A "Nursery for Men of Honour":
Scottish Military Service in France and
The Netherlands, 1660-92

Volume I

A Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Western Sydney

by

Matthew Robert Glozier
Master of Philosophy (University of Sydney 1997)

2001
PLEASE NOTE

The greatest amount of care has been taken while scanning this thesis,

and the best possible result has been obtained.
ABSTRACT

This work examines individual Scottish soldiers and Scottish regiments abroad in the second half of the seventeenth century. The particular focus of the dissertation is Scottish military service in France and the Netherlands, c.1660-92. The study contends that privately contracted units, of the sort common in the period of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), evolved into regular standing regiments by the end of the seventeenth century. This process is visible in the altered conditions experienced by professional Scottish officers and ordinary soldiers who served abroad in this period. This study proposes that Britain’s foreign policy was primarily affected by that of her two most potent neighbours: France and the Netherlands profoundly affected the attitude of the Stuart monarchs towards their subjects fighting abroad. In considering the general position of Scottish military service on the European continent, the enquiry maintains that the international military service performed by Scots in the reigns of Charles II and James VII and II was largely unprofitable, dangerous and sometimes unstructured. This theme is particularly observed in the vicissitudes experienced by George Douglas, 1st Earl of Dumbarton, K.T., and his Scottish regiment in French service. Dumbarton’s career, like that of so many Scottish soldiers overseas, was dominated by the question of loyalty to his native sovereign. While Dumbarton himself followed an unwavering adherence to the Stuarts, other Scots did not. This enquiry maintains that Dumbarton’s experience would have been typical of most Scots abroad between 1660 and 1688, were it not for the specific political and religious concerns of this period. The particular relationship of William of Orange to his uncle, James VII and II, created a situation in which British officers were willing to treasonably betray their native sovereign. This investigation, therefore, addresses the military background to the unique circumstances surrounding the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 and arrives at a mature assessment of the forces effecting all those Scottish veterans of military service abroad who took part in the dramatic events of that year.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a great debt to Associate Professor Sybil M. Jack and Dr. David Burchell for their guidance. This study has benefited enormously from their advice and knowledge. Any mistakes that remain in the text are entirely my own.

I would also like to thank Dr. Mark C. Fissell, of Augusta State University, and Dr. Edward M. Furgol, of the Washington Naval Museum, who both offered sage advice during the early stages of my research. Professor Bruce P. Lenman, Ian Gentles and John Morrill should similarly be mentioned, for their readiness to discuss issues dealt with in this work.

I also owe warm thanks to those generous souls who offered me their knowledge and friendship during the six months I spent in Europe researching. Dr. Steve Murdoch, Dr. Alexia Grosjean and David Worthington of Aberdeen University were singularly giving of their time and advice. Michiel de Jong and John M. Stapleton, of Leiden University, similarly deserve praise for their great hospitality, advice and encouragement.

This study could not have been written without the financial and administrative support offered by the University of Western Sydney at Nepean, which I thank heartily for the scholarship, travel and conference grants. I also thank them, through Dr. Burchell, for the teaching opportunities I have enjoyed at Nepean.

My thanks also go to the Trustees of the French Protestant Church at Soho, London, for their award of the Huguenot Research Scholarship in 1999 (administered through the Institute of Historical Research at London University). This grant allowed me to perform the final research necessary for the successful completion of this work and further encouraged my interest in Huguenot studies in Britain and France.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Add. MSS.         Additional MSS.
A. E. C. P.        Archives étrangères, correspondance politique, Quai d'Orsay, Paris.
Ang.               Angleterre.
B. L.              British Library, London.
f. Fr.             fonds Française.
H. G.              His Grace
H. M. C.           Historical MSS. Commission.
N. A. S.           National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh.
P. R. O.           Public Record Office at Kew, London.
Quai d'Orsay       Département des Affairs d'Étrangers, Quai d'Orsay, Paris.
R. P. C. S.        Register of the Privy Council of Scotland.
S. P. V.           State Papers Venetian.
W. O.              War Office.
NOTES ON THE TEXT

Where practicable, every effort has been made to indicate published material, as opposed to manuscript material, but this has not been possible in all cases. Many family muniments, held in archives in Britain, appear in the publications of the Historical Manuscripts Commission. Spelling and punctuation have, generally, been modernised. Most of the foreign-language material used in this work, has been translated into English. In all cases the year is taken to start at the 1st of January.

NOTES ON CURRENCY

The Scottish £ One twelfth of the £ Sterling.
The Scottish ‘merk’ Two thirds of the £ Sterling (13/4d.) or 1/4d. /12 (or 1/1 and 1/3d. Sterling).
INTRODUCTION

The seventeenth century witnessed important changes in the conditions under which men were engaged to fight in armed units. Before the mid-seventeenth century, rulers and monarchs raised men (when they were needed) through private contractors: these included great nobles and, increasingly, private commanders of less social significance. Often, rights and obligations of military service already existed. ‘Feudal’ military service, rendered to a monarch in exchange for rights in lands, remained a political and cultural concept well into the seventeenth century: Britain’s Charles I, and France’s Louis XIII and Louis XIV all attempted to raise men using mediæval institutions like knight service and the ban et arrière ban, or feudal levy. Both systems required military service from certain sections of the landed nobility and gentry in their respective countries, which was based upon the stipulations of their land tenure. Such institutions were usually employed in conjunction with other means of placing men under arms, including the recruitment of paid bodies of men for specific periods of time. Two other options presented themselves to early modern rulers: one was to pay soldiers from the coffers of the royal household, effectively placing a number of a monarch’s subjects under arms. Another was to raise sums of money to employ companies of professional soldiers who were sometimes aliens from abroad. By the time of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) the vast majority of armed forces on the European continent were international soldiers who had been raised by private contract.

At the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, the commanders of regiments subsisting entirely upon contract-based payments from major European Crowns had become highly professional entrepreneurs. Scots provided a large number of these enterprising colonels and the reputation of the professional Scottish soldier was high indeed. Scots played a prominent part throughout the Thirty Years’ War and excelled as part of Danish forces under the King of Denmark, before the 1630s. Thereafter, Scots constituted a high-profile section of the Swedish king, Gustav II Adolf’s military machine where they were at the forefront of the army, which the Swedish king sent into Germany. By 1648, there could be found, in every army in Europe, high-ranking Scottish commanders: some even served beyond the pale of Christian Europe in the forces of the Ottoman empire.

From the end of the Thirty Years’ War, until roughly the period of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688, privately contracted forces were gradually replaced by more permanent, standing armies. The
rationale for this was not so much strategic as political: the period 1660 to 1700 was strongly marked by 'absolutist' tendencies (for example, the centralisation of Crown administration) in many of Europe's greatest kingdoms. It is no mystery that this period corresponds roughly with the reign of Louis XIV of France who possessed both the willingness and ability to alter the pattern of military service in his kingdom significantly. Though precedents for more or less standing forces existed before Louis XIV's reign – the English Navy, the royal bodyguard of the French kings and the militia units of the Dutch Republic to name but a few – their size (and consequently their significance) was restricted by the limitations of the administrative and financial apparatus of the rulers they served. The changing face of armies throughout Europe was affected by military interaction with the 'Sun King' and his evolving army. This work suggests that, while the exact connection between absolutism and standing army development remains contentious, it is possible to discern an almost symbiotic relationship in the developmental stages of each. While the actual autonomy of contract-colonels probably should not be overstated, it is clear that, in this changing environment, the position of privately raised and financed units altered considerably. Such units were gradually brought under the control of monarchs who sought to impose upon them specific terms of service for prescribed periods of time within larger, increasingly regular, 'state' armies: this differed, essentially, from earlier mercenary forces which rarely served in armies which were in any way regular.

There were no simple structural means by which the contract colonels of the period of the Thirty Years' War could be easily transformed into dutiful professional soldiers in the service of a single monarch. The concept of an exclusive service agenda – one based upon national, religious or ethnic lines – was largely alien to that generation of veterans of the Thirty Years' War who lived into the second half of the seventeenth century.

Many governments between 1650 and 1700, whether absolutist or not in their general principles, attempted to restrict the actions of all groups in society by reserving the mandate for violence to the Crown alone. Rulers naturally needed to maintain some level of armed preparedness for the sake of national defence or offence, but many also gloried in the 'Cult of Arms' and were only too happy to provide avenues of military employment for those gentlemen, nobles, and courtiers who were keen to experience the danger and excitement of the battlefield. It, therefore, became important that the high-ranking nobles, whose social prestige and wealth ensured that they necessarily occupied key
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military positions in many countries, should not feel that they commanded private armies, but that they served the greater good of the Crown. However, even France, the largest kingdom in Europe, lacked the financial, administrative and human resources to maintain a Crown-funded standing army. In other kingdoms, such as England and Scotland, the notion of a standing army remained abhorrent to most subjects throughout the century. The logical economic alternative was the employment of regiments as need dictated. By these means, major European Crowns could also placate adherents of the military enterprise system, many of whom commanded thousands of men. Thus, while the growth of Crown-financed standing forces was also a factor in this period, these never completely replaced privately funded units in the period c.1660-92.

This dissertation examines the conditions surrounding Scottish soldiers’ service in France and the Netherlands in the reigns of Charles II and James VII and II. The first two sections of the work chart the nature and gradual fall of the older, contract-based system so common throughout the Thirty Years’ War. It was replaced by a newer, increasingly centrally controlled system of recruitment favoured by the ‘absolutist’ Kingdom of France and the federally administered, but regionally diverse Netherlands. The third section charts the ramifications of Scottish military service abroad. It analyses the relationship of the Stuart Crown to the large number of Scottish, English and Irish soldiers and officers who served abroad. In so doing, the broadly political and diplomatic place of Britain in relation to its two nearest neighbours – France and the Netherlands – are considered.

An important place is given to comparing and contrasting the nature and employment of those Scottish soldiers who returned from French service after 1678, and those who largely quitted Britain at that time to serve in the Netherlands. Few studies have attempted to analyse the specific nature and circumstances by which any one European Crown attempted to transform contract-forces into standing regiments in the period 1650 to 1700. Consequently, many assumptions have been made regarding the circumstances under which this transformation took place. This work specifically concentrates on the trend towards the adoption of standing-forces and the methods by which the older contract-based system, which this replaced, was eradicated in Great Britain. The mechanics by which two professional Scottish military units serving abroad – the Scottish Douglas regiment in French service and the Scottish regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in the Netherlands – were affected by changing attitudes towards contracted military units serving outside Britain are,
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therefore, analyzed. Central to the examination of the altered status of both these units is their very
different attitude to the policies and instructions of Britain's Charles II and James VII and II between
1660 and 1688. By concentrating on some aspects of the units' divergent attitudes to monarchical
control, this study contributes, in part, to scholarly understanding of the multiplicity of motives and
possibilities for centralised Crown control of armed bodies of men in a period of supposedly
straight-forward transformation.

By concentrating specifically on Scottish soldiers (with their long tradition of military service
abroad), it has been possible to draw various conclusions. The most important of these concerns the
interplay between their traditional associations with the countries in which they served and the
impact of changing political and social circumstances, affecting the continued relations enjoyed by
Scots abroad in the reigns of Charles II and James VII and II.

A central issue in the discussion of changing forms of military organisation is the importance of
national allegiances and the question of loyalty. The independence of Lord George Douglas as the
commander of the Scottish regiment in French service, diminished significantly between 1660 and
1685. At the time of the Restoration of Charles II, Douglas commanded an old Scottish regiment
which formed part of the French Army. Throughout the 1650s the regiment had freely served
against the forces of both Cromwell's England and Protectorate Scotland. After 1660, Douglas's
native sovereign again occupied the three British thrones and from this point onwards the colonel's
presence abroad was a source of diplomatic concern for Charles II. On several occasions, Douglas
was forced to choose between his natural allegiance to Charles and his professional and personal
inclinations towards Louis XIV. Douglas was never an independent contract-colonel in the style of
the Thirty Years' War commanders, but he, like them, relied ultimately on his monarch's permission
to make recruits in Scotland. What worked to limit the independence of Douglas and his regiment,
and what separates his experience from that of earlier commanders, was the direct complicity in
recruiting for his regiment on the part of his king. Charles, more so than his father or grandfather,
made use of the Scottish soldier abroad as an aspect of his foreign policy.

John Childs, among others, has suggested that Charles II maintained a foreign-based 'army' that
was designed to act as the bulwark of his intermittently unpopular crypto-Catholic regime. This
argument had certainly been used to describe the status of the Douglas regiment, which Charles II
posted to Ireland in 1679, following its final return from French service. The move was designed to
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shield the regiment and the king from public opposition to the popularly perceived pro-French posture of both. As the strongest supporter of this view, John Childs has presented a convincing argument in favour of Charles's reliance upon his army during crisis points of his reign – such as the 1680 parliament at Oxford where he had soldiers line the streets leading to the parliament's meeting chambers. However, the evidence presented by Childs is, ultimately, circumstantial. This work demonstrates that, while Charles II may well have seen the Scottish soldier abroad as a form of security for his regime, he remained a powerful, traditional monarch. His attitude towards the Scottish regiment from France was bound to his need to reward its commander and officers for their steadfast loyalty to his Crown. They seldom (except for key periods of crisis such as the Dutch wars) played a role in home defence, which in Scotland was left to a domestic militia and, later, a 'Highland Host' that was primarily used to police dissidents and collect arrears of taxation. Rewards for loyalty may appear to be something of a side issue compared to the revelation by Childs of an absolutist agenda on the part of Charles II. However, the royal obligation to reward faithful service continued to play as important a role in the king's decisions, regarding the destination and use of his army, as did any need or desire on the king's part for armed security.

Loyalty was also central to the later history of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. This unit consisted of three English and three Scottish regiments in the service of the Netherlands, but this old unit contained both Protestant and Catholic officers right up to the year 1688. Similarly, the Scottish regiment in French service contained a mixture of confessional faiths among both its officers and men so that while it is tempting to simplify the role of each unit by suggesting each represented only one faith – Protestant Dutch versus Catholic French – this was never the case. The events of 1688 (understood with reference to the history of both units during the reign of Charles II) prove that the corporate commitment to loyalty present in each unit ultimately carried much greater weight than did the confessional faith of the men belonging to the regiments.

Far from presenting an argument about the dynamics of seventeenth-century international military service, this work argues that the majority of Scottish soldiers abroad followed established traditions when it came to choosing their arena of service. Some choices were the direct result of the political and social proximity of Charles II to the French interest at his court. The pro-French attitude of the king was one of the dominant themes of his reign up until the fall of his favourite, Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby, in 1674. The career of the colonel of the Scottish regiment in
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French service – George Douglas, first Earl of Dumbarton – particularly demonstrates the strategies of patronage which magnates of the Restoration court employed to reward their political supporters.

Similarly, the official disapproval of service in the Netherlands, which existed throughout the reign of Charles II, can only be appreciated fully in the context of the British political malaise that created a Protestant uprising. This was led by the Duke of Monmouth, and supported by the Earl of Argyll, at the time of the accession of King James VII and II in 1685. These were led, supported and manned by Britons who had gone into voluntary exile in the Netherlands during the reign of Charles II. Existing Scottish and English communities living in exile in the Low Countries were augmented by these expatriates, making these groups even more important focal points for anti-Stuart militancy throughout the 1680s than they had previously been. The ultimate result was a vanguard of Scottish soldiers who volunteered to spearhead the Dutch invasion of Britain (and especially Scotland) in 1688. These soldiers were loyal to William of Orange, largely because he and his family were so strongly associated with the ideology of Protestant resistance. This had been created during the Dutch Revolt of the previous century, and enhanced by the United Provinces’ war with France from 1672, and by the arrival in the Netherlands of thousands of Huguenot refugees after 1685.

Scottish soldiers had fought abroad since at least the Middle Ages. From the earliest times Scottish soldiers augmented military forces ranging from Northern Ireland to Russia, and from Scandinavia to Italy. This study focusses on the way in which Scottish regiments in northwest Europe were integrated into contemporary political and military structures at a time when it was increasingly difficult to raise armies privately without the permission and approval of local monarchs. The position of the British regiments in French service between 1672 and 1678 is instructive to the study of this transition from the private military enterprise system prevalent during the period of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48). In many ways it is a model for the replacement of privately raised units, with those of a standing ‘British’ Army, while in other ways it represents the problems which monarchs faced in challenging the strongly entrenched rights and privileges of contractually established private units.

The position of military leaders in the changing environment of the seventeenth century presents a rich field of study. For example, the rights to gifts and property of commanders and lesser officers

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under the jurisdiction of foreign monarchs, was singularly fraught and particularly affected the heirs of a number of high-ranking Scottish soldiers abroad. Similarly, the politique nature of naturalisation and settlement rights of Scottish soldiers abroad, and the recognition and maintenance of their social status, are important issues which have received little scholarly attention. They are studied here as issues of great importance to any analysis of the effects of increasing Crown control of armed forces in the period c.1660-92.

The process by which foreign regiments were integrated into larger national armies, is an important concern in this study. It is particularly relevant in its effects on the attitudes of Scottish men and women associated with military service abroad. The differing experiences of foreign service of officers and men is also highly instructive of the increasingly divergent rationales for their enlistment, particularly as the attitude of both France and the United Provinces towards British forces changed markedly in the 1670s.

Basic forms of nationalism and patriotism had an impact upon the treatment of Scottish soldiers abroad: they might be vilified as foreigners or feted as old friends, depending on the place and time. Scottish soldiers were particularly ‘clannish’, or family, orientated in terms of how they arranged their service in regiments abroad. This general allegiance to family and kin in many ways reflected a wider sense of nationhood or ‘Scottishness’ among such soldiers. The restoration of Charles II provided many opportunities for the articulation of national and personal loyalty to the sovereign by his Scottish subjects abroad. The genuineness of many Scots’ statements of allegiance to their ‘natural’ king and country in 1660 should, however, be treated with scepticism. Though many were proud to be called Scots, and the establishment of a connection to Scotland by soldiers in many foreign countries often provided the basis for successful employment in Britain based on kinship or reputation abroad. Statements of nationalist and patriotic sorts were, therefore, employed by many Scots overseas, who saw distinct advantages in maintaining links with the country of their or their ancestors’ birth.

The presence of Britons abroad carried considerable diplomatic and political implications for British kings, however, the transformation from private to standing military units was also effected by changes in military technology. Technological advances in drill techniques, weaponry and siegcraft all affected traditional notions of service, helping to alter stereotyped methods of raising and equipping bodies of armed men.
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The particular relationship of France and the Netherlands to Britain in the period 1660-92 singles them out for specific attention in this work: both share a long association with Scotland and played host to Scottish and English regiments from the Middle Ages. English regiments could be found in countries such as Portugal, following the 1662 of Charles II and Catherine of Braganza. Scottish forces fought across central and eastern Europe, but permanent Scottish regiments only existed in France and the Netherlands in the second half of the century. Russia drew a small, but significant number of Scots to its service, and their experiences and later impact upon Scotland are cited throughout this study. In contrast, a great number of Scots served in Germany and Sweden before 1660 and many of these men lived to see the Restoration, although few played a significant role in the political or social development of Britain between 1660 and 1688. This work is not the appropriate place for a discussion of Scottish military service in Scandinavia, but two recent doctoral theses have added significantly to scholarly knowledge of the importance of Scots in this part of Europe. Similarly, an analysis of the significant military service rendered by Scots in Russia, Germany and Sweden is beyond the focus of this dissertation. This must wait until the experiences and impact of the service of these Scots can be considered in a larger study of Restoration Scottish military service abroad. Furthermore, while Scandinavian armies have been well-researched – most recently by Doctors Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean, and by at least one outstanding research student of the previous generation, J. A. Fallon – the Scottish dimension of the seventeenth-century armies of France and the United Provinces have not been so thoroughly treated.

Sources for the study of the Scottish soldier abroad remain surprisingly sparse. It might be thought that more prominent Scottish soldiers overseas would merit a mention in the memoirs of important domestic and foreign courtiers and monarchs, but in general they do not. The memoirs of James, Duke of York’s military campaigns of the 1650s, for example, contain two brief references to

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only one of the two major Scottish regiments in French service at that time.\textsuperscript{6} The memoirs of the French marshals, the Vicomte de Turenne and the Prince de Condé, are wholly concerned with their own military strategies and operations or with periods of their military activity prior to 1660.\textsuperscript{7} The memoirs of Louis XIV are concerned with statecraft, rather than individual courtiers, and were written long after the departure of the British presence from his armies.\textsuperscript{8} Other contemporary memoirs from the same period (usually written towards its end) tend to concentrate on significant French courtiers or courtly intrigues, rather than foreign military commanders.\textsuperscript{9}

Little direct information remains regarding the officers and men who staffed British units abroad. The major biographical source for Scottish officers remains the personal muniments held in private and public archives in Britain. The various collections at the National Library of Scotland, the National Archives of Scotland and the British Library contain a great deal of unpublished personal correspondence from Scottish soldiers overseas.\textsuperscript{10} However, before historians can use these papers it is necessary to establish which Scots actually engaged in such service.

What little information remains concerning private and non-commissioned soldiers in French and Dutch service, can be found (among a few other places) in the accounts of abduction and desertion contained in the State Papers series Domestic, France, Ireland and Scotland. The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland also contains complaints regarding the pressing and desertion of men from the Scottish regiment. A little information regarding ordinary British soldiers in the French Army, is contained in the records of the admissions to the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris in the period c.1670-88. These records are held at the military archives at the Château de Vincennes, Paris. The records list the age, religion, marital status, regiment and wounds of each soldier admitted to the Invalides. Instances of unjust pressing for service abroad (some of which came before the Scottish Privy Council) also provide valuable information regarding the personnel of Scottish foreign-serving

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\textsuperscript{10} The most important of these papers are listed in the bibliography at the end of this work.
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regiments. This information represents a somewhat negative form of evidence as it only allows us to know about those Scots who escaped from service abroad. From this evidence it is, however, possible to see which sector of the Scottish population was targeted for military service in the period under study.

An important starting point for the study of Scottish officers who were engaged in military service overseas is the Scots Peerage by James Balfour Paul. This multi-volume series provides excellent, if occasionally unreliable, biographical information relating to the members of Scotland’s titled families.11 A similar situation is, regrettably, not to be found in T. A. Fischer’s studies of the Scots in Germany, Sweden and Prussia. While useful for the period of the Thirty Years’ War, these works are somewhat reticent with regard to Scots in military service abroad in the second half of the seventeenth century.12 One recent initiative at the University of Aberdeen has witnessed the creation of a comprehensive database of Scots serving in Scandinavia and Denmark in the first half of the seventeenth century. While the large-scale nature of this service renders the database an invaluable asset to researchers, it is not so useful with regard to the rest of Europe or for the period following 1660. This was beyond the scope of the original project, but also reflects the relative lack of scholarly interest in the Scottish soldier abroad in the years after 1648.

Any discussion of the lives of Scots in foreign military service is initially hampered by the paucity of surviving sources. This is symptomatic of the fact that the vast majority of Scots in such service were poor, relatively poorly educated, and overworked professionals. The passages published from the diary of Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries, a Scot in Russian service, are among the best extant primary sources regarding the conditions of life of ordinary Scottish mercenary soldiers abroad.13 Other memoirs, such as those of Sir James Turner, are useful for incidental information touching upon Scotland, but are wholly focussed upon domestic issues in the period covered by this study and are, therefore, of little use for any analysis of Scots abroad after 1660.14 Some of the published letters and memoirs of older soldiers from the period of the Thirty Years’ War are useful for the beginning of the reign of Charles II.15 Equally, some biographies of Scottish

12 T. A. Fischer, The Scots in Germany (Edinburgh, 1902); T. A. Fischer, The Scots in Sweden (Edinburgh, 1907).
14 Sir James Turner, Memoirs of His Own Life and Time (Edinburgh, 1839).
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soldiers exist for the period after 1688: that of Hugh Mackay of Scourie, a veteran of Dutch service and a friend of William of Orange, is particularly useful for a soldier's view of the 'Glorious Revolution'. Scourie's memoirs provide almost no information, regarding the conditions of life and military service in the Netherlands, and half of the entire work is devoted to events from William's arrival in Britain to the defeat of James VII and II at the battle of the Boyne in 1690.\(^{16}\)

Charles II's foreign policy was a central feature of his reign. To a greater or lesser degree, every work devoted to Charles has considered his relations with the continent in general, and with Louis XIV of France specifically.\(^{17}\) However, even historians who acknowledge the important political and social implications of British soldiers serving abroad have tended to appreciate them from the point of view of the, often quite limited, role they played in Britain. This theme is evident in many of the secondary sources available in this area, many of which are cited throughout the footnotes of this research. No one has doubted that Charles's relationship with Louis XIV was central to the maintenance of the pre-eminent faction at the English court – the French interest. Charles II's attraction to Frenchmen and their culture was assumed by many of his contemporaries to be synonymous with a receptivity to Roman Catholicism. The king's French circle at the English court, however, also included prominent French Protestants: by far the most significant and powerful of these was Louis de Durfort-Duras, second Earl of Feversham – the Huguenot earl was Commander-in-Chief of the English Army of both Charles II and later James VII and II. It was this relationship with France, along with other long-standing connections, which fostered military links between Britain and France. However, rarely has any analysis of the connection between Charles II and France resulted in a study of the nature and scale of the military support sent to that country, or of the existing relationship between his smaller, northern Kingdom of Scotland and France.

Some analysis has occurred concerning Franco-British military co-operation during the Third Anglo-Dutch War of 1672-4. C. T. Atkinson remains one of only three authors to have written specifically on British soldiers in French service between 1672 and 1674.\(^{18}\) His article provides a good narrative of the service itinerary of the British regiments in French service during the Third

\(^{16}\) H. Mackay of Scourie, Life of Lieut. General Hugh Mackay of Scourie, ed. J. Mackay of Rockfield (Edinburgh, 1856).


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Anglo-Dutch War, but suffers from the fact that it was aimed primarily at redressing contemporary prejudices from the time of its publication in 1946. The most important of these, held that it was only during William of Orange’s wars of the 1690s that British regiments first engaged in major military operations on the European continent. Atkinson’s article therefore charted the number of Britons involved in French service in the 1670s and their theatres of service, rather than concentrate on the political rationale behind that service. By writing in this way, Atkinson failed to appreciate the subtle diplomatic position of the regiments he described, and consequently failed to see the problematic nature of stating that they were all unambiguously subject to the British king. This led him to express surprise at the recalcitrance of Louis XIV at returning the regiments to Britain in 1675, when in fact that king was actively assisting Charles II against English parliamentary opposition to British soldiers in French service.

Atkinson was also mute regarding the existing relationship between Louis XIV and Lord George Douglas, the commander of the Scottish regiment in French service. Douglas’s regiment consisted of over 3,000 men, representing two-thirds of the entire British force in French service. Though Atkinson mentioned the fact that the Regiment de Douglas had been on the French establishment since 1633, he made no comment on the political or diplomatic machinations, which its commander had consistently employed at the French court in the twelve years prior to 1672. Atkinson, therefore, missed the point that Douglas’s maintenance and preservation of his regiment (at times at the expense of the foreign policy of Louis XIV) lay behind that king’s treatment of the regiment in 1669 (see chapter 5). Before 1660, the third Duke of Hamilton used the Douglas regiment, which belonged to his brother, to supply Scottish soldiers to the army in exile of Charles II. As a special mark of appreciation, the king went out of his way to maintain the Regiment de Douglas in French service after the Restoration. Atkinson, along with every militarily orientated commentator on the regiment’s history, failed to grasp this fact.

In his historiographical analysis of the material available for a reconstruction of the British forces’ activities under French command in the period 1672-4, Atkinson provided a good survey of available sources in England. Admittedly, Atkinson’s research seems to have occurred at a time when France was barely free from Nazi occupation, and was therefore greatly disrupted, but he missed the vital point that British regiments in French service might actually have left evidence of their activities in France itself. Atkinson, similarly, did not seem to understand the personal,
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possessive nature of contemporary semi-entrepreneurial command, and therefore failed to see that a regiment’s movements and status might be intimately bound to its commander’s political and diplomatic standing in overseas service. In contrast, Atkinson did a particularly good job of assessing the career in France of the Duke of Monmouth in this period and, indeed, if it were not for his article no coherent narrative would exist of the movements of the British forces between 1672 and 1674.

John Childs has also written on British military service abroad during the reign of Charles II. Childs has significantly added to scholarship on British military service in Portugal, Tangier, France and the Netherlands and has also singled out the British Brigade in French service – including the Scotsmen of Douglas, the Irishmen of Hamilton, and the Englishmen of Monmouth – for particular study. The analysis by Childs of the brigade demonstrates a more sophisticated grasp of the issues facing later seventeenth century armies, than is manifested in Atkinson’s article. The study by Childs of the brigade is also more scholarly and his point is well taken, that overseas military service provided a valuable opportunity for young Britons to gain experience in the ‘Art of War’. Childs also suggests that the rationale of Charles for keeping British soldiers abroad was to maintain men under arms, but not on his own payroll: this was designed (says Childs) to ensure the security of his throne. Childs implies that this was the sole aim of Charles, but by adhering to this argument he, like Atkinson, places too much importance on an arbitrarily perceived absolutist agenda on the part of Louis XIV and Charles II. Both authors, consequently, fail to appreciate the significance of the personal relationships that semi-entrepreneurial colonels enjoyed with their monarchs – who were as much employers as they were ‘natural’ sovereigns. Having said this, there is indeed much historical evidence for the absolutist philosophy of both Charles II and Louis XIV. There is also no actual contradiction between favouritism and absolutism. The contention here centres on the question of whether Atkinson and Childs have simply assumed this to be self-evident or have actually perceived the reality of their assertions in empirical evidence.

The commanders of the English, Scottish, and Irish, regiments of the British Brigade in French service – the Duke of Monmouth (a Protestant), Lord George Douglas (a Roman Catholic), and Sir

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George Hamilton (a Roman Catholic, belonging to the Irish branch of a well-connected Scottish family) – led forces consisting substantially of men from their own countries. In many cases, the men they commanded shared the same religion as themselves, but the significance of this fact seems to be missed by some historians. Even the careful analysis by Childs of British military service abroad, for example, gives little credence to the power of domestic religious persecution as an incentive for such service. Confessional divisions were an important consideration in the willingness of men (especially junior officers) to join Scottish regiments overseas. This was especially true of Roman Catholic officers, and many of them decided to stay in France, following the return of most British units to Great Britain in 1678. The attraction of Dutch service for Protestant officers remained strong throughout the period following 1660. It increased greatly after 1680, reaching a crescendo in the years between 1685 and 1688.

The debt, which historians owe to Atkinson and Childs, becomes evident when it is realised that one cannot look to French historiographers, or French military histories of this period, for information regarding the Scottish regiments in French service between 1660 and 1688. The most recent English-language study of the French Army in the seventeenth century – John Lynn’s comprehensive Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715 – for example, deals cursorily with foreigners in the French Army. Lynn was obliged to estimate the number of foreign soldiers in the French Army at certain points throughout the seventeenth century, and the cost of raising and equipping them. However, he does so only with reference to existing French military studies, which are themselves largely reticent on this point. Lynn states that there were 6,000 Scots, English and Irish, as opposed to 14,000 Swiss, in the French Army in 1672, and, for example, that the average cost of raising and equipping foreign soldiers (during the wars of the Austrian Succession, 1740-8) was 122 livres, 11 deniers. These studies rarely make special mention of British soldiers in French service, and estimates of the number of foreign soldiers in, and their cost to, the French military establishment, represent the extent of interest taken in them by French historians of the French Army of the seventeenth century. In his treatment of foreign troops, Lynn largely follows the line of French military historians such as André Corvisier and

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Philippe Contamine. These studies only treat the colossal structure of the French Army under Louis XIV in so far as it had an impact on French soldiers and the French Crown. Studies by Corvisier, such as his Clientèles et fidélités sans l’armées française aux 17e et 18e siècles and Les généraux de Louis XIV et leur origine sociale, make only cursory mention of non-French personnel in the French Army.\textsuperscript{24} Whilst this is reasonable, given the extent of their investigations due to the enormous size of the military machine of Louis XIV, it is of little use to historians investigating the mechanics and rationale of Scottish service within that machine.

Far more useful are French studies of the careers and policies of the ministers of war. The studies by Camille Rousset, Louis André, and André Corvisier, of the French Secretaries of State for War, Jean-Baptiste Le Tellier and his son, the Marquis de Louvois, provide an excellent overview of the infrastructure of the French war office and its relationship to the French court and the king.\textsuperscript{25} Though the first two studies are now quite old, more recent scholarship has augmented, rather than challenged, their basic premises. Philippe Contamine has extended the scope of reference of the two earlier studies without questioning their basic preconceptions, while more exact work – such as David Parrott’s investigation of the operation of the French military administration under Richelieu – is too specifically bound to one period to be projected forward into the 1660s.\textsuperscript{26} All these works offer little information regarding Scottish soldiers in French service, and are of assistance primarily as explanatory devices for the administrative structures which managed those soldiers.

Dutch sources offer slightly more assistance to the historian researching the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in the Netherlands. The enormously useful, multi-volume history of the Dutch Army – Ten Raa’s and De Bass’s, Het Staatsche Leger – offers a great deal of information relating to British soldiers in Dutch service. The disadvantage of this source is that the information, which it provides, is largely contained in the form of undigested transcriptions of primary source material. It can, therefore, be taken as little more than a supplement to a historian’s normal work in the Algemeen Rijksarchief at The Hague. This archive contains a number of very useful administrative series relating to the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. The most immediately useful is the State van Oorloge (State of War)


\textsuperscript{25} C. Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, 4 vols (Paris, 1862-4); L. André, Michel Le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée monarchique (Paris, 1906); L. André, Michel Le Tellier et Louvois (Paris, 1942).

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accounts which list the personnel and pay of the regiments of the Brigade. Reinforcing this
evidential base are the Dutch Army’s commission books which cover the years 1649 to 1691. The
book covering the period 1666 to 1674 is lost, but this loss is partly supplemented by the book’s
index, which exists and which lists the names of officers and the rank with which they were
commissioned into the army during this period. Neither of these sources has previously been used
for a study of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. The same can be said of the General Letters series, which
cover incoming and outgoing correspondence to the States General of the United Provinces
regarding military matters. This source offers evidence for the movements of regiments, and helps
to explain the operation of the Dutch system of repartite (payment) divisions among the states and
the connections between these states and individual regiments.

It might reasonably be hoped that regimental histories would offer a great deal of information
regarding the movements, history and personnel of individual units. However, in most cases they
provide limited and often unsubstantiated overviews of a regiment’s origin and early history.
Furthermore, in many cases the political and diplomatic rationale behind regimental movements is
either ignored or completely lost on their authors, who wish simply to chart the chronology of a
unit’s campaigning history. In charting that history, many studies have indeed provided full
documentation and credible accounts of the movements of regiments, though the desire to cover a
regiment’s entire history often results in a truncated treatment of each important period within that
history. While unsubstantiated aspects of regimental histories must be treated with caution, the
histories themselves often represent an excellent starting point from which to start an investigation of
a single period in a regiment’s development. Histories of the First Scottish Foot Regiment, or the
Regiment de Douglas as it was better known in the period covered by this study, contain little or no
information, concerning the character or importance of its commander, the Earl of Dumbarton, or the

27 Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, Commissij boek van den Raad van State ane 1649-1664 (Lettera H 5), Commissij boek van den
Raad van State ane 1673-1675 (Lettera H 6), Commissij boek van den Raad van State ane 1676-1680 (Lettera H 7) and Commissij boek
van den Raad van State ane 1681-1691 (Lettera H 8). Full references for the state van oorloghe accounts, and other Dutch archival
material, are reproduced in the bibliography at the end of this work.

28 R. Cannon, Historical Records of the First, or Royal Regiment of Foot: Containing an Account of the Origins of the Regiment in
the Reign of King James VI of Scotland and its Subsequent Services to 1846, vol. 25 (London, 1847); A. Muir, The First Foot, The
History of the Royal Scots (Edinburgh, 1961); N. R. Crockatt, The Royal Scots (Aldershot, 1952); H. J. Simson, The Hundred Years:
The Royal Scots (Edinburgh, 1935); D. T. H. McLennan, A Short History of the Royal Scots (Poona, 1924); M.,M. Haldane, The Royal
Scots (Glasgow, 1919); L. M. Watt, The Royal Scots (Edinburgh, 1916); J. C. Leask and H. M. McCane, The Regimental Records of
the Royal Scots (Dublin, 1915); J. Wetherall’s Historical Account, 1st or the Royal Regiment of Foot (London, 1832).
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importance of the regiment to Louis XIV or Charles II.²⁹ It is not, therefore, to regimental histories that one must turn in order to investigate these questions.

This study’s description of the movements of the *Regiment de Douglas*, the English regiment of the Duke of Monmouth, and the Irish regiment of Sir George Hamilton, between 1672 and 1674 has been reconstructed primarily from the records of the military archives at the *Château de Vincennes*, Paris. Comprehensive military chronologies, memoirs and French administrative correspondence are preserved there, and these collections are particularly strong for the period covering the war in Flanders conducted by Louis XIV from 1672 to 1678. They contain a great deal of information relating to the Scottish, English and Irish regiments in French service from 1672 to the point at which they were disbanded in 1678. Some supplementary evidence is held at the *Bibliothèque Nationale* – including that contained in the *Collection Châtre de Congé* and the *Collection Mélanges de Colbert* – among copies of *licenciemnt* (disbandment) and *congé* (leave) notices and orders from the French Army and the correspondence of the French Secretary of State for War.

The letters and papers of Lord George Douglas – later first Earl of Dumbarton – are cited throughout this study. Douglas’s correspondence exists primarily in the *Lauderdale Papers* in the British Library and in the *Hamilton Papers* deposited at the National Archives of Scotland in West Register House, Edinburgh. The earl’s letters and papers provide a comprehensive narrative of his career. The muniments contained in the *Lauderdale Papers* cover the period of the late 1660s while those contained amongst the *Hamilton Papers* belong to the period of the late 1670s and 1680s. That part of Douglas’s correspondence, that are not contained in these archival collections, can be found in the publications of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, especially amongst the *Le Fleming* and *Ormonde* manuscripts.³⁰

There is no straightforward source for the officers of Douglas’s regiment before its final return to Britain in 1679. The published accounts of the regiment, by John Childs and Charles Dalton are based on manuscript collections, and reproduce a list of the officers in only two single years (1666


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and 1678 respectively). The personnel of the regiment, therefore, has to be deduced from stray references to recruiting and to battles which can be found in the Register of the Scottish Privy Council and the State Papers Domestic, French and Venetian. The information relating to personnel which is presented in this study, has been pieced together from the largely published Entry Books and Warrant Books for Scotland which are contained in the State Papers series Domestic and Scotland and from the published records of the Scottish Privy Council. Where these refer to recruits being raised under individual captains of the Douglas regiment in Scotland or England before 1679, they have proved to be particularly useful in charting the longevity of some of Douglas’s more senior officers. Little information is extant concerning the private and non-commissioned soldiers of the Douglas regiment. Some information regarding the ordinary soldiers of the regiment is contained in the records of the admissions to the Hôtel des Invalides, in Paris, c.1670-88, which have already been mentioned and are discussed in chapter 7.

This study concentrates on the impact of the diplomatic connections of Britain to France and the United Provinces on Scottish military service abroad. It also assesses the effect of military service abroad upon the major events of Charles II’s reign in Britain, in general, and of James VII and II’s reign in Scotland in particular. In doing so, the major emphasis has not been placed on the constitutional problems beloved by English historiography prior to 1688, as these have little relevance to the Scotland of 1685-8. Rather, this study touches on the influence of foreign service upon the establishment by James VII and II of a loyal ‘court party’ (arguably as part of a more general policy of encouraging the Catholic religion in Britain). The relevance of this ‘court party’ to Scottish military service abroad, becomes evident when it is recognised that the key members of James’s loyal group were veterans of military service in France: first among these was Lord George Douglas. His role in the implementation by James VII and II of a largely conservative and partly crypto-Catholic loyalist government in Scotland and in the events leading up to the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688, have never been fully analysed by Scottish historians. They have hardly been taken notice of at all by the anglocentric historiography which continues to dominate studies of the

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events of 1688, against which the activities in Scotland of James VII and II, and his use of a Scottish and largely Catholic ‘court party’, has been significantly less regarded.32

This work also considers the long-term connections between the French interest at the court of Charles II, the nature of Scottish military service abroad, and the formation of a Catholic Scottish ‘court party’ in the reign of James VII and II. It does this by examining the role played by George Douglas, Earl of Dumbarton, in the machinations of Stuart court politics between 1666 and 1688. No biography has been written of this soldier, and his importance as an exemplar of Restoration Stuart court factionalism has been under-appreciated. Under James, Dumbarton represented the military arm of the Scottish ‘court party’, while the Drummond brothers – the Earls of Perth and Melfort – headed the civil arm of that government.33

The domestic and political events of the reigns of Charles II and James VII and II reigns have attracted concerted academic study since the mid-nineteenth century. Lord Macaulay penned the first substantively historical analysis of the Restoration period, largely as a means of explaining the events of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688.34 Various collections of letters and correspondence also exist which chart the development of British foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations in the period.35 Of similar usefulness are the many histories of the events preceding the ‘Glorious Revolution’, which appeared after 1688 and are written by various Jacobite, Tory and Whig authors.36

Jacobitism – the pro-James beliefs of that ‘party’ of Stuart legitimists who operated from 1688 and who feature prominently throughout the eighteenth century – has been singled out (by Paul

35 Earls of Stair, Annals and Correspondence of the first and second Earls of Stair, ed. J. M. Graham, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1875); J. Maitland, Duke of Lauderdale, The Lauderdale Papers, ed. O. Airy, 3 vols (London: Camden Society, 1884-5); Scottish History Society Miscellany, vols 1, 2, 5 and 6; M. Kennedy, Letters from Lady Margaret Kennedy to Lauderdale (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, n.d.); Letter addressed by Prelates and Individuals of High Rank in Scotland . . . to Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, ed. W. N. Clarke (Edinburgh, 1848); Letters . . . to George, Earl of Aberdeen, Lord High Chancellor of Scotland, 1681-4, ed. J. Dunn (Spalding Club, 1851); Earls of Seafield, Seafield Correspondence from 1685-1708, ed. J. Grant (Edinburgh, 1912); Earls of Marchmont, Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, 1685-1750, ed. G. H. Rose, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1831).
36 Two Jacobite examples are C. Lindsay, Earl of Balcarres, A Memoir Touching the Revolution in Scotland (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1841), and J. F. D’Orleans, The History of the Revolution in England under the Family of the Stuarts, From the Year 1603 to 1690 (London, 1722). Whig histories – including Gilbert Burnet’s History of his Own Time – continued to be published into the eighteenth century: Burnet was widely published in French: cf. e.g., G. Burnet, Memoirs pour servir à l’Histoire de la Grande-Bretagne, sous les regnes de Charles II et de Jacques II (The Hague, 1725).
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Hopkins for one) as a particularly difficult movement to study in its infancy c.1688.37 A concentration on the origins of this faction, where these are connected to military service, the army, and the British officer corps, is presented in this work, though a specific study of the origins of Jacobitism is obviously beyond the scope of this present investigation.

Lord Macaulay’s early historical work was soundly based upon empirical historical evidence – such as memoirs left by contemporary observers of courtly and political matters – though his conclusions were resolutely Whiggish.38 These same sources continue to be the main targets of reappraisals and revisions of the actions of both Charles and James throughout their reigns. Macaulay’s work remains one of the most important critical historical narratives of the later Stuart period.

Charles II’s general attitude to Scotland has usually been assessed through his suppression of religious dissenting groups, such as the Conventicles, which has largely been taken to represent an absolutist agenda. Little credence has traditionally been given to his attitude towards individual Scots outside Scotland, but this study maintains that such Scots were essential to Charles II in the maintenance of his ascendancy at the English court. Moreover, Charles II used the Scottish regiment in France as a public show-piece for his support for Louis XIV.

Current reassessments of the reign of James VII and II in particular, have largely either ignored or marginalized the Scottish dimension of his kingship.39 Those studies of James VII and II that have concentrated on his Scottish policies, have usually taken the form of short and specific analyses of key moments in his life.40 Such studies have not had the opportunity to fit themselves into larger narratives, which would explain the activities of James VII and II in light of his broader political objectives, or comment on his larger attitude to Scotland and to the Scots. This is despite the fact

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that there exists much secondary material covering the lives of Scottish statesmen and politicians between 1660 and 1688. Less material exists concerning the lives of churchmen in the period. James VII and II's manipulation of foreign-trained Scottish soldiers to achieve his aims in Scotland specifically and in Britain more generally will be found in this work.

James relied far less on military force to control his Scottish subjects between 1685 and 1688 than he did in, for example, Ireland, where a purge of the Irish Army was thought by his Lord-Lieutenant, Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnel, to be essential for the maintenance of Crown interests. James's attitude towards the Scottish veterans of the Douglas regiment and the Anglo-Dutch Brigade was shaded by his acute desire for loyalty. Though an implicit believer in the supremacy of the Roman Catholic faith, James promoted Catholic officers and men primarily due to his certainty of their loyalty, not due to any rigorous plan to Catholicize his army. In this, his policy towards the army somewhat resembles that of Charles II, who was significantly more interested in rewarding personal loyalty than in promoting religious dogmatism.

An explanation of why Charles's and James's policies towards their armies led in different directions, lies in the evolution of the conditions which effected the profession of arms as a whole in the years between 1660 and 1688. Some historians – including John Childs and Victor Kiernan – have suggested that an increasing professionalism existed among the British officer corps from 1660. Childs has pointed to professionalism as the key factor in the receptivity of officers to political change within James's three kingdoms during his reign. He argues that career officers were removed from the political and social concerns of the civil nobility and gentry.

This enquiry questions the certainty of any increase in the professionalism of British officers abroad, especially where such an increase has been construed as having an impact on loyalty to a native sovereign. A clear disparity appears, for example, between the experiences of the veterans of the Douglas regiment in France and those of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in the Netherlands (see chapter 11). This suggests that it is inappropriate to lump together the experiences of all Scots abroad before 1688 (as John Childs tends to do). The very long-term nature of Scottish military

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42 A. Shields, The Life and Death of ... James Renwick (Edinburgh, 1724); T. Stephen, Archbishop Sharp (London, 1839).

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service overseas meant that Scots tended to follow established and entrenched career paths, sometimes based on established family or local practices. This augments the argument of Childs, regarding the professionalism of officers in general, by suggesting that the loyalty expressed in 1688 by the Douglas regiment to James VII and II represented the normal level of loyalty traditionally demonstrated by officers in service out of the country. In contrast, Dutch service promoted a number of British officers who were variously immigrants, malcontents, rebels or purely mercenary careerists, all of whom by definition had distanced themselves from Britain’s Stuart Crown by a conclusive act of removal. The testing of the loyalty of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade – by its recall in 1666, 1685 and 1688 – confirmed the decreasing reliance which the Stuarts could place upon it as a form of security for their throne, as, in each instance, fewer soldiers returned when the command was given. It is, therefore, again a question of loyalty, rather than strictly one of religious faith, which stood at the heart of the Stuarts’ attitude towards their subjects’ military service abroad. By contrasting the experiences and traditions of service of Scots in French and Dutch service, it is possible to explain Childs’s argument regarding the ‘conspiracy in the army’ in 1688 among the British veterans of Dutch service which did so much to bring down James’s regime.

This examination uses Scottish military service overseas as the focus for a discussion of some of the larger political, diplomatic and social interconnections between Britain, France and the Netherlands between the years 1660 and 1692. By concentrating on foreign military service, and the later political ramifications of that service, this work inevitably ignores other issues of great importance. The religious and political position of Scotland under Charles II, political and economic reformation in France under Louis XIV and the finer points of international diplomacy throughout the period are only mentioned where they are directly relevant to the argument under discussion. The Scots possessed a long tradition of military service abroad, and that history is partly related in the first chapter, which follows.
Part I:
The Scottish Military Experience to 1660
Losse of tyme and blood... in forreign partes of the earth

SCOTTISH MILITARY SERVICE IN FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS BEFORE 1660

The tradition of Scottish military service abroad is a long and honourable one. Those Scots who were serving abroad on the eve of the restoration of Charles II in 1660 had entered that service by disparate means. Traditional connections between Scotland and France and Scotland and the United Provinces of the Netherlands, meant that many Scots could be found serving in those countries. Many more remained in Swedish service, due to newly fostered connections that grew up during the Thirty Years’ War. For at least ten years preceding the Restoration, the issue of loyalty and service by the Scottish soldier abroad to his ‘native prince’ remained an insignificant problem. A king in exile (such as Charles II was throughout the 1650s), could only be served up to a point. With the Restoration in 1660, Scots in foreign service were forced to assess their position vis à vis their ‘natural’ service to their native sovereign versus continued service under adopted rulers. Various responses were adopted to solve this problem. Many Scots chose to express their loyalty to Charles, while remaining abroad. Others returned home, but all sought the redress of old wrongs. Charles was unable to give reparation after two decades of financial, social and political turmoil. This set the scene for a reign characterised by compromise, duplicity, and the implicit allowance to a significant minority of his courtly subjects, to maintain the same internationalist agenda which had sustained them during the years of adversity between 1649 and 1660. This was true in relation to diplomatic and economic activity, and particularly true with reference to military undertakings. Though Charles was never totally free to offer monetary rewards to his supporters he was always able to sanction, for example, the recruitment of men for military service in foreign parts.

Scottish mercenary activity abroad, though prevalent in Ireland since the thirteenth century – the West Highland and Island heavy infantry known in Ireland as Galloglasses were a famous example of early Scottish mercenary service overseas\(^1\) – and France since the fifteenth,\(^2\) only greatly

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expanded in the decades of the 1560s and 1570s: Henry VIII employed 2,000 Scots in 1544 "... out of the most wild and savage sort of them, whose absence should rather do good than hurt."\(^3\) Between 1560 and the 1590s, some 25,000 Scots served in Ulster. Called 'redshanks', they were employed by Elizabeth I in her war against the Earl of Tyrone, which was finally concluded in 1603.\(^4\) In Ireland, in the 1560s, Elizabeth I used the forces of James and Sorley Boy MacDonnell, and those of the Earl of Argyll, to undermine the power of the O'Neills in Antrim. As late as 1645, the Irish Earl of Antrim operated as a mercenary contractor for Philip of Spain's army in Flanders.\(^5\) The Dutch Revolt against Spain proved the most vital incentive for Scottish commanders to raise men in order to assist the northern Protestant states of the Netherlands in their struggle against Catholic Spain.\(^6\) Between 1573 and 1579, 3,100 Scots were recruited for service in Flanders and the Low Countries.\(^7\) This period of activity represents the first great wave of Scottish mercenary involvement on the European continent, and lasted from 1573 to 1620.

A second great wave occurred between 1625 and 1642. It is estimated that something in the region of 40,000 Scots, or one in ten adult males, served abroad as a soldier in this second period. Between 1625 and 1632, 25,000 Scots (representing 10 per cent of the adult male population) went to fight in High Germany. Up to 50,000 Englishmen also fought on the continent either under Count Ernst von Mansfeld or, for example, to aid Huguenot resistance at the siege of La Rochelle in France (in 1627).\(^8\)

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SCOTTISH MILITARY SERVICE IN FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS BEFORE 1660

Sixteenth-century Scottish commanders were gentry of middle or low standing. They were professional soldiers, typical of the great bulk of enterprising officers who raised men by contract and who became the mainstay of the armies of the seventeenth century. The first surge of Scottish mercenary activity abroad reached its high-point in a six-year period of unusually frenzied activity between 1573 and 1579. During these six years, individual colonels raised large numbers of men in companies of between a hundred to three hundred soldiers. An initial recruiting drive (which raised 1,600 men) took place on 4 June 1573. These soldiers represented Scotland’s first contribution to the Low Countries’ struggle against Spanish domination.

The second, later increase in Scottish mercenary activity occurred as a result of the troubles that followed the Bohemian Revolt of 1618, which led directly to the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), and which resulted from a succession struggle in Bohemia over the appointment of a Protestant king. This series of conflicts unmistakably possessed the character of a religious war. The great Scottish mercenary commander, Sir Robert Monro, said that he recruited Scots to serve in the war for the defence of Protestantism and the honour of the ‘Winter Queen’, Elizabeth, daughter of James VI and I, who had married the Elector Palatine who became King of Bohemia. Sir Robert wondered little that “... so few of our nation are induced to serve these Catholic potentates” due to the strength of their religious convictions at home, while he said he was:

Most willing and wished long to have scene a day, wherein I might hazard my life in this quarrell ... for many reasons, but especially for the libertie of our dread soveraigne, the distressed Queen of Bohemia, and her princely issue; next, for the libertie of our distressed brethren in Christ (kept long under the yoke and tyranny of the house of Austria and the Catholic League their mortal enemies).

A cursory glance at the destinations of Scottish forces raised in the period 1625-42 reveals that the majority were bound for service in Denmark, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Germany and

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9 F. Redlich, German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History, 2 vols (Wiesbaden, 1965).
10 Bartlett, Mercenaries, p. 18.
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Holland. Only after 1632 do other destinations, such as France and Russia, appear as variants to this service itinerary.

Scotland continued to possess very strong ties to France, but Scots could be found under arms in almost every corner of Europe in this period: for example, Scottish troops were recruited for service as far afield as the Venetian Republic. As a result, Scots were among the most prominent participants in the conflict of 1618-48 and Scottish recruits for Swedish service, for instance, were remarkably high from the late 1620s and continued throughout the 1630s. One explanation for the widespread service rendered by Scots of both religious persuasions (for many Catholic Scots also served abroad) might be found in the conclusion arrived at by Christopher Duffy that principles of military and noble honour often bore little relation to Christian morality. The thirst of many Scots for honour on the battlefield, and the contemporary early-modern aversion to bringing disgrace upon one’s family’s name, supports Duffy’s view that religion might have played a subsidiary role in the career decisions of many professional Scottish soldiers.

Contemporary Scottish officials believed that something in the order of one in twenty adult Scottish males were required for military service abroad. On 25th April 1627, to aid this supply of men, Charles I offered pardons to all criminals who volunteered for service before 15th June, suggesting that: “Highland chiefs and Border landlords move such of their families and kinsmen into service as might be spared or have got into trouble”. By 1628, Scots willing to enter into military service abroad were at such a premium that the Scottish authorities divided Scotland into three recruiting areas in which three of the most eminent recruiting commanders of the day were allowed to raise men. Robert Maxwell, Earl of Nithsdale, was allowed to recruit Scots in the south-west and central east coast of Scotland, while Alexander Lindsay, second Lord Spynie, controlled recruiting

13 Ibid., p. 21.
diagonally across the centre of Scotland from Argyll to Aberdeen. Colonel Sir James Sinclair of Murkhill was given the Highlands and the middle-shire of the border with England as his recruiting ground. Geoffrey Parker has produced a map, showing the recruiting grounds of Europe's armies between 1550 and 1650, which demonstrates that most Scottish soldiers came from a swathe of land across central Scotland, encompassing both Lowland and Highland areas.

One of the most important requirements for the continuity of Scottish military involvement in the Thirty Years' War, was a readily available pool of able-bodied men. The men of Scotland were particularly well suited to endure military hardship. The vast majority of Scots were rural-dwelling and existed by hunting and pasturage which "... contributed to a course of life which was a continual preparation for action". When William Robertson made this statement, Highland culture was under serious attack at the hands of the Hanoverian government. Robertson was consequently at some pains to emphasize this particular aspect of the Scottish temperament and lifestyle. More recent studies also emphasize the agrarian nature of Scotland's economy and culture at this time. Thus, Robertson emphasized Hanoverian prejudice against the Scots by stating that to the Scots of the later eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the Highlanders were similar to the Barbarian hordes which had caused Rome's downfall: they "... prosecuted their military enterprises with an ardour and impetuosity, of which men softened by the refinements of more polished times can scarcely form any idea".

Contemporary Scots also thought it was necessary to provide adequate, up-to-date military training for the adult male population of Scotland. To this end, two military manuals appeared in Scotland during the Thirty Years' War. They both provided military instruction for the training of sections of Scotland's urban population. Sir Thomas Kellie of Eastbarns, an advocate and

19 Fallon, *Scottish Mercenaries in the service of Denmark and Sweden*, p. 98.
professional soldier, wrote a manual entitled *Pallas Armata* (1627) which presented a plea for the militarisation of his professional colleagues – members of Scotland’s legal fraternity – to prepare themselves for military service. Kellie was well aware that he lived in an age when all levels of Scottish society might be called upon to save international Protestantism.

The connection between Scotland’s legal fraternity and warfare is particularly interesting in light of the later existence of the College of Justice Foot, also known by the name of Leslie’s Lifeguard of Foot. This unit was raised in 1639 and was commanded by Sir Alexander Gibson of Durie and Sir Thomas Hope of Kerse – which consisted of four hundred and thirty men. This figure reached two hundred and twelve men by 1640, and there were between a hundred and sixty and three hundred cavalry, of which fifty-five were volunteer lawyers. In 1643, the Estates commissioned John, ninth Earl of Sinclair, to raise an infantry regiment, sometimes also called the College of Justice Foot. The ministers of the Burgh of Edinburgh encouraged the writer-apprentices, servants and trade youths to join, so that, while it was not solely a unit of lawyers, it maintained strong links to Edinburgh’s legal fraternity. However, by April 1644, Edinburgh’s lawyers seem to have spurned the infantry regiment in favour of a cavalry troop, commanded by John Cockburn.26

One of the few venues for training civilians in the ‘Art of War’ was the Edinburgh militia. Militias traditionally operated as much as a forum for social display as for military training.27 Burghal use of militias as a vehicle for the display of social pretensions, was an ingrained feature of their inefficiency throughout the seventeenth century. The social position of the sixteen Scots elected to the command of as many companies within the Edinburgh militia in 1645 is a good indication of the quality of past personnel. Of these sixteen, ten were merchants while the remaining six included a wright, a pewterer, cordwainer, tailor, goldsmith and a skinner: all were prosperous bourgeois of the burgh.28 Edinburgh’s militia was as prone to the vanities of its citizen-members as other contemporary militias, for example, those of the United Provinces.29

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second early military manual was a gentleman called James Achesone who was attached to the king’s guard in Scotland. He received official encouragement for the publication of his manual from the Scottish Privy Council and it appeared in 1629 under the title of The Military Garden. The publication of the treatise occurred only one year after the 1628 partition of Scotland into three recruiting areas. This year marked the high-point of Scottish recruiting drives for military service abroad (particularly in Denmark and later Sweden).

Achesone desired a warrant from the Lords of Council which would allow John Writtoun, printer, “. . . to putt the supplicants said treatise to the presse, and to print suche ane number of thame as he sall direct upon his reasonable expenses”.30 The Lords of Council, therefore, “. . . ordained the said treatise to be offered to the consideration of the president of [the] Counsell of Warre”.31 This council was established by April, 1625.32 It is unclear how many copies of either manual appeared, but some guide to the potential popularity of the genre can be found in the fact that ten years later some 1,500 copies of Colonel Robert Monro’s Expedition were licensed for printing.33 Recorded in November of 1627, is the Privy Council’s response to Achesone’s original petition, regarding permission for the printing of his manual:

He hes writtin and drawin up ane little treatise anent the forme and ordour of militarie discipline quhilk he hes practised their diverse yeeres bygone within the burgh of Edinburgh to the great content of the said burgh and instructiouin of the inhabitants thairof in the right use of the said handling and exercise of thair armes and this treatise he intends to send to the presse and to make it publict for the use of the subjects.34

The Privy Council’s response to Achesone’s petition to the Council to allow the publication of his work, reflected the belief of Scotland’s ruling élite in the necessity of introducing Scots to modern and effective military training.

Monro’s work was the autobiography of one of the leading Scottish enterpriser colonels of the Thirty Years’ War, who warranted a great deal of attention as a famous soldier. However, appended

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30 S.P.V., vol. 19, 1625-6, p. 386.
31 Idem.
33 Ibid., vol. 6, p. 424; Monro, Monro His Expedition.
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to Monro’s work is a short military manual which outlines the responsibilities of soldiers in each rank in the army, demonstrating that Monro envisaged at least part of his potential readership being comprised of military enthusiasts. Only in this last section, then, does Monro’s military autobiography share the same purpose as the work of Atkinson. Later Scottish military manual authors, such as the pro-Earl of Huntly Roman Catholic Royalist, George Innes, were too busy with training men and fighting to describe anything more than the rudiments of military practice.35

Reflecting this level of military discourse in Scotland in the late 1620s, Sir Thomas Kellie of Eastbarns praised, in the preface to his Pallas Armata, all those “...noble-men, gentle-men, and well affected subjects who have bent their whole power to further and advance those levies”36 which had been taking place in Scotland on behalf of the Kings of Denmark and Sweden, saying: “Let their fame live for ever, and the sinceritie of their mindes bee knowne to all those who are interested in our querrel.”37 Achesone similarly echoes Kellie’s praise for those Scots who had decided to take up arms in the service of foreign princes in the Thirty Years’ War. Largely inspired by nationalistic pride, he says that Edinburgh, being the pre-eminent town in the country, its citizens should “...equal if not exceed the brave number of souledeours, that have with losse of tyme and blood followed the warres in forreign partes of the earth”.38

Achesone and Eastbarns were, in many ways, simply articulating a number of contemporary assumptions, relating to the role and occupation of members of the nobility and gentry throughout Europe. One of the earliest expositions of the form and content of the Scottish nobility is that of Archbishop Leslie, writing in the sixteenth century, who divided Scotland into three estates similar in quality and purpose to those which had been formulated in the Kingdom of France. Both were inspired by the prevailing Aristotelian model which divided society along spiritual, martial and labouring lines, represented by the clergy, nobility, and commonalty respectively. Following an increasingly influential Humanist tradition, Leslie included six degrees of ‘virtue’ (by which he simply meant precedence) among the nobility: the first of these was the eldest son of the Prince, followed by dukes, peers, lords of parliament and bishops, lairds and feudal barons and a sixth he

35 G. Innes, A Military Rudiment (Aberdeen, 1644).
36 Kellie, Pallas Armata, p. xiii.
37 Ibid., p. xiv.
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called untitled nobility "... quha are in duet with na certain title of honour, quhome in our language we call gentle men". Leslie's division of Scotland's landed, ruling class was strongly influenced by Humanism by which he desired to prove that Scotland, like France and other continental powers, possessed a native aristocracy equal to any. However, one of the most important aspects of his definition is the clear suggestion that the untitled gentry were considered to be noble in every sense of the word. As with the untitled nobility of continental Europe there can be no doubt that this was their position in the view of Scottish jurists.

This view has been continually reiterated by Scots, some of whom insist that up to 10,000 Scots belonged to the noblesse, and that as many as one person in forty-three in early modern Scotland, had either a territorial designation or was closely related to someone who did. The pride of the Scots was famous. Travellers commented on this point, as did those who encountered Scots on the continent. Pedro de Ayala said Scots were ostentatious and proud to a fault, and reported that they all displayed aristocratic prejudices against pedestrians (especially if they lived on the Borders), and that pride in their 'race', or family, obsessed them as much as it did Frenchmen, whose pride was proverbial.

What was it that prompted such extreme self-esteem? The most obvious starting point is the fact that Scotland's nobility, before the mid-sixteenth century, was almost exclusively rural and landed. Land-ownership was of huge cultural importance in Scotland, and even the so-called arriviste earls - that group of earls who were created in the mid-fifteenth century and formed a body of 'new men' within the ranks of the older Scottish titled nobility - had their traditional landed power-bases. Regionalism (though perhaps not parochialism) was a quality that permeated the institutions of Scotland as a whole. To call these centres of family power small kingdoms is not at all to misrepresent the power wielded by the heads of families: John Major said that vassals could be tied to their chiefs by various laws and by a basic fear of land-loss. The Privy Council records provide extensive evidence that chiefs were considered answerable for the actions of their followers: on 10th June 1590, there appeared a proclamation stating that chiefs had to find caution for the disruption

40 Sir T. Innes of Learney, Scots Heraldry (Edinburgh, 1934), ch. 8.
41 A. Weldon, quoted in Brown, Early Travellers in Scotland, p. 102.
43 John Major quoted in Brown, Early Travellers in Scotland, p. 45.
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caused by their kin. Obviously this was part of James VI’s attempt to stamp out feuding in all areas of Scotland, but it clearly demonstrates the fact that chiefs were the rulers of their kin (and only the king could rule over a chief).

The pride associated with tribal ‘homelands’ made its way into many contemporary references. Archbishop Leslie himself expressed pride in his ‘race’ when talking of the Leslie country in Aberdeen.\(^{44}\) Family-pride amounted to pride in land, and pride in land equalled pride in the ‘race’ or family. The fact that Leslie was an illegitimate son of his ‘house’ may well have prompted him to make such a statement, in order to affirm his membership of his father’s kindred. However, in a land where the ‘handfast’ marriage existed, it is doubtful that he ever found himself materially disadvantaged as a member of the kin group as a result of his illegitimacy.

It is certain that the Scots of ancient family, firmly planted on the soil of their ‘race’, felt themselves equal to anyone, but what of their position on the continent? Were they accredited with noble status? In most cases they were. Several birthbrevies – certificates attesting the nobility of their holders in Scotland (see chapter 2) – were issued from the office of the Lord Lyon King of Arms in Edinburgh throughout the early modern period. Birthbrevies are statements of nobility most often verifying an individual’s descent and, like later grants of Scottish coats-of-arms, they always emphasize the nobility of the candidate and, importantly, that they be treated “... in all places and among all people as noble and equal to all”.\(^{45}\) Among the records of the Scots in Poland, for example, there exists a fine mixture of these birthbrevies. Most of them are simply the equivalent of modern birth certificates but some are statements of nobility by virtue of the fact that the parents are described as being of noble status. Of the small percentage of these ‘noble’ birthbrevies, most belong to undesignated Scots – that is, Scots without landed estates – who bear plain names such as, for example, ‘John Stewart’.\(^{46}\) Thus, noble status can be seen to extend beyond regional or tribal power bases and into the esoteric realm of blood and name.

In Scotland, as elsewhere in Europe, there existed a stratum of society that was defined by law as being different and apart from the great mass of the people: the nobility and gentry. Most obviously, Scotland possessed a titled peerage consisting of the ancient Earldoms of Angus, Atholl, Buchan,
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Caithness, Carrick, Fife, Galloway, Lennox, Mar, the March, Menteith, Moray, Strathearn and Sutherland. However, the majority of titled families were Lords of Parliament who had been created by Letters Patent from the Crown. Many of these peerages were created during the great period of growth of the peerage in the mid-fifteenth century. Their numbers slowly increased by the elevation to the peerage of soldiers, statesmen and the heads of powerful landed families. One of the most prominent soldiers to be so honoured was Sir Donald Mackay, created a Lord of Parliament with the title of Lord Reay in 1628. Lord Reay was one of the most prominent Scottish participants in the Thirty Years’ War, and his regiment is the subject of Robert Monro’s narrative in his famous memoir of Scottish service in Sweden.

Below the level of the titled peerage there were a vast array of untitled, but often equally powerful, wealthy and ancient families who supplied the majority of Scotland’s lesser nobility or gentry. This group included a number of families which held feudal baronies where they enjoyed specific legal rights and privileges which were similar to what the Germanic parts of the European continent recognised as baronial rights of possession, as they were ‘free lords’ or freiberren. Many more Scottish families held lairdships. These were landholdings of various sizes that were often held by alodial tenure — meaning they were hereditary lands, free from taxation and in many cases from royal control. The extent of alodial landholding in Scotland accounts at least partly for the title of ‘King of Scots’, as opposed to ‘King of Scotland’, for the Scottish monarch as the Crown could never claim dominion over the entire country. The Scottish Crown did, however, exercise significant control over landed interests in some quarters: for example, every Scottish king maintained the right to revoke charters of land granted during a minority, once they came into their majority at the age of twenty-five.47

Ownership or rights in landed interests of one sort or another, was so wide spread in early-modern Scotland that it has been estimated that somewhere in the region of one in ten Scots were closely connected to a landed family. This would clearly have the effect of lessening the prestige and significance of such connections but it also, according to many contemporary observers, accounts for the ‘native pride’ of the Scot. This was partly due to the very large number of Scots present on the European continent in the early modern period, and many of them were demonstrably connected to landed families in Scotland. Whether in possession of a peerage title, feudal barony or simple

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'lairdship', Scots were among the most likely gentlemen in Europe to be able to cite truly antique family origins. The acknowledged length of many Scottish pedigrees, whether from the Highlands, Islands, Lowlands or Borders, is often remarkable: although few families could trace their ancestry beyond the later 1200s, the majority of landed families could cite pedigrees stretching back to martial origins c.1300. The evidence on this score suggests that the amazing genetic success enjoyed by Scotland's titled families, among whom there is so little evidence of failure of line, replicated itself further down the social scale.

From among Scotland's landed gentry and nobility, there emerged Scots who joined the titled peerages and untitled nobility of almost every participating country in the Thirty Years' War. In the Holy Roman Empire, Walter Leslie and John Gordon, the assassins of the Imperial commander Albrecht von Wallenstein, both joined the Imperial reichsadél (nobility). Leslie was granted the title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire, along with extensive portions of Wallenstein's former Czechoslovakian estates. They were ably assisted in Wallenstein's assassination by their junior officers – who were also Scots. Sweden adopted by far the greatest number of Scottish veterans of the Thirty Years' War. The Scottish founders of some seventy-three separate noble families in Sweden received a number in the country's riddarhus, or 'house of the nobility'. The vast majority of these Scots were raised to noble status in the 1640s, 1650s and 1660s as a result of loyal military service to King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden or his daughter Queen Christina. Large numbers were also ennobled in Denmark.

52 T. Riis, Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot... Scottish-Danish Relations, c.1450-1707, 2 vols (Odense, 1988); A. Douglas, Robert Douglas, en krigaregestalt från vår storhetstid (Stockholm, 1957).
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The social origins of Scottish officers may have eased their entry into a foreign nobility. Four of the commanders of the period 1620 to 1640 were knights, seven were peers (three of whom were earls – Nithsdale, Morton and Irvine; two Lords of Parliament – Spynie and Reay; and one Marquis – Hamilton). Three were already colonels (commanders who raised and ‘owned’ their own regiments), before they began recruiting Scottish troops for overseas service.\(^5\) This situation exists in stark contrast to that of the period 1573-9, when none of the eighteen commanders of the time were either knights, peers or colonels.\(^4\) This is not to say that those captains who recruited Scottish soldiers in the first wave of Scottish mercenary activity (1573-9) were not professional and socially well-connected individuals. A captain’s company within a regiment was the basic venal (i.e. purchasable) property upon which the whole military structure of early-modern armies was built, and captains needed, therefore, to be either wealthy enough to purchase existing companies of men or to clothe and equip new companies.\(^5\) However, the large-scale nature and longevity of the Thirty Years’ War provided a much broader arena for overseas service for many Scottish gentlemen, whether they were rich or poor. It also called for a previously unrealised level of military professionalism, which saw the practice of the ‘Art of War’ become a source of profit and honour for gentlemen across Europe and a tenable career for Scottish noblemen, their younger sons and members of the lesser Scottish gentry in particular.

The nature of Scottish mercenary service abroad did not change for some time after the Thirty Years’ War. This is evidenced by the continued appearance of factors, such as strong kinship links, among Scots on the continent. However, by the second half of the seventeenth century, the private military contract-captain had become a rarity. The Scottish mercenary service of the 1620s, 1630s and 1640s saw a majority of Scots listed with territorial designations after their surnames showing that they possessed landed estates. Many held the rank of colonel or were even more senior. During the Thirty Years’ War, it was rare for a prominent laird to serve in any capacity other than as a recruiter of men or the colonel of a regiment. The distractions of Scottish military involvement in the English Civil Wars meant that many lairds no longer enjoyed this kind of recourse to self-recruited troops abroad. They had now to accommodate themselves to the exigencies of a large-scale domestic conflict, in which they became cogs in a (theoretically) larger, domestic central


\(^4\) Ibid., p. 18.

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government-administered military structure based on a Swedish model for military financing and conscription.  

While the Civil Wars induced Britons to return to fight in their native land, this did not established a trend. The number of Scots in military service abroad during the Interregnum (1649-60), demonstrates the ongoing attractiveness of foreign service. The Scottish peer, Lord Cranstoun, for example, continued to recruit Scots for service in Sweden throughout the 1650s. However, it has to be emphasized that support for Swedish service was strongly encouraged by Cromwell, who allowed soldiers to serve Queen Christina of Sweden, as a means of supporting international Protestantism.

Exiled royalists also abounded overseas. When, in the late 1650s, Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries first entered military service on the continent, he found large numbers of expatriate Scots serving in the armies of Sweden, Poland, Brandenburg, and Russia. Many of the older soldiers he met, had entered service during the Thirty Years’ War and had never returned home: they continued their service abroad by participating in the war between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy.  

An uncertain number were Scots like himself, who were attempting to exploit existing ties of family and nationhood to secure military employment in another country. Due to these forces, a large number of Scots were still to be found on the continent by 1660. At Pillau, in Poland, in July 1656, Auchleuchries encountered no less than 2,500 Scots under Lord Cranstoun, the veteran commander of Scottish soldiers in Swedish service.

The officer corps of all armies in Europe were stocked largely by nobles and gentlemen. While it has already been said that the difference between these two terms was meaningless on the continent, where both were included in the noblesse as greater or lesser members, it is necessary to observe the distinction in Britain, as only members of the peerage were described as 'noble'. The mercenary officer who served on the continent, from the Thirty Years’ War through to the wars of the Spanish


succession, was no exception to this rule. The large-scale nature of Scottish mercenary involvement in the wars of the first half of the seventeenth century has attracted commented from many historians. Scots have, however, only ever been discussed within the larger context of the Thirty Years' War as a whole. Many family histories contain anecdotal reports of the foreign mercenary service of its members. One of the most recent examples of this trend appears in Maurice Lee's history of the Buccleuch heiresses. This mentions the regiments designed for foreign service which were raised by Walter, Lord Scott of Buccleuch, and his son, Walter Scott, first Earl of Buccleuch, in the early- to mid-seventeenth century. Many sources provide useful information regarding many Scots who served abroad and what they did while in that service. What they lack, however, is a synthesis of evidence which might facilitate a broader understanding of the culture of Scottish soldiers overseas: for example, Grant Simpson questions whether Scots who settled abroad as a result of military service, melted into indigenous communities or maintained proudly autonomous communities of their own. Factors, such as the highly clannish nature of Scottish regiments, for example, have also attracted comment by historians. Geoffrey Parker highlights kinship as one of the vital factors in the decision by many Scots to follow the head of their family abroad. He cites the example of the many Aberdeen-based Leslies who served on the continent as proof of the strong kinship ties between the members of many Scottish regiments in overseas service.

Another important aspect of Scottish communities overseas is the Scottish pre-disposition for marrying fellow Scots, which is evidenced by continued intermarriage between people bearing Scottish surnames, in Sweden and the Netherlands, after as many as two or three generations of settlement abroad. Both factors indicate the importance of understanding the social structure which existed among Scottish soldiers fighting and living outside Scotland. They also indicate that Scots who entered foreign service throughout the seventeenth century, perpetuated domestic Scottish social customs based on social prestige, wealth and kinship.

60 G. Parker, The Thirty Years' War (London, 1984); C. V. Wedgewood, The Thirty Years' War (London, 1967); Fallon, Scottish Mercenaries in the service of Denmark and Sweden, pp. 83 and 150.
62 The Scottish Soldier Abroad, ed. Simpson, p. x.
63 Parker, War, p. 195.
64 De Huwelijksstekeningen van Schotse Militairen in Nederland, 1574-1665, ed. I. J. MacLean (Zutphen, 1976).
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Throughout the seventeenth century, Scottish soldiers in the pay of foreign princes pursued serious careers as professional fighting men. There were a number of factors which remained constant for Scots intent on undertaking mercenary service throughout the whole century: status, opportunities for advancement, and the importance of kin connections. These factors represent vital elements in the lives and careers of Scots serving far from their homes. The most important Scottish commanders of the Thirty Years' War – those who commanded their own regiments and reaped the greatest financial benefits from the conflict – were all lairds in their own right who could thereby rely upon kin-based support. Sir James Lumsden of Innergellie, Sir Patrick Ruthven of Ballindean (later Earl of Forth and Brentford), and Sir James Spens of Wormiston, all commanded regiments under Kings Christian IV of Denmark and, later, Gustav II Adolf of Sweden. These Scots were amongst the Swedish king’s most important generals and represent the cream of Scottish mercenary commanders involved in the conflict who were all professional, long-term career soldiers. Their advanced social and financial standing in Scotland, rather than their martial reputations, allowed them the influence and ability to raise men (who were often their own relations and retainers) to fight on the continent.

Some Scottish professional soldiers were peers who commanded their own regiments (if they were colonels), or companies (if they were captains). Scottish lords in overseas service may, or may not, have been professional career soldiers. Some led regiments abroad due to political expediency, outright foolhardiness or, like Francis Scott, Earl of Buccleuch, family tradition: his father had raised a regiment to fight in the Netherlands in the early 1600s, but that nobleman, unlike Francis, was a valiant soldier. By contrast, Francis was a sickly youth obliged by family tradition to command a regiment of his kinsmen.66 The majority of Scottish lords in overseas service do, however, appear to have been deadly serious about the professionalism of their undertaking. For these men, the regiments they commanded were often their sole source of income, honour and social prestige. Lord Colville commanded a troop of horse in France; Lord James Douglas commanded a regiment in Sweden; Lord Forbes commanded a regiment staffed by four of his own brothers in Sweden; Lord Leighton was a major general in Sweden; Alexander Lindsay, Lord Spynie commanded a regiment in Sweden; two Earls of Crawford – George and Lodovick Lindsay – served Sweden: the former was a colonel, the latter a major general; Sir James Livingstone, Earl of Callander, was a Swedish major

66 Lee, Heiressest, pp. 3-5.
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general; and Lord Sancomb, a Swedish colonel. These men were among the most prominent members of Scotland’s martial noblesse who served abroad in the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century. All these individuals gained their livelihoods from their military careers, and all, save Callander who was created an earl, were peers by inheritance. All were the heads of their families, which suggests that those people who raised and commanded Scottish forces on the continent during the Thirty Years’ War belonged to the most prestigious strata of Scottish society. For the chance to command men in the field, all were prepared to put up their assets as collateral on the international military market.

The origins of the majority of lesser Scottish commanders are more difficult to ascertain. In his collection of minutiae, published in 1652 under the title of the Jewel, the eccentric Scottish soldier and writer, Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromartie, listed a large number of Scots in military service abroad. His work was designed to testify the value of the Scottish nation and its people to a hostile English republic. Cromartie wrote the book in 1651, in the Tower of London, immediately after the defeat of the Scots by Cromwell at the battle of Worcester. It is, therefore, thought that the Jewel was written to vindicate the worth of both Scotland and its author in an attempt, by Cromartie, to secure a pardon and his liberty. Of the eight full generals in service abroad, Cromartie mentions three who were knights, including Sir Patrick Ruthven, and two Sir Alexander Leslies. Another was a peer, Sir James Spens, Lord Spens. Two were called marquises, including Hamilton and Walter Leslie (though Leslie was in fact a Count of the Holy Roman Empire, not a marquis). All of these individuals, plus the remaining two who were simply listed as generals – James King (later Lord Eythyn) and General Rutherford – were well-connected members of the untitled Scottish landed nobility. Without exception they were all the sons of Scottish lords or lairds.

This was also the case with the three Scottish lieutenants general, and ten majors general, whom Cromartie mentions. Of the one hundred and five Scottish colonels in foreign service listed by Cromartie, only one of them – Colonel Edmond – appears to have been something other than a laird’s son: he was supposedly the son of a Stirlingshire baker. The other hundred and five

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67 Cromartie, Jewel, passim.
68 Ibid., pp. 50-60.
69 Probably a mistake for Andrew Rutherford, 1st Lord Rutherford (1661) and 1st Earl of Teviot (1663) in the Peerage of Scotland. He commanded a regiment in French service until 1661.
70 Cromartie, Jewel, p. 209.
71 Fischer, The Scots in Germany, p. 77.
individuals were colonels, knights, lairds and peers. Four, all of the Monro family, were obviously lairds as they all bore territorial designations attached to their surnames. Thirteen others were knights and eight were lords. As with the list of captains recruiting companies during the Thirty Years’ War, it is obvious that almost all high-ranking Scottish officers in overseas service during the war were landed Scots.

Another important aspect of overseas Scottish service in the seventeenth century, was the highly clannish nature of regiments. The method of raising soldiers in the first half of the century added greatly to the maintenance of kinship ties in military service. Scottish colonels usually had officers under their command who bore the same surname as they themselves did. Colonel James Ramsay, for example, had seven fellow Ramsays serving in his regiment. Four of these, excluding Ramsay, were officers, including Lieutenant David Ramsay, Ensign John Ramsay, Captain-of-Arms James Ramsay and Rottmaster (Corporal) G. Ramsay. The rest were private soldiers. Equally, all the officers in Captain Alexander Hanna’s company in the same regiment – including Lieutenant W. Hanna and Ensign D. Hanna – bore the name of ‘Hanna’. There are many similar examples that demonstrate the degree of kin-related service among Scots on the European continent, as well as its dynastic nature: four members of the Clerk family held in succession the position of ‘Holm’ admiral in the Swedish shipping yards. They are a good example of continued specialised and localised service by the members of one Scottish family abroad. The large number of Forbes family members in Swedish service also indicates the significance of having the head of a family in active command of a regiment. This was the case with the regiment commanded by Lord Forbes – four of them were Lord Forbes’s brothers, while another was his step brother.

The origins of Scottish military service in France can be traced to the Middle Ages. The formation, in the fifteenth century, of the garde écossais, or personal bodyguard of the French kings, ratified the ancient connections, or ‘auld’ alliance, between the two kingdoms, which originated in 1295. This ‘alliance’ fostered Scottish military involvement in France among broader links between the two

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74 Ibid., p. 221.
75 Ibid., pp. 121 and 177.
countries often based around the establishment of religious houses. The garde écossais was founded in 1449 from the remnants of the force originally raised for service in France by the Earls of Buchan and Wigton, and by Sir John Stewart of Darnley. The unit was entirely manned by Scottish gentlemen, though the ‘gentle’ status of a large number of these men must be treated with caution. The evidence of French nobility enquiries conducted into the noble status of their descendants in the later part of Louis XIV’s reign demonstrates the great difficulty which many of these descendants had in proving their ancestors’ status (see below).

Twenty-five Scottish gentlemen of the garde occupied the position of exempt (meaning they were allowed to be ‘de la manche’, or at the sleeve of the king himself), while the remaining seventy-five were mounted archers. The French king’s bodyguard consisted of four companies, each containing one hundred men. The premier company was the Scottish one and a small number of this company remained constantly by the king, while the rest formed the larger corps of the guard. This remained the case until the mid-1500s, when the French Wars of Religion prompted the reform of the unit. However, a description of the garde écossais (from 1612), confirms the ongoing proximity of its Scottish members to the king:

When the king is not at the Louvre or at anie other palace, he hath continually his garde with him, which consisteth of three nations, the Scottish which are next to his bodie, by reason of the greate league, which hath ever bene betweene France and Scotland in the times of the warres, that England held against them both.

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80 Requête de la garde écossaise au roi, pour être remise à son ancien nombre et recouvrer son privilège de garder la personne du roi: Bibliothèque de l’Institut, Paris, Collection Godefrey 512, fol. 343.

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A eulogistic description of the guard was also made by the English traveller, Thomas Coryate, at roughly the same time.\textsuperscript{82} Another reform of the garde later occurred under Louis XIV (between 1662 and 1677), which involved a complete re-evaluation of the unit’s function, composition and even name.\textsuperscript{83} From this time onwards the garde écossais effectively became the Regiment de Noailles, following the appointment (in 1651) of the Duc de Noailles as its colonel. Reflecting this change, the new duties of the four companies of the garde du corps du roi were formulated and posted by the French king himself in 1666.\textsuperscript{84}

Long before this time the status of the garde écossais was seriously compromised by the French Wars of Religion and by the fact that its last Scottish captain was Henri de Montgomery, Comte de Lorges. In 1559, he accidentally killed King Henri II in a tournament, and, in 1562, led Protestant armies against France’s Catholic League.\textsuperscript{85} The garde was the catalyst for a reasonably large-scale settlement in France of those Scottish gentlemen who had served in it, and many of them founded noble families in that kingdom. The garde was, therefore, an important historical point of reference for Scots in France and for Scottish visitors to the kingdom. Furthermore, its prominent place in the royal household remained a source of Scottish pride.

This became evident in the crisis which overtook the garde in 1612, when a small number of its Scottish members were dismissed from their positions by a French captain and (in the words of the Venetian ambassador) ‘... made their offence worse by having recourse to the king of England’.\textsuperscript{86} It was unthinkable that James VI and I would intercede with the French king on their behalf as they were members of the personal bodyguard of a foreign sovereign. Indeed, at the heart of the matter, was Scotland’s status as part of the three-kingdom monarchy of James VI and I, after 1603. The nature of the offence offered to James, as King of Scots, was understood well enough by the garde’s


\textsuperscript{83} Des changemens qui seront faits dessus 4 compagnies des gardes du corps, et qui leur sont communs: B.N., f. Fr. MS. 8,006, fols. 46-8; Règlement du roi entre les trois compagnies français des gardes du corps et celle des écossais, 15 August 1665: B.N., Collection Châtre de Congé 30/170.

\textsuperscript{84} Memorie des choses que je veux estre observé d’oresnavent par les officiers et gardes de mon corps, 1666: B.N., f. Fr. MS. 8,006, fols. 4-7.


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captain, the Duc de Bouillon, who allowed the men to be returned to their positions for two months so that they could finalise their affairs in France. But, he refused to take them back entirely and “... excused himself on the ground that it would be dangerous to place the king’s person in the care of soldiers who considered themselves offended: and he said that the king of England ought to be satisfied with restitution for a couple of months”.87 The Duc de Villeroy spoke even more plainly on the matter, saying that “... at the time the Scotch Guard was established Scotland was independent of England and even hostile to her, and as circumstances are changed so the attitude must change”.88

Statements of this kind, by prominent members of the French court, were soon eclipsed by diplomatic developments elsewhere. In September 1612, it was reported that James’s ambassador had spoken so vigorously to the French queen and her ministers that he had obtained the complete restoration of the soldiers to the garde.89 In many ways this was chimerical as James VI and I fought a more or less constant battle to ensure that his rights, in regard to the unit, were properly observed.90 James gave his ambassador to France specific instructions, insisting upon the appointment of his own younger son, Charles, as captain of the guard. Charles remained the garde’s nominal captain (he never commanded it in person) until the death of his elder brother, Henry, Prince of Wales, later the same year. The position was then felt to be inconsistent with his new status as heir to the throne.91

On Charles’s removal from the command of the garde, Louis XIII deprived all the garde “... of their salaries and would not give the command to the Duke of Lennox ... who is the first person of the royal blood [of Scotland]”.92 This statement possibly reflects a French insistence on Salic Law, as it clearly ignored the position of Elizabeth of Bohemia’s children: as Charles I’s nephew (his sister Elizabeth’s eldest son), Charles Louis of the Rhine (born before 1619) occupied a closer relationship to the throne than did Lennox. Elizabeth’s second son, Prince Rupert of the Rhine, was born in 1619.93 By 1621, the French king was talking openly of dismissing the garde écossais

87 Idem.
88 Idem.
89 S.P.V., 4 September 1612, vol. 12, p. 416.
90 These are extant in the British Library collections.
entirely. In British eyes, this action was connected to ongoing persecution of the Huguenots (French Protestants) in France. The Venetian ambassador to England reported that news had arrived in London that Louis XIII was determined to "... dismiss the ancient guard of Scots which he kept nearest to his person... [which]... greatly disturbed the people... and the king himself".94 Charles understood this to be a directly anti-Protestant move on Louis’s part, and insisted that "... he will assist those of his religion, of whom he will be no unworthy protector".95 However, others thought Charles was, in fact, acting to please the King of Spain "... to increase differences with the Most Christian King and encourage the Huguenots and thereby keep a war going with France".96

Questions, regarding the status of the garde écossais at this time, resulted from anti-English, and anti-Protestant, sentiment on the part of Louis XIII. The Venetian ambassador stated that Louis XIII did not "... follow his father’s example and maintain the balance [between religions] to relieve the world and so remove his own trouble and danger".97 Furthermore, Louis had personally offended Charles, Duke of York, by denying him satisfaction for his 'creatures' in certain circumstances and by the arrest of British ships at Bordeaux, so that "... although related to that crown [of France] and a Scot, yet he [Charles] is stirred up by the English, their bitter enemies and even more by the Spaniards".98

The garde écossais was not ultimately dismissed, but its membership was significantly less Scottish after 1620. The position of its members remained ambiguous in both kingdoms. When Captain John Seton, lieutenant to the garde, arrived in Scotland in 1628 to settle some of his affairs, he was arrested as an alien. He complained bitterly to the Scottish Privy Council, saying his detention was to the great prejudice of his position in the garde, as another had already been appointed to his post as lieutenant and had even been given his old rooms.99 By the mid-seventeenth century there were few actual Scots in the garde itself. After 1650, even its description as the garde écossais was threatened by the command of the Duc de Noailles. However, lieutenants and ensigns belonging to families of Scottish origin continued to be appointed in the unit. The last lieutenant of

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94 S.P.V., 21 May 1621, 1621-3, p. 52.
95 Idem.
96 Idem.
97 S.P.V., 21 September 1622, 1621-3, p. 457.
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Scottish ancestry was Jacques Setton, Seigneur de Lavenage, who was replaced in 1658. The last ensign of Scottish origin was Jacques de Melville, replaced some time after 1651. In the ranks of the garde itself, Scots (or rather Frenchmen of Scottish ancestry) continued to serve as archers until the late seventeenth century. The gager (muster list) of the gardes écossais for 1690 mentions three gentlemen with Scottish surnames – Nicholas Heron, Charles de Moncrief and David Seton – all of whom had Scottish forebears in the same unit a century earlier. Charles de Moncrief was the last of these to be recorded in the garde, in 1699, after which no Scottish names appear at all.

Interest in the unit’s Scottish roots remained strong. In 1660 an industrious Scot, attempting to generate income for himself as a writer, presented a history of the gardes écossais to Louis XIV. It was eagerly received, perhaps because its author had already secured his reputation by previously producing an abridgement of the history of the Popes, Emperors and Kings of France, England and Scotland. He cited in his history of the garde both Scottish and French sources, including John Leslie, Bishop of Ross’s History of Scotland, the works of Robert Paticollus ‘de Dondee’ and Louis XIII’s monument of 1612 regarding the regiment.

The symbolic importance of the garde was great for the Scots who lived and fought in France during the later seventeenth century. Its significance is particularly apparent in the relatively large number of legal cases waged against the usurpation of noble status in France from 1666. Each defendant who was of Scottish ancestry, were almost universally descended from members of the garde écossais du corps du roi. Though by no means ‘Scottish’ in terms of their lifestyles, attitudes or associations, they universally maintained their status and identity with reference to the position of the garde écossais, and of their Scottish ancestors who had been part of it. The descendants of the Scottish gentlemen of the garde permeated France’s broader noble community. By the second half of the seventeenth century, gentlemen descended from soldiers of the garde were acting as commissaires du roi (pay and muster masters) in the French Army, as advocates in regional

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103 Ibid.
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parlements, and as commissioned army officers. Many noble French families were founded in this way.

The influential French branch of the Moncrief family was founded by Jean de Montcrif, Seigneur de Bellenat, one of the twenty-four ‘gardes de la Manche’ of the garde écossais, c.1530.106 His descendants continued to serve in the garde and one of them was the last gentleman to possess a Scottish surname in the garde écossais. His cousins were commissaires du roi and officers in various French regiments throughout the 1660s and 1670s.107 Their armorial bearings and noble status were only definitively accepted by the French authorities following an investigation into the rights of Pierre ‘Demoncrif’, Sieur de Saney, the head of the family at the end of the seventeenth century. The question of Moncrief’s status was concluded in September 1669, but only after the payment of 150 livres to defray the expenses of the Crown in the case.108 In 1706, the status of Pierre’s son, Pierre-François, was investigated anew. As evidence of his noble status, he cited the findings of the case of 1669. He also produced marriage contracts, cerificates and legal documents covering every decade from 1550 to 1600, as well as parchments from the 1640s and 1650s, all of which attested the noble status of his ancestors. Only as a result of this surfeit of evidence, did the Crown’s procurator fiscal of Burgundy accept the claims to noble status put forward by this particular family of Scottish descent in France.

Equally, the illustrious family of Montgomery, Comtes de Lorges, were fully integrated into the French nobility. The Montgomery Seigneur de Chantelou, an officer in the French Army, subscribed, in June 1664, a monument for the provision of his “. . . enfans mineur . . . en faveur de Dame Elizabeth de Montbournie leur mère” in the event of his death.109 In the same way the various branches of the Forbes family in France in the second half of the century could all trace their descent from Thomas, Alexander and Samuel Forbes who all had been exempts in the garde in the 1580s and 1590s.110 Their descendants included Nicholas Forbes, described as the ‘Chevalier

107 Commissaire Montcrif to Louvois, Bar, 23 September 1671: AG, A1262, no. 315; Same to same, Brissac, 27 September 1672: AG, A1294, no. 412.
Seigneur Dallessé et Dracy et autres lieux’, who confessed to certain debts in 1659. Hubert ‘de Forbois’ and his late wife, Dame Françoise Norton, who confessed to debts in 1685, and Louis de Forbois (son of this Hubert), who was an ‘... escuier [and] sous lieutenant de ... regiment d’Infanterie’. He was over twenty-one years of age in 1690.

The majority of Scots in overseas service from the 1620s to 1640, served north European Protestant powers such as Germany or Sweden. Recent studies have highlighted the fact that military service in both France and Spain was attractive to Scots, many soldiers found service under Protestant monarchs unpalatable. Between 1624 and 1642, 10,400 Scottish soldiers entered French service. The political circumstances of the later 1630s allowed many Britons, both Scottish and English, to serve in France. Two powerful cliques in Whitehall during this period (out of as many as five which have been identified), further encouraged military service in Roman Catholic countries like France. A pro-Spanish clique was centred on Henrietta Maria’s mother, Marie de Medici, while a francophile, pro-Richelieu clique also existed. The symbolic importance of the ‘auld’ alliance between France and Scotland, and the continued existence of the garde écossais, considerably assisted in easing Scots into French service throughout the 1630s. This was encouraged, following France’s entry into the Thirty Years’ War in 1636. After 1641, following the outbreak of the Civil Wars in Britain, service in France became a Royalist gesture. Charles I allowed his Scottish subjects to be recruited for that service in exchange for the French support that helped bring about the Second Civil War, which led ultimately to the king’s capture and execution. Recruiters in Scotland understood the value of religion in soldiers’ decisions about their employment. One Catholic priest, travelling from Ireland to Scotland, received the following instructions: “If any Scotchman desire to raise soldiers to serve the king of Spain, exhort them to do

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112 Ibid., fol. 26.
113 Ibid., fol. 27.
it, and advertise the Spanish Ambassador in London what number of men and upon what conditions.”

Recruits for French service were viewed as a hindrance to the assistance being offered to Protestant monarchs during the Thirty Years’ War. At the high point of recruiting for the King of Denmark, in 1627, the recruitment of Scottish men for French service was viewed by the Scottish Privy Council as a hindrance to recruits for Danish service. Five years later, in 1632, the Roman Catholic Marquis of Huntly received a commission to raise a regiment of Scottish *gens d’armes* (mounted troops) for French service. *Gens d’armes* were virtually synonymous with cuirassiers, or armoured heavy cavalry. In 1634, one of Huntly’s officers, Alexander Erskine (the brother of the Earl of Mar), was given permission to recruit four hundred men for Huntly’s regiment in French service. In 1639, Erskine begged the Scottish Privy Council that any Scottish ships bound for France with soldiers on board might by no means be interrupted. The council concluded that, because of the strength of English animosity, only the king himself could make such an allowance.

By 1640, Erskine was commanding a Scottish regiment in France. In this year he received Lord Colville into his regiment as its captain-lieutenant (that is, his senior lieutenant, and the next in line for promotion to company command). Colville enjoyed a long association with the French court and, because of this pre-existing connection, it is clear that his first intentions in France were not professional soldiering: it was reported that he had “... so much favour as to receive his pay without serving”. His existing relationship with the French court meant that “... he has been very well accepted here, as I hear, and is minded to follow the court”. Colville was, however, exceptional, as most Scottish officers on the continent were highly professional. A comment recorded after Charles I’s recall of his subjects from foreign parts on the eve of the Second Bishops’ War in 1638, proves this point. It was said that various English captains had come back from Germany to serve

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120 R.P.C.S., 18 April 1632, s. 2, vol. 4, p. 482.
125 *Idem.*
their king without pay, "... whereas the Scots who come with them on the same terms have received means long standing", meaning money was forthcoming for the more experienced and, therefore, valued Scottish officers.\textsuperscript{126}

Another Scottish regiment, under the command of Sir James Hepburn, entered French service in 1634.\textsuperscript{127} This regiment had previously served in Sweden, under the command of Sir James's cousin, Sir John Hepburn. He quitted the Swedish service in favour of that of France, following a disagreement with King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden. After rendering sterile service under the French flag, Sir John was killed by a musket ball at the siege of Saverne on 8 July 1636.\textsuperscript{128} The command of his regiment devolved upon Sir James Hepburn, under whom it saw active service within the French Army. In September 1635, it formed part of the French force (which included fifteen standards and ten companies of dragoons, equalling 6,000 men) near Rambvilliers.\textsuperscript{129} Recruits, of sixty men each in three companies, were allowed to it in November and December of 1636.\textsuperscript{130} In 1636, Hepburn died at the head of this regiment, whose men had "... so worthily behaved themselves as they did purchase thereby both credit and meanes".\textsuperscript{131} His brothers, Lieutenant Colonel James and Andrew, arranged official credentials from the Scottish Privy Council in order to recover the colonel's possessions in France: these credentials were letters of introduction under the Privy Seal of Scotland. Despite its commander's death, the regiment remained strongly established in France, receiving 1,000 Scottish recruits in 1637.\textsuperscript{132}

In 1638, two Scottish regiments were promised to France through the intercession of Britain's queen, Henrietta Maria.\textsuperscript{133} They were to consist entirely of volunteers. The French ambassador to England, Bellièvre, had been authorised by the French authorities to recruit foreigners, such as these, to the French Army. Bellièvre reported to his masters that it was clearly to the advantage of the

\textsuperscript{126} April 1640: \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 92-3.
\textsuperscript{130} 26 November 1635 and 17 December 1635: R.P.C.S., s. 2, vol. 4, pp. 140-1 and 157.
\textsuperscript{131} 26 July 1636; \textit{Ibid.}, vol. 6, p. 305.
\textsuperscript{132} 9 March 1637: \textit{Ibid.}, vol. 6, p. 401.
British king to remove these Scots from Scotland, as the First Bishops’ War was now raging between the two kingdoms. Charles I would (said Bellièvre) be further aided by the fact that, while some of the recruits were clearly Catholic, the majority were Protestant: their removal from Scotland would prevent their participation in any anti-Stuart action during the Bishops’ Wars. It was hoped that around 3,000 men (comprising three regiments) would be dispatched from Scotland by the end of the year. So important were the recruits to France, however, that Bellièvre predicted a serious breach between Charles and the French king when the former threatened to renge on his offer of men in the summer of 1639-40. Bellièvre was still believed to be very unhappy when he departed from Britain in January 1640. However, between 1639 and 1642, France received at least three Scottish regiments, and these were all the direct result of the original 1638 promise of Henrietta Maria.

Lord Gray commanded one of these regiments. This man, Sir Andrew Gray (later Lord Gray), was a professional soldier who had fought in Bohemia and later took part with the Dutch in the defence of Bergen-op-Zoom in the early 1620s. Existing biographies provide conflicting information relating to Gray, compared to what can be gleaned from contemporary documents: for example, extant published sources make no mention of his earlier Bohemian or Swedish service, yet he was there, because James Spens mentions it in a diplomatic letter to Gustav II Adolf. Proof of just how obscure the activities of important Scottish soldiers were in this period, comes from the seeming contradictions of reports on Gray’s activities in the 1620s. For example, how could he have been made a Burgess of Dundee in 1620, when he was in Bohemia, while no mention is made in any published source of his 1622 or 1624 recruits for the Netherlands and the Count of Mansfeld? Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this work, but the questions themselves suggest that there is a large amount of work remaining to be done on the careers of such soldiers.

Sir Andrew Gray was appointed lieutenant of the gens d’armes écossais in France, under the command of Lord Gordon, in 1624. He continued in French service until the outbreak of the

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troubles in Britain in 1638. He was banished from Scotland by the parliament there in 1645, due to his activities with the Royalist Marquis of Montrose, but retained his commission in Lord Gordon's *gens d'armes* throughout. He was, however, prevailed upon by the exiled Charles II and his brother, James, Duke of York, to resign it in favour of the Count of Schomberg (later Marshal Schomberg, discussed in chapter 11) in the late 1650s.\(^{139}\) In 1638, while still in French service, he was allowed to recruit a thousand men in Scotland to make the regiment.\(^{140}\) In this year, the regiment consisted of 1,200 men, and seven hundred of them were Roman Catholics.\(^{141}\)

The second regiment belonged to the Earl of Mar. One of his officers, Alexander Erskine, was also allowed to recruit a thousand Scots for the regiment and he received permission from the Privy Council “... to caus tack drums, display cullours and doe and perfornse all and sindrie thingis quhilke toward the uplifting and transporting of the said thowsand men ar necessar and may be lawfullie done”.\(^{142}\)

Yet another regiment was sent to France in 1642. James Campbell, Earl of Irvine, was granted permission to recruit a regiment in Scotland to make a “... standing regiment of guards of foure thousand and fyve hundreth men to be imploied in the service of his Majesties deare brother, the French king”.\(^{143}\) Other existing Scottish regiments were also granted recruits: for example, permission was given to Colonel James Fullerton to recruit five hundred men in 1642.\(^{144}\)

In July 1642, Lord James Douglas commanded the regiment first raised by Sir James Hepburn. Douglas was a son of the first Marquis of Douglas by his first marriage. From this time onwards, it was known as the *regiment de Douglas*. In July 1642, Lord James was allowed five hundred recruits, with “... all liberties, priviledges and immunities quhilks have been heretofore granted to anie person in the lyk caise” – the liberties, privileges and immunities were for the raising and taking of men out of the kingdom.\(^{145}\)

The source of Hepburn’s recruits was not specified, but it was undoubtedly similar to that of those men who were allowed to the Earl of Irvine in the same year, who were to be idle persons and

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strong vagabonds. In the winter months, when summer harvesting work evaporated across Europe, enthusiasm for soldiering rose markedly. In the warmer months of the year the acquisition of men who were to be soldiers of the right age and state of health became very difficult indeed. In such cases it was common to turn for recruits to gaoléd felons, the idle, feeble or drunk: felons were offered a pardon in exchange for military service.

Another Scot in French service, Alexander Fraser, Lord Saltoun, went out of his way to target such recruits as idle persons, vagabonds and drunkards, complaining to the Scottish Privy Council that he knew of four such men of whom he said “... both their persons are poore miserable bodies unable to pay anie soumès, but are like to sterve in waerd and would willinglie goe with me to the French warres where they may be serviceable, whereas in this prissoun they can doe noe good to thamselfes nor to anie others”. Legally, a man had to accept payment from a recruiting officer before he could be restrained for embarkation for abroad. But, Saltoun was also instrumental in having men imprisoned for French service, before they had accepted payment for that purpose: one Thomas Johnston complained that Robert Stirling, one of Saltoun’s ensigns, had placed him in the tolbooth of Edinburgh “... howbeit I never receaue his pay and am his Majesties good subject”. Another two Scots, convicted of stealing sheep, were delivered to Captain James McMath for the French wars in January 1643.

The arbitrary nature of this recruiting is revealed in the complaints made against unjust imprisonment, which occasionally reached the Privy Council itself. One came from John Fergusson, who said that he had been imprisoned by Alexander Fergusson, younger of Kilkerran, in collusion with the latter’s uncle, Captain John Fergusson. They had kept him making writs until two o’clock in the morning, before sending him out to their soldiers to be arrested. When he complained to Sir John Fergusson of Kilkerran in person, he was beaten by soldiers who “… give him manie bauche and blae straikes and harled him doun Leith Wynd to the ship and tooke his cloak and sword from him till he was releaved be one of the baillies of Leith”.

149 Ibid., p. 586.
150 Ibid., p. 372.
151 17 April 1643: Ibid., p. 638.
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In June 1643, eleven more people complained of such unjust imprisonment. Having been imprisoned in Blackness by one Captain Monteith, they were "... yitt lying almost starving for want of maintenance, and their wyves and children ar begging through the countric[e]." The Privy Council found that six of these men had indeed taken money to serve in the French wars and were "... willingly tane on and wer content to goe with the said captaine." An even more turbulent example of recruiting methods was reported to the council in September 1643, when Mary, Countess of Hume, complained that Sir James Hamilton, younger of Reidhall, had abducted a number of colliers from her Barony of Gunglas: he insisted they had accepted payment to join his company. Violence of this sort, employed against civilian populations, reflects the long-standing division between military and civil authority. The profits to be had by captains from recruits were also high enough to add fuel to recruiting drives.

The status of many of the regiments in French service became blurred after Charles I's execution (in 1649) and the Scottish Royalist response that followed. Two Scottish regiments definitely continued to operate in France. The regiment de Douglas and the regiment first raised by James Campbell, Earl of Irvine, in 1642, which (as we have seen) came to be called the gardes écossais. Irvine was succeeded in the command of his regiment by Sir Robert Moray (d. 1673) who, in 1643, was knighted by Charles I and was one of the Treasurers of Scotland and, much later, a chief promoter of the Royal Society. His character was such that, though "... accused by the Chancellor and others among his enemies of sorcery, and of being against the king, it did him no harm at all". The same observer noted that his:

Whole weakness consists of a hatred, too aparent and of a completely unnecessary intensity, of Rome and the Pope. He always carried with him a catalogue of all the scriptural texts that can be stretched to consider Rome as Babylon, and the Pope as Anti-Christ. The King is in the habit of calling him by that name, in jest.

152 13 June 1643: Ibid., p. 446.
155 Capitulation of the regiment under the Earl of Irvine, 27 February 1642: B.N., f. Fr. 8,006, fol. 64-5v and f. Fr. 8006, fol. 34, 71, and 76-7v.
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In March 1659, he appeared before the town authorities of Maastricht, and was described thus: “Sir Robert Moray, Knight, born in Scotland, Privy Councillor of the King of Great Britain in Scotland, and colonel of the Scottish Guards in the service of His Majesty, the King of France, aged fifty years.” Moray’s religious convictions clearly did not prevent him serving in France – perhaps because that kingdom still contained many Calvinists at its court and in its army.

He was in turn followed by Andrew Rutherford (the future Earl of Teviot), who held the command of the regiment until 1661. The regiment had no connection with the actual gardes écossais, and was more properly the regiment d’infanterie écossais: though Rutherford was adament that the unit’s honour was deeply attached to its description as écossais in whatever form that national appellation appeared. It was merged into the regiment de Douglas in 1661 (despite Rutherford’s protests) after its commander accepted the position of Governor of Dunkirk from the newly restored Charles II. James, Duke of York, also possessed a regiment of infantry in the French Army, but this was disbanded in 1660 and its membership was entirely English.

In 1647, the commander of the Douglas regiment, Lord James Douglas, was killed. His brother-germain, Lord George Douglas, was sent to France in this year to be trained as a replacement commander. Lord George became a page at the French court, while the command of the regiment devolved upon his other brother-germain, Archibald, twelfth Earl of Angus. Very little is preserved that relates to the period of command of Lord Archibald. One piece of correspondence has, however, survived: a letter to the French Minister of State for War, Michel Le Tellier, dated 1650. In this, Lord Archibald complains about the bad capitulation (recruiting contract) he had secured from the French for recruiting Scotsmen for his regiment in France. His spirits were partly buoyed up by the good terms on which he stood with Sir Robert Moray, the commander of the so-called ‘garde écossais’.

Lord Archibald had received letters of exchange for four hundred men at

159 Robertson, Sir Robert Moray, pp. 215-16 and n1.
161 Andrew Rutherford was commissioned, on 28 May 1653, as colonel of the ‘gardes écossais’: B.N., f. Fr. MS. 21,451, fol. 214.
162 Rutherford to Lauderdale, 30 March 1661: B. L., Add. MS. 23,116, fol. 2.
165 Robertson, Sir Robert Moray, pp. 215-16 and n1.
ten écus per man and was to receive fourteen écus per head on two or three hundred prisoners who had been allowed to him. These were to be brought to France by two veteran officers of his regiment: the regiment’s major and a Captain Fleming. Lord Archibald had been unable to raise recruits for two years prior to this.\(^{166}\) He commanded the regiment, which served primarily in Flanders, until his death in 1656.\(^ {167}\)

The regiment continued on the French establishment (military budget) throughout the 1650s, without any recruits from Scotland or connections to the Cromwellian Protectorate. This may have been due in part to the royalist sympathies of Lord George’s elder brother, the Roman Catholic William, Earl of Selkirk (who would later become the titular third Duke of Hamilton upon his marriage to Anne Hamilton, the duchy’s heiress).\(^ {168}\) Both William and his brother, George, were raised as Roman Catholics, but William apostatized to the Presbyterian faith while courting Anne, Duchess of Hamilton.\(^ {169}\) Selkirk was involved in Royalist activities in 1655 and 1656 and Charles II (who had been crowned at Scone in 1650, following his father’s execution) acknowledged Selkirk’s role in Scotland, signing himself his “... very affectionate frende”.\(^ {170}\)

Lacking sufficient support from Charles, Selkirk was forced to surrender his soldiers and bow to the Protectorate government. He marched his men to Dalkeith, where they laid down their arms. Though fined £1,000, Selkirk was permitted to go into voluntary exile in France with the promise of 2,000 Scottish recruits \textit{per annum} for a new regiment in the French Army.\(^ {171}\) Domestic circumstances prevented him from completing this undertaking and, consequently, he found himself serving a short term in prison, under further suspicion of Royalist plotting.\(^ {172}\)

In May 1655, Selkirk ratified a treaty with the Protectorate government, which allowed recruits to be raised in Scotland for the Douglas regiment in France. However, recruiting was further hampered

\(^{166}\) Lord Archibald Douglas to Le Tellier, Holyroodhouse, 6 June 1650: AG, A\(^1\)58, No. 22.

\(^{167}\) The Conde de Fuenarsaldaña, \textit{Relación de lo Sucedido en Flandes desde 1648 hasta 1653: Colección de Documentos Inéditos}, vol. 75 (Madrid, 1880-8).


\(^{172}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 139.
by Cromwell’s difficulties in obtaining a treaty with France. However, a treaty was finally signed in October 1655, and a formal peace was declared between the two countries on 28 November 1655. No British soldiers actually materialised in French service, as the effective regent of France, Cardinal Mazarin, was personally opposed to the treaty with Cromwell: he ordered all English officials to leave the kingdom in December 1655. A further disincentive attached to the entente was the discovery that Cromwell’s engagement with the French contained secret articles which demanded the removal from France of the fugitive Charles II, his brothers James and Henry, and seventeen Royalists. Soon after, Cromwell allowed the English colonel, Charles Fleetwood, to recruit a thousand men for the Swedish regiment of Lord Cranston. Fleetwood also received permission for 2,000 men to be recruited for a regiment of his own in Swedish service. This license does not represent a change of foreign policy on the part of Cromwell as Swedish service was strongly supported by his government.

Lord George Douglas took command of his family’s regiment in 1656. There is some confusion as to exactly when Douglas obtained the position of colonel of the regiment. Though generally well researched, Douglas’s entry in the 1888 Dictionary of National Biography, names no date for the beginning of his period of command. A heavily damaged manuscript exists in the National Library of Scotland (dated 23 October 1656), which may be a family settlement of the regimental command upon Douglas. All that remains of the manuscript is fragmentary text relating to Douglas’s resignation of land in Scotland. The Italian traveller, Lorenzo Magalotti, relates a conversation with him in which he declared he became colonel of his regiment at the age of twenty: this would


176 Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell’s Court, ed. Roberts, p. 261.


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date Douglas's commission from 1656.\textsuperscript{180} He is first referred to as a colonel, in a commission to
raise a Scottish regiment for French service from the French king in 1658.\textsuperscript{181}

In 1657, Cromwell allowed two hundred Scots, and their officers, to be recruited to Douglas's
regiment in France.\textsuperscript{182} Douglas came over to England to negotiate for these recruits and, in January
1657, a pass was issued to him which allowed him and nine officers to return to France.\textsuperscript{183} The
recruits got as far as Dunkirk, where they promptly mutinied and offered their services to their exiled
king, Charles II.\textsuperscript{184} This may have been planned in advance, as Douglas's Royalist elder brother —
William, Earl of Selkirk — had been instrumental in recruiting well-affected men from among his
own tenants and supporters in Lanarkshire to the north and east of his new wife’s Hamilton lands.\textsuperscript{185}

Douglas received a formal French commission in 1658.\textsuperscript{186} In August 1658, he and the French
marshal, the Duc de La Ferté-Senneterre, were thought between them to have lost seven or eight
hundred men slain at a battle near Gravelines in Flanders.\textsuperscript{187} This might explain the later French
order to merge the regiments of all foreigners serving in that country into the regiments of Douglas
and Rutherford, which were each to be recruited to 2,000 men. Supporting the idea of Selkirk's
duplicity, the Cromwellian Protectorate supposed these men would be lent to Charles II in exile in
the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{188}

Douglas was forced to rely on the regimental capitulation to bring him in some money with
which he could pay the considerable debts he owed in France, through the agencies of his banker,

\textsuperscript{181} Commission to Lord George Douglas as colonel of a Scottish regiment in French service (1658): Centre Accueil de la Recherche des Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter C.A.R.A.N.), 0,12, fol. 549.
\textsuperscript{182} C. H. Firth, "Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657-1662. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, n. s., vol. 17 (1903), pp. 67-119.
\textsuperscript{183} Pass for the 'Marquis of Douglas', Colonel of a regiment of Scotch foot in service of the King of France, with nine officers and their servants to France, on the request of Monsieur de Bordeaux, the French ambassador. This pass is wrongly supposed by the editor to refer to Lord George Douglas's brother, William, later titular 3rd Duke of Hamilton: Warrants of the Protector and Council, I 77, 656; I 114, 61, printed in C.S.P.Dom., 1656-1657 (London, 1883), p. 586.
\textsuperscript{184} S.P.V., 12 January 1657, vol. 26, 1657-9, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{185} Colonel Lilburne to Major General Lambert, 11 April 1654.; Scotland and the Protectorate, ed. Firth, pp. 81-2.
\textsuperscript{186} C.A.R.A.N., 0,12, fol. 549.
\textsuperscript{188} John Heath to Secretary Nicholas, Calais, 10/20 December 1659 (Flanders Correspondence), printed in S. P. Dom., 1659-60, p. 281.
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Mowatt. About 1670, Mowatt’s bank broke and Francis Henderson wrote to his brother, Sir John Henderson of Fordell, saying: “I have written to you frequentlie bot have never heard from you nor any of my relations, my letters must of necessity have miscarried by reason of Mr. Mouatt who is brooken.” It remains unclear whether the new recruits to Douglas’s regiment came from among the Cromwellian veterans whom Charles was attempting to disband in the early 1660s or not. It is more likely that they came from the Douglas lands in Scotland. Douglas received them on the eve of the great series of wars that Louis XIV, freed from the supervision of Cardinal Mazarin by the latter’s death in 1661, was about to begin in Europe.

CONCLUSION

Scots were unusually prominent participants in the many European conflicts that occurred throughout the seventeenth century. Many followed traditional routes of employment as diverse as being personal bodyguards in Northern Ireland or soldiers of the maritime Republic of Venice. Neither France nor the Netherlands was the major employer of Scottish soldiers in the first half of the century: that honour went to Denmark, Sweden and Germany, which engaged many thousands of Scottish soldiers over many generations. This helped establish a firm idea of the nature and profit that could be had by the enterprising soldier whose position remained unchallenged until the third quarter of the century. The troubles which engulfed Britain throughout the 1630s, 1640s and 1650s increased the need for many Scots to find employment abroad and this was aided by alliances (such as that concluded between Cromwell and Louis XIV in 1656) which promoted such employment. The pre-existing relationships between France, the Netherlands and Scotland fostered the utilization of Scottish soldiers in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia (1648). This began a bleak period in military speculation in which the greatest opportunities for paid service were to be found in the relatively uncharted duties of central European powers such as Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy, neither of which could claim strong traditional connections with Scotland or Scots. Thus, France

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190 N.A.S., G.D. 172/1325/fol. 2.
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and the Netherlands early established their importance in the new era of military enterprise which would be marked, throughout the second half of the seventeenth century, by an increasing emphasis on Crown control of military forces.

A significant point in the story of Scottish military service abroad is the Restoration of Charles II to his three kingdoms in 1660 and the effect of this is examined in the next chapter.
A significant point in the story of Scottish military service abroad is the Restoration of Charles II to his three kingdoms. This was effected early in 1660 and was perceived by all Royalists, including many Scots, as an opportunity to solicit patronage. In Scotland there was one powerful and overriding reason for this, in the words of Paul Hopkins: “At Charles II’s restoration in 1660, the bulk of the nobility and greater gentry of Scotland, the nation’s traditional rulers, faced financial ruin”, due to three decades of social, political, and economic turmoil. This was especially true for John Maitland, second Earl of Lauderdale, who had shared the vicissitudes of his monarch throughout the 1650s and was first among the beneficiaries at the Restoration, being appointed Secretary of State for Scotland in 1661, and later, in 1667, Commissioner for the Parliament of Scotland. Exercising his office primarily from London, but occasionally travelling to Scotland to attend the four full sessions of the parliament which occurred there between 1669 and 1673, he was well placed to make appointments for Scots in both places, and to ensure strong connections with the royal court in England. After 1660, the tenor of the communications made by Scots to Charles II was one of supplication and congratulation mixed with craven self-interest. This is particularly evident in the representations made to him by those Scots engaged abroad in military service who were almost universally in distressed financial circumstances.

Alongside the flood of congratulation, however, the newly restored king faced opposition from the supporters of the ‘old cause’. These were republican Commonwealth men from the time of Cromwell who were opposed to Charles’s restoration, his perceived ‘foreignness,’ and his too close association with continental Roman Catholicism. They would plague both Charles’s reign and that of his brother, James. It is in this context of deep division in his English and Scottish kingdoms, that Charles’s receptivity to supplications from loyal expatriate, and mostly Royalist, Scottish soldiers must be understood.

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EXPATRIATE SOLDIERS AND THE RESTORATION

Many Scots made careers for themselves in the Swedish service, which had been entered by them in large numbers during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48). Not only veterans of this service, but indeed veterans of all foreign armies, faced the problem of obtaining redress for their efforts from foreign monarchs who were themselves often in financial straits. One prominent Scot impoverished by years of enforced service abroad, was the Earl of Callander. He was a veteran of French service who petitioned Charles II, seeking the use of all the rents, lands and titles that he had enjoyed before the ‘troubles’, and constituting a retrospective claim extending back over twenty years.\(^3\) The resurrection of the status quo as it existed in 1637 – the year before the First Bishops’ War (1638) and the twenty years of trouble which followed – was the standard theme of many of the supplications directed towards Charles II by these Scottish veterans: one among many was that received from Major General John Leslie of Myers in which he said he had been “... employed in the wars abroad where he had gained not onlie credit and reputation passing graduallie from one single feature to be ane generall persone”, but had retired to Scotland in 1638 (when many expatriate soldiers were recalled to aid Scotland in its struggle against England in the First Bishops’ War) “... out of natural affection to his native countrie ... that he might be the more serviceable to his king and kingdome”.\(^4\) However, he had lost everything serving the Crown (especially after the 1650 Royalist defeat at the battle of Dunbar), and he, therefore asked the king for some restitution of the sums of money he had expended in the service of the now monarch’s father.

There is no indication, however, that Charles’s Scottish subjects were any more successful in these petitions than were his English subjects: all suffered from the Crown’s need to consolidate a new regime by aiding both old friends and foes and also by the king’s perpetual want of revenue. ‘Cavaliers’ seeking revenge against old enemies got little out of Charles’s restoration.\(^5\) However, all soon realised that the best way for them to assure their position in this post-Restoration Britain was by attaching themselves to the newly restored monarch and his court. Here Charles was already allowing conservative elements to display visually their allegiance to the status quo prior to 1638: in Scotland the first post-Restoration meeting of the Estates (Scotland’s senior representative governing body) was accompanied by pomp and ceremony, much to the chagrin of Presbyterians.\(^6\) It is,

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\(^4\) Petition to Charles II, from Major General John Leslie of Myers, 1660: B.L., Add. MS. 23,114, fol. 129.


\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 13 and 25.
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however, representative of the desire for reconciliation, that half of the seventy-four Scottish peers who were present on this occasion, had been involved with Covenanting parliaments during the Interregnum.\(^7\)

While the Acts which re-established monarchical rule in Scotland and throughout Britain, steadfastly rejected parliament as an executive part of government, they emphasized Charles’s sole right to declare war and to make peace. Gilbert Burnet says that the original drafts of the Acts also contained the assertion that the king alone could arm his subjects, but parliament, both in England and Scotland, would not be so easily cowed, and the Crown would have to fight to defend its privileges throughout the 1660s.\(^8\) In January 1661, the Act anent his Majesties Prerogative in the Militia and in making of Peace and War or Treaties and Leages with Forraigne Princes or Estates was passed. It guaranteed Charles near total independence, at a constitutional level, to make ‘absolute’ decisions as King of Scots regarding war and peace.\(^9\) Furthermore, the king’s chief adherent in Scotland, John Maitland, second Earl of Lauderdale, was from the outset keen to rule Scotland by military force. Gilbert Burnet claims that, as early as 1660, Lauderdale wished to employ 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, which the Scottish Privy Council wanted to be available on request for Charles’s use in any of his three kingdoms.\(^10\) Furthermore, from the beginning of Lauderdale’s rule, the forced free billeting of government soldiers upon individuals and communities to recoup arrears of taxes was used.\(^11\) However, Charles’s revenue severely limited any attempt to increase the number of soldiers he commanded in any of his three kingdoms: in Scotland, the need to pay the army was the single largest problem facing the Treasury.\(^12\) The inevitable abuses in army pay in Scotland were used constantly as a means of disgracing political opponents: for example, in 1663, Sir Robert Moray and his friends brought malpractice to the notice of the king in order to disgrace their opponent, the Earl of Middleton.\(^13\) However, transgressions in the Scottish militia would only significantly increase in times of crisis such as the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-7).

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 13.
\(^8\) Ibid., p. 16.
\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 25-6.
\(^10\) Ibid., p. 37.
\(^11\) Sir Alexander Durham of Largo, Lord Lyon King of Arms, was allowed to direct soldiers into Argyllshire in 1661 and 1662 in order to recoup arrears of the ‘cess’ from 1648, 1650, and 1651: Ibid., p. 155.
\(^12\) Ibid., p. 104.
\(^13\) Ibid., p. 108.
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The Act Recission of 28 March 1661, paved the way for episcopacy to be re-introduced into Scotland: significantly, it was opposed by the titular third Duke of Hamilton who led a small group (forty out of two hundred members of the Estates).\textsuperscript{14} In Scotland, Charles was voted £480,000 \textit{per annum} from excise duties, and this was to be the revenue from his northern kingdom on which it was intended he should live "... of his own" and place no further burden on the public purse: Charles was also to pay all soldiers in Scotland from this relatively meagre amount, and taxation grants were required every time an increase in army size was made.\textsuperscript{15} This was usually by means of direct taxation, the most common form of which was the 'cess', which, by 1681, was worth £360,000 \textit{per annum}. The nominal royal income (c.1663-7) was £670,000: a rise in royal income of 54 per cent since November 1636.\textsuperscript{16}

One major reason for the Scottish soldier supplicants' lack of success is that rewards and compensation were far from automatic. Petitioning the Crown required sums of money and time spent at court and not having the means to attend court, or being forced to leave it, could seriously hamper the petitioning process. One example of a failed petition is that of Sir Norman Macleod of Bernera who had commanded his clan for Charles II at the battle of Worcester (1651). However, at the time Bernera made his claim, his kinsman, Neil Macleod of Assynt, was on trial for having betrayed Charles's Royalist leader in Scotland, the Marquis of Montrose. This seriously hampered Bernera's claim and he was later forced to withdraw from the expensive court: he returned home with no more than a knighthood, leaving Charles to forget his claim, after the death of Sir Robert Moray, the laird's principal patron at the court.\textsuperscript{17}

Charles II had also, at one time or another from 1650-60, recognised as legitimate almost all the regimes that afflicted Scotland. The ultimate effect of his policies of the preceding ten years was to force all future patronage to be based largely on favour rather than logic. This prompted supplicants to make petitioning, in the words of Ronald Lee, "... a theatrical art in itself".\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, when favour was shown it was drawn from fines and forfeitures which were then granted mostly to nobles "... bred in want, when their fathers were pinched by their creditors, ... having no hope but in the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 20-2.
\textsuperscript{15} This occurred in 1665, 1667, 1672, 1678, and 1681: Ibid., pp. 24 and 105.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{17} Hopkins, \textit{Glencoe and the End of the Highland War}, p. 23.
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king’s favour.” 19 The personal history of poverty and exile, common to so many of Scotland’s noble families at the time of the Restoration, produced a generation of Scottish gentlemen characterised by self-interest, moral laxity and outright venality. 20 In a context such as this, it is perhaps little wonder that religion would be propelled to the centre stage of British politics and society, as people searched in desperation for the meaning and identity in their lives which the lax leadership of their betters failed to provide.

The restoration of Charles II attracted a large amount of correspondence from Scots abroad. These Scots expressed their loyalty to the new king in terms, which are instructive of the conflict they felt between masters old and new. One of these correspondents was Robert Douglas, Count of Skånning, a veteran of Swedish service and long settled in that country where he was a member of its titled nobility. 21 The count had been promoted to the rank of field marshal in the wars of King Charles X of Sweden and was later the Master of the Horse in the reign of Queen Christina of Sweden, until she replaced him in this capacity with her favourite, Clas Tott. 22 He was said to have received permission from Cromwell to recruit soldiers for Swedish service in April 1655. Because of his continued connection to Scotland, Skånning is particularly representative of the conflicts of national identity and personal service, which bound many Scots abroad, at the beginning of the reign of Charles II. 23

Like many of these Scots, Skånning wrote to congratulate the king (through Lauderdale, his Secretary of State for Scotland) in October 1660, on “... the reestablishment of our royal king and y[our] lo[r]d[ship’s] delivery”. 24 This began a correspondence with Lauderdale, which fully displays that earl’s predilection for ambiguity in his policies (on many issues) and his treatment of supplicants. 25

In June 1661, he apologised profusely for his absence from Lauderdale’s presence, saying that his inability to travel was due to illness. He heartily recommended the latter’s marriage prospects to

19 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 11.
20 Lee, Government and Politics in Scotland, 1661-1681, p. 27.
Viscount Kingston’s sister. Skånning simultaneously mentioning the appointment of two friends – Sir Archibald Douglas of Cavers and Robert Sinclair of Longfordmains – as his agents in Scotland.²⁶

Skånning saw Lauderdale as a useful intermediary with Charles II, whom he hoped would intercede on his behalf with the Swedish Crown.²⁷ Douglas soon got down to matters of real importance and mentioning to Lauderdale his interest in some Swedish copper mines. The count was hoping to export the produce of these to Scotland, via two English merchants. To interest Lauderdale further, he made sure to mention both that the copper was worth 3,000 riksdollars, and that he had heard rumours abroad of a new rebellion against Charles in Scotland, which he said “... as a loyal subject doeth exceedingly touch my thinking”.²⁸

Despite his distance from the British court, and his foreign interests, Skånning was keen to gain a stake in the newly restored regime. By the tone of his comments on rumours of a prospective rebellion in Scotland, and by maintaining contact with Lauderdale, Skånning remained confident that “... no evil offices can be done to me at your Court”.²⁹ But, Skånning’s first allegiance was to the King of Sweden, whose interest was paramount with him. In December 1661, he addressed Lauderdale in the hope that the earl would obtain, on his behalf, the intercession of Charles II with the Swedish monarch. This was in order to obtain a fitting redress for his services in reorganising part of the Swedish militia for the better guarding of the copper mines in which he had an interest.³⁰

Despite suggestions of the difficulties created by his dual allegiances, Skånning was so successful in convincing Lauderdale of his allegiance to the king that, when a projected visit to Sweden by Charles II was mooted in 1662, he was expected to accompany the monarch he described as his “... royal Majesty and most gracious native king”.³¹ Such a visit never eventuated and the lack of contemporary reference to it may indicate that the project was nothing more than a passing suggestion on the part of Skånning himself. Despite the rhetoric contained in his statements of loyalty to Charles II, this was the point at which the difficulties of Skånning’s position revealed themselves. He said that “... being naturalized and taken in a nobleman among them [the Swedes] .

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²⁶ Skånning to Lauderdale, Riga, 12 June 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 22,878, fol. 32.
²⁷ Same to same, Riga, 14 July 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 22,878, fol. 30.
²⁸ Same to same, Stockholm, 18 October 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 22,878, fol. 34.
²⁹ Idem.
³⁰ Same to same, Stockholm, 20 December 1660: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fol. 171.
³¹ Same to same, Högsöster, 30 January 1662: B.L., Add. MS. 22,878, fol. 36.
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... [and as] ... a privy counsellor and as one of their general field marshals among the presidents of the counsel of warre and, therefore, frequently in the prosecution of my countrymans' [the Swedes'] interests" he could do no open service to Charles in Sweden.32 To all intents and purposes, therefore, Skånning had become a Swede in all but name and, clearly, Skånning could not have rendered personal service to Charles II or his father in the 1640s given his long-term associations with the Swedish Crown. Furthermore, in 1661, he was patently attempting to generate support from Charles for his own claims on the Swedish Crown. Like other Scots in Swedish service, Skånning was, therefore, something of an aristocratic ‘chancer’ out to exploit Charles II’s good fortune in being restored.

Skånning was asked to use his influence, discreetly, on behalf of Charles and those of his subjects in Swedish service whose affairs the king said he was determined to safeguard. To this end, in February 1662, Skånning was instructed to follow Lord Hugo Hamilton in supporting Colonel Forbes’s heirs in their attempt to secure the income of the late colonel’s Swedish estates. As an inducement, the king promised in exchange to intercede on his behalf in the matter of the copper mines, which had been vexing Skånning for some time.33

Skånning attempted to keep his hand in play throughout the negotiations by assuring Lauderdale that he could do more for the king “... in a indirect way” than he could through a public demonstration of loyalty.34 He was referring to his offer to Lauderdale to keep secret intelligence for him of the affairs of the Swedish court, but Lauderdale’s ultimate opinion of Count Skånning and his offers may be gauged by the latter’s vexation at “... never being honoured with on[e] line from your hand”.35

Sixteen years later, when Skånning died, his widow delivered a letter to Lauderdale, which acknowledged her and her late husband’s debt to one who had always, she said, had their interests at heart.36 Following the nobleman’s death, Lauderdale received a letter from the new count, William. He evidently knew of his father’s dealings and, though he did not openly express his desire to

32 Idem.
33 Same to same, Högsoster, 7 February 1662: B.L., Add. MS. 23,117, fol. 30.
34 Idem.
35 Same to same to Lauderdale, Riga, 15 October 1660: B.L., Add. MS. 23,114, fol. 65.
continue the same service for Lauderdale, was explicit in his desire to aid Charles II as wholeheartedly as his father had done.\textsuperscript{37}

Skånning's actions were the most obvious aspect of a concerted effort by a number of high-ranking Scots in Swedish service to secure some material benefit from the Restoration of their king. Many of them had staked and lost their ancestral lands, wealth and youth in their service of Charles I and of the Stuart Crown. Ultimately, many had also lost their national identity as a result of enforced and extended residency abroad and, to many of them, it seemed Charles II owed them something in return.

In mid-1661, during Skånning's negotiations with Lauderdale, other senior Scots officers in Swedish service, addressed a petition to Charles II, outlining their loyalty to the royalist cause throughout the years of the Commonwealth, in order to seek redress in their current distressed state. The petitioners reminded the king that mercenary service had traditionally entailed no disloyalty to their natural king:

That not only in your grandfather's but also in your father's of blessed memories tyme, many of your Majesty's subjects were by treaties between both kingdomes licensed to capitulate with the Crowne of Sweden to serve them, and did levy and transport many regiments into there [sic] service.\textsuperscript{38}

Having established that they had always been loyal subjects of the King of Scots, the petitioners went on to emphasize their sacrifices in the cause of international Protestantism. They had, they said "... either before the enemies, or by pestilence, hunger and ill usage lost the most part of their lives".\textsuperscript{39} Having complained, and there being a general peace, the pityful, and often penniless Scottish mercenaries were set at liberty by their employer, so that "... diverse also who served your Majesty and father of blissed memory... [and who]... were forced in these rebellious tymes to seke employment abroade for the preservation of there lifes" were now bereft of a means of making their living.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} William Douglas, Count of Skånning, to Lauderdale, 30 May 1663: B.L., Add. MS. 22,878, fol. 26.
\textsuperscript{38} Idem.
\textsuperscript{39} Idem.
\textsuperscript{40} Signed: Henry ffullerton, John Forbes, James Forbes, William Lindsay, Roger Johnston, John Fleet: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fol. 178.
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Scots in Swedish service failed to win significant support for their claims abroad from the Restoration government. Contemporary diplomatic correspondence in the State Papers series shows that no special ambassadorial pressure was exerted on their behalf. By contrast, Scots in French service were particularly favoured. The nature of the attention they received was, however, a mixed blessing and the career of Andrew Rutherford, first Earl of Teviot, is a good case in point. Rutherford, like his compatriot, Lord George Douglas, was a Roman Catholic. The attitude of Charles II to Roman Catholics is an important factor in his relationship to Scottish regiments in France. Following his Restoration in 1660, the king expressed the debt he felt to his Catholic subjects (many of whom served in the French Army), who had assisted him so greatly during his exile in the 1650s. Part of his gratitude was expressed by the consistent failure to enforce the penal laws against Catholics after 1660, though, in truth, it was relatively easy for Roman Catholics to avoid prosecution under the penal laws by moving county and, even if they were found out, prosecution was unlikely.\footnote{J. Miller, Popery and Politics in England, 1660-1688 (Cambridge, 1973), p. 61; R. Hutton, “The Religion of Charles II”, in The Stuart Court and Europe, ed. Smuts.} Charles's gratitude towards individual Roman Catholic supporters took many forms. For William, Earl of Selkirk, and his brother, Lord George Douglas, he allowed the recruitment of three hundred men, to form three companies, for the French regiment in 1662.\footnote{R.P.C.S., s. 2, 1665-9, Acta 1662, p. 354.} This represented a particularly personal favour to Lord George as the recruiting of the men was designed partly to alleviate his personal debts. Douglas had to crave the patience of the French Secretary of State for War, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, to stay proceedings against him for debt until recruits were made for his regiment in Scotland.

Colonel Andrew Rutherford obtained permission from the King of France to visit Scotland to arrange some personal affairs there in 1661, but, upon reaching Dunkirk, Charles II ordered him to become its governor. As a loyal subject, Rutherford found it difficult to refuse his prince's request to take up the position of Governor of Dunkirk: he had the added inducement of elevation to the Scots peerage as Lord Rutherford (created 19 January 1661).\footnote{Sir J. Balfour Paul, The Scots Peerage, vol. 7 (Edinburgh, 1910), p. 374.} The appointment necessitated the abandonment of his command as colonel of the so called 'garde écossais' (a regiment of Scottish infantry not to be confused with the company of the same name, belonging to the royal bodyguard) in the French Army. He was, therefore, obliged to leave the service of Louis XIV who had been a
good employer to him.  However, Rutherford’s period of French service had not been without its difficulties. In March 1661, he wrote to the Earl of Lauderdale complaining of his treatment at the hands of the French Secretary of State for War, Le Tellier, saying he was made much of when he first arrived and was granted 2,000 men, comprising twenty companies, but was then asked to “... renonce the title and qualitie of Scots Guardes”. This he thought to be so shameful a suggestion that he preferred to “... loose all my pretensions and fortune yea but rather suffer the rake [n. b. torture on the rack] before I condescended to so base an agreement”. Significantly, Rutherford said the regiment belonged “... to the Nation not me”, meaning it reflected the valour of Scots soldiers abroad, not that it was at the disposal of the King of Scots: this strongly supports William S. Brockington’s recent assertion that regiments (such as Rutherford’s) “... accelerated the process whereby Scots were incorporated into a group identity” abroad. The group identity which soldiers drew from their national regiments thus allowed them to maintain a strong presence in an alien world. Brockington claims that in this way a strong national consciousness was created among the soldiers of Robert Monro’s Scottish infantry regiment during the Thirty Years’ War, but it is difficult to assume that the same process occurred at all times and in different contexts. Brockington is, however, correct to assert that Monro’s regiment “... provides a clear example of the evolution of primary group cohesion, a fundamental element of nationalism”, which, arguably, Rutherford’s regiment may also have displayed had it survived longer than it did.

Due to his problems with the French authorities, Rutherford prophetically also said “... that no man hereafter could, with assurance, treat with the King of France, since he would violat his bargaines made so authentiquely and signed be his Secretaires of State”: this was a lesson which, in the years to come, his compatriot in French service, Lord George Douglas, would learn to his peril.

Dunkirk was a Cromwellian conquest, whose loss (in 1658) had been greeted bitterly by the British Royalists who held the place under the command of James, Duke of York. Charles II held it

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45 Andrew Rutherford to Lauderdale, 30 March 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fol. 2.
46 Idem.
48 Idem.
49 Idem.
50 B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fol. 2.
after 1660, quite reasonably as ceded by international treaty to England.51 On 10 March 1662, Rutherford took up the post of Governor of Dunkirk and the appointment as colonel of a regiment there.52 His former regiment in the French service, the so called ‘garde écossais’, were disbanded by an angry Louis XIV, prompting Rutherford to tell Lauderdale that “... robberies are committed be the cavaliers that were disbanded without moneys or recompense which hath so desperate them that they attaque all they meet with”.53 The few of them who could be gathered together were brought into the regiment of a loyal servant of the French Crown, Lord George Douglas.54

The continued British presence in Dunkirk was a blow to French territorial ambitions. The French ambassador to England – the Comte d’Estrades – was given specific instructions to broach the matter of “... the usurpations made by the English at Dunkirk at the command of their king”.55 The English occupation of Dunkirk was described, by the French, as violent and unjustified and “... contre toute raison et justice”.56 It was likened to similar English pretensions in the Americas, where many of France’s colonies were threatened externally by England and internally by religious dissent from large numbers of Huguenot settlers whom the French authorities perpetually, but usually unjustly, suspected of treating with their Protestant English and Dutch neighbours.57 As a diplomatic bargaining chip, the Comte d’Estrades was specifically charged with mentioning French rights in North America.58 French rights to Quebec were also to be mentioned, and D’Estrades was ordered to approach Charles II on all of these matters in order to seek a full restitution for damages and trespasses on France’s right of possession of her colonies in the New World.59

By March 1661, Rutherford found himself in an awkward position indeed, and, while experiencing difficulties regarding the composition of his regiment, he discovered that the French

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53 Rutherford to Lauderdale, 30 March 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fol. 5v.
54 Marc Antonio Giustinian to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 2 March 1666: State Papers Venetian (hereafter S.P.V.), vol. 26, 1657-9, p. 265.
55 Extrait de l’Instruction donnée le 13 may 1661 au Sieur Comte d’Estrades ... ambassadeur ordinaire en Angleterre depuis des affaire Étrangers: Centre Accueil de la Recherche des Archives Nationales (hereafter C.A.R.A.N.), Mar C7101, ‘Estrades’.
56 Ibid.
58 This was based upon the much earlier settlement in 1525 by the Sieur Chabot, the suggested ratification of this by Cardinal Richelieu, and the attacks on the colony, by the English, in 1655, which had resulted in 200,000 livres lost in pillage.
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queen was further prejudicing his standing at the French court by publicly stating to “... several of the French Grandes that the king hath made me Governor of Dunkerk ... [but knew not] ... fro[m] whom her Majestie hath it”.60 Rutherford’s annoyance becomes understandable when it is realised that the grandes were one of the most powerful groups at the French court. The status of grande was held by only about five families whose heads were sovereign (or former sovereign) princes or Princes of the Blood Royal in France. Though often mediocre in terms of their intellectual and political ability, they maintained the belief that they were ‘natural’ counsellors of the Kings of France and were consequently never far from the centre of court gossip and intrigue.61

Once he had publicly accepted Charles’s commission as Governor of Dunkirk, Rutherford faced the challenge of maintaining the defence of a town (Dunkirk) that the aggressive French Crown desperately wanted to possess. To achieve this, he initially exerted himself to unify the garrison. The position of Governor of Dunkirk was a thankless task, due largely to its highly sensitive diplomatic significance. Rutherford had, in fact, been thrust into the command of an English stronghold at a time when Charles II’s former allies in France and Spain were exerting pressure on him to cede Cromwellian conquests – of which Dunkirk was arguably the most important. Charles II correctly responded to this pressure by reminding both countries that they had done nothing to materially aid him in exile. In 1656, France had, in fact, signed an alliance treaty with Cromwell’s Protectorate government. Furthermore, Dunkirk had originally been a Spanish possession, and the Flemish character, which it retained, is evident in the language used by its burghermasters and administration. Because of these facts, Charles II had no intention of ceding Dunkirk to anyone. However, he was prepared to sell the strategically important town to France.62

At Dunkirk, Rutherford’s lot was not enviable. Shortly after his arrival (in June 1661), he complained to Charles II: “I am established Governor it is true but over a number of gallant gentlemen officers to whom I am a mere stranger having no other support but his Majesty’s pure free grace.”63 He faced opposition from the former governor, Sir Edward Harley (Governor 1660-1), and the latter’s brother, Sir Robert (Deputy Governor 1660-1), and feared a court martial as a result of it,

60 Rutherford to Lauderdale, 30 March 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fol. 2.

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so that he “. . . was resolved to touch no one’s charge in the garrison”.

Despite this resolve, he was still somewhat vexed at being deprived of the natural perquisites of his office. He was particularly eager to receive his due of a tax he called the ‘greniers gullden’ which he claimed had been freely farmed by his predecessors, Colonels Lockhart and Harley, while he himself “. . . must be questioned”. He blamed this fact on a prejudice against his nation, believing “. . . it is much I am a Scot” among so many Englishmen. He proceeded to defend himself from any count of misappropriation of funds by saying that he had “. . . never received a pennie of the said droit [right], and that I am not so avaritious” as to seek it without reason. Rutherford was somewhat better established by late July 1661, when the Venetian ambassador to England, Angelo Correr, visited him:

The [former] commander [of the Scots guards], is a Scottish gentleman, a man of birth and of great military repute and experience. He was summoned to England while on duty with a Scotch regiment of the French king’s guard [sic], but on reaching Calais he received secret instructions charging him with the government of Dunkirk and ordering him to go there at once . . . he took pleasure in our seeing the entire garrison, which is composed of over 6,000 very fine troops, well clothed and better paid, and all English except a few Walloons of the best that could be picked.

As he commanded predominantly veteran Cromwellian soldiers in the garrison, Rutherford was eager to assure his native master of his ability to guarantee the loyalty and serviceability of the men under his command there. To this end, he wrote to Lauderdale in October 1661, saying “. . . never officers loved their country so well as ours heir doeth”. He was also eager not to encroach upon the rights or privileges of anyone in the town. When the garrison’s Doctor General died, the governor explained to Lauderdale (in October 1661) that he was loath automatically to appoint the Scottish Doctor Burnet, though it was within his power to make the appointment.

Rutherford’s dilemma stemmed from the fact that Burnet was related to him and that Burnet’s brother was already acting as a Scottish minister of religion in the garrison. Rutherford understood

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66 Idem.
67 Idem.
68 Angelo Correr and Michael Morosini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 22 July 1661: S.P.V., vol. 33, 1661-4, p. 16.
69 Rutherford to Lauderdale, 13 October 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fols. 150-1.
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that "... being a Scot and fearing to give other subjects or appearance of jealouzie to the garrison that two brethren Burnets both Scots [the] direction of soul and bodie over the Inglish heir" would be an inflammatory act.\textsuperscript{70} He, therefore, referred the matter to Lauderdale for a commission for Burnet’s appointment under the king’s hand, which would absolve Rutherford of personal blame for the doctor’s appointment. No incident could better display Rutherford’s primary concern for the peace and good management of the garrison. Even though this compelled him to sacrifice many of the privileges of his appointment, including the perquisites which made office profitable and the right to exercise clientage by appointing friends and followers to positions of importance. The trust of Charles II in Rutherford, as governor, was well founded as the gentleman went very far out of his way to keep his men happy and, therefore, serviceable. Furthermore, he was concerned that they should be well-clothed and well provided for.\textsuperscript{71} Charles could not, therefore, have chosen a more competent, honest, and truly professional Scottish officer for the job of governor. Nor could he have compelled a more useful veteran officer to exit from the French Army, proving how well justified was the ire of Louis XIV at the loss of Rutherford.

Despite Louis’s annoyance, the governor maintained a correspondence with the King of France in which he reiterated his reasons for leaving the French service.\textsuperscript{72} Rutherford may have believed he would one day again serve in the French Army, but he was probably also simply observing the contemporary practice of currying favour with as many important, and possible future employers, as possible. For this reason, in 1662, both Rutherford and the aldermen and town counsellors of Dunkirk separately turned to the French king, when it became apparent that the town they inhabited was to be sold by Charles II to France. While Rutherford maintained a stoic attitude to his future, Dunkirk’s Flemish townspeople turned to Louis XIV, cravenly desiring a release from what they called ‘English domination’.\textsuperscript{73}

It was at this time that Rutherford started to look towards the interest in Tangier of Charles II as another avenue for displaying his loyalty to his ‘native’ sovereign. Tangier was already being considered as a dumping-ground for British undesirables such as Cromwellian veterans, as a retreat

\textsuperscript{70} Same to same, 5/15 October 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fols. 155-6.
\textsuperscript{71} Same to same, 19/29 October 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fols. 165-6.
\textsuperscript{72} Rutherford to King Louis XIV of France, c.1662: N.L.S., Acc. 2,955 (MS. 20,767), fol. 100.
\textsuperscript{73} Burgiers and Aldermen of Dunkirk to King Louis XIV of France, Paris, 1662 (Signed: Rugghe, 1662): N.L.S., Acc. 2,955, MS. 20,767, fol. 96.
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for Roman Catholics and a prison for Scottish Conventicles.\textsuperscript{74} While still Governor of Dunkirk, Rutherford wrote to Lauderdale, commenting on the nationality of the troops he would need at Tangier: “It is not my part (because too much interested) to say that his Majestie having so many English regiments of foot and four Irish regiments with his R[oyal] H[ighness] micht have an pour Scots regiment.”\textsuperscript{75} Reinforcing his loyalty to the king, he ended his letter by stating: “God save the king and make me a constant loyal subject ever to spend my heart[']s] bloud for him.”\textsuperscript{76}

At Dunkirk, Rutherford was beset by spies, informers, and cliques, which fostered his desire to quit his position there. He complained bitterly to Lauderdale that on “… conscience and point of honour I should be perfectly wearried of the imploy. I have 4,000 Spyes about me and non I dare impart myself too, since that was [n. b. those who were] confident hath acted against me and the principales of friendschip”.\textsuperscript{77}

Rutherford maintained a correspondence with the French throughout his time as Governor of Dunkirk, and this caused some difficulty for him: he thought himself suspected of duplicity with them in August 1662. He wrote to Lauderdale in that month (August 1662), assuring him that there was no truth in the rumour that he, some noblemen, and some of his countrymen, would betray Dunkirk to the French before its sale. However, he said that to have done so would have saved him some trouble as it had taken him a considerable time to embark all his troops for Tangier.\textsuperscript{78} In April 1663, Rutherford was formally appointed to the post of Governor of Tangier.

Charles II obtained this strategically placed Portuguese enclave in Morocco in 1662 as part of the dowry of his wife, Catherine of Braganza. Tangier was taken very seriously by Charles II, as he hoped by his occupation of the place to control the crucial interface between the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Charles II was also conscious of the fact that a garrison at Tangier would be the perfect training ground for a new generation of soldiers loyal to the Stuarts, who remained unconvinced of the security of their Crown.\textsuperscript{79} To assist in this aim, the king sent not only Rutherford, but also his Dunkirk regiment – which became the Tangier Foot (later called the Second

\textsuperscript{74} Webb, \textit{The Governors General}, pp. 42-3 and 130.
\textsuperscript{75} Rutherford to Lauderdale, 6/16 October 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fols. 168-9.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Same to same, 19/29 October 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 23,116, fols. 173-4.
\textsuperscript{78} Same to same, August 1662: B.L., Add. MS. 23,117, fol. 76.
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Queen’s Regiment) – and allowed its colonel to make Henry Norwood (who had been his Deputy Governor at Dunkirk) lieutenant colonel of his regiment at Tangier.\textsuperscript{80} Like Dunkirk, Tangier was another trouble spot where Charles had need of an able and experienced professional soldier, possessed of a regiment whose officers and men were of proven loyalty.\textsuperscript{81} Rutherford was an obvious choice. Having encouraged him to leave his employment in France to be the Governor of Dunkirk, which he sold, Charles also, clearly, had the responsibility to find Rutherford a new job.

In 1663, Rutherford wrote to Charles II, acknowledging his debt to the king, as well as that of the Earl of Peterborough,\textsuperscript{82} his predecessor as Governor of Tangier:

The extraordinary graces and favours which Your Highness had made to Mr. the Earl of Peterborough, my predecessor, and to the garrison of Tangier are to be greatly appreciated, so that I take the liberty to offer Your Highness my very humble respects and service.\textsuperscript{83}

Rutherford had few regrets about being appointed to such an inhospitable and isolated colony as Tangier was. In April 1663, he enthusiastically wrote to Lauderdale, saying that he was “... resolved to part tomorrow” for his new charge. Despite not having his commission, instructions, or establishment (military budget), he was resolved to “... go most willingly”.\textsuperscript{84} This may have had something to do with the considerable inducements offered to him to accept the posting. One of these was his appointment as Sheriff Principal of Roxburgh. Another was his advancement in the Scottish peerage with his elevation to the title of Earl of Teviot. Both occurred in the month of April 1663.\textsuperscript{85}

Upon his arrival in Tangier, Teviot took quick and effective action in strengthening the fortifications of the place against the Muslim forces, which surrounded it. In so doing, he employed

\textsuperscript{80} Idem.
\textsuperscript{82} Henry Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, Groom to the Stole, Governor of Tangier (1661-3). Sir John Mordaunt was Deputy Governor (1661-3): Webb, The Governors General, pp. 504-5.
\textsuperscript{83} Rutherford to Charles II, Tangier, 7/17 July 1663: N.L.S., Acc. 2,955, MS. 20,767, fol. 124.
\textsuperscript{84} Same to Lauderdale, 27 April 1663: B.L., Add. MS. 23,119, fol. 21.
\textsuperscript{85} B.L., Add. MS. 23,119, fol. 5.
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the knowledge of siegcraft he had acquired in French service.86 He told Lord Fanshaw that, only nineteen days after his arrival in the place, he had "... made an little stone fort" and done other things of importance. Teviot hoped in this way to add to the existing fortifications of Tangier.87 He had high hopes of the "... fortifying of it be land and securing the Mole [a stone-work jetty projecting a quarter of a mile out into the harbour] provyded their [sic] be no obstruction at home in point of Exchequer".88 Teviot asked for more men, claiming that those he had brought with him, combined with those already in Tangier, were still not enough to guarantee the defence of the place.

Both men and extra fortifications were necessary to guarantee the defence of Tangier. The garrison town was strategically well situated for controlling the rich trade passing through the mouth of the Mediterranean, but its immediate topography was anything but prepossessing. When sent to destroy the place twenty years later, Samual Pepys observed: "How could ever anybody think this place fit to be kept at this charge, that by its being overlooked by so many hills can never be secured against an enemy?"89

Teviot was, however, adamant that Tangier was defensible, but he insisted that the soldiers sent as reinforcements should be English, not Scottish, "... so as it may not appear a demunisshion of the assisstance his maj[es]ty intended for the Crowne of Portugall".90 On 22 July 1663, Teviot reported that he had built five redoubts of stone, and said that he had provisions and an abundance of merchandise.91 It is a testament to the vigour of the governor's fortification program that, twenty years later, one of the gentlemen charged with dismantling Tangier estimated that the leveling of the place would take three months.92

Anxious not to inflame sectarian divisions within the garrison, Charles II issued orders to his governor to "... take care that God's divine service be celebrated exactly, according to the rules sett

90 Teviot to Fanshaw, 8 July 1663: Bod. Lib., Tanner MS. 47, fol. 35.
91 Same to Lauderdale, 22 July 1663: B.L., Add. MS. 23,120, fol. 42.
92 Samuel Pepys, ed. A. Bryant, p. 16.
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doune in our Liturgy, printed".\textsuperscript{93} However, he admitted that "... the natives and situation of the place, and the persons that are to resort to it, and inhabit it are not likely at first to conforme thereunto" so that he was satisfied that Roman Catholics and Protestant dissenters, as much as Jews in Tangier, should be allowed their regular forms of worship.\textsuperscript{94} The 2,000 soldiers in the colony were also equally divided between 'English' (a term including the Scots whom Teviot had brought with him) and Irish. Teviot commanded the first group in person, while the Irish were under the command of Colonel Fitzgerald.\textsuperscript{95} In the promotion of officers to this group, Teviot took "... care of those that are of most merit and affection to that [Charles II's] service".\textsuperscript{96}

Teviot was to meet his end as a result of his service to Charles II in Tangier and, in death, he was, fittingly, viewed as a hero. The story of his death appeared in May 1664, which said that "... he himself [Teviot] being accompanied with several gentlemen volunteers and reformed officers" marched out of the fort and down along a nearby river. They were attacked by Muslims, and suffered a complete military disaster. Teviot met his own death, as did nineteen commissioned officers, fifteen gentleman volunteers and three hundred and ninety-six non-commissioned officers and private soldiers.\textsuperscript{97} This was a catastrophe, which greatly retarded the defence of the garrison in the name of Charles II. It also deprived the king of a highly skilled professional soldier and a loyal, honest and effective governor.

CONCLUSION

Apart from the catastrophe, which closed the career of Teviot, his service history contained many of the elements common to the Scottish military experience abroad (as we shall see in the following chapter). Teviot witnessed the significant changes, which took place in conceptions of service and loyalty among professional international officers of his sort. However, unlike most of the soldiers discussed in this study, Teviot fell prey to the personal and political ambitions of the Kings of France and England, before either had fully formulated stratagems for the control and manipulation of the

\textsuperscript{93} Instructions for Andrew, Earl of Teviot, as Governor of Tangier, 27 April 1663: Bod. Lib., Rawl.C.423, fol. 71v.
\textsuperscript{94} Idem.
\textsuperscript{95} "Colonel Fitzgerald, an Irish papist", later appointed major general of the British Brigade in France from 1672-4 (where he came under the overall command of Marshal Schomberg): A. Marvell, An Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government in England (Amsterdam, 1677), pp. 45 and 46.
\textsuperscript{96} Instructions: Bod. Lib., Rawl.C.423, fol. 72v.
\textsuperscript{97} Relation of the death of Andrew, Earl of Teviot, 5 May 1664: B.L., Eglinton MS. 2,618, fol. 114.
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group of professional soldiers, which Teviot represented. The example offered by the career of
Teviot must, however, have convinced both Charles II and Louis XIV that it was possible to
manipulate men of his ability, force of character and loyalty. Such men were ultimately at the mercy
of royal favour. The general nature and the mechanics of the military service, which they
experienced abroad, are examined in the next chapter.
In good equipage with horses and servants
THE EXPERIENCE OF MILITARY SERVICE ABROAD

Military service abroad remained an attractive option for many Scots throughout the second half of the seventeenth century. Among officers, this was primarily due to the necessity of many younger sons and some impoverished elder sons, to make a living, which was in accord with their social status. Many Scottish soldiers overseas belonged to noble or gentle families. These were kinship groups who were *generosity*, or 'honourably known', to the Crown, due to their possession of armorial bearings, or other titles of nobility. All such titles were granted, or allowed, by the Crown in recognition of the traditional services of the nobility of *consilium et bellum* (council and war). Such roles gave the *noblesse* preconceived notions of the role and function of a gentleman, which were often synonymous with military service. Scots born into families with pretensions to noble or gentle status, that is to say families which may have possessed a territorial or peerage title, but who certainly used armorial bearings, maintained a particularly strong cultural attachment to the connection between military service and high social status. Many Scots acquired birthbrieves ('birthbrief' in its singular form), which were statements of parentage and ancestry, and this reflects the desire on their part for the recognition overseas of the status of their families in Scotland. However, birthbrieves offered no road to comfort and riches, and those Scotsmen who pursued a military career abroad, exposed themselves to tireless physical effort. Many of them formed communities of Scottish officers who ably assisted their newly arrived countrymen. Serving in armies overseas, they all inhabited a hierarchical world, which would have been both familiar and intelligible to them based on their upbringing in Scotland. Apart from some spectacular exceptions (such as the Scots who murdered Wallenstein in 1634), advancement in their chosen career – if it came at all – usually required credit. This could only be obtained from family at home, the necessity of which often placed great strain on already fraught relations between fathers and sons, and lead to the further alienation of men already far from home.¹ Financial problems also help explain the attractiveness to many Scottish soldiers of settlement elsewhere, as many Scots clearly felt there was little for them to return to in Scotland.

¹ The antipathy contained in the father-son relationship in early-modern noble families is well explored in J. Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: France, 1570-1715* (Berkeley, 1993), ch. 3, 'Family, Education and Selfhood'.

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Before discussing the specific nature of Scottish military service abroad, it is useful to highlight the more general conditions of that service. The majority of Scotsmen who undertook careers as soldiers in foreign lands, did so out of financial necessity. Though they could often rise quickly to high command (due to high mortality rates during bitter conflicts like the Second Northern War of 1655-60 between Poland and Russia), officers often earned a paltry wage. Their pay was often in arrears and many endured unpleasant living conditions, no matter where they were. However, warfare was also seen, throughout the early modern period, as the natural occupation of the nobility, and Scotland’s élite possessed more fighting spirit than did many of Europe’s aristocracies. Throughout the seventeenth century, Scots at all social levels remained connected to some aspect of their country’s long martial tradition. As late as 1781, military writers were emphasizing the martial nature of the ‘old regime’ nobleman who “... knows no other condition of life, no profession other than that of arms. This prejudice is so deeply rooted that a gentleman who cannot find a post in the army will choose to remain buried in his native province, without employment or occupation” rather than demean himself in unworthy alternative employment.²

The men of Scotland were particularly well suited to endure military hardship. The vast majority of Scots were rural-dwellers who existed by hunting and pasturage which (said William Robertson in 1769) “... contributed to a course of life which was a continual preparation for action”.³ Robertson may well have been overstating the case when he wrote this, as it was a time (following the 1745 rebellion) of government suppression of Highland culture. However, the basically agrarian nature of early modern Scottish society is attested in recent studies by, among others, Ian Whyte and Julian Goodare.⁴

One study of early modern European soldiers has reinforced the point that mountain areas and political frontiers – including southern Germany, the Balkans, the Swiss cantons and Scotland – produced many more mercenaries than did plains-based monarchies, because the folk from

mountainous regions and conflict-ridden frontiers tended to be harder than those from the plains: "... flabby, soft and drunken" is the way plains-based Rhinelanders were described by some military recruiters. However, Flavius Vegetius Renatus – one of the central classical figures for early modern military theorists – highlighted a basic city/country divide when he said that "... the best soldiers of all are those raised in the countryside. They are hardened against fatigue and accustomed to digging in the soil, and they have been brought up to endure coarse food and the rigour of the seasons". However, the difficulty of making such claims is emphasized by the work of Tom Devine, which has found that the emigration rate of seventeenth-century Scots was staggeringly high, implying that economic or social conditions are more important than places of origin in soldiers’ desire and ability to find employment abroad.

Warfare in this period has been described as "... little more than a seasonal variation on hunting". This is an apt description, given the close association between aristocratic pastimes, such as hunting, and the perception of them as fit training for war:

[Hunting] inspires brave and cheerful spirits to despise fear and risk, it steels your temperament, and it schools the body to withstand all kinds of hardship through exposure to heat, frost and other kinds of adverse weather, through hunger, thirst and lack of sleep, and through the exertion of walking and running. It accustoms you to patience.

However, characterising war as sport, should not be allowed to undermine the real threat that the destruction of a regiment could have upon an individual commander’s income and economic and diplomatic position at court. Nor, for that matter, does it reflect the reliance of lesser officers and men on military employment for their livelihoods.

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7 Devine discusses migration due to Empire (p. 12), migration due to agricultural change in the Lowlands (pp. 104-5), and migration due to economic circumstances (pp. 169 and 258): T. Devine, *Ireland and Scotland, 1600-1850* (Edinburgh, 1983).
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The causes of wars have been analysed by a number of scholars. These encompass, perhaps naturally enough, reasons as diverse as escalating border disputes and the importance of male gender roles in early modern societies and this reflects very different levels of causation, highlighting the multiplicity of reasons for going to war in early modern Europe. However, a number of recent studies have reiterated the primacy of politics and trade in war, while other, more specific, examinations of the reign of Louis XIV have concentrated on the interplay between that king’s personal ambitions and the political, economic and social forces in late seventeenth-century France. The diversity of warfare’s origins was well understood by contemporary writers, whose propaganda deliberately exaggerated some issues on the understanding that people would find their explanations convincing.

A large number of Scots found it expedient to leave their native land and engage in military service abroad. Their reasons for doing so varied considerably and ranged from the avoidance of the law to impoverishment. At least one young man who departed Scotland did so to avoid a murder suit. In December 1682, William Home, a younger brother of the Earl of Home, stabbed to death, in his house at Hilton, Joseph Johnston of Hilton. Home escaped into England, thence fled to the continent, and Mr. Mylne, who edited the diaries of Home’s contemporary, Lord Fountainhall, reported hearing that the young man later returned to England, seeking forgiveness from Hilton’s son in order to end his days in his native country. However, Hilton’s son was set on revenge, and caused Home to flee once more abroad. Home’s case was, however, exceptional as the vast majority of Scottish soldiers abroad who have left records (who were predominantly officers, but who could occasionally also be found serving in the ranks) were professional careerists who were often, though not always, the younger sons of respectable families. Many had little to keep them at home in Scotland and their reasons for leaving home – including adventure, honour or the desire to serve – reflect those of soldiers throughout the ages.

Christopher Duffy has painted a picture of the “...sadness and quiet dignity, attended with gruff words from the father and the proud tears of the mother” which accompanied the parting of a young

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man from his home and family. When leaving for service abroad, it was important for an individual to put his domestic affairs in order. In 1660, Lord Cranston did this before departing from Scotland for Swedish service.

The management of a man's estate by others did not always run smoothly. In May 1688, for example, Lieutenant General James Hamilton complained from Flanders that his mother was not so much mismanaging his estates as positively usurping them. His mother was not only withholding his brother John's portion, but was pleading for all the rest of his family's lands. So paranoid and powerless did he feel, given the distance of the Low Countries from Scotland, that he ordered his correspondent to "... burne this, and forget not to send the recept for the 770 guldens". Because of their seniority abroad and the assets they had at their disposal, Hamilton was untypical of the majority of Scots abroad: however, his story illustrates the effect of the tyranny of distance on all Scots who offered their swords to foreign princes.

Initial employment in an army, like the later advancement which meant a relatively more comfortable life and, above all, more war booty, relied as much upon contacts as on credit. Family connections were the most important possession a Scot seeking employment abroad could have and, in a highly venal age, it was accepted military wisdom that "... our good fortune proceeds only from the support of the friends we make in this world". When in Padua, a city on the eastern route to Vienna and a particularly expensive place, surpassing even the high prices at Basel, the young Scottish nobleman, the Earl of Tarras, met a fellow Scot, William Macdougall, whom he found "... in good equipage with horses and servants". The route between Vienna and Venice was "... about three hundred and fifty Italian miles". Macdougall told Tarras that he was going to Vienna, to pay court to Count Leslie (the nephew of the great Imperial general, Count Walter Leslie), "... by

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15 The long list of friends and kin appointed by Cranston to be his administrators included Alexander, Earl of Leven, Lord Balgonie, Dame Marie Leslie, Lady Cranston, Thomas Craig of Riccarton, Sir Gilbert Elliot of Stobbes, Robert Dobie of Stannhill, Robert Scott of Harwood, Mr. Robert Preston of that Ilk, and Cranston's brother-in-law, John Cranston of Glen: Muniment of Lord Cranston (3 March 1660): National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh (hereafter N.A.S.), G.D. 135/1032.
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whose means he hopes to have employment",20 As a young man of means, MacDougall undoubtedly had letters of introduction to the count, which, he no doubt hoped, would place him at the top of the list of hopeful young men seeking military preferment.21 On his way to Vienna, MacDougall probably also took the time to tour sites of military interest, including fortresses, arsenals and battlefields. For all of these reasons he was untypical of the vast majority of poor Scottish soldiers abroad who lacked both the opportunity and means of wealthier young men such as MacDougall.

In their efforts to find military employment, many Scots simply took ship for the continent and hoped for the best. Many a military career started in this way and the sometimes humble beginnings of Scottish soldiers’ careers often led to a modesty and humility in later high command which strongly distinguished them from impetuous, haughty and generally unprofessional courtier-commanders.22 This was certainly the case of Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries who more or less fell into military service following his arrival on the European continent and it was this vague hope of employment which drew many poor younger sons away from their families in Scotland. After a rudimentary education, which had introduced him to Latin, mathematics and general literacy, Auchleuchries set off for the Low Countries. Latin, like speaking French, was a vital accomplishment for Scots in foreign service as it was the language of formal diplomatic communications, especially in Imperial circles. On his arrival in the Low Countries, Auchleuchries could only communicate with the Dutch people he met via Latin, which continued to be essential when he entered Polish and, ultimately, Russian service.23 Latin was also the language of international, and especially Imperial, diplomacy and many Scots used it for this purpose.24

With little financial credit, Auchleuchries was not one of those Scots gentlemen whose economic means allowed him to step over to the continent for the sake of education and diversion alone. Auchleuchries had heard of the opportunities available in the service of foreign princes. However, such opportunities were invariably connected to ongoing military campaigns, and Auchleuchries,

21 Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, pp. 36 and 51.
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therefore, targeted Russia’s ongoing war with Poland-Lithuania, which raged through the 1650s. Though initially undecided about a military career, he was induced to undertake voluntary service in a Polish regiment due to an entirely fortuitous meeting with a fellow Aberdonian. After inquiring as to Auchleuchries’s birth and family, one Major Garden claimed kinship with him. Majors were the officers most responsible for the performance of a regiment on the field of battle, and were, therefore, more interested than most in the calibre and quality of young officers: to this end, Garden assisted the young Auchleuchries towards obtaining a commission in the Polish Army.25 Auchleuchries’s fortuitous meeting with this kinsman solved one of the great difficulties of military life for him, the problem of ‘fitting in’ or being accepted by an often tightly-bound group of brother officers.26 In this, Auchleuchries was arguably typical of many Scots who, because they obtained employment abroad through friends or family, were automatically familiar to their new brother officers.

Auchleuchries later took service in Muscovy, where experienced foreign soldiers were eagerly sought but poorly treated.27 He eventually served under the man who became his father-in-law, in the latter’s small army, which was sent against the Cossacks and Tartars in 1668. Much earlier, in 1661, John Hebdon canvassed the possibility of British service in Muscovy, on behalf of the Russia Company. His scheme interested the English Privy Council in sending 3,000 men into the Tsar’s service, but it is unclear if this scheme ever eventuated.28

Auchleuchries was well aware of the importance of self-promotion. Having served overseas for some years, he was determined to make himself known to the Scottish Secretary of State, the Earl of Lauderdale, through whom he hoped to secure a commission in the Scottish Army.29 To this end, he contacted General Thomas Dalyell of Binns, a well-known veteran of Muscovy service, for an introduction to Lauderdale. Dalyell reported to the earl that “. . . that is a gentleman cum from Musko calit Colonel Gordon he is veray ambisheus of you[r] favour [but] all I ken saye of him is he

29 John Maitland, 2nd Earl and 1st Duke of Lauderdale (1616-82), Secretary of State for Scotland, 1661-80.
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is a pretay soier and a veray sivel man".30 Auchleuchries’s plans for promotion in his native land reflect the desire of many expatriate soldiers to return home. Like most other plans to return to Scotland, this one came to nothing due to Auchleuchries’s lack of money and contacts and he, like so many other Scots, was forced to remain in employment abroad. He rose to great heights in Muscovy service, being appointed the British envoy extraordinary "... to their Czaarish Majesties" in October 1687.31 He encouraged the Earl of Middleton to have him appointed to this position as the Tsar was anxious to broadcast his perpetual league with Poland officially to all Europe.32 Auchleuchries played an important part in Russia’s refusal to acknowledge William of Orange’s regime in Britain after 1689.33

Preferment could come from a prince or, as was more usual at a lower level, from a colonel. Among the many supplications which flooded into the hands of the Earl of Lauderdale, after Charles II’s Restoration, were many recommending young gentlemen who had formerly been in foreign service. Robert Douglas, Count of Skåning, recommended a young Scottish ensign of noble parentage to Lauderdale, of "... whose gallantry and experience in military affairs I have beine a witnesse".34 A similar supplication was received by Lauderdale from General Thomas Dalyell, who recommended his nephew, claiming that Charles I always showed favour to the nephew’s father "... so that I am hopeful seing the son hath all along been loyalle yo[ur] Lo[rdship] will procure the signing of this signature".35

Such recommendations were not purely the result of venality: experienced, motivated and capable military personnel were a highly prized and valuable commodity in any army and, as Frederick the Great later lamented, for most soldiers "... long service and good service are the same thing".36 Furthermore, as Christopher Duffy has observed, too many young men went to war simply to fill an inner emptiness: “Loving war as a means of satisfying their need for occupation or as a remedy for

30 General Thomas Dalyell to Lauderdale, Leith, 2 October 1668: B.L., Add. MS. 23,125, fol. 108.
31 The Earl of Middleton to General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries, Whitehall, 5 October 1686: B.L., Add. MS. 41,823, fol. 89v.
34 Count Robert Douglas to Lauderdale, Riga, 4 July 1661: B.L., Add. MS. 35,125, fol. 64.
35 Dalyell to Lauderdale, 22 March 1667: B.L., Add. MS. 23,126, fol. 141.
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boredom, exposing themselves to danger for the same kind of motives as a man who goes hunting foxes."

The generally serious and professional attitude to military life which many, if not most, Scottish soldiers displayed is evident in the longevity of their careers and the seniority they achieved abroad. Similarly, the fact that promotion was often obtained through purchase was not necessarily seen as a negative factor in early modern warfare: indeed, well into the eighteenth century military writers remained unsure of "... which means of promotion [n.b., purchase, seniority or merit] best corresponds with justice and the good of the service". Army-based venality clearly harboured the risk of placing veteran soldiers in the hands of wealthy dilettantes who might know nothing of the 'Art of War', while seniority could see the promotion of mediocre officers to positions that were beyond their capacity. Promotion based on merit, so seemingly logical to modern minds, contained the dilemma of defining merit in a military context: should one promote the brave and aggressive officer, or the prudent managerial officer who could guarantee that an army would be competently provisioned?

In the year 1682, the third Duke of Hamilton had to thank the Spanish Ambassador to France, for bailing his brother, the Earl of Dumbarton, out of financial embarrassment. This demonstrates the fact that credit was essential to the careers of Scots involved in both military and civil service abroad. Economy was considered, throughout the early modern period, to be a non-noble and demeaning trait, and there was little that could be done without credit, and it was necessary to procure advancement from the heart of the French court at Versailles to the frozen wastes of Russia. Credit procured fine clothes, servants, and the ability to distribute largess to one's peers and underlings alike:

These pleasant externals are not combat weapons, to be sure, but they are a perpetual reminder to the officer of his status and distinction, and by impressing his superiority on his soldiers they incline the men to consideration, respect and obedience... At drill, on field days, marches and triumphal entries, and when the

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army is drawn up in line or on the battlefield – on all these occasions they make a magnificent impression, at once noble, martial and pleasing to the eye.\textsuperscript{40}

The best form of credit was that drawn on family in Scotland, but many Scots did not have this option and consequently had to impose on their brother officers or, worse still, fell prey to local money lenders. In 1671, Anthony Hamilton, a colonel in Muscovy service, informed his cousin, Sir Patrick Home of Polwarth, that “... as your brother arrived heer in Russia his monys came short and was a great expense before he could be placed to”.\textsuperscript{41} Despite his lack of credit, Polwarth’s brother was found an honourable charge, but considerable tension remained, as Hamilton had no intention of seeing himself left out of pocket by Polwarth’s reluctance to fund his brother’s advancement abroad.\textsuperscript{42} Indeed, the financial straits of Polwarth’s brother were such that he lacked both horses and servants, so that it is amazing that he could accept an officer’s commission in the first place. However, Lord Polwarth’s brother was not simply lacking in credit and equipage as he was also in perpetual want of ready cash. Added to his problems was the fact that he was lonely and homesick and wrote to his brother (in November 1671), inquiring after family and friends in Scotland and complained of his loneliness and perpetual want of credit in Muscovy.\textsuperscript{43}

Home was particularly keen to have his credit honoured, as he could not expect to reliably procure clothes, servants or even food without it. For officers in garrison towns, such as Home became, service itself carried a high risk as all soldiers received nothing more than their basic pay and were prone to boredom. While in garrison there was no chance of combat booty and the risk of debts resulting from gambling (which was endemic among officers) was very high. Active military service was the thing that gave a man promotion and booty – two things guaranteed to ease the burdens of military life – while greatly increasing the quality of that life:

What goes on for most of the time in the guardroom, which is the usual meeting place of the officers. They are not content with swapping tales about the governor or the affairs of the regiment, and similar tittle-tattle, but indulge in gambling with dice or cards, eating and drinking, and full-scale parties which often go on all day and night.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40} Bilistein, \textit{Fragments militaires}, p. 71, cited in Duffy, \textit{The Military Experience in the Age of Reason}, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{41} Anthony Hamilton to Patrick Home of Polwarth, c.1671: N.A.S., G.D. 158/979/2.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Idem}.
\textsuperscript{43} N. Home to Polwarth, Seutakte, 6 November 1671: N.A.S., G.D. 158/971/1/1.
\textsuperscript{44} J. Esterhazy de Gallantha, \textit{Regulament und unumänderlich-gebräuchliche Observations-Puncten} (Gavi, 1747), p. 228, cited in Duffy, \textit{The Military Experience in the Age of Reason}, p. 86.
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Boredom could also lead to alcoholism, especially in an environment in which the display of masculine traits of endurance was highly valued. Certain cultures exacerbated the dangers of drinking and, in Russia, Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries was expected to take part in serial drinking bouts with Peter the Great throughout the 1680s and 1690s. A few decades later, the French Marquis de Conflans excelled in one such incident of ‘dram drinking’ with his English captors, but he was careful to spend the next few weeks drinking nothing but water so aware was he of the damaging effects of binge drinking on his constitution.45 Furthermore, soldiers in garrison towns often lost their military bearing by falling in with the civilian population, contracted marriages with local girls, and fought idleness by duelling or with litigation between themselves and the townsfolk.46

In one letter from Russia to his family in Scotland, Home mentions preparations for war in France: “Wee hear great preparations for warre: could you get me a company ether in Holland or elsewhere you would oblige mee. I have yet had noe newes from Scotland I pray let me hear of my mother and other friends good health, this with my service to them all.”47 These preparations must be those for the French invasion of the United Provinces, which took place in 1672. It is highly interesting that this was known of in the heart of Russia and the fact that it was known highlights the international nature of the professional officer corps. In Home’s case he had probably heard rumours of the coming French aggression from his brother officers, or their relatives in Scotland.48 For Home the chance to serve in France would have been a welcome one, as he could, thereby, be closer to Scotland: he may also have been aware of the status of Lord George Douglas’s Scottish regiment in France.

Polwarth’s brother never made it to France, however, as he died early in 1672: but he continued to be a financial burden to his family from beyond the grave. In 1674, Colonel Anthony Hamilton again wrote to Polwarth, informing him “... annent your brother, whom God heath removed out of this valy of misserie I dubt but you have resaveit my letter sent per post, wherein I gave you [a] full declaration where and how he died, as also the great trouble whereunto I am for his cause since his

46 Ibid., p. 147.
47 N.A.S., G.D. 158971/1/1.
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death". 49 Indeed, Hamilton bitterly complained that he was standing surety for Polwarth’s brother to one Madam Hayes, for two hundred riksdollars which, he said, was “. . . taken to noe bad us[e], but to his advancement and your credit”. 50 Polwarth claimed that he had given Hamilton no authority to engage himself for so much credit. Hamilton admitted that Polwarth had told him to be sparing, but explained that he knew he could not be miserly without damaging his reputation: “It was a thing not beseeeming me, to have been restractive or wanting to concure to his good he being soe neer a kinsman to me.” 51 The plight of Hamilton was great, and he complained that he had a wife, and small children, to support so that he turned to pleading with Polwarth:

If your relation as a brother to him, will not, and to me as ane neer kinsman, induce yow, I pray let natural reson informe yow to doe soe much for him who lay in the same bely wherein yow lay and under ane heart: and let him not be cursed in the grave, by the pure widow and children it will be known to yow selfe and me, what troubles I fred yow off in bringing him out of Scotland with me. 52

In a final plea, Hamilton appealed to Polwarth’s sense of masculinity. He complained of having daily to hear his wife’s friends call him “. . . very ivell” for making her suffer as a result of his financial ruin. Of those possessions which Polwarth’s brother had on him at the time of his death, Hamilton said they were “. . . scarce sufficient to defray the expences of his burriell, pay his servants hayer [hire] and some trifling debts which he had contracted heere”. 53 Here, indeed, is a true picture of the lot of most hopeful young men who sought honour and profit in foreign armies.

Not only the gentry, but also Scottish peers serving abroad suffered greatly for want of credit. The debts of the third Earl of Southesk forced him to seek his subsistence in the French Army. Southesk’s French connections were strongly influenced by his mother (a daughter of the second Duke of Hamilton), Anne’s relationship with Charles II’s court. She separated from Southesk’s father soon after their marriage, whereupon she was rumoured to have carried on an affair with a Frenchman and even to have been the mistress of James, Duke of York. 54 The third earl soon found that military employment was no road to riches and, despite his military employment, Southesk’s

50 Idem.
51 Idem.
52 Idem.
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wife still found herself in Paris "... wanting necessaries and which is worse, has nothing about her like to procure them".55

Though eventually living in self-appointed exile in the Low Countries, Henry Erskine, third Lord Cardross, was in constant correspondence with his extended family, concerning his affairs. In 1672, he owed £10,000 Scots (or £833.6.8 Sterling) to the Scottish Clerk Register, Sir Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun (who himself owed Sir John Nisbet £6,666.13.4 Scots).56 By April 1676, Cardross’s lands were so heavily mortgaged that he had to write to his cousin, Sir Charles Erskine of Alva, regarding his debt (of 2,000 merks) to one David Mitchel. Being unable to pay the debt, Mitchel had had himself infeft in the estate of Cardross "... now above twentie yeares which I am now retiring therefore I am confident you will add this new favour to the many others conferred upon my service".57 Continued financial pressure did not prevent Cardross from making further land transactions in Scotland, and he obtained a deed in his favour in name of lands in Bemersyde in 1678.58 Cardross’s estate was finally "... rouped and lost" to the Earl of Mar (on 28 October 1685) for the equivalent of seventeen years’ purchase. Cardross was reduced, by his years of service in the Dutch Army, to desperate financial dealings.59

Credit was also the essential element in the smooth running of any military enterprise. This was especially true in the Low Countries, where the States General of the United Provinces prided themselves on their regular payment of soldiers’ wages. To maintain their positions as respected commanders in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in the Dutch Army, many Netherlands-based British expatriates were forced to obtain credit from their compatriots in order to supply necessaries to their men. Doing this on a large scale was not unheard of, but it was rare. Ambrogio Spinola had done it, but he came from a multi-millionaire Genoese banking-family which had decided to ‘buy’ him the Army of Flanders by telling King Philip III of Spain that they would help pay the bills. Despite furious protests, Spinola proved to be an excellent Commander-in-Chief, and many self-funded Scottish gentlemen performed well at senior levels of command.60

55 Didington to Secretary Williamson, 23 February/5 March 1669: N.A.S., G.D. 78/126/34.
56 N.L.S., Salt. MS. 17,457, fol. 62.
59 His lady grudged the rental on her husband’s estates as being too low, and worked hard to prove that it failed to take account of the many improvements to the estate which had been made, including the extensive planting of trees: Fountainhall, Chronological Notes, p. 149.
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Large outlays of money were as necessary a preliminary to a military career as was a young gentleman’s level of courage. The failure to keep an open purse or to display one’s mettle, whether in private quarrel or on the battlefield, could have dire consequences: “What resort does a nobleman have, if he does not wish to dishonour his most precious jewel, his noble condition? A dishonoured noble is rejected by his kind, and not only injures himself, but shames his whole otherwise deserving family.” Expensive purchases and displays of wealth also greatly assisted in securing seniority in the army. This was expected of officers in the early modern period and continued to be until well into the nineteenth century. In general, expenditure of all kinds was part of a noble ethos that was as ruinous an institutionalised part of their general lifestyle as gambling or duelling. However, harm of this kind, whether financial or physical, was as much the result of the boredom associated with garrison life as it was the product of social expectations.

In 1669, when William Macdougall set out to secure employment under the nephew of the famous Imperial general, Count Walter Leslie, he did so well equipped and well attended. The Earl of Tarras, who met him in Padua, said it was by these means that “... he hopes to have employment”. An expensive equipage was also indulged in by Lord James Douglas, brother to George Douglas, first Earl of Dumbarton, who was a colonel in the French Army. In 1677, he incurred severe debts in order to maintain effects appropriate to his own status as a French colonel. This expenditure did not stop when Lord James’s regiment was merged with that of Dumbarton, his brother’s regiment, in 1677.

James Forbes, the tutor to the Earl of Arran (the nephew of both Dumbarton and Lord James), reported that Lord James had continued to extend credit on his accoutrements in expectation of the continuation of his colonel’s pay. The Marquis de Louvois, the French Secretary of State for War, had indeed promised this, but Forbes reported that Lord James had “... spent all his money in [the] making of his equipage, in hopes of that pay to be continued, which if he does not recive [it], it will

62 Cf. the series of coloured aquatints by George Cruikshank published by Thomas Maclean, 1 August 1835, on the career of young William Blockhead, especially nos. 1 and 6. In no. 1 his mother weeps while he prepares to go to be a R. N. midshipman whilst his father rages over the bills. Nos. 1-7 are reproduced in “The Naval Officer: Recruitment and Advancement”, in Fleet Battle and Blockade: The French Revolutionary War, 1793-1797, ed. R. Gadner (Chatham: N.M.M., 1996).
65 Idem.
be no small mortification to him". This was particularly worrying, as Lord James had "... gotten mighty debts since the seige of Combray", so that all his letters to Dumbarton spoke of "... nothing but of being wearied at the vanityes of this world, so that by his style of writting on[e] would think him minded to turn Capucin".

The Earl of Dumbarton himself, had to spend heavily on appropriate equipment when he was appointed to the rank of lieutenant general in the French Army in 1677. His brother, the Duke of Hamilton, was, however, informed that the general’s commission had not "... done any thing else for him, and that has put him but to a new charge, of twenty thousand livres were for a greater equipage". At this time, Dumbarton himself acknowledged that he was heavily indebted, prompting his nephew’s tutor to say he could "... easily believe it for he spends all he gets". Sadly for Dumbarton, Forbes also disparagingly reported that he could not "... see any hopes he has of a fine settlement of any place, nor any pension upon a good Lands ... [and] will be mightily put to it". Twenty two years later, Dumbarton was still complaining of the costs of his service, saying "... this camp [of the English Army on Hounslow Heath, outside London] will coste me a good dell of moneys, therefore I must draw upon you billes for what monyes youw have of myin in yo[ur] hands".

The psychological cost of military service abroad was as heavy as the financial one. Soldiers’ reactions to sudden separation from friends and family were often extreme. Francis Henderson (Sir the brother of John Henderson of Fordell) entered into service abroad as a junior officer in the regiment of Lord George Douglas in France c.1668. His initial reaction was one of home-sickness: "I have never had so much as one lyne from you nor any of my relations since I painted from Scotland though I have written very oft to you." His complaints continued for the next few years.

The distance between Francis and his family was so great that he did not even know if his sisters had been married: "I entreat you lett me know if my sister the Lady Ennoch or Anna be married

67 Combray was a strategically significant Flemish fortress town which lay between Artois and Hainault to the south of Lille, Douay and Valenciennes in the line of fortresses protecting the western side of the Spanish Netherlands: Idem.
68 Idem.
69 Idem.
70 Idem.
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[and] show the Lady Ennoch that John Murhead is dead. I shall writt to them both with the nixt.”

Despite his loneliness, he had a young man’s enthusiasm for military service. He eventually became so enthusiastic about his service that he even neglected to write to his family.

A similar rebuke was received from his son, Colonel John Forbes, by John Forbes of Culloden. Colonel Forbes was also a veteran of Douglas’s regiment in France, and he wrote to his father, complaining of his “... too long silence”, but admitted his debt to his father and thanked him for the gifts he had given to him. He dutifully wished for the continuation of his father’s good health, while politely informing him of the “... letter of credit drawn on my brother, Alexander, and payable next month”. Three years later, Colonel Forbes attempted to establish himself in the colony of Carolina in the Americas, following the attempt by Lord Cardross to settle a colony there. However, the difficulties associated with this colonial scheme forced him to succumb to a sense of ennui: “It might be supposed that in fyve or six months tyme which are past since I wrote my last, and being in the paier of the world that now I ame there might bee at fitt subject eneough to take a long letter were the pen in anie others hand than myne who you know was never so happie as to bee any thing either off calligraphy or rethoritian [n. b. calligraphy or rhetoric].” He was established as a planter, but complained that the place was unhealthy, a fact which, he said, affected all of Carolina’s inhabitants.

Scots serving abroad were frequently in transit between encampments, engagements, and the constant duties to family and property in Scotland. The mechanics of movements were often complicated, and travel was occasionally fraught with danger. To take leave of one’s regiment required a pass of the sort obtained by Ensign-Colonel Carstairs, of the Royal Scots Guard (Andrew Rutherford’s regiment which was later absorbed by the regiment de Douglas) in the French Army. Carstairs received a letter from his commander, the Sieur de Scrymgeour, for six months leave in order to attend to his affairs in Scotland. Louis XIV’s rival, the Prince of Orange, issued the same sort of pass to soldiers serving him. In 1681, James Coll, a gentleman in Colonel James Douglas’s

73 Same to same, 1668-73: N.A.S., G.D. 172/1325/fol. 2.

74 Idem.

75 Henderson to his brother, Amiens, 29 June 1673: N.A.S., G.D. 172/1325/fol. 3.

76 Colonel Forbes to Culloden, Rouen, 5 March 1681: N.L.S., MS. 2963, fol. 66.

77 J. Crawford of Crawfordland, A New and More Exact Account of the Fertile Colony of Carolina (on the Continent of America) (Dublin, 1683; reprinted Belfast, 1684); G. P. Insh, Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620-1686 (Glasgow, 1922); C. H. Lesser, South Carolina Begins: The Records of a Proprietary Colony, 1663-1721 (Columbia, 1995).

78 Same to same, Carolina, 16 March 1684: N.L.S., MS. 2963, fol. 84.

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regiment in Dutch service, obtained a pass, which, similarly, granted leave to attend to his private affairs in Scotland.80

Some Scots abroad found themselves completely deprived of the liberty to move. When Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries applied for a pass to visit his family in Scotland (in 1686), it “. . . was interpreted so high a misdemeanour (though never so before) that I have been and am still under a great cloud, and albeit I have used all possible and usuall means, yet nothing can prevall for obtaining of my liberty”.81 At the end of the next month of January 1687, Auchleuchries had greater hope for his freedom. War had been declared against the Turks, and he believed he would obtain the command of a regiment.82 In the end, Auchleuchries had to wait for his appointment as British envoy extraordinary to ‘Their Tsarish Majesties’ before his liberty was secured. Even then, he was at pains to explain to the British authorities the importance of insisting “. . . very much upon the priviledges [of the position] as the basis and cement of the friendship betwixt his Sacred Ma[jes]tie and the Czaars” in order to escape (albeit briefly) from the country.83 Based on this appointment, Auchleuchries was not only released, but was also given the command of a regiment in the war against the Turks.

Auchleuchries’s was a case of successful military service, which had led to a kind of military enslavement. In September 1687, he wrote to Samuel Marvel claiming that he had been preferred “. . . to be generall and told that I should entertain no hopes of going out of this countrey so long as this warr lasteth, which troubleth me exceedingly”.84 He hoped that, as the Tsar was in league with the other Christian princes, the war against the Turk would soon be concluded.85 So concerned was he with obtaining his liberty, that he attempted to dissuade his son from entering the Tsar’s territory in October 1687, only consenting because he felt “. . . forced to send for him, fearing he may take some desperate course if I should not give him liberty to come into this country”.86 In May 1688, Auchleuchries sent his son back to Scotland. He took this opportunity to recommend the boy to the favour and protection of the Earl of Middleton: “I shall use but few words in his behalfe, your

81 Auchleuchries to Middleton, Moscow, 3 December 1686: B.L., Add. MS. 41,842, fol. 150.
82 Same to same, Moscow, 7 January 1687: B.L., Add. MS. 41,842, fol. 152.
83 Same to same, Moscow, 25 January 1687: B.L., Add. MS. 41,842, fol. 154.
84 Same to Marvel, Moscow, 16 September 1687: B.L., Add. MS. 41,842, fol. 159.
85 Idem.
86 Auchleuchries to Marvel, Moscow, 22 October 1687: B.L., Add. MS. 41,842, fol. 164.
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L[ordship]s goodnes will, I doubt not cover and excuse what is defficient in him he hath the Latin, French, Dutch, and Polonian languages in some measure, and upon that acco[un]t may be usefull for other employments as well as military."87

By the 1680s, the Imperial campaigns against the Turks represented one of the few remaining theatres of military operations in Europe. As a result, they proved popular with many Scots in overseas service. William Leslie, a British agent in Austria, sent regular reports to Secretary Hughes regarding the war. In February 1688, he reported that the nephew of the great Count Leslie was governor of the new territories prised from the Turks in Hungary, but that he had been forced to resign them due to illness.88 His uncle, Walter Leslie (1606-67), had been made a Count of the Holy Roman Empire, while he served as Imperial ambassador to Constantinople towards the end of his life.89 Despite Count Leslie's apparent mobility, those Scots serving the Emperor could also have their liberty threatened. William Leslie reported: "His E[xcellency] Count Leslie will not permitt me to goe home, so I may have occasion to serve yow the ensuing campagne."90

Scottish soldiers abroad were predominantly younger sons of old landed Scottish families. Only a few such officers were burdened with the management of lands and family in Scotland. Captain John Somerville, who commanded a company in one of the Scottish regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, was prevailed upon to become tutor — a traditional role in landed Scottish families which allowed assets to be managed for minors by a close adult male relation — to his orphaned nephew, who was "... destitute of ane law[full] tutor for guiding and governing his person".91 Captain Somerville was consequently obliged to 'meddle' with his nephew's debts, "... carris goods gear and o[the]rs whatsomever pertaining to him and to pursue and defend in all causs that concern the said pupill and to doe all o[the]r things that any tutor dative may use and doe of the law within this kingdom".92 Somerville probably considered the appointment an honour and his due right as the nearest living adult male of the family, but, while the Sommervilles were an ancient family, they had

87 Same to Middleton, Moscow, 10 May 1688: B.L., Add. MS. 41,842, fol. 167.
88 William Leslie to Secretary Hughes, Grazt, 27 February 1687/8: B.L., Add. MS. 23,244, fol. 16.
90 Leslie to Hughes, Grazt, 8 March 1688: B.L., Add. MS. 23,244, fol. 17.
91 N.L.S., Ch. 1,403. This was the son of James Somerville of Drum, de jure 10th Lord Somerville (d. 1677): J. Somerville, History of the Somervilles (Edinburgh, 1919), transcript of James Somerville of Drum, de jure 11th Lord Somerville's The Memorie of the Sommervilles: N.L.S., Acc. 7,121.
92 N.L.S., Ch. 1,403.
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come seriously impoverished. It is ironic (or perhaps fortuitous) that the family’s fortunes would only begin to recover in the adult life of this child, when he was living under the Dutch king William III, having been raised by a veteran of the Dutch Army.

Putting one’s sword up for hire on the international military market could sometimes be a lucrative proposition. Many Scots, serving foreign princes, left large bounties for their heirs. However, the sudden death of a prominent Scottish soldier, far from Scotland and from the beneficiaries of a will, could result in his heir’s having great difficulties in obtaining bequests. The debate over the French assets of Andrew Rutherford, first Earl of Teviot, following his death in 1663, drew out many of his kinsmen and highlights the complicated and often inequitable circumstances experienced by Scottish soldiers. The often short-lived gratitude of foreign monarchs, served by Scots such as Andrew Rutherford, was fully expressed in the circumstances of his death.

One of the Earl of Teviot’s kinsmen felt the necessity, given the dispute over the earl’s estate, to state emphatically to his correspondent, Sir Gideon Scott of Haychesters, in 1664, that he had no interest in the late earl’s assets. Stating that he had no more interest in the matter than the fact of his name, he warned Haychesters that some of the late earl’s debtors would be slow to pay their debts if they knew that his papers were still in Tangier, where Teviot had lately been governor.93 However, Teviot’s assets were international and, in France where he had been colonel of a Scottish regiment serving Louis XIV until 1661, he retained the revenue from estates and pensions. The mobility of these assets was threatened at the time of the death of Teviot (in 1663) by animosity between France and England and only three years later (in 1666) a short-lived declaration of war was made between the two countries. It was only the fact of Teviot’s Scottish nationality, and the traditional largess offered to Scots by the Kings of France as a result of the ‘auld’ alliance, that the earl’s possessions were released. However, this was not effected until a keen inquiry into Teviot’s nationality was pursued, prompting his eager heirs to have a statement compiled to the effect that Rutherford had indeed been a Scot.94 As the scion of an old Scottish family and the former commander of the so-called ‘garde écossais’ because of its Scottish connections, there can have been no doubt regarding Rutherford’s nationality. This places an even greater emphasis on the politique background to the success of Scottish soldiers’ heirs in acquiring their just inheritance from abroad.


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The legacy of other Scots abroad was more straightforward. The Earl of Arran’s tutor reported to the Duke of Hamilton that the death of one Kirkpatrick, a Scottish officer in French service who was killed in Flanders in 1677, had “... made a great heiress in Scotland”.\textsuperscript{95} Kirkpatrick’s death prompted Forbes to tell the duke that “I believe [she] will be worth the looking after” for Arran’s sake.\textsuperscript{96} Goods and assets could be completely lost to the heirs of some of the Scots who had rendered considerable service to foreign monarchs. This was certainly the case in the Forbes family, many of whose members had served in Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War. One of the most prominent of these was Colonel William Forbes who had commanded a regiment in Swedish service which had included a great many prominent gentlemen of his name. In 1684, his nephew and heir directed a petition to Charles II, requesting the king’s intercession with the Swedish authorities in the matter of his late uncle’s assets in Sweden. He said that he had been unfairly deprived of his rights due to the manoeuvres of the city of Bremen and its expatriate English governor, Sir William Waller.\textsuperscript{97}

The tone of Forbes’s petition suggests that he felt himself to be a man who had been wronged but, in truth, the situation was more complicated. Sir William Waller, Commandant of Bremen, had been appointed to that office in December 1683 and it was thanks to him that Forbes was to receive the handsome yearly salary of a thousand \textit{riksdollars} on the understanding that he would bring over several families to establish woolen manufactories in Bremen.\textsuperscript{98} To this end, Waller corresponded with the Earl of Sunderland and an English agent, William Skelton.\textsuperscript{99} As these negotiations deteriorated, the personal animosity between Waller and Forbes escalated until the former was truly at odds with the latter who prosecuted his own strong dislike of the commandant. In 1684, Waller complained to Skelton, claiming that Forbes had slandered him, accusing Waller of saying that his “... Majesty of Great Brittain is a Papist, which is as false as malicious” and suggesting that Waller was a Catholic sympathiser who had been involved in the late ‘Rye House Plot’ of 1683.\textsuperscript{100} If true, the accusation would have seriously endangered Waller’s position in Bremen, but Waller claimed to have said that Charles II had used “... diligence in putting the laws of the land in execution ag[ainst]

\textsuperscript{96} Idem.
\textsuperscript{97} Petition to Charles II from Lieutenant General James Forbes, 1684: B.L., Add. MS. 41,824, fol. 167.
\textsuperscript{98} Copy of Sir William Waller’s letter of appointment to office: B.L., Add. MS. 41,824, fol. 144.
\textsuperscript{99} B.L., Add. MS. 41,824, fols. 140-4.
\textsuperscript{100} Waller to Skelton, 6 March 1684: B.L., Add. MS. 41,824, fol. 171.
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the Papists, and my detesting their curzed hellish plott for which many of them were most deservedly executed".\textsuperscript{101} In Waller's favour, the City of Bremen expressed a genuine inability to understand the nature of the displeasure of Charles II with them or their commandant, when the king sent them a letter of rebuke.\textsuperscript{102}

Partly as a result of this ignoble dispute, the rights of the Forbes family to their Swedish estates remained in abeyance until 1690. In this year, the Master of Forbes, the nephew of Lieutenant General James Forbes, employed a linguist to produce a report on his late uncle’s papers. General Forbes had faithfully served Gustav II Adolf of Sweden throughout the Thirty Years’ War and was subsequently, though briefly, employed by his daughter, Queen Christina of Sweden. Forbes learnt that a tribunal in Sweden had heard his father’s claims to estates in that country but had concluded with “... Coll[one]l fforbes not hhaveing gotten possession of the houses and lands; and there the affair lyeth, as the original does show”.\textsuperscript{103} The Master of Forbes was determined to obtain his right to these lands, not the least because they were worth 12,000 riksdollars, with yearly revenue equalling seven hundred and fifty-seven riksdollars.\textsuperscript{104}

In 1661, Charles II might have been forgiven for thinking that Sweden was the dominant influence on his expatriate Scottish subjects. Since the 1630s, Sweden had consistently dominated the military service agenda abroad of most Scots, but, in 1661, Charles II was still essentially dealing with members of his father’s generation. The dominance of English policy by France and the Dutch Republic throughout his reign, coincided with the emergence of a new generation of soldiers for whom these countries offered some of the most compelling employment opportunities in Europe. Had the next generation of professional international officers and the soldiers they recruited been wise enough, the experience of Swedish service might have been instructive for them.

Forbes’s situation was typical of the difficulties sustained throughout the seventeenth century by high-ranking Scottish soldiers in perpetuating their hold on assets abroad. In 1685, the death of General Thomas Dalyell of Binns, without heirs, prompted the Scottish judge, Lord Fountainhall, to ruminate on the progeny of eight of Scotland’s other leading soldiers, all of whom had served abroad. He said at the general’s funeral that it “... was observed that few of our generalls have

\textsuperscript{101} Idem.
\textsuperscript{102} City of Bremen to Charles II, 15 March 1684: B.L., Add. MS. 41,824, fol. 188.
\textsuperscript{103} A review of some papers of Colonel James Forbes in the German tongue, 1690: N.A.S., G.D. 52/1184.
\textsuperscript{104} Idem.
come to their graves without some tash [n.b. tache, stain]".\textsuperscript{105} The Earl of Leven and Lord Newark both died without heirs, the Earl of Montgomerie’s title failed on his death and “. . . Monro, [and] Drummond, [were] extinct”, meaning they had no progeny to succeed them.\textsuperscript{106}

A similar situation faced the heirs of those Scottish soldiers who died abroad. The great Imperial soldier, Count Leslie, was succeeded by his nephew, who, in turn, had only a nephew to continue his title. Ultimately, in 1802, the male line of the Counts Leslie became extinct, and their estates passed to the Princes of Dietrichstein, because the first Count Leslie had married a princess of that family.\textsuperscript{107} Leslie’s co-conspirator in the murder of Wallenstein, General Gordon, was similarly succeeded by an indirect heir when he died in 1687, and this man, Sir William Binnie, had to pursue the Laird of Carse for the late general’s effects, which were said to be worth 40,000 riksdollars.\textsuperscript{108}

Not all Scottish soldiers abroad died far from home and many, who had been forced onto the continent due to Royalist loyalties in the 1650s, attempted to return to their domiciles in Scotland after the Restoration. Before they could do this, they had to establish that they did indeed have something to return to. A typical supplication, addressed to the Earl of Lauderdale, came from Alexander Hamilton, formerly a soldier in Imperial service. He addressed Lauderdale, in 1669, in the most flattering terms possible, in the hope of obtaining a position in Scotland, which would allow him to return.\textsuperscript{109} There is little indication that the majority of such petitions were of any use to their promoters.

In many ways, the most important aspect of a Scottish soldier’s service abroad was the recognition and acceptance of his social status. The attitude displayed towards Scots soldiers of fortune on the continent who possessed a claim to noble status, but who were often virtually penniless, reflects the international character of the professional officer class in early modern Europe. Therefore, an adequate statement of his parentage and ancestry was essential to a Scottish gentleman’s position on the continent. This was often contained in the form of a birthbrief, a certificate which stated exactly

\textsuperscript{105} Fountainhall, \textit{Chronological Notes}, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{107} T. A. Fischer, \textit{The Scots in Germany} (Edinburgh, 1902), p. 116.

\textsuperscript{108} Mr. Hope of Carse: Fountainhall, \textit{Chronological Notes}, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{109} Alexander Hamilton to Lauderdale, Stolites, 1 July 1669: N.L.S., MD. 7,003, fol. 150.
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these facts and which sometimes mentioned an individual's occupation and reasons for travel. Birthbrieves were important throughout the seventeenth century, but gained in significance in the second half of it. In France, this was due to the purges of Louis XIV of false claimants of noble status from 1666. Birthbrieves were uniformly required for service in all arenas of employment for Scots, and especially so in Germany, Muscovy, Sweden and France, though they were also useful in less 'aristocratic' countries like the Low Countries.

The form and content of a birthbrief was not uniform. If they came from the hand of the king or his Privy Council, and were passed under the Great Seal, they were usually in Latin. If they emanated from private noblemen, as the head of their surname, they were usually in the vernacular language of English. Birthbrieves were distinct from passports, which allowed individuals to pass across national borders. Throughout the 1650s, Charles II issued many such passes to Scots, and these often mention no more than the recipient's occupation, reason for travel, and social status. A good example of such a pass is that given in 1655 by Charles II to Major General Drummond of Cromlix to enter service in Muscovy. Birthbrieves served quite a different function, and a good description of the use and form of one can be found in a letter from the Scottish eccentric, Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromartie, to the Earl of Leven. Here he requested the birthbrief which he had had drawn up for his cousin, Colonel John Urquhart, a soldier of fortune.

The later years of the 1660s saw a number of Scots who received birthbrieves enter the French Army. Sir John Seton, described as a lieutenant of the Scots Guard in France (the regiment commanded by Andrew Rutherford until 1661), acquired one in 1668, "... being of resolution to settle himself in France, or elsewhere, as occasion may best serve". This birthbrief was issued by neither the Privy Council of Scotland or the Court of the Lord Lyon King of Arms, the head of Scotland's heraldic establishment. Rather, it was signed by leading gentlemen of the name of Seton, including the Earl of Winton and Viscount Kingston, who affixed their signatures to the document. Birthbrieves were received for the same purpose by officers of Lord George

113 B.L., Add. MS. 15,856, fol. 69v.
116 Ibid., p. 528.
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Douglas’s regiment in the French Army. Captain William Douglas of the regiment acquired one, signed by Lord George Douglas (as his colonel), the Duke of Hamilton (the brother of his colonel), “... and diverse ather noblemen and gentlemen”, which he desired to have passed through the Scottish Chancellery in order to lend it greater authority. Hugh Mackay of Scourie, a junior officer in Douglas’s regiment in 1664, went further, obtaining a formal letter of introduction from the hand of Charles II himself. This was, arguably, necessary, as he wished to return to France to continue his military education under the Prince de Condé and Marshal Turenne, and independently of the Regimen de Douglass.

Tsar Alexis of Muscovy (1645-76) was particularly keen to recruit foreign officers in order to modernise and professionalise his army. Many Scots were lured to Russia by the attraction of Muscovy service. In November 1671, Patrick Home of Polwarth received a letter from his brother, a lieutenant colonel serving in the Tsar’s army. Though he had already bought his rank, he added a post scriptum to his letter: “I pray you brother send my borebrief, and a seal to me.”

William Bonnar was another colonel serving abroad and he obtained a birthbrief, in Latin, from the king in 1670. Other soldiers in Muscovy service managed to secure military appointments based purely on the recommendation of their countrymen, however, all eventually needed to ratify their position by acquiring a birthbrief from their native land. Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries, Scotland’s most successful soldier of fortune in Muscovy service, held high rank in the service of the Tsar long before receiving a statement of his birth and extraction from the head of his family, the Duke of Gordon, in 1686. Herd says that Auchleuchries received an earlier birthbrief, but does not specify when and intimates that it was some time in the early 1670s, though there seems to be little evidence for this. It is clear that Auchleuchries obtained his rank due to what Sir James Turner termed the “... very commendable custom” of the Tsars of Muscovy:

To chuse any of their colonelles, who they fancy are qualified for it to be generals or lieutenant-generals of a competent number of forces fit for the expidition they are to be imployed in, and so soon as that piece of service

117 5 September 1671: Ibid., s. 3, 1669-72, p. 385.
120 N. Home to Patrick Home of Polwarth, 'Seutske', 6 November 1671: N.A.S., G.D. 158971/1/1.
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is done, the colonel lays down his commission, and returns to his former charge, without the least thought or imagination, that he is disparag'd thereby, the frequent practice of this custom banishing such thoughts out of all men's heads.123

Indeed, as late as December 1684, Auchleuchries was still not describing himself as ‘noble’, despite an obvious attachment to his gentle ancestry and family connections in Scotland.124 However, in 1689 he was granted the full privileges of a Russian nobleman and was allowed to use the name ‘Peter Iwanowitsch’, rather than his old ‘Peter Iwanowsyn’.125 The suffix ‘witsch’ had something of the nature of the preposition ‘von’ in Germany and the Holy Roman Empire.

Scots, who were already long-settled in foreign parts, also received birthbrieves. To aid his claim to noble status, William, Master of Forbes, and "... diverse gentlemen of that name" were asked to provide a birthbrief "... in behalf of Hubert Forbes, Lord [of] Ardram and Alose in France" so that his descent and pedigree could be proved there.126 Similarly, one Thomas Kirkpatrick – "Secretary to the King of France and councillor to Lord Duplose in Dinma in France" – petitioned the Scottish Privy Council for a birthbrief. He stated that he was the son of Thomas Kirkpatrick, Scotsman, "... sometimes one of the twenty-five Scots gentlemen of the French king's lifeguard".127 His reason for applying for the birthbrief was that, "... having a residence in France and finding it necessary to have a borbreiff [sic] under the great seall for testifieing his pedigree and descent... [he]... purchased an ample certificat thereof" under the hands of the Earls of Morton, Linlithgow, Nithsdale, Annandale and diverse other gentlemen.128

Scottish noblewomen also acquired birthbrieves, though, not having to use them to acquire military commissions, far less regularly. Elizabeth Hamilton, wife of the French Comte de Grammont, who was brother-in-law to the Hamilton brothers, Colonel Sir George and Anthony, obtained a birthbrief in 1670 in order to establish her noble status in France.129 In 1684, she applied

124 Passages from the Diary of Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries, pp. 36-37 and 108.
125 Ibid., p. xiv n12.
128 Ibid., p. 173.
129 Birthbrief of Elizabeth, Comtesse de Grammont, 29 September 1670: N.L.S., Adv. MS. 34.6.3, fol. 1. The memoirs of the Comte de Grammont – written by his brother-in-law Count Anthony Hamilton – say that “it was Miss [Elizabeth] Hamilton and Miss [Frances] Stewart who were its [the English court’s] chief ornaments” and that “All the world agreed that Miss Hamilton was worthy of the most ardent and sincere affection: nobody could boast a nobler birth, nothing was more charming than her person”: A.
for French citizenship, on the strength of this.\textsuperscript{130} Lady Catherine Gordon, a daughter of George, second Marquis of Huntly, took a similar course. Both Catherine and her brother were born in France and carried into Poland, for their protection, in the late 1640s. Her twin brother, Lord George Gordon, served for a long time in the Polish Army before returning to his family’s home in Aberdeenshire, Scotland. Lady Catherine acted as a maid of honour to Mary Ludovica Gonzaga, following that lady’s marriage to Vladislas, King of Poland. Her own marriage was, thereafter, arranged to John Andrew, Count Morstein, Great Treasurer of Poland. For the purpose of gaining the full rights of the Polish nobility, she obtained a birthbrief under the Great Seal of Scotland on 12 August 1687. As early as 1658, her other brother, Lord Henry, was accorded the rights of the Polish nobility, for himself and his heirs, despite being described as “... a little hair-brained, but very courageous”\textsuperscript{131}

Birthbriefs, which constituted a legal statement of extraction, were quite different from genealogies which were often employed by the Scottish nobility in purely decorative capacities. This was certainly the intention of Henry, Lord Cardross, an officer in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade after 1685, who, in 1677, wrote to his cousin, Sir Charles Erskine of Alva, entreating him to:

\begin{quote}
let me have as soon as you that paper you have of the genealogy of the house of Erskine, for I am causing drawn [a] trie of our name till our coming off and then to continue to my owne famarly: a short time will serve me of it, and then it shall be returned [to] you.\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

Decorative genealogies (of the sort Cardross had in mind) had had a currency among the Scottish nobility and gentry since at least the 1630s when Sir Colin Campbell of Glenorchy patronised the Scottish portrait artist, George Jamesone. Glenorchy paid him to produce, among many ancestral portraits, a large ‘genealogy board’ which displayed the miniature portraits of his ancestors on a tree, showing all of the branches of his family back to the first Earls of Argyll.\textsuperscript{133} Earlier still, Robert,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{131}] \textit{Genealogie of the family of Gordon}, collected by R. M. (A.D. 1707): MS. in the library at Skene, quoted in the \textit{Diary of Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries}, p. 32n.
\item[\textsuperscript{132}] Cardross to Alva, Edinburgh Castle, 7 November 1677: NLS., MS. 5,071, fol. 172.
\end{footnotes}
sixth Lord Seton, commissioned a magnificent painting of his family’s genealogy, probably in collaboration with the production of the splendidly illustrated *Seton Armorial* of 1591.\textsuperscript{134}

CONCLUSION

In the period between roughly the end of the Thirty Years’ War and the Restoration of Charles II, Scots endured a wide range of experiences on the European continent. The necessity of obtaining credit and to use it to facilitate both basic survival and promotion is the predominant theme, which runs through the correspondence of the Scottish soldier abroad. So too is that of loneliness and the harsh realities of a soldier’s life, including illness, injury and protracted absence from friends and family. The ability of many Scottish soldiers of fortune to cope with vicissitude, owes much to their understanding of the soldier’s lot: or, in other words, to their professionalism. Examples of the Scottish soldier being able to cope with extremely trying conditions, abound and while Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries may well be one of the toughest examples of Scottish professional military tenacity, he is far from being the only one. The practical realities of soldiering existed alongside the more philosophical understanding of a soldier’s, and particularly an officer’s, social role and position. While the importance of masculinity, and the undoubtedly ‘maso’ connotations of military life, played a role in their self-definition, most Scottish soldiers were well aware of the social importance of the profession of arms. The desirability to Scots of establishing and presenting tokens of chivalric ancestry was strongly related to the material advantages, which this could obtain for them abroad. Antiquarian interest in gentle status also fuelled the curiosity of many Scots in heraldry, genealogy and the close association of these with the martial traditions and origins of their families. While travelling, Scots received practical advantages from birthbrieves while the related interest in a ‘Cult of Arms’ or honour amongst the nobility of post-Restoration Scotland had a largely symbolic importance. The nature of this cult is examined in the next chapter of this study.

The military establishment of our ancestors
SCOTS AND THE ‘CULT OF ARMS’

When a Scot decided to look for military employment abroad, he followed a traditional route to gentlemanly employment that could be traced back over many generations. The particular atmosphere of Restoration Scotland promoted a renewed insistence upon the rights and privileges of that country’s nobility and gentry. Many of these people saw a re-emphasis on their former status as the only means by which they could regain the social and financial prestige which had been lost to them through twenty years of turbulence and civil war. One explanation for them was the maintenance of a style of life free from derogatory associations for which the profession of arms was particularly apt in offering employment to the sons of Scotland’s nobility and gentry. Literature, art and custom all helped mould the expectations a young man might have regarding the appropriateness of a military career. As a result the importance of the ‘Cult of Arms’ in post-Restoration Scotland went far beyond the instruction of young men in the minutiae of military practice and extended out to encompass a whole way of life, a ‘cult’ surrounding the use and symbolism of ‘arms’.

The symbolism and significance of warfare effectively reinforced the social and cultural solidarity of Scotland’s nobility and gentry and they were employed to perpetuate a sense of group solidarity. The unique and extreme experience of war was mirrored, in peacetime, by the life or death struggle of the duel. Like warfare, the duel re-enforced noble group solidarity and allowed the officer corps of many armies the opportunity to demonstrate their physical endurance and their freedom from the moral and legal constraints which bound civilian populations. However, one of the negative effects of this process was a sense of invulnerability in regard to civil authority that, in many ways, reflected a natural contempt for restraint and control by Europe’s nobles. It could also be directly related to a monarch’s use of his army. Regiments employed in the subjugation of Huguenot populations in France in the 1680s or the suppression of Conventiclers in Scotland in the 1670s, reflected the degree of invulnerability and insensitivity of military personnel towards civilian populations. This chapter investigates these general themes and analyses their applicability to specific examples of the Scottish military experience abroad in the reigns of Kings Charles II and James VII and II.
SCOTS AND THE ‘CULT OF ARMS’

A strong cult of chivalric honour – centred on the practice of the ‘Art of War’ – existed among Scotland’s nobility and gentry. Aspects of this ‘Cult of Arms’ (as it has recently been called by W. S. Brockington, a scholar of Scottish soldiers), could be found at almost every level of Scottish society in the early modern period. Scotland’s nobility, in particular, were guided in their appreciation of war by the Stuart royal family, whose members took an active interest in all things martial. In August 1677, for example, both Charles II and his brother, James, Duke of York, visited the French court and some of the theatres of operations of the Franco-Dutch war, including the siege of Cambrai – which they greatly enjoyed. Five years later, in 1681, the Scottish Duke of Hamilton had to write a terse letter to his eldest son, the Earl of Arran, insisting that he not expose his other brothers to the dangers of the battlefield. Arran had secretly removed his younger brother, Lord Charles, from Paris and taken him to observe the French siege of Luxemburg. The Hamiltons’ financial capacity facilitated their voluntary attendance at such military events. The duke realised this and promptly wrote to Arran, ordering him to remove his brother from danger “... for it’s not a soldier I intend him, and so long as he stops there he shall not have sixpence from me.”

There is no doubt, however, that the Duke of Hamilton was deeply interested in all aspects of the nobility’s martial practices. He was keenly interested in Scottish history and heraldry – he heavily annotated his copy of Mackenzie of Rosehaugh’s treatise, *The Science of Heraldry*, based on his immense personal knowledge of the seals of the Scottish nobility – and was an expert on Scots law. It is this wider interest in all things martial which has prompted William Brockington to equate the ‘Cult of Arms’ with wider Humanist understandings of noble *vertue*, or ‘reputation’, based on honourable service in both civil and martial arenas.

For Arran and his brother, even the threat of penury was not enough to remove them from the dangers and excitements of the battlefield and only the surrender of Luxemburg to Louis XIV in 1681 put a stop to their adventure. The relief felt by the brothers’ mother, Anne, Duchess of

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SCOTS AND THE ‘CULT OF ARMS’

Hamilton, expresses the joy of all loving mothers at hearing that their sons are safe. The duchess wrote to Arran, expressing this joy:

Both that there was less blood shed and for my particular concern in you and your brother . . . I hope you will not expose yourselves so needlessly again, but make haste to England with your brother whom you may tell from me that if ever he offer to dispose of himself again without his father’s allowance and mine he shall never get anything from us, and that this has done shall on his return be pardoned . . . He writes to his father that he as well as you are looked on more favourably than others, which if he prefer so airy a thing to the favour of his parents he must be very simple . . . I will not say how great a disquiet your being at Luxembourg has been to me, but I am sure in duty you both ought not to have given me such perplexities.7

However, the Hamilton children were not all so protected, and two younger brothers, Lords John and George, were encouraged to study fortification, gunnery and geography, at St. Andrews University. Due to their different personalities, Lord John chose to study Law in France, while Lord George followed the career of arms. The latter ended his career with the title of Earl of Orkney, was a Knight of (Queen Anne’s) Order of the Thistle, and premier Field Marshal of England. However, he received his early military education under his uncle, the first Earl of Dumbarton and, in 1709, he would employ his first cousin, that man’s son, the second Earl of Dumbarton, as lieutenant colonel of a regiment under his command.8

What drove Scots to expose themselves to the dangers of the battlefield? The realities of military life, social pre-eminence and élite identity in late seventeenth-century Scotland were profoundly intermingled with the contemporary practice of warfare. The raison d’être of the ancient Scottish nobility, which was often shared by noble groups throughout Europe, was inexorably linked, throughout the century, to warfare. Even as late as 1776 the German military writer, Wolff, insisted: “The nobility derives its origin, and most of its privileges, from the military establishment of our ancestors.”9

For some sections of the Scottish nobility, nothing was more important than the ‘Cult of Arms’. For high-ranking, titled noblemen, such as the Earl of Dumbarton, the command of a family

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7 Marshall, Days of Duchess Anne, p. 145.
regiment represented a viable economic alternative to a landed estate. For the legions of younger sons of Scottish landed families who sought employment in foreign or domestic military service, their participation in warfare and mastery of the discipline of arms, represented the conscious articulation of this same, ongoing raison d'être. It is, therefore, important to comment on the Scottish nobility’s cultural attitudes towards the profession of arms and the artistic expression of these attitudes, especially in their painting and writing.

At a fundamental level, any Scot who decided upon a career in the army, needed to possess the quality of raw courage as he was entering into a way of life which might demand of him both life and limb. Similarly, young gentlemen were expected to have the commanding presence that breeding alone could produce, whether on the parade ground or the battlefield:

The posture, gait, voice, and the movement of the body and hands must... all convey an impression of grace, avoiding that which is coarse and boorish, and equally that which is over-sweet and effeminate.\(^\text{10}\)

They also had to be conversant with contemporary drill movements. No Scot could hope for employment if he lacked the basic skills required to train and manoeuvre men in the field as, without an adequate knowledge of drill, military efficiency and usefulness would elude any group of armed men. One of the reasons why experienced officers continued to be attractive on the international military market throughout the second half of the seventeenth century, rests upon the fact that a well-trained officer’s understanding of drill was well worth paying for.

Despite the existence of military manuals (which gave instructions for the drilling of men) the best and surest way of acquiring a sound knowledge of drill was by actual practice and experience. Many Scots who went abroad started their careers as volunteers as a means of acquiring the necessary knowledge of drill required by potential employers: moving from one army to another might require further periods of voluntarism as there were marked differences between, say, French and Dutch drill practices. In 1686, Sir Patrick Home of Polwarth’s son and namesake, Patrick, fled to the Netherlands and sought a commission there, to which end he entered as a volunteer the Prince of Orange’s Life Guards:

\(^{10}\) Wolff, Versuch über die Sittlichen Eigenschaften und Pflichten des Soldatenstandes, p. 404, cited in Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, p. 84.
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among persons of quality till we learn the Dutch way of exercising and when we are perfect in that I have very
good ground to expect to be an ensign in his guard or some far better place in some other regiment but pray do
not talk of this except to Grissell and very good friends for fear something may stop it.11

Home was forced instead to accept the rank of ensign in the less prestigious Anglo-Dutch Brigade.

According to John Childs, contemporary estimates held that it took two months to drill, train,
equip and clothe a raw recruit.12 This estimate could be affected by a number of factors, one of
which was the national style of drill which was employed. For this very reason, French methods of
drill were closely observed by the English secretary, William Blathwayt, who also took note of
French practices relating to the control of seniority and promotion within the army.13 This was of
some significance as French and Dutch drill practices varied in certain essentials. Charles II was the
driving force behind the adoption of French drill by the English Army and this was greatly aided by
the return of Dumbarton’s infantry regiment and the return of that of the Duke of Monmouth from
the French service in 1678.

French drill was, perhaps, more popular because of the connection (maintained by many leading
French soldiers) between modern practice and ancient authority. The posthumously published
*Mémoires sur la Guerre* (1725 and 1731) of Antoine Manasses de Pas, Marquis de Feuquières
(1648-1711), contained just such a combination of practice and theory, which appealed to
contemporary readers and proved the primacy of the French *theory* of war over the Dutch *practice* of
it.14

The memoirs of Feuquières were widely praised by eighteenth century soldiers, one of the
greatest of whom, Frederick the Great, thought very highly of the work.15 In this way, the
culmination of the French military experience of the later seventeenth century, was conveyed to the
military practitioners of the eighteenth, through the publication of numerous and admired treatises
and memoirs. These writings were produced by the great military figures of the reign of Louis XIV
and include the Chevalier de Guignard’s *L’École de Mars* (Paris, 1725), Charles Sevin, Marquis de
Quincy’s *Histoire Militaire du Règne de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1726), and, above all, the *Art de Guerre*

11 H.M.C., Laing MSS., vol. 1, p. 460.
Army and the Glorious Revolution*, p. 84.
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par principes et par Règles (2 vols, Paris, 1749) of Jacques-François de Chastenet, Marquis de Puységur (1655-1743), whose active military life spanned the years 1677 to 1735.

Despite his long period of service in the French Army (1652-60), James VII and II tended to favour Dutch drill. He may have been influenced in this by his familiarity with the Dutch drill methods he observed during visits to his daughter, Mary, and son-in-law, William of Orange: one of which occurred in 1679. Drill and training were taken seriously enough by James VII and II, in 1687, to send young engineers (such as Jacob Richards) into Hungary to visit the Imperial Army and record their observations in journals: Richards published one of these journals on his return to England. In 1688 another young officer – often Richard Burton – often went to Hungary to study the “... art military, modern fortification, and modern artillery, and all aspects of military science”. A number of other soldiers such as Captain Frederick Fife, of the Scottish Army, followed the same path: in 1686, he also went to Hungary.

James also instituted the annual encampment of the English Army at Hounslow Heath, on the outskirts of London. The first camp, in 1685, consisted at its height of 10,144 infantry and cavalry, encamped in well-ordered lines of tents covering a mile and a half of ground. To better train the army en masse, the 1685 battle of Sedgemoor was reenacted in Hyde Park. At Hounslow, James could uniformly drill his army in one place, rather than rely on regional commanders to maintain drill in their disparate garrisons. James encouraged war games at all the encampments held annually during his short reign. In 1687 an imitation fort was constructed and “... attacked in form by the whole army” as a reenactment of the 1686 siege of Buda. The camp allowed the army to drill in formations as large as a regiment or brigade. This was an important advantage, if James’s army was ever to achieve a useful level of efficiency.

While desiring to maintain efficient and up-to-date drill practices, the British military also closely followed army developments of all kinds abroad. The establishment by Louis XIV of the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris in 1670, was keenly observed and the regulations governing the institution were

18 Ibid., p. 41.
19 Ibid., p. 96.
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adopted by Charles II for use in his own Chelsea Hospital for veterans.\textsuperscript{21} This perhaps, lends credence to the suggestion of John Childs that, by the end of the century, the profession of arms was becoming a legitimate, long-term career choice in which the distinction between ‘gentlemen’ and ‘professionals’ was fast becoming redundant.\textsuperscript{22}

Practical military knowledge, gained on the battlefield, remained the backbone of military training throughout the period. The practical lessons of the ‘Art of War’ were further supplemented by a literary genre, which reinforced and solidified the group mentality of officers. However, despite the great involvement in military activity of Scots in the second half of the seventeenth century, only one Scottish gentleman left both a military manual \textit{and} a military memoir. Sir James Turner, a veteran of the Thirty Years’ War – often who survived political vicissitudes and secured a commission in the Scottish militia following the Restoration – often left a comprehensive memoir of his career covering the years 1632 to 1670. He also published one of the most comprehensive military manuals of the century.

The name of Turner’s manual, \textit{Pallas Armata}, was taken directly from the title of one of the few early Scottish contributions to the military manual genre: Sir Thomas Kellie of Eastbarns’\textit{s Pallas Armata}, which was published at Edinburgh in 1627. Turner knew this work and praised it in his own book of the same name, saying that Kellie’s instructions for the infantry were “. . . very well done”.\textsuperscript{23} The connections between the two manuals stop at the title, although both share the contemporary deference to classical sources. In this they evidence their close association with both prevalent continental trends in the military manual genre and with the six hundred and twenty-four other manuals published in England alone between 1471 and 1642.\textsuperscript{24} This is most demonstrable in their use of classical scholars as an authority for military knowledge and expertise.

Turner’s manual is of particular interest because it articulates the particular character of Scottish service abroad. The book itself was dedicated to James, Duke of York, who was given his appropriate Scottish title of Duke of Albany. Turner begged the duke to:

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Childs, \textit{James II, The Army and the Glorious Revolution}, p. 84.
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 157 and 204.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Sir James Turner, \textit{Pallas Armata: Military Essays of the Ancient Grecian, Roman and Modern Art of War, Written in the Years 1670 and 1671} (Edinburgh, c.1680), p. 211.
\item \textsuperscript{24} G. and A. Parker, \textit{European Soldiers, 1550-1650} (Cambridge, 1977), p. 41.
\end{itemize}
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Cast your princely eye on any thing contain’d in this treatise; You have given the world too publick demonstrations, how great a master of the art of war, to go to those schools again, especially to learn from such as I am.25

Though such praise was a rhetorical necessity for Turner, the content of it was real. James, as both a Stuart and a warrior prince, satisfied Turner’s requirements as a role model for the sons of Scotland’s gentry.

This theme was carried further, in Turner’s insistence that the *Pallas Armata* was not intended for experienced soldiers or idle readers who lacked any intention of practicing warfare. Turner’s intention was to address: “Young lords and gentlemen . . . and it is from you (whose birth entitles you to martial exercises) that it expects a fair welcome and entertainment.”26 Turner understood that the vast majority of the gentry’s sons would not find employment in the “. . . peaceable arts and sciences” or be “. . . admitted to the stern of government, or permitted to sit at the King’s council-board”.27 He therefore asked that young Scots consider how best they might serve their royal master, the king. His solution was based on tradition:

The ancients of you will derive your pedegree from those who bore arms, it is by arms you had your honour, and it is by arms you are bound now to maintain it. I shall not bid you look to those of your own rank and quality in France, who glory to learn the military art from them, and yet their example deserves imitation; but I shall entreat you to follow the footsteps of your martial ancestors, and account it more honour for you by warlike exploits to shew you are their worthy successors, than to pretend to it only by a vain muster of their old charters, patents and commissions.28

This line of argument was by no means unusual in Restoration Scotland. Turner shows himself to be as much influenced by the prevailing ‘aristocratic reaction’ in Scotland as were those antiquarians—often so intent on the study of charters and patents—often of whom he complains.

Turner aimed to reinforce a sense of group solidarity among the Scottish landed gentry. His suggestion was not, however, rhetorical. Many of Scotland’s younger sons were genuinely bereft of the means of making a living and had necessarily to look towards the profession of arms as a

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26 Ibid., preface.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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possible career choice. However, though it contains a highly comprehensive and intelligent explication of all matters relating to the 'Art of War', *Pallas Armata* was of little practical use to young aspirant soldiers. Its primary function lay in educating young gentlemen in the classical and scholarly origins of the early modern fighting practice. The military manual was a literary genre, designed for a specific class of educated, well-born young men. The authorship, or possession, of such a manual represented a discourse between gentlemen, their social milieu and popular prejudices regarding the origins, function and prestige of their social group.

The early-modern use of classical scholars, as a source of military knowledge and expertise, can be traced back to Count Maurice of Nassau who was himself strongly influenced by his mentor, the Dutch Humanist scholar, Justus Lipsius, who introduced him to the prevalent Humanist attitudes of the Northern Renaissance. He looked to the classical military writings of Polybius, Aelian and the Byzantine Emperor Leo IV, for military inspiration, whilst also experimenting with reproductions of classical drill patterns and troop formations. Among the personal papers of Maurice’s cousin, Johann II of Nassau, there exists a list of eighteen authors whose works were thought to be indispensable for the military commander of the late sixteenth century. Of these authorities, eleven are ancient and six are modern, including Livius, Polybius, Plutarch, Appianus, Diones, Josephus, The Byzantine Emperor Leo IX, Xenophon, Thucydides, Guicciardini, Tacitus, Aelian, Lipsius, Comnenus, Philippus, Martin de Bollas I, Gulilio Savorgniano and Vegetius.

The last name on the list belongs to Flavius Vegetius Renatus who (in the words of Christopher Duffy), “... was absorbed so completely by the Age of Reason that he became effectively an eighteenth-century author”. But, Vegetius’ fame predated the eighteenth century by two hundred years, while his work was far older than that: his *De Re Militari* was written between A.D. 385 and A.D. 450, but was, even then, something of a catalogue of military practice from earlier times. However, its basic tenets were so well founded, that they were adopted in the later sixteenth century. The most important of them was that: “Victory in war does not depend entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only skill and discipline will insure it.” In the Netherlands, the members of the


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Nassau-Orange family accepted the basic truth behind this statement. Its implications and meaning were thoroughly tested by them in the 1590s.

The facility with which such ancient authorities were cited and used in the early modern period is only truly comprehensible when it is remembered that contemporaries viewed military and political realities as being static. The use, by members of the Nassau family, of ancient authorities as a source of military knowledge was by no means novel, but the eventual patronage by Maurice of the Dutch engraver, Jacob de Gheyn, marked a significant moment in the evolution of the military literature genre. He produced a military manual containing fine engraved postures of soldiers holding themselves in each of a number of prescribed positions necessary for them to drill effectively. The manual was called the *Exercise of Arms* and published at The Hague in 1607, provided step-by-step visual instructions to company commanders for the drill of pikemen, musketeers, and arquebusiers.

The practical origins of these drill techniques, lie with the cousin of Maurice, Johann II of Nassau. He developed the provincial *landrettung* (provincial militia) which was levied in Nassau in 1584 to protect the country folk against bands of roving unemployed mercenaries. But the *landrettung* already possessed a tradition of intensive drill and, as it consisted of small bodies of men, Johann saw first-hand the affect of intensive drill on such a body. He received more direct military experience in the Dutch wars against Spain in the Netherlands, especially in 1592. He kept a note book which contains many examples of his keen interest in drill movements. These included a list of drill instructions in the four commonest languages in the Low Countries in the 1590s: Dutch, German, English and Scots.

Johann also made personal illustrations of drill positions: for example, he sketched the drill postures of musketeers in his personal *kriegsbuch* (war book). With his brothers, William Louis and Maurice of Nassau, Johann pioneered new Dutch war tactics based on his observations. It is clear that drill instruction was also a fascination of William Louis, *Stadtholder* of Friesland, who was instrumental in developing Johann’s (and later Maurice’s) military thinking. The last page of a letter from William Louis to Maurice (after the latter had attained the office of Captain-General of the United Provinces), contains written and illustrated instructions for the advanced drill technique.

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called the counter-march, which allowed musketeers to maintain constant, forward-moving fire by rotating their ranks.  

The *Exercise of Arms* (1607) by De Gheyn represented a significant break with the genre of the military treatise as it existed before 1600. Before this date military manuals were often written by prominent soldiers as a means of committing their acquired military knowledge and experiences to paper. Often, they also provided polemical prefatory advice to the reader, regarding the nature of war. For example, the French military commander and diplomat, Guillaume du Bellay, Seigneur de Langey, spent ten pages of the preface to his *Discipline Militaire* debating the question of whether it was right for a Christian prince to wage war.  

The most important aspect of these treatises, however, is their concentration on military practice as expressed in ancient, classical authorities. James Achesone’s 1629 manual contains few direct references to classical scholars, though he does mention in his brief preface that “... it is set down as a blemish in Constantine the Great, that at the desire of some (too peaceful) subjects, he cashired the auncient legions, and in them overthrew the militarie discipline of Rome, bearing a breach for barbarous nations to invade the Empyre”.  

In France (as early as 1508), the Franco-Scottish knight, Béarnault Stuart, Seigneur d’Aubigny, cited Vegetius in his *Traité Sur l’Art de la Guerre*. Sometime prior to 1542, Du Bellay subtitled his *Discipline Militaire* as being: “Primarily made and compiled by the author, as much from the ancients as the moderns, like Polybius, Vegetius, Frontin, Cornacan and others.” These two texts alone represent the consolidation of a genre which, according to a recent military study by Frank Tallett, “... began to appear in increasing quantities from the early years of the sixteenth century, reaching a flood around the 1560s and continuing almost unabated through the seventeenth century”.  

The authors of military manuals continued to be obsessed by ancient authorities. Sir James Turner’s *Pallas Armata* (written in 1671, but not published until 1680) devotes two-thirds of its

37 Guillaume du Bellay, *Discipline Militaire* (Lyons, 1592).  
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contents to the ancient Greek and Roman ‘Art of War’. Roger Boyle, Earl of Orrery’s *A Treatise on the Art of War* (1677), also makes liberal reference to the Romans – often particularly Julius Caesar – often as well as to the Holy Bible.42

In their enthusiastic devotion to classical sources, authors of military manuals could go as far as did, for example, the French Duc de Rohan, in his manual entitled *Le Parfaict Capitaine* (1636). So eager was he to demonstrate the continuity of ancient military practices in the seventeenth century, the he insisted the basic elements of Greek (more so than Roman) tactics and equipment continued to be used in his own time:

The ordinary arms of the infantry of this present time are, for defence, the pot [helmet], the cuirass [body armour] and the tassets [leg defences]; and for offence the sword, the pike and the musket [as a projectile weapon], which are above all the arms of the Greeks moreso than the Romans.43

As late as 1678, writers of military treatises, such as the Champeinois captain, Louis de Gaya, took pains to demonstrate the similarity between the ancient legions of the Romans and those of his own day.44

Kellie and Turner, in their respective *Pallas Armata*, refer to classical scholars who were also warriors: “Cicero Imperator: . . . did alike worthilie behave himselfe in his armes as in his gowne for his countrie.”45 Jacob de Gheyn’s contribution to the military manual genre rests on the fact that he was the first author to produce a manual which diverged radically from the conventions of the genre in terms of the nature of the information contained within it. In this sense, De Gheyn’s manual (and the many imitations, which it inspired), is unique in providing a series of illustrations of drill exercises, free from the moral polemic of authors such as Guillaume du Bellay.

De Gheyn’s *Exercise of Arms* enjoyed widespread popularity and was widely copied. Henry Hexham’s *The Principals of the Art Military Practiced in the Wars of the United Netherlands* (London, 1637), is one such copy of the De Gheyn manual. However, Hexham’s book employed crude woodcut copies of De Gheyn’s handsome original copper etchings of the various postures of

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pikemen, musketeers, and arquebusiers. It is also evident that De Gheyn’s manual was widely used by company commanders, for exactly the instructional purpose for which it was intended. There is clear evidence for the use in the early 1600s of the Exercise of Arms by the captains of recently formed Dutch militia companies. The Dutch artist, W. van den Valckert’s 1625 painting of Captain Burgh and his company of Amsterdam city militia clearly shows the captain referring to a copy of De Gheyn’s Exercise of Arms.\textsuperscript{46} Despite this, more traditional military manuals continued to be produced which owed more to the traditional style of the genre.

Manuals continued to take the reader through each issue relevant to a military commander, from how to besiege a city, to the importance of maintaining discipline amongst his soldiers. In the style of its construction, both Sir Thomas Kellie’s and Sir James Turner’s manuals conform perfectly with this traditional understanding of the military manual genre. Their Pallas Armata consequently consist of a series of chapters which attempt to encompass all the requirements for infantry soldiers in terms of their arming, drill, and deployment on the battlefield. Kellie and Turner remain resolutely loyal to the works of classical scholars throughout their works by continually quoting them as a precedent for the contemporary military action they describe. The names of Aelian, Polybius, Vegetius and the Byzantine Emperor Leo IV continually appear in the side notes appended to each page of Turner’s treatise. Kellie provided instructive words of command for pikemen and musketeers – often the two arms of the seventeenth-century infantry – often both in Scots and English, as well as highly detailed diagrams of the deployment of infantry for marching and fighting. Turner devoted two-thirds of his entire work to military essays on the Greek and Roman ‘Art of War’ respectively.\textsuperscript{47} In so doing, he provided one of the most thorough treatments of them by any military author of the seventeenth century.

Turner treated contemporary warfare in a straight-forward manner. Each of his chapters deals thoroughly with various aspects of late seventeenth-century warfare. Significantly, Turner ended his book with an examination of the comparison by Justus Lipsius between the ancient and modern ‘militia’ (n.b. ‘army’). He also included a discussion of the lawfulness of the profession of arms: this links Turner’s work with the original Humanist inspiration which drove Maurice of Nassau almost a hundred years before. Turner also reflected Scottish (and broadly European) cultural prejudices by linking contemporary military practice to ancient authorities. Turner’s manual,

\textsuperscript{46} Kist, Commentary, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{47} Kellie, Pallas Armata, cf. e.g., pp. 25-6 and 96.
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therefore, recites the mantra of contemporary European society, which insisted that its own greatness and moral legitimacy derived exclusively from the classical past.

The gulf between early modern military theory and practice only becomes evident upon examination of the practical considerations of the military art. Despite theories surrounding the social origin and function of its officer corps, early modern armies remained hostile and offensive institutions with reference to civilian populations. Not only did unlawful pressing of men into its ranks pose an intermittent threat to the peace and security of honest citizens, but armies across Europe generally considered themselves to be above normal civilian authority. The inevitable tension created by such assumptions meant that duels and scuffles between civilians and military personnel were commonplace in garrison towns. They also occurred when soldiers were billeted in towns and villages. For example, in Aldgate, in 1687, some soldiers of the Scottish regiment of the Earl of Dumbarton carried off the constable of the main town guard, but, when the sheriffs of the City of London demanded the man’s release, their captain replied with insolent language.48 James VII and II was forced to suspend the captain, Robert Hodges, but the incident was symptomatic of the vexed long-term relationship that existed between military and civilian authority.

Nor was this an isolated incident in the history of Dumbarton’s regiment. As it marched south in Ireland, in 1688, it quartered in the town of Loughborough where its soldiers paid for nothing and extorted money from the townsfolk. It further outraged local sensibilities and broke the law by illegally quartering its troops in private dwellings and refusing to make any payments. After injuring a number of townsfolk and robbing some local gentlemen, the regiment departed from the town, having done damage to the value of £100 Sterling.49

King James VII and II did nothing to dispel popular fears regarding the reinforcement of absolutist government by military strength. Quite the opposite occurred, as he established a standing court martial at the Horse Guards, in Whitehall. In the opinion of the judge advocate-general of the army, this, effectively, removed military personnel from the competence of the civil power rendering them independent and subject to the orders of the king alone.50 This was profoundly worrying as it

50 Autobiography of Dr. George Clarke: H.M.C., Leybourne-Popham MSS., pp. 262 and 265.
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was understood that the military, in its dealings with civilians, should always be liable to the civil authority.\(^{51}\)

Officers were often at the forefront of civil disturbances. Many gentlemen with military experience gained overseas, returned to Britain with continental habits and vices. One of the most dangerous of these practices to public safety and security was duelling. According to some sources, duelling was, predominantly, engaged in by Scots outside Scotland in the early seventeenth century. This implies that exposure to the atmosphere of the court in London, and to English laws regarding duelling and aliens, proved to be an incentive for Scottish duelling activity in the first half of the century.\(^{52}\) Scotland possessed strong anti-duelling legislation, which had been implemented in the reign of James VI and I in his attempts to eradicate the blood-feud. These laws continued in place to the extent that, in 1684, Mr. Robert Baillie of Jerviswood was fined £1,000 for drawing his sword (during the field conventicle suppressions of the 1680s), in order to rescue his brother, a Presbyterian minister, from the officious attention of one, Captain Carstairs.\(^{53}\)

It has been assumed that the atmosphere in Scotland (following the Restoration), was greatly shaped by an ‘aristocratic reaction’ which witnessed the Scottish nobility’s reconstitution of the rights, obligations and power which they had lost in the tumultuous period between the years 1638 and 1659. Post-restoration Scotland certainly exhibited an ‘aristocratic’ character: for example, the Estate’s Commissioners for February 1661 included thirty-seven nobles and twelve lairds.\(^{54}\) Furthermore, Lauderdale introduced many of his own noble and lairdly adherents – including the Earls of Tweeddale, Kincardine and Argyll – into the Privy Council.\(^{55}\) The insinuation by Lauderdale of allies into positions of power further strengthened the conservative character of the top level of Scottish government. The conservative, or even reactionary, character of the nobility in Scotland in Lauderdale’s time often fuelled tensions whereby a man’s refusal to act in a ‘gentlemanly’ manner had serious repercussions for his reputation throughout Britain. For example, in England, in 1682, a visiting continental nobleman – the Swiss Count Königsmarck – was accused of hiring rogues to kill Thomas Thyne, of Longleat, the husband of the count’s then love-interest, Elizabeth, the Dowager

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Lady Ogle, who was heiress to the Earl of Northumberland.56 However, Königsmarck only took this action after Thyne repeatedly refused to fight a duel with him.57

Significantly, no Scottish nobleman was brought before the Privy Council for duelling in the period c.1660-88, despite evidence that duels took place in Scotland. In 1666, a duel certainly occurred between two veterans of French service – often Thomas, Lord Carnegie (son of Robert, third Earl of Southesk) and the Earl of Linlithgow. The duel was reported to the Earl of Airlie who was informed that Carnegie had “…vounded the Earle of Linlithgow at Couper, upon some privat debaut [which] fell out betwix him [n. b. them]”.58 It may be argued that this was not a duel but in fact a far less structured affray, however, the fact that both men had served in the French Army would suggest otherwise.

France (and the French Army especially), was rife with duelling. The custom was ingrained, and the French Army and nobility were fascinated by it. For example, the early years of the reign of Louis XIV saw thirty-five duels take place on average per annum: almost all of them involved more than two combatants at a time and they were, therefore, mêlées.59 The temper which led to duelling was only diffused with difficulty, however, after 1660 the duel (even in France), is said to have lost some of its lustre and “…became instead something of an aberration”.60 If this is so it was not reflected in Britain, where the duel continued to offer catharsis of a hierarchical and masculine nature for many male participants.

Many Scots with military experience abroad, returned to Britain imbued with French military ideals of chivalry and honour. This was most commonly manifested in the duel, a practice which (Christopher Duffy says) was the “…inevitable outcome of the seething violence and insecurity of the upper classes”, but which was, in fact, acknowledged by most contemporaries to be most

56 This was the daughter of George FitzRoy, K.G. (the natural son of Charles II and Barbara, Duchess of Cleveland) who, on 6 April 1683, was created Duke of Northumberland. He married Catherine, daughter of Thomas Wheatley, Esq., of Brecknock, Berks (who was the widow of Thomas Lucy, Esq., of Charlecote). The heiress, Lady Elizabeth Percy, had been forced, at the age of twelve, to marry Lord Ogle, who died one year after their betrothal.

57 Incidentally, Königsmarck’s mistress, the Northumberland heiress, would become the niece of the Earl of Dumbarton, when, in 1686, the earl married her aunt (see chapter 10); Fountainhall, Chronological Notes, p. 23; Barrillon to Colbert de Croisy, 24 November 1670, cited in H. Fornéron, The Court of Charles II, 1649-1734: Compiled from State Papers (London, 1897), pp. 249-50.

58 M. Kennedy to the Earl of Airlie, Aberdeen, 16 April 1666: National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh (hereafter N.A.S.), G.D. 16/34/139.


60 J. Dewald, The European Nobility, 1400-1800 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 17 and 38; Billacois, Le duel dans la société française des XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle, pp. 247 and 381.
enthusiastically practiced among the French. The most prominent men involved in duelling in Britain in the later 1670s and 1680s were all members of the Gallicised officer corps of the Scottish regiment of Dumbarton who returned to Britain, following the regiment’s dismissal from the French Army, in 1678. When, in 1679, the regiment was quartered in Ireland, the Earl of Orrery reported to the Earl of Ormonde: “I cannot in duty but humbly acquaint your Excellency that there has been of late at least five or six duels in this regiment [Dumbarton’s] between the officers of it, and one duel between the private soldiers.” Orrery spoke to the major of the regiment, telling him that the first to send or receive a challenge would be proceeded against according to the ‘rules of war’, meaning he would suffer a court marshal.

The regiment’s Major Hacket disingenuously claimed to be unaware of the duelling, saying that “... he never knew such duelling in the regiment all the while they were beyond sea as there has been within this fortnight”. Whatever the truth of Hacket’s protest, Orrery thought the duelling a dangerous enough example to the Irish gentry, who might “... look upon it as a fine mode, which may be imitated since it is not punished”. The pervasive approval of duelling throughout the rank and file of the regiment is reflected in its punishment: the deduction of twelve pence in the pound from the arrears owing to every soldier. One duellist was forced to make a formal apology for his actions, but was ultimately forgiven.

Douglas family members were involved in many duels in the British Isles at this time. In June 1679, Captains Douglas and Campbell (both of Dumbarton’s regiment) fought a duel. They were out hunting when “... on some words which passed between them, Captain Campbell alighted, drew his sword, and then Captain Douglas did the like; but before they could be parted they fought, and Captain Campbell was killed”. Though forgiven (after a slight rebuke), Captain Douglas left the

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61 Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, p. 76.
63 Ibid., p. 139.
64 Orrery to Ormonde, Castlemartyr, 20 June 1679, printed in Ibid., p. 139.
65 Ibid., p. 139.
66 Ossory to Ormonde, Castlemartyr, 21 June 1679, printed in Ibid., p. 140.
67 Orrery to Ormonde, Castlemartyr, 27 June 1679, printed in Ibid., p. 145.
69 Orrery to Ormonde, Castlemartyr, 20 June 1679, printed in H.M.C., Ormonde MSS., n. s., vol. 5, p. 139.
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regiment in Ireland in 1680 and, thereafter, sought employment in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in the Netherlands.  

In April 1685, the Earl of Dumbarton had to inquire after his nephew, Colonel Douglas (the Duke of Queensberry’s son) whom he heard had been “... wounded in some private quarill”.  

Given the strong official disapproval of the practice, Queensberry’s correspondent strenuously denied the rumour: “I told him, no; and I was sure it was as fals as hell.”  

In November of the same year (1685), Dumbarton himself carried a challenge from Lord Devon to Lord Gray. Devon challenged Gray after hearing that the latter had defamed him to the king as an adherent of the rebel Duke of Monmouth. The wording of the challenge was inflammatory:

> My Lord... bids me tell [you] that you are a traitor, the son and husband of a whore and a liar, and if you had not once borne the title of a Lord, he would have ordered his footmen to have kicked you, but in regard of your past quality he is content to take his own satisfaction and to that purpose challenges you to meet him immediately.

Gray refused to accept the challenge, electing instead to inform the king of it who “... chid[ed] Lord Dunbarton [sic] for delivering it, and required Lord Devon to lay it down” which he offered to do if Gray withdrew his slander regarding the peer’s association with Monmouth.

Dumbarton himself may have set something of the trend for his regiment. He was wounded so badly in a duel with the French Duc de Normandie (see chapter 5) that reports of his death appeared in England in October 1669. Partly because of its association with such practices, his regiment was called a “... nursery for men of honour” as late as 1713. John Crookshanks, reporting to the Lord High Treasurer on the costs Scotland had incurred before the Union of 1707, said that:

The nobility and gentry of Scotland in foreign parts, especially in France, gained honourable distinction by their bravery but this drained their country of valiant men who thought it a disparagement to let a foreigner go more

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72 Ibid., p. 59.


74 Ibid.

75 John Carlyle to Under-Secretary Williamson, Dover, 7 October 1669: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 266, no. 53; Carlyle to Williamson, Dover, 18 October 1669: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 266, no. 133.
bravely than they to death and destruction. It has been reported and is probable that Lord Dumbarton’s regiment which was their nursery for men of honour has drawn 55,000 recruits from Scotland, whereof few returned with whole bones and less with estates; their troops in the Dutch service had not much better fortune; so that while Britain was in a profound peace at home they have been shedding their blood profusely in [their] quarrels of foreigners.76

The fracas that occurred between the Scottish patriot, Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, and Mr. Dare, an English participant in the 1685 Monmouth rebellion, represents just such a manifestation of these patterns of gentlemanly interaction. Angrily chasing after Saltoun, who had just stolen his horse, Dare waved his cane at the thief while Saltoun “... though riding in the duties of morality, yet having been accustomed to foreign services both by sea and land, in which he had acquired high ideas of the honour of a soldier and a gentleman, and of the affront of a cane, pulled out his pistol, and shot him dead on the spot”.77 Though highly skeptical of the rationale of such ‘honourable’ activity, Sir Hugh Dalrymple, whose ironic account this is, clearly understood the connection between overseas service and new ideas. In such an environment, the ongoing turbulence and debt suffered by the whole Carnegie family, as a result of their pursuit of French ideals of military service and gentlemanly honour, remained a morally elucidating fact.

Yet another Scot in French service who died as a result of duelling was Francis Henderson, the son of Sir John Henderson of Fordel. He was an officer in French service in the early 1670s who had entered the French Army as a junior officer in Lord George Douglas’s regiment.78 On the top of a bundle of his papers in the National Archives of Scotland a contemporary hand wrote: “He was a brave young officer and fell in a duel.”79

One of the best ways in which those nobles who were also soldiers could display their choice of career and the glory they had attained was through the medium of portraiture. Despite the relatively artistically narrow frames of reference that existed in seventeenth-century Scotland, Scottish nobles could reasonably hope to be successfully depicted as soldiers in portraits. The depiction of the common accoutrements of military life and noble status, common to early-modern Europe as a whole, including armour, the sword, sash and baton of command, is as important as a consideration

79 Ibid., fol. 4.
of the way in which these objects were used in the context of the every day. Like two halves of a whole, these elements – often the practical and the symbolic – often fit together to provide the historian with a sound understanding of the position and importance of the soldier and his accoutrements of war in the visual and artistic culture of seventeenth-century Scotland.

The importance of martial and chivalric themes to the Scottish nobility, is evident in the portrait of John Leslie, first Duke of Rothes, Lord Chancellor of Scotland (1667-81). This picture depicts the classic image of timeless heroism and temporal rank conveyed by his armour. It is tempered by his holding a lance, which seems ridiculous given that both armour and the lance were practically obsolete on the contemporary field of battle. This portrait of the Duke of Rothes, which, while preserving, almost unchanged, many aspects of the standard armour-clad image, takes the symbolism, which could be displayed in portraits to new heights. Most obviously, Rothes holds a lance in his right, armour-clad hand, which has the effect of creating a dividing line diagonally across the portrait’s centre. This technique emphasizes the division of the symbolism in the portrait between the helmet, which rests just above the duke’s name and titles (in gold lettering at the bottom right hand corner of the portrait) and the upper section of the portrait, which contains Rothes’s upper body and head. Rothes wears a version of the increasingly elaborate lace cravat (symbolising both wealth and taste) and the standard sash of command. However, new features of military portraiture are apparent in Rothes image, as there is a certain amount of background activity, with a steward holding his master’s horse, because Rothes is about to joust on the tilting field. This portrait is remarkable for its sophisticated manipulation of imagery and its lyricism. The obvious connotations of the lance – chivalric activity, knightly virtues – are highly unusual in Scottish portraiture.

The Duke of Rothes’s lance is not an isolated artistic fantasy, but demonstrates a particular style of Scottish portraiture at the end of the seventeenth century; one involving a kind of literary lyricism. As in France at this time and, to a lesser extent, in England the portrayal of Scottish noblemen in literary and classical guise was becoming increasingly popular. The most common conceit was Roman, and it is not unusual to find King Louis XIV of France and Prince Rupert of the Rhine, for example, both being portrayed in ancient Roman guise. This, of course, meant wearing Roman armour and many Scots and, in some cases, whole Scottish noble families were thus portrayed.

80 John Leslie, first Duke of Rothes (1630-81), President of the Privy Council (1660), Extraordinary Lord of Session (1661), Lord Treasurer (1663), the king’s Commissioner to the Scottish Parliament (1663), and Lord Chancellor of Scotland (1667-81).

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This was certainly the case with the family of Alexander Stewart, fifth Lord Blantyre, who had himself, his wife and all six of their children and three of their dogs portrayed in the guise of ancient Rome.\textsuperscript{82} The anti-heroic reality of such representations of the Scottish aristocracy can be gauged by one contemporary account of Lord Blantyre, which described him as being “... a little, active man [who] but thinks very seldom right and can neither speak nor act, but by overdoing spoils all”\textsuperscript{83}

While the Roman armour shown in Blantyre’s portrait was certainly fanciful in a way that other, more conventional armours were not, it nevertheless conveys a startlingly similar message. The message was one of aristocratic stability and authority, which was almost exactly attuned to more conventional representations of Scots nobles in modern armours. The group portrait of the Blantyre family represents an extension of, but by no means an alternative to, the aristocratic symbolism, which had been built up over the course of the seventeenth century. It is used here as an example of the, sometimes fluid, diversity which existed within the wider genre of military portraiture in seventeenth-century Scotland. The Romanised Blantyre family portrait, like the chivalric lance held by Rothes, did not represent exotic ‘otherness’ to contemporary viewers, but fitted firmly into the portrayal by the Scottish nobility of its identity through the medium of the portrait. The Earl of Dumbarton probably came close to being depicted in Roman armour as Count Königsmarck, the man whose regiment replaced his own for the 1669 French invasion of Candia (and who would also become his nephew by marriage in 1686), was etched wearing Roman armour in 1682.\textsuperscript{84} Armour, whether Roman, mediaeval or contemporary, was of great decorative value. In 1670, for example, when Prince Rupert redecorated Windsor Castle, John Evelyn reported that he:

\begin{quote}
had begun to trim up the keep or high round Tower, and handsomely adorned his hall with furniture of arms, which was very singular, by so disposing the pikes, muskets, pistols, bandoleers, holsters, drums, back, breast, and headpieces, as was very extraordinary. Thus, those huge steep stairs ascending to it had the walls invested with this martial furniture, as to represent festoons, and that without any confusion, troph-like.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

Rupert was arguably unrepresentative of most of the British nobility when it came to his antiquarian interest in armour. However, his redecoration of Windsor Castle might certainly have raised the

\textsuperscript{83} Marshall, \textit{Childhood in Seventeenth Century Scotland}, p. 33.  
\textsuperscript{84} Charles John, Count Königsmarck. Engraving by R. White, 1682.  
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profile of old suits of armour in the consciousness of many courtiers, both English and Scots. The portrait of Rothes, this might suggest that the nobility were far from immune to the influence of decorative armours. Thus armour may have been appreciated by the British nobility, and, in some cases, available to it in plentiful quantity.

CONCLUSION

Warfare and the pomp of the battlefield played a prominent role in the lives of Scotland’s nobility. Their association with war, as the raison d’être of the nobility in general, is beyond question, but the meaning of the connection between war and society in later seventeenth-century Scotland is not so straightforward. Many Scots, from many social strata, relied on warfare as a means of making their living. In doing so, they followed well-trodden paths to employment on the European continent that required an, at least passing, familiarity with the ‘Art of War’. The fact that any Scottish military manuals were written in the century, probably owes as much to this important and ongoing connection between Scottish soldiers and the rest of Europe as it does to particular periods of domestic unrest in Scotland. But, such practical knowledge was a far cry from the artistic demands of a post-Restoration Scottish nobility, who wished to reassert their ancient privileges and recoup some of the losses they had suffered during the protracted troubles of the Civil Wars and Cromwellian Protectorate.

The extreme conservatism of the post-Restoration Scottish nobility was one reason for their ongoing use of the symbols of mediaeval chivalry, but the appearance of armour, armorial achievements and antique weaponry in Scottish noble portraits should be understood within the wider context of post-Restoration Scottish society and politics. The artistic influence of the Duke of Rothes’s portrait would be meaningless, were it not for our understanding of his close political and kinship ties with the subjects of similar portraits. The increasingly conservative traditionalism of post-Restoration society, especially after the ‘Exclusion crisis’ (see chapter 8), allowed the visual and artistic representation of archaism to function simultaneously as a political statement of allegiance to the Stuart Crown.

The next three chapters of this work examine the specific nature of Scottish military employment abroad between 1660 and 1678. By analysing the mechanics of diverse elements of the military
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machine abroad, including recruitment, supply, payment, and so on, it is possible to draw broader conclusions about the true impact of the cult-like rhetoric of war among the Scottish noblesse. The next chapter focuses on the specific nature of military service for those Scots who decided upon military careers with Scottish units in overseas service.
Part II:
Active Service Abroad, 1660-78
Loyalty and the retention of a residual nationality were two of the most problematic issues for Scottish soldiers abroad. No Scot was more torn by the dilemma of dual allegiance while engaged in such service than Lord George Douglas, whose ownership and control of his family’s regiment was tested throughout the 1660s. His reaction to circumstance, which strained his loyalty to both Charles II and Louis XIV, is instructive to any analysis of the position of Scots in overseas service in this period. Douglas found himself caught between the traditions of service of the old unit he commanded and the changing patterns of military employment and service. Douglas’s problem was not new: all mercenaries throughout history have tended to possess a residual nationality at some level. The professionalism of Douglas’s unit was never in question, but its commander’s loyalty to Louis XIV became increasingly vexed due to that king’s increasing willingness to view his person as being synonymous with the kingdom he ruled.

Six years after Charles II was restored to his British throne, he was forced into an armed conflict with Louis XIV of France. The position of a semi-entrepreneurial unit abroad in the early 1660s (such as Douglas’s) has been likened to that of auxiliaries in regard to larger and increasingly permanent standing regiments.¹ This implies that such units lacked permanence, security and respect, but this chapter challenges that assertion. The vicissitudes suffered by the regiment de Douglas demonstrate the integral importance of some such auxiliary regiments in the larger armies of which they were a part due to the age and respectability of some foreign regiments in the French Army.

Many Britons had the happy opportunity in 1660 to return openly to the service of their newly restored monarch, Charles II. Some Scots, who were bound by commitments and duty elsewhere, returned to their anointed king in spirit alone. Charles’s military establishment in Britain was scarcely prosperous enough to support large numbers of returned soldiers and the lack of money at home forced many Britons to remain abroad. Furthermore, Charles knew that all armed forces in Britain were still strongly associated with the Interregnum period in which Scotland especially had been ruled by the forces. In 1660, General Monk’s army in Scotland was viewed as “one of the

badges of slavery” imposed by the English on Scotland. Meanwhile, Lord George Douglas continued to serve abroad, while still holding his master’s service sacred. Douglas, and many an officer who served under him, was bound by a loyalty established long before Charles II came to power. In Douglas’s case, his services to the French throne were bound by the specific circumstances of the period of the 1650s. It was also affected by connections between France, Scotland and the Douglas family, which went back as far as the fourteenth century. Some would argue they went back further still, to the signing of the ‘auld’ alliance between the two kingdoms in 1295.

With the Restoration, Douglas and the hundreds of Scots in his regiment, faced a significant dilemma regarding their loyalty to a Crown which had not functioned effectively since 1648. Douglas was eight years old when Charles I was executed and so had never known (to date) a reigning British sovereign. His only example of a successful, reigning monarch was Louis XIV, who had provided him with employment, honour and courtly position since his childhood. Douglas was, therefore, presented with the problem of maintaining the integrity of his obligations to Charles II, while supporting the not always complementary policies of King Louis XIV of France. The Candia episode of 1669 (discussed later in this chapter), highlights the vexed position of Scots abroad and the dangers they faced at the hands of manipulative masters, keen to exploit the conflict between their natural loyalties and their personal and professional needs. In 1669, Douglas, like so many of his countrymen, all too easily became a pawn in a political game between two masters. Douglas’s position is interesting because he never hesitated to obey the demands of his natural sovereign, Charles II – a mixture of loyalty and opportunism.

England went to war with the Dutch in 1665, and that conflict – the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-7) – was the first real test of the loyalty of British soldiers abroad. For Charles II, the war was deeply problematic as he was forced to declare war on France as that country was in formal alliance with the Dutch. This resulted in pressure on British merchant shipping in 1666, formal cessation of many of the networks which supported Scottish military service in France, and a major rupture in the traditional connections between France and Scotland.

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THE WARS OF 1666-9

In 1666, the English agent in Paris, Mr. Hales, reported the trouble that was being suffered by himself, and others of the English community in France, following the outbreak of hostilities. He said “I am sure it is a great trouble to me that I am forced to stay here any time after a warre in this manner proclaimed.” He was referring to the fact that war had been declared so suddenly between England and France, that the British merchant community had no time to arrange their affairs. Both English and Scots merchants were threatened by French pretensions, which had exacerbated the rivalry with England that had begun the conflict in the first place. At Bordeaux the British consul reported that the English and Scots merchants there, intended to post a petition to the French king, regarding the effects of the war upon them. They specifically complained of their inability to launch the “several vessels here . . . charged in all haste to depart”.

As late as May 1667, both English and Scottish merchants were complaining of the great difficulties they suffered as a result of prejudice against them, remaining from the war. In August 1670 a petition was also addressed by an English merchant who complained that he had lost a ship to French privateers in the West Indies “in November 1667 which was thirteene weekes after the peace”. The origin of the merchants’ problems lay in the persistent attempts of Louis XIV of France to remove their rights in favour of those of his own subjects. This was legally difficult in the case of Scottish merchants. They made reference to a tradition of Scottish rights in France, which dated from the reign of Francis I. Included amongst these was the assumption of automatic rights as subjects for all Scots in France, and all French in Scotland. Even if this had been a legal reality in France in the 1660s (which it was not), it is clear that it was not an accepted practice. Scottish merchants, particularly, felt the disadvantages of this given the valuable taxation concessions which came with being treated as a subject.

Evidence appeared in 1663 of how little the ‘auld’ connections between France and Scotland mattered in Louis XIV’s reign. In September of this year a group of Scottish nobles and lawyers addressed a petition to Charles II on behalf of the rights of Scottish merchants in France, in an attempt to win his support for their cause. In it they reminded the king of the long connections between France and Scotland, recalling the league between the Scottish king, Achaius, and

5 Consul of Bordeaux to the King of France, 6 February 1666: P.R.O., S.P. 78/122, fol. 45.
7 Idem.
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Charlemagne. They reminded the French authorities of the reiteration of these connections at the time of Mary, Queen of Scots's marriage to the Dauphin of France, Francis, in 1558. They also referred to a 1639 act of the parlement of Paris, which freed all Scots resident in France from taxes levied on strangers in the kingdom. With this reference in mind, they went on to complain of specific instances of French aggression against Scottish merchants. On 31 January 1667, Charles II received a similar petition from some English nobles on behalf of English merchants in France.

With France at war with a British king, none of these old connections were relevant to Louis XIV, and all Britons resident in France were threatened by the hasty declaration of hostilities. In January 1666, the English agent, Hales, reported to Sir George Downing that the compagnie d'Angleterre — a regiment of largely English soldiers in French pay and commanded by Sir Henry Jones — were being threatened by the French king with being disbanded.

The greatest threat, by far, was that posed to the longest serving British unit in the French Army: the Scottish regiment commanded by Lord George Douglas. This regiment had existed in France since Sir John Hepburn brought it there in 1633 from Swedish service. The regiment was commanded successively by Lord George's brothers-germain, Lords James and Archibald Douglas. When Lord Archibald died, in 1656, it was placed in the hands of Lord George Douglas.

The regiment had long been valued in the French Army and many efforts were made on its behalf to keep it intact as a functioning and significant entity. In April 1642, the French king made "strenuous efforts" to re-establish the position of the Scots regiments in French service. In January 1643 six commissioners were sent to Scotland for this purpose: on 26 June 1643, Lord James Douglas and the Sieur de Cressy were arrested in Scotland while seeking recruits.

Lord George was the second son of William Douglas, first Marquis of Douglas, by his second marriage to Lady Mary Gordon. As a younger son, it was unreasonable for him to hope for the titles

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9 Petition to Charles II, from various Scottish nobles, on behalf of Scottish merchants in France: British Library, London (hereafter B.L.), Add. MS. 23,120, fol. 46.
10 P.R.O., S.P. 78/142, fol. 245.
14 Ibid., pp. 229 and 290.
and estates which accrued to his elder brother-germain, Lord Archibald, who was heir to the titles of Earl of Angus and Marquis of Douglas.\textsuperscript{15} Meanwhile his elder brother, William, became third Duke of Hamilton (as a titular creation) on his marriage to Anne, Duchess of Hamilton in her own right.

Lord George’s position in the French service was of long standing. In many ways, he enjoyed all of the career opportunities, which applied to any other French colonel of noble lineage, but he was nevertheless a Scot and, therefore, owed his first allegiance to the British monarch.

In 1656, he was allowed to recruit one thousand Scots for his regiment, and the French also hoped 2,000 Irish soldiers might be obtained to serve in it.\textsuperscript{16} However, unlike other Scottish expatriates – such as Lord George’s kinsman, Field Marshal Robert Douglas, Count of Skånning, who was a naturalized Swede and held several positions of great trust under the Swedish monarch – Lord George enjoyed no position in the French peerage. Though called in France by the title of ‘Count’ or ‘Marquis de Douglas’, this was only by courtesy. Such titles were of a type awarded to, and used by, many French noblemen at the time, and implied an acknowledgement of the antiquity of Lord George’s noble status, but gave him no special rights in France as a result.

At no time in his career before 1666 was Douglas obliged to chose between the service of Charles II and that of France. However, as a commissioned officer in the French Army, Douglas was constrained to follow French orders and, furthermore, he commanded a large body of valuable veteran Scottish soldiers: men whom it had been tedious and expensive to train and in whom France, therefore, felt it had a considerable stake. Contemporary military observers were in no doubt of the value of such veterans and were prepared to go a long way to preserve them as the expensive and effective heart of an army that they were.\textsuperscript{17}

This all created the potential for a serious and embarrassing conflict of interests on Douglas’s part in 1665, at the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. The first instinct of Charles II was bluntly to order Douglas and his regiment to quit French service forthwith, giving only cursory guarantees as to the colonel’s financial and professional security in Britain. Douglas agreed (initially without hesitation) to obey the command of his monarch and duly tendered his resignation to Louis XIV who, realising he was losing an important regiment of veteran soldiers to his enemy, made Douglas’s departure from France as difficult as possible.

\textsuperscript{15} Though, when he died in 1655, he predeceased his father by five years.


\textsuperscript{17} C. Duffy, \textit{The Military Experience in the Age of Reason} (London, 1987), p. 11.
Hales reported the regiment’s situation to the English Secretary of State, Lord Arlington, in February 1666. He said that, despite initial hopes of an easy removal from France, Louis XIV had placed a number of obstacles in the way of the regiment’s departure. Most crippling of all was the king’s refusal to pay arrears. This made it virtually impossible for the regiment to move because its commander, officers and men were all deeply in debt to local merchants, suppliers and other victuallers, so that existing creditors, together with the impossibility of obtaining new credit, impeded the regiment’s mobility. Lord George said the payment of 15,000 livres (£1,200 Sterling) was necessary to secure their departure. This had to come from the English purse as “without money the regiment is absolutely broken, and the poore gentleman my Lord [George] Douglas quite undone, his fortune left every way”. On 2 March 1666, in an atmosphere of increasing animosity, Charles II declared that all those of his subjects living in France were to withdraw immediately from that country and cease correspondence with the French king, save to settle their estates.

The Venetian ambassador to France reported Douglas’s summons to the Doge, saying that Charles II had “recalled from service here a colonel of that nation [Scotland], who has deserved well of the king here and is much beloved by his Majesty who is greatly upset at this”. It was also thought that other regiments with Scottish connections would be sent for by Charles or dismissed by Louis. However, Scots from other parts of the world were also recalled: in 1666, Generals Dalyell of Binns and Drummond of Cromlix both withdrew from Russian service to aid Charles in the Second Anglo-Dutch War. In Scotland, they were a valuable commodity and were the objects of respect due to the experience they had gained in armies abroad. Their association in Russia with the earlier generation of Scottish soldiers, who had served there during the Thirty Years’ War, reinforced the connection between Scottish expatriate soldiers remaining in Russia and the newly restored Stuart Crown.

18 Henry Bennet, 1st Earl of Arlington, Secretary of State (south) from 1662 to 1674. His Under-Secretary was Joseph Williamson – who was later knighted – and was Secretary of State from 1674 until 1679 (when he was replaced by Robert, Earl of Sunderland, who served from 1678 until 1681), and then again, from 1683 to 1688, when Richard, Viscount Preston, was briefly appointed: Sir G. Clark, *The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714* (Oxford, repr. 1992), pp. 461-2; K. H. D. Haley, *Politics in the Reign of Charles II* (London, 1985), p. 15.


20 2 March 1666: R.P.C.S., s. 2, 1665-9, p. 144.


22 Idem.


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To survive a situation, which could well have spelt his ruin financially and professionally, Douglas was forced to call into play all his diplomatic skills in order to effect his financial and military survival. As a straight-forward and uncomplicated soldier, Douglas had few such skills to hand, but was successful to the degree that Hales could report to Arlington in early March 1666 that the colonel found things “a little smoother again at court”.25 Notwithstanding this, Louis XIV would give him no assurance as to the payment of his regiment’s arrears, and concluded that “the arrears shall be paid when there is money, that is, God knows when”.26 With his creditors still unsatisfied, all involved realised “that money must come to discharge his quarters”.27 However, the Commissaire de Lionne, who was the French paymaster of Douglas’s regiment, could see little hope for its commander and said that the capitulation of Douglas’s regiment obliged that commander to think first and foremost of his position in the French service.28

Contemporary observers were under no illusions regarding the ownership and loyalty of Douglas’s regiment. They understood that it really belonged to the British king rather than to its colonel. This is an important point as Douglas, though essentially engaged in mercenary service abroad, clearly did not act independently at either a personal or regimental level despite the fact that, to all intents and purposes, the regiment was his share of the Douglas family estate. In his Relazione d’Inghilterra (1668), the Roman nobleman, Lorenzo Magalotti, related that for “a long time the regiment has served in Flanders whenever there was no war in England; otherwise it crosses the sea and receives pay from its King, like the other regiments”.29 The quote clearly implies that contemporaries believed that Charles II could rely on Douglas’s regiment in time of need.

The real problem for Douglas stemmed, in part, from an aspect of the soldier’s existence described by Christopher Duff: “By embracing the trade of arms the gentleman accepted certain duties towards his masters and inferiors, and he unreservedly offered his life, if not his time and attention, to the service of his fatherland of the moment.”30 Naturally this notion upset the delicate balance between a soldier’s adopted and his ‘natural’ loyalties. For Douglas the choice was both

26 Idem.
27 Idem.
30 Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, p. 78.
novel and painful and his uncertainty regarding the best course of action is evident in his behaviour at the time.

Credence was given to Magalotti's belief that the regiment was at Charles's disposal when Douglas unwisely decided to press a new treaty, or contract, at the French court in order to maintain his regiment in French service. Douglas's real level of independence as the commander of the Douglas regiment, was revealed when he sought out a new capitulation from the French king. He was advised, by his friends and acquaintances at the French court, that his treaty was not supported by the English ambassador, so that he alone was seen to press for a French commission in defiance of Charles II's order to return home. As a result, Douglas was stigmatised to the degree that he was ordered by the French Secretary of State for War, the Marquis de Louvois, to retire from the court to the garrison where his regiment was stationed. Douglas's apparent duplicity in satisfying his own ends at the expense of his natural sovereign "... was very ill taken" by all involved.31 This was also the last straw for Louis XIV, who finally allowed the regiment's arrears to be paid but, for Douglas personally, "they tell him now plainly he shall not have a penny of the arreares of his pension, w[hi]ch is two thousand crownes".32

At this stage, Douglas was finally given permission to lead his regiment out of France. Without the arrears of his French pension, Douglas could not personally escape his French creditors and, therefore, desperately needed the assistance of the English authorities. Hales reported to Arlington that he had stood surety to Douglas's creditors, for the sum of £245.16.8 Sterling, "... without which he could not have stired, nor his Ma[ajes]t[y] have had the regiment".33 Hales informed Arlington that "... my Lord Douglas his regiment is upon their march and will be brought entire into England, but himselfe is much in their black book here", but reminded him that "my engagement for him is about 242ś sterling".34

As a result of these efforts, Lord George was with his regiment at the French shore by the end of April, but the regiment that Douglas brought into England was undermanned and badly equipped.35 Furthermore, Douglas was financially ruined which was the price of his and his regiment's loyalty to

32 Ibid.
34 Same to same, Paris, 24 March/3 April 1666: P.R.O., S.P. 78/122, fol. 122.
35 Same to same, Paris, 10 April 1666: P.R.O., S.P. 78/122, fol. 124; Lorenzo Magalotti, ed. Middleton, p. 91.
Charles II in 1666. His regiment was now technically involved in a war against France as Louis XIV had been obliged, under a 1662 defensive treaty with the Dutch, to declare war on England.36

For the next few pages we deviate from recital of active service abroad, to follow the fortunes of Douglas’s regiment and others in the period before their return to the continent. By August, the regiment was in Scotland where it was euphemistically called the ‘Queen’s Regiment’, presumably on account of the fact that it contained Roman Catholics, as did the household of Charles’s queen, Catherine of Braganza. In 1668, Catherine, her Grand Almoner – Lord Philip Howard —, her Chamberlain – the Earl of Sunderland —, and her Groom of the Bedchamber, Master of the Horse and Secretary were all either Roman Catholic, or strongly pro-French.37 Douglas himself was patently pro-French, having been “…brought up to favour the French” from his youth: as a boy he had been a page to Louis XIV.38 Three of the regiment’s companies were broken up and placed on the Scottish establishment and were sent to serve in the Scots Guards commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas Dalyell of the Binns, the veteran of Muscovy service.39

In Scotland the regiment briefly engaged in what many contemporary Scots saw as the ‘odious’ extraction of arrears – some dating from before the Civil Wars – by free quartering until the equivalent of the sum was reimbursed. This often occurred in Scotland’s remoter regions, where the force and rudeness of the soldiers receiving free quarter often led to genuine infractions of the law. They “…prey’d so uncontrollably upon the remoter parts of the kingdom which were far distant from the seat of justice, that in effect these shires paid still a double share”.40

One justification for the presence of armed units in Scotland and especially above the Highland line, was the continued appearance of ‘robbers’ and ‘thieves’ as many groups of ‘broken men’: men whose clans had lost their chief or who had been dispersed from their lands by chiefly forfeiture or dispossession. Another justification for the men and their methods was the recalcitrance of dissenting Conveners – the heirs of the Covenanters of the 1630s and 1640s – who persisted in hosting congregations in open fields throughout the 1660s and 1670s. Lauderdale firmly believed that “…some [forces] are necessarie to awe our mad phanaticks”, but his heavy-handed solution to

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38 Ibid., pp. 91 and 109.
the problem of ongoing dissent in Scotland caused as much trouble as it was hoped it would solve: the military burden in Ayreshire increased dissent there and led, in 1666, to the ‘Pentland Rising’. Billeting could also seriously affect the economic stability of Scottish towns: in 1667, Kilmarnock complained that “... of late they have suffered great misery by having had the burden of a great part of the forces, whereby they were almost ruined, being all poor tradesmen and having no other means of livelihood but their daily employment.” However, Lauderdale sanctioned the use of military forces against all opponents of his regime as, for example, when he sent two hundred infantry and fifty cavalry to Lochaber to assist James Campbell of Lawers in the collection of taxes there in the early 1670s. In Lauderdale’s favour is the fact that, throughout Europe, the use of military forces against subject peoples was on the rise, especially where the aim was the collection of taxes. However, this (and the presence in Scotland of Douglas’s soldiers) can have only exacerbated contemporary fears regarding the style of Stuart rule.

The blatant use in Scotland of harsh military force is the clearest evidence of the Stuart Crown’s lack of sensitivity for Scottish concerns. In some cases this ‘Highland Host’ – the force raised to police the Highlands and recoup unpaid taxes through free billeting (following the disbanding of additional military forces in Scotland in January 1676) – even committed murder with impunity as they were often the only representatives of authority in such remote areas. However, (in the words of Ronald Lee): “The freighting bellicosity of the ‘Highland Host’ was perhaps rooted in desperation on the part of a vindictive politician with nothing left to offer.” Lee here refers to the Earl of Lauderdale who, at the end of his career (c.1674), was experiencing increasing difficulties in retaining the king’s trust.

The depredations of the government soldiers, who were joined by the men of the Douglas regiment, caused great concern. In 1669, Lochiel and his Camerons, and MacDonald of Keppoch, forcibly drove back the Sheriff-Depute of Inverness, who had obtained a lucrative commission to collect arrears in their spheres of influence. While the government reacted mildly to this quasi-

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44 Ibid., p. 184.
46 Ibid., p. 258.
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rebellion it nevertheless quartered its own soldiers in the area to recover some of the arrears.\textsuperscript{47} However, it should be mentioned that the actions of many garrisons of the ‘Highland Host’ were dominated by local issues rather than national ones: for example, in 1680, the Earl of Caithness abused his commission to reclaim arrears in Badenoch, Lochaber and the Isles by invading and re-occupying Thurso in order to guarantee his own interests: the Privy Council said this was “... very far from their thoughts” when they issued his commission.\textsuperscript{48}

Back in England, by 9 October 1666, Douglas’s predicament at the loss of his French pension and his regiment’s arrears of pay, was rendered academic by the cessation of hostilities between England and France.\textsuperscript{49} Though he and his regiment did not yet return to France, the road was being opened for Douglas’s re-establishment in that kingdom. In the meantime, Lord George was allowed to raise recruits for his regiment in England rather than Scotland where existing recruiting drives were already taking place in the north for other Scottish regiments. However, he received two hundred Scots to form two companies of the regiment, “seeing the regiment is a Scottish regiment”.\textsuperscript{50} This is presumably why some observers continued to think that the regiment was exclusively Scottish.\textsuperscript{51} The new recruits were ready to depart from Scotland in December 1666 – but their destination was not France, but England.\textsuperscript{52} The veteran soldier and military expert, Sir James Turner, explained that recruitment in Scotland at this time was conducted by assembling all the men aged between sixteen and sixty years of age in a shire and making an election from among their number.\textsuperscript{53}

In 1667, Douglas’s regiment arrived at Rye, in Kent, ready to play its part fully in the Second Anglo-Dutch War and the regiment was allowed to recruit men in expectation of an invasion by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{54} In June its eight hundred men were quartered at Chatham, where Charles II suffered a singularly embarrassing and hurtful defeat at the hands of the Dutch Navy.\textsuperscript{55} Jonathan Scott says the disaster – in which the Dutch admiral, De Ruyter, sailed straight up the Medway and put to fire

\textsuperscript{47} Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{49} Anon., A Relation of the French King’s Late Expedition Into the Spanish Netherlands in the Years 1667 and 1668, G. H., trans. (Ghent, 1669).
\textsuperscript{50} 9 October 1666: R.P.C.S., s. 2, 1665-9, pp. 198-9.
\textsuperscript{51} Lorenzo Magalotti, ed. Knowles Middleton, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{52} General Thomas Dalyell to the Earl of Lauderdale, 6 December 1666: B.L., Add. MS. 23,125, fol. 189.
\textsuperscript{53} Turner, Pallas Armata, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{54} The Earl of Rothes to Lauderdale, 20 June 1667: B.L., Add. MS. 23,127, fol. 50.
many ships of the English Navy – signalled to the king “more keenly than most, the vulnerability” of his position on the throne in Britain.\textsuperscript{56}

The negative experience of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, in which the Medway disaster was the most embarrassing and damaging event, also triggered ‘the first restoration crisis’ (1667-73). This spanned the whole period from Douglas’s involvement on the English side during the Dutch war, through to his participation in the British Brigade sent by Charles II to aid Louis XIV in that king’s Dutch war.\textsuperscript{57} Though the main issue of the ‘crisis’ centred on England’s religious settlement, the ramifications of Charles’s association with Louis XIV – for which contemporaries had direct military evidence – further complicated the king’s position.

In England, Douglas’s regiment was never popular. Though by no means filled exclusively with Roman Catholics, its association with French service tainted it in the minds of the highly xenophobic English, and the regiment’s treatment of England’s civilian population only added to popular antipathy towards it. Perhaps taking too much to heart the example set them by government soldiers in Scotland, the men of Douglas’s regiment plundered the goods and possessions of Chatham’s civilian population with no apparent thought of retribution. For example, on 30 June 1667, Samuel Pepys expressed admiration for the honourable conduct of the Dutch who landed at Gillingham and “. . . though they went in fear of their lives . . . [they] . . . killed none of our people nor plundered their houses”, while “. . . to our eternal disgrace” Douglas’s regiment followed in the wake of the Dutch and “. . . plundered and took all away . . . [so that] . . . our own soldiers are far more terrible to those people of the country towns than the Dutch themselves”.\textsuperscript{58} Douglas, perhaps contemptuous of what he may have seen as ‘cowardly’ civilians and their concern for property, added insult to injury by having “the Scotch march beat by the drums before the soldiers” as he went.\textsuperscript{59} However, it is not impossible to believe that Douglas’s actions were deliberately aimed at furthering his brother, Hamilton’s opposition to Scotland’s chancellor, Rothes: the misbehaviour of soldiers throughout the Dutch war was used by the Earls of Lauderdale and Tweedale and Sir Robert Moray to discredit the chancellor.\textsuperscript{60} Lauderdale, simultaneously, used such points of weakness to promote his and

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 365.
\textsuperscript{58} S. Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ed. R. Latham and W. Mathews, 10 vols (London, from 1970), cf. 30 June 1667; Weaver, Royal Scots, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{59} The music for the march, which was played on this occasion, is published in Weaver, Royal Scots.
\textsuperscript{60} Lee, Government and Politics in Scotland, 1661-1681, p. 165.
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Charles’s project for a parliamentary Union between Scotland and England which was designed to free the king from the constraints of the English House of Commons. However, this plan drew universal disapproval from the nobility across Britain, as their representation in any joint parliament would have been limited to twenty peers. But Lee even suggests that Charles may never have seriously countenanced the plan and may have used it only as a ruse to divert attention from his secret negotiations over the Treaty of Dover (discussed presently).

On 28 August 1667, peace was declared between France and the Low Countries. England followed suit, allowing Douglas’s regiment to return once more to the continent. Unlike the sorry state in which it had arrived in England, the regiment departed Britain with a full complement of 1,500 men, all of them well-equipped at the expense of the Crown. In the short time it had existed on the English establishment, or military budget, the regiment had received pay to the value of £23,991 Sterling. The English government had largely to rely upon private, non-governmental means to fund a great percentage of this extraordinary amount of money: the military financier, Sir Stephen Fox, made a fortune from lending-based monetary speculation with the government for the armed forces.

The luxurious accommodation of the Douglas regiment confirmed many popular fears regarding French influence at the English court. Such fears were only heightened by Charles’s willingness to return the regiment to the French Army. The republican, Algernon Sidney, interpreted this action as part of a calculated plan to establish a universal (Catholic) absolutist monarchy in Europe:

Union with France and war with Holland is necessary to uphold monarchy in England... a strict friendship is to be held with the French that their customs may be introduced and the people by their example brought to

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62 Ibid., p. 206.


64 R.P.C.S., s. 2, 1665-9, p. 336.


In September 1667, the Marquis de Louvois informed the British king of his master’s pleasure at the news that Douglas’s regiment was to be returned to French service forthwith. Had Sidney seen Louvois’s response to Charles II, he would surely have taken it as further evidence of his supposition regarding the British king’s policies and intentions. Louvois said “that as for the regiment de Douglas, your lending it will be the strongest occasion on which to view the pleasure taken by you in permitting it to take part in this war”.

Louis XIV personally interceded with Charles II to secure British soldiers for service in France, though Jonathan Lynn’s narrative does not fully appreciate the diplomatic position of Douglas’s regiment. Lynn, therefore, misses the point that British soldiers were already on their way to France and that, consequently, Louis did not (as Lynn maintains) need to seek the permission of their king in advance. In fairness to Lynn, his comments are made in relation to English and not Scottish soldiers, though Douglas’s regiment was included in the request, cited by Lynn, by Louis for 4,000 British soldiers. In expectation of re-entering French service, Douglas’s regiment was allowed to raise recruits in Scotland for service in France. The ire of Algernon Sidney would have been raised even further had he been aware of the fact that the French Army was viewed as a haven for British Roman Catholics. In this context, the association of pro-French or openly Catholic British soldiers with Queen Catherine of Braganza and her household was made even more explicit:

To shew how men thrive that suffer for conscience’s sake, George Hamilton goes into France with 200 of the guards that were Catholiques, who are to be call’d there, Les Gens d’armes de Madame, and the employment will be worth him above 3,000 l. a year. My Lord George Douglass [sic] goes with his regiment back into France with leave to recruit it to the number of two thousand, when before it was never above twelve hundred.
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The veteran and Roman Catholic force recently disbanded from the English Royal Guards Regiment and commanded by Sir George Hamilton was, therefore, to join Douglas in France in 1669. If nothing else, this fact explains how contemporaries such as Sidney could find evidence to support their fears regarding the direction of Charles’s policies.

Douglas and his regiment returned to France in time to take part in its war against the Spanish Army of Flanders called the ‘War of Devolution against Spain’ (1667-8). He received a colonel’s commission in the French Army in September 1667 and joined an army which numbered 30,000 men.

Sidney was not alone in his objection to Charles sending British soldiers to fight for the French, but all of the king’s opponents would have been vexed to know that Louvois had a promise “of the British king, in which his Majesty estimates all the problems currently experienced [in getting support for soldiers in France] will be facilitated by the arrival of [the French envoy] Monsieur de Rouvigny”.

This man – Henri Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny et Reinval (1605-89) – was a general in the French Army and Deputy-General of the Huguenots at the court of France (1653-78) and had strong connections to England, being the uncle of Lord William Russell’s wife, Rachel. Ruvigny was specially chosen to ease anti-French sentiment in England, though he never spoke English with any facility. He was trusted by many Englishmen, due to his honesty and his profession of the Protestant religion, and was so in touch with the English spirit in 1680 that he retired from France to Greenwich.

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75 His sister, Rachel Massue de Ruvigny, married Thomas Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton, and their daughter was Lady Rachel Russell.

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In France the English ambassador, the Earl of St. Albans, was left to negotiate the fate of the Douglas regiment's arrears with Louvois, but St. Albans foresaw difficulties in discussing the matter with the French king.77 It is a measure of Douglas's diplomatic importance, and that of his regiment, that Louis XIV was personally involved in the welfare of both Douglas and his regiment throughout the Anglo-French conflict.78

One result of the regiment's return to France was the loss to General Thomas Dalyell of the three companies of Douglas's regiment that had joined his own in 1666. All three returned to their original place under Lord George's command "the captains therof haveing belonged formerlie to Lord George Douglas in that kingdome".79

On 1 October 1667, a newsletter announced the signing of "the vacant commissions of the Roman Catholic officers" and, on the following Saturday or Sunday, Douglas was to depart with his regiment for service in the French Army against the Spanish Army in Flanders.80 He was taking with him a regiment of 1,600 men, and enough cloth had been given to him by Charles II to make new red uniforms faced with white.

Sir George Hamilton, a Roman Catholic Scot with strong Irish connections who was acting as colonel of a British regiment in French service, was also "assured of the very honourable conditions" he and his men were to have in France.81 Douglas informed Lauderdale that "a very great reforme amongst the troupes" was to take place in France.82 He begged Lauderdale to talk to Charles II, hoping that the king might intercede with Louis XIV to secure good terms for the colonel and his regiment in the French Army.

Though previously referred to as a 'loan', Charles II went so far as to describe sending part of Douglas's regiment to Louis XIV as "... a present" in November 1667.83 This was very probably Charles's summary response to a threat from the English Parliament to inquire into the Crown's war finances, following accusations of great abuses during the Dutch war.84 It was much in the king's

77 St. Albans to Louvois, 14 September 1667: P.R.O., S.P. 78/123, fol. 178.
78 Louis XIV to St. Albans, 17 September 1667: Ibid., fol. 179-80.
80 Newsletter, 1 October 1667, printed in H.M.C., Le Fleming MSS. (London, 1890), p. 54a.
81 Ibid., p. 54a.
interest to offload any part that he could of his forces before Parliament had any chance to force him to disband old regiments upon which he might in future need to rely. Even without Parliamentary pressure, Charles would have been sensible to the necessity of finding an alternative paymaster for some of his forces: by December 1667 he knew he must pay his soldiers, but he learnt that the tax farmers of Scotland were doing badly. The Earl of Tweedale was “at pains to urge that the king should not add to the burden with any further display of his favour”. In this context, what option did Charles have but to gift away Douglas’s regiment to a sympathetic employer?

The regiment parted for Dieppe, accompanied by one of Charles’s own royal yachts as a convoy, while several officers of the regiment were busy raising recruits in Scotland for service in France. The new-raised nature of the personnel of Douglas’s regiment reflected the standard of Louis’s army in general: all were virtually new. The French king himself commented: “My cavalry was really very good, but the infantry, which would be the most useful in sieges, was almost all new.” This situation reflected the seasonal nature of raising soldiers at this time, and the speed with which Louis XIV was gathering armed men from many quarters of Europe. The French Army witnessed an appreciable rise in its numbers from 1660 onwards. It would reach a peak of 253,000 men during the protracted war in Flanders (1672-8). However, increased army size had dramatic effects upon the administrative ability of the French Crown, which as a result of the increasingly large forces under its direction after 1672 lost the control of the army that it had enjoyed in the 1660s.

In February 1668, despite Douglas’s hoped for return to French service, Joseph Domon, an informant of Lord Arlington’s, reported: “I do not know what will become of his Lordship the Lord Douglas whom I have also given knowledge of your demand for me to pray pardon for my writing you a word, while waiting upon your great bounty.” Douglas’s position in the French service was now seriously threatened by the English negotiations which, in April 1668, led to the signing of the ‘Triple Alliance’ between Spain, England and the Netherlands.

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85 The whole yield of the period November 1667 - November 1668 was £279,800 Scots: Ibid., p. 122.
86 Ibid., p. 123.
87 7 November 1667: R.P.C.S., s. 2, 1665-9, p. 357.
89 Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815, pp. 92-3 and 100.
91 Haley, An English Diplomat in the Low Countries, ch. 6.
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Charles II's lack of fidelity to this alliance can be gauged by his immediate encouragement of Douglas's presence and service in France. As a result, the *regiment de Douglas* arrived at Calais in late April 1668, with high hopes of their prospects in France. The Roman nobleman, Lorenzo Magalotti, happened upon Douglas at this time and has left one of the few descriptions of him. He had previously met the Scottish colonel during his stay in London, but only called upon him now at Calais:

After lunch... I was in a fit state to visit the Marquis of Douglas [sic], colonel of the Scottish regiment in French service. I had known this gentleman in London, and met him again at Calais where he spent three days before travelling to Abbeville [to join his regiment]. His family is among the best in Scotland, and has remained Catholic, though its chief household [Hamilton's] is primarily Protestant. He is forty years old, though his wig and deportment make him seem ten years younger; and he is a cadet [of his family]... who has the reputation of being a man of bravery, courtesy and easy manners in France, where he lives. In his own country he is said to have a cold and brutal temperament. This gentleman is well made, but does not speak easily, which makes him appear ungracious in conversation.92

It is clear from Magalotti's description that as early as 1668, Douglas's religious affiliations, his French manners, his regiment's actions during the Second Anglo-Dutch War and his alleged mistreatment of recruits in Scotland, were common knowledge to the British public and even to tourists, such as Magalotti.

Just three months after signing the 'Triple Alliance' treaty, Charles II tentatively initiated moves towards forming a contrary alliance with Louis XIV.93 So in August, Louis sent as his ambassador the Marquis de Ruvigny et Reinval, to discuss this issue with Charles.94 Ruvigny found Charles full of professions of his desire to be connected to the French king.95 Based on the optimism associated with these offers, Douglas received redress from the French king for the £330.11.8 Sterling he had paid, in March 1668, out of his own pocket to the officers and men of his regiment to cover their muster and the discharge of their quarters.96

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95 Haley, *An English Diplomat in the Low Countries*, p. 150.
96 Warrant to pay Lord George Douglas £330.11.8: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 30, fol. 16.
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Negotiations leading to the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (which ended the French 'War of Devolution with Spain') occurred throughout 1668. An alliance between Charles II and Louis XIV was one of the results of this treaty, which furthered arrangements for the reintegration of the regiment de Douglas into the France Army. The return of Douglas's regiment complemented the continuation in France of two other British units, both of which were supported by the royal household or maison du roi. The gens d'armes anglais and the gens d'arms écossais were both light cavalry units, and were, theoretically, regiments composed of nationals of the countries whose name they bore: in reality they were probably only officered by Britons. Both had existed since about 1667, but neither possessed an official capitulation, or treaty (of the sort Douglas's regiment would have), which stated their obligations to the British monarch.

The gens d'armes anglais were commanded by Sir George Hamilton. The unit consisted of a hundred Roman Catholic British officers who had been cashiered from service in England due to their religion. Hamilton resigned the captaincy of this troop in 1671 in order to raise a regiment of Irish soldiers as part of the British Brigade, which was sent to France in 1672. Upon Hamilton's departure the unit was augmented into a regiment of light cavalry.

Until 1672 the gens d'armes écossais were also sometimes commanded by Sir George Hamilton who had Sir Henry Jones as his lieutenant. Lord Morpeth was the cornet and Bevil Skelton, who was later an agent for James II, the quartermaster. The close connections between these British units is evidenced by the fact that, in April 1668, Douglas took ship with Sir Henry Jones for Calais, along with eighty men and thirty-three horses. This journey was not free from incident as Douglas highhandedly refused to acknowledge the authority of any of the port officials or pay any duty on the horses and cargo he was carrying. This incident can only have strengthened existing prejudice against him as an arrogant and high-handed nobleman who was perceived to possess no respect for the rule of law in England.

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97 Haley, An English Diplomat in the Low Countries, p. 183.
As soon as he returned to French service, Douglas was encouraged by the French king to recruit men in Scotland. To this end, on 13 October 1668, he corresponded with the Duke of Richmond. On the same day he received official permission from Lauderdale to recruit men in Scotland, for which he rendered the Scottish Secretary of State "... most hearty thanks". Lauderdale was active in the service of Douglas's regiment from the time of its return to France. His support was valued to the degree that Douglas spoke for himself and all his officers and men when he said "none of his subjects shall be more ready to obey his [Lauderdale's] commands nor I and all my regiment which we shall always do most faithfully and punctually".

Douglas was at great pains to demonstrate his honesty and loyalty to the British authorities, as so much of his future security depended upon them. Regarding his autonomy of action, he had been taught a valuable lesson in 1666. To this end, he strenuously denied a rumour related to him by his major, Alexander Monro, that he had recently married a Catholic French woman in France. Regarding this, he beseeched Lauderdale to "dow [me] that justice to believe that I am incapable to dow a base actione, and my Lord if you hier any such thing spoke you will oblige me extraimly to assur the contraire". A foreign Catholic marriage for this too foreign Scottish Catholic nobleman would have lessened any remaining prejudice in France against Douglas as a foreigner and may have opened up the way for his total integration into the French Army and court: this is probably what Charles feared most.

Some historians have observed the continuing need of early modern European kings to persuade the magnates among their subjects to lend military support to their throne. Louis XIV was acutely aware of the need for such assistance from his subjects, especially (as Jeremy Black emphasizes) given the increasingly noble-dominated nature of armies towards the end of the seventeenth century. Louis XIV's realisation of the military importance of his nobles extended to individual

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102 Douglas to Richmond, Paris, 13 October 1668: B.L., Add. MS. 21,947, fol. 201. Charles Lennox, 1st Duke of Richmond (1672-1723), natural son of Charles II by Louise de Keroull, called a "low raking", who slid from Protestantism to Catholicism and back again, and shifted his political allegiances as easily between Louis XIV, James II, and William III. On 22 January 1685, Richmond was naturalized as a Frenchman.

103 Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris, 13 October 1668: B.L., Add. MS. 23,130, fol. 68.

104 Idem.

105 Douglas to Lauderdale, 19 December 1668: B.L., Add. MS. 23,131, fol. 44.


107 Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815, p. 89.
colonels, such as Douglas, whom he consciously tried to keep in check. The French king was aware of the ambiguity of Lord George’s, and of his regiment’s, position in the French Army. Louis clearly harboured a grudge against Charles II over the British king’s recall of the Douglas regiment during the Anglo-Dutch war in 1666. In retribution (despite his initial pleasure at the return to France of the Douglas regiment), the French king took the first available opportunity to embarrass Charles and to compromise Douglas. Louis seems to have had this end in mind when he broadcast his intention to place Douglas’s regiment in the vanguard of the French invasion force which was to relieve the twenty-seven months’ Turkish siege of Candia [Heraklion], the capital city of the Venetian protectorate of Crete.

The Turks first declared open war against the Venetian protectorate of Crete in 1645. The declaration was ostensibly provoked by the Venetian Republic allowing the galleys of the Knights of St. John of Malta to take shelter in Cretan waters, following an attack by them on Ottoman shipping. However, Rhoads Murphy states that the siege was the result of ongoing, single-front Ottoman military strategy.\textsuperscript{108} Turkish morale on Crete was a constant problem: in 1649 it collapsed completely when 1,500 Janissaries were granted leave from the siege, prompting those soldiers who remained to demand a similar return home.\textsuperscript{109} The Turks intermittently besieged this city for the next twenty years.

The reason for choosing Douglas’s regiment for this mission is unclear. It may have been thought that the mission called for hardy veteran soldiers, but Douglas’s regiment was mostly filled with raw recruits. The decision-makers may also have been conscious of the Turkish threat to hang the French ambassador at the first sight of French soldiers, but as Douglas’s regiment fought under the French flag its appearance would hardly have moderated the French ambassador’s fate.\textsuperscript{110} A possible reason for the choice of the Douglas regiment lies in Louis’s distrust of Charles’s motives during the preliminary secret negotiations leading towards the 1670 Treaty of Dover, which were begun in 1668 and would ultimately lead to an open alliance between France and England.


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Louis XIV distrusted Charles’s sincerity throughout the preliminary discussions and rightly suspected that the British king desired nothing more than to obtain an increase in the French pension he already enjoyed by making promises he never intended to honour. Given this scenario it is not unreasonable to assume that the sacrifice of Douglas’s regiment was designed to teach Charles II – whose Crown had already been hard-hit by the economic disaster brought about by the Second Anglo-Dutch War – a lesson about avarice.¹¹¹ This would certainly explain Douglas’s extreme indignation at the unexpected news that his men were to lead the attack against the Turks at Candia.¹¹²

When he learned of the proposal concerning the Douglas regiment, Charles II was similarly outraged that his diplomatic and mercantile connections with the Ottoman Porte were to be compromised by his own subjects’ forced involvement in an attack on the Ottomans in Crete. As soon as Douglas informed him of the plan, Charles turned to the French ambassador to his court, Charles Colbert de Croissy, and “a decision was taken to stop the dispatch of this body of troops at all costs, as, if they entered Candia, it was feared that they might be recognised by the Turks”.¹¹³ The danger posed to English trade was explicitly stated as the reason why Douglas should not fight in Crete, and he was forbidden to go “… because considerations of trade do not permit that a subject of that crown shall proceed to fight against the Ottoman Port”.¹¹⁴ At least one historian, Paul Sonnino, supports the contemporary documentation by suggesting that Douglas’s regiment was specifically chosen to participate in the attack on Candia, in order to strike at Charles II’s interests, as Louis XIV had been piqued and frustrated by the British king on a number of issues.¹¹⁵

The problem of divided loyalty, and the potential for embarrassment created by subjects of one sovereign serving another, constitute the central predicament which both Charles II and Douglas faced in 1669. Charles’s response to the situation was to again order Douglas, and Sir George Hamilton, to return to England if the Candia plan was pressed. Indeed, the bitterness which now

¹¹³ Colbert de Croissy to Louis XIV, 28 February 1669: Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Quay d’Orsay, Paris (hereafter A.A.E.C.P.) Angleterre 94, fol. 97-8; A.A.E.C.P. Angleterre 93, fol. 273; Piero Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 1 March 1669: S.P.V., vol. 26, 1669-70, p. 23. Charles Colbert de Croissy, French ambassador to the Court of St. James and, later, a Secretary of State under Louis XIV and influential in supporting Jacobite resistance to the regime of William III, was a younger son of the great French statesman, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-83).
surfaced between the two monarchs, prompted Louis to consider “... cashiering this regiment rather than granting Douglas’s request”.116 This induced Charles to write to his favourite sister, the Duchesse d’Orléans, to have her intercede in the matter with Louis XIV, regarding “... the reasons for not irritating the Turk which might provoke a vigorous reaction against the capital which this nation has at the marts of the Levant and against the persons of the English”.117

Unlike his ambivalence of 1666, Douglas had no intention of refusing to depart from French service in 1669. The colonel recognised that, to obey Louis XIV, would mean rupturing his relationship with Charles II, while obeying Charles would probably mean the loss of his French pension and any hope he had of retaining his senior position in French service. After presumably weighing up the difference between the destruction of his regiment in French service and its survival in Britain, Douglas appealed to Charles, stating in some desperation that he had received orders to march to Vienne in Dauphiné, whence the regiment would be transported to Crete. By this stage, Douglas was desperate to avoid the deployment of his regiment in such a dangerous theatre of operations. Not relying totally on Charles’s good faith, he also appealed to Louis’s envoy to Britain, the Marquis de Ruvigny, to whom he demonstrated “... how we war not fitt for that service and how straunge it is to send us for our absolute rou[en]ling”, suggesting that it was the untried nature of most of his soldiers which worried Douglas most.118 Ruvigny spoke to the influential Marshal Turenne while Douglas reiterated the danger to English trade with the Turks as his last hope against embarkation for Crete.

Douglas’s predicament stood unresolved until March 1669, when the Earl of St. Albans reported to Arlington that the Scottish colonel “... hath made such a kind of dilligence that he hath inspired others I think to keepe pace with him”.119 In the end, Douglas was justified in placing his trust in his king’s attachment to trade with Turkey. In fact, the matter was concluded within two hours of Douglas’s return from the French court, where the relief of Douglas’s regiment had been arranged by Charles’s favourite sister and confidante, Henriette Anne, Duchesse d’Orléans, known to the French court as ‘Madame’. Despite St. Albans’s claim that he had affected the French king’s attitude by reminding him of the great importance of the matter to the English, he had to admit that ‘Madame’

118 B.L., Add. MS. 23,131, fol. 89; H.M.C., Report and Appendix, vol. 1, p. 447b.
119 Henry Jermyn, 1st Baron Jermyn of St. Edmundsbury, 1st Earl of St. Albans (c.1604-84).
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had left him "... no part in that w[hich] was to doe now".\textsuperscript{120} Indeed, the conclusion to the matter had already been published in England (in a newsletter of 9 March 1669): "The French king has readily agreed at his Majesty's desire to countermand the order for sending the Scotch Regiment under Lord Douglas [to Candia]."\textsuperscript{121} Given the prominent role later played by 'Madame' in encouraging Charles II to form an alliance with France, it is not impossible to discern an international political context in the treatment of the Douglas regiment in 1669.

This was good publicity for Charles II, who further demonstrated his control over his subjects abroad by successfully recalling from French service the Scots-Irish gentleman, Sir George Hamilton, commander of the \textit{gens d'armes anglaise}.\textsuperscript{122} Shortly after these dramatic events were concluded it was reported that a regiment of Swiss soldiers had been sent to Crete in Douglas's stead. Count Königsmark commanded this Swiss regiment. He was a Swiss colonel who occupied a position in France similar to Douglas's.\textsuperscript{123} The Venetians at the French court reported that they had suspected all along that Louis XIV's had intended to advantage his own trade with the Ottoman Porte, to the detriment of England's, by secretly conveying Douglas's regiment to Candia. They feared that this was designed to bring it face to face, at the last moment, with the Turkish force investing the town.\textsuperscript{124} As a result, the same disheartened Venetians foresaw little assistance in their ongoing war against the Turks in the Mediterranean from the English.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{120} St. Albans to Arlington, 13 March 1669: P.R.O., S.P. 78/126, fol. 49.
\textsuperscript{121} Newsletter, 9 March 1669, printed in H.M.C., \textit{Le Fleming MSS.} (London, 1890), p. 62.
\textsuperscript{122} The Venetian ambassador to England wrongly thought that Hamilton commanded the \textit{gens d'armes écossoise}: Piero Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 1 March 1669: S.P.V., vol. 36, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{124} Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 22 March 1669: S.P.V., vol. 26, 1669-70, p. 30. A strong French force was sent to relieve Candia under the command of François de Vendôme, the Duc de Beaufort (1616-69), and a close friend of Douglas's: J. F. M. Arouet de Voltaire, \textit{The Age of Louis XIV}, trans. M. Pollock (London, 1961), p. 89; Père Anselme, \textit{Histoire de la Maison Royale de France}, vol. 1 (Paris, 1726), pp. 196-8. No exact estimate of the size of the French force remains. The French Army as a whole is estimated to have possessed about 18,000 men in 1674: Beaufort commanded a small, but not insignificant, conglomorate force of 7,000 men, perhaps including as much as a quarter of the French Army: F. Tallett, \textit{War and Society in early-Modern Europe}, 1495-1715 (London, 1992), p. 5. They departed France in galleys that had been newly built at Toulon. The French relief force managed to fire off more than 3,000 cannon balls at the besieging Turks, but these were gathered up by the Turks and fired back at the Venetian force, via three guns which were cast on the spot for this purpose: M. Rashid, \textit{Tarih-i Râsid} (Istanbul, 1153), fol. 52v, quoted in Murphy, \textit{Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700}, p. 242 n20. Despite Turkish reservations that their force could not sustain a third season of campaigning on Crete, the relief of Candia failed: Letter from the Grand Vizier to Ahmed Pasha, quoted in Rashid, \textit{Tarih-i Râsid}, vol. 1, fol. 55, cited in Murphy, \textit{Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700}, pp. 186 and 257 n4. Indeed, the defence of the town proved ruinous on many counts, justifying Douglas's reservations regarding the danger inherent to the exploit. The Duc de Beaufort lost his life in a sortie, and the town itself was completely ruined by the time the Turks took possession of it, following its capitulation, on 16 September 1669: Voltaire, \textit{Louis XIV}, pp. 88-90.
\textsuperscript{125} S.P.V., vol. 26, 1669-70, p. 30.
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Ironically, some former officers of Douglas's regiment formed part of the volunteer relief force which fought at Candia. Hugh Mackay of Scourie, formerly a junior officer in Douglas's regiment and who would later be a prominent soldier in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, volunteered for service in the Venetian relief of Candia. He was one of a number of men who, according to his biographer, "...volunteered their services on the expedition, and were accompanied by a corps of a hundred reduced officers, all eager to gain military experience".126

The result of the Candia campaign was that the Turks gained both Crete and a valuable knowledge of the latest French siege-craft technology. They later employed this knowledge to their advantage during their investment of Çehrin (1678), and, ultimately, at the great siege of Vienna (1683) where the lessons they learned at Candia about the advantages of tenacious entrenching, were repeated with good effect.127

Louis XIV created obvious diplomatic difficulties for Charles II during the Cretan campaign. Despite this many contemporary military commentators glossed over the political implications of national regiments serving abroad.128 By August 1669, the threatened ruin of Douglas's regiment had been sufficiently postponed for him to concern himself with the affairs of his friends and dependents. On 15 August, Douglas approached the Earl of Lauderdale in order to intercede on the

127 Anonymous account of the Çehrin campaign: "Ahmed Pasa mukacalim olan seferlerde sahib-i teçhiz ve kâr-azmude olmagla (.) ve Kandiyê kalişi feth ve teshirinde müdebbir ve murur-dide olmagan (.)") B.N. Supp. Turcs MS. 297, fol. 32. Ahmed Pasha was earlier chief of armourers: M. Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. 1, p 223. Both of these sources cited in Murphy, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700, pp. 114 and 243 n.36: The Conte di Marsigli, Stato Militare dell'Impero Ottomano, also published as L'État Militaire de l'Empire Ottoman (The Hague and Amsterdam, 1732); J. Stote, The Siege of Vienna (London, 1964; reprint 1967), p. 159. On the wider political scene, the loss of Candia freed the forces of the Ottoman Empire to press the army of the Holy Roman Empire on its eastern front in Hungary by supporting the rebellion of the anti-Habsburg Thököly, 'King' in Hungary. This represented a blow to Imperial diplomatic and military initiatives as it forced Emperor Leopold I's limited and disparate Imperial forces to engage enemies on two fronts as the emperor was obliged to counter the French threat to imperial lands in the Spanish Netherlands while simultaneously suppressing Hungarian separatism aided by Ottoman incursions in Hungary. In the Spring of 1670, Hungary actively sought Ottoman support in a bid to free itself from imperial domination. Hungary was awash with inscriptionist pamphlets against Imperial, Catholic authority, and in Upper Hungary Protestant preachers were reported giving thanks for the Turkish victory in Candia: it would now, they said, free the Turks to come ‘rescue Hungary from its oppression and Papist slavery’: J. P. Spielman, Leopold I of Austria (London, 1977), p. 63. Given this scenario, it is perhaps not too difficult to conjecture that Louis XIV did what he could to ensure that Candia was not successfully defended and would thus fall to the Turks in order to weaken the imperial forces he faced in Flanders. By choosing the one unit (Douglas's) for the job which, he knew, had the ability to disrupt and delay the French relief sent to Candia, Louis XIV ensured both delay and confusion in the French response to the situation.

128 One of the most influential contemporary military theoreticians, the imperial field marshal, Raimondo Montecuccoli, based the greater part of his military theory upon the importance of an army's overall 'coercive-institutional' authority. His concern for smaller units of men within that structure was based entirely upon the small-scale tactical advantages they offered. Montecuccoli is typical of many contemporary military writers who refused to allow any correspondence between what they saw as the rational waging of war and the, sometimes, irrational political or social background to military appointments. The lesson of the Douglas regiment's response to the Candia dilemma is surely that military commentators such as Montecuccoli often refused to countenance the existence of the court-based and diplomatically determined stratagems to which monarchs subjected their armies.
part of his countryman, Sir William Ballantyne, who was then out of favour with the Scottish Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{129} By October, Douglas was planning his departure from French service and he had secured promises for pay from the English authorities, as a result of which, he paid his men four days’ worth of their arrears out of his own pocket. His regiment was in a state of chaos, however, as a report had run through it that he was leading them not to England, but to service in Charles II’s remote north African garrison at Tangier. This resulted in the desertion of three hundred men before he could get the regiment embarked on a ship, and Douglas now estimated his regiment’s strength at no more than seven hundred and six men.

This must have been a disappointment to the Earl of Lauderdale, who was expecting to receive a regiment of 1,200 veteran soldiers. Consequently, Douglas was expected to repay the surplus given to him on the heads of the estimated 1,200 men, though he had already spent this amount in embarking those men who remained. He, therefore, threw himself, once more, on the mercy and friendship of Lauderdale and requested that the Scottish Secretary of State speak to the king, again concerning his desire to “... be pleased to confer that honor upon me that I dissaiired your Lo[rdship]; to spik already to his Majesty of”.\textsuperscript{130} This honour was probably an earldom, which he would eventually receive in 1675. It was an otherwise empty honour as it carried with it no land or money, but Douglas (deeply influenced by the prejudices of the French court regarding honorific privileges), considered it “... would be extraimly for the advancement of my fortune”.\textsuperscript{131} If nothing else it would be a sign of royal favour at a time when he had little other security upon which to rely.

One of the personal consequences for Lord George, precipitated by his regiment’s removal from danger in the Candia campaign, was his involvement in a duel. Duelling was a widespread problem in the French Army. Louis XIV disliked the practice of duelling, which was so eagerly followed by his nobility, and attempted to have duellists brought before the \textit{Tribunal du point d’honneur} (established in 1602) and composed of marshals of the French Army. A 1653 regulation insisted on six months’ imprisonment for slapping a person as this constituted the ‘giving the lie’ which led to so many duels. In 1679 an edict appeared which categorised as murder the killing of someone in a

\textsuperscript{129} Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris, 15 August 1669: B.L., Add. MS. 23,132, fol. 75.
\textsuperscript{130} Same to same, Dieppe, 16 October 1669: B.L., Add. MS. 23,128, fol. 128.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}
duel and, in honour of his battle against the duel, Louis had a medal struck which proclaimed: “The Duel Abolished”.132

Douglas’s involvement in an affair of honour at this time is the first reported instance linking him to duelling, but veterans of Douglas’s regiment later introduced duelling to Ireland and Douglas himself was later responsible for carrying challenges between his friends.133 However, Lord George was wounded so badly in this duel that reports of his death appeared in England in October 1669.134 Douglas’s opponent was called the Duc de Normandie. Though no French nobleman held this title in the seventeenth century, the individual referred to was probably Charles-Paris d’Orléans, Duc de Longueville et Estouteville, Sovereign Prince of Neuchâtel and Wallengrin, whose father had attempted to secure the title of Duc de Normandie in 1649.135 Longueville was a foolish, headstrong young man who had served in the French Army in Flanders in 1667 and volunteered for service against the Turk in Candia in 1669.136 He later gave evidence of his intemperate character when, in 1672, his mistreatment of Dutch prisoners caused the loss of his own life and threatened that of his commander, the Prince de Condé, during the French Army’s campaign in the Rhine.137

The Longueville-Douglas duel probably resulted from the aggrieved feelings of a French courtier and veteran of the Candia campaign towards a man who had patently placed the welfare of himself and his regiment before honourable service to the King of France. An accusation of this sort was unforgivable at the French court and the violent reaction of Lord George to a probable accusation of cowardice helps explain his decision to fight the only recorded duel of his life. The duel suitably displays the level of animosity towards Douglas that must have been prevalent at this time at the French court. It is even possible to conjecture that Louis XIV may himself have prompted Normandie into challenging Douglas – the king certainly later used the Longueville family to discredit another of his enemies, William of Orange, by encouraging them to claim William’s Sovereign Principality of Orange in 1680.138

134 P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 266, no. 53; John Carlile to Williamson, Dover, 18 October 1669: Ibid., no. 133.
137 Voltaire, Age of Louis XIV, p. 97.
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Despite all these problems, Lord George's flirtation with quitting the French service following the Candia episode, was short lived and, in February 1670, he and his regiment returned once more to the French Army and were stationed at Lille in Flanders. This seems to have occurred with the blessing of Charles II who also gave Douglas a free gift of £1,000 Sterling. From Lille, Douglas corresponded with the Duke of Richmond regarding the purchasing of wine.

Douglas spent the next seven years ostensibly involved in the service of the King of France. This resulted from the close connections between France and England, which led towards the military alliance between Charles II and Louis XIV in the form of the 1670 Treaty of Dover. In December 1670, Douglas visited the English court in company with two of the court's luminaries, Lord Bellasise and Don Fransisco de Mello, the Portuguese ambassador. As a result of lobbying at the court, Douglas was allowed to recruit three hundred men in Scotland for his regiment in France. These soldiers were confined to the tolbooth at Edinburgh, while they awaited transportation to the continent.

In March 1671, Lord George's regiment was commissioned to raise another thousand soldiers for French service. The facility with which Douglas supplied his regiment with men accounts in part for the high status enjoyed by the unit in the French Army at this time. William Perwich's estimates of French armed strength in April 1671 included the regiment de Douglas among the oldest and most prestigious of France's regiments, with those of Navarre, Turenne, Alsace and the French Queen. Though it was not viewed as a hired, alien element in the French Army, the Douglas regiment remained the weakest regiment as a result of its reliance on recruits from abroad. Furthermore, it possessed only eight companies as opposed to the usual ten or more of the other regiments.

139 Privy Seal to Lord George Douglas of H.M.'s free gift, Docquet dated 9 February 1670: P.R.O., S.P. Entry Book 34, 71; Docquets, 25, no. 15.
141 Joseph Carlyle to Williamson, Dover, 12 November 1670: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II. 280, 98. Fransisco de Mello, brother of the Countess de Panétra, was described by Count Hamilton as "one of the gallants of the court": Hamilton, Memoirs of the Count of Grammont, p. 123.
143 9 February 1671: Ibid., p. 293.
146 Ibid., p. 144.
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The number of recruits being made for French service across Europe at this time prompted one observer to comment that:

What is most wondered at is the great levies making in all places for the King of France . . . those he expects out of Switzerland, Italy, Ireland and Scotland which will render his army most prodigious and capable of doing anything before ever others cared put themselves in a posture to oppose him.147

Perwich pursued the same theme in a letter to Arlington in which he predicted that Louis XIV’s recruiting forecast some military action on the part of the King of France.148

This did not prevent Charles from guaranteeing Douglas his three hundred Scottish recruits, and, by May 1671, the recruits had been integrated into the regiment.149 An observer said:

Of the French Army, the common foot were most set out with crewel ribbons; the horse appeared more gallant, not so much for the richness as variety, all of the same troop being of the same garb, and yet most troops distinguished by a different habit. They observe an exact discipline, and hang by martial law, whereby some have already suffered, among others one of Lord Douglas’s regiment.150

In June 1671, yet more recruits were raised in Scotland for Douglas’s regiment. The colonel’s recruiting officers were allowed to take “. . . severall thieves, vagabonds and other criminally persons declared fugitives by the commissioners of justiciary” in Scotland.151 These were convenient terms which were used to cover the unwanted and illegal pressing into military service of members of the community whose skill as craftsmen and artisans was as useful to regiments as it was to civilian populations. Frank Tallett suggests that the emphasis on ridding society of undesirables, by pressing them, remained strong throughout this period.152

By 8 June 1671, Douglas had received authorisation for the recruitment of almost an entire new regiment as he had obtained the right to take the enormous number of 6,000 men from Scotland to form sixteen new companies (of three hundred and seventy-five men each) under as many

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147 Perwich to Williamson, Paris, 29 June/1 July 1671: P.R.O., S.P. 78/131, fol. 147.
152 Tallett, War and Society, pp. 81-2 and 87-8.
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captains. These were to come from among the 9,000 soldiers raised in Scotland and Ireland, as requested from Charles II by the King of France, for inclusion in a new British Brigade in French service. Though many of Douglas’s recruits came from the disbanded Scottish regiment of the Earl of Linlithgow, the standard of many of the civilian recruits was not high. Warrant was specifically given for Ensign Alexander Campbell, of Captain Douglas of Spott’s company, to raise men in Argyllshire, where there were “. . . several thieves, vagabonds, idle and desolate masterless persones”.  

Captain George Murray also received license forcibly to recruit one Andrew Hope, resident in Balrudie, a “. . . turbulent persone and who hes committed several outrages by bleeding, wounding and utherwayes troubling the countrye where he lyves”. Indeed, a number of Scots were forcibly, but legally, recruited in this way. An outcry was, however, raised when recruiters abducted James and Alexander Home, who were both servants of Sir Alexander Hope. James Gray, tailor in the Cannongate, similarly complained of being unlawfully kidnapped by recruiting officers. All had been apprehended by Lord George’s younger brother, Lord James Douglas, who was a captain in the latter’s regiment: Lord James (1637-81) had been brought up largely by his elder brother, the Duke of Hamilton, and, like his brothers George and William, he was a big man.  

While Lord George Douglas had relied upon the support of Charles II in the past, some observers doubted his commitment to English interests. As far as Perwich was concerned, the overtures of friendship, which England had received from the French, were not to be trusted. He explained his fears of French duplicity by reminding Arlington of “. . . the English reputation and honour” which was so much an ‘eyesore’ to the French that they would seek to undermine it. He reported that the French king had given leave for 6,000 Swiss to be employed at six crowns a head and that a further six hundred Scottish recruits had arrived at Dieppe for Douglas’s regiment. They were among 4,000 men raised in Scotland and Ireland at four doubloons per head.
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Charles had meanwhile given Sir George Hamilton authority to raise men in Ireland, but this was revoked following the protestations of the Spanish ambassador, the Conde de Molina. He was annoyed, despite the fact that Spain enjoyed no history of officially-acknowledged recruiting in post-Restoration Ireland, that permission had been forthcoming for France to recruit men in Ireland, while it had been denied to Spain.\footnote{Perwich to Arlington, 30 July 1671: P.R.O., S.P. 78/131, fol. 189-93.} Perwich estimated that the state of the French forces on land stood at 60,000 infantry and a further two hundred new companies were to be added to these. Louis XIV also had his household regiments and regiments of cavalry, totalling 15,000 troopers, were to be raised in the following Spring.\footnote{Idem.} Furthermore, Louis was to have 10,000 Swiss, raised specially for French service, while the Pope had promised him “... great summs and notable ayds” if he would prosecute a war against the Ottoman Turks.\footnote{Perwich to Arlington, 9/19 August 1671: P.R.O., S.P. 78/131, fols. 206-9.}

However, Louis XIV’s war machine was, in truth, less formidable than many contemporary accounts would suggest. In August 1671, Perwich reported to Arlington that Louis had been told that “... his Troops diminish dayly by the vast numbers that desert the service”.\footnote{Same to same, 19/29 August 1671: Ibid., fol. 218.} His response was to offer a general amnesty to deserters in the hope of luring them back into the army. This was particularly important, as it was reported that his Dutch enemy ‘entertained’ most of the deserters, and at least some of them were veterans.\footnote{Ibid., fol. 128.} Furthermore, the estimated numbers coming into the French Army from the recruiting drive in France, and the recruits hired outside the country, were moving so slowly that Perwich thought they would “... have but a lame account of those they desired to raise”.\footnote{Perwich to Arlington, 6/16 September 1671: P.R.O., S.P. 78/132, fol. 13.} Louis was consequently reduced to accepting the stringent restrictions placed on him by the Prince of Tuscany, who offered him men – so long as he did not take married men, artisans or peasants.\footnote{Idem.} In these circumstances, further recruits for Douglas’s regiment, to the number of four new infantry companies, were also proposed.\footnote{R. Dickson to Williamson, 18 November 1671: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II, 294/43; Commissaire de Mannallet to Louvois, 14 August 1671: A.G., A’261, no. 132.} The regiment was in France and ready for service (with one hundred and four last-minute recruits) in August 1671.\footnote{Philip Langon to James Hickes, 20 August 1671, in C.S.P. Dom., 1671 (London, 1895), p. 438.}
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Louis's forces were steadily growing, and he could supposedly command 24,000 men from Lorraine, 9,000 from Cologne, 4-5,000 from Neuburg and 6,000 cavalry.\textsuperscript{170} The English agent, Francis Vernon, reported that, with all these men, the "... preparations for war go hotly on".\textsuperscript{171} Vernon said that the French began at this time "... to speak so high that they would even awake a man out of the deepest lethargie", implying that England could not afford to ignore the effects of French territorial pretensions in Spanish Flanders.\textsuperscript{172}

Tensions within this war machine were sometimes great. They extended to administrative and criminal jurisdictions, which went far enough down the scale of command to affect individual company commanders. In August 1671, Douglas's regiment was quartered at Fontainbleau when the Lieutenant-Criminal of that place reported to Louvois that three soldiers of the regiment had been arrested, but had escaped from their confinement and caused some disorder in the town. Several officers of the regiment, in an attempt to shield them from retribution by the French, pretended to the right to try their own men.\textsuperscript{173} This only represented one section of the regiment, which had been split up. One company (of one hundred and sixteen new recruits), under the command of Captain Buchan, arriving at Amiens the next day with three sergeants, the captain, two lieutenants and an ensign, from Scotland. Buchan's arrival completed the regiment at Amiens and its numbers were slowly expanded over the following months. The French paymaster of the force reported that they were all fine, strong young men and these soldiers were further augmented by the arrival at Amiens of two hundred and two men of Douglas's regiment.\textsuperscript{174} The regiment had left only four ill men at Dieppe.\textsuperscript{175}

Direct from Scotland, another hundred and twenty recruits to the regiment arrived, in September 1671, and, in October, a number of men arrived under the command of Captain Charles Douglas of Spott.\textsuperscript{176} These arrivals increased the regiment's strength at Amiens from 1,579 men to 1,829 men.\textsuperscript{177} At this point the regiment was ready to be moved to Cambrai in Flanders.\textsuperscript{178} However,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[170] Francis Vernon to Williamson, 21 October 1671: P.R.O., S.P. 78/132, fol. 47.
\item[171] Same to same, 18/28 October 1671: \textit{Ibid.}, fol. 49-50.
\item[173] \textit{Commissaire} de Becelles to Louvois, Fontainbleau, 13 August 1671: A.G., A1'1261, no. 112.
\item[174] Same to same, Amiens, 14 August 1671: \textit{Ibid.}, no. 131.
\item[175] Same to same, Amiens, September 1671: \textit{Ibid.}, no. 303.
\item[176] Same to same, Amiens, 10 September 1671: \textit{Ibid.}, no. 392.
\item[177] Same to same, Amiens, 4 October 1671: \textit{Ibid.}, no. 15.
\item[178] Same to same, 17 October 1671: \textit{Ibid.}, no. 81.
\end{footnotes}
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they could not know that, within a year, they would be transferred within the French Army to form two-thirds of the strength of the British Brigade sent by Charles II to aid Louis XIV in his war in Flanders. The role and importance of this British Brigade is the subject of the next two chapters of this study.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the decade of the 1660s, Douglas struggled to reconcile his increasingly ambivalent position as an important nobleman and courtier in both Britain and France with the increasing demands of professional soldiering. His strategies of action during the Candia crisis demonstrate his facility of action within the political and diplomatic world of the French and English courts, but his subjection to, and compliance with the demands of Charles II during the Second Anglo-Dutch War reveal the weaknesses of his position. The fact that Douglas was bound to two masters did not double his options, as it might have done two decades earlier, during the Thirty Years’ War. Rather, he found himself fêted and threatened in turn by two monarchs who were themselves coming to grips with the implications of a changing international military environment.
Many watchful eyes

BRITISH REGIMENTS IN FRANCE, 1672-5

Questions of loyalty and obedience were central to the operation of the British Brigade in French service between 1672 and 1674. Unlike the *regiment de Douglas* – which possessed a traditional relationship with France – the English and Irish regiments were new arrivals to French service. The same could not be said of the men who commanded those regiments. All possessed a standing relationship with France and the service of Louis XIV, this fact helps reinforce notions of the strength and breadth of Charles II’s pro-French supporters and his own ability to mobilise that support to aid his cousin, Louis XIV.

This chapter suggests that, while, according to their capitulations, or contracts, the British regiments in French service officially belonged to Charles II, their actions were as strongly affected by the motives of Louis XIV and their individual colonels. It is clear that a previously unstudied level of compromise and antipathy existed within the triangle of influence created by these two monarchs and the colonels of the regiments. Historians, such as John Childs, have proposed that the British regiments in French service stayed there, following the cessation of hostilities at the end of the Third Anglo-Dutch War in 1674, due to Charles II’s desire to keep men under arms. The belief is that these men might be used to impose arbitrary government at home in Britain, but this chapter suggests that Charles may have been equally influenced by the desire to continue to show favour to the commanders of the three British regiments. These men included his personal friends, supporters and some loyal Roman Catholic subjects. Charles also recognised the bonds of loyalty and friendship which existed between Hamilton, Monmouth, Douglas and the King of France. For Charles and his immediate family, friendship with France and with Louis was neither alien nor unwelcome.

This was quite different from the attitude of the English parliament, which saw the British soldiers in France as a direct threat to the privileges and independence of both itself and the English nation. Lauderdale’s use of the militia in Scotland was seen as being connected with Charles’s mobilisation of men for French service: it was exacerbated by the prominent role played by the Scottish regiment, which continued to draw men from Scotland while the English opposition looked on, powerless.
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Charles II was not averse to aiding his favourites, especially when this involved limited financial outlay on his part. Personal partiality was an important factor in Charles's foreign military policy. The experiences of Lord George Douglas's Scottish regiment in French service are highly instructive of just how far an individual military commander could manipulate international rivalry and personal antipathy between monarchs for his own benefit. Douglas's experiences in the 1660s and 1670s highlight the counterproductive results of such stratagems.

As a consequence of the Treaty of Dover (1670), which ratified a military alliance with the French, Lord George Douglas's regiment became part of a British force lent to the French king to aid his war against the Dutch.\(^1\) The treaty has received a great deal of attention by historians. Ronald Hutton says that Charles was lured into signing it through fear of alienating Louis XIV, who might himself have joined with the Dutch in opposition to English interests and despite the 'Triple Alliance' which Charles II had concluded between Spain, England and the Netherlands in April 1668. Hutton says that when Louis declared war on the Dutch, the French lured Charles into the treaty with the promise of £160,000 Sterling. However, Hutton's argument does not seem to appreciate the importance of the consistently indulgent attitude of Charles II towards the French interest at his court. He needed to accommodate French Catholic feeling in England in the wake of his secret alliance with Louis XIV has been given as one reason for his Declaration of Indulgence in March 1672.\(^2\) One fact which does seem to support Hutton's assertion comes from Charles's desire to warn his nephew, William of Orange, of the imminent declaration of war on the United Provinces until the moment when Charles found him to be "... so passionately Dutch and Protestant" that he decided against it.\(^3\) However, an important factor in Charles's decision to join with the French, was his 'pathological hatred' of the Dutch due to their republicanism and the sorry defeat they had subjected him to in the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-7).\(^4\)

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Charles began negotiations leading to the treaty as early as December 1669, when the first draft was prepared, and he asked for a subsidy of £800,000. Haley agrees that Charles's interest in the treaty stemmed from his desire to enjoy a 'special relationship' with Louis XIV, who owned the greatest economic and political resources in Europe. Louis believed that the revelation of Charles's Roman Catholicism (an implicit requirement of the secret clauses of the treaty) was impracticable. This suggests that Louis was not trying to trap Charles, but simply to subdue anti-French feeling in England by freeing Charles from the necessity of calling a parliament. Miller does not believe that Charles would have apostatized.

Much later, following the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, Whig revisionists held that the treaty brought the "Protestant interest in this part of Europe so very near to a final period". Indeed, Charles was overtly duplicitous in denying the existence of secret articles in the treaty. However, public knowledge of these articles was slight. The truth behind the treaty was revealed by Lord George Douglas, a son of the first Duke of Queensberry, to the young John Erskine of Carnock, on 29 December 1686. Carnock could not bring himself to believe what he heard of the secret clauses, and said that they were lies spread by the French king in order to harm Charles II's reputation. However, he gave them some credence, despite reservations regarding their truthfulness, but dismissed his thoughts on the rumour by observing that "... however, this was talked in France". The French interest at Charles's court was, therefore, quite successful in dissimulating the true significance of the treaty for some time after its signing.

Charles committed himself to supplying Louis XIV with a British Brigade of soldiers for that king's war against the Dutch. As early as 1670, the Dutch suspected a secret agreement existed between England and France, when Sir William Temple, the English Ambassador to Münster, was deeply embarrassed by the revelation that the French invasion of the Low Countries had been

9 Anon., An Account of the Reasons which induced Charles II... to declare War against the States General... in 1672 (London, 1689), p. 1.

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facilitated by British collaboration. In 1671, the Dutch consolidated an alliance with Brandenburg which secured 20,000 men for the Dutch Army, commanded by the Stadholder, William of Orange. But Brandenburg, like Great Britain, broke with the Dutch in order to secure lenient peace terms from the French – and 800,000 livres – in return for keeping their army behind the river Weser. Charles similarly secured a pension from Louis XIV, which promoted further fears of arbitrary government among his subjects. Both the French and his British subjects understood that the level of financial independence Charles now enjoyed, freed him from the necessity to call parliaments: he, therefore, had no recourse to parliamentary opinion and “. . . would become absolute sovereign”. However, Charles’s obligations in the Treaty of Dover allowed him to promise his Scottish subjects that he would burden them with no increased demands for the upkeep of the army there and this momentarily allayed ‘standing army’ fears in Britain.

In England, 12,000 soldiers were mustered at Blackheath to be sent to the continent: 14,000 had been raised by the summer of 1672. The camp became a popular attraction and promoted a great deal of anti-army sentiment from the public. The British Brigade was to consist of English, Irish and Scottish regiments, but contemporary understanding of the use of the term ‘brigade’ was not fully formulated:

It hath been a custom of a long time, and in many places, to put several regiments in one body or battalion, which they call a Brigade. There are of these both horse and foot, and the colonel, who commands that body, is called a brigadeer. It is not as yet defin’d, for any thing I know, how strong a Brigade should be, three thousand, two thousand, eighteen hundred, or fifteen hundred. These estates of the United Provinces had

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12 Halsey, An English Diplomat in the Low Countries, pp. 122 and 124.
always Brigades of foot in their service, but those were strong, five or six thousand. I have seen six regiments in one Brigade, and yet it did not consist of so many as two thousand men that carried arms; here you may suppose there were officers enough for so few soldiers. The colonel who is oldest in that service commands the Brigade. There is likewise a major of the Brigade, who receives the word and other orders from the major-general, and gives them to the majors of the other regiments of the Brigade, and they to their colonels and lieutenant-colonels, and then to the sergeants of all the several companies. This major of the Brigade is ordinarily he who is major of the oldest regiment of that Brigade.17

By these standards, it is clear that the officers of Douglas's regiment would have dominated the command and administration of the British Brigade.

Initially, the English component consisted of 1,664 men, commanded by Charles II's popular natural son, the Protestant Duke of Monmouth, and was known to the French as the regiment royal anglais, or Royal English Regiment.18 The Irish force, also of 1,664 men, was commanded by the Anglo-Irish peer, Wentworth Dillon, fourth Earl of Roscommon, however, his regiment lost so many men to disease, desertion and battle that it was disbanded in Lorraine in Autumn 1672, whereupon the remaining soldiers joined Sir George Hamilton's Irish regiment.19 By far the largest element of the Brigade, was the Scottish regiment of Lord George Douglas, which consisted of 3,432 men, arranged in thirty-three companies. Douglas's regiment was simply transferred within the French Army to become part of the Brigade. A regiment of cavalry, formerly the gens d'armes anglais of the French Royal Household Troop, under the command of its colonel, Sir Henry Jones, was also attached to the Brigade.20 On 10 February 1673 another volunteer corps, of a hundred gentlemen volunteers of the English Life Guards, under the command of the Anglo-Huguenot Henri de Durfort-Duras, who were keen to gain valuable military experience in a real theatre of war, joined the Brigade.21

20 *Idem*. This unit, along with the gens d'armes écossois, had formerly come under the overall command of Sir George Hamilton, who left them to recruit a regiment in Ireland in 1671: A. Hamilton, *The Memoirs of Count Grammont* (London: Sonnenschein, n.d.), p. 301.
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By the beginning of 1672, Louis XIV was ready to make a review of his army at Châlons in Champagne. An estimated 22,000 of his soldiers were foreign recruits.22 By August 1672, Monmouth's regiment was encamped at Dunkirk.23 However, Louvois was displeased with Monmouth for refusing to reform more than sixty of his men by re-organising and reducing them to half-pay. Monmouth explained himself by saying that he was awaiting the arrival of an English colonel who was coming over from Spanish service.24 The regiment removed itself to Amiens later in the same month, four days before the French king decided to disband Roscommon's now decimated Irish regiment.25

On 23 August 1672, Monmouth's regiment royale anglais arrived in Lille to take part in actions against the Dutch. Their condition prompted the commissaire there to comment that the officers were in the 'best state' possible.26 At the end of the month they arrived at Oudenarde in Flanders, where they joined the French regiment de Picardie in garrisoning the town.27

Meanwhile, Roscommon was attempting to preserve his decimated regiment from being disbanded: the commissaire at Nancy reported that the colonel was driven by a "... great desire and ambition" to serve Louis.28 He also had a number of good soldiers, though his officers were thought to be poor.29 By contrast, Douglas's Scottish regiment consisted of highly experienced officers, such as Hugh Mackay of Scourie, who returned to the regiment as a captain in 1672.30

24 Le Boistel to Louvois, Dunkirk, 14 August 1672: A.G., A'294, no. 86.
26 Commissaire le Pelletier de Souzy to Louvois, Lille, 23 August 1672: Ibid., no. 169.
27 Commissaire de Corcelles, Oudenarde, 31 August 1672: Ibid., no. 234.
28 Colbert de Croissy to Louvois, Nancy, 8 August 1672: Ibid., no. 128.
29 Idem.
30 After serving as a junior officer under Douglas (until 1666), Mackay became a volunteer in the French Army proper, seeing service at the attempted relief of the siege of Candia and in Flanders under Marshal de Turenne and the Prince de Condé: H. Mackay of Scourie, Life of Lieut. General Hugh Mackay of Scourie, ed. J. Mackay of Rockfield (Edinburgh, 1856), pp. 4 and 6; Sir E. Cust, The Campaigns of Marshall Turenne (1611-75) (London, 1867); H. M. Hozier, Turenne (London, 1907); L'Abbé Raguenet, Histoire du Vicomte de Turenne (Paris, 1824); H. Choppin, Campagne de Turenne en Alsace, 1674-1675. D'après les documents inédits... Extrait du Spectateur militaire (Paris, 1875); É. Legrand-Girard, Turenne en Alsace. Campagne de 1674-1675 (Paris, 1910); Count P. H. de Grimoard, Histoire des quatre dernières campagnes du maréchal de Turenne en 1672, 1673, 1674 and 1675 (Paris, 1728); J. H. Behr, Der aufs Neu-verschärfte Turenne oder Grundliche Al- und Neue kriegs-Ban kunst... Zum anderen mahl gedrucht... corrigirt und von dem Autore selbst... verbessert (Frankfurt, 1690); F. Des Robert, Les Campagnes de Turenne en Allemagne, d'après des documents inédits, 1667-1675 (Nancy, 1903); N. Deschamps, Sieur de Landez, Mémoires des deux dernières campagnes de M. de Turenne en Allemagne (Paris, 1678); H. de La Tour d'Auvergne, the younger, Précis des Campagnes de Turenne, 1674-1675 (Brussels, 1888); C. G. Picavet, Les Dernières Années de Turenne, 1660-1675 (Paris, 1919); T. E. Compton, The British with Turenne 167.
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French attitudes to the soldiers of the brigade were sometimes hostile. While the army was encamped at Metz in eastern France, the commissaire there observed that the soldiers who worked best were French, followed by Scots: worst of all were the Irish. However, all had worked together, arranged in companies, to produce a good encampment by the time the commissaire reported to Louvois.31 As Louis’s military machine grew larger throughout 1672, the rest of Europe watched and waited for the spark that would ignite the brooding tensions created by the French king’s posturing on his kingdom’s eastern border. Some pinned their fears for the start of a hot war on discontent in Franche Comté, the eastern province newly conquered by France where the nobility and people threatened to rebel due to the French failure to appoint a native governor in accordance with their agreement with the province.32 Others witnessed the constant desertions from the French ranks: Louis again declared an amnesty for the French cavalry who deserted at this time, if they agreed to return and serve for four years.33 In May a formal request was sent to the French court by a pro-French lobby in Franche Comté, requesting the liberation of the province from “... all the assembled nobles in the principal district of your jurisdiction”.34

At the end of 1672, some soldiers were reported as having deserted from Monmouth’s and Douglas’s regiments, and, in November, three of Douglas’s soldiers were incarcerated for this crime.35 In October of the next year, Louvois reported to Louis XIV that 4,000 soldiers were ready to depart from England for the French port of Dieppe.36 On 9 October 1673, Charles II arrived in person in France with many officers and soldiers.37 War had broken out, and Douglas’s regiment saw action almost immediately in the Rhine theatre of operations under Marshal de Turenne.38 They

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31 Cherisy to Louvois, Metz, 27 June 1672: A.G., A’293, no. 188.
34 Appeal for the liberty of the province of Franche Comté, delivered to the French court by the Marquis de Lestenet, 5 February/ 7 May 1673: P.R.O., S.P. 78/136/110.
38 Childs, Army of Charles II, appendix D, p. 245.
arrived to garrison the town of Amiens only one month later, carrying with them “. . . more than one hundred and twenty wounded [soldiers]”.39

Regiments filled predominantly with new recruits were garrisoned in this way, rather than sent directly into the field in order to allow them time to train, and the experience of Douglas’s regiment clearly demonstrates the wisdom of this policy. Jonathan Lynn cites the level of organisation behind the system as, at Dunkirk, there were “. . . agents in this area to ensure that the drill of the troops will be performed”.40 Besides casualties, the British Brigade in French service continued to lose men through desertion. In November 1673 two deserters – one each from the regiments of Monmouth and Douglas – were found aboard a boat on the English coast.41

In January 1674, after two brief campaigning seasons, a peace treaty (the Treaty of Westminster) was signed between England and the Netherlands. However, only some of the British Brigade returned home thereafter. They included some of those closest to Charles II, such as Henri de Durfort-Duras and his troop of a hundred Life Guards volunteers and three of the eight companies of Colonel Bevil Skelton’s battalion of the regiment royal anglais. Those who remained helped form a second battalion of Monmouth’s regiment. Thus, between 1674 and 1678, the Brigade in France consisted of Monmouth’s, Sir George Hamilton’s and Douglas’s regiments, with Sir Henry Jones’s regiment of light cavalry also being under Monmouth’s command as Jones had been killed at Maastricht in 1673.42

The regiments that remained in France, ceased to be standing British regiments on loan to France: after 1674 their official status was that of mercenary units under contract and in service abroad.43 However, it is clear that the regiments were not entirely ‘mercenary’. It is true that, in the tradition of contract-command established during the Thirty Years’ War, the commanders of the British regiments relied heavily on recruits who were subject to Charles II from their native countries. Throughout the century, gaining permission from their sovereign for British subjects to leave their native land was of great importance for the commanders of mercenary regiments abroad. However, the necessity of obtaining royal agreement highlights the bond between the units serving

41 Taylor to Williamson, 8 November 1673: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 333/62.
43 Ibid., p. 390.
in France and Charles II’s involvement with them because the regiments could not continue to serve in France without their king’s consent. Significantly, a clause was inserted into the capitulation, or contract, of each which governed the terms of service of the regiments and insisted that the monarch could “. . . recall [them] to his own service” at any time. What separated these units from the mercenary regiments of the Thirty Years’ War, was the highly personal involvement of Charles II in appointing commanders, aiding recruitment and stifling domestic political opposition to the regiments serving abroad. The status of these units as independent and, therefore, officially mercenary was an aspect of the political ‘double speak’ of Charles II. The later opposition to British service in France (prevalent from 1676 to the removal from France of the British regiments in 1678) is a testament to popular understanding of the real non-mercenary, government-sponsored agenda which lay behind the regiments’ service abroad.

In January 1674, Sir George Hamilton received permission to raise a regiment of Irish recruits for service in France. He attempted to recruit men at a time when there was increasing criticism of British forces serving abroad. Hamilton consequently had great problems and wrote to Lauderdale of his “. . . mauvaise fortune” (bad fortune). Furthermore, he said his brother, Anthony Hamilton, had informed him that his affairs in France were in such disorder that he could not delay his return to that kingdom. On 12 January 1674, Charles II informally allowed the recruiting for Hamilton’s regiment to begin in Ireland and those Irishmen who were to be particularly targeted for military service included gaolced felons, who would otherwise have been transported to colonial plantations as forced labour.

By 20 January, Sir George had still not received his formal commission, prompting him to write to the Earl of Essex, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, begging him to send one. Hamilton had already arranged for French ships to transport his men to France and these were to depart from Dublin on 15 March 1674, thus the appearance of his formal commission was vital. The authorities’ reluctance

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44 Rules for making Capitulations for such officers and soldiers, his Majesty’s Subjects, as shall be entertained in the service of any foreign Prince or State (12 February 1668): British Library, London (hereafter B.L.), Add. MS. 38,694, fol. 7.
45 Commission from Charles II to Sir George Hamilton to be colonel of a regiment to be raised in Ireland, 12 January 1674: Bod. Lib., Rawl. MS. B.492, fol. 106v.
48 Charles II to Hamilton, 12 January 1673: B.L., Stowe MS. 204, fol. 28.
to grant outright acknowledgement of his activities, was exacerbated by their desire for Hamilton to keep as low a profile as possible as "... it is not convenient in this present juncture of affairs that what is done in this matter should for the present be commonly known ... [so that] ... the levies [might] be made and even transported with all the secrecy that a matter of this sort is capable of and so passe it as a thing of connivement only".\textsuperscript{51}

In March 1674, Douglas received authority to raise nine hundred recruits in Scotland.\textsuperscript{52} Permission was granted to a number of the officers of his regiment to return to Scotland for this purpose.\textsuperscript{53} A warrant was issued which authorised the Scottish Privy Council to allow Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Monro, and other officers chosen for the purpose, to recruit eight hundred volunteer soldiers as recruits. A hundred men, designed to form a new company, were to be added to Douglas’s regiment in the service of the King of France. The warrant also directed the officers to make diligent search for the soldiers of that regiment who had deserted during the last campaign and who were said to be now lurking in Scotland: these deserters were to be delivered to any of Douglas’s officers. A declaration was also issued which stated that whosoever should desert that service would suffer harsh punishment.\textsuperscript{54}

No extant evidence exists in the Scottish regiment, of the custom of officers ‘passing off’ dead or deserted soldiers as being still present in order for their officers to collect their pay. Accusations of such behaviour were certainly present in England at this time, where Monmouth himself sat in judgment over many of the cases: in January 1675, for example, a captain of the Foot Guards was accused before Monmouth of this practice by his own lieutenant.\textsuperscript{55}

In the year 1674, the \textit{regiment de Douglas} saw action at the battles of Heidelberg, Landau, Mannheim, and Saverne.\textsuperscript{56} The Scottish regiment was not present at the battle of Entzheim (otherwise called Molsheim), though its colonel was there, acting in his capacity of a brigadier general in the French Army.\textsuperscript{57} Douglas was one of only three non-French infantry brigadiers in this

\textsuperscript{52} P.R.O., S.P.Dom., Car. II 334/221.
\textsuperscript{53} 5 March 1673: P.R.O., S.P. Scotland, Warrant Book 2/169 and 170.
\textsuperscript{54} Charles II to the Privy Council of Scotland, 5 March 1673: P.R.O., S.P. Scotland, Warrant Book 2/168.
\textsuperscript{56} Where Sir George Hamilton would meet his death at the head of his Irish regiment two years later: L. Weaver, \textit{The Story of the Royal Scots} (London, 1915), p. 30; Atkinson, "Charles II’s Regiments", p. 55.
campaign, further reflecting his strong position within the French court and military hierarchy. The massed strength of the French Army, which participated in this conflict, is estimated to have been 18,000 men.

Popular fears, regarding large forces of men under arms, exacerbated the instability of Charles II’s political position in England. The English parliament called upon the Scottish Secretary of State, the Earl of Lauderdale – a man detested by the English and some Scots as a representative of arbitrary government – to justify his Scottish Militia Act of 1669. Many contemporaries took the aim of the act to be the creation of a standing army on England’s northern border. English politicians generally misunderstood Lauderdale’s policy towards the militia, mistaking the earl’s policies in Scotland for a Britain-wide agenda on the part of his sovereign.

Lauderdale was, in fact, responding to specific, domestic, circumstances in Scotland. His, and Charles’s, use of the militia represents their ongoing insensitivity to Scottish affairs, rather than a desire to invade England from the north – though the king’s desire to quell the power of England’s House of Commons through means found in Scotland cannot be overlooked. However, in Scotland, Lauderdale’s absolutist style of government was far from being misinterpreted. It is clear that he intended, from the beginning, to rule arbitrarily, and, he not only raised a militia, but billeted it upon his political and regionally-based enemies. He did this by using the excuse that they owed money to the Crown: for example, in August 1669, he billeted the militia on a number of northern shires which owed money, despite the fact that it was contrary to reforms that had occurred in 1667.

Lord Arlington was also accused of having advised Charles to rule via an army, which he answered thus: “I wholly abominate it, and am not so vain as to think this great nation can be awed by 20,000 men.” Few people were ignorant of the trouble that soldiers could cause if they were not paid promptly. However, many were shocked when, in November 1670, a company of the Earl

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of Linlithgow’s regiment started marching across country in protest at lack of pay. Perhaps thinking of the difficulty experienced by his brother in getting recruits for French service, the Duke of Hamilton used the occasion to attack his opponents by expressing his wonder that soldiers in Scotland could be without pay when so many burdens were placed on the country for their upkeep. Following the parliamentary inquiries a series of addresses were made for the recall of the English (and presumably also the Scottish) soldiers from France. Surprisingly, Hamilton’s constant attacks upon Lauderdale and his style of government do not seem to have affected his brother’s, Douglas’s ability to secure permission to raise recruits in Scotland, proving that these resulted from quite a different agenda on the part of Charles.

It was openly stated that the French king’s intention was to dominate Europe. The fact that up to 10,000 Britons were assisting him in this design was held to be unconscionable. Though Charles II was only bound to offer 6,000 men, in the form of a British Brigade, according to the articles of the Treaty of Dover, at least two other regiments containing British officers were in French service (the gens d’armes écossais and the gens d’armes anglais). The real level of British interest in France was consequently higher than the numbers in the Treaty of Dover would suggest.

The matter was important enough for the House of Commons to insist that it be heard on the matter, though it had no traditional right to comment on royal foreign policy. Charles dismissed their agitation by insisting that there were in fact an inconsiderable number of English soldiers in French service. Even these, he said, had been there prior to the signing of the Treaty of Westminster. Despite this assurance, lengthy debates continued through May and these only ended when the parliament was eventually prorogued. The existence of the Scottish militia was still seen as a threat, and a third anti-Lauderdale address was heard and passed by a hundred and thirty-six votes to a hundred and sixteen. Proving that the matter would not rest, major

64 Commons Journal, vol. 9, p. 321.
67 Ibid., pp. 4-7.
70 Commons Journals, vol. 9, p. 348.
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Parliamentary debates, regarding British soldiers in French service, recurred on 13 October 1674 and in February 1677.\(^1\)

Parliamentary debates in England did not, however, prevent Charles from admonishing his Scottish Chancellor, the Duke of Rothes, for failing to inspect the men recruited in Scotland for service in France who were being dispatched thither from Leith in September 1674. On 29 September the king wrote him an angry letter of complaint which serves to demonstrate the rising influence of Lauderdale’s enemies at Charles’s court – chief among them the Duke of Hamilton. Both Hamilton and the Earl of Kincardine were simultaneously engaged in a dispute with Lauderdale over a petition from Edinburgh’s town council, which had been received only the day before.\(^2\)

Parliament was not alone in criticising the obvious support by Charles II of French territorial ambitions, which exacerbated the opinions of existing stridently anti-French and anti-‘Popish’ parties in England. Furthermore, the English parliament was largely hostile to the court’s pro-French stance throughout the British Brigade’s existence.\(^3\) On top of all this, when it served his purpose, Louis XIV actively assisted parliamentary opposition in England.\(^4\) The exact workings of the English court remain obscure as little is known about daily life there and, unlike Louis XIV’s court, especially after its removal to Versailles in 1681, few chronicles of events in England remain. For example, virtually the only non-partisan observations of the court at this time come from the Roman nobleman, Lorenzo Magalotti.\(^5\) Andrew Marvell, a politician and pamphleteer, forcefully articulated anti-French sentiment. He recognised the popularly perceived connection between Charles II’s pro-French stance and his support of the British Brigade in France. Marvell claimed that the king had turned to France for support of what he saw as Charles’s quasi-absolutist policies “. . . because it was difficult to find complices enough at home . . . but they wanted a Back for their Edge; therefore they applyed themselves to France, that King being indowed with all those qualityes,

\(^1\) Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!”, pp. 111 and 115.


which in a prince, may passe for virtues; but in any private man, would be capital".76 Discussing the creation of a land army, Marvell snidely observed that:

Because no Englishman, among so many well-disposed, and qualified for the work, had been thought capable, or fit to be trusted with chief command of those forces, but that Monsieur Schomberg a French Protestant, had been made general, as Colonel Fitzgerald, an Irish papist, major general, as more proper for the secret; the first of advancing the French government, the second of promoting the Irish religion . . . [so that it] . . . was manifest that in all these wars, the French meant nothing less than really to assist us.77

Schomberg was, in fact, half-English – his mother was Anne Sutton, a daughter of Lord Dudley – and he enjoyed the title of Baron Teford (created 1661) in the Peerage of England, and had commanded the British forces in Portugal from 1662 to 1668.78 However, he was a marshal of the French Army and remained loyal to Louis XIV until the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Marvell saw the British Brigade’s presence in France as a preliminary step in the imposition of Catholicism and absolute government on the British people:

Therefore that such an absurdity as the ordering of affairs abroad, according to the interest of our nation might be avoided, the English, Scotch and Irish regiments, that were already in the French service, were not only to be kept in their full compliment, but new numbers of soldiers daily transported thither, making up in all, as is related, at least a constant body of ten thousand men, of his Majesty’s subjects, and which oftentimes turned the fortune of battle on the French side by their valour.79

Marvell was greatly alarmed by the fact that (as a result of the British Brigade’s existence in France), Charles II, theoretically, had at his disposal a ready-made standing army.80

Furthermore, the Crown employed propaganda to justify its military alliance with France: a pamphlet appeared in 1672, for example, entitled *A Justification of the Present War Against the United Netherlands*.81 In 1675, eulogistic pamphlets circulated around London, following the death

77 Ibid., pp. 45 and 46.
80 Ibid., p. 60.
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of the great Marshal de Turenne, under whom all the British troops had served and who was the uncle of the Earl of Feversham, a favourite of Charles II. These pamphlets served the interests of the pro-French elements at Charles’s court, while simultaneously satisfying the curiosity of the public.\(^{82}\) The family of the formerly sovereign Protestant Ducs de Bouillon, to which Turenne belonged, had also been used as a means of proving the adherence of Charles II to the ‘True Reformed Religion’ when, in 1660, a collection of letters was published purporting to prove his Protestant convictions.\(^{83}\)

As a result of Charles’s parliamentary problems in July 1674, a momentary halt was called to recruiting for Douglas’s regiment when Charles II forbade any more enlistment of men to occur in Scotland.\(^{84}\) However, in October 1674, commissions were given to a troop of cavalry to be led by the Duke of Monmouth, to depart for France, and this body soon saw action against the Dutch.\(^{85}\) Monmouth reported that his regiment had “... given so good account of themselves in the battle near Strassburg” that he could not be more pleased with them.\(^{86}\)

In the early months of 1675, Douglas travelled furiously between France and England: at the end of January 1675, he arrived in England only to return quickly to France.\(^{87}\) He returned to England in February 1675, in company with the young French Duc de Vendôme and ten or eleven retainers, to lobby Charles for more soldiers.\(^{88}\)

The militant Sir Patrick Home of Polwarth was a militant and desperate enemy of Lauderdale. In January 1675, he accused the Crown of attempting, by armed force, to intimidate the Scottish parliament: “It is the common talk of the street that this is done against our parliament fitt to make

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\(^{82}\) Cf. e.g. B. L., The Frenchman’s Lamentation for the Loss of their noble general Monsieur Turenne, who was kill’d. . . ., 23 July 1675 (London, 1675); A Sermon [on 2 Sam. iii, 32, 33 and 38] at the funeral of Prince Henry de la Tour d’Auvergne, Viscount of Turenne, Mareschal General of France. Preach’d December 15, 1675, J. Spencer, trans. (London, 1677).

\(^{83}\) Anne de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomtesse de Turenne, Certain Letters Evidencing the King’s Stedfastness in the Protestant Religion: Sent from the Princess de Turenne, and the Ministers of Charenton, to some Persons of Quality in London (London, 1660).

\(^{84}\) Warrant forbidding the levying of men in Scotland and transporting them into any foreign service without the King’s licence: The King and Privy Council of Scotland, 16 July 1674: P.R.O., S.P. Scotland, Warrant Book 3, fol. 22.

\(^{85}\) Commissions to Buccleuch’s cavalry troop in French service, 3 October 1674: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II. 362/1.

\(^{86}\) Monmouth to M. Lanière, 22 October 1674, in P.R.O., S.P. Dom., 1673-1675, p. 382.

\(^{87}\) Francis Bastinck to Williamson, Dover, 27 January 1675: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 357, no. 140.

\(^{88}\) Richard Watts to same, Deal, 16 February 1675: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 368, no. 76. This Duc de Vendôme was Louis-Joseph, Duc de Vendôme, de Mercour, d’Etampes and de Penthievre, Peer of France, Prince de Martigues, Seigneur d’Anet, Knight of the Royal Orders (of St. Michel and the Holy Spirit) and of the Golden Fleece, Grand Seneschal and Governor of Provence and General of the Galleys, who had been at Paris on the night of 30 June 1654 and who (in 1672), had served as a volunteer in the French Army. He was the nephew of the Duc de Beaufort – the gentleman who had lost his life in 1669, while leading the French expedition to retake Candia – and was the great-grandson of Henry IV of France and Gabrielle d’Estrees: Père Anselme, Histoire de la Maison Royale de France, vol. 1 (Paris, 1726), pp. 196, 197-8, and 200-1.
some impression on the members." An Edinburgh-based correspondent of the Earl of Arran was convinced that the Crown intended to "... rule by a strong hand". In this context, Charles's willingness to allay popular fears by removing armed men from Scotland can well be appreciated: as a result, the king complained vociferously of Polwarth's 'factious carriage'.

Further royal favour was also shown to Douglas when, on 9 March 1675, he received his patent as Earl of Dumbarton and Lord Douglas of Ettrick in the Peerage of Scotland with remainder to the heirs male of his body. The coat-of-arms which was formally assigned to the new earl contained a singular honour in that the border, which surrounded the arms of the Earls of Angus, Douglas's forebears, consisted of English lions and French fleurs-de-lis. Though no land accompanied the honour, the title was not devoid of symbolic meaning. Dumbarton Castle was a royal possession, the captaincy of which lay intermittently with the Marquises of Douglas. Dumbarton's nephew, the Earl of Arran, would later be Lord-Lieutenant of Liddesdale and of the Burgh of Dumbarton during Argyll's rebellion in 1685. This helps to demonstrate the connection between the fortress at Dumbarton (a burgh not to be confused with the shire of Dumbarton), and the maintenance of royal authority and Douglas family influence in the area.

In February 1675, Monmouth was heavily involved in finding recruits for his regiment, insisting that every captain should raise soldiers for his own company of the Royal English Regiment. He experienced great difficulty in getting men and consequently begged the English authorities for two months more to see what could be done about raising them. At almost exactly the same time, secret Anglo-French negotiations were under way and the peerage conferred on Dumbarton might well be linked to these, although there is no clear extant evidence of this. The level of diplomatic secrecy involved in the foreign policy of Charles II towards France, can be gauged by the reaction of the Earl of Essex to the arrival in Ireland of Anthony Hamilton, the brother of Sir George Hamilton.

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90 Ibid., Government and Politics in Scotland, 1661-1681, p. 249.
91 Ibid., p. 253.
93 B.L., Add. MS. 23,138, fol. 100; W. Chambers, An Ancient Scottish Stronghold. The Story of Dumbarton Castle (Dumbarton: 1919); J. Glen, The History of the Town and Castle of Dumbarton (Glasgow, 1847); J. Irving, Dumbarton Castle Considered as a Fortress (Dumbarton 1915); I. MacIvor, Dumbarton Castle, Dumbarton (Edinburgh, 1958).
of the British Brigade, who "... is now gone into the countrey and I hope will carefully dispatch the business he comes about, I have directed him to be cautious in his proceedings, there being many watchful eyes, who are so busy as to give notice of every thing that is done here, what reasonable connivance may be permitted shall be allowed [to] him" in the recruiting of Sir George’s regiment.\textsuperscript{96}

To allay possible fears on this account, Sir George Hamilton had written to Lauderdale at the end of February 1674, assuring him that he and "... my friends have the honour to render you all the reverence [possible] from this country here [Ireland]".\textsuperscript{97}

Dumbarton returned to France, with a party of French noblemen, five days after receiving his Letters Patent.\textsuperscript{98} Two months later the common pressures of military encampments led to a serious mutiny occurring in the French Army. Dumbarton’s regiment became violently embroiled in a dispute with a French unit regarding their quarters with the result that "... a great deal of mischief is done on both sides".\textsuperscript{99} This mutiny in the French Army may have precipitated the removal of part of Dumbarton’s regiment back to Scotland. A more cogent reason can be found in a newsletter of 13 September 1675, which reported that Douglas’s regiment, consisting of 1,200 men, "... had been quite ruined during that siege [at Trèves or Trier], for most of the officers were killed, and only two hundred men marched out with the rest of the French, to the number of fourteen or fifteen hundred men, whereas before the siege they were four thousand five hundred, all old troops".\textsuperscript{100} Christopher Duffy has estimated that exhaustion, disease and desertion could reduce regiments by as much as one fifth of their total number: this is a stark contrast to Douglas’s losses, as only one sixth of his regiment survived, making this a catastrophe for the colonel and his unit.\textsuperscript{101} But the extent of the disaster at Trèves went further still: in his \textit{Principes Généraux de la Guerre} (1748), Prussia’s Frederick the Great defined the value of veteran soldiers:

It hardly matters if a clumsy man deserts and is replaced by an oaf of the same kind. But it does us damage in the long term when we lose a man who has been schooled for two years and to the requisite degree of physical skill, and we are left with a bad soldier, or indeed nobody at all to take his place.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{97} Hamilton to Lauderdale, London, 20 February 1675: B.L., Stowe MS. 207, fol. 176.
\textsuperscript{98} John Reading to Williamson, Dover, 14 March 1675: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 369, no. 6.
\textsuperscript{99} Reading to Williamson, 27 May 1675: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 370/255.
\textsuperscript{100} Newsletter, 13 September 1675, printed in H.M.C., \textit{Le Fleming MSS.} (London, 1890), p. 121; Childs, “British Brigade”, p. 395.
In a wider sense, the ongoing value of Douglas and his regiment to the French Army was just this ability to put trained and tested soldiers into the field.  

Following the disaster at Trèves, where the French commander, Turenne, was killed by a cannon ball, sections of both the regiments of Monmouth and Dumbarton departed from France for Britain. They commended "... the civilities of the Germans towards them" as the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg-Zell had offered them quarters and passports. The ramifications of their departure were great. Thomas Langley, an English observer, reported on inability to feed Monmouth’s regiment, which faced starvation as there was "... not one bit of bread left, we having so many hungry souls to feed". In the same month of September 1675, a further seventeen soldiers arrived in England from Trèves, most of them from Dumbarton’s regiment. The general chaos among the regiments at this time is reflected in the fact that one of the deserters was the king’s own kettle-drummer from Monmouth’s regiment. These were followed by another fifty Scots, who themselves preceded "... many po[o]r soldiers of Douglas’s regiment".  

The Scottish regiment still had enough men to participate in the siege of Dachstein in January 1676, where its senior major was killed a day before the town capitulated. Douglas himself returned to Scotland with about thirty of his soldiers and some officers to raise more recruits in the same month. In this sad period, the commanders of the British regiments in France were anxious to ensure their continued favour at the English court. Sir George Hamilton, commander of the Irish regiment, took the opportunity to visit it, where the king assured him of his support: writing to the Earl of Essex, Sir George said that the king had guaranteed that the Lord-Lieutenant would favour

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103 Furthermore, the training of officers occurred only within the regiment as no academies yet existed: military and naval establishments for the teaching and training of young gentlemen would not become a feature of European warfare until the ‘Age of Reason’, defined, by Christopher Duffy, as that period from the death of Louis XIV (1714) to the French Revolution (1789): Duffy, European Warfare in the Age of Reason, p. 15.


106 Thomas Langley to same, 21 September 1675: P.R.O., S.P.Dom., Car. II 373/157.

107 Taylor to same, 21 September 1675: P.R.O., S.P.Dom., Car. II 373/158.


109 Weaver, Royal Scots, p. 31.

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him and his brother, Anthony Hamilton.\textsuperscript{111} The concerted effort among the colonels in France to preserve Charles’s good will is reflected in the Irish peer, Lord Clare’s report from The Hague, that Sir George had returned to the English court with the particular desire to know if Dumbarton was already engaged there.\textsuperscript{112}

CONCLUSION

The Anglo-French alliance, which brought about the loan of 6,000 British soldiers to France, marks a central point in the story of Scottish soldiers abroad in the second half of the seventeenth century. While the Scottish regiment was simply transferred within the French Army it continued to be supplied with men from Scotland but it, like the English and Irish forces who formed the British Brigade, was formally being lent to France. Their status was, therefore, somewhere between that of mercenary units of the Thirty Years’ War type and regiments in a standing national army. However, their presence in France was the result of an ongoing crisis in Britain, which saw Charles II struggle to maintain his pro-French foreign policy in the face of increasing political opposition from the English parliament and civil unrest in Scotland. However, Lauderdale’s introduction of the Militia Act (1668) was designed to offer an efficient reaction to the destabilising effects of religious dissent in the northern kingdom: it was not designed to introduce arbitrary government into England via the back door of Scotland as so many feared. In a similar way, the British forces in France may well have added to Charles’s sense of security. However, they were intended primarily to facilitate the continued payment of his French pension and had the happy side effect of training British soldiers, removing undesirable social elements from Scotland and Ireland, rewarding loyal Crown servants, and strengthening Charles’s relationship with Louis XIV.

The fate of the three (now ostensibly independent) colonels in the decisive years 1676 to 1678 is examined in the next chapter, which analyses the circumstances under which they continued to serve abroad, while maintaining their loyalty and obedience to Charles II.

\textsuperscript{111} Hamilton to Essex, London, 20 February 1675: B.L., Stowe MS. 207, fol. 176.
From 1676 to 1678, Charles II played a political game with British forces in France. His desire for the continuation of his French subsidy looms large in any explanation of his willingness to allow so many of his subjects to remain under arms abroad, but the key decisions, regarding the dismissal or retention of the British forces in France, were essentially made by Louis XIV. Indeed, when the regiments were finally dismissed (in 1678) it was to Louis rather than to Charles that Colonel Dumbarton of the Scottish regiment turned. While the English parliament clearly attributed ownership of the regiments in France to Charles II (to raise further alarm among the English parliament about Charles's motives in keeping them abroad) it is not unfair to see them as the pawns exclusively of Louis XIV of France. As they were caught between the diplomatic machinations of Charles and Louis, the struggle to maintain recruits from home was just one of the issues with which the regiments' commanders had to contend. Indeed, the position of both these monarchs towards the regiments is ultimately ambivalent. It is, however, clear that both kings sought to exploit the bonds of loyalty, economy and friendship, by which the commanders and soldiers of each of the regiments were bound for their own ends.

By September 1676, following the catastrophe at the siege of Trèves, the Earl of Dumbarton and his regiment were fully re-established in France. Louvois expressed joy at their return, and the regiment again served in the Rhine theatre of operations, and was present at the siege of Philippsburg, where it was driven in confusion through the Alsace pass. ¹ The public nature of Dumbarton's enthusiasm for the campaign was entirely French in its nature: Henry Savile reported that the earl "... speaks publicly like a sanguine Frenchman that it [Philippsburg] will not be taken; but to his private friends he is of another opinion".² Like many Britons in France, Dumbarton was strongly francophile. He had, after all, spent the majority of the last twenty-nine of his forty years in France. However, unlike others Britons abroad – like Edward Clinton, fifth Earl of Lincoln, who “... lives

¹ Louvois to M. de La Reyrie, 2 September 1676: Centre Accueil de la Recherche des Archives Nationales (hereafter C.A.R.A.N.), 0'20, fol. 261; L. Weaver, A History of the Royal Scots (London, 1915), pp. 31-2.
² H. Savile, Savile Correspondence: Letters to and From Henry Savile, Esq., Envoy at Paris, and Vice-Chamberlain to Charles II and James II including Letters from his brother George, Marquis of Halifax, ed. W. D. Cooper (London: Camden Society, 1858), pp. 41-2.
here, but sees no English; rails at England, and admires France” – Dumbarton never distanced himself from the large number of British travellers who passed through the French capital.3

As a result, while his regiment fought, Dumbarton continued to raise his stake in the honour system of the French court. One of the stratagems he adopted to achieve this was the promotion at the French court of his nephew, the Earl of Arran: he was to receive him in Paris during the winter of 1676-7. Details from Arran’s visit display the extent of Dumbarton’s pro-French feelings. In July 1676, Dumbarton praised his brother, the Duke of Hamilton’s choice of Arran’s guardian and, on 25 July, expressed his expectation of receiving the young Arran in Paris in the winter.4 Arran’s guardian, James Fall, reported to the Duke of Hamilton about Dumbarton’s insistence that Arran maintain an appropriate equipage and state while he was in Paris, as befitted his rank as heir to Scotland’s premier peerage title.

Dumbarton was keen to see that Arran received instruction in arithmetic, geometry, navigation, fortification and fencing.5 Arran had already received some instruction regarding the handling of a pike and a musket in Glasgow, but Fall ignored Dumbarton’s recommendation to place Arran at Monsieur de Vallé’s academy as he thought it had neither good horses nor masters. Arran was instead placed at Monsieur Flaubert’s establishment.6 Dumbarton also insisted that his nephew’s attendants should look as handsome as possible:

My Lord Dumbarton was of opinion (when I see him at Paris) that my Lord Arran should have more footmen when he put in . . . he intended that my Lord Arran should have the use of one of his chariots and that it would be unhandsome to see the coachmen and footman of different liveries.7

This vehicle, the chariot [charrette], was the particular mark of a maréchal de camp, each of whom thought himself due a chariot, or two wheeled cart.8 Attempts to limit commanding officers’ impedimentia, including chariots, were made as early as the 1640s, although private individuals in

5 Arran met his death in 1712, during a duel with Lord Moham: V. L. Stater, Duke Hamilton is Dead!: A Story of Aristocratic Life and Death in Stuart Britain (New York, 1999).
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Britain also owned these two-wheeled vehicles: the wealthy government financier, Sir Stephen Fox, owned one in the early 1680s.9 When Fall arrived in Paris, Dumbarton was in Scotland, raising recruits for his regiment. This was particularly galling for Fall who expecting to collect money from him for Arran’s use.10

Throughout 1676, Dumbarton had been engaged in active service with the French Army. In November, his brother, Lord James Douglas, wrote to the Marquis de Louvois to inform him that he was himself involved in raising recruits in Scotland. This was proving somewhat difficult, but made possible with the assistance of the Earl of Lauderdale, who was content that the recruits should be found. The secret code contained in the letter approving this enterprise, clearly demonstrates the allegiance of both Lord James and Dumbarton to the French interest with regard to their zeal in Scottish recruitment.11

Dumbarton spent December of 1676 encamped at Charleville with the first battalion of his regiment. To Louvois, he complained that his officers and men were miserable, following a long campaign, and that, due to the non-payment of their arrears, the officers were destitute of the means of providing the small necessaries required by the men.12 In this month, the Duke of Hamilton chided the Earl of Arran’s gentleman companion, James Forbes, for borrowing money, to allow Arran to be received by Louis XIV, from the credit-squeezed Dumbarton.13 But at least, at their meeting, Louis “. . . made him [Arran] more than an ordinary return of his civility with a smile, which is not very common to that king to do”.14 Arran later fell violently ill while passing through Savoy, but was treated by the Duke of Savoy’s personal physician and was befriended by the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Villiers, who was a close personal friend of the Earl of Dumbarton.15

In February 1677, the clandestine recruiting for the French Army of men in Ireland was openly questioned by the English parliament. However, this situation was eclipsed, in March 1677, by the fact that Dumbarton’s name was not included among the thirteen new lieutenants general appointed

12 Dumbarton to Louvois, Charleville, 15 December 1676: A.G., A4505, no. 70.
15 Called “Marquis de Vilar” in Ibid., p. 140.
by Louis XIV, despite the fact that all the others had been appointed *maréchaux de camp* at the same time as he himself had been. A Dumbarton was mortified, and his brother, the Duke of Hamilton, was told that this was "... lookt upon by all persons, as the greatest affront could be done to anie man" so that Dumbarton "... could not but be sensible of it".

Dumbarton's reaction was forthright: he went straight to Louis XIV and confronted him "... with a high resentment", and questioned him as to why he had made such a "... distinction, which could discourage and make him unable of serving him as he had done formerly". In so doing, Dumbarton displayed the classic reaction of military men through the ages to a lack of recognition and promotion: "Nobles become extremely disgusted with war when they do not receive promotion. They believe that an injury has been done to their reputation unless, by suitable advancement, they are reassured that one is pleased with their services."

Louis XIV responded by assuring the earl that he was not dissatisfied with his service, but that "... the deed had been done" and no new lieutenants general could now be appointed. Dumbarton was by this stage very irate and wrote a bitter letter to Louis wherein he mentioned his twenty-two years' service and the "... twentie thousand men he had brought into France during the time, with the losse of a great many relations and friends in the service". After Dumbarton had forced this letter into Louis's hand, the king finally changed his mind and had Le Tellier inform the angry earl that he would, indeed, be promoted. After considerable manouevring at the French court, Dumbarton, therefore, secured his new rank in the French Army.

Dumbarton's actions represent a clear example of the honour-based struggle for promotion and position so familiar to the court of Louis XIV. The French king advised his son and heir, the Dauphin, that:

There is nothing that heats up spirits so powerfully as does jealousy of superiority. The pretensions of the commanders necessarily engages the men who are under their authority; each of the soldiers believes that it is a

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18 *Idem*.
20 N.A.S., G.D. 406/1/5997.
21 *Idem*. 

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question of his own interest; all are animated with envy, and in a single camp there form two enemy armies, each forgetting in a moment the service of their prince and the safety of their country.22

It is unclear what Louis XIV hoped to achieve by this incident. He clearly did not desire Dumbarton's actual resignation as he was loath to accept it, so it is possible that the king simply wanted to reduce the standing of the Scottish regiment within the French Army by degrading its commander. This is a likely motive, given Louis's later re-organisation of the unit. A more cynical explanation is that Dumbarton's only real value to Louis lay in his ability to recruit men for French service, so that the difficulties Dumbarton experienced in getting men from Scotland throughout 1676 may well have reminded Louis XIV of the earl's expendability.

To remind Dumbarton and his regiment of their duty, Louis XIV added a certain sting to the earl's hard-won promotion by ordering the reform of Dumbarton's regiment. Upon the receipt of five hundred new Scottish recruits, Lord James Douglas's regiment, until that time independent of Dumbarton's, was completely annexed to that of his brother.23 The Duke of Hamilton reported the news to the veteran Scottish soldier, Sir James Turner, who was seeking employment for one of his relations in the same regiment:

Att this junctur, it will be an ill time to recommend that relation off yours to be captane, for upon the takeing of 500 men off the recruits off my brother's [Lord James's] regiment att sea, the King of France has broke ten companies off the regiment.24

He added that "... nixt winter will be more fitt, for then is the time he makes up any vacancies, and then you shall have all the assistance I can give yow".25

22 Louis XIV, King of France, Mémoires de Louis XIV pour l'instruction de la Dauphin, ed. C. Dreyss, vol. 2 (Paris, 1860), pp. 123-4. Twenty years later, Louis de Rouvroy, Duc de Saint-Simon, was also passed over for promotion: "The promotion was announced; everyone was astonished at the number for there had never been so large a list. I early scanned the names of new cavalry brigadiers, hoping to find my own, and was mortified to see five junior to me mentioned. My pride was most deeply hurt but I kept silent for fear of saying something rash in my vexation. The Marichal de Lorges was most indignant and his brother-in-law not less so, and they both insisted that I was much inclined to do so; but my youth, the war beginning, the thought of renouncing my ambitions in my chosen career, the boredom of being idle, the tedious summers when conversation would all turn on war and partings, the advancement that could be earned by distinguished conduct, were all a powerful deterrent, and I spent two months in mental agony, resigning every morning and every night reversing my decision": L. de Rouvroy, Duc de Saint-Simon, Historical Memoirs of the Duc de Saint-Simon, ed. and trans. Lucy Norton, vol. 1 (London, 1967), p. 183.


Arran’s companion, James Forbes, thought Dumbarton’s promotion did nothing for him, except add a new charge of 20,000 livres for making up his equipage as a French lieutenant general. This reflected the contemporary practice that equated a man’s seniority with the amount of equipment and property he brought with him on campaign.26 It also justifies the complaint of Louis XIV’s ordinance of 1672 that “. . . one of the things which contributes the most to the ruin of the king’s officers is the luxury and the sumptuousness of their clothes”.27

There was also a contemporary movement aimed at limiting the expenses which officers incurred. Many of these expenses were brought about by dressing their men in costly garments: “The king does not desire that [officers] hand out decorative ribbons or other things of this nature, nor even that they provide [new] clothing to their soldiers all at once” and “It is ridiculous to think of giving velvet facings to sergeants, as well as gloves and lace cravats.”28

Forbes feared for Lord James Douglas’s future, seeing that the continuation of his full colonel’s pay rested on a tenuous promise from Louvois, and knowing that he was otherwise hopelessly indebted, having made up his own equipage for the encampment at Cambrai at ruinous expense to himself.29 As an inevitable result, Forbes reported a misunderstanding between Dumbarton and Lord James over the issue of the continuance of the latter’s colonel’s pay in May 1677. Louvois insisted that Lord James’s income must come from the profits of his ten former companies, which now formed part of Dumbarton’s regiment. Forbes said that this constituted the “. . . taking of the thousand livres of my Lord Dumb[arton] to give him [Lord James] which is neither just nor reasonable” as Dumbarton would, therefore, have to pay his brother out of his own pocket.30

In the middle of all this organizational and financial turmoil, French belligerence provided opportunities for Louis’s royal relations to enjoy the chivalric attractions of the battlefield.31 For example, the Duke of Monmouth and the Anglo-Huguenot Earl of Feversham were reported to have

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31 This calls to mind a trend still much in evidence in 1732, when Marshal Saxe said: “War is an honourable trade. Just call to mind all those princes who have borne a musket! - Turenne is one example. I have seen many an officer revert to the ranks rather than accept a demeaning condition of life”: Marshal Saxe, Mes rêves (Paris, 1732; reprint 1877), p. 10, cited in Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, p. 43.
both joined the French Army as volunteers in July 1677, while another peer – Lord Plymouth – volunteered to serve in the Dutch Army at about the same time.\textsuperscript{32} Though his presence in France was ‘unofficial’, Monmouth was still heavily associated with the British forces still present in that country and the duke reported that all of the British soldiers in France were being brought together at Amiens.\textsuperscript{33} However, there was still some doubt about the efficacy of the British force in France as the recruits raised for it in Scotland were felt to be poor.\textsuperscript{34}

Dumbarton’s regiment was at the siege of Freiburg later in the year, after which the \textit{regiment de Douglas} was ordered to muster at Châlons-sur-Marne in Champagne.\textsuperscript{35} The earl thought they might be quartered in Provence in expectation of going into Italy upon the declaration of war with the Duke of Milan. The Earl of Danby’s correspondent thought this would be a disastrous move as:

It is the King’s own regiment I mean our King’s; by my Lord Douglas his own confession 2,500 strong – 3,000 is the constant report – consisting of thirty-eight companies, and full of very good officers, which the King may recall to his own service by the capitulation between the Crowns.\textsuperscript{36} And it is too probable the sending of it into Italy is designed on purpose to render the recalling of it difficult, almost impossible; for it is observed that they have of late employed all his Majesty’s subjects in their service in those places most remote from England, for which I know they pretend it was done to prevent the deserting of the soldiers, in which there is in effect some appearance of reason. But besides that the difference is not great — as to the facility of deserting — between Flanders and Germany; I know the Douglas regiment hath been formerly for a long continuance quartered in Picardy and Artois and in Champagne some time, without much loss by deserting and it is not to be doubted, but if the regiment goes into Italy it will be lost to us irrevocably and perish.\textsuperscript{37}

The \textit{regiment de Douglas} may well have been the regiment of Charles II – according to its capitulation – but it was sufficiently the personal possession of its commander for Louvois to address Dumbarton alone, regarding the retention of the unit in French service.

In December 1677, the account of Dumbarton given by Sir Robert Southwell – evidently on the verge of possible aggression against Britain – is enough to confirm both the earl’s important position in the French Army and his influence over his own regiment:

\textsuperscript{32} Lord Ranelagh to Viscount Conway, 31 July 1677: Conway Papers, P.R.O., S.P. Ireland, Car. II 338/81.

\textsuperscript{33} Monmouth to Louvois, 29 November 1677: P.R.O., S.P. 78/41/103.

\textsuperscript{34} Sir George Rawdon to Viscount Conway, 8 November 1677: Conway Papers, P.R.O., S.P. Ireland, Car. II 338, no. 110.

\textsuperscript{35} J. Childs, \textit{The Army of Charles II} (London, 1976), appendix D, p. 245.

\textsuperscript{36} Special regulations to be observed by the Royal English Regiment of Foot in the French Service (1675): P.R.O., S.P. 44/41, fol. 32.

\textsuperscript{37} J. Brisbane to the Earl of Danby, 1 December 1677, printed in H.M.C., \textit{Buckingham, Lindsey, Onslow, Emily, Hare and Round MSS.} (London, 1895), p. 390.
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My Lord Dumbarton is every day in close conversation with my Lord Treasurer and (as we think) modelling the matters of the war. As he was riding post from Paris hither he was called back by Monseur Louvois with order to speak with him in the moment of his return; and accordingly he was waked out of his sleep, and in short [Louvois] asked my Lord if there should be wars with England whether the king of France might not place obligations enough on him to engage his stay; which when he declared the impossibility of, if his own king should call him, the other replied, that he then valued but little a marshal’s staff.38

However, Dumbarton displayed steadfast loyalty to his native sovereign, prompting the French authorities to respond harshly:

His Lordship’s regiment is sent to the further side of France in purpose to be harassed, and the Duke of Monmouth’s regiment is refused either quarters or pay unless they will subscribe to serve the whole campaigne.39

The regiment of Monmouth, under the personal commanded by Colonel Justin MacCarthry, was, on 16 January 1678, ordered to reform its sixteen companies. This meant reducing the officers to half-pay while they were not on active service.40 This implied that the regiment would lose both strength and prestige within the French Army and reinforced the fact that it existed in France purely for the convenience of Louis XIV rather than as a result of personal friendship or largess on the part of that monarch towards Charles II. Importantly, from the point of view of its officers and soldiers, a reformation also meant a reduction in their pay.

Though the Commissaire de Morangis reported to Louvois that the officers of the company received the news “. . . avec beaucoup de silence et de respect” (with much silence and respect) he greatly feared that they would reject the reform and return to Britain.41 They were given three days to decide whether they would return to England or remain in the king’s service under the new conditions.42 De Morangis, perhaps voicing Louis XIV’s expectations regarding the emasculation of the regiment, predicted that the majority of the officers would accept reformed pay and status,

39 Ibid., p. 391.
40 Justin MacCarthy, third son of Donogh, 1st Earl of Clanmarty. He was ennobled by James II as Viscount Mountcashel (23 May 1689), and married Lady Arabella Wentworth, daughter of Thomas, Earl of Stafford.
41 Commissaire de Morangis to Louvois, 16 January 1678: A.G., A1564, no. 5.
42 Idem.
rather than "... quitter le halbarde" (quit the halberd). But the authorities were quite mistaken in this.

On the very same day, upon hearing that they were preparing immediately to depart from French service, the Commissaire de Suçy complained to Louvois of "... la petulance de la nation anglais" (English petulance). The officers of the English regiment were not prepared to accept the reform: they had recently witnessed the effects of a reform upon the Swiss regiment in French service and fully understood its implications for their future income and status. Dumbarton’s regiment was not (for a short time) similarly threatened and it received recruits from Scotland at the end of January 1677. On 25 January, three ships were required to take the men from Edinburgh to Calais, which Dumbarton said he was attempting to do as humanely as possible. However, some difficulties were created by Lauderdale’s refusal to sign a release for the men, due to the diplomatic necessity of insisting to the Spanish ambassador that the French were not being unfairly favoured with British recruits to the exclusion of Spain. The Spanish ambassador’s complaint was, however, a purely diplomatic ruse, as English and Scottish regiments had no long-term or significant history in Spanish service.

Despite the insistence by Charles II that no recruits would be let out of Scotland, he put his own signature to passes which allowed the Scottish recruits belonging to Dumbarton to leave Scotland for France. The welfare of the Scottish recruits was closely watched by the French authorities, who were also expecting men from Ireland, under Captain Dongan of Sir George Hamilton’s Irish regiment. However, situation in which Dumbarton found himself was complicated by the threatened reorganisation of his regiment, so that one or two of its companies would be broken up at the same time as his brother, Lord James Douglas, was raising recruits for the regiment in Scotland. Dumbarton wrote to Lauderdale, expressing his vexation over the difficulties which now seemed to

43 Same to same, 16 January 1678: A.G., A'564, no. 5.
plague the way of life that had worked so well for him in the past: "This year all things goes crosse with me."\(^{50}\)

On 28 February 1677, Dumbarton's recruits were due to arrive in France, but the French ambassador to England, Honoré Courtin, complained that Lauderdale's reluctance to let them go had caused the loss of some of the men through desertion.\(^{51}\) Dumbarton's capitulation on these recruits was to be six *sous* per man, plus their bread, to supplement their pay from the previous December. They were also to be included in the twenty-four rations of forage allotted to the army at the encampment at Charleville, which had also to sustain a French regiment of cadets.\(^{52}\) On 25 February 1677, Monmouth also sought permission to obtain recruits, with the intention of forming a new battalion in his regiment.\(^{53}\)

In February 1678, the Scottish regiment was stationed in Burgundy "... on purpose to render the recall of it difficult almost impossible" according to the English opponents of French service. They reiterated the fact that it was still "... our King's regiment ... which the King may recall to his service by the capitulation between the Crowns".\(^{54}\) The reason for the regiment's relocation lay in the fact that, on 22 February 1678, the English parliament passed a bill, making it illegal for any English soldier to serve in the French Army.\(^{55}\) No parallel decision seems to have been taken openly by the parliament or Privy Council of Scotland, but the English ambassador to France was told that "... my Lord Dumbarton's [sic] regiment and the rest are all to bee recalled, insomuch that unlesse some balme (from heaven) be applyed to the wound, I doe not see but it must bleed very suddainly".\(^{56}\)

Charles II took measures to ease Dumbarton's situation by recommending him to the care of the English ambassador to France when Dumbarton returned there at the end of the month to "... bring home all our men there, which are all disbanded" as a result of the disagreement.\(^{57}\) But, Louis XIV


\(^{51}\) Courtin to Louvois, London, 4 February 1677: A.G., A'543, no. 23. Honoré Courtin, Seigneur de Chanteroigne (1622-1703), from Normandy, a former Counsellor of the *parlement* of Rouen and Governor of Picardy, began service as French ambassador to the Court of St James in May 1676.


\(^{54}\) H.M.C., *Lindsay MSS.*, 390, quoted in Atkinson, "Charles II's Regiments", 54.


continued to vent his spleen against Charles by refusing to allow the regiment to depart until one month after that king’s declaration of war against the Dutch. Ultimately, Louis had to admit the impossibility of keeping the men in French service indefinitely, despite the fact that so many of the veterans of Douglas’s regiment were unwilling to return that it was necessary to have “... a regiment of horse drawn up to charge them if upon disbanding they would not disperse themselves”.58

By March 1678, Dumbarton had made moves, as a form of insurance against the loss of his position in the French Army, towards securing a position for himself within the British military establishment. In this month, he obtained half-pay for the officers of his regiment thanks to Lauderdale’s intercession on his behalf and, perhaps as a sign of gratitude, was reporting freely to the latter on diplomatic occurrences in France and the Low Countries.59 As another mark of favour, his brother, Lord James, was allowed to recruit a regiment (consisting of ten companies) in Scotland, where he would be able to recruit men with “... greater expedition than in England”.60 The regiment was, basically, purchased by Lauderdale, who intended to make a gift of it to the Earl of Mar in exchange for the latter’s position as governor of Stirling Castle (worth £500 or £600 Sterling per annum). As heritable keeper of the castle, Mar refused to countenance the exchange.61

The unpopularity of French service in both England and Scotland was apparent in the difficulties experienced by Lord James in raising men for his regiment. He wrote angrily to the Earl of Moray, complaining that “... he could get no men in Scotland” and claiming that Lauderdale was, in fact, obstructing his recruiting. Lauderdale, indeed, forbade any existing members of the Scottish militia to join the recruit, so that Lord James was “... insinuating as mutch as you [Lauderdale] uer not so fordvard for this war”.62 However, both Charles II and Lord James’s brother, the Duke of Hamilton, were convinced that, had Lauderdale done otherwise, he would have “... injured his [the king’s] interest uhen Scotland uas in sutch disorder” due to the necessity felt by the Scottish government of using the Scottish militia in the suppression of field conventicles (the heirs to the radical

58 Idem.
59 Dumbarton to Lauderdale, 11 March 1678: B.L., Eg. MS. 3,331, fol. 7.
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covenanting tradition of the 1640s). Furthermore, Paul Hopkins has emphasized the importance of the militia in satisfying the fiscal demands of the Scottish Crown: it was still collecting pre-Restoration taxes towards the end of Charles’s reign. But despite all this, or perhaps because of the success of Lauderdale’s policy of caution, the Crown was voted the largest peacetime supply in Scotland for the payment of new forces there: £1,800,000 (including taxation revenue worth £360,000 per annum).

A great deal has been said about the commanders of the British Brigade in French service, but more needs to be said about the ordinary soldiers who served abroad. Any analysis of the common British soldiery in French service between 1672 and 1678 is limited by the obvious lack of extant personal information about most of them. One highly important source for common soldiers is the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, which describes desertions and complaints of wrongful pressing of men into military service. These records reveal a certain amount of information about the men who were targeted for military service. Among those who were officially allowed to the recruiters were the vagabonds and fugitives “... that are burdensome to their lieges and follow no settled way of livelihood nor calling”. Conversely, those men targeted for unofficial and illegal pressing were often among the most useful members of urban communities, including craftsmen and artisans. These groups were obviously of considerable advantage to regimental communities, burdened as they were with baggage wagons, weaponry and clothing which all required maintenance and replacement at one time or another.

Another important source of information is the previously unstudied reception of British soldiers at the Hôtel des Invalides. The 1668 ‘War of Devolution’ against Spain caused Louis seriously to consider the establishment of a home for wounded soldiers. A similar need was not apparent in Britain until the 1680s, when, in 1681, the establishment of Chelsea Hospital, for veteran soldiers,
was begun. The initial stages of the hospital were funded by Sir Stephen Fox, at that time paymaster of the Forces.\textsuperscript{69}

In 1670, a French edict stated that all men who had served for ten years in the ranks and who could not continue in that service due to age or infirmity, would be accepted into the care of the Crown. Entry to the hôtel was not particularly easy, as soldiers had to present certificates from their commanders, who verified their service and the nature of their incapacity.

A sixteenth-century practice insisted that the king could order monasteries to accept as lay brothers soldiers who had been wounded in action. In 1516 this was ratified (by the Concordat of Bologna), but the heavy casualties of the French Wars of Religion placed great strain on this system. According to a royal ordinance of 4 March 1578, Royal agents were allowed to verify the claims of military invalids.\textsuperscript{70} Henry IV offered them the choice between life in the cloister or life at home on a pension, but ordinances of 1597 and 1600 also converted the Charité Chrétienne (established by Henry III as a home for distressed civilians) into a home for former soldiers.\textsuperscript{71} Louis XIII resolved to transform the Château de Bicêtre into a home for invalids, but the money to support it was to come from taxes on monasteries – which drew opposition from the clergy.\textsuperscript{72}

These establishments were novel enough to attract visitors: for example, the Scottish physician and antiquarian, Sir Robert Sibbald, visited La Charité and the Hôtel Dieu during the course of his medical studies on the continent in the 1660s.\textsuperscript{73} Between 1670 and 1674, when the actual Hôtel des Invalides was opened, inmates were housed on the rue du Cherche-Midi, in the faubourg St. Germain in Paris.\textsuperscript{74}

Between October 1670 and March 1715, 27,172 soldiers were matriculated (had their status as soldiers translated into that of military pensioners) into the hôtel.\textsuperscript{75} Normally the hôtel housed 3,000 men, but it could accommodate 6,000 if required.\textsuperscript{76} Most veterans lived on the premises until, due


\textsuperscript{70} Baillargeat, Invalides, pp. 127-46.

\textsuperscript{71} Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, p. 431.

\textsuperscript{72} Idem.


\textsuperscript{74} Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, p. 432.

\textsuperscript{75} Baillargeat, Invalides, pp. 482-3.

to Louis's wars in the 1690s and early 1700s, their numbers swelled. Between October 1670 and 1688, some eighty-two Scottish and English officers and private soldiers were accepted into the hôtel. The information recorded about them included their age, rank, marital status, religion and the regiment to which they belonged. From this data it is possible to construct an image of the junior officers and private soldiers of the regiments of Douglas and Monmouth. The typicality of these soldiers is open to question, but the random nature of wounds and infirmity, contracted during military service, might be assumed to provide a fairly typical representation of the personnel of the British regiments.

The majority of British soldiers, both Scottish and English, who entered the Invalides were Protestant. Ten Scots are recorded as being Protestant, for example, while twenty-one English were recorded as being so. Roman Catholic soldiers came a close second, with nineteen Scottish Catholics and ten English Catholics being admitted between 1670 and 1688. Those soldiers recorded as Irish at the Hôtel des Invalides, were exclusively Catholic. The origin of the Scottish and English soldiers was variously Douglas's and Monmouth's regiments, with no fixed religious faith belonging to either regiment: there were both Roman Catholic and Protestant Scots in the Douglas regiment, while both faiths occurred among Englishmen in Monmouth's. It is estimated that something in the region of 10 per cent of the regular French Army were Protestant before 1685, a figure which obviously included both French Huguenots and foreign Protestants.77 With about 10 per cent of its personnel being Roman Catholic, the statistics for Douglas's regiment conform to the larger picture for the French Army as a whole, but it would be unreasonable to expect Monmouth's wholly English regiment to reflect these statistics.

Of those Scots taken into the Hôtel des Invalides at the high point of their campaigning in the Rhine theatre (1676 and 1677), all belonged exclusively to the regiment de Douglas, while a small number of Irish soldiers - two in all - were described as belonging to the same regiment. Monmouth's regiment was exclusively stocked by English soldiers and Sir George Hamilton's Irish regiment had a majority of Irish soldiers - nine in all were taken into the Hôtel des Invalides - though there were also three English soldiers taken into the hôtel who came from Hamilton's regiment. Four soldiers - two Scottish and two English - belonged to other standing French regiments which were not part of the British Brigade. Of the intake after the British Brigade was

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disbanded (from 1678-84), only four veteran soldiers from the regiment de Douglas were taken into the hôtel, two Scots and as many Irishmen. This is opposed to eight veterans from Monmouth’s regiment (six Irish and two English). By the late 1670s, this regiment was increasingly incapable of acquiring men from England, and consequently turned to Irish veterans to fill its ranks. By 1678 it relied almost totally for its personnel on Irish and Scottish veterans from the other regiments.78

By far the greatest number of British Brigade veterans came from Sir George Hamilton’s Irish regiment, which had ten Irish soldiers and three Englishmen accepted into the hôtel. Between 1684 and 1688 no veteran soldiers at all from Douglas’s regiment were taken into the hôtel, while only one English soldier, from Monmouth’s former regiment, was accepted, as opposed to two Scots, two English and fourteen Irish soldiers from various French regiments. The majority of these soldiers had previously served in the British Brigade in either the Scottish, English or Irish regiments and had gone on to join mainly German mercenary regiments – including those commanded by Count Königsmarck and Prince Fürstenburg – on the disbanding of the brigade in 1678.

Those soldiers taken into the Hôtel des Invalides were accepted either because they had been wounded in action, or because they were too old to continue in active service. A sample of the Scottish soldiers from the first five years of the hôtel’s operation (during the active years of the British Brigade in French service) shows that, in 1672, a lieutenant of Douglas’s regiment – one Robert Robisson – was admitted due to wounds received in action. He was twenty years old.79 Between April and August 1675, four Scots from Douglas’s regiment – Guillaume Jacques [Jack] and two soldiers called Denis Tambel [Campbell] and Jacques Morclanc [?McLeod] – were matriculated into the hôtel. One was suffering from general “...fatigues de la guerre” (war fatigue), while the other three had been wounded at the siege of Dachstein in Alsace, one having been hit by shrapnel from a cannon ball, while Morclanc’s right hand had been wounded in an accident involving a grenade.80 In 1677 a soldier in Lord James Douglas’s company of Dumbarton’s regiment – Jacques Guillaume – was admitted, having been ‘incomodé’ (worn out) by three years in French service in Flanders.81

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81 71 October 1677: A.G., X.Y.6, fol. 200.
The most interesting information contained in the registrations for the Hôtel des Invalides is the age of the soldiers who were committed. Of five Scottish soldiers matriculated into the hôtel between 1670 and 1675 their ages ranged from twenty to an average of twenty-seven years.\textsuperscript{82} Of those Scots admitted in 1676 and 1677, there were six soldiers over the age of sixty years: three of them were aged seventy. Of the remaining fifteen, three were in their fifties, five in their early- to mid-thirties, six in their mid-twenties and one eighteen year old.\textsuperscript{83}

In contrast, there was only one English soldier over the age of fifty-eight years: a sixty-three year old sergeant from Clifford’s company. There were five English soldiers in their fifties, one who was forty years old, ten in their thirties, and sixteen who were in their twenties.\textsuperscript{84} The Irish soldiers had a similar age distribution to the English. It is clear from this data that there were many more aged, veteran Scottish soldiers in the British Brigade in French service at its high point than there were either English or Irish. Those Scottish and English soldiers matriculated between 1684 and 1688, were all under the age of forty, with the eldest – a married convert to Roman Catholicism from Clifford’s company of Monmouth’s regiment – being aged thirty-eight years.

The two Scots accepted in this period were aged twenty-two and thirty years, suggesting that they were both relatively new recruits to Dumbarton’s regiment. The age of the six English soldiers accepted into the Hôtel des Invalides at this time, was evenly distributed from early-twenties through to late-thirties.\textsuperscript{85} The ages of the four eldest Irish soldiers were seventy-one and one sixty-five, while two were aged sixty. The seventy-one year old was a veteran in Prince Fürstenburg’s regiment, the sixty-five year old of the gens d’armes anglaise, and of the two sixty year olds one belonged to Moray’s company in Dumbarton’s regiment, while the other was a sergeant in Hamilton’s regiment.

Other than these elderly soldiers, the age distribution for Irish soldiers was again similar to that for English soldiers. In the period 1684 to 1688, one Scot (from the regiment of Surbeck in the French Army) was fifty-seven, and the other (from the regiment of Greder) was thirty-five years old.\textsuperscript{86} Of the three Englishmen admitted in this same period, one (from the regiment of Königsmarck) had achieved the remarkable age of eighty-four. The second eldest (a veteran of the

\textsuperscript{82} Idem.
\textsuperscript{83} A.G., X.Y.7, fols. 12-281 passim.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., fols. 75-203 passim.
\textsuperscript{86} Conseil du 4 Novembre 1684 [au 1691]: A.G., X.Y.10, nos. 4751 and 4855.
regiment of Monmouth, who had gone on to serve under Fürstenburg) was sixty-three, and the youngest (from the regiment of Greder) was thirty-six years old.\(^{87}\) The Irish were equally aged: one (admitted in 1684) was seventy, while another (admitted in 1685) had the same age, and a third (admitted in 1687) was seventy-five years old.\(^{88}\)

It is significant that the hôtel was ultimately used as something of a dumping ground for aged and infirm veterans of the British regiments in French service. Despite the number of British soldiers who were admitted to the hôtel, only six Scots were actually buried there.\(^{89}\) Only four soldiers described as being English by nationality were buried in the same period, but some thirty-three Irish soldiers were interred in the cemetery of the hôtel. However, the descriptions of soldiers' nationality are somewhat suspect as the surname of one of the Irish soldiers is recorded as 'Comin' (a Scottish name), while one of the English soldiers is called 'Reilly' (an Irish name). Jean Comin from Dongan's regiment was matriculated into the hôtel between 1678 and 1684. He was recorded as a Catholic and may, indeed, have been of Irish birth.\(^{90}\) Hugues Reilly was indeed described as 'Anglois de Nation' when he was admitted to the Invalides on 31 April 1675, but was received as a cavalry trooper from Sir George Hamilton's Irish regiment.\(^{91}\)

Most of the soldiers of the British Brigade were unmarried. Of the six Scottish soldiers of Douglas's regiment and of Monmouth's, recorded between 1670 and 1675, none was married. None of the Irish soldiers recorded in the same period were married. No soldier was married in 1676 or 1677. One English soldier – Thomas Gallamont, a thirty-eight year old convert to Roman Catholicism from Clifford's company of Monmouth's regiment – was recorded as being married in the period 1678 to 1684.\(^{92}\) Two Irish soldiers were also married in this period: the thirty-two year old Simon Conual, of Lacy's company in Hamilton's regiment, and the forty-eight year old Antoine Real, called 'La Jeunesse', of Caramont's company in the gardes française.\(^{93}\)

In the period 1684 to 1688, no soldiers were recorded as being married. Part of the reason for this may have been the very poor conditions army life offered to soldiers' wives. Sir James Turner,

\(^{87}\) A.G., X.Y.10, nos. 3493, 4187, and 4192.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., nos. 3519, 3598, and 4265.
\(^{89}\) Registre des officiers et soldats qui sont decedez et Enterrez au Cimitiere de l'hôtel Royal des Invalides depuis le 12 Octobre 1675 [au 1719]: A.G., X.Y.131.
\(^{91}\) Ibid., fol. 46v.
\(^{93}\) Ibid., fols. 145v and 176.
commenting on the "... needless numbers of women and boys who follow armies", highlighted the often harsh reality of their lives saying:

Of those [women] who walk on foot, and are the wives of inferior officers and soldiery; these must walk besides the baggage of the several regiments to whom they belong ... they provide, buy and dress their husbands meat when their husbands are on duty, or newly come from it, they bring a sewel [faggots] for fire, and wash their linnens, and in such manner of employments a soldiery's wife may be helpful to others, and gain money to her husband and her self.94

High mortality rates among both soldiers and their dependents may explain an obvious disinclination towards marriage for soldiers and civilian women alike.

It is a reasonable assumption that the happenstance of entry to the Hôtel des Invalides resulted in an intake which is broadly representative of British and Irish veterans of the British Brigade. This data indicates that the average Scottish, English, or Irish soldier of the Brigade was aged in his late twenties or early thirties. He might, in rare cases, be as old as seventy or as young as twenty, was unmarried and, generally, served in a regiment alongside others of his nation. The occasional great age of some of the soldiers attests the career-based nature of their service, which is reinforced by those aging soldiers who clearly continued to serve in diverse regiments in France long after those of the British Brigade were disbanded in 1678.

It is equally clear that many Scottish Catholics served in the Douglas regiment, while the Englishmen serving under the Duke of Monmouth were predominantly Protestant. Religious diversity did, however, exist to some extent in both regiments. The soldiers who served in the regiment of Sir George Hamilton were predominantly Irish and Catholic. The fact that some of them were also Protestant Englishmen serves as a reminder of the sometimes fluid, and undoubtedly diverse, factors which brought individual soldiers into one regiment rather than another.

CONCLUSION

Between 1675 and 1678, British forces formed a not insignificant proportion of the French Army. The Scottish contingent, forming two-thirds of the entire British Brigade in French service;
particularly distinguished itself as a thoroughly professional veteran body of soldiers. However, its term of service in the French Army in the second half of the decade saw its near total destruction at the siege of Trèves (1677). It’s commander experienced mounting problems in recruiting men in Scotland which stemmed from two factors: firstly, his understanding of, and care for, domestic developments in Britain remained (perhaps deliberately) obtuse while, secondly, he himself maintained an ambivalent relationship with both Charles II and Louis XIV. By 1678 neither monarch seems totally to have trusted Dumbarton, with the result that the colonel could do little but test the political winds during the last few years of his service in the French Army. Given his years of service to the French Crown, he ought to have established a strong position for himself and his regiment in France. His evident failure to achieve a position of strength can be directly related to his increasingly anomalous position as a courtier and nobleman, on the one hand, and a professional serving officer on the other. Dumbarton never forgot the lessons of semi-entrepreneurial command that he had learnt during his youth: his increasing inability successfully to apply those lessons in the late 1670s is symptomatic of the changing role and expectations of military commanders in the second half of the seventeenth century.

By 1679 the political situation in Britain was singularly tense. The continued presence in France of thousands of British soldiers especially aggravated anti-army and anti-absolutist government groups in England. Parliamentary and popular opposition to the continued presence of Britons in France, and the relationship between the conclusion of Louis XIV’s war with the Dutch and the ‘Exclusion Crisis’ which overtook Charles II in 1678, is the focus of the next chapter.
Part III:
The Return Home, 1679-92
Tampering in a high degree with foreigners
THE TREATY OF NIJMEGEN AND THE
‘EXCLUSION CRISIS’ OF 1678

The decade of the 1670s fuelled an impending crisis for Charles II’s Crown and the Restoration settlement, as fears of absolutist government (royal rule unfettered by constitutional or parliamentary influence) grew steadily in the years between 1672 and 1678. Opposition to Charles came predominantly from the Whigs, a disparate group (not yet a political ‘party’), who were united by the desire to safeguard Protestantism and Parliamentary privilege in England. For the more radical among them the restitution of the ‘old cause’ of Commonwealth republicanism was the driving force behind their actions. In this environment, the continued presence of British soldiers in France could do little but add to general apprehension, among the English populace, of the effects of French influence in Britain. The political instability of the late 1670s was further fuelled by Charles II’s break with Louis XIV, following the British king’s involvement in the peace negotiations leading to the 1678 Treaty of Nijmegen. Louis revoked Charles’s pension, started paying his parliamentary opponents, and created even greater problems for the king by dismissing the British Brigade from French service, obliging Charles to explain to the English parliament the arrival in Britain of thousands of highly trained and partially Gallicised veteran soldiers.¹

The ‘Exclusion Crisis’ (1678-81), in the middle of which Dumbarton’s regiment returned to Britain (in 1679), was brought about by growing English Parliamentary opposition to Charles’s openly Roman Catholic heir, James, Duke of York. It concluded with the vanquishing of the Whigs and the triumph of the monarchy, whose victory assured Charles II of peace and security in his final years on the throne and ought to have done the same for James VII and II when he succeeded in 1685.

In 1678, Charles II ratified an alliance with the Dutch, who had been forced into seeking a defensive agreement with England due to increasing pressure from France. It was initially English reluctance to join in such an alliance that caused the Dutch to consider peace negotiations with the French and these negotiations eventually led to the Treaty of Nijmegen which temporarily put a stop to open

aggression between France and the Netherlands. The pro-French enthusiasm of the ‘States Party’ in the Netherlands was significantly checked by the truculence of French peace negotiators, prior to the signing of the Treaty of Nijmegen.\footnote{M. A. M. Franken, Conraad Van Beuningen’s Politieke en Diplomatieke Aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-1684 (Gröningen, 1966), pp. 158-63; K. H. D. Haley, “The Dutch, the Invasion of England and the Alliance of 1689”, in The Revolution of 1688-1689: Changing Perspectives, ed. L. G. Schwezer (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 26-7; C. L. Grose, “The Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678”, English Historical Review, vol. 39 (1924), pp. 349-72, 526-52.} The negotiations of 1678 also considerably affected the Earl of Dumbarton’s attempts to raise recruits in Scotland, and he was bluntly informed by Lauderdale that further requests for this purpose would be considered by Charles to be “... very unseasonable and of no use to you”.\footnote{Lauderdale to Dumbarton, Whitehall, 18 September 1676: Public Record Office, London (hereafter P.R.O.), S.P. Scotland, Warrant Book 4, fol. 74.} Charles II would not consent to Dumbarton’s actions, because he was already fighting a losing diplomatic battle to maintain his position, as one of the powerful mediators in the Nijmegen negotiations. To allow recruits to be raised for either side involved in the conflict, would destroy what little integrity he had left.

Charles had already offered his services to Louis XIV, as a peace negotiator at Nijmegen, in order to secure a subsidy from the French king.\footnote{Négociations relatives à la succession d’Espagne sous Louis XIV, ed. F. A. M. Mignot, vol. 4 (Paris, 1835-42), pp. 426-7, 445, 487-93, 514, 516-17, 518, 523, and 572.} Furthermore, James, Duke of York, was given the difficult mission of making French support for England seem more credible to Protestant powers in Europe, by attempting to stay French aggression against the Netherlands throughout the negotiations.\footnote{J. Black, “The Revolution and the Development of English Foreign Policy”, in By Force or Default? The Revolution of 1688, ed. E. Cruikshanks (Edinburgh, 1989), p. 138; J. Black, A System of Absolutism? British Foreign Policy 1660-1793 (London, 1991), p. 24.} Partly as a result of the various, and often self-defeating, motives of the negotiators, the treaty which eventuated from the negotiations was a personal disaster for William of Orange. It ratified a peace that cost the United Provinces dearly in land. Conversely, William’s opponents in the anti-Orangist ‘States Party’ saw the treaty as a victory in reinforcing the ‘True Freedom’ of the States’ constitution against the incursions of the *stadtholder*, William of Orange, and the Orange-Nassau family.

Ironically for the Stuart Crown, the financial costs of the treaty were such that William of Orange was forced to consider, for the first time, a plan for the invasion of England in order to secure the financial and military support he required to defeat France after 1678.\footnote{I. J. Israel, “The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution” and W. Troost, “William III, Brandenburg, and the Construction of the anti-French Coalition, 1672-88”, both in The Anglo-Dutch Moment, ed. J. I. Israel (Cambridge, 1991), cf. pp. 113-16.} The Treaty of Nijmegen was equally disastrous, on a personal level, for Charles II and his principal advisor, the Earl of Danby.
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Louis XIV’s annoyance at Charles’s unreliability throughout the proceedings, resulted in the British king being left with two useless treaties – one with the Netherlands and one with France – and, for the next three years, Louis attempted to interfere in English domestic policy. Charles’s poor bargaining position and the loss of his French pension meant his finances were now partly reliant on supply from the English parliament. This situation exacerbated the ‘Exclusion Crisis’ later that same year (1678).7

The Earl of Danby tried to facilitate further French subsidy plans.8 However, the “... Miscarriages, Prorogations and Dissolutions” to which French subsidies had allowed Charles to subject the English parliament, could do little but feed that body’s growing fear of absolutist government.9 The automatic association of this style of government with Roman Catholicism, and particularly with the Most Christian King in France, significantly fuelled the popular hysteria that erupted into the ‘Exclusion Crisis’ of 1678-81. This crisis coincided with Louis XIV subsidising Charles’s political opponents (1678-80), France subsidising Charles (1681-5), a rebellion in Scotland (1679), a feared Irish rebellion (1680-1) and a planned English rebellion (1681-3), and which culminated in the unsuccessful Rye House Plot (1683).10

The crisis of 1678 revealed the depth of popular antipathy in Britain towards Catholicism and the public’s awareness of the dangers of international counter-Reformation Catholic evangelism. Indeed, Jonathan Scott maintains that the failure of the Restoration settlement to quell fears of the ‘foreignness’ of the Stuarts, and their too close association with the Roman Catholic faith, helped both to perpetuate and reinvigorate old fears. This resulted in them being bent on an even more direct collision course through the 1670s – a decade in which Charles II obviously displayed his support for France’s absolutism, religious intolerance and territorial rapacity.11 John Miller has pointed to both the self-interested and erratic nature of Charles’s policies in general, while also speaking of what, in Miller’s words, “... appeared to him sound diplomatic and geopolitical”

9 Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 188.
10 Ibid., p. 184.
11 Ibid., p. 176.
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reasons for a pro-French policy.12 While this may be true enough it, could, perhaps, be argued that it was geopolitical and diplomatic realities which played the largest part in Charles’s decision-making processes in the 1660s and 1670s. For, if the study of the king’s use and abuse of British soldiers abroad reveals anything about his wider policies, it shows that he continued to be bound by pre-existing relationships and obligations to various courtly nobles. Many of these connections stretching back over decades, and could be alter, for political, diplomatic, or economic reasons, with only the greatest difficulty.

Popular fears were fed by the fact that James, Duke of York, the Roman Catholic brother of Charles II, remained his sole heir. The popularly perceived ‘foreignness’ of both Charles and James, and their mutual proximity to pro-French and Catholic influences at the English court, helped build the crisis that erupted in 1678 into a major incident, which threatened the Stuart succession.13 Indeed, it was the very ‘foreignness’ of the Stuarts – from their time abroad more than their Franco-Italian ancestry or Scottish origins – which one contemporary observer blamed for Britain’s problems: “All our misfortunes arises from the late times. When the King came home, his ministers knew nothing of the laws of England, but [only] foreign government.”14 The client of the Whig Earl of Shaftesbury, William Russell, summarised the fears of many people when he said: “If we do not do something relating to the succession, we must resolve . . . to be Papists, or burn.”15

Such fears promoted a deep ‘crisis’ in 1678, by comparison to which, the question of how actual or perceived the threat to British Protestantism was, is largely unimportant. Many highly-placed and well-informed individuals genuinely believed that James and his private secretary, Coleman, sought to have “. . . extirpated, by root and branch” Protestantism from Britain in 1678. Evidence produced from Coleman’s personal correspondence with the duke, and the hysterical accusations of Titus Oates, conspired to feed general fears with specific (if spurious) revelations.16 The chief accomplices in this design were thought to be “. . . that sort of men, and of others too who have been tampering in a high degree with foreigners”, meaning not only Charles and James, but the pro-French faction at court and individuals (such as the Earl of Dumbarton) who were intimately linked

13 Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 169.
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with the French interest and who were automatically suspect in most British eyes due to their "... dangerous correspondency with foreign nations".\textsuperscript{17} Significantly, however, from the point of view of Charles and James, no parallel ‘Popish Plot’ erupted in Scotland – which partly explains its choice as a destination for James in 1679 – though Hopkins reminds us that there were elements there who would happily have aided a parallel plot!\textsuperscript{18} 

Charles II’s awkward position, in 1678, was exacerbated by his discovery that the Earl of Dumbarton had enough soldiers in his existing regiment in France, for a second battalion to be formed. It was placed under the command of the earl’s brother, Lord James Douglas, a long-time veteran of French service in the regiment. Charles had not given permission for this new arrangement which, when combined with domestic concerns in England over the extent of foreign control of the king, did much to convince the public that government was being delivered into the hands of a foreign and Catholic power.\textsuperscript{19} Jonathan Scott highlights the fact that John Locke’s \textit{Two Treatises of Government} were written at this time, with the intention of defining arbitrary government. Locke says in the treatise, that one of the ways by which such a government could be recognised was “... the delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power ... by the prince”.\textsuperscript{20} 

Part of the difficulty for Charles II in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Nijmegen, was generated by his seemingly novel desire to formulate a foreign policy independent of French interest, but as the negotiations were secret the benefits to Charles from public opinion on this matter were few. However, his permission for the marriage between his niece, Mary, and William of Orange was a very public and central feature of this design. The notion that Charles sought independence from Louis, has been challenged by the suggestion that he, in fact, merely fostered policies which might lead to a ‘pay rise’ from the French king.\textsuperscript{21} Charles argued that Louis ought to pay him something in the region of 6,000,000 \textit{livres} if the French king desired no English parliament – inevitably anti-

\textsuperscript{17} Charles II, \textit{His Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech ... to Parliament} (London, 21 October 1678), pp. 4 and 14, cited in Scott, \textit{England’s Troubles}, p. 185.
\textsuperscript{19} Lauderdale to Dumbarton, 18 September 1676: P.R.O., S.P. Scotland, Warrant Book 4, fol. 74; Scott, \textit{England’s Troubles}, p. 179.
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French – to sit in the near future. Following negotiations by the Earl of Sunderland, Louis offered Charles a new pension, worth £1,000,000 Sterling. However, this was largely designed as an inducement for Charles to cancel the marriage negotiations between his nephew, William of Orange, and his niece, Mary, which he was unwilling to do.

Charles was well aware of the implications of the Dutch marriage for his relations with France, while at home, the English parliament saw the marriage as yet another example of Charles’s attempt to consolidate foreign power behind his Crown for the purpose of arbitrary government. The French ambassador to the Low Countries, who strongly supported the anti-Orange ‘States Party’, reminded Charles II that:

So long as the Prince of Orange remained so powerful in the States General, nothing could be more prejudicial to the parliament of England, and the republic of Holland, than to allow the king of Great Britain to make an alliance with the Prince of Orange, for it was certainly intended to hurt the common liberty.

The marriage also caused considerable problems for William of Orange, who continued to suffer at the hands of political dissent from the ‘States Party’ in the Netherlands and militarily against France on the battlefield.

On 16 March 1678, alarmed at further recruiting in Scotland for French service, the English parliament determined that it would consider anyone an enemy of England who attempted to induce English subjects to take service in the French Army. To assist the case against recruits in Scotland, over which the English parliament obviously had no official authority, John Harrington, of Boothby Pagnell, Lincolnshire, a deputy-lieutenant and sheriff of the county, was brought forward. He was to attest that ‘dragooning’, or the forced billeting of troops on civilians, was being used in Scotland to secure men for service in the French Army. This was an incendiary accusation as it implied that Britons were being forcibly removed from Britain for service in France, and that the

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23 Scott, England’s Troubles, pp. 64-5, 430 and 457.
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methods used to secure them mirrored those currently being employed in France to reduce Huguenot communities to obedience to an absolutist Crown and the Roman Catholic Church.27

Despite Lauderdale’s obvious reluctance to exacerbate the situation by assisting in the raising of recruits, both he and Charles were named as co-conspirators in ‘dragooning’.28 Two Scots were interrogated who claimed to have been forcibly impressed for service in France.29 Harrington claimed to have met them after their return from Flanders:

[They] complained that many of their countrymen had in Scotland been seized by force, to be carried over into the French service, had been detained in the publick prisons till an opportunity to transport them: were heaved on board fastened and bound like malefactors, some of them struggling and contesting it, were cast into the sea, or maimed, in conclusion an intolerable violence and barbarity used to compell them.30

In light of these witnesses’ testimony, Charles did all he could to prevent Harrington’s trial on charges of ‘dragooning’ and expressly ordered its postponement until the next parliamentary term.31 One member of parliament, Sir Thomas Clarges, announced that it was “... one great conspiracy you have found out against the Court, viz. levying men, contrary to the king’s Proclamation”.32

Harrington was imprisoned, but managed to pass a blank, signed paper to a friend which would serve as a petition from him. Harrington’s imprisonment prompted an angry reaction from the anti-French faction in the English parliament, which began a propaganda campaign aimed at blackening Charles’s character by suggesting his desire to rule arbitrarily. One of the most vocal critics was Andrew Marvell, who published a small book, entitled An Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government in England (1677), which highlighted the fears of the anti-French and anti-'Popish' factions.33

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There also appeared an anti-Crown Christmas publication, *Mr. Harrington’s Case* (1677), which prompted an answer from the pro-French faction, entitled *Worse, and worse, or the Case alter’d in some short Reflections upon a late Scurrilous and seditious Paper intituled Mr. Harrington’s Case* (1677) said, by Marvell’s detractors, to have been “... poised of a most pernicious nature”. Marvell confirmed the relationship between pressing men and absolutist tyranny and explained that the army was “... ever supplied with recruits, and those that would go voluntarily into the French service were encouraged, others that would not, pressed, imprisoned, and carried over by maine force, and constrained”. This accusation was strongly evidenced by the means Lauderdale employed to rule in Scotland, where the ‘élite’ opposition led by the Duke of Hamilton, was beginning to articulate its objections to the Crown’s agents who were using what it saw as increasingly arbitrary methods: “... the administration of publick affairs these many years has been in several things contrair to law and with great encroachments upon their rights, liberties and privilidges”.

Marvell also gave an account of the expense of the war: “A short account of some ammunition, etc. exported from the port of London to France, from June, 1675 to June 1677”, included grenades “... without number, shipt off under the colour of unwrught iron”, twenty-one tonnes of lead shot, 7,134 barrels of gunpowder, eighteen tonnes of iron shot, eighty-eight tonnes of musket match and four hundred and forty-one tonnes of iron ordinance comprising an overall quantity of two hundred and ninety-two tonnes of goods, excluding “... carriages, bandileirs, pikes, etc. uncertain”.

Harrington’s situation was, however, extraordinary. In 1676, his son, Thomas, had entered into a contract with a Roman Catholic officer of Dumbarton’s regiment to raise recruits for French service. Thomas was to supply twenty men, but all of them deserted before he could get them aboard a ship. While his father may well have been a political tool of his Whig cousin, Shaftesbury, it seems equally likely that the Harringtons were keen to harass a disappointed business partner, such as Dumbarton, by discrediting the source of their own embarrassment: his Scottish regiment. However, it is equally possible that they were genuinely outraged by their discovery of the poor

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34 Marvell, *Growth of Popery*, p. 69.
conditions under which men were transported to France, seemingly against their will, in the later 1670s.

Harrington’s case helps to explain the level of animosity and popular fears about French service and Dumbarton’s regiment. Charles partly defended his actions by insisting that his opponents were “... such as would subvert the government themselves and bring it to a commonwealth again”. However it was not just supporters of the ‘old cause’, but Englishmen generally, who were averse to service in France. As early as 1673, there were reports that “... there is [among Englishmen] general unwillingness as well in the soldiers as officers to go into French service”. In Scotland too there was opposition, and one young officer, who had drawn his sword to encourage recruits to board a ship at Leith, “... was immediately knocked on the head and left dead on the place”. Indeed, the vast majority of ordinary British soldiers who fought in France were pressed men. Some accounts remain of Scottish recruiters cutting off the ears of unwilling recruits in order to scare others into submission, while a large number were bound together or actually tied to ships’ masts for the duration of the journey to France.

There is also the case of Simon Ayres, a private soldier who was left for dead on one of the battlefields of Flanders. However, he recovered, after being cared for by local villagers, and returned to Britain to tell his story in which he was forcibly recruited by one of Douglas’s officers and imprisoned in England as a deserter when he tried to escape.

Despite the opposition in England, Scotland was far enough removed from Whitehall for covert recruiting to continue there. Throughout May 1678, Dumbarton raised recruits in Scotland, but considerable disturbances were created by the fecklessness of two of his recruiting agents, the Laird of Ormiston and Lord Sempill. French service was so unpopular at this stage that Captain William Douglas, of Dumbarton’s regiment, had to suffer the jeers of the people of Leith, who were “... verie rude to the officers that embark them [the soldiers]”. This necessitated the employment of more overt means of embarking soldiers, and, as a result, Ormiston and Sempill were still engaged.

42 P.R.O., S.P. Dom., 1673-5, p. 81.
as recruiting agents for Dumbarton’s regiment in 1682, when they reported exactly the same ‘rudeness’ from the people of Leith while embarking soldiers for service in Ireland.\textsuperscript{44}

The objection to French service was not based on the assumption that the Douglas regiment was a breeding ground for Roman Catholics. Indeed, as the evidence of the receptions into the Hôtel des Invalides between 1670 and 1688 demonstrate, perhaps three quarters of the regiment consisted of Protestants, and later evidence of the regiment’s reception in Ireland also confirms the high number of Protestants contained in it at all levels. The regiment was typical in this regard as estimates hold that perhaps no more than 2 per cent of British army commissions, even in James’s reign, were held by Roman Catholics.\textsuperscript{45} This figure would naturally have been slightly higher beyond the confines of England and Scotland: higher numbers of Catholic officers served in regiments in Ireland, the British Brigade in France, in Tangier, and even in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade (before 1688). Objections to service in France were based largely on the abject conditions suffered by the common soldiers of the period, and the implicit refusal to go ‘beyond sea’ to what, for many simple Scottish soldiers, was an alien and threatening country.

In the summer of 1678, Louis XIV subscribed the Treaty of Nijmegen, ending his conflict with the Dutch.\textsuperscript{46} With the ratification of his conquests in the Low Countries, which this treaty afforded him, he set out to establish his citizens’ rights in Flanders. Among those rights were the traditional exemptions afforded in the Kingdom of France to Scots due to the ‘auld’ alliance with Scotland involving “...much affection towards the Scottish nation”.\textsuperscript{47} This declaration specifically relieved Scots from the exactions of the general tax levied on foreigners living in French territory. While referring to a similar ratification of these privileges, dated 26 January 1639, the act made specific mention of the recent military service rendered by Scots to the Kingdom of France: this represented a direct reference to Dumbarton’s regiment and its actions in the Dutch war.\textsuperscript{48}

The prominence given in the act to Dumbarton’s, and his regiment’s, service, provides a stark contrast to French actions against Scots not in French service. For example, in January 1678, a

\textsuperscript{44} Arran to Sir James Turner, 4, 6, 11 and 19 May 1682 and Lord Sempill to Sir James Turner, 6 May 1682, printed in Sir J. Turner, Memoirs of His Life and Times (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1829), pp. 296-9.


\textsuperscript{46} Clark, The Later Stuarts, p. 88.


\textsuperscript{48} C.A.R.A.N., 0\textsuperscript{11}, fol. 273.
Scottish merchant ship was knowingly attacked in a demonstration of French power at St. Malo off the coast of Brittany.\textsuperscript{49} However, it has been suggested that Anglo-French naval rivalry had an internal force in this era, which might have driven the French beyond considerations of long-established amity. Between 1668 and 1669, the French Navy completed six great First Rate warships, and, by 1675, it was apparent that, numerically, England was falling behind a French naval force. France’s navy had barely existed fifteen years earlier, but its growth prompted Charles II commissioned thirty new ships necessary for regaining parity with both France and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{50}

As has been said that Charles’s duplicity during the peace negotiations at Nijmegen caused Louis to turn against him absolutely and this enmity caused the final terms of the Treaty of Nijmegen to be disastrous for Charles and Danby, who were left with two useless treaties.\textsuperscript{51} At the end of June 1678, those British regiments ‘lent’ by Charles to France – the *regiment royale anglais* of the Duke of Monmouth\textsuperscript{6}, the Irish regiment of Sir George Hamilton, and the Scottish regiment – were dismissed from French service upon a formal order from the King of France.\textsuperscript{52} This sparked an exodus of British officers from France: a hundred Scottish commanders removed from French service in this way returned to Scotland almost immediately. In Britain there were plans for 10,000 men to be raised so that these officers would not want employment.\textsuperscript{53}

Few private and non-commissioned soldiers returned speedily from France, though the arrival of some Scottish veterans was reported in their home country as early as September 1678.\textsuperscript{54} Monmouth’s plans for the re-employment of his returned soldiers were harmed by his political scheming: for example, in June 1678, the duke attempted to use the English House of Lords to create a breach between Charles II and the Duke of York to favour his own ambition for the throne. This came to nothing.\textsuperscript{55} However, existing animosity to York was such at this time, that he was

\textsuperscript{49} 18 January 1678: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., 1677-8, p. 584.
\textsuperscript{51} Kenyon, *The Stuarts*, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{54} Taylor to Williamson, 3 September 1678: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Car. II 406, no. 98.
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compelled to make a forced withdrawal from Britain on the excuse of visiting his daughter and her husband (who was also his nephew), William of Orange, in the Netherlands, where he remained till 1679.

In January 1679, Dumbarton returned to France to supervise the removal of his regiment. The Scots were the last to leave the French service. They were left to make their own way to England, where the majority of the regiment arrived with no money and few clothes or personal effects.\textsuperscript{56} They were taken onto both the Scottish and English establishments (military budgets) and, on 11 March 1679, mustered in Hertfordshire: the estimated cost of which was £9,866 Sterling.\textsuperscript{57}

While his regiment was accepted into Britain, the Roman Catholic Earl of Dumbarton was formally debarred from active command due to the Test Act, which required a statement of allegiance to the Protestant faith and which had to be taken by all holders of public office.\textsuperscript{58} However, under the command of Captain Robert Hodges, a company of grenadiers was added to his former regiment.\textsuperscript{59}

CONCLUSION

The ‘Exclusion Crisis’ brought in Britain tensions, which had been building throughout the 1670s to the surface. Charles’s handling of the affair was deft, but the polarisation of his subjects’ political and religious convictions was unavoidable. Charles reasserted both the traditionalism of his reign and the deeply disturbing ‘foreignness’ of his beliefs and associations. His break with Louis XIV gave him a previously unrealised, if short-lived, level of independence from both parliament and foreign paymasters. The successful exploitation by Charles of this advantage would allow not only the relatively peaceful reception of the Douglas regiment to Britain in 1679, but also reinforcement the strongly traditional Stuart character of his rule from 1681-5.

The presence in the Douglas regiment of Roman Catholics before 1679, as well as the unit’s long association with the Catholic French Crown, rendered its return to Britain difficult. The methods by

\textsuperscript{56} Childs, “British Brigade”, p. 397.

\textsuperscript{57} Order disbanding the regiments, 17 January 1679, printed in H.M.C., Lindsay MSS., 1660-1745 (London, 1942), pp. 24-5.

\textsuperscript{58} The Test Act was an instrument forced upon Charles II in 1674 (and reiterated in 1676), and required all holders of civil and military office to swear not to tamper with the existing settlement of the Church of England or the Crown, thus effectively barring Catholics and Protestant dissenters alike from public employment of any kind.

\textsuperscript{59} Weaver, Royal Scots, pp. 32-3.
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which Charles II attempted to minimise the awkwardness created by the regiment's personnel and connections are the focus of the next chapter.
In the year 1678, after twenty years of service abroad, the Earl of Dumbarton had to choose between two masters. Initially, he tried playing a game in order to obtain promotion from both, but it soon became clear to the earl, that Charles II offered him his only real security. Dumbarton fell foul of the official strictures of the Test Act. Dumbarton continued to carry out important, though private and unofficial, functions. Embassies to France and de facto control of his old regiment provide just two examples of how little the Test Act could constrict the favour shown to Roman Catholic and dissenting Protestant friends of the monarch. However, Charles had to win this ability from the English polity and was in a powerful enough position to effect his desires, only after he emerged triumphant from the ‘Exclusion Crisis’ (1678-81). However, he remained keenly aware of strong anti-army sentiment in England and, therefore, took steps to limit confrontations there by sending the Scottish regiment of Dumbarton to Ireland where, in 1680, a rebellion threatened to break out. As the majority of Ireland’s people professed the Roman Catholic religion, this country possessed the potential to be a haven for the Catholic members of Dumbarton’s regiment. In effect, his Catholic soldiers were sent further afield to garrison Tangier, while the rest of his regiment, popularly perceived to be pro-French tools of Charles, was sent to Ireland. Dumbarton’s loyalties were not fully assured until 1684, after his final flirtation with French service, following his 1683 embassy there, brought him the rewards of money and an official military position in Britain. This represented was the security he had sought, and failed to obtain, in 1678.

A great deal of the patronage enjoyed by Dumbarton came from the hands of James, Duke of York. The duke took an active part in both civil and military affairs during the years of the ‘Exclusion Crisis’, when a parliamentary clique attempted to bring about plans which would have removed James from the line of succession to the throne. One of the more important results of this period, was the development of a special relationship between James and a number of prominent nobles in Scotland where he was sent as Commissioner to the Scottish Parliament but ruled as virtual regent. During his period of personal authority, James established the basis for a future Scottish ‘court party’ dominated by Roman Catholics. However, it would also include some Protestants such as the influential third Duke of Hamilton, all of whom were closely connected by kinship and by an
antipathy towards the first Duke of Queensberry, who was Commissioner and Treasurer Principal of Scotland until 1685, and the duke’s Campbell affiliates.

James’s reliance on a number of close friends and political allies made Scotland, in his mind, an important centre of security and obedience to the Stuart throne throughout his reign. Recent scholarship has done much to revise the view of him as a reforming influence in Scotland, and has tended to magnify the conservative elements of his rule there.¹ But James made great efforts to reconcile conservative forces in Scotland, which had been fomenting since the time of Lauderdale’s long and unpopular rule. His ‘court party’ was, therefore, composed of political conservatives, or even reactionaries, who, nevertheless, held strong principles regarding the limits of government and royal authority.

The nature of the Douglas regiment in Ireland demonstrates that Scottish service in France was not synonymous with Roman Catholicism. Charles went out of his way to remove the regiment’s Catholics to Tangier, so that no openly Roman Catholic soldiers remained at any rank in the regiment when it moved to Ireland in 1679. The fact that the unit’s commander was an avowed Roman Catholic, fuelled speculation regarding the undue influence of a Catholic over hundreds of armed men. Furthermore, popular fears of the regiment’s employment of French practices such as ‘dragooning’ and the use of military might to enforce the royal will, were unfounded but understandable in the atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion that existed in Britain in the wake of the ‘Exclusion Crisis’. While Charles II may well have seen Dumbarton’s regiment as a form of security for the stability of his regime, he was also under a considerable obligation to the commander of this body of men, which had displayed remarkable loyalty to him and his regime. More than offering bullying protection and security to Charles and his regime, the Scottish regiment gave the king a combination of professional, military and political benefits.

The dismissal from French service of the Scottish regiment introduced the final transformation of Dumbarton’s unit from a semi-entrepreneurial to an established standing one. Between 1678 and 1685, the Douglas regiment was transformed from a semi-independent unit into a standing regiment in Britain under the ultimate control of the king. The transformation was not at all of a straightforward nature as Dumbarton, Charles, and Louis were all ambivalent about the benefits and desirability of the change. However, it is ultimately clear that Dumbarton enjoyed none of the

prerogatives of ownership associated with mercenary colonels, in either France or Britain and was obliged to choose between two employers to whom he was bound by ties of loyalty and obedience, not exclusively by contractual ties or money. By 1685, Dumbarton firmly enjoyed the position of colonel of a regiment accommodated by the military budget, or establishment, of Scotland and Ireland.

In June 1678, the Earl of Dumbarton responded to the disbandment of his regiment from French service, by continuing to push his stock at the French court. To this end, he made deliberate use of his nephew, the Earl of Arran, and that young man's claims to the French Duchy of Châtelherault, an honour granted to James, second Earl of Arran (the ancestor of Arran's mother, Duchess Anne). In 1687, Anne gave her claim to Châtelherault to her son as a wedding present, upon his betrothal to Lady Anne Spencer, the daughter of the Earl of Sunderland. Arran was allowed to contract debts on the title to the value of £5,000 during the life of his father, and £500 per annum thereafter. He was serious enough about his rights and privileges in the title on the eve of Union (in 1707) to draw up a petition in his and his mother's name, regarding their position in the succession to the Scottish Crown.2 In this matter, Dumbarton displayed all the ambition commonly associated with both the Hamiltons and the Douglases. The Douglas-Hamilton desire for advancement was commented on by all: for example, Charles II made a sly remark regarding the just claims to the Scottish throne (in right of his wife) of the third Duke of Hamilton when he was in London in 1678.3

As early as July 1678, Arran's uncle advised him to remain in Paris in order to pursue the Châtelherault claim at the French court. To aid him in this, Dumbarton offered Arran, and his governor, free board and the use of his coach in Paris. He also advised that the Châtelherault claim might be furthered by the young man's marriage to a French heiress, which would lessen prejudice against him as a foreigner and thus raise his stake at the French court.4 He, therefore, proposed the Huguenot Mademoiselle de Roussy, a niece of Marshal Turenne and the granddaughter of a leading

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Protestant, Frédéric-Guillaume de La Rochefoucauld, Comte de Roye et Roussy. She, purportedly, had a 200,000 livres a year income and would be particularly useful “... in obtaining satisfaction for the right of Châtelherault”. Simultaneously, Dumbarton took the opportunity to petition Charles II regarding the loss of his regiment and its perquisites in the French Army. He reminded Charles that the regiment had long been associated with the Douglas family. He also emphasized the fact that his brother-germain, Lord James Douglas, had been killed at the head of the regiment and that he himself had been sent to France to be ‘bred’ in that court as a replacement commander. Dumbarton insisted that he had been a loyal servant to Charles, but had also proved his capacity for loyalty to his French master by having been made a lieutenant general in the French Army with pay and pensions amounting to £5,000 per annum. As he had sacrificed all these advantages of income and rank, by agreeing to return to Britain in 1678, he said he expected some redress.

This petition strongly resembles that which Dumbarton presented to Louis XIV in order to secure his appointment as a lieutenant general in the French Army, when:

He went to the king, with a high resentment of the mark of his displeasure ... wherein he said out by 22 years service, with a hundred thousand men he had brought over into France during that time, with the losse of a great many relations and friends in the service.

Dumbarton’s estimate that he had commanded 20,000 Scots over his twenty-two years of service in France may be slightly inflated, but his further claim to have seen many of his own relations killed in French service was certainly true. Both petitions demonstrate the understanding by Dumbarton of his importance. He was a highly trained professional soldier, operating in an international market that, traditionally, valued the skills and experience he possessed.

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Dumbarton said he had followed Charles II’s pleasure entirely in leaving the French service and bringing his whole regiment into England, where it did good service against the Dutch at Chatham in 1667. He continued that, having refused the French king’s offers to stay, he had debarred himself from further preferment at that court and could therefore expect only to subsist honourably in England. On the same day, a royal proviso was issued allowing the earl to remain in London, where he then was, so long as he gave security to live peaceably. Charles said he was sure the earl would do so, having quitted a service of great honour and profit in France for the king’s sake alone.\(^\text{10}\)

On 26 October 1680, Dumbarton submitted a similarly worded petition to the king in response to anti-‘Popery’ investigations in London. The constable of Suffolk Street Ward, in the parish of St. Martin-in-the-Fields, made a census of two hundred and eighty-seven individuals, and thirteen families, in 1680. Twenty-nine individuals and one family – identified as Dumbarton’s – were recorded as being ‘Papists’.\(^\text{11}\) The second petition was followed by a similar proviso, but, significantly for Charles’s position and that of his creatures in the closing stages of the ‘Exclusion Crisis’, it was laid aside this second time only after some debate.\(^\text{12}\)

Despite Dumbarton’s complaints about his situation in 1679, it is clear that he was still very much in personal command of his regiment, long after it had been taken onto the English establishment. A number of the Duke of Monmouth’s letters, ordering Dumbarton to quarter various companies of his regiment in villages around East Anglia and Huntingdonshire, throughout the later months of 1679, are extant. In November 1678, Captain Douglas of Spott’s, according to the route annexed to the letter of command, company was ordered to march from Puckeridge to St. Ives in Huntingdonshire where he was to remain until he received further orders.\(^\text{13}\) On the 26th of the same month, due to their financial straits in their present quarters, Dumbarton subscribed an order for the four companies of his regiment at Huntingdon to move to Godmanchester.\(^\text{14}\) This was followed by a series of orders

\(^{10}\) Proviso allowing the Earl of Dumbarton to remain in London (24 May 1679), printed in H.M.C., House of Lords MSS. (London, 1887), p. 132.


\(^{12}\) Petition to Charles II from George, Earl of Dumbarton and proviso (26 October 1680), printed in H.M.C., House of Lords MSS. (London, 1887), p. 159.


\(^{14}\) Same to same, Whitehall, 26 November 1678: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 113.
to individual company commanders to march their men to locations in and around East Anglia.\textsuperscript{15} Some of the companies of the regiment were broken up from the main force and sent to Newcastle-upon-Tyne – where they could presumably be better quartered.\textsuperscript{16}

This series of commands represent the confused and disorganised reaction to the unexpected arrival of the regiment in Britain. Some semblance of order was, however, attempted, and the unit was ordered to send an account of its strength to the commissaries of the musters. The regiment’s captains, or their agents, were commanded to send their rolls of soldiers between November 1678 and January 1679.\textsuperscript{17}

On 19 January 1679, Dumbarton’s regiment finally passed out of French service forever: “L’infanterie de Milord Douglas passé en service du Roi.”\textsuperscript{18} In this month, Paul de Barillon, the French ambassador to England, reported to Louvois that there existed some royal displeasure regarding the taking of men from Scotland as recruits for Dumbarton’s regiment, because this had seemingly been done without official approval.\textsuperscript{19} Despite the great offers made to Dumbarton by Louis to remain in his service, Barillon suggested that Dumbarton was loath to quit the service of Charles II entirely, fearing his displeasure, following these accusations of illegal recruiting.\textsuperscript{20} Dumbarton was, therefore, still bound to two demanding masters, and neither would offer him adequate security for the survival of his regiment. Clearly, neither Charles nor Louis knew what to do now that there was no specific role for the regiment, or its commander, to play in France or Britain.

The arrival of a regiment of Scottish veterans of French service in England caused some apprehension. The fact that some of the soldiers were known to be Roman Catholic heightened popular prejudice against the regiment and attempts were made to keep its soldiers in check. Because of the anti-army sentiment of many English parliamentarians, the regiment was ordered to remain in its quarters so as to ensure the fairness of the upcoming 1679 election of the parliament.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., fol. 119; Same to same, Whitehall, 5 December 1678: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 124; Same to same, Whitehall, 5 December 1678: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 125; Same to same, Whitehall, 5 December 1678: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 126; Same to same, Whitehall, 30 January 1679: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 48, fol. 90.

\textsuperscript{16} Same to same, Whitehall, 14 December 1678: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 145; Same to same, Whitehall, 17 January 1679: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 48, fol. 75.

\textsuperscript{17} Same to same, Whitehall, 20 February 1679: P.R.O., S.P. Dom., Entry Book 48, fol. 92.


\textsuperscript{19} Paul Barillon d’Amoncourt, Marquis de Barillon, was present at the English court from 1677 to 1688.

that would sit in Oxford in 1680.21 A further step was taken to remove the regiment from controversy, by separating a number of its companies and sending them to Ireland.22

The companies of Captains Monroe, White and the late Captain Maxwell, were ordered to march to Harwich and to embark there in order to be transported to Ireland and be placed on its military budget: by 1681 the cost of the regiment to the Irish establishment was £2,725.09.00 Sterling.23 Some sense of the unexpected nature of the move to Ireland can be gauged in the correspondence of the Irish Lord-Lieutenant, the Duke of Ormond:

As to what relates to Ireland, we are told that twenty companies of foot will shortly be sent over, and that my Lord Dunbarton's regiment is to make as many as it consist of to complete the number. Some expectation I had of that number of companies, but I was utterly ignorant how they were to be commanded and as much to seek how they should be maintained, otherwise than by calling a parliament, the revenue having been by the last establishment so even with it [n.b. "so even" with the armed forces as they stood at that time].24

On the way to Ireland they were to take their quarters at inns, taverns, ale houses and victualling houses, but Ormond took exception to this stipulation, from the Earl of Ossory, because it was feared the regiment might threaten the civilian population. Ossory explained that he specified public houses, as opposed to private ones, because these were the usual abode that the regiment had enjoyed abroad, which can only have heightened fears that the regiment's personnel might continue other, more harmful, foreign practices. However, Ossory claimed that he simply wished there to be no ambiguity about the quality of the regiment's quarters in Ireland.25 Furthermore, under the Disbanding Act of 1679, it was illegal to compel any householders "... against their wills to receive soldiers into their houses ... without [their] consent" so that civilians might reasonably hope to be protected by this rule from any practice resembling 'dragooning'.26

Seven companies were to march to Harwich.27 Fourteen other companies were ordered to march to Ipswich.28 The departure of the entire regiment from Harwich was designed for 8 March 1679.

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22 Ossory to Ormond, 22 March 1679, published in H.M.C., Ormonde, n. s., vol. 4, p. 366.
DUMBARTON’S REGIMENT IN BRITAIN

They were to go to either Kinsale or Cork “... or both places if one is not big enough to quarter them upon their landing”.29 The Earl of Ossory was hostile to the arrival of this veteran Scottish regiment and feared being tarnished by its association with French service – “I wish this recruit had rather consisted of English than Scotch” – but was instantly rebuked by Charles II, who:

Was positive in this matter, saying that no reasonable man could have jealousy of those who forsook good fortunes in France on account of their loyalty, and who consisted of soldiers and officers all of our [Protestant] religion, and who were so well disciplined, and whose behaviour had been so good as he was resolved to be so far from parting with them as he would have them have all manner of consideration.30

The king’s platitudes can have carried little conviction: the Scottish regiment had, after all, been dismissed from the French Army and, therefore, had had no choice in the matter. This was the very reason for their unexpected arrival in Britain. But Charles II persevered with this line, stressing the benefits which Douglas’s veterans could bring to the drill and general conduct of the Irish forces:

If the rest of the army would lay aside pride and laziness, faults natural to the Papists, and learn from them the use of arms, the whole army might be much benefited by their having among them so good and so old a body of men.31

Dumbarton was to send further instructions and orders for the receipt of the men.32

The claim that Dumbarton’s soldiers were all Protestant is striking. It is clear from the induction records of the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris that as much as 10 per cent of Dumbarton’s men may have been Roman Catholic in 1678. Indeed, most of the Catholic personnel of the regiment had been separated from it and bound over to serve in Tangier – though “... never surely was ever any town governed in all matters both public and private [as irregularly] as this place has been” – where their religion could not aggravate the English parliament of 1680.33 Nevertheless, Ossory said that he had no doubt “... that many will attack them upon account of religion” despite the fact that they

28 Idem.
31 Idem.
32 Idem.
had all "... taken the oaths, and cannot reasonably be suspected to love France, having quitted it to their loss".\textsuperscript{34} It is clear that Ossory’s real concern centred on the fact that everyone would think that he and Ormond had colluded in bringing the regiment over to Ireland:

It is not unknown what my Lord Dumbarton’s religion is, and that tho’ all his men and officers should be Protestants, yet their having been much under his command will render them suspect, and consequently very unwelcome at this time. Those who take the boldness to asperse my Lord Chancellor and me as Papists ... will lay hold on such an instance as this, and be able to make worse use of it than of anything that has yet happened.\textsuperscript{35}

Ossory’s fears were confirmed when the leader of the loosely Whig opposition to Charles II made a speech attacking "... two particulars, the Lord Dumbarton’s regiment and the multitude of Papists in towns" as two things prejudicial to Ireland.\textsuperscript{36}

All were thankful that the regiment still had not arrived by 22 March 1679, as Ormond was still searching for the money to pay them.\textsuperscript{37} However, the regiment’s twenty-one companies were mustered in Kinsale in April 1679, at which time it included twenty-one captains, under whom served forty-two lieutenants, nineteen ensigns, sixty-three sergeants and as many corporals, forty-two drummers and eight hundred and ninety-one private soldiers.\textsuperscript{38} Dumbarton was absent from this muster, but no replacement commander was officially appointed to the regiment until William of Orange attempted to place the Anglo-Huguenot Marshal Schomberg at its head in late 1688. This fact reinforces the notion that Dumbarton effectively avoided the strictures of the Test Act against non-Anglicans holding positions of public responsibility, following his arrival in Britain in 1679.

Dumbarton’s semi-official recruiting in Scotland, in mid-1680, significantly aggravated anti-army feelings throughout Britain. It was compounded by Louis’s anti-Huguenot policies in France where, in November 1680, William Saville, the English envoy to France, reportedly heard that Huguenots had to kneel before the Host or face public whipping in the streets by hangmen which, he said, "... if true, will make here worke".\textsuperscript{39} Saville also reported that a declaration had been drawn up in

\textsuperscript{34} Ossory to Ormond, 4 March 1679, published in H.M.C., Ormonde MSS., n. s., vol. 4, p. 342.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 354.
\textsuperscript{36} Ossory to Ormond, 25 March 1679, published in H.M.C., Ormonde MSS., n. s., vol. 5, p. 61
\textsuperscript{37} H.M.C., Ormonde MSS., n. s., vol. 4, p. 365.
\textsuperscript{39} William Saville to Arlington, 20/30 November 1680; P.R.O., S.P. 78 143/47.
favour of English Catholics living in exile in France, freeing them from the *droit d’aubeine*, or tax levied on burials. It seemed to many contemporary observers, that Britain might easily take the same path towards militarily enforced arbitrary government, especially as arbitrary government was connected in many people’s minds with both France and Roman Catholicism, two things explicitly associated with Dumbarton’s regiment now in Ireland.

In July 1680, this regiment officially was allowed to make recruits in Scotland. These recruits were not designed for France, and the regiment never served there after 1679, but they were largely designed to augment that part of the unit that was to be sent to Tangier. On 10 August 1680 two hundred of Dumbarton’s men were shipped from Leith to Tangier. Unlike previous recruits to the Douglas regiment, these men were all drawn from established Scottish regiments. The choice of Tangier seems to have reflected the real concerns of Charles II that the garrison there was under genuine threat. But, following 1680, the majority of the regiment saw service almost exclusively in Ireland and, on February 1681, one hundred and fifty recruits were sent to it there.

Ireland was an interesting choice of venue for the regiment. James, Duke of York’s personal patronage of the earl, which was itself an extension of Charles’s existing good will towards the nobleman, aided the anomalous position of Dumbarton in the first two years of the 1680s. Dumbarton’s involvement with the affairs of his regiment and his connections to the French court remained strong, despite his official ostracism from both. While his men pursued garrison duties in Ireland, he remained instrumental in recommending appointments to his family regiment and was heavily involved in the minutia of its mobilisation throughout its period in Ireland. His influence extended further still: he organised the nomination of Captain Douglas, formerly of his regiment, to a commission in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade (see chapter 10), following the captain’s involvement in a duel in Ireland, in which he had killed one of his fellow officers, Captain Alexander Campbell.

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41 In total a further four hundred recruits were to be made for Dumbarton’s regiment for service in Tangier: *Ibid.*, p. 529; Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 3 July 1680, published in H.M.C., Ormonde MSS., n. s., vol. 6 (London, 1911), p. 342.
44 14 February 1681: R.P.C.S., s. 3, 1681, p. 38.
Following the death of Alexander Monro, Dumbarton also had to appoint his regiment’s new lieutenant colonel. His nephew, the Earl of Arran, said: “I pretend not to dispose of commands in that regiment, but with the approbation of my Lord Dumbarton I suppose there is no doubt but that Sir James Halkett will be lieutenant colonel.”

Dumbarton’s obvious involvement with his regiment coincided with the Scottish development of a special relationship between James, Duke of York, and a nascent ‘court party’ dominated by Roman Catholics, or prospective Catholics, and political opportunists, but also including some Protestants such as the ambitious Duke of Hamilton. From c.1673, he was popularly seen as a political leader of Scotland’s ‘élite’ opposition: ‘élite’ to difference it from the other ‘Presbyterian’ opposition that existed in Scotland. Significantly, Ronald Lee has noted that Hamilton’s rise coincided with the point in Scotland at which forty-four of the peers who had been living in 1660 were dead. Paul Hopkins has said that, despite personal Catholicism, York’s “... vigorous administration and firm support for the established church had won him widespread loyalty among the governing classes” in Scotland during his time there as Commissioner. York enjoyed great popularity among conservative elements in Scotland (of the sort typified by Dumbarton and his family) where, contrary to some historians’ opinions, he altered little from Lauderdale’s period of rule.

York’s most loyal supporters, the members of his nascent ‘court party’, enjoyed pre-existing connections to one another, being closely connected by ties of blood or marriage and by an antipathy towards the first Duke of Queensberry. This group’s efforts to secure government in Scotland, was facilitated by the nature of Scottish government which remained small with a minuscule

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46 Ormond to Arran, 6 March 1682, published in H.M.C., Ormonde MSS., n. s., vol. 6, p. 338; Arran to Ormond, 14 March 1682, published in H.M.C., Ormonde MSS., n. s., vol. 6, p. 344.


48 Twenty-seven of the peers who attended the Restoration parliament of 1661 had died by October 1669; another seventeen were dead by 1673: Ibid, pp. 207 and 231.


bureaucracy. They also represent the long-term family strategies in which military commanders (such as Dumbarton) continued to play a part, and, therefore, warrant an extended description here.

From the point of view of the Duke of York’s supporters, Queensberry was too closely associated with the Earl of Argyll, the pre-eminent Presbyterian rebel of the realm. Hopkins says that part of York’s appeal to the Scottish nobility stemmed from his willingness to put an end to “... the favouritism and compromise towards Presbyterians and ex-rebels, and the corruption and abuse of power maintaining this”. Sadly for his later career, and for history’s judgment of his character, he turned to “... those antient loyal familys that have had no taint of the Presb[ytery] or accustom’d to rebell”, meaning ultra-conservatives and actual or proto-Catholics such as the Drummond brothers, Hamilton and Dumbarton. This reflects the fact that the future James II believed the position of the monarch in Scotland to be absolute and, therefore, free of the ambiguities or frustrations that a man like him saw in the English Crown. He was reassured by the fact that many of his Scottish nobles continued to act in ways that supported the arbitrary nature of Scottish government.

York’s sponsorship of individuals or families who were loyal to him – proto-Jacobites in terms of their highly conservative political beliefs and agenda – was only one aspect of a broader concerted effort on his part to make Scotland a legitimist bastion for the Stuart Crown. For example, in Scotland, he achieved an act guaranteeing his hereditary rights to the Crown, regardless of his personal religion (an issue then being hotly debated in England), and insisted that the Test Act in Scotland should incorporate an oath acknowledging the Confession of Faith of 1560 which, though an affirmation of Protestantism in Scotland, emphasized royal supremacy and insisted on the renunciation of all subsequent covenants and leagues and required the “... forswearing [of] all endeavours to make any alteration in civil or ecclesiastical government”.

The Duke of York’s eagerness to gather loyal supporters about him during his period of personal residence in Scotland (1679-81) owes much to the Crown’s need to consolidate support during the protracted ‘Exclusion Crisis’ (1678-81). Jonathan Scott has highlighted the breadth of the struggle

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53 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 83.
55 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 84.
for ‘Protestantism and parliaments’ in this period, which, he says, included the “... court (where ministerial rivalries were important), the Houses of Lords and Commons, parliamentary elections, the judiciary, the press, relationships with European Ambassadors, the government of the city of London, and its streets and coffee houses” 57 While the majority of these arenas of conflict were clearly English rather than Scottish, the role played by James in Scotland in consolidating support for his brother’s regime should not be underestimated.

Equally, while it was York’s popular Protestant nephew, the Duke of Monmouth, who was sent north to quell the 1679 rebellion in Scotland, it was York who took the time to cultivate Scottish support in the north. York was the first Stuart to hold court at Holyrood Palace since his father’s 1633 journey to Scotland some forty-seven years before. It is also significant that James attempted to follow Charles’s own example in cultivating heterodox groups excluded (by the English parliamentary settlement) from the heart of power in London. His emphasis on tradition – which extended to an interest in his family history, and that of many other noble Scottish families – is evidence of the brothers’ deeply conservative reliance upon tradition in their attempt to assure their position in Britain. However, as Jonathan Scott points out, by restoring old structures, they risked a repeat of many of the problems, which had plagued their father’s reign. 58

After the succession, the Scottish ‘court party’ of James II would feature most prominently in Scotland for the following reasons. First, the most active member, the Earl of Melfort, instigated the ‘restoration’ of the Order of the Thistle (1687) as an ostentatiously Catholic chivalric order: its first members included the group’s own recent converts to Roman Catholicism, born Catholics and well-affected Protestants. 59 The Earl of Melfort did more than anyone else to effect the Order’s ‘restoration’, supporting the general opinion that he could, in the words of Paul Hopkins, “... sometimes self-deceivingly harm the Jacobite cause to damage his rivals”. 60 Of the converted Catholic members of the ‘court party’ and the Order of the Thistle, all were close associates of

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57 Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 182.
58 Ibid., p. 164.
59 Significantly, James’s interest in ‘reviving’ the Order of the Thistle coincided with the entry of his natural son, the Duke of Berwick, into the overtly Roman Catholic Order of Malta. The year 1687 also saw Berwick attempt to revive of the Order of Malta’s former Grand Priory of England, dissolved by Henry VIII in 1540. This plan came to nothing, but Berwick was appointed by the Sovereign Grand Master of the Order titular Grand Prior of England, and was succeeded in turn in this position by two of his sons, Lords Peter and Anthony FitzJames. These actions all further bound James’s monarchy to obviously Catholic, and inherently conservative, elements across wider Europe: D. Seward, The Monks of War: The Military Orders (London, 1972; reprinted Folio Society, 2000), p. 253.
Melfort. The Earl of Perth was Melfort’s brother, friend and political ally, while the Earl of Moray was his close political associate, though his conversion gained him less than did that of other members of the group. Of the three knights who were born Catholics – the Dukes of Hamilton and Gordon and the Earl of Dumbarton – the first and last were Melfort’s brothers-in-law, while Gordon was a cousin in the first degree to all of them.

A large number of converts were explicitly associated with the Order’s ‘revival’. This fact partly explains Bruce Lenman’s statement that the Drummond brothers were involved in “. . . doing down all other interests, including the old Catholic interest” as they clearly preferred their own long-term political allies over those of the members of long-standing Roman Catholic families with whom they had little, if anything, in common. However, this view must be tempered in light of the fact that the old Roman Catholic family of Gordon of Huntly, was central to the familiar and political connections of James’s Scottish Catholic ‘court party’.

Secondly, the Protestant members of the ‘court party’ – the Marquis of Atholl and the Earls of Seaforth, who converted in 1685, and Arran – were all political allies: Atholl, like many ‘court party’ members, was bitterly opposed to the Campbells (he broke from the Earl of Argyll early in 1678). Six of the original eight Knights of the Thistle were cousins in the first degree and the central connection between these six knights were the Marquises of Huntly, the representatives of the old Catholic interest in northeast Scotland. The long-standing family connections between the founder knights can be seen, for example, in a letter written by Melfort to the young Earl of Arran in June 1685, desiring to know: “Hou Dumbarton is doing I hav h[a]d no letter from him and seing

61 Alexander Stewart, fifth Earl of Moray (1634-1700), was Commissioner of the Scottish Treasury (1678), Extraordinary Lord of Session (1680), Secretary of State for Scotland (from November 1680 to 1688) and Commissioner to the Scottish Parliament (1685). Moray was appointed Secretary of State for Scotland, alongside John Drummond of Lundin (later Earl of Melfort), on 6 November 1684. In 1686, he made a rapid conversion to Catholicism, in order to secure his position against Melfort’s ascendance: R.P.C.S., s. 3, vol. 10, 1684-5; M. Lynch, Scotland: A New History (London, 1991), p. 297; Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 106.


64 John Murray, second Earl of Atholl, had assisted in the suppression of Argyll’s rebellion in 1685; Sir Kenneth MacKenzie, fourth Earl of Seaforth, who assisted (with all the other knights) in the publication of the Letter of Indulgence (in 1687) allowing open worship for Catholics in Scotland; James Hamilton, Earl of Arran, son of William Douglas, titular third Duke of Hamilton: Lee, Government and Politics in Scotland, 1661-1681, p. 262.
E[arl] of Moray had one I think to resolve to correspond as [I] can get no account of him from any other hands.”

Thirdly, of all the founder Knights of the Order of the Thistle, synonymous with James’s ‘court party’, the Duke of Hamilton had a political position outside Scotland, although even Hamilton’s power can be largely attributed to his titular position as Scotland’s premier peer and his own “... deep hierarchical prejudices”, rather than to any innate ability of his own. However, Hopkins accuses him of having failed to secure real political power in both Charles’s and James’s reigns due to “... political incompetence and a hectoring personality” stemming from a mind capable only of “... attention to protocol and pedestrian cunning”. He was also a Presbyterian, which might have rendered his position anomalous were it not for his Roman Catholic Douglas upbringing. Nevertheless, as early as 1682, Hamilton’s name was unambiguously associated with the core of the later founding Knights of the Thistle. He was also an ambitious politician who knew that, after 1685, his political survival relied upon his Catholic monarch’s favour: but no one can deny his genuine devotion to the Stuart Crown, which he had consistently aided since the late 1640s.

Finally, Hamilton was both ambitious and a political enemy of the Duke of Queensberry, who, in 1685, was conveniently removed from power as a Commissioner for the Parliament of Scotland by the Earls of Perth and Melfort. Though Queensberry was intimately related to many ‘court party’ members, and had an impressive number of clients, he was never included among their number, due to his close association with the Earl of Breadalbane, a Presbyterian Campbell, and head of the family’s premier cadet branch. Later, in London, the Campbell earl acted as Queensberry’s agent, and tried to defend the Scottish Commissioner against the accusations of mismanagement and corruption made by Perth, Melfort and Hamilton. However, Breadalbane escaped Queenberry’s fall by preserving the favour of James II as a result of the support he gave to religious toleration in Scotland in the 1686 parliament there.

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65 Melfort to Arran, 6 June 1685: N.A.S., G.D. 406/1/3316.
71 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 103.
72 Ibid., p. 104.
DUMBARTON’S REGIMENT IN BRITAIN

The Campbells and their friends, furthermore, suffered throughout James’s reign. This was predictable, given the open rebellion, in 1685, of their chief, the Earl of Argyll, and many lost their lands through forfeiture as a result: James’s adherents even tried turning Argyllshire, homeland of the Campbells, into a loyalist centre by planting Crown adherents on attainted Campbell estates.73 Such persecution would drive Argyll’s heir, Lord Lorne, to make a highly public conversion to Catholicism in James’s reign, but his failure to regain his father’s titles and land, as a result of this, prompted his defection in 1688 to William of Orange.74

Who were Dumbarton’s circle of friends and family in Scotland? When the earl arrived in Scotland, accompanying James, Duke of York, he brought with him a portrait and, apparently, a personal style that was original on two counts. First, his portrait by Henry Gascars, the most prestigious court painter of the day, introduced into Scotland a novel depiction of a man in armour.75 Second, Gascars’s portrait of Dumbarton conformed to artistic conventions that were strongly French and martial. In his portrait, the earl wears the full equipage of a lieutenant general in the French Army of 1676. The cost and magnificence of the outfit was a necessary part of Dumbarton’s role as a general officer and the portrait displays the results of the 20,000 livres he expended on his clothes and accoutrements after being appointed.76 Unlike stereotyped background scenes of battlefields, which appear in many portraits of Scottish noblemen throughout the century, Dumbarton had the siege of Trèves depicted behind his own image: his regiment served at this siege, in 1675, as part of the French Army and suffered a catastrophic defeat.77

The close relationship enjoyed by the small, intimate circle of family, which included many Gordon-Douglas-Drummond-Hamilton connections, is evidenced by the fact that four copies were made of Dumbarton’s portrait.78 In 1681, Hamilton meant to send it to their brother-in-law, the Duke of Queensberry, but had to excuse its failure to arrive: “It was my fault you got not my

73 The Argyll Sastines, ed. H. Campbell, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1933-4); Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 105.
74 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 106.
75 Henri Gascars (1635-1701), from Paris, painted at least two portraits of Charles II’s mistress, the Duchess of Portsmouth, and one of her sister, Henriette de Keroualle.
78 An excellent analysis of the iconographic and cultural importance of portraiture in late seventeenth century Britain can be found in R. Wendorf, The Elements of Life: Biography and Portrait-Painting in Stuart and Georgian England (Oxford, 1990), section 3, pp. 65-98.
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brothers picture for I forgot to tell Rob[er]t Kennedy, but now I have ordered him to deliver it to Scougall he is feared your [sic] angry with him so you must tell him you are not.” A copy of Dumbarton’s original portrait was made for Queensberry, who was so impressed with the originality and artistic qualities of the original that he had his own brother – the future General James Douglas – painted wearing the same clothes and armour.

Another copy of the portrait was also made, but with the substitution of the head of William Fraser, Lord Saltoun. Though not closely related to Dumbarton, Saltoun had spent a year in France in 1678. Significantly, Saltoun was also partial to French cultural influences: in or about this period the members of the Lowland branch of the Fraser family “. . . not only admitted but emphasized their French origins and arrival as conquerors”. In England, such a statement might have been treated as part of a more pervasive ‘Norman Yoke’ ideology, prevalent since at least the time of the Commonwealth. However, in Scotland it was more likely to be treated as a directly pro-Stuart and pro-French stance: one, moreover, which contained implicit approval of the previous recruiting for French service and future prospects of Dumbarton at the French court.

One year after the appearance in Scotland of Dumbarton’s portrait, another was taken of the Duke of Hamilton. The artist was the court painter, Sir Godfrey Kneller. As with the earl’s portrait, that of Hamilton was also reproduced, by John Scougal, with the substituted head of William, Earl of Annandale. Copying portraits was a highly flattering activity. The replication of Dumbarton’s portrait demonstrates that he maintained an intimate level of contact with family members, and with friends from his period in France. The Duke and Duchess of Hamilton kept up strong family links with their immediate Catholic kinsmen, including the Earls of Perth and Annandale, Lord James Douglas and Dumbarton himself.

81 William Fraser, 2nd Lord Saltoun, went to France in 1679, returning after a year: See Sir James Balfour Paul, Scots Peerage, vol. 7 (Edinburgh, 1910), p. 444.
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By 1682, Dumbarton's position in his native Scotland was so strong that some people saw him as *de facto* Commander-in-Chief of the forces there. He was one of a number of Roman Catholic Scots who were rumoured to enjoy commands and privileges, which went blatantly against the allowances of the Test Act. In March 1683, the English envoy at The Hague, Thomas Chudleigh, wrote to Secretary Jenkins:86

Here are reports confidently spread about as if my Lord of Dumbarton were made general of the forces in Scotland and the [Catholic] Marquis of Huntly colonel of the [Protestant] Earl of Marr's regiment there, and governor of Sterling Castle.87

This report was false as the official Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Scotland was Lieutenant General Thomas Dalyell of Binns, who held the position from November 1679 until August 1685, until he was officially replaced by the Earl of Dumbarton. The Douglas-Hamiltons' sensitivity to the trouble such reports could cause them was such that they went out of their way to publicly assure the aged and irascible Dalyell of their support.

At least twice in 1682, Dalyell reviewed at Hamilton the heritors of Lanarkshire.88 The men were tenants and retainers of Dumbarton's brother, the Duke of Hamilton, and the duke himself reported that they "... all seemed very frank and willing to do all they could for the security of the peace, and fell on overtures which will be better digested against this day eight days that he returns from Aire".89 In June 1682, the same heritors "... offered advyce to Generall Dalzell anent the places most convenient for lodging such forces as may be thought necessary for apprehending skulking vagabonds and rebells. On the confynes of the shyre and elsewhere and for securing the peace".90 These men were presumably practiced in this particular, thanks to over twenty years' experience rounding up social undesirables for service in the Scottish regiment in France.

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In July of 1683, Dumbarton was appointed to a quasi-ambassadorial role by Charles II in order to commiserate with Louis XIV on the death of his queen. Significantly, this occurred only one month after his influential friend, the Duc de Vendôme, Grand Prior of France of the Order of Malta, and the reputed lover of the favourite mistress of Charles II, Louis de Keroullé, established himself, albeit briefly, in England alongside the royal mistress. Dumbaton went to France in company with a Colonel Nicolls, the Duke of York’s representative. His mission did not leave England until August 1683, in which month he received a pass to journey to France and took with him seven gentlemen attendants and ten servants, for whom he obtained passes to exit the kingdom after vouching that none of them was an ‘obnoxious’ individual. Nichols and the earl arrived in Paris on 1 September 1683. Fourteen days later, they had their audience with the French king, the Dauphin and Dauphine:

... and were very well received by them all... and this king parted with him with particular marks of esteem and favour. He told him that the king our master could have sent no one who could have been more welcome to him, and that he would thank his Majesty particularly for [the] sending of him.

At the end of September 1683, his mission completed, Dumbarton planned his return journey. To facilitate this, he requested and was allowed the use of one of Charles’s own yachts, but he seems to have been held up in France as he did not return to England until 5th or 6th October 1683. He arrived in company with his Douglas kinsman, and Queensberry’s heir, Lord Drumlanrig, his brother, who had been touring France for their education.
Following Dumbarton’s September visit to Louis, in February 1684, it appears that plans were discussed for the earl again to serve in the French Army. A spy informed Lord Preston, the English envoy at Paris, that it was “. . . reported much that my Lord Dumbarton is coming hither with a regiment, and that several more are following [him] into this service, and that we shall have a war with the Spaniard and league with the French”.99 Dumbarton’s nephew, the Earl of Arran, was in France at the same time, also performing a brief ambassadorship for Charles II.100 Unlike his uncle, Arran actually did take service in the French Army from 1683, but he returned to England at the start of James’s reign, in 1685: significantly, Louis granted him congé (leave) from the France Army rather than licenciement (dismissal).101

The correspondence of Preston and his spy reveals that, by late 1683, a struggle over Dumbarton and his valued regiment of veteran soldiers was obviously taking place. In June of the following year (1684), Dumbarton received £1,500 Sterling from the royal purse as a token of Charles’s favour: the money was to cover fines imposed on the nobleman for ecclesiastical irregularities, such as not attending Anglican communion, which resulted from his Roman Catholicism.102 Perhaps as a final gesture to keep Dumbarton in Britain, in open contravention of the Test Act, he was soon officially appointed to the command of his old Scottish regiment.103 This is a clear demonstration of the importance placed by the king on the earl, and his regiment. It supports the argument of John Childs that Charles sought to maintain the regiment as a form of security for his throne, to the extent that he evidently went out of his way to preserve the force intact in Britain. It also suggests that Charles valued Dumbarton’s loyalty to the extent that he was willing to outlay large amounts of money to the earl and to risk angering English politicians by contravening the Test Act.

Charles’s efforts to hold Tangier represent his final involvement with British soldiers abroad. After twenty expensive, and only partially successful years, the defence of Tangier was entirely

98 Dumbarton seems to have suffered little of the fallout from the unfortunate diplomatic situation, from November to January 1683-4, brought on by the Grand Prior’s refusal to depart from London and Louise de Kerouille. The earl’s relations with Louis XIV, and the Grand Prior’s own removal and reconciliation with his king, were both engineered by Louis’s ambassador to England, Paul de Barrillon d’Amoncourt.


100 Preston to Dumbarton, Paris, 5 February 1684, printed in H.M.C., Report and Appendix, vol. 1, p. 296b.

101 Ibid.

102 P.R.O., S.P. Scotland, Warrant Book 8, fol. 483.

abandoned in the early 1680s and, in November 1683, the Duke of Queensberry was informed that the fortifications at Tangier had been "... utterly destroyed and bloun up, and all the people brought off to Ingland, and it had bein better to have bein done the first hour it was taken in tocher from the Portugueses". Perhaps as a result of his resignation of Tangier, in September 1684, Charles II resolved not "... to burden his establishment in Scotland hereafter with the maintenance of any soldiers disabled either by age or wounds in service anywhere out of Scotland" though in truth there is little evidence of many such soldiers ever having returned to Scotland, except perhaps those few deserters who trickled back into Britain, following the catastrophe at Trèves. Charles's decision might, however, explain the burdening of Louis XI's Hôtel des Invalides with many veteran Scottish soldiers of advanced age (see chapter 7).

But such common soldiers were never the heart of the matter for, unlike men in the ranks, Charles's response to those of his officers who had been formerly maintained in foreign service, was to employ them as expeditiously as possible in Britain. To this end, great use was made of the Earl of Dumbarton who, though suffering from the constraints of the Test Act, remained keenly involved in their welfare. In May 1684, Dumbarton personally vouched for the debts of his regiment in Ireland:

For the debts due from the Scots companies, the main of them are due by some of the officers, which I doubt not but my Lord Dumbarton will take a course to see satisfied, and the soldiers have paid all they ought to have been trusted for.

Furthermore, the personal loyalty from the men of his regiment, which Dumbarton enjoyed, is evident in many communications. In 1684, one retired veteran of Dumbarton's regiment sent to the Earl of Arran to inform him that he had "... wrote to my Lord Dumbarton, and given account of the extraordinary and unusual favours we received from your Excellency".

Dumbarton's obvious involvement in military and civil affairs in Britain was such that he was specifically targeted by the anti-Catholic Whig faction at the English court, who whispered "... that

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104 Drummond to Queensberry, 1 October 1683, printed in H.M.C., Buccleuch and Queensberry Papers, vol. 2 (London, 1903), p. 167.
107 Idem.
my Lord Dumbarton and my Lord Dartmouth,\(^9\) and several other persons suspected of Popery and the French interest [should] be forbidden [entry to the] court and dismissed from the king and [his] confidence or else sent into the Emperor’s service.\(^1\) This suggestion contained a double sting as it would presumably have reduced French influence at court and have actively aided the anti-French interest in Europe: the sooner the Emperor reduced the Ottoman threat in Hungary, the sooner he could transfer his forces to the Spanish Netherlands to fight the French. However, in truth, the Holy Roman Emperor’s ongoing war with the Ottoman Empire was the sole attractive venue for military careerists at this time. The Emperor, having defeated the Ottoman Turks at the gates of Vienna only the year before (1683), himself was in constant and genuine need of soldiers. The Duke of York, for one, in the words of John Childs, “... was well aware of the lean times which a spell of general European peace brought to mercenary officers and men”.\(^1\) Furthermore, the implication was clearly that Dumbarton and Dartmouth would not have gone as individuals, but with their regiments which would certainly have eased anti-army fears in Britain at the very time that Charles was demonstrating his desire to keep the Scottish regiment and to reward its Roman Catholic commander. This role is a reminder that no military commander was solely a soldier, and many, Dumbarton included, were also courtiers and factious noblemen. This fact is central to any understanding of the events and decisions regarding armies and their personnel in the period covered by this dissertation.

Nevertheless, Charles employed Dumbarton as a private and trusted messenger. The earl conveyed the king’s mind to many of his own highly placed family members in Scotland. In January 1685, when Charles dispatched the earl to Scotland, the king gave Dumbarton letters to carry to the parliament and to his brother, the Duke of Hamilton. He was also to discourse with the Duke of Queensberry, Commissioner for Scotland, on “... all matters which ar not so proper to be urytten [written]”: Queensberry was his brother-in-law.\(^3\) Dumbarton further proved his worth when he,

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\(^9\) George Legge, 1st Baron Dartmouth of Dartmouth (1648-91), a member of the household of James, Duke of York, under whose patronage he became Governor of Portsmouth and Master General of the Army. In 1683, he was Admiral of the Fleet that dismantled the colony and garrison of Tangier. Under James VII and II, he was Master of the Horse and Governor of the Tower of London. Though he swore an oath of loyalty to William III he was imprisoned in the Tower as a suspected Jacobite: Burke, *Dormant, Abeyant and Extinct Peers* (London, 1866), cf. ‘Dartmouth of Dartmouth’.


\(^3\) Childs, *The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution*, p. 19.

briefly, in 1684, went north with James, Duke of York. James used his support as the basis for persuading the Scottish parliament to pass extraordinary legislation, enforcing an oath of loyalty on all holders of temporal and spiritual offices of public trust in Scotland, which acknowledged the supremacy of royal authority.¹¹³ This was “... in effect, an oath of loyalty to uphold a Protestant Church with a Catholic as its future head”.¹¹⁴ As a member of the Duke of York’s Catholic ‘court party’, Dumbarton was, therefore, instrumental in instituting the mechanisms by which James’s future reign would flourish in Scotland.

CONCLUSION

As a Roman Catholic prevented from holding public office due to the Test Act, Dumbarton achieved a good measure of success in establishing a position of strength at court and in the army in Britain. His ability to do so owed a great deal to the personal friendship and support of Charles II, however, it was his association with James, Duke of York, which aided him most materially. Dumbarton was a prominent figure in the period of Stuart strength that followed the ‘Exclusion Crisis’ of 1678-81. His unofficial command of his old regiment, as also his private ambassadorship to France in 1683, is symptomatic of the importance to Charles of trusted allies and supporters, whether they were Catholic or Protestant. Dumbarton’s reconstruction of his career in Britain paralleled the re-establishment in Scotland especially of strong Stuart traditionalism from 1681 and helped bind the colonel ever more powerfully to the person, political philosophy and policies of the future James VII and II.

The importance of the Douglas regiment’s loyalty can be fully appreciated only when it is contrasted against that of the Scottish regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. The next chapter analyses the Anglo-Dutch Brigade and the specific circumstances surrounding the very different decisions of its Scottish component relating to loyalty and obedience to the Stuart Crown in the period 1680-92.

¹¹³ Same to the same, London, 25 November 1684, printed in Ibid., p. 199.
The Anglo-Dutch Brigade was a unit which formed part of the Dutch Army and which consisted of three English and three Scottish regiments. The importance of this Brigade as a training ground for professional international soldiers from the late sixteenth century onwards, remained constant throughout most of its history and has never been doubted by scholars. Scholarly attention has usually focused on the role played in the demise of James VII and II’s regime in Britain by the Brigade. It played a prominent role in suppressing James’s Scottish supporters during the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. Historical scholarship has not been expansive in its commentary on the changes that took place in the Brigade in the years leading up to 1688. In the three short years of James’s reign, the three English and three Scottish regiments of the Brigade were purged of Catholic officers, and their places taken by British political exiles and Huguenot refugees. This development has been seen as a manifestation of international Protestant militancy that helped foster a ‘bilingual’ Anglo-Huguenot spirit in one of the most experienced units of the Dutch Army.\(^1\)

Furthermore, as Jonathan Scott has recently stated that: “Radical opponents of crown policy saw themselves as European Protestants, dependent upon the union of interest between England, the Netherlands and Scotland”.\(^2\)

This chapter examines the Prince of Orange’s role in encouraging the Protestant loyalty of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade through his promotion of Huguenots gentlemen into the unit between 1685 and 1688.

The vast majority of the officers of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade were British and the surnames of the Brigade’s officers before 1685 are recognisably so. In most cases the officers came directly from Britain, but some also belonged to families which had served in the unit for generations. They, therefore, belonged to the large expatriate community of British service veterans settled in the Netherlands. In many cases, family connections also existed between the officers of the regiments, which tied them even further to the Netherlands and to each other. Statistics relating to Scottish officers replacing English officers, and vice versa, also demonstrate close connections between the two nations who constituted the Brigade. Added to this impression of a generally ‘British’ unit, is.

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the fact that wider connections existed between members of the Brigade and British civilian communities settled in the Low Countries. Throughout the second half of the century these communities continued to provide the Dutch Republic with personnel in the regular Dutch civil and military administration. This generally British picture was augmented after 1685, by the establishment of large French Protestant refugee communities in the greater Dutch towns and cities and, most markedly, at Amsterdam. The Brigade was a ready-made agency-of-acceptance for refugee Huguenot officers. They were introduced into one of the Netherlands' most stridently Protestant communities, along lines which were demonstrably traditional in their nature. The examination of these factors forms the basis of this chapter's contribution to a mature assessment of the importance and breadth of international Protestant influence in the Netherlands in the years immediately prior to the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688.

For most of its history, the Anglo-Dutch Brigade was not an exclusively Protestant bastion. It was defined by its 'Britishness'. Service in the Dutch Army was, theoretically, open to all international professional soldiers. In the case of the Brigade, the weight of traditional British associations, and the nature of the original Dutch Revolt against the Catholic Spanish throne and its Army of Flanders, tended strongly to favour a Protestant element throughout its officer corps. All the British families associated with the Brigade – including the Scottish Colliers and Scotts and the English Monks and Sidneys – were Protestant. Roman Catholics like the English Bellasises, were the exception. However, no militant Protestant sentiment existed in the Brigade. In 1680, its strongly Protestant figures, such as Hugh Mackay of Scourie, were arguably atypical of the Brigade's officer corps, which continued to be heterogeneous until the eve of the 'Glorious Revolution' itself. This history of heterodoxy is in strong contrast to its militancy in 1688. Some scholars have written about the Brigade and the general nature of international military service by gentlemen officers: John Childs and Victor Kiernan, for example, argue that, before 1688, a large number of its officers were simply members of an international professional officer corps. They sought employment where it was to be had, rather than because of the nature of a unit's traditional associations with one religion or even one country. As will be presently shown, a change occurred in the Brigade when, between 1685 and 1688, militant Scottish Presbyterians, English Whigs, and Huguenots were introduced into its ranks.

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Arguments regarding officers' confessional diversity certainly hold true for the period prior to 1688. However, the evidence for religious exclusivity among the regiments of diverse kingdoms is inconclusive, and the argument can scarcely be upheld in the case of the Dutch Republic in 1688. William of Orange encouraged James's desire to remove Catholic British officers from the Brigade: they were also purged from the various Huguenot units that accompanied William of Orange on his journey to Britain. A number of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade's officers in the late 1670s had served in the French Army between 1672 and 1678. Others were Protestant Irish refugees from the Earl of Tyrconnel's purge of the Irish Army in 1687. Whilst, for exactly these reasons, loyalty was not synonymous with religion, confessional faith remained a useful indicator of an officer's likely political affiliations during major periods of flux of the type that occurred in 1688. It is possible to see many of the British officers of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade as careerists of the type moulded during the Thirty Years' War. That is to say, they were men who had joined the Brigade to make a living while maintaining an honourable lifestyle, their opinions did not necessarily differ from those of the later political malcontents and rebels who joined in the 1680s. All enjoyed a disjointed relationship with their homeland, while many also maintained a tenuous membership of a broadly international Protestant community.

Why did the majority of these men choose to follow William of Orange to Britain in 1688? The answer to this question lies in the origins of the Brigade itself, which formed a military arm of the international Protestant support for the Dutch Revolt in its war against Spanish domination in the sixteenth century. Its origins were deeply rooted in the international Calvinist traditions of the mid-sixteenth century which were fostered by the Scots and Huguenots who played such a large role in the Netherlands during the war with Spain (1568-1648). The Anglo-Dutch Brigade's involvement in the events of 1688 was not simply a reaction to wider political considerations: it also represents the depth and breadth of international Protestant connections between the Netherlands, Britain and Huguenots.4

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The Anglo-Dutch Brigade was one of the major employers of Protestant British soldiers in Europe in the seventeenth century. Surprisingly little has been published on this unit. The Brigade has usually only received academic attention in English speaking countries in relation to its role in the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. It has seldom been studied as an important component of the Dutch Army in the Netherlands in its own right. This emphasis is explicable in view of the Brigade’s connections to the British community of political exiles in the Netherlands after 1680, and the complicity of some of its officers, in and around the year 1688, in espionage activities on behalf of William of Orange in Britain. This also justifies the study of the Brigade with reference to the events of the ‘Glorious Revolution’. To date, there has appeared no analysis explaining the role played by it or the Dutch context of the 1680s in William’s personal aims and objectives in 1688.

Scholarly attempts to see the Brigade as more than a footnote in the history of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ include David Ditchburn’s work on Scots and the wars of the Low Countries. In this he makes an attempt to analyse the numbers and distribution of Scots in Dutch service between 1572 and 1648. Arguably, his most important finding is that Scottish soldiers consistently made up approximately between 5 and 7 per cent of the overall strength of the Dutch Army from the inception of their involvement, in 1572, through to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). While their numbers in the Dutch service might not, therefore, have been especially significant, their constancy in that service was remarkable. Ditchburn’s work offers a very good general analysis of the status

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5 The three volume study of the Brigade by James Fergusson remained the only authority on the subject for almost a hundred years. John Childs included chapters on the Brigade in his two books devoted to British military service under Charles II and James VII and II and David Ditchburn has also provided a valuable addition to knowledge on this topic. Fergusson’s work is curiously weighted towards the eighteenth century, with two out of three of his volumes being devoted to regimental material from that century. In particular, he made an attempt to fill in significant blanks in historical knowledge relating to the commissioned appointments to the three Scottish regiments of the Brigade in the second half of the seventeenth century. His failure to provide a complete chronology of the colonels of the three Scottish regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade is, itself, symptomatic of the relative dearth of scholarly analysis of this unit. Fergusson also made no attempt to study the many British officers in Dutch service who were not associated with the Brigade. Similarly no author, save Childs, has attempted to explain the role or significance of the Huguenots who joined the Brigade after 1685. John Childs’s work has added greatly to knowledge about the Brigade: *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands, 1572-1782*, ed. J. Ferguson, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1899); J. Childs, The Army of Charles II (London, 1976), pp. 240-3.


8 *Ibid.*, Table 1, p. 116.

9 Ditchburn’s research is weighted towards the period of the Dutch Revolt rather than the Thirty Years’ War, but recent scholarship has also addressed the role of Scots in the Dutch Army during the latter conflict: M. R. Glozier, “Scottish Soldiers in the French and Dutch Armies in the Thirty Years’ War”, in *Scotland and the Thirty Years War*, ed. S. Murdoch (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 2001), pp. 117-42.

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and organisation of the Scottish forces in Dutch service over the entire period. However, he also makes a cursory attempt to link the Brigade’s service in this early period of its history to its agenda in 1688. By doing so, he at least suggests a level of continuity that has not been previously highlighted.

The dynamics of the Brigade as a unit, in its own right, in the Netherlands before 1688 are interesting. This is especially so upon an examination of the Brigade’s personnel, composition and function and take into account the works of two Dutch historians, I. J. MacLean and D. F. Kuiken. These authors published source material, relating to the social impact of specifically Scottish service in the Brigade, from the late sixteenth century through to the middle of the seventeenth.10 Sadly, Huguenot scholarship has, to date, been in no position to mirror this undertaking. French influence in the Brigade came late and was sparse in comparison to its huge Scottish influence. A problem for scholars studying Huguenots in the Brigade is the fact that its French refugee presence was so short lived, being only tangible between 1685 and 1688.

The Anglo-Dutch Brigade had existed in the Netherlands since the Earl of Leicester’s mission on behalf of Elizabeth I of England, in the 1580s, to assist the Protestant States of the Netherlands in their struggle against the army of its former Spanish Habsburg rulers.11 The 5,000 Englishmen who accompanied Leicester on his mission, were joined, in 1593, by 6,400 Scots.12 Together, these two forces formed the Brigade, which served in the United Provinces from this time onwards. Huguenot contingents had also aided the Dutch Revolt, but their efficacy was compromised by the disastrous massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day in 1572.13

During the Thirty Years’ War, the majority of Scottish soldiers in the Low Countries were occupied in garrison duty.14 However, their value to the Dutch was fully appreciated and Ditchburn,


for example, says that, while they never constituted more than 7 per cent of the Dutch Army, Scottish soldiers were hailed by Prince Fredrick Hendrick of Nassau as "... the bulwark of the Republick; and after his famous siege of Bois-le-Duc in 1629, he shewed them many marks of his favour and esteem".\(^{15}\) Twenty-nine years earlier, in 1600, Scots had also taken the brunt of the fighting at the singular Dutch victory at the battle of Nieuwport, for which they were highly praised by Maurice of Nassau. It is no wonder that they held an important place in the minds of members of the House of Nassau-Orange.\(^{16}\)

Both Huguenots and Protestant Britons were a much-needed source of support for the nascent Dutch Republic. Both groups adopted the view that resistance was justified against rulers who impinged upon the consciences of their subjects. The long-term implications of this belief were great, as, in 1683, the republican Algernon Sidney maintained: "Noblemen, cityes, commonyaltes have often taken arms ... to defend themselves, when they were prosecuted upon the account of religion."\(^{17}\) The career of Sir Thomas Bodley, the founder of the Bodleian library at Oxford, provides just one example of the international character of the Protestant world which supported the young Dutch Republic: many people believed that Protestantism could not be defending in one country alone.\(^{18}\) Like so many Britons and Huguenots, Bodley studied at Geneva and in Holland and visited other Protestant countries in Europe, later becoming the representative of Elizabeth I to the Dutch Republic.\(^{19}\) He was by no means exceptional. Bodley represents an entire group of late sixteenth-century Protestant travellers, soldiers and scholars who helped strengthen the links between the Protestant nations of Europe.\(^{20}\)

As previously stated, although called Anglo-Dutch, the Brigade was made up of three English and three Scottish regiments. The kingdoms of Scotland and England, though joined in the person of one monarch, remained separate throughout the seventeenth century. The ambiguities created by this

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\(^{15}\) Ditchburn, "Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries", p. 113; *Strictures on Military Discipline with some Account of the Scotch Brigade in Dutch Service* (London, 1774), p. 73.

\(^{16}\) Puype, "Victory at Nieuwport", pp. 69-112; Ditchburn, "Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries", p. 113.

\(^{17}\) Sidney to John Hampden, 6 October 1683; East Sussex Record Office, Lewes, Gynde Place Archives, no. 794, cited in Scott, *England's Troubles*, p. 204.


situation became evident in 1665 when Charles II ordered the Brigade's three English regiments to return to Britain, as he had just declared war on the Dutch. His order did not affect the Scottish regiments who continued to serve in the Dutch Army throughout the conflict. Between 1666 and 1675, the English regiments' place in the Brigade was taken by a variety of international regiments. This period coincided with the introduction of its first Huguenot soldiers. In 1675, the three original English regiments were allowed to reform themselves in the Netherlands and rejoin the Brigade and, from this time onwards, it attracted an increasing number of British dissidents.\footnote{21}

Each Brigade regiment consisted of five hundred soldiers. This gave the unit an overall strength of 3,000 men. Two hundred and thirty-four officers commanded these men. In peacetime, the Brigade represented 10 per cent of the overall strength of the Dutch Army, which numbered 34,666 soldiers in 1679 and 30,855 in 1684.\footnote{22} These troops were so well prepared and trained that William Blathwayt, British Secretary of War, thought them the men "... best prepared for service that ever were seen".\footnote{23} By the late 1670s, a considerable number of the soldiers of the Brigade were political and religious exiles from the British Isles.\footnote{24}

The commission books and State of War accounts of the Dutch Army reveal a number of telling facts about the Brigade's function in the second half of the seventeenth century. Before discussing the Brigade's organisation in particular, it is important to understand the way in which the Dutch Army functioned in general. The proper name of the Netherlands was the 'States General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands'. The United Provinces were loosely called the Dutch Republic. They represented a confederacy of seven formerly sovereign states, including Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Utrecht, Drenthe, Overissel, and Gelderland, which had seceded from Spanish Habsburg rule at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1579.\footnote{25} The ruling body in the Netherlands was the assembly of the States General of the United Provinces, through which all requests for cooperation between the States passed. The administrative system within the Netherlands could,

\footnote{21}{Childs, James II, The Army and the Glorious Revolution, ch. 5.}
\footnote{22}{Ibid., p. 121; Het Staatsche Leger, 1568-1795, ed. and intro. F. J. G. Ten Raa, F. de Bas, and J. W. Wijn, vol. 6 (Breda and The Hague, 1911-64), pp. 161-5 and 214.}
\footnote{23}{The Dispatches of Thomas Plott (1681-1682) and Thomas Chudleigh (1682-1685), English Envoys to The Hague, ed. F. A. Middlebush (The Hague, 1926), p. 34.}
\footnote{25}{G. Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London, 1985), pp. 194-5.}
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therefore, be both inefficient and divisive. This was especially the case when it came to the organisation of the United Provinces’ armed forces.

Like many European states at this time, the Netherlands relied greatly upon contracted foreign regiments. These came predominantly from other states lying close by the Netherlands, such as Brandenburg, Brunswick-Lüneberg-Zell and, until 1672, France. The Anglo-Dutch Brigade was among the few permanent units in the Dutch Army. The regiments of the Brigade were, almost exclusively, paid by the State of Holland, though they were occasionally allotted to smaller states such as Friesland and Gelderland as a result of intermittent garrison duty there.26 Though confined to ‘national’ regiments, it is clear from the Dutch commission books, that a certain number of English and Scottish officers were present throughout the Brigade’s regiments. For example, about a fifth of the captains’ commissions received by Scots in the Brigade were for the replacement of captains of English companies due to either death or promotion. One quarter of captains’ commissions secured by Englishmen were for the replacement of officers of either Scottish or Irish companies: Irish officers tended to serve almost exclusively in English regiments. Interaction between the English and Scottish elements in the Brigade was, therefore, widespread.

While almost all of the English officers commissioned in the Dutch Army served in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, this was not the case with Scots. One quarter of military commissions received by individuals with Scottish surnames were for appointments to Dutch regiments independent of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. This is important as it demonstrates the presence of Scots throughout the Dutch Army and civil administration. It also suggests the great ‘Dutchness’ of many of these possessors of Scottish surnames as their facility with the language and diverse career paths indicate wide exposure to Dutch influences. The evidential base from which this information is drawn presents the obvious problem of dissociating Scottish-sounding names, which are not really Scottish, from genuine Scottish names which have been phonetically rendered into Dutch by clerks. In most cases names which appear to be Scottish can be directly linked to known Scottish families in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade such as, for example, the Collier and Scott families. The same can be said of officers bearing English names. A number of cases appear where the connection is less obvious and these have been treated with caution, but, fortunately, this last category applies in only a minority of cases. The primary explanation for the wide dispersal of Scots throughout the Dutch Republic is that

many of them belonged to families that were essentially Dutch: the Netherlands possessed many families of Scottish descent that had, by the 1680s, been settled in the Netherlands for several generations. Recent research has suggested that tightly bound communities of Scottish families existed in the Netherlands long before the political foment of James VII and II’s reign. Commanding officers, in standing Dutch regiments, could be descended from senior officers who served in the Netherlands anytime between 1574 and 1680. One example is Colonel Simon Scott, who consistently appeared on the payment returns of the repartitie (payment district) of Zeeland, and was always mentioned alongside his lieutenant colonel of Scots descent, John Cauw. Similar examples exist of Scottish families in the Netherlands, occupying commissions both inside and out of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.

The Colliers were a very important family, whose members held civil and military commissions in the Dutch Republic. They were a family of Scottish adventurers who arrived in the Netherlands in the 1620s using the name of Robertson alias Collier. Members of this family consistently held high rank within the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, while simultaneously occupying positions elsewhere in the Dutch Republic. For example, throughout the 1680s, Justinian Collier was the Dutch Resident at the Ottoman Porte, at Constantinople. His cousin, Sir Alexander Collier, commanded the third Scottish regiment of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in 1675. Their kinsman, Sir David Collier, commanded one of the three Scottish regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade during the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. Some soldiers possessing Scottish surnames came into Dutch service from established positions in other countries. For example, in the 1670s, one of these was Élie de Hamilton, Seigneur de Guicherie, a French nobleman of Scottish ancestry who was lieutenant colonel of a largely French regiment in Dutch service. As early as 1664, he was lieutenant colonel of a French regiment in the Dutch Army commanded by George Le Vasseins, Seigneur de Huilles.

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29 Het Huwelijksinlekenien van Schotse Militairen in Nederland, ed. MacLean, cf. e.g., pp. 196, 278 and 300.
32 He was later raised to the peerage as Lord Portmore: Ibid., pp. xxxi and xxxiv.
34 State van Oorloge, 1664 and 1668 under ‘Fransche’: A.R., 1.01.19, 1264 and 1.01.19, 1265.
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As well as non-Brigade commissions, there were non-military commissions among officers of Scottish descent who served in the Dutch Army which were similarly distributed. In the period 1681 to 1691, six Scots were commissioned as military commissioners, surgeons, school masters and, in one case, as the Dutch resident in Constantinople (see below). While these individuals might better be called Dutchmen of Scots descent than Scots in Dutch service the fact that eight native-born Englishmen also received non-military commissions in the same period, suggests a willingness on the part of the Dutch Republic to employ a variety of non-nationals in non-military capacities.

Many of the voluntary exiles from Britain were supporters of the ‘old cause’ of Commonwealth republicanism such as Algernon Sidney (see below). From the Restoration onwards, their numbers abroad prompted the formation of a small, but significant, ‘republican community’ of ideas in the Netherlands: it was particularly active against Charles’s interests during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-7).35 An increasingly large number of English expatriates lived in the Netherlands after 1680, but they did not put down roots in the Dutch Republic in the same permanent way that many Scots and even French Huguenots did throughout the century.36

Both new and old arrivals to the Netherlands, therefore, secured commissions outside the Brigade in the highly active period between 1681 and 1691. This implies that both belonged to groups that were welcome and trusted in the Netherlands, due to the long association of each with the Dutch Republic’s struggle against Catholic Spanish domination.

A further piece of evidence is important in gaining a fully formed picture of foreign Protestant employment in the Dutch Army. This is the fact that the vast majority of Britons and Huguenots commissioned, either in or out of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, belonged to the payment district of either Holland or Zeeland. In the case of the Brigade, these two provinces predominated as pay centres for the whole period between 1670 and 1700. The majority of people who possessed British or French surnames, but did not belong to regiments of the Brigade, were also included in these two payment districts. The payment district divisions were always somewhat arbitrarily appointed pay centres within the administration of the States General of the United Provinces. Part of each individual state’s contribution to the upkeep of the Dutch Army was, occasionally, to quarter soldiers

35 Scott, England’s Troubles, pp. 365 and 267.
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in their district. This practice suggests that there was a fair degree of geographical proximity between British units in the Netherlands.

The vast majority of the lesser Scottish officers who served in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in the second half of the seventeenth century had relatively obscure origins, and their reasons for entering Dutch service varied considerably. Some officers, like the many members of the Mackay family who joined the Brigade, already belonged to Scottish military families with an established reputation. Members of this family started entering Dutch service after Hugh Mackay of Scourie deliberately left from French service in 1672. Scourie served in the Scottish regiment in France of Lord George Douglas in the 1660s, but later transferred his captain’s commission to one of the Scottish regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. This was so he could marry Clara de Bie, a noble Dutch girl with whom he had fallen in love after having been billeted on her family during the French invasion of the outer-lying territories of the Low Countries in early 1672. Legend has it that her family would not accept him as a suitor while he remained in French service.37

Other families, such as the various branches of the Scott kindred, had been associated with Dutch service for generations.38 Others again, like John Somerville, captain of a company in one of the three Scottish regiments of the Brigade, were individuals constrained by their social position to maintain a suitable occupation. Many, like Somerville, belonged to ancient, but impoverished, Scottish noble families. The destitution of this family was such that its head was degraded from his position as a Lord of Parliament, losing the title and style of ‘Lord Somerville’, and being reduced to a simpler territorial designation. As his nearest living male relation, Captain Sommerville was appointed tutor to his orphaned nephew, the de jure eleventh Lord Sommerville, upon the death of the child’s father in 1677.39 The captain’s own tenuous financial position offered his already distressed family the only hope it had of providing the next head of the family with an education and upbringing suitable to a Scottish gentleman.

Neither military service in the Netherlands, nor service in other theatres such as France, were particularly popular amongst the common British soldiery, who saw before them only the fatigues of warfare, and shared none of the glory which their officers hoped to achieve in overseas military

38 Het Huwelijksaktekeningen van Schotsse Militairen in Nederland, ed. MacLean, passim; Scott Reed, “The Scots in Zeeland”, p. 45.
39 National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh (hereafter N.L.S.), Ch. 1,403.
service. Pressing into service prisoners, felons and vagrants was encouraged in both Scotland and England to fill the ranks of the regiments who served in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. Many tales of unjust pressing for service in the Netherlands appeared in Scotland. The high point seems to have been during the 1680s, when a series of complaints against Scottish recruiting officers in Dutch service appear.\textsuperscript{40}

Despite unwilling entry into the Brigade, many a veteran soldier who stayed with the regiments he joined, did so because he felt a strong connection to the service in which he risked his life. The decision to remain was undoubtedly aided by the fact that a majority of the recruits were Britons living in exile in the Netherlands, though what real proportion of the common soldiery they represent is impossible to assess. At a higher level, many veteran officers of the Brigade thought of their regiment as a home, and a certain number of Scottish and English officers married Dutch women. Many officers were integrated into the culture of the Netherlands, both speaking and writing in Dutch even after they returned to Scotland with William of Orange in 1688.\textsuperscript{41} For example, three letters in Dutch appear from Sir Thomas Livingstone to Major General Hugh Mackay of Scourie, dated 25 June 1689, 26 June 1689 and 4 April 1690.\textsuperscript{42} The Earl of Leven wrote fluently in Dutch by 1687.\textsuperscript{43} The facility with which many Scottish commanding officers in the Netherlands spoke Dutch, is demonstrated by a typical bill of exchange, from 1687, which was made between David, third Earl of Leven and Melville and Lord Keith. The bill was written in Dutch and subscribed at The Hague to the value of forty six ducats, which Lord Keith agreed to pay the Earl of Leven.\textsuperscript{44}

The Anglo-Dutch Brigade was always under the, at least nominal, control of the King of England. In 1680, Charles II attempted to make use of his notional power of appointment as he, and his brother, the Duke of York, were keen to see their favourites well-placed throughout all of the areas of their influence. This was especially true in relation to the Earl of Dumbarton, whose many services in the French arena had endeared him to the Crown. Following his return from French service in 1679, he could not be publicly appointed to any command in Britain, due to the Test Act

\textsuperscript{40} 6 March: Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (hereafter R.P.C.S.), ed. D. Masson, s. 3, 1683-4, p. 164; 11 March 1684, p. 403, p. 12; March 1684, p. 683; 27 March 1684, p. 420; 1 April 1684, p. 694.

\textsuperscript{41} Kuiken, "Van gene zijde van Het kana. . . in de stad Groningen, 1595-1672", pp. 154-82.


\textsuperscript{44} Bill of exchange subscribed between David, third Earl of Leven and Melville, and Lord Keith, 29 November 1687: N.A.S., G.D. 26/4/235.
which debarred Roman Catholics from holding positions of public trust. The first available opportunity for a suitable foreign appointment for him came in the shape of the overall command of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in the Netherlands when, in 1680, that position fell vacant.45

Demonstrations of royal control over the Brigade had already taken place in 1668, when it had been recalled to Britain, because of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. The three existing English units complied with Charles II's order to return, but the order did not affect the regiments from Scotland, with whom the Dutch Republic was not at war. The English regiments were not reformed until 1674, when three English regiments were allowed to rejoin the Brigade.46 Between 1666 and 1675, their place in the Brigade was taken by a variety of international regiments, some of which included Huguenot soldiers.47 The Huguenot officer who joined the Brigade, invariably did so as a captain in an English regiment. Their number was never great, but their presence is significant. Huguenots were the only non-British element in the Brigade and they were present in it both before and after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in France in 1685.48 With the re-formation of the old regiments of the Brigade in 1675, it increasingly became a focal point for Scottish and English political exiles, who found the religious toleration and crypto-Catholicism of the latter part of Charles II's reign unpalatable.49

The Brigade was commanded, from 1678, by an Irish peer and a Roman Catholic, Thomas Butler, Earl of Ossory. He was the son and heir of the Irish Duke of Ormond, and was a firm courtier, having been rumoured, in 1668, to be Catherine of Braganza's lover, though one observer thought this "... insulting not only to the virtue of the Queen, but also to her good taste, for this nobleman is not as suitable for the lover of a great Princess as for an innocent friend, while, apart from being ugly, he is also married".50 The earl maintained active command of the regiment in the field until

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45 John Childs does not mention this occurrence when he cites the unsuccessful application of the Duke of Albemarle: Childs, James II, The Army and the Glorious Revolution, p. 123.
46 Ibid., ch. 5.
47 Idem.
50 Thomas Butler, Earl of Ossory (1634-80). He was much afflicted with debts in the period immediately before his death and had borrowed heavily from the government financier, Sir Stephen Fox, to whom he owed £11,400 Sterling, in 1679. Their relationship was of long standing: Fox had previously paid Ossory £6,000, for an annuity worth £1,600 per annum, payable for five and three quarter years: C. Clay, Public Wealth and Private Finance: The Career of Sir Stephen Fox, (Oxford, 1978), pp. 177 and 185; B.L., 248
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the very end. For example, in August 1678, there were fears that he had been captured by the French, following a ‘very sharp’ engagement between the Prince of Orange and the Duke of Luxembourg, commander of the French forces.\(^{51}\) The earl died in 1680, necessitating the appointment of a new Commander-in-Chief.

For William of Orange, the most promising candidate was his personal friend, the staunchly Protestant, Henry Sidney. Sidney was another Caroline courtier who had served as Master of the Horse to the Duchess of York, with whom he was reputed to have had an affair.\(^{52}\) He was the brother of the Whig dissident, Algernon Sidney, who was, in 1683, implicated in the ‘Rye House Plot’, designed to kill both Charles II and his brother, James.\(^{53}\) Both Sidneys were wealthy sons of the Earl of Leicester.\(^{54}\) Henry’s importance in the Netherlands can be gauged by the fact that, in June 1680, he negotiated an Anglo-Dutch league.\(^{55}\)

The right to appoint the commander of the Brigade traditionally lay with the English sovereign. The name that Charles II put forward was, naturally, that of his own loyal servant, the unemployed Roman Catholic Earl of Dumbarton of whom, he said:

\[
\text{Besides the merrit he has towards me, in leaving so good an establishment in France and coming so frankly to serve me, I am sure he is the most capable man of my subjects to execute that charge, and certainly you will find him an easy man to live with, which I assure you is a great virtue in this age.}^{56}\]

William found the candidature of this pro-French, Roman Catholic nobleman unacceptable, and exercised his right of veto on appointments to the Brigade, to ensure that Dumbarton did not come anywhere near the Netherlands. Childs says that, when James VII and II came to the throne in 1685, Sidney was recalled, and the Roman Catholic Earl of Pembroke was offered as his replacement, but

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Pepys, \textit{Diary}, cf. 16 November 1665.
\item Both sons inherited from him £2,000 on Leicester House and £3,000 on Sidney lands in Kent and Sussex.
\item Henry Sidney, first Earl of Romney (1641-1704).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
this does not agree with Chudleigh's correspondence or Sidney's diary.\textsuperscript{57} The prince's objection to Dumbarton was probably due far less to his religion – many Roman Catholics still held commissions in the Dutch Army – than to his French sympathies and obvious political partisanship. By September 1680, it was clear that Dumbarton would not receive the command.

At this point Thomas Monk, second Duke of Albemarle, offered his services to William. He was the son of the great Cromwellian veteran, George Monk, first Duke of Albemarle, Earl of Torrington, Baron Monk of Potheridge, Beauchamp and Teyes (1608-70).\textsuperscript{58} In 1671, the second duke was elected a Knight of the Order of the Garter and a Privy Councillor. He married Lady Elizabeth Cavendish, daughter of Henry, Duke of Newcastle, and later, in 1687, served as Governor General of Jamaica. He also had Protestant kinsmen in the Brigade. His namesake, Thomas Monk, was appointed captain of one of the newly reformed companies that returned to Dutch service after 1674.\textsuperscript{59}

Monk, the Duke of Albemarle, clearly thought he could increase his chances of obtaining the position by taking a decidedly pro-English and pro-Protestant approach with the Prince of Orange:

I am most desirous, before all other princes in the world, to serve your Highness and the States-Generall, as I think myselfe obliged, as a true English man, to the common interest and religion of both our nations, which I hope will be now soe firmly united togetherr, that it shall never more be in the power of our enemys to separate.\textsuperscript{60}

But, Monk turned out to be no more acceptable to William than Dumbarton had been. There seems to be no reason for this beyond William's ardent desire to have Sidney appointed to the vacant command.

It soon became clear that Sidney was the only candidate whom the Prince of Orange would accept for the post. Orange was prepared to come to England, in order to intercede for Sidney's appointment. A measure of the diplomatic importance which the pregnant situation engendered can

\textsuperscript{57} Childs, \textit{The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution}, p. 123.


\textsuperscript{59} By 1676, he had obtained the rank of sergeant-major in Colonel Astley's regiment (in place of Henry Bellasise), was appointed lieutenant colonel of the same regiment a year later and, finally, in 1678, attained the rank of colonel, of the late Patrick Wesley's regiment: A.R., \textit{Commisijboek van den Raad van State ané 1673-75} (Letter H. 6), fol. 150; \textit{Commisijboek van den Raad van State ané 1676-80} (Letter H. 7), fol. 69; \textit{Commisijboek van den Raad van State ané 1681-91} (Letter H. 8), fol. 36.

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be gauged in the English Treasurer, Godolphin’s response to the news that Orange was coming to England.61 “Mr. Godolphin spoke to the King about the command of the English [sic] troupes in Holland; he expressed great kindnesse to me, and said he had rather have me att the head of them than any man in England . . . rather than a stranger [Albemarle].”62

Some of Charles II’s aversion to Sidney can be explained by the fact that he was also the prime candidate of a Whig faction at the English court, actually led by Godolphin. Sidney fostered this connection. But, all this time, Albemarle continued to lobby for the position:

I must take the liberty to let you know that, when my Lord Dunbarton [sic] first engaged the King and the Duke to presse your Highnesse that he might have the command of the King’s subjects in the service of the States, I desired them both that, if that could not be, upon the account of his being a papist, that they would not concerne themselves for any but Mr. Sidney. They both promised they would not, since which the Duke of Albemarle has been extremely earnest with the King to recommend him, or at least to be passive in the case.63

However, it was clear that Sidney was the focal point of debate, but, throughout the negotiations, he suffered from considerable dissimulation on the part of Charles II, who, in the previous September, “. . . told me he had rather me at the head of the troops than any man in England . . . which he hath not observed, but has done much the contrary, and nobody hath yet told me how I deserved it”.64

In the same communication, Sidney accurately guessed at the cause of his misfortune, pointing to the pre-eminence of the French interest (both Catholic and Protestant) at court: “My Lord Feversham hath more of the King’s personal kindness than any body.”65 Indeed, many of Sidney’s problems may have stemmed from the personal animosity which James, Duke of York, harboured against him: Sidney had flirted with James’s wife, Anne (c.1668), and been banished from the court for the offence.66

65 Idem.
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Despite these difficulties, William so badly wanted Sidney's appointment that he was prepared to make him acting commander of one of the regiments of the Brigade, saying, at the same time, that he desired no overall commander to be appointed in a time of peace. The supreme command of the Brigade lay in abeyance until 1684, when Sidney was finally recalled to England from The Hague. Despite the earlier defeat of Dumbarton's candidature, William of Orange openly expressed his belief that Sidney's later recall was specifically designed to allow a pro-French Roman Catholic to be appointed to this command. William's opinion of Dumbarton further underlines the earl as a link between British and European politics. To avoid a Roman Catholic gaining a position of such strength in the Netherlands, William asked that he himself be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Brigade, but the request was denied. Thereafter, no such commander was appointed and, after 1685, William relied upon Hugh Mackay of Scourie when he required a senior officer to act in this position.

When, in 1685, King James VII and II came to the throne, he immediately began to pursue policies which alarmed significant numbers of his subjects, who interpreted his actions as being designed to achieve the Catholicization of Britain. As a consequence, many Scots felt the need to leave Britain and the Anglo-Dutch Brigade was a natural home for Protestant discontent. Many members of the nobility and gentry continued to be excluded from Public Office due to the Test Act, so that the full ramifications of the 'Exclusion Crisis' (1678) continued to be felt well into the reign of James VII and II. The refusal of the Earl of Argyll to submit to the Test Act incurred the enmity of James, Duke of York, who was personally present in Scotland as the king's Commissioner at the time of his refusal.

68 Dispatches of Thomas Plott (1681-1682) and Thomas Chudleigh, p. vi.
69 Ibid., p. xn.
70 Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, p. 124; State van Oorlogh (state of war accounts) for 1688: A.R., 1.01.19, 1275.
71 Among exiles from Scotland were David, third Earl of Leven and Melville, the Earl Mareschal, Henry Erskine, third Lord Cardross, Sir James Dalrymple of Stair, Sir Patrick Home of Polwarth, the Earl of Argyll and the cleric, Gilbert Burnet. In 1681, in Scotland, both Stair and Argyll refused to subscribe to the Test Act, which required all holders of positions of public responsibility in Britain to swear that they would uphold the existing settlement of church and state and not meddle with either. It was clearly impossible for Conventicles, Catholics and Protestant dissenters of all colours to submit to the Test Act.
72 The nephews of Gilbert Burnet, Robert Ferguson and James Johnston, also joined him in Holland, while other expatriates, such as the prominent English theorist, John Locke, passed through the Netherlands in the late 1680s, and in 1683, the leader of the Whigs, the Earl of Shaftesbury, died in the Netherlands: G. Burnet, History; T. E. S. Clarke and H. G. Foxcroft, A Life of Gilbert Burnet Bishop of 252
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A great number of politico-religious refugees sought refuge in the Low Countries. Relatively few joined the Anglo-Dutch Brigade itself, but they all joined the large expatriate communities of English and Scottish voluntary exiles in which the Brigade played a prominent role. For example, on 3 November 1686, the Protestant minister, Master George Turnbull, noted in his diary that he:

... went to Utrecht, and there being invited to teach some friends the French language. I accepted the offer, and stayed with them till April 3: my scholars were Mr. Chisley, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Erskin, Mr. Lumsden, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Nisbet, Mr. Burnet, and Mr. Scrope... and I taught my Lady Southerland at Utrecht [and] I lodged with one Mr. Wallace, alias Adrington, till December 20.73

But, leaving Scotland was no easy task. In 1685, William Lindsay, eighteenth Earl of Crawford, attempted to flee the reign of James VII and II. He initially considered the Americas to be a suitable goal, but, loath to travel so far from Scotland, decided that the Netherlands was a better destination. He was significantly hampered, in any case, by the fact that noblemen were not allowed to leave the country without royal permission.74 Crawford also knew that ships' captains were dissuaded by heavy fines from taking passengers, such as he, overseas:

Besides the danger of reencountering on the seas with any of our King's ships, and the strict scrutiny that they make when they meet with any ships belonging to these three nations, to what place in the world could I retire to for my safety?75

Two years later, Crawford might have taken solace from Gilbert Burnet's reasons for voluntary exile in the Low Countries. A citation for treason was unwisely made against him in the Privy Council of Scotland. Although the charge was soon dismissed, it prompted Gilbert Burnet to say that he was not only going to the Netherlands to marry, but had been naturalized there, and saw no disloyalty in

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staying there indefinitely. Burnet was, in fact, obeying James by going, as that king clearly did not care for his presence in Britain.76

At the beginning of 1685, the Scottish possessions of all of these individuals were speedily attained.77 The financial embarrassment of Henry Erskine, third Lord Cardross, following his flight to the Netherlands in 1685, has already been mentioned and the great financial difficulties suffered by many expatriate Scots made the acquisition of credit an acute problem for all members of the British community in the Netherlands.78 Credit was an essential element of any military career.79

In 1685, at the beginning of his reign, James VII and II recalled the Anglo-Dutch Brigade because of the invasion of Monmouth and Argyll. Though present in England during Monmouth’s progress through the West Country, James’s distrust of the Brigade’s political sympathies was such that he kept them encamped, outside London, on Hounslow Heath, rather than send them to face the rebel duke’s forces for, in the words of John Childs, “... in 1685, the Anglo-Dutch Brigade must have appeared to be riddled with political and religious dissent, a thoroughly unreliable body of officers and men who were as likely to fight for Monmouth as against him”.80 Nevertheless, James was pleased with their martial disposition. After inspecting the three Scottish regiments encamped in Hyde Park, the king glowingly wrote to William of Orange: “There cannot be, I am sure, better men than they are and do truly look like old regiments and one cannot be better pleased with them than I am.”81

Both Monmouth and Argyll launched their invasions from the Netherlands, and drew on the large body of Scottish soldiers in Dutch service, and in that of Brandenburg and Brunswick-Lüneburg-Zell. Many Scots in the service of these countries (and some French Huguenots also) were caught up in this way in the dramatic exploit of Monmouth’s rebellion. Others, such as John Erskine of Carnock, became involved fully in Argyll’s rising, preferring service in it to following Monmouth.82

79 Het Staatsche Leger, 1568-1795, vol. 6 (Breda and The Hague, 1911-64).
80 Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, p. 126.
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Nine Scottish soldiers of the Brigade, however, openly toasted the success of Monmouth's venture, and some Scots actually joined Monmouth. One such unfortunate was a young man of the Bruce family, a brother of the Laird of Bunzionale in Fife. In July 1685, following the collapse of Argyll's campaign, he was captured with many of the rebels, whereupon Sir Andrew Forester informed the young man's kinsman, Sir William Bruce, that:

Amongst 14 Prisoners brought hither this day, who were in the rebellion, there is one of your name (a brother of Bunzionale in Fife) who is a captain in the Duke of Brandenbourgh's service, I spoke with him, and he tells me that as the late Monmouth was upon coming from Holland, he happed to be at Rotterdam designing to goe for Scotland to visit his brother and some other frends, and that he was unhappily wheedled to come over hither with the rebels: Hee seemes very penitent; and if upon that account, and his being a Bruce, it shalbe in my power to contribute anything towards the saving of his life, you may be sure I will not fail to doe it.

Captain Bruce was typical of the type and calibre of the rebels, being young, impetuous, ill-advised and, ultimately, unlucky.

James's reaction to the Brigade was determined by his deep distrust of Dutch-based Protestant support: he placed a much greater faith in the political allies he had gathered around him during his personal reign in Scotland from 1679 to 1681. He appointed a number of important Scottish Catholics to serve as commanders in his Scottish militia. Men like George Douglas, Earl of Dumbarton, and the Drummond brothers – John, fourth Earl of Perth, and his brother, James Drummond of Lundie, later first Earl of Melfort – were among his senior commanders in Scotland during the rebellion crisis. They were the backbone of his Scottish Catholic 'court party'. The French ambassador observed that James used the rebellion crisis as an excuse to promote his friends and was, therefore, "... very glad to have the pretence of raising troops and he believes that the Duke of Monmouth's enterprise will serve only to make him still more master of his country".

On 8 May 1685, the king dispatched Dumbarton to Scotland, and gave him all his dispatches and charged him "... to speak to you [Hamilton] of seuerall things, which would be too long for a letter,

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84 Sir Andrew Forester to Sir William Bruce, Whitehall, 16 July 1685: N.A.S., G.D. 29/1907/fol. 4.
hauing intire confidence in him, and so refer to him for what I have to say".87 On 9 March 1685, Dumbarton received a pass to ride north to Berwick, with five servants.88 He was reported moving towards Argyll in June, and, in July 1685, received a commission as lieutenant general of the forces in Scotland.89 James's use of appointments at this time highlights their importance among all military units. The king's actions in Scotland in 1685 also aid our understanding of William of Orange's feelings regarding the command of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.

Dumbarton followed his brother, the Duke of Hamilton's political opposition to Queensberry. James was aware of this and, therefore, wrote to allay any fears Queensberry might have regarding his choice of messenger:

Only this shall I say to you myself, which is that you need not apprehend it, it is in any bodys power to do you ill offices with me. No body has gone about it, and if they had, it would only have done them harme, and not you; therefore fear nothing of that kind.90

Dumbarton was well known to James as a firm Roman Catholic and a supporter of the French interest in Britain. James, therefore, looked upon him as a loyal servant in whom he could place his trust, and therefore had no qualms about appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Scotland at a time of real crisis.91 But even the non-Catholics whom James appointed to military commands during Argyll's and Monmouth's rebellions, proved to be men who were sufficiently politically avaricious, crypto-Catholic or conservatively loyalist, as to be considered trustworthy by him.92 The king wrote in May 1685:

I see that the D[uke] of Monmouth, L[ord] Argile [sic] and the rest of that rebellion . . . are resolved to attempt some thing and have shipt of arms and some few men, from Amsterdam, it will behove all you that I trust in my ancient kingdome to be alert, and to lay aside all little piques and animositys that may be amongst you, I am

87 P.R.O., S.P.Dom., Entry Book 70, fol. 162.
88 Idem.
89 4 June 1685: Greenwich Hospital, Newsletters 2, no. 140; Commission as Lt. General, 31 July 1685: P.R.O., S.P.Dom., Entry Book 164, fol. 248.
90 James to Queensberry, St. James, 8 May 1685, printed in H.M.C., Buccleuch and Queensberry Papers, vol. 1 (London, 1903), p. 107.
91 Claverhouse to Queensberry, 16 June 1685: H.M.C., Report 15, Appendix 8, p. 293.
92 Fountainhall, Chronological Notes, p. 131.
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sure you will do your part in that as well as you have always done, whenever my services have been concerned,
Lord Dumbarton will speake to you of this.93

In November 1685, when Monmouth’s and Argyll’s rebellions had been firmly and securely crushed, James VII pardoned, for not taking the Test Act, the three most prominent of the Catholics he had employed – Dumbarton, Lord Dover and Sir Edward Hales – as well as sixty lesser officers.94 Other Scottish Roman Catholics, such as the Duke of Gordon, who had been appointed commander of the heritors of Aberdeen and Bamffshire, were also effectively protected from the Test Act in this way.95 At the same time as he pardoned the officers, James shielded them through his dispensing power – the supposed right of the Crown to dispense at will with any existing law in the land – and ratified their commissions.96

In June 1685, the king wrote enthusiastically to his supporters in Scotland:

I see you are well pleased with what the Parliament here does, who persevere in doing what becomes them for my satisfaction, and the good of the nation, and as all honest men are pleased with it, so it must needs be a very great disappointment to Monmouth, Argile [sic] and all their rebellious adherents and well wishers.97

On the basis of this, it appeared that James’s personal dispensing power alone might have allowed Roman Catholics to serve in positions of public trust, but the king resolved to go further and have the Test Act overturned. James had the Lord Chancellor, Judge Jeffries, introduce a bill designed to repeal the Second Test of 1678 in the House of Lords. It simultaneously allowed the ‘Popish Lords’,

93 James to Perth, 10 May 1685: N.A.S. G.D. 160/52989-95/fol. 44.
95 Fountainhall, Chronological Notes, p. 130; “Warrant for an Approbation, Exoneration, and Remission in favour of George, earl of Dumbarton in all his actings under a Commission dated 2 May 1685, appointing him Lieutenant General and Commander in Chief of all His Majesty’s Forces in Scotland, and Particularly his acting under the said commission without taking any of the oaths prescribed by law”, Whitelaw, 22 October 1686, printed in H.M.C., Eglinton, Maxwell, Moray, Weston, Underwood, Digby MSS. (London, 1885), Charles Stirling-Home-Drummond Moray MSS., no. 47.
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some seventeen in number who had been barred from the house, to sit in it once more: "Which they alledge is their birthright and cannot be taken from them." 98

In July 1685, when it became clear that Monmouth and Argyll had been successfully defeated, James began to think of rewards for those of his Scottish supporters upon whom he now knew he could rely. Melfort, as Lord Treasurer of Scotland, was consulted as to what amount of money the Earl of Dumbarton should receive for his pains. 99 Dumbarton was eventually to be given the estates of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun: the sensitivity of this favour was such that, in the correspondence that passed on the matter, the initial dealings were conducted in code. It appears that the idea for the grant came from Dumbarton's brother-in-law, Queensberry, who proposed it to the king sometime in May 1685, perhaps in an attempt to curry favour for himself and his (increasingly put-upon) supporters in Scotland.100 However, the offer seems to have played little, if any, part in Dumbarton's own calculations and the Earl of Moray was vexed that the earl had "... not so much as takin notice of it [the Saltoun grant] to me in the least: what is the reason I can not tell, but I resolve to move some discours of it to him, and then shall give your Grace [Queensberry] account how it is lyke to succeed".101

In 1687, Saltoun was indeed granted to Dumbarton, but was, significantly, managed by the Duke of Hamilton.102 This suggests that the duke may have desired possession of the estate from the first. Another possibility is that Hamilton held it on behalf of Andrew Fletcher himself. The two had been close and, in 1685 and 1686, Fletcher had applauded Hamilton's pretensions to the Scottish Crown, and saluted him as the leader of the aristocracy in Scotland.103

Dumbarton informed Moray that it was, indeed, the desire of the Duke of Hamilton (and of his son, Arran), and, therefore, of himself also, to serve Queensberry in the matter. Moray remained

100 James to Queensberry, St. James, 31 May 1685, printed in Ibid., p. 95.
101 Moray to Queensberry, Whitehall, 28 July 1685, printed Ibid., vol. 2, p. 90.
102 Dumbarton's insensitivity to the Saltoun grant may also have been associated with his apparent indifference to Scotland itself. His London-based nephew, the Earl of Arran, was made privy to his family's fears that he had "given over thoughts of being a Scotchman", in 1694, and Arran may simply have been following an internationalist Douglas family pattern in this: Marshall, The Days of Duchess Anne, p. 209.
unconvinced of the earl’s enthusiasm for the grant, awaiting some outward proof of Dumbarton’s and the Hamilton party’s devotion to Queensberry and his generous offer.

The award of the Saltoun estates to Dumbarton was part of an attempt by Moray and Queensberry, in August 1685, to preserve a status quo at court regarding forfeitures. However, Dumbarton was well known as one who was “. . . easy and too much imposed upon” by his friends and relations, and this aspect of his personality alone may explain the strange arrangements regarding the Saltoun lands.104 Dumbarton was not, however, completely insensitive to the effects of the grant and wrote good-humouredly of his sister, the Duchess of Queensberry, saying that “. . . now I am a Scots laird I may hope to see her”.105

After the swift defeat of Monmouth and Argyll, James VII and II was left in the position of having a large body of men under arms, some of whom were Roman Catholic. This was in direct contravention of the Test Act and James openly stated that “. . . he had made use of some to be officers in his army who were not qualified according to the laws (being popish) but to deal plainly with them, he would rather expose nor desert them, having had experience of there loyalty”.106 This clearly opened the road to arbitrary and absolutist government – government free from the constraints of constitutional or parliamentary custom – which would culminate, in 1687, in the king’s imposition of a Declaration of Indulgence, which, “. . . by dispensing with the safeguards of the legislative religious settlement, brought all of these threats together”.107 The declaration harmed James’s relationship with Anglican Tories as it encouraged the settlement in Britain of dissenting groups towards which they were somewhat hostile: for example, two Huguenot goldsmiths – Samuel Margas, from Rouen, and Jean Chartier, from Blois – settled in Britain as a direct result of the Declaration of Indulgence.108

Furthermore, public fear, regarding the king’s support of Catholic officers, was such that his billeting of Roman Catholic cavalry at Gloucester was “. . . looked upon by some as the commencement of dragooning” of the type which was already well known in France, where Louis

104 Moray to Queensberry, Whitehall, 4 August 1685, printed in H.M.C., Buccleuch and Queensberry Papers, vol. 2, p. 92.
105 N.L.S., Salt. MS. 17.498, fol. 57.
107 Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 211.
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XIV’s troops were using it to force abjuration to Catholicism upon the Protestant population.\(^{109}\) As an experienced soldier, James may well have been attempting to use billeting as a means of breaking down the distance between soldiers and civilians.\(^{110}\) However, James had little to fear as, thanks to Charles’s victory in the ‘Exclusion Crisis’ of 1678-81, the Crown was, to all appearances, militarily, politically and economically stronger than at any previous time in the century.\(^{111}\) But, while “... by 1685 domestic struggle against royal popery and arbitrary government had disappeared” such opposition was far from dead and it took just three years to re-ignite it to the degree that James lost his throne.\(^{112}\)

It became increasingly clear that James meant to employ Roman Catholics both in his army and as his advisers. John Childs argues that this was a natural reaction to the scarce number of highly-qualified officers in general. James’s statement that, as an experienced military commander, he was simply pooling talent, rather than promoting a Catholicizing principle within his army at this time, is, however, suspect, as there were few such Roman Catholic officers: no more than thirty-one according to Charles Dalton’s conservative estimate.\(^{113}\) In 1685, the Earl of Ailesbury thought there were no more than 1,200 Catholics in the entire army.\(^{114}\) But, by 31 December 1685, a hundred and forty-one Catholics had been commissioned into the English and Scottish armies as officers.\(^{115}\) Furthermore, James was clearly interested in advancing Catholics in the army as he repeatedly (in 1686, 1687 and 1688) supported the Catholic religion at the army’s encampments on Hounslow Heath.

In 1687, the king created a fourth troop of the premier cavalry unit of the royal household, the Life Guards, with the intention of training a new generation of Catholic officers for his army. By contrast, in 1687, King James offered a concession to some Huguenot refugees by offering them


\(^{110}\) Well into the eighteenth century, billeting was acknowledged to “… ameliorate the essential bleakness of military life, and for good or evil it preserved a close bond between army and society”. Where that bond was lacking, such as in Britain in James’s reign, he might well be forgiven for trying to build it up: however, his lack of sensitivity to local feeling and popular fears clearly reduced the possible advantages of such interaction: C. Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (London, 1987), p. 126.

\(^{111}\) Scott, *England’s Troubles*, pp. 205 and 208.

\(^{112}\) Ibid., pp. 204-5.


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military employment in a new regiment of dragoons under the command of one of their co-religionists, Armand de Bourbon, Marquis de Miremont. However, this was with the stipulation that it should serve far outside Britain against the Ottoman Turks in Leopold I’s Imperial Army. 116 Significantly, there was no suggestion whatsoever that his Catholic Life Guards corps should enter Imperial service.

Ironically for James, the Catholic commander of the new Fourth Troop of the Life Guards, Lord Dover, is said to have sold half the available commissions to refugee Huguenot gentlemen “... for if a Turk had come, the fifty guineas had been acceptable to that lord, the captain”. 117 Having said this, however, it is clear that the Fourth Troop harboured a number of committed Catholics who were loyal to James. One of the most significant of these was Patrick Sarsfield, who would later command a force of pro-James soldiers against William of Orange in Ireland. Furthermore, John Kinross suggests that there was a fairly even mix of latent pro-William and pro-James, or Jacobite, soldiers in the Fourth Troop in the years immediately preceding William’s invasion. 118

The total lack of control exercised by James over the Fourth Troop of Life Guards is demonstrated by the fact that it not only contained Huguenots, but also violently anti-Catholic Whigs like Richard Savage, Viscount Colchester. This nobleman left Lord Churchill’s direct command in the Third Troop in order to take a commission in the Fourth, presumably with the intention of consolidating anti-James feeling within the corps. Not only did Colchester eventually become the Troop’s lieutenant colonel, he was also the representative of the ‘Treason Club’, being one of the first officers under James to desert to William of Orange when, in 1688, the prince arrived, taking with him sixty men from the Fourth Troop. 119 Stephen Saunders Webb highlights the speed with which these Huguenot officers became devoted subordinates to John, Lord Churchill, the executive officer of the Life Guards. 120 But, while the Huguenots of the Life Guards later enthusiastically followed Churchill when he defected to William of Orange, they did not themselves create, foster or even significantly aid that lord’s ‘conspiracy in the army’.

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The example of Lord Dover's Company reinforces the problem facing James in ensuring the support of his armed forces. His attempt to introduce more Catholics did not necessarily represent a desire to Catholicize the army but a desire to augment his existing military forces with trustworthy and dependable subjects who were loyal to him personally. If James really did aim at the Catholicization of the army, he failed miserably. Even in 1688 there were no more than 1,000 out of 18,000 soldiers, or 10 per cent of the army, who were Roman Catholic.\textsuperscript{121} One contemporary account insisted that James desired to "... have in Scotland of Scots Papists an army of three thousand men, in England of twenty thousand, without so much as one convert among them, when he pleases".\textsuperscript{122} John Childs questions this opinion by highlighting James's later policy in Scotland, where the king went out of his way to promote only a small number of recently converted Catholics to positions of public trust in the civil and military administration. This policy did not significantly extend to his Scottish Army, though this was arguably the result of regional conditions in his northern kingdom. Ultimately, however, Jonathan Scott's assessment of James's motives is, perhaps, the most useful: he suggests that the very real threat of the international counter-reformation movement in Europe must render unimportant the debate over the actual or perceived reality of James's 'Catholicization' of his three kingdoms.\textsuperscript{123}

In Scotland, the Earl of Melfort's bullying guidance, and the existence of a close-knit 'court party', ensured that the king could successfully institute his policies without recourse to military strength. However, the nature of the 'court party' in Scotland must seriously affect any assessment of James's Catholicizing policies. James was largely controlled by key members of the party, many of whom were closely connected to the 'old' Catholic interest in Scotland, who were pursuing their own agenda rather than complying with royal policy. The general public had no doubt that James wanted to lead his three kingdoms back to the Roman Catholic faith, but, the Crown's practical inability to achieve this end, ultimately meant the policy was a perceived, rather than a real, one.

While there is little evidence that James wished to Catholicize his officer corps in general, this does not in any way represent the absence of an absolutist agenda on his part. James was a firm believer in centralism to the detriment of the "... liberties and irregularities of peripheral areas":

\textsuperscript{121} Whitworth, "1685", p.136.
\textsuperscript{123} Scott, England's Troubles, p. 208.
though, ironically, he consistently favoured individuals whose origins were far from the centre of political power.\textsuperscript{124} John Hopkins believes the only reason James did not try ruling Scotland by military force was that his army there was tied down in the West Highlands, where disturbances had earlier (in 1680) prevented his brother, Charles, from establishing a garrison at Inverlochy.\textsuperscript{125} However, James's view of the need for military rule in the Highlands may have resulted as much from regional conditions as from his own proclivities. His chief Scottish advisors and factors, Perth and Melfort, are said to have had "... small faith in tartan trews", meaning that they distrusted the murky political scene in the Highland.\textsuperscript{126}

There is some evidence that the king used his largely non-Catholic army to enforce his policies as, in 1687, the Earl of Peterborough's cavalry regiment was used to keep the peace during the disturbances which followed the king's imposition of Catholic fellows on to Magdalen College, Oxford.\textsuperscript{127} Instances of James singling out Catholic soldiers for specific duties, such as this, are rare, but one such case occurred in 1686, when some Catholic soldiers of Dumbaron's regiment were detailed to guard the king's personal Catholic chapel at Holyrood Palace in Edinburgh.\textsuperscript{128} There is even the suggestion that James intended to turn Whitehall into an armed fortress with a new bridge designed to give direct access to the south bank of the River Thames.\textsuperscript{129}

The British Crown had for decades feared the connections between Ulster Scots and their dissenting cousins in southwest Scotland.\textsuperscript{130} Therefore, James also allowed the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, the Earl of Tyrconnel, to purge his Irish Army of its Protestant officers, as an integral aspect of his introduction into Ireland of James's absolutist and Catholicizing policies.\textsuperscript{131} Many of the dismissed officers sought employment in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, further enforcing the anti-Stuart militancy of its officer corps created by the inclusion, in its ranks, of expatriate British Whigs and some Huguenots.\textsuperscript{132} Two reasons explain why no purge took place in Scotland: the absence of a

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\item \textsuperscript{124} Hopkins, \textit{Glencoe and the End of the Highland War}, pp. 87-8.
\item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{128} The chapel would also served, in 1687, as the chapel for the newly 'restored' Order of the Thistle: Sir J. Lauder, \textit{Lord Fountainhall, Historical Notices of Scottish Affairs} (1661-88), ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1848), p. 772.
\item \textsuperscript{129} D. Jones, \textit{The Secret History of Whitehall from the Restoration of Charles II down to the abdication of the late King James}, vol. 1 (London, 1717), pp. 270-2.
\item \textsuperscript{132} \textit{Ibid}., p. 74.
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Catholic majority, and the existence there of a ‘court party’. Nor did the Earls of Melfort or Perth have any intention of using the Scottish army to intervene in English matters. Though Ireland represents the only instance of outright Catholicization in the armies of James’s three kingdoms, Childs suggests that the king, nevertheless, thinned out the officer corps of his armies "... and went a considerable way towards converting it from a body of gentlemen and courtiers to a professional institution whose members were dependent on the king for their livelihood and prospects". Sir James Dalrymple unambiguously recorded James’s attitude towards his officers: “He caresses the officers much and explains himself openly enough, that he will keep none but those on whom he may entirely depend.” This clearly suggests that religion played a subsidiary role to loyalty in James’s estimation of his supporters.

John Childs has suggested that Scottish Catholics, particularly, were constrained from holding military commissions because only five establishment Scottish regiments existed and all of these were in the hands of Protestants. However, this argument does not appreciate the close connections that existed between Dumbarton, the one de facto Catholic commander, and the Scottish Commander-in-Chief, and a future supporter of James Graham of Claverhouse. Dumbarton interceded with the king on the part of Claverhouse to allow that gentleman to leave his military command in Scotland in order to come south and secure his own position at court. He also approached the Scottish Secretary of State, the Catholic Earl of Melfort, with the same end in mind, and this fact reinforces the link between Claverhouse and the Catholic adherents of the king. The Earl of Moray despaired that so senior a soldier should leave his post in Scotland and complained that Dumbarton was easily imposed upon. The episode demonstrates the network of clientage that Dumbarton headed and emphasizes the fact that the confessional faith of the Scottish military élite could play a subsidiary role in their social and political affiliations during the reign of James VII and II.

Though John Childs has tried to emphasize the fact that Dumbarton’s residency in England debarred him from preferring Scots in Scotland, it is clear that many Scots and Englishmen alike

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133 Ibid., p. 78.
gained position and preferment as a result of his influence. For example, Dumbarton specifically sought employment for his kinsman and junior officer, William Douglas, who had killed a fellow officer of the Douglas regiment in Ireland in 1679. In 1680, though forgiven after a slight rebuke, Captain Douglas left the regiment in Ireland and sought employment in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. However, Childs himself states that promotion and advancement lay within the orbit of Whitehall. He cites the statistic that, of a hundred and seventy-five officers in the Scottish regiments in 1687, forty-five had absented themselves from their commands to live in London, in order to be closer to the centre of preferment.

Dumbarton was, however, no politician, and his attempts to curry favour with London-based court cliques were as inept as those of his brother, Hamilton. One striking example of this, is the failure of his marriage to affect any change in his influence or power at the English court. Dumbarton took as his bride, in or about 1686, Anne, the daughter of Robert Wheatley, Esquire, of Bracknell (or Brecknock), Berkshire. Her sister, Catherine Wheatley, became Duchess of Northumberland, following her marriage to George FitzRoy (the natural son of Charles II and Barbara, Duchess of Cleveland) who was created Duke of Northumberland on 6 April 1683. This connection ought to have propelled Dumbarton even more fully into the heart of his master’s courtly family, but it had the opposite effect. The earl’s own brother, the Duke of Hamilton, would never consent to meet his new countess, who died, on 25 April 1691, in exile, at St. Germain-en-Laye.

Hamilton’s reaction to the match is evidence enough of the un-politique nature of Dumbarton’s choice of bride, and the fact that the controversy erupted during a dispute over the prerogatives of the Knights of the Order of the Thistle, only strengthens the impression of Dumbarton’s poor judgment in the matter. The wearing of the badge of this order by Thistle Knights became a contentious issue in October 1687, when the Duke of Hamilton wrote to his duchess informing her that the Knights of the Order of the Garter, of whom he was one, had complained to the king “... against the knights of St. Andrew [sic] wearing there ribbon as we do”. The Thistle knights had been emulating the Garter knights’ habit of wearing the jewel of the order on a ribbon suspended

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137 In March 1683 he was instrumental in obtaining leave of the king for the Governor of Jersey, Sir John Lanier, to come to England to see to his affairs. Leave was granted 10 March 1683: P.R.O., S.P. Channel Islands 1, no. 130.
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from the shoulder and passing over the chest. The result was that the king "... ordered there [sic] wearing it again about their necks as formerly".141 Hamilton wrote that the Earls of Melfort and Dumbarton were "... extraordinarily ill pleased that I can not express it to you and believe it had floured all from me albeit I refused to concern with the rest of the knights of [the] Garter to go with them to the king".142

Long before James's reign collapsed, during the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, a great number of the Scottish officers in both Dutch and French service, chose to express their loyalty to James and his regime by emphasizing their membership of old Scottish social institutions.143 One way they did this, was by supporting the reinvigorated office of the Lord Lyon King of Arms, which housed the Public Register of all Arms and Bearings in Scotland. The Register began effective operation in 1672, following a parliamentary statute affirming the powers of the Lord Lyon King of Arms, the head of Scotland's heraldic executive, which had first been ratified by a Scottish parliament in 1593.144 These early powers remained dormant throughout most of the seventeenth century, but they included the right to visit the 'whole arms and bearing in Scotland'. This was with the specific intention of ensuring that cadet members of the noblesse used proper marks of difference on their arms in order to distinguish them from the arms of the chiefs, who alone could use the simplest form of the arms.145

After 1672, the effects of the renewed effort can be seen in the Scottish soldiers' arms that appear in the Register. These include many marks designed to differentiate the arms from those of their chiefs by the inclusion of bordures (the principal Scottish difference mark) and smaller marks, such as single crescents and mullets (moon- and star-shaped objects respectively).

In late seventeenth-century Scotland, the Court of the Lord Lyon King of Arms began to act as the sole official conduit through which proofs and tests of noble status could be obtained by Scots. After the 'abdication' of James VII, the 'political' implications of registration with the Lyon Court became explicit.146 Judgments by Lyon Court, pertaining to an individual's right to bear arms, were

141 Idem.
142 Idem.
145 Ibid., p. 10.
146 This was not always true, as proofs of noble status had been obtained by individuals through other agencies since the Middle Ages - among them town councils - and, of course, from the Sovereign under the Great Seal. This second course was taken by one Scot,
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final. They were enshrined in the procedure of matriculation, whereby an individual belonging to an
armigerous, or arms-bearing, family ‘made up’ his or her claim to a different version of that family’s
arms. A reasonable number of army officers matriculated their arms in the Register in the years
between 1672 and 1700. As holders of positions of public responsibility under the Crown, it might
be expected that Scottish Army officers would be encouraged to matriculate their arms. The failure,
in this period, of many to do so can be attributed, in part, to the continuing novelty of the Register.
The Lord Lyon faced a constant battle to persuade people to record their arms in the Register, and
had vigorously to advocate the necessity of doing so to a noblesse that had been, throughout its
history, free of such armorial constraints. However, the decision to register arms with the Lord Lyon
remained a political one, which demonstrated implicit acceptance of the ruling regime.

Of the sixty-one soldiers’ arms recorded in the Register between 1672 and 1714, a few remarks
can be made. In most cases, the soldiers who matriculated arms were professional army officers
serving in the Scottish regiments of Charles II, James VII and II or in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in
the Netherlands, many of whom returned into British service following the recall of the Brigade in
1674. In some cases, the soldiers served foreign monarchs. Two gentlemen serving abroad,
belonged to families which settled in France and Sweden respectively.147 Four soldiers were in the
service of the States General of the United Provinces, but they represent only a small proportion of
the large number of Scots who served in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.148 Apart from these six Scots,
only three other Dutch soldiers appear in the Register. Telling is the number of Brigade veterans
who can be found in the Register: most registered their arms in the early 1690s, in the period
immediately following William of Orange’s ascendancy in Britain. In their case, registration
represented a dual investment in terms both of re-integrating themselves into the Scottish social

Dr. David Kinloch, King James VI’s personal physician, who, on 20 March 1596, obtained directly from that king a birthbrief
attesting the noble status of all four of his grandparents: the Lord Lyon King of Arms of that time may well have refused to allow
the proofs of nobility presented by Kinloch. Lyon King Innes of Learney says, however, that, since the late seventeenth century, the
Court of the Lord Lyon King of Arms has acted as the exclusive official granting body for such statements of nobility in Scotland:
Ibid., pp. 194 and 196 (plate XL).

147 One was a member of the Moncreiff family, who possessed the title of ‘Seigneur de Messone’, and was a commissaire in the army
of Louis XIV, and the other, Colonel Robert Lyghtone, a Thirty Years’ War veteran in Swedish service. The use of administrative
functionaries who held the title of commissaires des Guerres and administered pay and supplies to the regiments of the French Army,
was begun some time before the ascendancy of Cardinal Richelieu. It was the famous cardinal, however, who consolidated their
position within the French military bureaucracy. For a full assessment of their position, duties and significance: D. A. Parrott, “The
Administration of the French Army During the Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu”, unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1985,
pp. 236-72.

148 Lieutenant Robert Mibet, Captain John Murray, Captain John Sommerville, and Colonel John Buchan are all described as
serving in regiments in the Dutch Army: R.P.C.S., 6 April 1682, s. 3, 1681-2, p. 385; 11 March 1684, p. 403; 30 July 1685, 1685-6, p.
124.
hierarchy, after years spent abroad, and of proclaiming their support for a new, and still controversial, regime. They did this by submitting their status in their homeland to the judgment of Scottish officials who were the Crown servants of William and Mary.

The significance of the Lyon Court evidence lies in the fact that, right up to 1688, the Anglo-Dutch Brigade contained a number of British officers who remained loyal to James. These included both Catholic and Protestant officers, but, after 1686, William refused to allow any Catholics to be commissioned in the Brigade. However, William was not free of Brigade Catholics until, in March 1688, James recalled it, in order to remove it from the harmful influences present in the Netherlands.

How much William had to fear from dissent within the Brigade, is demonstrated by the Peyton affair of 1686. Captain William Slater of the Brigade assisted Bevil Skelton in the attempted forced abduction and repatriation to England of a radical Whig opponent of James, Sir Robert Peyton, then living in exile in the Netherlands. The attempt failed, thanks to the fact that Peyton was a known Dutch citizen, but it was clear that a group of British officers in Dutch service had co-operated to further the political ends of the Roman Catholic King of England.149

The three-year reign of James II saw the departure from Britain of many political and religious dissidents from England, Scotland and Ireland. This helped to foster an increasing anti-Stuart sentiment within the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, which was further augmented by the flood of French Protestant refugees who arrived in the Netherlands after 1685. This had the result that, throughout this period, the Brigade attracted an increasing number of militant Protestant officers from Scotland, England and Ireland as well as French Huguenot refugees and some native Dutchmen. Furthermore, the militancy of many Huguenots was such that they were willing to go beyond their usual desire to serve alongside their compatriots and in order to come to grips with their persecutors, they joined the hard-fighting units of the Dutch army. Indeed, some Huguenot soldiers in the Dutch Army were reported to be so violently opposed to Catholic French interests that they were prepared to “... joyne with such English as resolve to have at the king’s person”.150 Service in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade seemed to offer this advantage.

150 B.L., Add. MS. 41,816, fols. 242 passim, cf. fol. 250.
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By 1687, those elements of staunch opposition to James’s regime had solidified. On 12 February in that year, to enable officers and men loyal to William to reform their regiments, a group of Scottish exiles in the Netherlands drew up a memorial, requesting that the Brigade be disbanded:

If it can be done or when it can, to have the six regiments put out of the king’s [James’s] power, by either setting British officers, trusty to the prince, over them and so the soldiers might be made or got to be all such, or else to break and disband so honest British and Dutch officers might levy and take on again the whole soldiers in companies to be divided among the Dutch regiments.151

James’s recall of the Brigade was designed to achieve precisely this, and to deprive William of one of the élite corps of the Dutch Army.152 The failed recall of the Brigade demonstrated to James that he could no longer rely upon the support of the majority of soldiers in this unit. Only three senior officers – Colonels John Hales, John Wauchop and Roger MacElligott – obeyed the king’s request to return to Britain, but they brought with them between forty and fifty junior officers and their men, representing a quarter of the strength of the entire Brigade, and some of these men were Roman Catholics.153 In order to supply the thousand men necessary to provide regiments for the three colonels, James was forced to reduce every infantry company in his army by ten men.154 William was, apparently, happy to see them leave his service as James’s final request (before the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688), aided the Prince of Orange in removing the last vestige of loyalty to the Stuarts from the Brigade.155

The loyalty of that section of the Brigade that remained, was now focused upon William of Orange – even above and beyond loyalty to the Protestant cause. Indeed, one hostile observer stated that those who remained “. . . presume to give out that the Protestant religion is att the stake; and men of no religion pretend now to have tender consciences”.156 If anything this statement further emphasizes the loyalty of the Brigade’s predominantly Protestant Britons and Huguenots of the

153 Among them were Alexander Cannon, who would later command the Jacobite army in Scotland in 1689, following the death of Viscount Dundee: Jones, “The Recall of the British from the Dutch Service”, pp. 423-35; Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, p. 320; Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, pp. 178 and 186.
156 B.L., Add. MS. 41,815, fols. 154, and Add. MS. 19, 253, cf. fol. 131, both cited in Greaves, Secrets of the Kingdom, p. 320.
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Brigade to William's stated policy of preserving Protestantism in the British Isles. The hard-core nature of the minority element supporting William, is further emphasized by the fact that, of some five hundred officers of the English Army who served between 1685 and 1688, only a hundred and twenty-seven took commissions under William III's regime. John Childs points out that a hundred and forty-seven men chose to fight for James VII and II in Ireland and Scotland, while a large number retired altogether from military life.¹⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

Great similarities existed between the nature of Dutch and French service in the second half of the seventeenth century. In both countries, there existed long traditions of Scottish service which led, in both cases, to Scottish settlement, which aided and fostered the movement of Scots, or their descendants, into the regular domestic administrative, civil and military structures of each place. In neither case did the descendants of Scots forget their origins. In France, Scottish origins were somewhat cynically exploited, by Frenchmen of Scottish origin, for the sake of securing the tax-exemptions and social prestige that came with noble status. Similarly, there is little reason to believe that Scots in the Dutch Army ceased to be aware of the advantage to be had from the reputation which Scots had built up in that kingdom since 1572.

Throughout the period covered by this study, both France and the Dutch Republic were at war and, therefore, required the experienced commanders and soldiers, reflected in the professionalism of the officers who served in both countries. Scots served in both France and the Netherlands as much due to the employment those places offered, as because of ongoing traditional connections. Professionalism similarly fostered the observation of international codes of honour among the officer corps of the French and Dutch Armies, though strong cultural differences, such as the interest in duelling among French officers, remained. One of the greatest links between service in France and the Netherlands was the role played by patronage. The Sidney-Monk-Dumbarton candidatures for the overall command of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade demonstrates the primacy of clientage in all military appointments at this time, as well as the deep divisions (often based on religion) between the two arenas of service.

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The only real contrast between Scottish communities in France and the Netherlands, was their religion. This clearly played a large factor as it further bound those Scots in French and Dutch service even more powerfully to the broad community of belief of the country they served. While, after 1678, this left the Scots in French service in a potentially poignant position, it clearly aided and benefited those in Dutch service. The full ramifications of Scottish military service in France and the Netherlands can be seen in the events of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688, which is the focus of the next chapter.
The reign of James VII and II came to an unexpectedly sudden end in November 1688, when he faced the invasion of Britain by the man who was both his nephew and son-in-law: William of Orange. Many of James’s supporters—Jacobites as they came to be known after 1688—were Catholics or High Anglican Tories, and were supporters of the ‘Anglican reaction’ who aimed to reduce the significance of Protestant dissenters and Roman Catholics in Britain, who, since 1685, had been strongly fostered by the king. Despite this truth, the idea that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ was a ‘confessional showdown’ between Catholic and High Anglican supporters of King James and pro-William of Orange Protestant extremists, has no basis in fact. It is correct that, in Scotland, where many Catholic Jacobites fought against many pro-William Calvinists, the ‘Glorious Revolution’ was more of a civil war than in other parts of Britain. However, even in Scotland, the factors determining the allegiances of many Scots were as political as they were religious.\footnote{The historiography of the events of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ is very large, but T. B. Macaulay’s traditionally Whiggish relation of events in Britain between 1688 and 1692 remains unsurpassed in its scope. Recent scholarly attempts to describe the situation in the localities of Ireland and Scotland have ranged from the comparable to the disappointing. One of the most recent publications on this subject is Politics and Political Imagination in Later Stuart Britain, ed. H. Nenner (Rochester, 1997).} Religion undoubtedly played a role in the revolution, due to the confessional divisions fostered in Britain during the reign of Charles II, who had enthusiastically favoured France. However, it is equally true that the major employer of Protestant soldiers, whether English, Scottish or Huguenot, was the States General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Despite this, the staunch support offered to both James and William by their respective armies during the ‘Glorious Revolution’, resulted more from the brief period of foment immediately preceding the birth of James’s son and heir in 1688, than from any long-standing religious enmity.

The Letter Book of Henry Brown, upon which some of this chapter is based, attests the lengths to which pro-James soldiers were willing to go, in order to continue serving their anointed king. The Letter Book succinctly presents the first installment of Jacobitism, or personal loyalty to James VII and II, fostered during his short reign and loyalty to the policies he pursued. Throughout James’s period as king, while the Netherlands clearly attracted both religious and political dissidents, France remained a haven for Roman Catholic and crypto-Catholic, or simply francophile, Scots. Britain’s
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moment of high political crisis in the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 is of great importance in assessing the significance of both countries to the Scots they fostered.

William of Orange’s intention to enter Britain at the head of an armed force, in order, he said, to safeguard the Protestant religion there, did not seem imminent until September 1688. James reacted by seeking the support of High Anglican Tories (a group strongly attached to the idea, also cherished by the king, of ‘divine right’ monarchy) which he had been courting throughout 1686 and 1687.\(^2\) The month of September also saw James’s first flight from London, which lasted from mid-September to 10 December 1688.\(^3\) As the threat posed by the Prince of Orange became increasingly real, James’s friends and supporters in France searched desperately for individuals who might successfully intercede on his behalf with him. However, none were found and nothing occurred to deter William’s resolution to enter Britain by force.

It is tempting to simplify the events between the Prince of Orange’s arrival, in 1688, and the final defeat of James VII and II at the battle of the Boyne Water in 1690. Too easily these events can be reduced to the playing out of confessional differences between two veteran bodies of Scottish soldiers: the Anglo-Dutch Brigade versus the veterans of Dumbarton’s regiment. However, the idea that the ‘Glorious Revolution’ represents a ‘confessional showdown’ between Catholic veterans of French service and Protestant extremists from the Netherlands has no basis in fact. It is true that, in Scotland, the ‘Glorious Revolution’ was more of a civil war than in other parts of Britain, but the determining factor in many Scots’ allegiance was not religious affiliations, but political inclinations. However, religion did play a role in the revolution due both to the confessional divisions fostered during the reign of Charles II, who had enthusiastically favoured France, and the regiments of partly Roman Catholic soldiers, which he allowed to serve in that country. It is equally true that the major employer of Protestant British soldiers, was the States General of the United Provinces, which, intermittently, actively recruited, and were grudgingly allowed recruits, in Britain. But, as has been said, the staunch support offered to both James and William by their Scottish veterans, resulted more

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from the brief period of foment immediately preceding the 1688 birth of James VII and II’s son and heir than any other cause.

In response to the invitation of a number of highly-placed British courtiers, soldiers and politicians, William of Orange resolved to come to England at the head of an army to “... secure the Protestant faith” against absolutist government and Catholicism. As a sovereign prince, he had the right to declare war. As Stadtholder of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, he also secured significant influence in the direction of Dutch foreign policy.4

The preamble to William’s 1688 invasion of Britain, was neatly summarized by John Cutts, a young Englishman known to the court who, having decided to take service in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, addressed a letter to the Earl of Middleton, James’s Secretary of State for Scotland. On 20 April 1688, John Cutts was commissioned as a captain in the Earl of Pembroke’s English regiment in the Brigade.5 He felt forced to leave Britain due to James’s perceived policy of Catholicizing both the civil and military wings of his government:

> It is with a great deal of regret that I find myself incapacitated to serve his Majesty in his present designs ... were not the present measures of state visibly opposite to the principles, and interests of that religion, which is dearer to me than all things in this world; or than life itself. The laws of conscience are sacred, and inviolable; and, since my principles are such, as make me unfit to serve at home; and my private affairs in a posture, which does not admit of an idle life; I desire your lordship to do me such offices to his Majesty, that he may not be angry at my taking service abroad.6

Despite these sentiments, Cutts was meticulous in emphasizing his loyalty to the king. He only added the slightest undertone of threat: he desired Middleton to “... assure his Majesty, that (whatever happens) I shall always pray for his Majesty’s person, and do justice to his merit; and in all occasions observe that duty, and respect, which becomes me”.7

By 12 July 1688, concerns about the security of James’s throne were such that Mary of Modena, James’s queen, wrote to Middleton: “I putt all my confidence in God, who has given him [the king]

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to me, and hope in his mercy he will preserve him."8 William’s invasion did not seem imminent until September, when James actively started seeking support from English Tories.9 For this reason, as has been noted earlier, September also marked James’s first flight from London.10 As the threat posed by William became increasingly real, James’s friends and supporters in France searched desperately for individuals who might successfully intercede on his behalf with the Prince of Orange. Anthony Hamilton offered his services, insisting that “... pour les interets de la France, qu’il soit un homme de probite” (for the interests of France, let it be a man of probity), but events moved too quickly to facilitate his intervention.11

William of Orange landed on the coast of Devon, at Torbay, on 15 November 1688. He brought with him an army which some estimate to have consisted of no more than 14,352 men,12 but which was probably far closer to 21,000.13 The numbers of his men were bolstered by a secret agreement, dating from September 1688, which brought him 14,000 German soldiers (including 6,000 Brandenburgers, 4,000 Brunswickers, 2,400 Hesse-Casselers and 1,000 Württemburgers).14 There were also two hundred black Surinamese soldiers.15 These large numbers of men made William’s invasion considerably less of a gamble than it might have been.16 The nature of this polyglot force has meant that the officers of William’s army still attract disparaging comments. They have been described by one historian (William S. Brockington, who bases his commentary on Sir James Turner’s memoirs) as “... men in a state of transition from condottieri to members of a regular standing army”.17 While this is pertinent in its reflection of the international nature of many

8 Mary of Modena to the Earl of Middleton, 12 July 1688: Original letters of Mary of Modena: B.L., Add. MS. 18,966, fol. 1.
10 This lasted from mid-September to 10 December 1688: Miller, “Proto-Jacobitism? The Tories and the Revolution of 1688-9”, p. 7.
11 Anthony Hamilton to Voisin, c.1688: B.L., Add. MS. 39,672, fol. 79.
professional officers' service, it ignores the long-term association of Britons, and mainly Protestant, Frenchmen and Germans, with the Dutch Republic.\textsuperscript{18}

In this context, the situation of, for example, professional Huguenot soldiers at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, in 1685, is analogous to that of Scottish soldiers abroad in 1688. Many French Protestant soldiers served in the armies of the Dutch Republic before 1685, but most had to make hard decisions regarding this continuation in that service, following Louis XIV's 1672 declaration of war against the United Provinces. Those Frenchmen who remained in Dutch service after 1672, tended to be Protestant and, above all, loyal to the Dutch Republic. The 1685 Revocation in France confirmed existing prejudices among them, whilst simultaneously galvanizing the Britons, and many hundreds of newly arrived refugees, into taking militant action against their king: it was this which Dutch-based Scots shared with their Huguenot co-religionists. No matter how 'professional' they were, many, though certainly not all, Scottish officers in the Netherlands decided to fight for the Dutch Republic for reasons beyond pay. However, it was the militant spirit fostered among them by British dissident exiles and by James's own actions, which was solely responsible for stirring them into action in 1688. Like the Huguenots, therefore, in 1688, Scots in the Netherlands acted in specific ways at a specific point of crisis and, if conscience and religion play any role in their actions, this was the reason for it.\textsuperscript{19}

The vanguard of William's invasion force consisted of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, and the large number of Huguenot soldiers in companies attached to Dutch regiments, and among William's own household regiments.\textsuperscript{20} Only months after his arrival, it became apparent to William that a campaign would have to be fought against King James both in Ireland and against pro-James soldiers in Scotland. In response to this, a large number of Huguenots were rapidly reformed into three infantry regiments and one large cavalry regiment consisting of two battalions. This new Huguenot Brigade was sent against pro-James Catholic Irish and French regiments in Ireland. Neither of these battalions were motivated by pay: the ardour with which they engaged the enemy


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was based on the highly personal nature of their grievances against Louis XIV, King James and Catholic absolutism.

The many Huguenot refugees who held senior positions in the various branches of his army, considerably strengthened William’s invasion force. A number of Huguenot noblemen became aides-de-camp to the prince. The militancy of Huguenot commanders was further augmented by the presence in the Dutch Army of British and Huguenot veterans of the Duke of Monmouth’s 1685 rebellion against James VII and II. A number of British, and some Huguenot, soldiers serving in the Dutch, Brunswick-Lüneberg-Zell, and Brandenburg armies had participated in this uprising. Many of those who escaped the ‘bloody assizes’, which followed Monmouth’s defeat, returned to their professional military careers on the European continent and, later, accompanied William of Orange to Britain in 1688.

By contrast, James had between 29,000 to 30,000 men under arms. Of these soldiers, 4,400 were such raw recruits that they had not yet completed their training. Another 4,000 to 5,000 of James’s soldiers were tied down by garrison duty and, furthermore, there were 2,964 Scottish and

21 Marshall Schomberg, the second-in-command of the Prince of Orange, was later appointed to lead William’s expeditionary force of about 10,000 to 14,000 men to Ireland in mid-July 1689. Under him, served the Huguenot Marquis de La Forest, who commanded William’s cavalry. The prince’s General of Artillery was Monsieur La Goulon, a former pupil of Marshal Vauban: his loss to the French Army was a source of great regret for Vauban and, after the invasion of 1688, Goulon served with distinction in Ireland, Germany and Italy. William’s Chief of Engineers was François du Puy du Cambon, a French refugee engineer officer who later commanded one of the Huguenot infantry regiments raised in 1689. On 21 August 1688 he was appointed Chief Engineer and Director General of Fortifications in the United Provinces of the Netherlands. He later fought at the Boyne, and at Athlone in Ireland, before meeting his end in Flanders (on 9 August 1693) at the battle of Landen: J. Kinross, The Boyne and Aughrim: The War of the Two Kings (Gloucestershire, 1997), p. 28; S. Smiles, The Huguenots: Their Settlement, Churches and Industries in England and Ireland (London, 1895), p. 411; R. D. Gwynn, Huguenot Heritage: The History and Contribution of the Huguenots in Britain (London, 1985), p. 80; A.R. Commissijbock, 1681-91, fol. 172; H. Wagner, “A List of Pensions to Huguenot Officers in 1692”, Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London (hereafter P.H.S.L.), vol. 9 (1911), p. 584 n3; Smiles, Huguenots, p. 371; Calendar of State Papers, Domestic (hereafter C.S.P.Dom.), 1 Nov. 1691 - End 1691, p. 335; E. J. Best, The Huguenots of Lisburn: The Story of the Lost Colony (Lisburne, 1997), p. 7; C. E. Lart, “The Huguenot Regiments”, P.H.S.L., vol. 9, no. 3 (1911), p. 490.

22 Nicolas de l’Estange, was colonel of a Dutch regiment consisting largely of Huguenot refugees and had been instrumental in enrolling French refugees into companies, designed to fight under William of Orange, at Rotterdam before 1688. The Marquis d’Arzilliers (who had also played a prominent role in encouraging Huguenot volunteers to join William’s invasion in early 1688) later received a pension, following the campaign in Ireland. A third Huguenot aide-de-camp was Isaac de Monceau, Seigneur de La Melonière, who had became a Protestant after his 1678 marriage to Anne, the daughter of Louis Addâe du Petit Val et Grand Champ. He was lieutenant colonel of a French regiment in Anjou before 1685, but abandoned this command after the Revocation in order to serve the Prince of Orange and was commissioned as a colonel by the States General on 1 April 1689, when he raised one of the three Huguenot infantry regiments for service in Ireland in this year: Ibid., p. 480; Smiles, Huguenots, pp. 199 and 41; W. A. Shaw, “The Irish Pensioners of Huguenot Regiments”, P.H.S.L., vol. 6 (1901), pp. 318 and 305; Lart, “The Huguenot Regiments”, p. 488; Smiles, Huguenots, p. 406; C.S.P.Dom., 1 Nov. 1691 - End 1691, p. 117; 11 William III, 82.


24 A full list of the regiments of James II can be found in Kinross, The Boyne and Aughrim, pp. 116-50.

25 Contemporary estimates held that it took two months to drill, train, equip, and clothe a raw recruit. By this measure, none of James’s newly-formed regiments would have been ready for action: Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, p. 3.
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2,820 Irish soldiers, who could not be readily drawn together into a cohesive fighting force. James could, therefore, rely on a force of no more than about 15,000 veteran soldiers. Regardless of these facts, he managed to muster 24,000 soldiers at Salisbury in 1688. Towards the end of September, it was reported that James was to raise his standard at Blackheath, in expectation of William's invasion, and that the three commanders of his army were to be the Earls of Feversham and Dumbarton and the French Comte du Croy.

William of Orange's victory over James was by no means predetermined. Paul Hopkins even says that the outcome of the conflict between pro-William and pro-James forces was one of attrition as they "... declined in strength together, and it remained an open question until fairly late which of the two would collapse first." Many contemporaries also feared that the Dutchman was far from an ideal replacement-king, and most historians now agree that William did not come to Britain purely to save the English nation from 'Popery'. The prince insisted that his presence in Britain was aimed at maintaining the Protestant religion there, and to some of William's strongest supporters - and, especially, the Huguenots - William was truly "... le roi Guillaume notre libérateur". The opinion of the Huguenots, and of William's militant British supporters, justifies some of his own rhetoric regarding the protection of the Protestant religion in Britain. It cannot, however, disguise the prince's need for English money and men to finance his continental war in Flanders against Louis XIV.

William of Orange did not act alone in 1688. The conglomerate nature of his army, and the international political support he enjoyed, were the fruits of the pre-arranged backing by the States General of the United Provinces and the burghers of Amsterdam. These wealthy and virtually independent gentlemen were, traditionally, hostile to the ambitions and pretensions of the Princes of Orange. The French had certainly made great use of this antipathy in the past, by dealing with Amsterdam, to the detriment of Orange's plans. However, many Amsterdammers were, however,

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26 All estimates of army size are drawn from ibid., p. 184.
27 Dumbarton's name would also, later, be used as a panacea for Jacobite defeatism, when he was proposed (in place of the Duke of Berwick) for the command of the Jacobite forces in Ireland in 1690, but by this time he was too ill in France to participate: N. Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1857), p. 464; Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 125.
28 Ibid., p. 6.
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particularly swayed against James by reports of the sufferings of French Huguenots under Louis XIV. Their trust was not misplaced: the Dutch reaped 6,000,000 gilders from the invasion. William himself was obsessed with diverting British money and men to his war in Flanders. The closeness with which he scrutinized any order affecting the availability of men for the continent is one reason for not accepting his ignorance of the order for the infamous Scottish massacre at Glencoe in 1691.22

While William may, indeed, have cared little for Britain, he was, undoubtedly, seen as a Protestant saviour by many hard-line Calvinist Dutch, Scottish and French Huguenot refugees in the Netherlands and by many Protestants in Britain and Ireland.33 This suggests that William’s insistence that his intention in Britain was simply to ensure fair elections and to safeguard the Protestant religion may have been more than rhetorical. Many of William’s own soldiers believed that Protestant determinism lay behind the prince’s actions. In 1689, Hugh Mackay of Scourie, a Scottish veteran of Dutch service and the commander of one of the regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, thought that, with William, the “... delveryance from the slavery which was imposed upon them [the Scots] by the Ministers of State during the late reignes is cum”.34

Many of James’s subjects actively colluded with William. Partly due to the unreliable nature of this volatile support-base there was nothing certain about William’s ascendency over James when he arrived in Britain in the November of 1688. This point is highlighted by T. B. Macaulay, and supported by his nephew, G. M. Trevelyan: both assert that William’s victory was largely the result of good luck.35 Support in Britain came from high-ranking officials and court-based nobles. A small

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group of these people were responsible for inviting William in the first place and it was the late Charles II's illegitimate son, the Duke of Grafton, who, in 1688, visited William at The Hague. Grafton's ire was raised against James by the king's abolition of the duke's offices of state, consisting of the posts of Vice Admiral and Rear Admiral of England, abolished by James as "... a wile to be rid of the Duke". Many historians claim that pro-William plot existed in James's army, and both in England and Scotland there were officers who had returned to Britain from the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, upon its recall in 1688, whose primary allegiance was to William.

While senior Anglo-Dutch Brigade personnel, such as Colonels MacElligott, Waughop and Hales, remained loyal to James, other officers maintained covert contact with William in the Netherlands. Aeneas Mackay was one Scottish veteran of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade who returned on James's command early in 1688. After his arrival in Britain he took an active hand in persuading the officers of various Scottish regiments to support William. In May, Mackay was arrested and detained in Edinburgh Castle "... on suspicion of a secret correspondence with the Prince of Orange, or some of his servants about him". The Earl of Balcarres openly stated that Mackay came over to Scotland:

That he might be the better able to serve the Prince of Orange in his own country which was confirmed by a letter of his own found in his pocket which he had intended for his uncle. In it he expressed great affection to the Prince of Orange and designed his uncle to let him know that, although he had quitted his service, yet he hoped, from the condition he was in, to be more useful to him and that he only wanted his directions to show his good intentions.

Though Mackay said the offer "... meant nothing but a compliment", being entirely rhetorical, his later actions, and those of his uncle, Mackay of Scourie, demonstrate their loyalty to William.

Even after William's arrival in Britain, there were Dutch-born Scottish commanding officers who experienced great difficulty in getting their officers and men to face James's forces. For example, despite being placed under the command of the Dutch-born Scot, Sir Thomas Livingstone,

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37 Mackay was the nephew of Hugh Mackay of Scourie, the colonel of one of the regiments of the Brigade.


many officers and men of one regiment, including its regiment’s lieutenant colonel, William Livingstone, were determined not to serve against James.\textsuperscript{40} As a result, Mackay of Scourie’s, Balfour’s and Ramsay’s regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade were shipped to the Scottish port of Leith in early 1689.\textsuperscript{41}

Espionage was not the sole preserve of the Dutch. Louis XIV sponsored English and Scots visitors to William of Orange in order to undermine the Dutch. He also established strong links with prominent anti-William burghermasters in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{42} However, it should be noted that many Britons enjoyed existing relationships with the prince which were not quite straightforward in their nature. For example, the prominent government financier, Sir Stephen Fox, entertained the Prince of Orange when he visited London in 1680. Though essentially pro-James, Fox remained friendly towards William throughout the revolution. His implicit conservatism, and consequent inability fully to accept William’s legitimacy in Britain, was, however, responsible for his loss of the position of Cofferer to the Royal Household to the prince’s staunch supporter, Lord Newport.\textsuperscript{43}

The French envoy to Britain, François Usson, Marquis de Bonrepos, specifically attempted to undermine the Huguenot cloth industry at Ipswich, by promoting its infiltration by French Catholics who were well-affected to the French government.\textsuperscript{44} The envoy was one of a number of French officials who maintained networks of informers in London, Rotterdam and Amsterdam where there were “...some of these [Huguenot] fugitives who have been converted... who miss no opportunity of soliciting their compatriots to take the same course as they have taken”.\textsuperscript{45} De Bonrepos fostered a network of informers during his time in London: including a Huguenot minister who informed him about false Catholic converts in France, and a Clerk of the Customs who kept him posted about new arrivals and the means by which they had escaped from France.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{40} Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 125.
\textsuperscript{44} François Usson, Marquis de Bonrepos (1650-1719), French Marine Officer and Diplomat, French Envoy to Great Britain (1685-8), French Ambassador to Denmark (1692-7) and to the Netherlands (1697-1700): A. Heinwis, De Briefwisseling van Anthonis Heinsius, 1702-1720, ed. A. J. Veenendaal, vol. 2 (The Hague, 1978), p. 121.
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The position of King James was further undermined by his international isolation. Though called, by Jeremy Black, an 'English chauvinist, because of his aloofness from both William of Orange and Louis XIV, James had been largely unable to engage in an alternate, 'Protestant', foreign policy. Such an undertaking would almost certainly have allied his interests with those of William of Orange, and, furthermore, he was unwilling to commit himself to the unstable Baltic region. He was also unwilling to aggravate France by engaging in any new Catholic alliances with Spain or the Empire, both of whom were at war with France. The fact that he could not afford to send any large part of his army overseas also counted against such alliances. It was also understood by contemporary observers, that Emperor Leopold I was himself in no position to aid other rulers. With the French constantly threatening Imperial possessions in the Spanish Netherlands, and the Ottoman empire pressing on his Hungarian lands, Leopold was unable to spare military resources for foreign aid.

Although there are suggestions that French influence was strong in London in 1688, when James needed foreign support against William none was forthcoming. Emperor Leopold I was equally unwilling to oppose Holland in favour of James: continued Dutch defiance of Louis XIV was vital to his strategy for the maintenance of Imperial lands in Eastern Europe. Assistance from France was similarly sparse, due to the fact that Louis XIV was himself 'perilously poised' between the two great power blocks represented by Austria, Bavaria, Pope Innocent XI and a scattering of their allies.

Despite all this, King James, Louis XIV and the French Secretary of State for War, Louvois, all believed that the only thing standing between James and the maintenance of his throne, due to the "peu de confiance dans ceux qui y étoient restés", were the militant Huguenots and Britons of


52 J. C. Rule, "France Caught between Two Balances: The Dilemma of 1688", in The Revolution of 1688-1689, ed. Schwoerer, p. 35.
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William’s invasion force. What really stood between James and his throne was his own steadfastly limited – though admittedly pious – refusal to countenance the legitimacy of the Protestant ‘heresy’ or the true faith of its followers:

His rebellious unaturall subjects are the objects of his charity not of his resentment: And as he sees them in the deplorable state of following blind guides, and their blinder passions in their obstinacy in heresee, faction and rebellion, he redoubles his prayers to God for their conversion, and if the example of a holy life can be of use towards that great end, they doe not want that in his Majesty’s practices.

These, the Earl of Perth’s words, reflect the king’s second major downfall: his failure to promote any but sycophants and ambitious courtiers either in London, Scotland or Ireland.

The fleet landed at Torbay, on the coast of Devon, on 15 November 1688. William’s army marched inland under great difficulties, caused by rain, which forced them to traverse cold and muddy roads. They entered Exeter in triumph and rested for six or seven days, after which William marched upon London via Salisbury. Along the way, he gathered adherents from among the local gentry. They were also joined by some soldiers who had deserted from English regiments upon hearing of the prince’s arrival. Resistance was only met at Reading, where five hundred of the King’s Horse were put to flight by fifty of William’s dragoons.

William’s ingress to the capital was unwittingly aided by the actions of James’s chief adherents. The Commander-in-Chief of James’s army, the Anglo-Huguenot Louis de Dufort-Duras, second Earl of Feversham, astutely disbanded the army when he heard of William’s arrival. This act of Huguenot loyalty was designed to avoid the army’s wholesale desertion to the Prince of Orange.

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54 James, fourth Earl of Perth, to Pope Innocent XI, 1706: National Archives of Scotland (hereafter N.A.S.), G.D. 24/1/1078A.


56 These were under the command of the Huguenot Colonel Marouit. The Huguenots of the invading army, thereafter, made contact with many of their co-religionists and compatriots, who were already settled in the capital. Chief among these was the aged Marquis de Ruvigny and Reinval, father of the future Earl of Galway, who was the central figure in a small, but significant, Huguenot community at Greenwich, where he had founded a French church. The marquis’s younger son, Charles Massue de La Caillemette, was already in Dutch service and arrived from the Netherlands in the van of William’s army: Macaulay, History of England, vol. 3; ch. 14.

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This disbanding of the army angered James, who chose to interpret the actions of Feversham as disloyalty, but, in truth, the earl intelligently understood that having the army together would merely allow pro-William agitation to gestate in its ranks. The anger with which William greeted the news of the army’s dispersal is testament to the grasp of this point by Feversham.58

William secured London simply by marching into it, and one of his first acts was to arrest the Huguenot earl. This greatly alarmed James who returned to London from his first flight, but was tactfully persuaded to flee again and to go to Rochester in late December.59 When the king returned to London, on Boxing Day, it became clear to his Anglican Tory supporters that he had been forced to flee for fear of his life.60

In the aftermath of William’s landing, the regiments of the English, Irish and Scottish Armies were in a state of disorder.61 This was primarily brought about by the defection to William of a number of key military figures, among them John Churchill, the Duke of Grafton, and Prince George of Denmark.62 Whilst this did not achieve the desired effect of turning the whole army against James, it significantly disturbed resistance to William’s invasion.63

The defections personally shocked and demoralised King James: they also justified his ‘court party’s’ distrust of Queensberry, whose son and heir – Lord Drumlanrig – has been called the ‘proto-rebel’ among the Scots.64 John Childs suggests that the officers’ actions are excusable on the grounds that the professional international officer corps tended to place careerism before national loyalties. It is clear, however, that the officers who fought under William were loyal to him for

60 Ibid., pp. 7 and 17; Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 452.
62 George was the Danish husband of the future Queen Anne and, therefore, another of the sons-in-law of King James.
64 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 121.
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reasons which went beyond their careers. Many of them had been forced into exile and most were politically, religiously, or personally embittered against King James. Childs's own point, that no more than a third of his officers took commissions under the regime of William, is evidence enough of their feelings on the subject.

The relatively straight-forward events that occurred in the capital, were not reflected in the counties. Those colonels who remained loyal to their anointed king involved themselves in securing and disarming groups of deserters and insurgents who were participating in pro-William activity throughout Britain. Many people were of doubtful political allegiance: they waited to see which way the political wind would blow. By 15 March 1689, the Roman Catholic Scottish Earl of Dumbarton's regiment had been annexed to William's service, under the command of Marshal Schomberg. However, as it was being embarked at Ipswich for service in Flanders, the regiment mutinied: Evelyn Cruikshanks is incorrect in stating that Dumbarton personally led this mutiny as, at the time, he was ill at the court of James at St. Germain-en-Laye in France. When they were joined by some fusiliers, the men of the regiment formed a body of eight hundred men, seized four small cannon and the money for their pay and "... were marching in a body northwards, and had proclaimed King James the 2nd". Some of the officers involved in the mutiny were, however, captured and carried to the assizes at Bury St. Edmonds where one of them was tried and "... on full evidence, convicted". Another six pleaded guilty and threw themselves on William's mercy, and were later set at liberty after pleading their cases at the Old Bailey. The mutiny of Dumbarton's regiment led directly to the passing of the Mutiny Act in 1689: it represented the tip of the iceberg of possible desertions from William's newly acquired forces.

Some time before this, however, James's army was already in a state of disorder when William of Orange landed at Torbay in November 1688. This was primarily due to the defection to William of a number of key civil and military figures. These were the leaders of the 'conspiracy in the army'.

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66 Ibid., p. 206.
68 E. Cruikshanks, "The Revolution and the Localities: Examples of Loyalty to James II", in By Force or Default?, ed. Cruikshanks, p. 28.
69 Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation, vol. 1, p. 511.
70 Ibid., pp. 566 and 590.
71 Idem.
who, through their spokesman, the Duke of Grafton, had tempted William to Britain in the first place. Churchill, Grafton, and Prince George of Denmark, were chief among them, but Colonels Percy Kirke and Charles Trelawny could also be included in their number. Also among their number can be counted French Protestants, such as Philippe Papillon who, in 1695, became a Member of Parliament for London, but who was long established in British before them.73

Recent research has down-played the role of the military conspirators, in favour of the ‘Assembly of Commoners’ and the parliamentary contribution to the ‘Glorious Revolution’.74 However, there can be no doubt that, in military circles, the role played by conspirators, such as John Churchill, was of great importance. Most, if not all, of the conspirators cited religion as the determining factor in their abandonment of the anointed king, James VII and II. Lord Churchill, whose motives are arguably the most questionable of all the conspirators, said he had “... an intier obedience to it [Protestantism], being resolved to dye in that religion”.75 Though T. B. Macaulay has questioned the strength of Churchill’s religiosity, other historians have pointed to Churchill’s earlier desire to command the Anglo-Dutch Brigade as a sign of his adherence to Protestantism and the Dutch cause.76 Churchill also later said to the Huguenot Earl of Galway, that “… if the king [William III] was ever prevailed upon to alter our religion he would serve him no longer, but would withdraw from him”.77

Furthermore, Jonathan Scott has emphasized William’s exploitation of existing, long-term religious divisions in England: suggesting that, at its most basic level, the employment of the rhetoric of religious struggle was probably an inevitable outcome of the events of 1688, regardless of the real strength of feeling behind it.78 Such was the association between the revolution and the international Protestant cause that, on 20 February 1689, Sir Edward Seymour said, referring to the

73 They also included Armand Nompar de Caumont, Marquis de Monpouillon, whose background was strongly Anglo-Dutch as he had commanded regiments in both countries, and was well known to both James and William of Orange. Monpouillon provided the prince’s forces with much-needed encouragement in 1688 and later reinforced William’s army in Ireland. His value to the Prince of Orange is reflected in his appointment as a Gentleman in Waiting to William III in 1690: Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 221; W. H. Manchee, “Huguenot Regiments in Holland”, P.H.S.L., vol. 14 (1930-3), pp. 96 and 98; Lart, “The Huguenot Regiments”, p. 492; Letters of Denization and Naturalisation, 1603-1700, ed. W. A. Shaw (Lymington, 1911), p. 227.
77 Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 216.
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assistance lent in the 1580s by Queen Elizabeth to the nascent Dutch Republic: "England has done formerly for Holland, as Holland has now done for England".79

The abandonment of James, by several of his most trusted advisors and courtiers, breached contemporary notions of military and gentlemanly honour. When he met Churchill in 1690, the staunch Protestant and veteran professional soldier, Marshal Schomberg, remarked that "... he [Churchill] was the first Lieutenant-General he had ever heard [of] that had deserted from his colours" meaning the first he had met who had deserted his master half-way through a campaign.80 But then, Schomberg had never fought purely for religion's sake or for the continuation of his religion in his native country.

To stem desertion from his own ranks, while encouraging it from those of his enemy's, William welcomed the publication, by one of his Anglo-Dutch Brigade officers, of a military manual. This book, by Captain Thomas Pluncket, doubled as a strongly pro-William political pamphlet. It was entitled The Character of a good commander: together with a short commendation of the famous Artillery (more properly military) Company of London: also a brief encomium on the duke and worthy prince Elector of Brandenburg; lastly, plain dealing with treacherous dealers: whereunto is annexed the general exercise of the Prince of Orange's army.81 This publication was useful on two fronts as, first, it promoted William of Orange's alliance with the new Elector of Brandenburg who, like William, was particularly using Huguenot refugees in the vanguard of his army. Second, Pluncket's work argued against desertions from the ranks of William's regiments while, simultaneously, attempting to galvanise pride and esprit de corps among William's supporters by regularizing their drill according to Dutch principles.

By August 1688, James needed both money and men to sustain his opposition in the face of an outright invasion of his three kingdoms. In Scotland, some pro-James elements were prepared to lose everything to keep their king on the throne. Lord Lorne, the heir to the Earldom of Argyll, wrote that he was selling all he could and, had he "... a world more it should goe the same way".82 Meanwhile, Dumbarton's regiment was at the forefront of the defence of James VII and II. In

81 Published at London, by William Marshall, 1689.
82 Lord Lorne to Lauderdale, 10 August 1688: B.L., Add. MS. 23,251, fol. 1.
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September, it marched south from Loughbarrow and the Earl of Huntingdon was informed that its soldiers were:

... very rude and have undone your tenants, for they paid nothing and forced moneys from many of them and quartered at private houses as well as public: it is thought the town is worse by four score or a hundred pounds, and they were poor enough before. At Bunny they wounded a servant or two of Sir Thomas Parkyn's and at Nottingham treated the Mayor rudely. I am sure the King does not allow them to wrong his subjects, for in so doing they do his Majesty great disservice. 83

Indeed, the soldiers of the regiment took one gentleman, who had been out walking, and carried him to a private ale house. In a back street, behind the ale-house, they took his money and his watch and would have stripped him, but he begged them on his knees not to and a woman cried out 'Murder', whereat the company pretended he had spoken treasonable words. 84

By November 1688, civil unrest had spread throughout Britain. In the initial face of William's arrival, many pro-James Scots under arms in both Scotland and England found themselves involved in policing actions against the civilian population. Dumbarton's regiment was charged with protecting the symbols of the Roman Catholic rule of James VII and II against popular iconoclasm. To the Catholic chapel at Reading, there came "... towards night, the matter of 200 [people] together with great long poles each, and made up [a] great bonfire before the chappell, the officer and his guard salied out on them, and severall of them suffitiently, and several prisoners [were] takin". 85 In the face of these disturbances, King James ordered all the Catholic chapels in London to be closed. 86

Nineteen days later, Dumbarton was actively campaigning against pro-William forces. Three miles from Emsberry he intercepted Major General Kirke's regiment of horse, arresting Kirke whom he sent under guard to the Earl of Feversham. Due to the bad weather, there being very heavy rain, he could not pursue the pro-William commanders - Colonels Trelawny and Churchill – further that


84 Idem.


86 T. Harris, "London Crowds and the Revolution of 1688", in By Force or Default?, ed. Cruikshanks, p. 52. 288
night, which allowed them to escape with about two hundred soldiers.87 Dumbarton wished to pursue them, believing they could not go far beyond Hungerford, but did not know the lay of the land, having “. . . not so much as a chirte [chart] with us”.88 The earl resolved to return to London and left his men under the command of Richard Hamilton.89

In the confusion, Dumbarton took the opportunity to award his six-month-old son a captain’s commission in his regiment, presumably in order to receive the extra income from the position.90 But, despite his difficulties in affecting any change in the fortune of his king, Dumbarton’s support remained vital to James, and his martial reputation was eminent enough to rally support for the king: in March 1689, it was believed that “. . . my Lord Dunbarton [sic] is at the head of a great army in Scotland, which the king will join with, and that the old army in England will now stick by him”.91 Of James’s three kingdoms, Scotland was the only one in which he was held formally to have abdicated, although it was actually a group of Scottish notables who asked William to assume the administration and summon a convention there.92 According to the ‘Claim of Right’ published by the Scottish parliament, the king’s “. . . subversione of the protestant religione, and the violation of the lawes and liberties of the kingdome, inventing all the ends of government” was enough fully to confirm his abdication.93 Pocock defines two stages of the revolution in England: the first being the flight of James in December 1688, and the second the attempt to fathom the reasons whereby he could be held, in early 1689, to have abdicated.94 Ironically, the ‘Claim of Right’ restored to the

88 Idem.
89 Idem.
91 Petition of Robert Clarke, 1 March 1689a, printed in H.M.C., House of Lords MSS. (London, 1889), p. 47.
92 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 122.
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Scottish parliament those powers, which it had originally enjoyed in the 1640s: it, therefore, obliterated the, largely conservative, Stuart Restoration settlement.95

The unofficial reaction to the revolution in Scotland was less favourable: the Scottish military veteran of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, Hugh Mackay of Scourie, noted that the people of Edinburgh “... appeared not well pleased with the late... so necessary a revolution”.96 In general, there was a lack of revolutionary zeal in Scotland, where the bulk of the common people had been successfully confused by the connection between the Crown and its advertised policy of religious tolerance which favoured many of their Presbyterian practices.97

Scottish opposition to pro-James resistance was further hampered by disputes over precedence by members of the Scottish nobility: for example, in July 1689, the Earl of Eglinton complained that, following the removal of the Earls of Glencairn and Argyll to engage the pro-James Viscount Dundee, he was left in the pro-William camp having to obey “... the meanest field officer” as he was only captain of an independent company rather than a commission-holder in an established regiment.98 This state of affairs allowed a degree of success to the pro-James forces: Viscount Dundee, for example, resolutely mustered fifty horsemen outside Edinburgh, and defiantly marched them all down Leith Wynd. Encouraged by such sporadic pro-James demonstrations of force, the Duke of Gordon successfully held Edinburgh Castle until 13 June 1689.99 Significantly, Gordon considered surrendering the castle to Queensberry, its governor until 1686. However, the Duke of Atholl chose to ruin the plan, rather than see Queensberry benefit. The Douglas duke remained anathema to many of James’s ‘court party’, being still bitterly resented for his closeness to Breadalbane.100 Significantly, the political ineptitude of many members of James’s ‘court party’ was displayed on this occasion by Gordon, who, when he surrendered Edinburgh Castle, failed to obtain indemnity for himself and his garrison: thus, in the words of Paul Hopkins, showing “... the good links but not a chain” which characterised and ruined Gordon’s career.101

96 H. Mackay, Memoirs of the War Carried on in Scotland and Ireland, 1689-91 (Edinburgh, 1833), p. 7.
98 The Earl of Eglinton to the Earl of Melville, 4 July 1689: N.A.S., G.D. 269/221.
100 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 120.
101 Ibid., p. 147.
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The failure of William’s forces speedily to subdue Scotland was symbolically depicted in a mezzotint by J. Broedeleit. The image depicts the royal arms of Great Britain, surmounted by those of William III, depicted with the Scottish quarter being painted in as William approached the consolidation of his power in Britain.102 The pugnacity of pro-James resistance, and the aid James received from the French, thrust the Highlands of Scotland directly into European affairs. Pro-James recruiting at Lille would further reinforce the internationalism of their cause, however, most of these recruits, like many of James’s supporters in the Highlands, were effectively continuing, rather than initiating, support for King James and his principles. For many of James’s supporters, especially in the 1670s, this support had originally been formulated in an international context of military service abroad. Thus, it is possible to see the origins of Jacobitism in the services of the Scottish regiment in France: the large-scale desertions of officers and men from this regiment from 1688 onwards must, ultimately, vindicate the earlier fears of many Britons regarding the pro-French feeling of Dumbarton’s unit.103 Unfortunately for pro-James elements, the connection would do little but foster the association of Jacobitism with “... incorrigible barbarians, robbers and supporters of Popery and Stuart tyranny”.104 While this added somewhat to the undeniable glamour of the Jacobite cause, it did little to inspire the support of more moderate elements.

At the beginning of 1689, James arrived in France, where the Laird of Riccarton “... met my Lord and my Lady Melfort near Paris and the Queen and Prince near Calais this days true gives account of the king’s landing in France where he was mett by the Duke of Berwick and his bray[the]r and Captain Mcdonald and Sir Roger Strickland”.105 By May, James was actively corresponding with his supporters in Scotland in order to direct the movements of troops there.106 However, the formation of an actual pro-James army abroad did not take place until late 1690. In December of that year, information was circulated regarding Peter Cook, a pro-James spy, and “... late an officer in Lord Dunbarton’s [sic] Scottish regiment”, who was known to be heading for France with letters for the James’s court. Cook was “... of a middle stature, a lean, slender man,

103 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 488.
104 ibid., pp. 492 and 494.
wears a wig, his hair and eye-brows red; he was a prisoner in Newgate with some other officers of that regiment upon account of mutiny at Ipswich”.

The Letter Book of Henry Brown reveals the mechanics of recruitment used by two recruiting agents of James’s court at St. Germain-en-Laye. The two principal Jacobite officers involved in the recruiting were the English Captain Knightly and the Scottish Captain Andrew Rutherford. Both were Roman Catholic gentlemen with a background of military service abroad. Throughout 1691, they were stationed at Lille, in Flanders and their mission was to secure as many Scottish, English and Irish deserters as possible from among the ranks of William’s newly acquired British regiments which he had hastily sent to Flanders in order to pit them against the French Army. By the end of the campaigning season of 1690, it seemed clear to the French that James’s struggle was futile. Jacobites were unwilling to accept this and, in the face of increasing French reluctance to aid their cause, James encouraged Knightly and Rutherford to gather together as many loyal British and (initially) Irish soldiers as could be had. In August 1689, Mary of Modena wrote to General Buchan in Scotland: “The King [James] . . . is at this tyme indeuoring to send what help he can to the Hylands, since he cannot . . . send what he would.”

In both Scotland and Flanders, desertion was endemic, and many regiments, especially the Scottish ones, remained close to the brink of wholesale defection from William’s service after 1689. For example, in 1690, in Scotland, where its men had planned to seize and plunder its officers on William III’s birthday, on 5 November, Colonel Ludovick Grant’s regiment almost totally went over to James’s service. Mackay of Scourie also feared that his dragoon officers were plotting, in 1689, to desert to Viscount Dundee.

In March 1689, Andrew Rutherford, son of Major Adam Rutherford, led a mutiny in the regiment that landed him in Newgate prison. He escaped sometime before 1691 and, in July 1695, his

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109 Ibid., p. 250.
110 Ibid., p. 144.
111 Andrew Rutherford was said to be the son of Major Adam Rutherford, of the prominent Scottish Border family of the same name. He was, therefore, a kinsman of the Roman Catholic veteran of French service, Andrew Rutherford, first Earl of Teviot (d. 1663), and the same devotion to duty — and to the ruling House of Stuart — was later shown by his kinsman and namesake. Rutherford was a lieutenant in the second Battalion of the Earl of Dumbarton’s infantry regiment, and his name appears in a muster taken at Leith, on 15 March 1686, where he was described as being a lieutenant, serving in the company of Major Andrew Monro. From 1 March 1688, Rutherford was also second adjutant to Dumbarton, and, on 31 December 1688, he was commissioned a captain in the regiment. This
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name appeared on the English Parliament’s list of rebels in France. In the murky political world of the Jacobite court at St. Germain-en-Laye it was the recruiting captains’ diplomatic, rather than military skills which sustained them through the year 1691. This was the year in which they were most active in recruiting English, Scottish and Irish soldiers from among those British regiments serving William III on the continent. As early as January 1691, Knightly and Rutherford arrived in Lille and established a line of communication to soldiers who wanted to desert from William’s service in Flanders. The Governor of Lille informed the recruiting captains that several of their countrymen were already waiting in the town. Rutherford found among them sixteen soldiers from his old regiment, who had already been engaged by a Swiss and a French regiment. Rutherford reported that they had been removed from these regiments by French court order to locate and transfer all James’s subjects serving in French regiments. The men were to join regiments commanded by Irish Catholic officers. They baulked at this, being:

... very ill satisfied with their being taken out [from] where they were to goe amongst the Irish troops in soe much that they are discontent and I am afraid my cominge here without an order to take them under my command will make them run away to their former regiments which if they should it would spoyle all our designes.

The separation of Irish and British soldiers at Lille is one of the clearest indicators in Brown’s Letter Book, of the growing scepticism of the French authorities regarding the Jacobite cause in both Ireland and Scotland. The French had already concluded, by the end of the campaigning season of 1690, that James and his cause were lost and consequently set about incorporating as many useful elements as they could of the Jacobite forces into the French Army.

On 2 January 1691, Knightly reported to Hume that he had received two soldiers who had deserted from Colonel Hodges regiment in Flanders. The soldiers had entered a French regiment coincided with the pro-William Marshal Schomberg was awarded command of the unit (following Dumbarton’s flight from Britain in the train of James VII and II). The regiment, which had been a central pillar of the French interest throughout the reigns of Charles II and James, now continued that tradition by supplying the vast majority of the officers and men who filtered into the Jacobite army being formed at Lille: Dalton, The Scots Army, p. 153 n1.5

112 Ibid., p. 153.


115 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 6.
and, according to Knightly, were very satisfied with their condition there. However, the Jacobite plan was to pull together as many of their countrymen as possible and, to this end, Knightly contacted the men personally, so that “... they were overjoyed wheare I was come tho’ a meer strainger to them onely that I was their country man w[hi]ch I find they expect”. He similarly complained that they had been compelled to enter a new Jacobite unit at which they were greatly dissatisfied, having been happily placed in a French one. Knightly feared they would desert and, concerned about the reaction of the French authorities, would return to their original colours under Colonel Hodges.

The recurrent desertions from William’s British regiments, and the necessarily duplicitous actions of the men involved, prompted the pro-William Lord Cardross to observe disparagingly that he was “... apprehensive [that] the sincerity and cautiousness of honest men will not be able to keep them from being traduced since there can [n. b. their keen] concerne for His Majestie and fidelity to his interest is the ground of their quarrel at them what ever ells be pretended, but I hope time will discover what men are”. Because of this, between 1689 and 1690 the loyalty of the British soldiers in Flanders was often thought to be doubtful, though John Childs says they were perceived to be more reliable in 1692, by which time most Jacobites had been purged or had deserted. Hugh Mackay of Scourie thought, and rightly, that the only reliable Scots belonged to the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, but his sole reliance on these soldiers was partly the reason for his defeat, in 1689, by Viscount Dundee at the battle of Killicrankie.

On 16 January 1691, Rutherford reported to Knightly that he and the soldiers he was forming into a regiment, had been visited by the French intendant of the area, who had informed him that he would have to negotiate with the commissaire (paymaster), who had been appointed for them. The French official added that he thought the Jacobite soldiers were very expensive, and that he would not hesitate to inform the French king of the fact. Despite these tensions with French Army officials, the recruiting captains at Lille enjoyed the favour of the commandant of the town, who

116 B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fol. 18.
117 Ibid.
120 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, pp. 125, 139, 144-6, and 156-7.
121 Rutherford to Knightly, Lille, 16 January 1691, Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fol. 22.
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learned that they had a steady intake of soldiers.\textsuperscript{122} To all appearances, it looked, to the recruiters, as though few soldiers actually possessed the courage to desert from their regiments, but, in truth, the soldiers were closely watched: in February 1691, Lord Cardross reported the disbanding of his regiment in Scotland, saying he was careful to observe the “... regiments loyal and dutiful full behaviour at their disbanding” and to remind William III that “... nothing can alter my zeal for His Majesty’s [William’s] service nor keep me from laying out my selfe for it on all occationes to the utmost of my power”.\textsuperscript{123}

Rutherford proposed to James that the intake to the Jacobite ranks might be increased by the king’s assurance of a captain’s commission to any man who brought over a body of soldiers to the Jacobite force. This had its effect, securing the interest of two sergeants – Maitland\textsuperscript{124} and Nisbett\textsuperscript{125} of Dumbarton’s regiment that was at this time stationed at Ghent in Flanders.\textsuperscript{126} They offered to bring out a number of men, but wanted an assurance that they would be made officers over the men they brought with them or, failing captain’s commissions for them both, they desired that Maitland be made a captain and Nisbett his lieutenant. Though keen to recruit them, Rutherford received no orders from the Jacobite court and he had to tell Brown that the sergeants “... waite for noething else [and] I am att a losse for want of some allowance from the [French] intendant” who would not advance him any money to cover the charge of sending a negotiator to Ghent covertly to treat with the two men.\textsuperscript{127}

Rutherford was equally keen to have a company of “... over four or five hundred men”, promised by one Captain William Hay, which was soon to embark for Flanders under William III’s

\textsuperscript{123} Cardross to Melville, Edinburgh, 10 February 1691: N.A.S., G.D. 26/9/317.
\textsuperscript{124} He was said to be related of Lord Maitland, and had recently been commissioned as an officer in England: Connely to Brown, 27 January 1691, \textit{Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662}, fol. 25.
\textsuperscript{125} Robert Nisbet, second lieutenant to William Garioch in the regiment of the Earl of Mar on 19 June 1682. He was the son and heir of Robert Nisbet of Cartin, and married Anna, daughter of John McKerrell of Hillhouse (contract dated 1689). He was promoted to the rank of captain before January 1692, when his company was given to James Kygo: Dalton, \textit{The Scots Army}, pp. 115 and 117 n46. He was described as “Mr. Nisbett who served very well to my certaine knowledge”: Connely to Brown, 27 January 1691, \textit{Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662}, fol. 25.
\textsuperscript{126} They negotiated with Rutherford and Knightly through Lieutenant Bell and Captain Davidson of their regiment. This was probably John Bell, recorded, on 20 February 1678, as an ensign in Lord James Douglas’s new-raised regiment of infantry. He later appeared, on 14 December 1681, as a lieutenant in the Earl of Dalhousie’s company of the Earl of Mar’s regiment: Dalton, \textit{The Scots Army}, pp. 102 and 114. It is unclear whether this is William Davidson, commissioned second lieutenant in Captain Hume’s company of the regiment of Foot Guards on 19 June 1682 – who was promoted, on 28 February 1689, to the rank of captain, serving in Flanders in 1690, and had left the regiment by October 1691, and whose name appears on the list of rebels in France on 2 July 1695 – or (as is more probable) Thomas Davidson, a lieutenant in Dumbarton’s regiment on 15 May 1686: \textit{Acts of the Parliament of Scotland}, vol. 9, p. 115; Dalton, \textit{The Scots Army}, pp. 28 n4 and 151.
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colours. Rutherford had high hopes for the force that Maitland and Nisbett were to bring over with them, to the extent that he hoped to "... see a great breach in that army very soone". He begged Brown to keep the entire matter a secret as there were "... many about courte who are none of the King's friends though they eat his bread".

Those men who entered the Jacobite army at Lille were disgusted with the conditions they were expected to endure. One officer, Captain John Gattacker, wrote to Brown, complaining that five weeks after his arrival he had still not received the pay "... we had att St. Germain and which wee were promised wee should not fail of". Bitterly, he added that his men had formerly received fifteen pence per day, but were now reduced to a mere eight thanks to the charges that the officers were forced to carry due to the fact that they were "... strangers both to the country, language, and to the service" in France.

At the end of February, one of William's officers had discovered a plot to carry over one hundred soldiers from Dumbarton's old regiment. Alexander Douglas, the regiment's lieutenant colonel, had approached a junior officer – Ensign Lyon – and assured him that he was for King James. He encouraged Lyon to reveal the feelings of the men in the regiment, whereupon Lyon assured him that a large number of the men were Jacobites. With this information, Douglas immediately approached Colonel Thomas Tollemash, an English commander. They resolved to arrest Lyon, who took flight and, thereby, narrowly avoided arrest and torture. Perceiving the discovery of their plan, his co-conspirators also took flight and they all arrived safely at Courtrai in Flanders where they were able to assure Rutherford that some forty or fifty soldiers of the regiment had "... stayed behind and retired into convents where they will stay till they can gett opportunities to come away".

By mid-March 1691, Rutherford and Knightly reported to Brown what a "... small body we have here whome wee finde all very willing to serve his Majesty in any capacity". However, their

128 This was probably the William Hay who was commissioned, on 11 February 1680, as a lieutenant in Lord Livingstone's company of the Guards regiment. He was the son of John Hay of Aberlady: Dalton, The Scots Army, p. 26 n3.
131 Gattacker to Brown, Abbeville, 3 February 1691, Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fol. 25.
132 Idem.
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resources were still significantly stretched, and they were forced to tell a company of dragoons loyal to King James, to remain in the service of William III in Flanders where they could at least be sure of receiving their pay. Brown also heard that many of the poor soldiers who had deserted to James, were “. . . forced to come in countrey mens’ habit” as the ten livres per soldier allowed by the French commissaire was not enough to clothe them properly on their arrival. As a partial relief, the Jacobite court sent the two captains a hundred and fifty livres, which had been promised to them by Brown.135

At the beginning of April 1691, Rutherford and Knightly continued to be hampered in their attempts to obtain recruits for their little army. They were told that the French court refused to grant any passports “. . . to any men whatsoever” until the French siege of the Flemish town of Mons was concluded: on 9 April 1691 the town was invested by Marshal Luxemburg and surrendered nine days later.136 Meanwhile, they knew of a good body of well-affected Scots from the old regiment of Dumbarton and that of Major General Wauchope who were currently in Flanders, but could not contact them for want of passports for their agents.137 Their frustration at not being able to secure these men was slightly allayed by the arrival of the men promised by Captain William Hay. This officer arrived from Dumbarton’s old regiment with Ensign John Clark and the promise that more men would follow.138

At the end of April 1691, it became clear that the Earl of Dumbarton was to be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Jacobite forces in Scotland. Lord Preston,139 the former Secretary of State of King James, reported to William of Orange that a servant of Dumbarton’s had come to his house from France. Having landed at Dover, or thereabouts, the man told Preston that he was heading for Scotland to meet the friends of King James and, as soon as any forces could subsist in that country, 6,000 men would be sent thither from France via Ireland. The messenger said that they could not expect many horsemen, as the King of France could not spare them, but that the Earl of

135 Same to same, 17-21 March 1691, Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fols. 48-9.
137 Like Dumbarton’s regiment, Wauchope’s had changed hands and was now commanded by Sir David Collier, another veteran of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade: Rutherford and Knightly to Brown, 10 April 1691, Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fol. 75; Diary of William Crandon, 1688-1691: B.L., Add. MS. 29,878.
138 Rutherford to Brown, 26 April 1691, Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fol. 98.
139 Lord Preston was appointed Secretary of State for England by James in the winter of 1688, and had previously been Envoy to France (1682-5), where he had found favour with Louis XIV. He was appointed Secretary of State again by James at St. Germain: E. Cruikshanks, “Attempts to Restore the Stuarts, 1689-96”, in The Stuart Court in Exile and the Jacobites, ed. Cruikshanks and Corp, p. 3; Life of James II, ed. Clarke, vol. 2, p. 442.
Dumbarton (despite his ongoing illness) was to command in chief. He also said that orders had been given to prepare the earl’s equipage in expectation of his departure from Paris. He further revealed that he was carrying orders to the many friends of the late king in the south of Scotland and in the Highlands where there were great numbers of people who would be ready upon summons.  

In preparation for this mobilization, an order arrived at Lille commanding all the British officers there on subsistence to serve as private soldiers. The nature of the personnel of the little Jacobite army at Lille is revealed in Rutherford’s response to this order. He recommended that some terms should be offered along with this order “... for otherwise we might find some difficulty amongst some few of them in their condescending [to serve as common soldiers] notwithstanding they are almost all young men that never had scene [sic] service and some that has never had the honour of the kings commission yet calls themselves officers and gett subsistance as such”.  

The chaotic organisation of the Jacobite force at Lille was highlighted by Rutherford and Knightly when they complained that they themselves still lacked commissions from James. Without these they could not easily take up deserters from William’s British regiments in Flanders. They reported that the French commissaire “... to make us uneasie will make use of one Mr. Bourke to take care of the men and to pay them which as wee believe will put the disorders amongst them that the commissary expects but our endeavours shall not be wanting to prevent it”.  

The commissaire at Lille went so far as to invite those British soldiers who had recently been taken from French regiments, to return to their former units. This greatly prejudiced Rutherford and Knightly, who feared that this would make them “... appear men of soe little interest that he [the commissaire] will pretend to doe all things att pleasure for when we spoke about our master’s courte he laughs and says he knows very well how things goe there”. Toby Bourke’s disruptive presence at Lille prompted the captains to request his removal.  

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141 Rutherford and Knightly to Brown, 23 March - 3 April 1691, Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fols. 54-5.
142 This man was Sir Toby Bourke, a prominent Irish Catholic who belonged to the influential Bourke of Clanricard family. In 1690, he left his studies at Bordeaux to come to the Jacobite court. In 1689, his father, uncle, and both of his brothers had joined the Jacobite army in Ireland: Rutherford and Knightly to Brown, 6 May 1691, Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fols. 114-15; Documents of admission as a knight of the Spanish military order of Santiago (1702): Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Santiago, 1281; H.M.C., Stuart Papers, vol. I, p. 176; M. Kerney Walsh, “Toby Bourke, Ambassador of James III at the Court of Philip V, 1705-13”, in The Stuart Court in Exile and the Jacobites, ed. Cruickshanks and Corp, pp. 144-5.
144 Idem.
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On 9 May, news arrived at Lille from the Highlands of Scotland when a Captain Dunbar appeared, with an English gentleman, both of whom were on their way to the court at St. Germain to report on naval movements. Another gentleman from Scotland, Mr. Kellock, informed Rutherford and Knightly that five Scottish regiments – the Scots Guards and the regiments of Buchan, Argyll, Hill, and Sir James Leslie – were to leave Ireland for service in Flanders. The money to finance the removal of these regiments was not immediately forthcoming and, in order to raise funds for the campaign, officers in England had to sell, at a great discount, the tallies they had been given in lieu of pay.

Rutherford and Knightly learned that another of Dumbarton’s veterans, Captain David McAdam, had deserted at Mons and was awaiting a pass to join the force at Lille. Rutherford said McAdam was “... like to become miserable” if a pass was not obtained for him, but he assured Brown of the man’s loyalty as he had often associated with Lord Arran. On 14 May, Captain Robert Somerville arrived in Lille together with his subordinate, Lieutenant Henderson, and one Mr. ‘Fowster’ (Sir Andrew Forrester’s son). On 28 May, a sergeant from Somerville’s company also appeared, bringing with him five of his men from Ghent. He said that “... all the soldiers in general are very well inclined but that they are very strictly kept and that if he had not had the guard at an advanced post he could not have come off[1].

Trouble continued to erupt at Lille, due to the devices of the French commissaire and Toby Bourke, who joined forces to undermine the British recruiters. On 30 May 1691, the commissaire arrived with an order from the French court by whose authority he drew up all the men at Lille. The Irish mutinied upon hearing this. According to Rutherford, they refused to serve alongside, or under, any who were not their countrymen. Rutherford accused Bourke of engineering the mutiny, as he had seen him “... very busie that morning amongst them [the Irish soldiers] and to my face spoke to severall of them but being in Irish I could not say it was to encourage them in their mutiny but by what followed it is to be believed”. The Irish soldiers were all hidden in the town and supported

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147 David McAdam was, on 15 May 1686, a lieutenant under Lord James Murray in Dumbarton’s regiment: Dalton, The Scots Army, p. 151.
149 Same to the same, 14 May 1691: Ibid., fols. 126.
150 Same to the same, 28 May 1691: Ibid., fol. 134.
151 Same to the same, 30 May 1691: Ibid., fol. 137.
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in their actions, said Rutherford, by Irish officers. By 9 June, despite the arrival, on 6 June, of six more soldiers, Rutherford and Knightly were left with only ninety-seven effective men due to the wholesale defection of the Irish from their command.152

Some relief must have come from the defection to the Jacobite ranks of Captain William Bois [Bowes]. He formerly served in the Highlands in Major General Cannon’s regiment, but almost all of Cannon’s officers deserted to William while their loyal colonel, Alexander Cannon, a man from Galloway who could not speak Gaelic, was (after the death of Viscount Dundee) given command of the Jacobite forces in Scotland. This was because James’s better Scottish generals, including Buchan and Wauchope, were engaged in Ireland at the siege of Londonderry.153 Bois was joined by Lieutenant Alexander Sandilands, who had “... quttet the service when the king went from thence and has suffered very much in Scotland since”.154 A third Scot also arrived – Ensign Edward Wauchope – “... a brother to Major General Wahopp [sic] ... very young and ragged in cloathes”.155 All came from the regiment of the Jacobite Major General Wauchope, now commanded by Sir David Collier.156 Six days later, fourteen deserters arrived: seven were from Dumbarton’s old regiment and two from the English Guards regiment.157 By the end of the month, Rutherford had assisted fifteen soldiers out of Tollemash’s regiment, one out of the Scots Guards, nine from Dumbarton’s, two from Hugh Mackay of Scourie’s and two from Ramsay’s regiment. As a result, the recruiters learned that none of the men in William’s camps was allowed to stir out from them and “... if any soildiers are found two hours away from their regiments he is taken as a deserter”.158 Rutherford was assured of the strength of Jacobite feeling in the ranks of William’s army: he was told that at Dunkirk “... above forty soildiers are gone there and lashed themselves aboard privateers” to escape serving William.159

152 Same to the same, 2 June 1691: Ibid., fol. 143.
153 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, pp. 178 and 186.
155 B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fol. 151; Diary of William Cramond: B.L., Add. MS. 29,878.
156 Idem.
159 Idem.
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The willingness of many of these soldiers to desert reflects the high hopes for James's restoration, which existed by July 1691. The Earl of Melfort wrote to Henry Brown, exalting the fact that amongst William's supporters there were:

\[\ldots\] divisions on solid ground which cannot but end in [the] destruction of [the] Church of England the privilidge of the House of Peers or of confusione and Civill Warr in the end all which makes soc fair for us that if they fall once in confusion the king can entrietie them.\[160\]

Referring to the Irish schism, amongst others in the Jacobite ranks, Melfort prayed "God grant that [by] laying aside all these differences at this important time all of them may unite ag[ains]t the common enemy of our religion and King".\[161\] However, the earl had by this time only just returned from Rome and was not fully aware of the situation.\[162\] Melfort left his position as Secretary to King James, in the early 1690s. His enemies at St. Germain, who were numerous, adroitly exploited the admiration of Louis XIV for the earl, and had him sent on a mission to the Holy See, far from the centre of Jacobite plotting in France.\[163\]

On 14 July 1691 the officers of Berwick's company were confirmed.\[164\] Any Scots or English serving in Mountcashel's new regiment were to be sent to join the British force at Lille.\[165\] The Irish, however, were no better treated at Lille than were the British. Their major, William Power, angrily wrote to Brown, claiming that the French governor of the town would "\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldo
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few places and in those places wee had effective and in Brittany they would not allow us even those because they were hired.”167

Similar mismanagement plagued the army at Lille, whence, on 27 July 1691, Rutherford wrote to Brown. He complained that he was still receiving winter quarters’ pay, which was contrary to French practice as it was now the summer campaigning season: the mistake had occurred due to the recent death of the French Secretary of State for War, the Marquis de Louvois.168 At the end of July, the Jacobite army at Lille consisted of almost two companies: one hundred soldiers under Rutherford’s command, and a further fifty-three who had arrived “... almost naked”.169

On 2 August 1691, twenty more soldiers appeared in Lille. Nine of these came from the regiment of Dumbarton, one from the Scots Guards, two from that of Mackay, two from that of Hodges, four from that of the Earl of Bath, and two from the English Guards Regiment.170 The defection of the majority of the soldiers of Bath’s regiment was the particular hope of the Jacobites.171

MacAdam, the veteran of Dumbarton’s regiment who had finally been allowed out of Mons, was entrusted with negotiating the release of more British soldiers for which he needed to enlist the assistance of Lille’s obstructive French Army intendant.172 By 10 August, Rutherford could announce the growth of the second Jacobite company to seventy-three soldiers, while another

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167 This company was part of a force of fifteen battalions of infantry, two regiments of dismounted dragoons, two regiments of cavalry and two companies of Life Guards (with a paper strength of 12,326 men) which were billeted in Brittany, but the Irish were to be particularly disappointed by James’s response to their particular grievances: _Ibid._; J. Childs, “The Abortive Invasion of 1692”, p. 64; J. G. Simms, “The War of Two Kings, 1685-91”, in _A New History of Ireland_, ed. T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin, and F. J. Byrne, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1976-89), pp. 478-508; J.G. Simms, _Jacobite Ireland, 1685-1691_ (London, 1999); K. S. Bottonheimer, “The Glorious Revolution and Ireland”, in _The Revolution of 1688-1689_, ed. Schwoerer.


169 The second company was to be given to James’s natural son, the Duke of Berwick, who was already attached to the French Army and enjoyed a good military reputation (which would continue to grow through the eighteenth century): Rutherford to Brown, 2 July 1691, _Letter Book_: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fols. 183-4; Hopkins, _Glencoe and the End of the Highland War_, p. 272.

170 _Idem._

171 In 1668, Bath was a Gentleman of the Bedchamber to Charles II, but ultimately went over, with the conspirators, to aid William’s invasion in 1688. Though it was Bath who had been in charge of receiving the charter from the Corporation of London when James VII and II ordered its surrender in 1687, the Jacobitism of his regiment was, in fact, fostered by its colonel, Sir Charles Cairney. He had served in Douglas’s regiment in France before 1678. He was wounded in French service, but went on to be commissioned (on 1 August 1687), as lieutenant colonel of Bath’s regiment. The favour shown to him by the regime of James VII and II is evident in his 1686 knighthood and his appointment (on 8 December 1688), as colonel of Bath’s regiment. William of Orange revoked Cairney’s commission, whereupon the gentleman joined King James in Ireland, under whom he held the rank of major general. On 2 July 1695, under William’s regime, he was outlawed in England for high treason: Sir J. Macpherson, _Original Papers Containing the Secret History of Great Britain, from the Restoration to the Accession of the House of Hanover_, vol. 1 (London, 1775), pp. 460 and 484; Sir J. Dalrymple, _Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland_, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1790), p. 251, cited in Childs, _James II, The Army and the Glorious Revolution_, p. 147; Cruikshanks, “The Revolution and the Localities”, p. 28; L. Magalotti, _Lorenzo Magalotti at the Court of Charles II: His Relazioni d’Inghilterra of 1688_, ed. W. E. Knowles Middleton (Waterloo, Canada, 1980), p. 109; Miller, “Proto-Jacobitism? The Tories and the Revolution of 1688-9”, p. 10; Dalton, _The Scots Army_, pp. 145 n12, 147 and 157; _Memoirs of James II_, ed. Clarke, vol. 2, p. 397; Warrant Book, Scotland, 1 August 1687.

172 Rutherford to Brown, 2 August 1691, _Letter Book_: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fol. 229.
fourteen were expected, including three sent by Knightly from among the deserters who had taken service with privateers at Dunkirk.\textsuperscript{173} The soldiers of the two companies were expected to pay three sous per day for bread, instead of the more usual two sous that came directly out of Rutherford’s own pocket. This was because the French commissaire continued his refusal to forward any money to the Jacobite force, until its officers secured commissions. Rutherford complained that, if he had not paid for it himself, not a single soldier would have been clothed.\textsuperscript{174}

Rutherford saw the discrimination against his companies as the result of blatant racism. He said that his men performed exactly the same duties as the regular French soldiers in the town so that “... 'tis my oppinion that our treatment [is] not to be worse than any other strangers since our dutie to our king will make us serve the French king with all zeal and faithfullnesse that he can expresse.”\textsuperscript{175} The “... ill usage to the souldiers here” at Lille, at the hands of the French commissaire, was also reported by Captain Forrester, who, towards the end of August 1691, rendered an account of it to Brown.\textsuperscript{176} The the intransigence of the commissaire was still a talking-point in September, when Rutherford complained that all the men thought it bad usage of them that they still received only company pay, which could not furnish them with the necessaries they required. The commissaire gave a shirt or cravat to new arrivals only “... when the fancy takes him”, but said that his hands were tied without further orders on the matter from the new French Secretary of State for War, the Marquis de Baribilieux. French contempt for the Scots may be explained in part by the fact that they represented something in the region of 5 per cent of the Jacobite exiles in France. The Irish constituted 65 per cent of all exiles, while 30 per cent of them were English, and the much larger Irish force as already formed part of the French Army.\textsuperscript{177}

Rutherford predicted that, without appropriate pay, his soldiers would not do their proper duty.\textsuperscript{178} Therefore, to prevent further desertions, and to transform the loyal Lille force into a Jacobite showpiece, the Duke of Berwick was given command of one of its two small companies. A few days later, he arrived in Lille and it was hoped “... his Grace’s speaking to the souldiers will

\textsuperscript{173} Same to same, 10 August 1691: Ibid., fol. 237.
\textsuperscript{174} Same to same, 16 August 1691: Ibid., fols. 240.
\textsuperscript{175} Same to same, August 1691: Ibid., fol. 244.
\textsuperscript{176} Same to same, 21 August 1691: Ibid., fol. 245.
\textsuperscript{178} Rutherford to Brown, 2 September 1691, Letter Book: B.L., Add. MS. 37,662, fol. 258.
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contribute very much to their satisfaction”. However, conditions had grown so bad that soldiers were starting to desert: one soldier, defecting in order to join a French regiment, was encouraged by his new French captain to say that Rutherford did cheat the soldiers of their pay and beat them like dogs: Rutherford craved a court martial of the man so that he could clear his name of the charges, and said that “... the continuall desertion that is amongst us is caused by the knowledge they [the deserters] have of our not being a comp [accountable] to try them”.

Rutherford’s position was further undermined, by the suggestion that the first captain of the ‘Prince of Wales’s Regiment’, which was to be formed out of the two fledgling companies at Lille, was to be William Hay. Rutherford complained bitterly to Brown, telling him that he “... was a lieutenant in my Lord Dunbarton’s [sic] regiment when Captain Hay was but an ensigne ... I had the company that I have now before he was thought on and ... I have the seigniority of him besides the King’s commission which I have for being major and capitaine of Dragoons”. Furthermore, he accused Hay, and the officers who had come across from the Scots Guards, of playing-up their role as recruiters, but “... if it would not looke too much like malice I would make the contrary appear and there is not twenty men here comprehending their servants that will say that they either spoke to them to come here or had any body from them to do [with them]”. Rutherford further reminded Brown that he was contracted to the merchants at Lille to the value of eighteen or twenty Louis d’Or, “... besides what I am oweing to the officiers here will noe doubt oblige me to stay behind if not to be put in prison”.

The controversy over Hay’s appointment marks the point at which Brown’s Letter Book ends. The preparation of the Scottish regiment at Lille was specifically designed to assist James’s invasion of Britain in the summer campaigning season of 1692. However, on the 3rd October 1691, William III had signed the Treaty of Limerick (3 October 1691), marking the defeat of the Jacobite forces in Ireland. Furthermore, Louis XIV had given up on Jacobite resistance in Ireland even earlier: he had agreed to send only enough supplies to keep the war going as a diversion – which probably accounts for the lack of interest in, and respect for, the efforts of the recruiters at Lille.

179 Forrester to same, 7 September 1691: Ibid., fol. 265.
180 Rutherford to Brown, 8 September 1691 and 79-16 September 1691: Ibid., fols. 267 and 271-2.
181 Same to same, 17 September 1691: Ibid., fol. 278.
182 Idem.
184 Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War, p. 297.
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James still believed he could strike out at William in Flanders, where he would be busy directing his British and Dutch regiments. Theoretically, James had at his disposal over 12,000 Irish soldiers billeted in Brittany, as well as the English and Scottish volunteers at Lille. However, he had effectively lost control of the Irish who were receiving their orders as part of the French Army.185 William’s forces in Britain, fearing a last Jacobite attempt in 1692, stationed 10,000 men in a forty-mile radius of Portsmouth and had a further 4,000 infantry on stand-by in Flanders.186 Louis XIV considerably harassed the forces of William the Low Countries, where William lost the fortress of Namur to the French in the same year.187 The success of this operation was keenly hoped for by a number of highly-placed British officers who served King William. Some of these people were actively colluding with James for the king’s restoration: the most prominent of them was Lord Churchill, whom John Childs suggests may, in January 1692, have betrayed to the French the planned English invasion of Dunkirk.188

Churchill’s duplicity marks the most common flaw of James’s support base in the years immediately after the ‘Glorious Revolution’, whose signature was irresolute conduct caused by the consistent failure to coordinate the different sources of Jacobite resistance. However, the activities of the recruiters at Lille demonstrate the deep divisions which existed among the soldiers who owed William allegiance and who he could send to Flanders to continue his war against Louis XIV. Despite many promises, the fact that less than two hundred defectors could be gathered at Lille between 1690 and 1691, can be attributed to the confusion of many of James’s former subjects combined with the strong policing activities of William’s own loyal officers.

Many Britons felt that William’s treatment of James was scandalous and were militant enough to express their disapproval through desertion, but few junior officers (and far fewer rank and file soldiers) acted on this feeling. The majority of the soldiers who went out of their way to aid James came from Dumbarton’s old regiment. This was due to three factors: including, first, the long history of that regiment in supporting the Stuart Crown; second, the unit’s association with Roman Catholicism, in the person of its commander, and French service; and, thirdly, the deeply

186 Childs, “Abortive Invasion”, pp. 64-5.
conservative social and political philosophy of its Scottish officer corps. All three of these factors were present in the beliefs and actions of the recruiters at Lille, and they account for the fact that the majority of the deserters they procured were professional Scottish career officers from regiments with a strongly Jacobite character. A number of these recruits were Roman Catholic, but whether Catholic or not, they were all outraged by what they saw as the outlandish and scandalous treatment of their anointed king.

Significantly, the Jacobite army at Lille represents the last attempt to form a Scottish unit (with a sizeable Scottish component at rank and file level) abroad. No distinctly Scottish regiments served abroad after 1688 that were not (in some way) attached to a larger British Army. In this way it is perfectly true to say that William’s ascendancy in Britain marks the end of the tradition of independent Scottish military service in foreign armies. Certainly, individual Scottish soldiers continued to serve abroad throughout the eighteenth century, not least because many of them espoused the cause of the ‘king over the water’, as King James, his son and grandson were called. Many, however, did so for exactly the same reasons that were common to soldiers throughout the seventeenth century, including the search for honour and profit: but none commanded regiments of their compatriots. The one exception might be the Scottish officers of the three Scottish regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, which did survive into the eighteenth century. However, the records of this unit suggest that, after 1700, few of the rank and file members of the regiments were Scots. Therefore, if a trend away from independent units towards state-funded and standing forces is to be seen in this period, its culmination resulted directly from the interventionist political circumstances surrounding the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. It did not come from what might be called ‘natural’ or ‘evolutionary’ developments fostered by, for example, changes in military technology.

CONCLUSION

The possible playing out of religious differences between an ‘absolutist’ Catholic king and a Protestant ‘saviour’ of the British nation could be construed to be the clearest and most compelling aspect of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. However, this scenario is, ultimately, misleading as a tool for explaining the events of 1688, from a military point of view. Religion played a central role
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in the rhetoric of the revolution, to the extent that it lay at the heart of most of the discourse that endeavoured to explain or excuse the division of loyalties in 1688. It is clear that the allegiance of the two most prominent groups of British soldiers caught up in the conflict – Dumbarton’s veterans of French service and the Protestants of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade – were predominantly motivated by political ideals that were not fully set in place until the eve of the revolution itself. The increasingly militant stance of the officers of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade presents a clear picture of an increasingly militant group of British expatriates within the Dutch Army. Equally, Dumbarton’s regiment (even without its Roman Catholic commander) continued to support the traditional conservatism of the Stuart Crown, which it had espoused for many years. While it would be wrong, beyond a reasonable measure, to demote the role of religious faith in the conflict, the actions of political mavericks, such as Lord Churchill, demand a pause for thought about the substance of people’s rhetoric throughout 1688.

The allegiances which manifested themselves among the military at this time were as much the result of long-term influences, stretching back to the Restoration and beyond, as they were of directly contemporary concerns. However, while this is so, it would be misguided to insist that these forces were themselves in any way divorced from the complicated interaction between religion, politics and tradition which took place in the reigns of Charles II and James. In this context, the polarization of expatriate republicans in the Dutch Army and ultra-conservative Jacobite forces seems more inevitable than it ought, perhaps, to be.

Ultimately, King James’s bid to regain his throne was a failure. The story of his campaign in Ireland and subsequent Jacobite attempts is, however, beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, the handful of Scottish veterans from the Dumbarton regiment who assembled at Lille represent the last, and the least significant, aspect of military service abroad by Scottish soldiers. However, they never played a significant role in James’s Irish campaign, in Flanders or in the French Army, and although Highland Scots remained a bulwark of Jacobitism well into the eighteenth century, they had no connection with those men who had served abroad during the reign of Charles II. In this way, Dumbarton’s regiment provided one of the first impetuses to Jacobite militarism, but this died with its colonel (in 1691-2), leaving the cause to be taken up by others.
CONCLUSION

The number of Scots involved in military service abroad in the reigns of Charles II and James VII and II was relatively small, especially when compared to the large-scale recruitment made for foreign service in the period of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48). However, the political and diplomatic importance of these Scots in overseas service after 1660 was disproportionately high. Some of the men engaged in continuing the mercenary tradition of the first half of the century, occupied important positions of command – often due to happenstance. Despite his high office in Muscovy, for example, Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries was lucky not to have lost his life on a number of occasions. Many other Scots, such as Patrick Home of Polwarth’s brother, who served alongside Auchleuchries in Muscovy, met their ends prematurely and left behind them nothing more than debts and destitute families.

Stories of profit and fortune gained in military service abroad were few in the later seventeenth century. Even relative success stories, like that of Auchleuchries, often rested upon years of hardship and dissatisfaction in a service which soldier were physically prevented from leaving: even Auchleuchries appointment as Britain’s Envoy Extraordinary to their Tsarish Majesties (in 1687), did not materially alter his poor condition in that service. His ultimate diplomatic coup of persuading Russia in 1689 not to acknowledge the regime of William III, was a relatively hollow achievement given Russia’s meagre international prestige at the time. The importance of other Scots in Germany, the Papal States and Imperial service can be gauged by their relative obscurity.

The passing of that generation of Scots who made their fortunes in the Thirty Years’ War, and remained abroad thereafter, marked the end of many of the regiments which provided Count Walter Leslie, Robert Douglas, Count of Skåning, and many foreign-based Scots with profitable avenues of employment. With the end of the great conflict in 1648, the fluid employment market, which had eagerly employed Scots, dried up almost completely. Only the Holy Roman Empire proved as potentially fluid a market for employment, and this was due to its active engaged, for much of the century, in war with the Ottoman Turks, and the wars in Poland-Lithuania. William Macdougall, the Scot whom the Earl of Tarras encountered at Padua, displayed the lengths to which some Scots had to go in order to secure employment even in Imperial service, in this new environment.

These employment factors were true for all British gentlemen who went out of their way to secure careers in the only field, the profession of arms, which, most of them felt, complemented their
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social status and educational level. For this reason, they looked into all the avenues of employment that were open to them in this field and exploited traditional markets of military service for Britons, including France and the Netherlands, which remained potential employers throughout the century. The restoration of King Charles II in 1660 provided these soldiers with hope for occupation and compensation.

In 1662, the marriage of Charles II with the Portuguese princess, Catherine of Braganza, created an entirely new arena, in Tangier and Portugal, of military service for Britons. Significantly, just like most of the structured military opportunities available to British gentlemen in the second half of the century, Tangier and Portugal service was overseas, but was not mercenary. Those soldiers who served in Tangier did so in English or Scottish regiments as the British king’s soldiers and often in his pay. Even the man appointed to command the British Brigade in Portugal, Frederick Herman von Schomberg, was himself half-English, held an English peerage title (from 1661) and was a fervent Protestant. Therefore, the question of who were these British soldiers abroad, rather than what they were, can reveal both the motivation for, and the context of, their service under foreign princes.

Andrew Rutherford, first Earl of Teviot, is one of the best examples of the type of man who served in one of the new areas of employment created by Charles’s marriage. As a loyal subject of his Stuart king, and, while governor of one of his king’s fortified towns (Dunkirk), in his sovereign’s pay, Teviot might easily be seen as an example of a ‘British’ soldier in an emerging ‘British’ Army. However, nothing could be further from the truth, as Rutherford remained a heavily Gallicized Scot, who had commanded a Scottish regiment wholly in French service, and who had little time for notions of pan-British identity. He also came back into his king’s service via the position of Governor of English-held Dunkirk, whence he had continued a correspondence with Louis XIV. Rutherford never served Britain nor was he ever part of what he would have seen as a ‘British’ Army. He was a Roman Catholic Scottish gentleman, whose natural affinity was with France rather than England. With regard to his subservience to the demands placed on him by Charles II, he saw himself as serving his ‘native sovereign’, the King of Scots. His eagerness to serve Charles was not synonymous with a desire to return to ‘British’ service, but had more to do with his understanding of the personal duty he owed to his anointed king.
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Rutherford never served a ‘nation’ before 1660: he served the King of France and the King of Scots thereafter. Had he lived beyond 1663, Rutherford may well have found himself inhabiting a different world, but when he was Governor of Dunkirk and Tangier, ‘Britain’ had little existence in reality. Ten years of Protectorate rule, following ten years of turmoil, had impoverished Scotland’s nobility and embittered it against England. It would take twenty years of Charles’s rule to produce British responses to European problems, but even these tended to by Anglo-centric in their nature. Furthermore, James’s reign emphasized, rather than diminished, the separation of Scotland and Ireland from England. His creation of ‘court parties’ in his northern and western kingdoms might indeed be said to represent a ‘British’ solution to his problems, but it is unlikely that he possessed the long-term vision to articulate his policies in this way.

Rutherford’s contemporary, Lord George Douglas (c.1636-92), first Earl of Dumbarton, represents a far more complex study than does Rutherford. Dumbarton lived through the entire period of flux in army organisation that occurred in the second half of the century. The story of his and his regiment’s vicissitudes between 1660 and 1692 charts the evolution of a system of semi-entrepreneurial command from the period of the Thirty Years’ War through to the establishment of standing regiments under William III c.1689. Dumbarton’s story displays the context of this change in relation to the political, social and religious development of three of Europe’s most important northern powers: Great Britain, France and the Netherlands.

Dumbarton possessed a far more complicated rationale than many Scots abroad for returning to his king’s service after the Restoration. Before 1660, his only possessions in the world were his regiment and the favour of Louis XIV. He was no fool and must have realized that the French king’s favour depended largely on the colonel’s continuing ability to provide Scottish soldiers for the French Army. But Dumbarton never shared Rutherford’s sense of ‘Scottishness’ and his continued reliance upon Scotland for recruits for his regiment should not be taken to represent a ‘nationalist’ agenda on his part.

What Dumbarton lacked in national feeling for his country of birth, he more than made up for in his dynamic use of many of Scotland’s inhabitants. The vast majority of the officers whom he appointed to commissions in his regiment, were his own Douglas relations or dependents, all of whom, naturally, came from Scotland. He was, therefore, aware of the rich source of recruits that might be found in his family’s domains in Scotland. The terms of service he secured in the French
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Army, emphasize the fact that he was exclusively engaging Scots, attest to his understanding of the facility with which they could be called into that service.

Dumbarton agreed to return to Charles’s service when, by 1662, his debts rose so high, that Le Tellier virtually threatened him with expulsion from the French Army if his condition was not relieved. As a result, it made sense for his regiment to be established in England or Scotland and to have himself safely removed from prosecution for debts in France. The outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1666 was, therefore, highly opportune for him, concurring, as it did, with Charles’s willingness to recall the Scottish regiment from enemy service. Given the extent of his debts in France, the refusal of Louis XIV to pay the Scottish regiment’s arrears, and its commander’s pension, can have had little sting in them, despite the insult implicit in the action. This factor in the regiment’s recall helps to explain its speedy return to French service ‘as a present’ from Charles II in 1667.

The regiment’s next recall from French service, in 1669, similarly resulted from complementary agenda on the part of both Dumbarton and Charles II. Douglas’s complaints regarding the imminent destruction of his regiment if it were sent to Candia in 1669, came long before any statement on Charles’s part regarding the desirability of the recall. Charles was clearly embarrassed by Louis’s abuse of a regiment of British subjects in French service, and was very probably as annoyed at him for compromising trade with the Ottoman Porte as he was with Douglas for falling out of favour with the French king. But the king clearly magnified the danger to British trade with the Ottomans as a diplomatic ruse designed to excuse the regiment without loss of honour from service in the highly dangerous theatre of Candia. It was Dumbarton’s own pique at being so used by Louis, which facilitated the regiment’s compliance with its total recall to Britain in 1669, leaving Dumbarton suitably ‘in their black book’ in France. The scant financial inducement for continued service in France, was emphasized by the fact that Dumbarton had to be lent two hundred and forty two livres by the English ambassador, Lord Arlington, in order to satisfy his regiment’s creditors and leave the country. It was only at this point that Dumbarton definitively threw in his lot with Charles II and that king’s regime in Britain.

The nature of that regime was by no means at variance with Dumbarton’s own sympathies and objectives, and it allowed him to guarantee the continued existence of his regiment and, with the full cooperation of Charles II, employ it to his own advantage. By about 1670, when the diplomatic
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storm over his quitting the French Army had blown over, Dumbarton returned to France. A clear indication of the favour enjoyed by the colonel can be seen in the concurrence by Charles in the recruitment in Scotland of a thousand Scots for the Scottish regiment in France.

Following Charles’s agreement in the Treaty of Dover of 1670 to send military aid to France, it was logical to include Dumbarton’s regiment in the resultant British Brigade, which served in France between 1672 and 1674. Two factors contributed to this: first, Dumbarton was already in France, commanding a regiment that officially belonged to Charles II. Second, Dumbarton was heavily Gallicized, a Scottish Roman Catholic and a royal favourite. He shared these qualities with Sir George Hamilton, another commander in the Brigade. Both shared the pro-Catholic and pro-French sympathies fostered in Charles by his exile in the 1650s, which partly explains the attractiveness to the king of these commanders. However, Charles’s allowance for them both to raise regiments for the British Brigade was also a mark of royal favour towards two loyal friends and courtiers. Theoretically, these favoured commanders stood to profit from the recruits made for their regiments. However, Charles was also giving them the honour of commanding part of his army in foreign pay, thereby extending his own ability to patronize his political, courtly and military clients beyond the limits of his own stretched income in Britain.

Dumbarton returned to Britain to take part in the Third Anglo-Dutch War in 1674. During this period of service, the rapacity of his soldiers tempered the anti-army fears of contemporaries. It was a testament to the connection between the harsh treatment of civilian populations and military professionalism, especially where this was equated with the removal of officers and soldiers from civilian authority and normal societal conceptions of morality. It also confirmed the notion that neither Dumbarton’s regiment or its commander cared particularly for Britain. The to and fro over the Scottish regiment between Charles and Louis was tipped in Charles’s favour by its colonel’s elevation to the Scottish peerage as Earl of Dumbarton and Baron Douglas of Ettrick: this sealed the new earl’s willingness to chose Charles II’s service over that of Louis XIV. It is debatable that Dumbarton ever saw himself as an officer of the ‘British’ Army, or even as a member of a Scottish, or broadly ‘British’, nation. Dumbarton’s real loyalty to his own family’s traditional pretensions, and to his evident conviction that this ambition was best served in France, is proved by his actions in the 1670s. He returned speedily to France in 1676, and showed a strong desired to secure the rank of lieutenant general in the French Army.
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Such ambition was not anti-British, but, like Charles's own policies, Douglas's actions reflect a profound lack of interest and confidence in any notion of 'Britishness'. In the commander's case this might safely be attributed to his own overweening ambition and pride. Unlike his king, however, Dumbarton seemed to care little for the lives of common Scots who died in the ranks of his regiment abroad. As a courageous and hard-working professional soldier, he probably took their deaths as a matter of course: even the death in battle of his near kinsfolk, was used by him as the means for promotion rather than as a source of sadness or regret. The irony is that, unlike his king, Dumbarton called Scotland home and though he seems to have had little, if any, affection for the country, he was passionately attached to his family and its position in that kingdom. Douglas emerges from all of this, looking like a traditional Scottish nobleman, for whom family and personal ambition counted for much more than any sense of nationhood. If he differs from Rutherford in this respect, it is probably because Douglas was far grander, wealthier and better-connected than Dunkirk's last 'British' governor ever was. Furthermore, in Dunkirk, the 'racist' prejudice of Englishmen against Scots, which was experienced there by Rutherford, provides one of the clearest explanations for the lack of 'British' feeling among Scots abroad. It is, therefore, ironic that this study closes with a rift between the ragged Scottish, English, and Irish soldiers at Lille. Though loyal to James, their objection to one another was based on 'national' sentiment, the insurmountable nature of which seriously hampered 'British' attempts to restore the 'British' king.

By 1678, the pique of Louis XIV at Dumbarton's machinations had grown so great that he expressed no desire to continue his employment. In the aftermath of his expulsion from French service, in 1679, the threats and supplications, which Dumbarton levelled at Charles helped remind that monarch of the great sacrifices in his service of the colonel and his regiment. These represent a desperate attempt on the earl's part to get some political mileage out of his past association with Charles, at what must have been the lowest point of his career. Effectively dismissed from the French service, but unable to hold command in Britain due to the Test Act, Dumbarton responded to his circumstances by using his nephew, the Earl of Arran, as a vehicle for his re-entry into the political world of the French court. Pathetically, he was reduced to procuring heiresses for the young man in the vain hope that this would affect his circumstances in France.

The attitude of Charles II towards Dumbarton at this point reveals much that lay at the heart of their relationship. His employment of the earl as an unofficial envoy to the earl's important family
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members in Scotland, is proof of the significance, which the king attached to the nobleman's support. This proves that he was never important simply because he commanded a regiment, though this was of great use to both Charles and Louis. The value of the Scottish regiment, even when the earl was no longer its official commander, remained such that it was consigned to policing duties in Ireland, while only a small, Catholic, section of it was broken off and sent to Tangier. Charles, therefore, attempted to keep the regiment together and relatively undamaged, and the fact that he never appointed a replacement commander demonstrates the ambiguous line between Charles's sovereign control over, and Dumbarton's personal interest in, the regiment. Dumbarton's tenure did, after all, begin when he was given the regiment in 1656 as his part of the Douglas family assets and there was, therefore, no easy resolution to this problem. The regiment's later actions, in the early years of the regime of William III, demonstrate the ongoing loyalty of many of its soldiers to King James. Whether this loyalty resulted from pro-Stuart, confessional, or even pro-French sympathies, is not clear. However, while the continued existence of the regiment of Dumbarton may have represented a safeguard to Charles's regime, it is difficult to see any clear long-term plan on the king's part regarding its future. Indeed, the evidence from Lille suggests that the men who deserted from the regiment in 1688 did so to join their old commander in France as much as to serve King James.

From Charles's point of view, one potential use for the Scottish regiment may have rested on the fact that his heir openly professed the Roman Catholic faith. Charles's steadfast refusal to abandon his brother during the 'Exclusion Crisis' of 1678-81 stemmed from his deep attachment to his family. Furthermore, Charles could not have predicted how James's desperate alienation of his people, in both Scotland and England, would be exploited by their nephew, William of Orange. Charles firmly favoured toleration and covertly approved of Roman Catholicism. However, in contrast to his brother, he had the good sense to keep his views secret. Upon taking the throne, James openly promoted the Roman Catholic Earl of Dumbarton, whose own support for the new king displays his deeply traditional conservatism, a trait approved of, and shared by, James VII and II.

The career of Dumbarton is a good example of some of the problems that could beset regimental commanders who, not unreasonably, felt a sense of ownership of their men in the second half of the seventeenth century. Officially, the earl's regiment belonged to Charles II, but the colonel's assent
remained essential as to where, when and how the regiment served. This was perfectly illustrated after 1679 when Dumbarton, directing its movements and quartering in Britain, and acted as the pre-eminent voice in the regiment. The central question regarding his regiment was not, therefore, who owned it, but whether or not its commander would comply with his king’s orders regarding it. Dumbarton’s predicament encapsulates that of many Scots in military service abroad, in that he was bound by an implacable loyalty to his ‘native’ sovereign, whose orders were sometimes at odds with the aims and desires of his subjects.

The other central issue concerning Dumbarton’s regiment is its membership. On average, he received permission to recruit Scots, and occasionally English, soldiers to the regiment once every two years. On two occasions the regiment was actually said to have been destroyed, which indicates that its personnel was relatively fluid at the level of its private soldiers and junior officers. The development of what military historians call esprit de corps cannot, therefore, have existed in the regiment in its traditionally accepted form — meaning an old unit filled at all levels with veteran soldiers — if, indeed, recruits rarely survived their first action. This would suggest that Dumbarton never commanded a large body of experienced soldiers, and this was not at all unusual for the period. If an esprit did exist in the regiment it was probably fostered amongst the significantly older senior and non-commissioned officers. There is, for example, evidence that the captains of the regiment provided the greatest sense of continuity and identity possessed by the regiment: their role was vital in the creation of the esprit that was visible in the regiment’s mutiny against the rule of William III in 1688.

In contrast to the personal part played by Dumbarton in French service, it is tempting to assess the role of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade in the Netherlands solely in relation to the important place it held in the successful establishment of William in Britain in 1688. Admittedly, this sort of analysis is retrospective and succumbs to the temptation to see the outcome of the Brigade’s involvement in the ‘Glorious Revolution’ as the natural result of its militant and politicized membership. Certainly, the connection between the Brigade officers’ political origins and their role in 1688 is straightforward, but this is to ignore the long-term connections that existed between Britain and the Netherlands. Among many of the Brigade’s Scottish and English soldiers, in the period 1681 to 1691, there often existed family connections, which stretched back to the unit’s very formation (in the late 1580s) under the Earl of Leicester. Many Englishmen had kinsmen in the Brigade from the
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early 1600s. For Scots, the connections went even deeper as established Scottish Protestant communities had (for a variety of reasons) been settled in the Netherlands since the early 1600s.

The Netherlands by no means provided the only option for secure employment for expatriate Britons in the 1680s. For example, the number of Scots in the armies of Brandenburg and Brunswick-Lüneburg-Zell, proves that these, too, continued to offer work to, mainly Protestant, British soldiers. The existence of long-established connections between Britain and the Netherlands provided a sound reason for British service in the Dutch Army in the 1680s. The fact that William of Orange went out of his way in the 1680s to make this service even more attractive to militant British Protestants, only strengthened the pre-existing links between those elements in each country.

Ultimately, the impact of military service abroad on Scotland is difficult to determine. The drain of manpower from Scotland is one area where the effect of foreign service was felt: as stated in chapter 9, Dumbarton claimed to have commanded 20,000 Scots in the course of his twenty-two year career (between 1653 and 1677) in the French Army. His estimate was almost certainly inflated in order to make Louis XIV repent that he had not him a lieutenant general in 1677: the recorded number of recruits received by his regiment between 1656 and 1677 comes to 4,900 Scots. The regiment also received, in 1669, at least eight hundred English soldiers, and an indeterminate number of English and Scots soldiers had joined it in 1667 and 1668. It seems unlikely that the regiment could have removed more than 10,000 men from Scotland in the reign of Charles II. Allowing for the existence of veteran soldiers in the regiment, serving alongside the new recruits, and the results of unofficial recruiting in Scotland throughout the period spent by Dumbarton in France, even this conservative estimate represents a small, but perceptible, proportion of about 1 per cent of Scotland’s population.

Captains recruited the vast majority of Dumbarton’s men, and these officers often either belonged to the Douglas family or were closely associated with it. It can, therefore, be assumed that most of these men came from their traditional area of influence in and around the Earldom of Angus. Dumbarton and his family, therefore, lost numerous servants, retainers and tenants from their lands in Scotland, while the Douglas family lost many of its own members in French service. In comparison, the number of rank and file Scots who served in the ranks of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade is nearly impossible to estimate. Official allowances of recruiting in Scotland for Dutch service in the Netherlands in the 1660s and 1670s do not specify the number of Scottish soldiers who were

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allowed to the Dutch recruiting captains, but they probably could be counted in the hundreds rather than the thousands.

It is impossible to estimate the number of soldiers who returned to Scotland from service abroad. Those few soldiers who deserted from Dumbarton’s regiment, following the disaster at Trèves (Trier) in 1677, were probably exceptional, in that they not only returned to Scotland, but were recorded doing so. Extant sources suggest that a minority of Douglas’s soldiers, who were recorded in the regiment during its periods in Britain in 1666, 1669, 1674 and 1679, returned with it to French service each time. The great age of some of the veterans of the regiment, who were admitted to the Hôtel des Invalides from 1670, suggests a limited continuity of personnel within the regiment over a long period of time. The continuity of the regiment’s officers was far greater than that of its rank and file, facilitating the supposition that the legacy of service in the regiment de Douglas did not become apparent until the regiment mutinied and upset the military and political scene in Britain in 1688. The same conclusion can be drawn regarding the Scottish veterans of Dutch service, who remained relatively obscure – often even in the realm of political intrigue – often until the unit as a whole played a prominent part in the ‘Glorious Revolution’.

It is equally difficult to determine the benefits, if any, enjoyed in Scotland as a result of its peoples’ service abroad. Commissions in Douglas’s regiment provided employment for many members of Scotland’s nobility and gentry, and the same might be said of ordinary soldiers who were similarly provided with work. Despite the long-term opposition in Britain to foreign service, recruits were gathered from Scotland throughout the period and were hardly ever impossible to come by. However, the forcible recruiting of a small but significant group of industrious and talented Scots clearly threatened to drain local talent from urban communities across Lowland Scotland. The loss of artisans and craftsmen, equally valuable in military and civil society, was detrimental to those Scottish towns which relied upon their skills. However, it is difficult to reconstruct figures, which illustrate the number of artisans who were removed from Scotland.

In Britain as a whole, the politically detrimental effects of French service are obvious in terms of the support which the pro-French interest received at Charles’s court. By contrast, the Dutch Republic offered a refuge for Britain’s political, social and religious dissidents and the benefits, if any, of this association to Scotland are unclear. However, the result of the Dutch-British connection is far from opaque, and is clearly visible in the events of 1688. Little can be said of the Scots in
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Russian, Polish, Venetian and Imperial service, as they hardly ever returned to their native country and few, if any, are worthy of note. General Drummond of Strathallan and General Dalyell of Binns, who both returned to Scotland from Muscovy service in the 1660s, are the rare exceptions to this rule.

In the final years of his reign, Charles II lost interest in promoting divisive and unpopular pro-French policies. His degradation of that haven for British Catholics, the garrison at Tangier, roughly coincided with his failure to impose the Roman Catholic Earl of Dumbarton on the Anglo-Dutch Brigade as its Commander-in-Chief. Nor did the king overly concern himself with the supposedly pro-French element of Dumbarton’s regiment: he simply consigned it to Ireland. These actions help confirm the impression that Charles was guided in his earlier years by a desire for the military security that could be provided only by soldiers abroad. The need to distribute favours to loyal courtiers, friends and supporters played a large role in the king’s actions in the 1660s and 1670s and his genuine, if hesitant, promotion of Dumbarton’s interests after 1678, represents a continuation of this rationale rather than a departure from it.

A similar story cannot be told of James VII and II, whose substantial experience of Restoration government was as an observer of his brother’s policies. His one period of personal rule, in Scotland, from 1679 to 1681, proved his ability to stay above factionalism, while simultaneously endearing him to some key figures in Scotland. The fact that James ultimately fell victim to the manipulation of his Scottish and Irish supporters might be a comment on the dangers of ‘dual monarchy’, but in James’s case it resulted from his own flawed personality which was seen in effect for years before he became king. His basic flaw -- the inability to discern good advice from bad -- was fatally fuelled by one of his great virtues: a tireless loyalty to his friends. Dumbarton, like James’s entire Scottish ‘court party’, benefited from the king’s loyalty to him. However, James’s promotion of personal friends as political allies has strongly affected serious assessments of his attitude towards his army and towards soldiers serving abroad. It seems clear that James did not have the ability to ‘Catholicize’ his English or Scottish armies and whether he intended to do so is still open to question. Less ambiguous, is the fact that James’s general prejudice was towards loyalists rather than Roman Catholics per se. Here again, his attitude towards non-Catholics has also shaded opinions of his real motives. Why, after all, did James go out of his way to discourage Huguenot refugees from taking commissions in his English Army, while creating a new unit
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especially designed to train Catholic officers? Why, too, did James effectively assist William of Orange in purging the Anglo-Dutch Brigade of Catholics in 1688? The answer to all these questions probably lies in the fact that James was a fine soldier, but a disastrous politician. As such, he valued people for their basic adherence to him, rather than their political usefulness to his, often non-existent, broader aims.

The ramifications of Scottish military service abroad in the reigns of Charles II and James VII and II were by no means of an entirely military nature. In many cases service abroad after 1660, constituted an outward display of the political and religious sympathies of the Stuart Crown -- just as it had since 1603. While the traditional associations between France and Scotland set the scene for the developments that occurred after 1660, they in no way dictated the narrative of political events that unfolded in the reign of Charles II. James inherited a strong throne that, moreover, had survived the ‘Exclusion Crisis’, the biggest threat faced by the Stuart monarchy since its re-establishment in 1660. However, in just three short years, James undid a political and social settlement in Britain that had taken his brother twenty years to achieve.

As a soldier, James’s prejudices were, partly, shaped by his experience of war and army reformation, but, more importantly, he retained a strong commitment to fellow noblemen and gentlemen who practised the ‘Cult of Arms’ with the same love and enthusiasm as he did himself. In hindsight, the Stuart dynasty’s fate could too easily be blamed on its relationship with Roman Catholicism and the Roman Catholic world. In reality, however, only James’s character and personality stood between the re-establishment in Britain of an openly Catholic Crown and the re-consolidation of Franco-Stuart relations in a way reminiscent of the period prior to the union of the thrones in 1603. But this would be to simplify a complex world of politics, factions and the all-important rhetoric of faith and religion. All these played a part in the story of the Scottish soldier abroad. However, none can fully articulate the private or public experiences of the lonely, brave, ambitious, credit-strained Scots who did so much to perpetuate the reputation of the Scottish soldier abroad in the final stage of its existence in the second half of the seventeenth century.
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George Douglas, 1st earl of Dumbarton, KT, by H. Gascars, portrait (oils). c. 1680/1.
Collection of H.G. the duke of Hamilton.
General James Douglas, by L. Schuneman (after Scougal), portrait (oils). Collection of H.G. the duke of Buccleuch
William Fraser, lord Saltoun, portrait (oils). *Collection of lord Saltoun*
Fig. 1: Scots, English and Irish soldiers admitted to the 'Hôtel des Invalides', 1670-1688.

Fig. 2: Burials at the 'Hôtel des Invalides', 1670-1689.
Fig. 3: Regimental distribution of Scottish, English and Irish soldiers taken into the 'Hôtel des Invalides', 1676 and 1677.

1 = Regiment de Douglas, 2 = Monmouth's regiment, 3 = Sir George Hamilton's regiment, 4 = other.

Fig. 4: Regimental distribution of Scottish, English and Irish soldiers taken into the 'Hôtel des Invalides', 1678-1684.

1 = Regiment de Douglas, 2 = Monmouth's regiment, 3 = Sir George Hamilton's regiment, 4 = other.
Fig: 6: Religious distribution among Scottish, English and Irish soldiers taken into the 'Hôtel des Invalides', 1670-1688.

1 = Catholics, 2 = Protestants, 3 = unknown.
Fig. 1: Membership of the Anglo-Dutch brigade vs. that of standing Dutch regiments.

Fig. 2: Scottish, English and Irish soldiers in Dutch service overall, 1660-1688.
Fig. 3: Repartitie divisions for the Anglo-Dutch brigade, 1660-1688.

1=Holland, 2=Friesland, 3=Flanders, 4=Gelderland, 5=Zeeland, 6=Maestricht, 7=s'Hertogenbosch, 8=Utrecht

Fig. 4: Lesser 'Repartitie' divisions of the Anglo-Dutch brigade, 1660-1688.

1=Amsterdam, 2=Ghent, 3=Oudenaarde, 4=Bergen-op-Zoom, 5=Overysele, 6=Brabant, 7=Middelburg, 8=Rotterdam, 9=Breda, 10=Sluis, 11=Zutphen, 12=Freiburg, 13=Groeningen, 14=Harlingen, 15=unknown.
Fig. 5: Occupational divisions for Scots, English and Irish soldiers in the Dutch army, 1660-1688.

1 = navy, 2 = artillery, 3 = cavalry, 4 = civil/administrative, 5 = garrison, 6 = engineers.
Gordon-Douglas-Drummond Connections of the Knights of the "Restored" Order of the Thistle (1687)

George Gordon
6th Earl of Huntly
1st Marquis of Huntly
(d.1636)

Mary Gordon
(1610-1632)

William Douglas
11th Earl of Angus
1st Marquis of Douglas
(1589-1660)

Lewis Gordon
8th Earl of Huntly
3rd Marquis of Huntly
(1626-1653)

Anne Gordon =
James Drummond
3rd Earl of Perth
(1615-1675)

William Douglas †
3rd Duke of Hamilton
= Anne, Duchess of Hamilton

George Douglas †
1st Earl of Dumbarton
(c.1636-1692)

Isabel Douglas =
William Douglas
1st Duke of Queensberry

George Gordon †
9th Earl of Huntly
4th Marquis of Huntly
(d.1716)

Mary Gordon =
James Drummond †
4th Earl of Perth
(1648-1716)

= Jane Douglas
1st Earl of Melfort
(1649-1714)

John Drummond †
Earl of Arran
(k.1712)

† Knight of the Order of the Thistle (1687)
Huguenot Connections at the Court of King James II (1685-8)

Guy-Aldonce de Durfort-Duras
Marquis de Blanquefort, Comte de Rauzun, Baron de Pujols

Charles-Henri de Duras
Comte de Montgommery
(1634-61) = * widow

Louis de Duras
2nd Earl of Feversham
(1641-1709)

Charles-Louis de Duras
Baron de Pujols
(1642-62)

Godefroy de Duras
Comte de Rauzun
(1644-92)

* Henriette de Duras = * Louis de Bourbon
(b. 1632) Marquis de Malauze
* Antoine de Bourbon †
Marquis de La Caze
(k. 1690)

* Elizabeth de Duras = * Frédéric-Charles de La
Rochefoucauld, Comte de
Roye & de Roussy
(1633-90)

* Armand de Bourbon †
Marquis de Miremont
Colonel of Horse, British Army (c.1687)

* Frédéric-Guillaume de La Rochefoucauld †
Comte de Marthon, 1st Earl of Lifford
(1666-1748)

* Lived with the 2nd Earl of Feversham at Somerset House (c.1686)
A 'Nursery for Men of Honour':
Scottish Military Service in
France and The Netherlands,
1660-1692.

Volume II: Sources

A Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Western Sydney at Nepean

by

Matthew Robert Glozier
Master of Philosophy (University of Sydney, 1997)

A.D. 2000
Appendix A: Letters and Papers of George Douglas, 1st Earl of Dumbarton, KT.


[Printed in SPD, 1655-6, M.A.E. Green (ed.), (London, 1882), 137]

24 January/ 3 February 1655/6


Discharge of Inheritance to Lord George Douglas

[NLS, MS. 5370, fol. 28]

23 October 1656

... all being part of ... portion of former provisione land ... Twelfth Thousand merks gross and of the said Angell of god w[ith] consent of the said Lord Marques my fay[ther] ...

Pass for Lord George Douglas [called Marquis of Douglas].

[Warrants of the Protector and Council, I 77, 656; I 114, 61]

27 January 1656/7

[pass for the 'Marquis of Douglas', colonel of a regiment of Scottish foot in the service of the king of France, with nine officers and their servants, to go to France, on request of M. de Bordeaux, the French ambassador].

¹ He was almost certainly related to the Kirkpatrick noted in J. Forbes to Hamilton, 5 May 1677 (see below).

² This is almost certainly the charter by which he was established as colonel of the Douglas family's regiment in French service. The original MS. is in very bad condition.
License for the 'Marquis of Douglas' [Lord George Douglas].

[Warrants of the Protector and Council, I 77, 656; I 114, 61]

27 January 1656/7

[License for the 'Marquis of Douglas' to export a horse from Dover to France].

John Heat to secretary Nicholas, Calais.

[Flanders Correspondence] 3

10/20 December 1659

I hear that in France all foreign soldiers (except the standing bodies of Swiss and Germans) are ordered to repair to the regiments of Scots guards, commanded by Lord Douglas and Col. Rutherford, 4 which are to be recruited to 2,000 each. These I presume the king of France intends to lend our king, and this is done speedily. I hope the preparations for us in Flanders are as forward, for it is high time we were in action.

Memorandum regarding Lord George Douglas' debts, Paris. 5

[BN, Collection Mélanges de Colbert 110, fol. 1]

9 August 1662

Following the proposition that the Marquis de Douglas made to Monsieur Colbert, of making an advance on his late levies, through his cautioner, Mr Mowatt, it is found satisfactory and it pleases us at present the money held in the hands of Messrs. Simonet, bankers of Paris, who are obliged to deliver the same to Mr Mowatt on his remittance this month of the revenues of the commissary who was charged to receive the levy on the men who will be obliged to come to France, and on condition that the said Mowatt will be cautioned to provide the surpluss for the latter. Sig: Douglas.

Lord George Douglas to an agent of Colbert, Paris.

[BN, Collection Mélanges de Colbert 110, fol. 13]

August 1662

Following this that M. Colbert will provide the proof that M. Simonet has the caution for the money which is to be remitted to me. I have talked to you of

4 Andrew Rutherford, 1st Earl of Teviot. He commanded a Scottish regiment in French service until 1661, when he was appointed governor of Dunkirk by Charles II. He was later made governor of Tangier, where he was killed in action in 1664.
5 Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), French Controller-General of Finance, from 1665, and French Secretary of State for the Navy, from 1668.
Mr Mowatt my banker; and we have been together with the said Mr Mowatt, who will provide the caution for me for the money which is to be delivered to me, and that the same Mr Mowatt will remit and hold of M. Colbert a ticket [billet] from M. Simonet of the entire sum to be received, at the charge which was made for when the recruits arrive. The said ticket will be received by you, and Mowatt will answer for the surplus. Sig: Douglas.

The Earl of Rothes to the Earl of Lauderdale.⁶

[BL, Add. MSS. 23123, fol. 120]*⁷

July the 6 [1665]

My Dear Lord,

I am much troublid that by the courts remuffal it will be impossibell for you to leat me hear so oftin ffrom, but I most intreat ffor it als oftin as posible you can. That tym ffor the conuensioun dus nou draue nier, and I shall by the nixt post or tuo giff you acount of uhat I shall in all humilitie expeckt ffrom his Majestie as letiers or instruxions in relasion to the conversione. You may remember a great uhayl ago his Majestie did in a prayffit letier ureatun by your Lo. command me to retard the leues of the fransche ofisiers under my Lord jorge duglies, of thos thrie hunder men uhich hie brought a uarat ffor. I uas tu long of geating the comand ffor me to meack a stop bot that it uold have esalie bin perseued, and tho I haue indeuored it to put all the stop I could prayfitlie yit I flaynd thay uill be in rediness against the tuintiethe of this munthe, ffor thay ar uerie dilient ouer the kingdum, and the ships uill be haue presisle against that day sent by the ffrenshe king ffor transporting of them, so that I most expeck a positiff comand uhat I shall du, ffor iff a stop be put to them it uill in my opinion be luckt upon as a breathand the consideration of that meacks me not enou uhat to du, bot iff ther be not a spidie breath layck to be I shuld thinck so small a number of men is not much uirthe of being notifid, bot leat me haue an ansuier to this als sun as you can, and so ffor this post adecie my dear Lard

[Rothes]

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23124, fols. 11-12]*

9 January 1665

Since that our kings ambassadeur hes takin his Leuve of this court, and that it

⁶ John Leslie, 7th Earl of Rothes, 1st Duke of Rothes (1630-1681), Chancellor of Scotland. Son of John, 6th Earl of Rothes, by Lady Anne Erskine: DNB.

⁷ Sources followed by an asterix have been published in Camden Miscellany, (Camden Society, 1883).
is thowhit that ther shall be wars betuixt his Majesté and the king of France, I wold intrait that faveur of your Lo: as to assor his Majesté of my most faithful Loyalnesse and all the regiments that I dow command, as also that I might know what is his Majestes will that I should dow, for altho as your Lo: dis know that I have nothing in my ouin contray and no other Livlyhood but be my regiment hier, yet whatever commands his Majesté will honnor me and my regiment with shall be most punctuall and faithfully obyed; as your Lo: hes alweis doun me the honneur as to be my frind I hop you will continued now and lat me know what is the kings intention we should dow. I should wish that your Lo: wold lat me hier from you as soon as possible can, for I belive I may be commanded to go towards jttaile or cattalloing. I begge your Lo: will excuse me for this fridom I tak as to give you this trouble, since I am most really,

My Lord,
Your Lo: most humble and obedient servint,
Douglas.

Lord Holles to Lauderdale, Paris.
[BL, Add. MSS. 23124, fol. 69]*

14/24 February 1665

My Lord,
This is but to acknowledge the receite of your LoD8 letter and to present you with my most humble service, for my Lord Douglas doth himself give your LoP an account of the little which wee both of us yet know will be done in his business as to the transporting of his regiment, of which some difficulty as yet seemes to be made here; by the next post more may be known, of which he or I or both will give your LoP an account. In the meane time lett me begg the continuance of your LoD8 favor to esteeme me as I really am,

My Lord,
Your LoD8 most humble servant,
Holes.

---

* Denzil Holles, 1st Baron Holles of Ifield (1589-1680), English ambassador to Paris. He had been a prominent opponent of Charles I, but played a leading role in the Restoration of Charles II, whose Privy Council he joined in 1660. He was created Baron Holles of Ifield in 1661. He was a member of the Whig party in the 1670s, and a supporter of Whig Earl of Shaftesbury.
D. Hales to Arlington, Paris.\textsuperscript{9}

\textit{[PRO, SP 78/12296]}

26 February/6 March 1665/6

My Lord,
I must unsay what I said last of the faire parting hence of my Lord Douglas & his Regiment, for the case is well latered: they demurr upon the giving him his orders to remove to the sea side, & put it off till after a Review a fortnight or three weeks hence & when they doe goe they are not like to have a penny of money; the K\& himself told me he had no Argent containt & if he had it should be Pour d'autres, but that hereafter he will pay what is due; so as he knows not what to doe, for without money he can not stir; neither himself nor his Regiment, they owing as much in their quarter as is owing to them for pay; My Lo. Douglas saith fifteene thousans livres, w\textsuperscript{ch} will be about twelve hundred pound sterling, w\textsuperscript{ch} money if he can have, he saith they will gett of in despite of them here; & will be able to bring into England compleat seaven hundred men; the intention here is to make the Regiment breake for want of money: therefore his Maj\textsuperscript{y} must speedily resolve what he will doe in the business, without money the Regiment is absolutely broken, & the poore Gentleman my Lord Douglas quite undone, his fortune left every way if any thing be writt in answer of this to me it must come to Ro\"en: & the Passes for the returne of the shipps that transport them would be sent thither.

D. Hales to Arlington, Paris.

\textit{[PRO, SP 78/12297]}

28 February/14 March 1665/6

My Lo. Douglas saith he finds [it] is a little smoother againe at Court then it was the two or three last times that he was there; he is now promised his orders for his regim[ent] to march, that he shall have his Route, & his Estate by the way to be defraide in his march; & ships to transport, but no more money then before, onely that the arreareas shall be paide when there is money, that is, God knows when: So that it stands for that point as when I wrett last, that money must come to discharge his quarters.

\textsuperscript{9} Henry Bennet, 1st Earl of Arlington, was a man who obliged his friends. He was Secretary of State (south) from 1662 to 1674. His under-secretary was Joseph Williamson, who was later created Sir Joseph. He was secretary of state from 1674 until 1679, when he was replaced by Robert, Earl of Sunderland who served from 1678 until 1681, and then again from 1683 until 1688, when Richard, Viscount Preston, was briefly appointed: Sir G. Clark, \textit{The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714} (Oxford, repr. 1992), 461-162 and K.H.D. Halsey, \textit{Politics in the Reign of Charles II} (London, 1985), 15.
Thierry Charpentier to Lord George Douglas.

[BL, Add. MSS. 23124, fol. 70]*

A St. Germain en laye, le 2 Mars, 1665/6

Sir,

I have the orders from M. le Marquis de Louvois. Your regiment must be assembled at St. Quentin and be embarked at St. Vallery. I will work to have all of your companies assembled at St. Quentin by tomorrow, but as you know, Sir, it will be difficult to part this month for they are difficult to replace. Thus I cannot say that they will be able to be brought together within three weeks. Do not doubt that I have not lost a moment's occasion to bring this about. And I always will greatly cherish that I can give much proof that I am,

Sir,
Your most humble servant,
Charpentier.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23124, fols. 72-3]*

3 March 1665/6

My Lord,

According as I did wryt to yo Lo: by my Last the king of France hes given me my pass conforme to our Capitulation, and as yo Lo: will si by the in Closed wch I have just now receivd from mon Lo de Louvois his Secretaire, we ar to be embarqued at St Vallery so yo Lo: most be plaissed to send the passes for the wessells that will transporte us from thence I can not spessefie the number; so yo Lo: most procure passes for such wessells as shall serve for the transportation of the regiment, by my Last I dissaired yo Lo: to Let me Know in what place the king dissaired we should Land at; now that you dow know the place that we ar to be Imbarqued at yo Lo: will be plaissed to Lat me know his majestes plaisir in it, wch shall be punctually observed, wind and wather serving. St. quentin wch is the place of our randevous is six days march from St Walley and it will be thri weiks befor we can be ther so it will be the Last of this month before we can be imbarqued my Lord Halles his pait from this I he dis tell me with in ten or tualve days so my Lord what

10 François-Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois (1639-1691), French Secretary of State for War. He was the son of Michel Le Tellier, Secretary of State of War and a creature of Cardinal Mazarin.
Letters and Papers of George Douglas, 1st Earl of Dumbarton, KT

Letters you dow send to me efter his paiarting adresse them under a cover, A mon$, mon$ Richard, maistre de la poste d’Angleterre. I am with respect, my Lord,

Your Lo: most humbl and obedient servint,

Douglas.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23124, fols. 78-9]*

6 March 1665/6

My Lord,

Since my last to yo$ Lo: things ar changed for now the king of France dis trairt us in the most crouel way that ever was for he told me that he hes no money to pay us what is ouing us, and that we shall have our rout, acclin as I did wryt to you by my Last and ships at St Walley but no money to pay us what is ouing us that we might pay our debts in the places we ar in, nor to Carry us to the sea side he dis this thinking to mak our sojers stay behind and distroy the regiment, I hop this shall not have the effect they belive, for I am assowred non of our Sojers will stay and thy should beg ther bred thorow the contray, I belive ther was never such a Crouel and barborus action doun efter so many years services spending our bleuds and fortuns in his services, to be nessesitat to beg hom and perhaps putt in prison for my debts, and refuss the payment of our arriars as also my pension, I belive such a traittement as this will be a warning to all my Contremen or any of our kings subject, I have sothit my pass presently with our rout that we may go to the sea sid the best way we can and ships for our transportation according to ther Last promis wch the Secreteraire of State said I should have, but that befor I but to give him the passports for the saif retoune of the ships, so my Lord I pray you to Lat me have them by the first post, as at so Lat me know what I should dow in this, I refer other particulars to my Lord holles letters to your Lo: and my Lord Arlington, only I intrait a spidy and diligent ansuer, for before I can recev it I will presse them, so that I hope to geitt all my ordres and pass from them and will pait immediately upon any account out of this most ungraitful Countray wher they begin to loik now upon me in a most straing way so expecting with impatience to hier from yo$ Lo: and to be in Ingland, I dow remaine,

My Lord,

Your Lo: most humbl and obedient servint,

Douglas.
Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23124, fols. 87-8]* 10 March 1665/6

My Lord,

Yesterday I did dissaire of the king of France that since he was not plaissed to pay us what he was ouing us, that he wold be plaissed to give me immediatly, my congé [dismissal] and routté [route] and ordres for my transportation, according to his promis to me, he told me, je vous ay deja ditte que je Suis court d'argent pour Le present mas je donné ordre a monr de Louvois de vous donner tous vos ordres nessesaires, et vous depecher; and he did immediately call for monr de Louvois and Commanded him to dispache me, who told me he should dow it with all diligence, and for that effect the ordres dispair to morrow to ... thri Companies marche that is towards Lorraine, he told me, also that we should have, estapes, upon our routte, wch is so much flech, bred and drink for every sojer and to the officirs a proportion and that we should find our shipes ready at St. Wallery for to cairry us over, and as for our tow months pay wch was ouing us and my pension, that the king wold pay us when he had mony if I woule Live a n'officire be hind, so that I had no raison to Complain of the King and that he did kip oure Capitullation to us, the raison why thy dow not pay us our arrires was that they thothit that that wold brek the regiment and obligle the officirs to stay, of the wch thy ar extraimly desseued for we shall Cairy over Seven hundred as good Sojers as is in the world; this is now ther Last dessein how thy will traite us wch yor Lo: may belive for certine, as all so that we shall be imbarqued against the first of Appryll. Now that I have had my congé of the king of France I will not si him no mor till I be redy to paert for to tak my liv of him. I dow expect with impatience the passports for the wessels, for the secretaire told me that befor I went from court I [was] but to delivre them to him. I told him that it was Litle honner to the king of france for to refuse to pay us our arrires and to si us put into prison or at List striped naked for our debts in our quarters. His ansuer was that the king had a dow[a] with his monyes, for to advertis your Lo: when we marche from St. Quentin, our lieu d'assemblé, and at our arrivall at St. Wallery, and I hop your Lo: will pardon me for the trouble I give you by my Letters, and that I am,

My Lord,

Your Lo: most humbl and obedient servint,

Douglas.
D. Hales to Arlington, Paris.

[PRO, SP 78/122/119] 11/21 March 1665/6
My Lord Douglas had now his orders to march wth his Regiment to ye seaside, & for the Pay of ye Regiment to their going of; but non of his Pension: so I am fain to stand for him for two hundred, forty five pounds, six teene shillins & eight pence to be paide in London the 24th of June next, without which he could not have stirred, nor his Ma's have had the Regiment: he desires to know where he should land, & whither to march.

Louvois to Holles, Paris.

[PRO, SP 78/122/112] 12/22 March 1665/6
I myself say that I am obliged to have this letter accompanied by MlLord Douglas, but to have him supply it to you by his own hand is to lose him and his regiment. The King, my master, who is his sovereign [le Roy mon Maistre qui est son Souverain], has demanded that he go to England, and following the capitulation which was made for the levy of his regiment, which was to serve primarily in France under his Most Christian Majesty. I do not doubt the justice of His Majesty or that of his ministers in the overseeing of all this that has been promised touching this affair. This is why I will not importune you in the advantage which is to be had by you in this service.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23124, fols. 94-5]*
ce 13 March 1665/6
My Lord,
Immediately after the wryting of my Last the secretaire of State send fer me and told me that the king had maid une efort, and had borrowed monyes for to pay us and that we should be payed to the day of our embarquement and at the kings retourne, from the reveu at Compienne, wher he is gon this day and will be a gaine this day agithit days I should have my orders, so this will retarde us aight or ten days Longer nor I expected but my Lord I shall mak all the heast that Can be, and I hope to cairy over a good regiment and at leist seven hundred men, for ther was never men so overjoied and willing as all
the officirs and Sojers ar, I asked the Secretaire if the king wold not pay me my pensions he was ouing me he told me that he had no ordres from the king to dow it for it was a particulaire bissinis that regardit myself, and that for the Capitullation the king wold kip it, and had me Spik to the king; what he will dow I know not, but I am affrayed of the warsit, I dow expect with impatience for thos pasports for the wessills as also to know in what place I should Land at, I pray yow my Lo: to lat me know it your Lo: will command me anything hier for your service, for now we have the faire de Saint Germains hier and I can be abl to cairy over things with me conveniently, I shall wish to god as may be abl to testifie how much I am your Lo: servint, and sensibl of thos obligations I have to your Lo: and in particulaire in this last, which shall be the greatest passion of him that is with respect,

My Lord,
Your Lo: most humble and obedient servint,

Douglas.

D. Hale to Arlington, Paris.

[PRO, SP 78/122/115]

14/24 March 1665/6

There is also the copy of a Tre[aty] I writ for my Lord Douglas who desired it of me, some of his friends at court telling him the English Ambassador appeared not in it, & that he himself was observed only to presse it & he eager in it, which was very ill taken; & he found it so yesterday whenhe went thither & carried my tre[aty] for Mr. le Telier & his son Mr. de Louvoy as soone as they saw him told him they had order from ye k of to command him to retire, & GO to his Garrison, whither his orders to march should be [given] him, so as he dares scarce go to court again, yet he says he will venture once more to deliver them the passports for the shippes wch yt LD sent me by the last post: they tell him now plainly he shall not have a penny of the Arreares of his Pension, wch is two thousand Crownes, but the Regiment shall be paid to their marching of; I wish it be truew, & that they send the orders wch they promise: However that he be in case to carry over his Regiment, I am glad to passe my word for a thousand Crownes without wch he saith it is impossible for him to stir, by reason of debts that he owes.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23124, fols. 105-6]*
My Lord,
At the retourne of the Court to St. Germaines, I went ther so yesterday the Secretaire of Stat told me that he should send presently the ordres for to casse the regiment assembl at St Quenten and that he had ordres from the king to Command me to rettire me self immediately to my regiment that the king was not satisfied with me and that for my pensions the king wold not pay me, I told him that I was ouing a great daill of debt hier and I had not a farding mony; he told me the king wold pay the regiment but as for me not and that I must be going presently, so my Lord you may juge in what a sad condition I am in, my Lord Ambassadeur hes bein pleased to casse Lenne me open his credit thri hundrid pounds Sterling for to pay my debts and to retir my self so I will part with in thri or four days for St Quentin wher I wold stay till my regiment be assembled, the Secretaire of Stat told me he should send me what ordres should be necesaire to me; you may jug my Lord how things stands with me hier by this hard usag I recev, I know not if I dare trust ther promis in what thy say thy will dow concerning the regiment; ther for my Lord if thy should put me off with delays (as I do not think thy will) Lat me know what I shall do. I have recevied yesterday the passes for the waissels, but no ordre for my landing nor wher I should dow it, my Lord Ambassadeur does wryt by this post to my Lord Arlington of it, as also to addresse his letteres and ordres for me in our queen mothers pakit, fo his Lo: does part within towr or thri days, if thy should braik ther words to me hier concerning my regiment, I have told Collonel Gerardin what may be douin in that conjunctur, who will acquaint yo£ Lo: with it, I am,

My Lord,

Your Lo: most humble servint,

Douglas.

Hales to Arlington, Paris.

[PRO, SP 78/122/122]

24 March/3 April 1666

My Lord Douglas his regiment is upon their march & will be brought entire into England, but himselfe is much in their black book here; my engagement for him is about 242£ sterling.

Hales to Arlington, Paris.

[PRO, SP 78/122/124]
10 April 1666

[Douglas is to be at the seaside with his regiment by the end of April, and wants orders to be ready for him].

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General Thomas Dalyell to ?.

[BL, Add. MSS. 23125, fol. 189]11

6 December 1666

My Lord,
I have nothing to ad to my laist ... The 200 men for Lord Georg Douglas regiment is commandit out.

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Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 35125, fol. 132]

27 January 1666

[Gives thanks for Lauderdale's showing his letter to the king. The English ambassador will not depart this month due to his gout] ... I pray you to Lat me know if ther be any thing hier that yo¹ Lo: wold have send over, for ther is none breathing mor willing to randre you service.

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Rothes to ?.

[BL, Add. MSS. 23127, fol. 50]12

20 June 1667

[Levies to be made for Lord George Douglas' regiment].

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The Marquis de Louvois to the Earl of St. Albans, Paris.

[PRO, SP 78/123/174]

3/13 September 1667

Sir,

Touching the colonels whom you intend to send to the King of Great Britain, this will not prove good for the two regiments which consist of 200 men in France. As for the regiment de Douglas, its loss, during a time of war, will be to our disadvantage. This is directly contrary to the procedure between our King and that of Great Britain.13 I have an order from the King which gives

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11 Published in O. Airy (ed.), The Lauderdale Papers, vol. 1 (Camden Society, 1884), 255.
12 Published in Airy (ed.), The Lauderdale Papers, vol. 2, 6.
13 Later ratified by the 'Rules for making Capitulations for such officers and soldiers, his Majesty's Subjects, as shall be entertained in the service of any foreign Prince or state,' 12 February 1667/8 (BL, Add. MS. 38,694, fol. 7).
final advice which, Sir, you will be pleased to write to England as quickly as you possibly can, which strongly states a promise I have on the part of the King of Great Britain. It cannot be doubted this will be facilitated, and presently concluded, by the arrival there of M. de Rouvigny.14

St. Albans to Louvois.

[PRO, SP 78/123/178] 14 September 1667

Sir,
I will not fail to write presently to England on the subject of your letter. Of this affair I will tell you in advance that there will be no difficulty for the regiment of M. Douglas. As for the rest I only know that I cannot say anything to you of another choice on the part of the King my master. I am persuaded that M. de Rouvigny will also provide satisfaction on this point. My letter departed this morning.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Dieppe.

[BL, Add. MS. 23128, fol. 140]* the 16 October 1667

My Lord,
I dow send over this officier for to intraite y'r Lo: to spik to the king, that his Majestie will be pleased according to his word to me: (upon the w'ch I payed my regiment, four days I stayed Longer nor I recev'd pay for and his Majesty did offour me I should be payed for it befor the Duke of Yorke, and my Lord Generall told me so to, I dow offour yo'r Lo: that insted of gaining upon this bissinis I will be a great lousser, for ther was sum personn'es that was pleased to mak a reporte go amongst my regiment that I was going for tangere so that ther runeaway al most thrie hundred men the day befor I shiped so that with thos and the sik men I was forced to live be hinde; all that I have broght over is seven hundred and six men in sted of twalve, so that I most repay the superplus w'ch really my Lord will putt me extraimly to it, what with the weknisse of my regiment, so my Lord I will have nide of the continuacione of yo'r Lo: faveir to spik to the king for me, and if his majestie wold be pleased to Confer that honor upon me that I dissaired yo'r Lo: to Spik

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14 Henri de Massue, Marquis de Renneval and de Rouvigny. He was deputy general of the Protestant churches of France and envoy extraordinary from the French king to the court of St. James. He was the father of Henry de Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny (d.2 September1720), who was later created Earl of Galway by William III: Burke, *Dormant ... Peerages* (London, 1866).
already to his Majesty of, it wold be extraimly for the advancement of my fortune so if yo[f] Lo: thinks fitt to Spik a gaine to the king of it, you will oblige me extraimly in it, and to assure his majesty that what ever service he hes a dow with me or my regiment, I shall obey his Commands most faithfully and punctually. I hop yo[f] Lo: will pardon me for this trouble I give you, and beliv I am,

My Lord,
Your most humbl[e] and obedient servant,
Douglas.


[PRO, SP 78/123/111] 24 February 1667
I have been to Dover, whence I have returned to London ... I doubt not that it will prove valuable for me to give you knowledge of M. MiLord de Douglas. I have also given him the knowledge that I have asked you for a pardon. If you would write a word, attendant on your great bounty, [on this subject] we might go further with him.

Sir James Turner's Memoirs

[Sir James Turner, Memoirs of His Own Life and Times, (Edinburgh, 1829), 196-197] 1667
In the beginning of September, he [general Dalyell] commanded three companies of the ten wherof his regiment of guards consisted, to be sent to France, the Captains therof haveing belonged formerlie to Lord George Douglas in that kingdom.15

Warrant to Douglas.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 30, fol. 16] 16 March 1667/8
[Warrant to pay Lord George Douglas 330l. 11s. 8d. advanced by him to the officers and soldiers of his regiment, being five days pay above their last muster, for the discharge of their quarters].

Douglas to Under-Secretary Williamson.

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15 These three companies were commanded by Patrick Melville, Adam Rutherford and James Leith: See Dalton, The Scots Army, 15 and 17, nos. 8-10.
20 March 1667/8

As the Customs make some difficulty, on account of a new order issued, about my passing 20 horses which remain good upon a warrant obtained when I went to France, I desire you will move Lord Arlington for a warrant to pay them; I am detained at Dover simply by this scruple.

John Carlile to Williamson, Dover.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 238, no. 26]

17 April 1668

Mr Francis took ship for Boulogne, and Lord Douglas and Sir Henry Jones,16 with 80 persons and 33 horses, have gone to Calais. Lord Douglas abused the mayor and me for demanding droits, and would not pay them either for man or horse; I was last week in a committee in London to give an account what men and horses have passed, but cannot do so, as Lord Douglas will not acknowledge any clerk of the passage or other officer at Dover.

John Clarke to Williamson, Plymouth.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 238, no. 128]

17 April 1668

The Merlin has arrived from Calais, having landed Lord Douglas.

Francis Bellott to Williamson, Plymouth.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 239, no. 14]

27 April 1668

The Maudlin yacht, one of the King's pleasure boats, has come in from Plymouth, having carried Lord Douglas for France, and intends for Ireland.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23129, fol. 100]*

9 May 1668

My Lord,
Now that the peace is maid hier thy ar going a mak a wery great reforme a mongst the troupes and I am affrayed that it faill haviely upon my regiment

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16 Former colonel of the gens d'armes Écossais, a cavalry regiment attached to the maison du roi. He later served under Sir George Hamilton (d.1676), who was colonel of an Irish regiment in French service between 1672 and 1676.
ther for I wold intraitte yo\textsuperscript{f} Lo: that you wold be pleased to spik to the king that he wold be pleased to wryt a Litter hier in my favoure and also to Sir Jhon Trever to spik to the king of france and monsieur de Louvois, if your Lo: will be pleased to dow me this faveur it must be doun by the first post; for the reforme of troup ar to be presently doun, so ther is no tyme to be lost, I shall begg the honnor of yo\textsuperscript{f} ansur, and to believe I am,

        My Lord,
        yo Lo: most humbl and most obedient
        servant,
        Douglas.

Douglas to the Duke of Richmond, Paris.\textsuperscript{17}

[BL, Add. MS. 21947, fol. 201]

13 October 1668

My Lord,
I wryt to your Grace, with my officirs, that I send to London for to have his majesties permissione for to recreute my regiment, but your Grace not being in towne I dow not know if you have receved my Letter; tow days a go I mett hier with monsieur Despesse, who was my Lord Aubinys great frind and whom he trustid with his bissinis hier at hes death, who told me he had send your Grace, the arreste de Councille concerning Aubigny, by won that belonged to monsieur de Verneulle, and dissairied me to Latt your Grace know that your presense hier was extraimly nessaire, or at Least yow wold send sume personne hier to dow your bissines of creditte, for he told me he was extraimly estonished of the Long delay you Leave bein at in not sending wch if your Grace had doun your bissinis had bein at a n'end be this.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23130, fol. 68]

13 October 1668

My Lord,
My major\textsuperscript{18} hes wrytin to me how your Lo: was pleased to procure his majesties Liberty for the recreutting of my regiment for the wch I randre yo\textsuperscript{f}

\textsuperscript{17} Charles Stuart, 3rd Duke of Richmond. He eloped with Charles II's favouite, Frances Stuart, in 1667: See A. Fraser, Charles II (London, 1979), 241. Not to be confused with Charles Lennox, 1st Duke of Richmond of the 4th creation, natural son of Charles II, by Louise de Kéroualle, Duchess of Portsmouth.

\textsuperscript{18} Alexander Monro, Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment by March 1670: See State Papers Scotland, Warrant Book 1, p. 23.
Lo: most hearty thanks, and I wish I may be capable to testifie how greatfulle I am of thos many obligations I have your Lo: ... [destroyed] ... it, and what ever service you will commande me ther shall nbe non breathing mor willing to obey you, sincem Iam most really

My Lord

Yo\r Lo: most humble and most obedient servant,

Douglas.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23131, fol. 44]*

19 December 1668

My Lord,
I have receved from Major Monro\(^{19}\) the letter yo\r Lo: was plaised to honnor me with, I dow assour yo\r Lo: all of us in the regiment ar extraimly sensible of your Lo: faveur in this Last particulaire as we ar also of the formers we have to yo\r Lo: and begge of yo\r Lo: to assour his majesty that ther is non of his subjects shall be mor redy to obey his commands nor I and all my regiment wch we shall alwaiz dow most faithfully and punctually; my Lord Major Monro told me that it hes been reported to yo\r Lo: and to several others that I was marayed hier, I dow assour your Lo: it is most false for upon my word of honnor I had nevr any such thothits and I pray yo\r Lo: to dow that justice to believe that I am incapable to dow a basse actione, and my Lord if you hier any such thing spoke you will oblige me extraimly to assur the Contraire, and to belive I am,

My Lord,

Yo\r Lo: most humbl and most obedient servant,

Douglas.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 23132, fol. 75]

15 August 1669

My Lord,
I hope your Lo: doeth firmlie belive how sensible I am of the obligations I owe yow, and the reallitie of my respects, wther ways I should not wryt anything concerning any person that is in the Least under yo Lo: displease:

\(^{19}\) Alexander Monro, see above.
But Sir William Balantine20 haveing applied him Self to me and finding him constantly to adhear to his innocencie with ... [destroyed] ... great that ever he should have given your Lo: any offence and his disaires being ind waiyes to his return but only for me to help him to somme imployement for his subsistance. I have presumed so farre to interposse with yo Lo: to make this representation but with assurance that I will no farther comply therin then I have trow Cause to be Live your Lo: favour in this particulare will be a tye upon him for ever to your Lo: service, I will expect yo Lo: directions.

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris

[MSS. of Alfred Morrison]21 13 February 1669

[His regiment under orders to go to 'd'Auphiné' with the report that they are to be 'imbarqued for Candie'22 or upon the ships ... wold be pleased to spik to the king that [his] majesty wold be pleased to spik to the french ambassador for to wryt heir to the king' and that 'hes Majesty wold be pleased to wryt to my Lord St Albans23 or Abbate Montagu24 for to spik heir for us in his Majestyes name' to save himself and his regiment, which 'will be rouing of the regiment infalably ... the letters thatcam by the last post from Ittali has brought the nouis that the tirk hes cassed hang the french ambassadour as soon as wer he hard that any French landed a Candy'].

Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris.

20 This Sir William Balantine may be synonymous with William Ballenden (Ballantine) (1616-1661), Prefect-Apostolic of the Catholic mission in Scotland. He was the nephew of Lord Newhall and a member of the household of the Marchioness of Huntly: DNB.
21 Printed in HMC, Report and Appendix, vol. 1 (London, 1883), 47b
22 Candia was the capital city of the island of Crete. The Turks first declared open war against the Venetian protectorate of Crete in 1645, because the republic had allowed the galleys of the Knights of St. John, or of Malta, to take shelter in Cretan waters, following an attack on Ottoman shipping: See E. Bradford, The Shield and the Sword; The Knights of St. John (London, 1972), 192-3.
23 Henry Jermy, 1st Baron Jermy of St. Edmundsbury, 1st Earl of St. Albans (c.1604-1684). He was a favourite of Charles I's queen, Henrietta Maria, Master of the Horse (1639) and governor of Jersey (from January 1645). Under Charles II he helped negotiate the Treaty of Dover (1672). He was criticised by Andrew Marvell as being 'full of soup and gold': Burke, Dormant ... Peerages (London, 1866), 'Jermy'.
24 Walter Montague (c.1603-1677), Abbé of St. Martin's, near Pontoise. He was the 2nd son of Sir Henry Montague, 1st Earl of Manchester, by Catherine, the daughter of Sir William Spencer of Yarmton. He was almoner to the queen dowager, Henrietta-Maria, and to her daughter, Henriette-Anne, duchesse d'Orléans (from 1644). He was forced to retire from his position as Abbot of St. Martin in favour of Cardinal Bouillon, but retained his annual income of 5,000 l.: DNB.
16 February 1669

My Lord,

By the Last post I gave you notice of our marche for Vienne en Dauphine, and being destined for Candy as this will be the absolut rouing and destructione of my regiment our only resource is to make you to Spik to the king to spik to the French ambasadeur and that his majesty wold be pleased to wryt hier in our favours; for, if my regiment com to be weik as it will most certinly, we will never be in Conditione to mak it up a gaine; and you knowis that it is all my fortune, and my officirs, as you have alwas been our frind, now is the only and Last strock for to help us, I have been with monsieur de Rouvigny and shoed him how we war not fitt for that service, and how strawinge it is to send us for our absolut rouing, wch he confessed and he spok of it to monsieur de Turenne, but there is sum other raisons, for all the holl world I admirs why my regiment should be sent, so, my Lord, our Last refuge is to the king and you, that his Majesty wold be pleased to tak our intrests and spik for us seriously, but what his Majesty dis most be sudenly; and, my Lord, as I wryt to you my Last, I dow not know but the kings ambassadeur and the inglishe merchants my suffer by it that is in Turky, so, expecting your Lo: speedy ansur, I remaine,

My Lord,
Your Lo: most humbl and most obedient servant,

Douglas.

Carlisle to Williamson, Dover.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 266, no. 53] 7 October 1669

I hear by a packet from France, that Lord Douglas has been killed in a duel.

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25 Henri Massue de Rouvigny, French ambassador to England and a leading French Protestant. He was the father of Henry, Marquis de Rouvigny, who assisted William of Orange's invasion in 1688.

26 Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne (1611-1675). He was the son of the Duke de Bouillon, by a daughter of William the Silent, Stadholder of the Netherlands. He was a leading French Protestant and a marshal of France.
by the Duke of Normandy; the cause of the quarrel is not known.\textsuperscript{27}

Carlile to Williamson, Dover.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 266, no. 133]

18 October 1669

The packets with the mails from France and Flanders have arrived, but I cannot learn any news only that the death of Lord Douglas is contradicted.

St. Albans to Louvois, Paris.

[PRO, SP 78/126/49]

13 March 1669/70

My Lord,
your servant hath made such a kind of Dilligence that he hath Inspired others I think to keepe pace with him for within two howers after his arrival this business was by Madame\textsuperscript{28} fully finished and the kings Desires sattisfyde by this king in the best manner that Could be wisht, I had my part in representing before the arrival of your servant of how much importance this matter might be to our Master and how little to this king whyther my Lord Dugloses or other regiment in the place of it were sent to Candia, and therefore how unexpected it would have beene if the king should not have bin gratifysde in soe reasonable a Desire as he has bin pleased to Expres, Madame\textsuperscript{29} hath left me noe part in that wch was to Doe now.

\textsuperscript{27} No French peer held this title in the seventeenth century. The individual referred to was probably Charles-Paris d'Orléans, Duc de Longueville, whose father had made attempts to secure the title of Duke of Normandy in 1649: See L. Bély (ed.), Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime; Rouaine de France, XVIe-XVIIe siècle, (Paris, 1996), 897. Longueville was a foolish, headstrong young man who had served in the French army in Flanders in 1667. He also volunteered for service against the Turk, in Candia, in 1669: See Père Anselme, Histoire de la Maison Royale de France, (Paris, 1726), vol. 1 223. Longueville later proved the intemperance of his character when his mistreatment of Dutch prisoners caused the loss of his own life, and threatened Condé's, during the French army's campaign in the Rhine, in 1672: See J.F.M.A. de Voltaire, The Age of Louis XIV, M. Pollock (trans.), (London, 1961), 97.

\textsuperscript{28} Henriette-Anne, Duchesse d'Orléans, called Madame. She was the favourite sister of Charles II of England. He affectionately called her 'Minette'. She was instrumental in negotiating the Treaty of Dover. This treaty ratified an Anglo-French entente which led directly to the employment of three British regiments in French service between 1672 and 1678.

\textsuperscript{29} Charles II had begun negotiations leading to the treaty of Dover as Early as December 1669, when the first draft was prepared, and he asked for a subsidy of £800,000: See J. Miller, Popery and Politics in England, 1660-1688 (Cambridge, 1973), 111-113. Charles' interest in the treaty came from his desire to enjoy a 'special relationship' with the owner of the greatest economic and political resources in Europe: See K.H.D. Haley, An English Diplomat in the Low Countries Sir William Temple and John De Witt, 1665-1672 (Oxford, 1986), 33. For Madame's role in the negotiations see K.G. Felling, Henrietta Stuart, Duchess of Orleans, and the Origins of the Treaty of Dover, English Historical Review, xlvii (1932), 642-645.
Carlile to Williamson, Dover.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 20, fol. 98]

12 November 1670

His Majesty's yacht has come from Calais with Lord Belasyse, Lord Douglas, and Sen. Don Francisco De Mello, Ambassador from Portugal, and another yacht is waiting there for Lord Berkeley.

Privy Seal to Lord George Douglas.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 34, fol. 71; Docquets, vol. 25, no. 15]

7 February 1670/1

[Privy seal for 1,000 l. to George, Lord Douglas, of his Majesty's free gift].

Douglas to Richmond, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 21947, fol. 290]

8 February 1670/1

I have receved yo' Graces Letter by my Lieut Colonel at Guise wher I was with my regiment, w'ch is now at Lille in Flanders, my Lieut Colonel told me that yo' Grace had ordered him to go to Creney, Le mestre de La Pommepain, for to know the price of him win d'hermitag, my Lord I have bein with him and he hes given me a natt under his hand of the preces of all the sorts of vins w'ch dow send yo' Grace; so you may choise what you will have and give order to wan at Rouen for to receu them and pay ther the sorts sortie du Royaume.

Commissaire de Becelles to Louvois, Fontainbleau.

[AG, A1261, No. 18]

30 John Belasyse, 1st Baron Belasyse of Worlaby, co. Lincoln (cr. 27 January 1644). He was the second son of Thomas, 1st Viscount Fauconberg. Under James VII & II Belasyse was 1st Lord of the Treasury: Burke, Dormant ... Peerages.

31 'Fransisco de Mello, brother to the Countess de Panétra' was described as one of the gallants of the court by Count Hamilton: See A. Hamilton, Memoirs of the Count of Grammont (Sonnenschein: n.d.; Originally published London, 1846), 123.

32 Sir John Berkeley, 1st Baron Berkeley of Stratton, co. Somerset (cr.19 May 1658; d. 28 August 1678). He followed Charles II into exile in the 1650s. He was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland between 1670 and 1672. In 1675 he acted as ambassador extraordinary to the French cour: Burke, Dormant ... Peerages, 'Berkeley of Stratton'.

33 Alexander Monro, see above.
August 1671

I have received your last letter, in response to which I tell you that you may make delivery of the powder for the use of three charges for each musketeer of the regiment de Douglas ... it is resolved by His Majesty that all companies are to consist of a second lieutenant, an ensign, with three serjeants, a captain, two lieutenants, an ensign, three sergeants, three corporals, six auspessades [lance corporals], two drumers; all these soldiers ... along with a second aide-major, are to be paid in conformity with the capitulation.

Becelles to Louvois, Fontainbleau.

[AG, A1^1261, No. 112]

13 August 1671

Sir,

The lieutenant criminal of this town has arrested three soldiers of the regiment de Douglas, who caused much disorder last night among the homes of the inhabitants. The officers of the same regiment pretend that we are wrong in this process and that they have the right to [try their soldiers] according to their capitulation. I have taken their views into consideration, but am mindful of His Majesty’s ordinance on the subject. Your envoy to the regiment arrives here today, as does another company of the regiment which consists of 113 men.

Becelles to Louvois, Amiens.

[AG, A1^1261, No. 131]

14 August 1671

Sir,

Buchan’s company of the regiment de Douglas arrived in this town yesterday with 116 men, three sergeants, the captain, two lieutenants and an ensign. The company is composed of good, strong men, with a reserve of six that are very young boys!

Commissaire de Mannallet to Louvois.

[AG, A1^1261, No. 132]

14 August 1671

Sir,

34 James Buchan. He still held a commission in the regiment in 1680: See ‘Officers of the Earl of Dumbarton’s late regiment’, c.1690, BL, Add. MS. 28938, fol. 34.
Today the soldiers of the Scottish regiment ... disembarked to the number of 111. Among these are sixty men led by two serjeants of Mr Reitofort's [Rutherford]35 company, of an ensign with 48 men, and of a serjeant. I am to attend upon Mr Hacquet's company,36 which is led by an ensign. I humbly supply the rolls of the regiment.

Philip Langon to James Hickes.
[SPDom., 1671 (London, 1895), 438]
20 August 1671
The Ann of Leith arrived yesterday from Dieppe, where she landed 104 Scotch soldiers to serve the French king, commanded by Colonel Douglas.'

Becelles to Louvois, Amiens.
[AG, A11261, No. 303]
September 1671

Sir,
There have arrived here in this town 202 men, including six serjeants, for the regiment de Douglas ... they have left four ill men at Dieppe ... 800 are to be before us ... which will make 1062 men in total.

Becelles to Louvois, Amiens.
[AG, A11261, No. 392]
10 September 1671

Sir,
There have arrived another 120 men who have been recruited for the

35 Adam Rutherford, formerly one of the three captains transferred to general Dalyell's regiment of Guards in 1667. He was the son of John Rutherford of Glensyland, baillie of Jedburgh: See Dalton, The Scots Army, 15 and 17, n10 and printed genealogy of the family by T. Cockburn Hood.

36 Sir James Halkett (d.1684). He obtained a commission in Douglas' regiment and was later appointed its major, in April 1679, when the regiment was quartered in Ireland. He commanded the sixteen companies of the regiment at Tangier where he greatly distinguished himself. A drinking song of the Royal Scots (printed 1681) records his bravery:
Hacket led on the Van,
Hey boys, ho boys:
Hacket led on the Van,
Ho!
Hacket led on the Van,
Where was killed many a man,
Hey the brave Scottish boys,
Ho!
On his return from Tangier he was knighted and granted a pension of £150 p.a.: See Dalton, The Scots Army, 49. n1.
regiment de Douglas, among them are 10 boys and weaklings [foibles]. With these, and others who have arrived, they make 1511 men.

Becelles to Louvois, Amiens.

[AG, A^1262, No. 15] 4 October 1671

Sir,
Since I last had the honour to write to you the vessel, charged with bringing recruits from Scotland, has arrived at St. Vallery. It has delivered 161 good men, of which 35 are under the command of captain Charles Douglas and a lieutenant. There also arrived in thie town, on the 29th of the last [August], 89 men. These last made the total number of men 1579, and with the men recently arrived the total is 1829.

Becelles to Louvois, Amiens.

[AG, A^1262, No. 81] 17 October 1671

Sir,
M. le Marquis de Douglas has done the honour of writing to your Lordship on the subject of sixteen soldiers who deserted from his regiment six days ago. Three were carried to Cambrai on pain of punishment. I cannot say, my Lord, that the furnishing of the regiment in this town has been good, therefore M. de Barillon and M. Derthier might think of moving the troops before Dunkirk.

Douglas to Richmond, Paris.

[BL, Add. MS. 21948, fol. 138] 2 December 1671

I have receved yo Grace of the 16/26 of November, if the mony war my ouin, I dow offour yo Grace I should not have demandit till you had thotht fitt to pay it, but my Lord I am pressed hier to give in a n'account of the monyes I have receved, and being defficient of that company yo Grace undertak for M'er Stuart, I most both for my honnor and credit repay presently the mony or give a n'account of what I have doun with it so I most ernistly intraitre yo Grace to casse pay the Mony to monr du Livier [d'Olivier?].
Commissaire de la Grange to Louvois.

[AG, A1292, I, fol. 255v] 22 March 1671/2

The two Scottish soldiers of Lockhart's company ... have been lost [to desertion].

Commissaire Le Peletier to Louvois, Lille.

[AG, A1292, I, fol. 274v] 25 March 1672

Of the six companies of the regiment de Douglas, the men of William Douglas of Widdrington's are good, the others are a little neglected and have many youths whom we are obliged to suffer in the recruits for this regiment.

Commissaire de Chrissy to Louvois.

[AG, A1293, No. 133] 23 May 1672

Sir,

The Scottish regiment de Douglas and Roskomon's ... have arrived here. The latter, and a strong proportion of the former, are not under 200 men [per company]. We are at considerable charges, of 4188ll for the regiment de Carignan. Roskomon's costs 9978ll. 10 f., for which we strongly require a further 790ll. 10 f. ... And 32 cows per month render subsistance to only 400 men. I therefore enjoin to you, Sir, the difficulty I foresee in provisioning...

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37 Julius Lockhart. He still held a commission in the regiment in 1680: See 'Officers of the Earl of Dumbarton’s late regiment', c.1680, BL, Add. MS. 28938, fol. 34.

38 William Douglas of Widdrington. He still held a commission in the regiment in 1680: See 'Officers of the Earl of Dumbarton’s late regiment', c.1680, BL, Add. MS. 28938, fol. 34.

39 Wentworth Dillon, 4th Earl of Roskomon. He was a soldier and poet whose character was commended by the poets Pope and Dryden:

'Roscommon, whom both court and camps commend,
True to his Prince, and faithful to his friends;
Roscommon first in fields of honour known,
First in the peaceful triumphs of the gown'
- Dryden.

'Roscommon, not more learned than good,
With manners gen’rous as his noble blood;
To him the wit of Grace and Rome was known,
And every author’s merit but his own'
- Pope.

See Burke, Dormant ... Peerages, 172.
these men through winter. I strongly doubt that the Country can support them through the winter.

Chrissy to Louvois, Metz.

[AG, A1293, No. 188]

2 June 1672

Of our soldiers the French are very bubbly [tres moussant], the Scots a little less, but the Irish are bad workers ... despite these bad workers I hope to distribute the work equally among the companies to good, strong effect.

Chrissy to Louvois, Metz.

[AG, A1293, No. 236]

13 June 1672

We have strongly encompassed ... the old town and on this new morn there are 1400 men working strongly. There are 25 companies of the regiment Royal de la Majesté [of England] and 50 each from the regiment de Douglas and of Roskommon's regiment of which the men are paid 7l. per day, but with all the application in the world I would wish this to be raised to 25l.

Francis Bastinck to Williamson, Dover.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 367, no. 140]

27 January 1674/5

[A yacht attends Lord Douglas at Calais to carry him up the river, where he is expected that day].

Richard Watts to Williamson, Deal.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 368, no. 76]

16 February 1674/5

Yesterday afternoon landed here from France Lord Douglas who is coming to recruit his regiment, and with M. de Vensdom [Vendôme],40 son of a French Duke of the same name, with 10 or 11 followers. They are gone for London today. The winds have been and are very tempestuous these five days and nights, blowing a whole storm between N.E. and E. and yet the ships ride fast in the Downs.

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Warrant to George, Earl of Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[SP Scotland, Warrant Book 3, fol. 220]

9 March 1674/5

Warrant for letters patent creating Lord George Douglas, colonel of the Scots regiment in French service, Earl of Dumbarton & Lord Douglas of Etrick, in Scotland, with remainder to the heirs male of his body.41

John Reading to Williamson, Dover.

[PRO, SP Dom., Car. II 369, no. 6]

14 March 1674/5

About 7 on Friday night Lord Douglas & Mons. Ravenette & some others went for Calais by yacht.

The Earl of Feversham's account of the battle of Entzheim,

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41 Though Douglas held no land in Dumbartonshire the title was not devoid of symbolic meaning. Dumbarton Castle was a royal possession (BN, Add. MSS. 23138, fol. 100) the captnacy of which traditionally lay with the Marquises of Douglas; Dumbarton's nephew, the Earl of Arran, was Lord lieutenant of Cliddealde and Dumbarton during Argyll's rebellion in 1685: See Dumbarton to Arran, 12 June 1685 (SRO, GD 406/1/7677). The coat of arms, which was formally assigned to the new Earl, also contained a singular honour in that the border which surrounded the arms of the Earls of Angus consisted of English lions and French fleurs-de-lis. Lord George Douglas formerly used for arms, Quarterly, 1, a lion rampant; 2, a lion rampant; 3, three pyles radiating from in chief; 4, a fess checky, debruised by a bend charged with three buckles. Charged overall with a cross croisit in base for difference and an inescutcheon bearing a human heart crowned, on a chief three mullets (Douglas of Angus). The shield ensignied by a French Count's coronet. Supporters: [on a compartment in base] dexter, a savage holding a club; sinister, a stag rampant: See seal attached to a letter from Lord George Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris, 9 May 1668 (BL, Add. MSS. 23129, fol. 100). The Earl of Dumbarton's official arms were, Quarterly, 1, Azure a lion rampant Argent crowned Or; 2, Or a lion rampant Gules surmounted of a ribbon Sable; 3, Argent three piles Gules; 4, Or a fess chequy Azure and Argent, surmounted of a bend Gules charged with three buckles of the first. Overall a shield of Douglas [vizt. Argent a human heart Gules crowned Or on a chief Azure three mullets of the first]; the whole within a bordure of France and England quarterly. Crest: A salamander Vert in flames of fire proper. Supporters: Dexter, a savage proper holding a baton erected, and wreath about the middle with laurel vert; Sinister, a stag proper armed and engulied Or, both standing on a pile of wood wreathed and impaled for a compartment. Motto: 'Jamais arrière': See Nisbet's Heraldry, quoted in J. Balfour Paul, The Scots Peerage, III, 217-8. The arms he used on his seal, and which are engraved on a map of the army's encampment at Hounslow Heath, were Quarterly, 1, a lion rampant; 2, a lion rampant; 3, two pyles from in chief; 4, a fess checky debruised by a bend charged with three buckles. All within a bordure quarterly, 1 & 4, semé-de-lis, 2 & 3, semé of lions passant guardant. The shield ensignied by an Earl's coronet and contained within a mantau: See seal attached to a letter from the Earl of Dumbarton to his brother, the Duke of Hamilton, London, 14 June 1689 (SRO, GD 406/1/6185).
At the same time as this affair was taking place other cuirassiers threatened to attack those of our infantry who had not been thrown into the fight for the wood, with whom were M. de Foucault, Lieutenant General, and Mr. Douglas and M. de Pierrefitte, Brigadiers, they having remained with their brigades which were in the front line. However, the enemy found that our men showed so firm a Countenance that they did not dare to attack them, except M. de caprara who came up with the rest of the cuirassiers and the Cravettes after having made a detour round the woods to take our left wing in flank, finding there the Queen's Dragoons and some of the second line of our left wing so well posted. It was M. de Lambert who commanded this line as Brigadier and m. le chevalier d'Hocquincourt who commanded the dragoons.

The first two battalions of Monmouth's were with Mr. Douglas and that is why they have lost nothing, their firm stand did them not a little service, for they were out in the open where the cuirassiers might well have got at them yesterday.

_N___ Gordon to Airlie._

[SRO, GD 16/34/319]

After 1675

My Lord,
I received your Lo: kynd letter, & I should have been very glaid to have seen your Lo: as I expected: Tho I have had a very tolsome march hither I enter'd to follow the Earle of Dumbartoun to Galloway if I can persuade the heritors to goe allongs after the expurying of the twenty days prefixed by there Coroncill, which is now neer an end I shall be laid to bear how affairs goes where you are, as I shall bee: I returne your Lo: a great many thanks for the kyndness you have already shown to the bearer.

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42 Louis de Dufort, 2nd Earl of Feversham, Viscount Sondes of Lees Court, Baron Duras of Holdenby and of Thowley, Marquis de Blanquefort (1641-1700). He first met James, Duke of York, in 1650. He arrived in England in 1665 where he was naturalised and created Baron Duras. He acted as a royal advisor and succeeded, by special remittance, his father-in-law, the elder Sir James, in the title of Earl of Feversham in 1677. He was commander-in-chief of the Army under James VII & II, whom he followed into exile in France after 1688: Burke, _Dormant ... Peersages, 'Duras'_.


44 James Ogilvie, 2nd Earl of Airlie (c.1615-c.1704). He had been a staunch Royalist in the Civil Wars, by which he had lost lands and money. He obtained many grants from Charles II as compensation. He succeeded his father in 1666 and declared for the Prince of Orange in 1688: _DNB_.

[SRO, GD 406/1/5978] 11/21 June 1676
... at our arrivall at Blois, to have found the town so empty of Inglish (which made me resolve to setle there for 3 moneths) but now they begin to come thick ... my Lord Dumbarton was of oppinion (when I see him at Paris) that me Lord Arran should have mo footmen when he put in ... he intended by my Lord arran should have the use of on of his chariots and that it would be unhandsome to see the cachmen and footman of different liveries.

[SRO, GD 406/1/6002] 12 July 1676
[Very pleased with the choice of Mr Forbes as his guardian].

Dumbarton to Arran, Paris.
[SRO, GD 406/1/6004] 25 July 1676
[Hopes to see Arran in Paris in coming winter].

Louvois to Commissaire de la Reynie.
[CARAN, 0120, fol. 261] 2 September 1676
Sir,
I send you the packet which is to be presented to the King by the Scottish garrison which comes to France ... aside from the money you are to give me, about which you have written before. His Majesty desires that you examine the packet and if it to your satisfaction you will be obliged to change your orders accordingly on this subject.


45 Forbes was a Scottish gentleman who acted as a professional tutor, or governor, for young gentlemen travellers. He had earlier been governor to the young English Lord Derby, who kept such bad company abroad that Forbes was obliged to survive two assassination attempts. He was replaced by a governor more skilled in swordsmanship: See Lady W. Burghclere, The Life of James First Duke of Ormonde, vol. 2 (London, 1912), 234-246. A full description of Forbes' guardianship and Arran's education can be found in R.K. Marshall, The Days of Duchess Anne: Life in the Household of the Duchess of Hamilton, 1656-1716 (London, 1973).
... my Lord Dumbarton parted for London yesterday, and gave me a great disappointment whereas his lo: had given me an assurance at his first coming here that he would leave moneys at Paris, for my Lord Arrans use and receive it again in Scotland.


[AG, A1512, No. 133] 46

12 November 1676

Sir,

I have satisfied the Duke of Lauderdale touching my brother’s regiment. He is content for it to pass as a single battalion, but, Sir, this is not all [[for] he has given permission for only 50 soldiers at the will of the Scots, and he is sure this is all that can be done in that nation for the interests and service of France]. I say I am obliged to represent this to you, I have made {my officers depart for Scotland} and I hope {they follow me all the same, despite what Lord Lauderdale has promised, which I expected} if it pleases you, Sir, according to me {for the companies which are to be augmented, I am infinitely obliged to you, as are the gentlemen whole enterprise works well here}. I am with the strongest respect,

Sir,

Your very humble and very
obedient servant,

(Signature hidden).

Forbes to Hamilton.

[SRO, GD 406/1/5986]

2 December 1676

[Appologises for accepting money from Dumbarton, before discovering this was against Hamilton’s wishes].

Dumbarton to Louvois, Charleville.

[AG, A1505, No. 70]

15 December 1676

Sir,

*We have been stationed at Charleville since 2 December with the first*

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46 Lord James Douglas (1637-1681), Dumbarton’s younger brother.
batallion of the regiment de Douglas. I say that I am obliged for the service rendered to it by the King without which it would not have arrived here as it has. For this we are obliged to you, Sir ... of our complaint ... since the month of November last we have not received that to which we have always been accustomed, and I myself have received only three days worth of my company's pay in the last month, without which our officers and soldiers are miserable following this long campaign. Our officers attempt to aid their men in their small necessities, but we have no other choice but to make an appeal to you for money. We will not touch anything without your order to the Intendant de Madry, but do appeal for supplementary monies for the two days of our march and the said month [of November]. We have great hope in the honour of your protection and are persuaded that no one can have a more passionate respect for you then me,

your very humble and
very obedient servant,
Douglas.

Lauderdale to Dumbarton, Whitehall.
[SP Scotland, Warrant Book 4, fol. 74]
18 September 1676

The last letters from Brussels particularly informed that you are to receive money and come hither to make recruits, I am commanded by the king to tell you in his name that your coming on such an account will be very unseasonable and of no use to you, for as mediator, when so many ambassadors are come to Nimèguen and the rest expected, he neither can nor will permit or connive at any recruits for either party now in war, nor can he thionk your old regiment needs recruits, as he is informed, that out of it or the recruits to it, a new regiment is drawn without his consent or application.

The Duke of Hamilton to Sir James Turner, Hamilton.
[printed in Sir James Turner, Memoirs of His Own Life and Times, (Edinburgh, 1829), 255-256]
19 March 1676/7

Att this junctur, it will be an ill time to recommend that relation off yours to be Captane, for upon the takeing of 500 men off the recruits off my brothers regiment att sea, the King of France has broke ten companies off the regiment. He added that 'Nixt winter will be more fitt, for then is the time he makes up any vacancies, and then you shall have all the assistance I can give yow.
[SRO, GD 406/1/5997] 3 March 1676/7

... the king the day befor he parted made 13 lieutenant generals and left out my Lord Dumbarton tho all the mareschals de camp, that were made at the same time w't him were of that number, they stopt at him, which was lookt upon by all persons, as the greatest affront could be don to anie man, he could not but be sensible of it, theupon he went to the king, w't a high resentment of the mark of his displeasure he had put upon him, by such a distinction, which could discouyrage and make him unable of serving him as he had done formerly, the K. told him that he was very well satisfied w't his person conduct and service, but that the thing was now don and that he could not alter it, this did not satisfie my Lord, but thought fit to writ his mynd more friely to the king, wherein he said out by 22 years service, w't tuentie thousand men he had brought over into France during that time, w't the losse of a great many relations and friends in the service, and as the K. was just readie to goe he went and put it in his own hand. He supposing it was his comission, he was going to give up in discontent refused at first to take it from him, but my Lord telling him that it was but a letter which he beged his mate to read, the K. took it gave him no answer to tell him, that he would recompence him to the full, and should lykwise make him lieutenant general before the campagne began, however upon the taking of his 500 men coming from Scotland they have reformed ten companies of his regiment, and my Lord James his regiment is to be again reunited to my Lord Dum:[barton's] and he to hand the comand of that regiment under his brother and his collonels paye to be continued to him.

Dumbarton to Lauderdale.
[BL, Eg. 3331, fol. 7] 11 March 1676/7

I have that same obligation to yo'f Lo: and aknowledgment for the bounty the king is pleased to have for me. I also give yo'f Lo: my most humble thanks for the half pay you have procured for the Reformed officers of my regiment; I dow not dout but shortly ther will be a n'end to the peace or the war now that the king of France hes bessiged Gent, w'ch I belive is taking ... and it is not thothit we will stop ther Mon't de Ruvigne[y]'s journay to the king of France
Letters and Papers of George Douglas, 1st Earl of Dumbarton, KT

and his returne to England with the reporte hier of the Stats of Holland not Ratifying of the traity the king maid with them dis mak Generall belive ther will be a peace;\textsuperscript{47} I most beg yoF LoP to do me the justice to believe that non breathing is mor faithfuller and with mor respect,

My Lord,

yoF LoP most humble and obedient servant,

Dumbarton.


[SRO, GD 406/1/5998]

14 April 1677

... my Lord Dumbarton goes this day for the army in Lorraine, wher he is to be comanded this campagne by the mareschall de crequi, he had his commission as lieutenant generall sent him but last night I do not fear these have done any thing els for him, and that has put him but to a new charge, of 20 thousand livres werefor a greater equipage, he sayes he is much in debt, and I can easely belive it for he spends all he gets, and today upon the score every year, I cannot see any hopes he has of a fine setlement of any place, nor any pension upon a good Lands and if he have now w\textsuperscript{t} fraute he will be nightely put to it. Lord James is now at the ville de Cambray, he is much reformed of late, I sent everybody gives him a good character, yet I do not perseave they do any thing for him at court, upon the reducting his regiment in the E: Dumbartons they promisd to continue his collonels pay, yet I see by his letters from the camp he compleans that mon\textsuperscript{sr} de Louvois puts him still of[F] w\textsuperscript{t} delays he hes spent all his money in making of his equipage, in hopes of that pay to be continued, which if he does not receive, it will be no small mortification to him, he is gotten mighty debes since the seige of combray all his letters to his brother speak of nothin but if being wearied w\textsuperscript{t} the vanities of this world, so that by his style of writting on[e] would think him minded to turn capucin, we had newes last night of a great victory

absearved by Monsieur over the Prince of orange, he was coming to ye relif of St Omer.

[SRO, GD 406/1/6014]
5 May 1677

[The writer has] heard of the death of young Kirkpatrick, who was killed at the last batle in Flanders we are informed that his death has made a great heiresse in Scotland, which I believe will be worth the looking after ... I am affrayd there will be some misunderstanding between my Lord dumbarston and his brother, mons de Louvois promised Lord James to continue his collonells paye and having put him off all this time w't hopes, they tell him now that he must have the profit of the ten companies which is taking of then thousand livres of my Lord Dumb: to give him which is nether just nor reasonable, I shall give your gr: more information of it by my next.

Mr. Brisbane to ?.
1/11 December 1677

My Lord George Douglas's regiment is appointed to meet altogether at Chalons-[sur-Marne] in Champagne, and his Lordship tells me he is informed - though he have not ye orders for it - that their quarters are to be assigned then in Provence, others say at Chalons-sur-Saône, which is in Burgundly near Lyons. Either of these quarters are certainly for that regiment with [the] intention to send it into Italy where the war is to break out against the Dukedom of Milan ... Now, my Lord, I humbly offer my opinion that by all means possible the march of this regiment into Italy, or even to Provence, should be hindered. For it is the King's own regiment ... which the King

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48 Philip, Duke of Orléans, younger brother of Louis XIV of France. The Prince of Orange was defeated, on 11 April 1677, at the battle of Mont-Cassel, by the French army under Luxembourg and d'Humières, under the overall command of Monseur, who charged with a bravery and presence of mind unexpected in an effeminate Prince. Never was there a better example that courage is far from being incompatible with effeminacy. This Prince, who frequently dressed like a woman, and indeed had the disposition of one, now acted as a captain and a soldier. His brother, the king, seemed to be jealous of his glory. He said but little to him about the victory ... Some of the servants of Monseur, more discerning than th erst, predicted then that he would not again be placed in command of an army: J.F.M.A de Voltaire, *The Age of Louis XIV*, M.P. Pollock (trans.) (London, 1961),121.

49 Probably closely related to Thomas Kirkpatrick, Secretary to the French king and chancellor to 'Lord Duplos, in Dimma', who petitioned for a birthbrief in his favour, claiming he was the son of Thomas Kirkpatrick, sometime one of the twenty four gentleman of the French king's Scots bodyguard: RPCS, s. 2, 1665-9, 9 June1670, 173.
may recall to his service by the capitulation between crowns. And it is too probable the sending of it into Italy is designed on purpose to render the recalling of it difficult, almost impossible; for it is observable that they have of late employed all his Majesty's subjects in their service in those places most remote from England, for which I know they pretend it was done to prevent the desertion of the soldiers, in which there is, in effect, some appearance of reason ... I know the Douglas regiment hath been formerly for a long continuance quartered in Picardy and Artois, and in Champagne for some time, without much loss by deserting, and it is not to be doubted but if the regiment goes into Italy it will be lost to us irrevocably and perish.

Ambassador Courtin to Louvois, London.

[AG, A1566, No. 25] 14 January 1677

I have received, Sir, the letter which you did me the honour of writing me on the 5th of this month. I can only say for MiLord Douglas that there is much sadness to be had on this subject, and I am afraid to assure you he cannot lose a moment's time {for Mr Dongan's recruits} have arrived here {above three weeks but he is in want of his orders, which depend on the hand of the King of Great Britain and of Mr the Duke of York} but these will be regarded {in the affairs of MiLord Douglas, the King of England does not return from Newmarket until} the end of October {MiLord Lauderdale does not return to London twelve more days after which I} will be employed {eight days in renegotiating his giving of his hand to which I have great repugnance} in this way {the orders which he [Douglas] has passed to his brother [Lord James] to read to his officers, and which MiLord Douglas has had pass from Calais to Edinburgh, have will not arrive in Scotland until} the end of November, from which time the snow will fall and it will be very difficult to travel {in the Highlands} nevertheless {three vessels charged with bringing men have departed Edinburgh, and another embarkation will follow on 25th of this month} so that, Sir, I respond to you in part {that MiLord Douglas has done all that he humanly could, on his part, and} in particular consideration of the fact that {Mr and Mrs Lauderdale have above all people} more {control of affairs of state} I hope you will have an ear {for all men in this bad time} permit me {to rise this year, but as for the said MiLord Lauderdale I am greatly irritated with his vindictiveness and the fact that he rules Scotland like a sovereign}.

Courtin to Louvois, London.
21 January 1677
We do here, Sir {all that MiLord Douglas and I can for this year's recruits, which go very badly despite the greatest diligence} but you can judge by what is done {in Paris with regard to the rights of ... MiLord Douglas to the ... Duke of York does all that we could desire of him and he has again imposed upon MiLord Lauderdale regarding ... the men for the vessels without which they could not have parted, and he has forwarded particular letters to the same purpose to the King, his master, who is a man of his party [a prison party] and with whom we can do} much {harm [de mal]}. 

The Earl of Danby to the Prince of Orange, London.50
[PRO, SP Dom., King William's Chest 1, no. 9]
8/18 January 1677/8
[The Duke of Monmouth's regiment of horse may be immediately sent over hither under the pretence of some disorders in Scotland, Lord Dumbarton goes also tomorrow to bring away his regiment & orders will go in two or three days more for recalling the rest of his Majesty's subjects in French service].

Danby to Orange, London.
[PRO, SP Dom., King William's Chest 1, no. 11]
29 January 1677/8
The French ambassador51 now begins to think there is no further hopes of peace with England, and the French king has answered that as to the return of our troops the capitulation shall be kept, which are not to return till 30 days after the war declared betwixt France and England, and in the meantime he has ordered the regiment of Douglas to march into Dauphiné.

Courtin to Louvois, London.
[AG, A1543, No. 1]
1 February 1677
Sir,
I send to you, Sir, Mr Dongan's52 letter which I received Earlier today, by

51 Courtin was replaced by Paul Barillon d'Amoncourt, Marquis de Barillon, in 1677.
52 Probably synonymous with Lord Walter Dongan, formerly a Roman Catholic officer of Charles II's Life Guards.
which you will be informed of that which has been done [for the Irish recruits and those from Scotland who are arriving with their lieutenant colonel MiLord [James] Douglas] who will be here in seven days, on Friday [we also have MiLord Hamilton's promise ... that they will be able to stay in Scotland a day or two before they make their journey ... for which we are greatful ... MiLord Douglas and] since [on the sorrow of parting] he will suffer {... [for that little which] his brother's regiment will be rendered by him ...} ... the Duke of York will not longer be suffered by the parliament.

Courtin to Louvois, London.

[AG, A1543, No. 23]

4 February 1677

Sir,

I received, Sir, the letter which you did me the honour of writing me of the 23rd of last month in which you told me of MiLord Douglas' reasons for departing in a day or two, and why he has had such difficulty in levying any considerable number of men in Scotland. If you want to extract one or two thousand [men] from there (of which I must say, if you will pardon my negligence, that this is due entirely to the bad times) ... MiLord Douglas is currently receiving two courses of advice, one from Ireland which suggests he might carry 120 from there, the second ... in the passed month which must be embarked at St. Vallery; the other news from Scotland is that you should know of an order from Mr Lauderdale which arrived on Thursday 28th of the same month to prevent the departure of men from Scotland, but which arrived too late to prevent the lieutenant colonel from embarking his men.

Dumbarton to Lauderdale, St. Germains-en-Laye.

[BL, Add. MS. 23138, fol. 35]

24 February 1677

... according to my promise to yo' Grace, at my coming hier my brothers53 regiment was brak, and upon the now is of the taking of the tow sheps with my recreuts ther is order for the breking of io: or ii: of the companies of my regiment so that this year all things goes Crosse with me: I beg the faveur of your Grace to belive that I am with all respect ,

My Lord

yo' Gracees most humble

53Lord James Douglas, see above.
Letters and Papers of George Douglas, 1st Earl of Dumbarton, KT

and most obedient

servant

Douglas,

dumbarton

Lord James Douglas to Louvois, Dino.

[AG, A1543, No. 164]

25 February 1677

Sir,

We have received, and thank you for, the order you have given us regarding our wages; We find that our battalion is to be attached to the regiment of the Count of Douglas [sic], which is an old body. Our capitulation is for 5 sous with bread, or seven sous excluding bread, our payment is thus ordered on this foot for the month of December. We have done all that we can, and all that is possible, to deliver the said battalion in a fit state, of which M. de Fraudlien can tell you, but we have exhausted ourselves in doing so. We are to have delivered to us 24 rations of forrage at five sous, just like the Charleville battalion receives, which is in no way reasonable; we expect that same conditions as are received by the Cadets. We have hopes for the justice of your bounty; I am most assuredly,

Sir,

Your very humble and

very

obedient servant,

(Signature

hidden).

Williamson to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 43, fol. 194]

11 March 1677/8

[Gives thanks for the letter of 6 March received from him that morning. Says he is sorry for the hard usage of himself, and his regiment, in France, which is far from what the king had expected given th honourable and generous friendship he had shown to the French king. Says we must be patient and grow wise, however dear we pay for it].

Arran to ?. 
Thursday ye. 4 of May, 7 at night,
Since the Last tyme I troubled you I have receiv'd a letter from Co'il Douglas telling that he will receive men. His ship is lieng in Leith Road I told him I had twelve men for I thought orbiston had had eight, he desir'd I may caus imbark 6 men in John Burnsydes ship & six in Robert Dumbars they are both leing together, I had a letter yesterday from orbeston telling me he would deliver what men he had to Cap. Douglas who had promised to caus convoy them to the Shoar I wish you would enquir what men he has gether with the 4 you have & the 2 my Lo: Semple promised mee Collo: Douglas tells me the people are verie rude to the officers that embark them on so desires me to gett some descreeet men to tack care of them that are sent but I think you may talk with cap. Douglas and send the men with thos orbiston had delivered to him I'll swar I ame so ashamed to ... this freedom with yow were it not that I know you'll forgive me I should neaver have used you with this freedom I had letters by the Last post that ask me the ?Rick was then resolved to, am off one the 5 which if the next post confirmes I will imediately goe to g'dr but as yet I have tacken noe other resolution soe I ame your faithfull friend

& servant
Aran

Arran to Hamilton.
[SRO, GD 406/1/6089]
July 1678

[Dumbarton has advised him to remain in Paris to further his claims for the Duchy of Châtelherault].

Forbes to Hamilton.
[SRO, GD 406/1/6054]
9 July 1678

[He and Arran are to stay in Paris and may receive board, and the use of his coach, from Dumbarton].

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54 'Original letters &c. to Sir James Turner, 1672-1703'.
55 Cockburn of Ormiston
56 Arran's claims to this French duchy are briefly examined in Marshall, *The Days of Duchess Anne*, 170.
Forbes to the Anna, duchess of Hamilton, Paris.

[SRO, GD 406/1/6055]

13 July 1678

[Dumbarton has the idea to advance Arran's claims to Châtelherault by marring him to a French heiress\textsuperscript{57} who has 200,000 l.] ... [the match] which my Lord Dumbarton has proposed here for my Lord arran I am of oppinion that it is not to be slighted for several reasons, but particularly for the interest that family can make in obteaning satisfaction for the right of Châtelherault.

The Duke of Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 106]

20 November 1678

[An order to remove captain Douglas of Spott's company, of his regiment, from Puckeridge, to St. Ives, Hunts., according to a march annexed to the letter, where he is to remain until further orders are received].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 113]

26 November 1678

[Order for the four companies of his regiment at Huntingdon to move to Godmanchester due to their straits in their present quarters].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 119]

26 November 1678

[The same as 26 November (above), with order to remove captain Melville's\textsuperscript{58} company from Newport to Thaxted, co. Essex, where they are to continue until they receive further orders].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 124]

5 December 1678

\textsuperscript{57} Mademoiselle de Roussi, daughter of the Comte de Roy: SRO, GD 406/1/6057.

\textsuperscript{58} Patrick Melville. He still held a commission in the regiment in 1680: See 'Officers of the Earl of Dumbarton's late regiment', c.1680, BL, Add. MS. 28938, fol. 34. He was captain of one of the three companies which were added to general Dalryell's Scots Foot Guards in 1667: See Dalton, The Scots Army, 15 and 17, nos. 8-10.
[An order for captain Regan's company to march for their present quarters at Sudbury, to Boxford, and to remain there until the receipt of further orders].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.
[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 125]
5 December 1678
[An order to remove captain Buchanan's company from Newport to the neighbouring towns of Wendon and Widdrington to quarter them there].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.
[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 126]
5 December 1678
[An order to remove the three companies of his regiment currently quartered at Weldon to Great and Little Chesterford and Littlebury to be quartered there].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.
[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 52, fol. 145]
14 December 1678
[An order to remove those companies of the regiment at Boxford to the neighbouring town of Groton].

Paul, Marquis de Barrillon, to Louvois, Londres. 59
[AG, A1 604, fols. 145-6v]
16 January 1678/9
The King of Great Britain told me that the King [of France] was pleasantly sensitive to him [lui soiet un plaisir sensible] in the present circumstances regarding the service of the regiment of MiLord Douglas: the [regiment's] capitulation, and conditions under which the regiment must not leave France, were to the contentment of His Majesty: MiLord Douglas has written to me expressing desiring the proposition, and has desired that we convey his letter [I foresee difficulties for his Lordship obtaining permission to remain in the same service, as it would mean displeasing the English .. all of which you

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59 Paul Barillon d'Amoncourt, Marquis de Barillon, was present at the English court from 1677 until 1688. He was part of the large contingent of French and Irish Roman Catholics at the court who were generally detested: See J.R. Jones, The Revolution of 1688 in England (London, 1972), 21 and J.C. Rule, France Caught between two Balances: The Dilemma of 1688, in L.G. Schwoerer (ed.), The Revolution of 1688-1689: Changing Perspectives (Cambridge, 1992), 42.
can judge. I have received the letter which you did me the honour of writing me of the 2nd January: I am, Sir, with all possible respect,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

Barrillon.

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 48, fol. 75]

17 January 1678/9

[An order for the colonel’s, major’s, grenadier’s, captain Murrey’s and the late captain Regan’s companies to march on Monday 27, towards Newcastle on Tyne. The officer commanding the companies is ordered to send ahead of him an officer to arrange quarters for the soldiers].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 48, fol. 90]

30 January 1678/9

[The two companies of Dumbarton’s regiment at Huntingdon are to march to Ramsey and Bery, Huntingdonshire, to be quartered there until they receive further orders. A memorandum says that the next day an order was signed to add Whittlesea in the Isle (of Ely) to these quarters].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 48, fol. 92]

20 February 1678/9

[An order to send captains, or agents, of regiments to attend on the commissaries of the musters with their rolls of November and January that are yet unclosed and procure the same forthwith and delivered to the paymaster].

Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 48, fol. 89]

29 February 1678/9

[Circular letter ordering regiments not to allow their soldiers to leave their quarters to ensure the fairness of the upcoming election].

60 Probably James Murray who held a commission in the regiment in 1680: See ‘Officers of the Earl of Dumbarton’s late regiment’, c.1680, BL, Add. MS. 28938, fol. 34. It may, however, be Alexander Murray who was a lieutenant in the regiment, 5 March 1673: See SP Scotland, Warrant Book 2, 170.
Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 48, fols. 109-110]

2 March 1678/9

[The companies of captains Monroe, White and the late captain Maxwell are to march to Harwich according to the a march annexed to the letter and to embark there in order to be transported to Ireland.61 on the way they are to have their quarters in inns, taverns, alehouses and victualling houses. These three companies, and four more, are to march to Harwich, while fourteen others march to Ipswich].

James, Duke of York, to the Prince of Orange, Windsor.

[Printed in G. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau, 2me série, vol. v, 1650-1688, (Utrecht, 1881), 413]

3 August 1680

I do not doute but you will be as much troubled as I am for the death of poore myLord [Thomas Butler, Earl of] Ossory;62 he is as much lamented heere as any man can be; and I am sure you and I have had a particular losse of him, but there is no remedy, we must all submit to the good will of God. I beleive now you will be thinking of one to command in his place, and I cannot chuse but recommend myLord Dunbarton to you, who, besides the merritt he has towards me, in leaving so good an establishment in France and comming so frankly to serve me, I am sure he is the most capable man of my subjects to execute that charge, and certainly you will find him an easy man to live with, which I assure you is a great vertu in this age, especially amongst our Country-men; these are the reasons that make me recommand him so earnestly to you. This being the only business of this letter, I will add no more, but to assure you of my enter kindnesse.

61 Captain Andrew Monroe, who was later appointed Lt. Col. 9 March 1689 (d.1693); Major Andrew White was appointed Lt. governor of Edinburgh Castle, 26 February 1685; probably Henry Maxwell, recorded as ensign of an independant company added to the regiment of Foot Guards, 20 November 1685: See Dalton, The Scots Army, 151, n7, 162 and 148, n10.

62 Thomas Butler, Earl of Ossory (1634-1680) was the son and heir of the Irish Duke of Ormond. He was rumoured to be Catherine of Braganza's lover, in 1668, which one observer thought 'insulting not only to the virtue of the Queen, but also to her good taste, for this nobleman is not as suitable for the lover of a great Princess as for an innocent friend, while, apart from being ugly, he is also married: See W.E. Knowles Middleton, Lorenzo Magalotti at the Court of Charles II; His Relazione d'Inghilterra of 1668 (Waterloo, Canada, 1980), 71. He was greatly indebted in the period immediately before his death. He had borrowed heavily for the government financier Sir Stephen Fox, to whom he owed £11,400, in 1679. Their relationship was long standing; Fox paid Ossory £6,000 for an annuity worth £1,600 p.a. payable for five and three quarter years: See C. Clay, Public Wealth and Private Finance: The Career of Sir Stephen Fox, (Oxford, 1978), 177 and 185, BL, Add. MSS. 51326, fols. 35-36 and J. Ferguson (ed.), Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands, 1572-1782, i, (Edinburgh, 1899), 476.
York to Orange, Windsor.

[Printed in G. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau, 2me série, vol. v, 1650-1688, (Utrecht, 1881), 413-414]

3 August 1680

I receved two days since yours of the 6, by the which I see you are going to Dieren for some tyme, and by it I see the concern you had for my daughter Isabella, who is now, God be thanked, quite well againe. I am sure you have been very much concerned for the losse of poor Lord Ossory; it has realy been a very great losse to our whole family, especially at this time, when we are like to have so much need of friends. You will by this post receive a letter from his Ma., recommending the Lord Dumbarton to you, for to have the command of his Ma. subjects that are with you, as Lord Ossory had. I thinke you cannot have a man better qualifiyd for it then he, having served long and quited so good a post as he had, in obedience to his Ma. commands, for which certainly he deserves all the kindnesse can be shewed him, so that I hope you will be favorable to his pretensions and, when you know him, you wil find he will deserve it from you. I would say more, but have not tyme and be assured I shall always be so kind to you as you can desire.

Christopher, Duke of Albemarle, to Orange, Albemarle House.

[Printed in G. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau, 2me série, vol. v, 1650-1688, (Utrecht, 1881), 419-420]

13 September 1680

May it please your Highnes. Upon the death of the Earle of Ossory, whose losse is justly lamented by all men living, I did immediately apply myselfe to the King my master for his leave and recommendation to accompany my humble desires to your Highnesses to succeide that worthy person in the command which he soe deservedly held during his life under your Highnes, in the service of the States-generall; where if I am still very ambitious, but, finding his Maj. then preingaged and had recommended another, the Earle of Dumbarton, I desisted from troubling your Highnes concerning that affayre, till this present, which I now take the boldness to doe, upon information that that noble Lord is not like to succeed in his pretensions. I have therefore renewed my most humbles suplication to his Maj. for his leave to addresse myselfe to your Highnes, which he hath granted, with his gracious promise of his letters of recommendation, as soone as his Maj. receives a positive answer concerning his former recommendation about the Earle of Dumbarton. Having obtained this permission, I would not stay one minute
longer from presenting my duty and service to your Highnes, with this assurance, that, next to my owne King and master, I am most desirous, before all other Princes in the world, to serve your Highnes and the States-Gerall, as I think my selfe obliged, as a true English man, to the common intrest and religion of both our nations, which I hope will be now soe firmly united togetheer, that it shall never more be in the power of our ennemys to separate. I shall not presume to add any more at present, only further to assure your Highnes, if you are pleased to thinck me worthy of being honored with this employment, I shall with all gratitude immaginable receive the same, and be ever obedient to all your commands and devoted to your service, with all fidelitie and reall affection, as become, may it please your Hignes,

your Highnes most humble, most faithful
and most obedient servant,

Albemarle

The Earl of Sunderland to Orange, Whitehall.63

[Printed in G. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau, 2me série, vol. v, 1650-1688, (Utrecht, 1881), 425-426]

8 October 1680

Mr Sidney,64 I am sure, will write all the publicke news of this place to your Highnesse, and therefore it is needless for me to doe it; but I must take the liberty to let you know that, when my Lord Dunbarton first engaged the King and the Duke to presse your Highnesse that he might have the command of the Kings subjects in the service of the States, I desired them both that, if that could not be, upon the account of his being a papist, that they would not concern themselves for any but Mr Sidney. They both promised they would

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63 Robert Spencer, 2nd Earl of Sunderland (1640-1702), Secretary of State for England (north) 1679-1680 and 1683-1687. He was distantly related to the Saviles, Coventrys and to Lord Shaftesbury. He marries Anne, daughter of George Digby, 2nd Earl of Bristol. He acted as Ambassador to Paris, in 1672, and was Plenipotentiary of the General Peace at Cologne, in 1673. He was appointed a Privy Councillor, 27 May 1673, and was appointed gentleman of the Bedchamber, in October 1674. He acted as Ambassador Extraordinary to the negotiations which led to the peace of Nijmegen, in 1672: DNB.

64 Henry Sidney (1641-1704) was Master of the Horse to the Duchess of York, with whom he was reputed to have had an affair: See Pepys, Diary, 16 November 1665. He was the brother of the politician Algernon Sidney. Both were sons of the Earl of Leicester, they inherited £2,000 on Leicester House, and £3,000 on Sidney lands in Kent and Sussex. Henry negotiated an Anglo-Dutch league in June 1660: See J. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis (Cambridge, 1991), 91 and 107.
not, since which the D. of Albemarle\textsuperscript{65} has been extremelie earnest with the King to recommend him, or at least to be passive in the case. The King told him he thought a man of his quality and fortune, and who had so many employments, could not possibly attend such a command abroade, but he still desires to have it, and I doubt not but he will soliciete it with greate care; but, since it is certaine he can not spare time enough for such a post in another Countrey, I hope your Highnesse will favour Mr Sydey, who, I am sure, has so much zeale for your service that I think there will make him fitter than any other man for such an employment, and, if your Highnesse will please to excuse the admitting the D. of Albemarle and recommend Mr Sidney, I beleive every body will be satisfied be the reason of the King. I beg you will be pleased to pardon this liberty I take, and that you will be assured that I am, with all respect,

your Highnesse most faithfull, most humble

Sunderland


[SRO, GD 406/1/3115]

19 October 1680.

[Excuses himself for trying to persuade his nephew, Lord William Hamilton, to 'quitte that heresie of Calvin' and asking the Duchess to increase her sons allowance].\textsuperscript{66}

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\textsuperscript{65} Christopher Monck, 2nd Duke of Albemarle, K.G. (d.1688). Son of George Monck, 1st Duke of Albemarle, Earl of Torrington, Baron Monck of Potheridge, Beauchamp and Teyes (1608-1670). The 2nd Duke was elected a knight of the Order of the Garter, and a Privy Councillor, in 1671. He married Lady Elizabeth Cavendish, daughter of Henry, Duke of Newcastle. Albemarle served as Governor-General of Jamaica, in 1687: See Burke, Dormant ... Peerages.

\textsuperscript{66} See also James Fall to Hamilton (Paris, 16 July 1682) - 'As for his [Lord William's] souls condition I have had Mons' Claude twice with him much to both their satisfactions. The Romish priests here are become of late very insolent since they see the severity is used against the protestants of late by the court, whereupon one came to L: Williams chamber when I was not there and proposed to him to change his Religion but finding that he was better grounded then to be so easily shaken, he went his way, I complain'd of this to Mr Savile immediatelest we should be troubled with more visits of that nature, who coming to visit under that pretext come also to seduce, Mr Savile took it very ill that many should have come to disturb him so unseasonably, was glad it fallen out upon such a persone whose familly was so well known in the world ... His uncle L: James and his Cousins L: Drumlanrig and his brother being here will not be wanting to this confort. L: James can not come out of his chamber as yet since he has had the flux de Bouche, he thinks he finds himself better by it but I fear as he recovers strentch so wil his desease its malignancy. My Lord Drumlanrig and his brother present their most humble service to your Grace, as also they make offer of their humble Deuty and Respects to Her Grace'. Henry Savile was British Envoy to Paris: See Savile Correspondence. Letters to and from Henry Savile, Esq., Envoy at Paris and Vice-Chamberlain to Charles II and James II ... , W.D.Cooper (ed.) (Camden Society: London, 1858).
York to Orange, Edinburgh.

[Printed in G. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison D'Orange-Nassau, 2me série, vol. v, 1650-1688, (Utrecht, 1881), 498-499]

14 May 1681

By yours of the 11 from Himmelings I see you were to go some back to the Hage, where I believe this will find you and chuse it rather by this bear[r] L.-Col. Bohan, who goes straight by sea rather than by the post, believing it will be sooner with you, the wind being now very faire for him, as it is generally at this tyme of yeare, and if it continu as it is, the passage is usually made in three or fewer days, and now I must needs recommend to you one cap[tain] Douglas,⁶⁷ that is now in Holland and out of employment; he is a very good officer and has served long in Lord Dumbartons regiment, and, had I not had a very good caracher of him, both from his colonel [Dumbarton] and others, I should not recommend him to you, and I hope you have found that thise I have formerly recommended to you have been good men, and you will find this cap. Douglas a good officer; therefore I hope, when there is an opportunity, you will oblige me so musg as to lett him have a company in one of the Scots or some Dutch regiment. For news there is none here; all things continues very quiet, so that I have no more to say now but that I shall ever be as kind to you as you can desire.

Hamilton to the Comte de Miranda.

[SRO, GD 406/1/8932]

27 August 1681

I have received Your Excellency's obliging letter in which you communicate your intentions of returning to Portugal; and at the same time I observe the proofs of your bounty towards my brother, the Earl of Dumbarton, for which I am extremely obliged and I await the occasion on which your kindness may be repaid. I wish Your Excellency a very good voyage, and hope that you are received at your Court in conformity with the merit which your services to us deserves. For I have found the whole world extremely satisfied with you, and I can assure you that I will always remember the

⁶⁷ Archibald Douglas, of the colonel's company 'Officers of the Earl of Dumbarton's late regiment', c.1680 (BL, Add. MS. 28938, fol. 34). In June 1679 he fought a duel, while his regiment was stationed in Ireland. His opponent was possibly Alexander Campbell, formerly ensign to captain Douglas of Spott's company of the same regiment, in August 1671 (RPCS, s. 3, 1669-1672, 379). They became engaged in a duel while hunting when 'on some words which passed between them, Captain Campbell alighted, drew his sword, and then Captain Douglas did the like; but before they could be parted they fought, and Captain Campbell was killed': The Earl of Orrery to the Earl of Ormonde, Castlemartyr, 20 June 1679, printed in HMC, Ormonde MSS., new series, vol. 5 (London, 1908), 139.
honour you have done me with the proofs of your friendship, which I hold
dear to my heart, and which make me on all occassions

Sir

Your Excellency's

Very humble and very

Obedient Servant.

Arran to Sir James Turner.

[Printed in Sir James Turner, Memoirs of His Own Life and Times (Edinburgh, 1829), 296-299].

6 May 1682.

I have just now had yours and immediately begine my letter; that yow servant
may be with you in all hast, I confesse I ame mor and more amazed at
[Cockburne, laird off] Orbistouns [sic: Ormeston] Carriage I think cap:
Douglas is extreamlie in the Right nor did I myself ever understand that
he should be put to further trouble then when they were brought to him to help
them forward with a swaird which Orbistoun writt to mee he had ingaged to
doe since he was to send in some men however to Coll: Douglas\textsuperscript{68} for his
eusse so I thought it would be all one trouble to carie in a few more which
maid me think of troubling cap: Douglas\textsuperscript{69} I ame afrayed if the wind comes
butt little more southward the shipes will be sayled before the men gett thither
however it is but venturing the jurnie, I doe heer send you a letter to the
Masters of the tuo shipes according to your desir to receave what men
Duncan Grant deliveres for my eusse but I wish they nay by put abroad Coll:
Douglas the ... know particularlie which is his, and so soon as I heer that ye
men are dispatched I shall writt to Coll: Douglas I wish I knew the possitive
number for if they be but 7 I think it were best to send them aboard Douglas
ships but becaus I told him in my last I had a dozen of men he desired I
might send 6 aboard Lift. Collo: Buchan\textsuperscript{70} & the other 6 aboard his ship but
if there be but one mor then the halfe I think it best not to seperat them I hope
you have not givn my aquittance to baxters wife ... so foolish stories for her
husband and I meik noe dout to gett him mead weare of his life heer but
since the Toun of Ruglen [Rutherglen] ingaged to furnish that man I don't
see whey they shold not make good ther word I doe assure yow I had
thought yow had had so bad a memorie I had neaver put yow to this trouble
but I thought in commradship one might be assistant to one other upon such
occassions as this but not at the raite yow have eussed me, for it had putt

\textsuperscript{68} Lord James Douglas, see above.

\textsuperscript{69} William Douglas of Widdrington, see above.

\textsuperscript{70} James Buchan, see above.
yw to too much trouble, and more coast then as fitt to mak a compliment ...
which is all at present from your faithfull old friend

and servant

Aran

Feversham to 'Marquis of Douglas', Tangier.
[SRO, GD 406/1/3177]  
26 January 1682/3
[The correspondent has written to Douglas with all of the latest news from Tangier].

Memorandum
[SP Channel Islands 1, no. 130]  
before 10 March 1683
Memorandum that H.M. has been pleased by Lord Dumbarton that Sir John Lanier, Governor of Jersey, should have leave to come to England on his concerns. Your Honour is desired to move his Majesty in Council in order thereto. [Leave was granted on 10 March 1682/3].

Newsletter to Madam Katherine Radcliffe, Dilston.
[Admiralty Greenwich Hospital 2, no. 71]  
28 July 1683
Lord Douglas is going to Paris from the King and Captain Nicolls from the Duke of Duke [of York] to condole the death of the Queen [of France] ... The Court are going into mourning Sunday sennight, the King in purple and the Court in black lined with crape.

Pass for Dumbarton.
[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 335, fol. 40]  
10 August 1683
[Pass to George, Earl of Dumbarton, sent to the Most Christian King of France to condole with him on the death of his queen].

Pass for Dumbarton.
[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 66, fol. 252]  
13 August 1683
[The same as for 10 August, plus Dumbarton is said to be taking seven
gentlemen and ten servants, and undertakes that none of them are obnoxious persons].

Richard, Viscount Preston, to Secretary Jenkins, Paris.71


1 September 1683

My Lord Dumbarton arrived here late the last night; notice is given if his arrival to Monsieur Bonnevil this day, who is at Fontainbleau. My Lord will write himself the next post.

Preston to Jenkins, Paris.

[Printed in HMC, Report and Appendix, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 289b]

15 September 1683

My Lord Dumbarton and Col. Nicholas had their audiences from this king, Monseigneur le Dauphin, Madame la Dauphine, Monsieur and Madame, and were very well received by them all upon Friday last.

Preston to Jenkins, Paris.

[Printed in HMC, Report and Appendix, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 290a]

29 September 1683

My Lord of Dumbarton and Coll. Nicholas had their audiences of Congé [discharge] at Fontainbleau upon Saturday last. My Lord hath been extremely well received, and this King parted with him with particular marks of esteem and favour. He told him that the king our master could have sent no one who could have been welcomer to him, and that he would thank his Majesty particularly for sending of him; he intends to leave this place within 5 or 6 days.

Jenkins to Brisbane.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 64, fol. 104]

25 September 1683

[The Earl of Dumbarton is in France and desires a yacht to receive him at Calais on 29 September, as he is designing to be there on that day. This is to be communicated to the Lords of the Admiralty].

Preston to the Marquis of Halifax, Paris.72
[Printed in HMC, *Report and Appendix*, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 341b]
5 October 1683
I did receive the honour of your Lordship's of Aug. 5th, s.v., from Mr. Goslin, and I had sooner returned an answer to it if I had not attended the opportunity of my Lord of Dumbarton's departure for the conveyance of it.

Sunderland to Preston, Whitehall.
8 October 1683
The French letters of the 9th and the 13th came not till late yesterday to hand, tho' my Lord Dumbarton hath been arrived here these five or six days, having passed from Calais to Greenwich in 12 hours: he brought us the news of the king of Portugal's death, and yesterday the Portugal letters of the 3/13 Sept, confirmed it.

Preston to Dumbarton, Paris.
30 October 1683
Preparations are here making now for a war, for it appears plainly that the Spaniard are resolved to have it at any rate, their conduct in Flanders is extraordinary, and their proceedings upon the French territories brisk.

Dumbarton to Preston, Paris.
28 November 1683
[Long, angry letter in which Dumbarton denies having spoken ill of Preston, when he was in London].

Preston to Dumbarton, Paris.
[Printed in HMC, *Report and Appendix*, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 294a]
1 December 1683
[Complains of ill offices done him by the Earl].

Preston to Dumbarton, Paris.

[Printed in HMC, Report and Appendix, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 294b]  
21 December 1683

[An amicable letter].

A spy to Preston

[Printed in HMC, Report and Appendix, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 394b]

2 February 1683/4

It is reported much that my Lord Dumbarton is coming hither with a regiment, and that several more are following into this service, and that we shall have a war with the Spaniard and league with the French.

Preston to Dumbarton, Paris.

[Printed in HMC, Report and Appendix, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 296b]

5 February 1683/4

My Lord Arran had his first audience on Monday last, and I believe he will soon have that of Congé, because the voyage holds to Compiegne upon the 20th of this month.

Charles II to the Duke of Queensberry and John Drummond of Lundin, Treasurer Deput, Windsor Castle.

[SP Scotland, Warrant Book 8, fol. 483]

21 June 1684

Warrant for Payment of 1,500 l. sterling out of the 1st and readiest of the moneys arising from fines imposed on account of ecclesiastical irregularities to George, Earl of Dumbarton, in consideration of his services and especially of his great charge since he left the service of the Most Christian King, from whom he had very great encouragement to have continued there.

Lord William Hamilton to Arran, Whitehall.

[SRO, GD 406/1/3296]

25 August 1684.

E: Dumbarton sent for me the other day and with a great [deal] of regrate told me that every body at Court tooke occasion to discomod yo[r] stay there and that by it you loose yo[r] interest here and diminish yo[r] respect and y[r] yo[r] best
friends were of advise that you should presently come over and take another occasion w⁴ fresh recomendations to return to which purpose he told me he wrote last post himself and comanded me to signifie [the] same by this.

Lord William Hamilton to Arran, Whitehall.
[SRO, GD 406/1/3294]
1 September 1684
[Dumbarton determined to return home from French service: Dumbarton is at home in Scotland: Writer hoped that Arran will return home soon as he is in great want of money and his business will not soon be concluded in France: Dumbarton has said that if he had been home] ... yow would certainly been secreten⁵ of States q⁶ch is not the first thing you have missed by absence.

A spy to Preston
9 September 1684
[There is talk at court] ... that my Lord Dumbarton and my Lord Dartmouth,⁷³ and several other persons suspected of popery and the French interest be forbidden Court and dismissed from the King and confidence or else sent into the Emperor's service.

Moray to Queensberry, London.
[Printed in HMC, Buccleuch and Queensberry Papers, vol. 2 (London, 1903), 199]
25 November 1684
It is not yet certaine how the Duke comes to Scotland. Earl Dumbarton is to come with him, and I hear he has resolved to lodge his necessary servants in the Abay [?at Holyroodhouse].

Dumbarton to King James VII & II, Ayr.
[Printed in HMC, Stapford-Sackville MSS., vol. 1 (London, 1904), 1]
29 May 1685

the gentleman wrytes from the cost of Galloway that they see som tymes 4, and other tymes 5 sheps croisng betwixt the ile of Man and Kintyre. It is

⁷³ George Legge, 1st Baron Dartmouth of Dartmouth (1647/8-1691). He was a member of the household of James, Duke of York, under whose patronage he became governor of Portsmouth and Master General of the Army. He was admiral of the fleet which dismantled the colony and garrison of Tangiers, in 1683. Under James VII & II he was Master of the Horse and Governor of the Tower of London. Though he swore an oath of loyalty to William III he was imprisoned in the Tower as a suspected Jacobite: Burke, Dormant ... Peerages.
fitting that your Majesie had four sheps upon this coste. this noor west wend
hes bein the greatest advantage Argylle\textsuperscript{74} could have had, for non of your
Majestie's shepes could com upon this coste n'other from St. George's
channell nor the north illes.

Dumbarton to King James VII & II.
[Printed in HMC, Stopford-Sackville MSS., vol. 1 (London, 1904), 1]

May 1685
Ther is non of your Majesties shepes yet on the coste nor no newis of any of
them, if they war heir all Argyll's sheps most be lost, and as it is he may go
on all the coste whe whe plases and give me allarmes of his landing at severall
places.

Dumbarton to King James VII & II.
[Printed in HMC, Stopford-Sackville MSS., vol. 1 (London, 1904), 1]

May 1685
Just as I am wrytting this ther is word broght me tht Argyll was standing in
at largs with 3 shepes, 24 great boates, and a great barke for to land, so I am
going ther with 3 troupes of horse which is on the cost and 3 of dragons.

Pass to Dumbarton.
[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 70, fol. 162]

9 May 1685
[Pass to ride to Berwick with five servants].

Dumbarton to the Earl of Linlithgow, Kintyre.\textsuperscript{75}
[NLS, MS. 1004, fol. 4]\textsuperscript{76}

31 May 1685
My Lord
I intreat yor Lop to send forward this Black box with all possible speed and
recommend it, have the three Loudien [Lothian] Regts ready to march in case

\textsuperscript{74} Archibald Campell, 9th Earl of Argyll (1629-1685): See J. Willcock, A Scots Earl of
Covenenting Times (London, 1907).

\textsuperscript{75} George Livingstone, 4th Earl of Linlithgow (c.1652-1695), Lieutenant of the King's
Lifeguards, 1661. He was commander-in-chief of the forces in Scotland, 1677-1679, where he
commanded the Scottish anti-Covenanter forces at the battle of Bothwell Bridge, in June 1679.
The Duke of York appointed him captain of the Lifeguards, in 1684. He declared for the Prince of
Orange in 1688: DNB and biographical sketch in Dalton, The Scots Army, 43-51

\textsuperscript{76} Printed in C. Dalton, The Scots Army, 1661-1688, (London, 1909), 68.
Letters and Papers of George Douglas, 1st Earl of Dumbarton, KT

I send for them, I am just now going to Irwine and from thence to Largs where I hear ye E: of Argyll was offering to Land therefore send yt way to me if you have any news, I hear there was one of ye Kings yachts went ys to Dunbarton, send and see w† newes there is of her and Let me hear from you, and if she knowes anything of any of the men of war, [if the] Perth or Forfar Regts come yo† way or your Lop. hear any news of them, order them in my name to march towards ye Coast of Largs where they will hear where I am, Let me know all ye news you have I am in haste going to march I am

My Lord

Yo† Lops most
humble servant
Dumbarton

The Earl of Melfort to Arran.
[SRO, GD 406/1/3316]

6 June 1685

I humbly desire to know Hou Dumbarton is Doing I hav h† no letter from him and seing the E of Murray77 had one I think to resolve to correspond as can get no account of him from any other hand.

Dumbarton to Arran.
[SRO, GD 406/1/7677]

12 June 1685

[Warns his nephew, Arran, as Lord Lieutenant of Cliddesdale and Dumbarton, that the rebels are preparing to march towards Dumbarton].

James Graham of Claverhouse to Queensberry.
[HMC, Report 15, Appendix VIII, 293]

16 June 1685

I am very sorry that anything I have done should have given your Grace reason to be dissatisfied with me and to make complaints against me to the Earl of Dumbarton. I am convinced your Grace is ill-informed, for after you

77 Alexander Stewart, 5th Earl of Moray (1634-1700). He was a commissioner of the Scottish treasury (1678), an extraordinary Lord of Session (1680), Secretary of State for Scotland (from November 1680 to 1688) and a commissioner to the Scottish parliament (1686). He converted to Roman Catholicism in order to win favour with King James VII & II and was one of the founder-knights of the 'restored' order of the Thistle (1687); See, e.g., Sir J. Balfour Paul, Scots Peerage, vol. 6, 322 and M. Lynch, Scotland: A New History (London, 1991), 297.
have read what I wrote to you two days ago on the subject, I dare say I may refer myself to your own censure. However, I am glad I have received my Lord Dumbarton's orders anent your Grace's tenants which I shall most punctually obey, though I may say they were as safe as any in Scotland before.

William Aikman to Preston, Edinburgh.

[Printed in HMC, Report and Appendix, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 379b]

11 July 1685

Coll. Ailiffe is civilly used upon my Lord Dumbarton's acquaintance, and is thought may be saved upon his Lordship's intercession ... all this day we have had firing of guns and ringing of bells, upon report of the rebels being beat in England, and gray and Holmes taken, the news whereof came first from my Lord Dumbarton's camp, near Dumfries, whence they were marching towards England.

The Earl of Moray to Queensberry, Whitehall.

[Printed in HMC, B'cucleuch and Queensberry Papers, vol. ii, (London, 1903), 89]

25 July 1685

Earle dumbarton came last night late, and caam to Court betuixt ten and alevin. I uas just caem auay befor. This morninge Early I uent to see him, and had your Grace's letter, which I shaal caerfully observe, and ansuer the particulars as sone as I can. The King spok to E: Dunb. last night only of henneral matters. This day he dyed uithe E: Middle[ton]78 and he and I recomended to him the same thins which I houp he will observe. His Majesty appointed sum this night at his eushe to spek uithe him, but your Grace can haw no account of it till next posts, and he desyrs me this night to make his excuss to you for not urtyinge till then. I am in paine till this matter be over and uill forbear to say any thignes of other matters.

Commission to Dumbarton.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 164, fol. 248]

31 July 1685

[Commission to be lieutenant-general of the forces in Scotland].

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Pardon to Dumbarton.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 336, fols. 280-284]

23 November 1685

[Pardon for holding office despite the Test Act].

Letters patent for Dumbarton.

[PRO, SP Dom., James II, no. 146]

25 November 1685

[Letters patent releasing George, Earl of Dumbarton, and others (who are not named) from any penalties for not taking the Test].

Commission to Dumbarton.

[PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 164, fols. 293-296]

28 November 1685

[Commission to be lieutenant-general of the forces in Scotland, colonel of the Royal regiment of Foot and captain of a company therein].

Dumbarton to Queensberry, London.

[NLS, Salt. 17498, fol. 57]

16 January 1685/6

My dear Lord,

I received this morning the honor of your Grace's of the 9, and thanks yow for wishing me joye of Saltoun, which his Majestie hes bein graciously pleased to give me as I did dissaire the warrant he seigned this morning the which I dow thank yor Grace for your faveurs in it, and I must beg the continuance of it, for yow shall dow it to non that shall be mor thankfull, and mor really your servant without compliment. I have sent the warrent to my brother Duke Hamilton79 to present to your Grace my Lord Chancellor, and other offices, which thy tell me it most passe, of which I am most ignorant. I have wrytyn to Hew Wallace of Englestones the cashe keper, to go to my brother to pay everything which is to be payed. Your son the Earle of Drumlannige, and his Lady, I have told to mak what use the plaize of the howse which being so neir Edinburgh, may be convenient for them. Your Grace may be shows what passes heir that is of any moment I shall give yow

79 William Douglas, titular 3rd Duke of Hamilton. He was Dumbarton's elder brother. His household accounts and lifestyle are discussed in Marshal, The Days of Duchess Anne, passim.
a particulare account of. Sir Andrew Forrester\textsuperscript{80} gave me this day Major Whyt's\textsuperscript{81} memorall to your Grace about the Castell of Edinbrugh, the which I shod the king who ordered me to give the Secretary in waitings who is the Earle of Muray, to whom I shall give it as shown as I shall see him I hop your Grace will be doun, and contineu your helping hand and favours to him that is most sincerly my dear Lord, your Grace's most humble, and obedient servant, and brother,

Dumbarton

My most humble service to my sister tell her now I am a Scots Laird I may hop to see herr.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 104]

16 January 1685/6

Yours of the 2 I have recev'd but wold not anseur till I could a given yow a n'account of what the King would dow, when the newis should com of the forfeiting Saltoun, which upon the arryvall his Majtie hes been graciously pleased to give me as I dissaired, as yow will see by the warrent I dow send you heir inclosed, in wch if yow find any mistake casse drawe a n[other and send it to me, but if not casse passe it all the secealles and tak possession and dow every thing wch is necesairy, wch I am showr yow know much better then I that is most ignorent in it, as for the charges of what it will cost I have wrytin to Hew Wallace to go to yow and pay according as yow shall derect, and draw upon me wch shall be payed on sight, or if yow think anything will be in the tenants hands wher off it can be gottin, I wold rather that it war gottin ther but dow in that as you shall think fitt, for I leve it holly to your ordering and displosel on wch I will expect your advayce what is to be doun in every thing wch is relating to it, of wch I am most ignorent. I have wryttin to my Lord Chancelor and my L[d] tresorer that I had send it to you and beged

\textsuperscript{80} A cadet of the house of the Lords Forresteres, he was appointed secretary to the Order of the Thistle. He was attached to the house of Bruce, through his patron Sir William Bruce of Balcaskie and Kinross, Master of Works. He helped a young Scots of the Bruce family escape rough treatment followin his involvement in Monmouth's rebellion in 1685. He was later imprisoned himself as a royalist and Jacobite, by William of Orange. From the Tower of London he continued his correspondence with Sir William Bruce: See his nomination as secretary to the Order of the Thistle (SRO GD 100/317A); Sir Andrew Forrester to Sir William Bruce, Westminster, 14 July 1685 (SRO, GD 29/1907/fol. 4); Sir Andrew Forrester to Sir William Bruce, Westminster, 28 August 1694 (SRO, GD 29/1907/fol. 14).

\textsuperscript{81} See Monmouth to Dumbarton, Whitehall, 2 March 1678/9 (PRO, SP Dom., Entry Book 48, fol. 109-110).
ther assistance, in it my Ld Advocate hes alwayes bein very civill to me in it and all other things therfor I intreate you to speak to him also of it and thank him from me; now that I am becon a Scots laird andmak yow may chief chamberland I may expect to come to grace at least not to want breade, if I should live long, but the nixt post I shall wryt mor at lenth to yow, my most humble service to my lady duchesse and my lady Margitte, a dieu.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 104-105]

26 January 1685/6

By my last of the 16 I did send yow my signettur for Saltous forffetur to casse passe the scalleis, wch I hop yow have receved and passed the scalleis and doun every thing wch is necessairy for the taking posseing of the Estate. my Lady Saltoun hes writin to me a very cavelle letter, but being most ignorent of all thos things I must leve that to you, to latt me know. I will first be in posseison of everything and what I dow afterwards that may holly be out of my owin good will, and upon no obligation, and see how she deals with me, for I am informed that she and her secund sone, since Salton hes bein forfeitted, hes doun all they can to presse and squies the tenants to a great deal of prejudice to the estate, wch I most beg of yow the favoure as to inqueir after, and to casse hindred, if they dow well with me in it, I have some thoughts of gaiting if I can, leve of the King to putt in the secund brother a n'officer in the regiment if he caries him self as he aught to the King and be no way fanaticuely inclened of wch I beg your opinion, Lat me know whom I showld apoint for Chamberland, ther is several that offers them self but I will take yo advayce, or I dow any thing in it of wch I beg yo advayce at lenth, as for news I wryt non to you for I dow not dout but yo son the Earle of Arane [Arran] dis it, but I have some raisons to belive the parlement will sitt therfor latt me know yo opinione of it and as to the commisionaire, and how yow dow all agrie ... I had a long discourse with the M. of Athole concerning his son my Lord Muray he seims inclined to agrie with him but if his story be right me Lord Muray is to blame, he pairs to morrow for Scotland.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 105]

21 October 1686
I have receiv'd two of your's which I have not answevred, the on of the 8, the other of the 11 by the last post which I have lattin the King know what yow wryt and your dissent air of coming up, the King ashowered me that he was satisfied and that yow nid not come up, so ther is a n'end of all that, but what I had wryt to you upon the subject had being sayd to me, so I thocht it fit for me to acquaint yow of it, I have also had a long discourses with the E. of Melfort who shed me your letter to him of the 11 also, but I did not (as you wryt me) spek of what yow wryt me to ask the King: he seims to be very much your friend, and says it is very fitt yow by communicat in everything, and that tyme coming it will be so and that ther be a good correspondance betwixt my Ld Chancellor and yow and that he had wryt to him about it, as also he blamed his brother in what he sayd about me, and my Ld Chancellors has wryt to me a kynd and cavel letter of it so that we ar good frinds. Yow may be showr I returned a n'answre conforme so that all mistakes I hope ar now taking away, and your may be showr I am of your opinion not to think nor tak any mor notis of it, and it is most juste to live allways well with them the King trust in his affaires, and specially when they ar our frinds as I dow beleive both my Ld Chancelor and the E. of Melfort is both to yow and me, dear brother I hop yow did not tak it ill what I wryt to you, since I did it out of good intention, and for your good. I am glaid my lady dutchesse is recovered to whom I intraite you to present my most humble service.

[Post-script] Your son the E. of Aran will be heir within a fortnight at fordest. I am told here your apoinited chamberland had sold my beere of Saltoun at 8 pounds scots and half a march the boll.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 105-106]

25 November 1686

82 James Drummond, 4th Earl of Perth (1648-1716). He was appointed Lord Justice General of Scotland and an Extraordinary Lord of Session, 16 November 1682. He was Governor of the Bass, 16 July 1684 and Lord Chancellor of Scotland, 23 June 1684. He was a Roman Catholic founder-knight of the 'revived' order of the Thistle (1687). He followed James VII & II into exile in France where he was appointed guardian to the future James VIII: Sir J. Balfour Paul, Scots Peerage, vol. 7, 51-52.

83 John Drummond of Lundie [London], 1st Earl of Melfort (c.1649-1714). Second son of James Drummond, 3rd Earl of Perth, he was Deputy-Governor of Edinburgh Castle (1680), Treasurer-General for Scotland (1682) and one of the principal Secretaries of State for Scotland (form September 1684).
If I have not ansuere yo[r] tuo last I hop you will excusse me, for I could not dow it showner, that yow dissaired me to sho the King I did, who was very weill satisfied with it and told me he left all things to thos he had appointed for the menaging of the tresory so that he could so [sic] no mor in it on wch yow may tak yo[r] messeurs you being wan of them, I am glaid to heir by the E. of Melfort that my Ld Chancelor wryts to him that he finds yow wery easy in every thing, wch I beg of yow, dear brother, to be so for what yow say or dow, altho I am show[r] yow mein it weill yett other people may tak advantage of it, when yow say anything wch dis louk as if yow war uneasey or dissatisfied. When the E. of Aran coms over I shall sho him yo[r] letter, I belive he will be heir within this fortnight, at fordest, latt me heir from yow, and yow may be shour I shall be mo[r] punctuall a wryting to yow heirefter, and that at least every other post yow shall heir from me, I belive the E. of Melforts going to Scotland is now over ... by the last post I send my Ld Chancellor the Kings letter for my being upon the Counceill I intraite yow, dear brother, to latt me heir from yow and what passes.

[post-script] The Queene was extraimly satisfied that yo[r] daughter my lady Katherine had named her daughter after her.84

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 106]

30 November 1686

Since yours at yo[r] coming to Edinbrugh I have not hard from yow, but I am affrayd it is becasse I was so long of answerit it, by my last I gave yow a n'account how I had shoed yo[r]s to the King and his anseur, since wch the King told me that the E. of Melfort had shoed him yo[r] letter yow wryt concerning the payment of the forcesse as also the E. of Melfort told me of it, himself, and what he had wryttn, both to my Ld Chancellor and yow of it, the King is not of yo[r] opinone in it, but of the way the E. of Melfort hes wryttn to yow. I intreate yow, dear brother to latt me heir from yow, I am told yow have agrid a mariaghe for yo[r] daughter, my Lady Marget with the E. of Panmeur. Yo[r] son the E. of Aran is not yett com, but I belive he will be

84 Lady Katherine, and other ladies of the Douglas-Hamilton household, are examined in Marshall, The Days of Duchess Anne, passim.
shortly heire, I belive the King is resolued to mak Windrome\textsuperscript{85} deputty gowernor of the castel of Edinbrugh, and Carny,\textsuperscript{86} who was in my regt and is major of foote heire lieu\textsuperscript{1} Coll. of the dragons, wch I intraithe yow not to spek of it till yow heire it from others, I have receved a very kynd letter from my Lord Strathallan, since he cam to Edinbrugh to whom I wryt by this post, latt me know what way my pention is payed and if I shoulde dissair it may be payed with the paye of the army ...

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[\textit{HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 106-107}]

2 December 1686

Yours of the 23 of the last month I receved last night ... I can not but be surpraysed at what yow wryt to me concerning the E. of Lithgow as also in the way yow dow it, but who ever wryt or sayd to yow that I wold not so much as concern myself or promote any thing that concerned yo\textsuperscript{r} son my Lord John, is a most false and bayse ley, for when the E. of Lithgow was coming to toun my Ld John dissairde me to spek to the King and the E. of melfort w\textsuperscript{f} I did to both, and told him of it as he can informe yow, the wch yow can know of him and I dissair yow wold ask it, as for the E. of Lithgow, he com to see me. and told me that what ever houts [\textit{sic}] of law might be betwixt yo\textsuperscript{r} son and his he thocht that nid not tak away any frinship of relations, but latt the Law dissaid, and trewly I told him I was of his opinione, then he dissaid me that I wold spek to the King that he might be captain and have the paye of the castle of Blaknesse, the wch I did and the King told me he wold not dow it, but dow som other thing for him, now in all this wheer ther is any thing that yow can tak ill I can not immagon; I most dissaire yow not to be so uneasey when yow have no reason, and I should be very sorry it shoulde no go doun with yow, but latt not me have raison to say what severall others dow that yow ar so imperieuse and hey that ther is

\textsuperscript{85} George Winraham received this warrant, 31 December 1686. Winraham was the younger son of Lord Liberton, who was killed at the battle of Dunbar. He had served, among other appointments, as major of Lord George Douglas regiment in France in the Early 1670s: See C. Dalton, \textit{The Scots Army, 1660-1688} (London, 1909), 163 and 77 n2.

\textsuperscript{86} Sir Charles Cairney served in Douglas' regiment in France before it was disbanded in 1678. He was wounded in French service but went on to become Lt. Col. of the Earl of Bath's regiment, 1 August 1687. He was knighted about 1686, and was appointed colonel of Bath's regiment, 8 December 1688. He was removed from this post by William of Orange, whereupon he joined King James VII & II in Ireland, where he held the rank of major general. He was outlawed for high treason, 2 July 1695: See C. Dalton, \textit{The Scots Army, 1661-1688} (Edinburgh, 1909), 145, n12, 147, 167, J. Clarke, \textit{Memoires of James II}, vol. 2 (London, 1816), 397 and Warrant Book, Scotland, 1 August 1687.
no liveing with yow ... I should be very sorry to dow a n'ill thing to any liveing far lesse to yow and yours, but in deed, my power is littel, other to dow good or harme, I wold beg of yow not to mistake me, for I am shour I dow not deserve it from yow, as for my intreste it never maid me dow any thing mor nor lesse.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 107]

30 December 1686

As for the E. of Lithgow bissines I most beg of yow, dear brother, to think no mor of its for as to me yow have not the least ground or reason to tak anything ill, and this is a tym we ar to pardon all our enimis, so I hop ther is a n'end as to that and yow shall heir ne mor of it from me ... Latt me know ... when anything will be payed of my pention, it is trew the officers of the army taks it ill to be payed as yow proposed and saysd yow ar the casse of it, and the E. of Melfort told me som days ago he did not think it could be doun that way; yo\textsuperscript{r} son the E. of Aran is not yett com but is expected shortly it is thocht he will gaitt somthing doun in his bissines of Chatelraux [Châtelherault], I believe it will be the pention ...

[post-script] My Lord Drumlanrigre complains extraimly against you and says yow persew his father mor violently then all the others does out of malice to his father and familly whose rewin yow wold have, at any raite, wch he never expected of yow, being so near relaited to yow.\textsuperscript{87}

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 107-108]

15 February 1686/7

Yours of the 15 I only receive but last night, as concerning my bissinis with the Lady Salton it is now the King and my Lord advocate has orders to persew it in the King's nam, therefor I intraity yow to spek to him of it and latt me know what is to be doun in it, I dow not dout but yow have receved myin wherein I send you seigned the precept yow send me of the half year of my pention, for yow to receve it on this cam to yo\textsuperscript{r} hands I dow not dout but my L\textsuperscript{d} Chancellor hes acquainted yow with the Kings commands in wch I

\textsuperscript{87} Lord Drumlanrig was the eldest son of William, 1st Duke of Queenberry. The Duke was brother-in-law to both Dumbarton and Hamilton. Queensberry was chancellor of Scotland until Hamilton, Perth and Melfort combined to overthrow him in 1685. Drumlanrig enjoyed a friendship with his uncle, Dumbarton: See James Fall to the Duke of Hamilton (Paris, 16 July 1682) and Dumbarton to Queensberry, London, 16 January 1685/6, NLS, Salt. 17498, fol. 57.
hop and most beg of yow not to sho any backwardnisses and give yo[e] enimis any reason to misrepresent yow to the King, whom I know hes a good ipinione of yow, the E. of Melfort told me he had wrytin to yow of it and dissaird me to wryt to yow also, and told yo[e] son the E. of Aran to dow it also, but upon som debate they fell hotte, and yo[e] son I think was to hotte in it w[ch] occaissened heatts w[ch] I am dowing what I can to aggrie, for the King spok to me of it, the E. of Melfort told me that should never mak any difference betweixt yow two, as for the particulars I dow not doute the E. of Aran will acquaint yow with, w[ch] in my opinon I dow think yow should not tak any further nottis, altho I dow think yo[e] son was to hotte w[ch] occasioned some other heatts, yet he did it out of his kyndnisse to you, and I must dow him that justice that I dow think him a very good and deutyfull son to yow and really yow should use him the better for it, I am wery glaid yo[e] daughter my lady Mar[gar]hitte is maryed.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 108]

22 February 1686/7

I have nothing mor to ad to my last to yow but expts with impatience to heir from yow concerning what the King send doun and I wryt to yow in my last, the Earle of Dunmoreis88 going doun for Scotland within few days, it is sayd it is about what his father the M. of Atholl hes settled upon him; yow shall have twyees a wekke all the nowis send to yow.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 108-109]

22 March 1686/7

I thocht fott to acquaint yow that upon the reporte that my lady dutchesse was ill, and yow and she sending for yo[e] son the E. of Aran, the King and every on heir did inqueir of him and me if that upon her death he wold not com to be Duke of Hamilton, w[ch] is thocht will be, and that my lady dutchesse did not resseigne her tylte to the laite King but only that she and the frinds did

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88 Lord Charles Murray, 1st Earl of Dunmore (1661-1710; cr. 16 August 1686). He was the second son of John, 1st Marquis of Athol, by Amelia Anne Sophia, daughter of James, Earl of Danby. He was the commanding officer of the Royal Scots Dragoons, under the overall command of General Dalzell. He was also Master of the Horse to the Duke of York (1683). Following 1688 he was twice charged with treason under William III's regime, but was eventually pardoned: Sir J. Balfour Paul, Scots Peerage, vol. 3, 392-396.
ingage that during yor life non els should tak it wch is sayd she nor they could not dow in prejudice of the E, of Aran. I did not speke to him of it he told me (as I dow really belive) that he wold be very deutilfully to yow, and I most say that he hes allways acted so, and as a very good son, but he does not think that his mother maid any resseignation of her tytill, therefor yow will dow weil to tak all the measeurs yow think convenient in it, for yow may be showe yor enemis will tak all the advantage can be in it. Yow nid not tak any notis of this till yow see the E. of Aran or then that I wryt this to yow but I thocht it was fitt to latt yow know it befor he cam down that yow might be prepared in it and tak thos messeurs yow think most fittest, if ther be any thing yow wold have me to say of it to the King latt me know it wch shall be most punctually and faithfully doun ... I send down Lieut. Grawme, who is lieu and agent of my regiment to adjust all accompts with yor son, my Ld George since he will paire on Monday nixt.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 109]

31 March 1686/7

Yor son the E. of Aram [Arran] hes not bein weill, so wil not paire from this before Sunday or Monday nixt. I have had since a discourse with him about the tytill, and told him that he hes always cairied himself so weill and so doutfuly to yow showl continew so to dow it, in caisse his mother cam to dey. He told me he wold, and that he wold dow nothing but by yor advayce, but that lawers was to be consulted in it for he thocht it a thing hes familly was concerned in it, and that it was not in his mother's power to dispuns on any thing to his prejudice, and that he must succid to it by his mother. This I thocht fitt to latt yow know that accordingly yow may tak yor preudince and wisdome to agrie with him init that ther may be no disputt nor publicke heiring of any differances betwixt yow, but how ther can be no two Dukes of Hamilton I dow not weill understand it ... As for the Lady Salton yow know she cutted doune som of the wood, and yet yow tak no notis of it now nor of what I wryt to yow how I had offered her son a lieu place, I most beg yow wold be pleased to latt me know yor opinione of what I wryt to yow.

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

89 Possibly George Graeme, who was promoted to the rank of captain, 1 November 1686: See Dalton, The Scots Army, 151 and 153, n20.
15 April 1687

[Writing about the affairs of Saltoun he assures his brother that he does not wish to entrust the care of it to any one else. He has told the bearer, Lt Fletcher, that the law must put an end to any claims that his mother, Lady Saltoun, has, and that what he may do afterwards is of his own free will. He offered Mr Fletcher a lieutenant's commission, which he refused. He is 'a very pretty gentleman' and the writer would be glad to do him a service. The Earl of Arran should have arrived by the time of writing. He is glad that the Duchess has recovered].

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

28 May 1687

Just now I am com from seeing yo\textsuperscript{s} son, my Ld Charles, pairte with the Duke of Berwicke,\footnote{James Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick (b.1670), natural son of King James VII & II.} they sealle this night from Greenwich in a yacht for Holland, and will be som few days at the Hage, I dow not think yo\textsuperscript{s} son, my Ld Charles, hes had any tymne all most to rest since he pairted with yow for he cam heir on Tuesday laite at night and hes being ever since, day and night, going and coming from Wendsor. The King hes given him 500\textsuperscript{I}. What service hes being in my power to dow for him I have dowin it, as for what yow wryt to me concerning my own bissinis, as I wryt to yow in my formers I live it holly to yow to dow in it as yow think fitt, for I dow not understand it in the least, and if I war upon the place wold leve it holly in yo\textsuperscript{r} direction and what abatments yow think fitt to give the tenants yow may. I am glaid to heir my lady dutchesse is weill, for we had it reported she was fallin ill. I wish the Earle of Aran war heir, for his reg\textsuperscript{r} wold appeir the better, and send him away as shown as yow can, what is in my poswer to do for it I dow when thos he hes left his bissinis with gives me notitis. I am now in heast for I am com to send doun Mr Wm Hamilton with a 100 guines to my Ld Charles to Greenwich, fifty of them upon my owin credit but he hes left me a n'order to receew them againe upon what was owing him in Sr Jhon Laniers reg\textsuperscript{r}, wch I will get payed, and I have gottin him verry good recommendations in the empereurs army.
Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[SOR, GD 406/1/6185]91

14 June 1687

Wher this is any thing that yow or yor familly is concerned ther is non mor redy and willing to serve yow ther for, I must latt yow know, that it was told the king befor me that the Earle of Abercorne92 laid his claime to the Marquiseat of Hamilton, I told I was surpraised why he did it now, and had not doun it formerly, it was anseured, that it had allways been doun from tym to tym, as he sayd and therfor he did it now that his prettaintions might be allways a footte, and the king told me he had spoking to him concerning Chatelreaux [Châtelherault], wch he says is his, and I am told he should have told yo\textsuperscript{s} son the :E: of Aran that it was his, and that if any thing was doun in it, he wold lay his claime, therfor he nid not give himself to much trouble, upon wch severall things was sayd, and of yo\textsuperscript{s} tytill of Duke if my Lady dutchesse cam to dey all wch I can not wryt, but it is fitt (if my L\textsuperscript{d} Aran be not painted) that yow informe him at lenthe of the holl bissinis; also it was thocht strange why that yow wold dissair that yo\textsuperscript{s} son, my L\textsuperscript{d} Charles, to have the tytill of Earle of Selkirke,93 to tak the place of yo\textsuperscript{s} creation, for if it be doun for an Earl, it may be doun for a Duke, so that you might have that same thing do me to yow that yow wold have doun for y\textsuperscript{r} son ... Tomorrow I go to the camp, and the King deyns with me, this camp will coute me a good dell of moneys, therfor I must dra upon yow billes for what monyes yow have of myin in yo\textsuperscript{s} hands. My L\textsuperscript{d} Chancellor wryts to me that the lady Salton intended to begin her shewt at Law, so that I most beg of yow to sp[eal]k with my L\textsuperscript{d} Chancellor in it, and that a n\'end be putt to it, Mr Fletcher hes wrytin to me to give him his brother's books, for that he intended to tak himself to the law, latt me know what they ar that I may accordingly know what I dow give, if I shoulde give them.

[Post-script] I could wishe that when yo\textsuperscript{r} affaires could permitte yow that yow cam up for severall reasons wch I can not wryt to yow.

91 HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 110-111.
92 Claud Hamilton, 4th Earl of Abercorn, 5th Lord Strabane (1659-1690). He was a gentleman of the bedchamber to James VII & II. As a staunch Jacobite he commanded a regiment of Horse at the battle of the Boyne and was killed while attempting to return to France: Sir J. Balfour Paul, Scots Peerage, vol. 1, 51.
93 This title was held by his father, William Douglas, before his marriage to Anne, Duchess of Hamilton in her own right, in 1656.
Diary of Narcissus Luttrell

5 July 1687

His majestie hath given the Duke of Somerset's places to these persons following: the Lord Dunbarton the place of bedchamber, lieutenant col. Cannon his regiment of dragoons, and the Lord Walgrave is made Lord lieutenant of Somersetshire.94

Dumbarton to Hamilton, London.

[HMC, Hamilton MSS. (London, 1932), 111]

9 July 1687

I have just now com from Wensdor and most returne within the hour ... The reason of my so spedy return to Wensdor is that the King hes bein pleased to mak me gentilman of his bed chamber, and I most go back tonight to be sworne. Never place was mor sought from the King, who hes bein pleased to give it me altho I was in the camp when the Duke of Sumerset was turned out, wth I am very sorry for, for he is extraimly my frind and I did what I could to hinder him to dow what maid the King putt him out of all his employments, I have bein also extraimly obliged to the Queen who spok to me, I expect dayly the E. of Aran so did not wryt to him.

James VII & II to Peterborough, Windsor Castle.

[SP 44/70, fol. 277]

9 July 1687

Warrant to cause to be sworn and admitted George, Earl of Dumbarton, to be Gentleman to the Bedchamber in ordinary in the room of Charles, Duke of Somerset.

Sunderland to the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Windsor.

[SP 63/340, fol. 249]

14 August 1687

[H.M. having received an account of the constant loyalty, services and

94 Somerset suffered significant financial problems after his removal from office. Sir Stephen Fox, the wealthy Lord of the Treasury, had to support quite large personal loans to the Duke as a result: See C. Clay, Public Finance and Private Wealth: The Career of Sir Stephen Fox, 1627-1716 (Oxford, 1978). Dumbarton was not appointed purely because he was a Catholic. Most of James' gentlemen of the bedchamber were Anglican Tories; all were men whom he could trust and who obeyed him without question: See J.P. Kenyon, The Stuarts: A Study in Kingship (London, 1963), 160-161. James' relationship to Catholics and Anglicans is analysed in J. Miller, Popery and Politics in England, 1660-1688 (Cambridge, 1973), chps. 10-12.
offerings to the crown of bearer of this letter, Sir John Edgeworth, from the Earl of Dumbarton, and others, the King commands Sunderland to recommend that something may be done for him in the next parliament to be held in Ireland. He is persuaded that this gentleman is very deserving and may be useful to H.M.'s service.

Hamilton to Anna, duchess of Hamilton, London.
[SRO, GD 406/1/7650]
10 October 1687
I have thought of allowing George [Hamilton] to go to Paris this winter to better himself in his exercises if yow agree to it ... My brother Dumbarton has been very earnest w' me to see his wife but I wold not consent to it which he is very angry.

Hamilton to Anna, duchess of Hamilton, London.
[SRO, GD 406/1/7652]
27 October 1687
... my brother Dumbarton is on other thoughts now then [sic: that] George95. should succeed him in his Regiment or be Lt. Collonell. He is very angry att me because I will not vissit his wife.96

James, 2nd Marquis of Douglas to the Tutor of Blackwood.
[Sir W. Fraser, Douglas Book, vol. 4, 281]97
1687

95 Lord George Douglas-Hamilton (1666-1737). He was later to become a field marshal, being raised to the title of Earl of Orkney. He was colonel of the regiment into which Dumbarton's son, George Douglas, 2nd Earl of Dumbarton, was commissioned following his pardon by Queen Anne, in 1710.

96 Dumbarton married Anne, daughter of Robert Wheatley, of Bracknell, co. Berks., and sister to the duchess of Northumberland. She died 25 April 1691: See M.R. Glozier, 'George Douglas, Earl of Dumbarton, KT', *New DNB*, (Oxford: forthcoming). There is evidence to suggest he was married as Early as 1680. In a census of 287 individuals, and thirteen families, made by the constable of Suffolk street ward, in the parish of St. Martin's in the Field, in 1680, twenty nine individuals, and one 'family' (Dumbarton's), were recorded as resident Papists of the ward. This clearly suggests that Dumbarton may have been married as Early as 1680: See J. Miller, *Papery and Politics in England, 1660-1688* (Cambridge, 1973), 164-165. An explanation of the administrative structures of London can be found in G.S. De Krey, 'Revolution *Redivivus*: 1688-1689 and the Radical Tradition in Seventeenth-Century London Politics', in Schwoerer (ed.), *The Revolution of 1688-1689*, esp. 200.

97 James Douglas, 2nd Marquis of Douglas (c.1646-1700) was the son of Archibald Douglas, 12th Earl of Angus (c.1609-1655). Angus was the eldest son of the 1st Marquis of Douglas, and therefore the elder half-brother of the third Duke of Hamilton and the 1st Earl of Dumbarton.
It is great bussiness for him to have a son and air ... for his son's title is Lord Ettrick. I doe believe he hes nothing more in Ettrick than he hes in Dumbarton, but only the title. I am glad he hes got ane air, upon Duke Hamilton's account, for it would have made the Duke too rich to have been my Lord Dumbarton's air.

Diary of Narcissus Luttrell
[Printed in N. Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1857), 464]
28 September 1688
When the Dutch lands, 'tis said the king will sett up his standard on Blackheath; that the army will be commanded under him by 3 lieutenant generalls, Lord Feversham, Lord Dunbarton, and the Count du Croy.

N____ Mackenzie to Dumbarton, Reading.
[BL, Add. MS. 41805, fol. 148]
6 November 1688
This is to acquaint your Lordshipe, of som disorderes yt hapened heir yesternight, being yt fifth of november, about ten of yt Cloake yesterday, yt mobibe [mob] got together before yt Chapell, when they wer at masse and throw in severall stones at yt windows of qth the major was acquainted with who deserved my asistance wherupon I doubled my ordinary gard, qth consisted of fiftie men, and sent 24 fuizilers Comand be ane oficer to gurd yt Chapell, yt Major sent his Constables about the town declaring uppon pain of Corporall-punichment now said yo now yt Chappell, or put on any bunfires yt night, not withstanding of yt Mayoresordes, yt mobibe gather'd towards night, yt mater of 200 together with great Long poles each, and made up great bonfire before yt Chapell, yt oficer and his gard salyed out on yt, and beat severall of them sufficiently, & several prisoners takin.

Dumbarton to the Earl of Middleton, Malbery.
[BL, Add. MS. 41805, fol. 283]
25 November 1688
I intreite you Lo: wold be pleased to acquaint his majtie that I went from Andover straight towards emsbery wher within :3: mylles I mett major
Generall Kirke,\textsuperscript{98} marching on the head of the horse under his commands wher according to the kings I secured him, and send him, with a brigadier, and six Guards and four grenadiers to andever to my Lord fevershem, from thens I cam to the place holding as neir as I could, but ther war so great a rene the wather so bad, that it was night or I could riche this, and foote cam not in a n'our afterwards, w be raison of the badinesse of the wather cam in every weiry then I was told that trelawney, Lt Coll Churchill\textsuperscript{99} with all the capitans except the major and capt. Fox and [Gordon of] Fyve or six L.\textsuperscript{10} and as many Ens war gon, with a bout 200 sojers, Last night befor thy can to the devyses, I could not Learne anything in the Least of the Prince, nor any thing of the enemy I send this night from this to see what now is, I can gait and I strave to putt myself in that condition as not to be surrysed I have heirpeterbury and wardens regts of horse to go further then Hungerfurd. Sr. Tho. Ogilthorpe and I ar heir with a foote men each of us so that as shwone as thy ar all marched from this I will go for London and live them with major Generall Hamilton, I am told by Kirke lieuts Coll: that he hes asshowred that we have Lossed non at my coming to London I shall give his majie a mor perfitted account, I send L.\textsuperscript{1} Douglas the Earle of Mortons brother with this, and of ther ne anything yo\textsuperscript{f} Lo: will command me Let me Know it.

\textbf{Preston to Dumbarton.}

\textit{[Printed in HMC, Report and Appendix, vol. 1 (London, 1879), 350b]}

4 December 1688

I am commanded by his Majesty to enclose a passport to your Lordship which he hath been demanded by the Prince of Orange for a person whom he intends to send into Holland. Your Lordship will be pleased immediately upon the receipt of it to dispatch it to my Lord the King's commissioners, either by a trompette or by any other messanger who will convey it safe and may return to give you an account of the deliveryof it, which your Lordship will take care to signify to me.

\textsuperscript{98} Percy Kirke (c.1646-1691), Lt-General and colonel of 'Kirk's Lambs'. He was the son of George Kirke, Gentleman of the Robe to Charles I, Groom of the Bedchamber to Charles II and Keeper of Whitehall Palace. He started his career as a lieutenant in the Admirals regiment, afterwards serving in the Earl of Oxford's regiment of Horse. He served under the Duke of Monmouth at the siege of Maestricht, in 1673, thence in two campaigns under Turenne in the Rhine theatre. He was appointed Lt-Colonel of the 2nd Tangier regiment, in 1680, and was joint commissioner (with Dartmouth and Samuel Pepys) for the British abondonment of Tangiers, in 1683. Although he was appointed a brigadier-general in 1685 he never apostacised his Protestantism under James VII & II. He joined the Prince of Orange with the rank of major-general, serving at the battle of the Boyne and in Flanders: \textit{DNB}.

King James VII & II's Army in Ireland.


1 May 1689

Left sick at Brest:- Ld. Cheife Justice Herbert; Earle of Dunbarton; Earle of Dover.

Richard, Earl of Tyrconnel, to Dumbarton, Dublin Castle.

[BL, Add. MS. 38145, fol. 22]

20/30 April 1690

Yo'r Lordsp of the 30th Aprill french style I shewed the king, who is very well pleased Yo'r Lordsp should come hither, and serve him in yo'r place as Gentleman of the Bedchamber, but as for yo'r serving in the Army, in regard you are only L's Generall of his Army in England and Scotlant without relation to this kingdome, he beleives those Comissions will give you noe station here, and y't you would not take out a new one w'ch would make y'r youngest L's General of this army, nor doe I find his Maj'ty has any intentioun of takeing yo'r other employments from you. This my Lord is what I take to bee the kings mind upon this whole matter.

R. Yard to Williamson, at Cobham Hall.

[PRO, SP Dom., William & Mary 4, no. 16]

22 March 1691/2

[A letter containing an account of the death of George, Earl of Dumbarton, at St. Germain].

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100 Sir Edward Herbert (c.1648-1698), titular Earl of Portland and Lord Chief Justice of England. He was the younger son of Sir Edward Herbert, Lord Keeper to Charles II, and was brother to Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington. He succeeded Lord Chief Justice Jeffries, 16 October 1685: DNB.

101 John Carey, 2nd Earl of Dover and 5th Baron Hunsdon (d.1677): Burke, Dormant ... Peerages.

102 Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnel (d.1691).

103 His death is quoted in J. Balfour Paul, The Scots Peerage, III, 217. See also SRO, RH 9/18/30.
Diary of Narcissus Luttrell

[Printed in N. Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1857), 403]

31 March 1692

The Duke of Gourdon succeeds Lord Dunbarton in bedchamber to king James.104

Diary of Narcissus Luttrell

[Printed in N. Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1857), 406]

2 April 1692

Paris letters say, the Lord Dunbarton was inter'd in great state at Versailles, where the nobility and gentry of king James's court assisted in deep mourning.

Key to abbreviations in the text:

Airlie = James Ogilvie, 2nd Earl of Airlie (c.1615-c.1704).
Albemarle = Christopher Monck, 2nd Duke of Albemarle, K.G. (d.1688).
Arlington = Henry Bennet, 1st Earl of Arlington, Secretary of State (south) (1662-1674).
Barillon = M. de Barillon, French Ambassador to England.
Brisbane = John Brisbane, English Ambassador to France, c. 1677.
Claverhouse = James Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee.
Colbert = Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), French Controller-General of Finance, from 1665, and French Secretary of State for the Navy, from 1668.
Courtin = M. Courtin, French Ambassador to England.
Danby = Thomas Osborne, 1st Earl of Danby, 1st Marquis of Carmarthen and 1st Duke of Leeds.
Lord Treasurer of England, from 1672, Lord President of the Privy Council, from 1695.
Dongan = Lord Walter Dongan, formerly an officer of the Life Guards.
Feversham = Louis de Durfort, 2nd Earl of Feversham, Viscount Sondes of Lees Court, Baron Duras of Holdenby and of Throwley, Marquis de Blanquefort (1641-1709).
Halifax = George Savile, Marquis of Halifax (1633-1685), Lord Privy Seal from 1682-1685 and 1689-1690.
Holles = Denzil Holles, 1st Baron Holles of Ifield (1589-1680).
Jenkins = Sir Leoline Jenkins (1623-1685), Secretary of State for England (north) till 1681 and (south) from 1681-1684.


Linlithgow = George Livingstone, 4th Earl of Linlithgow (c.1652-1695).

Lord James Douglas = Lord James Douglas (1637-1687), Dumbarton's younger brother.

Louvois = François-Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois (1639-1691), French Secretary of State for War.

Melfort = John Drummond of Lundie [London], 1st Earl of Melfort (c.1649-1714). Second son of James Drummond, 3rd Earl of Perth, he was Deputy-Governor of Edinburgh Castle (1680), Treasurer-Depute for Scotland (1682) and one of the Principal Secretaries of State for Scotland (form September 1684).

Middleton = Charles Middleton, 2nd Earl of Middleton.

Monmouth = James Scott, Duke of Monmouth (k.1685).

Moray = Alexander Stewart, 5th Earl of Moray (1634-1700). Commissioner of the Scottish treasury (1678), Extraordinary Lord of Session (1680), Secretary of State for Scotland (from November 1680 to 1688) and Commissioner to the Scottish parliament (1686).

Ossory = Thomas Butler, Earl of Ossory (1634-1680), Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade.


Peterborough = Henry, Earl of Peterborough, Groom to the Stole.


Queensberry = William Douglas, Duke of Queensberry, sometime Treasurer Principal of Scotland and Chancellor of Scotland, before 1684.

Richmond = Charles Stuart, 3rd Duke of Richmond.


St. Albans = Henry Jermyn, 1st Baron Jermyn of St. Edmundsbury, 1st Earl of St. Albans (c.1604-1684).

Sunderland = Robert Spencer, 2nd Earl of Sunderland (1640-1702), Secretary of State for England (north) 1679-1680, 1683-1687.

Tyrconnel = Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnel (d.1691).


{} = code.

italics = translation from French.
Appendix B: Documents Relating to the Scots Guard in France.

Document 1: The History of the Gardes Écossais du Corps du Roi (circa 1645/50), anon.¹

Institution de de [sic] le Garde Escossois du corps du Roy de France.
Chp. XXXII
Vous trouverez en l’ancien testament que Saül premier Roy d’Israel, créé institué, et ordonne de Dieu pour regner sur son peuple avoir des gardes de son corps commandées par Abener, lequel fut aigrement repris par David de n’avoir bien gardé lors que le Roye dormoit, Car Abener et sa compagnie de gardes qui de vuoint veiller, & faire garde allentour du Roy dormirent d’un si profund somme il que, David vint jusques au chevet de son lit, et ne le voulant point tuer, bien qu’il en fut sollicitée par Avis a son Conseil, il ne laissa d’emporter sa Lance, et le pot a l’eau qui estoit pres de son lit pour tesmoigner comme il estoit venu jusque là, et le pouvoit tuer s’il eut voulu, veu le mauvais traitement qu’il luy faisait, le mauvais guet que faisoient les gardes, et par ainsi les gardes du corps seurant leur commencement et institution avec le premier Roy ordonné de Dieu.

Tite Live et autres qui ont escript l’histoire des premiers Roys et Empereurs de Rome, disent que Romulus qui fut premier ?vastir et fonder la ville de Rome, et par consequent qui en fut le premier Roy, avoir des gardes qu’on appelloit Ceteres, iusques au temps de Neron VI Empereur de Rome, et lors, ion les appella Satellites, Le Capitaine des quelz estoit Burtuis, lequel ordre a tousjours en lieu pres des Empereurs et Roys pour la conservation de leurs personnes dont ilz ne s’en scavoient passer.

Or a l’imitation du premier Roy que le grand Dieu avoit ordonné regner sur son peuple, et aussi des premiers Roys et Empereurs des Romaines, Les Roys des Gaulois qu ont regnëient en la Gaule Belgique, Celtique, Aquitanique, Narbonnoise, Allobroges, - qu’en la Gaule Transalpine ont lousiers en des gardes, tant pour la conservation de leurs personnes que pour la garde et police de leur nation.

Saint Gregoire Archevesque de Tours escrit que Gautier un Roy de

¹ BN, f. Fr. MS. 16216, fols. 428-439v. Similar accounts can be found from other MSS. sources: See ‘Notes sur Denis II Godefroy sur la garde écossais‘ (Bib. de l’Institut, Collection Godefroy 512, fols. 362-363); Monsieur de Chambre, écossais, ‘Histoire de la garde écossais du corps du roi,’ circa 1660 (BN, f. Fr. MS. 8006, fols. 24-31); ‘Plainte Des Gardes Escossises au Roy ou est l’origine de l’alliance de leur nation avec la France 1612’ (BN, f. Fr. MS. 8006, fols. 59-61). This particular account is not included in Papers Relative to the Royal Guard of Scottish Archers in France, from Original Documents (Maitland Club: Edinburgh, 1835).
France Bourhuignon, ou d’Orléans, voyant que Sigisbert Roy de Metz, et chilperic Roy de Soissons ses frères furent tuez, mit grosse garde, sans laquelle il n’allot a la messe, ny a ses Estatz.

Sidoine Apollinaire dit que Theodoric Roy de la Gaule Narbonnoise vivanz l’an de grace 460: avoit des gardes, quelqu’un de la suite (dit-il se tient armé pres de sa chaire, le gros de ses satellites pour oster le presse demeure à la porte de la gardes du corps distinguées distinguées [sic]) en deux ordres, A sçavoir le premier nombre de xx mj gentlhommes Escossais qui servent pres de la personne, et chaire du Roy, et les salle, ont tous deux pris leur origine, a l’exemples des Roys dessus nommez, et leurs successeurs.

Mathieu historiographe remarque que l’infidélité des subjects a contrainct les Princes de se servir des Estrangers pour leurs gardes, Alexandre ... fut le premier qui prit des soldats d’aspects rudes, affreux, et terribles, Et pour ce Dion dit que son entrée à Rome fut odieuse: Les Empereurs se servoient ordinairement de Gaulois, d’Italiens, d’Espagnoz, d’Allemands ou de Macedoniens; L’Empereur de Constantinople se servon d’Anglois, Tibere se servon d’Allemands, Et les Roys de France ont pris des Escossais; Car les histoires d’Escosse remarquée que Charles le gros Empereur de Rome, et Roy de France environ lan de nostre salut 886 institua vingt quatre Gentilshommes Escossois pour estre aupres de sa personne iour & nuict, et pour la fidelité qu’il avoit recogni en ceux de cette nation depuis le commencement de cette alliance faict entre la France et l’Escosse, il y avoit environ cent and ses vingt quatre gentilshommes Escossoise furent remarquer par leur fidelité et vigilence aux voyages que le Roy S’t Louis entreprint en la terre sainte, lesquels ont esté seulement par le Roy environ l’Espace de quatre cen[t]s ans.

Le roy Charles V adiousta a ce nombre 75 archers ausquels fut commis la garde du logis du Roy et charge de faire les Courvées ... et sentinelles, par ainsi ce nombre de 24 premiers instituez sont du tout differends des Archers en tirées, en armes, station, service et appointement, comme premiers hommes d’armes de France, dont le premier homme d’armes qui fut l’institué par le Roy Charles V en a pris son nom de primauté, et en cette qualité il est appointé du Roy, differend en leurs station, et service, fut remarqué de freiche memoirs a la ceremonie faitte a la conversion du feu Roy Henry le grand dans la ville de Saint Denis le 25 Juillet 1593. En voicy les motz de Mathieu commandé par sa Ma[jes]té d’estre ainsi mis par luy en son histoire, Le Roy, sortir du logis Abbatial accompagné de quarante Archers de ses gardes portan[t]s le ... escaillle d’argent, et vestus de ses livres, et apres 12 trompettes ... de la Noblesse Françoise, au milieu de laquelle estoit le Roy
environné des escossois de sa garde tous convertz de blanc, et marche en cette façon jusques à l'Eglise, et deplus receut le sacre et couronnement de Sa Maîe Charles le Dimanche 27 fevrier 1594. Le sacre et couronnement de la Rayne Marie de Medicis a Saint Denis le Jeudy xiii iour de May 1610 Et la sacre et curonnement du Roy Louis le Juste a present regnant qui fut a Rheims le dimanche 17 Octobr 1610.

Cet ordre de 25 hommes d'armes, et 75 archers le tout faisoient une compagnie entier de cent gentilshommes qui servent par quartier dans la maison du Roy, pres et alentour de Sa personne et non ailleurs si leur ordre n'est enfraint fut confirmé et maintenu par le Roy, Charles sixiesme.

Le Roy Charles VII son filz donna le commandement de cette compagnie des gardes Escossaisses a M're Robert de Pathiloc, Escossais, qui fut appellé en France selon les histoires d'Aquitaine le petit Roy Gasogne.


Au temps du Roy Henry II cette compagnie des gardes du corps fut commandé par M're Jean Stuart seigneur d'Aubigny Comte de Beaumont le Roger, et capitaine de cent hommes d'armes Escossaises, frere de Mathieu deuxiesme du nom Comte de Lenox, qui est [de la famille] du Roy d'Escosse, apres lequel le seigneur de Lorges Montgomery eut le commandement des cent Escossois des gardes de corps du Roy, qui fut le dernier Capitain de la nation Escossais, Car l'injure des guerres vieilles et autres corruptions sont tellement coutées parmi les affaires que cette confusion a donné lieu aux françois de s'introduire en cette compagnie Escossoise, et par ainsy aucunement ... de son premier ordre pour n'estre la compagnie de la nation Escossoise suivant le premiere institution, bien que l'égalité ne permet point que leur ordre de service soit encore du tait entrant Le Marquis de Gardes en est aujourd'huy capitaine.

Le compagnie Escossais se ditemé le seul garde du corps des Roys de France jusques au temps du Roy Charles, qui ayant souffert une infinité de
troubles dans son regne, et redoutant les divisions ausquelles il voyait son Estat, apprehendant qu'on n'attentant sur sa personne voulut augmenter sa garde d'une compagnie Francaise, Le Roy Louis II en-institua une autre, et donna la charge à M Claude de la Chastre seigneur de Nancy. Le Roy Francais premier la troisiemse de sorté que la garde du corps du Roy de France a present est composée de quatre compagnies, et comme les prerogatives des vingt quatre gens d'armes instituez par Charles le gros, ausquel le premier gendarmes de France estant adiousté faict le nombre de 25 les tesmoignent plus anciens que le vert de la compagnie, et les plus signalées factions a elle seule la tesmoignent plus ancienne que les autres trois compagnies.


Note: names appear in this list as they do in the original. Modern versions of Scottish names appear in brackets beside the originals.

Chronologie des Enseignes de la Compagnie des Gardes du Corps Ecossaise depuis Sa Creation En 1449

Il sont observé que Seton Les Legictres des hayere de la Chambre des Comptes, Les Enseignes nont Été comme pendent quelque tenus que sous le nom de Deuxième homme d'armes, et que Thomas Helidai et patris foulair commandant Les vingt cinq hommes d'armes, quand ils ferent incorporé dans la compagnie du cent archiers de la gardes cette jonction le fit les.

Octobre

I

Thamas Helidai [Halliday] Le 18 1449

II

A donte poulor esquier d'Escosse, connu sans le nom de deuxieme homme d'armes Séton les registres de la Chambre des Comptes 1468

III

Patris Machelain [Maclean] 1485

IV

Jean Bourdie [Brodie] 1506

V

Gratien Carre [Kerr] 1521

VI

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2 BN, f. Fr. MS. 8006, fols. 86-91.
Montjon Stuart 1522
VII
Guille[ume] Stuart 1525
VIII
Jean Stuart 1531
IX
George Elphiton [Elphinston] 1545
X
Gabriel de Montgomeri 1552
XI
François de Montgomeri son frere 155...
XII
Jacques de Montgomeri 1557
XIII
Patriss D’Heriot 1568
XIV
Claude de Straton [Stretton] 1584
XV
Thomas Forbois3 1587
XVI
Samuel Forbois4 1587
XVII
Jean Paul de Mont Lezun 1601
XVIII
Jean Paul de Monguin 1606
XIX
Jean Marie de Bors, S’t de Lusan 1608
XX
Jean Bogue (?Bogne) 1609
XXI
Bonquaire de Murs [Muir] 1611
XXII

Robert de la Mont⁵ [Lamont] 1633
XXIII
Jacques Setton 1643
XXIV
Jacques de Melville⁶ 1651
XXV
Jean Baptiste Vialard Sᵉ de la Fredière 16…
XXVI
François Bernard Seigneur de Beaumont 16…
XXVII
Jean Louis d’Hautefort de Brussac, Eut La deuxième Lieutenant Louquele ...
une second En 1667 il est parlé de lui dans la Chronologie des Lieut[enant]s
1667
XXVIII
Jean d’Est Estre fut Enseigne de la Compagnie En après la démission de Mᵉ
de Beaumont, il est parlé de lui dans La même Chronologie
1671
XXIX
Joseph de l’Épinay Lignery parvient a une Enseigne En 1676 par
l’avancement de Mᵉ de Brussac, il est parlé de lui dans la même Chronologie
cydessus
1676
XXX
Louis Joseph de Rochechoüart Baron de Batiment fut Enseigne En 1677
quand Mᵉ dest Estre fut avancé et après la retraite de Mᵉ depierre pont. Il en
aussi parlé dans La suiditte Chronologie
1677
XXXI
François de la Grange, par vint à une Enseigne En 1677, lorsqu’on créa une
troisième; il étoit deja Exempt dans la compagnie en 1665 et serait En Cette
qualité pendant Les Campagnes de 1667 et 1668 passa auni Le Rhin à la
Nage En 1672 à la tête de Sa Brigade, se distingua Beaucoup au Siège de
Mastricht En 1673 des même que l’année suivante à la prise de Besçoncan et
de Dole, Se surprassa Le même année à La Bataille des ?enes retrouva au

⁵ ‘Robert de Lamont, Exempt des gardes du corps du Roy’ confessed to certain debts in 1625

⁶ He was an exempt circa 1644 (BN, Collection Clairambault 393, fol. 316). He received a
quittance for debts, signed by his colonel the duc de Noailles, in July 1655 (BN, Pièces Originales
1921, ‘Melville’, fol. 13). His son was called Jacques le Deux de Melville and is mentioned in a
quittance of debts received by him, 26 February 1674 (BN, Pièces Originales 1921, ‘Melville’,
fol. 14).
siège de Condé [Candia] en 1669 et au combat de Kokesberg en 1677 où il fit connoitre qu’il eût digne du choix que le Roi avait fait de sa personne, En 1678 il fit sa dernière Campagne en Allemagne après avoir servi au siège de Gans et d’Ipres dont Le Roi se Rendit Maitre au Commençement de l’année en 1687. M de la Grange se trouvant dans de là ses tirer; lequel obtint avec une Gratification de 20 milles Livres l’une pension pendant faire il Epousa Elizabeth de Salnoé de laquelle il eut marié de la Grange marie en 1713 avec Philippe Henry de Bouvoust M de Brusloy souslieutenant dans les Gendarmes.

XXXII
Alexandre Boulanc de Vignan, fut nommé Enseigne en 1677 après l’avancement de M de Lignery, j’ai parlé de lui dans le Chronologie de Lieutenants 1677

XXXIII
Louis Philippe Seigneur de St Viance fut nommé Enseigne après l’avancement de M Du Batiment en 1680. J’ai aussi parlé de lui dans La chronologie des Lieutenants 1680

XXXIV
Eustache Marion Comte de Druys, par vint... Enseigne en 1687 après l’avancement de M de St Viance et la retraite de M de St Estre, on à encore fait mention de lui dans la Chronologie de lieutenants XXV [sic]

Claude de Blancher de Pierre Bussier, Marquis de Lostange, originaire du Limousin d’une famille noble, fut pourvu de l’Enseigne de M de la Grange en 1687 après sa demission il fit à la tête de sa Brigade, la Compagnies de 1689, 1690 et 1691. Le Roi Le Cria Brigadier d’armée En 1690, et Lui donné au mois de janvier 1691. La tué cette même année au mois de mars devant Mons En portant La fascine à le tête de Sa Brigade

XL
Armand de Macueville fut Exempt dans Le compagnie avant 1682 et aide major En 1687, il S’acquita parfaitment bien de son employ En 1681 au combat de Leuze et a celle de Steinkerke, aussi bien qu’a La Bataille de Nervinde; où il se destingua beaucoup, par vint à un Enseigne de la Compagnie En 1697 par La mort de M De Lancon et seroit à la tête de sa Brigade jusqu’e La paix de Ryswick; mais ses incommode L’aiant Empêche
de Continuer, il ent L’agreement du Roy en 1702 de se retirei avec une pension de 100l pendant sa vie.

**Chronologie Des aydes majors.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Etienne de la Taste</td>
<td>1674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques du fossé, Sr de la Motte d’Atteville</td>
<td>1678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armand de Macquoille, il en acté parté dans la chronologie des Enseignes</td>
<td>1687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chronologie de les Capitaines de la Gardes Ecossois du Roi.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Patiloe [Puttoc?]</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillaume Stuyers [Stuart?]</td>
<td>1462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Stuyers [Stuart?]</td>
<td>1466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffroi Coucran [Cochrane]</td>
<td>1471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Conningham</td>
<td>1473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean de Conningham</td>
<td>1480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berault Stuart, Sr d’Aubigny</td>
<td>1493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Stuart, Sr d’Aubigny</td>
<td>1508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Stuart, Comte de Beaumont</td>
<td>1513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Stuart, neveu du Marèschal d’Aubigny</td>
<td>1544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques de Montgomery, Comte de Lorges</td>
<td>1544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel de Montgomery, Comte de Lorges</td>
<td>1557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean d’O, Sr de Maillebois</td>
<td>1562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joachim de Chateauvieux, baron de Verjon de la Châtre en Poitou, et de la Villatte</td>
<td>1569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Paul Desparbes, Sr de Lussan</td>
<td>1599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Arnoult de Pardillon Gondrin, Mqg de Montespan et D’Antin</td>
<td>1605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philibert de Nerestag</td>
<td>1611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles d’Estournel, Sngr de Plainville</td>
<td>1612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles I, du nom, Duc de la Vieuville, Baron de Ruyles</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillaume de Simiane, Mqg de Garde, b² de la Seneuve, Sr de Goul, de la Banne</td>
<td>1623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François de Simiane, Mqg de Garde, Comte de Carces, b² de Caseneuve, Grand Senechel et Lt. Gen. de Province</td>
<td>1642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 BN, f. Fr. MS. 8006, fol. 90.
8 BN, f. Fr. MS. 8006, fols. 126-152.
François de Rochechouart, M. de Chaudenier 1642
Anne de Noailles, Comte d’Ayan, Duc de Noailles, M. de Montelar et de
Monelin-Le-Chatel, B. de Malemont de Chambre, et de Carbonniere,
S. de Baires 1651
Anne Jules, Duc de Noailles 1661
Adrien Marie de Noailles, Duc et Pair

Chronologie des Lieutenants des Gardes Ecossois du Roi. 9
Petrus Faoulean [Fuller/Fallon?] 1449
Alexander Barrey [Barry] 1462
Huchon Aere [Air] 1476
David Coningham 1490
Joseph Quoque [Cook] 1494
Jean Stuart 1506
David Abreconie [Abercrombie] 1509
Guillaume Lang 1520
Jean Stuart 1531
Gabriel de Lorges, Comte de Montgommery [sic] 1553
Guillaume Stuart 1557
Jean d’Heriot 1560
Thomas Forbois 158...
Alexandre de Bortuit10 [Borthuik] 1606
Jean Bogue escuier, S. de Monfoutin [Boag] 1611
Jean Setton 1631
Jacques Setton, S. de Lavenage 1643
Rober de Pierrepont [of Normandie] 1658
Anthoine de Romecourt, S. de Suzeman [of Champagne] 1662
Jean Louis d’Hautefort de Brussac 1672
Jean d’Est 1677
Joseph D’Epinay, S. de Ligneres [of Normandy] 1677

9 BN, f. Fr. MS. 8006, fols. 152-165.
10 ‘Alexandre de borthuik escuier s. de platehelle Exempt des Gardes du corps du Roy’, 1581. He was an ensign by 1598 (BN, Pièces Originales 421, ‘Borthuik’, no. 9500, fols. 2 and 3). He was probably the sone of James de Borthic, a archer of the garde in 1561 (BN, Pièces Originales 421, ‘Borthuik’, no. 9500, fols. 4). This James may have been the son of either the Jean ‘de Borthuyk’ or Andrew ‘borthic’, mentioned in 1542 and 1546 respectively (BN, Pièces Originales 421, ‘Borthuik’, no. 9500, fols.4 and 7). The former used for arms: three cinquefoils (BN, Pièces Originales 421, ‘Borthuik’, no. 9500, fols.7). Alexander probably had a son, George, described as an archer of the garde in 16... (BN, Pièces Originales 421, ‘Borthuik’, no. 9500, fols.8).
Jacques de Villelume, Sr de Batimoul [of Limousine] 1680
Louis Philippe, Sr de St Viance [of Limousine] 1687
Claude Boulure, Sr de Vignau 1687
Eustache Marion, Comte de Druys (of Nivernais) 1692

Document 3: Roolle des noms et surnoms des gardes tant du corps que de La manche de la Compagnie de la garde Escossoise du Roy Commander par la Sieur Duc de Noailles Captaine de la dud[it] Compagnie que sa Majesté tout a ... jour des privilegesdes Comman dans de Sa maison pendant La prevues annee 1671.11

* = descendants of Scottish members of the garde écossais.

Premierem1
Mre Anne duc de Noailles par de France Capitain
Mre Anne Jules de Noailles Comte d’Ayen son fil Capitain en ...
Antoine de Romtcourt Lieutenant
Escossois
Robert de Pierrepont Lieutenant
Francois
Jean Louis Dantefort Sr de Brusac Enseigne
Jean de Sr Estruc Sieur de la Conv Sr Estruc Eanseigne
Jean Duval Esq, sieur de Lambert homme desmerr
Exempts
Jean de Beaulclaire esq Sr de la Brousse
Francois de la Grange esq
Le Sr Chevalier de Grignon
Chevalier de Sr Viance Vicomte de Biac

11 BN, Collection Clairambault 818, fols. 23-31.
Francois de Rostignac esq
* Henry de Sacvel, esq
Robert Le Vasseur esq St de Vinis
Armand de Melun esq

Brigadiers
Joseph de l’Espinay esq St de Lignerey
Dominique Bernard esq Sieur de Bray
Le St de la Motte

Exempts qui ne servant point mois qui souvivant des gagner et
privileges sentements Leur mort.

Vir durand sans quité
Puissant resigner et seront supriméz par mort.

Claude de Ramoy esq St Darfevil
Adrien de la Fontaine esq St de la Favrousse
Claude Gassies esq St de Sonillum
Louis Barateau esq
Nicolas Le Clee esq St de Nallées
Michel Canu esq St de la Fonquier
Francois Jacques de Barseau Beaudelair
Audrun de Siry esq St de Sironu

Brigadiers
Jean de St Martin esq St de Braye
Dominique Bernard esq St de Bray
Francois de Cresny esq St de Marchaumont
Jean Delegrois esq St de Boanregard

Sousbrigadiers
Claude le Pieres esq
Jean Durval esq St de ?Cene
Edmé La ?Cirmurees
Pierre Bandin esq St de Savigny
David Baylin
N____ Lannoy esq
Edmé Denises esq
N—— Rose es9
    Du Corps
* Charles de Moncrief es9
    Pierre Le Vieux es9 Sr de Conlange
    Oudas de Dabinet es9
    Michel de Caronnet es9 Sr de la Chavinier
    Martin Pontrain es9 Sr de Thiecourt
* Nicolas de la Marre es9 Sr de Beauchamp
    Henry Briquairs es9 Sr de Francheville
    Gabriel de Brizenauct es9 Sr de Blanchamp
    Claude de Dalon es9 Sr du Destroit
* Robert Hepbron es9 [Hepburn]
    Francois de Lorne es9 Sr de Bellefontaine
    Jean ?Delrames es9 Sr Desmurs
* David Setton, es9
    Louis Le ?Suene es9 Sr de Versailles
    Jean de Gass es9 Sr du Colombier
    Charles de Goubert es9 Sr des ?Fernress
    Jean Guichon es9 Sr de Beaumont
    Simon Rignault es9
    Thomas Le Parmentier es9
    Philippe Binet es9 Sr de Canonville
    Francois de Rilliac de St Paul
    Jean Marton de Corps es9 Sr Dinnas
    Le chevalier de Romecourt
    Pierre de Tesserat Sr de la Grange

    De Le Manche
    Antoine du Puget
    Claude Bardet es9 Sr de St Julien
    Claude Conturier es9 Sr d’Arbonville
    Louis Blamain es9 Sr de la Borde
    Gabriel de Touche es9 Sr Dupusay
Jean de la Motte esq Sr Dupecq
Estienne le Nassau esq Sr de Grandpré
Jean de Gobert esq Sr de Nosvell
Estienne Piedier esq de la Grenade
Antoin de la Foir esq Sr Danbiette
* Nicolas Heron esq Sr de Marimont
Nicolas Michelin esq Sr de Jarny
* Francois Jourdan esq Sr de Lannoy [Jardine]
* Francois Hocart esq Sieur de Serignac [Halkett]
Pierre Filaire esq Sr Dalbiat
Philippe Girard esq
René Le Febvre esq
René Le Mensieur esq Sr de la Rousseliere
René de Baignant esq Sr Dangires
Jean de ?Garie esq
Claude Ansoult esq Sr Dutaillie et Claude Ansoult Sr de Miramont son fils
en survivance
Estienne Barbur esq Sr du Repaire er Pierre son fils en survivance
Nicolas de Chambourg esq Sr de ?Verisson
Henry Pierce Dupain esq Sr de Vieuxpont
Pierre Boisses esq Sr Demarie
* Guillaume Frezel esq Sr de Beaulieu12 [Fraser]
Jean de Tillier esq
Henry de la Vigne esq et Charles son fils en survivance
Louis Laurenceas esq
Gernaire de Chevriers esq Sr de Foix
Louis Sr Art et Louis son fils en survivance
* Jean de Mareville esq [Melville]
Charles Gebault esq Sr du Bourrat

12 Probably belonged to the same family as Antoine Frasier, contrôleur au grenier à sel de Péronne: See his enregistrement in this position, 29 January 1678 (CARAN, Z1A571).
Michel Tanton esq Sf ?de Monssen
Claude Pierre Rouget esq Sf de Granpré et Jean Pierre Rouget son fils en survivance
Jacques Antoin du Chernin Sf de Neubourg
Etienne Pinon esq Sf de la Derugeonerie
Nicolas Dideron esq Sf de Bellevat
Louis de la Porte esq Sf du Bocage

* Pierre Lemaire esq Sf de Bezanville [Lamont]
Charles de Jeberie esq Sf de Frenelle
Pierre Pasquier esq Sf Dubut
Antoine de Sf Pardoux esq Sf du Bousquet
Jean Chanon Sf Desgrandere
Pierre Pasquier Sf de la Haye
Floryse Libere esq
Henry Robert Gillot esq Sf de Franqueteres
Philbert Treillar esq Sf de Grandsigne
Adrien du Moyne Sf Dumesnil Varin
Charles Du Crocq esq Sf de la Ronce
Claude Estienne Sf Daubigny
Jacques Marchand Dupouch Sf de la Vinir et Henry son fils en survivance
Anselme Chesdeville esq Sf dud[it] Lieu
Leonard Cousseau Sf de la Roche

* Franchois de Ternher Sf de la Borir [Turner]
Bernard Pailhardel Sf de Beaufort
Mathieu Bigot Sf de Lanal
Chevalier Villandré esq Sf de Chogy
Pierre Roder esq Sf de Sondvillier
Guy de Lanoüe Sf de la Parenterie
Durnad Favarel
N___ Duplessie

Estate Major
Documents Relating to the Scottish Guard in France

Le chevalier de Fourbin
N___ de la Marthe
Chevalier de Brouilly
Benoist Le Brun

Tresorieres
Pierre Fenvy
Louis de Champin
Andre Flory

faiect a Tervaillier Le dixiesme jour de novembre mil six cent soixante vingt signi Louis et plues les Colbert.

Document 4: Roole des noms et surnoms des cap[itain] lieutenant, Enseignes hommes d’armes Exemptes, gardes, du corpsque de la Manche et officiers de la compagnie de la garde Escossoise du Roy commandé par les S Duc dde Noailles cap de lad[it] Compagnie que Sa Majesté ... jour des privileges des commandans de sa maison [1679].

Capitaine
Mre Anne Julles Duc de Noailles

Lieutenants
Jean Louis d’Houdefort Sr de Bruzac
Jean Seigneur de la Cour de Sr Estebin
Joseph de Lespiney Sr de Lignery

Enseignes
Jacques de Villelaine Sr de Bastinan
Alexandre de Boullene Sr de Vignau
Francois de la Grang escuyer

13 BN, Collection Claiремbauld 818, fols. 77-84.
Homme d’armes
Jean Dudal Sf de Lambert

Exemptes
Louis Charles de Sf Viance Vicomte Daubiac
Jacques Fossay Sf de la Motte

* Pierre Gaudin Sf de Savigny
  guillon
Jean Louis de Castelsagnat
Paul Leon de Caston
Francois de Nesles Sf de Cierville
Jean de Verdusant
Bonnaventure Frottier de la Messeliere
Charles Berthomaer de Beaulieu
Robert le Vasseur Sf du Vivier

Exemptes qui ne serviront point mois qui jouviant des gager a
privileges leur viz durant et suivant supprimiez par mort
Claude Raincy Sf d’Arivil
Adrian de la Fontaine Sf de la Farrouse
Claude Gassier Sf du Fouillon
Louis Baratrou
Nicolas le Clére Sf de Vallier
Michel Canu Sf de la Foucquiere
Francois Jacques du Garreau Sf du Bourdelair et de Lessart

Brigadiers
Louis Massée de Brenisson
Pierre Collin Sf de Lisle
Gabriel Bonju Sf de Fonteny
Louis le Surier Sf de la Fontaine
Francoise de la Guichardie
Moyse Tivier
Nicolas Heron Sf de Marimont
Jacques de Montfalcon

* David Seton
* Paul Petan [Patton]

Sousbrigadiers
Louis de Glavenair Sr de Courbon
Louis Joseph Bechon
Pierre Dufour Sr de la Coste
Thomas du Sevre
Jean Davet Sr de la Trille
Jacquier Moreau Sr du Vinet
Antoine de Guiesville
Antoine du Roule
Henry de la Vigne
Charles Priolo
N___ Sablé
Charles Villelume
Gardes du Corps
Gabriel de Brigenan Sr de Blanchampe
Claude Dalon Sr du Destroit
Michel Dargaicourt
Edmé de Longuemauere
Pierre du Braul Sr de la Vergue
Pierre de Boislaurence
Jean Dagez
Bernard de Lary Sr de la Motte
Henry de Mieux Sr du Hameau
Jacques de la Haye Sr de Boiscapelle
Louis d'Herbinot Sr de Blumierz
Richard Rousselin Sr d'Houbourg
* Charles Montcrif
Pierre le Vieux Sr de Coulanges
Edouart Sabiner
Michel de Charonnet Sr de Chavigniere
Martin Faiffirin Sr de Tillecourt
* Nicolas de la Marre Sr de Beauchampe [Lamer]
* Robert Ebron [Hepburn]
Jean de Gar Sr du Colombier
Charles de Gaubert Sr des fevrières
Simon Renault
Thomas le Parmentier
Philippe Binet Sr de Canonville
Gardes de la Manche
Louis Blanpin Sr de la Borde
Jean de la Motte
Jean de Marseille
Adrian du Magne Sr du Mesnil Varin
Charles de Changy Sr de Villandré
Billar Vignau Sr du Tranblay
Siguare Guineau de la Croix
Francois Mutinot
Pierre de Rhode Sr de Sondeille
N___ La Doradie
Claude Barbier des Sr Julian
Gabriel Detouches Sr du Pozay
Estienne le Vassaur Sr de Grandpré
Estienne Piedener Sr de la Grenade
Nicolas Michelin Sr de Jarny
* Francois Jourdain Sr de Launay [Jardine]
* Francois Hocard Sr de Savignoet [Halkett]
Pierre Pilaier Sr Dalbiac
Gernaier de ?Chavricoer Sr de Foix
René Lefevre
René le Maisuer Sr de la Rousseliere
René de Bagnole Sr d’Angier
Louis Lourenceau
Claude Anzon Sr du Tillaier et Claude Anzon Sr de Marimont son filz en survivance
Nicolas de Chambourg Sr de Verbuisson
Pierre du Pont Sr de Vieuxpont
* Guillaume de Frezel Sr de Beaulieu [Fraser]
Jean de Villiere
* Michel Vinton S de Mouchy [Winton]
Claude Pierre Rouget Sr de Beaupré et Jean Pierre son fils en survivance
Estienne Pinon Sr de la Drougeonnir
Louis de la Porte Sr du Bocage

* Pierre Le Maire Sr de Bazonville [Lamer]
Louis de St Care et Louis son fils en survivance
Claude de Farvier Sr de Fraville
Pierre Pasquier Sr du But
Jean Chavon Sr Desgranges
Pierre Pasquier Sr de la Haye
Henry Robert Gillon Sr de Franquetiere
Philbert Treille Sr de Grand Saigne
Charles du Croc Sr de la Ronce
Claude Estienne Sr d’Aubigny
Claude de Rouel Sr des Routtier
Jean Marchand du Pouce Sr de la Vivic et Franscois son fils en survivance
Anselme de Chedeville
François Vergne Sr de la Bovic
Nicolas Videron Sr de Bellebat
Charles Pion Sr de la Bretesche
Antoine de la Fond
Jean de la Vigne
Jacques Antoine Duchain Sr de Noubourg

Estat Major
Albert Grillet Sr de Brissac major
Guillaume de Louis de Serignan ayde major
Françoise de Vandail Sr de Dieudonné ayde major
Estienne Taste ayde major de la

Compagnie
Louis Françoise de Ganarier des Essartes exempt pour les ceremonies
Tresorier

N____ Deraux
Louis Champin
Andree Flory

faict a arresté a St gerain en Laye le 2r jour du mois de Juin 1679.

Document 5: Estat des gages et solde des officiers a gardes du corps du Roy pendant le pute année mil six cent quatre vingt six [1680].

Premierment

Compagnie commander pat le St Duc de noailles pair de france

Aud[it] st Duc pour ses appointment a gager

A luy par forme d’indemnité à cause de la disposition des charges qui a esté ostée en l’année 1666

Au st de Brusac premier lieutenant de lad² compagnie pour ses
gager

Au st Esteben second lieutenant de lad² compagnie pour ses

gager

Au st de Lignery troisieme lieutenant pour lad² compagnie pour ses

gager

Au st de Bastiment premier Enseigne de lad² compagnie pour ses

gager

Au st du Vignau second enseigne pour ses gager

Au st de la Grange troisième Enseigne pour ses gager

Au clerç du guet

Au premier homme d’armes

Au troisieme de la dite compagnie pour leures gager

A un exempt pour servir toujours pres du Roy a raison de xxxiill viii viiiid

par mois

A l’Exempt ordinaire qui sera pres de la Reyne

14 BN, Collection Clairembauld 818, fols. 121-121v.
A un autre Exempt qui ... pendent le quartier dud[it] s' Du de Noailles pres
de la Reyne a raison de xxxiiiiil viiys viiidd par mois cll
A deux Brigadiers a raison de iii cha[c]un par jour pour les douze mois iiiz clxll
A deux sousbrigadiers a raison de Lz chacun par jour les douze mois xviiicll
A vingt gardes a raison de xl par jour xiiizoz iiiicll
A deux gardes de la manche qui sont tousjours pres du Roy a raison de
cinquante sols par jour cy pour douze mois xviiicll

Somme Totalle des gages et solds des officiers a garder de la dite Compagnie liizoz xlzvll viiz vidd

Estat des Officiers des gardes du Corps.15

Compagnie de Noailles 52052
10
Compagnie de Duras 44248
10
Compagnie de Lorge 44863
10
Compagnie de Luxembourg 44313
10

15 BN, Collection Clairembaud 818, fol. 138v.
Appendix C: Scots and English in France, 1660-1688:
Ennoblements, Naturalisations, and Military Service.

Descendants of members of the *garde écossais* can to be found among the ranks of the landed gentry in the French countryside. As the vast majority of these families arrived in France only in the 1500s they, like many French families in possession of proofs of nobility of only a hundred years standing, fell prey to Louis XIV's purges of his lesser nobility. The noble house of Leslie-Leloy were descended from Françoise, seigneur de Clisson, a lieutenant in the *garde écossais* in the reign of Louis XIII, who was also a captain of marines. This family obtained letters of naturality in 1690, which described them as being descended from the 'Illustre Maison de Leslie en Ecosse dont etoient les Barons de Leslie de Balquain et le Duc de Leslie de Rotesque [Rothes] dernier Chancelier de Royaume', but this still needed to be ratified by a personal appeal to James VII & II, at the Jacobite court at St. Germains, by François Leslie Lesloy du Clisson, seigneur de Ricordieres and de la Besseliere.1 The ancestor of the house of Leslie-Leloy was said to have 'abandonée à cause de la Religion le Pais de leur origine et s'étoient établis dans les Province d'Anjou et du Maine' where they married into the powerful house of Laval, Marshals of Bois-Dauphin, on the strength of which they were automatically allowed naturality by the French authorities.2 Similarly members of the noble House of Leiston were maintained in their status; Messire Charles de Leiston, of Blois, was maintained in his nobility after an investigation in 1696. He was descended from the 'feu noble David de Leiston, archer de la Garde Ecossaise du Roy' (who flourished *circa*

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1 Declaration by James VII of the nobility of François de Leslie, 31 December 1692, printed in HMC, *Stuart Papers*, i, 75.
2 Genealogical notes on the house of Leslie (BN, Collection Chérin 121, 'Leslie').
Another Frenchman of Scottish ancestry, Henry de Lamont, was a captain in the French army in 1665. His brother Claude was sergeant-major of the town of Toulon. The two Lamonts were descended from Robert de Lamont, an ensign of the garde écossais in 1625. In 1668/9 Claude de Lamont was forced to obtain proofs of his noble ancestry in order to maintain his rights as a nobleman in France. He was investigated by the 'commis de la recherche des usurpateurs de titres de noblesse en nostre pays et Comté de provence'. Lamont's defence was straightforward; he presented the letters patent of nobility, of 1621, which maintained his father's 'ancienne noblesse'. The document was readily accepted, after being examined, with the result that Claude, and his children already born, or to be born, within lawfull marriage were maintained in their 'titre dignité et prerogative de noblesse'.

A family of Frasers monopolised the farming of the salt tax in Péronne; one Guillaume Frezel, Seigneur de Beaulieu, was a member of the garde écossais at the same time as his cousin, Antoine Frasier, was the contrôleur au grenier à sel in Péronne.

3 Genealogical notes on the house of Leiston (BN, Collection Chérin 121, 'Leiston', fol. 2-2v).
4 Henry de Lamont, Captaine d'Une Compagnie de gens de guerre a pied francais' and 'Claude de Lamont, sergent major de la ville de Toulon' (BN, Pièces Originales 1632, 'Lamont', fols. 17 and 18).
5 'Robert de Lamont, Exempt des gardes du corps du Roy' confessed to certain debts in 1625 (BN, Pièces Originales 1632, 'Lamont', fol. 16).
6 Testament of noble ancestry for Claude de Lamont, Paris, 23 January 1669. Transcribed by d'Hozier, 24 July 1698, from a letter from 'Charles De Lamont', sealed with the Lamont arms, viz. two oval shield accoulée, dexter, quarterly, 1 & 4, Azure and orb, 2 & 3, a lion rampant; sinister, party per fess, in chief per pale, dexter, a fleur-de-lis dimidiated, sinister, an eagle displayed dimidiated, in base Or three torteaux. Supporters, dexter, a lion, sinister, an eagle regardant crowned. The two shields ensigned with a marquis' coronet (BN, Pièces Originales 1632, 'Lamont', fols. 23-24v). These arms were described by Claude de Lamont as 'de Imaon qui Lorraine Longuy, d'Azur a un Monte d'Argent cintre et Croisé d'Or, Ecartelé de Sinople au Lyon d'Argent'. D'Hozier's note, attached to this letter, says 'donc Claude de Lamont, Cher, Lieutenant de Roy Gouverneur de Lonuy, et Capitaine d'une Compagnie de cadets Gentilhomme[s]': Claude de Lamont to D'Hozier, circa 1698 (BN, Pièces Originales 1632, 'Lamont', fols. 25-7).
7 'Rooile des noms et surnoms des gardes tant du corps que de la manche de la Compagnie de la garde Ecossaise du Roy', 1671 (BN, Collection Clairambault 818, fols. 23-31). See Antoine Frasier's his enregistration in this position, 29 January 1678 (CARAN, Z1A571).
The Scots of Villetroche, Savigny and Coulanges, in Orléans, suffered a protracted series of prosecutions touching their rights to the title and privileges of nobility in France between 1600 and 1700. The first of these was launched by Mr. Antoine Bauldron, procurator-fiscal of the parliament of Normandy, against André Scott, Écuyer, Seigneur de Savigny and Coulanges in 1600. Scott chose as his advocate, Charles Barentine, a conseiller du roi and procurator-general of the king's Court of Aides at Paris. An inquest was held specifically to assess the 'Lettres patents et titres y attachés concernant son exaction et Genealogie [et] faïtes de noblesse' to adjudge his right to the status of nobility. These documents were to be supported by evidence of Scott's exemptions from the rolls of the taille and other taxes not normally levied on the nobility. The inhabitants of the parish of Coulanges were also to give their testimony. To assist him in his defence Scott called upon several Scottish gentlemen of the garde écossais, all of whom were 'Ecuyers natifs d'Ecosse, Archers des Gardes du Corps du Roi'. Thomas Cranston, Jacques Maliville [Melville], and Henri Lesle, all under the command of Guillaume de Cobarne, Seigneur de La Fosse, who was also called a native of Scotland, came to Scot's assistance. Equally David Cetton [Seton], Jacques Carvel, Archibald Berartone, and their lieutenant, Thomas de Fortois [Forbes], described as a 'natif d'Ecosse', attested Scot's nobility. All of these Scottish members of the garde were said to have been under the ultimate charge of the sieur de Lussan and David d'Anstrude [Anstruther]. The testament they subscribed, along with the other proofs put forward by Scot, were found to be 'suffisant et Capable a ces

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8 This family used for arms: Argent a bend between a mullet in chie and two crescents in base Sable: R. Reistap, Armorial Général de la France, (Paris, 1880).
9 BN, Pièces Originales 2667, 'Scot', no. 59290, 29 February 1661, fols. 1-4.
10 Jacques le Deux de Melville was the son of Jacques de Melville, an ensign of the Gard Ecossais du Corp du Roi in 1651: 'Chronologie des Enseignes de la Compagnie des Gardes du Corps Ecossaise depuis Sa Creation En 1449' (BN, f. Fr. MS. 8006, fol. 86-91). He is mentioned in a quittance of debts received by him, 26 February 1674 (BN, Pièces Originales 1921, 'Melville', fol. 14).
11 Non of these Scots belonged to the garde in 1671: 'Roolle des nooms et surnoms des gardes tant du corps ...', 1671 (BN, Collection Clairambault 818, fols. 23-31).
effet' in preserving Scott from degradation of status.\(^{12}\)

In April 1663, André Scott's son, Constant, was accused of usurping the quality of 'escuyer', for which he was liable to a fine of two thousand livres, to compensate the state for the loss of his contribution to the most usual tax levied on commoners, the taille. In this prosecution André Scot's original defence, signed by his fellows of the garde écossais, was found to be 'Contradictoire' to the normal proceedings of the court which accepted it. On the basis of this document Constant Scot had been allowed to marry Demoiselle Catherine Degue, a noblewoman. The marriage produced two sons; Constant, called an escuyer, and Seigneur de Coulanges and Mareille, and Louis, also called an escuyer, who was Seigneur de Savigny. Despite the irregularity of the testament of 1600 the crown's prosecutor, one Bousseau, accepted them as being 'Noble et issu de noble Race et lignée' based on the 'Si longuement qu'ils vivant Noblement et ne seront acte derogant a Noblesse'.\(^{13}\) The acceptance of the claims to noble status of the Scott family was therefore based on their de facto position, and not their de jure right.

The Scot family's claims to noble status were further tested in 1667, when the quality of Louis Scot, Seigneur de Savigny, was investigated. Louis' son, Léon, was further investigated, in 1700. In his defence Léon produced his marriage certificate, recording his betrothall to Demoiselle Madelène Druillon, a noblewoman, dated 6 March 1682, in which he was described as the 'Ec\(f\) S\(f\) de Ville[l]roche, et est qualifié fils de Louis Scot Ec\(f\) S\(f\) de Savigny et de Dame Jeanne de la Cour son Epouse'. Based on this proof the crown prosecutor recommended that Scot be maintained and guaranteed in the quality of a nobleman, but this was again attributed to the fact that the Scots 'Si longuement qu'il vivra noblement et ne sera acte

\(^{12}\) Investigation into the noble claims of Andrew Scott de Savigny et Coulanges, 28 February 1600 (BN, Pièces Originales 2667, no. 59290, 'Scot', fols. 1-5).

\(^{13}\) 'the truly long time they had lived nobly, free of any derogatory activity': Investigation into the noble claims of Constant Scott de Coulanges, 28 April 1663 (BN, Pièces Originales 2667, no. 59290, 'Scot', fols. 5-6v).
derogeant à Nobless'. After one hundred years of tenuous noble status the House of Scott of Villetrouche, Savigny and Coulanges was therefore finally and unquestionably accepted as noble. In a session in the court of Blois, to determine Leon Scot's rights in his late mother's lands, it was stated that the 'President au Siège Presidial de Blois, Scavoir de tout Les droits' of the Scot family.

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14 Investigation into the noble claims of Leon Scott de Villetrouche, Orléans, 1700 (BN, Pièces Originales 2667, no. 59290, 'Scot', fols. 9-10).

15 'President of the presidential selection of Blois, knows of all the rights ...': 'Hearing into rights in the lands of the feu demoiselle de Fenouilles', February 1703 (BN, Pièces Originales 2667, no. 59290, 'Scot', fol. 11).
List of Britons ennobled, naturalised and commissioned in France, circa 1660-1688

* = Scots.

Adiak, Elisabeth, Anglois: Naturalité, 30 Mars 1683 (PP 151).

* Anstrude [Anstruther], Arnould d', garde de la compagnie Écossais du Roi, tué d'un coup de mousquet au siège de Laon, 1694 (Champeaux, I, 44).

* Bailleul [Balliol], Sr de Bailleul en Normandie (circa 1560). 'On ne sçait sur quoy elle Fonde la fable de descendre d'un Bailleul Roy d'Escois il a n'ons jamais pu prouver ce pretendo fait' (BN, f. Fr. 32353, fol. 55).

* Bain, Jacques, Enseigne de vaisseau Toulon, 19 Januar 1669: Notaire publique par le roi, 1669 (C160-161).

Bakstard, Jean, Anglois: Naturalité, 30 Juin 1662 (PP 151).

Belle, Anne Marie de, Angloise: Naturalité, 30 Juin 1677 (PP 151).

Betam, Maître Jean, Prêtre Anglois: Naturalité, 20 Septembre 1685 (PP 151).

Bethani, Jean, de la province de Worcester en Angleterre, docteur de Sorbonne, naturalité, 1685 (0129, 377).

Bethomas, ? de, Capitaine aux Gendarmes Anglaise, tué à Marsailles, 1693 (Champeaux, I, 177).

Blakal, Priméron, Anglois: Naturalité, 20 Septembre 1681 (PP 151).

Blakal, Diane, Angloise: Naturalité, 10 Avril 1693 (PP 151).


Bonnen, Guillaume, Anglois: Naturalité, 24 Mars 1681 (PP 151).

Boullain, ? de, Colonel des Dragons à pied de la Reine d'Angleterre, tué à la Marsailles, 1693 (Champeaux, I, 235).

Bourdet, Étienne, Capitain de frégate, Anglois: naturalité, 1677 (0121, 247): Déclaration de naturalité 13 Mai 1681 (PP 151).

Brasse, Marie, Angloise: Naturalité, 4 Juin 1684 (PP 151).

Broé, André de, Capitaine -Lt. des Gendarmes Anglais, reçu plusieurs blesseurs à Cassel, 1677 (Champeaux, I, 272).

Buterfield, Michel, Anglois: Naturalité, 8 avril 1672 (PP 151).

* Cars [Kerr], Sieur de, garde du corps: lettres d'état, 1693 (0137, 313v): ? de Carse, Lt. des Gendarmes Anglais, blessée à mort à Cassel,
1677 (Champeaux, I, 319).
* Chambre [Chambers], de, a family of Scottish ancestry, which arrived in France in 1451. It provided many officers and ingénieurs to the French army (Blanchard, 146).
* Cook, Abbé Sibicruth, de Hollande, 19 Février 1666 (PP 151 bis, 54).
  Cooke, William, Maître de la flotte Angloise, 1662 (C772).
* Coquerel [Cochrane], ?, Écrivain de la marine, 1681 (C772).
  Cornwalles, Elisabeth, Angloise: Naturalité, 18 Août 1683 (PP 151).
  Corteret, Georges, Vice amiral des armées navales du roi de la Grande Bretagne, sa femme et ses enfants: Naturalité, 3 Février 1656 (PP 151).
  Coulert, Jean, Anglais: Naturalité, 9 Avril 1666 (PP 151).
  Cressé, Elisabeth, natif de Londres: naturalité, 1682 (0126, 367).
  Cressé, Gabriel, permis de séjour à Londres, 1670 (0114, 114v., 143).
  Cressé, Laurent et Claire, natifs de Londres: naturalité, 1693 (0137, 332v).
  Cressé, Marie, de Londres: naturalité, 1688 (0132, 101).
* D'Igby, Le 'feu Sr Chevalier d'Igby Anglois de Nation', died in France after a long residency there, 9 June 1665 (AG, A197, no. 297).
* Douglas, Jean, Tué au siège de Trèves, 1679 (Champeaux, I, 196).
* Douglas, Jacques, Tué en Allemagne, 1692 (Champeaux, I, 196).
* Dowell, Guillaume, Anglois, maintenu de noblesse, 29 Mai 1675 (PP 146 bis, 27).
  Erlington, Édouard, Prêtre Anglois: Naturalité, 30 Juin 1672 (PP 151).
  Estoges, ?, de, Sous-Lt. des Gendarmes Anglaise, blessé à Cassel, 1677 (Champeaux, II, 26).
  Fauvel, Jean, Prêtre Anglois: Naturalité et pouvoir de tenir bénéfice, 20 Février 1677 (PP 151).
  Ferris, Ferdinand, Anglois, naturalité, 10 Septembre 1669 (PP 151 bis, 60).
  Foiloard, Suzanne, Anglois: Naturalité, 12 Jan. 1683 (PP 151).
* Frasier, Antoine, Contrôleur au grenier à sel de Péronne. Enregistrer 29 Jan. 1678 (Z1A571)
  Gahaine, Sieur, permis de séjour à Londres, 1670 (0114, 114v).
  Gahory, Henry et ses soeurs, de Londres, naturalité, 1679 (0123, 385).
  Gahory, Hiérôme-Franc, maître à danser: permis de séjour à Londres, 1670 (0114, 91, 120v., 144).
  Giffard, André, Merchand Anglois, natif de Londres: Naturalité, 13
Octobre 1661 (PP 151).

* Gourdon de Genouillac, Miles, Capitaine des Gendarmes Anglaise, tué à Cassel, 1677 (Champeaux, II, 152).

* Gourdon, *alias* Gordon, d'Huntly family, Genealogy (Bib. Maz., 4389 [1770]). (Blanchard, 339).

  Esmé, m. Catherine of Saint-Pierre-le Guillard de Bourges (4 June 1674) (Blanchard, 339). He had issue,

  Jean, (b. Bourges 1641-d. Versailles 19 February 1699),
  Architect at Versailles. He had issue,

  Gilbert, écuyer, (b. Versailles 14 March 1681), Capitain reformé au regiment de Bourbonnais et brigadier des Ingenieurs, 1709 (Blanchard, 339).

* Gourdon, N__, Sous-Lt. au regiment de Clerambault, blessé à Stafforde, 1690 (Champeaux, II, 151).

* Hamilton, Dame Elizabeth d', Comtesse de Grammont, Écossois, naturalité, 19 Septembre 1684 (PP 151 bis, 88).

* Hamilton d'Abercorne, Sir George, Maréchal de Comp, capitaine-Lt. des Gardes Anglaise, blessé à Entsheim, 1674, tué d'un coup de mousquet, près de Saverne, 1676 (Champeaux, II, 196).

* Hamilton, Sieur de, permission de voir milord Montjoye à la Bastille, 1691 (0135, 287).

Howard, Mylord, Tué au service de France, au siège de Luxembourg, 1684 (Champeaux, II, 226).


Leans, Jacques de, Anglois: Naturalité, 9 Septembre 1670 (PP 151).

* L'Esle Le Loy, François de, Écossois: naturalité, 1690 (0134, 196v).

* Livry [Lowry?], N__ de, Maréchal de logis des Gendarmes Écossais, blessé gravement à Cassel, 1677 (Champeaux, II, 345).

Lodens, N__, Agent en Hollande et en Angleterre, 1661 (C7101).

* Macaye, N__ [Hugh McKay of Scourie?], Ancien Garde-Marine Rochefort, 1 Septembre 1671: Licencé 18 Juillet 1671 (C1160-161):
  ? de Macaye, Lt. au regiment de Navarre, blessé à Sereif, 1674 (Champeaux, II, 370).


* Maclines [Maclean], Henri, Lt. du Roi et Colonel au regiment du Piémont,
blessé à Maëstrick, 1676 (Champeaux, II, 370).
Macquart, Rémi, Procureur du Roi en l'Élection de la Rochelle.
Enregistrer 28 Avril 1667 (Z1A564).
Macquart, Les Sieurs de, Lettres de noblesse, 29 Mars 1681 (Z1A571).
* Macquet [Mackay], Jacques, sommier de la Chapelle, 1682 (0126, 28).
* Macquet [Mackay], Louis, survivance de sommier de la Chapelle et
oratoire du roi, 1688 (0132, 340v).
* Macréée [MacRae], Jean, père et fils, port faix de la chambre, 1683 (0127, 97).
* Moncrié, Pierre de, confirmation de noblesse, 5 Mai 1679 (0124, 30v).
* Moncrié, Sieur de, commissaire ordinaire des guerres: don de lods et
ventes, 1680 (0124, 281v).
* Moncrié, ?, de, fils: gentilhomme de la manche [du roi], 1672 (0116, 258v).
Montaigiu, Milord, ordre de prévenir le roi quand il sera en France, 1685
(0129, 307v).
* Montet [Menteith], N__, Officier au regiment de Douglas [Douglas], tué à
l'assaut d'Echstein, 1675 (Champeaux, II, 475).
* Montgomery, Jean de, clerc du diocèse d'Avranches, pensionné par
l'archevêque d'Auch, 1684 (0128, 386).
* Montgomery, Sieur de, transféré de la Bastille au Fort l'Evêque, 1669
* Montgomery, N__, Eut l'époule cassée à Sintzheim, 1674 (Champeaux,
II, 478).
* Napier, Thomas, et Dozotée Lisle, sa femme, Anglois, 9 Septembre 1680
(PP 151 bis, 81).
Northumberland, Dom Charles de Dudley, duc de, Comte de Waruick,
Angloi; Robert Antoine et Charlotte Dudley ses enfants: Naturalité,
30 Juillet 1677 (PP 151).
O'Brien, ?, Enseigne des Gendarmes Anglais, blessée à Cassel
(Champeaux, III, 30).
Parcreur, Elizabeth, Angloise, naturalité, 1675 (0119, 259v).
* Passage, N__, Maréchal de logis des Gendarmes Écossais, blessé `a
Cassel, 1677 (Champeaux, III, 56).
Pedart, François et Thomas Pasquaille, Anglois: Naturalité, 23 Mai 1664
(PP 151).
Pontier, Gédéon, Prêtre Anglois,: Naturalité et permission de tenir
bénéfices, 9 Juin 1674 (PP 151).
Pople, Guillaume, Anglois: Naturalité, 26 Novembre 1672 (PP 151).
Price, Charles, Anglois: Naturalité, 22 Mai 1680 (PP 151).
* Ratery, Henry, bourgeois, c. 1722, son of 'feu Mr Henry Ratery, advocat en la cour et de demoiselle Jeanne Dubreuil', of Montauban (Pièces Originals 2437, 'Ratery', no. 54796).
* Ratery, Marc Antoine, of Montauban, brother german of Henry (above) (Pièces Originals 2437, 'Ratery', no. 54796).
Rirdan, I__ de, Maréchal de logis des gendarmes Anglaise, tué `a Cassel, 1677 (Champeaux, III, 189).
Roche, Louis Charles et Françoise, Anglois: Naturalité, 30 Juillet 1676 (PP 151).
Roche, Louis et Marc, Anglois: Naturalité, 20 Mai 1678 (PP 151).
Roche, Sieur, tailleur de la Reine d'Angleterre: permis de séjour à Londres, 1670 (0114, 144).
Rouph, a Norman family supposedly of English ancestry. It provided man yadvocates and military officers from the mid seventeenth century (Blanchard, 658).
* Ruterfort [Rutherford], Mdme, widow of Mr de Bezons, 'est présentée au roi à Pithiviers avec des Maures de l'un et l'autre sexe. Prendre mesures pour qu'ils soient instruits dans la religion catholique, 1684' (0128, 440).
* Scott de Funochon [Fumerchon], Jean Baptiste, 'pour le pouvoir d'une charge de preseident au parliamen de Roüen [14 mai 1692] (0136, 299).
* Seton, Sieur, Brigadier des garde du corps, 1679 (0123, 82): retenue d'exempt des garde du corps, 1691 (0135, 69v).
Smitz, Robert, anglois, naturalité, 1676 (0120, 294).
Stohien, Anne, Angloise: Naturalité, 29 Juin 1670 (PP 151).
* Stuart, Guillaume, Irlandois; Naturalité, 1696 (0140, 417).
* Stuart, Robert, Écossois, placet, 1694 (0138, 194); Pension, 17 Juin 1715 (0159, 95v).
Symon de Palmes et de Solémy, Noble Alexandre, (b.1683/4), said to come from a family of English ancestry, which provided many councilors to the chamber of aides in Marsailles and numerous officers to the French army (Blanchard, 704).
Thomesson, Hélène, Angloise: Naturalité, 11 Mai 1663 (PP 151).
Torner, Georges, Anglois: Naturalité, 11 Juillet 1681 (PP 151).
Tourner, Jean, Anglois: Naturalité, 4 Mars 1681 (PP 151).
* Valdrop, André, Écossois, naturalité, 1 Septembre 1663 (PP 151 bis, 48v).
Velington, Henry, Anglois, naturalité, 1 Février 1681 (PP 151 bis, 82).
Withley, Sieur, et sa femme, Anglois, sauf conduit pour le mois, 1686 (0130, 66).
Wuildegos, Guillaume, Anglois, lettre de maintenu et confirmation de noblesse, 12 Juin 1674 (PP 146 bis, 27v).
Zouche de la Lande, Alexandre-Pierre, écuyer, (b. Berry 1650/1) Officer and Ingenier from a family which pretended to be of English origin (Blanchard, 773).

Key
C1 - C7 = CARAN, Liste de la Marine.
011 - 01128 = CARAN, Secretariat de la Maison du Roi, 1601-1786.
PP 146 bis = CARAN, Chambre des Comptes de Paris; Anoblissements, Naturalités, Legitations, II, 1635-1742.
PP 15 bis = CARAN, Lettres Naturalité et de Legitimation, 1635-1787.
X1A21 = CARAN, Ordres de Conseil, 1671-1688.
Z1A03 = CARAN, Provisions d'Office et Anoblissements.
Appendix D: British Officer Commissions in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade and the Dutch Army, 1649-1691.

English Officers in Dutch Service

Ackersloe, Hugo, c. 1668.
Adams, Thomas, Provost of Bergen-op-Zoom. Commissioned 14/2/1659 (i, 142).
Allard, Peter (Pieter Allart), Provost of the fortress of Issendijk, in place of Joris Willis.
Commissioned 3/7/1685 (v, 103).
Applegate, William (Willem Appelget), Canoneer, in place of Matthias van der Lip.
Commissioned 5/11/1674 (iii, 178).
Archer, Francis, Sergeant Major of Colonel Fenick's regiment. Commissioned 8/2/1676;
Astley, Edward, Captain, by will of Petrus Watkin. Commissioned 8/3/1662; Sergeant Major, 1667; Colonel in place of Colonel Lillington. Commissioned 9/3/1676 (i, 194; iii, 33; iv, 21).
Astley, Isaac, c. 1659.
Astley, James, Captain, in place of Cromwell Claypool. Commissioned 11/3/1676; Captain,
in place of Captain and Colonel Lillington. Commissioned 26/5/1678 (iv, 22, 153).
Babington, Arthur, Captain, in place of Richard Richardson. Commissioned 19/9/1678 (iv, 159).
Babington, Phillip, (Philip Babington), Major, replacing Bartholomew Balfour as
commander of Bergen-op-Zoom. Commissioned ?? (v, 37, 133, 158).
Bacon, Michael, Captain of nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 4/3/1675 (iii, 208).
Baker, James (Jacob Baker), Captain, by will of Captain Meteren, in place of Captain Gordet.
Commissioned 5/4/1674 (iii, 134v).
Baker, George (Joris), c. 1678.
Ballantyne, Chevalier E., Captain, 1672 (ii, 198).
Ballantyne, Ridder William, Captain in Colonel Pain's regiment. Commissioned 25/1/1673;
Lt. Col. of Baron de Grijspere's regiment. Commissioned 3/2/1673 (iii, 14, 18).
Ballard, Francis (Francois Bailjaert), Captain, by will of Jacob van Paij. Commissioned
11/3/1659 (i, 146v).

Barnwall, Anthony, Captain, nieuwe Veringe. Commissioned 22/7/1674 (iii, 215).

Barnwall, Patrick, Captain, in place of Captain Mountford. Commissioned 2/9/1677 (iv, 113).

Barnwall, Peter, Captain, in place of Captain Mountford. Commissioned 1/9/1677 (iv, 113).

Barrington, ?, c. 1677.

Bartholomew, Frederick (Frederick Bartholomei), Apothecary, in place of Walterus Cruck.
Commissioned 23/12/1685 (v, 281).

Bellews, Andrew, Captain, in place of Jean de la Mon. Commissioned 26/6/1673; Captain, in place of Johan Catz. Commissioned 4/10/1674 (iii, 68, 162).

Bellasise, John, Captain, in place of William Bellasise. Commissioned 10/4/1681 (v, 12).

Bellasise, Henry (Henry Belasise), Sergeant Major of Henry Lillingstone's regiment.
Commissioned 7/12/1675; Lieutenant Colonel of Edward Astley's regiment. Commissioned 28/10/1676; Colonel in place of Edward Astley. Commissioned 22/3/1677 (iii, 244v; iv, 51, 89).

Bellasise, William, Captain, in place of Jacob Astley. Commissioned 29/4/1678; Captain, in place of Captain Tabott (Talbot). Commissioned 24/11/1678 (iv, 150, 166).

Bernards, John (Jean Bernacij), Captain, in place of Jasper Paston. Commissioned 3/12/1685 (v, 232).

Beveridge, William (Willem Beveridge), Captain, in place of Captain ?Frischijn.
Commissioned 30/1/1675 (iii, 203).

Blandon, Matthew, Captain. Commissioned 24/1/1679 (iv, 177).

Booth, William (Willem Booth), Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Philips Otto van Coaworden's regiment, of which he was formerly sergeant major. Commissioned 17/12/1675 (iii, 249).

Boxtel, George, c. 1676.


Browne, Matthew, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 17/4/1674 (iii, 135).

Brown, Peter, Captain, in place of Barent Zijghers. Commissioned 16/11/1676 (iv, 63).

Caddel, Thomas, Captain, by will of Colonel James Erskine. Commissioned 12/9/1655 (i, 86v).


Carpenter, Walter, Commissaris of ammunitions. Commissioned 18/10/1677 (iv, 118).

Carry, Ferdinand (Ferdinando Careij), Sergeant Major, by will of Brockwell Lloyd.
Commissioned 1/4/1658 (i, 123).

Carry, Matthew, Provost of Colonel John van Stockheijn's regiment. Commissioned 11/8/1673 (iii, 84).

Carry, William (Willem Carrij), Captain, in place and by will of Captain Ferdinand Carey. Commissioned 19/8/1673 (iii, 76v).

Carstairs, Matthew (Mattheus Caersteker), Captain, by will and in place of Captain and
Colonel Johan van Beveren. Commissioned 29/1/1674 (iii, 117).
Catz, John, Captain. Commissioned 21/9/1660 (i, 182v).
Cave, William, c. 1659.
Charleton, Jasper, Captain, in place of Captain John Morgan. Commissioned 17/5/1675 (iii, 228).
Claypool, Cromwell, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 7/2/1675 (iii, 204v).
Clinton, Robert (Robbert Cleijntont), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 27/9/1674 (iii, 161).
Coleman, Francis, Captain, in place of Captain Anselmus. Commissioned 16/10/1677 (iv, 118).
Coleman, Thomas, c. 1677.
Colombine, Ventris (Ventri Colombini), Captain, in place of Captain Stack. Commissioned 17/11/1679; Sergeant Major of Colonel Bellaissé's regiment. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 17/7/1688 (iv, 204; v, 169).
Colpeper, James, Captain, in place of John Abraham, by will of John Suitlandt. Commissioned 1/10/1661 (i, 183v).
Colpeper, James, Captain, in place of James Colpeper. Commissioned 16/6/1677 (iv, 118).
Colpeper, John, c. 1678.
Colve, Anthony, Sergeant Major, in place of Gilles de Mauregnault. Commissioned 22/7/1679 (v, 100, 194).
Corbet (Crabet), Gerrit, c. 1676.
Cootes, Frederick, c. 1677.
Cootes, George Robert (George Robbert Coutis), Captain, by will of Colonel Henderson. Commissioned 8/4/1662; Captain, in place of Ferdinand van Rabenhaust. Commissioned 29/11/1675 (i, 194; iii, 243).
Cootes, Joris Robert, Captain, by will of Colonel Henderson. Commissioned 8/4/1662 (i, 194).
Coventry, Henry, Captain, by will of Johann Coventry. Commissioned 7/4/1659 (i, 27, 147).
Croft, Charles, c. 1668.
Cromwell, M.H., Canoneer, 1665 (iii, 460).
Custer (Custers), Peter, c. 1677.
Custer (Custus), Zacharia, Captain of Captain Hillier's company. (v, 58).

Dillon, Thomas, Adjutant to Colonel Wesley's regiment. Commissioned 28/10/1677 (iv, 163).


Dolman, Thomas, Colonel, in place of John Cromwell. Commissioned 18/9/1663 (i, 221).


Easy (Esdai), Adam, c. 1659.

Engelby, William (Willem Engelbij), Sergeant Major of Oudewater; Captain, in place of Captain Daniel Boxtel. of Colonel Bamphlett's regiment. Commissioned 16/1/1673; Sergeant Major, due to the promotion of Philip de Saint Amant to colonel of the Grave van Horne's artillery. Commissioned 15/8/1689. (iii, 7, 57; v, 214).


Eton, Edward (Eduaert Eton), Ingenier, 1671; Ingenieur. Commissioned 7/2/1674 (iii, 68; iv, 119).

Eton, H., Doerwaerder, 1670 (iii, 126, 133).

Fawkes, John (John Fuikes), Captain, by will of Col. and Captain Astley. Formerly Lt. of Col. Bellasise's company. Commissioned 24/8/1689 (v, 11).

Fenick, John, Captain, in place of [not named]. Commissioned 3/9/1675 (iii, 235).

Ferrar, Quartermaster of Colonel Bellasise's regiment. Commissioned 12/11/1677 (iv, 122).

Fortman, James (James Fortman), Quartermaster, commissioner for Caspar Smits. Commissioned 12/10/1659 (i, 37).


Godfrey, P. (P. Godefroy), Surgeon, 1666 (ii, 94).

Goodwin, Robert (Robbert Goodwijn), Captain, in Col. Bellasise's regiment, in place of John O'Brian. Commissioned 29/7/1689 (v, 86).

Hair, William, c. 1660.


Haphardt (Hansard?), David, c, 1677.

Hatton, J. (J. van Hattun), Canoneer, 1665 (ii, 53).


Haughton, Henry, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 23/7/1674 (iii, 152).

Hawkins, James (Jacobus Herkens), (v, 35).

Hempell, Frederick, Sergeant Major and Captain of Col. Joachim Willemesen Paubergen's regiment. Commissioned 29/1/1689 (v, 196, 197).

Hend, William, c. 1659.

Hennings, James, (Jacobus Henninges), Schoolmaster. s'Hertogenboesch. Commissioned
8/7/84. (v, 84).
Herbert, Henry, c. 1659.
Hervey, William, c. 1678.
Heyn, Albert, Captain, by will of Captain Rampton. Commissioned 21/8/1673 (iii, 153v).
Hillier, Richard, Captain, in place of James Berry. Commissioned 7/1/1676 (v, 6).
Honneywood, Robert (Robbert Honiwood), Ritmeister. Repartitie van Holland. Commissioned 23/7/1659 (i, 151v).
Howe, Emanuel Scroop, Captain, in place of Charles Hara. Commissioned 29/6/1686 (v, 121).
Ingilby, John, c. 1659.
Ingilby, William, Quartermaster, 1666; Captain, 1671 (ii, 257, 347).
Ingram, Robert, Sergeant Major of Colonel Macdowall's regiment. Commissioned 1/1/1677 (iv, 177).
Jackson, Robert (Robbert Jackson), Captain, replacing Patrick Bernewall. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 26/6/1688. (v, 165).
Kemp, John (Johan Kemp), Commissioner under Heere Lurst van Waldeck. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 3/2/1689. (v, 198).
Kettleby, Charles (Charles Kittelbij), Captain, by will and in place of Adiaen van Aersen. Commissioned 20/1/1674 (iii, 114).
Killigrew, Thomas, Captain, by will of Captain John More. Commissioned 2/4/1656 (i, 94).
Killigrew, William (Willem Kilgreij), Captain, by will of Captain Stanton. Commissioned 9/5/1659 (i, 149).
Knight, James, c. 1677.
Lacy, Edward (Edij Laciij), Captain. Commissioned 20/3/1675 (iii, 213).
Lake, A. (A. Lancko), Captain, 1664 (ii, 379).
Lake, Henry, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 20/10/1674 (iii, 164).
Lake, John (Johan Luck), Surgeon of the regiment of Horse Guards of the Prince of Orange. Commissioned 23/11/1675 (iii, 241v).
Lambert, Henry, Captain of the nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 6/3/1673 (iii, 30v).
Latham, Humphrey (Humphrij Lauham), Captain, by will of Col. Thomas Monck. Commissioned 1/7/1682 (v, 43).
Lee, Patrick, c. 1677.
Lely, Peter (Pieter Lelie), Provost of Colonel La...gaede's regiment. Commissioned 1/1/1674 (iii, 227).
Lillingston, Henry (Henry Lellingsthoen), Colonel of a new English regiment. Commissioned 29/1/1675 (iii, 203).
Lillingston, Luke, Captain, in place of Captain Bacon. Commissioned 18/2/1676. Captain,
replacing Captain Bellasise. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 4/12/1683 (iv, 17; v, 68).

Lince, William, c. 1678.

Lloyd, Brockwel, Sergeant Major, in Baron Cravan's regiment, by will of Captain Henry Wittepoll. Commissioned 20/7/1657 (i, 109v).

Lloyd, Edward (Eduard Llojed), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 2/7/1674; Sergeant Major of Colonel Thomas Monck's regiment. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 4/6/1685. (i, 6; iii, 149v; (v, 101).

Lloyd, John, c. 1677.

Lloyd, Godfrey (Godfried Lloyd), Quartermaster general, 1668; Captain, in place of Captain Rose, in the Prince of Orange's regiment of Guards. Commissioned 22/12/1674; Captain, in place of Lieutenant Colonel Archer. Commissioned 9/12/1678 (ii, 164; iii, 177; iv, 172).

Lloyd, Owen, Captain, in place of Thomas Storck. Commissioned 19/4/1678 (iv, 149).

Lloyd, Peter (Pieter Floyd), Ingenier, 1666; Captain, 1671 (ii, 128, 362).

Lloyd, William (Willem Floyd), Provost, 1667; Captain, in place of Jasper Carlton. Commissioned 12/9/1678 (ii, 28; iv, 157).

Lucas, D., Canoneer, 1666 (ii, 190).

Lucas, James (Jacob Lucas), Commissaris of the ammunition of the fort of Ghent, by will of Everard Everwijn. Commissioned 5/12/1653 (i, 56).

Lutton, Charles (Charles Looten), Captain, by will of Captain Alexander Hay. Formerly vondrig to Captain Hugo Ackerston. Commissioned 10/3/1673 (iii, 27v).

Mallory, Christopher (Christoffel Mallerij), Adjutent to Baron Thiesenhause's regiment. Commissioned 24/5/1690. (v, 256).

Mallet, Gabriel, Captain, in place of Grave van Fogelaert. Commissioned 5/11/1676 (iv, 56).

Manly (Mayne), Anthony, Captain. Commissioned 13/4/1674 (iii, 147).

Manly, John, c. 1659.

Manning, John, (Johan Manninga), Captain, by will of Captain and Colonel Wibolt van ?Ysselmyden. Commissioned 11/3/1663 (i, 211).

Mings, Samuel (Samuel Minnes/Innes), Provost of the soldiers of fort Coerverden, in place of Hillebrand van Steenvoordeen. Commissioned 27/12/1673 (iii, 112).

Mogge, Leonard, Captain, by will of Captain Everhart Le Lion. Commissioned 10/12/1653 (i, 56).

Monck, Thomas, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 9/7/1674; Sergeant Major of Colonel Astley's regiment, in place of Henry Bellasise. Commissioned 27/11/1676; Lieutenant Colonel, in place of Henry Bellasise. Commissioned 26/3/1677; Colonel, replacing Colonel Wesley. (iii, 150; iv, 69, 90; v, 36).

Montague, John de la, Adjutant to Prince Maurice van Nassau's regiment. Commissioned 28/11/1675 (iii, 243).

Mordaunt, James, c. 1676.
Mordaunt, John (John Mordent), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 7/2/1675 (iii, 204).
Mordaunt, Robert (Robbert Mordaunt), Captain, by will of Captain and Colonel John
Cromwell. Commissioned 19/8/1663 (i, 221v).
Morgan, Charles, Captain, by will of Captain John Woulkhear (Walker). Commissioned
16/2/1654 (i, 60v).
Morgan, Emanuel, Canoeine, in place of Berent Janz. Commissioned 28/10/1674 (iii, 168).
Morgan, John, c. 1677.
Morgan, Thomas, Captain, by will of Colonel Morgan. Commissioned 13/2/1650 (i, 20).
Morris, John (Johan Morris), Captain of nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 19/5/1672 (iii, 37).
Mortimer, James (Jacobus Mortemer), Adjutant of Hendrick Vylde, grave van Reuse's regiment.
Commissioned 10/12/1675 (iii, 246v).
Morton, George, c. 1659.
Mountain, Arthur, Captain, in place of Captain and Colonel van Leeuwen. Commissioned
22/9/1676 (iv, 54).
Mountford, Henry, Captain, in place of Henry Pladt [?Plot]. Commissioned 21/1/1676 (iv, 10).
Nevil, John (Johan Nevile), Captain, in place of William Carnock. Commissioned 27/3/1688
(v, 156).
Norwood, Ralph, c. 1659.
Note, Samuel, Major and Commissaris, by will of Barent van Naarden. Commissioned
18/1/1651 (i, 33v).
Ogle, Cornelius (Crn. Ogle), Captain, by will of Captain and Colonel John Cromwell.
Commissioned 9/9/1663 (i, 221).
Ogle, Thomas (Thomas Ogele), Captain of an English company of Foot. Commissioned
19/3/1656; Sergeant Major, by will of Captain Evert Stuardt, of Colonel Sidney's regiment.
Commissioned 7/5/1660 (i, 91v, 161).
Okeover, Humphrey, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 19/12/1674 (iii, 190).
Pagun, Charles, Sergeant Major of the state of Nijmwegen. Commissioned 1/12/1674 (iii,
183).
Parson, Andrew (Andries Persoon), Sergeant Major. Commissioned 18/6/1658 (i, 126v).
Parson, Robert (Robbert Parson), Sergeant Major of Col. Canon's regiment. Commissioned
19/12/1685 (v, 108).
Parsons, William, Captain, in place of Lt. Col. and Captain Haile's company. Repartitie van
Hollandt. Commissioned 12/6/1685 (v, 101).
Paston, Caspar (Gaspar Paston), Captain, replacing Danial MacGillicuddy. Repartitie van
Hollandt. Commissioned 29/7/1684. (v, 86).
Penfold, Francis (Franchois Penford), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 22/1/1675 (iii,
201).
Pentland, William, c. 1659.
Peyton, Humphrey, Lieutenant Colonel, by will of Captain Henry Wijne, Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Killigrew's regiment. Commissioned 14/8/1658 (i, 132).

Pierson, Robert, Captain, in place of Captain Carry. Commissioned 21/9/1677 (iv, 197).
Plot, Henry, Captain. Commissioned 18/6/1674 (iii, 147).
Pool, Frederick William (Frederick Willem Pool), Captain, in place of Baron Stuebeck. Commissioned 14/6/1677; Sergeant Major of Col. Delwick's regiment. Commissioned 22/1/1691 (iv, 101; v, 284).

Pye, James, c. 1659.

Rampton, John (Johan Rampton), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 23/7/1674 (iii, 152).

Richardson, Richard, Captain, Commissioned 22/1/1675 (iii, 201).
Rochwel, Gabriel, Adjutant to Col. Ignatius Kingsma's regiment. Commissioned 26/10/1673 (ii, 97).

Roper, Ferdinand, c. 1664.
Roper, John, Sergeant Major to Colonel Dolman's regiment. Commissioned 18/9/1663 (i, 221).
Roper, Matthew (Mathijs Roper), Adjutant to Grave van Berl's regiment of dragoons. Commissioned 22/11/1688 (v, 209, 266).
Roper, Thomas, Captain, in place of William Rorre van Amerongen. Formerly Lieutenant in Jeremias Roper's company. Commissioned 16/5/1673 (iii, 67).

Rouse, Adrian, c. 1677.

Rouse (Rousch), William, Captain (iv, 88).

Sasbery, Thomas, c. 1677.


Savage, Philip, Captain nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 18/6/1674 (iii, 147).


Scrope, Gervais, Captain, in place of Arthur Barnwell. Commissioned 13/10/1676 (iv, 48).

Sear, A., Lt. Col., 1665 (ii, 6).

Sear, Albert (Albert Siers), Quartermaster of Prince Ferdinand van Nassau's regiment. Commissioned 1/2/1675 (iii, 204).

Sear, John (Johan Sair), Lieutenant Colonel, in place of Robert Sidney. Commissioned 27/3/1655 (i, 81v).


Sheldon, John (John Schelton), Captain, in place of William Lloyd. Commissioned 3/12/1685

Smith, Gerrit, c. 1659.

Smith, Richard (Richart Smith), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 31/1/1675 (iii, 203).

Smith, Richard Nevil, Captain, in place of Captain Mordaunt. Commissioned 31/3/1676 (iv, 28).


Spencer, William (Willem Spenser), Ordinarius edelman vant canon, in place of Adrean van Reede. Commissioned 14/2/1674 (iii, 124).


Stanton, Francis (Francois Stanton), Sergeant Major, by will of Captain Saijes, sergeant major and Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Sidney's regiment. Commissioned 14/3/1656 (i, 92).

Stone, Sir Robert (Sir Robbert Stone), (v, 101v).

Stone, Thomas, Captain, in place of John MacElligott. Commissioned 7/1/1676 (iv, 6).

Storck, Frederick, Auditor of ?Hulst. Commissioned 26/6/1658 (i, 127v).

Straton, ?, c. 1680.

Suckling, John (Johan Sicklinghe), Rittmeister. Commissioned 8.2.1672 (iii, 49).

Suffolk, Charles, Captain, in place of Baron de Scherin. Commissioned 10/5/1678 (iv, 154).


Sutton, David (Davidt Souten), Major 'vierwercker' of S'Landt. Commissioned 31/1/1673 (iii, 16, 17).

Tait, William, c. 1659.

Talbot, John, c. 1677.


Taylor, William, Captain, in place of Owen Lloyd. Commissioned 18/12/1680 (iv, 241).

Temple, Roger, c. 1659.

Temple, Sandis, Captain, in place of Captain and Colonel Fenick. Commissioned 14/1/1677 (iv, 79).

Throckmorton, Herbert, c. 1659.

Throckmorton, William (Willem Throchmorton), Captain, by will of Captain Breden. Commissioned 27/12/1674 (iii, 194).

Tissott, Simon, Schoolmaster of s'Hertogenbosch. Commissioned 18/7/1679 (iv, 194v).
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Tollemarche, Thomas (Thomas Tollmarch), Captain, replacing Col. and Captain Thomas Monck. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 24/3/1688. (v, 156).

Vane, Walter, Major ende wachtmeester over de infanterie. Commissioned 18/6/1674 (iii, 148).

Venner, Thomas, c. 1680.


Villers, John (Johan Viller), Captain, in place of Godefroy Man van Swartzestein 30/11/1673 (iii, 103).

Walkers, Gerald, Provost of Colonel Mackay's regiment. Commissioned 27/1/1678 (iv, 140).


Walsingham, Thomas, Captain, in place of Captain Straton. Commissioned 26/10/1678 (iv, 162).

Walter, Frederick, Quartermaster of Ernst Christophel van Marwitz's regiment. Commissioned 16/8/1691 (v, 309).

Watkin, John, Captain, in place of Philippe de St. Armand. Commissioned 17/11/1678 (iv, 167).

Watkin, Peter (Petrus Watkin), Captain, in place of Johan Watkin. Commissioned 8/3/1662 (i, 194).

Wats, James, Captain, in place of Captain Coleman. Commissioned 7/7/1679 (iv, 175).


Wesley, Edward, Captain, in place of Caesar Edward de Basogen. Commissioned 31/10/1676 (iv, 53).

Wesley, Patrick (Patricius Wesleyi), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 24/1/1675; Lieutenant Col of Colonel Fenick's regiment. Commissioned 5/3/1676; Captain, in place of Captain Whitehead. Commissioned 5/12/1676; Colonel in place of Colonel Fenick. Commissioned 26/11/1676 (iii, 201; iv, 20, 55, 92).


Whithead, Nicholas (Nicolaes Whithead), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 7/2/1675 (iii, 204).

Widdrington, Thomas, Captain, in place of Captain Lake. Commissioned 31/12/1677; Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Macdowall's regiment. Commissioned 31/21/1677 (iv, 134, 135).

Wingrave, Charles, Quartermaster of Colonel Fenick's regiment. Commissioned 9/10/1676 (iv, 47).
Wolsey, S., Quartermaster, 1666; Ingenier, 1669 (ii, 122, 441).
Wylde, Anthony, Captain, by will of Captain Henry Wylde. Commissioned 31/8/1656; Sergeant Major, of Colonel Kirkpatrick's regiment, in place of Major Everwijn Kirkpatrick, now Lieutenant Colonel of the same regiment. Commissioned 19/7/1673 (i, 98v; iii, 76).
Wylde, Herman de, Captain, in place of Godert Frederick van Reede. Commissioned 5/10/1673 (iii, 94).

Scottish Officers in Dutch Service

Aikman, Albert (Albert Aickma), Captain, by will of Captain Albert Bonnema. Commissioned last/1/1656 (i, 89v).
Aikman, Francis (Frans Ackma), Commissaris van Monsterringe. Commissioned 26/3/1651 (i, 32).
Alison, John (John Ellerson), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 11/7/1674 (iii, 150).
Balfour, Bartholomew (Bartholomew/Bartbolt Balfour), Captain, 1672; Captain, in place of François de Conde, called de Marigny. Commissioned 14/11/1676; Sergeant Major, in place of Johan Alexander Lauder. Commissioned 25/1/1678; Captain, in place of Sergeant Major de Savory. Commissioned 16/3/1678; Lt. Col. of Col. Kirkpatrick's regiment. Commissioned 5/12/1678; Colonel, in place of Major General and Colonel John Kirkpatrick. Provincie van Hollandt. Commissioned 16/9/1689; Major and Commander of Breda. Commissioned 11/10/1681 (iii, 43; iv, 63, 140, 145, 171; v, 24, 75, 43).
Balfour, Bertholt, c. 1677.
Balfour, Henry, Captain, by will and in place of Colonel and Captain James Kirkpatrick. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 6/5/1683 (v, 75).
Balfour, J., Captain, 1672 (iii, 64).
Balfour, James (Jacob Balfour), Officer in Colonel Hoffwegen's regiment. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 12/2/1689 (v, 198v).
Balfour, Patrick, Captain, in place and by will of Captain Cox. Commissioned 25/7/1673; Sergeant Major of heer van Hoffwegen's regiment. Commissioned 18/10/1677; Major and Commandant of Bergen-op-Zoom. Commissioned 29/7/1689; Lieutenant Colonel of the Edelen Gestrenger heer van Hoffwegen, replacing Baron van Gent. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 4/1/1689 (iii, 79; iv, 119; v, 86, 201).
Balfour, Philippe, Captain. Commissioned 20/5/1672 (iii, 41).
Barry, Charles, c. 1677.
Beaton, Gervais (Servais Baeten), Commissaris of Rijnberck, by will of Johannes Heerman. Commissioned 1/11/1655 (i, 88).

Bellew, Andrew (Andraes Bellous), Captain, in place of Johan Cats. Commissioned 4/10/1674 (iii, 162).

Bias, William, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 14/3/1675 (iii, 210).

Blair, John (Johan Blair), Captain, in place of William Sneller. Commissioned 22/4/1675 (iii, 221).


Bruce, Alexander, Sergeant Major, in place of Louis Erskine. Commissioned 7/8/1660 (i, 165v).

Bruce, Alexander, Captain, in place of Kohn Pyll. Commissioned 29/5/1677 (iv, 99).

Bruce, Andrew (Andreas Bruce), Ritmeister, in place of Robert Lennox. Commissioned 26/9/1673 (iii, 92v).

Bruce, count Charles, Captain, in place of Captain Bruce. Commissioned 1/5/1679 (iv, 188).

Bruce, John, Captain, in place of Johan de Maurignau. Commissioned 21/1/1677 (iv, 104).

Bruce, Robert, Captain, in place of Patrick Wesley. Commissioned 12/11/1676 (iv, 62).

Buchan, John (Johan Bouchan), Captain, in place of John Douglas. Commissioned 7/12/1678; Captain, in place of Hugh MacKay as Sergeant Major. Commissioned 13/1/1683 (iv, 172; v, 49).

Buchanan, John (Johan Buchanan), Quartermaster of Colonel Daniel de Forsay's regiment. Commissioned 5/10/1689. (v, 232v).


Carnock, George, Captain, in place of Captain Scheel. Commissioned 16/3/1675; Sergeant Major of Henry Graham's regiment, in place of Alexander Coliert. Commissioned 16/3/1675 (iii, 212).

Carnock, George (George Conocque), Ingenier, 1669; Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 13/12/1673; Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Frederick de Backer's regiment. Commissioned 13/12/1673 (iii, 106; iii, 36).

Carnock, William (William Cannock), Captain of Sergeant Major and Captain Snejard's (?Seward) company. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 19/12/1685. (i, 147; (v, 108).

Caw, James, Captain, in place of Captain Prince Frederick van Nassau. Commissioned 28/9/1676 (iv, 43).

Caw, Jasper, Captain, under prince Frederick van Nassau. Commissioned 28/9/1676 (iv, 43).

Chisholm, Maurits. c. 1670.

Clerk, Derek (Dirck Clercq), Officer of Colonel van Deden's regiment, Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 1/2/1689. (v, 197).

Clerk, John, Captain, in place of Sergeant Major Colier. Commissioned 1/5/1679 (iv, 188).

Clerk, Leonard (Lenaert Cletz), Ordinarius Boden. Commissioned 19/2/1653 (i, 47).
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Colier, Alexander (Alexander Colier), Lieutenant in Lieutenant Colonel Lauder's company of Colonel Balfour's regiment. Commissioned 7/11/1661; Sergeant Major, due to the promotion of John Lamy. Commissioned 1/4/1673; Adjutant General of the army to His Highness the Prince of Orange. Commissioned 27/9/1673; Captain, in place of Sergeant Major Macdowell. Commissioned 26/10/1676 (iv, 51). (i, 187v; iii, 48, 93, 200).

Colier, David (David Colijera), Lieutenant Colonel of Col. Mackay's regiment, in place of Thomas Buchan. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 14/1/1683. (v, 49).

Colier, John, Sergeant Major of Colonel Mackay's regiment. Commissioned 16/11/1677 (iv, 123).

Colier, Justinius (Justinius Colier), Advocate. Commissioned 12/2/1661 (i, 173v).

Colier, Thomas (Thomas Colyaer), Captain of Lieutenant Colonel James Erskine's company. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 17/12/1682. (v, 131).

Colier, Walter Phillip, Captain, in place of Godfrey Lloyd. Commissioned 10/11/1678 (iv, 166).

Comyn, John, c. 1677.

Cunningham, Frederick, c. 1678.

Cunningham, John (Johan Cunningham), Sergeant Major of Col. Balfour's regiment, in place of Thomas Livingstone. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned (n.d.). (v, 75).


Dalyell, Thomas (Thomas Daleijell), Captain, in place of Captain Wauchope. Proventie van Holladt. Commissioned 18/7/1681. (v, 21).

Dalyell, T., Schoolmaster, 1664 (iii, 217).


Douglas, George, Captain, in place of Alexander Flemming. Commissioned 14/2/1654 (i, 59).

Douglas, James (James de Douglas), Captain of the company commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mackay; Sergeant Major of Colonel Colier's regiment, in place of Maximillian Macdowell. Commissioned 3/12/1676; Captain of Foot, by will of Alexander Colier. Commissioned 22/3/1680 (iii, 188; iv, 55, 222).

Douglas, John, Captain, in place of Captain Champfleury. Commissioned 3/12/1677; Captain, in place of Walter Bowie. Commissioned 29/11/1687 (iv, 127; v, 147v-8).

Douglas, Robert (Robbert Douglas), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 21/5/1675 (iii, 228).

Douglas, William (Willem Douglas), Captain, in place of heer van Valkenberg. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 11/10/1681; Captain, in place of Lord Bruce. Commissioned 6/10/1682 (v, 24, 47).

Elphingston, William (Willem Elphingston), Adjutant General of the army to Prince Johann
Maurice of Nassau. Commissioned 7/4/1673; Captain, in place of Captain and Lieutenant Colonel Johan van Passenrode. Commissioned 7/9/1673; Sergeant Major of Johan Maurits van Nassau's regiment, in place of Melchior Mackwitz. Commissioned 14/12/1673 (iii, 49v, 88, 106).

Erskine, Henry, Lord Cardross (Henri  Lord Cardross), Captain, in place of George Ramsay.

Repertitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 29/3/1688. (v, 156v).

Erskine, James (James Arskine/ J. van Arskyn), ?Captain. Commissioned 21/2/1659; Major, 1666; Captain, by will of Colonel Walter Scott 14/1673; Lieutenant Colonel of Nicholas Ferdinand Zobel's regiment. Commissioned 24/4/1676 (i, 143; iii, 48; iii, 323; iv, 168).


Erskine, Thomas (Thomas Arskine), Captain, by will of Colonel Erskine, in place of Jacob Rogier. Commissioned 7/12/1672; Captain, in place of John Hackett. Commissioned 30/1/1676. Commissioned; Captain, replacing James Middleton. Repertitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 20/8/1686. (iii, 2; iv, 14; v, 119).

Fergusson, James (Jacob Ferguson), Clerk in ordinary to the Raad van Stadt. Commissioned 13/1/1665; Captain, replacing George Hamilton. Repertitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 1/4/1687. (i, 206; v, 157).

Finlay, J., Captain, 1671 (ii, 256).

Flemming, William, Captain, by will of Lieutenant Colonel Livingstone. Commissioned 11/5/1645 (i, 9).


Forret, Hubert (Huibert Foejaert), Captain. Pruvincie van Gelderland. Commissioned 10/8/1690. (v, 259).

Forret, J.P. (J.P. van Forest), Captain, 1672 (ii, 386).

?Fraser, James (Jacob de Freese), Povost of Aerdenbosch, in place of Hendrick de Freese. Commissioned 14/4/1676 (iv, 30).

Fullerton, Osbert (Gijsbert Fulleteen), Quartermaster of Baron Halude's regiment. Commissioned 19/8/1689. (v, 230v).

Fullerton, William (Willem Fulleken), Quartermaster of Colonel van Heuculun's regiment. Commissioned 28/2/1690. (v, 250).

Gardin, Michael, Quartermaster of the Marquis de Montpouillian's regiment. Commissioned 13/10/1677 (iv, 116).

Gardiner, B. (B. Gardinier), Canoneer, 1669 (ii, 128).

Gardiner, J.R. (J.R. van Gardinier), Canoneer, 1671 (ii, 183).

Gibson, John (Jhone Gibson/ Jan Gibson), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 19/3/1675; Captain, in place of Thomas Colier. Commissioned 27/8/1687; Sergeant Major of Col. Zobel's regiment. Repertitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 7/4/1687. (iii, 213v; v,

Gordon, James (James Guordon), Provost of Frederick Ferdinand, Baron von Steijn's cavalry regiment. Commissioners (cancelled) 14/10/1691. (v, 318).


Gosford, John (Jan Gusfart), Lieutenant of a company of young cadets under the command of Captain Laurence de Frenay. Provincie van Zeelandt. Commissioners 10/8/1691. (v, 284).


Graham, Henry (Hendrick Graham), Sergeant Major, due to the advancement of Alan Couttis, in the regiment Colonel John Henderson. Commissioners 7/3/1662; Colonel of Foot, in place of Colonel Walter Scott. Commissioners 1/4/1673 (I, 193; III, 48, 81).

Graham, John (Johan Graham), Provost of Colonel Henry Graham's regiment. Commissioners 8/4/1673; Captain, by will of Colonel Salisbury. Commissioners 17/1/1680 (III, 50; IV, 213).


Grant, P.J. (P.J. de Grand), Canonner, 1665 (II, 502).

Gray, John, Adjutant to Colonel Disney's regiment. Commissioners 8/1/1676 (IV, 9).

Hailes, John (John Hajiiles), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioners 18/5/1675; Captain, in place of Sergeant Major Plunket. Commissioners 28/7/1679; Lt. Col. of Col. Canon's regiment. Commissioners 2/6/1685 (III, 227v; IV, 196; V, 100).

Hackett, J., Captain, 1671 (II, 123).

Hackett, J.G., Captain, 1671 (II, 119).

Hackett, Maurice (Maurits Halquet/Maurits Hacquet), Captain, by will of Thomas Caddel. Commissioners 11/9/1660 (I, 165; III, 80).

Hamilton, Gavin, Captain, in place of Captain John Buchan. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioners 20/9/1685. (V, 63).


Hamilton de Guicherie, H, Sergeant Major, 1665 (II, 540).

Hamilton, J., Captain, 1665 (II, 433).


Harris, J, Captain, 1665 (II, 384).

Hay, Alexander, Captain, in place of Peter Blous (IV, 107).
Hay, John, Captain, by will of James Henderson. Commissioned 14/4/1659 (i, 148v).
Hay, William (Willem Heij), Rittmeister, by will of heere van Waldeck. Commissioned last/6/1660 (i, 161v).
Henderson, James, Captain, by will of Captain Patrick Stuart. Commissioned 18/5/1656 (i, 94v).
Henderson, John (Johan Henserdon), Colonel, by will of John Henderson. Commissioned 8/6/1660 (i, 162).
Hume, Albert (Aelbert Hum), Captain, in place of Jean Baptiste Bernardson de Reese. Commissioned 20/12/1673 (iii, 108).
Hume, George, Rittmeister, in place of Alexander Abercromy. Commissioned 31/1/1654 (i, 57).
Irvine, Everard (Everard Everwijn), Captain. Commissioned 20/3/1674; Sergeant Major, in place of the now Lieutenant Colonel Wynbergen. Commissioned 25/1/1677 (iii, 130; iv, 80).
Ivory, Maximillian, Commander of the fortress of Schenckeshauen. Commissioned 2/3/1680 (iv, 219).
Kerr, George (George Kier), Sergeant Major, due to the promotion of sergeant major Walter Murray to Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Walter Scott’s regiment. Commissioned 2/4/1655 (i, 82).
Kerr, Peter (Pieter Kier), Captain, by will of Charles Forret. Commissioned 17/5/1649 (i, 8).
Kerr, William, Captain, by will of Colonel Drummond. Commissioned 13/9/1655 (i, 86).
Kinmond, Patrick (Patrick Kinmon), Lieutenant Colonel of 7 companies of Foot. Commissioned 16/1/1674; Captain, in place of Captain Fairwell (Farrell). Commissioned 27/4/1679 (iii, 112v; iv, 186).
Kirkpatrick, Conrad, Sergeant Major of Grave Lodvijk Frederick van Nassau’s regiment. Commissioned 18/9/1677 (iv, 114).
Kirkpatrick, John, Sergeant Major, by will of Captain William Riddel, of Colonel Kirkpatrick’s regiment. Commissioned 21/7/1662 (i, 7200v).
Lamer, Maurits, c. 1659.
Lamer, Walter (Wauter Lameer), Canoneer, in place of Thomas Le Meer, his father. Commissioned 22/9/1653 (i, 54).
Lamy, Alexander, Captain, in place of Andrew Bruce (iv, 101).
Lamy, John, Captain, by will of Johan Suttlandt. Commissioned 1/10/1661; Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Graham’s regiment, replacing the now colonel. Commissioned 1/4/1673 (iii, 48).
Lauder, A., Captain, 1672 (ii, 63).
Lauder, George, Captain, in place of James Murray. Commissioned 21/3/1654; Lieutenant
Colonel by will of Walter Murray, Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Scott's regiment. Commissioned 21/9/1657 (i, 60, 110).

Lauder, George, Captain, in place of Jahn Alexander Lauder. Commissioned 5/12/1678; Sergeant Major of Col. Balfour's regiment. Commissioned 13/12/1685 (iv, 170; v, 107v-8).


Laurie, James, Adjutant to Col. Philip Otto van Coevoorden's regiment. Commissioned 9/12/1676 (iv, 72).


Leith, J. (J. van Lith), Auditor, 1666 (ii, 218).

Lesley, William, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 18/6/1674 (iii, 147).

Lindsey, William (William Lindesey), Lieutenant of Colonel Kirkpatrick's company and captain in place and by will of William Riddel. Commissioned 11/7/1662 (i, 200v).

Livingstone, Alexander, Captain, in place of Alexander Hay. Commissioned 10/5/1679 (iv, 189).

Livingstone, John (Johan Lvinston), Quartermaster of Colonel William Balantyne's regiment. Commissioned 27/11/1674 (iii, 181).

Livingstone, Thomas (Thomas Livingstone), Vendrig of the company of Captain and Colonel Livingstone, and captain in his place. Commissioned 19/7/1673; Sergeant Major of Colonel Kirkpatrick's regiment, in place of Bartholomew Balfour. Commissioned 5/12/1678; Sergeant Major, promoted to Lieutenant Colonel to replace Bartholomew Balfour, who had been promoted to Colonel of his regiment. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 18/2/1689 (i, 162; iii, 77; iv, 171; v, 75).

Livingstone, Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Kirkpatrick's regiment. Commissioned 11/6/1660 (i, 162).

Lockhart, Adam van, Captain, in place of Passchasinus Turcq. Commissioned 12/11/1674 (iii, 170v).

Lyon, D., Canoneer, 1666 (ii, 256).

Lyon, E.C., Lieutenant Colonel, 1669 (ii, 218).

Lyon, J., Canoneer, 1665 (ii, 286).


Macdougall, John, Captain replacing Walter Bowie. Provintie van Gelderland. Commissioned 29/10/1687. (v, 147).

Macdougall, Maximillian, c. 1676.

Macdougall, William (Willame Macdowel), Sergeant Major of Colonel Scott's regiment, and
Mackay, Hugo (Hugo de Macquaij/Hugo Makaij), Captain, in place of Lieutenant Colonel and Captain Balantine. Commissioned 19/3/1675; Lieutenant Colonel of the Scottish regiment, in place of Alexander Colier. Commissioned 19/3/1675; Colonel and Capt. of Colonel Graham's regiment and company. Commissioned 27/8/1677/Colonel, appointed Sergeant Major general 'over de Infantereye voor Nederl. Commissioned 7/2/1686. (iii, 213v; iv, 112, 113; v, 111).
Mackay, James (Jacob Maechaij), Captain, in place of Hugo Mackay. Commissioned 12/1/1678; Sergeant Major of Colonel Wauchope's regiment. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 18/9/1687. (iv, 137; v, 142).
Mackay, ?N. (?N. de Mackay), Provost, 1670 (ii, 161).
MacLean, Lachlan (Lacklame Macklijn), Captain, replacing John Abraham. Repartitie van Gelderlandt. Commissioned 16/12/1681. (v, 30).
MacRae, Rory, Provost of Colonel Colier's regiment. Commissioned 3/1/1674 (iv, 100).
Maxwell, Thomas, Captain, by will of Alexander Colier. Commissioned 5/4/1680 (iv, 224).
Mellis, Henry (Henry Moelis), Sergeant Major, by will of sergeant major Humphrey Peyton, Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Killigrew's regiment. Commissioned 7/10/1658 (i, 134v).
Montgomery, Arnold, c.1677.
Mure, A., Schoolmaster, 1664 (ii, 13).
Mure, James (Jacob Meurs), (iii, 170).
Mure, John Philips (Johan Philips Mohr), Colonel of a regiment of voetknechte, replacing Daniel de Forsay. Commissioned 7/6/1690. (v, 266v).
Mure, John (Johan de Moor/ Jan Meurs), Adjutent of Colonel Bulow's regiment. Commissioned 30/6/1690. (iii, 83; v, 270).
Mure, John Philip (Jan Philips Mor), Captain, in place of Captain Steenbergh. Commissioned 7/10/1678 (iv, 161).
Mure, Patrick (Patrick Mohr), Captain, nieuwé veringe. Commissioned 12/5/1674 (iii, 143).
Mure, William (Meurs), Captain, in place of Caesar Duijck. Commissioned 2/2/1677 (iv, 106).
Murray, John (Johan Murrai), Captain, in place of Captain Joris Douglas. Commissioned 23/7/1655 (i, 85).
Murray, John, Captain, by will and in place of Sergeant Major Wylde. Commissioned 9/11/1674 (iii, 170).
Murray, Walter, Lieutenant Colonel of Walter Scott's regiment. Commissioned 27/5/1655 (i, 80v).
Murray, William, Captain, in place of William Wachop. Commissioned 5/10/1676 (iv, 50).
Neil, J. (J. de Neel), Captain, (ii, 151).
Neil, Michael (Michiel Neel), Captain, in place of Captain Jan Neel, of Colonel Mauregnaule's regiment. Commissioned 27/4/1673 (iii, 57).
Nisbet, William (Willem Niset), Comptroller of the regionel contributions from Luxemburg, Lorraine etc. Commissioned 4/1/1689. (v, 194).
Ochterlony, Henry Alexander, Captain, in place of Hendrick Verloss. Commissioned 22/3/1680 (iv, 222).
Oliphant, J. (J. Lisfot), Procureur, 1664 (ii, 419).
Oliphant, H., Schoolmaster, 1670 (ii, 49).
Patterson (Pietersen), Bonifacius, c. 1678.
Rae, John (Johan Raije), Commissioner of Magazines under Heere van Breuheleeweert. Commissioned 25/1/1689. (v, 220).
Rannock, John Sigmond (Johan Sighmond Ranick), Ritmaester. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 15/12/1689 (v, 193).
Reid, William, c. 1664.
Riddell (Roddell), F., Captain, 1672 (ii, 278).
Ridderton, George Barent van, Captain nieuwé veringe. Commissioned 23/6/1673 (iii, 152v).
Roberts, James (Jamis Rooberts/ Jacob Robberts), Provost of Otto, Grave van Stirum's
regiment. Commissioned 20/7/1673 (i, 17v; iii, 78).
Robertson, J., Schoolmaster, 1667 (ii, 28).
Roderick, John Nicolas (Johan Nicolaes Riderick), Ritmeester. Provintie van Gelderlandt.
Commissioned 3/11/1688. (v, 190).
Rose, Peter (Peeter Rosa), Commissaris van Monsteringe. Commissioned 24/12/1652 (i, 45).
Sanderson, Nicholas John (Nicolaes Johan Sanderson), Sergeant Major, of Grave van Erpagh's
regiment, in place of Captain Nicholas Sanderson. Commissioned 12/4/1673 (iii, 52).
Sanderson, Nicholas John, Lt. Col. of Col. Delwijck's regiment. Commissioned 22/6/1677
(iv, 201).
Sanderson, Robert, c. 1664.
Sandilands, H., Sergeant Major, 1668 (ii, 135).
Scott, Cornelius (Corn. Schotte), Commissaris. Commissioned 7/12/1655, 7/4/1662 and
19/6/1662 (i, 89, 198, 199v).
Scott, Francis, Canoneer, 1671; Doerwaerdcr ofte exploicteur. Commissioned 8/10/1680 (ii,
120; iv, 236).
Scott, J., Col. and Captain, 1672 (ii, 104).
Scott, John (Johan Schot), Commissaris of ammunition. Commissioned 30/1/1674 (iii, 123).
Scott, Simon, Colonel, 1665 (ii, 3).
Scott, Walter (Walter Schot), Lieutenant Colonel, by will of John Livingstone, Lieutenant
Colonel of Colonel Drummond's regiment. Commissioned 21/5/1649; Colonel of Scott's
regiment. Commissioned 7/5/1655 (i, 8, 80v).
Scrimgeour, Paul (Paul Schirmer), Provost of grave van Reus's regiment. Commissioned
8/8/1674 (iii, 158).
Sibbald, John (Johan Sibel), Sergeant Major, replacing William Theodore Constance. Bergen-
op-Zoom. Commissioned 1/12/1683. (v, 67).
Simpson, John (Johan Simson), Provost of Colonel Gustav Ulspaar, Baron van Broxwikk's
regiment. Commissioned 19/10/1673 (iii, 96).
Sinclair, John (Jean Seinklair), Sergeant Major of Oxenstern's regiment. Provintie van
Zeelandct. Commissioned 17/5/1691. (v, 289).
Sommerville, John (Johan Sommerwel), Captain, in place of Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatrick.
Commissioned 13/6/1678; Captain, replacing James MacKay. Repartitie van Hollandt.
Commissioned 4/10/1684; Captain, replacing Maurice Plunkett. Repartitie van Hollandt.
Commissioned 20/4/1688 (iv, 153; v, 90, 160v).
Stirling, Frederick, Adjutant of heer ?Ehpgrave's regiment. Commissioned 29/1/1676 (iv, 14,
56).
Stuart, Alexander, Captain, in place of Francis van Beaumont. Commissioned 12/10/1676 (iv,
48).
Stewart, Edward (Edwart Stewart), Sergeant Major, by will of Francis Stenton, sergeant major
of Colonel Sidney's regiment. Commissioned 10/5/1657 (i, 107v).
Stuart, Cornelius (Cornelis Stuart), Captain, by will and in place of Captain Creueet.
Commissioned 17/11/1674 (iii, 171).
Stuart, Gerrit, c. 1680.
Stuart, James William (Jacob Willem Stuaert), Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel Christian Brandt's regiment of dragoons, in place of Cornelius Monius van Reet. Commissioned 7/2/1674 (iii, 120).
Stuart, John, Deurwaerdeer ofte Exploitueur, replacing Francis Scot. Commissioned 22/12/1687. (v, 150).
Sutherland, B. (B. van Suitslandt), Col., Captain and Ritmaester, 1665 (ii, 247, 380).
Sutherland, Edward (Eduart van Suitslandt), Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 28/12/1673 (iii, 109).
Sutherland, William (Willem Suitslandt), Lieutenant Colonel of Theodor van Vrybergh's regiment. Commissioned 28/11/1672; Commandant and Major of the State of Sluys. Commissioned 27/12/1679 (iv, 205, 210).
Sutherland, William (Willem Suitland van Teijlinghen), Captain, in place of William de la Cave. Commissioned 19/11/1680 (iv, 238v).
Urquhart, Ralf (Roeloff Eijckhou), Captain, by will of Captain Brockwell Everts. Commissioned ?/5/1659 (i, 150v).
Wauchope, William, c. 1676.
Waus, Gerrit, c. 1668.
Wilson, Edward, Adjutant to Viscount Clare's regiment. Commissioned 27/3/1675; Captain, in place of Captain Byrne. Commissioned 3/2/1679 (iii, 215v; iv, 178).

Irish Officers in Dutch Service

Butler, James, Lord (Baron Jacob Butler), Captain of the Life Company of the Duke of Holstein. Commissioned 24/1/1674 (iii, 115).
Butler, John (Johan Butler), Lieutenant of Lieutenant Colonel Wyne's company, in place and by will of Captain Roger Temple. Commissioned ?/3/1663 (i, 210).
Butler, John Thomas (Johan Thomas Butler), Captain, in place of Col. and Captain Simon Scott. Commissioned 8/10/1687 (v, 149).
Butler, Thomas, Earl of Ossory, Colonel by will of Colonel Macdowall. Commissioned last/1/1678 (iv, 141, 230).

Clare, Daniel, Viscount of (Daniel viscomte de Clare), Colonel of a regiment of infantry (their nationality not specified). Commissioned 22/3/1675 (iii, 214).

Dery, Nicholas, Captain. Commissioned 22/3/1672 (iii, 109).

Durdan, Gerard (Gerard Dudan), Officer, 'under ten Brugge'. Commissioned 1/2/1689 (v, 198).

Fagel, Francis Nicholas (Francois Nicolaes Fagel), (v, 96).

Farrell, John (Johan Fairewel), Captain, place of the Earl of Ossory. Commissioned 17/10/1680; Sergeant Major of the Earl of Pembroke's regiment. Commissioned 29/5/1688 (iv, 237; v, 162).

Garry, Abraham (Abraham Guerij), Doerwaerder oft exploitier, of the barony of Breda. Commissioned 15/7/1674 (iii, 138v).

Horran, Simon (Simon Haugherne), Captain of Lt. Col. Ingehove's company. Commissioned 29/1/1685 (v, 50).

Keen, Peter (Pieter Kien), Captain, 'by will of heere van Brederode. Commissioned 15/7/1658 (i, 128).

Kien, Nicholas, c. 1677.

Kerwin, Matthew (Mattheus Cheeuwen), Sergeant Major of the fort of Lille, in place of Saverin de Steynbergh. Commissioned 5/11/1682 (v, 60).

Lararin, Patrick, c. 1676.


MacCarthy, William (Willem Makoffij), Quartermaster of Colonel Frederick Backer's regiment. Commissioned 7/4/1673 (iii, 49v).

MacElligot, John, Captain, nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 22/1/1675 (iii, 212v).

MacElligot, Gregor, c. 1676.

MacElligot, Robert, c. 1677.

MacElligot, Roger, c. 1678.

MacGillicuddy, Dionisius, Captain, in place of Sandys Temple. Commissioned 13/11/1677 (iv, 122).

MacGillicuddy, Daniel (Daniel MacGillijcuddi), Captain, of a new company of English soldiers. Commissioned 22/1/1675 (iii, 201v).

MacKerras, William (Guilliam Mackaris), Quartermaster of Ferdinand van Weede's regiment. Commissioned 10/5/1675 (iii, 226).

MacKigny, James, Captain, in place of Captain Lavalin. Commissioned 9/4/1676 (iv, 21).

Macnamara, Daniel, Quartermaster of Viscount Clare's regiment. Commissioned 28/3/1675 (iii, 216).

Magicham, William, Provost of the grave van Schellaerts' regiment. Commissioned 22/1/1678 (iv, 140).

Moonie, William (Willem Monni), Adjutant of the Grave van Nassau's regiment of cavalry.
Commissioned 17/10/1689. (v, 234v).

O’Brien, Daniel (Daniel O’brian), Provost of Viscount Clare’s regiment. Commissioned 29/3/1675 (iii, 216).


O’Farrell, Francis (Francois O Farel), Captain, in place of Captain and Colonel Laurin. Commissioned 5/4/1674’ Captain in place of Ferdinand Miltener. Commissioned 18/9/1674; Sergeant Major, due to the advancement of Sergeant Major Fabian Melchior to Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel La Verge de Rodet’s regiment. Commissioned 2/9/1674; Captain nieuwe veringe. Commissioned 24/1/1675; Lieutenant Colonel of Ferdinand L’Avergne’s regiment. Commissioned 8/4/1676 (iii, 134, 160, 200; iv, 28).

Plunket, James (James Plunkett), Sergeant Major, in place of Francis Archer (iii, 201v; iv, 117).


Plunket, Peter (Petrus Plunket), Captain, replacing Ernst van Baer. Repartitie van Hollandt. Commissioned 27/7/1686. (v, 122).

Waterson, John (Jan Woutersen), Major of fort Shyckenbergh. Commissioned 4/4/1672 (iii, 49).

Miscellaneous British Officers in Dutch Service

Ockerse, Bonifacius, Lieutenant Colonel of Heere van Walgebow’s regiment. Commissioned 1/5/1689. (v, 251).

Ockerse, Nicholas, c. 1664.

Swan, William (Willem Swan), Captain, by will of Captain John Ingelson. Commissioned 2/10/1660 (i, 166v).

Wilkins, Anthony, Captain, in place of Captain Gerrit Seys. Commissioned 19/8/1673 (iii, 76).

Legend
Commission book collocations
i) Commissijboek van den Raad van State ane 1649-1664 (Lettera H 5).
ii) Commissijboek (index only) van den Raad van State ane 1665-1672.
iii) Commissijboek van den Raad van State ane 1673-1675 (Lettera H 6).
iv) Commissijboek van den Raad van State ane 1676-1680 (Lettera H 7).
v) Commissijboek van den Raad van State ane 1681-1691 (Lettera H 8).
Explanatory terms in the text

nieuwe veringe = New raised regiments

Deurwaerder ofte Eplourenrur = Usher

'Montgomery, Arnold, c.1677' = Known officer for whom a commission cannot be found.

Vendrig = Ensign.
Appendix E: Itinerary of the *Regiment de Douglas*, Dumbarton's or the First Royal Foot, 1643-1689

1643 The regiment was joined by the *Regiment de Rutherford*, or *Garde Écossais*, whence both regiments were engaged in the relief of Rocroy, under the command of the Marshal de Condé. They were thereafter engaged at the siege of Thionville. Following this the *regiment de Douglas* was removed from Flanders and placed under the command of the Prince Francis-Thomas of Savoy, who layed siege to Turin, in August 1643. It was rejoined by Rutherford's regiment in September.

1644 The regiment returned to Flanders, via Picardy, where it was commanded by the Duke d'Orléans, under whom it was engaged against the Spanish at the siege of Gravelines. The Spanish surrendered, 28 July 1644.

1645 Five English battalions, made up of exiled Royalists, were added to the French army in Flanders, where they were engaged at the siege and capture of Courtray and Dunkirk.

1647 The colonel of the Douglas regiment, lord James Douglas, was killed while commanding the regiment in 1647. His brother-germain, lord George Douglas, was sent to France in this year to be trained as a replacement. Lord George became a page at the French court, while the colonelcy of the regiment devolved upon his other brother-germain Archibald, twelfth earl of Angus.

1648 A troop of Scottish cuirassiers, and Rutherford's regiment, fought at the battle of Lens, 10 August 1648.

1649 300 veteran Scots were stationed in the garrison at Ypres, which they defended against the Spanish, but were forced to surrender, 6 May 1649.

1650 The Scottish soldiers received no pay, due to the upheavals of the Fronde. Charles II was refused their assistance in his attempt to retake his throne from Scotland. Douglas' regiment was engaged under the loyalist Marshal Turenne, against the insurgent Duke of Orléans and the Prince de Condé.

1652 The Scottish regiments were present at the siege of Bar-le-Duc, which was taken by storm in December 1652. In the same year the Duke of York was given

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1 This is based partly on the excellent account of the regiment's movements in R. Cannon, *Historical records of the First Regiment of Foot*, vol. 25 (London, 1847), 40-78.
command of a regiment of Scottish *gens d'armes*, and of his own English regiment, which were employed in the siege of Ligny.

1655/6 The regiment's colonel, Archibald Douglas, twelfth earl of Angus, was killed during a skirmish between the French army's camps at Douay and Arras. He was replaced by his brother, Lord George Douglas.

1656 Cromwell signs a treaty with France. Charles II concludes an arrangement with Spain, causing the British troops in the French army to desert to the Spanish side. Spain gained one English, one Scottish and four Irish regiments. The French applied great pressure to prevent the two older Scottish regiments from following their king.

1660 After Condé's return to royal favour the French army was reduced. Douglas' regiment was reduced to eight companies, which were garrisoned at Avennes.

1661 The *Regiment de Douglas* returned to England with the Duke of York's foot, following the Restoration.

1662 The regiment was allowed to return to France. Rutherford's regiment was collapsed into Douglas', as was another Scottish regiment commanded by Lord James Douglas. This resulted in a regiment of 2,500 men. Their number was reduced to 800, following the Peace of the Pyrenees.

1666 The regiment was recalled at the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Dutch War. It landed at Rye, Kent, 12 June 1666. Thereafter it spent a year stationed in Ireland.

1668 The regiment returned to France, following the Peace of Breda.

1669 The regiment narrowly avoided heading the French force sent to relieve the Turkish siege of Candia, on Crete.

1670 According to an order of the French army the *Regiment de Douglas* numbered among the first regiments of the French army in age and reputation.

1672 The regiment consisted of 16 companies, or 2 battalions. In June it was encamped near Nimeguen, from where it was detached under the Comte de Chamilly, to attack Grave. Some Britons in Dutch service in the town were allowed to join it following the town's surrender.
8,000 British soldiers were estimated to be serving in the French army.

Despite a peace treaty being signed by Charles II and the Dutch the British brigade continues to operate privately in French service, where it was encamped along the Rhine. In June the Regiment de Douglas was encamped near Philipsburg, half a mile from the Rhine. It was formed into a brigade consisting of the French regiments of Du Plessis and La Ferté, under the overall command of Lord George Douglas. This brigade was collapsed and the regiment was removed from the Rhine, whence it marched towards Heidelberg in order to prevent the junction of the Imperial forces under the Dukes of Lorraine and Bournonville. The regiment marched to Alsace in October, where it advanced upon Molsheim (Entzheim), 3 October 1674. Here the Earl of Feversham distinguished himself in the engagement which followed with the Imperialists; he lost three horses from under him. Marshal Turenne next marched to Saverne, in Alsace, with the French and British forces, in order to cut off the Imperialists. The British brigade was placed under the command of Marshal de Vaubrun, under whom it was engaged in the siege of Dachstein, on the Lower Rhine. This town was stormed on the night of 29 January 1675. The major of Douglas' regiment was killed in the affair.

The regiment was ordered to join the main army at Philipsburg, whence it marched to Trèves in order to reinforce the garrison there. Turenne was killed at this point, leaving the Comte de Lorge to take overall command. The regiment fell back across the Rhine. When the Imperialists attacked Trèves, the Regiment de Douglas distinguished itself, under the command of the Marshall de Crequi. The French soldiers mutinied, but Douglas' men stood by Crequi, and were thanked by Louis XIV.

Douglas' and Hamilton's regiments were encamped on the Rhine, under the command of the Duke de Luxembourg.

The Marshall de Crequi re-took overall command of the forces. He inflicted a defeat upon the Imperialists, commanded by the Prince of Saxe-Sysenach.

Charles II recalled the British brigade from France, establishing the ability for the English, Scottish and Irish establishments to take on 20,000 soldiers. Hand-grenades were introduced.

21 companies of Dumbarton's regiment were stationed in Ireland. Part of this force was shipped to Tangiers.
1680 Four companies of Dumbarton's were sent to reinforce the garrison at Tangiers. They embarked at Kinsale, 4 April 1680. A further twelve companies arrived in Tangiers in Summer, under the command of Major Sir James Hackett.

1683 Tangier was abandoned due to fears that it might become a bed for Papist soldiers.

1684 One company of the regiment arrives at Gravesend, Kent. Four companies attend the Duchess of York at Tunbridge Wells. Charles II renames the regiment the First Regiment of Foot. At this time the regiment consisted of twenty-one companies, each possessing two lieutenants, three sergeants, three corporals and two drummers. They wore red coats, lined with white, and white sashes, fringed with white. Their breeches and stockings were light grey.

1685 The regiment was quartered in Kent until February, when it was ordered into London, under the command of Lt. Col. Archibald Douglas. It fought the Duke of Monmouth's forces at Sedgemoor, 5 July 1685.

1686 In July the regiment was encamped on Hounslow Heath, with the rest of the army, outside London. Four companies marched to Tunbridge Wells to attend Princess Anne. They struck tents in August and marched to Yarmouth and Bungay for their Winter quarters.

1687 The regiment marched to Portsmouth, via London, for its Summer garrison. In Winter it was quartered in Yorkshire, where the soldiers worked on the fortifications of Hull.

1688 The regiment marched from Yorkshire to Greenwich, Woolwich and Deptford. It was encamped at Hounslow Heath, 26 June 1688. The regiment's second battalion marched from Scotland, via York, to Hounslow soon after. In November/December the Duke of Schomberg was appointed colonel.

1689 The regiment mutinied at Ipswich.
SCOTS IN THE FRENCH AND DUTCH ARMIES DURING THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

by MATTHEW GLOZIER

[to be published in S. Murdoch (ed.), Scotland and the Thirty Years' War (Leiden, E.J. Brill: 2001)]

Surprisingly little attention has been given to the role played by Scottish soldiers in the armies of France and the Netherlands during the period of the Thirty Years' War. From the early 1630s military service in France became an increasingly important feature of the Scottish service agenda abroad. Due to the collaboration of Charles I's queen, Henrietta Maria, and her mother, Marie de'Medici of France, service in that country ultimately became a loyalist, Royalist gesture on the part of Britons loyal to the cause of Charles I by the mid-1640s. Scottish military involvement in France throughout the 1630s helps explain the continuity of Scottish service in that country throughout the period of the English Civil Wars. For Scots the traditional associations of the 'auld' alliance also fostered military and civil connections with France which continued to operate throughout the period of the Thirty Years' War.

A quite different story can be told of Scots in Dutch service during the Thirty Years' War. Ever at the cutting edge of technological developments in the art of war, the Dutch attracted a steady stream of professional officers, and career soldiers, throughout the entire period of the war. In both the Netherlands and France there existed traditional military units which specifically required Scottish soldiers to fill their ranks. The premier unit of the personal body guard of the kings of France was composed of one hundred Scottish gentlemen; the unit had existed since 1449. In the Netherlands there was the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. This was not an exclusively English unit, but consisted of three English and three Scottish regiments. The brigade had been in existence since the Earl of Leicester's period of regency in the Netherlands in the 1580s, giving it a good three generations or so of existence before the outbreak of hostilities which led to the Thirty Years' War.

The Dutch revolt against Spain was the most vital incentive for Scots commanders to levy men to assist the Dutch in their struggle against Catholic Spain.1 Between 1573 and 1579, 3,100 Scots were levied for service in Flanders and the Low Countries.2 This period of activity represents the first great wave of Scottish mercenary activity in the period 1573-1620. A second wave of military service abroad came between 1625-1642, when it is estimated that something in the region of forty thousand Scots, or one in ten adult males, saw military service abroad.3 A distinction should be drawn between outright mercenaries, who could be bought for pay, professional soldiers undertaking military career, but possessed of high degree of principle and loyalty, and troops raised to serve their king in foreign armies as allies. Both the Danes and Swedes made this distinction with regard to most Scottish and English regiments in their service compared to, for example, their German regiments in their service. The Danes and Swedes even employed different terms for the English and Scottish regiments in their service, as opposed to the German regiments which similarly served them; Hjaelptropper (allies) and Lejetropper (mercenaries).4

I

The origins of Scottish military service in France can be traced to the middle ages and the formation of the garde écossais, or personal Scottish body guard of the king of France, in the fifteenth century which ratified what was perceived to be the ancient connection, or 'auld' alliance, between the two kingdoms. This alliance fostered Scottish military involvement in France as well as links between the two countries based around the

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4 Information from S. Murdoch.
establishment of religious houses. The garde écossais was founded in 1449 from the remnants of the force originally raised for service in France by the earls of Buchan and Wigton, and by Sir John Stewart of Darnley. It was manned entirely by Scottish gentlemen, twenty-five of whom were exempt while the remaining seventy-five were archers. The household guard of the French king consisted of four bodies of one hundred men each, of which the premier unit was the Scottish guard. The garde écossais was the only one of the four units which was allowed to remain constantly by the king.

The garde was seriously compromised during the French religious wars. Its last Scottish captain was Henri de Montgomery, comte de Lorges. He was obliged to stand down after accidentally killing king Henry II in a joust in 1561. The garde was the catalyst for a reasonably large scale settlement in France of its Scottish members, who founded noble families in that kingdom. The Scots guard had a significantly less Scottish membership after 1620 and the position of its members was often ambiguous in both kingdoms. By the mid seventeenth century there were few actual Scots in the garde itself, but Scots or rather Frenchmen of Scottish ancestry continued to serve in the unit until the late seventeenth century.

Military service in both France and Spain was attractive to Scots who found service under Protestant monarchs unpalatable. Between 1624 and 1642 ten thousand, four hundred Scottish soldiers entered French service. The political circumstances of the later 1630s allowed many Britons, both Scottish and English, to serve in France. The prevailing pro-Medici (Spanish) and pro-Richelieu (French) cliques in Whitehall during this period further encouraged military service in Roman Catholic countries like France. Between 1624 and 1642 ten thousand, four hundred Scots entered French service.

Recruits for French service were seen as a hindrance to the assistance offered to Protestant monarchs during the Thirty Years' War. At the high point of recruiting for the king of Denmark, in 1627, the raising of troops for French service was highlighted by the Scottish Privy Council as a hindrance to levies for Danish service. Five years later, in 1632, the Roman Catholic marquis of Huntly received a commission to raise a regiment of Scottish gens d'armes, or mounted troops, for French service. One of Huntly's officers, Alexander Erskine, the earl of Mar's brother, was given permission to recruit four hundred men for Huntly's regiment in French service in 1634. In 1639 Erskine begg the Scottish Privy Council that any Scottish ships, bound for France with soldiers on board, might by no means be interrupted, but the council concluded that only the king himself could make such an allowance.

By 1640 Erskine had become colonel of a Scottish regiment in France. Another Scottish regiment entered French service in 1634, under the command of Sir James Hepburn.

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8 Chronologie de les Capitaines de la Garde Écossais du Roy' (BN, f. Fr. MS. 8066, fols. 126-152).
9 RPCS, s. 2, vol. 2, 221.
12 Brockington, 'Robert Munro.'
13 RPCS, s. 2, vol. 2, 56.
14 RPCS, s. 2, vol. 4, 482.
15 SP Dom., 1634-1655, 386.
16 SP Dom., Car. I., 1659, 97.
Scots in the French and Dutch Armies during the Thirty Years' War

This regiment had previously served in Sweden, under the command of Sir James' cousin, Sir John Hepburn who had quit the Swedish service, in favour of the French, following a supposed affront given him by king Gustav Adolph of Sweden. After sterling service under the French flag, Sir John was killed by a musket ball at the siege of Saverne, 8 July 1636. The colonelcy of his regiment thereafter devolved upon Sir James Hepburn. This regiment saw active service within the French army. Recruits, of sixty men each for three companies, were allowed to it in November and December of 1636. Hepburn died at the head of this regiment in 1636, causing his brothers, lieutenant colonel James Hepburn and Andrew Hepburn, to arrange for official credentials from the Scottish Privy Council so that they could recover his possessions in France:

His said unquitable brother have by their vertues and valorous achievements abroad muche endeared themselves to foreign princes, under whom and in whose service they preferred to charges of great trust and commandement, wherein they so worthily behaved themselves as they did purchase thereby both credit and meanes. It has pleased God now in end, when they were serving the French king in the waeres, to call [him] to his mercie from this mortall lyffe.

Despite its colonel's death the regiment remained strongly established in France and received one thousand men in 1637.

In 1638 two Scottish regiments were promised to France thanks to the intercession of Henrietta Maria. They were to consist entirely of volunteers. The French ambassador

25 For biographical information relating to Sir Andrew Gray, 7th lord Gray (1611-1663), see Balfour Paul, Scots Peerage, vol. 4, 286-287 and Gordon's History, vol. 3, 12. This may well be the same Sir Andrew Gray mentioned in the chapter by Poliesnky in this volume. Existing biographies provide conflicting information relating to this individual, compared to what can be gleaned from contemporary documents; e.g., no mention is made in either Balfour Paul or DNB of his earlier Bohemian or Swedish service. We know he was there, because James Spens mentions so in a diplomatic letter to Gustav II Adolph. Another point is how could he have been made a burgess of Dundee in 1620 when he was in Bohemia and no mention made in either place of his 1622 or 1624 levies to the Netherlands and the Count of Mansfeld.
26 RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 103-104.
28 RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 106 and 156.
29 RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 147.
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were also granted levies, such as that commanded by colonel James Fullerton, for five hundred men, in 1642.\textsuperscript{30}

The regiment originally raised by Sir James Hepburn was being commanded by lord James Douglas, a son of the first marquis of Douglas, by his first marriage, by July 1642. From this time onwards it was known as the \textit{regiment de Douglas}. Lord James was allowed five hundred recruits in 1642.\textsuperscript{31} The source of these recruits was not specified, but it was undoubtedly similar to that of those allowed to the earl of Irvine in the same year, who were to be idle persons and strong vagabonds.\textsuperscript{32} Another colonel in French service, Alexander Fraser, lord Saltoun, went out of his way to target such recruits, complaining to the Privy Council that he knew of four such men of whom he said 'both thir persons ar poore miserable bodies unable to pay anie soumes, but ar like to sterve in ward and would willinglie goe with me to the French warres where they may be serviceable, whereas in this priassoun they can doe noe good to themselves not to anie others.'\textsuperscript{33} Saltoun was also instrumental in actually having men imprisoned for French service.\textsuperscript{34} The arbitrary nature of forced recruiting for the French army during the Thirty Years’ War is revealed in the complaints made against unjust imprisonment, which occasionally reached the ears of Scotland’s Privy Council.\textsuperscript{35}

The status of many of the regiments in French service became blurred following Charles I's execution and the Scottish royalist response which followed. Two Scottish regiments definitely continued to operate in France; the \textit{regiment de Douglas} and the regiment first raised by James Campbell, earl of Irvine, in 1642, which came to be called \textit{les gardes écossais}.\textsuperscript{36} The regiment had no connections to the actual \textit{gardes écossais}, and was more properly the \textit{regiment d’infanterie Écossais}. The colonel of the Douglas regiment, lord James Douglas, was killed while commanding the regiment in 1647. His brother-germain, lord George Douglas, was sent to France in this year to be trained as his replacement. Lord George became a page at the French court, while the colonelcy of the regiment devolved upon his other brother-germain Archibald, twelfth earl of Angus. The \textit{regiment de Douglas} remained the only Scottish unit to survive in the the French army from the period of the Thirty Years’ War.\textsuperscript{37}

II

Despite the fact that the Anglo-Dutch brigade was the major employer of Protestant British soldiers in Europe, in the later part of the seventeenth century, surprisingly little had been published on this unit. James Ferguson's three volume study of the brigade remained the only authority on the brigade until Childs' contribution. Ferguson's work is curiously weighted towards the eighteenth century, with two out of three of his volumes being devoted to material from that century. Ferguson made an attempt to fill in significant blanks in historical knowledge relating to the colonels of the three Scottish regiments of the brigade in the second half of the seventeenth century. His failure to provide a complete chronology of the colonels of the three Scottish regiments of the Anglo-Dutch brigade alone is symptomatic of the dearth of historical analysis of this unit. Ferguson made no attempt to analyse Scottish officers in Dutch service who were not associated with the brigade.\textsuperscript{38}

John Childs work on British soldiers abroad has added greatly to scholarship on the

\textsuperscript{30} RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 281.

\textsuperscript{31} RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 302-303.

\textsuperscript{32} RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 330.

\textsuperscript{33} RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 573.

\textsuperscript{34} RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 586 and RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 372.

\textsuperscript{35} RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 638, RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 446 and RPCS, s. 2, vol. 7, 450.

\textsuperscript{36} For the original capitulation of the regiment under the earl of Irvine (27 February 1642) see BN, f. Fr. 8006, fol. 64-65v. See also BN, f. Fr. 8006, fol. 34, 71, and 76-77v.

\textsuperscript{37} The later history of this regiment and its significance during the reigns of Charles II and James VII & II is discussed in Glidewell, 'A Nursery for Men of Honour'.

\textsuperscript{38} Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands, 1572-1783, I. Ferguson (ed.), 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1899).
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brigade. Childs provided a more comprehensive list of the colonels and officers of the regiments of the brigade, but by largely confining his evidential base to English sources he was only able to construct complete lists of brigade personnel in the late 1660s. This is characteristic of the fact that the brigade usually receives scholarly attention in English speaking countries in relation to its role in the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. Childs fully displayed this tendency by discussing the brigade largely from the point of view of the self-exiled British community in the Netherlands after 1680 and by emphasising the complicity of some of its officers in espionage activities in Britain on behalf of William of Orange in and around 1688.

A notable exception to this trend is David Ditchburn's monograph on Scots and the wars of the Low Countries. In this he makes an attempt to analyse the numbers and distribution of Scots in Dutch service between 1572 and 1648. Arguably his most important finding is that Scottish soldiers consistently made up approximately five percent of the overall strength of the Dutch army from the inception of their involvement in 1572 through to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The monograph is somewhat weighted towards the period of the Dutch revolt rather than the Thirty Years' War, but does offer a very good general analysis of the status and organisation of the Scottish forces in Dutch service over the entire period.

This chapter takes the novel approach of examining the dynamics of the brigade as a unit in its own right in the Netherlands, providing a novel analysis of the brigade's personnel, composition and function. In so doing it owes a stylistic debt to the works of two Dutch historians, I.J. MacLean and D.F. Kulkens, who have published various material relating to the social impact of service in the brigade, from the late sixteenth century through to the middle of the seventeenth, based on marriage registers and other evidence relating to the Scottish regiments. This chapter goes even further by discussing Scottish and English service in non Anglo-Dutch brigade regiments of the Dutch army in order to arrive at a more mature assessment of British influence in the Netherlands in the second half of the seventeenth century.

The Anglo-Dutch brigade had existed in the Netherlands since the earl of Leicester's mission, on behalf of Elizabeth I of England, to assist the Protestant states of the Netherlands against Habsburg-Spanish domination in 1586. Though called 'Anglo-Dutch' the brigade consisted of three English and three Scottish regiments. The establishment of the brigade under Leicester in fact post-dated Scottish military involvement with the Netherlands; Scottish support for the Dutch revolt against Spanish Habsburg rule appeared as early as 1572, when the Scottish Privy Council issued a proclamation which, considering 'the present hunger, derth and scarcitie of viveris' in Scotland, called upon all able-bodied, unemployed Scotsmen to fight in the Netherlands 'quhair they may haue sufficient entertainement.' Among the Scots serving in the Low Countries at this time was William Semple, the founder of the Scots College at Madrid, proving that both Calvinist and Catholic Scots viewed service in the Dutch army as an attractive career option.

The commanders of the Dutch mission were gentry of middle to low standing. They

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39 Childs, Army, appendix c, 240-243.
42 Ditchburn, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries', Table 1, 116.
43 I.J. MacLean, De Huwelijkscertekeningen van Schotse Militairen in Nederland, 1574-1665, (Zutphen, 1976).
46 RPCS, s. 1, vol. 2.
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were professional soldiers typical of the great bulk of enterprising officers who raised men by contract in the late sixteenth century. The Dutch relief was localised to a six year period of unusually frenzied activity, but even this involved recruiting by individual colonels of usually between 100 to 300 men with the exception of an initial levy, on 4 June 1573, of 1,600 men. These troops represented Scotland's first contribution to the Low Country's struggle against Spanish domination.

The later, highly politicised history of the Anglo-Dutch brigade in the second half of the seventeenth century stands in stark contrast to its history during the Thirty Years' War during which the majority of Scottish soldiers in the Low Countries were occupied in garrison duty. Their value to the Dutch was, however, fully appreciated. Ditchburn, for example, says that while they never constituted more than seven percent of the Dutch army, Scottish soldiers were hailed by prince Fredrick Hendrick of Nassau as 'the bulwark of the Republick; and after his famous siege of Bois-le-Duc in 1629, he shewed them many marks of his favour and esteem.' Twenty-nine years earlier Scots had also taken the brunt of the fighting at the battle of Nieuport (1600) a singular Dutch victory, for which they were highly praised by Maurice of Nassau. It is no wonder that Scots held an important place in the minds of members of the house of Nassau. Between 1624 and 1642 three thousand, eight hundred Scottish soldiers entered Dutch service.

Scots were as strongly attracted to Dutch service as they were to service in France throughout the thirty year conflict. Not surprisingly the division was predominantly based upon divergent confessional faiths. Unlike the attraction of French service for Roman Catholic Scots, however, there existed strong alternatives for Protestant service in Europe. By far the greatest employer of Protestant Scottish soldiers were Denmark and Sweden. These kingdoms continued to attract greater numbers of Scottish soldiers then any other throughout the conflict. Strong traditional economic, political and dynastic links existed between these Scandinavian kingdoms and Scotland which further added their appeal. Consequently Dutch service was not an unusual option for Protestant Scots departing for military service abroad. The number of Scots who entered Dutch service was indeed small by comparison; it roughly paralleled the number of Scottish soldiers who entered French service, being no more than perhaps three or four thousand over the entire thirty years.

Another similarity with French service was the role played by traditional associations between Scotland and the Low Countries. The significance of Dutch-Scottish connections is currently under review, but few historians challenge the strong links which existed between the two countries from the early middle ages. The strongest rationale for Scots to enter Dutch service during the Thirty Years' War can certainly be attributed to pre-existing links with the Anglo-Dutch brigade. The vast majority of ordinary Scottish soldiers whose records can be traced in the Low Countries belonged to companies attached to the brigade. In the few cases where Scots were attached to other Dutch units, outside of the brigade, they stand as individuals and seldom appear in groups. This is to be expected given the methods of raising men in this period, when each captain was sub-contracted by his colonel to supply the men of his company. It was natural that these men should be drawn from among the localities and family relations of the captains in question. The number of instances in which a captain's junior officers - his lieutenant, ensign and non-commissioned officers - bore his own surname stands testament to the regularity of this

47 P. Redlich, German Military Enterprise and His Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History, 2 Vols. (Winibaden, 1965).
48 Bertlett, Mercenaries, 18.
50 Ditchburn, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries', 113 and Strictures on Military Discipline with some Account of the Scotch Brigade in Dutch Service (London, 1774), 73.
52 Brockington, 'Robert Moray.'
54 Redlich, The German Military Enterprise.
practice. Thorough studies of Scots in Swedish and Danish service have also commented on the universality of this practice among Scots serving abroad during the Thirty Years' War.\textsuperscript{55}

The role played by Scottish soldiers in the Dutch service in the Thirty Years' War was occasionally signal. As stated, they were prominent at some of the most important Dutch victories against the French, and could be found under arms in Flanders and Brabant.\textsuperscript{56}

The vast majority of their service was, however, dominated by garrison duty in strategically important towns. The service agenda for the vast majority of Scottish soldiers in Dutch service consisted of such garrison duty, but this by no means reduced the importance which Dutch service experience had for Scottish soldiers. The Anglo-Dutch brigade operated throughout the century as a nursery for professional soldiers. The true significance of Scottish experience in Dutch service lies in the dissemination of revolutionary Dutch military tactics to the armies of the rest of Europe.

The Swedish adoption of Dutch methods owed a great deal to the experiential input of foreign mercenary soldiers into the Dutch army. First among these were the legion Scots who could be found in the Swedish ranks by the 1630s.\textsuperscript{57} Many of these soldiers had gained military experience in the Dutch army; the most prominent of them, Alexander Leslie, later Earl of Leven, gained his earliest military training in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{58} As the senior Scottish soldier in Swedish service, Leslie was instrumental in adopting Dutch military techniques to Swedish practice. Dutch military techniques were later carried into Muscovy by Leslie's kinsman, Alexander Leslie of Auchinleck. Under his influence several regiments, arranged according to Dutch principles, appeared in Muscovy.\textsuperscript{59} So influential was Auchinlecks' introduction of Dutch techniques that during his command of the Russian army during its Smolensk campaign (1636), he forced his enemy to 'fight against them in the Netherlandish style.'\textsuperscript{60}

Who served under the Dutch flag in the Thirty Year's War? There were no less than thirteen Scottish colonels in Dutch service between 1618 and 1648.\textsuperscript{61} These colonels commanded more than four thousand Scottish soldiers between 1618 and 1649; three thousand, eight hundred Scots entered Dutch service between 1624 and 1642.\textsuperscript{62} Many of these commanders were actively engaged in Dutch service before and after these dates. This makes any conclusions regarding the specific relationship of Scottish service in the Low Countries and the thirty year conflict difficult to ascertain. Like Scottish commanders serving other states, those in the Netherlands were contract colonels who sub-contracted to their captains in order to raise bodies of men for service in the Low Countries. Unlike Scots in, for example, Swedish and Danish service the majority of Scottish officers and men serving in the Netherlands belonged to a long-established and respected military unit; the Anglo-Dutch brigade. This old, established unit had a long traditional association with the preeminent Dutch state of Holland and the stadtholder house of Orange. These associations helped make service in the unit a point of honour for some Scottish Protestant families, such as the Scotts of Buccleuch and the Drummonds, and explains part of the attraction of Netherlandish service for Scottish soldiers.

Dutch service also afforded an assured income. Though not offering the highest pay in Europe, the States General of the United Netherlands prided themselves on prompt and

\textsuperscript{55} Fallon, Scottish Mercenaries in the Service of Denmark and Sweden.
\textsuperscript{56} Dittrich, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries', 110-111.
\textsuperscript{58} B.F. Porshnev, Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years' War, 1630-1635, F. Dukes (ed.), B. Pearson (trans.) (Cambridge, 1995), 75.
\textsuperscript{59} E. Stashelvskyj, Svoedolhazs vojns, 1632-1634. Organizatsii i sostoinani moskovskoi armii (Kiev, 1919), 84, quoted in Porshnev, Muscovy, 76.
\textsuperscript{60} Stashelvskyi, Svoedolhazs vojns, 174.
\textsuperscript{62} Brooklington, 'Robert Munro.'
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regular payment of their armed forces.\textsuperscript{63} This was unusual enough to attract comment from contemporary observers such as the Venetian ambassador to the Dutch republic, Girolamo Trevisano:

I do not believe that there is any other place or country where the army observers discipline and rules as well as here. All soldiers are paid every ten days, so that nobody's pay is delivered [late] even for an hour.\textsuperscript{64}

The prestige of the Anglo-Dutch brigade also explains the position of those Scots who served outside of the Anglo-Dutch brigade. A large ex-patriot community of Scots lived in the Netherlands, where they had settled from the late 1570s onwards. Not a few of the people possessing Scottish surnames, who served under Scottish commanders in the Anglo-Dutch brigade, belonged to families settled in the Netherlands. Equally there was a free-flow between Scottish- and Netherlandish-born Scots who served as garrison and regimental officers in other Dutch regiments; a third of the soldiers with Scottish surnames who served under captain John Kinninmond, commandant of the Dutch garrison at Cadzand throughout the 1620s, for example, were described as coming from places within the Netherlands rather than straight from Scotland.\textsuperscript{65}

What of the ordinary Scottish soldiers who served in the Netherlands? It is possible to glimpse something of the origins and character of the vast majority of Soldiers who entered Dutch service between 1618 and 1648 by perusing their marriage records. The betrothal registers preserved by Dutch garrisons are one of the few rich sources available for the study of ordinary rank and file Scottish soldiers in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{66} The evidence presented in these marriage records is revealed in the attached graphs, Figs. 1 and 2. The graphs shows that soldiers possessing Scottish surnames and serving in the Netherlands predominantly came from Scotland and served under Scottish commanders, who had recruited them at home in Scotland. Out of a total of 1,836 soldiers recorded in marriage records between 1618 and 1648, for whom there is full information - approximately a third of all Scottish soldiers who served in the Netherlands in the Thirty Years' War - some 77% (1,415) served under Scottish officers. By comparison a negligible number, 3% (74), served under English officers and only 2% (50) served under Dutch, French or other non-Scottish officers. These figures clearly demonstrate that most soldiers with Scottish surnames - whether born in Scotland or the Netherlands - served under Scottish officers.

The importance of Scottish commanders in the Netherlands was such that some 18% (331) of the men who served under them were not Scots, but were predominantly Dutch, French, English or even Welsh. It is possible, therefore, to construe that the Scottish commanders and officers who served in the Low Countries possessed both a secure enough position to attract soldiers from various sources and that their reputations were such that service under them was considered acceptable to non-Scots. Another explanation centres around that fact that strong marriage connections existed between Scots, Dutch, English, French and German soldiers in the Netherlands.

The information relating to who Scottish soldiers and officers actually married in the Netherlands is even more interesting. Garrison betrothal records contain precise information relating to 2,071 soldiers serving under Scottish officers in the Low Countries in the period between 1618 and 1648. Of all of the men and officers recorded, 34% (711) of the ordinary Scottish soldiers married women from Scotland, or women who possessed

\textsuperscript{63} Puype, "Victory at Nieuwpoort", 87.
\textsuperscript{64} H.J. Zwart, 'The Eighty Years War', in van der Horven (ed.), Exercise of Arms, 49.
\textsuperscript{65} MacLean, De Huwelijksintekeningen, 67-68.
Scottish surnames. Almost twice as many Scottish soldiers, 64% (1,316), married women with no Scottish ancestry. The origins of non-Scottish wives were diverse. Non-Scottish wives were predominantly Dutch with the second largest group being English. A small number of German, French and Irish women completed the ethnic pool from which the soldiers in Scottish garrisons took their spouses. A small number of the daughters of Scottish garrison soldiers also married non-Scottish husbands; 2% (43) are recorded marrying Dutch, German, French and English husbands, suggesting that the majority of non-Scottish wives indeed possessed little, if any, Scottish family connections. The number of officers' marriages which were recorded are few, but they suggest that a similar number, about two-thirds, of Scottish officers similarly married Dutch women. The Scottish officer corps tended to marry women designated by the title of 'juffrouw', or miss, indicating gentle status. The most surprising betrothal data regards the highest ranking Scottish regimental commanders, such as colonels James Henderson and Sir James Balfour, all of whom married noble Dutch women. Far from seeing Dutch service as a transitory career option, high-ranking Scottish professional soldiers clearly saw the Netherlands as home.

This information should not be too surprising as the officers, like the men, spent long periods of time on garrison duty in the Low Countries. And given the standard billeting arrangements which armies followed at the time the opportunity to meet and court local girls must have been high. The high incidence of marriage between garrison soldiers and local girls perhaps attests the truth of the comment made by the hero of Hans Jacob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen's Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch, upon joining the Dutch army during the Thirty Years' War:

I found better pay, but for my temper a tedious war because we were kept on a tight rein as Monks and were expected to practice chastity like Nuns.67

67 Zwieter, 'The Eighty Years War.'

High moral expectations on behalf of the state, and individual Calvinist commanders, clearly translated to the honourable option of marriage among local garrison communities. The figures also suggest that a very large number of Scots, Dutch, English, German and other women must have been permanently attached to the Scottish garrisons. And they remained attached; as many as half of all the recorded betrothals were of women who had lost their husbands, while about a third of marrying men were widowers. The marriage records therefore record the attempts of garrison communities to deal with the mortality rates attached to early modern urban living.

It is sadly impossible to assess how many of the women possessing Scottish surnames were half-Dutch. About half of all the recorded marriages between Scottish soldiers and women with Scottish surnames involved women who are stated to have come from Scotland. A quarter of all marrying women with Scottish surnames are recorded as being resident in the Low Countries, but as many of them were also widows of Scottish soldiers in the Netherlands, obviously necessitating residency, it is impossible to assess their true origin. Whatever their origins it is clear that there was a strong sense of community among the garrison regiments as both the widows and daughters of Scottish soldiers married and remarried other soldiers. A typical example of just one of these women might serve to demonstrate their parentage, residential status and marriage history. Anneken Tweedie, for example, was the daughter of William Tweedie, Scotsman, a soldier in the Tiel garrison, under the command of captain William Balfour.68 William Tweedie married a Dutch woman, Cathrijn Berchtsdochter, on January 28, 1607.69 The result of this marriage was one recorded daughter, Anneken, who was resident at Grave when she married George Swaen, a soldier of the Grave garrison, under captain Kerr, on October 1, 1644.70

68 MacLean, De Huwelijken, 135.
69 MacLean, De Huwelijken, 278.
70 MacLean, De Huwelijken, 135.
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...twenty years later she was recorded as a widow upon her remarriage to another Scot, Daniel Buchanan, a soldier under Colonel Kirkpatrick, in the Heusden garrison, on December 30, 1667.⁷¹ Anneken might have been as old as sixty at the time of her second marriage, in 1667, demonstrating the necessity of marriage as a form of economic and social security for early modern women of humble means. As the half-Dutch daughter of a Scottish garrison soldier and a permanent resident in the Low Countries, who took two husbands from among Scottish garrison regiments, Anneken was typical of a great many women attached to the Scottish garrisons throughout the Netherlands. Though not born in Scotland, and therefore not a Scot de jure, she was by association and intent a Scot de facto. Examples, such as Anneken's, are important indicators of just how strong the interrelationship was between newly arrived Scottish soldiers in garrison regiments and the wider Scottish community in the Netherlands during the Thirty Years' War.

A number of important conclusions can be reached regarding Scottish military service in the Low Countries during the Thirty Years' War. The first is that Scots were attracted to Dutch service due to strong, pre-existing connections which existed between Scotland and the Netherlands. These connections account for the large number of Scots who gained, at least partial, exposure to the military techniques perfected in the Netherlands from the late sixteenth century. This military knowledge was disseminated throughout the armies of Europe during the course of the thirty year conflict. Those Scottish soldiers who spent their entire careers in Dutch service were most likely to have served under a Scottish commander. They would have found themselves serving alongside Dutch-born Scots and a small number of Dutch, French or German soldiers. They were more then likely to marry a daughter or widow of one of these groups, but might also have married a woman from further afield. The level of interaction between the members of the Scottish regiments and the local community cannot be overemphasised. Far from being alien military units, randomly hired for the sole purpose of professional garrison duty, the Scottish regiments in Dutch service reinforced a centuries old dialogue between Scotland and the Low Countries. The short term result of Scottish service in the Low Countries was the dissemination of Dutch advances in military technology. The long term result of the close ties between Scotland and the Netherlands during the Thirty Years' War is not, arguably, apparent until the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the descendants of the same officers and men who served in the Anglo-Dutch brigade during the Thirty Years' War, along with newer men following the same pattern of intermarriage with Dutch women, spearheaded William of Orange's invasion of England and the Scottish Highlands.

Conclusion

Research into Scottish soldiers in the French and Dutch armies during the Thirty Years' War is of particular importance given the ongoing connections between Scotland and the two continental powers throughout the seventeenth century. Scottish involvement in the armies of both during the thirty year conflict helped reinforce old connections between Scotland, France and the Netherlands and assisted in the establishment of military, mercantile and political affiliations between Scotland and the other two countries. Ongoing animosity between France and the Dutch Republic throughout the century makes the study of Scots' reactions to service in both kingdoms particularly interesting. The reason for the choice of one service arena over another, as this chapter has partly suggested, was clearly based upon the interconnections between established confessional faiths, noble dynastic connections and specific contemporary political circumstances. All of these factors operated to direct Scots to one or other arena of service.

The research contained in this chapter is of importance in that it considers the specific nature of service in both countries at a vital point in the history of each. The only way to quantify and evaluate the general importance of Scottish soldiers abroad during the Thirty Years' War is to examine their specific roles in individual national, or sub-national, armies.

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⁷¹ MacLean, De Huwelijkskeningen, 188.
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during the conflict. This chapter has concentrated on the continuities inherent in Scottish service in France and the Netherlands in order to demonstrate the rationale for armed service in those countries during a highly atypical, Europe-wide conflict. The demonstration of these established connections allows this study to take on an importance beyond military service. Scottish involvement abroad in civil and military capacities becomes somewhat more understandable when considered within the context of traditional associations which existed long before, and would exist long after, the Thirty Years' War.

This study has highlighted the need for further research into the subject. While Scandinavia armies have been well researched - most notably by other contributors to this volume such as William Brockington, Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grojean, and by at least one outstanding research student of the previous generation, J.A. Fallon - the Scottish dimension of Dutch and French armies has not been so well treated in this period. This chapter helps fill a gap in research regarding Scottish soldiers abroad. It is clear that a small, but significant number of Scottish soldiers served in both the French and Dutch armies throughout the Thirty Years' War. Their choice of service arena was dictated by their officers who in most cases, though not all, chose to serve in a country possessing a similar religion as their own. In many cases the Scottish officers and men who entered service in France or the Netherlands were professional career soldiers who had served elsewhere on the continent. The number of officially acknowledged recruiting drives in Scotland confirms, however, that a good number of men and junior officers came straight from Scotland. These Scots were often drawn from the family lands and relations of a regiment's senior officers. The position occupied by these Scottish units in both countries depended largely upon pre-established connections. Even new units, such as the Green Brigade which entered French service from the Swedish army, accrued status from pre-existing connections such as, in this case, the 'auld' alliance between Scotland and France.

In the case of Dutch service Scots went further. While assisted by a history of mutual assistance and religious affiliation, Scottish soldiers in the Netherlands, unlike those in French service, displayed a marked tendency to marry and settle in the Netherlands which further consolidated those links between Scots and the Dutch republic which stretched back to 1573. The importance of this realisation, of the preeminence of traditional connections between nations and the role played by these in specific contexts such as the Thirty Years' War, constitutes a significant contributions to our understanding of the Scots in the Netherlands and France in the first half of the seventeenth century.
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List of abbreviations
Add. MS. = Additional MS., British Library.
BL = British Library.
BN = Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
f. Pr. = fonds Francaise, Bibliothèque Nationale.
PRO = Public Record Office, London.
RPCS = Records of the Privy Council of Scotland.
SRO = Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh.

Appendix

Table: Scots in the Dutch Army in the Thirty Years' War
(1618-1648): Regimental Distribution and Marriage Statistics

<table>
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<th>Category</th>
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<th>Berne</th>
<th>Culemborg</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
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Marriage statistics:
Scots & Scots                  | 39      | 7     | 64     | 22    | 1         | 19        |
Scots & non-Scotts             | 83      | 26    | 83     | 22    | 14        | 46        |
Non-Scotts & Scots girls       | 2       | -     | 8      | -     | -         | 2         |
Total                          | 124     | 33    | 155    | 44    | 15        | 67        |

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<th>'s-Grave</th>
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### Scots in the French and Dutch Armies during the Thirty Years' War

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<th>45</th>
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<tr>
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<td>118</td>
<td>322</td>
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![Pie chart showing distribution of Scots in service.](image)

### Key
- 77% - Scots serving under Scottish officers.
- 18% - non-Scots serving under Scottish officers.
- 3% - Scots serving under English officers.
- 2% - Scots serving under Dutch and other officers.

*Fig. 1: Scots in Dutch Service in the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648: Regimental Distribution*
Scots in the French and Dutch Armies during the Thirty Years' War

Fig. 2: Scots in Dutch Service in the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648: Marriage Statistics

Key
65% - Scots marrying non-Scots.
34% - Scots marrying Scots.
2% - Non-Scots marrying Scottish women.

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Scots in the French and Dutch Armies during the Thirty Years' War

1976.

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Stricton on Military Discipline with some Account of the Scotch Brigade in Dutch Service (London, 1774).
SCOTS IN THE DUTCH ARMY OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE, 1681-1691
by Matthew Groat

The major employer of Protestant British soldiers in Europe, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, was the States General of the United Netherlands. Neither military service in the Netherlands, nor service in other theatres, such as France, was particularly popular amongst the common British soldiery, who saw before them only the fatigues of warfare, and shared none of the glory which their officers hoped to achieve in overseas military service. Impressment of prisoners, felons and vagrants was encouraged in both Scotland and England, in order to fill the ranks of the regiments who served in the British brigade in Dutch service. Tales of unjust impressment for service in the Netherlands were common in Scotland; complaints against Scottish recruiting officers in Dutch service occurs from 1684 onwards in the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland. Despite this many of the veteran soldiers who stayed with the regiments they joined did so because they felt a strong connection to the service for which they risked their life; many veteran officers of the Anglo-Dutch brigade felt their regiments were their homes.

A certain number of Scottish and English officers serving in the British brigade in Dutch service married Dutch women. Indeed established Scottish communities existed in the Netherlands by the early 1600s. Many were deeply integrated into the culture of the Netherlands, speaking and writing in Dutch, even after they returned to Scotland with William of Orange in 1688. Ferguson relates the story of Hugh Mackay of Scourie who was billeted on a noble Dutch family during the third Anglo-Dutch war. He fell in love with the daughter of the family, but her parents refused to let her marry him as he was an officer of the earl of Dumbarton's regiment in French service. For love he left French service and entered the brigade in Dutch service.

Despite the fact that the Anglo-Dutch brigade was the major employer of Protestant British soldiers in Europe, in the later part of the seventeenth century, surprisingly little had been published on this unit. James Ferguson's three volume study of the brigade remained the only authority on the brigade until Childs' contribution. Ferguson's work is curiously weighted towards the eighteenth century, with two out of three of his volumes being devoted to material from that century. Ferguson made an attempt to fill in significant blanks in historical knowledge relating to the colonels of the three Scottish regiments of the brigade in the second half of the seventeenth century. His failure to provide a complete chronology of the colonels of the three Scottish regiments

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1 *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland* (RPCS hereafter), vol. 3, 1683-4, 6 March 1684 (392-3), 11 March 1684 (403), 12 March 1684 (483), 27 March 1684 (420), and 1 April 1684 (884).


3 See three letters in Dutch from Sir Thomas Livingstone to Maj.-Gen. Hugh MacKay, 25 June 1689, 26 June 1689 and 4 April 1690 (SRO, GD 2659/2552; GD 2659/2551 and GD 2659/2553). Leven was writing in Dutch as early as November 1687; See David, third Earl of Leven and Melville to Lord Keith, 25 November 1687 (SRO, GD 2654/235).

Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

of the Anglo-Dutch brigade alone is symptomatic of the dearth of historical analysis of this unit. Ferguson made no attempt to analyse Scottish officers in Dutch service who were not associated with the brigade.5

John Childs work on British soldiers abroad has added greatly to scholarship on the brigade. Childs provided a more comprehensive list of the colonels and officers of the regiments of the brigade, but by largely confining his evidential base to English sources he was only able to construct complete lists of brigade personnel in the late 1660s.6 This is characteristic of the fact that the brigade has usually only received scholarly attention in English speaking countries in relation to its role in the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. Childs fully displayed this tendency by discussing the brigade largely from the point of view of the self-exiled British community in the Netherlands after 1680 and by emphasising the complicity of some of its officers in espionage activities in Britain on behalf of William of Orange in and around 1688.7

A notable exception to this trend is David Ditchburn's monograph on Scots and the wars of the Low Countries.8 In this he makes an attempt to analyse the numbers and distribution of Scots in Dutch service between 1572 and 1648. Arguably his most important finding is that Scottish soldiers consistently made up approximately five percent of the overall strength of the Dutch army from the inception of their involvement in 1572 through to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.9 While their numbers in the Dutch service might not therefore have been especially significant, their consistency in that service certainly is. The monograph is somewhat weighted towards the period of the Dutch revolt rather then the Thirty Years' War, but does offer a very good general analysis of the status and organisation of the Scottish force in Dutch service over the entire period.

This chapter takes the novel approach of examining the dynamics of the brigade as a unit in its own right in the Netherlands between circa 1660 and 1691. It provides a unique analysis of the brigade's personnel, composition and function. In so doing it owes a stylistic debt to the works of two Dutch historians, J.J. MacLean and D.F. Kuiken, who have published various material relating to the social impact of service in the brigade, from the late sixteenth century through to the middle of the seventeenth, based on marriage registers and other evidence.

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5 Neither Bernardi or Ferguson discuss the period following the return of the British brigade to Dutch service, or its role in the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. Ferguson, in his three volume history of the brigade, concentrates mainly on the eighteenth century.


7 John Childs has written a very good chapter on the Anglo-Dutch brigade, and its role in William of Orange's conquest of Britain in 1688: See Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, chaps. 5 and 6. Other pertinent references to the early history of the Brigade can be found in J. Bernardi, A Short History of the Life of Major John Bernardi (London, 1729) and An Historical Account of the British Regiments Employed since the Reign of Queen Elizabeth and King James I in the Formation and Defence of the Dutch Republic (London, 1794).


9 Ditchburn, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries', Table 1, 116.
Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.
relating to the Scottish regiments. This chapter goes even further by discussing Scottish and English service in non Anglo-Dutch brigade regiments of the Dutch army in order to arrive at a more mature assessment of British influence in the Netherlands in the second half of the seventeenth century.

I

The Anglo-Dutch brigade had existed in the Netherlands ever since the earl of Leicester's mission to relieve the Protestant Netherlands on behalf of Elizabeth I. Though called 'Anglo-Dutch' the brigade was made up of three English and three Scottish regiments. The three existing English regiments all complied with Charles II's order to return to Britain during the second Anglo-Dutch war, in 1665, but his order did not effect the Scottish regiments, which continued to serve in the Dutch army throughout the conflict. The English regiments were not reformed until 1674, when three English regiments rejoined the brigade, after being allowed to return to the Netherlands after 1675. From this time onwards the brigade became a focal point for Scottish and English political exiles, who found they could not stomach the policies of


14 Hugh Mackay of Scourie deliberately departed his service in the regiment of lord George Douglas, in French service, in 1672. He transferred his captain's commission to one of the Scottish regiments of the British brigade in Dutch service so that he could marry Clara de Bie, a noble Dutch girl whose family he had been billeted on while in French service. Her family would not accept him as a suitor while he remained in French service: See J. Mackay of Rockfield, Life of Lieut. General Hugh Mackay of Scourie (Edinburgh, 1856), 7.

15 See MacLean (ed.), Het Huwelijksstakingen van Schotse Militairen in Nederland, passim.
Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

his father's death in 1677. Captain Somerville was consequently obliged to 'medle' with his nephew's 'debts ... carris goods gear & cys whatsoever pertaining to him And to pursue & defend in all cauß that concerne the s½ pupill And to doe all cys things that any tutor dative may use and doe of the Law within this kingdom'. Indeed Somerville, as a younger surviving brother to the head of his house, may have considered it his duty to be his nephew's tutor, but in his case it was clear that his own tenuous financial position offered his severely economically distressed dynasty the only hope it could have.

In 1680 the commander-in-chief of the brigade died; he had been an Irish nobleman, Thomas Butler, earl of Ossory. The appointment of a new commander became an issue, as the most promising candidate, from William of Orange's point of view, was his personal friend, and staunch Protestant, Henry Sidney. The king of England traditionally had the right to appoint the commander of the brigade. The name that Charles II therefore put forward was that of his Scottish Roman Catholic courtier, the earl of Dumbarton. This arch-representative of the pro-Catholic, and pro-French interest at the court was completely unacceptable to William, who exercised his right of veto on appointments in the brigade in order to ensure that Dumbarton came nowhere near The Netherlands. Sidney was appointed commander-in-chief of the brigade, in Dumbarton's stead, but only after considerable dissimulation on the part of Charles II:

in September last his Majesty told me he had rather me at the head of the troops than any man in England, and many other things he promised towards the advancement of my fortune, which he hath not observed, but has done much the contrary, and nobody hath yet told me how I deserved it.

Sidney was later recalled from The Hague, to England, in 1684. William of Orange openly expressed his belief that this was specifically designed to allow a Roman Catholic to be appointed to

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16 NLS, Ch. 1403. This was the son of James Somerville of Drum, de jure 10th Lord Somerville, who died in 1677. See J. Somerville, History of the Somervilles (1919), transcript of James Somerville of Drum, de jure 11th Lord Somerville's The Memorials of the Somervilles (NLS, Acc. 7121).

17 NLS, Ch. 1403.

18 Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade, 476.


20 Childs only says that it was not until James VII came to the throne, in 1685, that Sidney was recalled and the Roman Catholic earl of Pembroke offered as his replacement. This clearly does not concur with Chalke's correspondence, or Sidney's own diary. See Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, 123.

the command of the brigade. To avoid a Roman Catholic gaining a position of such strength in the Netherlands, William asked that he himself be appointed commander-in-chief of the brigade. This request was denied, whereupon no overall commander was appointed. After 1685, when he required a senior officer to act in this position, William relied upon the veteran Scottish soldier, major general Hugh Mackay of Scoury, who was colonel of one of the Scottish regiments.

When James VII came to the throne, in 1685, he immediately began to pursue policies designed to lead towards the Catholicisation of his subjects. As a consequence many Scots felt the need to exit Britain. The Anglo-Dutch brigade was a natural home for Protestant discontent. Among those exiles from Scotland can be counted David, third earl of Leven and Melville, earl Mareschal, Henry Erskine, third lord Cardross, Sir James Dalrymple of Stair, Sir Patrick Hume of Polwarth, the Earl of

Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

Argyll and the cleric Gilbert Burnet. All of these 'religious' refugees sought refuge in the Low Countries. They did not necessarily join the brigade itself, but all joined the large ex-patriot communities of English and Scottish voluntary exiles already formed in the Netherlands.

Exiting Scotland was no easy task. William Lindsay, 18th earl of Crawford attempted to flee James VII's reign in 1685. He initially thought of the Americas as a suitable destination, but, loath to travel so far from Scotland, decided that the Netherlands were by far the best destination. He was significantly hampered, in any case, by the fact that noblemen were not allowed to leave the country without royal permission. Crawford also knew that ships' captains were dissuaded by heavy fines from taking passengers such as himself overseas.


22 Middletoft, Dispatches of Thomas Pott (1681-1682) and Thomas Chaldrigh, vi.
23 Middletoft, Dispatches of Thomas Pott (1681-1682) and Thomas Chaldrigh, xii.
24 See Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, 124. The earl of Cassolly was still listed as the commander-in-chief of the brigade, as late as 1688: See the State of Orkney [state of war accounts] for 1688 (AR, 1.01.19, 1275).
26 The prominent English theorist John Locke also passed through the Netherlands in the late 1680s: See R. Ashcroft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government (Princeton, 1986), chp. 11.
27 On 3 November 1686 the Protestant minister, Master George Turnbull, noted in his diary that he 'went to Utrecht, and there being invited to teach some friends the French language. I accepted the offer, and stayed with them till Aprill': 3: my scholars were Mr. Challey, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Baskin, Mr. Lumsden, Mr. hamilton, Mr. Niblet, Mr. Burnet, and Mr. Scrope, the 4 last english: and I taught my Lady southerland at Utrecht I lodged with one Mr. Wallace, slips ardcroft, till Dec 20': Rev. Robert Paul (ed.), 'The Diary of the Reverend George Turnbull; Minister of Allens & Tyninghame, 1657-1704', in Miscellany; Scottish History Society, Vol. II, (Edinburgh, 1906), 319-335.
Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

Besides the danger of encountering on the seas with any of our King's ships, and the strict scrutiny that they make when they meet with any ships belonging to these three nations, to what place in the world could I retire to for my safety? 28

Two years later Crawford might have taken solace from Gilbert Burnet's reasons for voluntary exile in the Low Countries. A citation for treason had been unwisely prosecuted against him in the privy council of Scotland. The charge was soon dismissed. It prompted Burnet to state that he was not only going to the Netherlands to marry, but had been naturalized there and saw no disloyalty in staying there indefinitely; he was in fact obeying James by going, as that king clearly did not care for his presence in Britain. 29

Forfeitures of the lands of all of these individuals were speedily passed at the beginning of 1685. 30 Henry Erskine, third lord Cardross, suffered continued financial embarrassment throughout his life; he owed £10,000 to the Scottish clerk register, Sir Andrew Fletcher, in 1672. 31 By April 1676 his lands were so heavily mortgaged that he had to write to his cousin, Sir Charles Erskine of Alva, regarding his debt to one David Mitchel, to the tune of two thousand merks. Being unable to pay the debt Mitchel had had himself infested in the estate of Cardross 'now above twentye yeares which I am now retiring therefore I am confident you will add this new favour to the many others conferred upon my service'. 32

Despite his financial straits Cardross continued to make land transactions, obtaining a deed in his favour in name of lands in Bemersyde, in 1678. 33 As a result of his flight to The Netherlands in 1685, Cardross' estate was finally 'rouped and lost' to his cousin, the earl of Mar, on 28 October 1685, for the equivalent of seventeen years purchase, a rental which lady Cardross complained was too low, and which had scant regard for the many improvements made to the estate, such as extensive planting of trees. 34

The great financial difficulties suffered by these Scots made the acquisition of money an acute problem for the British community in The Netherlands. Money was an essential element in the smooth running of any military career. This was especially true in the Low Countries as the Estates General prided themselves on their prompt payment of soldiers' wages. 35 To maintain their positions as respected commanders in the British brigade in Dutch service many

28 William, 18th earl of Crawford to two ministers, printed in A. Crawford, lord Lindsay, Lives of the Lindsayes: A Memoire of the House of Crawford and Balcarres, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1858), ii. xxxviii.
31 Fletcher himself owed Sir John Nisbet £6,665, 13s, 4d. (NLS, Slat. MS. 17457, fol. 62).
32 Henry Erskine, lord Cardross to Sir Charles Erskine of Alva, Edinburgh Castle, 3 April 1676 (NLS, MS. 5071, fol. 161).
33 Deed in favour of Henry, lord Cardross, in lands in Bemersyde, April 1678 (NLS, MS. 1560, fol. 47-8).
34 Fouquetinbalt, Chronological Notes, 149.
Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

of the self-exiled British community in the Netherlands were forced to borrow money from their compatriots in order to pay their men. A typical bill of exchange, from 1687, was made between David, third Earl of Leven and Melville and Lord Keith. The bill was written in Dutch and subscribed at The Hague to the value of forty-six ducats, which Lord Keith agreed to pay the Earl of Leven. A post scriptum at the bottom of the note recorded the transfer of the money to the countess of Leven - la Contesse avoir Receu de ce Comte Leven Le Coundeno Ci dessus pour compte de milord Keith a la haige le 29e novembre 1687.36

James VII recalled the Anglo-Dutch brigade in the face of Monmouth’s and Argyll’s invasions at the beginning of his reign, in 1685. Though present in England during Monmouth’s progress through the West country James’ distrust of the brigade’s political sympathies was such that he kept them encamped on Hounslow Heath, outside London, rather than sending them towards the rebel duke’s forces.37 Both Monmouth and Argyll had launched their invasions from the Netherlands, and both had drawn on the large body of Scottish soldiers in the service of The Netherlands, Brandenburg, and Lüneburg-Zelle. Many Scots in Dutch and Brandenburg service prior to 1685 were caught up in the dramatic exploit of Monmouth’s rebellion. Many Scots, like John Erskine of Carnock, were fully involved in Argyll’s rising, preferring service in it to following Monmouth. Some joined Monmouth due to poor judgment, or peer pressure. One such unfortunate was the brother of the Laird of Bunzione, a Bruce. He was captured, along with many of the rebels, following the collapse of Argyll’s campaign in July 1685. Sir Andrew Forester wrote informing Sir William Bruce of the young man, saying:

Amongst 14 Prisoners brought hither this day, who were in the Rebellion, there is one of your name (a brother of [Bruce of Bunzione in Fiffe who is a Captain in the Duke of Brandenbourghs service, I spoke with him, and he tells me that as the late Monmouth was upon coming from Holland, he happened to be at Rotterdam Designing to Goe for Scotland to visit his brother and some other freinds, and that he was unhappily wheedled to come over hither with the Rebels: Hee seems very penitent; and if upon that account, and his being a Bruce, it shall be in my power to contribute anything towards the saving of his life, you may be sure I will not fail to doe it.38

James’ reaction to the brigade resulted as much from his deep distrust of Protestant support; he placed a much greater faith in those of his assured political allies, whom he appointed to be colonels of his Scottish militia. Men like George Douglas, Earl of Dumbarton, and the Drummond brothers James, Earl of Perth, and his brother John, later earl of Melfort, were among his senior

36 the countess has received of the count Leven the above named amount for the account of Lord Keith at The Hague the 29th November 1687: Bill of exchange subscribed between David, third Earl of Leven and Melville and Lord Keith, 29 November 1687 (SRO, GD 204/235).

37 Inspecting the three Scottish regiments encamped in Hyde Park the king wrote glowingly to William of Orange, that were cannot be, I am sure, better men then they are and do truly look like old regiments and one cannot be better pleased with them then I am: Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, 156.

38 Sir Andrew Forester to Sir William Bruce, Whitehall, 16 July 1685 (SRO, GD 291/90/7/fol. 4).
commanders in Scotland during the crisis. They became the backbone of his Catholic court party in Scotland.

The tenor of public opinion, which formed the preamble to the events which led to the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, was neatly summarised in a letter addressed to Charles, earl of Middleton from John Cutts, a young Englishman, who belonged to a dynasty of Anglo-Dutch brigadiers.\(^{39}\) He felt he was forced to leave Britain, as a result of James VII's policy of Catholicising both the civil and military wings of his government:

> It is with a great deal of regret that I find myself incapacitated to serve his Majesty in his present designs ... were not the present measures of State visibly opposite to the Principles, and Interests of that Religion, which is dearer to me than all things in this World; or than life itself. The laws of Conscience are sacred, and inviolable; and, since my Principles are such, as make me unfit to serve at home; and my private affairs in a Posture, which does not admit of an idle life; I desire your Lordship to do me such offices to his Majesty, that he may not be angry at my taking service abroad.

Despite these sentiments Cutts was meticulous in stating his personal loyalty to James VII, as his anointed monarch, adding only the slightest undertone of threat by saying that he desired Middleton to 'assure his Majesty, That (whatever happens) I shall always pray for his Majestys Person, and do justice to his Merit;

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\(^{39}\) John Cutts was commissioned as a captain in the earl of Pembroke’s English regiment in the brigade, 20 April 1688: (AR, 1.01.28, letters H, fol. 160).

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and in all occasions observe that duty, and respect, which becomes me.\(^{40}\)

Cutt's letter was written one month after the whole brigade had been recalled to England, for the second time during James' reign, on 14 March 1688, as a test of its loyalty to his regime. The brigade singularly failed this test. It was infiltrated by so great a number of exiled English and Scottish Wigs, and Protestant extremists, that only a few officers remained loyal to James. From those who did return to James in 1688, three new regiments were formed, commanded by John Hailes, John Wachop and Roger MacElligott. Wachop's regiment, filled predominantly with Scots, was annexed to Sir David Collier, an officer of the Anglo-Dutch brigade, after William of Orange's invasion in 1688/9.\(^{41}\)

II

Military commissions and the states of war accounts kept by the federated Dutch Council of State reveal a number of telling facts about the functioning of the Anglo-Dutch brigade. Though confined to 'national' regiments it is clear, from the Dutch commission books, that a certain number of Scottish and English soldiers replaced each other in the captaincy of companies. About a fifth of the captains' commissions received by Scots in the brigade were for the replacement of English captains, who had either died or been promoted. Fully one quarter of captains' commissions secured by Englishmen in the brigade were for the replacement of

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\(^{40}\) John Cutts to the earl of Middleton, 12 April 1688 (BL, Add. MSS. 41805, fol. 23). This letter is partially quoted in Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, 130.

\(^{41}\) A full account of this regiment's involvement in the Nine Years War (1688-1697) is reproduced in the diary of William Cranwood, Captain in Sir David Collier, lord Portmore's Scottish Regiment, 1688-1691 (BL, Add. MSS. 29878).
Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

either Scottish or Irish officers. As Irish officers tended to serve in
the English regiments, and might therefore be counted as English,
it can be said that the numbers of Scottish captains replacing
English, and *vice versa*, were roughly similar between 1681 and
1691; about one fifth of all replacement commissions. In the case
of Irish officers in the brigade there are only two cases of them
replacing a Scot and an Englishman respectively.

Not all Scots served in the brigade itself. The most interesting
information from the Dutch commission books is that one quarter
of military commissions received by individuals with Scottish
surnames were for appointments outside of the Anglo-Dutch
brigade. The most obvious explanation for this is that these
individuals belonged to families which were essentially Dutch, and
which may, by the 1680s, have been settled in The Netherlands for
three or four generations. If this was the case, which it certainly
seems to have been, then there is considerable evidence that tightly
bound Dutch communities of Scottish descent existed long before
the political ferment of James VII’s reign; the names of
commanding officers in standing Dutch regiments, such as colonel
Simon Scott, who consistently appeared on the pay-scale of the
repartitie (payment district) of Zeeland, was always mentioned
alongside his lieutenant colonel of Scots descent, John Caww.42

Similar examples exist of Scottish dynasties in The Netherlands
occupying commissions both inside, and out of, the Anglo-dutch
brigade. The Colliers are a good example. They consistently held

42 Both could have been descended from any number of senior officers of the same
name who served in the Netherlands between 1574 and 1680. See MacLean (ed.),
*Het Huwelijksinschrijvingen van Schotse Militiën in Nederland*, e.g., 196, 278, 300.

43 See, e.g., *Justinus Colijzaert, Resident tot Constantinopel 17 duijzen
yfhondert ponden des jaers ende ter lopendet* (Justus Collier, resident at
Constantinopel, seven thousand, five hundred pounds this year and to date). State
van Oorlogs (AR, 1.01.19, 1274 - 1687).

44 See ten Ras & de Ros, *Het Staatsche Leger*, vol. v, 494.

45 See State van Oorlogs, 1664 and 1668 under 'Frentzcher' (AR, 1.01.19, 1264
and 1.01.19, 1265).
evidence is important in gaining a fully rounded picture of British employment in the Dutch army. This is the fact that the vast majority of Britons, whether Scottish or English, who were commissioned either in or out of the brigade, belonged to either the repartite (payment district) of Holland or Zeeland. In the case of the brigade these two pay districts predominated throughout the 1670s as well. It is telling that people who possessed Scottish or English surnames, but did not belong to the brigade, were also encompassed by these two payment districts. The repartite divisions were always somewhat arbitrarily appointed pay centres within the administration of the States-general of the United Netherlands. Part of each individual state’s contribution to the upkeep of the States general’s army was to occasionally quarter soldiers in their district, making it not entirely unreasonable to project a sense of British community in The Netherlands, beyond the narrow confines of the politically explosive brigade itself.46

Conclusion

It is tempting to assess the role, and membership, of the Anglo-Dutch brigade solely in relation to its important role in the successful establishment of William of Orange’s regime in Britain in 1688/9. This sort of analysis ultimately represents retrospective victor’s history. The weight of historiography associated with the Glorious Revolution has led to the temptation to see the outcome of the brigade’s involvement in the military campaigns of 1688/9 as the natural result of the politics of its members. While the connection between the politics and origins of the brigade’s officers, and their role in Revolution, is straightforward, the long-term connections which existed between Britain and the Netherlands are often ignored. In the case of many of the Scottish and English soldiers who belonged to the brigade in the period 1681 to 1691 there often existed family connections which stretched back to its very formation, under the duke of Leicester, in the late 1580s. Englishmen like John Cutts, who found James VII’s Catholicising policies unpalatable, had family in the brigade from the early 1600s. For Scots the connections went potentially even deeper, with established Scottish Protestant communities existing in the Netherlands from the late 1500s, when Scottish soldiers were formally encouraged by the Scottish Privy Council to aid the Dutch revolt against Spanish Habsburg domination. The Netherlands was by no means the only option of employment and safety for self-exiled Britons in the 1680s. The number of Scots in Brandenburg and Lünenburg-Zellish service, for example, proves that these states were also an option for Protestant British soldiers seeking employment on the continent. The existence of these long-established connections between Britain and the Netherlands are by far the most compelling reason for the attractiveness of the Low Countries as a place of refuge and employment for Scottish, English and Irish soldiers in the 1680s. The fact that William of Orange went out of his way to make this service even more attractive only strengthened the pre-existing links between Britain

46 The use and functioning of repartite divisions in The Netherlands are explained in the first volume of ten Ras & de Bas, Het Stuartsche Leger, 1568-1795, passim. For specific instances in the period covered by this chapter, see ten Ras & de Bas, Het Stuartsche Leger, vol. VI, 1672-1688 (Breda, 1940).
### APPENDIX I

**Officers of the Anglo-Dutch brigade, 1680-1690.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Lieutenant Colonel</th>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Captain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Irish Regiment</strong></td>
<td>John Clark</td>
<td>William Middleton</td>
<td>John Douglas</td>
<td>John Wachop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Gibson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jasper MacKigny</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George Ramsey</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Murray</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James Mackay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Douglas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Dalyell</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Maxwell</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The 1st English Regiment</strong></td>
<td>Daniel MacGillicuddy</td>
<td>John Hailes</td>
<td>Godfrey Lloyd</td>
<td>Thomas Moseck</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edward Lloyd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James de Puis</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>David Barnwell</td>
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<td></td>
<td>James Watts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>William Taylor</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Lillias (Hillier)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Lloyd</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edward Wilson</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The 3rd Scottish Regiment</strong></td>
<td>John Foulkes</td>
<td>Philip Babbington</td>
<td>Henry Bellaise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humphrey Lucan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edward Astley</td>
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</tbody>
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47 The following three appendices all derive from information contained in the following series, at the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague: Commisariekroniek, 1648-1688 (commisariekroniek # 1533), 1676-1680 and 1.01.28., letter H.18, 1.01.27., letter H.7 (inventaris # 1531), 1681-1691, Staten van Oorlog, 1683, 1686, 1687 and 1688 (inventaris # 1532), 1683-1691, Staan van Oorlog, 1683, 1686, 1687 and 1688 (AR, 0.01.19, 1271 - 1683; 1272 - 1683; 1273 - 1686; 1274 - 1687; 1275 - 1688).
### Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

#### 'Second English camp' - 1683
**The 2nd English Regiment**
- Colonel: Thomas Butler, Alexander Earl of Osmonry Canong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>John Farrell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Cunningham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Stuart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Beveridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roger MacElligot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Hara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Graham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert Pierson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Stutt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sergeant</th>
<th>William Sutherland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 'First English camp' - 1686 & 1687
**The 3rd Scottish Regiment**
- Colonel: John Wachop, William Middleton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>John Clark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Walter Corbet*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maurice Plunket*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Middleton*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Murray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James Mackay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Douglas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Dalyley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Hamilton*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sergeant | George Ramsey            |

#### 'Second English camp' - 1687
**The 2nd English Regiment**
- Colonel: Alexander Canong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>William Saxby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caspar Paston*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James du Puis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>David Bannwell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zacharias Castle*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Lloyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edward Wilson*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sergeant | Edward Lloyd             |

#### 'First English Regiment' - 1688
**The 3rd Scottish Regiment**
- Colonel: (George Ramsey) Middleton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Somon Slater*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humphrey Lusam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Paston*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sergeant | Dionysius Macgillicuddy  |

#### The Irish Regiment
- Colonel: Edward Dutton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Robert Goodwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luke Lillington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ventris Columbine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arthur Babington</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sergeant</th>
<th>Godfrey Lloyd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| (appointment) | Edward Lloyd             |

Thomas Walstingham (one appointment left)
**Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.**

**The 1st English Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edward Dutton</td>
<td>(appointment left vacant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The 2nd English Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Canan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other regiments not fully accounted for - 1685**

**The 1st Scottish regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hugo Mackay</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td></td>
<td>John Buchan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The 2nd Scottish regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Kirkpatrick Borthold Balfour</td>
<td>Thomas Livingstone</td>
<td>Henry Balfour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**

* = new to the regiment

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**Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.**

Hugo Mackay    Thomas Buchan
of Scoury

**The 2nd Scottish regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Kirkpatrick Borthold Balfour</td>
<td>Thomas Livingstone</td>
<td>Henry Balfour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other regiments not fully accounted for - 1686**

**The 1st Scottish regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hugo Mackay</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td></td>
<td>John Buchanan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The 2nd Scottish regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Kirkpatrick Borthold Balfour</td>
<td>Thomas Livingstone</td>
<td>Henry Balfour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**'Second English camp' - 1688**

**The 2nd English Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Canan</td>
<td></td>
<td>William Patons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other regiments not fully accounted for - 1683**

**The 1st Scottish regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Colonel</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Farrell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

APPENDIX II
Scottish officers of the Anglo-Dutch brigade, regiments unidentified, 1680-1690.

1683 - 'ordinari' and 'extraordinari' accounts

Lt. Colonels
Nicolae Sanderson

Sergeant Majors
Patrick Balfour
Willem Engelsbe, Major at Oudewater.
John Siibald

Officers
Joris Backer
George Canoche
Johannes Colpeper
Frederick Cunningham
Charles Gordon
Evert Hacquet
Lochmnce Maclean [Maclean]
Frederick Willem Pool
Alexander Stuart

1684

Sergeant Majors
Bartholomew Balfour, Major of Breda
Patrick Balfour, Major of Bergen op Zoom
Willem Schaep, Major of Amstel

Officers
Joris Backer
George Canoche
Johannes Colpeper
Frederick Cunningham
Charles Gordon
Evert Hacquet
Lochmnce Maclean [Maclean]
Frederick Willem Pool
Alexander Stuart

Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

Goderich Sanders
Alexander Stuart
Petrus Watkin

Nicolae Sanderson
Charles Suffolk
Jeremias Woyg [Wise], Overseer at Oteouchaus.

Joris Backer
Walter Coljaert

Johan Hendrick Delugh
Johan Gordon
Evert Hacquet

Hendrick Alexander Ochterlony
Petrus Watkin

1685

Officers
Joris Backer
George Canoche
Richard Cunningham
Henry Graham
Alexander Livingston
Willem Meurs
Petrus Watkin

Hugo Boeck
[Bollock]
Frederick Cunningham
Valentijn Godde
Gerard Hacquet
Willem Mannly
Walther Murray
Willem Schaep
Johan Watkin

1687

Sergeant Major
Bartholomew Balfour, Major of Breda
Patrick Balfour
Willem Schaep, Major of Amstel

Officers
Joris Backer
George Canoche
Richard Cunningham
Henry Graham
Alexander Livingston
Willem Meurs
Petrus Watkin

Hugo Boeck
[Bollock]
Frederick Cunningham
Valentijn Godde
Gerard Hacquet
Willem Mannly
Walther Murray
Willem Schaep
Johan Watkin
APPENDIX III

British officers of Dutch regiments, 1680-1690.

1683 - ordinaria's accounts

Colonels
Simon Schotte [Scott].

Lt. Colonels
John Aukin, of Nikolaes Frederick Zobet's regt.
Johan Caw
François Offarel, of Ferdinand du Weszen's regt.

Sergeant Majors
Patrick Balfour, of Charles van Mannacker, heer van Hoffewegen's regt.
Andoni Calve, of Louis, Grave van Noyelle's regt.
Bonifacius Ockerass, of Malrac, Grave van Naisan's regt.

Officers
James Balfour, captain in Hoffewegen's regt.
Robbert Jordam, Commissary at Ÿendingyk
Charles Lancke
Johan Oorlock, Commissary at Zeelandt
Johannas Walewrinck [Walsingham], Provost of Groll ad vitam.
Anthony Waverling, Commissary.

1683 - extraordinaria's accounts

Officers
Anthony Walk
Willem Throgmorton [Throokmorton]
Willem Cook, Lt., Lifepensioner

1688

Colonels
Hendrick Loseaet [Lovecote]
Simon Schotte

Lt. Colonels
James Aukin, of Zobet's regt.
Jasper Caw, of Schotte's regt.
François Offarel, of Pagels' regt.
Nicolaas Johan Sanderson, of Dewich's regt.

Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

Sergeant Majors
Patrick Balfour, of Charles van Mannacker, heer van Hoffewegen's regt.
Adam Mauz, of Antbert George, Grave van Stirum's regt.
Anthony Swain, of Colonel 'Geechelen's regiment.

Officers
Gilbert Cooke, reformed captain.
Hendrick Hartie, Lt., reformed captain.
Jacob Iyntn [Ivins], Provost of Langhacherschauss
Pieter L. Loydt [Lloyd]
Samuel Menes [Menzes/Mingo], Provost of Cooborden
Johan Oorlock, Commissary at Zeelandt
Willem Rouwe
Robert Schelton [Skelton]
Hendrick Sitten [Sutton]
Abraham Wickhart [Wisbarto], Advocat fiscal in Zeelandt
John Fergot, Captain of a company of guards in Grave van Noyelle's regt.

1687

Colonels
François Nicolaes Pagel
Simon Schotte [replaced by Thomas Butler, 8/12/1687]

Lt. Colonels
James Aukin, of Zobet's regt.
Jasper Caw, of Schotte's regt.
François Offarel.

Sergeant Majors
Patrick Balfour, Major of Bergen op Zoom, and of Charles van Mannacker, heer van Hoffewegen's regt.
Charles Buverije [Boverij], Major of fort Catherine.

Officers
Justinius Coljaert, Dutch Resident at Constantinople.
Charles Lancke.

1688-1691

Colonels
Johan Thomas Butler

Lt. Colonels
Johan Caw

Sergeant Majors
Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.

Willem Engelsby, of Grave van Horne's regt.
Adam Menz

Officers
Willem Rouse
John Buchanan, Quartermaster of Colonel Daniel de Pressey's regiment. Commissioned 5/10/1689.
Oswell Fullerton, Quartermaster of Baron Halade's regt. Commissioned 19/8/1689.
William Fullarton, Quartermaster of Colonel van Heuculain's regt. Commissioned 27/2/1690.
James Gordon, Provost of Frederick Ferdinand, Baron von Stejin's cavalry regt. Commissioned (canceled) 14/10/1691.
John Gofard, Lt. of the Company of young cadets under the command of Captain Laurence de Pressey. Commissioned 10/8/1691.
William Moonis, Officer in the Grave van Nassau's regiment of cavalry. Commissioned 17/10/1689.
William Nisbet, Comptroller of the regional contributions from Luxembourg, Lorraine etc. Commissioned 4/11/1689.
Peter Plunket, Captain, replacing Ernst van Baer. Commissioned 27/7/1686.
John Rae, Commissioner of Magazines under Heere van Brechelouweet. Commissioned 25/1/1689.
John Stuart, Usher, replacing Francis Scot. Commissioned 22/12/1687.

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Scots in the Dutch Army of William of Orange, 1681-1691.


Abbreviations used in the text
AR = Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague.
BL = British Library.
BN = Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
NLS = National Library of Scotland.
PRO = Public Record Office, London.