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Development of a Reconstruction - Governance
Contingency Path Analysis for a System's
Evolution After Turbulence:
The Case of Lebanon

Mammy Helou

PhD Thesis
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Mammy Helou

July, 1997

This research study is dedicated to my children who continuously surround me with chaotic love.
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Previous Publications and Symposia Resulting From On-Going Research

Slightly different versions of chapters four, six and seven of this thesis have been developed as working papers and published articles as follows:


Several colloquia presentations and conference papers have been generated out of the current research study. These include:

1. (1993) 'Politics of Multi-national Brain Drain', paper presented at the University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury, Research Colloquia, 23 April, Richmond.


In terms of media coverage, this research has been discussed in the following radio interviews:

1. Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), 31 October, 1994 (7:00 pm).
2. Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), 29 May, 1995 (7:45 am).
3. Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), 3 April, 1996 (9:30 am).
Part I

Part I is composed of three chapters:

Chapter I: Introduction - Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Chapter II: Reconstruction, Governance and Decision-Making - Literature Review

Chapter III: Systems Evolution After Turbulence - Reconstruction-Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA)
Chapter I

Introduction: Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Sections:

Introduction
  Brief Background
  Purpose and Objectives
  Research Issues
  Utility and Significance of the Study
  Scope and Limitations of the Research

Theoretical Framework and Methodology
  Theoretical Framework
  Methodology
  Sources of Information and Validation of the Study
  Preview, Structure and Organisation of the Study
Chapter I

Introduction: Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Brief Background

During recent decades, governmental efficacy in handling various types of economic, social and politically-turbulent events has been a major concern of public planners and civil administrators. The decision-making process used to resolve an unusual event has severe implications on both local communities and administrative institutions (Rosenthal, Hart and Kouzmin, 1991:211). In addition, conflict resolution patterns used to settle unique events may have great impact on communities and political agencies of neighbouring countries as well, especially in regions of constant turmoil where the spillover of events across borders is usual. A recent example relates to the impact of the Persian Gulf war resolution on the Arab-Israeli peace process in general and the settlement of the Lebanese seventeen year old crisis in particular (Eke and Alali, 1991:6; Kisirwani, 1992:335).

Conflicts and crises tend to be dynamic in today’s world. A conflict situation may take different forms, including ideological conflicts of values and beliefs and socio-economic conflicts of interest (Bell and Hall, 1991:228). As a means of promoting ideologies and interests, conflicting parties may engage in various forms of violence which, at a later stage, may lead to foreign interventions in a system’s internal affairs. The Lebanese (1975-1991) conflict provides a perfect example of a lost democracy due to intensive levels of regional and international interventions triggered by continuous internal violent actions.

A system needs to look back and evaluate its past performance as a means of developing a better perspective to plan for its future (Emery, 1977:16). A good understanding of the nature and causes of conflict are needed not just for controlling the conflict itself but also in terms of developing alternative recovery projects (Bell and Hall, 1991:267). Reconstructive logic has been widely used to evaluate causes of conflict and to devise crisis rehabilitative strategies (Allison, 1971:12; Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:410-414; Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:5; Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:13).

A brief literature review of decision making under crisis unites in emphasising uncertainties, ambiguities, risks, environmental threats and time pressures as important factors impacting on policy decisions (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:1). It is beneficial to view crises as dynamic processes that pave the way for change. Accordingly, crises could be mapped through critical policy pathways as a means for identifying vital points of discontinuity for possible policy interventions (Axelrod, 1976:5; Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:421-3). Crises are double-edged; while they are definitely a burden for some, they are also considered as opportunities and catalysts of intervention and radical change by others. In his article, 'Steering Requisites for Crisis-Opportunities', Dror (1993a:13) refers to "Windows of Opportunity" requiring time-compressed responses as opposed to continuous long-term opportunities. The urgency and time pressure dimensions inherent in crisis-opportunities and associated with decision making under crisis represent a major challenge to present political leaders and public planners.

The Lebanese (1975-1991) crisis demonstrates the dual nature of crises; being an obvious burden on the majority of the Lebanese population as well as providing critical "Windows of Opportunity" to local, regional and international forces. The failure of local decision makers to adequately foresee and act upon possible future crisis-opportunities at various stages of the events helped not only in legalising intensive foreign interventions but also led to the prolongation of turbulence and violence in the country. What was truly lacking was deep thinking in crisis coping strategies and opportunity policy decision making. The Lebanese crisis itself and the sequence of events demonstrate the fragility and vulnerability of the political system in handling such multiple crises.
Purpose and Objectives

In this study the author attempts to evaluate structural evolutionary networks after turbulence using reconstructive logic. Analysing contingent stages of evolution provide for an in-depth study of the various forces impacting on a non-linear social system’s recovery after turbulence. Similarly, such a mode of analysis allows for studying the inter-relationships among a system’s endogenous and exogenous forces. Although each crisis is unique, yet an analysis of previous events would pave the way to generate learning curves geared towards the prevention, or at least mitigation, of the impact of future similar events (Toft and Reynolds, 1994:4-5).

A detailed conceptual analysis of decision-making contexts and behavioural styles under varying levels of turbulent environmental states are evaluated to illustrate the direct and indirect inter-relationships among the actors/participants and their contributions to the creation and prolongation of a state of turbulence and instability. Since environmental states relate to the perceptions of the actors involved and their interactions over time, the connection between the two main environmental levels, namely, the system’s internal micro-environmental factors - including inherent socio-political contradictions - and its external uncontrollable macro-environmental influences - incorporating regional and international forces - are evaluated.

This study primarily deals with contingency planning for a system’s evolution after crisis. It is essentially a case study of turbulence at the national level of analysis, mainly dealing with the development of normative and predictive transferable policy implications geared towards a system’s embarkation on a recovery and reconstruction mode. With this purpose in mind, this research study aims at developing a Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA) in terms of identifying and evaluating contingent stages of evolution based on an analysis of developmental leadership pathways. This is accomplished through an in-depth analysis of the components and conditions for a system’s evolution as well as evaluating the inter-relationship between the system itself and its environment, both at the micro- and macro-levels. To illustrate its application to a specific country, the Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA) is applied to the case study of Lebanon.

Research Issues

The current research attempts to study the interaction between two social systems at the national level of analysis, namely the system in focus and its environment (see Figure 1:1), as a means of evaluating administrative and socio-political learning curves geared towards recovery and reconstruction after turbulence. An in-depth analysis of the dependence and inter-relationships between the two social systems is undertaken. The main research issues of the current study are:

1. Identification and analysis of a system’s basic institutional devices and major internal recuperation mechanisms aiming at limiting and/or reverting the system’s deterioration given turbulent environmental states;

2. Identification and evaluation of contingent stages of evolution based on an analysis of developmental leadership pathways. This objective is achieved through the development of a Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA); and

3. Application of RGPA or its modification for the case study of Lebanon with the aim of generating transferable normative and predictive policy implications for a system’s reconstruction after crises.

Related research concerns which stem from the above mentioned primary issues are:

1. Identification and evaluation of the inter-relationships among the system’s pertinent internal - external reform forces, including the determinants of the balance among them, for achieving an optimal mixture of recuperation mechanisms geared towards moving the system in focus out of a crisis mode into a relatively more stable environment;
Figure 1-1
System in Focus and Its Environment

Macro-environment

- External Forces
- Internal Forces
- Decision making contexts
- System in Focus
- Internal factors
- Leadership strategy
- External Actors

Decision-making Contexts
identification and analysis of the components, properties and conditions associated with the Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA);

evaluation of decision making contexts under varying environmental levels of turbulence and uncertainty which, in turn, are determined by the actors and their interactions;

identification of the pre-requisites/conditions needed to control/coordinate with actors, stakeholders and agencies involved as a means of controlling the environmental states, thus allowing the system to embark on a reconstructive mode;

evaluation of a developmental leadership path analysis aimed at positively impacting the decision-making processes undertaken by the system in focus;

generation of contingent reconstruction evolutionary phases/networks geared towards the rapid diffusion of recovery and reconstruction;

evaluation of the RGPA as a plausible reconstructive policy level methodology through its application to the case study of Lebanon. Since reconstruction is a by-product of the global agenda, this study provides an evaluation of the interplay between the external causes and the internal contradictions displayed within the country in focus. In his book, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States*, Hirschman (1970) defines “exit” and “voice” as two critical and sensitive reform forces which are highly influenced by the degree of “loyalty” displayed within the system. Following Hirschman’s (1970) discussion of these two recovery requisite forces, this study conceptually and empirically evaluates two main policy traces; namely, multi-national brain drain and media management. Intellectual emigration and media mis-information represent two traces of policy issues developed throughout the crisis period and, therefore, shape the post-crisis reconstruction agenda;

a. development of an internalised reconstructive agenda based on an evaluation of policy implications related to internal reform forces and institutional devices used as recovery and recuperation mechanisms:

i. identification and evaluation of a multi-national brain drain driven reconstructive policy implication, including an assessment of the impact of loyalty and commitment displayed within the system in focus on the overall intellectual emigration movement;

ii. identification and evaluation of media driven reconstructive policy implications, including an appraisal of the influence of loyalty and commitment displayed by the system in focus on the post-crisis media regulation scheme;

iii. identification and evaluation of reconstructive governance and leadership strategies through an in-depth evaluation of the bureau-politics of the Lebanese system; and

iv. development of learning curves and plausible mitigation strategies for the recovery and reconstruction of Lebanon based on the intellectual emigration and media slices of reconstructive logic analysis;

b. development of an externalised reconstructive policy agenda based on an exploration of the external recovery implications relating to global and regional forces; and

c. development of an overall reconstructive policy analysis for Lebanon through juxtaposing the internalised self-interest and the externalised policy path analysis; and

development of overall generalised transferable, normative and predictive policy implications for a system’s evolution after experiencing genuine symptoms of long-term multiple crises.
Utility and Significance of the Study

The rate at which rapidly developing discontinuous crises have turned to become a series of infrequently continuous events, especially during the last quarter of the twentieth century, necessitates the identification and evaluation of policy imperatives for a system’s evolution after turbulence. Strategic management literature suggests that supportive behavioural patterns tend to develop as a system confronts a crisis situation (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990:432-3). The current study proposes that varying patterns may progress as the system encounters a crisis. Such contingent behavioural patterns highly depend on the nature and degree of interaction among the system’s internal and external environmental forces, among other factors. Behavioural resistance patterns may emerge and assert themselves during a crisis situation; thus, eventually transferring a discontinuous incident into a series of infrequently continuous events.

This research presents an interesting framework for identifying and evaluating a system’s internal-external reform forces which could be used as alternative recuperation mechanisms given varying levels of environmental deterioration. With the help of the analysis provided in this study, public planners and senior policy makers can better evaluate decline-recovery cycles. Using the framework developed in this research, policy planners would also be able to determine who would constitute the reforming actors, including stakeholders and agencies, within their respective systems. The current research provides valuable insights for the development of alternative corrective and recovery policy choices and institutional re-designs relating to the optimal mixture of reform forces the system in focus is responsive to; thus, broadening the range of plausible recuperation schemes.

The Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA) developed in this research is a situation specific model. Although it is basically developed as a response to deterioration at the national level of analysis, nevertheless, the RGPA could also be applied to identify and evaluate policy intervention points of discontinuity in declining organisations. It represents a temporal model of recovery featuring various phases of a system’s evolution after turbulence. The temporal speed and seriousness within which the attainment of critical recovery requisites/activities take place highly condition the nature of the reconstruction phases. This may lead to either distinct stages of recovery and development with the abrupt realisation of pertinent recovery requisites, or incremental and gradual stages of development with slow and irregular fulfilment of recovery activities.

The RGPA serves three main purposes. First, it provides a conceptual framework to initially evaluate a system’s capacity to embark on a recovery mode as opposed to being fixated in a creeping state of turmoil and instability. This could be achieved through exploring the dynamic nature of the crisis situation, including an evaluation of the turbulent environmental state and the corresponding decision-making process. Secondly, if the pre-requisite re-equilibration elements and constructive conditions are within reach for the system to gradually develop an effective rulership strategy characterised by an acceptable degree of perceived legitimacy, a reconstruction - Governance path analysis would outline the system’s evolutionary stages and the corresponding circumstantial recovery networks. Thirdly, such an analysis allows civil administrators and public planners to identify and evaluate structural and normative policy imperatives - including possible rulership strategies - conditioning the successful implementation of recovery activities.

In order to conceptually evaluate decision-making processes and leadership styles under various states of turmoil and instability, an event-time longitudinal socio-political analysis of an actual specific situation/country is undertaken. Given the previously mentioned objectives, this research reveals valuable theoretical and methodological transferable implications for the analysis of recovery and reconstruction activities of other systems/countries displaying warning symptoms associated with creeping states of instability and turbulence. In addition, the RGPA also serves as a basis for future quantitative research and analysis in evaluating and planning for a system’s development and reconstruction.

In developing a qualitative, descriptive reconstruction governance path analysis, identifying contingent stages of evolution, policy makers and public administrators can become alert to the long-term impact of their policy decisions on the system’s prospects for recovery and stability. The RGPA provides a qualitative framework to evaluate the inter-relationships of a system’s two main environmental levels namely, the internal micro- environmental forces - such as socio-political and cultural variables - and the external uncontrollable macro-environmental influences including
regional and international forces. Accordingly, politicians and public servants undertaking reconstruction and development activities in general, and in Lebanon in particular, will have an added analytical planning tool to assist them in their policy decision making so as to optimise the impact of the reconstruction network followed as a means of assisting the system’s rapid embarkation on a recovery mode.

Such policy reconstruction research represents an extension of crisis management literature into strategic management research and policy analysis. One of the important issues which is highly debated in the crisis management literature is a system’s obvious commitment to losing courses of action. How and why would a system - whether it is an individual, firm or state - overly commit itself to what evidently is a failing course of action, and thus lead itself to an irreversible process? In their article titled, ‘Understanding Behaviour in Escalation Situations’, Staw and Ross (1989) have developed a dynamic temporal model of system’s behaviour in escalation situations based on the influence of four sets of evolving variables over time; namely project economic factors, psychological, social and organisation determinants.

Given these four temporal sets of evolving determinants, the following questions relating to the Lebanese crisis come to mind: What were the causes leading to the Lebanese crisis? How did Lebanon become a receptacle case of local and regional problems? How do decision makers over commit themselves to the continuous implementation of losing courses of action? Why did not the leaders pull out at an earlier stage of the crisis? This is a multi-dimensional temporal problem encompassing psychological and social factors, institutional forces, political pressures, “garbage canning” (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972:5) and “grouptythink” (Hart, 1990a:16; Janis, 1972:6). In addition, cultural variables including commitment, faith and loyalty, among other forces were also involved. An investigation into the reasons behind the longitudinal case study of the Lebanese (1975-1991) crisis adds further pertinent insights into the underlying causes of war due to commitment escalations, the heuristics underlying the process of persistence in obviously failing choices and a system’s behaviour in escalation cycles.

In addition, the basic theoretical research scope of the current study relates to the development of new definitions used for evaluating various phases of a system’s crises and its evolution after turbulence. Applied research is simultaneously undertaken as a means of evaluating the significance of the transplantation of present and emerging managerial crisis resolution models and the more politically orientated conflict re-equilibration theories to the context of a system’s creeping crisis. This analysis is geared towards the development of imperative and predictive policy implications and learning curves for recovery and development.

Scope and Limitations of the Research

This study requires a highly inter-disciplinary approach, including concepts and theories of crisis management, strategic management and the more politically-orientated conflict resolution models. Accordingly, a collective body of theories from the social sciences are used to develop a systems reconstruction - governance path analysis geared towards the recovery of a non-linear social system after turbulence, with application to the case study of Lebanon.

The scope of this paper is limited to the following factors. First, establishing a definition of a macro-crisis and limiting the Reconstruction-Governance Contingency Path Analysis to the post-impact activities of response and recovery as opposed to the pre-impact functions of mitigation and preparedness. Secondly, limiting the current research to the construction of a qualitative reconstruction - governance path analysis; and thirdly, restricting its application to a single longitudinal case study of Lebanon.

The first limitation relates to definitional concerns of trying to differentiate a macro-crisis in terms of underlying causes, level and scope, and duration of impact. Of equal importance is the identification and evaluation of the double-edged nature of macro-crises in terms of representing both a burden as well as time-compressed opportunities. Based on in-depth literature review and evaluation of managerial crisis resolution models, politically-oriented conflict re-equilibration theories and numerous case studies of instability and breakdown; the current research reveals a comprehensive systems analysis of the various dimensions characterising micro- an macro- crises.
Such dimensions include the underlying forces behind the crisis situation, degree of environmental turbulence involved, level and scope of the crisis, and the duration of its impact.

The first limitation has been overcome in this research by constructing a situational reconstruction - governance path analysis encompassing all categories of crises. Although it is mainly designed to evaluate a system's macro-crisis recovery stages, nevertheless, it could also be used for the analysis of micro-crisis reconstructive strategies, both of which tend to impact a system's ability to embark on a progressive evolutionary mode. Knowing that reconstruction is not linear and that each and every crisis is a unique event, the RGPA developed in this research represents a situation specific reconstructive planning tool. Since crisis planning is a rather dynamic process where different planning modes are used for pre-crisis and post-crisis situations, the RGPA provides for the identification and evaluation of learning avenues needed for future policy making.

While prevention is better than cure, every crisis situation contains unique dimensions. It is this unique nature of crises which makes it difficult to fully adopt learning patterns derived from previous experiences in recovery strategies for future crises. Since crises represents 'windows of opportunities' necessitating critical time-compressed decisions under conditions of risk and uncertainty, research related to post-impact planning of response and recovery is highly needed. The RGPA represents a significant conceptual framework for the study of contingent stages of recovery through a developmental leadership path analysis.

The second limitation is to restrict the research to the generation of a qualitative reconstruction leadership path analysis. The political, economic and socio-cultural conditions impacting on the politics of reconstruction activities generate a delicate and complicated system of inter-related, internal-external country conditions. Since the internal socio-political environmental states relate to the perceptions of the actors - stakeholders and agencies - involved and their interactions over time, an analysis of the internal and external actors/participants, including the bureau-politics of the system in focus, is used to qualitatively evaluate the connection between the two main environmental levels namely, the system's internal micro-environmental forces and its external uncontrollable macro-environmental influences — including regional and international forces. Quantitative analysis of the various inter-related system reconstruction variables would not as meaningfully achieve the previously mentioned objectives.

The impact of governance requisites and leadership strategies, practised during chaotic circumstances, on the reconstruction policy decision making process is better understood through qualitative analysis. The system's institutional devices and internal reform forces need to be qualitatively analysed so as to generate imperative policy implications related to pertinent reconstruction considerations. Accordingly, a number of major internal reconstructive sub-strategies are generated, namely, a governance - reconstruction policy agenda; a brain drain driven reconstructive program; and a media-driven reconstructive strategy. These sub-strategies are then integrated into an internally and externally - regionally and globally - driven reconstructive policy program for a system's evolution after turbulence. Nevertheless, a qualitative system's evolutionary path analysis to recovery and reconstruction will serve as a basis of future qualitative research of reconstruction and rulership related studies.

The third limitation of the current study relates to confining the application of the RGPA to a single longitudinal case study country. The depth and breadth of this analysis is a pioneering effort in the field, thus, association with similar studies is not possible. Knowing that reconstruction is not linear, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find two or more countries that have faced identical crises with similar decision making contexts and governance strategies being practised. By the same token, it is also difficult to find two or more countries at similar stages of evolution and facing the same hurdles to recovery and reconstruction. It should be noted that the case study country analysis in this research represents an original and experimental investigation. It provides an interesting study for further future analysis. The application of the RGPA to a single case study country shows its applicability and usefulness to any other system's rehabilitative policy analysis and reconstructive decision making after turbulence for both the public and private sectors.

In terms of the case study itself, the following additional limitations apply. First, due to the incompatible goals and directions of the various local and foreign participants engaged in the Lebanese crisis, it would be appropriate to construct a different chronology for each of the
participants, knowing that their comprehension and perceptions of the same events were extremely different. Yet, this becomes practically impossible given the bewildering number of local political factions and foreign government interventions that emerged at different stages of the Lebanese crisis. At the same time, the massive volume of events that took place simultaneously, or at short intervals, on various parts of Lebanese soil, again makes it impossible to generate a comprehensive chronology of events, covering the period 1974 to 1991, in a single case format.

Secondly, it has been difficult, and at times impossible, to gather the solid information needed to evaluate the decision making process during specific stages of the Lebanese crisis. It is worthwhile to note that grey and mysterious parts do exist throughout the crisis events. This makes it hard for the non-participants, as well as the participants at times, to comprehend.

Thirdly, besides internal chaos, Lebanon served as an arena for the Middle-East Arab-Jewish conflict, making it hard for research agencies and governmental bodies to undertake and document statistical data during the crisis period. Thus, every effort is made to evaluate and screen the data acquired.

Finally, with respect to possible subjective bias pertaining to local political factions or regional and international actors, the author maintains continuous contact with Lebanese officials, professors and media professionals, residing in Lebanon and abroad, to double check on data verification, methodology used and reconstruction policy implications being developed.

Although the RGPA has been confined to recovery policy decision making undertaken by public administrators; nevertheless, the analysis provided in the current research demonstrate its simultaneous usefulness to the private sector. Accordingly, the previously mentioned limitations pertaining to the overall research in general, and the case study country in particular, do not confine the significance and usefulness of the study as an additional planning tool for reconstruction and modernization after turbulence. The current study represents a detailed analysis of situation specific political leadership requisites in chaotic circumstances, which at a later stage heavily impact the system's ability to embark on a reconstructive mode. It demonstrates the potential impact of the various leadership strategies on a system's policy decision making contexts, thus, heavily impacting its ability to recover and develop. Accordingly, this research illustrates the usefulness of reconstructive logic, managerial crisis resolution models, and the more politically-oriented conflict re-equilibration theories to in-depth analysis and planning of a system's evolution after turbulence for both the public and private sectors. It serves as a base for future conceptual and applied research in the field of rehabilitative macro-crisis management.

**Theoretical Framework and Methodology**

**Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework of this research study encompasses concepts and theories of crisis management, conflict resolution, strategic management, management of change and planning and decision making literature as they relate to evolutionary/incremental stages of recovery and reconstruction after turbulence. To put the theory into practice, the RGPA is applied to the case study of Lebanon.

In this study the author aims at developing a reconstruction-governance contingency path analysis for a system's evolution after crisis. The RGPA analyses stages of a system's evolution based on an analysis of developmental leadership pathways. To identify and evaluate the elements and properties of the proposed model, and determine their inter-relatedness, this study builds on three main theoretical frameworks, namely, Hirschman's Decline-Recovery Model (1970:18; 1995:10), the managerially-oriented Contingency Typology (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:410-4; Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:418) and the Risk Path Analysis Model (RPAM) (Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:421; 1994:420-6), and the more politically-oriented Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration Model (Linz and Stepan, 1978:19). The Contingency Typology is used to define decision-making contexts, whereby individual disasters can be identified in terms of networks. It outlines four decision-making contexts
namely (1) Algorithm, (2) Opportunity Cost, (3) Muddling through and (4) Crisis. Within the same context, the Risk Path Analysis Model allows for the progression of uncertainty scenarios. The Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration Model is used to define the elements of re-equilibration, namely, legitimacy, efficacy, effectiveness and stability and performance.

Juxtaposing the Risk Path Analysis Model to the more politically-orientated Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration Model provides an interesting analytical tool to evaluate a system’s evolutionary/incremental reconstruction stages. The current research reveals new methodological synergies. Four evolutionary rehabilitative stages are initially identified and evaluated, followed by in-depth conceptual analysis of normative policy imperatives, ultimately leading to the classification and evaluation of contingent leadership pathways, with re-modernization transfer implications for a non-linear social system's recovery after turbulence.

Building on the two previously mentioned models of Contingency Typology and Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration; The RGPA provides an integrated approach to meet the challenges of recovery and reconstruction after turbulence. This study pays particular attention to developmental leadership pathways as impacting on a system’s contingent evolutionary networks in terms of its ability to overcome reconstruction hurdles and, thus, embark on a recovery mode. The RGPA serves as a reconstructive planning tool to be used by public planners and policy administrators under environments characterised by instability, uncertainty and unpredictability. The RGPA also represents a contingent, interactive systems’ approach to help public administrators and senior government officials study contingent reconstruction alternative options and choose a competitive evolutionary pathway geared towards recovery diffusion and long-term stability.

In addition to the analysis of an overall recovery reconstruction agenda, the RGPA provides in-depth insights into the impact of a system’s inter-related endogenous and exogenous variables and constraints, including cultural and socio-political rules and limitations, on a system’s long-term stability and performance. Overall generalised prescriptions for recovery and reconstruction are derived out of transplanting the RGPA to the context of the case study country. In addition, the RGPA presents an interesting approach which enables each system to investigate and analyse its own reconstruction challenges and, thus, construct a unique response to those challenges in terms of developing appropriate reconstructive policy pathways.

Methodology

The current research is phenomenon driven by a set of multiple crisis events. As is the case with various valuable studies of conflict resolution, reconstruction and modernization literature pertaining to individual states/nations (Apter, 1965; Hirschman, 1970; Eisenstadt, 1973; Lavenverach, 1974; Donald, 1984; Hudson, 1985; Abul-Husn, 1992), this study is guided by a series of primary and secondary research questions rather than hypothesis testing. With the aim of generating methodological and theoretical synergies in relation to a conceptual and empirical reconstruction - governance contingency path analysis, the methodological paradigm used in this research includes the following. First, since environmental states relate to the perceptions of the actors involved and their interactions over time, the case study country is viewed as an open system. This allows for evaluating the connection between the two main environmental levels, namely, the internal micro-environmental forces and the external regional and international uncontrollable macro-environmental influences. Such an analysis of the internal and external dimensions within the context of the case study country allows for the establishment and analysis of cause and effect relationships pertinent to reconstruction and development.

Secondly, an in-depth longitudinal single case study country is used to test the applicability of the RGPA as a useful planning tool for the identification and evaluation of reconstructive policies geared towards a system’s evolution after turbulence. The analysis of the Lebanese socio-political system for the period 1975-1991 reveals valuable and transferable normative and predictive policy imperatives for the analysis of evolutionary/incremental stages of reconstruction agendas of other systems/countries displaying warning symptoms associated with creeping environmental states of instability and turbulence (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Charles, 1989:27-28). Given the nature of the questions used to guide the current research, the case study method is used to allow for the
descriptive and empirical research needed to evaluate the components of the proposed RGPA and their inter-relationships (Yin, 1989:13).

Knowing that different social clocks are needed for policy reconstruction interventions, event time rather than clock time is used to analyse the single case study country presented in this study (Rosenthal and Hart, 1991:350-351). Accordingly, cyclical event time is applied to the longitudinal, descriptive and historical analysis of the country in focus. This allows for the development of a continuous "video"-like systematic and elaborate presentation of the inter-related internal-external forces impacting on the overall macro-crisis as opposed to a simple presentation of a "photo"-like analysis of the separate events. Using a single, longitudinal process time case study country application also provides for the development of primary and secondary causation analysis of the elements/conditions of evolution and reconstruction. Diachronic analysis is given some impetus in the development of new methodologies in this research.

Thirdly, through the application of the Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model to the case study country, reconstructive logic has been used to identify and evaluate the important points of discontinuity within the system in focus. Such critical turning points are then integrated in the analysis of pertinent reconstruction leadership pathways leading to contingent stages of evolution. Within the context of the case study of Lebanon, reconstructive logic has been mainly used in developing two powerful slices of the overall reconstruction program, namely, multinational brain drain and media regulation.

Fourthly, given the number of local, regional and international actors involved in the political decision-making process of the case study country, primary sources of information include the use of in-depth interviews with open-ended questions conducted with primary and secondary actors (public planners, politicians, senior administrators, academicians, industry professionals, political scientists and journalists) to evaluate their perspectives and views, which in various instances were contradictory.

Finally, cross-sectional comparative analysis with the decision-making processes of other systems facing similar warning symptoms is undertaken as needed throughout the study. The main aim of such analysis is the generation of normative and predictive transferable implications for the evolution of non-linear social systems after turbulence.

Sources of Information and Validation of the Study

This research requires a multi-disciplinary approach to recovery and reconstruction, encompassing theories and models of crisis management, conflict resolution, strategic management, management of change and planning and decision making literature. Supporting material relating to the following two main models, namely, the Risk Path Analysis Model and the Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration Model, have been used to identify and evaluate the pertinent elements and properties of the proposed Reconstruction-Governance Contingency Path Analysis. In addition, further studies on development and reconstruction have been obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO); Projekt Management Austria; World Bank; International Monetary Fund (IMF); and various published and unpublished manuscripts, including case studies on crisis management, leadership, policy decision making and reconstruction.

Further information relating to the case study country was obtained from the Centre for Lebanese Studies in Oxford and the Council for Development and Reconstruction in Beirut. Various primary and secondary sources of information have been used to gather basic background country information in general, and more specific data on the pre-war and post-war socio-political, economic and cultural environments in particular. A detailed case chronology covering the period 1972 to 1995; in addition to a series of in-depth interviews (using open ended questions) with government officials, civil servants, businessmen, social scientists, journalists, academicians, and media personnel provide the case study with an empirical base to analyse the inter-relationships among internal and external forces impacting on the country's current prospects for recovery and development. The formal interviews, along with the less formal discussions, were undertaken during the period 1990-1995. In terms of secondary research related to the case study country, the author has reviewed and evaluated
various sources and publications relating to the Lebanese political system, the socio-cultural texture and the economic system for the period 1972 to 1995.

As for the validation of this research, including the case study country analysis, the author maintained continuous contact with Lebanese officials, academicians and industry professionals — residing in Lebanon and abroad — so as to double check on data verifications, methodology used, reconstructive policy implications suggested and the learning patterns and curves generated throughout the various stages of developing the current study. In addition, the research includes a number of supportive material comprising specific statistical and empirical data, maps, figures, tables, diagrams and charts. The various supportive documents included in the study feature an overall Middle-East regional chronology, general and more specific case study country chronologies, selective interview transcripts among other related lists of the primary and secondary actors and media channels used throughout the crisis and post-crisis period.

Preview, Structure and Organisation of the Study

In terms of structure, this research is divided into two main parts. The first part deals with the development of the Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis, while the second part relates to the application of the RGPA to a case study country and the generation of learning curves geared towards systems recovery after turbulence.

Within the context of the case study of Lebanon, this research emphasises the inter-relationships of the inherent socio-political contradictions and external factors which have both contributed towards the prolongation of the crisis. This study is based on the following premises. First, domestic socio-political contradictions represent a main cause of the Lebanese conflict. Secondly, it is such inherent structural weaknesses that have opened the gates to intensive external interventions which, in turn, played a major role in the acceleration and prolongation of the conflict. Thirdly, several by-products of the conflict, including brain drain and media chaos, represent both a cause and an effect of the system's overall macro-crisis. Although eventually caused by the conflict itself, intellectual emigration and the dysfunctional pluralistic media have played a major role in accelerating the level of turbulence throughout the country.

Accordingly, this study is organised into ten chapters. Chapter one provides a brief overview of the research including the theoretical framework and methodology. This is followed by an in-depth literature review presented in chapter two. The literature search and evaluation undertaken in this study covers representative theoretical frameworks, methodological approaches and various theories and concepts related to post-impact crisis activities of response and recovery. Accordingly, a thorough review of previous studies related to the following areas has been undertaken: representative conflict resolution and crisis management theories; reconstruction and development models pertaining to recovery and rehabilitation after crisis; longitudinal case studies of recovery and reconstruction; decision-making under crisis; and the management of change literature as it pertains to the politics of reconstruction. Chapter two is concluded with the identification of literature gaps and other suggestions for future research.

The current research study is concentrated on reconstructive evolutionary/incremental phases and developmental leadership pathways under conditions of risk, uncertainty and turbulence. Chapter three provides an analysis of the significant elements, conditions and structure of the Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis as it relates to a system's process of evolution and rehabilitation.

The background information for the case study country is provided in chapter four. This includes a discussion of the cultural and sub-cultural elements, educational, social, political and economic systems during the pre-war, war period and post-war Lebanon. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of the (1975-1991) Lebanese crisis in chapter five, which includes an evaluation of the endogenous and exogenous forces causing and/or contributing to the conflict.

Two main by-products of the Lebanese crisis, including multi-national intellectual emigration and dysfunctional pluralistic media chaos are analysed through transplanting the Reconstruction - Governance Path Analysis to the context of the case study country. Chapter six provides a brain
drain-driven reconstructive strategy in terms of identifying and evaluating brain influx policy implications, while chapter seven features a media-driven reconstructive strategy in terms of identifying and analysing media policy implications geared towards achieving acceptable degrees of media regulation while providing for freedom of expression. Chapter eight features an in-depth study of the bureau-politics of the Lebanese system, which partly entails a close examination of the internal social structure and an evaluation of the relationships and social ties with neighbouring and other regional countries.

The various sub-strategies previously mentioned are integrated in an overall systemic and interdependent reconstruction strategy in chapter nine of the study. This includes the development of learning curves and normative policy implications for the case study country. A summary and concluding remarks pertaining to systems' evolution after turbulence, the case study method, the RGPA and rehabilitative crisis management are provided in chapter ten. The study is concluded with directions for future research and analysis.
Chapter II

Reconstruction, Governance and Decision-Making: Literature Review

Sections:

Introduction

Concepts and Definitions

Literature Review
  Representative Recovery and Reconstruction Literature
  Representative Crisis Decision Making and Governance Literature

Theoretical Frameworks and Interpretive Methodological Approaches
  Representative Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management Theories and Model
  Representative Longitudinal Reconstructive Case Study Analysis
  Representative Reconstructive Logic Studies and Learning Literature

Conclusion - Literature Gaps and Suggestions for Future Research
Chapter II

Reconstruction, Governance and Decision-Making: Literature Review

Introduction

Chapter two presents a review of the representative literature related to the framework and methodology used in this research study to identify and evaluate evolutionary/incremental stages of recovery and reconstruction after turbulence. It mainly deals with the methodological choices to be made in reconstructive studies, including crucial determining factors relating to their usefulness and limitations.

This chapter is of two main sections. The first section covers a review of representative recovery and reconstruction studies, crisis decision making theories and governance literature. The second part covers the theoretical frameworks, methodological approaches and the interpretive modes applied to put this research study into ordered focus. This section covers a review of representative conflict resolution theories, managerially-oriented crisis management concepts and models and longitudinal process time reconstruction case studies. Such a literature review allows for the evaluation of previously generated reconstructive policy agendas through the application of reconstructive logic and the establishment of cause and effect relationships. This chapter concludes with the identification of relevant literature gaps and suggestions for future research.

Concepts and Definitions

To put this research study in proper focus, the various concepts and terms used throughout the current study need to be well defined. The current research represents a case study of turbulence at the national level of analysis. Within the context of this study, turbulence is defined as an intended or unintended process with a limited duration which changes the identity, image and nature of the social system concerned. Thus, the system in focus referred to in this research relates to a nation that has undergone a series of turbulent events leading to a prolonged and multi-dimensional crisis.

The term "system" is used in this research study to show the systemic correlation and/or systemic interdependency related to the linkages between the internal and external environment. Instead of applying the theoretical systems model, the author undertakes an in-depth evaluation of the internal and external actors involved - including a discussion of the roles and agendas of the stakeholders and agencies - and the bureau-politics of the system in focus (Rosenthal, Hart and Kouzmin, 1991:213). Such an analytical evaluation of the participants - directly and/or indirectly - concerned will allow for the analysis of the inter-relationships between the system's micro- and macro- environmental forces and, thus, facilitate the demonstration of the interplay between the internal, regional and global reconstruction policy agendas.

For the purpose of this research, environment is defined as: 'that set of entities outside the system, the state of which set is affected by the system or which affect the state of the system itself' (Kramer and de Smit, 1977:34).

Thus, the environment encompasses national and international forces and conditions influencing, while simultaneously being influenced by, the system in focus. Within the context of the case study country in question, the environment is considered to lack any physical or psychological frontiers. This definition is broad enough to allow for the demonstration of the interaction that takes place between the two interdependent levels of the environment, namely the micro- and macro-environmental forces. At the same time, it helps in studying the relationship between the system in question and the various environmental levels; including internal national forces, regional factors and global influences (Kouzmin and Korac-Boisvert, 1997:2).

Within the context of this research study, the micro-environment refers to the internal set of entities which affect the state of the system in focus while simultaneously being affected by it. The
micro-environment consists of the following: (1) internal actors/participants and their interactions over time, (2) the rehabilitative activities undertaken - including relevant policy implications related to internal reform forces and reconstructive institutional devices, and (3) the human and capital resources available to formulate, implement and control the reconstructive strategies/activities.

The macro-environment refers to the external set of entities which either directly affect the state of the system itself or indirectly influence it through impacting its micro-environment. The macro-environment consists of the following: (1) external actors and their interactions with the other participants, (2) relevant strategies/activities undertaken as influenced by their self-interests and hidden agendas, and (3) the resources available to dedicate towards the accomplishment of the previously set strategies.

Such a distinction between the system's two levels of environmental factors help to visualise the interplay among the internal and external forces which, at first, may cause or at least contribute to a crisis situation and, at a later stage, may actuate or concede to its rehabilitation and recovery. In addition, an analysis of the environmental forces and their interactions help to further evaluate and resolve the internal-external dimensions of a crisis situation (Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:16). Figure 2-1 depicts the preliminary determinants of a non-linear social system's reconstruction activities.

With predominantly external causation crises, the system's reconstructive side of the equation should reflect the impact of the external forces on the internalised reconstruction agenda. So as to avoid any possible contradictions between the causes of a crisis situation and a proposed reconstruction policy programme, reconstructive logic is used in the current research study to identify the crucial points of discontinuity and to develop and evaluate relevant policy interventions. It is the view here that reconstruction is very much a global plan as it is an internal developmental governance agenda. With the use of reconstructive logic, the author aims at accomplishing the following: First, identify and evaluate the critical points of discontinuity causing and/or contributing to the crisis situation. Secondly, consider and appraise normative and predictive reconstructive policy implications built around the previously identified important points of discontinuity. At the same time, a bureau-politics analytical perspective is used to develop and evaluate an internalised reconstructive policy path analysis (Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:17), which in turn is juxtaposed with an externalised policy analysis scenario. This is undertaken as a means of outlining the impact of the external environmental factors - including regional and global forces - on the internalised policy reconstruction agenda.

This study proposes that reconstruction is not just limited to economic recovery and revitalisation. Unfortunately, the cult which involves a system's rehabilitation and reconstruction after a devastating long-term crisis has mostly become a byword for drastic infrastructural and economic development. This study argues for the introduction of more "holistic" reforms aimed at the maintenance of long-term development, growth and stability.

Economic development and market forces acting alone are unlikely to bring about recovery. In his book titled, The Strategy of Economic Development, Hirschman (1958) argues that non-market forces are not necessarily less effective than market forces in terms of restoring vitality and equilibrium. He also emphasises the same notion in a later book titled; Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States; whereby he proposes the view that when market forces fail to deliver an optimal state, non-market social institutions take over in an attempt to restore equilibrium (Hirschman, 1970:18-9).

Based on the three critical non-market social reform mechanisms that Hirschman (1970) discusses - namely, exit, voice and loyalty - this study emphasises a well integrated and accumulated process consisting of the effective formulation, implementation and continuous evaluation of a holistic strategic reconstructive policy agenda. Just as a crisis itself is partially a function of the cumulative impact of the intellectual emigration waves, dysfunctional and pluralistic media and inflexible leadership strategies; the current study proposes that internal reconstruction would, in turn, be a function of the aggregate impact of effective brain influx activities, proper media regulation programmes and flexible developmental governance strategies. Such flexible governance rules allow the system in focus to shift from one leadership strategy to another as the system itself passes through different environmental states.
It is the cumulative effect derived from the interaction of the above mentioned three internal reform mechanisms combined that generate a holistic, internalised reconstructive policy agenda for a system's evolution after turbulence. As previously mentioned, the author here again emphasises the application of reconstructive logic, not just as a means of evaluating critical points of discontinuity that cause and/or contribute to a crisis situation, but also as an interpretive mode of analysis used to generate time sensitive reconstructive policy imperatives built around the previously identified strategic policy intervention points.

Figure 2-1: Determinants of Non-Linear Social System's Reconstruction Activities

The term *turbulence* must be distinguished from hostilities, although the feelings of hostility mostly emerge as a result of conflict situations. Various words/phrases are associated with turbulence including risk, uncertainty, disorder, chaos and violence, among others. To avoid confusion, the inter-relationships among these terms should be analysed. Turbulence is used to describe various levels of chaotic environmental states. Within the context of this study, the term turbulence reflects a system's deviation from its orderly algorithmic environmental state to a more chaotic and disorderly mode of existence, which severely leads to the deterioration of its performance.

Environmental states within which systems operate tend to be increasingly dynamic. Thus, systems are faced with intensive pressures to conform and adapt as needed to environmental changes. Since environmental states tend to affect a system's behaviour and, thus, impact on its long-term survival, examining the characteristics of the environment and analysing their impact on the

According to Emery and Trist (1965, 1969), environmental states can be described in terms of four environmental types and characteristics:

1. Type one: the “placid/random environment” represents the simplest form of environment as compared to the remaining three types. It is characterised as a static environment in which the “goods and bads” are randomly distributed, thus it is called ‘placid, randomised environment’. There is no difference between strategy and tactics. The optimal strategy to follow under these environmental conditions is simply to do one’s best, whereby the best tactics can be formulated through trial and error.

2. Type two: the “placid, clustered environment” is more complicated than type one yet it is still static. Under type two environmental conditions, there is a difference between strategy and tactics. Environmental knowledge is a key requisite for survival.

3. Type three: “disturbed - reactive environment” is different from the previous two types in terms of being dynamic. It relates to an oligopolistic market whereby each organisation works towards improving its own position by obstructing the efforts exerted by others. In type three environments, there is a distinction between strategy, operations and tactics; whereby as Emery and Trist (1965) explain it, an operation consists of “a campaign involving a planned series of tactical initiatives, calculated reactions by others, and counteractions”.

4. Type four: “turbulent fields” refer to a more complicated and dynamic type of causal texture arising from the field itself, whereby the system itself is unable to successfully adapt by relying on its direct interactions. Given shifts within the field itself, the environment becomes an unstable ground. It is the values held by the field members that constitute a crucial control mechanism.

In addition, Baburoglu (1988) discusses a conceptual scheme related to a fifth vertical environmental level as a means of better articulating the different causal texture of a system’s environment. He explains that persistence of turbulence for long-time periods produces both adaptive and mal-adaptive responses. Emery (1967:200) clearly argues that, with planning, the social sciences can modify their environment to help individuals to take an active role rather than adapt passively to emerging changes. In the absence of conscious adaptive planning as a means of better shaping the future, mal-adaptive responses may develop (Emery and Trist, 1973). Thus, the persuasion of active adaptation to turbulence by the system in focus and the involved members of its social field is essential. Emery and Trist (1973) emphasise that to undertake active adaptation as a means of dealing with disintegrative disturbances depends on the emergence of significant values for the system itself and the members of the social field. Such values would help to reduce the uncertainty resulting from turbulent environments.

Baburoglu (1988:185) uses the Arab-Jewish conflict, Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Cyprus, among other cases to provide contemporary evidence that there is no immunity from stalemate. He argues that various other cases of stalemate are in existence among nations that are in a transitional developmental phase. This includes Nicaragua, Honduras, South Korea and India, among others.

Given the organising principles of Emery - Trist taxonomy including the increasing degree of complexity, connectedness and causal texture; Baburoglu (1988:204) explains that the addition of a fifth environmental level must satisfy the same criteria. With the fifth environmental level, an ultimate degree of complexity is reached whereby there is no more room for additional complexity. The system is set to be rigid and frozen, since the mal-adaptive responses of the system to the turbulent environment persist at this higher level of ordering.

He suggests that polarisation, stalemate and dogmatism - all of which connote rigidity - represent a second order of active mal-adaptive responses. Turbulent environmental causal textures can be suspended only at that point where the system is able to self-seal off from environmental
influences through the processes of stalemate, polarisation and dogmatism. Baburoglu (1988:206-7) concludes his discussion of vertical environments by explaining the paradoxical nature, and plausible impact, of the mal-adaptive responses; leading to either stability or more instabilities, changes and fluctuations.

Emery (1977) outlined bureaucratisation as a major contributor leading to turbulence. According to him, the bureaucratic model increases the relevant level of environmental uncertainty; thus, it leads to diminish a system’s ability to constructively shape its future. It is crucial for a system to continuously adapt to changes within its micro- and macro-environments as a means of ensuring its survival in the long-run. Crisis responses are culture bound. Cultural factors heavily impact the way individuals treat turbulent events. Different cultures are prime to react differently to similar chaotic situations (Kouzmin and Korac-Boisvert, 1995:1).

Knowing that systems do have certain amounts of freedom in terms of their interactions with other systems around them, the question becomes “how” to adapt to turbulence? Besides cultural influences, Emery (1977) argues that there are only two basic design principles for enhancing a system’s adaptive capability. First, redundancy is crucial for improving the potential ability for systems’ adaptability. It is essential to design potentially parallel/duplicating functions that can takeover in case a certain function stops operating effectively. The second principle affecting a system’s adaptive capability is the enhancement of its social control mechanisms as a means of augmenting the adjustability of its members (Hirschman, 1958:23; Hirschman, 1970:92; Emery, 1977:23).

The current research represents an extension of crisis management theory to strategic management literature and policy research and analysis. The common elements to strategy conception and policy formation is that they both deal with choices formulated by purposeful individuals (Emery, 1993:176). Nevertheless, there is a big difference between policy and strategy.

Emery (1993:179) outlines four main distinctions. First, a strategic plan relates to the achievement of a strategic objective within a specified time period, while a policy attempts to incur essential social environmental changes necessary to achieve certain ends. Secondly, while a strategy creates both the “necessary and sufficient” conditions needed to achieve the previously set strategic objectives, a policy can only establish the most essential and “necessary” conditions needed for the achievement of the objectives. Thirdly, the system moves itself to a more favourable position in its environment through the accomplishment of its strategic objectives, while the successful attainment of the set policies can only lead to the realisation of the essential environmental changes needed to achieve the strategic objectives. Finally, the execution of a strategic objective relates to an interdependent and convergent set of activities, whereby the failure and/or success in any one step may impact the remaining steps. On the other hand, the implementation of a policy relates to separate and divergent set of activities whereby the failure and/or success in any one activity does not necessarily impact the other activities.

It is not an easy task to develop a precise definition of the term policy. A common attribute to policy literature is the lack of concise definition of policy studies and the meaning of policy analysis as compared to other social sciences (Wildavsky, 1979:2; Emery, 1993:176). Although pioneering academicians and practitioners have problems in defining policy, this research attempts to evaluate its traditional uses in policy literature as well as society at large. This helps in developing a satisfactory definition of policy that serves the purpose of the current study.

The term policy has been expressed as ‘any or all of the following three things:

• clarifications of public values and intentions;

• commitments of money and services; or

• granting of rights and entitlements’ (Considine, 1994:3).
Other definitions and/or merger of definitions include the following:

- ‘A policy is a principle which is intended to guide the choice of means (methods) in the pursuit of objectives. A formulated policy is one which specifies how that principle will be implemented in given conditions’ (Emery, 1993:178).

- ‘Policy research is defined as the process of conducting research on, or analysis of, a fundamental social problem in order to provide policy-makers with pragmatic, action-orientated recommendations for alleviating the problem’ (Majchrzak, 1984:12).

Since policy analysis is about people and since it presumes creativity, which could be incited by theory and further polished by practice (Wildavsky, 1979:3), within the context of this research, policy is used to express an adopted course of conduct which directs the implementation of action plans needed to realise set objectives. Accordingly, during the policy formulation stage, it is essential for public planners and policy administrator to critically evaluate the levels of risks and uncertainties prevailing in the system’s environment within which the action plans are to be developed and implemented. It is essential that policy statements reflect the prevalent environmental contingencies (Emery, 1993:176).

The study of policy formation at various levels of analysis - including organisational, national and international - is not new (Bauer, 1968:6). Lindblom (1959:81; 1980:5) argues that policy making is a rather untidy process, which does not proceed through a relatively rationalistic and orderly fashion. On the contrary, policy making represent a complex process whose boundaries are uncertain. Lindblom (1980) emphasises that one should understand all of political life and activity so as to understand policy making.

An overview of social policy literature shows that various labels are given to the decisions and actions undertaken by policy makers, including routine actions, problem solving, tactical decisions, strategic decisions and policy formation, among others. The term used to describe the decision and/or action depends on both the nature of the decision itself; the perspective of the decision maker who views the event; and the allocation of time, attention, and other resources needed during the decision making process (Bauer, 1968:2).

The current study focuses on generating a holistic reconstructive policy agenda for a system’s evolution after crisis. Accordingly, the main emphasis is set on the rehabilitative and recovery stages of the overall crisis management process. Theoreticians and practitioners of crisis management agree that uncertainties and risks are implied properties of decision-making under turbulence (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:1).

Several definitions have been associated with the term crisis (Hermann, 1972:13; Perrow, 1984:8). Rosenthal, Hart and Charles (1989) define crises as ‘serious threats to basic social, institutional and organisational interests and structures’. Moreover, fundamental values and norms can also be threatened. From an administrative point of view, crises necessitate critical decision-making under conditions of time pressure and considerable uncertainty. The term crisis has also been defined as ‘situations featuring severe threat, uncertainty, and sense of urgency’ (Rosenthal and Pijnenburg, 1991:3). A variety of chaotic situations may be approached using this perspective. Basically, these definitions outline three main characteristics inherent in crisis situations including threat, uncertainty and urgency (Rosenthal, Hart and Kouzmin, 1991:212-3). For the purpose of this study, a multi-dimensional crisis is considered as an accumulation process triggered by a series of events which impact the system’s overall performance. The nature of such an impact does not necessarily have to be negative (Amendola, 1994:1). A crisis could also be perceived as a catalyst for socio-political change, “occasions for decision” (Robinson, 1969:81), as well as an opportunity for reconstructive policy interventions (Helou, 1995a:30). With this in mind, a crisis event may act as a “check-up mechanism” to help a system undertake the environmental adaptations needed.

Kouzmin, Sainsbury and Jarman (1995) outline the relationship between the genesis and the structure of major crises in a two-step sequence. They emphasise the essential linear relationships between an initial crisis-triggering incident and a primary crisis, and between a primary crisis and consequent multiple crises. In their article titled, ‘Oil Spills, Creeping Crisis and Planning
Vulnerabilities, "chaotic sets" are defined as 'modelled crisis situations which facilitate the visualisation and understanding of the genesis, structure and dynamics of multi-crisis complexity', thus, enabling the multi-crisis situation to be conceptualised as a means of controlling and managing it. Since stabilising and destabilising forces co-exist within a system, crisis management processes are designed to have a stabilising influence, unless certain advantages could be realised from preserving instability. Following the US Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) four-stage crisis management model; namely mitigation, preparation, response and recovery; Rosenthal and Pijnenburg (1991:3) provide an interesting functional summary of the crisis management process. Such functions include:

- the prevention of crises from occurring,
- the preparation for protection against the impact of a crisis agent,
- the preparation of a response to a crisis event, and
- providing plans and resources for recovery and rehabilitation after crises.

This study specifically deals with the fourth's function, namely, the preparation of internalised/externalised transferable normative and predictive reconstructive policy implications to help a system embark on a recovery mode in the aftermath of a crisis situation. A bureau-political perspective is applied to the case study country in focus as a means of evaluating the internal and external destabilising forces impacting on the prolonged crisis.

There are two main premises that underlie the current research. First, the post-crisis "blaming" (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin, 1991: 212) behaviour that may take place could have destructive implications on the realisation of long-term recovery and reconstruction programmes. Secondly, if reconstructive policies implemented during the post-crisis period are not perceived as fair and equitable by all conflicting parties alike, this could give birth to another emerging crisis. In other words, for the reconstructive activities to be successful, the peace implications need to be perceived as fair by both the victors and the defeated (Bell and Hall, 1991:267).

This research study distinguishes between two levels of crisis situations, namely micro- and macro-crisis. The differentiation is undertaken using the following three basic dimensional factors: First, the cause(s) behind the crisis itself which are either single or multiple, endogenous or exogenous and manufactured or genuine. Secondly, the level of the crisis (Duin, 1992:320) may vary from individual human failure to a complete system failure (Perrow, 1984:8). Thirdly, the scope and duration of the impact of the crisis, itself, as it pertains to various stages of the crisis/recovery management process. Crisis impact dimensions can vary from a single sector within the economy to a multiple sector impact, which, in turn, results in system paralysis.

Micro-Crisis: a single, endogenous and genuine force is the main cause of the crisis. The events can be interpreted by an individual, human error/failure. The scope of impact is limited to a single sector of the system. At the same time, the duration of impact is rather short, whereby the crisis situation can be analysed and evaluated using a cross-sectional, comparative and clock-time-based research approach.

Macro-Crisis: multiple forces are the main cause of the large-scale crisis. The series of internal events can be explained by a mixture of endogenous and exogenous factors, which can either be manufactured or genuine. Events are evaluated from a comprehensive system perspective, whereby socio-technical problems inherent in the system can transfer the system itself into a failure and "error inducing system". Perrow's (1984) concepts of "normal accidents" and "error inducing systems" refer to crises that are deep-rooted in the structure of an error/failure inducing system, transferring the system itself into an inevitable crisis prone entity. The scope of crisis impact covers a wide range of sectors, leading to system paralysis. The duration of crisis impact covers a long period of time, thus, necessitating the use of longitudinal, event/process-time-analytical research approaches to evaluate the crisis situation (Rosenthal, 1986:103; Rosenthal and Hart, 1991:351). Given the duration and scope of the damage undertaken during Lebanon's (1975-1991) crisis, the Lebanese macro-crisis stands out quite prominently. This becomes quite obvious given the enormous number of publications that make continuous references to Lebanese events as a means of illustrating conflict resolution and crisis management issues (Linz and Stepan, 1978:8; Himes, 1980:9; Witty, 1980:48; Hudson, 1985:87; Diehl, 1987:48; Baburoglu, 1988:185; Bell and Hall, 1991:231). Defining the nature of the Lebanese events is of significant benefit in terms of developing and evaluating post-crisis reconstruction implications.
The effectiveness and the temporal factor relating to the actual realisation of a system's holistic reconstruction strategy largely depends on the managerial and administrative capacity displayed by involved individuals and institutions. The success of major reconstructive activities is dependent on the personal, intellectual and moral qualities of the parties concerned (Amendola, 1994:1). Accordingly, the formulation and implementation of reconstructive programmes have crucial educational and training implications in terms of developing the necessary knowledge and skills needed to cope with emergencies. Being able to manage a series of chaotic events could be quite a stressful process by itself, apart from any learning derived.

A main tool for policy analysis and research is the development of a clear and useful model/device that relates to a real-life situation being analysed by the creator of the model/device. The final version of the model itself is affected by the creator's perceived perceptions of the social system in focus (Hoos, 1974:125). As Quade (1989:139) emphasises, models are essential to policy analysis, whereby decision-making in itself is dependent on the use of sequential models.

This study aims at generating a Governance - Reconstruction Contingency Path Analysis to be used as a reconstructive policy planning tool. The term model, just as culture and system, is quite vague in meaning and usage (Hoos, 1974:124). Many definitions of the word model and its uses appear in both the qualitative and quantitative research literature, some of which include the following:

- 'A model is a representation of reality which abstracts the features of the situation relevant to the question being studied. The means of representation may vary from a set of mathematical equations or a computer program to a purely verbal description of the situation, in which judgment alone is used to assess the consequences of various choices' (Quade and Boucher, 1968:12).

- 'A model is a symbolic representation of something, and like all representations, it is subject to the distortions, pre-judgments, and limitations of vision and wisdom of its creator' (Hoos, 1974:125).

- 'The essence of using models is that a material of formal image of a system is made which is easier to study than the system itself. This image is then used as a model of the system. The model must then obviously contain information about the system. Hence, there must be a certain resemblance between the model and the system' (Kramer and de Smit, 1977:69).

- 'Models have certain aspects in common. Each is an idealisation, an abstraction of some part of the real world, and each is an incomplete representation of the real thing - an imitation of reality' (Quade, 1989:139).

As Hoos (1974:124) explains in his book titled, Systems Analysis in Public Policy : A Critique, models are quite useful and they do get assigned purposive roles. Nevertheless, situations do arise whereby policy and technical analysts tend to emphasise the technicalities of the model itself rather than concentrate their efforts towards generating appropriate solutions to address the social problems in question. Thus, in such situations, preoccupation with the model itself tends to overshadow the research questions instigated by the study.

Based on a merger of the previously cited definitions, the temporal developmental leadership path analysis developed in this research represents an abstraction of significant specific parts of the case study country in focus. It is essentially based on a system's evolutionary/incremental stages of recovery and reconstruction after turbulence. Nevertheless, to achieve its main utility, namely the generation of transferable normative and predictive policy imperatives, the model in focus ignores irrelevant and distracting details.
Representative "Recovery and Reconstruction" Literature

As a means of surveying recovery and reconstruction literature, an attempt is first made to review studies relating to causes of crises and conflict situations. Dunford (1992:216) reviews three different perspectives to the study of conflict. Following the unitary perspective; conflict is perceived as a state of disharmony, thus, typically, assuming that it has a negative and destructive impact on a system’s productivity. The pluralist perspective on the other hand considers conflict to be a normal state of affair, which reflects the conflicting interests of the stakeholders and agencies involved. Thus, conflict can either be destructive or constructive in its impact on a system’s behaviour. It is the responsibility of the manager or leader to well manage and/or balance conflict effectively as a means of positively impacting on the system’s performance. The third perspective on conflict is the radical approach, which considers conflict to be an inherent property of systems given the disparate interests of the parties involved. The radical perspective assumes a "core conflict" which could cause various types of "conflict incidents".

Each perspective has its own advantages and disadvantages in terms of their applicability to the evaluation of conflict situations (Edwards, 1986). In this study, the pluralist perspective is applied to the case study country in focus. Given the dual nature of crises, being both a burden for some and an opportunity for others; the pluralist perspective allows for evaluating the impact of the multi-dimensional crisis in question.

Within the context of the case study country in focus, it would be impossible to talk about recovery and reconstruction without making reference to the issue of ethnic diversity. For the development of a holistic reconstruction programme, factors related to "social mobilisation" and "rate of assimilation" in relations to national identity need to be instigated. As Connor (1972) explains in his article titled, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?', the speed of assimilation and the rate of mobilisation are highly interdependent. He emphasises that the process of assimilation is rather slow among people who are strongly attached to their own societies, while it proceeds faster and smoother among the mobilised population.

Deutsch (1961) explains that rapid social mobilisation tends to support the unity of nations whose population have the same culture, values, norms, language and social institutions. On the other hand, rapid social mobilisation would lead to ravaging the consolidation of states whose people have different cultures, norms, values and languages. Nevertheless, Deutsch (1961) clearly elucidates that ethnic identity does not override the power of self-interest. He specifically emphasises the point that the acceptance or rejection of a political unit goes beyond the impact of culture, language or social institutions. Given rapid social mobilisation, the main criteria affecting the acceptance of a political unit is mainly its own effective performance and its responsiveness to its people’s needs.

In addition to a government’s long-term performance, a basic premise underlying this research is that internal ethnic divisions constitute a main challenge to political units and reconstruction public administrators. An effective political amalgamation with the complete integration of a system’s internal ethnic communities constitute an essential goal of policy researchers and public planners in a post-war recovery period. Although a system’s evolution after turbulence may take several pathways to recovery and development, an important question which challenges reconstruction public planners is how long does it take, and what are the stages that conflicting political parties and/or ethnic communities pass through, before attaining the ultimate reconstruction goal of complete socio-political integration? In other words, what are the national political leadership requisites needed to facilitate, and if possible speed up, a system’s internal assimilation process as a means of achieving social amalgamation and political integration? A comprehensive literature search on governance and leadership strategies reveals that little is known about political leadership requisites in chaotic situations. The whole research area of governance rules and effective leadership strategies under crisis is rather underwritten (Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:13).

Another main premise underlying the current study is that reconstruction is very much a function of the political situation as it is a function of the brain influx movements and intellectual capabilities of the reconstruction leaders (Helou, 1995b:160; Kouzmin and Korac-Boisvert, 1997:2).
The limitations implanted in the political situation help to explain the decisions and/or actions taken or not taken by the reconstruction leaders in charge either to promote, or at times even hinder, the attainment of actual reconstruction and development during post-crisis years (Donald, 1984:1). Since creeping and prolonged macro-crisis need longitudinal theoretical elaboration, using a bureau-political framework provides an excellent opportunity to relate the empirical case study country data with complex planning and decision-making models (Kouzman, Jarman and Rosenthal, 1995:27). Accordingly, adopting a bureau-political perspective to the study of the political situation within the case study country in focus is undertaken as a means of evaluating the interplay between the system's inherent internal contradictions and the external limitations impacting on its performance, thus, shaping the adopted pattern of reconstruction (Rosenthal, 1986:115).

An overview of the growing reconstruction literature shows that various terms have been associated with the concepts of recovery and reconstruction; including modernization, transformation, change, adaptation, growth and development among others (Lauterbach, 1974:1). To minimise any possible confusion with the above mentioned terms, this chapter covers some basic definitions to the previously mentioned terms used throughout the current research.

As discussed by Lauterbach (1974:3), the term modernization refers to the updating of economic, social, administrative and political institutions and processes as needed by the system in focus. He emphasises the fact that the modernization process does not have to coincide with that of Western or the more "developed" nations. Transformation refers to the alteration and changeover in economic and socio-political processes. Thus, within the context of this study, the term transformation will be used interchangeably with modernization.

Change is used to express adaptations in economic, administrative and socio-political institutions and processes in both of the system in focus and its environment. The terms development and development planning on the other hand refer to the process of evolution and progression of social, cultural, economic and political institutions geared towards an improved state that better fits the current needs of the system itself. To be holistic in nature, development planning should take into account the enhancement of socio-cultural and psychological processes, rather than merely concentrate on the advancement of economic vigour.

Systems usually pass through environmental states which could be characterised as high in risk and uncertainty during its early stage of embarkation on a reconstruction era. As Lauterbach (1974:68) explains, uncertainty in general is inherent in any situation, whereby the system - whether it is an individual or a group - faces unknown elements in a situation requiring decisions. The condition applies regardless of whether uncertainty is defined in subjective or objective terms. Nevertheless, Lauterbach (1974) distinguishes between subjective and objective uncertainty. Subjective uncertainty refers to a state of mind reflecting the feelings of lack of control over conditions related to essential decisions. Although subjective feelings of uncertainty may not be objectively rationalised, they tend to shape the system's behaviour and decision-making. Failure to resolve such uncertainties may lead to cumulative long-term feelings of insecurity, thus, resulting in continued unrealistic perceptions of uncertainty. Objective uncertainty on the other hand, refers to conditions related to decision-making that are prevalent regardless of the identity of any decision-maker.

Lautenbach (1974:70) emphasises in his discussion the determinants of perceived uncertainty as: (1) Prevailing objective conditions; (2) the general attitudinal environment within the system in focus; (3) the availability of institutionalised plans of action given the realisation of objective predictabilities; and (4) the system's prevailing psychological make-up. For the purpose of this study, the previously outlined determinants of uncertainty will be utilised in various contexts in this research, specifically in relations to the case study country, as a means of evaluating: (1) The nature of the prevalent environmental conditions at various stages of the crisis and post-crisis eras; (2) the decision-making processes adopted; (3) and the recommended reconstructive policy interventions/activities.

**Representative Crisis Decision-Making and Governance Literature**

The times of stability and predictability have passed away. More and more theoreticians and practitioners tend to agree that the world is experiencing more novel and discontinuous change, thus,
adding to the level of environmental uncertainties. This, in turn, tends to impact on planning and decision-making processes (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990:432; Cochran, 1994:1; Hastings, 1994:1). Crisis decision making is mainly perceived to be a crucial response function within the overall crisis management process. As explained by Rosenthal and Frijns (1991:3), the context of the decision making characteristics include ‘propositions on organisational, informational, and psychological patterns’ that occur during crisis situations.

Given the level of rapidly developing discontinuities, it is crucial for systems to develop a quick sense for learning, adaptation and responsiveness. Hastings (1994:4) talks about a responsive learning system in terms of a continuous circular process consisting of five intertwined processes, as follows: (1) the system should continuously monitor its environment so as to quickly perceive early and weak warning signals of new environmental trends; (2) information relating to environmental warning signals should be quickly disseminated internally to the system’s decision makers; (3) focusing and re-structuring the system’s skills and resources should be undertaken as needed; (4) the system should be able to carry on a quick response; and (5) provide continuous and rapid feedback, specially with high levels of environmental risk and uncertainties.

A crisis situation could be evaluated on the basis of major significant events impacting the system in focus and/or its environment (Rosenthal, 1984:103). In their article titled, ‘Expert and Decision Makers in Crisis Situations,’ Rosenthal and ‘t Hart (1991:351) refer to crisis management as ‘the making of tough decisions in an environment of threat, urgency, and uncertainty’. They emphasise the difference between decision time and clock time, which in a crisis situation may diverge considerably. Using a crisis management perspective, Rosenthal and ‘t Hart (1991) analyse the relationship between crisis decision makers and expert advisors as a means of setting recommendations for managing such relationships under severe conditions of stress and uncertainty. The multi-dimensional facets of a crisis management situation calls for a variety of specific crisis-relevant expertise and advice; which in turn impact on the quality of decisions, choices and policies. Decision makers may need to consult with a variety of expert advisers, including media communication experts (Lindheim, 1994:1), medical experts, police chiefs, fire chiefs and psychiatrists, among others (Rosenthal and ‘t Hart, 1991:351). Inter-agent policy making should be considered while managing a crisis situation. Although the main focus would be on a small crisis team, a variety of advisors may proceed to decision making positions as a means of better managing a crisis episode (Kouzmin, Jarman and Rosenthal, 1995:27).

To reduce the stress resulting from the process of decision making under crisis, the decision-maker may shift individual decision-making responsibilities to the group level (Janis, 1982:9; Rosenthal and ‘t Hart, 1991:361). Accordingly, a decision unit as opposed to an individual decision-maker, will assume responsibility for the policy or decision taken, thus, relieving the decision-maker from such obligations.

The resolution to groupthink is quite paradoxical. While used as an individual defensive mechanism, it may lead to critical policy fiascoes (‘t Hart, 1990a:5). History is full of examples illustrating the fact that decisions undertaken using the groupthink approach result in failures and fiascoes (Whyte, 1984:40). Janis (1982:9) defines groupthink as ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures’. In his book titled, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure, ‘t Hart (1990a:11) refers to the process of groupthink as excessive concurrence-seeking behaviour. He further explains that concurrence-seeking ‘is a necessary element within each collective decision process; however, it becomes excessive when it takes place too early and in too restrictive a way’.

In agreement with Janis (1972, 1982), Whyte (1984) argues that decision makers may act contrary to self-interests by making counter-productive decisions. The primary focus is on the process through which a decision is taken rather than on the consequences resulting from the decision itself. Decision failures are attributed to the groupthink phenomenon due to various reasons including the following:

- the group’s inability to change a failing policy (Staw, 1981:579);
the main theme of groupthink is concurrence seeking (t Hart, 1990a:11); and

- group polarisation is demonstrated by excessive risk seeking often observed in decision fiascoes (Janis, 1982).

Both Janis (1972) and t Hart (1990a) relate the decision quality to the process of groupthink. Given the fact that in the case study country in focus, a multi-actor and multi-interest environment prevailed, which in various instances have resulted in policy failures; a study of the groupthink process within the context of the proposed Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis is undertaken. As Janis (1972), and later on t Hart (1990a), advocate in their studies on decision-making, the quality of policies and decisions are highly dependent on the procedures and context through which they are taken. In the case study country in focus, the author attempts to analyse the environmental states and decision making contexts within which major decisions were taken during the crisis period. This, in turn, will facilitate the identification and evaluation of the properties of the leadership team needed to manage recovery.


In their article titled, 'Crisis Decision Making: The Centralisation Thesis Revisited'; t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993:35) outline the conditions for the emergence of different structural policy making patterns that governments use in coping with crisis situations. Their study aims at revisiting the centralization crisis decision making thesis based on recent empirical studies. Whether exogenous or endogenous, manufactured or genuine, a crisis situation usually calls for strong leadership. To circumvent short-term threats, policy makers tend to introduce and implement speedy interventions. As a means of qualifying the centralization theme, the authors clearly discuss seven crisis decision making response patterns as follows: informal decentralization; formal decentralization; non-decision making including decisions not taken, decisions not to make, and decisions not to act on; paralysis; situational dominance; pluralistic; and strategic evasion. Administrative centralization is the main vehicle used by government officials to structure their responses while coping with crises. A central adaptation of bureaucratic structure and culture under crisis situations converges towards the centralization of decision making (Dahl, 1978:202-3; Kouzmin, Jarman and Rosenthal, 1995:26).

t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993:20) consider a functional perspective to differentiate between strategic and operational decision making. The definitions they offer are as follows: 'Strategic decision making refers to the choices, or lack of them, that set the crucial parameters for intervention, where as operational decisions focus on technical issues and details of implementation'. Given the focus on technical implementation issues in crisis coping situations, it becomes quite possible that a number of major crisis coping decisions are made at lower governmental levels. This, in itself, opens up various questions related to the appropriate leadership strategies to adopt in chaotic situations. The authors advocate three main determinants to crisis response patterns, namely:

- the degree of perceived time pressure;
- operational versus strategic levels of decision; and
the pre-crisis decision structure. Such an analysis is significant in assessing the usefulness - in terms of functions and dysfunctions - of alternative modes of crisis decision making structures and regimes adopted in chaotic situations.

In an article titled, 'Crisis Decision-Making in The Netherlands', Rosenthal (1984:103) examines governmental decision-making processes as related to a number of post-war dramatic events in The Netherlands. This specific study does not only open up new pathways to the study of crisis decision-making in The Netherlands, but it also provides interesting insights to the general analysis of crisis decision-making. It examines four basic dimensions of decision-making under crisis, namely the organisation of crisis decision-making; information and communication processes; and the psychological features and the rationality of crisis decision-making. These dimensions are quite significant to the analysis of the changes of the post-war political system within the case study country in focus.

As previously mentioned, crises constitute "occasions for decision" (Robinson, 1969:81). They can be viewed as catalysts for change and opportunities for policy intervention (Helou, 1995:n:30). Accordingly, within the context of decision making, a crisis can be defined as 'a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social system, which under time pressure and uncertain circumstances - necessitates making critical decisions' (Rosenthal, 1984:104).

The proposed Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis represents a critical planning tool for studying the impact of various leadership strategies on the formulation of domestic reconstructive policies in the aftermath of a crisis situation. In his article titled, 'A Paradigm of Crisis Decision Making', Ahrari (1986:71) argues that the self-imposed necessity to quickly respond to a crisis event involving the generation of a policy decision leads the decision maker to embrace a policy option that otherwise would not have been adopted. He further argues that for the policy response to outlast, it must endure under "normal" conditions involving that same policy.

The current study shows that the various public policy approaches - including the rational model (Hopwood, 1974:124) and garbage canning (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972:3) among others - are not individually applicable to the formulation of a comprehensive reconstructive policy programme at the national level of analysis. Although single policy making paradigms could be individually applied during limited intervals of a "creeping crisis", the current study argues that decision makers tend to shift among the existing decision making paradigms as needed. The proposed RGPA represents an interesting paradigm of leadership strategies and crisis reconstructive policy making. Accordingly, the RGPA argues for a temporal developmental governance paradigm, thus, allowing reconstruction leaders to shift among the existing leadership strategies and decision making models during different environmental states of a prolonged multi-crisis situation.

Although there is a variety of political theories and models guiding political and administrative behaviour, the body of knowledge governing leadership response patterns under crisis situations is rather limited. A review of representative leadership governance literature proves that it is very difficult to prescribe common leadership patterns that apply to similar crisis episodes. Temporal governance crisis response strategies tend to be situation specific. Since various categories of macro crises share certain key properties, including the notions of threat, uncertainty and time pressures (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Charles, 1989:5); a representative leadership literature review and an evaluation of governance patterns that prevailed in past crisis situations would help to develop, and better shape, future crisis governance response strategies. For each decline/recovery environmental state, differentiated strategies could be identified as plausible appropriate patterns of crisis management.

A popular traditional governmental decision making response to crisis has been centralization (’t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:12-16). Nevertheless, in an article titled, 'Inter-Organisational Policy Processes in Disaster Management'; Kouzmin, Jarman and Rosenthal (1995:26) argue that the centralized crisis decision making pattern emerging during a crisis situation depends on various factors including the strategic versus operational level of the response, the extent of time pressure, personal properties of key actors, organisational structure, and infrastructural constraints - including the type of communication facilities available.
Dror (1993a:14) explains that "deep" policy thinking and crisis-opportunity steering represent two inter-twined elements of governance upgrading. He stresses the fact that crisis handling should be integrated with both opportunity utilisation and "deep" policy thinking. In a later study, Dror (1994) uses the Middle-East Peace Process to explore the problem of uncertainty and its impact on the decision making processes and statecraft.

Earlier interesting studies of public policy, leadership and statecraft were undertaken by Wildavsky (1979; 1984; 1988; Singer and Wildavsky, 1993). Following Wildavsky, Dror (1984:127) depicts uncertainty as a main difficulty facing public policy makers and statecraft. He explains that although uncertainty is widely acknowledged as a major obstacle to decision making, it is rather neglected and mis-handled in public policy literature. He further discusses statecraft as 'prudent risk taking within the context of moral fuzzy mega-gambling with history'. In a way of conclusion, Dror explains that the development of learning curves and social experimentation does not work with ongoing radical transformation. Such political transformations lead public administrators and political leaders to face severe uncertainties in the face of critical strategic choices.

An overview of leadership literature shows that little is known about political leadership requisites in chaotic situations, apart from perhaps charismatic leadership strategies (Dror, 1994:127). Minimal research is undertaken in relations to situational governance patterns under crisis circumstances. The proposed RGPA argues that different patterns of governance tend to emerge following changes in crisis events. The progressive leadership path analysis developed in the current study specifically proposes that governance strategies are situation specific. Political leaders and public administrators tend to adapt their strategies based on changing crisis episodes. A flexible situational leadership pathway clearly outlines the movement among the leadership strategies as the system itself shifts from one environmental state to another.

Theoretical Frameworks and Interpretive Methodological Approaches

Representative Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management Theories and Models

Regardless of the theoretical framework used to crisis management and conflict resolution, two core assumptions need to be made about (i) the nature of the conflict, and (ii) how desirable conflict is (Dunford, 1992:216). This study assumes that an optimal level of conflict exists for any system, thus, leaders should not aim at instituting an environment without any conflict. Socio-political conflict may represent a catalyst for long-term constructive social change, thus, positively impacting a system's overall performance. In an article titled, "Conflict Management" and 'Conflict Resolution' are not Synonymous Terms', Robbins (1978:68) argues that the term conflict management is preferred to conflict resolution because of the negative implications that could be attached to the latter term. Himes (1980:235-6) also explains that conflict resolution refers to the termination of a fully developed non-legitimate conflict and the restoration of social relations among the actors involved within the realm of legitimacy. Burton (1972:10-11) elucidates that although the traditional view is that conflict is essentially subjective, there is an objective element to it, namely the inevitable conflicts of interest. To illustrate his point, he discusses the Middle-East situation as a case of subjective motivational perceptions. The fears that both the Israelis and the Arabs have of each other's motives limit their cooperation in the division and/or allocation of the disputed resources.

The political orientated body of knowledge available to analyse and resolve conflicts is rather extensive. Burton (1972:12) explains that conflict approaches cover two main areas of study, namely (i) the nature of world society, and (ii) the nature of conflict itself. In regards to the origins of conflict, Burton (1972:18) postulates that leadership interests may lead to the maintenance and exaggeration of conflict through propaganda, thus, raise its intensity. While on the other hand, functional cooperations in common interest tasks - such as reconstruction after crisis - can assist the resolution of conflict.

Diehl (1987:48) argues that although, in theory, peacekeeping should lead to conflict resolution by maintaining a suitable environment for mediation, various cases in different troubled areas have
proved that in practice peacekeeping has failed as a conflict resolution mechanism. A good example to illustrate the failure of the deployment of peacekeeping troops as a means of generating peace treaties is that of Beirut, Lebanon. An attempt to resolve the Lebanese crisis at the national and international levels has been undertaken through the deployment of the Multi-national Forces (MNF) from Western nations in Lebanon. The MNF has not only failed in achieving a cease-fire, but it has also failed in drawing an agreement among the conflicting factions; thus, leading to intensify the fighting.

Diehl (1987:49-50) provides some reasons for the failure of peacekeeping as a tool for solving international disputes and offers interesting alternatives for its improvement. Among the reasons he cited are the following:

- Peacekeeping troops have been unable to perform their supervisory functions. Again, Lebanon in this case would serve as a good example to illustrate the inability of the MNF to at least retain a cease-fire;
- without much guidance on the initiation of a peace process, the main reliance is on the fighting factions - parties, militias or nations - to initiate and proceed with a peace agreement;
- in emergency situations peacekeeping forces are usually deployed without the arrangement for mediation mechanisms. An agreement for the mediation mechanisms to be used may arise in the context of the peacekeeping mission; and
- through removing urgency and decreasing the level of hostility, peacekeeping may contribute to the prolongation of the conflict situation.

"Cultural pluralism" has been referred to as a main cause of conflict situations. "Cultural pluralism" is also used as a synonym for "cultural" or "social diversity" (Dahl, 1978:191). A pluralistic system is one which allows for a substantial degree of autonomy to be practised by the main units and/or sub-units within the system in focus. Dahl (1978:192) examines the causes of a system’s pluralism including some of the commonly proposed solutions. He further explains that some of the proposed remedies could be more problematic than the pluralistic problem itself. Among the causes Dahl (1978) outlines for pluralism within a political system are the following:

- The amount of latent conflictive pluralism produced by the existing different cleavage lines in various countries;
- the nature of the socio-economic order prevailing in the country could act as a main cause leading to socio-cultural diversity. It is crucial to focus on control rather than ownership of the economy to better understand the political order within a specific country;
- the nature of the ruling political regime affects the degree of pluralism existing within a country. Limiting the barriers to opposition makes it easier for public conflict to appear, thus, further manifesting the elements of conflictive pluralism. This is especially apparent in pluralistic countries characterised by a number of languages, religions, ideologies, ethnic origins and national identifications. Dahl (1978:197) further explains that a system’s pluralism is ‘both a cause and an effect of the liberalisation and democratisation of hegemonic regimes’; and
- the concrete structure of the political institutions can also affect the level of autonomy practised by the major units and sub-units within a system. A multi-party system, for example, increases the number and probably the level of autonomy practised by the major units and sub-units within a system. A multi-party system, for example, increases the number and probably the level of autonomy practised by the political parties/militias, as is evident with the case of Lebanon. In addition, the degree of autonomy practised by the political institutions are evaluated in systems characterised as "consociational democracies".
Sociologists have maintained a continuous interest in social conflict. Karl Marx described social conflict as a dynamic force which would change the Western world (Himes, 1980:2). In his book titled, Conflict and Conflict Management, Himes (1980:9-10) discusses how a civil strife - including an internal war - changes from one form of conflict to another over time. What might seem to start as an internal religious struggle between two or more parties might develop into an organised regional and/or international conflict. He actually describes international wars as the ultimate form of social conflict. Wars tend to have a great impact upon the communities/nations involved. In various war cases resulting in victorious and defeated groups, a new social order would ultimately emerge.

Himes (1980:13) reformulates the definition of social conflict to 'refer to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power, resources, and other scarce values'. Various political conflict resolution theories and more managerially-oriented crisis management models have been developed to assist political leaders and public administrators in evaluating and managing chaotic events. A representative conflict management literature review reveals a number of conflict resolution definitions. Conflict resolution has been defined as the 'processes of communication and exchange between collective actors engaged in non-legitimate conflict, which seek to terminate non-legitimate conflict and to restore social relations between the actors' (Himes, 1980:235). Burton (1990:2) refers to a problem-solving conflict resolution process in terms of the transformation of relationships in particular cases by solving the problems which led to the conflict in the first place. He uses the term conflict “prevention” because of the negative connotation associated with the term “prevention”. Burton (1990:3) explains that conflict prevention refers to the removal of the causes of conflict including the promotion of an atmosphere that creates cooperative relationships.

Various models of conflict resolution and crisis management relate to general theories of behaviour. Complex issues can be effectively evaluated through the analysis of basic conventional terms such as authority; legitimacy; legality; values; norms; power relationships; democracy; deterrence equations; ethnicity; ... (Burton, 1990:209). The current research study is phenomenon driven by a set of multiple crisis events. It is guided by a series of primary and secondary research questions rather than hypothesis testing.

The current study builds on two main models: First, the managerially-oriented Contingency Typology (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:410-4; Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:418) is used to define decision-making contexts, whereby individual crises can be identified in terms of four different networks. It outlines four decision-making contexts; namely (1) Algorithm; (2) Opportunity Cost; (3) Muddling Through; and (4) Crisis. Within the same context, the Risk Path Analysis Model (Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:421; Jarman and Kouzmin, 1994:409-13) allows for the progression of uncertainty scenarios. Secondly, the Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration Model (Linz and Stepan, 1978:19) is used to define the elements of re-equilibration; namely legitimacy; efficacy; effectiveness and stability; and performance. In addition, the Decline-Recovery Model (Hirschman, 1970) is used to identify and study the inter-relationships among the three main non-market internal post-crisis recuperation mechanisms proposed in the current study; namely, the brain influx movement, media management and adaptive governance patterns. These models are further elaborated in chapter three of the current study.

Representative Longitudinal Reconstructive Case Study Analysis

The methodological paradigm used in the current research comprises the utilisation of a qualitative, single longitudinal case study analysis. Reconstructive logic is applied as a means of developing crucial learning curves in terms of transferable reconstructive policy agendas. An in-depth analysis of the Lebanese crisis (1975-1991) reveals valuable theoretical and methodological transferable implications for the analysis of evolutionary/incremental stages of reconstruction. Such research findings - in terms of reconstructive policy imperatives - could be further adapted to be applied in other systems/nations displaying warning symptoms associated with creeping environmental states of instability (Rosenthall, 't Hart and Charles, 1989:27-8). Given the nature of the questions used to guide the current research, the case study method is used to allow for the descriptive research needed to evaluate the components of the proposed model and their inter-relationships (Yin, 1989:13).
Although qualitative research is not as accepted as quantitative approaches, qualitative descriptive research tools continue to be frequently used as significant modes of inquiry in the social sciences. Descriptive research methods are widely used in sociology, community psychology, anthropology, criminology, political science and public administration, among other disciplines. Specifically, qualitative case studies are extensively used for policy research. Marshall and Rossman (1989:9 -10) provide valuable research examples to illustrate the application of qualitative research investigation methods in the previously mentioned areas of inquiry.

An open system approach is utilised to evaluate the crisis management process within the case study country. Different rehabilitative policy agendas relating to the internal reform forces under study are examined. To be able to generate inter-related reconstructive policy imperatives, the current research slices through the layers of the crisis in question. This includes the development of a brain drain-driven reconstructive policy agenda, a media-driven rehabilitative policy scenario and a set of governance policy imperatives. A bureau political perspective to the study of the decline-recovery forces is applied to evaluate the interplay between the internal and external environmental forces. The above mentioned policy intervention slices are finally integrated as a means of generating a holistic reconstruction programme for the case study country in focus.

As is the case with all qualitative research, case study analysis demands simplicity and structure. The data needs to be well disciplined and the logical links among the variables considered, including the internal reform forces in question. Within the case study country undertaken in the current research, each of the three internal recuperation mechanisms - namely, brain influx movements, media regulation and flexible governance patterns - is first individually evaluated before integrating them into an overall national, internal reconstruction strategy. The internal and external policy scenarios are finally juxtaposed as a means of evaluating the interplay between the national, regional and global decline-recovery forces.

It is the view here that the main general purpose for the development of concepts and theories is to provide an explanation of how the world works. The case study analysis provides a good method for explaining particular situations. Although each and every crisis is rather unique, through applying the case study method to investigate a particular problem, the experience could be passed on. Transferable policy imperatives can be developed and adapted to other systems experiencing similar warning signals of instability and lack of performance.

According to Ragan (1992:3-4), the term case is a basic methodological term that has been misrepresented and corrupted over time. It has gained multiple, and at times contradictory, meanings. He clearly states that social scientists should strive to clarify and differentiate the meaning of cases as methodological constructs. The basic question remains "what is a case?" This is a question that produces diverse responses (Ragan, 1992:16). Various definitions of the term case, case history and the case study method have been offered. Alternative representative definitions include the following:

- ‘Case study is an umbrella term for a family of research methods having in common the decision to focus an enquiry around an instance’ (Adelman et al., 1983:2).

- ‘A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used ... The case study is a separate research strategy that has its own research designs ... including: (1) a study’s question; (2) its propositions, if any; (3) its units of analysis; (4) the logic linking the data to the propositions; and (5) the criteria for interpreting the findings’ (Yin, 1989:23-9).

- ‘A case is a description of an actual situation. It describes how the current position developed (Easton, 1982:1). Although a case is a unique instance, a single case study must be able to stand on its own (Adelman, 1983:8; Easton, 1982:78).

- Winterburn (1987:10) bases his definition of case studies on decision - making. He clearly states that the case study method ‘usually involves consideration of an actual example requiring the synthesis of a large amount of different kinds of information, and the
making of recommendations or decisions. It is applicable to ... any subject that studies the making of decisions'.

- In her definition, Hakim (1987:61) outlines an important discriminating variable. According to her, case studies 'take as their subject one or more selected examples of a social entity - such as communities, social groups, organisations, events, life histories, families, work teams, roles or relationships - that are studied using a variety of data collection techniques. ... Using a variety of data collection techniques and methods allows for a more rounded, holistic study than with any other design'. In her book titled, Research Design: Strategies and Choices in the Design of Social Research, Hakim (1987:64) discusses the degree of fit between the questions addressed by the research study and the selection of a suitable case study to investigate.

Yin (1989:20) clearly explains that it is advantageous to use the case study method when the following three conditions are met:

- A “How” or “Why” explanatory question is being asked;
- the question relates to a contemporary set of events; and
- the investigator has little or no control over the events.

Yin (1989) provides a rather comprehensive survey of various aspects of the case study research; including design, preparation for data collection, analysis of evidence, and documentation and reporting research outcomes. In addition, he provides examples and illustrations from a wide range of social science disciplines - including policy research and analysis.

Easton (1982) clearly discusses the differences between using single longitudinal cases and multiple case studies. He explains that single longitudinal cases are to be used under the following conditions:

- Unique situations are to be studied;
- situations which are critical to the understanding of the world; whereby
- the context and content of the case study itself is more important.

When deciding on whether to apply a single case study analysis or a series of multiple cases, there is always a trade off between the number of the cases undertaken and the context per case. With multiple case study research, the context per case would be rather limited as opposed to a single longitudinal case study analysis. A process time research allows for the application of reconstructive logic whereby researchers go back through the crisis layers and study the interaction among the crisis variables/forces concerned. Although the implementation of the new rehabilitative policies lead to the establishment of a new order - which is usually quite different from the previous one - such a process serves as an effective uncertainty reduction mechanism. The current research could be described as a case study of turbulence at the national level of analysis. It is the case of a country under transition in terms of its long-term decline-recovery cycle. The main focus is on the recovery and rehabilitative phase of the overall crisis management process. Accordingly, this research could best be described as a case analysis investigating a rather “holistic” reconstructive programme geared towards the rebirth of a nation.

The case study method has traditionally been heavily criticised (Yin, 1989:10). Although case studies have been frequently used as a teaching device, the social science literature pays little attention to the case study approach as a research tool (Perry and Coote, 1994:2). In an article titled, ‘The Case Study as a Serious Research Strategy’, Yin (1981:97) summarises three of the frequent stereotypes of the case study method as follows: (1) case studies should be used at the exploratory stages; (2) cases can only lead to unconfirmable conclusions; and (3) case studies are really a method of last resort. Nevertheless, research undertaken by Yin and Gwaltney (1981:575) clearly suggests that the above mentioned stereotype is rather wrong and misleading. In addition, in his research titled,
'Case Study and Theory in Political Science', Eckstein (1975:124-31) provides an exhaustive summary of the main objections to the use of case studies as well as the methods used to overcome them.

Just like various modes of qualitative research, social researchers applying a single longitudinal case study analysis may face a number of limitations. Case study research is often attacked on the basis of difficulty of generalisability or establishing external validity (Blau, 1963:303; Bolgar, 1965:30; Eckstein, 1975:128; Philliber et al., 1980:65; Hoaglin et al., 1982:10-12; Stake, 1987:75; Yin, 1989:21). How can researchers generalise from the one case study outcome? It is the uniqueness and complexity of different case studies that limit their bases for representation and prediction.

Adelman et al (1983:2) clearly explain that generalisations produced by case study research is quite legitimate when they relate to 'generalising about the case rather than from it'. They specifically state that 'case studies allow generalisations either about an instance or from an instance to a class. Their peculiar strength lies in their attention to the subtlety and complexity of the case in its own right' (Adelman et al, 1983:8). It should also be kept in mind that various types of social research - including experiments - generate outcome from data gathered from an unrepresentative sample (Blau, 1963:303). Yin (1989:21-23) clearly explains that case studies, just like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions rather than to populations or universes. He distinguishes between "analytic generalisations" and "statistical generalisations". With single case study research, social researchers should aim at generating analytic generalisations (Yin, 1989:40).

Another main limitation is the problem of bias that can result while choosing the perspective used to study a particular situation (Campbell, 1975:179; Yin, 1989:21). Biases can also impact the conduct of experiments and other research strategies, including the design of questionnaires for surveys. In addition, the subjective compelling explanations generated through single qualitative case study research cannot be considered as dominant biases (Campbell, 1975:182). Nevertheless, it is not enough to be aware of the biases, one must be able to limit them.

A traditionally cited shortcoming of the case study method is that it is limited to impressionistic information. This study argues that this is rather a misconception of the significance of the case study analysis method as a valuable objective research tool. Although longitudinal research consists of mainly qualitative studies, it is possible to quantify the data relating to the variables under study. Thus, researchers are able to generate powerful statistical analyses through applying longitudinal case studies. Another criticism to the application of a longitudinal case study approach is the time involved in preparing and documenting the results, which are frequently described as massive and unreadable. Nevertheless, there are alternative ways of composing the case study report whereby lengthy narratives can be avoided (Yin, 1989:137).

With culturally specific cases, imputed national characteristics constitute a principal cultural constituent (Tixier and Berridge, 1985). The more culture specific the case is, the more challenging it is to adapt the case findings to another situation having different cultural aspects. It is not only the cultural factors inherent in the case itself, but the cultural aspects of writing the case findings and their implications that should be considered (Winterburn, 1987:53). Both case writers and readers need to be aware of the cultural facets inherent in the case study and its outcome in terms of the developed policy implications generated out of the study itself. Nevertheless, cases with different cultural dimensions can also aid the learning experience about the culture(s) concerned (Winterburn, 1987:54-5).

There exists a number of constraints limiting the outcome and significance of single case study research. Nevertheless, the case study method could be considered as an interpretive research approach that involves more theory building than hypothesis testing (Perry and Coote, 1994:4). Various researchers argue for the use of a single case study analysis, not just as a powerful learning tool but as a means of policy-relevant theory building method (Eckstein, 1975:127; George, 1979:43-44; Hoaglin, 1982:121; Adelman et al., 1983:8; Liljegren, 1988:437; Kinch, 1993:22). A single case study should be able to stand by itself (Adelman et al., 1983:8) and have an "anatomy of its own" in terms of narrative, plot and time structures (Towl, 1969:66-68).

A considerable number of advantages relevant to the application of the case study method are worth highlighting. Such advantages become quite evident given the increasing frequency within which case studies are currently being used as a main methodological construct (Yin, 1981:97; Stake,
A process/event time longitudinal single research case analysis allows for the gathering of crucial data that is otherwise difficult to capture through the study of response units over time. Longitudinal case study researchers tend to benefit from the rich data and the detailed account of the events embedded in single cases (Rosenthal and Pijnenburg, 1991:5). A longitudinal process time case study research becomes rather an essential methodological approach to investigate dynamic decline-recovery cycles, in terms of massaging past, as well as present, data.

A main advantage to using single case studies is that by allowing for field research, the researcher is provided with the opportunity to go back and forth between preliminary analysis and further data collection as needed before the final outcome is generated (Blau, 1963:303). This obviously allows to test the validity of the findings being developed. In addition, case studies provide some archive of descriptive material which could be considered as a valuable data source to be used for future reinterpretations (Adelman et al., 1983:8). At the same time, the researcher is able to gain more depth and detail regarding the particular situation under study (Philliber et al., 1980:64).

Another important advantage to the use of the single case study approach as discussed by Adelman et al. (1983:9) is that cases are ‘a step to action’. They represent ‘reconstructions of action-contexts’ (Kemmis, 1983:132). They originate from a real-world situation and they finally end up contributing to it. Their contributions, in terms of the feedback resulting from the case itself, could be used in the formulation and development of future policies.

It is the view here that the single longitudinal case study method has made significant contributions so far. This study argues that a single longitudinal process/event time case study approach would best serve such research pertaining to the development of holistic reconstructive policy agendas. An in-depth longitudinal case study analysis of the Lebanese socio-political system for twenty three years, covering the period 1972-1995, reveals valuable normative and predictive theoretical and methodological transferable implications for the analysis of evolutionary/incremental stages of recovery and reconstruction agendas of other non-linear social systems/countries displaying warning symptoms previously associated with creeping environmental states of instability.

Representative Reconstructive Logic Studies and Learning Literature

Elaborate longitudinal studies represent long-term investigations geared towards helping policy planners and public administrators understand the behaviour of a particular system over time (Hoaglin et al., 1982:108). For policy research, longitudinal studies are needed to repeatedly solicit data relevant to the same variables over time. As applied to the study of chaotic situations, longitudinal research is needed to nail down the main causes or critical points of discontinuity as a means of introducing relevant policy interventions.

The single longitudinal case study method has been widely used to study public sector bureaucracy, administration, policy development and structural social change (Stein, 1952; Blau, 1963; Towl, 1969; Lauren, 1979; Hoaglin et al., 1982; Rosenthal et al., 1989; 't Hart, 1990b; Ragin and Becker, 1992). Case studies have also been applied to the study of crisis management, disaster management and public policy (Rosenthal et al., 1989; 't Hart, 1990b). Furthermore, cases have been used in various other areas including social anthropology, comparative political science and comparative sociology (Kidder, 1971; Campbell, 1975). In policy research studies, the qualitative longitudinal case study approach is widely used to illustrate 'good practice' (Hakim, 1987:61).

The single case study method has also been applied at various levels of analysis, including the national level (Comfort, 1999; Khondker, 1989; Lowenhardt and van den Berg, 1989; Rosenthal, 1989); community level (Assefa and Wahhaftig, 1989; Harper, 1992); and the corporate, organisational level, including the analysis of governmental agencies (Blau, 1963; Towl, 1969; Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989; Settle, 1989; Turner and Toft, 1989).

Causal research could be defined as a ‘term which is used to describe those methodologies which are concerned to establish, in their own terms, where causality lies in the social system under study’
(Easton, 1982:55). Axelrod (1976:5) clearly explains that the establishment of causation is essential to alternative policy evaluation. In addition, Axelrod advocates the use of “cognitive mapping” to highlight the main concept variables in question including policy alternatives and causes and effects.

The longitudinal single case study approach allows for the use of reconstructive logic, which in turn is widely applied to study cause and effect relationships. Reconstructive logic represents a valuable tool for taking a “road back” into the various slices of the events under question (Hirschman, 1970:89). Establishing causation is rather essential to policy-makers. It is important for public administrators and policy planners to be able to measure the effect of their policy interventions, given their self-interest relating to the maintenance of a favourable political climate, public acceptance and the cooperation of program staff (Hoaglin et al., 1982:4).

In their book titled, *On Purposeful Systems*, Ackoff and Emery (1972) provide an interesting discussion of cause and effect relationships. They define causality in terms of time-slices belonging to the same natural mechanical system. A time-slice in turn is defined as “that part of the natural world that interests an investigator”. The size of the slice itself is determined by the purpose of the investigation and the required accuracy of the outcome. Ackoff and Emery (1972:20) explain that the natural mechanical system is composed of “time-slices and a set of laws applicable to them”. Within the same natural mechanical system, a preceding time-slice becomes the cause of the following time-slice, being its effect.

It is the view here that the ultimate goal of a holistic reconstructive programme is to develop a purposeful system (Ackoff and Emery, 1972:31), which can (1) learn from previous experiences; (2) select its own goals as well as the means used to achieve them, and (3) adapt its goals in response to changing environmental conditions.

The actual design and testing of a particular explanation is perceived to be the main objective of explanatory case studies, which clearly implies the existence of causality (Yin, 1981:107). The case study approach relates to the integration of the case study data around the theoretical framework(s) selected by the researcher as a means of establishing causal links among the variables under study. Determining the causes and evaluating the impact of the three main internal decline - recovery forces identified in the current study - namely, multi-national brain drain, media chaos and inflexible governance patterns - is of significant benefit in terms of identifying and analysing post-crisis conditions needed to mitigate the impact of the decline forces and facilitate the pursuit of recovery mechanisms needed to incur recovery and reconstruction. Longitudinal explanatory case studies are used to establish causality. Accordingly, event time and process time become more relevant than simply clock time, because the boundary between the phenomena under study and the context may not be clear.

To advance, empirical research and logical thinking should be undertaken simultaneously (Yin, 1989:12). Rosenthal and Pijnenburg (1991:3) discuss reconstructive logic in terms of a “what ... if ...” perspective. In other words, how would the crisis management process have been better, if the crisis managers had pursued alternative paths of decision making at the successive crisis decision events. Rosenthal and Pijnenburg (1991:4) propose three questions to guide reconstructive analysis as follows:

- ‘Why and how was a specific decision that had actually been taken, made?’
- ‘What decision would have been a more satisfactory option?’
- ‘What consequences would each of the more satisfactory options have had for the final outcome of the decision making process?’

Reconstructive logic has been applied in a wide variety of longitudinal studies to trace the chronology of events leading to a chaotic situation and to identify crucial reconstructive policy intervention points (Thompson and Tuden, 1959; Bauer, 1968; Dror, 1969; Allison, 1971; Janis, 1972; Axelrod, 1976; Hogarth, 1980; Ford and Hegarty, 1984; Christensen, 1985; Herek, Janis and Huth, 1987; Schwenk, 1988; Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989; Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990). With the application of reconstructive logic, the researcher goes back through the layers of the crisis event to investigate the interaction among the variables within the system under study. Although the system does not go
back to the same pre-crisis algorithmic order, using reconstructive logic aids in reducing the uncertainty situation. Cutting through the slices of a crisis event allows for the evaluation of not just the apparent problem(s) facing the system, but also permits an in-depth evaluation of possible administrative failures that pave the way to a rather unstable and turbulent environment (Charles, 1989:163).

Another main advantage to the application of reconstructive logic within the context of an explanatory case study research is that it allows for causal inquiries and, thus, the development of causal explanations (Yin, 1989:15). Developing causal relationships are essential for the establishment of internal validity, which in turn represents an important logical test judging the quality of a research design (Yin, 1989:40). An intensively studied example of both descriptive and explanatory case studies is Allison’s (1971) research titled, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Various researchers have made reference to Allison’s (1971) work (Yin, 1989:15; ‘t Hart, 1990:238; Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:421; Rosenthal and Pijnenburg, 1991:1).

Crisis managers learn from their previous experiences and they tend to apply lessons previously learnt in the management of emerging crises. By emphasising the importance of developing alternative pathways to crisis progression, through the empirical reconstruction of historical case data, reconstructive logic serves as a valuable method for facilitating learning about the crisis itself and the crisis management processes pursued (Rosenthal and Pijnenburg, 1991:1). Elmore (1982) stresses the fact that crisis managers learn from the application of reconstructive logic through “backward mapping”. In addition, cognitive mapping provides for understanding and enhancing crisis decision making (Axelrod, 1976:3). With the use of reconstructive logic, practitioners may learn that with a deficient crisis management process they may end up with only short-term remedies to longer term problems, thus, allowing unpleasant surprises to unfold in the future (Rosenthal and Pijnenburg, 1991:4-5).

A main contribution of the current research is that it adds to the existing knowledge of the ways in which crisis managers learn from coping with crises. It also highlights crucial difficulties related to the deduction and implementation of lessons previously learned. Usually there are problems associated with both the lessons learned and the learning process itself. As Rosenthal and ‘t Hart (1989:382) suggest, lessons from the past may be wrong, even stubborn. Even when applicable, it is difficult to integrate the lessons previously learned with current crises. Crisis managers’ preconceived notions about cause and effect relationships may lead to the attribution of causality to the wrong contextual factor(s) or to the misunderstanding of adaptations in the contextual factor(s) and resulting implications (Ford, 1984:272). In addition, preconceived notions about cause and effect linkages relating to a system’s structure impact the system’s actions, motivation and strategic choices (Haberstroh and Gerwin, 1972:132; Ford, 1984:272).


Although each and every crisis is rather unique, analysis of the conditions enclosing such crises show the existence of common elements of behaviour among a wide range of similar crises (Toft and Reynolds, 1994:47-8). Accordingly, a system’s post-crisis learning would also exhibit common elements. Such commonalities allow one to “design” crisis management learning models. It is essential for a system to adopt a learning ideology as a means of continuously adapting itself as needed in environmental contingencies. This, in turn, will help the system to respond to future crises, especially as conflict resolution in itself is considered to be an analytical and learning process (Burton, 1990:206).

It is difficult enough to deal with an unexpected and unmanageable situation, let alone to learn from it. The socio-political and time pressures associated with creeping macro-crisis tend to limit the capacity of crisis managers to learn (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:10). The chaotic event could also be quite dramatic and so disturbing that the crisis itself may end up curtailing the learning process.
At the same time, it should also be kept in mind that the “opposite side” can also learn from previous crises (Rosenthal, Charles and ‘t Hart, 1989:29).

Available research studies show that there are inadequate learning patterns in governmental agencies (Etheredge, 1981; 1985; Rosenthal and ‘t Hart, 1989). As Rosenthal and ‘t Hart (1989:383) explain, situations have occurred whereby crisis managers learn the wrong lessons, misuse lessons previously learned, even over-generalise from previous experiences (May, 1972). Notwithstanding that each and every crisis situation is unique, crisis managers utilise their previous experiences when dealing with unexpected emergencies (Rosenthal, Charles and ‘t Hart, 1989:28).

The current research aims at the re-construction of optimal - or, at least, satisfying - reconstruction scenarios based on empirical-derived crisis events and the associated crisis decisions made during the Lebanese events (1975-1991). As a means of achieving the rehabilitative scenario-writing objective, this research clearly highlights the characteristics of a scenario format, as outlined by Rosenthal and Pijnenburg (1991:4) - namely, crisis processual dimensions, evaluation of crucial variables and the undertaking of predictive as well as prescriptive analyses. To provide the raw material of the Lebanese events, the current study includes (i) a general Middle-East regional chronology; (ii) a detailed Lebanon case chronology covering the period 1972-1996; (iii) a comprehensive list of political parties/militias to identify who was who throughout the crisis years; and (iv) a list of media channels to identify the who’s who of media in Lebanon during the crisis and post-crisis period.

Although detailed chronologies are prepared to empirically analyse the crisis events of the case study country in focus, process and event time, as opposed to clock time, will guide the analysis of the events themselves and the relevant crisis and post-crisis decisions.

To better understand the Lebanese (1975-1991) crisis management processes, crucial variables - including internal/external reform forces, the domestic and international actors in the Lebanese politics, and the inter-relationships among them - are identified and evaluated. The analysis undertaken throughout the case study country is guided by empirical facts. In addition, the outcome of the current study includes transferable prescriptive policy imperatives dealing with a system’s recovery and reconstruction after turbulence.

Conclusion: Literature Gaps and Suggestions For Future Research

Through applying reconstructive logic, strategic management theories and crisis management models, a considerable number of studies have previously but partially dealt with various aspects related to the formulation, implementation and control of recovery and reconstruction studies (Bauer, 1968; Dror, 1969; Allison, 1971; Janis and Mann, 1977; Hogarth, 1980; Ford and Hegarty, 1984; Christensen, 1985; Herek, Janis and Huth, 1987; Lyles and Thomas, 1988; Schwenk, 1988 Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989). There have been relatively no discussions linking leadership pathways and power configurations to a set of inter-related reconstruction evolutionary/incremental phases given various decision making contexts. The whole area of contingent leadership strategies given chaotic environments is rather underwritten. Not much is known about the essential leadership requisites needed in crisis situations. Further research is, thus, needed to better evaluate plausible contingent leadership pathways under turbulent conditions.

The existing gap in the literature is addressed in this research in terms of evaluating a contingency governance path analysis in relations to plausible evolutionary/incremental rehabilitative stages. A bureau - political perspective is utilised, allowing one to examine the relationships among the various internal and external forces impacting on - and in certain instances shaping - the leadership strategies practised and the reconstruction activities undertaken during the post-crisis period.

The contribution of this research is two-fold. The current study utilises both basic and applied research. Conceptual and theoretical work is being undertaken through the development of a Reconstruction-Governance Contingency Path Analysis. In addition, conceptual work is undertaken in terms of developing definitions of such concepts as macro-crises and macro-crisis-management processes. Applied research is also being undertaken through exploring a longitudinal case study.
country. Since Lebanon has been a case of real issues and problems for the past two decades, it has been chosen as the case study country. The diverse problems facing the country include economic stagnation; cultural issues; national identity problems; geo-political divisions; and social schisms and instability, among others.

The main purpose of this research was to serve as a planning tool in terms of a system’s recovery after turbulence. The current study serves as a crucial supporting study for future conceptual and applied research in the field of macro-crisis management. Future research work will seek a comprehensive analysis of the “points of discontinuity” identified by the current research study as a means of developing and evaluating normative and predictive transferable policy imperatives critical to rehabilitative public planners and reconstruction policy makers.
Chapter III

Systems Evolution After Turbulence:
Reconstruction-Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA)

Sections:

Introduction

Strategic Crisis Decision Making: A Contingency Approach

Sources of Information - Theoretical Frameworks
Decline - Recovery Model
Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model
Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration Model

Limitations and Convergence of the Frameworks

Contingent Stages of Evolution and Leadership Path Networking: The
Reconstruction Governance Contingency Path Analysis
Leadership Path Networking
Chapter III

System’s Evolution After Turbulence: Reconstruction-Governance Contingency Path Analysis

Introduction

The main aim of this study is the development of a conceptual reconstruction model geared towards a non-linear social system’s recovery after turbulence. The proposed reconstruction model of macro-crisis multi-level contingency programme defines decision-making contexts and their possible re-equilibration elements, as they relate to evolutionary/incremental reconstruction stages. A developmental leadership path analysis represents a crucial component of the proposed model as it impacts on recovery and reconstructive activities.

Chapter three presents the framework developed in the current study, namely the Reconstruction-Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA), as a policy level methodology. The RGPA represents a developmental leadership path model based on evolutionary/incremental stages of recovery and reconstruction after turbulence. This chapter consists of two main sections. The first part covers the fundamental theoretical frameworks used to develop the current study, as well as provide for the identification of the recovery elements of the proposed model. Accordingly, this section consists of an analytical evaluation of the Decline - Recovery Model (Hirschman, 1970), the Breakdown and Re-equilibration Model, and the Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model. Finally, this section presents the limitations and convergence of the previously mentioned frameworks.

The second section features a detailed analysis of the developmental leadership path network as it relates to a set of inter-related evolutionary/incremental phases of recovery. This is achieved through an analysis of the components and the process of the proposed RGPA. Finally, this section presents an analysis of the temporal characteristics of the four main reconstruction phases.

In addition to its administrative cultural dimension, another important feature of the RGPA is its temporal dimension. Accordingly, the nature and texture of the recovery process could either be evolutionary or incremental based on the actual realisation and the rate of attainment of the proposed recuperation mechanisms. An evaluation of the inter-connections between the two main non-linear social systems in focus; namely, the system itself and its internal/external environment, provide for the identification and evaluation of the forces impacting on the realisation of actual reconstruction activities.

Strategic Crisis Decision Making: A Contingency Approach

The three crisis elements outlined in the definition of crisis (Rosenthal, 1986:104) adopted in the current research, namely, threat, urgency and uncertainty, partially provide for an explanation of the need for sophisticated contingency thinking in crisis management and reconstruction policy studies. Contingency planning refer to the development of alternative future courses of action. Among the various public sector contingencies and crises are natural disasters (Kouzmin, 1991:20), environmental crises, socio-political turmoil, institutional change and conflict and policy fiascoes (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:1-2).

Although contingencies tend to regularly emerge in complex situations, in many cases administrative and political actors fail to take them into consideration as part of their strategic crisis management plans (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:399). Contingency - related analysis is related to the skills and training of political actors (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:399). The current study argues for the development of higher levels of awareness for requirements of contingency planning in crisis situations. Although cutting through bureaucratic jurisdictions tends to be heavily criticised by politicians, following informal contingent strategies under highly critical and politically-uncertain
situations tend to help in shortening the time required to develop and introduce policy interventions needed to respond to such crises (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:401).

Especially when it comes to a non-linear social system's evolution after turbulence, developing a set of "multiple futures" rather than a one "single future" should dominate the reconstruction planning agenda. Contingency thinking should be used in conjunction with reconstructive crisis policy research. The need for contingency reconstruction planning and analysis becomes even more critical given the opportunities and challenges affecting the realisation of reconstructive reform policy requisites.

Contingency analysis has been mostly used by defence planners to develop worst-case scenarios (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1989:3). Although it is an effective uncertainty reduction mechanism, contingency planning should not be limited to the formulation of worst-case scenarios. The need for contingency planning tends to escalate as the degree of uncertainty, complexity and innovativeness of non-routine crises intensify. Under conditions of severe threat and uncertainty, the system may find itself pressured for time in terms of responding to an emerging situation (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:5). Accordingly, it may be difficult to follow previously set formal procedures and administrative processes. To be able to respond swiftly to such demanding crises, political leaders and crisis managers may thus exhibit contingent behaviour through reverting to informal channels of communication.

Applying a contingency approach to a system's reconstruction after turbulence, as it relates to the case study country in focus, helps in developing plausible reconstructive pathways based on a developmental leadership path analysis. Accordingly, alternative recovery patterns could be evaluated based on the actual realisation of the proposed reconstructive reform requisites - including brain influx programmes, proper media regulation and flexible governance patterns. Different post-algorithmic states may very well be the outcome of different reconstruction-governance critical paths.

The application of a contingency approach to recovery policy research validates the use of reconstructive logic as a crucial methodological construct used to deduct relevant lessons from previous crisis situations. In addition, the application of reconstructive logic, accompanied with a heuristic approach, to the case study country in focus helps in the identification and evaluation of critical discontinuity points. Such turning points could, at the post-crisis stage, essentially be used as valuable opportunities for reconstructive policy interventions. The application of a contingency heuristic approach to recovery policy analysis provides an answer to a crucial question as to why certain systems are able relatively to quickly emerge and embark on a recovery mode after experiencing drastic turbulent events while others tend to remain buried in what seems to be an everlasting crisis situation.

Reconstructive policy research has evolved through various descriptive as well as analytical stages in terms of its major thrust and emphasis. Analysis has mainly shifted from purely economic and market forces to a rather "holistic" approach to reconstruction and development. Following a more analytical holistic approach to recovery after turbulence, the framework in focus tends to heavily emphasise non-market social reconstruction contingent reform forces (Hirschman, 1970:18-9).

**Sources of Information: Theoretical Frameworks**

The RGPA represents a situation specific macro-policy level methodology. In terms of developing the proposed model and applying it to the case study country in focus, the current study builds on the following frameworks: (i) Decline - Recovery Model (Hirschman, 1970:18; 1995:10); (ii) Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989; Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990); and (iii) Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration Model (Linz and Stephan, 1978).

This section provides an overview of the components and processes of the previously mentioned frameworks in relations to the development of the proposed RGPA. A discussion of the consistencies and inconsistencies of these frameworks is provided. In addition, this section covers the contribution(s) of each of these models to the understanding and evaluation of the relevant issues/components of the proposed RGPA and the case study country in focus.
Hirschman's Decline - Recovery Model

Environmental states are the property of the perceptions of the actors involved and their interactions over time. The failure of some actors to display expected behaviours may eventually give rise to the feelings of threat and uncertainty (Hirschman, 1970:1; Linz, 1978:10). Negative perceptions, in turn, may cloud the psychological atmosphere with tensions and hostilities, thus, leading to unstable environments.

Regardless as to how well developed a system's basic agencies and institutions are, hostilities and unstable environmental states may eventually lead to emerging crises. In the absence of creative crisis management techniques to resolve an emerging situation, the crisis may feed on itself and develop into a creeping, long-term macro-crisis.

As it starts its decline phase, the system would be forced to identify strong internal recuperation mechanisms and institutional devices to utilise in mitigating the dysfunctional impact of the misbehaving actors. Hirschman (1970:3) discusses a number of internal mechanisms of recuperation, including competition, exit, voice and loyalty. Based on these endogenous recovery forces, Hirschman (1970:77-9) developed a decline-recovery model to help a system reverse its decay phase as a means of avoiding social losses and achieving recovery after turbulence. The model itself is mainly based on a comparative analysis of the exit and voice options and to the interplay between them.

According to Hirschman (1970:4), exit is a crucial optional internal reform mechanism. He clearly discusses the exit option as an exemplar of economic behaviour. Although it has not received much attention, exit is an extremely powerful option (Hirschman, 1970:15). As an increasing number of individuals choose to withdraw from a particular system, the system's basic institutions would be under severe pressure to improve their performance and efficiency. This applies to both business organisations as well as political institutions. A massive exit option, especially by professionals and socio-economically advantaged members of society further weakens the system itself. With time, the exit option tends to feed upon itself, making it difficult for the system to embark on a recovery mode. In such cases, reform would have to be initiated from outside.

Hirschman (1979:16) discusses voice as 'political action par excellence'. As opposed to exit, the voice option is discussed as an impersonation of politics. Nevertheless, it is by far messier than exit. Hirschman (1970:30-37) introduces the voice option as a crucial recuperation mechanism which could either be used as an alternative to exit or as a residual to it. Voice is defined as 'any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, . . ., with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests including those that are meant to mobilise public opinion' (Hirschman, 1970:50).

The effectiveness of voice increases with its volume. Just like exit, voice can also be overdone. An "overdose" of the voice option may even hinder rather than enhance reform activities. Hirschman (1970:34) refers to the connection between exit and voice as a 'see-saw relationship'. Voice becomes a more utilised and powerful reform option as the use of exit declines. In the complete absence of exit, voice becomes extremely powerful for it is the only option left for stakeholders and agencies to express their dissatisfaction.

The decision to resort to the use of voice as opposed to exit is determined by the following factors: (i) the degree of loyalty displayed by the actors concerned; (ii) the willingness on the part of the actors themselves to take the risks involved with the use of voice as opposed to the level of certainty associated with the exit option; (iii) the leadership strategy practised by the concerned authorities in terms of either enhancing or hindering the freedom of expression; (iv) the management of perception practised in terms of the possible attainment of perceived advantages from presenting the case in question; and (v) the opportunity cost involved in using voice as opposed to exit. When compared to exit, voice is rather costly and it is affected by the bargaining power of the parties concerned.

The decision not to exit is highly influenced by the degree of loyalty displayed by the members involved. With higher degrees of loyalty, stakeholders and agencies may decide to resort to the use of voice rather than exit. Accordingly, the activation of the voice option tends to be dependent on the
feelings of loyalty, whereby loyalty in turn may constitute a barrier to exit. It takes a high degree of loyalty and faithfulness on the part of the actors/participants concerned to resist exit in the face of better alternative options. Thus, faithful and well capable individuals may decide to effectively use voice as a means of impressing their dissatisfaction and adapting the policies and practices of the system in question.

If the system restricts the practice of voice, the attainment of reform would then be expected to be undertaken from without rather than from within. In the presence of loyalty, the relationship between exit and voice becomes more complicated. Hirschman (1970:99-100) highlights two conditions that underlie the special loyalist behaviour. First, exit may feed upon itself. The system tends to continue deteriorating as an increasing number of its members decide to withdraw. Thus, exit could be considered as a crisis that implodes upon itself. Secondly, the actors continue to follow up and care about the system’s deterioration whether or not they decide to exit. Accordingly, full and complete exit is rather impossible. In case of exit, reform would have to be undertaken through utilising the voice option from without rather than from within.

Hirschman (1970:19) introduced exit and voice as two main economic and political mechanisms of 'equal rank and importance'. Exit and voice reflect the basic schism between economics and politics. Economists tend to favor exit over voice, for the withdrawal option represents a straightforward way of showing one's dissatisfaction. The interplay between exit and voice shows the inter-connection of economics and politics. It actually represents the inter-relationship between economic market mechanisms and non-market social and political mechanisms, acting simultaneously to help a system overcome its decline phase and move towards recovery and development.

Hirschman (1970:19) clarifies the fact that both reform forces of exit and voice can either work separately on their own, or they can intervene in conjunction with each other to achieve recovery and development. The optimal mix of voice and exit tend to differ from one system to the other. It depends on the system’s reaction to each of the previously mentioned reform options.

Difficulties may be encountered when combining exit and voice together. The availability of the exit option may reduce the chances for the effective use of voice. The actual practice of the exit or the voice options can be either enhanced or suppressed by the authorities in charge. The facilitation of the exit option restricts the use of voice and vice versa.

Competitive political parties provide a good example of organisations that react strongly to both exit and voice. The decision as to which reform mechanism represents a dominant reaction mode depends on the responsiveness of the system in question to each of the mechanisms, or to any combination of them. The choice of institutional devices utilised as a means of incurring change in the system’s policies and practices imply a wide range of recovery policy choices. Hirschman (1970:124-125) makes it clear that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe a set of optimally effective mixture of exit and voice. In light of the East German experience, Hirschman (1995) revised his earlier model; whereby he spoke of a direct, complementary and harmonious relationship between exit and voice.

To further analyse the main recuperation mechanisms in focus and to develop the Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis, the current study builds on two additional interesting models; namely, the managerially-oriented Contingency Typology and the more sophisticated Risk Path Analysis Model, and the politically-orientated Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration Model.

The Contingency Typology and The Risk Path Analysis Model

Kouzmin and Jarman (1989:397) developed a contingency heuristic model that highlights different ways in which policy makers may progress from routine “algorithmic” decision making to “crisis” management. The authors use various organisational contingency theories to develop an interesting analytical model which identifies various decisional pathways leading to crisis.
The contingency-theory simulation heuristic approach to crisis networking defines decision making classes and their contingent-possible environmental states, whereby individual disasters can be defined in terms of crisis pathways. The first crisis network (Path 1 - 2 - 3 - 4) represents the longest crisis pathway. In this path, the move from (1) Algorithm to (2) Opportunity Cost to (3) Muddling Through to (4) Crisis is a case of avoided and neglected warning signals.

Given an environment of extreme complexity and uncertainty, it is only natural for the system to respond and solve the emerging problem facing it with the available means. When left alone, conflict seldom gets resolved. Thus, creative action to the problem is usually needed to solve the emerging conflict(s), before it develops into an overwhelming macro-crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Making Classes</th>
<th>Environmental States</th>
<th>Decision Making Contexts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1: Calculation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Placid/Random = Algorithm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2: Judgement</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Placid/Clustered = Opportunity-cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3: Compromise</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Disturbed/Reactive = Muddling through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 4: Inspiration</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Turbulent = Crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In certain instances, due to high degrees of uncertainty, urgency and threat, the solution may necessitate the bypassing of previously established formal procedures, hierarchical authorities, or agreed upon communication channels (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:400). Thus, a contingent, informal hierarchical sub-system, within the formal system, is developed to handle the conflict situation, with minimum needed time, effort and human cost. A basic assumption of the current research is that the longer an emerging conflict is left to interact within a system, the harder it gets to be resolved.

Kouzmin and Jarman (1989:412-3) argue that if the two contingency theory schemas of Thompson and Tuden (1959) and Emery and Trist (1965) are juxtaposed into a hybrid set, Thompson and Tuden’s four types of decision making will correspond to the environmental states identified by Emery and Trist (See Table 3-1 above). As shown in Figure 3-1 below, Kouzmin and Jarman (1989:412-413) labelled the four types of decision making contexts as Algorithm, Opportunity-Cost, Muddling Through and Crisis. The complexity of decision making increases with the increase in environmental disturbance and uncertainty. The authors explain that turbulent events and crises can be traced through certain “crisis paths”, which are explained in terms of the four contingent decision making contexts. Each network begins with the first contingent class; namely, Algorithm (status quo) and ends with the fourth contingent class; namely crisis. Yet different paths can be travelled for events to reach the crisis stage.
Figure 3-1: Contingency Typology

Algorithm 1

3 Muddling Through

2 Opportunity Cost

4 Crisis


Figure 3-1 illustrates the four different decision pathways discussed in the Contingency Typology. The first crisis decision pathway (Algorithm) is the longest one, whereby events travel through stages 1 - 2 - 3 - 4. The second crisis pathway (Opportunity-Cost) is shorter, where the events travel through the stages 1 - 2 - 4. The third crisis decision pathway (Muddling Through) is also shorter than the first path and it covers stages 1 - 3 - 4. The fourth crisis pathway (Crisis) is the shortest and it covers stages 1 - 4. The first crisis pathway (Path 1 - 2 - 3 - 4) presents one way of studying the Lebanese (1975-1991) crisis.

The reasons behind the choice of the first crisis pathway to analyse the crisis events in question include the following: First, the long periods of time involved covering the events, starting in 1975 and ending in 1991. The failure to control the situation at an early stage resulted in a seventeen-year old prolonged crisis. Secondly, the complexity of the crisis itself, whereby the events in focus took different dimensions during different time periods. The Lebanese crisis constitutes a receptacle case of political, socio-economic and national identity problems. In addition, the intertwining of the internal and external factors leading to the prolongation of the crisis add to the high level of uncertainty and complexity associated with the events in focus. Thirdly, the nature of the crisis decision making processes followed throughout the events lend themselves to the first crisis pathway. The opportunity costs involved in the crisis decisions undertaken and the prolonged muddling through stage that faced the government in control concedes the applicability of the four decision making contexts - namely, algorithm, opportunity-cost, muddling through and crisis - to the analysis of the crisis events in focus.

Within the creeping crisis Risk Path Analysis Model, Jarman and Kouzmin (1994a:417) propose eight policy modes/paths, which constitute the 'heuristic core of the meta-policy model', thus, allowing for the progression of uncertainty scenarios. Figure 3-2 depicts the Risk Path Analysis Model (RPAM). Using the RPAM for creeping crisis analysis, two directions are used to represent different levels of uncertainty scenarios. The first direction covers the right hand side of phases 1 to 4 and is termed Neo-Satisficing (NS) at phase 3. The second direction covers the left hand side and is termed Neo-Rational (NR) at phase 2. NR1 represents the most predictable type of decision situation with the lowest level of environmental uncertainty, while NR4 is the least predictable type of decision.
situation with the highest level of environmental uncertainty. On the other side, the outcome of decision is most predictable at NS1 and least predictable at NS4.


The application of RPAM in the current study allows for analysing the significance of transplanting the previously mentioned contingency crisis frameworks to the context of the case study country in focus. In addition, it also provides for the identification of a recovery and reconstruction research agenda.

**Figure 3-2: Risk Path Analysis Model (RPAM)**

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)


Recovery policy implications are identified and evaluated through applying the Risk Path Analysis Model (RPAM) of creeping crisis to the previously identified internal reform forces of brain influx and media regulation in relations to the case study country in focus. RPAM provides an interesting theoretical framework to identify and evaluate various policy pathways within a system crisis situation needed for policy recommendations. Integrating the lessons learned from the analysis of the separate internal reform forces is undertaken; thus, resulting in an analytical empirical evaluation of the overall Lebanese crisis decision making process.

Given the RPAM model, a basic question that comes to mind relates to the role that crisis management theory and practice can play in the formulation of reconstructive policy planning and
development at the national level. Within the crisis management process of the case study country in question, emphasis is given to the development of pre-crisis events, in terms of incorporating reconstruction policy implications and recommendations for future action. Finally, with the application of the RPAM, reactions to decision crisis pathways can be addressed.

**Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration Model**

The Breakdown Re-equilibration Model (Linz and Stephan, 1978) represent a more politically-oriented model for recovery after turbulence. Linz (1978:8) clearly indicates that there is no meaningful accepted measure of the degree of democracy. He emphasises the fact that democracy is only a 'means to an end'. Nevertheless, he summarises a few criteria for democracy as follows: 'Legal freedom to formulate and advance political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech and other basic freedoms of person; free and non-violent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community, whatever their political preferences' (Linz, 1978:5).

The Breakdown Re-equilibration Model addresses the dynamics of the political process of both breakdown and recovery. The application of the above mentioned model helps to analyse such questions related to the availability of democracy alleviation options and inevitability of the breakdown of democracy. In conjunction with the previously discussed crisis management contingency frameworks, the Breakdown Re-equilibrium Model is used to develop the proposed Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis. It also acts as a major framework applied to the context of the case study country in question as a means of analysing the events leading to the breakdown and recent reconstruction efforts for Lebanon.

Linz (1978:14) emphasises that even though the line between cause and effect is rather unclear, political violence represents both an indicator and a contributing cause of breakdown. The Breakdown Re-equilibration Model is based on three main elements; namely, legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness. Linz's (1978:18) relative definition of a legitimate government is 'the one considered to be the least evil of the forms of government'. A major requirement for democratic governments is to have the majority of its citizens and armed forces believe in its legitimacy. It is the perception of the government’s legitimacy that enables the government to enforce its decisions. Nevertheless, in every society there are always those who tend to reject the legitimacy of the government in charge. The perceptions of legitimacy are rather dynamic, in the sense that legitimacy is granted and withdrawn continuously. Political socialisation plays an important role in clarifying the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

The two other dimensions which characterise a political system is its efficacy and its effectiveness, both of which can either strengthen or weaken the belief in legitimacy (Linz, 1978:19). Efficacy is defined as the 'capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system that are perceived as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens' (Linz, 1978:20-1). The efficacy of a regime is judged by the sum of its actions over a long period of time. It is also compared to the performance of different governments as well. With the loss of legitimacy, the regime in charge collapses which, in turn, improves the legitimacy of the new regime. Linz (1978:22) emphasises that legitimacy and efficacy are two different dimensions that are highly inter-related. Efficacy tends to greatly affect a regime's legitimacy. As a system's efficacy drops, the intensity of legitimacy of the regime would drop as well.

The third dimension of a regime is its effectiveness (Linz, 1978:22). Effectiveness is usually treated in conjunction with the regime's efficacy. Linz (1978:22) defines effectiveness as the 'capacity to implement the policies formulated, with the desired results'. Just like efficacy, legitimacy and effectiveness are also highly inter-related. Ineffectiveness on the part of the regime weakens the intensity of its legitimacy. Ineffectiveness also impacts the degree of perceived efficacy. This again raises all sorts of problems for new regimes. Linz (1978:23) relates the effectiveness dimension to the use of power. He clearly states that the inefficient use of force leads to the transfer of legitimacy to the regime's opponents.
The Breakdown Re-equilibration model is based on the inter-relationships between the previously discussed three dimensions of political regimes (See Figure 3-3). The model itself takes into consideration the changing nature of each of the political system’s dimensions; including legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness at any time throughout its development. Linz (1978:44) explains the breakdown of a political regime as a crisis of legitimacy, efficacy or effectiveness. Linz (1978:22) combines these three dimensions together to produce an eight-fold typology of situations.

Limitations and Convergence of the Frameworks

Hirschman’s Decline - Recovery Model is used in the current study to identify and evaluate the inter-relationships among the crucial internal recovery reaction mechanisms in focus; namely the brain influx movements, effective media regulation and flexible governance patterns. The multi-national brain drain option corresponds to the exit recuperation mechanism, while media regulation corresponds to the voice option as discussed by Hirschman (1970:30). In addition, Hirschman’s Decline - Recovery Model is used to study the interplay among the previously mentioned internal recovery mechanisms; thus, providing a basic framework for the development of a holistic reconstructive policy agenda for a system’s evolution after instability and turbulence.

Just like exit, the brain drain phenomenon represents a double-edged recuperation mechanism, whereby recovery is expected to come from without rather than from within. Unless multi-national brain drain has been manufactured rather than being genuine, it may prove to be an extremely powerful option in terms of altering the government in charge and ameliorate the deterioration taking place within the system in focus. In addition, a massive brain drain movement may prove to be a
crisis that implode upon itself. With time, it may even impact post-crisis recovery and reconstruction efforts.

Just like voice, the media option constitutes a crucial alternative recovery course of action. With an effective use of the media, recovery is expected to be initiated either from within or from without. Once again, the media choice could either be used as a residual to the withdrawal option or in conjunction with it. The decision to resort to the media as the main recuperation mechanism is highly conditioned by: (i) The governance patterns exercised by the authorities in charge in terms of either hindering or enhancing the freedom of expression; (ii) the availability of the institutions and the institutional devices needed to voice public concerns; (iii) the level of risk that individual stakeholders and agencies are willing to take; and (iv) their perceptions of the possible success in achieving the desired changes to the system’s policies and practices.

Hirschman (1970:76) clearly indicates in his Decline - Recovery Model that the interplay between exit and voice is affected by the feelings of loyalty exhibited by prominent members of society. This could easily be translated to the inter-relationships between the two main decline - recovery variables in focus; namely the brain drain and media options. In addition, the current study stresses the importance of the governance strategies practised by the system itself in terms of either the explicit or implicit allowance or hindrance for either mechanisms.

If it is not manufactured by the authorities in control, genuine exit could be considered as treason while resorting to the use of the media could be considered as mutiny and rebellion (Hirschman, 1970:121). In such cases, the system's deterioration is so well advanced that recovery and development are neither possible nor allowed. With such an extreme case of decay and deterioration, both the brain drain and the media modes may be used so strongly that their impact as recuperation mechanisms may be rather destructive and harmful.

Hirschman’s Decline - Recovery Model has contributed significantly to the current study through the identification and evaluation of temporal and situation specific reform mechanisms, with essentially a non-market, social, holistic orientation to recovery and reconstruction. Although Hirschman’s model is extremely useful for the development of the reconstructive policy agenda undertaken in the current study, it has a major deficiency. It does not prescribe a certain optimal mix of the two recovery forces of exit and voice. Nevertheless, this limitation is understandable given the fact that efficient recovery mixes tend to change over time.

As it has been previously implied, the reform forces themselves are subject to decay and deterioration. Even under relatively more stable environments, it is rarely ever possible to prescribe solid optimal mixes of the various recuperation mechanisms under study. One way of overcoming the previously mentioned limitation is for the system itself to rely on one of the recuperation mechanisms while having a sporadic injection of the other as and when needed. An effective reaction to early crisis warning signals is beneficial in terms of enhancing the design of the institutions and the institutional devices needed to effectively help a system back on its recovery path.

Although at first look, the Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model may seem to be quite abstract, their usefulness as temporal planning tools for the development of crisis events and post-crisis recovery scenarios should not be under-estimated. Transplanting the Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model to the context of the events of the case study country in focus provides an interesting framework for evaluating time-sensitive patterns needed to analyse the development of the Lebanese pre-crisis events and identify recovery response patterns. With the transplantation of the multi-path crisis-oriented contingency schema to the case study country in question, the Lebanese events are defined as a crisis pathway. Given the complexities involved in the seventeen year old crisis in focus, the application of the first crisis pathway (Path 1 - 2 - 3 - 4) to the Lebanese (1975-1991) events provides a systematic framework to evaluate the progression of the events, the imposed external forces, as well as inherent internal socio-political pre-crisis contradictions leading to the crisis itself. With the application of the Risk Path Analysis Model to the case study country in focus, descriptive analysis is shifted to an analytical evaluation of reconstruction policy implications.

A main limitation of the Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model is that they do not provide for the dynamic nature of the crisis phase itself. They do not allow for the time-
sensitivities incorporated within stage "4" of the typology, namely "crisis". Beyond a certain degree of
decay and deterioration, a system may find itself rather fixated in a crisis mode. Thus, the
embarkation on a recovery pathway becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible. As a contingent
heuristic approach to crisis management, the Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model
fail to explore the dynamic nature of the crisis stage.

Nevertheless, the two previously discussed contingency crisis management frameworks are
applied to the evaluation of both post-crisis reform forces under study, namely brain influx and
media regulation. The application of both contingency frameworks to the case study country in
question significantly contribute to the identification of crucial policy intervention turning points.
Such discontinuity points are in turn used to develop time-sensitive post-crisis holistic recovery
response patterns for the case study country in focus.

Linz and Stephan’s (1978) Breakdown Re-equilibration Model represents an interesting framework
for the understanding of the development of pre-crisis events leading to a gradual process of a
system’s political breakdown. The model itself also represents an integral framework for the
formulation of political re-equilibration and reconstructive policy implications for a system’s recovery
after turbulence. Given the inter-relationships between the feelings of loyalty displayed to a particular
political regime and the intensity and support for its legitimacy (Linz, 1978:54-55), Hirschman’s (1970)
Decline - Recovery Model and Linz and Stephan’s (1978) Breakdown Re-equilibration Model are used
in conjunction with Jarman and Kouzmin’s (1990; 1994a) Risk Path Analysis Model, as a means of
constructing the proposed Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis and the
formulation of a developmental leadership pathway, based on evolving stages of recovery and
reconstruction.

Contingent Stages of Evolution and Leadership Path Networking: The Reconstruction -
Governance Contingency Path Analysis

The Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis represents a non-linear social system’s
rehabilitative model of macro-crisis, multi-level contingency evolutionary programme. It defines
recovery decision-making contexts and their possible re-equilibration elements, whereby individual
rehabilitative projects can be defined in terms of inter-related evolutionary/incremental stages
leading to recovery pathways. A leadership path analysis represents a crucial component of the
proposed model as it impacts on the progression of reconstructive activities.

The contingency approach to recovery outlined in this research approaches the issue of
reconstruction strategy making from a more qualitative perspective. It is mainly deductive in nature
(Jarman and Kouzmin, 1994b:120).

Two sets of independent conceptual variables are considered in terms of recovery and
reconstruction after turbulence: First, the contingent decision-making contexts used in a crisis
situation (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989) and, secondly, the elements of a system’s political breakdown
and re-equilibration (Linz and Stephan, 1978) which impact on the decline - recovery decision making
contexts. When these two contingency schemas are juxtaposed, the four types of decision-making
contexts (Algorithm, Opportunity-Cost, Muddling Through and Crisis) will be related to the system’s
political elements of breakdown and re-equilibration (Legitimacy, Efficacy, Effectiveness and Stability
and Performance) (See Table 3-2).

Juxtaposing the Contingency Typology to the more politically orientated Breakdown and Re-
equilibration Model provides an interesting analytical tool to evaluate a system’s
evolutionary/incremental phases of recovery and re-equilibration (See Figure 3-4). The four resultant
reconstruction stages are set out in Table 3-3.

The deducted contingent reconstruction - governance path analysis is conceptually more
intricate than each of the models taken separately (See Figure 3-5). The above mentioned dual - level
contingency schema allows for the evaluation of reconstructive meta - policy analysis. As shown in
Table 3-3, the four resultant inter-related evolutionary/incremental stages of reconstruction are
labelled: Jumbled, Experimentation, Transition and Routinisation (See also Figure 3-5).
Figure 3-4: Contingent Systems Reconstruction Stages

Elements of Breakdown/Re-equilibration

Stages of Systems Evolution
Stage I: Jumbled Phase
Stage II: Experimental Phase
Stage III: Transitional Phase
Stage IV: Routinisation

Table 3-2: Decision-Making Contexts, Breakdown and Re-equilibrium Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision-Making Contexts</th>
<th>Breakdown and Re-equilibrium Elements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Algorithm</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Opportunity-Cost</td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Muddling Through</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Crisis</td>
<td>Instability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-3: Contingent System's Reconstruction Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision-Making Contexts</th>
<th>Breakdown and Re-equilibration Elements</th>
<th>Recovery and Reconstruction Contexts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>Muddling Through</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>Opportunity-Cost</td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>Algorithm</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Linz and Stephan, 1978; Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989)

Figure 3-5: System's Inter-related Stages of Evolution and Reconstruction

Stages of Evolution: Leadership Pathways

Stage I: Jumbled Phase
Stage II: Experimental Phase
Stage III: Transitional Phase
Stage IV: Routinisation
Although the previously identified four reconstruction phases are highly inter-related; each of them possesses distinct properties. First, Phase I (Jumbled Phase) represents a new order or a new "Algorithmic State" which is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty. Under the jumbled disordered phase the system is just emerging out of a crisis situation, with the previous system being characterised with instability and lack of performance. The system itself may either be fixated in a crisis phase, given certain socio-political factors, or it may be just attempting to embark on a reconstructive mode. Even with the latter case, the reconstruction goals and the means for attaining them may neither be determined nor clear (See Table 3-4). The new regime taking over the political system may come up with various reconstructive promises that are difficult to realise with the system's limited resources. Accordingly, Phase I is characterised with a high level of risk and uncertainty at best.

Secondly, Phase II (Experimental State) again represents a new order which in terms of stability and performance tend to be more comfortable than Phase I. Since the system is still in a muddling through stage, the new political regime may not be able to study the system's reconstruction needs and, thus, deliver accordingly (See Table 3-4). Nevertheless, governmental effectiveness of formulating and implementing the reconstructive policies related to the internal reform forces needed with the desired results, eventually will positively influence the intensity of the legitimacy granted to the new regime in charge. This in turn will lead to higher degrees of stability and certainty within the system itself.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-4: Reconstruction Meta - Policy Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rehabilitative Internal Reform Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rehabilitative means refer to the methods and approaches used to actually realise the system's constructive reform forces needed.

Thirdly, Phase III (Transitional State) is the third phase of reconstruction. It again represents a new order which could be characterised by short-term stability. The capacity of the regime in charge to find appropriate solutions to internal reconstruction and developmental problems will again positively impact the feelings of loyalty displayed to the new regime. This in turn will favourably influence the intensity of legitimacy granted to the government in charge. In other words, the more efficacious the regime is in choosing among alternative reconstruction strategies, the better off are the new government's chances of enhancing stability within the system itself. Although the reconstruction goals may be known and quite clear to policy planners and public administrators, the means of attaining them is rather ambiguous. Accordingly, comprehensive feasibility studies and cost-benefit analysis of alternative reconstruction strategies should be carefully undertaken at this stage of rehabilitation and development (See Table 3-4).

Finally, Phase IV (Routinsisation and Stability) represents the fourth and last phase of reconstruction. Assuming that the new government has been both efficacious and effective in formulating and implementing the reconstructive policies needed, it will then be perceived by its citizens as effective governance for the persual of collective goals. Accordingly, in this case, the general public probably displays strong feelings of loyalty to the new regime which, in turn, gets translated into a higher intensity of legitimacy for the new government. With such strong feelings of trust, loyalty and legitimacy; the government is in an excellent position to reassess the system's current reconstruction needs and determine the appropriate cost-effective means of achieving them.
(See Table 3-4). Although it is highly improbable that the system can go back to its pre-crisis algorithmic state, the new post-crisis order at its fourth phase of recovery could be characterised by long-term stability. The achievement of such long-term stability is obviously conditioned by the system’s attainment of the internal reform requisites needed.

Regardless of the reconstructive phase being considered, it is worth noting that the post-crisis new order is usually different from the pre-crisis algorithmic state. Figure 3-6 represents time-sensitive contingent stages of recovery and reconstruction. The nature of the above mentioned four recovery phases can either be evolutionary or incremental as conditioned by the reconstruction pathways being followed. This depends on the seriousness and the pace for which previously identified reconstruction requisites are being attained by the political regime in charge which, in turn, is determined by the leadership strategy practised by the new government.

**Figure 3-6: Contingent Stages of Recovery and Reconstruction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE IV</th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Routinisation and</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE III</td>
<td>PHASE I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional State</td>
<td>Jumbled State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The non-linear system’s reconstruction - governance model of macro-crisis, multi-level contingency evolutionary schema defines crisis - recovery, decision-making types and their possible breakdown - re-equilibration elements; whereby individual rehabilitative projects can be defined in terms of inter-related evolutionary/incremental stages leading to recovery policies.

As a system embarks on a recovery mode, it tends to move away from Phase I in the direction of Phase IV (from a jumbled state to routinisation and stability). Meanwhile, there is a number of recovery pathways that the system may choose to undertake. Figure 3-7 outlines four different recovery pathways, all of which start from Phase I and end in Phase IV. The first recovery network (Path I, II, III, IV) represents the longest recovery pathway, while the last recovery network (Path I, IV) represent the shortest rehabilitative pathway. In addition, the system may either move towards Phase II or Phase III before finally reaching Phase IV.

**Figure 3-7: Reconstruction Paths**

The recovery network followed by the system is determined by: First, the system’s capacity to clearly determine an optimal reconstructive strategy and be able to actually realise it with the available resources. Secondly, the appropriateness of the governance patterns being practised by the political regime in charge.
Leadership Path Networking

The current research reveals new methodological synergies, not just in terms of contingent stages of evolution and reconstruction, but also in terms of the formulation of developmental leadership path analysis. The four evolutionary/incremental rehabilitative phases previously identified are based on the actual practice of a suitable governance patterns by the political regime in control. An integral part of the Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis is the development and evaluation of contingent leadership pathways, geared towards the formulation of reconstructive, transferable policy implications for a non-linear social system’s recovery after turbulence.

At each and every recovery phase, the new government in control may meet a number of challenges to reconstruction and development. The ability to embark on a recovery mode while eventually overcoming emerging reconstruction barriers is conditioned by the governance patterns practised by the new government. The literature search undertaken shows that little is known about leadership strategies in chaotic situations. There is definitely a need for statecraft breakthroughs (Dror, 1993b:95). Before embarking on a reconstructive mode, it is important to develop an understanding of such specialised requisites of government.

The new post-crisis regime may have to undertake shifts in their leadership strategies as a means of gaining public approval and increasing the intensity of their problematic legitimacy. In her book titled, The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership, Willner (1984) advocates the use of some form of charismatic leadership, especially in the short-run, as an effective conflict-resolving strategy. Nevertheless, given chaotic situations, the official bureaucrats in charge may regard the newly emerging charismatic leader as a threat to their official authority (Jarman and Kouzmin, 1994b:125). This, in itself, can create various types of conflicts with the system’s social and bureau-political setting.

With respect to charismatic leadership, religious identification may be extremely relevant (Wriggins, 1969:72). The general public may identify with a newly emerging leader due to purely religious inclinations. “Confessional” politics has played a critical role in the Lebanese political system while, at times, posing significant constitutional difficulties. Besides religious affiliations, personal leaders may get accepted due to family connections, common regional origins or a past sense of indebtedness (Wriggins, 1969:73). In such cases a good deal of political resources are used to maintain the loyalty and perceived legitimacy of the followers.

Although charismatic leadership has been clearly cited by some as an effective leadership strategy under chaotic situations, various studies recommend other governance patterns. Linz (1978:8) states that there is no accepted measure of the degree of democracy, but the main distinction between putative democracies is based on majority rule. He further uses Lebanon - before its (1975-1991) crisis - as an example of a country characterised by various properties favourable to democratic stability. Under chaotic situations, Linz’s (1978:13) clearly states that leaders, especially in the short-run, should value the persistence of democratic institutions. Given turbulence and instability, democratic leadership should prove its capabilities (Hirschman, 1965:329). Since most governments operate under varying degrees of populism and mass electoral conditions, accountability makes it extremely crucial for political leaders to demonstrate goals acceptable to the majority of the population (Apter, 1965:224; Linz, 1978:19).

Dror (1988:248) refers to nearly all decision making as fuzzy gambling. Accordingly, every decision to be taken under conditions of risk, uncertainty, surprise propensities and ignorance constitute a gamble (Dror, 1988:251). Just as surprises can be quite disruptive to decision makers, crisis situations can also be considered positive incidences in terms of providing windows of opportunity. To be prepared to act as quickly as needed, Dror (1988:257) states that it is not just crucial to make predictions of surprise possibilities, but it is essential to update continuously the standard list of possible surprise events. Nevertheless, regardless of how well prepared the political system is, significant surprises do emerge. This necessitates crisis management upgrading. Dror (1988:258) stresses two main issues regarding crisis management decision-making. First, previously prepared surprise lists become extremely significant for upgrading crisis decision making. Secondly, pre-testing decisions relevant to possible surprise situations may prove to be quite useful.
History has been greatly influenced by the governance rules of different rulers. Various additional leadership patterns have been practised by famous and less famous leaders. In their book titled, *The Middle East: Politics and Power*, Bill and Leiden (1974) discuss a classification of three leadership strategies based upon general patterns of power and politics; namely, traditional, reforming and transformational leadership.

Traditional rulers include such leaders as King Abdullah of Jordan, King Muhammad V of Morocco, King Farouk of Egypt, King Idris of Libya and Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia (Bill and Leiden, 1974:125). Patrimonial leadership reflects a basic type of traditional rulership. Traditional rulers tend to demand full acceptance and respect of their people. Even their expert advisors would not express their opinions without first ascertaining the ruler’s views of their suggestions. The leader’s family relies at the heart of such patrimonial systems. With most traditional patterns of rule, family ties, including marriages, become exceptionally political. Marital relations play extremely important political roles in expanding the ruler’s power. Issues of dedication and loyalty are the essence of patrimonial leadership. Personal face-to-face politics and superior military ability are extremely crucial for patrimonial rulers. Although some economic changes may result, patrimonial rulership hardly leads to significant degrees of social, economic and political administration and development (Bill and Leiden, 1974:132). Actual political decision making continues to lie entirely in the person of the ruler himself.

Reforming rulers include such Middle-Eastern leaders as King Hassan II of Morocco and Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran (Bill and Leiden, 1974:133). Reforming leaders may also perceive themselves as playing an essential patrimonial role for their countries. Although they might be highly dedicated to preserving the traditional political order, they tend to introduce various types of reforms in the administrative, educational, industrial, social, and political structures. Through implementing major developmental reforms, reforming leaders preserve their patrimonial role and their power base.

Transforming leaders tend to radically revolutionise various traditional socio-political patterns dominating in their societies. Good examples of transforming rulers include Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (Bill and Leiden, 1974:145). Radical transformational leadership is widely practised in political environments characterised by nepotism, demoralisation and personal and administrative corruption. With the use of transformational leadership, the ultimate goal is to transform personal charisma, authoritarian rule and patrimonial leadership into a self-sustaining transformational program (Bill and Leiden, 1974:154).

When considering the previously discussed leadership strategies, one can identify post-crisis potential leadership pathways along which rulers may choose to follow while guiding the system’s passage throughout the recovery and reconstructive phases, starting with Phase I and ending in phase IV. The proposed RGPA argues for a temporal developmental and adaptive leadership paradigm which allows reconstruction leaders to shift among alternative leadership strategies as needed during the post-crisis recovery phases (See Figure 3-8). A main limitation of the RGPA is that it does not prescribe common governance patterns to similar post-crisis recovery phases. It is the view here that temporal governance response strategies tend to be situation specific. Nevertheless, developing an understanding of governance patterns practised during past recovery situations would help to better shape future post-crisis recovery governance response strategies. The problem arises if the system fails to develop active adaptive leadership strategies as needed. In such cases, the system may find itself being fixated with a rather long-term crisis phase. In addition, at such a deteriorated state, recovery and development may be unfeasible or even undesirable.

The Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis represents a crucial temporal rehabilitative planning tool for a system’s recovery after turbulence. In summary, it represents an analytical, but heuristic, mode used to identify internal reform forces and reconstructive institutional devices significant to the formulation and implementation of satisfying reconstruction strategies given a system’s limited resources. In addition to its temporal dimension, the RGPA presents a social, holistic orientation to recovery and reconstruction. It incorporates both non-market as well as market economic internal reform mechanisms simultaneously used to help a system embark on a recovery mode.
Furthermore, the RGPA constitutes a crucial situation specific reconstruction model. It applies to various types of crisis situations at different levels of analysis. Although in the current research study the RGPA is applied at the national level to the case study country in focus, the model itself could be adapted to apply at organisational, corporate levels.
Part II

Part II is composed of two chapters:

Chapter IV: Case Study of Lebanon - Background Country Information

Chapter V: Lebanon in Crisis (1975-1991) - Basic Developments, Analysis and Evaluation
Chapter IV

Case Study of Lebanon:
Background Country Information

Sections:

Introduction
Recent History and Geography
Topography, Climate and Water Resources
Population, Language and Religion
Government and Political System
Economic Development and Modernization
   Tourism and the Hospitality Industry
   Banking and Financial Services
   Education, Research and Consulting Services
Cultural and Social System
Chapter IV

Case Study of Lebanon: Background
Country Information

Introduction

In order to conceptually evaluate post-crisis reconstruction phases based on developmental rulership strategies, given various states of turmoil and instability, an event-time, longitudinal, socio-political analysis of an actual specific situation/country is undertaken. The Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis is applied to the case study of Lebanon as a means of fulfilling three main objectives.

First, the various stages of the Lebanese (1975-1991) conflict are discussed to better evaluate the causes - both internal contradictions and the external contributing factors - behind the Lebanese events and the development of the crisis over a period of seventeen years. The post-crisis period of 1991-1995 is evaluated to appraise the forces enhancing, as well as hindering, the realisation of actual reconstruction activities. Secondly, two main by-products of the Lebanese crisis, namely, the multinational brain drain and media chaos, are evaluated in light of the various stages of the Lebanese conflict. Thirdly, strategic reconstructive policy implications are identified and evaluated in relation to the Lebanese conflict in general and intellectual emigration, media regulation and governance patterns in specific.

In addition, applying the RGPA to the context of the Lebanese events provide a perfect opportunity to evaluate the significance of the proposed model as a crucial planning tool for the analysis of recovery and reconstruction activities of other systems/countries displaying warning symptoms associated with prolonged states of instability and turbulence.

Lebanon has been chosen as the case study country to be evaluated simply because it represents a distinctive case of complications and contradictions. Such complications include the number and variety of actors involved; the gradual, but intense, levels of instability prevailing throughout the events; the inter-relationships between the system's internal, structural contradictions and intervening external, uncontrollable influences; the interesting rate of development and modernization that prevailed pre-1974; the diverse phenomenal by-products of the seventeen year-old events, covering the period 1975-1991, including multi-national brain drain and dysfunctional pluralistic media chaos; and the frequency and intensity of the warning signals and breakdown symptoms experienced throughout the creeping-crisis events.

Given the fact that Lebanon represents a complex case, the current research strongly suggests that the Lebanese experience - with both the crisis and post-crisis events - cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to recovery, reconstruction and governance research. Chapter four presents the relevant background country information relating to Lebanon's history and geography; topography, climate and water resources; population, language and religion; government and political system; economic development and modernization; and cultural and social systems.

Recent History and Geography

Lebanon is a small, Middle-Eastern country at the eastern side of the Mediterranean Sea. It is 35 miles wide and 120 miles long. It acquired its name from the Arabic word "Lubnan" meaning "White" (Khayat and Keatinge, 1960:1), in reference to the snow which blankets the cedars of Lebanon in winter. Pre-1975 Lebanon could be described as a free country with a proud republic. The country has three main topographical areas; namely, the Mediterranean coast, Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley in which the Litani River flows. The country covers an area of 10,452 sq. km.

Lebanon was created by France in 1920. Considerable autonomy to the state was given by the Franco-Lebanese treaty of 1936 and, directly after World War II, independence was achieved. Until
the mid-1970s, Lebanon's electoral system had well served to balance the reconciliation of interests among the various main Lebanese communities, including the Maronite, Druze, Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, Armenian.

Lebanon had open economic policies and it had always been known to associate itself with the United States and Western European countries. Throughout this period, the government was struggling to resist outside pressures and retain its independence and internal unity. Nevertheless, outside forces had been able to establish internal networks for themselves among the local factions (Bowen-Jones, 1988:77).

Under the presidency of late Camille Chamoun, between 1952 and 1958, Beirut developed as a main banking centre for the Gulf oil-exporting countries. As the Middle-East region was experiencing a state of turmoil and instability, the Lebanese government was being challenged by local anti-Western factions. In 1958, late president Chamoun invited the American military to restore law and order in the country. The Lebanese 1958 crisis has been described as a mini-civil war (Bowen-Jones, 1988:77). It had revealed the fragility of Lebanon's confessional system (Gilmour, 1988:424). Although after the 1958 crisis the political system remained effective, with General Fuad Shihab as president and Rashid Karami as prime minister; nevertheless, from 1958 onwards the country's internal environment started to mirror the turmoil and tensions experienced by neighbouring countries.

The country continued to experience continuous growth and development until 1967, whereby Lebanon became increasingly involved with the Palestinian cause. Since then Lebanon began to serve as the "scapegoat" of the Israeli-Arab "problem". The number and power of the Palestinians in Lebanon was constantly increasing. Their presence became known as a "State Within a State". Street battles between the Palestinian fighters on one side and the Lebanese army and the Phalange (Kata'ib) party on the other side became common. Increasing hostilities grew on both sides. In addition, the Lebanese-Israeli border conflict was also intensifying. Israel frequently retaliated in southern Lebanon and, at times, the raids extended into Beirut.

In 1975, war broke in Lebanon and Syrian intervention was invited. Lebanon was used by foreign regional and international forces as an arena to realise personal and hidden political agendas (Kisirwani, 1992:336). Chaotic events included the assassination of prominent Lebanese figures. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon on a full-scale basis, the result being the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) fighters from Beirut. Nevertheless, chaos continued in the country and in 1983 the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon.

The South Lebanon Army, used as a buffer force by the Israelis, was supported by them. Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian Islamic fundamentalist militia, undertook continuous attacks on the Lebanese-Israeli borders. According to the late Shaykh Abbas Al-Musawi, a leading Hezbollah spokesman: 'We follow the leadership of Ayatollah Khumaini, and his leadership is as compelling in Lebanon as it is in Iran' (Salame. 1986:10; Deeb, 1988:694-6; Kisirwani, 1992:340).

The Gulf war had a serious impact on the military and political events in the country. Although for some peace had been compromised with sovereignty, others feel that peace and sovereignty both had been compromised (Kisirwani, 1992:335). It is the Gulf war that paved the way to the Taif Accord of 1989. The Taif Accord was prepared by Lebanese politicians, with the approval of the United States and Syria and under the patronage of Saudi Arabia. The Accord emphasised the "special relationships" between Lebanon and Syria. The Accord also led to the emergence of the Syrian-Lebanese Treaty of Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination in the fields of education, trade, economy, foreign policy and security arrangements. According to Gregory (1990:64), the Syrian dream was transformed into reality through the Gulf war. Depending on one's perspective, the Taif Accord can be considered to be either a catastrophe or a blessing (Kisirwani, 1992:337).

Topography, Climate and Water Resources

After watching the horrific images of the war in Lebanon on television and in newspapers, it becomes difficult to conceive of the beauty and tradition the country has to offer. Describing the spring season, the late Lebanese poet Gibran Khalil Gibran has once said, 'Spring is beautiful everywhere, but it is most beautiful in Lebanon'. Lebanon enjoys four distinct seasons each of which is characterised by its
distinct weather and sports. The fall of snow in winter encourages snow skiing, while in summer the
country has been described as a cool haven (Bowen-Jones, 1988:73). Lebanon is a small country with
beautiful mountains and coastal plains. Situated to the north of Judea, Lebanon represents part of the
Holy Land. The Bible makes several references to the Cedars of Lebanon.

Although Lebanon is a relatively new country, it is considered to be old in tradition and
civilisation. It has been invaded by various troops, including Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Romans,
Arabs, Crusaders and Turks. Until today, Lebanon continues to be the sight of foreign invaders. Pre-
1975, tourists from all over the world used to visit the country to enjoy its historic and natural beauty.
Various civilisations passed by Lebanon. Tourists are interested to see the Greek, Roman and
Byzantine ruins; the Crusader castles and the Phoenician towns. Now that the war is over, the
government might make every attempt to change people's perceptions by offering the world the other
side of the country which has long been hidden throughout the crisis years.

Lebanon does not have crude oil. Instead, the country used to be known for its human and
water resources. Since water supply exceeds the estimated water demand in the country, unused
reserves approximating 2,859 Mcm are available (Kolars, 1993:23). Some of the main Lebanese rivers
include the Litani, 'Asi, Kebir and the Hasbani. The added flow of the previously mentioned four
rivers is between 32 to 36 per cent of the country's estimated water supply (Kolars, 1993:23). The
competition for scarce water resources continue among the neighbouring countries of Israel, Jordan
and Syria.

The Litani River - which lies entirely within Lebanon - has a natural flow averaging 920
Mcm/yr. (Naff, 1993:3). The Litani River is known for its quality and quantity, thus, it could be used
for both drinking and irrigation purposes. In a region characterised by its water scarcity,
neighbouring countries have made several claims to Lebanese water. Under-estimating Lebanon's
need of the Litani River, Israel has pressed claims to Litani water as part of its negotiations (Naff,
1993:5). Israel has also proposed purchasing Litani water, thus, depriving the Lebanese southern
region farmers adequate irrigation. Bilateral agreement between Lebanon and Israel regarding the
Litani water has never materialised. Nevertheless, with its 1982 invasion and the establishment of the
current Israeli “security zone”, Israel has gained control over the lower Litani reservoir (Naff, 1993:9).

The question remains as to whether Israel is actually taking water out of South Lebanon and in
what amounts. The second question that comes to mind is whether the Israeli withdrawal from South
Lebanon will be conditioned by its claiming a considerable portion of South Lebanon's water.
Although there are no definite answers to both questions, Naff (1993:14) states that although the
water quantities are not known, there is evidence that Israel is trucking water out of the Litani River.
Simultaneously, it would be rational to assume that Israel would make a strong effort to take away a
considerable allocation of South Lebanon's water before departing the "security zone”.

Population, Language and Religion

The population of the country is approximately three and a half million of which about two million
are expatriates. Since the (1975-1991) crisis, a large part of the Lebanese population is displaced and
no accurate distribution data is currently available (Bowen-Jones, 1988:75). Beirut remains to be the
main city with the largest population.

The Lebanese, in general, are mostly open minded. They mainly speak three languages.
Although Arabic (with a Lebanese dialect) is the main language used, French and English are widely
used as well. It is not uncommon to find people speaking the three languages inter-changeably.

In Lebanon, language is more than a medium of expression. English for example, represents
the first foreign language of most Muslims (Scruton, 1987:20). The Lebanese people who have
mastered the English language tend to use it for business and propaganda purposes. They do not
identify with English history or culture. The French-speaking Lebanese, on the other hand, are of
French culture. To them, the French language is not just a means of self-expression. It is a crucial link
with Western European civilisation which provides the French-speaking Lebanese a sense of history
(Scruton, 1987:21).
The Lebanese have always been free to worship as they please. Churches, cathedrals, mosques and synagogues stood side by side during the pre-crisis period. Nevertheless, a considerable number of places of worship have been destroyed by the infighting factions during the (1975-1991) events. The Lebanese Republic has no official state religion. Muslim sects include Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims and Druzes; while the Christian sects mainly include Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Protestants and Maronites, among others. Among the Christian sects, the Maronites represent the largest and strongest community. Table 4-1 shows the religious distribution in the country for the period 1865-1977.

### Table 4-1: Religious Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mountain region</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Beirut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>172,000</td>
<td>226,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druzes</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>53,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>76,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholics</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>45,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnites</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>175,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'ites</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>154,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>31,156</td>
<td>79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (including Jews, Protestants, Syrian Orthodox, Latins, Nestorian Chaldeans)</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>266,661</td>
<td>785,543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Largest Concentration (1956 approximate)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mountain region:</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Beirut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>south: 23,000</td>
<td>Biga'a: 36,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>north: 118,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>south: 149,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Religious sectarianism has always been part of the Lebanese system. Although recent Lebanese events have been referred to as a civil war, it is the view here that the internal contradictions have largely been inflamed by external forces while being explained as religious differences among the Lebanese themselves (Bowen-Jones, 1988:75; Haddad, 1995:6). Pre-1975, Lebanon enjoyed a state of peaceful coexistence among its various communities.

It is hard to comprehend the Lebanese (1975-1990) crisis and the current hurdles to a complete and holistic recovery without first having the basic background knowledge about the various communities that co-exist in the country. The Lebanese communities include the Maronite, Sunnite, Shi'ite, Orthodox, Melkite, Druze, Armenian, Chaldaean, Assyrian, Protestant, Alawites, Ismaelite and Jewish (Scruton, 1987:23). Since it is difficult to discuss all the communities within the context of the current study, discussion is limited to the main ones. One way to better understand the contemporary complexities relating to Lebanon's recovery after the (1975-1991) crisis is to study the country's political history. The history of Lebanon represents the history of its religious communities (Humphrey, 1989:3).
The Maronites

The Maronites form a distinct branch of the Roman Catholic Church. The Maronite sect was first
founded by an early Antiochene, Maroun, who died around 410 A.D. The date for the Maronite's
migration to Lebanon's Mountains has not been clearly specified. The acceptance of the Maronite sect
into the Roman communion took place in 1445 at the Council of Florence. This union was later
confirmed by the Synods of Qarnoubi, in 1596, and Luwayze, in 1736. The Maronite's liturgical
language is Syriac and their spoken language is Arabic. They are heavily concentrated in Mount
Lebanon and Kesrouane area. The Maronites currently constitute the largest Christian denomination.

The Druze

The Druze sect take their name from Nachtekim Darazi, who is the Grand Vizier to the Fatimid Khalif
Hakim Ibn Nizar (Scruton, 1987:25). He was succeeded by Hamza Ibn Ali, who is considered to be the
true founder of the Druze religion. The Druze became heavily concentrated in the Lebanese
mountains, along with the Maronites. Their sacred book is the Book of Wisdom (Kitab Al-Hikma).
People of the Druze faith believe in reincarnation; that is, their souls will pass from one body to the
other until the return of the Hakim at the Judgement Day.

The Druze living in Palestine have been able to accept the new Judaic order and the Druze
Israeli army personnel were successfully able to police the Chouf area (Scruton, 1987:27). The Druze
have organised themselves as a "Progressive Socialist Party" with Walid Jumblatt, the son of the late
and prominent Lebanese leader Kamal Jumblatt, as their leader.

The Shi'ites

The most important schism in Islam was over Muhammad's succession. The Shi'ites are the sect of
Islam whose followers have accepted the imamate of Ali's descendants through his son Husayn to the
twelfth generation (Scruton, 1989:28). During the Fatimid period, the Shi'ites dominated Lebanon,
except for the Northern Maronite areas. The Shi'ites have been able to preserve their culture and
tradition in Jabal Amil and the Beqa' area. The Shi'ites of Lebanon have closely linked themselves
with Iran where Shi'ism is the official religion. The linkage between the Shi'ites and Iran parallels that
between the Maronites and the Papacy, both of which have survived to the present day (Scruton,

The Sunnites

Although until the late thirteenth century the population of Lebanon was predominantly Christian,
the Sunnite have been able to establish themselves in the country as an important community
(Scruton, 1987:30). They have been able to maintain an excellent relationship with Constantinople,
which negatively impacted on their enthusiasm for an independent Lebanon (Scruton, 1987:30).

Greek Orthodox

The Greek Orthodox represent the branch of the Greek church loyal to Constantinople. During the
Nineteenth Century, the Orthodox community enjoyed the ruling of the Russian Czar. The Arabic
Orthodox continue to have a strong emotional attachment to Mother Russia (Scruton, 1987:32). The
Lebanese Orthodox consist of two main groups: The wealthy and the poor. The wealthy represent the
cosmopolitan French- and English-educated community highly supportive of an independent
Lebanon. They were considered to be among the richest of Lebanon's upper class. The poor live in the
villages and are influenced by the pan-Arabism movement. Both groups belong to the Patriarchate of
Antioch who currently resides in Damascus. In today's Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox make up the
second largest Christian community.
Greek Catholic

The Greek Orthodox along with the Greek Catholics were first known as Melkites. They held good positions under the Byzantine empire. The "Melkite" and "Greek Catholic" represent branches of the Greek church loyal to Rome.

Although the Christian Lebanese community is rather heterogeneous in its class structure, it is united in its feeling that it represents a threatened Lebanese minority that is in need of protection. The following statement by late president Bashir Gemayel talks to this effect: 'We were under attack as Christians, we defended ourselves as Lebanese' (Salman, 1984:261). The Christians have always looked to the West for affection and help. The Arab Nationalist movement has always constituted a threat to Christian Lebanese. They were mainly scared of Nasser's plans of reducing Lebanon into an Islamic Arab entity whereby the Lebanese Christians would have the same fate as the Egyptian Copts or the Iraqi Christians (Salman, 1984:261). The Lebanese Christian nationalists, on the one hand, tend to stress Lebanon's independence and uniqueness; while Arab Muslim nationalists, on the other hand, tend to present Lebanon as part of the Arab-Islamic empire (Hanf, 1993:49).

The bullets and bombs exchanged by the infighting factions throughout the Lebanese (1975-1991) crisis did not distinguish among the Lebanese churches or mosques. Accordingly, the Christian community developed feelings of hatred and disdain to the Muslim community and vice versa. Added to this is the Palestinian cause, which is definitely considered more Arab than Lebanese. This, among other causes considered, has paved the way to a prolonged Lebanese crisis.

Government and Political System

The Lebanese constitution was drawn up on 26 May, 1926. It states that: 'As a temporary measure and in the interests of justice and peace, the communities will be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the cabinet.' It defines Lebanon as a democratic republic with three main branches representing the executive, legislature and judiciary. The elected President represents the head of state. Once elected by the National Assembly, he/she assumes the presidency position for a period of six years. The president is not eligible for re-election at the end of his presidency term. As the president, he/she appoints the prime minister and the other members of the Council of Ministers. The religious communities in Lebanon have always played an important political role.

The various communities were proportionally represented in Parliament with a formal ratio of 53 Christians to 45 Muslims. The Parliament consisted of 99 representatives as follows: 30 Maronites, 20 Sunnites, 19 Shi'ites, 11 Greek Orthodox, 6 Greek Catholics, 6 Druzes, 4 Armenian Orthodox, 1 Armenian Catholic, 1 Protestant and 1 representative of the other minorities. The parliamentary representatives are elected for a period of four years. In addition, the National Pact of 1943 - which was prepared by the "Resistance Government" formed in the mountains by Christians, Muslims and Druzes - instituted the Community Charter which states that the President of the state is a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, the Speaker of parliament a Shi'ite and the Deputy Prime Minister a Greek Orthodox. The President's position is very powerful. He/she may adjourn or dissolve the House of Representatives. The President along with the Council of Ministers, together, form the government of Lebanon.

As far as the judiciary system is concerned, the legal codes date back to 1930, with subsequent amendments covering civil and criminal matters. There are three levels of court to enforce the legal codes as follows: 57 single-judge courts dealing with civil and criminal cases throughout the country, 11 three-judge courts dealing with more serious civil and criminal cases and three higher civil courts and one criminal court. Political life has always been organized on confessional basis. Communities, clans and the Zaa'ma - the local sectarian leaders - play a major and powerful role in Lebanon's political life. The country's traditional political families have been influential for generations.

Other governmental posts are also apportioned among the major religious sects. Until today, the contracting and dissolving of marriages, guardianship and child legitimisation, wills and inheritance are all determined by religious authorities related to the individual's sect (Betts, 1978:190).
Lebanon’s delicate political religious balance has been continuously threatened since the National Pact (Al-Mithaq Al-Watani) was first formulated in 1943.

Arab Nationalists, the majority of which are Muslims, believed that Lebanon is part of the Arab World and, accordingly, should be associated with the Arab countries. Lebanese Nationalists, on the other hand, the majority of which are Christians, viewed Lebanon as a country belonging to the Mediterranean World and thus it should be associated with Western countries. Although there has been a balance in political power among the various religious sects in Lebanon, up until the current post-crisis period, final decisions have remained mainly in the Christian establishment domain. In accordance with all public sector appointments, the army establishment has also reflected the confessional proportions of the overall population. Since independence, the head of the Lebanese army has been a Christian Maronite. The Muslims have continuously requested a new Census to show their numerical majority (Betts, 1978:197).

Economic Development and Modernization

Pre-1975, Lebanon was considered to be affluent and modern. It was a second home country for a considerable number of people who found it to be a pleasant place to live and to work (Gordon, 1983:33). Just like other Middle-Eastern and Arab countries, Lebanese society is full of internal contradictions. It is the land that combines both eastern and western civilisations. In Lebanon one can find a unique blend between modern and traditional ways of living. This can be easily seen by comparing Beirut’s cosmopolitan population with the more traditional societies prevailing in Sidon, Tyre and the various Lebanese villages.

A clear indication of the country’s high level of modernity is the status that Lebanese women enjoy. More educational and employment opportunities have been provided for women. Other indicators include the movement from the extended to the nuclear family; higher levels of education; increasing the possibility for women to divorce; sharp decline in polygamy; shed veils; birth control practices; smaller families; bigger size of media audience as compared to neighbouring countries; higher rates of literacy and higher percentage of the population working for the service industry, among others (Gordon, 1983:35-6).

During the pre-crisis stage, Beirut had served as the international centre of the Middle-East. Being a bridge between East and West, Beirut became one of the best known cities in the Middle-East (Aburish, 1989:201). A blend of political, economic and social forces have led to the country’s modernization. Salem (1973:2) defines modernization as the ‘process by which a country adapts, transforms or replaces its traditional institutions and patterns of life under the influence of the new science and technology that arose during the Renaissance in Western Europe’. Unlike most other Arab countries of the Middle-East, Lebanon’s modernization has emerged due to the continuous efforts of the reformers at the top levels of government, in academic life and in private business, rather than through the guidance of military elites (Salem, 1973:3-4).

An important force underlying the country’s modernization is its economic advancement, especially within the service sector. Lebanon’s per capita income was one of the highest when compared to its neighbouring countries during the early 1970s, yet the uneven disparities between the rich and the poor continued (Gilmour, 1988:425). Up to 1973, sixty per cent of the country’s GNP was derived from the service sector. Banking and tourism have always been vital to the Lebanese economy, nevertheless, these sectors have also been highly influenced by political changes and pressures (Bowen-Jones, 1988:77).

Tourism and Hospitality Sector

Pre-1975, Lebanon was considered as a main Middle-Eastern tourist resort. It is hard to describe the country without mentioning its beautiful beaches; modern hotels; relaxing snow resort centres; elegant restaurants; western boutiques and book stores; credible high-schools, universities and research centres; and a rich intellectual and cultural life.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Syrians</th>
<th>Other Nationalities</th>
<th>Estimates of Direct Expenditures (in Million LL)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>37,891</td>
<td>89,412</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>95,865</td>
<td>120,553</td>
<td>30.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>160,833</td>
<td>123,762</td>
<td>39.8</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>544,008</td>
<td>151,233</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>722,336</td>
<td>179,128</td>
<td>107.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>668,339</td>
<td>190,815</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>369,095</td>
<td>180,498</td>
<td>97.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>25,913</td>
<td>98,132</td>
<td>48.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>179,626</td>
<td>173,258</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>379,000</td>
<td>233,083</td>
<td>128.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>235,055</td>
<td>297,675</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>294,204</td>
<td>321,153</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>340,338</td>
<td>389,814</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>488,720</td>
<td>472,176</td>
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<td>1966</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>702,891</td>
<td>516,228</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>790,510</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>810,050</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>863,832</td>
<td>822,347</td>
<td>430.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>650.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,232,903</td>
<td>1,048,159</td>
<td>621.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,019,498</td>
<td>884,997</td>
<td>573.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,498,131</td>
<td>1,498,131</td>
<td>880.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Raymond Mallat's (1980), Fiscal Policy For Social Justice and Economic Development In Lebanon, Aleph, Beirut, p. 112.

Lebanon has a number of interesting resorts. Tourists from various parts of the globe, especially from other Middle-Eastern countries, enjoy visits to Chemlan, Suq Al-Gharb, Aley, Bhamdoun, Sofar, Beit Mery, Brummana, Hammana, Ain Zhalta, Jezzine, and many others. In all the main resorts, just as in Beirut, the mixture of East and West prevails. Lebanese cuisine is well known in most parts of the world. As Khayat and Keatinge (1960: 78) explain, the variations and combinations of Lebanese dishes are beyond simple arithmetic.

Tourism has always been a vital element of Lebanon’s service economy, nevertheless, it has been highly conditioned by political factors. Table 4-2 shows the number of tourists during the pre-crisis period covering the years 1951-1974. As the number of Syrian tourists dropped by more than 50 per cent in 1958, Lebanon started to encourage American and Western European tourists to visit the country as a means of revitalising its tourist industry. Since the outbreak of the war in 1975, tourism completely ceased as a source of income.

Banking and Financial Services

During the pre-crisis period Lebanon represented an important financial centre, not just for the Lebanese themselves, but for the oil-producing countries as well. This trend continued during the early years of the crisis. Nevertheless, since the mid-1980s, commercial banks played a less effective role as financial intermediaries in the saving-investment process. During the war period, banking became a highly regulated industry. Commercial banks were regulated in such a way so as to make more of the banking system's resources available to the public sector. The continued increase in inflation, in addition to the deterioration in the overall economic activity in the country and the decreased purchasing power of the Lebanese pound, led to a long period of stagflation.

The Gulf crisis added to the various dimensions of the Lebanese financial sector problems. It led to further decreases in the transfers from the Gulf countries to Lebanese banks. At the same time, the level of withdrawals from previous savings by the Lebanese workers themselves also increased as they had to leave their jobs in Kuwait. Given the continuous deterioration in the value of the pound, people lost trust in the Lebanese currency and, as such, increased their savings deposits in foreign exchange at the expense of the local currency deposits. Given the marked change in the deposits' currency composition, bank loans to the private sector were also being granted in foreign currency. As the war continued and its intensity increased, a considerable number of banks closed in Beirut and opened branches in neighbouring countries, including Cyprus and the State of Bahrain.

Lebanon experienced a revival in the commercial banking activity during the post-crisis period of 1991-1995. In 1994 and 1995, the economic activity of the commercial banks continued to grow. In the 1994 overview of the Lebanese economy, Iskandar (1995:25) outlines the following observations/trends currently relevant to the banking sector: the trend towards fewer and larger banks is prevailing given the current mergers; strong Lebanese banks with foreign branches; shift in emphasis of banking activities to Lebanon, as is the case with the Mediterranean Investment Group, the Audi Group, Banque du Liban et d'Outre - Mer and Saradar Bank; a growing functional cooperation between the Central Bank and the commercial banks; increased interest in foreign banks to return to Lebanon as is the case with City Corp and the Bank of Tokyo; and an overall increase in the total banking resources.

Education, Research and Consulting Services

The rate of literacy in Lebanon is rather high when compared to its Arab neighbouring countries. Lebanon has a number of internationally credible educational institutions, including high schools, colleges and universities. Some are financed by the public sector while others are purely private institutions. The educational system in Lebanon represents a reflection of diverse confessional structure (Salem, 1973:33). The school system encourages multi-linguistic training. The educational institutions have mostly been founded by foreign missionaries.

The Ras Beirut area is quite famous for the American University of Beirut (AUB). Students come from a wide variety of Arab and other countries to attend AUB. It is not just an educational, but a cultural and social, institution of great value in the Middle-East. Of equal importance to AUB is The University of St. Joseph, founded by the Jesuits. A number of other universities and colleges exist in Lebanon, including The Lebanese American University, The Lebanese University and North Lebanon College, among others.

In addition, there are a considerable number of intellectual clubs - organized societies where intellectuals voice opinions - including the Cenacle Libanais; the Institute of Developmental Studies; the Lebanese Association of University Professors; the Lawyers Syndicate; the Doctor's Syndicate; the Engineering Syndicate; University Graduates Society and Lebanese Student League (Salem, 1973:68-69).

Unfortunately, government and Lebanese political structure leave little room for Lebanese intellectuals. Although the various associations provide the forum for the exchange of innovative ideas, it does not provide an opportunity for real political reform.
Cultural and Social System

Lebanon has rapidly acquired the "best" of both Eastern and Western ways of living. Even at this critical post-crisis phase, Lebanon continues to represent a mixture of the East and the West. The Lebanese are known for their rich social life. Their hospitality lies at the heart of their social as well as business life. There is no equivalence to the term "hello" in the Arabic language (Khayat and Keatinge, 1960:87). As a sign of ordinary politeness, a simple greeting expands into a number of questions about the individual's health and welfare.

Many believe that the essence of Lebanon is the family (Khayat and Keatinge, 1960:15; Farsoun, 1970:258). Strong feelings of love, respect and dignity tend to tie family members together. The sense of family union in Lebanon continues to be similar to tribal obligation. Good family reputation and prestige is often extremely important.

The character of the extended Lebanese family is derived from its structural position in an ethnically fragmented but religiously united society (Farsoun, 1970:258). The extended family also plays the role of an employment agency. It is not unusual to see networks of relatives employed together in a single family business. The extended family also serves as an emigration agency. The process of chain migration has been quite common throughout the crisis period. In addition, the extended family also serves political purposes. One cannot simply discuss the political role of extended families without making reference to the concept of Za’im, referring to political, confessional or sectarian leader who looks after the interests and welfare of his particular group. Followers tend to highly support their Za’im because of their expectations. The concept of Zu’una (pl. of Za’imi) represents an extended family affair rather than a strictly charismatic or individual quality. As Farsoun (1970:280) explains, the loyalty and submissiveness to the Za’im is built up at the grass-roots level.

Finally, as Haddad (1994:14) clearly notes, the major challenge facing Lebanon is not the layout of reconstruction plans, but the ability to make them tangible realities. Currently large areas of the country remain outside the control of the government. The main question remains whether post-crisis Lebanon will be able to face the post-crisis challenges and overcome the hurdles standing in the way of realising an effective and holistic reconstruction programme.
Chapter V

Lebanon in Crisis (1975-1991);
Basic Developments, Analysis and Evaluation

Sections:

Introduction

Basic Developments

The Dual Nature of the Lebanese Crisis: Analysis and Evaluation

Lebanese Crisis Networking

Mapping the Lebanese Macro-Crisis

Critical Turning Points: The Risk Path Analysis Model

Conclusion
Chapter V


Introduction

Many countries have been following the series of events that took place in Lebanon which, on the world map, is only the size of a dot. They include the United States, Western Europe, Israel, Syria and other Arab countries. United Nations forces have for years been present in the south of Lebanon. Several countries have sent their forces to support what was a well-recognised Lebanese central government, to overcome the long, creeping crisis that Lebanon experienced from 1975 to 1991. The events that took place in Lebanon during the seventeen year crisis period could be described as a creeping crisis (Rosenthal, Hart and Charles, 1989:27-28), after considering the sequence and complexity of the events, as well as the time period involved. It is essential to note that most of the Lebanese leaders, as well as the general public, did not foresee that the events of 1975 would lead to a series of multiple events that would sweep the country from north to south.

Chapter five outlines the various dimensions to the Lebanese war and evaluates its impact on local society and its neighbouring countries. The role of national government, local political factions and foreign government interventions are evaluated in the process of the Lebanese crisis. The first part of this chapter briefly outlines the basic development of major events. This section is followed by a twofold analysis of the Lebanese crisis. First, four alternative perspectives are used as prisms to differentiate and trace the various trends within the Lebanese crisis, namely: conventional wisdom; crisis as opportunity; crisis as burden; and a contingency typology. Accordingly, various frameworks are used to evaluate the Lebanese events within the context of the previously mentioned analytical perspectives. Secondly, after identifying the limitations of the models used, a recovery and reconstruction research agenda is developed. Policy issues and implications of reconstruction strategies are evaluated. Reactions to decision pathways, resulting from the Lebanese crisis, are addressed. Knowing that crisis planning is a rather dynamic process, where different planning modes are used for pre-crisis and post-crisis situations, learning avenues are discussed.

Basic Developments

Before 1975, Lebanon was known by some as “Switzerland of the Middle-East” and by others as “Little Paris”. During that period, Lebanon could very well have been described as a peaceful, pro-western, civilised, sovereign and independent nation with a competent and legitimate government, headed by a respected Lebanese president and supported by a well-organised national army. It was perceived by the Western world, as well as the Arab countries, as a peaceful tourist resort. It is in this small part of the world that Western and Eastern civilisations met, not to mention the variety of religious ideologies; especially Christianity and Islam.

On August 17, 1970, Suleiman Franjieh was elected as President of Lebanon. During his inauguration, President Franjieh declared, 'Lebanon is for all Lebanese, and must remain united. We should have strong ties with all friendly countries, especially Arab states on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty' (Saade, 1992:6). Before 1973, Lebanon enjoyed peace, progress and stability. This peace and stability, however, was disrupted by the flood of Palestinian refugees from Jordan into Lebanon, after the defeat of the Palestinian military forces by the Jordanian army in 1970. Lebanon was the only Arab country to accept the Palestinian refugees (Saade, 1992:7).

The Palestinians continued to increase in number and many refugees were smuggling arms into Lebanon. With time, the Palestinians started to establish a strong power base in the country, which allowed them to launch military attacks against Israel from the Lebanese-Israeli borders. Accordingly, Israel continuously retaliated by undertaking frequent air raids against Palestinian targets in Southern Lebanon. In 1973, it became quite evident to the Lebanese - both government and people - that the Palestinians were attempting to create what became known as a 'State within a
State”. The Lebanese army then attempted to enter Palestinian camps, so as to limit their movements. Consequently, the Lebanese government faced strong political and economic pressures from several Arab countries. Eventually, the Arab League of Nations met and ordered a halt to all military operations.

In 1975, President Franjieh met with American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, at Shtourah, Lebanon. During the same year, President Franjieh held a meeting with the American messenger, Dean Brown. The American solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was to re-settle the Lebanese Christians outside Lebanon, in a country of their choice, and to settle the Palestinians permanently in their place (Khalifeh, 1990:19). The Lebanese government totally rejected the American plan. President Franjieh declared that the Lebanese would never abandon Lebanon, and that they were prepared to defend their homeland to death (Saade, 1992:9).

On April 13, 1975, fighting broke out between the Lebanese and Palestinians in the area of Ain Al-Remaneh, Beirut (Gordon, 1983: 106, Haddad, 1995: 1, Makdisi, 1990: 11; Odeh, 1985: xii). It became apparent to the Lebanese government that a “conspiracy”, with the following aims, was being undertaken. First, breaking down law and order in the country. Secondly, destroying the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. Thirdly, attempting to disrupt the co-existence of the Lebanese people (Saade, 1992: 9). The Lebanese government’s attempts to maintain law and order in the country were continuously frustrated by internal and external socio-political forces. Such forces aimed at creating a constitutional crisis in the country, by attempting to force President Franjieh’s resignation before the end of his term. The presidential palace was continuously being bombed and armed conflicts escalated in various parts of Lebanon (Saade, 1992: 9).

On September 23, 1976, President Franjieh handed power, in accordance with the terms of the Lebanese constitution, to president-elect Elias Sarkis. President Sarkis continued with the struggle to provide order and security in the country while, at the same time, attempting to restore a spirit of Lebanese unity and sovereignty. After the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the death of President Bashir Gemayel, his brother Amine Gemayel was elected as President of Lebanon. The level of military confrontation and foreign intervention was escalating and the situation continued to deteriorate. In 1988, Colonel Michael Aoun was appointed as head of military government. During his two years in office, the Lebanese people experienced two severe wars, namely, a “liberation war” and a “cancellation war”. One important remark worth noting, is that Lebanon continues to be a victim of the Middle-East crisis.

The Dual Nature of the Lebanese Crisis: Analysis and Evaluation

In an attempt to study the various dimensions of the Lebanese crisis, four alternative theoretical frameworks are used to generate chronological longitudinal maps for critical reconstruction policy “turning points”. Each frame of reference is used as a prism to prioritise and differentiate the previously collected raw data. Using different frames of reference helps in examining the complexity of the Lebanese crisis, knowing that each framework emphasises certain aspects of events and ignores others. The main aim for using different frameworks, in this focused case, is to explain the complex and inter-related events comprising the Lebanese crisis, while attempting to avoid over simplification. Responses to such questions as: Why did the events occur? Who is mainly responsible for the crisis? and who are the beneficiaries? will be offered.

The Conventional Wisdom approach is basically a neutralist international relations-driven model. The crisis data is gathered and then integrated into specific frames of reference. The conventional wisdom approach proposes a three-period model; starting with a pre-crisis period, crisis period and a post-crisis period; where the level and intensity of stress differs from one period to the other. Accordingly, a periodization of the Lebanese events is used so as to operationally sub-divide the total crisis. Each of the periods is further sub-divided into separate stages so as to better analyse and evaluate clusters of events. During each of these stages, several relevant crisis variables are analysed, including the identification of the major decision makers; their images and perceptions of the crisis situation; environmental changes - both internal and external; and the choices made. The inter-relationships of all these variables will also be considered at each and every period.
Three alternative perspectives are used in an attempt to further explain the Lebanese events and formulate a pattern of crisis behaviour, namely: Crisis as Opportunity (Allison, 1971:10-14) - which for the sake of this study will be referred to as Perspective II, Crisis as Burden (Allison, 1971:144-148) - which will be referred to as Perspective III and a Contingency Typology (Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:405) - which will be referred to as Perspective IV.

Using perspective II, Crisis as Opportunity, the events will be explained from a local, regional and international perspective. Responses are offered to such questions as to what extent is the problem of Lebanon Lebanese, Arab, Palestinian, Israeli, regional and/or international? Various participants in the Lebanese crisis, including American, Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian diplomats and journalists have reported on the Lebanese events from their own perspectives. Knowing that facts/events do not speak for themselves and that conclusions derived are highly conditioned by the trane of vision and assumptions used, this study presents and evaluates the 1975-1991 crisis from a Lebanese point of view.

A third perspective, Crisis as Burden, is used to further differentiate the random events in terms of discussing and evaluating the impact of the Lebanese crisis on the socio-economic situation. Responses are offered to such questions as what are the impacts of the Lebanese crisis on Lebanon's economy and society? Aspects of the social, environmental, economic, political, military, religious, intellectual and media impacts are evaluated.

A fourth perspective, Contingency Typology, is applied to the context of the Lebanese events. Responses are offered to questions such as were the Lebanese events avoidable or compulsive? Could any learning curves be traced throughout the events? The purpose of such crisis decision networking is to develop and evaluate reconstruction policy implications for future directions. One important issue to be considered in this regard is the inability of the Lebanese government officials to act upon apparent continuous warning signals, which finally led to a seventeen-year old creeping crisis. Lebanon with its current socio-religious texture, in addition to the presence of foreign regional military forces, is a crisis-prone country. Accordingly, the aim of transplanting the multi-level contingency theory to the context of the Lebanese events, is mainly to analyse policy issues related to recovery of Lebanon.

Conventional Wisdom

The first attempt to analyse the Lebanese 1975-1991 crisis is through the use of a historical neutralist international relations driven model, which proposes the periodisation, and further subdivision, of the Lebanese events into inter-related stages of crisis activities; with an analysis of the pre-crisis events, moving to the crisis events and ending with the post-crisis stage (Dowty, 1984:7-10). Using the Crisis Management Model developed by the American Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods are further divided into sub-stages within the context of the overall Lebanese crisis decision making process. The Crisis Management Model classifies crisis events into four stages. The pre-crisis stages consist of mitigation and preparedness and the post-crisis stages are composed of response and recovery activities.

Pre-Crisis Period. For the sake of this research study, the pre-crisis activities are analysed for the period 1965 to 13 April, 1975. Before 1973, Lebanon enjoyed a non-crisis period as evidenced by its economic growth, peace, security and strong national defence. Yet, many other trends were also taking place at the same time. There are various reasons behind the Lebanese crisis - both internal and external. It reached a point where confrontation among the different participants became compulsive (Rosenthal, 1989:238). Lebanon has two strong neighbours; namely, Syria and Israel. Until April 1975, some of its neighbouring countries had not yet experienced the same level of economic growth and degree of modernization that Lebanon had experienced during its pre-crisis period. Lebanon has been a pioneer in the modernization of several Arab countries. The advanced level of modernization in Lebanon during the pre-crisis period is evidenced by the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), discussed by Bill and Leiden (1979:21), and referred to by Gordon (1983:36). Table 5-1 shows a comparative modernization of few Middle-Eastern countries for the years 1973 and 1974.
Table 5-1: Comparative Modernization of Middle-East Regional Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>$1,070</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>$560</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>$280</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>$1,160</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>$430</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>(84%)</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>($3,460)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Lebanon exists in a region of constant turmoil, where the spillover of events across borders is usual. Lebanon accepted the Palestinian refugees after their defeat by the Jordanian army in 1970. With time, the Palestinians established a strong military presence in various parts in Lebanon, especially in Beirut and the south. This resulted in a series of clashes between them and the Lebanese army and civilians. Due to their presence in the south of Lebanon, military action between the Palestinians and the Israelis became inevitable.

The problem with the Palestinians started after the Cairo Agreement in 1969. The Cairo Agreement gave Palestinians the right to undertake resistance and military actions against Israel from south Lebanon. Yet, the Palestinians did not limit their military presence to the south, but expanded all over Lebanon and, as mentioned earlier, they became a State in themselves. In 1973, the Lebanese president, Sulaiman Frangieh, supported by an organised Lebanese army, intended to enter the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila suburbs of Beirut, in an attempt to limit their military existence and movement. Due to strong Arab political pressures, the Lebanese army did not enter the Palestinian camps. At the same time, the Muslims of Beirut considered the Palestinian forces as their own protective army and began to deal with the Christian population and Lebanon’s national army from this perspective.

An additional reason that helped to formulate the psychological environment for the Lebanese crisis was the continuous demands by the Muslims, especially the fundamentalist Shi'ite Muslims, for what they called socio-economic and political equality with the Christians. In other words, they demanded the cancellation of what they considered as “privileges” being given to the Christians. On various occasions, Lebanese and international officials clearly stated that the roots of the Lebanese crisis were quite complex and have been shaped by Henry Kissinger’s long-range plan for the Middle-East (Khalifeh, 1990:209). Many politicians and scholars in international politics have written about “Kissinger’s plan/project”, the “Kissingerian conspiracy” and “Kissingerology of the Middle-East”. Evaluating the extent to which such plans are true is a study in itself. Yet, it would be an oversimplification to claim that the Lebanese events were the result of a single person’s project or even the planning of a foreign intelligence agency. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that Kissinger himself clearly stated that, ‘Lebanon is an ideal state to implement conspiracies against Lebanon itself, as well as the Arab world. Given Lebanon’s contradictions, I have discovered new factors to be used in a comprehensive conspiracy against all Arabs’ (Khalifeh, 1990:217). Some politicians and political scientists consider such statements by Kissinger as “confessions” on his part regarding a possible, unproclaimed US foreign policy in the Middle-East.

Accordingly, a considerable number of politicians and senior government officials believed that some foreign governments saw the overtaking of Lebanon by the Palestinians as an appropriate solution to the Middle-East crisis. In other words, Lebanon is to be replaced by Palestine, and from
here the term “Replacement Nation” originated. Thus, the Middle-East crisis would be solved on account of Lebanon’s peace and independence.

Participating in crisis escalation within a specific country needs careful planning. It becomes easier when the soil is fertile with different religious sects, especially in the Near- and Middle-East region, where basic distinctions are unfortunately religious. Accordingly, the Lebanese crisis could be easily labelled as compulsive, given the number of religions and sects prevailing, whereby partitioning the country could be planned on a religious basis. Needless to say, every foreign government that participated in Lebanese events had its own aims and objectives to achieve, as compared with the costs incurred in being involved in what seemed to be an endless crisis. The strategy used by most foreign countries, to help in escalating and prolonging the war, was to sponsor a local party/militia - keeping in mind that the political parties during the war were based on religious sects. Examples include Israel’s support for the Lebanese Forces - Christian political party; Iran’s support for Hezbollah - fundamentalist Shi’ite Muslim party; Palestinian and Libyan support for the Murabitun - Sunni Muslim militia; among others. The sponsoring countries obviously had conflicting objectives which were translated into continuous escalations of the Lebanese events.

All of the above factors, among others, make up the prevailing environment during the pre-crisis period. In this case, the pre-crisis period might be better referred to as the preparation stage. From the previous discussion of the inter-relationships of the environmental elements that Lebanon experienced, it becomes easier to identify the decision-makers for this time period. The major actors during the pre-crisis stage were mainly two: the Lebanese government on one side, and the Palestinian resistance forces, supported by various Arab countries, on the other side.

The Cairo Agreement of 1969, between the Lebanese government and the Palestinians, paved the way to serious problems between the Lebanese government and Israel. It legalized the Palestinian military operations undertaken from south Lebanon against Israel. This conflicts with the UN Security Council’s Decision Numbers 425 and 426, governing the relationship between Lebanon and Israel. In addition, over the years, the Palestinians established themselves militarily in various parts in Lebanon, which was the cause of several confrontations between them and the Lebanese army and civilians. Several meetings were held between members of the Lebanese government and Palestinian leaders where negotiations took place. Yet, every time the Lebanese government was led to believe that the confrontation was over, a new round of events took place with more serious consequences than previously. In addition, Israel was continuously shelling south Lebanon in retaliation to the military operations against its North territories undertaken by the Palestinian resistance forces from Southern Lebanese villages.

From the preceding discussion, it becomes evident that the Lebanese officials were able to clearly define the threat facing the country. Nevertheless, little effort was undertaken in terms of prevention and mitigation of the crisis events. Given the clear warning signals and crisis symptoms that had been accumulating, the Lebanese government, supported by an organised national army, was prepared to undertake action to prevent, or at least limit, the movement of Palestinian military forces in Lebanon. Yet, the Lebanese government’s efforts were frustrated by political opposition from the Arab countries, who were highly supporting the Palestinians. Thus, the government’s crisis preventive plan was dominated by Arab political and economic pressures. Accordingly, the only option available to Lebanon, as perceived by its government, was to start negotiating with PLO leaders, which proved to be unsuccessful. Thus, the pre-crisis evidenced the disintegration of Lebanon.

Crisis Period. It is believed that the Lebanese crisis started militarily on 13 April, 1975, when two members of the Kata’ib party - Phalanges - were shot dead during a Kata’ib festival in Ain Al-Roumaneh area. The Kata’ib party responded quickly by shooting twenty six Palestinians returning in a bus after celebrating a Palestinian festival in the Arab University area. The bus passed through Ain Al-Roumaneh area instead of taking the main road to the Palestinian camp of Tal Zaatar. Naturally, the event of 13 April, 1975, led to an increased level of stress experienced among the Lebanese, both government and civilians. The environment continued to be unstable as during the pre-crisis period, except that with the continuous fighting and shelling, the environment was to become much more turbulent and stressful for all parties involved, not to mention Lebanese civilians who had to spend seventeen years of their lives moving from one shelter to the other.
Since 11 April, 1975, two conditions of crisis outlined by Rosenthal, Hart and Kourzman (1991:212) prevailed in Lebanon. First, a considerable increase in perceived threat to the basic values of freedom, peace and stability were spreading among the Lebanese, especially the Christian community. Secondly, a rising awareness of time pressure and constraints was felt as the fierceness of confrontations increased. The Lebanese government and political parties opposing the Palestinian military presence felt that a definite decision was needed concerning the PLO presence in the country. In addition to the previously mentioned conditions, involvement in military confrontations already began. The increasing number of the Palestinian resistance forces and the support they were receiving from various Arab countries, the terrorist acts they performed, their military capabilities and the advanced Russian weaponry they held led to an increased threat.

Since April, 1975, and for two consecutive years, brutal battles took place between the Christian Lebanese parties on one side, and the Palestinians supported by Lebanese leftist militias on the other side. The Lebanese army was involved militarily on several occasions. At the same time, Israel continued its military operations in south Lebanon in retaliation to Palestinian military actions against its northern territories. With the entrance of the Syrian troops, tanks, and heavy weaponry to Lebanon in 1976, an additional actor was added to the Lebanese scene. With time, Syria proved to be a major decision maker.

Lebanon has witnessed brutal battles, bombardments, and explosions throughout the seventeen-year old crisis. A bewildering number of new leftist political parties emerged at different stages of the Lebanese events matching developments in the region. Examples include Hezbollah, which was founded after the religious political revolution in Iran. Its aim was to institute a fundamentalist Islamic political system in Lebanon, similar to that established in Iran.

As the crisis escalated, the number of participants in the Lebanese events also increased. Knowing the interest several countries took in this small part of the world, the direct actors in the crisis could better be classified as major and minor. The major/primary actors were the governments of neighbouring countries; namely, Israel, Syria and the Palestinians. Needless to say, both Syria and Israel were supported by the two superpowers; namely, Russia and the United States. The minor/secondary actors were the various local political parties/militias that were sponsored by the primary participants. To name a few, the main local parties included the Lebanese Forces, Progressive Socialist Party, Amal, Murabitun, Al-Sa'aqa and Hezbollah, among others. Several indirect actors that impacted on the crisis and helped in shaping the events included Iraq, Iran, Libya, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, among other Arab and Gulf countries.

The actions and decisions of the secondary participants, namely, the Lebanese political parties and militias, were determined and restricted by the objectives of the foreign governments supporting them. Following primary versus secondary causation in the Lebanese crisis takes one back to the causes behind the crisis itself. Was the accident on 13 April, 1975, for example, the triggering event leading to a seventeen-year old crisis, or was it an induced crisis? Is it Lebanon’s internal contradictions that escalated foreign intervention or is it the interests of foreign governments that was behind the prolongation of Lebanon’s internal conflict?

What added to the complexity of the events in focus, and contributed to the prolongation of the war, is the fact that today’s ally became tomorrow’s enemy. This becomes quite evident when evaluating random Lebanese events. The actions undertaken by the sponsoring governments throughout the Lebanese events kept the balance of power in equilibrium among the various conflicting parties and resulted in prolonging and escalating the crisis. Although it became quite evident to internal conflicting factions that Lebanon’s events greatly vary with external Arab-Jewish politics, there was minimal evidence of lessons learned from previous experience including the 1958 civil strife (Gordon, 1983: 26).

Qubain (1961: 71) describes the 1958 civil strife as a ‘Comic Opera’. In his book, Crisis in Lebanon’, Qubain (1961) states that ‘there was something unreal about the whole affair - a succession of scenes taken virtually in toto from Rutania: an army that would not fight; opposition leaders officially declared “rebels”, with warrants out for their arrest, blandly walking the streets of Beirut in broad daylight with no-one laying so much as a finger on them; pitched battles between the army and “rebels” forces stopped, so that army trucks could bring water to the rebels and move their wounded to hospitals; a president virtually a prisoner in his own palace for over two months; a parliament that
could not meet; opposition leaders, each with a private army of his own, establishing virtually independent government in his locality' (Quban, 1981: 71). Although few small battles took place that led to about 2,000 to 4,000 casualties, the legitimacy of the government was challenged (Gordon, 1983: 26). Ten thousand US Marines were sent to Lebanon to help establish stability, who later on left the country in response to an Arab-sponsored UN resolution (Gordon, 1983: 27).

Given the level of foreign influence on Lebanon during the crisis events, the crisis period is divided into four stages. The first stage covers the two-year war period, 1975-1976, followed by the stage covering the period 1977-1982. It evidenced division and fragmentation of Lebanese society. This stage has been labelled by several Lebanese politicians and civilians as the "war of others on Lebanese soil". The second stage ended with a massive Israeli invasion on 16 June, 1982. The third stage covers the period 1982-1988. The events taking place during this stage partly reflect the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion. After the death of president Bashir Gemayel, his brother Amine Gemayel was elected as president of Lebanon on 21 September, 1982. With Israeli partial withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983, Syria re-emerged as the dominant force on the Lebanese scene. It is worthwhile to note that during this stage, an interesting deterrence relationship emerged between the two primary external actors in the Lebanese crisis; namely, Syria and Israel (Evron, 1987:32).

The fourth crisis stage covers the period 1988-1990. It began with Colonel Michael Aoun being appointed as the head of a military government. This stage could be characterised as extremely stressful to local government and civilians. During this stage, Baabda presidential palace was known as the 'people's palace'. Colonel Aoun was defeated on 13 October, 1990.

Post-Crisis Period. The post-crisis decision making process is discussed through transplanting the two post-crisis stages of the Crisis Management Model; namely response and recovery to the context of events covering the period 1989-1995.

On 24 November, 1989, Elias El-Hrawi was elected as President of Lebanon. Although bombing had stopped, various crucial questions come to mind: Why did the fighting end? What had been achieved? Why were foreign troops still present in Lebanon? When will all foreign forces withdraw from the country? Have the issues that created the Lebanese crisis in the first place been resolved? Where is Lebanon now? What is its present identity? Currently, the Lebanese have more problems coping with the peace than with the war; Lebanese people feel that their economy has been stolen from them and they are currently struggling to build a peace-time economy (George, 1992).

Presently, new divisions are opening between the Lebanese population. During the pre-crisis period, Lebanon had three major social classes; namely, the upper class, the middle class and the lower class. By the end of the crisis period, the middle class had been abolished; leaving Lebanon with only two classes, the war nouveau riche and the poor, who had lost everything (George, 1992). Food, which was available during the crisis period, is now in short supply. Necessary commodities for daily living are more difficult to get now. People have lost hope and trust in the future, especially now there are no victories to look forward to. Electricity is available for only a few hours a day. Water, when available, is dangerous to drink. Telecommunications have become a luxury (George, 1992). Today's Lebanon is an impoverished country. Instead of the religious and political divisions that were experienced during the crisis period, the new divisions now are between Lebanon's wealthy and elite on the one hand and the poor people who are finding it hard to cope with their poverty on the other hand.

There are plans for building Beirut in terms of a "New Beirut". The Sunday Age reported on 31 May, 1992, that Lebanon's Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, wants to build Beirut from the ashes of war. Will the new city be owned by another country? Will it be owned by a company? It will take USS2.5 billion to start a "New Beirut", but there are no plans for the poor in the centre of the new city. It is suggested that it will look like the centre of Paris. "No man's land" once separating East and West Beirut during the crisis period has been abolished. Yet, most of the retail outlets continue to quote prices in US dollars. Having to cope with the current stressful living conditions, the general public feel that Lebanon has lost the battle of peace.

Although interesting, the neutralist, conventional wisdom and international relations-driven model does not explain the following issues:
• The dichotomy inherent in the Lebanese crisis, being a burden on the Lebanese themselves and an opportunity for foreign powers;

• classificational definition of Lebanese events, given the wide range of crisis dimensional impacts experienced for the past seventeen years; and

• the theoretical background of decision making categories needed for analysing processes of policy development and reconstruction agendas.

Accordingly, the Lebanese events are further evaluated using three alternative perspectives: Crisis as Opportunity, Crisis as Burden and a Contingency Typology.

Crisis as Opportunity

What is considered as crisis for some may constitute an opportunity for others. The levels and goals behind foreign intervention is evaluated using the Crisis Typology presented by Rosenthal, Hart and Charles (1989:27-8). In this section, responses are offered to such questions as: To what extent is the Lebanese problem Arab, Palestinian, Israeli, American and/or Lebanese?

Using Crisis as Opportunity to analyse the level of foreign intervention, distinction is made between three different, but related, variables. First, variables related to the threat of norms and values. Secondly, variables related to different perception of solutions to the Lebanese crisis held by primary and secondary participants, keeping in mind that each and every participant views the events from a totally different perspective. Thirdly, variables related to the different perceptions regarding the balance of power of the participants involved in terms of implementation of solutions/plans.

The Crisis Typology approach allows for the use of a geographical threat domain. Accordingly, the Lebanese events are viewed from three different levels of vision; namely, local, regional and international. Within this perspective, the origins of threat, both internal and external, are discussed. In addition, the nature of the threat is also evaluated.

To better understand the events in focus, it is helpful to keep in mind that regional countries, especially the neighbouring governments of Syria and Israel, have impacted on both the level of international intervention and the decisions undertaken by the local parties. On the other hand, the developments of internal events partly dictated the extent and type of foreign intervention undertaken. Thus, within the context of the Lebanese crisis, co-ordination of efforts and plans between local factions and foreign governments could be described as a mutual process. Thus, the level and type of support local parties were able to secure from foreign powers depended on their capabilities of promoting the goals of the foreign government(s) supporting them.

On the international level, the behaviour of the United States towards Lebanon could best be described as schizophrenic (Dowty, 1984: 36; Gordon, 1983: 15). After examining the Lebanese events, it becomes evident that the US foreign policy in Lebanon had not been stable throughout the crisis years. It was continuously adapting to regional changes. The US government impacted on the direction of the events by politically and militarily interfering in Lebanon’s affairs (Bickerton and Pearson, 1991: 219).

There are at least three main factors which affected the US government’s behaviour towards Lebanon. First, its empathy toward Israel, its main ally in the Middle-East region. Accordingly, several Lebanese leaders have accused Henry Kissinger of planning to partition Lebanon and to settle the Palestinians in Lebanon as an attempt to find a replacement country for them. Thus, the Middle-East crisis could be solved by compromising Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty (Khalifeh, 1990:75).

Secondly, during the crisis events, American civilians residing in Lebanon were taken as hostages in West Beirut. Thus, the co-operation of the Syrian government was needed to negotiate the release of the hostages. Thirdly, with the Desert Storm Operation, US President George Bush continued his search for allies, especially Arab troops, so as to make it clear that it is not just Western
countries acting against Saddam Hussein. Syria was one of the Arab countries who supported President Bush in his struggle against Iraq. This had serious implications on the balance of power in Lebanon. On the regional level, the Israeli intervention in Lebanon needs to be evaluated from three important angles. First, the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon, starting in 1970; secondly, the Syrian intervention in Lebanon, starting in 1976; and, finally, Israel's own interests in Lebanon.

Israel had invaded Lebanon several times throughout the seventeen years of war. Israel paid high material and human costs during its 1982 invasion, which forced the Palestinians out of Lebanon, including those in Sabra and Shatila camps. Accordingly, several questions come to mind, including the following: Why did Israel interfere militarily in Lebanon? What were its aims? Did the Israeli government achieve its objectives? On various occasions, Israeli officials made statements claiming that Israel was interested in signing an agreement with the Lebanese government - similar to the Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt. Israeli officials continuously state that Israel will not withdraw its troops from Lebanon as long as the Syrian army is present in the country due to security purposes. An interesting conventional deterrence relationship emerged between Syria and Israel during the aftermath period of the 1982 Israeli invasion. This new regional deterrence equation, beyond Lebanon, shaped its internal events.

Within the level of foreign intervention perspective, several questions come to mind. What are the actual causes of the Lebanese crisis? To what extent can the Lebanese events be explained by the involvement of foreign powers? What was the real threat as perceived by the Lebanese government? What are the proportions of endogenous versus exogenous variables leading to the crisis? Given the various statements made by prominent Lebanese politicians at various stages of the crisis, one of the basic assumptions of this study is that the major threat felt by the Lebanese - both government and citizens - was the feelings of insecurity and anxiety of losing independence and sovereignty, associated with increasing Palestinian military presence in the country. The perceived degree of threat intensified with reports by government officials relating to foreign plans dealing with Christian Lebanese displacement and Palestinian settlement in their place.

Since the problem was well defined by the Lebanese government, perceived necessity and urgency to respond to the frequent warning signals, as evidenced by regular military clashes between Palestinian armed forces and the Lebanese army and civilians, was felt at all levels. In 1973, the Lebanese government military's planned response ended after intensive political and economic Arab pressure. With the bewildering number of local and foreign participants involved in the crisis, numerous strategies of crisis resolution were generated throughout the events. Yet, given the conflicting and incompatible goals of the participants, each and every actor had a different perception of the appropriate solution(s). Obviously, the unwillingness of participants to collaborate or trade-off led to the prolongation of the crisis. The crisis in focus could be classified as compulsive. The frequent warning signals during the pre-crisis stage were successful in creating an atmosphere of tension and terror in the country. The internal instability of the Lebanese political system and the considerable level of foreign intervention in internal affairs turned Lebanon into a crisis-prone system.

Channels of distribution of weapons and arms serve as another framework for evaluating the relationship among local, regional and international participants; as well as determining the level and degree of involvement of foreign powers in the Lebanese crisis. While discussing the deterioration of the security situation, in January 1974, the Lebanese Minister of Interior stated that currently there was about half a million pieces of weaponry in Lebanon (Saade, 1992:8). Knowing that for seventeen years Lebanon served as a perfect target market for arms, it is interesting to examine the channel structure and behaviour for the marketing of international weaponry in the Lebanese market.

To free Americans taken as hostages by Islamic fundamentalist parties in what was known during the crisis period as the Western sector of Beirut, the Reagan administration became highly involved in a controversial arms deal with the Iranian government in 1986 (Stern, El-Ansary and Brown, 1989:499), affecting his image among the US general public. Within the Lebanese context, Christian parties were frequently referred to by the leftist as "isolationists" and "Israeli agents" for using American and Israeli weapons.

The Manar magazine, published weekly in London, reported in January 1978 that military battleships, full of latest Soviet weaponry, unload in Tyre port and weapons get delivered to Palestinian camps, under the supervision of the Syrian troops in Lebanon. Thus, one interesting way
of viewing the level and intensity of foreign intervention is through examining the dynamic international marketing channel structures for the distribution of arms and heavy weaponry to the various internal fighting factions. An interesting way of appraising the nature of relationships existing among local and foreign powers at different crisis stages is through depicting channel flows of physical weaponry ownership and possession, weaponry financing and forms of payment, arms negotiations and weaponry education and military training and development. The international marketing entry strategy used by almost all foreign regional governments, aiming at expanding their control over the sequence and direction of internal events, is through establishing connections with existing or emerging channels of independent/integrated local political factions. This is an area worth investigating in future studies. Analysing the arms black market helps to advance understanding of this phenomenon, as a means of allowing states to frame needed policy to control it (Sampson, 1977: 7).

In 1975, the Lebanese crisis began with Lebanon being a victim of the Palestinian issue, dressed up in religious differences among the Lebanese. In 1997, Lebanon continues to be a victim of the Middle-East conflict.

Although it is a dynamic perspective for tracing foreign interventions over time, and discussing response strategies emerging out of them, Crisis as Opportunity perspective does not explain the following issues:

- The "other" side of crisis; where it is viewed as a burden on the Lebanese themselves;

- a clear definition of the nature of the Lebanese crisis which embraces the various dimensional impacts of the events; and

- a frame of reference of crisis networking and decision pathways needed for developing a reconstruction agenda.

**Crisis as Burden**

Using a third perspective, namely Crisis as Burden, responses are offered to such questions as: to what extent could the Lebanese events be considered social; intellectual; economic; media-driven; political; military and/or religious? The various dimensions of the Lebanese events are discussed from a micro- and macro-crisis scope of vision. Given the duration and scope of the damage undertaken during Lebanon's (1975-1991) events, the Lebanese macro-crisis stands out quite prominently. Defining the nature of the Lebanese events is of significant benefit in terms of developing and evaluating post-crisis reconstruction policy implications.

The Lebanese government was losing power as foreign governments were gaining more control over Lebanese events (Keenan, 1992: 169) by enforcing and supporting their local militias. The loss of power and effectiveness by the Lebanese government were evident by the presence of participating foreign governments’ intelligence in Lebanon and the absence of the Lebanese government’s intelligence in its own territories. The number of local militias/factions increased and became more powerful as the supply of weapons, heavy artillery and armed men from the sponsoring foreign governments continued (Davie, 1992: 629-631; Gordon, 1983: 88; Khalifeh, 1990: 192; Sampson, 1997: 18). Knowing that one important reason for foreign intervention is weaponry experimentation, and given the Lebanese special addiction to personal weapons, it was believed by local politicians and the general public that, throughout the crisis period, Lebanon became a laboratory for testing the effectiveness of weaponry used (Sampson, 1977: 15-17).

When studying the Lebanese crisis, it is hard to separate between the political and military dimensions. The behavioural pattern that was observed when evaluating the actions and decisions of local militias was that political negotiations were usually preceded by military victories. Military advancements were perceived to be advantageous in terms of pressuring the enemy to accept certain demands and conditions. Thus, military action and political negotiations progressed hand in hand throughout Lebanese events.
The Lebanese crisis has been perceived by some as a religious war between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon, who find their co-existence disintegrating. Others perceived it as a struggle for power between the two main religions in Lebanon; namely Christianity and Islam. It is the view here that the reasons behind the Lebanese crisis were never religious. On the contrary, the various religions and religious sects in Lebanon were mis-used to serve political and military purposes. Thus, the same events, which were considered as opportunities by foreign powers, constituted a burden on the Lebanese themselves.

Using Turner's (1978) developmental model, the social dimensions of Lebanese events started during the "incubation period" of the crisis. Turner (1978) explains the unnoticeable development of crisis through what he called an "incubation period". He identified predisposing variables which interact together during the incubation period, resulting in major crisis events. Accordingly, Turner's (1978) developmental model is in line with the definition of macro-crisis previously discussed in chapter two of the current study. In accordance with Turner's (1978) model, large scale crises can be attributed to multiple causes.

Transplanting Turner's (1978) developmental model to the context of the Lebanese events, provides an interesting framework for partially identifying the socio-political predisposing variables. Accordingly, the following socio-political predisposing variables which existed during the "incubation period" are worth noting:

**Perceptual Rigidities.** Rigidities in belief, leading to fixation on the local scene, existed among the political factions and the general public. Although the Lebanese government was able to define and communicate the problem facing the country, some local factions decided to support foreign forces against their own government.

At the same time, the Lebanese government, itself, had its own fixations and perceptual rigidities in terms of retaining the existing political system and power balance. This affected its ability to negotiate with the rejection front, which was supported by the Palestinians. Thus, it is the view here that the Lebanese war was between conservatives, who wanted to continue with the existing political system and radicals, who were seeking change and adaptation.

**Decoy Phenomena.** Several induced events (Gordon, 1983: 106) took place during the "incubation period" which diverted attention from the genuine problem, namely the settlement of the Palestinians. Incidences of manufactured events (Gordon, 1983: 117) within the context of the Lebanese crisis are numerous. April 13, 1975 incident, which is believed to be the triggering event behind the outbreak of the crisis in focus, provides a good example to such manufactured events. It remains uncertain as to whether this incident is justifiable as retaliation for earlier assassination incidents (Gordon, 1983: 106).

**Information Ambiguities and Communication Difficulties.** There were several incidences of information ambiguities during the pre-crisis period. A classic example is the content of the Cairo Agreement, signed in 1969, in Egypt, between the Lebanese government and the PLO. Government officials were not informed of its contents except after it was published, at a later stage, in An-Nahar, an independent Lebanese newspaper. Once its contents became known, several Lebanese politicians requested its cancellation. The Cairo Agreement is considered by several politicians as one of the basic causes of the Lebanese crisis. Thus, on several occasions Lebanese officials were requested to make decisions while experiencing information and communication difficulties.

**Failure to Comply With Basic "Safety" Regulations.** It is the view here that the Lebanese government was weak in protecting its own integrity as a sovereign nation worthy of its independence. Knowing that a nation cannot survive purely on the sympathy and support of Western countries, the Lebanese government did not achieve the right balance between compromise with the Arab countries, including the Palestinians, and its political system's viability. The authorities in control failed to develop the feeling of unity among the various communities as a means of protecting the country's sovereignty.

**Ignoring Emergent Crises.** Lebanon was expected to continue supporting the Palestinian cause until the country itself became an international cause. Notions such as: "this will not happen to us"; "simply we will not leave Lebanon"; "Lebanon can never be partitioned"; "France will not allow it";
and "the United States will provide help", depict the typical attitudes of Lebanese officials and the general public during the pre-crisis stages. Government officials felt that the separate events taking place were controllable. The failure of the Lebanese government to put an end to the continuous clashes at an early stage of the crisis, contributed to escalating the crisis (Saade, 1992: 8). At a later stage, this resulted in foreign intervention, at various levels, which affected local government's negotiability capacities with the opposition (Saade, 1992: 8).

In 1975, the country started to experience a new social crisis; namely, religious and geographic displacements. Throughout the seventeen years of war, one million Lebanese citizens were displaced based on their religions. The Lebanese became refugees in their own country. Several meetings were held by the Lebanese government to discuss the problem of religious and physical displacement and, accordingly, find a solution for the displaced. In the Taif Peace Accords of 1989, the return of all displaced Lebanese since 1975 to their villages was specified. Presently, the government is continuing to exert serious efforts to realize this crucial objective.

Another social problem that has severe economic implications is the emigration of over one fifth of Lebanon's population to foreign countries, where most of them were granted permanent residency, green cards and citizenships. In 1990, 400,000 Lebanese citizens applied for visas to foreign countries. With the further deterioration of the Lebanese pound, accompanied with a high inflation rate, more Lebanese citizens are expressing interest in leaving the country.

Among the various social problems resulting from the seventeen year old crisis is the deterioration in educational standards in schools and universities. About 60 per cent of high school teachers and university professors left Lebanon for other countries throughout the crisis. At the same time, the socio-economically advantaged students found it difficult to commute to classrooms and to concentrate on their programs and consequently transferred to American and French universities to pursue their education.

Within the multi-national brain drain that Lebanon experienced throughout the crisis events, the country is currently going through severe intellectual and political difficulties. Within the Lebanese context, brain drain has proved to be a crisis in itself, in terms of future reconstruction policy issues. Presently, the government is exerting precious efforts to rectify the problem. Lebanon provides an excellent case of the politics of long-term brain drain policy implications for post-crisis recovery periods. Since brain and skill drains can prove to be a crisis in itself, it is interesting to study primary versus secondary causes among the two variables; system crisis and brain drain phenomena.

With this perspective, the following questions come to mind. Is brain drain one of the causes or the result of the crisis in focus? What are the economic changes resulting from brain drain? What are the religious implications? How did the social relations among the Lebanese people transform due to the emigration of over one-fifth of the country's population?

Emigration in Lebanon has taken two versions. First, internal displacement within the country and, secondly, external emigration to foreign countries, including the United States, France, Canada and Australia, among others. The whole issue of a reconstruction and recovery policy agenda throws light on Lebanon's current problems which may not be understood except in terms of brain, skill and talent drain. Thus, at the current stage of reconstruction, a study of the trend and impact of multi-national brain and skill drain becomes a crucial research in terms of recovery policy construction.

Lebanon experienced a severe prolonged economic crisis throughout the seventeen years of war. This becomes quite evident in view of the emigration of about 60 per cent of its labour force, the destruction of the infra- and super-structures of the country and the closing down of firms and factories. The economic situation in the country was highly conditioned by political factors. Marwan Iskandar (1995:8), a well known Lebanese economist, made it clear that Lebanon was in need of eliminating corruption in the civil administration for the crisis to end. This highlights a new and interesting synergy between corruption and creeping crises which deserves empirical research and analysis.

In 1992, Lebanon continued to experience a severe financial crisis. It became obvious for almost all the internal factions who fought the war that they had lost the peace. The country faced a severe state of stagflation. The unemployment rate during March 1992 was 30 per cent. At the same time, the
Lebanese pound continued to deteriorate. In 1994 and 1995, the economic situation generated acceptable results when compared to previous years. Such economic progress had been reflected through a number of manifestations, including growth of GNP in real terms; a surplus in the balance of payments' figure; an increase in the total private deposits in banks; a considerable increase in the capital and reserves of commercial banks; an increase in the Central Bank reserves of foreign currencies; significant improvement in the security conditions; an increased interest on behalf of foreign investors to invest in real estate, banking, industry and tourism (Iskandar, 1995:5-6). At the same time, there have been negative developments requiring corrective policies on the part of government. Such developments include an increased rate of government borrowing; an increased rate of inflation as measured by the Consumers' Price Index; and lack of solid improvements in electricity supplies, public transport and communications; among others (Iskandar, 1995:7-8).

Lebanon is a country where freedom of the press is highly valued. Yet, several changes took place during the crisis period. A large number of militias, politicians and private companies started over 100 private radio stations, 25 TV stations and a large number of newspapers and magazines. Throughout the seventeen years of war, these private stations were operating without governmental licences. The media chaos in Lebanon became clearly evident as Muslim militias took over the official TV station in West Beirut. The Lebanese Forces - Christian political party - started a new TV station; namely, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) which, with time, proved to be highly efficient in terms of broadcasting informative, educational, and entertainment programs. To the majority of residents all over Lebanon, the LBC proved to be a reliable source of information, especially during periods of fierce fighting and heavy shelling.

The general public was made to experience media chaos throughout the crisis. The chaos intensified as the government continued to lose power over time, while the militias were gaining control. It reached the point where almost all war militias had their own media channels used as propaganda outlets. Thus, one of the basic assumptions in the current study is that there has always been a crucial impact of local and foreign media on the nature and direction of crisis events. As the media crisis intensified, the general public had to pay the price. People were often receiving distorted, incorrect and misleading reports of the events. Each political party and militia used their media channels to argue their interpretation of the events, ones which were often contradictory. Such contradictions resulted in increased tension and panic among the general public. Thus, media wars were taking place, where each militia was blaming the other(s) for actions and decisions.

The presence of foreign troops in Lebanon did not only impact on the political, intellectual, military and socio-economic crisis dimensions; but it also reflected negatively on the freedom of the press as well. Several newspaper offices and publishing houses were forced to shut down, either temporarily or permanently because they had published reports which disagreed with the militias' interpretation of the events. In addition, well-known Lebanese journalists were taken as hostages and murdered during the events.

Given the conflicting interpretations of the same events, crisis and dis-information are two terms that were highly correlated during the Lebanese crisis. Researching the synergy between these two variables is crucial in terms of evaluating the central role played by local and foreign media in managing the crisis in focus. Given the partly induced nature of the Lebanese events, questions come to mind: To what extent can the crisis in question be considered a series of media manufactured events? Given the publicity the Desert Storm Operation had acquired throughout the war with Iraq, are there any significant comparable variables between the Iraqi media manufactured war and the Lebanese media manufactured events? What has been the role of the media in either perpetuating or solving the crisis? Can the events in focus serve as an example of media-construction crises? The use of pluralistic media in Lebanon was very chaotic. This is especially true with the "I am right, you are wrong" dialogue often presented by local militia leaders. Given the Lebanese experience, one can strongly argue for a proactive stand in terms of feeding the media, rather than have the media itself manage the crisis. The Lebanese creeping crisis events provide a good background for evaluating the impact of media-constructed crises on a system's perceptions and images developed over time.

Although it provides a dynamic frame of reference for evaluating the Lebanese macro-crisis as a burden on the Lebanese themselves, the Crisis as Burden perspective does not provide a theoretical background of crisis networking and decision making categories needed for developing a re-
construction policy agenda. Accordingly, the following section features the networking of the crisis in focus using a Contingency Typology.

Lebanese Crisis Networking

Within the context of the crisis in question, failure of the national government to control the situation at an early stage resulted in a seventeen year old crisis; where 144,240 were killed, 197,506 were seriously wounded, 13,455 were maimed and 17,415 are still missing.

During the pre-crisis stage, fusion of indigenous vectors, represented by internal socio-political weaknesses and exogenous vectors, evidenced by external regional dependencies and pressures, simultaneously influenced the national government's decision making process. This becomes quite apparent when evaluating the continuous lack of the government's military actions to protect the country's sovereignty and independence, due to extensive Arab pressures. Considering the local decision making environment, the decision situations were highly uncertain, necessitating trial and error in alternative solutions.

Phase (1): Routine/Algorithm. Although the incident of April 13, 1975 - which is set to have triggered the crisis - came as a surprise to the Kata'ib members and the Palestinian passengers alike, the Lebanese crisis was the result of the Lebanese government's neglect of the various warning signals preceding this incident. Lebanese events show that 1972 through 1974 were years of socio-economic and political turmoil in the country. There were several labour union strikes and the Palestinians reinforced the Lebanese Muslims in their demands for what they perceived to be equal political rights with the Christians. Economically, the inflation rate was rising and signs of stagnation were evident which negatively impacted on the existing problem of income inequalities (Mallat, 1988:39).

Several external and regional factors were interacting simultaneously. These include the Cairo Agreement in 1969, the defeat of the Palestinian forces in 1970 by the Jordanian army and the numerous political and military clashes between Palestinian resistance forces and the Lebanese army and civilians, among others. Repeatedly, such critical incidents were ignored by the Lebanese government. Given the opportunity cost involved with the decisions made at this stage, there has been a movement from phase (1) (Routine/Algorithm) to phase (2) (Opportunity-Cost) (see Figure 5:1).

Phase (2): Opportunity-Cost. During phase (1), the Lebanese government was able to clearly define the problem facing it; namely, the settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon as a means of solving the Middle-Eastern Arab-Jewish conflict. The Lebanese government decided during phase (2) to break with the routine and start implementing a creative military solution to resolve the threat facing its sovereignty. Nevertheless, under intensive Arab economic and political pressures, it was agreed to continue the negotiations between the government and the Palestinian leadership. After considering a cost-benefit analysis, the cost of ignoring the intensive pressures received from various Arab leaders in the region was judged by the Lebanese government to be higher than the benefits that would have been achieved out of limiting Palestinian military presence in the country (Saade, 1992: 8). Taking a contingency analysis perspective, in 1973 the Lebanese government was passing through a "cognitive arrogance" stage, which limited its ability to evaluate the various pathways available in terms of minimizing long-term costs.

Phase (3): Muddling Through. In phase (3), the security situation in the country continued to deteriorate. Further creative action was needed to solve the problem. During this phase, Lebanon was muddling through internal Palestinian military pressures and external Arab political and economic pressures.

The fateful decision of the national government to ignore the warning signals was not the decision of the Lebanese President alone. With strong Arab pressures, it became evident that the Arab and Gulf countries in the region had direct impact on the causes of the crisis in focus. Unfortunately, Lebanese and Palestinian negotiations did not lead to a permanent solution, but a series of cease fires that were broken one after the other. The disintegration of Lebanon is, in part, the result of the Lebanese government muddling through what seemed to be endless negotiations. Following Rosenthal (1986), Lebanon decision makers could be considered as victims of "groupthink".

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Phase (4): Crisis. The path leading toward political and socio-economic destruction of Lebanon's sovereignty was not planned nor desired by the national government. Yet, the Lebanese reaped the consequences of their government's decisions. Terrorist actions, violent clashes, kidnapping and fierce battles resulted in creating a chaotic atmosphere in the country. The causes of the crisis could have been avoidable had a strong stand been taken by the Lebanese government to put an end to the internal clashes taking place in various parts of the country. Instead, the events were left to accumulate until a point was reached whereby emerging conflicts developed into a compulsive macro-crisis. As the crisis mounted and the number of actors increased, the government was continuously losing control over various parts of the country; progressively limiting its negotiatory capabilities. In no time, political parties/militias, supported by foreign governments, took over different areas in Lebanon and there was little left the national government could do.

The absence of governmental crisis planning necessitated a great need for proper communication and co-ordination among international relief organisations operating in Lebanon; which included the Red Cross, Caritas and Save the Children Federation, among others. Under the circumstances, the approximate date for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese troops was unknown. It is the view here that presently Lebanon will continue to be a victim of the Middle-East regional crises.

Given the current situation in the country, Lebanon is currently in need of macro-crisis management policy planners. After evaluating the transplantation of the various crisis management frameworks to the context of the Lebanese events, the following integrated observations become quite apparent:

1. Throughout the pre-crisis period, the national government was seeking to strike a balance between compromise and its political system’s viability. The events proved that it had been hard, and at times impossible, to establish and maintain the desired level of equilibrium;

2. it is difficult for the political system to depend purely on external alliances for survival. Given the crisis in focus, this is initially one of the main reasons leading to foreign intervention;

3. during the crisis period, internal governmental fragmentation was highly apparent. The continued fragmentation was escalating with intensified pressures and threats, which contributed to continuous political deterioration;

4. as internal problems intensified, the level of foreign intervention was continuously escalating, as evidenced by the continuous foreign support to the bewildering number of factions/militias emerging during the crisis period;

5. with time, the local government was losing control over various areas, as political parties/militias continued to dominate different parts of the country, especially with regard to civil and military matters;

6. Senior public servants, holding key administrative decision-making positions, are not trained in crisis management response techniques. Thus, given a crisis situation, they became fixated with short-term evaluations of alternative decisions;

7. with chaos spreading all over the country, corruption in civil administration became highly noticeable. During the post-crisis period, this became extremely evident to the general public;

8. although 1975-1991 events do not constitute the first crisis in Lebanon's history, there was no evidence of particular learning derived from previous crises in terms of need recognition for crisis communication systems, as well as crisis management networks;

9. training and development is needed in various crisis management techniques and practices, including "expert system introduction and implementation" (Jarman and Kouzmin, 1992:5). Given the geographical location of the country, in addition to its internal socio-political texture, disaster management preparations are needed.

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preparations include social welfare and environmental planning; installation of well-equipped hospitals and crisis medical centres; construction of fire stations, well-built shelters and warehouses for storage of food and medications; and design of effective evacuation plans; among others; and

to achieve such plans, efficient national and international planners, with an appropriate crisis management mind set, are needed.

Mapping the Lebanese Macro-Crisis

With the case of Lebanon, crisis management literature provides interesting theoretical frameworks for focusing on crisis contingencies, arrogance and over-confidence resulting in managerial failures. The Lebanese macro-crisis of 1975-1991 can partly be explained by internal bureaucratic conflicts, short-run decision making orientations and considerable level of optimism displayed by government officials. Given the fragility of the country's socio-political system, the demand for foreign intervention, as proved by the crisis events, was highly elastic (Gordon, 1983: 26-28). The following issues constitute a crucial part of the reconstruction policy agenda, recommended for evaluation by national public planners. For simplicity purposes, these policy issues are grouped into the following categories:

- **Macro-Economic Reconstruction.** Enhancing the value of the Lebanese pound; enhancing the balance of payments; evaluation of current monetary and fiscal policies; reconstruction of infra- and super-structures; revival of various sectors of the economy, with special emphasis given to the service sector, namely, tourism and banking; limiting inflation and providing further employment opportunities.

- **Political Reform and Integration.** Holistic national reconciliation, centralization of political and military planning, limiting foreign intervention and abolition of corruption in civil administration.

- **Social Rehabilitation.** Enhancing the country's perceived image; limiting intellectual emigration and brain drain; rehabilitation of the physically and geographically displaced; providing an equitable social welfare system for the disabled and media regulation.

- **Crisis Environmental Analysis and Implementation.** Knowing that internal politics in Lebanon is tied to the wider Middle-Eastern politics, specifically, Arab-Jewish on-going peace negotiations, crisis-system strategic and operational planning is desperately needed. Disaster management administrative preparations include the construction of well-equipped hospitals and medical crisis centres; establishment of sufficient fire stations; providing well-built shelters; construction of food and medication warehousing facilities; providing intensive crisis seminars and educational packages to senior public servants and decision makers; development of well-trained evacuation teams and establishment of effective crisis communication systems.

- **General Environmental Planning and Development.** Imposing regulations on heavy industry to filter pollutants; treatment of waste into the sea; designing effective garbage schemes; building garbage processing factories; designing environmental consciousness programs; development of regulations to limit noise pollution and the creation of national parks.

**Critical Turning Points: The Risk Path Analysis Model**

This section provides a brief application of the Risk Path Analysis Model (RPAM) to the Lebanese macro-crisis and a putative reconstruction policy agenda. Since different strategies could
have been implemented, figure 5-1 depicts interesting "turning points" within possible Lebanese decision paths.

The Lebanese multi-crisis decision path is shown as follows:

1 to A: The Palestinian presence in Lebanon was legitimized in the 1969 Cairo Agreement. With the defeat of the Palestinians by the Jordanians in 1970, their number and military appearances increased substantially in Lebanon. Accordingly, continuous clashes were taking place between them and the Lebanese army and civilians. Simultaneously, Palestinian forces were launching attacks against Israel's northern borders and, in turn, Israel was continuously retaliating.

Figure 5-1: Lebanon Macro-Crisis Decision Path, 1974-1991

A to B: Lebanese government clearly defines the problem. Little sense of urgency displayed, although internal socio-economic problems were escalating, in addition to continuous clashes with the Palestinian armed forces. In addition to the external factors, 1972 and 1973 were years of internal social and political turmoil in the country, including union strikes, increasing inflation rates and Palestinians reinforcing Lebanese Muslims in their demands for equal political rights.

B to C: Lebanese government decides to take military action. Lebanese army attempts to enter Palestinian camps so as to limit their military movements. Division among the Lebanese people becomes quite apparent as the Sunnite Muslims of Beirut support Palestinian military action.
C to D: (1973-1974) Intensive Arab political and economic pressures escalate in support of the Palestinians. The Arab League of Nations meet and order a halt to all military action, thus putting an end to the Lebanese government's military plan. Accordingly, the government starts a series of political negotiations with Palestinian leaders.

D to E: (1974) Military clashes continue between Palestinian forces and Lebanese army and civilians. A series of cease fires fail, one after the other. Continued negotiations prove to be unsuccessful. At this stage, the Lebanese government fails to take any military action.

E to 4: (crisis) (1975: January-13 April) The continuous escalation of military clashes, internally and across the Lebanese-Israeli borders, constitute obvious crisis warning signals.

Point 4: (crisis) (13 April, 1975-1992) Repeated, but unattended, clashes result in the event of 13 April, 1975 between the Palestinians and members of the Kata'ib party, triggering a seventeen year-old crisis.

Beyond Point 4: (1992-1997) The country is currently trying to embark on a reconstruction mode. Various hurdles to recovery and development continue to face the present national government. The question remains as to whether the government will be able to overcome current reconstruction challenges facing it.

The fact that the government in charge did not act upon the numerous warning signals taking place in 1972 and 1973 in different parts of the country represent a crucial “turning point” (point A). Clashes between the Palestinian forces and the Lebanese Army and civilians were escalating. Although the government defined the problem facing the country, no action was taken to prevent the forthcoming crisis events, or at least, to mitigate their possible consequences (point B). External intervention in national affairs was not a new experience in Lebanon. The decision of the government in control to stop the military plan, that was being implemented by the national army, and to embark on a negotiations process with the Palestinian leadership, in agreement with the decision taken in 1973 by the Arab League of Nations, constitutes a crucial decision (point D). This led to prolongate the events in focus. The deterioration continued its progression. It became obvious at point E that the country was heading to a crisis.

The events depicted by the period D-E, in figure 5-1, are especially sensitive in terms of reconstruction policy implications. At this stage, the failure of the Lebanese government to protect the country's independence and sovereignty constituted a mis-used opportunity. In turn, it also resulted in intensive foreign interventions and a seventeen-year old series of crisis events.

Conclusion

With regard to the macro-environmental crisis in focus, the following analytical questions are worth noting: Keeping in mind regional deterrence thresholds developed between Israel and Syria after the 1982 Israeli invasion (Evron, 1987-180), to what extent has deterrence theory been used on a national level? To what extent is the application of methodology of victimology successful in massaging raw data relevant to macro-crisis events? What is the role of media management in the perpetuation or solution of a macro-crisis? Can the Lebanese crisis be considered a case of media construction? The development of the Lebanese creeping crisis events provide an interesting background to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of using a decentralized decision-making process as a crisis response strategy. Each of the perspectives analysed in this chapter throws different decision/policy "turning points" within the multi-crisis decision path framework. Chapters six, seven and eight will seek in-depth analysis of such "turning points" in an attempt to generate a
comprehensive list of policy planning issues critical to bureaucrats and politicians involved in reconstruction of post crisis agendas.
Part III

Part III is composed of three chapters:


Chapter VII: Media Manufactured Events as a Case of Crisis Multiplier, 1975-1991

Chapter VIII: Bureau-Politics of the Lebanese System
Chapter VI

Politics of Multi-national Brain Drain, 1975-1991

Sections:

Introduction

Intellectual Emigration, 1975 - 1991: Basic Developments
  Brief Background
  Trend Analysis of Lebanese Emigrants

Intellectual Emigration and Multi-national Brain Drain: Analysis

Mapping the Lebanese Brain Drain Crisis

Lessons for Reconstruction: Policy-Oriented Prescriptions

Conclusion
Chapter VI

Politics of Multi-national Brain Drain, 1975-1991

Introduction

For the past two decades, Lebanon has been a good example of socio-political disorganization (Salibi, 1988:1). The post-crisis period, continues to witness the dis-integration of Lebanon. This can partly be explained by the national and multi-national brain drain phenomena that the country has been experiencing since the beginning of the crisis period.

During the seventeen year old war, the Lebanese have experienced several types of migration, both internal and external. Internal geographical and religious displacement took place throughout the crisis years. In terms of external migration, one can find large Lebanese communities spread throughout the world, including the United States of America, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, France, Denmark, England, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain and many other countries.

This chapter analyses the magnitude of the country's intellectual emigration crisis for the period 1975-1991 and evaluates its impact on the formulation of policy issues and implications of recovery strategies in relation to Lebanon's reconstruction and future development. It is the view here that the story of the intellectual Lebanese emigrants, being victims of the war of others on their own territories, deserves to be considered part of the history of the Lebanese 1975-1991 crisis and part of the historical movement of people in search of safety, security and, above all, freedom.

Although this study reflects the different perceptions of Lebanon's history and national identity interpretations, critical to the study of intellectual emigration and brain drain phenomenon, the present research is neither a political science research study nor a history thesis. Its main aim is to analyse and evaluate the impact of the more recent multi-national brain, skills and talent drain during the period 1975-1995 on recovery policy implications and reconstruction strategies. Needless to say, the brain drain crisis is one of the major pressing problems facing Lebanon during the current post-war period.

The first part of this chapter outlines the basic developments of the multi-national intellectual emigration movement during the period 1975-1995. It provides a brief background of the brain drain crisis, including an analysis of the push and pull variables underlying the causes and reasons behind the emigration movement. In addition, this section provides an evaluation of the dichotomy of intellectual emigration, being an opportunity on the micro-level, that is, mainly a source of income for individuals and their households, and a burden on the macro-level, that is, the increasing deterioration in the socio-political institutions of the domestic society.

During the pre-crisis period, the number of foreign expatriates living in Lebanon constituted a considerable proportion of the overall population of the country. Foreigners residing in Beirut included French, Americans, British, Egyptians, Syrians and Palestinians, among others. In his book titled, The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy, Gordon (1983) mentions that in 1975 the estimated number of foreign expatriates in Lebanon included 15,000 Americans, 14,000 British and 30,000 French, in addition to 350,000 Syrian residents, 370,000 Palestinians and 75,000 Egyptians, among others. Besides being a commercial and banking centre, Lebanon provided several interesting pull factors, including first-class hotels, beautiful beaches, exotic snow resort areas, a variety of foreign schools, as well as being the regional headquarters of several international companies.

Since the outbreak of the war in 1975, over half a million Lebanese, in addition to a considerable number of foreign expatriates, have left Lebanon due to the internal security situation in the country. Although Lebanese emigrants have helped in restoring the Lebanese economy, through remittances to their families, the overall intellectual emigration movement has negatively impacted on the local economy and society in general. Given the crisis events during the period 1975-1991, a basic assumption in this research study is that brain drain is a dynamic crisis which builds upon itself.
Multi-national brain drain has proved to be a crisis within a crisis, whereby the economic multiplier could be employed to measure its increasing impact on local society. It stands out as both a cause and an effect of the overall macro-crisis.

While the first section of this chapter is designed to descriptively evaluate the intellectual emigration movement and brain drain crisis, the second part is rather analytical in nature. Brain drain issues and policy implications of reconstruction strategies are evaluated by applying the Multi-Level Contingency Scheme (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:410-414; Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:418) and the Risk Path Analysis Model (RPAM) (Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:421; 1994:420-6) of creeping crisis to the multi-national emigration movement stages for the period 1975-1995. Mapping the Lebanese brain drain crisis, through the application of the RPAM approach to the stages of the intellectual emigration movement, aims at the identification of reverse brain drain policy intervention points, geared towards national policy planning for intellectual and administrative reconstruction and development after crisis. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of brain influx national policy planning implications and recommendations, in addition to outlining directions for future basic and applied research in the area of multi-national intellectual emigration.

The scope of the Lebanese brain drain study is limited to the following factors. First, due to internal turbulence and instability in the country, compilation of statistics related to the number of individuals who left the country became rather impossible at times, with emigrants using various paths and means to cross the Lebanese borders. Thus, immigration figures and statistics provided by governmental documents are unreliable. Accordingly, the numbers of emigrants provided in this research study are rough estimates.

Secondly, one basic assumption of this research is that there is not a single approach to the study of the brain drain phenomenon. Due to the complexity of the crisis in focus and the inter-relatedness of the intellectual emigration variables under study, a rather pluralistic form of inquiry is applied to further evaluate the critical conditions needed to bring about a re-newed brain influx situation. Accordingly, to make this study possible, a variety of historical, sociological, cultural, statistical, demographic and psycho-graphic concepts are used.

Finally, knowing that the Lebanese migrants, over a period of several decades, do not constitute a homogeneous community in any given receiving country, it would be an over simplification to lump together the Lebanese migrants as one population. Accordingly, this research study evaluates individual cases from separate lebanese communities residing in different countries.

**Intellectual Emigration, 1975-1995: Basic Developments**

**Brief background**

Besides being a tourist resort during the pre-war period, Beirut was considered a major, strategic location within the Middle-East region for commerce and trade. It was a main centre for banking and exchange services. There has always been a bias in favour of service activities for income generation within the Lebanese economy. Before its 1975 crisis, Lebanon was well known for its tourist and financial services. Due to the turbulent military and political events that undermined stability and peace in the country, the various sectors of the economy have been badly affected. Tourism, an important element of the service sector in terms of income generation, has been highly conditioned by political factors. Before the tragic events of 1975, Lebanon was highly supportive of all nationalities visiting the nation in order to revitalise the educational and tourism sectors. Yet, with the beginning of the 1975 war, tourism stopped being a major income generation activity within the service sector of the economy. Domestic tourism continued under highly restrictive limitations, mainly for visiting relatives on religious feast days (Mallat, 1988:69).

Lebanon does not have crude oil. Its main exports are restricted to a variety of agricultural commodities, including fruit and vegetables. Other exports include wood, tobacco, cotton and fertilisers. Lebanon's main resource is its human power. In 1975, the unemployment rate was 3.1 per cent, whereby most of the unemployed were either unskilled or voluntarily unemployed (Mallat,
Americans, British and French, among other nationalities, used to enjoy working in Lebanon, where many took it as a second home and, thus, found it difficult to leave as the crisis unfolded.

Besides being a commercial and banking centre, Beirut was considered an educational and cultural centre as well. Thousands of students, from all over the Near- and Middle-East, and even beyond, came to the schools, colleges and universities in Lebanon. When it came time for them to leave, they took with them Lebanese cultural and traditional customs (Mallik, 1983).

Due to the turbulent environmental states that prevailed in the country during the crisis years, multi-national emigration continued to flourish. A considerable number of the emigrants were practising professionals in their own fields of specialization, including medical doctors; engineers; lawyers; school teachers; university professors; journalists; social scientists; economists and public administrators; among others. The brain death phenomenon experienced by the nation, for seventeen consecutive years, constitutes a crisis in itself. People who at one point in time never thought of leaving their country are now citizens of other nations.

### Table 6-1: Per Centage Religious Composition of The Lebanese Community in Australia: 1971-1981

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Christian</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Christian</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-Christian</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per centage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>24,218</td>
<td>33,423</td>
<td>49,623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the three-year period, 1976 to 1978, 7,901 Lebanese entered the US, while 19,161 entered Canada and 14,100 emigrated to Australia. In 1980, the US embassy in Beirut was receiving between 200 to 250 tourist, student, and permanent residency (Green Card) visa applications daily (El-Telegraph, 1980:3). In 1978, newspapers reported that 82 per cent of the emigrants were Christians, 12 per cent were Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims and 6 per cent were Druzes. The average age of the emigrants was between 28 to 45 years, most of whom held university degrees. As the war proceeded, there has been considerable adaptations to the per centages of Christian and Muslim Lebanese emigrants. This applies to most Lebanese emigrant communities around the world; including the US, Canada, France and Australia (See Table 6-1). Presently there are over 400,000 Lebanese emigrants spread all over the world.
Trend Analysis of Lebanese Emigrants

As the crisis unfolded in 1975, various factors impacted on increasing the number of emigrants during the period 1975-1995. A longitudinal study of various emigrant communities over time allows for the evaluation of salient emigrant characteristics. Keeping in mind that the major reason behind the recent wave of Lebanese emigration is the seventeen-year old crisis, the following trends have been identified:

1. Although people from various parts of Lebanon have fled the country, considerable changes in the religious composition of the recent wave of emigrants is observable. During the period 1975-1982, the majority of the Lebanese emigrants were Christians. The predominance of the Christian emigrant communities over other Lebanese emigrant religious sects was observable in Australia, as well as several other host countries. Since 1983, the more recent wave of emigration has been characterized by an increasing number of Muslim and Druze immigrants.

2. The phenomenon of chain migration continued to be popular among Lebanese emigrants throughout the crisis period. With the outbreak and continuous spread of military operations in various areas of the country, family emigration became a crucial alternative solution in the face of hard military, political and social realities. This trend was noticeable in various Lebanese emigrant communities around the world, including Canada, United States, Australia and Western Africa (Labaki, 1992:623).

3. Although financial ambitions continued to be a major cause of emigration during the crisis period, a considerable number of recent emigrants come from diversified economic and professional backgrounds (Labaki, 1992:625). Such professions include doctors; lawyers; engineers; political and social scientists; public administrators; traders; bankers; economists; brokers; insurance agents; industrial technicians and semi-skilled labourers, among others (El-Telegraph, 1978: 30; Gordon, 1983: 62-63). The population of Lebanon had fallen from about 3 million in 1974 to about 2.6 million in 1979. Among the permanent or temporary emigrants were 30 per cent of Lebanon's construction workers and 32 per cent of its industrial workers (Gordon, 1983: 72). Thus, emigrants included both white and blue collar workers, as well as the socio-economically advantaged and the lower class, poorer citizens. Accordingly, the post-1975 period witnessed wide socio-economic discrepancies among recent emigrants, given the relaxed foreign immigration policies towards the Lebanese due mainly to humanitarian reasons.

4. Lebanese emigrants are highly committed to their countries of destination. McKay (1991) reproduces a quote from his interviews with a second-generation, Australian-Lebanese business executive, explaining that the best parts of the Lebanese culture, including cuisine and close family relationships, have been passed to the Australian community through inter-marriage (Ethnos, 1991:8). Emigrants tend to carry their national identities with them to the host societies. Interviews with emigrants, in the United States and Australia, confirm that Lebanese emigrants continue to suffer from the dilemma of national identification. The Christian emigrants continue to believe in the "Lebanism" ideology while identifying with the Phoenicians and the Crusaders, while the Muslim emigrants are proud of their Arab heritage, being part of the "Arabism" ideology (Mackey, 1991: 30-31; Salibi, 1988: 53). Such a dichotomy in the politics of national identity interpretations has severe policy implications in terms of the ideological reconstruction of the nation, especially with the lobbies of the Lebanese expatriates on issues related to their country of origin.

5. There are various socio-political factors affecting the intensity of the intellectual emigration movement during the crisis and post-crisis periods. Such factors include political conflicts dressed up as religious clashes and political oppression, in addition to intensive levels of foreign intervention.

In this case, the proceeding push factors to leave the homeland had the greatest impact on the emigration decision (Gordon, 1983: 72), especially during the post-crisis interval covering the period 1991-1995 (Davie, 1992: 629; Labaki, 1992: 606-607; McGuire, 1992: 665). Given the complexity of the situation, the issue of leaving one's homeland, either permanently or temporarily, becomes more of an obligatory decision. Although Lebanese emigrants cannot
be classified as political refugees, the majority of those who fled the country during the period 1975-1995 consider themselves as victims of the war, especially the socio-economically advantaged intellectuals and highly-trained professionals.

Table 6-2: Sectorial Breakdown of Lebanese Migrants: 1975-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Active Population Employed</th>
<th>Estimates of Emigration (1975-7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>79,500</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>23,500</td>
<td>15,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communic.</td>
<td>38,500</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>53,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>306,500</td>
<td>363,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the pre-crisis period, Lebanon was rich in human assets. In addition, the country was considered a commercial link between the Western world and the Middle-Eastern countries. It was the land where Eastern and Western civilisations met. While this used to be a virtue during the pre-war period, it became a problem during the crisis period.

One-fifth of Lebanon's economically active population left the country during the two-year war period of 1975-1976 (*El-Telegraph*, 1978). A sectorial breakdown of Lebanese migrants for the period 1975-1977 shows that the estimated public service sector emigrants added up to 3,700 individuals, amounting to 7 per cent of the sector's manpower (Labaki, 1992:612) (see Table 6-2).

As the war continued, the outflow of intellectual emigrants kept increasing. The number of temporary and permanent emigrants for the period 1975-1989 added up to 990,000 individuals, which amounts to 40 per cent of the total population (Labaki, 1992:696). The balance of Lebanese migrants during the period 1975-1989 is shown in Table 6-3.

**Intellectual Emigration and Multi-national Brain Drain: Analysis**

Through the use of reverse reconstructive logic, this section provides an analysis of possible policy implications geared towards converting brain and skill outflows into productive intellectual inflows. Accordingly, the contingency-theory simulation heuristic approach to crisis networking and the Risk Path Analysis Model by Jarman and Kouzmin (1990: 405; 1994a: 402) are used to map the multi-national brain drain crisis for the period 1975-1994.

Evaluating the degree to which the brain drain movement is an administrative disaster necessitates an analytical study of several inter-related error typology variables which constitute both administrative skills and pure fate (Hart and Bovens, 1995:1-4). To learn from disasters, two separate
series of events are needed. First, pre-crisis events leading into a crisis situation and, secondly, an analysis of the attitudes, methods and operations undertaken to handle the crisis itself.

Table 6-3: Approximate Net Balance of Lebanese Migrants: 1975 - August, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Number of Lebanese Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>+ 400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>- 297,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0977</td>
<td>+ 38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>+ 76,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>+ 49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>+ 33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>+ 33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>+ 33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>+ 33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>+ 61,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>+ 70,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>+ 73,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>+ 67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>+ 67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 31, 1989</td>
<td>+ 240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>990,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Knowing that misfortunes are real and have to be taken into account, it becomes necessary to outline the unforeseeable political and administrative failure impacting on the Lebanese crisis, and negatively impacting on the multi-national brain drain movement. Among the external contingencies impacting on the crisis in focus was the Jordanian Palestinian conflict in 1970, leading to a chain reaction; Israeli-Palestinian conflicts in South Lebanon; the power configuration between Syria and Israel; the country’s geographical location, being on the cross roads of the Israeli-Syrian boundaries; the Iranian Islamic revolution and its expansion to other countries; terrorists acts and hostage taking practices causing hostile international media; and the timing of the crisis itself, with Moscow being a strong supporter of the Syrian regime.

The previously mentioned external contingencies partly constitute the system’s political and administrative failure. Accordingly, the situation could be summed up in few words. Given the overall international and regional environment, Lebanon was at the wrong time and in the wrong place on the geographical and political map of the Middle-East region. Accordingly, fortune has played a big role in influencing the intensity and sequence of the events in focus. The scope of policy making used to offset the externally imposed dangers on the country was rather limited. There were several fundamental policy errors undertaken by the Lebanese government during the pre-crisis stage, partially contributing towards the development of the crisis in focus.

- First, the national government’s refusal to negotiate the constitution at an early stage of the crisis diminished its political and military power base. Throughout the Lebanese crisis, political negotiations went hand in hand with military victories. As the crisis
progressed, the government was left with little to negotiate with on both levels; internally, with the opposition and externally, with foreign regional powers.

The Lebanese crisis continued to be an internal affair during the two-year war period. With the Syrian intervention in 1976, negotiation possibilities started to diminish. Furthermore, with the Israeli invasion of 1978, Lebanese events went out of control, as the crisis was turned into a regional rather than a national affair. Accordingly, the Lebanese government was continuously loosing momentum throughout the crisis period. With the 1982 Israeli invasion and the Palestinian expulsion from Lebanon, the government faced a new momentum for re-negotiations. Yet, again, government failed to politically negotiate matters, leaving pending conflicts to be resolved militarily.

- Secondly, the failure of the Lebanese government to respond to frequent socio-demographic pre-crisis warning signals led to the rapid escalation and spreading of the crisis to various parts of the country. Various demographic changes took place during the period 1946-1975, resulting in a new balance of power in the country. The decision of the government to accept the Palestinian refugees after the Jordanian Palestinian conflict in 1970 impacted on the new power balance in the country, intensifying the system's internal contradictions. At the same time, the socio-economic discrepancies among the various religious and social classes were growing. With all the previously mentioned changes, the Lebanese government continued to be rather conservative and attached to its traditional power bases.

- Thirdly, during the period 1989-1991, the local political system was experiencing an adventurist policy failure stage. With the 'Al-Tahrir' war of 14th March, 1989, meaning the Liberation war, followed by the 'Al-ilgala' war of 30th January, 1990, meaning cancellation or elimination of war, the political system was definitely heading for disaster. Both of these wars negatively impacted on the government's negotiatory capacities with both internal and external foreign opposition.

- Finally, the system failed to manage the media. In addition to perpetuating the overall crisis, the media did considerable harm to the country's perceived image. Media chaos and mis-information dominated and where pluralistic media was used it was disorganized. As Boyd (1991: 269) explains, war does not get confined to battlefields. Fighting fractions attempt different sorts of campaigns to impact public opinion. Given the Lebanese experience, the two variables of mis-information and crisis have been media sensitive (Boyd, 1991: 273; Gervasi, 1982: 2). The importance of managing the media to better cope with a crisis situation cannot be over emphasized. Co-operation by media officials is highly crucial in effectively managing crisis events (Turner, 1992: 221). Managing the media in crisis situations becomes a crucial aspect of 'military and political activity' (Boyd, 1991: 284). For example, during the Gulf war, it has been reported that the media and the military have undertaken equally important functions (Ham, 1995: 81). Given macro-crises, co-operation of media officials is essential for security purposes. By the same token, accurate information dissemination becomes important as a means of sustaining people's morale in uncertain and difficult environments (Boyd, 1991: 284). Browne (1975: 692) explains that the media also serves to reinforce national values in modernizing states.

In addition to pluralistic media chaos and image problems, the new balance of power in the country made it difficult for the US government and Western European countries to support the national government. The crisis events, especially the image attached to the Christian political parties, reminded foreign observers of the Western European events of the 1930s and the 1940s (Mackey, 1991: 51). Although the Lebanese situation was a totally different case, it was interpreted by some European governments as being in line with their previous fascist experiences (Mackey, 1991: 52). The fact that the Christian political parties were viewed as authoritarian and right-wing did not help with the media. Due to their co-operation with Israel at various periods of time, they were also looked upon as "isolationists" (Gordon, 1983: 131), intensifying negative impressions by local and foreign press.
Contingency Typology

The Contingency-Theory Simulation Heuristic Approach defines individual disasters in terms of crisis decision networks. It identifies four different crisis networks, based on decision making classes and their contingent possible environmental states. Transplanting the contingency typology model to the context of the Lebanese emigration waves during the period 1974-1995 provides a valuable theoretical framework for analysing socio-political and economic trends needed to identify and evaluate reverse reconstructive policy recommendations.

Using the multi-path oriented contingency-theory heuristic schema, Jarman and Kouzmin (1990:418) explain four different crisis decision networks used to trace crisis events beginning with the first contingent decision making class, namely, Algorithm and ending with the last contingent class, namely crisis. The first crisis decision network is used to interpret the Lebanese intellectual emigration crisis. The first crisis network is the longest path, where events travel through stages 1-2-3-4. The reasons behind choosing the first crisis pathway as a means of explaining the Lebanese brain drain phenomenon include the following. First, the multi-national emigration movement extended over a long period of time. It started with the beginning of the crisis and extended beyond the post-crisis period. As a result, a number of brain drain waves took place throughout the crisis. Secondly, a series of temporary cease-fires and occasional internal/external negotiations - for example, Geneva Peace Conference in October, 1983 and Lausanne Peace Conference in February, 1984 (Saade, 1992: 10-11) - among the main fighting factions took place throughout the crisis period. Such efforts exerted to incur peace, resulted in limited brain influx movements, which partially explain the muddling through phenomenon (Gordon, 1983: 91) experienced within the Lebanese brain drain crisis. Thirdly, the causes of the crisis in focus are complex and numerous (Davie, 1992: 629; Gordon, 1983: 72; Labaki, 1992: 606-607; McGuire, 1992: 665). The multi-national brain drain crisis experienced in Lebanon can be explained in terms of a crisis within a crisis. It can also be explained as an opportunity as well as a burden. The monetary remittances sent by emigrants abroad to their relatives in Lebanon constitute an opportunity (Gordon, 1983: 73). An estimate of the average remittance from abroad add up to an annual total of US $2 billion (Ignatius, 1980: 1). The administrative and intellectual vacuum created by the out-flow of professionals constitute a burden, especially with the current reconstruction efforts. Figure 1 depicts the system's multi-national brain drain crisis for the period 1975-1995. Transplanting the first crisis-oriented contingency schema network to the multi-national intellectual emigration waves, provides an analytical framework to empirically evaluate both genuine and manufactured political and socio-economic events resulting in the current intellectual and administrative vacuum.

Following the overall national macro-crisis, the multi-national brain drain movement of 1974-1995 is described using the first crisis network (Path 1-2-3-4). The causes behind the massive emigration waves could be broadly summarised in terms of economic forces, political oppression, suppression of freedom of expression and continued occupations of various parts of the country. Additional causes include continued foreign intervention and the continuous practices of non-nationalistic tropism (El-Telegraph, 1993:3). Given the development of the Lebanese events, emigration constituted an individual solution in the face of difficult military, political and socio-economic conditions. During the current post-war period, a significant number of Lebanese expatriates have decided to continue residing abroad.

Phase (1): Routine/Algorithm. During the period 1972-1974, Lebanon experienced an overall unstable and turbulent psychological environment, due to various political and socio-economic difficulties. Several local and regional forces were interacting simultaneously, which impacted on the overall emigration movement. The first wave of emigration started with the beginning of the two-year war period in 1975, where approximately 400,000 individuals departed from the country. Since the general public, as well as senior government officials, did not project that the events of 1975 would lead to a national macro-crisis, it was assumed that emigrants' departure would only be temporary short-term overseas visits.

Phase (2): Opportunity-Cost. During phase (1), the Lebanese crisis could still be classified as a domestic conflict, although Palestinian Liberation Organisation forces constituted a major regional participant in the crisis.
The decision of the Lebanese government in 1976 to involve the Syrian troops, in an effort to end the two-year old war, limited its negotiatory capacities. In addition, with the various local political parties/militias taking the law into their own hands, and giving a different interpretation to it, the power of the national government was limited and this enhanced the powers of the foreign intervening governments supporting the militias (Gordon, 1983: 103; Sampson, 1977: 18). An evaluation of the aftermath of the overall seventeen-year old crisis indicates that the cost incurred by the conflicting long-term goals of regional intervening governments, exceeded the short-term benefits attained through their support to individual parties or clusters of local militias. This becomes evident when considering the human and capital losses incurred during the crisis period.

Phase (3): Muddling Through. The Syrian military intervention of 1976 legalized the involvement of an additional regional participant in the Lebanese situation. The emigration movement continued to escalate, as a response to the severe deterioration in the security situation. Emigration constituted a crucial individual solution to what seemed to be an endless macro-crisis. The system was passing through a Muddling Through stage (Gordon, 1983: 91). By being unable to control the factors causing the brain drain waves, the net number of Lebanese migrants for the period 1984-1988 added to approximately 339,713 individuals. Hostage-taking constituted a crucial part of the overall manufactured events which led to a multi-national talent and skill drain crisis. The situation could briefly be summarized in terms of deterioration of standards of education, frequent interruptions of schools and universities necessitating intensive courses and make-up sessions at a later stage, shortage of specialized professors and research fellows and strict limitations on research facilities. The continuous deterioration in the security situation led some of the best Lebanese schools to either internally relocate or open new branches overseas where a considerable percentage of staff and students were Lebanese. Accordingly, a considerable number of new Lebanese schools previously well-established in Lebanon were founded in the Arab Gulf, Cyprus, England and other western countries.

The only alternative solution left for a significant number of both academics and socio-economically advantaged students was to leave the country in search of educational and research opportunities elsewhere. Nevertheless, Lebanon experienced a severe economic deterioration starting in 1984, where the Lebanese pound was decreasing in value relative to foreign currencies. The deteriorated socio-economic conditions impacted on the financial capacities of Lebanese families to send their children to American and European universities to further pursue their higher education. Such intense emigration movement carried crucial cultural and social implications in terms of the remaining population in Lebanon.

Phase (4): Crisis. Among other by-products of the overall seventeen year old macro-crisis, educational institutions, research agencies as well as governmental administrative bodies suffered from the intellectual emigration movement.

The events of 1989-1991, mainly the Liberation war of 1989, followed by the Cancellation war of 1990, and the defeat of Colonel Michael Aoun on 13 October 1990, impacted on the overall emigration movement. The net number of Lebanese migrants for the eight months period covering January through August 1989 was approximately 240,000 individuals (Labaki, 1992:610). Unfortunately, the path leading toward political and socio-economic destruction of Lebanon had negatively impacted on the country’s cultural, intellectual and administrative capabilities.

The fact that Lebanon experienced far too many political and military decision makers controlling parts of the country resulted in a plurality of judgments, perceptions and conflicting decisions which contributed to the overall system’s policy paralysis (Gordon, 1983: 135). The contingency framework does not reflect, however, the dynamic nature of the brain and talent drain crisis. Knowing that intellectual and administrative crises represent both a cause and effect of the system’s overall macro-crisis, it becomes crucial to evaluate the administrative vacuum created at each and every phase of the intellectual emigration movement. In the following section, the brain drain crisis is viewed using the Risk Path Analysis Model. This allows for a better presentation of the dynamic nature of the crisis in focus as it progressively implode upon itself. Each new wave of emigration accelerates the accumulation of intellectual and administrative vacuum, continuously worsening the impact of the system’s overall macro-crisis.
Mapping the Lebanese Brain Drain Crisis

In this analytical section, the significance of identifying and analysing the overall emigration waves during the period 1975-1995, using various crisis models, is evaluated in terms of identifying ideological brain drain reconstruction policies geared towards a renewed brain influx movement. Reconstructive intellectual and administrative policy 'turning points' are identified, through transplanting the Risk Path Analysis Model (RPAM) of creeping crisis to the previously discussed emigration movement for the period 1975-1996. Knowing that the overall crisis decision making process had impacted on the intellectual emigration movement, RPAM provides an effective theoretical approach to evaluate various administrative and policy decision pathways, within the overall multi-national intellectual crisis situation, needed to generate reverse brain drain policy recommendations.

The multi-national emigration movement is mapped through applying the RPAM approach to the multi-national intellectual emigration activities for the period 1975-1996. Figure 6-1 depicts interesting political, policy and administrative "turning points" useful for the planning and implementation of a reverse multi-national intellectual movement. In this section, brief insights are offered to emigration national policy administrators in general, and intellectual private and public policy planners in particular. The multi-national brain drain crisis decision path is shown as follows:

1 to A (Stage I: 1975-1976): Military and political factors constitute the main forces pressuring a significant number of the population to leave the country. Given the fast development of military events, triggered by the 13 April 1975 incident, the net number of Lebanese migrants for the year 1975 added up to 400,000 individuals. The series of battles between the rightist and leftist political parties/militias, in addition to the Lebanese Palestinian military confrontations, accelerated the rate of perceived threat and uncertainty to both Lebanese government officials and the general public. As the struggle for power and military confrontations continued, every new cycle of military events was more stressful than the previous one. The feelings of mistrust and frustrations constituted a main cause behind the acceleration of the emigration movement during the two-year war period. The first wave of intellectual emigration, during the period 1975-1976, started a whole chain of brain and skill-drain movements which progressively impacted on the system's recovery and future reconstruction prospects. The impact of the overall brain drain crisis (C) on the local society is a function of the intellectual emigration movement, during a specific time period (t).

Accordingly, $C_t = C_1$ to $t_1$

where, $C_t$ = indicates the overall impact of the brain drain crisis on system's recovery and reconstruction prospects.

$C_1$ = impact of the 1st wave of intellectual emigration movement on local society.

$t = t_1$ = covers the first wave of emigration period, starting in 1975 (to), and ending in 1976(t1).

A to B (1976): During the first two years of war, Lebanon lost six per cent of its active (1976) labour force, in addition to 60 to 70 per cent of its professionals and intellectuals (El-Telegraph, 1977:4). The first wave of Lebanese emigrants included a considerable per centage of Lebanon's overall industrialists, traders and academicians. Previous research shows that forty two per cent of the country's engineers had emigrated in 1975. In addition, 15.6 per cent of the overall number of medical doctors and pharmacists had left the country during the same year (El-Telegraph, 1980:4). The national government's acceptance of a Syrian military intervention, to curtail the crisis events, could be
explained by the movement from the relatively conservative response to the problematic situation (NR2) into a “disjointed incrementalist” approach to decision making (NS3). The Syrian army was perceived to be a strong and stable player so to solve a well defined and clear problem. The general public, just like the national government, was under the impression that the 1976 Syrian intervention would put an end to the two-year old war. Accordingly, Lebanon witnessed a significant short-lived brain influx movement.

Figure 6-1: Lebanon’s Multi-national Brain Drain Crisis Decision Path 1975-1996

B to C (Stage II): The second wave of emigration started with the transformation of the Lebanese crisis from a national to a regional conflict. The intellectual emigration movement escalated in accordance with continued military clashes. The higher level of calculated decision analysis approach adopted by the national government in an attempt to put a halt to the ongoing military clashes is represented by a movement from NS3 to NR1. The impact of the brain drain crisis accelerated during the second wave of intellectual emigration, covering the period 1977-1983.

Accordingly, \[ C = C1 + C2 \]

\[ \text{to} \rightarrow t2 \]

\[ \text{to} \rightarrow t1 \quad t1 \rightarrow t2 \]

where, \[ C2 = \text{impact of 2nd wave of intellectual emigration movement on local society} \]

\[ t = \text{the period covered by the second intellectual emigration movement, starting in 1977 (t1) and ending in 1983 (t2).} \]
C to D (1977-1979): Military operations among the conflicting parties continued to spread to various parts of the country. The regional conflict - being a crucial part of the overall Lebanese macro-crisis - intensified with the 1978 Israeli invasion. Immigrants’ academic qualifications and professional achievements affected the choice of the host country. The majority of engineers and medical doctors emigrated to the United States, while businessmen and bankers departed to Europe and the Arab Gulf (Labaki, 1992:613).

D to E (1980): During the year 1980, there had been a drop in the overall number of Lebanese migrants. This trend continued through the remaining period of the second wave of emigration, ending in 1983. With the inability of the national government to curtail the crisis, there has been a movement towards Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) ‘Garbage Can’ approach to decision making (NS2). At this period of time, the situation presented limited opportunities in addition to the on-going threats. This includes the 1982 Israeli invasion and withdrawal.

E to F (1980-1983): The approximate net number of Lebanese migrants for the period 1980 to 1983 added to 132,000 individuals (Labaki, 1992: 610). The 1982 massive Israeli invasion and withdrawal was a direct cause leading to a considerable number of departures. During this period, bold terrorism became the main tool used to drive the west out of Lebanon (Keenan, 1992: 169).

F to G (Stage III): With the withdrawal of the Israeli army in 1982 and the movement of the national government towards a more calculated form of decision analysis as a means of solving the macro-crisis events, there has been a movement from the ‘Garbage Can’ model (NS2) to the calculated ‘neo-rational approach’ (NR1). Although attempts were undertaken to solve the problems on hand, the national government has not been successful to put an end to the chaotic events. The third wave of emigration started in 1983, where there had been a sharp rise in the overall intellectual emigration movement. The approximate net balance of emigrants during the period 1984 to 1988 added to 339,713 individuals (Labaki, 1992: 610). The impact of the overall brain drain crisis so far is a function of the progressive three previous intellectual emigration waves.

Accordingly, \[ C = C_1 + C_2 + C_3 \]
\[
\text{to} \rightarrow t_3 \text{ to} \rightarrow t_1 \text{ t}_1 \rightarrow t_2 \text{ t}_2 \rightarrow t_3
\]

where, \[ C_3 = \text{system's impact of 3rd wave of intellectual emigration wave.} \]

\[ t = \text{third wave of emigration period starting in 1984(t2) and ending in 1988(t3).} \]

G to H (1984-1986): During this period, foreign hostage taking, among other bold terrorist acts (Keenan, 1992: 258) constituted a major part of the overall manufactured events, leading to further acceleration of the multi-national brain drain movement. In addition to the severe deterioration in the security situation beginning in 1984, Lebanon witnessed an unprecedented sharp decline in the overall economic conditions, as evidenced by the high inflationary rates, accompanied with high unemployment rates and continuous depreciation in the value of the Lebanese pound relative to foreign currencies (Mallat, 1986: 160). Accordingly, military and socio-economic factors highly impacted on accelerating the overall intellectual emigration movement. With the frequent interruptions of public and private administrative and research agencies, as well as schools and universities, in addition to severe deterioration in educational standards and strict limitations to research facilities, the only individual solution left for intellectuals and academicians was to leave the country in search for better teaching and research facilities elsewhere. The approximate net balance of Lebanese emigrants during the period 1984 to 1986 adds to 205,713 individuals (Labaki, 1992: 610).
H to I (1987): As the chaotic events continued to spread all over Lebanese territories, there has been a movement from the "neo-rational" decision making approach to disjointed incrementalism (NS3). Although the problem(s) were originally well defined by the national government; the actions displayed by the players involved, including the internal fighting factions and their sponsoring governments, did not provide a genuine and solid solution to the crisis events. During the year 1987, there has been a slight drop in the number of Lebanese migrants, whereby the approximate net balance of migrants added to 67,000 individuals. Again, this trend continued during 1988, which constitutes the end of the third wave of emigration.

I to J (1987-1988): Approximately, the net balance for Lebanese migrants during the two year period 1987 to 1988 added to 134,000 individuals (Labaki, 1992: 610). Following the series of events during the previous two stages, internal geographical displacement of a considerable number of the population continued, purely due to their religious/political affiliations (Davie, 1992: 633-634).

J to K (Stage IV): The unsuccessful attempts of the national government to curtail the crisis events are represented by a movement towards the neo-rational and relatively conservative approach to decision making (NR2). The fourth wave of emigration started in 1989 and continued until the end of the war period. The overall intellectual emigrant movement severely escalated during this period. The approximate number of migrants during the first eight months in 1989 added to 240,000 individuals.

K to 4 (1989-1991): Given the political and military events during the period 1989-1991, the main policy adopted by senior local government officials could best be described as pure adventurism (Davie, 1992: 631). Actions and reactions to political and military operations were undertaken on a trial and error bases. With the level of foreign intervention, the internal struggle for power unfortunately continued (Gordon, 1983: 122).

Point 4 (1991): Point 4, in figure 6-1, could be categorised by severe intellectual and administrative vacuum. It represents a clear case of accumulated multi-national brain drain crisis that had been building on itself for a period of seventeen consecutive years. The series of four intellectual emigration waves, covering the period 1975-1991, were continuously being triggered by a high rise in the perceptions of threat and uncertainty experienced by the general public. The brain drain crisis had specifically impacted on three main internal sub-systems, namely political, educational and cultural forces. Every new wave of intellectual and administrative emigration had been more stressful in terms of the system's overall recovery and reconstruction prospects than the previous one. The impact of the overall brain drain crisis, at point 4 in figure 3, is a function of the accumulated progressive impact of all the previous four waves of intellectual emigration.

$$C = C_1 + C_2 + C_3 + C_4$$

to→t4 to→t1 t1→t2 t2→t3 t3→t4

where,

$$C_4 =$ system's impact of 4th intellectual emigration wave.

$$t =$$ fourth wave of emigration period, starting in 1989(t3), and ending in 1991(t4).

July, 1997: The multi-national brain drain crisis could be defined in terms of a value added problem, which impacts on the system's evolutionary prospects after crisis.

The national government adopted different crisis decision making approaches at different time intervals as an attempt to solve the events in focus. Point "A" illustrates the lack of effective government action to stop the crisis events and the corresponding intellectual emigration movement at an early stage. Although the national government was under the impression that the 1976 Syrian intervention - at point "B" - would put an end to the military events, the crisis continued. With the continued foreign interventions, the national government was losing power over its own territories.
(Gordon, 1983: 115-116). It came to the point whereby the legitimate government of President Ilyas Sarkis was ruling the whole nation in theory only. Practically, the national government was not ruling any part of the country (Gordon, 1983: 119-122). Point "C" depicts the inability of the national government to assert its power over its territories. The lack of decisiveness of the national government became apparent at point "E". The government was unable to take control over its territories. This was evident with the 1982 Israeli invasion and withdrawal. Point "G" represents the government's movement towards a neo-rational and a calculated approach to deal with the crisis events after the withdrawal of the Israeli army in 1982. Discussions/negotiations with the leaders of the infighting factions to stop military clashes proved impotent. Point "I" depicts the lack of effective action by the national government to stop the problem of internal displacements of a considerable proportion of the population due to their religious/political affiliations. With the high levels of foreign intervention in internal affairs and the government's continuous lack of control over its territories, the system was heading towards crisis at point "K". Given the previously identified "turning points" (Figure 6-1), it becomes evident that local public agencies as well as political parties continuously failed to undertake appropriate action to prevent, or at least mitigate, the consequences of the massive discontinuities extending from stage 1: (Algorithm) to stage 4: (Crisis).

Observations

The outcome of the previous analysis indicates that the system continues to operate at phase 4, namely, the crisis stage, during the post-crisis period. The overall system has been strictly confined to the crisis state. There has been a lack of tangible and efficient reconstructive efforts, besides basic infrastructure (Kisirwani, 1993: 1-2). The need to normalise has not been effectively addressed yet. It is worth noting that normalisation efforts will give birth to a new Algorithm state, rather than take the system back to the same old order which prevailed during the early 1970s. Lebanon will be in a weaker position to regain its pre-1974 competitive position as the commercial centre of the Middle East due to the advancements achieved by its neighbouring countries during the crisis years.

There has been a clear lack of ability to achieve a considerable brain influx movement, extending from the crisis state to such a putative new Algorithm phase. Such an inability to embark on a reconstructive mode is a crisis within a crisis. Thus, the crisis stage depicted by point 4 (Figure 6-1) is too simple to describe the system's current position. There exists a longitudinal dimension within the crisis state itself.

During the current post-war period, the brain drain crisis has emerged as one of the major problems facing both public and private enterprises. Government officials and administrators of Lebanese universities are currently encouraging specialised intellectuals and professionals of a Lebanese origin, currently residing in the various host countries, to return and assume academic and administrative duties in their home country. Although the voice of cannons has not been heard lately, the post-crisis period has not evidenced the abolition of brain influx barriers (Davie, 1992: 632-635).

The current system is badly in need of capable emigration policy administrators, as part of the country's overall team of crisis management policy planners. After evaluating the consecutive emigration waves during the period 1975-1995, several observations come to mind.

1. Political and military factors were the primary causes behind the various emigration waves (Davie, 1992: 631). There has been a strong correlation between the two inter-related crisis variables, namely, internal security situation and emigration (Davie, 1992: 629).

2. Religious demographic trends have to be accounted for in terms of impacting on the degree of attainment of a demographically balanced reverse intellectual emigration movement.

3. The dilemma of national identification is not a new phenomenon in Lebanon's history. The various communities in crisis have been suffering from conflicting ideological and historical interpretations of Lebanon's national identification since 1920. Although the various Lebanese communities have more in common with each other than with any
other Arab or Western nation, they have continued to suffer from a dichotomy in nationality interpretations, as being followers of either ‘Lebanism’ or ‘Arabism’ ideology. Needless to say, the political forces behind the manufactured nature of national identification conflicts need to be resolved, as they impact on the attainment and direction of the brain influx movement.

4 The Lebanese intellectual movement was transferred into a multi-national brain drain crisis. With the consecutive evacuations of Americans and Western European expatriates from Lebanon, the country’s cultural and educational system suffered severely (Davie, 1992: 635). In terms of brain drain policy recommendations, public administrators need to plan for a multi-national intellectual return movement, rather than a purely nationalistic reverse emigration waves.

5 A main cause of migration is Lebanon’s well-educated and cultured human capital. The majority of Lebanese migrants are educated, cultured and familiar with Western ways of living (Maouia, 1992: 655). This facilitates the process of acculturation and settlement in host countries.

6 Given the overall events experienced by almost all Lebanese communities, there has been slight evidence of learning curves in favour of the attainment of a demographically well-balanced return movement. Now that the security situation in the country has relatively improved, both Christian and Muslim communities are starting to question the nature of the manufactured events they have witnessed. Although national identity dilemmas have been experienced by the various Lebanese communities, for a long period of time, people are coming to finally realise the political implications behind the manufactured nature of national identity contradictions. They have finally reached the understanding that it is not impossible to get the two main cultures together (Salibi, 1988: 2-3).

What is more important is that the general public has realised that the multi-national intellectual emigration movement - being a crucial part of the overall system’s macro-crisis - has not been culturally determined. On the contrary, the war of others on Lebanese territories has unfortunately been dressed-up as a religious and cultural conflict among the Lebanese communities themselves. More than ever before, Lebanese communities have started to exhibit a keen sense of common identity which could be translated into a new national order (Salibi, 1988:3). Accordingly, the tendency to converge towards a common national identity could be utilised to generate a unified Lebanese nation.

7 The overall intellectual emigration waves have clearly demonstrated the absence of governmental agencies of emigration in Lebanon, thus necessitating family or other private emigration networks in both the country of origin and the countries of destination.

8 The high correlation between the two inter-related crisis variables, namely brain drain and overall security situation, necessitates the establishment of a specialised crisis management task force to analyse terrorism and formulate anti-terrorist policy recommendations in an attempt to limit acts of armed violence.

9 To achieve national reconciliation and political integration, as pre-requisite conditions to attain a renewed brain movement, an efficient team of national administrative public planners, with an appropriate intellectual and administrative crisis management mind set are needed.

10 Following the primary versus secondary causation logic, the multi-national brain drain crisis is both a cause and an effect of the overall Lebanese macro-crisis. Accordingly, a renewed brain influx movement would constitute a basic resolution of several crucial secondary problems emanating from the system’s overall macro-crisis. Such problems include deterioration in educational standards, administrative vacuum, lack of well trained medical staff, and deterioration in standards of living, among others.
Among the necessary pre-requisite conditions needed to attract multi-national academicians, intellectuals and administrators; the existence of law and order, acceptable degree of overall internal security, freedom of expression, political integration and national reconciliation are important. On the other hand, a renewed brain influx movement would help resolve various inter-related socio-political and economic problems, including macro-economic reform, media regulation, limitations of corruption in civil administration and enhancement of foreign perceptions and image of Lebanon.

Lessons For Reconstruction: Policy-Oriented Prescriptions

A crucial question at this stage of the attitudinal and socio-political analysis of the brain drain and intellectual emigration movement is: what are the reconstructive policy implications in terms of the previously mentioned "turning points" extending from stage 1: (Algorithm) to stage 4: (Crisis)? The brain drain slice of reconstructive logic comprises a powerful policy analysis tool. The following policy recommendations constitute a tangible brain drain-driven reconstructive programme built around the massive discontinuities revealed by the previous intellectual emigration analysis. Accordingly, the following hypothetical policy agenda for action represents a plausible brain drain-driven reconstructive strategy, which attempts to mitigate the consequences of the previously identified points of discontinuity.

Keeping in mind that intellectual emigration is a subset of a larger macro-crisis; reconstruction of various aspects of the political, socio-economic and educational systems is needed. Given the various reasons behind the intellectual movement, hypothetical reconstructive policy recommendations have been classified into the following three categories: Political and administrative factors; socio-economic implications; and educational development and professional training.

Political and Administrative Factors. The internal security conditions in the country constitute one of the main forces behind the massive emigration waves throughout the crisis period, as shown by several stages of discontinuity (Figure 6-1), including I-A (Stage I), B-C (Stage II) and J-K (Stage IV). Such discontinuity phases clearly depict the fragility of the Lebanese political system under crisis, thus allowing for various levels of foreign interventions in the system's internal affairs. Accordingly, the following hypothetical restorative political and administrative policy recommendations are designed to prevent, or at least restrict, the conditions necessitating future intellectual outflows, while promoting a plausible reverse brain influx movement.

1. A competent socio-political organisation, representing all Lebanese communities, and capable of gaining people's confidence is needed to provide leadership for the country. One of the main objectives of the organisation is the development of reconstructive plans of action geared towards national rehabilitation.

The new socio-political organisation, being the essence of the country, should be credible enough to act as a unifying factor in a way that would bridge the gap between Lebanon's internal divisions/factions. Although previous efforts to unify the country have failed, attempts should continue to integrate the Lebanese communities. It is only through internal reconciliation, cooperation and co-existence that external intervention can be minimised, if not eliminated. The establishment of such a competent political organisation would act as a strong brain influx force, aiming towards the redirection of Lebanon's talents, skills, human and capital resources in a reconstructive manner, given the country's rehabilitative needs. The establishment of such an organisation is a plausible effort.

2. Local policy planners and senior public officials need to conduct round table sessions, aiming at the formulation of constructive and practical political/military solutions, geared towards improving the country's long-term security situation in a way that would make it appealing to scientists - including academicians, research fellows and practitioners - to visit Lebanon. Among the fundamental issues that need definite solutions are the following:
• Neutralisation of all foreign forces present in the country, as an attempt to minimise foreign intervention;

• although the solution to Lebanon’s problems is part of an overall regional solution, divorcing Lebanon’s internal affairs from the overall Middle-East regional problems might be fruitful; and

• harmonising the relationships among all Lebanese communities. This could be achieved using a piecemeal approach. A good starting point would be to plan for and ensure that all Lebanese citizens, regardless of their religious/political affiliations, are treated equally.

3 Reverse intellectual emigration efforts are currently being undertaken by individual university administrators in an attempt to attract academicians and researchers of a Lebanese origin, to assume various teaching and administrative duties in Lebanon. Although such efforts are to be highly encouraged, an overall, well-organised national brain drain programme is needed within both the public and private sectors of the economy. Taking it step by step, professionals are to be encouraged to consider a short-term contract/visit to Lebanon, hoping that, with time, confidence and trust will be established, resulting in a long-term renewed brain influx movement.

Socio-Economic Implications. Given the overall crisis period, socio-economic hardships continued to be a major cause of emigration of a considerable proportion of the population (Davie, 1992: 632-633), as depicted by GF continuity stage (Figure 6-1). The following hypothetical socio-economic rehabilitative policy implications are built around the previously mentioned socio-economic discontinuity stages.

1 Keeping in mind that economic power could be translated into national political power, rethinking the Lebanese economy should be one of the main objectives of the post-crisis political order. Areas of economic growth need to be identified as potential investment projects. Pre-crisis Lebanon was well known for its service economy, including tourism; education, training and consultation services; banking and financial services. Instead of purely rethinking the pre-crisis economic order, a current situation analysis of the Lebanese economy is needed to build an appropriate economic infrastructure for the country. The current peaceful Lebanese economy is pregnant with potential strengths and opportunities (Iskandar, 1995: 2-5).

2 A major problem hindering the achievement of a brain influx movement has to do with people’s attitudes, perceptions and a lack of trust in the current security situation. Presently, Lebanon suffers from an image problem. The seventeen- year old crisis left deep perceptual and emotional scars. Such deep rooted scars could easily be depicted by people’s reactions to reports and books authored by former Beirut hostages, both Lebanese and foreign. Accordingly, well-developed positioning strategies, geared towards gradual adaptations in people’s attitudes towards Lebanon, are needed.

3 Normalising relations with Israel and Syria allows for economic cooperation and the establishment of regional networks aiming at the facilitation of international trade functions, thus resulting in economic prosperity to all countries involved.

4 With the destruction of the economic infrastructure, deterioration of the Lebanese pound, accompanied with an accelerating triple-digit inflation rate, well trained professionals were undertaking two or more jobs to make ends meet. Increases in salaries were continuously being eaten up by the inflationary prices of essential basic commodities. Granting a fair raise in salaries, especially to public service employees, helps to raise their productivity, while limiting corruption in civil administration.

5 Word-of-mouth and diffusion of emigrants’ information regarding past achievements and possible employment opportunities in host countries has become quite popular
during the crisis period, thus encouraging intellectual emigration. Accordingly, restricting the promotion of brain drain is recommended.

Educational Development and Professional Training. C-D, E-F and G-H discontinuity stages outline various educational and professional push factors causing intellectual emigration (Figure 6-1). Rethinking the education system is one of the main issues to be discussed during the current post-war period. The following hypothetical policy implications are geared towards the rehabilitation of the educational system, as being a crucial pre-requisite for developing and maintaining a plausible reverse intellectual emigration programme.

1 The political schism and division of opinion among the Lebanese in general have continuously been emphasised through the Lebanese system of education. Private schools and universities have always been superior to public institutions in terms of quality of education, staff training and development and research facilities, including libraries and laboratories. Such disparities between the two educational systems have helped to further deepen the ideological and cultural differences among the Lebanese communities. At a later stage during the crisis period, this was translated into two sectors of Beirut. To overcome the cultural and ideological dichotomy in Lebanon, it is important to re-think the overall educational system, including textbooks used, in such a way that would unite the two main ideologies and emphasise the benefits of Lebanon's sovereignty to all Lebanese communities (Gordon, 1983:31).

2 Language has always been a debatable issue in Lebanon. The two variables, namely, multilingualism and Lebanon's sense of national identity, have highly correlated in the past. It is the view here that the two previously mentioned variables should be separated. Being bilingual, or trilingual, has proven to be a valuable cultural asset for emigrants, as well as the remaining population in Lebanon.

3 Bearing in mind that "educational explosion" leads to student radicalisation, increased alienation and, finally, socio-political destabilisation (Gordon, 1983:31), national educational planners have to continuously monitor the demand and supply of professional and semi-professional manpower. Creating employment opportunities for graduates is needed. Of course, job creation is linked to the overall level of developmental activities undertaken by both the public and the private sectors.

4 Public encouragement of scientific research has been minimal, as evidenced by the percentage of national budget being allocated to the National Research Council that was established in 1963 (Gordon, 1983: 49). An acceptable budget and a strategic long-term plan of action is needed to promote and encourage fellow researchers and academicians to return to their homeland.

Other areas in need of reform and rehabilitation, partly geared towards the establishment of a reverse brain drain movement, include medical and health care, judicial and legal system, as well as the reconstruction of the country's infra- and super-structures.

Conclusion

Various approaches could be used to analyse and evaluate the impact of multi-national emigration movements on systems evolution after crisis. Basic theoretical research, including the development of new definitions and models is useful for analysing various intellectual emigration stages and evaluating the overall impact on intellectual/administrative systems' evolution policy implications. In particular, the inability of the current system to embark on tangible reconstructive modes makes it crucial to further explore the longitudinal dimension within phase 4 of the Risk Path Analysis Model, namely the crisis state (Figure 6-1). In addition, applied research is useful in evaluating the significance of the transplantation of various crisis management models to the context of a system's intellectual and administrative emigration activities, geared towards the development of a renewed brain influx situation.
New synergies impacting on the development of an administrative and intellectual return movement are worth evaluating. Such correlations include intensity of the overall emigration movement and political corruption; multi-national brain drain and politics of national identification; magnitude of intellectual emigration and socio-cultural implications for the remaining population; development of a renewed brain influx movement and the country's image; among others. A longitudinal research approach is useful to further analyse the time-sensitive decision “turning points” geared towards the identification of valuable learning patterns, which provide future brain drain policy recommendations to both public and private national administrative planners. Knowing that multi-national brain drain is a creeping crisis which feeds upon itself, quantitative research is useful in measuring the progressive impact of the brain drain crisis with every new stage of intellectual emigration.

This research serves as a basis for evaluating the implications attached to the politics of brain drain and intellectual emigration movement. Although the case of Lebanon has been the focus of the current research, this study serves as a planning tool applicable to other regional and international brain drain crises. It would also be interesting to make similar research studies to measure the impact of intellectual emigration movements on system’s development in other countries, such as Egypt, which have experienced two or more generations of settlement in various host countries.
Chapter VII

Media Manufactured Events as Case of Crisis Multiplier, 1975-1991

Sections:

Introduction

Historical Perspective: Basic Developments

Nature and Impact of Media Coverage: Analysis
  Media Functions: Role and Consequences

Mapping the Lebanese Dysfunctional Media Crisis

Media-Driven Reconstructive Research Agenda

Conclusion
Chapter VII

Media Manufactured Events
As a Case of Crisis Multiplier, 1975-1991

Introduction

Just like the brain drain and the intellectual emigration phenomenon, media chaos witnessed during the crisis period could best be described as both a cause and effect of the overall macro-crisis. The media itself had been a victim during the two-year war period of 1975-1976, as witnessed by the gradual loss of the freedom of the press, mainly due to local and foreign pressures on press agencies. As the war progressed, media channels mostly served as propaganda outlets by the infighting factions, thus, resulting in media chaos and mis-information. Questions that come to mind within this context include the following: what were the causes behind media chaos? Is mis-information the result of the freedom of the press or the limitations/pressures imposed on it? What is the nature of the role played by local and foreign media? What should be the role of the media during national crisis?

Chapter seven attempts to explore the nature of media coverage of the crisis events for the period 1975-1991; and evaluate its impact on the various parties involved, including the national government, foreign governments, the general public which, in most incidents, constituted the silent majority, the infighting factions and terrorists themselves. In particular, this chapter explores the socio-political effects of media coverage under crisis.

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, to analyse the nature and role of media coverage during the crisis period. Secondly, to evaluate media reconstructive policy implications; the Risk Path Analysis Model being applied to the media crisis events. Thirdly, to evaluate insights for future research related to the role and impact of media coverage under crisis.

There are three schools of thought governing the relationship between the role of media coverage and diffusion of terrorism, namely: (i) media as crisis contagion; (ii) media as crisis prevention/reduction; and (iii) media as crisis neutral. The first approach suggests that media coverage of terrorism may increase the rate of future violence, mainly to attract media coverage, increase awareness of terrorists’ cause/problems and gain the general public’s support in terms of future public policy. This approach has received great support among various government officials, academics, researchers and even media personnel (see Rabe, 1977; Alexander, 1978; Kelly and Mitchell, 1981; Schmid and de Graf, 1982; Weimann, 1983). Similar opinions have been expressed by government officials supporting increased public regulation and restrictions of media coverage of terrorist activities. State Department spokesman, Charles Redman, expressed similar views regarding the short interview undertaken during NBC Nightly News with the Secretary General of the Palestine Liberation Front, Abul Abbas, in 1986 (Boyer, 1986:A7; Picard, 1991:49; Viera, 1991:73). At the 1985 American Bar Association meeting in London, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated that democracies should limit terrorists’ use of publicity (New York Times, 1985:A3; Picard, 1991:50; Viera, 1991:75).

A second school of thought suggests that media coverage of violent activities leads to prevention, or at least reduction of the possibilities of future terrorist activities. Followers of the media as the crisis prevention approach argue that providing media access to terrorist groups such as holding news conferences, undertaking interviews on national news, allowing newsmprint articles and television appearances; contributes to reducing the rate of terrorist incidents geared towards gaining media coverage (see Simmons, 1991; Miller, 1982; Rubin and Friedland, 1986).

Few writers prefer not to argue for or against the role of media coverage in terrorism (Eke and Alali, 1991: 8-10). To them, there is no cause-effect relationship governing the previously mentioned two variables. They simply believe that the suspected correlation between media coverage and diffusion of terrorism is nothing more than a speculation that lacks empirical evidence; thus,
enforcing the grey area governing the relationship between media and terrorism. Accordingly, they support the media as crisis neutral approach (see Bassiouni, 1983; Picard, 1991; Elke & Alali, 1991).

Several social scientists, academicians and media personnel argue that the use of a pluralistic media has been a contributing factor in the expansion and prolongation of the crisis in focus (Dajani, 1992: 80). The purpose of this study is not to argue for or against media coverage of terrorist acts. Obviously there are a number of variables underlying the intensification and prolongation of crisis events, including the variety of local and foreign actors; presence of supporting regional governments with conflicting personal agendas; availability of arms and heavy weaponry; sponsorship of terrorist groups by foreign governments; administrative failures displayed by domestic government; internal socio-political contradictions; high levels of foreign intervention; and the country’s geographic location, amongst others. Given the Lebanese experience, there has been several instances whereby local and foreign journalists covering current events have been victims of the war (see Appendix D). Nevertheless, several cases of misinformation took place during the crisis period. Various instances could be cited whereby the general public has been victimised by the role of the media coverage of the events; including the characterisation, language and labels displayed through various media channels (Dajani, 1992: 125-126; Kemp, 1992: 692). This could partly be witnessed by the frequent political public relation wars preceding military actions and reactions (Dajani, 1992: 127-129).

Knowing that the country is geographically located in a highly turbulent region, and given its internal socio-political fabric, there is a high probability that the nation may face future violent acts. Accordingly, the need exists for a detailed research agenda covering such areas as journalists' roles in the diffusion of terrorism; media's use of labels; the impact of media coverage of violence on the general public and terrorists themselves; and the use of pluralistic media and overall national image. The analysis and resulting recommendations in terms of policy implications are meant to further develop the level of understanding and appreciation of both media personnel and government officials concerning the role of media coverage of terrorism and its consequences.

This chapter attempts to address the following questions: What was the role of the media in portraying the Lebanese conflict? Did local and foreign media agencies play a significant role in crisis perpetuation/solution? To what extent can the Lebanese crisis be partially classified as media-manufactured event? To what extent was the media reflecting rather than shaping the situation? Given the Lebanese events, can the media be considered a crisis multiplier? Is there an evidence of learning curves generated by a pluralistic media management of the crisis? What are the policy "turning points" that were evidenced throughout the crisis period in relation to pluralistic media chaos and the resulting intensive levels of misinformation? What actions/policies could have been undertaken to mitigate the consequences of media discontinuities?

The previously outlined questions are geared towards the development and evaluation of a media-driven reconstructive strategy built around media discontinuities revealed by analysis. Knowing that the overall system had suffered from pluralistic media management of crisis events, a media-driven rehabilitative strategy constitutes a powerful policy analysis tool.

A multi-medium research was conducted as follows. A simple content analysis of terminology used in 295 randomly selected articles covering violent actions was undertaken. The majority of the articles appeared in various well-known Lebanese newspapers and magazines; including AL-Nahar, AL-Anwar, AL-Safir, and AL-Hawadeth, amongst others which were being published at various intervals throughout the crisis period. The remaining selected articles appear in a number of political newspapers produced by the in-fighting factions at different time periods. The crisis period examined is April 1975 to December 1991. Such an analysis allows an unfolding of changes in media attitudes over time in terms of characterisation, labelling and language used. Such media-attitude changes occur in response to changes in the overall socio-political system, adaptations in internal and external alliances, as well as foreign interventions, amongst other factors. The selected articles primarily deal with such situations as foreign hostage crises; car bomb casualties; kidnapping; hostage taking; heavy shelling; political and religious displacement; drug trafficking; individual murders and assassinations; assault incidents; group massacres; and foreign human and material aid to infighting factions, amongst other violent situations.

The current study evaluates the impact of various audio-visual media channels, including TeleLiban (channel 5 broadcasting from Hazmieh and channel 7 from Talet AL-Khayat) and the
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC). In addition to the central-government-run radio station, other stations are considered as part of the news content analysis, including The Voice of Lebanon run by the Kata'rib Party; The Arab Voice of Lebanon for the MOURabitun movement; The Voice of the People run by the Communist Party; Voice of the Mountains for the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP); Al-Manar for Hizbollah; Voice of Free Lebanon for The Lebanese Forces; and the Voice of the Homeland for Sunnite Muslims of Beirut, amongst others.

The current study constitutes a policy analysis tool; however, scope is limited to the following factors. The majority of the selected articles considered in this research were taken from the relatively large and well known Lebanese newspapers and magazines, including AL-Nahar, AL-Safir, AL-Awnar and AL-Hawadeth; with only a limited number of the selected articles appearing in the political newspapers produced by the infighting factions at different time intervals.

Historical Perspectives: Basic Developments

The current research work is directed towards the evaluation of the role and impact of media coverage of the Lebanese macro-crisis, in an attempt to develop a media-driven reconstructive strategy to help with the country's rehabilitative efforts. This section presents the reader with a brief summary of the extended situation in the country, as related to past and present media conditions/limitations. Interactive longitudinal research is needed to analyse the relationships among media variables and to trace the adaptations in media trends over time; as partly witnessed by the characterisation, pictures, music, labels, terminology, and overall language used. Such media trends reflect adaptations in attitudes resulting from changes in alliances and foreign government interventions, over time, amongst other factors.

Pre-Crisis Period. Lebanon is a country where freedom of the press was highly valued. The media in Lebanon has continued to play an important role in spotlighting ongoing incidents throughout the country, analysing preliminary meanings and impacts of major events, as well as building public awareness of the numerous and conflicting political values displayed by infighting factions (Graber, 1989:5-10). Numerous incidents could be cited whereby journalists and other media personnel had to pay a price while undertaking the previously mentioned functions. Accordingly, the media has witnessed a great deal of deterioration in both human and material resources, as well as freedom limitations/pressures.

The history of print media in Lebanon dates back to 1610, when the first printing press in the Near and Middle-East was founded at the Monastery of Saint Anthony Kizhaya. Another printing press, using Arabic script, was set up in 1734 at the Monastery of Saint John the Baptist in Khinshara. The first Arabic Protestant and Catholic versions of the Bible were produced in Lebanon. In 1958, the first non-governmental newspaper in the Arab world, Hadiyat AL-Akhbar, by Khalil Khuri, appeared in Beirut. In 1870, Butros Bustani established AL-jinan, the first magazine in the Arabic language. In the 19th century, and as a result of Turkish pressures, Lebanese writers emigrated to Egypt where they played an important role in establishing Egyptian journalism, such as AL-Ahram, AL-Mukattam, AL-Hilal, AL-Muktatuf, and Ad-Diaa, amongst others (Malek, 1983:17-21).

The Lebanese press has always carried strong political orientations. Before the country gained its independence, a number of well-respected newspapers were founded including AL-Nahar, AL-Sayyad and AL-Dijar, amongst others. With changes in the political systems in the surrounding and other regional countries, whereby authoritative regimes took over, Lebanon became an important major centre for print media, where freedom of the press as guaranteed by the constitution was highly respected. The 1950s witnessed a strong intellectual emigration influx movement, especially by journalists and other media personnel. With time, Lebanon became the main centre for print media in the Arab world.

The 1960s and early 1970s witnessed considerable growth in the print media, where a wide variety of specialised magazines and journals were founded. This prosperity had to suffer at an early stage of the crisis in focus. As the war unfolded, various internal and external pressures were imposed which limited the freedom of the press. Such limitations are partially accountable for the brain death and intellectual emigration that took place during the two years war period of 1975-1976 (See Appendix D).
The first radio station in Lebanon, Radio de l'Orient, was established in 1937 by the French. With a government-run news department, it was renamed radio Lebanon. In 1950, the Kata'ib Party started a new radio station, Voice of Lebanon (Sawt Lubnan), yet the government soon closed it down as a means of discouraging political parties from propagating sensational news and exploiting sensitive events. Later on, leftist opposition parties threatened to start their own radio station. Given the government's objection, they failed to carry on with their threats at this stage. In 1957, a French-Lebanese company, Compagnie Libanaise du Television (CLT), started broadcasting on channels 7 and 9. In a two year period, TeleOrient started broadcasting over channels 5 and 11. In 1966, the National News Agency of the Ministry of Information was founded, monitoring news broadcasts on all channels. Due to the financial hardships in 1979, the government formed a new television company, TeleLiban, whereby each of CLT and TeleOrient held 25 per cent of the shares, leaving the government with the remaining 50 per cent. In the early 1980s, another television company, Middle-East Television, started broadcasting from the Israeli-established "security zone" in South Lebanon.

Crisis Period. The Lebanese macro-crisis had a drastic effect on the press since the beginning of the war in 1975. Various interacting factors have contributed to the deterioration of the print media during the war; including occasional occupation of press offices; material destruction; assaults and kidnaping incidents of media personnel; pressures on press freedom by the in-fighting factions; travelling difficulties and risks; breakdown in communication systems; foreign interventions in local press censorship regulations; and assassination incidents of well known journalists. In addition, economic and competitive variables, among other macro environmental forces, have contributed in the deterioration of the Lebanese press agencies. Such variables include increasing production costs accompanied with a decline in purchasing power; sharp decline in aggregate demand for products and services; smaller local and foreign Arab markets; and noticeable increase in regional press agencies. Increasing competition discouraged the importation of Lebanese publications. As a result, a considerable number of daily and weekly publications closed down during the two-year war period of 1975-1976. Some of the others, remaining in business, relocated their offices to Paris or London. Newspapers that decided to keep their offices in Lebanon had to experience cut down in personnel. Since they concentrated mainly on local news coverage, newspapers experienced a reduction in size as well.

During the war, tabloid journalism gained popularity. The various infighting factions started their own dailies/weeklies, which were mainly used as propaganda outlets (see Appendix D). Such tabloids could best be described as simple bulletins or newsletters. In many instances, militias forced themselves an internal local market. Such tabloids were mainly purchased by people, living in the area, usually supporting the militias producing them. In some instances such newspapers were purchased by people residing under the jurisdiction of opposing factions, mainly out of curiosity. During the crisis years, Lebanese newspapers and bulletins concentrated on the presentation of views and opinions of their supporting parties as opposed to news and facts (Dajani, 1992: 44). Opinions and subjective interpretations of the events were usually included within the news story; either as biased presentation of the facts themselves, or as pure expressions of subjective opinions (Dajani, 1992: 59). Accordingly, people residing under the jurisdiction of opposing factions were at times tempted to purchase such bulletins and newsletters to observe how people living in the other sector of Beirut tend to interpret the ongoing events.

Militias and political parties found it easier to support radio stations rather than newspapers and print media, due to human and material cost considerations. In addition, several parties tried to manipulate the print media by controlling some of the well-respected newspapers in Lebanon, due to the physical location of the press offices. During early crisis intervals, AL-Nahar, a highly respected newspaper located in Muslim West Beirut, was perceived to be the voice of the leftist parties; while AL-Anwar, another well-known newspaper located in the Christian area, was perceived to be the voice of the rightist parties. A number of magazines were also established during the war period, including Voice of the Tigers (Sawt Al-Nourour) and Guardians of the Cedars (Houuras AL-Arz) by the Christian parties; and Nasserist Stand (AL-Mawakef AL-Nasser) representing the voice of the Nasserist Movement, and AL-Shira' which became well known after the Iran gate.

Both violent and non-violent forms of control have contributed to the deterioration of the press. The non-violent forms include the following. First, the imposition of strict censorship regulations interfered with the role and the freedom of the press. On 16 January, 1984, AL-Safir newspaper
reported that in most instances the imposed censorship regulations were inspired by external circumstances. Secondly, financial dependency on external sources of funds - due to circulation problems and poor advertising revenue - allowed foreign embassies, business firms and local groups including national government officials to buy the support of the print media (Dajani, 1992: 45-49). Newspaper offices were also accepting payments to keep silent about unfavourable issues relating to the image of their supporting political, religious and interest groups (Dajani, 1992: 52).

Violence was also used to intimidate the press and silence prominent journalists. Violent control mechanisms practised during the crisis period included kidnapping and assassination of media personnel, bombing of printing plants and raids on editorial and newspaper offices, among others.

Although the previously mentioned factors have all contributed to the deterioration of the press, it is worthwhile to note that Lebanon continued to provide the venue through which Arab governments and their opposition expressed their views. As the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) became a major force in Lebanon, they invested considerably to finance their own publications (see Appendix D).

The crisis period in Lebanon witnessed the birth of too many media channels, especially in terms of radio broadcasting systems. The government-run central radio station was broadcasting the news from the government's perspective, while the various infighting factions aimed at broadcasting their own interpretations of the situation. The impact of the war on media coverage became quite evident at an early stage of the Lebanese crisis. Such an impact could be witnessed by the division of the news department within the Ministry of Information; whereby Muslim leftist factions took over West Beirut station headquarters, while Christian factions took over the main station in Amshit.

As the war progressed, infighting factions experienced a greater need to communicate with their supporters, militia-men and general public. Accordingly, a considerable number of radio stations were established. In 1976, Lebanon witnessed the re-launching of a well-respected radio station, The Voice of Lebanon (Sawt Lubnan), by the Kata’ib party. It started with the main objective of conveying messages to supporters about battlefield situations, as well as presenting general information related to the party and its operating system. Knowing that it was difficult to expand its target market while implementing its current procedures; the administration adapted its policies in terms of the geographical and news coverage and overall programming. They aimed at targeting all Lebanese communities rather than merely concentrating on the Christian sector. The Voice of Lebanon had been quite successful in attaining its main goal; namely, audience attraction and satisfaction. It is well respected nationally and internationally. It has been rated as a credible source of information by the majority of Christians and Muslims alike.

Soon after, The Voice of Arab Lebanon (Sawt Lubnan AL-Arabi) was founded, during the two-year war period of 1975-1976, by the Nasserist Muslim leftist movement - Murabitun. It ceased operations at a later stage. Other broadcasting stations included the Voice of Free Lebanon (Sawt Lubnan AL-Hor) by Lebanese Christian Forces, Voice of the Mountains (Sawt AL-Jabal) by the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Voice of the People (Sawt AL-Sha’ib) with a liberal orientation by the Communist Party, Voice of the Homeland (Sawt Al-Watan) with a Sunni Makassidi Muslim orientation, and Al-Manar by Hizbollah. Few stations were also established in the Beqaa’ valley, such as Voice of the Beqa’a and Voice of Tripoli, amongst others.

Each of the above mentioned stations developed their own primary audiences based on geographics, political affiliations, as well as religious and sect factors. Radio stations continuously reflected changes in local and external political alliances throughout the crisis period in terms of characterisation, labels and language used to portray their position versus that of the "enemy". Such adaptations in alliances, over time, affected audience attraction and target market overlaps. Operating without licenses, their own legality was their popularity and recognition (Dajani, 1992: 82).

A considerable number of the radio stations operating during the crisis period lacked credibility. They were mainly used as microphones by the infighting factions to get their views across to their publics. With the conveyance of their own conflicting interpretations of the events, the general public was left to experience a great deal of mis-information exposure. With time, some stations started to expand their broadcasting to cover broader geographical areas; thus, attempting to
influence each other's publics. Various cognitive and emotional influential determinants were used besides personal interpretations of events; including special programming, emotional songs displaying political slogans, choice of music and labels, and interviews with selected politicians and celebrities, amongst others. A significant number of the broadcasting stations failed in gaining people's trust, as they were known to be representing and promoting the interests of a particular political, religious or interest group.

Throughout the crisis period, there had been a lack of expertise in broadcasting and media management. Most of the employees working for the previously mentioned radio stations; including producers, writers, announcers, and engineers were former staff members at the central government-run radio station. The division of staff was allocated along confessional bases. Christian staff members were mostly hired by the Voice of Lebanon, while Muslim employees worked for the Voice of Arab Lebanon. Accordingly, private broadcasting stations took over the government-run central station. The growth in private broadcasting systems was accompanied by continuous deterioration in public media channels.

Before the war, television broadcasting was limited to TeleLiban. The financial performance of TeleLiban continued its deterioration during the crisis period. Similar to the government-run central radio station, the news department within TeleLiban was also divided into two, resulting in competitive broadcasting from both sides of the Lebanese capital. Accordingly, Channel 7 broadcasting from Talet AL-Khayat in West Beirut experienced several consecutive influences from various militias; including the Murabitun Movement in 1975-1976, which was supported by the PLO; followed by the Amal Movement; and later the government. On the other hand, Channel 5 broadcasting from Hazmieh in the Eastern sector of Beirut - continued to support the government; thus, mostly broadcasting the government's interpretation of the events.

In the early 1980s, a new station - Middle-East Television - was established in the "security zone" in South Lebanon (Dajani, 1992: 105). Its Lebanese audience was rather limited due to geographic coverage constraints. Unlike other stations, Middle-East Television did not expand geographically to cover other areas in Lebanon. In October 1985, Lebanon witnessed the birth of a highly successful television station, Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC). It was founded by the Lebanese Forces (Dajani, 1992: 104), who generously financed its operations. LBC's main strengths included modern equipment and facilities, entertaining and creative programming and strong internal and external contacts. Soon after its introduction, LBC gained the highest market share (Dajani, 1992: 105). It continues to be the leader in the television sector in Lebanon.

With the increased level of mis-information taking place throughout the crisis period, the general public was lost with the clutter of conflicting messages. Accordingly, switching to a station associated with a higher perceived level of credibility became a common practice. Unfortunately, the once outspoken Lebanese media, functioning as a venue for self-expression for the Lebanese themselves and the Arab world in general, had been pressured throughout the crisis period to practice strict self-censorship, as determined by the geographical location of its offices. This obviously was accompanied by a careful choice of words, pictures and event coverage.

Post-Crisis Period. Media chaos and mis-information continued throughout the seventeen year-old war period. The various audio-visual and print media founded in 1975-1990 served as propaganda outlets for the supporting militias. The "us versus them" dialogue escalated to counter opposing claims and interpretations. Various noticeable developments have taken place during the post-crisis period as related to the audio-visual and print media. Such developments pertain to event coverage, language and labels used, geographical expansion, primary and secondary audience attractions, and types of programming, amongst others. In 1992, there was about 42 television stations broadcasting on UHF and VHF and over 120 AM and FM radio stations.

In the 1990s, Lebanon witnessed the birth of too many television stations, including Television AL-Mashriq by the labor party of Zaheir AL-Khatib. It employed a good per centage of TeleLiban producers. Television AL-Mashriq has been affiliated with the Egyptian television. This explains the frequent broadcasting of Egyptian programs; rarely displaying an American, British or French programme. The "Arabism" ideology strongly stands out through its programming. Another television station was founded by the Communist party. It is perceived to be rather liberal in its
programming. It faces a coverage constraint, in terms of limiting its broadcasts to Beirut and its suburbs. In addition, a number of small television stations have been operating as well.

The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) continues to be a highly successful station. It has done an excellent job in terms of overseas transmission of American, British and French programs, amongst others. LBC is affiliated with the Canadian Television Broadcasting. It has established a branch in Canada and LA and is currently broadcasting from Canada. In addition, LBC has been producing and broadcasting local social entertaining programs in different parts of the country. Such efforts have been geared towards the re-establishment of the feelings of unity among various Lebanese communities; which have been suffering from geographical, ideological and psychological isolation for several consecutive years. LBC maintains strong internal and external relationships and continues to acquire the biggest market share of viewers. Currently LBC serves all Lebanese communities. In addition to the eastern sector of Beirut, it is presently broadcasting programs from Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyeh, in South Lebanon, amongst other villages; in an attempt to encourage the feelings of co-existence among the Lebanese communities. Such programs/activities by LBC are continuously being implemented. In the near future, Lebanon is estimated to have about four well-respected television stations; including LBC, TeleLiban (official government station) and Television AL-Mashriq. All of the previously mentioned stations operate on the high frequency band.

Most of the radio stations, established during the crisis period, continue to operate. Among the stations that have ceased operations is the Voice of Arab Lebanon. The currently operating radio stations are working hard to meet the competitive demands in an attempt to attract more viewers. In addition, most of the print media established by the infighting war factions during the crisis period have ceased their publications, mainly due to cost and functional considerations. Accordingly, the general public is left with the better known and well-respected magazines and newspapers; including AL-Nahar, AL-Anwar, AL-Diyar and AL-Safir, amongst others.

Primary audiences, which were previously determined by religious sects and political affiliation factors, are currently influenced by more objective considerations of broadcasted programs. Stations that were perceived to be the voice of a particular militia/sector at one point in time, are currently expanding their coverage to represent various Lebanese communities. For example, LBC is currently broadcasting programs involving prominent war figures from the Western sector of Beirut. During such programs as Saturday’s Visitors (Douyaf AL-Sabt), LBC is providing a media channel to militia leaders and government officials from West Beirut to broadcast their views to all Lebanese communities. Accordingly, the general public has started to witness the extension of a media channel by one political party to another; an action which obviously was not practised during the crisis period. Noticeable positive attitudinal changes by many operating stations have been witnessed during the post-crisis period, with the exception of the labelling and language used in events coverage of the “security zone” in South Lebanon. Media channels in East Beirut continue to use respectful and neutral labels while referring to the South Lebanon Army, such as “the head of South Lebanon Army, General Antoine Lahd”. Media channels in the Western sector of the Lebanese capital use such labels as “Lahd”, “the traitor Antoine Lahd”, “zionist agents” and “Lahdi militias” (al-milishiat al-Lahdiah), amongst others.

When compared to the multi-national brain drain phenomenon (Helou, 1995b:155), as part of the overall Lebanese macro-crisis; media learning curves stand out quite prominently during the post-war period. In an attempt to end the “media chaos” and the prevailing mis-information, in 1992 the government proposed a comprehensive plan to regulate the media. On 12 January, 1992, the National News Agency published the proposed media regulation project, which was geared towards the organisation of the media. The media plan was intended to serve as a framework for regulating privately owned stations. Among the various clauses proposed in the media regulation plan are the following:

- Privately operating television stations have to apply for commercial TV licenses to TeleLiban which, in turn, would be submitted to the ministers of information and telecommunications through the Ministry of Information;

- taxes will have to be paid for the operating permits and generated profits; and
- ministers of information and telecommunications are to study radio network possibilities and develop conditions for use by the privately owned radio stations.

Although there have been rumors regarding the prohibition of news broadcasts on all private television stations, and restricting news broadcasting to Tele Liban (AL-Nahar, 21 January, 1992: 1; AL-Safir, 11 January, 1992: 2; AL-Safir, 13 January, 1992: 1), the government in control denied that news broadcasting will be restricted to Tele Liban (Dajani, 1992: 111). The minister of information, Albert Mausour, explained that the plan does not limit private television stations from broadcasting news bulletins. In addition, two committees were formed; namely, a national independent body and a judicial body, whose primary responsibility is to monitor the means and implementation of the freedom of expression as practised by the Lebanese media. The 1992 media plan has been implemented. The proposed project has been interpreted by the privately owned stations as an attempt to enforce governmental censorship on their news broadcasts.

Nature and Impact of Media Coverage: Analysis

This section presents a threefold analysis. First, content analysis is undertaken to study the nature of media coverage of the Lebanese events throughout the crisis period of 1975-1991. The frequency of nominal versus descriptive characterisations usage is primarily evaluated (Picard and Adams, 1991:22). The source of characterisations, including both public and private media channels as well as the item/person being characterised - acts, actors, and supporters, are all considered. The content analysis undertaken is mainly geared towards the evaluation of the language used, including labelling and terminology. In addition, the use of pictures, emotional music, political songs, levels of geographical and event coverage, primary and secondary audiences, and programming types are analysed.

Secondly, since the same event could simultaneously act as a crisis for one group/nation and an opportunity for another, two contemporary perspectives, namely Crisis as Burden and Crisis as Opportunity are used to explore the dichotomy of "media chaos", being a valuable medium of propaganda and political advertising by the perpetrators (Dajani, 1992: 118), while constituting a main cause of misinformation and frustration to the general public. Accordingly, this section provides insights to the following questions: To what extent has "media chaos" contributed to the prolongation of the overall macro-crisis? Thirdly, using the Conventional Wisdom periodisation analysis presented in the previous section, the overall media crisis is divided into consecutive stages of inter-related media activities.

Media Functions: Role and Consequences

The content analysis undertaken considers the type and frequency of characterisations and labels used during media event coverage. Picard and Adams' (1991:22) classification of nominal and descriptive characterisations is primarily used. This section addresses the nature and role of media coverage of the Lebanese events; including functions performed by the media, language and terminology used and misinformation diffusion. Two perspectives, namely Crisis as Burden and Crisis as Opportunity are simultaneously used to analyse the dichotomy of the media crisis; constituting a valuable source of political propaganda by the infighting factions and their supporting foreign governments, while allowing for misinformation diffusion for the general public.

As the war unfolded, deteriorations in media coverage of the events became clearly noticeable. Negative connotations were continuously attached to the terms, characterisations and labels used by the infighting factions. Such deteriorations could be evidenced by the division of the Ministry of Information's news department. Labels used to describe the opposition's involvement in the events, were mainly directed towards demeaning and degrading the enemy. Accordingly, the exchange of accusations and insulting characterisations made up daily news. Humiliating statements were continuously used to discuss the role of the enemy in the overall events. Exchange of blame regarding the causes behind foreign regional interventions in local affairs was not uncommon.

The Lebanese experience clearly depicts that the use of positive and negative nominal and descriptive characterisations was determined by both the source and action of perpetrators. Nominal
and descriptive characterisations were used simultaneously to cover the same event. While using nominal terms to cover one faction's side of an event; descriptive and negative judgmental terms are used to portray the involvement of the opposing faction(s). Obviously, such coverage results in a chain reaction of negative labelling and characterisation exchanges among the infighting factions. Exchange of negative labels had a contagion effect; whereby known regional political figures became involved in publicly exchanging such labels, using both print and audio-visual media channels.

During the crisis period, the infighting factions aimed at serving their own people through establishing localised media channels. Accordingly, primary audiences were determined by political and religious sect factors. Changes in strategic political alliances over time were continuously being reflected by the media. Accordingly, overlaps in primary and secondary audiences was not uncommon. The rivalry in audience attractions impacted on the degree of mis-information diffusion as evidenced by the creation of non-existent stories/incidents by local and foreign media agencies.

As the war came to an end, considerable changes in language and terminology used took place. Some media channels were quick in adapting to changes in the system's overall socio-political situation. The current role that the LBC is playing in terms of emphasising feelings of unity and co-existence among the Lebanese communities, provides a perfect example to adaptations in media orientations. LBC is currently producing and broadcasting programs involving well-known figures from the Western sector of the capital.

Two extremely different attitudes were displayed by the Lebanese media during the war and post-war periods. Media channels that were once emphasising hatred, revenge and violence are currently encouraging the feelings of peace and co-existence. Accordingly, noticeable attitudinal and behavioural changes could lately be depicted; as evidenced by the currently broadcasted programs, positive terminology and characterisation adaptations, respectful use of labels and choice of music and songs, amongst other factors. It has come to the point whereby one faction is providing a media channel for the broadcasting of other faction's views. Within this context, LBC is considered to be a pioneer in the television industry in Lebanon. With its current programming, The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation is presently the voice of all Lebanese communities.

During the crisis period, the media served two main purposes. First, political advertising and propaganda diffusion; and, secondly, profit generation. Communication for the sake of pure information dissemination did not exist. Unfortunately, all print and audio-visual media carried strong political orientations. The media was primarily geared towards servicing political ends rather than concentrating on the general public, who, in most cases, constituted the silent majority. Citizens' grievances are only addressed if they could be politically manipulated; that is, if they serve as means to a political end. Accordingly, the media has helped to prolong and worsen the system's overall macro-crisis. It simultaneously served two main conflicting functions, including the following:

Outlets of Manifestation of People's Feelings. The media provided overt channels for expression. It was continuously mis-used to attack/insult opposing opinions. The Voice of Lebanon and The Voice of Free Lebanon expressed the Christian community's point of view; while The Voice of Arab Lebanon - which has ceased to exist - clearly expressed the opinions of the Muslim communities.

Propaganda Outlets For Infighting Factions. While serving as a medium of expression, media channels acted as a stimulator inciting violent actions. Projections of assassinations along confessional lines, in addition to manifestations of shelling and bombing civilian areas made up daily news. The display of pictures of casualties, fires and helpless children has all helped in escalating the feelings of anxiety and frustration among the general public. The portrayal of victims through the use of pictures of burnt-out houses, cars, churches and, even, children has led to increase the feelings of physical and psychological insecurity. This has been over-topped by the fact that at various stages of the overall crisis some media channels were clearly expressing non-Lebanese foreign opinions.

The media acted as a catalyst to provoke and escalate fanaticism, as well as sectarian and confessional feuds. It helped in the enrichment of fanatical instincts and emotional bias among the Lebanese communities. The media has also acted as a salient separating force between the government and the ordinary Lebanese citizen, on one hand, as well as the national army and the government on the other hand. It contributed in the portrayal of the national army, government and
parliament to be in conflicting positions; which was not necessarily the case. Accordingly, the media was mis-used as a detrimental force, aiming at the continual fragmentation of the socio-political system. The Lebanese events were portrayed as a civil war between Lebanese religious communities, who found co-existence an impossible condition. Media coverage of the crisis events was rather shallow and superficial. The media failed to portray the events as being an important slice of the overall Middle-East conflict. It failed to analyse the impact of the regional deterrence equation developed by Israel and Syria (Evron, 1987:32) on the prolongation of the internal military situation within the country. Due to enormous pressures/limitations imposed on the freedom of the press, the once outspoken Lebanese media failed to portray the true nature of its own crisis (Dajani, 1992: 53). In an article titled ‘AL-Sahafah AL-Lubnaniyah Fi AL-Madi wa Fi AL-Mustakbal’, meaning the Lebanese press: past and present, Salameh (1967: 173) states that due to the limitations imposed on the media, the print media published in Lebanon represent all countries except Lebanon.

"Media chaos" became a crisis within a crisis. It got to the point whereby the pluralistic media was managing the overall socio-political crisis. Several instances could be cited whereby military actions were being provoked by exchanges of politically broadcasted messages. This has been precisely the case during 1989 Harb AL-Tahrir, meaning liberation war, which was announced by Colonel Michel Aoun. In his press releases, he continuously demanded that Syria withdraw its 40,000 soldiers and heavy military weaponry from Lebanon. Heavy shelling and bombing of the residential areas in East Beirut followed such press releases. A similar pattern to Harb AL-Tahrir, whereby military battles were preceded by public relation wars was also experienced during Harb AL-Raj'ah, meaning cancellation or elimination war. It took place in East Beirut in 1989 between the Lebanese army, headed by Colonel Michel Aoun, on the one side, and the Lebanese Forces, headed by Mr. Samir Geagea, on the other side. Press conferences held by either Colonel Aoun or Mr. Geagea to express their interpretations of the events were usually followed by brutal military battles, including heavy shelling of residential areas. It reached the point whereby the general public living in the eastern suburbs of Beirut would prepare themselves to go to shelters upon the announcement of a press release broadcast.

The system's macro-crisis could be described as media constructed events. Several violent reactions were being preceded by public relation wars, broadcasted over local media channels. This had mainly served to increase the people's appetite for violent actions thus, resulting in the escalation and prolongation of the overall crisis. Within this context, the pluralistic media in Lebanon was shaping rather than reflecting the true nature of the events. Incomplete pictures of the overall situation were continuously being painted. Instead of reflecting the regional and international dimensions of the crisis, the media concentrated on local event coverage. This contributed in distorting the country's image, as well as incurring a great deal of mis-information diffusion.

**Mapping the Lebanese Dysfunctional Media Crisis**

The purpose of the current study is to develop a media-driven reconstructive strategy geared towards the rehabilitation of the media sector. Rather than purely regulating the privately-owned stations, fundamental policy plans are needed to shift the role of pluralistic media coverage from serving as emotional discriminatory catalysts to becoming contributors in the implementation of the current reconciliation accords. Instead of serving as microphones for political advertising and mis-information diffusion, the media could act as a rehabilitative catalyst causing positive emotional reactions among the Lebanese. In other words, it could be used as a medium to communicate the benefits of unity and coexistence rather than stress the feelings of hatred and revenge, especially at the time when the country is emerging from a seventeen-year old crisis (Dajani, 1992: 118).

The time dimension constitutes an important element in terms of exploring the simulated multi-path time sensitive relationships. This section partly discusses the transplantation of the multi-path crisis decision network contingency schema to the "media chaos" slice of the overall Lebanese macro-crisis. The first decision pathway (Algorithm) is used to analyse the pluralistic media crisis in Lebanon (Figure 7-1). It provides a valuable analytical framework to explore both the genuine and manufactured nature of media-chaotic events resulting in the intensification of the system's seventeen-year old war.
Phase (1): Routine/Algorithm. A quick overview of the overall crisis shows that media chaotic events started at a rather early stage. The first phase covers the two-year war period of 1975-1976. Various incidents took place during this period resulting in considerable deterioration in both human and material resources (See Appendix D). The once outspoken Lebanese media found itself in a situation where self-censorship was a must. As the war unfolded, the various Lebanese factions, supported by foreign governments, experienced the need to express their views which, in most cases, were conflicting in nature. Accordingly, the government’s monopoly was shattered as the infighting factions started to establish their own stations. Such media channels were mainly used to publicise political viewpoints and conflicting interpretations of the overall situation. Right from the beginning of the war, media chaotic events represented a crisis within a crisis. It acted as both a cause and an effect of the overall crisis. Considering this perspective, the media sector during the two-year war period could best be described as both, a victim and an agitating catalyst stimulating violent actions. Public relations wars were continuously exchanged through local media channels. The manufactured nature of the crisis had partly been stimulated by political propaganda of the infighting factions. With the introduction of the governmental censorship regulations in 1976, there had been a movement from phase (1) (Routine/Algorithm) to phase (2) (Opportunity-Cost) (Figure 7-1). This is mainly due to the fact that the strict censorship regulations imposed on the Lebanese press were induced by an Arab request, and at a time when the country was in need of Arab support as the crisis unfolded. In return, Arab Deterrent Forces presence and operations in Lebanon were continued (Dajani, 1992: 40).

Phase (2): Opportunity-Cost. The system passed through a relatively short media opportunity-cost phase. The governmental censorship regulations were enforced for about a twelve months period, starting January 1977. The decision of the government to enforce strict censorship on the media had considerable negative consequences. As a result of enforcing such regulations, some foreign news agencies closed their offices in Beirut while others established new offices in neighbouring countries to cover major Lebanese events. What had really worsened the situation was the escalation of direct foreign intervention in local media affairs, whereby foreign officers dealing with local government censorship regulation enforcement were increased in number. The implementation of the previously mentioned regulations continued for about a twelve months period, after which they were ignored without cancellation. The benefits of enforcing such censorship regulations on the local media was perceived by the national government to be lower than the cost incurred by propaganda and mis-information diffusion. Accordingly, the general public evidenced an
escalation in the overall media chaotic events. The failure of the government to manage such media events at an early stage constituted a lost opportunity (Figure 7-1).

**Phase (3): Muddling Through.** The media crisis continued to escalate with the progression of political/military events. Given the seventeen-year old Lebanese experience, the pluralistic media coverage and political/military conflict escalations can be correlated. Public relation wars preceded and followed political/military conflicts. The Muddling Through phase extended for a relatively short period of time, covering the years 1978-1979 during which the in-fighting factions continued to use old and newly established media channels as microphones for the promotion of conflicting political messages.

**Phase (4): Crisis.** Media chaotic events continued to drastically develop for a relatively long period of time, covering the years 1980-1991. The functional media dichotomy progressed, as depicted by its role; being a victim and a stimulating catalyst for further political/military skirmishes. Due to the contradictory nature of media coverage, the media crisis period is divided into two sub-phases. The first phase (Media Crisis I) covers the period 1980-1983 and the second phase (Media Crisis II) covers the period 1984-1991. During the Crisis 1 phase, the media sector could mainly be described as a victim of the system’s socio-political crisis. A considerable number of well-known journalists and other media personnel paid a price for the freedom of the press (See Appendix D). The media sector was continuously exposed to threats and pressures of different sorts and from varying sources. In addition, the financial performance of the main television station, TeleLiban, was continuously deteriorating.

Growth in media chaotic events could be observed during the second crisis sub-phase (Media Crisis II) covering the period 1984-1991. It got to the point where most factions had already established prints and audio-visual media channels - including the Lebanese Forces, Marada, South Lebanon Army, Progressive Socialist Party, Amal, Hizbollah and others. The official government-run news department was divided in 1984 based on religious and political factors, contributing to the division of media personnel along confessional bases. Through this second phase, the general public was being victimised by the role of pluralistic media coverage of the events. Through escalating people’s sectarian and religious fanaticism, the media acted as a negative emotional stimulus thus, promoting the feelings of hatred and hostility among the infighting factions.

**Recovery Phase.** As the war ended, tremendous positive attitudinal adaptations were displayed by the media. Unlike other socio-economic sectors, the print and audio-visual media showed impressive recovery symptoms; whereby learning avenues could be depicted. As previously mentioned, LBC is currently playing an impressive role in terms of re-developing the feelings of unity and stressing the benefits of co-existence among all Lebanese communities thus, contributing towards the implementation of peace and security. Attempts for an evolutionary media learning curves could be evidenced by the governmental media plan proposed in 1992. The question as to whether the process of media normalisation would produce the same status quo prior to the crisis situation needs in-depth analysis, knowing that the system is currently developing a new post-crisis order.

The transplantation of the contingency typology to the media events throughout the period 1975-1991 allows for further evaluation of the overall media crisis. It contributes in the identification of critical turning points needed in reversing the role of the media, from a crisis catalyst agitator to a peace and unity stimulator. Nevertheless, contingency-theory does not allow for the evaluation of the time sensitivities incorporated within the dynamic nature of the media crisis. The following section presents the transplantation of the Risk Path Analysis Model to media events. Accordingly, research is diverted towards an analytical evaluation of media reconstructive policy implications; thus, allowing for an in-depth reflection on the dynamic nature of the role and impact of the pluralistic media coverage of the events.

Transplanting the Risk Path Analysis Model (RPAM) to the context of the pluralistic media crisis allows for the analysis of two inter-related crisis dimensions. First, temporal or time-sensitive factor as related to the sequence of events is assessed. Secondly, specific "turning points" of the private media post-crisis regulation process is considered. Accordingly, this section presents a media-driven reconstructive strategy, based on critical media massive discontinuities identified, through the application of the RPAM approach to the overall media chaotic events. In addition, the system's current recovery stage is analysed by creating potential simulation paths along which the Ministry of
Information and Telecommunications may wish to consider in terms of setting the foundations for a new media order.

The Risk Path Analysis Model provides an interesting theoretical framework to evaluate various policy decision pathways critical in terms of reversing the nature and role of pluralistic media under crisis. Media chaotic events are mapped through applying the Risk Path Analysis Model to the media slice of the overall crisis events, for the period 1975-1991. Interesting administrative "turning points" for pluralistic private media re-organisation are depicted in Figure 7-2. Media chaotic events and mis-information diffusion path is shown as follows:

Figure 7-2: Lebanon Media Crisis Decision Pathway, 1975-1991

1 to A:
(Phase 1: 1975)
Segment "1" to "A" (Figure 7-2) partially represents the media chaotic events at the beginning of the crisis situation, mainly during 1975. As the war unfolded, infighting factions experienced the need to express their socio-political views. Accordingly, preparations for establishing new media channels were being undertaken.

A to B:
(Phase I: 1976)
With continuous deterioration in the decision outcome predictability, there had been a movement from point "A" on NS1 to point "B" on NS2 (Figure 7-2). The main cause was the intensive level of foreign interference in the freedom of the press, whereby local media agencies found themselves in a position where self-censorship was a must. Segment "A" to "B" represents media chaotic events undertaken during the second half of the two-year period, namely 1976. As the war progressed, considerable deterioration in both human and material resources within the media sector had taken place. With the establishment of new stations, financed by the infighting factions, the government's monopoly was violated. Such media channels primarily served as microphones for political propaganda through which public relation wars were continuously being practised.
Point "C" (Figure 7-2) represents a relatively short phase of media administrative failure. The unsuccessful attempts by the local government to end the progression of chaotic media events, through an acceptable adaptation and enforcement of the censorship regulations introduced towards the end of 1976, represent a lost opportunity. Nevertheless, the implementation of such strict regulations had negative connotations, especially with an increased regional intervention in local media affairs. The introduction of new stations by the infighting factions continued during this stage.

Segment "C" to "D" (Figure 7-2) depicts considerable increase in environmental turbulence due to the increased level of misinformation and noise created by the newly introduced stations. This led to a relatively short muddling-through phase.

Segment "D" to "E" (Figure 7-2) covers the period 1978 to 1979. Public relations wars continued to precede and follow military skirmishes. Throughout this phase, media channels continued to serve political purposes.

Segment "E" to "F" (Figure 7-2) represents recurring escalations in environmental turbulence due to increased levels of noise created by the tabloids and radio stations introduced and used as propaganda outlets by the infighting factions, leading to a fairly long crisis period.

Although misinformation diffusion continued throughout the crisis period; nevertheless, segment "F" to "G" (Figure 7-2) depicts the media as being a victim of the overall socio-political events. Due to the functional media dichotomy, being an opportunity for the infighting factions and their supporting foreign governments while constituting a burden to the general public, the crisis period extending from "F" to "4" is divided into two sub-phases. Segment "F" to "G" represents the first phase, termed Media Crisis I, covering the period 1980-1983. Kidnapping and assassination incidents of well-known journalists and other media personnel became a rather common practice (See Appendix D). Escalations of foreign interventions in local media affairs continued. Accordingly, the media sector continued to practise self-censorship as it was being exposed to various types of threats and pressures from local militias and foreign intelligence agencies.

Segment "G" to "H" (Figure 7-2) represents an acceleration in the system's level of environmental uncertainty accompanied with a depreciation in the decision situation predictability. This is mainly due to the continued escalation in environmental turbulence and noise, contributing towards the prolongation of the crisis phase.

Segment "H" to "4" (Figure 7-2) represents the second crisis sub-phase, termed Media Crisis II, covering the period 1984-1991. As opposed to Media Crisis I, this phase depicts the general public as being victimised by media tension frustrations created by the pluralistic and conflicting media coverage of the events. In addition, the government-run news department was split in 1984; thus, contributing in the reallocation of media personnel along confessional lines. By this stage, almost all factions had already established their own media channels, which were mainly used to counter the enemy's socio-political/military propaganda. Accordingly, public relation wars made daily news. This has contributed towards accelerating the degree of mis-information diffusion and tension levels created by the system's pluralistic media sector.

Segment "4" to "F" (Figure 7-3) represents an attempt for an evolutionary recovery stage. The system has been able to preliminary embark into a media reconstructive mode as evidenced by the governmental media project proposed in 1992; aiming at the organisation of the privately owned media outlets.
Considering the massive discontinuities previously identified (see Figure 7-2), it becomes evident that the local government was gradually losing control over the media sector. It failed to manage, or at least mitigate, the consequences of the critical "turning points" extending from the Algorithm phase to the crisis stage. With the transplantation of the Contingency Typology simulation heuristic approach and the Risk Path Analysis Model to the context of media chaotic activities for the period 1975-1991, the following observations are noticeable:

1. Although the 1992 media regulation project had contributed towards managing the pluralistic media crisis; it should be noted that the proposed plan is only a starting point towards the embarkation into a reconstructive mode leading to a new media order. After considering the previously media massive discontinuities, it becomes evident that several other media issues/problems need to be recognised and properly addressed as part of a comprehensive media normalisation process.

2. The role of pluralistic media, in terms of providing communication channels for continuous exchanges of public relation wars, highlights a correlation between two inter-related crisis variables, namely the internal security situation and the role of the pluralistic media coverage of creeping crisis events.

3. Another strong correlation worth noting, is the use of pluralistic media and the level of misinformation diffusion. With the increasing number of privately-managed print and audio-visual media (Dajani, 1992: 118), promoting conflicting political messages (Dajani, 1992: 51-52), people were often receiving distorted and misleading reports (Dajani, 1992: 59) of the events. This had obviously contributed towards escalating the level of media tensions leading to emotional frustrations among the general public.

In many instances, claims of military reactions by the enemy were being broadcasted before their actual implementation. In this sense, the media proved to be a source of information...
guiding the enemy's behaviour in terms of generating and promoting insights for future military actions and reactions.

4 Given the rather chaotic nature of pluralistic media coverage of the events, especially with the use of "I am right, you are wrong" dialogues as a counter propaganda, one can argue for a government's proactive stand in terms of media management under crises.

5 The system's overall perceived image had been shattered, not just by the brutality of the war, but also by the media coverage of it. News broadcasts related to the abolishment of Sabra and Chatila Palestinian refugee camps, accompanied by television pictures and print journalism coverage, represent gates of hell as far as the country's image was concerned. In addition, books and television interviews by foreign and national former Beirut hostages, describing their experiences as hostages in Beirut and other areas of the Beka'a Valley, present a perfect example (McCarthy and Morrell, 1993:47-49; Keenan, 1992:165-171; Waite, 1991:113-116).

Accordingly, the system is in need of a well-targeted and promoted positioning strategy geared towards the establishment of strong foundations for the realisation of an acceptable new Algorithm state. The new strategy should project the system as a recovered, peaceful and democratic country. Knowing that Lebanon has once served as "Hong Kong of the Middle-East" in terms of providing educational, tourist and financial services, the media has a valuable role to play in re-positioning the system within the region. Portraying the system as a valuable centre for international services may prove to be one of the crucial functions of the media during its recovery phase.

6 With the creation and portrayal of hostile images of the opponent, the media was continuously manipulating and conditioning the general public's perceptions of the enemy, in an attempt to motivate and direct their behaviour accordingly. The general public was dependent on the media for information (Dajani, 1992: 158). It reached a point where people even got into the habit of continuously carrying pocket radios (Davie, 1992: 646) to listen to new developments as soon as an incident took place.

7 The manufactured nature of the Lebanese crisis could partially be described as a pre-planned script that took different dimensions over time. Throughout the war period, the general public had been portrayed as passive victims of the crisis.

8 During the Media Crisis I phase, covering the period 1984-1991, the media was used as a positional bargaining medium by the infighting factions; in terms of blaming the enemy as a means to justifying one's involvement in military actions. The main aim was the activation of people's emotions against the opposing faction(s).

Unlike the brain drain crisis, the above analysis clearly indicates that the media sector had ceased to operate at phase IV, namely Media Crisis II stage. The need for normalisation has been recognised by the government. The implementation of the media regulation project proposed in 1992 is contributing to the development of a new Algorithm state, quite different from the previous order that prevailed during the 1960s and early 1970s.

While examining the outcome of the previous analysis, it becomes clear that the system has preliminary been able to embark on a reverse reconstructive path, with a backward extension from Stage 4: (Crisis) moving towards State I: (Algorithm) (See Figure 7-1). Media wise, the system has already started a slow progression towards a rehabilitative mode. Given the Lebanese media post-crisis experience, it becomes evident that a detailed evaluation of the recovery longitudinal dimension is critical for the system's eventual realisation of a healthy new Algorithmic state.

**Media-Driven Reconstructive Research Agenda**

Given the nature and role of media coverage of the crisis events, reconstructive media policy recommendations have been developed based on the discontinuity segments identified through the transplantation of the RPAM approach to the context of media chaotic activities. For simplicity purposes, media rehabilitative suggestions have been grouped into the following four categories:
Political and Diplomatic Factors. The Lebanese experience depicts a direct correlation between the level of environmental turbulence, the role of private pluralistic media outlets and the degree of mis-information diffusion. The following rehabilitative political and administrative policy recommendations are designed to reverse the role of the pluralistic media from a violence catalyst agitator to a peace keeping stimulator.

1 The main cause behind the continuous establishment of pluralistic media outlets by the infighting factions is the promotion of political messages to counter the opponent's propaganda. Accordingly, the war has aided in the reinforcement of the political orientation of the press which had prevailed during the pre-crisis period. With the current peace keeping efforts, the government should encourage the media to adapt its political focus; in terms of generating social, economic, humanitarian, educational, entertainment and other related reports and programmes. Such media efforts should be geared towards the reinforcement of unity, coexistence and national values; rather than stress emotional, religious and political differences.

2 Driving the West out of Lebanon did not only serve to de-professionalise local society, but also to shut down foreign media outlets. It is the responsibility of the national government to encourage foreign agencies to re-open their offices in Lebanon; partially through providing peace and security in the country, limiting foreign military intervention and enhancing the freedom of the press.

3 Media construction crises impact on people's perceptions and image formations over time. Besides regulating the privately-run media outlets, the government is in need of developing an efficient positioning strategy to promote the system's service sector, both domestically and internationally. Such efforts would contribute towards the realisation of an efficient socio-economic Algorithmic state. Accordingly, capable media outlet are needed to communicate such positioning strategies to their targeted audiences.

4 The importance of normalising relationships among the Lebanese communities and with neighbouring countries cannot be over-emphasised. The media can play a considerable role in promoting such harmonious domestic and international relationships as part of communicating the values of unity, peace and coexistence as a means of achieving economic prosperity.

Socio-economic Determinants. During the crisis period, socio-economic constraints continued to be a major cause of media deterioration. Segments AB (Phase I), BC (Phase II), FG (Media Crisis I) and H4 (Media Crisis II) (Figure 7-2) depict various economic discontinuities, including human and material losses, escalations in operational costs, small domestic markets, fragmented Arab markets and increasing competition from regional countries, amongst others.

Other critical "turning points" depict the social hardships facing the media sector throughout the war period, including segments A B (Phase I), BC (Phase II), FG (Media Crisis I), and H4 (Media Crisis II). Such social constraints include intensified levels of threats and pressures leading to a consistent practise of self-censorship, lack of governmental protection, increasing operational and communication risks, occupation of offices of major press agencies and the prevention of their publications for varying time periods and extensive levels of foreign intervention in local media affairs. The following reconstructive policy recommendations are built around the previously mentioned socio-economic "turning points".

1 Financial constraints facing the media sector partially explain the manufactured nature of the chaotic media events (Dajani, 1992: 49). The causes of such economic hardships include shrinking and fragmented markets (Dajani, 1992: 45), increased operational costs and competition from nearby regional countries. Escalations of such economic hardships meant an increased reliance on foreign sources of income (Dajani, 1992: 45) in terms of financing the
rising costs which, in turn, affects the publications' political agendas, leading to increased levels of foreign intervention (Dajani, 1992: 49, 51) in local media coverage. In addition, financial constraints prevented the upgrading of equipment and the implementation of training and development programs for media personnel. An end should be drawn, whereby structural defects within the press and audio-visual media has to be properly addressed by the Ministry of Information.

2 The freedom of the press has been victimised by the overall socio-political crisis. With the loss of democracy, the media sector in Lebanon has been continuously exposed to threats and pressures by domestic militias and foreign intelligence agencies. This could partially explain the shallow approach to event coverage and the self-censorship practised by a well-domesticated media sector. Although it is one of the main challenges facing the present government, providing an acceptable level of protection to the press will help the once outspoken media to expand its markets and embark into a reconstructive mode in terms of establishing a new Algorithmic state.

3 Educational and Professional Training. The media sector is in need of capable journalists and mass communication professionals. The problem of brain drain, brain death and intellectual emigration relates to media staffing issues. Segment FG (Media Crisis I) evidences the kidnapping and assassinations of many professional journalists and other media staff. Such incidents continued to take place, as depicted by segment H4 (Media Crisis II). The following reconstructive policy implications focus on mass communication and educational and training issues, as depicted by the previously mentioned media discontinuity segments.

1 Media coverage of the events assumed a shallow rather than an analytical approach in terms of purely reporting the ongoing events. The media concentrated on reproducing local events rather than exploring the true nature of the crisis. Critical investigative and suggestive reports were seldom generated. This was due to three main reasons. First; threats and pressures facing the media; thus, forcing a rather simplistic and shallow approach to media reporting. Secondly, the high levels of foreign intervention in local media affairs, which constituted a main source of frustration to the general public. Thirdly, a lack of analytical journalistic education and training. Accordingly, the government should allocate an annual educational budget to encourage and train reporters to use analytical investigative reporting.

2 The media sector, being a cause and an effect of the socio-political crisis, could be explored from a media staffing perspective. With the continued intellectual emigration movements, there had been a lack of journalists and other mass communication specialists. The kidnapping and assassination of media experts was not uncommon. Accordingly, media agencies were exposed to a serious staffing problem. In an attempt to address this issue, the government should allocate an annual budget for the development and implementation of relevant educational and training programmes.

3 Media education is rather weak in Lebanon. Domestic media agencies have mainly been selecting their staff from the few Universities in the country that offer related programmes. Such institutions include The Lebanese University, Lebanese American University, American University of Beirut, Saint Joseph University and Notre Dame University. Although the Lebanese University School of Information and Documentation has the largest program, the number of journalism academicians is insufficient. To start with, training and development programmes could be tailored to the academicians first. Upgrading libraries and relevant audio-visual materials and equipment would obviously be part of the overall University training programmes.

4 A joint public-private sector programme could be established whereby the Ministry of Information would provide academic scholarships for distinguished journalism and mass communication students finalising their undergraduate degrees at local universities and interested in assuming an academic position at the Lebanese University after graduation.

5 Dual degree programmes, along the lines of the engineering programmes administered at The Lebanese American University, could be structured and negotiated with American and
European Universities. This would encourage distinguished and socio-economically advantaged students to pursue post-graduate programmes at foreign schools of journalism.

Training and development programmes could also be developed for journalists and other media staff members. Local distinguished reporters and analysts could be encouraged to attend related regional and international conferences and workshops as an attempt to continuously enhance their skills. In addition, well-planned incentives could be awarded to top journalists as a means of recognition and encouragement.

**Media Administrative and Cultural Factors.** The failure of the government to regulate and manage the privately-run pluralistic media agencies at an early stage of the overall crisis constituted a lost opportunity, as depicted by segment BC (Phase II) (See Figure 7-2). Such an administrative media failure had negative implications throughout the crisis period. The following operational media factors are built around the previously mentioned media administrative discontinuity stage.

1. Given the Lebanese experience, it becomes evident that a direct correlation exists between the following two crisis variables; namely, political stability and the public sector's broadcasting capacity (Dajani, 1992: 45). The financial performance of TeleLiban had been continuously deteriorating throughout the crisis period. Nevertheless, there are hopes for a slow recovery given the revenues that will be generated from the private station's permit licenses. In addition, drastic improvements are needed to resume broadcasting from the government-run radio station. Given the advancement of privately-run media outlets, the public sector should focus on strengthening the capacity of its own media channels.

2. The radio archives within the Ministry of Information constitute important historical and cultural heritages which should be saved and properly stored. Early musical recordings could be broadcast by government-run media outlets, as a means of emotionally reinforcing the values of peace and coexistence that prevailed during the pre-crisis period.

3. Developing a full-scale emergency communications program may prove to be highly rewarding in the long-run. Such a programme would be designed to limit the chances of crisis development or at least mitigate its consequences if a crisis situation arises.

**Conclusion**

With recurring escalations in media environmental turbulence, as depicted by segment "E" to "F" (Figure 7-2), the system was exposed to a long-term crisis phase covering the period 1980-1991. The conflicting functional dichotomy of the pluralistic media during crisis, being used as an opportunity for political advertising by the infighting factions while constituting a major cause of psychological tension and emotional frustrations to the general public, had impacted on the intensification and prolongation of the war, as depicted by discontinuity segments FG (Media Crisis I) and H4 (Media Crisis II). Having been fixated in a crisis mode for several consecutive years, necessitates further exploration of the longitudinal dimension of Phase 4 of the Risk Path Analysis Model, namely Crisis.

Unlike the intellectual emigration movement, the media sector has been able to embark on a preliminary rehabilitative path. Since crisis rehabilitative planning is a dynamic process, the longitudinal dimension of the recovery period needs to be carefully evaluated in light of the previously mentioned recommendations. Individual segments extending from Phase 4 (Media Crisis II) to Phase 1 (New Algorithm) (Figure 7-3), need to be further explored, based on the various plausible reconstructive pathways.

Various synergies and correlations identified by the previous analysis need careful exploration in terms of reversing the role and impact of the chaotic pluralistic media coverage of the events. Crisis variables to be considered within this context include intensity of media coverage and rate of terrorism/violence diffusion; mis-information and crisis; and internal security situations and the role of pluralistic media coverage, amongst others.
Chapter VIII

Bureau-Politics of the Lebanese System

Sections:

Introduction

Dysfunctional Bureau-Politism: Analysis and Evaluation

Bureau-Politism and The Politics of Blaming

The Lebanese Bureau-Politics, 1975 - 1991 Crisis Episodes: Causes and Implications

Conclusion: Reform and Normative Implications
Chapter VIII

Bureau-Politics of the Lebanese System

Introduction

A main assumption in relation to governmental crisis response is the centralization of the decision making process (Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:14; Kouzmin, Jarman and Rosenthal, 1995:25). Among other studies, the current research suggests that the centralization thesis needs to be revisited. It is difficult, and at times impossible, to deal with crises in a mechanical, routine manner. At times, it is non-feasible to deal with high levels of uncertainty associated with crisis decision making in terms of centralized responses (Kouzmin, Jarman and Rosenthal, 1995:26). The types of crisis decision making emerging during high levels of threat and uncertainty depend on various forces, including the level of response itself as to whether it is operational or strategic, the system's structure and practices and the personal characteristics of the key actors and decision makers, among others (Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:32).

This chapter analyses the bureau-politics of the Lebanese system in terms of dysfunctional bureau-politism, the politics of blaming and its negative implications on bureaucratic structure, as well as the causes and implications of the crisis episodes of the country's bureau-political system for the period (1975-1991). In addition, analysis reveals the impact of war on bureaucratic behaviour and performance. The chapter ends with an analysis of pertinent observations, as well as normative and predictive policy implications, related to the country's bureaucratic system.

As Dror (1987:80) explains, a main drawback in current policy development capability is the significant deficiency in governmental think tank capacity. The mis-management of various aspects of the creeping crisis in focus for the period covering (1971-1991) implies a growing incapacity to govern. This, in turn, raises serious doubts in relation to the existence and the efficiency of the system's think tanks needed to undertake the functions of policy research and development (Dror, 1980:139). The existing theories of leadership, including concepts of rulership and governance, do not comprehensively explain severe contingencies and drastic crisis episodes (Kaufmann, 1991:12).

Current research shows that the literature pertaining to leadership and governance patterns under chaotic situations is rather underwritten (Dror, 1994: 126). With the exception of few articles and research studies (Codevilla, 1992; Dawes, 1988; Dror, 1993a; 1993b; 1994; Wildavsky, 1984), little is written about the properties of effective rulership under chaos. Nevertheless, given the fact that every crisis is unique, it becomes difficult to prescribe common governance patterns that unanimously apply to crisis situations. The characteristics of effective rulership tend to remain situation specific. Evaluating the functional as well as the dysfunctional elements within the Lebanese bureau-political system allows for the generation of transferable insights on how to improve the capacity to rule under chaos.

Dysfunctional Bureau - Politism: Analysis and Evaluation

A main challenge to the Lebanese government during the crisis years had been the coping with the drastic events taking place throughout the country. A key drawback had been the reactive rather than the proactive attitude that the national government had adopted in dealing with the events in focus. The adoption of such an attitude had a dysfunctional impact on crisis decision making processes. The crisis events, themselves, have left deep scars on the Lebanese communities as well as administrative and political institutions.

The repetitive mis-handling of the crisis events by the national government had negatively impacted on the general public's feelings of mistrust in the ability of the system in focus to manage the contingencies facing it. Allegations of corruption had been voiced against the government starting at an early stage of the Lebanese crisis. As a result of such allegations and protests, the general public was questioning the efficiency of the political and administrative institutions.
Creeping crises demand strategic decision-making under severe levels of threat, urgency and uncertainty (Rosenthal, Hart and Charles, 1989:10). Rosenthal, Hart and Kouzmin (1991:212) clearly explain that crises provide a suitable context for the practice of centralization. Nevertheless, a comprehensive evaluation of the crisis in focus shows that the system had been moving away from centralization of decision-making to decentralization of power and authority.

During the pre-crisis period, the country's successive governments had attempted to undertake improvements in the national bureaucracy as a means of better implementation of developmental projects and effectively improving the level of public services. This continued to be a main challenge throughout the crisis and post-crisis periods. Within the political system in focus, national bureaucracy remains to be the main policy-making body responsible for the formulation and execution of modernization policies (Salem, 1975:75). Given the country's socio-political texture, bureaucracy has been limited by factional, confessional and personal motives (Salem, 1975: 76). This has been one of the main causes of the Lebanese dysfunctional bureau-politism.

With its increasing responsibilities during the pre-crisis period, the country's bureaucracy had grown tremendously. A major drawback with the Lebanese administrative system is the lack of well-specified policies regarding the accountability of civil servants. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister represent the head of the bureaucracy. In theory, it is the Council of Ministers that controls the bureaucracy by holding ultimate control to fire and transfer the bureaucrats as needed. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that both the cabinet ministers and the bureaucrats have strong political and economic linkages which, in practice, tend to limit the accountability of the Lebanese bureaucracy. In addition, the ministers themselves depend on the upper bureaucrats for policymaking and execution. Political manoeuvring, favouritism, intermediation and intercessions of influential politicians and friends (takati) play a key role in limiting the accountability of civil employees (Salem, 1975:79-80).

Most of the country's zuwa'ina are upper bureaucrats. Their employees and subordinates are there to execute their commands while financially being dependent on them. Bribery has been one of the main problems with the Lebanese bureaucracy. Presenting monetary bribes and presents to bureaucrats has not been unusual.

On the whole, the Lebanese bureaucracy can be described as dysfunctional. A considerable number of developmental projects - including educational, agricultural, commercial and tourist ventures have either been cancelled or unsatisfactorily completed due to poor bureaucratic supervision (Salem, 1973: 82). Serious bottlenecks can be identified as related to the Lebanese bureaucracy during the pre-crisis period. Salem (1973:85) distinguishes between two categories of such problems, namely administrative and socio-cultural.

A main administrative problem is that of centralization. The country's bureaucratic system has been shaped by its socio-cultural and political traditions, as well as its history as being part of the Ottoman empire and the French domination (Iskandar, 1964:5). The country's bureaucratic structure is highly centralized. Routine transactions demanding minimal time and effort get transferred up the hierarchy to be dealt with by supervisors. A major cause of excessive centralization is the belief that lower - level bureaucrats are rather inexperienced. Training and development of the bureaucrats is limited (Salem, 1973: 86). Personal jealousies and professional and political rivalries hinder the flow of information and the administration of effective communication and coordination among the various ministries and public agencies (Salem, 1973: 87).

The socio-cultural bottlenecks are more difficult to remedy since they tend to be closely inherent in the country's social texture. Main dysfunctional, socio-cultural barriers include confessionalism, favouritism, nepotism and bribery, among others (Salem, 1973: 87-88). The confessional and sectarian policy has promoted corruption and intensive levels of external interventions in the country's internal affairs.

Strong ties and loyalties constitute a main property of Lebanese families. Although this seems to be quite advantageous at times nevertheless, it has contributed to the dysfunctional nature of the bureaucratic system. Appointments to bureaucratic positions have been influenced by favouritism and nepotism. In addition, the act of bribery is not unusual in the Lebanese socio-political culture. The
The value of the gifts presented depend on the bureaucratic position and the amount of intercession needed to undertake a certain transaction.

### Table 8-1: Impact of Crisis on Internal Bureaucracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What has been the effect of conflict in Lebanon on political interference in administrative matters?</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>10 (15%)</td>
<td>08 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Somewhat</td>
<td>17 (25%)</td>
<td>25 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Greatly</td>
<td>40 (60%)</td>
<td>22 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>67 (100%)</td>
<td>55 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has the conflict in Lebanon resulted in increased outside pressure on employees?</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less Pressure</td>
<td>01 (02%)</td>
<td>07 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>20 (30%)</td>
<td>06 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat More Pressure</td>
<td>13 (20%)</td>
<td>19 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much More</td>
<td>32 (49%)</td>
<td>23 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66 (100%)</td>
<td>57 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do government employees submit more to outside pressures as a result of the conflict in Lebanon?</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less Pressure</td>
<td>03 (05%)</td>
<td>07 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>19 (29%)</td>
<td>07 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat More</td>
<td>12 (18%)</td>
<td>19 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much More</td>
<td>32 (48%)</td>
<td>24 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66 (100%)</td>
<td>57 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another major problem with bureaucratic behaviour in Lebanon is the high level of absenteeism and tardiness. The rules and regulations governing employees' conduct is rather loose. Even during demanding working hours, the overall atmosphere within the bureaucratic office is that of ease and comfort. In addition, civil servants come to work late and leave early. While on the job, a considerable number of the public employees have coffee breaks and read newspapers. All of the above mentioned problems, combined, have led to escalate the general public's feelings of mistrust and inefficiency towards the national government.

The war, itself, had a negative impact on the national bureaucratic system. It helped in escalating most of the traditional problems of the Lebanese bureaucracy. Personal threats to bureaucrats have not been uncommon. Indications of the erosion of higher authority include a decline in presidential authority over various governmental agencies, less effective supervision of subordinates by their superiors and less effective coordination among administrative units (Kisirwani and Parle, 1987:21-22). In addition, internal infighting led to limitations on civil servants' attitudes and the overall bureaucratic behaviour (Table 8-1).

Due to the continuous intermittent clashes taking place in the country, government employees were unable to commute back and forth to their offices. Transfers and relocations of offices were not unusual throughout the crisis period. While retaining their bureaucratic positions - including monetary compensation and other benefits - a considerable number of public employees undertook a second job. This had a serious, negative impact on the professionalism and the career devotion of the upper level bureaucrats as well as lower civil servants.

The country's political system has always been influenced by sectarianism. Such sectarian feelings have increased significantly during the war which, in turn, have negatively impacted on the country's bureaucratic performance. It has worsened the traditional problem of governmental corruption, including nepotism and bribery (Kisirwani and Parle, 1987: 24). As a result of the country's creeping crisis, the level of bribery had tremendously increased. It became more likely for citizens to initiate bribes as a means of getting their transactions approved. Economic corruption became a fact of life throughout the crisis period (Kisirwani and Parle, 1987:24-25).

In addition to the destructive internal factors, external influences helped in promoting bureaucratic corruption. Kisirwani and Parle (1987:25) define external influence on bureaucracy as the 'efforts by political groups to affect policies that are outside of the legally prescribed political process'. A main aspect of the Lebanon crisis to the general public, as well as to outsiders, has been the considerable number of new political parties/militias emerging throughout the events.

Various regional powers, through their connections with local parties, have also succeeded in impacting the bureaucratic environment (Table 8-1). Knowing that political parties were the most influential groups during the war, regional powers have invested in them as a means of influencing the Lebanese bureaucratic system (Kisirwani and Parle, 1987: 25). A survey conducted by Kisirwani and Parle (1978:26) clearly indicate that external pressures on internal bureaucracy has been escalating throughout the crisis. Table 8-1 partly summarises the findings of the survey related to external influences on the bureaucratic system.

Christian groups tend to be sensitive to external influences in the country's internal affairs, for such influence represents a threat to their political power. Muslim groups, on the other hand, tend to be sensitive to the perceived privileges of Christian bureaucrats. The leadership's ability to manage the bureaucracy has deteriorated by the continuous loss of power on the part of the national government and the spread of authority and influence by the local parties and regional powers. The loss of some of the basic elements of the Weberian bureaucracy led to increased inefficiency in the country's bureaucratic performance (Kisirwani and Parle, 1987: 27).

Bureaucratic POLITIS and the Politics of Blaming

Following Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin's (1991:214-215) discussion on the degree of bureaucratic politics, the dysfunctionalism of Lebanese bureaucratic politics during the crisis period could be attributed to the following: the presence of many policy makers having conflicting and opposing
interests, non of the actors having over-riding influence and most policy decisions being compromised with a wide inconsistency between policy development and implementation.

The politics of "blaming" and bureaucratic performance become highly related during crisis periods (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin, 1991: 222). Crises could very well be induced and prolonged by the exchange of blaming accusations. Such exchanges escalate as actors, having their own conflicting interpretations of the events, increase in number.

The media plays a key role in crisis management. Given the Lebanese experience, the exchange of humiliating public statements by senior politicians and upper-level bureaucrats through national media channels led to diminish the credibility of the government as an effective crisis moderator. Demeaning public statements are usually followed by heated articles in newspapers and the tabloid press. The exchanged accusations usually go beyond professional interpretations and expression of views. The "us versus them" debates are meant to humiliate and demean the "enemy", and to shift the blame for the occurrence of events and casualties. This, in turn, provides a good enough cause to start a new series of events, thus prolonging and escalating the overall crisis. In this sense, bureaucratic agencies, including the leadership of the local political parties/militias, were serving their own agendas rather than national interests. It is such accusations and the following events that provide for intensive foreign interventions, which, in turn, are justified as being a means of calming down the parties concerned and putting an end to the crisis events.

When evaluating the overall Lebanese macro-crisis, it becomes quite evident that internal infighting and exchange of accusations had a dysfunctional impact on bureaucratic performance and behaviour. It had clearly led to various instances of bureau-political inefficiency (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin, 1991:216-217), whereby excessive time and effort was invested to achieve minimal compromises. During critical instances of the crisis, exchanged accusations and blaming have been a main cause of bureau-political paralysis (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin, 1991:216-217), whereby senior politicians and upper-level bureaucrats have been unable to achieve any consensus on serious national policy security matters.


After evaluating a number of case studies of crisis management; Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin (1991:223-225) classify the causes for the occurrence of bureau-politics during crisis situations into four interesting categories, as follows:

First, chaos and serious national security threatening situations do not discourage politicians and upper-level bureaucrats from loosing interest in the formal hierarchies of power, authority and prestige. On the other hand, it is such situations of ultimate threat and uncertainty that provide an even better excuse to prove their effectiveness by exercising power and authority as dictated by centralized formal hierarchies in terms of developing and implementing relevant crisis decisions. The intensity of their legitimacy depends on the level of professional efficiency displayed during critical circumstances.

Secondly, information related to the way post-crisis resources will be re-allocated tend to impact the bureaucratic behaviour during the crisis period itself. This may help to positively impact the performance of the bureaucratic agencies during emergencies and crisis situations.

Thirdly, dysfunctional bureau-politism may also be the result of mis-information and the lack of communication between the bureaucratic agencies concerned. Such difficulties in flows of communication may lead to long-term problems in cooperation and coordination. Instead of experiencing inter-organisational coordination during crisis, politicians and bureaucratic agencies may end up getting involved in competition and confrontational situations. Accordingly, the proper management of civilian and military organisations, as well as public and private inter-agency relationships, becomes a crucial issue governing bureaucratic performance and behaviour during chaos. Developing crisis related inter-agency networks becomes quite an important aspect of managing crisis events. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the lack of coordination among governmental organisations may not merely be due to conflicting self-interests. Regional pressures
and external interventions tend to severely influence the relationships among the various agencies/parties, thus finally impacting the level of coordination and cooperation undertaken.

Fourthly, although the parties concerned tend to have conflicting perceptions of the crisis events, they all believe that they are positively contributing to the national cause. The fact that each and every party concerned believes that its decisions and actions are the only ones serving the public interest, tends to negatively impact on the bureau-political system and crisis decision making.

In addition to the previously mentioned issues, there are a number of specific causes leading to Lebanese dysfunctional bureau-politism. First, the extreme centralization of the bureaucratic system in focus and the high level of concentration of power and authority tend to limit the creativity of the bureaucrats at all levels. Minor issues go through a long process before getting resolved, which is time and effort consuming.

Secondly, training and development for administrative and emergency decision making for bureaucrats at all levels is rather limited (Salem, 1973: 86). Bureaucratic educational preparations are rather traditional when compared to the practical and realistic bureaucratic needs of the country (Salem, 1973:87). In addition, the overall public and political structure leaves little room for the intellectuals. Although a number of intellectual clubs, which provide an excellent forum for the exchange of innovative ideas are in existence, they are not provided with the opportunity for developing the effective and realistic political reform needed (Salem, 1973:68-9).

Thirdly, the lack of communication and coordination among the various ministries and the inter-agencies concerned tend to negatively impact on bureaucratic performance and behaviour (Kisirwani and Parle, 1987: 21; Salem, 1973: 86-87). Information flows are extremely rigid. Personal jealousies and professional rivalries among the bureaucrats, themselves, tend to intensify the communication problem.

Fourthly, the country’s bureaucratic infra- and super-structures are badly in need of updating. This includes the buildings and offices used, storage facilities, filing systems, lighting facilities, office furnishes and machines used, among others; all of which contribute to low moral (Salem, 1973:87).

In addition to the above mentioned difficulties, a number of cultural problems hinder functional bureaucratic performance. Such problems include sectarianism, nepotism, favouritism, bribery and the lack of motivation on the part of the bureaucrats. All of the administrative, technical, cultural and socio-political problems combined have negative implications on the national bureaucratic structure and behaviour (Salem, 1973: 85-89). Post-crisis bureaucratic reform is essential as a means of rebuilding the nation.

The problem of administrative corruption is not strictly confined to Lebanon. Various Western and third world countries have dealt with the issue of bureaucratic corruption (Kisirwani, 1995). In Lebanon, the problem of corrupt administration has been critical since the 1930s. Generally speaking, the concern in ethics and morality in public life has certainly gained momentum lately. The main instruments of accountability of the Lebanese bureaucratic system are located in the executive branch. Yet, unlike the Western countries, the Lebanese mechanisms of accountability are rather weak. At the same time, the courts’ role in ensuring the strict implementation of the financial controls and the proper conduct of public officials is limited.

As noted by Kisirwani (1995), throughout the period (1962-1979) not a single high ranking official (Grade 1) was punished for violating public duties and responsibilities. Accordingly, the level of corruption has been mounting. At times, the media has acted as the only control mechanism and a means of accountability (Dajani, 1992: 55; Kisirwani, 1995). Although the Lebanese media has paid a price for fighting for the country’s sovereignty, independence and democracy; it has not shown the same zeal in handling the internal affairs pertaining to the abuse of power. The media has failed to undertake an aggressive and constructive effort in bringing forward public servants accountability (Kisirwani, 1995).

The bureaucratic control system in the country is rather slow and highly fragmented (Salem, 1973: 80). The parliament’s role in control and accountability has been marginal. Accordingly, sanctions are only limited to lower rank civil servants. Although most bribes, among other corrupt
acts, are undertaken in complete secrecy (Salem, 1973: 83); corrupt behaviour becomes quite evident when dealing with the country's bureaucratic system. As expected, such inefficient bureaucratic performance has intensified during the crisis years (Kisirwani and Parle, 1987: 21-22).

Conclusion: Reform and Normative Implications

Contrary to the Lebanese case, bureau-politics does not have to be dysfunctional to crisis management and crisis decision making. A cost-benefit analysis of bureaucratic competition is worth considering during chaotic situations. Given the multi party - based politics administered throughout the crisis period, it is the view here that bureau-politics could have a positive function in crisis management.

Rosenthal, t' Hart and Kouzmin (1991:226-7) discuss a number of bureau-political functions in crisis management. Knowing that bureaucratic performance gets evaluated during the post-crisis period, bureau-politics may help to test the efficient performance of crisis-relevant agencies. The media also plays an important role in determining the impact of bureau-politics on crisis management. The media could abuse critical information through leakages emanating from bureau-political competitions (Rosenthal, t' Hart and Kouzmin, 1991:227). This may even lead the media to manage the crisis rather than be managed by it.

A critical reformative approach within the crisis in focus is to develop and implement appropriate policies and procedures to turn dysfunctional bureaucratic issues into functional and effective elements. Given the Lebanese experience, a number of transferable observations come to mind. A main observation is that public organisations should resist both internal and external pressures to comply with short-term resolutions as a means of crisis management.

The absence of administrative control and political accountability in Lebanon remain as the main challenges to recovery and reconstruction. Since the war has come to an end, the continuation of corrupt behaviour is currently unjustified. The country cannot afford to experience such corrupt behaviour during its rebuilding phase. The system should be able to periodically evaluate the performance of public agencies and account for inefficient behaviour. Sectarianism, a main bottleneck experienced by the Lebanese bureaucracy, remains to be a major obstacle to eliminating, or at least minimising, corruption by civil servants and upper-level bureaucrats and politicians. This, in itself, may be a sufficient cause leading to internal wars and infighting.

Various attempts have been undertaken by Lebanese leaders to incur administrative and bureaucratic structural reforms since independence. Such attempts include President Chamoun's regulative reforms of 1952; the establishment of the National Civil Service Commission for personnel management in 1954, with the support of Sami Al-Sulhi's cabinet; the creation of the Central Committee for Administrative Reform in 1959, during president's Foudh Shahab's regime; the development of the Personnel Law, the Civil Service Council and the Central Inspection Administration in 1959; and the establishment of a General Disciplinary Council for Officials in 1965 (Salem, 1973:94-96).

In addition, other autonomous bodies were also established to act as social change agencies. Such bodies include the National Council of Tourism, the Council for the Execution of Major Projects for the City of Beirut, and the Office of Social Development, among others (Salem, 1973:98-99). Although some of the reformative measures undertaken were quite effective, the prestige and support given to high-level bureaucrats by their respective zia'na, who act as their political patrons, prevented the treatment of serious incidences of corruption and bribery. One of the main detriments to the effective implementation of developmental and reformative projects has been the strong personal relationships among the bureaucrats and the senior political leaders of the country.

Throughout the Lebanese crisis there has been a number of failed attempts to end the war and partially manage administrative reforms. First, the Constitutional Document of February 1976, by the late President Suleiman Frangieh, included some elements relating to the sectarian representation in the parliament, the minimization of confessionalism limited to the appointment of lower-level bureaucrats and the decentralization of the administrative system. The Constitutional Document failed to achieve the aims set for it due to the lack of support it received by the infighting factions.
President Elias Sarkis, the successor to the late President Frangieh, announced his fourteen points National Entente Program on the 5 March, 1980. Some elements of the program partially addressed political and administrative reforms. The National Entente Program's fate was quite similar to its predecessor in terms of its rapid failure due to the lack of support it received.

Another failed attempt at resolving the Lebanese conflict known as the Tripartite Agreement was drawn in December 1985 by the leaders of the three main parties/militias in Lebanon, namely Elias Hobeika of the Lebanese Forces, Walid Joumblatt of the Progressive Socialist Party and Nabih Berri of the Amal movement. Again the Tripartite Agreement partially dealt with the cancellation of confessionalism by incurring changes to the power-sharing formula between the two communal blocs and the decentralization of the administrative system. Again, the Tripartite Agreement failed fairly rapidly due to the lack of support it received, mainly from the Lebanese forces.

Although the war has ended, there has not been serious measures set to manage administrative and bureaucratic reforms. The Document of National Reconciliation, also known as the Taif Accord, was drawn by members of the Lebanese parliament in October 1989 at the Saudi Arabian town of Taif in the presence of the Tripartite Arab Committee of the Foreign Ministers of Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In addition to addressing issues related to conflict resolution and nation-building, it also covered basic elements of political reform. Like previous agreements, the Accord addressed the problem of sectarianism and confessionalism. Among various issues, it called for the elimination of sectarian requirements and for the recruitment of bureaucrats and public servants except for the higher positions.

The Taif Accord constitutes an important document in Lebanon's modern history (Abul-Husn, 1995:2), yet it has not so far succeeded in abolishing sectarianism, corruption and bribery (Kisirwani, 1995). The war-time mentality of bureaucratic corruption continues in post-war Lebanon. Serious efforts need to be undertaken by the national government to develop and strictly implement appropriate policies and procedures leading to the eradication of bureaucratic and administrative corruption.

The means to gradually eradicate bureaucratic corruption can take various dimensions. For simplicity purposes, bureau-political rehabilitative suggestions have been grouped into the following categories: Political forces; socio-cultural determinants; and educational, recruitment and technical factors.

**Political Forces.** Given the fact that the traditional socio-political composition in the country has hindered the effective implementation of various bureaucratic modernization attempts, an implementation of the following political factors may act to positively impact on the bureaucracy in focus.

1. It is important to have the Zia'ma and their respective followers play an effective role in supporting administrative modernization projects. The lack of their support may lead to the ineffective implementation of such projects or even the cancellation of such transformational attempts all together.

2. Although the Taif Accord of 1989 is considered to be partially an attempt at gradually eliminating sectarianism, the country has not been able to end the problem. Sectarianism and confessionalism continue to be a basic fact of life in Lebanon.

3. Knowing that external political interference in administrative matters has escalated as a result of the conflict (Kisirwani and Parle, 1987:31-32), it is crucial for the current leadership to realise the importance of minimising external interventions in internal affairs. This, in turn, would also help to decrease outside pressures on local bureaucrats; thus, allowing them to go through objective decision making processes.

4. Given the fact that reality dictates theory, the decentralized formula pursued during the crisis period has been dysfunctional. Having different party/militia leaders running various parts of the country has proven to be inefficient. The informal decentralized structure followed during the conflict years has only acted to escalate the traditional administrative problems facing the Lebanese bureaucracy. Given the
crisis bureaucratic behaviour, a main suggestion to be implemented during the post-crisis period is to move back to a centralized structure. Nevertheless, given the country’s traditional pre-crisis bureaucratic problems, the centralized formula currently suggested would have to be carefully developed and well adapted to suit the bureaucratic needs of the country.

**Socio-Cultural Determinants.** Knowing that the country’s socio-cultural composition has, in the past, impacted on bureaucratic behaviour and performance, a number of factors ought to be considered by the national government as a means of improving the bureaucratic environment.

1. Given Lebanon’s socio-cultural composition, the performance of the bureaucracy depends on the effective participation of the various local communities. The prolonged crisis led to the curtailment of various basic elements of the Weberian bureaucracy, including the well-defined hierarchy of authority (Kisirwani and Parke, 1987:26 -27). Given the drastic experiences during the war, it would be advisable for the national government to ensure the active participation of all Lebanese communities at the different levels of the bureaucracy, based on the qualifications of the respective candidates.

2. Since corruption and bribery have traditionally been built-in problems within the Lebanese bureaucracy, it would be advisable for the national government to undertake all possible activities to change the war-time mentality as a means of adapting the overall bureaucratic culture and ensuring public service accountability. This could include the institutionalization of strict punishments and fines.

3. The support and sympathy provided by senior government officials to upper-level bureaucrats has helped to escalate bureaucratic competition (Salem, 1973: 80). Since the concern in public morality continues to be quite a critical issue, the courts’ role in ensuring public service accountability should be enlarged. Being able to develop and implement a tight and rigid system of fines would help in encouraging and ensuring proper bureaucratic conduct. Punishments should not be limited to lower-level bureaucrats but they should also be applied to high ranking officials as well.

4. In pre-crisis Lebanon, the media represents a means of public service accountability (Kisirwani, 1995). During a post-crisis Lebanon, the media should be encouraged to actively bring forward issues related to the administration of internal affairs and the abuse of power.

5. Given the sensitive socio-cultural composition of the Lebanese society, especially in regards to sectarianism and its role in civil appointments, policies and procedures dealing with disciplinary acts would have to be developed and implemented with care. Because of sectarianism, disciplining and/or discharging corrupt civil servants, even at the lower-level of the bureaucracy, may lead to renewed infighting.

**Educational and Recruitment Factors.** Since a considerable number of the current bureaucrats lack the educational background needed to effectively undertake their responsibilities (Salem, 1973: 86), introducing an effective and up-to-date administrative and emergency developmental program would help in up-grading the practical administrative and bureaucratic skills currently needed to rebuild the nation. This could be achieved by various ways:

1. The selection and recruitment of educated personnel might help in limiting the problem of corruption and subjectivity within the bureaucratic system (Salem, 1973: 103). Although the Lebanese socio-cultural composition makes it difficult to limit the role of the Zia’ma in the appointment process, such an achievement would be a prerequisite to the development and implementation of an objective recruitment system. Having well educated and experienced bureaucrats might limit dysfunctional information dissemination to the media. This, in turn, would help to better manage the role of the media in crisis situations.
Although bureaucratic posts are characterised by high levels of status and prestige, the rate of monetary compensation associated with such posts is rather low (Salem, 1973: 83). The well educated and highly qualified individuals find it beneficial to join the private sector due to higher rates of pay and the additional benefits that could be achieved. Accordingly, it is crucial for the national government to review the pay system as a means of increasing their competitiveness in attracting the well educated and qualified personnel needed.

Traditionally, there has always been a greater supply of bureaucratic personnel than what is actually needed. This has led, in various instances, to the duplication of work which, in turn, has increased the time, energy and expenses incurred by the general public while attempting to undertake regular transactions. Given budgetary constraints, it would be advisable to undertake an administrative re-distribution of tasks relevant to the pool of bureaucrats currently in existence based on their qualifications and skills.

It is not enough to institute an objective recruitment structure with the existing internal promotional system. Promotions from within are mostly based on high degrees of political patronage and nasta'ali (intercession) (Salem, 1973: 89). Objective criteria for both recruitment and promotion would have to be carefully developed and instituted to modernise the current bureaucracy.

One way to aid in the up-grading of current administrative bureaucratic skills is by instituting a series of developmental seminars and lectures to be attended by the bureaucrats as needed, especially at lower levels. Simultaneously, a separate budget should be set aside to cover travel and other administrative expenses needed for the attendance of relevant conferences and other educational and developmental activities.

Although there are a considerable number of active intellectual syndicates in existence, the bureaucratic system, in effect, leaves little room for the active participation of intellectuals. This deficiency in the current system would have to be remedied as a means of achieving a higher rate of participation of knowledgeable and experienced professionals as needed. Such experts could also act as consultants to the existing system to help generate creative insights and up-grade the administrative system as needed.

**Technical Factors.** Various technical factors could be improved as a means of modernizing the current bureaucracy. Office facilities and machinery including computers, word processors and calculators are needed. In addition, improving the lighting, heating and air conditioning systems would also aid in improving personnel’s morale (Salem, 1973: 87) which, in turn, would help to minimise time wastage and maximise bureaucrats’ concentration and performance.

The absence of political accountability and administrative control in Lebanon constitutes a major barrier to recovery and reconstruction. The continuation of war-time practices in unjustified in post-war Lebanon. A main pre-requisite to realising rehabilitative and developmental projects is to develop and implement serious measures to handle administrative reforms. Getting rid of the wartime corruption epidemic is a must to actively incur bureau-political reforms. The ability of the political leadership to better control the bureaucratic system has lately been enhanced as it has relatively regained the centralized political authority and power needed.
Part IV

Part IV is composed of two chapters:

Chapter IX: Learning From Crisis: Reconstructive Policy Implications

Chapter X: Conclusion and Summary
Chapter IX

Learning from Crisis: Reconstructive Policy Implications

Sections:

Introduction

Leadership and Crisis Decision Making: Crucial Issues

Learning From Experience

Paradigm Shifts: Planning for Socio-Political Change

The Interplay of Brain Drain and Media

General Observations and Conclusion
Chapter IX

Learning From Crisis: Reconstructive Policy Implications

Introduction

Although each and every crisis situation is a unique event, it is always helpful to analyse previous crises and evaluate the rehabilitative modes used as a means of future planning for plausible crisis recovery and reconstruction pathways. Politicians and senior public administrators dealing with emergency situations tend to depend on their previous experiences in coping with current stressful events (Rosenthal and 't Hart, 1991a: 351). Such learning curves could be derived from various sources, including personal experiences, preceding emergency plans, as well as previously set strategic and operational policies and procedures (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Charles, 1989:28). A relevant source of learning is history, which partially involves the reconstruction of reality. Accordingly, the chronicle of events and the manner in which such historical events are presented to both the analyst and the reader is extremely crucial (de Neufville, 1972:285).

Learning from crisis may generate its own problems, especially as the "enemy" can also learn from their previous experiences (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Charles, 1989:29). This chapter attempts to analyse the applicability - and the needed adjustments - of the RGAP to the historical events depicted by the case study country in focus. Accordingly, the crisis events in question are evaluated in light of Hirschman's (1970) framework and its revised (1995) version of internal reform forces, namely exit, voice and loyalty. Learning curves relevant to transferable policy implications are evaluated in relation to the interplay of the three main internal recuperation mechanisms presented in the current study; namely the development of a brain influx situation, media regulation and crisis governance patterns. Relevant observations related to recovery and development after turbulence are discussed and evaluated in terms of evolutionary/incremental post-crisis reconstruction stages. This chapter concludes with a brief summary of the lessons learned relating to the previously mentioned internal crisis reform mechanisms. Of equal importance to the brain drain driven reconstructive agenda is the transferable policy implications related to media's role in the management of macro-crises and the development of appropriate post-crisis media regulation schemes.

Leadership and Crisis Decision Making: Crucial Issues

With the exception of few research studies (Codecilla, 1992; Dawes, 1988; Dror, 1993a; 1993b; 1994; Wildavsky, 1984), a lengthy crisis leadership literature search shows a considerable gap in professional knowledge about crisis governance patterns (Dror, 1994: 126). The current research, including this chapter in particular, emphasises the importance of learning from past experiences as a means of preparing for future crisis decision making tailored to cope with emergency situations (Rosenthal and Pijnenburg, 1991:1). In addition, this study advocates the use of generating alternative scenarios of leadership strategies to be implemented during crisis and post-crisis situations on the basis of empirical reconstruction and evaluation of previous historical events. Accordingly, the current research argues that reconstructive logic constitutes a crucial method of governance crisis learning.

Dror (1993b:95; 1994:126) discusses statecraft in terms of prudent risk taking. The consequences of decisions undertaken under crisis are influenced by various contingencies, including environmental threats and opportunities. Accordingly, crisis decision making is undertaken in the absence of fixed guiding rules and regulations and a rather ambiguous set of probable outcomes. This further emphasizes Dror's (1994) concept of statecraft as basically being a fuzzy gambling process with history.

Crisis leadership strategies - as already indicated in terms of political rulership and governance patterns - tend to be situation specific. They relate to taking decisions and making choices under conditions of high uncertainty, risk and emergency. High levels of risk and uncertainty add to the burdens faced by the leaders themselves. The prerequisites of an effective approach to statecraft
requires an in-depth evaluation of the possible contingencies, including the risks and uncertainties involved.

A careful weighing of a crisis situation requiring a decision has to be well evaluated before concrete choices are made. Accordingly, developing effective ways to reason and understand crisis situations with the possible risks involved becomes an extremely crucial condition to crisis decision making. The system's long-term future is a function of its existing governance patterns (Dror, 1994: 128). As it could be deduced from the preceding bureau-political analysis, this formula highly applies to the Lebanese crisis in focus.

Learning From Experience

Learning should not be confused with mere occasional behavioural changes. Change in itself may not always implicate learning (Wilson, 1993:52). As a system's internal and external environmental factors change, actors will exhibit changing patterns of behaviour as a means of responding to the uncertainties and risks associated with the environmental change. Accordingly, problem-solving and decision-making could be explained in terms of adaptations in behavioural patterns consequently affecting the undertaken choices.

Crisis decision-making mostly relates to learning new and more effective ways of understanding chaotic situations, including the environmental risks involved; which, in turn, would impact on the choices undertaken. Given the world wide rapid rate of environmental change, it becomes crucial for decision makers and political leaders to develop dynamic learning processes to identify new ways of tackling emergencies.

An appropriate and well designed decision making system is crucial for making satisfactory choices. The system tends to move to a non-programmed and unstructured type of a crisis decision making strategy as the level of risks and environmental uncertainties increase. The distinction between the design and implementation becomes quite critical in crisis decision making processes (Wilson, 1993: 59).

Although macro-crises appear to be unique in nature, crisis situations tend to reveal similar behavioural elements (Toft and Reynolds, 1994: 47). It is such similar behavioural elements that facilitate the learning processes generated from previous emergencies. This becomes particularly pertinent in the case of prolonged and creeping crises. Recurring crisis events ignited by the same or similar causes may very well be an indicator of failures in the system's learning process. In such cases, it would be wise for the system to design the necessary procedures and policies that would facilitate the learning process, which in turn aids in reducing the chances of future policy failures (Toft and Reynolds, 1994: 48).

For "active learning" to take place - as opposed to passive learning processes, lessons learned from previous experiences would have to be implemented (Toft and Reynolds, 1994:48). Nevertheless, adapting a system's culture to become an active learning society is a rather slow process. Thus, the success of such an initiative may be difficult to assess. It may take several decades before concrete results become apparent.

In addition to coping with crisis situations, lessons learned relate to the implementation of post-crisis policies (t Hart, 1990:243). There are various ways to accumulate learning generated from previous experiences. A common method is to learn by trial-and-error (t Hart, 1990: 244). Nevertheless, the trial-and-error method of policy design and implementation may lead to the actual prolongation of the crisis period.

Paradigm Shifts: Planning For Socio-Political Change

Although there has been a considerable number of studies prepared about the (1975-1991) Lebanese crisis - including articles, books and autobiographies - various grey and ambiguous areas related to the crisis in focus continue to exist. General migration - including intellectual brain drain - and the use of pluralistic media were two main alternatives used by the general public to resist the prolonged
events in the country. Following Hirschman (1995:10), exit and voice proved to be characteristic alternatives to various resistance movements. In particular, he discusses the preceding two variables, namely "outmigration" and "contradicting" in terms of the upheaval in Germany.

The brain drain - media perspective has been further enriched by its application to the context of the seventeen-year old crisis in question. The application of the brain drain, media and governance perspective to the context of the Lebanese (1975-1991) crisis distinguishes it from other studies related to the analysis of the same crisis events. Such studies mainly consist of masters and doctoral research work (Abul-Husn, 1992; Haddad, 1995).

The Interplay of Brain Drain and Media

The preceding chapters of the current research are geared towards the identification and evaluation of recovery policy intervention points to help a system embark on a reconstructive mode. Accordingly, a brain-drain driven reconstructive strategy as well as a media reconstructive agenda have been developed. Nevertheless, the intellectual emigration and media slices of the country's overall rehabilitative strategy have so far been investigated separately. This section aims at studying the interplay between the preceding two main recuperation mechanisms of brain drain and media regulation. In addition, an evaluation of the impact of leadership strategies and governance patterns on successfully achieving a well-balanced intellectual influx situation and designing an appropriate media regulation strategy is offered.

So far, brain drain and media have been presented as two separate individual alternative resistance responses used to cope with instability, crisis and chaos. Intellectual emigration simply refers to having a considerable percentage of the work force leave a particular system to another, because of better living and working conditions or benefits offered by the other system. Different scenarios may result from the practise of multi-national intellectual emigration. First, the intellectual emigration movement may have a positive impact on the system itself. As a result of continuous migration, the deteriorating system may re-evaluate the situation and decide to improve its offerings (Hirschman, 1970:4; 1995:12).

Secondly, a negative impact may result from continuous and dynamic emigration waves. The system's deterioration may simply continue, or even accelerate in pace, due to the political, administrative and lack of technological know-how created by the intellectual emigration waves. In this case, the brain drain phenomenon becomes a crisis in itself, causing continued deterioration within a particular system. It becomes both a cause and an effect of the overall macro-crisis, whereby a causal multiplier could be used to quantitatively access its impact over time. Thirdly, another scenario may exist whereby intellectual emigration may not have any impact on the use of the media.

Media, on the other hand, refers to the use of voice as a means of informing of one's points of view and/or protesting against the other side. The main aim is to alert the system to its defaults in the hope that the deteriorating system may decide to correct and improve on its faults (Hirschman, 1970:4; 1991.5; 1995:12). The previous chapters of the current research have dealt with the multi-national brain drain phenomenon, media regulation and governance patterns within the context of the (1975-1991) Lebanese crisis in focus. The analysis has been geared to investigate the causes and conditions for which each of the preceding recuperation mechanisms has been separately initiated. In addition, separate reconstruction agendas - in terms of rehabilitative policy intervention points - have been identified and evaluated in relations to each of the preceding internal reform forces.

The analysis resulting from the application of the brain drain - media perspective to the context of the case study country in focus shows that the nature of the relationship and interdependencies between brain drain and media vary from one period to the other depending on the underlying conditions activating them (Hirschman, 1995:13).

Prolonged occasions can also be spotted whereby the intellectual emigration waves and the resulting multi-national brain drain phenomenon have actually undermined the use of the media. Shifts from one phase of the preceding relationship to the other has not been uncommon throughout the term of the crisis and post-crisis periods in question. Such shifts in the brain drain - media interdependencies were conditioned by the causes activating them.
An analysis of the impact of governance patterns on the brain drain - media relationship in Lebanon necessitates an investigation of the interplay between the internal-external reconstructive and/or destructive forces impacting on, and at times shaping, the rulership strategies themselves. Accordingly, such an analysis craves for an evaluation of the degree of external intervention in the system's internal affairs and the resulting impact that such an intervention has on the internal statecraft policies practised by the system itself.

In his book titled, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States, Hirschman (1970) clearly indicates that exit and voice tend to mostly contradict and undermine each other. Exit, on the one hand, represents an individual rather than a collective effort. Voice, on the other hand, represents 'public action' whereby participants may incur monetary and human costs. Some may end up paying a price for their active participation in contradictory activities such as petitions, demonstrations, strikes or, even, a mere expression of opinion.

In Hirschman's (1970; 1995) work, numerous economic and social examples confirming the inverse exit - voice relationship have been provided. Personal and business demonstrations were illustrated at various levels of analysis, including family, firm and state. Hirschman (1970) describes the inverse exit and voice relationship as a seesaw pattern of outmigration and contradicting. The more people migrate outside the system, the less loyal individuals are available to contradict and protest.

Nevertheless, instances can be noted whereby exit and voice can be used to reinforce and support each other as is the case with Germany (Hirschman, 1995). A number of variables may intervene to shift the inverse exit - voice pattern into a direct relationship, whereby migration might end up reinforcing the use of the media (Hirschman, 1995: 13). The exit option may encourage the loyal members to use their vocal option - internally and from abroad - as a means of protesting against the system's defaults. The inter-relationships between multi-national brain drain and the use of the media within the context of the case study country in focus illustrates the variety of intellectual emigration - media relationships that might exist at different time periods.

Multi-national Migration and Media as Complementary

The "Lebanese Model" of coexistence in pre-war Lebanon was a major source of envy by its neighbouring countries (Hanf, 1993:48). This has been a crucial point in aiding the social and economic development of the country. Historically, pre-crisis Lebanon has been a refuge to emigrants from various parts of the globe. Although corruption constituted a traditional problem; due to its democratic political system, freedom of expression and its educational development, Lebanon has been able to attract intellectuals and scholars over the years. Accordingly, the country has never failed to experience a positive brain influx situation throughout its pre-crisis period. Due to the freedom of thought, freedom of expression and freedom of choice practised during the pre-war period, the country has acted as a refuge to the oppressed and objectivist movements who find Lebanon to be a safe haven for them to express their contradictory beliefs and views (Malek, 1983).

Since then the media has flourished in Lebanon to voice all sorts of public concerns and interests. Given the freedom of speech practised in the country, main stream as well as opposition leaders have always been able to freely express their views and interests across to their respective publics. What has helped to further develop the media in the country is the regular inflow of emigrants and refugees who, with time, came to consider Lebanon as their own country. Accordingly, throughout the pre-crisis period, the knowledgeable members of the community have always been available to effectively use the media to get their contradictory views across. This has greatly helped in pinpointing the defaults within the country as a means of raising awareness to the existing problems. Thus, the positive inflow of emigrants throughout the pre-crisis period has helped to support and reinforce the media's role as an internal rehabilitative mechanism, and to alert the system in focus to the persisting defaults.

Fortunately, this trend continued as the war unfolded in 1975. A direct and complementary relationship continued to exist between intellectual emigration and the media during the periods 1975 to early 1976, 1978-1979, and 1984-1991. Although massive multi-national intellectual emigration waves took place during these time periods, the media did not fail to show the needed zeal and
courage in attempting to perform its traditional role of alerting the officials in control to the system’s defaults. Although the country had experienced massive brain and talent loss throughout the above mentioned time periods, prominent members of the community continued to be available to voice their concerns internally and from abroad.

As the war unfolded, emigration became a promising resistance alternative, especially as various countries opened their emigration gates to the well educated and socio-economically advantaged members of the community. The brain drain movement in Lebanon can be divided into a series of inter-related intellectual emigration waves, each of which has had an impact on the role of the media. Accordingly, the impact of outmigration on the media, within the context of the case study country in focus, would have to be evaluated in separate but inter-related stages; whereby the causal multiplier could be used to study the variation in the relationship overtime.

The first two main waves of brain drain experienced during the periods 1975 to early 1976 and 1978-1979 have had a rather positive impact on the media and the use of voice as an alternative resistance alternative (See Table 9-1). Since the migration option was available, people were encouraged to continue to use the media option to voice their views and objections from inside and outside the country.

**Table 9-1**

Approximate Net Balance of Lebanese Migrants and Corresponding Major Media Activities For the Years 1975, 1978-1979, and 1984-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Number of Lebanese Migrants</th>
<th>Major Media Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>+ 400,000</td>
<td>War breaks out. Media's main concern is covering war events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>+ 76,000</td>
<td>The Voice of Free Lebanon station (Sawt Lubnan Al-Hor) is established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>+ 49,000</td>
<td>A mixed television company, TeleLiban, was formed by the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>+ 61,605</td>
<td>The news department within TeleLiban was split, which gave rise to rival broadcasting between both sides of the Lebanese capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>+ 70,201</td>
<td>The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) was established.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The approximate net number of Lebanese migrants for the years 1978, 1986 and 1989 were +76,000, +73,907, and over 240,000 respectively (See Table 6-3 and Table 9-1). This increasing number of Lebanese migrants for the previously mentioned periods indicate that the pressure to leave the country during these years has been on the increase.

Most of the international and local media broadcasts were focused on the human and material losses incurred due to prolonged infighting. A considerable number of newspaper articles have also dealt with the intellectual emigration phenomenon and the loss of a considerable portion of the country’s active labour force, foreign interventions and their impact on the country’s internal affairs, as well as the numerous and on-going socio-economic daily hardships encountered by the general public.

Prominent members of the community who have decided to migrate continued to voice their concerns from outside the country. A number of magazines, newspapers and other publications were being issued from abroad. Accordingly, the accelerated use of the media during the years 1975, 1978-
1979 and 1984-1985 could be partially caused by the intended and/or the actual migration movement taking place in the country.

Multi-national Migration and Media as Supplementary

Instead of acting harmoniously to support and reinforce each other, the two main recuperation mechanisms under study have at times served to undermine and debilitate one another during the periods 1976-1977, 1980-1983 and 1992-1996. A main characteristic that distinguishes the Lebanese from other Middle-Eastern people is their mobility and ability to orient themselves to the ways of the West. Their upbringing and multi-linguistic skills tend to facilitate the adaptation process. This partly explains the increase in the outmigration waves during the pre-crisis period (Maouia, 1992: 655). In addition, lack of stability, minimal security conditions and the deterioration in the socio-economic standards have contributed in the acceleration of the migration outflow waves throughout the crisis period. The approximate net number of Lebanese migrants for the years 1977 and 1980-1983 were + 38,000 and + 132,000 respectively (See Table 6-3). This again explains the outmigration pressure that the general public was subjected to throughout the war years. Nevertheless, the acceleration in the multi-national migration movement has seriously debilitated the role of the media during the following slices of the crisis period, namely, 1976-1977, 1980-1983 and 1992-1996.

The media had clearly suffered due to the continuous flows of outmigration. Given the total population in the country, emigration was relatively high during the crisis period. With the series of assassinations, kidnappings, exchanged threats and enforcement of strict news censorship regulations, the knowledgeable members of the community were pressured to depart. Such an intended and highly pressured outmigration movement has acted to undermine the power of the media as an internal reform mechanism during the crisis years of 1976-1977 and 1980-1981. The death and forced outflow of the highly skilled media experts, among others, was strong enough to cause a considerable shift in the previously described complementary brain drain - media relationship. Both the actual forced emigration of a large percentage of the population, and the dissemination of their experiences and successes, partially explain the subdued and repressed role that the local and foreign media agencies situated in the country played during the periods 1976-1977 and 1980-1981.

Outmigration remained more available and possible in Lebanon than the other Arab countries throughout the crisis period. At the same time, the chances of using the media to voice people's concerns and objections continued to be more feasible in Lebanon than in any other Arab country. Yet, during the crisis years of 1976-1977 and 1980-1981, the chances for successful use of the media as an internal recuperation mechanism was rather limited due to the enormous obstacles that faced media personnel and relevant objection movements.

In addition, the crisis events of 1976-1977 and 1980-1983 reveal that the armed forces in the country were aware of the preliminary inverse brain drain - media relationship, which was well manipulated by the militias in charge. Examples include the strict restraints imposed on the media, as well as the practise of violent and media manufactured events aimed at encouraging - and at times forcing - multi-national intellectual emigration. The implementation of such a policy of extensive intellectual emigration, utilised during the crisis period, has succeeded in destabilising the socio-economically advantaged and well educated middle-class in the country, by forcing them to leave everything behind and emigrate.

It becomes easier to limit and subdue internal opposition through forcing critical key media figures, among other well-educated and skilled labour, to leave the country. What is quite distinctive about the crisis in focus, is that the emigration movement continued internally in terms of geographical displacements. During critical and dangerous circumstances, people were moving between the two sectors of the country's capital Beirut at their own risk.

With time, the educated individuals who departed - including well-known journalists, writers, intellectuals, engineers, doctors, senior administrators and politicians - have blended well in their chosen countries of emigration. They have exerted tremendous efforts to re-establish themselves, thus, finding it difficult to permanently return back and reside in their homeland country (Kemp, 1992: 693).
Table 9-2

Approximate Net Balance of Lebanese Migrants and Corresponding Major Media Activities For the Years 1976-1977 and 1980-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Number of Lebanese Migrants</th>
<th>Major Media Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-297,000</td>
<td>British radio station moves its offices from Beirut to Cairo. Armed forces occupy the offices of major newspapers and magazines and prevent their publication for two consecutive weeks; This includes Al-Nahar, Orient Le Jour, Beirut, Al-Moharar, Al-Safir, Al-Nida’a, and Al-Doustour magazine. Lebanese Parliament introduces general censorship regulations to be practised with all newspapers and magazines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>+38,000</td>
<td>The newly introduced governmental censorship regulations starting 3 January, 1977 are enforced for nearly a twelve months period, after which they were ignored by media officials without cancellation. During the twelve months period, January 1977-January 1978, foreign news agencies leave Beirut due to the enforcement of strict news censorship regulations. The French press agency establishes a new office in Nicosia, Cyprus, while maintaining its office in Beirut. Important Lebanese events get printed in Cyprus, since Lebanese censorship regulations prohibit their publications. The Liberal party press (Al-Ahmar) offices are attacked and the printing of the Voice of Liberals newspaper (Sawt Al-Ahmar) and the Liberal Tigers magazine (Nmour Al-Ahmar) is prevented. The number of foreign officers dealing with local censorship regulations enforcement is increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>+33,000</td>
<td>The well-known journalist and owner of Al-Hawadeth magazine, Mr. Salim Al-Lawzeh, is assassinated. Head of Journalism Syndicate, Mr. Riad Taha, is assassinated. General Manager of TeleLiban, Mr. Charles Rizk, is kidnapped and then released at a later stage after the interference of pertinent political figures. Main media figures - such as Ambassador Ghassan Toueini, owner of Al-Nahar newspaper; Mr. Michael Abou Joudeh, director of Al-Nahar Newspaper; and Mr. Talal Salman, owner and director of Al-Safir newspaper; among others - depart their offices in Beirut and leave the country due to pressuring phone threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>+33,000</td>
<td>The dysfunctional use of pluralistic media in the country leads to the exchange of contradictory messages, mis-information and media chaos. It got to the point where nearly every street in Beirut was publishing a newspaper, bulletin or a tabloid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
General Observations and Conclusion

Each of the recovery forces in focus, namely intellectual emigration and media, may generate a different impact, largely depending on the selective policies and the governance patterns in practise. The multi-national intellectual emigration movement represents a sword with two edges. First, besides the monetary remittances sent by the emigrants themselves to their families, intensive and continuous emigration may act as a critical internal recovery force. As a reformatory recuperation mechanism, brain drain may create the needed awareness regarding the system’s embarkation on a recovery mode.

Secondly, given the induced intellectual and administrative vacuum that could be created with continuous outmigration waves (Hirschman, 1995:24), the brain drain movement could be described as a crisis within a crisis. It is a prolonged crisis that implodes upon itself, whereby the causal multiplier could be used to measure its continued impact overtime. Accordingly, a selective policy of a manufactured brain drain movement could be pursued by the authorities in charge as a means of causing further deterioration within the system itself. It may get to the point where the level of deterioration gets beyond the recovery means. It may even be the case that recovery and reconstruction may not be a desired option any more.

Similar to brain drain, the media in itself also represents both sides of the coin. First, the media could act as a strong recuperation mechanism to voice the general public’s views and concerns. Given the freedom of speech and expression that was in practise in the case study country in focus, the media was able to perform important reformatory functions, including a medium of expression and an alerting mechanism pointing the authorities in charge to the existing defaults. Secondly, the media can also act as a destructive force as it was used as propaganda outlets by the infighting factions.

Secondly, similar to other cases, including the German Democratic Republic (Hirschman, 1995:21), the migration - media balance was severely affected by the practise of a selective policy of media manufactured events, which helped to facilitate the implementation of an intended and, at times, forced migration movement. In addition, the dysfunctional use of pluralistic media channels, used throughout the crisis period, mainly serving as propaganda outlets for the in-fighting factions, led to a great deal of mis-information exchange and media chaos. Similar to the intellectual emigration movement, the media could act as a constructive and a destructive mechanism, depending on the selective policies set in practise by the authorities in charge. It is the relationship among the preceding three forces; namely, brain “influx”, media regulation and governance, that determine and condition the system’s level of recovery and reconstruction, as well as the timing and the movement among the four temporal reconstruction stages previously discussed within the context of the Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis (RGPA).

As outlined in figure 9-1, the brain drain - media balance could partially be explained by the governance patterns being practised within the system. The relationship between outmigration and the media gets conditioned by the selective policies practised by the government in charge. The existence of the feelings of loyalty is one thing and their manifestation is something else. The actual manifestation of loyalty is conditioned by the governance patterns and the levels of tolerance set in practice. There has been occasions whereby selective strategies of induced violence and media manufactured events have been set in motion to encourage and facilitate the process of forced migration internally and across the border, so as to destabilise the well-educated middle class and, in turn, neutralize unwanted voice.

At the same time, there have been occasions where the forced outmigration waves have actually resulted in supporting the reformatory role of the media from within and without the country. Knowing that the emigration gates are open for the socio-economically advantaged and well-educated citizens has actually encouraged them to use the media option to voice their views. At the same time, local and foreign news agencies who were forced to leave the country continued to voice their concerns from across the borders.

In this case, intellectual migration has, in fact, supported and enforced the reformatory role of the media. Accordingly, the leadership strategies and governance patterns practised in the country -
as influenced by the internal local and foreign armed forces, as well as the external regional and international agendas - have influenced the series of events comprising the crisis in focus. This has partially been undertaken through impacting on the brain drain - media balance within the system.

Figure 9-1

Reconstruction as a Function of Intellectual Emigration, Media and Rulership Patterns

The ability of the leaders to deliver such a commitment is, in turn, highly conditioned by the internal and external environmental forces, including regional and international reconstructive/destructive personal and hidden agendas. Thus, the variation in the brain drain - media balance during different time intervals is not just conditioned by the internal governance selective policies and leadership strategies being in practise, but also by their reactions and interactions with external forces and conditions overtime.

Thus, reconstruction is as much a globalized external recovery agenda as it is an internalised rehabilitative plan of action. This necessitates reconstruction planners to juxtapose the external recovery agendas with the internal rehabilitative strategies as a means of developing a comprehensive, holistic and realistic reconstructive plan for a particular system.
As figure 9-2 depicts, the variation of the brain drain - media relationship is a function of both internal as well as global environmental forces. It is both the internal and external forces together that shape the governance strategies practiced which, in turn, affect the policies set to condition the intellectual emigration - media balance. Thus, they finally affect the speed and rate of actual reconstruction taking place within the system itself.
Chapter X

Conclusion and Summary

Sections:

Summary and Concluding Remarks

Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Implications

Directions for Future Research
Chapter X

Conclusion and Summary

Summary and Concluding Remarks

This chapter presents a summary of the concluding remarks and observations analysed in this research study, with special emphasis on the conceptual frameworks used and theoretical implications concluded. This includes observations related to the use of the single case study approach in terms of possible generalisations and transfer implications, the significant use of the Contingency Typology and the Risk Path Analysis Model to depict and analyse critical points of discontinuity useful in developing reconstructive policy implications and the conditions impacting on the balance between brain drain and the media and their relationship to the governance patterns being practised within the system itself.

This chapter ends with possible directions for future research in relations to the proposed Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis. This includes the proposition to quantitatively assess the relationship among the internal recuperation mechanisms under study, namely multi-national brain drain, media functions and rulership strategies. A quantitative assessment of the reconstruction forces in focus aids in the comprehension and evaluation of the actual attainment pre-requisites/conditions and the temporal dimensions of the four proposed reconstruction stages, namely the a) Jumbled Phase, b) Transitional Phase, c) Experimental Phase, and d) Routinisation.

The quantification of the proposed reconstruction model helps to further the understanding of the recovery pathway the system decides to undertake in terms of its progression among the four reconstruction stages, while attempting to rehabilitate and recover after turbulence. It also helps to identify and evaluate the interplay between the internal and external factors which facilitate, as well as hinder, the attainment of the desired reconstruction agendas after crisis.

Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Implications

The current study mainly utilises crisis management concepts and theories as a means of developing a better understanding of macro-crisis and, in turn, generates plausible recovery and reconstruction strategies for diverse and multicultural societies experiencing a creeping and prolonged state of instability and turbulence. The methodology and theoretical frameworks used to evaluate the crisis in focus are partially what distinguishes the current research study from other research work related to the particular case study country under investigation.

Rather than merely concentrating on internal recuperation mechanisms, as part of an internalised reconstructive strategy, this research is directed towards studying the interplay between the internal and external forces both facilitating and hindering rehabilitation after turbulence. The main theoretical framework utilised in the current study - namely the Decline-Recovery Model (Hirschman, 1970; 1995) - in addition to the Contingency Typology (Kouzmin and Jarman, 1989:410-414; 1990:418) and the Risk Path Analysis Model (Jarman and Kouzmin, 1990:421; 1994:420-426) aids in directing the current research to evaluate the interaction between the internal and external points of discontinuity relating to the conflict in focus; thus developing awareness to the fact that reconstruction is as much a regional, international and global agenda as it is an internalised, local and national strategy.

The two main models utilised in this research were used complementarily to study the nature of the crisis in focus and to identify and evaluate relevant rehabilitative policy interventions. The current research represents a trans-disciplinary work used to explain emerging behavioural phenomena using political and economic concepts. This study aids in demonstrating the usefulness of inter-disciplinary research in terms of combining both economic mechanisms as well as political forces in developing further understanding to behavioural and social phenomena.
Intellectual emigration, and the resulting brain drain, as an internal recuperation mechanism represents an economic solution to prolonged macro-crisis (Hirschman, 1970: 84). Intellectual emigration does not lead to full departure. External attempts for reform may take various shapes and dimensions, including designing protests, demonstrations and petitions. Emigration may even encourage the use of the media to express opposing opinions and protesting views from outside the system. Emigrants may even feel more relaxed to utilise the media to voice their views from abroad. The media on the other hand, as an alternative internal recuperation mechanism, represents a political option. The use of the media to voice opposing and conflicting views from inside obviously increase the chances for political activity.

In addition to political forces, the balance between intellectual emigration and the media is partially determined by the systemic's economic development. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe an optimal mix of the reform forces in focus in relations to a particular system, for such a blend would be influenced by the continuously changing internal and/or external environmental forces over time.

The second model utilised in this study, namely the Contingency Typology (Kouzmin and Jarnac, 1989: 410-414; 1990:418) and the more sophisticated version of the Risk Path Analysis Model (Jarnac and Kouzmin, 1990: 421; 1994: 420-426) aimed in directing the current study towards the identification and evaluation of critical "turning points" needed to develop reconstructive policy implications as relevant to the case study country in focus. Two different, but highly inter-related, crisis pathways have been generated for both the internal reform forces under study; based on which reconstructive networks were derived. The brain drain driven reconstructive policy agenda was finally juxtaposed with the media slice of the reconstructive agenda to investigate, and finally evaluate, the nature of the brain drain - media relationship over time as related to the context of the case study country under question.

As a means of deriving a holistic and comprehensive reconstructive agenda, regional and international forces have been evaluated in terms of their impact on the internal national policy implications previously derived from the current analysis of the case study country crisis events in focus. Since reconstruction is as much a global agenda as it is an internal rehabilitative strategy, the interplay between the internal and external forces facilitating as well as hindering recovery activities were evaluated.

Finally, Stage 4 of the Risk Path Analysis Model, namely "Crisis" needs to be further developed to show the dynamic nature of prolonged macro-crisis. It is not always the case that systems tend to revert back to a "normalised" and "routinised" new order, which could be characterised in terms of higher levels of stability within short time periods. The current analysis of the events in focus clearly show that it might take a great deal of time and effort before a particular system gets to embark on a reconstructive mode. Thus, various types of systems - including states, governments and organisations - at times tend to be fixated in a crisis mode for considerable time periods before actual signs of recovery start to emerge. Such a prolonged and dynamic crisis mode need to be well reflected within Phase 4 of the Risk Path Analysis Model.

The managerially-oriented crisis management models and the more politically-orientated conflict resolution models utilised in this study, namely the Contingency Typology, the Risk Path Analysis Model and the Breakdown - Re-equilibration Model directed the research into the development of an acceptable reconstructive pathway emanating from the previously identified critical decisional crisis "turning points".

Knowing that the environment is created by the internal and external actors and their interactions, reconstructive logic relates to the evaluation of crisis decision making processes and the decisions undertaken over time. Accordingly, a more satisfactory recovery pathway may be developed at the identified crisis decisional points of discontinuity.

The current case study analysis of the Lebanese macro-crisis represents a rather systematic research in re-constructive logic. A general chronology of the local events relating to the case study country in focus was first developed. In addition, more specific chronologies related to intellectual emigration and the resulting brain drain phenomenon, as well as media events, were developed. Finally, a regional Middle-Eastern Chronology was also developed as a means of studying the
interplay between the relevant internal and external forces impacting on the system's local affairs, thus, influencing the realisation of actual recovery and reconstruction.

The development of local and regional chronologies of events allow researchers to study the temporal dimension related to such crisis reconstructive events, which is a central element in crisis resolution and reconstruction activities. At the same time, such chronologies aid in the process of mapping prolonged crises which, in turn, allows researchers to pinpoint the critical and more relevant decisional events that could be used to formulate effective reconstructive policy interventions.

Although each and every crisis situation is a unique event (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Charles, 1989:4-5; Toft and Reynolds, 1994:47-48); when comparing and contrasting such macro-crises, similar patterns of behaviour across various crisis case studies tend to emerge. It is the existence of such similarities that encourages researchers to undertake vigorous crisis research as a means of learning from the management of past crises to anticipate and better manage future similar incidents.

With time, factors facilitating the learning process can also be further understood. This would obviously help in designing procedures that would accelerate and enhance individual as well as institutional crisis management learning (Toft and Reynolds, 1994:48).

Various researchers and scholars (Rosenthal and Fijnenburg, 1991; Rosenthal and 't Hart, 1991a; 1991b; Toft and Reynolds, 1994) promote the need to learn from recurrent crises as a means of improving decision makers crisis management capabilities so as to minimise future losses. Reconstructive logic is an important method to promote learning about crises, whereby multiple reconstructive logic scenarios based on the empirical reconstruction of past cases should be developed as opposed to single deterministic scenarios (Rosenthal and Fijnenburg, 1991:1; Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993:5).

A single case study approach has been chosen as the main methodological tool used in the current research. Since Lebanon constitutes a difficult case of numerous problems - including ideological, geo-political, economic and socio-cultural - the seventeen-year old Lebanese macro-crisis has been the main focus in the current research study. The evaluation of the primary events constituting the crisis in question extends to the post-1991 period (See Appendix B).

The accelerated level of uncertainty created by the explosive events taking place during the post-crisis transitional period have actually led to reduce the impact of the learning curves accumulated during the crisis period itself (Dror, 1994:129-130). The events comprising the crisis in focus, especially the implementation of the Taif Accord and the associated radical transformation undertaken, have left the rulers in charge facing critical decisional uncertainties. The post-1991 transitional period typifies such an interim and uncertain environment that various institutions tend to experience before they finally start to embark on developmental reconstructive paths. Accordingly, the temporal dimension of the proposed Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis relates to the rate and speed within which the reconstruction pre-requisites needed are actually attained during the jumbled and transitional rehabilitative phases usually following a crisis period.

In spite of the traditional stereotype associated with the case study approach, where the majority of the social science books do not consider it as a formal research strategy, more and more social science researchers are extensively using the case study approach as a main mode of inquiry. In addition, the use of well-chosen theory makes it possible to generalise from the outcome of a single case analysis (Yin, 1989:40).

A central source of traditional prejudice against the case study approach is the issue of generalisation. "Can the researcher generalise from the findings binding to only a particular situation?" is a critical and relevant question. As various researchers and scholars who have dealt with case studies explain, case studies as well as experiments are generalisable to theoretical propositions rather than to populations (Blau, 1963:303; Yin, 1981:107; 1989:21). Thus, as is the case with the current research, transferable reconstructive policy implications in relation to the internal reform mechanisms under investigation have been generated through analysing the events of the chosen case study country. The case study strategy used in this research provided for a clear description of the real-life situation, whereby continuous volatile events were taking place.
In addition, the significance of using the case study longitudinal research method in the current study is twofold. First, it provided the opportunity to separate a complex set of inter-related and inter-connected events and forces to be better analysed by the researcher. Secondly, it facilitated the construction of the proposed temporal Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis, based on a developmental leadership path evaluation and the development of four separate but inter-related reconstruction stages. The movement from one rehabilitative stage to the other is conditioned by the rate and speed of the actual realisation of the reconstruction requisites, namely the recuperation mechanisms under study.

The current research represents an extension of crisis management and conflict resolution studies into strategic management and policy research. Event and process time, rather than clock time has been used as part of the current longitudinal research. Such longitudinal research provides the opportunity to quantify the variables under investigation, to better evaluate their inter-relationships and their impact on systems recovery after turbulence.

The longitudinal case study method is best used when researchers are able to construct boundaries around systems to observe how the variables in question tend to work with or against each other to create certain outcomes. The use of reconstructive logic is significant within the context of longitudinal event time studies for it allows researchers to go back through the layers of history to observe how the variables in focus interact within a particular system. Developing multiple reconstructive logic scenarios is widely used as an uncertainty reduction mechanism (Rosenthal and 't Hart, 1991b: 81).

In addition, it is worth noting that case studies are culture bound. Accordingly, the cultural dimensions should be well examined as an important element of the case study analysis. It might be wise for the researcher using the case study approach to prepare a cultural note relating to specific cultural parameters of the case itself as a means of creating the cultural awareness needed to deal with the particular situation.

**Directions For Future Research**

Research on system recovery after crisis could take two directions. First, basic theoretical research investigating the transplantation of concepts, models and theories from various disciplines: Sociology, political science, economics, crisis management and public administration; to the context of a system's prolonged crisis. In addition, theoretical research scope also relates to the development of new definitions and models for evaluating various phases of a system's crisis. Secondly, applied research relates to the value and significance of the transplantation of present and emerging theories and models to recovery research and analysis after crisis. Within this scope, applied research relates to evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the transplantation of inter-disciplinary models to the context of a system's creeping crisis, in terms of developing critical reconstructive policy interventions and learning curves, knowing that each crisis is a differentiated and unique event.

In the current study, the author took the opportunity to use both basic and applied research. Basic research has been used to evaluate the prolonged macro-crisis in focus for the period 1974-1991, through applying managerially and politically-orientated crisis resolution and recovery models, with conceptual work being done in the definition of micro- and macro-crisis. More theoretical work is needed to further elaborate on the concept of macro-crisis management, in terms of the application of a system's approach to the analysis of resulting dimensional impacts.

In addition, the current research proposes a temporal Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis as a policy level methodology. The RGPA is based on a developmental leadership path evaluation as well as four inter-related stages of recovery and rehabilitation. The temporal dimension of the RGPA is critical to the actual achievement of specific reconstruction programmes. Future work will seek to quantify the main elements of the RGPA as a means of better evaluating the relationships among relevant internal reform forces, as well as the interaction of the internalised and globalised reconstruction agendas on the actual attainment of a system's rehabilitation after turbulence.
In terms of future research related to prolonged macro-environmental crises, the following analytical questions are worth investigating: To what extent is the application of methodology of victimology (McGuire, 1992: 664) successful in massaging raw data relevant to macro-crisis events? What is the role of media management in the perpetuation or solution of a macro-crisis?

New synergies impacting on a system's recovery policy implications after crisis are worth analysing. Such correlations include corruption and creeping crises, induced crises and disinformation, as well as elasticity of demand for foreign intervention and system's internal socio-economic weaknesses, among others.

Applied research has been undertaken to develop policy implications of reconstruction strategies. The Risk Path Analysis Model has been applied to the context of the case study country in focus in an attempt to evaluate critical decisional "turning points" on the multi-crisis decision path.

Although each crisis situation is differentiated, it is significant to analyse and develop learning patterns, from previous experiences, that may provide valuable future policy planning insights. Thus, a longitudinal process time research approach is needed to evaluate such prolonged macro-crises. At the same time, comparative research is of value, in terms of comparing and contrasting various recovery strategies used by similar systems undergoing turbulence and instability. Interesting comparative research may include the Jordanian crisis of 1970, the Israeli Yom Kippur war of 1973 (Dowty, 1984), and the Iraqi war with the Desert Storm Operation of 1991 (Bullock and Morris, 1991; Brenner and Harwood, 1991; Darwish and Alexander, 1991; Stanwood, Allen and Peacock, 1991).

Another interesting applied research area is to explore the use of international channels of distribution of weapons and arms as related to the macro-crisis participants - both local and foreign - as a means of identifying the overall network of globalised actors involved, as well as the nature and intensity if the relationships among them during each of the crisis stages.

The main purpose of the proposed temporal Reconstruction - Governance Contingency Path Analysis is to serve as a policy planning tool in terms of system recovery after crisis. This planning tool is intended to serve various regional and international systems' evolution after crisis. Accordingly, the current study serves as a base for future research in the field of macro-crisis management and systems' recovery. The proposed model takes into consideration the goal incompatibilities for both genuine and induced crises, as well as the interaction among the internalised and globalised reconstruction agendas, to evaluate and plan for system's recovery after prolonged macro-crises.
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**Miscellaneous**


APPENDICES

Appendix A  Map of Republic of Lebanon
Appendix B  General Middle-East Case Chronology
Appendix C  Actors and Participants: Who is Who?
Appendix D  Media Case Chronology
Appendix E  Lebanon in Crisis: Overall Case Chronology
APPENDIX A

Map of Republic of Lebanon
APPENDIX B

General Middle East Case Chronology
Appendix B

1916 According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain gets to control Palestine, and France controls Lebanon and Syria.

1917 The Balfour Declaration emphasises the notion of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.

1920 France announces the formation of Greater Lebanon, which includes Mount Lebanon, Beirut, Tripoli, Beq'a Valley, Sidon and Tyre.

1943 Christian and Moslem leaders of Lebanon agree to a National Pact which provides for two basic issues: First, balance for power sharing; and secondly, balance of Lebanon's Western and Arab orientation. Accordingly, Lebanon gained its independence of France.

1948 The state of Israel gets established, after the withdrawal of Britain from Palestine. Egypt occupies Gaza Strip, and Jordan takes over the West Bank.

1956 During the war with Egyptian president, Mr. Gamal Abdul Nasser, Israel takes over the Sinai Peninsula, but it withdraws from it at a later stage.

1958 United Arab Republic (UAE) was announced, representing the temporary unification of Egypt and Syria during President Gamal Abdul Nasser's rule. Lebanon experiences its first civil war, during the rule of President Camile Chamoun. The United States government sends US Marines to Lebanon to help the Lebanese government restore peace and security in the country.

1964 Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is established in Cairo, by Arab leaders headed by President Gamal Abdul Nasser.

1965 Palestinian raids and military operations from Lebanon into northern Israel are undertaken. Lebanese army and security forces often opposed and prevented them. Several Palestinian leaders are sent to Lebanese jails.

1967 A six day war between Israel on one side; and Egypt, Syria and Jordan on the other side, ends with Israel taking control of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula.

1969 Lebanese government signs the Cairo Agreement with Palestinian leadership in Egypt. According to the agreement, Palestinians are allowed to undertake military struggle against Israel, provided that no firing into Israel from Lebanese territories takes place. In addition, appearing armed in the streets of Lebanon is not allowed. The Cairo agreement was designed by President Nasser. Its contents remained a secret for a considerable period of time, before it got published in An-Nahar newspaper at a later stage. A considerable number of prominent Lebanese politicians requested the cancellation of the agreement as they got acquainted with its contents.

1970 Jordan experiences a civil war. The Jordanian army defeats the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) fighters while attempting to take over Jordan. A considerable number of PLO fighters move to Lebanon. Consequently, the number of Palestinian refugees and PLO fighters tremendously increase in Lebanon.

1972-1973 Continuous military clashes take place between Palestinian resistance movement and Lebanese army and civilians.
1973 Egypt and Syria attack Israel in Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula. The Lebanese army move against Palestinian fighters, after it became apparent that they were attempting to create a "state within a state". Consequently, Syria closes its borders with Lebanon. The Arab League of Nations meet and order a halt to all military operations. Negotiations proceed between Lebanese government and PLO leaders.

1974 Cyprus is partitioned into two sections, after the entry of the Turkish army to the northern part of the island.

1975 On 13 April, 1975, a seventeen year old crisis starts in Lebanon.

1976 Syria sends troops to Lebanon to support the Lebanese government in restoring peace and security in the country.

1979 Israel and Egypt sign a peace treaty, during the rule of President Anwar Al-Sadat. Religious sectarian conflict takes place in Syria leading to brutal events. Ayattollah Khomeini's Iranian revolution changes the political system of Iran. It promotes a purely Islamic and anti-Western society.

1982 Massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon is undertaken. President elect Bashir Gemayel is assassinated. His brother, Mr. Amine Gemayel, is elected as the new president of Lebanon. Kata'ib members, with the help of Israeli troops, abolish the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila, resulting in the death of hundreds of Palestinians. The United States and France send troops to Lebanon as part of multi-national peace keeping forces.

1983 The American embassy gets blown in the Western sector of Beirut.

1984 After making arrangements with President Gemayel, the American president Ronald Reagan orders US Marines to leave Lebanon.

1987 The Palestinian intifada movement starts in Gaza Strip and West Bank. It acquires a lot of publicity, emphasising the fact that women and children are participating in the intifada.

1988 Israel's right to exist gets recognised by PLO leader, Mr. Yasser Arafat. United States Government establishes a dialogue with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.


1991 In January, 1991, war against Iraq starts. President George Bush continued to make serious efforts to enlist Arab allies in the cause against Iraq; thus, making it clear that it is not just the Western countries against Saddam Hussein. In September, 1991, Egypt and Syria, among others, committed Arab troops to the Desert Storm Operation.

1992 In September, 1992, and according to the Al-Taif peace accords, the 40,000 Syrian troops in and around Beirut are to be redeployed to the Beqa'a Valley. The on-going Arab-Israeli peace talks continue.
APPENDIX C

Actors and Participants: Who Is Who?
Appendix C

During the seventeen year old crisis, several political/military factions, parties, militias, fronts and movements emerged. It would be appropriate to define and evaluate the orientations of all parties/militias, knowing that their ideologies highly affected their comprehension and interpretation of the events taking place, as evidenced by their foreign connections and decisions throughout the crisis period. Yet this becomes practically impossible, in this focused research, given the bewildering number of new parties/militias that emerged at different stages of the events in focus. For the purpose of this research study, a brief definition is offered for the principle parties involved in the crisis events.

The basic two fronts that represented most parties at the beginning of the crisis period are the following: First, the Lebanese Front, constituted of rightist Christian parties; and secondly, the Front for Progressive Parties and National Forces (FPPNF), representing the leftist Muslim parties.

The Lebanese Front. It was established in 1973. It consists of rightist Christian parties devoted to retaining the independence, sovereignty and the pro-Western democratic orientation of Lebanon. Such parties include the Kata’ib (Phalanges), Ahrar (Liberals), Guardian of the Cedars, and Marada, among others.

Front for Progressive Parties and National Forces (FPPNF). It was established in 1973, representing a combination of leftist parties, with the leadership of Mr. Kamal Jounblatt. Such parties included the Progressive Socialist Party, Murabitun, Communist Party, Ba’ath Party, and Syrian Social Nationalist Party, among others.

Kata’ib. The Kata’ib, meaning Phalange, is a cohesive Christian - mainly Maronite - rightist political party. The party was founded in 1936 by Mr. Pierre Gemayel. After the death of its leader, his son, the late President Bashir Gemayel, took over in leading the party. The major goal of the Kata’ib party is to resist any threat to Lebanon’s independence, integrity and sovereignty. Members of the Kata’ib party believe that Greater Lebanon is a pro-Western democratic country.

The Ahrar. The term Ahrar means liberals. The National Liberal Party is a Christian - mainly Maronite - rightist party. It was headed by the late President Camille Chamoun. There are several ideological similarities between the Ahrar and Kata’ib parties. Accordingly, the two parties have fought several wars together. The late President Chamoun believed in preserving Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and its pro-Western democratic orientation.

National Bloc. This is a Christian rightist party, headed by Mr. Raymond Iddi, patriarch of Jbeil. He believes that Lebanon should be open to the Arab world. Due to the unstable situation in the country during the crisis period, Mr. Iddi has been residing in Paris. He objected to the Cairo Agreement of 1969 between the Lebanese government and the FLO. On several occasions he requested the cancellation of the agreement. He is a believer in Greater Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence.

Lebanese Forces. Major Christian parties joined forces together under the leadership of late president Bashir Gemayel. The Lebanese Forces was dissolved during the post-crisis period and its leader, Mr. Samir Geagea was sentenced to life time imprisonment.

Deuxième Bureau. This represents the intelligence service of the Lebanese army. Currently it is defunct.

Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). It is mainly a Druze political party. It was headed by the
**Arab Nationalist Movement.** This movement was founded in 1954 by Mr. George Habash, at the American University of Beirut. It represents a small socialist leftist party. At present, it is defunct.

**Murabitun Movement.** This is mainly a Sunnite Muslim leftist militia, highly controlled by the Palestinian resistance. The party was headed by Mr. Ibrahim Quilait. Members of the Murabitun believe in the Arabism ideology. Accordingly, they highly supported the Palestinian cause. The Murabitun movement is now defunct.

**Nasserist Movement.** Throughout the crisis in focus, several small leftist parties emerged. Most of these parties allied to foreign governments. Such parties include the Independent Nasserist Movement and the Nasserist Organisation.

**Amal Organisation.** The term Amal means hope. This is a Leftist Shi'ite Muslim militia. It was founded in 1974, as a Shi'ite Movement of the Deprived, by Imam Musa Al-Sadr. The Amal Organisation allied with the Syrian troops during critical stages of the crisis period. The leadership of Amal was passed to Mr. Nabih Berri after Imam Al-Sadr's disappearance.

**Hezbollah.** This is a fundamentalist Shi'ite Muslim leftist militia, supported by Iran. It emerged after Ayatollah Khomeini's Iranian revolution of 1979. It aims at instituting a fundamentalist Islamic political system in Lebanon, similar to that of Iran.

**Ba'ath Parties.** The Ba'ath leftist party in Lebanon was founded in 1949. It is mainly a Pan-Arabist socialist party with two regional branches, including the Syrian Ba'th regime and the Iraqi Ba'th regime.

**Communist Party.** The Communist Party is a small leftist party with a Marxist ideology. It was founded in 1930, and it was headed by Mr. Muhsin Ibrahim.

**Al-Sa'iqa.** This is a Palestinian militia which is highly controlled by Syria.

**Syrian Social Nationalist Party (PPS).** The party was founded in 1993 and headed by Mr. Antun Saadeh, who believed that Greater Lebanon is nothing but a French invention. Accordingly, the party has long fought for uniting historical Syria, where Lebanon and Cyprus would be included, into a one Greater Syrian nation.
APPENDIX D

Media Case Chronology
1920-1996
Appendix D

The events outlined in this brief chronology for the year 1976 are mainly summarised from AL-Nahar Special Edition. The events of 1977-1980 are summarised from EL-Telegraph and Middle-East News periodicals.

1920 AL-Nahar newspaper is founded.

1937 The first radio station, Radio de l'Orient, is established in Lebanon, which at a later stage became known as Radio Lebanon.

1957 Rights to broadcast two programs over channels 7 and 9 VHF were granted to Compagnie Libanaise du Televison (CLT) by the government.

1958 The Kata'ib Party establishes Voice of Lebanon Station (Sawt Lubnan), which was soon forced to close down.

1959 Rights are granted to TeleOrient to broadcast one program over channels 5 and 11.

1966 National News Agency of the Ministry of Information is established.

1970 King Hussein of Jordan moves against Palestinian legions in a bloody conflict labelled as Black September. Palestinians move from Jordan to Lebanon.

1975 War breaks out in Lebanon.

1976 The Kata'ib party successfully re-launches The Voice of Lebanon (Sawt Lubnan).

Nasserist Party - Murabitun - establish Voice of Arab Lebanon (Sawt Lubnan AL-Arab). Operations ceased at a later stage during crisis period.

Nasserist Party - Murabitun unsuccessfully attempt to establish Television of Arab Lebanon (Television Lubnan AL-Arab), a new television station with an Arab orientation.

British radio station moves its offices from Beirut to Cairo.

Troops occupy the offices of major Lebanese newspapers and magazines, and prevent their publication for two consecutive weeks; including AL-Nahar, Orient Le Jour, Beirut, AL-Moharar, AL-Safir, AL-Nida’a, and Doustour magazine.

Lebanese parliament holds a meeting to discuss the occupation of offices of major Lebanese newspapers.

Parliament decides on the withdrawal of the troops, and the reissuing of the newspapers. In addition, Parliament introduced general censorship regulations, to be practised with all newspapers and magazines.

Lebanese president, Mr. Elias Sarkis, refuses the occupation, and states that it is an illegal process which contradicts the Lebanese laws and regulations related to the media and freedom of the press.
The newly introduced governmental censorship regulations starting 3 January, 1977 are enforced for about a twelve months period, after which they were ignored without cancellation.

Lebanese government requests PLO to abide by the Lebanese censorship laws and regulations, knowing that the Palestinians produce a considerable amount of publications in Lebanon.

Foreign news agencies leave Beirut due to enforcement of strict news censorship regulations.

The French press agency establishes a new office in Nicosia, Cyprus, while maintaining its office in Beirut. Important Lebanese events get printed in Cyprus, since Lebanese censorship regulations prohibits their publications.

Arab Peace Keeping forces attack the offices of Liberal party press (AL-Ahrar), and prevent the printing of the Voice of Liberals newspaper (Sawt AL-Ahar) and Liberal Tigers magazine (Nmour AL-Ahrar).

Voice of One Lebanon station (Sawt Lubnan Al-Wahid) is founded.

1978 **Lebanese** Forces establish Voice of Free Lebanon station (Sawt Lubnan AL-Hor).

1979 A **mixed** television company, TeleLiban, was formed by the government, whereby each of CLT and TeleOrient holds 25% of shares, and the government holds the remaining 50%. TeleLiban was given monopoly rights over all television broadcasting in the country until the year 2012.

1980 **Assassination** of a well known journalist, and owner of AL-Hawadeth magazine, Mr. Salim AL-Lawze.

Assassination of head of Journalism Syndicate, Mr. Riad Taha.

The General Manager of TeleLiban, Mr. Charles Rizk, is kidnapped and released at a later stage, after the interference of main local political figures.

Threats over the phone lead to the departure of owners and directors of major newspapers in Lebanon, including Ambassador Ghassan Toueini, owner of AL-Nahar newspaper; Mr. Michael Abou Jaudeh, director of AL-Nahar newspaper; and Mr. Talal Salman, owner and director of AL-Safir newspaper; among others. Nearly every street in Beirut publishes a newspaper. (About 43 newspapers are being published in West Beirut and 7 in East Beirut; some of which are the following: AL-Nahar, Arab Weekly (AL-Usbough AL-Arabi), Nasserist Stand (AL-Mawkef AL-Nasser), Freedom (AL-Houriah), Monday Morning, the Homeland (AL-Watan), AL-Amal, The Land (AL-Ard), The Communist (AL-Ishtiraki), the Revolutionary (AL-Thawrawi), Voice of the Public (Sawt AL-Jamahir), and Arab Youth (AL-Shabibah AL-Arabiah). In East Beirut, the following newspapers are being published: The Phalengist (AL-Kata’ibi), Work (AL-Amal), Lebanese Fighter (AL-Moukatel AL-Loubnani), Voice of the Tigers (Sawt AL-Noumour), Gardians of the Cedars (Hourass AL-Arz), Voice of the Cedars (Sawt AL-Arz), The Movement (AL-Harakah), Lebanon (Lubnan). Some of the Palestinian publications include The Voice of Palestine (Sawt Phalastine), The Wind (AL-A’sifah), Palestine (Phalastine), Revolutionary Palestine (Phalastine AL-Thawrah), the Base (AL-Ka’idah), and The Message (AL-Risalah). In addition, other publications include Arab Lebanon (Lubnan AL-Arabi). One Lebanon (Lubnan Alawahed), Voice of the Kurds (Sawt AL-Akrad), The Alternative (AL-Badil), the Truth (AL-Hakikah) and Co-operation (AL-Tadamon).

Most of the previously mentioned newspapers are mainly bulletins or tabloids that have ceased to be published.
Middle-East Television station is established in the security zone in South Lebanon.

The news department within TeleLiban was split, which gave rise to rival broadcasting between both sides of the Lebanese capital.

Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) was established by the Lebanese Forces militia, which soon acquired the highest market share of both viewers and advertisers alike.

LBC became the voice of all Lebanon, through which government officials are currently broadcasting messages across to the general public. In an attempt to impose order, the government has proposed a project for organising and regulating audio-visual media.
APPENDIX E

Lebanon in Crisis: Overall Case Chronology
LEBANON IN CRISIS: OVERALL CASE CHRONOLOGY
1972 - 1996

Appendix E

Although political scientists and other critics believe that the Lebanese events started on 13 April, 1975, with a military clash between the Kata’ib party and the Palestinians; yet this case chronology summarises the events in focus starting from 1972. The main aim is to show the pre-crisis events that led to the seventeen years of war. The following chronology outlines only the major events that took place in Lebanon from 1972 to 1991. The events outlined in this appendix for the periods (1972 - 1974) and (1977 - 1988) are mainly summarised from El-Telegraph and Middle-East News periodicals. The events of 1975 and 1976 are summarised from An-Nahar Special Edition, 1976.

1972

October 1972

- Mr. Raymond Iddi, member of the Lebanese parliament, reports to An-Nahar independent newspaper, stating that the Cairo Agreement should be cancelled for it is not in favour of Lebanon nor the Palestinians. In addition, it is not in harmony with the Lebanese constitution and the truce agreement drawn between Lebanon and Israel.

- Palestinian resistance leaders visit president of the Lebanese parliament, Mr. Kamel Al-Asaad in his office, and Lebanese Shi’ite religious leader, Imam Moussa Al-Sadre. Imam Al-Sadre later reports that the Palestinian leaders assured him that all Palestinian forces will leave the villages and cities in South Lebanon, and that they are considerate of the situation in Lebanon and the area in general.

- The Egyptian president, Mr. Anwar Al-Saddat, announces from Radio Al-Cahira, during a speech that Israel’s attack on Lebanon at the beginning of this month was expected, and the only way to stop Israel’s attacks is to undertake military operations inside Israel. He emphasises that Lebanon should not be given more responsibilities than what it can handle. He proceeds to say that all Arab countries are responsible for the Lebanese events. He accuses the united States of giving the green light to Israel to attack Lebanon. He emphasises that the Lebanese events will continue as long as the United States continues to support Israel.

November 1972

- Lebanese army leadership announces on Friday, 3 November, 1972, that during the month of October, 1972, Israel broke the truce agreement between Lebanon and Israel, by sending Israeli planes ten times over the Lebanese villages of Al-Tibe, Tibneen, Nabatiyeh, Tyre, Jezeine, Maroun Al-Ras, Keroun, Rachaya Al-Wadi, Hasbaya, Marjoyoun, Barouq, Yaroun, Aitaroun, Mrouheen, Naquorah, Sidon, Tripoli and Beirut.

1973

March 1973

- On Thursday, 29 March, 1973, Israeli police and 150 army members open fire on Lebanese territories, for one hour, in retaliation for mines spread on the way to the village of Mezraeet, near Tarbikha in Israel.

- Lebanese Defence National Ministry announces on Thursday, 29 March, 1973, that Israel broke the truce agreement for three times between the 17th and the 24th of this month by sending Israeli planes over almost all Lebanese territories.
April 1973

- Israeli army members attack Beirut through the sea, which results in the assassination of three Palestinian leaders, and the death of ten others including two Lebanese policemen.

- Consecutive explosions take place at the Tapline establishments and Medrico refinery in Al-Zahrani, South Lebanon. Army members found seventeen other timed bombs near the operation room in the area. Pumping oil from Saudi Arabia to Al-Zahrani stops for a while, during which Lebanon was unable to export crude oil to Europe and America. The Palestinian leadership accuses the Israeli marines of exploding the oil refinery in South Lebanon, while the Lebanese army emphasises that the operation was undertaken from land, not sea.

May 1973

- Fierce fighting between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian resistance forces result in twelve deaths and forty wounded Lebanese soldiers.

- Fighting resumes between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian resistance forces.

- Lebanese president, Mr. Suleiman Franjieh, decides to abolish Palestinian military existence in Sabra and Chatila camps in Beirut.

- Intensive Arab political pressures and interventions take place on the Lebanese scene. Accordingly, President Franjieh orders a cease fire after 24 hours of brutal fighting, which stops the Lebanese national army from entering Palestinian camps. Negotiations resume between the two sides.

- Emergency situation is announced in the country, and Beirut International Airport is closed after its runways were heavily bombed by the Palestinian forces.

- Fighting resumes and the Lebanese air force participate in the battle. Dbayeh and Tel Zantar Palestinian camps surrender.

- Syria closes its boundaries with Lebanon, resulting in a deterioration in the Lebanese export activities through land.

- President Franjieh explains the Lebanese policy to Arab representatives and ambassadors, emphasising that the Lebanese law is to be applied on Palestinians living in Lebanon, as it is applied on the Lebanese themselves. He continued to say that the Lebanese government does not accept kidnapping accidents or the appearance of armed men in the cities.

- Fierce fighting continues between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian forces, especially in the suburbs of Beirut including Dbayeh.

- Crowds gather near bakeries and supermarkets to purchase necessary commodities during enforced cease fires.

- Syrian, Algerian, and Libyan governments make statements criticising Lebanese politics, and announcing full support for the Palestinians and their resistance.

- Israeli Minister of Exterior, Mr. Aba Iban, reports that what is happening in Lebanon is extremely dangerous, and Israel should be ready for any future emergency.

- Fierce fighting resumes in Al-Arquoub and Rachaya. The Lebanese army defends itself against huge numbers of Palestinian "liberation army" members, entering Lebanon through Syria. The Lebanese army interferes after it is bombed from Palestinian bases.

- On Friday, 11 May, 1973, the Lebanese cabinet holds a meeting, whereby president Franjieh announces to the ministers that the Lebanese government does not accept to have an occupying
army in Lebanon. He proceeds to say that there is no other Arab country that gave the Palestinians as much as Lebanon has given them.

- The kidnapping of a member of the Lebanese army in Tripoli on Thursday, 17 May, 1973, leads to resuming the fighting between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian armed forces in the city of Tripoli. An emergency situation is announced in the country.

- President Kadhafi of Libya emphasises his support for the Palestinian resistance forces.

- Iraqi government limits the approval of tourist visas to Iraqi citizens wanting to tour Lebanon, after the number of tourist visa applications reached 100,000 in number. Baghdad only approved 16,000 visa applications.

- A considerable number of European tourists arrive at Beirut International Airport. Also a considerable number of Lebanese expatriates in the United States and Canada are expected to spend their summer in Lebanon.

June 1973

- In an article published by Al-Thawrah newspaper, meaning "The Revolution", Mr. Marwan Hamwi, the general director of the Syrian news agency Sana states that Lebanon is not a stable country. Syria and Lebanon make up one country from the view point of history and geography.

December 1973

- On 16 December, 1973, US Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, visits Lebanon and meets Lebanese President Franjiah, to offer him the possibility of displacing the Christian population of Lebanon (Khalifah, 1990:25).

1974

January 1974

- Lebanese Minister for Interior describes the security situation in the country. He states that there is about half a million pieces of weaponry at present in Lebanon, and there are groups supported by foreigners who aim to destroy the country.

February 1974

- The security situation deteriorates at the Lebanese Israeli borders. Israel bombs southern Lebanese villages, for three consecutive days, in retaliation for Palestinian military operations undertaken against Israel from the south of Lebanon.

March 1974

- During a meeting in Baalbeck, a Shi'ite member of the Lebanese parliament, Mr. Hussein Al-Husseini, accused the Lebanese government of starting side battles so as to run away from being fair to the deprived Shi'ites.
April 1974

- Fierce fighting between the Palestinian forces and the Kata'ib - Christian Lebanese party - continues for four consecutive days, after which a cease fire is announced in Beirut. The fighting results in 100 deaths and 200 wounded, most of which are Lebanese civilians.

- Israeli airforce bombs the villages of Memes and Kfar in South Lebanon for seven consecutive hours. Material losses include destruction of houses and agricultural crops and the death of livestock.

June 1974

- The Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr. Taki El-dine Al Solh, meets with Arab ambassadors in Lebanon. He explains to them that Lebanon is in need of support, for the country is unable to face the Israeli attacks. He requests them to put pressure on the superpowers as a means of pressuring Israel to stop its attacks on Lebanon.

July 1974

- The Palestinian leadership announces on Thursday, 4 July, 1974, that it will increase its military operations against Israel from within the occupied land, instead of the south of Lebanon so as to stop Israel from holding Lebanon responsible for the Palestinian attacks.

- Israel heavily bomb the villages of Yaroun and Anaya for one hour and fifteen minutes. The bombing continues throughout the night resulting in two wounded and several material losses including the destruction of a school, club and many houses.

August 1974

- Mr. Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, orders Palestinian resistance forces to leave the village of Rachaya Al-Foukhar, after its villagers protested regarding their security situation requesting the Palestinians to leave their village.

September 1974

- Israel undertakes an air raid and heavily bombs Lebanese villages at the Israeli Lebanese borders, especially Al-Arquoub and Rachaya, killing the mayor of Hasbaya and wounding several others. In addition, many houses are destroyed.

January 1975

- Mr. Phillip Takla, Lebanese Minister of Exterior, announces on Friday, 10 January, 1975, that Lebanon submitted a grievance to the United Nations Security Council regarding the latest Israeli attacks on its territories.

- Israel informs the United Nations that it holds Lebanon responsible for the Palestinian resistance actions, and that it will take all the necessary measures to ensure security in its territories.

- Villagers of Kfarchouba are displaced to Marjaoun - a nearby village in south Lebanon due to the continuous Israeli attacks on their village.
February and March 1975

- Various indicators show that a civil war is about to start in Lebanon. Fighting starts in Beirut between members of leftist and rightist parties, after demonstrations were undertaken by the Christian rightist parties of Kata'ib and Ahrar in support of the Lebanese National Army.

- A shi'ite Muslim party by the name "Deprived Group" emerged. It was headed by the spiritual leader of the Shi'ite Muslim sect in Lebanon, Imam Moussa Al-sadre.

- The "Deprived Group" express economic requests and demand equal privileges with the Christians.

- Fishermen in Sidon go on a strike.

- Fishermen organise a demonstration in Sidon during which fire was opened in every direction resulting in the death of Mr. Maarouf Saad, a member of the Lebanese parliament and the leader of the Nasserist party, in late February, 1975.

April 1975

- On 13 April, 1975, two members of the Kata'ib - Christian rightist party - are shot dead during a Kata'ib festival in Ain Al-Ramaneh area, for no obvious reason. The Kata'ib party quickly respond by shooting twenty six Palestinians, who were in a bus coming back from a Palestinian festival at The Arab University area. There is no explanation for the reason why the bus went through Ain Al-Ramaneh area, instead of taking the main road to the Palestinian camp of Tal Zaatar.

- A bomb was thrown on the Ahrar political Christian party in Tripoli, a major city in North Lebanon.

- Fighting is resumed in Al-Dekwanah, a suburb of Beirut, and the worst battle since the beginning of the events takes place, with heavy weaponry being used. Side battles start in Borj Al-Barajneh, Chiah, Harat Houraik and Ain Al-Ramaneh.

May 1975

- The Palestinian liberation Organisation (PLO) announces that it will not communicate with the Kata'ib party but only with the Lebanese government.

- Military clashes in Al-Dekwanah and Tal Za'atar with one killed and thirty wounded. Military clashes extend to the areas of Jisr Al-Basha, Ashrafieh, Forn Al-Sheback and Ain Al-Ramaneh.

- Syrian Minister of Exteriors, Mr. Abdul Halim Khadam, arrives in Lebanon to mediate.

June 1975

- The number of people killed is 105 after eleven days of heavy military actions.

- Mr. Khadam meets twice in one day with Lebanese President Franjieh.

July 1975

- Heavy military battles are resumed in Ashrafieh and Karantinah areas.

- Forty killed and eighty wounded due to a bomb explosion in the city of Baalbeck, where Amal - a leftist Shi'ite Muslim party - was practising on the use of new weaponry.
- Three explosions in Zahle lead to enormous fires and material destruction. Mutual kidnapping starts again.

- Mr. Curt Valdheim, General Secretary of the United Nations, warns of the possibility of war in the Middle-East region.

- Israeli attack on the Palestinian Ain Al-Helweh camp, and sam rockets fired in Israeli planes for the first time.

August 1975

- Minimum wages in the public sector increased to 310 Lebanese Pounds (LP) per month.

September 1975

- Another series of brutal military battles resume in Zahle, where twenty six are killed and nine corpses are found in the village of Saad Nabel.

- Armed men in Zahle forcibly enter a Lebanese army centre in retaliation to the arrest of their colleagues.

- An armed attack on a military truck belonging to the Lebanese army in Tripoli leads to wounding fifteen army men.

- Displacement of Lebanese people, according to their religion, continues in the Christian village of Beit Mallat in Akkar after the killing of sixteen villagers. The inhabitants of Al-Kaa - a Christian village in Beqaa area - were also displaced.

- Strikes took place in Muslim areas for using the Lebanese army in the battle against armed forces. The Sunni Muslims of Beirut considered the Palestinian armed forces as their own protective army, and began to deal with the Christian rightist parties, as well as the Lebanese army from this perspective. Accordingly, the Murabitun - a Sunnite Muslim militia - undertook military operations with the Palestinians. Other leftist parties also supported the Palestinians on different occasions, for they perceived them to have similar and coinciding goals.

- Sunnite Muslim Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr. Rashid Karameh, threatens to resign if the Lebanese army is to be used in all areas.

- Beirut suffers from lack of water, electricity and food.

- The Kata'ib party starts its own radio station.

October and November 1975

- Spiritual leaders meet in Bkiry to discuss the Lebanese events.

- Step-by-step Beirut attempts to normalise and experience what is considered to be a relatively "routine" way of life.

- The economic and material loss that the country had experienced during the previous 140 days is estimated at three and a half million US dollars.

- The city of Beirut is now under the control of armed forces, after a long day of heavy military actions.

- Hundreds of Lebanese civilians, especially in Christian East Beirut, protest against the existence of the armed forces.
- Civilians living in Beirut experience food shortage.
- Beirut literally becomes a battle field. Battles take place in front of the Lebanese parliament.
- Hundreds were reported as dead and wounded in the streets of Beirut. Foreign countries formally request their citizens to leave Lebanon.
- A cease fire was announced lasting a few hours.
- The shadow of famine threatens Beirut.
- Mr Valdhiem meets with President Franjieh and Prime Minister Rachid Karameh.
- Fighting spreads all over Lebanon in hundreds of dead and wounded. Several corpses of members of the Kata'ib party are found in North Lebanon.

1976

January 1976

- Mr. Raymond Iddi, member of the Lebanese Parliament, accuses the United States of aiming to partition Lebanon.
- Fierce fighting resumes in the Fanadek area of Western Beirut, and the American embassy heavily shelled.
- American messenger, Mr. Dean Brown, visits Lebanon and renews Dr. Kissinger's offer, emphasising the necessity of displacing the Christian population of Lebanon, as a solution to the Lebanese war. He states that the United States has already prepared for the displacement of Christian Lebanese. (Telegraph, January, 1976. Also see Khalifeh (1990:25)).
- Fierce attack on Jiye, Damour, and Meshref - Christian Villages - resulting in the displacement of people.
- British radio station moves its offices from Beirut to Cairo.
- President Franjieh visits Damascus to sign an agreement aiming at ending the crisis.

February 1976

- It is agreed to maintain the Cairo (Al-Cahira) Agreement with a Syrian guarantee.
- Two professors at The American University of Beirut are murdered by one of the students.
- PLO troops in charge of security and order in Tripoli.
- The American Ministry of Exterior agrees to grant US$25 million to help the Lebanese government.

March 1976

- Mr. Valdhiem announces his fears of partitioning and asks others to help Lebanon.
- Dean of School of Engineering at Saint Joseph University is killed.
- Leftist parties take over the Holiday Inn Hotel.
- Leftist parties fiercely shell Baabda presidential palace, and force the Lebanese president to leave.
- Two hundred individuals killed during the past two week period.

April 1976
- Armed robbers steal over US$50 million from Lebanese banks.
- Mr. Valdheim announces again his fears about partitioning Lebanon, which will affect its independence.
- American messenger, Mr. Dean Brown, visits Lebanon again to study the current situation.
- The Syrian army enters the north border areas.
- French messenger, Mr. Gorse, arrives in Beirut and starts his contacts with Lebanese officials.
- A committee of four members are sent to Lebanon from the Vatican to help in resolving the Lebanese crisis.
- Destruction of houses owned by Christian displaced families continues in Hamana.
- The French government hints at the possibility of sending troops to solve the Lebanese problem.
- President Ford praises the Syrian stand from the Lebanese crisis.
- Christian East Beirut exchanges wheat in return for fuel from Muslim West Beirut.

May 1976
- The American University of Beirut resumes classes.
- Beirut experiences the heaviest rocket shelling so far.
- Mr. Elias Sarkis is elected as the new Lebanese president on 8 May, 1976 in Mansour palace by 66 out of 69 votes.
- Libyan Prime Minister, Mr. Abdul Salam Jalloud, visits Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad to help resolve the Lebanese crisis.

June 1976
- After previously opposing the French intervention in the Lebanese crisis, Mr. Walid Jounblat, leader of the Druzes Socialist Progressi ve Party, changes his mind and requests France to intervene.
- 10,000 Syrian soldiers with 200 tanks enter Lebanon.
- Syrian president, Mr. Hafez Al-Asad, sends his assistant to Beirut to solve the Lebanese crisis.
- Palestinian forces request Arab volunteers to help them with their military operations.
- Syrian troops continue their progression into Lebanon to reach Al-Arquoub village.
- Shelling and seizure of Tal Zaatar Palestinian camp continues by Kata’ib party.
Foreign citizens leave Lebanon as requested by their governments through the American and British embassies.

Appointment of Egyptian colonel, Mr. Ghounaim, to administer Arab Peace Keeping Forces that entered Lebanon. Five Arab countries participate in the Arab Peace Keeping Forces, including Sudan and Jordan. The majority of the Peace Keeping Forces are Syrian troops.

July 1976

- Mr. Jalloud leaves Lebanon after accusing the Lebanese Christian rightist parties of trying to abolish Palestinian resistance.
- So far 585,000 Lebanese citizens have left the country.
- Syrian army heavily shells Tripoli - main city in north Lebanon.
- Arab Ministers of Exterior initiate a series of meetings in Cairo to discuss the Lebanese crisis.
- Syrian troops at the city boundaries of Sidon, Tripoli and Baalbeck.
- Terror and fear all over Beirut after the majority of Americans and other foreigners evacuated from Lebanon.
- The last three hundred foreigners evacuated from Lebanon.

August 1976

- Syrian troops surround Al-Badawi and Nahr Al-Bared areas.
- The American University Hospital is badly in need of blood and medication.
- Syrians enter Majdel Anjar village and arrest some individuals.
- Ouyoun Al-Seeman area gets heavily shelled by Syrian planes.

September 1976

- All three Christian parties join together, as "Lebanese Forces", under the leadership of President Bashir Gemayel.
- The Israeli Minister of Exterior announces that he will not permit the Palestinian forces to return to south Lebanon.
- President Camil Chamoun and Mr. Pierre Gemayel visit Damascus and meet with President Assad. Peace talks reach a dead end.
- New committee organised to help individuals migrate to Australia.
- Battles on all fronts and Syrians advance to south of Lebanon.

October 1976

- 18 October, 1976, is labelled as "Black Monday". Eight hundred rockets fell on both sides of Beirut, resulting in five hundred deaths.
November 1976
- Head of Israeli army objects to the entrance of the Arab peace keeping forces beyond Al-Litani area in south Lebanon.
- Arab peace keeping forces consist of 25,000 Syrians and the rest are drawn from other Arab nationalities.
- Lebanese Minister, Mr. Ghassan Touaini, states in Geneva that:
  1. 1,700,000 Lebanese are in need of nutritious substances.
  2. The number of casualties reached 60,000 deaths and 20,000 wounded.
- Palestinian resistance forces try to regain their earlier position and start shelling Ain Ibl and Rumaish.
- Numerous Israeli troops gather at the Lebanese southern borders.
- Palestinians refuse to give up their heavy weaponry.

December 1976
- Lybin withdraws its troops from the Arab peace keeping forces.
- Continuous fights between the Christian rightist party and the Palestinians in south Lebanon take place.

1977

January 1977
- Lebanese newspapers and magazines are expected to reappear in two days time after troops withdrawal from the publishing offices.
- Lebanese government requests PLO to abide by the Lebanese censorship laws and regulations, knowing that the Palestinians produce a considerable number of publications in Lebanon.
- Strikes and demonstrations against the presence of the Arab peace keeping forces take place in East Beirut. Participants in the demonstrations hold signs stating: "Not for an Arab occupation ."

March 1977
- Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fouad Boutros, states that Lebanese government has no control over the south, especially in the areas where fierce fighting continuously takes place between the Palestinians, supported by leftist parties on one side, and the Christian parties and Israel on the other side.
- Israel's Defence Minister, Mr. Chimon Perez, states that Israel prefers to have the Lebanese army in charge of security in south Lebanon rather than the United Nations forces.
- Fierce fighting resumes between Palestinians and Israelis in Bint Jbail area, which is about four kilometers from the borders with Israel. Immigration continues from the south towards Beirut.
- Mr. Raymond Iddi, member of the Lebanese parliament, accuses Dr. Henry Kissinger, American Minister of Foreign Affairs, of attempting to partition Lebanon, as is the case with
Cyprus. Mr. Iddi requests international public consciousness to interfere and stop Mr. Kissinger's conspiracy against Lebanon.

- At 11:15 a.m. on Wednesday, 16 March, 1977, unknown armed men open fire on Lebanese Minister and founder of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Mr. Kamal Jounblatt, while he was in his car leaving his village Al-Moukhhtarah to Beirut.

April 1977

- On Friday, 22 April, 1977, the Telegraph newspaper reports that during a dinner held at the Kremlin, Syrian President, Mr. Hafez Al-Assad, defended the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. He stated that, Syria cannot ignore the events in Lebanon, for Syria and Lebanon are made up of the same people and they were previously one country. He continued to say that the Syrian intervention in Lebanon helped in making the situation go back to its previous nature, with the exception of South Lebanon. He also reminded the participants that the Lebanese army will soon enter the south area.

- United Nations observers in south Lebanon report that Israel has opened fire on Lebanese territories five times during the month of March 1977 - specifically on 1, 6, 8, 17, and 22 - using mostly automatic weaponry, and that it has crossed the Lebanese borders on one occasion during the month.

May 1977

- Mr. Walid Jounblatt, son of the late Kamal Jounblatt, is voted as the head of the Druzes Progressive Socialist Party.

July 1977

- Fierce fighting resumes between Al-Sa‘iqa militia, backed by Syria, and the National Rejection Front - Muslim parties - in Borj Al-Barajneh in West Beirut. The Rejection Front accuses Syria of planning and causing the Lebanese events.

- The Lebanese Front - rightist parties - produce a report criticising the actions practised by the Arab peace keeping forces, which gets published in the French newspaper, La Reveil. After few copies were sold, the remaining issues were collected and destroyed. Israel's media broadcast the report for two consecutive days.

- Al-Anwar - Lebanese newspaper - reports on Thursday, 26 July, 1977, that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to send UN forces to be based along the Lebanese Israeli borders. The number of UN forces is increased from 40 to 4000 members.

October 1977

- The French Press Agency in Beirut reports that as the Lebanese army prepares to enter the south of Lebanon, Israel heavily shells Nabatieh and Deir Al-Zahrani, which are about thirteen kilometers from the borders with Israel.

- The leader of the Kata‘ib - Christian party - reports that there is an intention of using some religious sects in Lebanon to cause chaos in the country. He requests the government to be firm in providing safety and security measures.

- Former American Foreign Minister, Mr. Henry Kissinger, states during a speech at the International Jewish Conference that true peace in the Middle-East cannot materialise, except through close co-operation between the United States and Israel. He made it clear that he is against the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank for it will act against providing
security in the Middle-East. Finally, he requests any American administration in the White House to continue providing weaponry to Israel, as was the case with previous administrations, when he was foreign minister.

November and December 1977

- Former Lebanese president, Mr. Charles Helou, reports to the Hawadeth - Lebanese magazine - that there are over ten countries that made use of the Lebanese tragic events, and that the United States could very well be the planner of the Lebanese crisis.

- An article was published in the Times magazine reporting that after a year since the end of the two year war, Lebanon tries to overcome the previous events. One important indicator is the intention to quickly re-construct Beirut. Currently, roads are clean, Beirut international airport is open, work resumes in Mekael industrial area, 73 national and international banks re-open, Beirut port regains 50% of its operating capacity, and beaches and hotels re-open. The Saint George beach, which was burnt during the previous events, is repaired and ready to receive tourists. 2000 Americans out of the 5000 who were previously living in Beirut before the events return to Lebanon.

1978

January 1978

- The Manar magazine - published weekly in London - reports that military battleships, full of latest Soviet weaponry, unload in Tyre port; and the weaponry get delivered to Palestinian forces under the supervision of the Syrian troops in Lebanon.

- Former Lebanese president, Mr. Camil Chamoun, expresses his fears of renewed battles between Israel and the Palestinians in Lebanon.

February 1978

- Mr. Adel Ossairan - member of the Lebanese parliament - reports to Lebanese and Arab officials the presence of an American plan aiming towards the settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon, although the American ambassador in Lebanon, Mr. Richard Parker, had previously denied such plans. Mr. Ossairan expresses his doubts regarding statements made by American officials about supporting the sovereignty of Lebanon. He continues to say that there are American officials who went a long way in their partitioning plans, as a means of serving Israel's interests. He states that it is impossible for the Palestinians to leave Lebanon if they do not get their country back.

- Le Reveil newspaper reports that 600 Syrian army men, equipped with heavy weaponry are added to the present Syrian troops in Lebanon.

- 9000 Syrian army members, with full equipment and heavy artillery, refuse to end the seizure of Fayadieh Lebanese army military base. Additional 1000 Syrian army men are sent to support current Syrian troops in Lebanon.

- Syrian peace keeping forces block Beirut Damascus road, proclaiming that it is necessary for security reasons. Almost all Lebanese leaders, including Mr Victor Khoury, head of Lebanese army, object to the entrance of huge Syrian military troops to Lebanon through Beirut Damascus road without prior discussions with the Lebanese government. Mr. Khoury finally requests to open Beirut Damascus road, and allow the Lebanese army to help in providing security along this road.

- Syrians refuse the requests of head of Lebanese army, and continue to further strengthen their military positions in Lebanon.
March 1978

- Israeli invasion of south Lebanon. Israel occupies part of the south. The Mixed Forces in Beirut - leftist parties supported by the Palestinians - report that 40,000 to 50,000 Israeli soldiers participated in the invasion, while Israel admits that 25,000 to 28,000 soldiers, in addition to the Israeli navy and heavy bombardiers, participated in the attack. Mr. Begen announces that Israel will stay in south Lebanon.

- The US media, based on official sources in Washington, announce the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon 23 minutes before it actually started. Mr. Hodig Carter, spokesman for the White House, states that he supports the Israeli occupation due to the dangers threatening Israel.

- Head of U.N. forces arrives in Lebanon on Tuesday, 21 March, 1978, in an attempt to implement U.N. decision number 425. Thirty additional international observers visit south Lebanon. At 6:00 a.m., on Wednesday, 22 March, 1978, emergency U.N. forces enter the south to supervise the ending of the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon and the establishment of an area free of weaponry.

- The Telegraph newspaper reports that the American ambassador to Lebanon, Mr. Parker, informed the Lebanese minister, Mr. Boutros, to forget the south as being part of Lebanon.

- Lebanese government decides to prevent all Arabs from entering Lebanon without a visa, in an attempt to prevent Arab volunteers from supporting Palestinian resistance forces. Syrians are excluded, since Syrian troops are already present in Lebanon.

April 1978

- Mr. Raymond Iddi, member of the Lebanese parliament, reports that the Cairo Agreement was the cause of Lebanon's destruction. He states that the aim behind the conspiracy is partitioning Lebanon and the settlement of 400,000 Palestinians in Beirut.

- Fighting resumes between the rightist parties and Syrian troops in Chiaah and Ain Al-Remanah. Tens of deaths are reported and the battles continue.

- Dani Chamoun - head of the Ahrar party - announces that 12 cease fires failed to stop the fighting.

May 1978

- Fierce fighting between the French international forces - as part of the UN international peacekeeping forces - and the mixed forces - including leftist parties and Palestinians - result in 9 dead. The head of the French forces, Colonel Salvan, gets seriously wounded.

- International Security Council in New York agrees to increase the number of international peacekeeping forces from 4,000 to 6,000 members, and requests Israel to completely withdraw from south Lebanon as soon as possible.

- Mr. Raymond Iddi, member of the Lebanese parliament, reports from Paris, where he is currently residing, that Mr. Kissinger's plans continue to be implemented in Lebanon, and President Carter has not put an end to them.

June 1978

- Kata'ib members attack lhden resulting in 50 dead. A member of the Lebanese parliament, Mr. Tony Franjeh, his wife, and his three year old daughter were all assassinated.
During a conversation on the phone with the Telegraph newspaper, Mr. Raymond Iduli, member of the Lebanese parliament, states that he is pessimistic, for the conspiracy against Lebanon is continuously being implemented. He reports that the assassination of Mr. Tony Franjich is the beginning of a series of assassinations of Christian Maronite leaders. He proceeds to say that the overall plan is destroying Lebanon and displacing its people.

Fierce fighting resumes between Syrian peace keeping forces and Christian rightist political parties, after the Syrian request to dissolve the rightist political parties, and to confiscate their weapons. Syrian troops heavily shell East Beirut.

Residents of Beirut leave to the mountains.

Israel threatens to interfere in Lebanon, and objects to the dissolvement of rightist political parties. Mr. Chloumo Ghazet, manager of the Israeli intelligence, states that Syria sent about 40,000 soldiers, over 200 additional tanks, and a number of heavy artillery to Lebanon. He proceeds to say that there are about 25,000 Syrian soldiers in Beirut alone. General Ghazet warns Syria from attempting to dissolve the rightist parties. He reports that it is dangerous for Israel to have Syria dominating Lebanon, for Lebanon will then become a confrontation country.

Material losses resulting from the war in East Beirut during the past week are estimated at about 3,700 million Lebanese pounds.

Russian government requests its citizens to leave Lebanon due to the deterioration in the security situation. Previously, Americans, British and Australians, among others, were requested by their governments to leave Lebanon.

Fierce fighting continues for the sixth consecutive day between Christian rightist parties and Syrian troops in Haddath area. Hundreds of bombs fall over Haddath which results in the death and wounding of several civilians. Bombs fall around Baabda presidential palace. Lebanese president, Mr. Sarkis, requests a cease fire but none of the fighting parties respond.

Shelling continues in West Beirut for two consecutive days on an "ON" and "OFF" bases.

United States government advises remaining Americans to leave Lebanon.

Canadian government advises remaining Canadians to leave Lebanon as soon as possible.

France and the United States suggest to internationalise the Lebanese crisis.

After failing to internationalise the Lebanese crisis, President Sarkis requests 10,000 Saudi soldiers to participate in the Arab peace keeping forces.

After a long meeting, President Sarkis and President Assad agree to a cease fire to stop the battles in East Beirut.

Arab Ministers for Exterior hold a meeting to discuss the Lebanese crisis. They agree on a redistribution of the Arab peace keeping forces in Lebanon.
February 1979

- Former president, Camil Chamoun, requests the UN to send international observers to Lebanon to observe the implementation of the cease fire agreement set on 6 November, 1978.

March 1979

- Sudanese forces withdraw once again from the Arab peace keeping forces and return back to Sudan due to disagreements with Syria.

- Saudi Arabia suddenly orders its forces to withdraw from the Arab peace keeping forces effective Friday, 16 March, 1979, without announcing the reasons behind this decision.

- Colonel Victor Khoury, head of Lebanese army, announces that the Lebanese army presently consists of 20,000 soldiers, representing all religions, and is well equipped with heavy artillery.

- Lebanese army takes over the positions of the withdrawing Saudi Arabian forces.

- Heavy shelling takes place between Israel and the mixed forces - Lebanese leftist parties and Palestinian forces - Hasbaya and the surrounding areas.

April 1979

- United Arab Emirates announces that withdrawal of its 700 soldiers from the Arab peace keeping forces effective 27 April 1979. The 30,000 Syrian troops remain as the only component of the Arab peace keeping forces left in Lebanon after the withdrawal of the rest of the Arab forces.

- Lebanese army enter south Lebanon after a long period of preparation. After several meetings with the American ambassador in Israel, Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Menahem Begin, reports that Israel agrees to the presence of the Lebanese army in south Lebanon, on condition that it does not reach the areas of the Christian milita, headed by Major Sa'ad Haddad - and supported by Israel - for Israel considers this to be a security belt that defends the country against Palestinian attacks.

- Mr. Raymond Iddi reports from Paris that Israel's current actions reflect the beginning of an Israeli plan to take over the south of Lebanon until Litani river.

May 1979

- Israel attacks and penetrates 8 kilometers in south Lebanon, until it reaches the UN forces positions in Chakra and Bargesheet, after three days of heavy shelling. The attacking Israeli forces consist of about 500 soldiers with twenty tanks.

- Israel withdraws its forces from south Lebanon after it is threatened by the UN forces.

- Seventeen additional tanks coming from Syria get centered in Ablah.

June 1979

- During a meeting held in Beirut, between Mr. Yasser Arafat and leftist leaders, Palestinian resistance leadership announce that they have decided to close PLO offices in Tyre and all Lebanese southern villages, in an attempt to stop Israel from using their presence as an excuse to bombard south Lebanon.
July 1979

- Israel continues to shell the city of Tyre, and announces that it will not stop its attacks except after it makes sure that Palestinian military existence present in southern Lebanon has ended.

August 1979

- A huge explosion takes place in Ashrafieh area in East Beirut resulting in 7 dead and several wounded.

- General Manager of Security, Mr. Farouq Abi-Al-Lameh, announces that censorship of newspapers will be resumed gradually for the media has to be responsible, and that some newspapers inflate the news in order to provoke religious fanaticism.

November and December 1979

- Mr. Mohamad Montathari, son of Tehran religious leader, Ayat Allah Montathari, announces on Friday, 7 December, 1979, that 1000 Iranian armed men will reach south Lebanon to fight with the Palestinians and leftist forces against Israel and Christian rightist Lebanese parties. He threatens that if they are not given visas, they will enter Lebanon by force.

- Lebanese higher authorities continue to prevent Iranian fighters from entering Lebanon.

1980

January 1980

- Fighting takes place between members of Amal - Shi'ite Muslim militia - and members of the Syrian Nationalist Party.

- Head of Lebanese intelligence, Mr. Johnny Abdo, reports that the number of armed Iranians who are currently present in Lebanon are 500 volunteers. They entered Lebanon illegally.

- Mr. Pierre Gemayel, head of the Kata'ib party, reports that the presence of the Syrian peace keeping forces in certain key positions in Lebanon restricts commercial transactions, and that internal security is the best and shortest way to take care of daily issues.

February 1980

- Fighting resumes in North Lebanon between Maradah- Christian party in north Lebanon - and Kata'ib party, resulting in 10 dead and 7 wounded.

- The security situation deteriorates in south Lebanon, and UN forces try to set a cease fire but Major Sa'ad Haddad - head of Christian forces in south Lebanon, refuses to agree to a cease fire with the Palestinians.

- Menahem Bagen, Israel's Prime Minister, announces the commitment of his government toward protecting the Christians in Lebanon. He states in a speech delivered to a group of American Jews currently visiting Israel that the Christian minority in Lebanon is threatened by the leftist Palestinian co-operation and Syrian presence in Lebanon as Arab peace keeping forces. He continues to say that Israel defended the Christians before and supported them in several ways, and that it will continue to support them.

- Fighting starts between Druzes Progressive Socialist Party and Syrian National Party in Chouaifat, leading to 7 dead.
March 1980

- Fighting starts between Syrian troops and villagers of Deir Nabouh, in North Lebanon.

- Dr. Abdel-Raouf Al-Kasm, Syrian Prime Minister, states during a conversation to Monte Carlo broadcasting station that his decision to gather and withdraw Syrian troops in Lebanon already started, and that all positions will be given to the Lebanese army. He continues to say that the Syrian forces entered Lebanon for two reasons:
  1. To stop the Lebanese war; and
  2. to achieve national reconciliation.

  Mr. Al-Kasm reports that Syria did not enter Lebanon to take the role of the police, but to prevent the big conspiracy against Lebanon.

April 1980

- In a report published in newspapers printed in Jerusalem, Mr. Shen Reunau, Ireland’s ambassador in Israel, accuses Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Menahem Bagen, of unfulfilling his promise to stop the attacks on the Irish forces, as part of the UN forces in south Lebanon. Ambassador Reunau mentions that the real reason for the attacks is the implementation of a plan set by Major Sa’ad Haddad - head of the Christian militia in south Lebanon which is supported by Israel - to overtake the positions of the Irish forces in Al-Tairy village for it has strategic importance to Israel.

May 1980

- Fierce fighting and heavy shelling resumes in upper Matn between Kata’ib and Ahrar on one side, and Syrian National Party supported by the leftist parties in the other side, resulting in several dead and wounded.

August and September 1980

- Fighting resumes between Lebanese army and Palestinian forces.

- Israel continues to shell south Lebanon for five continuous days. Lebanon submits a grievance to UN Security Council.

1981

January, February and March 1981

- Explosive bomb is thrown on the Christian Orthodox archbishopric in Sidon, south Lebanon.

- Fierce fighting resumes between Lebanese army and Palestinian Liberation Organisation forces, resulting in several dead and wounded.

April 1981

- European Parliamentary Council requests the departure of all foreign forces from Lebanon with the exception of the UN forces.

- In a letter to Mr. Court Valdhiem, Mr. Bashir Gemayel, head of Lebanese Forces, requests the withdrawal of all foreign forces and their replacement with UN emergency forces all over Lebanon.
After an emergency meeting with the Christian Maronite religious leaders and priests, archbishop Khraish announces the following:

1. Shelling and seizure of Zahle must end;
2. the Lebanese army should be in charge of providing security in Zahle; and
3. UN forces should be present in all other Lebanese territories.

East Beirut and Zahle are heavily shelled on Easter day. Archbishop Khraish, former president Chamoun and Mr. Gemayel object to the shelling and burning of churches in Sidon.

Fighting resumes between Amal militia men and Syrian Nationalist party.

May 1981

- Shelling and fighting intensifies between the two sectors of Beirut, leading to 25 dead and 125 wounded. Bombs are targeted on hospitals, Lebanese army positions, Baabda presidential palace, and other areas of Beirut, Matn and Kesrouane.

- Fighting between Syrian Nationalist Party and Druzes Progressive Socialist Party results in 7 dead and 7 wounded.

June 1981

- Fighting resumes between the two sectors of Beirut, whereby shelling is targeted on beaches and other leisure places, resulting in several casualties.

July 1981

- The seizure of Zahle in Bekaa ends after three months, and Lebanese interior security forces enter the city. Lebanese security forces get a ceremonial welcome by the people of Zahle.

- Fighting starts between Amal militia men and Communist party in Chyah, resulting in tens of dead and wounded.

- Israel undertakes several air raids on Beirut and south Lebanon, and shells the bridges that connect the two areas together, resulting in 179 dead and 569 wounded, in addition to the destruction of nine buildings.

August 1981

- Villagers of Bab Al-Tebaneh object to the entrance of the Syrian forces to their village.

September 1981

- The French ambassador to Lebanon is assassinated.

October 1981

- Fighting resumes between Amal militia and Communist Party in Nabatieh area.

- Australia closes its embassy in Beirut in fear of revengeful actions after it agreed to participate in the peace keeping forces in Sinai desert.
November 1981

- The Christian militia in south Lebanon, headed by Major Sa’ad Haddad, shells Al-Aishieh and Al-Mahmoudieh areas.

December 1981

- A mined car storms through the Iraqi embassy in Beirut and explodes, resulting in 30 dead and 106 wounded, while the destiny of tens of individuals who were in the embassy remains unknown.

1982

January through December 1982

- Israel invades Lebanon in June, 1982, with the proclaimed intention of removing the Palestinian fighters from the south borders where they were undertaking military actions against Israel.

- Israel succeeds in expelling the PLO from Beirut, at high material and human costs.

- Israel occupies tens of additional southern Lebanese villages, which were added to the security zone established by Israel earlier.

- United Nation forces sent to Lebanon. They settle in the south after the Israeli invasion.

- Mr. Bashir Gemayel, head of Lebanese Forces, is elected as the new Lebanese president on 24 August, 1982.

- President Bashir Gemayel is murdered on 14 September, 1982, by an explosion in the conference room where he was holding a meeting in East Beirut.

- His brother, Amine Gemayel, is elected as the new president on 23 September, 1982.

1983

- Multi-national forces sent to Lebanon to separate conflicting parties. These forces include Americans, French, British and Italians among others.

- American carrier New Jersey sent to Lebanon to help the Christians, and separate the fighting parties.

- On 18 April, 1983, huge explosion takes place in the American embassy in West Beirut, resulting in the death of 17 Americans and 40 Lebanese. The American embassy moves its operations to the British embassy.

- On 17 May, 1983, Israel signs an agreement with the Lebanese government regarding the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon. According to the agreement, Lebanon would recognise Israel as a State. Yet, the agreement did not materialise for Israel set a number of pre-requisite conditions to be performed by the Lebanese government, which in turn were deemed uncontrollable by the Lebanese government.

July 1983

- Fighting starts between Christian Lebanese Forces and Druze Progressive Socialist Party in Alay and Chouf areas.
August 1983

- Fighting starts between Amal militia and the Lebanese army. US marines participate in the battles, and Amal militia men occupy the television station in Talet Al-Khayat.

September 1983


- A group massacre takes place at Bmaryam village in Matn, resulting in 35 dead, including the priest of the village and its mayor.

- The Lebanese government accuses the Palestinians of participating in the mountain battles. The Lebanese army defends some villages against the Druzes PSP attacks and controls Souk El-Gharb village. The US government warns Syria, and the French government warns the PSP against attacking and shelling Christian areas.

- The PSP, Palestinian and Syrian forces control Bait El-Din. Christian Lebanese forces control Cabr Chamoun, in addition to four other nearby villages, and hand them over to the Lebanese army.

- Massacre takes place in Al-Bayri, near Jezeine, where 60 of its inhabitants are murdered.

- Lebanese army fiercely fights against Palestinian and Syrian forces to regain control over Medawar palace.

- Israel threatens to use its air force if PSP attack Deir El-Qamar - a Christian village in the area controlled by the PSP.

- Lebanese army regains power over Kaifoun and Ait in an attempt to liberate the surrounding villages of Souk El-Gharb.

October 1983

- Mr. Walid Joublatt, head of PSP, announces the establishment of civil administration in the Chouf and Alay areas.

- Explosion of US marines' location at Beirut International Airport in West Beirut results in the death of 183 American marines. After 3 minutes, a second explosion takes place in the building inhabited by the French soldiers in West Beirut, resulting in the murder of 41 French soldiers and the wounding of 20 others, in addition to the death of 5 Lebanese citizens. At a later stage, the American Embassy was moved to Aukar in the Christian area.

- On 31 October, 1983, Lebanese leaders and government officials arrive in Switzerland to hold the Geneva Peace Conference aiming at finding a solution to the Lebanese crisis. Participants include president Amine Gemayel, former president Camil Chamoun, former president Suleiman Franjieh, Adel Ossairan, Saeb Salam, Pierre Gemayel, Rashid Karam, Walid Joublat, Raymond Iddi and Nabih Berri, among others.

November and December 1983

- After several months, the seizure of Deir El-Qamar, Christian village in Chouf area, by PSP ends on Wednesday, 7 December, 1983.

- Heavy shelling resumes on Souk El-Gharb, Ashrafieh, Ain Al-Rameh, Forn Al-Chebak and Hamana. American battleships support Lebanese army during the fighting.
- Israeli battleships shell Tripoli port and nearby areas. Mr. Yasser Arafat, head of PLO, and other Palestinians in Tripoli leave the city to Algeria on Greek ships.

1984

February 1984

- American carrier New Jersey shells armed militia men in an attempt to support the Lebanese army. One American soldier dies, and 8 Italian soldiers are wounded.

- President Reagan decides to withdraw the 1,470 US marines from Beirut after discussions with the French, British, Italian government and President Gemayel.

- Amal militia takes control of the official radio station and armed men attack stores that sell alcoholic drinks.

- The withdrawal of the Italian forces end today.

- Lebanese army defends itself against several attacks undertaken by PSP and other militia men in an attempt to overtake Souk El-Gharb village.

March 1984

- Lebanon officially cancels 17 March, 1983 agreement with Israel.

- A second Lebanese national conference starts on Monday, 12 March, 1984 at 10.00 a.m. at the Boulivarge Hotel in Lausanne, Switzerland. The first decision taken is an immediate cease fire agreement. Participants explain their conflicting plans to solve the crisis, yet the conference ends without an agreement on a unified plan.

- PSP occupy the Murabitun offices and broadcasting station. Fighting resumes between the PSP and Murabitun. PSP occupy several Murabitun centres.

July 1984

- Fierce fighting takes place in Tripoli, north Lebanon, for five consecutive days, between the United Islamic Party and Arab Democratic Party, resulting in 41 dead and 130 wounded.

- Fighting and shelling takes place in Zgharta, north Lebanon, between the Maradah - Christian party headed by Mr. Suleiman Franjieh - on one side and the Nationalist Syrian Party supported by Palestinian forces on the other side.

November 1984

- An explosion takes place at the American embassy in Aukar, resulting in 24 dead and 75 wounded. Islamic Jihad Organisation announces its responsibility for the explosion and threatens to continue destroying American centres.

October and November 1984

- During the third stage of military negotiations in Naqora between Lebanon and Israel, Lebanon proposes a security plan for Sidon, Jezzine and Western Beq'a area while Israel objects to withdraw its forces before ensuring the security and safety of its borders.
On Monday, 26 November, 1984, the security plan prepared earlier by the Lebanese government starts to be implemented and the Lebanese army is to be in charge of the coastal road at the end of the week.

- Amal militia and Lebanese Forces exchange hostages.

- After severe political escalations PSP heavily shells East Beirut and other areas, including Beit Mery.

- The spreading of the Lebanese army, as set by the previously prepared security plan, is postponed for further negotiations. Military and security deterioration go hand in hand with political deterioration in Beirut, Chouf and Qleem.

1985 - 1988

- While fierce fighting, shelling, kidnapping and continuous assassinations take place, and while political peace talks continue to reach dead ends, the economic situation and value of Lebanese pound continuously deteriorates. The value of one US dollar reaches 900 Lebanese pounds.

- Minimum wages as set by the public sector ranged between US$25 and US$28 per month.

- Inflation rate is continuously increasing, reaching 300% and 400% for some of the basic commodities. Prices for both consumer and industrial products are mostly quoted in US dollars.

- Several humanitarian international organisations are extending help to the Lebanese people during this period.

- In 1988, President Amine Gemayel appoints the head of Lebanese army, Colonel Michael Aoun, to be the head of a military government.

1989 - 1990

- In 1989, Al-Tahrir war, meaning the liberation war, was announced by Colonel Michel Aoun. In his press releases, he demands that Syria withdraw its 40,000 soldiers and military weaponry from Lebanon.

- An explosion takes place at the American Embassy in Aukar. American embassy personnel leave Lebanon to the United States.

- An Arab committee consisting of representatives of three Arab countries, including Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Algeria meet to put an end to the Lebanese crisis.

- Mr. Al-Akhdar Al-Ibrahim, Arab committee representative, visits Lebanon several times and meets with party leaders and Lebanese politicians.

- A decision was taken by the Arab committee to have the Lebanese parliamentary members meet in Al-Taif, Saudi Arabia, to find a solution to the Lebanese crisis.

- A conference was held for the Lebanese parliament with representatives from the three Arab countries on 2 October, 1989 in Taif.

- Taif Accord, representing an agreement among Lebanese legislators was signed on 22 October, 1989 at the Saudi Arabian town of Taif. The document was also called 'Document of National Reconciliation'. The negotiations were undertaken in the presence of the League of Arab States represented by a Tripartite Arab Committee of the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria.
- Lebanese parliament members dismissed from their duties by Colonel Michael Aoun.

- At the Taif conference, several decisions relating to the Lebanese political system were taken, including the duties and responsibilities of the Lebanese president, prime minister, ministers and parliament.

- Another war takes place in East Beirut between the Lebanese army headed by Colonel Michael Aoun and the Lebanese Christian Forces headed by Dr. Samir Geagea. This was labelled Al-Ilgia'a war meaning cancellation or elimination war.

- Fierce fighting and heavy shelling of the Christian areas takes place, resulting in both massive human casualties and drastic material losses.

- Mr. Rene Moawad was elected as the new president in Chtorah, but did not come to rule. He was assassinated on Lebanon's independence day, 22 November, 1990.

- Mr. Elias El-Hrawi elected as the new president in Chtourah, after which he made several public statements indicating that he wanted to rule from Baabda - where the Lebanese presidential palace is located.

- Colonel Michael Aoun refused to leave Baabda presidential palace, since he refuses Al-Taif decisions.

- Colonel Aoun explained to the general public, through the media, that he rejects Al-Taif decisions on the following grounds: 1. the parliamentary members that met in Al-Taif were already relieved of their duties, and 2. Al-Taif decisions provided legal dimensions for the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

- Mr. Lahoud was appointed as the new head of army.

- Baabda palace comes to be known as the "people palace" for the first time in Lebanon's history. Huge number of Lebanese civilians move in to live in Baabda palace as an attempt to support Colonel Aoun.

- Heavy and centred shelling on the Christian areas of Hazmieh, Mar Takla, Jisr El-Basha and Hadath, among other areas in general, and of Baabda presidential palace specifically.

- Lebanese army units under the command of Mr. Lahoud accompanied by Syrian troops and tanks enter Baabda palace as well as other parts of East Beirut.

- Colonel Aoun took refuge in the French embassy.

- After the Lebanese army, headed by Mr. Lahoud and supported by the Syrian army took over, Mr. Danny Chamoun, the son of the late president Camil Chamoun and the president of the Ahrar party, was assassinated along with his wife and two sons in their house by unknown assassins.

1991

- Relative calmness all over Lebanon where people are able to cross from one area to the other.

- Al-Taif decisions being implemented slowly.

- The Lebanese crisis transformed from military battles to a silent war, opposing the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

- An agreement is signed between Lebanon and Syria relating to political and economic cooperation.
Relative calmness prevails over Lebanon.

After several days of cross border shelling with Katyusha rockets between Israeli troops and members of the Islamic fundamentalist group Hezbollah, on 21 February, 1992, Israeli tanks, bulldozers and armoured vehicles backed by helicopter gunships invade southern Lebanese villages beyond their self-declared security zone after crashing through a United Nations cease fire line. It was reported that 12 soldiers died and almost 40 were wounded. (Telegraph Mirror. Friday, 21 February, 1992, Sydney, pp 1).

UN Force Commander Lieutenant, General Lars Eric Wahlgren, reports from his Naqura headquarters that they have protested to the Israelis for an immediate withdrawal from UN area of operation, and that UN Forces have not fired a shot. (Telegraph Mirror. Telegraph Mirror. Friday, February 21, 1992, Sydney, pp.2).

UN Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Ghali, urged Israel to withdraw immediately.

Economic deterioration continues, including the value of the Lebanese pound. On 30 July, 1992, the US dollar was exchanged for 2,300 Lebanese pounds in the local market.

American Minister of Exterior, Mr. James Baker, visits president Assad in Damascus. Syria continues to support the US against Iraq, and proceeds in the negotiations with Mr. Baker in return for their continued presence in Lebanon.

The Lebanese army unexpectedly attack Lebanese forces in Karantina area after an agreement was reached between Dr. Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Christian Forces, and Mr. Fakhoury, Lebanese Defence Minister. The attack results in several casualties. President El-Hraii and Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr. Rashid El-Solh, announce that they had no idea about the attack and that they were the last people to know about it.

Labour union requests labour force to go on a strike on Wednesday, 30 July, 1992 in protest against the continuous economic deterioration in the country.

1993

February 1993

 Contacts are being conducted between the Army Command and UN Intrrim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Command to consolidate the Lebanese government's authority in the south.

The World Bank agrees to give Lebanon a loan of 175 million US dollars.

Hezbollah launches wide-scale attacks on the Israeli occupied enclave in south Lebanon.

March 1993

Hezbollah issues a statement criticizing the Egyptian regime for firing indiscriminately on worshipers in an Aswan mosque. The Hezbollah statement says that arrogance will meet a black fate similar to that of Anwar Al-Sadat.

Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri states that Lebanon will not grant citizenship to hundreds of Palestinians, whom the Israeli occupation authorities must allow to return to their homes.
August 1993

- Lebanese-Syrian ties are strengthened with the creation of a high council from both states.

October 1993

- Israeli backed Lebanese militiamen kill three unidentified guerrillas in a gunbattle in southern Lebanon.
- PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat orders his followers in Lebanon to start collecting their weapons and selling all PLO properties within a period of two months.

November 1993

- In an interview with the Al-Watan Al-Arabi magazine, Defence Minister Muhsin Dallul says that Lebanon rejects to sign a separate agreement with Israel. He adds that the settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon is unacceptable.
- Leader of the pro-Iranian Hezbollah accuses the Lebanese government of trying to silence opponents of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.
- Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri stresses Lebanon's rejection of the settlement of Palestinians on its territory.

December 1993

- Israeli helicopter gunships fire two rockets at a suspected guerrilla hideout in southern Lebanon after guerrillas attack Lebanese militiamen allied with Israel.
- Pro-Iranian Hezbollah clash with an Israeli commando force trying to cross the border zone in southern Lebanon inflicting casualties and triggering retaliatory Israeli shelling on Shiite villages.

1994

January 1994

- SOLIDERE, the company that aims at rebuilding war shattered central Beirut states that it has raised US$850 million in Lebanon's first corporate flotation since the war ended.
- SOLIDERE closes cash subscription after receiving US$ 926 million, some US$270 million more than what the company has previously sought.

February 1994

- Fifty two Palestinians are massacred in the Hebron mosque near Jerusalem by the Jewish gunman Baruch Goldstein. President Clinton condemns the attack as 'a gross act of murder' and 'a terrible human tragedy' (Sydney Telegraph, 27 February, 1994, p. 1).
- The fundamentalist Islamic Jihad organisation in Palestine issues a chilling warning that it will avenge the massacre within 24 hours.
- PLO chairman Yasser Arafat warns that the massacre has 'very serious fallout ... at all levels' and appealed to the United Nations to protect his people.
Israel cracks down on PLO's main rival Hamas which opposes any peace deal with the Jewish state (Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February, 1994, p.19).

Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas vows to step up attacks on Israelis in an attempt to sabotage any peace accord (Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February, 1994, p. 19).

A bomb explodes in a Maronite church in East Beirut on 27 February killing 11 people.

March 1994

As manoeuvring continues in the United Nations Security Council over a resolution to condemn the Hebron massacre of February 25 in which dozens of Palestinians died, an official inquiry is told by Israeli Chief Superintendent Meir Tayar that Israeli troops are under strict orders never to shoot at Jewish settlers even those killing Arabs (Sydney Morning Herald, 12 March, 1994, p. 15).

Miss Lebanon Ghada Turk, a 21 year old philosophy Christian student is interrogated for two and a half hours by a judge at the military tribunal. Her crime is the collaboration with the enemy, for she had posed at the beauty pageant in south Africa last November with the 17 year old miss Israel, Tamara Porat.

April 1994

Christian Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea is taken to jail to await trial on charges stemming from a church bombing and the murder of another Christian leader Danny Chamoun and his family.

Israel states that deadly Islamic attacks and nationwide right wing Jewish protests will not slow the pace of its peace talks with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Sydney Morning Herald, 9 April, 1994, p. 21).

May 1994

The official National News Agency reports that a helicopter borne Israeli commandos capture the Islamic fundamentalist commander Mustafa Al-Dirani from his house in Eastern Lebanon.

Police state that a bomb explodes in the cafeteria of the National Evangelical School in Sidon.

June 1994

Israeli warplanes stage a deadly attack killing 26 people at a training base for Muslim fundamentalist guerrillas near the Sidon border.

Columns of Israeli tanks and artillery park along the northern borders in preparation to strike at Shi'ite Muslim guerrillas in Lebanon if they renew rocket attacks on Israel.

July 1994

Israel blames Islamic extremists for the attack on the Israeli Embassy and the Consulate in London which injured 15 people. The attack came 24 hours after King Hussein of Jordan shock hands with Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn (Telegraph Mirror, 27 July, 1994, p. 1).
August 1994

- The Venezuelan born Carlos is arrested carrying a stolen Lebanese passport. He is handed over to France (El-Telegraph Review, 16 September, 1994, p. 1).

- Israel threatens to delay implementing any new Palestinian self-rule agreements unless leader Yasser Arafat cracks down on Muslim extremists (The Arab World, 19 August, 1994, p. 1).

- Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas condemns a crackdown by PLO leader Yasser Arafat against its members (The Arab World, 19 August, 1994, p. 1).

- Israeli Minister of Justice, Professor David Liba’i, says in Sydney that he will pass a letter from the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to his Australian counterpart, Senator Evans, requesting Australian participation in a temporary international presence in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area (Sydney Morning Herald, 20 August, 1994, p. 13).

September 1994

- Faris Bweiz, Lebanon’s foreign minister, states that it is unjustifiable to engage in high-level and direct negotiations with Israel.

- Lebanese security sources state that a member of the UN Intrim forces in Lebanon is wounded by Israeli army shelling of southern Lebanon.

- The Lebanese General Security Department reports that the stolen Lebanese passport found with Carlos as he was arrested in August is one of 999 passports stolen from the department during the last stages of Lebanon's 1975 - 1990 war (El-Telegraph Review, 16 September, 1994, p. 1).

October 1994

- Lebanon signs a US$740,000 contract with the United Nations Development Program and the International Labour Organisation to prepare a study aimed at defining the country’s labour needs.

- Union sources state that thousands of Lebanese utility workers begin an open ended strike to demand work benefits.

- Labour Minister Abdullah Al-Amin states that Lebanon and Syria will sign a labour agreement to organise for the first time the flow of tens of thousands of Syrian workers into Lebanon.

November 1994

- Syria’s foreign minister briefs Lebanese leaders on US President Clinton’s talks with President Hafez Assad in Damascus on Middle-East peace endeavors.

- Ford Motors Co. resumes selling North American built cars and trucks in Lebanon after a 30 year period.

- Lebanese President Hrawi and Syrian President Assad stress the need for coordination in their peace negotiations with Israel.

- A Russian envoy visits Beirut to brief Lebanese officials on Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's Middle-East tour and promise cooperation in shepherding the Arab-Israeli peace talks.
- Lebanon's main labour union confederation threatens to hold a one day strike claiming that the government is stalling on their demands for a pay rise.

- Hundreds of thousands of Syrian workers take up posts in Lebanon. Syrian workers vary from about 70,000 to 900,000 in a country of 3.2 million.

- Bank Audi reports that Lebanon's economy is growing by eight percent annually but inflation rate and rising public debt could threaten the recovery.

- Former Christian leader of the disbanded Christian Lebanese Forces militia goes on trial. The Lebanese news media calls it the most important trial in Lebanon since it gained independence from France in 1943.

- Lebanon celebrates its 51st independence day with a military parade in Beirut.

December 1994

- Najah Wakim, a Christian deputy who represents a Beirut constituency, states in a news conference that political corruption and bribery are widespread.

- Lebanon's work force stage a one day strike to pressure the government into meeting demands for pay hikes to match soaring inflation.

- The Lebanese government orders a 25 percent minimum wage increase for public and private sector workers.

- Bahij Tabara, Minister of Justice, states that Lebanon is coming under international pressure to limit its banking secrecy to help fight drug money laundering.

- A series of scandals involving accusations of bribery and drug trafficking by politicians and government leaders threaten rehabilitation efforts.

- Roy Hrawi, the son of President Hrawi states that accusations against him of links to drug dealing are intended to damage his father.

- Heavy fighting breaks out between Israeli forces, their militia allies and Hezbollah guerrillas in south Lebanon (The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December, 1994, p. 8).

1995

January 1995

- The official National News Agency reports that Lebanese police seize 270 Kg of hashish in north Lebanon.

February 1995

- Bank Audi report that the economy grew an estimated 8.5 percent in 1994 and the country is attaining political and economic recovery.

- The German government gives Lebanon a grant of 15 million deutschmarks ($10 million) to carry out a sewage project in Beirut's southern suburbs.
March 1995

- The Bank of Lebanon states in its monthly report that the country’s economic growth improved in January as compared to the results achieved during the previous two months.

- Transport minister Omar Miskawi states that radio amateurs using the same frequencies as Beirut airport are endangering aviation in Lebanon.

- A bulletin published by the central bank reports that Lebanon registered a 135 million dollar balance of payments deficit for the month of January.

- Lebanon’s lucrative reconstruction market is attracting more British trade delegations in the post-crisis era.

- Pro-Israeli Lebanese militia leader Antoine Lahad says that there is little hope for Lebanon while it remains under occupation from both Syria and Israel.

April 1995

- Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin warns Hezbollah that Israel would hit back at the Iranian-backed guerrillas in south Lebanon if they fired more rockets at the Jewish state.

- Prime Minister Rafik Hariri calls on Arab countries to help Lebanon rebuild from its 1975 - 1990 crisis.

- Israel’s Haaretz daily reports that Israel has been acquiring raw materials from Syria for more than a year by shipping them through third countries.

May 1995

- The environmental group Greenpeace states that it has proof that Italian toxic waste still lies dumped in Lebanon despite repeated assurances from Rome that it has taken it all back.

- Christiane Clech, secretary General of the International Hotel Association states that 'the Middle-East is in for a period of unprecedented growth in tourism if the region continues to move towards political stability’.

- The pro-Iranian Hezbollah states that two Muslim guerrillas were killed in a clash with pro-Israeli militiamen in south Lebanon.

- Israeli planes hit guerrilla controlled hills in southeastern Lebanon with rockets.

- Chinese Minister of Textile Industry Wu Wenyong arrives to Lebanon for an official three-day visit.

- Monks at the Syriac Catholic monastery of Deir Al-Shurfeh, north of Beirut, seek help to restore 2,047 ancient manuscripts.

- Beirut port workers stage a 24 hour strike to press for higher wages.

- About 70,000 school teachers go on a strike demanding pay increases and improved benefits.

- An Israeli soldier is killed and three are wounded by Arab guerrilla gunfire and shelling in southern Lebanon. The pro-Iranian Hezbollah claims responsibility for the attack.

- The local government will receive US$20 million loan from the World Bank for administrative rehabilitation programmes.
- An international trade fair opens in Beirut with more than 200 companies from around the world taking part in the hope of gaining access to the Lebanese market as the country rebuilds itself.

- Japan's ambassador to Lebanon presents his credentials to Foreign Minister Faris Bouez.

- House Speaker Nabih Berri rejects any amendment of the constitution or extensions of the presidential term in May.

- Former Christian warlord Fuad Malek is released from prison after court frees him on bail under condition that he is not to leave the country and must attend all future trial sessions for a 1994 church bombing.

- A Russian Parliamentary delegation touring Middle-Eastern countries arrive in Lebanon.

- One hundred workers are poisoned by ammonia gas that leaked inside a frozen-foods factory in the Bekaa valley town of Chtoura.

- Lebanon recovers Phoenician treasures including gold and ivory artefacts from Germany thirteen years after they were sent there for repair and safekeeping.

- Lebanon's chief financial prosecutor begins investigating alleged speculation against the Lebanese currency. He says that offenders could face a three year jail sentence.

- Prime Minister Hariri meets three times with President Hrawi and twice with House Speaker Berri to discuss the formation of new cabinet.

- Bashar Al-Assad, son of the Syrian president, comes to Beirut to visit Berri.

- Prime Minister Hariri takes his time to form new government. A new 30 member cabinet headed by Prime Minister Hariri is formed.

- Pro-Iranian Hezbollah fires Katyusha rockets into Israel in retaliation for attacks by Israeli troops in South Lebanon.

- Aurel Cornea, a French television Journalist held hostage for nine months by Lebanese Shi'ite kidnappers in 1986 dies at the age of 63.

- Leading human rights advocate, Joseph Moghezel, dies only four days after he was appointed environment minister.

- Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Al-Shara arrives in Beirut to brief Lebanese leaders on the latest Syrian-Israeli peace talks development.

- The National News Agency states that the World Bank has signed an agreement for US$20 million loan to Lebanon to be spent on administrative modernization. The loan is to be paid back over 17 years after a five year grace period with an interest of 7.1 percent.

June 1995

- The French companies Bouygues and Dumez win the US$ 1.2 billion contracts to build the 60Km toll motorway from Beirut to Masnaa (on the Lebanese - Syrian border) and parts of the 11 Km toll ring road around Beirut. The project also includes awarding a second BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) contract to the German firms Dywid AG and Walter Ban AG along with Bouygues SA to build the second 26 Km section of the ring road around the Lebanese capital.

- World Bank approves a US$ 55 million loan to Lebanon to develop means to get rid of waste. The loan will be for seventeen years with a variable interest rate linked to the bank's cost of funds.
Warm reception for president Hrawi in Paris. President Chirac says the implementation of U.N. Security Council resolution 425 is a pre-condition to peace between Lebanon and Israel.

President Hrawi asks for French support against the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and for an Israeli withdrawal from the south.

SOLIDERE finds 100 mortar bombs while digging near Beirut port. The army is notified to pull them out or detonate them.

Dozens of Lebanese, supporters of exiled General Aoun gather near the Elysee Palace at the time President Hrawi was due to pass. French security forces change the convoy's route.

Generale de Banque, Belgium's biggest bank, is ready to start long-term financing in Lebanon to help Belgian companies play a role in the post-war reconstruction.

Under the ruins of a landmark cinema ravaged by the war, archeologists unearth remnants of a Crusaders castle in Beirut.

The billionaire Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri wins a vote of confidence in his cabinet. There has been a sharp reduction in margin from the backing given to his previous government.

Fransabank SAL reports big increases in profits, assets, customer deposits, loans and capital in 1994. It says that it will further double its capital in 1995.

Lebanon's National News Agency states that a Beirut military court sentences to death three men accused of working for Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency.

The French language daily L'Orient Le Jour reports that Sheikh Mohammed Ali El-Jouzou, mufti of mount Lebanon asks Interior Minister Michel Al-Murr to ban Shi'ite Muslim Ashoura ceremonies in Beirut public gardens for they represent 'provocative sectarian demonstrations'.

A United Nations team arrives in Lebanon on a mission to uncover the fate of employees, including British journalist Alec Collett, kidnapped at the height of Beirut's Western hostage saga.

The Israeli-allied South Lebanon Army frees three Lebanese and two Palestinian men detained for four years.

A senior Merrill Lynch executive states that Lebanon's fast growing postwar economy and its sound financial indicators make it an attractive emerging market for international investors.

A fragile ceasefire is announced at a Palestinian refugee camp in Ain El-Hilweh, south Lebanon, to halt fighting between followers and opposers of PLO chief Yasser Arafat.

The court of Publications orders Youssef Howayek, director of the daily Ad Diyar, to spend three months in prison for publishing an article on 27 November, 1994 which suggests that Deputy Saud Rouphael is involved in drug trafficking. The court also orders that Howayek pays Rouphael the sum of 50 million Lebanese pounds (US$31,000).

Amnesty International states from London that the seven month trial of Samir Geagea was seriously flawed and 'did not meet international standards for a fair trial'.

The Lebanese Leasing Company receives loans totalling US$22.5 million from its shareholders - the International Finance Corporation, Ucbail, and Fransabank - to boost its financing capacity after making a rapid start to its leasing operations.

Amid the bustle of reconstruction in Beirut, workers are repairing the country's war battered National Museum that was among the most important archaeological museums in the Middle-East.
- Israeli radio reports that Muslim guerrillas ambushed an Israeli army convoy in the Israeli-occupied border zone in southern Lebanon, wounding four Israeli soldiers.

- Corral Petroleum Holdings AB of Jeddah and Gulf Interstate Oil Company of Dubai jointly purchased all the shares of the Fortuna Holding Company Limited. Corral and Speed are the successor companies to the former Shell and BP companies in Lebanon and own 146 service stations.

- Lebanon’s press unions say that they would hold a general meeting to decide action to take in protest at jail sentences imposed last month on three journalists. Melhem Karam, head of the Editors’ Union states that ‘we are against imprisonment as it humiliates journalists and Lebanese legislation...We have nothing against the judiciary but we should protect ourselves against obstacles to the exercise of our profession and freedom’.

- Lebanon’s General Labour Union threatens to resort to street demonstrations if the government insists on raising taxes to finance pay raises for teachers. The union president warns the government against its ‘policy of salvation’.

- The Washington post publishes an open letter from the Council of Lebanese American Organisations, CLAIO, to President Bill Clinton. The main theme of the letter is to encourage the American initiative for initiating the peace process in the Middle-East but not on the account of Lebanon’s interests. The letter begins as follows:‘Yes to peace in the Middle-East but Lebanon should not be its victim’.

- German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel meets with top Lebanese officials to discuss post-war rebuilding programs and the Middle-East peace process.

- Pro-Israeli sources state that two Israeli soldiers are wounded when Muslim guerrillas detonate a roadside bomb amid their motorised patrol in south Lebanon.

- The Tourism Ministry decides to reopen the Jeita grottoes that once attracted tourists from around the world.

- President Clinton nominates the State Department Middle-East expert Richard Henry Jones of Nebraska as the next US ambassador to Lebanon.

- The government boosts taxes on petrol by almost 40 percent and orders retroactive payment of a 20 percent wage hike for public workers.

- Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Posousvoliouk states that Russia is interested in reactivating Lebanese - Israeli peace talks.

- The government’s reconstruction agency states that the European Investment Bank granted Lebanon a 10 million Ecu ($13.3million) soft loan to modernise aviation services at Beirut airport.

- Lebanon’s oil ministry reports that US company Prishard began negotiating with the Lebanese government for work to rehabilitate and build new oil refineries.

- An-Nahar reports that IBM resumes operations in Lebanon after a 20 year absence. Quan Tech President Cyrus Salesse states that his company, which will distribute IBM products and services, aims at ‘occupying the leading place in Lebanon’s information technology market’.

- Reuter reports that a third Lebanese child dies after he gets hit by steel nails from Israeli anti-personnel shells.

- Beirut port workers go on strike in a bid to force the government to go back on tax increases announced last week by Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri.
- A Beirut military court sentences to death a Lebanese man convicted of being an Israeli agent giving Mossad information on Lebanese Syrian and Palestinian armies, and jailed seven others for 15 years in absentia.

- Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans says that his country is satisfied with the security situation in Lebanon and hopes to boost bilateral economic and diplomatic ties.

August 1995

- President Hrawi states that 20 percent of Lebanon's total income goes to 700,000 foreign workers, most of which are Syrians.

- The Iran-backed Hezbollah movement accuses the US and other Western nations of unfairly accusing Iranian and Muslim groups of terrorism.

- France signs a 500 million franc (US$104 million) financial protocol with Lebanon to help the reconstruction of the country.

- Trade unions renew their threats to the government to go on open-ended strikes and demonstrations until controversial tax and price hikes get cancelled.

September 1995

- United Press International reports that the majority of emigrants returning to Lebanon are young educated males and affluent businessmen.

- US government continues to maintain a travel embargo on Lebanon.

- Ten companies offer a bid for the construction of a new Lebanese State University campus.

- The Washington Post reports that the Clinton administration has notified Syria that it holds the Damascus regime responsible for proliferating threats from Palestinian terrorist groups against US citizens and that it will respond to terrorist attacks as it deems necessary.

October 1995

- Japan is considering granting Lebanon soft loans to benefit its reconstruction. Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman states that Japan is evaluating several projects related to infrastructure, administrative reform, water supply and sewage systems.

- Japan's deputy foreign minister, Yasuo Fukuda, arrives in Beirut on a three day visit to meet top Lebanese officials.

- Secretary General of pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Party of God) calls on Christians to fight in south Lebanon.

- Israeli gunboats fire warning shots at five fishing boats off south Lebanon coast. Three fishermen are detained and then released after several hours of questioning.

- Parliament Speaker Berri considers constitutional amendments a 'political coup' that can resume war once again in the country.

- The Hilton International group announces the opening of the Beirut Hilton. The hotel was built before the crisis started. Hilton International states that the hotel will start to trade in 1998 following an agreement with Societe Mediterranee des Grands Hotels. The hotel is equipped with a swimming pool, five restaurants, four bars and a ballroom for 900 people.
- Dozens of fires take place across Lebanon from the north to the south.

- Civil defence workers put out 92 forest and bush fires burning in the mountains across Lebanon. Michel Murr, interior minister, states that the fires are caused by hot weather.

- A civil defence official states that firefighters are still battling a fire near the village of Jeita, about 20 km northeast of Beirut. The official National News Agency states that the fires have destroyed dozens of hectares of forests.

- US Secretary of State Christopher makes quick trip to Syria to meet President Assad.

- Tens of thousands of trees are destroyed in 33 fires across the country.

- Spanish Foreign Minister, Javier Solana, arrives in Beirut at the head of a delegation touring the Middle-East. He states that the European Union is interested in having an agreement of cooperation with Lebanon if possible by early 1996, and is looking forward to Lebanon's participation in the European Mediterranean dialogue at the Barcelona conference on 26 November. The Spanish, French and Italian officials hold talks with President Elias Hrawi and Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri during their five hour visit before heading to Damascus.

- The Lebanese government approves the formation of two multi-million dollar real estate companies, namely the Lebanese Company for the Development of the Northern Coast of Lebanon (LINORD) and the Lebanese Company for the Development of the City of Sidon (Sidon). The purpose of these companies is to develop the coast north of Beirut and the port of Sidon.

- Israeli jets fly heavy reconnaissance missions over Beirut.

- Acting Finance Minister Siniora discusses with a Japanese delegation possible fields of cooperation in Lebanon.

- Israeli planes fly over Lebanon, carrying out mock air raids.

- Iranian delegation express interest in taking part in Lebanon's reconstruction.

- The meeting between the Israeli and Syrian foreign ministers has failed to break the deadlock in the Syrian-Israeli track of the negotiations.

November 1995

- The General Directorate of Industry issues a report detailing the 35.7 percent rise in Lebanon's industrial exports. The exports rose from 39.052 billion pounds (US$24.258 million) in September to 52.952 billion pounds (US$32.931 million) in October. The top countries that imported Lebanese goods are ranked as follows: 1. Syria with 38.7% of total exports.
  2. Saudi Arabia with 20.5%.
  3. France with 6.5%.
  4. Libya with 6.5%.
  5. Jordan with 4.81%.
  6. USA with 3.6%.

- The United States asks Lebanon to sign the international agreements against terrorism. The US embassy issues a statement calling for the resolution of several wartime crimes committed against US citizens in Lebanon, in particular the killing of ambassador Francis Meloy and economic councillor Robert Waring.

- In a cable sent to President Hrawi, on the occasion of Lebanon's independence, Hafez Al-Assad of Syria states that he was happy with the 'development of the brotherly cooperation and coordination between Syria and Lebanon ...'. The cable adds that Syria is keenly interested in helping its sisterly country Lebanon in liberating south Lebanon and Western Bekaa.
The destruction of downtown Beirut provides archaeologists with innumerable treasures among them a crusader castle wall, a phoenician wall and the remnants of a city dating back to 4000 B.C. are among the major discoveries. Among the other findings are a marble statue of Apollo, a marble statue of a woman from the Roman era, a Roman cave used for storage, several marble statuettes of Persian cavaliers and about 10,000 pieces of pottery.

Beirut port workers unions state that they will stop overtime work and they will go on a strike on 24 and 25 November in protest of the government's delay in signing a pay agreement. They are also demanding a reduction in taxes imposed on day labourers.

Some 300 British businessmen are in Beirut working on major projects including the construction of a US$50 million sports stadium.

In his Friday sermon, Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of pro-Iranian militants states that 'female students in West Beirut wearing Islamic headdress were dismissed from their schools and that such an action is against Islam and Muslims'. He adds, 'we call on all Muslims and Lebanese to stand against this policy. We demand for our female students the freedom to abide by Islamic rules'.

In an interview with the Egyptian newspaper Akbar Al-Youm, Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri states that Lebanon has so far received US$600 million in Arab grants out of the original US$2 billion approved for its post-war reconstruction program according to the 1989 Taif agreement. He adds that, 'the percentage of grants is estimated to cover between 10 to 15 percent of the required expenses'.

On 16 November, celebrations are held in Kaslik, Kessrouan, to commemorate the anniversary of the Syrian Reform Movement that brought Hafez Al-Assad to power 25 years ago.

- Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Sfeir warns about another tragedy like the 1992 elections, if officials and the Lebanese people cannot relate to what is imposed on them.
- The Israeli air force raids the city of Naameh, a southern suburb of Beirut. The raid concentrates on the positions of the popular front for the liberation of Palestine. The raid has resulted in 2 death, several injuries and severe damage to several homes in the area.
- Head of the General Labour Confederation Elias Abou-Rizk states that the government is looking for short-term solutions to resolve the problems of high cost of living, taxes, reconstruction and salaries. He continues to say that in the long run this will lead the country to a point of no return and create an uprising by the people.
- The Bureau of the Teachers condemns the regime for ignoring its demands and threatens to go back to negative measures.
- The downtown property owners are appalled about the requests that they received to vacate their land. They denounce this game playing with public property.
- Richard Murphy, president of the Middle-East Institute in Washington and previous assistant to the secretary of state gives a presentation in London titled, 'misconceptions in the Middle-East', in which he discusses the mistakes of American foreign policy in the area. He states that Syria is adamant about being the main foreign power broker in Lebanon. In his presentation, he adds that the big fish always swallows the smaller one, and Lebanon is a perfect example of that.
- Archaeological ruins are discovered in Beirut that date back to the 4th century B.C. which prove the link between Lebanon and the Pharaohs of Egypt.
- The American University of Beirut (AUB) President Robert Haddad visits Lebanon to meet with senior Lebanese officials and to roam the campus.
- Lebanon signs a US$8.5 million contract with Sony to upgrade TeleLiban’s equipment and studios. Information minister Farid Makari states that the upgrade makes TeleLiban the first television station in the Arab world to use digital technology.

- The Lebanese army receives its sixth load of used US military equipment in two years. The batch consists of 107 refurbished M113 APC’s and 23 other vehicles including jeeps and trucks.

- Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Pedro Merith Presito visits Lebanon and meets with Lebanese Finance Minister Fouad Saniora. Presito holds talks regarding an investment promotion agreement and a financial agreement that would avoid dual taxation.

- A Wall Street Journal ad invites bids for a shopping centre in Ras Beirut with a parking lot and an office tower within 48,000 square meters.

- Hertz car rental company opens a new rental office in downtown Beirut.

- One Israeli soldier and three guerrillas killed in south Lebanon clashes.

- Israeli warplanes attack suspected Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon. According to security sources, the air retaliation came after Islamic militants ambushed an SLA militiaman.

- In a heavy Katyusha barrage, more than 30 rockets hit northern Israel, wounding six Israelis and sending thousands to bomb shelters.

- Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Barak states that Syria is not directly responsible for guerrilla rocket attacks from Lebanon on northern Israel but adds that Damascus has it in its power to prevent guerrilla operations.

- Israeli Prime Minister Peres warns Syria that Israel holds Damascus responsible for the Katyusha attacks. He states that ‘we see a big contradiction between calling for peace and firing Katyushas. It does not go together and it cannot go together’.

- The Pope inaugurates a synod to chart the future of the Catholic church in Lebanon with a mass in Saint Peter’s Basilica, and says that he hopes it will help consolidate peace in Lebanon and the Middle-East. The synod ends on 14 December.

- The publications court sentences Mourad Khoury, publisher of the Documents File / The Courts, and Walid Khoury, publisher of Keeping Justice, for publishing reports and pictures which violated public morals in August 1994 to one month in jail.

- Aouni Al-Kaaki, owner of the As-Sharq, is sentenced in absentia to a one month jail term for printing cartoons that offended the dignity of President Elias Hrawi and his wife Mona.

- The Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights, a local human rights monitoring group, says that the present government abuses are far reaching. The group’s report points to ban demonstrations and the arrest of protestors as a means of curbing trade unions. The report condemns the imposition of the death penalty for political and civil crimes and the state of prisons where detainees are ‘subject to physical and moral torture’. The report also criticises the new citizenship law stating that it probably leads to ‘destroying Lebanon’s constitutional body and international personality’. It adds that the new educational policy leads to ‘spoiling the biggest liberal educational heritage in the Arab world’.

- US Secretary of State Christopher arrives in Damascus on the first stop of his Middle-East tour.

- Deputy governor of Bank of Lebanon Saidi says that ‘financial markets are a strategic choice for Lebanon’.

- A report attributed to UNRWA states that the number of Palestinians in Lebanon is 178,000.
- Israeli troops fire anti-personnel shells wounding three Norwegian U.N. troops in south Lebanon.

- President Hrawi's suggestion to hold early parliamentary elections provokes parliamentary and constitutional controversy.