</th>
<th>Number of Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event presenters</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Actors</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Images:</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.12: Image Themes across *Yeni Vatan* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Feb 25 – April 25, 2009 (n=11)

8.2.2. Analysis of Australian Mainstream Media. Only one article in the Australian mainstream press reported this event during the data collection period, through a feature story published in *The Australian* on April 23. The headline – “Europe Awakens to Turkey’s Dark Intentions” sets the “dark” tone that follows. The main theme is not the South Australian parliamentary motion, but rather why Turkey’s accession to the European Union should not be supported, and the denial by the nation’s leaders that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is an act of “genocide” is the cited reason (Hitchens, 2009, April 23).

The mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is only described as “genocide” in this article, and the emotive language refers to Turkey “lying about
the Armenian genocide” and “trying to impose its Islamist and chauvinist policies”. While this article is not about the parliamentary motion, it may be argued that articles such as this one paved the way for the motion to be passed; a step in building Jameson’s “political unconscious” and an individual’s “understanding” of events (Mander, 1999, p. 3).

8.3. Data Collection Period Three: 23 December 2011 to 28 March 2012

Former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, made denying an “Armenian genocide” a criminal offence in France, in 2012. This bill was passed in the name of human rights; in ignorance of freedom of speech, one of the most basic rights in the French Constitution. This restrictiveness, however, was not long lived; the French Constitutional Court quashed the bill within 37 days. The bill was criticised for violating freedom of expression, by Amnesty International.

The analysed content was restricted from 23 December 2011 to 28 March 2012. This period encapsulates the month before the Sarkozy Government’s bill was passed, the period for which it was valid, and the month following the Constitutional Court’s decision to overturn the bill. This period saw a spike in coverage of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and heightened tensions. The findings provide a summary of the disseminated tense narratives.

8.3.1. Analysis of Australian Ethnic Media. During the third data collection period Armenia Online published 72 articles (breakdown available in Table 8.25 and Figure 8.15). Calls for recognition were once again the most prominent theme (across 21% of articles), followed by the French Senate Bill (13%) and updates in Karabakh (13%) (further detailed in Table 8.23 and Figure 8.13).

Criticism of political figures (11%), particularly Hillary Clinton (10%), was a common theme. “The Obama-Biden Administration – with Secretary Clinton’s latest remarks – continues to dig itself deeper and deeper into a hole of complicity in Turkey’s genocide denial,” Aram Hamparian, ANC America Executive Director, was quoted saying (Asbarez, 2012b, January 28).

Another key theme was Member of NSW Legislative Council, Walt Secord’s visit to Armenia for an “Armenian Genocide” tour (5%), again highlighting the
position of influence the Armenian lobby holds with those in power. Other prominent political figures included Bob Carr, who received the ANC Australia Friend of the Armenian Community Award, and Jonathan O’Dea, Member for Davidson in the Legislative Assembly. O’Dea was reported to have met with the NSW Parliamentary Friends of Armenia Group to “discuss a series of Armenian-Australian issues ahead of Armenian Commemorative Week”.

In comparison, of the 19 articles published in Yeni Vatan, nine (47%) were directly about the Turkish opposition to the French Denial Bill. All of the articles except for one (95%) discussed the French bill in one way, or another. The remaining article was about the Karabakh region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Senate Bill</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial Bill put on hold</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial Bill deemed unconstitutional</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans to bring back Denial Bill</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrities view on the mass killing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education about the mass killing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commemorative events</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for “genocide” recognition</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condenming Hillary Clinton</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial Bill protests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walt Secord’s tour of the “Armenian Genocide”</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karabakh</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s threats are hollow/hypocritical</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s response to Denial Bill</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey discusses reconciliation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condenning “revisionism”</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel’s response</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW Friends of Armenia at Parliament House</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging protests/activism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condenning politicians</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.13: Main Themes in Armenia Online Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to French Senate Denial Bill</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Senate Denial Bill</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerie Boyer's Role</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy’s view</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nargo-Karabakh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims that history is being changed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US views on French Senate Denial Bill</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once more, the majority of articles published in Armenia Online were news articles; 86%, a 30% increase in news published in Armenia Weekly from the previous case study (detailed in Table 8.25 and Figure 8.15. Advertisements, in the form of event reminders, were the second largest form of content (33%). The increase in news may be attributed to the switch from print to online, allowing for an increase in content and articles from other sources. As seen in Table 8.36 and Figure 8.22, 82% of the content published by Armenia Online was from other sources (namely Asbarez (79%) and the California Courier (3%)).
Table 8.25: Types of Articles Published in *Armenia Online* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Articles</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad/Event reminder</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feature interview</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News feature</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Articles:</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.15: Types of Articles Published in *Armenia Online* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Dec 23, 2011 – Mar 28, 2012 (n=72)

In comparison, 12 of the 19 stories in *Yeni Vatan* (63%) were news stories, and the remaining 37% were editorials (Table 8.26 and Figure 8.16. They all contained original material.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Articles</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Articles:</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.16: Types of Articles Published in *Yeni Vatan* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Dec 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012, n=19

Voices of influence were once more given prominent coverage by *Armenia Online*, including ANC America (across 17% of articles), French President Nicolas Sarkozy (17%) and ANC Australia (11%) (as seen in Table 8.27 and Figure 8.17). Interestingly, voice was also given to the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, who expressed that Turkey was “ready to share the pain of Armenians as they prepare to mark the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide”, according to one article. However in the actual quote, Davutoglu’s comment was: “We want to share the pain of those who are ready to share it with us,” (Asbarez, 2012, March 1). So while there
was a willingness to show the other perspective, it is open to misinterpretation as recognition of “genocide”.

There was also the presence of celebrity voices, with Eric Bogosian, from Law & Order, Criminal Intent, talking and writing about the assassination of Talaat Pasha, the “mastermind of the Armenian Genocide,” (Asbarez, 2012, March 15). Having said this, it was the Kardashian family that highlighted the impact fame could make to reframing a debate. The search term “Armenian Genocide” was the 10th most searched term on Google, following a “Khloe and Lamar” Kardashian family show, which had an education segment on the “Armenian genocide”. Tweets made by Khloe and Kim Kardashian earlier that day about the same topic reached more than 13 million followers (Asbarez, 2012, March 13). Clearly, celebrity voices have the ability to spread a message far and wide.
Table 8.27: Prominent Voices included in *Armenia Online* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prominent Voices</th>
<th>Title/Role in 2011/2012</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy</td>
<td>French President</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC Australia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varant Megueditchian</td>
<td>ANC Australia President</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egemen Bagis</td>
<td>Turkish Minister of European Union Affairs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC America</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aram Hamparian</td>
<td>ANC America President</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Bogosian</td>
<td>American-Armenian actor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elena Harrison</td>
<td>Armenian Education and Cultural Society President</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harut Sassounian</td>
<td>American-Armenian journalist</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Panayiotis Diamadis</td>
<td>Genocide scholar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Taner Akcam</td>
<td>Historian and sociologist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama</td>
<td>United States President</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
<td>United States Senator</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Schiff</td>
<td>US House of Representatives Member</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His Holiness Karekin II</td>
<td>Catholicos of All Armenians</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF Youth</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walt Secord</td>
<td>Member of NSW Legislative Council</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia-Australia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Friendship Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Carr</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicos Aram I</td>
<td>Catholicos of Cilicia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduard Nalbandyan</td>
<td>Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerie Boyer</td>
<td>Member of the French National Assembly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Kirk</td>
<td>United States Senator</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Menendez</td>
<td>United States Senator</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Israel Charney</td>
<td>Genocide scholar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Davutoglu</td>
<td>Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recep Tayyip Erdogan</td>
<td>Turkish Prime Minister</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Gul</td>
<td>Turkish President</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khloe and Lamar Kardashian</td>
<td>American-Armenian celebrities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In comparison, there is no clear-cut, authoritative voice being presented in *Yeni Vatan* (as seen in Table 8.28 and Figure 8.18). The main voices are those of the Australian-Turkish columnist, which is problematic to framing their case because their opinions carry no great weight within the community; they are not experienced journalists, nor are they well known community members, they are simply community members presenting their opinion.
Table 8.28: Prominent Voices included in *Yeni Vatan* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prominent Voices</th>
<th>Title/Role in 2011/2012</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huseyin Erdem Yormaz</td>
<td>Australian-Turkish Columnist</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutlay Yagmur</td>
<td>Australian-Turkish Columnist</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erkal Eken</td>
<td>Australian-Turkish Columnist</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy</td>
<td>French President</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
<td>United States Senator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egemen Bagis</td>
<td>Turkish Minister of European Union Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulent Arinc</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemal Kilicdaroglu</td>
<td>Turkish Leader of the Opposition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recep Tayyip Erdogan</td>
<td>Turkish Prime Minister</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerie Boyer</td>
<td>Member of the French National Assembly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Gul</td>
<td>Turkish President</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.18: Prominent Voices included in Yeni Vatan Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)
Table 8.29: Type of Coverage in *Armenia Online* about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present coverage</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Articles: 72

Figure 8.19: Type of Coverage in *Armenia Online* about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Dec 23, 2011 – Mar 28, 2012 (n=72)

Analysing the data, it becomes clear that while *Armenia Online* writes pre-emptive and present-day articles, encouraging activism and recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”, while almost all of the articles in *Yeni Vatan* are reactive, never in a position to set the agenda, instead
only ever responding when it feels that the community it represents has been slighted (see Table 8.30 and Figure 8.20).

Table 8.30: Type of Coverage in *Yeni Vatan* about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present coverage</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Articles: 19

Figure 8.20: Type of Coverage in *Yeni Vatan* about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Dec 23, 2011 – Mar 28, 2012 (n=19)
Table 8.31: Spread of Articles Published on the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in *Armenia Online* (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Months</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.32: Spread of Articles Published on the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in *Yeni Vatan* (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Months</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the majority of articles by *Yeni Vatan*, as previously mentioned, were reactive, there were still articles published in the lead up to the French Senate’s passing of the Denial Bill. This stems from the fact that the bill was first passed in the Lower House on 22 December 2011. As a result, not only were there articles published in the lead-up to the Senate’s decision, there were also five articles published outside of the data collection period (in the month of December, 2011). Only one of these articles referred to the Denial Bill. The others addressed the 31st anniversary of the death of the Turkish Consul General in Sydney, Sarik Ariyak and the attaché for security, Engine Sever, in a terror attack organised by ASALA, an Armenian terrorist organisation. The remaining articles addressed the pressure lobby groups were placing on the Australian
Federal Government to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”.

Table 8.33: Features of Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 Published in Armenia Online (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Articles (out of 72 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article used emotive language</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article was negative/ condemned “other”</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article described the mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article’s headline clearly pointed to the mass killing</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The use of emotive language was prominent in Armenia Online articles (Table 8.33), with 68% of articles using emotional descriptions. Emotive language was particularly common in articles written by journalist Harut Sassounian, who wrote the articles in the California Courier as well as four of the Asbarez articles (Table 8.36).

Critical and harsh, Sassounian states: “Such a judgement would be a stern warning to the Turkish Authorities that they cannot continue to enjoy the ill-gotten gains from the blood money of genocide victims,” (Sassounian, 2012, January 3) in regards to lawsuits launched in the United States, demanding payment for properties seized during the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

His headlines follow a similar trend, one example is: “Sassounian: Constitutional Council’s scandalous rejection of French Genocide bill” (Sassounian, 2012, March 7). In the article, he says: “French Armenians should take up all legal and political measures to reverse the Council’s unfair and illegal decision. They could file a lawsuit with the European Court of Human Rights against the Constitutional Council as well as introduce a new bill in the French Legislature.” Sassounian adds: “Turkey must not be allowed to export its denialist policies to European shores!” Interestingly, his argument is that France already has restrictions on freedom of speech, and should continue to impose such restrictions (although Sassounian has
previously condemned Article 301 of Turkey’s penal code, which restricts freedom of speech, so there is some hypocrisy in this argument). “Unlike the United States, France has several laws that restrict freedom of expression. Why is that when it comes to punishing deniers of the Armenian Genocide, the Council members all of a sudden become staunch defenders of free speech?”

“Far more important than any bill is Armenians’ solemn determination to continue the struggle for their rightful cause, undeterred by setbacks or obstacles. Having survived several millennia of occupation, pillage, massacres and genocide, Armenians cannot succumb or surrender at the first sign of adversity!” Sassounian writes, motivating activism, once more (Sassounian, 2012, February 7).

The negativity present in Armenia Online continues across the writings of other journalists as well; with references to the “victims of Turkish tricks” (Asbarez, 2012, January 23), and statements that “In Turkey, genocide denial is an industry. It is also a state policy of primary importance,” Prof Taner Akcam was quoted saying in a feature article (Asbarez, 2012a, January 28).

The mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was only ever referred to as an act of “genocide” across all 72 articles published in Armenia Online during the data collection period, and 51% of the headlines clearly pointed to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

In comparison, only one headline in Yeni Vatan clearly pointed to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The others were vague, and included “Guillotine to History”, “Opposition to Appeal”, “The New Inquisition in Europe”, and “Turkish Kiss Not French Kiss”.

The language used across the articles were quite emotive – “[A]ll of our blood is boiling inside us, we are burning with anger,” wrote one columnist (Yormaz, 2012, March 7, p.9). And the French Senate bill was identified as the final straw that might result in activism from the Australian-Turkish community: “I hope that this will be a start for our Australian Turkish citizens, in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Canberra, to no longer remain silent about GENOCIDE lies! “(Yormaz, 2011, December 29, p.12)

The other was also criticised by columnists – “A country that has so many crimes against humanity in its history has no right to blame Turkey about any topic,
or to stain our country under the mask of human rights,” wrote Yormaz (29 December 2011, p.12) in reference to France’s history.

The mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was never described as an act of “genocide” in the *Yeni Vatan* articles, however, there was no clear label being set forth either (as seen in Table 8.35 and Figure 8.21). The range included everything from “Genocide lies” to “the Armenian thesis”. The use of quotation marks when using the label “Armenian ‘genocide’” was common, in a manner as if to say ‘so-called genocide’. The case study was also alluded to, at times, with terms such as “this topic”, “if the law gets passed in the Senate” and “the denial bill”.

Table 8.34: Features of Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 Published in *Yeni Vatan* (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Articles (out of 19 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article used emotive language</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article was negative/ condemned “other”</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article described the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article’s headline clearly pointed to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 8.35: Labels for the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 used in *Yeni Vatan* (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labels for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916</th>
<th>Number of Times Printed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alleged genocide</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide lies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide claims</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Armenian issue</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide debate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian proposal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian case</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian ‘genocide’</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Armenian thesis</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No label, only alluded to</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No such genocide</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.21: Labels for the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 used in *Yeni Vatan*, December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012

Table 8.36: *Armenia Online* Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asbarez</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia Online</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Courier (Harut Sassounian)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.22: *Armenia Online* Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Themes</th>
<th>Number of Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC Australia representatives</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event audience</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular actors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillary for President logo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestors</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political actors</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists/columnists</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French buildings</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Senate</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Images: 70
Figure 8.23: Image Themes across *Armenia Online* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, Dec 23, 2011 – Mar 28, 2012 (n=70)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Themes</th>
<th>Number of Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Columnists</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Actors</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Senate</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Images: 21
Both *Armenia Online* and *Yeni Vatan* again used images to advance their story agendas, including photographs of event presenters, political actors, columnists and images of the French Senate (as seen in Tables 8.37 and 8.38 and Figures 8.23 and 8.24).

**8.3.2. Analysis of Australian Mainstream Media.** Coverage of South Australian and New South Wales parliamentary decisions was minimal in Australian mainstream media, however, the French Senate debate sparked significantly more controversy and coverage (in Australia). This may partially be attributed to the fact that numerous articles were from news agency sources, including Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Associated Press (AP).

The majority of the coverage focused not only on the French Senate Bill – 13 of the 14 articles (93%) – but also on President Sarkozy’s need for Armenian votes, which was mentioned in 71% of the articles (as seen in Table 8.39 and Figure 8.25). The one article that contained the key search terms, but did not discuss the denial bill, was about ASIO’s findings around a previous Armenian terror attack in Australia.

The 14 articles consisted of 13 original stories and one duplicate story, which were published in both the *Age* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The duplicate story
was a news item. Of the 14 articles, 11 were news stories (79%) and the remaining three were opinion pieces (21%), as seen in Table 8.40.

Table 8.39: Main Themes in Mainstream Media Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Senate Bill</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian massacre/genocide</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish sanctions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing Turkish entry to EU</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarkozy's need for Armenian votes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death threats</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb plot (in Australia)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.25: Main Themes in Mainstream Media Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (December 23, 2011 – March 28, 2012)
Table 8.40: Types of Articles Published in Mainstream Media about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Articles</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion/column</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Articles:</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Australian* published 10 of the 14 stories during the data collection period. Six were original pieces, three were opinion and three were news. The remaining four articles were sourced from news agencies, including AFP and AP. *The Age* and *Sydney Morning Herald* published two each; all of their stories were sourced from news agencies.

*The Age* and *Sydney Morning Herald* attributed the photographs published to AFP (for three images) and Reuters (for one). Six of the seven images used were of protestors (86%), the remaining image was of former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy (14%) (Table 8.47). The same images of protesters were frequently used.

Table 8.41: Mainstream Media Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP (The Australian)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP (The Australian)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian News &amp; Media (The Age and Sydney Morning Herald)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloomberg (Sydney Morning Herald)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times (Sydney Morning Herald)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.26: Mainstream Media Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)

Table 8.42: Prominent Voices included in Mainstream Media Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prominent Voices</th>
<th>Title/Role in 2011/2012</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy</td>
<td>French President</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recep Tayyip Erdogan</td>
<td>Turkish Prime Minister</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Davutoğlu</td>
<td>Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerie Boyer</td>
<td>Member of the French National Assembly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alain Juppe</td>
<td>French Foreign Minister</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Devedjian</td>
<td>French MP of Armenian origin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulent Kenes</td>
<td>Turkish journalist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Sueur</td>
<td>French Senate Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The majority of the articles covered the French Senate Bill as it progressed. Two opinion pieces reacted to the French Senate decision. The article that fell into the ‘neither’ category was about ASIO’s findings around the Armenian terror attack in Australia (Table 8.43). The spread of articles is consistent with the coverage of the French Senate decision (Table 8.44).
Table 8.43: Type of Coverage in Mainstream Media Articles about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present coverage</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Articles: 14

Table 8.44: Spread of Articles Published on the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Mainstream Media Articles (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Months</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>5 (4 original and 1 repeat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eight articles used ‘genocide’ in the headline. Six headlines did not use ‘genocide’ in the headline. Of these six, three made no clear reference to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. For anyone who was aware of the developments in France, at the time, the remaining three headlines were clearly about the French Senate’s decision (see Table 8.45).

The Age and the Sydney Morning Herald news articles were careful to describe others’ views, instead of their own journalists’ views, using phrases such as;
“historians widely believe”, “Turkey maintains” and “Armenians say”. This, however, was not always the case.

Table 8.45: Features of Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 Published in Mainstream Media Articles (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Articles (out of 14 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article used emotive language</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article was negative/condemned “other”</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article described the mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article’s headline clearly pointed to the mass killing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.46: Labels for the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 used in Mainstream Media Articles (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labels for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916</th>
<th>Number of Times Printed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass killings</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Genocide</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematically killed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killings</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massacre</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-call ‘genocide’</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.28: Labels for the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 used in Mainstream Media Articles (23 December 2011 – 28 March 2012)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Themes</th>
<th>Number of Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestors</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French President, Nicolas Sarkozy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Images:</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Australia, where one might have assumed the discussion of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 would not be as one-sided as it is in Turkey or Armenia, as an effect of multiculturalism, we find that this is often not the case. Even in instances where mainstream media sources and political actors are more careful about the label they assign, there is still limited discussion.
8.4. Data Collection Period Four: 8 April to 8 June, 2013

The NSW Parliament passed another motion in 2013, using the label of “genocide”, following a “request of the Assyrian Universal Alliance, the Australian Hellenic Council and the Armenian National Committee” (Jovic, 2013, May 10). The motion also recognised the deaths of other Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire as an act of “genocide”, and stated:

“Whereas the NSW Parliament passed a motion in 1997 recognising and condemning the Genocide of the Armenians, this House recognises that Assyrians and Greeks were subjected to qualitatively similar genocides by the then Ottoman Government between 1914 – 1923: and
(a) joins the Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks communities of New South Wales in honouring the memory of the innocent men, women and children who fell victim to the first modern genocides;
(b) condemns the genocides of the Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks, and all other acts of genocide as the ultimate act of intolerance;
(c) recognises the importance of remembering and learning from such dark chapters in human history to ensure that such crimes against humanity are not allowed to be repeated;
(d) condemns and prevents all attempts to use the passage of time to deny or distort the historical truth of the genocides of the Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks, and other acts of genocide;
(e) recalls the testimonies of ANZAC prisoners-of-war and other servicemen who were witness to the genocides of the Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks;
(f) recalls the testimonies of ANZAC servicemen who rescued Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks genocide survivors;
(g) acknowledges the significant humanitarian relief contribution made by the people of New South Wales to the victims and survivors of the Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks; and
(h) calls on the Commonwealth Government to condemn the genocides of the Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks.” (Parliament of New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, 8 May 2013, p.20204)

8.4.1. Analysis of Australian Ethnic Media. During the final data collection period *Armenia Online* published 30 articles (breakdown available in Table 8.50 and Figure 8.31). Again, while the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was a prominent theme across the publication, the parliamentary resolution itself was not one of the major themes (which are listed in Table 8.48 and visually represented in Figure 8.29) during the data collection period. Arguably, however, the constant coverage of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 helped to set the agenda in parliament, and also framed the way the issue was considered by parliamentarians. *Calls for the United States to recognise “mass killing” as “genocide”* (27%) and *Calls for Turkey to recognise “mass killing” as “genocide”* (27%) were the key themes. These were followed by *commemorative events* (17%). The presence of common messages can aid to set an agenda. What we see from the data is that the NSW Government’s recognition did not slow down coverage of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 or result in a decrease of calls for “genocide” recognition by other parliamentary bodies.

The theme, that there is no need to pursue further recognition, has shown up in this content analysis period, as well as another. American-Armenian journalist, Harut Sassounian, claims, “there is no longer a need to continue pursuing recognition – having largely prevailed over persistent Turkish denialism”. Instead, he believes the Armenian community should be “declaring victory and moving forward to reclaim their just demands”. Sassounian’s definition of “the more meaningful goal of justice” is the “restitution and recovery of the substantial losses suffered as a consequence of the Genocide, including personal and community properties, and the occupied territories of Western Anatolia”. Sassounian concludes his editorial by stating, “Armenians, rather than being satisfied by merely regurgitating the well-known facts of the Genocide, demand a just resolution through full and comprehensive restitution.” (Sassounian, 2013)

There is clearly a significant difference to what labels the Armenian and Turkish communities use to define the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between
1915-1916. However, Sassounian’s editorial states that despite the different views, the debate itself is over.
Table 8.48: Main Themes in *Armenia Online* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pressure for US recognition of mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for Turkey to recognise mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass killing commemoration events</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s reaction to genocide recognition</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW Govt resolution on mass killing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for NSW Govt from Australian-Armenian community</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books/films about mass killing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for Turkey to lift economic sanctions on Armenia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for Israel to recognise mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational events about mass killing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condemning academics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No further need to pursue recognition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for Turkey to pay compensation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All of the themes across the *Yeni Vatan* articles revolved around responses to the NSW Government resolution, except for a news item about a memorial for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 to be erected in Fairfield (Table 8.49 and Figure 8.30).
Table 8.49: Main Themes in Yeni Vatan Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 8 (April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW Govt resolution on mass killing</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s reaction to “genocide” recognition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm to Australian-Turkish community and multiculturalism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call to protest NSW Govt recognition of mass killing</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational seminar on mass killing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfield Council memorial</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During this data collection period, there was a drop in news items (46%) and an increase in editorial coverage (20%) (Table 8.50 and Figure 8.31).

The news stories published in Yeni Vatan (46%) were specifically about the NSW Government resolution, and the preparations for protests that followed. A large portion of the content (39%) was advertising about the upcoming protest and seminar (Table 8.51 and Figure 8.32).
Table 8.50: Types of Articles Published in *Armenia Online* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Articles</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Coverage</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement/Press Release</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad/Event Reminder</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feature Interview</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Articles:</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.31: Types of Articles Published in *Armenia Online* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, 8 April – 8 June 2013 (n=30)
Table 8.51: Types of Articles Published in *Yeni Vatan* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Articles</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad/Event Reminder</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Articles:         | 13                 |

Figure 8.32: Types of Articles Published in *Yeni Vatan* about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, 8 April – 8 June 2013 (n=15)

Internationally, the Armenian National Committee plays an important role in the recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”, by hosting educational events, trying to have their view of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 placed in curriculums, writing articles, and using many other methods of keeping the conversation alive. The key role they play is evident in the prominence of their voice in news. ANC Australia and ANC Australia’s Executive Director, Vache Kahramanian, were referred to in 20% of articles. ANC America and ANC America’s Executive Director, Aram Hamparian, were referred to in 23% and 17% of articles, respectively (Table 8.52 and Figure 8.33).
Table 8.52: Prominent Voices included in *Armenia Online* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prominent Voices</th>
<th>Title/Role</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian National Committee (ANC) Australia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vache Kahramanian</td>
<td>ANC Australia Executive Director</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian National Committee (ANC) America</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aram Hamparian</td>
<td>ANC America Executive Director</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harut Sassounian</td>
<td>American-Armenian journalist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev Fred Nile</td>
<td>NSW Legislative Council Member</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope Francis</td>
<td>Current Pope of Roman Catholic Church</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Schiff</td>
<td>US Congressman</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walt Secord</td>
<td>NSW Council Member &amp; Co-chair of NSW Parliament Friends of Armenia Group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Youth Federation of Australia (AYF)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerie Boyer</td>
<td>French Parliament Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry O’Farrell</td>
<td>NSW Premier, 2011-2014</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Australian-Turkish Mutual Alliance and the Australia Ataturk Cultural Centre were prominent voices following the NSW Government resolution, however, from an agenda-setting perspective, their approaches were too little too late (Table 8.53 and Figure 8.34).
Table 8.53: Prominent Voices included in *Yeni Vatan* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April - 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prominent Voices</th>
<th>Title/Role</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barry O'Farrell</td>
<td>NSW Premier, 2011-2014</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev Fred Nile</td>
<td>NSW Legislative Council Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Perry</td>
<td>NSW Legislative Assembly Member for Auburn, 2001-2015</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian-Turkish Mutual Alliance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erkal Eken</td>
<td>Columnist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia Ataturk Cultural Centre</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.34: Prominent Voices included in *Yeni Vatan* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)
Table 8.54: Type of Coverage in *Armenia Online* about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present coverage</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Articles:</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over the course of this case study, *Armenia Online* did not have as many pre-emptive articles as expected (Table 8.55). However, constant repetition “primes” minds for what is “fact” and can result in agenda setting. This repetition also maintains a constant connection to a homeland issue for diaspora communities. Of the articles published 30% were published in April, 57% of the articles were written in May, and 13% were published in the one-week period of June (Table 8.56). The NSW Government’s recognition did not slow down coverage of the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 or result in a decrease of recognition.

Almost all of the media coverage in *Yeni Vatan* was reactive (85%) (Table 8.55). As seen in previous content analysis periods, the Australian-Turkish media does not have a history of being proactive. As all of the articles were in response to the NSW Government resolution, no stories with references to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, or other key search terms, were published in the month of April. Coverage started in May, once the motion was passed (Table 8.57). The reaction to the resolution resulted in further protests and media coverage well into June, passing the content analysis period this time, however the protests resulted in no change to the resolution and eventually died down.
Table 8.55: Type of Coverage in Yeni Vatan about Parliamentary Motions Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present coverage</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Articles:</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.56: Spread of Articles Published on the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Armenia Online (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Months</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.57: Spread of Articles Published on the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Yeni Vatan (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Months</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, the articles published in *Armenia Online* during the content analysis period were emotive, negative, and criticised the “other” (Table 8.58). Of the articles published, 80% used emotive language, to “reflect on the horrors of the Armenian Genocide” (“Armenian Genocide commemorated in Australian cities,” 2013, May 2). Furthermore, 87% of the articles were negative towards the “other”; Turkey is described as “repugnant” (“Australian politician visits Western Armenia,” 2013, May 15) and the nation’s actions are “deplorable” and “should be condemned by all” (“BREAKING: Turkey bans Australian legislators from Gallipoli,” 2012, May 10).

Of the remaining articles, 13% were neither negative, nor positive, but rather stated fact. When first beginning data collection, there were three categories; negative, positive/hopeful, and neither. After finding no positive articles, and no articles that even hinted at possible reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian communities, the “positive/hopeful” category was removed.

*Armenia Online* sent an unequivocal message by describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” in 100% of articles across all case studies. Furthermore, in the final data collection period, 93% of articles had a headline that clearly pointed to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, ensuring readers who were interested in the topic would not miss the article.

Table 8.58: Features of Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 Published in *Armenia Online* (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Articles (out of 30 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article used emotive language</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article was negative/ condemned “other”</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article described mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article’s headline clearly pointed to mass killing</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Yeni Vatan* did not provide a clear stand on what the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was, or should be labelled as. While the term
“genocide” was never used, there were five other labels that were used instead, four of which still included the word “genocide” (see Table 8.60 and Figure 8.35). Adding to the ambiguous stance of *Yeni Vatan* were its headlines. Only 46% of the publication’s headlines pointed that the following story was about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (in comparison to *Armenia Online’s* 93%) (Table 8.59). One headline about an upcoming protest read: “Preparations for the big day continue” (Preparations for the big day continue,” 2013, June 6, p.3), while another about the passing of the NSW Government resolution read: “There is no complaining against a conceded goal” (Eken, 2013, p.4).

Emotive language was used in 62% of the articles in *Yeni Vatan*. All of the articles were negative, however, the negativity was not aimed at the Armenian community, but rather at the NSW Government for its “unfair decisions” to “accuse us of genocide” (“They recognised the alleged genocide,” 2013, May 8).

Table 8.59: Features of Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 Published in *Yeni Vatan* (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Articles (out of 13 articles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article used emotive language</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article was negative/ condemned “other”</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article described mass killing as “genocide”</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article’s headline clearly pointed to mass killing</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.60: Labels for the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 used in *Yeni Vatan* (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Attributes</th>
<th>Number of Times Printed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alleged genocide</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide lies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide claim</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Armenian situation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide accusation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.35: Labels for the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 used in *Yeni Vatan*, 8 April – 8 June 2013

*Armenia Weekly’s* move to an online presence, in the form of *Armenia Online*, has greatly increased the number of articles published. Using articles written by both *Armenia Online* journalists and from other sources has allowed the publication to provide a constant stream of information to readers. Content from *Asbarez* (an Armenian-American newspaper, published in Armenian and English, by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation) is commonly used. More than half of the articles (53%) published during the content analysis period were sourced from *Asbarez* (see Table 8.60).
8.61 and Figure 8.36). Articles by American-Armenian journalist, Harut Sassounian, were also regularly published. Both of the articles obtained from the *California Courier* were written by Sassounian, as were two of the articles published initially by *Asbarez*; meaning that Sassounian wrote 13% of the articles published during the data collection period. All articles published in *Yeni Vatan* were original content.

Table 8.61: *Armenia Online* Sources for Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asbarez</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia Online (Armenia Weekly)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Courier</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Post</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.36: *Armenia Online* Sources, 8 April – 8 June 2013 (n=30)

The vast majority of images in *Armenia Online* were of people calling for “genocide” recognition, and supporters of the call for “genocide” recognition; giving
faces to prominent voices in the Armenian side of the debate (Table 8.62 and Figure 8.37). Interestingly, one of the images in the “political actor” category was of Obama and Erdogan, closely shaking hands [see image below]. In an article, urging the United States to recognise the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” and condemning US President Obama for failing to do so, the image supports the perception of solidarity between Obama and the “other”; the Turkish Government.

“His [Obama’s] public retreat, under Turkish pressure, comes despite his own pledge to acknowledge this crime” (Asbarez, 2013, April 24). This specific image is a reoccurring image across Armenia Online articles, where the United States is condemned for failing to use the “genocide” label.

Image: President Obama with Prime Minister Erdogan.
Table 8.62: Image Themes across Armenia Online Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Themes</th>
<th>Number of Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People/crowd at event</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political actors</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker at event</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic stock image</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commemorative Statue</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book cover</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author/filmmaker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Images:</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other than the frequent use of logos with “calls to protest”, there was no discernible pattern in regards to visual choices by *Yeni Vatan* (Table 8.63 and Figure 8.38). The stories that followed in the month of June, and which fell outside of the data collection period, were all of protestors – seven images in total. Despite the coverage increasing as a result of the organised protests, one of the front pages in June focused on protests held in Sydney and Melbourne, in solidarity with those protesting in Taksim Square, Istanbul, at the time. Ironically, there was a greater turnout at the Australian Taksim Square protests.
Table 8.63: Image Themes across *Yeni Vatan* Articles about the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 (8 April – 8 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image Themes</th>
<th>Number of Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside NSW Parliament</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political actors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People/crowd at event</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish flag</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic stock image</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalised memorial</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Ataturk Culture Centre (AACC) logo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Turkish Mutual Alliance (ATA) logo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Images:</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.4.2. Analysis of Australian Mainstream Media. *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Australian* published two articles during the data collection period. Both articles were published in the month of May. One was a book review and the other was a feature story. Neither of the stories directly discussed the parliamentary motion, however, they both described the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as the “Armenian genocide” and one of them referred to it as the “first holocaust”.

Both articles used emotive and negative language, such as: “the gendarmes lay tiny corpses in the sand”, “terrible stories about the worst of human nature”, “horrors” and “recounting of atrocities”. Neither of the headlines directly pointed to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916; the vague headlines were: “A force for harmony” and “Harrowing stories from a broken world” (Feneley, 2013, May 11; Pierce, 2013, May 18).

The themes explored in these stories were the life of Stepan Kerkyasharian – whose parents experienced the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-
1916 firsthand – and his decision to step down from the NSW Community Relations Commission, and a book review of Bone Ash Sky by Katerina Cosgrove. Kerkyasharian and Cosgrove were the prominent voices in the articles.

The images printed were photographs of Stepan Kerkyasharian, Kerkyasharian with his family, and a Palestinian woman displaying “Phalangist helmets after the 1982 Sabra massacre”.

Despite the article’s focus on the hardships faced by Kerkyasharian’s family during the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, he states that “whether we like it or not, racism is part of human nature. It is the mark of civilisation to rise above that. And that requires constant political leadership,” bringing the story back to his role in supporting a multicultural NSW.

While neither story directly mentioned the parliamentary motion, it is possible that the motion still motivated the writing of these stories. Even if that was not the case, it is arguable that stories like this are part of what pre-empted the parliamentary motions in the first place.

8.5. Interview Findings: The Political Actors and their Voices

This chapter will now present a discussion on how and why contentious international debates on the histories affecting the Armenians and Turks have made their way into Australian State Parliaments, and how the debates and political decisions impact and play out on the lives of the two communities. Having incorporated the views of experts, it will highlight how, at times, there was minimal consultation with academics and community groups, and how politicians use academic research to advance their set agendas. Insight into why political actors use and refuse certain labels when describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is provided, as well as their views on why labelling can be important or detrimental when examining history and its impact on communities.

Interviews with five political actors were undertaken for the purpose of gaining in-depth insight into their reasons for using and refusing certain labels to describe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The names of the interviewees have been changed, in order to protect their anonymity, in accordance
with ethics approval criteria. The interviews were conducted through emails and face-to-face discussions. The methods varied according to the preference of the subjects.

The first interview took place with Timucin, an Australian-Turkish lobbyist. He has worked as an engineer and a teacher in Australia. At the time of the interview, he was not associated with a specific lobby group, as the groups he had been a member of had dismantled. He has since joined the Australian Turkish Advocacy Alliance (ATAA). The second interviewee was Peter, an Australian legal and genocide studies scholar. Peter has spoken openly and published widely about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The third interview was with Matthew, an American historian who has also spoken openly and published widely about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The remaining two interviews were with Arman and Mehmet. Arman is an Australian-Armenian academic, whose work has been referred to by Australian parliamentarians when defending their decision to pass the state parliamentary motions. Mehmet is an Australian-Turkish lobbyist at ATAA and a former journalist.

The interviewees selected represent both the “Turkish side” and the “Armenian side”, according to the way the communications they have created have been referenced in Australia and internationally. Further discussions with the political actors show that none of them felt accountable towards a group. Their decisions to use or not use labels were based on their belief that they were backed by the “facts”, rather than any allegiance. They did, however, feel accountable to their peers, whether these were in the Australian-ethnic community, or the research community.

This chapter serves as a “conversation” between key political actors, who are unable to have this conversation about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 face-to-face with one another in the current Australian climate.

8.5.1. The Act of Labelling and the Art of Language. Language plays a key role in the labels that are used, the ways in which they are disseminated, and how researchers, the media and parliamentarians across the world are informed. Interestingly, of those political actors interviewed, who arguably play the role of the ‘label-maker’, only Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) admitted to believing it is important to apply labels. He noted, however, that the insufficiency of the English language results in labels that are inadequate to describe matters as
complex as the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Having said this, while only Peter highlighted the importance of using labels, each of the interviewees used one label or another, based on the “facts” they believed supported their chosen label.

Peter, Arman and Matthew’s academic research informed political debates. Yet, none were happy about the ways in which their work had been taken out of context by parliamentarians, as their research was not conducted for the purposes of aiding party politics. It is not possible to go further into how the work of these academics was used by parliamentary bodies without inadvertently revealing their identities.

**8.5.2. Labelling and the Shortfalls of English.** The political actors interviewed had significantly different views on not only what labels should and should not be used, but also the reasons, which made their usage appropriate and inappropriate.

“My feeling on the use of labels on the deaths of Ottoman Armenians and Turks is that such labels should not be used at all,” states Matthew (personal communication, September 19, 2012). He opts not to use the “genocide” label when describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and has often been referred to as a “revisionist”.

Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013), however, states that he believes the label of “genocide” is appropriate when referring to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and mentioned a report by Geoffrey Robertson, where Robertson (2009) wrote: “[T]he term “genocide” may be applied to massacres before the passage of the [Genocide] Convention: those who drafted and debated it spoke repeatedly of other historical events as “genocide” even though they had occurred centuries before.” (p.14)

“You absolutely need to specify what it is, or you have nothing,” states Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012). Peter’s legal background has resulted in the academic taking a “legalistic approach” when reviewing history. Peter uses the “genocide” label because it is the only “actionable” approach, “the only basis on which you can proceed to trial of an issue through the courts is by using the UN definition”. So despite using the label of “genocide,” Peter still believes that the events of the mass
killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 should be reviewed in an international court.

Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) considers the UN Convention definition of “genocide” to be “so wide as to be unfunny”, and were it up to him, the definition would be redrawn to be significantly tighter. Peter gives the example of the forcible removal of Armenian children. While these children grew up “Turkified”, they were still “alive, which is a hell of a lot better than being dead, or being stuck in a gulag or salt mine or something appalling.” Peter explains that this removal falls under the current definition of “genocide”, however, he does not believe that it should be co-equated with “genocide”; “it’s a subjective view,” he explains. While Peter believes the current definition of “genocide” is “full of flaws”, he states that at least “it is an attempt at specific-ness”.

“Then the question becomes two things: was there genocidal acts during this whole period... was this just merely civil war or was there an intention?” From a legal perspective, Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) explains “the whole thing is about intent... motive is not important”. “Motive is in a sense irrelevant to criminal law. The question is ‘what did you intend doing?’ and ‘could you foresee the actions of... your intent. Not why”. As it currently stands, no documentation to intent has been found (as discussed in Chapter Six).

Also notable is that while Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) believes the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was “genocide” – based on the currently available definition – and uses the “genocide” label in public presentations and written texts, he does not believe there was an intent to exterminate the Armenian people, but rather that there was an attempt at “dismantling Armenian-ness as a separate identity”, an identity held together by their common language. So Peter believes the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was essentially a linguistic “genocide”.

“I plead for the use of adjectives in front of a flat word,” states Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012). So was there a political genocide, economic genocide, religious genocide, linguistic genocide... I mean you need an adjective in front of the word genocide. I think this one, that I’m talking about, is essentially a linguistic genocide... One person gets killed, you say that’s terrible, but they killed three people yesterday with a bank robbery... well that’s an atrocity. The word, as is
the word ‘genocide’, misused very often to describe any number of events that are not. In fact, if you were to draw it as a circle and there is genocide, there is true genocide at the core, but at the periphery there are a whole host of activities, which don’t fit the word, but we still use the word.” In the same way, Peter explains that the word “tragedy” is used in far too many contexts. If a young person is diagnosed with cancer, it is described as a “tragedy”. It is also tragic if Australia falls short of scoring a century in the cricket. “Words lose their meaning,” says Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012).

In comparison, Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012) refuses to use the “genocide” label because no documented proof has been made available to date. “We know there were deaths, however, these deaths never took place with the intention of destroying a people or a race. You have to remember, there was a war, there was famine, there was starvation... double the number of Turks died in the area than what Armenians did... The deaths did not happen because people said ‘let’s go kill them’. Yes, there may have been disputes among villagers, but that wasn’t commissioned by the [Ottoman] Army or the Ottomans [Government],” he states.

Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012) does not believe it is a coincidence that documents from the Armenian archives are not available. “Our [Turkish] commissions have asked for evidence, however, the documents are never provided... they refuse to open the archives... they will give you the translations, however, refuse to provide the actual documents. The Ottoman archives are open, however,” says Timucin, adding that, “we need to focus on these points. Why aren’t the original documents being shared?”

He also does not believe the label of “civil war” is appropriate either, although he believes the Ottoman-Armenian alliance with Russian-Armenians caused the tensions and the following relocation. Instead he prefers labels such as “tragedy” or “event”.

Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) and ATAA do not believe that it is appropriate to use the word “genocide” because it is “legal term”, which carries weighty implications. Furthermore, Mehmet is adamant about not assigning a label, because he thinks the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is too complex to explain with a word, instead ATAA uses vague terms such as “sufferings” or “events of 1915”. Mehmet states: “Do we need labels, do we need to
generalise sad things of the past by using labels? We don’t have a label, it’s war, civilians die, we don’t have a word for it. How can you put a word on the suffering of five million people? How can you put a word on people losing their... [lives]?”

“My grandmother had to walk with six of her siblings and mother and aunt, running away from the approaching Armenian bands and the Russians, approaching from North-western city of Trabzon, walked all the way to Samsun... from Trabzon to Samsun, that’s like 700km, and they lost their mum and aunt to disease, so seven kids had to be split up into seven families and they grew up not seeing each other ever again... How many words, how many semantics, symbols can you use to explain something like this? Or like my grandfather had to walk with his brother and family all the way from Tunceli to Istanbul. His brother died on the road, out of starvation. How can you explain these things with one word? You cannot, so we are not using a specific one word, we’re not countering the word with a word. Words are not enough to encapsulate what really happened back then,” he adds.

Clearly, the political actors interviewed had significantly different views on which labels were appropriate and why – from the legal implications to the ineffectiveness of the English language.

8.5.3. Language Barriers in Research. The ineffectiveness of English in describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is not the only language barrier adding further contention to the debate. Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) says one of the largest problems the Turkish lobby is facing is that many of the peer-reviewed articles that do not describe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” are also not in English. “That is one of the biggest issues we are trying to deal with ... We just want our side to be heard,” he explains. As referred to earlier in the chapter, texts that are written in a language other than English will be understood by far fewer people across the world (Curan, 2011).

After reading everything Peter has read, he believes there is “sufficient intent to be able to use a label like genocide in relation to those events”. Having said this, it is important to note that Peter has done his reading in English. He admits that while he reads some German, he does not do so “well enough” and he reads no Turkish (Peter, personal communication, November 4, 2012). This is key, and quite common
amongst academics researching the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Significantly, large portions of the research are written in German and Turkish, and almost none of the Turkish research has been translated into English, meaning that those works are often not taken into account by academics. Many of the English research sources are written by academics such as Vahakn Dadrian, who have Armenian heritage.

“My view on the Armenian genocide is based essentially on what I read from Turkish sources, and not from Armenian sources, so if you say to me, why do I use the word ‘genocide’ in relation to Armenian events, because on more than a balance of probabilities, I think there was an intent to destroy Armenian-ness”. It is notable that while Peter claims his view is based on “Turkish sources”, he has already admitted to only being able to read the small number of sources that have been translated to English (Peter, personal communication, November 4, 2012).

“Our academics provide evidence, however, it gets ignored,” says Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012). More likely, it is in a language the researcher or parliamentarian does not understand – Turkish. So, it is less about the “evidence” being ignored, and more a case that it is essentially unavailable. With so many journal articles, news reports and books on the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 available in English, few academics or journalists spend time having Turkish resources translated; particularly when there is already the view that Turks are “denialists”.

### 8.5.4. The Evidence Says…

Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) states that “one has to look at what evidence there is and the evidence is... seldom written. I mean people don’t write down ‘I’m about to commit genocide’.” While Peter may be correct in this assertion, it is unlikely that high-ranking Ottoman officials would have written down that they intended to commit “genocide”, it is quite likely that at one point, had this been their intent, they would have had to give some form of order to “exterminate”, as they could not carry out the killings themselves. It may also be argued that these same high-ranking officials would not have had enough foresight to destroy such evidence, during a time of war from multiple fronts. Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) believes that because evidence of such an order has never been found, it is not appropriate to use the term “genocide”. The order
issued on 17 May 1915, was to “temporarily relocate” those who were believed to be disloyal to the Ottoman State, says Mehmet.

Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) argues that much of the case for believing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was “genocide” is based on “circumstantial evidence,” although it is “a very strong circumstance”. He refers to previous clashes between the Ottoman-Turks and the Ottoman-Armenians (discussed in Chapter Six), and states this particular circumstance points to the “victim-ness of the Armenians”. However, circumstantial evidence can be inferred in multiple ways. It could also be argued that previous historic clashes led the Ottoman Government to believe the members of their Armenian community may be willing to rise up against the Government, to change their “victim” status. Of course, this is only speculation, as is often the case with circumstantial evidence.

8.5.5. Discussing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Australia. Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) feels that using the label “genocide” in Australia is appropriate because it is “the only basis on which you can proceed to trial,” and that as a scholar he is in a position to assign a label. Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) also feels that is appropriate because “Australia is a major western nation, which has signed the UN Genocide Convention and many other human rights conventions. It is also a country that has come a long way in coming to terms with dark chapters in its past. Aboriginal culture is protected and much of the annual Australian budget is earmarked for Aboriginal welfare. Therefore, I see no reason why the Armenian genocide issue can’t be freely discussed in Australia.”

It is interesting that in the Australia case, Australian-Armenian community members have stated the Federal Government refuses to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” as a result of fears that Turkey will cut ties with Australia. Yet the research published in Armenia Online proves that countries who have recognised the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” have continued to trade with Turkey; in fact, trade has increased by as much as 912% in the case of Russia (Asbarez, 2012, February 7).
8.5.6. Who has the Right to Assign a Label: Individuals and Groups?

Despite all his assertions that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was an act of “genocide”, Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) does not believe that it is appropriate for individuals to assign labels to events that have not been reviewed by a historical commission, or have not been brought to international court. “I think that one has to produce evidence that something happened and the best way to produce it is in a court of law where the rules are tighter than any other facet of life. Sitting in an academic study and saying this happened and that happened is not valid enough, you need that trial, which has the sharpest possible focus we can muster.”

Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016), on the other hand, believes that individuals have the right to call the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 “whatever they want”. As someone who has a background in journalism, he does not believe in putting constraints on free speech. However, he believes that those in positions of power and influence have a duty to uphold when it comes to using labels, in order to maintain cohesion within multicultural Australia. “If you’re holding a government position, if you’re in the power of making laws and affecting people’s lives, then you have to be careful.”

For Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013), it all comes down to opinion. “As a writer, I am free to assign the genocide label if that is what my conviction is,” he says. “I’m aware that there are some scholars who choose not to use that label. I doubt there will ever be a genocide that will not be contested by one or more scholars. This doesn’t mean that one can’t use the genocide label if they are convinced it’s the most suitable label to use.”

As the Turkish lobby does not have a label they set forth, Timucin uses vague terms such as “event”. “We only explain that they’re not telling the truth,” states Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012). He does not believe that a label should be used unless it has been set forth by an historical commission or international court, in this instance. However, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, lobbying without a strong label can be ineffective to say the least.

8.5.7. Who has the Right to Assign a Label: Parliaments? Of the interviewees, only Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) believes that it is appropriate for a parliament to assign the label of “genocide” to describe the mass
killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 under the current circumstances. “I personally believe that since genocide is recognised as an international human rights issue, it is above party politics. As stated earlier, the Armenian massacres and deportations form an intrinsic part of the word genocide and the UN Genocide Convention. Many governments including Australia have signed the UN Genocide Convention, therefore there’s no reason why parliaments can’t re-affirm their support of the convention and make reference to the Armenian genocide,” he explains.

Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) believes a historical commission would “be a great to assess and analyse the events that occurred during the period but not to determine whether or not it was genocide”. He refers to page 24 of Robertson’s 2009 report as reason why a historical commission should not determine a label after following a review. Robertson’s report states:

“The Eastern Department considers that it is not the work of the HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] to decide what constitutes genocide: “investigating, analysing and interpreting history is a matter for historians”. At the outset, this basic error can be detected, namely HMG’s reliance upon historians to decide a legal issue. Deciding what amounts to genocide is a matter for judgement according to international law, and not at all a matter for historians. Historians establish facts: lawyers must judge whether those facts amount to a breach of international law.” (2009, p.24)

Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) also cites the meeting of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal in 1984, which found the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 to be an act of “genocide” and “an ‘international crime’ for which the Turkish state must assume responsibility”, as a reason for using the “genocide” label. The Permanent People’s Tribunal is independent of state authorities, and provides judgements based on the examination of evidence. On this occasion however, the meeting only took place from 13 April to 16 April (1984), and evidence from the Ottoman archives was not analysed, as it was “inaccessible”. The final verdict, at the time, was made without crucial pieces of evidence, which are now available for review.
Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) says that he is “neither for nor against Armenian genocide resolutions that are being passed by parliaments. I believe that ultimately, the Turkish Government needs to come to terms with its past and show remorse for the massacres and deportations that were committed against the Armenians in Ottoman Turkey. Armenian genocide resolutions by foreign governments may assist or hinder this process. There are differing schools of thought on this.”

Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012), however, does not agree with parliaments assigning labels that have not been set by a trial outcome. “Unless there have been substantial enquiries, investigations, commissions, of various kinds. And the parliament that passes such a resolution or condemnation should be shown to have done its homework, that’s the point,” says Peter. And yet, no such “homework” was done before the passing of the New South Wales and South Australian motions. And as one of the leading genocide studies scholars in Australia, Peter was not asked to offer an opinion. “I wasn’t party to any of the discussions or decisions, I wasn’t asked an opinion. I don’t have the faintest idea of how the New South Wales Parliament, let alone the South Australian Parliament, arrived at where they arrived.”

“There wasn’t even a debate before that motion passed in Parliament,” said Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016), referring to the lack of informed debate in the Parliaments leading up to the passing of the motions. The views of the Australian-Turkish community were not asked either, before the passing of any of the Australian State Parliamentary motions. When the news was reported after the fact, it left the Australian-Turkish community feeling excluded and disengaged from the political process. For them, it felt like a particular betrayal from the Labor Party, who the community has long since supported. “That really hurt the feelings of the Turkish community, who have been very long supporters of the Labor Party,” said Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016). “We have a strong belief that there is a bit of complacency within the Labor Party [when it comes to securing the Australian-Turkish vote]. Whatever happens, Turks will vote for Labor, but we’re trying to change this momentum, trying to make sure that they realise the Turkish votes are not guaranteed,” he explains.

As discussed in Chapter Seven, this level of complacency seems likely, especially after the last State Election, when Labor won the seat of Auburn, despite
Liberal candidate, Ronney Oueik, stating that if elected he would rally for the NSW Government to review its decision to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 an act of “genocide”. When Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) was asked about this, he said he was actually unaware of Oueik’s promise, adding that, “we are not that cheap”. It seems unlikely the Australian-Turkish community will be able to show parliamentarians that they will not automatically vote for Labor, especially if they’re unwilling to cast a vote for Liberal even when the candidate is promising to fight for a cause important to their community.

Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) also believes it is inappropriate for State Parliaments to weigh in on labelling the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 because by putting labels on the “record” there is the potential to “create case law”. With what authority can Parliaments define an historic event, unless a historical commission has advised them, he asks? He believes that the State Government motions have set an inappropriate precedent by recognising the plight of the Ottoman-Armenians over other diaspora groups that reside in Australia. “What about the Bosnians, what about the Rwandans, what about the 192 different nationalities living in this country? Where is it going to stop?” He wonders why the suffering of Armenians is recognised in Australian, when the suffering of so many others who have sought refuge here is not.

As argued in Chapter Seven, it is often the work of lobby groups, which decides what labels get assigned. As mentioned previously, this is a point of weakness for the Australian-Turkish community, who have only worked towards forming a stronger lobby in recent years.

8.5.8. Problems with Parliamentary Recognition. The interviewees have differing perspectives on whether or not it is appropriate to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” in Australian Parliaments. There have been noteworthy problems associated with this level of parliamentary recognition.

ATAA was founded after the NSW Parliament’s 2013 recognition motion. “That really, really created a lot of emotional response within the community,” said Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016). “It was sickening in a way”. According to Mehmet, also problematic is that the motions doesn’t recognise the
deaths of people who weren’t Christian-Ottomans during that time period. “So there is war, there is forced conscription, the whole army is overstretched, lack of equipment. On top of it comes, the biggest drought in the whole century. There is no food, the crops are dying and there is uprisings everywhere. So in those conditions... under war, people died. According to the... numbers... between 1912-1918, five million people perished in the Ottoman Empire,” he explains. “It’s insulting,” he says, referring to the fact that not all those who lost their lives have been recognised.

Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) agrees that not recognising other deaths during the period may be part of the reason why the “genocide” label is “highly contested”. He described this as “what some feel is an injustice by the non-acknowledgement of Turkish or Muslim suffering during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They view Armenian genocide claims as being one sided and it ignores the suffering of the ancestors of Turks. Many Turks of today for instance have ancestors who suffered during the time of Russian expansion in the Caucasus and the Balkan insurrections.” The other possible reasons for contention, which Arman mentioned are, “fear by some that if the Genocide is internationally accepted there will be demands for restitution by the victims” and “national pride”.

“It is common for people to feel a sense of pride of the nation or tribe they belong to, and any accusation that their nation or tribe had committed acts in the past that are labelled genocide, may bring a sense of shame. Many of these people are decent and compassionate human beings and don’t believe that members of their nation could have committed these acts in the past. Many of these people don’t realise that the genocide accusations are not aimed against them. In fact there were many Turks who rescued Armenians during the period or refused to carry orders of the deportations,” he explains.

A significant problem to recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” is that it left the Australian-Turkish community feeling disenfranchised. Former Premier Bob Carr’s statement that the level of recognition was important “because the Armenian community is part of the Australian community,” left the Australian-Turkish community feeling as if they were not a part of that same multicultural community. For Carr it was important that “Armenians in Australia understand that we welcome them to our shores as part of one of the world’s unique cultures, and they wear Australian citizenship with pride”,
however, this same welcome was not offered to the Australian-Turkish community when he served as the New South Wales Premier (“Armenian Genocide Commemoration,” 1997, May 7, p.9). For Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016), this statement was a sign that Carr was “distant” from “his own constituents” and that had become “ignorant and complacent” as he felt the Australian-Turkish vote for Labor was guaranteed. Really, he felt that Carr’s attitude at the time showed that he and other Labor politicians “don’t care”.

Parliamentary recognition of contentious issues has been known to create feelings of resentment and hostility. Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) shares his experience of being the target of a “very aggressive campaign of cyberstalking” by a website, which, “makes character assassinations and defamatory libel against Australian-Armenian individuals and organisations.” Arman and “many others were initially overtaken by fear and uncertainty and continue to feel unease at having a collection of personal information placed online without our consent. It’s not nice when an anonymous person posts photos and defamatory material in a website that has been set up through proxy and is aimed at trying to discredit and demonise you.”

At the time of writing this thesis, the website mentioned was no longer active. The name of the website and the names of the individuals involved will not be disclosed for their safety. While this behaviour is completely unacceptable and cannot be condoned, it does signal the rise of feelings of victimisation and resentment felt among member of the Australian-Turkish community.

Online attacks have been an avenue also used by the Armenian diaspora, and the “hacktivist” group known as “Anonymous” launched a video threatening to attack the Turkish and United States Governments, if they did not recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”. “This is a warning to you,” the video started, “We will start targeting Turkish government websites until the genocide is confirmed,” and “Every four years in the United States, every official who wants to become president tells the Armenian people that they will confirm the existence of the Armenian Genocide. However, the U.S. has not yet confirmed it. If this occurs next year, we will start targeting U.S. official websites. Operation Armenian Genocide, engaged.” (Barsoumian, 2012, February 3)
Despite the negative attacks online, Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) believes “there are extreme elements within both communities that are very sensitive to the “use” or “omission” of the genocide label, which can be the cause of tension. These elements are, in my opinion, a minority of the respective communities. The sensitivity of these people should not stop others from choosing to use or not use the label.”

8.5.9. The Ineffective Turkish Lobby and Underrepresentation. Until the formation of ATAA, the Australian-Turkish lobby was nothing other than ineffective (although how effective ATAA will become remains to be seen). Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012) recounts his experience of the Australian-Turkish community’s earlier lobbying efforts, after the year 2000. The group consisted of almost 10 people, who worked as lawyers, engineers and journalists. Feeling the pressure to respond to constant Australian-Armenian lobbying efforts, they decided to form the group. However, it was problematic from day one and they were not even able to settle on a name for their lobby group. Timucin’s lobbying group dismantled soon after being created.

“The Turks have this habit, you can’t keep three people together for long. Even when creating the group, there was arguments about what to do and how to do it. We struggled to set goals and we act too personally. After that protest, we did not gather again.”

Historically, the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 has not been key to the forming of Turkish national identity, and therefore it is not surprising that a lobby group created to dispute recognition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was unable to survive.

“Turks are not hateful people. They are a forgetful and uninterested people. No one took this seriously. If you look at history, there are lots of [Turkish] mass graves, no one speaks about them though. We have no statues commemorating these people,” expands Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012).

When John Watkins, former NSW Deputy Premier, attended a bridge opening in 2006, Timucin’s lobby group decided to use this opportunity to question Watkins on his decision. They caught his attention by sending Timucin’s three-year old daughter, who was wearing a Turkish flag bandana and passed him a DVD (personal
communication, September 5, 2012). “We wanted to use Lara [name changed for privacy and safety] as a symbol. Children are important... We thought she could get his attention.” Watkins was asked if he knew about the murder of the Turkish Consul and his Assistant in Australia, or about the details of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and he did not, yet he voted to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”. According to Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012), this proves that parliamentarians are willing to pass motions about matters of which they are ill informed. This again, points to the fact that the “substantial enquiries” that Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) believes are necessary if a motion – such as recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” – is to be passed did not take.

When Timucin’s lobby group was initially formed, it aimed to have a plaque erected in Auburn, which commemorated the death of the Turkish Consul General in Australia (discussed in Chapters Four and Eight), by those who were later identified to be terrorists seeking “genocide” recognition. The group also wanted the 24 people, who had been killed in similar attacks around the world to be remembered. Furthermore, it aimed to have the commemorative statue in Ryde that recognises an “Armenian genocide” removed, for which they collected a petition with 1,000 signatures. A protest was also organised, with approximately 200 people in attendance. However, as time went on, their group started to shrink, and their goals were not achieved (Timucin, personal communication, September 5, 2012).

Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) believes the larger problem at hand is political underrepresentation; “5000 people can walk outside the parliaments, but at the end of the day, they’re outside the parliament”. He refers to the likes of Gladys Berejiklian and Joe Hockey, who represent the Australian-Armenians, and explains that the Australian-Turks do not have the same level of representation within Australian parliaments (as discussed in Chapter Seven). ATTA is trying to engage Australian-Turkish youths, however, they only have about 20 young people who regularly attend meetings. “We just need more people representing more proportionately our community with the levels of decision-making within Australia, Federal and State level.”
Timucin states that part of the reason for disinterest in politics is the lower levels of education amongst the Turkish community, in Australia and abroad (Timucin, personal communication, September 5, 2012). In countries like Australia and Germany, many of the Turks migrated as unskilled labourers, and as such, have a lower level of education. The Armenian communities, in comparison, place a great level of importance on education, and are in professions where they can make a more significant impact on political policies (as discussed in Chapters Five and Seven).

“When people come for conferences about the matter, only a couple of hundred people gather in Auburn, if that. People do not want to know, they’re not interested,” Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012) notes. He explains that the Australian-Turkish community came to Australia with the desire to start a ‘new’ life, and gives the example of Australian-Turks not wanting the Consulate to know their email addresses (a common complaint from the Turkish Consulate, which frequently calls for people to make contact with them so they are able to distribute relevant information to the diaspora in Australia). It appears that the desire to fade into the background in Australia is quite strong, from observations.

8.5.10. “Genocide” Education in Australian Schools. Australian-Armenian efforts to influence the Australian curriculum so that it teaches the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” is another contentious topic for the Australian-Turkish community.

“There is now talk in schools about Armenians being killed in a genocide. We obviously don’t want children learning this in schools,” says Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012). He refers to the calls and resources made available by Armenian Genocide Education Australia (2017). Their website “identifies the five courses of the NSW Board of Studies History Syllabus and the corresponding aspects of Armenian Genocide history, which are suitable for incorporation into these courses.” To “assist with the teaching of Armenian Genocide studies” they have published a table that “provides links to student exercises and various multimedia resources for each of these courses”.

“Their youth are negatively impacted because they constantly speak about the ‘genocide’...it is everywhere…If you think that way, your children will think that way…The Turkish people forget quickly…However, they [Armenians] don’t forget.
We never teach our children anything about the Armenians, but they teach their children,” states Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012).

Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) is concerned about the impact recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” and potentially including it in the curriculum could have on school children with a Turkish background. “We don’t want them to grow up in a country where they will be finger pointed…This is happening at schools, universities, high schools. They point the finger at Turkish kids and say your grandfather raped my grandmother”. Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) believes this level of recognition in multicultural Australia will only serve to create disharmony amongst ethnic groups.

Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) refers to the speech given by the late Hrant Dink’s wife, Rakel Dink, after her husband – known for advocating Armenian-Turkish reconciliation – was gunned down by fanatical Turkish nationalist, Ogun Samast. Rakel made an emotional plea at Hrant’s funeral: “unless we can question how this baby grew into a murderer, we cannot achieve anything” (European Stability Initiative, 2017). Mehmet too believes that “unless we change our system, whatever is in our society that turns these babies into murderers, we will never be able to solve these problems”. He believes that this form of education in schools will only further fuel the issues that create murderers, and that “ignorant politicians” are “creating this culture that breeds murderers”. Whether it is the death of Hrant Dink, or Sydney Turkish Consul General, Sarik Ariyak, each death is an irreplaceable loss, yet none of these losses have resulted in a change to the methods of the Armenian or Turkish communities.

Yet, as far as Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) is concerned, the best way to save lives is to do further research. “My main motivation for researching and writing on the Armenian genocide is based on my belief that through learning and understanding past cases of genocide; we can help prevent future genocides from occurring. I therefore feel accountable first and foremost to humanity and to possible ‘would-be victims’.”

Having said this, he recognises that “it is virtually impossible to reconstruct absolute historical truth in both written and visual form. As a form of representation, historical narratives, no matter how accurate and precise, will never be able to present
an absolute truthful visualisation or understanding of a historical event. A good historian strives to portray a historical event as objectively, accurately and precisely as possible."

Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) believes that despite the “inherent limitation” mentioned, it is important to reconstruct “historical truth” in order to “provide readers with the ability to learn lessons from the past and use this knowledge to help forge a better future… You cannot stop what you don’t understand.”

8.5.11. Reconciliation and the Diaspora. All those interviewed have hope for reconciliation, however, they each believe that reconciliation will be achieved via different routes. Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012) believes the best route to reconciliation is leaving the discussion to the historians, and the Armenian and Turkish Governments. “All these discussions [in Australia] do is make the Turkish people who live here uncomfortable. It does not mean anything on an international level,” he says. He sees the conversations taking place in Australia as “vilifying” the Australian-Turkish community. “As long as this continues, reconciliation is difficult.”

Arman (personal communication, May 9, 2013) believes the best way to diffuse tension is for the Turkish and Armenian communities to “engage more in civil dialogue and both communities need to respect the differing views on the genocide issue of their respective members. For those with differing views should agree to disagree peacefully.” He also believes that if any Australian-Armenian or Australian-Turk is cyber stalked or harassed the respective communities should condemn this behaviour.

Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) believes it is only through talking that the two communities will be able to diffuse tension. He suggests a private workshop – a two or three day live-in – where intellectuals, clerical people and political leadership could talk privately, without the watchful gaze of the media. Under these circumstances, where each person could freely express their views, Peter believes an understanding could be reached; one that is at the very least an improvement on the pre-workshop situation.
Peter (personal communication, November 4, 2012) talks about the opportunity to move forward through reparations; not in the form of money, but rather an attempt for both the Armenian and Turkish communities to come to an agreement, allowing them to move on. While there are “good signs emerging from Armenia”, particularly with the Turkey and Armenia Accords, as discussed earlier in the chapter, “diaspora people, including Turks, sometimes feel much more strongly about this than homeland people.” According to Peter, the problem inevitably becomes “less to do with the home countries and more to do with diaspora attitudes, which people cling on to for an extraordinarily long time”. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, diaspora groups often cling to the “symbolic manifestations” that feed their nationalistic spirit, and while this forms a great sense of “community and cohesion” it also doesn’t allow for the questioning of issues related to the nationalistic spirit and its symbols (Castles et al., 1992, p.142).

Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012) agrees that diaspora attitudes cause the problem more so than homeland politics. “At our schools [in the homeland] we never heard anything about the Armenians. I did not know until I came to this country, when I was 30 years old... We were never told that the Armenians are our enemy,” he explains. Timucin does not recall any discomfort between himself and his Armenian friends in Turkey. This is not the case in Australia though, where he feels that the Australian-Armenian community blames the Australian-Turkish community for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. “The Armenians in Turkey do not create these problems. It is the Armenians in different nations,” he states.

Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) believes the erecting of monuments, which memorialise events that did not necessarily play a role in Australian history can pose problems for multiculturalism and reconciliation. ATAA had made submissions to this effect to Multicultural NSW, as had the Japan Community Network, after they found out about the intention of the Australian-Korean and Australian-Chinese communities to erect a statue in Strathfield recognising the “sex slaves” who were “abused by Japanese soldiers in World War II”. The submissions resulted in Multicultural NSW CEO, Hakan Harman, issuing guidelines to local governments, asking them to “be careful not ‘assign blame’ when considering memorials or public monuments to ‘contentious’ historical events”.

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Before long, leaders of the Armenian, Greek, Cypriot, Korean and Assyrian communities united and demanded either the resignation or sacking of Harman, stating he was pushing for the agenda of his homeland Turkey’s politics. Minister for Citizenship and Communities at the time, Victor Dominello, is believed to have forced Harman to withdraw the guidelines after being alerted to the view of the “aggrieved community leaders” (Feneley, 2015, February 16).

Mehmet, Timucin, Peter and Arman all believe that the Armenian and Turkish communities have many cultural similarities and that under the right circumstances, there is significant hope for reconciliation. They do not, however, agree on the path to reconciliation.

8.5.12. Using the Media. The media has the potential to play a significant role in how the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is recognised, however, as discussed earlier in the chapter, the Australian-Turkish and Australian-Armenian lobbies have had vastly different success rates based on how they have approached both mainstream and ethnic media. We have seen that the Australian-Turkish community has a culture of silence, when it comes to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

“We don’t speak about things…Things are only reported in our media once,” states Timucin (personal communication, September 5, 2012). He gives the example of mass graves, where the Turkish were buried, found in the 1970s. “They were mentioned once at the time and then not again. What about the people who were children then, or born after? They do not hear these stories, and it is forgotten. No one knows.” In addition, he says “if the Armenians were not lobbying, there would be no point in us talking about it, but the fact that they are means we need to talk.” Interestingly, despite criticising members of the community about the culture of silence, Timucin himself believes there is no need to further question history, and instead would be willing to move on if the Armenian communities would.

Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016) believes the Australian-Turkish media do not play a role in uniting the community, as the Australian-Armenian media does. “None of the printed [Turkish] newspapers here in Australia are run by journalists. They’re all businesses, so a little bit of content scraped from here and there only to sell advertisements. And if you look at SBS Turkish, that’s really become the
domain of three of four people, so they decide what needs to be broadcasted,” he states. In fact, he does not believe that Australian-Turkish media plays the role of “Big Brother” either; the Fourth Estate that is meant to hold the system accountable.

“We don’t even know what’s happening with the Government…Every day there is legislation passing… we have no idea what’s going on in Australia… especially those who don’t speak English,” says Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016). Mehmet explains that one of ATAA’s long-term plans is to find a way of battling the disconnect felt within the Australian-Turkish community by creating an engaging and informing media. He believes that ATAA is making a dent in the approach the Australian media takes. They now send press releases to SBS and the ABC, and have been contacted for comment when there have been major developments in the debate, such as when the German Government passed a motion in 2016 recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”.

“Three years ago they [Australian journalists] would have just done the story…They might at best have sought some reaction from a representative of the Turkish Government, but they never sought any sort of reaction from the Australian-Turkish community… we’ve begun to create, establish these kinds of contacts,” explains Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016).

Having said that, ANC Australia and Armenia Online are quick to respond when SBS reports on the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in a manner they deem inappropriate. In fact, SBS was recently under pressure again to change its policy on not referring to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide” (as detailed in Chapter Two), when the Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide (AIHGS) Studies organised a signed statement by academics calling for the broadcasting service to refer to the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as “genocide”.

In response ANC-AU Managing Director, Vache Kahramanian stated: "We welcome this statement by such a distinguished group of Australian experts, and it will no doubt add to the massive condemnation of SBS's unjust, inaccurate and unacceptable policy supporting genocide denial (ANC Australia, 2017, July 6).

ATAA was accused of influencing editorial policy, however, Head of SBS, Michael Ebeid, explained the editorial policy about the “Armenian situation” has long
been in place. “Our protocol is to say, when referring to the mass killings of Armenians, considered by many to have been genocide, which Turkey denies. This is really important because firstly the Australian Government doesn’t call it a genocide, the United Nations doesn’t call it a genocide, but obviously, many historians dispute whether it was a genocide or not, so we at SBS do refer to it as the mass killings of Armenians considered by many to be genocide, and I think that way we make sure that our viewers understand that this is matter of contention that historians world over dispute,” stated Ebeid. “There is a lot of debate on this one. I appreciate it is a very sensitive issue and we do try and balance the conflicting community pressures on this.” (ANC Australia, 2017, May 24).

ATAA has had a harder time having their voice heard across Australian commercial media though. According to Mehmet (personal communication, August 5, 2016), “today’s journalism is all about Wikipedia journalism and that is a battle we are losing too, an online battle…When a young journo is assigned to write something about what happened in 1915, and the first thing he googles or she googles… is all about the Armenian side of the story, that’s what she’s going to write.”

With Google’s search engine optimisation and search engine marketing algorithms, ATAA will not be able to make an impact online anytime soon because they are unable to complete with the sheer amount of content being created by the Armenian side of the debate.

The media plays a significant role in labelling the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and this role is likely to grow with the development of online reporting. This does not, however, does not mean that the content of the reports will change. Having said that, change is possible, particularly if the Australian-Turkish media first changes its approach in support of the Australian-Turkish lobby. This is an area that will require further monitoring to track possible progression.

8.6. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the four main case studies analysed for this thesis, each of which have resulted in heightened debate about the labelling of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. It presented findings from
the media coverage data collected in the months surrounding the case studies and discussed them with reference to the theoretical framework set out in Chapter Four.

Due to sheer numbers alone, *Armenia Online* has a much stronger agenda-setting capability. Having said this, it is important to note that the unavailability of circulation data limits the study. *Yeni Vatan’s* agenda-setting capability is also weaker in comparison because the newspaper does not utilise the Web 2.0 functions that *Armenia Online* does. At the time of this study, *Yeni Vatan* was uploaded as a PDF, making the process of accessing articles of interest a laborious task, and the website was not search engine optimised. *Yeni Vatan* is also only published in Turkish, making it inaccessible to the wider Australian community, limiting its agenda-setting capability to only those who read Turkish. Importantly, it does not offer comments or posts functions. As such, the site lacked the ability to facilitate discussions and influence agendas.

The views of the interviewees supports the view that without the use of a strong label, the Australian-Turkish lobby flails around trying to have its views taken into consideration. Its commitment to the lofty ideal that all that is needed is “the truth” will be the lobby’s undoing, at this rate. Realistically, labels are what demand grab attention, and the Australian-Turkish lobby’s refusal to set forth its own label will likely result in the continued dismissal of its version of “truth” and “fact”.

Arguably, the lack of research published in English, however, is a significantly larger disadvantage because the Turkish perspective is unable to compete in academic areas (which should inform political debate, although this is clearly not always the case). It is apparent that the “facts” used to validate the use of the label “genocide” are questionable in some instances, with much research being unavailable in English. This is not to say that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was not a case of “genocide”, or that it was. It merely shows that there was significantly more information that could have been reviewed, in conjunction with historians and legal experts, before a definitive label was set forth by a parliamentary body.

Overall, across the interviews, most agreed that while individuals should be free to assign their own labels, it is not the place of parliaments to assign labels. The majority of interviewees also believed that this matter should undergo a systematic review in a legal setting. Based on these discussions, this thesis argues that it is not the place of governments to define contentious historical events, such as the mass killing
of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, if the issues have not yet faced the scrutiny of an international court hearing. As the term “genocide” is a legal term, with severe implications, the decision to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” should be left to a legal body, not to governments in multicultural Australia, which have the duty of representing people from many different ethnic backgrounds.

The research questions, theories and findings will be further discussed in Chapter Nine.
Chapter Nine
Discussion and Limitations

This chapter presents an overall discussion on the research, arguing how government decisions to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” have the ability to create tense narratives amongst Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities. It also explains how the inclusion of these debates in multicultural Australia became possible following attacks on the concept of Australian multiculturalism. It further considers the role of political presence, ethnic lobbying, and media coverage on the parliamentary decisions to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide”.

According to the undisputed historical record, Armenians and Turks have interacted a great deal. However, their senses of Armenian or Turkish ethnicity tend to highlight different accounts of that interaction, and they now have vastly different interpretations of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, which is evident in the way the media they consume frames this issue. It is also important to remember that the political actors involved in these framings have had their own agendas. The resulting reductive arguments prevent the acceptance of multiculturalism as a normative concept; however, this diversity of historical memory makes multiculturalism that much more necessary.

9.1. Multiculturalism and Ethnic Representation

Multiculturalism, as both a concept and a policy, is not dead (Banting & Kymlicka, 2012, 2013). However, if the principles of multiculturalism are to be accepted as a normative concept, they require greater consideration by Australian governments. A successful multicultural society, one which strives to achieve unity through celebrating diversity, is responsible for ensuring equal treatment of ethnic groups if it is to thrive.

The decisions by the New South Wales and South Australian Parliaments to recognise the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” did not happen in a vacuum. This decision was able to surface in
multicultural Australia because the ideals of multiculturalism were left vulnerable from the attacks by the Howard Government on the institutions that support multiculturalism (Jupp, 2011), from the white paranoia and white nationalism that was ignited by Pauline Hanson (Hage, 2000, 2002), and from fears of the Muslim other, that erupted in Australia and across the world following the September 11 terror attacks (Noble, 2009). These are just a few examples of key influencers on Australian perceptions.

Yet if it were for the aforementioned attacks on multiculturalism alone, the debate to label the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” most likely still would not have surfaced in the New South Wales and South Australian Parliaments. There were key political actors who fought for the inclusion of those motions. The role of the ethnic lobby in seeking to influence governments was clearly established in Chapter Seven. As an unregulated body, ethnic lobby groups have the freedom to work towards swaying a government and political actors to the position that is most beneficial to them. While there is nothing wrong with working to inform government proceedings, nor is there anything to say the information they are providing is necessarily incorrect or biased, it becomes problematic when ethnic lobbying is one-sided, because it allows a “competitive advantage”, as identified by Zetter (2011, p.29). This competitive advantage is present in the Australian-Armenian lobby, who are significantly more influential than the Australian-Turkish lobby. Higher educational attainment, stronger English language skills, and a historic trauma (as discussed throughout this thesis) has united the Australian-Armenians and strengthened their lobbying efforts. The Australian-Armenians arrived as educated people who already spoke English. With higher levels of education and the ability to successfully communicate their thoughts, goals and ambitions, Australian-Armenians are uniquely positioned to hold more prominent roles in Australian political spheres, as seen by the success of the current NSW Premier, Gladys Berejiklian. This is not to say that Berejiklian is a lobbyist, but she is well positioned to frame the perspective of the Armenian diaspora in Australian parliamentary debates, and she does use her position to communicate the Australian-Armenian position on the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

In comparison, language barriers and a lower socio-economic background have prevented Australian-Turks from undertaking the same level of political
participation. The first generation of Australian-Turks who migrated to Australia were members of the working class (as detailed in Chapter Five). They were from a NESB, and very few had any form of higher education. With decreased levels of education and social status, they’re members of a lower socio-economic group than the Australian-Armenians and cannot compete with their level of political presence and activism.

The issue of underrepresentation in Australian parliaments can be traced to the ethnic seat paradox (Zappala, 2001). While all Australians are politically represented, and every adult over 18 has the right to vote for a representative in their electorate, it is argued in this thesis that representative democracy is still flawed and ineffective in many ways. Ethnic-Australians, particularly those of a NESB, are less likely to be nominated or elected for representation. While NESB Australians still have the right to vote for a representative, there is nothing to say that representative will actually voice their concerns in parliament, particularly because the majority in Australian governments has historically been held by a group of powerful elites who may not necessarily be influenced by the citizens who voted for them.

If Australia hopes to become a responsible, representative government, a higher level of participation from ethnic Australians is a requirement. Of course political representatives do not need to be from a NESB to represent those members of the community, however political representatives from a NESB members have been found to be more likely voice NESB community concerns (Zappala, 2001), and therefore are more likely to see to the creation a parliament that better represents the many perspectives found in multicultural Australia.

9.2. Coverage of Competing Histographies

The discourses surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, both disputed and undisputed, were presented in Chapter Six. The recurring labels used to describe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 – namely “genocide”, “civil war”, “massacre” and “event” – were also identified in this chapter. While this highlighted the need for further research regarding the definition of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and a return to primary sources in order to conduct this research, it also provided necessary background
knowledge for the media content analysis that took place in Chapter Eight. What we saw in Chapter Eight is though there are competing historiographies, the “genocide” label, which was first disseminated in a timely manner, is the one most frequently used. While there are other factors to its use, timeliness is critical in the management of perceptions, and can have long lasting effects, as seen in this case. The Turkish Government at the time, preoccupied with rebuilding its nation following World War I, did not set forth its own label, and did not respond to claims of “genocide” until years later. Even now, the Government and Turkish lobbies use vague terms such as “event” or fail to set forth a label at all.

Theories such as framing, priming and agenda-setting are used by political actors, who have revised and retold historical accounts from multiple perspectives, to influence the ways an historic event is perceived. Labelling is a key component to setting agendas. Using predominant labels can allow political actors to frame events and sway political discourse (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003). Framing is the way to present one’s perspective to the world. While framing does not change the actual reality of an event, it changes the perception and attitudes towards that event, and those perceptions are then what filters into the media. Investigative journalism, the kind of in-depth research that would be required to write a story about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, is rarely seen these days. In the internet age, journalists are significantly more time poor. There is a constant race to be the first to break a story, and it is not uncommon to see online stories that are later found to have inaccuracies. While a retraction can be issued in such situations, the message has already been broadcast into the world. In this environment, it is difficult to find balance in reporting about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, and the parliamentary decisions in New South Wales and South Australia. While the media does not tell citizens what to think, it does very much influence what they think about (Mackey, 2000), and the perceptions resulting from the coverage about the motions passed by the State Parliaments and the French Senate were negative in some instances.

A significant problem to recognising the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 as an act of “genocide” is that it left the Australian-Turkish community feeling marginalised. Former Premier Bob Carr’s statement that recognising the “genocide” label when referring to the mass killing of Ottoman-
Armenians between 1915-1916 was important “because the Armenian community is part of the Australian community,” left the Australian-Turkish community feeling as if they were not a part of that same multicultural community. Carr felt it important that “Armenians in Australia understand that we welcome them to our shores as part of one of the world’s unique cultures, and they wear Australian citizenship with pride,” however did not extend this same welcome to the Australian-Turkish community (“Armenian Genocide Commemoration,” 1997, May 7, p.9).

What we can see is that the narratives surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in Australia, both inside and outside of the parliamentary setting, are resulting in an Australian-Turkish community, which feels disconnected and underappreciated, despite its efforts to leave homeland politics behind and assimilate into Australian society. We also saw from the content analysis in Chapter Eight that any references to the idea that the label to describe the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was still open for historical debate enraged the Armenian press, and the same can be said of the Turkish press when the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was recognised as “genocide”. The emotional attachments to further reviewing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 will make reconciliation difficult, particularly when both sides have their own ethnic media that uses emotive language to further fuel tensions.

Parliamentary recognition can create even greater feelings of animosity and separatism than those already mentioned. In the lead up to the French Senate recognition bill, there were reports that former French Senator, Valerie Boyer’s website was hacked and visitors were diverted to another site, where messages posted read: “You, the Armenian Diaspora, are such cowards that you don’t have the guts to open up Armenian archives and face the truth,” and “You, the French people, are so pitiful and pathetic that you are disregarding the truth for votes.” There was also news that Boyer received death threats (Asbarez, 2011, December 28).

This thesis has presented examples of cases where the power of words has influenced decisions and debates about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Pre-emptive messages portrayed via strong labels are crucial to perception management. By seizing the initiative, political actors can sculpt messages to suit their own agendas; forcing their opposition into a reactive position, as was often
seen in the communications set forth by the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities (presented in Chapter Eight). Once in a reactive position, there is no choice other than to defend one’s own actions, or to join a debate where the central issue has already been defined. Therefore, while the Australian-Turkish press was not “forced” to adopt any particular view of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, it was under great pressure to have something to say about the mass killings once others began putting forth their own viewpoints. With few barriers to online communication, the exchanges can be emotive and absent of empirical evidence.

While words are a powerful tool, they are underused at times. The definition of the term “genocide” is a notable example. As discussed in Chapter Eight, Peter, the legal and genocide studies scholar, considers the UN Convention definition of “genocide” to be “so wide as to be unfunny” (Peter, personal communication, November 4, 2012), and that is a significant problem in the labelling of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916. It is not often that words, which carry such heavy legal ramifications, are so open to interpretation. As such, further research to explore the vocabulary around “genocide” would be greatly beneficial. Distinguishing on a spectrum where the word genocide is appropriate, and where other words – such as murder, mass murder, massacre, genocidal massacre, atrocity, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and so on – are more appropriate, may help ease some of the contention that surrounds debates about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

9.3. Limitations and Research Challenges

There were a number of difficulties inherent to undertaking this research. Arranging interviews, in particular, was surprisingly difficult. Considering that those approached were lobbyists, academics and media professionals – who had each spoken or published openly about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 – the lack of interest was unexpected. This may have been because they were uncomfortable having to explain, rather than present, their views on the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and their decision to assign a specific
label. While the initial plan was to undertake at least 20 interviews, after four years of attempts to secure interviews, only five agreed.

It should be noted that while the interview request sent to ANC Australia was initially responded to, upon the provision of further information about the research, their representative stopped responding to communications and follow-up interview requests. The offices of the parliamentarians approached for this research also did not respond to interview requests.

In addition to the difficulty recruiting interview participants, and the inability to have Armenian newspapers translated, having limited access to archives was initially also considered a challenge. While Turkey’s historic archives are available for public review, the same cannot be said for Armenian archives, housed both in Armenia and the United States. Even if they were accessible, the unavailability of a translator again posed a problem. However, this thesis is not a historical dissertation, and so it was decided that reviewing the different opinions set forth in secondary sources was a significantly more appropriate approach.

9.4. Summary

This chapter has presented a general discussion of this research and its limitations. It has explained that while the concept or the policies that underpin multiculturalism are not dead, governments must consider the voice of ethnic Australians, and their presence in parliaments and political spheres, if we hope to achieve equal representation for all Australians. This chapter has also discussed the impacts of political presence, ethnic lobbying, and media coverage on parliamentary motions.

The following chapter concludes my arguments in this thesis.
Chapter Ten
Summary and Conclusion

10.1. Thesis Overview

The debate as to whether to label the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians in the early twentieth century as “genocide”, in geographically distant Australian parliaments, has deeply affected Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish ethnic-migrant communities. The decisions to use and refuse labels when describing these deaths, referred to in this thesis as the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, is not only a source of tension in multicultural Australia, but also an issue of ethnic and national pride, cultural identity and belonging.

This thesis has used a multidisciplinary approach to examining the history and theories of Australian migration and multiculturalism, the demographics of the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities, a summary of the historic events that are and are not disputed by scholars, and the political presence of ethnic-migrant communities in Australia. In order to meet the objective of understanding how and why political actors and the media use labels when describing the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, this research included in-depth content analysis of key media and political narratives, and interviews with dominant political actors in the debate.

Central to this work is the proposition that while Australian multiculturalism has not failed, constant attacks on multiculturalism policies by political leaders have created an environment where complex discourses and conflicted narratives are oversimplified for the purposes of political gain. This thesis also suggests that the act of recognising one ethnic minority’s collective memory of an event, over the collective memory of another ethnic minority, has set a precarious precedent in multicultural
Australia, where many cultures with many different ideologies and interpretations of history reside.

After considering the impacts of labelling the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 on the “normative” concept of Australian multiculturalism, it is the view of this researcher that labelling historic events falls outside of the responsibility of state governments. The mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 is an international issue, and the label of “genocide” has legal ramifications, as such, the labelling of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 should be left to an international legislative body. Furthermore, freedom of speech is a basic right, which should be respected by all governments. Governments, which recognise freedom of speech, in particular, should not then attempt to quash this right by making it illegal to discuss differing labels for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916.

10.2. The Role of Parliaments in Multicultural Australia

This thesis has explored Australian multiculturalism as both a policy and a theory, identifying that multiculturalism allows Australian migrants to maintain a portion of their cultural identities and lifestyles, as long as respect for the majority of the population is maintained. It has also identified that this idealised concept of multiculturalism is not always how the policy itself is exercised.

This research has explored the notion that while there is and should be an Australian “national culture”, Australians need to distinguish between those parts of it, which governments must seek to define and those parts that must remain in the hands of Australian communities, including Australian ethnic-migrant communities. The approach taken at SBS was presented as a practical model that Australian governments should consider following. SBS remains impartial to labels and treats ethnic groups equally and fairly; “SBS is not subject to the desires of any one group as to how any other group is to be identified” (SBS, 2014, p.4).

As mentioned, the broadcast provider’s policy states: “While SBS accepts self-identification of cultural groups, this policy has no implications other than recognition of group identity within the Australian community. It should not be interpreted as recognition of any historical or political claims or conferring official authority on
activities counter to the policies or practices of other governments.” (SBS, 2014, p.4) The SBS model is ideal for dealing with contentious ethnic narratives as it provides space for each ethnic group to project its own identity, and it does not take sides when ethnic groups promote their preferred stories about themselves.

This thesis supports Levy’s (2011) argument that there are certain features of ethnicity that should remain beyond the interference of Australia’s laws and policies; ethnic communities in Australia have the right to believe whatever account of history they choose to. As such, it argued that is not the place of Australian parliaments to comment or take action on definitions of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, even if this results in disagreements between the communities as they attack each other’s accounts. Furthermore, this thesis accepted the liberal nationalist perspective, which acknowledges it is not appropriate for Australian governments to interfere in matters of national pride, such as the history and symbols of other nations. In this case, the differing collective memories of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 and its definition amongst the Australian-Armenian and Australian-Turkish communities. Recognising the view of one ethnic minority over another does not support diversity and the acceptance of individual and group cultural practices, and is contrary to Australian multiculturalism principles.

Most of the efforts ethnic groups make to maintain their distinct identities are undertaken without encouragement or discouragement by the state; this includes building their own churches, clubs, schools and ethnic media. Each is a move to support and maintain their ethnic culture in a multicultural nation. In a multicultural society, this work is allowed by the state, but the work is not undertaken by the state itself.

It is not surprising that the principles of multiculturalism have faltered, with both the ideology and policy of Australian multiculturalism facing constant attacks from the likes of John Howard and Pauline Hanson over the years. This thesis argued that the principles of multiculturalism require greater consideration by Australian governments if they are to be accepted as a normative concept. A successful multicultural society must impose equal treatment of ethnic groups in order to thrive. Again, this is not to say that parliaments should not discuss issues that are contentious, that is part of their role. However, state parliaments in particular, should be cautious not to discuss contentious international issues that fall outside of their responsibility.
and jurisdiction, particularly if they have the potential to harm Australian multiculturalism.

10.3. Ethnicity, Identity and Political Representation

This research explored how class has shaped the participatory experiences of the Australian-Armenians and Australian-Turkish communities. For the Australian-Armenians, who migrated to Australia as skilled workers, adapting to “the Australian way of life” was not difficult. As many of them already spoke English upon arrival in Australia, they were able to secure white-collar positions in the labour force. The Australian-Turks, however, migrated as unskilled labourers, who had significantly lower levels of education and no English skills. As a result, they avoided participating in Australian social organisations, and many still continue that trend.

The Australian-Armenians and Australian-Turks also have different ways of identifying their ethnicity and ethnic community. The Australian-Armenian community did not migrate to Australia from a single ‘homeland’ nation, as such, they have poorly documented demographics. For them, ethnic community is not identified by their country of origin but rather by their ancestry, language, religious affiliation, and the shaping of a collective memory – their memory of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. The struggles faced by the Armenian people are referred to as a “historical trauma” in this thesis. It was argued that this “trauma” created more intense feelings of nationalism among the world’s Armenian population, which has united the Armenian diaspora communities.

In comparison, the Turkish ethnic community is defined by a person’s country of origin. Their demographics are better known and easier to track. However, the same strong ties that bind the Australian-Armenian community do not bind the Australian-Turkish community. The Australian-Turks are united by their religion (predominantly Islam, and shared with many other nationalities), by their collective memory of Ataturk as a (secular) national founder and, at times, by their belief that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was not “genocide”. Compared to the ethnic ties among Australian-Armenians, these shared “ethnic” features of Australian-Turks are not overly strong.
While first generation Australian-Turks have a strong belief that the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was not an act of “genocide”, a lack of cohesion in their ranks has resulted in second and third generations who are uncertain of their culture and their “collective historic memory”. The Turkish people who migrated to Australia believed they were coming to the “lucky country” and came with the intent of starting over, which included leaving any homeland quarrels behind. As a result, “historical memories”, such as the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, have not been openly discussed and shared with the second and third generations. This ideal of “moving on”, combined with the community’s lower levels of education and limited English skills, has left them unable and unwilling to form a strong and united front against persuasive Australian-Armenian lobbies.

The Australian-Armenians hold a unique position in regard to political representation. This research does not consider them to be from a NESB because most arrived as educated people who already spoke English. As a result, they have not faced the problems of political under representation, which is faced by other Australian ethnic communities, including the Australian-Turks. The Australian-Armenians have political actors such as current NSW Premier, Gladys Berejiklian, representing their cause.

To date, policies that support NESB members to run for office have not been adopted by Australian political parties, making the problem of ethnic under representation an ongoing issue. In fact, the problem is further complicated by the “ethnic seat paradox”, where the Labor Party’s leaders run for the “safe” seats, which are predominantly in areas with higher ethnic populations. These same areas are the ones most likely to elect an ethnic candidate. In the absence of Australian-ethnic members of parliament, ethnic representation is supposedly provided by consultation with non-parliamentary ethnic groups.

This research argued that the inclusion of ethnic representation in politics through consulting with non-parliamentary ethnic minority groups is problematic because all groups involved with an issue may not be consulted, such as when the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 was recognised as “genocide” by the South Australian and New South Wales Parliaments without first consulting Australian-Turkish groups. Furthermore, it argued that consulting with non-parliamentary ethnic minority groups is a problematic long-term approach because it
can result in unorganised ethnic groups becoming complacent and preventing members of ethnic groups from seeking their own voice in parliament, as they already feel that there is sufficient representation. Finally, it argued that such consultations could create unrest in Australian communities, as those from non-ethnic backgrounds may resent the “special privileges” being awarded to Australia’s ethnic-migrant communities.

Instead of non-parliamentary consultation, Australian society would benefit from policies that encourage and support ethnic-migrant Australians to seek a seat in parliament. These policies would need to address the “ethnic seat paradox”, so that ethnic candidates could run for the seats in largely ethnic-Australian electorates, where they would have the best chance of being elected. While it is unlikely that political parties will readily hand their safe seats from their most influential members to new political candidates, it may be plausible to consider an exemption process, which would allow for a certain number of safe seats in predominantly ethnic electorates to be run for by ethnic-Australian members, with this number slowly increasing each election year, until there is adequate representation of ethnic minority groups.

Clearly, the task of finding a solution to the under representation of ethnic minority groups in Australian governments is a considerable obstacle, and one that requires much further discussion, however it is an issue that will determine how democracy progresses in multicultural Australia.

10.4. The Role of the Media and Political Actors in Labelling the Mass Killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916

The content analysis of print and online media undertaken for this research revealed that the Australian-Armenian ethnic press has a significantly stronger agenda-setting capability than the Australian-Turkish press. At the time of this study, Armenia Weekly had moved to its online platform, Armenia Online, and was actively obtaining material from other sources, including ANC Australia, the Australian-Armenian lobby. The magnitude of the articles they were publishing meant that their Australian-Turkish counterpart, Yeni Vatan, was unable to compete.

In comparison, Yeni Vatan was still being uploaded as a PDF and it was hosted on a website that was not search engine optimised. Importantly, Armenia Online is
published in both English and Armenian, while *Yeni Vatan* is only available in Turkish, limiting its reach. By seizing the initiative, the Australian-Armenian lobby has forced the Australian-Turkish lobby and community into a reactive position.

Perception management relies on pre-emptive messages, which the Armenian lobby around the world has mastered. By seizing the initiative, political actors are able to sculpt messages that forward their own agendas; forcing their opposition into a reactive position, as we saw in the communications analysed in Chapter Eight. Late to the party, the Australian-Turkish media had to join a debate where the central issue had already been defined. While the Australian-Turkish press was not “forced” to adopt any particular view of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, it was under great pressure say something about the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 once the Australian-Armenian press and the state governments had put forth their own viewpoints. The result was emotive exchanges, absent of empirical evidence.

Over the course of history, as reviewed by this thesis, we have seen a strong Armenian lobby, which unites with the media and political actors to present its cause. Interestingly, the Armenian lobby has also used celebrity voices, including Eric Bogosian, from Law & Order and, perhaps more notably, the Kardashian family, to achieve its goals. Mentioning the “Armenian genocide” on the “Khloe and Lamar” Kardashian family show resulted in “Armenian genocide” becoming the 10th most searched term on Google, and tweets from Khloe and Kim Kardashian about the “genocide” have reached more than 13 million followers (Asbarez, 2012, March 13).

In this media barrage from the Armenian lobby, both in Australia and around the world, the Turkish lobby has yet to set forth one united label for the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916. Instead, they cling to vague terms such as “event”, stating that they have “facts” on their side. However, this research has shown that there are very few pieces of primary evidence that support one perspective over another, and the available secondary sources are heavily disputed. Furthermore, with much of the research not available in English, there is significantly more information that needs to be reviewed by historians and genocide scholars. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely the Turkish lobby will be able to change perspectives without the use of a strong, definitive label.
Closer examination of the labels used by political actors also revealed the need to further explore the vocabulary around the term “genocide”, as the lack of specificity in the current United Nations definition is one of the areas creating contention in this debate.

This thesis considered the debates surrounding the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916 in the Australian context. As a nation that has ratified the Genocide Convention, Australia should not tolerate instances of genocide. However, in the instance of the mass killing of Ottoman-Armenians between 1915-1916, where no definitive label has been set forth by an international court and historians have not been able to provide an undisputed account, this thesis argues that it is not the role of any government to recognise or label an event as “genocide” because it is not merely a descriptive or scholarly term; it is a legal term that carries severe implications for those who are accused of perpetrating “genocide”, and for those who identify with the national group to which “genocide” has been attributed.

Including contentious narratives in the Australian context, both inside and outside of parliamentary settings, has served to create ethnic-migrant communities that feel disconnected and underrepresented in Australian society. Raising tense narratives regarding contentious international issues in the Australian context is a significant challenge inherent to multiculturalism, and needs to be performed with great caution if Australian multiculturalism is to be accepted as a normative concept.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Letter from Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop to the Australian Turkish Advocacy Alliance (ATAA)

Mr Ertunc Ozan
Australian Turkish Advocacy Alliance
PO Box 1989
ALBURN NSW 1835

Dear Mr Ozan,

Thank you for your letter of 5 May 2014 expressing concern at motions passed by the parliament of New South Wales in May 2013 regarding Turkey and the fate of various communities of the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I.

The Australian Government acknowledges the devastating effects which the tragic events at the end of the Ottoman Empire have had on later generations, and on their identity, heritage and culture. We do not, however, recognise these events as genocide. Australian states and territories have no constitutional role in the formulation of Australian foreign policy. While respecting the rights of individuals and groups to have strong views on the matter, the long-standing and clear approach of the Australian Government has been not to become involved in this sensitive debate. We encourage all parties to resolve this issue through dialogue, and in particular encourage Turkey and Armenia to ratify the protocols signed by both parties in 2009 to normalize relations.

Australia attaches great importance to its relationship with Turkey, which is underpinned by our shared history at Gallipoli, and by recent cooperation in the G20 and a range of other international fora. We value the contribution that Turkish Australians have made to our community.

I trust that this information is of assistance.

Yours sincerely,

Julie Bishop

[Signature]

04 JUN 2014
Appendix B: United Nations Genocide Convention Treaty

No. 1021

AUSTRALIA, BULGARIA, CAMBODIA, CEYLON, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, etc.


AUSTRALIE, BULGARIE, CAMBODGE, CEYLAN, TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE, etc.


Textes officiels anglais, chinois, espagnol, français et russe. Enregistrée d'office le 12 janvier 1951.
No. 1021. CONVENTION\(^1\) ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE. ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 9 DECEMBER 1948

THE CONTRACTING PARTIES,

HAVING considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946\(^2\) that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world;

RECOGNIZING that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and

BEING CONVINCED that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,

HEREBY AGREE AS HEREAFTER PROVIDED:

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\(^1\) Came into force on 12 January 1951, the nineteenth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, in accordance with article XIII.

The following States deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations their instruments of ratification or accession on the dates indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratifications</th>
<th>Accessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUSTRALIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 July 1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government of Australia extended the application of the Convention to all territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations Australia is responsible.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BULGARIA</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>21 July 1950</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CEYLAN</strong></td>
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<td>14 October 1950</td>
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<td><strong>COSTA RICA</strong></td>
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<td>14 October 1950</td>
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<td><strong>JORDAN</strong></td>
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<td>3 April 1950</td>
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<td><strong>KOREA</strong></td>
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<td>14 October 1950</td>
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<td><strong>LAOS</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>8 December 1950</td>
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<td><strong>MONACO</strong></td>
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<td>30 March 1950</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POLAND</strong></td>
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<td>14 November 1950</td>
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<td><strong>ROMANIA</strong></td>
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<td>2 November 1950</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SAUDI ARABIA</strong></td>
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<td>13 July 1950</td>
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<td><strong>TUNIS</strong></td>
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<td>31 July 1950</td>
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<td><strong>VIET-NAM</strong></td>
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<td>11 August 1950</td>
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<td><strong>FRANCE</strong></td>
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<td>14 October 1950</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GUATEMALA</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>13 January 1950</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HONDURAS</strong></td>
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<td>14 October 1950</td>
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<td><strong>ICELAND</strong></td>
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<td>29 August 1949</td>
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<td><strong>ISRAEL</strong></td>
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<td>9 March 1950</td>
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<td><strong>LIBERIA</strong></td>
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<td>9 June 1950</td>
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<td><strong>NORWAY</strong></td>
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<td>22 July 1949</td>
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<td><strong>PANAMA</strong></td>
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<td>11 January 1950</td>
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<td><strong>PHILIPPINES</strong></td>
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<td>7 July 1950</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>YUGOSLAVIA</strong></td>
<td>29 August 1950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* With reservations. For text of reservations, see pp. 314-322 of this volume.

Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.

Article IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Article V

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

Article VI

Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory
of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Article VII

Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

Article VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

Article IX

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

Article X

The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.

Article XI

The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation1 to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

1 In accordance with resolution 368 (IV) (United Nations, document A/1251, 28 December 1949), adopted by the General Assembly at its 266th meeting on 3 December 1949, the Secretary-General was requested to despatch invitations to sign and ratify or to accede to the Convention... "to each non-member State which is or hereafter becomes an active member of one or more of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, or which is or hereafter becomes a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice".

Accordingly, invitations were addressed to the following States on the dates indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6 December 1949</th>
<th>27 March 1950</th>
<th>10 April 1950</th>
<th>20 December 1950</th>
<th>31 May 1950</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Lao</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Laos</td>
<td>Viet-Nam</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. 1021</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After 1 January 1950 the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid.

Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XII

Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

Article XIII

On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a procès-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.

Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

Article XIV

The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force.

It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.

Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XV

If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

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1 See note page 292.
2 See p. 312 of this volume.

No. 1021
Article XVI

A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article XVII

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in article XI of the following:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article XI;
(b) Notifications received in accordance with article XII;
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with article XIII;
(d) Denunciations received in accordance with article XIV;
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV;
(f) Notifications received in accordance with article XVI.

Article XVIII

The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

Article XIX

The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.
Appendix C: Interview Guide

Locked Bag 1797
Penrith NSW 2751 Australia

1) Are you aware of the label you have employed during political communications describing the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916?
2) If so, why did you choose to employ that label?
3) Are you aware the label you chose is contested by some scholars?
4) Why do you believe the label you chose to describe the events is more suitable over other labels?
5) Why do you believe the differing terms used to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916 are heavily contested?
6) Do you believe it is appropriate for individuals to assign labels to an event which has not been reviewed by a joint historical commission and/or has not been brought before the International Human Rights Court?
7) Do you believe it is appropriate for parliaments to assign labels to an event which has not been reviewed by a joint historical commission and/or has not been brought before the International Human Rights Court?
8) If answered ‘yes’ to questions 6 and/or 7, why do you believe it is important to discuss the events from 1915-1916 in Australia?
9) If answered ‘yes’ to questions 6 and/or 7,
   a) Can you state whether you believe the term ‘genocide’ to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916 is completely unsuitable, unsuitable, suitable or completely suitable. Why?
   b) Can you state whether you believe the term ‘civil war’ to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916 is completely unsuitable, unsuitable, suitable or completely suitable. Why?
   c) Can you state whether you believe the term ‘tragedy’ to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916 is completely unsuitable, unsuitable, suitable or completely suitable. Why?
d) Can you state whether you believe the term ‘massacre’ to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916 is completely unsuitable, unsuitable, suitable or completely suitable. Why?

e) Can you state whether you believe the term ‘event’ to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916 is completely unsuitable, unsuitable, suitable or completely suitable. Why?

f) Can you state whether you believe the term ‘holocaust’ to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916 is completely unsuitable, unsuitable, suitable or completely suitable. Why?

10) If answered ‘yes’ to questions 6 and/or 7, please explain why you believe you are qualified to assign or deny such labels.

11) Do you believe there is tension amongst Australian migrant ethnic community members of Armenian and Turkish origins?

12) If answered ‘yes’ to question 11, do you believe the current tensions amongst Australian migrant ethnic community members (of Armenian and Turkish origins) is a result of the contradictory labels used to describe the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916?

   If answered ‘no’ to question 11, do you believe tension can arise when the deaths of Ottoman-Armenians from 1915-1916 are discussed in Australia?

13) How do you believe such tensions could be diffused?

14) To what organisations, communities and professions do you think you are accountable? You can name more than one sense of accountability.

15) If you answered ‘yes’ to question 14, are there any inconsistencies or tensions between your feelings of obligation or accountability to these entities?

16) Is there anything else you would like to add, or any questions you believe should have been asked?
Appendix D: Interview Reference List