1. This is nū sūlūg - the Uslūg Y biūlūq

"We are social beings' (Peter Singer, 1999: 37)

"Anthony Giddens used to insist that there is no place at all in social theory for the concept of evolution, which to my mind is about as sensible as insisting that there is no place in physical theory for the concept of gravity"
(Runciman, 1998: 8)

"...we cannot move straight from a rejection of crude biologistic arguments about 'nature' to a crude sociolinguistic argument from 'culture' because to do so is to operate within the unhelpful framework of an assumed opposition between nature and culture." (Barrett, 1991: 94 citing Horigan, 1988)

Human biology is often presented as Sociology's bête nūr. In so far as both disciplines examine humans and human society they are enmeshed, in a form of 'co-dependent' relationship, although fundamentalists in each will lay claim to the other having an axiomatic flaw. Within sociology, acceptance of any form of biological influence is seen as an acceptance of 'deterministic' qualities which are purportedly representative of 'bad' sociology: a form of 'scientistic' sociology which condemns the poor to poverty, women to the kitchen and culture to the rubbish-bin of social science history. The fear of a call to Eugenics also weighs heavily in this epistemological nightmare. Thus there is a need to be especially clear in one's writing to ensure that 'deterministic' notions are declined and deleted. In raising these issues, this thesis will be replete with what could be considered 'dumb' questions, which Kirby bluntly describes as those questions which query the 'common' understanding of a problem, and which have often provoked "blustering hostility" (Kirby, 1997: 1).

Sociology and sociological enquiry are hamstrung when the certainty is established that little can be learnt that is not drawn from some 'pure' form of sociology. This certainty is usually acquired by excluding biology from any place in sociology, other than as a measure of how far we have moved away from deterministic notions. I would argue that an excursion into the terrain occupied by ecology, nature and biology does not represent an anti-sociological platform, rather that such material can be included in a sociological
framework. In and of itself, this is not a new notion and is supported by many writers and theorists in this and related fields (e.g. Singer, 1999; Arnhart, 1998; Grosz, 1994; 1993; Kirby, 1991). Indeed one can see a history in sociology of 'borrowing' from other fields. However, drawing from biology has been a marginal discourse within sociology. It has provoked many arguments and raised many concerns, none more contentious than the relationship of biology to sociology. In the sociology of child abuse, along with the bath water of Enlightenment-based theory, we have thrown out the corporeality of the body.

Foucault challenged us to revisit the position and place of the body in sociology. His examination of discourse and the productive nature of power, its exercise through discourse and the nature of this relationship with the body, provided techniques for inquiry into arguments on the nature of the body's relationship to the social. I would argue, as we shall see have others, that this repositioning of the body can also encompass the biology of the Body and the psychological research which has sprung-up around this subject - notably the material relating to attachment and failure to thrive.

Furthermore, it was Foucault's contention that power becomes observable at the points of resistance and that it is at these points, in these venues, that the operation and mechanisms of power can be most easily identified. These points of resistance are also, within themselves areas of interest. In what way does a location of resistance come into being? What is it that gives it such characteristics? How does it operate and how 'resistant' is it? As we shall see, the biology of the body and its position in relation to studies of child abuse within sociology is one of those manifestly marginalised discourses.

### 1.1 Sociology and Biology - a difficult relationship

Though sociology has consistently borrowed from other fields, there has been a concurrent desire to ensure it is not subsumed within other fields of social science study, such as psychology or biology (Morgan and Scott, 1993b: 2). Sociology has been involved in a protracted struggle to differentiate from the other members of the 'faculty of sciences'. Comte (1853) noted the necessity for sociology to be a separate form of enquiry, as did Durkheim, who wrote: "Practically all sociologists now demand a separate existence for their science…” (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: xlvii). As a 'founding father' of sociology, Durkheim was particularly interested in staking out the scientific
territory of sociology, ensuring particularly that it was distinguished from psychology. In 'The Rules of Sociological Method' (1938 [1895]), we can see a reflection of the current struggle. How to make use of material from other fields, how to use them as analogies or metaphors, frameworks for further study, without becoming so like them that the field is in danger of being subsumed. At the time Durkheim was writing, sociology was attempting to individuate from the other social sciences. As evidence of its progress, Durkheim praised the founding of the *Année sociologique* as one of the factors which contributed to the field gaining ground as a separate science, and thereby allowing it to be distinguished from its confrere's, psychology and philosophy (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: xlii).

Just as psychology could not be reduced to organic phenomena: "...so we separate the psychological from the social; like them, we refuse to explain the complex in terms of the simple" (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: xxxix). Using the analogy of water, the properties of which cannot be found in the properties of the gases it is formed by, but is rather an emergent property, Durkheim proposed that psychological facts also were not the substratum of sociological facts: "...whatever relationships there may otherwise be between them" (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: xlviii-xlxi). By this, Durkheim was attempting to distinguish sociology and sociological research as separate from biology and psychology (Craib, 1997: 27). I would argue that Durkheim was right - to an extent. Given that his aim was to establish a methodology for sociology distinct from that used in other fields, it is understandable that he should seek to emphasise the distinctions as much as possible. What can also be drawn from this comment is that he did not think there was not a relationship between the two fields of study of human life.

Further, addressing the common use of biological analogies within discussion of social life and sociology, he made the observation that: "We cannot determine approximately the moments of the birth and death of a society". Consequently, as mysterious as life and death are still to biology, so still is the life and death of a society to sociologists (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 53). Sociology was, therefore, the study of social institutions, identified as "...all the beliefs and all the modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity" (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: lvi). Herein lies the definition of sociology, as a: "...science of institutions, of their genesis and of their functioning" (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: lvi).¹

¹ It was sociology's focus on institutions and power that Foucault was to later criticise (Foucault, 1980: 72-73).
Working from the premise that social facts define social facts and could be apprehended and identified as separate from psychological facts, Durkheim still needed to set a baseline for what he wished to achieve: the development of a methodology to assist in improving society for its members (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]; Lindholm, 1999; Craib, 1997; Alverez, 1972 cited in Mestrovic, 1988c).

Acknowledging that such an aim was an extremely difficult thing to achieve, Durkheim started from the premise that:

"...for societies as for individuals, health is good and desirable; disease, on the contrary, is bad and to be avoided." (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 49)

Taking great care, Durkheim reminded the reader that the existence of some state in society did not mean that it was either good or bad purely as a result of its longevity in a community or society. Indeed, he dismissed the notion that the development of a 'perfect adaptation of the organism to its environment' was itself proof of normality or health (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 50). Rather, he argued that biological analogies used in the social sciences are just that - analogies. As such they are merely descriptive and not formative or prescriptive (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 50-52). Therefore, though adequate, in part and in some means, they would never be sufficient (Nisbet, 1974: 17). Whilst writing his 'Rules', Durkheim raised the use of biological templates as metaphors, to ensure that the reader was clear that he was not asserting a form of biological determinism when he used these templates to delineate what was pathological as against what was healthy in a society.

"People argue about this question as if, in a healthy organism, each element played a useful role, as if each internal state corresponded exactly to some external condition and, consequently, helped to maintain vital equilibrium and to diminish the chance of death." (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 51)

Additionally, one of the differences between the biologist and the sociologist is the ability to manage the environment of the subject. This is not so easy to achieve, if not impossible, in sociology:

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"In sociology the greater complexity and inconstancy of the facts oblige us to take many more precautions, and this is all too evident in the contradictory judgements on the same phenomenon given by different scholars." (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 65)

Durkheim clearly positioned the biological metaphors he used as just that: a technique by which to assist in the conceptualising of the matters he was discussing. This was patently to ensure that the reader understood the limitations of the descriptive and framing powers of the metaphor. We shall come back to Durkheim and these issues in a later chapter.

Herein is the position that many sociologists take. Analogies may well work, but they are not proscriptive or prescriptive or statements as to the fact of a matter. The greater the extension of the analogy from its original position as a descriptive element of one's work, the weaker its force and the poorer its accuracy. It is easy to see how metaphor and analogy are confused as fact. What is also evident is that the struggle in sociology for clinical precision and independence from sciences has a long history and a persistent grasp.

The position of biology within sociology has often taken the form of a 'straw-man' fighting the wind of intellectual superiority, knocked down by a stiff breeze due to a lack of substance and intellectual rigour; a sort of early target practice to show students the supremacy of sociology. It is this form of 'academic rigour' that I remember from my early years as a student of sociology. Each year, as in mine, the stuffing was replaced to allow the faux guerre to begin anew. This approach, which founded many modern approaches to sociological study, including 'social constructivism', "...talks as if biology and psychology have no relevance...which implicitly makes all other sciences, including the natural sciences, redundant" (Craib, 1997: 27).

This 'redundant element' however refuses to stay in the margins. Despite all the best efforts to the contrary, the debate is not dead, the fight is not over and some examples continue to raise their heads with a leery grin. Though cultures have each created their own concept of time and space (Duncan, 1998) one of the problems which haunts sociology is that "...in order to recognise, for example, the spatial relations suggested to us by our social experience, we must already have a sense of space" (Craib, 1997: 73).
Another example is the acquisition of language. How is it that we have the capacity for the verbal expression of symbols that represent our life experiences and thoughts? (Unless of course, you are a strict behaviourist and then the internal aspects of this question becomes meaningless). The theoretical model which best fits a purely social/cultural acquisition of language, the one which requires only social elements of development, is behaviourism (Baldwin, 1982, 1985; Baldwin and Baldwin, 1978a; Kunkle, 1975; Scott, 1971; Burgess and Bushell, 1969 cited in Baldwin and Baldwin, 1981: 25). It is here that all the necessary social constructionist elements are to be located. Indeed in behavioural terms, language is considered 'verbal behaviour' (Candland, 1993; Baldwin and Baldwin, 1981). In summary, and this does not do justice to the complexity of the behaviourist approach, language is acquired through the operation of systems of reinforcement which produce a vocalised series of sounds. Others may then respond to these sounds, either through physical behaviour or verbal behaviour. Grammar, syntax etc., are all learnt through this interaction of modelling and reinforcement/punishment (Baldwin and Baldwin, 1981).

The argument that language is purely the result of social learning is challenged by work in the fields of neurology, neuro- psychology and -psychiatry by those such as Noam Chomsky and Steven Rose (discussed later in the section on the brain). Without the necessary 'wiring' in the brain, language could not be learnt. One example of this is research that reminds one of Doctor Doolittle, which has, at best, shown ambiguous results. Work with apes to develop human style language has achieved little success, the premise being that apes brains are not structured to enable speech and their vocal physiognomy does not allow the verbalisation required (Morgan, 1995; Candland, 1993; McConnell and Philipchalk, 1992 and Rose, 1976). Such work clearly shows that humans possess biological dispositions to that which is recognised as social behaviour.

1.2 'Man's' position in relation to Nature

Judeo-Christianity has long claimed human life to be separate from animal life (Shreeve, 1995: 12). This conflict between nature and civilisation has been "...a traditional theme in western thought" (Connell, 1987: 197). Like Aristotle's 'Great Chain of Being', drawn from Plato's theory of a connecting chain between the heavens and the earth (Candland, 1993: 74-75), in 843 CE, the Treaty of Verdun established what Western Christendom had long argued: the 'Great Chain of Being' started with God and ended with the...
of animal and plant life. Just below God was 'Man' and the end of the chain were those thing that were not 'Man' (Duncan, 1998: 196). This was later to be emphasised to Nicolaus Copernicus and Galileo Galilei: God created the Earth at the centre of the universe (Duncan, 1998). This was evidence of Man's centrality to God's plan and his supremacy over all that lay upon the earth. All that happened occurred with Man as it purpose and focus. Anything that proposed this to be not true was blasphemous. Placing Man in a heretical position to God threatened to dispossess Man of his central place in God's plan (Russell, 1961: 523).

The Renaissance saw the 'discovery of man' (Fernandez-Armesto, 1995: 451, citing Michelet), 'his' individuality and the emphasis of his "...superiority to the rest of creation" (Fernandez-Armesto, 1995: 451). In this sense, Man was not animal. Human beings are a species separate from and Overlord of, the animal kingdom. This enduring tension between 'man' and 'nature' can be seen in Hobbes' 'short, brutish life' (Diprose, 1991: 80) of 'all against all' versus Rousseau's 'Noble Savage' (Russell, 1961: 662). These polar positions "...effectively set the agenda for sociologists as well as philosophers..." (Runciman, 1998: 85). Man in Nature? Nature if Man?

Rousseau's savage was, to him, more noble and worthy than the de-natured, civilised man (Fernandez-Armesto, 1995). This human had remained in and of nature. Hobbes' man required community to restrict the worst of his excesses (Russell, 1961: 534-535). In this setting, one could position Marx with Rousseau and Durkheim with Hobbes. The question holds whichever way it is asked: If Humans are part of nature (i.e. humans are animals), what is human nature? If Human's are not part of nature, then are we not animals? If humans are not animals, do humans have a nature? If so, what is human nature? Additionally 'Is there a human nature?' 'Is there a (singular) human nature?' The problem here is of course the notion of 'nature'.

Ultimately, in the West, the superiority of man to animals was intact. Indeed, considerable effort was continually applied to extricate man from any relationship to the animal kingdom (Leakey and Lewin, 1982: 21). Whatever was argued, Man in the image of God, the raison d'être for the creation of the world and its plant and animal life, was the corner stone of the argument placing humans outside of the 'natural' world (Fernandez-Armesto, 1995; Leakey and Lewin, 1982).

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3 This later created problems when trying to categorise the various levels of sub-human. Fernandez-Armesto, 1995: 448
1.3 *Darwin placed us squarely back in nature.*

This was to be virtually unchallenged until the 1850s:

"Whereas Darwin looked at man and saw an evolved ape, medieval naturalists looked at apes and saw degenerated men." (Fernandez-Armesto, 1995: 448)

Darwin's work presented the greatest challenge to the belief that humans were not animals. Though not the sole 'creator' of evolutionary theory, and certainly not the first to consider that evolution occurred, Darwin's name has become synonymous with the theory that all species evolve over time, and that humans have an animal origin. The effect of his work was revolutionary, displacing "… the former authority of religion and belief in God's creation of man as the centre of the universe" (Segal, 1987: 181) and making humans just another member of the evolving life-forms on the earth (White and Gribbin, 1995).

1.4 *Arguments that we are part of nature*

One of the difficulties in utilising elements of a 'natural' human nature is where to 'draw the line'. Despite the claims of geneticists and the hopes pinned on the Human Genome Project, as Rajan (2000) states, the level of influence of both genes and the environment is such that "...the much-vaunted genetic blueprint may leave us far less enlightened than we are sold" (2000: 35). Sociology has generally taken its lead from Durkheim in that the social explains the social. At the time Durkheim was writing, the necessity to separate sociology, as a study of social life, from other disciplines, created extra pressure to clarify the distinction between sociology and the other social sciences, indeed it was considered necessary to ensure that sociology was seen as a science. This division between 'social' facts and 'natural' facts was, until recent times, 'largely uncontroversial' (McNaughten and Urry, 1995: 203). By defining sociology as the study of a human society that is no longer embedded in nature (Murphy, 1995: 691), we are saying that at some point, human society and human social activity overcame any and all of the relationship it had in the past to 'the natural' or biological.

The question arises as to when this occurred and how? In essence, those communities with which we are no longer able to communicate, due to temporal separation, can be
identified in the same manner as 'primitive' peoples once were - not us. Questioning these assumptions fragments the certainty of social constructivist epistemology and asks again: 'How do we determine what is 'natural' and what is 'cultural' and what does this mean for social change? If aspects of both are melded, what does this mean for social change? These sorts of questions strike at the very heart of nature/nurture arguments. One example of the social constructionist view on the relationship between the social and nature is exemplified by illicit drug use. The construction of a drug as being a threat to society, therefore requiring the intervention of state law enforcement authorities, has little to do with its chemical effect and more to do with historically and culturally specific values and morality. Marijuana, considered addictive and dangerous in 1930s USA, was no longer considered addictive in 1960s USA (Murphy, 1995: 690). By 1972, a US Congressional report recommended that criminal sanctions be removed for possession of marijuana (National Commission on Marihuana (sic) and Drug-Abuse, 1972). In short, the respective social status of users of a drug, prevailing public attitudes and the influence of political authorities all play a part in the prohibition or decriminalization of various forms of drug-use (Elliott and Chapman, 2000; National Commission on Marihuana and Drug-Abuse, 1972), rather than the chemical composition of the drug itself.

Though pertinent as it is in such debates, social constructionism is not applicable to all social situations. We shall come back to this argument in the later section on the problems in defining child abuse. This reliance on social constructionism has blinded sociology to the relationship between human social life and the environment, and human life and the environment; in effect, to the impact of biology on the social. There are a number of reasons for this, which in the light of their aim, are understandable and comprehensible. This does not, however, mean that we need to continue this approach in perpetuity.

1.5 Darwin, Evolution and Social Darwinism.

The fear that sociology will be seen as, or become, 'applied biology' has meant there has been an active fight to occlude evolution from any place in social theory. The result being that the 20th Century's dominant theories in sociology, Functionalism, Structuralism and Behaviourism, have been 'anti-evolutionary' (Runciman, 1998: 8). Darwin's theory is often interpreted as 'survival of the fittest', the credit for which, in
fact, belongs to Herbert Spencer (Runciman, 1998: 6-7), and was then utilised under the rubric 'Social Darwinism'. The credit for this also does not belong to Darwin, but to one of Darwin's most vocal supporters, the zoologist, Ernst Haeckel (White and Gribbin, 1995: 232). Fusing sociology and evolutionary theory, Haeckel applied the results to cultural development. Social Darwinism was used to place the European Empires within a 'natural' environment of the more capable and better adapted, with Europeans at the pinnacle of the ladder of humanity (Shreeve, 1995: 33).

This ranking of races extended to the ranking of individuals. Millionaires in this 'evolutionary model' became the apotheosis of natural selection, being the 'fittest' members of the economy and therefore, society - a position held by two of America's greatest, Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner (Singer, 1999; Ryan, 1972; Burrow, 1968). Such thinking is also one of the central reasons for sociology's distrust of things Darwinian (Runciman, 1998: 6-7, 51) and has resulted in 'mutual recriminations' between, amongst others, Marxists and Neo-Darwinists (Marsh and Campbell, 1982: 5). Darwin himself refuted the application of Natural Selection theory to social theory as a means to claim a status of superiority for any one particular social group (Singer, 1999: 10-11). When imposed upon by the well-meaning and enthusiastic Ernst Haeckel, Darwin attempted to dissuade him of his attempts to fuse social theory with natural selection (White and Gribbin, 1995: 232).

It is this ready application of Darwinistic theories to form justificatory models for social inequality and disadvantage, which has contributed to the wedge between social structure theorists and those who consider the 'animal/evolutionary' elements of human life to be important. As we have seen already, Runciman comments:

"Anthony Giddens used to insist that there is no place at all in social theory for the concept of evolution, which to my mind is about as sensible as insisting that there is no place in physical theory for the concept of gravity"

(Runciman, 1998: 8)

What many sociobiologists, and particularly Social Darwinists, have failed to acknowledge is that "...the social order to which they addressed themselves was the outcome of human cultural capacity, and was not in the natural order of things" (Leakey and Lewin, 1982: 2). Whilst there may, for some, be an analogy or correlation, able to be
drawn between natural selection and social status or position, it remains just that - an analogy or correlation. Due to its appealing simplicity it can take a hold of the popular imagination. This is especially so when what is being sought is a reductionist ideal - the simple solution to a complicated question.

The tendency to see evolutionary theory as a theory solely of competition is also questionable. The word 'compete' "...derives from the Latin roots "together" and "to seek"" (Sagan and Margulis, 1986: paragraph 2). The corruption of this word has focused on an individualistic notion of 'winner-take-all', which has more to do with the "...capitalist ethic of competition, than it does with biological fact" (Sagan and Margulis, 1986: paragraph 3). In a cute reframe, Sagan and Margulis inform the reader that when 'an individual' (one of their critics):

"...pays lip service to the prevailing status quo that evolution is really competition and not cooperation, his physical constitution - his multicellular, multiancestral anatomy - belies his view." (Sagan and Margulis, 1986: paragraph 2)

This is also the view of Peter Singer, a contemporary philosopher who positions himself on the political left, whilst simultaneously believing Darwin's work to be relevant to contemporary social life. Singer cites Maynard Smith's argument that cooperation had been ignored by evolutionary theorists until the 1960s (Singer, 1999: 19). Citing Marx's comment in 'Theses on Feuerbach', that human nature, rather than being an abstraction inherent in individuals is instead an ensemble of social relations, Singer states that this perception lead Marx to believe that altering the social relationships would thus change human nature. Citing the failure of (allegedly) Marxist states, Singer contends that the view that human nature can be written out of social theory is incorrect and fundamentally flawed. Due to its association with 'survival of the fittest' arguments - the unfit are those who cannot compete in society - Darwinian sociobiology has been identified with the political Right. In order to counter this 'hijacking', which Darwin himself did not support (Singer, 1999: 10-11) Singer states:

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5 As this thesis argues, Alienation requires a sense of human nature to be more than a relativistic, culturally-specific theory. Indeed, what Marx also said was that what passed for human nature was what
"It is time for the left to take seriously the fact that we are evolved animals, and that we bear the evidence of our inheritance, not only in our anatomy and our DNA, but in our behaviour too. In other words, it is time to develop a Darwinian left." (Singer, 1999: 6)

This does not mean that he supports any form of Social Darwinism, or notions of 'social survival of the fittest', in fact rather the opposite. Singer criticises sociobiologists such as Edward O. Wilson for claiming that biology shows that individuals are self-interested as a consequence of natural selection (Singer, 1985). Separating cultural evolution (in this sense, merely changes in culture, rather than with some teleological perspective) from genetic evolution (Singer, 1985: 120) Singer contends that humans are social animals and, in operating collectively, we have a tendency to support others - including those to whom we are not related (Singer, 1999, 1985). Singer's position is that biology plays a role in social life, but not to the extent that it is the sole vector in social relationships (Singer, 1985). Additionally, he contends that an understanding of biology and human nature is important, if only to prick the over-inflated claims to 'biological principals' of those who contend such things as assisting the unemployed will only: "...make it possible for them to have children, and therefore lead to a greater representation of 'deleterious' genes in the population" (Singer, 1999: 15).

Social policy does not have to adhere to Darwinian principles. It need only be more aware of the means and ways by which it can achieve its goals, in light of knowledge of how human beings are likely to respond. In this sense "...it leaves the ethical decision up to us, merely offering to provide information relevant to that decision" (Singer, 1999: 15). If we accept that humans are not supra-animal, then we need also to question the impact of the ecological environment, our biology and our physiology.

1.6 Environmental StPriUųgy, Deep Ecułęgy and Deep BiUthics.

"Metaphysicians may baulk, but there is no practical difference between passing for true and really being true." (Allen, 1998: 179)
"We have inherited, occupy, and will bequeath a world of scarcity..." (Allen, 1976: 221, citing Stigler, 1969: 221)

The social constructionist approach in sociology has been placed under severe criticism for its premise that the other sciences are irrelevant and therefore redundant (Craib, 1997: 27). Some of the criticism of social constructionism along this line emanates from the fields called, amongst other names, Environmental Sociology, Deep Ecology and Deep Bioethics. Each positions humans as animals, within an ecosystem which can be adversely and detrimentally affected by human action. The consequences they identify are not only for the ecosystem, but also for its human inhabitants.

In the 1970s, the drought in the African Sahel placed considerable strain on the USA to provide food. At the same time, the failure of USSR food crop production led to a then record sale of US wheat to the Soviet Union. This reduced the food supply available to other nations and increased prices in the US: the result being that it came 'close to smothering' the philanthropic and humanitarian attempts to resolve the need food in the Sahel (Vermeer, 1976: 383). The consequent nightmare of millions of starving people, the political and social upheaval it wrought, was a clear example of the impact of the ecology on social life.

The consequence of this was the 'discovery', then, of "...the environment as a social problem..." (Buttel, 1976: 307). The droughts and famines of the 1970s, and then the 1980s; heightened concern about the impact humans were having on their environment; and the impact of the environment on human society. This also problematised the divide between humans and other species and humans as biological creatures and 'animals' in their own environment, and by extension, the notion that social facts alone explain social facts.

One of the progenitors of contemporary ecological conscience is considered to be Professor Aldo Leopold (Potter and Whitehouse, 1998: paragraph 10), who wrote: "A land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it" (A Sand County Almanac. 1947. New York: Oxford University Press, cited in Potter and Whitehouse, 1998: paragraph 10). During the 1970s, the term 'bio-ethics' was first used by Arne Naess. In 1972, at a Third World Futures conference, Naess indicated that the 1960s environmental movements had been focused more on pollution, resource limitation and the well-being of the populations of
the First world nations. 'Deep Ecology' on the other hand was an ecocentric, 'deep, long-range ecology movement' focused on the world as a whole (Potter and Whitehouse, 1998: paragraph 8).

Epistemologically, these movements assert that denying human dependence on the environment reiterates the conceptual paradigm that humans are central to the universe, as well as removed from environmental consequences; in the same manner that Judeo-Christian theology said that what is good for humans is good for the world. This dismisses the role of biology, ecology and the natural sciences, and positions human life, collectively, as unaffected by the environment and as fundamentally separate from all other biological life on the planet - what has been called a denial of 'ecosystem-dependence' (Murphy, 1995: 691). One of the consequences, claimed as a result of this, is to place human existence in jeopardy by denying the impact of the actions and reactions of the environment (Potter and Whitehouse, 1998).

The collateral victory of nurture over nature within sociology has placed the environment in the realm of a social constructionist paradigm, there is no concrete, real, 'existing-in-an-objective-world' referent to which the sign of nature or biology relates, nothing concrete which will result, other than that which we construct. This form of theorising is criticised by environmental sociology for neglecting environmental biology, human biology, scarcity and the 'survival base' (Buttel, 1976: 307). Within this framework, the social construct of scarcity is acknowledged as being specific to a historical and cultural milieu, with the examples of the scarcity of oil and uranium being contemporary examples (Buttel, 1976: 308). Refusing notions of scarcity, and the impact of ecology and biology, denies the part that such elements play in social arenas. Opening the gate to notions of scarcity, the division of the natural from the social is challenged, and the dominance of social constructionism undermined (Jarvikoski, 1996: 73).

Additionally, the deployment of social constructionist arguments in this debate has embedded human exceptionalism within the sociological framework as an absolute (Murphy, 1995). This notion of humans as an Über-Species, held by some sociologists, has been termed the H.E.P. - 'Human Exceptionalism Paradigm' (Catton and Dunlap, 1978: 42-43). What Environmental Sociologists contend is that much of the research in theoretical sociology shares the same position: it is anthropocentric (Catton and Dunlap, 1978: 41). At the root of their argument lies a challenge to the same centrality and position of 'exceptionality' for humans (Catton and Dunlap, 1978: 42-43). It is also a
position that Darwin challenged and which can be paralleled with the notion of humans being 'God's Chosen Children' and therefore immune from factors that affect the animal kingdom. By placing humans in a position wherein they are not subject to their ecology, sociology continues to fail to see that limits exist. Yet, far from the world being an ever-available resource, the earth has concrete limits to its exploitation. The hegemony of H.E.P. has resulted in sociology focusing solely on the 'social' environment, thereby marginalising⁶ the environment (Catton and Dunlap, 1978: 44). This mirrors the neglect of the corporeal body within sociology and particularly within the sociology of child abuse. The body/child is treated much like the ecology - without limits.

Criticism of the social constructionist approach is particularly salient in the debate over the notion of scarcity. It is a standard of Environmental Sociology that the world is a place of finite resources (Bartlett, 1978)⁷, and that the environment is a reacting and interacting entity. These elements have an effect on human social life in the present and for the future. In this, they argue that social facts alone are not the sole influences of human social life, thus transgressing the Durkheimian notion of social facts being the sole constructor of social facts (Catton and Dunlap, 1978: 44-45). One argument has been that the pervasive nature of scarcity, its very commonality and obviousness in social, political and economic arenas, has meant that in the social sciences: "…it appears to have been frequently taken for granted or treated as an assumption"⁸ (Borjean, 1976: 260). Competition for non/material resources has an obvious effect on people's behaviour and on social policies, but appears to surface only after or in the face of impending crises" (Borjean, 1976: 260). The result is that environmental scarcity or limits have also been ignored and their impact on social life denied or minimised.

Traditional order-conflict theory has also informed theorising within environmental sociology (Buttel, 1976: 317), begging new threads for research to follow. This polarising of social science theorising along traditional lines was evident in the division of environmental sociology into pro- and anti- economic development, pro- and anti-environment lines (Buttel, 1976: 321; Buttel and Flinn, 1976: 410). Similarly, Allen

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⁶ I think, here, that Catton and Dunlap are being polite when they say 'crowding-out'.
⁷ Romer (Romer, R.H., American Journal of Physics, 59, March 1991, p. 205) states that Bartlett's paper 'Forgotten Fundamentals of the Energy Crisis' was listed as one of the ten "memorable papers" for the year 1978 in a list of memorable papers of the American Journal of Physics, covering the period 1933 to 1990.
(1976) identifies Hobbes as articulating the concept that resource scarcity results in conflict, exemplifying the problem of order that when two people wish for, but cannot both have, the same resource "…they become enemies" (1976: 265).

Such views are not without their critics. The contention that natural resources will soon be in such short supply as to imperil a large section of the world's population "…has been controversial among environmentalists as well as between environmentalists and others (Morrison, 1976: 294). The view that economic development and expansion must be at the expense of the environment and thus growth cannot be unlimited, is not taken as a given by all. Peterson (1976), for instance, accuses (I would like to use a less pejorative word, however his article is nothing if not denunciatory) many of the theorists of the use of hyperbole and of being 'neo-Malthusians'. This has resulted through a failure to recognise that views on population growth have swung between two disaster poles: "not enough people to sustain an economy" and "too many people to feed" (1976: 365). The inability to accurately determine the level of production and availability, due to the paucity of record keeping, complicates the question of scarcity and present/future limits. This is compounded by the very high level of loss of produce (30-40%) in 'Lesser Developed Countries' due to "…waste, erosion, spoilage, disease, pests, and improper storage" (USA Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, 1974: 2 cited in Peterson, 1976: 367). This does not count the amount of food that is NOT distributed or lost, as a result of being used as a tool of military/civil conflict, ineptitude and/or economic or social events/crisis (Fernandez-Armesto, 1995: 540-541; Peterson, 1976: 367).

In Peterson's analysis, concerns at the level of pollution are also exaggerated and without an historical analysis. Anthropological research has shown that the Mese Verde Indians dumped an extraordinary amount of waste within a short distance of their cliff-face homes, throwing it into the valley below. Additionally, pollution levels have been reduced in some areas of the world. Through the collusion of population and pollution:

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8 As of 1976, *The International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* did not have one reference to this issue in 17 volumes (Borjean, 1976: 260).

9 In his autobiography, Bob Geldof, Boomtown Rats lead singer and the founder of Band-Aid, made many interesting and similar comments about the African famine of the mid-1980s. "Entering the city we drove beneath a massive concrete arch with gaudy trappings and the legend 'Long Live Proletarian Internationalism'. Above it was a hammer and sickle. 'What the fuck is that?' I asked. 'It is the arch of revolution.' 'Christ, no wonder there's a famine here if you insist on putting up crap like that. In any case, it's palpably not true. If there really was any proletarian internationalism you wouldn't have millions dying
"Whether an industrial city remains polluted depends not on its population but on engineering and especially economics; among others, Pittsburgh and London transformed themselves without sending off a single one of their inhabitants" (1976: 367).

In response, others argue that pollution in the form of DDT, Uranium/Radioactive waste, is so fundamentally different to organic (food scraps) or ecologically inert matter (eg. clay, steel, glass) in its effect on the environment and animal life, including humans, as to make comparison a mockery (Erlich and Erlich, 1976: 378). Air pollution has been linked to a 10 - 15% reduction in lung capacity and up to 10% of non-cigarette lung cancer in the California region (Brown, 1994: 58). Heavy metals poisoning (such as lead and mercury) of the environment can cause kidney and brain damage "...as well as anaemia, mental retardation, seizures, and death" (Davison and Neale, 1990: 455). Added to this, the economic and resource costs of the North American lifestyle means that "There is no way, for example, that the majority of the world's people could switch to an American style diet" (Erlich and Erlich, 1976: 384). Even accepting that politics, economics and social factors do impinge on food distribution, access equity etc, the question as to the ability to feed the world's growing population is still valid and of concern (Erlich and Erlich, 1976: 380).

Still others feel that despite the sides taken, "...many of those among us professing to be experts on the topic are often in doubt as to the incompatibility of economic expansion and environmental quality" (Buttel and Flinn, 1976: 410).

Humans are susceptible to the ecology of the world in which they live, not separate and somehow above - a position once accorded by a deity whose authority (existence is a question best left to another thesis) has long since been undermined. Long after it challenged the certainty of theological dominance, sociology has continued to present a similar message - humans are exceptionally different and free from the interference of God's given earth and God's given biology. In essence, we have choice. A reasonable assessment would be that exposure to socio-historical forces contributed to sociology's stance: pressure to specialise, to individuate from biology, psychology and philosophy, to show that it was a science.

here." He was later to express a similar attitude when raising related issues with western leaders (Geldof, Bob. 1986. Is that it? Harmondsworth: Penguin. p 299).
The centrality of humans as exceptions to the animal world is then, without doubt, a creation of the religious and social influences of the past millennia. This position of being separate from other biological life forms and separate from other anthropoid's, of being superior to them, by dint of being human, rather than any other physiological or biological element which evinces some clear rationale in ecological terms is, in total, suspect and merely self-congratulatory. If this is so, then the complete and total occlusion of biological elements in human social life must also be suspect and open to more sympathetic analysis.

1.7 Sociology, biology and equality

The conflict between biology and sociology is the bedrock of the nature/nurture divide. It is a divide between the social and the biological, and between sociologists and biologists and evolutionists. A divide has also separated sociology and psychology. This is not necessary, or advantageous. The varieties of approaches that exist imply that somewhere along the line, each field has something useful to say to the other.

Feminism and the social sciences in general have been critical and wary of biological determinism (Benton, 1991; van Sommers, 1986: 70). This strong move to distance sociology from biology developed from the desire to ensure that perceived natural social structures and arrangements where problematised, rather than accepted as being the result of natural social states. The American Black Civil Rights movement of the 1960s spawned many other liberation movements (e.g. the Women's movement, Gay liberation) and it was the 'biological blindness' (Benton, 1991: 1) of sociology which provided such movements with their primary analytical tool. This refusal of sociology to take the apparent 'biological' aspects of relationships at face-value made it seem the perfect weapon in the war on such fronts as race bias, gender bias and the repression of homosexuality.

Sociology was able to provide many tools in the push for equality for groups that perceived their social positions to be the result of social structures and cultural practices. This can be seen in Feminist sociology, which was founded in response to the social and economic inequality of women. If Feminism were a child, its first word may well have been 'Why?' This central position in the ranks of status quo 'nay sayers', makes feminism
1.8 Feminism

Without doubt, there is a wide range of perspectives covered by the term 'feminism' (Sargent, 1994: 13). Consequently, any attempt to summarise its gains, positions and stances will be faulty and limited. This is more so when covered within the space available in this thesis. Nonetheless, the substantial and seminal quality of the material contributed to the biology-culture, nature-nurture, debate by feminist theory and research, requires that I make an overview of some of the more relevant aspects and positions.

Influenced by the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan, (Eisenstein, 1984) the 'Second Feminist Wave' of feminist research and theorising was primarily, though not exclusively, concerned with the oppression and inequality of women. In short, with capital 'L' liberation - removing the restrictions (economic, social, and cultural, amongst others) imposed on women (Jackson, 1999; Sargent, 1994; Eisenstein, 1984). This grew from the late 60s, through the 1970s and into the early 1980s (Eisenstein, 1984).

Feminist sociologists began to critique notions of masculine/feminine, and to assert they were neither synonymous with nor contingent upon biology.

Feminist research added to theory in areas such as gender segregation in the labour market, power and exploitation within families and sexual violence (Jackson, 1999). In this, Marxism operated as one of the major theoretical frameworks. By the seventies, movements in support of Women's Liberation, Gay Liberation, and Men's Liberation movements began to emerge. As Bob Connell puts it: "...it seemed that a millennia of patriarchy and oppression could now end" (Connell, 1996: paragraph 1).

More recently, Feminist research and theorising has been brought to bear on subject areas such as the body (e.g. DeNora, 1997 and Lindemann, 1997 cited by Jackson, 1999; Kirby, 1997; Grosz, 1994). This shall be discussed later in the section on Foucault and other theorists on the body.

Feminist research highlighted how many areas considered gender-free were in fact not so. The construction of the notions of 'women' and 'female' in one of the most
important theoretical movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, psychoanalysis, began to be questioned (Mitchell, 1974). Accounts of history, for instance, where women's matter were considered "…as trivial and not the stuff of history" (Curthoys, 1988: 5). Within social science research, Konrad Lorenz's book 'On Aggression' did not identify that the greater amount of violence in the community was committed by men, rather he discussed 'people' (Miedzian, 1992: 8). Social stratification was generally ignorant of the position of women, taking the family to be the 'basic unit' of concern al la Talcott Parsons (Wild, 1978: 132). Research on women's health was criticised for its failure to identify the social and political elements in women's morbidity (Williams, Annandale and Tritter, 1998: paragraph 2.5).

1.9 Biology as oppression

Historically, the differences between men and women had been proposed and used to enforce the social and economic position of women. If women were smaller, less physically capable, more oriented to emotions and nurturing, less likely to be intelligent or competent in the sciences or mathematics, this was plainly the result of biological and evolutionary determinants. Women's biological difference to men and, consequently, their greater 'fragility', 'unreliability', 'defectiveness' and 'biological closeness to nature' (usually in reference to their ability to bear children) has been used to rationalise male hegemony and the lower status of women (Wild, 1978: 132; Miedzian, 1992: 8; Grosz, 1994: ix; Sargent, 1994: 115 and 180).

Such theorising was used to prevent women being educated, being given the vote and being allowed an 'excessive' amount of self-determination. The biological capacity of women to have children has been used as the definitive reason for women's 'greater capacity' and 'inclination' to care for children; therefore, the very reason for their social and economic position (Oakley, 1974). In an excellent chapter entitled, 'The definition of male and female biological reductionism and the sanction of normality', Kaplan and Rogers (1990) describe a litany of examples where biology has been used to deny women, and minorities, options or equality:

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10 Germaine Greer used the term 'The Second Feminist Wave' to discriminate it from the suffragettes of the 19th and very early 20th Century (Greer, 1970: 11).
Early work by eugenicist's Galton, (1869), Pearson, (1901) and Thorndike, (1913-14), asserted the biological inferiority of blacks and non-whites (Kaplan and Rogers, 1990: 211).

Women's brain size, being smaller on average than men's, being de facto evidence of their lesser intelligence (Fee, 1979).

Men are better at mathematics and their spatial abilities are better (Bleir, 1984).

Edgar Berman MD, "You would not want the president of your bank making a loan under the raging hormonal influence of that particular period." (New York Times, 26 May 1970) Kaplan and Rogers state this was the same argument used in the 1970s, by airline companies in Australia, to deny women becoming commercial airline pilots.

Clarke's 'Sex in education' - women would overstress their brains and therefore be less able to reproduce.

When Albert Speer attempted to convince the Nazi government to allow women to work in war production, he was told "...factory work could be morally harmful to German womanhood, possibly even putting at risk their ability to bear children" (Sereny, 1995: 310-311).

Reductionist arguments legitimised constructs which identify social inequalities and disadvantage as the result of genes and biology, placing the individual as the locus of their social enquiry and the repository for the responsibility for poverty, gender, race and sex bias. What scared feminists into rejecting biology was the assumption that attributes which had been identified with masculinity had become normative and related to 'freedom and choice'. Therefore, biology could only show that 'feminine' attributes would need to be suppressed for female liberation to take place (Miedzian, 1992: 72). It may also be fair to say that what scared feminists was the 'mis-recognition' of biology and it potential for use as a means of oppression and discrimination.
Ultimately, the belief evolved that the only positions available within sociology were social constructionism or biological determinism. "If you did not agree with one, then by implication, you must believe in the other" (Benton, 1991: 3). Biology and its parvenu, sociobiology, came to represent those elements of science which would act towards limiting or denying choice and preventing liberation from determinism.

1.10 Biology and Sociobiology

In the 1963 movie, *Dr Strangelove: or How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, one of the characters played by Peter Sellers, Dr Strangelove, is aware that one of his arms is acting in a socially inappropriate manner (i.e. giving a Nazi salute). Dr Strangelove continually struggles to control the recalcitrant limb with his other 'self' controlled arm. The character and the spontaneous salute were a parody of the German scientists who, following the end of the Second World War, worked for the USA developing missile and atomic weapons delivery systems. Dr Strangelove frequently has to fight to restrain his arm. If we accept the pretension that Strangelove's arm represents his real nature, then despite his best efforts, his nature is showing through. Though a brilliant satire on the Cold War, is that all it is? Can arms really work 'by themselves?' Does nature really assert itself against the best of intentions?

An article by Richard Restak (1983, in Rubinstein and Brent, 1988), titled *Is Free Will A Fraud?*, encapsulates many of the issues which comprise the debate. Restak provides a thumbnail sketch of some of the issues which arise out of reductionism, citing a number of experiments which purport to show that 'free will' is a concept which humans have developed to explain something we do not in fact control. In his article, he describes research that purports to show that human conscience is purely a 'face-saving activity'. The research work he outlines was carried out during neurosurgery with conscious patients. In one experiment, a part of the skin was stimulated and the patient was asked to press a button when they became aware of the stimulation. The research showed that whilst the brain began to activate a response, the patients did not state an awareness of the 'stimulus-response' loop for between one half and one and a half seconds afterwards.

The opposing argument, in the same collection, written by Joseph Rychlak (1988 in Rubinstein and Brent, 1988) also uses neurological research to establish its position. Rychlak states that similar research reveals that patients, whose limbs are stimulated to
move during such procedures, state they are fully aware that they themselves did not make their limb move. Rather, they are conscious that it is the actions of the neurosurgeon that caused the response. Rychlak also writes that one patient, aware that he had not directed his arm to move, grabbed the wayward limb with his other hand. In summary, this interaction is a tidy and highly visual symbolic representation of the very subject matter at hand. Does nature, like Dr Strangelove's arm, work against our better efforts and despite our direct intentions?

This notion of being 'controlled' rather than 'controlling' relates to the notion of biological impulse or drive which is central to the debate between sociology and biology. If we are controlled by our biology, then we (in the Royal, collective, sense) are not controlling our lives. If this is so, then culture is a charade we engage in to make ourselves feel happier, creating the illusion that we are able to direct our destiny, to have choice and to make a difference.

One of the areas in which the biology-sociology dichotomy has been most strongly contested is in the study of gender and sex differences. Gender research and social issues in relation to gender have formed a large part in the teaching of sociology and hold a special position in sociology - everyone has their pet theories and everyone can relate the issue to himself or herself. All of us can personally relate to how we have experienced issues of gender and its acquisition. Exploring this dispute brings the elements of the positions into relief.

For this reason and the fact that there is so much research on this issue, we shall explore the notions surrounding gender and use it as a means by which to further explore the sociology Vs biology rift. It is, unfortunately, not a journey easy to chart. There are many conflicting positions and interpretations of the literature and the research. In this sense, it is not as simple as saying 'this is the sociobiological position and these are its opponents'. In fact, as with sociology, there are variations within variations (ad infinitum). Kaplan and Rogers (Kaplan and Rogers, 1990) identify some of the major supporters of biological gender differences as sociobiologists Trivers (1978), Tiger and Fox (1978) and Wilson (1975), and psychobiologists Levy and Gurr (1980), Buffery and Gray (1972), Hutt (1972) and Bardwich (1971).

Interestingly, some feminist writers have adopted and, at times, eulogised difference: Possi has argued for the celebration and equal valuing of the perceived differences (e.g.
women's ability to rear children). Kaplan and Rogers have equated this with Fascist views of women's virtue\textsuperscript{11} something that was also honoured in medieval Europe. Lambert has emphasised 'Equality with difference', in which women need assistance to express their distinct feminine character "...denied existence in a male-dominated society" (1978, cited in Kaplan and Rogers, 1990: 208). At the 1984 National Women's Conference to Prevent Nuclear War, the theme was developed, and the argument adopted, that women were more likely to promote peace and stability as a result of their natural tendencies (Miedzian, 1992: 50).

\textbf{1.11 Criticism of biological and genetic determinism.}

As stated earlier, the nature/nurture position within the biological sciences is not represented by a sole voice and has not presented a monolithic, united front. Nor has it been merely variations on a similar theme. Like the disunity within feminism and sociology, similarly the biological sciences are not united in their views. Gould (1998) for instance argues that the division between the biological and social sciences is really the result of what he calls 'false categories' and 'bad mental habits'. Even theorists such as Edward O. Wilson, a staunch sociobiologist, have begun to argue for a more inclusive relationship with the social sciences (Wilson, 1998).

One of the stumbling blocks for feminists who oppose biological determinism, has been a self-perceived lack of knowledge about the science of biology and being "...unaware of the biological determinist theories" (Kaplan and Rogers, 1990: 208). This, along with the fact that such theoretical work has lead to reactionary, racist and sexist policies, has resulted in:

"Many sociobiologists, including Edward Wilson... [being]... the target of scathing attacks, some of them personal as well as intellectual. The more virulent attacks grow out of the critic's fears that any attempt at grounding human emotions and behaviours in evolutionary theory will be used to justify reactionary, racist and sexist social policies." (Miedzian, 1992: 50)

\textsuperscript{11} As stated above, Albert Speer's attempt to gain permission for German women to work in the war industry was refused on the grounds that it could reduce German women's ability to bear children (Sereny, 1995: 310-311). He was also told it was "...an offence...against the sacred nature of German womanhood" (Sereny, 1995: 308).
It is also possible that the reaction to sociobiology has not needed to be so adamant and denunciatory. True it is that some sociobiologists have asserted the certainty of their position with conviction. They are however, neither the sole speakers for sociobiology nor the sole arbiters of 'Truth, Justice and the Biological way'. Even those proposed as the paramount villains in sociobiology, such as E.O. Wilson, are receiving some 'detoxification' and rehabilitation. This said, it is still important that a careful and wary eye be kept. As we shall see in the section on attachment, drawing parallels between animal research and human social relationships can be used to 're-write' ideologies, so that one can claim women should care for children because this is more biologically 'natural' (Eyer, 1992).

1.12 Nurture or Nature?: a false Dichotomy

We must move beyond a simplistic view of violence in which one side contends that it is biological and therefore nothing can be done about it, whilst the other side asserts that human beings are naturally good and violence is cause by socialization alone." (original italics) (Miedzian, 1992: 72)

The complexity of the arguments over nature/nurture is often not one of the difficulties of the material discussed, as in the difficulty in following the biological terms or thinking, or the sociological terms or thinking, but more one of the intractable diversity and apparent contradictory material available. Additionally, both sides in the debate have operated on caricatures of their opposites (Kitcher, 1984).

One of the classic arguments, brought forth at every dinner table discussion of the differences between males and females, is that males have more testosterone and therefore are more prone towards violence. In John Money and Anke Erhardt's *Man and Woman, Boy and Girl* (1972 cited in Miedzian, 1992), the influence of hormones on male and female children's behaviour was studied. Part of the study compared children raised as males who, in utero, had been exposed to lesser levels of testosterone than usual, with children raised as females who, in utero, had been exposed to higher levels of testosterone.

Money and Erhardt concluded that a higher level of testosterone was linked to other precursors, which in themselves were linked to higher levels of aggression. In other
words, testosterone *per se*, was not the primary factor in higher levels of aggressive behaviour. Rather it was linked to agitation and a greater propensity towards such things as physical activity. During an interview with Miedzian, Robert Holt stated that there was overwhelming evidence to show that boys were 'over-stimulated' from an early age (Miedzian, 1992).

Differentiation on the basis of allocated gender is reflected in a large body of work in the field. Hartup (1978) refers to a 1966 study by Rothbart and Maccoby with respect to aggression and dependency. Mothers tended to be more permissive towards boys than girls. Gordon (Hanes and Dunn, 1978) reported differentiation in the behaviour of mothers towards female and male children. Biller, 1969, Lynn, 1974 and Rothbart and Maccoby, 1966 (Young and Hamilton, 1978) all reported male children were more likely to be physically punished than were female children; male children are considerably more likely to be placed in day care than female children in the same circumstances and parents, particularly mothers, appear to believe that male children cope better with being placed away from home than female children of the same age (Brennan and O'Donnell, 1986). This gendered differentiation in the management and interaction with children also occurs cross-culturally (Oakley, 1972: 59).

Gender bias in labelling children's behaviour has been also been shown in studies focusing on the interactions between grandparents and their observations of newly born children in a maternity ward (Wallum, 1977 cited in Giddens, 1989). The gender bias shown in the labelling of the children's behaviour "...sounds so exaggerated that it is tempting to think they are made up" (Giddens, 1989: 157). The interactions of mothers with what they believed to be a female or male infant (actually the same child in differing dress and with a substituted fe/male name), has also been recorded. When with a child whom they believed to be a male, the adults provided male oriented toys to play with; when with the 'female' child, they reported the child as being sweet, with a soft cry. The child was also provided with dolls to play with (Will, Self and Datan, 1976 in Giddens, 1989).

The behaviour of carers towards children represents forms of behaviour which occur not in a static or rigid construction, but within a flexible and changing composition "...usually invisible, operating within a taken-for-granted context of behaviour" (Richards, 1994: 80) and is continually created and recreated by its subjects through their

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12 Courtesy of Myriam Miedzian, 1992.
participation in its partial representation of reality" (Reiger, 1984, cited in Richards, 1994: 99). Thus differentiation is both forming and being formed within a circular relationship. Perceptions of gender differentiation are both creator and creation: the pre-constructed is re-constructed. This is witnessed again in research on the reactions of infants to stressors. Children were exposed to a 'jack-in-a-box' and their reactions shown to adults. If the adults were informed the child was male, the child's reaction to the event was thought to be anger. If the adults were informed the child was female, the child's reaction to the event was thought to be fear (Condry and Condry, 1976 cited in Bussey, 1986: 97).

Even within the supposedly 'closed shop' of biology, research shows the effect of environment. Work by Moore and Morelli (1979, cited in Kaplan and Rogers, 1990) criticised work by Harris and Dorner claiming that rats brains developed female or male characteristics as a result of the presence or absence of testosterone. Moore and Morelli showed that the behaviour of the mother rat prompted the difference in brain development. i.e. the mother would more often lick the anogenital region of male pups; this caused the enlargement of the testes and the adoption of male-type behaviour. It was the mother's behaviour and the testosterone, not the testosterone alone, which brought about the male or female behaviour in the rats. Both were required for the behaviour to be elicited and therefore existed within an interactive relationship: between the biological and social (Kaplan and Rogers, 1990: 205). Consequently:

"…sex differences in brain structure and function may result in the adult because females and males have been taught different things, and at different crucial stages of development." (Kaplan and Rogers, 1990: 215)

Interestingly, some of the previously mentioned 'scathingly attacked' sociobiologists are not necessarily so adamant or deterministic. In researching aggression, Wilson proposed a theoretical position that situated violence as the result of a predisposition towards aggression, combined with cultural practices. He argued that cultural changes can occur within very short periods of time, which will in themselves change the frequency of violent interactions. One example is the Maori of New Zealand. Following the introduction of firearms by Europeans, fighting amongst the Maori resulted in approximately 25% of the population dying in a 20-year period. Seeing the result, the Maori began to question their cultural practices (Miedzian, 1992: 48-49). Should
violence be purely the result of biological factors and not amenable to social reflection and modification, such behaviour would be impossible to change. Further, an argument that evolution is 'the' behaviour modifier in humans becomes redundant.

In his later work with Iraneus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, E.O. Wilson has argued that whilst 'genes hold culture on a leash', the leash is very long (Wilson, 1982: 175 cited in Miedzian, 1992: 50). The contention that biology is 'the determiner', or 'the controlling element' in human social life is therefore undermined by an argument that predisposition, combined with cultural practice, results in properties of emergence (Miedzian, 1992: 73).

An example of the argument based on genetics and evolution is that of caregiving in other animals, which is also often proposed as 'female due to biology' and therefore elevated as further evidence of the 'naturalness' of females. This has been undermined by the work of Harry Harlow (as seen in the section on Failure to Thrive). Additionally, this work also refutes the position that higher order, or complex, behaviour is the consequence of genetic determinism. We are thus moving away from an all-inclusive, all determining and all encompassing biology, to a sociology that is inclusive, incorporative and interactive of and with biology and one in which properties emerge from a confluence of factors. In their collection of works on aggression, Marsh and Campbell make the point that genetic and biological components could be considered to have an influence, but not a causal role, in aggressive behaviour (Marsh and Campbell, 1982: 1-5). This seems an eminently reasonable position to take and one that permits exploration of fields normally deemed 'outside of' when writing sociology.

As stated, all members of the biological sciences do not support the absoluteness of some of the arguments for biological determinism - as all members of the social sciences do not support all the arguments within the social sciences. In a recent article, T.V. Rajan, Boehringer-Ingelheim Professor and Chair of the Department of Pathology, University of Connecticut Health Center, stated that whilst we are technologically able to break down and analyse genes, and assess the consequences of various pathogens, the ability to correlate genotype and phenotype\(^\text{13}\) is 'woefully deficient'. Referring to identical twins and inbred lab mice:

\(^\text{13}\) 'genotype, genetic constitution of an organism, comprising the entire complex of genes inherited from both parents. The genotype determines the potentials and limitations of an individual, from embryonic formation through adulthood...The genotype determines the formation of the individual's...
"...both genetic components and environmental influences seem to play roles in complex phenotypes, and the knowledge of the much-vaunted genetic blueprint may leave us far less enlightened than we are sold." (2000: 35)

1.13 "We should not be afraid of biology..."

Self-reflection has been a characteristic of recent sociology. At times this has been criticised, not as a bad thing per se, but for a tendency to become a practice unto itself. As Martin has written (and I'm not certain that it is not as true now), self-examination:
"...has been the most characteristic feature of the period of 'the new sociology'...Sociology now rivals society as the discipline's central focus of interest" (Martin, 1972: 3). This reflection has produced the liveliness of what are at times internecine fights. This can be seen in the fights surrounding the place of biology and its relationship to sociology. As shown above, there have been many concerns and fears surrounding a biology/sociology relationship. All of these have and are valid in their own right.

Recently, however, there have been strong arguments advocating the inclusion of biology, and particularly the corporeality of the body, in sociology. A number of writers (e.g. Singer, 1999; Arnhart, 1998; Grosz, 1994; Scott and Morgan, 1993; Kirby, 1991; Steklis and Walter, 1991; Turner, 1984; Barker, 1981) propose a rethink in sociology around this issue. This is not, and is not going to be, an easy endeavour. There has been a 'conceptual blind spot' in contemporary feminist and western philosophical theory (Grosz, 1994). This epistemological scotoma has allowed research to un-problematise the body, its biology and its physiology. This has assisted in sociology's resolve to strike out determinism, root and branch.
Generally sociology has taken the position that biology is unnecessary to sociological theorising. The result has been that biology has been actively 'written-out' of sociology, to prevent giving more ground to biological essentialism or reductionism. One consequence has been the delivery of a feminism that usually judges itself by the distance that it is able to create between itself and any sense or taste of determinism (Kirby, 1991). In sociology as a general study, and especially in what passes as theoretical sociology, the body, the flesh and bone body, is improper; it is generally excluded and quarantined for fear that: "...its ineluctable immediacy will leave us no space for change, no chance to be other wise, no place from which to engender a different future" (Kirby, 1991: 91).

This, bluntly, is to reduce the imposition of a form of 'deterministic biological die', which could thereby establish the certainty that we cannot be other than what we are, and how things are is the way they 'ought' to be and ever shall be. There is, obviously, enough material to show that we are mutable and malleable. The question remains to what degree this is true. The current counter point is specifically that to truly place the body within sociology, the biology of the physical body must be addressed. For the "...development of a more embodied sociology" (Scott and Morgan, 1993: 136) further investigation is required into the relationship of biology and sociology. This would meet demands for a 'humanising' of sociology (Murphy, 1995; D'Alton, 1971).

To reiterate, to have biological content is not the same as saying there is a biological foundation to all aspects of social life (Barker, 1981). But, and this is a big 'but', to argue that all human behaviour is purely social transaction would mean that:

"...humans as biological entities (born, about to die, getting hungry or randy) would be merely the physical bearers of their social transactions. Change the transactions, and you have changed everything significant. Our bodies, with their joyful and painful processes, seem to me terribly marginalised by such an account." (Barker, 1981: 54)

Additionally, by applying a methodology that focuses purely on the Durkheimian premise 'social fact creates social fact', reifies abstract intellectual constructions, embedding a nature/nurture dichotomy (Steklis and Walter, 1991). This is echoed by morphology, physiology, origin and distribution; sometimes, in a narrower sense = physiology (The Oxford
Connell (and shall be returned to shortly): "We should not be afraid of biology, nor so refined or tricky in our theorizing" of gender that we have no place for sweaty bodies" (Connell, 1996: paragraph 3). In this he does not say that biology is the determinant for all masculine behaviour, nor that change is not possible. He states purely that the body plays a role and we should not be afraid to acknowledge this. Rather it is this 'tricky' theorising which allows for a theoretical sociology in which the biology of the beings doing the theorising is denied and dismissed.

It is important then to create a positive dialogue about the relevance of biology to sociology. This thesis takes the position that within the area of the study of children there exists research that has a biological base that presents a special challenge. This material is found particularly in the early childhood research of such researchers as Bowlby and Ainsworth, whose work on attachment presents a particularly strong challenge to post-structural notions of humanness and, therefore, the definitions of child abuse it sponsors.

This is not to dismiss or occlude any notion that human social life is complex or plastic. The simple existence of a multiplicity and oft changing variety of forms of social life is evidence alone of the possibilities. The flexibility that humans show in their adaptation to their environment is considerable. Humans can be seen as "… a being whose biological organisation does not determine its behavioural dispositions, but rather grounds a rich and open space of species-specific potentials" (Benton, 1991: 23).

As stated previously, movements such as Deep Ecology question the viability and legitimacy of separating humans from other species in the way that contemporary sociology has. Rather than contextualising humans as being an 'other', if we were to see humans as 'another' species:

"Widely held biological views about human developmental processes, about gender-differentiation, the links between genetic constitution and behaviour, hormones and emotional states and so on would have to come to terms with a range of social scientific sources or evidence and argument which it is so far all too easy for them to evade." (Benton, 1991: 9)

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17 Italics added.
There has been some excellent interactive work in this mode. Research on factory workers\(^1\) from the period of the initial threat of closure, to the period two years later, when the closure did occur, showed there was an increasing level of ill-health amongst those under threat of losing their jobs. This displays a correlation between not only the physical/material loss of money/financial security and ill health, but also the threat of the loss of such and ill health. Stress and anxiety have an effect on the physiological organism, correlating with an increase in other health issues (mental health deterioration, para/suicide), amongst those who experience the stress. This sets a new frame of reference for such things as class analysis of health and service equity and the impact of economic change.

The body and its biology are thus not purely a canvas-in-flux, or another surface for post-modernist analysis, but an interactive organism that requires a holistic approach. To analyse such entities we need "...sophisticated models of the dynamic interaction between organic and psychological processes at the level of the individual person, and between persons and their social-relational and bio-physical environments" (Benton, 1991: 5).

Rather than biological determinism, it is the notion of biological potential that can help illuminate new information and possibilities for human social life. In recognising this, we also need to recognise that:

"...as with all materially-grounded potentials, their scope is not unlimited. Human beings cannot successfully adapt to every possible set of environmental conditions, nor are their bio-physical or social environments limitlessly malleable. Environments, physical or social, may impair or enhance well-being, induce pathologies, or facilitate survival." (Benton, 1991: 24)

Ignoring or leaving the biological sciences to the essentialists or the reductionists also embarrasses sociology - it is provided with no real defence and thus left vulnerable to attack from what can present as attractive determinist propositions (Morgan and Scott, 1985).

1993b: 5). The triumphal acceptance of such arguments can be seen in papers and publications on the racial characteristics of intelligence, such as "The Bell Curve". The inclusion of biology does not mean victory for biological determinism or Social Darwinism. Rather it is a recognition that our "…capacity for and a dependence upon social life is built into our very anatomical and physiological constitution…” (Benton, 1991: 23). This is a position empathic with Durkheim and Marx. Some writers have come to the conclusion that Marxism needs biology and that it is possible to argue that socialism is only possible "…because of our biological nature"(Barker, 1981: 72-73). For a socialism based on human needs, specialist knowledge must be utilised as a resource (Barker, 1981: 73) rather than purely as target practice. For example, environmental health science-based research in the USA has highlighted the disparity between the health of the wealthy and that of the poor and socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. These populations have little control over limiting their exposure to environmental and work-based hazards:

"Where one lives and works is less a matter of choice than a result of one's socioeconomic status. Thus, people in the lower socioeconomic strata are more likely to live in the most hazardous environments and to work in the most hazardous occupations, a fact that would be reflected in greater health risks." (Olden, 1998: 7)

The inclusion of the effects on human biological and physiological life consequent of unemployment, the sequestering of the poor in polluted environments and polluted work places, can all be read within a socialist framework.

As with Singer, (1999, 1985) and mirroring Parson, Barker states that social life is the result of emergent properties a 'la Talcott Parsons. This is a reiteration of Durkheim's conception of the social as an emergence of human interaction. The body can be read as both containing and a consequence of emergent properties. This denies reductionist premises and singular-state/cause elements: it is not possible to reduce the parts of the whole, or their functions, to some smaller, more pure, aspect or component. Indeed, there exists the need to 'defend humanity from the imperialism of certain forms of biology' (Barker, 1981: 46). The task for sociology is to locate the place and effect of

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biology more clearly, to express a positive dialogue about "...what we can say about the relevance of biology..." (Barker, 1981: 45).

This would help free sociological thought from the sense of being overwhelmed or subsumed whenever issues of biology are raised seriously. Though the context is specific, the principal remains. Sociology as a field of study needs to constantly reconsider its position in the light of the information and research conducted in other fields relating to human life and social existence. Like the efforts of Sisyphus in the Underworld, an eternal torment this may be, but a necessary one and one that can only benefit sociological enquiry. The danger otherwise would be to become isolated and redundant, becoming more 'self' focused or narcissistic. This is especially so when discourses have been pre-excluded or formed as an academic stereotype.

So how does this relate to child abuse, the second theme of this thesis? Most contemporary sociological study in the area of child abuse has generally failed to acknowledge abuse as more than a cultural or historical construct. The consequence is seen in the research methodology and definitions. This argument thus cycles back to the notion of harm and notions of 'Human Nature'. In this thesis these are not juxtaposed as independent variables but as mutually dependent when discussing child abuse. To argue that any event is exploitative or harmful, one commences with a particular notion of what humans need or are 'naturally' inclined to become; human nature is thus implicit. It is this notion of 'human nature' that provides the engine for the definitions of harm held by child protection services and the community.

The body, the 'flesh and bone' body has been excluded and quarantined for fear that "...its ineluctable immediacy will leave us no space for change, no chance to be otherwise, no place from which to engender a different future (Kirby, 1991: 91). To overcome this we need to see that the biological body has a reciprocal relationship with culture, that it is interactive and productive (Grosz (1994: x-xi). This thesis argues that those who wish to construct definitions of child abuse need to come to terms with such arguments. The position that harm does not occur minimises the impact the event has on the individual. It infers that all life is merely cognitive, that one is fundamentally and purely the construct of intellectual discourse and therefore it is the operation of physical and language-based interactions that form our relationship with the world. It also infers that humans are flexible and mutable to an endless degree. What it fails to grasp is that
this is not true. "...the original site of reality..." (Scarry, 1985: 121) is the human body and it is not neutral.

As a means to further explore this debate, I shall now turn to an examination of historical and sociological views of children and childhood.
2. A Brief history of views of Children and Childhood

It was Foucault's contention that "Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people" (Foucault 1971 in Rabinow, 1984: 80). This chapter will show that the attitudes towards children and their well being have varied both in history and between and within cultural groups. It will also show how there have been multiple views about children held simultaneously throughout history and how attempts to locate 'where' the desire for better treatment of children began are fruitless. "Belief in the notion of the 'origin' is a belief that things conceal a 'timeless and essential secret'…" (Marks, 2000: 130 referring to Foucault's Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 1971). It is this which fools us into thinking we can find the 'where and when'. Whilst we may well be able to show the relationship between events recent in the past and the present, it is not possible to present a great, constant, arc of history, in which there is an unbroken line of ascent - a causal relationship throughout history which has brought us to the present.

What we do find it is that societal views of children have been historically inconstant and varied. That this is a current state of affairs is quite easy to show - ask as many people as you know what their views are of children and children's rights. This is also no less true of the position of children within the study of sociology. Children represent a social category which, relative to other social categories, has received little direct study and has often been included with, or 'distilled' from, the study of families and adults (Branmen and O'Brien, 1995: 729). Noting this neglect of children and childhood, Locke (1690) petitioned readers to accept that men (sic) came together in freedom, to form society and governments and to form social contracts. In response to the argument of others that there was no written evidence to support such a claim, Locke responded:

"And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of Nature, because we hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because we hear little of them till they were men and embodied in armies." (1690: paragraph 101)
It may be argued that part of the reason for this was the high infant mortality rate:

"...I am a baby, and my tongue is mute. Yesterday I was born, and today I must depart. I do no more than come and go." (Herlihy, 1978: 109 citing a 14th Century French poem)

Indeed, during the greater part of human history, most children came and went. This was to such an extent that:

"Of all the social groups which formed the societies of the past, children, seldom seen and rarely heard in the documents, remain for historians the most elusive, the most obscure." (Herlihy, 1978: 109)

Though Herlihy also comments that it was likely that the limited life span of many children was one of the possible reasons for the brevity of record keeping, children did live and still they were not written about. If we accept that documents and letters are often the places in which we are able to locate the existence and intersection of discourses (Foucault, 1977a), then this means that the difficulty of reading 'childhood' or 'children' is immense.

The more recent desire to write of children is perhaps because historians, echoing Phillip of Navarre's message that "Childhood is the foundation of life" are becoming aware of an "...older wisdom, the recognition that society, in the way it rears its children, shapes itself" (Herlihy, 1978: 109).

Questions of what a child 'is', what constitutes the notion of 'child', 'who?' or 'what?' children are, therefore precede any discussion on children as a class, an interest group or childhood as a status. One of the problems with this social constructivist approach is that it appears to result in an uncertainty as to whether children exist. This is to be contrasted with the presence of adults, or 'people', who are perceived as a constant.

This diminution of children acts to sideline them. It marginalises them in the study of sociology and acts to undermine interest in them and the exploration of children's interests separate from that of adults. One of sociology's difficulties with the study of children results from the very real consequence of great changes and varieties in social
and cultural attitudes towards, and definitions of, children and childhood. What needs to be remembered is that what forms the notion of children as an identifiable social grouping can only be constituted by a discursive and praxis boundary with that which operates to constitute the notion of adults. To argue that a failure to be able to adequately identify children prevents adequate research in to their needs, can then only be a failure to adequately identify adults. However, this has not prevented study of, research on and interest in adult-focused social issues. This argument, then, is at best tenuous. I would also argue that it is a nice piece of sleight-of-hand. Such theorising serves to prevent adults from seriously questioning adult-child relationships. By this technique, the adult world has provided itself with an easy means by which to ignore the history of a relationship in which oppression and violence - actual and threatened - has been a constant theme.

The frequent (in historical terms) changes in the age at which one is a considered a child, combines with a wide variety of cultural and historical variations, which themselves have shown to be rarely concrete and immutable over time. Interestingly, as Jeremy Bentham was to state in 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation' (1823):

"In English we have no word that will serve to express with propriety the person who bears the relation opposed to that of parent. The word child is ambiguous being employed in another sense, perhaps more frequently than in this: more frequently in opposition to a person of full age, an adult, than in correlation to a parent."

(Bentham, 1823 Chapter 16, Section 3, Part 4)

So it is not only that we are vexed as to what best describes the relationship between parents and their begotten, but so too have we changeable views of what or who is a child. This problem is not confined to western societies. For example, in 1885, an American graduate of the Annapolis Naval Academy, one Mr. Philo Norton McGiffen, approached the Chinese minister responsible for the Imperial Chinese Navy, Li Hung-Chang, saying that he wished to serve as an officer in the Chinese fleet. As a graduate of the American Naval Officer academy, McGiffen believed he was entitled to an officer's position. The minister finally agreed and proposed to make arrangements for McGiffen's command. Then the minister asked the American his age:
"When he [Hung-Chang] learnt that McGiffen was 24, Li said that the American was a child and would not do. To the Chinese, a male was not a man until the age of 30." (Hull, 2000: 72)

Though considering himself adult enough to travel from America to China to offer his services - a trip which was full of dangers and threats - McGiffen was rebuffed at the last hurdle as he was still a child, with, as the minister inferred, a child's limitations.

The problematic here is not dissimilar to that discussed by many gender theorists. Universal fe/male and 'universal heterosexual fe/male/universal homosexual fe/male' imagery, mirrors the historical child - parent relationship. Connell criticises social structure epistemologies for locating "...basic constraints in stereotyped interpersonal expectations" (Connell, 1987: 48). Others such as Anne Edwards identify the perpetuation of dualism within homogenous male/homogenous female constructs (Connell, 1987: 51). Added to this has been work that creates a form of individual universalisation (Mary Daly in Gyn/ecology and Kathleen Barry in Female Sexual Slavery, cited in Connell, 1987: 57-58). However, what is normative is not necessarily standard (Connell, 1987: 51, citing Kalpana Ram's work on suttee in India) and this creation of universals fails to acknowledge the resistance and divergence that occurs within the culture or society.

Consequently, the many theories of the construction of gender and specifically masculinity have generated what Eisenstein (1984: xii) calls a 'false universalism': the notion that there is a universal example which can easily represent the group. Such examples have the advantage of providing a means by which to discuss the group, without having to reference the whole - a sort of 'everyone' which represents the whole. We can see this same universalism in studies of childhood - the '17th Century child' or the 'Medieval child' etc. which must necessarily generate the '17th Century parent' and the 'Medieval parent'. An example of how the Universal Child is brought in to being is the historical chart drawn by Kennedy (1988), in which he describes a variety of images of children over time and the period of history within which these views predominated. Each of these 'Images' is, in essence, a representation of what was believed to be the nature of children:
One of the advantages of creating such charts is the readily available 'child' which it produces. This child is then used to discuss the various experiences and changes over historical periods which children have been subjected to. Not only does this help to frame the general adult views of children during these periods, it also helps to generate a sense of what forms of parenting dominated the eras, and what sorts of information were presented to the parents of children. We must however be wary of the universal child image - the unitary image - that concurrently develops reciprocal unitary views of childhood and the management of children or 'parenting'. The danger otherwise is that we adhere too firmly and easily to them and ignore the variations and differences.

In the struggle to answer questions like 'What is a child?' and 'What is the nature of a child?' and how they are perceived, Kennedy (citing work by Merleu-Ponty and Suransky) notes that what adults often perceive and have perceived of children has not been the nature of the child but the nature of the relationship between adults and children. Interestingly, Merleu-Ponty writes that the perception is of the relationship between the child and "...a being who is no longer a child..." (Merleu-Ponty cited in Kennedy, 1988: 122). When we talk about the relationship between children and adults, we are defining children within a particular framework of age, capacity, competency etc; we are discussing their relationship with persons who are not children. Consequently, what forms the view of children is the relationship 'child and not child'. This creates a process by which the notion of Adult exists as a constant and is axiomatic in our work. It is through this prism of Adult that we engage in our enquiries. Children then are
discovered by determining those who are not *Adults*. Therefore, *Children* are constructed in relation to the generic concept of *Adult*.

This relationship reflects the position of male/female in gender studies, where the creation of the social category 'heterosexual' "...only has meaning through a gender opposition... [which]... requires two categories, heterosexual men and heterosexual women" (Connell, 1987: 137). Thus the notion of childhood, and its defining characteristics, presents a considerable problematic. We cannot imagine children without reference to adults (Jenks, 1996). Further, the historical setting of the enquiry, the 'when' we ask these questions, influences the answers we may receive (Aries, 1960). Not only is the answer then predicated on what question one asks, but also 'when' the question is asked and with reference to whom.

It is this unidirectional flow which Jenks inverts when he states that it is:

"... impossible to generate a well defined sense of the adult and, indeed adult society, without first positing the child." (1996: 3)

Without a notion of 'child', there is no notion of 'adult'. However, as stated, 'adults' form the given in sociology. It is from this position that we commence sociological enquiry on industrial issues, political power and gender etc. What would happen if sociology had to first come to some conclusion as to who and what children were, before determining who was inferred as the *a priori* human (which at the present is usually an adult) in relationship to these particular issues?

Despite the increase in the amount of attention or interest, or maybe because of it, there is no generally accepted view on the history of children or the development of the social notions of childhood (Herlihy, 1978: 110). In his seminal work on children and childhood, Aries (1960) considers that adults had a fairly indifferent attitude towards children during the middle ages (Aries, 1960: 127). This is similar to De Mause's psychogenic theory of history (The History of Childhood, 1976). For example, in *Centuries of Childhood* (1960), Aries entitled one chapter *The Discovery of Childhood*. In this he argued that childhood was not considered a separate stage in life and that people saw children as miniature but poorly formed adults. As their needs, separate to adults were not identified, then the discovery of these differences could be noted as a discovery of children and childhood. This parallels Foucault's notion of how power, in the guise of
observation and the development of record keeping and norms, forms an architectural framework within which the individual can be identified and effected (Foucault, 1977a). Large-scale comparisons are assisted by these mechanisms which then more effectively assist in the 'norming' of childhood vis à vis adulthood.

Though Aries considered that this discovery occurred somewhere during the period of the 15th to the 18th Centuries, others, such as De Mause and Tucker, considered a number of candidates as possible pioneers, whilst Priscilla Robertson nomi nates Rousseau for 'special credit' (Herlihy, 1978: 110).

Similarly, the notion that children were not recognised as distinct from adults is not accepted by all historians (See Elizabeth Pollock, 1983 and Herlihy, 1978: 109 and 111, who also cites Klapisch (1973), Goldthwaite (1972) and Bec (1967)). Taking an unambiguous stance, Herlihy states:

"The lessons that I would draw from this confusion of learned opinions are the following: Historians would be well advised to avoid such categoric and dubious claims that people in certain periods failed to distinguish children from adults, that childhood really did lie beyond the pale of collective consciousness." (Herlihy, 1978: 112)

One of the reasons Herlihy puts forward for this position is the significant lack of documentation and commentary on children. This poses a major challenge for those who wish to compare children across time.

1 This means that researchers will at times utilise one thread or theme that then colours the history, resulting in stereotypes rather than an acknowledgement of the "…mix of sometimes inconsistent attitudes towards children" (Herlihy, 1978: 120).

An example of this form of position-taking can be seen in the work of writers such as Priscilla Robertson (de Mause, 1976). In Robertson's work, Rousseau is presented as having been a major influence on attitudes towards children in the society of the day. Pollock questions such assertions, asking how it is that one writer, such as Rousseau, could have had such an overwhelming influence and at a time when literacy rates were...
so poor (Pollock, 1983)? In three volumes, Robert Bremner presented research covering the period 1600 to 1937 (Pollock, 1983). He argued that contrary to this notion of 'discovery', children were well known and well considered in some areas and groups, claiming that the Puritans "...emigrated to New England for the benefit of their children's souls" (Pollock, 1983: 11). It would appear that more authors need to acknowledge that public and private policy is not always the same.

As a result: "...we should not expect either rigorous consistency across society or lineal progress over time" (Herlihy, 1978: 112). This makes writing a history of childhood as significantly difficult as writing a comparison of abuse of children throughout history. This becomes even more complex an exercise when one attempts to compare treatment of children across cultures in varying historical periods.

Herlihy's argument here presents two warnings to researchers that echo those given by Foucault: 1. Be careful of 'the truth', and, 2. Multiple discourses exist which are neither necessarily mutually compatible nor similar. We again can draw on Connell's work on gender here. There have been various masculinities in the history of senior military leadership, such as the personal leadership and valour expected of earlier leaders (for example Richard III, Alexander the Great) which required they prove themselves personally. In contemporary terms, warfare has now become more logistically-oriented, with the moving and arranging of massive amounts of matériel and troops (Connell, 1987). In each instance, both are considered masculine activities. It is with these warnings that we now look at some of the history of views of children.

2.1 Ancient

In the study of childhood, we can see mutations in the presentation and apprehensions of children and the multiplicity of discourses surrounding the subject when we review the material from varying periods. What constitutes childhood has changed and can change. Therefore, what has constituted an abuse of children has changed and continues to do so. This is not to say that what was practised was a routine and unquestioned activity. Infanticide, so often reported in history, was an event that occurred throughout the Roman Empire. In Ancient Medical Conscience and the Life of Children, Robert Etienne (Herlihy, 1978) argues that the natural father in a Roman family often had the power of
life or death over a child, in quite literal terms\(^2\). The practice of *patria potestas* meant the newborn child was presented to the household head (usually the natural father). If he decided not to accept the child, he could order that it be exposed - or in more prosaic terms, be left to die.

In calling to mind the quite aggressive and violent management of children, Herlihy cites Augustine's comment:

"Who would not shudder if he were given the choice of eternal death or life again as a child? Who would not choose to die?" (Herlihy, 1978: 114)

Though children may have been put to death through such means, Herlihy is at pains to argue that adults still saw children as being valuable, at least in some senses, and therefore requiring attention. For example, again citing Etienne, Herlihy states that in the Empire of the Romans, the Jews were the only peoples to not support this execution of "...deformed, unpromising, or supernumerary babies" (Herlihy, 1978: 113).\(^3\) Germanic tribes of the same period did not appear to 'expose' their children if there were so many that they presented a Malthusian-style threat. Rather they continued to care for and maintain their children. However, citing Tacitus, the 'barbarians' appeared to pay little attention to their children. Unlike the Romans, who required children to formally learn a range of skills and develop a range of knowledge, the Germans did not appear to place this expectation on their children. As the reports are from Tacitus and not the German tribes themselves, it is not entirely possible to say that this is an accurate representation of the 'barbarians' view of their children (Herlihy, 1978: 114-115).

Records relating to the Visigoths, from the middle of 600 CE (Christian Era), show the scale of fines to be paid for the injury or death of a member of the community. Male children had an increasing value from birth which plateaued at the age of 20 years (at 300 Wergeld of gold) and remained constant until the age of 50 years. By the age of 65 years, the adult held the same value as a child of 10 years. Females prior to 15 year of age were valued at half that of males. Between 15 and 40 (child bearing years) their

\(^2\) Old Roman law 'Is pater quem justae nuptiae declarant' (Legal marriage with the mother establishes the father's rights over the children) (Durkheim, 1938 (1895): 91).

\(^3\) For an excellent work on the treatment of children with physical deformities (many also with intellectual impairments) in contemporary Israel, see Ethical Reflections: Taking a walk of the wild side, 1998, by
worth would increase to 250 Solidi (83% of that of similarly aged males). In old age she was worth the same as an old man. This is in sharp contrast to the Salian and Ripurian Franks. A free woman of childbearing age was worth triple that of a similarly aged male. As Herlihy comments, this is in contrast to the argument that historically children were not considered valuable and that they were not valued for their potential (Herlihy, 1978: 115-116).

2.2 Medieval

The rise of the Christian era in Europe saw other changes in the attitudes towards children. In the New Testament, Christ instructs his disciples that "Unless you become as little children, you will never enter the Kingdom of Heaven" (The King James Bible. Matthew 18: 1-5; see also Matthew 19: 33-37 and Luke 9: 46-48). Despite this, the church’s view on the nature of the child was quite harsh, with Augustine eventually deciding that an unbaptised child would not enter heaven. Reviewing the nature of children, Augustine saw the early entry of evil. The child's cries, demands, tantrums and lashing out at those caring for them, were clearly the result of:

"The innocence of children…in the helplessness of their bodies, rather than any quality of soul."

and:

"Who does not know…with what ignorance of the truth (already manifest in babies), with what plenitude of vain desire (initially apparent in children) man enters in to this life? If he is allowed to live as he wishes…he will fall into all or many kinds of crimes and atrocities." (Herlihy, 1978: 120 citing the 'Confessions of St. Augustine')

From around the 11th to the 12th Century, there was a growing specialisation of economies and a corresponding increase in social complexity. Phillipe of Navarre considered training from childhood necessary to master the skills required, whilst Thomas Aquinas wrote:
"Men from childhood…apply themselves to those offices and skills in which they will spend their lives… This is altogether necessary. To the extent that something is difficult, so much the more must man grow accustomed to it from childhood." (Herlihy, 1978: 121 citing Aquinas from 'Opera omnia iussu XIII P.M. edita, LXI')

The first available record of a European orphanage is that founded in Milan in 787. The next appears to be Santo Spirito, established in Sassia in 1201. This hospital accepted "…pilgrims, the poor, the sick and crippled and foundlings" (Herlihy, 1978: 123 citing carita cristiani). Though Villiani recorded that by the 1330s Florence had 30 hospitals, no mention of any of them caring for unwanted children is made. This was to change by the 1420s, when Gregorio Dati wrote that in the same city, there were three hospitals caring for foundlings. A 15th Century legend said that Pope Innocent III founded the hospital when, following a dream, he instructed fishermen to drag the river Tiber. The bodies of 87 drowned babies were found and, after a second effort, 340 more. The Pope, shocked by the discovery, then commissioned the hospital of Santo Spirito to receive Rome's unwanted babies (Herlihy, 1978: 123). By the 15th Century a number of French cities had hospitals for children. One possible reason is that the plague was killing off a large part of the population and children were especially susceptible. Additionally, the death of parents and extended family members appears to have increased the number of abandoned children (Herlihy, 1978: 124).

For Herlihy, two movements appear to have begun: a concern for children's education early in the 12th Century and a movement concerned with children's survival and hygiene in the late 14th Century (Herlihy, 1978: 124). Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1264) wrote advice on the care of children, as did Raymond Lull⁴, later in the same century. Vincent recommended beating children who did not learn, but warned that

"Children's minds break down under excessive severity of correction, they despair, and worry, and finally they hate. And this is the most injurious; where everything is feared, nothing is attempted." (Herlihy, 1978: 125 citing Vincent of Beauvais, Biblioteca Mundi)

⁴ Raymond Lull proffered the opinion that the 'wheel' of education, to which was joined all men, and which determined men's position in life, served best those who were skilled. One and a half centuries later, Giovanni Dominici informed a woman from an aristocratic family, that she should "… make sure
Contrary to the popular opinion of the times (and the present), some wished to ban physical punishment of children. Matteo Palmieri and Maffeo Vegio both believed that physical punishment "...induced servility and sowed resentment, which in later years might make the student hate the teacher and forget his lesson" (Herlihy, 1978: 125). Jean Gerson, on the other hand, felt that his contemporaries were overly concerned with children's well-being. Gerson recounted a story where the parents of a child, becoming 'zealously' concerned with their child's well-being and future success, became less pious and neglectful of their God. Consequently God took away the child. According to Gerson this was to warn parents of the dangers of becoming excessively concerned with a child's needs. Gerson would probably be "...surprised to learn of the opinion of recent historians, that medieval parents cared little for their offspring" (Herlihy, 1978: 126).

2.3 Early Modern

In the 16th and 17th century, wet-nursing was a very popular practice of well-to-do families, with children often cared for in the home of the wet-nurse (Ochiltree, 1990: 39; Aries, 1960: 362). As swaddling was a common practice, infants could be hung from a hook on a door if the carer was busy (or uninterested) in the child. This on occasions led to infants suffocating to death (Ochiltree, 1990: 39). One could hypothesise that as infant's neck and shoulder muscles are quite weak, the infant would be unable to move from a position in which they were suffocating. The London Bills of Mortality report that between: "...1639 and 1659 the stated cause of death for 529 babies was 'overlaid and starved at nurse'." (1990: 39)

As will be commented on later in this same chapter, for those who were aware of his writings and for those with the capacity or power to implement them, Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, published in 1693, had a significant influence on the view and management of children of the time. Its major impact was on those who were involved in the large-scale education of England's children (Cleverley and Phillips, that her child learned a useful trade." For at no stage of their life would they be required to demean themselves by dint of financial disaster (Herlihy, 1978:121).

1 From Matteo Palmieri's *Della Vita civile: Trattato di Matteo Palmieri cittadino fiorentino* and Maffeo Vegio da Lodii's *De excavacione liberorum et eorum claris moribus.*
1987). Other than within these groupings "…such ideas literally took root among only the wealthiest classes…" (Steward, 1995f: paragraph 1).

Locke's work can be seen as a break with views of parents rights held both then and now:

"Firstly. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, nor dominion over the world, as is pretended." (1690: 1)

By considering the power of fathers over children to be like that of God over Adam and Eve, adults had made a fundamental mistake, overstating and misconstruing parental power. It was:

"…as if the mother had no share in it; whereas if we consult reason or revelation, we shall find she has an equal title, which may give one reason to ask whether this might not be more properly called parental power?" (1690: paragraph 52)

It was Locke's contention that the notion of an absolute power or 'paternity' that fathers had over their children was an easily shown absurdity, especially once the notion of parental power was considered. The concept that God had divinely provided the King or Queen with absolute power and that this transferred to the father in a household, was a poorly construed and insupportable contention, a 'gross mistake'. Though children were obviously not born in a 'full state of equality' it was something they were 'born to' (Locke, 1690: paragraph 55) and their subjection to their parents was but a temporary one. The consequence of the weakness of infancy, this would decrease as they grew.

It was rather more obvious that parents had a responsibility, as a separate issue to the notion of rights. Parents were:

"…under an obligation to preserve, nourish and educate the children they had begotten, not as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them." (Locke, 1690: paragraph 56)
A parents power over children, then, was not absolute and without parameters, or for the parents own benefit. More important was the duty which was 'incumbent of parents', to care for their children (Locke, 1690: paragraph 58). Locke's emphasis on 'responsibility' as opposed to 'right' also directed him to conclude that this 'right to take responsibility' would be forfeited if the parent abrogated their responsibility to the child by failing to take care of them: such as neglecting their education or health.

Children also had responsibilities, which were to honour their parents and to do nothing which would: "...injure or affront, disturb or endanger the happiness or life..." of their parents or persons who had made good their responsibilities in their upbringing. This was, however, not the same as "...absolute obedience and submission" (1690: paragraph 66). On notions of punishment of children, Locke drew on Deuteronomy (8-5), where God, in his relationship with the Israelites:

"...chastened them as a man chastens his son" (Deut. 8. 5)- i.e., with tenderness and affection, and kept them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness, to have slackened... [for]...God hath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their offspring, that there is little fear that parents should use their power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe side, the strong bias of nature drawing the other way." (1690: paragraph 67)

Later he says:

"....the affection and tenderness God hath planted in the breasts of parents towards their children makes it evident that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their offspring." (1690: paragraph 170)

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Locke's position then is one where parents have responsibilities to their children, the right to exercise such being forfeited through neglect or causing harm, whilst punishment or discipline was not meant to be harsh.

2.4 Modern

18th Century

Views amongst those who could afford or were forced into this practice of nursing of small children began to change as early as the 1740s (Steward, 1995d: paragraph 1):

"Artists such as George Morland lampooned parents who chose to be separated from their own children, detailing the negative effects of such separation on family well-being." (Steward, 1995d: paragraph 1)

This is mirrored in more recent cartoons by Michael Leunig focusing on day care, which caused such a storm in Australian newspapers in 2000. Part of the rationale for Morland's work related to concerns at the mortality rates of children being nursed out-of-home (Behlmer, 1982: 17-43). By the end of the 19th century and in to the early part of the 20th century, an increasing number of wet nurses began to live in the home of the child's parents (Steward, 1995d: paragraph 1; Aries, 1960: 362). This practice was of course being restricted to those families wealthy enough to afford it (Gathorne-Hardy, 1972: 309 cited in Mullan, 1987: 73).

Medical opinions on the rearing of children were also being expressed at this time. In the published third version of a letter to the Governors of a foundling hospital, an express interest in children was lauded by Dr William Cadogan:

"Sir, It is with great Pleasure I see at last the Preservation of Children become the Care of Men of Sense…" (Cadogan, 1794: page 1, paragraph 1)

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8 For examples of these paintings, see The Comforts of Industry (1790) and The Miseries of Idleness (1790) by George Morland.
9 For examples of the Leunig cartoons, see those titled Infantile Statistic Poem (23 March 2000); 'And still more thoughts on the baby in the creche' (19 April 2000); Drive Thru Creche (26 April 2000); More Thoughts from the Creche (7 April 2000); Stay At Home Swine (7 June 2000) in The Melbourne Age and Sydney Morning Herald. These can also be seen on the following website: http://www.curlyflat.net. For examples of the articles the cartoons inspired, see To breed or not? It's your choice by Sian Watkins in The Melbourne Age,
The letter also covers Cadogan's concerns that mothers and grandmothers, being unlearned and ignorant of all else about raising children than that which they have learnt from their own parents, were inadequate for the task of raising children. He assured that 'Men of Sense', science and research would provide means to better manage and raise children, providing "...a Means not only of preventing the Murder of many, but of saving more, by introducing a more reasonable and more natural Method of Nursing" (page 1, paragraph 1). Though accepting that this would take some time, he was nonetheless confident that ultimately:

"When these Advantages appear in Favour of Children so brought up, as I am confident in time they will, it may serve to convince most Nurses, Aunts, Grand-mothers, &c. how much they have hitherto been in the wrong, what Mischief is done to Children, and what Multitudes are destroyed or spoiled, as well by cramming them with Cakes, Sweetmeats, &c. till they foul their Blood, choak their Vessels, pall the Appetite, and ruin every Faculty of their Bodies; as by cocketing and indulging them, to the utter Perversion of their naturally good Temper, till they become quite forward and indocile." (page 2, paragraph 2)

This neatly highlights the comment from Aries that during this period, 'coddling' was something seen by many as insufferable; children were being too softly managed (Aries, 1960: 127).

Now whilst it may appear that one article alone is little to make gain from, it was Foucault's contention that such articles provided an insight to the discourse which informed the practice of those with authority (Grosz, 1990: 82). Articles, letters, documents, all contribute to the elements of the discursive formation constructing and moulding the actions and attitudes of adults towards children. Physical punishment was an accepted form of discipline for children (Ochiltree, 1990: 39), and corporal punishment (which, for example, is clearly and violently defined in some instances as flogging with the birch), provided "...an opportunity for the boy being flogged to exercise self-control, the first duty of an English gentleman" (Aries, 1960: 254). Such attitudes were held by the mother of the founder of the Methodist Church, John

Wesley. Wesley's mother believed that children, born evil, needed to be 'broken' by their parents (Ochiltree, 1990: 46).

One argument put forward for the hesitancy of parents to become close to very young children is the high rate of morbidity in infants. For example, in the City of London before 1750, only 25% of children lived beyond 5 years of age (Maccoby, 1979).

Consequently little attention was paid to children's developmental needs (e.g. Ochiltree, 1990, Maccoby, 1979 and Herlihy, 1978). As morbidity rates decreased and birth rates decreased, a greater degree of importance and concern was therefore placed on children and their needs. This concern manifested in more attention being paid to organising the individual child's environment as opposed to the collective needs of children. This focus on the individual child saw a concomitant increase in the development and production of mechanisms of control and management, and as Foucault was himself to later argue, an increased desire to control the actions of the individual/child. (Foucault, 1978)

Though "The simple piety of childhood remained an ideal of religious reformers for the duration of the Middle Ages" (Herlihy, 1978: 129) when Girolamo Savonarola and Desiderius Erasmus had urged followers to be like children in their Christian lives, by the 18th century the standard belief of the time was of children's innate evil. Despite this, Thomas Moore believed in the 'innocence of children' (Ochiltree, 1990: 48), and "William Blake [1757-1827] hoped the ways of children would inspire adults to rekindle the visionary flame of childhood" (Steward, 1995f: paragraph 1).

During the reign of the King Georges (1714 to 1837), as in contemporary society, there was continuing debate as to the nature of childhood and children. Letters written by Lord Chesterfield to his son in 1740 (entitled imaginatively, Letters of Lord Chesterfield to His Son) and published in the 1770s, became quite popular. They included a note that his son should have: "No more levity: childish toys and playthings must be thrown aside, and your mind directed to serious objects" (Chesterfield in Steward, 1995e: paragraph 1). This closely reflected the traditional 18th century notion that "...play, along with affectionate behaviour, be abandoned at the onset of the "age of reason"- as early as age seven" (Steward, 1995e: paragraph 1).

Though Georgian England inherited the Calvinist perception that 'the child' was innately evil, similar views to Locke and Rousseau began to make inroads. By the end of the Georgian period:
"...a great philosophical shift took place... [and]... the child became allied with the natural world, and childhood, a period of improbably extreme innocence." (Steward, 1995b: paragraph 1)

This change in the perception of children is manifested in the artwork of the time. Referring to works such as Sir Joshua Reynolds's Master Hare (1788), Steward writes "Artists increasingly depicted children outdoors, often close to animals and the larger natural world" (Steward, 1995b: paragraph 2). It is this which people like Aries have seen as indicating a prior lack of interest in children. Like Steward, many consider that, at best, prior to the early 18th Century, children "...while loved by their families, were viewed as little more than small, vulnerable adults" (Steward, 1995a: paragraph 1).

19th Century

Again, the change in society was not evenly spread or all encompassing. Harshness existed in the treatment of children before the law. Ochiltree (1990, citing Pinchbeck and Hewitt, 1973: 351) provides an example of this with excerpts from a list of those hung:

"...the little girl of seven hanged in the marketplace of Norwich for stealing a petticoat...on one day alone, in February 1814, at the Old Bailey Sessions, five children condemned to death; Fowler, aged twelve and Wolfe, aged twelve, for burglary in a dwelling; Morris aged eight, Solomons, aged nine, and Burrell, aged eleven, for burglary and stealing a pair of shoes." (1990: 40)

As well as being subjected to capital punishment for a range of offences, British children were also transported to Australia (Ochiltree, 1990: 40). An interesting point made by Ochiltree is that there was not an offence in the statutes for kidnapping a child, but one could be charged for taking their shoes!

If the hangman's noose didn't catch up with children, then poor hygiene, disease and industry would. Angus Reach, an investigative journalist, wrote that:
"A vast proportion of the mortality of Manchester is that of children, but of children, be it observed, under the age of labour in the mills. Out of every 100 deaths in Manchester, more than 48 take place under five years of age, and more than 51 under ten years of age." (1971 [1849]: 23)

When incorporating data from the whole area, over the five years up to June 30, 1843, "...it appeared that, out of the whole number of deaths, 57 per cent [sic], were those of children under five years of age" (Reach, 1971 [1849]: 23). This corresponds with Cadogan's comment, some 100 years earlier, that the Bills of Mortality showed: "...that almost half of the Number of those, that fill up that black List, die under five Years of Age" Cadogan, 1749: paragraph 2).

In his reports for the Morning Chronicle, Reach also felt compelled to comment on the appalling state of the accommodation of the inhabitants of the industrialised areas. "This is a matter which, in discussing seriously and earnestly the social condition of the people, it would be weak and foolish to shirk" (Reach, 1971 [1849]: 5). The crowding produced by the lack of room, resulted in there being "...little delicacy or decent reserve" (Reach, 1971 [1849]: 5) and consequently, 'little female virtue' (Reach, 1971 [1849]: 5). Additionally, with the crowding of the men and women, "...thus follow[s] the inevitable results of brutalised men and hardened and shameless women - of children precociously knowing in everything which children ought not to know, and by consequence, precociously criminal" (Reach, 1971 [1849]: 5). In a similar vein, Water Babies (Charles Kingsley, 1863) highlighted the plight of child chimney sweeps, who were subjected to appalling and lethal treatment (Ochiltree, 1990: 41).

These death rates and living conditions, which were not unusual for the times, occurred whilst Britain was the 19th century's imperial power (Hyam, 1993; Kennedy, 1989) and had yet to pass a bill to protect children from abuse. Though the circumstance for children was poor and Reach's writings impassioned, the times were not apparently conducive to humanitarianism.

In Britain, the Indian Mutiny of 1857-59 brought demands for revenge. This caused Lord Macaulay to make the observation that such demands had not only silenced peace societies and the 'Aborigines Protection Society', but also societies for the reformation of criminals. In 1862, Cobden too commented on a reaction by the ruling class against
what they derisively termed 'humanitarianism' (Hyam, 1993). Along with calls for an increase in corporal punishment:

"The toughening up of discipline and the glorification of physical prowess…the 1860s saw a hardening of attitudes towards criminals and children, [and] a general growth of more authoritarian attitudes..." (Hyam, 1993: 162-3)

We can see that a variety of discourses existed at the time in relation to children, their environment and their needs. Yet, even as this was occurring, around the 1870s neglect became a 'known' problem (Gordon, 1990). During 1870 in London some 276 children's bodies were found, children who had died as a result of the 'care' of those responsible for them (Ochiltree, 1990: 41). This discovery added to the demand for legislation to protect children. The situation of children in Australia was little different. In 1863 a medical journal published in Melbourne reported that 25% of deaths of children under three were found to be non-accidental. The deaths of children in the care of 'baby-farmers' (Ochiltree, 1990: 45) put pressure on the state governments to introduce legislation to register those caring for children.10

The Children's Charter for the 'Prevention of Cruelty to and Better Protection of Children' was passed by the British Parliament in 1889, 75 years after they had passed a bill on the prevention of cruelty to animals. Concerns at intrusion into the family home (Ochiltree, 1990: 40) had acted to inhibit the legislators, much as their parliamentary descendants debate the same issue today. In the five years following the enactment of the bill, of the 47,000 cases of child cruelty reported, there were 5792 prosecutions and 5460 convictions, ranging from acts such as killing a child:

"...leaving a child unlifted out of its cradle for weeks, till toadstools grew around the child out of its own rottenness...keeping a child always in a cool cellar till its flesh became green." (Pinchbeck and Hewitt, 1973: 628 cited in Ochiltree, 1990: 40)

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Interestingly, for tying-up and then locking a child in a cupboard, where the child then died, a mother was sentenced to gaol for only one year, though for a child, as stated above, to commit 'break and enter' resulted in hanging. These 47,000 should also be seen in terms of the overall population of Great Britain which by 1890 had reached 37.4 million (Kennedy, 1989: 199). Compare this to the New South Wales Department of Community Services, which in the 1998-99 period received 56,867 contacts relating to the well-being of children, from a total State population of approximately 4.5 million (NSW Department of Community Services. Annual Report, 1998-99: 19).

The passage of the 1889 Poor Law Adoption Act allowed children to be removed from their parents and placed in the care of 'overseers' and in 1891 the Custody of Children Act prevented parents from claiming back children they had abandoned or neglected, once they were old enough to earn money (Ochiltree, 1990: 41). Concern for the well-being of children was raised as a result of recruitment drives for the Boer War, which showed deterioration in the physical well-being of the overall population. The concern was not purely of a humanitarian nature however, rather more for the future of the British Empire:

"Alarming symptoms showed a clear danger to the continued existence of Britain as a world power. In 1900 recruitment medicals showed that 565 men per thousand were below the standard army height of 5' 6", compared with only 105 per thousand in 1845. Forty-four men in every thousand weighed under 7 st. 2 lb. At the Manchester recruiting depot in 1899, 8,000 out of 12,000 men examined were rejected as virtual invalids…Three thousand men had to be sent home from South Africa on account of bad teeth." (Hyam, 1993: 275)

"…for many politicians the physical condition of the working class child came to represent the pivot on which turned the fate of British civilisation" (Hyam, 1993: 275). The future British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, became a social reformer for these same reasons. Similar concerns also promoted the introduction of subsidised school meals (1906) and compulsory school medicals (1907) (Hyam, 1993: 275). Both of these innovations were still in existence when this writer attended school in Derker, Oldham, an old cotton-industry neighbour of Manchester.
The 1830's and 1840's saw the severity and extent of poverty, child deaths and abuse being brought to the attention of the public and despite this having, "...aroused the conscience of the middle classes and strengthened the social reformers in their attempts to deal with the "condition-of-England-question"" (Harrison, 1965: 328), both Seebhoom Rowntree and Charles Booth were to show that by the latter half of the century, little had changed in the conditions of the poor (Harrison, 1965: 328) and, by extension, the lives of a great many children.

The intervention of the state into family lives for the purpose of child protection was a marginal discourse in Victorian Britain. Though consideration was given to the application of state power in relation to juvenile offenders\(^1\), protection of children from harm was another matter altogether:

"To patrol industry on behalf of the young was England's Christian duty. To patrol the home was a sacrilege." (Behlmer, 1982: 9)

The notion that the home is sacrilege still holds currency today as a counter-argument in child abuse and child protection debates (Jones, 1998; Frost, 1990; Newberger and Bourne, 1978).

The child saving movements of the 19\(^{th}\) century were primarily directed and organised by philanthropists, as opposed to the medical profession. As a consequence, their efforts were limited by their finances\(^2\) and the legal power available to them.

In contrast to this, the 20\(^{th}\) century was to see an increase in the growth of professions (Jamrozik and Sweeney, 1996: 205), and in this instance specifically those related to child welfare and child protection. This development occurred in tandem with child protection as a State interest and a concomitant rise in financing of services. In 1907, in a speech which was to offer support to the passage of the Children Act, 1908, H.H. Asquith\(^3\) justified the State's interest in social reform, stating that he was acting to "...safeguard England's "raw material"..." (Behlmer, 1982: 220). The bill passed unopposed. It was the 'irresistible appeal of children' to which Asquith was to attribute

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\(^1\) In this we can see a Durkheimian concern with order and stability - who else poses a risk to either of these 'issues of the state' if not juveniles in general and juvenile offenders particularly?

\(^2\) Ramsland's *Children of the Backlanes* (1986) provides some examples of the financial difficulties faced by institutions in NSW.
his belief that the State "…cannot pass by that appeal with folded arms" (Asquith, 1907 cited in Behlmer, 1982: 220).

During this period, two of the areas of study that saw increasing involvement in the lives of children were the fields of psychiatry and psychology. In the 1920's John Watson, working from Pavlovian theories, was the progenitor of behaviourism. Watson considered:

"One of the bad habits [of children] was their tendency to cling to adults and ask for help, attention and affection." (Maccoby, 1979: 12)

Watson's famous dictum was that given a group of healthy children:

"…and my own specified world to bring them up and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select…" (Mullan, 1987: 5 citing Watson, 1926)

In this we can see a reiteration of a constant, though not always dominant, theme of child-adult relationships through the ages: children are too needy and children are malleable and manageable, as long as the correct environment is created.

The major contemporary work that was to oppose this view of children as being too needy, essentially without limit in the ability to mould them and in establishing a very different attitude towards children, was to come some thirty years later. Its impact is still felt in child care and child protection agencies today. In 1951, John Bowlby's report to the World Health Organisation was published. Requested as an inquiry into the mental health of post-World War Two refugee children, the 'popular version' published in 1953 for public consumption, was titled Child Care and the Growth of Love. This version "…became a manual for the social work professions as well as certain schools of child psychiatry" (Mullan, 1987: 29-30). In brief, Bowlby's work emphasised the importance of interactive and sensitive caregiving in the early years of life. He particularly criticised approaches which isolated children and neglected their need for physical stimulation and social interaction. Bowlby's work had a major impact on child welfare agencies, the concept of good mothering and on attitudes to day care services and other forms of care.
outside of the home. (I shall discuss Bowlby's work in more detail in the later chapter on attachment).

Other economic and political factors also played a role in the attitudes to the quality of care children should receive and, by extension, who should look after them. (These issues too, shall be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the problem in defining child abuse). In Britain, for instance, though day care centres had been established in London in 1850, it was during the First World War that their availability was expanded - women were needed to work in the factories and to assist in other non-combat military roles. The end of the war saw a dramatic reduction of services. Availability was to again peak during World War Two - women were yet again needed for the war effort. It was again to decline after the war - the number of services fell from around 1600 to 466 between 1945 and the early 1960's (Mullan, 1987: 78-79). As we discussed earlier, the debate about child care, its adequacy and suitability, is still a current topic.

It is generally accepted (with qualifications) that the recent era of child protection and abuse concern is linked primarily to the initiating work of C. Henry Kemp (for example: Ferguson, 1990; Tower, 1989; Jenks, 1982; Bourne and Newberger, 1979). Kempe's then startling assertion was that many of the injuries experienced by children were non-accidental, This was to commence the West on a path towards solving what became known as the 'battered baby syndrome'. With the recognition that child abuse was not an isolated, individual psychopathology, but a social problem, the consequence was the dismantling of the "…Victorian legacy of romanticizing family life and mythologising 'normal' relations between parents and children as respectful and harmonious" (Gordon, 1990: xv). I shall discuss more of Kempe's work in the later chapter on defining child abuse.

In Australia, the period from the 1800s to the middle of the 1900s saw the formation of “The main features of the child welfare system we know in Australia today…” (van Krieken, 1992: 3). During this same period, NSW experienced changes in legislation and by extension, a changing role for child welfare agencies.

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14 During the Second World War, whilst women were working in the war industries of the USSR, the USA (Overy, 1995: 187 and 197 respectively) and Great Britain (Sereny, 1995: 310), the Nazi hierarchy refused to allow women to work in the German war industry (Sereny, 1995: 310).

15 A concise history is provided in Blackmore, Rod D. 1989 The Children's Court and Community Welfare in NSW. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
The State Children Relief Act (1901) provided for the establishment, in 1905, of the first NSW Children's Court (Blackmore, 1989: 5 and 32). This was followed by the Child Welfare Act of 1923, which replaced the State Children Relief Act (1901), Children's Protection Act (1902), Infant Protection Act (1904), and the Neglected Children and Juvenile Offenders Act (1905).

This Act was itself replaced by the Children Welfare Act (1939) and was to be amended 25 times in the intervening 48 years (Blackmore, 1989: 6). It was not to be replaced until the promulgation of the Children (Care and Protection) Act, 1987 and then, more recently, the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act, 1998.

So what has been the cause of this increase in the welfare of children and the creation of concurrent legislation and service delivery and availability? From the 19th century through to the 20th century, in both Australia and Britain, there was a gradual increase in the amount of legislation and social policy specifically aimed at child protection and child welfare. In Britain there was a general decrease in the employment of children in mines and factories, and an increase in the intention of ensuring their education. One of the more recent explanations put forward to explain the acceptance of the passing of legislation restricting children's employment in factories was that they had become uneconomical (Cleverley and Phillips, 1987: 104).

Like the difficulty in determining why the centralising of government grew during the Victorian era (Behlmer, 1982: 16), so too is there difficulty in determining why child protection became of increasing interest (though erratically so and with ebbs and flows) to these same authorities. Behlmer cites a number of factors which have influenced 20th century perspectives on child protection: a rise in the availability of medical services and improvements in their quality, an increasing interest in child abuse by centralised and local government agencies and the proliferation of the mass media (Behlmer, 1982: 225).

Mirroring Foucault, Bauman comments that the modern state has had an 'obsession' with order and regularity, with setting rules, managing, surveiling and supervising and with deterring and opposing deviance and divergence. Whilst modernity brought with it scientific and medical breakthroughs and approaches, it also promised certainty and order (Bauman, 2000b: 76). Unlike the pre-modern state, in which there was a 'natural order' and the state acted as gamekeeper.
"The modern state is a gardener state; it is in charge of an order which otherwise would not come about or survive." (Bauman, 2000b: 76)

As stated above, many politicians saw the future of the British Empire in terms of the physical condition (which translates also to living and working conditions, as well as educational levels) of working class children (Hyam, 1993: 275). Social reform needed therefore to be co-ordinated and enforced. How better to do this than to utilise the growing power of the state? It would appear then that one of the dominant, current themes surrounding children is, as we have already discussed at the beginning of this chapter, "… that society, in the way it rears its children, shapes itself" (Herlihy, 1978: 109). In doing so, we have then circled back to accepting the message put forward by Phillip of Navarre, that "Childhood is the foundation of life".

What we can also say, is that in the case of children, and in terms of purely the protection of children from harm or risk of abuse, the range of juridical authority and the coherent, organised and focused power of state authorities to intervene, is greater and more pervasive than at any other time in our history.

As history is not homogenous and there is a multiplicity of practices, some more common than others, then there will be places and times where contradictions and alternate actions occur in parallel. The predictability of children's experiences and adult behaviour is greater under the intervention of institutions and agencies formed around them. Non-discursive elements generate a policy of practice and a list of actions to be taken in similar circumstances: a bureaucratisation of relationships. Though most children's lives are influenced by institutions (especially school), for the greater part of their lives their primary relationships are outside of those institutions. Families and family life is not a bureaucratic institution, practices in the home are not as defined as those in institutions and therefore the hegemony of any particular historical and/or cultural practice is not so entrenched.

Hegemony, as described by Gramsci, is "...a social ascendancy achieved in a play of social forces that extends beyond contests of brute power into the organisation of

16 Though Baumann presents this as a means to describe the aim of the modern state, van Krieken (1992: 108) disputes this analogy, more from an apparent sense that it appears to give the state greater control than he considers it has.
private lives and cultural processes" (Connell, 1987: 184). In this sense and in this thesis, the ascendancy of one particular type of 'view of children' does not mean that others are eliminated or extinguished, rather that they are subordinated, or in Foucault's terms, marginalised. The range of view can be considerable. One way of observing what may be hegemonic is through the actions of institutions, their practices and policies, and experts employed or lauded. Accepting that the others are eliminated would, as Connell states, mean that we eliminate the contest that goes on in society for dominance and thus the engines for change.

Cultural ideals may ill match what actually occurs. Paraphrasing Connell and replacing gender terms and references, 'the cultural ideal (or ideals) of children and child care need not correspond at all closely to the actual practices and views' (Connell, 1987: 184). The existence of varying practices, varying discourses, means that views and practices are not eliminated, rather they are, as with Connell's analogy of clothing styles, subordinated (Connell, 1987: 179). Just as:

"Hegemonic masculinity is always constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women." (Connell, 1987: 193)

So too are views on childhood and appropriate care constructed in relation to normative notions of the adult. Just as:

"Conventional historiography recognizes, indeed presupposes, consensual femininity. What is hidden from it is the experience of spinster, lesbians, unionists, prostitutes, madwomen, rebels and maiden aunts, manual workers, midwives and witches." (Connell, 1987: 188)

So too, varying views and practices in relation to children and childhood exist. It may be that what each of these 'periods' or 'ages' represents is a reification of childhood and the relationship between adults and children. The creation of the singular and concrete - a particular form of parent/adult-child relationship - from a multiplicity of occurrences, views and practices.

When childhood and parenting practices are seen as historically mutable, this realises the possibility of chance and difference. This in turn raises the possibility of the emergence of several forms of childhood and parenting "...emerging in the same society at the same time" (paraphrasing Connell, 1987: 63). One of the possibilities which emerge is that research throws up a variety of parenting practices and notions of childhood for the
very simple fact that a variety of parenting practices and notions of childhood existed and exist simultaneously.

By reviewing and dismantling the oft-proposed homogeneity, we may well begin to see a multiplicity of vectors. From these we may also see some commonalities. In recognising the development of practices and their 'historical cumulativeness' (Connell, 1987: 203 citing Dinnerstein) we may also begin to see that "Real practices are messy and complicated, ideological representations of them squeaky clean" (Connell, 1987: 246).

The political nature of the relationship between the State, children and families is covered in greater detail in chapter 5.5: Political: Children, the Family and the State.

2.5 Marx, Durkheim and children

Reviewing the history of social constructs of children and childhood reveals many elements of the operation of society as described by Marx and Durkheim. Movements which profess to affect the circumstances in which children live are based upon a premise which Marx himself outlined: that human social activity and consciousness are influenced by the conditions of one's material existence (Marx and Engels, 1967 [1848/1888]). In fact children can be seen as operationalising Marx's comment about that:

"It is Man's nature…to be constantly developing, in co-operation with other men, himself and the world about him." (McLellan, 1980: 121 citing Marx's Paris Manuscripts)

The push to change children's environment, to make it more amenable to the perceived needs of children is in essence an effort to humanise it (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844b]: 115) for children. This again is an operationalisation of notions of what a child needs, what is in their nature: in effect an 'essence of man' (Marx, 1984 [1845-6]) which may well be that created by the environment produced for children. What should be deemed 'natural' is then not so easy to identify.

The church organisations involved in children's services have usually acted on the premise that children require a more rounded and developed socialisation, thus echoing Marx's belief that one sided development crippled the individual (1984 [1845-6]: 154). For religious organisations, this usually meant a focus on spiritual enlightenment, by
which children would develop their relationship to God and the community. This is also a reiteration of Durkheim’s view that recognising the existence of one’s relationships with other, and working to develop them, prompted more depth in human development (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 403).

Like Durkheim (Hughes, Martin, Sharrock, 1995), Marx believed that seeing society as an abstraction, as separate from people, was incorrect and a misunderstanding (1984 [1844a]: 95). What separates Marx and Durkheim is their primary focus: Marx’s interest in humanising society, Durkheim’s in humanising ‘man’ (Horton, 1965: 290). This highlights the two themes in the care of children: Do we need to manage, supervise and modify their behaviour, to make them better members of society, or are we to humanise our society and its relationship to children?

Operating axiomatically within the whole of this debate is the concept of human nature and what society should do about it. Should it seek to free and liberate the individual, to allow human social nature and self-development to assert itself, or should it seek to exert control, for the benefit of the individual and their relationship to the greater community?

In the following chapters we shall explore Marx, Durkheim and Foucault’s views on human nature and how the definitions they worked with operated to influence their views on society and human sociality.
3. **Marx, Durkheim, Foucault – Human Nature**

Put simply, the purpose of this chapter is to look at how notions of human nature manifest in the work of Marx, Durkheim and Foucault and to draw on this work to support the argument of this thesis that sociological notions of child abuse require redress. The chapter will work to show how Marx and Durkheim both placed their understanding of human nature at the centre of their work, using it as an anchor to provide coherence and purpose. In doing so, this chapter shall argue that the work of each shows an interest in ensuring human wellbeing, and that their concepts of human nature informed their notions of why this was necessary and how it could be achieved. By covering the work of Marx and Durkheim, I hope to draw out that concern for the wellbeing of others has been a crucial part of sociological work historically, and thereby to place this thesis squarely in the same camp - though necessarily of a much lower order of achievement than either of the above.

The section in this chapter on Foucault serves to assist in critiquing the role of the body in sociology, and in so doing to question the marginalisation of its flesh-and-blood existence. Well known for his pronouncement of ‘the death of man’, in an interview in 1978 with Duccio Trombadori, Foucault was himself to refer to the statement as “…confused, simplifying, and a bit prophetic…” (Trombadori, 1991: 124). Though it may seem that little could be found in his work to support the aim of this thesis, Foucault’s work is of such importance in sociology that the critical evaluation it has received provides a broad range of material to draw from (eg. Bell, 1993; Barrett, 1991; Kirby, 1991; Shilling, 1991; Grosz, 1990; Turner, 1984). It is this work, and the later shift in Foucault’s position, that the chapter uses to provide support to the contention that the literal corporeality of the body (Oyama, 1991; Kirby, 1991) requires addressing in any sociology of child abuse.

3.1 **Marx - 'The first premise of all human history'**

"…one cannot say that Marxism 'is' anti-humanist when all the evidence points to the salience of humanism in Marx's own thought and when attempts to develop anti-humanist Marxism have proved virtually impossible…" (Barrett, 1991: 83)
Marx held to the hope that the tools of the Enlightenment - the application of scientific and systematic forms of reason - would lead to 'a comprehensive emancipation of humankind' (Hughes, Martin, Sharrock, 1995: 218). In Marx's work nature is used to refer to two separate concepts: the environment of humans and the internal or inherited nature of humans. The result is that the issue of nature and what Marx meant by it is a bone of contention within the field of Marxist studies.

As stated above, there are references in his writing to two forms of nature: that without and that within. Humans have a 'nature', which is intrinsic to them, and humans exist within nature, which is extrinsic to them. These two forms of nature hold a special place in Marx's writing, with the relationship between humans and (extrinsic) nature forming a dialectic, which to Marx had primacy over any dialectic of nature (McLellan, 1980: 152). Within this argument, Marx sought to establish man and nature as "...two equally real poles of the dialectic" (McLellan, 1980: 153). On one side he asked:

"Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions in one word, man's consciousness changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?" (Marx and Engels, 1980 [1848/1888])

 Whilst on the other side, for example in Capital, he stated:

"By this acting on the external world and changing it, at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway." (1984 [1867]: 249)

Both operate to make changes in the other.

If, as Marx wrote, it is through labour that one develops a sense of self and one's humanness (Sargent, 1994: 21; McLellan, 1980), this give rise to the question “was he referring to a change in one's character or a change in one's biology or hereditable aspects?” Within this confusion one begins to see the shadow of a Lamarckian form of development. It is difficult to argue with the statement that Marx's presentation of the

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38 It is likely that Marx's poor iteration of a definition of human nature, compressed and at times confusing style [one must admit that reading very different punctuation styles is a challenge in itself] combined with a murky utilisation of the term 'nature', has assisted in the confusion over what exactly he was trying to tell us.

39 Lamarck did have some following before Darwin published *Origin of the Species* in 1859 - which itself took years to garner legitimacy (recent events in the US state of Kansas notwithstanding: 'Kansas School Officials Monkey With Evolution: Concept deleted from state science curriculum'. New York Times. 12
concept of human nature, his 'nature of man', is undifferentiated and quite ambiguous. As already stated, this lack of specificity makes it difficult to identify with any precision what he meant by human nature. Some like Firth criticise Marx's view on human nature, for a lack of 'empiricism' which has resulted in a nature that is "...essentially inferential, from postulates concerned with his views on capitalist exploitation" (1972: 2).

All confusion acknowledged, a notion of human 'nature' is positioned axiomatically throughout Marx’s work. What is arguable is that to strip a notion of human nature and humanism (not synonymous) from Marx's work denies his motivating sentiment and leaves his work bereft of purpose and direction, for which we have critics (see Kamenka (1972 and Michelle Barrett's recounting of Althusser's argument in The Politics of Truth, 1991) and supporters (Norman Geras, Marx and human nature: refutation of a legend, 1983, and Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, 1972). One of the problems with how citations are used can be seen in Kamenka's (1972) argument that Marx's reevaluation of this notion of human nature can be seen in The German Ideology. In support of this Kamenka cites the following passage:

"This sum of productive forces, forms of capital and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as 'substance' and 'essence of man'" (The German Ideology, cited in Kamenka, 1972: 123)

In a footnote he goes further:

"Passages in the German Ideology, the Poverty of Philosophy, the Communist Manifesto and the Theses on Feuerbach suggest that the mature Marx does not merely minimise the importance of permanent human appetites, attitudes and drives, but actually denies their existence." (Kamenka, 1972: 131)

However, in the quote from The German Ideology, the preceding sentence states: "It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances" (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1845-6]: 141). What Marx is actually arguing, up to this point in The German Ideology, is that what historians have seen as the 'essence of man' has in fact been
humans in the context of their socio-historical development. As McLellan points out, Marx considered:

"...it is absurd to interpret...purely material relationships as natural relationships, inseparable from the nature of individuality (in contrast to reflected knowledge and desire) and inherent in it." (McLellan, 1973: 81)

Barrett outlines is criticism of Althusser in the same way: whilst it is one thing to say Marx had identified the use of the term 'human nature' as 'universalising and essentialist', to "... conclude that Marx was therefore theoretically anti-humanist is quite another" (Barrett, 1991: 90).

Thus the grasping, exploiting and individually oriented 'man' is the consequence of the construction of the individual within the capitalist system, "...as an isolated individual involved in the economic war of all against all" (McLellan, 1980: 20). Ominously for those who lived in the Soviet Union and other Stalinist inspired states, in On The Jewish Question (1984 [1843]) Marx stated that the Constitution of Rights which existed in the United States of America merely legitimised the separation of man-from-man.

In the political community, man "...is valued as a communal being and in Civil society where he is active as a private individual [he] treats other men as means, degrades himself to means and becomes the plaything of alien powers" (Marx, 1984 [1843]: 58). Thus humans see each other as the means by which opportunity is restricted and freedom limited. This also results in the objectification of others:

"Thus the individuals appear to be independent (though this independence is merely a complete illusion and should rather be termed indifference); independent, that is, to collide with one another." (McLellan, 1973: 82)

The consequence of this has been that "...the relation of man to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of nature and history is created" (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1845-6]: 141). In its place Marx is proposing an interactional perspective between humans and nature (that is nature composed externally and internally) and humans and their historical context. Humans are social beings and this requires they treat others as social beings, in relationship with each other, rather than in competition with each other.

Later, in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx wrote:
"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production." (1984 [1858-59]: 193) (Authors Italics)

Here he explicitly states that humans are engaged in relations that are the consequence of the existing relations of production. These relations have an independence, a separateness, from the direct will of Man. It would be unnecessary to make this distinction if he had, as Kamenka asserts, abandoned the notion of human nature as a composing influence. Rather what he did was to assert that humans are born into relations of production, the effect of which influences their consciousness.

Man's nature

The concept of what Marx's notion of human nature can be found more clearly in his concept of 'species-being'. For Marx human nature is dominated by spontaneous, free activity which is required "... to assert his true individuality..." (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844b]: 115). As humans have some desires and needs which are inherent or natural, and others that are socially created, this nature is not easily located or identified (McLellan, 1980).

In the Paris Manuscripts 40, it is Marx's contention that "It is Man's nature...to be constantly developing, in co-operation with other men, himself and the world about him" (McLellan, 1980: 121). If something inhibits this interaction, then Man's development is inhibited, it is restricted. For Marx, long working hours, degradation, estrangement and alienation all inhibit the full development of the human nature of man. In a sense all these are forms of abuse. Capitalism reduces humans to components of an economic system. In effect, they are de-humanised.

Though humans retained a relationship with animals, Marx believed the distinct difference was the human ability for consciousness (1984 [1844a]: 86) and the capacity to learn and create (Jarvikoski, 1996: 75). In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx emphasised the social nature of humans and their 'species-being'. From one's relationship with others:

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40 The more common name for the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (Wheen, 1999: 68).
"...one can therefore judge man's [sic] whole level of development. From the character of this relationship follows how much man is a species-being, as man, has come to be himself and to comprehend himself." "...the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being" (1984 [1844a]: 93).

This is an explicit statement of Marx's concern for humans to achieve a stage which allowed a broad and comprehensive level of development. “Man is a species-being ...because he treats himself as a universal and ... free being." (1984 [1844a]: 85)

This concept of 'species-being' provides what Marx begins to identify as being 'Human' - a social being, the body as nature, and the need to change the environment to make it into a human environment. Marx wished to present different parameters by which to analyse economic systems. The basis for this alternate analysis would be the degree to which the economy assisted Man to attain his "universal essence". His concern was not the economy per se, but the consequence for the development of Man and his capabilities (Marcuse, 1968). But it was the threat to human social development which most greatly concerned Marx:

"If man forms all his knowledge, perception etc from the world of sense and experience in the world of sense, then it follows that the empirical world must be so arranged that he experiences and gets used to what is truly human in it, that he experiences himself as a man." (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844b]: 114)

"If man is shaped by nature, his environment must be made human. If man is by nature social, then he develops his true nature only in society and the power of his nature must be measured not by the power of the separate individual but by the power of society." (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844b]: 115)

This is reiterated in Notes on James Mill, where Marx takes the position that "...labour could become the central activity creating and enriching the human essence"(1980: 165) and that "...labour in its proper context was the self-realisation and objectification of the subject, therefore, real freedom, whose activity is precisely labour." Even the production of music was hard work. However labour only has this character when "... (1) it is of a social nature and (2) it has a scientific character" (McLellan, 1980: 165). For Marx, then, the shortening of the working day was necessary for self-development. With
the production of necessities, humans are given the time and opportunity to develop their potential.

Estranged labour would also cause man to be apart from his body, for it then becomes seen as external to him and "... the worker is degraded to the most miserable sort of commodity...in inverse proportion to the power and size of his production." (McLellan, 1973: 25) A further consequence is "...the estrangement of man from man" (1984 [1844a]: 87). Increasing specialisation and the division of labour renders people as one-sided and machine-like through the requirement to fulfil a task required by a machine system becoming ever more specialised and fragmented (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844a]). This concern is echoed in *The German Ideology*:

"If the circumstances in which the individual lives allows only the [one] sided development of the one quality at the expense of all the rest, [if] they give him the material and time to develop only that one quality, then this individual achieves only a one-sided, crippled development." (1984 [1845-6]: 154)

If however, the means of production were owned by the proletariat, industrialisation and automation could provide an opportunity for the development of the social or universal individual; a vision outlined in *Grundrisse*:

"...communal production in which the quality of work determined its value; the disappearance of money with that of exchange value; and an increase in free time affording opportunities for the universal development of the individual" (McLellan, 1980: 82).

With the reduction in time necessary for labouring "...all members of society can develop their artistic, scientific, etc., education..." (McLellan, 1973: 78). The ability of the proletariat to control the means of production would enable the reduction of the amount of time required in production:

“Man therefore becomes able to understand his own history as a process and to conceive of nature (involving also practical control over it) as his own real body." (McLellan, 1973: 144)

Another way in which the 'social essence of man' could be expressed and affirmed was the universal suffrage (McLellan, 1980: 14). Despite this enthusiasm for universal suffrage, in *On The Jewish Question*, Marx makes it perfectly clear that he believes that political and religious emancipation alone will not achieve human emancipation. It is
only when the acknowledgement, integration, and organization of man's social forces and the refusal to separate such into political forces has been achieved that human emancipation will also be achieved (Marx, 1984 [1843]: 71).

In a swipe at the attempts at controlling people to create a civil society, Marx wrote "The standpoint of the old materialism is "civil society"; the standpoint of the new is human society or socialized humanity" (Marx, 1845/1888 in Burns, 1936: 228). When human society was 'humanised, humans would be able to become truly social and achieve their potential. Consequently, theories had to "…avoid postulating 'society' again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being"(1984 [1844a]: 95). The particularity of each person makes each an individual, but each "…is just as much the totality…the subjective existence of imagined and experienced society…” (1984 [1844a]: 96). Consequently, spontaneous, free activity is human nature, as much as humans are social creatures by nature. Therefore, estranged labour causes man to be apart from his body, for it then becomes seen as external to him and this estrangement results in "…the estrangement of man from man" (1984 [1844a]: 87) and estrangement from his species-being (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844a]: 86).

When humans are not estranged and not alienated, when labour is completed in communal production, when the value of work is set by the quality of the work rather than reified into an exchange value represented by money, and humans have free time, then and only then will humans be afforded "…opportunities for the universal development of the individual" (McLellan, 1973: 82).

_Harm_

"Unable to elaborate on his rather vague humanism, Marx preferred to say what it was not" (Wheen, 1999: 73-74). Marx was also unwilling to identify the exact nature the new society would be like, agreeing with Hegel that it was to attempt the impossible (McLellan, 1980). This said, there is no doubt that he was consumed by an interest in human development and progress. Indeed Engels wrote that the Historical Materialism that he and Marx postulated was composed of "…German Idealist Philosophy, French Socialism and English Classical Economics"; Kant's proposition of a general "…progress to a free and peaceful society…"; and Fichte's proposal of "…human history as a rational development" (McLellan, 1980: 134).
What we see is a Marx concerned with harm to humans. He believed that there existed a means by which humans could become more human – by overcoming the dehumanising effects of capitalism and exploitation. Whilst he would rarely mention 'nature' in his later works, this fundamental focus of his work did not change. Because of this, the notion of a concept of harm can be elicited as a central theme of Marx's work. It is implicit within the demand expressed in *The German Ideology* (1984 [1845-6]: 128) that human experience is the true starting point of enquiry. This is a call to focus on the well-being of people as the fulcrum for all sociological work (McLellan, 1980: 28). By emphasising the negative consequences of estrangement and alienation, Marx was also emphasising a concept of harm.

Estrangement of humans from nature and 'themselves' results in estrangement from their species-being (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844a]: 86). Alienation results from estrangement and has a deleterious effect on humans and human relationships, and this very notion has acted as the sinew and bones of Marx's written work; concern for the exploitation and abuse suffered under industrial capitalism, concern for the harm that is caused to the nature of humans. To overcome this, 'Man' has to reclaim 'his' humanness. Humans are to dominate external nature, to humanise it. This is the proper relationship of humans with nature, a true expression of oneself. Humans must also be able to recognise themselves in their work and BE recognised by others (McLellan, 1980: 28).

This implies a capacity for relationship, and it is here that we see what may have appeared to be an elusive connection. Without the ability for relationships, humans cannot become human. They cannot achieve their potential, for it is within this capacity for relationships that humans recognise others and their work. To humanise an environment and to enter into human relationships, one requires the ability to develop and continue relationships with others and to be capable of being human towards others.

Anything that restricts this capacity for relationship restricts and individuals potential and humanness. Thus abuse, from Marx's position, can be considered that which harms, interferes with or is otherwise detrimental to one's ability to recognise both one's self and others.

Marx wrote "It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness" (1984 [1845-6]: 131). One then needs to ask 'Can we have life without a
body? Marx's 'life' is Diprose's 'body', the body that allows us to orient, and be oriented, in time, space and in society and to interact with others (Diprose, 1991: 65). This is something we all possess (Kirby, 1991: 88) and which is required for all our activity (Oyama, 1991: 30). In Marx work, one can read post-modernisms interest in the body. This body however had a nature that was a concrete extant fact, despite it being subsumed, captured and distorted by capitalism.

Marx’s interest in human nature and its central role in theory was shared by Durkheim. In the following section, I will review Durkheim’s work, with an emphasis on how his view of nature framed and gave substance to his theoretical work, and will argue that without this, his concept of anomie is set adrift and rendered significantly less powerful and valuable.

### 3.2 Durkheim

"Since man is both a member of nature by virtue of being an organism and a member of society by virtue of culture, some solution has to be found to this Jekyll-and-Hyde duplexity. For Durkheim, the restraining and regulation of man as body was to be found in the coercive nature of moral facts." (Turner, 1984: 21)

Two issues exist axiomatically and symbiotically within Durkheim’s work. The first, a concept of humans as being social by nature, is far more obviously stated and acknowledged. The second, harm, is more ephemeral. However, without both concepts, Durkheim's classic concept of anomie, an unrequited state of being (for the individual and the community), is meaningless.

A theoretical extension, not explicated by Durkheim, can be made from these concepts. Firstly, anomic states are harmful to human development and well being. Secondly, the social nature of humans means that those actions or circumstances that prevent the development and growth of this ability to be social are, _ipso facto_, harmful to human life and development. By this definition, those actions or inactions that inhibit the ability of humans to be social are consequently harmful.
In a salutary comment, Alverez highlights both the raison d'etre for Durkheim's work and contrasts it with what I argue is wrong with much of contemporary theorising in child abuse.

"...despite the mountains of contemporary research on suicide in the wake of Durkheim's theory, sociologists have somehow made the subject seem 'unreal'. Wading through all the correlation of this with that, it is easy to forget that suicide is about humans who suffer..." (1972 cited in Mestrovic, 1988c: 698)

Much of the sociological work focusing on how to define child abuse suffers from the decentring. It is easy to forget that child abuse is about children who suffer.

Durkheim's work on social structures, deviance and social cohesion was underpinned by this concern for human social life. By focusing on developing a coherent system by which social phenomena could be assessed and analysed, he hoped to institute a means by which communities could reflect on their actions and processes and thereby enhance social life. He also stated a belief that individuals needed to associate with others, and that isolation from social contact was unnatural (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999: Sens Lectures 40).

Regarded as one of the founders of modern, empirical, scientific sociology, Durkheim wished to make of sociology a more precise and 'clearly bounded discipline'. Drawing on Comte, Schmoller and Schaffle, Durkheim became interested in their accentuation of "...the _historical_ nature of man. (Giddens, 1972: 1). Whilst acknowledging the usefulness of utilitarian theory, Durkheim felt, as did Marx, that such theories positioned themselves upon a historically created 'nature of man': one that was egoistic and self-interested. For Durkheim, such a society "...would be no society at all" (Giddens, 1972: 2). Noting that "Good and evil do not exist for science" Durkheim 1938 [1895]: 47) neatly problematised the position of sociology and social scientists: science is able to tell us what has or is happening, but not what we should do or what is desirable. It was, as he acknowledged, one of the most difficult and contentious issues in the sciences:

"Science...can indeed illuminate the world, but it leaves darkness in our hearts; the heart must find its own light." (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 47-8)

The problem facing social scientists was the utility of a purely descriptive science. What purpose or use is a science which could only tell where we were, how we got there (and that only sometimes, as Durkheim notes) and nothing about what choices to make in
One of the reasons for the persistence of ideologically-driven constructs of the social world was that such approaches offer an 'escape from mysticism' and uncertainty. Further, this form of 'master-concept' predetermined the outcomes sought by ideologically framing what was gathered, rather than deriving concepts from the facts gathered. Such approaches were therefore to be avoided (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 48).

In his eponymous *The Rules of Sociological Method*, (1938 [1895]), Durkheim outlined what he believed to be the methodology sociology and sociologists should use when conducting research. With this, Durkheim believed he had a methodology that could generate a sense of purpose and usefulness for sociology; one which that did not revert to *a priori* grand schemes or ideologies. In doing so, he outlined general principles for research, one of which was that:

"...for societies as for individuals, health is good and desirable; disease, on the contrary, is bad and to be avoided." (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 49)

Devoting chapter three41 of the text to this, Durkheim acknowledged the difficulties inherent in his approach. One of the complications was that the longevity of existence of some state in society was not of itself an adequate indicator that it was either good or bad. A requirement was to identify a means by which to determine 'normal' as against 'morbid' or 'pathological', as a way of identifying variations ranging between what was simply different, and what was harmful to a community. "The purpose of all the life sciences...is to describe the normal and the healthy, to distinguish it from the pathological..."(Craib, 1997: 29). This concern is strongly shown in his classic work, *Suicide* (1888) in which he was "...increasingly concerned with the place of the individual in modern society..." (Craib, 1997: 64). The second task, in Enlightenment tradition, was to assist in the development of a healthy community for the betterment of its members (Lindholm, 1999).

In Durkheim's thesis 'normal' became those social conditions that were 'most generally distributed' within a population, whilst the remainder became 'morbid' or 'pathological' (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 55). Consequently the 'average type' would be that which corresponded most closely to the more frequent social conditions, and deviation from this 'standard of health', would be a morbid phenomenon (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 56).

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41 'Rules for Distinguishing between the Normal and the Pathological'.

In this sense, like the physiologist and biologist, the sociologist would study the average 'organism' (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 55-56).

Durkheim was concerned ultimately with the fate and existence of the members of a community and thus with the impact community relations and structures had on the nature of humankind. Herein lay his abjuration of anomie and anomic states. They were harmful to human social life and human nature. It is here then that we come to the crux of the matter: Durkheim's theoretical and practical work was underpinned by a genuine concern with what was harmful for human social life. It is not enough to merely define the function of the normal/pathological connection, one needs also to identify whether the result is 'useful to the organism' (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 95). To make sense of what is and what is not 'useful', one needs to have a sense of the nature of humans.

The nature of Man

Like Marx's view that humans had to be the central concern for social research and social theory (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1845-6]: 131), Durkheim argued that sociology:

"...has as its object the explanation of some actual reality which is near to us, and which consequently is capable of affecting our ideas and our acts: this reality is man, and precisely, the man of to-day..." (Durkheim, 1961 [1915]: 13)

The focus of his studies helped to identify elements of human life (Durkheim, 1961 [1915]: 13-14) and human nature (Durkheim, 1961 [1915]: 38) which indicated that this nature was not self-interested. Indeed, for Durkheim, self-interest was considered inimical to the true nature of humans and was an indicator of anomie. Where Marx wished to humanise society, Durkheim wished to humanise Man, though to achieve this, "We need to ask 'what Man is' before we can ask 'what Man should do'" (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999: Sens Lectures 62-68). An understanding of human nature was thus imperative, for: "If man's nature is plastic and therefore without a system of inner direction and control, then the needed control system must be external" (Horton, 1965: 290).

Like Marx, however, Durkheim's presentation of what exactly human nature was and from where it was formed or how it was inherited, or in what way it was innate, is not particularly well defined. As Craib notes:
"We take off from the principle that man ought to realize his nature as man...But this nature does not remain constant throughout history; it is modified with societies." (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 402)

This nature is constructed from a 'collectivist image of man', meaning:

"...history could not be explained with reference to what individuals think and that events are not necessarily, and certainly not ideally, the result of universal self-interest drive." (Horton, 1965:287)

Human nature needed to be seen in its social setting, not in isolation (Durkheim, 1914). A social being, as Durkheim (Horton, 1965) saw humans, needed to be seen within a social context, which along with the (inherent) social nature of humans, was one which would colour and affect human responses. Durkheim's dualistic 'nature' highlights one of the perennial conundrums: which aspects are natural and which the results of the formation of the 'civilised' side? Unfortunately by writing of nature as changing through history, and with changes in society (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 402), Durkheim succeeds more in confusing us rather than enlightening us. A more current interpretation would be that Durkheim saw human nature as emergent and interactional, both reacting to and acting upon social elements. Though he considered human nature malleable to a degree, it was not universally plastic and he considered some aspects of human nature unchanging. Thus he considered self-interest as inimical to the true nature of humans and an indicator of anomie. In brief, anomie occurs when an individual lacks connection to their community, resulting in the experiencing of a state of discomfort, pain and/or irrationality.

Durkheim saw 'human nature' inclusive of an impulsive, biological side and a social, civilised side (Craib, 1997:76). This was reaffirmed in Durkheim's 1913 defence of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, in which he outlined his notion of the duality of
human nature (both social and individual) and emphasised the 'dynamogenic quality of religion': its ability to both inspire and curb human action (Jones, 1986: 596).

Acknowledging the questioning of altruism by, amongst others, La Rochefoucauld, Hobbes, Pascal, and Rousseau (Jones, 1999), Durkheim took the position that humans were innately concerned with not only themselves, but with others as well (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999, Sens Lectures 11 and 12). This altruistic orientation extends from the family to society, forming a 'union of families'. From the union of families, follows the 'union of societies' - or humanity (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999, Sens Lectures 12). This thread was to be repeated in The Division of Labor. Clearly Durkheim considered the dualistic aspect of human nature to be something which was not a conflict within, but rather the interrelationship and operation of mutually dissimilar elements. From this interaction, human life became more fully developed and rounded. Put simply, human nature includes an impulsive, biological side and a social, civilised side (Craib, 1997:76), what Turner terms 'Homo Duplex' (1986: 20).

What was important was to be aware of the affect that social environments had on humans and to make a distinction between the 'natural' and the 'socially created'. As with Marx, Durkheim saw the potential for harm and the misinterpretation of human nature. He saw the claims to greed and self-serving ambition as 'natural drives', (expressions of Man's 'natural state') as a misrepresentation of human development and "...the reification of self-interest as a contradiction of man's social nature" (Horton, 1965: 288). This sense of what is 'natural' to humans is pivotal to an understanding of Durkheim's work. Without this, Durkheim's work is set adrift and, as Horton (1965) states, 'dehumanised'.

Society as an extension of the nature of man - Society and nature

"The duties of the individual towards himself are, in reality, duties towards society." (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 399)

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42 Without wishing to make too many excuses for either Durkheim's lack of clarity, or make too many '...however, he did then say...' style comments in defence of my own thesis, without a constant social human nature Durkheim's assertion as to the temporal and historical transcendence of 'anomie' is invalid.

43 "If there is one rule of conduct which is incontestable, it is that which orders us to realize in ourselves the essential traits of the collective type" (Durkheim, 1895 (1964): 396).

44 One hesitates to use the term 'dialectic'.
"The only power which can serve to moderate individual egotism is the power of the group…” (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 405)

Clear and succinct, this constitutes the overall thematic arc of Durkheim's work. The individual notion of self and independence is a small thing compared to the richer variety of the community at large. When the individual does not recognise their dependence on society, then "…he would no longer feel about and above him this salutary pressure of society which moderates his egoism and makes him a moral being" (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 400).

Collectively, we are socialised into the rules and expectations of the society within which we live. Individually, we experience some difference between what we are taught occurs and what we experience. This generates a tension between what is internalised, collectively, by the community members and what is additionally or alternately internalised by the individual through their experiences. There is thus a continual tension between the group and the individual experience of society, as there is a tension between the individual and society (Hughes, Martin, Sharrock, 1995: 175, Horton, 1965: 289-90). Durkheim did not wish to seem as if he was proposing an 'individual verses society' model. His self perceived need to carry the greater burden of proof resulted in him being forceful and overwhelming in his arguments (Hughes, Martin, Sharrock, 1995:157). This meant that he argued for society so strongly that it appeared to leave no room for the individual.

Seeing and recognising our relationship with others, along with having a sense of purpose and place, produces a sense of self superior to that where the individual is self-focused and self-oriented. Those who are not able to achieve this "…have no cognisance of all the obligations their positions as social beings demand of them" (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 402). Unlike Marx, who saw the specialisation of industrialisation as a means by which the individual could more readily be alienated from the result of their labour, Durkheim specifically states that the division of labour provides a greater ability to develop rather than a hindrance: "…far from being trammelled by the progress of specialization, individual personality develops with the division of labor" (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 403). Ultimately, in recognising their relationship with others, individuals develop in more depth rather than shallowly across a range of areas (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]: 403). Society then is not representative of a 'shackle around the legs' but the means by which the individual develops themselves.
However, this individual development needs to take place within the context of social relationships - the 'natural' arena for humankind.

Disputing the position of philosophers such as Hobbes, Bossuet and Rousseau, that society was 'artificial' and 'counter to nature', Durkheim believed society to be natural to humans, a result of the desire to associate and an extension of the social nature of the 'human animal', echoing Herbert Spencer.\(^4\) As the drive to associate is natural within humankind, societies whether small or large are all natural developments within which the individual can develop\(^5\) (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999: Sens Lectures 62-68).

Ultimately, the development of society is an expression of humankind's social nature. In saying this, he did not ascribe an immutable quality to society, saying rather that societies change, as do concepts of moral rights. By extension, there will be conflict flowing from the duties prescribed by the development of such rights (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999: Sens Lectures 65).

In what Giddens calls the 'juggernaut of late modernity' we have come to perceive ourselves as having:

"…complete control over our lives; that we have a high degree of independence because our dependence on others is so well hidden." (Craib, 1997: 66)

The resulting reification of self-interest has loosened the ties of sociality, falsely promoting egoism. Whilst believing that individualism was a necessary part of human nature, Durkheim also believed that human nature "…required constraining through social control" (Horton, 1965: 288). In this sense, Durkheim shared the view of Hobbes, "that an individual - whatever strength he might have - is quite fragile, and an insufficient guardian of right" (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999: Sens Lectures 56-61).

One of the primary roles of society and community is to assist its members to control and manage the more 'self-interested' elements of their nature.

\(^4\) "Instead of civilization being artificial, it is part of nature; all of a piece with the development of the embryo or the unfolding of a flower." Spencer, H. (1851) Social Statics: or, The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified and the First of Them Developed, London: John Chapman. pp. 64-65 Cited in Young, Robert M. "The Naturalization Of Value Systems In The Human Sciences" - Online Archive http://www.shef.ac.uk/~psyse/staff/rmyoung

\(^5\) This was not, however, an acceptance of Rousseau's thesis that the individual gave up their rights as an individual and a claim to individualism, by becoming part of society. Jones, Sens Lectures 62-68, 1999.
"If man would not restrain his will of his own accord, various social institution could, and, Durkheim felt, had the duty to do it for him." (Mestrovic, 1988c: 691)

Thus studying the "...way in which a potentially vulnerable and dangerous human physical organism is brought into the discipline and power of society..." (Craib, 1997: 73) is of central concern and consequently the study of the implementation of effective cultural constraints was necessary to ensure that humans could adhere to their social nature (Horton, 1965: 285).

It has been argued that it was not his intent to propose an 'individual-verses-society' model. As stated above, (per Hughes, Martin, Sharrock, 1995: 157) individualism is pertinent and necessary, "To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself" (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 71). As an example Socrates is cited as one who was condemned as a criminal for the original and independent nature of his thoughts and views.

In short, for Durkheim human nature possessed elements that were social and elements that were disorganised. Social rules and norms were necessary to manage and orient those elements of human nature which obstructed the socially, communally oriented elements of human nature. To realise this social nature, it was necessary to construct and arrange a society of rules and norms as a means to assist this orientation. One of sociology's goals is to promote those elements which create a healthy and organised community within which human social life could develop (Lindholm, 1999).

One of the threats to society was that people did not understand their relationship to society and this created a variety of problems. It is necessary for members of society to be aware of their relationship to develop social integration and to assist in realising and fulfilling their potential and capacities (Hughes, Martin and Sharrock, 1995: 168). This is not to argue that social norms and rules do not limit this expression or oppose individual expression (for example, as it may with someone who is violent or homicidal). However, society should not be a means by which individuality is automatically suppressed 'for the good of the community at large', but one in which it is assisted to develop. Durkheim's work on Anomie comprises the question of 'What happens when this social nature is obstructed in its development, or when human social nature is denied?'
"Our inclinations, therefore, must be developed harmoniously, some being subordinated to others; and the inclination to which all others should be subordinated is that of human dignity. Everything that degrades or diminishes our persons, must be repugnant to us." (Jones, 1999, citing Durkheim 1884a, Sens Lecture 37)

"The object of men's orientation, society, being collective and outliving the life of individual men, is transcendent, qualitatively different from the parts which compose it." (Horton, 1965: 290)

Durkheim's intention was not just research for the sake of research, but as a means of promoting 'social health'. If science gave us a better understanding of nature and therefore a more effective means to control nature to our benefit, then a better understanding of our social life could possibly do the same. Creating a more conscious understanding and giving us "... self-conscious control of our social lives" (Hughes, Martin, Sharrock, 1995: 168) is necessary then to develop individual potential.

Durkheim like Marx was concerned with the nature of humanism; both utilised notions of harm and notions of 'humaness'. As Horton states, for Durkheim the key concept here was anomie and the classical concepts of alienation and anomie were, and continue to be, radical both ethically and politically. (1965: 285). The first two tasks of sociology are to utilise science to understanding these 'suprapersonal laws', and then:

“…to promote the conditions that will lead to a properly organized and healthy community where men and women could escape from their disparate and animalistic personal selves - and where thought could escape from the worry of deriving a moral world from disparate human desires." (Lindholm, 1999)

The statistical methods developed by Durkheim demonstrated that, “...alienation and anomie afflict a community in which social embeddedness is lacking…” (Lindholm, 1999) Ineffective cultural constraints, absent and/or conflicting social values, goals which are not achievable or for which opportunity structures have not been adjusted, inadequate cultural direction and inadequate socialisation are all contributors to anomie. Possible reactions to living in an anomic society include "...egotism, insatiable striving, meaninglessness, and aimlessness…” (Horton, 1965: 285).
The form of humanness that Durkheim considered natural, was plastic and pliable and could be moulded and adjusted in a variety of forms. This also means that human society could appear in a multitude of forms. What this did not mean was that all of the forms it could achieve were positive or sustainable. Indeed, some result in its members experiencing anomic states, which are negative and destructive; in short, harmful to the ongoing nature of humans. Thus the fact that some forms of behaviour occurred or some practices existed did not mean that they should or ought to be maintained and nor did the longevity of practice or a cultural activity mean that it was good or bad.

In addressing progress of human kind, Durkheim's move towards a positivistic means by which to determine appropriate forms of human social interaction was for the purpose of ensuring that a scientific means of analysis could be brought to bear on the problem of 'how' to achieve and 'what form' of existence and social grouping was desirable for humans to achieve their potential.

Harm and the possibility of human distress therefore form an underlying framework within Durkheim's study. His contention that humans needed to avoid and ameliorate anomic and anomic states or forms of existence makes more sense and has a clearer genesis and goal when seen in this light.

I have no doubt that had Durkheim considered the issue of child abuse, he would have applied his belief that life sciences needed to identify that which was normal and healthy for humans, against that which constituted pathology (Craib, 1997: 29). He would also have instituted the old Enlightenment chestnut of identifying what it is within the care of children which would assist in developing a productive and positive community (Lindholm, 1999). Additionally, the fact that the history of childhood may be replete with various forms of childcare and actions towards children which today would be seen as abusive, is not evidence of it having been 'good' then either.

The capacity for, and the ability to establish constructive, reciprocal relationships, is a central and emergent element of Durkheim's thesis as much as it is to this thesis. To paraphrase Durkheim, life spontaneously attempts to both achieve the potential it possesses and to emancipate itself (Durkheim, 1914). In reading harm into Durkheim's work, one can argue that what diminishes or impairs this capacity in humans, interferes with a central aspect of human life. In terms of this thesis, one would term such potential or actual harm, by definition, abuse.
In the next section, I shall be covering the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault stated he wished to make a break with the form of approach utilised by Marx and Durkheim, with enquiry constructed within Enlightenment-based thinking (Foucault, 1984). Despite this claim of a rejection of the 'grand narrative' of Marx and Durkheim, Hughes, Martin, and Sharrock argue that postmodernists utilise methods similar to those of Marx and Durkheim, and at times are 'directly derivative', "The postmodern analysis of society shares the objective of analysing the condition of contemporary, principally Western, society..."(1995: 216) and whilst not all contemporary sociology owes an evident debt to Marx and Durkheim, the connection is still there (Hughes, Martin, and Sharrock, 1995: 212).

It is not my case here to argue the merits of this particular debate, but rather I shall be arguing that Foucault’s initial position on the body was in error, and that Foucault himself would begin to reconsider this position in his later work. My argument with his first position is that he failed to account for the literal, physical existence of the body and therefore its capacity for agency, to resist and be harmed. Consequently, many others began to write of the body as if it were a mannequin – plastic, immobile, unchanging and lifeless – and to construct human existence and experience as flexible to an extent that appears virtually without limit.

3.3 Foucault

For Foucault, diverting the focus of enquiry on to the body was initiated in part by his desire to avoid the 'blackmail of enlightenment' thinking (Foucault, 1984) and to avoid deploying notions of agency as a means by which power was possessed and wielded. The following chapter explores how Foucault oriented the body and its relationship to the power/knowledge nexus and his later theorising of body as a locus of resistance.

"The problem of the truth of what I say is very difficult for me, and it's also the central problem. It's essentially the question which up to now I have never answered." (Foucault, 1981b: 32)

"Foucault saw determination as polymorphous rather than unilinear, and he wanted to claim the determinative powers of discourse in constituting practices that are intimately responsible for - as Said put it - 'how people thought, lived and spoke'." (Barrett, 1991: 131)
"My concern has been to argue that the body provides the basis for a different conception of knowledge: we know within our bodies. In this regard, the authenticity of experience might be reclaimed; if there is any truth, it is the truth of the body." (Game, 1991: 192)

Foucault, Power and the Body - an overview

Foucault has been one of the major theoretical influences on the sociology of the body (Scott and Morgan, 1993a: ix). His contribution to the field of adult sexual exploitation of children was contentious enough to warrant a book in response47. In this thesis, Foucault's notions of discourse and power and the role of the body are utilised to enquire into the traditional view within sociology that biology has no place. By extension, this questions Durkheim's dictum that 'the social explains the social'. Foucault argued that the body has a place in sociology. This thesis extends this argument and contends that 'the body as a biological phenomenon' has a place in sociology. As I have already argued in the chapter on Marx, this thesis also adopts the notion that enquiry and research needs to have a focus and that focus, in its materiality, is the human being and social life. The first premise of this thesis fits with that which Marx saw as the first premise of human history:

"...the existence of living human individuals...and their material conditions of life...those which they find existing as well as those they which they produce through their actions." (1984 [1845-6]: 128)

As with Durkheim and Marx, when negotiating human social life in either theory or practice, that which is harmful to human life and human social life must be taken into consideration. Without wishing to adopt Foucault's determination to not take a position (Foucault, 1981b: 162) I shall paraphrase his techniques48. Additionally, rather than spend the greater part of this thesis arguing in detail why particular positions are wrong, I will take Foucault's stance and argue for the inclusion of other materials commonly not included, and why they assist in a different form of analysis.

47 Vikki Bell 1993 Interrogating Incest: Feminism, Foucault and the Law. London: Routledge. Foucault made fleeting and shallow comments on sexual relationships between adults and children (The History of Sexuality, pages 29-34) which identified a lack of knowledge of power imbalance in the relationships between adults and children. Interestingly, he makes the comment that the protagonist was not able to seek the same 'favors' (sic) from older girls. One wonders why this was - the ability to make more informed and preferable decisions springs to mind.

48 Imitation is the greatest flattery.
This chapter is an exploration of a means by how this might be done. To do so, I shall make a few extrapolations from the following themes of Foucault's work: notions of discourse; power and its operation; the body; and resistance to power.

As we have seen in chapter on the history of childhood, and as we shall see in the chapter on the construction of notions of child abuse, an overview of Foucault's notion of discursive and non-discursive formations assists in establishing the argument as to how childhood has been constructed, and how definitions of what constitutes child abuse are established. We will see how these definitions operate in an interactive and non-linear fashion to construct both the non-discursive elements of child abuse prevention and protection: i.e. child protection legislation and policies, as well as the discursive elements: i.e. the interpretation of and implementation of these laws and practices.

As we explore his notions of resistance, the central notion of finding a locus in the human body, its biology and physiology, shall become clearer. Through the use of Foucault's later work, and that of others who have contributed to studies of the body in sociology, we shall begin to construct a framework within which a reassessment of how future definitions of child abuse can be created and how the body (of the child) can play a far more active and central role.

It was Foucault's intention to seek lateral connections between contemporary discourses, rather than historical lineages (Grosz, 1990).

"...it is through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work." (Foucault, 1980: 82)

In this thesis, I use material from major and minor theorists and researchers. Admittedly, this diverges from Foucault's intention to search through material obtained more from the minor officials, texts and records, than from the masters or 'grand texts' (Grosz, 1990: 82). However, I would argue that these are marginal players in sociology and particularly in the sociology of child abuse. Though it may not be possible to claim attachment theory and biology as 'local popular knowledges' they are certainly ones that whilst important in child protection practice, they have been disqualified as relevant in sociological work on child abuse and child protection.
As shown in the chapter on biology and sociology, there has been, and continues to be, anxiety expressed in the field of sociological study of the consequences of using material drawn from the study of human biology or physiology. To reiterate the point I made earlier, this is an understandable but not necessarily justified fear. As we shall see in the chapter on failure to thrive and attachment, the research utilised from these fields in this thesis have, like Foucault's notion of power, achieved only a "...non-complete, non-hegemonic domination" (Grosz, 1990: 86); it is neither absolute nor rigidly deterministic.

A common argument put forth in the dispute surrounding child abuse and child protection is that some children seem to experience similar events differently; that there is no one outcome for any one event. It is one of the contentions of this thesis that actions that can be construed as being abusive of children are multi-linear, rather than being uni-linear. The consequence (singular) of an action (singular) is not concrete and distinctive to the point within which an absolute, singular future can be determined. There is always the interaction of a sequence of events and occurrences. They are multi-effectual; combined with a series of events and happenings, which draw together a consequence. Again, I would caution against thinking this means there are an infinite possible outcomes. Rather there is a plurality of possible outcomes, with some much more likely than others.

It is this very fact which makes outlining what constitutes abusive behaviour so difficult and complex. This said, NOT making the effort allows for any behaviour constituted as 'good' or 'bad' to be equally correct or false. It was Marx who criticised Feuerbach (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1845-6]: 128-131) for failing to address the real needs of people and Durkheim who wished to identify that which was better for human social life (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]) I do not intend to commit the same error.

This thesis contends that the corporeal, flesh and blood needs of humans are important and require integration in the social sciences. What is also needed is an examination of the social aspects of humans which does not ignore these issues and that the sciences require "...a re-grounding in the real needs and wishes of communities" (Gofton and Haines 1999: paragraph 1. 6, citing Bauman, 1992, 1997; Boholm, 1995). To do this we need to examine the alternate evidence, showing that biology and the physical environment play a role in social life and more specifically, that the body, its biology and physiology, need to be included in the problematic of child abuse research and
theorising. As I will later demonstrate in the chapter on defining child abuse, much contemporary child abuse research has come adrift from concern with abuse and harm of children. This thesis argues for a more grounded research, focusing on the child, their experience and their corporeality.

Ideology and biology

Through his observations of the way in which certain issues were not permitted to be discussed within the PCF, Foucault began to reflect on political power and the use of knowledge (Foucault, 1980: 109-133). What he saw as the intellectual ‘dirigisme’49 (Macey, 1994: 43) of Lysenko and Zdhanov50 and the pandering of the French Communist Party (PCF51) to directives, regardless of their accuracy or veracity, brought the nexus of power and knowledge closer together for him in his thinking (Foucault, 1980: 109; Macey, 1994: 43). Eventually, what he termed the Lysenko affair52, brought him to question "...the political status of science and the ideological functions which it could serve" (Foucault, 1980: 109). This in turn caused him to begin to question the social sciences particularly. What he saw as a dubious science (Foucault, 1980: 109), such as psychiatry53, was easier to critique due to its immediacy and more obvious social influence. This drew Foucault towards an interest in "...the less certain, more conjectural 'science of man'" (Grosz, 1990: 61). Initially, his research was to lead him to publish *Madness and Civilisation* (Foucault, 1980: 109).

I would argue that even in this 'dubious science' there is work that reflects Foucault's interest in the body and the later notion of the body claiming some level of agency. In *The Ego and the Id* (1923), Freud made a number of comments as to the importance of

50 Andrei Zdhanov (1896-1948). Senior USSR government and Communist Party official. Zdhanov was responsible for the introduction of Zdhanovshchina, or Zdhanovism. In line with Stalin's views on the West, this policy sought to free the cultural and scientific fields of bourgeois and other western influences. (*Encyclopædia Britannica*. 15th ed. 1983. Chicago: Chicago University Press) It was Zdhanov’s support that assisted Lysenko to eliminate the opposition to his alternate Marxist genetics (Bullock, 1991).
51 Parti Communiste Français.
52 See chapter on biology.
53 In the early 1950's Foucault "...briefly entered into analysis himself, only to terminate in a fit of pique when his therapist went on vacation" (Miller, 1994: 62). As Foucault stated to Duccio Trombadori, "...there is no book I have written without there having been, at least in part, a direct personal experience" (Foucault, 1981b: 38). It is likely that there are many of his comments which can be readily said to have the same genesis.
the body in the development of Self\textsuperscript{54}. Freud's position was that one's relationship with the world, as well as one's sense of self, is drawn from a corporeal relationship which emanates from the body itself. This relationship also mediates and influences the psychological development of an individual. As we briefly discussed in the chapter on Marx, and more fully discuss in the chapter on biology, this reflects Shilling's statement that sociology needs to come to terms with the materiality of the body (1991: 664) and the existence of the individual, fleshy, visceral, corporeal body, and its literal necessity as a requirement for humans to act in any fashion (Oyama, 1991; Kirby, 1991). In this sense, it is also a reiteration of Marx's argument that 'life determines consciousness' (1845-6: 131).

**Discourse**

The most direct comment one can make about the concept of discourse is that it is not a simple matter. (Bell, 1993; McHoul and Grace, 1993) It is both greater and lesser than language - greater in that it includes social and political relations and lesser in that it "...is not a description of the whole language system..." (Bell, 1993: 420). For example discourses are:

"...practices that systematically form the object of which they speak. Of course discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech. It is this ‘more’ that we must reveal and describe." (Foucault, 1972: 49)\textsuperscript{55}

Discourse creates 'experience as perception'. In a sense it is the mould for what we experience as our perceptions, thoughts and beliefs. Discourse is constructed from and within actions, ideas, relationships; the very manner in which we operate and exist in the world. All these are the result and operation of the power of discourse. Truth is then contingent on the interplay of discursive factors.

Whilst to many it may appear to be the case, Foucault never meant to say that truth does not exist. Rather, he wished to challenge what others see as self-evident truths (Bell, 1993: 48).

\textsuperscript{54} In one such comment he stated: "...the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus" (Footnote 2, Freud, 1923 (1984): 364).
Truth therefore becomes a discursively produced concept, action and process that is balanced (one may argue, axiomatically held) on the buttresses of intertwining and mutually supportive knowledges. Truth does not then stand alone, so to speak. There are particular conditions which are required for the 'truth claims of a discourse to be considered "true". In the human sciences, the conditions which make a discourse able to claim truth are much more difficult to identify, and even more difficult to control.

In a sense, a discourse is considered true at the points that it intersects with other supporting discursive positions. The 'truth' that is elucidated is also a historically differentiated truth. Those discursive forces that determine truth are specific to a period of history (McHoul and Grace, 1993: 57). As an example, we live in an era where science determines truth, and scientific and empirical logic provide the framework for analyses:

"It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures." (Foucault, 1972: 112)

In brief, Foucault’s position on discourse is that it ‘creates’ the knowledge we have of the world, of others and of ourselves. We are formed and wrapped within a discursive web which organises the space surrounding us; this forms, '…an architecture that would operate to transform individuals…” (Foucault, 1977a: 172). The rules of discourse define how things are ordered, not the "…dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects" (Foucault, 1972: 14, cited in Barrett, 1991: 130).

Foucault's work identifies three forms of events within which power operates:

**Discourse:** (texts, documents, notes, practices and behaviours - discursive practices.)

**Non-discursive practices:** (systems of education and punishment, confession and other organised, systematised practices. This would also include manuals that state exactly what you should do)

**The effects of these practices on people, on bodies.**

(Grosz, 1990: 88-89)

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55 What he is saying here is that HOW is more important than WHAT. How we come to these conclusions is more important than the conclusions themselves.
In summary, that which is recorded about another or the self and the practices instituted form elements of discourse, whereas acts of law which determine action to be taken, rather than thoughts or opinions which can be held, are Non-discursive elements (Foucault, 1972: 76). Thus the relationship formed by Foucault’s famous nexus of power/knowledge is created within the frame of the relationship between discursive and non-discursive elements. Each element works in a symbiotic relationship, as opposed to a cause/effect model (McNay, 1992; Barrett, 1991).

The resultant grid of power is mutable and constantly changing. It is not formulated as a singular, all-controlling monolith, but as a “…non-complete, non-hegemonic domination” (Grosz, 1990: 86). This grid of power creates mutually supportive and antagonistic localities, at times mutually co-operative, at others resistant. One of the ironies is that Power generates points of resistance. Subjects are never totally subjugated as opportunities for resistance are always possible. As we have seen throughout history, no matter the range and level of power of any state institution or group, whatever the system of political control, there are always those who are branded 'traitors', 'agitators' etc. Whether it be the Jews at Masada or heretics during the Inquisition, the very existence of such groups and/or individuals is evidence of the ability to resist.

**Bio-power**

Foucault coined the term 'Bio-power' to represent the interpolation of techniques and mechanisms of power into all group social relationships. Bio-power is represented by the disciplines of the body and the regulation of the population - the organisation of power over life (McHoul and Grace, 1993), and assists with the administration of social life. To achieve this, measures are established by which it is possible to identify the 'norms', as this permits the ability by which the masses can be measured. Panopticism, which Foucault describes in detail in *Discipline and Punish*, assists this movement to regulate, assess and evaluate, by providing the mechanisms by which to cast a classifying and monitoring gaze. Observation allows greater investigation, leading to greater knowledge. This identifies the surfaces and angles upon which power can operate.
By 'demassifying' the population (that is, by creating the ability to view a group as sub-groups and/or individuals), information is gathered which identifies and consolidates the techniques required to impress greater degrees of constructive power and to create more subtle and intimate mechanisms of this constructive, discursive power. In child protection and child abuse literature and practice that power operates upon the body of the child and it is here that we diverge from Foucault's earlier work and look at his later interest in the body as an active, operationalising agent.

The Role of the Body

Foucault had earlier written that "Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men" (Foucault, 1971: 87-88). As we shall see later in this paper, this is a position which I believe is untenable, representing either a lack of knowledge of research on the body in other fields of research or too ready a dismissal and would further argue that it was something that Foucault himself was gradually coming to question. Indeed Butler writes that "...Foucault waivers on his arguments about the body, sometimes speaking of the body as if it were a prediscursive materiality...but at others as the 'inscribed surface of events'" (Bell, 1993: 51 citing Butler, 1990a). In some ways, this confusion is not surprising. Given that we all possess one (Oyama, 1991; Kirby, 1991), it is difficult to conceptually separate the body and its biology. We have to ask ‘When is the body without materiality?’

Others have criticised Foucault's representation of the body and the constructed subject as a representation that was passive, pliable and non-specific in any form. For example, though Foucault emphasised the body as the locus of power and resistance (Grosz, 1990: 92):

"Power inscribes male and female bodies in quite different ways, with different goals and consequences. The body is not a sexually neutral or indifferent, pliable, flesh; it is a body that is sexually concrete..." (Grosz, 1990: 107)

This same argument against the passive body is also seen in the work of Vikki Kirby, (e.g. 1997) and Lois McNay (e.g. 1992).

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As early as 1978 (though, not published until 1981, and then not in English until 1991), in an interview with Duccio Trombadori (1991), Foucault stated that his statement was about the ‘death of man’ was more specifically about the contemporary and historical construction of human nature and how we know of ourselves (1991: 122-4). His response to a question about this by Trombadori was that, “Man is an animal of experience…” (1991: 124), involved in an interactive, transforming and transfiguring existence. He felt that the science of man had not, and was unlikely to be able to, place man “…in the presence of his own “nature”.” (1991: 123). The use of the phrase ‘animal’ is not explored, and he may merely have been using it as a metaphor, for colour, rather than an expression that humans are biological creatures. This rethinking is discussed later, in the first two volumes of *The History of Sexuality* (1978). Here, Foucault explained that he was revising his view on the passive ‘subject’:

"When I was studying asylums, prisons and so on I perhaps insisted too much on the techniques of domination…But it is only one aspect of the art of governing people in our societies" (Foucault, 1985b: 367 cited in McNay, 1992: 49)

What he felt he had done, to an extent, was uphold the importance of the overarching structures as opposed to the actions of the subject, making the subject the *object* or focal point of the influence of discourse. This made the subject, in many ways, a passive object and thus the notion of the ‘passive body’ in *Discipline and Punish*. In this, he felt he was too deterministic (McNay, 1992) and this required a rethink - which he discusses in the introduction to 'The Use of Pleasure', volume two of his *The History of Sexuality*. In *'The Use of Pleasure'* , he makes the comment that what was needed was an analysis of the "hermeneutics of self" (1985: 5). To look at the way within which the self - the subject - also constructs and perceives of the self as a subject, a subject upon which to work and which to form and change:

"What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, labouring being?" (Foucault, 1985: 7)

The body then becomes more than purely the focal point for forms of power, more than simply an object, but becomes an active subject within the nexus of the operation
of discursive and non-discursive formations. Foucault himself comments on this later working of the subject into an interactive element:

"…there is no book that I have written without there having been, at least in part, a direct personal experience. I had a personal, complex, direct relationship with madness, psychiatric hospitals, and illness…starting from experience, it is necessary to clear the way for transformation, a metamorphosis which isn't simply individual but which has a character accessible to others: that is this experience must be linkable, to a certain extent, to a collective practice and to a certain way of thinking." (1981b: 38-39)

In this sense, the subject is operationalised and operationalising. Foucault's personal experience formed part of his perception and motivation. The body, in its interaction with discursive forces also has an operationalised and operationalising element. It is not purely reacted to and upon, but also reacts to and upon.

There has been much made of Foucault's comment on the 'death of man' and the view that humans exist purely as objects which are constructed and without any form of innateness: an 'anti-humanism' and 'anti-enlightenment' stance. This has also been seen as an 'anti-rationalism' (e.g. Windschuttle, 1994). Part of the reason for this has been "His refusal to rely upon concepts of an essential human nature…" (Patton, 1998: 65). Foucault's position is that we have not investigated the ‘nature’ of humans as much as investigated the culturally produced and historically specific ‘nature’ of humans. A comment, as we have seen, which aligns well with Marx (McLellan, 1980).

Discourse, Power and the Body

What we find captured within this nexus of discursive and non-discursive force is the human body, and it is here that Foucault expressed a particular interest. In its operation, power, generated within non/discursive forces, operates at the level of the manufacture of the body, speech, self-knowledge, and so on. Here, power runs through, not from or within, and is exercised rather than possessed: existing neither in the person nor the structure, "…it is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away…" (Foucault, 1981: 94). For example, patriarchal structures do not hold power. Like all social formations, power is the condition of their existence.
In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault clearly identified the means by which the body is formed and created within a nexus of discourse which 'operates to transform individuals' (Foucault, 1977a: 172). In it he described how power constructs the body through the regulation of space. Far from being 'free' to develop, the body is caught up within discursive practices which permeate the regulation and handling of all people: in this paper those people are specifically children and it is the forms of care they are exposed to which represent techniques of power.

"Is there resistance…?"

"Where there is power, there is resistance…" (Foucault, 1981: 95)

"…power incites it does not repress - it only appears at points of resistance. Is there resistance in the malleability and plasticity of childhood?"

"What if the 'object' started to speak?" (Irigaray, 1985: 135 cited in Bell, 1993: 174)

Foucault's later notions on the operation of power were that resistance was always a part of the environment within which power operated and that "...at the heart of the power relationship there lies what he calls the 'intransigence of freedom'" (Moss, 1998: 5). The colonising effects of power are met with resistance in the same way that some form of resistance has always met colonising forces. The body, being a site of this colonising practice, evinces examples of resistance and opposition to discursive powers and practices. Later in the chapters on failure-to-thrive and attachment, we shall explore examples of how this resistance manifests. What shall be argued as that the innate temperamental tendencies or predispositions, existing from birth, present obstacles to the incorporation and consolidation of the body by discursive forces.

Though both Marx and Durkheim positioned a notion of human nature as central to their work, Foucault's position on Enlightenment thinking caused him to decline (Patton uses the term 'refused', 1998: 65) reliance on a notion of a 'human nature'. Nevertheless, "...his genealogies do presuppose a conception of the human material upon which power is exercised, or which exercises power upon itself. This human material is active; it is composed of forces or endowed with certain capacities" (Patton, 1998: 65). As stated above, some, like Butler, believe Foucault (or themselves) to be less

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57 Personal correspondence from Dr Steve D'Alton (1996).
certain. It is this very unclear mélange that I wish to exploit. If Foucault was not certain as to the 'materiality' of the body, then this leaves a fracture in his work that can be explored and exploited. If it is not a blind spot, then it is at least a hesitation.

A theme frequently stated in this discussion is that the incorporation of work from the fields of psychology and biology does not necessarily mean that one is developing a notion of absolutism, or unilinear determinism. As the chapter on biology, at the beginning of this thesis, and the discussion on the brain, failure to thrive and attachment (which are to follow) argue, the material available displays evidence of limitation, restriction and greater or lesser probability of particular outcomes. It does not argue for a unilinear, absolutist determinism. As I discussed in relation to biology in sociology, elements of materiality have been occluded for political and theoretical reasons. It is still politically dangerous, though becoming less so, to allow for notions of materiality and biology into human social relationships. Finally, it is theoretically complicated to account for these elements unless again one wishes to be absolute and deterministic.

One can accept that social relationships are formed within power relationships as per Foucault (Patton, 1998: 67), and allow for other influences. Constructing this form of critical alliance exposes a series of fissures and fractures in contemporary theorising on the body and social relationships and, by extension, in the theoretical frameworks used to create the methodologies utilised in the sociology of childhood and child abuse.

Ultimately, we have to agree on some basic elements: without a body, there is no human life. With the existence of a material body, there is the possibility of limitations. With the possibility of the existence of limitations, we have a probable cause: 'BYO attribution'. 'La homme plastique' runs concurrent with the parameters which produce probability and possibility, whilst declining the concept of illimitability. Just as there exists a fantastic spectrum of electromagnetic radiation, ranging from roughly $10^{-14}$ meters to $10^8$ meters, (Price, Glickstein, Horton and Bailey, 1982: 69) the human eye is limited to the range from approximately 400 nanometers to just over 700 nanometers. This does not deny the enormous range of colours we can see, which is estimated to be approximately 7 million! (Goldstein, 1984: 113) As a metaphor, this speaks volumes. We may be limited, but this means neither a lack of potential diversity nor a monolithic homogeneity.

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58 A nanometre being one billionth of a meter (Price, Glickstein, Horton and Bailey, 1982: 575).
If we accept the notion of resistance being always present, we need also to accept that the notion of unlimited potential, unlimited possible change and difference, a plastic, perennially flexible human body, is not an accurate reflection of human being. What then happens if, following Irigaray, this 'object' started to speak? What would it say? This is a provocative question, and one which (in the form of the most over utilised of claims in post-modernism), 'destabilises' the notion of the passive body, and 'fractures' Foucault's earlier notion of the body as a purely historically specific construct. It is this very notion that this paper wishes to explore. If the 'object' begins to speak, what will it say and what will be the result?

"To reject Cartesianism, it is not necessary to deny the corporeal nature of human existence and consciousness. To accept the corporeality of human life, it is not necessary to deny the fact that the nature of the human body is also an effect of cultural, historical activity. The body is both natural and cultural." (Turner, 1984: 49)

Though Foucault's earlier work argued that the perceived body is a monument that arises from the architecture of discourse (Foucault 1979a; 1972), I would agree more with Shilling that for sociology to grasp that which discourse, ideology etc, effects\(^9\), it is imperative that it takes hold of the "actual material phenomenon" (Shilling, 1991: 664) of this effect: the biology and physiology of the body. All of us, without exception, find ourselves in possession of a body. In the simplest and most concrete of terms, one cannot improve upon Susan Oyama: "All behaviour requires a body" (Oyama, 1991: 30). All of us, without exception, find ourselves in possession of a body (Kirby, 1991: 88). What allows us to interact with others, to 'be' in-the-world, and 'in-the-society/community' of which we are a member, is the very fact that "...the intrinsic reference point for temporality, spatial orientation and, therefore, difference, is one's own body" (Diprose, 1991: 65). It is therefore not surprising that its ubiquitous matter is, and should be, the subject of relentless investigation (Kirby, 1991: 88).

This investigation, identifiable as the nurture/nature debate is characterised by continued instability, shifting positions, diverse material and research. Sociology is

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\(^9\) effect. ("f_kt) 1. a. sub. Something accomplished, caused, or produced; a result, consequence. Correlative with CAUSE.

effect. v. 1.a. trans. To bring about (an event, a result); to accomplish (an intention, a desire)
b. To produce (a state or condition). Obs.
c. To make, construct. rare.arch.
enmeshed in this debate and finds it hard to extricate itself from it. If we say there is nothing natural, do we really know what we are agreeing to? (Kirby, 1991: 90) Kirby asks why we cannot readdress the issue of biology and what are we afraid of? Is it not that we are tied to biology by our determined effort to make sure we are not? We are enmeshed in our relationship with it. In rewriting the question Kirby makes the point that others have also decided that this 'essentialism' is not necessarily something we should dissociate ourselves from (Kirby, 1991).

One of the theoretical models which has supported this notion is social construction theory. This approach has enabled sociology to ascend towards Durkheim's notion of sociological purity, (Catton and Dunlap, 1978: 41) where social facts are explained through a form of hermeneutic relationship with other social facts. The result of the influence of these principles was opposition to what was seen as the reductionist nature of biological work. In the desire to resist this perceived (and at times, actual) tendency within the biological sciences, sociology further embedded the nature/nurture divide, developing its own anti-reductionist posture and leading to a reification of "…abstract analytical constructs into entities that possess powers of agency…" (Steklis and Walter, 1991: 137).

For example, in Finkelstein's entertaining article 'Chic Theory', fashion is shown to be a form of disciplinary power "…in that it coerces the body to shape and rearrange itself in accordance with ever-shifting social expectations" (1997: paragraph 17). This is achieved through dieting, exercise, and cosmetic surgery. The subject is required to "…apply facial cosmetics, arrange clothes, and wear ornamentation…in the service of aesthetic innovations that continually reinvent subjectivity." Ultimately, "this capacity of fashion to provide a performance script for the transactions of the everyday also draws upon a physiognomic history of interpreting the body surface" (1997: paragraph 10). "The body becomes a site of aesthetic innovation, much like the family car, and subject to periodic upgrading." (1997: paragraph 18)60.

I have no argument with drawing out fashion as a disciplinary power, nor with the contention that it focuses on the body and its spatial configuration (for example, way of walking, standing). Though diet is mentioned, the consequences of poor health as a result of inappropriate dieting are not considered. It is implicit that this is merely a way of altering the surface without any potential for other effects. If any further proof of this
was required, Finkelstein's meaning is well embodied in the use of the term *physiognomy*. *The Oxford English Dictionary* shows this to mean:

I.1.a The art of judging character and disposition from the features of the face or the form and lineaments of the body generally.

Whilst in its transferred meaning, it can be taken as:

II.4.a *transf.* The general appearance or external features of anything material.


Unfortunately, when it comes to a discussion of the body, the article tells me no more about the corporeality of the body than a motor magazine journalist's discussion of the new colour for this season's F1 Ferrari would tell me about the vehicle's engineering. Finkelstein is, in a real sense, discussing the clothes, colour, and fat levels etc, which make up the aesthetic aspects of the body. Thus the biology of the body and its responses to the environment are not the focus, the exterior surface of the body is retooled as part of the 'aesthetic focus'. The body becomes another mannequin, no different to those in the windows of fashion houses and clothing stores.

Much theorising has positioned the body as a surface, replacing the 'Tabula Rasa' of Locke and social learning theory, with the body as the blank canvas. In this way, the body becomes malleable and reflective, though not responsive; unlimited in its flexibility. Echoing, as we've already discussed in the introduction to this thesis (Bigwood, 1991: 103), the view that: "The body is socially constructed [and therefore has] no intrinsic meaning" (Synnott, 1992: 79). Thus the surface of the body, its docility and acceptance, become the focus.

What is worrying and misleading in this form of theorising is that there is no reference to the fact that bodies interact or react. This is also Smart's (1998: 80) criticism of Foucault's work on the constitution of the subject. On a global level, as stated previously, the body reacts to environmental pollutants of various kinds. On an individual level, but within the species, the body interacts with its environment, including the 'aesthetic innovations'. This is still not a neutral activity. Attempts to adhere to standards of beauty can be injurious and at times lethal. Cosmetics can cause death and illness, such as occurred in the use of white lead in the face 'whitener' Ceruse,
used from the 2nd to the 19th Century (Stehlin, 1995). Lead is absorbed by the body, at times proving fatal to adults and posing a major health risk to infants. Lead poisoning is also linked to developmental delay, decreases in intellectual development, reduction in hearing capacity, increased dental decay, reduced physical growth and height and behavioural and learning disorders (Wolfe, 2000).

Clothing also can cause injury, illness and even death (Rowe and Hamada, 2000: 16). The wearing of bodices and corsets caused injury to internal organs, impaired respiration and muscle deterioration. For example, a person exposed to a situation which prompted an increasing heart rate requires faster or elevated respiration for increased oxygenation of the blood. If this is prevented or inhibited then the body is starved of oxygen, which may result in fainting. Thus we arrive at the 'fainting female' response to stress, much commented on during the Victorian era and in 'bodice ripper' novels.

Wearing such outfits as bodices and corsets also inhibited women's physical activity and thereby affecting their general level of health (Palmer, 2000; Murton, 1995; Roberts, 1977). Similar issues of physical restriction, discomfort, pain and impairment can be seen in the late Chinese practice of foot binding (Mackie, 1996; Gates, 1992; Greenhalgh, 1977).

The consequence of deciding that the body is ultra-flexible/plastic, without restriction, is a failure to address or acknowledge the real material and physical effects of various forms of body practices. Preference is given to what amounts to a 'Vogue Living' explanation of preferred colours for this season, whilst the rot in the floorboards and the collapsing load bearing wall goes unnoticed. Ultimately we are left with the position that the surface is inscribed and theorised, but little more than that. There is no further exploration of the body, beyond the quite obvious and colourful surface. We have what amounts to a blinkered, or 'professional vision' (Goodwin 1994, in Threadgold, 1996). If, as Deutscher writes, one of the truths of post-structuralism is that 'there is no outside of the text' (1997: paragraph 1), then it may well be that what post-structuralism 'most wanted to do' was to deny and recant any 'biologicist accounts of the body' (Deutscher,

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61 Lead sulfide is still being used in India in a cosmetic called Surma or Kohl (Earth Summit Watch and the Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin, 2000). http://www.ies.wisc.edu/research/leadphaseout/welcome.html

62 In Tokyo in 1999, a woman fell over whilst wearing high-sole d shoes and died. At the same time, advertisements came out in Japan showing the dangers posed when driving a car wearing platform shoes.
1997: paragraph 10); a perfect explanation for the failure not to address more than the 'dress' of the body and its surfaces.

As a result, these approaches have produced a 'disembodiment' of the body. The corporeal has disappeared "...in a nexus of 'intentions', 'perspectives', and 'coping strategies'..." (Shilling, 1991: 653). The biological phenomena of the body vanishes from the frame, to be replaced by a shadowy 'social construct', owing nothing to the body and everything to the interplay of intersecting forces arrayed in its environment.

Questioning the passivity of the body and exchanging this 'passive body' for a 're/active body' challenges assumptions about the relationship between the body and culture and the enculturation and cultural encompassing of the body. This reactive body (Kirby, 1997, 1991 and Connell, 1996) illuminates other areas of exploration for sociology. Ones within which the body offers influence and resistance to its environment. In the existing gender politics, social practice addresses bodies. Within these practices, masculinities as well as femininities are experienced "...as certain muscular tensions, postures, physical skills, ways of moving, and so on" (Connell, 1996: paragraph 12). In contesting the position that socially-specific constructs, such as masculinity, are so 'all-powerful' and singular in their results, Connell states we infer a sort of 'chocolate-frog-stamp-on-a-conveyor-belt' analogy, which:

"...woefully under-estimates the energy, the activity, the agency of a growing person. It under-estimates the pleasures and excitements of entering a gendered world... [rather] ...we should think of the making of masculinity as a project (in Sartre's sense), pursued over a period of many years and through many twists and turns." (Connell, 1996: paragraph 3)

Humans are growing, whether it be growing-up or growing-old. In either sense, there is a change that occurs and that change involves biological and physiological changes and differences. Are we to say that these changes have no influence on social life or do we take the position that the only effects are purely the cultural interpretations inscribed?

It is postmodernism's rampant cultural theorising which acts as:

"...a prophylactic against contagion - it isolates the essence of Man by identifying him as absolutely different from that animal part of himself received in nature." (Kirby, 1997: 151)
It is this reading of the body as a "metaphor of inscription...written on by culture, and often only at the exterior" for which Kirby (1997: 126) criticises contemporary post-structural feminism. Kirby believes that writers such as Jane Gallop and Judith Butler, for all their description and discussion on the body, ultimately hesitate at the surface of the body. Rather, in Kirby's book, *Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal* (1997), it is an active body, an active physiology, that one finds. The body reads what nature 'scribbles'. Rather than merely reflecting, the body responds. Such an approach is not without problems. Fears may arise that one could easily segue in to some form of naturalistic body, or an 'immutable essence' (Deutscher, 1997: paragraph 10). This said, it does raise some very interesting questions whilst simultaneously denying attempts to establish any simple nature/nurture divide. We end up with a 'speaking body', one which is not so silent or easily disenfranchised. To this we shall return shortly.

Bruno Bettelheim (1960, cited in Scarry, 1985) provides an example of how the body reasserts itself and in doing so, reasserts identity and relationship. Recounting a true story which occurred during World War II in a Nazi concentration camp, a guard noticed a woman who had been a dancer and ordered her to dance for him. As she did:

"...she moved into the habitual body rhythms and movements from which she had been cut off."

As she did this, she reacquainted herself with the self from which she had 'lost contact':

"...recalling herself in her own mimesis of herself, she remembered who she was, danced up to the officer, moved her hand with grace for his gun, took it, and shot him." (Scarry, 1985: 347)

Though the Nazi regime, through the concentration camp, had acquired her body for itself, she had retrieved it through an act of action and movement. No words, no discussion were needed for this. It was, as Scarry cites Bettelheim, 'an exceptional moment of resistance.' Indeed, the advice that Bettelheim contends best helped his own survival was to control as much of his own body as possible.

"What is remembered in the body is well remembered. It is not possible to compel a person to unlearn the riding of a bike, or to take out the knowledge of a song residing in the fingertips..." Scarry, 1985: 110)
For Marx and Durkheim, human nature comprised one of the founding elements of their work and both discussed the interrelationship between this nature and human social relationships. Furthermore, their notions of optimal social structures and relationships were formed by their understanding of human nature. Though Foucault was interested in decentring absolute notions of human nature, refusing “…to rely upon concepts of an essential human nature…”(Patton, 1998: 65), it is not possible to deny that to have social relationships (Shilling, 1991), and to exhibit behaviour within these relationships, we need a body (Oyama, 1991). However, this body not only has a memory, but is the concrete, physical, corporeal element from which we experience our social relationships and, as we shall see later in this thesis, has a pre-prescribed nature which places limitations our social relationships.

The work of both Marx and Durkheim included concern for the well being of human’s and outlined what they believed to be negative social structures and relationships which impinged adversely on human life, individual and social development. This thesis argues that the human body has inherent limitations and that it is these limitations which sociology needs to come to grips with if it is to frame any enquiry into what child abuse is and how to define it.

Marx, Durkheim, Foucault and child abuse

"What we have lost in this process of universalisation of common - essentially rational-scientific - modes of thought is the subject of the most radical of present day critiques.”(Martin, 1972: 10)

"How these definitions are made ultimately determines the nature of the relationship between the state and the institution of the family, and that relationship in turn, is the cornerstone of the social organisation of the whole society, the expression of its most basic social values." (Giovannoni and Becerria, 1982: 3)

For both Marx and Durkheim, human nature existed as real, extant, and knowable. As a result both also concerned themselves with identifying what was potentially harmful to this nature. For Marx, the place for all enquiry to commence is human experience (1984 [1845-6]: 128) and it is human nature to experience estrangement and alienation, both of which he saw as harmful to human development, when inhibited from developing the

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63 I use the word 'acquired' to remind us of the hideous intent of the perpetrators of the Holocaust - to treat humans as non-human objects and to utilise them, and their bodies, as a 'resource'.

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range of human potential (1984 [1845-6]: 154) and social, cooperative relationships with others (Marx and Engels: 1984 [1844a]: 87).

For Durkheim, though humans needed to express their originality (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 71), his research was interested in what was best for human social life (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]) and a society in which promoted self-interest as a central feature was in fact not a society (Giddens, 1972: 2). Sociology had to understand that in its research the focus needed to be on the reality of people’s lives (Durkheim, 1961 [1915]: 13), otherwise, as Alvarez so acutely stated in relation to work on suicide, and this thesis argues is the case in much sociological work on child abuse, one can forget that it is “…about humans who suffer…” (Alvarez 1972 cited in Mestrovic, 1988c: 698)

It is impossible to know what Foucault would have written later and so what presents as enticing possibilities remains just that. What the section on Foucault’s work shows is that the responses to his work have argued for the inclusion of human biology in sociological work, for the body as an active participant, and for human physiology as a component (Kirby, 1997: 151). This is a move against isolating human life from its biological life and that sociology/biology are not mutually exclusive, but complexly interacting. The same consideration is required when developing and researching notions of what is child abuse, and most specifically when proposing what child abuse may be.
4. The problem of how to define child abuse and notions of harm

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"How these definitions are made ultimately determines the nature of the relationship between the state and the institution of the family, and that relationship in turn, is the cornerstone of the social organisation of the whole society, the expression of its most basic social values." (Giovannoni and Becerria, 1982: 3)

As I have described in the section on Foucault, notions and definitions are constructed within a discursive framework. This is equally true of those in relation to child abuse. What is considered abusive is the result of the intersection of political, social, cultural, historical and psychological streams of information and knowledge. In this chapter, I shall explore a small selection of these elements to see how they operate and combine to provide contemporary definitions.

How abuse is defined is the central problematic in the field of child protection. Definitions of child abuse have a pervasive and significant effect, anchoring research and the practice to which is gives birth. What is defined as abuse creates the conclusions reached by research. The definition of what is defined as abusive has consequences for statistical surveys of frequency, influencing funding and service delivery (The Violence Against Children Study Group, 1990: 4) and community education, which in turn has an effect on community attitudes and the interest of legislators and the power of political lobby groups. Other such examples can be found in papers and research compiled for state and national child protection services.64

The definitions used shape the questions asked and the answers implemented. Ultimately, these definitions directly affect children. Understandable and legitimised definitions provide child protection workers with a sense that they are operating in a manner that is meaningful, purposeful, and with direction. The workers in the agencies

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64 For example, the NSW Department of Community Services Legislation Review Unit, Paper No 1, 1996.
involved hope they are more respectful and purposeful than their predecessors, and are not repeating their mistakes.

Political agendas and demands, ethnic and cultural difference, the gender of the carers or parents and the colour of those whose actions are being assessed, (Gordon, 1990; Bourne, 1979) all have an influence on the defining of an event as abusive. The 'child saving' of the past is categorised as classist, bourgeois attempts to create all children in the mould of the gentry and the civilised. One of the most contentious examples in Australia can be seen in the 'Stolen Generation' report, describing how the State and its allies removed children from their families and from their social groups. Presented at the time as action taken to improve the life of Aboriginal children, as a means to help the disadvantaged and those likely to be abused, or suffer neglect, it is now considered to be largely both class and race based: an attempted genocide of the Aboriginal people (Bringing them Home, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997: 27).

In New South Wales, the desire to not repeat this relationship with the Aboriginal community can be seen in legislation such as of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act, 1998. Other examples of legislation which reflect the change to child protection services relationship with Australia's indigenous population can be seen in:

Victoria: Children and Young Persons Act, 1989, Section 112 (permanent care orders need to include a report from an Aboriginal agency recommending the order) and Section 119 (case planning needs to include a member of the Aboriginal community or a person approved by the community).

Queensland: Child Protection Act 1999, Clause 6 (decisions by the court should only be made after consulting with a recognised Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander agency) and Clause 80 (placements for Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander children must be culturally appropriate and consultation with Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander agencies must take place).

Northern Territory: Community Welfare Act, Amended 1999, Part IX, Section 68 (the minister must provide 'support and assistance to Aboriginal communities and organisations' to assist in the welfare of Aboriginal families children) and Part IX, Section 69 (Aboriginal children are to be placed either within their extended family or

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65 See Chapter 1, Section 5, Paragraph (2) and (3); Chapter 2, Part 2, Sections 11 to 14 and Chapter 11, Section 191, sub-section (6).
community. Where this is not possible, the opinion and involvement of Aboriginal agencies is to be sought and the child's links with their community to maintained.)

South Australia: *Children's Protection Act*, 1993, Section 5, sub-sections (1) to (7) (In relation to Aboriginal children, all decisions must be made in consultation with an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander Community agency. An Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child must remain within their community.)

These are not isolated examples of the changing views on children and their needs. The social opprobrium for parents and their children 'born out of wedlock' has decreased. It is no longer the dominant view that such children would be 'better off' if they were adopted. This has meant that along with a decreasing birth rate, the number of children being placed for adoption has fallen sharply from 9,798 in 1971-72 to 668 in 1995-96.66

Since the 1960s there has been a noticeable move towards providing financial and material support to assist in maintaining children within their family of origin (Little, 1995). The consequence has been that the removal of children on the basis of material and financial hardship has largely ceased in NSW. The current Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act, 1998, specifically prohibits the notification of children as being in need of care as a result of poverty67. In short, by utilising research methods that are less class-based, and less ethno-centric, it is hoped that the mistakes of the past have been incorporated and definitions clarified. Yet definitions of child abuse are as problematic in the present as in the past.

As Foucault has demonstrated, definitions have a constructing effect. By delineating what is 'good', they also create a measure by which to determine what is 'not good'. What is defined as abuse acts to define what good parenting is, and hence, what is inadequate parenting (Bourne, 1979: 4). Abuse need not merely be some form of behaviour that is immediately harmful; neglect of a child's needs is also a form of abuse. Consequently, the issue generally hinges on, but is not exclusively mitigated by, concepts of the ability of the parents to control their surroundings and their resources sufficiently. This is obviously complicated for even if the parents are doing everything they can, neglect may still exist (Bourne, 1979: 4).

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67 Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act, 1998, Section 71 (Grounds for Care Orders), sub-section 2, paragraph (b).
The causes of the neglect may be financial impoverishment resulting from a nation's economic troubles. Take for example the following excerpts:

"Mortality rates among mothers and children are rising as a result of the crippling cost of debt in the world's poorest countries, says a United Nations report...women and children are bearing the brunt of the debt crisis, especially in Africa, where many governments are diverting resources away from health and education."

"In Angola, the continuing civil war, the virtual collapse of the health system, a lack of basic education and nationwide food shortages combine to make it the worst place for children."

"The UN children's organisation calls for the outright cancellation of all debt."

"People wash in the same water they use to cook and drink - perfect conditions for the spread of polio. Mariana Antonio - barely a year old - is a survivor from that outbreak, but has lost the use of both her legs. But her 18-year-old mother Suzannah is at a loss to know what more she can do."

This brings out the issues central to child abuse and how definitions of abuse are created. The positions often form within a State/Individual milieu. As discussed above, these are best represented by the positions of David Gil and C. Henry Kemp. Without wishing to present either as a concrete and unchanging polemic, the differences can best be summarised as follows:

For Kempe the definition of abuse of children is the violent injury of children, whereas Gil defines abuse as those things which cause a child's potential to be compromised. For Kempe the focus for research and clinical work is the family, for Gil it is society and social structures. Where Kempe considers the method of work should centre around "the public health visitor's opening [of] 'life lines' between abusers and helping institutions" (Bourne and Newberger, 1979: xi). Gil looks at the changing of those social conditions.

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factors which are causally linked to child abuse such as poverty, racism, the social emphasis on competitive rather than co-operative approaches, the acceptance of violence in conflict resolution and regressive employment policies (Bourne and Newberger, 1979).

For Gil, any behaviour of omission or commission, cultural, structural or individual which results in or contributes to:

"…inflicted gaps or deficits between circumstances of living which would facilitate the optimum development of children, to which they should be entitled, and to their actual circumstances, irrespective of the source or agents of the deficit." (Gil, 1975: 347)

and therefore act to:

"…deprive children of equal rights or liberties, and/or interfere with their optimal development constitute by definition, abusive or neglected acts or conditions." (Gil, 1975: 348)

4.1 Cultural and Anthropological Elements

Cultural diversity, or difference, further complicates the question of what is or is not abusive. Attempts to delineate a definition of abuse are caught on the horns of a dilemma: ethno-centricism versus absolute relativism (Korbin, 1991 and 1981). Social patterns of childcare can vary considerably between cultures; what is considered 'good' practice in one culture or community may not be considered so in another (Best, House, Barnard and Spicker, 1994; Carlson and Stenmalm-Sjoblom, 1989; Hsu, Tseng, Ashton, McDermott, Jr. and Char, 1985; Sidel, 1982; Findlay, 1987-88; Hearn, 1990). This divergence in culturally approved caring styles presents a serious confounding variable to research and the development of definitions.

One case in point is the disquiet when the issue of cultural differences is raised in regard to child abuse. The NSW Child Protection Council's report *Culture - No Excuse* (no year of publication listed) summarises the difficulties encountered when weighing cultural issues in child protection. At what point is it necessary, if at all, to acquiesce to the parents cultural imperatives in their care of a child? Is female genital mutilation
acceptable because of cultural determinates? At what point is this deemed not in the child's best interest? What criteria are used for this decision making? While this report raises questions, it does not provide concrete, useful answers.

The problem at times seems insurmountable. The questions are frequent, heated, pointed and relevant. Criticism of studies in the language, perception and morals of children tend to "...proceed without the benefit of any reflection upon the way their methods already prejudge the nature of the phenomena they intend to elicit" (O'Neill 1982: 77 discussing Merleu-Ponty). Adult perceptions of children are more often views of the relationship between children and adults than views of children themselves (Kennedy, 1988: 122 discussing Merleu-Ponty). In this sense, it is equally true to say that:

"Any theory of child socialisation is implicitly a theory of the construction of social reality, if not a particular historical social order." (O'Neill, 1982: 76)

How and what society believes children are to become, influences the actions of those who seek to institute or deflect this trajectory: it is a supposition of what is to be. This forms a template, a 'consensual reality', against which children, like the bodies of Foucault's prisoners (1977a) and, by extension, all subjects of this discursive pattern, are measured and judged to be 'competent' (Jenks, 1982: 13). Activities which encourage social cooperation form part of the former Soviet Union's policies on childcare activities: "...Group games and special toys are designed to heighten the side of self-development" (Denzin, 1982: 192 citing Bronfenbrenner's USSR studies). In NSW, Koori children are not taught to always respond to adults and parents are not necessarily upset if children don't respond to them when speaking. Children are also allowed much more autonomy than in non-Aboriginal families (Gunumbera, 1987). Children born and raised in the Democratic Republic of North Korea are seen as highly valuable and their education an imperative. In his address to education workers, the founder of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, in On The Duties Of Educational Workers In The Upbringing Of The Children And Youth⁶⁹ stated:

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⁶⁹ What one could almost call his 'Little Green Book'.

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"You are successfully conducting the honourable work of educating and training 2,500,000 children and youths, our future masters, into reliable Communists." (Kim, 1970 (1961): 1)

"…home and social education are necessary, but the greater responsibility rests with the teachers. It is not too much to say that whether or not our children and youth grow up into to good people depends upon how the teachers educate them." (Kim, 1970 (1961): 4)

Kim Il Sung makes the point that in capitalist societies, self-interested competition is promoted. To become a good communist, a child needs to be taught to: "…place the interests of the people and the collective above his own and must not be concerned only about himself but learn to care for his comrades and the people" (Kim, 1970 (1961): 7). This must start from kindergarten and should include teaching children to "…treat with loving care our roads, buildings and streets and all the property of states and society" (Kim, 1970 (1961): 9).

One of the dangers associated with this lack of clarity around what exactly a 'culturally sensitive approach' means is illuminated in work by Dingwall, Eekelaar and Murray, 1983 (Tomison, 1995). Workers can dismiss and diminish incidents and actions that are dangerous for the child's well being, all under the vague rubric of 'cultural relativism'.

### 4.2 Problems with the definitions used

The varying definitions employed by researchers are frequently identified as critically problematic when attempting to compare research into child abuse (Gordon, 1990; Bourne, 1979). Often "…[t]here is no way of knowing whether the cases being counted represent similar or diverse phenomena..." (Giovannoni and Becarra, 1982: 14), whilst "different studies often use different definitions of abuse (The Violence Against Children Study Group, 1990: 4, citing as support, work by Birchall, 1989, and Milner and Blyth, 1988). The substance of the cases used in research can differ (Giovannoni and Becarra, 1982) as can the definitions of abuse used (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1999 and 2001; Little, 1995; The Violence Against Children Study Group, 1990). Definitions and research are complicated by research parameters and research definitions that may vary considerably (Gordon, 1990; Gelles, 1990; Bourne, 1979). For
example, in a paper entitled *Child Abuse: the Dutch Response*, Findlay (1987-88) writes that the Dutch debated the limitation of a child's options to sexist definitions of gender-specific behaviour as an example of abuse. Obviously, this opens up the definition of abuse to capture a whole range of areas not previously considered as abusive, (Hearn, 1990) and which this writer's research indicates is not included within legislation in any English-speaking country (nor, one suspects, included in any other nation's legislation).

Those working in community service areas such as child protection agencies, are warned that observer bias in the form of set views about various communities or classes can affect how incidents and actions are perceived: "...the greater the social distance between the professional and the patient, the more readily the label of inflicted injury is applied" (Bourne, 1979: 3). As a result, it can be that rich, well presenting parents are considered less likely to be abusive than aggressive, inarticulate people.

It is not difficult to argue, then, that serious difficulties exist with attempts to define abuse: "...not only are abuse and neglect difficult to detect, however, but also they are conceptually unclear" (Bourne, 1979: 2). Consequently, the lack of clarity of definition means that apprehending the extent of abuse is very difficult - varying definitions give varying results. Citing an example of a survey conducted by Richard Gelles (in the same volume), 'self-reporting' provides a frequency of incidents in excess of those available through perusing the records of state agencies responsible for child protection and investigating complaints of abuse. 'Self-reporting' also shows a greater demographic range than the official material which focuses "...more heavily on the poor and powerless than it does on the affluent and influential" (Bourne, 1979: 6). Other possible influences on the search for statistics are historical desires to prioritise funds for service provision.

### 4.3 Financial issues

The cost of managing the problem of child abuse is also influenced by the financial issues it creates. The economic 'rationalism' of the end of the 20th Century has influenced service delivery models and planning, with the introduction of privatisation and competition in tendering, aiming to cut the cost of service delivery (Tomison, 1998: paragraph 6 citing Burbidge 1998). This reframing of service delivery cannot be
separated from the desire to reduce costs: "As Parton notes 'the attempts to re-balance child protection and family support are thus intimately related to new ways of targeting scarce resources'" (Tomison, 1998: paragraph 7 citing Parton, 1997: 10). This provides a neat historical and social context to research outlining the growing change within the approaches to child welfare. Increasing numbers of notifications and concern that removal of children is possibly harmful has combined with an elevation of the threshold for intervention (Little, 1995) and the form of intervention (Tomison 1996). Curiously, this has occurred at the same time as concerns over costs.

In countries like Australia and the USA, a central Federal government provides some financial support to the individual states, which themselves run their own child protection services. The ability to show the cost of providing this service assists in the sourcing of extra funding from the relevant Federal bodies. This reduces the overall cost to the state and, in theory, should enhance the ability to provide a more comprehensive coverage of service delivery.

As in Australia, the individual States of the American union and the Federal government face the same problem in trying to determine the frequency of the occurrence of child abuse:

"In addition, [different] states have different standards for determining whether or not maltreatment occurred, with some states requiring evidence of actual harm to a child and other states simply requiring evidence of potential harm." (Wang and Daro, 1997: paragraph 7)

It is these statistics which are fundamentally important when the breadth of the problem is being discussed and financial and social resources are being allocated:

"Child abuse reports continue to climb at a steady rate despite the absence of significant new funding to states for investigation or service provision. In 1997, the number of child abuse reports rose 1.7%, exceeding 3.1 million. A similar increase in the number of substantiated cases also occurred, with

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70 I use inverted commas here as it appears that the term 'economic rationalism' is a peculiarly Australian term. Associate Professor (Econometrics) Graham Elliott, University of San Diego, USA. Personal communication, November 2000.
over one million new cases entering child protective service caseloads last year." (Wang and Daro, 1997: paragraph 44)

Additionally, more than half of the respondent agencies indicated that while they had received (small) increases in their 1996-97 operating budgets; they also believed that decreases in the level of Federal funding would mean very little or no increases in real terms (Wang and Daro, 1997: paragraph 44).

To provide a local comparison, the annual report for the NSW Department of Community Services, the agency with primary responsibility for child protection in New South Wales, shows the following statistics comparing the years 1997-8 to 1998-9:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Reported Issues</th>
<th>1997-8</th>
<th>1998-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Harm and/or Injury to child</td>
<td>17,808</td>
<td>17,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child at Risk (of harm or injury)</td>
<td>13,568</td>
<td>13,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult/carer issues affecting care of child</td>
<td>20,091</td>
<td>25,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Issues</td>
<td>11,367</td>
<td>14,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other mandated issues</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General issues</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption issues</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>64,645</strong></td>
<td><strong>72,762</strong></td>
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</table>

(NSW Department of Community Services, Annual Report. 1998-99: 18)

Of the total number of reports, the first three categories are the ones which the Department of Community Services considers represent concerns relating to possible abuse. The following chart outlines the comparison between reports and allegations of abuse contained in these first three categories and the number confirmed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997-8</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1998-9</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Harm and/or Injury to child</td>
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</tr>
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<td>20,091</td>
<td>25,266</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,467</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,836</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>19.11%</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,867</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,624</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>15.16%</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,867</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,624</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

(NSW Department of Community Services, Annual Report. 1998-99: 19)

This represents an actual increase in cases of 11.4% and a relative drop of confirmed cases of approximately 12% between 1997-8 and 1998-9. At the same time, there was an increase of 11% in case numbers. Compare this to Britain, where 160,000 children were the subject of notification, (of a total child population of 11,000,000) (Little, 1995). This represents a notification rate of 1.45% of children, as against 4.5% of children in the USA (Wang and Daro, 1997). Of the British reports of abuse, 15% were considered to be inconclusive (i.e. unnecessary notifications) (Little, 1995) compared to a rate of 1.5% in the USA (Wang and Daro, 1997).

Obviously the total cost and range of the panoply of agencies, bodies and authorities which are involved, directly and indirectly, in child protection and child abuse, is considerable: Children's Court services, the Police, Health and Education services, funding to statutory bodies and non-government agencies. There are additional costs such as stress to the community and its members, lost productivity through a person's life-span and the ongoing negative experiences and actions of people caught up in the milieu of child abuse and protection (e.g. related abuse, physical injury and illness, criminal activity).

The total expenses and revenues for the NSW Department of Community Services for 1997-8 was over $765 million whilst the total expenses and revenues for 1998-9 period was over $816 million, an increase of 6.25%; a not insubstantial amount for any
Below is an outline of the increasing cost of providing child and family oriented welfare services across Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total welfare services expenditure</th>
<th>$ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–95</td>
<td>1,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–96</td>
<td>1,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996–97</td>
<td>1,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997–98</td>
<td>1,476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The difference between the totals appearing in this table and the sums of Commonwealth transfer to State and Territory Governments and State expenditure net of Commonwealth transfers in Table A1 is due to special appropriations by the Commonwealth Government to State And Territory Governments which cannot be broken down by State and Territory.

Sources: Welfare services expenditure: Commonwealth Grants Commission unpublished data; Transfer payments: Department of Finance database.


In Tasmania, for example, the smallest state in Australia, the following costs are given in their 1998-99 budget estimate:

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71 It should be noted that the Department of Community Services has many other responsibilities beyond child protection. Therefore a simple breakdown of dividing the dollar values by cases would not be anywhere near an accurate representation of the cost to the community per case.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Services</th>
<th>Assistance in the provision of care and protection for children with an emphasis on supporting and strengthening families</th>
<th>$21,488,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Care</td>
<td>The provision of support and accommodation services for families and individuals in crisis including victims of domestic violence and sexual assault</td>
<td>$1,912,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Care</td>
<td>The provision of safe, responsive and therapeutic environments for children who are unable to live with their families</td>
<td>$9,684,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$33,084,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a comparison, funding by the United States Federal government (as opposed to the individual State budgets) was announced in 1995 as $US60 million. This was to be followed by funding of $275 million in the 1999 financial year, $295 million in the 2000 financial year and $305 million in the 2001 financial year (Wang and Daro, 1997).

Admittedly New South Wales is the State with the largest population and financial base and Tasmania one of the smallest in both respects. This notwithstanding, it is easy to see that the costs incurred by a single department in each of these States are quite high. Combined with the amounts spent by the Federal government in the United States, this brief overview of a select aspect of the funding levels involved shows that the financial ramifications and relevance of definitions of child abuse are of no small import. The broader the definition, the greater the cost of intervention; the narrower, the greater the potential for reducing costs. Further, the greater the number of cases confirmed, the more likely the greater cost. The obverse in reduced confirmations is also likely true. Though often presented as a service delivery and issue of definition, it is also clearly a financial statement: a state government is only willing to financially imburse an agency
to a limit, beyond which it becomes untenable or undesirable (Newberger and Bourne, 1978: 379).

We can see, in a concrete sense, that definitions of abuse combine with definitions of what constitutes a correct answer to enquiries into the extent of child abuse. This lack of clarity of definition means that mapping the extent of abuse is very difficult. This has led Epstein (1988: 198) to argue that much of what is taken as proven is, in reality, based on research bound-up in a specific period of history and a specific sort of science. More concrete examples are found when reviewing the interest areas for research; funding allocation; the proscriptions of the prevailing paradigm; the present (historical) and culturally contemporary belief in the ability of psychology and psychiatry to provide answers.

The contribution of sociological work has been considerable, raising significantly pertinent and challenging questions. Particularly, it has located child abuse as a social problem, rather than a purely medical, psychological or biological one (for example: Parton, 1990; Newberger and Bourne, 1978; Gelles, 1975; Gil, 1975). It has also questioned the social processes involved in defining abuse, abusers (Parton, 1990; Newberger and Bourne, 1979; Gelles, 1975) and notions of abuse, questioning 'who' makes the decisions and in 'whose' best interests? How can we compare research that uses such varied definitions? From what did we develop these definitions and from whom did we receive them? In asking these questioning, sociology has developed a strong base for stating that abuse is, in itself, a concept that has little to offer beyond acting as a buoy marking the channels along which the fleet of researchers has passed. What harm may be and the possibility of a transcultural, transhistorical concept/notion, becomes a reef to avoid, which little profits the researcher. The answer is profoundly post-modern - there is no harm, only that caused by the definitions.

4.4 Intersection of financial and political

Child protection agencies are often under media and political pressure. As service provision costs money, money which is taken from the public in the form of taxes, they are also under financial pressure (Tomison, 1998). At times this means they are required to direct attention to the more obvious forms of abuse (eg. sexual, physical and neglect) (O'Hagan, 1995: 492) and to re-identify the focus of their work. Thus negotiating the child abuse/family support complex is "…intimately related to new ways of targeting
scarce resources" (Parton, 1997: 10 cited in Tomison, 1998: paragraph 17). This means that for child protection agencies, those forms of abuse that are less easy to identify, such as emotional and psychological abuse, are neglected or de-prioritised in terms of a response rating. It could be argued that this is related to knowledge, within the agencies, that other forms of abuse are more likely to stir the public's imagination. As Kari Killen states:

"Go to the newspapers. When did you last read about neglect in your newspaper? Physical abuse and sexual abuse stir people up, whereas neglect is very heavy…We don't like neglect, it is seen as non-dramatic." (Killen, 1994: 7)

Killen also suggests that the emotional cost, for staff, of managing such cases, combined with its lack of dramatic interest, conspires to discourage a focus on neglect within child protection agencies. This contention is supported by Moore (1989 in Tomison, 1995), who also suggests that the financial expense for services, in worker time and effort, is another factor encouraging this 'neglect of neglect'.

Additionally, physical and 'inadequate supervision' (itself categorised as neglect in NSW) forms of abuse are considered more likely to have a direct correlation with a child's death at the hands of their parents or carers. This was clearly displayed during a 1999 report into a child's death in NSW. The report from the Commissioner chairing the inquiry states:

"Given the evidence before the Commission raises serious questions about the adequacy of the Department's assessment of risks to Ben72, and given the Department's position that, in the face of increasing workloads and static staff numbers, the Priority One procedures for prioritising work will remain in force, the community is entitled to ask in what circumstances will cases be responded to in accordance with Department's published procedures." (NSW Community Services Commission, 1999: 2)

"Based on comments made by departmental staff in relation to this matter, it seems that unless there is a physical manifestation of abuse, the

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72 The pseudonym used in the report.
Department's ability to intervene in a child's life is either severely curtailed due to competing priorities or, is seen as not warranted." (NSW Community Services Commission, 1999: 17)

The commissioner went on to write:

"The legislation does not envisage the possibility of simply closing a file without investigation, simply due to the Department's inability to allocate the matter in a specified period." (NSW Community Services Commission, 1999: 19)

and:

"In an environment of limited resources and competing priorities where 'low risk' or low priority cases can remain unallocated, and eventually be filed, in some instances with no follow-up, it is inevitable that cases such as Ben's will increasingly not be attended to by the Department, particularly if the 'Priority One' procedures remain unamended." (NSW Community Services Commission, 1999: 19)

In her response to the Commission's preliminary report, Carmel Niland, the Director-General of the NSW Department of Community Services, wrote

"DoCS does not accept that the proposed review of the Priority One procedures will necessarily lead to a resolution of the difficulties faced by staff in allocating work in relation to competing demands. The adoption of the Commission's position will put our Managers and Assistant Managers into an unsustainable position where they are expected to allocate work which is not physically possible to do with the numbers of staff we have." (Niland, 1999: 19)

In this we can see a number of issues: the death of a child, leading to an enquiry and public dispute (actual, terminal harm and political fall-out); staff numbers (financial and political issues); amount of work (based on definitions used and forms of intervention proposed). Underlying each is not an argument about the harm caused - this is beyond
debate - but a positioning around what can be done with the resources available, which in brute terms relates to the cost of service provision.

4.5 Political: Children, the Family and the State

Then no man on earth is truly free.
All are slaves of money or necessity.
Public opinion or fear of prosecution
Forces each one, against his conscience,
To conform.
(Euripides, Hecuba, 11.864-867)

The conflict over how to define child abuse is not merely theoretically interesting. Its practical application has a broader and more significant impact and it is this which makes the disputes over definitions politically and professionally important (Kilpatrick and Rinaudo, 1995; Parton, 1990). Child abuse definitions operate within one of the most contentious debates in sociology - the State and its relationship to the Family (Parton, 1990; Frost and Stein, 1989; Giovannoni and Becarra, 1982). The actions and powers of State agencies in the field of child abuse prevention and investigation, and the implicit (and explicit) notions of social control and deviancy, are manifestly part of the agenda in any child abuse debate (Mason, 1993: 16-17):

"The concern about child abuse justifies state employees literally crossing the threshold of the home of those with children considered to be at risk. Thus the child abuse issue helps to define the 'good' family and the boundary of state intervention in households. It also acts in a way that separates child care from child abuse; the latter occurring only in the malfunctioning family, as if 'normal' parents have not sometimes felt as if their patience has come to its end." (Frost and Stein, 1989: 48)

Both social control theory and deviancy analysis have played a large part in sociological theorising in the debate over child abuse and the relationship between the state and the family, and, as I shall detail below, although both have made major contributions to the area, both also have the same major shortcoming: a failure to place the child as the central point of reference.

For the sake of clarity, this section shall be presented in the following sequence: how and from where the State claims a right to intervention in the lives of children, followed by a critique of sociological work relating to the child abuse and the state.

“In Western societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of power has always been formulated in terms of law.” (Foucault, 1978: 87)

In Australia, contemporary child protection authorities are legislated into existence. That is, each is formed by an Act of Parliament, has the general parameters of its responsibilities outlined in the Act, and is answerable to the courts for a many of these actions. Prior to Federation, each State in Australia had primary responsibility for child protection and child welfare services. Following Federation in 1901, this responsibility remained unchanged (Charlesworth, Turner and Foreman, 2000: 239) due to the separation of Commonwealth and State powers under the Commonwealth Constitution (Dessau, 1998: 15). The Supreme Court in each State and Territory was provided this authority by virtue of statute, further embedding this as a right of the courts (Dickey, 1990: 312). Additionally, “Subject to any overriding legislation, the Supreme Court of each state and Territory has jurisdiction to make orders and give directions... ”(Dickey, 1990: 311). Each state and territory now has children’s courts and agencies to implement its authority. Put simply, each state child protection authority is answerable to the children’s court, and the children’s court is answerable to the relevant state (or territory) supreme court. In other words, decisions made in the children’s court can, ultimately, be appealed to the Supreme Court in each state or territory.

The courts in Australia, and most other English-speaking countries that have derived the basis of their court system from Britain (eg. Australia, Canada, USA), draw their right to intervene on behalf of children from the same source: the notion of the state as the ‘parent’ of children (Jamrozik and Sweeney, 1996: 102), though, as we shall see below, the concept also relates to a much broader group of people. This concept of the ‘state as a parent’ to some members of the community is known as parens patriae, and dates back to the English Court of Chancery’s responsibility to exercise “…the

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74 Though there are other bodies in NSW to which the Department of Community Services is answerable: eg. the Minister and parliament, the NSW Ombudsman, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, the specific relationship and legislation relative to each is complex, does not detract from the Supreme Courts authority, and we need not be distracted here by further elucidation.

There are two major citations in relation to this concept, both of which are still referred to in matters appearing before Australian courts (as well as courts in the UK, USA and Canada);


and,

2. The *Coke Reports*, which represented the formalisation of English law as written by Sir Edward Coke (1552 to 1634) (Walker, 1980: 240)

In *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort* (1827), Wellesley, the father, requested children be removed from their aunts care and be placed with him. In refusing this request, Lord Eldon, then Lord Chancellor, determined that the courts right to intervene was an extension of *parens patriae*, and derived directly from the King’s right to intervene in matters relating to a person who was ‘mentally retarded’ (Bevan, 1973: 257). Examples of the use of both *Wellesley* cases being used as a key reference can be seen in ‘Local Authority (applicant), A Health Authority (First Respondent) and Ms A (Second Respondent), (2003)’76, the Family Law Courts response to ‘ALRC discussion paper 62’ (1999)77, Marion’s Case (High Court of Australia) (1992)78 and Eve V Eve (1986), Supreme Court, Prince Edward Island, Canada 79.

In his determination in *Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort*, Lord Eldon cited decisions by Lord Somers, *Lord Falkland V. Bertie* (1696) and Lord Macclesfield, *Eyre v. Countess Shaftsbury* (1722). In their decisions, both Lords referred to the principle of *parens patriae* and the

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75 Coke’s *Reports* were themselves based on the writings of Sir Thomas Littleton (1402-1481), who wrote the *Tenures* (1481). Coke’s work has been considered to be the first printed exposition on English law. (Walker, 1980: 772)

76 High Court Of Justice Family Division, Royal Courts Of Justice, England (Case No: Fd99c00286, Neutral Citation No: [2003] EWHC FAM 2746; Date: 27th November 2003; Between : A Local Authority (Applicant), A Health Authority (First Respondent) And Ms A (Second Respondent)

77 ‘Response of the Family Law Court of Australia to ALRC discussion paper 62 entitled Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, October 1999.’


79 Dickson C.J. and Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain and La Forest JJ. Supreme Court, Prince Edward Island, Canada. In a matter relating to a parent who wished to have her intellectually disabled daughter sterilised (E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388; 1986-10-23; Docket: 16654. URL: http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/sec/1986/1986osce57.html.

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history by which this concept was elucidated. Each derived their reasoning from an edition of Lord Coke's Reports, (known as Coke's Reports) published 1610 and referring to the Beverley case of Non Compos Mentis (1603).

In the Beverley case of Non Compos Mentis Sir Edward Coke ruled that a person who was not non compos mentis, "...could have no felonious intent and, therefore, could not be convicted of crime." (Whitlock, 1963: 13). Further determinations made in the case were that the Crown had the responsibility of parens patriae:

"in the case of an idiot or fool natural, for whom there is no expectation, but that he, during his life, will remain without discretion and use of reason, the law has given the custody of him, and all that he has, to the King" (emphasis added). Later at the bottom of the page he adds:

2. Although the stat. says, custodiam terrarum, yet the King shall have as well the custody of the body, and of their goods and chattels, as of the lands and other hereditaments, and as well those which he has by purchase, as those which he has as heirs by the common law.”

Eve v Eve, Supreme Court, Prince Edward Island, Canada. (Paragraph 40, 1986)

In each instance, children were considered to be a member of the group of persons for whom the Crown had parens patriae responsibilities.

The middle ages also saw the development of those elements that would give rise to existence of ‘the State’ (Cheyette, 1978), with the modern crystallisation being dated to 17th century France, and the ability of the state to effect ‘close control’ manifesting in the 19th century (Van Krieken, Smith, Habibis, McDonald, Haralambous, Holborn, 2000: 94). Not only does Foucault agree with the time frame of the development of ‘the state’ (1978: 86), but he also contends that the state rose up in opposition to the ‘dense, entangled and conflicting powers’ (1978: 86) then extant, presenting its institutions as

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81 Interestingly, at the time Coke wrote his Reports the language used for writing ‘learned works’ was ‘Law French’, which was "...abolished by statute from 1733.” (Walker, 1980: 725). Dickey (1990: 312) states that it is now argued that an error was made in translating an instance of the French ‘ideot’ – it was written as ‘enfant’. Thus it was determined that Coke was referring to children as well as ‘idiots’. As Dickey states, despite this inauspicious beginning, by the 19th Century, the notion that the Court of Chancery had the right to intervene was firmly established in law. (Dickey, 1990: 312)
“…agencies of regulation, arbitration, and demarcation; as a way of introducing order in the midst of these powers…” (1978: 86-87).

Thus we find the rationale for the Court, as an institution of the state, to identify its right to intervene in the lives of children and their families through the notion of *parens patriae*. By asserting a long established precedent in history, the court maintains and reinforces the notion of the state as the locus of order, stability and predictability, whilst simultaneously reinforcing its status in the network of power relations. This authority is thus embodied in the institutions which focus and assert the power of the state, such as child protection agencies.

To summarise 3, section 4.2, Van Krieken has argued that, for Australia at least, the events of the 19th to the mid-20th Century generated the main features of the contemporary child welfare system (van Krieken, 1992: 3). The rise of modernity brought not only breakthroughs in science and medicine, but also an obsession with order and regularity; the ‘gardener state’ (Bauman, 2000b: 76), seen in comments about the need to guarantee the future continuation of the Empire (Hyam, 1993: 275), to rescue the colony (NSW/Australia) from moral endangerment, and keep its children safe from ‘corrupting influences’ (Ramsland, 1986: 1, 3). This occurred in both Australia and Britain in the 19th and 20th centuries. A number of factors appear to have contributed to the growth of the states involvement in the lives of children during this period: the centralising of government; an increasing interest in child abuse by centralised and local government agencies, the proliferation of the mass media and a rise in the availability of medical services and improvements in their quality (Behlmer, 1982: 225). Each brought with it elements that proffered themselves to attempts to surveil and regulate the population; what Foucault termed bio-power (1978: 140-141). This has further been cemented by concurrent growth, in the 20th century, of the professions and professional involvement in the lives of children (Jamrozik and Sweeney, 1996: 205).

In relation to theoretical work on the state, Connell outlines four lines of argument:

Liberal Theory, in which the state is neutral and its practices can, in a sense, be hijacked by interest groups;
The state, “...mainly as an apparatus of regulation and soft domination.” Included in this group are Donzelot’s *The Policing of Families* (1980) and Michel Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* (1981), which Connell defines as ‘classics’. In this approach the discourse and discursive practices can operate seductively and are dispersed throughout society, both surrounding and manifesting the individual;

The state as class-based, in pursuit of dominant class interests.

Under this heading will also be elements of the arguments relating to notions of social control and the construction of deviance. The primary reasons for this are simplicity of approach by avoiding a reduction in the fragmentation of the section, and the creation of a collection of hierarchies and intersecting and interrelating cross-references.

The state as a fundamentally and essentially patriarchal institution.

(Connell, 1987: 127);

I will now outline the arguments within the literature that coalesces under each of the headings in the framework provided by Connell.

*Liberal Theory, in which the state is neutral and its practices can, in a sense, be hijacked by interest groups;*

As Parton states: "...debates about the nature of child abuse and what to do about it are at root not technical and professional but political" (1990: 7) and the effect of interest groups can be seen clearly in the public debates that emerge over how child abuse is problematised and dealt with. This usually becomes most prominent during proposed public policy or legislative changes and in response to well-known incidents (e.g. the U.K. Cleveland Child Abuse Enquiry, 1987, NSW Child Protection Council, 1991: 9).

The jockeying for position of the various interests latent (and at times overt) in the debate were clearly visible in NSW during 1995 when a debate over physical punishment of children took place in the media. At the time, Alan Corbett, a member of the NSW upper house, introduced a private members bill to ban physical punishment in all NSW
schools. The debate then expanded to cover the issue of parents using physical punishment (titled violence if directed against an adult). A review of the articles published in one newspaper, the Sydney Morning Herald, provides a clear picture of the discourse surrounding the issue. What emerges are notions of an adults right to 'lawfully correct' their children (but not another adult if they happen to be their wife - only 7% of adults polled supported this, as against more the more than 80% who supported hitting children) versus children's right to the same protection from violence as claimed by adults; the State-Family relationship; competition over funding and the creation of future anti-social behaviour in children. Also published were articles incorporating and discussing the 'Spare the rod, Spoil the child' form of argument, which is often claimed as a Biblical directive.

More recently, Scott and Swain (2002) have stated that the review committee which published the Carney Report in Victoria (1984), was heavily influenced by persons lacking child protection experience and who were “…very receptive to a sociological critique of child protection” (2002: 146). This ‘critique’ operated from a similar theoretical position as that used to analyse “…the criminal justice system and the mental health system.” (2002: 143) and thus perceived the existing Child Protections Service as formed within a middle-class bias and operating as an agent of social control, “…the welfare state was ‘the wolf in sheep’s clothing’…” (2002: 143). Thus those families around who concerns were held in relation to child abuse and/or neglect, and were caught-up in the Child Protection net, were victims of oppression and disadvantage and needed protection from the state. (2002: 143-144)

Another example, with great relevance today in light of the incarceration of the children of illegal migrants and the debate relating to their mental and physical health, occurred in 1995, when the Australian Federal Government considered taking action which

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82 In 1989, the NSW Liberal Government introduced legislation giving parents the authority to permit government schools the right to physical punish children (‘Children’s polly has got a voice - against a folly of ‘Christian’ righteousness’. Sally Loane, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 September 1995).
83 ‘Crowley rejects call to ban hitting of children’ (Margo Kingston, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 1995).
84 ‘The door slammed on child discipline debate’ (Adele Horin, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 1995).
85 ‘Punishment ban smacks of good sense’ (Adele Horin, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 May 1995).
86 ‘Crowley rejects call to ban hitting of children’ (Margo Kingston, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 1995).
87 ‘Children’s polly has got a voice - against a folly of ‘Christian’ righteousness’ (Sally Loane, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 September 1995).
would have disallowed the High Court from referring to the United Nations International Convention on the Rights of the Child in appeals relating to immigration matters. This followed a successful appeal in the High Court, overturning a Federal Immigration Department deportation order. At the same time, the Government was developing a national policy to respond to the issue of the abuse of children. The debate, which dissipated and was never concluded, polarised around the adoption of one of two models: the Scottish, allowing children to be physically punished (as long as no objects are used and the punishment leaves no lasting marks); and the Scandinavian, forbidding physical punishment and providing for the imposition of criminal sanctions on parents who break the law (Adele Horin, Sydney Morning Herald 6 May 1995).

In terms of the construction and deployment of notions of child abuse, such a hypothesis would appear to indicate that this dominant group, or vested interest, is itself the creator of deployed definitions of child abuse. However, a critical analysis of how such an approach posits the state also illuminates the inaccuracy of this position. Whilst the notion that the state as somehow a neutral body, which falls under the sway of interest groups, has some overt commonsense in light of the above, it fails to provide an argument that coherently shows how the state exists without these interest groups, and infers that the state is somehow separate from society, rather than part of it.

Foucault’s contention would be that the state is the salient point of a nexus of powers, relationships and intersecting forces. This theme is taken up by Rose and Miller (1992: 1) who state, that the ability of the state to ‘rule’ is dependent upon a collection of competing forces and discourses that impinge on the operation of the state. Any action by the state is both affected and effected by complex combinations of organisations, both state and non-state, alliances and interests and therefore rarely free from influence – its very actions are the production of a collection of forces and influences. Therefore it is not a matter of the state being hijacked per se, but the state being continually composed and recomposed by these same forces, along with state agencies which are themselves, "...produced and constantly re-produced within a framework of broader social structures and processes..." (van Krieken, 1992: 31). The result being what Grosz (drawing upon the work of Foucault) would describe as a nexus of power with "...non-complete, non-

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88 “He that spareth the rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes” (Proverb 13:24; King James Bible). Usually paraphrased as 'Spare the Rod, Spoil the Child', the fact this is a metaphor appears to have evaded many of the readers of Proverbs.
hegemonic domination" (990: 86). This domination is not complete for, "Where there is
power, there is resistance…” (Foucault, 1981: 95).

Therefore is not accurate to put the state as the central actor. "...the state is not a thing
which thinks and acts..." (van Krieken, 1992: 7), nor is it accurate to represent the state,
or its power, as neutral and independent of society, something to be held or held from,
by those with ‘vested interests’ being seen as the sole creators and definers of what state
agencies define as child abuse.

The state, “…mainly as an apparatus of regulation and soft domination.”

One of the operational premises of Foucault work was a belief that an excessive amount
of time had been spent on analysing the operations of State institutions (Foucault,
1980). This was not to say that such analyses were not important, or that state power
was ineffective or insignificant, rather that the result left the impression that these were
the only sources of power, the only means by which the hegemony of particular
ideological positions was maintained. Thus the impression left was that there where
positions which were ‘evidently’ ideologically-based (read - as in support of the
‘patriarchy’ and ‘masculine’ values) and others which were true or more humane. Over-
focusing on such approaches meant that other mechanisms of the operation of power
were being ignored, if acknowledged at all (Foucault, 1980: 72-73).

Foucault also felt that many theorists proposed power as something restrictive,
prohibitive and destructive. The argument that we would be free when we had
overcome or routed the people with power, or changed the dominant ideology was
misleading. No position could be free from the operation of power, for the operation of
power was a constructive mechanism and created the very tools and ideas we would use
to be free (1977a). In this sense Foucault believed that Feminist and Marxist notions
that we could achieve a state were we would be free from relationships in which power
was a component, were a utopian, theoretical and practical fallacy.

"We must cease one and for all to describe the effects of power in negative
terms...power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of subjects and
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him
belong to his production” (Foucault, 1977a: 194).
Therefore, if we talk of power in terms of repression, restriction and limitations, we are unable to describe the manufacture of anything beyond what already exists. A mechanism of power in which there is no creativity, which operates only through the ability to refuse, is "…doomed only to repeat itself" (Foucault, 1977a: 85).

In turning to what had originally symbolised the sovereign’s power, Foucault notes that the power of death was replaced by the 18th Century institutions and disciplines of organisation and supervision, of the mechanisms of control (1981: 140). This period saw a change in the scale of control; a new microphysics of power emerged. Instead of treating all persons as one, en masse, there developed an interest in identifying the individual, gaining control at the level of the body, singular. (Foucault, 1977a: 136-7)

Influencing not only the body to perform tasks desire but to gain a hold at the level of its gestures, the movement it performs, its attitude and with this, the economy of the movements, the speed, the sequence of actions followed in the performance and the very accuracy of its adherence to these disciplines - for it is these mechanisms of control that Foucault calls 'Disciplines'. Institutions began to implement the power of recording, of the production of data to enable comparisons across time (Foucault, 1977a: 191).

Surveillance allows the creation of knowledge about skills acquisition and task development. It was seen that acquisition of task was learnt more economically and speedily through a series of gradually more complicated exercises. Ability would slowly develop through a series of these exercises. This allowed power to be "…articulated directly on to time…" (Foucault, 1977a: 160). Thus state agencies are able to track, assess and ‘performance test’ the children, families and parents subject to intervention.

Whilst all social welfare professions (eg. psychology) utilise approaches which draw on research and theory, for Foucault the theory underlying the methodologies employed are all subject to the vagary of dynamics of power:

"…power is comprised of instruments for the formation and recording of knowledge (registers and archives), methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation, apparatuses of control…"

(McHoul and Grace, 1993: 22)

They construct “…the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. “(Foucault, 1977b: 199)
Foucault coined the term 'Bio-power' (1981: 141) to represent the interpolation of techniques and mechanisms of power into all group social relationships. Bio-power is represented by the disciplines of the body and the regulation of the population - the organisation of power over life (McHoul and Grace, 1993) and assists with the administration of social life. To achieve this, the measures are established by which it is possible to identify the "norms" as this provides the means (both statistically and literally) against which the masses can be measured. By 'demassifying' the population (i.e. by creating the ability to view a group as sub-groups and/or individuals), information is gathered which identifies and solidifies the techniques required to impress greater degrees of constructive power and to create more subtle and intimate mechanisms of this constructive, discursive power.

This was a representation of the notion of power unlike that identified by Hobbe, Locke and Mill (i.e. power as a social and legal right established through social contract), and that identified by Marxist's i.e. it is a property or right exerted by one class over another. (Grosz, 1990: 87) Thus, unlike Marxists, in Foucauldian terms, power is evident in all relations. Its activities are not purely macro-social, they are also evident in the operation of a 'micro-physics' of discourse. (1977a)

In Foucault's world, domination is not blatant, but rather is far more subtle and indirect - a view which "...can be seen as an elaborate expansion of Weber's idea of the modern world as an 'iron cage' for the soul of the modern individual." (Hughes, Martin and Sharrock, 1995: 217) Foucault's notion of power was also something that operated more effectively when it was located within 'truth' and 'knowledge', rather than ideology and falsehood. In other words, when it was believed that information and actions were considered to be based on something that was a fact or the truth, power was more dangerous and entrenched. This made it more intransigent to change and alteration and provides those who perform its concurrent actions, and the actions themselves, a greater degree of legitimacy.

It is here that we find what most closely approximates more general notions of the state and its operation. Bio-power provides state institutions the opportunity to classify, analyse and categorise children, families and parents, to scale and score them against pre-developed tools of assessment, policy determinations and discursively produced 'professional' value systems; often using what Foucault termed the 'dubious sciences' (eg. Psychiatry) (1980: 109). In this manner, the operation of power, through state child
protection agencies, creates, as Connell neatly states, “…an apparatus of regulation and soft domination” (1987: 127).

As this thesis already contains a critical analysis of the contribution of Foucault’s work to the debate on the construction of child abuse definitions (see Chapter 4, section 3) the following is a brief reiteration of the criticism already made of his contribution to notions how notions of child abuse are constructed.

The focus of this regulatory and ‘soft domination’ apparatus was, most specifically, the very concept of the self; the creation, delineation, inscribing of the self and self-knowledge. The operation of the power/knowledge nexus meant that even the body of ‘man’ (sic) was not capable of providing a reference point for ‘self-recognition’ or the understanding of others (Foucault, 1971: 87-88). In this, Foucault was describing a passive, inarticulate body, created and trapped within a web of discursive forces (Discipline and Punish, 1977a). However, as Bell states (1993: 51 citing Butler, 1990a), Foucault’s later work, specifically The History of Sexuality (1978), appeared to show a reassessment of his previous position of the body as passive, though this was never expanded upon.

By presenting the body as passive and lacking substance, Foucault’s work lends itself to a definition of abuse as purely the result of the intersection of various discursive positions. A body produced within discourse is, in a sense, amenable and available to any form of relationship and experience. This neatly parallels notions of abuse as a cultural construct (discussed in Chapter 5, section 1). It is this very point in the fabric of Foucault’s work that lays itself open to analysis in terms of child abuse definitions. This notion of a passive body, lacking corporeality, has been subject to criticism from a number others (eg. Vikki Kirby, 1991; Shilling, 1991: 664; Bell, 1993; McNay, 1992; Grosz, 1990; Turner, 1984: 49). The body as presented by Foucault lacks any ‘presence’ and fails to meet the obviousness of statements that we all find ourselves in possession of a body (Kirby, 1991: 88) and that "All behaviour requires a body"(Oyama, 1991: 30). Once it is accepted that the body is both ‘natural and cultural’ (Turner, 1984: 49), definitions of child abuse utilising purely cultural and social construct theory become problematic as they lack acknowledgement of the literal, visceral corporeality and physiology of human children.
As van Krieken (1992) and Connell (1987) state, Donzelot’s *Policing of the Family* (1980) has had considerable influence on the sociological literature on the relationship between the family and the state, and in his book acknowledges an intellectual debt to Foucault, and Deleuze, stating his position as part of, “…a team formed on the periphery of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze” (Donzelot, 1980: xxv).

Drawing on Foucault’s work, Donzelot identifies child welfare/protection agencies as only one of a collection of means by which the working class families were reformed; there was no single ‘agent’ and the mechanisms of this change were internalised by the subjects upon whom change was focused (Scott and Swain, 2002: 8). The activities of the social worker and other professionals, though employed in various institutions and agencies, are bound together by a common “…sphere of intervention, which follows the contours of the “less-favored” [sic] classes…” (Donzelot, 1980: 96); the focus of attention being children in danger and dangerous children. Utilising the knowledge available to it to supervise the ‘climate’ of the family, this intervention sets itself between the family and the arm of the law, hoping to prevent “…the drama of police action…” by instilling change and cooperation. Despite this intended hope, Donzelot claims that this ability to incite police action, if deemed necessary by the professionals, makes gratuitous any claims that they are not to be seen as other than another form of oppression and social control (Donzelot, 1980: 98).

It is therefore not surprising when Donzelot proposes that what is termed philanthropy aimed at the poor, is actually a means by which “…to diminish the social cost of their reproduction and obtain an optimum number of workers at the minimum public expense…” (Donzelot, 1980: 16) whilst simultaneously allowing for the “…destruction of the family as an island of resistance…” (Donzelot, 1980: 94). In this way, the duel outcome of overcoming family resistance and socialising its member could be achieved without generating a return to “…the old forms of dependence or organic solidarity…” (Donzelot, 1980: 94-5).

The workers of agencies involved in the family are supported by a range of mutually intersecting skills and knowledges (eg. education, health, family support). This intersection forms what Donzelot terms ‘the tutelary complex’ (1980: 96-168), and provides the mechanism by which professionals develop a form of ‘tactical collusion’ with the family, and most specifically the mother, in which their related concerns achieve a form of convergence; this makes cooperation mutually beneficial. The families
concerns related to those who bring them into disrepute: eg. rebellious teenagers and ‘women of ill repute’, and other working class persons of lower status; the states concern was the waste of a state resource (Donzelot, 1980: 25). As an example, he talks about the introduction of places of imprisonment (eg. reformatories) which the state developed where children could be put whom either the state and/or family (generally the poor) believed were in need of ‘correction’. In comparison to this, the middle-classes would use convents or psychiatric facilities for the same purpose (Donzelot, 1980: 86-7).

Similarly, van Krieken (Donzelot (1980), along with Davis, (1984); Katz (1978) and Philips (1977) (cited in van Krieken), argues that the working class often used the courts and the legal system as a means to control their own children. Therefore far from it being the put upon and downtrodden merely having their children removed from them, "...'parents themselves provided the largest source of commitments to reform school' (Katz, 1978: 14, cited in van Krieken, 1992: 27.)

Provision for such a request existed in the NSW Child Welfare Act (1939), wherein parents could make an application to the court that their child was uncontrollable and seek that they be remanded in custody[^9]. Though this terminology was not included in the Children (Care and Protection) Act (1987), parents could still approach the court with the complaint their relationship with their child had ‘broken down and was irretrievable’. The current NSW legislation, Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act (1998), does not provide for parents to approach the court for an order (other than on appeal).

For Donzelot this tactical implementation of these educative and supervisory interventions has a strategic aim, “…replacing the coercion of bodies with control over relations” (Donzelot 1980: 145), and thereby instilling self-regulation and moralisation. This creates the family, “…as a relay of different and varied forms of power” (Kendall, Collins and Michael, 1997: 22). The motivation for which has essentially been to assert control over the dangers posed by working class families. By making surveillance part of

[^9]: In the mid 1980s, parents of a teenager came to the child protection office I worked in. They requested their son be placed in a remand centre; to teach him a lesson for running away and involving himself with ‘the undesirables roaming the street’ who were involved in criminal activity. When I informed them that by placing him in a remand centre they would be forcing him to associate with the very same people – only this time it would be for 24 hours a day, every day – they left in disgust.
the provision of assistance, the family is caught up in the state’s system of power (Thomas, 2000: 53-4).

This conception of the primary interest being social control is disputed by Thomas (2000), who argues that this diminishes the multiplicity of those involved in trying to improve the lot of children. As an example he cites the work of Steedman (1986) which showed how state-delivered welfare provided some children with a sense of being valued and having “…a right to exist…” (Thomas, 2000: 54).

It is this juncture that opens up how the notion of child abuse would be framed within this approach. Simply put, it would be one that was considered as a tool or mechanism to further justify intervention, supervision and (re)education by the professionals of the state. For example, when introducing his notion of ‘tutelage’, Donzelot argues that the rights of the family are undermined and diminished, that the family is ‘stripped of its rights’ (1980: xxi). It is important to note here that he is positioning children as equal members of ‘the family’, with shared or similar interests, needs and demands and identifying the children’s social position with that of their parents; curiously shadowing Taclott Parsons view of children sharing the status of their parents (1948: 269). Thus, in addition to sharing much of the same criticism as that made of Foucault, the form of child abuse definitions that would be produced by applying Donzelot’s thesis would not address the issue as argued in this thesis – that of consideration of the body as a biological phenomenon and of the possibility of negative experience/abuse - but would focus more on the relationships of power, the purpose (in terms of the state/family relationship) and how such a notion was focused and brought to bear.

*The state as class-based, in pursuit of dominant class interests;*

“The effects of the working of the capitalist system and of maintaining it are seen in all the social and economic pressures on people to conform to social expectations of normality” Sargent, 1994: 359).

It is this very form of social analysis that caused Scott and Swain to write, in what appears to be a state of frustration, that some critics claimed “…child saving derived
from the middle-class desire to control the ‘dangerous and perishing classes’…” (Scott and Swain, 2002: 7)

Prior to the 60s, analysis of child welfare was primarily along the lines of progress and positive notions of state intervention. The 70's saw a critical approach to the state with a focus on 'relations of power' and the 'capitalist patriarchal society' (van Krieken, 1992: 16).

Platt's *The Child Savers* (1969; second edition 1977) is cited by van Krieken (1992) as a turning point in the literature. Platt identified child welfare as a middle-class activity aimed at controlling 'the dangerous classes and expanding the influence of the middle-class. Along with Platt, van Krieken identifies Christopher Lasch as another who placed the middle class and 'the professions' in the position of attempting to control and re-socialise the working class (van Krieken, 1992:18). In fact, Lasch’s concept of the family was of being at the mercy of "...both their children and the army of social pathologists at their door" (van Krieken, 1992: 19).

By focusing on the less wealthy and those whose lifestyles and characteristics are presented as peripheral or problematic, the relatively powerless becoming the focus of research and the subject of instituted mechanisms of social control (Mason, 1993; Parton, 1990). As Foucault and Donzelot (see above) have argued, the greater the knowledge of the subject group/s, the greater the ability to institute and apply disciplinary measures. Thus the poor, as parents, are seen as causal factors of child abuse, rather than their circumstances being correlational. If the problem is that of an individual, then we do not need to address poverty. If the problem is the poor, then we can address the individual poor. This focus on the individual (even if within an identified group) refutes the alternate argument that: "...by addressing the concrete poverty-related needs of the families in these cases, we can avert a significant percentage of child placements" (Pelton, 1981: 20-21).

In discussing the analysis of social policies, Jones (1996) identifies three perspectives to consider: what political compromises are permitted in relation to the class the state wishes to control; the forms of control, and the intensity of application, that are utilised and to create the required outcome and the third is “…how the family and other social institutions enforce controls on members’ behaviour” (Jones, 1996: 58).
Social policies, and their implementation, that focus on the 'not us/me' allow 'the other' to be identified as the 'problem carrier'. Classic deviancy construction allows a small group to carry the burden of the problem and to become the focus of attention for its resolution. The application of deviancy analysis has permitted the exposure of 'the deviancy of the private' in child abuse research (Nelson, 1984). Correlates and causal factors are merged and blurred. Poverty then becomes an element of the individual's failings and a causal rather than correlational vector. In this, the individual becomes the focus of attempts to resolve the problem. The problem is within them, not their circumstance, and is therefore not within the grasp of structural change, thus obviating the need for change in social structures.

It is this blurring of correlation and causal which allows the persistence of seemingly contrary, though mutually supportive arguments surrounding poverty and child abuse:

"Politicians, for their part, have been amenable to the myths of classlessness because it serves certain functions for them. Both professional and politician, each for his own reason, are disinclined to see the problems as poverty related - the former to increase his chances to gain funding for a medical-model approach, the latter to increase his own chances of a bill passed and thus appearing to be aggressively dealing with the phenomenon of child "battering" which the public already perceives as a "sickness"." (Pelton, 1981: 32)

Rather cuttingly and cynically, though effectively outlining her thesis, Nelson wrote that for many: "The problem of child abuse did not seem important, the opportunity to be on the 'side of the angels' did" (Nelson, 1984: 76). Additionally, by defining intervention as ‘help’, management of those that threaten the dominant ideology is legitimised (Sargent, 1994: 359) and maintenance of the status quo is achieved, if only for a short while (Nelson, 1984: 18).

By critiquing class-based notions of abuse, feminist theory (as seen in the following section) and social deviancy theory have shown a willingness to challenge the sacredness of family relationships, thus more critically exposing aspects of adult-child relations (Gordon, 1990: xv), and in so doing, pursuing the exposure of two approaches to child abuse: the construction of the individual abuser as the sole element of the equation and
the creation of a group of persons with whom this person can be identified and towards whom all necessary action can be taken.

The effect of class and racial bias are no more clearly identified than in William Ryan's classic *Blaming the Victim* (1972). In the chapter 'Mammy observed: Fixing the Negro Family' (1972: 63-89), Ryan outlines how the 'Negro Family' became the cause of the social problems faced by black families in the United States and the vested interests this served: white liberals (as US Americans call them). *The Moynihan Report*, 1965, showed how:

"...the "Negro family" was destroyed by the villainous slavemaster and that subsequent generation of Negroes have learned (from their fat, doughty mammies and a succession of shifty, irresponsible pappies) precisely how to have a disorganized family..." (Ryan, 1972: 71. Original Italics)

In short, whites plead guilty to abuse in the past: "...in order to escape trial for the crimes of today" (Ryan, 1972: 73) and shift the blame to the present generation. This allowed (and still does) whites to see the past (slave masters and slavery) as the sole causal factor of the present - thereby eliminating present responsibility - and the 'Negro family' as the perpetuating vector in black inequality. This mechanism defines those who are marked as deviant as responsible for their own deviancy, and therefore legitimizes state intervention as a means to help raise up the unfortunate from a sorrow of their own making. Rejection of this discourse and its attendant pursuit and oppression of the subject individual/family/group/class, forms part of contemporary criticism of constructs of child abuse in which professionals are considered to have often:

"...constructed parenthood in ways that omit many mothers, particularly those who are black, working class and single, making them more liable to state intervention." (Mason, 1993: 16-17)

Consequently this form of analysis has lead some to claim that, "In other words there is no objective behaviour we can automatically recognise as child abuse..." (Gelles, 1975: 40).[^1]

[^1]: Gelles does not say that any form of behaviour directed towards children is acceptable, rather that the more extreme forms (such as torture and murder, which he considers abuse) are in the minority.
As we have seen above, deviancy analysis has provided valuable assistance in identifying the mechanism by which some in society are marginalised, and there are often good arguments for the deployment of this methodology in a great number of areas in sociological study, such as the identification of means of control and the imposition of various morally, religiously, class-based definitions and management of social issues.

Yet for all this, the sociological predilection for utilising a 'sociology-of-deviance' approach to child abuse has produced a lack of appreciation of the effect on the child. Some writers have acknowledged the assumptions of their own work and denounced their previous positions, arguing that when attempting to utilise social deviancy methodology to address domestic violence and child sexual assault, the feminist challenge results in a theoretical nightmare (Parton, 1990). What can often occur through radical deviancy analysis, and requires considerable effort to avoid, is the submergence of concerns of the effect of child abuse. Its persistent focus and utilisation in areas that were considered 'victim-free' meant that "...when it was recognised that there may be victims, the harm was minimised" (Parton, 1990: 11). In the field of child abuse, the sociology of deviancy:

"...became an advocate for the indefensible: the criminal became the victim, the state became the solitary focus of attention, while the real victim remained off stage." (Parton, 1990: 10, citing Mathews, Roger and Young, 1986)

The state as a fundamentally and essentially patriarchal institution.

“Power in the state is strategic because there is more at issue than a simple distribution of benefits. The state has a constitutive role in forming and re-forming social patterns.” (Connell, 1987: 130)

Segal states that “Patriarchy’ has been defined in a variety of ways within different feminist frameworks and discourses…” (Segal, 1987: 49). Therefore, for the purposes of this section of the thesis, the notion of patriarchy used will be taken from one identified by Hearn (1997) in which patriarchy is a form of domination, for the overall benefit of men, through cultural, as well as economic and political structures. In a more complex
form, Walby identifies six domains as the means by which a gender regime is formed, “…employment, household work, state, violence, sexuality and culture…” (2002: 23 citing her work of 1990, 1997, 2002).

Thus, if, to extend the initiating argument of this part, we accept that the state is fundamentally patriarchal, then this must extend to the operation of its agencies and authorities. In this sense, child welfare and child protection authorities acting with the legal authority of the state would be influenced by, or imbued with, policies and practices that reinforce patriarchal notions and relationships.

“…the concept of women’s responsibility for coping with nurturing involved the attribution to them of culpability in parenting.” (Mason, 1993: 29)

An example of this responsibility can be seen in Ryan’s discussion of a campaign about lead poisoning and the deleterious effects it can have on children:

"Now, no one would argue against the idea that it is important to spread knowledge about the danger of eating paint in order that parents might act to forestall their children from doing so." (Ryan, 1972: 23)

The rider to this being that the advertisement campaign also implied that mothers were 'neglectful and thoughtless' if they did not adequately supervise their children against this danger. The father, whom one assumes is absent at work, cannot be the focus, as the mother ('logically' as she is not at work) has the care of the children.

Dinnerstein has argued that the devalued position of women (and from this, we can extend to those activities identified as forming the role of women) is related directly being seen to have primary responsibility for the care of children (Connell, 1987: 35; Dixson, 1986: 16). This has been reiterated by Mason (1993: 29). As a consequence, though early theorising about child abuse, child protection proponents tended to ‘sanctify’ the family, seeing abuse as dysfunction within the family, within which family members were complicit, the focus of attention became the mother (Jenks, 1982: 94-95). This focusing on the mother operated to reinforce women’s responsibility for the care of children and thereby support patriarchal notions of the family (Stunstill, 1997: 43).
Examples of this can be seen in the case of child sexual assault, where claims of the mother’s responsibility for the sexual assault of their children range from their refusal of a sexual relationship with the father (Bell, 1993: 84; Jenks, 1982: 94) and of being described by professionals as incompetent and spiteful if not outright collusive (Bell, 1993: 83-6, for which she provides an unfortunately long list of examples).

It is this emphasis on the responsibility of mothers for the care and abuse of their children that highlights the patriarchal nature of state intervention. As Gilding states, the mother has frequently been the focus of professionals intervening in the care of children (1997: 214-5). Donzelot comments on this in his notion of the tutelary complex (1980: 96-168), in which the mother is drawn into an alliance or ‘tactical collusion’ with the intervening professionals.

Others have also noted that despite the father being the party responsible for the abuse of children, mothers have been the focus of intervention (Farmer and Owen, 1998). Lang (2003: 3, citing Stark & Flitcraft 1988 and Thorpe 1996) states this is the case even when the violence to the children is in the context of violence towards the mother. This blaming mothers, is paralleled with state agency failure to adequately deal with the adult male perpetrator (Tomison, 2000, citing Farmer & Owen 1995; Burke 1999; Tomison 1999)

A recent Australian example is the study completed by D’Cruz (2002), based on the activities of child protection workers in a state agency. D’Cruz comments that mother’s are often seen as ‘equal partner’ and therefore of equal responsibility when their partner is violent, abusive or neglectful. However, in one particular instance, though the mother was seen as failing adequately protect her child, the father, by laying claim to being a ‘concerned parent’, was able to minimise his responsibility (D’Cruz, 2002: 3.10 to 3.13).

Despite this, with the obvious exception of literature concerning child sexual abuse, sociological writing shows little focus on what child abuse means to the abused, in marked contrast to the literature on domestic violence and disempowerment through sexism, racism, economic exploitation and class bias in which overt concern is expressed for the experience of the adults affected.

However, in juxtaposing ‘male’ with ‘violence/aggression’, the experiences of others are denied (D’Cruz, 2000: 2.16).
It is on these grounds that Parton (1990) takes Julie Burchell (1986) to task for discussing child abuse as though it referred to only child sexual assault, (the absolute majority of which is carried out by males) to the exclusion of other forms of abuse. Another example is Lobel's *Naming the Violence* (1986), which covers the existence of violence in lesbian relationships. One of the main issues she raises is the disinclination of members of the Lesbian community to acknowledge the violence for what it is, and the promotion of this attitude by research which focuses almost exclusively on domestic violence committed by straight men. By the overt and covert reading of 'perpetrator' as 'male' and 'victim' as 'female', the experiences of both lesbian and gay males are denied. This highlights the importance of acknowledging the bias of theoretical premises and de-linking the juxtaposition of 'male' and 'violence' and ultimately 'female' and 'nurturer'.

Of course there are issues of gender within child abuse, but to focus on the abuse of children by one group detracts from the adult-vs-child dynamic that is the experience of the great majority of abused children. ie. most abused children are abused by adults. Children and women are not the same, though many feminist writers often conflate the two; taking the position, when discussing child protection, that it is 'women-and-children' who require protection from men:

"When feminists lay claims to rights over their own bodies, one often has the impression that this entails absolute rights over the products of their bodies - their children." (Parton, 1990: 17 citing Judith Ennew, 1986)

Often what occurs is a sidelining, marginalising or plain ignoring, of the abuse of children by women and the complicity of women in male abuse of children, thus conveniently making this issue disappear, which avoids the necessity of the painful exploration of abuse by the 'gentler sex' (!!). The very issue raised in 'Naming the Violence' (Lobel, 1986). More significantly, it allows one not to consider that, "If women do 'develop their own power and autonomy' it does not necessarily follow that children will automatically do the same" (Parton, 1990: 17 citing Judith Ennew, 1986).

Unfortunately, whilst feminist analysis of power and gender inequity provides clear theoretical explanations for male violence, it falls far short of explaining female violence and sexual assault, beyond the extraordinarily limp and slip-shod throw-away that it is a result of oppression. The same argument could be proposed that males are socially
constructed and, therefore, created within an environment of oppression. It is both
simplistic and shallow if we are left with a model that explains female violence as the
result of oppression, powerlessness and 'legitimate' frustration, whereas male violence is
the result of choice and male desire to oppression and control. This equates all too well
with the simplistic and biologistic notion of 'female good - male bad'.

Notions of child abuse which are framed within notions of patriarchal violence, or the
prerequisite of emancipation and liberation for another adult, do not address the
argument that children ought to remain the central issue in notions of child abuse. Child
abuse will not cease either as the result of de-patriarchalisation or because women are
empowered.

**Conclusion**

In contrast to the emphasis on how psychological and legal definitions of abuse are
determined, within the field of sociology notions of abuse are usually implicit within
research surrounding theories of violence, aggression, pain and power, rather than
explicit as central concerns.

Thomas (2000: 54 – details on 211), in an endnote worthy of greater prominence,
reports that:

“…a recent comprehensive overview of policies toward children and families,
numbering twenty contributors and four hundred pages, failed to mention
children’s rights, children’s views, or anything that recognises children’s
subjectivity; Zigler, Kagan and Hall (1996).”

Despite the breadth and range of writing on the relationship between the state and the
family, children have been rarely seen as other than objects, problems, or property
subject to the rights of parents (again, read: adults).

As argued, there are vested interests involved in the positions held in the debate on
child abuse (Pelton, 1981). For example, identifying the problem as being within the
individual provides support to the American thesis of an individualistic approach to
solving problems (Van Krieken et al, 2000: 440; Nelson, 1984). This develops a theme
of social deviancy; orienting the focus of concern on to the individuals caught in the
gaze of the authorities, media and public.
"The term social problem indicates not merely an observed phenomenon but the state of mind of the observer as well. Value judgments define conditions of human life and certain kinds of behaviour as social problems; there can be no social problem without a value judgement." (Waller, 1936: 922)

Problematically, in the last two decades many writers are still analysing child abuse and neglect from the position of the family and the impact of intervention on the family and/or the rights of women. This is not something that many of them would consider if they were asked to discuss the rights of women in relationship to men, but is clear in relation to children:

"How these definitions are made ultimately determines the nature of the relationship between the state and the institution of the family, and that relationship in turn, is the cornerstone of the social organisation of the whole society, the expression of its most basic social values." (Giovannoni and Becerria, 1982: 3)

The position of the authors is quite clear. The relationship of the family to the state creates the social structure. The family is the fundamental component of social dynamics, powering the engine of society and the structures that exist. At stake in the debate is "...the welfare of the future generations and...the viability and integrity of the most fundamental social institution, the family" (Giovannoni and Becerria, 1982: 3). This highlights the highly emotive tone of the discussion, whilst simultaneously placing the authors squarely in the camp of Parsons and other structuralists. Children are thereby tied into the debate on contemporary morals, the collapse of support for the family and the modern day 'do-gooders' attempts to undermine the rights of the family. Encroachment on the families socially proscribed rights, such as family freedom from interference and right to autonomy constitutes "...an assault on the social institution of the family" (Giovannoni and Becerria, 1982: 3).

Children’s rights are often perceived as an abrogation or unwarranted impingments on adults rights. An example of an extension of this theme is found in Swift’s book, Manufacturing 'Bad Mothers'.
"The rights approach pits mothers and children against each other in a scramble for scarce resources, and the ultimate effect is the destruction of many families."
(Swift, 1995: 193)

Why, one asks, are a child's rights not separate and individual, rather than contingent on their parents, and why should they be considered as much more destructive and dangerous than rights claimed by adults?

Critical analysis is required of this dyadic approach, one in which child/mother child/father underpinning is more closely elucidated. This dyad approximates that of the State/Family intersection. One can see this again in a comment during a presentation by Dr Kari Killen, which is worth citing in full:

"There was some controversy at the seminar about Dr Killen's statements on the potential for certain people to be successful parents, especially those with a severe psychiatric or developmental disability. In response to heated criticism from the floor that this was contrary to principles of human rights, Dr Killen countered that she was 'not talking about people's rights to have kids but kid's rights to be protected.'" (Kilpatrick and Rinaudo, 1995: 12)

The issue here for the protagonist/s 'from the floor' is not 'Is this harmful to the child?' but 'Are these peoples (read: adults) rights being denied?'

Parton (1990) contends that the notional focus of the construction of deviancy, the development of a moral panic, the relationship of poverty, powerlessness and disadvantage to the production of crime, helps explain the factors which shape the incidences described as crime and is similarly applied to notions of what forms child abuse. It is this form of analysis which also results in a shearing away of the explainable and explicable from the inexplicable. Why do members of affluent, socio-economically powerful families abuse their children? Why don't more members of less powerful, less affluent families abuse their children? This focus, however, still fails to address the impact upon the child of what we are terming abuse.

Whilst working at the Boston Children's Hospital, Eli Newberger decided that the 'Battered Child Syndrome' type of diagnostic entry was inaccurate, instead preferring to see it "...as an illness, with or without inflicted injury, stemming from situations in his (sic) home setting which threatened a child's survival"(Newberger, 1979: 15). The
parents intention was not usually the death of their child, but usually represented their 'inability to nurture their child', which could result from the environment and circumstances the parent found themselves in (Newberger, 1979: 15). The focus here is more on the child's needs and the parent's capacity to meet these needs; a definition of abuse which is concerned with what the child needs, rather than ignoring this. To:

"...deprive children of equal rights or liberties, and/or interfere with their optimal development constitutes by definition, abusive or neglected acts or conditions." (Gil, 1975: 348)

Therefore, any behaviour of omission or commission, cultural, structural or individual, which acts to do deprive or interfere, constitutes an abusive or detrimental circumstance for the child. To paraphrase Bourne, 'In order to have abuse, parents must be failing to meet their child-rearing responsibility' (Bourne, 1979: 4). The issue generally hinges on, but is not exclusively mitigated by, concepts of the ability of the parents to control their surroundings and their resources sufficiently. It is also contextualised, all other circumstance being equal, by the ability of the parent to meet their child's social, emotional, physical and psychological needs. "The issue of control is complex, however, for there might be "neglect" even if the family were doing everything possible to fulfil a child's needs"(Bourne, 1979: 4).

It is important to acknowledge cultural elements, socio-economic, gender and social oppression when developing notions of child abuse. However, at one end:

"...extreme cultural relativism, with all judgements of human treatment of children suspended in an air of cultural sensitivity, would be counter productive to prompting the well-being of the world's children."(Korbin, 1991: 6)

Thus, the application of deviancy theory does not present a morally liberated position. Rather, what occurs is the occlusion of notions of rights for children; rights that we allow adults. One has to question whose interests would be being served by occluding these rights?; in whose best interests are these competitions for the right to strike children?; for the legitimacy to claim children as a right? Who benefits when children's rights are subsumed under rights accepted for adults? Whose benefit is met when children's needs and rights are not components of definitions of child abuse? Deviancy
analysis operates to hide adult-centric political aims in much of the work on defining and critiquing definitions of child abuse. This is a major paradox for a model of analysis that prides itself on uncovering such hidden aims.

It may not, therefore, be as simple as saying that:

"In western societies children are considered as potential citizens with rights and duties, but deserving special protection because of their vulnerability." (Jones, Pickett, Oates and Barbor, 1987: 9)

As the legal and philosophical arguments and questions of 'children's rights - parents' rights, when should which dominate?' are difficult to unravel. So much is embedded in 'ancient rights and customs' that:

"Gradually we find ourselves trying to cope with the full range of human life and tragedy. We find we cannot stay with our own narrow fields, but must become involved to some degree with genetics, anthropology, ethology, sociology, history, the law and even politics." (Steele, 1977: 4)

This said, a more satisfactory and accurate interpretation of child abuse would be one in which children and their needs are placed first in the definition, as opposed to not considering children at all, or positioning their rights as an abrogation of an adults rights. In the same way that Foucault's work on sexuality as a modern presence fails to address the "...object of the strategies of control" (Connell, 1987: 148), the argument as to how child abuse definitions are formed seems to have overlooked who children are and what they feel. If "The crucial moment in the social dynamic of politics is the constitution of interests" (Connell, 1987: 262), then what happens when children's interests are focused and defined and thus constituted? Where does this leave child abuse research which focuses on the experiences and views of adults to the occlusion of the child's story?
5. The brain, the body and Human social relatedness

"...human social relatedness is present from birth..." (Stern, 1985: 44)

This thesis argues that the body incorporates a drive towards social relationships. It is also argued that there are limitations to the flexibility and possibilities of human capability and that these can be seen in the body and its relations with others.

It is part of the premise of this thesis that sociology has attributed a plasticity to human life that is far in excess of human capacity. The diversity of forms of human existence, cultural variation and differences has lead to a false belief that anything is possible and everything probable: the only limiting factor being the imagination required, and the desire. This thinking is akin to the claim by John B. Watson, founder of behaviourism and the source of the much (mis)quoted argument that a child can be made into any kind of person desired (rich, poor, thief etc). Watson proposed that given a child to raise, in a world of his making, he could create any form of behaviour (and therefore person) he so desired (Mullan, 1987: 5 citing Watson, 1926). This thinking was extended via Operant Conditioning by probably the most famous name in behaviourism, B.F. Skinner. Skinner also wrote Walden Two (1948), the title of which pays homage to Henry David Theroux's book, On Walden Pond (1854). Skinner's Walden describes the creation of a perfect society, within which, utilising behaviourist techniques, the population has been trained to co-operate and have their needs and desires met. This is because what they believe they need and desire is the result of their socialisation. All needs and desires and the means to meet them are created - The perfect world.

In many ways, the antithesis (but, one fears, more likely and realistic), 1984 by George Orwell, shows a more malevolent world within which one's needs, desires and views are carefully constructed by the omnipotent and omnipresent institutional organs of 'Big Brother'. Orwell answers the question raised by Skinner's 'Walden' as to who would create and manage his perfect world - those who can control. The consequence of allowing this degree of control to exist in the hands of any group or individual is plain for Orwell. Skinner describes a world within which there is no resistance because there

91Something often attributed to the Jesuits - as in the paraphrasing 'give me the boy, and I will show you the man'.
92At least in operant conditioning, responses from the organism involved in the exercise had some relationship to what happened around and to them.
is no desire to resist. Orwell describes a world within which the thought of resistance does not exist. Even words within which the term 'free' exists are to be eliminated.

In both instances, humans are presented as plastic and malleable. For Skinner, resistance was irrelevant, for Orwell, only the characters Winston and Julia are capable of resistance. What is significant in Orwell's story is that one of the elements of resistance instituted by Winston and Julia is to have sex, to engage in physical contact: to allow the body one of its most intimate and physically stimulating activities. This thesis argues that resistance is not futile\textsuperscript{93}, but rather elevates the argument to one in which resistance, viz. Foucault, is perpetual. Not only is resistance perpetual, but it also instigates a limiting element to human development.

The body resists. It resists because it is within its 'nature' to do so. It also seeks social contact. It does this because it is within its 'nature' to do so. Further, the body sets limits as to what it can and can not do and what it is oriented towards. Rather than determining every instance, like some form of pre-programmed but 'not too smart' computer, it sets limits and pathways. Rather than representing a single vector of forms, it is rather a net that covers the possibilities with an elastic boundary. Despite this elasticity, the range of possibilities is still limited.

We have already seen in the chapter on biology that the body is not merely a container for, nor a submissive agent of, cultural constructs. The body interacts with its environment. We have already seen the debate over the place of the body in sociology. As stated previously, without the very body we all possess, we would not be having this debate; indeed we could not have any debate at all (Kirby, 1991: 88; Oyama, 1991: 30). This same body also exists prior to developing a common language and therefore pre-exists attempts to socialise, indoctrinate, ideologise or construct through verbal discourse.

By reviewing work by Bowlby (1958) and Harlow (1958) and the resultant psychological and biological research (eg. Waters and Cummings, 2000; Degrandpre, 1999; Perry, 1997a; Perry and Pollard, 1997; Iwaniec, 1995; Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991; Josephine Klein, 1987; Stern, 1985; Ainsworth, 1969), we can begin to see that the body expresses an orientation towards social relationships with others. We shall also review what happens when the body experiences negative relationships at an

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\textsuperscript{93} Apologies to the Borg of Star Trek.
early age, when the body's drive towards social life is thwarted and cannot achieve this. This can be most clearly seen in the work on non-organic failure to thrive (NOFTT). When the environment fails to provide the opportunity for a social connection, the body responds by slowing down. Growth and development are retarded and delayed.

In what follows, we shall see that within the literature and research from the fields of development of the human brain, non-organic failure to thrive and the development of attachment in children, there is ample evidence to support a reassessment of the notion of the body as limitlessly pliable. The argument shall be established that the body is an interactive and active element in the construction of social relationships. Not only this, the body presents limits and resistance within this relationship. Far from it being endlessly changeable, it has limits, the breaching of which can cause harm.

At this point, I wish to show the depth of work in this field and to avoid the inherent difficulties and dangers in attempting to resuscitate an argument from another field of work after drowning it in one's own specialisation (i.e. translating the whole into sociology from psychology then resurrecting it). It is therefore necessary to outline the theoretical elements of the argument put forward within the field of psychology's own language. The primary aim is of assisting the less familiar reader to develop a stronger grasp of the material and how it is relevant to this thesis. The secondary aim is to ensure that it is understood that this is material that is central to a considerable amount of work in the field of psychology and biological psychology, and thereby emphasising its importance to sociology.

The field of study on attachment has focused on the development of a relationship between infants and the adults who care for them. This has then been extended to include the projection of these relationships as a foundational element in human relationships and by this, a constructing framework for human social life. In this sense then, research into attachment is co-terminus with the models upon which Durkheim and Marx both developed their arguments surrounding Anomie and Alienation - the innate social elements of human relationships.

Humans can be seen as "...a being whose biological organisation does not determine its behavioural dispositions, but rather grounds a rich and open space of species-specific potentials" (Benton, 1991: 23). "Both a capacity for and a dependence upon social life is built into our very anatomical and physiological constitution..." (Benton, 1991: 23). The
flexibility that humans show in their adaptation to their environment is considerable. We do, however, need to develop a strong sense of what it is that is inherent in humans, how this manifests in relationships and to what degree is any of this flexible (Steele, 1977: 2).

5.1 "...a memory without words" (Stern, 1985: 91)

As has been argued already in this thesis, the body has a relationship with its social environment which precedes language. This social environment is one in which physical contact plays a central role. The literal (and figurative) holding environment within which the human body, the child, develops (Melanie Klein 1948, cited in Ivey, Ivey and Simek-Downing, 1980: 205) is essential. It is through this contact that the body apprehends a relationship, in which the world is perceived through touch and the sensations of the skin (Josephine Klein, 1987) and through which our early relationships are perceived.

Our bodily experiences inform the relationships we have with others, projecting and reflecting our reality and sense of truth, social relationships and social roles, values etc, forming and shaping the nature of physical-ness:

"In order for the infant to have any formed sense of self, there must ultimately be some organisation that is sensed as a reference point. The first such organisation is the body; its coherence, its actions, its inner feeling states, and the memory of all these." (Stern, 1985: 45)

Our body and its experiences are the referring framework for our relationship with others and with the world (Sietz, 1993: 54 citing work by Piaget, Johnson and Fisher). This echoes Game's proposition that:

"...the body provides the basis for a different conception of knowledge: we know within our bodies. In this regard, the authenticity of experience

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94 Interestingly, Bowlby would come to state that even when Klein and her colleagues had made such observations: "...each seems to feel a compulsion to give primacy to needs for food and warmth and to suppose that social interaction develops only secondarily and as a result of instrumental learning" (Bowlby, 1958, pp. 4-5, cited in Ainsworth, 1979: 979).

95 No relation to Melanie Klein.
might be reclaimed; if there is any truth, it is the truth of the body."
(Game, 1991: 192)

From the age of 2 months, infants begin to develop a sense of self as a separate, cohesive, bounded, physical unit (Stern, 1985: 10). This sense of self is not a cognitive construct but "...an experiential integration" (Stern, 1985: 71) creating what Bruners calls "...a memory without words" (Stern, 1985: 91). An example of this is shown in work by Bower, 1978. Children were shown objects of different sizes and weights. They were asked which weighed more and then given the object to hold. An adult, thinking an object to be heavier, will tense their muscles to accept the weight. When the object is lighter than believed, we overcompensate, resulting in the accidental 'extra lift' that we have all experienced.

Using high speed filming techniques, the researchers showed that even when a child verbally stated their belief that an object was of a particular weight, their body would act differently. For very young children, the research showed that the body "...at the sensorimotor level has already achieved conservation of weight and volume" (Stern, 1985: 175-6) even though this has not been achieved at a level of language and conceptualisation.

The reactions of the infant are part of an active, participatory role, which is part of an interactive developmental pattern (Magnussen, 1983) and parallels Foucault's proposition of conditioned and conditioning relations of power (Foucault, 1977b: 142). This 'inter-action' exists as elemental to the relationship, providing a complex, differentiated space, obviating mechanistic and deterministic interpretations.

The skin forms the surface of the body, representing a boundary (as opposed to the boundary) of in/out, not/self, self/other relationship. It also forms the point of contact with the world, the initial moment of interaction - it transacts the phenomenology of existence and forms the surface not only upon which power operates, but within which it is invested. The dualism of nature/nurture, body/mind is thus merged into a monist, elemental relationship. The body and social relationships are thus formed and sensed prior to language (Waters and Cummings, 2000: 5).

What are we left with here? Setting aside the language framework that psychology uses (sociology can interpolate its own), it becomes clear that the body seeks a relationship
with its environment. It seeks social relationships with others around it and prefers animated others: in other words, a relationship with another social being. This argument will be more fully developed in the chapter on attachment, failure to thrive and the experiences of Romanian orphans under the Ceausescu regime.

In short, the development of attachment is the development of a social relationship; arguably the first social relationship. Attachment precedes the development of language and is the result of tactile experiences occurring between the body of the infant and the body of the adult; on an elemental, physical level. It is formed within a relationship that exists between physiological bodies: active, interactive bodies that dispel any notion of the body as a passive mannequin.

If our desire is to permit all humans to achieve their potential, to best utilise their abilities, then it is also true that this potential and these abilities can be impaired. Neither clothes nor language doth make a man and the artificiality of a theoretical platform that claims language and words alone are the forming elements of human life, will be seen, in the light of the following sections to be simplistic and inaccurate.

5.2 "What is remembered in the body is well remembered." 96
"...human social relatedness is present from birth..." (Stern, 1985: 44)

In returning to the body, this section extends on the theme developed in chapter 2, relating to sociology and biology: we need not be afraid of biology (Connell (1996). Human sociology and human biology do not have to be considered opposable or mutually exclusive elements of human social life. This thesis argues that they are not and that humans are social beings (Singer, 1999: 37), with the body incorporating a drive towards social relationships and that there are limitations to the flexibility and possibilities of human capability that manifest in the body and its relations with others.

The following sections on Harlow’s work, recent research on the human brain and research into attachment theory, contribute equally to showing that the body is affected by its environment in more than just positive or neutral ways, and that human social life is very much dependent on an inherent drive to the social. The sections show the impact of social relationships on the human body (for example, the development of the

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96 Scarry, 1985: 110.
brain and human growth) and the consequences for the ability of individuals to relate constructively to others in their community.

It is part of the premise of this thesis that sociology has attributed a plasticity to human life that is far in excess of human capacity. The diversity of forms of human existence, cultural variation and differences has lead to a false belief that anything is possible and everything probable: the only limiting factor being the imagination required, and the desire. This thinking is akin to the claim by John B. Watson, founder of behaviourism and the source of the much (mis)quoted pronouncement that a child can be made into any kind of person desired (rich, poor, thief etc). Watson proposed that given a child to raise, in a world of his making, he could create any form of behaviour (and therefore person) he so desired (Mullan, 1987: 5 citing Watson, 1926). This thinking was extended via Operant Conditioning by probably the most famous name in behaviourism, B.F. Skinner. Skinner also wrote *Walden Two* (1948), the title of which pays homage to Henry David Theroux's book, *On Walden Pond* (1854). Skinner's *Walden* describes the creation of a perfect society, within which, utilising behaviourist techniques, the population has been trained to co-operate and have their needs and desires met. This is because what they believe they need and desire is the result of their socialisation. All needs and desires and the means to meet them are created - The perfect world.

5.3 *The Brain*

In this section, the brain is discussed as an organic part of the corporeal body. As such, I am not attempting to explore Cartesian mind/body dualism. Rather I shall discuss the impact that human experience has on the development of the physiological brain. In commencing this discussion, I would like to reiterate the reasons for exploring material on the brain. As covered in the chapter on recent sociological work on the body, it is a contention of this thesis that sociological theorising in this area has tended to focus on the surface of the body, and not on its materiality - its corporeality. In covering research on the organic phenomena of the brain, I wish to further explore the nature/nurture debate, and to examine the relationship between the bio-physiological and the social. By

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97 Something often attributed to the Jesuits - as in the paraphrasing: 'give me the boy, and I will show you the man'.
98 At least in operant conditioning, responses from the organism involved in the exercise had some relationship to what happened around and to them.
doing this, I also continue to deconstruct the ongoing duality of nature/nurture, and emphasise the importance of an inclusive sociological relationship with this material.

Recent research has revealed that contrary to the 'insult model', which opposes the possibility of neural plasticity (Fox, Calkins and Bell, 1994: 679), there is clear evidence for claiming a relationship between brain development and social experience - at least in the very early years of human life. This 'transactional model' (Fox, Calkins and Bell, 1994: 681) argues that aspects of the brain are related (though not necessarily causative) to particular functions. That is, damage to particular parts of the brain result in various deficits that do not occur if the injury were to occur to another lobe or area (Milner, Petrides and Smith, 1985; Shallice and Burgess, 1991; Wilkins, Shallice and McCarthy, 1987 cited in Fox, Calkins and Bell, 1994: 681)

In short and more importantly, there is a relationship between brain development and environment and experience. Substantially the genetic coding for brain development interacts with the environment, to form an interactional relationship, one in which the development of the brain is affected by social experiences. These models are called experience-expectant and experience-dependent models (Greenough and Black, 1992 cited in Glaser, 2000: 100).

In experience-expectant cases, particular experiences are required for the development of a related part of the brain. For example, visual acuity is reduced permanently if input is limited past the age of 8-10 years (Taylor and Taylor, 1979, cited in Glaser, 2000: 100). Children who have received Cochlear implants show a greater benefit if they receive the implant before the same ages (Tye-Murray, Spencer and Woodworth, 1995). Noam Chomsky's work (1967, 1970) has focused on the innate capacity for language and its relationship to brain structure, raising questions as to the limits of social influences on language development. His argument, which finds support in the field of neurobiology, (e.g. Rose, 1976: 174) is that unless the brain was 'hardwired' already, humans would not be able to speak to one another (Morgan, 1995: 132-133; McConnell and Philipchalk, 1992: 342; Rose, 1976: 172-181). This said, there appears to exist a critical period. If language is not acquired by the age of five, then it is highly unlikely to be developed thereafter (Morgan, 1995: 135)99.

99 Research on 'feral children' is interesting but somewhat inconclusive (see Candland, 1993), primarily because it was not known at the time whether the children in question had an intellectual disability that impeded their progress.
In *Experience-dependent* brain development, social experiences impact upon neural development. For example, environments which lack interactivity, a variety of experiences and activities, which are socially isolating and experientially neglectful, can inhibit the development of a child’s neural connections. It is believed that this has a severe impact on the brain's capacity to develop fully, contributing to behavioural problems and learning difficulty (Perry, 1997a; Perry and Pollard, 1997; Perry, Pollard, Blakley, Baker and Vigilante, 1995 and Turner and Greenhoff, 1985 cited in Glaser, 2000). It is important to remember that we are not talking here about intellectual discussions and highly complicated social interactions. We are talking about the simplest of interactions, touch and physical affection. It is to this we shall return when discussing the research into attachment, Non-Organic Failure to Thrive and children who were placed in orphanages in Romania.

In an article titled *Just Cause: Many Neuroscientists Are All Too Quick To Call A Blip On A Brain Scan The Reason For A Behavior*, Richard J. Degrandpre (1999), cites a number of pieces of research into the effect of brain chemistry and pharmacology and its relationship to behaviour.

Degrandpre’s position is that the common argument is too often that 'biology is all cause and no effect' - the result of researchers remaining within a dualist Cartesian model. Through a review of research on subjects such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and hyperactivity, Degrandpre puts forwards a case based on the argument that interaction with ones social environment can just as easily be shown to have produced variations in brain chemistry, rather than the variations being the cause of the subject behaviour. In one example, during research into hyperactivity conducted in 1971, Mary Coleman kept the two ‘worst’ children in hospital longer. Their attention spans drastically improved and their serotonin levels returned to normal. A month after returning home, their attentions spans and behaviour deteriorated, and their serotonin levels returned to abnormal levels.

Other research provides support for these contentions. Work conducted by the U.S. National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, indicated that failure to be provided with physical contact in infancy and childhood (what is termed somatosensory deprivation), can lead to the brain's physical development being inhibited. Other postulations were that this would result in behavioural difficulties in later behaviour (Bylinsky, 1973). Later work concluded that children who have experienced neglect, for
which there has been child protection service intervention have "...a much higher probability of emotional, behavioural, cognitive, social and physical delays and dysfunction than 'comparison' children (Perry and Pollard, 1997: 1).

Research into brain chemistry has shown that violently shaking a baby can leave a high levels of a 'chemical marker' (an amino acid called glutamate) in a child's cerebrospinal fluid. The amino acid itself can also cause further neuron damage to the brain. In short, the damage is not purely the result of the shaking, but of the reactions of the body following the shaking. One application of this knowledge, combined with X-rays, would be to assist in determining the occurrence of this form of abuse of an infant. High levels of Quinolinic acid are also co-related with high levels of violent abuse (Baker, 1998).

Other more recent work on the development of the brain has also shown that some experiences are harmful to the development of the brain and its capacities (Perry and Pollard, 1998; Perry, 1997a; Perry, 1997b; Perry and Pollard, 1997; Perry, Pollard, Blakley, Baker, and Vigilante, 1995). Severe deprivation is generally considered to be a lack of a social environment; one in which the child is not in social contact with others, receives little physical contact and touch, where they are prevented from or not provided with emotional warmth and human interaction. In the early years of development, this form of existence can have permanent negative effects on sensory development and function (Perry and Pollard, 1997). It has been argued that until the age of three years, the brain is highly vulnerable to injury through sensorily deprivin and neglectful environments. This 'neural plasticity', and therefore vulnerability to negative experiences, is considered to be coming to a close by approximately three years of age.100 (Perry, 1997b: 3) In short, isolation from human social contact prevents the full development of the brain and therefore limits human potential, and ultimately limits human social capacity.

In summary, there is a great degree of support for the 'transactional model' in which there is an interactive relationship between brain development and experiences. There is also support for the contention that there is the likelihood of harm occurring through various experiences, particularly deprivation. In other words, through the failure to provide adequate experience and social interaction. This deprivation is unlike that which

100 Some recent research has shown that, contrary to what had been believed, some neural regrowth occurs in adulthood, though at present it appears to be quite little (Rayl, 1999).
prevents the acquiring of language, which, unless there is a neurological/ physical/ biological reason, is the result of not being exposed to language.

As stated earlier in the section on Biology, the body is not merely a reflection of what occurs or a reflection of the cultural structures or structuring elements. The body reacts to its environment and is concurrently shaped by it and, in consequence, shapes its responses; it is in a constant interactive process, and this is seen in the research conducted into the organic brain.

It is this form of research which reveals the operation of the brain, and its pharmacology, as an integral part of the body (i.e. for the sense used in this thesis, something which is intrinsic in humans), existing and operating in relationship to its environment. The body and brain continue to grow during infancy (and even into the twenties) and is affected by its surroundings (see the discussion on the brain and harm caused by pollution such as lead). Aside from the chemical influence of the environment, the brain/body is also affected by the relationship formed with the world. In order to avoid notions of brain/body dualism, from this point on I shall write of the brain and body combined as 'the body'.

To return to earlier chapters in this thesis, in many ways this research can be identified with notions of human nature proposed by Marx and Durkheim. Marx argued that for 'man' to develop his social nature, then the environment must be made human (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844b]: 115), whilst Durkheim, as discussed at the introduction to this chapter, believed that isolation from social interaction was 'unnatural' and that all humans had a need to relate to others (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999: Sens Lectures 40). Both contend that humans are fundamentally social and require socially constructive environments to ensure that human needs and development are met. For both, human social development and the ability to adequately interact can be retarded or restricted by environments that do not support this development. As the research on brain development clearly shows, brain development and pharmacology is directly affected by social experiences and there is a need for particular experiences to be avoided.

The contentions of Marx and Durkheim are given further flesh and bone in the following sections on the work of Harry Harlow, research into Romanian orphans following the fall of the Ceausescu regime, failure-to-thrive and attachment. Each of
these sections provides evidence for the argument that despite its ability to achieve a plurality of forms and social relationships, human development is not comprised of an open ended plasticity and cannot be subjected to any form of environment with the probability of negative consequences.

5.4 Harry Harlow's (in)famous work with monkeys and attachment.101

"Love is a wondrous state, deep, tender, and rewarding. Because of its intimate and personal nature it is regarded by some as an improper topic for experimental research...But of greater concern is the fact that psychologists tend to give progressively less attention to a motive which pervades our entire lives. Psychologists, at least psychologists who write textbooks, not only show no interest in the origin and development of love or affection, but they seem to be unaware of its very existence." (Harlow, 1958: 573)

Thus begins Harlow's 1958 address, *The Nature of Love*, to the sixty-sixth American Psychological Association annual convention. Harlow wished to show that "...organisms are driven to seek contact and comfort..." (Turner and Helms, 1983: 131). During research he and his colleagues were conducting on monkeys, it was observed that the infant monkeys would exhibit a strong attachment response to cloth pads covering the floors. "The infants clung to these pads and engaged in violent temper tantrums when the pads were removed and replaced for sanitary reasons" (Harlow, 1958: 575). They also realised that the mortality rate for infant monkeys who were raised in cages with bare wire mesh floors was very high.

To conduct this research, he placed captive monkeys into two groups. The members of each group would be placed in the 'care' of an inanimate 'parent'.102 Harlow used two fabricated figures as 'mothers'. One was made of wire, the other had a similar frame, but was covered with cloth to make it softer. The two carers could also have a light bulb placed inside them, to provide warmth; the monkeys could only be fed by their respective carer. Both provided the monkeys with food from a built-in bottle, to which

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102 In much of the research, the term 'mother' is used to identify the parent or carer. In the same way, 'mothering' is used to describe the act of providing care. Later research has amended some of the terminology. Despite this, the research usually acknowledged the gender bias in the term, whilst recognising that the essential element was not the gender of the provider.
was attached a teat. The food supplied by each was identical. Other than this, the monkeys were free to interact with either of the carers (Turner and Helms, 1983).

Despite the monkeys having ease of access to either carer, they spent the greatest part of their time with the cloth carer. The cloth mother appeared to provide some sense of security, as opposed to the wire carer (Mullan, 1987: 40). When the cloth carer was removed, the monkeys would then become highly distressed (Beadle, 1972, cited in Mullan, 1987: 40). Other research showed that if the wire carer emitted a warm current of air, the monkey would spend more time with that carer (Morgan, 1995: 91).

Harlow's work also showed that reared in isolation, monkeys would become socially inept; this could be overcome if they were allowed to socialise with more socially competent monkeys (Morgan, 1995: 146). However, if the period of isolation was 12 months or more, the monkeys were not able to be 're-educated' or 're-mothered' (Eyer, 1992: 58-59).

Overall, monkeys who were raised with inanimate carers would also show high levels of social incompetence and an inability to relate constructively with other monkeys. When the monkeys were later made pregnant, they would become abusive and neglectful to their infants (Peterson, 1984: 131). This was the same for those raised in isolation (Eyer, 1992: 59). This research on Rhesus monkeys has also been shown to be accurate for Old World monkey and ape species (Suomi, 1999: 182).

What was Harlow's conclusion at the time?:

"It is cheering in view of this trend to realize that the American male is physically endowed with all the really essential equipment to compete with the American female on equal terms in one essential activity: the rearing of infants. We now know that women in the working classes are not needed in the home because of their primary mammalian capabilities; and it is possible that in the foreseeable future neonatal nursing will not be regarded as a necessity, but as a luxury ---to use Veblen's term - a form of conspicuous consumption limited perhaps to the upper classes. But whatever course history may take, it is comforting to know that we are now in contact with the nature of love." (Harlow, 1958: 684)
This is far from a biological-determinist attempt to make women give up work and become housebound child carers. Harlow's conclusion was that the infant required care and comfort and along with feeding, this was sufficient. In this case, anyone with the capacity to do so could: male or female, mother or father. Interestingly, what appears to have colloquially resulted was the conclusion that 'mothering' was required, as opposed to 'parenting' or 'caring'. In later research, this gendering was questioned, in an oblique rather than overtly political fashion. The argument was made that the infant monkeys in Harlow's isolation tests had been deprived of 'all contact', rather than being deprived of 'a mother' per se (Rutter, 1974, 1979, 1981 cited in Eyer, 1992: 67).

The need for 'Mothering' then is more a need for 'care-giving' and an opportunity to learn social skills, to be 'encultured'. We can also see here the interaction of elements of the biological and the social. Infants left in isolation and without forms of comfort were at a high risk of dying. Monkeys who were deprived of the opportunity for learning social skills, at an early age, could not relate to other monkeys in a constructive, mutual, positive fashion. They also could not relate to and provide care for their own infants.

The next question is does this relate to human infants? Interestingly, Harlow's work on this drive to a social connection was influenced by his awareness of the work of Spitz and Bowlby. In trying to reduce the mortality rate of the monkeys being held for experimentation, he had begun to notice results that mirrored their work. As we shall see in the discussion of failure to thrive in infants, and attachment, there are many similarities. At the time, Harlow's work was seen as a major blow to the opposition to Bowlby's research and theoretical propositions. This necessarily is qualified, and of a limited nature, for monkeys are not humans (Karen, 1994: 119-125).

5.5 Failure to Thrive
As stated above, failure to thrive (FTT) was noticed in monkeys by Harry Harlow (1958). Infant monkeys, which were deprived of all social and physical contact and comfort, were placed at mortal risk: they could literally die. If they did not die, their social skills were seriously impaired. This phenomenon has also been observed in human infants and studies have been conducted into this issue in several countries.

103 Or for that case masculine/feminine, fe/male or otherwise, 'mother or mother' 'father or father' etc.
Generally, FTT is defined as a weight under the 5th percentile or a downward deviation in weight of 2 major percentiles, as defined on the growth charts, for a duration of at least one-month. The following is an example of how this translates. In New South Wales, the Public Health Service provides a 'Personal Health Record' book to the parents of newly born children. Each copy has growth charts at the back, showing head circumference, length and weight growth curves (different ones for male and female children). The growth charts also include a curve showing the percentage of the population of children who would fall under the ranges recorded at a given age. For example, at age 12 months, 50% of Australian-born children weigh 9.5 kilograms or less, 50% will have a length of 74 centimetres or less, and 50% will have a head circumference of 45.5 centimetres or less. Only 3% will be under 7.5 kilograms, only 3% under 70 centimetres in length, and only 3% will have a head circumference of 43 centimetres or less.\(^{104}\)

FTT is divided into 2 categories: organic FTT (OFTT), where medical causes, such as physiological or biological problems are identified as the cause of the child's failure to develop and grow, and non-organic FTT (NOFTT), where the underlying problem is considered to be psychosocial (Tomison and Tucci, 1997; Ramsay, 1995; Karniski, Van Buren and Cupoli, 1986). In this thesis, it is non-organic failure to thrive that is of interest. As Fischoff, Whitten and Pettit (1971) write:

"…maternally [sic] deprived infants are underweight because of under eating which is secondary to not being offered adequate food or not accepting it, and not because of some psychologically induced defects in absorption or metabolism." (Cited in Braun, Wykle and Cowling, 1988: 809)

A number of factors have been identified in NOFTT: child abuse and neglect, poverty, depression in the carer, poor feeding and/or feeding routines and anxiety in the carer (Drotar, Eckerle, Satola, Pallotta and Wyatt, 1990; Kristiansson and Fallstrom, 1987; Karniski, Van Buren and Cupoli, 1986: 477), negative and disengaging relationships with the child (for example, where the carer acts in a negative fashion towards the child, or withdraws from relating to them) (Alderette and deGraffenried, 1986), and disorganised and poorly responsive carers (Bradley, Casey and Wortham, 1984; Casey, Bradley and Wortham, 1984; Haynes, 1987). One reason proposed for this latter factor has been a

carer history of some form of abuse (either as a child and/or adult). In one research group, 80% of the carers (in this instance, mothers) were found to have experienced abuse, either in their childhood or as adults\(^{105}\) (Weston, Colloton, Halsey, Covington, Gilbert, Sorrentino-Kelly and Renoud, 1993).

Though feeding difficulties can arise in any child, insecure attachments can exacerbate feeding problems and lead to severe malnutrition (Chatoor, Ganiban, Colin, Plummer, and Harmon, 1998). A parent’s poor ability to adapt to their child's needs has also been identified, along with poor emotional relationships with their children (Drotar et al, 1990). A lack of emotional warmth, physical engagement and contact (such as wanting to nurse and hold or cuddle the child) are considered common features of the social interactions between carers and children in cases of non-organic failure to thrive.

Children who were identified as NOFTT had a greater likelihood of experiencing chronic health problems and intellectual delays (Singer, 1986). Cognitive functioning of neglected children who were diagnosed as FTT has been shown to be below that of the standard for non-neglected children (Mackner et al, 1997). Physical growth and development of NOFTT children has been shown to improve through hospitalisation, however improvement in psychosocial skills development has been poor (Fryer, 1988). Children with NOFTT are also were more likely to continue to experience suboptimal growth, unless psychosocial intervention occurred (Kristiansson and Fallstrom, 1987: 39-40). That is, they experience growth rates less than that generally considered common for children their age, unless there is some form of intervention that focuses on changing the physical and emotional care and interaction they receive.

As I have noted, although some research has shown a correlation between NOFTT and child abuse in the carer's personal history (Weston et al. 1993), other research questions this. For example, Eyers cites a 1980 longitudinal study (Vietz, 1980) in which the researchers found: "...no significant differences between mothers whose infants remained normal and those whose infants were later diagnosed as non-organic failure to thrive" (Eyer, 1992: 33). What they did postulate however, was: "...a complex chain of events, including certain characteristic of the infants, that results in the syndrome" (Eyer, 1992: 34). This permits the question "Did the carers show an ability to match the needs and temperament differences of the individual child, as against exhibiting the

\(^{105}\) The research did not make the distinction between historical or presently occurring abuse and excluded persons for whom existing records indicated a disclosure of some form of abuse (Weston, Colloton,
same generic responses as other carers?" We shall see the importance of this question in
the following section on social and interactional perspectives.

Though the debate is ongoing, failure to provide soothing and positive physical contact
(termed by some as emotional deprivation) is generally accepted as one of the major
factors in NOFTT. Arguably 50 percent of NOFTT is the result of parental neglect,
other than feeding problems (Tomison and Tucci, 1997: 7). In countering notions of
this problem somehow being purely a result of ‘defects’ in the child, and therefore
criticism of the care style being an inadvertent or deliberate victimisation of the carer, it
is significant to note that when placed with carers with training in how to recognise and
meet a child's specific needs, the children in the experimental group showed rapid
growth and weight gain (Karniski, Van Buren and Cupoli, 1986)\(^\text{106}\).

Failure to Thrive has also been identified as a problem for elderly persons placed into
nursing homes. Under-nutrition combined with poor physical, social and intellectual
(psychology sometimes terms this 'cognitive') engagement, leads to a negatively
spiralling relationship, resulting in declining physical and cognitive capacities and social
withdrawal (Braun, Wykle and Cowling, 1988). Indeed, even with an adequate diet, the
research into this problem has emphasised the importance of social relationships and
exercise regimes, and thereby mirrors the research on children.

This is a significant point. It shows that there is an interactive relationship between the
body and the environment. In this I do not mean a chemically poisonous or physically
injurious environment, but the social environment. Before picking up this thread of an
interactive relationship, I shall review some research on probably the largest group of
children subjected to environments in which they were fed, but were largely deprived of
social interaction.

### 5.6 Research involving Romanian orphans

The 1989 collapse of the Romanian dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu provided a large
scale example of the consequences of environmental deprivation on children and their
development. Many of the children located in state orphanages were eventually adopted
by carers from around the world. The degree of deprivation the children had
experienced prompted a considerable volume of research into the children's condition,

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\(^{106}\) This has also been the author’s experience when working with children who have NOFTT.
both then and in the years following. The circumstance many of the children were
placed in included, being left alone in their cot for extended periods, having few carers
for large groups of children, rapid turn-over of staff, social isolation and little social and
physical interaction with other children or adults. This research also confirmed many of
the findings discussed in the preceding sections; impaired social relationships and
impaired physical development.

In one research paper, 90% of children adopted from Romania, were assessed as having
developmental delays of some form (Johnson, Miller, Iverson, Thomas, Franchino,
Dole, Kiernan, Georgieff and Hostetter, 1992). Assessed against a control group,
children adopted from Romanian orphanages showed a greater level of behavioural and
physical contact (such as touch) problems (Cermack and Daunhauer, 1997) and global
problems in language and social and physical developmental (Marcovitch, Cesaroni and
Roberts, 1995). Canadian follow-up research, four years after adoption, showed that
whilst a third of families indicated no 'significant' problems, another third reported up
to three areas of deficit and the remaining third: "… reported serious and sometimes
worsening cognitive and behavioural/emotional problems" (Jenista, 1997 cited in
Gindis, 1999).

The younger the child and the shorter the length of stay in an orphanage, the more
likely the child would parallel the physical and social/emotional developmental norms
for children their age (Rutter, 1996; Groze and Ileana, 1996; Groze and Schmidt, 1995;
Other research found that while children from the orphanages displayed greater
language and social/behavioural problems, the greater the level of physical contact
during the time, the better their developmental level (Ames, 1997). Again, what was
interesting was that the more physical contact the children received, the greater the
amount of interaction they experienced with other people, the better they functioned
and the better their developmental levels. In other words, the more frequent their
physical contact and the shorter their stay in deprived circumstances, the fewer
problems the children experienced. Whilst the impact of length of stay has been
questioned by some (Kaler and Freeman, 1994 cited in Glaser, 2000: 98), being adopted
before the age of 6 months was shown to decrease the frequency of later developmental
problems (Rutter, M and the English and Romanian Adoptees Study Team, 1998, cited
What much of this research shows is that for the development of the potential existing at birth, a child requires not just feeding and being kept warm, but social contact. This social contact is required to be sensitive to the needs of the child and to be encouraging. Poor feeding routines and lack of feeding are thus separate matters. One places a direct and obvious restriction on the growth and survival of the infant. The other is a form of communication with the infant that precedes the sharing of language.

What is even more important is the social relationship the child experiences, one mediated through touch, requiring engagement with the body of the infant and with the body of an 'other'. The body requires a social connection and interaction to provide the ability to develop and meet the potential for development that it contains. Social deprivation is not the occlusion of highly complicated interaction; it is the occlusion of tactile experiences and interactions (Carlson and Earls, 1997: 422). In each of the instances we have so far discussed, the factor under consideration is the physical, tactile, sensory experience of being embodied; having physical contact with another, interactive, physically existing, responding body.

This element falls within the rubric of attachment theory. Attachment theory argues that there is a sensorimotor drive towards the other, toward contact with others. This need for tactile experiences and interactions is part of what the body directs its activities towards. It is to this that we shall now turn.

5.7 **Attachment: the social bond**

To position this section and the discussion on attachment, it is important to make the point that the terms 'Attachment' and 'Bonding' are not synonymous, though they are often colloquially used in this fashion. Even within the 'professional field', people frequently speak of 'Attachment and Bonding issues' in the hope that the hearer will determine for them which was meant\(^\text{107}\). To clarify, 'Attachment' is the term used to describe an infant's relationship with their carer/s. Bonding, loosely, is the term used to describe a carer's relationship with a child.

In an excellent book, which combines an understanding of psychology and sociology, Diane Eyer (1992)\(^\text{108}\) clearly positions bonding theory in a fraternal relationship to attachment theory. This relationship and the "...deeply embedded ideology regarding...

\(^\text{107}\) Personal communication with Amanda Elliott, Psychologist, NSW Department of Health and Bruce Bowmaker, Psychologist, NSW Department of Community Services, 2000.
the proper role of women" (Eyer, 1992: 9), combined with ethological research on adult mammals and their infants, to derive an acceptance of the existence of bonding in humans. In this sense, bonding meant the development of a relationship by the mother, with the child. This relationship, which would ensure the mother provided adequately for the child, was believed to be impaired if the mother and child were separated, or prevented from having contact, during a critical period - usually in the hours immediately after birth.

What must be noted here is there is often confusion as to the relationship between notions of maternal bonding and attachment theory, particularly in reference to Bowlby. The two are often misconstrued as being in some way synonymous. Giddens (1991), for example, discusses maternal bonding in relation to Bowlby's work and then writes that they were disconfirmed (Giddens, 1991: 67 and 69). This is a misrepresentation of Bowlby's work. The notion of maternal bonding preceded that of Bowlby's research, and as I shall later discuss, was not something he supported.

One of the elements of attachment theory is the concept of "sensorimotor schemes" and the action of the carer in relation to the infant's actions (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991). As the commencement of attachment predates the infant's grasp of language, and relates to the infant's non-language-formed behaviour, this means that from a sociological perspective the focus is the body without a verbal language – therefore 'a body which speaks'. The child develops a relationship with the social world through the intersection of its body and its environment. In short, this brings into question over-reaching theoretical arguments which state that the first or primary relationship with the world is one mediated through language.

Reading attachment theory, one can easily replace 'infant' or 'child' with 'body'. Infant is used to describe the being in question as a person, a human being. Body can be used to view purely the actions and interactions within a social milieu; the body's reactions and interactions with its environment prior to the intervention of language. Attachment theory also outlines limitations to the utility of various forms of relationships and the negative consequences of these relationships. It is this which I would like the reader to remember when reading this section - the body in a dynamic relationship, the body with limits, the body prior to the intervention of language.

We also need to see how it is that the attachment relates to social human life.

"In the absence of adequate human attachment the great human experiences of the joys and love and the sorrows of loss and bereavement cannot happen. Without these elements life is not really human…" (Steele, 1977: 2)

Attachment theory can be utilised within sociology to discuss the social elements of human existence as it focuses on the development of the ability to be social and to interact in a constructive and mutually positive fashion. That is, the development of an ability to engage with others and to interact to meet needs.

5.8 **Bowlby**

Two of the primary researchers to discuss attachment in the fashion we understand it today, were John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth. Ainsworth's work was preceded by that of Bowlby, and she was able to address many of the criticism raised against attachment theory. Additionally, she was able to defend Spitz's conclusions more effectively than he was himself (Karen, 1994: 124). The theoretical and empirical response to the work of Bowlby and Ainsworth is now in its 5th decade (Waters and Cummings, 2000: 11) and is very well known in the field of child welfare and children's services. Within the field of child protection attachment theory holds a central and senior place (Swift, 1995: 156). This can be judged by the frequency that requests for the Children's Court to permit an 'Attachment and Bonding" assessment to be completed are made. Indeed, such has become the frequency that the present Chief Magistrate of the Children's Court asked that requests be more specific about what they meant and not so frequent.109

In the UK, *The Children Act Report*, 1995 – 1999 (page 10) comments on the need for secure and stable attachment, whilst in the USA, as in Australia, Family Law Courts are also encouraged to consider attachment issues (Kelly and Lamb, 2000).

Bowlby's work represented both an extension and a separation from the work of Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham and a complete break with Kleinian psychoanalytic

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109 Personal Communication with Bruce Bowmaker, Psychologist, NSW Department of Community Services, November, 2000.
theory\textsuperscript{110}, leading to René Spitz\textsuperscript{111}, who was more aligned with the Kleinians, rejecting Bowlby’s work (Schwartz, 1999; Bretherton, 1994; Ainsworth, 1969). In effect, this split with Kleinian theory formed a new line of thinking about children and their relationship with the world and representing a paradigmatic shift (Kuhn, 1970). Rather than focusing on the child's internal world, Bowlby focused on the observable relationship between the child and the world: a relationship preceding the development of language and therefore on in which sensorimotor elements played the initiating role.

Generally: "...defined as an affectionate tie that one person forms with another" (Turner and Helms, 1983: 130), this limits and underplays the depth of the interpretation as originally described in Bowlby’s 1958 work in which he described attachment more as: “...an emotional bond that ties the child to one or a few figures across time and space...” with an emerging preference for one or a small number of figures. Included in this was the onset of ‘secure base behaviour’\textsuperscript{112} (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 217). By describing attachment as he did, Bowlby meant to distinguish the concept from its meaning in other theoretical work, and to ensure it was specific to child-carer and adult-adult relationships. However it was meant as: “...neither a generic term nor an exhaustive perspective on human relationships" (Waters and Cummings, 2000: 2), with one of the (still current) debates being the degree to which it is has influenced and/or is (over) generalised to, adult-adult relationships.

The contention that attachment in human infants had its base in human biology, and was instinctive, underwrote Bowlby’s work on attachment, deprivation and the consequences for children (Bowlby, 1980: 39). His proposition is that the desire to develop an attachment is innate and therefore biologically driven: representing an evolutionary element of human adaptation (Suomi, 1999: 181). Whilst there are debates as to how attachment develops (Polan and Hofer, 1999: 172; Turner and Helms, 1983: 133), from a sociological perspective the argument that it is a universal response of infants makes it an ideal target of, and container, for debates over biological determinism. It also makes it an excellent subject for a sociological analysis of the body.

\textsuperscript{110} In which Bowlby himself was trained and later criticised (Schwartz, 1999; Bowlby, 1958 cited in Ainsworth, 1969: 979).

\textsuperscript{111} Eyer’s states there have since been concerns raised that some of Spitz’s work may have been fabricated (Eyer, 1992: 7).

\textsuperscript{112} The term ‘secure base phenomenon’ is attributed to Ainsworth (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 223).
Though concerns of sliding into deterministic theorising are reasonable and to be expected, this is erroneous and a (mis)understanding. (Waters and Cummings, 2000: 3; Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 224-5). Like Foucault, Bowlby also was guarded as to what was deemed 'natural' and how this was determined. He was well aware of the interplay of innate and social elements, going so far as to say that determining what was 'natural' was problematic, making it difficult to decide "…by what criteria to judge the beginning of attachment behaviour in human beings" (Bowlby, 1969: 246 cited in Klein, 1987: 100).

What Bowlby proposed was that the progress of the development of attachment was the consequence of interplay between the biological capacity to learn and the social experience of learning (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 218). Attachment involves "… the interplay of experience and species specific biases in learning abilities" (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 222). Thus it does not lend itself to arguments along the lines of simplistic biological or deterministic propositions that emphasise the genetic precursors in highly complicated and specific cultural values and behaviours. Indeed these arguments were considered false by Bowlby himself (Waters and Cummings, 2000). This is an important distinction to make as it helped: "…both in demystifying the processes involved and in accounting for the adaptedness of attachment behavior" (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 221). It is also important to note at this point that Bowlby did not support the notion that women alone could provide adequate care for children (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 218).

This thesis does not argue that all the evidence is in and that no outstanding issues remain to be raised in the theory and research into attachment. Even the researchers themselves agree that there is work to be done and that much has "…been left to the imagination" (Waters and Cummings, 2000: 4; Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 218). However, those children whose 'attachment security' was observed and assessed 20+ years ago are now becoming adults, thereby allowing for follow-up research to be conducted (Waters, Hamilton, & Weinfield, 1999 cited in Waters and Cummings, 2000: 2).

What I do argue is that the work of researchers such as Bowlby and Ainsworth has significant implications for sociology, representing a long-term, highly detailed and
repeated series of experiments that argue that 'the social' is a biological element of central importance to human development, relationships and human society. This also highlights the importance of the body's relationship to the outside world, i.e. the importance of the physical relationship to things that are not of the (individual) body itself and the interactivity of the biological and social.

Finally, it should also be noted that work has also been done on the cross-cultural existence of attachment, particularly in terms of the development of a secure base and the relationship of the carer actions to this development. The conclusion of this research is that attachment is a trans-cultural phenomenon (Posada, Jacobs, Carbonell, Alzate, Bustamente, and Arenas, 1999; Posada, Gao, Wu, Posada, Tascan, Schoelmerich, Sagi, Kondo-Ikemura, Haaland, and Synnevag, 1995 cited in Waters and Cummings, 2000: 9) and therefore not a western or ‘First World’ phenomena.

5.9 So what does attachment do?

Attachment causes the child to seek to be close to the carer, or the attachment figure/s: to have physical contact with others (Klein, 1987: 98-99). Contrary to the Freudian notion that hunger was a superior drive, Bowlby contended that the child's drive to be close was "…more about clinging than about sucking" (Bowlby, cited by Klein, 1987: 102). As stated previously, this was seen in the research on monkeys, and can be seen in research into non-organic failure to thrive in human infants raised by their parent/s and infants raised in institutions where they were sensorily deprived (e.g. very little physical interaction with others).

Attachment causes the infant, prior to the development of language, to seek the whereabouts of the attachment figure, either through visual apprehension or locomotion and "…makes loneliness and lack of support as agonizing a deprivation as hunger" (Klein, 1987: 100). Children seek to find figures they have attached to and become distressed when they are not able to. Feeding the child is not the means by which an attachment develops. Rather it is the physical relationship which helps form the attachment. Again, as is so often stated, it is an engagement which is mediated through the physical body. The development of language is not required.

In effect, attachment draws the child into a social relationship, to exhibit a drive towards social connectedness and to interactiveness: when this is thwarted, there is a negative
consequence not only for the child's social development but also, significantly, for the development of the body.

The quality, if not the existence, of attachment is shaped by a number of factors:

1. The primary caregiver's attitude towards their responsibilities to the child,
2. Their capacity to respond appropriately,
3. Their expectations and desires for and of the child,
4. The manner with which the infant responds, and is perceived to respond to its environment, most specifically, the primary caregiver/s. (Mussen, Conger and Kagan, 1974: 116)

As discussed earlier, Perry and Pollard's research showed that for a child's brain development to reach its potential, children require a nurturing, predictably patterned environment that is responsive to their needs (Perry and Pollard, 1998). Research into attachment has shown that NOFTT infant's environments are more likely to be disorganised, and their mothers less responsive and less attuned to the child's needs. Additionally, the child's social and physical environment is unpredictable and difficult for the child to exert any control over or elicit predictable responses within (Bradley, Casey, and Wortham, 1984).

There are, of course, factors that would influence a caregiver's attitude towards their responsibilities and their capacity to respond appropriately, for example financial stress, physical illness, community and cultural responses experienced and enacted by the carer (eg. single mothers, living in an economically depressed area). It is important that these factors be highlighted here to avoid the implication that the issue is one purely of the carer's psychological disposition. It is undoubtedly true that there are persons who, no matter what the circumstances, are incapable of providing adequately for a child. It is equally true that the act of 'parenting' or 'caregiving' is located within a social milieu and this environment is not divisible from the act of caregiving and parenting. There is an ongoing and interactive environment circumscribing and constructing both acts and which has and continues to influence whatever potential is brought to bear by those caring for the child.
5.10 Social Interaction and Attachment

One of the criticisms raised recently is that:

"…attachment theorists in the Bowlby/Ainsworth tradition have placed little emphasis on the secure base figure's role in organizing and providing coherence and consistency to early secure base behavior." (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 228-229)

If we look at attachment as an interactive process, we can see the relationship between attachment and the environment more clearly. By taking a larger scale view, we can change the focus from the individual's responses, to the influences in the environment to which both are exposed.

Evidence for the shaping of an infant's behaviour by a carer's behaviour is shown in research on the parenting of American and Japanese babies. In this study the research showed that American babies were typically more active and more vocal than Japanese babies, whose mothers spend a greater proportion of their time soothing and quietening their children (Caudill and Weinstein, 1966, cited in Janis, Mahl, Kagan and Holt, 1969: 435). Indeed, a major influence on children's sleeping patterns is the personality of their parents. Those who were highly anxious, or had high levels of anger, were more likely to have children who woke during the early hours of the day (Osofsky and Connors, 1979 cited in Peterson, 1984: 125).

Longitudinal work (Ainsworth, 1969), which is foundational in the research into attachment theory, shows that the manner in which a caregiver responds to a child and the messages received by the infant during this period critically effect the attachment process. This process of interaction clearly affected the anxiety levels and security of attachment of the child. It is not merely the provision of care to the infant which develops a strong attachment but, more importantly, the quality of that care (Peterson, 1984: 128). For example, eight months after the birth of their child "…mothers who were hostile during pregnancy had less favourable relations with their children…" (Davids and Holden, 1974 cited in Mussen, Conger and Kagan, 1974: 116) There has even been the postulation put forward that intrauterine experiences may have an impact on social relationships (R.D. Laing, cited in Monte, 1980: 400).
Children are also born with particular temperament patterns, which in themselves respond to a given situation and can influence the environment the child finds themselves in. Thomas, Chess and Birch (1963, in Mussen, Conger and Kagan, 1974: 182) are credited with describing a list of nine differences identifiable amongst infants by the age of three years:

Motor activity (level of physical activity)

Irritability (the ease with which a child could be provoked to crying)

Passivity

Rhythmicity ('the degree of regularity of function, like eating, sleeping)

Adaptability of behaviour to changes in the environment

Sensitivity to stimuli

Intensity of response

Distractibility, or ability to concentrate

Span of attention and persistence in an activity.

In essence, these affect the infant's response to their environment - a response that has as yet to be mediated by any development of verbal or complex language:

"It is a well-established fact that the newborn has already developed a complete emotional repertoire largely independent of whatever limited degree of cognitive development exists" (O'Hagan, 1995: 492 citing Christie, Newson, Newson and Prevezer, 1992 and Maletesta, Culver, Tesman and Shepherd, 1989).

We can see that the infant body, in its earliest social state is not a blank wall, awaiting inscription by a passing cultural graffiti artist, or to repeat a metaphor already used in this thesis, some plastic store dummy awaiting its tribal clothing. In this we can see how the body is less a piece of matériel awaiting sculpting into a suitable model and more one which interacts vigorously with its environment. The body's responses (plural) to its environment, and in this sense we are talking pre-language, is not purely responsive or reactive in a meaningless sense, waiting for more appropriate terms with which to relate
to the world. It engages in a process of interaction which informs those surrounding it of some element of its nature and its interactive capacity.

We can see this in the research into the effect infant's behaviour has on their carers. The relationship is not purely unilateral. Indeed there is evidence of a complimentary operation at work, which shows this to be only one part of an interactive process. An interactional process has been observed in which the actions of the infant were shown to have an influence on the actions of the carer (Gewirtz and Boyd, 1976). How the adult carers constructed the meaning of the infant’s actions, that is the interpretative elements forming the carer’s interactions, plays a major role in how the carers react to the child. This underlines the importance the temperamental differences of infants, and the meaning placed on this behaviour, play in the relationship between the child and the carer (Scott-Little and Holloway, 1992; Janis, Mahl, Kagan and Holt, 1969).

What is interesting is that not only can the caregiver greatly influence an infant they attend to, by reacting to the child's own actions, but they simultaneously are manipulating and modifying a child. They can in turn be "…made more or less anxious by the babies own particular style of mood and degree of adaptability" (Peterson, 1984: 125).

There is then a relationship here between the infant and their environment, an interactional relationship. Read in other terms, the developing body, with its actions and reactions, enters into a dynamic with its surroundings. This dynamic forms a reciprocal relationship. Within this relationship, we can see two elements, nature and nurture: the body with its responses and demands and the environment with its responses and demands. Cycles of re/action are observable within which there is no clear element of cause/response or action/reaction. Consequently benign and negative cycles can result. Benign cycles result within an environment which encourages trust, producing "…an infant who will be happier and more content…" (Turner and Helms, 1983: 143). The happier infant will influence the caregiver in a positive manner, which will elicit more sensitive attention from them, which will in turn more positively affect the child. Children who experience a supportive and trustworthy environment "…have a tendency to exhibit smoother patterns of emotional stability and adjustment…" (Walters and Stinnett, 1971, cited in Turner and Helms, 1983: 184).
This behaviour tends to elicit more relaxed and soothing responses from carers, avoiding a negative cycle of interaction. The development of a healthy attachment assists the child to see the world as composed of challenges rather than obstacles; as events that can be managed rather than persistent threats (Monte, 1980). It also influences the child to engage in a higher quality of exploratory play and promotes a greater degree of persistence, skilled problem-solving (Sroufe, 1979, cited in Peterson, 1984: 130) and personal control (Seligman, 1975, cited in Peterson, 1984: 130).

A negative cycle may result when a child "...whimpers, cries and finally may scream as hunger pangs or skin irritations increase" (Turner and Helms, 1983: 143). This in turn angers or frustrates the caregiver, who may respond negatively to the infant. e.g. roughly handling the child, screaming or shouting, thus further exacerbating the child's discomfort and therefore worsening the child's discomfort. The result is a perpetuation of the child's behaviour and further anger/frustration from the carer.

Analysis based within an interactional perspective provides an opportunity to evaluate the development of children in a manner that allows for the social environment of the child to be incorporated: the effects of the body and its social experiences are thus highlighted. This can be seen in work on motor skills development.

Studies have been conducted on children in a diverse number of countries (e.g. Japan, Ghana, Solomon Islands, USA, Britain, Belgium). The results show that the chronology of when a range of skills is developed (e.g. walking, sitting up) varies from country to country, as well as within a country. What has also been important to notice is that the variations in the care styles is quite likely the factor implicated in the differences and these factors are culturally based. Cultural variations in infants have also been linked to such things as obstetric care and maternal adaptation to the infant's behaviour (Coll, 1991 cited in Fay, 1991: 3). For example, Japanese children were shown to have a greater degree of fine motor competency (in the handling of pens and pencils) at the age of three, when compared to British children. Japanese children also were more exposed to the need for these skills by their experience with chop-sticks (Saida and Miyashita, 1979 cited in Fay, 1991: 4).

Another area of debate is the argument raised surrounding class-differences within cultural groups (Fay, 1991 citing Scott, Ferguson, Jenkins and Cutler, 1955; Williams and Scott, 1953 Vs. Capute, Shapiro, Palmer, Ross and Wacentel, 1985).
What all this shows is the interactive nature of the relationship between developmental elements and social elements; between the biological and the social.

5.11 Attachment, quality of life and later life relationships

One of the central issues in this field of study is the impact attachment has on life and life quality: the ability to achieve the maximum level of the potential available, with regard to structural disadvantage. This thesis emphasises consideration for the quality of life and for a more human consideration to be given to people.

In his work, Bowlby was aware of the future implications that various attachment styles would have (Waters and Cummings, 2000: 5). There are many debates within the field as to the long-term consequences of poor or disrupted attachment. Some research has identified a strong correlation between the 'affectional bonds' developed in infancy and those in later life (Hazan and Shaver, 1987, cited in Pervin, 1989: 111-114). Other research looked at children at the age of one year and then again at six. For the boys, they found a correlation between insecurely attached children (at age one) and (what was termed as being at risk of) pathological behaviour patterns at the age of six (Lewis, Feiring, Muffog and Jaskir, 1984 cited in Pervin, 1989).

Some consequences of attachment disorders are neatly summarised by Iwaniec (1995, citing work by Zeaneh and Emde, 1994; Powell, Low and Speers, 1987 and Herrenkohl and Herrenkohl, 1981): "…withdrawal, detachment, lack of connection with activities in the immediate surroundings, depressive reactions, indiscriminate sociability, apprehension, stupor, irritability, and distress" (Iwaniec, 1995: 67). Social interactions are characterised by "…ambivalence, avoidance, or indifference on the one hand, or by attention-seeking in the other (Iwaniec, 1995: 67). Such results have also been found in research by others, for example Provence and Lipton (Iwaniec, 1995: 21). However, the research also showed a poor predictive element in the results. It is "…when we observe later pathology [that] it is all too easy to understand how it developed" (Pervin, 1989: 111).

This is not to say that the development of one form of attachment and security in infancy (good, bad or indifferent) is the sole arbiter of future social relations. Though early attachment patterns are shown to have an influence on later interactions:
"By adulthood, the list has expanded to include social alliances, status, and broad array of assets that are important across cultures (e.g., good health, experience, wealth) and culture specific assets (e.g., religious values, rank, and socially valued traits)." (Waters and Cummings, 2000: 9)

However, there is a strong correlation between poor, early attachment development and later relationships; especially those relationships with one's own children. As stated the development of attachment and security operates within an interactional framework. When this is poor, and the adult also has a history of poor attachment, there is a greater risk of abuse to their own children (Zuravin, McMillen, DePanfilis and Risley-Curtiss, 1996). In short, poor adult attachment styles place the subject's children at risk of abuse (Moncher, 1996).

5.12 Problems with the research

"Both Bowlby and Ainsworth initially worked toward a normative theory of attachment - that is, the emphasis was on the typical infant rather than on individual differences among infants." (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 226)

To research the individual differences would have required distinguishing between those children who become attached and those who do not. "The practical problem is that essentially all home-reared infants become attached" (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 226).

This is the same problem highlighted by Durkheim:

"It is the functions of the average organism that the physiologist studies; and the sociologist does the same." (Durkheim, 1938 1895: 56)

"We forget that it is much easier for him [the biologist] than for the sociologist to observe how the resistance of the organism is affected by each phenomenon and to determine thereby its normal or abnormal character with sufficient exactness for practical purposes. In sociology the greater complexity and inconstancy of the facts oblige us to take many more precautions, and this is all too evident in the contradictory judgements on
the same phenomenon given by different scholars." (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 65)

It is only through research into pre-existing situations, such as orphanages in Britain in the 1940's and Romania in the 1990's, that another form of social relationship development can be analysed en masse.

Problems exist in trying to research the carer's behaviour prior to the child's birth and therefore its consistent presence following birth (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 227). The diversity of carer behaviour is also problematic in relation to the evolutionary elements of attachment development.

In evolutionary terms, individuals of the same species tend to be uniform in their possession of critical survival mechanisms. This makes assessing the dissimilarity quite difficult. Additionally, whilst the research into the diversity would be of interest, they "...might not prove critical to the onset of attachment behavior" (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 227).

A neat summary is provided by Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters:

"Correlations between infant attachment security and later socialization outcomes are among the most widely cited findings in the attachment literature. At the same time, they present attachment theory with one of its most difficult challenges. Specifically, it is not obvious how a child's confidence in its mother's availability and responsiveness (i.e. secure attachment) could keep it from putting a rock through the schoolhouse window." (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991: 234)

5.13 Conclusion: The brain, the body and Human social relatedness

Research on the brain shows that it is develops in close relationship with its environment. It can be affected by events not only in its chemical environment, such as pollution, but also events in its social environment. These changes can have subsequent effects on behaviour. On a more wholistic scale, the withdrawal of positive, engaging social interactions can have an adverse effect on human physical growth and the ability to relate constructively towards others; all of which can be seen the chapters covering
Harlow’s work, work into non-organic failure to thrive, the experiences of orphans under the Ceausescu regime and attachment theory. The last of these also provides evidence of the existence of attachment and the drive to social contact as an inherent, biological drive and thereby draws a common thread through all preceding sections.

This thesis argues that the human body incorporates a drive towards social relationships. It also argues that there are limitations to the flexibility and possibilities of human plasticity and that these can be seen in the body and its relations with others. Some of the research shown here provides direct and concrete evidence that supports a contention made by Durkheim - that isolation itself is unnatural and that everyone has a need for association (Durkheim cited in Jones, 1999, Sens Lectures 40). It also supports Marx’s contention that to develop man’s human environment is required to ensure humans develop their ‘true nature’ (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844b]: 115).

To reiterate Stern: "...human social relatedness is present from birth..." (1985: 44)

Generally, it is not the case that an instance or an isolated negative event results in some negative outcome, but it is the patterning of events and the exposure of the child to them which causes them to be: "...exposed for varying periods of time to relatively good care..." or bad (Haynes-Seman, 1987: 320 citing Brandt Steele, 1983). We do not have to accept that there is uniform outcome for all instances. As Foucault contends, forms of determination have 'polymorphous rather than unilinear' outcomes (Barrett, 1991: 131). It is necessary to repeat here, however, that ‘Polymorphous’ does not mean ‘Omnimorphous’. There is a receding probability of varying outcomes the greater the similarity of the circumstances. Further, some environments inhibit the drive to being social. As Durkheim commented, the existence of a particular form of social or community behaviour does not necessarily mean that it is productive or good (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 49). Multiple possible outcomes do not mean all are acceptable or constructive and some, as we have seen, may well be dangerous or harmful.
Human life is social life. It requires the ability to relate to others and, in doing so, to be able to be flexible to varying degrees. That human life is social is not a discovery of sociology (Horton, 1965), but it is an interest of sociology. The intent of this thesis has been to explore the notion, within the nature/nurture debate, of the body having a nature, and that being a social nature. In doing so, the intransigency of the problematic of laying claims to some form of truth is evident (Foucault, 1987b); so to is the acknowledgement that in developing theory, one can only pose a 'hypothetical model of the nature of reality' from which one can seek to develop questions for investigation (Weigart, 1970).

As stated in the introduction, this thesis has been seeking to explore some 'dumb questions' (Kirby, 1997) about the nature/nurture debate and to apply some of the results of this exploration to the sociology of child abuse. I have also tried, with varying degrees of success, to avoid the 'blind hostility' element of this statement by Kirby.

In one sense, the lack of discussion of the corporeality of the body, and children, in sociological research, forced the inclusion of this material. At the time of writing this conclusion, I am also attending training in a 'new' model of child abuse risk assessment, and am again being reminded of the influence of the two areas of research - sociology and psychology - and the reasons that I have wished to use material from both.

In drawing on material from psychology and biology, and attempting to write it into sociology, I have also tried not to 'write over it', in the sense in which Marx criticised the 'German literati (Marx and Engels, 1967 [1848/1888]: 110). Rather I have tried to maintain its integrity and meaning, whilst critically evaluating its use to this thesis, to the sociology of the body and to the sociology of child abuse.

Though it is never true that a conclusion is in fact what it states itself to be (as this would foreclose on further debate), this conclusion is a crude discussion of the results of this thesis. In this sense, it is a discussion in terms of what the thesis proposes for the sociology of the body and the nature/nurture debate, and the sociology of child abuse.

6.1 Sociology and the body

The body has become a much-debated subject in sociology and as such is an extreme contrast to a focus on social structures; a micro-physics as against a macro-physics. It was this desire to re-focus interest from State institutions which lead Foucault to the body (Foucault, 1980). In doing so, sociology began a different form of exploration of the body in the social world. As a consequence, newer debates and older debates about the nature/nurture divide are drawn together and re-mixed and re-explored.

Legitimate concerns are still evident about the political nature of sociobiology, and its potential for framing and forming oppressive theory and practice, such as those that globalise and homogenise intelligence levels between races (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). This does not mean that this is its only potential use and a 'Biological Left', like Singer's 'Darwinian Left' (Singer, 1999), is a possible and legitimate aim. However, a sociology which places humans as separate from, and beyond the effect of, biology, places humans as an Über-species in the animal world and replicating the Judeo-Christian view of 'man' and closing the discussion. Even in such a brief review of research on pollution, cosmetic and clothing, as covered in this thesis, we can see this is a simplistic and incomplete image of the body.

By engaging with biological material and becoming more familiar with its limitations (Kaplan and Rogers, 1990), we can locate its applicability to a sociology of the body (Kirby, 1997; Grosz, 1994) and propose a rethink in sociology around the nature/nurture divide. In this way, we generate a discussion which is less 'one or the other' (Benton, 1991) and thereby subvert the notion that nature and nurture are 'natural' opposites (Miedzian, 1992).

The research discussed shows clearly the inter-twining and inter-operation of culture/biology. This means that biology cannot be seen as a purely separate entity, a 'stand-alone' closed system. In exploring the limit-setting of biology's effect on sociology, we enter into a limit-setting of biology. To say that the 'natural', biology, 'bleeds into' the 'cultural', sociology, is patently incorrect. Cultural activity has an effect on biological development. Moore and Morelli's work (1979, cited in Kaplan and Rogers, 1990) on the gender development of the sex of rats, provides evidence of the inter-relationship culture/biology, in the development of male and female related behaviour and brain development. Language, vision and hearing are all possible developments of human biology, but without the environment providing these
opportunities, they are limited their development. The up shot is that what the body is capable of, and its limitations, are areas for ongoing exploration (Grosz, 1994).

In such a debate, the tenets of Marx and Durkheim's work become reinvigorated. If, following Foucault, we look to the body for new answers and questions, we can ask, like Marx and Durkheim: are there experiences or environments that are not productive or positive for humans to experience? Are there environments that do not permit the full exploitation and development of human potential? Both axiomatically utilised notions of human nature in their work and their 'human nature' was a social nature. Both acknowledged that what was often proposed of as human nature was in fact socially constructed. In accepting that there was difficulty in determining what was 'natural' and what was 'social', they settled on 'being social' as an innate attribute. In neither instance is there the proposition that this could not be deflected or re-constructed, but both considered that this resulted in negative consequences for human social existence.

After exploring the literature on non-organic failure to thrive and attachment, we can see how prescient both Marx and Durkheim were, although unwittingly. As I have stated earlier, this is not to position the biology of the body as inflexible or deterministic; observable difference is far too great to support notions of linear rigidity. Rather it provides information to assist in our theorising and decision making - ethical decisions are not biological facts (Singer, 1999: 15).

The body then begins to speak its opinion. The nature/nurture divide becomes a debate over the same ground, rather than opposing sides. The corporeality of the body gives voice to its interests, expressing its ability to change, explore and create - within limits, to extents, with greater or lesser capacity, with greater or lesser ease and virtuosity. We are then in the realm of an 'embodied sociology' (Scott and Morgan, 1993). Drawing on a corporealised body, rather than the post-modern cosmetic body, means we engage with the potential, the possible and the probable: for instance, an embodied sociology would also create newer ways of approaching the creation and operation of gender (Grosz, 1994). This may well trespass against Foucault's argument that the body does not provide a stable means by which to develop 'self-recognition', or by which one can understand another (Foucault, 1971), but I, along with others (Bell, 1993 cited in Butler, 1990a), have argued that in his later work, Foucault himself was questioning the wisdom of his own words.
Is the body prediscursive? Is this the way it enters the world? R.D. Laing (Monte, 1980) argued that there was the possibility of interuterine interaction. Exploring this would be one of the options for an embodied sociology. There has already been exploration of the effects of social change on the body, as we saw in the research on factory workers discussed by Benton (1991, citing Beale and Nethercott, 1985 and 1986). Exploring the physical, embodied effects of social change and social interactions would open up other links between the 'what happens' and the 'how it happens'. How does poverty create ill health (other than through the obvious limitation in health service availability) what is 'so bad' about the social environments some people live in? This allows explorations that are not so susceptible to the criticism of pure cultural relativism, whilst at the same time refusing individualisation.

6.2 The Sociology of Child Abuse

Amongst other thing, post-modern theorising has helped to critically evaluate structural disadvantage, the homogenising of social categories, legitimise difference and variations, re-evaluate notions of freedom, power and the veracity of truth claims and the objectivity of claims to objectivity. In doing so, it assists to identify and constitute the interests of 'others'. Research based on social construction theory and deviancy analysis has also brought into question existing social conditions and institutions, political alliances, legal bias and the demonising of difference. Both support Durkheim's contention that whilst science can illuminate the world, it cannot illuminate our hearts (Durkheim, 1938).

Yet, these approaches have a limited utility when the issue of abuse is addressed (Parton, 1990). Often in the sociology of childhood and child abuse, we see the question: 'what constitutes childhood?'. That this same question is not raised in the context of research on abuse or oppression in general provides the best evidence that in sociology, especially in terms of the sociology of children, childhood and child abuse, the notional adult is normative. As a consequence, children's interests are either not recognised or addressed, produced in tandem with adult-child (often parent or mother) (Giovannoni and Becerria, 1982), or marginalised as of secondary importance. This can be most clearly seen when writers (eg. Swift, 1995) state that emphasising children's rights somehow places children in competition with their mothers.
In exploring the nature/nurture debate, this thesis has sought to cover some elements of the issue of harm (albeit in a limited and tentative fashion), within the context of the sociology of child abuse. Both Marx and Durkheim were concerned about the fate and well-being of people. For all their theorising, I think they would be seriously concerned if this kernel of their work was forgotten or somehow diluted. As an axiomatic element of their work, it framed the notion of what they believed to be the nature of humans. Without humans having a nature, both alienation and anomie lose any sense of meaning and become so plastic and distorted as to bring into question their veracity and utility. For both, there was danger in failing to differentiate between culturally produced human actions, and 'natural' tendencies. Despite this, both adopted a notion of human nature that was social in orientation. In both instances, inhibiting this social nature produced harmful effects. Consequently, events and actions which produced alienation and anomie were harmful, and preferably avoided or ameliorated. For Marx, humans required a social environment to fully develop, for Durkheim, self-interest and self-orientation were manifestations of cultural practices that lead to anomie.

In the sociology of child abuse however, notions of harm, if included at all, have often been oriented toward the experience and interests of adults (Parton, 1990), especially their experiences of state intervention. This is in many ways a consequence of the process of discussing childhood as an historical and cultural construction, and, I suspect, because the research is conducted and written by, and for, adults. This needs to be addressed by locating the experience and interests of children first, in the same way that feminists have argued that research on violence against women should place the experience and interests of women first.

The notion of the changing view of childhood and varying levels of interest in children is often presented as a means by which to position children in a way not usually attributed to adults - as pure social construct. By failing to then address children in the same manner as adults this somehow presents them as lacking substance. The question as to whether this form of question is found at the commencement of research involving the normative adult has a most obvious answer. Yet to be theoretically consistent, how is it that we manage to discuss the operation of adult society without identifying the child? (Jenks, 1996); I would hypothesis that this reflects an unease in adult relationships with children. They are the last group of humans to speak for themselves and the only ones who don't provide self-written social research papers.
As stated earlier, Connell argues that a crucial moment in social politics occurs when the interests of a social group are constituted as separate from those around them (Connell, 1987: 262). By showing that children are a separate group, not a sub-group, their interests must be treated as seriously as those of other groups. Not only is it unreasonable to explain or 'theorise' them away, such activity only serves to expose the latent interests of adults. Addressing this tendency is imperative, no matter how unpleasant or difficult this may be for adults - and I would submit that it is something that many adults will not find pleasant or comfortable.

This raises the question of what happens in sociology when children's interests are focused, defined and constituted? Where does this leave child abuse research which focuses on the experiences and views of adults to the occlusion of the child's experience or story? In deconstructing the body in social theory and approaching the sociology of the body from a notion of corporeality, with the attendant (open) question of both potential and limitation, we re-address the notion of harm and abuse. Failure-to-thrive and attachment research both emphasise the importance of the social environment. The research shows that failure to provide an environment in which there is social contact and stimulation impairs development. Significantly, what it impairs is not only physical and neurological development, but also social development; the acquisition of the ability to interact positively and constructively with others.

The approach in this thesis is akin to that of David Gil's (1975). As stated in the section on defining child abuse, Gil defines child abuse as that which causes a child's potential to be compromised, inhibited or restricted. His focus is on the 'gaps or deficits' in the circumstances of a child's life which prevent their optimum development. In doing this, he refuses to individualise the problem, rather looking at the social factors and issues which are related to abuse, such as poverty, racism, the normalising of competition as opposed to co-operation, and the acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of conflict resolution. Additional to this are those economic practices that position humans as a 'resource'.

In the creation of definitions of child abuse, I would argue that it is an axiom that children have an innate right to optimal development. This right exists regardless of whatever the source or agent of this omission or commission, or cause of the deficit in provision of such circumstances. Far from requiring the individualisation of the notion
of child abuse, this approach requires the institution of child abuse as a harmful experience of children and as such, a problem of society.
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"Dumb questions - blustering hostility"\textsuperscript{1}:
Nature/nurture, the body and the sociology of child abuse.

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\textsuperscript{1} (Kirby, 1997: 1)
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Summary

This thesis critiques the nature/nature debate in sociology and applies current thinking to sociological work on child abuse. By examining the literature available within sociology, biology and ecology, the nature/nurture debate is shown to be a defining epistemological construct within sociology. The debate frames both the classical theories of Marx and Durkheim, and contemporary sociological research on the body, such as that by Foucault. In deconstructing the debate, this thesis shows that addressing biology within sociology does not require an acceptance of determinism and that a plurality of possibilities still exists. It also reveals that human corporeality is viscerally susceptible to the environment and that separating human social life from its corporeality merely reiterates the Judeo-Christian theology that human life is divinely separate from its environment. This work is contextualised in the debate on defining notions of childhood and child abuse, thus revealing the operation of underlying discourses which both depend on notions of human nature, and which operate to marginalise children by postulating the 'adult' as a clearly formed and deserving category of sociological interest. In applying contemporary and classical sociology to the issue of child abuse, this thesis destabilises contemporary notions of the plasticity of the body and the irrelevance of the biological sciences to human social life.

Certificate of Submission

This thesis is submitted in satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Honours) Sociology, University of Western Sydney - Macarthur. It has not been submitted for a higher degree at any other institution.

Signed: Patrick J Brennan
4 April 2004
Introduction

"The notion that human life is social, in the sense that human life involves relationships with others, is not a discovery of sociology. What is distinctive about the treatment of this idea during the formative period of modern sociology is the strong intimation that the 'social' can be the subject of disciplined reflection." (Horton, 1965: 13)

"The problem of the truth of what I say is very difficult for me, and it's also the central problem. It's essentially the question which up to now I have never answered." (Foucault, interview with Trombadori, 1991: 32)

As Foucault himself said later in the same interview, he was not certain that intellectuals could identify the problems of the society they lived in. To do so, one needed to talk to "non-intellectuals", to help identify those things that affected them (Trombadori, 1991: 151-152). This raises some interesting questions: Can intellectuals tell the 'truth'?; What truth is there to tell?; and, should this 'telling' remain the preserve of the intellectual disciplines? Foucault's concern was that this intellectualisation of social theory served to prevent the opening up of what he termed 'real problems'. To overcome this, it was necessary to collaborate by listening to the non-intellectuals problems and to address localised problems (which in no way diminished their ability to be a general problem).

In the same way that Foucault commented that his works are part of his life, his biography (Trombadori, 1991: 38), so too it is not possible to separate this thesis from my own experiences, work and life. Having worked in the field of child abuse, and more specifically recently in child protection, for some 16 years, the fact of the first quote is quite evident, as are the two references drawn from Foucault. Child protection, as a professional occupation, is interested in whether the social and physical circumstance in which a child lives is detrimental to a child's present well-being and future livelihood. How this is assessed is based within a legal, financial, political and personal framework, formed by a combination of discursive and non-discursive forces. How all of this forms practice on a day-to-day basis becomes a professional and personal exercise, and as such, requires direct, involved and face-to-face application. That it is about human life and lived circumstance is unavoidable.
The poststructuralist determination (as defined by Bigwood) of the body is that it: "… is contextualised only as a place marker of quasi-linguistic systems of signifiers, is so fluid it can take on almost limitless embodiments and has no real terrestrial weight" (Bigwood, 1991: 103). Thus, in terms of post-modernist theorising, there is no "…practical difference between passing for true and really being true" (1998: 179), which in itself, is a reiteration of Foucault's 'truth claims'. The practical application of such approaches is very difficult to sustain in the area of child abuse. Essentially it denies the purpose of intervention. It also denies the issue of harm in all social interaction and as such has presented epistemological enterprises aimed at equality and liberation, such as feminism, with little in which to ground an approach.

I would argue that it is far easier to make such comments when one is engaged purely in philosophical or academic discussion without the need to take any action. As Foucault himself said, when he was asked to intervene in a case where a man had beaten to death his wife and then raped and killed a 12 year old boy: "I answered no. He was a terrifying head-basher and I didn't have the prescription in my pocket…" (Trombadori, 1991b: 162). For those who work in the field of child protection, writing legislation, investigating, assessing and supporting, such refusal to engage in providing answers is not possible. What I am not so certain about, is much that passes for child abuse/protection research within the field of sociology. To me is seems that: "Sociology is the answer. But what was the question?"(Ulrich Beck, 1991, cited in Bauman, 2000a: 85) succinctly phrases the concern this thesis identifies in contemporary sociology and particularly its engagement with child abuse.

After the storms of the 1980s, one of the problems for sociology has been its utility (Black, 1999) and I am conscious of Denzin's comment that one of the problems with applied sociology is its: "…unwitting support of the current political system" (Denzin, 1970: 125). Debates about sociology's future and present create such interactive discussions as those between Collins and Denzin in the 1980s (Collins, 1986; Denzin, 1987; Collins, 1987). However, the break with Enlightenment notions of freedom and humanism has caused sociology to drift further and further away from some basic concerns and to which this thesis proposes a redirection:

"Doing sociology and writing sociology are aimed at disclosing the possibility of living together differently, with less misery or no misery: the possibility daily withheld, overlooked or disbelieved. Not-seeing, not-seeking and thereby suppressing this possibility is itself part of human misery and a major factor in its perpetuation." (Bauman, 2000a: 89)
It is this aspect of sociology which has interested me, and is the very reason for this thesis. In child protection work, the purpose is to prevent harm to children, and if this is not possible, to aim to reduce or minimise the risk of harm: a purpose and aim opposed by few if any. In this sense, how this is done is far more complicated than the why. How, when, in what way and what should be done, and to whom, are merely more avenues of complexity. What appeared to me, however, was that in ignoring human embodiment, the sociology of child abuse had veered into a discourse in which the notion of harm to children was marginalised, and at times denied, in preference for concern for the rights of adults and their interests. By questioning accepted notions with 'dumb' questions, as Kirby so plainly states, and risking being met with "blustering hostility" (Kirby, 1997: 1), this thesis seeks to examine the nature/nurture debate, applying the debate to sociological notions of childhood and the social and human sciences knowledge of children. By doing this, I wish to expose some of the flaws in post-modern views of human life and by extension, to destabilise the hyper-flexible and plastic notions of human existence and social life it has proclaimed.

This thesis is based on an interest in the rights of children and their well-being. It argues against adult interests and rights in that it places children as the focus of sociological work into child abuse. It also seeks to explore the research on the body and to address the sociology of child abuse as an embodied practice; as a practice based in the corporeal, biological body.

I raise this as an acknowledgement that in sociology, statements are based on accepted axioms, which are in a sense, value statements. These axiomatic underpinnings need, in turn, to be accepted as proper sociological means of enquiry (Denzin, 1989). In theorising this approach, I wish to produce a means by to legitimise and develop a means by which to extend this form of investigation (Weigart, 1970: 114). Therefore, this thesis begins its argument on the basis that as humans we are:

"…a member of nature by virtue of being an organism and a member of society by virtue of culture, some solution has to be found to this Jekyll-and-Hyde duplexity." (Turner, 1984: 21)

What I take Turner to be saying here is that the nature/nurture debate is a defining element within sociological theorising. One starts off from a premise of what human nature is or is not, or if indeed there is one - even if you decide not to acknowledge it.

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1 Though, as I shall discuss later, Nelson argues that for some it is merely an opportunity to be 'on the
As I shall discuss in the opening chapter of this thesis, I am not proposing an epistemology based on a deterministic axiom, more exploring a theory which, through study and in working in child abuse, has gradually and slowly developed.

The section on biology explores the debates that have existed within sociology and between biology and sociology. Much effort has already gone into this debate and Feminism has taken a central position in the nature/nurture debate, working to dislocate the biology/gender nexus (Wild, 1978; Miedzian, 1992; Grosz, 1994; Sargent, 1994). In addressing legitimate concerns that sociology may be subsumed by sociobiological theories (which over-reach their methodology and seek to position all human social interaction as the result of some variation of genetic determinism), this section argues that rejecting all notions of biology perpetuates the "…assumed opposition between nature and culture" (Miedzian, 1992; Barrett, 1991: 94 citing Horigan, 1988). By examining the debate, I seek to show that sociology has positioned humans as somehow above and beyond the reach of nature (Catton and Dunlap, 1978). The consequence has been the instating of theoretical models that are derivative and reflective of Judeo-Christian theology (Shreeve, 1995: 12), and thereby ignoring the obvious - that the body is a biological phenomenon, which is both interactive and creative.

To extend this analysis, in the chapter on the history of childhood, I explore the changing notions of childhood throughout history. What is also argued is that there has been no period in which childhood was 'discovered' and that differentiation of children from adults is not a recent phenomenon (Elizabeth Pollock, 1983; Herlihy, 1978); thereby undermining the commonly held sociological view that childhood is a relatively recent social phenomenon. What is also shown is that notions of childhood have varied within the same periods of time and concern for children has been an historical constant. By exploring historical and contemporary childhood, the nature/nurture debate becomes manifest in notions of children's primary nature and how these notions have framed social views about children, their place in society and in relation to the adult world.

What also becomes evident is that sociology is based on an adult-centric view of society. Combined with the elusiveness of children in historical records (Herlihy, 1978: 109) and a paucity of research (Branmen and O'Brien, 1995: 729) this has conspired to relegate children and childhood to a 'phenomena' of social construction and thereby marginalising their interests. Finally, the chapter argues that sociology has disputed constructs of childhood, without recognising the inherent hypocrisy that
a failure to develop a notion of childhood and children renders it is impossible to form a notion of adulthood and adults (Jenks, 1996: 3).

Developing this thesis within the nature/nurture debate, I then address classical sociology, in the form of Marx and Durkheim. Epistemologically influenced by the Enlightenment (Hughes, Martin and Sharrock, 1995) the two sources of inspiration for classical sociology have been that of human liberation and control (Dawes, 1970: 211).

"The dominant objectives of the whole age…were those of release: release of the individual from ancient social ties and of the mind from fettering tradition." (Dawes, 1970: 211)

This thesis resurrects Marx's criticism of Feuerbach (1936 [1845/1888]) and the French Materialists (McLellan, 1980), which, like contemporary hyper-theorising on child protection and abuse, leave out 'the human element' (McLellan, 1980: 136). Similarly, criticism of the same practice can be found in Durkheim's warning that in some research, ideology frames the approach to such an extent that it predetermines the outcome, rather than relying on the 'facts' gathered (Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 48). Foucault was also to later raise the criticism that ideology could have a structuring effect (Foucault, 1980: 109-133). By determining that biology/nature plays no role, most post-modernist approaches have already set their destination, it's merely the path that is undetermined.

The section shows that Marx and Durkheim's work commences from "…a view of human nature, from which follows a view of the relationship between the individual and society" (Dawes, 1970: 208). For both Marx and Durkheim, notions of what was human nature (and as I shall show in the discussion to follow, these are at times quite ambiguous) formed the basis for their major works on Alienation and Anomie (Horton, 1965). Each was concerned for the well being of humans and held that humans were social by nature (Jones citing Durkheim, 1999; Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844a]). Without an acceptance of these axioms (that human nature exists and humans are social by nature), the concepts of alienation and anomic come adrift from their original meanings and are rendered so pliable as to become ultimately vacuous and meaningless (Mestrovic, 1988c; Horton, 1965). Attempts by the 'German literati' to re-write his work in a similar fashion were criticised by Marx himself (Marx and Engels, 1967 [1848/ 1888]). More recent work, extending from Durkheim's exploration of suicide, has been criticised for making it 'unreal', to the point where the human suffering is lost (Alverez, 1972, cited in Mestrovic, 1988c: 698).
From the classical theorists, I then cover more recent work on the body, drawing primarily on work by Foucault, with an extension in to other contemporary sociological counter-work on the body and biology. Foucault's work is used to legitimise the use in this thesis of 'disqualified knowledges' (Foucault, 1980: 82) drawn from the biological sciences. It also supports the theme in this thesis that such material can assist in the constitution of polymorphous outcomes - though with greater or lesser degrees of probability. Foucault's' notions of discourse, the power/knowledge nexus and the body, was to draw him away from his initial postulations about power, made in *Archaeologies* (1972), to the more constructive and creative notions of power discussed in *Discipline and Punish* (1977a). Though he was to initially theorise that the human body provided no basis for self recognition or social interaction (Foucault, 1971: 87-88), his later work on resistance to the operation of power/knowledge brought about the beginnings of a re-evaluation of this position (Bell, 1993: 51 citing Butler, 1990a).

More recently, the body has been positioned as both natural and cultural (Turner, 1984: 49). Prompting the argument that sociology needs to come to terms with the materiality of the physical body (Shilling, 1991: 664). That we all have a body (Kirby, 1991) seems as prosaic as to say we need one to effect any action in the world (Oyama, 1991: 30). In the context of theorising which has determined the biological body as irrelevant, both comments are as obvious as they are politically dangerous. This work shows that focusing on the surface of the body, as if it were a store mannequin, is not a comment on the biology of the body, rather it is commentary on purely aesthetic elements of culture - a sort of 'cosmetic body'. In this it ignores that cultural aesthetics can have a deleterious effect on the body. This is critically assessed by briefly looking at the constituents of cosmetics (Stehlin, 1995), environmental pollution (Wolfe, 2000) and the effects of some forms of clothing (Rowe and Hamada, 2000; Mackie, 1996; Gates, 1992; Greenhalgh, 1977). In a sense, most work on the body is really just about the scribbling on the surface. It neglects the biological corporeality of the body, the memories held in the body and its recursive relationship in defining experience.

In turning to issues of child abuse, the next chapter looks at the problems encountered when attempting to define what child abuse is. In this, the influence of nature/nurture dualism is brought out in the debates over what constitutes child abuse, bringing together the material covered in the chapter on a history of childhood. Definitions turn on what is considered 'natural' in children and society's expectation of and for them - in essence, what they are 'to become'. Definitions of abuse are identified as the central problematic in the field. Not only do they have a
constructing effect (Mason, 1993; Bourne, 1979), but are themselves a construct of the definitions created. Elements such as service funding (The Violence Against Children Study Group, 1990; Tomison, 1998; Newberger and Bourne, 1978), community interest, political considerations (O'Hagan, 1995; Kilpatrick and Rinaudo, 1995) and media and community interests (Killen, 1994), are turned back on themselves, so that the process of creating definitions develops within a recursive hermeneutic. In attempting to include cultural variations, a dilemma is produced: how to chart a path between ethnocentrism and relativism (Korbin, 1991 and 1981). Consequently, variations in definitions make international comparisons difficult (Gordon, 1990; Bourne, 1979).

In that they are political debates (Parton, 1990), child abuse definitions throw in to relief notions of social control (Mason, 1993) and the relationship between the State and the Family. In conflating correlational and causal factors (Pelton, 1981: 32) 'blame the victim' style interventions are produced in which poverty, social disadvantage (Ryan, 1972) and child abuse are 'individualised' (Nelson, 1984). Feminism and social deviancy analysis have both contributed to a critical dismantling of these approaches (Gordon, 1990: xv). Unfortunately, this has also lead to notions of harm 'to the child' becoming minimised and marginalised (Parton, 1990). In arguing the position of the disadvantaged and oppressed against the power of the State, children have been subsumed into parent-child and mother-child tandems, as if somehow their interests and needs are synonymous. This thesis, however, argues that the rights of children will not somehow 'naturally spring forth' simultaneously, nor will child abuse stop, when adults rights, freedoms or needs, are met or obtained (Ennew, 1986, cited in Parton, 1986: 17). Theoretical constructs in which the problematic of child abuse is either individualised or constructed as a matter of social values and attitudes, mirror the nature/nurture divide, setting up a false dualism. This thesis argues that a more effective approach is engaged by addressing the body as a corporeal phenomenon.

In this last chapter, material not often utilised in the sociology of child abuse is deployed, developing the notion of the body as a physiological entity, as a body constituted by its corporeality. Rather than revealing a hidden 'biological determinism', the research emphases that whilst there are limitations, the overwhelming evidence leans towards the interactive nature of the bodies' biology. Research on the organic brain has shown the existence of an interactive relationship - the brain develops as a result of social experience (Glaser, 2000: 100). Without some experiences, the related aspects of the brain are restricted in their development, for example the capacity for vision (Glaser, 2000), hearing (Tye-Murray, Spencer and
Woodworth, 1995) and language (Morgan, 1995; McConnell and Philipchalk; Rose, 1976). What the research also reveals is that sensory deprivation, that is the lack of physical and social contact, one in which the lack of touch and physical contact and interaction can result in impaired and restricted brain development (Perry and Pollard, 1998; Bylinsky, 1973). The result of this removal of the social world, results in behavioural and social dysfunction (Perry and Pollard, 1997). The failure-to-thrive (FTT) noticed in research carried out by Harry Harlow on monkeys (eg. 1958), has also been observed in human infants. Though failure to thrive can have organic and dietary causes, non-organic failure-to-thrive (NOFTT) is identified with social factors such as child abuse and disengaged parenting (Drotar et al, 1990; Kristiansson and Fallstrom, 1987; Alderette and deGraffenried, 1986; Bradley, Casey and Wortham, 1984). In short, environments in which children are refused contact and interaction, where they are not touched, played with or treated as a human, social, being, prevent and impair the development of the capacity for human social interaction. This is a succinct, and direct, constitution of Marx's argument that the development of human social nature requires experience of what is human in the world and that to do so, one's environment must be made human (Marx and Engels, 1984 [1844b]: 114-115).

The research was to be replicated, and confirmed, unfortunately, on a large scale. The collapse of the dictatorship in Romania in 1989, provided an opportunity for follow-up with a great many children who had spent varying period (up to years) in large scale, poorly staffed and poorly resourced, orphanages in Romania. The research revealed socially created (i.e. not genetic or bio-physiological) developmental delays (Johnson, Miller, Iverson, Thomas, Franchino, Dole, Kiernan, Georgieff and Hostetter, 1992), problems with language acquisition (Marcovitch, Cesaroni and Roberts, 1995) and behavioural problems (Gindis, 1999). In essence, it was to replicate the results published by John Bowlby in 1951. The factors shown to be the most destructive were the lack of tactile experience and social interaction (Carlson and Earls, 1997). In this is seen, in a concrete, clear image, one of the central issues of this thesis - the human body is not without limitations, it is neither plastic nor malleable ad infinitum. To achieve its potential, it requires a socially and physically interactive environment.

Attachment theory holds a special place in child protection practice and theory (Swift, 1995: 156) and it is for this reason that the last part of the chapter deals with the theory of, and research on, attachment. As an extension of the work on children in British orphanages and refuge camps, Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth were to address the notion of attachment in humans. The same issues as those seen in
Harlow's research on monkeys (Harlow, 1958), were also seen in humans. Attachment is based on the theory that from birth, there is an innate, biological drive to seek contact with others (Suomi, 1999; Bowlby, 1980). In other words, the body has a desire to seek interaction. This drive precedes the development of higher order thought and language acquisition. Thus it can be read as the language of the body, seeking an interactive, dynamic relationship with its environment. Bowlby himself termed attachment a social bond (Polan and Hofer, 1999) and emphasised the importance of the inter-relationship between biology and the social environment (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991). He also considered deterministic and unilinear adaptations of his work as misleading (Waters and Cummings, 2000). An unfortunate irony was that in reading Bowlby's language of 'mothering', his work was criticised for its alleged gender-bias and support for positioning women as solely responsible for the care of children and their development; a notion not supported by Bowlby himself (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada and Richters, 1991).

Research has shown that whilst children are born with temperamental patterns (Thomas, Chess and Birch, 1963 in Mussen, Conger and Kagan, 1974), cross-cultural studies show evidence of the shaping of this temperament occurring between the child and the carer (Caudill and Weinstein, 1966, cited in Janis, Mahl, Kagan and Holt, 1969). Additionally, reviewing attachment research allows the exploration of its relationship to later styles of social interaction (Iwaniec, 1995; Pervin, 1989). By considering attachment as an interactive process, the operation of both social and biological factors is brought into focus, initiating a redrawing of the nature/nurture divide and the development of a more integrative notion of sociology and biology - and its locus in the body. This permits its deployment without restricting the possibility of focusing on cultural and environmental influences.

In the conclusion, I draw together the main themes of the thesis. One is how sociology has marginalised bodies and the influence of their corporeality, tending to avoid the body's materiality and the 'weight' it brings to bear on human life and social interaction. The influence of this form of theorising has been the complimentary evasion of placing children and their experiences as the central concern in sociological approaches to child abuse. The adult's interests have become normative interests, permitting the twinning of child-adult/child-parent, thereby developing them as a synonymous enterprise. By deploying a corporeal notion of the body, adult interests and child interests are rendered separately, with separate vectors and rights.

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2 This research was to have an emotionally destructive affect on the monkeys, a catastrophic impact on their ability to relate to their offspring and other monkeys and is research that is confronting in its lack
This does not mean there is no correlation or relationship between the two, but it does require separate analysis and a separate focus.

of compassion for the monkey subjects and their future lives.