The Nature and Function of Ideas and Ideologies
in Human and Non-Human Systems

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Dedication

In all the world there are but a few people to whom I could enthusiastically dedicate this work. Of those, two people have played the very same role. The first is my paternal grandmother Helen Smithers, the second my partner and wife Alexandra Smithers. “Daddies Mummy”, as my siblings and I often called her, never told us fairy tales but delighted us with stories from history, of a changing world, knowledge gained, lost and unknown. She encouraged us to imagine bigger worlds and greater things. When Alexandra and I were married she was a university student and I was a carpenter. Alex has always delighted me with her inquisitive mind, her openness and her ability to encourage others to question and to learn. Alex is my inspiration. With Alex in my life imagining bigger worlds and greater things is everyday.

For Helen and Alexandra
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To each of these people I owe some debt but it is to my wife Alexandra that I owe the greatest of debts. Without Alex’s support, encouragement, understanding and interest I would never have attempted such a project. Without her love and endless proof reading this thesis would never have been completed and I would have gone insane had I not first starved to death.
Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

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(Signature)
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Abstract

With a view to understanding the root of what is today a confused, contradictory and limiting body of theory this thesis describes, analyses and advances the concept of ‘ideology’. The purpose of this thesis is to make sense out of that messy theory, understand the origin of its muddled definitions and ineffective formulations, and offer a new foundation from which a sound working alternative may be developed. This transdisciplinary thesis brings the sciences, philosophy and the history of ideas together. The aim here is to present a new theoretical model upon which a more comprehensive theory can be developed.

This thesis has two distinct parts. Part One addresses the historical emergence of ‘ideology’ as a ‘science of ideas’, its ultimate inversion, and redefinition as an anthropocentric and negative rather than neutral concept. It is further suggested that that ‘negative conception of ideology’ gave rise to, influenced and limited the scope of modern theories of ideas and ideology. Moreover Part One uncovers a theoretical gap that is today manifest as characteristics and limitations in theory. Potentially those limitations may deny any researcher working within those areas access to the majority of their field of study. Free from the constraints imposed by traditional theories of ideology, Part Two sets out to develop a sound testable and useful theory of ideas, ideologies and ‘ideotectonics’.

Looking at the big picture means understanding the definition of the word ‘idea’ to include non-cognitive ideas. It means thinking of ideas in respect to the concept described by the original Greek as well as in the modern sense. Considering Plato’s Theory of Forms and Destutt de Tracy’s Science of Ideas and the modern view of ideas as ‘human thought’ in respect of modern science enables this thesis to comment upon all ideas not just human ideas. It is further suggested that all ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses are expressions and/or functionaries of a single phenomenon here described as ideotectonic. Subsequently, this thesis examines ‘ideas’ important to the evolution of matter, living things, ecological, intellectual and social systems, and explores the ideotectonic processes, ideologies and ideological apparatuses that are associated with them. Ultimately this work represents a substantive departure from existing theory.
Preface

Science, Philosophy and Ideology

This thesis offers a description and analysis of the historic emergence of the term ‘ideology’ and some of its later theoretical developments for a particular purpose, related to the contemporary state of scientific knowledge. This term, especially as used by Karl Marx, has proved so influential, yet so full of arbitrary, unsustainable and contradictory meanings arising from its history, that a more comprehensive and systematic treatment is still urgently needed, in spite of previous valuable attempts at clarification by Karl Mannheim, Louis Althusser and Raymond Williams. To meet this need, this thesis shapes its critique of existing antecedents towards the establishment of a new theoretical foundation. In so doing the theory of ideas, of ideotectonics and ideology that I propose not only contests certain aspects of the influential Marxist tradition, but employs the term ‘ideotectonic’ in a manner unique to this thesis.¹

As one may expect, I justify the way I use these terms following conventional academic means, and develop particular arguments to support my interpretations, and demonstrate their value. Highlighting a seldom used, redundant or obscure aspect of a word’s meaning as a means of expanding its usefulness is a common academic practice, which has occasionally proven to yield worthwhile results. My own variant of this practice is not intended to distort agreed definitions nor alter received

¹ The word ‘tectonic’ is found in the term ‘plate tectonics’ which describes the building or construction of the Earth’s crust or its general structure, that is the cause and effect of action or movement involving one or more continental plate. Therefore plate tectonics describe the construction of mountains, valleys, fault lines, deep ocean trenches and so on. The point here is that ideotectonics describes the relationship between ideas, ideologies, ideological apparatuses and their effects. For further reference see The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology. A more precise definition is given in the General Introduction and again in Chapter Five of this thesis.
meanings of ‘ideas’ or ‘ideology’, although I cannot but point out many problems with both as they are often used, and I have interrogated their histories to see if they can provide a better basis for political and scientific thought today. An equally important factor that has made my use of these terms unique to this theory is that while honouring their original meaning, the theory of ideas is naturally extended when the field of objects they may be supposed to refer to is informed by modern science. The basic concepts upon which this new theoretical foundation is predicated were shaped by my location in science. Further to this, my continuing reliance upon science as a means of informing my understanding of the nature and function of ideas and ideotectonics processes in general distinguishes my use of those terms from what is commonly found in traditional Philosophy or Critical Theory in its many forms.

My PhD candidature was evenly split between the College of Science, and the College of Arts. Throughout the first half of my candidature I was immersed in scientific research as a means of discovering whether either side of a particular ‘ideological’ argument could be ‘proven’ through science. During this period I revisited the writings of Destutt de Tracy, Marx and Althusser among others. Although ignored or derided by later thinkers Destutt de Tracy described his contribution as the *Science of Ideas*, and set out to understand the nature of ideas through science. Famous for his statement that “ideology was part of zoology” (*Elements of Ideology* Vol. 1. xiii), Destutt de Tracy thought of ideology as a field of study that included the ideas of all sentient beings. He did not limit the world of sentient beings to the human race, nor accept humanity’s separation from nature. Importantly, Destutt de Tracy thought of ideology in much broader terms than later
theorists. Nevertheless, Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* was inevitably limited by the goals of the French Enlightenment and the capacity of the then pre-Lamarckian, pre-Darwinian, pre-DNA world of science. Therefore, while taking up several propositions important to the theoretical tradition in which Destutt de Tracy took part, because of the disparity between modern science and the ‘science’ that Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* employed, this thesis does not trace its ‘scientific heritage’ to the work of Destutt de Tracy. As a result of the transdisciplinary nature of this thesis the theory developed here is not only framed by modern science, but traces its philosophical heritage through a number of different traditions. In view of the theory and etymology of ‘ideas’ I receive a rich inheritance from Plato, the classical meaning ascribed to the word idea and his theory of ideas as unthought principles, archetypes or forms. Furthermore, Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke and materialists like Destutt de Tracy have influenced my thinking as did Karl Marx, the rich Marxist tradition, Michel Foucault and his contemporaries.

Rather than accepting an inheritance from either science or philosophy, or straddling the imaginary chasm between science, ideas and ideology, I make the argument that Marx’s reinvention of ideology as false consciousness and the popularity of the Marxist conception of ideology as antithetical to science obscures the otherwise clear scientific and philosophical heritage that the theory developed in this thesis enjoys. Further to highlighting the central role that the schism between science and ideology plays in the Marxist tradition it is argued that that schism limits its ability to inform the theory being developed here. On the other hand the way that Destutt de Tracy
positioned his theory of ideas and ideology in respect to science makes it better suited as a site from which to develop a new relationship between ‘science’ and ‘ideology’ than that of any later tradition.

The argument that science has long since had the ability to extend the study of ideas beyond that of the human sphere but has been impeded due to the artificial division between science and ideology is central to this thesis. Naturally, theorists of prior eras like Destutt de Tracy and Marx cannot be blamed for not foreseeing the discoveries like that of DNA or how such findings inform modern science of humanity’s relationship to the rest of nature. However, given the current state of science we cannot be excused for not applying this knowledge. The accessibility of the ideas and discoveries of modern science not only to us academics but to the average person through popular science, devalues the excuse that scientific knowledge is too specialized for a humanities-educated philosopher or political scientist to engage with, further highlighting our responsibility to apply the scientific knowledge available to us as a means of furthering human understanding. I have taken care to ensure the accessibility of my exposition of the scientific basis for the critique of current theories of ideology and my development of the propositions that make up the work undertaken here. Readers require no more scientific knowledge than can be found in popular science books by scientists like Richard Dawkins and Stephen Hawking, and television programs such as those hosted by David Attenborough. Such texts provide a platform from which the average educated person can catch a glimpse of the incredible diversity in which ideas are manifest in nature.
Having become aware of the unnecessary limitations placed upon the study of ideas and ideology by Marxist theorists, and the importance of understanding the development of their ‘negative conception of ideology’, the second half of my doctoral candidature was spent in the School of Humanities. Immersed in the intricate world of philosophical and humanist argument, I found that much of what they had to offer my research was well informed, but just not well informed by science. I became only more aware of the unfortunate effects of the artificial divide between science and ideology, which had rendered the methods, discoveries and ideas of science invalid for the study of ideology. Isolating human ideas from those common to the rest of nature renders them superficial, rather than unique. Discovering and disposing of that artificial divide revealed new horizons for the study of ideas. Interestingly, removing the limitations imposed by that artificial divide not only expanded the field of what could be encompassed by the concept of ideology but added a degree of depth and complexity to the analysis of human ideas and ideology. Paradoxically, instead of diverting the focus away from humanity, removing the artificial constraints placed upon ideology has enabled the theory, as developed in this thesis, to throw new light on the complexity of humanity’s ideas and ideologies. The result is an interdisciplinary thesis, which readers may find difficult to classify as the product of any one discipline. While informed by science, the thesis was produced at the nexus of science, philosophy, and the history of ideas. The following work has the discursive form of an essay or commentary, as in genres of the humanities, science has a structural role within this thesis.
General Introduction

Ideas, Ideologies and Ideotectonics

It was my original intention to produce a doctoral thesis that increased my understanding of a particular ideology. However, the more research I carried out on that ideology the less well it could be understood through the lenses of existing theories of ideology. Ultimately, it became obvious that before I could examine any particular ideology I would have to explore and understand the overarching theory of ideology. Foregoing my original intention, this thesis aims to do two substantive things. First, it examines the initial formulations out of which the dominant theory of ideology emerged. My aim here is critical, not comprehensive. My main interest is with the limitations it acquired, which became part of its semantic baggage, and the possibility that it foreclosed on a different history that the term might have had. Secondly, I seek to develop a new theoretical foundation from which those limitations may be addressed. Further I aim to proceed from that foundation toward developing a set of theoretical tools that may be applied productively to questions about ideas and ideologies in a very wide range of human and natural systems. As such this thesis is presented in two distinct parts: Part One, consisting of four chapters, defines ‘the gap’ in existing theory; Part Two, also consisting of four chapters, addresses that ‘gap’ while developing a new theoretical foundation upon which a theory maybe later be developed. Beyond this General Introduction, Part One and Part Two each have a dedicated introduction that contains a brief overview and chapter summaries. The thesis is completed with a brief conclusion.
As straightforward as a thesis in two parts sounds, where Part One defines ‘the gap’ and Part Two addresses that gap, beyond the complexities associated with the term ‘idea’, the problematic nature of ‘ideology’ as a subject extinguishes any hope of simplicity. Like any other term in common use ‘ideology’ is employed by a wide range of disciplines, which often use the term in a general rather than a critical sense. Subsequently, both the meaning and application of the term are somewhat inconsistent. In contrast to the general and uncritical use of the term a substantial number of theorists employ the term in relation to a fewer number of established theoretical frameworks. As useful as those theoretical frameworks are their multiplicity complicates the task at hand. How does a theorist go about defining ‘the gap’ in a body of theory that is not in agreement? From what point does such an analysis proceed? Fortunately, as problematic as it is, the vast majority of the accounts and theories of ideology not only share but have inherited a negative view of ideology from Karl Marx.\(^2\) This is of course ‘fortunate’ in the sense that the negative conception of ideology provides a common denominator in view of which the dominant perception of ideology can be commented upon.

Assuming that the dominant perception of ideology arises from Marx and thus the Marxist negative conception of ideology, it can be said that ideology is predominantly, but not universally, portrayed as illusion or ‘false consciousness’.\(^3\)

The relatively unstructured form that Marx’s negative conception of ideology

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assumed has led to more than its popularity, it promoted theoretical diversity. According to John Torrance the variation in the treatment of ideology in Marxist theory may be due to the fact that when Marx died in 1883, “his published allusions to ideology were scanty and unsystematic” (1). Furthermore, Torrance argues that those theories have made their way back into Marx mistakenly, as many have no real basis in Marx’s work (1). Nevertheless, because Marx’s negative conception of ideology has influenced the common use of the term, Marx’s treatment of ideology has in turn influenced the thought of theorists who may conceivably demonstrate no other theoretical inheritance. Subsequently, it may be argued that wherever a theorist incorporates the negative conception of ideology, that aspect of their theory can be traced back to Marx’s treatment of ideology. That is not to say that all such theories are Marxist, or that they trace their disciplinary heritage to Marx or his work, but rather that his negative conception of ideology continues to influence its modern use.

The pervasive nature of Marx’s negative conception of ideology and the effect that it has upon the treatment of ideas and idea-based systems has neither gone unnoticed nor failed to attract comment from many renowned theorists, such as Antonio

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6 For instance, despite the terminology even a cursory glance can detect a thematic correlation between Marx’s negative conception of ideology and Feuer’s treatment. Feuer argues that the ‘three ingredients of ideology’ are, “the first, an invariant myth, the second, a compound of philosophical doctrines which alternate cyclically in the history of ideology, the third, a historically determined decision as to a chosen class of the time” Lewis S..Feuer Ideology and the Ideologists. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. 1.

Gramsci, Mannheim, Althusser, and Raymond Williams just to name a few. Like Gramsci, Mannheim acknowledged Marx’s reinvention of ideology and the lack of any systematic treatment of the theory of ideology in his day (53-4). According to Karl Mannheim, “it was Marxist theory that first achieved a fusion of the particular and the total conceptions of ideology” (66). Essentially Mannheim argued that Marxist theory first considered the ‘total conception of ideology’ to extend the analysis of ideology from “showing that an adversary suffers from illusions or distortions on a psychological or experiential plane” (68), to subjecting “his total structure of consciousness and thought to a thoroughgoing sociological analysis” (68). That is, rather than analysing an opponent’s ideas in isolation, the Marxist analyst would examine every aspect of the social setting that gave rise to those ideas. However, according to this more comprehensive definition, the only difference between an ideology and any other system of ideas is that only other people have ideology never oneself; the nature and function of the ideas are irrelevant. The irony of this description was not lost on Mannheim. Accordingly he wrote, “at the present stage of our understanding it is hardly possible to avoid the general formulation of the total conception of ideology, according to which the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological character” (69). From this statement, it is obvious that Mannheim was preparing an assault upon the negative conception of ideology, an assault that would echo through the remainder of his work.

8 Antonio Gramsci noted ideology’s historical shift from signaling the Science of Ideas to what he described as its association with “negative value judgment” in Marxist philosophy (Prison Notebooks 376), yet in general Marxist theorists have not followed up Gramsci’s insightful lead.
10 Mannheim describes the ‘particular notion of ideology’ as the transformation of a naïve distrust into a systematic distrust of another’s way of thinking (57).
The negative conception of ideology was not the only casualty of Mannheim’s assault. Ideology itself would bare the brunt of his offensive. Mannheim continues: “with the emergence of the general formulation of the total conception of ideology, the simple theory of ideology develops into the sociology of knowledge… it is clear, then, that in this connection the conception of ideology takes on a new meaning” (69). Acknowledging that in association with this “new meaning” ideology and/or knowledge cannot be simply understood as false consciousness or illusion, Mannheim goes on to say that, “knowledge, as seen in the light of the total conception of ideology, is by no means an illusory experience, for ideology in its relational concept is not at all identical with illusion” (76). Much argument and many examples separate the initial indication that the sociology of knowledge would find no place for the negative conception of ideology and its absolute confirmation. Nevertheless, Mannheim clearly states that, “since suspicion or falsification is not included in the total conception of ideology, the use of the term ‘ideology’ in the sociology of knowledge has no moral or denunciatory intent” (238). According to this “new meaning” Mannheim did not consider the negative conception of ideology to be a universal construct, however, as noted in the following passage, ideology’s victory was very short lived as ‘ideology’ was to be all but excluded from Mannheim’s ‘sociology of knowledge’:

In the realm of the sociology of knowledge, we shall then, as far as possible,

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11 Further to this argument Mannheim argues that, “it has become extremely questionable whether, in the flux of life, it is a genuinely worthwhile intellectual problem to seek to discover fixed and immutable ideas or absolutes” (77), thus questioning the usefulness of focussing upon discovering truth as opposed to understanding ideology.

12 Further distancing his ‘sociology of knowledge’ from the negative conception of ideology, Part III of Mannheim’s book, *Ideology and Utopia, The Prospects of Scientific Politics* (97-171), delves into the relationship between ideology and science. Despite the obvious ideological nature of politics, Mannheim argues that, “if we understood by politics merely the sum of all those bits of practical knowledge which are useful for political conduct, then there would be no question about the fact that a science of politics in this sense existed” (99).
avoid the use of the term “ideology”, because of its moral connotation, and shall instead speak of the “perspective” of the thinker. By this term we mean the subject’s whole mode of conceiving things as determined by his historical and social setting (239).

Having clearly stated his intent to avoid making reference to ‘ideology’ Mannheim goes on to describe the subject of the sociology of knowledge. Between unveiling two new ‘terms’, the “social determination of knowledge” and the “existential determination of knowledge” (239), Mannheim says, “we will present the sociology of knowledge as a theory of the social or existential determination of actual thinking” (239). Mannheim’s analysis of ideology had come full circle, expanding, liberating, restricting and eventually abandoning ideology to its original fate.

In essence Mannheim began by outlining the historical emergence of the negative conception of ideology, highlighting what he referred to as “the total conception of ideology” which included not only ideas and beliefs but the analysis of the entire social and class circumstances that fostered such ideas and beliefs. Quite rightly he argued that within that framework all social systems could be described as ideological. However, rather than suggesting that the total conception of ideology demonstrated the impropriety of the negative conception of ideology, Mannheim abandoned ideology in favour of thought, thinking, knowledge and knowing. In essence, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge deals with a very different subject than what many theorists consider ideology to be. Furthermore, Mannheim never

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13 Throughout this thesis I will be quoting from sources produced when what is today considered sexist language was accepted as standard academic terminology. While I do not agree with such usage in modern texts, due to the fact that those references were not considered to be sexist in their day, I will not be indicating my disagreement. Nor will I be using the ‘[sic]’ notation to indicate my objection.

14 It may be argued that Michel Foucault took a similar approach to ideology. Rather than get bogged down in the mess that was the theory of ideology Foucault discussed what was referred to as ideology by other theorists under the terms, Discourse and Power. For instance see, Michel Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Ed R.D. Laing. London: Routledge, 1989.
entertained the possibility that the theory of ideology should include the ideas, processes and practices of species other than homo sapiens, thus echoing Marx’s anthropocentrism. The level of debate on ideology increased in the years following the publication of Mannheim’s book, demonstrating that his work did not provide a satisfactory resolution to the problems perceived to exist between ideology and science.

The ‘end of ideology debate’\(^\footnote{15}\) raged throughout the 1960s, 1969 saw Louis Althusser produce his *Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses* and his *Theory of Ideology in General*.\(^\footnote{16}\) Yet, as the following quotes demonstrate, the problems that stem from the ideology-science divide continue still. Compounding the problems associated with addressing such a diverse body of theory and despite the ongoing popularity of the negative conception of ideology not all theorists assume that the relationship between science and ideology is static or that ideology is antithetical to science. For instance, under the heading “Science, Ideology and Methodology”, István Mészáros argues that science is a tool of ideology employed to legitimize ideological interests.\(^\footnote{17}\) Further questioning the clear distinction between ideology as false consciousness and science as true consciousness, Michael Rosen ponders whether all consciousness is false and/or irrational, before highlighting the possibility of ‘non-ideological false consciousness’.\(^\footnote{18}\) Rosen asks whether belief in science that is later proven to be false or unfounded can be described as non-ideological false consciousness.


consciousness. If so would that void the distinction between science and ideology as false consciousness? In his chapter entitled, “Science and Ideology” Raymond Boudon writes, “One immediately concludes that scientific knowledge is not only not protected from beliefs which are not proven, it could not even exist without them” (143).\(^{19}\) Patrick Corbett goes one step further saying,

Granted, then, that this favourable force [of science and reason] is there to be used, what more rational then that the ideologists should seek to use it for their special purposes? If only they could plausibly represent as ‘rational’ or ‘scientific’ the considerations that they bring forward to support their party they would be much nearer to making its authority unquestionable.\(^{20}\)

Corbett goes on to describe the misrepresentation of belief as science, claiming that once exposed the “demolition of ideology is in principle complete” (139). Respectively Mészáros, Rosen, Boudon, Corbett, and many others, comment upon the complex and very messy relationship between ideology and science while ‘maintaining’ the negative conception of ideology. Jorge Larrain, on the other hand, not only questions the nature of the relationship between science and ideology he questions whether they are mutually exclusive constructs. Larrain says that,

The important thing here is that ideology in itself is not a concept to be distinguished from science. Ideology could be “scientific”. If it is not scientific, this is not due to its being ideology but, rather, due to it being developed within the scope of certain specific class interests. Ideology is non-antithetical to science—it could also be a science: the distinction between science and ideology is blurred. The most important consequence of this conception is the loss of the concept of ideology as a critical notion.\(^{21}\)

Interestingly Larrain does not argue that ideology cannot be described as negative,

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but rather that it need not be limited to the negative. And perhaps more importantly he goes on to argue that,

Ideology is not simply a cognitive error which can be overcome by a more adequate cognition. Nor does science exhaust the concept of truth. There are errors which are not ideological, and there are truths which may be found beyond the actual cognition of society as it is. The specificity of the ideological error is the fact that it conceals contradictions. The only truth which may successfully defeat this particular error is the practical solution of those contradictions. Ideology cannot be dispelled by simple theoretical means because its roots are beyond the boundaries of mere intellectual mistakes (173).

Interestingly, while arguing that ideology need not be considered as antithetical to science, and that ideology could be a science, Larrain says that science could be false consciousness. That is, Larrain does not so much champion ideology as other than negative, but rather argues that science need not be associated with truth.

In his book *Marxism and Literature*, Raymond Williams takes account of both the historic development and the varied use of the term ‘ideology’ in modern theory. Williams acknowledges the difficult relationship between science and ideology (62), and the many problems arising from segregating ideological consciousness from practical consciousness (67). Ultimately, Williams argues that the resolution to the problems that the theory of ideology faces may lie in unifying the ‘material social processes’ and the ‘fundamental signifying processes’. Williams writes, “For the practical links between ‘ideas and theories’ and the ‘production of real life’ are all in this material social process of signification itself” (70). Sceptical of the feasibility of such a union in the face of so much theoretical difference Williams goes on to say,

It is then an open question whether “ideology” and “ideological”, with their senses of “abstraction” and “illusion”, or their senses of “ideas” and “theories”,

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or even their senses of a “system” of belief or of meanings and values, are sufficiently precise and practical terms for so far-reaching and radical a redefinition (71).

The difficulty facing any theorist who attempts to resolve the differences that plague the theory of ideology is that in its collective form the theory of ideology has become far too messy to be of any real theoretical value. However, the messiness of the collective theory of ideology is also one of its major strengths. If the division between science and ideology could be resolved in a satisfactory manner such that many of the theoretical innovations perceived to be exclusive of one another could be unified, the resulting theory would be both workable and full of depth and richness. The question then remains: is the negative conception of ideology and the subsequent schism between science and ideology valid, and if so in what capacity should it be maintained? Further still, a better question may be: is the negative conception of ideology valid as a universal construct, if not what are its natural limitations, and how could the negative aspect of ideology be framed in order to benefit a new theoretical platform?

Considering that Marx’s reinvention of ideology was the antecedent of the Marxist negative conception of ideology any question as to the validity of a negative conception of ideology as a universal construct should first look toward the historic conditions that precipitated that reinvention. Part One of the thesis, therefore, begins with an examination of the historic emergence of ideology as a Science of Ideas in the 18th century, before mapping its decline and reinvention in the hands of Marx. The historical context provided by that discussion directs the examination toward an investigation of Marx’s treatment of ideology. By the time Marx commented upon ideology Destutt de Tracy’s version of the Enlightenment project had all but come to

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an end, and new concerns troubled the minds of thinkers in Marx’s age. I argue that ‘ideology’ suffered something akin to collateral damage sustained as a result of Marx’s battle against Idealism, rather than as the result of a deliberate campaign. Even though Marx was not alone in the critique of idealist philosophy, it was through Marx’s ‘more radical’ critique of Idealism and his subsequent ‘inversion of Hegel’ that the term ‘ideology’ re-emerged with an entirely different meaning to that intended by Destutt de Tracy. Despite the lack of any formal or systematically developed theory of ideology Marx’s treatment of ideology made a distinct impression upon successive generations of theorists. For instance, all subsequent theories of ideology discuss ideology in respect to human systems alone, thus echoing what may be described as Marx’s unconscious or unconsidered anthropocentrism. More systematically, most critically engaged modern theories of ideology (post-structuralist, postmodernists, Feminist etc), view ideology in respect to Marx’s negative conception of ideology rather than as a general or neutral concept.

While Marx’s comments can be said to ignore other species, such that one can make a note of the anthropocentrism of his formulations, or his failure to engage with the existing theory of ideology which described ideology as part of zoology, his negative conception of ideology was the result of his theoretical development. Thus, despite the lack of a formal theory of ideology the theoretical basis of Marx’s negative conception of ideology is examined through an analysis of his work. Marx’s writing

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23 Many theorists including those known as the Young or Left Hegelians developed materialist theories that sidestepped the key tenets of Idealism, while strengthening their ties with the natural sciences. For a historical overview see, Warren Breckman. *Marx, The Young Hegelians and the Origins of Radical Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

24 See *Elements d’Ideologie, Vol. I xiii.* Qtd. in Williams 56
provides an incredibly complex and interesting backdrop for this investigation, as his bold arguments, contradictions and inconsistencies provoke many questions regarding the validity of the modern conception of ideology.

In many respects the importance of Marx’s work is directly proportionate to the influence that it continues to have upon modern thinking and modern theory. Significantly, this aspect of Marx’s legacy is neither entirely good nor evil. Despite the limitations imposed by the artificial divide between science and ideology sponsored by his negative conception of ideology a great deal of well-formulated theory has emerged from the ensuing tradition. In fact Marx’s negative conception of ideology has influenced so many modern theorists that it is impossible for any one work to address them all. Therefore, at the risk of leaving out other important theorists, it is necessary to limit the number of works examined hereafter. It is important to note that the following analysis is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather that the inclusion of a modern theorist’s work is needed to demonstrate how Marx’s negative conception of ideology has affected that and similar bodies of work. Subsequently, choosing a suitable modern work needs to take two main criteria into account: the work must clearly show a dependence upon as well as the affects of Marx’s reinvention of the term, and it must inform the theoretical development undertaken in Part Two of this thesis.

Of the many writers on ideology who have used Marx’s ideas in one form or another, Louis Althusser stands out for a paradoxical quality: his knowledge and fidelity to Marx’s work, co-exist with the capacity for theoretical innovation and an ability to encapsulate both the potential and the limitations of the Marxist tradition.
Althusser’s work further provides this thesis with a great number of stepping off points, from which it can benefit. Althusser’s work on Ideological State Apparatuses alone makes him a suitable candidate, but the way in which he wrestles with the nature of reality, material, psychology, socialization and interpellation, and perhaps most important of all, the way he honours the divide between science and ideology renders his contribution most suitable. Therefore rather than detract from the main focus of my argument by attempting to do justice to all the differences that exist between the various writers on ideology, whether declared Marxists or not, I have chosen to use Althusser’s important statements on ideology as my primary example of this tradition. Only a careful, detailed analysis can hope to make a complex case of the kind I am attempting.

Part One of the thesis not only addresses the historical origins of the modern conception of ideology, it outlines the main theoretical propositions that constitute the modern ‘negative conception of ideology’. Highlighting the impropriety of the negative conception of ideology’s penchant for commenting upon all forms of ideas and ideologies brings other aspects of that tradition into question. By uncritically accepting Marx’s negative conception of ideology the Marxist tradition inadvertently accepted Marx’s unconscious anthropocentrism which limited the scope of successive generations of theory to the human sphere. Not only does this assumption limit the study of ideology to the human sphere but it likewise questions the fit between those theoretical developments and what is known now and was known then about human history before the industrial age. What is important about these assumptions is that they are challenged by science. In this way the analysis undertaken in Part One highlights the limited scope prescribed to ideology as
opposite to science, while illuminating the theoretical gaps inherent within those theories. Those findings provide the catalyst that propels the development of a new theoretical foundation, model and tools elaborated in Part Two of this thesis.

As both parts are structured around these analyses Part Two affords the opportunity to focus and articulate the theoretical ‘gap’ highlighted in Part One. Thus Part Two begins by summarizing the theoretical limitations familiar to many theories of ideology that take their lead from Marx’s negative conception of ideology before asking a series of questions aimed at providing a footing on which a new theory may, one day, be developed. Healing the breach between science and ideology is perhaps the first step. However, removing the limitations placed upon ideology, by the taken-for-granted humanist assumptions shared by Marxists and many of their opponents alike, is still insufficient on its own to reveal the full scope of the phenomenon that includes ideas and ideologies. Thus the nature and function of ideas and ideology as constituent functionaries in that phenomenon must also be understood. Only by beginning with a definition of an idea and a description of what every ideology does, can the scope of the field of study that includes ideologies be understood. Perhaps Destutt de Tracy’s perception of humanity as part of nature offers the first clue to the expansion of ideology’s scope. If our humanity and ‘animality’ are more or less separated by our perception of difference, rather than our actual difference, we may not be able to know whether or not ideology is limited to the human sphere? Did human beings have ideology before they began to think of themselves as distinct from animals? Is ideology the only functionary to work toward the fulfilment of ideas, or is it only one manifestation or projection of a range of ideotectonic processes? Is there a common denominator that unifies all ideas, ideologies and
ideotectonic processes, regardless of their many different guises? Part Two of this thesis argues that institutionalized belief is only one manifestation of ideology and that ideology is only one form of ideotectonic process. Subsequently, the first challenge on this path of discovery is finding a way to look beneath the display of difference to where ideology can be seen and understood as one aspect of a clearly defined, functional phenomenon.

Ironically, whereas examining a particular ideology lends itself to making general comments about ideology as a whole, examining ideology as part of a phenomenon, invites specific comment about the detailed form and function of ideology which is ‘specific’ to every ideology. It is here suggested that all ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses can be understood as ideotectonic in nature. That is, they may be understood as functionaries in the building or construction of that which is described by the principles, plans or blueprints that compose an idea. The word ‘ideotectonic’ stems from two Greek words **ideo** and **tektonikós**. **Ideo** meaning ideas in the collective sense and **tektonikós** meaning that pertaining to building or construction. Therefore, when combined the term **ideotectonic** describes the principles that compose an idea, and the relationship between an idea and the functionaries through which the projected outcome of an the idea is realized. In other words ideotectonics both defines terms like idea, ideology and ideological apparatus and describes the nature and function of the processes by which the idea is manifest in the real material world.

Effectively, ideotectonics is the name of the phenomenon that includes ideas, ideologies and so on and therefore describes them as sharing certain characteristics
and in general may be applied to processes like quantum mechanics, biology and ideology as functionaries in the service of particular ideas. It is argued that all ideotectonic processes can be examined in specific detail without inappropriate generalization. The key is to look beneath the endless display of diversity to the mechanism that projects that diversity. Once Ideotectonics (the phenomenon) is outlined its properties can be examined and described in detail, without detracting from the diverse expression of that phenomenon. Many great philosophical and scientific discoveries have been predicated on much the same method of enquiry. For instance, think of a pre-Darwinian zoologist trying to understand the nature of organic life on earth, faced with the diversity presented to him or her, by plants and animals, fungi, and bacteria, let alone the difference between a bumblebee and a Blue Whale. The biologist’s job is made more difficult because the specific details of any single form of life can say little about all life in general. However, when armed with the theory of evolution and the discovery of genes and DNA, zoologists are able to peer beneath the diversity of life to see and understand all life as having a common origin and developmental mechanism. The discovery of the mechanism beneath the diversity of life does not negate that diversity, but rather allows zoologists and biologists to think of all life in common terms. It is argued here that much like life itself, beneath its many variations ideotectonics as a phenomenon has specific characteristics that lend it to a diverse range of outcomes. Allowing oneself to think of ideas and ideologies as part of such a phenomenon is perhaps the next great challenge.

The work of zoologist Richard Dawkins on ‘memes’ as non-genetic replicators presents a bridge between Biology, Cultural Studies and Philosophy. Crossing that
bridge from the other direction, Part Two of this thesis examines ideotectonics, relative to ‘the ideas inherent within every living organism’. In fact it is suggested that the signature of the naturally emergent phenomenon that includes both ideas and ideology can be seen at work in the physical universe, within natural, biological, ecological and social systems. As such, this theory of ideology is examined most closely in view of human biology, instinct, intellect and institutions. However, the human experience of ideology is also examined in view of our place in nature and nature’s ongoing influence upon our race. Part Two of this thesis is very much informed by science, contains substantive argument, addresses the ‘big picture’ of ideotectonics, and presents a new theoretical foundation and a set of theoretical tools.

Seeking to address the ‘big picture’ of the world of ideotectonics presents a unique set of problems. A theory that comprehensively addresses every aspect of every ideas and ideology is simply too big for any one work to deal with. As such the discussion of ideotectonics is limited to uncovering a new theoretical foundation, presenting clear definitions and examples and developing some basic theoretical tools to assist the future development of a more comprehensive theory. Nevertheless the argument, and thus the theoretical framework developed in Part Two of this thesis is composed of premises, definitions, limitations, a predictive capacity, and further comments on the nature and function of ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses in respect to being part of the same phenomenon. As such, while falling well short of presenting a comprehensive theory, the following thesis does outline the basics of a complete and workable theoretical model.
One drawback of being unable to present a full and comprehensive theory is that not all informative theories, bodies of knowledge or approaches can be pursued. Complexity theory, socio-biology, deep ecology, evolutionary psychology and organizational psychology are among those theories and approaches that have not been taken up. While all of these and many other disciplines can add to and even complete the theory developed here; simply stated, the incredible scope of the subject prevents me from attempting to present a comprehensive work at this time. Nevertheless, I have every hope that while comfortably nested among many other theories and disciplines the theoretical propositions developed here will, in time, benefit from being tested, fine-tuned and fleshed out by theorists educated in a range of disciplines.
Introduction to Part One

Traditional Theory and the Majority Gap

Part One of this thesis consists of four chapters. The first of these addresses the historic shift in ideology’s meaning from making reference to the scientific study of ideas as a means of determining their validity, to a term signifying any belief system founded upon untrue premises, falsehood, myth, legend or the like. The main actors in this drama were the Enlightenment philosopher, Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, Napoleon Bonaparte and Karl Marx. Having established Marx as the author of the theoretical inversion of ideology’s meaning and demonstrated that Marx’s reinvention of the term was neither, neutral nor uncritical but specifically anthropocentric, system oriented and negative in its conception, the second of these chapters critically examines Marx’s inversion of ideology. The basis and validity of his argument, his ‘first premises’ and his treatment of ideology in respect of its relationship to ‘reality’ and history are examined. The first two chapters of this work, therefore offer a historic overview of the development and reinvention of the term, ideology, while clearly and explicitly positioning Marx’s negative conception of ideology in respect to both earlier traditions and later uncritical or ‘neutral’ uses of the term.

As noted above, I have chosen one major theorist as an example of how Marx’s negative conception of ideology has influenced modern theory. I could have chosen major theorists like Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Jurgen Habermas or even Michel Foucault, but I chose Louis Althusser. Althusser was both one of the most influential Marxist theorist to address the theory of ideology, his theory is well suited to the kind of critique I wish to undertake, and his many propositions provide
a basis for discussion late in Part Two of the thesis. Althusser’s essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: notes toward an investigation”, is his most noted work on the subject. His essay provides the basic text from which I develop a theoretical exposition of ideology in the Third and Fourth Chapters.

Chapter One, entitled From ‘Ideology as a “Science of Ideas” to a “Negative Conception of Ideology”’ examines the historic development of ideology as a Science of Ideas and its historic inversion and subsequent redefinition. In effect, ideology went from being described as a ‘science’ to describing belief in false ideas. As such Chapter One begins by investigating the theoretical, political and historical context that saw the advent of ‘Ideology’. Coined by Destutt de Tracy, the term ideology was chosen to refer to a Science of Ideas. In essence Destutt de Tracy and his fellow ‘Ideologists’ developed the ideas of John Locke and Étienne Bonnot de Condillac in an attempt to produce a scientific method for separating true and untrue ideas. They believed that true ideas were derived from the sensorial experience of the real world.25 The untimely development of their Science of Ideas coincided with the protracted Napoleonic wars and the ultimate demise of the French Enlightenment. Subsequently, Destutt de Tracy’s Science of Ideas and therefore ‘ideology’ was one of, if not, the very last major theoretical development of the French Enlightenment. The dramatic changes set in motion by the French Revolution, Napoleon’s struggle for power and the industrial revolution saw the end of the Enlightenment project in France. The Enlightenment’s focus of discovering ‘truth’, ‘freedom’ and the ‘perfecting of humanity’ gave way to thoughts of Imperialism and industrialization. However, Destutt de Tracy’s Science of Ideas was

not just the victim of historical circumstances; it was the victim of political strategy. Hastening the demise of their science, Destutt de Tracy and his fellow Ideologists opposed Napoleon’s reintroduction of State religion. Napoleon responded by discrediting them. Casting their science in a negative light, Napoleon stated that the “ideologues” failed to locate their science in reality and instead traded in a “diffuse metaphysics” (qtd. in Williams 57). Subsequently, the terms ‘ideologue’ and ‘ideology’ acquired a negative connotation throughout Europe. Even so, the real inversion of ideology’s meaning from the scientific study of ideas to a label applied to any belief system rooted in falsehood, myth or legend came at the hand of Marx. In fact Marx’s negative conception of ideology is generally accepted as ideology’s legitimate definition; in contrast to which Destutt de Tracy is attributed with coining the term but little else. Nevertheless, given my concern with the conditions under which this original form of ideology was reinvented by Marx, I have chosen not to investigate in detail the philosophical setting into which Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* originally emerged or every aspect of its intended character. It is sufficient for my purposes to stay with the original work which gave the word ‘ideology’ to the world’s social and philosophical lexicon, merely noting in passing that this work is a still-neglected masterpiece, in spite of the work of scholars such as Brian Head.26

Despite the dramatic effect that Marx has had on the modern ‘negative conception of ideology’ there is no evidence to suggest that he deliberately set out to invert Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* in order to rob it of its ‘scientific’ credibility. Marx described the Hegelian Idealist’s theory or system of ideas as an ideology and it was

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this ideology that he inverted. Marx wrote, “If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-processes as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process” (German Ideology 25). Thus, he argued that ideology was in reality an inversion of what it appeared. However, whereas Napoleon inverted a ‘materialist science’, falsely claiming that it was a branch of metaphysics, Marx inverted the positive value attributed to ideas in ‘Hegelian metaphysics’. In effect because Marx presented ‘Hegelian metaphysics’ as though representative of all ideology by inverting the values associated with metaphysics he also inverted the value of ideology. Ultimately redefining all ideology in view of false ideas created an artificial divide between ideology and science. Subsequently, Marx depicted all ideology in a negative sense, giving rise to not only his own but also traditional theories of a ‘negative conception of ideology’. Marx justified his inversion of Hegelian ideology and thus all ideology through a complex argument. Whether his inversion of ideology and his subsequent ‘redefinition’ of ideology can be justified is the subject of Chapter Two.

Given the task of examining Marx’s argument Chapter Two, titled, ‘The Historical Shift in Ideology's Meaning’, takes the form of a textual analysis addressing the relevant sections of his theory. Primarily focusing on his treatment of ideology and the supporting argument found in The German Ideology, the veracity of Marx’s inversion of ideology and the production of his negative conception of ideology is examined. Beginning with Marx’s “first premise of all human history” (German Ideology 31) each point of his premises passage is examined, read in its full context and cross referenced with other relevant passages. The main question asked is: can
Marx’s claim that the “living human individuals” of his first premise distinguish themselves from animals when they begin to “produce their means of subsistence” (*German Ideology* 31), be justified? If not, why not, and how does this affect the validity of his treatment of ideology? Answering these questions begins by testing his claim that his premises are not arbitrary, asking whether they can be “verified in a purely empirical way” (*German Ideology* 31) or not? Given that ‘proving’ his argument by empirical or scientific method would have required some kind of ‘physical testable evidence’ or observation, it would appear that the existence of the “living human individuals” of Marx’s first premise could not have been nor can be verified by empirical methods. What is certain is that Marx offers no such evidence, nor provides a time or location in which he believed these human individuals to have lived.

There is no doubt that the ensuing analysis is critical of Marx. However, because his theory is the real origin of the dominant definition of ideology, establishing the nature and origin of the ‘gap’ in his theory is of critical importance. In the same spirit that Dawkins wrote, “much of what Darwin said is, in detail wrong” (*The Selfish Gene* 195), while supporting Darwin’s theory of evolution, it must be said that much of what Marx said cannot be justified, nor verified through empirical means, yet his overall argument has many merits. Nevertheless, it is argued here that it appears that Marx based the existence of the “living human individuals” of his first premise upon the assumption that because the real living human beings that he mixed with every day produced their means of subsistence, as did their forefathers, they must have descended from a long line of living human beings who also produced their means of subsistence. The reality of the “living human individuals” of Marx’s
first premise is supported by unsubstantiated assertions, not any kind of science, his or ours. Furthermore, I argue that because Marx bases his claim that the living human individuals of his first premise distinguished themselves from animals by a behavioural characteristic rather than a biological condition, in the absence of empirical evidence his claim that they marked the beginning of “all human history” cannot be verified. As a consequence of the lack of any empirical evidence available to Marx or his contemporaries, I suggest that the “living human individuals” of Marx’s first premise were reified, rather than real. As a result, Marx begins “all human history” at an arbitrary point in time. Having identified and demonstrated the insecure basis for the first premise of Marx’s argument, I test the remainder of his argument and later treatment of ideology point by point.

Chapters Three and Four address Althusser's Theory of Ideology in General through a textual analysis of his essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes toward an investigation” (I&ISAs), also drawing on passages from other relevant texts. Althusser’s essay has a great deal to offer despite the fact that he perpetuates Marx’s negative conception of ideology. Regardless of his respect for traditional Marxist theory Althusser’s essay does not simply reflect Marx’s theoretical position. His essay has two distinct sections, each of which was originally written as a separate discussion paper. The first section expands upon Marx’s Theory of the State, while the second presents the new and more complex Theory of Ideology in General, which incorporates many theoretical innovations. I address each section separately. Chapter Three examines the first section in which Althusser highlights the “double functioning” (I&ISAs 145) of ideology and repression as the means by which the State Apparatus directs State power, thus expanding upon Marx’s Theory of the
State. Chapter Four addresses the second section of Althusser’s essay, exploring and analysing his *Theory of Ideology in General*. As such the analysis of Althusser’s essay serves to demonstrate the impact of Marx’s Theory of the State and his negative conception of ideology upon modern theory, while formalizing and expanding upon the theory of ideology.

Chapter Three begins by showing the link between Marx and Althusser’s theory. The first section of Althusser’s essay effectively demonstrates the continuity between Marx’s materialist conception of history, his negative conception of ideology, and Althusser’s development of Ideological State Apparatuses as a theoretical construct. Althusser begins his essay by outlining and explaining Marx’s *Theory of the State*, the reproduction of the means of production, the reproduction of labour-power, and the relationship between infrastructure and superstructure, before introducing the subject of ideology. Having outlined Marx’s theory Althusser proposes an addition in the form of a theory that illuminates and extends the reach of the State through Ideological State Apparatuses. Althusser’s argument is elegant and insightful in the way it addresses the subtle and pervasive influences of State power.

Althusser’s theory begins in earnest when he makes a distinction between the Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses, which introduces his concept of “double functioning”. Subsequently, he argues that Repressive State Apparatuses like the Police Force and the Army are predominantly repressive yet function secondarily by ideology. Conversely, he argues that Ideological State Apparatuses like religion, politics and the family are predominantly ideological and only function secondarily by repression. Althusser concludes that every Repressive and
Ideological State Apparatus combines repressive and ideological elements (I&ISAs 145). Furthermore, Althusser makes several significant points regarding the pervasive nature of State power. Althusser argues that regardless of the nature of the various Ideological State Apparatuses, all Ideological State Apparatuses and by association all ideology, is “in fact unified, despite its diversity and contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of the ‘ruling class’” (I&ISAs 146). The very context and theoretical development of Althusser’s theory confines the subject of ideology to the realm of the State.

In many ways the second part of Althusser’s essay, addressed in Chapter Four, is more complex and innovative as he wrestles with the nature of ideology. Perhaps the most productive, if not contradictory, elements of his argument tackle the relationship between ideology and reality, and ideology and history. It is important to note that here Althusser does not simply mirror Marx’s treatment of ideology but engages with a number of significant contradictions regarding the conception of ideology. Subsequently Althusser’s *Theory of Ideology in General* is far more challenging than his expansion of Marx’s *Theory of the State*. Despite avoiding any discussion and criticism of Marx’s first premise, Althusser makes a valiant attempt to justify Marx’s treatment of ideology, while answering many of the contradictions apparent in Marx’s work by looking for answers in interesting places outside Marxist theory. Althusser attempts to reconcile two contradictory aspects of Marx’s theory, arguing that “ideology has no history” (I&ISAs 159) because “ideology is eternal” (I&ISAs 161) yet he also argues that “ideology has a material existence” (I&ISAs 165) and therefore does have a history of its own. Althusser differentiates between the “imaginary form of ideology” and the “materiality of ideology” (I&ISAs 162).
ultimately limiting the scope of Marx’s treatment of ideology. Nevertheless, despite expanding the theory of ideology, throughout his work Althusser maintains Marx’s negative conception of ideology. Regardless of his theoretical dependence Althusser produced an innovative and clearly defined theory of ideology which acknowledges the impacts of ideas and ideology upon the real world.

Rounding off his essay, Althusser outlines his theory of interpellation, which describes the mechanism through which he argues that all citizens are interpellated into the dominant ideology. Althusser argues that the process of interpellation “transforms individuals into subjects”, further stating that “it transforms them all” (I&ISAs 174). Althusser argues that the social context into which we humans are born presents us as “always-already a subject, even before he is [or we are] born” (I&ISAs 175-6). Ultimately, Althusser argues that, through the process of interpellation all citizens misrecognize themselves as free when they are in fact subjects of the State. Thus Althusser reminds his readers that his Theory of Ideology in general is itself an extension of Marx’s Theory of the State. Likewise, reinventing Marx’s negative conception of ideology, Althusser concludes his argument by saying, “The reality in question in this mechanism, the reality which is necessarily ignored (meconnue) in the very forms of recognition (ideology = misrecognition/ignorance) is indeed, in the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of production and of the relations deriving from them” (I&ISAs 182-3).

Considering that Part One’s function is to briefly outline the history of the term, to test the theory by which it was generated and highlight the origins of the ‘gap’ currently existing in contemporary and the most influential theories of ideology, it is
important to note the limitations of Althusser’s theory. There can be little doubt that ideology can be a negative force; ideology can be restrictive and repressive and can be employed by the State. However, if ideology is only ever considered to be negative and restricted by its State context all subsequent theory will incorporate this limitation. This is of course true of Althusser’s theory. For Althusser ideology is not only restricted by his adherence to Marx’s negative conception of ideology, but it is unable to have a significant relationship with ideas and belief systems that exist outside the influence of the State as a social construct. Consequently Althusser’s theory is unable to address the full nature and function of ideology, the relationship between ideas, ideology and ideological apparatuses in pre-State, non-State and non-human systems. Put simply, the parameters of his research prevent him from exploring all aspects of ideology, even as it concerns humans.

In the final analysis Part One highlights the limited ability of existing theory to address ideology in relation to the set of wider related objects which ideology needs to cover, in the human sphere as in the rest of nature. The main limitations to understanding ideology’s scope are: its negative conception; a restricted view of ideology’s relationship to both history and reality; ideology’s nature and function in regards to other species and dimensions; and ideology’s role in social structures not dominated by State power. Finally, the relationship between ideas, ideology and the mechanism or ideological apparatus by which ideas are empowered is not fully understood. Together the recognition of the limitations of existing theory and the perceived benefits of resolving the ongoing problems that plague the treatment of ideology provide the impetus for Part Two of this thesis.
Chapter One

From Ideology as a ‘Science of Ideas’ to a ‘Negative Conception of Ideology’

While the stark difference between the meaning of ‘ideology’ for the French materialist Destutt de Tracy and that of the later Marxist tradition is well documented, or at least often acknowledged, little is known about how and why this schism came about. For instance, in his *Prison Notebooks* Antonio Gramsci acknowledges the disparity between Destutt de Tracy’s Ideology and the meaning that ideology has for Marxists. As Gramsci wrote,

“Ideology” was an aspect of “sensationalism”, i.e. eighteenth-century French Materialism. Its original meaning was that of “science of ideas”, and since analysis was the only method recognized and applied by science it means “analysis of ideas”, that is, “investigation of the origin of ideas”. Ideas had to be broken down into their original “elements”, and these could be nothing other than “sensations”. Ideas derived from sensations…. Indeed the meaning which the term “ideology” has assumed in Marxist philosophy implicitly contains a negative value judgment and excludes the possibility that for its founders the origin of ideas should be sought for in sensations, and therefore, in the last analysis in physiology (375-6).

Considering that ideology was not the focus of his study Gramsci simply noted the ‘historically’ inconsistent use of the term ‘ideology’, before saying, “How the concept of Ideology passed from meaning ‘science of ideas’ and ‘analysis of the origin of ideas’ to meaning a specific ‘system of ideas’ needs to be examined historically” (376). It is argued here that the ‘negative value judgment’ assumed in Marxist philosophy was not a direct result of Marx’s opposition to Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* but rather was derived from Marx’s opposition to the status afforded human rationality in metaphysics and particularly in German ‘speculative idealism’.
Beginning with an outline of the theoretical basis of Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*, this chapter investigates the differences between Destutt de Tracy’s ‘ideology’ and the Marxist ‘negative conception of ideology’, while presenting an argument as to how and why this disparity was developed.

Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy\(^\text{27}\) was one of the last Enlightenment thinkers in France.\(^\text{28}\) Unfortunately he has all but been forgotten, robbed of his rightful place in the Pantheon of Enlightenment thinkers. The significance of his contribution was eclipsed by the monumental changes brought about by the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and the birth of Modernity. Ideology, Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*, was in many ways the pinnacle of Enlightenment thought, designed to ‘perfect humanity’ by freeing it of false ideas.\(^\text{29}\) However, rather than the French Revolution realizing the outcomes of the Enlightenment project, as captured by Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*, the political turmoil of the Napoleonic era ultimately triggered the decline of the Enlightenment ideals. The actuality of what the French Revolution brought about was in many ways inconsistent with its founding ideals. The Terror, the protracted horror of the Napoleonic wars and the onset of the industrial revolution changed the face of Europe forever. Likewise Napoleon’s counter-revolutionary imperial rule required loyalty and self-sacrifice, and the industrial revolution ‘enslaved’ the masses. Perfecting humanity, truth and liberty were not so important when starvation was common, when labour was the subject of

\(^{27}\) Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy was born into an aristocratic family in Paris on 20 July, 1754 and died aged 81 years on 10 March, 1836.

\(^{28}\) In Emmet Kennedy. *A Cultural History of the French Revolution*. London: Yale University Press, 1989, Kennedy says that, “The Enlightenment was neither so short as an event nor so durable as a permanent structure but rather something in between, which we call *conjuncture*. It spanned several generations, from that of Spinoza and Bayle around 1680 to the *Ideologues* after the Revolution” (55).

extreme exploitation, when living from one day to the next was all that many could hope for. Together these political and socio-economic forces demanded the death of the Enlightenment project. Enlightenment thinkers, like Destutt de Tracy, had simply run out of time.

While there is no doubt that the tumultuous events that ushered in the modern age affected every strata of European Society, these forces alone did not create the schism between Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* and the Marxist ‘negative conception of ideology’. Marx’s many negative comments about ideology in general and ‘German ideology’ in particular, were not penned in an effort to oppose the *Science of Ideas* developed by Destutt de Tracy. In fact there is no doubt that Marx agreed with the precepts upon which Destutt de Tracy established his science. For instance, Marx wholeheartedly subscribed to the notion that ideas were born of sensorial perception, that the material body was a mediator between reality and the human mind. As such Marx and Destutt de Tracy had much in common. Most commentators agree that Marx never produced his notion of ideology in response to Destutt de Tracy, the ideologues or any of the French Enlightenment thinkers. Moreover most commentators fail to make any connection between Destutt de Tracy and Marx at all. The simple truth is that Marx’s ‘negative conception of ideology’ was forged as a by-product of his profound opposition to the speculative idealism of German metaphysics, or in other words, Hegelian philosophy.

The Hegelians, Old and Young, do nevertheless have one significant thing in common with Locke’s sensationalism and subsequently Destutt de Tracy’s *Science

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of Ideas: they all accept that ‘rationality’ is humanity’s primary faculty. That is, ignoring for a moment, the material or metaphysical origin of human rationality, both schools of thought accept that humanity is first distinguishable from all other earthly creatures by their ‘primary faculty’, rationality. The theoretical genealogy that led to Marx’s ‘negative conception of ideology’ flows through materialists like Locke, Condillac, and Destutt de Tracy, before jumping tracks to the metaphysics of Hegelian philosophy. Marx’s inversion of Hegel was in part a negative reaction to the ‘primacy of ideas’ doctrine. Marx exchanged the ‘positive depiction of the Idea’ in Hegel’s work with its opposite and applies the subsequent ‘negative conception’ to all ideas. Marx’s ‘negative conception of ideology’ was essentially the legacy of Marx’s inversion of Hegel, designed to counter the ‘primacy of ideas’ argument, and was therefore not deliberately constructed in opposition to the materialist origins of ideology. Nevertheless, Destutt de Tracy’s Science of Ideas suffered ‘collateral damage’.

Rather than proceeding with this overview, let us here examine some of the particulars pertaining to the historic development of ideology’s modern meaning. According to history Destutt de Tracy became enamoured with Locke’s sensationalism when he read Condillac’s works while imprisoned during the Terror (Head 10). Later he claimed that together Locke and Condillac opened his eyes to

31 In a now famous passage Marx wrote, “If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life processes” (German Ideology 37). Thus, Marx’s inversion of Hegel and his subsequent materialist conception of history attempted to correct what he saw as a ‘theoretical or ideological inversion of reality’. The ‘photo-negative’ illustrates a similar inversion.

32 It is not only reasonable but quite logical to trace the theoretical origins of ‘ideology’ as a ‘science of ideas’ back to the earliest known philosophers, but such a history must be set aside for another day. I have decided that explaining the schism between Destutt de Tracy’s ideology and Marx’s negative conception of ideology need only reference the protagonist’s relationship with Locke and perhaps Descartes. Beyond this, the context of the theoretical developments of both Tracy and Marx will be restricted to their immediate influences.
the possibility that truth could only be found through the analysis of thought, and that ‘thought’ naturally arose from sensorial perception (Head 10). Marx enthusiastically praised the thinkers of the “French Enlightenment… and in particular French Materialism” for their “struggle against” all metaphysics, making a special note of their opposition to the metaphysics of Descartes (Holy Family 147). Like Destutt de Tracy, Marx was also impressed with Condillac, of whom he wrote,

Locke’s immediate pupil, Condillac, who translated him into French, at once applied Lock’s sensualism against seventeenth-century metaphysics…. He expounded Locke’s ideas and proved that not only the soul, but the senses too, not only the art of creating ideas, but also the art of sensuous perception, are matters of experience and habit (Holy Family 152-3).

Essentially Marx was excited by the material base afforded ideas, in opposition to the metaphysical basis underpinning the ‘universal concepts’ that dominated ‘speculative idealism’. In relation to French materialism Marx also wrote, “there are two trends in French materialism; one traces its origin to Descartes, the other to Locke. The latter is mainly a French development and leads directly to socialism” (Holy Family 148). And so Marx paid, what was for him, the ultimate compliment to the French materialists that opposed Descartes, and traced their origin to Locke, as he believed that ‘socialism’ was the answer to which human exploitation, inequality and suffering was the question. Destutt de Tracy was not only one such French materialist, but he established his entire Science of Ideas upon Locke’s

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33 Intriguingly, despite the fact that Tracy boldly critiqued Descartes in ‘Lockean sensualist terms’, and opposed the resurgence of both metaphysics and religion, Marx made no mention of him in the Holy Family.
‘sensationalism’, and, perhaps more importantly opposed Descartes’ mind/body split on the grounds that the sentient human being only existed as the union of mind and body.\(^{34}\)

Essentially Destutt de Tracy argued that Descartes erred when separating thinking from feeling. Destutt de Tracy believed that, in the first instance, thinking and feeling were one and the same thing. Employing Locke’s sensationalism as a foundation allowed Destutt de Tracy to break down the distinction between thinking and feeling. Destutt de Tracy wrote,

> We may regard the words *perception* and *idea* as synonymous in their most extensive signification, and for the same reason the words *think* and *feel* as equivalent also when taken in all their generality: for all our thoughts are things felt; and if they were not felt they would be nothing; and sensibility is the general phenomenon which constitutes and comprehends the whole existence of an animated being, at least for himself; and inasmuch as he is an animated being, it is the only condition which can render him a thinking being (*Political Economy* 40).

Further to which, Destutt de Tracy believed that feeling and thus thinking is humanity’s primary faculty. Destutt de Tracy argues that, “if I ask myself how I know I have the faculty of walking I answer I know it because I feel it, or because I experience it….” (*Political Economy* 42). Continuing he writes,

> But if I ask myself how I know I feel, I am obliged to answer I know it because I feel it. The faculty of feeling is then that which manifests to us all the others, without which none of them would exist for us… [it] constitutes our existence;

\(^{34}\) Marx not only praised the French materialists in general, but he wrote quite positively of Helvetius, with whom Destutt de Tracy had much in common, and Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy’s closest academic companion and fellow ‘Ideologue’ (*Holy Family* 147-53).
that it is everything for us; that it is the same thing as ourselves (Political Economy 42).

Furthermore, addressing Descartes’ famous dictum Destutt de Tracy wrote,

I feel because I feel: I feel because I exist; and I do not exist but because I feel. Then my existence and my sensibility are one and the same thing. Or in other words the existence of myself and the sensibility of myself are two identical beings (Political Economy 42).

Destutt de Tracy continues his argument by addressing the relationship between sensibility and being, further stating that, “it is then the sole fact of sensibility which gives us the idea of personality, that is to say which makes us perceive that we are a being…” (Political Economy 43). Destutt de Tracy links thinking and thus feeling to existing, leaving but one final clarification. According to Brian Head, Destutt de Tracy states that Descartes famous dictum, should have read “je sens, donc j’existe” (“I sense therefore I exist”) (Ideology and Social Science 27).35 Considering the greater context of Destutt de Tracy’s theory, it is clear that what he means to say is that Descartes’ dictum should have read: ‘I sense therefore I exist as a sentient being’; as a sentient, thinking being can only exist as such through the “faculty of feeling” which naturally requires the union of mind and body. Explaining how Destutt de Tracy’s revision of Descartes’ dictum avoids the problems associated with the Cartesian split between body and mind or as it is often labelled between ‘thought and extension’, Head writes,

this formula would have saved Descartes from many of the errors into which he subsequently lapsed in assuming that thought and extension were two utterly different substances…. [And that] Descartes’ rash assumption in separating thought and extensions led directly to the hypothesis of innate ideas… these false doctrines, said Tracy, since disproved by Locke and Newton respectively,

35 See Destutt de Tracy, Count Antoine Louis Claude. Elements d’ideologie, Troisième partie. Logique. 1805. 133.
could only have arisen from Descartes’ failing to follow carefully his own rules of procedure. A more cautious attention to the facts, to the operation of our intellectual faculties, would have shown Descartes that “thinking and existing are… one and the same thing” for the thinking subject (27).36

Destutt de Tracy simply argues that the mind and body are elements of the one existence, such that without either part the other cannot be sentient. Destutt de Tracy’s argument eliminates the possibility that the mind and body can be anything but united, as in humans, thinking is an extension of the human body’s sensorial capacity, without which human thought could not exist. Destutt de Tracy not only accepts the pre-existence of a flesh and blood human body as a precondition to the faculty of feeling and thus rationality, he argues that we only exist as thinking, sensing beings because our physical, material bodies frame our existence in relation to the ‘real material world’. For Destutt de Tracy human existence is the union of mind and body as one sentient being, which is for him the beginning of human history.

Avoiding any discussion of “first causes”, Destutt de Tracy argued that our actual existence must be assumed to be the datum without which no other human faculty could exist, but that the datum alone is of little significance to the argument. Destutt de Tracy clearly says that,

Unless we [intend] to say that our existence itself is our first mean, which is very true but very insignificant; for it is the datum without which we should have nothing to say, and certainly should say nothing.37 This first observation

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36 See Destutt de Tracy, Count Antoine Louis Claude. *Elements d’ideologie, Troisième partie. Logique*, 1805, 189

37 Here Thomas Jefferson used the word ‘mean’ which I have exchanged for the word ‘intend’ in order to avoid confusion. I believe that this is necessary as the original subject of this passage is the human ability to effect their ‘means of subsistence’, or our ability to satisfy our desires, the word ‘intend’ avoids unnecessary confusion without affecting the substance of the passage.
does not prevent its being true that our will directs all our actions, which can be regarded as the means of supplying our wants (Elements of Ideology, Vol. 4, 58).

While focusing the reader’s attention upon his discussion of the function that ‘will’ plays in directing human actions, Destutt de Tracy’s claim that “our existence itself is our first mean, which is very true but very insignificant” is overstated as the existence of living human beings would only be insignificant if the nature of the human beings was incontestable. Destutt de Tracy certainly did not consider this to be the case as he not only critiqued but reworked Descartes’ dictum, bringing the ontological question to the fore. Furthermore, the most fundamental and profound difference between both Destutt de Tracy and the metaphysicians, and Destutt de Tracy and Marx can be described as ontological. The difference between Destutt de Tracy and the metaphysicians’ view of what it is to be human is quite obvious, however, the differences between Destutt de Tracy and Marx’s view is less obvious. Certainly, both Destutt de Tracy and Marx cite the natural emergence of the human race and the necessary existence of living human beings as a starting point for all human sciences. In fact Marx clearly and repeatedly states that, “the first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals” (German Ideology 31).

Destutt de Tracy claims that, like all other sentient beings, the ‘living human being’ is firstly a product of nature, a biological entity. In much the same way that a cheetah is born with the faculty to run fast, Destutt de Tracy argues that human

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38 Drucker argues that “according to de Tracy, there is no sensory perception which corresponds to either the ‘soul’ or ‘mind’; hence these ideas are not meaningful. Deprived of these ideas, and hence the usual distinction between men and animals, de Tracy concludes that there is no essential difference between them”. See H. M. Drucker. The Political use of Ideology. London: McMillan, 1974. 5-6.
beings are born with the faculty of thinking, of generating ideas and all that pertains to rationality. Further, it must be understood that Destutt de Tracy agreed with Locke in his opposition to the notion that ideas may be innate, such that he believed that ideas were not instilled by God, but rather generated from the sensorial experience of all things natural. One needs search no further for evidence of Destutt de Tracy’s belief in the naturalness of humanity than his most frequently quoted passage: “we have only an incomplete knowledge of an animal if we do not know his intellectual faculties. Ideology is a part of Zoology, and it is especially in man that this part is important and deserves to be more deeply understood” (Elements d’Ideologie, Vol. 1 xiii. Qtd. in Williams 56). Nevertheless, this passage does not stand alone. Destutt de Tracy often refers to humans and animals alike as thinking sentient beings. Logically, as he argues that rationality is humanity’s primary faculty, it is easy to understand why he believes that understanding these faculties is especially important when attempting to understand humanity. In essence Destutt de Tracy was developing his Science of Ideas as a ‘natural science’ in the materialist tradition, a science founded upon the belief that to be human was yet a biological condition. Nevertheless, he was not concerned with the means through which the human organism emerged nor of the forces that developed rationality as its primary faculty: ‘nature’ was for Destutt de Tracy humanity’s first cause (Political Economy 48). Thus, it may be argued that according to Destutt de Tracy the living thinking, sentient human is the starting point of human history proper. Marx, on the other hand, has a far more narrow definition of what it is to be human, and thus what begins human history.

Like Destutt de Tracy, Marx maintains that there is a connection between the physical existence of human beings and nature. However Marx insists that the physical existence of the functional ‘human organism’ does not define that organism as a human being. Marx argues that humans, “begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence” (German Ideology 31) and that “the first historical act of these individuals distinguishing them from animals is not that they think but that they begin to produce their means of subsistence” (“German Ideology” 20). Furthermore, Marx states that the “real ground of history… does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice…” (German Ideology 50). As such the context in which Marx places the “living human individuals” of his first premise, defines their ability to produce the means of subsistence as humanity’s primary faculty. Likewise, as this ‘socio-economic’ development translates the living human organism from an animal to a human, their ability to produce their means of subsistence is for Marx the first cause, beginning all human history (German Ideology 31).

When understood, Marx’s ‘first cause’ is, at once, evident throughout all of his works. It is the authority that underpins his social theory, his concept of humanity and their means of (socio-economic) salvation. It is the genesis of humanity, a kind of ‘religious’ truth, and the foundation of the Marxist doctrine. Contentiously, Marx claims that this foundation, the ‘rock’ upon which he builds his truth is in fact ‘reality’, not faith in myths or legends. Unashamedly he replaces the ‘fictions’

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40 This sentence does not appear in every version of The German Ideology as it was crossed out in Marx’s original manuscript. In fact this sentence does not appear in the Lawrence and Wishart edition but appears in a footnote in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. “German Ideology”. In Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. I. Moscow: Progress Publishing, 1969.
favoured by theologians and ‘Idealists’ alike with his own version of the genesis of human history. Marx argues that Bauer’s conception of history, “postulates religious man as the primitive man, the starting point of history; and in its imagination puts the religious production of fancies in the place of the real production of the means of subsistence and of life itself” (German Ideology 52). As such Marx replaces both the ‘religious man’ and the ‘primitive man’ with the ‘living human individuals’ of his first premise, claiming that not only is the “production of the means of subsistence” the real starting point of history, but because the ‘production of the means of subsistence’ first distinguishes humanity from animals, it is also the first cause of ‘human life itself’.

Needless to say Marx takes a very different approach to Destutt de Tracy regarding exactly what it is to be a ‘human being’. Despite the fact that Marx praised the French materialists for taking up Locke’s sensualism, his interpretation of their argument ignores their original intent. In fact the context of Marx’s ‘first premise’ argues against the sensualist notion that to ‘exist as a living human being’ is to ‘exist as a thinking, sensing human being’. In actuality, Marx separates the living human body from the thinking human entity. Or, in other words, for Marx ‘material production’ acts as a mediator between body and mind. Marx clearly differentiates between the human organism (the body) and the human capacity to think (the mind), just as he separates the ‘socio-economic’ human from nature.41

It is quite obvious that the perception of what is was to be human was very different for Destutt de Tracy and Marx. The significance of this difference is not, however,

41 In addition to this point it is argued (in the following chapter) that Marx reinvents the Cartesian Split between mind and body, humanity and nature.
fully understood. It may be argued that this difference is ultimately responsible for vast differences between their theories, yet, alone it does not account for Marx’s negative conception of ideology. Marx could have easily accounted for the differences regarding humanity’s primary faculty. After all Destutt de Tracy did argue that all ‘true ideas’ were directly dependent upon the material conditions of human life. Marx need only to have explained, that in his view, Destutt de Tracy had overlooked a vital stage in humanity’s mental development prior to arguing that the ability to produce the means of subsistence was one of the ‘material conditions’ upon which this ‘human life’ depended. And, subsequently, all thought preceding this development failed to distinguish humanity from other animals, thus ‘human thought’ can only be defined as different to other animals as a result of their socio-economic activity. The fact is that Marx did not make such an argument, nor, despite his treatment of ‘ideology’ did he ever attack Destutt de Tracy’s theory of ideology directly.

Most historians and commentators of philosophy agree that Marx’s treatment of ‘ideology’ makes no reference to Destutt de Tracy’s work. Alternately, Napoleon’s treatment of the ‘Ideologues’ had everything to do with his disapproval of their Science of Ideas. History has the unfortunate habit of recording certain events while forgetting their context, and all too often distorting those events in the telling of the story. The story of Napoleon’s treatment of the Ideologues reflects one such distortion. Napoleon had a very good reason for discrediting, even ‘destroying’ ideology, as the very principles upon which ideology was established ultimately challenged his imperial rule. According to Drucker, “for reasons of state he decided

42 Nevertheless, according to David Hart Marx called Destutt de Tracy a “fischblutige Bourgeoisdoktrinair” (a fish-blooded bourgeois doctrinaire) (http://www.econlib.org 4/7/2002)
to reinstate the religious education and restore the influence of the Catholic Church, if only because the Church’s hold on the people was greater than the Ideologues hold”. Eliminating any influence that the Science of Ideas may have had over the people was for Napoleon a matter of political self-preservation, and an important strategic manoeuvre, if his dreams of an imperial dynasty were to be realized.

Despite a very difficult beginning Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis and the other ‘ideologists’ had established themselves in influential positions prior to Napoleon’s ascent to power. With the Enlightenment ideals of truth and freedom in mind the Ideologists adopted Locke’s opposition to ‘innate ideas’, to “truths imprinted on the soul” (Locke 49) in favour of truths born of empirical evidence. Developing a set of scientific principles designed to free humanity from the bonds of religion and imperial rule, they believed that their Science of Ideas would replace classical logic. Simplistically, the Science of Ideas maintained that truth could only be born of scientific observation, not assumption, speculation or desire. Likewise, they believed that the results of experiments, observation and experience can only be properly understood in relation to the ability to sense changes in the ‘real world’. That is, humans as sentient beings can only arrive at truth through sensorial perception. Such was their influence that the basic concepts of their Science of Ideas was being taught in French schools as the sun set on the French Enlightenment. Destutt de Tracy and his fellow theorists were true to the Enlightenment ideals that spawned the French Revolution. They were opposed to the repression of the masses by Church and State. They sponsored the scientific quest for truth, freedom and equality, eroding class

distinction and repression. Nevertheless, as honourable as their intentions were, their application of the Enlightenment ideals set them on a collision course with Napoleon’s imperial rule. As Destutt de Tracy wrote, “every man has the power to determine the truth and falsity of his ideas without recourse to authority, right and wrong, moral and political”\(^{45}\); a statement that guaranteed Napoleon’s opposition as he could not possibly tolerate the erosion of his authority through the proliferation of such thought. Testing an already strained relationship, in direct contravention of the fundamental principles of the revolution, Napoleon sought the re-establishment of State Religion. Naturally Destutt de Tracy and his fellows spoke out in opposition to Napoleon.\(^{46}\) According to Head, “the ideologues were outraged by Bonaparte’s policies whereby the Church regained a great deal of its erstwhile influence” (57). The fragile relationship between Destutt de Tracy and Napoleon was ultimately shattered.

Napoleon attacked Destutt de Tracy and his companions in a bid to undermine the impact of their school of thought. In what can only be described as scandalous, Napoleon slandered Destutt de Tracy and his fellows, misrepresenting them and their materialist *Science of Ideas* as “diffuse metaphysics” (qtd. in Williams: 57). Voicing his opposition to them, Napoleon referred to Destutt de Tracy and his team as ‘ideologues’: a term which according to Raymond Williams was a ‘slanderous


\(^{46}\) Drucker writes, “the *Ideologues* had to attempt to influence the state. It was relatively easy for them to do this as all were members of the French Senate and took part in drafting the Constitutions of the years III and VIII… They passed a number of important laws, two of which, the laws relating to the separation of Church and State, and to education, were almost solely the work of the *Ideologues*”. See H. M. Drucker. *The Political use of Ideology*. London: McMillan, 1974. 8-9.
indictment’ that became very popular throughout Europe and North America in the first half of the nineteenth century (57). According to Arne Naess,

The use of the term “ideologue” by Napoleon and Chateaubriand made the term current within larger groups of people and the then predominant usage underwent a change. Napoleon found the so-called ideologists or ideologues among his opponents and referred to them in a contemptuous manner using “ideologue” and thus also “ideologie” as derogatory words…. The term was—outside the circles of Destutt—used in such a way that low estimation was implied by its connotation, and the technical core gradually receded.

Furthermore, Napoleon referred to the “doctrine of the ideologues” as “this diffuse metaphysics, which in a contrived manner seeks to find the primary causes” (Naess 151). Napoleon’s misrepresentation of the materialist, anti-metaphysical theory of the ideologists simply inverted reality depicting ideology as opposed to the ideals of the revolution. Thus, through a blatant and slanderous lie Napoleon was able to popularize the derogatory use of the terms ‘ideologue’ and ‘ideologie’ by association, discrediting and destroying the ultimate theoretical product of the French Enlightenment. Napoleon suppressed the Ideologists, closing down their faculty at the Institute National in 1803 and had Ideology, Destutt de Tracy’s Science of Ideas, removed from school curricula. The first inversion of ideology was complete. The ‘neutrality’ of a scientific discipline was replaced with the negative conception of ideology signposting the decline of the Enlightenment project in France.

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47 A point worth noting is that Napoleon’s use of ‘ideologue’ as a derogative term was coined some forty-three years before Marx wrote The German Ideology.
In addition to the tragedy that was Napoleon’s inversion of Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*, it has been suggested that Marx reflected Napoleon’s attitude toward ideology: a suggestion that has a certain romantic appeal yet confuses the issue quite considerably. It is here argued that despite certain similarities Marx’s treatment of ideology has virtually nothing in common with that of Napoleon. The similarities are easily stated. Both Napoleon and Marx employed an inversion to produce their negative conception of ideology, and both misrepresented materialist theory as either metaphysics or idealist theory in order to discredit it, but this is where the similarities end. Napoleon’s ill treatment of ideology was a calculated attack on what he perceived to be a threat to his political power, while Marx was reacting to what he perceived to be idealist ideology, rather than the theoretical formulations of the French Materialists. In fact, the entire business is complicated by Marx’s misrepresentation of the Young Hegelians as “idealists” (*German Ideology* 30) even though they were quite plainly materialists, because he also misrepresents the entirety of their work as idealist theory: his argument is without a doubt fashioned in opposition to what he perceived to be Idealist theory. That is, Marx falsely claims that the Young Hegelians expounded an idealist theory based upon their acceptance of rationality as humanity’s primary faculty (*German Ideology* 30). Their differences are further confused as Marx collapses Young and Old Hegelian theory into one, ignoring the materialist perspective of the Young Hegelians.\(^{51}\) Therefore, despite the fact that Marx claims to be addressing the Young Hegelians, as he ignores the differences that set them apart from the Old-idealist-Hegelians, he is actually addressing the Old Hegelians. As such whereas Napoleon inverted a ‘materialist doctrine’, Marx intended to invert the positive value placed upon ideas

within what he considered to be an ‘idealist doctrine’. Therefore, while Napoleon and Marx both cultivated a negative conception of ideology they did so for very different reasons. In brief Napoleon reacted to what Destutt de Tracy had defined as ideology, whereas Marx reacted to something that he defined as ideology.

Interestingly the ‘history’, or perhaps the story behind Marx’s negative conception of ideology, his inversion of Hegel, is far more complex than Napoleon’s inversion of materialist ideology. Napoleon was a warrior, a political beast and his assault on ideology was decisive, politically expedient and damaging to the materialist cause. Marx may not have agreed with Destutt de Tracy in every regard, but as he was a materialist philosopher, his motivation was to overturn idealist philosophy. Thematically Marx should have opposed Napoleon’s negative conception of the materialist *Science of Ideas*, but he did not. The negativity generated by Napoleon’s slanderous treatment of the ‘Ideologues’ primed the masses for what Marx had to say about idealist ideology. As such, it must be acknowledged that had Napoleon’s comments not popularized the negative conception of ideology, Marx may have expressed his opposition to ‘speculative idealism’ very differently. The fact is that the masses, ignorant of the actual benefits offered by Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*, had internalized Napoleon’s derogatory view of ideology, so that for them the term ‘ideology’ represented a negative value. The reality is that Napoleon’s comments greased the path, providing Marx’s critique of the Idealist system of ideas with ‘a course of least resistance’. Marx may not have even been aware of the inherent conflict between Napoleon’s negative conception of ideology and his materialist agenda, he simply took advantage of the popular negative, rather than neutral, conception of the term *ideology*. Needless to say that Marx’s argument is
complex, and the best part of two centuries later, still effective, despite the fact that it harbours several fundamental flaws.

Marx believed that Hegel’s dependence upon ‘the primacy of ideas’ was the chink in his armour, a chink that he believed the Young Hegelians shared through their acceptance of rationality as humanity’s primary faculty.\(^{52}\) As far as Marx was concerned this common denominator sealed their combined fate. Despite Marx’s treatment, and their joint dependence upon the primacy of ideas, the Young and Old Hegelians did not share the same premise, agree upon humanity’s first cause, nor share a common ‘ideology’. Further it is here argued that Marx collapsed their insurmountable differences, referred to their theories as though they were without dissention, labelled their work as ideology and subsequently inverted the value of all ideology. Furthermore, Marx’s negative conception of ideology was forged in reference to the sum of what he described as idealist doctrine without reference to Destutt de Tracy or his *Science of Ideas*. Nevertheless, the very fact that Marx’s insistence that idealist theory was itself the very paradigm of ideology raises an important question: is Hegelian idealism ideology as defined by Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*? And if so, was Marx well within his rights to describe idealist philosophy as ideology? Even when addressing these questions in respect to Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* their answers may well entertain the possibility that Marx was quite correct in describing Idealism as ideology. Notwithstanding that possibility, before ascertaining whether or not Marx’s treatment of Hegelian Idealism as ideology was justified or unjustified, we must uncover the reason why he described Idealism as ideology. Subsequently, we must test his negative conception

of all ideology. This is the aim of the remainder of this chapter, while the validity of
the how and why Marx produced his negative conception of ideology will be
addressed in the following chapter.

The reason that Hegelian idealism can be considered to be, and considered not to be
ideology in respect to Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* is that for Destutt de Tracy
‘ideology’ has a dual meaning. According to Naess, Destutt de Tracy began with “a
neutral concept of ‘idea’” and employed the term ‘ideology’ in two ways: “the mass
of human ideas and the general science of ideas” (157). This is in keeping with the
etymological construction of the word ‘ideology’ which stems from the Greek words
ίδέα (idea), from which we get the English word ‘idea’, and λογία (logy) meaning ‘to
study’ or ‘a system of’. As such for Destutt de Tracy ‘ideology’ simply meant ‘the
study of ideas’ or ‘a system of ideas’. In the first instance ideology may be
considered to be a scientific discipline, that is, the science of ideas. As with any
other science Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* claimed to rely upon empirical
methods of experiment and observation that employed the five senses as a means of
divining the ‘truth’ and discovering and exposing untruth. For instance even though
Hegel’s work, the *Philosophy of Right* did address ‘a system of ideas’ with great
depth, it did not comply with the scientific discipline demanded by Destutt de
Tracy’s *Science of Ideas.*

In respect to the scientific rigour required by Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*, the
problem with Hegel’s work is that he assumed that the core ideas were universally
ture without any supporting evidence. Hegel made no attempt to locate the origin of

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the ‘Idea of right’ in reality, saying only that, “the concept of right, so far as its coming to be is concerned, falls outside the science of right; it is to be taken up here as given and its deduction is presupposed” (Philosophy of Right 9). Likewise he did not attempt to ‘prove’ his assumptions to be correct through the application of any empirical method. Nevertheless, setting aside the true or false nature of Hegel’s premises and the origin of the founding ideas of nineteenth century Prussian society alike, Hegel does a good job of tracing the pervasive influence that a ‘dominant idea’ may have upon a human social system.54 Furthermore, Hegel, although not deliberately, illustrates the incredible influence that a dominant idea can have upon a modern society regardless of the true or false nature of that idea. As such, rather than considering Hegel’s work to be worthless due to its ‘unfounded premises’ his work demonstrates the importance of assessing and studying systems of ideas based on the power and influence of the ideas, rather than their ‘truth’. This development alone is incredibly significant as it highlights one limitation of Destutt de Tracy’s Science of Ideas. Thus despite his claim that he was practicing the “philosophical science of right” (Philosophy of Right 9), Hegel’s The Philosophy of Right does not operate in accordance with scientific principles, let alone the principles set out by Destutt de Tracy. Nevertheless, Hegel’s work consistently addresses systems of ideas and their influence on human social systems, therefore, ignoring the Enlightenment obsession with scientific truth, Hegel’s work does address and illustrate the function of ideas, as well as presenting its own idealist perspective, thus while generating its own influential ideas, it may be considered to be a particular

54 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of Destutt de Tracy’s contemporaries. Although Hegel’s rise to prominence was after that of Destutt de Tracy’s most productive period, they were nevertheless contemporaries. Hegel was both born after and died before Destutt de Tracy. Destutt de Tracy published his major works between 1801 and 1820, whereas Hegel published his first book in 1801, his first major work Phenomenology of Mind in 1807, and although he continued to write up until his death in 1831, and had much published posthumously, his last major work The Philosophy of Right was published in 1821 (six years after Destutt de Tracy completed his major work).
‘kind of ideology’. That is while Hegel’s study addresses and examines a system of ideas it does not comply with the disciplinary requirements of Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*, nor does it make any attempt to access ideas in relation to their real or material origins. Therefore, while it may be considered to be a kind of ideology it certainly cannot stand in the place of all ideology.

It must be noted that even though Hegel does not first establish the existence of the ‘idea of right’ as a universal construct his study of its influence while unorthodox is an acceptable variation to the study of a system of ideas and therefore can correctly be referred to as an ideology. Nevertheless, Marx did not employ this logic nor even attempt to define Hegel’s work as ‘ideology’ in relation to Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*. Marx described Hegel’s Idealism as ‘ideology’ because it promoted the importance of ideas rather than complying with any existing description of ideology itself. Perhaps a better way of saying it is, Marx employed the term ideology to describe what he perceived to be a flawed belief system without referring to its former definition. Therefore, despite the lack of any formal definition, the context of his argument provides the reader with a kind of informal definition. According to Naess throughout the one hundred plus times that Marx makes reference to “*ideologie*”, “*ideologe*” or “*ideologisch*”, “there is no occurrence in which ‘ideologie’, ‘ideologe’ or ‘ideologisch’, are used to designate something of which Marx approves, makes it justifiable to assume that the term ‘ideology’ as intended by Marx stands for something which by definition cannot be valid, sound or true” (159). Furthermore, Marx consistently associates ideology with fables, myth and illusion which he described as “illusions of the consciousness” (*German Ideology* 30). Subsequently, Marx’s use of the term ideology and his subsequent negative
conception of ideology is not only born of his inversion of Hegelian idealism, it also has no connection to Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*. As such understanding how the meaning of the term ideology went from a *Science of Ideas* to the ‘negative conception of ideology’ requires one to understand Marx’s argument.

Despite the fact that Idealist theory may have been a fair target, Marx directed his ‘inversion of Hegel’ at both Old and Young Hegelians. As noted above, before Marx could refer to their combined theory as ‘ideology’ he had to demonstrate a reason to collapse their otherwise irreconcilable differences. Marx did so by citing their common acceptance of human consciousness as that which defined humanity as distinct from other creatures. Marx simply states that, “The Young Hegelians are in agreement with the Old Hegelians in their belief in the rule of religion, of concepts, of a universal principle in the existing world…” (*German Ideology* 30). Marx highlights what he perceived to be the Young Hegelian’s “philosophic charlatanry” (28), mentioning the “allegedly dominant metaphysical, political, juridical, moral and other concepts” in their theory (*German Ideology* 29) before going on to argue that the Young Hegelians, like Hegel were concerned only with concepts, religious ideas and dogmas. As Marx said, “Gradually every dominant relationship was pronounced a religious relationship…. On all sides it was only a question of dogmas and belief in dogmas…” (*German Ideology* 29). Ultimately Marx does not justify every claim. Even so, the following passage goes a long way toward contextualizing his point of view:

Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against the illusions of the consciousness (*German Ideology* 30).
Thus, it becomes clear that Marx objected to the Young Hegelian’s acceptance of “conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness” as being of primary importance. Marx’s criticism is perhaps best summed up in this way: “it has not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material surroundings” (German Ideology 31). In contrast to which Marx claims that his own conception of history is based upon real premises, “not arbitrary ones, not dogmas” (German Ideology 31).

Considering Marx’s argument that the Young Hegelian’s theory was in error as they had failed to undertake a “comprehensive criticism of the Hegelian system” (German Ideology 29), Marx had little choice but to undertake his own ‘comprehensive criticism’ of Hegel’s Idealist philosophy. According to David McLellan, “Marx’s fundamental criticism of Hegel was that, as in religion men had made God the Creator and man dependent on him, so Hegel started from the Idea of the State and made everything else… dependent on this Idea” (Thought of Karl Marx 12). While it is certainly true that Hegel placed great emphasis on the “absolute infinity and rationality in the state” (Philosophy of Right 81), and said that, “The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea” (Philosophy of Right 80). Further commenting upon the “absolutely divine principle of the state… its majesty and absolute authority” (Philosophy of Right 81), and that “the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life” (Philosophy of Right 80). Further Hegel described the State as “the actuality of concrete freedom” (Philosophy of Right 82). However, Marx’s
fundamental criticism of Hegel was certainly not directed at his belief in the State as an institution, but rather was directed at the primacy of the universal idea of right upon which Hegel’s theory of the State was predicated. This point is immediately evident as the basis for Marx’s critique of Idealist philosophy (German Ideology 29-30). Marx criticized the ‘idea’, the imagined origin, illusory history, basic premises, authority and structure of the idealist conception of the State, yet never inverted the State as it is located in material reality (German Ideology 37-41 & 60-64). Marx did, however, exchange the primacy of the universal idea with the material origin of the State. As any good materialist knows, no amount of theory alone can invert relationships between material objects in the real world. In fact ‘the State’ maintains its position as ‘public enemy No. 1’ throughout Marxian and Marxist texts alike, providing a common enemy and site of desired revolution. In brief the ‘primacy of the idea’ can be seen as the common denominator that unified all of Marx’s Hegelian opponents, Young and Old.

Highlighting the difficulties that Marx faced when depicting all Hegelians as Idealists, the Young, Left, Materialist Hegelians traced humanity’s first cause to ‘material nature’. Ludwig Feuerbach argues that while consciousness set humanity apart from animals, human consciousness was a product of nature rather than divine intervention as some Idealists suggest. In true ‘naturalist’ tradition Feuerbach argued that “Thought is a product of being, not being of thought…. The essence of being as being is the essence of nature”, and concluded that, “only a sensible being is a real, true being”. While avoiding the primacy of a transcendental or universal idea or conscious soul he argued that “in a being which awakes to consciousness, there takes

place a qualitative change, a differentiation of the entire nature”, a differentiation that sets us humans apart from species that lack such consciousness. A conclusion to which Marx, almost flippantly, replies, “men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like” (German Ideology 31), yet he goes on to argue for a distinction on actual grounds: “They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence” (German Ideology 31). It appears that the differences between Feuerbach’s materialism and that of Marx stems from their differing premises. Nevertheless, regardless of the details Marx and Engels viewed Feuerbach’s argument as straddling the line between idealism and materialism as Marx’s Thesis on Feuerbach and Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, suggest. Engels simply wrote Feuerbach “stopped half way; was a materialist below and an idealist above” (360-361). Essentially Marx and Engels interpreted the Young Hegelians’ acceptance of ‘human consciousness’ as separating us from other species as maintaining the ‘primacy of the idea’, which was a core element of the metaphysical argument maintained by the Old ‘idealist’ Hegelians. Marx goes on to describe the Young Hegelians as fostering this “religious idea”. The “religious idea” to which Marx makes reference is not embedded in a belief in God, but rather belief in the primacy of consciousness. This he argues is religious because

57 Feuerbach’s ‘new philosophy’ rejected the “obtuse materialism” of Newtonian science and Idealism alike. Feuerbach believed that the empiricists, positivists and Idealists alike could not comment upon the functions of human consciousness. He argued that “for as a man belongs to the essence of nature—in opposition to common materialism; so nature belongs to the essence of man” —in opposition to subjective idealism”. In opposition to much idealist theory Feuerbach argued that humanity, human consciousness and all subsequent ideas were born of natural material processes. Nevertheless, while the Young Hegelians argued that human consciousness had a natural rather than transcendental origin, they did not argue against the ‘primacy of the idea’ in its entirety, they acknowledged that humanity was distinguished by human consciousness. See Eugene Kamenka. The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
it is not located in ‘reality’; that is, while the Young Hegelians argue that religion is simply a projection of humanity’s fears and desires, Marx argues that they fail to locate ‘consciousness’ in material reality and therefore maintain consciousness as a religious idea (*German Ideology* 29-30).

Marx’s counter argument is essentially very simple: he attacks the basic notion that ‘social reality’ descends from the primacy of ideas. Accordingly, he takes issue with the Young Hegelians and Hegel himself. With a hint of sarcasm Marx says, “Since we are dealing with the Germans, who are devoid of premises, we must start by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history…” (*German Ideology* 39). Addressing their premises Marx goes on to write that,

The Germans move in the realm of the “pure spirit”, and make religious illusion the driving force of history. The Hegelian philosophy of history is the last consequence, reduced to its “finest expression”, of all this German historiography, for which it is not a question of real, nor even of political, interests, but of pure thoughts… finally swallowed up in “self-consciousness”. This conception is truly religious: it postulates religious man as the primitive man, the starting-point of history; and in its imagination puts the religious production of fancies in the place of the real production of the means of subsistence and of life itself (*German Ideology* 51-2).

Obviously inferring that these Idealists believe in the ‘creation narrative’, which according to science is little more than a fairy tale, Marx is here stating that the Idealist conception of history is based upon a false premise, a fantastic illusion spawned in the imagination. Marx also criticizes a question that he believed to have been occupying the German philosophical mind for some time, further mocking the way that the ‘Germans’ engage with the history of primitive humanity, he wrote “how [did] we ‘pass from the realm of God to the realm of Man’ —as if this ‘realm of God’ had ever existed anywhere save in the imaginations, and in the learned
gentlemen, [who] without being aware of it were constantly living in the ‘realm of Man’” (German Ideology 52). While this kind of critique continues, the most succinct summary of Marx’s counter argument is “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life” (German Ideology 38). Of course by “consciousness” Marx is not just referring to a singular concept. He is referring to both the lucid mind born of material reality and a false-consciousness based on illusions such as the creation narrative as cast in history. Therefore another way of reading this passage is, ‘Life is not determined by false-consciousness, but consciousness by material life’. What Marx is saying is that the Young Hegelians traded in false-consciousness as they wrongly maintained the ‘primacy of ideas’. Subsequently, Marx associated their ‘theory of false-consciousness’ with ideas and ideology.

Other than railing against the primacy of human consciousness, Marx also highlights his objection to the role that ideas play in class dominated social systems. While introducing the concept of ‘ideological power’ to the equation, Marx focuses upon the relationship between the ruling class and dominant ideas. Addressing the effect that the ruling class has upon society’s dominant ideas, Marx states that the ruling class “rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch” (German Ideology 60). Furthermore he argues that it is the “ideologists, who make the perfection of the illusions of the class” (German Ideology 61), before suggesting that the Idealist conception of history was based on the progressive epochs of ideas. Marx continues:

Now one can go back again to the producers of “the concept”, to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes then to the conclusion that the
philosophers, the thinkers as such have at all times been dominant in history: a conclusion, as we see, already expressed by Hegel (*German Ideology* 63).

Marx then outlines three points aimed at “proving (or perhaps disproving) the hegemony of the spirit” (or hierarchy of the spirit). Once again Marx focuses on the importance placed upon ideas and their effect influence on history as mediated by thinkers and ideologists:

No.1. One must separate the ideas of those ruling for empirical reasons, under empirical conditions and as corporeal individuals, from these rulers, and thus recognize the rule of ideas or illusions in history.

No.2. One must bring an order into the rule of ideas, prove a mystical connection among the successive ruling ideas, which is managed by regarding them as “forms of self-determination of the concept”….

No.3. To remove the mystical appearance of this “self-determining concept” it is changed into a person—“self-consciousness”—or, to appear thoroughly materialistic, into a series of persons, who represent the “concept” in history, into the “thinkers”, the “philosophers”, the ideologists, who again are understood as the manufacturers of history, as the “council of guardians”, as the rulers. Thus the whole body of materialistic elements has been removed from history and now full rein can be given to the speculative steed.

This historical method which reigns in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be explained from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general (*German Ideology* 63-4).

Here Marx clearly demonstrates his belief that the Idealist conception of history depends upon the dominant ideas or, as he puts it, the “illusions of the ideologists”.

Further arguing that this conception of history is the history of ruling class ideas “common to all historians”, Marx says that,

Each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aims, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is expressed in ideal
form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones (*German Ideology* 61-2).

Additionally, Marx states that, “history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas ‘the idea’, the notion, etc., as the dominant force in history.... Hegel himself confesses at the end of the *Geschichtsphilosophie* that he “has considered the progress of the concept only”” (*German Ideology* 63). Thus, Marx highlights the role of the primacy of the concept or idea in Hegel’s theory. Marx’s objection to the primacy of ideas is perhaps best described by the following passage:

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily sublimates of their material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history (*German Ideology* 37-38).

According to Marx then, German ideology, including that of Hegel and the Young Hegelians, has no history. He argues that their ideology is predicated upon a false idea, presented as a universal truth while in reality the entire system of ideas is devoid of sound premises, and is therefore synonymous with false-consciousness or according to Marx, ‘ideology’.

Marx presents an alternative argument that requires the inversion of the Idealist hierarchy, exchanging the primacy of ideas, or ideology, for the productive material forces of ‘real history’. In effect Marx argues that real history shows that ideas
originated from physical actions resulting in the production of the means of subsistence, therefore shifting the ‘primacy’ from ideas to material practices. Marx’s inversion of Hegel essentially inverts the Idealist genealogy, in which authority descend from the ‘primacy of ideas’, and consequently from ideology down to material practice. Rather, Marx argues that the primacy and thus authority that empowers human social systems rises from material and economic practices (Critique of Political Economy 328). Marx’s argument presents the extraction of surplus value from the material production of commodities for economic exchange as that which empowers the socio-economic structure of society. From this basis Marx argues that “all human history” can be located in reality. As such Marx’s material conception of history locates the ‘power’ upon which all human social systems depend squarely in the ‘material relations’ or means of production that define humanity as separate from nature. In effect, he argues that a new premise from which a ‘true’ history of humanity can be established is necessary. As such Marx sets himself and his theory in opposition to that of the idealists, arguing that the Idealist conception of history is based in myths, legends and illusions.

Marx’s treatment of ideology, through the consolidation of false-consciousness, allowed him to invert ideology as a whole rather than acknowledging the potential difference between ‘true and false’ ideas and the ideologies that they promote. Arguably, projecting the nature of Hegelian ideology as though characteristic of all ideology was a gross generalization. Nevertheless, this generalization allowed Marx to not only invert the value associated with dominant ideas but to shift the conception of ideology from being a Science of Ideas to being a belief system based on false ideas. For Marx this was of course appropriate as he believed that the entire Idealist
discipline, and thus ideology, was founded upon a catastrophic failure to uncover its false premises and was therefore opposed to every scientific principle. Even so, it is unfortunate for ideology that Marx never segregated good and bad ideology by some empirical method, rather than creating an artificial divide between ideology and science. If, for instance, Marx had described Idealist ideology as an aberration to scientific method, he would have been able to establish his point at the expense of flawed theory rather than at the expense of the neutrality of ideology. The point is not that Marx falsely claimed the idealist theory was an ideology but that his generalization portrayed all ideology as ‘false-consciousness’, thus limiting ideology’s ability to comment upon all ideas and idea-based systems. Further exaggerating his treatment of ideology, the popularity of Marx’s inversion of Hegel and his inversion of ideology canonized his negative conception of ideology as though the correct definition of ideology.

Another consequence of Marx’s inversion of Hegel is that, just as Hegel’s theory was incomplete, Marx’s inversion of that theory reflects that incompleteness. Whereas Hegel’s theory was unable to comment upon material production in a meaningful way, Marx’s theory is unable to comment upon the potency and general function of ideas and ideology in a meaningful way. Ironically these limitations restricted Marx’s ability to comment upon the relationship between ideas and reality, between ideas and their influence upon human social systems. Marx did more than simply denounce all ideology as being rooted in illusion. In actuality Marx took that which he perceived to be the very essence of idealism, its most highly prized element, and exchanged it with what the Hegelians considered to be the most base element and vice versa. Effectively Marx inverted the ‘hierarchy of value’ ascribed to the order
of things within the Hegelian system, exchanged ideology for material, arguing that human practice, or ‘material production’, was the foundation and driving force of human relations, not ideas or ideologies (German Ideology 41). Furthermore Marx describes the founding ideas of idealist theory and class dominated society alike as phantoms of the imagination. Instead of ideas giving rise to the various modes of human practice, Marx inverted the idealist ‘mode of production’, arguing that the formation of ideas stems from material practice (German Ideology 50). As a result of this inversion, Marx’s conception of history was not dictated by dominant ideas but by real human practices, by material production (German Ideology 37). Therefore, at once Marx’s inversion of the primacy of ideas, and the role and value afforded ideology, gave rise to the negative conception of ideology and the Marxist materialist conception of history, complete with its reflected limitations.

As demonstrated above, the transformation of ideology from a Science of Ideas to a term describing systems of ideas based on false-consciousness, or the ‘negative conception of ideology’, was a disjointed affair rather than a deliberate and conscious effort because it was guided by other concerns. Ideology has nevertheless been slandered, misunderstood and misrepresented. Destutt de Tracy’s Science of Ideas died along with the Enlightenment ideals that spawned it, the victim of a changing mindset brought on by the Napoleonic wars, the industrial revolution and modernity. The validity of Marx’s redefinition of ideology is dependent upon the validity of his own argument, his own premises and his disavowal of rationality as humanity’s primary faculty. Subsequently, the validity of Marx’s first premise, his treatment of ideology and history, and his negative conception of ideology are examined, in detail, in the next chapter.
Chapter Two

The Historical Shift in Ideology’s Meaning

Just as the meaning of the term ideology is fractured in history, the ‘gap’ or ‘problem’ produced by the various theories of Ideology is fractured in logic. Between the various theories of ideology lay a number of gaps and inconsistencies that have produced a body of theory incapable of dealing with the diverse manner in which ideas and systems of ideas are manifest. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Marx’s negative conception of ideology did not react to Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* nor account for its shortcomings but was rather fashioned in opposition to a conglomerate of theory that he labelled ‘idealism’ and further categorized as ideology. In effect Marx did not compliment the existing theory of ideology, instead he reinvented the term. The passing of time not only saw Destutt de Tracy’s contribution forgotten but Marx’s negative conception of ideology accepted without critique. The tragedy of this is that Marx’s negative conception of ideology has been formalized by successive generations of theorists, such that despite their many innovative developments, their work has established the limitations placed upon ideology by Marx as though immutable. Subsequently, confirming those limitations systematically reduced traditional theory’s ability to comment upon a wide range of ideas, whether true or false.

The overwhelming influence of Marx’s negative conception of ideology alone warrants its investigation. However, the nature of its genesis, its assumptions, premises, and supporting arguments beckon analytical attention. Continuing the thread spun in the previous chapter, the validity of Marx’s inversion of ideology and the subsequent historical shift in ideology’s meaning is tested in this chapter. Further
to which this chapter aims to define the initial theoretical ‘gap’ created by Marx’s treatment of ideology including the creation of the divide between ideology and science, while setting the scene for the following chapters where Louis Althusser’s innovative theory of *Ideology in General* and *Ideological State Apparatuses* are examined.

As noted in the previous chapter, Marx’s negative conception of ideology was a theoretical side note that stemmed from his inversion of Hegel rather than a deliberate formulation. Marx’s identification of Idealist philosophy as ideology was quite astute; but whether identifying a single belief system as an ideology justified his treatment of all ideology in like terms is open to question. The validity of Marx’s negative conception of ideology thus depends upon the validity of his argument. Marx’s argument was in turn predicated on and justified by the ‘reality’ of his “first premise of all human history” (*German Ideology* 31); therefore examining the veracity of his first premise is the logical place to begin this analysis.\(^{59}\) Naturally, if Marx’s premises, reasoning and subsequent arguments hold true, his treatment of ideology may be considered reasonable. However, if his premises or subsequent arguments fail to hold true, the veracity of his negative conception of ideology will be open to challenge.

Despite the initial appearance of simplicity, Marx’s premises are not as straightforward as they appear. The ‘greater context’ complicates and compromises their relevance, and brings their ‘reality’ into question. While the greater context is

\(^{59}\) It is important to note that the *German Ideology* was published posthumously.
spread over many pages, Marx first presents his premises in a single passage and as such deserves to be quoted at length:

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and their material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geographical, orohydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to produce.

This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.

This production only makes its appearance with the increase of population. In its turn this presupposes the intercourse [Verkehr] of individuals with one another. The form of this intercourse is again determined by production (German Ideology 31-2).
Marx begins the premises passage with a very bold declaration, stating that his premises ‘are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstractions can only be made in the imagination’. Beyond the provocative nature of this statement, the complexity of Marx’s argument necessitates the analysis of this point (which is dealt with below). Nevertheless, throughout the remainder of the first paragraph Marx assures the reader of the ‘reality’ of the ‘real individuals’ of his first premise, of their actions and the material conditions that determine their existence in contrast to existing only in myth, legend or in the imagination. Driving his point home Marx suggests that the reality of these individuals ‘can thus be verified in a purely empirical way’, inferring that objective ‘scientific’ observation would establish their credentials once and for all. Yet, despite the confidence of Marx’s declaration, there are no means through which his first premise can be empirically verified. Empiricism requires that the object of study must be able to be assessed through experiment or observation. In essence, Marx’s claim that the existence and conditions in which these first living human individuals lived could be ‘verified in a purely empirical way’ suggests that ‘all human history’ began with specific human individuals that could be identified as objects of empirical research. However, as neither ‘these individuals’ nor any remnant of their culture survived till Marx’s day, science would not have been able to empirically establish their existence or reality through either experiment or observation.

Despite the lack of empirical evidence it is nevertheless logical to assume that because human beings exist today prior generations including the ‘first human individuals’ must have existed. This assumption, as logical as it may be, is based upon a priori knowledge rather than empiricism. That is, the existence of prior
generations of living human beings can be taken for granted without empirical evidence as our own existence testifies to their existence but this assumption does not verify their existence ‘in a purely empirical way’. Likewise, the existence of a fossil record that demonstrates the prior biological existence of homo sapiens does not amount to empirical evidence supporting Marx’s argument as he does not define human beings as a biological entity but rather claims that humans are distinguished from animals by their ability to produce their means of subsistence. As such, in order for the fossil record to provide empirical evidence that supports Marx’s argument it would need to demonstrate that the first living human individuals of all human history produced their means of subsistence by the very means described by Marx. That is, the fossil record would need to be able to distinguish between biological relatives that lived by different means of subsistence. For instance, according to Marx subsistence farmers are not part of ‘all human history’ while a farmer who produces the very same crops for the market is part of human history. This distinction would need to be reflected in the fossil record or by some other artefact in order for Marx to employ it as empirical evidence. Put simply, the means by which Marx distinguishes humans from non-humans is scientifically untenable. Therefore, while the very purpose of Marx’s first premise was to locate his argument in unquestionable reality by enlisting the authority associated with scientific or empirical methods, the reality is that he arrived at the ‘exact nature’ of the living human individuals of his first premise through an abstraction of the conditions that he observed. Marx argued that, “history is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations” before going on to warn that history can be “speculatively distorted so that later history is made the goal of earlier
Therefore, despite the fact that he was aware of the danger, not only is verifying the reality of Marx’s first premise via ‘a purely empirical way’ impossible, but the essence of his claim, that his premises are ‘real premises from which abstractions can only be made in the imagination’ (“German Ideology” 31), is directly inverse to their actual manufacture. In actuality, despite Marx’s posturing, his argument is simply not rooted in scientific method. In addition to the difficulties that Marx’s first premise encounters in relation to the lack of empirical verification, the context that he provides these ‘living human individuals’ is problematic to say the least. In effect Marx describes these ‘living human individuals’ as beginning ‘all human history’ not by their genus, race or species but by a secondary, behavioural practice. This is a complex point that will be examined at length throughout this chapter. However, at this juncture it is suffice to say that the criteria by which Marx defines these ‘living human individuals’ as beginning all human history proves to be somewhat difficult to argue.

Continuing with the analysis of his ‘premises passage’, Marx says, “thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature” (“German Ideology” 31), this reveals two very important pieces of information. Firstly, that he believed that the very first humans shared some kind of ‘physical organization’ and that they were defined ‘in relation to the rest of nature’, rather than as part of nature. Marx further clarifies this point in his very next paragraph, saying that, “men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, be religion or anything else you like. They begin to distinguish

themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence” (“German Ideology” 31). Essentially Marx argues that regardless of how we may choose to distinguish humanity, they began all human history by distinguishing themselves from animals through their actions. It is important to note that Marx does not argue that human history began when the human race emerged from nature as a distinct species, but rather that human history started when certain individual’s began to ‘produce their means of subsistence’. Consequently, the means through which Marx separates humanity from nature demands that prior to distinguishing themselves from animals, humans (homo sapiens) were akin to animals. Subsequently, according to Marx the lives and experiences of all humans that lived before humanity began to produce their means of subsistence are excluded from ‘all human history’.

Prior to examining exactly what Marx means by ‘produce their means of subsistence’, it is important to note that the original text included a sentence that qualified ‘the means through which they distinguishing themselves from animals’.

61 It is difficult to know whether or not Marx’s treatment of humans as distinct from animals was explicitly anthropocentric as he does not argue that humans are innately of higher value than other species. Certainly, Marx argues that human beings are different from other species but that cannot be in doubt. It is the basis from which he argues that is here in question. Unlike the strong and weak anthropocentrists Marx argues that humanity is essentially separate from animals, and to a certain extent nature, as a consequence of our economic or mercantile practices. In regard to the relationship to value—human beings valued above that of other species see See part iii pages 87-120 (especially chapter eight Anthropocentrism and the Problem of Priorities 99-110) of Leena Vilkkka, The Intrinsic Value of Nature. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997. Vikka distinguishes strong anthropomorphism from weak anthropomorphism. “according to strong anthropomorphism, nature is valueless until people ascribe some instrumental value to it. Nature cannot have intrinsic value. Only people have this special kind of value. Weak anthropocentrism attributes intrinsic value in terms of ends—value of people is prior” (100).
The qualifying sentence was originally found between the first and second sentences of the third paragraph, as quoted above, and reads as follows: “The first historical act of these individuals distinguishing them from animals is not that they think, but that they begin to produce their means of subsistence” (“German Ideology”. In Selected Works in 3 Vols., Vol. 1, 20 footnote). This sentence is not only consistent with other such passages, but it succinctly captures Marx’s intent. The purpose of this distinction is to discount the primacy of ideas or the primacy of human consciousness, arguing that humans first distinguished themselves from animals through physical activity rather than by thinking. What is perhaps more important is that this point of argument strategically sidesteps the notion that humanity was primarily distinguished, from other animals, by their ability to think. Naturally, Marx’s intent is far more obvious when reading the ‘qualifying sentence’ in its original context. Prior to editing, the original text read,

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. The first historical act of these individuals distinguishing them from animals is not that they think, but that they begin to produce their means of subsistence. Thus, the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature.62

Furthermore, it becomes apparent that as the ‘qualifying sentence’ employs the phrase ‘not that they think’, which was intended to contradict Descartes’ famous dictum. Descartes’ dictum, ‘Cogito ergo sum’, argues that there is a relationship between existing as a conscious human being and the ability to think, which when understood in relation to the Cartesian split between humanity and nature, we understand that his dictum also distinguished humans as being distinct from

62 This passage combines the printed text and the edited sentence referred to in the footnote as a means of recreating the passage as written. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. “German Ideology”. In Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Publishing, 1969. 20.
animals. Conversely Marx argues that ‘men’ are not ‘men’ distinct from animals because they think, but rather that men distinguish themselves from animals because they employ different practices.

Despite Marx’s first premise being based upon a priori knowledge rather than empirical evidence he clearly and systematically devalues thought, consciousness and ideas in favour of the practices of the ‘living human individuals’ of his first premises. He argues that, “the phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises” (German Ideology 37-8). In addition to this, according to Marx his materialist conception of history (Historical Materialism), “does not explain practice from the idea, but explains the formation of ideas from material practice” (German Ideology 50). Likewise, he writes, “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life” (German Ideology 38): a statement that appears to make perfect sense, as being alive is a necessary prerequisite of consciousness. However, the context provides us with a different argument. As Marx is focussed on establishing the primacy of material practice, the above statement does not comment upon the relationship between biology and thought, but rather addresses the relationship between thought and material practice. Subsequently, when removed from its context Marx’s clever turn of phrase and use of allusion clouds the actual conclusion of his argument. His reference to ‘life’ refers to the ‘men’ or the ‘living human individual’ mentioned of his first premise. These ‘men’ are defined, and further separated from nature not by their ability to think but by their ability to produce their means of subsistence and ultimately to exchange

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material products for their economic benefit. Therefore, another translation of the statement, ‘Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life’ is ‘the living human individual is not realized through thought but thought by material production’.

What exactly does Marx mean by ‘they themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence’? In opposition to many of Marx’s contemporaries who adhered to a form of materialism taking its ‘authority’ from nature, Marx’s materialist conception of human history was economically determined, taking its ‘authority’ from the economic or mercantile practices of men producing their means of subsistence through trade. Like Marx, many of his materialist contemporaries discounted Hegel’s notion that humanity was distinct from nature as a result of our relationship with ‘the universal idea of right’. Nevertheless, they did not all find it necessary to invert the historic relationship between ideas and human practices, but rather sought to redefine, correct or clarify that relationship, replacing the transcendental genesis of humanity with the natural production of human consciousness. Michael Bakunin, for instance, regarded humanity to be the “ultimate product of nature on earth” (qtd. in Morris 79).64 And in keeping with evolutionary theory wrote, “One can clearly conceive the gradual development of the material world, as well as of organic life and of the historically progressive intelligence of man, individually and socially” (qtd. in Maximoff 175).65 Nevertheless, considering that Marx criticized the Idealists for commenting upon the “imagined activity of imagined subjects” (German Ideology 38), he could hardly be

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seen to argue that the ‘reality’ of his ‘material premises’ relied upon the theory of evolution which was at that time almost purely speculative. Nor could he base his argument upon any such speculation.

It is important to note that there are a number of problems associated with Marx’s depiction of all theorists who accepted human consciousness as that which distinguishes humans from other animals as being in agreement. There is more than one great divide separating theorists such as Rene Descartes and Emanuel Kant, George Berkeley and Gottfried Leibniz, Johann Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Hegel. Likewise there are further divisions among materialists like Locke and Destutt de Tracy, Feuerbach and Bakunin. All have different views as to the origin and relationship between ideas and reality. Nevertheless, this problem is most obviously related to Marx’s homogenization of the Young and Old Hegelians, as there is a significant difference between Hegel’s ‘primacy of the Idea’, being a specific universal idea (as noted in the previous chapter) and the Young Hegelian’s acceptance of human consciousness as that which defines humanity as being different to creatures that do not share human consciousness. The most significant difference is that Hegel’s premise reflects his Idealist position, while the Young Hegelian’s theory reflects their Materialist position due to their claim that human life and consciousness were materially produced. Therefore, whereas Hegel argues that material practices descend from ideas, the Young Hegelians argue that ideas arise from human consciousness which is itself the product of the material processes of
nature. Thus, despite Marx’s treatment of all Hegelians as though they were in agreement, the Young ‘Left’ Hegelians were in fact materialists in opposition to the Old, ‘Right’ Hegelians who were idealists.\textsuperscript{66}

Ignoring, for a moment, the ‘species-ism’ of Marx’s ‘first premise of all human history’ as the existence of real living human individuals, the argument that humans ‘begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence’, assumes that animals do not produce their means of subsistence. This, however, is certainly not always the case. For instance, many human groups live in nomadic hunter-gatherer societies just as many omnivorous species such as bears, primates, many birds and sea creatures both hunt and gather. Otters and some primates even use tools to open shell fish, crack nuts and even fish ants out of ant nests. Spiders weave nets or webs to catch their prey, dolphins herd fish into shallow waters where they are easy prey. The examples are virtually endless.

Beyond species that sustain their existence through hunting and gathering there are countless examples of creatures that work to maintain, if not create, an environment in which they thrive. There are countless examples of insects and spiders who trap or catch unsuspecting prey. According to Attenborough, “the gladiator spider, Dinopis, hangs from her suspension line with her net held outstretched between four of the outstretched legs, waiting for unwary prey to walk beneath” (\textit{Life in the Undergrowth} 150). Many creatures work to improve their survival. Among these

\textsuperscript{66} As noted in the previous chapter Marx ignored the many irreconcilable differences that existed between the Old and Young Hegelians, rather focusing upon their shared acceptance of the ‘primacy of ideas’.
beavers damn waterways to create lakes that not only allow them to establish a sedentary life but create a habitat where their subsistence is provided.\footnote{Because of their dam building skills beavers are recognized as geomorphic agents. For more details regarding their ability to transform their landscapes and overall environments including creating habitats for other species see David R. Butler. *Zoogeomorphology: Animals as Geomorphic Agents.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 148-183. Also see Heather A. Viles. *Biogeomorphology.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1988. For further details regarding building, repairing and maintaining dams see Karl Von Frisch. *Animal Architecture.* Trans. Lisbeth Gombrich. London: Hutchinson and Co, 1975. 266-278. And for a discussion of habitat modification and the promotion of species diversity see, Mike Hansell. *Animal Architecture.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 207-213.} Sea otters not only cultivate and maintain kelp forests within which fish, urchins, and various crustaceans such as abalone thrive, but they likewise use tools such as stones to open the abalone, and strips of kelp to tie themselves to their kelp beds so that they do not drift off while sleeping.\footnote{For general information regarding social behaviour and so on see, G. R. Van Blaricom, and J. A. Estes eds. *The Community Ecology of Sea Otters.* Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1988; Hans Krunk. *Wild Otters: Predation and Populations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.} Squirrels burry acorns in the forest beneath the leaf litter away from the hungry mouths of other creatures. Considering that an acorn hidden beneath the leafy ground litter has a far greater chance of germinating and growing into an oak tree than if it lay on top of the leaf cover, when, as is often the case, a squirrel fails to retrieve an acorn from its place nested beneath the leafy ground cover the squirrel inadvertently assists the oak tree. If successful, in time that oak tree would provide the squirrel with more acorns than it could ever eat. Elephants smash down acacia trees when they no longer provide them with a reliable food supply, and assist in the propagation of the next generation of acacia trees by providing future seedlings with unrestricted sunlight.\footnote{For a description of how elephant behaviour affects trees see, C. A. Spinage. *Elephants.* London: T and A. D. Poyser, 1994. 172-176; For more general information on elephant ecology etc see, Sylvia K. Sikes. *The Natural History of the African Elephant.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971. 227-255; R. M. Laws, I. S. C. Parker and R. C. B. Johnstone. *Elephants and Their Habitats.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.} The elephant eats the acacia seeds and deposit them, along with a large amount of fertilizer, thus propagating a new vibrant forest and future food supply. The acacia also benefits from this process due to the fact that the lack of an upper canopy allows the new growth to get full sun, while the felled
trees decompose providing a steady source of nutrition for the next generation. Likewise, there are countless examples of such symbiotic relationships between animal and plant species.

It may be suggested, and rightly so, that Marx would not have been so naive as to argue that animals neither hunt nor gather, or even inadvertently cultivate or propagate through the dispersal of seeds and so on. And so we may turn to a more fitting example— the cultivation of subsistence crops and the farming of other creatures for food— at which point we may concede that during the period when Marx wrote *The German Ideology* (1844-5) no species other than human beings were known to deliberately cultivate subsistence crops or farm other creatures. However, prior to his death several hundred such species had been identified. Perhaps the most startling of these creatures was discovered in 1872 by Thomas Belt who published *A Naturalist in Nicaragua* in 1874, outlining the farming practices of Leaf-Cutting Ants, or ‘Attines’. These ants cut leaves from the surrounding foliage, process it into a mulch from which they cultivate a fungus. The fungus is propagated in a nursery and grown in an underground garden where it is tended until ready for harvest. The fungus is then harvested and consumed as a staple of their diet. In


72 For a detailed discussion of chamber structure see Mike Hansell. *Animal Architecture*. Oxford:
agricultural terms these little creatures are ‘subsistence farmers’ as their farming practices produce their means of subsistence.\textsuperscript{73} Subsequently, it has been discovered that 210 species of Attines, from 12 genera, around 330 species of termites and ambrosia beetles farm fungus.\textsuperscript{74} Likewise it is well documented that Argentine ants farm aphids, in a similar way to which humans farm cattle. These ants tend and keep the aphids, taking them out of their underground nests during the day to feed on leaf matter, where soldier ants stand guard over them, protecting them from predators. The ants milk the aphids for food, and even devour them. As such ants both cultivate crops and farm other species for food, by which they directly produce their own means of subsistence. Therefore, it can be said with absolute certainty that humans did not distinguish themselves from animals by the practice of hunting and gathering, the cultivation of crops or the farming of other creatures alone. If Marx’s argument that humans “begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence” includes the various forms of subsistence farming, humanity cannot be distinguished from many other animals. Therefore in order for Marx’s argument to maintain any semblance of legitimacy it must be demonstrated that Marx intended the phrase ‘produce their means of subsistence’ to refer to something other than hunting, gathering or subsistence farming.\textsuperscript{75}


\textsuperscript{75} For an example of the argument that human and animal social and economic world’s have a great deal in common, see, Auguste Forel. The Social World of the Ants Compared With That of Man. Trans. C.K. Ogden. London: Putnam’s Sons, 1928.
Returning to our analysis of the ‘premise passage’, the fourth paragraph of this section contains the following: “The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to produce” (31). This passage fails to provide any further information. Likewise the next paragraph gives little information that cannot be assumed from the first three paragraphs. However, like the second, the third paragraph makes reference to the ‘physical organization’ that not only pre-existed the living human individual’s ability to ‘produce their means of subsistence’, but provided the basis for social development. Marx acknowledged that in order for the ‘living human individuals’ of his first premise to produce their means of subsistence it was necessary for them to build upon pre-existing social factors. Nevertheless, Marx does not take the opportunity to describe the pre-existing social relations in any detail. He does, however, describe these social relations as “a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part.” (German Ideology 32). Further to which he clearly states that, “they themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization” (31). Therefore, while the particulars are not specified, Marx does acknowledge that certain social relations must have existed prior to the beginning of ‘all human history’. Continuing in this vein, the very last paragraph of the premises passage underlines Marx’s presupposition that the ‘living human individuals’ of his first premise existed within a social context necessary for the socio-economic development that he described. As Marx writes,

This production only makes its appearance with the increase of population. In

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76 The relevance of this acknowledgement is returned to after first exploring exactly what Marx meant by “produce their means of subsistence”.

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its turn this presupposes the intercourse \textit{Verkehr} of individuals with one another. The form of this intercourse is again determined by production (\textit{German Ideology} 32).

Despite the language, Marx alludes to several new elements such as ‘increased population’ and the presupposition of ‘intercourse’ between individuals, by which he means the social relations that foster trade as determined by ‘production’. Even though this passage describes trade or mercantile practice, and hints at the production of commodities for economic exchange, the language is not very clear and thus further clarity must be sought.

Narrowing the focus, the question needs to be asked: what did Marx exactly intend by the phrase ‘produce their means of subsistence’? The section that follows on from the ‘premises passage’ provides some context by eliminating certain possibilities. Remembering that Marx’s criteria excluded all humans that lived prior to developing the ability to produce their means of subsistence, he writes about the ‘undeveloped stage of production’ and its practices. Marx begins,

\begin{quote}
The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of ownership…. The first form of ownership is tribal \textit{Stammeigentum} ownership. It corresponds to the undeveloped stage of production, at which a people lives by hunting and fishing, by the rearing of beasts or, in the highest stage, agriculture… \textit{(German Ideology} 32-3).\end{quote}

What is interesting about the way Marx describes “the undeveloped stage of production” is that it applies to the way that creatures mentioned above produce their means of subsistence and that he mentions “forms of ownership”. This point is quite significant as Marx clearly dates the ‘undeveloped stage of production’ to have existed prior to the beginning of human history, before humans first distinguished themselves from animals, yet he relates the various ‘pre-historic’ stages of
production to different forms of ownership which are intertwined with other ‘human’
concepts such as the awareness of self. Therefore, despite the fact that Marx argues
that all human history started when the first humans began to produce their means of
subsistence, he attributes ‘human concepts’ such as ownership to people living in
prior epochs.

Quite reasonably Marx argues that humans must “be in a position to live in order to
be able to ‘make history’” (German Ideology 39). Continuing Marx describes
humanity’s ‘first historical act’. Marx states that, “the first historical act is thus the
production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself…
the satisfaction of the first need leads to new needs; and this production of new needs
is the first historical act” (German Ideology 39). Removing any doubt as to his
intension, the following passage clearly acknowledges the role of nature yet argues
that human history must be studied in relation to human industrial and economic
practices:

The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in
procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural,
on the other as a social relationship. By social we understand the co-operation
of several individuals… a certain mode of production or industrial stage…
itself a “productive force”. Further, that the multitude of productive forces
accessible to men determines that nature of society, hence, that the “history of
humanity” must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of
industry and exchange (German Ideology 41).

Subsequently, it need not be argued, but rather can be dogmatically stated that
according to Marx, all human history is the history of human industry and economic
exchange. Therefore, in actuality Marx’s ‘first premise of all human history’ is not
‘the existence of living human individuals’, but as demonstrated by the context, the
existence of living human individuals who produced the means of their subsistence
by extracting surplus value from the production of commodities for economic exchange. In light of this clarification the actual meaning of the last paragraph of the ‘premises passage’ is quite straightforward. As Marx writes, “This production [human industry] only makes its appearance with the increase of population. In its turn this presupposes the intercourse [socio-economic relations] of individuals with one another” (German Ideology 32). Therefore, as ‘this production’ is in actuality industrial or commercial production, what Marx means by they ‘begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence’, is that the first humans distinguished themselves from animals by deriving their means of subsistence by producing goods for economic exchange. As such, according to Marx’s argument ‘all human history’ began when living human individuals were first able to derive their subsistence from the extraction of surplus value through the production and sale of commodities.

Essentially Marx promotes the mercantile practices of the living human individuals of his first premise as being that which first distinguished humanity from animals and therefore marked the beginning of all human history. Subsequently, it is the extraction of surplus value through mercantile practice that underwrites Marx’s materialist conception of history. To this end, in the preface to The Critique of Political Economy, Marx and Engels write,

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness…. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.

In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. (Selected Works, in 2 Vols. 328-9)

As such Marx’s first premise has two distinct effects. Firstly, Marx argues that the act of producing material commodities for the market propelled the economic formation of not only the first society but all subsequent human social structures. And secondly the process of extracting surplus value through the economic exchange of commodities, produced as the sum of material manipulated by human labour, locates the beginning of mercantile practice, and for Marx the beginning of all human history in material reality.

The material or ‘socio-economic relations’ between humans that produce their means of subsistence from the extraction of surplus value through mercantile practices is the mechanism that empowers Marx’s materialist conception of history. Considering that Marx argues for a materialist conception of history, promoting mercantile practice as that which drives human history is quite problematic as it promotes mercantile practice as the means by which humans produce or extract their own means of subsistence as the driving force of human history. However, extraction surplus value from mercantile practice does not automatically arise from the production of material objects but rather is the projected outcome of the merchant’s ideology. That is, because ‘material’ itself does not contain any innate economic
value of itself nor does the material production of objects always increase the material’s value, the economic value is developed in relation to demand, as well as the ratio between production costs and commodity prices. Therefore, regardless of material production, without the unifying ideology that enlivens the mercantile system, the ‘living human individuals’ of Marx’s first premise would not be able to extract surplus value through economic exchange, but rather would be relegated to the undeveloped stage of production. Remembering that the undeveloped stage of production is for Marx pre-human history and that material production alone did not begin nor enliven ‘all human history’, the extraction of surplus value as a means of satisfying human subsistence through the implementation of mercantile ideology is ironically the mechanism that drives Marx’s Historical Materialism. As such mercantile ideology not only drives the socio-economic system that Marx describes as beginning all human history but it also organizes the production and economic exchange of commodities. The very basis of all mercantile practice is the idea that an individual or company can produce his/her or their means of subsistence by the extraction of surplus value (profit) through the sale of commodities. Actually making a living by mercantile practice is the projected outcome of its foundational idea, however, as the mercantile practice itself is the means by which the projected outcome is achieved, mercantile practice is by definition an ideology. Therefore, the ‘living human individuals’ of Marx’s first premise do not mark the beginning of all human history but rather signalled the beginning of humanity’s mercantile history.

Marx also argues that material practice or, perhaps more correctly, humanity’s mercantile practice, gave rise to human thought, and subsequently the idea that all human activity that occurred prior to this point was accomplished before the
development of human consciousness. This argument is obviously problematic. Assuming that the very first merchants would not have employed any form of artificial currency, having bartered or exchanged goods or services for their own products, it may be argued that there are countless examples of creatures, devoid of human consciousness, that provide goods or services to either other animals or plants in exchange for goods or services that better suit their needs. For instance, the reproduction of many plant species is accomplished through cross pollination. However, as plants cannot uproot themselves and go in search of a sexual partner, they often employ the movement of insects and small birds as a means of distributing their genetic material. Thus the plants and animals live in a symbiotic relationship where the animals derive their means of subsistence through harvesting pollen. When harvesting some pollen is deposited onto the flower’s stamen, the plant is fertilized and the cultivation of the next generation of plants, that will provide the means of subsistence to future pollinators, is begun. In essence the bird or insect provides a service in exchange for goods (pollen, nectar etc) provided by the plant. Nevertheless, in all fairness to Marx there is of course a distinct difference between human mercantile practice and the exchange of goods and services between insects and flowers. Unfortunately for Marx’s argument, the difference between human and animal trade further contradicts his argument. The human system of economic exchange distinguishes it from that of animals, not by its complexity but because trade or economic exchange between humans was not an instrument for its evolutionary development. Human mercantile practices are an expression of, or


abstract application made possible through, human consciousness. In other words, economic exchange did not assist the evolution of the human organism. Once having developed human consciousness humans were able to engage in trade as a deliberate and conscious process from which they could derive their means of subsistence. The kind of trade that Marx describes is therefore very different from the kind of trade that exists between bees and flowers for instance. That is, trade as a conscious act between individuals is different from the kind of trade that facilitated the evolution of ecologically co-dependent organisms. As such that which distinguishes human trade from ‘animal trade’ is the influence of human consciousness. Thus, it can be argued that human consciousness preceded human mercantile endeavour.

Ironically while contradicting his main argument Marx ‘supports’ the idea that human consciousness existed prior to human trade, claiming that ‘ownership’ pre-existed human mercantile endeavour. Marx is of course quite correct: the kind of economic exchange that exists between humans does indeed require ownership. Without ownership there are no objects to exchange nor can anything be gained in return, as receiving such an object as a personal possession also defines ownership. Therefore, if ownership is a prerequisite of economic exchange, before any two individuals can trade items of value, they must be self-aware, and be able to contextualize external objects in relation to ownership and exchange value.

Destutt de Tracy argues this exact point, very elegantly, claiming that ownership is the result of self-awareness, that “the thine and the mine were never invented. They were acknowledged the day on which we could say thee and me; and the idea of me and thee or rather me and something other than me, has arisen” (Political Economy 49). Destutt de Tracy goes on to demonstrate that when the “me and thee” are recognized it is only natural to “accord to them a personality other than his own, a self other than his own and different from his own” (Political Economy 49). Essentially Destutt de Tracy is arguing that the concept of ‘ownership’, is not only dependent upon human consciousness, but that it is predicated upon the realization that other people, distinct yet similar to the self, may have the same needs as the self. Thus ownership is a response to this realization as it is designed to protect one’s interest in resources and so on.
Ownership thus requires self-awareness and self-contextualization. Putting it quite simply, ownership requires thought, and thought in humans stems from human consciousness. Human consciousness pre-exists the conception of ownership, and consequently human consciousness is a prerequisite of human economic exchange. Remarkably this point does not need to be argued without any help from Marx himself. Even though Marx’s premises and core arguments assert that material production pre-exist human consciousness he does acknowledge human consciousness as existing prior to that of human production for economic exchange. Firstly we know that Marx makes note of the existence of a prior epoch or undeveloped stage of production, but he winds the clock back further commenting upon a still earlier epoch. Marx states that the very first distinction that existed between humans and animals, such as sheep, was human consciousness. Marx argues that when humanity first became aware of what is now called ‘society’ their consciousness was, “mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one” (German Ideology 42). Therefore, Marx does acknowledge that humanity was first distinguished from other species at the dawn of human consciousness, and that at that time, other than obvious physiological differences, human consciousness was the only thing that defined humans as being different from other animal species.\(^{80}\) Marx proposes that “this sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension

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through increased productivity” (*German Ideology* 42), clearly demonstrating the primacy of human consciousness. Additionally Marx argues that human consciousness is ‘further developed’ through ‘increased productivity’: a development that could not have occurred without the prior existence of human consciousness. Consequently Marx also dates the dawn of human consciousness to a time before humans had developed the skills necessary to produce their means of subsistence via economic exchange. This acknowledgement undermines his argument that material production preceded thought, thus negating his ‘first premise’ and ‘first historical act’ alike.

Considering the above analysis it is quite obvious that there are a number of problems associated with Marx’s ‘first premise of all human history’ (*German Ideology* 31). The first of which is that while he acknowledges the natural origin of the human race his ‘first premise’ presupposes a relatively large population of fully developed, socially advanced human beings. As noted above Marx makes several references to the pre-existing ‘physical organization’ of the living human individuals of his first premise. Furthermore, despite claiming that, “the writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the actions of men” (*German Ideology* 31), Marx does not concern himself with the biological existence of prior generations of human beings but rather begins all human history with relatively advanced mercantile activity. This is problematic because he ignores the ongoing ‘natural’, social and biological forces responsible for the existence of the ‘living human individuals’ of his first premise. Essentially Marx argues that the forces of human industry, material production, and economic exchange were the primary, if not the only, real forces to influence ‘real’ human
history. Paradoxically while Marx claims that his argument justifies his materialist conception of history, the mercantile system that he presents is in actuality mediated and driven by ideology, not material practice. As such mercantile ideology not only empowers the socio-economic system that Marx wrongly describes as beginning all human history, but organizes the production and economic exchange of commodities. As such ideology is not only responsible for the social relations described by his materialist conception of history but organizes mercantile practice itself. The idea that an individual can produce his or her means of subsistence by the extraction of surplus value through the sale of commodities is the very foundation upon which mercantile practice is established. Extracting one’s means of subsistence from mercantile practice is the projected outcome of its founding idea, while mercantile practice is itself the means by which the projected outcome is achieved. Therefore mercantile practice is not only mediated by an ideological apparatus, it is the product of mercantile ideology.

By claiming that the forces of human industry, the material production of commodities for economic exchange and so on, were the primary forces to influence the development of all human social systems, Marx reinvents an inverted Cartesian split. Descartes’ “I think therefore I am” positions human consciousness, thought and rationality above the carnal faculties of the body, whereas Marx distrusts the illusions of the mind, the imagination and false consciousness. Therefore, while Marx maintains a ‘split’ he promoted ‘practice’ over ‘thought’. In essence Marx’s premises and subsequent arguments reinvent Descartes’ famous dictum. The dictum, “I trade therefore I am” accurately reflects Marx’s ontology, his premises and greater
argument. Unlike Descartes’ dictum which separated and subjugated the physical to the mental and ultimately spiritual, Marx’s dictum not only separates humanity from nature, and maintains the separation of body and mind, but excludes much of humanity’s development and subsequent experience from ‘all human history’. Marx largely ignored the instrumental forces of nature, of competition and survival of the fittest. Despite acknowledging that the human species existed prior to developing the ability to produce their means of subsistence, Marx’s first premise excluded countless numbers of ancient and modern humans from ‘all human history’. Marx both perceives humans to have distinguished themselves from animals by their ‘mercantile practices’ and considers, what is to other historians a topical history, to be ‘all human history’. That is Marx argues that “the ‘history of humanity’ must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange” (German Ideology 41), the history of real material relations, not ‘myth’, ‘legend’ or speculation of prehistoric men. Nevertheless, these solutions do not justify Marx’s exclusion of great epochs of human development and experience from human history, nor does it warrant overstating the universality of his ‘first premise of all human history’.

Marx’s inversion of ideology and his subsequent negative conception of ideology were based upon the argument that idealist philosophy was ideology and because

81 Louis Althusser makes a similar point, albeit, distinct from any parallel to Descartes. In his book Essays in Self Criticism Althusser writes, “One thing is certain: one cannot begin with man, because that would be to begin with a bourgeois idea of “man”, and because the idea of beginning with man, in other words the idea of an absolute point of departure (= of an “essence”) belongs to bourgeois philosophy. This idea of “man” as a starting-point, an absolute point of departure, is the basis of all bourgeois ideology; it is the soul of the great Classical Political Economy itself. “Man” is a myth of bourgeois ideology: Marxism-Leninism cannot start from “man”. It starts “from the economically given period”; and at the end of its analysis, when it “arrives”, it may find real men’ (52). In short Althusser justifies Marx’s treatment of human history in respect to the ‘economically given period’ or as has been stated above in respect to period when human beings survived through the production of their own means of subsistence, that is through mercantile practice.
idealist philosophy dealt in matters of pure imagination ideology was also pure imagination. In direct contrast Marx argued that his ‘Historical Materialism’ was based upon real premises that could be proven by empirical means. The importance of the reality of his first premises to the subsequent argument cannot be understated. The context that framed the ‘living human individuals’ of his first premise revealed that they were only vehicles for the mercantile practices that allowed them to produce their own means of subsistence through the extraction of surplus value. The point of this is that Marx argued that ideas, ideologies and other products of the imagination were residues of the day’s activities, and that ideas and indeed human consciousness were in fact the products of mercantile practices. It is important to note that while Marx often referred to ‘material practice’ as the driving force of human history, excluding the ‘material practices’ of everyone that lived through subsistence farming or other non-mercantile practices described by the undeveloped stage of production, he defined the ‘material practices’ of which he spoke as mercantile practices alone. If, on the other hand Marx’s premises were not real or human consciousness, ideas and ideology were found to have pre-existed mercantile practices, his argument and subsequent inversion of ideology would fall down.

Having tested the veracity of Marx’s ‘first premises’ we may address the questions upon which this chapter was predicated. Do Marx’s premises, reasoning and subsequent arguments justify his inversion of ideology? At first glance the substance of Marx’s first premise, ‘the existence of living human individuals’, appears to be not only logical but unquestionable. It is of course logical that some humans were the first to derive their subsistence through the production and economic exchange of commodities. However, Marx’s first premise presupposed that all human history
began with a significant population of fully developed, socialized, sedentary human beings, while largely ignoring the historical development of that population. Further to which, given that science defines the human race as a particular species that can be identified by their unique genetic structure (including DNA), the ‘living human individuals’ of Marx’s first premise could never have existed as the first humans and therefore had nothing to do with the beginning of all human history. Subsequently, the part that the ‘living human individuals’ of Marx’s first premise played in human history was not only overstated, but when considering that they did not, in reality, begin human history, their proposed existence is not relevant to any discussion of the beginning of human history. As the ‘reality’ of those ‘living human individuals’ cannot be established by empirical means, Marx’s first premise cannot be proven to be any more real than the premises that underpinned Hegel’s argument. In fact, the human individuals of Marx’s first premise are of far greater significance to his argument than to the course of human history as a whole. The point is that, even though the production of commodities and the subsequent mercantile practices of our ancestors have shaped our social development in many ways, their significance to ‘all human history’ was born in Marx’s mind’s eye rather than in reality. Marx needed a real concrete premise to offset the ‘unseen’ premises of idealist theory; ‘real premises’ upon which he could establish his materialist conception of history. As such Marx’s first premises of all human history can be described as the result of his theoretical needs: reified, rather than real.

In actuality Marx admits to his inability to address the ‘real premises’ and conditions that gave rise to human history. Marx says, “of course we cannot here go either into
the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself” (*German Ideology* 31), before going on to argue that,

Our difficulties begin only when we set about the observation and the arrangement—the real depiction—of our historical material, whether of a past epoch or the present. The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises which it is impossible to state here, but which only the study of the actual life-process and the activity of the individuals of each epoch will make evident (*German Ideology* 38-9).

Acknowledging the difficulties in understanding the ‘life processes’ that resulted in the existence of the ‘living human individuals’ of Marx’s first premise does not excuse him from ignoring and excluding those processes from ‘all human history’. Furthermore, excluding those ‘life processes’ from human history ignores their ongoing impact upon humanity and human socio-economic development. Subsequently, Historical Materialism was not only robbed of several important dimensions, but his depiction of mercantile practice as the driving force of all human history betrays his motivation. Marx was rightly troubled by the injustice, inequality and exploitation of the working men and women in the emerging industrial age. Undermining the ‘power’ of the ruling class while empowering the working class was no doubt his goal, however, downplaying the importance of the natural and biological forces that produced the human race did not strengthen nor justify his first premise. Likewise, considering the era in which he lived, promoting a ‘history of humanity’ that began at an arbitrary point in time with advanced humans capable of material production and economic exchange, rather than beginning human history at a time when humans were indistinguishable from nature is inexcusable as various theories of evolution were the hot topic of his day.
The premises that Marx chose to establish his argument upon appear to have been selected for their potential to anchor his argument to ‘reality’ rather than their scientific value. Theoretically Marx’s premises are composed of the very opposite substance to those of the idealists and such as they fulfil a dual function. Firstly, claiming that his were “real premises” (German Ideology 31) created a site of opposition between what Marx referred to as, science and what he referred to as ideology. And secondly, by anchoring his own conception of history to ‘material reality’ through science, Marx was able to indulge his materialist conception of history with the authority afforded reality. However, ironic as it may be, Marx argues that his first premises of all human history could be ‘verified in a purely empirical way’, yet the description of the supposed beginning of all human history was devoid of a location in time or space, nor was that beginning verified by record nor artefact. Subsequently, the analysis of Marx’s argument, premises and his treatment of ideology have shown that there is no empirical evidence to justify the historical shift in ideology’s meaning.\textsuperscript{82} Despite the fact that Marx is able to demonstrate the difference between ‘Idealist philosophy’ and his own ‘Materialist philosophy’, he is unable to establish the reality of his premises through science, and his argument does not justify his negative conception of ideology nor the divide between ideology and science. Certainly, Idealist philosophy, Idealist ideas and ideology are less than scientific, but that is no reason to assume that all ideas and ideology share the same status. Further to which, Marx provides no scientific evidence to suggest that all ideology is negative, rooted in myth, ghostly apparitions,

\textsuperscript{82} The impending results of the analysis conducted here certainly comment upon Marx’s treatment of ideology, and may have further implications for the veracity of Historical Materialism in particular. However, despite the flawed nature of Marx’s argument, his comprehension of the origin of ‘power’ in human social systems is both astute and defensible. That is not to say that the entirety of his argument nor social theory holds true, but that the underpinning mechanism that he describes can be defended, I take up these issues in detail in Chapter Six
or the phantoms of the mind. As such the generalization by which Marx understood all ideology is not only unjustified but if adopted restricts the subsequent study of ideas and ideology to what would more accurately be described as ‘belief in the imaginary’. What is clear is that the analysis of Marx’s treatment and depiction of ideology uncovered a very large gap in the understanding of both the nature and function of ideas and ideology alike. What is yet to demonstrated is that the artificial limitations placed upon ideology by Marx had a negative impact upon traditional philosophy.

In contrast to the many theorist who are directly or indirectly influenced by Marx’s treatment of ideology it may be said that some theorists use the term ideology in an entirely neutral sense. However it must also be pointed out that wherever the term is used to approximate a complete set of ideas pertaining to a political standpoint, a belief system or a ‘way of life’, Marx’s influence can be seen. It was, after all, Marx who popularized *ideology* as a word that described ‘specific “systems of ideas”’ rather than the science of ideas.\(^{83}\) On the other hand it would be foolish to claim that the most casual and uncritical use of the term derived any real inheritance from Marx’s treatment. The following two chapters highlight a particular instance of just how the term has been used in a very specific way rather than in a very broad or general sense. Subsequently, while it is here acknowledged that the term *ideology* is employed as a synonym for ‘belief system’, ‘opinion’, ‘political bias’ or ‘grand narrative’ it is argued that those terms should be used instead of *ideology*. Further, I believe that the misuse of the term only degenerates the debate and further confuses the topic. Hence the tendency of this work to avoid discussing examples of ‘the

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general usage’ and/or misuse of the term ‘ideology’ explicitly positions Marx’s treatment of ideology as distinct from that described as ‘neutral’. The contrast between the ‘neutral’ use of the term as a synonym for “something else” and that intended by Marx’s negative conception of ideology is stark indeed. Importantly, it is here suggested that Marx, and later Marxist theorists alike, use the term ideology in a very specific way, rather than in a general or uncritical way.

The following two chapters are not intended to comprehensively demonstrate the ongoing affect of Marx’s negative conception of ideology. Alternately, the following chapters illustrate specific instances where Marx’s negative conception of ideology has had a direct and profound affect upon modern theory. The challenge is not finding a suitable example of Marx’s influence, but rather making a decision as to which work to employ. Being spoilt for choice is sometimes an uncomfortable luxury, especially when the work of so many leading theorists is available. Additionally, the fact that a number of prominent theorists address certain aspects of the concept described by Marx as ideology by various other terms further complicates things. For instance Antonio Gramsci employs the term hegemony to describe the ideological forces that work to establish and maintain the active consent of the masses through their self organization established under the threat of punitive measures. Michel Foucault, on the other hand, approaches what Althusser described as the function of Ideological State Apparatuses via his discussion,

analysis and exposition, of ‘discourse’ and ‘power’. The difficulty is that while each of these theorists made a significant contribution, their work does not lend itself to clearly illustrate the direct influence of Marx’s negative conception of ideology. Put plainly, the object of the following two chapters is made easier by examining a text that shows a clear linkage between the concepts and language it employs and those addressed by Marx himself.

Of the many available texts the work of Louis Althusser is best suited to the task at hand. Interestingly, Althusser works hard to signpost his debt to Marx, yet struggles to expand his theory beyond the strictures of Marx’s propositions. Althusser both uses Marx’s language and references several passages from the *German Ideology* and actively promotes Marx’s negative conception of ideology while paradoxically arguing against it. Further Althusser’s ‘Theory of Ideology in general’ aims to expand upon Marx’s own characterization of ideology in order to develop or formalize those fragments into a complete theory. Subsequently Althusser’s work is interesting and informative. Best of all, Althusser’s work clearly illustrates the ultimate limitations of Marx’s negative conception of ideology. Overall Althusser’s work is not only suited to illustrating the ongoing affect of Marx’s inversion of ideology, but I suggest it is best suited to further the aims of this thesis. In brief Althusser’s theory provides many points of departure from which the analysis being undertaken here can benefit.

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86 Foucault’s theory informs the discussion in Chapter Six *Ideas and Power*.
87 Many other theorists including those of the Frankfurt School offer significant comment. Of these the work of Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Jurgen Habermas stands out. A more comprehensive work would need to address the contribution of the Frankfurt School more directly, however as it is not the purpose of this text to address every instance or theoretical variation, that task will be left to another time.
The following two chapters focus upon Louis Althusser’s innovative *Theory of Ideology in General* and *Ideological State Apparatuses*. Examining Althusser’s work not only enriches this study and provides a well formulated theory of ideology as a backdrop to future theoretical development, but invites discussion on the nature and function of ideas and ideology in respect to reality, history and their ability to effect changes in the real material world.
Chapter Three

Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

There can be no doubt that there is a schism between the original conception of the term ‘ideology’ and its latter, Marxist, use. The nature of this schism and the events that precipitated its development were examined in chapter two. Likewise, the basis of the latter use of the term ideology, the premises and logic underpinning Marx’s negative conception of ideology were analysed and found wanting. In fact it was demonstrated that Marx based his negative conception of ideology upon an argument underwritten by reified rather than real premises, developed in order to anchor his argument to material reality rather than imagination. This chapter explores the impact left by Marx’s theoretical footprint upon Louis Althusser’s *Theory of Ideology in General* and his *Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses.*

Althusser’s work was certainly both significant and influential, as it not only reinvigorated Marx’s work but elegantly and insightfully extended Marx’s theory. Despite the fact that Althusser’s theoretical developments are only one site demonstrating the significance of Marx’s negative conception of ideology, Althusser’s theory not only demonstrates the impact of Marx’s treatment of ideas and ideology, but illustrates the effect of the inherent limitations of Marx’s work when projected forward. As such this chapter examines the effect of the theoretical gap, created by Marx’s negative conception of ideology upon modern theory.

Althusser’s essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: notes toward an investigation”, was certainly one of his most valuable contributions to Marxist

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This brilliant essay not only expands Marx’s Theory of the State by demonstrating the pervasive nature of State power but defines the limitations of ideology in accordance with Marx’s negative conception of ideology. Subsequently, the relationship between Althusser’s theory and that of Marx is important. Althusser’s work clearly demonstrates the impact of Marx’s assumptions and further illustrates the theoretical and practical limitations emanating from Marx’s reified premises. Nevertheless, beyond its value as an illustration, Althusser’s theory of ideology develops concepts well beyond the immediate strictures of Marx’s negative conception of ideology. In effect Althusser’s theory of how the State employs ideology as a means of extending and exerting its influence upon the private lives of its citizens is not only plausible but insightful. Therefore, analysing Althusser’s essay not only further defines the gap, highlighting the need to address the theory of ideology, but provides a platform from which an investigation of the nature and function of ideology can be mobilized.

While there are many examples of how Althusser held Marx in very high regard, this chapter is primarily concerned with Althusser’s work on ideology, and of greatest interest the work that he produced during the late 1960s. Althusser’s letter to Ben Brewster (1969) clearly lends support to the notion that Althusser was himself dedicated to Historical Materialism. He writes: “no theory of psychoanalysis can be produced without basing it in historical materialism” (in Writings on Psychoanalysis

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Interestingly, this letter was dated the 21 February 1969, while the essay in question ("Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses") was written between January and April 1969. This letter is, however, not the only evidence of Althusser’s dedication to Historical Materialism. Further to which Althusser wrote a number of other texts at or about the same time that not only confirmed his dedication, but manifest his claim that Marxism was scientific. Althusser had been given the honour of writing the Preface to the very first, complete, French translation of Marx’s great tome Capital volume one, which was dated March 1969. And in April of 1969 he wrote a follow up article to his 1968 essay, Lenin and Philosophy, entitled Lenin before Hegel. Thus, all four texts were not only dated in the same year, but may have been written concurrently. Therefore, not only is the essay in question analysed, but, Althusser’s Preface to Capital and his essay, “Lenin before Hegel”, are looked to as possible sites of evidence regarding the role that Marx’s theoretical propositions and assumptions played in Althusser’s Theory of Ideology in general and his Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses.


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91 Prior to the translation referred to here Capital had only ever been published in French via serial form.
indicating a new direction in his work.\textsuperscript{94} Outlining the motivation behind these “new theses” Althusser says, “I have tried to re-emphasize the fact that we owe to him [Marx] the greatest discovery of human history: the discovery that opens for men the way to a \textit{scientific} (materialist and dialectical) understanding of their own history as a history of the class struggle” (\textit{Lenin and Philosophy} 7). This passage clearly demonstrates Althusser’s desire to not only promote Marx’s work as ‘scientific’, but to demonstrate its relevance in a modern context. Furthermore, Althusser says, “in order to defend Marx’s work, in order to develop and apply it, we are subject to the same class conditions in theory…. The struggle for Marxist science and Marxist philosophy is today, as it was yesterday, a form of political and ideological class struggle” (\textit{Lenin and Philosophy} 9). Althusser clearly believed that he was able to reinvent Marx’s theory through his “new theses” enabling, not only himself but also contemporary Marxism to critique the new forms of bourgeois ideology.\textsuperscript{95} However, while boastful of his “new theses”, it must be said that Althusser wholeheartedly believed that his “new theses” were a mere extension of Marx’s own work. Subsequently, Althusser did not present his work as though a separate or new theory, but rather as a modern application of Marx’s theory.\textsuperscript{96}

Althusser’s claim that Historical Materialism was ‘scientific’ may not have been readily accepted by the Marxist community but it was not without precedence. As noted above Marx argued that,

\begin{quote}
Where speculation ends—in real life—there real, positive science begins: the
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{96} For a list of Althusser’s works, Co-authored works and reviews see pages 23-61 of Joan M. Miller. \textit{French Materialism: A Multidisciplinary Bibliography}. New York: Garland, 1981.
representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place (German Ideology 26).

Marx argues that in contrast to idealist theory, his materialist conception of history is rooted in reality, and can be proven by empirical means, thus attributing the ‘authority’ associated with science to his own theory. Althusser not only supports this notion, but ranks Marx’s ‘scientific discovery’ as one of the three greatest ever. 97 Throughout the Preface to Capital Althusser demonstrates his immense respect for Marx’s greatest work. On the very second page of the Preface Althusser writes,

Capital, a mighty work, contains what is simply one of the three great scientific discoveries of the whole human history: the discovery of the system of concepts (and therefore of the scientific theory) which opens up to the scientific knowledge what can be called the ‘Continent of History’. Before Marx, two ‘continents’ of comparable importance had been ‘opened up’ to scientific knowledge: the Continent of Mathematics, by the Greeks in the fifth century BC, and the Continent of Physics by Galileo.

We are still very far from having assessed the extent of this decisive discovery and drawn all the theoretical conclusions from it. In particular, the specialists who work in the domain of the ‘Human Sciences’ and of the Social Sciences (a smaller domain) i.e. economists, historians, sociologists, social psychologists, psychologists, historians of art and literature, of religious and other ideologies – and even linguists and psycho-analysts, all these specialists ought to know that they cannot produce truly scientific knowledges in their specialisations unless they recognise the indispensability of the theory Marx founded (qtd. in Lenin and Philosophy and other essays 72).

Interestingly, describing Marx’s theory as, ’the discovery of the system of concepts (and therefore of the scientific theory)” mirrors Destutt de Tracy’s claim that

‘ideology’ as the study of ideas and systems of ideas was indeed the *Science of Ideas* or the *scientific theory of ideas*. The irony is that with less scientific rigour than Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*, Althusser claimed that Marx’s theory which inverted ideology and created the divide between ideology and science without recourse to scientific method, was itself a ‘*scientific theory*’. Nevertheless, comparing Marx’s theory with the contribution of the classical Greek mathematicians and Galileo as ‘one of three great scientific discoveries of the whole human history’ leaves little doubt as to Althusser’s sentiment. Unlike many other theorists Althusser clearly describes Historical Materialism as “the Marxist science of history” (*For Marx* 14), while describing Dialectical Materialism as “a new philosophy” (*For Marx* 33). Therefore, his references to Marx’s “*scientific theory*” and the “continent of history” indicate that he is making a direct reference to Historical Materialism as the Marxist science of history. By employing the term ‘science’ in this manner, Althusser posits Marx’s theory as the foundation of all human sciences, while excluding non-scientific belief and ‘all ideology’ from the ‘truly scientific’. As such Althusser’s argument directly reflects the artificial divide between ideology and science created by Marx.

Althusser believed that Historical Materialism was the only theory through which history could be understood. For instance, the article “Lenin before Hegel” reflects upon Lenin’s understanding of Hegel, describing how Lenin’s initial understanding of Hegel (prior to 1914) was rightly based upon the commentary of Marx and Engels, as at that time Lenin had not read Hegel’s work for himself (108-110). While ‘acknowledging’ that Hegel was writing about elements of the imagination,

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Althusser argues that the ‘materialistic’ approach was the only vehicle through which the history of non-materialist theory could be understood (124). This is quite clearly an argument for the primacy of the so-called ‘Marxist science of history’ (*Reading Capital* 130). Together these passages certainly suggest that throughout the early part of 1969 Althusser consistently believed in the primacy of Historical Materialism and the divide between ideology and science.99

Althusser’s depiction of Historical Materialism as the Marxist *science of history* has a number of significant implications for his theory, and more importantly for the extension of the theoretical gap created by Marx’s treatment of ideology. Presenting Marx’s theory as the ‘scientific foundation’ of all the human social sciences not only fortifies, empowers and affords it a certain authority, but more importantly it restricts Althusser’s ability to develop a theory of ideology that goes beyond the strictures of Marx’s negative conception of ideology. Despite clearly recognizes the irony embedded within the claim that “the accusation of being in an ideology only applies to others, never to oneself” (I&ISAs 175) Althusser still locates his own argument outside ideology via his position in ‘Marxist science’. Althusser argues that, “what thus seems to take place outside ideology, in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems to take place outside it” (I&ISAs 175). While being aware of the paradox, he managed to convince himself that his belief was scientific, and therefore as an exception to the rule could not be described as an

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99 This point is further supported by the tone of his article “Lenin and Philosophy” (1968) and his two major works, *For Marx* (1966) and *Reading Capital* (1968).
ideology. Ironically, the belief that Marx’s theory could be proven by empirical means, and therefore was separate from ideology illustrates the paradoxical nature of such belief.

As Althusser’s argument develops the problematic nature of his depiction of Marxism as science becomes more evident. Directly prior to introducing his new *Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses*, Althusser wrote a summary of Marx’s *Theory of the State* in which he listed the following four points:

1. the State is the repressive State Apparatus,
2. State power and state apparatuses must be distinguished,
3. the objective of the class struggle concerns State power, and in consequence the use of state apparatus by the classes…
4. the proletariat must seize State power in order to destroy the existing bourgeois State apparatus and in a first phase, replace it with a quite different proletariat State apparatus, then in later phases set in motion a radical process, that of the destruction of the State (the end of State power, the end of every State apparatus) (I&ISAs 141).

The fourth point concludes that the “destruction of the State” is tantamount to the destruction of, or, “the end of State power [and] the end of every State Apparatus”. Therefore, the destruction of the State, would also constitute an end to every Ideological State Apparatus. Thus, when considering that Althusser also categorically exclaimed that “ideology always exists in an apparatus” (I&ISAs 166) which by its context demands that ‘ideology always exists in a State Apparatus’, the destruction of the State, its power and ideological apparatuses translates to the end of all ideology.¹⁰⁰

How could the demise of the State bring ideology to an end? For Althusser the State was predicated upon belief in falsehood or ideology. Therefore the destruction of the State would also put an end to ideology. Althusser believed that the ultimate realization of ‘Marxist science’ would be the destruction of the State resulting in the ultimate success of socialism. Subsequently, it is clear that Althusser wholeheartedly believed that the term ‘ideology’ only applied to ‘systems’ produced in conjunction with, manipulated or governed by, the State. Thus, as Marxist ‘science’ was not produced in conjunction with the State it could not be described as an ideology. This argument is not without its problems. Ironically, Althusser’s claim that “there is no practice except by and in an ideology” (I&ISAs 170) highlights ideology’s indispensability, because where there is practice, there must be ideology. This problem is exacerbated as he also describes ideology as ‘ideas, representations, belief, rituals and actions’ (I&ISAs 166-9), such that the destruction of the Capitalist State and the success of socialism would result in an end of practice, actions, rituals, belief, and ideas: conclusion that is even more dumbfounding when considering that Althusser began his essay by arguing, “As Marx said, every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same time as it produced would not last a year” (I&ISAs 127). Thus, in accord with Marx, if socialism could not ‘reproduce the conditions of its own production at the same time as it produced, socialism would not last a year’. When this particular flaw in Althusser’s argument is taken to its logical conclusion, the end of all ideology, of all practice, action, ritual, belief, and ideas would render socialism a scientific impossibility as without ideology it would be devoid of the ideas, practices and actions prescribed by socialism.
There can be little doubt that despite the philosophical, rather than scientific, nature of Marx’s negative conception of ideology, and the artificial divide created between ideology and science, Althusser loyally accepted Marx’s claim to ‘positive science’ and thus accepted his treatment of ideology as both justified and scientific. Consequently, establishing Marx’s theory as both scientific and the foundation of his own work circumvented the necessity for Althusser to justify the ‘scientific nature’ of his own theories of ideology. Further to which, the fact that Althusser perceived Marx’s theory as scientific, betrays his inability to understand one of the most basic principles of the nature and function of ideology. In short Althusser limited ideas and ideology to their negative sense, rather than accepting that ideas exist on either side of every good-evil, truth-untruth divide. Subsequently, Althusser’s acceptance of Marx’s distinction between ‘ideology and science’ had a profoundly detrimental effect on his very ‘unscientific’, philosophical understanding of ideology.

The most conclusive evidence of Althusser’s dependence upon Marx’s theory’s assumptions and reified premises, is found in the development of his own theory as presented in his essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: notes toward an investigation”. As such there are a number of complex questions that need to be asked of Althusser’s essay: does Althusser’s Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses depend upon Marx’s theory as described in the previous chapters, and if so, is Althusser’s theory affected by the inherent limitations and reified premises upon which Marx’s theory is based? Do Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses accurately account for the role that ideology and all ideological apparatuses play in the production and maintenance of human social systems? Dealing with the simplest
of these questions first, the following ‘brief overview’ of Althusser’s argument asks whether his theory is inextricably linked to Marx’s own theory of the State and so on.

By way of introduction the essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, is an interesting text from its beginning to end. According to the very first footnote, “this text was made up of two extracts from an ongoing study” (I&ISAs 127), (which may account for the lack of any formal introduction and the change of focus midway). Nevertheless, even though there is no formal separation of the two extracts, it appears that the first extract, addressing the Ideological State Apparatuses comprises the first 30 pages (qtd. in Lenin and Philosophy 127-157), while the second extract completes the essay (I&ISAs 158-183). The essay was originally written in French, dated ‘April 1969’ and first published in La Pensée in 1970.

The essay’s sub-title “Notes towards an investigation” infers that the contents of the essay are something less than that which constitutes an investigation. As such the essay could be viewed as something akin to a discussion paper. However, it is unlikely that that is what Althusser intended. The investigation that Althusser had in mind (to re-emphasize the importance of Marx’s work and further the cause of socialism), reflects a much greater project as hinted at in the ‘Forward’ to Lenin and Philosophy and other essays. Furthermore, the subtitle is not the only signpost indicating the incompleteness of the essay. The ‘first footnote’ presents the following disclaimer, “the ideas expounded should not be regarded as more than the

101 The edition from which I am working was subsequently translated into English by Ben Brewster and published as part of a collection of essays, entitled Lenin and Philosophy and other essays by Louis Althusser, 1971. The essay is contained within fifty-six pages and is followed by a three-page post-script that further clarifies a few points addressed in the essay.
introduction to a discussion” (I&ISAs 127). Nevertheless, even though the tenor of this ‘disclaimer’ underlines the intended message of the subtitle, the greater context of the essay’s publication questions this notion. Firstly, prior to including the text for reprinting in Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, Althusser had more than twelve months to review the text, during which time the essay had been published in La Pensée. Thus, Althusser had the opportunity to review the text in relation to any criticism flowing on from its first publication prior to its inclusion in the collection. During that time, whether in response to criticism or simply as a matter of review Althusser added a ‘post script’ written in April 1970, twelve months after the essay was originally penned. Secondly, as mentioned above, Althusser’s description of the essay in the Forward of the book appeared to be almost boastful of its new direction. Therefore, regardless of the tenor of the subtitle and first footnote it must be concluded that Althusser not only considered the essay’s contents to be more substantial than that of a set of ‘notes’ or a mere ‘introduction to a discussion’, but that he believed the essay to be worthy of publication in English. Therefore, one gets the impression that the subtitle was designed as a safeguard against criticism rather than reflecting the real status of the text. Further to which, as Althusser did not employ this text as an ‘Introduction’ to a much larger or more substantial work on ideology, it stands out as his definitive work on the subject. Thus, while the subtitle and the footnote provide background information to the text their tone must not be allowed to rob the text of its validity.

As published, Althusser’s essay deals with two distinct topics. The first extract aims to extend Marx’s theory of the State by addressing the pervasive nature of State ideology through Althusser’s Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses, while the
second extract puts forward Althusser’s *Theory of Ideology in General*. Subsequently, the change of topic mid-essay presents this thesis with something of a ‘thematic’ dilemma. Therefore, in order to deal with one topic at a time this chapter will address Althusser’s *Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses* as an extension of Marx’s theory of the State, while leaving the analysis of Althusser’s *Theory of Ideology in General* to Chapter Four. This decision not only simplifies and streamlines each chapter but allows any objections raised by Althusser’s extension of Marx’s theory of the State or the construction of his own theory of Ideological State Apparatuses to be addressed independently. Nevertheless, as the essay in question is composed of both extracts, all aspects of the argument pertaining to Althusser’s dedication to Marx’s theory during the late 1960’s equally comment upon both extracts and therefore may be considered as providing context to this and the following chapter.

The essay lacks a formal introduction, beginning instead with a brief preamble regarding his reflection upon prior analysis. The second paragraph introduces the theoretical principles that are set up to frame the essay and are returned to at the end of the essay. The first ten pages of Althusser’s essay briefly explains various aspects of Marx’s theory, including the “reproduction of the means of production” (I&ISAs 128), “reproduction of labour-power” (I&ISAs 130), “infrastructure and superstructure” (I&ISAs 134), and finally summarizes Marx’s theory of “the state” (I&ISAs 137). Throughout these pages Althusser makes very little mention of ideology, nor is his argument directed toward a discussion of ideology. In fact, the first extract is not at all concerned with the nature or function of ideology itself, but rather how ideology functions as part of the State Apparatus. And perhaps correctly
so, as Althusser’s purpose for writing this extract was to extend Marx’s theory of the
State to include and account for the pervasive influence of ideologies such as those
dominating religion, politics and so on. Therefore, in view of his motivation, the
opening ten pages successfully ‘re-emphasizes’ the basic tenets of Marx’s work,
while bringing the Marxist theory of the State into focus.

Althusser introduces the need to expand the Marxist theory of the State and the State
apparatus in particular by saying, “I think that it is indispensable to add something to
the classical definition of the state as a State apparatus” (I&ISAs 140), before going
on to summarize what he referred to as “the essentials of the Marxist theory of the
state” (I&ISAs 140). Continuing Althusser writes, “in this perspective, therefore,
what I would propose to add to the ‘Marxist theory’ of the State is already there in so
many words” (I&ISAs 141). By this statement he means that while Marx and
Marxist theorists wrote about such things “in so many words”, the role of the
Ideological State Apparatus was neither clearly defined nor fully developed.
Althusser continues:

Thus, what has to be added to the ‘Marxist theory’ of the State is something
else. Here we must advance cautiously in a terrain which, in fact, the Marxist
classics entered long before us, but without having systemised in theoretical
form the decisive advances implied by their experiences and procedures…. They recognize this complexity in their practice, but they did not express it in a
corresponding theory. I should like to attempt a very schematic outline of this
corresponding theory. To that end, I propose the following thesis.

In order to advance the theory of the State it is indispensable to take into
account not only the distinction between State power and State apparatus, but
also another reality, which is clearly on the side of the (repressive) State
apparatus, but must not be confused with it. I shall call this reality by its
concept: the ideological State apparatus (I&ISAs 141-2).
Thus, Althusser’s *Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses* (ISAs) was undeniably presented as an extension of Marx’s theory of the State. In the seven pages of Althusser’s essay that follow page 141 he outlines and explains his theory, as it relates to Marx’s theory of the State. Having completed an empirical list of the various ISAs and further described their joint function, Althusser returns to write about “the reproduction of the relations of production” (I&ISAs 148), the “class struggle” (I&ISAs 149), and further tests his theory against a few historical examples. Althusser then concludes that, “all Ideological State Apparatuses, whatever they are, contribute to the same result: the reproduction of the relations of production, i.e. of capitalist relations of exploitation” (I&ISAs 154). The extract rounds off with a few in-depth examples of ideology as a function of the State, including the French Revolution. Therefore, Marx’s theory of the State did set the beat to which Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses march.

From the very outset Althusser clearly described his motivation as a desire to extend the Marxist theory of the State in order to incorporate and account for the role played by ideology. Althusser never intended the exposition of what he referred to as Ideological State Apparatuses to replace or reduce the importance of Marx’s theory of the State, as the following quote attests:

> The State is thus first of all what the Marxist classics have called the State apparatus…. The Marxist-Leninist ‘theory’ of the State has its finger on the essential point, and not for one moment can there be any question of rejecting the fact that this really is the essential point. The State apparatus, which defines the State as a force of repressive execution and intervention ‘in the interests of the ruling class’ in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the proletariat, is quite certainly the State, and quite certainly defines its basic ‘function’ (I&ISAs 137).

Thus, Althusser’s theory of *Ideological State Apparatuses* simply clarifies one aspect
regarding the ‘essential point’, which is that the State’s function, including that of ideology, is manifest as “a force of repressive execution and intervention… in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the proletariat”. Therefore, as the means of repression is the ‘essential point’, according to Althusser’s argument any complete contemporary theory of the State must address the State’s means of repression, the understanding of its agents and their function. Hence, it is worth noting that Althusser’s Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses is not a theory of ideology in general, nor is it a theory that addresses the nature or function of ideology, but rather it is a theory that identifies another type of ‘State Apparatus’ and describes how these newly identified State Apparatuses function as agents of State repression.

Having cited the founding argument and the first extract’s purpose, let us begin the analysis of Althusser’s essay in earnest by first establishing exactly what he argues in regard to Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses. Althusser begins to address Ideological State Apparatuses by describing Marx’s ‘State Apparatus’, before re-naming it the ‘Repressive State Apparatus’. As Althusser clearly says, “Remember that in Marxist theory, the State Apparatus (SA) contains: the Government, The Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons etc., which constitute what I shall in future call the Repressive State Apparatus” (I&ISAs 143). From first impressions one may assume that Althusser simply re-names Marx’s ‘State Apparatus’ as his own ‘Repressive State Apparatus’ in order to clear the way for an entirely new, yet accompanying, set of ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’.Interestingly, this ‘first’ but false impression remains until it is corrected in the argument’s conclusion. He continues, “I shall call ideological State Apparatuses a
certain number of realities” (I&ISAs 143), and then produces an empirical list which includes, “the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal and political ISAs, the trade-union ISA and the communication and cultural ISAs” (I&ISAs 143). Despite defining RSAs and ISAs separately and describing their differences Althusser eventually brings them together, as composite aspects of the State apparatus. Nevertheless, the argument requires that Althusser first clarify the differences between ISAs and RSAs through their various functions:

I have said that the ISA’s must not be confused with the (Repressive) State Apparatus. What is the difference? What distinguishes the ISAs from the (Repressive) State Apparatuses is the following basic difference: the Repressive State Apparatus functions ‘by violence’, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function ‘by ideology’ (I&ISAs 143-5).

Althusser further articulates the difference between ISAs and RSAs by saying that “the (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly through repression (including physical repression), while functioning secondarily by ideology” (I&ISAs 145). Likewise, he goes on to say that, “Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression” (I&ISAs 145). As such Althusser further claims that “there is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus” or a “purely ideological apparatus” (I&ISAs 145), as both function doubly through repression and ideology. Althusser refers to this concept as “double functioning”. Accordingly Althusser writes, “double ‘functioning’ by repression and by ideology… makes it clear that very subtle explicit or tacit combinations may be woven from the interplay of the (Repressive) State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses” (I&ISAs 145-6). As such Althusser extends the reach of the State apparatus into private homes, private beliefs, rituals and the practices of ordinary citizens. In this regard
Althusser’s theory suggests that the State has the ability to influence the most private aspects of human life. This is, however, a ‘reasonable’ argument as the State clearly influences the day-to-day life of its citizens through their social, financial, and ethical expectations, and so on. Even so, the degree of State influence within the realm of the private is certainly questionable.

Essentially, Althusser’s argument blurs the distinction between the public and private spheres, yet does not dissolve it completely. Nevertheless, by blurring the distinction between the public and private spheres Althusser places them on a continuum that represents the degree of State influence. Consequently, Althusser’s theory does extend the Marxist theory of the State quite considerably, as he arms his theory with the theoretical tools needed to penetrate the domain of private ‘institutions’.

Regarding the theoretical conjunction of the public and private spheres Althusser enlists the support of Antonio Gramsci. As Althusser writes (in reference to Gramsci), “the distinction between public and private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law… the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private” (I&ISAs 144). Furthermore, Gramsci wrote of fixing the two major superstructure ‘levels’ as follows: “one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the State’” (Prison Notebooks 12). By describing private institutions as part of the superstructure, Althusser implies that Gramsci thought of ‘private’ institutions in a similar way to himself. However Gramsci never defined the private as part of the State apparatus nor attempted to argue that the State was in control of the ‘private’, but rather argued that “this [State] apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of
society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed” (*Prison Notebooks* 12). Gramsci segregates the private and the State apparatus in much the same way as Marx and Lenin, while Althusser formally removes the theoretical chasm between the public and private spheres by presenting private institutions as ISA’s and therefore extended the Marxist theory of the State. Accordingly, Althusser wrote, “private institutions can function perfectly well as Ideological State Apparatuses” (I&ISAs 144) further eroding the distinction between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ institutions, so that together they form the “State Apparatus”.

One difficulty encountered when dissolving the distinction between the public and private is that Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses encompass every aspect of private life as his list of ISAs include the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA, the trade-union ISA, the communication ISA, and the last and possibly most encompassing of all, the cultural ISA. Therefore, whereas Gramsci, Marx and even Lenin inferred that the State maintained control over the entirety of society through the punitive capacity of the State Apparatus, Althusser went one step further. There is no doubt that there are such things as Ideological State Apparatuses. However, not every ideological apparatus that exists in association with the State complies with the theoretical definition of an Ideological State Apparatus. As such, the ‘truth’ of the matter may be found in a balance between Gramsci’s understanding of the relationship between ‘private institutions’ and Althusser’s ISA’s.

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102 The subject of Pre and Non-State Ideological Apparatuses is dealt with at length in Chapter Seven.
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty associated with Althusser’s description of the nature and function of an Ideological State Apparatus is that his list of ISA’s conceivably incorporate every aspect of private life, such that the concept of the State controlling every aspect of the private lives of its citizens aptly describes private institutions by the term ‘Ideological State Apparatus’. This term, however, implies that all ‘ideological apparatuses’ are in fact ‘State Apparatuses’. In addition to this because Althusser claims to present a theory of ideology in general where ideology is always exists within an apparatus (I&ISAs 166), his list of ISA’s must have been considered by him to cover all ideology. Subsequently, as Althusser’s ‘double functioning’ unites the repressive and ideological ‘State Apparatuses’ under the State sponsored ruling class, there is no place left for truly privately held belief, individuality or practices. Understanding the pervasive nature of the State and its ability to control its citizens while allowing them to believe that they are ‘individuals’ is quite astute. Nevertheless, as the State is not omnipotent, its influence can never be absolute. As such while Althusser’s theory of ISA’s is elegant and insightful his depiction of the ‘universal’ influence of the State is problematic to say the least. There can be little doubt that the State does employ so-called ‘private institutions’ or ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ as a means of influencing its citizens, but as State power is limited, the existence of such Ideological State Apparatuses does not preclude the possible existence of Non-State or ‘Private Ideological Apparatuses’.

Momentarily setting aside these difficulties, Althusser forges ahead to address the unifying nature of ruling class ideology. Clarifying the relationship between the State and the ruling class, that is, explaining what he previously referred to as the
‘essential point’ he argues that the institution of the State is not the only link between the Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses, but that all ISA’s are mediated and unified by ‘ruling class’ ideology. Althusser writes:

If ISAs ‘function’ massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their diversity is precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology by which they function is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and contradictions, *beneath the ruling ideology*, which is the ideology of the ruling class’. Given the fact that the ‘ruling class’ in principle holds State power… it is ultimately the ruling ideology which is realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses (I&ISAs 146).

While Althusser is able to complete his argument by redefining Marx’s State Apparatus (SA) as including both Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses, he relies upon Marx’s theory of the State to provide the mechanism by which ruling ideology is empowered. As such Althusser simply restates Marx’s proposition relating State power to the State Apparatus, yet distinguishes between the Repressive and Ideological manifestations of the State Apparatus. Althusser writes,

I argue that it is necessary to distinguish between State power on one hand and State Apparatus on the other. But I add that the State Apparatus contains two bodies: the body of institutions which represent the Repressive State Apparatuses on the one hand, and the body of institutions which represent the body of Ideological State Apparatuses on the other…. I can now answer the central question which I have left in suspense for so many pages: *how is the reproduction of the relations of production secured?* I shall say: for the most part, it is secured by the existence of State power in the State Apparatuses, on the one hand the (Repressive) State Apparatus, on the other hand the Ideological State Apparatuses (I&ISAs 147-8).

As such, Althusser completes the process of naming, un-naming and re-naming Marx’s State Apparatus as constituted by both Repressive State Apparatuses and Ideological State Apparatuses. Cleverly uniting the RSA’s and ISA’s under the classical Marxist term “State apparatus”, Althusser confirms his motivation.
Althusser says, “if the thesis I have proposed is well-founded, it leads me back to the classical Marxist theory of the State” (147). However it must not be forgotten that by developing his theory of Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses he did indeed add something to the classical Marxist definition. Effectively, by claiming that “if well-founded” his theory would lead him back to “the classical Marxist theory of the State” he attaches his theory to it like a footnote explaining the complexity of the State Apparatus without actually changing Marx’s theory of the materialist conception of history, this theory of the State or anything else.

The Marxist theory of the State assumes that the State’s influence is somewhat universal. Althusser’s theory exaggerates this ‘universality’ by extending the State’s reach into the private lives of each citizen through the double functioning of all Ideological State Apparatuses as repressive agents of the State. By exaggerating the perceived ‘universality’ of the State Althusser’s perception of the State Apparatus as being ‘universal’ a number of questions naturally arise. Firstly, even though Althusser presents a clear and logical argument as to the mechanism through which the State influences the private, and makes allowance for class struggle and so on, he infers that the State’s ability to control or manipulate the ISAs is guaranteed and ultimately uninterrupted. Remembering that Althusser wrote, “the ideology by which they [ISAs] function is always, in fact unified, despite its diversity and contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of the ‘ruling class’” (I&ISAs 146), in effect arguing that the State’s influence is a constituent part of every ISA, regardless of its nature. This assertion is further established when Althusser says, “the unity of the different Ideological State Apparatuses is secured, usually in contradictory forms, by the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling
class” (I&ISAs 149). Given that Althusser subscribes to the idea that State power is something akin to universal power, his conclusion makes sense. However in the case that the State has limited power and cannot control, influence or manipulate every ideological apparatus his conclusion overstates the influence of the ruling class. Althusser is certainly correct in suggesting that ruling ideology does unify and organize a ‘workforce’, although it can only organize those that are receptive to its influence. Considering the incredible diversity of human ideas and their associated ideologies, the ruling class simply does not have the ability to unify, nor have a uniform influence upon, every ideological apparatus. For instance in Australia as in many other parts of the world there is a small community that revolves around the illegal sport of cockfighting. The cocker’s practices are not unified with other mainstream ideologies by the ruling ideology, nor is the energy expressed by their ‘workforce’ harnessed by the ruling class or the State. In fact the actual sport of cockfighting has not changed very much since the days when it was considered to be a legitimate sport. The daily way of life and associated world-view that revolves around keeping, breeding, caring for, preparing and fighting gamecocks is not, nor ever was, completely controlled by the State, otherwise when the law declared it a prohibited practice it would have ceased to exist. Naturally cocking’s ‘illegal’ status does have some effect upon the secrecy that surrounds the practice, rites of passage and so on. Even so, this only acts to unify the social world of illegal cockfighting as a Non-State Ideological Apparatus. Likewise, witchcraft and other pagan traditions, although no longer illegal, continue to be practiced in secret. They are not in the least regulated by the State nor controlled by it, yet they continue to exist just as they did before, and while they were outlawed. The very nature of the witch’s coven

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103 This example, along with witchcraft, are expanded in the next chapter.
means that it always practiced rituals in secret, dealt with specialized knowledge, ideas and ideology. Therefore while it may have at times been associated with mainstream society, its rites of passage, dependence upon secrecy and its inability to be regulated prevented it from being unified with mainstream practice beneath the ruling ideology. Essentially, the witch’s religion is its own ruling ideology. In reality there are many examples of ideological apparatuses operating outside that which is accepted by the dominant, beyond State control.

The ruling ideology or the State cannot control every idea that crosses the mind of every citizen, or even that which is shared by groups of citizens. Likewise, it is not as though every citizen is under the sway of ruling ideology at all times. An individual that simply thinks a little differently from the average citizen and therefore believes in, and practices, different things to everyone else so that he or she occupies a unique ideological space or inhabits an Ideological Hermitage is not unified with, or controlled by, ruling ideology. Conceivably, not only cockers, witches and ideological hermits manage to escape the clutches of the State; any individual can partake of the practices of Private Ideological Apparatuses or an Ideological Hermitage without separating themselves from mainstream society, beyond that required by that experience. It is certainly conceivable that an individual who works for the Police Department, State Rail, is self-employed, unemployed, or living as a law abiding citizen, may at any convenient moment slip into another world where different rules apply, and just as easily slip back into mainstream society. It may be that a police officer can organize a cockfight amongst his friends, or perhaps a railway engineer is a member of a non-commercial Swingers Club, or the desk clerk at a hotel worships Diana, bathed in the pale moonlight. Such individuals are not
completely controlled by the State as their practices are not consistent with the ‘ruling class’s’ ideals. This argument is more fully developed below.\textsuperscript{104} However, it is suffice to say that Althusser’s \textit{Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses} is by definition incapable of dealing with every Private Ideological Apparatus, Ideological Hermitage or any other private or public ideological manifestation that operates in distinction to the State. This is perhaps the first and most substantial limitation of Althusser’s theory. Althusser’s theory of ISA’s conjointly overstates the influence of the State in the private lives of its citizens, while failing to account for other ideologically-based social formations.

Within Althusser’s argument the assumed universality of the State has yet a few more effects. It may be argued that Althusser’s characterization of ideology stems from his conception of the State and that, as noted above, Althusser thinks of, or assumes that, ideology is a product of the State, such that in the event that the State is destroyed and replaced by socialism, ideology would be destroyed along with the State. This ‘assumption’ is less obvious in classical Marxist theory than in Althusser’s work as the classics lack a distinction between Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses. The assumption is that ideology is a function of the State, whereas in reality the State itself is a function of ideology.\textsuperscript{105} In which case, Althusser unwittingly inverted the relationship between the State and State ideology.

\textsuperscript{104} For further and more in depth analysis see Chapter Seven of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{105} A simple exploration of the State’s own production more than adequately proves this point. However as Historical Materialism’s account is based on a false premise, a Marxist materialist account of the State’s genesis is incapable of illuminating the ‘real’ conditions of the production of the State.
Althusser’s inversion of the actual relationship between the State and ideology has one further affect on his theory. He argued that, “the (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression, whereas Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology” (I&ISAs 149). In reality, however, the ‘repression’ exercised by the State is an expression of ideology that harks back to the original idea in accordance with which the State was formed. Therefore, the difference between RSAs and ISAs is not manifest in their nature alone, as both Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology. The difference between them is in the way that they express ideology; their most substantial difference is the means by which they influence the masses. The RSAs express repression in a vulgar, explicit, punitive form, whereas ISAs express repression in a far more cultured, subtle, implicit fashion. The desire to be good, honourable, law-abiding, upstanding, righteous, patriotic and brave is shaped by societal expectations while being reinforced by the guilt and shame felt when an individual is discovered to be otherwise. Compliance with dominant ideology is increased by the fear of discovery, the threat of incarceration and even eternal damnation.

Returning once again to the question with which this chapter has been focused— did Althusser’s theory of ISAs adequately understand the nature and function of ideology in relation to the State and society in general? While Althusser illuminated the means by which the State extends its influence through the pervasive nature of State ideology, he simply did not concern himself with ideology in general, therefore the answer to the question has to be a considered, yet unequivocal NO. Althusser did not correctly nor fully depict ideology in relation to the State and society in general.
Althusser’s theory of *Ideological State Apparatuses* was simply not concerned with anything other than ‘perfecting’ the Marxist theory of the State. According to Althusser, “the State (and its existence in its apparatus) has no meaning except as a function of *State power*” (I&ISAs 140). Thus, his *Theory of Repressive* and *Ideological State Apparatuses* was bound to ignore all Non-State Ideological Apparatuses, and the ‘less relevant’ aspects of ideology as the mechanism by which an individual or group attains the projected outcome of their ideas. As such Althusser’s theory is simply incapable of addressing the complexity of ideology, let alone all of its ideological manifestations. Althusser’s RSAs and ISAs were simply not designed to illuminate every ideological reality, ‘ideological truth’ or cultural circumstance. Nevertheless, remembering that Althusser started out by uncritically adopting Marx’s negative conception of ideology and his theory of the State, limiting his ability to address neutral or positive ideologies or Non-State Ideological apparatuses, Althusser’s theory of ISAs and RSAs presents itself as a useful theoretical tool.

While the second extract is written very differently to the first, Althusser’s essay continues to further extend Marx’s theory of the State. In fact, Althusser employs some very interesting and innovative arguments aimed at justifying the findings of Marx’s theory. Paradoxically Althusser tries to shore-up the conclusions of Marx’s theory, while reinventing his argument almost entirely. Nevertheless, while avoiding Marx’s false premise by employing very different methods and theoretical approaches, he is unable to account for every affect of Marx’s foundational argument. Consequently, Althusser’s theory retains a number of significant flaws. As such the following chapter engages the many complex arguments found in the
second extract and demonstrates both the depth and elegance of Althusser’s theory. Interestingly the theory found in Althusser’s second extract opens new vistas, while illustrating the need to start afresh.
Chapter Four

Althusser’s *Theory of [State]Ideology in General*

Completing the analysis of Althusser’s essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: notes toward an investigation” (1969), this chapter addresses Althusser’s *Theory of Ideology in General*. As noted above, Althusser’s essay was composed from two separately written papers or extracts that addressed different aspects of ideology. The second extract begins on page 158 and ends on page 183 of the essay printed in *Lenin and Philosophy and other essays by Louis Althusser*.106 Beginning with the section entitled “On Ideology”, the second extract has a very brief introduction, which establishes Althusser’s *Theory of Ideology in General* as an explanation of the mechanism by which his Ideological State Apparatuses function and therefore further extends Marx’s *Theory of the State*.107

One major difference between the first and second extracts is that the argument contained in the first extract, although incomplete, does not rely upon the second extract for support, whereas the second extract does rely upon the first in two distinct ways. Firstly, as Althusser spends the first ten pages of the first extract promoting Marx’s theory and the principles of ‘Historical Materialism’ as the foundation of his own argument, it provides the methodological, if not theoretical, context (Marxist/materialist), upon which the second relies. And secondly, not only does the first extract explicitly address the expansion of Marx’s *Theory of the State*, but in so

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doing Althusser clearly argues that all ideology exists in an apparatus. Further to which he states that all such apparatuses arise within the context provided by the State. Subsequently, Althusser treats all ideology as ‘State ideology’ and therefore limits his *Theory of Ideology in General* to a ‘Theory of State Ideology in General’. This context not only defines his *Theory of [State] Ideology in General* as a theory that addresses a particular set of ideologies rather than ideology in general, but places a covenant upon what his theory is able to say about ideology. Nevertheless, while this limitation restricts his theory’s ability to comment upon ‘non-State’ ideology, the dynamic, almost abstract, nature of his argument has many implications beyond the realm of the State. Importantly, Althusser’s Theory of [State] Ideology in general does clarify the mechanism by which ideology functions within Ideological State Apparatuses and therefore enriches his ‘extension’ of Marx’s theory of the State. The very first passage of the second extract attests to this very point. Beneath the sub-heading, “On Ideology”, Althusser writes, “when I put forward the concept of an Ideological State Apparatus, when I said that the ISA’s ‘function by ideology’, I invoked a reality which needs a little discussion: ideology” (I&ISAs 158). The context in which this passage places ideology clearly indicates that the second extract was intended to explain the ‘reality’ in which State ideology exists and the mechanism by which it functions.

For the purpose of succinct analysis, the second extract is divided into four sections. Firstly, the opening arguments lay a foundation for the remainder of the argument. Then there are three mains strands of argument, each dealing with a critical point. These arguments may be described as: Althusser’s first thesis—“ideology represents

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108 This proposition is repeated in the second extract (I&ISAs 166)
the imaginary relationship of individuals to their conditions of existence” (I&ISAs 162), Althusser’s second thesis—“Ideology has a material existence” (I&ISAs 165), and Althusser’s theory of interpellation. However, as polemic dictates that these four points of argument are not always addressed in order, the following analysis addresses each of these points of argument in depth. Althusser’s opening argument pays homage to Marx, but also finds several points of departure from Marx’s theory, predicting the ‘mood’ for his later argument. Honouring his compatriots, Althusser first acknowledges that Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy and their contemporaries not only originated the term ‘ideology’, but that they “assigned to it as an object the (generic) theory of ideas” (I&ISAs 158). However, in a matter-of-fact tone Althusser simply states that Marx used the term differently to that of its original intent, without questioning the validity of this change, nor attempting to justify it. Instead he simply outlines the meaning that he believed Marx attributed to the term.\footnote{Althusser failed to note that “the system of ideas” to which Marx refers is defined by his negative conception of ideology.} He writes, “when Marx took up the term fifty years later, he gave it a quite different meaning, even in his early works. Here, ideology is the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the minds of a man or a social group” (I&ISAs 158). Nevertheless, while appearing to adopt Marx’s usage of the term, Althusser does go on to highlight what he sees as a shortcoming of Marx’s treatment of ideology. In effect Althusser uncovered a gap that he intended his own theory to fill. Pondering what he referred to as an “astonishing paradox”, he says, “everything seems to lead Marx to formulate a theory of ideology” (I&ISAs 158).\footnote{Althusser does say that “The German Ideology does offer us, after the 1844 Manuscripts an explicit theory of ideology, but… it is not Marxist” (158), before revealing that this thesis was originated by Feuerbach “taken over word for word by Marx in his early works” (163), therefore according to his logic it is not Marxist.} However, as Althusser explains, Marx never
did develop such a theory affording him the opportunity to, as he put it, “venture a first and very schematic outline of such a theory” (I&ISAs 158).

Contrary to what we know to be the outcome of Althusser’s theoretical development, he rightly explains the necessity of developing a theory of ideology in general rather than a theory of specific ideologies.\(^{111}\) This is of course quite logical as any theory tailored to a specific instance or instances is not only specific to the subject of study, but is limited to comment upon specific conditions, and therefore may not accurately comment upon the phenomena in general. Perhaps somewhat ironically, Althusser argues that any theory addressing a specific ideology or set of ideologies would fail to address ‘ideology’ as a subject in its own right, and would as such have limited application. In what is a particularly confusing passage Althusser writes,

> It is quite obvious that it is necessary to proceed towards a theory of ideologies in two respects, I have just suggested. It will then be clear that a theory of ideologies depends in the last resort on the history of social formations, and thus of the modes of production combined in social formations, and of the class struggles which develop in them. In this sense it is clear that there can be no question of theory of ideologies in general, since ideologies (defined in the double respect suggested above: regional and class) have a history, whose determination in the last instance is clearly situated outside ideologies alone, although it involves them.

On the contrary, if I am able to put forward the project of a theory of ideology in general, and if this theory really is one of the elements on which theories of ideologies depend, that entails an apparently paradoxical proposition which I shall express in the following terms: ideology has no history.

\(^{111}\) Althusser’s theory is not truly a ‘general theory’ but rather a theory addressing particular, state ideologies.
As we know, this formulation appears in so many words in a passage from *The German Ideology*. Marx utters it with respect to metaphysics, which he says, has no more history than ethics (meaning also the other forms of ideology) (I&ISAs 159).

The confusion as to whether or not it was “necessary to proceed towards a theory of *ideologies*” is resolved by the conclusion of the passage where Althusser began to proceed with what he believed to be a Theory of Ideology *in general*. However, more importantly, this passage uncovers a dangerous and volatile point of contention; if as Althusser writes, “this theory really is one of the elements on which theories of *ideologies* depend”, his theory would clash with one of Marx’s own propositions.

As he sets out to forge a theory of ideology fore-grounded by, but never contained within, Marx’s work, Althusser leans heavily upon Marx’s theory, even though the nature of his argument also indicates that he was having some problems justifying Marx’s treatment of ideology. In effect, by introducing Marx’s proposition “ideology has no history” as “paradoxical”, Althusser challenges its validity. Subsequently, Althusser’s argument presents its readers with a struggle between what he perceived to be theoretically justifiable and his loyalty to Marx’s theory and language. On the one hand, statements like, “while the thesis I wish to defend formally speaking adopts the terms of *The German Ideology* (‘ideology has no history’), it is radically different from the positivist and historicist thesis of *The German Ideology*” (I&ISAs 160), are particularly telling. On the other hand, Althusser constantly justifies the status of Marx’s theory, ensuring that he, at no time openly states that Marx’s theory was invalid. Bound by his loyalty to Marx,
Althusser walks a fine line, outlining a controversial new theory of ideology on one side while presenting a theory couched in Marxist terms on the other. Nevertheless, despite his posturing the very argument that he employs leaves one with the distinct impression that while Althusser continued to employ Marx’s terms and propositions he did not wholeheartedly agree with the concept behind formulations like, “ideology has no history”. The disparity between Althusser’s lip-service to Marx and the reworking of Marx’s concepts appears to have alienated him from much of the Marxist community.\footnote{A number of theorists openly opposed Althusser’s work, the most noted work being E.P. Thompson’s \textit{The Poverty of Theory}, Merlin Press, London, 1978.}

Despite ultimately defending Marx, Althusser actually argues that Marx misunderstood ideology. Althusser makes way for his analysis by describing the context in which Marx made the famous statement “ideology has no history”. Althusser writes “as we know this formulation [ideology has no history] appears in so many words in a passage from \textit{The German Ideology}. Marx utters it with respect to metaphysics, which, he says, has no more history than ethics (meaning also the other forms of ideology)” (I&ISAs 159), continuing Althusser goes on to analysis Marx’s statement\footnote{The passage that Althusser makes reference to reads as follows: “morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history” (\textit{German Ideology} 25).}

In \textit{The German Ideology}, this formulation [ideology has no history] appears in a plainly positivist context. Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. as nothingness. All its reality is external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an imaginary construction whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud. For these writers, the dream was the purely imaginary, i.e. null, result of ‘day’s residues’, presented in an arbitrary arrangement and order, sometimes even ‘inverted’, in other words, in
‘disorder’. For them, the dream was the imaginary, it was empty, null and arbitrarily ‘stuck together’ (bricole), once the eyes had closed, from the residues of the only full and positive reality, the reality of the day. This is exactly the status of philosophy and ideology (since in this book philosophy is ideology par excellence) in *The German Ideology*.

Ideology, then, is for Marx an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the ‘day’s residues’ from the only full and positive reality, that of concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence (I&ISAs 159-160).

As the above passage clearly attests, Althusser compares Marx’s understanding of ideology to that of pre-Freudian writers on dreams. For Althusser this comparison is akin to comparing a ‘class conflict’ historian to pre-Marxist writers on the subject. In his essay “Lenin and Philosophy” (1968), Althusser affords Freud’s theory similar significance to that with which he accredits thinkers like Galileo, Darwin and Marx. Having stated that Galileo opened up the continent of physics and Marx “the continent of history”, of Freud Althusser writes, “it is probably that Freud’s discovery has opened a new continent, one which we are only just beginning to explore” (39). Therefore, for Althusser, comparing Marx’s understanding of ideology to those that wrote about dreams before Freud represents a very damning report card. In essence Althusser is saying that just as the pre-Freudian writers of dreams failed to comprehend the significance of dreams and their relationship to reality, Marx did not understand the significance of ideology nor its relationship to reality. In view of which, Althusser writes, “it is on this basis that ideology has no history in *The German Ideology*, since its history is outside it, where the only existing history is, the history of concrete individuals, etc” (I&ISAs 160).
Demonstrating the fine line that Althusser’s theory traverses and despite arguing that Marx misunderstood the relationship between ideology and reality, he goes on to justify Marx’s statement that “ideology has no reality”, while contradicting the concept behind the statement. The way in which Althusser manages to walk both sides of this argument is not only quite clever but rather elegant. Before contradicting Marx’s statement that “ideology has no history”, Althusser argues that Marx presents a “negative thesis”, in contrast to which he would offer a ‘positive thesis’. As Althusser writes,

In *The German Ideology*, the thesis that ideology has no history is therefore a purely negative thesis, since it means both:

1. ideology is nothing insofar as it is a pure dream….

2. ideology has no history, which emphatically does not mean that there is no history in it… but that it has no history of *its own* (I&ISAs 160).

As mentioned above, Althusser goes on to say that “While the thesis I wish to defend formally speaking adopts the terms of *The German Ideology* (ideology has no history), it is radically different…” (I&ISAs 160). What is omitted above, however, is that Althusser goes on to state that, “on the one hand, I think it is possible to hold that ideologies *have a history of their own*; and on the other, I think it is possible to hold that ideology *in general has no history*, not in a negative sense… but in a positive sense” (I&ISAs 160-1). Consequently, despite the impression left by the language of agreeing with Marx, Althusser manages to disagree with Marx on both accounts. Firstly, in contravention of Marx’s statement that “ideology has no history” Althusser says “I think it is possible to hold that ideologies *have a history of their own*.” And secondly, making reference to *The German Ideology*, Althusser

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argues that “the thesis that ideology has no history is a purely negative thesis” (I&ISAs 160) regarding ideology, in effect, where he says that, “ideology in general has no history, not in a negative sense but in a positive sense”, he agrees with the statement that “ideology has no history”, but does not agree with the “sense” in which Marx makes the statement.

In addition to highlighting Althusser’s struggle with Marx’s concept of ideology, which appears to be in conflict with his desire to employ Marxist terms, the following passage demonstrates yet another inconsistency. In reference to “the positive sense” in which Althusser agrees with the statement that “ideology has no history”, he writes,

This sense is a positive one if it is true that the peculiarity of ideology is that it is endowed with a structure and a functioning such as to make it a non-historical reality, i.e. an omni-historical reality, in the sense in which that structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form throughout what we can call history, in the sense in which the Communist Manifesto defines history as the history of class struggles, i.e. the history of class societies (I&ISAs 161).

In keeping with the theory that Althusser presents in the first extract where he states that, “Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology” (I&ISAs 145) and that “the ideology by which they function is always in fact unified… beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of the ruling class” (I&ISAs 146), class struggle is the result of tension created by moments of resistance between the workers and ruling class ideology. Hence Althusser’s statement, “the Communist Manifesto defines history as the history of class struggles, i.e. the history of class societies” describes human history as the a history of the ideological struggle
between the classes. Damning though it may appear, despite the fact that this argument goes against Marx’s statement that “ideology has no history” it does not contradict Marx’s negative concept of ideology, his view of the state nor his depiction of the class struggle in general. Althusser simply provides ‘the’ history of class struggle with a mechanism through which it may be explained more fully. This inconsistency is, however, indicative of Althusser’s struggle with new concepts and established theory, rhetoric and language.

Returning to his “positive thesis”, Althusser employs Freud’s proposition where the “unconscious is eternal”, as a means of justifying his agreement with the statement, “ideology has no history”. Althusser simply says that the proposition “ideology has no history, can and must be related directly to Freud’s proposition that the unconscious is eternal, i.e. that it has no history” (I&ISAs 161). Qualifying what he means by this Althusser says,

If eternal means, not transcendent to all (temporal) history, but omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in the form throughout the extent of history, I shall adopt Freud’s expression word for word, and write ideology is eternal, exactly like the unconscious (I&ISAs 161).

Beyond the methodological questions, this passage raises one very important question: does Althusser intend to limit eternity as indicated by the phrase, “throughout the extent of history”, to the same period as intended by the phrase “all human history” which, according to Marx, started when humans first began to produce their means of subsistence by extracting surplus value from the production

116 In the service of clarity I have chosen to exclude a bracketed passage that was inserted between the words ‘must’ and ‘be’.
and sale of commodities? If Althusser does intend to limit eternity in the same way that Marx limited “all human history”; writing “ideology is eternal” is certainly not “exactly like” Freud writing “the unconscious is eternal” as Freud traces the symbolism in dreams to a much earlier stage of human development.\(^{117}\)

As the ‘positive sense’ in which Althusser agrees with Marx’s statement, “ideology has no history”, actually disagrees with Marx’s concept, Althusser’s argument appears, at least in the short term, to lessen his dependence upon Marx’s theory. For instance Althusser begins his ‘assault’ upon Marx’s theory by comparing Marx’s understanding of ideology to the understanding of dreams before Freud. Before employing Freud’s proposition, “unconscious is eternal”, to recalibrate Marx’s proposition, “ideology has no history”, he explains that ‘ideology has no history, because ideology is eternal’. Then in direct contrast to the ‘negative thesis of Marx’, Althusser describes the comparison between Freud’s ‘proposition’ and his own as being “theoretically justified”. As Althusser writes, “and I add that I find this comparison theoretically justified by the fact that the eternity of the unconscious is not unrelated to the eternity of ideology in general” (I&ISAs 161). Finally, while aiming to fill a gap in Marx’s theory, Althusser uses Freud’s presentation of “a theory of the unconscious in general” (I&ISAs 161) as justification for proposing his own “theory of ideology in general”. The point of this ‘departure’ is not that Althusser should agree with Marx as though uniformity is some kind of litmus of good theory, but rather that despite this ‘departure’ from Marxist methodology, Althusser’s theory continues to be shaped by it. In reality, as my analysis

demonstrates, Althusser’s theory arrives at much same conclusion as Marx’s theory, although it explains the mechanisms by which the State maintains power with much more detail than Marx ever did. Therefore, while employing apparently contradictory methodologies to arrive at his point, the big, ‘Marxist picture’ remains the same.

Under the sub-heading, “Ideology is a ‘Representation’ of the Imaginary relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions of Existence”, Althusser really gets down to the business of discussing two important aspects of ideology, neither of which completely agree with Marx’s description. He begins by saying, “in order to approach my central thesis on the structure and functioning of ideology, I shall present two theses…”: a negative and a positive thesis. The first of these is, however, not really negative, but rather addresses the “object which is ‘represented’ in the imaginary form of ideology”, while the second “concerns the materiality of ideology” (I&ISAs 162). Throughout the discussion of his first thesis Althusser continues to address the relationship between the ‘imaginary’ aspect of ideology and reality in a similar way to that which Freud addresses the meaning of dreams and their relationship to the real world. His second thesis relies upon the first in order to justify the “material existence of an ideological apparatus” (168) through a formulation that proposes “his ideas are his material actions” (169). Divisive as it may be, Althusser does continually anchor his theory to Marxist terms and theoretical propositions.

Although Althusser’s first thesis appears to be quite straightforward, despite appearances it dissolves the strict distinction between ideology and reality via a
‘Freudian’ interpretation of that relationship. In brief, Althusser initially describes ideology as a belief maintained by an individual or individuals through which they represent their, “real conditions of existence” to themselves, rather than presenting ideology as a mishmash of distorted representations of reality. This is a significant theoretical development as it acknowledges, not only the interpretive powers of perception but presents ideology as a representation of the perception of reality. Althusser, therefore, describes ideology differently to Marx. However, Althusser does take up Marx’s ‘definition’ of ideology as “the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group” (I&ISAs 158).

Yet, while addressing the relationship between ideology and reality Althusser does not claim that ideology equates to reality. Althusser’s first thesis states that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their conditions of existence” (I&ISAs 162). Althusser describes the various ‘religious, ethical, legal and political ideologies’ as “world outlooks”, before describing them as “largely imaginary, i.e. [they] do not ‘correspond to reality’” (I&ISAs 162). According to the remainder of his argument what Althusser means by “do not correspond to reality”, is that they are only a perception of reality, and therefore can never completely capture reality, in contrast to arguing that they do not exist at all. The very next passage clarifies this point:

While admitting that they [the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence] do not correspond to reality, i.e. that they constitute an illusion, we admit that they do make allusion to reality, and that they need only be ‘interpreted’ to discover the reality of the world behind their imaginary representation of that world (ideology = illusion / allusion) (I&ISAs 162).

Rekindling his Freudian connection, Althusser argues that the ‘imaginary’ includes
certain ‘mental or cognitive processes’ generated as a direct response to reality. The importance of this development is that it allows Althusser to avoid dismissing all ideology as ‘imaginary assemblages’. Or as Althusser later put it, “we arrive at the conclusion that in ideology ‘men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form’” (I&ISAs 163). Nevertheless, having clearly argued that ‘men represent their real conditions to themselves’ Althusser not only questions why ‘men’ appear to ‘need’ such representations of reality, but goes on to argue that ‘men’ do not make these representations to themselves.

Having identified what he refers to as “one small problem” (I&ISAs 163), Althusser describes and discredits a number of theories that aim to answer the question, “why do men ‘need’ this imaginary transposition of their real conditions of existence as a means of ‘representing to themselves’ their real conditions of existence?” (I&ISAs 163). Marx’s *Theory of Alienation* is one theory that Althusser discredits. However, Althusser claims that it was never Marx’s theory but was rather taken word for word from Feuerbach. In summary of these ‘failed theories’ Althusser writes, “All these interpretations thus take literally the thesis… that what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found in an ideology is the conditions of existence of men, i.e. their real world” (I&ISAs 164). In effect Althusser takes exception to the nature of this representation as reflecting reality, and thus makes a critical distinction. Quoting Althusser at length, he writes,

Now I can return to a thesis which I have already advanced: it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there. It is this relation which is at the centre of every ideological, i.e. imaginary, representation of the real world. It is this relation
that contains the ‘cause’ which has to explain the imaginary distortion of the ideological representation of the real world. Or rather, to leave aside the language of causality it is necessary to advance the thesis that it is the \textit{imaginary nature of the relation} which underlies all the imaginary distortion that we can observe (if we do not live in its truth) in all ideology (I&ISAs 164).

Not only does Althusser manage to unify “every ideological, i.e. imaginary relation of the real world”, but cites the “\textit{imaginary nature of the relation}” as that which underlies “all the imaginary distortion” observed in “all ideology”. Furthermore, what is more important is that when identifying a cause he also alludes to a unifying agent. The passage, “it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there”, clearly indicates that this ‘distortion’ is represented to them by a third party. Althusser does not immediately identify this third party, nor attempt to uncover the mechanism responsible. However the context does indicate that Althusser intends to identify the State as the manipulative third party. Summarizing his point Althusser writes, “what is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live” (I&ISAs 165). While dodging the immediate need to address the question of cause, Althusser writes, “if this is the case, the question of the ‘cause’ of the imaginary distortion of the real relations in ideology disappears and must be replaced by a different question” (I&ISAs 165). Unfortunately, while Althusser poses the question, “why is the representation given to individuals of their (individual) relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of existence and their collective and individual life necessarily an imaginary relation?” (I&ISAs 165), he postpones giving his answer, rather turning to his second thesis. Once again
the context provides the reader with a clue to Althusser’s new question. The phrase, “why is the representation given to individuals”, assumes that this “representation” is “given” to these individuals rather than produced by them, thus inviting the question: by whom is this representation given? Consequently, for Althusser ideology is a State construct which is always ‘given’ to such individuals by the State.

Althusser’s second thesis, that “ideology has a material existence” (I&ISAs 165), unashamedly attacks the idealist notion that ideas or human consciousness have a spiritual origin. Introducing his argument, Althusser says, “I have already touched on this thesis by saying that the ‘ideas’ or ‘representations’ etc., which seem to make up ideology do not have an ideal or spiritual existence, but a material existence” (I&ISAs 165). A point that he later supports by arguing, “ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence)…” (I&ISAs 169). Nevertheless, remembering that he is arguing from a materialist perspective and that his second thesis argues that “ideology has a material existence”, his statement that his “thesis is unproven”, comes as a surprise. However, this ‘surprise’ is rather tame in comparison to the request that follows. Althusser asks his readers to be “favourably disposed to it [his unproven thesis], say, in the name of materialism”. Furthermore, he refers to his thesis as, “this hypothetical thesis of the not spiritual but material existence of ‘ideas’ or other ‘representations’” (I&ISAs 166), before stating that “this hypothetical thesis… is indeed necessary if we are to advance in our analysis of the nature of ideology” (I&ISAs 166). The irony of asking his readers to accept his hypothetical and unproven thesis that ideology has a material existence in the name of materialism could hardly be lost on anyone. Nevertheless, not only does he go on unabashed to argue that ideology, despite being constituted by a mix of
illusion and allusion, has a material existence, but also manages to weave his argument together with his *Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses* and the class struggle (I&ISAs 166).

Highlighting the connection between his treatment of ideology and his *Theory of Ideological State Apparatuses* not only reminds the reader of the overriding ‘State’ context of his theory of ideology but does so at a critical stage of his argument. Addressing what he refers to as the main point of his argument, Althusser writes, “I now return to this thesis: an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material” (I&ISAs 166). This point marks another significant turning point for his theory. Throughout the remainder of his argument Althusser sets about to argue that ideology exists in the actions of ‘men’, actions that he describes as ‘material’. The obvious objection to Althusser’s argument is that neither a practice nor practices are actually composed of matter and therefore cannot properly be referred to as “material”; an objection that Althusser not only foresees but attempts to resolve. Making note that ideological apparatuses are not composed of matter or physical material Althusser writes, “of course, the material existence of ideology in an apparatus and its practices does not have the same modality as the material existence of a paving-stone or a rifle” (I&ISAs 166). However, despite making this clarification, he goes on to suggest that matter, “exists in different modalities, all rooted in ‘physical’ matter” (I&ISAs 166). Therefore regardless of acknowledging that ideological apparatuses are not composed of ‘physical matter’, Althusser argues that their existence is “rooted in ‘physical’ matter”. Continuing Althusser clarifies the difference between what he describes as ‘material’ ideas and ‘ideal’ ideas. Althusser writes, “‘ideas’ or ‘representations’, etc., which seem to
make up ideology do not have an ideal or spiritual existence, but a material existence" (I&ISAs 165). By dissolving the perceived association between ideas and ideals and presenting ideology as material, Althusser reinvents the definition of ideology in view of his conception of reality. In effect he argues that the ‘material reality’ of ideology renders it as real, while completely rejecting the concept of ‘spiritual reality’. Considering that the analysis of this argument not only requires a lengthy discussion, but culminates in an argument that reflects the conclusion of this chapter, the full analysis of Althusser’s second thesis is hereby postponed until after the analysis of Althusser’s theory of interpellation is complete.

Beneath the sub-heading “Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects”, Althusser restates his last proposition that “there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects” (I&ISAs 170), before clarifying his intent. He writes, “there is no ideology except for concrete subjects” (I&ISAs 170). In like kind Althusser goes on to argue that, “ideology has the function of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects” (I&ISAs 171). Considering that Althusser was a materialist, there is little surprise in his discussion of ‘concrete subjects’. However, the next point in his argument is somewhat more unexpected as it projects several problems for his own theory. Althusser argues that both himself and his readers, “live ‘spontaneously’ or ‘naturally’ in ideology in the sense in which I have said that ‘man is an ideological animal by nature’… [or] as St Paul admirably put it, it is in the ‘Logos’, meaning in ideology, that we ‘live, move and have our being’” (I&ISAs 171). The significance of this point is that if human beings live spontaneously, or naturally in ideology, such that our very being is ideological by nature, how can ideology ever cease to exist while humanity survives? What does this mean for Althusser’s “end of every State
Apparatus”, and the end of ideology? Furthermore, how does this formulation reflect upon his argument that “ideology is eternal”? While Althusser does not pose nor attempt to answer any of these questions he does return to his formulation, “ideology is eternal” (I&ISAs 175), which reignites this crucial question: is the history of ideology as an eternal phenomena limited to the same period as “all human history” in the sense that Marx began all human history at an arbitrary point, or is it ‘eternal’ in some other sense? Nevertheless, one point of contention is clear; according to Althusser’s argument the very practices by which Marx argued that the first living human individuals of all human history separated themselves from animals could not have occurred “except by and in an ideology” (I&ISAs 170).

The more developed Althusser’s theory becomes the greater and more profound the fundamental differences between his theory and Marx’s conception of ideology become. For instance, when explaining the term ‘interpellation’ Althusser writes that “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” (I&ISAs 173). To this he adds, “ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)” (I&ISAs 174). In fact Althusser argues that, “the existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing” (I&ISAs 175). Subsequently, according to Althusser’s argument, “the first living human individuals” of Marx’s first premise were, “always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects” (I&ISAs 175). Althusser writes,

As ideology is eternal, I must now suppress the temporal form in which I presented the functioning of ideology, and say: ideology has always-already

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118 This question is answered in full toward the end of this chapter.
interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that
individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which
necessarily leads us to one last proposition: *individuals are always-already
subjects*” (I&ISAs 175-6).

In fact Althusser goes on to argue that, “an individual is always-already a subject,
even before he is born” (I&ISAs 175-6). Therefore, in view of Althusser’s
argument that “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals”, and are
always–already subjects, Althusser’s argument defines Marx’s first living human
individuals as ideological animals by nature. This logic underpins his statement,
“man is an ideological animal by nature” (I&ISAs 171). Furthermore, according to
Althusser’s theory, in order for all practice to exist within an ideological apparatus,
ideological apparatuses needed to have either pre-existed the practices that Marx
described as distinguishing the first living human individuals from animals, or have
come into existence at the very same time as the first human practices, thus jointly
beginning ‘all human history’. Nevertheless, as human beings living in what Marx
referred to as the ‘undeveloped stage of production’ sustained their lives through
practices like fishing, hunting and subsistence farming, it can be argued that human
practices existed long before those described by Marx as separating humans from
animals. Therefore if all practices exist in an ideological apparatuses, and a range of
human practices described by Marx to have existed before, what Marx describes as
the “beginning of all human history”, ideological apparatuses also pre-existed the
“beginning of all human history” (*German Ideology* 31). Interestingly, Althusser’s
argument demonstrates that his theory of ideology did not depend upon Marx’s first
premises.

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119 Althusser argues that a child, from its conception is emersed into ideology as a subject as the
expectation of its birth is embedded in human culture and thus in ideology (I&ISAs 176-7).
Althusser further explores the effect of being interpellated, or what it means to be a subject, through a rather well-developed exploration of how Christian ideology works in the absence of any real material God (which reflects Althusser being an atheist). Beginning with the statement: “As the formal structure of all ideology is always the same” (I&ISAs 177) Althusser identifies the authority to which the interpellated become subjects as the ‘Subject’, before analysing the co-dependent relationship between the Subject’s authority and the subject’s subjection.\(^{120}\) Polemically Althusser’s ‘Subject’ is akin to the concept of an ‘Authority’ such that those in subjection to an Authority act in the name of that Authority. For instance ordinary men and women justify their actions in the name of God, the King or Queen, justice, truth, economic rationality or common sense, and as such the interpellated subject reflects that which gives authority to their actions. Althusser succinctly outlines the co-dependent relationship between the Subject and the subjects in a way that his theory may be applied to the relationship between the superstructure and the base, between ruling class ideology and the working class and so on. But what is perhaps more interesting is that Althusser argues that because the human individual is reflected in the authority that underpins the system (I&ISAs 178-180), ‘men’ recognize themselves in the ‘image’ of God, justice or truth, complying with the ideas underpinned by the authority of the Subject, regardless of its form. This leads the subject to a kind of salvation and a fulfilment of their purpose, which in turn rewards the obedient through feelings of justification and satisfaction.

\(^{120}\) As confusing as the notation ‘Subjects’ and ‘subjects’ notation is, it belongs to Althusser and therefore it is retained here. For further discussion of the ‘Subject-subject’ relationship see Steven B. Smith. *Reading Althusser: An Essay on Structural Marxism*. London: Cornell University Press, 1984. (135).
Returning to his main argument Althusser summarizes what he claims to have “discovered about ideology in general” (I&ISAs 180). However, his summary does not address the mechanism by which ideology functions, but focuses on the mechanism by which human subjects recognize themselves as existing in systemic relationships that work to maintain the dominant ideological system (the State). Describing what he refers to as the ‘quadruple system of interpellation’, Althusser lists four key points:

The duplicate mirror-structure of ideology ensures simultaneously:

1. the interpellation of ‘individuals’ as subjects;
2. their subjection to the Subject;
3. the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects’ recognition of each other, and finally the subject’s recognition of himself;
4. the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right… (I&ISAs 181).

The importance of the mutual-recognition between subjects, and between subjects and the Subject, is that being recognized as part of a ‘community’ not only unifies the parties, but invites each subject to compare him or herself to all other subjects. This in turn constitutes a standard by which the individual judges all. Comparison provides the basis for value judgments and thus Althusser addresses ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subjects. Employing the example of the capitalist State, Althusser argues that ‘good’ subjects work “all by themselves, i.e. by ideology” (I&ISAs 181), while ‘bad’ subjects attract the attention of various Repressive State Apparatuses. Essentially what Althusser is saying is that through Ideological State Apparatuses, ideology organizes the economic, social, political and ethical relationships existing between
the State’s subjects. Accordingly, Althusser proposes that, if correctly and fully interpellated, all ‘good’ subjects ‘freely’ work toward fulfilling the goal of the Subject to which they are in subjection.

Althusser concludes his essay with one final point of argument regarding freedom and the perception of freedom. In much the same way that he argues that State ideology pervades the private lives of its citizens through its Ideological State Apparatuses, Althusser argues that the State’s subjects misrecognize their subjection as an act of free will. Althusser writes,

The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gesture and actions of his subjection ‘all by himself’. There are no subjects except by and for their subjection. That is why they ‘work all by themselves’ (I&ISAs 182).

Brilliant, though it may be, this point reflects the anxiety of a ‘Marxist’, or perhaps a socialist writing a theory of State ideology. Althusser appears to be very aware of his purpose when drawing his argument to its conclusion. In fact he returns not only to his former ‘Marxist’ language but returns ideology to a synonym of distortion or untruth. In what appears to be a most unfitting conclusion Althusser writes,

If the reproduction of the relations of production is to be assured, even in the processes of production and circulation, every day, in the ‘consciousness’, i.e. in the attitudes of the individual-subjects occupying the posts which the socio-technical division of labour assigns to them in production, exploitation, repression, idealization, scientific practice, etc. Indeed, what is really in question in this mechanism of the mirror recognition of the Subject and of the individuals interpellated as subjects, and of the guarantee given by the Subject to the subjects if they freely accept their subjection to the Subject’s ‘commandments’? The reality in question in this mechanism, the reality which
is necessarily ignored in the very forms of recognition (ideology = misrecognition/ignorance) is indeed, in the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of production and the relations deriving from them (182-3).

If we are to accept this conclusion, Althusser’s *Theory of [State] Ideology in General* is that ideology not only continues on from Marx but ideology continues on as illusion, as misrecognition or as ignorance of the real conditions of human ‘material existence’. As such by reflecting Marx’s original conception of ideology as illusion Althusser’s concluding remarks appear to contradict and devalue much of his own work. Subsequently, these remarks have all the hallmarks of a theorist giving lip-service rather than an honest and appropriate finding.

The array of theoretical developments contained within Althusser’s second thesis not only question the validity of his banal conclusion, but raise a number of contradictions and inconsistencies which uncover a fundamental dissonance between the theories of Althusser and Marx. If one was to analyse Althusser’s relationship with Marx according to his own theory, one could say that, in order for Althusser to be a ‘good’ subject, despite holding alternate views, he could not reject Marx, because Marx was the Subject to which he was in subjection. Subsequently, Althusser’s theory wrestles with many of the same concepts as Marx’s original treatment of ideology. In particular Althusser’s second thesis encounters difficulty with the concept of non-material things having both a history and a place within reality. Althusser spends several pages arguing that ideas have a material existence through human practice. Initially justifying this expenditure was difficult as Marx had argued the very same point. As Marx writes,

> The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour.... The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily sublimes of their material life-processes... (German Ideology 24-5).

Furthermore, Marx concludes that the historical conception of history “does not explain practice from ideas, but explains the formation of ideas from material practice...” (German Ideology 42). So why did Althusser reinvent Marx’s argument? It could be argued that because Althusser’s theory was not based upon Marx’s flawed premises, any point of argument that derived its validity or ‘authority’ from Marx’s premises had to be re-established within the context of Althusser’s own argument. Consequently, Althusser’s argument is significantly different to that of Marx. For instance, where Marx casts ideas as “phantoms formed in the human brain”, Althusser simply divides and conquers, discounting the existence of ‘spiritual’ or ‘ideal’ ideas, while accrediting other ideas with a material existence (I&ISA’s 160). Ideas, according to Althusser, are not simply imaginary assemblages, or residues of the day’s work, nor are they formed from material practices. For Althusser ‘ideas are eternal’, ‘ideas are material practices’. Althusser essentially collapses the mental process and the action into the material practice, which reinvents the idea as a constituent part of the base, rather than as part of the superstructure alone. Different though Althusser’s argument may be he restrained the scope of his theory by framing it as ‘Marxist’.

Choosing not to rely upon Marx’s flawed premises has a number of far-reaching consequences. For instance because Althusser’s theory of ideology does not rely

upon Marx’s premises which were instrumental to Marx’s inversion of Hegel, Althusser’s independence questions his theory’s relationship to Marx’s inversion of Hegel, and thus to Historical Materialism. In response Althusser effectively reworks Marx’s inversion of Hegel with remarkable results. Not only does Althusser’s inversion of Hegel achieve much the same result as Marx’s inversion, but it also presents the State as real in material terms, and thus makes the forces by which the State controls the masses real or tangible. I propose that he demystifies the State and provides the superstructure with its own materiality while maintaining the materiality of the base. This enables him to establish a dialectic between two opposed material forces. The class struggle is therefore very real, as is the entire social mechanism that provides the motor force of the capitalist state. Althusser depicts the superstructure and the base as co-dependent players in a ‘game’ immersed in a distortion of reality. Althusser clearly states that an individual’s, “ideas are his material actions” (169). However, in so doing he also argues that those material ideas incorporate an element of distortion. This is in itself quite significant as when inverting Hegel, Marx inverted the ‘value’ associated with ideas and material in a way that material was enriched with ‘truth’ and reality, while ideas and ideology were depicted as untruth, nothingness and so on. Arguing that ideas have a material existence supersedes Marx’s inversion of Hegel without disagreeing with its conclusion. In a way Althusser reinvents Marx’s inversion, not only providing it with an explanation independent of Marx’s theory, and more importantly Althusser’s reinvention of Marx’s inversion of Hegel does not rely on the arbitrary beginning of all human history nor the reification of the ‘living human individuals’ of Marx’s first premise. As such there is reason to suspect that while Althusser was aware of these foundational ‘problems’, he discretely avoided any discussion that would discredit
Marx. Nevertheless, while restricting the scope of his own theory Althusser justifies Marx’s inversion of Hegel and the ultimate conclusion of his theory albeit by an alternate mechanism.

Reinventing Marx’s inversion of Hegel is, however, not without its pitfalls. Despite taking an entirely different and independent path, Althusser was confronted with the same problems that Marx faced. Although both Marx and Althusser promoted the material dialectic between the superstructure and base as the motor force of capitalism, they dealt with ideas, ideology, history and reality very differently. Whereas Marx claimed that “ideology has no history” as it was an imaginary assemblage, Althusser argued that ideology is eternal and has a material existence, and that the State maintains control over the working class by perpetrating a distorted representation of their relationship to the real conditions of existence. Due to the fact that Althusser argues that ideas have a material existence he is, by default, also arguing that ideas are related to reality, and thus ideas are part of history, confirming his earlier argument. On the other hand, when eternity shadows the existence of material, wherever ideology has a material existence it is also eternal. Furthermore, according to this formulation the ‘ideal’ or ‘spiritual idea’, has neither a material existence, a relationship with reality, nor a history and therefore disappears. In many ways Althusser presents a logical argument. However, one flaw with such an argument is that when the logical progression of ideas is based upon a false assumption, or a false relationship, the outcome, while logical, does not reflect reality. Consequently, Althusser’s assumption that material equates to ‘reality’ seriously reduces the veracity of his argument.
The inverse of stating that ideology is only ‘real’ when manifest through ‘material practice’ is to argue that a human’s idea is only real when in its original context before it is abstracted by externalization. Subsequently, the externalization of that idea through movement, speech or some other physical action is at best a representation of that idea. In keeping with Jean Baudrillard’s theory of simulacrum, if the original idea is considered to be real, once ‘ideology’ is represented in the material world through the physical actions of an individual or group, that ‘representation of ideology’ can no longer be considered to be ‘real ideology’ as it is at best an honest representation of reality, and at its worst a simulacrum or a dishonest representation behind which there is no reality. Therefore, the argument that Althusser uses to transform ideology from Marx’s depiction of it as “phantoms formed in the human brain” (German Ideology 37), a pure dream based upon nothingness to material reality, actually works toward the destruction of the non-material reality of ideas and thus of ideology rather than proving its material origin.

Given that Althusser’s argues that ideas have a material existence, yet that that existence is misrepresented through a veil that distorts humanity’s real conditions of existence; removing that veil should in essence reveal the truth about the real conditions of humanity’s existence. Therefore, if one understood all ideology to be State ideology, and that ideology was itself that veil of distortion, not only would the end of the State culminate with the end of all ideology but the end of ideology would unveil humanity’s real conditions of existence, and therefore the truth. Or in other

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words, free from the ideological distortion that permeates the State, human beings would be able to perceive their physical actions for what they are and therefore have access to the truth of their ‘material existence’. Furthermore, according to this scenario the end of the State would mean that the ‘spiritual’ or ‘ideal’ element often associated with ideas would disappear; human beings would be able to ascribe meaning to their physical actions through their five senses, or to put it another way, through their unpolluted sensorial experience of the real world. Ironically, divining ‘true ideas’ through sensorial experience free of ‘spiritual interpretation’ achieves the very goal of Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas*: Ideology. Destutt de Tracy argued that true ideas could be traced back to reality only when proven through the sensorial experience of the real world (Political Economy 40). The obvious difference is that Destutt de Tracy argued that only through the application of the scientific principles inherent to his *Science of Ideas* could this truth be uncovered, while Althusser proposes that only in the absence of ideology can truth be uncovered. Subsequently, Althusser formalizes and duplicates Napoleon’s inversion of ideology.

Althusser does however account for the power of ideas not rooted in material by enlisting “Pascal’s defensive ‘dialectic’”, which according to Althusser enables him to “invert the order of the notational schema of ideology” (I&ISAs 168): or in other words, through practice an individual will come to believe. In essence Althusser’s formulation inverts the ‘source’ of power, from the object of belief to the practices

124 See argument developed in Chapter One of this thesis.
associated with believing. Nevertheless, this formula fails to account for ideas and ideologies formulated in human brains but not acted upon. While a vast multitude of ideas have been conceived but never acted upon, they exist in the minds of the thinkers. Likewise, ideas, thoughts, responses to dangerous situations, and acts of contrition or of clemency, can prevent action from ever taking place and thus effect the real world. And furthermore, where one’s perception is akin to their reality, ideas never acted upon can limit or enhance the success of the ideas that are acted upon. Consequently, wherever ‘reality’ is a construct of its perception, reality can only ever maintain an arbitrary relationship with the material world. That is, while ‘reality’ is a representation of what is perceived to be real, the reality cannot be a constant. Therefore, while a material object may be ‘constant’ in its mass and so on, the perception of that object may vary to the degree that the concepts denoted by the terms ‘reality’ and ‘material’ are not consistent with one another and as such are not interchangeable.\footnote{For instance Einstein’s \textit{Theory of Relativity} argues that the perception of the passing of time and thus the aging of a material object is relative to the speed that it travels in relation to the point from which it is observed.} The inequality between the terms, ‘reality’ and ‘material’ is quite significant as Althusser massages the problems associated with his inversion of Hegel by confusing the term material with reality, and material-reality with existence. However, before addressing the veracity of Althusser’s inversion of Hegel, the following section will address Althusser’s second thesis in detail.

Althusser justifies his proposition that “ideology has a material existence” by arguing that while ideology is a mix of illusion and allusion, it is not just an imaginary assemblage of nothingness, but rather that ideology is an interpretation of reality. And that the distortion inherent to all ideology reflects the difference between an
individual’s perception of their relationship to the real conditions of their existence and the reality of those conditions. Or, in other words ideology is a distorted representation of humanity’s relationship to the real material conditions of their existence. Continuing he writes,

Let me move straight on and see what happens to the ‘individuals’ who live in ideology, i.e. in a determinate (religious, ethical, etc.) representation of the world whose imaginary distortion depends on their imaginary relation to their conditions of existence, in other words, in the last instance, to the relations of production and to class relations (ideology = an imaginary relation to real relations). I shall say that this imaginary relation is itself endowed with a material existence (I&ISAs 166-7).

If one understands Althusser to be arguing that ideology affects human practice in a manner that ideology both influences and impacts upon the material world, one must consider this point to be quite reasonable. However, if this is his point the language that he uses is rather clumsy. Ideology, even when affecting human practices, can hardly be referred to as material, and while the impact of ideologically motivated practices may leave a material residue, that residue is surely a manifestation of the ideology rather than being the ideology itself. Therefore, while it is easy to agree with the concept that ideology both influences and impacts upon the material world, given the definition of ideas and ideology employed by Althusser who unequivocally states that ideology has a material existence, it is also certainly problematic.

Althusser initially explains how ideology (as material) functions by unifying his first and second thesis. Althusser argues that, “in every case, the ideology of ideology thus recognizes, despite its imaginary distortion, that the ‘ideas’ of a human subject exist in his actions... and if that is not the case, it lends him other ideas
corresponding to the actions (however perverse) that he does perform. This ideology talks of actions” (I&ISAs 168). As such the mechanism by which Althusser believed his Ideological State Apparatuses to function is uncovered. Ideology, which according to Althusser, always exists within an apparatus controlled by the State and unified beneath ruling class ideology, either influences or provides each individual with his or her ideas. As such, the phrase, “in every case”, alludes to the ‘universal’ of the State as the perpetrator of all such ideas, while the phrase, “the ideology of ideology” presents State ideology as a kind of puppet master, pulling the strings of other, ‘supposedly private’, ideologies. Likewise, the impersonal pronoun ‘it’ refers directly to the State, because that he argues that the State lends ideas to those unable to accredit their practices with meaning. Interestingly Althusser is not only proposing that ideology facilitates the desires of State ideology, but that through the pervasive influence of State ideology human actions appropriate meaning. Surprisingly, Althusser does not make a great deal out of this point as its implications are truly monumental. Althusser presents an entirely new theory regarding the relationship between ideas and material that does away with the binary opposition between ethereal and material existence. The significance of this point is that whether he knew it or not Althusser suggests that the site of class struggle exists between the ‘oppressed’ and those that ‘oppress’ the masses by disseminating a distorted view of the real conditions of material existence. That is, the ideas by which the worker as ‘State subject’ contextualizes his or her existence are developed and distributed by the ruling class as ‘State subjects’ through ‘ruling class ideology’. The class struggle is therefore a constant battle to maintain an ‘equitable imbalance’
between the interests of two sets of State subjects. The point being that for Althusser the class struggle is a struggle between opposing aspects of the one ‘material ideology’.

Returning to Althusser’s misuse of terms, it must be stated that Althusser’s argument is based upon a distortion of meaning as he conflates the term ‘material’ with that of ‘actual’ or ‘real’ (as Marx often does), as well as interchanging the terms ‘idea’ and ‘ideology’, which results in what at face value appears to be a nonsensical argument. He writes,

I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject (such and such an individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatuses from which derive the ideas of that subject (I&ISAs 169).

Ironically, using the term ‘material’ to describe a whole range of non-material things strips the term ‘material’ of its own meaning. According to Althusser’s use, virtually everything can be described as material, regardless of its ‘mode’ of existence. If Althusser intended to transcribe the qualities associated with material reality on to ideas, actions, practices, and rituals he could have done so by first addressing the definition of, and thus the nature and function of, ideas and ideology alike. However translating everything into material confuses rather than clarifies his point.

The word material has a particular meaning, which is not consistent with the way that Althusser employs it. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* defines material as, “pertaining to matter as opposed to form. Relating to the physical aspects of things.
The matter from which anything is made”. When referring to ‘logic’ material is defined as, “concerned with the matter, as distinct from the form of reasoning”. The context shows that Althusser was using the first definition as his reference to ‘material’ was synonymous with ‘physical substance’. In which case, according to Althusser’s argument, the only way that an idea or ideology could be manifest as ‘physical substance’ is through the production of material objects. Conversely, if we invert the argument for a moment, supposing that Althusser intended the meaning of ‘material’ to be in keeping with the second definition, we will see the confusion from which it springs. ‘Material’, when related to logic refers to the ‘matter’ which is akin to the subject. In this case the subject is constituted from thought or ideas. Thus, in reference to the realm of logic Althusser should have correctly concluded that ideology, ideas and thoughts have a ‘material’ existence as the material of an argument is akin to its subject matter. Therefore Althusser’s argument would redefine ‘material’ as the subject of logic and of ‘logical thought’, or as Marx would have it, as ‘nothingness’, ‘pure dreams’ and ‘illusion’. Matter, and thus material, would be stripped of its ‘physical substance’ and Historical Materialism would cease to make reference to any physical relationships, ultimately circumventing Marx’s inversion of Hegel, and propelling Historical Materialism into the realms of metaphysics and so on. As such this formulation can be discarded as its outcome is certainly not aligned with Althusser’s intent. Nevertheless, the first definition highlights the problems associated with the way that Althusser employs the term. The terms ‘material’ and ‘reality’ in the end are simply not synonymous.

127 In the broader sense this could be interpreted to include energy, as energy and matter are different forms of the same thing.

128 Althusser could have argued, as I do below, that ideas may be embedded in a physical form, such that a plan or blueprint from which something is made is an idea. This may even include DNA as it is the ‘blueprint’ according to which living creatures are made. Furthermore, Plato’s Theory of Forms links ideas and objects as I will argue in Chapter Five.
If, as I would suggest, Althusser actually intended to argue that the true or false nature of ideas can be ‘proven’ through science. Subsequently, if the ‘substance’ of ideas can be addressed and therefore ‘proven’ to exist through observation or measurement, the ideas found in nature can be investigated. As such the *Science of Ideas* could address ideas in the natural, biological, ecological and social spheres. Rewriting the passage in question by removing all reference to ‘material’ and replacing it, where necessary, with appropriate terms like ‘real’, would fulfil that intent. As such the passage would read,

I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject (such and such an individual) is concerned, the [evidence] of the ideas of his belief is [real] in that *his ideas are [manifest] in his [physical] actions inserted into [actual] practices governed by rituals which are themselves defined by the ideological apparatuses from which derive the ideas of that subject.*

This passage contains significant albeit, imposed meaning. The difference between this passage and the original is, however, more than semantic. This passage argues that ideas are real and may affect the material world through their ability to influence and direct projected outcomes. In effect this point establishes a relationship between ideas and their ability to influence change through working agents or ideological apparatuses and thus effect the material world. As such, the material manifestations of ideas act as signifiers, testifying to the existence of their original, albeit often, unseen ideas.\(^{129}\) Therefore, actions or practices provide a mechanism by which non-material ideas can be manifest in observable ways through an intervening agent. Furthermore, this mechanism explains how ideologically laden objects such as icons,

\(^{129}\) In the next chapter of this thesis, through an abstraction of Plato’s *Theory of Forms*, I argue that certain kinds of ideas and ideologies can and do have actual material existence through genetic codes, DNA and so on.
crowns, sceptres, churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, palatial homes and so on may explicitly reflect the ideology of which they are a manifestation. Regardless of its merit, this argument is not contained within Althusser’s essay.

Acknowledging that any argument that claims ideas to have a material existence ‘appears’ to invert the natural order of things, Althusser makes note of the necessity for material to exist in “different modalities” (I&ISAs 169). However, he avoids dealing with the apparent inversion of the natural order by saying “I shall leave on one side the problem of a theory of the differences between the modalities of material” (169). Despite his sidestep he does attempt to diffuse the apparent effect of inverting the nature of ideas by claiming that there was in actuality no inversion. As Althusser writes,

It remains that in this inverted presentation of things, we are not dealing with an ‘inversion’ at all, since it is clear that certain notions have purely and simply disappeared from our presentation…. It is therefore not an inversion or overturning… but a reshuffle… a rather strange reshuffle, since we obtain the following result. Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence) (169).

In effect Althusser proposes that there is no inversion, as nothing is turned upside down. Accordingly, Althusser argues that ideas always had a material existence, and therefore have always had a material modality. However, he also suggests that because there is no ‘material reality’ behind the belief in spiritual things the constituent components of that non-reality never had any substance and therefore simply disappear. The problem with this theory is that just because an idea may have no immediately observable material substance or cannot be seen, touched, weighed or otherwise quantified does not mean that it does not exist. Nor does it mean that
such ideas do not have the ability to affect the real material world. Put simply, religious people and believers from all walks of life live their lives in respect to their beliefs, whether true or false. The question as to whether God, gods or goddesses actually exist or not is irrelevant while people believe that He, She, it or they exist. The perception of reality is all the impetus that an idea needs to affect the actions, practices, rituals, and subsequently impact upon the material existence of believers the world over.

Althusser’s argument continues to reinforce his ‘materialist’ argument that ideas have a material existence. The following quote, which continues on from the above extract, not only concludes this section of Althusser’s argument, but it sets the scene for his grand finale:

Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence), to the precise extent that it has emerged that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed by rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus. It therefore appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness in his belief. But this very presentation reveals that we have retained the following notions: subject, consciousness, belief, actions. From this series I shall immediately extract the decisive central term on which everything else depends: the notion of the subject. And I shall immediately set down two conjoint theses:

1. There is no practice except by and in an ideology.

2. There is no ideology except by and in the subject and for subjects (169-70).
Other than duplicating the problems addressed above regarding his overuse of the term material, and identifying the “subject” as the focus of the remainder of his essay, the final two points are of particular interest. The first point relates ideology to activity. However, in contrast to Marx’s view of history as mapping the class struggle, Althusser’s formulation casts history as mapping the effects of dominant or State ideology as a site of class conflict. The second point simply demonstrates the absolute limitation of Althusser’s theory.

Having carefully examined Althusser’s Theory of Ideology in general, it can be said that Althusser’s theory is without a doubt both innovative and informative. However, it can also be argued that the main drawback of Althusser’s theory is that it has a very limited application. Althusser may not have been loyal to every tenet of Marxist theory, but the scope of his theory was constrained by the overall framework. Consequently, Althusser’s theory is restricted to comment upon a limited range of human ideas and ideologies. In summary, Althusser’s theory is restricted to discussing human institutional ideas and institutional ideologies unified beneath the ruling class and thus within a State construct. Further to which, Althusser’s theory was developed to discuss the negative aspects of ideas and ideologies as they equate to illusion, allusion, distortion, misrecognition, and ignorance. In contrast to Marx’s conception of ideology, Althusser does argue that ideology can be ‘real’, but only when manifest through ‘material practice’. Together these contextual restraints limit the scope of Althusser’s theory of ideology to comment upon a specific strata of State ideology, and the nest of ‘institutional ideologies’ that it employs, rather than ideology in general.
Despite the inherent limitations in Destutt de Tracy’s original *Science of Ideas*, Marx’s negative conception of ideology and Althusser’s State-centred theory, they all have much to offer the development of a new theory of ideology. Destutt de Tracy’s view of ideology as not only part of natural science, but as the study of all ideas (not just human ideas) is invaluable. Marx’s depiction of ideology as addressing entire systems, whether of an individual or group has the potential to expand the study of ideology. Furthermore, in response to his *Theory of the State* and his interlocking *Theory of Power* the relationship between ideas, ideologies and the expression of power needs to be explored. In addition, Althusser’s theory provides a broad platform from which to launch a more comprehensive theory of institutional ideology, that incorporates Non-State ideological apparatuses. Furthermore, the very fact that traditional theories of ideology are complex, contradictory, confused and often confusing, highlights the need for a new theory of both ideas and ideology. It is here suggested that the obvious starting point is to clear away the debris, the confusion and the limitations posited by the traditional theories of ideology and establish a new theoretical foundation from which new models and eventual theories may be built.
Introduction to Part Two

‘The Nexus’

From its inception the theory of ideology has had its limitations. Despite the fact that Destutt de Tracy managed to avoid the unnecessary problems brought about by the Cartesian split and was therefore able to broaden the study of ideas to include those of other species his theory had its limitations. The tenor of Destutt de Tracy’s theory was constrained by both the tumultuous events of his time and the Enlightenment obsession with divining truth through science. ‘Actual truth’, albeit important, has after all very little to do with the appeal of an idea, the potency of an ideology, or the ability of ideological processes to impact upon the material world. Marx, on the other hand, never intentionally set about to develop a theory of ideology, yet his treatment of ideas and ideology has had more influence upon the modern conception of ideology than any other theorist. It is suggested here that Marx’s work has had a negative impact upon the ongoing study of ideas and ideology alike. Marx’s statements, formulations, his negative conception of ideology and his description of ideology (as having no place in reality or real history) have defined and limited ‘ideology’ as a subject of study, and therefore impeded the theoretical treatment of ideology for generations.

After Gramsci many theorists acknowledged the need for a review of the theory of ideology. As Mannheim wrote in his famous book *Ideology and Utopia*, “we do not as yet possess an adequate historical treatment of the development of the concept of ideology” (53). Some theorists predicted that ideology would end, while others like
Althusser produced new and innovative theories of their own. Althusser claimed that his theory addressed ideology in general. But as noted above his theory comments upon State dominated ideology alone. He certainly never commented on the ideas and ideologies of other species. Althusser’s *Theory of Ideology in General* formalized Marx’s negative conception of ideology by describing how ideology was ‘unified beneath the ruling class” (I&ISAs 146). Nevertheless, despite his innovative approach, Althusser’s struggle to marry his understanding of ideology with Marx’s formulations limited his ability to address ideology in general. Even though Althusser successfully illustrated the pervasive nature of State ideology, because he treated ideology as solely a State construct, he not only limited ideology as a concept, but the potential field of study. One thing is for certain, when the study of ideology is approached from an ideological viewpoint, rather than the rigour of science, the result is less than satisfactory. Furthermore, it is here strenuously argued that while the limitations and negative conceptions that dog the theoretical treatment of ideology continue to dominate the study of ideology, theorists in general will not be attracted to the study of ideas and ideology as a broad field.

Having examined the context and development of Marx’s negative conception of ideology, demonstrated its affect upon the modern conception of ideology and shown that the question of what ideology is and how it functions continues to be unresolved, there can be little doubt that the entire field of study needs to be reviewed. In fact, it is suggested here that the ‘gap’ projected by the limitations of traditional theory represents the biggest part of the potential field of study. That is, the limits

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proscribed by traditional theories of ideology prevent it from commenting on all but a minority of ideas and ideologies. Challenging traditional theories and conceptions of ideology is easy to do, as many theorists have a flair for polemic. However, describing ideas and ideology set free of human imaginations and belief systems is an entirely different proposition. Once freed from their constraints questions regarding the nature and function of ideas and ideologies alike immediately begin to mount. It soon becomes clear to anyone attempting to make sense of that seemingly endless area of study that an entirely new theory of ideology is required. It also becomes obvious that a new theory of ideology would need to be both general and detailed so that it could comment upon the nature and function of all ideas and ideologies without exception.

The difficulty that faces any theorist that attempts to develop a broadly applicable theory of both ideas and ideology is that the area of study is unmanageable in its size and complexity. In view of this ‘difficulty’ the following chapters present the bare bones of a theoretical skeleton upon which a truly comprehensive theory of ideology could be later developed. As such, the following chapters both describe and give account of ideotectonics, the nature and function of ideas, ideologies and the ideological apparatuses and their function and affect. Furthermore, the theory developed here takes into account the relationship between ideas, ideologies, ideological apparatuses, time and reality, as well as natural forces, energy and power. In essence, while the ‘theory’ developed here cannot claim to be complete, it does present a working model. Furthermore, the following analysis presents a testable
theory that has premises and broadly applicable principles that highlight logical and causal relations in such a way as to increase the theory’s explanatory and predictive capacity.

Where should such a theory begin? The logical advancement of this theory demands that before examining the nature and function of an idea or attempting to gauge the field of study, the confusion and limitations that plague the current theories of ideology must be swept away and a working definition of ideas and ideologies must first be put forward. Further it is argued that a ‘back to basics’ approach is needed if the nature and function of all ideas, not just human ideas are to be understood. Therefore, ‘ideas’ are hence described in respect to the original Greek meaning of the word, with special consideration to Plato’s description of ideas as forms, principle or archetypes with a view to understanding how the term is used today. Prefiguring a more substantial discussion; ideas are described as the plans, blueprints, or recipes from which something is constructed, while the term ‘ideology’ describes the schedule of works required to achieve the outcome projected by the idea. The outcome projected by the idea and described by the processes prescribed by the ideology are undertaken by an ideological apparatus or working agent. Together these three distinct components form the complete ideological system. Subsequently, it is argued that all ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses are expressions of a single phenomenon named ideotectonics. Together the working definition of ideas and ideologies posits an important set of premises.

131 For further reference please see the ten page discussion at the beginning of the General Introduction of this thesis.
Chapter Five, *Ideas and Ideotectonics: Five Categories, One Phenomenon* thus begins with a discussion of the key terms and further advances a theoretical model that describes the functional relationship between ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses. Subsequently, the phenomenon and field described by the term ideotectonic is explained. Having arrived at a reasonable working definition of ideas and ideology, and thus also had a glimpse of the field of study, finding a suitable place to start my analysis of the nature and function of ideas was the next challenge. Despite arriving at the starting point by asking a series of questions that identified ever more fundamental sets of ideas, and ever more ancient origins, telling the story is much easier when one starts at the beginning. Therefore, avoiding all discussion of first cause, with the assistance of modern science the ideas and ideologies that emerged from the Big-Bang and saw the evolution of matter and life can be described as ideotectonic. That is not to say that the following discussion attempts to explain the existence of energy or matter, but rather that the ideas or principles that describe the ‘structure’ of all forms of energy and matter are conditional to their existence. With the aid of some basic science, it is argued that ideas are conditional to the existence of both energy and matter and everything that is composed of energy or matter. Therefore, my field of research spans from the ideas that describe atomic structures, describe the structure of every living organism, and those manifest in ecological, social, and institutional systems. Considering the vast field addressed by ideotectonics, ideas and their associated functionaries are described in five broad categories. As a theoretical tool used to simplify the study of ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses, each category takes into account the nature and function of ideas in view of their particular characteristics, medium of existence, fecundity, power, and effect. The categories broad group similar kinds of
ideas together as a means of thinking about the different ways ideas work, and the different things that they achieve. Despite the fact that describing ideas in five broad categories may appear to be quite structured, and that the nature and function of ideology may appear somewhat mechanistic, those formulations do not suggest simplicity, but rather provide a basis upon which complexity and uncertainty is overlaid. Furthermore, this taxonomy is aimed at demonstrating the growing complexity of ideas from those describing atomic structures and the evolution of matter, to the evolution of living things, consciousness, individual and communal thought. The taxonomy was developed to facilitate discussion of the ever increasing complexity and application of the premises upon which this ‘theory’ is developed. In time and with the contribution of other theorists the emerging theory may incorporate more or fewer categories. Only time will tell.

One difficulty that Part Two of this thesis faces is that in order to address the many mechanical and functional aspects of the theory being developed here, several interesting avenues of inquiry needed to be ‘shut down’. In effect, several very pertinent bodies of thought, such as: socio-biology, deep ecology, and evolutionary psychology, among others, have not been engaged. In each case, dealing with the complex nature of those theories detracted from my ability to address the immediate object of this thesis. Therefore, the following chapters present a theoretical framework designed to explore and describe the nature and function of ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses without addressing every point at which the theory being developed here converges with other bodies of thought.
Part Two of this thesis is composed of four theoretical chapters and a brief concluding chapter. The first three chapters address the nature and function of ideas, ideotectonic processes and ideology, the means by which ideas and ideotectonic processes interacts with power in natural, biological and ecological systems, and the impact of ideological competition upon human social systems. Chapter Five, titled, “Ideas and Ideotectonics: Five Categories, One Phenomenon” describes ideas as falling into five distinct categories: Intrinsic-Ideas, Inborn-Ideas, Instinctive-Ideas, Intellectual-Ideas, and Institutional-Ideas. As the title suggests, it is argued that the five categories of ideas and their associated functionaries are expressions of a single phenomenon. All ideas and ideologies regardless of their particulars are described as sharing the same basic characteristics. Given that ideas are here described as the plans, principles, blueprints or recipes from which something is formed or constructed, everything that is constructed is also said to be the actual outcome of its constituent ideas and the ideotectonic processes by which it was formed. In turn, an idea’s projected outcome is only achieved through natural, biological, ecological, human or social processes or effects. In effect a system of ideas is described as composed of the rules and regulations, or the schedule of works, that guide the processes by which the idea’s projected outcome is achieved. The processes described by that system of ideas are then undertaken by an ideotectonic apparatus or working agent. Together the entire system, from the emergence of principles to their realization, is described as ideotectonic.

The most fundamental of all ideas describe the nature of energy, the atomic structures of matter, their properties and possible applications. Further, Intrinsic-Ideas are said to naturally and simultaneously emerge as new structures are formed.
Consequently, it is argued that all Intrinsic-Ideas were made possible at the moment of the Big-Bang. The projected outcomes of all Intrinsic-Ideas are achieved through the processes that simultaneously manifest the structure and realize the ideas that describe its form and/or properties. Subsequently, it is suggested that Intrinsic-Ideas are a fundamental condition of everything, formed of energy or matter that exists in the universe. Ernst Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle” steps in to devalue any notion of predetermination, rather promoting the concept of relative uncertainty, probability and complexity (Ferris 103). Further to this the “uncertainty principle” or the degree of relative uncertainty helps explain the diverse range of Inborn-Ideas, which are defined as the plans, principles, blueprints or recipes encoded upon strands of DNA from which biological organisms are constructed.

The second of the five categories of ideas describe the ideas that project the physical form or construction of biological organisms. It is argued that the degree of uncertainty relative to the accurate reproduction of the Inborn-Ideas encoded upon DNA strands, coupled with the environmental pressures exerted by the sum of the natural forces acting upon an organism, account for the mutations or adaptations described by the theory of evolution. Science once again has a great deal to say on this subject, informing and supporting the argument without the necessity of abstraction. Instinctive-Ideas relate to behaviours that add survival value to biological organisms. It is here suggested that the survival instinct is also very important to the way that living things express power. As such Instinctive-Ideas complement the processes by which the projected outcome of Inborn-Ideas are achieved. This theory proposes that Inborn-Ideas and Instinctive-Ideas work together to successfully achieve the biological imperatives that reproduce life and the ideas
that it contains. Like a nest of Russian dolls, the more fundamental ideas are not
superseded by later additions, but rather the complexity increases with the addition of
each category of ideas which produce new possibilities. Continuing with the Russian
doll metaphor, Intellectual-Ideas are ultimately influenced by: the Intrinsic-Ideas that
determine the physical or temporal nature of life, the Inborn-Ideas that project the
physical characteristics and capacities of all living things, and the Instinctive-Ideas
that enhance the survival strategies employed by those life forms. The advent of
Intellectual-Ideas not only increases the complexity of new ideas but renders
idealized or imagined ideas possible. Much discussion about ideas, reality and
history ensues which leads to discussions of social structures and Institutional-Ideas.
However, before examining Institutional-Ideas at length the discussion turns to the
interaction between ideas and power, ideotectonic processes and power, and ideology
and power, and power’s many natural, biological, ecological and social expressions.

Chapter Six, titled, “Ideas and Power” addresses the interaction between both ideas
and power and all ideotectonic processes and power. Power is therefore understood
in respect to an idea’s ability to exert an influence upon an outcome and the power
developed during the processes required to achieve an idea’s projected outcome.
Because not all ideas are acted upon ideas are said to have a kind of latent power, a
potentiality to exert an influence, rather than always expressing power. While it is
argued that the very nature of ideas means that all ideas have latent power, not all
ideas exist in a social setting. Where they do, the power they exert can best be
understood in respect to the social conception of power. Alternately, where power is
developed as the result of some kind of process or action the scientific theory of
power more than adequately steps in. In much the same way that science informs the
discussion of ideas in the natural universe and in biological structures, the scientific conception of power is here used to describe the development of power at the rate at which work is done in all ideotectonic systems. Nevertheless, as the scientific conception of power cannot describe the power or ability to influence an outcome according to ‘will’ or some other motivating factor, the social conception of power is used in conjunction with science to produce a working definition of the interaction between ideas, their functionaries and power.

Beginning with the emergence of the survival instinct, it is further suggested that living things have had the power to exert an influence upon their own behaviour, the behaviour of others and in some cases, upon their environments. The degree to which the first living things had such power may have been almost negligible. However, with every successive development that capacity has increased enabling them to express their will upon other living things and their environments to greater effect. Therefore, while the social and scientific conceptions of power are used to describe the expression and/or development of power, the ability of each theoretical approach to comment upon the way that power is expressed or developed is dependent upon the particulars of the ideas and ideotectonic processes in question. Setting aside the ideas ability to exert an influence and therefore power as an expression of its own nature the absence of ‘will’ or any other motivating factors in naturally emergent atomic and astronomical systems science exclusively describes the power developed at large in the natural universe. Nevertheless, beginning with biological and ecological systems, the social conception of power best describes the kind of power expressed in human social and political systems. This chapter further defines the nature and function of ideas, ideotectonic processes, ideologies,
ideological apparatuses and their relationship to energy, time and reality. Describing the mechanism that not only mediates but empowers the process by which an idea’s projected outcome is achieved is not only central to this theory but critical to understanding the processes by which natural, biological, ecological and social systems function. Subsequently, Chapter Six also explains the essence of ideological competition, especially in view of the ongoing influence exerted by Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual-, and Institutional-Ideas upon human social systems and the modern State.

Focussing primarily upon Institutional-Ideas, ideologies and the ideological apparatuses that serve them (institutions), Chapter Seven, titled, “Competitive Ideological Apparatuses and Ideological Warfare” addresses the nature and function of institutions as ideological apparatuses. Acknowledging the human race’s (and my own) limited understanding of the social lives of other species, this chapter examines human social systems, institutions and the State. In short, the State’s or Ideological State Apparatus’s monopoly over social power and social institutions is questioned and refuted. Subsequently, a number of pre- and non-State ideological apparatuses are described in relation to fulfilling human needs. Chapter Seven, thus, sees the introduction of terms such as: Primal Ideological Apparatus; Private Ideological Apparatus; Counter-State Ideological Apparatus; Opposition Ideological Apparatuses; Alternate-State Ideological Apparatuses: and the Ideological Hermitage. Each of these terms is defined and discussed in relation to both ideological competition (warfare) and the State. Needless to say it is argued that the world of institutions is not as straight forward as traditional theory suggests.
Chapter Eight breaks with the format of its preceding three chapters in that it does not aim to introduce any new theory but rather endeavours to clarify the theory developed in the previous chapters. Essentially a summation chapter, titled, “Something of a Conclusion, Something of a Beginning” Chapter Eight approaches the theory developed here from a slightly different angle. The logic behind this brief chapter is to clearly and succinctly present the theoretical developments outlined in the previous chapters free of lengthy explanations, complex arguments or involved examples, free of everything other than the theory itself. Pitching the summation of the theory from a different point of view, will sharpen the edges and highlight the functionality of the theory, while demonstrating the importance of each part of the theory. Part Two, and indeed the entire thesis, is completed with a brief concluding chapter. Titled: “Concluding Remarks”, the final chapter does not aim to conclude this study, or claim that the theory developed here is in any way complete. Rather it seeks to wrap up with a few remarks about the nature of the project, its limitations and its possible applications.

Part Two of this thesis responds to the historical context, the confusion and limitations described in the General Introduction, and the four chapters that compose Part One. Despite highlighting the flaws, inconsistencies and limitations of those theories, the acknowledgment of their limitations can be used appropriately in respect to the ideological systems that they were developed to comment upon. Nevertheless, by and large, the theory developed here promises to challenge traditional theory and extend ideology’s field of study. The difficulty has always
been to maintain a cohesive, coherent and linear argument while taking account of all ideas, whether manifest in natural, biological, ecological and social systems. That story begins here.
Chapter Five

Ideas and Ideotectonics: Five Categories, One Phenomenon

The theoretical foundation, framework or model developed in this and the following chapters requires the artificial constraints that limit traditional theory’s conception of ideas and ideology to be abandoned or at least suspended. The artificial constraints placed upon ideas and ideologies by various theorist need to be avoided if this work is to move forward. Granted that the artificial constraints that need to be abandoned include: Marx’s negative conception of ideology; Destutt de Tracy’s notion that we should study ideas in order to distil or ascertain truth; Hegel’s notions of ideas as universal truths; and Plato’s metaphysical explanation of the relationship between ideas and material things, but the theory that remains is incredible important to this study. It is thus argued that the theory developed here is in no way isolated from previous traditional or dominant theories but rather depends upon the diachronic study of key terms, their meaning, use and characterisations.

The new theoretical foundation uncovered here receives a theoretical heritage from a number of theoretical traditions which together provide a broad view of the nature and function of ideas and ideologies alike. It is my contention that ideas and ideology are aspects of one and the same phenomenon expressed or manifest in a number of different ‘spheres’, and as such all ideas and all ideologies function in a similar way despite their infinite variation. I call this phenomenon ideotectonics. The word ideotectonic is the contraction of two Greek words ideo meaning ideas and
tektonikós meaning “that pertaining to building or construction” (ibid 906).\textsuperscript{132} Therefore, the term ideotectonic describes both the composition or nature and function of an idea, and the processes pertaining to the building or construction of that which is projected by that idea. Subsequently the word ideotectonic describes the relationship between ideas, and functionaries which include natural phenomena and any ideologies or ideological apparatuses by which the projected outcome of an idea may be realized in the material world. Hence it is here suggested that all ideas and processes involved in the building or construction of that which is described by the principles encapsulated by an idea can be understood as ideotectonic in nature. Furthermore, in a general sense, the word ideotectonic describes the characteristics of all ideas, and the processes by which their projected outcomes are realized.

The way in which the word idea is used in the following chapters requires no abstraction or extension, but rather assumes a close reading of the word’s modern definition, informed by its etymology. Stated clearly the signifier, idea is here informed by a diachronic study of its meaning and subsequent uses. Nevertheless the definition employed here is based on the nature of the referent to which the word idea is the signifier, and is therefore somewhat technical. Understanding the referent and its said relationship to both ‘visible’ and ‘intelligible’ forms provides a site upon which this research can focus modern science’s knowledge and principles in an effort to understand the nature of the relationship between ideas and forms. In essence the following theoretical developments are based upon understanding the nature and

\textsuperscript{132} The word ‘tectonic’ is found in the term ‘plate tectonics’ which describes the building or construction of the Earth’s crust or its general structure, that is the cause and effect of action or movement involving one or more continental plate. Therefore plate tectonics describe the construction of mountains, valleys, fault lines, deep ocean trenches and so on. The point here is that ideotectonics describes the relationship between ideas, ideologies, ideological apparatuses and their effects. For further reference see The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology.
function of the referent to which the word *idea* is the signifier, that the essential qualities of that referent are uniform, yet broadly applicable and that science can inform us as to how ideas relate to forms. Additionally it is argued that all ideas and the processes including ideological processes that facilitate the realization are ideotectonic by nature. Naturally, in order to discuss the nature and function of all ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses in respect to ideotectonics, this argument needs to begin by establishing some uniform definitions.

Considering that the words idea, ideology and ideotectonic, are described in full or in part by the definition of the Greek word *idéā*, defining that word appears to be the logical place to begin. Because the term has been used for some two and a half thousand years, understanding the term not only requires a diachronic approach, but further demands an understanding of the thing, quality or concept to which the word *idéā* refers. Importantly understanding the nature and function of the referent itself and getting the mental image haled by the word *idéā* or signifier to accurately reflect that referent is the goal of the following pages.

Naturally understanding the referent requires us to survey the ways in which the term has been, and continues to be, used and defined. Secondly, discerning what those instances have in common should shed some light upon the nature of the referent to which the word *idea* alludes. According to Webster’s Concise Dictionary an idea may be defined as: ‘1. a conception existing in the mind as a result of mental activity. 2. an opinion or belief. 3. a plan. 4. a purpose or guiding principle.’ Like the *Webster’s Concise Dictionary* definition and *The Macquarie Dictionary* begins by

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listing conceptions, thoughts, notions and impressions, and adds, ‘a plan of action, an intention.’134 Interestingly the seventh point headed ‘philosophy’ includes, ‘a governing conception or principle’ and ‘(in Platonic philosophy) an archetype or pattern of which the individual objects in any natural class are imperfect copies and from which they derive their being’. The Cassell’s English Dictionary begins with, ‘1 a mental image, form or representation of anything,’ then moves on to include ‘a conception, a plan’ and ‘an intention or design’, while the sixth point includes, ‘an archetype or pattern as distinct from an instantiation or example of it.’ Like the Macquarie Dictionary, Cassell’s English Dictionary goes on to list a number of applications in philosophy.135 As indicated by the passage below the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary includes a much more comprehensive definition.

Idea: plural ideas… Greek idēā look, semblance, form, kind, nature, ideal form, model…

I. Archetype, pattern, plan, standard. 1. In Platonic philosophy: an eternally existing pattern of any class of things, of which the individual things are imperfect copies, and from which they derive their existence -1563. 2. A standard of perfection; an ideal -1586. 3. The conception of a standard or principle to be realized or aimed at; the plan or design according to which something is created or constructed -1581. 4. In a weaker sense: A notion of something to be done; an intention, plan of action 1617. 5. A pattern, type; a preliminary sketch or draft; an outline; something in an undeveloped state -1702. 6. A musical theme, phrase, or figure as sketch.

II. A figure, representation, image, or symbol (of something) 1531-1714; form, figure (as a quality or attribute); shape; aspect; nature or character -1737.

III. 1. a. The mental image of something previously seen or known, and recalled by the memory -1764. b. More generally: A conception -1612. c. Something merely imagined -1588. 2. a. More widely: any product of mental apprehension or activity, existing in the mind as an object or thought; a

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thought, conception, notion; an item of knowledge or belief; a way of thinking - 1645. b. A vague belief, opinion, or estimate; a supposition, impression, fancy - 1712.  

Putting aside the more general or widely uncritical use of the term as a ‘vague belief’ or a ‘thought’, the definitions show a number of distinct applications. Certainly they all include mental conceptions, a plan of action or intention, a governing principle or design, and an archetype, pattern, semblance, representation or form. The question is, what do these things have in common? Or perhaps more importantly, what essential quality does an idea share with all of these synonyms, definitions and explanations? The point of these questions is that the answer should describe the referent for which the word idea is the signifier. Examining the word idea’s English etymology, in addition to analysing the above definitions and common usage may help answer these questions.

The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology defines the Greek word idéā as: ‘look, semblance, form, kind, nature, ideal form, model; analogous in origin and primary meaning to species’. Much of this etymology owes itself to Plato’s Theory of Ideas or Forms. Interestingly, Sir William David Ross says that, ‘there is nothing in Plato to justify the view sometimes expressed by scholars, both ancient and modern, that the Ideas are simply thoughts, in the divine or in the human mind’ (88). In fact, according to Ross, ‘both είδος and ιδέα are derived from ídeïν, ‘to see’, and the

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original meaning of both words is no doubt ‘visible form’ (13). After examining a few other scholar’s work Ross wrote,

Sight is the most informative of our senses, and it is not surprising that the words which originally meant visible form should come to mean visible nature, and then to mean nature in general; nor that from meaning nature they should come to mean ‘class marked off by a nature from others’ (14).

Fortunately Plato did not just formulate a theory he gave examples, and thus indicates the nature of ideas themselves. One of the clearest examples is that of the carpenter and the shuttle. Ross renders Plato as follows,

To what does the carpenter look’, says Socrates, ‘in making the shuttle? Does he not look to something that was naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? …And suppose the shuttle to be broken in the making, will he in making another look to the broken one? Or will he look to the Form according to which he made the other?’ And this he proceeds to describe as ‘precisely that which a shuttle is’ or ‘the Form of the shuttle’ (19).

Ross further describes how Plato ‘goes on to speak of the carpenter as succeeding, when he is skilful, in embodying the Form in particular materials (19). Here Plato is commenting upon the relationship between the idea of a shuttle and the actual or material shuttle. Another example of the relationship between ideas and manufactured objects is found in the ‘the idea of bed’ (87). In modern vernacular we would describe manufactured goods in respect to their blueprints or specifications, buildings in respect to plans; we would not hesitate to describe all manner of stylish objects, jewellery, clothing, sports cars and so on, in respect to their design. As such we have no problem understanding the relationship between a blueprint, plan, or
design and an actual shifting spanner, a house or a car. Nevertheless, unlike the Greeks, we may have a problem thinking about an animal, man or the entire universe as existing in respect to their ideas.

Ross clearly states that Plato wrote about the idea of an animal (214). According to the Greeks the physical attributes of different species of animals were proof of the different ideas in respect to which they were formed. Each species of animal reflected the idea of that species, such that differences between ideas accounted for the differences between every class of animal just as it accounted for differences between every class of thing. Aristotle made reference to the ‘idea of man’ (ibid, 87) and perhaps most interestingly Plato discussed ‘the idea of universe’ in respect to the actual manifestation of our universe (ibid 87). Any difficulty that we may have in understanding manufactured objects to exist in respect to the ideas, plans or principles according to which they were constructed and naturally emergent or living things existing in respect to the ideas according to which they are constructed is due to our perception of what an idea is, not the nature or function of ideas.

The difficulty of understanding ideas on the one hand as human thoughts and on the other as principles in nature may be expected considering the common uncritical use of the term, but it is not necessary. Happily the etymology of the word idea provides a strong and common link between both ideas as thoughts and ideas as principles in nature. According to Ross, ‘Plato not seldom uses both words [είδος and ιδέα] in their original meaning ‘visible form’, that he uses both words in various non-

technical senses in which they had been used by earlier writers, and that he uses both words in the two technical senses of ‘Idea’ and ‘class’ (15). Whether Ross intended it or not, his clarification uncovers a common denominator. Just as Plato uses the word *idea* in discussion of the relationship between principles and visible forms, when an idea comes to mind the thinker sees in his or her mind’s eye a visual representation of the idea. Or as Ross put it, ‘when he [Plato] says that the carpenter looks to the Form, he may not think of the Form as Pre-existing any more than, when we aim at some end, we think of that end as existing already’ (14). That is, in much the same way that a person may see an object and thus see the ‘visible form’ of the idea of that object, when a thinker arrives at an idea, he or she sees the ‘visible form’ of the finished product in their mind’s eye. The common denominator is that there is a relationship between the plan, blueprint or idea of something and its form, which according to Ross, we perceive most strongly through our faculty of sight, and thus through ‘visible forms’.

Before attempting to describe the referent to which the word *idea*, is signifier, let us first go to a few objections. It may be argued that regardless of how the original use of the word *idea* is extended, wherever that word signifies the very same referent as identified by the Greek word *idēā*, the application may have changed but the definition remains uniform. However, wherever the usage is not related to the original meaning such that it fails to hale the same referent, and therefore has no relationship to the thing that the word *idea* technically refers, and in fact signifies a different thing or referent, any discussion of that usage is beyond the scope of this discussion and thus will not be engaged here. Stated plainly, this study is interested in the referent signified by the technical use of the term in contrast to ‘any product of
mental apprehension or activity, existing in the mind as an object or thought; a thought, conception, notion; an item of knowledge or belief; a way of thinking’ or ‘a vague belief, opinion, or estimate; a supposition, impression, or fancy’, as included in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition. Furthermore, this study rejects the notion that ideas are, as the Oxford Companion to Philosophy includes, ‘entities that exist only as contents of some mind’ (389), as a misuse of the term. It is here argued that defining ideas as limited to mental processes poses a number of problems. Such a definition fails to acknowledge the distinction between ideas and other mental processes, thoughts, and observations. Ideas may, of course, be thoughts. However, not all thoughts are ideas. Presenting ideas as though synonymous with thought prevents the thinker from discerning their ‘true’ nature and function. Describing all mental processes as ideas is like referring to all vegetables as carrots. It not only leads to confusion, and makes discussing particulars quite difficult, but also inhibits the communicator’s ability to say anything definitive about the subject.

What then, are ideas? And what do ideas in Platonic philosophy have in common with the modern definition? In the context of this thesis and making use of the dictionary definition quoted above, ideas—whether intellectual or non-intellectual—incorporate a plan or recipe according to which something is formed or constructed, or, in other words, an idea incorporates certain potentialities that project outcomes that may be achieved through certain actions in the absence of other actions. That is, all ideas are focussed upon the attainment of an outcome that may be realized through the application of a plan or course of action. For example, if an individual

sitting in a rather stuffy room begins to feel a little hot and drowsy, that individual having observed this feeling surveys the room before formulating an idea: if the window and door on opposite sides of the room were to be opened it may cause a draft, filling the room with fresh air, reducing the temperature, and relieving his/her discomfort. As far as this individual is concerned, the feeling of drowsiness, the awareness of drowsiness, and surveying the room all require sensations and mental processes. However these mental processes are not ideas. The idea to create a draft, thus freshening and cooling the air in the room, comes to mind as a result of the other data and the desire to alleviate the situation. This idea, as all ideas, contains a plan, a course of action and a projected outcome. Regardless of whether dramatic or mundane, all ideas incorporate a plan or a blueprint from which an outcome or effect can be projected and as such there are logical (and often causal) relations between ideas and their projected outcomes. This principle applies equally to all ideas.

When understood, free from the ‘misuse’ of the term, ideas can be viewed as containing a plan or recipe from which something can be formed or constructed, highlighting the relationship between ideas and forms. Furthermore, free of Plato’s theoretical explanation of how ideas are related to forms this work is able to investigate that relationship in view of modern science. That is not to say that

\[\text{\footnotesize 140 In general, well formulated ideas are ones that work, that is, by following the plan the outcome is achieved (or at least it is believed to be reached). Whereas poorly formulated ideas do not result in the objective being reached, or that the objective is reached but the consequences of that outcome do not fulfill the objective. Such that, if the theoretical individual mentioned above followed through with the plan so that cool fresh air filled the room the objective or ideal would be achieved, however if the plan was stifled or when carried out hot stale air wafted into the room, failing to alleviate the problem, the plan would have failed to have successfully achieve the projected outcome.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 141 It is important to note the difference between an idea’s projected outcome and its actual outcome. The difference is significant in that while there is a direct relationship between the idea and its projected outcome, some ideas may never be achieved in the real world as they contravene the laws of the universe. Therefore while the above mentioned principle holds true, further conditions must be taken into account when evaluating the probability of any given idea’s projected outcome being realized.}\]
Plato’s theory has no value, but rather that modern solutions to the valid problems that he identified need to be sought. For instance, rather than simply rejecting Plato’s *Theory of Forms* as discussing inferior terrestrial objects as flawed copies of their ideal forms, the problem that he identified with variations within a class or species of thing need to be addressed. His theory can be understood to discuss the disparity between the objects that surround us and the principles by which they exist. Plato observed the inequity between the perfect projection of ideas and that which was achieved in reality, yet noted that the imperfection of production did not render the principles or ideas in keeping with which the object was constructed non-existent. In essence Plato’s *Theory of Forms* described the differential between the projected outcome of an idea, which is a perfect representation of that idea, and the actual outcome of that idea manifest in reality. If we think of this ‘disparity’ as confirming the possibility of difference and uncertainty in production or replication we not only identify a problem, but set modern science a question worth answering. I am in no way the first to seek the assistance of science in answering this problem. In fragments of Aristotle’s *Peri ideön* preserved in Alexander’s *Metaphysics* he argues that if every science does its work, whether medicine or geometry it will discover things that are ideas.\(^{142}\) As noted in chapter one of this text, Destutt de Tracy’s *Science of Ideas* endeavoured to employ scientific principles in order to identify true and false ideas. His empirical notions inherited from John Locke’s claim that a man’s ideas arise from sensorial perception, that is through experience and

\(^{142}\) See translations of five passages, each containing an argument of how arguments from the sciences inform the study of ideas in Gail Fine. *On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993 (13-14)
observation. Only after Marx’s inversion of ideology and the advent of his negative conception of ideology did a ‘schism’ between science and systems of ideas become popular (a notion rejected in part one of this thesis as inherently flawed).

One aspect of Plato’s *Theory of Forms* that does not resonate with post-Enlightenment thinking is the notion of innate ideas. Such determinism does not work particularly well with the ‘rationalist paradigm’. Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle” (Ferris 99), which is one of Quantum Mechanics’ basic propositions, addresses the degree of uncertainty observed in the movement and velocity of electrons whizzing around the nucleus of an atom. In fact, Heisenberg and Bohr arrived at conceptually equal theories regarding the lack of determinacy in nature. Together Bohr’s “principle of complementarity” and Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle” form what is known as the ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of Quantum Mechanics (Ferris 103). Heisenberg first explained his uncertainty principle in relation to measuring the position and velocity of an electron. He noted that the position and velocity of an electron could not be measured simultaneously because multiple measurements produced varying results. The point being that, the assumption that the electron’s position and velocity once measured could be predicted perfectly, could not be maintained, but rather needed to be tempered with a degree of uncertainty. Accordingly Max Born said,

> The generation to which Einstein, Bohr, and I belong was taught that there exists an objective physical world, which unfolds itself according to immutable laws independent of us; we are watching this process as the audience watches a play in a theatre. Einstein still believes that this should be the relation between the scientific observer and his subject (qtd. in Ferris, 106).

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Consequently, Quantum Mechanics demonstrated that the universe was not the site of objective determined events. With the aid of much argument, mathematics and experiment, the uncertainty principle, or rather the Copenhagen interpretation, renounced the determinism and objectivity of the natural world (Ferris, 99).

Even though the rules that apply to Quantum Mechanics do not strictly apply to all aspects of the known universe some critical lessons can be learnt. For instance, Quantum Mechanics argues that if the act of observing or measuring an event creates a degree of interference, it also reduces the objectivity of the outcome of that event by a ‘degree of uncertainty’. Richard Feynman refers to such interference as “uncertain external influences” (Feynman Lectures 1408). He suggests that if the means by which something is to be observed generates uncertain external influences that interfere with the object being observed, the validity of the subsequent findings will be uncertain. Likewise, where any external source of interference affects an event, the exact outcome of that event may be uncertain. Naturally the degree of uncertainty would reflect the degree of interference encountered. Considering the dynamic interplay of forces, energy and matter in the universe, the probability that any event could be influenced by some degree of interference must be considered. If the construction of the universe and everything in it is mediated by a degree of uncertainty, the workings of the universe must be understood as incorporating a degree of ‘relative uncertainty’. Subsequent to the lack of determinacy, nature has been described as part of an “indeterminate universe” (Ferris, 111). However, an ‘indeterminate universe’ is not a universe in total disorder but rather a universe that

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144 While in homage to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, I wish to employ the concept of ‘relative uncertainty’ in reference to ideas, ideologies and the indeterminate nature of their outcome. As such, I intend to use this term free of the constraints of Heisenberg’s terminology and scientific application.
is less than ‘determined’ by the degree to which any outcome is uncertain. This is of particular interest to this thesis as it means that all outcomes cannot be predetermined, preformed or innate.

As introduced in the previous chapter, it is here argued that whether imagined or naturally emergent, all ideas are real and that despite this principle, all ideas need not be true. Ideas can be partly or completely false and still have the potential to affect the material world. Furthermore, where a false idea is accompanied by an ‘imagined history’ it may be difficult, if not impossible, to prove the idea to be either true or false. Consequently, the presence or absence of truth may have no relationship to an idea’s popularity. For instance, in The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins gives the example of the “god meme” (193) as both popular and culturally replicated. In effect Dawkins argues that as a culturally constructed non-genetic replicator, the god meme is reproduced in the minds of people as they are interpellated or socialized as members of a particular culture. The undeniable fact that the intergenerational idea of god exists defines the god meme as real. Whether the god meme reflects any truth is another question. It is significant, however, that for those that believe that God exists, both the idea of God and the existence of God are ‘real’ and ‘true’. While those that do not believe that God exists, do not consider Him to be real nor the idea of God to be true, however, the non-believer must acknowledge that the idea of God or the god meme does exist and therefore, even if false, is real. While science may not yet fully understand the workings of the human mind, brain activity, including the processes described as ‘imagination’, can be observed through empirical means. Exactly how imagined ideas are manifest in the human brain or stored in human memory may not be fully understood, nevertheless, the electrical impulses associated
with retrieving a memory or imagining a new idea can be observed by science (as brainwaves). Likewise it is worth noting that while imagined ideas are real and thus have the capacity to effect projected outcomes, imagined objects or events are neither real nor have the ability to effect projected outcomes of themselves. Only when imagined objects or events are believed to be real can they affect the processes carried out by the believer. Nevertheless the projected outcome is effected by the believer not the imagined object or event. Even if manifest in no other way, imagined ideas have a material existence in the brain.

The reality of false, imagined or idealized ideas is, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, informed by Stephen Hawking’s use of imagined numbers and imagined histories to “avoid the technical difficulties with Feynman’s sum over histories” (A Brief History of Time 141-2). Hawking states that imaginary numbers and thus imaginary histories help physicists make sense of our universe. However, he also says, “we may regard our use of imaginary time… as merely a mathematical device (or trick) to calculate answers about real space-time” (142). Nevertheless, when applied to imagined ideas and their role in creating humanity’s ‘imagined histories’ Hawking’s work provides ‘imagined histories’ with a foothold in reality. Applying imagined numbers, and thus imagined time, to the many stories or ‘histories’ constructed in the human imagination can tell us a great deal about the nature of Intellectual and Institutional-Ideas alike. For instance, many of the peoples of the world have their own stories describing how the world came into existence, as well as stories of

145 Richard Feynman proposed an argument based on the idea that particles may travel every possible path in space-time such that they could not be said to have a single history.
146 Any other species with suitable intellectual capacity may have their own explanation of their world, and thus imagined histories, but as I am unaware of any such histories I will restrict my comments to humanity.
benevolent and angry gods and the need to please or appease them by curbing their own behaviour, offering sacrifices and so on. As neither those gods nor the events said to have accounted for the existence of the world are either real or true, those stories do not reflect real history but imagined history. However, where those imagined histories influenced the behaviour or practices of the people who believed in them, the practices associated with them manifest change in the real world. Subsequently, imagined histories not only have an impact upon the material world, but affect real history. The point is that regardless of whether imagined histories are true or false because the ideas upon which they are based exist in human minds, in texts, icons, architecture, culture and so on, the effect of those ideas is manifest in the real material world. Or in other words, imagined histories impact upon real history because imagined histories are projections of real (albeit false) ideas which, when acted upon, affect the material world and thus contribute to real history. Furthermore, because imagined ideas are manifest through actions directed by ideologies, not only are imagined ideas real, but they exist in the real world. In fact there can be little doubt that ideologies rooted in imagined histories are real. Following on from the example of the god meme, even if God never existed no one could doubt the reality of Christianity, Judaism or Islam. If for no other reason, because the processes by which the projected outcome of any idea, true or false, take place in real time, and thus in real history, the nature and function of all ideas are worth investigating.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on ideas in respect to naturally emergent ideas and ideas generated through natural, biological, ecological or social systems, highlighting the unique way that ideas and all ideotectonic processes are understood.
as expressions of the one phenomenon. Beginning with the most fundamental ideas that describe the nature of energy and atomic structures, through to the most lofty utopian ideas imagined, all ideas are here described within five broad categories. For the purpose of this thesis these five categories, Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual- and Institutional-Ideas, describe different manifestations of a single phenomena. The most fundamental ideas at play in the universe not only form the instruments from which the universe is constructed (hence the title) but as they exist as part of the ‘chain of causality’ (Hawking, *Nutshell* 79), in the wake of the Big-Bang, they are best described in respect to the laws of physics. Further, as everything that science can observe is described in the context of the post Big-Bang universe all Intrinsic-Ideas are not only contextualized by the Big Bang but can be described by tracing their genealogy back to the Big-Bang. That is, while all ideas did not come into existence in the moment after the Big-Bang, the Big-Bang set in motion the force of gravity, the electro-magnetic force and both the strong and weak nuclear forces which when acting upon the available energy are responsible for constructing the entire universe and everything within it.

Einstein’s formula, $E=mc^2$, argues that energy and matter are essentially the same thing manifest in different states: in essence everything in the universe is ultimately composed of energy. Because all energy and matter exists in accordance with the principles or ideas that describe them, the relationship between ideas, energy and matter is axiomatic. Or in other words, because energy/matter cannot exist apart from the ideas or principles that define their existence, their coexistence is self evident. The existence of ideas is a fundamental condition of the existence of energy/matter.

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The ideas that relate directly to the nature of energy and matter and the forces that emanate from them are here referred to as Intrinsic-Ideas. These ideas are the instruments by which everything in the universe is ultimately constructed. Intrinsic-Ideas simultaneously manifest three distinct aspects: in the first instance an Intrinsic-Idea describes the very ‘essence’ of energy and the construction of matter; in the second instance an Intrinsic-Idea describes the nature of energy and the physical properties of matter; and in the third instance an Intrinsic-Idea projects the entire range of possible applications of that form of energy/matter. All three aspects of the complete idea emerge simultaneously, at the moment that the processes take place, by which the energy/matter was first achieved. For instance, the idea of a hydrogen atom describes its construction, (one electron whizzing around a single proton), while projecting its physical properties (an inflammable gas) and its possible uses (the construction of a star). All of these elements exist at the very same moment that the hydrogen atom is constructed. As such, in the most fundamental of all Intrinsic-Ideas the idea and the realization of its principles are simultaneously emergent. This means that the construction of a hydrogen atom and therefore the idea of a hydrogen atom was a possible projected outcome of the Big-Bang. The ideotectonic process by which the hydrogen atom was constructed did not precede the possibility of the construction of a hydrogen atom but rather emerged simultaneously at the realization of that structure. Thus, the spontaneous emergence of that atom and the idea or principle in accordance with which it was constructed were facilitated by the ideotectonic process or chain of causation that began with the Big-Bang. This means that the process or ‘practice’ by which matter is constructed did not come before the idea of matter. The singularity may have been the realization of the idea of itself but it contained the idea of an immense explosion. Considering that the laws of physics
are said to be suspended in a singularity the idea of the universe, which depends
upon the known forces could not have existed until after the Big-Bang when the
forces that shape our universe came into being. As such the singularity was pregnant
with possibilities that exploded into existence with the Big-Bang. Along with the
release of energy the possibility for all Intrinsic-Ideas was also released. Therefore,
the possibility that the idea of a hydrogen atom could be realized through the process
or work done by which it was to be constructed existed before that process took
place.148

Ideas, by the definition employed here, project an outcome that when achieved,
manifest change or displacement. But ideas cannot achieve change or displacement
of themselves. It is here suggested that ideas are served by ideotectonic processes
and apparatuses that work to achieve the idea’s projected outcome. There are
however a vast number of such apparatuses, many of which are described by physics,
biology, chemistry etcetera, and the social sciences. Therefore where speaking in
genral those processes will simply be referred to as ‘ideotectonic processes’, and
‘ideotectonic apparatuses’ meaning the working agent(s) by with an idea’s projected
outcome is formed, constructed or otherwise achieved. In specific cases the natural
processes should be described in keeping with scientific terms and references.
Likewise in the case of social systems the term ideology and ideological apparatus
will be used to describe those processes. Further to which it is argued that all
ideotectonic processes are akin to a schedule of works that describe the processes
required to achieve the projected outcome of the idea that they serve. Such

148 Ideas may be developed through or during working processes, or even arise as the result of
observations of processes or practices. This will be discussed below in relation to Marx’s formulation
that ideas are born of material practice rather than the other way around.
ideotectonic processes may be identified in respect to the character of the idea that they serve. The actual work done in order to achieve the change or displacement required to achieve the idea’s projected outcome, is carried out by an ideotectonic apparatus, which may be composed of a single working agent, a working agency or a nest or set of working agents. An ideotectonic apparatus may take the form of any object, being, phenomena or force that can work on behalf of an idea in order to effect its projected outcome.

Significantly, the ‘spontaneous natural emergence’ of ideas is at odds with the argument put forward by intelligent design advocates. The differences are both dramatic and easily stated. William Dembski, is one of the most, if not the most, prominent of these theorists. In Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology, Dembski gives a number of points describing exactly what constitutes intelligent design. In the first paragraph of the preface Dembski writes, “Intelligent design is three things: a scientific research program that investigates the effects of intelligent causes; an intellectual movement that challenges Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy; and a way of understanding divine action” (13). Beyond the question as to whether intelligent design is in actual fact “a scientific research program” or, as it has been called, ‘Creationism’s Trojan Horse’, the main points of Dembski’s description clearly distinguish intelligent design from the theory being developed in this thesis. In contrast to intelligent design, the theory developed

150 A number of papers and books have been written bringing into question the claim that intelligent design is ‘scientific’. The following books provide in depth analysis: M. Perakh. Unintelligent Design, New York: Prometheus Books, 2004; M. Young, and T. Eds. Why Intelligent Design Fails. New Jersey: Rudgers University Press, 2004.
here does not aim to ‘investigate the effects of intelligent causes’ (that is, of God). Neither ideotectonics nor the theory being developed here ‘challenge Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy’ nor do they attempt to provide ‘a way of understanding divine action’ as anything other than misunderstood natural phenomena. In fact the theory developed in this thesis not only endorses Darwin’s scientific *Theory of Evolution*, but it seeks to demonstrate the ongoing influence of genes and instincts upon intellectual and institutional ideas and ideologies. The argument developed here rejects the notion that patterns in nature indicate either an intelligent cause or divine action as the glorified personification of natural processes. In further contrast to the intelligent design theory, one of the characteristics of the theory developed in this thesis is that it predicts that the existence of every object, force and phenomena that can be felt, measured or observed, whether thought to be physical or ‘paranormal’, can be understood and explained through scientific methods as existing in respect to their fundamental ideas and the ideotectonic processes through which they are manifest. Furthermore, this theory is predictive in that it argues that all phenomena, objects and forces were made possible through natural processes like those thought to be linked through a chain of causation to the Big-Bang. That is, the theoretical framework being developed here employs scientific principles as a guide to strategic and progressive advancement rather than seeking to root its findings in an un-testable hypothesis.

In essence Intrinsic-Ideas are here described as the ‘principles’ in accordance with which the universe was constructed. Subsequently, it is argued that while all Intrinsic-Ideas were possible from the time of the Big-Bang, they need only have

became manifest at the moment that their projected outcomes were realized. Intrinsic-Ideas are encoded within the nature of energy, the atomic structures of matter, the amassing together or nesting of ideas to form compounds, chemical bonds, mixtures, and molecules. In effect, the category of Intrinsic-Ideas may be thought to include all that ‘governs’ the nature and construction of the physical universe.\(^\text{152}\) As such Intrinsic-Ideas include what humanity, or at least scientists, think of as the immutable laws of physics, chemistry, meteorology and geology. Subsequently, the nature and function of many Intrinsic-Ideas are already described by conventional science which in turn informs this theoretical framework. The premises of this theory relate to a wide range of ideas, processes and apparatuses which are expressions, or agents of a single phenomenon (ideotectonics). The explanatory capacity of the theory relate that phenomenon to the real world in such a way as to clarify the relationships between its various parts and its complexity. In this way the theory presented here posits something new, but not something contrary to that of existing science. For instance, science informs us that in the right circumstances swirling masses of atomic particles such as hydrogen and helium atoms come together to form a proto-star. As the force of gravity increases the hydrogen and helium atoms begin to produce more complex atomic structures.\(^\text{153}\) Eventually an atomic reaction takes place and a star is born. In time some stars go supernova, spreading their constituent elements over a vast area. Ultimately those elements may form part of another star, planet or living organism. The theory being

\(^\text{152}\) Despite the fact that the physical universe includes living organisms, ecosystems, social systems and so on, the development of living organisms must have been possible from the moment of the Big-Bang, as the nature of life and all that stems from it (instinct, the intellect, imagination and all social structures) are influenced by or made possible through the Intrinsic-Ideas from which they and their environments are constructed. Consequently, more appropriate categories are employed to describe the nature and function of those ideas.

\(^\text{153}\) According to Dawkins, these complex or large atoms include Carbon atoms, which are vital for life on this planet (The Ancestor’s Tale 3).
developed here accepts the science that describes those outcomes and processes yet
describes them in respect to the nature and function of the ideas and ideotectonic
processes by which they are achieved.

Each Intrinsic-Idea has a projected outcome. Whether successfully achieved or not,
every idea is pursued through both the influence of the forces described by the laws
of physics, chemistry and so on, and the ‘work done’ in order to effect those
outcomes. As such the impact that ideas and the ideotectonic processes through
which their projected outcomes are realized have upon the real world can be
measured and quantified. Regardless of what words we may use to describe the
means by which those outcomes are realized, whether through influence,
manipulation, or by direct force, the productive capacity of all ideotectonic processes
can be measured in terms of power. Therefore, it may be stated that while various
ideotectonic processes may express or develop power differently, no ideotectonic
process can perform its function in the absence of power. Likewise in keeping with
the concept that all things exist in respect to the ideas that describe them, that all
things are manifest through ideotectonic processes, and that those processes either
exert an influence or develop power; it can be said that power is always expressed
within an ideotectonic context. Because ideotectonics is understood to be
inextricably linked to ‘power’, by necessity, the theory being developed here
incorporates a discussion of power in view of the scientific and social conceptions of
power.\(^\text{154}\)

\(^\text{154}\) In keeping with this point, power accompanies ideology at every level as it pervades the natural
and biological world as well as human social systems. While this understanding of power extends
existing theories of power it need not be seen as contradicting the accepted conception of power.
Nevertheless, because this notion extends existing theory, the relationship between ideology and
power is examined at length in the following chapter.
By applying sound scientific principles to any observable phenomenon, force or object, one should be able to discover its founding ideas (the nature of the phenomena in question will determine what scientific principles describe its fundamental ideas). In respect to the phenomena observed throughout the natural universe, the scientific community, whether they know it or not, go about the business of discussing the ideas, and ideotectonic processes by which the universe works. Consequently in addition to understanding all observable phenomena, forces and objects as the result of natural processes described by the laws of physics, chemistry and so on; all matter and all objects constructed from matter may be understood as the actual outcomes of ideas and the processes described and undertaken by ideotectonic processes and apparatuses. Nevertheless, the existence or reality of the Intrinsic-Idea, or set of ideas, in accordance with which all energy and matter exist is not predicated upon the prior physical manifestation of those ideas as a plan or recipe. The proof of the existence of such Intrinsic-Ideas is evident in energy’s ability to do work and in the material production of matter itself. Intrinsic-Ideas are real, nevertheless, there may be no material evidence of their existence until they are manifest in an observable manner. Fortunately, the processes that serve Intrinsic-Ideas are not as hard to observe as the ideas themselves. Like all other ideotectonic processes the processes that serves an Intrinsic-Idea are manifest in the chain of events that result in the idea’s projected outcome being achieved. Subsequently, the sum of all outcomes achieved can be said to act as links in the chain of causation that has produced the naturally constructed universe. Thus, the contemporary universe is both the actual outcome of the Intrinsic-Ideas that describe its very construction and a stage in the construction of a future universe currently under construction.
Intrinsic-Ideas are both the most and least abstract of the various categories afforded ideas. They are the most abstract as they are perceivably the furthest from the general conception of what ideas are thought to be, and the least abstract, because in spite of their relative uncertainty, their projected outcomes are best suited to mathematical prediction and scientific formulation. The intellectual challenge facing anyone attempting to explain the emergent nature of these ideas is that unlike most ideas Intrinsic-Ideas neither require a motive nor a remote origin. For instance, a person’s circumstances can provoke in them certain ideas. Necessity is said to be the mother of invention, and every invention incorporates an idea. Thus the inventor’s ideas are at least partly produced by their circumstances. The appearance that Intrinsic-Ideas do not have any motive is deceiving. It is thus important to note that Intrinsic-Ideas require no other motivation than the dynamic forces set in play by the Big-Bang. Despite the need to factor in a suitable degree of uncertainty relative to the dynamic nature of the universe, scientific formulae can explain the movements of planets, the existence of black-holes and so on, which demonstrate that the universe works according to certain principles or ideas. Nevertheless, my reason for discussing Intrinsic-Ideas is not to produce a theory of how or why the universe was constructed (as that should be left to physicists) but rather to promote the notion that the constructive forces of nature continue to influence Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual- and Institutional-Ideas and their associated ideologies, and always will. That is, regardless of the passing of time, the same forces that produced this planet and gave rise to the conditions from which life sprang forth, continue to affect life on Earth, including human lives and human thinking, and ultimately human social systems. Humanity does not exist apart from its environment. The ongoing
influence of Intrinsic-Ideas upon humanity and human social systems contribute to their complexity. Further, the abstract nature of Intrinsic-Ideas, their ‘indeterminate’ nature, and the relative uncertainty of their outcomes being achieved does not reduce their theoretical veracity. Understanding the nature and function of ideas in respect to their material reality avails the theorist of new ways to think about ideas. In fact, thinking of the phenomenon that includes ideas and all ideotectonic processes as incorporating a degree of relative uncertainty, at least theoretically, accounts for one of the problems that determinist thinkers encounter when thinking of the replication of supposedly predetermined ideas. The very notion that a single process based upon a single idea repeated over and over again need not yield the same results not only supports the possibility of uncertainty, it supports the emergence of Inborn-Ideas.

Despite the fact that Inborn-Ideas also incorporate a degree of relative uncertainty they are much easier to explain than Intrinsic-Ideas. Further to which, the task of explaining Inborn-Ideas is made easier as a number of eminent scientists and philosophers have already done some of the work. Naturally, they have not spoken of ideas in the same way as this thesis but they have built a bridge between ideas and genes. In his 1976 book, _The Selfish Gene_, Dawkins alluded to an analogous relationship between the primordial soup in which life, and thus genes, were first formed and a “new soup of human culture” (192). Out of this “new soup”, he argued, emerged a new ‘non genetic replicator’ which he referred to as a “meme”. Dawkins went on to describe a meme as “a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation” (_Selfish Gene_ 192). His examples include “the idea of God” (192-193), “popular songs and stiletto heels” and more complex units of culture like “the Jewish religious laws” (194). Furthermore, Dawkins wrote,
The phenotypic effects of a meme may be in the form of words, music, visual images, styles of clothes, facial or hand gestures, skills such as opening milk bottles in tits, or panning for wheat in Japanese macaques. They are the outward and visible (audible, etc.) manifestations of the memes within the brain (The Extended Phenotype 109).

Stressing that, “memes are not genes, and they have nothing to do with DNA except by analogy” (The Ancestor’s Tale, 278), Dawkins nevertheless builds a bridge between the genetic replication of information and the cultural replication of information. Drawing the disciplines of cultural studies and genetics closer together, Dawkins said, “I agree with Pulliam and Dunford (1980) that cultural evolution ‘owes its origin and its rules to genetic evolution, but it has a momentum all its own’” (The Extended Phenotype, 111). The question is, are all ideas non-genetic replicators or are some incorporated into genes and thus play by the same rules as other genetic replicators?

The following discussion on Inborn-Ideas makes use of the bridge that Dawkins built. However, whereas Dawkins crossed the bridge between genes and memes, from his foundation in science to cultural studies or Philosophy, this thesis crosses the bridge from the other direction, applying a philosophical theory to a biological reality. In keeping with Dawkins’ statement that “memes are not genes and that they have nothing to do with DNA”, this thesis maintains that distinction. Instead this discussion is focussed upon the nature and function of genes and DNA. In fact, while the treatment is different, this discussion shares the same topic as Dawkins’ book, River out of Eden. As Dawkins wrote, “the river of my title is a river of DNA, and it flows through time, not space. It is a river of information, not a river of bones

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and tissue: a river of abstract instructions for building bodies…” (5). Employing the premise that an idea is a plan or recipe from which something is constructed, it is here suggested that the information encoded upon strands of DNA compose the Inborn-Ideas from which every living organism is constructed. Likewise the degree of uncertainty with which DNA is replicated not only accounts for mutations, but when those changes are manifest within the context of a competitive environment the combination of Intrinsic- and Inborn-Ideas account for the many adaptations and species of life. Furthermore, it is here suggested that DNA may contain sets of nested ideas and ideas that are shared between the organisms living in an ecological system. In essence, the complete set of ideas necessary for the existence of life on earth is not contained within any single organism, but is shared between co-dependent living organisms in what may be referred to as an ‘ideotectonic ecology’.

It is here argued that the construction of every living organism is not only dependent upon the Intrinsic-Ideas encoded within the atoms from which it is composed, but is dependent upon the Inborn-Ideas encoded upon strands of DNA. Put simply, the DNA of every living organism contains the Inborn-Ideas, plan or recipe from which that organism is constructed. The variation between the Inborn-Ideas contained within genes not only determine the stages of development and the adult form of every species, and assist each successful organism to survive and ultimately reproduce, but the inclusion of such Inborn-Ideas separates living and non living cells. In *Chaos and the Evolving Ecological Universe*, Sally Goerner\(^\text{157}\) explores the origin of information transfer as an accompaniment to the origin of life itself:

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When Schrödinger (1944) asked, “What is Life?” his primary concern was “what is the biochemistry of replication?” Dyson (1985)\textsuperscript{158} points out that the thrust of Schrödinger’s concern reflects a past and continued bias — i.e., life effectively equals replication… this distinction is only another example of over-focus on replication (102).\textsuperscript{159}

Goerner goes on to state that “geneticists usually point out that it is not replication but reproduction that counts” (102). The significance of Goerner’s work, to this study, is that she argues that the definition of a living cell includes code (DNA), or information, and the ability to reproduce and transfer that information.

With the assistance of the work of theorists such as Freeman Dyson, Manfred Eigen, Lynn Margulis, H. Pattee and R. Swenson, Goerner sets out to define ‘the amazing thing that is life’. Goerner argues that ‘non-living’ cells like the Benard cell are not true biological cells as they are incapable of existing without what amounts to a ‘life support system’ or external energy source (108). Continuing, Goerner argues that Eigen’s\textsuperscript{160} “nucleic acid polymer molecules” (103) along with Dyson’s “cells with no genetic apparatus” (104) may not constitute life as they do not contain functional information. Employing Pattee’s\textsuperscript{161} symbol-matter dynamic, Goerner states that “the miracle of life is that it uses metabolism and code-processing to create a system that preserves functional information— it is a single, inseparable symbol-matter system that preserves functional information” (105).\textsuperscript{162} Conversely, Goerner also argues that code-processing and replication (DNA and RNA) of themselves do not define life.

\textsuperscript{158} Also see Freeman Dyson. \textit{Origins of Life}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
\textsuperscript{159} Also See Ernst Schrödinger. \textit{What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944.
\textsuperscript{160} For further background see Manfred Eigen. “The Origin of Genetic Information”. In \textit{Scientific American}, 1981. 244:4, 88-118.
\textsuperscript{161} Also See H. H. Patee. “Cell Psychology: An Evolutionary Approach to the Symbol-Matter Problem”. In \textit{Cognition and Brain Theory}. 1982. 5:4, 325-341.
\textsuperscript{162} Also see R. Swenson. “Gauss-in-a-Box: Nailing Down the First Principles of Action”. In \textit{PAW Review}. 1990, 4:1.
Essentially Goerner argues that life is not the product of a single factor. Goerner suggests that before a cell can be thought of as a living cell the various factors must be able to work together so that the cell is able to function in ways that separate it from non-living cells. In other words, replicating the information contained within the cell does not define it as living. The information or code must have a function; it must assist the cell to achieve something that would otherwise not be possible. Goerner says,

There’s an important additional code-processing and physical effect: the symbol-processing side of things ends up guiding metabolism in a way that adds survival value. When something manages to do this—i.e., code processing with survival-enhancing effects—it has really become life (107).

Therefore, to summarize Goerner’s conclusion, the most basic form of life requires more than that which can be seen under a microscope. The information contained within a cell must affect that cell’s metabolism, so that the cell may function independently of any artificial energy source, that it may exchange matter and energy with its environment and that the cell, complete with the information encoded upon its DNA, may be reproduced. Goerner says, “what is really interesting about life is the coupling of replication, metabolism and function” (102), all of which, I might add, depend upon the ideas contained within a particular cell’s DNA.

Considering that the cell/s of every living thing known to humanity, from amoeba to the most complex and highly evolved multi-celled organisms, contain information that assists its construction, survival and reproduction, Goerner’s conclusion appears to be quite reasonable. For instance, the human body contains a multitude of cells,

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and each body cell contains 46 chromosomes made up of multiple genes, containing a multitude of DNA strands encoded with information. As such every human body cell contains a plan or recipe from which the entire human body could be formed or constructed. The point is that the very material existence of every living thing, from single celled organisms to the most complex multi-celled plants and animals, relies upon a combination of physical matter and information. Therefore, if the difference between non-living cells and their living counterparts is that living things contain chemical structures that generate a reproducible code, and that that code assists those living cells to survive, reproduce and even adapt, it may be concluded that the basis of all Inborn-Ideas encoded within DNA were present at the genesis of life itself.

In essence, it is here argued that the projected outcome of the Inborn-Ideas contained within DNA code is the successful production of the physical bodies or biological apparatuses of those living organisms. It is further argued that Inborn-Ideas are constituent to life itself.164 Traditional science may not describe genetic information as Inborn-Ideas, but the existence of the nature and function of that information is not in doubt. Everyday DNA’s secrets are being decoded by geneticists and biological engineers alike. What is being suggested here is that the plans or recipes encoded upon the strands of DNA act in the very same way as any other idea. While the cells containing the DNA are alive, the information that they contain is not inert and in fact has a projected outcome. Those ideas are inherited, but in accordance with the principle of relative uncertainty the uniformity of their replication is not guaranteed. Whether because of radiation or some other uncertain external influence, DNA is

subject to random change or mutation. Dramatic mutation may produce deformity, or characteristics that amount to disadvantage. However, the accumulative effect of small advantageous changes account for the diverse range of adaptations of life on Earth. This is the essence of the theory of evolution. Nevertheless, regardless of the differences between the Inborn-Ideas of one species and another, not only do the basic premises upon which life is based remain the same, the ideas encoded upon the strands of DNA have the same relationship to their projected outcome as any other category of idea has to its projected outcome.

Having defined the nature and function of Inborn-Ideas, explaining the processes by which they are realized is theoretically a relatively simple task. In much the same way that Intrinsic-Ideas and the processes by which they are realized as both naturally emergent and spontaneous, the Inborn-Ideas incorporated within the first living cells and the function of that cell were naturally emergent and spontaneous in their existence. That is, the living cell requires both the idea and form in order to exist as a living cell. Therefore the ideotectonic processes and the Inborn-ideas themselves were the result of instrumental processes, and were therefore both spontaneous and naturally emergent. From that point forward the uncertainty of replication, environmental pressures and the survival instinct drove the evolutionary processes responsible for the evolution of subsequent species. Therefore, the ideotectonic processes by which successive generations of living things evolved incorporate a raft of Intrinsic-, Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas and their ongoing influences. Therefore given that Inborn-Ideas are defined as the plans, or recipes encoded upon strands of DNA from which the successful organism is constructed, the natural physiological processes that facilitate the realization of the Inborn-Idea
are here described as ideotectonic in nature. That is, in a general sense, because those natural processes assist the developing organism to achieve its Inborn-Ideas those processes are ideotectonic. In a specific sense those processes may include asexual budding, meiosis, mitosis and all the developmental stages required to translate that which is encoded upon strands of DNA into a sexually mature or adult organism. Every successful Inborn-Idea is achieved through the work undertaken by a biological or physiological apparatus such as a cell or body. When an organism successfully achieves its biological or genetic potential it demonstrates the success of the natural, biological and ecological apparatuses that realize the outcomes projected by its Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas and their associated ideotectonic processes. Likewise, the very sequence of anatomically developmental changes from infancy to sexual maturity follow the schedule encoded upon an organism’s DNA. All of the actions and practices that are required to achieve the projected outcome of the Inborn-Ideas contained within the DNA is facilitated by the cells or bodies of those organisms. as ideotectonic apparatus. Once again what is important about understanding these natural processes as ideotectonic is that they facilitate the realization of Inborn-Ideas, not that this terminology somehow explains the development of successful organisms. What is important here is the relationship between ideas, processes and material forms. Furthermore, understanding the ongoing influence of Inborn-Ideas upon all living organisms, including human beings highlights their ongoing influence on our thinking, ideas, ideologies and social systems.

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Dawkins’ reference to those “abstract instructions for building bodies” (*River Out of Eden*, 5) does not strictly limit those ‘instructions’ to affecting the physical structures of living organisms, but extends to the essential qualities of life as a dynamic and active state of being. Furthermore, as a basic catalyst of the evolutionary process those ‘abstract instructions’ empower life by imparting a ‘will to survive’, or as Goerner says, “adds survival value” (107). ‘Adding survival value’ is, however, more dramatic than it first appears. ‘Adding survival value’ transforms what would otherwise be an inert envelope into an active and dynamic living cell. Naturally if a cell did not have any mechanism encouraging it to survive it may just as well expire as survive. So what is this quality? It is an insatiable survival instinct, a natural involuntary reaction to the threat of expiration. Complimenting the concept of ‘will’ in non-thinking cells and organisms, in *The Selfish Gene*, Dawkins describes the behaviour of genes as ‘selfish’ without attributing to them self-awareness, or thought of any kind. Likewise he argues that competition occurs at the ‘information’ level, or at the level of the gene. Together Goerner’s definition of ‘life’, the ‘survival instinct’ and the concept of a “selfish gene”, bridge the gap between the Inborn-Ideas embedded within DNA and what I refer to as ‘Instinctive-Ideas’. Interestingly, employing the term ‘instinct’ in relation to the ‘actions’ of unthinking single celled organisms creates a semiotic link between genetic code and certain behavioural characteristics.

Instinctive-Ideas certainly relate to behaviour, action and response to external conditions, as well as internal drives and responses. The term ‘instinct’ is often used

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to describe natural reactions, such as the ‘fight’ or ‘flight’ response, that appear to have been generated without recourse to higher cognitive processes such as forethought. For instance, my wife has a very playful black cat named Sirius, who is scared of spiders, especially big ones like tarantulas. If caught off guard or surprised by a spider scurrying toward him he jumps an impressive distance, then maintains that distance while keeping an eye on the offending creature until it is gone. On the other hand Sirius often catches black beetles, which he doesn’t kill, but prefers to play with until discovered and robbed of his catch. But under no circumstances will he touch a spider. How does he know the difference between spiders and beetles? His senses obviously channel information into his brain, he analyses that information and understands that creature to be either a spider or a beetle. Why does he fear spiders? Or perhaps how does he know that spiders are dangerous? Arachnophobia, semiotics, instinct? Instinct is far more complex than often thought.

Instinct is all too often misunderstood. I could recount numerous occasions being told that “animals don’t think, they get by on instinct” and that “their behaviour is pre-programmed”. One of the many problems with such statements is that they assume that all instinctive responses are more or less predetermined. Logic, on the other hand, suggests otherwise. If, for instance, when faced with a given situation a creature always responded in the very same manner its actions would be predictable. Predictability is, however, a poor survival strategy, as the ‘ideological genealogy’ of Instinctive-Ideas incorporates a degree of relative uncertainty. Consequently, not only is the principle of relative uncertainty evident in Instinctive-Ideas but it appears to be exaggerated. The degree of uncertainty is exaggerated because the competitive nature of the struggle for survival exaggerates the degree to which external
influences impact upon and interfere with each individual’s ability to achieve the projected outcome to which they aspire. For instance, an antelope may need to eat grass and drink water in order to stay healthy. They also need to mate, and where appropriate give birth, produce milk and protect their young. As the seasons change they must find new areas to graze. Along the path to successfully surviving and reproducing they encounter numerous situations that threaten that success. Their food and water supply is often threatened, not to speak of the constant threat of predation. All of Africa’s big cats, hyenas, wild dogs and so on survive by killing and eating animals like antelope. An antelope cannot simply walk in a straight line between water holes while eating grass, having the occasional rendezvous with a suitable mate and ultimately raise a happy family. The very competitive nature of the ongoing evolutionary process dramatically increases the degree of interference where that interference is not only systemic, but the degree of relative uncertainty is dramatically increased. One of the upshots of the increased degree of relative uncertainty is that instinctive reactions are rarely, if ever, predictable. Naturally when a lion springs from the long grass the antelope run for their lives without so much as a thought. Even so, all instinctive responses do not require split second decisions. In fact instinct is often about choice. Which of the antelope should the lion target? Should the antelope run away from the herd or into the herd? From the available breeding partners, which mating will give their offspring the greatest chance of survival? Decisions such as these highlight the fuzzy area between instinct and cognition which raises some interesting questions regarding consciousness.

Instinctive-Ideas appear to have three main functions. Firstly, Instinctive-Ideas provide the impetus and the desire that drives an organism to satisfy its needs.
Secondly, instinct imparts the ability to respond to a situation without the delay required by forethought. And thirdly, Instinctive-Ideas solicit emotive responses such as trust, love and hate. Regardless of the actual manifestation of Instinctive-Ideas they are all purposeful, they all have a projected outcome, and that outcome assists the individual to achieve the projected outcome of their Inborn-Ideas (survival and reproduction). As such not only are Instinctive-Ideas dependent upon Inborn-Ideas they are complementary to their pursuit. The essential difference between Instinctive-Ideas and Inborn-Ideas is that Instinctive-Ideas relate to behaviour rather than physical form. Instinctive-Ideas affect the organism’s behaviour in such a manner as to assist the organism to achieve the projected outcome of its Inborn-Ideas. That is, in order for an organism to achieve the outcome projected by its Inborn-Ideas, it must reach sexual maturity and successfully reproduce, all of which requires the organism to behave in a certain way. Interestingly, because the function of Instinctive-Ideas is to facilitate the means by which the organism is able to reach sexual maturity, and thus achieve its projected outcome, Instinctive-Ideas form part of the ideotectonic processes required at the level of Inborn-Ideas. Nevertheless, as manifestations of the same phenomenon as all other ideas, Instinctive-Ideas have the same function as all other ideas. Whether recoiling from danger, shivering to keep warm, or finding a suitable sexual partner, the actual behaviour prescribed as a means of achieving an Instinctive-Idea’s projected outcome is undertaken by the biological and/or ecological apparatuses that serve it.

There is certainly some debate as to whether learned behaviour enhances instinct or extends the faculties beyond instinct and into the intellectual realm. Likewise the point at which decision making ceases to be thought of as instinctive and is
considered to be intellectual is open to debate. In this regard discussing the phenomenon of ideas and ideology has a number of advantages. Not only does the theory being developed here provide a framework, which incorporates the principle of relative uncertainty, but because all ideas and associated processes are manifestations of the one phenomenon, the exact point at which intellectual decision making takes over from instinct is of little consequence. The different categories are simply devices designed to facilitate the analysis of ideas and ideotectonic processes rather than precise taxonomical categories. Further to which the complementary nature of each category of ideas renders discussing Intellectual-Ideas and their associated ideologies and ideological apparatuses as though they were completely independent from Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas inappropriate.

Destutt de Tracy believed that humans were not the only “sensible beings” on Earth (Political Economy, 81): a belief that need not be refuted but one which could benefit from some qualification. Destutt de Tracy does not assert that all species enjoy exactly the same faculties as humanity, but rather that each species have faculties unique to themselves (Treatise on the Will and its Effects, 14). One thing is certain, the differences between the physical form of one species and another reflect different Inborn-Ideas. Likewise differences in behaviour between one species and another reflect different Instinctive-Ideas, which reflect different Inborn-Ideas. However, the difference between one species and another’s capacity to generate Intellectual-Ideas reflects the accumulative effect of each species’ Inherent and Instinctive-Ideas. That is, Intellectual-Ideas are developed in brains, and fully functional brains are a projected outcome of a creature’s Inborn-Ideas (DNA), which are developed in conjunction with Instinctive-Ideas (behaviour). Therefore, while the differences
between one species and another’s ability to generate Intellectual-Ideas may be the result of different Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas, differences in physical form and behaviour between humans and other species may mean that other species do not think exactly like humans. Nevertheless, that does not mean that they do not think.

Anyone who has had the good fortune to observe animal behaviour will attest to the genius of many creatures. Once my wife and I had a miniature British Bull-Terrier pup who could escape from almost any situation. She had escaped from the yard twice before we found out how she was getting out. The fences were all impenetrable, the gates securely latched. At first we thought that the mail man must have let her out, because the gate was left open. But we were quite mistaken. Frustrating our detective work, she would only try to escape when we were out. And pretending to be out did not fool her for a minute. However one day, feeling a little off colour, I stayed in bed instead of going out. Upon hearing the front gate rattle I was able to observe her technique, as I watched her through my bedroom window. The front gate consisted of two hinged panels. The right panel was fixed by a steel pin that fitted into a copper pipe located in the ground. The left panel was hinged and latched at the top. After a number of attempts and what appeared to be trial and error she found a winning formula. First she lifted the pin that located the right hand panel out of the ground. This allowed both panels to open, just a little, creating a gap between the panels. Then standing on the bottom rail of the right hand panel, she simultaneously put her left paw into the gap and pulled at it, while lifting the latch with her nose. It took a few attempts, the gate swung open and away she went. From that time onward we kept a loop of chain hung over the two leading edge pickets, preventing the gates from opening. Over the years she escaped so many
times that she had a file at the local dog shelter marked ‘escape artist’. Undoubtedly
she was a clever little dog, but that is not the point. Her instinct for freedom was met
by her intellectual capacity for solving relatively complex problems. Faced with a
new situation she would go about testing all of the security devices before finding
and often exploiting what was to us an unforeseen weakness. She summed up the
situation before arriving at an idea that, if successfully executed, would, achieve her
aim. In effect the projected outcome of her idea was getting through, around, under
or over whatever obstacle stood between her and her freedom.

Having instinctive desires is one thing, fulfilling those desires is not only another, but
the fulfilment of desire often requires the application of Intellectual-Ideas. For
instance, the desire to eat is not alone fulfilled by the instinct to hunt. Hunting takes
a lot of skill, stealth, selection of suitable prey, anticipation and some understanding
of the potential prey’s capacity to fight or take flight as well as a realistic appraisal of
the individual’s own prowess. In short, while driven by instinct successful execution
often makes use of intellectual faculties and Intellectual-Ideas. Naturally the
Intellectual-Ideas of a bald eagle, a dolphin, or a lion are very different from the
Intellectual-Ideas generated and employed by a chimpanzee, a mouse or a human.
But then again the evolutionary response of each of these species to the Intrinsic-
Ideas and the ecological apparatuses that shaped their environment is very different.
The result of which is that each of these species sports a unique set of Inborn- and
Instinctive-Ideas that give rise to various Intellectual-Ideas. Human DNA enables
human beings to develop certain physical characteristics including brain size.
Likewise human instinct presents humanity with certain root behaviours.167 Together

167 For a general philosophical explanation of the evolution of human consciousness see chapter seven
those physical and instinctive characteristics present humanity with intellectual abilities beyond that of any other known species on Earth. The nature of human thought is affected by our will to survive and reproduce, by fear and desire, and by our physical limitations, which includes our mortality. Human thought is fundamentally subjective, complex and wonderfully messy, rather than sanitary and objective. The beauty of this complex subjectivity is that the possibilities of its inventiveness, humour and artful expression are seemingly ‘unlimited’. The number of human ideas possible is dramatically increased by the distinct probability of making mistakes, failure, a multitude of interpretations and, perhaps most significantly, the ability to draw conclusions that satisfy our view of the world in the absence of exact information. Our subjective minds are able to fill the gaps, make assumptions, construct arguments, and draw conclusions that allow us to believe without sound reason. Perhaps most importantly our subjective minds allow us to get on with the business of successfully living our lives even while knowing that we do not fully understand our world. The significance of the ability to believe in things without sound reason is that ideas have the ability to affect people’s lives regardless of whether they are true or untrue. In fact an idea full of promise but lacking in truth may solicit a far greater following than the belief in an idea that is simply true. In practical terms an idea’s ability to make something happen is more dynamic than the presence or absence of truth. An idea’s ability to affect a satisfactory outcome does not depend upon which category it best fits or whether it is judged to be true or untrue. It may, however, depend upon the unique and dynamic interaction between its many Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual- attributes.

What is significant about the unimportance of knowing the point at which the intellect takes over from instinct is that the intellect does not replace instinct, but rather the intellect complements instinct. Just as Instinctive-Ideas interact with and build upon Inborn-Ideas, Intellectual-Ideas interact with and build upon the sum of both Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas. The accumulative effect of adding the capacity to generate Intellectual-Ideas to the sum of Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas highlights the usefulness of understanding all ideas as ideotectonic and promotes the notion that with the addition of each successive generation of ideas the complexity of the resultant ideas increases.\textsuperscript{168} The greater the complexity and degree of relative uncertainty, and thus the variability of each category of ideas, the greater the range of possible ideas. Further to which with every increase in intellectual ability the possible number of Intellectual-Ideas increases dramatically.

The exponential increase in the number of possible ideas is accompanied by an increase in the number of ideas that do not have a reasonable probability of being achieved. A proportion of those ideas cannot deliver their projected outcome as their outcome contradicts the laws of physics, logic or the natural order of things (for example, perpetual motion machines). While achieving the projected outcome of some ideas may be technically possible, they are in reality highly improbable. For instance, an idea that begins with ‘the first step is to win the lottery each week for the next six months’, would have an extremely high probability of failure, whereas other ideas may simply depend on everything going perfectly to plan, and the probability of that is very slim. Achieving the projected outcomes of certain ideas may be

\textsuperscript{168} Considering that it is here suggested that nested sets of ideas function like ecosystems, it is also reasonable to offer an example of the dynamic nature of ecosystems as an illustration of that complexity. See C. Pahl-Wostl, \textit{The Dynamic Nature of Ecosystems: Chaos and Order Intertwined}. Chichester: Wiley, 1995; M. A. Huston, \textit{Biological Diversity: The Coexistence of Species on Changing Landscapes}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
improbable simply because they were predicated upon the expectation of perfect results or deterministic principles. Determinism depends upon predictability. Determinism demands that if everything has been fully thought through, everything should go perfectly to plan. However, in practice, not taking into account an appropriate degree of uncertainty paves the way for unexpected outcomes. The disruption that arises may cause that project to fail. Then there are idealized Intellectual-Ideas with their idealized outcomes that can only be achieved with the aid of some kind of ‘gearing’ where the expected return is far greater than the input would normally achieve (that is 2+2=8). Get rich schemes, con games, and the gambling industry all employ the idealized outcome as a drawcard. The ‘supernatural’ represents another set of Intellectual-Ideas that are simply impossible to achieve without intervention from outside the natural system. In view of science, life on Earth is the product of natural evolutionary processes alone, the natural order of things provides no avenue for life after death. According to this view when a religious person dies their mental function ceases and that person simply decays like any other organic matter. However, the religious person believes that with the assistance of some supernatural force they may live forever after death in peace and happiness. All such ideas are here referred to as ‘idealized ideas’. The difference between a ‘natural idea’ and an ‘idealized idea’ is the outcome projected by the natural idea may be achieved by ordinary means, while achieving the projected outcome of an idealized idea is dependent upon unnatural good fortune, a highly improbable outcome or intervention from outside the natural system. Not only are the projected outcomes associated with ‘impossible’ and idealized Intellectual-Ideas improbable from a scientific or mathematical point of view, but the degree of relative uncertainty increases dramatically with the emergence of ideas with idealized
outcomes as the possibility of interference and misadventure is greatly increased.

The problems associated with idealized Intellectual-Ideas are exacerbated by the desire to negate every degree of uncertainty from the things believed in. As such, belief in the ‘absolute reality’ and thus ‘absolute truth’ of the possibility of achieving an idealized outcome poses a number of problems. Believing in idealized outcomes creates a schism between the ‘natural’ ideas from which the universe and everything in it, including our mortal bodies and carnal desires are formed, and our ability to achieve the projected outcomes of idealized Intellectual-Ideas. Whereas the Intellectual-Ideas that harmonize with the most fundamental of humanity’s Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas promote the successful reproduction of the human species and therefore constitute part of humanity’s ideotectonic apparatus, those Intellectual-Ideas that require celibacy or self-sacrifice directly hinder or oppose the fulfilment of naturally emergent Inborn-Ideas. Subsequently, the emergence of idealized Intellectual-Ideas and their associated ideologies create a rupture or a schism between ‘reality’ and the perception of reality according to those ideas. The idea of an afterlife reflects the survival instinct, present from the genesis of life on this planet. And yet ironically, the idealized idea of surviving beyond death often works against the survival and reproduction of the human organism. The process of denying the fulfilment of one’s Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas regarding reproduction and survival of the species by assuming a life of celibacy as a path to enlightenment is one such example. Put simply dedicating one’s life to achieving idealized rather than natural outcomes may be counter-productive from an evolutionary point of view. The schism between naturally emergent ideas and idealized ideas only serves to highlight the potency of Intellectual-Ideas. In contrast to naturally emergent ideas,
all idealized ideas are generated by the intellect. Nevertheless, I would suggest that whether serving a naturally emergent idea or an imagined idea, the nature of the idea does not change the function of the associated ideologies (as ideology is a functionary and is therefore of itself neither good nor evil), but where there is no possibility of achieving the outcomes projected by an idea, the ‘character’ of the associated ideology may be affected.

The fifth category of ideas, referred to here as ‘Institutional-Ideas’, has the potential to be the most complex of all ideas. Found in relation to social organization and therefore biological organisms, Institutional-Ideas are, at least partly, the product of all the other ideas.\textsuperscript{169} Furthermore the multiplicity of complementary Institutional-Ideas develops ideological ecosystems, which not only incorporate Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas, but entire sets of ideas that depend on one another for their ongoing existence.\textsuperscript{170} Therefore, Institutional-Ideas, while ‘separate’ from the ideas of any individual, continue to be influenced by the ideas that describe organisms, form, behaviour, intellect and social systems. However, as Institutional-Ideas are manifest through remote working agents directed by ideologies and managed by ideological apparatuses as institutions, understanding the nature and function of Institutional-Ideas requires some knowledge of the means by which institutions are enlivened or empowered. Therefore, rather than producing a disjointed discussion of the nature and function of Institutional-Ideas only to return to discuss the nature and function of the institutions that they produce after discussing the interaction between various ideotectonic processes including


ideologies and power, this discussion is adjourned until the exploration of the relationship between ideas, ideologies, ideological apparatuses and power is complete. Due to the fact that all ideas and their associated functionaries are expressions of the one phenomenon, the following discussion on ideas and power while critical to the discussion of Institutional-Ideas, addresses the means by which all ideotectonic processes express or develop power. Subsequently, the next chapter examines the mechanism by which ideas are realized and the way power is both expressed and developed.
Chapter Six

Ideas and Power

The discussion of power is at any time complex, especially when in respect to complex social systems. Discussing the relationship between ideas and power is here further complicated by the difference between Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual- and Institutional-Ideas and their projected outcomes. Further, it is here suggested that the nature of ideas and their realization evoke two complimentary, yet distinct aspects of power. It appears that because all ideas contain the plans, blueprints or recipes according to which something is formed or constructed that all ideas have the potential to influence the form of that which is formed or constructed. This aspect of power may be described as latent, dormant or potential as it need never be acted upon, but when action is taken the idea exerts an influence and therefore expresses power. Likewise it appears that no idea can be realized without certain ideotectonic processes effecting change. It is here argued that when successful those processes develop power. This kind of power is not measured in potentiality or influence, but rather at the rate at which the idea’s projected outcome is realized, that is as ‘mechanical power’.

At first glance science would appear to exclusively describe the kind of ‘mechanical power’ developed through the ideotectonic processes by which Intrinsic-Ideas are realized. Social theory would appear to describe the kind of ‘latent power’ expressed by Institutional-Ideas, but what about the latent power expressed by ideas that do not have a social aspect? Furthermore, any number of social theories of power address the kind of power expressed through belief, fear, hegemony, ideology, obedience, honour, and morality in human social systems, but what theory of power describes...
the relationship between power, the Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas of species other than homo sapiens? What theory of power takes into account the ongoing influence of the ideas built into human DNA and human instinct on the ideas that project all human social systems? What if that first glance failed to adequately sum up the relationship between the different types of ideas and the different approaches to power? What if, the theories of ‘latent power’ and ‘mechanical power’ had something to say about ideas and power at every level? Can existing theories of power be brought together to discuss, not only, the middle ground, but the whole field? I happen to think so. A good place to begin this theoretical resolution is by attempting to understand the relationship between ideas and power and between ideotectonic processes and power. Moving on, a systematic explanation of how both aspects of power interact with Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual- and Institutional-Ideas and their associated ideotectonic processes may help clarify those relationships. Additionally given the lack of any theoretical framework special attention needs to be paid to the relationship between Inborn-Ideas, Instinctive-Ideas and the Intellectual-Ideas of all species and power, not just homo sapiens.

Without first offering a full treatment of the various theories of power it is impossible to comment upon their individual characteristics. It is nevertheless obvious that more than one theory is required to discuss the relationship between power and ideas. The ‘universality’ of the phenomenon that includes all ideas and ideotectonic processes from those that describe atomic structures, the formation of stars and galaxies to the aims of the latest political movement, means that ideas and ideotectonic processes interact with power wherever and however power it is expressed or developed. Subsequently employing a number of theories of power in
an effort at understand the different manifestations of power is expected. Put simply, science more than adequately understands power when developed through mechanical processes and social science recognises the complexity of power as the expression of ‘will’ in human social systems; bringing those two approaches together to inform the expression and/or development of power for non-human and early human systems is the task here. Further, because human social systems continue to be influenced by the Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas that have assisted human evolution, understanding power in respect to human ‘biology’ may extend the social theory of power. In essence, as no single theory of power adequately addresses mechanical, ecological, biological, cognitive and social expressions of power, even the most useful theories of power need to be extended if they are to serve the needs of the theory being developed here.

The following chapter presents a ‘working definition’ of power as used in the context of this theory. This ‘working definition’ combines the scientific conception of power and what is here referred to as the ‘social conception of power’. Unlike the social theorists scientists agree on the nature and means by which science describes and calculates power. Therefore, while the scientific conception of power can be employed to comment on what can be referred to as mechanical power without abstraction or caveat, before the ‘social conception of power’ can be used to describe the relationship between ideology and power a definition must be fixed. Given that the theory developed here is essentially ‘materialist’, yet neither Marxist nor anarchic some of the social theories of power are more useful to this thesis, and less problematic than others. The most prominent theoretical traditions stem from the

work of Marx, Weber and Foucault. Different as they are, all of those theories share some common ground. For Marxist sociologists power describes the ability of one social class to exert an influence upon another. Weberians maintain an interest in social stratification, but describe power as the ability or probability that a person in a social relationship will be able to successfully exert his or her will regardless of resistance. While Foucault takes this approach further still as he describes power as diffuse, personal and natural. The common ground shared by these theories is, they all describe power as the ability to exert an influence in the pursuit of effecting a desired outcome. Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, this ‘common ground’ is hereafter referred to as the ‘social conception of power’. Moreover, in view of the way that ideas are treated in this thesis the social conception of power is extended to comment upon the power expressed by all manner of living things.

Bringing the social and scientific approaches to power together effectively extends and overlaps the social conception of power and demonstrates the interdependence of the latent power of ideas and power developed through ‘mechanical processes’. In

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many ways Foucault’s theory of power and the scientific formulae used to calculate power make a very happy marriage. In essence Foucault’s theory demystifies power and reduces it to a practical expression of influence, force or action.\textsuperscript{176} Foucault understood power to be expressed in ordinary everyday effects. He writes,

Do not regard power as a phenomenon of mass and homogeneous domination—the domination of one individual over others, of one group over others, or of one class over others…. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in the position to both submit to and exercise this power (qtd. in Morris and Patton 29).\textsuperscript{177}

Foucault throws the shackles of traditional theory off, freeing his theory of power from the limitations implied by power as sovereign authority. Foucault understood power in many contexts, as expressed in his work: The History of Sexuality, Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish, The Archaeology of Knowledge, and The Order of Things. In Society Must be Defended, Foucault said that he wanted to,

emancipate this analysis of power from three assumptions—of subject, unity, and law—and to bring out, rather than these basic elements of sovereignty, what I would call relations of operators of domination. Rather than deriving powers from sovereignty, we should be extracting operators of domination from relations of power, both historically and empirically (44-5).\textsuperscript{178}

Put simply, for Foucault power is dynamic rather than linear.\textsuperscript{179} Or, in the words of

Joseph Rouse, Foucault accomplished his aim by conceiving of power dynamically (108-9). But, much more than that, by describing power in the context of functions, effects and relations Foucault described power at the nexus of will and action. In many ways Foucault describes social power in the language of science.

Important as the links between Foucault and the scientific conception of power are, what is more important to this thesis is the way that Foucault’s theory lends itself to comment on power as it is expressed in biological and ecological systems. Before going on to quote Foucault in support of his point Gary Wickham\textsuperscript{180} says,

\begin{quote}
Foucault suggests that all power starts in the ‘smallest elements’ of the social body; “the family, sexual relations, but also residential relations, neighbourhoods, etc. As far as we go in the social network we always find power as something that runs through it, that acts, that brings about effects” (152).\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}

Further to this, it can be argued that Foucault not only conceives of power as diffuse, but, by focussing upon aspects such as the subject and subjectivity, Foucault provides the expression of power and its effects with a human, corporeal or biological context.\textsuperscript{182} The resulting overlap between the social (Foucault) and scientific conceptions of power enables me to comment upon power in respect to mechanical and biological systems as well as ecological and social systems.

Bringing the social and scientific approaches to power together has a number of

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\textsuperscript{181} While this passage was quoted by Gane, it originally appeared in Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton. \textit{Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy}. Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979. 59.
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\textsuperscript{182} Also see Alec M’Houl and Wendy Grace. \textit{A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject}. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1993. 57-59.
\end{flushright}
implications. Firstly, by extending Foucault’s theory in order to comment upon power in respect to biological and ecological systems, power as expressed by all life forms can be discussed in similar terms. Therefore, placing the interaction between ideotectonics and power under a new lens potentially increases our understanding of both the nature and function of ideas and ideotectonic processes and the expression of power at every level of functionality. Subsequently, bringing the social and scientific conceptions of power together within the context provided by the theory developed here frames power in respect to the Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual- and where appropriate the Institutional-Ideas of single celled organisms, ordinary individuals, nations, world religions and so on.

It is important to note that while acknowledging the expression or development of power within the context of an entire nest of ideas, describing power as diffuse does not reject the notion of power expressed by a sovereign power or other powerful apparatus. Foucault himself never denied the ability of nations or powerful organizations to exert an influence upon others. In fact, in his book *Society Must be Defended* Foucault says, “I am obviously not saying that great apparatuses of power do not exist, or that we can neither get at them nor describe them. But I do think that they always function on the basis of these apparatuses of domination” (45). What Foucault’s theory of power was able to do, was to describe power in view of the ability to exert an influence, regardless of how small or insignificant that influence is.

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It is important to state that the following model does not aim to co-opt science, abstract scientific formulae or employ scientific principles as pure metaphor, but rather argues that the phenomenon that includes ideas and ideotectonic processes, albeit previously not considered to be, is partly explained by existing science. Furthermore, as it is here argued that ideas are ‘real’ and not simply ‘phantoms of the mind’, the veracity of the theory being developed here cannot be reinforced by distorting scientific principles.
In essence Foucault’s theory not only lends itself to comment upon power as expressed by ordinary flesh and blood human beings but perhaps more importantly the kind of power expressed by a range of non-human agents existing in different ecological contexts. In essence, Foucault’s conception of power as diffuse rather than hierarchical caters very well to the needs of the theory developed here. Furthermore, within the context provided by the theory of ideotectonics being developed here Foucault’s theory of power in concert with the scientific conception of power provides a very practical and broadly applicable conception of power.\textsuperscript{184}

It is here argued that the ability to effect an outcome and the rate at which a projected outcome is achieved, are two aspects of the same achievement. Granted the social and scientific theories of power focus alternate aspects, but they both address aspects of the same thing. Naturally, it is also proposed that, depending on the particular expression of power, one theoretical approach may be more appropriate than the other. For instance, it appears that there is a correlation between the capacity of living things to influence the world around them in such a way as to reflect their ‘will’ and the social theory of power to comment on that capacity. Furthermore, the greater the living thing’s ability to influence what goes on around it the more appropriate is the social theory of power. Subsequently, it is suggested here that in the context of the ever increasing complexity that accompanies each level of Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual- and Institutional-Ideas, the ability of the social and scientific conceptions of power to comment upon those systems changes.

Other than the latent power associated with all naturally emergent ideas, the social

\textsuperscript{184} In view of the intersection between the theory being developed here and Foucault’s \textit{Theory of Power}, see Chapter Two of \textit{Foucault on Knowledge Power and Politics}, Pamela Major-Poetzl. Michel Foucault’s \textit{Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History}. UK: Harvester Press, 1983. 31-60. And for general reference see, Gary Gutting, ed. \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Foucault}. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2005.
conception of power is well suited to comment upon the ability of ideas to influence outcomes in all social systems. Importantly, social theory is also best suited to comment on the power of all Institutional-Ideas and ideological processes. On the other hand, science is undoubtedly suited to calculate power in respect to all ideotectonic processes described by physics, chemistry, biology, geomorphology, material production and so on. Importantly, the messy stuff of evolution, the struggle for survival and dominance is an expression of both will and action. Therefore, beginning with the power expressed and or developed by single celled organisms and moving through to modern humans the expression and development of power needs to be addressed by both scientific and social conceptions of power.

The laws of physics are said to be immutable. If this is indeed the case, the formulae by which power, force, work done, displacement, and velocity, are calculated must also be universally applicable. Subsequently, when addressing displacement, whether achieved by work done in the biological or cultural spheres, the laws of physics and the formula used to calculate their effects can be employed to calculate the power developed by working agents while undertaking the work required to achieve an idea’s projected outcome. Thus, while scientific principles may be used as metaphor, when applied directly to the nature and function of ideas and ideotectonic processes, scientific formulae yields real and meaningful results. This marriage, however, comes with a warning. If, for instance, the laws of physics and their formulae are to be used as a lens by which ideas and ideotectonic processes are

186 Many prominent physicists such as Stephen Hawking believe that the immutable laws of physics are only suspended in singularities such as those that exist in black holes or existed before the Big-Bang. See Stephen Hawking, *The Universe in a Nutshell*. London: Transworld, 2001. Therefore in all other circumstances the laws of physics are manifest in a uniform manner.
to be better understood, scientific formulae cannot be applied to that which cannot be measured. If the laws of physics are to be applied to work done in the social sense, the work done in the social sense must equate to work done in the scientific sense. Likewise, if achieving an outcome in the social sense is to be measured in the scientific sense, the displacement achieved by the ideotectonic apparatus must manifest some form of displacement in the scientific sense. In other words, if the application of the laws of science are to have any real meaning in the study of the interaction between ideotectonic processes and power they must be applied to relationships between energy, matter, time and space. Therefore, if the formula, power equals work done over time \((P = W/t)\)\(^{187}\) is used to calculate the power developed by a church work bee, it must be able to measure the work done (and thus cite material displacement) and time lapsed in real terms. Likewise, if the power developed by an ideological apparatus in the service of an Intellectual-Ideology was to be calculated by scientific formulae, it would need to be measured by calculating the work done (and thus the displacement) divided by the time lapsed. Subsequently, if an idea cannot manifest a measured effect or potentially exert an influence within the real material world, regardless of how pervasive that ideology appears to be, in both the social and scientific sense it would be said to have no mechanical power.

The scientific method of quantifying power in respect to work done and time, or force and velocity, highlights one major difference between the social and scientific conceptions of power. The scientific\(^{188}\) formula demands that power is either


\(^{188}\) The theory presented here defers to the premises and theories established by science where directly applicable.
predicted or calculated after the event.\textsuperscript{189} For instance, in physics “the rate at which work is done by a working agent is called the power developed by that agent” \textit{(University Physics 134)}.\textsuperscript{190} Or in other words, power equals work done divided by the time lapsed \textit{(P = W/t)}.\textsuperscript{191} Likewise, in physics, the term work \textit{(W)} “involves the application of a force \textit{([F])} to a body [resulting in the] displacement \textit{([d])} of that body” \textit{(University Physics 115)}. Therefore in keeping with scientific formula, power is not calculated until the displacement achieved by a force or the work done can be measured in respect to the time that that work took. In effect the scientific formula demands that the actual power developed by an action cannot be quantified until after its effects are realized.

Given the limitation of the scientific formulation of power and in view of the above mentioned sliding scale, how does the scientific conception of power inform the interaction between ideology and power? The scientific or formulaic method for calculating power is very useful to the discussion of ideotectonic processes and power because regardless of the kind of process being addressed, wherever an ideotectonic processes manifests real changes the power developed can be measured. For instance, let us say that a rock weighing 1000 kilograms is dislodged from its place and free-falls one kilometre to the bottom of a grand canyon. According to the formula, power equals work done divided by time lapsed \textit{(P = W/t)}, the falling rock

\textsuperscript{189} Interestingly, in some cases science is able to predict the power that would be developed if or when certain circumstances arose. That is, scientific formula can accurately calculate a nuclear bomb’s ability to cause displacement and thus do a certain amount of work in a certain time, predicting the amplitude of the power developed by that bomb. Therefore, science has the capacity to predict the potential power of something like a bomb which is not that different from the social theory of power quantifying the ability of one individual, institution or belief system to exert an influence upon itself and other bodies.


\textsuperscript{191} Power is also said to equal force multiplied by velocity \textit{(P = F\cdot v)}, and force is measured in relation to work done over displacement \textit{(F = W/d)}.  

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would develop approximately 686 kilowatts of power before coming to rest. In this regard, the scientific formula describes ‘work’ as a quantity, rather than a practice, which is described by a whole raft of rules. If on the other hand, an assassin was to drop a 100 kg anvil 100 meters onto his victim, the power expressed by the falling anvil coming to rest could be calculated in exactly the same way as the power developed by the falling rock. Simple though this example may be it clearly demonstrates how scientific formulae measure power without commenting upon the relationship between motive and the ability to act. Nevertheless, in keeping with the above example, if an ideology is unable to apply a force or does not affect any displacement, the ideology would be said to have done zero work (where \( W = F \cdot d \), and \( F = 0 \) or \( d = 0 \), \( W = 0 \)) and therefore would develop zero power. What this means is that in respect to ‘power’, scientific formulae produce meaningful results when measuring the development of power through the processes that effect the displacement required to achieve an idea’s projected outcome. Likewise it also shows that the scientific conception of power is not suited to describing power as the ability of a living thing, ecosystem, or institution to effect an outcome in accordance with their will or other motivating factors.

192 Ignoring air resistance and so on the power developed by the falling rock may be calculated as follows. In this case the work done equals the potential energy therefore where potential energy equals mass multiplied by gravity multiplied by height (\( PE = 1000 \text{kg} \cdot 9.8 \cdot 1000 \text{m} \)) the potential energy and therefore the work done equals 9800 000 joules. The time elapsed during the fall is 14.29 seconds (using the equation \( S=ut+\frac{1}{2}at^2 \) or \(-1000 = 0t+\frac{1}{2}x9.8xt^2 \), \( t=14.29 \) seconds). According to the equation \( P = W/t \), \( P = 9800 \cdot 14.29 \cdot 0.26 \text{J/S or watts} \), or, rounding up, the power developed during the rock fall is 686 kilojoules or 686 kilowatts.

193 For instance, one of those rules states that if an object or ‘body’ was lifted up and down or moved back and forth before coming to rest in its original position, and the sum displacement of that action was zero, no work would have been done. In addition to this rule there are distinct differences between the rules that apply to: work that results in vertical or horizontal displacement; displacement in respect to varying force or multiple factors; displacement in a different direction to the direction of the force; and displacement as a result of internal work (produced by force internal to the displaced body). For further details see Chapter Six ‘Work and Energy’ of the sixth edition of Francis W. Sears, Mark W. Zemansky and Hugh D. Young University Physics. Sixth ed. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1982. It is well worth reviewing for a full explanation of the quality referred to as ‘work’ as it provides a more complete explanation than many contemporary texts.

194 Likewise, where an ideology is unable to apply a force and its force equals zero, in view of the equation \( P = F \cdot v \), its power also equals zero (where \( F = 0 \) and \( P = F \cdot v \), \( P = 0 \)).
In keeping with the theory developed above, I suggest that the relationship between ideas and ‘latent power’, and in fact between ideotectonic processes and ‘mechanical power’, is born of the nature and function of ideas and their realization. Ideas do not themselves effect the changes required to realize their own projected outcomes, those processes are left to ideotectonic processes such as those described by physics, chemistry, biology, social ecology and political science. In turn, all ideotectonic processes influence or effect change and therefore express or develop ‘mechanical power’. Consequently it may also be said that no idea can be realized in the absence of power. Conversely, power cannot exist in an ideotectonic vacuum. In principle, ideotectonics and power are inextricably linked.

Given the above discussion on the relationship between ideas and power and between ideotectonic processes and power let us summarise that discussion into a number of points before employing specific examples of their application. First, analysing the relationship between ideas and power is to understand that every idea contains a kind of ‘latent power’. That is, because every idea is composed of the plans, blueprints or recipes in accordance with which something is formed or constructed, every idea influences the composition of that which is formed or constructed. Therefore, every idea affects the processes through which that outcome is achieved. Second, it is suggested here that ideas once formed are static. Ideas do not effect the changes by which their outcomes are realized. In order to manifest actual change all ideas require the assistance of external forces, processes or functionaries. Third, there is no direct relationship between ideas and mechanical
Ideas neither effect a displacement or change and therefore develop no power in the scientific sense. That is, mechanical power describes or is developed through various actions or processes in contrast to stasis. Fourth, because the projected outcomes of all ideas are realized through ideotectonic processes and the work done by ideotectonic apparatuses there is, however a direct relationship between ideotectonic processes and the development of mechanical power. Fifth, is to conclude that understanding the relationship between the phenomenon here named ideotectonics and power requires both the scientific and social aspects of power are included at every level. Likewise it is important to realize that the very illusive intangible nature of latent or potential power, prevents ‘power in the social sense’ from being quantified in scientific terms. Likewise no social theory of power contains formula suited to calculating the power of a star going supernova or the power developed by an internal combustion engine. Science can only measure the effects of ideas in social systems when they have a direct impact upon material objects by calculating their effect. Let us now examine these proposition in view of examples of how the latent and mechanical aspects of power relate to Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual- and Institutional-Ideas.

Beginning with the interaction between Intrinsic-Ideas and power, it can be said with relative confidence that the naturally or simultaneously emergent ideas that describe atomic structures, the making of stars, planets and so on influence the material

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195 The scientific or formulaic conception of power sheds new light on the historical inversion of ideology. There can be little doubt that Marx rejected the notion that the ‘authority’ or ‘power’ upon which human society was based either descended to humanity through one pure universal idea of truth, or emanated from the soul, via innate ideas. Marx railed against Hegel’s Idealist hierarchy, arguing that ‘power’ ascended from society’s material base. Ignoring for a moment his negative conception of ideology, the fact that ideas neither produce nor retain power of themselves means the central component of Marx’s argument was correct in a limited sense. Just like any other system, the power developed in human social systems, religions and politics is measured by the rate at which work is done and thus is developed by its working agents.
characteristics of those things. It is the very nature of an idea to do so. Like all other ideas, Intrinsic-Ideas have a kind of latent power, a potentiality built into energy and matter, but they do of themselves not amount to the formation of any thing. The actual physical formation of the things in the universe requires ideotectonic processes, which in turn develop power in the mechanical or scientific sense. There are no Machiavellian plots, no will or personal ambition, no political power plays to account for. The relationship between Intrinsic-Ideas and power is limited to the influence of the naturally emergent principles in accordance with which the universe was formed.

The mechanical power developed by the ideotectonic processes according to which the universe was formed can be appropriately and effectively described by scientific formulae alone. The reason for this is partly hidden in the wording. Latent power expresses an influence upon something, while mechanical power is developed during some kind of process that involves work being done and time passing. Therefore the kind of power that is developed is different from the kind of power that expresses an influence. Consequently it is quite correct to speak of the development of mechanical power separately from the kind of latent power that has influenced that production. Furthermore because in the natural universe power is developed in the absence of any other motivating factors, such as union agreements, or national interests, there is no motives, no threats of punitive action, no dangerous red button to press, just natural uncaring processes. For instance, the power developed during the formation of an atomic particle, star, galaxy or any other naturally occurring thing can be described by scientific formulae for the simple reason that all of the
intersecting forces, energy and material can be exclusively described by science.\textsuperscript{196}

According to Robert Resnick and David Halliday, the only known forces in the natural universe are gravity, the strong nuclear force, the weak nuclear force and the electromagnetic force.\textsuperscript{197} Life, on the other hand, doesn’t necessarily play by the same rules as non-living or inert objects. Living things express power differently to physical systems, mechanical devices and chemical reactions. In light of the theory developed in the previous chapter it is here argued that the advent of life gave rise to motivating factors not explained by physics or chemistry. In essence it is suggested that the advent of Inborn-and the most fundamental Instinctive-Ideas gave rise to the survival instinct which changed the way power is expressed in all biological, ecological and social systems.\textsuperscript{198} Subsequently, it is argued here that because ‘will’ acts as a ‘potentiality’, such that its very existence signals the existence of latent power. Therefore, the actions of all living things cannot be fully understood by calculating the power developed by those actions, but rather demands that we understand the motive behind the actions. Beavers, for instance don’t dam waterways for no reason, but to establish a habitat in which they and their offspring can thrive. Therefore, all biological, ecological and socially based systems are best

\textsuperscript{196} Ultimately understanding the working of the universe extends the scope of the this theory. However, exploring all such theories is not only beyond the scope of this thesis, but understanding those theories or even being aware of them is not required to understand the theory being developed here. Fortunately, basic science is all that is needed. Subsequently, mathematical equations and the like will be kept to a bare minimum.

\textsuperscript{197} Robert Resnick and David Halliday. \textit{Physics: Part I}. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966. 120.

\textsuperscript{198} It is important to note the connection between the survival instinct, evolutionary stable strategies and competition in respect to the expression of power. Importantly, even without brains, cognition or the intellectual capacity to think, the survival instinct does represent a motivator and therefore is able to affect living things, which influence each other and ultimately affect their environments. John Maynard Smith describes C. B. Harley as the original researcher of Learning and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in John Maynard Smith. \textit{Evolution and the Theory of Games}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 55. Also see C. B. Harley. “Learning an Evolutionary Stable Strategy”. In \textit{Theor. Biol.} 1981. 89, 611-33. And for further details regarding Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas see Chapter Five of this thesis.
described in view of both the social and scientific conception of power. What this means is that in contrast to science’s monopoly on calculating the power developed at large in the universe, beginning with the first life forms the will of the actors needs to be considered, not just the mechanics of those actors.

The survival instinct is here confirmed as a fundamental condition of life and it is further suggested that beyond the forces from which the universe was constructed the survival instinct is the most fundamental motivator to influence the actions of any life form. Further to which it is here argued that motivators like the survival instinct set up a kind of currency between the outcome projected by the motivator, the processes required to achieve that outcome and the fulfilment of that outcome. Interestingly, as in the scientific sense work done is measured in joules or units of energy consumed while doing work, undertaking the ideotectonic processes required to achieve the projected outcome is the cost of achieving the outcome. Or in other words, the ideological processes are themselves the currency by which that outcome is ‘purchased’. The exact nature of the currency depends upon the motivator or need and the difficulty of fulfilling that need.

The development of the survival instinct represents a critical juncture as it marked the emergence of a new class of ideas, and introduces ideologies as key sets of ideas and ideological processes as a new order of ideotectonic process. The inclusion of ‘ideologies’ as sets of ideas and as organizing actual processes associates ideologies with both the expression of will and thus latent power and the development of power by effecting change.\textsuperscript{199} The advent of the survival instinct as an influence over the

\textsuperscript{199} This point of argument is picked up later in this chapter where it is discussed more fully. Likewise
organism’s actions introduces the union of latent and mechanical power. Even though the first living organisms’ physical characteristics determined the degree to which they were able to influence their own behaviour, the behaviour of other organisms or their environment, the survival instinct provided the organisms’ actions with the motive to achieve the outcomes projected by their Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas. Subsequently, the survival instinct introduces the need to incorporate the ability to exert an influence and the potential to act in such a way as to achieve a projected outcome as a feature of this working definition of power. In keeping with this working definition of power, even the first single celled organisms expressed, and developed, power. According to Goerner, single celled organisms have the ability to exert a positive influence upon their chances of survival by altering their biorhythms, and therefore express power in the social sense (107). Likewise as single celled organism ingest nutrients they effect displacement and consequently do work. Like any other action their work takes a certain amount of time and therefore, in view of the formula $P = W/t$, develop power. Further, the power developed by single celled organisms can be measured in the scientific sense. As such both the social and scientific conceptions of power appropriately describe the ability or potential of a life form to influence, manipulate, or otherwise effect an outcome. It is with the introduction of the most fundamental survival instinct that the framework provided by the theory being developed here highlights the necessity to understand the interaction between ideotectonic processes and power in view of the social and scientific conceptions of power. The relevance of the interaction between power and those processes becomes ever more apparent when discussing more complex life.

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the discussion on energy, available energy and the role that energy plays in the relationship between ideology and power is also taken up in more detail below.

forms in view of their Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas, and the practices that they inform.

When questioning the legitimacy of Marx’s “first premise of all human history” (German Ideology 31) previously, a number of examples were used to highlight the ability of creatures like beavers, sea otters, dugongs, elephants and leaf cutter ants, to influence their environments and/or other life forms in order to produce their means of subsistence. While not pertinent to the above discussion, each of those examples also describe the species’ motives and practices in terms of both their power to influence outcomes and the power that they develop when doing the work required to achieve the outcomes projected by their Inborn-, Instinctive- and in some cases Intellectual-Ideas. In view of the interaction between power and ideas let us here revisit a few of those examples with the aim of further clarifying both the relationship between ideas and power and ideotectonic processes and power.

When beavers cut down trees, move them into place and pack mud and sticks around them in order to dam a waterway, they demonstrate their ability to plan out a schedule of works, and undertake the work that culminates in the construction of an environment and ultimately an ecosystem, that assists them to achieve the outcomes projected by their Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas. For instance, let us say that a beaver was considered to be a working agent had to move one ton of branches, tree trunks and so on, fifty metres to a breach in the dam wall. During the task the beaver metabolizes 2400 kilojoules of energy. By applying the formula, \( F = \frac{W}{d} \) the force

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201 See Chapter Two of this thesis.
required to complete the work is calculated as 2400 kilojoules divided by 50 Meters, which equals 48000 newtons. If, however the beaver was not alone such that he was one of ten beavers working to repair the dam wall. Each beaver would metabolize 240 kilojoules of energy equalling the total of 2400 kilojoules of energy, the force required to complete the work would still be 48000 newtons. However, even though the same amount of work was done by the one beaver as the ten beavers, because the ten beavers completed the work in one tenth of the time they developed ten times the power.\textsuperscript{203}

The beaver’s capacity to not only plan such construction but carry it out is underpinned by both their physiognomy and their instinct to dam waterways. Only with the successful marriage of physical form, instinct and intellectual capacity can beavers create a habitat for themselves, their families and the species upon which they feed. Like that of all well adapted creatures, the beaver’s success is a testimony to the interaction between the beaver’s Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas, the processes that they influence and power. Furthermore, their ability to influence their world and to shape it in such a way as to reflect their will demonstrates that they do have power in the social sense. Dam building also highlights the beaver’s ability to do the work required to achieve its desired outcome within a certain time frame,

\textsuperscript{203} Considering that “the rate at which work is done by a working agent is called the power developed by that agent... [And the] SI unit for power is one joule per second (1J·s\(^{-1}\)), which is called 1 watt” (\textit{University Physics} 134), the following calculations apply to our first example. Using the formula \(P = \frac{W}{t}\) let us calculate the power developed when the same task is completed by a single working agent as compared to the ten working agents. Let us say that the one beaver took exactly three hours and twenty minutes, which equates to 200 minutes or 12000 seconds to complete the work, while it took the ten beavers 20 minutes or 1200 seconds to complete the work. The lone worker consumed 2400 kilojoules of energy in 12000 seconds developing 200 watts of power (2400 kilojoules divided by 12000 seconds equals 200 watts). While ten beavers completing the same task, in one tenth of the time, developed 2000 watts of power (2400 kilojoules divided 1200 seconds equals 2000 watts). The advantage of a fast repair is that if unattended a breach can erode the wall and even destroy the dam. Therefore the power available to a large family of beaver provides them with a distinct advantage.
and therefore highlights its ability to develop power in the scientific sense.\textsuperscript{204} The beaver example clearly highlights the necessity of employing the social and scientific approaches to power when describing the interaction between power and beaver ideology.

Like beavers, bees influence the environments in which they live and have a dramatic influence upon the success of other species. But unlike beavers, bees make their keep through the service industry. Bees provide a pollination service to the many plant species that they visit in exchange for pollen and nectar that they later process into honey. Nevertheless, as informative as a bee’s impact upon its environment is, the social and working life of bees has a lot more to offer the discussion on power. In fact the working lives of both the queen bee and the many ordinary worker bees highlight the interaction between the social and scientific conception of power in biological and ecological contexts. In Attenborough’s book \textit{Life in the Undergrowth} he describes the working life of a worker bee in relation to her physiological development. Interestingly all female bees have the ability to become queens. When the young female worker bees feed the queen, the queen feeds them something referred to as “queen substance” (\textit{Life in the Undergrowth} 243). Queen substance contains a hormone that prevents the young worker bee’s ovaries from developing thus rendering them sterile.\textsuperscript{205} They serve the needs of the queen and the hive for the remainder of their lives (\textit{Life in the Undergrowth} 243). By sterilizing her daughters the queen is able to influence their behaviour and the


behaviour of the entire hive which certainly illustrates her ability to express power in the social sense.\textsuperscript{206}

In addition to the division of labour evident in the hive, the type of work undertaken by the queen and workers, and therefore the way in which they each contribute to the power of the hive, is very much dictated by changes in bee physiognomy.\textsuperscript{207} The changes in the queen’s form is evident in her size and shape, which may be described as appropriate to her egg producing role and her ability to produce queen substance. The relationship between the physiological changes that the worker bees undergo and the work that they do while less obvious is perhaps more interesting to this discussion. According to Attenborough, the first three days after emerging from her larval chamber the female worker bee works as a cleaner before graduating to the job of nurse maid. She feeds the larvae on ‘royal jelly’ which she excretes from glands in her mouth (\textit{Life in the Undergrowth} 242-243). After about a week these glands cease to function and she begins to feed her charges on the pollen and honey that has been stored in wax chambers (\textit{Life in the Undergrowth} 245). She then develops another set of glands that produce flakes of wax which she uses in her new role, building the storage chambers that hold the honey and egg chambers to house future siblings (\textit{Life in the Undergrowth} 245). Finally in one last change in job description she will fly from the hive offering her services as a pollinator to the many plants that offer a reward (\textit{Life in the Undergrowth} 245-246). The bee’s physiological changes projected by their Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas, hive culture and sterilization.

Granted that the worker’s sterilization may be for the good of the hive, but it clearly


shows the queen’s power over her subjects. The hive is a hive of interacting social and biological forces which dictate the type of work undertaken by each bee throughout the many stages of its life. Whether as egg producers, cleaners, nursemaids, builders, pollinators or gatherers, the work done by bees can certainly be measured in terms of displacement and time taken, and therefore the power developed by their work can be calculated in the scientific sense. Together their ability to influence one another and their wider ecosystem demonstrates the complex way in which ideology and power interact within the hive.208

Bees are not the only insects to influence their environments or impose their will on other life forms. Argentine ants, for example, tend and keep aphids in much the same way that humans farm dairy cows. Motivated by their dietary needs the argentine ants impose their will onto other species, which include aphids.209 They graze the aphids, milking them and even eating them. Leaf-cutting210 ants propagate fungus211 in underground nurseries before transplanting it to underground gardens where it is grown and harvested as their main food source.212 Attines are in agricultural terms ‘subsistence farmers’, but like many other nesting insects whose

nests contain so many individuals their activities are organized by division of labour, and a social structure. There are many examples of creatures other than bees and ants that exert an influence on their worlds.

When the relationship between power and ideotectonic processes is examined within the context of human social systems the relevance of the overlap between the social and scientific conceptions of power, and their appropriateness in respect to the sliding scale, is immediately evident. For instance, a preacher who wanted to have a house of worship built, and was able to influence or manipulate his parishioners in such a way that they agree to build a house of worship, may be said to have the power to achieve his desired outcome. Regardless of how that preacher was able to influence the parishioners, whether through promises of glorious rewards in the afterlife or some other means, the combined effect of their belief, desire for an everlasting reward or fear of damnation; building the house of worship may be describes in terms of either the Preacher’s personal power, or his religion’s power over the people. Therefore the social conception of power would appropriately describe the power expressed by the preacher. Nevertheless, the actual work undertaken by the builders (the parishioners etc) can be calculated with the aid of scientific formula. Furthermore, the less time taken to achieve the projected outcome, in this case, building a house of worship, the more power required or developed. Therefore, building a house of worship can be understood in terms of the

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power expressed by the religious institution, the preacher and belief, as well as being understood in terms of the rate at which the work was done resulting in the construction of that building. As in all social and ecological systems, the social and scientific conceptions of power describe different aspects of the power required to achieve the very same outcome.

What the scientific conception of power cannot fully describe is the more subtle expression of power in respect to will or some other motivating factor. In short, the ability or potential for one life form to influence its own actions, the actions of others or the shape of its environment cannot always be measured in scientific terms. The degree to which a living thing, a human being, an ideological agent, or an institution expresses its power via influence rather than by completing capital works is the degree to which (in the absence of scientific explanation), the social conception of power is able to describe or comment upon that power. Therefore, while individuals and institutions manifest outcomes in the real world which can be measured by the scientific formula, the potential to exert such influences is best, and has been predominantly, described by the work of social theorists. The survival instinct that accompanied the very first living organisms may have been a catalyst for the evolution of ever more complex survival strategies and physical and intellectual abilities. Subsequently, it can be argued that the emergence of the survival instinct makes it necessary to introduce the social conception of power when discussing power in respect to biological and ecological systems. Subsequently, while the first living things had a very limited capacity to express their will, the advent of life and the survival instinct introduces power as the ability to influence an outcome according to a living thing’s will. At the other end of the sliding scale we find
advanced and manipulative human beings who have economic and political interests, not to speak of institutions that truly have power in the social sense. Nevertheless, humans and institutions still develop power at the rate at which work is done. However, the rate at which that work is done is dictated by those that have the ability to influence the world around them in such a way as to achieve outcomes projected by their ideas. Subsequently, while humans and human institutions develop power in the scientific sense, that power is an expression of the processes described by their ideologies and the work done by the ideological apparatuses that they employ.

Together the social and scientific approaches to power have been shown to provide valuable insights into the interaction between ideas and power, and between ideotectonic processes and power, especially when extended to comment upon the biological, ecological and social systems that support all life forms. In order to proceed from this point it is now necessary to analyse the means by which a system of ideas is able to influence the ideotectonic apparatus that serves it. Moreover, the correlation between an ideology’s ability to access or amass energy, recruit suitable working agent(s) and develop power in the scientific sense is yet to be addressed. Understanding the role that ‘energy management’ and the management and maintenance of working agents plays in intellectual and institution based ideological systems promises to refine the description of how ideology interacts with, and expresses, power at every level.

Just as potential energy was critical to calculating the power developed by the falling rock in the above example, harnessing, metabolizing and storing energy enables biological organisms of all kinds to achieve the outcomes projected by their Inborn-,
Instinctive-, and often Intellectual-Ideas. Storing energy is an age-old business. Before humans were able to harness the energy of fossil fuels and radioactive materials, all manner of living things harnessed the energy contained within their environments to power their lives and assist them to achieve their biological imperatives. All biological organisms harness or metabolize energy from some natural source. Some plants and animals have developed methods of amassing and using energy to enhance their chances of survival. Beyond the example of a plant’s harnessing energy from the sun’s rays, many species of plants and animals (squirrels, acorn woodpeckers, camels, cactuses, boab trees etc ²¹⁵) horde nutrients and/or water in preparation for a potential shortage. Subsequently, the relationship between the body as a working agent and its energy supply is relevant to this discussion.

Skipping over the obvious relationship between the development of power and the expenditure of energy explained by physics, and turning immediately to a biological example, the relationship between energy and the success of Inborn-, and Instinctive-Ideas is quickly established. Evolution has produced some creatures that have turned energy management into a fine art. For instance, virtually all mammals that hibernate, whether female polar bears or the much smaller marmot, store energy in their own bodies as fat deposits. In the book that accompanied David Attenborough’s television wildlife documentary series, The Life of Mammals, Attenborough furnishes some details worth noting as much for their ability to highlight the combination in Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas, as for their ability to illustrate the relationship between successfully realizing the projected outcome of an idea, the expenditure of energy and thus the development of power. Illustrating the

way that the marmot’s extraordinary survival strategy combines its physical ability to store sufficient amounts of energy and the behavioural or dietary habits that support such weight gain, Attenborough writes, “by the end of the summer adults in the marmot family will have accumulated substantial reserves of fat and may be almost 50 per cent heavier than they were at the beginning of the season” (67). Further commenting on the marmot’s practices during deep hibernation Attenborough says, “their breathing slows to two or three breaths a minute. Their body temperature drops from 36°C to a mere five” (67). What is significant about the marmot’s lifestyle is that when the Inborn-Ideas encoded on its DNA and its Instinctive-Ideas, come together to inform the processes by which the marmot lives its life, the marmot’s ability to achieve its primary objective, to both survive and reproduce is mediated by its ability to manage its energy needs. Marmot ideas are empowered by its ability to not only do work at a rate which sustains its immediate life processes, but to manage its lifestyle in relation to its energy needs. If the marmot was not able to store sufficient energy in its body fat to empower its biological ‘life support system’ through the long winter months it would indeed die. Successfully achieving the projected outcome of its Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas depends on its ability to effectively manage its energy supply in view of its physiological demand. As such, this example clearly demonstrates that the success of marmot ideotectonics depends on the storing and efficient expenditure of energy.

There are of course other more complex energy management systems. A bee amasses energy by gathering and processing pollen before storing it in a cleverly

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designed wax chamber. Thus the energy that it lays up is stored remotely. However if one thinks of the bee hive as a single organism, the valuable energy is stored within that organism, and therefore storing honey is analogous to the method by which the marmot stores energy in its body fat. Likewise, human social systems and bee hives have a great deal in common. The means by which human social systems store and employ energy may be more diverse but the parallels are obvious. Unlike the marmot, human beings never evolved the ability to store sufficiently large amounts of energy within their body fat. Subsequently, humans have developed other ways of providing their energy needs. Much like bees, humans both harness and amass energy, but the complexity of human social systems complicates the whole business. Tokens, money or some other currency that offer the ability to access various forms of ‘energy’ can be both earned and traded in. Nevertheless, like any other system, the greater the ability to access and deploy energy the greater the potential of both the individual and the entire social system to express and develop power. The ability to harness and release energy stored in nature increases a social system’s ability to do a lot of work in a very short time, and thus enables it to express its will by developing large amounts of power.

If we consider ‘mechanical power’ to be a quantifiable quality that allows an ideological agent, whether an individual, group or institution, to effect the displacement or changes required to achieve their idea’s projected outcome, the magnitude of that power must also be important. Furthermore, the efficiency by which a working agent translates energy into work done is critical if power is to be

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maximized. In simple terms, because the magnitude of power is proportional to the ideological agent’s ability to exert an influence and the rate at which outcomes are achieved, and effecting an outcome consumes energy; the greater the supply of readily available energy and the greater the potential work force, the greater is the ideological agent’s ability to develop and express power. Therefore, it can be said with relative certainty that the difference between a potent ideology and an impotent ideology can be stated in the following way: a potent ideology outlines the processes by which energy can be efficiently accessed and deployed for use by a suitable ideological apparatus, where in contrast, an impotent ideology either fails to outline an effective means of accessing energy, is unable to enlist the assistance of a suitable ideological apparatus, or both. Further to which the ability to maintain ideological apparatuses is essential if an ideological agent is able to effectively achieve its objectives.

Comprehending the significance that tapping into a large reservoir or store of energy has upon the potency of an ideology is perhaps the key to understanding the relationship between the social and scientific conceptions of power. Why? Because whether power is described as the ability to influence an outcome or is measured at the rate at which work is done, the expenditure of energy fuels ideological apparatuses and the work that they do regardless of how subtle is that which achieves the projected outcome of every idea. If there is no energy to be spent, no influence can be expressed nor can any work be done. Furthermore, because power is developed or measured at the rate at which work is done, and work

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218 The scientific explanations regarding the relationship between work and energy (internal and external potential energy included), is somewhat tangential to this discussion and therefore will be kept to a minimum.
requires the expenditure of energy, ‘energy’ is important to power. Therefore, the simple fact that energy can be easily accessed, amassed, or stored so that it can be made available to a working agent at short notice which allows it to do a lot of work in a short period of time, increases the ideology’s ability to influence or effect outcomes. Thus the management of energy is very important to the interaction between ideology and power. Strategically, the ability to access and deploy large amounts of energy is tantamount to having large amounts of power. Therefore, as the practice of amassing and deploying energy in order to effect some change is governed by ideology, the management of energy not only facilitates the realization of ideas it affects the magnitude of the ideology’s power. The significance of the relationship between available energy, a suitable working agency and the magnitude of power is pertinent in every ideological context.

Highlighting the relationship between ‘available energy’, power and ideology let us reinvent the example of the beaver moving logs. Let us instead think of men as working agent(s) displacing concrete blocks. As noted above, the work done was calculated in respect to the amount of energy (measured in kilojoules) expended while achieving the desired displacement of material. Those men would need to access energy in order to fuel their work by either metabolizing energy contained in the food or drink that they consumed before or during the time that they carried out their work, or, they would need to draw on energy previously stored in their body tissue. If sufficient energy was not available to the working agent(s) to enable them to do their work, so that they were unable to displace any of the concrete blocks, the displacement of those concrete blocks would equal zero. Subsequently, the work done would thus also equal zero and the power developed by their lack of work
would equal zero. Interestingly, if the parishioners failed to do any work the priest’s power would also be seen to equal zero. If, on the other hand, there was sufficient energy to fuel the activity of the working agent(s), but that energy could only be accessed at the rate of 240 kilojoules every 20 minutes (1200 seconds), the energy supply would sustain only one worker at a time and the maximum of 200 watts of power would have been developed when displacing the concrete blocks. However, if the energy was made available at the rate of 2400 kilojoules every 20 minutes (1200 seconds), allowing all ten men to be employed, 2000 watts of power could have been developed. Therefore, given that a suitable working agency has been recruited, both the amount of available energy and the rate at which it can be made available to a working agent determine the rate at which work can be done. Consequently, this determines the amount of ‘mechanical power’ that can be developed by an ideological apparatus.

In respect to the sum of ideas in the entire universe the rate at which work can be done is not the only way that energy impacts upon ideas and all ideotectonic processes. ‘Available energy’, in contrast to ‘unavailable energy’, places a natural limitation upon both the number of realizable ideas and the number of possible projected outcomes. According to Resnick and Halliday, the first law of thermodynamics maintains that energy can neither be created nor destroyed (Physics: Part 1 170). The second law, which addresses entropy, says that while energy may be conserved, as entropy or disorder increases energy becomes ever more unavailable (University Physics 382). In effect the generative nature of ideas fuels an ever increasing number of possible outcomes, multiplying the number of ways

that energy and matter can be configured and thus increases disorder and thus entropy. Therefore, if the second law of thermodynamics holds true, there must come a time when the number of ideas and the number of possible projected outcomes has increased to such a degree as to render energy unavailable to do work.\textsuperscript{220} If work cannot be done, ideas cannot be realized, preventing new possibilities from arising. What does this mean? Ultimately, while the vast number of ideas spread throughout every corner of the universe will continue to exist, their inability to do work will render them impotent. Therefore, at least theoretically, the second law of thermodynamics can be applied directly to the materiality of ideas and can predict their ultimate limitation.\textsuperscript{221} This limitation further underlines the axiom: ideotectonics and power are inextricably linked.

Together the function of ideas and their functionaries is to outline and undertake the processes by which the ideas, plans, blueprints or recipes that they serve are to be fulfilled. As expressions of a single phenomenon, all ideologies describe the step by step processes required to effectively realize the projected outcome of whatever idea they serve. Nevertheless, considering that no idea can be realized without effecting some kind of displacement, or without doing some kind of work, ideology may be thought to not only describe a schedule of works but direct the work done by or through an ideological apparatus. Formula like \( P = \frac{W}{t} \) describe the basic mechanics by which power is developed through work done at every ideotectonic

\textsuperscript{220} There is still some debate as to whether the universe will reach total entropy or will be drawn back in on itself resulting in the ‘big crunch’. If the ‘big crunch’ scenario is correct the gravitational force by which the entire mass of the universe is drawn into a single point would indeed result in displacement, thus work being done over a period of time developing a massive amount of power. What role of ideas in this scenario can be described in the same terms as the ideas that influence or describe the existence and relationships between all forms of matter and energy.

\textsuperscript{221} Nevertheless, as energy is still readily available to the myriad of ideological apparatuses that continue to do work as a means of achieving the projected outcomes of their founding ideas, further discussion of entropy would not only be indulgent, but would not further clarify the present relationship between ideas, energy and power and therefore will be discussed no longer.
level. It is important to note that scientific formulae describe the various relationships between energy and matter, and between energy, work done, displacement, time and power in every situation. However, the mechanics of developing power is incapable of commenting on every aspect of social power. For instance the reason men work in factories is not that they serve the idea of saucepans, toasters and flash cars, but that they have obligations that demand cash payment, their survival and the survival of their families depend upon it. Therefore, if nothing else their socio-economic circumstances influences their decision to get out of bed and go to work in that factory. The labour market is further complicated when working agents can think for themselves. These complications are exaggerated when working agents are manipulated by other desires and by other social institutions. It is therefore suggested that while scientific formulae accurately describe the means by which social systems develop mechanical power, where a working agent has the ability to decide whether or not to dedicate their services to the pursuit of any given idea and that that decision can be influenced by other individuals or institutions, the process of attracting and maintaining a working agency introduces an entirely new dimension to the interaction between ideology and power.

The emergence of institutions presents us with a critical juncture. In the case of Institutional-Ideas it matters not whether the institution employs a single working agent, or a working agency with a large constituency, the institution functions as an ideological apparatus. Nevertheless, like any other ideological mechanism the

222 Althusser made the statement that “ideology always exists in an apparatus” (I&ISAs 166), which is at least partly true. All successful ideologies achieved their purpose through the work done by an ideological apparatus. However, not all ideology is acted upon. Therefore, ideology devoid of an apparatus can exist as an end within itself. Althusser’s treatment of ideological apparatuses was limited to the context of State ideology alone, therefore his description of an ideological apparatus is theoretically akin to an institution as he makes no reference to any other form of ideology.
capacity of institutions to exert or develop power is affected by their ability to both access available energy and recruit or attract a suitably large working agency. Let us here examine the means by which an institution such as an organized religion or political party expresses power.⁴²³ In keeping with the social conception of power employed above, institutions express power by influencing their working agents to do work. Likewise institutions develop power in the mechanical sense if they manage to cause some kind of displacement or change in the real world. Interestingly an institution can realize change by simply exerting an influence in the social sense, without employing a single working agent of their own, i.e. lobbying a government to change a law. Nevertheless where an institution does directly effect change, the greater the institution’s ability to do a lot of work in a short period of time the more power it develops in the scientific sense and the more power it expresses in the social sense. The ability to do a lot of work in a short period of time depends upon the rate at which energy can be made available to the working agents, the ability to recruit and maintain a suitably large working agency, access to the required material resources and minimal resistance.

Employing an organized religion that has a very large number of devout members who live their lives according to the tenets of their faith as an example; the religion in question, like all religions that teach its faithful to observe certain practices in the absence of other practices, underlines its teaching with the promise of ‘salvation’ for

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⁴²³ While this discussion is focussed on developing a working definition of the interaction between power and ideology delving into the appropriateness, or usefulness of Marx, Weber, Foucault or any other theorist’s contribution to the theory of power is left to one side of this discussion.
the faithful and damnation for the wicked. Religious ideas have a projected outcome, and religious belief systems describe the processes and the schedule of works required to achieve that projected outcome. Therefore, religious belief systems are consistent with what the theory developed here describes as an ideology. Furthermore, like any other ideological apparatus, where a religious institution organizes its members or working agents to do work on its behalf, given time, it will develop power in the scientific sense. The magnitude of the institution’s power depends upon how quickly it is able to influence or affect its desired outcome. In keeping with the scientific formula, before an institution can develop power it must have access to an energy source and be able to attract a suitable working agency, achieve change or displacement, and have the time to implement its schedule of works.

In the case of Institutional-Ideas, the institution that facilitates the work by which its projected outcome is achieved has the same function as all other ideotectonic apparatuses. Yet the internal division between the institution and the working agency sets them apart from all other self-contained functionaries. Furthermore, in addition to the ideology’s role as the director of works, the ideology is central to the institution undertaking that work. The ensuing process not only aims to achieve or realize the idea’s projected outcome but it empowers the ideology itself. In human social systems the role of ideology is enhanced by the institution which not only recruits and organizes the available working agency, but manages the development of power in the scientific sense. Therefore, while an idea may not develop power in the scientific sense, its associated ideology has the ability to influence the processes undertaken by an ideological apparatus and therefore illustrates the ideas influence
and power in the social sense. The ideology is also, at least partly, empowered by the work undertaken by the ideological apparatus that serves it. Nevertheless, this does not explain the means by which an institution recruits and maintains an effective working agency. The simple answer is that institutions provide sufficient remunerations, repressive measures or physical restraints to ensure servitude, or in other words they have power in the social sense and that power enables them to exert an influence of those in need of what they offer in return for their service. However, enlisting the services of an ideological agent of their own free will is more complex than simply paying them, threatening them or imprisoning them. For instance, unlike any commercial venture religions do not remunerate the faithful in dollars and cents but they do trade in a kind of currency. Christianity, for instance, teaches that Christians amass treasures in heaven as reward for their good works.  

Therefore, a Christian’s way of life is the currency by which the projected outcome is achieved and by which the reward is acquired. But, unlike biological apparatuses, where cells or bodies work for their existence on a purely physical level, the introduction of will, belief and other such motivating factors locates currency in ideas and ideology also. Believing in the resurrection of Jesus and having faith in the grace of God are also said to be necessary to a Christian receiving salvation. Furthermore, the very


225 I am aware that Christians would disagree with the concept of purchasing salvation as Scripture clearly states that salvation cannot be bought, but is rather a free gift from God. Even so, there is certainly a relationship between what it is to be a Christian and the promise of salvation. My argument simply makes that connection.

226 It matters not whether this promise of salvation can ever be realized, the perception of its potential realization is all that is required for the idea to have currency, because the idea of salvation, and an afterlife are real, even if only in the believer’s brain.

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idea of receiving salvation is a matter of faith on two fronts: firstly, the Christian is required to have faith in order to be saved; and secondly, as the receipt of the promised salvation cannot be established by empirical means, the perceived reality of the reward itself is mediated by faith. Nevertheless, there is an ‘economic exchange’ between the institution and the parishioner, and between the parishioner’s ‘works’ and the reward believed to be offered by God. It is here suggested that all ideological systems function in relation to some kind of exchange mediated by some form of currency.

In keeping with Althusser’s theory of ideology, it is my contention that where an institution is in the business of achieving a series of processes described by an ideology or schedule of works, rather than simply controlling a population, institutions attract and maintain a working agency in such a way as to interpellate them as ideological subjects. The working agent undertakes work on behalf of the ideology in exchange for some kind of remuneration. In short Institutional-Ideology trades in a kind of currency. In keeping with the example of organized religion, this ‘currency’ need not be exclusively monetary. Providing that a working agent is willing and able to carry out the work required, and thus potentially realize the idea’s projected outcome in exchange for whatever return is offered, a suitable contract can be arrived at. Subsequently, the institution’s dealings are analogous to the labour market. Due to the fact that Institutional-Ideas are unable to achieve their projected

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outcomes without the assistance of a ‘remote’ working agent (who is inherently selfish) the ideology and/or institution must offer the working agent something in exchange for their services.

There is no denying that social systems that rely upon an economy generated by mercantile practices are in actuality empowered by both their ideology and the work done by their working agents. In keeping with the scientific formula, regardless of how working agents are compensated for their servitude, all ideological systems develop their power at the rate at which their working agents do work. However, the institution also has power in respect to its ability to exert an influence, either socially or economically. In most cases the working agent is compensated for his or her work, even if that compensation is never realized in material or economic terms. This is further complicated by the fact that the working agents are attracted to give their services for different reasons and for different returns. Different appetites are fulfilled by different means. Therefore, the capacity of the entire working agency cannot be hired in exchange for a single form of reward. In effect institutions offer rewards which fulfil the working agent’s various needs. Nevertheless, regardless of the form of remuneration offered, all institutions are empowered through the work done by their working agent(s). For example, religion, the conservation movement, and social reform movements such as feminism seek different rewards earned through different kinds of service. Therefore each trades in a different currency to, say, capitalism, even though they all develop power through the same mechanism. For example, through the efforts of working agents, the conservation movement has had a real effect upon the way modern Western societies manage their pollutants, waste materials, consume fossil fuels and so on. Changes in legislation that reflect
conservationist ideology are not only the result of dedicated working agents doing work over a period of time; once the tenets of the conservation movement are adopted by a formal State institution and are subsequently canonized in law, those laws direct a greater constituency of working agents to undertake conservation work. Subsequently, institutions increase their power on two fronts. First by their ability to influence action, and by increasing their working constituency (because a greater constituency of working agents can do work at a much faster rate, the institution becomes more powerful). In effect, the conservation movement’s power reflects the conservationist’s ability to influence governments, peoples and individuals to do the work required to achieve the projected outcome envisaged by their central ideas. Furthermore, the success of previous generations of conservationists and lobbyists working to effect changes in legislation have enabled the conservationist movement to increase its constituency of working agents and thus increase the conservation movement’s ability to express power in the social sense. Subsequently, the ideological power developed by the conservation movement as an ideological apparatus has increased in direct proportion to its influence and in turn, the rate at which its working agency is able to do work. The conservationist movement is a good example of how an idea has been co-opted by an institution and used to put people to work on behalf of an ideotectonic project.

Adding a Machiavellian twist, it can be argued that power can only be maximized when the entire population of working agents within the sphere of an ideology’s influence subscribe to and thus serve that ideology. The combination of a dedicated population of working agents, focussing their attention on their work and developing power, and the single mindedness of a dominant or ‘totalitarian State’ or ideological
The apparatus is able to amass surplus energy, and thus have the potential to direct its power outwardly. Such unity of purpose is rarely manifest in the real world as it effectively reduces the impact of any one ideological apparatus. Nevertheless, beyond the political machinations, intrigue and plotting to suppress dissent and crushing separatism, the very same principle applies to more practical mundane matters of progress. For instance, if conservationists picked up litter, and the anti-conservationists littered at the same rate at which the litter was picked up the status quo would remain. However, if all ideological agents worked to achieve the same projected outcome the accumulative effect of their work would be a clean or cleaner environment.

In the real world, ideological apparatuses, even totalitarian dictatorships, must deal with the day-to-day running of hospitals, schools, transport, policing and so on as no regime has the luxury of a single focus. Therefore, even when in possession of the most cohesive constituency of working agents, the State contains a large number of competing ideological apparatuses. Subsequently, the power developed by its working constituency is divided between various domestic duties, production of their means of subsistence and the amassing of surplus power. In effect, the natural diversity required to sustain healthy human social systems reduces the amount of surplus power that can be directed outwardly. Complicating this equation, while ideologies and institutions that deal in different currencies can cooperate, they may...

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228 I intend all references to the State in a general sense, feudal, ancient, monarchist, modern, nation etc, rather than as a reference to the nation state. Nevertheless, for a good historical overview of the emergence of the nation state see Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities (revised ed.)*. London: Verso, 2006. Anderson says, “I will be trying to argue that the creation of these artifacts toward the end of the eighteenth century was the spontaneous distillation of a complex ‘crossing’ of discrete historical forces; but that, once created, they became ‘modular,’ capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness… to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations” (4). Also see Geoffrey Hosking, and George Schöpflin eds. *Myth and Nationhood* London: Hurst and Company, 1997. and George L. Mosse. *Confronting the Nation: Jewish and Western Nationalism*. Hanover: Brandeis University press, 1993.
not necessarily be able to develop surplus power. However, where the different needs of the various ideological agents can be met by more complex ideological systems, the existing currencies may be unified as complementary elements of a single currency. In effect unifying currencies brings together the services of previously remote working agencies which increases the collective ideological apparatuses’ ability to develop surplus power. Consequently, where the multiple currencies are not only complementary but co-dependent or interrelated, what is invested in one currency can be mobilized to empower another. Arguably, where the combined value of each currency can be translated into a single currency the entire working agency could be mobilized in relation to a single cause. The modern State is a very good example of the complementary relationship between power and a relatively unified currency traded in by a large population. The battle between repression and freedom is an aspect of ‘ideological warfare’, which is taken up in the following chapter.

When a dominant apparatus such as the State is able to employ the services of the vast majority of its constituency of working agents, the ideological power that it develops can set a world at war, damn mighty rivers and put men on the moon. But can the State ever have complete control over the ideological agents living within its territories? Althusser argued that all citizens are interpellated as subjects even before they are born (I&ISA 176). While never claiming that the State had complete control over its citizens, Althusser suggested that the State was able to influence the lives of its citizens through both Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses (I&ISA 149). Furthermore, Althusser claimed that all Ideological State Apparatuses were unified beneath ruling class ideology, which worked to keep the working class in subjection.
to the ruling class, enabling it to develop and hold State power. In contrast to Althusser’s view, the complex nature and function of ideas and ideologies highlighted by the theory developed here questions the State’s ability to express such power over its people. Certainly, as noted above theorists like Foucault argued that the State was not the only vestige of power. And while not formally presented as a theory of power, the working definition of power developed here rejects the notion that power equates directly with authority. Power is here described within the context of ideas influencing ideotectonic processes which in turn effect the changes required to achieve the outcome projected by the idea that it serves. Therefore, whether considered as the ability or potential to exert an influence, or developed at the rate at which work is done, power is always expressed within the ideotectonic context provided by the nesting of Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual- and Institutional-Ideas, and their functionaries. Highlighting the interaction between ideas and power and between ideotectonic processes and power in all active natural, biological, ecological and social systems compliments Foucault’s conception of power as diffuse, while problematizing Weber’s theory and those put forward by Marxists like Althusser. Subsequently, this understanding of power questions the status of what Althusser described as “Ideological State Apparatuses”, and further questions whether human social systems could include a range of private or non-state ideological apparatuses. The following chapter takes up the challenge of answering these questions.
Chapter Seven

Competitive Ideological Apparatuses and Ideological Warfare

In view of the entire course of human history, formal ideological apparatuses or institutions and the power that they express and/or develop are a relatively recent invention. However, in the time that they have existed institutions have come to dominate the human landscape. The simple fact that recorded human history is by and large a collection of stories written on behalf of, or in relation to, a dominant ideological apparatus and its champions does nothing to encourage theorists to explore the ideological apparatuses of those written out of human history. Furthermore, the important role that the State and its Ideological State Apparatuses have in modern society has led some theorists to describe ideological apparatuses as uniquely State constructs.\textsuperscript{229} Naturally, the obvious role that ideology plays in politics does nothing to dispel this belief. Rather politics highlights the nature of ideological warfare waged between competing ideologies and the ideological apparatuses that support them. Even so, the history of humanity written in our DNA, old bones, cold fire places and ancient artefacts tells a different story. Beyond the nature and function of ideas, ideotectonic processes, ideologies, ideological apparatuses and their interaction with power, energy, matter and time, the history of humanity and the development of human culture betray the fact that Institutional-Ideas are rooted in more fundamental ideas.

Having dismissed the arbitrary beginning of all human history and consequently the arbitrary beginning of ‘all ideology’ as dependent upon human mercantile practice\textsuperscript{230} and found any such claim to be an unjustified imposition upon history, this chapter addresses the world of ideological apparatuses, and their use of ideological warfare in view of the natural history of the phenomenon that has included ideas, ideotectonic processes and ideologies from the beginning of time.\textsuperscript{231} So, when and why did ideological warfare first begin? Ideological warfare is certainly everywhere to be seen in the modern world: in fact conflicts like the Cold War and the War on Terror spring to mind when hearing the term for the first time. Nevertheless, despite its modern proliferation and the fact that the theory presented here has demonstrated that all ideas, ideotectonic processes including ideologies are manifestations of a single phenomenon, there is no reason to believe that ideological warfare has been waged since the beginning of time. Certainly, throughout time there may have been some competition for matter between the gravitational forces of neighbouring stars and so on, but as the universe is governed by a single set of Intrinsic-Ideas, described by the laws of physics (in the absence of will or any other motivating factors including social forces), there is no real ‘ideotectonic difference’ to be exploited. It can, subsequently, be argued that where there is no ideology there is no ideological warfare. If this is indeed the case there can be no ideological warfare at the level of Intrinsic-Ideas. On the other hand, the relative harmony between Intrinsic-Ideas does not suggest that ideological warfare is limited to the world of Institutions. The effects of ideological warfare are everywhere to be seen in the natural world. In fact it is here argued that ideological warfare made its debut in earnest with the

\textsuperscript{230} See the discussion on pre industrial societies in Christine Hambling and Pauline Matthews. \textit{Human Societies} (2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.). London: Macmillan, 1983. (3-29).

\textsuperscript{231} See the argument developed in Part One Chapters One and Two, regarding Marx’s first premise of all human history. Also see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. \textit{The German Ideology}. Trans. S. Ryazanskaya. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1965. 31.
emergence of the survival instinct. The very biological properties that made possible
the evolution of ever more complex life forms also gave rise to competition between
species. Further, it is here argued that the development of many Inborn- and
Instinctive-Ideas, which projected greater intellectual capacity and the subsequent
ideas produced by intelligent beings, are the direct result of ideological warfare.232
Larger brain sizes and increased intellectual capacity did nothing to put an end to this
struggle. It is here argued that the ultimate development of human Intellectual- and
Institutional-Ideas complimented, extended, formalized and institutionalized
ideological warfare.

Despite the fact that the theory being developed here is at least partly predicated
upon the rejection of the arbitrary beginning of human history, and thus the rejection
of the limited anthropocentric history of ideology, the history of institutions
incorporates Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive and Intellectual-Ideas and is primarily
limited to the human experience. Unfortunately, neither I nor science have sufficient
understanding of the social systems of other species to comment on whether they
have religion or other such belief systems and therefore this discussion is limited to
human social systems by necessity. Nevertheless, understanding the nature of
institutions in relation to both the nesting of Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-
and Institutional-Ideas, unique to humans, and their modern context is critical if such
an examination is to extend and demonstrate the relevance of this theory. It is within

232 Ideological warfare drives the evolutionary process, as the creatures who are themselves the
successful projected outcomes of Inborn-Ideas compete for survival. Consequently, their Inborn-Ideas
change or mutate in progressive generations projecting physiological changes and thus the evolution
of new species over time. Where an advantage, those new species survive and perpetuate the ideas
that enhance his or her chances of survival. Yet creatures may compete at the level of individuals and
groups, even though their ability to compete is determined by the ideas from which they were
constructed in respect to their environment and other ecological factors. As such, the struggle for
dominance is ideological warfare to the core.
this context that some of the limitations placed upon both institutions and ideology by Althusser’s theory of *Ideological State Apparatuses* and his *Theory of Ideology in General* are further examined.

Althusser’s theory of interpellation not only describes the process by which individuals are made citizens of the State, it also unveils a kind of theoretical paradox. Despite arguing against the pre-Lockean concept of ‘innate ideas’, his proposition that “an individual is always-already a subject, even before he is born” (I&ISAs 176) appears to argue that the pre-incarnate status of an individual as a subject, in subjection to State ideology, is innate. Althusser does not support the notion of innate ideas, but rather appropriates the aspirations and intentions of the father and mother to raise their child as a ‘good citizen’, which extends the subjection of the parents and other family members to the unborn child. Therefore, while Althusser does not support the existence of innate ideas as emanating from God or the soul, he does argue that the pervasive nature of State ideology (all ideology) affects the State’s subjects (I&ISAs 170-1). This means that in view of Althusser’s formulation, where ideology always exists in an apparatus and all ideological apparatuses are unified beneath the ruling class as Ideological State Apparatuses, in the event of a revolution that puts an end to the State, the ruling class, all ideology and thus all Institutional-Ideas would cease to exist. Even at first glance there appears to be at least one glaring exception to this rule. As noted above, Althusser not only describes the family as an institution but he lists the family as an Ideological State Apparatus (I&ISAs 143-4). Therefore, according to Althusser’s formulation putting an end to the State would also put an end to the family as an institution.
Testing the validity of Althusser’s depiction of institutions as solely State structures by using the ‘family’ as a kind of case study prompts the question: is the family an institution and, if so, is it governed by Institutional-Ideas that would be automatically extinguished if the State came to an end? This question could be either answered in the affirmative or negative depending upon how the ‘family’ is defined. The ‘family’ could indeed cease to exist along with the State, if the State’s definition of what constitutes a family did not comply with humanity’s biological needs. For instance, if the ‘nuclear family’ was considered by the State to be the only model of a family, any other ‘arrangement of people’ would not be considered a family, and as a consequence the ‘family institution’ could be done away with or replaced by another model without adversely affecting the human race. On the other hand, where the word ‘family’ refers to a biological apparatus that is a projection of our very humanity, of our Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas, the family could not be eliminated without threatening the human race with extinction. One effect of the human organism’s long gestation and extended infantile condition is that when a child is born both the mother and child require a great deal of assistance from other human beings. New born babies cannot simply be set free to fend for themselves with any expectation of survival. Whether governed by kin altruism or reciprocal altruism, the family’s function is derived from our species’ biological structure, encoded upon our DNA (Inborn-Ideas) and further mediated by the human instinct (Instinctive-Ideas) to preserve our species. Or, in other words, the biologically necessary family unit, along with the human body itself forms an integral part of the ideotectonic apparatus

233 For a general discussion on the universality of the family, the family as a primary group, the making of the modern family and the nuclear family, see James B. McKee. Sociology: the Study of Society. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981. (289-310).

that assists both individuals and the human race to fulfil its biological imperative. Subsequently, the human race has depended upon the ‘biologically necessary family unit’ as a means of its intergenerational survival from its genesis. The biologically necessary family protects young mothers and nurses its infants in an effort to secure the survival of the next generation and the ultimate survival of the species. Therefore, the ideas upon which the ‘biologically necessary’ human family is predicated cannot be discarded en mass without threatening the species. Subsequently, a distinction must be made between the ‘necessary human family’ or biological apparatus that assists the human race to both survive and reproduce, and the culturally constructed family as an institution.\textsuperscript{235} The distinction between the family as a biological apparatus and the Institutional-Ideas that define the family according to social convention is evident by the self organizing manner of the one and the imposed organization of the other. When the ‘family’ is idealized or defined in accordance with ideas other than those that promote the biological success of the human race, the family unit is manifest as an institution. Furthermore, it must be noted that the Institutional-Ideas that define the nuclear family model as ‘a family’ defines the family more narrowly than that which is dictated by nature. In essence, the ideas upon which the family as a biological apparatus is predicated are purely functional. The day-to-day function of the family as an ideological apparatus may be augmented by learned processes that incorporate Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas. But adapting the family’s basic function to individual needs does not automatically make it an institution. Therefore, as the family as a biological apparatus is necessary to the primary function of our species, it cannot be discarded without eliminating the human race, nor can it be described as an institution in the same sense as other

‘socially constructed’ institutions. However, where the modern ‘family’ is defined by culturally constructed Institutional-Ideas, the culturally constructed family unit can correctly be referred to as an institution. This ‘formula’ does not only apply to family units. It equally applies to any group of people that fulfil their needs by coming together under an informal understanding or self managed ‘social contract’, in contrast to people whose relationship is managed by, or in respect to, a third party or formal social contract. The difference being that the self managed relationship does not employ any ideological machinery other than that which the parties posses naturally, whereas a relationship that is formally mediated by an external ‘authority’, their relationships, by implication, are nested within the context of other ideological apparatuses or institutions.236

Whether the family is an institution or biological apparatus has little relevance if the human race and the State emerged simultaneously. That is, if the State was either an expression of a biological or ecological apparatus necessary to the survival of the human race from its beginning, and thus had existed from the dawn of the human race, describing the family as a biological apparatus or as an institution would have no real significance. Subsequently, the timing of the emergence of the human race and the development of the State is important to this argument. If the human race evolved prior to the advent of the State, humanity may have employed the services of other ecologically or socially constructed ideological apparatuses before there ever was a State. This possibility is quite important because if humanity employed

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Institutional-Ideas during the period between its evolutionary emergence and the advent of the State, the accompanying Pre-State Ideological Apparatuses would need to be both acknowledged and explained.

The previous two chapters have focussed on extending this theory’s field of study to include all manner of ideas, and further described the relationship between ideas, ideologies, ideological apparatuses and power. However, by focussing on showing how ideas and ideology are manifest in natural, biological and ecological systems, Institutional-Ideas and their accompanying ideologies and ideological apparatuses have been largely neglected. Let us here not only address that injustice but examine the composition of those ideological apparatuses with a view to enriching and broadening our understanding of the way they function in view of the theory developed here.

In contrast to institutions, the ideotectonic apparatuses that serve Intrinsic-, Inborn-, and Instinctive-Ideas are constituent parts of the ideological system itself. In all biological and ecological systems, the working agent is not only the ideotectonic apparatus by which the idea’s projected outcome is achieved it is also a natural part of the ideological systems. For instance, the projected outcomes of Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas are not only embodied within biological organisms, they are fulfilled in and through those very biological organisms. That is, the cells, bodies or structures that are themselves projected outcomes of their Inborn-Ideas are also the ideological apparatuses which carry out the processes that assist them to achieve their physiological potential. The fact that Institutional-Ideas are manifest outside human beings in artefacts, beliefs and culture, as well as religious,
political and communal structures, creeds and manifestos of all kinds demands further analysis. Unlike biological and ecological systems that have self-contained ideological agents, Institutional-Ideas are neither self-sustaining nor self perpetuating. Therefore, Institutional-Ideas must be maintained by remote ideological agents. Furthermore, it is argued that devoid of the servitude of remote working agents Institutional-Ideas and Institutional-Ideologies would be impotent and untenable rendering their projected outcomes unachievable.

Unlike many other ideological apparatuses the ‘working agents’ that compose institutions may be organized into a number of different roles.\(^{237}\) The most obvious difference exists between the group that manages or directs the actions of a second group which may be portrayed as the working agency. Organized Christianity provides a very good example of institutional structure. Like many other organized religions, the Christian Church is built around a set of beliefs here described as an ideology. Those beliefs are taught to the parishioners by a ministry or priesthood that breach the divide between the ideology and the ordinary Christian (who takes on the role of the working agent). Promoting the notion of power relations being dependent upon class division, it could be argued that the buildings, beliefs and ministries should be viewed as the institution and the parishioners the working agency. Nevertheless, considering the nature and function of ideology and its interaction with power at every level; it is here argued that institutions are made up of both the ministry and parishioners. Incorporating a divided ideological apparatus into the theory developed here is far less problematic than it may appear. The

\(^{237}\) Rather than understanding the power relations developed by working agents in these roles in terms of a class struggle, that is, in view of Marxist theory or as a hierarchy (Weber), the different working roles can be understood as analogous to the work done by different organisms in an ecosystem. In keeping with Foucault’s theory of power as diffuse the power relations between individuals, between workers and between workers and institutions is far more complex than otherwise suggested.
working relationship between ideas, ideologies and the divided ideological apparatus is explained with the assistance of the following example. It is here suggested that the relationship between the idea, the ideology, management and the working agent are analogous to a client, architect, builder, and team of tradesmen, where the client is the Institutional-Idea, the architect is the Institutional-Ideology, and together, the builder as management and the team of tradesman as the working agency form the institution or ideological apparatus.\textsuperscript{238} The separation of parties clarifies the function of each role in both the construction process and the ideological process. The client formulates an idea, plan, impression, or vision of what it is that he or she wants built. The architect internalizes that vision and formalizes the client’s idea or plan through precise notes and drawings that describe the dimensions, materials and methods by which the client’s vision is to be achieved. The builder examines the plan, understands the founding idea and sets about to develop a schedule of works, recruit a suitable workforce, and locate both energy and material resources required in the construction of the idea represented by the draft plan. The tradesmen arrive on site when scheduled and do the work required to construct that which the idea envisages. In practice the projected outcome of the client’s idea, formalized by the architect, is achieved directly by the work done by the tradesmen. But they alone could not achieve the client’s dream: with the client, architect and builder are crucial here. Likewise, in order for the work done by any working agent to achieve the outcome projected by any Institutional-Idea requires that the associated ideology, and both parts of the ideological apparatus, fulfil their set functions.

\textsuperscript{238} In all other systems the ‘ideological apparatus’ is the working agent, because there is no division between the ideological apparatus and the working agent. Despite here represented as two distinct functionaries, the ideological apparatus can be thought of as including the working agency, yet maintaining an internal division between the labourers and management. Therefore the ideological processes undertaken by institutions can be understood to reflect those of all other idea based systems.
In much the same way that Institutional-Ideas arise out of a nested set of Intrinsic-, Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas, Institutional-Ideas are often grouped or nested together to form more complex sets of Institutional-Ideas. The modern State is a good example of a set or nest of Institutional-Ideas and the institutions that complement them. For instance, within the modern State, institutions such as those that socialize, educate and provide basic health services also work to supply suitable workers for industry, law enforcement, the military, government and the administration of the State’s many concerns.\(^\text{239}\) It may be true that all ideologies are either State or Non-State, but it certainly is not true to say that all ideologies are defined in relation to ‘The’ State.\(^\text{240}\) Other than the vast array of natural, biological, ecological and social ideologies and ideological apparatuses found in nature, the vast majority of ideologies that directly affect the human sphere can be described as functional-ideologies that exist and work in much the same way regardless of the nature of the dominant ideology beneath which they operate. What is certain is that the dominant ideology may be described as either a State or Non-State Ideology and that that ideology appears to enlist the services of other ideologies. In fact enlisting the services of other ideologies is a clever way of fighting an ideological war. Rather than eradicating institutions that offer working agents something that the dominant ideology does not, dominant institutions may choose to incorporate them as part of a


more complex ideological apparatus. This form of ideological union not only unifies diverse currencies, but manages to recruit a greater number and percentage of working agents to a single cause. Such unions negate the dominant’s need to reduce the potential population of working agents by incarcerating them as anti-social or trying to convert them. As such, ideological warfare does not always lead to conflict, but may be waged through diplomacy. Nevertheless, as the words ‘enlisting the services of’ suggest the relationship between dominant and subordinate ideologies need not be completely equitable. For instance, a dominant ideology that makes use of, or employs, subordinate ideologies may be considered to be an ‘employer-ideology’. As such Institutional-Ideologies appear to function as employer or employee, master or slave ideologies, regardless of their State or Non-State status.

Where a dominant ideology is defined as a State ideology simply because it holds State-power, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that all employee, mercenary and slave-ideologies in the service of such a State are defined as part of that State Ideology by their context. Consequently, if the very same ideologies were employed or enslaved by a master or employer-ideology that did not hold State power, those very ideologies could be described as Non-State Ideologies. As such the same or similar ideological structures that are described by Althusser as ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ could (depending on its historic and/or social context), constitute a Pre-State or Non-State Ideological Apparatus. Therefore, it may be concluded that while a great number of ideologies and their associated ideological apparatuses are

employed by the State, they are of themselves primarily functional mechanisms. There is certainly a difference between the majority of rudimentary ideotectonic processes employed by the human race as a means of fulfilling the Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas that project their will to survive, prosper and reproduce, and those that try to harness the sum of humanity’s ability to work toward a particular end. The grand idea upon which such a ‘projected outcome’ is based may require world peace or world domination by a religious or political order but these are simply bigger ideas that function in the very same way as any other idea. The sheer scale of such projects combined with the necessity for public involvement highlights the particulars of such grand ideologies and where sponsored by State power formalizes their ideological apparatuses as State Institutions. All too often this extremely obvious and garish expression of ideas and the Ideotectonic processes by which they are realized is referred to as ‘ideology’ as though it were a unique phenomenon. Undoubtedly Institutional-Ideas and their associated mechanisms are a unique expression of the phenomenon, Ideotectonics, but like all other Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas, Institutional-Ideas are competitive, and that competitiveness all too often escalates into ideological warfare.

Naturally, just as it is impossible to know exactly when or how institutions first arose, or whether there was an original ‘first institution’, or many spontaneously generated ‘first institutions’ it is impossible to know the precise nature of that, or those, institutions. Nevertheless, without referring to a procession of anthropologists, there is certainly a great deal of evidence to suggest that before there ever was a State, human beings gathered together in family groups, and multiple

family groups and individuals came together to form tribes and so on.\textsuperscript{243} At least theoretically, the development of institutions appears to have followed on the heels of humanity’s suspension of kin altruism in favour of reciprocal altruism, which led to the advent of the social contract.\textsuperscript{244} Further to which, considering the overwhelming evidence left to us in the form of cultural artefacts, there can be little doubt that pre-State social structures incorporated ritualized customs and practices.\textsuperscript{245} Likewise, given the incredible length of time between the genesis of our species and the emergence of the State as a dominant social structure, there is every reason to conclude that Institutional-Ideas began to mediate human social interaction at some point during that period.

The proliferation of social contracts, coupled with the development of agriculture and thus a sedentary lifestyle, would have enabled a diverse range of Institutional-Ideas such as: new systems of governance, law, religion, ritual, ‘education’, notions of the family, ownership, private property, the division of labour, and organized warfare.\textsuperscript{246} Subsequently, it is only reasonable to assume that somewhere along this path of development and before the advent of Feudal States and so on, people in various times and places began to derive their means of subsistence through the production and sale of commodities, giving rise to mercantile ideology and ultimately the modern State. Nevertheless, human beings walked the face of Earth


\textsuperscript{244} See Mary Maxwell. \textit{Human Evolution: A Philosophical Anthropology}. London: Croom Helm, 1984. (150-1).


\textsuperscript{246} See the section on agricultural societies in Christine Hambling and Pauline Matthews. \textit{Human Societies} (2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.). London Macmillan, 1983. (21-29).
for almost one hundred thousand years before there ever was a State. By what means did they mediate their relationships? There can be little doubt that humanity tried many different methods. It is absolutely certain that at some point during that period some humans began to employ Institutional-Ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses to organize and manage their social interaction. In lieu of a better term, humanity’s first social institutions are here referred to as Primal Ideological Apparatuses. Regardless of their particulars, the very first institutions functioned in the same way as all other institutions have since. The first institution or institutions not only bridged the gap between naturally emergent social structures such as the biologically necessary family unit, and formalized the complex social structures that fostered the development of ancient cultures.  

Before discussing the emergence of new, potentially Non-State Ideological Apparatuses there remains a question as to whether the advent of the State extinguished pre-existing Non-State Ideological Apparatuses. In ‘reality’ the answer to this question is very simple. History shows us that the advent of the State did not automatically extinguish all Pre- or Non-State Ideological Apparatuses. However, in view of the theory of the State, the answer is a little more complex. Furthermore, that ‘theory’ appears to depend upon the supposed ‘universality’ of the State. If, for instance, the State automatically assumed an omnipotence that placed everything within its territorial borders in subjection to its power, there would be no place for Non-State Ideological Apparatuses. Nevertheless, in order for this to work the State would need to be omnipotent as well omniscient. If the State were omnipotent not only would every person be subject to State power while within its borders, but

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where the State actually willed to prevent lawlessness, lawlessness would also certainly cease. Nevertheless, as every individual’s personal experience attests, the State is not omnipotent. Even though State law is administered and ‘enforced’ by what Althusser describes as Repressive State Apparatuses, or law enforcement agencies, the will of the State can be resisted. Furthermore, not only is the State not omnipotent or universal, but the pretensions of State power appear to provide individuals with a site of opposition and self-expression, and therefore perpetuate Non-State Ideological Apparatuses. That is not to say that individuals who subscribe to Non-State ideology or submit to Non-State Ideological Apparatuses are not affected by State power— the pervasive influence of the State may have effects other than those that it intends. Therefore, it is here suggested that Non-State Ideological Apparatuses may be produced in isolation from, or co-produced by, the State.

It is certainly clear that before the emergence of a State, human beings enjoyed social structures that depended upon Institutional-Ideas, and their beliefs and practices perpetuated them. Likewise, there is every reason to believe, and there is no evidence to the contrary, that Primal Ideological Apparatuses continued to exist long after the advent of the State. The State may have co-opted some Primal Ideological Apparatuses (like religion) transforming them into Ideological State Apparatuses, eradicating others, while others still, may have evolved into ‘Private’ or similar Non-State Ideological Apparatuses. Likewise, despite the modern State’s

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250 See the Religions Before History section of R. Pearce Beaver et al eds. A Lion Handbook, The
ability to influence its citizens through the various Ideological State Apparatuses, much evidence suggests the existence of other ‘Private Ideological Apparatuses’ over which the State has no substantial influence. In addition to these Private Ideological Apparatuses, an examination of Non-State Ideological Apparatuses further uncovers a range of what are here named Oppositional Ideological State Apparatuses and Alternate-State Ideological Apparatuses. However, in distinction to all ideological apparatuses the ‘Ideological Hermitage’ operates in the absence of any institutional ideas, or social mechanism of any kind. Yet the Ideological Hermitage neither reflects the relationship between primal people and ideas, nor of Primal Ideological Apparatuses. In fact because the ideological hermit is the sole working agent on behalf of his or her ideology, the Ideological Hermitage leaves no place for any formal institution.

Unlike people occupying State, Private, Counter-State, Oppositional, and Alternate-State Ideological Apparatuses, the ideological hermit may be acted upon by the State and may construct and occupy an ideological fortress built for one. Separated from society by ideology rather than by space, an ideological hermit can live quite happily in a busy city. The Ideological Hermitage is an ideological apparatus composed of a secret or distinct system of ideas that assist the individual in making sense of his or her ideological world. Subsequently, the ideological hermit does not respond to the pervasive influences of State ideology in the same way as those that are ‘fully’ interpellated as citizens of the State. This is not to say that the ideological hermit is


251 It must be noted that at no time in human history was the Ideological Hermitage the standard functional framework for human ideas or human ideology. A collection of socially and ideologically isolated individuals that are unable to function as a single unit, could not have successfully maintained the human race, let alone collectively forged complex social systems. As such the Ideological Hermitage is something of an aberration: while natural, they are off the ideological thoroughfare of mainstream human social systems.
not physically or even ideologically affected by the State, but rather that the ideological hermit has by choice, birth or societal injunction found him or herself at odds with mainstream ideology. An unconventional thinker or heretic may be rejected by society as a ‘lunatic’ and is thus viewed as a social outcast (just as a misunderstood genius may be thought to suffer from madness). Even though there is no single description of an ideological hermit, the ideological hermit is not measured against what it is to be human in the biological sense, but is measured against the institutional idea of what it is to be a ‘normal healthy citizen’ in the social sense. Consequently, many ideological hermits, although harmless, are mistreated by society as anti-social ‘misfits’ and may find themselves incarcerated in either mental hospitals or prisons.

Despite having no antisocial behavioural characteristics or mental illness, an individual may be segregated from society because of his or her unconventional ideas and thus forced into an Ideological Hermitage. However, if such an individual were to be joined by others that share the same ideas, together they would form a Private Ideological Apparatus. The Private Ideological Apparatus is quite different to that of the biologically necessary family unit or any other biological or ecological apparatus. Despite the fact that the ideas and ideologies promoted by Private Ideological Apparatuses are influenced by Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-

253 Among the many famous examples of people who fit the profile of an ideological hermit is that of Theodore John Kazinski, also known as the UNA Bomber. In rare cases the ideological hermit may take a direct and violent course of action against society, and/or the ‘State’, in an attempt to bring it into line with his or her own ideas. Kaczynski, killed three people and injured twenty-three others over a seventeen year period, because he believed that society was not functioning properly. While it is not necessary to be physically separated from society, prompted by his ideological separation from mainstream ideas, Kaczynski moved to a small isolated shack in Montana. Nevertheless, Kaczynski fits the description of a violent man living in an Ideological Hermitage.
Ideas, they focus on culturally constructed rather than biologically necessary practices. Or, in other words, those ideas and ideologies are not critical for the people who share them to fulfil their biological imperative. Like all Institutional-Ideas, the ideas that promote Private Ideological Apparatuses are shared by communities not simply maintained by individuals for their own use. Consistent with all such Institutional-Ideas, the foundational ideas of Private Ideological Apparatuses transcend the bounds of human brains because they are manifest in rituals, cultural artefacts, landmarks, and encoded beliefs. Nevertheless, unlike the dominant institutions, Private Ideological Apparatuses trade in ‘unorthodox’, unique, or secret beliefs and practices. The Private Ideological Apparatus allows people of like mind to come together to share ideas and practices shunned by the dominant institutions. The most rudimentary of Private Ideological Apparatuses require privacy, even secrecy and often lack a formal organizational hierarchy. Further they neither generate capital, nor material production of any volume. The currency of these social orders cannot be measured in units of gross domestic product, yet for those who are fully interpellated into the system the currency is measurable and it is real.

One may argue that because Private Ideological Apparatuses do not aim to contribute to the gross domestic product, they deplete the State’s potential power. Therefore, while Private Ideological Apparatuses co-exist with the State and are relatively innocuous, the State need not enjoy sharing ‘its’ working agents and the power that their work develops with its ideological competitors. In fact, there are countless examples of dominant political and/or religious organizations stamping out less powerful orders and their ideas. For a straightforward and succinct overview of the religious persecution of the Jews in Britain and the persecution of witches in Europe in which 40 000 lives were lost in the 16th, 17th and even 18th centuries see Juliet Gardiner and Neil Wenborn eds. *The History*
examples of dominant ideological apparatuses waging war on relatively insignificant ideological competitors. Subsequently, the threat of persecution and the subsequent desire for privacy certainly affects the character of some Private Ideological Apparatuses. Nevertheless, despite technically being a ‘threat’, Private Ideological Apparatuses are the most innocuous of all Non-State Ideological Apparatuses in that they exist below the State’s radar, out of the public gaze and make no attempt to affect the dominant in any way. A taxonomy of Private Ideological Apparatuses would have two main groups: those produced without any reference to the State and those that are partly defined in relation to the State. It is here suggested that, excluding the Pre-State or Primal Ideological Apparatuses, Private Ideological Apparatuses may exist within the territorial limits of a modern State without being unified beneath ruling class ideology. While all such Private Ideological Apparatuses may be influenced by the State they are formed independently of State ideology and make little or no reference to the State. They can be described as secretive, non profit making subcultures which sit outside the mainstream. Further to which, while not all such groups are proscribed at law, those that are need not be affected by their prohibition. For instance, where their Institutional-Ideas were inherited, or passed down through history, their beliefs and practices can remain unaffected wherever their private nature insulates them from the influences of the law. As such, changes to the law do not always prevent Private Ideological Apparatuses from continuing. Practicing witchcraft or Wicca was prohibited by Australian law up until quite recently.\textsuperscript{255} However because of its ‘secretive’ nature, its rites of passage and special practices, it has largely remained as it was during and

\textsuperscript{255} In the State of New South Wales the witchcraft act of 1735 was repealed by the Imperial Acts Application Act, 1969; and as late as 2005 in the state of Victoria.

prior to its prohibition. Witchcraft and other ‘pagan’ religions are perhaps the best example of truly Private Ideological Apparatuses as they are communal\textsuperscript{256}, private rather than public,\textsuperscript{257} have their own Institutional-Ideas, enjoy their own Institutional-Ideologies and are mediated or organized by an institution. Whether the lost prominence through the loss of prior ideological wars forced witches into hiding or their practices naturally suited secrecy may not be completely clear, however, it is clear that the rites practiced today require a relatively high degree of secrecy.\textsuperscript{258} Either way most modern witches simply want to be left alone to practice their craft in private, wishing not to arouse the interest of the State or make any impact upon it.\textsuperscript{259}

Just as ideological hermits can be created by society, Private Ideological Apparatuses can be created by a society hostile to, suspicious or critical of a perceived difference. In response to that hostility, suspicion or criticism those individuals may choose to separate themselves from the majority. In most cases that ‘separation’ is not complete but is limited to certain occasions, rituals or practices. For instance, the Greek family that live across the street from me are part of a Private Ideological Apparatus for no other reason than that they like to share their Sunday afternoons with other Greek nationals. Despite the fact that we are good friends, non-Greek Australians such as me are simply not invited to take part in their festivals. In a way such Private Ideological Apparatuses are produced in response to the State, but not at


a political level. In fact the particulars of the dominant ideology have little to do with the construction of the subculture. In this case the subculture was formed by the disparity between their heritage, present geographical location and social context. Ironically if my neighbours and their friends decided to relocate to Greece their ‘Australian heritage’ may find them forming a subculture consisting of Greek-Australians. Nevertheless, as many Greek migrants not only identified themselves as being different to Anglo-Saxon Australians, but were thought of as different by Anglo-Saxon Australians, they forged their own subcultures. As such the members of their subculture share in, and enjoy, a different language, a unique appreciation for cultural icons, music, and food. Their gardens promote a different aesthetic to that of other people in the street. Perhaps most importantly, being Greek in Australia allowed them to develop a unique world-view. In short, despite the fact that these people live normal productive lives they also enjoy their own ideas, rituals and practices in the privacy of their own subculture. All members follow the rules of the house and the subculture is maintained by a social order. Furthermore, when maintaining the subculture, each individual is provided with an entirely different set of ideas and practices peculiar to themselves. The very act of coming together and sharing their cultural practices achieves the projected outcome of the subculture’s Institutional-Ideas. Private Ideological Apparatuses like the subculture described here seek a little privacy in order to perpetuate their own ideas and practices which are different to those promoted by dominant ideology. However, they neither seek to reform nor replace dominant ideology.

Unlike the Private Ideological Apparatuses enjoyed by foreign nationals perpetuating their indigenous culture, many of the Private Ideological Apparatuses produced in
direct contrast to the State are centred on illegal practices (other than organized crime). Contextualized by their illegality, the law is broken as a consequence of the difference between State ideology and the Non-State ideology being practiced. Many subcultures are not only organized around activities frowned upon by the law, but are formed because their chosen activity cannot be practiced openly. The people who support and engage in illegal cockfighting, for example, form one such group. Nevertheless, like the members of many other Private Ideological Apparatuses, the cockers (cock fighters) may only break the law in relation to the particular practices undertaken as fulfilment of their Institutional-Ideas. For instance, despite the fact that cockfighting in Australia was made illegal in 1850, more than 150 years ago, it is still practiced. And while illegal, those practicing the illegal sport may observe all of the other laws of the State. That is, while engaging in the illegal practice of cockfighting, stealing and murdering each other is not thought of as acceptable behaviour. In fact cocking in the ‘British Empire’ is a very interesting example of how a subculture can shift from being part of the dominant culture to an illegal subculture (from an ISA to a PIA).

As noted by Sir Walter Gilby, “After Queen Victoria’s accession in 1837, a tide of opinion against cock-fighting set in, and as a public spectacle it ceased to be fashionable” (Sport in the Olden Time, 96). Thus like many other ‘vulgar’ practices, the Victorian era saw the end of cockfighting as a legal past time. Although the actual practice of cockfighting has not changed


much since it was made illegal, the culture surrounding it has changed from incorporating a public spectacle attended by kings and aristocrats to a sport practiced in secret by a very small number of people.

Not all Non-State Ideological Apparatuses are as invisible or as ‘private’ as those listed above, although some are unseen until we are personally confronted by them and as such can only exist within an institutionalized social structure like the State. Unlike Private Ideological Apparatuses, organized crime, or crime as a way of life, does not seek privacy in order to explore ideas or engage in unorthodox practices, but rather such criminals seek to fulfill their needs and desires by unlawful means that counter the expectations of dominant culture. As such, organized crime and crime as a way of life is a Counter-State Ideological Apparatus. It is ‘Counter-State’ rather than ‘oppositional’ or ‘alternate’ as it neither seeks to reform nor replace the dominant, but satisfies its subscriber’s needs by way of a counter action to that of the dominant. Ironically assisting organized crime, the law identifies and prohibits the production and economic exchange of ‘illicit materials and substances’ such that ‘prohibition’ creates a demand and therefore a market for illicit goods and services. These laws provide criminals with an opportunity to extract surplus value through economic exchange. Organized crime such as extortion and robbery operate according to a variation on the Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas that promote the desire for self-preservation by which criminals extract their means of subsistence from others without economic exchange. As such, the criminal operates in a manner contrary to the ideology that directs law-abiding citizens toward fulfilling their needs through the hire of their labour and/or exploitation of mercantile practices. At the
level of the individual, the real difference between working for a living and living by organized crime is not always seen in the end result but in the means by which the projected outcome is achieved. The difference is essentially ideological. Organized crime functions according to a Counter-State Ideological Apparatus, facilitated by the prosperity of the State and its citizens.\textsuperscript{263} Organized crime does not seek to change the society by converting everyone to its own ideas, but rather depends upon the majority of people subscribing to the morals, ethics and materialism promoted by dominant Institutional-Ideas.

The simple fact that modern humanity’s cultural landscape is dominated by both Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses not only accounts for their prominent position in modern theory but justifies that discussion. As noted in Part One of this thesis, the gap in traditional theory defines the greater part of the ideological landscape. However, when viewed in the absence of those limitations traditional theories of ideology have a great deal to offer. Marx and Althusser’s description of State Apparatuses and Ideological State Apparatuses is invaluable to this discussion. Like all other institutions, Ideological State Apparatuses reflect the Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas from which they are composed. They may be either benevolent or repressive depending on one’s perspective. But they are dominant, and all of the Non-State Ideological Apparatuses being discussed are in some way influenced by their existence. While Althusser’s treatise on Ideological State Apparatuses gives little recourse for disagreement, failing to comment upon the existence of Non-State Ideological Apparatuses robbed him of the opportunity to discuss ideological warfare.

\textsuperscript{263} Counter-State Ideological Apparatuses need not be limited to organized crime: others engaged in fraudulent, or parasitic practices may fall into this category.
Ideological warfare is not always about engaging in conflict. A Nation-State may win and lose more through diplomacy than outright ideological competition. In many ways competition unifies and polarizes working agents on both sides of the divide. However, in order to maximize the potential development of surplus power any dominant ideological apparatus must unify its working agents while eradicating its opposition. When Emperor Constantine unified Rome under his governance by raising Christianity to a status akin to that of a State Religion, he translated the various religions into a single currency that perpetuated the political and social structure of the Roman Empire.264 While often horrific, stamping out alternate ideologies by murdering or threatening to murder anyone involved in so-called ‘abhorrent’ practices, limits the ideological competition. Creating a homogeneous working agency, ‘unified’ beneath a single ideological apparatus, is one way of increasing the ideological apparatus’ ability to increase its stake.265 Ideological warfare, whether carried out through cultural genocide or more subtle means, always competes for the services of the working agents because ideas and ideologies are powerless as they are incapable of achieving their projected outcome without the assistance of dedicated viable ideological apparatuses complete with a functional institution and a suitable working agency. In fact it could be argued that competing for the services of working agents is all the motivation that an ideological apparatus requires for it to engage in institutionalized ideological warfare. Consequently, as


265 In essence, this was discussed at the end of the previous chapter in respect to maximizing power and neutralizing internal divisions.
the co-existence of competing States, Non-State and Private Ideological Apparatuses translates into relentless competition, ideological warfare is a permanent feature in the world of institutions.

The remaining Non-State Ideological Apparatuses are described as Oppositional and Alternate-State Ideological Apparatuses. The first of these, Oppositional Ideological Apparatuses, are not truly ‘private’ social orders; they are more like political organizations or ‘protest cultures’ than Private Ideological Apparatuses. The Oppositional Ideological Apparatus is based on promoting Intellectual- and Institutional-Ideas that are contrary to those held by the State. As such, they tend to employ lobbyists, protestors and issues as weapons in their war against dominant ideology. Nevertheless, the focus of their opposition to the State is topical, as their point of difference addresses a particular aspect of dominant Institutional-Ideology. Second wave feminism, for instance, was born of the inequality between men and women perpetrated by the State: it did not seek to overturn democracy or destroy the State, but rather to reform the practices proscribed by challenging the validity of their Institutional-Ideas.266 The projected outcome of their ‘idea’ and subsequent ideology was to enhance the rights of women and thus democracy.267 As such, while situated outside State ideology, second wave feminism was the joint product of the Intellectual and Institutional-Ideas of the female activists that championed women’s rights and the inequality promoted by the dominant Institutional-Ideology.268 Even

268 Hester Eisenstein. “Femocrats, Official Feminism and the uses of Power.” In Playing the State:
though initially outside the scope of bipartisan politics, when the voice of second wave feminism began to be heard the feminists were able to bring political pressure to bear upon Western governments. Subsequent to their ability to influence those in government, legislation was changed, confirming the feminist movement as a powerful body.\footnote{269}

The Green movement is another example of an Oppositional Ideological Apparatus. The historical context which saw environmental scientists,\footnote{270} conservationists and environmental activists emerge as a ‘force for change’ was promoted by the clear ideological differences between them and the dominant ideology of Western industrialized States.\footnote{271} Their beliefs and practices are obviously opposed to those of the State.\footnote{272} However, much like second wave feminism, the environmentalists do not propose an alternate form of government.\footnote{273} Like any other Institutional-Ideology, environmentalism arose from an Intellectual-Idea informed by Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas. Perhaps seeing the potential destruction of the ecological apparatus and thus biological apparatuses that sustain the existence of life on Earth

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the survival instinct was aroused in some people who were able to articulate their concerns through Intellectual- and institutional-Ideas. The instinctive desire to stave off disaster is formalized as an Intellectual-Idea that projects an ecologically sustainable future as its outcome. Like all other ideological systems, Institutional-Ideas are promoted as being achievable through the application of certain practices in the absence of others: codified, these practices compose the ideology that defines environmentalism as a way of life. The Institutional-Ideology at the heart of environmentalism directs and informs every aspect of an environmentalist’s life, from the materials they use, their recycling of waste products and their opposition to the destruction and pollution of the environment. While communal, environmentalists do not simply share their concerns and practices among themselves: their actions empower the Oppositional Ideological Apparatus designed to achieve the projected outcome of their ideas. Based on their Institutional-Ideas, as an Oppositional Ideological Apparatus environmentalism’s projected outcome is to reform dominant Institutional-Ideology. Environmentalist actions, lobbying, protesting and so on are aimed at affecting changes in legislation so that the State and its citizens become sensitive to the environment and thus change Institutional-Ideology. Consequently, the functional ideology of private citizens is a catalyst for conserving and protecting the natural environment.

The objective of every Oppositional Ideological Apparatus is to get the State to replace its ‘flawed’ ideas and ideology with a better set of Institutional-Ideas and associated Institutional-Ideologies. Ultimately, if its projected outcome is achieved, the ideas and ideologies promoted by the Oppositional Ideological Apparatus are appropriated by an Ideological State Apparatus. Those ideas are then empowered
and disseminated by the State, its pervasive influence reaching into the daily lives of its citizens transforming them into environmentalists. Once the State’s resistance to the ‘Oppositional Ideas’ is overcome and the Oppositional Ideas are accepted as part of the State, the Non-State Ideology is no longer in opposition to the State and thus ceases to exist as an Oppositional Ideological Apparatus. Most often a watered down version of the Oppositional Ideology is adopted by the State. Those that continue to champion the cause operate from within a ‘legitimate’ Ideological State Apparatus.  

For instance, if feminism was completely successful, dominant Institutional-Ideology, the law and social practice would afford men and women complete equality. Likewise if the environmental movement achieved all of its goals the State would outlaw all environmentally damaging practices and all of the State’s citizens would alter their practices ultimately becoming environmentalists themselves. Given the very nature of ‘idealized outcomes’, the projected outcome may never be realized, leaving those dedicated to achieving the outcome envisaged by their Oppositional Institutional-Idea to champion further reform from within the State.

Oppositional Ideological Apparatuses predominantly choose to fight their ideological battles through peaceful means. But, not all protests are peaceful and not all Oppositional Ideological Apparatuses seek change through political pressure alone. Historically, protestors have resorted to all kinds of stunts in order to publicize their causes. The ability to draw the world’s attention to a particular ‘plight’ through protest increased with modern broadcasting. Nevertheless, when such attempts fail

to gain publicity or sympathy some protestors have sought the coercive forces that the threat of violence provides. Further, when realized through acts of terrorism, ongoing threats have proven to be a powerful motivator. While alienating much of the community, terrorism is perhaps the most dramatic and provocative form of ideological statement or protest. However, not all terrorist acts are perpetrated by Oppositional Ideological Apparatuses. Perpetrating an act of terrorism was once the most infamous means of drawing attention to and thus furthering a political cause.\textsuperscript{276} Notwithstanding that perception, the events leading up to and including September 11 have overshadowed such perceptions. Flying planes into iconic buildings was by no means a simple protest. September 11 was a dramatic statement, a declaration of opposition posted from one ideological apparatus to another.\textsuperscript{277} Those responsible for the events of September 11, were, however, not part of an Oppositional Ideological Apparatus. Quite clearly their ultimate goal is not directed at reforming the West but rather to replace ‘Western ideology’ with an Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus.

In order for the projected outcome of the Institutional-Idea behind the ideology and ideological apparatus that launched the terrorist acts of September 11 to be fully achieved, the existing ideological apparatus, ‘the State’, would need to be replaced by an Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus.\textsuperscript{278} Rather than simply wishing to reform an existing State, planning to overthrow or replace the State with an alternative form of governance describes the ‘antagonist’ or ideological competitor

\textsuperscript{277} For a broad critique of the events of September 11 and the political climate that led to them see Phil Scraton, ed. \textit{Beyond September 11: An Anthology of Dissent}. London: Pluto Press, 2002.
as an Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus. In brief, an Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus is formed around the idea of replacing dominant Institutional-Ideas, ideologies and ideological apparatuses. Subsequently, while the Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus is the machine that strives to replace a competing ideological-apparatus, it also seeks to replace the dominant Institutional-Ideology with its own Alternate-State Ideology. Unlike Private Ideological Apparatuses, these ideological apparatuses do not aim to practice their beliefs in private or without affecting the State, but rather seek to hold State power through aggressive ideological warfare. As such their alternative Institutional-Ideology is designed to unseat and usurp State power, and establish an alternative government. Subsequently, while the means of achieving political revolution may be varied the projected outcome of all Alternate-State Ideological Apparatuses is essentially the same.

Alternate-State Ideological Apparatuses are, however, not always strictly Non-State Ideological Apparatuses. State sponsored democracy (Communism etc) can itself function as an Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus. For instance, the allied forces led by the United States of America brought an Alternate-State Ideology with them into Iraq. Having overthrown Sadam Hussein’s government by military force, the American led forces have been working with the Iraqi people to organize democratic elections (in January and December 2005), thus replacing the previous State Apparatus with an alternative system of governance. If successful, democracy, as the Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus, will become the means by which the Iraqi State functions. In which case democracy will form an integral part of the State

Apparatus of Iraq. What will happen if Iraq’s insurgent forces continue to resist what they perceive to be an ‘imposed’ form of governance is anyone’s guess. It is certain that if democracy becomes the dominant State Ideological Apparatus in Iraq, and the insurgents’ desire to reinstate the old system grows stronger, the insurgents would then be considered to not only hold an Alternate-State Ideology, but their actions could be said to be organized by an Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus.

Alternate-State Ideological Apparatuses are defined by their context: essentially they offer an alternative to what ever State ideology is in place. Whether for greed, glory, political power, religious domination or freedom, the masses have risen in bloody revolution more than once. The French Revolution provides an example of an Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus acquiring State power, as does the Russian Revolution. In fact, replacing one system of government with another, where State power is not dissolved but rather co-opted in order to empower an Alternate-Ideology, is the bread and butter of political revolutions and civil wars everywhere. The pages of history yield countless examples of wars waged as a means of protecting one’s own ideology from an inevitable ideological threat. The war between England and Napoleon’s armies was at least partly fuelled by England’s fears that republicanism, which if left to fester may have crossed the Channel. While other factors played their part, the British and their allies also entered World War II in order to stifle Adolph Hitler’s plans for world domination which threatened to impose Nazism as the dominant ideology. Following this the Cold War not only saw former allies divided according to ideological lines, but illustrated the lengths

that opposing States would go to in order to promote their State Ideology over that of
their enemies.\textsuperscript{282} The USSR championed Communism in opposition to the West,
which championed capitalism and democracy.\textsuperscript{283} Each manipulated and/or supported
other States as a means of, not only protecting their own ideology, but promoting
their own State Ideological Apparatus. The USSR supplied arms and financial
support to Fidel Castro among others, while the U.S. and its allies entered Korea, and
Vietnam in an effort to stem the march of Communism across Asia. As these
examples attest, the pages of history are cluttered with ‘ideological struggle’.\textsuperscript{284}

Considering that the phenomenon that includes ideas and ideologies incorporates: the
nesting of different categories of ideas, the impact of Intrinsic-Ideas upon our
evolutionary development; the ongoing influence of our Inborn-, Instinctive- and
Intellectual-Ideas upon institutions, and the institution’s influence upon us, it is easy
to see that ideological competition is not restricted to the world of institutions. In
fact it bears the same face as the code by which our species survived. History tells us
that ideas, ideotectonic processes such as ideologies and ideological apparatuses are
not only a constituent to the existence of energy and matter and everything composed
of energy and matter, but that as long as there continues to be a struggle for survival
there will be ideological warfare. Institutional-Ideas whether promoting State or


Non-State Ideological Apparatuses have not yet found a way to circumvent the most basic survival instinct. All known institutions are predicated upon the very same ideas as all other aspects of human existence, thus institutions reflect humanity, and we humans are competitive to the core.\textsuperscript{285} Ideology is far more complex than first meets the theoretical mind.

\textsuperscript{285} It is certainly possible for other life forms to employ Institutional-Ideas, however whether through our ignorance or inability to discern such systems all known socially constructed institutions are contextualized by the human experience.
Chapter Eight

Something of a Conclusion, Something of a Beginning

Considering that the theory developed in this thesis is contextualized by its place among other theories of ideas and ideologies, makes a significant departure from traditional theory, and the pace at which this new theory unfolds, this chapter aims to present the theoretical framework developed here free of the encumbrance of complex arguments and involved examples. Without the restrictions placed upon ideas and ideology by traditional theory, ideas and ideology can be understood as manifestations of a single phenomenon. However, this is not to suggest that the theory of ideotectonics presents a narrow view of ideas and ideologies, but rather accounts for complexity, diversity and the degree of uncertainty that pervades the universe. The straightforward manner in which this theory addresses ideas, ideotectonic processes and functionaries such as ideologies and ideological apparatuses incorporates the indeterminate nature of Nature itself, and accounts for, rather than dismisses, complexity. It may be said that explaining the nature and function of all ideas and ideotectonics in respect to a few relatively basic, yet testable, principles demystifies the entire subject. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework developed here is not devoid of ‘romance’, as it uncovers an ongoing relationship between the most primal ideas and human culture. Nevertheless, the methodical and practical approach taken to all kinds of ideas, and the simplicity with which their nature and function is exposed, is of little advantage if it is not understood.

As noted above, I make no claim that the theory developed here is in any way comprehensive but rather maintain that it represents a theoretical outline that could
benefit from further discussion. Nevertheless, I do suggest that the theory developed here presents a sound working model, and while not described as ‘scientific’, its premises, principles and propositions are testable. Therefore, in the service of clarity, the following summation is intended to present the essential principles and propositions from which the theory if ideotectonics is composed, free of elaborate arguments and illustrations.

The theory developed here is in essence based upon a few principles or propositions that may correctly be referred to as a set of premises. Each premise exists in the context of the entire set of premises such that the premises are interrelated and interdependent. Subsequently, the premises cannot be ordered in respect to their historic development or according to any other schema other than that required for their explanation. Nevertheless, these first premises include; ideas defined as the plans, principles, blueprints or recipes from which something can be formed. Ideotectonic processes are described as operating between the idea and achieving the idea’s projected outcome, such that they describe the processes by which the potential outcome projected by an idea is achieved. Where necessary those processes are then carried out by an apparatus which may consist of a single working agent, many working agents or an institution composed of management and a working agency. \(^{286}\) Subsequently, it is suggested that the projected outcome of an idea is an expression of the combined function of an idea, and its ideotectonic functionaries. By definition all ideas project a potential outcome. All ideas, whether true or false, imagined or material, are said to be real and never pale reflections of reality. Ideas

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\(^{286}\) All working agents, whether chemicals, atoms, biological cells, bodies or structures are ideological apparatuses, however in the case of Institutional-Ideas the ideological apparatus is divided into two equally important parts: the institution and the working agent.
are not restricted to human thoughts, but can refer to all plans, principles, blueprints or recipes, whether found in natural, biological, ecological or social systems. In conjunction with these principles, it is argued that all ideas have the same function, as do all ideotectonic processes and all ideotectonic apparatuses. All ideas have the potential to exert an influence and therefore hold a kind of latent power. When activated that power is expressed as the ability to influence outcomes. All successful ideotectonic processes achieve some kind of influence, effect or displacement and therefore are inextricably linked to the development of power. Furthermore, all ideas, and their functionaries are said to be manifestations of a single phenomenon named ideotectonics.

As noted above the word ideotectonic is the contraction of two Greek words *ideo* meaning ideas and *tektonikós* meaning “that pertaining to building or construction” (Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 906). In view of describing a theory, *Ideotectonics* describes the nature and function of ideas in view of their influence over the formation or construction of everything that exists, whether material or intelligible. In effect ideotectonics is the theory of how ideas relate to the building, construction or formation of things. In a specific sense it refers to the phenomenon of which all ideas and their functionaries such as ideologies are expressions. As a general or functional term it may be used to describe any process through which an idea’s projected outcome is realized. Therefore, in all correctness, given that this work addresses the nature and function of all ideas, and further discusses the

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287 The word ‘tectonic’ is found in the term ‘plate tectonics’ which describes the building or construction of the Earth’s crust or its general structure, that is the cause and effect of action or movement involving one or more continental plate. Therefore plate tectonics describe the construction of mountains, valleys, fault lines, deep ocean trenches and so on. The point here is that ideotectonics describes the relationship between ideas, ideologies, ideological apparatuses and their effects. For further reference see *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology.*
relationship between ideas and their functionaries, ideas and their projected outcomes, ideas and power, all ideotectonic processes and power in respect to naturally emergent and human social systems, I think it only fair to describe the theory developed here as a *Theory of Ideotectonics*. Furthermore, I suggest that all ideas and processes involved in the building or construction of that which is described by the principles encapsulated by an idea can be understood as ideotectonic in nature.

Because the this *Theory of Ideotectonics* is predicated upon a set of principles and formulations, it may be explained in a number of different ways. While maintaining continuity, it is important to here approach the theory from a slightly different tack. Therefore, let this ‘telling’ begin with power, truth and corruption. Despite the fact that truth and corruption have not been discussed in any detail above, in much the same way that Destutt de Tracy and Marx searched for truth and fought against its corruption, this theory continues that tradition. Nevertheless, truth is here described as the absence of artificial restraints or limitations that restrict our ability to understand the nature and function of ideas, and ideotectonics in general, regardless of their manifestation. In many ways finding this truth has to do with connecting with reality, practical philosophy and practical science. Finding truth is, at least partly, about finding reality in the imagination rather than finding ghosts and apparitions. Therefore discussing power, truth and corruption is essentially all about discussing ideas in respect to reality.

It is argued above that everything that exists is real, ideas included. Understanding this fundamental point sets ideas free of human brains, free of the human context,
and free of the limitations of traditional theory. Likewise, this realization not only sets ideology free of its social context, it sets ideology free from the negative conception placed upon it by traditional theory. I argued that ideas were only ever limited to the human sphere in the context of humanity’s perception of them. Ideas have always been the plans, recipes, blueprints or principles from which something can be formed. Hence it is suggested that the most fundamental ideas in the universe have always been conditional to, and manifest in, the energy and matter from which everything that exists within the universe is constructed. That is, at the moment that the singularity expressed the energy from which the entire universe would later be formed, that energy was described by the ideas or principles that described its every quality. Therefore, at the moment of the Big-Bang every potential application of that energy was also released. This is not to say that every idea that ever existed was at that moment made real but rather that every idea ever to have existed was made possible by that initial expression of energy and potentialities.

Understanding power is important to understanding the nature and function of ideas and ideotectonic processes. All ideas project outcomes and therefore by nature contain certain potentialities. When activated ideas exert an influence over the formation of all things, therefore all ideas contain a kind of latent power and when taken up express power through a direct influence, force or manifest effect. Likewise all successful ideotectonic processes require the expenditure of energy, work to be done and time to have lapsed. Or, in other words, all ideotectonic processes and effects are manifest through the expression of power. Bringing Foucault’s conception of power together with the scientific conception of power to form a working definition of power allows me to discuss power as expressed and/or
developed in natural, biological, ecological and social systems. In this context power describes the ability to exert an influence over something or to develop power at the rate at which work is done. In natural systems where there is no ‘will’ or other motivating factors, the Intrinsic-Idea is said to exert power via its influence over the formation of the things it describes. Beyond that influence science describes the power developed while undertaking the work required to achieve an idea’s projected outcome. However, in all systems where the survival instinct, the will to live or some other motivating factor is able to influence an outcome, the effect of such motivating factors demands the introduction of Foucault’s conception of power. The greater the ability of such motivating factors to influence ideological processes, the more appropriate Foucault’s theory becomes. In this regard, the overlap between the social and scientific conceptions of power has been described as interdependent.

Regardless of the circumstances, achieving an idea’s projected outcome demands the ability to exert an influence or cause some kind of displacement. In all biological, and ecological systems the influence exerted by an idea can explained by social theory. Naturally social theory has to be extended to include the ideas of other species. While not specifically designed for such an extension, Foucault’s theory of power as diffuse is particularly useful. On the other hand the relationship between ideotectonic processes, the changes that they effect and development of power can be calculated through scientific formula. For instance, if one could identify the work done in order to achieve an idea’s projected outcome and the time lapsed the power developed by that process could be easily calculated. As such it matters not whether the idea relates to building stars, biological organisms or sky rockets: the relationship between the ideotectonic process, time, energy and power developed can be
understood in common terms. Further to which, understanding the means by which power is developed in the scientific sense not only highlights the fact that ideas and ideotectonic processes relate to power differently. The relationship between ideas and power is more about the ideas ability to exert an influence over an outcome, rather than directly effecting change. All ideas require other actors or functionaries to carry out the processes by which they are realized. As such the means by which an idea is ‘built, constructed or formed’ are ideotectonic in nature. Subsequently the relationship between those ideotectonic processes and power describes a different aspect of power than that described by the relationship between ideas and power. Together both aspects of power come together in the expression of the principles, plans, or blueprints that compose the idea and the processed through which they are realized. Together both forms of power are expressed and developed in achieving an idea’s projected outcome. Importantly while all ideas express a certain kind of power, when the idea arises in respect to living organisms, ecosystems, will, or political machination it is best described by the social conception of power.

Like all ideas Intrinsic-Ideas influence the formation of the things they describe, however when thinking about the big picture of atomic structure, the formation of galaxies, stars and planets it makes sense to employ scientific formulae to calculate the power developed during those processes. But what does ‘displacement’ and ‘work done’ have to do with power in all other natural and social systems? Put simply, if the processes described by an ideology are unable to apply any force nor effect any displacement regardless of the perception of work being done, that ideology would not have developed any power.\[^{288}\] This in itself is very significant

\[^{288}\] According to the formula, Work done = Force multiplied by displacement \((W = F \cdot d)\), where either
not only because it verifies that ideas do not develop power in the scientific sense but because it clearly demonstrates that ideas “alone a cake don’t make”. Everything not man-made is formed through natural processes not by ideas alone, yet without plans, principles nothing could be made. Therefore it must be conceded that ideas, and all ideotectonic processes and functionaries each have an interest in, are maintained by, and achieved through the power relations. Why is all of this ‘power’ so important? It is all well and good to say that every idea to emerge in the universe was made possible by the release of energy at the time of the Big Bang, but in practical terms all successful ideas are realized through the processes and work done by apparatuses. What is important is that all ideas, whether manifest as atomic structures, celestial bodies, biological organisms or notions of the afterlife, can be understood to not only exist but be manifest in the real world through the same mechanism.

Given the dramatic variation between different types of ideas, the theory developed here seeks to not only explain but also explore the nature and function of all ideas as expressions of a single phenomenon through the assistance of a taxonomical device. Ideas are hence examined in respect to five major categories that account for the vast differences while facilitating the understanding that all ideological systems are expressions of the very same phenomenon, and therefore ideotectonic by nature. The five categories are: Intrinsic-Ideas, Inborn-Ideas, Instinctive-Ideas, Intellectual-Ideas and Institutional-Ideas. All five categories are explained in relation to their unique manifestation, the relationship between ideas, their associated functionaries, and their interaction with power.

\[ P = F \cdot v \]

the displacement or the work done equals zero, the Force also equals zero. Likewise, according to the formula Power equals Force multiplied by velocity \( P = F \cdot v \) where the force equals zero, the Power also equals zero.
Intrinsic-Ideas describe the naturally emergent principles according to which atomic structures are formed, and in turn those fundamental building blocks of all nature project the formation of all manner of things. Together Intrinsic-Ideas and the ideotectonic processes by which those ideas are realized are responsible for the evolution of matter influence the nature and formation of everything that exists in the universe. As such, not only are Intrinsic-Ideas visible in atomic structures, but Intrinsic-Ideas describe both the structure and movement of the celestial bodies, the geothermal forces and weather of all planets and satellites. Consequently, Intrinsic-Ideas continue to exert an influence and therefore have power over the realization of other more abstract ideas. Acknowledging that this is a materialist theory, it is here argued that the natural and simultaneous emergence of ideas and forms stem from energy expressed by the Big Bang, alleviating any necessity for a supernatural explanation. Furthermore, it is here claimed that ideotectonics illustrates a connectedness between the natural evolution of matter, living things and social forms. Hence, this theory of ideotectonics states that all ideas, whether located on strands of DNA or in sacred rites build upon or are arrived at in conjunction systems constituted in respect to Intrinsic-Ideas.

The emergence of new types of ideas are not only said to build upon the foundation provided by Intrinsic-Ideas but the complexity born of each successive development is accumulative. As such, Intrinsic-Ideas not only describe the atomic and chemical structures that provided the building blocks of life, the realization of solar systems, planets, and even Earth’s environment set the stage for the genesis of life, and their ongoing influence provides the impetuous for the evolution of life as we know it. All
biological organisms are made up of atoms, yet living things are more than a collection of atoms. The genesis of life saw the natural emergence of Inborn-Ideas. Inborn-Ideas are not only essential to every living organism as they describe and influence their very structures and formation, but they are encoded within every organism’s DNA. In essence, Inborn-Ideas are the plans, recipes or blueprints encoded within strands of DNA. Subsequently, it may be said that every living creature is the projected outcome of the Inborn-Ideas embedded within genes, encoded upon strands of DNA.

In much the same way that Inborn-Ideas are overlaid onto Intrinsic-Ideas, Instinctive-Ideas are overlaid and intermingled with Inborn-Ideas. It is argued that the very will to live (the survival instinct), is not only the most fundamental of all Instinctive-Ideas but that it is the basis for all other instincts. Instinctive-Ideas influence the behaviour of biological organisms in such a way as to assist their survival and reproduction ultimately fulfilling the projected outcome of their Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas. As such all living organisms contain Inborn-Ideas that describe their ‘form and capacity’, and Instinctive-Ideas that describe their basic behaviour. Every ecosystem demonstrates the interplay of a diverse range of competing and complimentary ideas. Not only do plant and animal species co-exist, exchange goods and services, but the Intrinsic-Ideas that govern the natural environment provide the stage upon which those dynamic ecological apparatuses function.

The emergence of higher cognitive abilities found in all sentient creatures and exaggerated in homo sapiens introduce the ability to generate and implement Intellectual-Ideas. The capacity to reason and plan ahead has shaped the
evolutionary processes of many species. Many carnivorous animals combine athletic ability, speed of reflexes, sharp talons, claws and teeth with clever hunting strategies that often demand planning, and teamwork. Some species including early and modern humans employed their increased intellectual abilities in ways that bypassed the need for physical attributes depended on by other species, and yet manage to dominate those stronger and faster than they. The implementation of Intellectual-Ideas certainly altered the ecological balance in the favour of the human race. Humanity has since been able to exploit the natural environment, other species and each other to the gain of some and the detriment of others. Nevertheless, Intellectual-Ideas are not free of the influence of either Inborn- or Instinctive-Ideas, nor are they free of the universal context provided by Intrinsic-Ideas. Thus, within the context of our material universe, together Inborn-, Instinctive- and Intellectual-Ideas influence how we think, what we think and how we go about realizing the projected outcomes of the ideas that arise in our minds. While often frivolous, Intellectual-Ideas also underwrite the biological imperative built into an organism’s very Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas. Humanity’s par chant for satisfying our needs sexual desires and ambitions clearly demonstrates how new categories of ideas are overlaid upon existing ideas. The increased capacity to develop more complex or abstract ideas does not render more fundamental ideas redundant. Like a nest of Russian dolls Intrinsic-, Inborn- and Instinctive-Ideas are composite to Intellectual-Ideas, which in turn give rise to Institutional-Ideas.

The ideological apparatus that facilitates the work by which Institutional-Ideas are achieved incorporates management and a working agency. The management functions as an intermediary between the ideology and working agent. Subsequently,
the ideotectonic processes and apparatuses that support Institutional-Ideas are a little more complex than other such mechanisms. Nevertheless, Institutional-Ideas function like all other ideas in that they project an outcome. Likewise, Institutional-Ideologies consist of the ‘rules and regulations’ according to which the institution not only organizes the workforce, but directs its working agency to do the work required in order to achieve the original idea’s projected outcome. Institutional-Ideologies maintain the vision of the original idea’s projected outcome and a ‘schedule of works’ that describes the processes required to achieve its projected outcome. Management not only organize working agents on behalf of an ideology but they preserve the Institutional-Idea and implement the processes, or practices, proscribed by its associated ideology. Institutional-Ideas can hold great influence over the beliefs, and behaviour of those that pursue the realization of those ideas, and/or impose the service of those ideas on others as an expression of their own political power. Institutional-Ideas can therefore expresses power over peoples lives. Furthermore as adherents to those ideas carry out the practices demanded by those ideas Institutions like religions and political parties develop power in the scientific sense.

In this regard the mechanism by which Institutional-Ideas are achieved is more complex than those that serve ‘naturally emergent’ idea based systems. The separation of ideas, ideologies and working agents requires the mediation of a formal structure. The administrators and/or managers that formally serve the interests of the institution perpetuate the system, and orchestrate and manage the means by which working agents are recruited and remunerated. Despite the fact that the ideological apparatuses that serve Institutional-Ideas are composed of two equally important
parts, the institution and the working agency, when viewed as a single ideological apparatus, Institutional-Idea based systems function in the same way as every other ideotectonic system.

Throughout this thesis ideas and ideotectonic processes have been viewed in relation to achieving the projected outcomes that are not only constituent to, but characteristic of, ideas themselves. Subsequently, achieving the projected outcomes of ideas of every kind have been discussed in relation to the expression of influence of processes and formations, work done, displacement and time lapsed, and thus successful ideas of every kind have been discussed in respect to power. Or, in other words, not only have ideas been discussed in respect to their ability to influence outcomes, the processes involved in achieving the projected outcome of an idea, regardless of its particulars, have been discussed in respect to quantities that can be measured and understood through scientific formulae. Subsequently, because the work required to achieve an idea’s projected outcome consumes both energy and displaces material, where a number of ideological systems coexist and resources are limited, ideological competition is certain to develop.

Ideological competition or ideological warfare exists between idea based systems that compete for the same resources, which, for Institutional-Idea based systems, includes competing for suitable working agents. Due to the fact that mechanical power is developed at the rate at which a working agent is able to do work, and doing work uses up energy, the greater the supply of available energy, coupled with a

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289 Ideological competition is limited to systems where ideological difference exists. Therefore, as the entire universe functions according to the same set of Intrinsic-Ideas and their associated ideologies, referred to as the immutable laws of physics, there is no ideological difference and no ideological competition. Ideological competition or ideological warfare is, thus, limited to idea based systems where there is difference: biological, intellectual or institution based systems.
suitably large working agency, the greater the ideological apparatus’s ability to harness power. Therefore, the difference between a potent ideology and an impotent ideology is that a potent ideology is able to access available energy and attract a suitably large working agency, while an impotent ideology is either unable to access available energy, attract a suitable working agency or both. Therefore, the potency or lack thereof combines the institution’s ability to exert an influence over people and other organizations as well as develop power through effecting change. The need to compete for suitable working agents highlights another subtle yet significant difference between ‘biological’ and ‘institutional’ based systems. The biological imperative is essentially the same for the ideas, ideologies and working agents in Inborn-Idea based systems (biological), therefore all ‘parties’ are served by the same processes or work. However, as the interests of institutions and working agents may differ, the institutions may need to offer remuneration for services rendered, impose penalties for services refused or, in the case of working agents, they may need to offer their services for free in order to gain entry or some other reward offered by the institution. Complicating the field of competition, not all ideas ‘trade’ in the same ‘currency’ and therefore not all ideologies compete directly against one another. Not only do different ideologies offer different rewards for services rendered but they require different types of service. Nevertheless, this ‘complication’ paves the way for complementary ideologies to not only coexist, but come together to form more powerful ideological apparatuses.

Powerful ideological apparatuses like those that support the ruling class or the State are composed of entire sets of complementary ideologies. Ideologies relate to one another as employer-employee, master-slave and employer-mercenary ideologies.
Subsequently, ideologies with entirely different projected outcomes, dealing in entirely different yet complementary currencies, can coexist. If a unifying Institutional-Ideology is to become a dominant ideology it needs to unify those ‘different currencies’ or find some way to harness the surplus power developed by its constituent religious, mercantile and political ideological apparatuses in conjunction with the functional ideologies that guide our survival and reproduction. Nevertheless, in order for one ideological system to ‘dominate’, such as the modern State, that ideological system needs to not only harness the surplus power developed by the working agents that serve it and its constituent complementary ideologies, but limit the competition from other ideologies. When a potentially dominant ideological apparatus such as the State is able to unify the currencies operating within its sphere of influence and the majority of its working agents, it is able to harness the surplus power developed by its working agents and direct that power toward further conquests. Unifying all complementary ideologies while limiting or eradicating all competing ideologies is, however, more idealistic than realistic. Many modern States may be dominated by their respective ‘ruling class ideology’ but they are unable to unify every ideology under the guise of an Ideological State Apparatus, and eradicate every Private, Counter-State, Oppositional, or Alternate-State Ideological Apparatus. In practice, while dominant ideologies may take the lion share of surplus power developed by the ‘State’s working agents’, the competitive nature of the Inborn-, Instinctive-, Intellectual-Ideas that drive those working agents forward prohibit the State from achieving total dominance.

Ideology has a single yet layered history. Considering that both Ideas, ideotectonic processes and Ideologies are manifestations of the same phenomenon, all ideas and
ideologies share in a single history. However, as ideas and ideotectonic processes are manifest in at least the five broad categories outlined in this thesis, the advance of ideotectonics can be viewed in respect to several great epochs: the building of the universe, the emergence of life and the will to survive, the dawning of higher intellect and the development of culture. Naturally each of these great historical epochs is composed of individual stories, each beginning with a plan, blueprint, practices and events that either successfully or unsuccessfully achieved the projected outcome of the original idea. The dynamic nature of ideotectonics may present its history as the history of ideas, forms and formation. Yet it is also the history of failed projects, extinct species, and destruction. The history of ideas and ideology is neither a happy or sad history, nor a history of good or evil: it is the history of principles and functions. Ideology is not limited to State controlled institutions, human social systems or even the human realm. Ideology is only limited by its nature and function, by those that serve it, the bounds of possibility imagined or real and the availability of energy.

The theory developed here locates its definition of ideas among other long used definitions and philosophical traditions, and locates its treatment of ideology among other theories of ideology. At times the analysis has been understandably critical of those theories, has rejecting some of their propositions and borrowing others, but the theory developed here has always been contextualized by its place among those theories. What is important is not that this work is somehow comprehensive, but that it extends the history of ideas beyond the dawn of the human race, it takes ideology beyond good and evil, beyond the modern State and beyond the machinations of we cunning and industrious primates. Understanding the interplay between ideas of the
same and different categories not only reveals new horizons, but understands them in respect to their potential and often probable influence upon forms and thus introduces us to ideotectonics. Not only has this thesis discovered the nature and function of ideas, ideologies and ideotectonics, it has broadened the field of study to include natural, biological, ecological and social systems. However, as demonstrated it matters not whether expressed through atomic structure, DNA, some obscure survival strategy, politics or organized religion, all ideas share a common nature and function and are broadly empowered by the same mechanism. Despite employing a relatively narrow definition, the theory developed here accounts for a broad cross-section of ideas, ideotectonic processes and apparatuses, while unveiling ever increasing complexity. The scope and style of this theory describes it as moving toward the development of, what may one day may be, a comprehensive Theory of Ideotectonics.
Concluding Remarks

The process that brought about the production of this thesis began with the desire to do something that was, at that time, not possible. The original project was about testing the hypotheses of both sides of a particular argument where both camps claimed to hold the truth when neither side had anything other than belief and opinion to go on. ‘Hard science’ was to intervene and tell the truth, sorting out the ‘right’ ideology from the ‘wrong’. Because those ideologies were based around the perception of an object that could have easily been qualified, measured and defined by scientific processes, science could have then, and could still now, divine which ideology was based upon truth and which was not. However, in view of the tenor of traditional theories of ideology, the aims of the project posed something of a problem. The original project aimed to: separate ‘good ideology’ from ‘bad ideology’, examine the effect of false ideas upon reality, uncover the historic divergence of the two ideologies in question, map the progress of a Non-State Ideological Apparatus or institution, and make notes on the impact of those ideologies upon a particular group of men’s understanding of ‘masculinity’. The problem was that the ideologies in question simply did not comply with any of the definitions by which traditional theory examined ideology. Considering that the theory developed here has addressed many of the limitations placed upon ideas and ideologies by traditional theory, undertaking my original project would not only now be possible, but relatively straightforward. However, now that undertaking such an enquiry is possible it seems relatively unimportant.

Having decided to address the big-picture of the nature and function of ideas and ideology, a number of goals were immediately apparent. To begin with, the subject
revolved around the reason why Marx had inverted what was a materialist theory. Why did Marx have so little regard for Destutt de Tracy? Why had he treated Hegelian idealism as though it stood in the place of all ideology? And asked, why did Marx describe ideology as having no history? But then, while grappling with these questions, Marx’s reinvention of the Cartesian split, his speciesism, and insistence that humanity was separated from other species by our ability to produce our means of subsistence, a whole new world of possibilities opened up. What if the study of ideas and ideologies was not limited to belief systems, what if it was more diffuse, like Foucault’s conception of power? What if Destutt de Tracy was on to something when he described ideology as part of zoology? What if Plato’s theory of forms held a secret, hidden beneath his so easily misunderstood argument? The ‘beginning’ of this history of ideas was receding into the distant past. At first it all appeared to be so very abstract, so hard to see beyond definitions and differences, yet the same kind of relationships kept appearing in entirely different spheres. Sequences, structures and processes, logical arguments, circular arguments, axioms, connections and then possibilities. And finally problems.

What was this research to be, science or philosophy? Could it be both, or would it be neither? The difficulty is that the universe and everything in it does not play by the rules. And as it turns out nor do we. Destutt de Tracy did not play by the rules when he coined the term ‘ideology’ and tried to divine true ideas from false through what he perceived as empirical methods. Marx certainly wrote his own rules, turned everything upside down and changed the course of the history of ideas in the process. Althusser produced a new innovative theory of ideology, all the while claiming to be a good Marxist. The rules keep changing. The problem is, some things just do not
fit neatly between the lines. The study of ideas and the field of ideology are such things. Considering the many points of intersection between the theory that was developing and other fields of study, maintaining a linear argument was quite a difficult task.

In essence Part One of this thesis set out to present a historical overview of the development of the traditional theory of systems of ideas and of ideology. The main premises and arguments of that theory were examined, which illustrated the need to question its validity. Addressing those questions identified a ‘theoretical gap’. Traditional theory had depicted ideology in a negative light and placed artificial limitations upon it which restricted its ability to comment upon all manner of idea-based systems. Subsequently, it was argued that traditional theories of ideology focused upon a particular kind of ideology and failed to address the majority of idea-based systems. Then, having demonstrated the need for a new theory, the challenge was to develop a theory that would not only fill that gap, but potentially extend the field of study. I suggest that the theory developed here has achieved those goals. Nevertheless, that is not to say that the Theory of Ideotectonics is in any way comprehensive, but that the theoretical structure has been developed to such a degree as to benefit future research. Furthermore, the marriage between science, critical theory and the history of ideas has much to offer further research. Just as this theory could benefit from being tested and fine-tuned by those trained in other schools of philosophical, psychological and scientific thought. The Theory of Ideotectonics is, I propose, a very useful theory as it is easily understood, and provides a number of
analytical tools that can assist in research of a wide range of questions. Furthermore, its broad application unifies a number of continents of thought and removes a number of barriers in the process.

Examining the nature and function of ideas and ideology in general rather than continuing with the original project allowed me to investigate theories and historical examples that I would not have otherwise looked at. The world is a far bigger and more interesting place as a result. However, the down side of this process has been my inability to pursue every avenue of interest. And now with this project at an end there is so much to do, so many related subjects to study, it is hard to know where to begin. Certainly the _Theory of Ideotectonics_ has wide reaching implications for the study of ideas in nature, ideology as a subject and the analysis of individual ideologies alike. However, it certainly has the potential to add to the study of ethics, cultural studies, anthropology, human resources, group dynamics, communication theory, conflict resolution, and political science. In essence I would argue that this theory, if taken up by other theorists, has the capacity to introduce new ways of thinking about ideas and ideological processes across the board.

More specifically, if the theoretical framework is ever to be developed into something that could be referred to as a comprehensive _Theory of Ideotectonics_ it would need to comprehensively take greater account of the many important theoretical works on both ideas and ideology. That may begin with an in-depth examination of the works of Plato and Aristotle, trace the development of those concepts through the Christian era up to the Enlightenment. The works of Descartes and later Locke, Hobbs and Hume may provide further insights. Likewise there are
many important theorists from Gramsci, those in the Frankfurt School through to the postmodernists that address the influence of ideas, ideologies, discourse and power upon our futures. Within philosophy alone there appears to be an unlimited amount of work to be done. Furthering this research would certainly require studies in the actual function of DNA, animal behaviour, the nature of consciousness and the interrelationship between DNA, instinct and thought. The nature/nurture debate may even get a little attention. In brief it would appear that the work left to be done is endless.

Hopefully, for the most part, if this theory has a life beyond that of a thesis, it may be part of a much needed post-postmodern enlightenment, assisting philosophers and other theorists to undo some of the damage done by the limitations prescribed by past generations of theory. In effect, like the last chapter this brief chapter presents not only something of a conclusion, but, hopefully something of a beginning.
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